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Can one rightfully sue Stack Overflow for a suspension? If someone gets suspended or banned from stackoverflow in a way where it can be shown that no violation of the terms of service were broken, is that sufficient grounds for a lawsuit? SO could be a financial source of income etc., and it might be considered false advertising on their part, but maybe not.

If you have a contract with another party, you can in principle sue them for damages if they breach the contract. Since you mentioned Stackoverflow, we would look at that contract, here. There is a bunch of stuff you can't do, and a bunch of stuff you can do. One thing that you will note is that their liability is highly limited (big print §9 Limitation of Liability). Also note in §4: Stack Overflow reserves the right to refuse, suspend or terminate your access to the public Network if it determines, in its sole discretion, that you have in any way violated these Public Network Terms or are otherwise ineligible to access or use the Network or Services. If your actions are determined by us to violate these Public Network Terms, Stack Overflow may, in its sole discretion, try to remediate that violation by working with you individually, but is under no obligation to do so, and if any such remediation efforts are unsuccessful (in Stack Overflow’s sole discretion), then Stack Overflow may revoke your rights to the Network. So they get to ban you, if they decided that your actions warrant. If you try to sue them, they will win because of this clause.

Generally, such sanctions prevent certain sorts of transactions in goods and services with nationals or entities of the nation under sanction. The exact list of transactions prohibited or restricted varies. If Open source software were being provided as a service, so that the recipient paid directly for a license, or for customization or configuration work, or for some sort of consulting or assistance, such transactions could be banned or restricted by a sanctions regime, but might not be. (If the sanctions included that particular class of transactions.) However, if it is merely a matter of an open source product being published, for anyone to download, install, and use, I don't see how that would be barred or restricted by any sanctions of the sort recently in use.

The Apache 2.0 license purports to be irrevocable, but it also presupposes that the supposed licensor has the right to grant permission to copy. In this case, that is untrue, so there never was a proper license and nothing to revoke (the copyright owner grants permission in the form of "a license" which is a legal abstraction, that normally is specified in the license document). An end-user snared by this illegal license might attempt to sue the author because of the legal screw-up but paragraph 9 says that the supposed licensor cannot be held liable. In this case, though, "licensor" is defined not as the person who hands you the license document, but as the copyright owner. So it's the employer who would be not liable under the terms of the document (but since the employer had nothing to do with the license, it's as though the license never existed). The end-user is a secondary infringer (the employee is the primary infringer, in illegally distributing the material). Under US law, that doesn't matter, the user is still liable. Under UK law, secondary infringement includes the element that you have to have reason to know that the copy is infringing, which in the scenario that you describe is not the case.

In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order.

The platform will get in trouble for copyright infringement. The disclaimer that you are not liable does not work, legally, since the person suing you hasn't agreed to the TOS on your webpage. You can be sued for "secondary infringement", meaning that not only the uploader but also you the service provider are liable. The solution to this quandry is the "DMCA safe harbor", a set of rules which, if you follow them, you won't be held liable. The specific piece of law is here. The essence of the rules is that you have to have a "designated agent" who receives takedown notices: if a copyright owner finds their stuff on your page, they officially notify you, then you take the material down – expeditiously (no dawdling). You notify the uploader, they either accept the takedown or file a counterclaim, you notify the rights-holder, there's a waiting period, then the rights holder can file a lawsuit, or not. If the rights-holder doesn't file suit, you can put the material back up. You cannot rely solely on the intricate DMCA notice / counter-notice dance, because under para (c)(1)(A)(ii) of §512, you also must not be "aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent".

Criminal liability is triggered by guilty knowledge. The people who run OnlyFans may know in general terms that it is probable that some illegal images exist on their servers, but so does everyone who allows the public to upload stuff. If that was illegal then the senior management of Google and Facebook would be liable to arrest on the same grounds and the Internet as we know it could not exist. Once the company becomes aware of a specific file that contains such material they need to remove it. If they fail to do so then they become liable. OnlyFans has been doing this: [OnlyFans] provides templates for each successive warning - explaining why material has been removed, and that failure to comply with terms of service may result in the closure of the account. [emphasis added] The site operators also become liable if they have a general policy of tolerating illegal material. This is a grey area; a prosecution would have to prove that the toleration was an active policy rather than merely ineffective moderation. There doesn't seem to be any evidence to support such a claim. Permitting an account to continue after deleting an offending file is not toleration of the offending file. The BBC report does not allege that the OnlyFans policy of multiple warnings has been applied to cases of underage content; rather it talks about cases of incest, bestiality and exploitation of vulnerable adults (such as homeless people), and only where the accounts were particularly popular. The linked articles do report cases where accounts have been set up advertising content by minors, but they were shut down as soon as the company was notified of them. The second article also quotes its source as saying that lots of such accounts get closed down all the time; there doesn't seem to be any evidence of toleration of that material specifically. So in conclusion it seems from the available evidence that OnlyFans have been complying with the law. It is telling that the BBC article specifically does not say that they have done anything illegal. If the BBC had found unambiguous evidence of illegal conduct by OnlyFans management then they would certainly have highlighted this.

Is it illegal to ask a company for money in exchange for information on a bug in their software/website? That in itself is legal. Indeed, the company would incur unjust enrichment if it coerced you to disclose your discovery for free. Only if you threatened the company to divulge to others your discovery unless the company pays you, it would be illegal and trigger charges such as extortion (likewise, legislations outlaw the unjustified delivery of programs or instructions for hacking a software/network/etc., although this goes beyond your actual question). Can the company take legal action against me? That seems doubtful, futile, and it could backfire (please note I have not done any research on legal precedents about this). Although the terms and conditions of the website or the End User License Agreement (EULA) of software might prohibit you to reverse engineer (RE)/decompile/etc. the application, anti-RE clauses are unenforceable and the remedies therefor are indeterminate because the sole act of conducting reverse engineering does not subject the company (or third parties) to any losses. The company's decision to take legal action for your discovery could backfire from two standpoints. First, it calls attention to the fact that the software at issue is defective and unsafe. And second, the bug is likely to be detected by someone else anyway, thereby potentially compromising customers' systems.

If you commit a robbery but then return the money, can you be prosecuted? Yes. Similarly, if you breach copyright and then stop, can you be prosecuted? Yes, however, you will probably not be because: Your offence may not have been noticed by the copyright holder, and/or The damages they would get are probably not worth the effort.

Is a police chief charging me again for same cause of action previously dismissed selective prosecution? I live in a smal TX town (<850 people), with one policeman and a chief overseen by mayor and town council, where there is a 250ft rule for no livestock within city limits & an exemption noted for children as part of FFA, 4H, etc. Our daughter is 15, and belongs to multiple qualifying youth organizations, having rescued and had the animals 5yrs of where we've lived for 7yrs. Ordinance was written in 2012, first enforced (on me only) in 2021, and I was cited and posted bond moving it out of the town to have the county judge dismiss it 10 months later in ~15min (did not specify "with prejudice" unfortunately). Originally the citation was due to a town citizen that never occupied his property, yet had argued that he wanted to have a cow & was told no. As part of the dismissal, the ADA suggested that we get our neighbors to sign a statement of no concern, which they all did - 26 signatures reflecting 100% response rate. 2mos after the dismissal, I was summoned again (without a new citation) this time with a bond of $1000 (1st bond was $200). In so many words, the chief stated he was doing it again, because there is nothing that says he can't. The town has never created the exemption paperwork to assist in executing the mechanics of the ordinance. I have been given multiple verbal ultimatums by the chief that the only way we will keep our 2 mini horses and mini donkey (on 3 acres) is to request a variance at the town monthly meeting. However, the variance process is neither defined nor recognized in the code of ordinance. As significantly, there are at least 6-8 other properties in same open violation seen clearly from the street, that continue to be ignored by police. Is this not a clear case of selective enforcement, prosecution, and abuse of power?

Selective prosecution is when a defendant (1) is charged with a crime based on conduct that others are generally not prosecuted for; and (2) is singled out for an impermissible reason, such as race, religion, or First Amendment-protected speech. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985). Because there is no indication that you are being targeted for an impermissible purpose, this does not appear to be selective prosecution. It does sound like the chief is a jerk, but American courts do not care about that sort of thing.

I'll use Washington state as my source, but laws will be similar in other states. RCW 9A.76.020 outlaws obstructing a law enforcement officer, which this would be: it is a gross misdemeanor. In using lethal force, you would have committed first degree murder, under RCW 9A.32.030. There is a defense that can be used, per RCW 9A.16.050, that homicide is justified when: In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. Law enforcement officers have access to justifiable homicide defenses as well under 9A.16.040, for example (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony The outcome of the case would hinge in part on whether the officer's arrest and use of force was lawful. To take two extremes, if the guy on the ground had just killed a dozen people and was aiming to rack up another dozen kills, the officer's arrest would almost certainly be held to be legal and his degree of force justified. Your personal belief that the suspect was compliant and unarmed might be refuted by the facts. On the other hand, if the guy on the ground had slept with the officer's sister and the officer wanted to rid the world of this vermin, then the arrest and force would almost certainly be held to be not legal. It can be legal to use deadly force to resist unlawful arrest. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, where the court held that if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant, and who had no right to arrest him, and if, in the course of that resistance, the officer was killed, the offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder, if the officer had had the right to arrest, to manslaughter The court also said where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction when the officer had the right to make the arrest from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. This ruling has been somewhat eroded, in US v. Simon: We recognize that law enforcement officers are frequently called on to make arrests without warrants and should not be held, so far as their personal security is concerned, to a nicety of distinctions between probable cause and lack of probable cause in differing situations of warrantless arrests. It is for this reason we believe that the force of John Bad Elk has been diminished The upshot of this is that (assuming no warrant), leeway is granted to officers in assessing probable cause (I'm not sure anybody really knows at a general conceptual level what constitutes "probable cause". The court seems to imply that the remote hearsay used as the basis for the arrest would not have been sufficient for a warrant, but it was "reasonable grounds" for believing accused had committed a crime). Your premise that the officer is about to shoot would have to be substantiated by some fact, such as a declaration "I'm gonna kill you". Otherwise, your belief that the officer was about to commit unjustified murder would itself be unjustified. With better fleshing out of the circumstances, you could manufacture a justified-homicide scenario.

