Datasets:

Equall

/

perplexity_evaluation

like 2

We see no difference in the agreements in the Houston Cement case, where the value of inventory was specified in the agreements but the agreements did not accurately reflect the value of actual inventory on hand, and the agreement in the present case, where the value of “transmission line(s)” was specified in the a greement but the agreement did not accurately reflect the actual value of the transmission lines present.

Party Submissions

Gallaher is factually distinguishable as well. Gallaher involved a newspaper article in which, absent attribution language, a reader would have virtually no ability to determine whether the allegation was being leveled by the newspaper, or whether the newspaper was only reporting (accurately) that the allegation had been made. The Program, on the other hand, is a visual documentary, not a written article. Documentary viewers can easily discern when an allegation is being leveled by an interviewee and not the documentarian, not least because they can see the interviewee saying it out loud. Imposing a “THIS IS A THIRD-PARTY ALLEGATION” disclaimer requirement would not only reach beyond the statute’s plain text, but would be absurd under the facts presented.

Party Submissions

OSI Systems, Inc. (the “Company”) hereby adopts the Second Amended and Restated OSI Systems, Inc. Deferred Compensation Plan (the “Plan”), effective December 1, 2023 (the “Second Restatement Date”). This Plan amends and restates in its entirety the Amended and Restated OSI Systems, Inc. Deferred Compensation Plan adopted on April 25, 2014 (the “2014 A&R Plan”), which amended and restated the OSI Systems, Inc. Deferred Compensation Plan adopted on May 9, 2008. In order to provide Participants with additional flexibility to elect Payment Schedules with respect to future Deferrals, this restatement, among other updates: (i) renames a Participant’s “Separation from Service Account” as his or her “Retirement Account” and (ii) permits each Participant to establish one or more “Separation from Service Account” in addition to his or her Retirement Account with respect to amounts deferred under any Compensation Deferral Agreement that becomes effective and irrevocable on or after the Second Restatement Date. Nothing in this restatement is intended to change or does in fact change the time or form of payment of amounts deferred under the Plan as in existence prior to the Second Restatement Date, including without limitation, the time and form of payment of any Retirement Account.

Contract

PRAYER For these reasons, Petitioners request that the Court grant their motion for rehearing and then grant their petition for review, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, and remand for further proceedings. Petitioners also pray for all other relief to which they are entitled.

Party Submissions

However, we agree with our sister court that the third Penn Central factor weighs heavily against finding a taking in this case. See id. at *8. The character of the governmental action in this case is nothing like a physical invasion. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The Emergency Orders must be viewed in the context of the existing national public health emergency, during which “restrictions were issued to combat ‘ the imminent threat of disaster’ posed by COVID–19, a contagious and deadly virus. ” See Stand for Something Grp. Live, 2022 WL 11485464 at *8.

Party Submissions

Relator relies on dicta from In re Anthony, stating that “[t]he Legislature has since made clear. .. that candidates may not amend their applications once the filing deadline passes.” Pet.10 (quoting 642 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Tex. 2022)). But Anthony never reached the remedial question because it held “that Anthony’s application is not defective.” 642 S.W.3d at 591. As recently as 2020, this Court cited with approval Francis and its holding that candidates can be given the opportunity to cure. See In re Green Party of Texas, 630 S.W.3d 36, 40 (Tex. 2020) (“[U]nder In re Francis, an opportunity to cure should be provided when a candidate could still comply with Election Code requirements.”). This line of cases remains good law. IV. Removing Justice Devine from the ballot would violate the U.S.

Party Submissions

The court of appeals largely based its decision on Bayou Terrace Investment Corp. v. Lyles, which held that a “lis pendens is a part of the judicial process and the resulting absolute privilege bars a suit for damages arising from the filing of the lis pendens.” 881 S.W.2d 810, 818 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (citing Prappas v. Meyerland Cmty. Improv. Ass’n, 795 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied)). The court then concluded that extension of the privilege was justified because “[a]n abstract of judgment, likewise, is a part of a judicial proceeding in that it is a necessary step to convert a money judgment into a judicial lien that may later be executed against real property to satisfy a judgment.” 2022 WL 1038372, at *6 (citations omitted).

Party Submissions

The Agreed Motion alleges the lawsuits arise out of incidents leading up to, during and following a live performance by Travis Scott during the Astroworld Festival outside NRG Park on November 5, 2021. These incidents are collectively referred to in the Agreed Motion as the Incident.

Party Submissions

Certain Companies Owned by Duke Energy International Latin America, Ltd submitted as Exhibit C-568 that the restructuring of the Claimant’s investment was done to (i) facilitate compliance with newly issued Resolution 7/2003 Section 1 of the Argentine Superintendency of Corporations, (ii) relocate certain holding companies to countries more favorable for Argentine purposes, (iii) streamline the organizational structure and thus minimize administration costs, and (iv) obtain certain Argentine tax benefits derived from the tax treaty between Spain and Argentina. 477 462. The Claimant’s witnesses confirmed the tax-driven reorganization during the Hearing.

Legal Decisions

Respondent notes that in principle Claimants do not object to this request, “ with the exception of any documents created in preparation for and/or in connection with the conduct of the present arbitration” However, Claimants' willingness to produce the documents is made uncertain and is overshadowed by the fact that they have raised the two grounds based on which they in fact object to produce.

Legal Decisions

Wright is distinguishable. There, this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that an expert report was deficient for concluding that the patient might have had “the possibility of a better outcome ” when the report failed to explain how the negligent conduct caused the patient ’ s injury. Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 53.

Party Submissions

Arbitration Rule 32 21.1. The oral procedure shall consist of a hearing for examination of witnesses and experts, if any, and for oral arguments.

