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Respond as Socrates | LACHES: What can he possibly mean, Socrates? | SOCRATES: I think that I understand him; and he appears to me to mean that courage is a sort of wisdom. |
Respond as Socrates | LACHES: Yes. | SOCRATES: That is a question which you must ask of himself. |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: Certainly not. | SOCRATES: Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: No. | SOCRATES: Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre? |
Respond as Socrates | LACHES: I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates; and I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or wisdom. | SOCRATES: But what is this knowledge then, and of what? |
Respond as Socrates | LACHES: Why, surely courage is one thing, and wisdom another. | SOCRATES: Why do you say so, Laches? |
Respond as Socrates | LACHES: Yes, that is what he denies; but he is so silly. | SOCRATES: That is just what Nicias denies. |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: Laches does not want to instruct me, Socrates; but having been proved to be talking nonsense himself, he wants to prove that I have been doing the same. | SOCRATES: Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: Yes, he is saying something, but it is not true. | SOCRATES: What is Laches saying, Nicias? He appears to be saying something of importance. |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: Why, because he does not see that the physician's knowledge only extends to the nature of health and disease: he can tell the sick man no more than this. Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whether health or disease is the more terrible to a man? Had not many a man better never get up from a sick bed? I should like to know whether you think that life is always better than death. May not death often be the better of the two? | SOCRATES: How so? |
Respond as Socrates | LACHES: Yes; I suppose that, in his way of speaking, the soothsayers are courageous. For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live is better? And yet Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a soothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous? | SOCRATES: Do you understand his meaning, Laches? |
Respond as Socrates | LACHES: Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him: I think that I have asked enough. | SOCRATES: I quite agree with you, Laches, that he should not. But perhaps Nicias is serious, and not merely talking for the sake of talking. Let us ask him just to explain what he means, and if he has reason on his side we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him. |
Respond as Socrates | LACHES: Very good. | SOCRATES: I do not see why I should not; and my question will do for both of us. |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: I do. | SOCRATES: Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and I are partners in the argument: Do you mean to affirm that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of hope and fear? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: I was. | SOCRATES: And not every man has this knowledge; the physician and the soothsayer have it not; and they will not be courageous unless they acquire it--that is what you were saying? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: I think not. | SOCRATES: Then this is certainly not a thing which every pig would know, as the proverb says, and therefore he could not be courageous. |
Respond as Socrates | LACHES: Capital, Socrates; by the gods, that is truly good. And I hope, Nicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all admit to be courageous, are really wiser than mankind; or whether you will have the boldness, in the face of universal opinion, to deny their courage. | SOCRATES: Clearly not, Nicias; not even such a big pig as the Crommyonian sow would be called by you courageous. And this I say not as a joke, but because I think that he who assents to your doctrine, that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope, cannot allow that any wild beast is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or a leopard, or perhaps a boar, or any other animal, has such a degree of wisdom that he knows things which but a few human beings ever know by reason of their difficulty. He who takes your view of courage must affirm that a lion, and a stag, and a bull, and a monkey, have equally little pretensions to courage. |
Respond as Socrates | LACHES: Yes, Socrates; and the examination of such niceties is a much more suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom the city chooses to preside over her. | SOCRATES: Do not answer him, Laches; I rather fancy that you are not aware of the source from which his wisdom is derived. He has got all this from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who, of all the Sophists, is considered to be the best puller to pieces of words of this sort. |
Respond as Socrates | LACHES: Then examine for yourself, Socrates. | SOCRATES: Yes, my sweet friend, but a great statesman is likely to have a great intelligence. And I think that the view which is implied in Nicias' definition of courage is worthy of examination. |
Respond as Socrates | LACHES: I will if you think that I ought. | SOCRATES: That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Do not, however, suppose I shall let you out of the partnership; for I shall expect you to apply your mind, and join with me in the consideration of the question. |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: Very true. | SOCRATES: Yes, I do; but I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. You remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue. |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: Certainly. | SOCRATES: And you yourself said that it was a part; and there were many other parts, all of which taken together are called virtue. |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: Certainly. | SOCRATES: Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say that justice, temperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well as courage. Would you not say the same? |
