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stringlengths 386
71.4k
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Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: BrowserGpuChannelHostFactory::EstablishRequest::EstablishRequest()
: event(false, false),
gpu_process_handle(base::kNullProcessHandle) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 3,825 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool Cues::Find(
long long time_ns,
const Track* pTrack,
const CuePoint*& pCP,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition*& pTP) const
{
assert(time_ns >= 0);
assert(pTrack);
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //establish invariant
assert(m_cue_points);
assert(m_count > 0);
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count + m_preload_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
assert(pCP);
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment))
{
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
while (i < j)
{
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
assert(pCP);
pCP->Load(pReader);
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i <= jj);
assert(i > ii);
pCP = *--i;
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) <= time_ns);
#else
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return false;
if (m_count == 0)
return false;
CuePoint** const ii = m_cue_points;
CuePoint** i = ii;
CuePoint** const jj = ii + m_count;
CuePoint** j = jj;
pCP = *i;
assert(pCP);
if (time_ns <= pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment))
{
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
while (i < j)
{
CuePoint** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
CuePoint* const pCP = *k;
assert(pCP);
const long long t = pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment);
if (t <= time_ns)
i = k + 1;
else
j = k;
assert(i <= j);
}
assert(i == j);
assert(i <= jj);
assert(i > ii);
pCP = *--i;
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTime(m_pSegment) <= time_ns);
#endif
pTP = pCP->Find(pTrack);
return (pTP != NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | Low | 27,281 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int rdfa_parse_start(rdfacontext* context)
{
int rval = RDFA_PARSE_SUCCESS;
context->wb_allocated = sizeof(char) * READ_BUFFER_SIZE;
context->working_buffer = (char*)malloc(context->wb_allocated + 1);
*context->working_buffer = '\0';
#ifndef LIBRDFA_IN_RAPTOR
context->parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL);
#endif
context->done = 0;
context->context_stack = rdfa_create_list(32);
rdfa_push_item(context->context_stack, context, RDFALIST_FLAG_CONTEXT);
#ifdef LIBRDFA_IN_RAPTOR
context->sax2 = raptor_new_sax2(context->world, context->locator,
context->context_stack);
#else
#endif
#ifdef LIBRDFA_IN_RAPTOR
raptor_sax2_set_start_element_handler(context->sax2,
raptor_rdfa_start_element);
raptor_sax2_set_end_element_handler(context->sax2,
raptor_rdfa_end_element);
raptor_sax2_set_characters_handler(context->sax2,
raptor_rdfa_character_data);
raptor_sax2_set_namespace_handler(context->sax2,
raptor_rdfa_namespace_handler);
#else
XML_SetUserData(context->parser, context->context_stack);
XML_SetElementHandler(context->parser, start_element, end_element);
XML_SetCharacterDataHandler(context->parser, character_data);
#endif
rdfa_init_context(context);
#ifdef LIBRDFA_IN_RAPTOR
if(1) {
raptor_parser* rdf_parser = (raptor_parser*)context->callback_data;
/* Optionally forbid internal network and file requests in the
* XML parser
*/
raptor_sax2_set_option(context->sax2,
RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET, NULL,
RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET));
raptor_sax2_set_option(context->sax2,
RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE, NULL,
RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE));
if(rdf_parser->uri_filter)
raptor_sax2_set_uri_filter(context->sax2, rdf_parser->uri_filter,
rdf_parser->uri_filter_user_data);
}
context->base_uri=raptor_new_uri(context->sax2->world, (const unsigned char*)context->base);
raptor_sax2_parse_start(context->sax2, context->base_uri);
#endif
return rval;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Redland Raptor (aka libraptor) before 2.0.7, as used by OpenOffice 3.3 and 3.4 Beta, LibreOffice before 3.4.6 and 3.5.x before 3.5.1, and other products, allows user-assisted remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a crafted XML external entity (XXE) declaration and reference in an RDF document.
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa. | Medium | 13,586 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: l2tp_accm_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
uint16_t val_h, val_l;
ptr++; /* skip "Reserved" */
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "send=%08x ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "recv=%08x ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | Low | 18,530 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnPreviewDataIsAvailable(int expected_pages_count,
int preview_request_id) {
VLOG(1) << "Print preview request finished with "
<< expected_pages_count << " pages";
if (!initial_preview_start_time_.is_null()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("PrintPreview.InitialDisplayTime",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - initial_preview_start_time_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("PrintPreview.PageCount.Initial",
expected_pages_count);
initial_preview_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
}
base::StringValue ui_identifier(preview_ui_addr_str_);
base::FundamentalValue ui_preview_request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("updatePrintPreview", ui_identifier,
ui_preview_request_id);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 15,941 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int ovl_copy_up_locked(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir,
struct dentry *dentry, struct path *lowerpath,
struct kstat *stat, struct iattr *attr,
const char *link)
{
struct inode *wdir = workdir->d_inode;
struct inode *udir = upperdir->d_inode;
struct dentry *newdentry = NULL;
struct dentry *upper = NULL;
umode_t mode = stat->mode;
int err;
newdentry = ovl_lookup_temp(workdir, dentry);
err = PTR_ERR(newdentry);
if (IS_ERR(newdentry))
goto out;
upper = lookup_one_len(dentry->d_name.name, upperdir,
dentry->d_name.len);
err = PTR_ERR(upper);
if (IS_ERR(upper))
goto out1;
/* Can't properly set mode on creation because of the umask */
stat->mode &= S_IFMT;
err = ovl_create_real(wdir, newdentry, stat, link, NULL, true);
stat->mode = mode;
if (err)
goto out2;
if (S_ISREG(stat->mode)) {
struct path upperpath;
ovl_path_upper(dentry, &upperpath);
BUG_ON(upperpath.dentry != NULL);
upperpath.dentry = newdentry;
err = ovl_copy_up_data(lowerpath, &upperpath, stat->size);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
}
err = ovl_copy_xattr(lowerpath->dentry, newdentry);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
mutex_lock(&newdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
err = ovl_set_attr(newdentry, stat);
if (!err && attr)
err = notify_change(newdentry, attr, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&newdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
err = ovl_do_rename(wdir, newdentry, udir, upper, 0);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
ovl_dentry_update(dentry, newdentry);
newdentry = NULL;
/*
* Non-directores become opaque when copied up.
*/
if (!S_ISDIR(stat->mode))
ovl_dentry_set_opaque(dentry, true);
out2:
dput(upper);
out1:
dput(newdentry);
out:
return err;
out_cleanup:
ovl_cleanup(wdir, newdentry);
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c in the Linux kernel before 4.2.6 uses an incorrect cleanup code path, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (dentry reference leak) via filesystem operations on a large file in a lower overlayfs layer.
Commit Message: ovl: fix dentry reference leak
In ovl_copy_up_locked(), newdentry is leaked if the function exits through
out_cleanup as this just to out after calling ovl_cleanup() - which doesn't
actually release the ref on newdentry.
The out_cleanup segment should instead exit through out2 as certainly
newdentry leaks - and possibly upper does also, though this isn't caught
given the catch of newdentry.
Without this fix, something like the following is seen:
BUG: Dentry ffff880023e9eb20{i=f861,n=#ffff880023e82d90} still in use (1) [unmount of tmpfs tmpfs]
BUG: Dentry ffff880023ece640{i=0,n=bigfile} still in use (1) [unmount of tmpfs tmpfs]
when unmounting the upper layer after an error occurred in copyup.
An error can be induced by creating a big file in a lower layer with
something like:
dd if=/dev/zero of=/lower/a/bigfile bs=65536 count=1 seek=$((0xf000))
to create a large file (4.1G). Overlay an upper layer that is too small
(on tmpfs might do) and then induce a copy up by opening it writably.
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.18+ | Low | 25,035 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PlatformSensorLinux::PlatformSensorLinux(
mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
PlatformSensorProvider* provider,
const SensorInfoLinux* sensor_device,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> polling_thread_task_runner)
: PlatformSensor(type, std::move(mapping), provider),
default_configuration_(
PlatformSensorConfiguration(sensor_device->device_frequency)),
reporting_mode_(sensor_device->reporting_mode),
polling_thread_task_runner_(std::move(polling_thread_task_runner)),
weak_factory_(this) {
sensor_reader_ = SensorReader::Create(
sensor_device, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), task_runner_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607} | Medium | 28,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: InvalidState AXNodeObject::getInvalidState() const {
const AtomicString& attributeValue =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kInvalid);
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "false"))
return InvalidStateFalse;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "true"))
return InvalidStateTrue;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "spelling"))
return InvalidStateSpelling;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "grammar"))
return InvalidStateGrammar;
if (!attributeValue.isEmpty())
return InvalidStateOther;
if (getNode() && getNode()->isElementNode() &&
toElement(getNode())->isFormControlElement()) {
HTMLFormControlElement* element = toHTMLFormControlElement(getNode());
HeapVector<Member<HTMLFormControlElement>> invalidControls;
bool isInvalid =
!element->checkValidity(&invalidControls, CheckValidityDispatchNoEvent);
return isInvalid ? InvalidStateTrue : InvalidStateFalse;
}
return AXObject::getInvalidState();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 24,491 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanCommitURL(int child_id,
const GURL& url) {
if (!url.is_valid())
return false; // Can't commit invalid URLs.
const std::string& scheme = url.scheme();
if (IsPseudoScheme(scheme))
return url == url::kAboutBlankURL || url == kAboutSrcDocURL;
if (url.SchemeIsBlob() || url.SchemeIsFileSystem()) {
if (IsMalformedBlobUrl(url))
return false;
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
return origin.unique() || CanCommitURL(child_id, GURL(origin.Serialize()));
}
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (base::ContainsKey(schemes_okay_to_commit_in_any_process_, scheme))
return true;
SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
if (state == security_state_.end())
return false;
return state->second->CanCommitURL(url);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of blob URLS in Site Isolation in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation protections via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914} | Medium | 6,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static sent_status_t send_data_to_app(int fd, BT_HDR *p_buf) {
if (p_buf->len == 0)
return SENT_ALL;
ssize_t sent = send(fd, p_buf->data + p_buf->offset, p_buf->len, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (sent == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)
return SENT_NONE;
LOG_ERROR("%s error writing RFCOMM data back to app: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return SENT_FAILED;
}
if (sent == 0)
return SENT_FAILED;
if (sent == p_buf->len)
return SENT_ALL;
p_buf->offset += sent;
p_buf->len -= sent;
return SENT_PARTIAL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 7,142 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void AppLauncherHandler::FillAppDictionary(base::DictionaryValue* dictionary) {
base::AutoReset<bool> auto_reset(&ignore_changes_, true);
base::ListValue* list = new base::ListValue();
Profile* profile = Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui());
PrefService* prefs = profile->GetPrefs();
for (std::set<std::string>::iterator it = visible_apps_.begin();
it != visible_apps_.end(); ++it) {
const Extension* extension = extension_service_->GetInstalledExtension(*it);
if (extension && extensions::ui_util::ShouldDisplayInNewTabPage(
extension, profile)) {
base::DictionaryValue* app_info = GetAppInfo(extension);
list->Append(app_info);
}
}
dictionary->Set("apps", list);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableAppWindowLaunch", true);
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableCreateAppShortcut", true);
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableCreateAppShortcut", true);
#endif
const base::ListValue* app_page_names =
prefs->GetList(prefs::kNtpAppPageNames);
if (!app_page_names || !app_page_names->GetSize()) {
ListPrefUpdate update(prefs, prefs::kNtpAppPageNames);
base::ListValue* list = update.Get();
list->Set(0, new base::StringValue(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_APP_DEFAULT_PAGE_NAME)));
dictionary->Set("appPageNames",
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(list->DeepCopy()));
} else {
dictionary->Set("appPageNames",
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(app_page_names->DeepCopy()));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTMLMediaElement::didMoveToNewDocument function in core/html/HTMLMediaElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving the movement of a media element between documents.
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 25,684 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: check_acl(pam_handle_t *pamh,
const char *sense, const char *this_user, const char *other_user,
int noent_code, int debug)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pwd;
FILE *fp;
int i, save_errno;
uid_t fsuid;
/* Check this user's <sense> file. */
pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, this_user);
if (pwd == NULL) {
}
/* Figure out what that file is really named. */
i = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/.xauth/%s", pwd->pw_dir, sense);
if ((i >= (int)sizeof(path)) || (i < 0)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"name of user's home directory is too long");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
}
fsuid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
fp = fopen(path, "r");
save_errno = errno;
setfsuid(fsuid);
if (fp != NULL) {
char buf[LINE_MAX], *tmp;
/* Scan the file for a list of specs of users to "trust". */
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) != NULL) {
other_user, path);
}
fclose(fp);
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
} else {
/* Default to okay if the file doesn't exist. */
errno = save_errno;
switch (errno) {
case ENOENT:
if (noent_code == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, ignoring",
path);
}
} else {
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"%s does not exist, failing",
path);
}
}
return noent_code;
default:
if (debug) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
"error opening %s: %m", path);
}
return PAM_PERM_DENIED;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The check_acl function in pam_xauth.c in the pam_xauth module in Linux-PAM (aka pam) 1.1.2 and earlier does not verify that a certain ACL file is a regular file, which might allow local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) via a special file.
Commit Message: | Low | 22,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void MaybeCreateIBus() {
if (ibus_) {
return;
}
ibus_init();
ibus_ = ibus_bus_new();
if (!ibus_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ibus_bus_new() failed";
return;
}
ConnectIBusSignals();
ibus_bus_set_watch_dbus_signal(ibus_, TRUE);
ibus_bus_set_watch_ibus_signal(ibus_, TRUE);
if (ibus_bus_is_connected(ibus_)) {
LOG(INFO) << "IBus connection is ready.";
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 10,555 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: kadm5_modify_principal(void *server_handle,
kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask)
{
int ret, ret2, i;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol;
krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE;
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data_orig;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
if((mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
(mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) ||
(mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if(entry == (kadm5_principal_ent_t) NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
tl_data_orig = entry->tl_data;
while (tl_data_orig) {
if (tl_data_orig->tl_data_type < 256)
return KADM5_BAD_TL_TYPE;
tl_data_orig = tl_data_orig->tl_data_next;
}
}
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb);
if (ret)
return(ret);
/*
* This is pretty much the same as create ...
*/
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &pol, &have_pol);
if (ret)
goto done;
/* set us up to use the new policy */
adb.aux_attributes |= KADM5_POLICY;
if (adb.policy)
free(adb.policy);
adb.policy = strdup(entry->policy);
}
if (have_pol) {
/* set pw_max_life based on new policy */
if (pol.pw_max_life) {
ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb,
&(kdb->pw_expiration));
if (ret)
goto done;
kdb->pw_expiration += pol.pw_max_life;
} else {
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
}
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) && (adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) {
free(adb.policy);
adb.policy = NULL;
adb.aux_attributes &= ~KADM5_POLICY;
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES))
kdb->attributes = entry->attributes;
if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE))
kdb->max_life = entry->max_life;
if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME))
kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time;
if (mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION)
kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration;
if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)
kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life;
if((mask & KADM5_KVNO)) {
for (i = 0; i < kdb->n_key_data; i++)
kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno = entry->kvno;
}
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
krb5_tl_data *tl;
/* may have to change the version number of the API. Updates the list with the given tl_data rather than over-writting */
for (tl = entry->tl_data; tl;
tl = tl->tl_data_next)
{
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl);
if( ret )
{
goto done;
}
}
}
/*
* Setting entry->fail_auth_count to 0 can be used to manually unlock
* an account. It is not possible to set fail_auth_count to any other
* value using kadmin.
*/
if (mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) {
if (entry->fail_auth_count != 0) {
ret = KADM5_BAD_SERVER_PARAMS;
goto done;
}
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
}
/* let the mask propagate to the database provider */
kdb->mask = mask;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_modify(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
if (ret) goto done;
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_modify(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask);
ret = KADM5_OK;
done:
if (have_pol) {
ret2 = kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol);
ret = ret ? ret : ret2;
}
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) kadm5_create_principal_3 and (2) kadm5_modify_principal functions in lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) 1.12.x and 1.13.x before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) by specifying KADM5_POLICY with a NULL policy name.
Commit Message: Check for null kadm5 policy name [CVE-2015-8630]
In kadm5_create_principal_3() and kadm5_modify_principal(), check for
entry->policy being null when KADM5_POLICY is included in the mask.
CVE-2015-8630:
In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, an authenticated attacker with permission
to modify a principal entry can cause kadmind to dereference a null
pointer by supplying a null policy value but including KADM5_POLICY in
the mask.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8342 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup | Low | 4,118 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ConnectPanelServiceSignals() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
IBusPanelService* ibus_panel_service = IBUS_PANEL_SERVICE(
g_object_get_data(G_OBJECT(ibus_), kPanelObjectKey));
if (!ibus_panel_service) {
LOG(ERROR) << "IBusPanelService is NOT available.";
return;
}
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"focus-in",
G_CALLBACK(FocusInCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"register-properties",
G_CALLBACK(RegisterPropertiesCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"update-property",
G_CALLBACK(UpdatePropertyCallback),
this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 20,263 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int read_entry(
git_index_entry **out,
size_t *out_size,
git_index *index,
const void *buffer,
size_t buffer_size,
const char *last)
{
size_t path_length, entry_size;
const char *path_ptr;
struct entry_short source;
git_index_entry entry = {{0}};
bool compressed = index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP;
char *tmp_path = NULL;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + minimal_entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
/* buffer is not guaranteed to be aligned */
memcpy(&source, buffer, sizeof(struct entry_short));
entry.ctime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.ctime.seconds);
entry.ctime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.ctime.nanoseconds);
entry.mtime.seconds = (git_time_t)ntohl(source.mtime.seconds);
entry.mtime.nanoseconds = ntohl(source.mtime.nanoseconds);
entry.dev = ntohl(source.dev);
entry.ino = ntohl(source.ino);
entry.mode = ntohl(source.mode);
entry.uid = ntohl(source.uid);
entry.gid = ntohl(source.gid);
entry.file_size = ntohl(source.file_size);
git_oid_cpy(&entry.id, &source.oid);
entry.flags = ntohs(source.flags);
if (entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_EXTENDED) {
uint16_t flags_raw;
size_t flags_offset;
flags_offset = offsetof(struct entry_long, flags_extended);
memcpy(&flags_raw, (const char *) buffer + flags_offset,
sizeof(flags_raw));
flags_raw = ntohs(flags_raw);
memcpy(&entry.flags_extended, &flags_raw, sizeof(flags_raw));
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_long, path);
} else
path_ptr = (const char *) buffer + offsetof(struct entry_short, path);
if (!compressed) {
path_length = entry.flags & GIT_IDXENTRY_NAMEMASK;
/* if this is a very long string, we must find its
* real length without overflowing */
if (path_length == 0xFFF) {
const char *path_end;
path_end = memchr(path_ptr, '\0', buffer_size);
if (path_end == NULL)
return -1;
path_length = path_end - path_ptr;
}
entry_size = index_entry_size(path_length, 0, entry.flags);
entry.path = (char *)path_ptr;
} else {
size_t varint_len;
size_t strip_len = git_decode_varint((const unsigned char *)path_ptr,
&varint_len);
size_t last_len = strlen(last);
size_t prefix_len = last_len - strip_len;
size_t suffix_len = strlen(path_ptr + varint_len);
size_t path_len;
if (varint_len == 0)
return index_error_invalid("incorrect prefix length");
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, prefix_len, suffix_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&path_len, path_len, 1);
tmp_path = git__malloc(path_len);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(tmp_path);
memcpy(tmp_path, last, prefix_len);
memcpy(tmp_path + prefix_len, path_ptr + varint_len, suffix_len + 1);
entry_size = index_entry_size(suffix_len, varint_len, entry.flags);
entry.path = tmp_path;
}
if (entry_size == 0)
return -1;
if (INDEX_FOOTER_SIZE + entry_size > buffer_size)
return -1;
if (index_entry_dup(out, index, &entry) < 0) {
git__free(tmp_path);
return -1;
}
git__free(tmp_path);
*out_size = entry_size;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the index.c:read_entry() function while decompressing a compressed prefix length in libgit2 before v0.26.2 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted repository index file.