Legal Decisions

JUAN DELAPENA, Individually and as § IN THE DISTRICT COURT next friend of C.D.L.P., a Minor, § and KORINA DELAPENA, § individually and on behalf of the estate of § C.D., Deceased Minor. § § Plaintiffs, § § v. § 201st JUDICIAL DISTRICT § HIGHPOINT COMMUNITY § MINISTRIES d/b/a HIGH HOPES § SUMMER CAMP, and § CITY OF CEDAR PARK § § Defendants. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS ON THIS the 2nd day of September, 2021 came on to be heard Defendant City of Cedar Park’s Plea to the Jurisdiction. After careful consideration of the City of Cedar Park’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, the responses, the replies, the briefs, the evidence, the pleadings, and arguments of counsel, this Court DENIES The City of Cedar Park’s Plea to the Jurisdiction. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Defendant City of Cedar Park’s Plea to the Jurisdiction is DENIED in its entirety. All relief not expressly granted is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Party Submissions

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 56.1(a)(3), (a)(5), and (a)(6), and Texas Government Code § 22.001(a). This appeal involves construction of Texas Health & Safety Code § 341.0645 and Texas Administrative Code title 25, § 265.191, regarding whether governmental units have an affirmative duty to provide lifeguards and abide by pool safety standards prescribed by HHSC.

Party Submissions

Participant. Participant means an Eligible Employee who has been given notification of his or her eligibility to defer Compensation under the Plan under Section 3.1 and any other person with an Account Balance greater than zero, regardless of whether such individual continues to be an Eligible Employee. A Participant’s continued participation in the Plan shall be governed by Section 3.2 of the Plan.

Contract

Notional Investment becomes effective generally, but not more frequently than once per business day. The Committee from time to time may specify such times, frequencies, methods, rules and procedures for calculating the value of any particular Notional Investment (for example, specifying that interest on money market funds shall be calculated and credited on a monthly basis).

Contract

Wife acknOwledges that a‘trial court need not divide community pr0perty equally, but rather the, division mustbe equitable. She contends the trial court abused its discretion by making aproperty division that was manifestly unjust and unfair and Operated to punish her for her fault in the diverce. She speeical-ly contends the trial court did not factor in the attorney’s fees she owed when making-a just and right division of the assets. We disagree.

Party Submissions

Rafiei failed to show that the delegation provision was unconscionable. Additionally, Rafiei did not demonstrate that the arbitration agreement as a whole was unconscionable.

Party Submissions

Claimants disagree with Serbia’s interpretation of the Cyprus -Serbia BIT and, by extension, with Serbia’s description of alleged relevance and materiality of the requested documents. Claimants will address S erbia’s arguments in detail in their Reply.

Legal Decisions

Because of its historic designation, the Texaco building was eligible to participate in the Federal Historic Preservation Tax Incentive Program. The federal program is administered by the Internal Revenue Service and was created to incentivize the private sector to invest in the rehabilitation and re-use of historic buildings by offering federal income tax credits to developers undertaking such efforts. The income tax credits are available for qualified rehabilitation expenditures (also known as QREs), which are amounts spent on the rehabilitation of historic components of a building, as determined by the Secretary of the Interior.

Party Submissions

Q... . But anyway, as of 1995 in the real-property records of the [County] of Galveston, we seek the City of Friendswood claims a road called Windemere Road, right?

Party Submissions

As discussed above, the Oncor’s pet. complains of actions taken by the Wilbarger CAD, which does not fall within the scope of the DJA’s express waiver provisions. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 622 (finding no waiver of immunity under the DJA where the Plaintiff did not challenge the validity of a statute, but TxDOT's actions under it). In a similar case, Boll v. Cameron Appraisal Dist., 445 S.W.3d 397 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013, no pet. ), property owners sued under the DJA challenging the purported unconstitutional and unlawful taxation of their trailer homes. The appellate court found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear any of the property owners’ claims under the DJA, including their claim for attorney's fees, because they were not challenging the validity of a provision of the Tax Code. Instead, they were challenging the appraisal district's actions under it, and the DJA did not expressly waive immunity for those claims. Id. at 400. Like the plaintiffs in Boll and Sefzik, Oncor here does not challenge a particular ordinance or statute. Accordingly, the DJA does not waive immunity and the trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear Oncor’s claims under the DJA against Wilbarger CAD. Id. C. There is no jurisdiction under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act Oncor cannot challenge the assessment of ad valorem taxes on its property through the Declaratory Judgment Act because the Texas Property Tax Code is a pervasive regulatory scheme that provides the exclusive means for taxpayers to resolve valuation disputes. See TEX. TAX CODE § 42.09 (“Remedies Exclusive”); In re ExxonMobil Corp ., 153 S.W.3d 605, 617 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding). Furthermore, the Texas Supreme Court has held that “the Act cannot be invoked when it would interfere with some other exclusive remedy or some other entity's exclusive jurisdiction.” MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P ., 292 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Tex. 2009). The Declaratory Judgment Act cannot be used as a vehicle to avoid or evade the exclusive administrative process and remedies in the tax code. Fort Worth v. Pastusek Indus., Inc ., 48 S.W.3d 366, 370-371 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet. ).

Party Submissions

Barina’s attempt to read an attribution requirement into the statute finds no support in the cases she cites. In Gallaher, the court noted (in dicta ) the defendant newspaper’s attribution, stating that it “expressly qualified its reporting with sourcing language.” Resp. Br. at 32 (citing 2022 WL 2071779 at *9). But the court did not hold that such sourcing language was required for the third-party-allegation rule to apply. Instead, the court made clear that, “to be accorded summary judgment on this so-called ‘third-party allegation’ defense, the Newspaper had only to conclusively prove that it accurately reported the information it received [...]— which it did.” Id. at *9 (emphasis added); accord Hall at 380 (“[M]edia outlets that accurately report allegations made by a third party about matters of public concern can assert the truth as a defense.”). That is precisely what the Petitioners did here.

Party Submissions

The first session of the Tribunal was held on October 25, 2023, at 12 pm (Washington, DC time), by videoconference. The session was adjourned at 12:40 pm.

