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Perhaps more importantly, however, none of the evidence Respondents cite played any part in the court of appeals’ decision. The court refused to consider it. Nor did the court rely on any “Rule 11 agreement” memorialized in the agreed judgment because it deemed the judgment’s contents themselves unimportant. All that mattered to the court below was the judgment’s very existence, which purportedly “precluded” Westwood’s constructive eviction and breach -of-contract claims in district court. (Op. 6) That conclusion violates Texas statutes and this Court’s precedent, creates conflicts among the lower courts, strips eviction proceedings of the jurisdictional limits necessary to ensure their efficiency, threatens the separation of powers and the jurisdictional boundaries between Texas district courts, and creates intractable practical problems for Texas tenants. It therefore raises issues of substantial importance to Texas jurisprudence that this Court should review and resolve.
Party Submissions
13.715796
13.656862
14.071822
Therefore, the Respondent is ordered to produce: “all documents, communications, or other correspondence issued/received by the MOPC directly addressing its decision to remit payment and subsequently revoke payment of libramiento no. 7852-1 to Sargeant, from 1 August 2019 to date”.
Legal Decisions
28.822428
28.6154
29.509077
Notice shall be given to the other party by delivering a copy of the notice to the party by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. Notice shall be given to the Court by delivering a copy of the notice either in person to the clerk of this Court or by registered or certified mail addressed to the clerk at 2100 Bloomdale, McKinney, Texas 75071. Notice shall be given to the state case registry by mailing a copy of the notice to State Case Registry, Contract Services Section, MC046S, P.O. Box 12017, Austin, Texas 78711-2017.
Party Submissions
4.203338
4.259696
4.348806
Two days later, McCarthy filed a motion to dismiss in the Oklahoma case, arguing that (1) the forum-selection clause in the MCC is voidable under the Texas “home-rule” statute found in section 272.001 of the Business and Commerce Code;1 and (2) the case should further be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Party Submissions
9.061017
7.565163
10.690118
On the other hand, protecting the public fisc is cold comfort for an injured person barred from the judicial remedies that would otherwise be available to them had the complained-of-acts been committed by a private person. See id.; Bacon v. Tex. Hist. Comm ’ n, 411 S.W.3d 161, 172 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (noting that “sovereign immunity generally shields our state government ’ s improvident acts — however improvident, harsh, unjust, or infuriatingly boneheaded these acts may seem” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Consequently, c ourts “ defer to the Legislature in waiving immunity because it is in a better position to weigh the conflicting public policy interests associated with subjecting the government to liability. ” Dohlen, 643 S.W.3d at 392 (citing Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 432 – 33 (Tex. 2016)).
Party Submissions
7.047692
7.098716
7.322139
Agreement was the result of a negotiated process to which generators could choose to adhere or not. As appears from a letter from CAMMESA to the Energy Secretary dated 20 October 2005, the Tribunal notes that not all generators that adhered to the Adhesion Contract adhered to the FONINVEMEM I Agreement.944 This further confirms the noncoercion in relation to the program. 803. The testimony of the Claimant’s witness Ms. Bertone confirms the Tribunal’s findings.
Legal Decisions
18.620777
14.98413
18.782494
To prohibit the Environmental Protection Agency from using assessments generated by the Integrated Risk Information System as a tier 1 data source in rulemakings and other regulatory actions, and for other purposes.
Legislation
7.167085
6.225279
6.963819
Finally, Rafiei concludes his discussion with Brunke v. Ohio State Home Services, Inc., No. 08CA009320, 2008 WL 4615578 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2008). In Brunke the court found procedural unconscionability of a contractual arbitration clause because both of the plaintiffs had “very limited reading ability,” “poor quality” comprehension skills, and an almost total lack of understanding what they were signing. 2008 WL 4615578, at *2-3. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that the arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable. Id. at *3. The court then found the arbitration provision to be substantively unconscionable because the plaintiffs would have to spend nearly 50% of the contract price to arbitrate the dispute. Id. at *4. Brunke was subsequently distinguished by two Ohio decisions based on the “extreme facts” of the case. Khaledi v. Nickris Prop., Inc., No. H-17-015, 2018 WL 3738083, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. August 3, 2018); Moran v. Riverfront Diversified, Inc., 968 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).
Party Submissions
4.942958
4.950409
5.023098
America; 2) not tied to any commissioned work and 3) an “expectancy” and not an entitlement until it was received. Id.
Party Submissions
29.565308
52.287674
57.097412
Relevant court of appeals precedent can be found in the Cunningham case. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 183 S.W.2d 985 (Tex.
Party Submissions
6.001844
6.395123
7.064515
Having overruled each of Grant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court ordering partition and the order requiring Grant to pay costs.
Party Submissions
12.009193
19.84321
25.23186
We will collectively describe these state, county, and municipal limitations on restaurants, which began in March 2020 and extended to varying degrees for approximately one year, as the Emergency Orders.
Party Submissions
13.502373
18.073174
15.584849
Under the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, the legislature grants an administrative agency the sole authority to make the initial determination in a dispute. If an agency has exclusive jurisdiction, courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute until the party has exhausted all of the administrative remedies within the agency. Absent subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court must dismiss any claim within the agency's exclusive jurisdiction.
Party Submissions
6.259991
6.044031
7.052415
Drawings and Operating and Maintenance Manuals, receipt by McCarthy of such materials is required prior to processing Subcontractor's final payment.
Party Submissions
21.13589
35.42519
30.655293
Terry: $ ~ 1 000 0~0 1 Newsom, Terry & Newsom, L.L.P.: $~MU00 1 When you go into the jury room to answer the questions, the first thing you will need to do is choose a presiding juror.