Commit Message: index: fix out-of-bounds read with invalid index entry prefix length
The index format in version 4 has prefix-compressed entries, where every
index entry can compress its path by using a path prefix of the previous
entry. Since implmenting support for this index format version in commit
5625d86b9 (index: support index v4, 2016-05-17), though, we do not
correctly verify that the prefix length that we want to reuse is
actually smaller or equal to the amount of characters than the length of
the previous index entry's path. This can lead to a an integer underflow
and subsequently to an out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by verifying that the prefix is actually smaller than the
previous entry's path length.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com> | Medium | 12,734 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int do_fpu_inst(unsigned short inst, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fpu = &(tsk->thread.xstate->softfpu);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
if (!(task_thread_info(tsk)->status & TS_USEDFPU)) {
/* initialize once. */
fpu_init(fpu);
task_thread_info(tsk)->status |= TS_USEDFPU;
}
return fpu_emulate(inst, fpu, regs);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | Low | 8,305 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static Image *ReadOneJNGImage(MngInfo *mng_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info, ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*alpha_image,
*color_image,
*image,
*jng_image;
ImageInfo
*alpha_image_info,
*color_image_info;
MagickBooleanType
logging;
int
unique_filenames;
ssize_t
y;
MagickBooleanType
status;
png_uint_32
jng_height,
jng_width;
png_byte
jng_color_type,
jng_image_sample_depth,
jng_image_compression_method,
jng_image_interlace_method,
jng_alpha_sample_depth,
jng_alpha_compression_method,
jng_alpha_filter_method,
jng_alpha_interlace_method;
register const PixelPacket
*s;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
unsigned int
read_JSEP,
reading_idat;
size_t
length;
jng_alpha_compression_method=0;
jng_alpha_sample_depth=8;
jng_color_type=0;
jng_height=0;
jng_width=0;
alpha_image=(Image *) NULL;
color_image=(Image *) NULL;
alpha_image_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
color_image_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
unique_filenames=0;
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter ReadOneJNGImage()");
image=mng_info->image;
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" AcquireNextImage()");
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
/*
Signature bytes have already been read.
*/
read_JSEP=MagickFalse;
reading_idat=MagickFalse;
for (;;)
{
char
type[MaxTextExtent];
unsigned char
*chunk;
unsigned int
count;
/*
Read a new JNG chunk.
*/
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
2*GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
type[0]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"errr",MaxTextExtent);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
count=(unsigned int) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading JNG chunk type %c%c%c%c, length: %.20g",
type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3],(double) length);
if (length > PNG_UINT_31_MAX || count == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
p=NULL;
chunk=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (length != 0)
{
if (length > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
chunk=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*chunk));
if (chunk == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
chunk[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
p=chunk;
}
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image); /* read crc word */
if (memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 16)
{
jng_width=(size_t) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) |
(p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
jng_height=(size_t) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) |
(p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
if ((jng_width == 0) || (jng_height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
jng_color_type=p[8];
jng_image_sample_depth=p[9];
jng_image_compression_method=p[10];
jng_image_interlace_method=p[11];
image->interlace=jng_image_interlace_method != 0 ? PNGInterlace :
NoInterlace;
jng_alpha_sample_depth=p[12];
jng_alpha_compression_method=p[13];
jng_alpha_filter_method=p[14];
jng_alpha_interlace_method=p[15];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_width: %16lu, jng_height: %16lu\n"
" jng_color_type: %16d, jng_image_sample_depth: %3d\n"
" jng_image_compression_method:%3d",
(unsigned long) jng_width, (unsigned long) jng_height,
jng_color_type, jng_image_sample_depth,
jng_image_compression_method);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_image_interlace_method: %3d"
" jng_alpha_sample_depth: %3d",
jng_image_interlace_method,
jng_alpha_sample_depth);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_alpha_compression_method:%3d\n"
" jng_alpha_filter_method: %3d\n"
" jng_alpha_interlace_method: %3d",
jng_alpha_compression_method,
jng_alpha_filter_method,
jng_alpha_interlace_method);
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((reading_idat == MagickFalse) && (read_JSEP == MagickFalse) &&
((memcmp(type,mng_JDAT,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JdAA,4) == 0) ||
(memcmp(type,mng_IDAT,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JDAA,4) == 0)))
{
/*
o create color_image
o open color_blob, attached to color_image
o if (color type has alpha)
open alpha_blob, attached to alpha_image
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating color_blob.");
color_image_info=(ImageInfo *)AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(ImageInfo));
if (color_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
GetImageInfo(color_image_info);
color_image=AcquireImage(color_image_info);
if (color_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(color_image->filename);
unique_filenames++;
status=OpenBlob(color_image_info,color_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if ((image_info->ping == MagickFalse) && (jng_color_type >= 12))
{
alpha_image_info=(ImageInfo *)
AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(ImageInfo));
if (alpha_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
{
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
GetImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
alpha_image=AcquireImage(alpha_image_info);
if (alpha_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating alpha_blob.");
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(alpha_image->filename);
unique_filenames++;
status=OpenBlob(alpha_image_info,alpha_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
alpha_image=DestroyImage(alpha_image);
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (jng_alpha_compression_method == 0)
{
unsigned char
data[18];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing IHDR chunk to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,8,(const unsigned char *)
"\211PNG\r\n\032\n");
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,13L);
PNGType(data,mng_IHDR);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IHDR,13L);
PNGLong(data+4,jng_width);
PNGLong(data+8,jng_height);
data[12]=jng_alpha_sample_depth;
data[13]=0; /* color_type gray */
data[14]=0; /* compression method 0 */
data[15]=0; /* filter_method 0 */
data[16]=0; /* interlace_method 0 */
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,17,data);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,crc32(0,data,17));
}
}
reading_idat=MagickTrue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_JDAT,4) == 0)
{
/* Copy chunk to color_image->blob */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying JDAT chunk data to color_blob.");
if (length != 0)
{
(void) WriteBlob(color_image,length,chunk);
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
}
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_IDAT,4) == 0)
{
png_byte
data[5];
/* Copy IDAT header and chunk data to alpha_image->blob */
if (alpha_image != NULL && image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying IDAT chunk data to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,(size_t) length);
PNGType(data,mng_IDAT);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IDAT,length);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,4,data);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,length,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,
crc32(crc32(0,data,4),chunk,(uInt) length));
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((memcmp(type,mng_JDAA,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JdAA,4) == 0))
{
/* Copy chunk data to alpha_image->blob */
if (alpha_image != NULL && image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying JDAA chunk data to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,length,chunk);
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_JSEP,4) == 0)
{
read_JSEP=MagickTrue;
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_bKGD,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 2)
{
image->background_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[1]);
image->background_color.green=image->background_color.red;
image->background_color.blue=image->background_color.red;
}
if (length == 6)
{
image->background_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[1]);
image->background_color.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[3]);
image->background_color.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[5]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_gAMA,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 4)
image->gamma=((float) mng_get_long(p))*0.00001;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_cHRM,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 32)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(p);
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[4]);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[8]);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[12]);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[16]);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[20]);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[24]);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[28]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sRGB,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 1)
{
image->rendering_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(p[0]);
image->gamma=1.000f/2.200f;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=0.6400f;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=0.3300f;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=0.3000f;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=0.6000f;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=0.1500f;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=0.0600f;
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=0.3127f;
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=0.3290f;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_oFFs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) mng_get_long(p);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
if ((int) p[8] != 0)
{
image->page.x/=10000;
image->page.y/=10000;
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
image->x_resolution=(double) mng_get_long(p);
image->y_resolution=(double) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
if ((int) p[8] == PNG_RESOLUTION_METER)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=image->x_resolution/100.0f;
image->y_resolution=image->y_resolution/100.0f;
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#if 0
if (memcmp(type,mng_iCCP,4) == 0)
{
/* To do: */
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#endif
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
if (memcmp(type,mng_IEND,4))
continue;
break;
}
/* IEND found */
/*
Finish up reading image data:
o read main image from color_blob.
o close color_blob.
o if (color_type has alpha)
if alpha_encoding is PNG
read secondary image from alpha_blob via ReadPNG
if alpha_encoding is JPEG
read secondary image from alpha_blob via ReadJPEG
o close alpha_blob.
o copy intensity of secondary image into
opacity samples of main image.
o destroy the secondary image.
*/
if (color_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
{
assert(color_image == (Image *) NULL);
assert(alpha_image == (Image *) NULL);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (color_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
assert(alpha_image == (Image *) NULL);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
(void) SeekBlob(color_image,0,SEEK_SET);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading jng_image from color_blob.");
assert(color_image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
(void) FormatLocaleString(color_image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",
color_image->filename);
color_image_info->ping=MagickFalse; /* To do: avoid this */
jng_image=ReadImage(color_image_info,exception);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(color_image->filename);
unique_filenames--;
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
color_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(color_image_info);
if (jng_image == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying jng_image pixels to main image.");
image->columns=jng_width;
image->rows=jng_height;
length=image->columns*sizeof(PixelPacket);
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
s=GetVirtualPixels(jng_image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,s,length);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
jng_image=DestroyImage(jng_image);
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (jng_color_type >= 12)
{
if (jng_alpha_compression_method == 0)
{
png_byte
data[5];
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,0x00000000L);
PNGType(data,mng_IEND);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IEND,0L);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,4,data);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,crc32(0,data,4));
}
(void) SeekBlob(alpha_image,0,SEEK_SET);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading opacity from alpha_blob.");
(void) FormatLocaleString(alpha_image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,
"%s",alpha_image->filename);
jng_image=ReadImage(alpha_image_info,exception);
if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
s=GetVirtualPixels(jng_image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; x--,q++,s++)
SetPixelOpacity(q,QuantumRange-
GetPixelRed(s));
else
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; x--,q++,s++)
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,GetPixelRed(s));
if (GetPixelOpacity(q) != OpaqueOpacity)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(alpha_image->filename);
unique_filenames--;
alpha_image=DestroyImage(alpha_image);
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL)
jng_image=DestroyImage(jng_image);
}
}
/* Read the JNG image. */
if (mng_info->mng_type == 0)
{
mng_info->mng_width=jng_width;
mng_info->mng_height=jng_height;
}
if (image->page.width == 0 && image->page.height == 0)
{
image->page.width=jng_width;
image->page.height=jng_height;
}
if (image->page.x == 0 && image->page.y == 0)
{
image->page.x=mng_info->x_off[mng_info->object_id];
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id];
}
else
{
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id];
}
mng_info->image_found++;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,2*TellBlob(image),
2*GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOneJNGImage(); unique_filenames=%d",unique_filenames);
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.6-1 has a memory leak vulnerability in ReadOneJNGImage in coderspng.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/550 | Medium | 29,403 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiH264Accelerator::FillVARefFramesFromDPB(
const H264DPB& dpb,
VAPictureH264* va_pics,
int num_pics) {
H264Picture::Vector::const_reverse_iterator rit;
int i;
for (rit = dpb.rbegin(), i = 0; rit != dpb.rend() && i < num_pics; ++rit) {
if ((*rit)->ref)
FillVAPicture(&va_pics[i++], *rit);
}
return i;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372} | High | 6,004 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void wdm_in_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct wdm_device *desc = urb->context;
int status = urb->status;
spin_lock(&desc->iuspin);
clear_bit(WDM_RESPONDING, &desc->flags);
if (status) {
switch (status) {
case -ENOENT:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ENOENT");
goto skip_error;
case -ECONNRESET:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ECONNRESET");
goto skip_error;
case -ESHUTDOWN:
dev_dbg(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -ESHUTDOWN");
goto skip_error;
case -EPIPE:
dev_err(&desc->intf->dev,
"nonzero urb status received: -EPIPE\n");
break;
default:
dev_err(&desc->intf->dev,
"Unexpected error %d\n", status);
break;
}
}
desc->rerr = status;
desc->reslength = urb->actual_length;
memmove(desc->ubuf + desc->length, desc->inbuf, desc->reslength);
desc->length += desc->reslength;
skip_error:
wake_up(&desc->wait);
set_bit(WDM_READ, &desc->flags);
spin_unlock(&desc->iuspin);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the wdm_in_callback function in drivers/usb/class/cdc-wdm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.4 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted cdc-wdm USB device.
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | Medium | 12,748 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool GDataCache::CreateCacheDirectories(
const std::vector<FilePath>& paths_to_create) {
bool success = true;
for (size_t i = 0; i < paths_to_create.size(); ++i) {
if (file_util::DirectoryExists(paths_to_create[i]))
continue;
if (!file_util::CreateDirectory(paths_to_create[i])) {
success = false;
PLOG(ERROR) << "Error creating directory " << paths_to_create[i].value();
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "Created directory " << paths_to_create[i].value();
}
}
return success;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 6,609 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info, int texel_size)
{
register ssize_t
i;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i = 1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) ((w + 3) / 4) * ((h + 3) / 4) * texel_size;
(void) SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_CUR);
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/dds.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DDS file.
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring. | Medium | 5,755 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int vrend_decode_create_ve(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, uint32_t handle, uint16_t length)
{
struct pipe_vertex_element *ve = NULL;
int num_elements;
int i;
int ret;
if (length < 1)
return EINVAL;
if ((length - 1) % 4)
return EINVAL;
num_elements = (length - 1) / 4;
if (num_elements) {
ve = calloc(num_elements, sizeof(struct pipe_vertex_element));
if (!ve)
return ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < num_elements; i++) {
ve[i].src_offset = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_SRC_OFFSET(i));
ve[i].instance_divisor = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_INSTANCE_DIVISOR(i));
ve[i].vertex_buffer_index = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_VERTEX_BUFFER_INDEX(i));
ve[i].src_format = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_VERTEX_ELEMENTS_V0_SRC_FORMAT(i));
}
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The vrend_draw_vbo function in virglrenderer before 0.6.0 allows local guest OS users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access and QEMU process crash) via vectors involving vertext_buffer_index.
Commit Message: | Low | 4,557 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long ContentEncoding::ParseContentEncAESSettingsEntry(
long long start, long long size, IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentEncAESSettings* aes) {
assert(pReader);
assert(aes);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x7E8) {
aes->cipher_mode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (aes->cipher_mode != 1)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| Medium | 20,051 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static bool caller_is_in_ancestor(pid_t pid, const char *contrl, const char *cg, char **nextcg)
{
char fnam[PROCLEN];
FILE *f;
bool answer = false;
char *line = NULL;
size_t len = 0;
int ret;
ret = snprintf(fnam, PROCLEN, "/proc/%d/cgroup", pid);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PROCLEN)
return false;
if (!(f = fopen(fnam, "r")))
return false;
while (getline(&line, &len, f) != -1) {
char *c1, *c2, *linecmp;
if (!line[0])
continue;
c1 = strchr(line, ':');
if (!c1)
goto out;
c1++;
c2 = strchr(c1, ':');
if (!c2)
goto out;
*c2 = '\0';
if (strcmp(c1, contrl) != 0)
continue;
c2++;
stripnewline(c2);
prune_init_slice(c2);
/*
* callers pass in '/' for root cgroup, otherwise they pass
* in a cgroup without leading '/'
*/
linecmp = *cg == '/' ? c2 : c2+1;
if (strncmp(linecmp, cg, strlen(linecmp)) != 0) {
if (nextcg)
*nextcg = get_next_cgroup_dir(linecmp, cg);
goto out;
}
answer = true;
goto out;
}
out:
fclose(f);
free(line);
return answer;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: LXCFS before 0.12 does not properly enforce directory escapes, which might allow local users to gain privileges by (1) querying or (2) updating a cgroup.
Commit Message: Fix checking of parent directories
Taken from the justification in the launchpad bug:
To a task in freezer cgroup /a/b/c/d, it should appear that there are no
cgroups other than its descendents. Since this is a filesystem, we must have
the parent directories, but each parent cgroup should only contain the child
which the task can see.
So, when this task looks at /a/b, it should see only directory 'c' and no
files. Attempt to create /a/b/x should result in -EPERM, whether /a/b/x already
exists or not. Attempts to query /a/b/x should result in -ENOENT whether /a/b/x
exists or not. Opening /a/b/tasks should result in -ENOENT.
The caller_may_see_dir checks specifically whether a task may see a cgroup
directory - i.e. /a/b/x if opening /a/b/x/tasks, and /a/b/c/d if doing
opendir('/a/b/c/d').
caller_is_in_ancestor() will return true if the caller in /a/b/c/d looks at
/a/b/c/d/e. If the caller is in a child cgroup of the queried one - i.e. if the
task in /a/b/c/d queries /a/b, then *nextcg will container the next (the only)
directory which he can see in the path - 'c'.
Beyond this, regular DAC permissions should apply, with the
root-in-user-namespace privilege over its mapped uids being respected. The
fc_may_access check does this check for both directories and files.
This is CVE-2015-1342 (LP: #1508481)
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> | Low | 1,930 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, count)
{
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(zend_hash_num_elements(&phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The phar_convert_to_other function in ext/phar/phar_object.c in PHP before 5.4.43, 5.5.x before 5.5.27, and 5.6.x before 5.6.11 does not validate a file pointer before a close operation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted TAR archive that is mishandled in a Phar::convertToData call.
Commit Message: | Low | 25,566 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void perf_event_for_each(struct perf_event *event,
void (*func)(struct perf_event *))
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct perf_event *sibling;
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
event = event->group_leader;
perf_event_for_each_child(event, func);
list_for_each_entry(sibling, &event->sibling_list, group_entry)
perf_event_for_each_child(sibling, func);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: kernel/events/core.c in the performance subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.0 mismanages locks during certain migrations, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 31095224.
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | Medium | 14,357 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static BOOL gdi_Bitmap_Decompress(rdpContext* context, rdpBitmap* bitmap,
const BYTE* pSrcData, UINT32 DstWidth, UINT32 DstHeight,
UINT32 bpp, UINT32 length, BOOL compressed,
UINT32 codecId)
{
UINT32 SrcSize = length;
rdpGdi* gdi = context->gdi;
bitmap->compressed = FALSE;
bitmap->format = gdi->dstFormat;
bitmap->length = DstWidth * DstHeight * GetBytesPerPixel(bitmap->format);
bitmap->data = (BYTE*) _aligned_malloc(bitmap->length, 16);
if (!bitmap->data)
return FALSE;
if (compressed)
{
if (bpp < 32)
{
if (!interleaved_decompress(context->codecs->interleaved,
pSrcData, SrcSize,
DstWidth, DstHeight,
bpp,
bitmap->data, bitmap->format,
0, 0, 0, DstWidth, DstHeight,
&gdi->palette))
return FALSE;
}
else
{
if (!planar_decompress(context->codecs->planar, pSrcData, SrcSize,
DstWidth, DstHeight,
bitmap->data, bitmap->format, 0, 0, 0,
DstWidth, DstHeight, TRUE))
return FALSE;
}
}
else
{
const UINT32 SrcFormat = gdi_get_pixel_format(bpp);
const size_t sbpp = GetBytesPerPixel(SrcFormat);
const size_t dbpp = GetBytesPerPixel(bitmap->format);
if ((sbpp == 0) || (dbpp == 0))
return FALSE;
else
{
const size_t dstSize = SrcSize * dbpp / sbpp;
if (dstSize < bitmap->length)
return FALSE;
}
if (!freerdp_image_copy(bitmap->data, bitmap->format, 0, 0, 0,
DstWidth, DstHeight, pSrcData, SrcFormat,
0, 0, 0, &gdi->palette, FREERDP_FLIP_VERTICAL))
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains an Integer Overflow that leads to a Heap-Based Buffer Overflow in function gdi_Bitmap_Decompress() and results in a memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8787
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies. | Low | 15,567 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void reflectStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
Element* impl = V8Element::toImpl(holder);
v8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectstringattributeAttr), info.GetIsolate());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the opj_t2_read_packet_data function in fxcodec/fx_libopenjpeg/libopenjpeg20/t2.c in OpenJPEG in PDFium, as used in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long segment in a JPEG image.
