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Thus, Delaware law is designed to facilitate Mr. Condon’s right to seek legal relief from Alpesh, Ruchir, and the other Respondents—not to impede it. This is the reason the Response constructs hurdles and obstacles that have no basis in Delaware law.

Party Submissions

To establish requirements for the Federal Trade Commission with respect to certain rules related to automotive retailing, and for other purposes.

Legislation

Preliminarily, in her notice of appeal, Douglas asserted that she is appealing the summary judgments in favor of both Transcontinental and Moody. However, in her brief, Douglas does not assign error to, or present any argument challenging, the summary judgment in favor of Transcontinental. Therefore, Douglas has waived any challenge to this summary judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e), (h) ( HN2 [ ] requiring, inter alia, that brief state issues presented for review and contain argument); Keough v. Cyrus USA, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (recognizing appellant waives error by failing to brief it on appeal). Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of Transcontinental. We will address only the summary judgment in favor of Moody.

Party Submissions

To promote and enhance outdoor recreation opportunities for members of the Armed Forces and veterans on Federal recreational lands and waters.

Legislation

Each Contracting Party will accord in its territory for the investments made by investors of the other Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment.

Legal Decisions

Justice Brian Walker currently holds Place 7 on the Second Court of Appeals. See Justice Brian Walker, TEXAS JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.txcourts.gov/2ndcoa/about-the-court/justices/justice-brian-walker/ (Jan. 8, 2024). He likewise seeks the Republican Party’s endorsement for the general election to Place 4 on this Court. JUSTICE BRIAN WALKER CAMPAIGN, https://voteforwalker.com/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). Walker filed his application seeking the Republican Party’s endorsement on December 4; Chairman Rinaldi accepted Walker’s application on December 14. See, e.g., Candidate Information, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE, https://candidate.texas-election.com/Elec-tions/getQualifiedCandidatesInfo.do (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). On December 27— twenty-three days after filing and sixteen days after the deadline to apply for the Re-publican endorsement—Walker first contacted Chairman Rinaldi regarding his belief that Devine’s application failed to comply with statutory requirements for applications to appear on primary ballots. Pet. Ex. A. Walker alleged that Devine failed to obtain the requisite number of signatures from each of this State’s appellate judicial districts—the Eighth District in particular—to accompany his application to appear on a primary ballot for election to this Court. Pet. Ex. A.

Party Submissions

As to the first ground, Claimants failed to specify which of the documents related to the present arbitration would be covered by legal privilege. It would be obviously erroneous to claim that all documents showing the exercise of Coropi's management and control where the topic was Obnova are covered by legal privilege. Claimants, therefore, should have explained which of these documents are privileged and why. For the avoidance of doubt, Respondent does not seek communications with Claimants' counsel in relation to the present arbitration or which were otherwise prepared for the purpose of providing or obtaining legal advice.

Legal Decisions

The Mills decision, however, is based almost entirely on a mis-interpretation of and unwarranted expansion of this Court’s decision in Willacy County Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd ., 555 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. 2018), a position also illogically urged by Oncor in its Brief. The Mills opinion essentially holds that this Court has implicitly over-ruled Bastrop Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Acme Brick Co., 428 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet. ), Signal Int’l Texas L.P. v. Orange Cty., Texas, No. 09-13-00412-CV, 2014 WL 7183667 (Tex. App.— Beaumont Dec. 18, 2014, pet. denied), Valerus Field Sols., LP v. Matagorda Cty. Appraisal Dist., No. 13-17-00520-CV, 2018 WL 4924752 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg, Oct. 11, 2018, no pet. ), and Houston Cement Co. v. Harris County Appraisal District, No. 14-12-00491-CV, 2013 WL 3243281 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2013, no pet. ) and broadly applied theories of contract to agreements under TEX. TAX CODE § 1.111(e). But Willacy hardly holds anything of the sort.

Party Submissions

Administrative and Financial Regulation 28 7.1. The Tribunal Secretary is Mr. Alex Kaplan, Senior Legal Counsel, ICSID, or such other person as ICSID may notify the Tribunal and the Parties from time to time. The Tribunal Secretary shall remain at all times impartial and independent of the Parties.

Legal Decisions

To authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to relocate a memorial honoring the 9 Air Force crew members who lost their lives in an airplane crash in the Cherokee and Nantahala National Forests during a training mission on August 31, 1982.

Legislation

Also please inform us what is the rules concerning informing of Coast Guard or any department on catching of crab [.]770 577. On 15 January 2017, the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries replied: Snow crab is a sedentary species under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This means that the Coastal State exercises sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources, including snow crab. This means that other States cannot harvest snow crab on the continental shelf of a coastal State, without the express consent of the coastal State concerned. According to UNCLOS, exploring and exploiting the natural resources of the continental shelf is a sovereign right vested with the coastal State. Under no circumstances may a State “license” the exploitation of living or non-living resources on the continental shelf of another State. Such illegal licensing would be a blatant violation of the coastal State’s sovereign rights under international law. This includes licensing by the EU on behalf of vessels from EU member States. This has at several occasions been communicated to the EU, including in a verbal note from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the EU dated 9 January 2017. Hence the certificates and licenses your vessels are referring to in the letter are not in accordance with neither [ sic] Norwegian nor international law.