Party Submissions
18.699684
18.860493
28.109444
Third, Rafiei assumes that he will be burdened with the cost of three arbitrators. But the parties can agree to use one arbitrator. Rafiei has not explored that prospect with the Lennar. Additionally, Rafiei can petition the AAA for a hardship waiver, which he has not done. III. Rafiei’s cases from other jurisdictions.
Party Submissions
14.182256
17.42988
16.380648
Without this erroneous reading of art. XVII.D, Samson gives no meaning to the last sentence of XVII.C. The importance of this last sentence is shown both by the text of XVII.C and the legal context in which it was drafted.
Party Submissions
19.2307
27.844118
28.252722
The Relator is a candidate for statewide office. The Respondent is the Chairman of the Republican Party of Texas, which is headquartered in Austin. Relator seeks a writ of mandamus compelling Respondent to reject the application of the Real Party in Interest, Justice John Devine, to appear on the ballot in an upcoming election.
Party Submissions
5.916372
6.380685
6.873595
This body of law is in straightforward opposition to the application of any common law principles. This recognizes the fundamental difference between common law and statute law.
Party Submissions
17.865656
22.69967
27.952665
Letter from the Directorate for Construction Land and Urban Development of Belgrade to the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction No. 19111/96000-VI-I dated 14 April 2010, together with all accompanying attachments. RELEVANCE Claimants hereby incorporate explanation from Request No. 34 above.
Legal Decisions
21.775541
17.361172
22.520325
McCarthy’s position would render other portions of the paragraph 47.7 in the MCC meaningless. McCarthy admits that it waived any “objection” to venue or convenience of forum. Significantly, however, McCarthy “irrevocably submit[ted] to the exclusive jurisdiction” of the Tulsa County District Court or the Northern District Federal Court located in Tulsa, Oklahoma; “agree[d] that all claims in respect of such action or proceeding shall be heard and determined only in” the Tulsa County District Court or the Northern District Federal Court located in Tulsa, Oklahoma; and “agree[d] not to bring any action or proceeding arising out of or relating to this contract or the enforcement hereof in any other court.” It is not inconsistent for McCarthy to have waived any objection to venue or convenience of forum while also agreeing that claims arising out of or relating to the MCC be brought in the Tulsa County District Court or the Northern District Federal Court located in Tulsa, Oklahoma. We must harmonize all provisions in paragraph 47.7 of the MCC so that none will be rendered meaningless. See Nettye Engler Energy, LP, 639 S.W.3d at 690; Sundown Energy LP, 622 S.W.3d at 888. Moreover, we cannot rewrite a contract or add to its language under the guise of interpreting it. Abdullatif v. Choudhri, 561 S.W.3d 590, 602 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). McCarthy bargained freely to waive its section 272.001-right to void the forum-selection clause in the MCC.
Party Submissions
4.895608
5.143765
5.19725
The United States objects to Request No. 2.f for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.a.
Legal Decisions
8.428967
13.278079
14.621537
As in the Diocese’s own proposed definition of “undue advantage,” passive receipt of a benefit that it would be unconscionable to retain has been equated with taking an “undue advantage,” the phrase used in Heldenfels, by the PJC committee and several appellate courts. See TEX. PATTERN JURY CHARGES Business 101.44 (2022) (citing Tex. Integrated Conveyor Sys., Inc. v. Innovative Conveyor Concepts, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 348, 367 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied); Villarreal v. Grant Geophysical, Inc ., 136 S.W.3d 265, 270 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied); City of Corpus Christi v. S.S. Smith & Sons Masonry, Inc., 736 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1987, writ denied). By incorporating the “equity and good conscience” language into Question 1, the jury charge adequately instructed the jury on undue advantage. (2CR839).
Party Submissions
6.005066
6.45015
6.217472
Section 272.001 makes the forum-selection clauses in construction contracts “voidable.” See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 272.001(b). RLB cites to statutes from other states that make forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses in construction contracts void and unenforceable in support of its position that the Texas Legislature intended for section 272.001 to be non-waivable. RLB’s reliance on these other statutes is misplaced because those statutes expressly deem forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses in construction contracts as “against public policy” and/or “void” and/or “unenforceable” rather than merely “voidable.”4 RLB contends that the Legislature indicated its intent to grant a non-waivable right by making forum-selection clauses in construction contracts requiring litigation in another forum voidable and that contractual waiver of the right to void such clauses would be against Texas public policy. RLB relies on legislative analysis on section 272.001 observing that Texas has “provided protection for general contractors and subcontractors who contract with entities from other states” and that “projects constructed in Texas will be decided in Texas, under Texas law.” Senate Res. Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. S. B. 807, 85th Leg. R.S. (April 18, 2017). Generally, however, we do not resort to extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, to interpret a clear and unambiguous statute because the statute’s plain language is the surest guide to the Legislature’s intent. See Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. 2016). In any event, we do not dispute that the Legislature intended to protect contractors. But insofar as forum-selection clauses are concerned, the Legislature clearly did not intend to void them in all construction contracts or prohibit contractual waivers of the right to void them.
Party Submissions
4.201049
4.335296
4.325892
HN1 [ ] Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., L.P., 235 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Tex. 2007). Generally, a writ of mandamus will issue only when the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal and the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion. In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005). The relator has the burden of establishing these prerequisites, and this burden is a heavy one. In re Fitzgerald, 429 S.W.3d 886, 891 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2014, orig. proceeding.); see In re EPIC Holdings, Inc., 985 S.W.2d 41, 56 (Tex. 1998).