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375} | Low | 25,226 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void DownloadCoreServiceImpl::SetDownloadManagerDelegateForTesting(
std::unique_ptr<ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate> new_delegate) {
manager_delegate_.swap(new_delegate);
DownloadManager* dm = BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(profile_);
dm->SetDelegate(manager_delegate_.get());
manager_delegate_->SetDownloadManager(dm);
if (new_delegate)
new_delegate->Shutdown();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Bad cast in DevTools in Google Chrome on Win, Linux, Mac, Chrome OS prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515} | Medium | 4,024 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: AutoFillQueryXmlParser::AutoFillQueryXmlParser(
std::vector<AutoFillFieldType>* field_types,
UploadRequired* upload_required)
: field_types_(field_types),
upload_required_(upload_required) {
DCHECK(upload_required_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the frame-loader implementation in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.204 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 14,428 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int inet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct inet_protosw *answer;
struct inet_sock *inet;
struct proto *answer_prot;
unsigned char answer_flags;
int try_loading_module = 0;
int err;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
/* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */
lookup_protocol:
err = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(answer, &inetsw[sock->type], list) {
err = 0;
/* Check the non-wild match. */
if (protocol == answer->protocol) {
if (protocol != IPPROTO_IP)
break;
} else {
/* Check for the two wild cases. */
if (IPPROTO_IP == protocol) {
protocol = answer->protocol;
break;
}
if (IPPROTO_IP == answer->protocol)
break;
}
err = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
}
if (unlikely(err)) {
if (try_loading_module < 2) {
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* Be more specific, e.g. net-pf-2-proto-132-type-1
* (net-pf-PF_INET-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP-type-SOCK_STREAM)
*/
if (++try_loading_module == 1)
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d-type-%d",
PF_INET, protocol, sock->type);
/*
* Fall back to generic, e.g. net-pf-2-proto-132
* (net-pf-PF_INET-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP)
*/
else
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d",
PF_INET, protocol);
goto lookup_protocol;
} else
goto out_rcu_unlock;
}
err = -EPERM;
if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !kern &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
sock->ops = answer->ops;
answer_prot = answer->prot;
answer_flags = answer->flags;
rcu_read_unlock();
WARN_ON(!answer_prot->slab);
err = -ENOBUFS;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_INET, GFP_KERNEL, answer_prot, kern);
if (!sk)
goto out;
err = 0;
if (INET_PROTOSW_REUSE & answer_flags)
sk->sk_reuse = SK_CAN_REUSE;
inet = inet_sk(sk);
inet->is_icsk = (INET_PROTOSW_ICSK & answer_flags) != 0;
inet->nodefrag = 0;
if (SOCK_RAW == sock->type) {
inet->inet_num = protocol;
if (IPPROTO_RAW == protocol)
inet->hdrincl = 1;
}
if (net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc)
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_DONT;
else
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT;
inet->inet_id = 0;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sk->sk_destruct = inet_sock_destruct;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = sk->sk_prot->backlog_rcv;
inet->uc_ttl = -1;
inet->mc_loop = 1;
inet->mc_ttl = 1;
inet->mc_all = 1;
inet->mc_index = 0;
inet->mc_list = NULL;
inet->rcv_tos = 0;
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(sk);
if (inet->inet_num) {
/* It assumes that any protocol which allows
* the user to assign a number at socket
* creation time automatically
* shares.
*/
inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num);
/* Add to protocol hash chains. */
sk->sk_prot->hash(sk);
}
if (sk->sk_prot->init) {
err = sk->sk_prot->init(sk);
if (err)
sk_common_release(sk);
}
out:
return err;
out_rcu_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: The networking implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3, as used in Android and other products, does not validate protocol identifiers for certain protocol families, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL function pointer dereference and system crash) or possibly gain privileges by leveraging CLONE_NEWUSER support to execute a crafted SOCK_RAW application.
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | Medium | 18,648 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int udf_symlink_filler(struct file *file, struct page *page)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
unsigned char *symlink;
int err;
unsigned char *p = kmap(page);
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo;
uint32_t pos;
/* We don't support symlinks longer than one block */
if (inode->i_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize) {
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
goto out_unmap;
}
iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
pos = udf_block_map(inode, 0);
down_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB) {
symlink = iinfo->i_ext.i_data + iinfo->i_lenEAttr;
} else {
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, pos);
if (!bh) {
err = -EIO;
goto out_unlock_inode;
}
symlink = bh->b_data;
}
udf_pc_to_char(inode->i_sb, symlink, inode->i_size, p);
brelse(bh);
up_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
SetPageUptodate(page);
kunmap(page);
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
out_unlock_inode:
up_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
SetPageError(page);
out_unmap:
kunmap(page);
unlock_page(page);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The UDF filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.18.2 does not ensure that space is available for storing a symlink target's name along with a trailing 0 character, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information via a crafted filesystem image, related to fs/udf/symlink.c and fs/udf/unicode.c.
Commit Message: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> | Low | 1,660 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
{
int i,al;
int enc_err;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned int mac_size;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
sess = s->session;
/* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
* and we have that many bytes in s->packet
*/
rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
/* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
* rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
* need to be copied into rr->data by either
* the decryption or by the decompression
* When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
* rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
/* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
* rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
/* check is not needed I believe */
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
rr->data=rr->input;
rr->orig_len=rr->length;
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
/* enc_err is:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
* 1: if the padding is valid
* -1: if the padding is invalid */
if (enc_err == 0)
{
/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto err;
}
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
printf("\n");
#endif
/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
if ((sess != NULL) &&
(s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
{
/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
unsigned char *mac = NULL;
unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
* removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
* therefore we can safely process the record in a different
* amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
*/
if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
{
/* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
* can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
* the MAC in constant time from within the record,
* without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
* */
mac = mac_tmp;
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
rr->length -= mac_size;
}
else
{
/* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
* equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
* enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
rr->length -= mac_size;
mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
}
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
enc_err = -1;
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
enc_err = -1;
}
if (enc_err < 0)
{
/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto err;
}
/* r->length is now just compressed */
if (s->expand != NULL)
{
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
rr->off=0;
/*-
* So at this point the following is true
* ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
* ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
* ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
* ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
* after use :-).
*/
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
s->packet_length=0;
dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Memory leak in the dtls1_buffer_record function in d1_pkt.c in OpenSSL 1.0.0 before 1.0.0p and 1.0.1 before 1.0.1k allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by sending many duplicate records for the next epoch, leading to failure of replay detection.
Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | Low | 28,603 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int cdxl_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame, AVPacket *pkt)
{
CDXLVideoContext *c = avctx->priv_data;
AVFrame * const p = data;
int ret, w, h, encoding, aligned_width, buf_size = pkt->size;
const uint8_t *buf = pkt->data;
if (buf_size < 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
encoding = buf[1] & 7;
c->format = buf[1] & 0xE0;
w = AV_RB16(&buf[14]);
h = AV_RB16(&buf[16]);
c->bpp = buf[19];
c->palette_size = AV_RB16(&buf[20]);
c->palette = buf + 32;
c->video = c->palette + c->palette_size;
c->video_size = buf_size - c->palette_size - 32;
if (c->palette_size > 512)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (buf_size < c->palette_size + 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->bpp < 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->format != BIT_PLANAR && c->format != BIT_LINE && c->format != CHUNKY) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Pixel format 0x%0x", c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, w, h)) < 0)
return ret;
if (c->format == CHUNKY)
aligned_width = avctx->width;
else
aligned_width = FFALIGN(c->avctx->width, 16);
c->padded_bits = aligned_width - c->avctx->width;
if (c->video_size < aligned_width * avctx->height * (int64_t)c->bpp / 8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!encoding && c->palette_size && c->bpp <= 8) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8;
} else if (encoding == 1 && (c->bpp == 6 || c->bpp == 8)) {
if (c->palette_size != (1 << (c->bpp - 1)))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_BGR24;
} else if (!encoding && c->bpp == 24 && c->format == CHUNKY &&
!c->palette_size) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_RGB24;
} else {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Encoding %d, bpp %d and format 0x%x",
encoding, c->bpp, c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_buffer(avctx, p, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
p->pict_type = AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;
if (encoding) {
av_fast_padded_malloc(&c->new_video, &c->new_video_size,
h * w + AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if (!c->new_video)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (c->bpp == 8)
cdxl_decode_ham8(c, p);
else
cdxl_decode_ham6(c, p);
} else if (avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8) {
cdxl_decode_rgb(c, p);
} else {
cdxl_decode_raw(c, p);
}
*got_frame = 1;
return buf_size;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The cdxl_decode_frame function in libavcodec/cdxl.c in FFmpeg 2.8.x before 2.8.12, 3.0.x before 3.0.8, 3.1.x before 3.1.8, 3.2.x before 3.2.5, and 3.3.x before 3.3.1 does not exclude the CHUNKY format, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: avcodec/cdxl: Check format parameter
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 1378/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5715088008806400
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc> | Medium | 22,886 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len)
{
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
int mode = ctxt->mode;
int def_op_bytes, def_ad_bytes, goffset, simd_prefix;
bool op_prefix = false;
bool has_seg_override = false;
struct opcode opcode;
ctxt->memop.type = OP_NONE;
ctxt->memopp = NULL;
ctxt->_eip = ctxt->eip;
ctxt->fetch.ptr = ctxt->fetch.data;
ctxt->fetch.end = ctxt->fetch.data + insn_len;
ctxt->opcode_len = 1;
if (insn_len > 0)
memcpy(ctxt->fetch.data, insn, insn_len);
else {
rc = __do_insn_fetch_bytes(ctxt, 1);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
}
switch (mode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_REAL:
case X86EMUL_MODE_VM86:
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16:
def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 2;
break;
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 4;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
def_op_bytes = 4;
def_ad_bytes = 8;
break;
#endif
default:
return EMULATION_FAILED;
}
ctxt->op_bytes = def_op_bytes;
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes;
/* Legacy prefixes. */
for (;;) {
switch (ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt)) {
case 0x66: /* operand-size override */
op_prefix = true;
/* switch between 2/4 bytes */
ctxt->op_bytes = def_op_bytes ^ 6;
break;
case 0x67: /* address-size override */
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
/* switch between 4/8 bytes */
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 12;
else
/* switch between 2/4 bytes */
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 6;
break;
case 0x26: /* ES override */
case 0x2e: /* CS override */
case 0x36: /* SS override */
case 0x3e: /* DS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = (ctxt->b >> 3) & 3;
break;
case 0x64: /* FS override */
case 0x65: /* GS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->b & 7;
break;
case 0x40 ... 0x4f: /* REX */
if (mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
goto done_prefixes;
ctxt->rex_prefix = ctxt->b;
continue;
case 0xf0: /* LOCK */
ctxt->lock_prefix = 1;
break;
case 0xf2: /* REPNE/REPNZ */
case 0xf3: /* REP/REPE/REPZ */
ctxt->rep_prefix = ctxt->b;
break;
default:
goto done_prefixes;
}
/* Any legacy prefix after a REX prefix nullifies its effect. */
ctxt->rex_prefix = 0;
}
done_prefixes:
/* REX prefix. */
if (ctxt->rex_prefix & 8)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8; /* REX.W */
/* Opcode byte(s). */
opcode = opcode_table[ctxt->b];
/* Two-byte opcode? */
if (ctxt->b == 0x0f) {
ctxt->opcode_len = 2;
ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
opcode = twobyte_table[ctxt->b];
/* 0F_38 opcode map */
if (ctxt->b == 0x38) {
ctxt->opcode_len = 3;
ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
opcode = opcode_map_0f_38[ctxt->b];
}
}
ctxt->d = opcode.flags;
if (ctxt->d & ModRM)
ctxt->modrm = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
/* vex-prefix instructions are not implemented */
if (ctxt->opcode_len == 1 && (ctxt->b == 0xc5 || ctxt->b == 0xc4) &&
(mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 ||
(mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 && (ctxt->modrm & 0x80)))) {
ctxt->d = NotImpl;
}
while (ctxt->d & GroupMask) {
switch (ctxt->d & GroupMask) {
case Group:
goffset = (ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7;
opcode = opcode.u.group[goffset];
break;
case GroupDual:
goffset = (ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7;
if ((ctxt->modrm >> 6) == 3)
opcode = opcode.u.gdual->mod3[goffset];
else
opcode = opcode.u.gdual->mod012[goffset];
break;
case RMExt:
goffset = ctxt->modrm & 7;
opcode = opcode.u.group[goffset];
break;
case Prefix:
if (ctxt->rep_prefix && op_prefix)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
simd_prefix = op_prefix ? 0x66 : ctxt->rep_prefix;
switch (simd_prefix) {
case 0x00: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_no; break;
case 0x66: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_66; break;
case 0xf2: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_f2; break;
case 0xf3: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_f3; break;
}
break;
case Escape:
if (ctxt->modrm > 0xbf)
opcode = opcode.u.esc->high[ctxt->modrm - 0xc0];
else
opcode = opcode.u.esc->op[(ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7];
break;
default:
return EMULATION_FAILED;
}
ctxt->d &= ~(u64)GroupMask;
ctxt->d |= opcode.flags;
}
/* Unrecognised? */
if (ctxt->d == 0)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
ctxt->execute = opcode.u.execute;
if (unlikely(ctxt->ud) && likely(!(ctxt->d & EmulateOnUD)))
return EMULATION_FAILED;
if (unlikely(ctxt->d &
(NotImpl|Stack|Op3264|Sse|Mmx|Intercept|CheckPerm))) {
/*
* These are copied unconditionally here, and checked unconditionally
* in x86_emulate_insn.
*/
ctxt->check_perm = opcode.check_perm;
ctxt->intercept = opcode.intercept;
if (ctxt->d & NotImpl)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 && (ctxt->d & Stack))
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
if (ctxt->d & Op3264) {
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
else
ctxt->op_bytes = 4;
}
if (ctxt->d & Sse)
ctxt->op_bytes = 16;
else if (ctxt->d & Mmx)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
}
/* ModRM and SIB bytes. */
if (ctxt->d & ModRM) {
rc = decode_modrm(ctxt, &ctxt->memop);
if (!has_seg_override) {
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->modrm_seg;
}
} else if (ctxt->d & MemAbs)
rc = decode_abs(ctxt, &ctxt->memop);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
if (!has_seg_override)
ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_DS;
ctxt->memop.addr.mem.seg = ctxt->seg_override;
/*
* Decode and fetch the source operand: register, memory
* or immediate.
*/
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src, (ctxt->d >> SrcShift) & OpMask);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
/*
* Decode and fetch the second source operand: register, memory
* or immediate.
*/
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src2, (ctxt->d >> Src2Shift) & OpMask);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
/* Decode and fetch the destination operand: register or memory. */
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->dst, (ctxt->d >> DstShift) & OpMask);
done:
if (ctxt->rip_relative)
ctxt->memopp->addr.mem.ea += ctxt->_eip;
return (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) ? EMULATION_FAILED : EMULATION_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The instruction decoder in arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.18-rc2 does not properly handle invalid instructions, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and host OS crash) via a crafted application that triggers (1) an improperly fetched instruction or (2) an instruction that occupies too many bytes. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2014-8480.
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | Low | 16,533 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct rb_node *_p = v;
struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);
struct timespec now;
unsigned long timo;
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
char xbuf[16];
int rc;
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = key->type,
.index_key.description = key->description,
.cred = m->file->f_cred,
.match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed,
.match_data.raw_data = key,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,
};
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
/* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can
* skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it
*/
if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {
skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(&ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_ref_put(skey_ref);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
}
}
/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */
rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
if (rc < 0)
return 0;
now = current_kernel_time();
rcu_read_lock();
/* come up with a suitable timeout value */
if (key->expiry == 0) {
memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5);
} else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5);
} else {
timo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec;
if (timo < 60)
sprintf(xbuf, "%lus", timo);
else if (timo < 60*60)
sprintf(xbuf, "%lum", timo / 60);
else if (timo < 60*60*24)
sprintf(xbuf, "%luh", timo / (60*60));
else if (timo < 60*60*24*7)
sprintf(xbuf, "%lud", timo / (60*60*24));
else
sprintf(xbuf, "%luw", timo / (60*60*24*7));
}
#define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \
(test_bit(FLAG, &(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-')
seq_printf(m, "%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s ",
key->serial,
showflag(key, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED),
showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED),
showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD),
showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA),
showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT),
showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE),
showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),
refcount_read(&key->usage),
xbuf,
key->perm,
from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->uid),
from_kgid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->gid),
key->type->name);
#undef showflag
if (key->type->describe)
key->type->describe(key, m);
seq_putc(m, '\n');
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | Low | 110 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void smp_proc_master_id(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
tBTM_LE_PENC_KEYS le_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_update_key_mask(p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, true);
STREAM_TO_UINT16(le_key.ediv, p);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(le_key.rand, p, BT_OCTET8_LEN);
/* store the encryption keys from peer device */
memcpy(le_key.ltk, p_cb->ltk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
le_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
le_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size;
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) &&
(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_PENC,
(tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE*)&le_key, true);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In smp_proc_master_id of smp_act.cc, there is a possible out of bounds read due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote information disclosure over Bluetooth with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-7.0 Android-7.1.1 Android-7.1.2 Android-8.0 Android-8.1 Android-9.0 Android ID: A-111937027
Commit Message: Add packet length check in smp_proc_master_id
Bug: 111937027
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1144c9879e84fa79d68ad9d5fece4f58e2a3b075
(cherry picked from commit c8294662d07a98e9b8b1cab1ab681ec0805ce4e8)
| Low | 12,474 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool SerializeNotificationDatabaseData(const NotificationDatabaseData& input,
std::string* output) {
DCHECK(output);
scoped_ptr<NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData> payload(
new NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData());
const PlatformNotificationData& notification_data = input.notification_data;
payload->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.title));
switch (notification_data.direction) {
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_LEFT_TO_RIGHT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::LEFT_TO_RIGHT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_RIGHT_TO_LEFT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::RIGHT_TO_LEFT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_AUTO:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::AUTO);
break;
}
payload->set_lang(notification_data.lang);
payload->set_body(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.body));
payload->set_tag(notification_data.tag);
payload->set_icon(notification_data.icon.spec());
for (size_t i = 0; i < notification_data.vibration_pattern.size(); ++i)
payload->add_vibration_pattern(notification_data.vibration_pattern[i]);
payload->set_timestamp(notification_data.timestamp.ToInternalValue());
payload->set_silent(notification_data.silent);
payload->set_require_interaction(notification_data.require_interaction);
if (notification_data.data.size()) {
payload->set_data(¬ification_data.data.front(),
notification_data.data.size());
}
for (const PlatformNotificationAction& action : notification_data.actions) {
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationAction* payload_action =
payload->add_actions();
payload_action->set_action(action.action);
payload_action->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(action.title));
}
NotificationDatabaseDataProto message;
message.set_notification_id(input.notification_id);
message.set_origin(input.origin.spec());
message.set_service_worker_registration_id(
input.service_worker_registration_id);
message.set_allocated_notification_data(payload.release());
return message.SerializeToString(output);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.114 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649} | Low | 17,571 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PlatformSensorProviderWin::SensorReaderCreated(
mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback,
std::unique_ptr<PlatformSensorReaderWin> sensor_reader) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (!sensor_reader) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<PlatformSensor> sensor = new PlatformSensorWin(
type, std::move(mapping), this, sensor_thread_->task_runner(),
std::move(sensor_reader));
callback.Run(sensor);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607} | Medium | 7,392 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PepperMediaDeviceManager* PepperMediaDeviceManager::GetForRenderFrame(
RenderFrame* render_frame) {
PepperMediaDeviceManager* handler =
PepperMediaDeviceManager::Get(render_frame);
if (!handler)
handler = new PepperMediaDeviceManager(render_frame);
return handler;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Pepper plugins in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Flash content that triggers an attempted PepperMediaDeviceManager access outside of the object's lifetime.
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897} | Low | 4,006 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int ext4_punch_hole(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t length)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t first_block, stop_block;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
loff_t first_block_offset, last_block_offset;
handle_t *handle;
unsigned int credits;
int ret = 0;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
trace_ext4_punch_hole(inode, offset, length, 0);
/*
* Write out all dirty pages to avoid race conditions
* Then release them.