Legal Decisions

The jurisdictional limits on the justice of the peace courts’ powers in eviction cases serve to prevent other courts from drawing the impermissible inference that abandoning immediate possession in an eviction action equates to abandoning any right of possession or claim of damages in a district court action. ( See Pet. Br. 30-31) The court of appeals’ decision transgresses all these legal boundaries, notwithstanding Respondents’ misguided effort s to recast the decision as entirely fact-based.

Party Submissions

And thus far, at least one other court has relied on the analysis in the case. See Aguilera v. Costilla, No. 13-21-00135-CV, 2023 WL 2711129, at *8 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi – Edinburg Mar. 30, 2023), reconsid. en banc denied, No. 13-21-00135-CV, 2023 WL 3879854 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi – Edinburg June 8, 2023, pet. filed).

Party Submissions

The United States objects to Request No. 3.b for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a.

Legal Decisions

Lost Participants or Beneficiaries. Any Participant or Beneficiary who is entitled to a benefit from the Plan has the duty to keep the Committee advised of his or her current mailing address. If benefit payments are returned to the Plan or are not presented for payment after a reasonable amount of time, the Committee shall presume that the payee is missing. The Committee, after making such efforts as in its discretion it deems reasonable and appropriate to locate the payee, shall stop payment on any uncashed checks and may discontinue making future payments until contact with the payee is restored.

Contract

TAX CODE § 1.111(e); also citing TEX. TAX CODE § 41.01(b); also citing MHCB (USA) Leas. & Fin. Corp. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist. Review Bd., 249 S.W.3d 68, 83-84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied.).

Party Submissions

A critical aspect of the above-cited governing AAA rules is that there is no cap of any kind on the arbitration fees and expenses that Rafiei would have to pay. Indeed, this clause essentially employs the very same kind of language that was deemed unconscionable in Santorsola, and lacks much of the protective language found in In re Poly-Am .

Party Submissions

Fleming Defendants cite one document filed by the Harpst trial plaintiffs on November 1, 2016 before severance on November 4, 2016 (XXI CR 13571), in which they mention the fact that the Wilson Plaintiffs would be willing to sign a confidentiality agreement if the drug company requested it. This was merely reiterating a well-established fact that all the parties were already aware of. Fleming Defendants had tried to block certain evidence for allegedly violating a very old confidentiality agreement with the drug company, and to avoid that result Wilson Plaintiffs had always indicated a willingness to sign a confidentiality agreement if that would help with admissibility for their trials when they eventually came up. But such a confidentiality agreement was never made, the evidence was never allowed in, and pointing out Wilson Plaintiffs ’ willingness to make a confidentiality agreement does not mean that the Wilson Plaintiffs somehow controlled or represented the Harpst Plaintiffs or vice versa.

Party Submissions

West Headnotes (10) [1] Administrative Law and Procedure Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Courts Determination of questions of jurisdiction in general Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction, including the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, is a question of law.

Party Submissions

The principle of waiver is the core of the agreement between Oncor and Dis- trict, and Oncor’s waiver of its right to pursue further proceedings is enforceable.

Party Submissions

Osprin complains that the trial court erred when it concluded that Backes was released and discharged from all of his obligations under the guaranty agreement when the conditions of the termination clause were fulfilled. Osprin argues that the termination clause should be 15 interpreted to mean that the fulfilled conditions only discharged and released future, executory obligations. Relying on cases in which a party exercised its right to terminate a contract, Osprin insists that terminating a contract only relieves the party of liability on defaults that occur after the termination date but does not discharge obligations that have arisen and matured before the termination date. See Gulf Liquids New River Project, LLC v. Gulsby Eng’g, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 54, 66 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. Interenergy Res., Ltd., 99 F.3d 746, 754 (5th Cir. 1996).

Party Submissions

The majority cites cases that did not involve self-dealing by an interested director or manager. 661 S.W.3d at 443 (citing Connolly v. Gasmire, 257 S.W.3d 831, 845–46 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); In re GGP, Inc. S’holder Litig ., C.A. No. 2018-0267-JRS, 2021 WL 2102326, at *17 n.195 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2021) (mem. op.); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig ., C.A. No. 2017-0337-SG, 2018 WL 1381331, at *18 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018) (mem. op.); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 n.50 (Del. Ch. 2002)).

Party Submissions

UCC Member's or designee's facilities pursuant to a Separate Contract. For avoidance of doubt, the Burnel line connected to UCC's Seadrift Operations is Intermediary Equipment.

Contract

Other Costs and Expenses USD 32,230.39 Total: 582. The Tribunal’s decision on costs is governed by Articles 38 to 40 of the UNCITRAL Rules.

Legal Decisions

Respondent disputes this. Respondent points to Article 1(3)(b) of the Cyprus-Serbia BIT, which requires the investor to prove that its seat is in the territory of Cyprus and argues that regardless of whether the Tribunal applies international law or Cyprus law to determine what "seat" means under the BIT, the term "seat" requires effective management by the Cyprus entity, which the Cypriot Claimants failed to prove.

Legal Decisions

Sections 1.111(e)(2) and 25.25(c-1)(4) and (d-1) may readily be harmonized to give effect to both. Sections (c-1)(4) (d-1) create a bar to bringing a motion for correction under sub-sections (c-1) and (d), the sections for correcting rendition errors and value errors that exceed 1/3 of the appraised value. One of named exceptions to each is that the property owner appeared and offered evidence on the same issue at a protest hearing under §§ 41.41, 41.45. Creating a list of disqualifiers for bringing a sub-sections (c-1) and (d) motions that does not list the disqualifier of having previously entered a § 1.111(e) agreement could be interpreted to implicitly repeal § 1.111(e)(2) as applied to sub-sections (c-1) and (d) motions. Thus, the disqualifier of § 1.111(e)(2) is repeated in § 25.25(c-1)(4) and (d-1). Both statutes are thus given effect.

