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Assuming without deciding that the Investment Agreement had a term of 25 years as argued by Respondent (see Respondent’s Opening Presentation, slide 13), why and on what legal basis has Respondent allowed CALICA to continue its operations under the Investment Agreement after the expiry of that period?
Party Submissions
11.674022
10.185708
12.908018
In its motion for summary judgment in the trial court, Sonic argued that section 406.075 had not been satisfied when it made payments to Cochran and, therefore, no remedy was obtained in Alabama until the judgment was entered and section 406.075 could not bar its reimbursement [**3] claim. Sonic also argued that there was no "election" under section 406.075 until Cochran recovered the Alabama judgment on July 13, 2001. Thus, by its arguments, Sonic conceded that receipt of the Alabama judgment was Cochran's "election" to recover benefits under Alabama's laws for purposes of section 406.075. The opinion notes there was no dispute that once Cochran received the Alabama judgment, he recovered benefits under Alabama's laws for purposes of section 406.075 and no dispute that Sonic sought reimbursement after that election. The opinion does not address whether Sonic may have been able to recover payments had it filed the reimbursement claim prior to Cochran's receipt [*484] of the Alabama judgment. As we noted, HN1 [ ] section 409.009 requires a subclaimant seek and be refused reimbursement from the insurance carrier. TMI refused reimbursement-- according to Sonic-- in 1997; however, Sonic did not pursue reimbursement benefits under the TWCA until after Cochran received the Alabama judgment. Further, Sonic received credit in the Alabama judgment for payments it made to Cochran-- adjudicating those payments-- and, in the trial court, the parties indicated the payments may be characterized [**4] as "damages" in the underlying contract dispute. Sonic is not left without a remedy regarding those payments.
Party Submissions
7.331944
7.326838
7.455908
Attorneys for Petitioner Westwood Motorcars, LLC 1. This brief in reply complies with the type-volume limitation of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(C) because it contains 6,380 words, excluding the parts of the petition exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9 .4(i)(l).
Party Submissions
5.645999
6.168315
9.813123
As the Cypriot Claimants claim that Mr Obradović and Mr Rand relied on the 2003 RP in their expectation to develop the Dunavska Plots, the requested documents (serving as the basis for such reliance) are in the Cypriot Claimants' possession, custody or control.
Legal Decisions
18.770016
20.320492
24.103672
January 20, 2017 to the present, National Archives (to the extent that documents in the National Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) by November 27, 2023.
Legal Decisions
12.068502
11.844861
15.582259
Further, the El Paso court was wrong to suggest that World Car invited an exclusive focus on the dealer agreement. App. G at 19. World Car simply argued that HMA imposed a specific consequence for World Car’s failure to be 100% sales efficient (treating World Car as in material breach of the dealer agreement), and that this was evidence that HMA “require[d]” the standard. None of this can excuse the Board’s or court’s failure to apply § 2301.467(a)(1) properly by analyzing the evidence on which World Car’s claim relied.
Party Submissions
16.192656
16.764982
18.934185
Whether Flaven was a proper RTP depended on the suit the BNC Sellers brought, the facts they alleged, and the damages they claimed. They sued HSMiller and its agent Defterios in tort for fraud and negligent misrepresentation and alleged damages based in tort.
Party Submissions
37.81249
36.658016
51.572807
This Court rejects holdings that attempt to silently overrule or deviate from its previous reasoned opinions. See, e.g., Nazari v. State, 561 S.W.3d 495, 506 (Tex.
Party Submissions
9.284991
11.756083
10.445404
Ammonite asks for reversal and remand on the ground that “the Commission never reached or decided” whether “EOG’s existing wells could be extended or reworked in the future and thereby produce hydrocarbons from the riverbed tracts.” Letter at 1. That is no basis for reversal or remand. Ammonite did not propose such a thing to the Commission, see, e.g., 1.SCR.97-115 (written closing argument), 137-46 (reply), and this Court cannot reverse based on an issue never presented to the agency, see Imperial Am. Res. Fund, Inc. v. RRC, 557 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex. 1977). Ammonite had the burden of proof as the MIPA applicant, so the administrative record’s lack of evidence showing whether EOG’s wells could be extended or reworked is attributable to Ammonite’s decision not to develop such evidence during the administrative proceedings.
Party Submissions
8.455266
8.715256
8.831229
Making emergency supplemental appropriations to respond to the attacks in Israel for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024, and for other purposes.
Legislation
8.237205
7.116365
8.347398
The City’s duty to deny access to Catiana and High Hopes arose because it became subjectively aware of an unreasonable risk of harm. Unnegated evidence in the record establishes that “the lifeguard supervisor on site stated that they had to [sic] many children” and “took photos and 8 The court of appeals also alluded to this Court’s decision in Suarez v. City of Texas City, but there this Court commented only on the risks of “open-water swimming.”465 S.W.3d 623, 634 (Tex. 2015).
Party Submissions
16.969868
16.958971
18.058262
The United States objects to Request No. 3.c for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 3.a.
Legal Decisions
8.143477
12.339021
14.069344
Nor was the Seventh Court in error by stating that an event that happened six or more hours before the injury was “too attenuated” to the eventual harm. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 2022 WL 17324338, at *4. The court’s point was that the event was not connected to the harm. Specifically, no expert explained why the nurses’ failure to attach fetal scalp electrode around 9:00 a.m. was connected to the harm that occurred (according to the reports) somewhere between 3:15 and 3:45 p.m. (CR.795, 805) The Walkers are again attempting to shoehorn the court of appeals’ holding into something that it is not. The court did not require the expert reports negate other possible causes of harm, as the Walkers suggest. But the court did rightly require the expert to explain how and why the two things were causally connected. Arguing otherwise would require the court to assume a causal connection, which is not permitted. See Bowie Mem’l Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 53.