Party Submissions
3.082589
3.288358
3.559622
Since TX 1111 would not receive the state tax credits or the Contributions until completion of the historic rehabilitation, it sought a loan to assist funding the rehabilitation project until the state tax credits could be monetized. TX 1111 was referred to First NBC, a lender with significant experience in making tax credit loans and as a tax credit investor, for the loan. First NBC was willing to make the loan to TX 1111 for purposes of funding a portion of the rehabili tation and to “bridge” receipt o f the Contributions, with the Contributions serving as collateral for the contemplated loan.
Party Submissions
9.513799
8.06938
10.268147
For these reasons, Petitioner OSPrin II, LLC, respectfully prays that this Court grant this Motion for Rehearing of the Petition for Review, grant the Petition for Review, and reverse the opinion of the court of appeals, and remand to the court of appeals to consider issues it did not previously reach. Petitioner also prays for such further relief to which it may be entitled.
Party Submissions
6.802282
7.488001
7.916842
The EU has raised the issue of regulation of snow crab in NEAFC, both at the Commission meeting in 2014 and in PECCOE, but so far without success. Russia has stated in the NEAFC that they consider the snow crab as a sedentary species that must be managed according to the shelf jurisdiction in accordance with the Convention on the Law of the Sea. From the Norwegian side, it was communicated in PECCO in January that we currently have the case under consideration, but that there is much to suggest that the snow crab is a sedentary species according to UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 77 (4).
Legal Decisions
9.184357
10.217381
9.245458
OSPrin first argues, again, that the Court of Appeals’ opinion conflicts with the Austin Court of Appeals’ decision in Person v. MC-Simpsonville, SC-1-UT, No.
Party Submissions
43.230087
45.72315
49.305904
Confidentiality Agreement by Claimants. In this regard, Clause 8 of the Confidentiality Agreement prevents the Parties from using any statements made by one party to the other party, or to a third party, or any action taken over the course of the consultation and negotiation procedure, in a future arbitration (see ¶ 1293 above). However, there is an express carve-out in Clause 8 for information which is “generally available to the public or which has come into the public domain for reasons other than a breach of this Confidentiality Agreement” (see ¶ 1293 above). Respondent has not established that Claimants revealed non-public information in making their assertions. Nor is the Tribunal satisfied that by making these assertions, Claimants effectively “opened up” the content of the Parties’ settlement discussions.
Legal Decisions
6.750735
6.654772
7.5193
Section 3. Participation. Each Eligible Associate shall become a participant (a “Participant”) in the Plan on the later of the Effective Date, or the date on which he or she has a Qualifying Termination. A Participant’s participation in the Plan shall cease as of the date the Participant is no longer an Eligible Associate and is not entitled to any benefit provided under this Plan.
Contract
4.590291
4.092532
4.790078
On the other hand, the courts of appeals widely cite the standard for abuse of discretion in most family law decisions to be a two-prong inquiry: (1) Did the trial court have sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) Did the trial court err in its application of discretion? Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 549 (Tex. 2018), J. Devine dissent, citing Lindsey v. Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. App. – El Paso 1998, no pet); Roberts v. Roberts, 531 S.W.3d 224, 231 (Tex.
Party Submissions
4.189278
4.059661
4.297094
By my signature above, I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was served as required Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5 to the parties to the proceeding, via-efiling on this the 5th day of January, 2024.
Party Submissions
8.907785
11.534811
12.664416
Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann, 549 S.W.3d 314 (2018) By its second issue, Bay asserts that the ROCIP carrier's denial of coverage does not prevent Bay from asserting the exclusive-remedy defense. In the trial court, the Manns argued that the workers' compensation insurance carrier was Bay's agent. The Manns reasoned that the carrier's denial of coverage therefore binds Bay, preventing Bay from contesting the issue of coverage on appeal. Based on related reasoning, the Manns asserted that the carrier's denial of coverage estops Bay from taking a contrary position.
Party Submissions
7.684374
8.098392
8.813342
Wife argued that the transfer constituted an irrebuttable presumption of gift and therefore should be characterized as wife’s separate property. Id. Husband made no claims of fraud, accident, or mistake. Id. Wife argued that the parol evidence rule should not allow evidence of the parties’ intent. Id. The trial court granted directed verdict in favor of wife as to the irrebuttable presumption of gift. Id. The trial court did not allow parol evidence by husband as to his position on the characterization. Id .
Party Submissions
7.456688
8.306301
8.48672
R. 024, 035-036. RLB alleges that it based its fixed-price bid on the soil conditions set forth in the Terracon report. R.3-4, 6.
Party Submissions
17.15975
21.26768
27.060469
Claimants agree to conduct a reasonable search for and produce documents responsive to this request that are in the Claimants’ possession and/or control.
Legal Decisions
8.80494
12.352917
11.246558
That reason fails on its own terms: Walker is the architect of his own timeliness problem. Walker waited 53 days between when Devine’s application became public information and when he sought mandamus relief. Measuring more generously from when Walker filed his own petition, on December 4, or even from when he first raised his complaint to Chairman Rinaldi, on December 27, Walker waited either over three weeks or nearly a week and a half to act. He easily could have sought emergency mandamus relief in the court of appeals on either of those timelines, asking for a decision by a date certain if necessary; an attempt to do so would have satisfied Rule 52.3(e)’s requirements. Other litigants have done so on similar timelines before seeking mandamus relief from this Court. Walker’s “failure to diligently pursue relief. .. belies [his] justification for not first seeking mandamus in the court of ap-peals,” In re Dorn, 471 S.W.3d 823, 824 (Tex. 2015) (Brown, J., concurring in denial of petition for mandamus), because “the urgency [Walker] face[s] is of [his] own making,” and therefore “is no excuse for skipping past the court of appeals.” Id. II. The Petition Should Be Denied on the Merits.