*/
if (mapping->nrpages && mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY)) {
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(mapping, offset,
offset + length - 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/* No need to punch hole beyond i_size */
if (offset >= inode->i_size)
goto out_mutex;
/*
* If the hole extends beyond i_size, set the hole
* to end after the page that contains i_size
*/
if (offset + length > inode->i_size) {
length = inode->i_size +
PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - (inode->i_size & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1)) -
offset;
}
if (offset & (sb->s_blocksize - 1) ||
(offset + length) & (sb->s_blocksize - 1)) {
/*
* Attach jinode to inode for jbd2 if we do any zeroing of
* partial block
*/
ret = ext4_inode_attach_jinode(inode);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_mutex;
}
first_block_offset = round_up(offset, sb->s_blocksize);
last_block_offset = round_down((offset + length), sb->s_blocksize) - 1;
/* Now release the pages and zero block aligned part of pages*/
if (last_block_offset > first_block_offset)
truncate_pagecache_range(inode, first_block_offset,
last_block_offset);
/* Wait all existing dio workers, newcomers will block on i_mutex */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
credits = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
else
credits = ext4_blocks_for_truncate(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_TRUNCATE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
ext4_std_error(sb, ret);
goto out_dio;
}
ret = ext4_zero_partial_blocks(handle, inode, offset,
length);
if (ret)
goto out_stop;
first_block = (offset + sb->s_blocksize - 1) >>
EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
stop_block = (offset + length) >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
/* If there are no blocks to remove, return now */
if (first_block >= stop_block)
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, first_block,
stop_block - first_block);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
ret = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, first_block,
stop_block - 1);
else
ret = ext4_ind_remove_space(handle, inode, first_block,
stop_block);
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
/* Now release the pages again to reduce race window */
if (last_block_offset > first_block_offset)
truncate_pagecache_range(inode, first_block_offset,
last_block_offset);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
out_stop:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_dio:
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the ext4 filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (disk corruption) by writing to a page that is associated with a different user's file after unsynchronized hole punching and page-fault handling.
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | Medium | 27,409 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: gamma_test(png_modifier *pmIn, PNG_CONST png_byte colour_typeIn,
PNG_CONST png_byte bit_depthIn, PNG_CONST int palette_numberIn,
PNG_CONST int interlace_typeIn,
PNG_CONST double file_gammaIn, PNG_CONST double screen_gammaIn,
PNG_CONST png_byte sbitIn, PNG_CONST int threshold_testIn,
PNG_CONST char *name,
PNG_CONST int use_input_precisionIn, PNG_CONST int scale16In,
PNG_CONST int expand16In, PNG_CONST int do_backgroundIn,
PNG_CONST png_color_16 *bkgd_colorIn, double bkgd_gammaIn)
{
gamma_display d;
context(&pmIn->this, fault);
gamma_display_init(&d, pmIn, FILEID(colour_typeIn, bit_depthIn,
palette_numberIn, interlace_typeIn, 0, 0, 0),
file_gammaIn, screen_gammaIn, sbitIn,
threshold_testIn, use_input_precisionIn, scale16In,
expand16In, do_backgroundIn, bkgd_colorIn, bkgd_gammaIn);
Try
{
png_structp pp;
png_infop pi;
gama_modification gama_mod;
srgb_modification srgb_mod;
sbit_modification sbit_mod;
/* For the moment don't use the png_modifier support here. */
d.pm->encoding_counter = 0;
modifier_set_encoding(d.pm); /* Just resets everything */
d.pm->current_gamma = d.file_gamma;
/* Make an appropriate modifier to set the PNG file gamma to the
* given gamma value and the sBIT chunk to the given precision.
*/
d.pm->modifications = NULL;
gama_modification_init(&gama_mod, d.pm, d.file_gamma);
srgb_modification_init(&srgb_mod, d.pm, 127 /*delete*/);
if (d.sbit > 0)
sbit_modification_init(&sbit_mod, d.pm, d.sbit);
modification_reset(d.pm->modifications);
/* Get a png_struct for writing the image. */
pp = set_modifier_for_read(d.pm, &pi, d.this.id, name);
standard_palette_init(&d.this);
/* Introduce the correct read function. */
if (d.pm->this.progressive)
{
/* Share the row function with the standard implementation. */
png_set_progressive_read_fn(pp, &d, gamma_info, progressive_row,
gamma_end);
/* Now feed data into the reader until we reach the end: */
modifier_progressive_read(d.pm, pp, pi);
}
else
{
/* modifier_read expects a png_modifier* */
png_set_read_fn(pp, d.pm, modifier_read);
/* Check the header values: */
png_read_info(pp, pi);
/* Process the 'info' requirements. Only one image is generated */
gamma_info_imp(&d, pp, pi);
sequential_row(&d.this, pp, pi, -1, 0);
if (!d.this.speed)
gamma_image_validate(&d, pp, pi);
else
d.this.ps->validated = 1;
}
modifier_reset(d.pm);
if (d.pm->log && !d.threshold_test && !d.this.speed)
fprintf(stderr, "%d bit %s %s: max error %f (%.2g, %2g%%)\n",
d.this.bit_depth, colour_types[d.this.colour_type], name,
d.maxerrout, d.maxerrabs, 100*d.maxerrpc);
/* Log the summary values too. */
if (d.this.colour_type == 0 || d.this.colour_type == 4)
{
switch (d.this.bit_depth)
{
case 1:
break;
case 2:
if (d.maxerrout > d.pm->error_gray_2)
d.pm->error_gray_2 = d.maxerrout;
break;
case 4:
if (d.maxerrout > d.pm->error_gray_4)
d.pm->error_gray_4 = d.maxerrout;
break;
case 8:
if (d.maxerrout > d.pm->error_gray_8)
d.pm->error_gray_8 = d.maxerrout;
break;
case 16:
if (d.maxerrout > d.pm->error_gray_16)
d.pm->error_gray_16 = d.maxerrout;
break;
default:
png_error(pp, "bad bit depth (internal: 1)");
}
}
else if (d.this.colour_type == 2 || d.this.colour_type == 6)
{
switch (d.this.bit_depth)
{
case 8:
if (d.maxerrout > d.pm->error_color_8)
d.pm->error_color_8 = d.maxerrout;
break;
case 16:
if (d.maxerrout > d.pm->error_color_16)
d.pm->error_color_16 = d.maxerrout;
break;
default:
png_error(pp, "bad bit depth (internal: 2)");
}
}
else if (d.this.colour_type == 3)
{
if (d.maxerrout > d.pm->error_indexed)
d.pm->error_indexed = d.maxerrout;
}
}
Catch(fault)
modifier_reset(voidcast(png_modifier*,(void*)fault));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| Low | 14,914 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int Equalizer_getParameter(EffectContext *pContext,
void *pParam,
uint32_t *pValueSize,
void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int bMute = 0;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
int32_t param2;
char *name;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS:
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
case EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS:
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
case EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE:
if (*pValueSize < 2 * sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 2 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = 2 * sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE:
if (*pValueSize < 2 * sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 3 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = 2 * sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 5 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME:
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES:
if (*pValueSize < (2 + FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) * sizeof(uint16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = (2 + FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) * sizeof(uint16_t);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter unknown param %d", param);
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE:
*(int16_t *)pValue = -1500;
*((int16_t *)pValue + 1) = 1500;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 < 0 || param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
if (param2 < 0) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "32438598");
ALOGW("\tERROR Equalizer_getParameter() EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL band %d", param2);
}
break;
}
*(int16_t *)pValue = (int16_t)EqualizerGetBandLevel(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 < 0 || param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
if (param2 < 0) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "32436341");
ALOGW("\tERROR Equalizer_getParameter() EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ band %d", param2);
}
break;
}
*(int32_t *)pValue = EqualizerGetCentreFrequency(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 < 0 || param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
if (param2 < 0) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "32247948");
ALOGW("\tERROR Equalizer_getParameter() EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE band %d", param2);
}
break;
}
EqualizerGetBandFreqRange(pContext, param2, (uint32_t *)pValue, ((uint32_t *)pValue + 1));
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetBand(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetPreset(pContext);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetNumPresets();
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
name = (char *)pValue;
strncpy(name, EqualizerGetPresetName(param2), *pValueSize - 1);
name[*pValueSize - 1] = 0;
*pValueSize = strlen(name) + 1;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
ALOGV("\tEqualizer_getParameter() EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES");
p[0] = (int16_t)EqualizerGetPreset(pContext);
p[1] = (int16_t)FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS;
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
p[2 + i] = (int16_t)EqualizerGetBandLevel(pContext, i);
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_getParameter */
int Equalizer_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int32_t preset;
int32_t band;
int32_t level;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
preset = (int32_t)(*(uint16_t *)pValue);
if ((preset >= EqualizerGetNumPresets())||(preset < 0)) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, preset);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
band = *pParamTemp;
level = (int32_t)(*(int16_t *)pValue);
if (band >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, band, level);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
if ((int)p[0] >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (p[0] >= 0) {
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, (int)p[0]);
} else {
if ((int)p[1] != FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, i, (int)p[2 + i]);
}
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_setParameter */
int Volume_getParameter(EffectContext *pContext,
void *pParam,
uint32_t *pValueSize,
void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int bMute = 0;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;;
char *name;
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
case VOLUME_PARAM_MAXLEVEL:
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
if (*pValueSize != sizeof(int16_t)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int32_t)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 2 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int32_t);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter unknown param %d", param);
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
status = VolumeGetVolumeLevel(pContext, (int16_t *)(pValue));
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MAXLEVEL:
*(int16_t *)pValue = 0;
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
VolumeGetStereoPosition(pContext, (int16_t *)pValue);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
status = VolumeGetMute(pContext, (uint32_t *)pValue);
ALOGV("\tVolume_getParameter() VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE Value is %d",
*(uint32_t *)pValue);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
*(int32_t *)pValue = pContext->pBundledContext->bStereoPositionEnabled;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Volume_getParameter */
int Volume_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int16_t level;
int16_t position;
uint32_t mute;
uint32_t positionEnabled;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
level = *(int16_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetVolumeLevel(pContext, (int16_t)level);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
mute = *(uint32_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetMute(pContext, mute);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
positionEnabled = *(uint32_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeEnableStereoPosition(pContext, positionEnabled);
status = VolumeSetStereoPosition(pContext, pContext->pBundledContext->positionSaved);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
position = *(int16_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetStereoPosition(pContext, (int16_t)position);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Volume_setParameter */
/****************************************************************************************
* Name : LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16()
* Input : Signed 32-bit integer
* Output : Signed 16-bit integer
* MSB (16) = sign bit
* (15->05) = integer part
* (04->01) = decimal part
* Returns : Db value with respect to full scale
* Description :
* Remarks :
****************************************************************************************/
LVM_INT16 LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16(LVM_INT32 Lin_fix)
{
LVM_INT16 db_fix;
LVM_INT16 Shift;
LVM_INT16 SmallRemainder;
LVM_UINT32 Remainder = (LVM_UINT32)Lin_fix;
/* Count leading bits, 1 cycle in assembly*/
for (Shift = 0; Shift<32; Shift++)
{
if ((Remainder & 0x80000000U)!=0)
{
break;
}
Remainder = Remainder << 1;
}
/*
* Based on the approximation equation (for Q11.4 format):
*
* dB = -96 * Shift + 16 * (8 * Remainder - 2 * Remainder^2)
*/
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(-96 * Shift); /* Six dB steps in Q11.4 format*/
SmallRemainder = (LVM_INT16)((Remainder & 0x7fffffff) >> 24);
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix + SmallRemainder );
SmallRemainder = (LVM_INT16)(SmallRemainder * SmallRemainder);
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix - (LVM_INT16)((LVM_UINT16)SmallRemainder >> 9));
/* Correct for small offset */
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix - 5);
return db_fix;
}
int Effect_setEnabled(EffectContext *pContext, bool enabled)
{
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() type %d, enabled %d", pContext->EffectType, enabled);
if (enabled) {
bool tempDisabled = false;
switch (pContext->EffectType) {
case LVM_BASS_BOOST:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_BASS_BOOST is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountBb <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountBb =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
tempDisabled = pContext->pBundledContext->bBassTempDisabled;
break;
case LVM_EQUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_EQUALIZER is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountEq <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountEq =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
break;
case LVM_VIRTUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VIRTUALIZER is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountVirt <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountVirt =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
tempDisabled = pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerTempDisabled;
break;
case LVM_VOLUME:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VOLUME is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() invalid effect type");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!tempDisabled) {
LvmEffect_enable(pContext);
}
} else {
switch (pContext->EffectType) {
case LVM_BASS_BOOST:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_BASS_BOOST is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_EQUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_EQUALIZER is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_VIRTUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VIRTUALIZER is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_VOLUME:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VOLUME is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() invalid effect type");
return -EINVAL;
}
LvmEffect_disable(pContext);
}
return 0;
}
int16_t LVC_Convert_VolToDb(uint32_t vol){
int16_t dB;
dB = LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16(vol <<7);
dB = (dB +8)>>4;
dB = (dB <-96) ? -96 : dB ;
return dB;
}
} // namespace
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in lvm/wrapper/Bundle/EffectBundle.cpp in libeffects in the Qualcomm audio post processor could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-32588016.
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Effect command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32448258
Bug: 32095626
Test: Use POC bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I69f24eac5866f8d9090fc4c0ebe58c2c297b63df
(cherry picked from commit 01183402d757f0c28bfd5e3b127b3809dfd67459)
| Medium | 27,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium::setLocalDescription(PassRefPtr<RTCVoidRequest> request, PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor> sessionDescription)
{
if (!m_webHandler)
return;
m_webHandler->setLocalDescription(request, sessionDescription);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Low | 4,643 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static inline int map_from_unicode(unsigned code, enum entity_charset charset, unsigned *res)
{
unsigned char found;
const uni_to_enc *table;
size_t table_size;
switch (charset) {
case cs_8859_1:
/* identity mapping of code points to unicode */
if (code > 0xFF) {
return FAILURE;
}
*res = code;
break;
case cs_8859_5:
if (code <= 0xA0 || code == 0xAD /* soft hyphen */) {
*res = code;
} else if (code == 0x2116) {
*res = 0xF0; /* numero sign */
} else if (code == 0xA7) {
*res = 0xFD; /* section sign */
} else if (code >= 0x0401 && code <= 0x044F) {
if (code == 0x040D || code == 0x0450 || code == 0x045D)
return FAILURE;
*res = code - 0x360;
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
break;
case cs_8859_15:
if (code < 0xA4 || (code > 0xBE && code <= 0xFF)) {
*res = code;
} else { /* between A4 and 0xBE */
found = unimap_bsearch(unimap_iso885915,
code, sizeof(unimap_iso885915) / sizeof(*unimap_iso885915));
if (found)
*res = found;
else
return FAILURE;
}
break;
case cs_cp1252:
if (code <= 0x7F || (code >= 0xA0 && code <= 0xFF)) {
*res = code;
} else {
found = unimap_bsearch(unimap_win1252,
code, sizeof(unimap_win1252) / sizeof(*unimap_win1252));
if (found)
*res = found;
else
return FAILURE;
}
break;
case cs_macroman:
if (code == 0x7F)
return FAILURE;
table = unimap_macroman;
table_size = sizeof(unimap_macroman) / sizeof(*unimap_macroman);
goto table_over_7F;
case cs_cp1251:
table = unimap_win1251;
table_size = sizeof(unimap_win1251) / sizeof(*unimap_win1251);
goto table_over_7F;
case cs_koi8r:
table = unimap_koi8r;
table_size = sizeof(unimap_koi8r) / sizeof(*unimap_koi8r);
goto table_over_7F;
case cs_cp866:
table = unimap_cp866;
table_size = sizeof(unimap_cp866) / sizeof(*unimap_cp866);
table_over_7F:
if (code <= 0x7F) {
*res = code;
} else {
found = unimap_bsearch(table, code, table_size);
if (found)
*res = found;
else
return FAILURE;
}
break;
/* from here on, only map the possible characters in the ASCII range.
* to improve support here, it's a matter of building the unicode mappings.
* See <http://www.unicode.org/Public/6.0.0/ucd/Unihan.zip> */
case cs_sjis:
case cs_eucjp:
/* we interpret 0x5C as the Yen symbol. This is not universal.
* See <http://www.w3.org/Submission/japanese-xml/#ambiguity_of_yen> */
if (code >= 0x20 && code <= 0x7D) {
if (code == 0x5C)
return FAILURE;
*res = code;
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
break;
case cs_big5:
case cs_big5hkscs:
case cs_gb2312:
if (code >= 0x20 && code <= 0x7D) {
*res = code;
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
break;
default:
return FAILURE;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range | Low | 24,476 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: icmp6_rrenum_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, const u_char *ep)
{
const struct icmp6_router_renum *rr6;
const char *cp;
const struct rr_pco_match *match;
const struct rr_pco_use *use;
char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
int n;
if (ep < bp)
return;
rr6 = (const struct icmp6_router_renum *)bp;
cp = (const char *)(rr6 + 1);
ND_TCHECK(rr6->rr_reserved);
switch (rr6->rr_code) {
case ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING_COMMAND:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"router renum: command"));
break;
case ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING_RESULT:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"router renum: result"));
break;
case ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING_SEQNUM_RESET:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"router renum: sequence number reset"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"router renum: code-#%d", rr6->rr_code));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,", seq=%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&rr6->rr_seqnum)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
#define F(x, y) ((rr6->rr_flags) & (x) ? (y) : "")
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[")); /*]*/
if (rr6->rr_flags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s%s%s%s%s,", F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_TEST, "T"),
F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_REQRESULT, "R"),
F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_FORCEAPPLY, "A"),
F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_SPECSITE, "S"),
F(ICMP6_RR_FLAGS_PREVDONE, "P")));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"seg=%u,", rr6->rr_segnum));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"maxdelay=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&rr6->rr_maxdelay)));
if (rr6->rr_reserved)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"rsvd=0x%x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&rr6->rr_reserved)));
/*[*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,"]"));
#undef F
}
if (rr6->rr_code == ICMP6_ROUTER_RENUMBERING_COMMAND) {
match = (const struct rr_pco_match *)cp;
cp = (const char *)(match + 1);
ND_TCHECK(match->rpm_prefix);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"match(")); /*)*/
switch (match->rpm_code) {
case RPM_PCO_ADD: ND_PRINT((ndo,"add")); break;
case RPM_PCO_CHANGE: ND_PRINT((ndo,"change")); break;
case RPM_PCO_SETGLOBAL: ND_PRINT((ndo,"setglobal")); break;
default: ND_PRINT((ndo,"#%u", match->rpm_code)); break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,",ord=%u", match->rpm_ordinal));
ND_PRINT((ndo,",min=%u", match->rpm_minlen));
ND_PRINT((ndo,",max=%u", match->rpm_maxlen));
}
if (addrtostr6(&match->rpm_prefix, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf)))
ND_PRINT((ndo,",%s/%u", hbuf, match->rpm_matchlen));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,",?/%u", match->rpm_matchlen));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
n = match->rpm_len - 3;
if (n % 4)
goto trunc;
n /= 4;
while (n-- > 0) {
use = (const struct rr_pco_use *)cp;
cp = (const char *)(use + 1);
ND_TCHECK(use->rpu_prefix);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"use(")); /*)*/
if (use->rpu_flags) {
#define F(x, y) ((use->rpu_flags) & (x) ? (y) : "")
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s%s,",
F(ICMP6_RR_PCOUSE_FLAGS_DECRVLTIME, "V"),
F(ICMP6_RR_PCOUSE_FLAGS_DECRPLTIME, "P")));
#undef F
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"mask=0x%x,", use->rpu_ramask));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"raflags=0x%x,", use->rpu_raflags));
if (~use->rpu_vltime == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"vltime=infty,"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"vltime=%u,",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&use->rpu_vltime)));
if (~use->rpu_pltime == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"pltime=infty,"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"pltime=%u,",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&use->rpu_pltime)));
}
if (addrtostr6(&use->rpu_prefix, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf)))
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s/%u/%u", hbuf, use->rpu_uselen,
use->rpu_keeplen));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo,"?/%u/%u", use->rpu_uselen,
use->rpu_keeplen));
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|icmp6]"));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ICMPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-icmp6.c.
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test. | Low | 5,508 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int em_sysenter(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
struct desc_struct cs, ss;
u64 msr_data;
u16 cs_sel, ss_sel;
u64 efer = 0;
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
/* inject #GP if in real mode */
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
/*
* Not recognized on AMD in compat mode (but is recognized in legacy
* mode).