Most prosecuting attorney positions in a District Attorney, or State Attorney General's office are full time salaries positions that prohibit individuals holding those positions from having any other legal employment. They are also, often, conceptually a division of state government, even if the DA is locally elected. So, any criminal defense engagement in the same state court system would also be a conflict of interest, and the reality of joint task forces discussed below would also make almost any federal case criminal defense engagement in the same state a conflict of interest in most cases because state prosecutors would gain confidential information about pending federal criminal prosecutions (and vice versa). In theory, a criminal defense engagement in the next state over, for example, say, in Gary, Indiana for a prosecutor employed in Chicago, Illinois, would not be a conflict of interest, but it would still be prohibited in most cases because the prosecutor is a full time salaried employee whose full efforts are required to be devote to that position. (In practice, de minimis civil transactional work for the assistance of friends and family members, even for a small fee, or representation of such persons in small civil lawsuits would probably be tolerated, however, and maybe even a defense of a civil ordinance violation like a traffic ticket brought by a separate local government as discussed below, for a friend or family member for free, might be tolerated.) Local governments such as cities, towns, and counties, however, sometime have an office separate from the DA's office or State Attorney General's office often called a city attorney, town attorney, or county attorney, who works part-time on a contract basis for that government and has limited authority to prosecution violations of that local government's own ordinances in the name of that governmental entity, rather than on behalf of the People as part of the state government. In those cases, it is generally ethically permissible for the city attorney (for example) to serve as a criminal defense attorney in cases outside that city that do not otherwise pose a conflict of interest from having been adverse to various criminal defendants in the city attorney role. But there might be a conflict of interest, if, for example, there was a joint task force of the city attorney, the local DA, and the federal assistant U.S. attorney to prosecute people in a coordinated fashion on federal, state and local charges of various kinds, in connection with a rash of gun violence. And, if one of the city attorney's clients were arrested for an ordinance violation in the city, a non-conflicted counsel would have to be retained by the city for that case. Often, in those cases, however, even though it is not a prohibited conflict of interest, the lawyers involved would view a criminal defense representation as a "business development conflict" that would risk non-renewal of the city/town/county attorney position if undertaken. Incidentally, government attorneys, unlike almost all other government employees, are usually employees at will, as a matter of legal professional ethics, unlike almost all other fixed term contract or civil service employees, even if they have other contractual or civil service employee rights.

The statute reads (emphasis mine): A person is guilty of adultery when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Suppose Alvin has sex with Betty while Betty is married to Charlie. Does Alvin's conduct satisfy the elements of the crime? Alvin engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (namely Betty) at a time when the other person (Betty again) had a living spouse (namely Charlie). So yes, Alvin has violated this law. Betty has also violated the law (the first clause instead of the second). Betty engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (Alvin) at a time when he (Betty; the pronoun "he" is meant to be gender-neutral in the statute's style of writing) had a living spouse (Charlie). However, this law is effectively unenforced in modern times. According to https://www.dbnylaw.com/adultery-is-still-a-crime-in-new-york-state/: It is extremely rare for anyone to be arrested just for adultery. Indeed, since 1972, only 13 persons have been charged with adultery. Of those 13 persons, only five actually were convicted of the crime. In virtually every one of those cases, there was some other crime that was committed and the prosecuting attorney added adultery as just one of many crimes committed. If Charlie files a complaint regarding the affair, it is almost certain that the police and prosecutors will ignore it, and that nobody will actually be charged with anything.

(Lots of digging) https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/609.341 The above is a series of definitions for the purposes of criminal statues. Way down (noting that the page notes that this section was amended in 2021, so almost certainly in response to this case, given the amount of attention it has received), as subdivision 22, we have the definition: Subd. 22.Predatory crime. "Predatory crime" means a felony violation of section 609.185 (first-degree murder), 609.19 (second-degree murder), 609.195 (third-degree murder), 609.20 (first-degree manslaughter), 609.205 (second-degree manslaughter), 609.221 (first-degree assault), 609.222 (second-degree assault), 609.223 (third-degree assault), 609.24 (simple robbery), 609.245 (aggravated robbery), 609.25 (kidnapping), 609.255 (false imprisonment), 609.498 (tampering with a witness), 609.561 (first-degree arson), or 609.582, subdivision 1 (first-degree burglary). Thus, it looks like your Minnesota government website is not complete. However, the above seem like the most likely crimes to warrant inclusion on the register. The prominent reason in this instance is the registration will hamper Chauvin from regaining employment as a police officer in Minnesota or any other state. Where I live, there are reports of "problematic officers" being "shuffled" between departments; this would explicitly prevent that.

No, there is no recourse. An yes, the potential "costs", both personal, financial, social, can be high and are not compensable under an investigatory hold scenario; however, it doesn't usually happen like that. There is no investigatory hold that long without arrest. If the police want to talk to you but don't have enough to arrest you, you can leave any time. If you call your lawyer, he/she will come to the police station and tell the cops to release or arrest you. If the police really want you to stay, likely there is probable cause and they can keep you anyway. The police can arrest you and keep you, without a warrant so long as there is "probable cause" to believe that a crime has been committed (by you). Once arrested without a warrant, this is what is usually referred to as an investigatory hold, where the law says you must be arraigned within 72 hours (some states it must be 48 hours, 1 day less than supreme court says is reasonable). During this time they can investigate their case against you and decide what, if any, charges they will bring. There is no recourse for this, (in the event they bring no charges) unless you can establish that you were held for no reason (including not being falsely identified) and that it was only to intentionally deprive you of your right to liberty. This is nearly impossible to prove, unless you really did nothing and the cop was just messing with you (for instance in a personal vendetta) and you can show that.

In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure.

There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney.

Can the conduct of victim have an effect on the guilt of the accused? Are there any such cases where the conduct of victim can justify or at least cause a not guilty verdict? Or, is it a general rule that non-criminal conduct of victim cannot justify the actions of the accused in a trial?

Your question is very broad, but yes, there innumerable ways that the actions of a victim/complainant can result in a not-guilty verdict. I'll list some. Contemporaneous consent to contact. If the victim/complainant consented to the contact, then the offence of assault or sexual assault will not have been committed. Self-defence. If the victim gave the accused reasonable grounds to believe that the victim was about to use force against the accused, then depending on the circumstances, it might not be an offence for the accused to take certain actions against the victim for the purpose of defending themself (the accused). The provocation defence that is based on conduct of the victim. See Criminal Code, s. 232, which can result in a not-guilty verdict for murder.

The courts do not supersede your constitutional rights, although you may believe that you have a constitutional right that isn't actually there. This article discusses the position that "due process forbids convicting an individual of a crime unless the government proves the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt". This standard is actually not stated anywhere in the US Constitution, but it has been assumed as an implicit meaning of "due process". It sounds like you were charged with a crime, and there is most likely an applicable statute in your state that is analogous to RCW 26.50.110 in Washington. So you have the right to a trial and the prosecution would have the obligation to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appears that you did violate the applicable law and you were willing to plead guilty, as urged by your attorney. You are correct that you don't technically have to prove your innocence, but there is a practical problem that if the prosecution provides some weak evidence that you violated the law, then the jury might decide that your failure to refute the evidence means that there is no reasonable doubt. The problem is that there is a tendency for jurors to think that the defendant has to create a doubt. States differ somewhat in how they explain the burden of proof to jurors, and you might fare better in a state where the instruction is that "you must be firmly convinced". Since the attorney seems to have said that "the constitution doesn't apply to this", this is a puzzle. I would not assume (though it is possible) that the attorney was incompetent. It is possible that he was speaking of a non-criminal matter, and it is possible that you were talking at cross purposes. There is no legal situation where "the constitution doesn't apply to this", but perhaps "that constitutional limitation doesn't apply to this specific situation". Regardless of what the attorney said, your attorney doesn't violate your rights, even if he gives you bad advice. The actual court might, and then you would have a cause for an appeal. Similarly, if the district attorney reasonably believes that you are a danger to society and is prosecuting you, that is not a violation of your constitutional rights. An improper conviction would be a violation of those rights, although it might take an appeal to get the court to recognize that fact.