Party Submissions
8.207117
8.686463
9.357825
Group, Inc. was founded in 1986, went public in 1995 and is traded on the NASDAQ Global Select Market under the ticker symbol SBGI.
Party Submissions
4.549388
4.476818
5.309244
In a decree of divorce or annulment, the court shall determine the rights of both spouses in a pension, retirement plan, annuity, and bonus, among other things.
Party Submissions
8.609159
8.948124
10.767469
HN5 [ ] Standards of Review, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretation The Texas Labor Code provides for a modified de novo review of appeals panel decisions on issues of compensability or eligibility for or the amount of income or death benefits. Generally, a trial court is required to give consideration to the appeals panel's decision. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 410.304(b). A question of statutory interpretation, however, is a question of law and the administrative determination of a question of law is not entitled to a presumption of validity. Neither a district court nor an appellate court is bound by an administrative agency's construction of one of its statutes. The construction given to a statute by the administrative agency charged with its execution is entitled to serious consideration if it is reasonable, consistent with the Legislature's intent, and does not contradict the plain language of the statute. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(6) (1998).
Party Submissions
4.895783
5.555412
5.276835
This letter contains certain objections to the Environmental Impact Assessment Report of the 2013 DRP. The requested document is relevant and material to assess whether the Secretariat for Environmental Protection considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and 23 during the preparation of the 2013 DRP, and if so, what was its contemporaneous understanding of these rights.
Legal Decisions
18.578884
17.308214
18.969515
B. Respondent assumed the risk of mistake. “A party bears the risk of mistake when the risk is allocated to him by agreement or when he knowingly treats his limited knowledge of the facts surrounding the mistake as sufficient. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154(a) & (b) (1981)” de Monet v. PERA, 877 S.W.2d 352, 359 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994) Furthermore, relief is barred where a mistake is shown to be due to negligence on the part of the party seeking avoidance. Roland v. McCullough, 561 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. —San Antonio, 1978), writ refused n.r.e.
Party Submissions
6.018131
6.555475
6.22149
Testimony at trial created a fact issue on whether Diamond State failed to provide an effective defense by failing to hire separate counsel for Defterios and HSMiller, (8RR273-74), and by allegedly hindering Terry’s defense on damages. (7RR38-39, 92-96) As this Court held in Keck, Mahin & Cate, an insurance company’s negligence in providing a defense may be considered in an ensuing malpractice case against the insured’s lawyer. 20 S.W.3d at 701-03.
Party Submissions
14.853563
13.201678
15.79947
You are instructed that negligence means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a lawyer or law firm of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a lawyer or law firm of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.
Party Submissions
2.886735
3.89514
3.787995
It is true that the error in the total mileage of Sharyland’s transmission lines that P&A used in the allocation process originated in an email communication from Sharyland’s agent.1 Appendix F to Oncor’s Brief at ¶ 7; RR.Vol.2 at 42-43 & 45-46 (Appendix H to Oncor’s Brief). But even though that error caused nonsensical internal inconsistencies in P&A’s appraisal report, neither P&A nor Sharyland had discovered the error when Sharyland settled its 2019 protests. Appendix F to Oncor’s Brief at ¶¶ 9-12; Appendix H to Oncor’s Brief at 44-46. Though Sharyland could have filed protests to correct the clerical error on the appraisal rolls of P&A’s thirteen client counties, see Texas Tax Code section 41.41(a)(9), Sharyland did not do that because it did not know of the clerical error. Appendix F to Oncor’s Brief at ¶¶ 11-12.
Party Submissions
7.270651
7.594109
7.771571
Trial Court’s disposition: The trial court overruled the objections and denied the motion to dismiss. App. 1, CR 1332; App. 2, Supp. CR 4.
Party Submissions
9.994385
14.779913
12.026704
The Hooks Case and This Bordages Case Remained Allied to the End The severance formally divided Hooks and Bordages, but they remained allied. The parties did file separate pleadings, but their ownership stipulation, most evidence, many pleadings, and some court orders were jointly filed in all three cases, and all summary judgment motions were simultaneously heard by the same special master. See, e.g., 2CR1784, 1824, 1826, 2636, 3448, 3516, and SuppCR1208-33, 1234-41, 1242-49, 1250-55, 1569-1606.
Party Submissions
11.841952
12.58848
12.711043
Counsel for Petitioners/ Cross-Respondents This motion for rehearing complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i) because it contains 3,231 words.
Party Submissions
10.046936
12.318953
14.448948
Petitioner’s arguments have been repeatedly and unanimously rebuffed by multiple Courts of Appeal. Smith v. Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp., No. 05-21-00305-CV (Tex.App.-Dallas Mar. 22, 2023, no pet. h.)(mem. op.); Thompson v. Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp., No. 01-21-00147-CV (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 3, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); Washington v. Yellowfin Loan Servicing Corp., No. 02-21-00215-CV (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Nov. 3, 2022, no pet.)(mem. op.). The reason for this is not because – as Petitioner argues – everyone is getting it wrong, but because Petitioner is trying to force a revision of Texas jurisprudence that need not occur.
Party Submissions
3.425001
3.503264
3.479185
Respondent respectfully prays that this Court deny Petitioners' motion for rehearing and consider the relief sought by Respondent in its pending Motion for Rehearing.
Party Submissions
7.277679
7.940428
9.712347
On August 17, 2020, Santos filed her First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction, Answer, and Counterclaim. CR1:4-52. The Plea to the Jurisdiction alleged that Yellowfin lacked standing to sue because it lacked standing to enforce the Note and because Yellowfin’s immediate predecessor, RCS Recover Services, LLC forfeited its right to do business in Texas prior to selling the Note to Yellowfin. CR:82-83.