Respond as Socrates | LACHES: Yes, Socrates, entirely. | SOCRATES: Well then, so far we are agreed. And now let us proceed a step, and try to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and the hopeful: I do not want you to be thinking one thing and myself another. Let me then tell you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set me right: in my opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things which do or do not create fear, and fear is not of the present, nor of the past, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not agree to that, Laches? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: I agree. | SOCRATES: That is my view, Nicias; the terrible things, as I should say, are the evils which are future; and the hopeful are the good or not evil things which are future. Do you or do you not agree with me? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: Precisely. | SOCRATES: And the knowledge of these things you call courage? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: What is that? | SOCRATES: And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself as to a third point. |
Respond as Socrates | LACHES: Quite correct. | SOCRATES: I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is not one knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of what is likely to be best and what will be best in the future; but that of all three there is one science only: for example, there is one science of medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health equally in all times, present, past, and future; and one science of husbandry in like manner, which is concerned with the productions of the earth in all times. As to the art of the general, you yourselves will be my witnesses that he has an excellent foreknowledge of the future, and that he claims to be the master and not the servant of the soothsayer, because he knows better what is happening or is likely to happen in war: and accordingly the law places the soothsayer under the general, and not the general under the soothsayer. Am I not correct in saying so, Laches? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: Yes, indeed Socrates; that is my opinion. | SOCRATES: And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: Yes. | SOCRATES: And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the fearful and of the hopeful? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: True. | SOCRATES: And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future goods and future evils? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: That is true. | SOCRATES: And the same science has to do with the same things in the future or at any time? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: That, as I suppose, is true. | SOCRATES: Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the fearful and hopeful, for they are future only; courage, like the other sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of the present and past, and of any time? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: I agree, Socrates. | SOCRATES: Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a third part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature of courage: and according to your view, that is, according to your present view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to time. What do you say to that alteration in your statement? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what you say. | SOCRATES: But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil, and how they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance, or holiness? He would possess them all, and he would know which were dangers and which were not, and guard against them whether they were supernatural or natural; and he would provide the good, as he would know how to deal both with gods or men. |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: It would seem so. | SOCRATES: But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: Yes, that was what we were saying. | SOCRATES: But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: That appears to be the case. | SOCRATES: And that is in contradiction with our present view? |
Respond as Socrates | NICIAS: We have not. | SOCRATES: Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is. |
Respond as Socrates | LYSIMACHUS: I like your proposal, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, I am also the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favour of you: Come to my house to-morrow at dawn, and we will advise about these matters. For the present, let us make an end of the conversation. | SOCRATES: Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid in the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation that I had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I admit that you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty; but as we are all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferred to another? I certainly think that no one should; and under these circumstances, let me offer you a piece of advice (and this need not go further than ourselves). I maintain, my friends, that every one of us should seek out the best teacher whom he can find, first for ourselves, who are greatly in need of one, and then for the youth, regardless of expense or anything. But I cannot advise that we remain as we are. And if any one laughs at us for going to school at our age, I would quote to them the authority of Homer, who says, that 'Modesty is not good for a needy man.' Let us then, regardless of what may be said of us, make the education of the youths our own education. |