Be careful: from the Wikipedia article, it appears that there is a state criminal trial and there will be a federal criminal trial. In addition, there is a federal civil suit which incorporates some stats law claims. The defense in each trial may be different. Have you read the complaint in the civil case? As an example, count 1 alleges, in paragraph 214, that the defendants' actions were "without legal cause." An obvious defense is to show that the actions were actually justified under the law. The law under which they would have been justified would be state law. It's still possible that the state law justification isn't sufficient, but that is another point to be argued in court. If they can't prevail in showing that state law did authorize their actions then the act was certainly unlawful under both state and federal law. Do defendants have standing to invoke self-defense given the context or did they give this up at some point in time? Standing is a threshold that plaintiffs must meet. But defendants can certainly argue self defense. Whether they can prevail on that argument depends on the facts of the case as determined by the court, in particular by the "finder of fact," which is the jury in a jury trial and the judge in a bench trial. The facts that I'm aware of in the public record suggest that the defendants would not prevail on such an argument, but that doesn't deprive them of the right to advance it in court. If someone claims that Arbery was grabbing for the shotgun then the defendants have a right to introduce any evidence of that fact that they may have. It is for the finder of fact to judge the credibility of the evidence.

It is not as simple as the witness just making the assertion that they are the killer. They will be subject to grueling cross examination to break their story. If the victim was killed at a specific time, perhaps the prosecution can prove the witness was somewhere else at that time, and therefore lying. (No Opportunity) If the victim was killed with a specific weapon, perhaps the prosecution can prove that only the accused had the weapon, and the witness had no access to it, and therefore lying. (No Means) If the victim was killed in a specific way, perhaps the witness doesn't know any of the details of how the crime happened, and therefore is not credible. (No Knowledge) If the accused's DNA is found at the scene, and their shirt is covered in blood, and the witness has no corroborating evidence against them, then the witness is likely lying. (No Evidence) If the witness claims he is the murderer, the prosecution can inquire as to why he killed the victim. The real murderer had a reason: Perhaps money, power, hatred, passion, etc, that the witness may not be able to provide. (No Motive) Planting doubt in the mind of a jury is an effective defense. But lying about who did what, when, how, and why it is not as easy as you suggest.

The burden of proof is always on the plaintiff (except for counterclaims brought by the defendant against the plaintiff). In your example, the businessman has to prove that he did not rape her.

I assume you mean to ask whether the guilt of the victim affects the validity of a crime-of-passion defence. canada In Canada, the only crime-of-passion type defence is provocation, today codified at s. 232 of the Criminal Code. Provocation is only relevant to a count of murder. If the person who committed what would otherwise be murder "did so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation," then the conviction is reduced to manslaughter. Current codified defence: victim must have done something that would be an indictable offence punishable by five or more years of imprisonment One of the statutory requirements for a successful provocation defence is that the victim must have conducted themselves in a way that "would constitute an indictable offence under this Act that is punishable by five or more years of imprisonment." This is an objective element of the defence, not dependent on the perception of the accused. One court has found this limitation to the defence to be unconstitutional (R. v Simard, 2019 BCSC 531). However that court would still require that the "conduct of the victim [to be] of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control..." The common law and the previous codified defence also required provocative conduct by the victim Both the common law and the pre-2015 codification of the provcation defence required that the victim's provocative conduct be "of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control" (R. v. Cairney, 2013 SCC 55 at paragraphs 24-35). Burdens for establishing this defence The provocation defence is an "air of reality" defence (R. v. Cinous, 2002 SCC 29, paragraph 57). This means that there is an initial evidential burden on the accused. There must be evidence on the record that, if believed, could lead a reasonable properly instructed jury to acquit (or, in the case of provocation, to convict of manslaughter instead of murder). Once the accused meets this burden, then the defence is properly in play and will be successful unless the Crown disproves any element of the defence beyond a reasonable doubt.

canada A person is deemed to not be guilty unless convicted In Canada, by s. 6 of the Criminal Code, "a person shall be deemed to not be guilty of the offence until he is convicted." This is also bolstered by s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which guarantees the right "to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal." There is always a chance that the tier of fact is not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt The accused (and therefore their lawyer) cannot be sure that the evidence will leave the trier of fact (judge or jury) with no reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. Thus, the accused and their lawyer can only "know" the accused is guilty in the colloquial sense (in that they did the things that could be found to be a crime). However, they cannot know that they will be guilty in law. There is always a chance that the trier of fact is not convinced. Ways that the Crown's case can fall apart at trial: what appeared to be convincing to the parties just isn't convincing to the trier of fact a key witness or evidence becomes unavailable it turns out critical evidence was obtained contrary to constitutional principles a key witness's credibility or reliability crumbles on cross examination the prosecution is complacent in diligently moving the trial forward and the trial drags on to the point that a stay of proceedings is warranted (e.g. in jurisdictions with strict rights to timely trials) The interest in truth-seeking is not the only component of a fair trial Fair trials should seek the truth, but they should also be timely (Jordan), and they should also not rely on evidence obtained contrary to the Charter (Grant). Fair trials are not only about securing convictions when a person did the things that could constitute an offence if proven. At base, a fair trial is a trial that appears fair, both from the perspective of the accused and the perspective of the community. A fair trial must not be confused with the most advantageous trial possible from the accused's point of view. Nor must it be conflated with the perfect trial; in the real world, perfection is seldom attained. A fair trial is one which satisfies the public interest in getting at the truth, while preserving basic procedural fairness to the accused. R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 SCR 562, at para 45 The lawyer's duty Tuckiar v. R [1934] HCA 49: He had a plain duty, both to his client and to the Court, to press such rational considerations as the evidence fairly gave rise to in favour of complete acquittal or conviction of manslaughter only. No doubt he was satisfied that through [an interpreter] he obtained the uncoloured product of his client's mind, although misgiving on this point would have been pardonable; but, even if the result was that the correctness of [another witness]'s version was conceded, it was by no means a hopeless contention of fact that the homicide should be found to amount only to manslaughter. Whether he be in fact guilty or not, a prisoner is, in point of law, entitled to acquittal from any charge which the evidence fails to establish that he committed, and it is not incumbent on his counsel by abandoning his defence to deprive him of the benefit of such rational arguments as fairly arise on the proofs submitted. The subsequent action of the prisoner's counsel in openly disclosing the privileged communication of his client and acknowledging the correctness of the more serious testimony against him is wholly indefensible. It was his paramount duty to respect the privilege attaching to the communication made to him as counsel, a duty the obligation of which was by no means weakened by the character of his client, or the moment at which he chose to make the disclosure. No doubt he was actuated by a desire to remove any imputation on Constable McColl. But he was not entitled to divulge what he had learnt from the prisoner as his counsel. Our system of administering justice necessarily imposes upon those who practice advocacy duties which have no analogies, and the system cannot dispense with their strict observance. A laywer's obligation is to put forward on behalf of their client their best efforts. Whether they "know" their client is guilty of the offence charged or not, to do otherwise amounts to a dereliction of duty and weakens the protections afforded all of us who believe in the rule of law: Arthur Maloney, Q.C., "The Role of the Lawyer in Society" (1979) 9 Manitoba Law Journal 351.

I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.

Can a child be a contract killer? Various jurisdictions including Canada, England and Wales and Washington have laws which state, apparently categorically, that children under a certain age cannot commit crimes or be convicted of crimes. E.g. Canada's criminal code section 13 says: No person shall be convicted of an offence in respect of an act or omission on his part while that person was under the age of twelve years. Does this mean that a minor under the specified age could "openly have, say, a contract killer career, retire at [the specified age] and walk free"? What legal mechanism would stop a child that is younger than their jurisdiction's minimum age for criminal liability from doing this? There may very well be legal consequences for the minor's parents or legal guardians, but this question is specifically about the legal consequences for the minor. (This question is a follow-up to a discussion on this other Q&A, where @Greendrake proposed this hypothetical example.)

In germany, a child below the age of 14 cannot be guilty of a crime. However, a family court may order measures regarding the welfare of the child. In a case like the one you describe, or even somewhat less extreme ones, this might be taking the child out of the family and into a care home where the child would be locked up for his or her own good.

british-columbia I am not aware of any judicial consideration of this issue. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 78(1) says: A minor must not, except as provided under this Act or unless the minor does so with other lawful excuse, ... consume liquor. (One of those exceptions are when the alcohol is supplied by the minor's parents, spouse or guardian in a residence for consumption in the residence. There are other exceptions, too. But I'll assume you're asking about a circumstance where no exception applies.) The Liquor Control and Licensing Act defines a "minor" to be a person under the age of majority established by the Age of Majority Act, which is age 19 today. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 57 makes it an offence to contravene s. 78(1). The Interpretation Act, s. 25.1 states that "A person reaches a particular age expressed in years at the beginning of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date." The Interpretation Act also clarifies that the reference to time "is a reference to Pacific Standard Time" (or Pacific Daylight Saving Time, when it is in effect). Thus, a person is a minor until "the beginning [in Pacific time] of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date." It is most clear in relation to the identification requirements when selling to a minor, but the Regulations (s. 158) refer to the date of birth as displayed on the person's identification card. This all suggests that when consuming alcohol in the greater Vancouver area, a person just about to reach the age of majority must wait until the date in the Pacific time zone is that which is displayed on their identification. Or barring any identification, until the date in the Pacific time zone is the date that is the person's birth date.