Legal Decisions

Weatherford correctly states the general issue presented (“whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Trial Court’s grant of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity”). Weatherford Brief on the Merits (“Brief”) at 4. However, several of Weatherford’s seven “subsidiary questions” require a response from Midland as to the true questions presented because they misstate the basis for the lower courts’ rulings in support of Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction. As such, Midland counters with the following subsidiary questions, correlating to Weatherford’s offered questions: 1. Whether Weatherford presented evidence sufficient to raise at least a genuine issue of material fact as to the SWDA’s applicability to Midland at all: as either an owner-operator or arranger-acceptor of solid waste? Midland takes issue with Weatherford’s subsidiary question 1, as it asks the Court to question whether an exception to a statute applies before establishing whether the statute itself would apply to Midland as a threshold inquiry. Furthermore, Weatherford wrongly presents as an incorrect premise in subsidiary question 1 that Midland is an entity “responsible for ‘solid waste’” when that determination is part of the baseline showing Weatherford must provide to establish that the statute itself is applicable. Brief at 4. Finally, Weatherford misstates this Court’s precedent by asserting that in R.R. Street v. Pilgrim Enterprises that this Court reached a “contrary holding under similar circumstances.” Brief at 4; R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 166 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. 2005). As Midland details further herein, the R.R. Street precedent did not involve “similar circumstances” as there was not a jurisdictional plea at issue in the case, the Court determined that a fact issue existed as to the applicability of the domestic sewage exclusion, and as a result of such fact issue, the Court did not ultimately render a decision at all related to the domestic sewage exclusion. 2. Whether Weatherford presented evidence sufficient to trigger subject matter jurisdiction as to whether Midland was a person “responsible for solid waste,” irrespective of whether an alleged “mixture” occurred following the alleged acts of a third party not named Midland. With respect to Weatherford’s subsidiary question number 2, once again, Weatherford attempts to circumvent jurisdictional deficiencies in the hope that the Court will allow Weatherford to jump past the required analysis of whether the SWDA even applies in order to conduct a purely academic analysis of whether an exemption to that statute is appropriate.

Party Submissions

Respondents repeatedly state, “nothing in the lien notice even suggests that the amount of the lien has anything to do with the account number.” Id. However, not once in their brief do Respondents affirmatively state that the account numbers 2 Neither lower court held that an unfair debt-collection claim is more proper than a Chapter 12 claim.

Party Submissions

The requested Documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute in that they address (i) the expectations of Mr Broshko regards Obnova's rights to the Dunavska Plots and compensation, and (ii) Mr Broshko's knowledge at the time of making the investment and foreseeability of the investment dispute.

Legal Decisions

Claimants note Serbia’s objections. Claimants have limited the temporal scope of their request to the years 1946 – 1960 during which Obnova’s buildings were built. As for Serbia’s allegation that “ it would be unreasonably burdensome to require Respondent to identify other authorities, not listed in Claimants' request, which might be in possession of the requested documentation and require them to search their archives for any responsive documents ,” Claimants note that Serbia is clearly better positioned to identify their own relevant public authorities than Claimants are. DECISION 71 Counter-Memorial, ¶ 63.

Legal Decisions

The malpractice trial. At the malpractice trial HSMiller and the Lawyers disputed (i) whether Terry should have designated Flaven from the beginning, (ii) whether Terry committed malpractice by not designating Flaven more than 60 days before trial, and (iii) whether the trial court denied the motion for designation solely because it was filed late.

Party Submissions

To amend title 10, United States Code, to include training regarding financial literacy training programs for members of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Legislation

Ames’s third issue presents a blanket statement that the Additional Service Charge, as defined in Section 5.2(c) of the Contract tied to wastewater volumes in excess of a baseline amount, constitutes an unenforceable penalty, consequential damages, or exemplary damages, and Chapter 271 does not waive immunity for such damages. The actual issue is not whether the agreed-upon rates are a penalty, but whether Ames is responsible for paying an amount due and owed for a service as provided for in the Contract. As discussed in more detail below, the Contract provides the Additional Service Charge as a typical volumetric adjustment for wastewater volumes over the Total Accepted Volume (“ TAV”). Amounts owed under this volumetric charge are a direct result of Ames delivering volumes exceeding the TAV. Because the Additional Service Charge is a volumetric charge that was agreed-upon by Ames, such amounts are due and owed under the Contract. Liberty’s restated issue correctly characterizes the Additional Service Charge for what it is: an agreed-upon rate structure where Ames must pay for services received.

Party Submissions

Samson pressed its “law of the case” argument that rulings in Hooks should dictate results in the severed T.S. Reed case, including even “implicit” rulings: Samson’s Appellant’s Reply Brief filed May 19, 2014, in T.S. Reed at 4, n.2, located at: https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=d771066f-93f0-4556-aed2-ea379e68a886&coa=coa09&DT=Brief&MediaID=02631a8d-e955- 4792-a644-a28978861c76.

Party Submissions

The requested documents are relevant and material because they will show that the City of Belgrade considered Obnova to be the user of its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23 and charged Obnova a fee for the use of the land at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23. This is inconsistent with Serbia’s position in this arbitration that Obnova was not a rightful user of its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23.

Legal Decisions

Section 14. Successors. The Plan shall bind any successor to all or substantially all of the Company’s assets in the same manner and to the same extent that the Company would be obligated under the Plan if no succession had taken place.

Contract

The Respondent understands that this Request has been withdrawn. The Respondent reserves the right to object to any further request for these documents in due course.

Legal Decisions

Section 4.11. No Third Party Beneficiaries. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as giving any Person, other than the Parties and their respective successors, legal representatives and permitted assigns, any right, remedy or claim under or in respect of this Agreement or any provision hereof.

Contract

HSMiller has argued that the trial court could both quote the statute and then explain its application under the facts of the case. (Cross-Pet’r’s Br. at 23) The cases it cites in support of this 47 proposition do not support it. One case simply repeats the generic statement that trial courts have broad discretion in submitting jury instructions and then holds that the trial judge correctly refused to give an instruction that covered a matter that was not at issue in the case. See Interstate Northborough P’ship. v. State, 66 S.W.3d 213, 224 (Tex. 2001) (stating that, although a judge has broad discretion in the instructions it gives, court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to submit an instruction on a matter that was not at issue in the trial). The second case is one of this Court’s early opinions explaining the meaning of abuse of discretion and whether a sanctions order was an abuse of discretion. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985).