Respond as Socrates | ION: I obtained the first prize of all, Socrates. | SOCRATES: Welcome, Ion. Are you from your native city of Ephesus? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: And I will, please heaven. | SOCRATES: And do the Epidaurians have contests of rhapsodes at the festival? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Very true, Socrates; interpretation has certainly been the most laborious part of my art; and I believe myself able to speak about Homer better than any man; and that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus of Thasos, nor Glaucon, nor any one else who ever was, had as good ideas about Homer as I have, or as many. | SOCRATES: And were you one of the competitors--and did you succeed? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Certainly, Socrates; and you really ought to hear how exquisitely I render Homer. I think that the Homeridae should give me a golden crown. | SOCRATES: Well done; and I hope that you will do the same for us at the Panathenaea. |
Respond as Socrates | ION: To Homer only; he is in himself quite enough. | SOCRATES: I often envy the profession of a rhapsode, Ion; for you have always to wear fine clothes, and to look as beautiful as you can is a part of your art. Then, again, you are obliged to be continually in the company of many good poets; and especially of Homer, who is the best and most divine of them; and to understand him, and not merely learn his words by rote, is a thing greatly to be envied. And no man can be a rhapsode who does not understand the meaning of the poet. For the rhapsode ought to interpret the mind of the poet to his hearers, but how can he interpret him well unless he knows what he means? All this is greatly to be envied. |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes; in my opinion there are a good many. | SOCRATES: I am glad to hear you say so, Ion; I see that you will not refuse to acquaint me with them. |
Respond as Socrates | ION: I can interpret them equally well, Socrates, where they agree. | SOCRATES: I shall take an opportunity of hearing your embellishments of him at some other time. But just now I should like to ask you a question: Does your art extend to Hesiod and Archilochus, or to Homer only? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Very true: | SOCRATES: Are there any things about which Homer and Hesiod agree? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: A prophet. | SOCRATES: And can you interpret better what Homer says, or what Hesiod says, about these matters in which they agree? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Clearly. | SOCRATES: But what about matters in which they do not agree?--for example, about divination, of which both Homer and Hesiod have something to say,-- |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Very true, Socrates. | SOCRATES: Would you or a good prophet be a better interpreter of what these two poets say about divination, not only when they agree, but when they disagree? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes, Socrates; but not in the same way as Homer. | SOCRATES: And if you were a prophet, would you not be able to interpret them when they disagree as well as when they agree? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes, in a far worse. | SOCRATES: But how did you come to have this skill about Homer only, and not about Hesiod or the other poets? Does not Homer speak of the same themes which all other poets handle? Is not war his great argument? and does he not speak of human society and of intercourse of men, good and bad, skilled and unskilled, and of the gods conversing with one another and with mankind, and about what happens in heaven and in the world below, and the generations of gods and heroes? Are not these the themes of which Homer sings? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: He is incomparably better. | SOCRATES: And do not the other poets sing of the same? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes. | SOCRATES: What, in a worse way? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: The same. | SOCRATES: And Homer in a better way? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes. | SOCRATES: And yet surely, my dear friend Ion, in a discussion about arithmetic, where many people are speaking, and one speaks better than the rest, there is somebody who can judge which of them is the good speaker? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Clearly the same. | SOCRATES: And he who judges of the good will be the same as he who judges of the bad speakers? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: The physician. | SOCRATES: And he will be the arithmetician? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: True. | SOCRATES: Well, and in discussions about the wholesomeness of food, when many persons are speaking, and one speaks better than the rest, will he who recognizes the better speaker be a different person from him who recognizes the worse, or the same? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes. | SOCRATES: And who is he, and what is his name? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes; and I am right in saying so. | SOCRATES: And speaking generally, in all discussions in which the subject is the same and many men are speaking, will not he who knows the good know the bad speaker also? For if he does not know the bad, neither will he know the good when the same topic is being discussed. |