Party Submissions
8.679484
8.906312
9.563774
Fundamentally, like this Court’s opinion in Zamarripa, there is no showing that the nurses could have taken the actions Dr. Tappan assigned to them when the treating physician was highly involved in the labor and delivery course and giving the medication and other orders. See Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 461. The courts are prohibited from creating the missing explanations. Id. ; Bowie Mem’l Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 53. The case is unlike those cited by the Walkers on what they claim to be “similar” facts. While those were birth cases, they were decided on factually specific expert reports. See Cornejo v. Hilgers, 446 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (report explained pregnant woman should not have been sent home following hospital visit and that baby’s brain tissue was not receiving oxygen during the 13 hours she was away from the hospital); McKellar v. Cervantes, 367 S.W.3d 478 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (expert report explaining how one twin was injured during birthing process while other twin remained neurologically intact).
Party Submissions
9.031558
9.065715
9.760656
For the avoidance of any doubt, Claimants also reiterate their general objection to production of any documents covered by privilege under the legal or ethical rules.
Legal Decisions
15.151161
16.802433
21.443403
This is crucial because even if Rafiei wished to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement, according to the arbitration agreement and the fee schedule he would be required to pay an Initial Filing Fee of $3,250, a Final Fee of $2,500, all of his own costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees and paraprofessional fees, as well as the cost of a hearing room and the cost of an arbitrator.
Party Submissions
8.391952
10.133255
9.723883
At the designation stage the trial court can still deny the motion for leave if the defendant cannot plead a violation of a legal standard or duty. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(g)(2). So, while RTP designations are governed by the “fair-notice pleading standard,” see In re YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d 805, 809-10 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding), even under that standard, a court can dismiss a claim where the pleader fails to provide fair notice of a legally cognizable claim for relief. E.g., City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016) (discussing Rule 91a). At this point, it is not an evidentiary challenge, but a legal one. See In re Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 621 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (“[W]hether a defendant is entitled to dismissal under the facts alleged is a legal question.”).
Party Submissions
4.756226
4.738745
5.151726
Claimant its receivables, even at the reduced values resulting from the measures.901 Even after the construction of the FONINVEMEM plants, Argentina did not respect or reinstate the principles set forth in the Electricity Law, as promised, and granted itself the right to increase its stock share in the FONINVEMEM plants.902 The Claimant also submits that it was repeatedly forced to waive certain rights to receive payments for its receivables and that the Government withheld payment to Cerros Colorados.903 The Claimant argues that entering into the agreements was the only way for the Claimant to recover any of its outstanding receivables.904 786. Citing Total v. Argentina, 905 the Claimant submits that, although participating in the FONINVEMEM program appeared voluntary, the Respondent through Resolutions 826/04 and 1427/2004, forced the Claimant to invest its outstanding receivables in the FONINVEMEM, thereby giving the Government a below market loan. The Claimant submits that the findings of the Total tribunal are sufficiently clear and can assist the Tribunal, and the fact that the Total tribunal issued its findings 10 years ago is irrelevant.906 787. The Claimant submits that its participation in the FONINVEMEM was not voluntary.
Legal Decisions
9.213691
8.585716
10.051586
The United States objects to Request No. 1.b for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a.
Legal Decisions
7.583667
11.990026
12.516125
Memorial, paras. 92-96 Counter-Memorial, paras. 364-380, 398-403 Kalemegdan was registered in the Cypriot corporate register on 23 March 2012. According to Claimants, on 26 April 2012, Mr Obradović, acting upon Mr Rand's instruction, contributed his shares in Obnova and in four other Serbian companies to Kalemegdan, of which he was the sole legal owner, in exchange for additional share capital in Kalemegdan ( C-318 ). As a result of Mr Obradović's in -kind contribution, Kalemegdan became the nominal and direct beneficial owner of the Obnova shares. That same day, Mr Obradov ić purportedly concluded the first of two trust deeds with Coropi in respect of his shares in Kalemegdan. Claimants allege that Coropi acquired a beneficial interest in Kalemegdan (and an indirect beneficial interest in the Obnova shares) through the conclusion of these two trust deeds. The trust deeds state that Coropi " for consideration given is beneficially interested and entitled to " Mr Obr adović's shares in Kalemegdan ( C-066, Whereas (a), and C-067, Whereas (a)).
Legal Decisions
8.023359
8.531207
8.027198
To ensure that a declaration for a major disaster or emergency is made on a timely basis, rural areas receive assistance, and for other purposes.
Legislation
16.661722
15.439534
19.711014
Claimants note that Serbia’ s objections relate to the lack of a specific time period and the fact that the request was not limited to documents related to the rezoning for residential purposes of the land plot located directly across the street from Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23. Claimants have limited the scope of their request accordingly. Requested documents are relevant and material Claimants hereby incorporate their reply from Request No. 53 above.
Legal Decisions
16.915295
16.818748
18.696327
Under Cockerham, parol evidence may establish lack of intent to gift. Id. To the contrary, the First District Court of Appeals has held that parol evidence is not admissible to rebut the gift presumption creating an irrebuttable presumption of gift in such deed. Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 79 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The Raymond court distinguished the Cockerham case because the deed in Raymond involved a conveyance directly from husband to wife with no other reasoning for the conveyance other than to transfer the one-half interest to wife. Id. at 81. As such, the court held that the husband was estopped to contradict the recitations in the deed conveyance except through fraud, accident, or mistake. Id .