There is a specific exemption in 29 USC 213(c)(3) that The provisions of section 212 of this title relating to child labor shall not apply to any child employed as an actor or performer in motion pictures or theatrical productions, or in radio or television productions. See this article for further analysis, a propos state laws. Incidentally, the act defines "oppressive child labor" as: a condition of employment under which (1) any employee under the age of sixteen years is employed by an employer (other than a parent or a person standing in place of a parent employing his own child or a child in his custody under the age of sixteen years in an occupation other than manufacturing or mining or an occupation found by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years or detrimental to their health or well-being) in any occupation, or (2) any employee between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years is employed by an employer in any occupation which the Secretary of Labor shall find and by order declare to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children between such ages or detrimental to their health or well-being; but oppressive child labor shall not be deemed to exist by virtue of the employment in any occupation of any person with respect to whom the employer shall have on file an unexpired certificate issued and held pursuant to regulations of the Secretary of Labor certifying that such person is above the oppressive child-labor age. The Secretary of Labor shall provide by regulation or by order that the employment of employees between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years in occupations other than manufacturing and mining shall not be deemed to constitute oppressive child labor if and to the extent that the Secretary of Labor determines that such employment is confined to periods which will not interfere with their schooling and to conditions which will not interfere with their health and well-being. Without the statutory exemption, if you are under 16 and employed by a non-parent, in any occupation, that is oppressive child labor. But because of the specific exemption, what would otherwise be statutorily oppressive child labor is allowed. The political "why" question (why did the bill contain such language) is extremely difficult to answer. The only substantive clues that I have seen are in a 1959 dissertation by G.E. Paulsen and this article on the passage of the act. It seems to be a legislative compromise relating stricter original standards, and was particularly driven by the need to allow children to work on family farms. The relevant clause was added from the floor of the House on May 24, 1938 by Rep Charles Kramer (CA). This is recorded on p. 7441 of the Congressional Record, which, unfortunately, is not freely available online. The two toughest questions were asked by Schneider (WI), Kramer's reply in parentheses: The gentleman's amendment would exempt children engaged only in the making of moving pictures? (The gentleman is correct) There are very few young people employed in that occupation? (Very few. There are hardly more than 10 employed at one time.) Shirley Temple was in fact invoked by Kramer.

It depends In the united-states "Pedophilia" is not a legal term for the prohibited content. The relevant legal term is "child pornography" The US DOJ offers a useful "Citizen's Guide To U.S. Federal Law On Child Pornography" which mentions key federal laws on the topic, including: 18 USC §2251 18 USC §2251 (Sexual exploitation of children) prohibits having a minor (person under 18) engage in sexual activity "for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct" So if a drawing is modeled from an actual child who engaged in sexual activity, it is illegal under 18 USC §2251. That section also makes it illegal for a parent, guardian, or custodian to permit such sexual activity and the making of a depiction of it. It also prohibits the advertising and distribution of any such depiction. All offenses under 18 USC §2251 involve an actual child at some point. 18 USC §2252 18 USC §2252 (Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors) makes it a crime when someone knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce ... any visual depiction, if— (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; under certain circumstances, mostly involving intestate or foreign transmission or distribution. The same section also makes it a crime when a person: knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction... if the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and such visual depiction is of such conduct; So again to be covered under 2252 an actual child must have engaged in sexual conduct at some point, but a drawing modeled on such a child would be covered under this section. 18 USC §2252A 18 USC §2252a (Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography) makes it a crime if anyone: knowingly mails, or transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce ... any child pornography knowingly receives or distributes any child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce ... [or] any material that contains child pornography [that has been similarly mailed shipped or transported] or who possesses such child porn. This section does not define "child pornography" but 18 USC §2256 (8) defines it as: any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where— (A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; [or] (B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; [or] (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; It would appear that under this section an image that "appears to" be a depiction of an actual minor engaged in sexual acts or is advertised as such may count as "child pornography" and thus be criminal. Whether this can apply to a wholly fictional character not based on any real child is not clearly stated in the law. I don't find any reported conviction involving an invented child character under this section. However in United States v. Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d 306, 310 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) aff ’d, 09-3935 WL 677398 (2011), the US 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that an image created by combining the image of the face of an actual child with the body of an adult in a sexual situation was child porn under this section. That case involved computer morphing to in effect paste photos of the heads or faces of children onto the bodies of adults engaged in sex, but a combination done by an artist's skill would presumably face the same ruling, if the child was recognizable. 18 USC §2260 18 USC §2260 makes it a crime if anyone outside the US has a minor engage in sexually explicit activities in order to make a visual depiction of such activities, and imports that depiction into the US, or who participates in the import or attempted import of such a depiction into the US. 18 USC § 1466A 18 USC § 1466A (Obscene visual representations of the sexual abuse of children) makes it a crime when anyone knowingly produces, distributes, receives, or possesses with intent to distribute, a visual depiction of any kind, including a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or painting, that depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and is obscene; or depicts an image that is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in graphic bestiality, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or sexual intercourse ... lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Simple possession of such a visual depiction is also a crime under this section. In United States v. Whorley No. 06-4288. (2008) the 4th circuit Court of Appeals wrote: Counts 1-20 [of the indictment] charged Whorley with using a computer on March 30, 2004, to knowingly receive obscene cartoons in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462. The 20 cartoons forming the basis of those counts showed prepubescent children engaging in graphic sexual acts with adults. ... We also reject his arguments that ... cartoons depicting minors in sexually explicit conduct must depict real-life minors to violate § 1466A(a)(1). ... The clear language of § 1466A(a)(1) and § 1466A(c) is sufficiently broad to prohibit receipt of obscene cartoons ... The Supreme Court declined to review Whorley Leaving this holding in place. First Amendment issues In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) the US Supreme Court held that obscene content, which it defined by a 3-part test somewhat looser than the previous test in Roth, was not protected by the first amendment. This means that prosecutions under 18 USC § 1466A have no first amendment issues, because only obscene visual depictions are prohibited under that section. in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) the Court held that child pornography was not protected by the first amendment. However, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) the Court limited this to visual depictions of actual children that are produced by the abuse of such children, and found that depictions of fictional children that are not obscene under Miller are protected by the first amendment. This means that prosecutions under §2251, §2251a, §2252, §2252a, §2260 and related sections of 18 USC have no first amendment issues, because all of these are limited to the depictions of actual minors. Some of these sections, however, also criminalize possession or distribution of images that "appear to be" minors, or are advertised as being of minors. Prosecutions under those provisions for images that do not in fact depict any actual child and are not obscene might be barred by the US first amendment. I have not found any reported case in which such a claim has been raised and decided, one way or the other. Conclusion "Cub art" as described in the question will not be protected under the US first amendment simply because it is a drawing rather than a photograph. A drawing which recognizably represents an actual child engaged in explicit sexual activity will probably trigger prosecution under one or more of §2251, §2251a, §2252, §2252a, or §2260. Even if the child was not actually abused, using the recognizable image of an actual child can be treated, under Hotaling (cited above) as child pornography and therefore criminal. If the art does not depict any actual child, but the image is found to be obscene under Miller, then a prosecution could be brought under § 1466A. Note that whether a given image is or is not obscene is a matter of fact, ultimately for a jury to decide, based on the Miller standard. As Whorley shows, completely fictional cartoons may be the basis of a successful prosecution under § 1466A. Anyone reading this answer should be aware that anything that might be considered "child porn" is taken quite seriously by US law enforcement. Penalties for conviction are severe. Even if the materiel is found to be protected by the first amendment, an arrest may lead to significant expense, loss of employment, and other negative consequences. It should also be noted that a "minor" or "child" under the sections of US law mentioned here means anyone under the age of 18. The age of consent under state law is not relevant. Thus it might be lawful for a person of 16 to engage in sex in some US states, but it will still be criminal to distribute or poses a photo or other image of such an act. People should also be aware that the law on such matters differs significantly between different countries. Content that US courts have held to be protected by the US first amendment may be criminal to posses, receive, or transmit under the laws of other countries. Penalties are potentially severe. The question of whether any given image is protected or criminal is not always easy to resolve, and finding out via an arrest and a criminal trial could be a very unpleasant and expensive way to determine this. Consulting a lawyer skilled in such matters might be wise if any content in one's possession is even arguably questionable on such points.

E can leave at any time E is not detained and there is no basis to detain her. As a child, that decision can be made by a parent. E can be subpoenaed to testify but she does not have to talk to law enforcement (and would be wise not to).

In colorado, it appears that the kidnapping statutes do not apply if the act is not "knowing" or if the perpetrator lacks intent. § 18-3-301 Any person who does any of the following acts with the intent thereby to force the victim or any other person to make any concession or give up anything of value in order to secure a release of a person under the offender's actual or apparent control commits first degree kidnapping: (a) Forcibly seizes and carries any person from one place to another; or (b) Entices or persuades any person to go from one place to another; or (c) Imprisons or forcibly secretes any person. § 18-3-302 Any person who knowingly seizes and carries any person from one place to another, without his consent and without lawful justification, commits second degree kidnapping. 2. Any person who takes, entices, or decoys away any child not his own under the age of eighteen years with intent to keep or conceal the child from his parent or guardian or with intent to sell, trade, or barter such child for consideration commits second degree kidnapping. § 18-3-303 Any person who knowingly confines or detains another without the other's consent and without proper legal authority commits false imprisonment. As @ohwilleke pointed out in this answer, this means that as soon as the hypothetical car thief becomes aware that the child is in the car and doesn't then act to return the child to their parents, it becomes second-degree kidnapping. (It's also possible that CO case law has interpreted the statutes differently than I'm interpreting them here, but the plain language seems to require the actual intent to take and/or confine a person illicitly.)