Party Submissions

We review a trial court’s award of attorney fees under the UDJA for an abuse of discretion. See Nabers v. Nabers, No. 14-18-00968-CV, 2020 WL 830025, at *2 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Under the UDJA, “ reasonable and necessary attorney ’ s fees ” may be awarded if they “ are equitable and just. ” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009. “Trial courts have wide discretion in determining what is equitable and just in awarding attorney ’ s fees, and appellate courts will not overturn such a decision unless it is clear from the facts the trial court abused its discretion. ” Nabers, 2020 WL 830025, at *2 (citing Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998)). “ The trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. ” Id. (citing Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)).

Party Submissions

Even if Section 51.003(a) does not apply, Yellowfin’s suit is untimely under any other applicable statute of limitations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.004 (four-year limitations period after cause of action accrues on a debt); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 3.118 (six-year limitations period after the note’s accelerated due date). That is so because foreclosure accelerated the loan. See Opening Br. 28-31.

Party Submissions

Terry also designated HSMiller as a responsible party in the malpractice trial below. (CR323) Under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 33.003, the jury should have been asked to apportion HSMiller’s own responsibility in causing its harm.

Party Submissions

Dr. Tappan has no such demonstrated experience in the area of causation. This case is akin to De La Riva, 351 S.W.3d 398. In that case a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist offered an opinion regarding the cause of infant hypoxia. As in this case, nothing in the four corners of his report indicated that he was qualified to offer such opinions. The doctor’s CV was also devoid of any recent perinatological experience. Id. at 407. The court properly determined that the causation opinions were matters of pediatric neurology, not obstetrics. Id. The expert was therefore not qualified to give them. Id.

Party Submissions

Proceeding in the Trial Court: The Walkers timely provided Dr. Castillo and BSA with preliminary reports and CVs from Dr. James G. Tappan, M.D., FACOG, FACS, a board-certified obstetrician, Dr. Donald M. Null, M.D., a neonatologist, and Nurse Martha Beach. App. 6, CR 57-450; App. 8, CR 453-490, App. 10, CR 491-506. Both defendants timely objected and moved to dismiss. CR 45; CR 507. The parties then agreed that the Walkers would have more time to file supplemental reports if they waived the right to seek a future 30-day extension. CR 759-80. After being served with amended reports from all three experts (App. 7, CR 663-707; App. 9, CR 708-45; App. 11, CR 842-57), both defendants objected and moved to dismiss. CR 649; CR 763.

Party Submissions

Enacted by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 269 (H.B. 752), § 1, effective September 1, 1993; am. Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1443 (H.B. 3522), § 1, effective September 1, 1997; am. Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 275 (H.B. 2095), § 2, effective September 1, 2003; am. Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 265 (H.B. 7), § 3.003, effective September 1, 2005; am. Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 133 (H.B. 1003), § 1, effective September 1, 2007; am. Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 134 (H.B. 1006), § 1, effective September 1, 2007; am. Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 147 (S.B. 458), § 1, effective September 1, 2007; am. Acts 2009, 81st Leg., ch. 1330 (H.B. 4290), § 13, effective September 1, 2009.

Party Submissions

To establish requirements for the Federal Trade Commission with respect to certain rules related to automotive retailing, and for other purposes.

Legislation

The fact that Wilson Plaintiffs would have sought offensive collateral estoppel on the Harpst judgment if the Harpst plaintiffs had won does not create privity between the Wilson and Harpst plaintiffs. I t’s important to note that the odds of Wilson Plaintiffs getting offensive collateral estoppel on a favorable Harpst judgment were extremely low. Offensive collateral estoppel on the Kinney judgment had already been denied, and their odds of obtaining offensive collateral estoppel on their second try had gotten vastly worse by the time of the Harpst trial. There’s no evidence or indication that Wilson Plaintiffs could have waltzed into court like Fleming Defendants did without even attaching an affidavit to their cursory motion for summary judgment and obtained collateral estoppel on 4,000 cases after a five-minute hearing. ( Ex 19 to Respondents’ Opposed Motion to Declare Harpst Judgment Unfair and Void). If Wilson Plaintiffs had sought offensive collateral estoppel on a favorable Harpst judgment, they were much more likely to get excoriated and denied like they did on practically every other important ruling before that judge. Id .

Party Submissions

Except as otherwise provided under law, or the terms of the Long-Term Incentive Plan, or any other employee benefit plan in which Executive participates, Executive shall not be entitled to receive any additional compensation or benefits from the Company after the termination date.

Contract

There are several conflicting versions in the record regarding what Mann was doing, or not doing at the time of his injuries. Bay essentially argues that since most of the differing versions of the facts place Mann within the course and scope of employment, and Mann cannot himself contradict any of the several versions, that course and scope is therefore conclusively established. This is a new rule of evidence never encountered in Texas jurisprudence. The carrier for the ROCIP owner determined through their own investigation, that Mann was going back to his personal truck for personal reasons. 39 It would defy logic and basic jurisprudence to allow multiple versions of an event which, by definition creates a fact issue to establish course and scope as a matter of law.