*/
if ((ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32) && (efer & EFER_LMA)
&& !vendor_intel(ctxt))
return emulate_ud(ctxt);
/* sysenter/sysexit have not been tested in 64bit mode. */
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
setup_syscalls_segments(ctxt, &cs, &ss);
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, &msr_data);
switch (ctxt->mode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
if ((msr_data & 0xfffc) == 0x0)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
break;
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
if (msr_data == 0x0)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
break;
default:
break;
}
ctxt->eflags &= ~(EFLG_VM | EFLG_IF);
cs_sel = (u16)msr_data;
cs_sel &= ~SELECTOR_RPL_MASK;
ss_sel = cs_sel + 8;
ss_sel &= ~SELECTOR_RPL_MASK;
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 || (efer & EFER_LMA)) {
cs.d = 0;
cs.l = 1;
}
ops->set_segment(ctxt, cs_sel, &cs, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, &msr_data);
ctxt->_eip = msr_data;
ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, &msr_data);
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = msr_data;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: The em_sysenter function in arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the Linux kernel before 3.18.5, when the guest OS lacks SYSENTER MSR initialization, allows guest OS users to gain guest OS privileges or cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) by triggering use of a 16-bit code segment for emulation of a SYSENTER instruction.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: SYSENTER emulation is broken
SYSENTER emulation is broken in several ways:
1. It misses the case of 16-bit code segments completely (CVE-2015-0239).
2. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is checked in 64-bit mode incorrectly (bits 0 and 1 can
still be set without causing #GP).
3. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP and MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP are not masked in
legacy-mode.
4. There is some unneeded code.
Fix it.
Cc: stable@vger.linux.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | High | 350 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: UserInitiatedInfo CreateUserInitiatedInfo(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle,
PageLoadTracker* committed_load) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsRendererInitiated())
return UserInitiatedInfo::BrowserInitiated();
return UserInitiatedInfo::RenderInitiated(
navigation_handle->HasUserGesture());
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Leaking of an SVG shadow tree leading to corruption of the DOM tree in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to inject arbitrary scripts or HTML (UXSS) via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870} | Medium | 26,030 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidPreviewPage(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage_Params& params) {
DCHECK(params.page_number >= printing::FIRST_PAGE_INDEX);
print_preview_pages_remaining_--;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 15,312 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static uint32_t scsi_init_iovec(SCSIDiskReq *r)
{
r->iov.iov_len = MIN(r->sector_count * 512, SCSI_DMA_BUF_SIZE);
qemu_iovec_init_external(&r->qiov, &r->iov, 1);
return r->qiov.size / 512;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in hw/scsi-disk.c in the SCSI subsystem in QEMU before 0.15.2, as used by Xen, might allow local guest users with permission to access the CD-ROM to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted SAI READ CAPACITY SCSI command. NOTE: this is only a vulnerability when root has manually modified certain permissions or ACLs.
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> | High | 23,887 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void BlobURLRegistry::unregisterURL(const KURL& url)
{
ThreadableBlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(url);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.91 on Mac OS X does not properly mitigate improper rendering behavior in the Intel GPU driver, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Low | 6,401 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool AXObject::isHiddenForTextAlternativeCalculation() const {
if (equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false"))
return false;
if (getLayoutObject())
return getLayoutObject()->style()->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
Document* document = getDocument();
if (!document || !document->frame())
return false;
if (Node* node = getNode()) {
if (node->isConnected() && node->isElementNode()) {
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> style =
document->ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(toElement(node));
return style->display() == EDisplay::kNone ||
style->visibility() != EVisibility::kVisible;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 3,903 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: __imlib_Ellipse_DrawToData(int xc, int yc, int a, int b, DATA32 color,
DATA32 * dst, int dstw, int clx, int cly, int clw,
int clh, ImlibOp op, char dst_alpha, char blend)
{
ImlibPointDrawFunction pfunc;
int xx, yy, x, y, prev_x, prev_y, ty, by, lx, rx;
DATA32 a2, b2, *tp, *bp;
DATA64 dx, dy;
if (A_VAL(&color) == 0xff)
blend = 0;
pfunc = __imlib_GetPointDrawFunction(op, dst_alpha, blend);
if (!pfunc)
return;
xc -= clx;
yc -= cly;
dst += (dstw * cly) + clx;
a2 = a * a;
b2 = b * b;
yy = b << 16;
prev_y = b;
dx = a2 * b;
dy = 0;
ty = yc - b - 1;
by = yc + b;
lx = xc - 1;
rx = xc;
tp = dst + (dstw * ty) + lx;
bp = dst + (dstw * by) + lx;
while (dy < dx)
{
int len;
y = yy >> 16;
y += ((yy - (y << 16)) >> 15);
if (prev_y != y)
{
prev_y = y;
dx -= a2;
ty++;
by--;
tp += dstw;
bp -= dstw;
}
len = rx - lx;
if (IN_RANGE(lx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(lx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
dy += b2;
yy -= ((dy << 16) / dx);
lx--;
if ((lx < 0) && (rx > clw))
return;
if ((ty > clh) || (by < 0))
return;
}
xx = yy;
prev_x = xx >> 16;
dx = dy;
ty++;
by--;
tp += dstw;
bp -= dstw;
while (ty < yc)
{
int len;
x = xx >> 16;
x += ((xx - (x << 16)) >> 15);
if (prev_x != x)
{
prev_x = x;
dy += b2;
lx--;
rx++;
tp--;
bp--;
}
len = rx - lx;
if (IN_RANGE(lx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, ty, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, tp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(lx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
if (IN_RANGE(rx, by, clw, clh))
pfunc(color, bp + len);
dx -= a2;
xx += ((dx << 16) / dy);
ty++;
if ((ty > clh) || (by < 0))
return;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: imlib2 before 1.4.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and application crash) by drawing a 2x1 ellipse.
Commit Message: | Low | 10,762 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void MessageService::OpenChannelToNativeApp(
int source_process_id,
int source_routing_id,
int receiver_port_id,
const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& native_app_name,
const std::string& channel_name,
const std::string& connect_message) {
content::RenderProcessHost* source =
content::RenderProcessHost::FromID(source_process_id);
if (!source)
return;
WebContents* source_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
source_process_id, source_routing_id);
std::string tab_json = "null";
if (source_contents) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> tab_value(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
source_contents, ExtensionTabUtil::INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS));
base::JSONWriter::Write(tab_value.get(), &tab_json);
}
scoped_ptr<MessageChannel> channel(new MessageChannel());
channel->opener.reset(new ExtensionMessagePort(source, MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL,
source_extension_id));
NativeMessageProcessHost::MessageType type =
channel_name == "chrome.runtime.sendNativeMessage" ?
NativeMessageProcessHost::TYPE_SEND_MESSAGE_REQUEST :
NativeMessageProcessHost::TYPE_CONNECT;
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(
content::BrowserThread::FILE,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&NativeMessageProcessHost::Create,
base::WeakPtr<NativeMessageProcessHost::Client>(
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
native_app_name, connect_message, receiver_port_id,
type,
base::Bind(&MessageService::FinalizeOpenChannelToNativeApp,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
receiver_port_id,
channel_name,
base::Passed(&channel),
tab_json)));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not ensure that an extension has the tabs (aka APIPermission::kTab) permission before providing a URL to this extension, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 26,396 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void copyMono24(
short *dst,
const int *const *src,
unsigned nSamples,
unsigned /* nChannels */) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
*dst++ = src[0][i] >> 8;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A remote code execution vulnerability in FLACExtractor.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable an attacker using a specially crafted file to cause memory corruption during media file and data processing. This issue is rated as Critical due to the possibility of remote code execution within the context of the Mediaserver process. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2. Android ID: A-34970788.
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
| Medium | 10,304 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int mailimf_group_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx,
struct mailimf_group ** result)
{
size_t cur_token;
char * display_name;
struct mailimf_mailbox_list * mailbox_list;
struct mailimf_group * group;
int r;
int res;
cur_token = * indx;
mailbox_list = NULL;
r = mailimf_display_name_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &display_name);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
r = mailimf_mailbox_list_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &mailbox_list);
switch (r) {
case MAILIMF_NO_ERROR:
break;
case MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE:
r = mailimf_cfws_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if ((r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) && (r != MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE)) {
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
break;
default:
res = r;
goto free_display_name;
}
r = mailimf_semi_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_mailbox_list;
}
group = mailimf_group_new(display_name, mailbox_list);
if (group == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_mailbox_list;
}
* indx = cur_token;
* result = group;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
free_mailbox_list:
if (mailbox_list != NULL) {
mailimf_mailbox_list_free(mailbox_list);
}
free_display_name:
mailimf_display_name_free(display_name);
err:
return res;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: A null dereference vulnerability has been found in the MIME handling component of LibEtPan before 1.8, as used in MailCore and MailCore 2. A crash can occur in low-level/imf/mailimf.c during a failed parse of a Cc header containing multiple e-mail addresses.
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274 | Low | 26,984 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void TestFlashMessageLoop::DestroyMessageLoopResourceTask(int32_t unused) {
if (message_loop_) {
delete message_loop_;
message_loop_ = NULL;
} else {
PP_NOTREACHED();
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PPB_Flash_MessageLoop_Impl::InternalRun function in content/renderer/pepper/ppb_flash_message_loop_impl.cc in the Pepper plugin in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 mishandles nested message loops, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529} | Medium | 3,872 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::DisplayPasskey(
const dbus::ObjectPath& device_path,
uint32 passkey,
uint16 entered) {
DCHECK(agent_.get());
DCHECK(device_path == object_path_);
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": DisplayPasskey: " << passkey
<< " (" << entered << " entered)";
if (entered == 0)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bluetooth.PairingMethod",
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_DISPLAY_PASSKEY,
UMA_PAIRING_METHOD_COUNT);
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
if (entered == 0)
pairing_delegate_->DisplayPasskey(this, passkey);
pairing_delegate_->KeysEntered(this, entered);
pairing_delegate_used_ = true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 13,066 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long Chapters::Display::Parse(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size)
{
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05) // ChapterString ID
{
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_string);
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x037C) // ChapterLanguage ID
{
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_language);
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x037E) // ChapterCountry ID
{
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_country);
if (status)
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | Low | 28,839 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void UnwrapAndVerifyMojoHandle(mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle buffer_handle,
size_t expected_size,
bool expected_read_only_flag) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle memory_handle;
size_t memory_size = 0;
bool read_only_flag = false;
const MojoResult result =
mojo::UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(std::move(buffer_handle), &memory_handle,
&memory_size, &read_only_flag);
EXPECT_EQ(MOJO_RESULT_OK, result);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_size, memory_size);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_read_only_flag, read_only_flag);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: Incorrect use of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle in Mojo in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | Medium | 27,849 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct ipt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
return -EINVAL;
err = xt_check_entry_offsets(e, e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The compat IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE and IP6T_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt implementations in the netfilter subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.6.3 allow local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) by leveraging in-container root access to provide a crafted offset value that triggers an unintended decrement.
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> | Low | 29,256 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Firejail before 0.9.44.6 and 0.9.38.x LTS before 0.9.38.10 LTS does not comprehensively address dotfile cases during its attempt to prevent accessing user files with an euid of zero, which allows local users to conduct sandbox-escape attacks via vectors involving a symlink and the --private option. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-5180.
Commit Message: security fix | Low | 8,752 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xmlParseElementContentDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *name,
xmlElementContentPtr *result) {
xmlElementContentPtr tree = NULL;
int inputid = ctxt->input->id;
int res;
*result = NULL;
if (RAW != '(') {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_STARTED,
"xmlParseElementContentDecl : %s '(' expected\n", name);
return(-1);
}
NEXT;
GROW;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (CMP7(CUR_PTR, '#', 'P', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A')) {
tree = xmlParseElementMixedContentDecl(ctxt, inputid);
res = XML_ELEMENT_TYPE_MIXED;
} else {
tree = xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(ctxt, inputid, 1);
res = XML_ELEMENT_TYPE_ELEMENT;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
*result = tree;
return(res);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 10,888 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static bool r_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj *obj, struct minidump_directory *entry) {
int i;
struct minidump_handle_operation_list *handle_operation_list;
struct minidump_memory_list *memory_list;
struct minidump_memory64_list *memory64_list;
struct minidump_memory_info_list *memory_info_list;
struct minidump_module_list *module_list;
struct minidump_thread_list *thread_list;
struct minidump_thread_ex_list *thread_ex_list;
struct minidump_thread_info_list *thread_info_list;
struct minidump_unloaded_module_list *unloaded_module_list;
struct avrf_handle_operation *handle_operations;
struct minidump_memory_descriptor *memories;
struct minidump_memory_descriptor64 *memories64;
struct minidump_memory_info *memory_infos;
struct minidump_module *modules;
struct minidump_thread *threads;
struct minidump_thread_ex *ex_threads;
struct minidump_thread_info *thread_infos;
struct minidump_unloaded_module *unloaded_modules;
/* We could confirm data sizes but a malcious MDMP will always get around
** this! But we can ensure that the data is not outside of the file */
if (entry->location.rva + entry->location.data_size > obj->b->length) {
eprintf("[ERROR] Size Mismatch - Stream data is larger than file size!\n");
return false;
}
switch (entry->stream_type) {
case THREAD_LIST_STREAM:
thread_list = (struct minidump_thread_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread.format", "ddddq?? "
"ThreadId SuspendCount PriorityClass Priority "
"Teb (mdmp_memory_descriptor)Stack "
"(mdmp_location_descriptor)ThreadContext", 0);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_list.format",
sdb_fmt ("d[%i]? "
"NumberOfThreads (mdmp_thread)Threads",
thread_list->number_of_threads),
0);
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
for (i = 0; i < thread_list->number_of_threads; i++) {
threads = (struct minidump_thread *)(&(thread_list->threads));
r_list_append (obj->streams.threads, &(threads[i]));
}
break;
case MODULE_LIST_STREAM:
module_list = (struct minidump_module_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_module.format", "qddtd???qq "
"BaseOfImage SizeOfImage CheckSum "
"TimeDateStamp ModuleNameRVA "
"(mdmp_vs_fixedfileinfo)VersionInfo "
"(mdmp_location_descriptor)CvRecord "
"(mdmp_location_descriptor)MiscRecord "
"Reserved0 Reserved1", 0);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_module_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_module_list.format",
sdb_fmt ("d[%i]? "
"NumberOfModule (mdmp_module)Modules",
module_list->number_of_modules,
0),
0);
for (i = 0; i < module_list->number_of_modules; i++) {
modules = (struct minidump_module *)(&(module_list->modules));
r_list_append(obj->streams.modules, &(modules[i]));
}
break;
case MEMORY_LIST_STREAM:
memory_list = (struct minidump_memory_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory_list.format",
sdb_fmt ("d[%i]? "
"NumberOfMemoryRanges "
"(mdmp_memory_descriptor)MemoryRanges ",
memory_list->number_of_memory_ranges,
0),
0);
for (i = 0; i < memory_list->number_of_memory_ranges; i++) {
memories = (struct minidump_memory_descriptor *)(&(memory_list->memory_ranges));
r_list_append (obj->streams.memories, &(memories[i]));
}
break;
case EXCEPTION_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
obj->streams.exception = (struct minidump_exception_stream *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_exception.format", "[4]E[4]Eqqdd[15]q "
"(mdmp_exception_code)ExceptionCode "
"(mdmp_exception_flags)ExceptionFlags "
"ExceptionRecord ExceptionAddress "
"NumberParameters __UnusedAlignment "
"ExceptionInformation", 0);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_exception_stream.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_exception_stream.format", "dd?? "
"ThreadId __Alignment "
"(mdmp_exception)ExceptionRecord "
"(mdmp_location_descriptor)ThreadContext", 0);
break;
case SYSTEM_INFO_STREAM:
obj->streams.system_info = (struct minidump_system_info *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_system_info.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
/* TODO: We need E as a byte! */
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_system_info.format", "[2]EwwbBddd[4]Ed[2]Ew[2]q "
"(mdmp_processor_architecture)ProcessorArchitecture "
"ProcessorLevel ProcessorRevision NumberOfProcessors "
"(mdmp_product_type)ProductType "
"MajorVersion MinorVersion BuildNumber (mdmp_platform_id)PlatformId "
"CsdVersionRva (mdmp_suite_mask)SuiteMask Reserved2 ProcessorFeatures", 0);
break;
case THREAD_EX_LIST_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
thread_ex_list = (struct minidump_thread_ex_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_ex.format", "ddddq??? "
"ThreadId SuspendCount PriorityClass Priority "
"Teb (mdmp_memory_descriptor)Stack "
"(mdmp_location_descriptor)ThreadContext "
"(mdmp_memory_descriptor)BackingStore", 0);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_ex_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_ex_list.format",
sdb_fmt ("d[%i]? NumberOfThreads "
"(mdmp_thread_ex)Threads",
thread_ex_list->number_of_threads, 0),
0);
for (i = 0; i < thread_ex_list->number_of_threads; i++) {
ex_threads = (struct minidump_thread_ex *)(&(thread_ex_list->threads));
r_list_append (obj->streams.ex_threads, &(ex_threads[i]));
}
break;
case MEMORY_64_LIST_STREAM:
memory64_list = (struct minidump_memory64_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory64_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory64_list.format",
sdb_fmt ("qq[%i]? NumberOfMemoryRanges "
"BaseRva "
"(mdmp_memory_descriptor64)MemoryRanges",
memory64_list->number_of_memory_ranges),
0);
obj->streams.memories64.base_rva = memory64_list->base_rva;
for (i = 0; i < memory64_list->number_of_memory_ranges; i++) {
memories64 = (struct minidump_memory_descriptor64 *)(&(memory64_list->memory_ranges));
r_list_append (obj->streams.memories64.memories, &(memories64[i]));
}
break;
case COMMENT_STREAM_A:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
obj->streams.comments_a = obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva;
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_comment_stream_a.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_comment_stream_a.format",
"s CommentA", 0);
break;
case COMMENT_STREAM_W:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
obj->streams.comments_w = obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva;
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_comment_stream_w.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_comment_stream_w.format",
"s CommentW", 0);
break;
case HANDLE_DATA_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
obj->streams.handle_data = (struct minidump_handle_data_stream *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_handle_data_stream.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_handle_data_stream.format", "dddd "
"SizeOfHeader SizeOfDescriptor "
"NumberOfDescriptors Reserved", 0);
break;
case FUNCTION_TABLE_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
obj->streams.function_table = (struct minidump_function_table_stream *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_function_table_stream.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_function_table_stream.format", "dddddd "
"SizeOfHeader SizeOfDescriptor SizeOfNativeDescriptor "
"SizeOfFunctionEntry NumberOfDescriptors SizeOfAlignPad",
0);
break;
case UNLOADED_MODULE_LIST_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
unloaded_module_list = (struct minidump_unloaded_module_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_unloaded_module.format", "qddtd "
"BaseOfImage SizeOfImage CheckSum TimeDateStamp "
"ModuleNameRva", 0);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_unloaded_module_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_unloaded_module_list.format", "ddd "
"SizeOfHeader SizeOfEntry NumberOfEntries", 0);
for (i = 0; i < unloaded_module_list->number_of_entries; i++) {
unloaded_modules = (struct minidump_unloaded_module *)((ut8 *)&unloaded_module_list + sizeof (struct minidump_unloaded_module_list));
r_list_append (obj->streams.unloaded_modules, &(unloaded_modules[i]));
}
break;
case MISC_INFO_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
obj->streams.misc_info.misc_info_1 = (struct minidump_misc_info *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
/* TODO: Handle different sizes */
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_misc_info.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_misc_info.format", "d[4]Bdtttddddd "
"SizeOfInfo (mdmp_misc1_flags)Flags1 ProcessId "
"ProcessCreateTime ProcessUserTime ProcessKernelTime "
"ProcessorMaxMhz ProcessorCurrentMhz "
"ProcessorMhzLimit ProcessorMaxIdleState "
"ProcessorCurrentIdleState", 0);
break;
case MEMORY_INFO_LIST_STREAM:
memory_info_list = (struct minidump_memory_info_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory_info.format",
"qq[4]Edq[4]E[4]E[4]Ed BaseAddress AllocationBase "
"(mdmp_page_protect)AllocationProtect __Alignment1 RegionSize "
"(mdmp_mem_state)State (mdmp_page_protect)Protect "
"(mdmp_mem_type)Type __Alignment2", 0);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory_info_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory_info_list.format",
sdb_fmt ("ddq[%i]? SizeOfHeader SizeOfEntry "
"NumberOfEntries (mdmp_memory_info)MemoryInfo",
memory_info_list->number_of_entries),
0);
for (i = 0; i < memory_info_list->number_of_entries; i++) {
memory_infos = (struct minidump_memory_info *)((ut8 *)memory_info_list + sizeof (struct minidump_memory_info_list));
r_list_append (obj->streams.memory_infos, &(memory_infos[i]));
}
break;
case THREAD_INFO_LIST_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
thread_info_list = (struct minidump_thread_info_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_info.format", "ddddttttqq "
"ThreadId DumpFlags DumpError ExitStatus CreateTime "
"ExitTime KernelTime UserTime StartAddress Affinity",
0);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_info_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_info_list.format", "ddd "
"SizeOfHeader SizeOfEntry NumberOfEntries", 0);
for (i = 0; i < thread_info_list->number_of_entries; i++) {
thread_infos = (struct minidump_thread_info *)((ut8 *)thread_info_list + sizeof (struct minidump_thread_info_list));
r_list_append (obj->streams.thread_infos, &(thread_infos[i]));
}
break;
case HANDLE_OPERATION_LIST_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
handle_operation_list = (struct minidump_handle_operation_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_handle_operation_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_handle_operation_list.format", "dddd "
"SizeOfHeader SizeOfEntry NumberOfEntries Reserved", 0);
for (i = 0; i < handle_operation_list->number_of_entries; i++) {
handle_operations = (struct avrf_handle_operation *)((ut8 *)handle_operation_list + sizeof (struct minidump_handle_operation_list));
r_list_append (obj->streams.operations, &(handle_operations[i]));
}
break;
case LAST_RESERVED_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
break;
case UNUSED_STREAM:
case RESERVED_STREAM_0:
case RESERVED_STREAM_1:
/* Silently ignore reserved streams */
break;
default:
eprintf ("[WARN] Invalid or unsupported enumeration encountered %i\n", entry->stream_type);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The r_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry function in mdmp.c in radare2 2.7.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted Mini Crash Dump file.
