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E) The calculation of interest 567. The Tribunal has established that the compensation due by Respondent for its violations of the Treaty amounts to USD 4,880,609 + 38,709,481 = USD 43,590,090, plus interest, to be added to this sum on the basis of the principle of full reparation.

Legal Decisions

Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 346. The bankruptcy court’s order is not void, and therefore, the Lawyers may not collaterally attack it here.

Party Submissions

ETMC Athens contends Respondent abused his discretion when it granted Dunn's motion to strike the designation of Woolverton and ETMC EMS as responsible third parties. Applicable Law HN4 [ ] Texas law allows a tort [*5] defendant to designate a person as a "responsible third party." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004(a) (West 2020). The designation's purpose is to have the responsible third party submitted to the trier of fact as a possible cause of the claimant's harm. See id. § 33.003 (West 2020). This may reduce the percentage of responsibility attributed to the defendant, thus ultimately reducing its liability to the claimant. See id. § 33.013 (West Supp. 2022); Flack v. Hanke, 334 S.W.3d 251, 262 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. denied) ("[T]he defendant typically would be the party seeking to retain the RTP in the jury charge to diminish his potential liability and perhaps eliminate any joint and several liability.").

Party Submissions

Footnotes 1 The Hon. Michael J. O'Neill, Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, Retired, sitting by assignment. 2 The elements of a legal malpractice claim are not in dispute. Under Texas law, a plaintiff alleging legal malpractice must establish four elements: (1) that the defendant attorney owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) that the attorney breached that duty; (3) that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; and (4) that damages occurred. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) (citing Alexander v. Turtur & Assocs., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. 2004)). A litigation attorney's negligence causes damage to a client if the result the client would have obtained with competent counsel is more favorable to the client than the result actually obtained. See Kelley & Witherspoon, LLP v. Hooper, 401 S.W.3d 841, 847 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2013, no pet.). The plaintiff must prove that it would have obtained a more favorable result but for its attorney's negligence. See id. Legal malpractice damages “are the difference between the result obtained for the client and the result that would have been obtained by competent counsel.” Elizondo v. Krist, 415 S.W.3d 259, 263 (Tex. 2013). 3 HSM alleges the failure to properly “designate and scope” an expert witness to address damages also constituted gross negligence, but the parties do not address the issue in detail or explain how the record provides clear and convincing evidence of the objective and subjective components of gross negligence on this point. We therefore do not address this contention further. 4 This statutory section, part of The Real Estate License Act, provided, “A licensed broker is liable to the commission, the public, and the broker's clients for any conduct engaged in under this chapter by the broker or by a salesperson associated with or acting for the broker.” The applicability of this statute was hotly contested at trial. HSM's position was that the statute did not apply because Defterios's alleged misrepresentations were not made to “the commission, the public, [or] the broker's clients,” but to the plaintiffs in the Underlying Lawsuit who were the opposing parties in a transaction. The Lawyers, in turn, relied on the statute to argue that as a matter of law HSM was liable for all of Defterios's actions. In the jury charge, the trial court explained it had “concluded that reasonable attorneys could differ in their opinions as to whether this statute in fact applied to the Underlying Lawsuit.” The trial court instructed the jury that “[y]ou need not decide whether this section applied in the Underlying Lawsuit. Instead, you are to decide whether it was negligence on the part of [the Lawyers] to assume that it applied and to conduct the defense of the Underlying Lawsuit in accordance with that assumption.” 5 The statute was amended in 2015 to replace the term “salesperson” with “sales agent.” See Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 1158, § 89, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 3896, 3921 (codified at Tex. Occ. Code § 1101.803). This amendment was effective on January 1, 2016, after the verdict and judgment in this case. Id. 6 The record reflects that the motion was filed on September 26, 2008, less than sixty days before the October 20, 2008 trial date. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004(a) (motion to designate responsible third party must be filed on or before 60th day before trial date unless court finds good cause to allow later filing). 7 These statements were made in an email dated December 18, 2007, approximately ten months before the trial in October 2008.

Party Submissions

The requested document, referred on page 14 of the 2013 DRP, includes, among other things, an analysis of traffic frequency considered as one of the parameters for deciding on optimal location of a bus loop. The requested document is relevant and material to assess whether the decision to place the bus loop at Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23 was reasonable in light of the conclusions in the Public Transport System Work Plan or whether there was a more appropriate location.

Legal Decisions

Any and all lease agreements, agreements on use of warehousing space, land and/or buildings, including all of their annexes, concluded between Serbia or Luka Beograd on one side and Obnova on other side between 1948 and 26 April 2012 related to Dunavska 17-19, Dunavska 23 and/or the Surrounding Area, including, but not limited to, Agreement no. 619 dated 15 March 1994 referred to i n Article 16 of Serbia’s exhibit R -013 and Agreement no. 1819 for providing and using port and warehousing services dated 16 March 2006 refe rred to on page 3 of Serbia’s exhibit R-028.

Legal Decisions

If Samson had taken these positions during its opening argument, Respondents could have hit them head-on from the podium. Because Samson saved them for rebuttal, an answer to each is appropriate. First, the U.S. Supreme Court has never sat to overrule this Court’s pronouncements of Texas law. Second, unpaid Late Charges do not furnish a ground for lease termination. Finally, departing from Hooks would be unfair to the Bordages parties who were slow-walked and severed against their will on the strength of Samson’s argument about treating everyone the same.

Party Submissions

Nor can Respondent argue that unilateral mistake makes the Agreement voidable. “Two separate unilateral mistakes in the minds of the grantors and grantees do not create a factual issue for a mutual mistake cause of action.” Holley v. Grigg, 65 S.W.3d 289, 295 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2001, no pet.). A unilateral mistake does not provide grounds for relief even though it results in inequity to one of the parties. “A mistake by only one party to an agreement, not known to or induced by acts of the other party[,] will not constitute grounds for relief.” Johnson v. Snell, 504 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.1974). A unilateral mistake does not provide grounds for relief even though it results in inequity to one of the parties. Holley, 65 S.W.3d at 295.