Party Submissions
6.311329
7.092347
7.03213
Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to Article 34.1 of USMCA by November 27, 2023. Alternatively, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to immediately seek, in good faith, to obtain Canada’s and Mexico’s consent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada and Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to Article 34.1 of USMCA.
Legal Decisions
5.65271
6.132845
6.086117
Bay alleges that Mann was covered by two separate, complementary workers' compensation policies. One policy was a “rolling owner controlled insurance program” that was procured by Valero (the “ROCIP policy”). 1 The ROCIP policy covered *319 the refinery and was designed to provide blanket workers' compensation coverage to contractors who worked on Valero projects (such as Bay), as well as their employees (such as Mann).
Party Submissions
13.230731
13.180286
15.634985
To amend title 31, United States Code, to prohibit the misrepresentation and receipt of a false obligation to the Government, and for other purposes.
Legislation
7.605093
6.889081
7.824521
What are the implications, if any, of the fact that Respondent brought its jurisdictional objection based on the supersession of NAFTA by the USMCA together with its Counter-Memorial on the Ancillary Claim of 19 December 2022 (see Counter-Memorial on Ancillary Claim, ¶ 407 et seq.)?
Party Submissions
8.710803
8.417073
9.300013
All past due royalties (including any compensatory royalties payable under Paragraph VI.B) shall be subject to a Late Charge based on the amount due and calculated at the maximum rate allowed by law commencing on the day after the last day on which such monthly royalty payment could have been timely made and for every calendar month and/or fraction thereof from the due date until paid, plus attorney’s fees, court costs, and other costs in connection with the collection of the unpaid amounts. Any Late Charge that may become applicable shall be due and payable on the last day of each month when this provision becomes applicable.
Party Submissions
7.377473
7.716916
7.916716
To amend title XI of the Social Security Act to require the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to test a model to improve access to specialty health services for certain Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.
Legislation
4.561616
3.978542
3.914954
Respondent Rafiei respectfully requests that the Court uphold the trial court’s order denying Petitioner’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and grant Respondent all other appropriate relief.
Party Submissions
7.235045
8.674316
8.48788
For the reasons explained in Oncor’s initial brief and this one, petitioner respectfully requests this Court—either through a per curiam opinion or after oral argument—reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, render judgment that the district court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of Oncor’s claims, and remand the case for further proceedings. Oncor further requests any other relief to which it may show itself justly entitled.
Party Submissions
5.992558
6.726288
8.039038
A similar analogy was made by the Brown court with respect to the community interest in contingent fees earned during marriage.
Party Submissions
39.098984
49.030155
87.730644
This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session, the 1st C.S. and the 2nd C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the 2023 ballot proposition contingencies to date.
Party Submissions
8.685042
7.921706
8.740299
Dr. Castillo prays that this Court affirm the Court of Appeals’ opinion and judgment because the experts’ Chapter 74 reports (as amended) failed to address, factually, how and why Dr. Castillo’s alleged standard-of-care breaches proximately caused H.W.’s injuries. That result should be cemented if this Court addresses the experts’ lack of qualifications. Because Dr. Tappan was not qualified to opine about causation, and because Dr. Null’s causation opinion was conclusory, the Walkers provided essentially no causation opinion at all.
Party Submissions
13.560599
14.368062
14.673881
McCarthy from all claims and losses arising from professional services including negligent acts, errors or omissions of Subcontractor in the performance, nonperformance or failure to render professional services, including but not limited to design, design assist, inherent design, preconstruction services, design coordination or testing responsibilities under this Agreement. In addition, Subcontractor shall comply with the requirements of Paragraphs 5.1.
Party Submissions
10.784259
9.267756
11.585734
Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to the length of the transition period, including but not limited to its relationship, vel non, to NAFTA Chapter 11’s limitations period, or paragraph 3 of Annex 14-C of USMCA, by November 27, 2023. Alternatively, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to immediately seek, in good faith, to obtain documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada and Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with the transition period in paragraph 3 of Annex 14-C of USCMA.
Legal Decisions
7.464463
7.692124
7.697765
The application to qualify for the income tax credits in the federal program consists of three parts, Parts 1, 2, and 3, which are submitted to and must be approved by the National Park Service (NPS). Part 1 requests that the historic building be deemed eligible for historic rehabilitation tax credits. Part 2 requires a description of the scope of work with a request that 5 The Texaco building actually consisted of three buildings built in 1915, 1936, and 1959.
Party Submissions
7.981804
7.741743
9.063711
For these reasons, the evidence is conclusive that Wilson Plaintiffs did not mutually assent with the trial court to accept defensive collateral estoppel, and thus, there is no agreement, implied or otherwise, between Wilson Plaintiffs and the trial court to accept defensive collateral estoppel.
Party Submissions
9.263791
8.775763
11.462229
To require the Secretary of Agriculture to establish and maintain a training program for Department of Agriculture personnel and third-party pro-viders on the rapidly evolving methodologies, science, and practices of biological soil health managagement systems on agricultural land, and for other purposes.
Legislation
14.446813
14.099024
15.08186
A. The Appellate Court erred in its decision that this agreed judgment on attorney fees constituted a relinquishment of the right to appeal.
Party Submissions
12.78747
13.580882
14.426285
Nature of the case: This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal concerning the sufficiency of preliminary expert reports under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 74. Daniel and Kristen Walker, individually and as next friends of their minor son, H.W., filed a health care liability claim against obstetrician Dr. Rhodesia Castillo, M.D., and Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital. CR 4.
Party Submissions
8.755794
9.621552
10.546225
Therefore, the documents are neither relevant to the case nor material to its outcome, based on Claimant's grounds for its request. In any event, Respondent has conducted a reasonable search of the requested category of documents, and other than the documents referred to in the objection below (Privilege), it does not have in its possession, custody or control the documents described in the request.