Commit Message: Fix #10464 - oobread crash in mdmp | Medium | 25,018 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int ext4_punch_hole(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, loff_t length)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t first_block, stop_block;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
loff_t first_block_offset, last_block_offset;
handle_t *handle;
unsigned int credits;
int ret = 0;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
trace_ext4_punch_hole(inode, offset, length, 0);
/*
* Write out all dirty pages to avoid race conditions
* Then release them.
*/
if (mapping->nrpages && mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY)) {
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(mapping, offset,
offset + length - 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/* No need to punch hole beyond i_size */
if (offset >= inode->i_size)
goto out_mutex;
/*
* If the hole extends beyond i_size, set the hole
* to end after the page that contains i_size
*/
if (offset + length > inode->i_size) {
length = inode->i_size +
PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - (inode->i_size & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1)) -
offset;
}
if (offset & (sb->s_blocksize - 1) ||
(offset + length) & (sb->s_blocksize - 1)) {
/*
* Attach jinode to inode for jbd2 if we do any zeroing of
* partial block
*/
ret = ext4_inode_attach_jinode(inode);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_mutex;
}
first_block_offset = round_up(offset, sb->s_blocksize);
last_block_offset = round_down((offset + length), sb->s_blocksize) - 1;
/* Now release the pages and zero block aligned part of pages*/
if (last_block_offset > first_block_offset)
truncate_pagecache_range(inode, first_block_offset,
last_block_offset);
/* Wait all existing dio workers, newcomers will block on i_mutex */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
credits = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
else
credits = ext4_blocks_for_truncate(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_TRUNCATE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
ext4_std_error(sb, ret);
goto out_dio;
}
ret = ext4_zero_partial_blocks(handle, inode, offset,
length);
if (ret)
goto out_stop;
first_block = (offset + sb->s_blocksize - 1) >>
EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
stop_block = (offset + length) >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
/* If there are no blocks to remove, return now */
if (first_block >= stop_block)
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, first_block,
stop_block - first_block);
if (ret) {
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
goto out_stop;
}
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
ret = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, first_block,
stop_block - 1);
else
ret = ext4_ind_remove_space(handle, inode, first_block,
stop_block);
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
/* Now release the pages again to reduce race window */
if (last_block_offset > first_block_offset)
truncate_pagecache_range(inode, first_block_offset,
last_block_offset);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
out_stop:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_dio:
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the ext4 filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (disk corruption) by writing to a page that is associated with a different user's file after unsynchronized hole punching and page-fault handling.
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | Medium | 10,280 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void ext4_end_io_dio(struct kiocb *iocb, loff_t offset,
ssize_t size, void *private)
{
ext4_io_end_t *io_end = iocb->private;
struct workqueue_struct *wq;
/* if not async direct IO or dio with 0 bytes write, just return */
if (!io_end || !size)
return;
ext_debug("ext4_end_io_dio(): io_end 0x%p"
"for inode %lu, iocb 0x%p, offset %llu, size %llu\n",
iocb->private, io_end->inode->i_ino, iocb, offset,
size);
/* if not aio dio with unwritten extents, just free io and return */
if (io_end->flag != EXT4_IO_UNWRITTEN){
ext4_free_io_end(io_end);
iocb->private = NULL;
return;
}
io_end->offset = offset;
io_end->size = size;
wq = EXT4_SB(io_end->inode->i_sb)->dio_unwritten_wq;
/* queue the work to convert unwritten extents to written */
queue_work(wq, &io_end->work);
/* Add the io_end to per-inode completed aio dio list*/
list_add_tail(&io_end->list,
&EXT4_I(io_end->inode)->i_completed_io_list);
iocb->private = NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> | Low | 16,404 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ieee802_15_4_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int hdrlen;
uint16_t fc;
uint8_t seq;
uint16_t panid = 0;
if (caplen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return caplen;
}
hdrlen = 3;
fc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
seq = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(p + 2);
p += 3;
caplen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"IEEE 802.15.4 %s packet ", ftypes[FC_FRAME_TYPE(fc)]));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"seq %02x ", seq));
/*
* Destination address and PAN ID, if present.
*/
switch (FC_DEST_ADDRESSING_MODE(fc)) {
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_NONE:
if (fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION) {
/*
* PAN ID compression; this requires that both
* the source and destination addresses be present,
* but the destination address is missing.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_RESERVED:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved destination addressing mode"));
return hdrlen;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_SHORT:
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p + 2)));
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_LONG:
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
if (caplen < 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p + 2)));
p += 8;
caplen -= 8;
hdrlen += 8;
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"< "));
/*
* Source address and PAN ID, if present.
*/
switch (FC_SRC_ADDRESSING_MODE(fc)) {
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_NONE:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_RESERVED:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved source addressing mode"));
return 0;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_SHORT:
if (!(fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION)) {
/*
* The source PAN ID is not compressed out, so
* fetch it. (Otherwise, we'll use the destination
* PAN ID, fetched above.)
*/
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
}
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p)));
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_LONG:
if (!(fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION)) {
/*
* The source PAN ID is not compressed out, so
* fetch it. (Otherwise, we'll use the destination
* PAN ID, fetched above.)
*/
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
}
if (caplen < 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p)));
p += 8;
caplen -= 8;
hdrlen += 8;
break;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
return hdrlen;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The IEEE 802.15.4 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-802_15_4.c:ieee802_15_4_if_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13000/IEEE 802.15.4: Fix bug introduced by previous fix.
We've already advanced the pointer past the PAN ID, if present; it now
points to the address, so don't add 2 to it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | Low | 26,073 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setTimeToSampleParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (!mTimeToSample.empty() || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mTimeToSampleCount = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if ((uint64_t)mTimeToSampleCount >
(uint64_t)UINT32_MAX / (2 * sizeof(uint32_t))) {
ALOGE(" Error: Time-to-sample table size too large.");
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
if (!mDataSource->getVector(data_offset + 8, &mTimeToSample,
mTimeToSampleCount * 2)) {
ALOGE(" Error: Incomplete data read for time-to-sample table.");
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mTimeToSample.size(); ++i) {
mTimeToSample.editItemAt(i) = ntohl(mTimeToSample[i]);
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: SampleTable.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 28076789.
Commit Message: SampleTable.cpp: Fixed a regression caused by a fix for bug
28076789.
Detail: Before the original fix
(Id207f369ab7b27787d83f5d8fc48dc53ed9fcdc9) for 28076789, the
code allowed a time-to-sample table size to be 0. The change
made in that fix disallowed such situation, which in fact should
be allowed. This current patch allows it again while maintaining
the security of the previous fix.
Bug: 28288202
Bug: 28076789
Change-Id: I1c9a60c7f0cfcbd3d908f24998dde15d5136a295
| Medium | 11,521 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
WORK_STATE ret;
ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
return ret;
}
#endif
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
* in case there are any unexpected retransmits
*/
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
}
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num = 0;
if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
/* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
if (s->server) {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
} else {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit)
s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
}
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* done with handshaking */
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The DTLS implementation in OpenSSL before 1.1.0 does not properly restrict the lifetime of queue entries associated with unused out-of-order messages, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by maintaining many crafted DTLS sessions simultaneously, related to d1_lib.c, statem_dtls.c, statem_lib.c, and statem_srvr.c.
Commit Message: | Low | 24,513 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int cypress_generic_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;
struct cypress_private *priv;
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cypress_private), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv)
return -ENOMEM;
priv->comm_is_ok = !0;
spin_lock_init(&priv->lock);
if (kfifo_alloc(&priv->write_fifo, CYPRESS_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL)) {
kfree(priv);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Skip reset for FRWD device. It is a workaound:
device hangs if it receives SET_CONFIGURE in Configured
state. */
if (!is_frwd(serial->dev))
usb_reset_configuration(serial->dev);
priv->cmd_ctrl = 0;
priv->line_control = 0;
priv->termios_initialized = 0;
priv->rx_flags = 0;
/* Default packet format setting is determined by packet size.
Anything with a size larger then 9 must have a separate
count field since the 3 bit count field is otherwise too
small. Otherwise we can use the slightly more compact
format. This is in accordance with the cypress_m8 serial
converter app note. */
if (port->interrupt_out_size > 9)
priv->pkt_fmt = packet_format_1;
else
priv->pkt_fmt = packet_format_2;
if (interval > 0) {
priv->write_urb_interval = interval;
priv->read_urb_interval = interval;
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - read & write intervals forced to %d\n",
__func__, interval);
} else {
priv->write_urb_interval = port->interrupt_out_urb->interval;
priv->read_urb_interval = port->interrupt_in_urb->interval;
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - intervals: read=%d write=%d\n",
__func__, priv->read_urb_interval,
priv->write_urb_interval);
}
usb_set_serial_port_data(port, priv);
port->port.drain_delay = 256;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.1 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a USB device without both an interrupt-in and an interrupt-out endpoint descriptor, related to the cypress_generic_port_probe and cypress_open functions.
Commit Message: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | Low | 8,821 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
key_perm_t perm)
{
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,
};
struct request_key_auth *rka;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
int ret;
try_again:
ctx.cred = get_current_cred();
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
switch (id) {
case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->thread_keyring) {
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
goto error;
ret = install_thread_keyring();
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
goto reget_creds;
}
key = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->process_keyring) {
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
goto error;
ret = install_process_keyring();
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
goto reget_creds;
}
key = ctx.cred->process_keyring;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->session_keyring) {
/* always install a session keyring upon access if one
* doesn't exist yet */
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)
ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
else
ret = install_session_keyring(
ctx.cred->user->session_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto reget_creds;
} else if (ctx.cred->session_keyring ==
ctx.cred->user->session_keyring &&
lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {
ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto reget_creds;
}
rcu_read_lock();
key = rcu_dereference(ctx.cred->session_keyring);
__key_get(key);
rcu_read_unlock();
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring) {
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
key = ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->user->session_keyring) {
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
key = ctx.cred->user->session_keyring;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:
/* group keyrings are not yet supported */
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
goto error;
case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
key = ctx.cred->request_key_auth;
if (!key)
goto error;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->request_key_auth)
goto error;
down_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
key = NULL;
} else {
rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];
key = rka->dest_keyring;
__key_get(key);
}
up_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (!key)
goto error;
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
default:
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (id < 1)
goto error;
key = key_lookup(id);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
goto error;
}
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
/* check to see if we possess the key */
ctx.index_key.type = key->type;
ctx.index_key.description = key->description;
ctx.index_key.desc_len = strlen(key->description);
ctx.match_data.raw_data = key;
kdebug("check possessed");
skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
kdebug("possessed=%p", skey_ref);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_put(key);
key_ref = skey_ref;
}
break;
}
/* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all
* the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */
if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {
ret = 0;
goto error;
}
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {
ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
switch (ret) {
case -ERESTARTSYS:
goto invalid_key;
default:
if (perm)
goto invalid_key;
case 0:
break;
}
} else if (perm) {
ret = key_validate(key);
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
}
ret = -EIO;
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
goto invalid_key;
/* check the permissions */
ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, perm);
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
error:
put_cred(ctx.cred);
return key_ref;
invalid_key:
key_ref_put(key_ref);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
/* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new
* creds to be installed */
reget_creds:
put_cred(ctx.cred);
goto try_again;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | Low | 23,499 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageHelperHTMLVideoElement(
const SecurityOrigin* security_origin,
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
HTMLVideoElement* video,
const IntRect& source_image_rect,
GLsizei depth,
GLint unpack_image_height,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
const char* func_name = GetTexImageFunctionName(function_id);
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateHTMLVideoElement(security_origin, func_name, video,
exception_state))
return;
WebGLTexture* texture =
ValidateTexImageBinding(func_name, function_id, target);
if (!texture)
return;
TexImageFunctionType function_type;
if (function_id == kTexImage2D || function_id == kTexImage3D)
function_type = kTexImage;
else
function_type = kTexSubImage;
if (!ValidateTexFunc(func_name, function_type, kSourceHTMLVideoElement,
target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 1, 0, format, type, xoffset,
yoffset, zoffset))
return;
WebMediaPlayer::VideoFrameUploadMetadata frame_metadata = {};
int already_uploaded_id = -1;
WebMediaPlayer::VideoFrameUploadMetadata* frame_metadata_ptr = nullptr;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::ExperimentalCanvasFeaturesEnabled()) {
already_uploaded_id = texture->GetLastUploadedVideoFrameId();
frame_metadata_ptr = &frame_metadata;
}
bool source_image_rect_is_default =
source_image_rect == SentinelEmptyRect() ||
source_image_rect ==
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight());
const bool use_copyTextureCHROMIUM = function_id == kTexImage2D &&
source_image_rect_is_default &&
depth == 1 && GL_TEXTURE_2D == target &&
CanUseTexImageByGPU(format, type);
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
DCHECK_EQ(xoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(yoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(zoffset, 0);
if (video->CopyVideoTextureToPlatformTexture(
ContextGL(), target, texture->Object(), internalformat, format,
type, level, unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr)) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
return;
}
}
if (source_image_rect_is_default) {
ScopedUnpackParametersResetRestore(
this, unpack_flip_y_ || unpack_premultiply_alpha_);
if (video->TexImageImpl(
static_cast<WebMediaPlayer::TexImageFunctionID>(function_id),
target, ContextGL(), texture->Object(), level,
ConvertTexInternalFormat(internalformat, type), format, type,
xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_ &&
unpack_colorspace_conversion_ == GL_NONE)) {
texture->ClearLastUploadedFrame();
return;
}
}
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageBufferSurface> surface =
WTF::WrapUnique(new AcceleratedImageBufferSurface(
IntSize(video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight())));
if (surface->IsValid()) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageBuffer> image_buffer(
ImageBuffer::Create(std::move(surface)));
if (image_buffer) {
video->PaintCurrentFrame(
image_buffer->Canvas(),
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight()), nullptr,
already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr);
TexImage2DBase(target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 0, format, type, nullptr);
if (image_buffer->CopyToPlatformTexture(
FunctionIDToSnapshotReason(function_id), ContextGL(), target,
texture->Object(), unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
IntPoint(0, 0),
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight()))) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
return;
}
}
}
}
scoped_refptr<Image> image =
VideoFrameToImage(video, already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr);
if (!image)
return;
TexImageImpl(function_id, target, level, internalformat, xoffset, yoffset,
zoffset, format, type, image.get(),
WebGLImageConversion::kHtmlDomVideo, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_, source_image_rect, depth,
unpack_image_height);
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient data validation in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Tighten about IntRect use in WebGL with overflow detection
BUG=784183
TEST=test case in the bug in ASAN build
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie25ca328af99de7828e28e6a6e3d775f1bebc43f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811826
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522213} | Medium | 13,269 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::FindCache(int64_t cache_id, CacheRecord* record) {
DCHECK(record);
if (!LazyOpen(kDontCreate))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"SELECT cache_id, group_id, online_wildcard, update_time, cache_size"
" FROM Caches WHERE cache_id = ?";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, cache_id);
if (!statement.Step())
return false;
ReadCacheRecord(statement, record);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Resource size information leakage in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 75.0.3770.80 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719} | Medium | 13,437 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int nci_extract_activation_params_iso_dep(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf *ntf, __u8 *data)
{
struct activation_params_nfca_poll_iso_dep *nfca_poll;
struct activation_params_nfcb_poll_iso_dep *nfcb_poll;
switch (ntf->activation_rf_tech_and_mode) {
case NCI_NFC_A_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
nfca_poll = &ntf->activation_params.nfca_poll_iso_dep;
nfca_poll->rats_res_len = *data++;
pr_debug("rats_res_len %d\n", nfca_poll->rats_res_len);
if (nfca_poll->rats_res_len > 0) {
memcpy(nfca_poll->rats_res,
data, nfca_poll->rats_res_len);
}
break;
case NCI_NFC_B_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE:
nfcb_poll = &ntf->activation_params.nfcb_poll_iso_dep;
nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len = *data++;
pr_debug("attrib_res_len %d\n", nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len);
if (nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len > 0) {
memcpy(nfcb_poll->attrib_res,
data, nfcb_poll->attrib_res_len);
}
break;
default:
pr_err("unsupported activation_rf_tech_and_mode 0x%x\n",
ntf->activation_rf_tech_and_mode);
return NCI_STATUS_RF_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
return NCI_STATUS_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in the Near Field Communication Controller Interface (NCI) in the Linux kernel before 3.4.5 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via incoming frames with crafted length fields.
Commit Message: NFC: Prevent multiple buffer overflows in NCI
Fix multiple remotely-exploitable stack-based buffer overflows due to
the NCI code pulling length fields directly from incoming frames and
copying too much data into statically-sized arrays.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Ilan Elias <ilane@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> | Low | 23,098 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int dev_forward_skb(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
skb_orphan(skb);
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_UP))
return NET_RX_DROP;
if (skb->len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len))
return NET_RX_DROP;
skb_set_dev(skb, dev);
skb->tstamp.tv64 = 0;
skb->pkt_type = PACKET_HOST;
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, dev);
return netif_rx(skb);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The veth (aka virtual Ethernet) driver in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly manage skbs during congestion, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging lack of skb consumption in conjunction with a double-free error.
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | Low | 11,212 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> UnpackPermissionSet(
const Permissions& permissions, std::string* error) {
APIPermissionSet apis;
std::vector<std::string>* permissions_list = permissions.permissions.get();
if (permissions_list) {
PermissionsInfo* info = PermissionsInfo::GetInstance();
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = permissions_list->begin();
it != permissions_list->end(); ++it) {
if (it->find(kDelimiter) != std::string::npos) {
size_t delimiter = it->find(kDelimiter);
std::string permission_name = it->substr(0, delimiter);
std::string permission_arg = it->substr(delimiter + 1);
scoped_ptr<base::Value> permission_json(
base::JSONReader::Read(permission_arg));
if (!permission_json.get()) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kInvalidParameter, *it);
return NULL;
}
APIPermission* permission = NULL;
const APIPermissionInfo* bluetooth_device_permission_info =
info->GetByID(APIPermission::kBluetoothDevice);
const APIPermissionInfo* usb_device_permission_info =
info->GetByID(APIPermission::kUsbDevice);
if (permission_name == bluetooth_device_permission_info->name()) {
permission = new BluetoothDevicePermission(
bluetooth_device_permission_info);
} else if (permission_name == usb_device_permission_info->name()) {
permission = new UsbDevicePermission(usb_device_permission_info);
} else {
*error = kUnsupportedPermissionId;
return NULL;
}
CHECK(permission);
if (!permission->FromValue(permission_json.get())) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kInvalidParameter, *it);
return NULL;
}
apis.insert(permission);
} else {
const APIPermissionInfo* permission_info = info->GetByName(*it);
if (!permission_info) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kUnknownPermissionError, *it);
return NULL;
}
apis.insert(permission_info->id());
}
}
}
URLPatternSet origins;
if (permissions.origins.get()) {
for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator it = permissions.origins->begin();
it != permissions.origins->end(); ++it) {
URLPattern origin(Extension::kValidHostPermissionSchemes);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = origin.Parse(*it);
if (URLPattern::PARSE_SUCCESS != parse_result) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kInvalidOrigin,
*it,
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return NULL;
}
origins.AddPattern(origin);
}
}
return scoped_refptr<PermissionSet>(
new PermissionSet(apis, origins, URLPatternSet()));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The extension functionality in Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not verify that use of the permissions API is consistent with file permissions, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 19,006 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: smb_flush_file(struct smb_request *sr, struct smb_ofile *ofile)
{
sr->user_cr = smb_ofile_getcred(ofile);
if ((ofile->f_node->flags & NODE_FLAGS_WRITE_THROUGH) == 0)
(void) smb_fsop_commit(sr, sr->user_cr, ofile->f_node);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: illumos smbsrv NULL pointer dereference allows system crash.