Party Submissions
10.255828
9.789607
12.477315
The intermediate courts are in near uniform agreement that an obstetrician’s experience dealing with all aspects of labor and delivery qualify him to opine on complications that can occur during delivery, including neurological birth injuries. See, e.g., Monga v. Perez, No. 14-16-00961-CV, 2018 WL 505263, at *9 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 23, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“There is no per se requirement that an expert be a pediatric neurologist to opine on causes of fetal brain injury occurring during labor and delivery.” ) (emphasis omitted); Cornejo, 446 at 120 – 23 (board certified obstetrician/gynecologist qualified to testify about neurological injuries suffered at or around time of birth because report demonstrated he had specific expertise in complications in pregnancy, management of labor, and evidence of fetal hypoxia as predicted by fetal heart rate patterns); Abilene Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Allen, 387 S.W.3d 914, 922 – 23 (Tex. App. – Eastland 2012, pet. denied) (obstetrician/gynecologist qualified because expert had attended hundreds of deliveries and was familiar with biological mechanisms that can lead to brain injury in fetus); Livingston, 279 S.W.3d at 877 (obstetrician qualified to testify even though not a pediatric neurologist because expert had sufficient experience managing labor and delivery and the complications that stem from labor and delivery, including an infant ’ s neurological injuries).
Party Submissions
5.23255
5.081346
5.36609
If Chapter 74 is to function as the Legislature intended, it is vital that the lower courts consistently apply the appropriate standard and scope of review when evaluating and reviewing preliminary reports. This Court should grant review to preserve the balance.
Party Submissions
18.049408
19.70952
24.926748
For column 9: Indicate the epidemiological units surveyed, indicating its description and unit of measurement. ‘Epidemiological unit’ means a homogeneous area where For column 10: Indicate the methods used during the survey including the number of activities in each case, depending on the specific legal requirements of each pest.
Legislation
23.429754
24.46771
27.669523
The requested Documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute in that they address (i) the expe ctations of the Cypriot Claimants and/or Mr Obradović as regards Obnova's rights to the Dunavska Plots, and (ii) the Cypriot Claimants' knowledge at the time of making the investment and foreseeability of the investment dispute.
Legal Decisions
14.089457
16.996803
15.861803
PCC : The requested documents must be in Obnova’s, i.e., Claimants’, possession, custody or control since all requested documents appear to be the annexes of the agreements concluded by Obnova. In any event, Respondent is not in possession of these documents.
Legal Decisions
17.359198
21.536568
22.718937
Contents of Notice. If a claim for benefits is completely or partially denied, notice of such denial shall be in writing and shall set forth the reasons for denial in plain language. The notice shall: (i) cite the pertinent provisions of the Plan document; and (ii) explain, where appropriate, how the Claimant can perfect the claim, including a description of any additional material or information necessary to complete the claim and why such material or information is necessary. The claim denial also shall include an explanation of the claims review procedures and the time limits applicable to such procedures, including a statement of the Claimant’s right to bring a civil action under Section 502(a) of ERISA following an adverse decision on review. In the case of a complete or partial denial of a Disability Benefit claim, the notice shall provide a statement that the Committee will provide to the Claimant, upon request and free of charge, a copy of any internal rule, guideline, protocol, or other similar criterion that was relied upon in making the decision.
Contract
3.042543
3.303011
3.297978
The purpose of an appeal is to review a trial court’s exercise of discretion. The court’s discretion was never meant to be unbridled. For this trial court to hold a standard for trial court discretion that eliminates FS review by court of appeal would unnecessarily give the court judges the ability to impose rulings with out any oversight. Such situation fails to serve justice and instead sets back our idea of justice immeasurably.
Party Submissions
20.2965
19.006203
20.36155
To direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to include information relating to the rate of suicide among covered Reserves in each National Veteran Suicide Prevention Annual Report of the Office of Mental Health and Suicide Prevention of the Department of Veterans Affairs.
Legislation
5.893317
4.814111
6.365016
This appears to have generated confusion among the courts of appeals as to whether “use” of property claims have been eliminated. See City of Brownsville v. Nezzer, No. 13-21-00150-CV, 2022 WL 2251818, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2022, no pet.) (holding a claim for premises defect or arises when “plaintiff alleges injury as a result of a physical condition or defect left on the premises.”). But see Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Halstead, 650 S.W.3d 707, 714 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (“A claim for a condition or use of real property is a premises defect claim under the TTCA.”).
Party Submissions
4.97118
5.223181
5.263241
The HMA Agreement is replete with provisions regarding sales, performance, and objectives for a franchisee as HMA depends upon those sales for its standing amongst other OEMs and for its profitability. Whether a sales objective is reasonable for a particular dealer requires a hearing because if HMA determines the dealer has not performed adequately in sales then HMA may elect to terminate the Agreement16–an action that is the essence of a required sales standard.
Party Submissions
28.153925
21.123909
28.251133
Respondent, H A O appeared in person and through attorneys of record, Michael D. Wysocki and Ryan H. Segall, and announced ready.
Party Submissions
29.72293
32.487804
49.03666
The Parties desire to amend the Credit Agreement according to the terms in this Amendment. Any capitalized terms used in this Amendment, but not otherwise defined in this Amendment, are as defined in the Credit Agreement.
Contract
4.586882
4.022069
5.874202
The Bordages owners later filed amicus briefs at the court of appeals and in this Court in support of the Hooks in Samson’s appeal. 5CR6188, 6284. Samson asked the First Court in 2011 to strike the Bordages brief. 5CR6255-60. The Bordages owners pointed out that Samson had briefed “how to compute Late Charges under the identical Hooks and Bordages leases.” 5CR6262. But Samson succeeded in muzzling them. The First Court struck their brief. 5CR6303.
