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PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain these documents from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (which prepared exhibit R-101), in accordance with the applicable regulations.88 In other words, the requested documents are "in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties".89 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Institute in order to obtain documents in question.90 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it is not justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants obviously already obtained certain documentation from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (exhibit C-025), so they can also request the documents whose production they now seek.
Legal Decisions
11.950609
13.162484
13.154532
Further, Dr. Tappan relies heavily on the “Oxytocin Infusion Protocol for BSA Women’s Center” (the “Infusion Protocol”). (CR.793-94) These repeated references are confusing because the report does not explain what the Infusion Protocol was, who it applied to, when it applied, or what it called for. Moreover, reference to the outside document is impermissible because it is outside the four corners of the report. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878.
Party Submissions
11.393693
12.896126
13.368909
During relevant times, Moody was a workers' compensation subscriber. However, Douglas did not timely file a workers' compensation claim. Instead, she filed this negligence suit against Moody. Nevertheless, the issue of whether Douglas sustained a compensable injury became the subject of a workers' compensation proceeding. 1 The trial court abated this suit because the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission ("the Commission") had not issued its final determination. A Commission hearing officer decided Douglas was injured in the course and scope of her employment, but she was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because she failed to timely file a claim. A Commission appeals panel affirmed this decision. 2 Subsequently, the trial court reinstated this suit.
Party Submissions
5.374928
5.752504
5.967017
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that public health authorities and tobacco control advocates should encourage American innovation and embrace harm reduction as part of the comprehensive United States approach to tobacco control.
Legislation
15.335952
7.568482
15.39008
For the avoidance of any doubt, Claimants also reiterate their general objection to production of any documents covered by privilege under the legal or ethical rules.
Legal Decisions
15.151161
16.802433
21.443403
Respondents also emphasize that both Westwood and the tenant in Kemp complained they had suffered “mistreatment” from their landlords that occurred in the aftermath of losing a forcible entry and detainer action in a justice of the peace court—and yet the tenant in Kemp could not maintain a constructive-eviction claim in district court. (Resp. 30) But the result in Kemp did not flow from any hard-and-fast rule that constructive-eviction claims are categorically unavailable to the evicted tenant, that compliance with an eviction order conclusively establishes “voluntary abandonment” or disproves damages, or that “testimony” about “perceived mistreatment” simply “doesn’t matter” in a constructive eviction action. ( Id .) Instead, the tenant’s claim failed simply because of the absence of causation: She could not carry her burden of establishing “that the premises was abandoned because of the complained-of condition.” (Resp. 23, quoting 2020 WL 205313, at *3) (emphasis in original) Specifically, the tenant had no “evidence demonstrat[ing]” that she “abandoned the property as a direct consequence of the [landlord’s] triggering acts” because she merely “vacated only after being lawfully evicted.” (Id. 24, 34, quoting 2020 WL 205313, at *4) That is why the tenant’s admission that she “moved out of the premises” immediately after the “writ of possession was issued”—rather than after any supposed acts of interference by the landlord—was considered dispositive. (Resp. 29, quoting Kemp, 2020 WL 205313, at *3), But none of that can be said about Westwood, because the record here is replete with evidence that Westwood decided to leave only because of Respondents’ repeated wrongful acts, and did not merely abandon the property after receiving an eviction order.
Party Submissions
6.515295
6.797568
6.68696
The United States objects to Request No. 1.d for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a.
Legal Decisions
8.430825
12.370636
13.937416
Eligibility and Participation. An Eligible Employee becomes a Participant upon the earlier to occur of: (i) a credit of Company Contributions under Article V; or (ii) notification of eligibility to participate by the Committee or its authorized representative.
Contract
8.307238
7.733108
12.313209
Request No. 5 also fails to comply with Article 3.3(a)(ii) of the IBA Rules because Claimants have offered no basis to believe that there exist any documents discussing the KXL Pipeline in the context of the USMCA negotiations.