Party Submissions

Similarly, as above, a notice evaluation is unnecessary to conclude jurisdiction is lacking for Weatherford’s SWDA suit against Midland; however, the provision of reasonable notice is yet another threshold requirement that Weatherford has failed to satisfy. Notice under the SWDA requires: (1) notice “of the existence of the release or threatened release”; and (2) notice that the person seeking cost recovery intended to take steps to eliminate the release or threatened release.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.344(c)(1)–(2). While case law does not provide a detailed process for providing notice, Vine St. LLC v. Keeling indicates that defendants should be notified prior to the completion of remediation. Vine St., LLC v. Keeling, 460 F.Supp.2d 728, 756 (E.D. Tex. 2006). Further, as Weatherford cites, the court in Aviall held that “the court will assume that § 361.344 required. . . advance notice of its intention to undertake remediation. .. .” Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., 694 F.Supp.2d 567, 581 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (emphasis added).

Party Submissions

To amend the Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act to fund the information clearinghouse through fiscal year 2031, and for other purposes.

Legislation

None of these documents were provided by the Respondent to the Claimant at the time of his arrest or thereafter. The requested information is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden.

Legal Decisions

On March 11, 2021, the trial court signed the order denying MVP’s plea in abatement. MVP filed a motion for clarification and reconsideration. MVP asked the trial court to dismiss the Texas case based on RLB’s and McCarthy’s waiver of the right to object to the forum-selection clause, or alternatively abate the Texas case until entry of the final judgment in the Oklahoma case. MVP also filed a motion to stay, in which it advised the trial court that it intended to seek mandamus relief in the court of appeals and asked the trial court to stay the trial court proceedings until the appellate court had ruled on MVP’s mandamus petition.2 The trial court held a hearing on April 23, 2021, and signed the order denying MVP’s motions on July 14, 2021.

Party Submissions

The majority cannot justify why it treats these “easily severable” matters as intertwined in an arbitrability appeal. “[T]he question on appeal,” as the majority opinion correctly identifies, is “whether the case belongs in arbitration.” Ante, at 1919. But the questions remaining before the district court are different: whether the claims have merit, *756 whether the parties are entitled to the discovery they seek, and so on. Proceedings on those questions would not interfere with the appellate court's review of the arbitrability order. Those proceedings, in other words, do not implicate the Griggs principle, which addresses the “danger a district court and a court of appeals would be simultaneously analyzing the same judgment.” 459 U.S. at 59, 103 S.Ct. 400.

Party Submissions

Defendant Alvarez was not assigned to the “Bill Greehey” refinery when he struck and injured Mann, and therefore his actions were not within the scope of people protected from suits at common law under the umbrella of Valero's ROCIP. Had Alvarez been assigned to Valero's “Bill Greehey” refinery at the time he struck and injured Mann, and had Mann also conclusively been in the course and scope of employment, then both may have been under the coverage of the potential ROCIP, and Bay would have the immunity it seeks. But those aren't the facts in this case.

Party Submissions

Tribunal may draw the inferences it deems appropriate in relation to the documents not produced, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances.

Legal Decisions

Respondent argues that Claimants' investment does not deserve protection as it was not made in good faith, in particular because the investment dispute was foreseeable at the time of the alleged investment of the Cypriot Claimants in April 2012. Claimants' allegations also concern multiple circumstances concerning Obnova's rights pre-dating the Cypriot Claimants' investment, such as (i) Obnova's unsuccessful attempt to be inscribed at the holder of the right of use over the Objects in March 2003, (ii) the inscription of the City of Belgrade as the holders of the rights of use over the Objects and Dunavska Plots in November 2004, and (iii) the adoption of the decision on 6 March 2006 on drafting a Detailed Regulation Plan concerning an geographic area covering the Dunavska Plots. This shows that as of April 2012, an investment dispute over the Dunavska Plots was objectively foreseeable. Respondent also disputes the actual rights held by Obnova and the possibility of conversion.

Legal Decisions

The City of Liberty (“Liberty”) contends that “Liberty provided a service for which Ames has not fully paid.” Respondent’s Response to Petition for Review (“Liberty’s Response”) at 16. The City of Ames (“Ames”) has paid all amounts owed for the services that Liberty was contractually required to provide under the Liberty-Ames Disposal Contract (the “Contract”). The only amounts that Liberty pled were owed are associated with the “Additional Service Charge” for exceedances of the Total Acceptable Volume (“TAV”). However, under the Contract, this was not a service that Liberty was to provide, and in fact it was prohibited, by the Contract’s explicit terms. Liberty’s performance of accepting flows above the TAV is voluntary and should not be sufficient to waive Ames’s immunity.

Party Submissions

Again, Terry was acutely aware of the Flaven problem. But in Terry’s view, designating Flaven — who Terry believed to be a fraudster — as an RTP before he had any idea what Flaven would say, was a greater risk to his clients than waiting to designate him. He believed Flaven’s testimony was likely to make his clients look worse than they already did. In short, Terry painstakingly 40 demonstrated a concern regarding the consequences of his acts and a belief that he chose the better strategy.

Party Submissions

Arbitration Rule 38 19.1. All the rules set forth in Section 18 above shall apply by analogy to experts unless they are inconsistent with this Section.

Legal Decisions

G. Without limiting the other provisions of this Article XVII, it is further specifically acknowledged and agreed by the parties hereto that the term “market value” as used herein shall be defined in accordance with the above Paragraph III.H. and not. in accordance with the provisions of Subsection 91.402 (i) of the Texas Natural Resources Code.

Party Submissions

Manager, Superintendent and necessary assistants. The Project Manager or Superintendent and necessary assistants shall be in attendance at the Project site during the progress of the Work. These personnel shall be satisfactory to McCarthy and shall not be changed except with the consent of McCarthy, unless such personnel are unsatisfactory to McCarthy or cease to be in Subcontractor's employ. The Project Manager and Superintendent shall represent Subcontractor, and all communications given to the Project Manager or Superintendent shall be as binding as if given to Subcontractor. The Project Manager or Superintendent shall attend all coordination, scheduling and safety meetings where Subcontractor's Work is involved and as required by McCarthy.