Party Submissions

Ru lin g o f th e Fo urth Co u rt o f Ap p e als The Opinion of the Court of Appeals (Tab 2) in this case employs an erroneous standard of review, which led to an erroneous review of the evidence in question. The Opinion notes that whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a non-resident Defendant is, “... a question of law we review de novo.” (Op. p. 3) The correct standard of review is set forth in BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). This Court held that: When a trial court does not issue findings of facts and conclusions of law with this special appearance ruling, all facts necessary to support the judgment by the evidence are implied. ...For legal sufficiency points, if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the no evidence challenge fails. (Citing a case) At 795. After the plaintiff has pled sufficient allegations to bring a non-resident defendant within the provision of the long arm statute, the defendant challenging jurisdiction over it must negate all jurisdictional bases. BMC, Supra at 794.

Party Submissions

This notion of “one order, one reviewing court” is all that was at issue in Griggs. Griggs concerned a party that tried to appeal a judgment while the District Court was still considering whether to alter that same judgment. Id., at 56, 103 S.Ct. 400. The Court held that the appeal needed to wait until after the District Court's work on that judgment was done. *755 Id., at 60–61, 103 S.Ct. 400. This result, which followed from the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, was necessary to “avoi[d]” the situation “in which district courts and courts of appeals would both have had the power to modify the same judgment.” Id., at 60, 103 S.Ct. 400 (emphasis added).

Party Submissions

Samson’s oral argument rebuttal assertion that compounding Late Charges is an issue “unaddressed by the trial court or either of the courts of appeals” is incorrect. The Hooks jury decided the issue (Oral Argument Exhs. 4 and 4.a-c), the Hooks trial judge decided the issue (Exh. 4.d), and the First Court of Appeals resolved the issue against Samson (Oral Argument Exhs. 4). And collateral estoppel was an alternative grounds for the Bordages summary judgment in this case. 6CR 8170, 7CR9378.

Party Submissions

According to the undisputed summary-judgment evidence, on April 27, 2001, Douglas was employed at a hotel owned by Moody. During her lunch break, she sat on a curb in the loading dock area of the hotel while smoking a cigarette. A fellow employee inadvertently engaged the accelerator of a utility cart, causing [*2] it to roll over Douglas's leg. Douglas sustained injuries requiring medical treatment.

Party Submissions

To achieve a balance between this public interest and the rights of property owners, a lis pendens can only be filed when “the suit on which the lis pendens is based ... claim[s] a direct interest in real property, not a collateral one.” 6 Id. at 293. If (like here) a party “seeks a property interest only to secure the recovery of damages or other relief that the [party] may be awarded, the interest is merely collateral and will not support a lis pendens.” Id. In this situation (like here) there is no public interest that could outweigh the harm caused by giving litigants an absolute privilege to—even negligently or maliciously—prevent property owners from freely transferring their property.

Party Submissions

Second, Barina ignores Petitioners’ argument that the appellate court improperly focused its substantial-truth analysis in this defamation-by-gist claim on omitted materials rather than on what the Program actually said, veering dangerously close to re-establishing an already rejected tort of false light in Texas. Had the courts below done the proper analysis, they would have concluded that the Program’s alleged defamatory gist—i.e., that Barina exploited Thrash—was substantially true. The statements actually made about Barina, including most notably that she offered to abandon her role as guardian and leave Thrash in the care of the very people she now claims were abusing him in exchange for half his estate, establish the truth of the alleged defamatory sting.

Party Submissions

The United States objects to Request No. 3.e for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a.

Legal Decisions

Such documents are relevant to demonstrate the nature of the treatment and protection accorded by the Respondent to the Claimant and are therefore, notably, material to an assessment of the Respondent’s alleged breach18 of the Claimant’s rights under Art. 319 of the France-Qatar BIT.

Legal Decisions

Respondents repeatedly insist that the court below merely analyzed the legal sufficiency of the “evidence” of Westwood’s constructive-eviction claim and concluded that Westwood’s withdrawal of its appeal amounted to “voluntarily abandon[ing] the premises” of its own accord. (Resp. 7, 8, 12, 16-17, 19, 21, 28) But that argument misrepresents the evidence and misconstrues the basis for the court of appe als’ decision.

Party Submissions

In short, Section 272.001 expressly authorizes a contractor performing work in Texas to void any provision seeking to fix forum in another state, which necessarily includes any contractual language purporting to “waive” objections to the forum-selection clause. A forum-selection clause and this sort of waiver language are both provisions that “mak[e] the contract or agreement or any conflict arising under the contract or agreement subject to another state’s law, litigation in the courts of another state, or arbitration in another state.” TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 272.001(b). This Court should conclude RLB voided these contractual provisions under Section 272.001 when it filed suit in a Texas court.

Party Submissions

Value is agreed to be $X Square footage agreed to be X The roof is agreed to be composition The veneer is agreed to be brick The lot size is agreed to be X The age is agreed to be X years. Etc., etc., etc. A property owner could easily claim that when it reported the square footage to the appraisal district, it transposed some numbers. Thus, it might claim, the subsequent agreement on value could be attacked by a clerical error correction. The point is, when one agrees to an appraised value, one agrees to all the components thereof and all the theories thereof and all the remedies to the contrary. Otherwise, such an agreement is toothless.

Party Submissions

This Court previously recognized this unethical practice. See In re N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd ., 559 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 2018). Petitioners should be able to seek recourse under Chapter 12, as intended by the Legislature. Petitioners ask this Court to apply Chapter 12’s plain language and reverse the court of appeals’ erroneous decision that securing a lien under Chapter 55 precludes recovery under Chapter 12. Doing so will restore integrity in hospital billing. More specifically, it will discourage hospitals from using unreasonable chargemaster rates (the fraudulent claim) with the intent to recover more than the “reasonable value” from the patients’ personal injury claims using the enforcement powers of Chapter 55.