Legal Decisions
14.79491
14.850016
17.170435
In this subtitle: (1) “Adjuster” means a person licensed under Chapter 4101, Insurance Code. (2) “Administrative violation” means a violation of this subtitle, a rule adopted under this subtitle, or an order or decision of the commissioner that is subject to penalties and sanctions as provided by this subtitle. (3) “Agreement” means the resolution by the parties to a dispute under this subtitle of one or more issues regarding an injury, death, coverage, compensability, or compensation. The term does not include a settlement. (4) “Alien” means a person who is not a citizen of the United States. (5) “Benefit” means a medical benefit, an income benefit, a death benefit, or a burial benefit based on a compensable injury. (5-a) “Case management” means a collaborative process of assessment, planning, facilitation, and advocacy for options and services to meet an individual’s health needs through communication and application of available resources to promote quality, cost-effective outcomes. (6) “Certified self-insurer” means a private employer granted a certificate of authority to self-insure, as authorized by this subtitle, for the payment of compensation. (7) “Child” means a son or daughter. The term includes an adopted child or a stepchild who is a dependent of the employee. (8) “Commissioner” means the commissioner of workers’ compensation. (9) “Commute” means to pay in a lump sum.
Party Submissions
3.539181
3.424104
3.293808
In 1977, this Court again was confronted with an issue over the characterization of retirement benefits. Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.
Party Submissions
6.622967
9.307981
9.23363
Certificates of historical changes contain certain data about land plots since their registration in the Real Estate Cadaster, including ownership changes, the date when the registration in the Cadaster was made, any changes in the surface and borders of the land plots, etc. The requested documents represent certificates of historical changes for all land plots constituting Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23. As such, the requested documents are relevant and material to assess the historical development of rights to individual land plots registered in the Cadaster, as well as reasons for registration of such rights.
Legal Decisions
12.27399
13.261393
12.294482
What Oncor is proposing is that a court may look behind the appraisal roll to start altering aspects of the appraisal process. Looking behind the appraisal roll to pick apart aspects of the appraisal is not the purpose of a § 25.25(c)(3) motion and has been specifically rejected by courts in similar circumstances. Bauer–Pileco, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 443 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
Party Submissions
6.828393
6.744742
7.815137
Petitioner claims support for the concept that Respondent could not “revive its rights” by “purporting to accelerate” the loan, and cites to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Express Limousines, Inc., No. 03-21-00266-CV, 2022 WL 3048235, at *3 (Tex.App.-Auston Aug. 3, 2022, no pet.)(mem.op.). But Petitioner artfully leaves out key portions of the entire quote: “ Even in the context of a note payable in installments secured by a deed of trust, which was the type of instrument at issue in Holy Cross, acceleration is not relevant once the note has matured under its own terms. If the note has matured, the limitations period commences at that time, and the creditor may not revive its rights to foreclose by purporting to accelerate a note that has already matured.
Party Submissions
6.236258
6.781339
6.33641
Barina attempts to deflect the issue, by engaging instead in a discussion of this Court’s decision in Rosenthal—which she claims precisely addresses the issues before this Court. E.g., Resp. Br. at viii (citing D Mag. Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. 2017)). Barina’s argument is not only wrong, but it further emphasizes why this Court’s review is necessary.
Party Submissions
9.022953
10.20587
9.400211
For the avoidance of any doubt, Claimants reiterate their general objection to production of any documents covered by privilege under the legal or ethical rules.
Legal Decisions
15.440399
16.272959
20.018091
Acceleration of or Delay in Payments. The Committee, in its sole and absolute discretion, may elect to accelerate the time or form of payment of a benefit owed to the Participant hereunder, provided such acceleration is permitted under Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-3(j)(4). The Committee may also, in its sole and absolute discretion, delay the time for payment of a benefit owed to the Participant hereunder, to the extent permitted under Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-2(b)(7). If the Plan receives a domestic relations order (within the meaning of Code Section 414(p)(1)(B)) directing that all or a portion of a Participant’s Accounts be paid to an “alternate payee,” any amounts to be paid to the alternate payee(s) shall be paid in a single lump sum.