Party Submissions

Without specific explanations factually connecting Dr. Castillo’s claimed negligence to H.W.’s injuries, Dr. Tappan’s causation opinions left readers to do exactly what this Court has held they cannot: speculate, infer, or fill in gaps in his report. Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52; see also Tiscareno, 495 S.W.3d at 607.

Party Submissions

The seminal case in this area is Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). In Grenn Tree, the United States Supreme Court noted that “[i]t may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant. .. from effectively vindicating [her] rights in the arbitral forum.” Id. at 90. However, the Court held that the mere “‘risk’ that [a plaintiff] will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidati on of an arbitration agreement.” Id. at 91. Where “a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.” Id. at 92.

Party Submissions

Division of Debt: Wife’s Attorney’s Fees In Wife’s nal issue, she argues the trial court abused its discretionby failing to consider the $140,000 she incurred in attomey’s fees as debt when dividing the marital estate. She asserts this resulted in a. grossly disproportionate division in favor‘ of Husband. Husband responds the trial court acted within its broad disoretion by_ not including Outstanding attorney’s fees in the community liabilities.

Party Submissions

Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized that the Republican Party of Texas enjoys a robust First Amendment right to select the candidates that shall bear its nomination. Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 795 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. 1990); Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Dem. Ctrl. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224-25 (1989). That First Amendment right protects the Republican Party’s prerogative to “identify the people who constitute the [Party]” as well as the ability to “select a standard bearer who best represents the [P]arty’s ideologies and preferences.” Eu, 489 U.S. at 224. “When a political party questions the constitutionality of state statutes regulating the party’s method of selecting a candidate, as applied to a particular office or candidate, the courts must employ a balancing test,” Brady, 795 S.W. at 715, which “weighs the burden on the. .. party against the compelling state interest the state must advance to justify the burdens.” Id. Mandamus against Chairman Rinaldi here would impose an unconstitutionally heavy burden on the Republican Party’s associational rights.

Party Submissions

Sequentially, assuming arguendo that Bay can meet these monumental burdens, and only after those two issues are established, does the court then reach what Bay chooses to argue as the dispositive issue: whether Bay has conclusively established “course and scope” as a matter of law. Mann contends course and scope cannot be conclusively established; that it is a fact question. Mann does not have the burden of conclusively disproving course and scope as argued by Bay. Mann contends that course and scope cannot be conclusively established on contested facts but that nonetheless, a determination of course and scope would only affect the availability of certain common law defenses.

Party Submissions

No amendment or modification of any provision of this Agreement, the Note or any instrument delivered under this Agreement or the Note is effective unless the same is in writing and signed by the Lender and the Borrower.

Contract

Weatherford insists that Midland must prove that a leak occurred after mixture with residential sources in order to show that the domestic sewage exclusion applies. R.R. Street never required the cost-recovery defendant to prove such a finding, nor did it affirmatively decide whether the exclusion applied. In R.R. Street, this Court held that a fact issue existed as to whether the sewage pipes actually leaked, and due to insufficient evidence, no holding was made regarding the application of the domestic sewage exclusion in that case. R.R. St., 166 S.W.3d at 250 (“Because there is conflicting testimony that raises a fact issue as to whether the sewage pipes leaked at Pilgrim’s facilities, we cannot determine as a matter of law whether the [perchloroethylene] mixture Corbin poured down the drains at Pilgrim’s facilities qualifies as solid waste subject to SWDA regulation[.]”) (alteration in original). Consequently, R.R. Street imposes no duty under the SWDA for a cost-recovery defendant to provide evidence showing that the alleged leak occurred after any mixing with residential waste.

Party Submissions

The arbitration agreement has a “delegation provision,” which “is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement.” Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010). The delegation provision required “issues of formation, validity or enforceability of [the arbitration agreement itself]” to be arbitrated. Op. at 2. The delegation provision specifically required that “[a]ll decisions respecting the arbitrability of any Dispute shall be heard and determined by the arbitrator(s)[.]” Id. at 3.

Party Submissions

On cross-examination, Thomas testified as required by A.S.’s plan of service, A.S. completed her: (1) parenting class; (2) psychological; (3) psychosocial; and (5) may have completed her ETCADA/Sabine Valley Assessment with another case worker. 4 RR 144-46. Thomas also testified that A.S. did not miss appointments with her counselors. 4 RR 147-78. Thomas testified that A.S. was appropriate during visits that she supervised. 4 RR 159-60.

Party Submissions

This payment-for-services Contract is a textbook contract for goods and services for which the Legislature has expressly waived governmental immunity. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.152. The Contract obligates Liberty to provide wastewater treatment services to Ames in exchange for Ames’s payments, including payments for treatment of wastewater over and above an established threshold volume of flows. (CR 41.) Ames incorrectly attempts to separate out Liberty’s single service—treating Ames’s wastewater — into two parts: (1) the treatment of Ames’s wastewater flows up to the baseline TAV level; and (2) the treatment of Ames’s wastewater flows above the TAV. ( Pet’r’s Pet. at 6. ) Ames states that Liberty has discretion over the treatment of Ames’s excess flows, however the Contract contains no such distinction; no provision makes Liberty’s treatment of wastewater flows above the threshold amount voluntary. Ames’s argument turns on its insistence that Liberty’s treatment of any wastewater exceeding the TAV is not an obligation under the Contract, and therefore does not qualify as a “service” under the Texas Local Government Code, Chapter 271, waiver of governmental immunity. However, Liberty is obligated — by its permit and simple plumbing realities — to provide treatment to wastewater reaching its WWTP, including Ames’s flows exceeding the TAV. (CR 49.); Tex. Water Code § 26.121.

Party Submissions

To amend the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 to require the timely appointment of agency transition officials, to ensure adequate performance and oversight of required transition-related preparation, to require new guidance for agencies and possible transition teams, and for other purposes.

Legislation

Acting as the factfinder, the trial court had the right to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight that it wished to give to their testimony.