canada It depends on what the mens rea requirement is. Mens rea if not specified in a criminal offence In Canada, if this is a criminal offence, and a mens rea is not specified in the Criminal Code, the presumption is that the mens rea would be satisfied by recklessness, knowledge, willful blindness, or intention (Pappajohn v. The Queen, [1980] 2 SCR 120; R. v. Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13). The prosecution would have to show that Alice was at least subjectively aware of the risk that she was doing XYZ during the prohibited hours and proceeded nonetheless (this is recklessness; Sansregret v. The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 570 ). Based on the facts as you've presented in the hypothetical, you may have ruled out the possibility that Alice was reckless. Although, depending on the time of year, it may be that the sun sets around 9pm, which may present some awareness of the risk that you have not accounted for in your hypothetical. Mens rea if specified If the text of the statute does specify a mens rea then that is what the prosecution needs to show. For example, if one is prohibited from doing XYZ while "knowing" that it is after 9pm, then the prosecution will have to demonstrate actual subjective knowledge of the time, or wilful blindness (which Canadian law takes to impute knowledge: Briscoe). Additional burdens to make use of some mistakes of fact Some offences put an even higher burden on the accused in order to rely on a mistake of fact. In sexual offences where the age of the complainant is relevant (e.g. that they 14 or younger, or 16 or younger, or 18 or younger), the accused cannot make out a mistake-of-age defence without showing they took reasonable steps to ascertain the age (see Criminal Code, s. 150.1).1 Presumptive mens rea for regulatory offences is much lower: strict liability, subject to a due-diligence defence However, if this were a public-welfare/regulatory offence, like a provincial traffic law, or a licensing restriction on an aviation licence, or municipal by-law, there is no mens rea presumption. Rather, public-welfare/regulatory offences prima facie fall into the category of strict liability offences, subject only to a due-diligence defence (R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 SCR 1299). Alice would have to show that she had a "reasonable belief in facts which, if true, would have rendered the act innocent". What it means to have a "reasonable belief in facts" is very fact-specific.2 Alice has to hold the belief herself, and the trier of fact must accept that a reasonable person would also have held that belief. Just as in the case for recklessness, I can imagine that the timing of sunset might pose a problem for a due-diligence defence in your particular example. Absolute liability If the penalties for the offence do not include the risk of imprisonment, the offence can even be declared to be an absolute liability offence, in which due diligence is not even a defence (Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486). 1. For example, simply relying on a complainant's "language and statements indicating that she could be 14 years of age or older did not constitute taking reasonable steps or all reasonable steps to ascertain her true age in all the circumstances, especially after being warned by her mother to stop all contact or she would call the police and stating that the complainant was way too young for him" (R. v. Dragos, 2012 ONCA 538). 2. For example, for the sale of alcohol, "when the individual clearly appears to be underage, ... a duly diligent permittee would require at least two more pieces of ID confirming that the person was not a minor, question the individual about the ID, then decide if it is reasonable to serve the individual alcohol versus the youthful appearance of the individual" (Citynski Hotels Ltd. v. Saskatchewan, 2003 SKQB 314).

Sometimes running away is a juvenile offense, but it is not an offense for which an adult aged eighteen or over would be arrested or punished. An adult would not be returned home.

Landlord Picks Lock & Enter Premises Without a Judgment for Possession? If a landlord enters residential premises without receiving a judgment for possession and without the presence of a Special Civil Part Officer what recourse does the tenant have USA? Can they be charged with trespassing? Illegal lockout? Does one file a complaint in Special Civil Court or with the police department? In this case the landlord is trying to evict the tenant in Special Civil Court but the landlord refuses to wait until the judge orders the eviction.

british-columbia All of this is from the Residential Tenancy Act and related decisions from the Residential Tenancy Branch (a delegate of the director). A tenant is entitled to exclusive possession subject only to the landlord's limited right of entry, described next. As long as there is a tenancy, the landlord cannot enter unless: the tenant consents, or the landlord gives 24 hours notice and enters between 8am and 9pm (up to monthly), or the landlord is providing agreed-upon housekeeping services, or the landlord has an order of the director authorizing entry, or the tenant has abandonned the unit, or an emergency exists. If satisfied that the landlord will enter other than as authorized above, the director can authorize the tenant to change the locks. If a landlord does not comply with the Act, the director can make orders to give effect to the tenant's rights, and can award compensation. One such possible award, where the tenant can establish that the landlord is trespassing contrary to the permitted entry described above, is retroactive rent decrease, consistent with the loss of a right to exclusive possession.

I don't know Canadian rental law, but as a general rule in civil cases you don't get to play Perry Mason and bring in evidence at the last minute. If you have evidence that the landlord broke the law then disclose it immediately and use it to pressure him into settling. His later lies to you are less important than the fact that he broke the law in the first place. However you can certainly testify about what he said as evidence that he has acted in bad faith.

There are several questions in the OP. The answers to all of them depend on the lease terms. If Person A wants out of the lease, is the only option to just try to negotiate a way out of their portion of the lease with the landlord, presumably by payment or other means? Yes, usually. Regardless of who is on the lease, Person A is on the lease. In order to terminate or break the lease, Person A will have to negotiate termination. Most residential leases provide for joint and several liability for lease obligations. That means the co-signed lease is like three non-exclusive leases, one each between landlord and Persons A, B, and C. So Person A has to find a way to break the Person A lease. Other than a breach by either party, that likely can only be done by negotiation with landlord. What rights do Person B and C have if Person A does stop paying? Absent some other relationship or understanding between them (that is, other than the lease,) likely none. Persons B and C are each fully responsible to pay all of the rent. In other words, as far as the landlord is concerned it does not matter who pays the rent as long as it gets paid. If it doesn't get paid, the landlord can evict and sue all 3 for non-payment of rent. But the lease likely does not discuss the relationships between A, B, and C - whether they pay pro rata by time in the unit, by space used, per capita, or whatever. Landlord doesn't care, and is not the counterparty to those decisions. That said, if there is a relationship between A, B, & C (for instance, if A & B had a contract describing who would pay what, and B entered into another contract with C,) that will determine their relative obligations. The landlord agrees to allow the lease to be amended for another person, person C to be on the lease. Person B negotiated this with the landlord without consent of person A. This may create liability between B to A, C to A, or B & C to A. It is even conceivable that it creates a liability from landlord to A, if A had a reasonable expectation that the lease would not be amended absent A's consent. And the amendment may not be enforceable against A. So, for instance, A may be able to kick C out of the unit and bar C from reentry. It will not effect A's liability to pay rent.

Joint tenancy means that you both have equal (full) rights to the entire property, so just as you don't his permission to live there or to invite guests, he doesn't either. Unless they threaten you in some way (and you get a court order barring them from entering), there is no legal means to deprive an owner of their property rights, while they are still an owner.

Charlie is not a party to the contract between Alice and Bob Alice and Charlie have no contractural relationship and Alice cannot require him to do anything nor is he liable to Alice in any way. Alice’s issue is with Bob who has clearly breached his contract. Alice can sue Bob for damages and may be able to end the lease. There is no trespass because Charlie is there with the permission of the leaseholder. From Charlie’s position there is no reason to believe that Bob does not have the authority to give this permission so Charlie is not in breach of the law. The police will see this as a civil matter and won’t intervene.

You have acknowledged that the house was in "new" condition, which establishes a baseline for determining if the present state is normal wear and tear. The lease and California law agree that normal wear and tear is not the responsibility of the tenant. You may then need to sue the landlord in small claims court to get the remainder of the deposit (the above guide will be useful). The thing that is not clear is exactly what constitutes "normal wear and tear". The state guide tends to emphasize extreme forms of damage such as dogs chewing the woodwork, or cigarette burns. If you do ordinary cleaning on the walls, windows, carpets etc. then it is more likely that the judge will find in your favor.

Is entry into the yard subject to 24 hour notice? Most likely it is. Note that section § 47-8-3 defines both dwelling unit and premises. The latter encompasses the term "appurtenances", which the Black's Law Dictionary defines, inter alia, as "an adjunct; an appendage; [...] garden [...]". At least in the context of fenced backyard, the fact that § 47-8-3 defines dwelling unit and premises separately does not exclude "premises" from the scope of § 47-8-15. That is because the fence is "a structure [...] or part of a structure [...] that is used as a home, residence". Indeed, the existence of the fence suggests that the backyard is intended for only that tenant's exclusive use/enjoyment, with the implications it has on tenant's privacy.