Respond as Socrates | ION: That is true. | SOCRATES: Is not the same person skilful in both? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Why then, Socrates, do I lose attention and go to sleep and have absolutely no ideas of the least value, when any one speaks of any other poet; but when Homer is mentioned, I wake up at once and am all attention and have plenty to say? | SOCRATES: And you say that Homer and the other poets, such as Hesiod and Archilochus, speak of the same things, although not in the same way; but the one speaks well and the other not so well? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes. | SOCRATES: And if you knew the good speaker, you would also know the inferior speakers to be inferior? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes, indeed, Socrates; I very much wish that you would: for I love to hear you wise men talk. | SOCRATES: Then, my dear friend, can I be mistaken in saying that Ion is equally skilled in Homer and in other poets, since he himself acknowledges that the same person will be a good judge of all those who speak of the same things; and that almost all poets do speak of the same things? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes. | SOCRATES: The reason, my friend, is obvious. No one can fail to see that you speak of Homer without any art or knowledge. If you were able to speak of him by rules of art, you would have been able to speak of all other poets; for poetry is a whole. |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes. | SOCRATES: And when any one acquires any other art as a whole, the same may be said of them. Would you like me to explain my meaning, Ion? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: No indeed, I have never known such a person. | SOCRATES: O that we were wise, Ion, and that you could truly call us so; but you rhapsodes and actors, and the poets whose verses you sing, are wise; whereas I am a common man, who only speak the truth. For consider what a very commonplace and trivial thing is this which I have said--a thing which any man might say: that when a man has acquired a knowledge of a whole art, the enquiry into good and bad is one and the same. Let us consider this matter; is not the art of painting a whole? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: No indeed; no more than the other. | SOCRATES: And there are and have been many painters good and bad? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: I cannot deny what you say, Socrates. Nevertheless I am conscious in my own self, and the world agrees with me in thinking that I do speak better and have more to say about Homer than any other man. But I do not speak equally well about others--tell me the reason of this. | SOCRATES: And did you ever know any one who was skilful in pointing out the excellences and defects of Polygnotus the son of Aglaophon, but incapable of criticizing other painters; and when the work of any other painter was produced, went to sleep and was at a loss, and had no ideas; but when he had to give his opinion about Polygnotus, or whoever the painter might be, and about him only, woke up and was attentive and had plenty to say? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes, indeed, Socrates, I feel that you are; for your words touch my soul, and I am persuaded that good poets by a divine inspiration interpret the things of the Gods to us. | SOCRATES: Or did you ever know of any one in sculpture, who was skilful in expounding the merits of Daedalus the son of Metion, or of Epeius the son of Panopeus, or of Theodorus the Samian, or of any individual sculptor; but when the works of sculptors in general were produced, was at a loss and went to sleep and had nothing to say? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: There again you are right. | SOCRATES: And if I am not mistaken, you never met with any one among flute-players or harp-players or singers to the harp or rhapsodes who was able to discourse of Olympus or Thamyras or Orpheus, or Phemius the rhapsode of Ithaca, but was at a loss when he came to speak of Ion of Ephesus, and had no notion of his merits or defects? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Precisely. | SOCRATES: I perceive, Ion; and I will proceed to explain to you what I imagine to be the reason of this. The gift which you possess of speaking excellently about Homer is not an art, but, as I was just saying, an inspiration; there is a divinity moving you, like that contained in the stone which Euripides calls a magnet, but which is commonly known as the stone of Heraclea. This stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a similar power of attracting other rings; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long chain: and all of them derive their power of suspension from the original stone. In like manner the Muse first of all inspires men herself; and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons is suspended, who take the inspiration. For all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not by art, but because they are inspired and possessed. And as the Corybantian revellers when they dance are not in their right mind, so the lyric poets are not in their right mind when they are composing their beautiful strains: but when falling under the power of music and metre they are inspired and possessed; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk and honey from the rivers when they are under the influence of Dionysus but not when they are in their right mind. And the soul of the lyric poet does the same, as they themselves say; for they tell us that they bring songs from honeyed fountains, culling them out of the gardens and dells of the Muses; they, like the bees, winging their way from flower to flower. And this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him: when he has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to utter his oracles. Many are the noble words in which poets speak concerning the actions of men; but like yourself when speaking about Homer, they do not speak of them by any rules of art: they are simply inspired to utter that to which the Muse impels them, and that only; and when inspired, one of them will make dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another choral strains, another epic or iambic verses--and he who is good at one is not good at any other kind of verse: for