Party Submissions

The lower court also noted the reports’ lack of explanation of why it mattered that Dr. Castillo left the unit or what would have been different had she not. There was no explanation of what the BSA nurses could have done about Dr. Castillo’s leaving that would have made a difference in the outcome. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 2022 WL 173214338, at *4. They allegedly could have gone “up the chain of command.” But, the experts did not even address “whether those higher up the chain of command had a right to stop Castillo from leaving, persuade her to remain, secure a substitute physician, or the like.” Id. (citing Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 461). There was not any explanation of what someone higher up could have or should have done differently at the time when Dr. Castillo left the unit. Also lacking is any explanation of how or why going up the chain of command would have affected the outcome. This is especially the case when the harm was not alleged to have occurred until several hours after she returned.

Party Submissions

On October 9, 2023, this document was served on Douglas W. Alexander, lead counsel for Petitioner, via DAlexander@adjtlaw.com; and on Jane M. N. Webre, lead counsel for Respondent EOG Resources, Inc., via JWebre@scottdoug.com.

Party Submissions

We propose to uphold COES’s proposal regarding a joint optimization program/secondary reserve (Unit Commitment) since it would be difficult for a model of specific allocations of a Unit Commitment based on costs to coexist, such as the current daily programming in Perú, with a separate market model for the secondary band. [...] However, the assignment algorithm should take the Base Provision reserve into account as a boundary condition, in such a way that the units that supply the Base Provision should be adequately programmed to ensure the supply and the minimum reserve they provide must not be taken into account when optimization occurs.

Legal Decisions

Cabe señalar además que la propia Demandante atribuye lo cual contradice abiertamente el argumento de que el valor de CALICA es equivalente a la de la Red CALICA.204 182. El otro defecto que tiene la estrategia empleada por la Demandante es que no se puede aislar el valor de CALICA del valor de la Red CALICA. Como no presentó una valuación alterna basada únicamente en CALICA, la Demandante busca convencer al Tribunal de que todo el valor de la Red CALICA reside en CALICA.

Party Submissions

If the Lawyers had filed a motion for leave to designate Flaven as an RTP more than 60 days before trial and if the trial court had granted that motion over the BNC Sellers’ objections, the next step would be surviving a motion to strike. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(l). As explained in the Lawyers’ brief, no evidence suggests that the Flaven RTP designation would have survived a motion to strike, assuming the BNC Sellers raised the same objections as they did in the underlying trial. See Pet’rs’ Br. at 54-56. Terry’s testimony that the trial judge focused solely on the duty issue at the hearing on the motion to strike and that is why she denied the motion remains unrebutted by Stanley (the BNC Sellers’ trial counsel), the only other person who was there.

Party Submissions

Serbia does not seem to dispute that the requested documents indeed are material and relevant. Serbia merely asserts that the requested documents are “ not sufficiently ” relevant and material. However, Serbia does not propose any test nor refers to any authority that would establish when documents requested in a document production process are “ sufficiently ” relevant. For the avoidance of doubt, the requested documents clearly are relevant and material. As explained above, the requested documents will show the envisaged costs of building a bus loop at Obnova’s premises and their comparison with the costs that would be potentially incurred at other locations. As such, the requested documents are relevant and material to assess: ( i ) whether Serbia’s decision to put the bus loop at Obnova’s premises was reasonable in light of the envisaged costs (or, on the contrary, arbitrary); and ( ii ) whether Serbia acted in compliance with the proportionality principle when it decided to place the bus loop at Obnova’s premises. Serbia’s claim that “ Claimants' request for the documents underlying the implementation costs for the construction of the bus loop is wholly speculative and of limited relevance to the dispute ” is thus clearly incorrect. Finally, as for Serbia’s argument that “ Claimants and Respondent have not argued that implementation costs played any role in respect of the decision to locate the bus loop on the Dunasvka [sic] Plots ”, it seems that Serbia misunderstood Claimants arguments in their Memorial. Claimants clearly pointed out that in order to comply with requirements under the Cyprus-Serbia BIT, t he decision to put the bus loop on Obnova’s premises cannot be arbitrary and, at the same time, must respect the proportionality principle.95 The comparison of implementation costs for building of the bus loop at Obnova’s premises and potential other locat ions is directly relevant to assess both whether the eventual decision to put the bus loop on Obnova’s premises was reasonable, i.e. not arbitrary, and whether it respected the proportionality principle. DECISION Any and all documents relied upon in the preparation of the tables summarizing the evaluation of the four potential locations for a new bus loop presented on pages 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of exhibit R-101.

Legal Decisions

This is the ninth of nine requests for documents which the Claimant contends was seized during the criminal proceedings in Qatar.

Legal Decisions

Court concluded the appellate court erred in upholding the denial of a party’s motion to compel arbitration on a ground not presented in the trial court. MVP’s Brief at 30-31 (citing 392 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. 2013)). This Court noted that the party opposing arbitration never denied the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate; thus—unlike here—the court reached a conclusion unsupported by the record and contrary to both parties’ positions. Richmont Holdings, 392 S.W.3d at 635. • In Fritz Management, LLC v. Alfortish Contractors, LLC, the plaintiff did not challenge the existence of a valid arbitration clause in the trial court or on appeal except in a footnote unsupported by briefing. No. 04-22-00572-CV, 2023 WL 2672901, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 29, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). The existence of a valid governing arbitration clause was never in dispute—only whether the defendant waived by conduct its right to enforce the arbitration clause. Id.

Party Submissions

The United States objects to Request No. 1.h for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a.

Legal Decisions

To restore the ability of the people of American Samoa to approve amend- ments to the territorial constitution based on majority rule in a democratic act of self-determination, as authorized pursuant to an Act of Congress delegating administration of Federal territorial law in the territory to the President, and to the Secretary of the Interior under Execu-tive Order 10264, dated June 29, 1951, under which the Constitution of American Samoa was approved and may be amended without requirement for further congressional action, subject to the authority of Con-gress under the Territorial Clause in article IV, section 3, clause 2 of the United States Constitution.