Legal Decisions
10.595615
11.407528
11.788601
Executive shall be entitled to fringe benefits and perquisites (including but not limited to any applicable benefits related to health, dental, vision, life, disability, retirement, etc.) consistent with the practices of the Company and governing benefit plan requirements (including plan eligibility provisions), and to the extent the Company provides similar benefits or perquisites (or both) to similarly situated executives of the Company.
Contract
7.169052
7.540076
8.679402
According to the Norwegian Food Safety Authority, it should also be okay to land live crabs at Norwegian reception centres. 742 526. Norway maintains that this email relates only to landing not harvesting of snow crab. That is true but the Tribunal does not consider that it put Mr Ankipov on notice that there might be a need for authorization for EU vessels to take snow crab in the Loop Hole. On the contrary, the assumption of both correspondents appears to have been that there was no such requirement and, indeed, until December 2015 there were no Norwegian regulations prohibiting the taking of snow crab in the Loop Hole.
Legal Decisions
14.072519
15.87534
16.36924
HSMiller is wrong. The instruction the malpractice trial judge gave — specifically the last two sentences of the instruction4 — incorrectly stated the law on a hotly disputed issue at trial. It was harmful and alone supports reversal of the case as the court of appeals held.
Party Submissions
21.911749
29.14697
29.848928
In rebuttal, Samson announced a new “meaning” for the last sentence of XVII.C: that an unpaid Late Charge is a “ground for termination of the lease” under “the very next sentence,” so that failing to timely pay a Late Charge is grounds for the Lessor to “play the game of gotcha” and terminate the lease. This theory has no basis in the text of the Bordages Leases. It highlights the perils of construing a single-spaced, 23-legal-page long contract using one paragraph and a red marker. (For reference, all of art. XVII is reproduced in the Appendix below.) That “very next sentence” is in art. XVII.D. It does not even mention Late Charges. There is nothing “gotcha” about the provision. It authorizes the Lessor to give a 30-day notice of intent to terminate the lease if the Lessee fails to pay “royalty payments as provided herein.” Samson’s scenario requires ignoring the actual words and substituting other words in art. XVII.D.
Party Submissions
11.153197
10.989743
11.682651
Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Harris Cnty. v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2018) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)). When reviewing a trial court’s grant of a Plea to the Jurisdiction that challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the court looks to the “relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. When such review requires the examination of evidence, the trial court “exercises its discretion in deciding whether the jurisdictional determination should be made at a preliminary hearing or await a fuller development of the case, mindful that this determination must be made as soon as practicable.” Id. (citing Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000)).
Party Submissions
3.134112
3.449976
3.599627
FAILURE BY A PARTY TO OBEY THE ORDER OF THIS COURT TO PROVIDE EACH OTHER PARTY, THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY WITH THE CHANGE IN THE REQUIRED INFORMATION MAY RESULT IN FURTHER LITIGATION TO ENFORCE THE ORDER, INCLUDING CONTEMPT OF COURT. A FINDING OF CONTEMPT MAY BE PUNISHED BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR UP TO SIX MONTHS, A FINE OF UP TO $500 FOR EACH VIOLATION, AND A MONEY JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT COSTS.
Party Submissions
3.509693
3.316582
4.007036
The Tribunal will refer to these costs as “ Legal and Other Costs ,” which the Tribunal understands include legal fees and expenses, expert and witness fees and expenses, travel expenses, bank fees, delivery fees, photocopying, support services, translation, research and other internal expenses. Under Clause 11.8 of the RER Contract, Legal and Other Costs are excluded from the provisions of Clause 11. The Tribunal concurs with Claimants’ interpretation1544 that the meaning of this provision is that each party will bear its own Legal and Other Costs with respect to an arbitration under the RER Contract.
Legal Decisions
9.946226
8.05505
10.111002
On October 8, 2015, Mann clocked in to work at 6:44 a.m. at a terminal on the side of Up River Road in Corpus Christi, Texas. Around 6:47 a.m., as Mann walked across the road, he was struck by a vehicle driven by Alvarez, also an employee of Bay. There are four different versions of what Mann was intending to do as he crossed the road: (1) gathering water for his workers, (2) preparing for a safety meeting, (3) going to look at an excavation site to determine what paperwork he would need to obtain from Valero before his men could commence work, or (4) walking to his truck to get out of the rain.
Party Submissions
7.500214
8.025447
8.163828
I agree with Judge McElhaney's 1 observations regarding the “substantial grounds for disagreement” standard, and courts should take these observations into account when deciding whether to grant a petition for permissive appeal. Nothing in this record, including Bay's petition, demonstrates a substantial ground for disagreement in the exclusive remedy defense. The fact that the parties have taken “diametrically opposed legal positions” is not enough for me to agree that a permissive appeal should be granted. Parties taking opposite legal positions is but one of the joys of litigation, and, in my opinion, simply not enough to warrant a permissive appeal. If we are to utilize that low standard to decide whether substantial grounds for disagreement exists in order to grant a permissive appeal, appellate courts need to brace for an influx of permissive appeals.
Party Submissions
8.316233
8.686459
9.230861
Galovelho no longer faces the purportedly unconstitutional conduct about which it complains; any prospective declaratory relief we might grant cannot help it. See Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184. Deciding Galovelho’s declaratory judgment claim would yield no more than an advisory opinion. The claim is moot. We overrule Gal ovelho’s fourth issue.