Party Submissions

For the avoidance of doubt, Respondent has already conducted a search and has not located any lease agreements concluded between Obnova and Serbia and/or Luka Beograd other than the ones already on the record. Claimants' statement that documents from the period predating Obnova's privatization should be in the possession and control of Serbia, rather than Claimants is erroneous. There is no reason for the documentation of the entity undergoing privatization to be in Serbia’s possession. On the contrary, such documentation always remains within privatization entity, i.e. Obnova. Therefore, all Obnova's documentation should be available to Claimants.

Legal Decisions

It is the plaintiff’s initial burden to plead facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and we review this question as a matter of law. City of Austin v. Leggett, 257 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226). We construe the pleadings liberally, accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, and look to the plaintiff’s intent. See id. (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226). If the pleadings are deficient but do not demonstrate an incurable defect, then the issue is one of pleading sufficiency, and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend their pleadings. Id. (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27). Conversely, if it becomes clear that the plaintiff cannot allege a viable waiver of immunity, then the suit should simply be dismissed. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007).

Party Submissions

The legislature has vested the power to determine whether a claimant is entitled to workers' compensation benefits solely in Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers Compensation (DWC), subject to judicial review. A trial court cannot adjudicate an employee's claim for bad-faith denial of workers' compensation benefits without first determining whether that employee was entitled to benefits at the time of the denial, a question within the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction. And the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction to determine compensability necessarily encompasses exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury or death occurred in the course and scope of employment. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 401.011(10) defines compensable injury as an injury that arises out of and in the course and scope of employment for which compensation is payable.

Party Submissions

Coinbase also moved the District Court to stay its proceedings pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal. The District Court denied Coinbase's stay motion, and the Ninth Circuit likewise declined to stay the District Court's proceedings pending appeal.

Party Submissions

To amend the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 to improve biorefinery, renewable chemical, and biobased product manufacturing assistance, and for other purposes.

Legislation

To establish an advisory group to encourage and foster collaborative efforts among individuals and entities engaged in disaster recovery relating to debris removal, and for other purposes.

Legislation

Code Section 409A. For U.S. taxpayers, it is the intent that the grant of the Award as set forth in this Agreement shall qualify for exemption from or comply with the requirements of Section 409A of the Code, and any ambiguities herein will be interpreted to so qualify or comply. The Company reserves the right, to the extent the Company deems necessary or advisable in its sole discretion, to unilaterally amend or modify this Agreement as may be necessary to ensure that all payments provided for under this Agreement are made in a manner that qualifies for exemption from or complies with Section 409A of the Code; provided, however, that the Company makes no representation that the grant, vesting, or settlement of the Award will be exempt from or comply with Section 409A of the Code and makes no undertaking to preclude Section 409A of the Code from applying to the grant, vesting or settlement of the Award granted pursuant to this Agreement. The Company will have no liability to you or any other party if the Award, the delivery of Shares upon settlement of the Award or other payment hereunder that is intended to be exempt from, or compliant with, Section 409A of the Code, is not so exempt or compliant, or for any action taken by the Company with respect thereto.

Contract

Ed., Page 524, Sec. 438. Thus, whether property is separate, or community is determined by its character at inception. Barnett v.

Party Submissions

Berrelez v. Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc., 562 S.W.3d 69 (2018) [7] Administrative Law and Procedure Exclusive or original jurisdiction Administrative Law and Procedure Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies If the Legislature expressly or impliedly grants an agency sole authority to make an initial determination in disputes within the agency's regulatory domain, the agency has exclusive jurisdiction, and a party must exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking recourse through judicial review.

Party Submissions

This Guaranty is a continuing guaranty of payment and not of collection and cannot be revoked by Guarantor and shall continue to be effective with respect to any indebtedness referenced in Section 1 hereof arising or created after any attempted revocation hereof.

Party Submissions

Under Texas law, an unconscionable contract is unenforceable. Id. at 348. “[T]he theory behind unconscionability in contract law is that courts should not enforce a transaction so one-sided, with so gross a disparity in the values exchanged, that no rational contracting party would have entered the contract.” In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 892 (Tex. 2010) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981)).

Party Submissions

By July 2016, the anticipated amount of QREs to be incurred on rehabilitating the Texaco building increased, which resulted in an expectancy of more state tax credits than anticipated when the bridge loan closed. TX 1111 provided updated and audited projections of QREs to First NBC and requested additional funding based on the availability of additional state tax credits to serve as collateral. Based on these projections, First NBC loaned TX 1111 an additional $10,000,000. On July 5, 2016, First NBC and TX 1111 entered into an Amended Bridge Loan Agreement to reflect the additional $10,000,000 extension of credit. An Amended Assignment Agreement was also executed to reflect TX 1111 ’s assignment of increased Contributions it expected to receive for the state tax credits, as well as an indirect and contingent interest in contributions from the federal tax credit investor. Neither the note nor the security and pledge agreement were amended. Likewise, the guaranty was neither amended nor increased.

Party Submissions

Instead, it informs jurors of the legal mechanics of a motion to strike proceeding as colored by the factual allegations here. Any comment on the evidence is the definition of incidental. See Bilotto, 985 S.W.2d at 24. The best sense I can make of the majority's reading—to the extent it considers the “incidentally” language in rule 277 at all—is that incidental means only small or minuscule. But that ignores the other use of incidental, which is “liable to happen as a consequence of an activity.” 2 The majority cites several cases to support a conclusion that the instruction directly instructed jurors how the court had ruled and is objectionable for that reason. 3 But unlike those cases, the court here made no announcement that it had concluded either party was correct on any issue, and it gave no hint that the court favored one party over the other because it had already decided for that party on particular issues. The majority hyperelasticizes the principle those cases stand for and in the process, ignores the incidental effect an instruction might have as opposed to a specific instruction regarding prior final findings the court has made.