Legislation

Galovelho also relies on mootness cases that express a concern when charged conduct is voluntarily ceased by the defendant without an admission that the action – 20– was wrongful. The concern is that “ defendants could control the jurisdiction of courts with protestations of repentance and reform, while remaining free to return to their old ways. ” Matthews, on behalf of M.M., 484 S.W.3d at 418. In a voluntary cessation case, dismissal is appropriate only when subsequent events make clear that the challenged conduct could not reasonably be expected to recur. Id. Again, no court can predict the future. But we can conclude that, based on the passage of more than two years without imposition of any further restrictions on restaurants, it is not reasonable to expect appellees to issue restrictions comparable to those issued at the height of the pandemic. Here, the complained-of conduct was voluntarily ceased as the dangers of Covid-19 were mitigated through vaccination and immunity gained after infection. Subsequent events do not support a concern that appellees will “return to their old ways.” See id.

Party Submissions

A breach of a contract by itself is not a negligent act or omission. B. HSMiller’s claim that the phrase “that violates a legal HSMiller argues Flaven was a proper RTP based on the concluding phrase defining an RTP as someone who has engaged in “other conduct or activity that violates an applicable legal standard.” (Cross-Pet’r’s Br. at 28 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6)) (emphasis original)). But, as noted above, this Court has never held that a violation of a contractual promise alone violates an “applicable legal standard” sufficient to qualify one as an RTP in a tort case. And its cases suggest it would hold otherwise. See DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d at 404 (holding that a claim for negligent breach of contract sounded in contract rather than tort).

Party Submissions

If the Court agrees with the Lawyers’ arguments on the assignment or negligence issues, gross negligence and exemplary damages should be set aside as a matter of law. E.g., U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 137 (Tex. 2012). But, if the Court does decide that remand on any issue is appropriate (which the Lawyers dispute), the Court should not remand gross negligence and should, instead, reverse and render the award of exemplary damages. No evidence supports the jury’s finding on gross negligence. See id. at 141 & n.23 (remanding for new trial on negligence claims but rendering take nothing judgment on gross-negligence claims based on legally insufficient evidence).

Party Submissions

Finally, Mann will address Bay's creative attempt to collaterally establish standing at the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation (“the Division”). This issue was not addressed in the trial courts order granting permission to file this permissive appeal and is not necessary to the determination of any issues before the trial court or this reviewing court. Nonetheless, Mann will demonstrate that Bay cannot collaterally bootstrap standing before the Division.

Party Submissions

Worse still, relief here would greatly disserve the public interest. Signature requirements, like other laws that “require candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify for a place on the ballot,” serve the public interest by keeping “frivolous candidates” off the ballot. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983). That interest is not served here, where there is no dispute that Justice Devine has ample support. He has been elected twice to the same position, having received tens of thousands of votes from Eighth Court of Appeals District voters in previous elections. Office of the Secretary of State, 2018 General Election Results, https://perma.cc/389N-T8MT.

Party Submissions

Even with the Texas Workers' Compensation Act's waiver of defenses, an employee must still prove all elements of a negligence claim to prevail against nonsubscribing employers.

Party Submissions

Id. Second, the Court noted that the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction does not extend to all cases that touch on workers’ compensation issues. Id. (quoting AMS Constr. Co., Inc. v. K.H.K.

Party Submissions

The United States objects to Request No. 3.f for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a.

Legal Decisions

Memorial, paras 90-96 Counter-Memorial, paras 357-359, 492-495 Kalemegdan was registered in the Cypriot corporate register on 23 March 2012. According to Claimants, on 26 April 2012, Mr Obradović, acting upon Mr Rand's instruction, contributed his shares in Obnova and in four other Serbian companies to Kalemegdan, of which he was the sole legal owner, in exchange for additional share capital in Kalemegdan ( C-318 ). As a result of Mr Obradović's in -kind contribution, Kalemegdan became the nominal and direct beneficial owner of the Obnova shares. That same day, Mr Obradov ić purportedly concluded the first of two trust deeds with Coropi in respect of his shares in Kalemegdan. Claimants allege that Coropi acquired a beneficial interest in Kalemegdan (and an indirect beneficial interest in the Obnova shares) through the conclusion of these two trust deeds.

Legal Decisions

Weatherford claims that limitations are an issue that cannot be reached if the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction because Midland enjoyed immunity from suit. However, a time-barred suit is yet another threshold requirement for a valid SWDA claim that Weatherford failed to meet. City of Madisonville v. Sims, 620 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Tex. 2020) (“When a statutory prerequisite to suit is not met, ‘whether administrative (such as filing a charge of discrimination) or procedural (such as timely filing a lawsuit),’ the suit may be properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”).

Party Submissions

In a self-dealing case involving two principals, the demand-futility arguments advanced by the Response have no legitimate place. As the Delaware Chancery Court explains, it makes “little sense to find that demand is required in an evenly divided situation.... Rather, it is enough for a plaintiff to show that there is an absence of impartial board members necessary to cause the corporation to accept demand.” Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80, 86 (Del. Ch. 2000).

Party Submissions

C) Damages related to Claimant’s shares in Lajun 549. The Tribunal considers that, in view of Respondent’s breaches of the Treaty, the value of Claimant’s shares in Lajun has been materially impaired. As a consequence, Claimant is entitled to full reparation for the loss of his ownership interest, which is 90% of Lajun’s capital.

Legal Decisions

But assuming the filing fee for a $1 million claim applies, the initial filing fee for such a claim under the flexible schedule is $3,500. Further, the payment of the initial fee can be deferred upon request in cases of extreme hardship. See AAAA Construction Industry Arbitration Rule 55. Dissent, p. 7.

Party Submissions

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Relator, Hon. Brian Walker, prays that the Court grant his Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus and issue a writ of mandamus compelling Respondent, Hon. Matt Rinaldi, to review and reject the application of Hon. John Devine for a place on the 2024 Republican General Primary ballot for the office of Justice, Texas Supreme Court, Place 4, and further directing Respondent to notify Devine, and the Secretary of State that Devine’s application does not comply with the applicable statutory requirements and will thereby be removed from the list of certified candidate in the 2024 Republican General Primary Election. Finally, Relator prays for all other relief, at law or in equity, to which he may be justly entitled.

Party Submissions

To amend the Agricultural Credit Act of 1978 to remove barriers to agricul- tural producers in accessing funds to carry out emergency measures under the emergency conservation program, and for other purposes.

Legislation

The United States objects to Request No. 2.i for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 2.a.