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <matt.barden@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <evan.layton@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com> | Low | 19,455 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int on_http_message_complete(http_parser* parser)
{
struct clt_info *info = parser->data;
ws_svr *svr = ws_svr_from_ses(info->ses);
info->request->version_major = parser->http_major;
info->request->version_minor = parser->http_minor;
info->request->method = parser->method;
dict_entry *entry;
dict_iterator *iter = dict_get_iterator(info->request->headers);
while ((entry = dict_next(iter)) != NULL) {
log_trace("Header: %s: %s", (char *)entry->key, (char *)entry->val);
}
dict_release_iterator(iter);
if (info->request->method != HTTP_GET)
goto error;
if (http_request_get_header(info->request, "Host") == NULL)
goto error;
double version = info->request->version_major + info->request->version_minor * 0.1;
if (version < 1.1)
goto error;
const char *upgrade = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Upgrade");
if (upgrade == NULL || strcasecmp(upgrade, "websocket") != 0)
goto error;
const char *connection = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Connection");
if (connection == NULL)
goto error;
else {
bool found_upgrade = false;
int count;
sds *tokens = sdssplitlen(connection, strlen(connection), ",", 1, &count);
if (tokens == NULL)
goto error;
for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
sds token = tokens[i];
sdstrim(token, " ");
if (strcasecmp(token, "Upgrade") == 0) {
found_upgrade = true;
break;
}
}
sdsfreesplitres(tokens, count);
if (!found_upgrade)
goto error;
}
const char *ws_version = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Sec-WebSocket-Version");
if (ws_version == NULL || strcmp(ws_version, "13") != 0)
goto error;
const char *ws_key = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Sec-WebSocket-Key");
if (ws_key == NULL)
goto error;
const char *protocol_list = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Sec-WebSocket-Protocol");
if (protocol_list && !is_good_protocol(protocol_list, svr->protocol))
goto error;
if (strlen(svr->origin) > 0) {
const char *origin = http_request_get_header(info->request, "Origin");
if (origin == NULL || !is_good_origin(origin, svr->origin))
goto error;
}
if (svr->type.on_privdata_alloc) {
info->privdata = svr->type.on_privdata_alloc(svr);
if (info->privdata == NULL)
goto error;
}
info->upgrade = true;
info->remote = sdsnew(http_get_remote_ip(info->ses, info->request));
info->url = sdsnew(info->request->url);
if (svr->type.on_upgrade) {
svr->type.on_upgrade(info->ses, info->remote);
}
if (protocol_list) {
send_hand_shake_reply(info->ses, svr->protocol, ws_key);
} else {
send_hand_shake_reply(info->ses, NULL, ws_key);
}
return 0;
error:
ws_svr_close_clt(ws_svr_from_ses(info->ses), info->ses);
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: utils/ut_ws_svr.c in ViaBTC Exchange Server before 2018-08-21 has an integer overflow leading to memory corruption.
Commit Message: Merge pull request #131 from benjaminchodroff/master
fix memory corruption and other 32bit overflows | Low | 16,484 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ssize_t pcnet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_)
{
PCNetState *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
int is_padr = 0, is_bcast = 0, is_ladr = 0;
uint8_t buf1[60];
int remaining;
int crc_err = 0;
int size = size_;
if (CSR_DRX(s) || CSR_STOP(s) || CSR_SPND(s) || !size ||
(CSR_LOOP(s) && !s->looptest)) {
return -1;
}
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG
printf("pcnet_receive size=%d\n", size);
#endif
/* if too small buffer, then expand it */
if (size < MIN_BUF_SIZE) {
memcpy(buf1, buf, size);
memset(buf1 + size, 0, MIN_BUF_SIZE - size);
buf = buf1;
size = MIN_BUF_SIZE;
}
if (CSR_PROM(s)
|| (is_padr=padr_match(s, buf, size))
|| (is_bcast=padr_bcast(s, buf, size))
|| (is_ladr=ladr_match(s, buf, size))) {
pcnet_rdte_poll(s);
if (!(CSR_CRST(s) & 0x8000) && s->rdra) {
struct pcnet_RMD rmd;
int rcvrc = CSR_RCVRC(s)-1,i;
hwaddr nrda;
for (i = CSR_RCVRL(s)-1; i > 0; i--, rcvrc--) {
if (rcvrc <= 1)
rcvrc = CSR_RCVRL(s);
nrda = s->rdra +
(CSR_RCVRL(s) - rcvrc) *
(BCR_SWSTYLE(s) ? 16 : 8 );
RMDLOAD(&rmd, nrda);
if (GET_FIELD(rmd.status, RMDS, OWN)) {
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
printf("pcnet - scan buffer: RCVRC=%d PREV_RCVRC=%d\n",
rcvrc, CSR_RCVRC(s));
#endif
CSR_RCVRC(s) = rcvrc;
pcnet_rdte_poll(s);
break;
}
}
}
if (!(CSR_CRST(s) & 0x8000)) {
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
printf("pcnet - no buffer: RCVRC=%d\n", CSR_RCVRC(s));
#endif
s->csr[0] |= 0x1000; /* Set MISS flag */
CSR_MISSC(s)++;
} else {
uint8_t *src = s->buffer;
hwaddr crda = CSR_CRDA(s);
struct pcnet_RMD rmd;
int pktcount = 0;
if (!s->looptest) {
memcpy(src, buf, size);
/* no need to compute the CRC */
src[size] = 0;
uint32_t fcs = ~0;
uint8_t *p = src;
while (p != &src[size])
CRC(fcs, *p++);
*(uint32_t *)p = htonl(fcs);
size += 4;
} else {
uint32_t fcs = ~0;
uint8_t *p = src;
while (p != &src[size])
CRC(fcs, *p++);
crc_err = (*(uint32_t *)p != htonl(fcs));
}
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_MATCH
PRINT_PKTHDR(buf);
#endif
RMDLOAD(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,crda));
/*if (!CSR_LAPPEN(s))*/
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, STP, 1);
#define PCNET_RECV_STORE() do { \
int count = MIN(4096 - GET_FIELD(rmd.buf_length, RMDL, BCNT),remaining); \
hwaddr rbadr = PHYSADDR(s, rmd.rbadr); \
s->phys_mem_write(s->dma_opaque, rbadr, src, count, CSR_BSWP(s)); \
src += count; remaining -= count; \
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, OWN, 0); \
RMDSTORE(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,crda)); \
pktcount++; \
} while (0)
remaining = size;
PCNET_RECV_STORE();
if ((remaining > 0) && CSR_NRDA(s)) {
hwaddr nrda = CSR_NRDA(s);
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
PRINT_RMD(&rmd);
#endif
RMDLOAD(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,nrda));
if (GET_FIELD(rmd.status, RMDS, OWN)) {
crda = nrda;
PCNET_RECV_STORE();
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
PRINT_RMD(&rmd);
#endif
if ((remaining > 0) && (nrda=CSR_NNRD(s))) {
RMDLOAD(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,nrda));
if (GET_FIELD(rmd.status, RMDS, OWN)) {
crda = nrda;
PCNET_RECV_STORE();
}
}
}
}
#undef PCNET_RECV_STORE
RMDLOAD(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,crda));
if (remaining == 0) {
SET_FIELD(&rmd.msg_length, RMDM, MCNT, size);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, ENP, 1);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, PAM, !CSR_PROM(s) && is_padr);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, LFAM, !CSR_PROM(s) && is_ladr);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, BAM, !CSR_PROM(s) && is_bcast);
if (crc_err) {
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, CRC, 1);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, ERR, 1);
}
} else {
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, OFLO, 1);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, BUFF, 1);
SET_FIELD(&rmd.status, RMDS, ERR, 1);
}
RMDSTORE(&rmd, PHYSADDR(s,crda));
s->csr[0] |= 0x0400;
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG
printf("RCVRC=%d CRDA=0x%08x BLKS=%d\n",
CSR_RCVRC(s), PHYSADDR(s,CSR_CRDA(s)), pktcount);
#endif
#ifdef PCNET_DEBUG_RMD
PRINT_RMD(&rmd);
#endif
while (pktcount--) {
if (CSR_RCVRC(s) <= 1)
CSR_RCVRC(s) = CSR_RCVRL(s);
else
CSR_RCVRC(s)--;
}
pcnet_rdte_poll(s);
}
}
pcnet_poll(s);
pcnet_update_irq(s);
return size_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the pcnet_receive function in hw/net/pcnet.c in QEMU, when a guest NIC has a larger MTU, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) or execute arbitrary code via a large packet.
Commit Message: | Medium | 26,426 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool SampleTable::isValid() const {
return mChunkOffsetOffset >= 0
&& mSampleToChunkOffset >= 0
&& mSampleSizeOffset >= 0
&& !mTimeToSample.empty();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: SampleTable.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 28076789.
Commit Message: SampleTable.cpp: Fixed a regression caused by a fix for bug
28076789.
Detail: Before the original fix
(Id207f369ab7b27787d83f5d8fc48dc53ed9fcdc9) for 28076789, the
code allowed a time-to-sample table size to be 0. The change
made in that fix disallowed such situation, which in fact should
be allowed. This current patch allows it again while maintaining
the security of the previous fix.
Bug: 28288202
Bug: 28076789
Change-Id: I1c9a60c7f0cfcbd3d908f24998dde15d5136a295
| Medium | 13,572 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
unsigned long cs;
int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &ctxt->_eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
if (ctxt->op_bytes == 4)
ctxt->_eip = (u32)ctxt->_eip;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &cs, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
/* Outer-privilege level return is not implemented */
if (ctxt->mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 && (cs & 3) > cpl)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
rc = load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, (u16)cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
return rc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly perform RIP changes, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during loading the new RIP, we are left in
unconsistent state. Therefore, this patch saves on 64-bit the old CS
descriptor and restores it if loading RIP failed.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | Low | 20,534 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: StateBase* writeFileList(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value, StateBase* next)
{
FileList* fileList = V8FileList::toNative(value.As<v8::Object>());
if (!fileList)
return 0;
unsigned length = fileList->length();
Vector<int> blobIndices;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
int blobIndex = -1;
const File* file = fileList->item(i);
if (file->hasBeenClosed())
return handleError(DataCloneError, "A File object has been closed, and could therefore not be cloned.", next);
m_blobDataHandles.add(file->uuid(), file->blobDataHandle());
if (appendFileInfo(file, &blobIndex)) {
ASSERT(!i || blobIndex > 0);
ASSERT(blobIndex >= 0);
blobIndices.append(blobIndex);
}
}
if (!blobIndices.isEmpty())
m_writer.writeFileListIndex(blobIndices);
else
m_writer.writeFileList(*fileList);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the V8 bindings in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 37.0.2062.94, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper use of HashMap add operations instead of HashMap set operations, related to bindings/core/v8/DOMWrapperMap.h and bindings/core/v8/SerializedScriptValue.cpp.
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Low | 8,142 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool CheckClientDownloadRequest::ShouldUploadForDlpScan() {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kDeepScanningOfDownloads))
return false;
int check_content_compliance = g_browser_process->local_state()->GetInteger(
prefs::kCheckContentCompliance);
if (check_content_compliance !=
CheckContentComplianceValues::CHECK_DOWNLOADS &&
check_content_compliance !=
CheckContentComplianceValues::CHECK_UPLOADS_AND_DOWNLOADS)
return false;
if (policy::BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveDMToken().empty())
return false;
const base::ListValue* domains = g_browser_process->local_state()->GetList(
prefs::kURLsToCheckComplianceOfDownloadedContent);
url_matcher::URLMatcher matcher;
policy::url_util::AddAllowFilters(&matcher, domains);
return !matcher.MatchURL(item_->GetURL()).empty();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient Policy Enforcement in Omnibox in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.104 for Mac allowed a remote attacker to perform domain spoofing via a crafted domain name.
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196} | Medium | 24,975 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: stringprep (char *in,
size_t maxlen,
Stringprep_profile_flags flags,
const Stringprep_profile * profile)
{
int rc;
char *utf8 = NULL;
uint32_t *ucs4 = NULL;
size_t ucs4len, maxucs4len, adducs4len = 50;
do
{
uint32_t *newp;
free (ucs4);
ucs4 = stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 (in, -1, &ucs4len);
maxucs4len = ucs4len + adducs4len;
newp = realloc (ucs4, maxucs4len * sizeof (uint32_t));
if (!newp)
return STRINGPREP_MALLOC_ERROR;
}
ucs4 = newp;
rc = stringprep_4i (ucs4, &ucs4len, maxucs4len, flags, profile);
adducs4len += 50;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The stringprep_utf8_to_ucs4 function in libin before 1.31, as used in jabberd2, allows context-dependent attackers to read system memory and possibly have other unspecified impact via invalid UTF-8 characters in a string, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: | Low | 17,582 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium::setRemoteDescription(PassRefPtr<RTCVoidRequest> request, PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor> sessionDescription)
{
if (!m_webHandler)
return;
m_webHandler->setRemoteDescription(request, sessionDescription);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163, does not properly perform object sealing, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that leverage *type confusion.*
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Low | 27,779 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: png_set_IHDR(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_uint_32 width, png_uint_32 height, int bit_depth,
int color_type, int interlace_type, int compression_type,
int filter_type)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "IHDR");
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL)
return;
info_ptr->width = width;
info_ptr->height = height;
info_ptr->bit_depth = (png_byte)bit_depth;
info_ptr->color_type = (png_byte)color_type;
info_ptr->compression_type = (png_byte)compression_type;
info_ptr->filter_type = (png_byte)filter_type;
info_ptr->interlace_type = (png_byte)interlace_type;
png_check_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr->width, info_ptr->height,
info_ptr->bit_depth, info_ptr->color_type, info_ptr->interlace_type,
info_ptr->compression_type, info_ptr->filter_type);
if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
info_ptr->channels = 1;
else if (info_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
info_ptr->channels = 3;
else
info_ptr->channels = 1;
if (info_ptr->color_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA)
info_ptr->channels++;
info_ptr->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(info_ptr->channels * info_ptr->bit_depth);
/* Check for potential overflow */
if (width > (PNG_UINT_32_MAX
>> 3) /* 8-byte RGBA pixels */
- 64 /* bigrowbuf hack */
- 1 /* filter byte */
- 7*8 /* rounding of width to multiple of 8 pixels */
- 8) /* extra max_pixel_depth pad */
info_ptr->rowbytes = (png_size_t)0;
else
info_ptr->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(info_ptr->pixel_depth, width);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298} | Low | 18,113 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: vbf_stp_error(struct worker *wrk, struct busyobj *bo)
{
ssize_t l, ll, o;
double now;
uint8_t *ptr;
struct vsb *synth_body;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(wrk, WORKER_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo, BUSYOBJ_MAGIC);
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo->fetch_objcore, OBJCORE_MAGIC);
AN(bo->fetch_objcore->flags & OC_F_BUSY);
assert(bo->director_state == DIR_S_NULL);
wrk->stats->fetch_failed++;
now = W_TIM_real(wrk);
VSLb_ts_busyobj(bo, "Error", now);
if (bo->fetch_objcore->stobj->stevedore != NULL)
ObjFreeObj(bo->wrk, bo->fetch_objcore);
HTTP_Setup(bo->beresp, bo->ws, bo->vsl, SLT_BerespMethod);
http_PutResponse(bo->beresp, "HTTP/1.1", 503, "Backend fetch failed");
http_TimeHeader(bo->beresp, "Date: ", now);
http_SetHeader(bo->beresp, "Server: Varnish");
bo->fetch_objcore->t_origin = now;
if (!VTAILQ_EMPTY(&bo->fetch_objcore->objhead->waitinglist)) {
/*
* If there is a waitinglist, it means that there is no
* grace-able object, so cache the error return for a
* short time, so the waiting list can drain, rather than
* each objcore on the waiting list sequentially attempt
* to fetch from the backend.
*/
bo->fetch_objcore->ttl = 1;
bo->fetch_objcore->grace = 5;
bo->fetch_objcore->keep = 5;
} else {
bo->fetch_objcore->ttl = 0;
bo->fetch_objcore->grace = 0;
bo->fetch_objcore->keep = 0;
}
synth_body = VSB_new_auto();
AN(synth_body);
VCL_backend_error_method(bo->vcl, wrk, NULL, bo, synth_body);
AZ(VSB_finish(synth_body));
if (wrk->handling == VCL_RET_ABANDON || wrk->handling == VCL_RET_FAIL) {
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
if (wrk->handling == VCL_RET_RETRY) {
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
if (bo->retries++ < cache_param->max_retries)
return (F_STP_RETRY);
VSLb(bo->vsl, SLT_VCL_Error, "Too many retries, failing");
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
assert(wrk->handling == VCL_RET_DELIVER);
bo->vfc->bo = bo;
bo->vfc->wrk = bo->wrk;
bo->vfc->oc = bo->fetch_objcore;
bo->vfc->http = bo->beresp;
bo->vfc->esi_req = bo->bereq;
if (vbf_beresp2obj(bo)) {
(void)VFP_Error(bo->vfc, "Could not get storage");
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
ll = VSB_len(synth_body);
o = 0;
while (ll > 0) {
l = ll;
if (VFP_GetStorage(bo->vfc, &l, &ptr) != VFP_OK)
break;
memcpy(ptr, VSB_data(synth_body) + o, l);
VFP_Extend(bo->vfc, l);
ll -= l;
o += l;
}
AZ(ObjSetU64(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, OA_LEN, o));
VSB_destroy(&synth_body);
HSH_Unbusy(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore);
ObjSetState(wrk, bo->fetch_objcore, BOS_FINISHED);
return (F_STP_DONE);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: vbf_stp_error in bin/varnishd/cache/cache_fetch.c in Varnish HTTP Cache 4.1.x before 4.1.9 and 5.x before 5.2.1 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory because a VFP_GetStorage buffer is larger than intended in certain circumstances involving -sfile Stevedore transient objects.
Commit Message: Avoid buffer read overflow on vcl_error and -sfile
The file stevedore may return a buffer larger than asked for when
requesting storage. Due to lack of check for this condition, the code
to copy the synthetic error memory buffer from vcl_error would overrun
the buffer.
Patch by @shamger
Fixes: #2429 | Low | 10,510 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void SubpelVarianceTest<SubpelVarianceFunctionType>::RefTest() {
for (int x = 0; x < 16; ++x) {
for (int y = 0; y < 16; ++y) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1; j++) {
ref_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var1 = subpel_variance_(ref_, width_ + 1, x, y,
src_, width_, &sse1));
const unsigned int var2 = subpel_variance_ref(ref_, src_, log2width_,
log2height_, x, y, &sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2) << "at position " << x << ", " << y;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| Low | 11,848 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setTimeToSampleParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mTimeToSample != NULL || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mTimeToSampleCount = U32_AT(&header[4]);
uint64_t allocSize = (uint64_t)mTimeToSampleCount * 2 * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > UINT32_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mTimeToSample = new (std::nothrow) uint32_t[mTimeToSampleCount * 2];
if (!mTimeToSample)
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
size_t size = sizeof(uint32_t) * mTimeToSampleCount * 2;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, mTimeToSample, size) < (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mTimeToSampleCount * 2; ++i) {
mTimeToSample[i] = ntohl(mTimeToSample[i]);
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: SampleTable.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted file, aka internal bug 28076789.