Party Submissions
13.554787
15.491539
14.305309
In family law cases, the traditional sufciency standard of review overlaps with the abuse of discretion standard of review; therefore, legal and factual insufciency are not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in our assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. In reviewing the evidence for legal sufciency, we consider all the evidence, in the light r'nost favorable to the judgment, to determine if the trier of fact could reasonably have formed arm belief or conviction that its nding was true. See Sink, 364 S.W.3d at 344. We must assume that the factnder resolved disputed facts in favor of its nding if areasonable factnder could do so. Id. In reviewing the evidence for factual sufciency, we must give due consideration to evidence that the factnder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing and then determine whether, baSed on the record, afaCtnder could reasonably form arm conviction or belief that the allegations were proven. .Id.
Party Submissions
6.941773
8.756434
8.835195
December 19, 2013)(mem.op.); Poston v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., No. 14-11-00485-CV, 2012 WL 1606340, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 8, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Party Submissions
3.104462
4.555018
4.124786
Nicaragua’s asset freeze upon HSF.12 These were actions outside of Riverside’s control and all within Nicaragua’s control and dominion. Nicaragua caused the illiquidity and then relied upon it for this Application. In any event, Nicaragua’s accusations fail to meet the necessity requirements for the relief sought. Nicaragua has not fulfilled its burden of proving these necessities as the moving party. c) Nicaragua’s lack of evidence for exceptional circumstances is apparent.
Party Submissions
16.35198
18.935404
18.431108
The Lender agrees, on the terms and conditions stated in this Agreement, to make one advance to the Borrower (the “Advance”) on the date hereof in an aggregate principal amount not to exceed USD 1,543,400,000. The amount of the Advance outstanding from time to time under this Agreement is referred to as the “Loan.” Any amount of Loans repaid or prepaid may not be reborrowed.
Contract
4.307553
3.624307
4.954464
The Company shall advise you of the percentage of Units earned for the Performance Period, which may be subject to further adjustment under Section 2(c), as soon as practicable following the Certification Date. All earned Units for the Performance Period shall be settled in accordance with Section 4 and any Units not earned for the Performance Period shall be canceled and forfeited as of the Certification Date.
Contract
4.755146
6.764153
6.127101
Differential diagnosis “is a clinical process whereby a doctor determines which of several potential diseases or injuries is causing the patient’s symptoms by ruling out possible causes— by comparing the patient’s symptoms to symptoms associated with known diseases, conducting physical examinations, collecting data on the patient’s history and illness, and analyzing that data — until a final diagnosis for proper treatment is reached. Coastal Tankships, U.S.A., Inc. v. Anderson, 87 S.W.3d 591, 604 – 05 & n.24 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
Party Submissions
7.441353
6.927956
8.045872
Parties in the Court of Appeals: The City was the appellant. Petitioners were appellees. The appeal was transferred to the Thirteenth Court of Appeals from the Third Court of Appeals.
Party Submissions
7.0288
7.813402
7.949195
Petitioners seek this Court’s guidance on fundamental principles of Texas defamation law, including whether the third-party-allegation rule in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 73.005(b) (“CPRC”) includes an unexpressed “endorsement” exception, how to apply the substantial-truth doctrine in defamation-by-gist cases, and whether the Program’s criticisms leveled at state institutions and their agents constitute constitutionally-protected opinion. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits (“Pet. Br.”) at X.
Party Submissions
9.999175
9.586817
10.654022
C) The Tribunal’s analysis 427. Certain preliminary observations are necessary in order to properly analyze the arguments raised by the Parties regarding the Treaty obligation to ensure FET for investments and returns. It should be noted, in particular, that the Parties have stated radically opposite positions on the FET standard applicable in this case.
Legal Decisions
13.741189
13.399344
14.368422
The United States objects to Request No. 1.i for the same reasons stated above with respect to Request No. 1.a.
Legal Decisions
8.963881
13.600171
15.68962
Delaware courts have also recognized that “self-dealing” covers a broad range of fiduciary misconduct, including attempts by directors to usurp corporate opportunities. See Halpin v. Riverstone Nat’l, Inc., No. CV 9796-VCG, 2015 WL 854724, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2015). Under Delaware law, “self-dealing” has also been applied to “three specific kinds of self-dealing practices....: (1) directing employees to perform services that did not benefit the entity; (2) diverting funds from the entity; and (3) usurped corporate opportunities that belonged to the entity.” Balin v. Amerimar Realty Co., No. CIV. A. 12896, 1993 WL 542452, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1993).
Party Submissions
5.240118
5.335245
5.290136
The Walkers’ short argument about causation as to the BSA nurses remains untethered to their expert reports. At best the reports list a number of alleged failures of the BSA nurses and provide an unsupported conclusion of a suggestion of a possible mechanism of injury. This is insufficient.
Party Submissions
31.453392
21.870409
40.793648
Svalbard Treaty in more detail later (see Section V.B(4), below). For the moment, however, the only question is whether this proposed redeployment alters the conclusion that North Star’s fishing vessels were not an investment in the territory of Norway.
Legal Decisions
20.784481
24.30535
33.69691
In the end, even if one sees differently the issue’s importance (or other points like how this case will ultimately come out if “require” is properly applied), this Court’s intervention is needed. The legal errors below are so straightforward that they can easily be corrected, even by summary reversal. That would avoid confusion by future courts and litigants, and prevent parties from rendering § 2301.467(a)(1) useless against unreasonable actions. And the infrequency of appellate opinions confronting this statute’s meaning only adds to the case for intervening here because, though this statute has widespread effect and is important in the industry, the Court may not soon have another chance to address its meaning. The Court should grant review and reverse.