Legal Decisions

To amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to clarify when the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency has the authority to prohibit the specification of a defined area, or deny or restrict the use of a defined area for specification, as a disposal site under section 404 of such Act, and for other purposes.

Legislation

This point can be illustrated by an analogy to the law of intestate succession. Suppose a person dies without a will. In such a case, a statutory scheme provides a set of default rules about who inherits what. Anyone who wishes to opt out of the statutory default scheme may do so by executing a will. And if someone chooses to execute a will, courts understand that various words and phrases have attained stable meanings through adjudication over generations of common-law tradition.

Party Submissions

NAFTA Articles 1127, 1128 and 1129 28.1. Non-Disputing NAFTA Parties may make submissions to the Tribunal within the meaning of NAFTA Article 1128 by the date indicated in Annex B .

Legal Decisions

After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding Berrelez had not exhausted her administrative remedies under the Act and her claims were barred by the Act's exclusive remedy provision. Thereafter, the trial court severed Berrelez's claim against Mascorro, creating a final, appealable judgment with regard to the order of dismissal in favor of Mesquite Logistics. Berrelez then perfected this appeal.

Party Submissions

As explained above, the requested documents will show the basis for the inscription of Selfnest doo as the owner of a part of the former land plot 39/1, on which a part of Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 23 is located. Clarification of Selfnest’s alleged ownership, its extent and its validity is relevant and material to establish whether the registratio n of Selfnest in any way affects the area subject to Obnova’s rights. The area of land to which Obnova has rights at Dunavska 23 is clearly relevant and material for the outcome of this case.

Legal Decisions

COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS Each Party shall comply with its commitments regarding investment and shall, in no way, impair, through the adoption of arbitrary and discriminatory measures, the management, development, maintenance, utilisation, usufruct, acquisition, expansion or transfer of said investments.

Legal Decisions

All contributions Husband made to his 401(k) during the marriage are part of the community estate. The trial court found that $62,042.77 of Husband’s 401(k) was community property and $311,778.24 was his separate property. (CR 596–597). The evidence showed that Husband contributed to his 401(k) each year of the marriage, and Husband testified that his paystubs show each contribution to his 401(k). (6RR D 729–751; 4RR 103:6–9). To determine the community interest in Husband’s 401(k), the trial court consider all the contributions Husband made during the marriage. (6RR D 729–751). Further, Husband offered a summary of his yearly contributions based on the values stated on his paychecks. (4RR 98:2–25, 99:1–3; 6RR D 752). Based on this evidence, the trial court was able to determine that Husband contributed $62,042.77 to his 401(k) during the marriage and included that amount to the community estate.

Party Submissions

Liberty ignores the clear language of the Contract and argues that the Additional Service Charge is part of an agreed upon rate structure. The Contract did not contain volumetric rate brackets, as Liberty claims, where Liberty agreed to accept all of Ames’s wastewater and Ames agreed to pay a certain rate up to the “Total Acceptable Volume” (“TAV”) and an additional progressive high-volume rate for exceeding the TAV. In reality, the Contract prohibits Ames from sending flows in excess of the TAV, and Liberty has no obligation to accept such flows. The Additional Service Charge is not a “high-volume” rate to cover increased treatment costs as Liberty claims for accepting higher wastewater volumes; instead, it is Liberty’s attempt at charging Ames liquidated damages for sending Liberty flows that are prohibited by the Contract. This liquidated damages provision is an unenforceable penalty because at the time it was drafted, it was not a reasonable forecast of just compensation (it arbitrarily requires Ames to pay SIX times the highest rate of any charged by Liberty for volumes exceeding the TAV with no relation to actual increased treatment costs as Liberty claims) and there is an unbridgeable discrepancy between Liberty’s actual damages (Liberty has pled no actual damages2 other than the Additional Service Charges) and the liquidated damages Liberty’s seeks ($1,356,611.20). See Atrium Med. Ctr, LP v. Houston Red C LLC, 595 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. 2020).

Party Submissions

A case where litigants were found to NOT be in privity with each other despite being in the same case together during pre-trial was Saqui v. Pride Intern., Inc., No. 14-10-00540-CV, 2011 WL 5056162, at *1 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 25, 2011, no pet.). In Saqui, the Saqui Plaintiffs and the Spinoso Plaintiffs filed their suit together in the same case on September 12, 2006. Id. They were in pre-trial together for 16 months. Id. On July 27, 2007, one defendant (“PCA”) filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, and all the plaintiffs filed a response thereto on August 16, 2007. Id. and Doc. 41. Before that motion was heard, on January 22, 2008, the Saqui Plaintiffs’ cases were dismissed without prejudice for failing to show up for a status conference. Id @ 2. On September 29, 2008, the trial court finally granted PCA’s motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. Id. The Saqui Plaintiffs later filed a new lawsuit, and PCA sought and obtained summary judgment on collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of the forum non conveniens issue. Id. The 14th Court of Appeals reversed, essentially finding that conducting pre-trial together did not rise to the level of privity as follows: 7 ... because they had been dismissed from the lawsuit, appellants were not parties to the federal district court litigation at the time the district court reversed its forum non conveniens decision. In addition, PCA has not established as a matter of law that the Spinoso Plaintiffs represented appellants' interests in the federal district court litigation. Also, PCA has not established as a matter of law that after appellants were dismissed from the federal district court litigation, they participated in, exercised any control over, or had any right to do either in the federal district court litigation. ...PCA has not established as a matter of law that appellants have any beneficial interest in any recovery by the Spinoso Plaintiffs or the reverse, the Spinoso Plaintiffs have any right to any recovery made by appellants. ... we conclude the fact the two cases arise out of the same maritime accident does not establish as a matter of law that appellants and the Spinoso Plaintiffs were in privity.

Party Submissions

Galovelho pleaded: “The economic impact of the regulations was total and failed to allow any economic or beneficial use of the property as a full-service restaurant. ” But the Lucas requirement of a “complete elimination of value” or a “total loss” is not tied to an owner’s preferred economic use of the property. Galovelho does not dispute that restaurants were always permitted to operate under the Emergency Orders, albeit in a limited capacity. Customers could always take food out or have it delivered. And for significant amounts of the affected time period, restaurants were permitted to operate as “full -service dine-in restaurants”— to use Galovelho’s description— with limited levels of occupancy on site. Moreover, all of the regulations on the res taurant industry were temporary, which means an owner’s economic loss could not be complete. See id. at 332 (“Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted .”). We conclude that Galovelho’s complaints cannot meet the requirements of a categorical taking because the Emergency Orders never completely destroyed all economic value of its property.