Party Submissions
12.392412
11.951559
14.55225
Read together with Dr. Tappan’s report, Dr. Null’s deductive reasoning easily provides at least some factual basis to support the experts’ conclusion that intrapartum factors (including the prolonged second stage labor, fetal heartrate abnormalities, and forceful delivery) caused H.W.’s brain injury. See Miller, 536 S.W.3d at 513 – 15 (reading expert reports together and concluding that when considered together they met the statutory requirements); Van Ness, 461 S.W.3d at 144. And at this early stage of the proceedings, some explanation is all that is required. See E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 664.
Party Submissions
8.831074
10.470889
10.418504
These are not circumstances of Nicaragua asserting defenses that were not just simply wrong, but where the bona fides of Nicaragua’s behavior in this Arbitration is called into question.
Party Submissions
18.87213
26.290583
23.270607
The Court should grant review because this case involves the construction of two statutes—Chapter 55 of the Texas Property Code and Chapter 12 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See id. Additionally, due to the profound impact the construction of the statutes will have on similarly situated parties, the court of appeals has committed an error of law of such importance to the state’s jurisprudence that it should be corrected. See id.
Party Submissions
6.54473
7.173463
6.933026
No failure or delay on the part of the Lender to exercise any right under this Agreement or the Note operates as a waiver of this Agreement or the Note. Nor does any single or partial exercise of any right under this Agreement or the Note preclude any other or further exercise of any right under this Agreement or the Note or the exercise of any other right. The remedies provided in this Agreement or the Note are cumulative and not exclusive of any remedies provided by law.
Contract
2.345806
2.397713
2.911619
See Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex.1985). The refusal to abate is such an incidental ruling for which there is an adequate remedy by appeal. See id. at 567; Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v.. Flores, 908 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1995, orig. proceeding) (opinion on motion for leave). There are limited exceptions to this rule such as when one court interferes with the jurisdiction of another court or when a party seeks to enforce mandatory statutory rights.
Party Submissions
5.277
5.570649
6.247726
Nor could he. Relator says (Pet.5) that 28 individuals signed his petition first, thus invalidating those same individual’s signatures for purposes of Justice Devine’s petition under Tex. Elec. Code §141.066(a), (c). But no amount of diligence could have led Justice Devine to discover this before December 4. Even contacting these signers individually likely would have been fruitless because all 28 signed Justice Devine’s petition despite it stating that “Signing the petition of more than one candidate for the same office in the same election is prohibited.” Id. § 141.066(b); Ex.C.
Party Submissions
12.023974
11.459341
13.133313
Attempting to defend that precedent, Respondents maintain, “Petitioners have no support for their argument that the use of an otherwise valid lien can support a Chapter 12 claim.” Respondents’ Br. at 13. Respondents’ argument ignores the plain language of §12.002 that prohibits the use of a lien for an improper purpose such as to collect “a fraudulent. .. claim” with the intent to cause financial injury. Further, the cases Petitioners cited are, contrary to Respondents’ argument, directly supportive of Petitioners’ position.
Party Submissions
9.055404
9.096351
10.369928
HSMiller argues that the Lawyers cannot raise the assignment issue because they failed to address it fully in the most recent trial. HSMiller also claims the Court cannot consider three documents the Lawyers cite in their Petitioners’ Brief: the Litigation Agreement, the Bankruptcy Plan, and the Bankruptcy Court’s order on fees (in which the court notes that the case lacks the attributes of the usual bankruptcy case and wonders why it was ever brought).
Party Submissions
18.701391
15.772117
20.76201
I. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, Lessor's exercise of the rights under this paragraph shall not be deemed as a waiver of Lessor’s right to take all actions necessary to recover unpaid royalties, interest and other damages incurred.
Party Submissions
7.783501
7.814874
8.887279
Petitioner respectfully prays that its petition for review be granted, that the court of appeals’ judgment be reversed, and that the case be remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings.
Party Submissions
3.772248
3.804704
4.095276
The plain language of the indemnity provision does not show that the parties intended for TX 1111 to indemnify First NBC or its successor-in-interest, Osprin, for defending against claims filed by Osprin against TX 1111. If TX 1111 and First NBC “ had intended to include claims between them, they would have had to specifically add such language ” to the indemnity provision. Id. at *3 (citing Ganske, 129 S.W.3d at 708). Since the indemnity provision lacks any specific language that would overcome the general rule that indemnity provisions do not apply to claims between the parties, Osprin has not shown that the indemnity provision is applicable to its claims. See id.; see also Nat’l City Mortg. Co. v. Adams, 310 S.W.3d 139, 143– 44 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth 2010, no pet.); MG Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Moses Lopez Custom Homes, Inc., 179 S.W.3d 51, 63 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied).
Party Submissions
4.873271
4.880176
5.286068
Serbia does not seem to dispute that the requested documents are not in Claimants’ possession, custody or control. Serbia only asserts that the requested documents are “ in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties. ” This assertion is incorrect for the same reasons that Claimants already explained in paragraphs 30 to 47 above and in their response to Serbia’s objections to Requests No. 6. Claimants hereby incorporate all those arguments.234 Furthermore, as explained above, even if the reque sted documents had been “equally and effectively available to both parties ” ( quod non ), Serbia would still be obliged to allow Claimants access to the responsive documents — as long as the Tribunal concluded that the documents are relevant and material and thus should be produced.235 DECISION 96 NO.