Party Submissions

As explained above, the requested documents will show when Obnova’s buildings were built. This determination is, in turn, relevant and material to rebut Serbia’s argument that Obnova’s buildings at Dunavska 17-19 were built before Obnova’s establishment and Obnova thus does not have any rights to these buildings.67 Serbia’s argument that the requested documents are not relevant and material because “ Claimants have not identified any specific documents or category of documents that are in Respondent's possession which provide this information ”, supposedly being the information about when the buildings were built, is clearly 67 Counter-Memorial, ¶ 63.

Legal Decisions

This brief was prepared using Microsoft Word. Relying on the word count function in that software, I certify that this response contains 7,996 words (excluding the cover, tables, signature block, and certificates).

Party Submissions

This Invention and Non-Disclosure Agreement (this “Agreement”) is made by and between OneSpan North America, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the “Company”), and Matthew Moynahan (“you”).

Contract

R, M : Claimants failed to demonstrate how requested documents are relevant to its case and material for the outcome of the proceedings. In particular, Claimants failed to explain how the opinion of the Secretariat for Transport – Department is relevant to the question of Obnova’s alleged property rights or material to the Tribunal’s determination of this question. This is a classic “fishing expedition”, with Claima nts simply casting about for any documents which might contain information they consider helpful in substantiating their (unsubstantiated) case. PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants.214 In other words, the requested documents are “in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties”. 215 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the mentioned authority in order to obtain documents in question.216 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants, to obtain these documents and it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves.

Legal Decisions

More examples of anti-waiver language may be found in other codes. Of these, section 143A.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is especially noteworthy.

Party Submissions

DEBTS, LAWSUITS AND CAUSES OF ACTION OF WHATEVER NATURE AND CHARACTER, WHETHER ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO CONTRACT (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, RELATED TO DELAYED DELIVERY, NONDELIVERY, PRODUCT QUALITY OR DEFECTIVE PRODUCT), TORT, STRICT LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, MISREPRESENTATION, VIOLATION OF APPLICABLE LAW, AND/OR ANY SOURCE OR CAUSE WHATSOEVER, WITHOUT LIMIT AND WITHOUT REGARD TO THE CAUSE OR CAUSES THEREOF, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF OR ALLEGED TO ARISE OUT OF BODILY INJURY OR LOSS OF PROPERTY.

Contract

The two-year statute of limitations in Section 51.003(a) of the Texas Property Code bars Yellowfin from pursuing Ms. Santos’s unpaid debt more than twelve years after foreclosure of her home. Section 51.003(a) ’s text plainly covers deficiency actions brought by non-foreclosing junior lenders, and to hold otherwise, as Yellowfin urges, would require this Court to add words to the statute that the Legislature did not include.

Party Submissions

To express the sense of the Senate regarding the constitutional right of State Governors to repel the dangerous ongoing invasion across the United States southern border.

Legislation

Id. At *2, citing Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d at 168. Thus, where husband purchased the home using separate property but took title in both spouses’ names, the presumption arose that he intended to make a gift to wife of one-half of the property. Id. Husband testified that he did not intend to make such a gift, which rebutted the presumption. Id. The trial court’s characterization of the house as husband’s separate property was within its discretion and affirmed. Id .

Party Submissions

For the reasons stated above, the Walkers pray that this Court grant review, reverse the judgment of the intermediate court, and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. The Walkers further pray for such other and further relief as to which they may be entitled.

Party Submissions

In turn, “Defterios assured [the underlying plaintiffs] that Flaven was a trust-fund beneficiary able to close the deal.” Lawyers’ Brief at 15.

Party Submissions

In addition, the Request seeks the production of all documents “between and/or among Respondent”. This is overly broad for the reasons set out in relation to Request 9 supra, which apply here mutatis mutandis .

Legal Decisions

One of our sister courts has recently applied these Penn Central factors to a group of bars complaining of emergency orders during the Covid-19 pandemic and alleging a taking; we find that court’s analysis persuasive. See Stand for Something Grp. Live, LLC v. Abbott, No. 13-21-00017-CV, 2022 WL 11485464 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi – Edinburg Oct. 20, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Party Submissions

Claimant’s 2013 Contract with Respondent, i.e. how many gallons of AC-30 are outstanding to be supplied and stored. The executive summaries, like those cited in paragraph 91 of Mr. Abu Naba’a’s witness statement, will evidence that the Department of Importation and Supply of Asphalt shared the same interpretation of the 2013 Contract as Claimant and advised the MOPC of that interpretation. Moreover, these documents evidence that Respondent operated under the 2013 Contract, which it now alleges was “null and void” ( see Respondent’s Memorial ¶ 8) without issue for almost 10 years. These documents, therefore, directly support Claimant’s assertion that the supply and storage clauses of the 2013 Contract were wholly independent from each other and that the 2013 Contract was valid ( see Claimant’s Memorial ¶¶ 42, 48, 50-51, 86; Witness Statement of M. Abu Naba’a ¶ 45-46, 54, 56-57) and refute Respondent’s allegations that the 2013 Contract was completed and requested documents, has exemplified the alleged content of such documents (see Abu Naba’a WS, ¶ 91), and has clarified that the requested documents are issued annually.

Legal Decisions

Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce all documents described in this January 20, 2017 to the present, that are in the possession, custody, or control of USTR, the State Department, and the Request No.

Legal Decisions

On March 2, 2021, Abbott issued an order stating that “there are no Covid-19-related operating limits for any business or other establishment [in Texas].” GA- – 5– 34.2 Shortly after, appellees filed their joint Supplemental Plea to the Jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Galovelho’s equitable clai ms because the claims had become moot following GA-34. Appellees also argued that Galovelho lacked standing for a number of its claims and that some claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Galovelho responded, and after hearing, the trial court granted the supplem ental plea and dismissed all of Galovelho’s claims with prejudice.