I am sympathetic to your problem but there is probably not a legal solution: at least not an easy or cheap one. To help you clarify a whole mish-mash of issues I will address each of your points. frequently calls false noise complaints on neighbors resulting in police action. If the person genuinely believes that these complaints are valid, even if they do not end up being substantiated, he is within his rights to make such complaints. If you can document an ongoing pattern of unproven complaints this might amount to harassment and you could then seek a court order that he stop the harassing behaviour. However, if even a few of these complaints are proven this would become much harder. stands in front of the building in a menacing way as people enter/exit. He is entitled to stand wherever he likes in whatever "way" he likes. This is only an issue if the person entering/exiting has a reasonable fear that he will he will visit actual harm upon them, o, of course, if he actually does visit physical harm upon them. If so, then this is assault and can be reported to the police or be the basis of a civil action. hates black people. So, he's a bigot - this is not actually illegal. Discriminating against someone on the basis that they are black is illegal, hating them on that basis isn't. hates Middle Eastern people and Muslims. Ditto. constantly pounds on the floor/walls/ceilings. It can't be "constantly" - it might be often or even frequently, if you intent to take legal action hyperbolic language is not going to aid your case. To make a real complaint about this you would need to diarise each occurrence. Notwithstanding, unless he is damaging someone else's property or is violating a noise ordinance this is not illegal. screams curses at children. Clearly reprehensible behaviour: not clearly illegal. Unless this is assault (see above) or qualifies as offensive behavior under the criminal code wherever you are (unlikely) then he can scream whatever he wants at whoever he likes. Again, a pattern of such behavior may constitute harassment. Continues to park in handicap parking despite not being handicap, and receiving very expensive parking tickets. This is illegal and he is being punished for it. Unfortunately the expression Don't do the crime, if you can't do the time. has a corollary: if you are willing and able to take the punishment then you do as much crime as you want. And to add to the list, I suspect he's been putting nails in my car tire, always on the same tire, on the inside wall of the tire; I just replaced my 5th tire in 3 months. This is a crime. If you can get evidence to prove it then you can report him to the police and/or sue him for the damage. You have stated in your comments that you will be asking another question specifically about filming him, so I won't address this here. Is there some sort of legal incentive I've not clearly communicated to management to evict him? That depends on if any of his actions are actually grounds for terminating his lease and, if they are, the landlord wants to do so. A remote landlord who is getting his rent on time and not having their property damaged has no incentive to evict a tenant: no matter how annoying they are to others. It is possible, that you have a case for breaking your lease and/or suing your landlord for damages as you are not getting "quiet enjoyment" of the property. A suit along those lines may resolve the matter because either you or he will be evicted. Consult a lawyer. If he actually is insane, what sort of liability for his actions does he have? The same as anybody else. Liability for civil wrongs is an objective test of what a reasonable person would be liable for: it is not based on the specific characteristics of the person.

Can I legally include a line break in my child's name? Ethics aside, is it legal (or even possible) to include a line break (newline) in my child's name? Preferably at the end of the child's first name, directly after the last letter. So instead of (for example) the name "John Doe", the name would always be written out "John Doe". And then when the first name only is written out the line break would have to be included, such as "My child's first name is John and his last name is Doe". If this is legal, how would I go about making sure the line break is included on the name section of the birth certificate?

In the US, any legal restrictions on names are implemented at the state level——although broad administrative restrictions exist on the federal level. Some states may restrict use of diacritics (ubiquitous in Vietnamese) or Arabic numerals (but not Roman numerals). At the other extreme, in Washington state, there is no requirement to include a name at all in the case of live birth of known parentage. In the case of delayed report of live birth, and "An individual requesting the delayed report of live birth of an individual under twelve years of age must establish the facts concerning full name, date, and place of live birth". But no restrictions are imposed on names that can be so reported. Theoretically, one could attempt to register a child with the name 𑠓𑠳𑠢 (in the Dogra script), which would cause technical problems for the registrar's office. It is likely that the clerk taking in the form would respond something along the lines of "Huh?" and "How do you spell that". Similarly, one might try to register a birth name Hoàng Phủ Ngọc Tường, which would not be particularly difficult to deal with but might still stress the system (it depends on the county). In the latter case the name might be quietly converted to Hoang Phu Ngoc Tuong. In the former case, it is virtually guaranteed that the clerk would have no recourse but to insist on a romanization. Then the person registering would be insistent, they would file a lawsuit, and the courts would make some decision. It is most likely that the courts would be sympathetic to the practical concerns of the registrar and would not demand a huge overhaul of computer systems to allow any arbitrary graphic representation as a legal name. The State Department has regulations regarding names at 8 FAM 403: Personally Identifying Information. 8 FAM 403.1-3(C) addresses punctuation, special characters and symbols, diacritical marks, and non-Latin alphabets. They do not prohibit anything in names, instead they acknowledge that not everything is supported, and there is a long discussion of "discrepancies" which would explain the passport name "Nyema" for 𑠓𑠳𑠢. Passport names comply with the International Civil Aviation Organization standard. Social Security has a different set of rules where spaces, numbers, hyphens, slashes or any other special characters are not allowed for names, even including length limits where first, middle and last names can be maximally 10, 7 and 13 characters long (enter the first 10, 7 and 13 characters).

Yes, this is legal in many US states, perhaps most. Search for "adult adoption". For instance, here is the procedure in Colorado. Also, another article on the topic. Before the advent of same-sex marriage, this used to be a technique for a same-sex couple to legally formalize their relationship; one partner would adopt the other. Here is a New York Times Magazine article about the practice. Here is another article, from The Atlantic. They even refer to a case in which the parent was younger than the child.

I do not believe that there is any requirement to number clauses, paragraphs, or pages, and I have certainly seen contracts where none of these are numbered. It is a common practice to number provisions in some way, in particular to make reference from one to another easier. But not all contracts include such internal references. Contracts presented in electronic form, such as on a web page, may not have any clear concept of separate pages, and so page numbers would be pointless on such contracts. Page numbers on contracts printed out are common, but I do not know of any legal requirement for such numbers. For contracts presented in electronic form, one can ensure against unauthorized modification by including a checksum or hash of the contract text. If a one-way hash function is used, it will be quite hard to produce a text with a different content but an identical hash value. This technique could also be used on printed contracts. However, I do not recall seeing this technique used in practice.

I'm not sure if the information is accurate, but according to the above text, when a wife cheats, it is marriage not biology that decides the paternity of the child. I got some questions: If my wife cheats on me, I would still be the legal parent of the child. If I don't want this paternity, is there a legal process to disavow it? In most states, yes (I can't think of any exceptions, but there are 50 states and more self-governing territories and this is a matter of state law). Typically there is a statute of limitations of one to five years from the date of birth for a husband or person listed as a father on a birth certificate to bring a legal action to disavow paternity. See, e.g., California Family Code §§ 7540-7541 (setting a two year statute of limitations from a child's birth for a person with standing to dispute that a cuckolded husband is the legal father with genetic evidence). Note also that the process and statute of limitations are usually not the same, if, for example, a child wishes to prove that the child's biological father is someone other than the legally presumed father of that child. If I fall in love with a married woman and we give birth to a child, I am the biological but not legal parent of the child. Is there a legal process for me to claim paternity of the child from the woman's husband? Sometimes yes, and sometimes no. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), held that a state is not constitutionally required to make such a process available, but some states do anyway. The details of how this plays out under New York State law are described in this Law.SE question and answer. An analysis of the relevant portions of Minnesota law can be found here. For example, in California, Family Code Section 7541 limits standing to dispute paternity to spouses, people "presumed to be a parent" under Family Code Section 7611, or representatives of children seeking to establish or disestablish the paternity of someone "presumed to be a parent" under Family Code Section 7611. So, the only people eligible to be found to be parents are (excluding spent provisions of only historical interest): A husband who was married to the mother at the time of the birth or within 300 days before the birth. § 7611(a). A putative husband who would have been a spouse under § 7611(a), who marriage is annulled (e.g. because a marriage license expired or a husband was too closely related to the mother or either spouse is already married). § 7611(b). A putative husband who cohabited with the mother within 300 days before the birth whose attempt to married was too obviously defective to require an annulment (e.g. two fifteen year olds who have a church wedding without a marriage license). § 7611(b). A husband of the mother who marries the mother after the birth and is also named as a father on the birth certificate, in a voluntary written promise, or in a court order. § 7611(c). A putative husband who attempt to marry the mother after the birth and is named as a father on the birth certificate, in a voluntary written promise, or in a court order. § 7611(c). A person "who receives the child into his or her home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child." § 7611(d). A parent who dies while the "child is in utero" if this is established in a probate court proceeding. § 7511(f). Thus, in California, a father of the child of a woman married to someone else, who is still alive, (or someone of behalf of the child seeking to establish that he is the father) can only dispute the paternity of the husband of the child's mother (if the husband himself or the mother does not challenge the husband's paternity) if he "receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child." Simply claiming paternity without "receiving the child into his home" isn't sufficient to overcome the presumption that the mother's husband is the father in California unless the mother of the child or her husband disputes this presumption. The document says "The reverse is not true". Why the decision about paternity is different between a wife cheats on a husband and a husband cheats on a wife? Because maternity (absent a surrogacy arrangement) is almost never in doubt, while paternity is often in doubt. Furthermore, it wasn't possible when these doctrines were formulated (centuries ago) to determine paternity reliably in all cases anyway, at least at an affordable price. Cheap and reliable paternity tests, that can be used in pretty much any circumstances{1}, have only been possible for less than forty years, which is why a case like Michael H. v. Gerald D. didn't come up until then. {1} There have been particular cases, for example, when mother and father are both white and a child is at least partially black, where it has always been possible to do so (although even that scenario isn't 100% accurate, as illustrated by a famous historical case in which both parents had a modest amount of African ancestry that wasn't visible phenotypically). Similarly, there was the scenario of @MartinBonner where husband "was away at sea/war at the time conception would have had to occurred". Later on, blood types could disprove paternity in some cases, but not prove it with any certainty. There is a quasi-magical process described in the Old Testament for resolving such disputes involving the wife drinking a semi-poisonous liquid. In the Roman Empire, those cases were resolved by the husband who had a right to commit infanticide if he wished. In modern times, something close to the existing legal process has usually been available, complicated in certain eras by criminalized adultery, "heart balm" civil actions, and fault based divorce.