Party Submissions

Respondents ultimately correctly concede that appraisal review boards and courts “may examine a settlement agreement to discern its contents” to determine “what the agreement covered” and what the settlement precludes a tribunal from doing. See Respondents’ Brief at 24. They even argue that it would be “irrational” not to acknowledge a tribunal’s power to do that. Id. at 25. According to Respondents, “[o]therwise, one could argue that the existence of any settlement agreement with an appraisal district on any property, with any owner[,] precluded any subsequent protest.” Id. That is exactly what Respondents are arguing to this Court. The argument is, indeed, irrational. Courts must have the power to construe section 1.111(e) agreements to determine whether they bar subsequent claims. The lower court’s contrary decision conflicts with this Court’s decisions in both Matagorda County and Willacy County, supra.

Party Submissions

But even taken on its own terms, Respondents’ tale makes no sense. Westwood did not “go out of business” or “sh ut ... down” as part of “a b roader strategic decision.” (Resp. 12, 31, 38) It simply changed its name from “Westwood Motorcars, LLC” to “Westwood Motors LLC” and continued selling cars under the new name. (8RR154-55, 159-60 ) So it had the same need for “warehouse” space after the name-change as before.

Party Submissions

On April 28, 2005, Santos executed a Note and Security Agreement (the “Note”) in the principal amount of $24,398.00. CR2:49 -56. The unpaid balance was to accrue interest at a rate of eleven and one quarter percent (11.25%). CR2:49. The Note was payable to the order of First Franklin a division of Nat. City Bank of In. (“First Franklin”). CR2:49.

Party Submissions

The Mandarino and Hays courts correctly read Section 51.003(a) by harmonizing it not only with Section 16.004, but other law regarding limitations. If the Note is a negotiable instrument, it is governed by Texas Business & Commerce Code § 3.118, and limitations could not run until either acceleration or the last installment due date. If the Note is not a negotiable instrument, nevertheless Texas law considers it an installment loan, with a breach occurring each time an installment payment is missed. Gabriel v. Alhabbal, 618 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Goldfield v. Kassoff, 470 S.W.2d 216, 217 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ); Stille v. Colborn, 740 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987). There could thus be no “accrual” of all monetary obligations under the Note unless Respondent exercised its optional acceleration clause. The demand for payment was an integral part of the cause of action, and a condition precedent to the right to sue; this means that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the demand was made. Intermedics, Inc. v. Grady, 683 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

Party Submissions

In listing the additional evidence attached to the summary judgment record in Briggs, the Fourth Circuit observed: “In addition to the OCIP manual and the documents previously discussed, the record also includes an affidavit from Mitsui's [the workers carrier] vice president and regional claims manager, Dale Wimer. *16 Wimer's affidavit states Toyota manufacturing “purchased an insurance policy from Mitsui under which multiple entities received workers' compensation insurance” and notes the “OCIP was purchased for work performed at the Toyota Motor Manufacturing plant in San Antonio, Texas.” The affidavit also states Briggs received workers' compensation benefits under the policy purchased by Toyota Manufacturing. In addition, the record contains the deposition testimony of Toyota Manufacturing's OCIP coordinator, Lauri Andrews. Andrews testified she believed the Walbridge/Bartlett Cocke joint venture was participating in the OCIP because its venturers, i.e., Walbridge Aldinger Company and Bartlett Cocke L.P., each had insurance policies issued to them by Mitsui. She further stated that a contractor “would be in violation of their contract with Toyota likely” if it was not enrolled in the OCIP. ” Briggs at 283.

Party Submissions

HN6 [ ] Preclusion of Judgments, Estoppel Under the quasi-estoppel principle, a party is precluded from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by the party. The doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a party to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which it acquiesced, or of which it accepted a benefit.

Party Submissions

Petitioners claim that this Court somehow implicitly overruled its prior precedent of Romero v. KPH Consolidated., Inc .6 Petitioners argue that the Court's Opinion conflicts with Romero's holding that a harm analysis is appropriate when 1 Motion for Rehearing (Mot.), p. 3. 2 Opinion (Op.), p. 34. 3 Op., p. 36 4 Op., p. 37. 5 Id. 6 166 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2005).

Party Submissions

Mr. Trumbull ( with whom was Mr. Hughes ), in support of the motion: 1. Unless Congress have given appellate jurisdiction to this court, it will be conceded that none can exist.

Party Submissions

PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the requested documents from the Assembly of the City of Belgrade in accordance with the applicable regulations157. In other words, the requested documents are "in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties".158 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Assembly in order to obtain documents in question.159 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants, to obtain these documents and it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves.

Legal Decisions

Open Government and protecting the First Amendment, as well as publishing guidebooks on various legal issues, including access to public information.

Party Submissions

Without relevant expert testimony that the Lawyers breached their standard of care in stipulating that HSMiller was responsible for the conduct of its own vice-president in representing a potential buyer (HSMiller’s core business), legally insufficient evidence supports a finding of negligence based on the Defterios stipulation.

Party Submissions

But the “communication” granted absolute privilege by the court of appeals here is an abstract of judgment that was not made during a judicial proceeding and plays no role in protecting the rights of the general public to full and free administration of justice—it protects only the pocketbooks of specific institutions by hampering other individuals’ right to sell their property. By definition, an abstract of judgment must be filed after “judgment was rendered” at the conclusion of a judicial proceeding. TEX. PROP. CODE § 52.003. Upon recording in the real property records, it “constitutes a lien on and attaches to any real property of the [judgment debtor].” Id. § 52.001. And that is precisely why the Hospitals improperly filed and then refused to unequivocally withdraw their abstracts: to manipulate the system and prematurely try to protect their ability to collect an attorney’s fees award (then already twice-reversed) by hampering the Naths’ ability to sell a specific piece of real property.5 None of the public policy reasons or justifications for the privilege supports expanding it to cover an abstract of judgment.