Party Submissions

It is unclear what Serbia is actually arguing on this issue. To begin with, Serbia argues that searching for responsive documents would put Serbia “ in the difficult position of searching both physical archives and 151 Article 5(2) of the Law on Free Access to the Information of Public Importance states that everyone has the right to have the information of public importance made available to them, by providing them with an access to a document containing information of public importance, the right to a copy of that document, and the right to have a copy of the document sent to him by mail, fax, by email or otherwise, upon their request. Article 2(1) defines information of public importance as information at the disposal of a State authority, created in the work or in connection with the work of the State authority, contained in a certain document, and refers to everything that the public has a legitimate interest in knowing. See Annex 9. 152 See above para 14. 153 State Attorney Office, representing Serbia in arbitration proceedings, is not in physical possession of the requested documents and thus has to address the relevant state authorities to obtain the documentation, just like Claimants are entitled to do. 154 Request to the Assembly of the City of Belgrade, 17 November 2022, Annex-16 .

Legal Decisions

The issue is limited. Texas Occupations Code § 2301.467(a)(1) states that distributors and manufacturers cannot “require” a franchised dealer to adhere to an unreasonable sales standard. World Car’s § 2301.467(a)(1) argument is that HMA unreasonably demanded that its dealers be 100% “sales efficient”— applying real consequences for noncompliance—but failed to allocate World Car enough vehicle inventory to meet that standard. Receiving ample vehicle allocations is the lifeblood of franchised dealers, who heavily rely on their manufacturers and distributors for those allocations. So HMA’s actions were surely unreasonable, but reasonableness is not at issue here because the El Paso court of appeals and DMV Board ruled that HMA did not “require” the sales standard in the first place. That is the sole issue presented.

Party Submissions

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to impose a tax on the purchase of single-family homes by certain large investors, and for other purposes.

Legislation

Likewise, before the court of appeals could validly conclude the trial court abused its discretion, it too needed to review the contracts and not simply assume the Subcontract incorporated the MCC’s forum-selection/choice of law and waiver provisions. In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., L.P., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (finding a clear failure to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion). If anything in the record supports the trial court’s rulings—and the language of the MCC and Subcontract does—the court of appeals was bound to find the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See In re Univ. Interscholastic League, 20 S.W.3d 690, 691-92 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (appellate court should “review the entire record” and determine if the facts and law permitted “the trial court to make but one decision”). The court of appeals erred in not conducting this contractual analysis and instead just making assumptions.

Party Submissions

Counsel for Respondent I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Respondent’s Oral Argument Exhibits has been served on the following counsel of record via e-service in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, on this 9th day of January, 2024.

Party Submissions

The majority’s second case citation dealt with an altogether different question, arising from an allegation that a member of a special litigation committee was so dominated by the company controller that she could not fairly consider a litigation demand. The Delaware Chancery Court held this assertion was “beyond the bounds of reasonable conceivability.” In re GGP, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2021 WL 2102326, at *17.

Party Submissions

The Advance shall be made either by a transfer initiated by the Lender pursuant to cash concentration agreements or by a manual transfer from the Lender to the Borrower.

Contract

Petitioners Dr. Rahul K. Nath and Usha Nath respectfully request the Court grant their motion for rehearing and petition for review, and reverse and remand to the trial court for litigation of their claims. In the alternative, the Naths pray the Court remand the Hospitals’ attorney’s fees claims with instructions that the Naths raised a fact issue and have the right to a jury determination of the reasonableness of any fee award. The Naths pray for any other additional relief to which they may be justly entitled.

Party Submissions

Astonishingly, Nicaragua appears to feign ignorance of the wide scope of this US Presidential Proclamation. Still, it would be hard to believe that Nicaragua (represented here in this Arbitration by its Attorney General and its US-based counsel) could be unaware of this barrier to entry for its officials. Without any doubt, Nicaraguan government officials who have already presented evidence before this Tribunal are ineligible for entry to the United States because of US sanctions that are in effect.

Party Submissions

If the Court chooses to address Dr. Castillo’s qualifications objections, the Walkers’ experts were not qualified to opine on causation. Dr. Tappan was not qualified to offer opinions about H.W.’s neurological injuries or their cause(s); he offered no facts in his report or CV to establish his qualifications to offer those opinions. Similarly, Dr. Null’s report and CV did not establish his qualifications to allow him to offer opinions about an “asphyxia event” or the proximate cause(s) of H.W.’s neurological injuries. Indeed, his primary area of practice deals with pulmonary health and ventilator management practices, not in-utero neurological or brain injuries. Issue No. 4: The Court of Appeals decided this case on the narrow grounds briefed by Dr. Castillo and Baptist. Both defendants objected to the reports’ sufficiency on causation grounds, which necessarily involved both components of proximate cause—cause in fact and foreseeability. Therefore, the Court of Appeals properly considered the foreseeability issue in concluding the reports were insufficient under section 74.351.

Party Submissions

Thus, the determination of whether any type of claim is within the Act's exclusive jurisdiction depends on whether the claim is based on an entitlement of benefits. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d at 804; Henry v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 70 S.W.3d 808, 809 (Tex. 2002) (holding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate an employee's claim because the trial court could not “adjudicate the damages claim without determining whether the employee was entitled to benefits, a matter within the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction.”).

Party Submissions

On August 14, 2020, the trial court issued an order purporting to support resolution of jurisdictional issues in an efficient manner. The order required Galovelho to seek leave of court before further amending its pleadings. Shortly after, Galovelho’s interlocutory ap peal was voluntarily dismissed and remanded to the trial court. Galovelho, LLC v. Abbott, No. 05-20-00784-CV, 2020 WL 6156014 (Tex. App. — Dallas Oct. 21, 2020, no pet.).