Party Submissions

NATURE OF THE CASE: Financial retribution and explicit bias obstruction in the expose of extrajudicial misconduct in the theft of Uniformed Partition of Heirs Property Act (UPHPA) protected land, active mineral leases, and producing mineral estate protected.

Party Submissions

Sonic acknowledges that abatement orders are ordinarily incidental rulings of the court not subject to mandamus review. But Sonic argues that when extraordinary circumstances exist, this general rule may not apply. Sonic claims extraordinary circumstances are present here because continued abatement prevents it from pursuing remedies against real parties in interest and violates the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. See TEX. CONST. Art. I, § 13. Sonic also contends that the trial court has abused its discretion because there is no authority to support continued abatement.

Party Submissions

If Lessee is not producing any quantities of gas from leased premises but is receiving payments under the “pay” portion of such “take or pay” gas purchase contract provision, such payments shall not relieve Lessee of the duty to make shut-in royalty payments if Lessee desires to continue this Lease, but such “take or pay” payments shall be applied as a credit against any shut-in royalty obligation of the Lessee.

Party Submissions

Not only is the franchise more than the OEM’s agreement, Texas also defines it to include a written communication in which a duty is imposed from an OEM to a franchisee. A franchise also includes the recognition that a dealer relies upon its OEM for a continued supply of motor vehicles. A franchise is also defined to encompass any right, duty, or obligation that is granted or imposed by Chapter 2301, Texas Occupations Code.

Party Submissions

As a result, we find th at the trial court’s aw ard of attorney fees to Osprin did not result in a double recovery and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the fees under the UDJA. We overrule Backes ’s sole iss ue. VI. Conclusion For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Party Submissions

Taylor v. Sturgell does not indicate the Wilson and Harpst plaintiffs were in privity. Taylor describes six paths to privity, and Fleming Defendants focused almost exclusively on the first one (“Taylor Privity Path 1”) as being allegedly applicable in this case. Taylor Privity Path 1 states the following: First, “[a] person who agrees to be bound by the determination of issues in an action between others is bound in accordance with the terms of his agreement.” 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 40, p. 390 (1980).

Party Submissions

Also, the history of this litigation demonstrates that guidance is needed from this Court now—to avoid the inevitable need for yet another appeal in the near future. For example, in an unusual procedural ruling, the court of appeals did not determine the Naths actually raised a fact issue on attorney’s fees: instead it remanded for “reconsideration” of former Justice Craig Enoch’s counter-affidavit, even after strongly hinting the $1.2 million fee award for two joint motions to dismiss (filed two months after the case started) was excessive.3 Nath v. Baylor Coll ege of Med., No. 01-20-00401-CV, 2022 WL 1038372, at *16 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 7, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The court thereby sidestepped the question of whether a jury must decide the reasonableness and necessity of any fee award under the TCPA or Rule 91, finding that argument is “moot” while the trial court reconsiders the correctness of its summary judgment. Id. at *17. The jury question will likely need to be decided in yet another appeal—if not addressed now by this Court.

Party Submissions

Word 2019, which indicated that the total word count (exclusive of those items listed in Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i) (1)) is 4,116 words.

Party Submissions

First, Relator’s cursory assertion “explain[s]” nothing “with precision.” Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 764. Relator contends that the time to print the ballots “would typically be ten days.” Pet.2. But he does not address whether this allegedly “typical” number applies to each of Texas’s 254 counties. Nor does he defend the apparent assumption that the “typical” ballot printing timeline is the same in, say, Harris County (pop. 4,780,913) versus Loving County (pop. 51). Compare U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts: Harris County, Texas, https://perma.cc/WA7L-UMRX, with U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts: Loving County, Texas, https://perma.cc/3X2X-MDLN.

Party Submissions

Petitioner essentially argues that an optional acceleration clause must be considered mandatory after some certain, undefined length of time. How the parties or the courts are to determine where this line in the sand should be drawn is not an ambiguity that the law should favor.

Party Submissions

The Court of Appeals, below, held that the “gist” of “Guardians, Inc.” was defamatory and not substantially true because it omitted certain facts. Op. at 4–5.

Party Submissions

In their petition, appellants Berry Contracting, L.P., d/b/a Bay Ltd. and Juan Tomas Hernandez Alvarez (Bay) fail to meet their burden entitling them to a permissive appeal. Berry asserts that the requirement that there is substantial ground for difference of opinion on the controlling question of law is “obvious from the fact that [appellees] Gernal Randolph Mann and Jennifer Mann and Bay have taken diametrically opposed legal positions on the exclusive remedy defense.” Such an argument is unpersuasive.

Party Submissions

ON THIS DAY came to be heard the petition for writ of mandamus filed by East Texas Medical Center Athens; who is the relator in appellate cause number 12-23-00263-CV and a defendant in trial court cause number 68714, pending on the docket of the County Court at Law of Smith County, Texas. Said petition for writ of mandamus having been [*13] filed herein on October 11, 2023, and the same having been duly considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that the writ should not issue, it is therefore CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the said petition for writ of mandamus be, and the same is, hereby denied .

Party Submissions

Declaratory Judgment both by failing to join a proper party Defendant, and on the ground of governmental immunity. VII. WILLACY v SEBASTIAN DOES NOT SUPORT RESPONDENT’S Throughout these proceedings, Respondent has relied heavily—and almost exclusively—on Willacy County. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd ., 555 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. 2018), opinion corrected on reh'g (Tex. Sept. 28, 2018). Petitioners contend that Willacy be limited to its facts, at least as far as precluding the conclusion of the Third Court of Appeals that “For our purposes, however, the pivotal holding in Willacy is that courts may entertain a challenge to the validity of a Section 1.111(e) agreement at all.” This opinion is not binding precedent for the current case.