In general, in the absence of a reason to the contrary, an individual parent can consent to medical care for the parent's child, even if the other parent wouldn't have agreed to it. This is where to begin the analysis. Often, when parents aren't married there is a custody decree from a court that spells out who does and does not have custody of a child with respect to issues like medical care, but it does not appear that this is the case here. The way paternity law works is that there are certain circumstances which cause someone to be presumed to be a parent until disproven (a couple of which are conclusive presumptions that can't be overcome with facts at some point), but a lack of a presumption doesn't mean that you aren't a parent, just that it is harder to prove that you are a parent. Someone who is, or is presumed to be, a parent, continues to be a parent until that status is legally terminated (usually in a legal proceeding, but sometimes by operation of law). Since you are an actual parent, you continue to be a parent and have that authority, until that status in terminated for purposes of the law or until a court order limits your parental authority. A lack of a father's name on a birth certificate does not create a presumption that a child does not have a father or that you are not a father, although the name of a different man on a birth certificate does create a presumption which can become conclusive at some point, that the person named on the birth certificate is the father. Often this presumption becomes conclusive after five years, although I haven't (as I write this) confirmed that this is the case in New York. It isn't clear from the question if there is a different man named as a father on the birth certificate although it sounds as if it simply fails to name any father. And, often paternity petitions are disfavored or disallowed once a child turns eighteen for at least some purposes. A written acknowledgement of paternity delivered to the appropriate vital statistics record keeping office can establish paternity if not contested. The standard version of this form must be signed by both parents, in each case before two witnesses. The extent to which you are acknowledged as the parent of the child by the mother and others, and the extent to which you are involved in a child's life is also relevant to legal paternity, because a termination of parental rights can proceed in the absence of showing these things. The fact that the child share's your last name and that you are actively involved enough in the child's life to make it seem unlikely that this could be established even if a proceeding was brought, and in the absence of a formal termination of parental rights proceeding, you would not normally have your legal status as a parent terminated. So, probably, you are legally the child's parent whose authority is not limited by any custody decree, and therefore, you are entitled to authorize a vaccination. But, for a wide variety of reasons, it would be prudent to have your paternity formally established under the law if you are going to have an ongoing involvement in your child's life. Also, as DaleM notes, if you have the child with you, even if you are not the legal parent, you would usually be considered "in loco parentis" and have the authority to do this even in the absence of actual paternity.

I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.

Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.

Yes you can. The pieces of information you are going to include are facts. Facts are not copyrightable. The names will be trademarks but you will not be pretending to have any connection with them, so just using them for reference is fine.

I'm writing a book and ask for help on Worldbuilding Stack Exchange. Does my book become CC-BY-SA because I used an answer from WB.SE? The following question is similar to If I include an unmodified CC-BY-SA work in a book, does the whole book have to be CC-BY-SA?, but there is a contextual difference I believe is unique enough to ask a new question. If I am wrong, please mark this question as a duplicate. Over at Worldbuilding.SE a user asked, basically (and simplifying), if there were any books, movies, etc. on the market that contained material from Worldbuilding. I posted as an answer my belief that there would be few if any due to the limitations imposed by Stack Exchange's use of the CC-BY-SA license. To wit, while some of the work (e.g. a book) could be copyrighted, those portions (at least) that fell under CC-BY-SA could be used by a film maker with proper attribution but without compensation to the author. In my I-only-think-I'm-a-lawyer-because-I-slept-in-a-Holiday-Inn-Express-last-night mind, CC-BY-SA made that portion of the book open game for "fair use." One of our mods then asked if CC-BY-SA wouldn't then make the whole book CC-BY-SA, a question that's partially answered by the previously linked question... but not exactly. The Situation I'm an aspiring author with a novel in progress, but I'm stuck while developing my fictional world for the work. I saunter over to Worlbuilding.SE and ask how I can resolve my problem. I follow SE's rules such that the question is specific and answerable and I get a dozen answers — one of which fits neatly into the world I'm building. I use the idea as a modified idea because, kinda by necessity, nothing actually written on Worldbuilding.SE is editor-ready for any work, but because I received the solution from the Stack, I attribute the concept to the respondent.1 Can I (and I assume only one can be chosen)... (a) Copyright the entire book, despite CC-BY-SA but providing proper attribution? (I get, for the sake of argument, 100% of whatever movie rights the author is entitled to. The respondent gets 0%.) (b) Copyright the the entire book, despite CC-BY-SA, but copyright of the attributed concept is granted/retained/owned by the respondent? (I get most of the movie rights and the respondent gets the rest.) (c) Copyright the book save that one concept, attributed to the respondent? (I get most of the movie rights but the respondent gets 0% because they've lost control via CC-BY-SA.) or... (d) There is no practical copyright, the entire book is CC-BY-SA and a film maker can make their film, so long as both I and the original respondent are attributed, without any compensation to either of us? As you might imagine, the answer to this question will be of great interest to the users over at Worldbuilding.SE. Please note that there might be a follow-up question posted based on the answer to this one that asks whether or not the author can claim copyright protections should anyone else us the selected respondent's answer to the author's question. But that's not contemplated in this post. 1 And don't think that creating a useful attribution from a website that uses usernames wouldn't by itself cause a legal nightmare. But let's assume I was able to get in contact with the respondent and get a suitably legal attribution.

Placing a work which uses idea suggested in a Stack Exchange post under a CC-BY-SA license is not required Copyright law is clear: copyright does not in any case protect an idea or a method of achieving a result. In the US 17 USC 102(b) provides that: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. There are similar provisions in the law of most countries Article 2 of the Berne Copyright Convention protects “literary and artistic works”, not the ideas expressed in such works. The text of the CC-BY-SA license states in section 3.b: In addition to the conditions in Section 3(a), if You Share Adapted Material You produce, the following conditions also apply. The Adapter's License You apply must be a Creative Commons license with the same License Elements, this version or later, or a BY-SA Compatible License. Notice that this applies only to "Adapted Material" Section 1.a of the license defines Adapted Material: Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. Use of an idea is not a translation, alteration, transformation or modification of a source work. Note further that section 2.a.2 of the CC-BY-SA license states: For the avoidance of doubt, where Exceptions and Limitations apply to Your use, this Public License does not apply, and You do not need to comply with its terms and conditions. This means that when an exception to copyright (such as fair use or fair dealing) permits a use, he terms and restrictions of the license do not apply. It also means that when a limitation of copyright law prevents a lawful claim of protection, the license and its terms and conditions also do not apply. Thus the license does not purport to cover protection of ideas, as copyright law dos not protect them. This means that there is no such thing as a "copyright on a concept". Choice (a) of the four in the question would be the normal response, the finished book is under copyright to the author, until or unless s/he sells it or gives it away or licenses it. The author could choose to release the book under a CC-BY-SA license (which is essentially option (d)), but is under no obligation to do so. (And this would be very unusual.) Options (b) and (c) are not really legally possible. If the other person does enough of the work to be considered a co-author, that person would get half of all profits unless the co-authors agreed on a different split, which they may choose to do. But merely providing an idea in a typical worldbuilding.se post would not normally be enough to make the poster a co-author. Derived works What many find confusing in a situation of this sort is the issue of derivative works. When one work is based on another, the later work is said to be a "derivative work" and one may not create a derivative work from a work protected by copyright without permission from the current copyright holder. For example, creating a sequel to a work of fiction that uses the distinctive setting, and at least some of the distinctive characters from the source work would usually be considered a derivative work, and require permission if the original is protected by copyright. But merely using an idea from an earlier work would not constitute creating a derivative work. In the US, 17 USC 102 (quoted above) would forbid this. In US law a derivative work is defined in 17 USC 101 as: a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. Similar definitions apply in other countries, and in the Berne Convention. Merely using an idea does not make a later work a derivative work. There must be detailed, distinctive, non-generic similarity of setting, character, plot, or other creative element of the original. General ideas such as "a couple coming from feuding families fall in love" is not enough. Professional writers asked about the value of an idea for a work are apt to say things like: Ideas are ten a penny. It is what a writer does with the idea that matters. Specifically, author Lawrence Watt-Evans writes on his witting FAQ page: I have this cool idea -- if I tell it to you, will you write it, and we'll split the money 50/50? No. Ideas are cheap. I have far more than I can use; there are literally hundreds in my files that I haven't used yet. I have this nifty idea -- has it ever been used before? Yes. Pretty much every idea you can imagine has been used, and probably at least a decade earlier than you'd have thought possible. (The first story describing something like the Internet was published in 1909.) So simply using ideas, particularly ideas specifically offered to help a writer in progress, will not require the resulting book to be placed under CC-BY-SA. However, if such a post contains a detailed and specific way to use an idea, copying those details might require getting permission from the post author. In practice, such a suit would be quite unlikely. Multi-Licensing Note also that the author of a work released under a CC-BY-SA license, such as a SE post, is free to re-release under a different, less restrictive license, if s/he so chooses. The copyright owner is not bound to continue using the CC-BY-SA license, nor to use the same license to everyone. The poster of an SE answer could, for example, grant the poster of the corresponding question a free license to use content from that post on any terms the poster chooses, including on simple attribution alone, with no share-alike requirement. Thus if the person who posted the question and wants to use content from an answer asks the poster of the answer for permission, and gets it, there is no need to place a book under a CC-BY-SA license, even if the book uses so much of the post as to become a derivative work of the post (unlikely but possible, as described above). Attribution The question reads: And don't think that creating a useful attribution from a website that uses usernames wouldn't by itself cause a legal nightmare. But let's assume I was able to get in contact with the respondent and get a suitably legal attribution. One may validly attribute to a pen name, which is what a user name is, legally. It serves to credit the originator of the idea or text quoted. Many CC tests are posted under usernames or pen names, and people make reasonable attributions and fulfill the terms of the license often. Something like Concept based on a post to worldbuilding.stack exchange by user "QRS" on {date}. Post available at {URL}. ought to be a sufficient attribution. There is no need to learn the legal name of the poster. In fact all the CC licenses allow the licensor to specify a pen name to be used for attribution, and in the absence of any other statement, the user name would be that pen name. Fair Use The question reads: ... CC-BY-SA made that portion of the book open game for "fair use". A CC-BY-SA does not in any way increase (or decrease) the scope of fair use in a work licensed under it. In fact, where fair use (or any other exception to copyright) applies, the CC-BY-SA license explicitly does not apply. A CC-BY-SA license is a grant of permission, over and above what fair use permits, to use the work. CC-BY-SA seems similar to fair use in that it allows a person to reuse a work, or part of one, without specifically asking permission, and without paying any fee. But the basis is different. Under a CC-BY-SA license there is no need to ask permission because the owner has already given permission, that is what the license does. That permission is limited by the terms of the license, including the SA part. Under a claim of fair use one is allowed to reuse a protected work because the US Congress has decided that m a limited amount of reuse is for the public benefit, and has included this exception into the rights given to the copyright owner. Any fair use is restricted by the terms of 17 USC 107 and the complex case law developed under that provision. So each grants permission for reuse for specific reasons subject to limits. But the entity doing the granting is different, the reasons are different, and the limits are different. CC Licenses The questiion reads, in option "d": (d) There is no practical copyright, the entire book is CC-BY-SA It is not the case that a CC license, such as CC-BY-SA gives up or loses copyright. It is the case that the owner of the copyright in such a work gives up some of the rights s/he would otherwise have had, including the right to insist n payment for any use or modification of the licensed work. However, a commercial filmmaker is unlikely to want to use a work under a CC-BY-SA, because of the license that such a film would need to be released under. As I explain in the "Multi-Licensing" section above, the owner of such a copyright can still grant to a person or firm a different license on different terms. A filmmaker could still get the right to create a film based on such a work in a traditional arrangement in return for a royally or fixed fee, and the filmmaker would not need to release the film under a CC-BY-SA license.