Party Submissions

On appeal, Grant asserts that the order should be reversed because the trial court ignored her, failed to consider evidence, allowed judicial misconduct, and violated her due process and equal protection rights. We review the trial court’s order requiring payment of costs for an abuse of discretion. In re R.J., No. 02-16-00445-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4567, at *3– 4 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth May 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Party Submissions

Not all bonuses are paid after the fact. Professional athletes, for example, may receive a bonus for signing an employment agreement which is referable to the entire length of the contract. Treating such a bonus as purely separate or purely community depending on when it is received would be inconsistent with the law’s treatment of other forms of compensation for services.

Party Submissions

To the extent that Respondent invokes the deliberative process privilege unde r Article 9.2(b) of the IBA Rules, Respondent must show that the requested documents are subject to that privilege within the scope of Article 9.2(b).

Legal Decisions

Merely reciting the wording of the statute (that the Contract was “properly executed”) is simply making a legal conclusion. Liberty was required to plead facts, not conclusions, that “affirmatively demonstrate that. .. immunity from suit has been waived.” In other words, they were required to plead facts that support the conclusion that the Contract was “properly executed.” Liberty’s argument that presenting a signed and executed contract met its initial burden completely ignores that this Court has held that not every executed contract is “properly” executed. El Paso Education Initiative, Inc. v. Amex Properties, LLC, 602 S.W.3d 521, 532 (Tex. 2020) (“The adjective ‘properly’ necessarily limits the verb ‘executed,’ leading to the inexorable conclusion that not all executed contracts qualify for Chapter 271's waiver.”).

Party Submissions

The Walkers’ real problem is that only Dr. Tappan addresses foreseeability, and he limits his opinion to one sentence: that “[i]t was foreseeable to an ordinarily prudent obstetrician that failure to deliver by reverse breech extraction might reasonably result in traumatic extraction ... and trauma, including the increased risk of arterial ischemic stroke with injury to the fetal brain.” (CR.669). Missing from Dr. Tappan’s foreseeability opinion—like the rest of his opinions—is the necessary 6 E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 664.

Party Submissions

Company’s choice. The foregoing right of indemnification will not be available to a Covered Person to the extent that a court of competent jurisdiction in a final judgment or other final adjudication, in either case, not subject to further appeal, determines that the acts or omissions of such Covered Person giving rise to the indemnification claim resulted from such Covered Person’s bad faith, fraud or willful misconduct. The foregoing right of indemnification will not be exclusive of any other rights of indemnification to which Covered Persons may be entitled under the United Rentals Restated Certificate of Incorporation or Bylaws, as a matter of law, or otherwise, or any other power that the Company may have to indemnify such persons or hold them harmless.

Contract

USMCA does not exclude Claimants’ claims. Annex 14-C of USMCA allows investors holding legacy investments to 70 Commentary on the revised text of the 2020 IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, at 9 (Jan. 2021) (“Article 3.3 [of the IBA Rules] is designed to prevent a broad ‘fishing expedition’, while at the same time permitting parties to request documents that can be identified with reasonable specificity and which can be shown to be relevant to the case and material to its outcome.”). 71 Respondent’s Cover Letter for Respondent’s Responses & Objections to Claimants’ Document Requests, Oct. 11, 2023 (“Respondent’s Letter”), at p. 2.

Legal Decisions

At the outset, this test is “particularly dependent on a fully-developed factual record.” Id. at 715. But that is another reason why mandamus is improper. As this Court recognized in a parallel context, resolving whether the First Amendment would allow for mandamus here “necessarily requires factual determinations.” Id. at 716. No such record exists here. Yet this is the first opportunity the Republican Party of Texas has had to assert its First Amendment rights: the lack of a robust factual record cannot fairly be charged against it. Nor did this Court hold the absence of such a record against the respondent in Brady, where the Court reversed a court of appeals’ mandamus grant regarding a claim that a candidate did not submit sufficient qualifying signatures when seeking judicial office. Id. at 713, 716. Mandamus is no more proper an avenue to resolve the Republican Party’s First Amendment claim here any more than it was in Brady .

Party Submissions

The Borrower agrees to pay on demand all losses and all costs and expenses, if any, in connection with the enforcement of this Agreement, the Note and any instruments or other documents delivered under this Agreement or the Note, including, without limitation, losses, costs and expenses sustained as a result of a default by the Borrower in the performance of its obligations contained in this Agreement, the Note or any instrument or document delivered under this Agreement or the Note.

Contract

The survey design shall take into account the Guidelines for statistically sound and risk-based surveys of Agrilus planipennis. The survey design and sampling scheme used for detection surveys shall be able to identify with at least 95 % confidence, a level of presence of the specified pest of 1 %.

Legislation

Here, Husband was employed with Bank of America for eight years (from -2002 to 201 0) before marriage. It is undisputed that Husband made contributions to a401(k) prior to marriage. Wife introduced paystubs from 2005 to 2010 showing he contributed $20,648.23 to the retirement account. Husband neither presented evidence to the contrary nor presented evidence of contributions prior to 2005 because he admitted some account statements were unavailable because they were too old. Thus, the value of the 401(k) owned at the time of marriage was never identied.

Party Submissions

Respondents acknowledge that the result in Kemp turned mainly on the fact that the tenant lacked the legitimate “right of possession” to the property necessary to maintain a constructive-eviction claim. (Resp. 34, citing Kemp, 2020 WL 205313, at *4) Respondents claim that they too challenged Westwood’s right of possession by questioning whether Westwood’s renewal of the lease was effective. (Id.) But the two challenges are very different. The challenge brought by the landlord in Kemp was meritorious: The tenant was a holdover whose continued “possession [was] unlawful.” (Pet. Br. 16, quoting 2020 WL 205313, at *1-2) By contrast, Respondents’ challenge to Westwood’s right of possession in this case was specious. See supra, at pp. 8-9. Thus, unlike the tenant in Kemp, Westwood possessed the property rights necessary to maintain a claim for constructive eviction, and breach of contract.