Party Submissions
20.053947
20.982685
21.127737
Weatherford goes on to misstate the Court of Appeals’ holding, completely ignoring that Court’s jurisdictional basis for affirming the Trial Court, and wrongly characterizing the Court of Appeals’ analysis as hinging on the domestic sewage exclusion. Brief at 12. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals deemed the SWDA inapplicable, and as such had no reason to perform a merits-based analysis on the exclusion to such statute. Weatherford’s argument conflates two separate types of infrastructure—a wastewater collection system and a landfill—with two entirely different regulatory schemes. Such interpretation would be an overreach of the SWDA and the intent of the Texas Legislature.
Party Submissions
10.143523
10.32354
10.564533
As mentioned in the previous section, Texas Mutual filed a "request to schedule, reschedule, or cancel a benefit review conference" in March of 2020, listing the disputed issue as "whether or not Mr. Bruno Martinez was an employee of Hellas Construction, Inc. at the time of injury and subsequent death." See 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 141.1(b) (Tex. Dep't of Ins., Div. of Workers' Comp., Requesting and Setting a Benefit Review Conference). In October, following a contested-case hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that "[d]ecedent did sustain a compensable injury on July 19, 2019, that resulted in his death," and that "Hellas Construction[,] Inc.[,] was Decedent's employer for purposes of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act." The Martinez Family requested review by an appeals panel, arguing that DWC's jurisdiction had "never been invoked" because the Martinez Family had chosen not to file a claim with the agency. In December, the appeals panel adopted the ALJ's Decision and Order.
Party Submissions
5.350273
5.973326
5.833068
C) The Tribunal’s analysis 205. First of all, the Tribunal notes that Claimant does not seem to dispute that the Tribunal may, in principle, sanction a potential abuse of right.
Legal Decisions
15.281273
12.515543
16.164055
Midland does not address Weatherford’s subsidiary questions 5 and 6 as to whether the Trial Court erred in sustaining Midland’s Plea to the Jurisdiction based upon either notice or liability defense of limitations, as the underlying Trial Court and Court of Appeals determinations were based upon jurisdictional defects rather than notice or statute of limitations issues. As to Weatherford’s subsidiary question 7, while Midland does not offer a corollary question, Midland would point out that while Weatherford complains that it lacked a “meaningful opportunity to conduct discovery” in subsidiary question 7, the fact that Weatherford failed to trigger subject matter jurisdiction of the Trial Court precludes subjecting Midland to the type of discovery Weatherford requests for the reasons set forth herein.
Party Submissions
8.199406
9.229509
8.401521
Recall that Section 51.003(a) applies to “ any action brought to recover the deficiency” after a foreclosure sale. Tex. Prop. Code § 51.003(a) (emphasis added). It does not say “any action brought by the senior lienholder, ” or “any action brought by the foreclosing party ,” or “indebtedness remaining on the note on which the lender foreclosed.” It says “any action,” period.
Party Submissions
6.634121
6.158551
6.476889
In Respondents’ telling, Westwood merely decided to leave the location where it had sold cars for more than four years as part of a “broader strategic decision to shut” down its business, “leave the warehouse space that it no longer needed,” “and make a fresh start with a new entity.” (Resp. 12, 31, 38) And, according to Respondents, upon losing the forcible entry and detainer action, Westwood simply “announced its intention” to “vacate the premises” and “withdraw its appeal” in an exchange of letters. (Resp. 11-12, 28, citing 16RR307(DX42)) Nothing can be further from the truth.
Party Submissions
12.486478
12.389795
13.936403
To amend title XI of the Social Security Act to establish a pilot program for testing the use of a predictive risk-scoring algorithm to provide oversight of payments for durable medical equipment and clinical diagnostic laboratory tests under the Medicare program.
Legislation
6.596092
5.45452
6.805689
Affiliate. Affiliate means a corporation, trade or business that, together with the Company, is treated as a single employer under Code Section 414(b) or (c).
Contract
3.842174
4.594676
7.771808
Such documents are relevant to demonstrate the nature of the treatment and protection accorded by the Respondent to the Claimant and are therefore, notably, material to an assessment of the Respondent’s alleged breach of the Claimant’s rights under Art. 325 of the France-Qatar BIT.
Legal Decisions
9.94558
10.44448
11.459595
Groce Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.—App. San Antonio 1994, writ ref’d)) 9. Oregon: Gregory v. Lovlien, 174 Or. App. 483, 26 P.3d 180 (Or.
Party Submissions
10.120476
11.791014
11.012702
Request No. 952-02-6-74/2004 referred to on pages 5 and 7 of exhibit R-043 and any and all documents and information used for the preparation of the sketch ( in Serbian: skica ), which was prepared based on that request.
Legal Decisions
23.697317
26.835709
27.420464
To overcome the community presumption, the burden is on the spouse claiming certain prOperty as separate to trace and clearly identify the property claimed to be separate. Id. However, real property gifted by one spouse to another during marriage is the recipient spouse’s separate pr0perty. TEX. CONST. art. 16, §15. Agi is avoluntary transfer of property to another made gratuitously and without consideration. Magness, 241 S.W.3d at 9'12. The elements of agi are (1) the intent to make agift;_(2) delivery of the property; and (3) acceptance of the property. Adeed for property from one spouse as grantor to the other spouse as grantee creates apresumption the grantee spouse received the property as separate property by gift. Id.
Party Submissions
10.630698
10.187616
10.602276
In essence, Petitioner’s entire case centers on her mistaken insistence that the Property’s first lienholder’s foreclosure must constitute mandatory acceleration of the Note, rather than an optional default. She argues that Texas Prop. Code § 51.003(a) mandates acceleration of all loans secured by liens on any one piece of real property, transforming the provision into a complete revocation of several legal concepts, such as the optional acceleration clause or the separate obligations of liens and notes. This confusion negates the need to address the matter in this Court.