Party Submissions

Having sustained each of Bay's issues, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment disposing of Bay's exclusive-remedy defense. We remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Party Submissions

Barina mounts little real resistance to this argument, arguing instead that the Program’s full context makes it clear that the statements are statements of fact. See Resp. Br. at 34-39. This is not a meaningful dispute. Petitioners wholeheartedly agree with Barina’s exhortation that this Court should view the report as a whole. Petitioners are confident that after doing so, this Court will conclude that the Program’s statements are rhetorical hyperbole or statements of opinion based on disclosed facts. See Pet. Br. at 34-35, 38; Lilith Fund for Reprod. Equity v. Dickson, 662 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2023) (making clear that “[a]ny limitation that defamation law places on free speech, however, may not muzzle a speaker from asserting an opinion in an ongoing debate about the law.”). That is particularly true for the type of advocacy-oriented speech the Program represents (see Pet. Br. at 34-35), characterizing the court-authorized financial exploitation of wards by guardians as criminal or a crime is not an assertion of verifiable fact, but rather the kind of moral questioning of purely legal behavior that this Court has long given the strongest possible legal protections.

Party Submissions

B. Specifically, the court of appeals held that this case involved a breach of the duty to create and maintain medical records (although none were alleged nor should be presumed) and would fall under the professional or administrative services component of the second element.

Party Submissions

Serbia does not seem to dispute that the requested documents are not in Claimants’ possession, custody or control. Serbia only asserts that the requested documents are “ in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties. ” This assertion is incorrect for the same reasons that Claimants already explained in paragraphs 30 to 47 above and in their response to Serbia’s objections to Requests No. 6. Claimants hereby incorporate all those arguments.244 Furthermore, as explained above, even if the requested documents had been “ equally and effectively available to both parties ” ( quod non ), Serbia would still be obliged to allow Claimants access to the responsive documents — as long as the Tribunal concluded that the documents are relevant and material and thus should be produced.245 DECISION 99 NO.

Legal Decisions

The Amarillo Court correctly noted that there is no explanation of how a prolonged second stage of labor or heart rate abnormalities caused any birth injury. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 2022 WL 17324338 at *4. At best, in a generic paragraph applicable to both defendants, Dr. Tappan opined that the clinical presentation “suggests the possibility that [H.W.] sustained a perinatal arterial ischemic stroke.” (CR.794 (emphasis added)) There is no explanation of how or why prolonged second stage of labor, heart rate abnormalities, or anything else could have led to a possible stroke. This is insufficient under the statute. See Constancio v. Bray, 266 S.W.3d 149, 157-58 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (report did not explain cause of anoxic encephalopathy, how it could have been prevented by increased monitoring, or whether and how it caused death).

Party Submissions

Here, Oncor argues that it discovered it was mistaken after it made its § 1.111(e) agreement. But that does not change the fact that there was harmony of opinion as to the value being per the agreement at the time of written agreement. Because that final value was a matter on which a protest could have been filed, and indeed was filed and then denied, the agreement is final as to value. TEX. TAX CODE § 1.111(e).

Party Submissions

CKC alleged specific facts in support of its allegations that Alpesh had engaged in self-dealing, CR472-73, ¶ 58; the usurpation of corporate opportunities, CR471, ¶ 53 and CR472-73, ¶ 58; the diversion of CKC employees to perform services that did not benefit CKC, CR462, ¶ 36 and CR473, ¶ 58; and the diversion of $1.1 million in funds from CKC to Alpesh, CR467, ¶44 and 473, ¶ 58. Respondents’ argument that this case does not turn on Alpesh’s self-dealing cannot withstand review of the controlling facts and the governing law.

Party Submissions

CKC respectfully asks this Court to call for briefs on the merits, grant review, reverse the judgments of the lower courts, and grant all other proper relief.

Party Submissions

After negotiations to extend the maturity date of the bridge loan failed, Osprin filed this suit in April 2018. In response to the lawsuit, Rusk Investors interpleaded the $23,605,580.00 in Contributions into the registry of the court in July 2018. In October 2018, Osprin filed a motion for partial summary judgment to obtain a release of the interpleaded funds. After the motion was set for hearing, the parties submitted an agreed order to release those funds to Osprin. In accordance with the bridge loan agreement, Osprin applied those funds as follows: 11 (1) $290,462.35 to legal fees, costs, and other expenses; (2) $2,604,811.64 to interest; and (3) $20,927,919.06 to principal.

Party Submissions

The Gaonas argue that they may be denied any recovery if the Smith County suit is tried first because the position they take in that suit depends on the outcome of the Harris County trial. We disagree. Regardless of their strategy for trying the negligence claims first, when Reynaldo elected to participate in the system, he voluntarily relegated his common-law rights and remedies in favor of the rights ensured by the Act.

Party Submissions

The statutory text would have been directed at the courts if the Legislature intended to overrule this Court’s then-decade-old holding that “a court may order equitable relief from a statutory deadline” in the Election Code, In re Gamble, 71 S.W.3d at 318, as well as the application of that doctrine in cases like Francis. Instead, section 141.032(g) is directed at what “candidate[s]” can do; it is not directed at what equitable judicial remedies courts may order in appropriate circumstances. The Legislature, moreover, could have amended Section 273.081, which governs injunctive relief under the Election Code, see In re Gamble, 71 S.W.3d at 317, if it intended to disapprove of this Court’s equitable remedies for election filing deadlines. But it did not.

Party Submissions

In Tyler, another workers' compensation case, this Court determined that judicial review is a part of the statutory process under the TWCA, and because the viability of the negligence action there depended on whether the deceased worker was within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his death, an issue under the exclusive jurisdiction of the TWCC, abatement of the negligence action pending a final determination in the judicial review case was necessary. 107 S.W.3d at 836, 843 .