Party Submissions

Convention Article 61(2); Administrative and Financial Regulation 15; Arbitration Rule 50 10.1. The Parties shall cover the direct costs of the proceeding in equal parts, without prejudice to the final decision of the Tribunal as to the allocation of costs.

Legal Decisions

Midland, a public entity shielded from suit by governmental immunity, submitted an evidentiary Plea to the Jurisdiction to the Trial Court, and the Trial Court granted that plea. Weatherford failed to meet its burden to submit rebuttal evidence that its chosen statute, the SWDA, is in any way applicable to Midland so as to implicate the limited waiver of immunity found in that statute. Weatherford’s shortcoming is a jurisdictional barrier to entry, and its Petition’s focus on a statutory exclusion—the domestic sewage exclusion—should be seen for what it is: a backdoor attempt to argue substantive SWDA law when Weatherford could not even show the statute applied to Midland in the first place.

Party Submissions

At minimum, the El Paso court’s decision would cause confusion in future dealings and legal proceedings. The El Paso court created conflicting precedents, or at least confusion, on a statutory-interpretation issue that is critical for the entire auto industry.

Party Submissions

To amend title 49, United States Code, to establish a program to provide grants to eligible recipients for eligible operating support costs of public transportation, and for other purposes.

Legislation

E. Neither Lessee nor its purchaser of production· shall be authorized to make any deductions or adjustments against present or future royalty payments for royalty amounts previously paid without first giving Lessor or royalty owner thirty (30) days advanced notice of same along with a full explanation of such overpayment. In the event Lessor or royalty owner disputes the legitimacy of such deduction or adjustment, Lessee or purchaser shall not be entitled to make such deductions or adjustments against Lessor's royalty (and Lessor's full royalty payments shall not be interrupted) until such dispute is resolved. If it is agreed between Lessor or royalty owner and Lessee that a royalty owner was overpaid, then the overpaid royalty owner has the option of repaying such overpayment or allowing Lessee or purchaser to recoup such overpayment out of future royalty payments on a schedule and in monthly amounts agreed to by such overpaid royalty owner and Lessee or purchaser. Any overpaid royalty owner shall not be charged interest on the overpaid sums.

Party Submissions

Id. at 814–15. A hearing officer eventually determined the employee sustained a compensable injury. Id. at 815. However, an appeals panel reversed and remanded for further factual determinations on the compensability issue.

Party Submissions

Enacted by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 136 (S.B. 28), § 1, effective September 1, 1995; am. Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 204 (H.B. 4), §§ 4.03, 4.04, 4.10(2), effective September 1, 2003; am. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 203 (H.B. 274), §§ 5.01, 5.02, effective September 1, 2011.

Party Submissions

The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the a greement's silence with respect to costs and fees creates a “risk” that she will be required to bear prohibitive arbitration costs if she pursues her claims in an arbitral forum, and thereby forces her to forgo any claims she may have against petitioners. ” Id. at 90. The Court reasoned that “[t]he record reveals only the arbitration agreement's silence on the subject, and that fact alone is plainly insufficient to render it unenforceable. The “risk” that [plaintiff] will be saddled with prohibitive costs [was] too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.” Id. at 91.

Party Submissions

Sunset Termination Provision Section 21 of the Guaranty states that the Guaranty terminates upon construction and completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation of the Texaco Building.

Party Submissions

S.W.3d at 667. The expert explained the physician should have obtained certain heart rate information from the nurses, but that information was misreported. If the physician had known the correct information, he would have delivered the baby sooner. The expert also set out what happened to cause the injury (cord compression) and linked it to the alleged wrongdoing (heart rate variability that was not reported to physician). There is no such explanation here.

Party Submissions

The split among the courts of appeals compounds the problem by creating confusion among parties. Parties will not know whether a termination clause will effectively end a case, which can have a great impact on early settlement.

Party Submissions

Liberty asserts that all it had to do to satisfy its burden to show that the Contract was properly executed was to attach a copy of a contract with a signature on it and assert in its pleadings that the Contract was “properly executed.” Liberty’s actual burden was to “allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate that. .. immunity from suit has been waived. . .” Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 389 (Tex. 2021).

Party Submissions

In Houston Cement Co. v. Harris County Appraisal District, No. 14-12-00491-CV, 2013 WL 3243281, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2013, no pet. ), the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held there was no subject matter jurisdiction when an agreement such as the one in this case is made between a taxpayer and an appraisal district. In that case, the taxpayer protested the appraisal district’s market value in 2009 and 2010. Id. at *1. In both years, prior to the appraisal review board hearing, the parties agreed to an amended appraised value “thereby resolving the dispute.” Id. In both years, the parties executed and signed written agreements to such effect. Id .

Party Submissions

Here, between the medical-ese of Dr. Tappan’s report and Dr. Null’s terse, conclusory opinion, the Amarillo Court of Appeals properly concluded neither report—standing alone or read in tandem with the other—sufficiently explained factually how and why Dr. Castillo’s alleged departures from the standards of care were a proximate cause of H.W.’s injuries. With the help of dictionaries, the Court of Appeals accepted the experts’ statements but concluded that the experts omitted any adequate explanation of how and why each defendant caused, within reasonable medical probability, the baby’s subacute infarction before birth. Thus, the reports were deficient on causation.

Party Submissions