Party Submissions

Eligible Employee. Eligible Employee means a member of a “select group of management or highly compensated employees” of a Participating Employer within the meaning of Sections 201(2), 301(a)(3) and 401(a)(1) of ERISA, as determined by the Committee from time to time in its sole discretion.

Contract

Oncor’s argument that the agreement did not purport to resolve the possibility of a clerical error existing is specious. The agreement resolved value. If Oncor’s sole concern were for the accuracy of Wilbarger CAD’s records, records not apparent on the face of the appraisal roll, but that it was not seeking to alter value, this matter would have never reached this Court. What Oncor is patently seeking to change, however, is the value of it property on the Wilbarger CAD 2019 appraisal roll, that same value it previously agreed to resolve. C. The preclusive effect of § 1.111(e) agreements is not limited to §§ In another utterly mind-boggling twist of legal illogic, Oncor contends that §1.111(e) agreements do not preclude § 25.25(c) motions, but only § 25.25(c-1) and (d) motions. The argument rests on the fact that § 25.25(c-1) and (d-1) prohibit corrections under sub-sections (c-1) and (d) when an agreement has been reached on value, but no such language exists regarding sub-section (c).

Party Submissions

Relator, Justice Brian Walker of the Second Court of Appeals, seeks mandamus relief originally in this Court—bypassing both the appropriate district court and court of appeals—to address a putative emergency of his own creation. Walker al-leges, though no court has ever found, that Justice John Devine’s application to appear on the ballot in the Republican primary for Place 4 of this Court is facially defective. E.g., Pet. at 1 (“Walker will show that, at best, Devine has 45 signatures from the 8th Court of Appeals District.”) (emphasis added). Walker attacks Justice Devine’s application based on information publicly available no later than November 14, 2023. Though Walker is aware that mail-in ballots for the Republican primary election will be printed imminently—in just two days by Walker’s estimate, Pet. at 2—he waited until January 5, 2024 to bring this action. Pet. at 16. Indeed, Walker waited until December 27 before he even raised the possibility that Devine’s application was flawed. Pet. Ex. A.

Party Submissions

H.B. A No. A 59 AN ACT relating to child water safety requirements for certain organizations; authorizing disciplinary action, including an administrative penalty.

Party Submissions

But no such “attribution” rule exists. The statute is clear—media defendants cannot be held liable for “accurate reporting of allegations made by a third party regarding a matter of public concern.” CPRC § 73.005(b). The statute does not, in any way, mention or imply an attribution requirement, just as it includes no endorsement exception. See generally CPRC § 73.005; Public Util. Comm'n v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. 1988) (“A court may not write special exceptions into a statute so as to make it inapplicable under certain circumstances not mentioned in the statute.”); Tex. Gov't Code § 311.021(2) (entire statute is intended to be effective).

Party Submissions

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a). Only community property is subject to the trial court ’ s just and right division. Barnard v. Barnard, 133 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Tex.

Party Submissions

The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 3.a and no decision is therefore made.

Legal Decisions

Husband responds the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s characterization of the marital residence such that there was no abuse of discretion.

Party Submissions

This RESTRICTED STOCK UNIT AGREEMENT (this “Agreement”) is made as of the Date of Grant set forth above by and between UNITED RENTALS, INC., a Delaware corporation, having an office at 100 First Stamford Place, Suite 700 Stamford, CT 06902 (the “Company”), and Awardee (together with the Company, the “Parties”), currently an employee of the Company or an affiliate of the Company.

Contract

When the episode introduces Tonya, it cuts to a photo of her scowling in the courtroom as foreboding music plays in the background.

Party Submissions

The name-change issue that Respondents did brief is entirely meritless. That issue relates solely to the damages that Westwood would be entitled to recover under the jury’s verdict if the court of appeals’ ju dgment is reversed. And while Respondents insist that Westwood’s name change creates “intractable problems” for the entire damages award (Resp. 31), it actually leaves most of it untouched.

Party Submissions

Relator’s petition should be denied because it would disrupt the ongoing election process. Relief at this late hour would be incredibly destabilizing, as the Secretary of State has advised counties across Texas to “complet[e] [thei]r ballots not later than the 60th day before election day, which is Friday, January 5, 2024. ” Christina Worrell Adkins, Director of Elections, Tex. Sec’y of State, Election Advisory No. 2023-27 (Dec. 23, 2023), https://perma.cc/8MMK-48DV. Relator never confronts this fact, and he never explains how this Court could grant relief “that would not disrupt the larger election.” In re Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d 762, 764 (Tex. 2022). That is fatal to his claim because, on mandamus, it is his burden to clearly prove that relief would not disrupt the election process. Speculation and empty assurances have never been sufficient under this Court’s caselaw.

Party Submissions

In the first instance, it is up to a local appraisal board to decide whether there has been more than one protest relating to the same property. While a board has no authority to change a settlement reached by a taxpayer and the chief appraiser, it certainly has the authority to take note of what property was included.

Party Submissions

One Lease Ended Up in Both the Hooks and this Bordages Case The severance also put a single lease into both the Hooks case and Bordages cases. One Bordages owner under that lease is also in privity with the Hooks, who own the executive rights under that lease.

Party Submissions

Orders confirming Chapter 11 reorganization plans become final judgments when not challenged for fraud in accordance with 11 U.S.C.

Party Submissions

Synopsis Employer petitioned for writ of mandamus, compelling the 189th District Court, Harris County, Carolyn Marks Johnson, J., to abate employee's negligence action against employer until Workers' Compensation Commission made final decision on employee's claim. The Court of Appeals, Bill Cannon, J. (Assigned), held that trial court abused its discretion by refusing to abate negligence trial in which employer asserted that workers' compensation was exclusive remedy for employee's injury until Commission made final decision on whether employee's injury was compensable, and thus, employer was entitled to mandamus relief.

Party Submissions

The Texarkana court held that the Raymond exclusion only applies where the deed is from one spouse as the grantor to the other spouse as grantee. Id. at 710. In Moncey, the sisters were the grantors under the deed, so it was not a conveyance from one spouse to the other spouse to exclude parol evidence. Id.

Party Submissions