Party Submissions

HN9 [ ] "The mootness doctrine implicates subject-matter jurisdiction." Pantera Energy Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 150 S.W.3d 466, 471 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (citing Speer v. Presbyterian Children's Home & Serv. Agency, 847 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1993) ). "A case becomes moot when:. .. one seeks to obtain a judgment on some controversy, when in reality none exists, or. .. when one seeks a judgment on some matter which, when rendered for any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect on a then-existing controversy." Id. (citing Texas Health Care Info. Council v. Seton Health Plan, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) ). Here, there is no doubt a controversy exists: Texas Mutual and the Martinez Family disagree as to the proper mechanism for obtaining redress for Bruno's fatal injury. HN10 [ ] For that very reason, the suit for judicial review will result in a judgment that will, indeed, have a "practical legal effect" on the controversy. See id. Moreover, while the statute of limitations governing a claim for death benefits generally runs on the one-year anniversary of the date of the employee's death, see Tex. Labor Code § 409.007(a), the passing of that anniversary is not an absolute bar to asserting such a claim, see id. § (b)(2) ("Failure to file in the time required. .. bars the claim unless. .. good cause exists for the failure to file a claim."). Thus, this [*21] case is not moot.

Party Submissions

For column 5: Indicate the zone of the DA where the survey was carried out, including as many rows as necessary: infested zone (IZ) or buffer zone (BZ), using separate rows. Where applicable, indicate the area of the IZ where the survey was carried out (e.g. last 20 km adjacent to the BZ, around nurseries) in different rows.

Legislation

M Our verdict is not unanimous. Ten Ofus have agreed t0 each and every answer and have signed the signature below.

Party Submissions

Sonic appealed the hearing officer's decision regarding Cochran's election of remedies and its entitlement to reimbursement. On May 22, 2002, the appeals panel issued its decision, affirming the hearing officer's determinations and concluding as follows: The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant elected to pursue a remedy and recover compensation under the workers' compensation laws of the State of Alabama. .. . **** 1 Sonic's policy with TMI contained an "Other States Endorsement" that provided coverage for employees injured while working outside of Texas. 2 The Croix defendants are not a party to the appeal, but are real parties in interest in the mandamus proceeding. 3 Specifically, the sum represents payments made to Cochran from June 3, 1997 to July 6, 2001.

Party Submissions

Dr. Null’s discussion is limited to generally describing H.W.’s condition after birth, noting it is “consistent with an asphyxia event that occurred late in the course of labor,” and then concluding he “would not have suffered the degree of birth injury that he has” if he had been delivered earlier. (CR.709). That is not functionally different from the Wright expert’s “possibly had a chance at a better outcome” opinion.

Party Submissions

It is certainly true that in very limited circumstances described in TEX. TAX CODE § 25.25(c) a property owner is allowed to contest aspects of appraisals five years in arrears. But, that is not the case when the property owner and appraisal district have reached an agreement on the value pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE § 1.111(e). Indeed, avoiding such latent recalculations is undoubtedly a significant factor to inducing appraisal districts to enter the type of agreements which Oncor seek s to treat so lightly. IV. Harris County Appraisal District v. Jacob S. McDonald and 1615 Houston’s First Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Jacob S. McDonald and 1615 Tabor, LLC, No. 01-19-00990-CV, 2021 WL 3556215 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] August 12, 2021, no pet. ) (mem. op.) (“1615 Tabor”). The case upheld a § 1.111(e) agreement and rendered judgment for the appraisal district. Id. at *5. The holding in the case is irrelevant to these proceedings.

Party Submissions

North Star unless that exceeded Seagourmet’s processing capacity.363 While the Tribunal has some reservations about the asserted unwritten agreement between the two companies, it has nevertheless concluded that the evidence that the contractual relationship between North Star and Seagourmet went beyond a series of unconnected contracts for the sale of goods and that North Star operated on the basis that Seagourmet had an obligation to take and pay for catches of snow crab; this is sufficient to justify the Tribunal in finding that North Star had an investment within the meaning of Article I(1)(iii) of the BIT.

Legal Decisions

While we recognize the supreme court decided Loya based on the MSA, which is distinguishable to the present facts, we nonetheless find its dicta instructive.

Party Submissions

In Graham v. Franco, the Supreme Court explained: A much later case of this Court reverted to a test more akin to that prevailing under the Spanish and Mexican law, and several early opinions of this Court, dealing with community property. It applied an affirmative test; i.e., that property is community which is acquired by the work, efforts or labor of the spouses or their agents, as income from their property, or as a gift to the community. Such property, acquired by the joint efforts of the spouses, was regarded as acquired by ‘onerous title’ and belonged to the community. Norris v. Vaughn, 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953); DeBlane v. Lynch, 23 Tex. 25 (1859); Smith v. Strahan, 16 TEX. 314 (1856); Epperson v. Jones, 65 TEX. 425 (1886); De Funiak, Principles of Community Property (1971) ⸹ 62; Moynihan, Community Property, 2 American Law of Property (1952) ⸹ 7.16.

Party Submissions

To amend the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, to expand the replacement of stolen EBT benefits under the supplemental nutrition assistance program.

Legislation

In fact, the majority's supercharged version of Griggs contradicts its own account of Congress's intent. Consider the statutes that the majority points to as models of how Congress would reject a mandatory-general-stay rule. Ante, at 1921 – 1922, and n. 6; see supra, at 1925 – 1926. Under those statutes, the majority says, Congress intends that an interlocutory appeal does **1929 “ not ... automatically stay district court proceedings.” Ante, at 1921. Yet, the majority also seemingly accepts that under those statutes, “the Griggs principle applies.” Ante, at 1920. And per “the Griggs principle” as the majority sees it, in some cases an interlocutory appeal does automatically stay district court proceedings. Ante, at 1919 – 1920. So a mandatory general stay is thus both prohibited (by the statutory text) and required (by the majority's view of Griggs ). 3 As this contradiction underscores, the majority's *757 holding is untethered from any statute and any existing conception of Griggs .