Contract
3.123994
3.400874
3.414415
Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 361 (Tex. 2019) (“We are not blind to the truism that, ‘ just as immunity is inherent to sovereignty, unfairness is inherent to immunity. ’” (quoting City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466, 480 n.38 (Tex. 2007) (Willett, J., dissenting))); Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126, 160 (Tex. 2010) (Willett, J. concurring) (“As litigants often discover, in the Legislature a deal is sometimes a raw deal.”). The TTCA has been routinely criticized by jurists for its difficult application and arbitrary outcomes. See Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 386–87 (collecting cases calling on the Legislature to amend the TTCA); Robinson, 780 S.W.2d at 175 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (“ I confess that not all the consequences of construing ‘use’ to exclude ‘non -use’ seem entirely sensible. ”). Nevertheless, until the Legislature sees fit to redraw those lines, we are duty bound “to interpret and apply the statute as written.” Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 387 (quoting Abutahoun v. Dow Chem. Co., 463 S.W.3d 42, 49 (Tex. 2015)). Because the circumstances of this case do not fall within the TTCA’s limited waiver of immunity, the trial court erred in denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction .
Party Submissions
4.68396
4.67117
4.985478
The reasons for such conclusion and the measures taken as a result of it shall be communicated to the Commission in the report pursuant to Article 9.
Legislation
9.225491
13.17551
12.668775
Foremost, Oncor ignores the explicit language of § 1.111(e)(2) which makes such agreements final with regard to any matter “which may be corrected under § 25.25.” The statute is not specific to § 25.25(c-1) or (d), it simply refers to § 25.25, which presumably encompasses all sub-sections of § 25.25. And, of course, cases such as Houston Cement have held that § 25.25(c) motions are precluded by a § 1.111(e) agreement.
Party Submissions
8.255683
8.487598
9.111052
Joint Agreed Motion For Transfer To Pretrial Court And Immediate Stay, filed on December 21, 2021; c. All tag-along cases. See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.2 (g). 3. The “Designation of Parties To Serve Request For Transfers And Other Notices On Other Parties In Rule 13 Proceeding” (Designation) signed by the Clerk of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation applies to proceedings before this panel and is not terminated by this order. The Designation does not limit the authority of the Pretrial Judge to designate party representatives in a Pretrial Court.
Party Submissions
10.549547
12.28468
13.073991
The Tribunal may, if it deems it necessary at any stage of the proceeding, call upon the parties to produce documents, witnesses and experts.
Legal Decisions
5.750584
6.130173
6.344174
This letter shall serve to confirm that the Parties have mutually agreed to terminate the Agreement effective as of November 1, 2023. Please confirm your agreement to the foregoing by signing where indicated below.
Contract
4.480123
6.106942
6.057516
In November of 2000, the carrier filed suit in the 114th Judicial District Court of Smith County, Texas, seeking judicial review *837 of the appeals panel decision. The Gaonas also challenged the appeals panel decision in the Smith County suit, but, alternatively, requested affirmance and death benefits should the court find Reynaldo's death compensable. Pursuant to a motion by the Gaonas, the Smith County court abated its suit. The Smith County court has also granted several continuances. 4 Thus, the Smith County suit has not yet been tried.
Party Submissions
8.449807
10.737286
10.344963
The Walkers attempt to conjure a conflict where there is none by citing cases where obstetricians had experience in diagnosing the cause of injury in babies. Each of those cases was decided on fact-specific details found in the respective reports and CVs. In each, the expert explained their knowledge and experience to support causation testimony. For example, the expert in Livingston v. Montgomery, had stated “knowledge and expertise to recognize the perinatal progression of hypoxia due to inadequate oxygenation through a compromised uteroplacental unit. . .[and] on the subject of hypoxia as it relates to the associated build up of carbon dioxide. .. that complicates ischemia. . .” 279 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.); see also Cornejo, 446 S.W.3d at 117 (experience or training in “the probable causes of. .. hypoxic-ischemic injuries in babies”); Abilene Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Allen, 387 S.W.3d 914, 922-23 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (experience in infant neurological injuries); see also Monga v. Perez, No. 14-16-00961-CV, 2018 WL 505263, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 23, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (expert had many years’ experience with perinatology and maternal-fetal medicine was qualified to opine as to shoulder dystocia that can occur during delivery). Dr. Tappan has no such qualifications, and his causation opinions, such as they are, should not be credited.