Legal Decisions
9.16973
9.910342
9.687292
PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (which prepared exhibit R-101) in accordance with the applicable regulations.92 In other words, the requested documents are "in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties".93 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Institute in order to obtain documents in question.94 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it is not justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants obviously already obtained certain documentation from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (exhibit C-025), so they can also request the documents whose production they now seek. R, M : Claimants' request is not sufficiently relevant or material. Claimants' request for the documents underlying the implementation costs for the construction of the bus loop is wholly speculative and of limited relevance to the dispute. Claimants and Respondent have not argued that implementation costs played any role in respect of the decision to locate the bus loop on the Dunasvka Plots. This is a classic "fishing expedition" as Claimants are merely casting about for any documents which might exist and which might contain information they consider helpful for their case.
Legal Decisions
11.933509
13.143439
12.622742
null
Contract
null
null
null
F. ... If it is determined [by audit] that royalty owner has not been correctly paid all sums owed him, then Lessee shall reimburse the requesting royalty owner for all costs and expenses incurred by Lessor for such audit, together with all unpaid revenues, late charges, and interest thereon.
Party Submissions
13.892136
13.196001
15.230511
The Seventh Court also misread Thompson to require preliminary experts reports to preemptively explain why negligent acts are not “ too attenuated to the eventual harm. ” Id. at *2. But Thompson involved an appeal from a final judgment following trial. 649 S.W.3d 160. The opinion confirmed than in order to establish cause-in-fact, an expert must negate other causes of an injury, but only when the evidence demonstrates that other plausible causes exist. Thompson, 649 S.W.3d at 161; see also Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 536 (“When the only evidence of a vital fact is circumstantial, the expert cannot merely draw possible inferences from the evidence and state that ‘in medical probability’ the injury was caused by the defendant’s negligence. The expert must explain why the inferences drawn are medically preferable to competing inferences that are equally consistent with the known facts.”).
Party Submissions
8.831471
8.740014
9.371874
Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann, 549 S.W.3d 314 (2018) We cannot agree. Section 408.001(d)’s only reference to the exclusive-remedy defense is to ensure that employers retain access to the defense even in cases of certain noncompensable injuries; it says nothing of stripping an employer of the defense if coverage is denied for any other reason. See id. Instead, because none of the scenarios referred to in section 408.001(d) are present here, that section neither applies to this case nor provides a basis to affirm summary judgment. Bay's third issue is sustained.
Party Submissions
9.019062
9.060447
9.911316
Again, a dealer’s primary market area is “not intended to be permanent” as HMA may, in its sole discretion, change a dealer’s primary market area from “time to time as allowed by its Agreement.”7 As a primary market area changes at the discretion of an OEM, so too must a dealer’s required sales standard vary to meet the changed market area assigned by the OEM. The necessary and adequate inventory to fulfill the dealer’s required best efforts to meet the designated sales objective for that new primary market area must also be modified to match the required sales objective.
Party Submissions
16.367851
13.078168
16.272354
Osprin also argues that, because the trial court awarded it attorney fees, costs, and expenses against Backes for the period from March 2018 through February 12, 2020, the trial court should have awarded it the same fees, costs, and expenses against TX 1111 on the same grounds. Osprin points to the trial court’s findings of fact regarding TX 1 111’s opposition to Osprin’s entitlement to the Contributions during the course of the litigation. The trial court awarded Osprin its reasonable attorney fees, costs, and expenses against Backes through February 12, 2020, pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.
Party Submissions
6.017471
6.140443
6.78889
Relator never asked any trial court for an injunction, and he never asked any appellate court for mandamus relief. No court has yet considered his challenge. Relator concedes that ballots must be mailed by January 20, 2024. Mot.2. That is the absolute latest date that ballots must be mailed. Relator offers no evidence to support the conclusion that every county in the State has waited (or will wait) until the last possible moment to print and send ballots. Relator also argues that it is “estimated” that county election officials will need “about ten days” “to print the ballots, and run logic/accuracy tests.” Mot.2. But Relator offers no factual support for that guess or any explanation for why it might be accurate. He also does not credit the estimation to any specific individual or source.
Party Submissions
8.622334
9.950983
8.877891
Congress's longstanding practice reflects the Griggs rule. Given Griggs, when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal and to automatically stay the district court proceedings during that appeal, Congress ordinarily need not say anything about a stay. By contrast, when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal, but not to automatically stay district court proceedings pending that appeal, Congress typically says so. Since the creation of the modern courts of appeals system in 1891, Congress has enacted multiple statutory “non-stay” provisions. Pp. 1918 – 1922.
Party Submissions
6.849841
7.316536
7.358257
Ultimately, like the intermediate courts in Miller, Abshire, and E.D., the Court of Appeals’ “real concern” in this case appears to be the “believability” of the expert ’ s opinions, “not the manner in which [he] stated them.” Miller, 536 S.W.3d at 516; Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 225; E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 664. But whether BSA and Dr. Castillo will ultimately be liable for baby H.W.’s brain injury is a question that “will be answered further in the litigation process.” Miller, 536 S.W.3d at 517.
Party Submissions
7.052223
8.478534
7.978767
As we have explained, Douglas had her own attorney to advise regarding her rights and responsibilities under the act, including the need to timely file a workers' compensation claim. If she had filed a claim, she may have been compensated for her injury. Alternatively, if the workers' compensation process had ultimately yielded a determination that her injury was not compensable, she could have filed a negligence suit without being subject to the exclusivity provision of the act. Consequently, Douglas is not denied recovery for her injury based on Moody's inconsistent positions. Rather, she is denied recovery because she elected not to timely pursue a workers' compensation claim. Therefore, it is not unconscionable for Moody [*12] to rely on the exclusivity provision of the act as a defense to this suit.
Party Submissions
6.01146
6.503247
6.623681
Based on a word count run in Microsoft Word, this brief contains 4,044 words, excluding the portions of the brief exempt from the word count under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).