Commit Message: Resolve merge conflict when cp'ing ag/931301 to mnc-mr1-release
Change-Id: I079d1db2d30d126f8aed348bd62451acf741037d
| Medium | 27,170 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: status_t Camera2Client::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
result.appendFormat("Client2[%d] (%p) Client: %s PID: %d, dump:\n",
mCameraId,
getRemoteCallback()->asBinder().get(),
String8(mClientPackageName).string(),
mClientPid);
result.append(" State: ");
#define CASE_APPEND_ENUM(x) case x: result.append(#x "\n"); break;
const Parameters& p = mParameters.unsafeAccess();
result.append(Parameters::getStateName(p.state));
result.append("\n Current parameters:\n");
result.appendFormat(" Preview size: %d x %d\n",
p.previewWidth, p.previewHeight);
result.appendFormat(" Preview FPS range: %d - %d\n",
p.previewFpsRange[0], p.previewFpsRange[1]);
result.appendFormat(" Preview HAL pixel format: 0x%x\n",
p.previewFormat);
result.appendFormat(" Preview transform: %x\n",
p.previewTransform);
result.appendFormat(" Picture size: %d x %d\n",
p.pictureWidth, p.pictureHeight);
result.appendFormat(" Jpeg thumbnail size: %d x %d\n",
p.jpegThumbSize[0], p.jpegThumbSize[1]);
result.appendFormat(" Jpeg quality: %d, thumbnail quality: %d\n",
p.jpegQuality, p.jpegThumbQuality);
result.appendFormat(" Jpeg rotation: %d\n", p.jpegRotation);
result.appendFormat(" GPS tags %s\n",
p.gpsEnabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
if (p.gpsEnabled) {
result.appendFormat(" GPS lat x long x alt: %f x %f x %f\n",
p.gpsCoordinates[0], p.gpsCoordinates[1],
p.gpsCoordinates[2]);
result.appendFormat(" GPS timestamp: %lld\n",
p.gpsTimestamp);
result.appendFormat(" GPS processing method: %s\n",
p.gpsProcessingMethod.string());
}
result.append(" White balance mode: ");
switch (p.wbMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_INCANDESCENT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_FLUORESCENT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_WARM_FLUORESCENT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_DAYLIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_CLOUDY_DAYLIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_TWILIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_SHADE)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Effect mode: ");
switch (p.effectMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_OFF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_MONO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_NEGATIVE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_SOLARIZE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_SEPIA)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_POSTERIZE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_WHITEBOARD)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_BLACKBOARD)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_AQUA)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Antibanding mode: ");
switch (p.antibandingMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_OFF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_50HZ)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_60HZ)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Scene mode: ");
switch (p.sceneMode) {
case ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_UNSUPPORTED:
result.append("AUTO\n"); break;
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_ACTION)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_PORTRAIT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_LANDSCAPE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_NIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_NIGHT_PORTRAIT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_THEATRE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_BEACH)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_SNOW)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_SUNSET)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_STEADYPHOTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_FIREWORKS)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_SPORTS)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_PARTY)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_CANDLELIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_BARCODE)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Flash mode: ");
switch (p.flashMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_OFF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_ON)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_TORCH)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_RED_EYE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_INVALID)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Focus mode: ");
switch (p.focusMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_MACRO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_CONTINUOUS_VIDEO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_CONTINUOUS_PICTURE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_EDOF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_INFINITY)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_FIXED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_INVALID)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Focus state: ");
switch (p.focusState) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_INACTIVE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_PASSIVE_SCAN)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_PASSIVE_FOCUSED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_PASSIVE_UNFOCUSED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_ACTIVE_SCAN)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_FOCUSED_LOCKED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_NOT_FOCUSED_LOCKED)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Focusing areas:\n");
for (size_t i = 0; i < p.focusingAreas.size(); i++) {
result.appendFormat(" [ (%d, %d, %d, %d), weight %d ]\n",
p.focusingAreas[i].left,
p.focusingAreas[i].top,
p.focusingAreas[i].right,
p.focusingAreas[i].bottom,
p.focusingAreas[i].weight);
}
result.appendFormat(" Exposure compensation index: %d\n",
p.exposureCompensation);
result.appendFormat(" AE lock %s, AWB lock %s\n",
p.autoExposureLock ? "enabled" : "disabled",
p.autoWhiteBalanceLock ? "enabled" : "disabled" );
result.appendFormat(" Metering areas:\n");
for (size_t i = 0; i < p.meteringAreas.size(); i++) {
result.appendFormat(" [ (%d, %d, %d, %d), weight %d ]\n",
p.meteringAreas[i].left,
p.meteringAreas[i].top,
p.meteringAreas[i].right,
p.meteringAreas[i].bottom,
p.meteringAreas[i].weight);
}
result.appendFormat(" Zoom index: %d\n", p.zoom);
result.appendFormat(" Video size: %d x %d\n", p.videoWidth,
p.videoHeight);
result.appendFormat(" Recording hint is %s\n",
p.recordingHint ? "set" : "not set");
result.appendFormat(" Video stabilization is %s\n",
p.videoStabilization ? "enabled" : "disabled");
result.appendFormat(" Selected still capture FPS range: %d - %d\n",
p.fastInfo.bestStillCaptureFpsRange[0],
p.fastInfo.bestStillCaptureFpsRange[1]);
result.append(" Current streams:\n");
result.appendFormat(" Preview stream ID: %d\n",
getPreviewStreamId());
result.appendFormat(" Capture stream ID: %d\n",
getCaptureStreamId());
result.appendFormat(" Recording stream ID: %d\n",
getRecordingStreamId());
result.append(" Quirks for this camera:\n");
bool haveQuirk = false;
if (p.quirks.triggerAfWithAuto) {
result.appendFormat(" triggerAfWithAuto\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (p.quirks.useZslFormat) {
result.appendFormat(" useZslFormat\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (p.quirks.meteringCropRegion) {
result.appendFormat(" meteringCropRegion\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (p.quirks.partialResults) {
result.appendFormat(" usePartialResult\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (!haveQuirk) {
result.appendFormat(" none\n");
}
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
mStreamingProcessor->dump(fd, args);
mCaptureSequencer->dump(fd, args);
mFrameProcessor->dump(fd, args);
mZslProcessor->dump(fd, args);
return dumpDevice(fd, args);
#undef CASE_APPEND_ENUM
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libcameraservice in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not require use of the ICameraService::dump method for a camera service dump, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that directly dumps, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26265403.
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
| Medium | 14,130 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: devzvol_readdir(struct vnode *dvp, struct uio *uiop, struct cred *cred,
int *eofp, caller_context_t *ct_unused, int flags_unused)
{
struct sdev_node *sdvp = VTOSDEV(dvp);
char *ptr;
sdcmn_err13(("zv readdir of '%s' %s'", sdvp->sdev_path,
sdvp->sdev_name));
if (strcmp(sdvp->sdev_path, ZVOL_DIR) == 0) {
struct vnode *vp;
rw_exit(&sdvp->sdev_contents);
(void) devname_lookup_func(sdvp, "dsk", &vp, cred,
devzvol_create_dir, SDEV_VATTR);
VN_RELE(vp);
(void) devname_lookup_func(sdvp, "rdsk", &vp, cred,
devzvol_create_dir, SDEV_VATTR);
VN_RELE(vp);
rw_enter(&sdvp->sdev_contents, RW_READER);
return (devname_readdir_func(dvp, uiop, cred, eofp, 0));
}
if (uiop->uio_offset == 0)
devzvol_prunedir(sdvp);
ptr = sdvp->sdev_path + strlen(ZVOL_DIR);
if ((strcmp(ptr, "/dsk") == 0) || (strcmp(ptr, "/rdsk") == 0)) {
rw_exit(&sdvp->sdev_contents);
devzvol_create_pool_dirs(dvp);
rw_enter(&sdvp->sdev_contents, RW_READER);
return (devname_readdir_func(dvp, uiop, cred, eofp, 0));
}
ptr = strchr(ptr + 1, '/') + 1;
rw_exit(&sdvp->sdev_contents);
sdev_iter_datasets(dvp, ZFS_IOC_DATASET_LIST_NEXT, ptr);
rw_enter(&sdvp->sdev_contents, RW_READER);
return (devname_readdir_func(dvp, uiop, cred, eofp, 0));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The devzvol_readdir function in illumos does not check the return value of a strchr call, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: 5421 devzvol_readdir() needs to be more careful with strchr
Reviewed by: Keith Wesolowski <keith.wesolowski@joyent.com>
Reviewed by: Jerry Jelinek <jerry.jelinek@joyent.com>
Approved by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com> | Low | 20,013 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
{
struct user_namespace *ns, *parent_ns = new->user_ns;
kuid_t owner = new->euid;
kgid_t group = new->egid;
int ret;
/* The creator needs a mapping in the parent user namespace
* or else we won't be able to reasonably tell userspace who
* created a user_namespace.
*/
if (!kuid_has_mapping(parent_ns, owner) ||
!kgid_has_mapping(parent_ns, group))
return -EPERM;
ns = kmem_cache_zalloc(user_ns_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ns)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = proc_alloc_inum(&ns->proc_inum);
if (ret) {
kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns);
return ret;
}
atomic_set(&ns->count, 1);
/* Leave the new->user_ns reference with the new user namespace. */
ns->parent = parent_ns;
ns->owner = owner;
ns->group = group;
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The create_user_ns function in kernel/user_namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.6 does not check whether a chroot directory exists that differs from the namespace root directory, which allows local users to bypass intended filesystem restrictions via a crafted clone system call.
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.
Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.
For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.
Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> | Low | 10,237 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: MagickExport int LocaleUppercase(const int c)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_LOCALE_SUPPORT)
if (c_locale != (locale_t) NULL)
return(toupper_l(c,c_locale));
#endif
return(toupper(c));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: LocaleLowercase in MagickCore/locale.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.8-32 allows out-of-bounds access, leading to a SIGSEGV.
Commit Message: ... | Medium | 23,214 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: AppControllerImpl::~AppControllerImpl() {
if (apps::AppServiceProxy::Get(profile_))
app_service_proxy_->AppRegistryCache().RemoveObserver(this);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted PDF files.
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122} | Medium | 23,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void copyIPv6IfDifferent(void * dest, const void * src)
{
if(dest != src) {
memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: A Denial Of Service vulnerability in MiniUPnP MiniUPnPd through 2.1 exists due to a NULL pointer dereference in copyIPv6IfDifferent in pcpserver.c.
Commit Message: pcpserver.c: copyIPv6IfDifferent() check for NULL src argument | Low | 24,147 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void check_pointer_type_change(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
{
VncState *vs = container_of(notifier, VncState, mouse_mode_notifier);
int absolute = qemu_input_is_absolute();
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE) && vs->absolute != absolute) {
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, absolute, 0,
surface_width(vs->vd->ds),
surface_height(vs->vd->ds),
VNC_ENCODING_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
vnc_flush(vs);
}
vs->absolute = absolute;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An out-of-bounds memory access issue was found in Quick Emulator (QEMU) before 1.7.2 in the VNC display driver. This flaw could occur while refreshing the VNC display surface area in the 'vnc_refresh_server_surface'. A user inside a guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process.
Commit Message: | Low | 26,955 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static inline int unicode_cp_is_allowed(unsigned uni_cp, int document_type)
{
/* XML 1.0 HTML 4.01 HTML 5
* 0x09..0x0A 0x09..0x0A 0x09..0x0A
* 0x0D 0x0D 0x0C..0x0D
* 0x0020..0xD7FF 0x20..0x7E 0x20..0x7E
* 0x00A0..0xD7FF 0x00A0..0xD7FF
* 0xE000..0xFFFD 0xE000..0x10FFFF 0xE000..0xFDCF
* 0x010000..0x10FFFF 0xFDF0..0x10FFFF (*)
*
* (*) exclude code points where ((code & 0xFFFF) >= 0xFFFE)
*
* References:
* XML 1.0: <http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml/#charsets>
* HTML 4.01: <http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/PR-html40-19990824/sgml/sgmldecl.html>
* HTML 5: <http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#preprocessing-the-input-stream>
*
* Not sure this is the relevant part for HTML 5, though. I opted to
* disallow the characters that would result in a parse error when
* preprocessing of the input stream. See also section 8.1.3.
*
* It's unclear if XHTML 1.0 allows C1 characters. I'll opt to apply to
* XHTML 1.0 the same rules as for XML 1.0.
* See <http://cmsmcq.com/2007/C1.xml>.
*/
switch (document_type) {
case ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML401:
return (uni_cp >= 0x20 && uni_cp <= 0x7E) ||
(uni_cp == 0x0A || uni_cp == 0x09 || uni_cp == 0x0D) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xA0 && uni_cp <= 0xD7FF) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xE000 && uni_cp <= 0x10FFFF);
case ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML5:
return (uni_cp >= 0x20 && uni_cp <= 0x7E) ||
(uni_cp >= 0x09 && uni_cp <= 0x0D && uni_cp != 0x0B) || /* form feed U+0C allowed */
(uni_cp >= 0xA0 && uni_cp <= 0xD7FF) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xE000 && uni_cp <= 0x10FFFF &&
((uni_cp & 0xFFFF) < 0xFFFE) && /* last two of each plane (nonchars) disallowed */
(uni_cp < 0xFDD0 || uni_cp > 0xFDEF)); /* U+FDD0-U+FDEF (nonchars) disallowed */
case ENT_HTML_DOC_XHTML:
case ENT_HTML_DOC_XML1:
return (uni_cp >= 0x20 && uni_cp <= 0xD7FF) ||
(uni_cp == 0x0A || uni_cp == 0x09 || uni_cp == 0x0D) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xE000 && uni_cp <= 0x10FFFF && uni_cp != 0xFFFE && uni_cp != 0xFFFF);
default:
return 1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range | Low | 10,615 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static inline size_t GetPSDRowSize(Image *image)
{
if (image->depth == 1)
return((image->columns+7)/8);
else
return(image->columns*GetPSDPacketSize(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in coders/psd.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted PSD file.
Commit Message: Fixed head buffer overflow reported in: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/98 | Medium | 27,254 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int phar_verify_signature(php_stream *fp, size_t end_of_phar, php_uint32 sig_type, char *sig, int sig_len, char *fname, char **signature, int *signature_len, char **error) /* {{{ */
{
int read_size, len;
zend_off_t read_len;
unsigned char buf[1024];
php_stream_rewind(fp);
switch (sig_type) {
case PHAR_SIG_OPENSSL: {
#ifdef PHAR_HAVE_OPENSSL
BIO *in;
EVP_PKEY *key;
EVP_MD *mdtype = (EVP_MD *) EVP_sha1();
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
#else
int tempsig;
#endif
zend_string *pubkey = NULL;
char *pfile;
php_stream *pfp;
#ifndef PHAR_HAVE_OPENSSL
if (!zend_hash_str_exists(&module_registry, "openssl", sizeof("openssl")-1)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "openssl not loaded");
}
return FAILURE;
}
#endif
/* use __FILE__ . '.pubkey' for public key file */
spprintf(&pfile, 0, "%s.pubkey", fname);
pfp = php_stream_open_wrapper(pfile, "rb", 0, NULL);
efree(pfile);
if (!pfp || !(pubkey = php_stream_copy_to_mem(pfp, PHP_STREAM_COPY_ALL, 0)) || !ZSTR_LEN(pubkey)) {
if (pfp) {
php_stream_close(pfp);
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "openssl public key could not be read");
}
return FAILURE;
}
php_stream_close(pfp);
#ifndef PHAR_HAVE_OPENSSL
tempsig = sig_len;
if (FAILURE == phar_call_openssl_signverify(0, fp, end_of_phar, pubkey ? ZSTR_VAL(pubkey) : NULL, pubkey ? ZSTR_LEN(pubkey) : 0, &sig, &tempsig)) {
if (pubkey) {
zend_string_release(pubkey);
}
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "openssl signature could not be verified");
}
return FAILURE;
}
if (pubkey) {
zend_string_release(pubkey);
}
sig_len = tempsig;
#else
in = BIO_new_mem_buf(pubkey ? ZSTR_VAL(pubkey) : NULL, pubkey ? ZSTR_LEN(pubkey) : 0);
if (NULL == in) {
zend_string_release(pubkey);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "openssl signature could not be processed");
}
return FAILURE;
}
key = PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(in, NULL,NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(in);
zend_string_release(pubkey);
if (NULL == key) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "openssl signature could not be processed");
}
return FAILURE;
}
EVP_VerifyInit(&md_ctx, mdtype);
read_len = end_of_phar;
if (read_len > sizeof(buf)) {
read_size = sizeof(buf);
} else {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
while (read_size && (len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, read_size)) > 0) {
EVP_VerifyUpdate (&md_ctx, buf, len);
read_len -= (zend_off_t)len;
if (read_len < read_size) {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
}
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, (unsigned char *)sig, sig_len, key) != 1) {
/* 1: signature verified, 0: signature does not match, -1: failed signature operation */
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "broken openssl signature");
}
return FAILURE;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
#endif
*signature_len = phar_hex_str((const char*)sig, sig_len, signature);
}
break;
#ifdef PHAR_HASH_OK
case PHAR_SIG_SHA512: {
unsigned char digest[64];
PHP_SHA512_CTX context;
PHP_SHA512Init(&context);
read_len = end_of_phar;
if (read_len > sizeof(buf)) {
read_size = sizeof(buf);
} else {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
while ((len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, read_size)) > 0) {
PHP_SHA512Update(&context, buf, len);
read_len -= (zend_off_t)len;
if (read_len < read_size) {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
}
PHP_SHA512Final(digest, &context);
if (memcmp(digest, sig, sizeof(digest))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "broken signature");
}
return FAILURE;
}
*signature_len = phar_hex_str((const char*)digest, sizeof(digest), signature);
break;
}
case PHAR_SIG_SHA256: {
unsigned char digest[32];
PHP_SHA256_CTX context;
PHP_SHA256Init(&context);
read_len = end_of_phar;
if (read_len > sizeof(buf)) {
read_size = sizeof(buf);
} else {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
while ((len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, read_size)) > 0) {
PHP_SHA256Update(&context, buf, len);
read_len -= (zend_off_t)len;
if (read_len < read_size) {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
}
PHP_SHA256Final(digest, &context);
if (memcmp(digest, sig, sizeof(digest))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "broken signature");
}
return FAILURE;
}
*signature_len = phar_hex_str((const char*)digest, sizeof(digest), signature);
break;
}
#else
case PHAR_SIG_SHA512:
case PHAR_SIG_SHA256:
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "unsupported signature");
}
return FAILURE;
#endif
case PHAR_SIG_SHA1: {
unsigned char digest[20];
PHP_SHA1_CTX context;
PHP_SHA1Init(&context);
read_len = end_of_phar;
if (read_len > sizeof(buf)) {
read_size = sizeof(buf);
} else {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
while ((len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, read_size)) > 0) {
PHP_SHA1Update(&context, buf, len);
read_len -= (zend_off_t)len;
if (read_len < read_size) {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
}
PHP_SHA1Final(digest, &context);
if (memcmp(digest, sig, sizeof(digest))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "broken signature");
}
return FAILURE;
}
*signature_len = phar_hex_str((const char*)digest, sizeof(digest), signature);
break;
}
case PHAR_SIG_MD5: {
unsigned char digest[16];
PHP_MD5_CTX context;
PHP_MD5Init(&context);
read_len = end_of_phar;
if (read_len > sizeof(buf)) {
read_size = sizeof(buf);
} else {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
while ((len = php_stream_read(fp, (char*)buf, read_size)) > 0) {
PHP_MD5Update(&context, buf, len);
read_len -= (zend_off_t)len;
if (read_len < read_size) {
read_size = (int)read_len;
}
}
PHP_MD5Final(digest, &context);
if (memcmp(digest, sig, sizeof(digest))) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "broken signature");
}
return FAILURE;
}
*signature_len = phar_hex_str((const char*)digest, sizeof(digest), signature);
break;
}
default:
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 0, "broken or unsupported signature");
}
return FAILURE;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ZIP signature-verification feature in PHP before 5.6.26 and 7.x before 7.0.11 does not ensure that the uncompressed_filesize field is large enough, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted PHAR archive, related to ext/phar/util.c and ext/phar/zip.c.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile
(cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2) | Low | 10,805 |