Party Submissions
6.247757
6.171317
6.629047
Respondents fare even worse in trying to distinguish Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2013). Respondents’ focus on statements from Coinmach that have no bearing on this case — such as that a tenant who “defeats an eviction suit can s till be liable for trespass” (Resp. 40) — cannot change Coinmach’s holding that a tenant who loses a forcible entry and detainer action and gets evicted can still seek damages for wrongful eviction in district court. Respondents are forced to admit, ( id. ), that Coinmach properly drew support for that holding from Johnson v. Highland Hills Drive Apartments, 552 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. — Dallas 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.), which had previously adopted the same rule. See Coinmach, 417 S.W.3d at 919. Respondents are also forced to admit that this rule has been followed in numerous other cases. (Resp. 41) And because that is the rule, Respondents cannot explain how the court of appeals’ decision can survive.
Party Submissions
5.520664
6.159311
5.972218
Without Written Notice by April 1 -If L M O does not give H A O written notice by April 1 of a year specifying an extended period or periods of summer possession for that year, L M O shall have possession of the child for thirty consecutive days in that year beginning at 6:00 p.m. on July 1 and ending at 6:00 p.m. on July 31.
Party Submissions
9.299238
12.173172
11.560762
The judgment alone establishes existence of the easement. But there is more. The City’s 1992 annexation ordinance identified the easement.
Party Submissions
14.649505
24.539896
18.151321
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS This document complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the word-count limitations of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i), if applicable, because it contains 9,543 words, excluding any parts exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).
Party Submissions
3.117754
3.826072
4.564394
For the above reasons, Claimant respectfully requests the Tribunal to order Respondent to produce the documents requested here Request No. 14: The Request is denied. The Claimant is requesting access to documents mostly prepared by the Claimant himself and relating in whole or in part to the encounter organized by the Claimant between Qatar representative Dr Ali bin Smikh Al Marri and Mr. Etienne Schneider, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy of Luxembourg in May 2019 regarding the negotiations in the field of telecommunications. Such documents are not material to assess the Claimant’s investment in Qatar for the purpose of preparing his forthcoming Memorial, nor are they relevant as an input for a quantum expert evaluating such investment before any submissions have been exchanged on the merits of the instant case, as this is argued in the Claimant’s rubric on the “Relevance and Materiality according to the Requesting Party”.
Legal Decisions
13.471437
12.580451
13.599537
Although there is no‘statute specically authorizing an award of attomey’s fees in adivorce proceeding, the trial court may within its sound .discretion award attorney’s fees: See Mandell v. Mandel], 310 S..W.3d 53l, 541 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied); see..alsb C.A.S., 405 S.W-.3d at386. Ari attorney’s fee is but another element for the court torconsider in dividing the marital estate. Mandel], - 310 S.W.3d at 541. That is, in adivorce suit, the trial court has the equitable power to award either spouse attorney’s fees as apart of the just and right division of the marital estate. See, e.g., Mur’v. Murff, 615 S.W.Zd’696', 699 (Tex. 19.81).
Party Submissions
9.451407
9.137659
9.084292
The Development program is a document issued by the Urban Institute of Belgrade, which offers general information concerning the plan's adoption, such as conditions, deadlines and/or budgeting for its development. This document is an annex and an integral part of Decision No. 350-5/06-c, in accordance with Article 11 of the aforementioned decision.113 The requested document is relevant and material to assess which inputs the City of Belgrade took into consideration when preparing the 2013 DRP —including whether Serbia considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 and if so, the City of Belgrade’s contemporaneous understanding of the extent of these rights.
Legal Decisions
16.036552
17.240786
17.77354
Compensation/Employers Liability policies shall contain endorsements waiving all rights of subrogation in favor of McCarthy and the Owner together with any other entities required by the Contract Documents where allowable by law.
Party Submissions
12.217707
16.380775
16.76542
Enacted by Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959 (S.B. 797), § 1, effective September 1, 1985; am. Acts 1987, 70th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 2 (S.B. 5), § 2.09, effective September 2, 1987; am. Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 136 (S.B. 28), § 1, effective September 1, 1995; am. Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 204 (H.B. 4), §§ 4.07, 4.10(5), effective September 1, 2003; am. Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 593 (H.B. 8), § 3.02, effective September 1, 2007; Acts 2021, 87th Leg., ch. 221 (H.B. 375), § 2.02, effective September 1, 2021; Acts 2021, 87th Leg., ch. 837 (S.B. 109), § 4, effective September 1, 2021.
Party Submissions
1.918073
2.080358
1.983633