not by art does the poet sing, but by power divine. Had he learned by rules of art, he would have known how to speak not of one theme only, but of all; and therefore God takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers, as he also uses diviners and holy prophets, in order that we who hear them may know them to be speaking not of themselves who utter these priceless words in a state of unconsciousness, but that God himself is the speaker, and that through them he is conversing with us. And Tynnichus the Chalcidian affords a striking instance of what I am saying: he wrote nothing that any one would care to remember but the famous paean which is in every one's mouth, one of the finest poems ever written, simply an invention of the Muses, as he himself says. For in this way the God would seem to indicate to us and not allow us to doubt that these beautiful poems are not human, or the work of man, but divine and the work of God; and that the poets are only the interpreters of the Gods by whom they are severally possessed. Was not this the lesson which the God intended to teach when by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the best of songs? Am I not right, Ion? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: That proof strikes home to me, Socrates. For I must frankly confess that at the tale of pity my eyes are filled with tears, and when I speak of horrors, my hair stands on end and my heart throbs. | SOCRATES: And you rhapsodists are the interpreters of the poets? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: No indeed, Socrates, I must say that, strictly speaking, he is not in his right mind. | SOCRATES: Then you are the interpreters of interpreters? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Only too well; for I look down upon them from the stage, and behold the various emotions of pity, wonder, sternness, stamped upon their countenances when I am speaking: and I am obliged to give my very best attention to them; for if I make them cry I myself shall laugh, and if I make them laugh I myself shall cry when the time of payment arrives. | SOCRATES: I wish you would frankly tell me, Ion, what I am going to ask of you: When you produce the greatest effect upon the audience in the recitation of some striking passage, such as the apparition of Odysseus leaping forth on the floor, recognized by the suitors and casting his arrows at his feet, or the description of Achilles rushing at Hector, or the sorrows of Andromache, Hecuba, or Priam,--are you in your right mind? Are you not carried out of yourself, and does not your soul in an ecstasy seem to be among the persons or places of which you are speaking, whether they are in Ithaca or in Troy or whatever may be the scene of the poem? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: That is good, Socrates; and yet I doubt whether you will ever have eloquence enough to persuade me that I praise Homer only when I am mad and possessed; and if you could hear me speak of him I am sure you would never think this to be the case. | SOCRATES: Well, Ion, and what are we to say of a man who at a sacrifice or festival, when he is dressed in holiday attire, and has golden crowns upon his head, of which nobody has robbed him, appears weeping or panic-stricken in the presence of more than twenty thousand friendly faces, when there is no one despoiling or wronging him;--is he in his right mind or is he not? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: There is no part, Socrates, about which I do not speak well: of that I can assure you. | SOCRATES: And are you aware that you produce similar effects on most of the spectators? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: And what is there in Homer of which I have no knowledge? | SOCRATES: Do you know that the spectator is the last of the rings which, as I am saying, receive the power of the original magnet from one another? The rhapsode like yourself and the actor are intermediate links, and the poet himself is the first of them. Through all these the God sways the souls of men in any direction which he pleases, and makes one man hang down from another. Thus there is a vast chain of dancers and masters and under-masters of choruses, who are suspended, as if from the stone, at the side of the rings which hang down from the Muse. And every poet has some Muse from whom he is suspended, and by whom he is said to be possessed, which is nearly the same thing; for he is taken hold of. And from these first rings, which are the poets, depend others, some deriving their inspiration from Orpheus, others from Musaeus; but the greater number are possessed and held by Homer. Of whom, Ion, you are one, and are possessed by Homer; and when any one repeats the words of another poet you go to sleep, and know not what to say; but when any one recites a strain of Homer you wake up in a moment, and your soul leaps within you, and you have plenty to say; for not by art or knowledge about Homer do you say what you say, but by divine inspiration and by possession; just as the Corybantian revellers too have a quick perception of that strain only which is appropriated to the God by whom they are possessed, and have plenty of dances and words for that, but take no heed of any other. And you, Ion, when the name of Homer is mentioned have plenty to say, and have nothing to say of others. You ask, 'Why is this?' The answer is that you praise Homer not by art but by divine inspiration. |
Respond as Socrates | ION: I remember, and will repeat them. | SOCRATES: I should like very much to hear you, but not until you have answered a question which I have to ask. On what part of Homer do you speak well?--not surely about every part. |