Party Submissions
15.197241
16.02265
16.231606
None of these documents were provided by the Respondent to the Claimant at the time of his arrest or thereafter. The requested information is internal governmental documentation, which Qatar is in a position to access without undue burden.
Legal Decisions
14.367309
17.40334
14.598733
This Court cannot grant the relief that Walker seeks without throwing the primary election into chaos—if not deciding it outright. Courts are rightfully cautious to engage in “judicial interference in an election that is imminent or ongoing,” and such interventions are “strongly disfavored.” In re Hotze, 627 S.W.3d at 645–46 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Court orders affecting elections. .. can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006); see also Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020).
Party Submissions
5.09654
5.40862
5.764072
In its appeal, TMI presents two issues for our review: (1) whether section 406.075 applies to bar Cochran's pursuit of remedies under the TWCA; and (2) if so, is Sonic, as Cochran's subclaimant, barred from seeking reimbursement under section 409.009. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 409.009 [**9] (Vernon 2006).
Party Submissions
6.619525
7.22723
7.847652
Both section 31.004(a) and section 24.008 cover more than just res judicata. Section 31.004(a) explicitly goes beyond prohibiting giving “res judicata” effect to lower court decisions by also prohibiting them from having effect as “estoppel by ju dgment”—i.e., “collateral estoppel.” Avila v. St. Luke’s Lutheran Hosp., 948 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. App. — San Antonio 1997, writ denied). And section 24.008 reaches further still, explicitly forbidding courts from giving any legal effect to the result in an eviction proceeding that would “bar a suit for trespass, damages, waste, rent, or mesne profits.” And both statutes have long been interpreted to reach further still, preventing “ a judgment in a court of limited jurisdiction from controlling the results in a suit in a district court” for any reason—legal or factual. Genender v. Kirkwood, 506 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (quoting McClendon v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 796 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex.
Party Submissions
5.313078
5.739611
5.491252
Considering all the circumstances of the case, we cannot say that it is clear from the facts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award Osprin attorney fees against TX 1111 under the UDJA. See Nabers, 2020 WL 830025, at *2. For these reasons, we overrule this issue.
Party Submissions
8.733592
10.57418
12.398796
In fact, Oncor’s agent, Dennis Deegear, testified at the hearing on Respondents’ jurisdictional pleas and motions that what he agreed to with P&A on behalf of Sharyland in 2019 was P&A’s “total value of the transmission lines in Texas,” which subjective unit valuation was “$496,193,596.” See Appendix H to Oncor’s Brief at 41. Mr. Deegear also testified that he emailed P&A how many miles of 138kV and 345kV transmission line Sharyland owned in the state, but he mistakenly and unknowingly transposed those numbers in his email. See id. at 42-43 & 45-46. Though the District objected several times during Mr. Deegear’s testimony, the district court repeatedly overruled the District’s objections and admitted the testimony. See id. at 32, 35-36, 37, 42, 45. Neither the District nor the Board asked to strike the testimony. Id. Neither the District nor the Board challenged any evidentiary rulings on appeal. See Appellants’ Brief to Seventh Court of Appeals. Mr. Deegear’s uncontroverted testimony is corroborated by his affidavit, which confirms that neither P&A nor Mr. Deegear was aware of the clerical error when the parties signed the 2019 agreement. See Appendix F at ¶¶ 7-12; see also CR.268-69.
Party Submissions
6.573226
6.862404
7.012379
The mootness doctrine implicates subject-matter jurisdiction. A case becomes moot when one seeks to obtain a judgment on some controversy, when in reality none exists, or when one seeks a judgment on some matter which, when rendered for any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect on a then-existing controversy.
Party Submissions
8.523747
10.339237
11.275288
The instruction then concluded with this phrase: “but the designation may be struck, by the Court, for lack of evidence after an adequate time for discovery has passed.” (Id.) The first sentence of the second non-statutory instruction repeated this “may be struck” language a second time, emphasizing the point. (Id. at 587) These statements cut in favor of HSMiller’s positions at trial on an important issue and negated Terry’s testimony and credibility.
Party Submissions
23.844046
27.190338
26.571045
The Planning Commission is a commission that was created by the Assembly of the City of Belgrade for providing expert assistance and performing tasks in the process of drafting and implementing planning documentation.150 The requested documents are relevant and material to assess the factors the Commission took into consideration when working on the 2013 DRP —including whether it considered Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23 and i f so, the Commission’s contemporaneous understanding of the extent of these rights.
Legal Decisions
21.501736
20.542446
21.702007
A copy of the agreement concluded between Luka Beograd and Obnova on 15 March 1994 (as referred to in the Agreement on Provision and Use of Transhipment and Warehousing Services between Luka Beograd and Obnova of 25 January 2000, R-013 ), as well as a copy of all lease agreements entered into by Obnova with regard to the Dunavska Plots or the Objects, to the extent such agreements have not already been submitted in this arbitration.
Legal Decisions
10.089238
10.096218
11.401324
The Response includes an extended discussion of Delaware demand-futility law. Resp. 10-14. This discussion, however, does not meaningfully address CKC’s argument that the Zuckerberg8 decision did not address cases involving self-dealing by a manager or director. See PFR 18-19.
Party Submissions
17.85177
25.06613
22.957771
HSMiller also raises the specter of preemption, arguing that any action this Court might take to set aside the assignment would be improper meddling and would violate preemption principles. It then argues the Lawyers are making an improper collateral attack on the Bankruptcy Plan. Both are wrong.