Party Submissions

Discretionary Bonus Wife argues the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Husband a2019 discretionary bonus as his separate property because the evidence conclusively established he earned the bonus during marriage even though he received it post-divorce. Husband responds controlling case law is to the contrary; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion .by awarding him the discretionary bonus.

Party Submissions

The trial court concluded that each party was responsible for their own attomey’s fees. The-Final Decree further stated that Wife “shall pay, as apart ofthe division of the estate. .. [a]ll debts, charges, liabilities, and other obligations. incurred solely b'y the “rife unless. express provision is made in this decree to the contrary.” The nal decree specifically included in this allocation one hundred percent-of the $12,000 loan 'or'n her parents for attomey’s fees. Thus, the record indicates the trial. court considered Wife’s attomey’s fees debt when making its just and right division of'the assets.

Party Submissions

But nowhere does Dr. Tappan mention (much less explain) that he has experience evaluating newborns, neurological injuries in newborns, or what does or does not cause neurological injuries in newborns. The words “neurology” and “neurological”—let alone “ischemia,” “hypoxia,” “stroke,” or “encephalopathy”— are not even mentioned in his curriculum vitae. (CR.787-99).

Party Submissions

In stark contrast, Rafiei's agreement lacks any safeguard against potentially exorbitant costs. This omission means that Rafiei faces not only his share of the arbitration costs but also all other associated expenses, without any ceiling or limit. Rafiei provided the trial court with evidence that the unreasonably expensive filing expenses and unlimited fee-splitting required by the delegation clause and (separately) by the remainder of the arbitration agreement were both independently unconscionable because each would operate to bar him from being able to litigate his claims. The Fourteen Court of Appeals agreed.

Party Submissions

Furthermore, pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE § 42.01(a)(1)(B), as well as (C) and (E), a property owner is authorized to appeal the order of an ARB on a § 25.25 motion. As referenced above, in an appeal under chapter 42, an ARB is not a proper party. Pursuant to TEX. TAX CODE § 42.24, the district court is authorized to grant relief notwithstanding the absence of the ARB as a party.

Party Submissions

B. A reasonable person could view the episode’s gist as accusing Tonya of exploiting Charlie by placing him in an unwarranted guardianship to convert his assets for her personal benefit.

Party Submissions

In short, the Wilson plaintiffs litigated as a unified group in 2010, 2011-2015, and in 2016 all the way to the November trial.

Party Submissions

The carrier began providing workers' compensation benefits, but it later disputed the claim on the grounds that a condition was preexisting. However, the claimant prevailed at administrative hearings and on judicial review. Fees for the claimant's attorney were deducted from the claimant's recovery. The claimant later filed a breach of contract action seeking to recover the administrative attorney's fees. The carrier's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was granted, and this appeal followed. In affirming, the appellate court determined that the claimant had to exhaust his administrative remedies. The claim for attorney's fees, whether grounded in contract or tort, was based on the carrier's dispute of the claimant's entitlement to benefits. That was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Texas Worker's Compensation Commission. Moreover, both 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 152.3(d), (e) and Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.221 governed the award and payment of attorney's fees during the administrative phase of a workers' compensation proceeding.

Party Submissions

Although ROCIP's have been held to apply vertically, horizontally, and diagonally to all contractors, subcontractors, or sub-contractors enrolled in a ROCIP, there are no authorities that hold that a ROCIP applies to shield employers from the negligent acts of co-employees not participating in a ROCIP.

Party Submissions

Claimants maintain their request and respectfully request the Tribunal to order the production of the responsive documents. The requested document is relevant and material As Claimants explained above, the requested document represents a request based on which the Serbian Republic Geodetic Authority prepared a “ NOTICE ” submitted as Serbia’s exhibit R -043. Serbia relies on this document to argue that Obnova’s buildings at Dunavska 17 -19 were allegedly “ built before Obnova was established in December 1948. ”22 Based on this assertion, Serbia argues that there is no evidence that Obnova acquired these buildings.23 Serbia, therefore, uses Exhibit R-043 as an important part of its defense. However, as explained above, this exhibit was compiled by Serbia’s own authorities (the Serbian Republic Geodetic Authority) for the sol e purpose of this arbitration and based on Serbia’s own request. Needless to say, the scope of Serbia’s request necessarily predetermines the scope of the response, on which Serbia now relies in this arbitration. The requested document will show whether exhibit R-043 was compiled in an objective manner and thus represents reliable evidence. As a result, the requested document is directly relevant and material to assess the veracity of Serbia’s claim that Obnova did not build the buildings at Dunavska 17 -19 and does not have any rights to these buildings. For the avoidance of doubt, Serbia’s argument that if “ Claimants consider that the information contained in the exhibit R-043 [sic] may be inaccurate or incomplete, they could have sought additional information they consider relevant from the Cadastre ” is not serious. Enough to say, Claimants requested production of certain documents necessary to assess completeness and accuracy of exhibit R-043 in some of their other requests ( e.g. Requests Nos. 6-7 and 9-12). However, Serbia objects to production of any such documents as well.

Legal Decisions

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, DOW MULTINATIONAL HOLDING LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the “Borrower”), promises to pay to the order of UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, a New York corporation (the “Lender”), the principal sum of USD 1,543,400,000 or such lesser amount as shall be outstanding (the “Loan”) pursuant to the terms of that certain Term Loan Agreement, dated as of December 1, 2023 (as amended, amended and restated, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time, the “Loan Agreement”), between the Lender and the Borrower. Capitalized terms used herein and not defined have the meanings assigned to such terms in the Loan Agreement.

Contract

On the basis of the evidence in the record, under the income approach to damages as proposed by Claimant, what would Claimant’s damages be if the flow of income was to be determined on the basis of the market price ex-works off CALICA?

Party Submissions

We granted this permissive appeal to address four questions posed by the trial court concerning the exclusive-remedy defense. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3. Because we resolve each of these questions in favor of Bay, we reverse the summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Party Submissions