Respond as Socrates | ION: 'Bend gently,' he says, 'in the polished chariot to the left of them, and urge the horse on the right hand with whip and voice; and slacken the rein. And when you are at the goal, let the left horse draw near, yet so that the nave of the well-wrought wheel may not even seem to touch the extremity; and avoid catching the stone (Il.).' | SOCRATES: Surely not about things in Homer of which you have no knowledge? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: The charioteer, clearly. | SOCRATES: Why, does not Homer speak in many passages about arts? For example, about driving; if I can only remember the lines I will repeat them. |
Respond as Socrates | ION: No, that will be the reason. | SOCRATES: Tell me then, what Nestor says to Antilochus, his son, where he bids him be careful of the turn at the horserace in honour of Patroclus. |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Certainly not. | SOCRATES: Enough. Now, Ion, will the charioteer or the physician be the better judge of the propriety of these lines? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Certainly not. | SOCRATES: And will the reason be that this is his art, or will there be any other reason? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes. | SOCRATES: And every art is appointed by God to have knowledge of a certain work; for that which we know by the art of the pilot we do not know by the art of medicine? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes. | SOCRATES: Nor do we know by the art of the carpenter that which we know by the art of medicine? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes. | SOCRATES: And this is true of all the arts;--that which we know with one art we do not know with the other? But let me ask a prior question: You admit that there are differences of arts? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: That is my opinion, Socrates. | SOCRATES: You would argue, as I should, that when one art is of one kind of knowledge and another of another, they are different? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Very true. | SOCRATES: Yes, surely; for if the subject of knowledge were the same, there would be no meaning in saying that the arts were different,--if they both gave the same knowledge. For example, I know that here are five fingers, and you know the same. And if I were to ask whether I and you became acquainted with this fact by the help of the same art of arithmetic, you would acknowledge that we did? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: The charioteer. | SOCRATES: Tell me, then, what I was intending to ask you,--whether this holds universally? Must the same art have the same subject of knowledge, and different arts other subjects of knowledge? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes. | SOCRATES: Then he who has no knowledge of a particular art will have no right judgment of the sayings and doings of that art? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Yes. | SOCRATES: Then which will be a better judge of the lines which you were reciting from Homer, you or the charioteer? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: True. | SOCRATES: Why, yes, because you are a rhapsode and not a charioteer. |
Respond as Socrates | ION: The art of medicine. | SOCRATES: And the art of the rhapsode is different from that of the charioteer? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Clearly, Socrates, the art of the fisherman. | SOCRATES: And if a different knowledge, then a knowledge of different matters? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: And you are quite right, Socrates, in saying so. | SOCRATES: You know the passage in which Hecamede, the concubine of Nestor, is described as giving to the wounded Machaon a posset, as he says, 'Made with Pramnian wine; and she grated cheese of goat's milk with a grater of bronze, and at his side placed an onion which gives a relish to drink (Il.).' Now would you say that the art of the rhapsode or the art of medicine was better able to judge of the propriety of these lines? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: All passages, I should say, Socrates. | SOCRATES: And when Homer says, 'And she descended into the deep like a leaden plummet, which, set in the horn of ox that ranges in the fields, rushes along carrying death among the ravenous fishes (Il.),'-- will the art of the fisherman or of the rhapsode be better able to judge whether these lines are rightly expressed or not? |
Respond as Socrates | ION: Why, what am I forgetting? | SOCRATES: Come now, suppose that you were to say to me: 'Since you, Socrates, are able to assign different passages in Homer to their corresponding arts, I wish that you would tell me what are the passages of which the excellence ought to be judged by the prophet and prophetic art'; and you will see how readily and truly I shall answer you. For there are many such passages, particularly in the Odyssee; as, for example, the passage in which Theoclymenus the prophet of the house of Melampus says to the suitors:-- 'Wretched men! what is happening to you? Your heads and your faces and your limbs underneath are shrouded in night; and the voice of lamentation bursts forth, and your cheeks are wet with tears. And the vestibule is full, and the court is full, of ghosts descending into the darkness of Erebus, and the sun has perished out of heaven, and an evil mist is spread abroad (Od.).' And there are many such passages in the Iliad also; as for example in the description of the battle near the rampart, where he says:-- 'As they were eager to pass the ditch, there came to them an omen: a soaring eagle, holding back the people on the left, bore a huge bloody dragon in his talons, still living and panting; nor had he yet resigned the strife, for he bent back and smote the bird which carried him on the breast by the neck, and he in pain let him fall from him to the ground into the midst of the multitude. And the eagle, with a cry, was borne afar on the wings of the wind (Il.).' These are the sort of things which I should say that the prophet ought to consider and determine. |