Party Submissions
16.18979
17.455881
22.362999
Perhaps more importantly, reliance on the Infusion Protocol is misplaced. Internal hospital policies do not set the standard of care under Texas law. See Espalin v. Children’s Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 27 S.W.3d 675, 686 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.) (hospital’s policy did not set standard of care); Denton Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. LaCroix, 947 S.W.2d 941, 951 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 1997, pet. dism’d by agr.) (same); Hicks v. Canessa, 825 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, no writ) (same). This is an extension of the general rule in Texas that a company’s internal policies or procedures do not create a negligence duty where no such duty otherwise exists See, e.g., FFE Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Fulgham, 154 S.W.3d 84, 92 (Tex. 2004) (refusing to create a standard of care or duty based upon internal policies). Dr. Tappan’s seeming reliance on the Infusion Protocol as some sort of standard of care for the administration of oxytocin and terbutaline is insufficient to set a standard of care.
Party Submissions
4.179277
4.422148
4.407021
Deferral. Deferral means a credit to a Participant’s Account(s) that records that portion of the Participant’s Compensation that the Participant has elected to defer to the Plan in accordance with the provisions of Article IV. Unless the context of the Plan clearly indicates otherwise, a reference to Deferrals includes Earnings attributable to such Deferrals.
Contract
5.186349
4.798924
6.249037
S.W.3d 144, 148 (Tex. 2020) (“[A]n ambiguous contract’s meaning must be determined by a finder of fact, who may consider evidence of the parties’ subjective intent.”). It is also appropriate to consider evidence in a jurisdictional dispute. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). This Court should not, therefore, ignore the only evidence in the record illuminating what the parties’ intent when they signed the 2019 settlement. That evidence and Oncor’s pleadings establish at least a justiciable controversy over the scope and effect of the 2019 settlement, so the district court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of the dispute.
Party Submissions
5.181475
5.20444
6.480064
Agreement number 71 dated 13 January 2003 and Agreement number 72 dated 13 January 2003 – both referred in Article 2 of an agreement submitted as Serbia’s exhi bit R-015.
Legal Decisions
17.921453
14.624083
19.548601
As explained above, Serbia argues that Obnova allegedly did not have the right of use over its premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23. According to Serbia this is, amongst other things, because the right of use purportedly belonged to Luka Beograd which leased the premises to Obnova.72 The agreement submitted by Serbia as R-060 is an agreement dated 6 March 1975 under which: ( i ) Luka Beograd agreed to transfer back to the City of Belgrade the right of use over the entirety of the land it had received from the City of Belgrade in 1961; and ( ii ) the City of Belgrade agreed to grant Luka Beograd the right of use over the land that Luka Beograd actually needed for its activities. According to Article 7 of the agreement, “ The development of the construction land referred to in Article 4 of this contract will be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Decision on the Development and granting of construction land for construction (Official Gazette of the City of Belgrade No. 22/72) and in accordance with the Spatial Development Program of the Company as well as the Construction Land Development Program, with the provision that the land which according to the Port Program needs to be developed must also be entered into the Construction Land Development Program. ”73 The requested documents address the scope of the development envisaged by Luka Beograd and may determine whether Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and/or 23 were within the area that was necessary for Luka Beograd’s development. Therefore, the requested documents may show whether Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and 23 were part the land over which Luka Beograd was granted the right of use under the agreement submitted as R-060.
Legal Decisions
6.162481
6.063098
5.935346
There is an increasing trend throughout the country of hospitals using the term “reasonable value” in their lien notices to exclude the possibility of an attack under Chapter 12 for intent to collect on “a fraudulent claim” using otherwise facially valid hospital liens. Hospitals like Respondents believe that by simply meeting the procedural requirements of securing a lien under Chapter 55, they cannot be liable for filing and using that lien with the fraudulent intent to collect a grossly unreasonable amount later.
Party Submissions
17.871914
14.435937
20.309584
In contrast, other provisions of the Business and Commerce Code impose conditions on the waiver of statutory rights — even specifying when the waiver must be executed.
Party Submissions
11.825647
17.147198
17.194563
HN10 [ ] But we are bound by our own precedent. See, e.g., Dyer v. Medoc Health Servs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 418, 427 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied) ("[A]bsent an intervening change [*9] in law, we follow our own precedent."). This Court was previously asked whether a negligence case against a nonsubscriber is a workers' compensation case in Kroger Co. v. Keng, 976 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App.— Tyler 1998), aff'd, 23 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. 2000).4 In that case, Kroger sought to limit its liability in asserting comparative negligence against Keng, its employee. Id. at 888. HN11 [ ] In attempting to determine whether the proportionate responsibility statute in Section 33.001 conflicted with the TWCA, we held that "when an employee files suit against a nonsubscribing employer, that suit is 'an action to collect benefits [and damages] under the workers' compensation laws of Texas.'" Id. at 891. Two reasons supported this determination. First, under the TWCA, an employee has a statutory burden to prove the employer's negligence. Id. (citing Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 406.033(d) (West 2006)). Therefore, under the statute, if the employee is the sole cause of the injury, he cannot recover pursuant to the statute even without the defense of contributory negligence. Id. "Consequently, an employee's negligence action against his nonsubscribing employer is brought 'under the workers' compensation laws of Texas,' not only common law." Id. Second, a nonsubscriber is statutorily prohibited from asserting certain common law defenses in a personal injury [*10] action brought by an employee. Id. (citing Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 406.033(a)). "It is 'by the terms of [Texas Workers' Compensation] law" that an employer is deprived of the defenses of contributory negligence, assumed risk, and fellow servant negligence. Id.
Party Submissions
4.488752
4.590564
4.748716
This Agreement may be executed and delivered (including by facsimile or other means of electronic transmission, such as by electronic mail in “pdf” form) in two or more counterparts, each of which when executed shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which taken together shall constitute one and the same agreement.
Contract
2.5705
2.688778
2.928901