Party Submissions
5.406247
9.196079
10.380731
Despite the Walkers’ complaints about the Amarillo Court’s decision, this Court always has held that an “objective good faith effort” by an expert requires more than Drs. Tappan and Null provided here. It is true, as the Walkers point out, that Chapter 74 imposes only minimal requirements, and that this Court has held the Legislature intended the statute’s requirements to be a method of separating meritorious claims from frivolous ones. (Pet. Br. at 5-8). But, an expert must nevertheless offer an opinion about the standard of care, breach, and causation. Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 879 (Tex. 2001). A conclusory statement is not enough; “the expert must explain the basis of his statements to link his conclusion to the facts.” Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52.
Party Submissions
7.471174
9.269852
8.358615
The reports wholly fail to explain what caused the possible asphyxia event or stroke. Tenet Hosps. Ltd v. De La Riva, 351 S.W.3d 398, 404-05 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2011, no pet.) (report insufficient when it opined without explanation that “neurological disabilities are the result of hypoxic ischemic brain injury that occurred in the aftermath of a cardiac arrest, which was present immediately after birth” and that a “delivery prior to onset of bradycardia. .. would have prevented all of the baby’s neurological problems”).
Party Submissions
9.095041
9.246573
10.68547
Because the evidence clearly showed Rafiei would be required to pay more than this amount, such that he would be forced to abandon his claim, there was legally sufficient evidence for the trial court to find the delegation clause was unconscionable and should not be enforced. In turn, because the delegation clause was severable and to be disregarded in the interest of justice, the trial court resultingly had full authority to then consider the unconscionability of the remainder of the arbitration agreement. The very same evidence and arguments addressing the unconscionability of the delegation clause would apply with just as much, if not more, force to the Arbitration Agreement as a whole. Therefore, the trial court had sufficient basis to deny the entirety of Petitioner’s Motion to Compel Arbitration.
Party Submissions
7.360318
7.062868
7.642602
Accordingly, RLB’s argument that some of some of its claims fall outside the scope of the forum-selection clause is, quite simply, irrelevant. RLB BOM at 68.
Party Submissions
19.524214
22.649342
27.629498
And in the construction context, the Legislature knows how to mandate that a waiver provision be included “in a written original contract or subcontract[.]” Tex.
Party Submissions
19.658352
23.973654
28.638218
Alonzo v. Lampkin, No. 074-12-00030-CV, 2013 WL 6073431, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 13, 2013, no pet.) (board certified obstetrician not qualified to opine as to cause of brain injuries).
Party Submissions
4.558201
5.658894
5.984748
Their response hinges on the assertion that the court of appeals’ rejection of Westwood’s constructive eviction and breach-of-contract claims did not depend on the legal effect of the agreed judgment in the forcible entry and detainer action, but instead on “evidence” that Westwood “voluntarily” “agreed to leave the premises” on its own as part of a strategic effort to gain a “fresh start with a new entity.” (Resp. 7, 8, 12, 31, 38) And they insist this “voluntary abandonment” was memorialized in a “Rule 11 Agreement” contained in the agreed judgment. Maintaining that assertion requires Respondents to rewrite the court’s opinion and take evidence entirely out of context, and to conflate Westwood’s abandonment of its appeal with the abandonment of all rights Westwood ever had in the premises.
Party Submissions
8.93783
9.320024
9.199314
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(B) because, according to the Microsoft Word 2016 word count function, it contains 7,351 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).
Party Submissions
3.350633
5.351818
6.277899
Second, even if the Court assumes that Rafiei’s expenses would in district court would not exceed $30,000, Rafiei’s affidavit—if believed— shows that he cannot afford the expenses of litigation. If Rafiei cannot support more than $6,000 in expenses up front, there is no reason to think that he could afford $30,000 in expenses. (Rafiei argues that the problem with expenses is that they prevent “a party from ever reaching trial because they simply cannot afford to maintain the litigation that long. Brief at 31.
Party Submissions
10.38466
9.964083
10.632131
To answer the hypothetical, if the forbearance agreement had allocated $100,000 to the Diocese’s injury, that would be sufficient to establish the first step of Sky View and would raise a presumption of a $100,000.00 settlement credit. But the Court could still, under Utts, consider evidence like the affidavit from Bay’s counsel showing that payments and a benefit had not been and would never be received under the allocations.
Party Submissions
17.919384
21.117575
19.779987
Actual control matters under this analysis; it is dispositive. To apply “arranger” liability, analyzing the control the defendant has over the disposal should focus on the “degree of the defendant’s actual control over the decision regarding the specific method or manner of disposal.” R.R. St., 166 S.W.3d at 243 (emphasis added). Notably, R.R. Street cites Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., in which several oil companies sold petroleum products, including underground tanks used for storing waste motor oil. R.R. St., 166 S.W.3d at 243 (citing AAMCO, 962 F.2d at 283–84). Such oil companies were not arrangers because while they periodically inspected the equipment, they “made no recommendations regarding disposal methods and did not participate in disposal decisions.” R.R. St., 166 S.W.3d at 243. Midland’s alleged actions are even further attenuated than the AAMCO case because it had no way to know that the alleged disposal even took place (if it even did). Absent the proper pretreatment permit or discharge license—the evidence necessary to show Midland’s consent to a discharge—Midland would have no way of knowing that any discharge occurred, as pretreatment authorizations are the manner in which Midland could permit and regulate certain industrial wastes. (CR 54.) Weatherford provided no evidence—nor could it—showing that Midland had any connection or communication with the two electronics manufacturers. Weatherford Int’l, 652 S.W.3d at 915. Consequently, Weatherford failed to demonstrate that Midland had any authority or obligation to make disposal decisions, or that Midland exercised any control over such decisions.
Party Submissions
7.691158
7.635909
7.670596