Can he use another commercial product that is copyrighted, e.g. a map of a location (the map is a political map and has nothing to do with trees), for his tree research purposes, if such a map won't be part of the book he works on? Yes. Copyright protects particular expressions of ideas and knowledge, not the ideas and knowledge themselves. Using a map for research purposes when the map or a modified version of it does not appear in the final work does not make the final work a "derivative work" covered by copyright.

You are confusing two separate concepts: trademark and copyright. I'll give you a broad overview of both of these, although the details will differ depending on what country's law we're talking about. A copyright is held by the creator of a work of artistic expression. It gives the creator certain exclusive rights, including the right to create copies of the work and to prepare derivative works. For example: The movie "Star Wars" is a work of artistic expression. You cannot copy "Star Wars," or any significant part of it--including the script, the music, etc.--without the permission of the copyright owner, unless your use fits into one of the exceptions to copyright in your jurisdiction. Likewise, you cannot write your own book featuring the Star Wars characters: that would be a derivative work, a work based on the original work, and would violate the rights of the copyright holder. Without having read the book in question, I'm not going to comment on whether it does or doesn't infringe the film's copyright. But ideas can't be copyrighted. A film review, for instance, isn't a copyright violation--and a longer work discussing the ideas involved in a film isn't necessarily a copyright violation, either. Copyright only protects the expression itself--the language, the images. You are very limited in how much of that you can copy, but as long as you're using your own words, copyright protection is less of a concern. Trademarks, on the other hand, are intended to protect a business from customer confusion. Trademarks are not protected in the same way as copyrights; the key analysis of a trademark infringement lawsuit is: does it create confusion about the origin of the goods? For example: if you slap a swoosh on a shoe, Nike will sue you. If you use a swoosh in a political cartoon criticizing Nike, they won't, because nobody is going to think Nike wrote the political cartoon. So: If you write a book and call it: "Ewoks Gone Wild: A Star Wars Story," Disney will sue you, because it would be reasonable for someone who saw that book in a store to think that Disney authorized that book. If you wrote a book called "Forcing the Issue: The Hermeneutics of Science Fiction Movies from Star Wars to Inception", the case would be less clear-cut. But the important thing to understand is that these issues are complicated. There are exceptions to these rules; there are applications that may not be obvious to the non-lawyer ("initial interest confusion" is one minefield in U.S. trademark law), there are national and EU-specific considerations, there are safe harbors, and there are practical considerations, like whether you can afford to fight a lawsuit even if you're in the right. Therefore, I'm not going to tell you whether your hypothetical work would infringe anyone's copyright or trademark, and I'm not going to give you a set of rules on how to avoid it. The only person you should be listening to that sort of advice from is a real, non-anonymous-internet lawyer, licensed to practice in your jurisdiction, who is familiar with the specific details of your specific situation.

Under United States law, copyright is normally held by the creator of a work. There is one major exception to this rule: the "work for hire." If something is considered a "work for hire" under the copyright statutes, the copyright is held by the employer. Whether something qualifies as a work for hire is a complex analysis: here is a Copyright Office circular covering some of the basics. To be clear, I'm not giving an opinion (and I don't have enough information to give an opinion) on whether any specific works you or your fiance may create or commission qualify as "works for hire." It's a narrower test than you probably think it is. If the work is not a work for hire, the copyright holder owns the copyright, and anyone else can use it only with a license from the copyright holder. A license can be implied by the parties' behavior and communications--but it shouldn't be. If you're in a situation where you need to know, for example: That you are allowed to use the artwork forever, and the artist can't ask you to stop later; That you are allowed to change the artwork if you need to, even a simple change like cropping or adding a filter or text; or That, if your product is successful, the artist won't be able to sell another license to someone else to compete with you; then you need a written contract spelling out who owns the copyright and what the rights of the other party are. A lawyer can draw up a simple, re-usable form contract for you cheaply that will prevent the problems you're worried about. Remember: even if this is a work-for-hire situation, if you need to prove that down the road, it may require a trial, or at least preliminary motion practice, to do so. That's a lot more expensive than getting your ducks in a row now will be. tl;dr: Get a lawyer. If you're in a major city, there may be a local arts law organization that will provide you with free help for a simple job like this one. (Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts operate in several East Coast cities, and I know many top commercial lawyers who do pro bono for them).

All computer programs are not just copyrightable, they are protected by copyright as soon as they are put into fixed form (for example, as soon as I type it on my computer which will save it as a file on a disk). The copyright owner doesn't have to take any actions whatsoever to have a computer program protected by copyright. It’s not just computer programs, even many fonts are copyrighted because they are essentially computer programs. BTW. What I just wrote is also protected by copyright. There are some licenses involved that I agreed to when I submitted it to this website, and which allow the website to publish and you to read this text, but I'm the copyright holder. PS. There is a comment saying “computer programs are not literary works and therefore not copyrightable”. That may have been true or arguable in the 1980’s. It’s not true now. PS. No, stack exchange doesn’t own the copyright to my post, I do. Unless I was an employee of the company and posted on their behalf. Stack exchange needs and has a license to publish this post.

Copyright is hard. The movie has a copyright, and so has its ship model. This is the original copyright. The boardgame has a token. That thing has its own copyright, no matter if it's a parody of another thing or not. The copyright holder might not be the boardgame maker, but it is under copyright. In any way, parody is fair use, so no harm here. The model has a copyright, but also infringes on the film's copyright as it is a derivative of the film. If the film copyright holder wants, they can have it taken down and sue the maker. In any way, this model is available under a specific license. The model license is clearly Non Commercial. The CC-A-NC license can't be changed to one that is commercial. You can only add more No categories. The questions: 1 - No. Your work is a derivative work of both the model AND the boardgame. You don't parody the boardgame. 2 - You need a license from not one but at least two sources: the model author and the boardgame copyright holder. You might even need a license from the original film company. 3 - YES. He made the model, he can license it as he wants, but the license might be ineffective: He might have coverage under an explicit fan license with the movie company to make the model (allowing sharing under such other license) or not (when it might be silent acceptance of fan works, am implicit license or just plain lack of knowledge of the infringing model) - determining if the company wants to pursue is not your legal battle. Your battle is more likely with the copyright holder (of movie and boardgame) anyway because you lack a valid license from them. "I used this infringing model and breached the license I got it under" is... a very precarious point in court. 4 - No. You used the other work, you can't get out of the CC-A-NC license by altering the item. It'll always be a derivative work of the model you put in. You only get copyright in the changes. The resulting item has shared copyright with the original model maker. He gave you a license to do that, but the unbreakable condition unless you get a different license is: You can't ever sell this, you HAVE to tell them that I was part of this design.

The comment is incorrect; creating a derivative work without permission is still disallowed, even for private use. In US copyright law 17USC 106 defines the exclusive rights that the copyright holder has, the right "to do and to authorize". The second of these is: (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; Note that the right is the right to "prepare" a derivative work, not the right to "distribute" or "sell" the work. US copyright law defines a derivative work in 17 USC 101 which reads: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. The laws of other countries are similar to US law on this point. Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (3) Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original work. However, it should be noted that if a person creates a derivative work in private, and never shows it to anyone else, the copyright owner would never learn of it, and so could never sue for infringement. But if it were shown or described to anyone, and the owner did learn, then he owner could in theory sue. Whether the owner would choose to sue over a derivative work never circulated is a different matter. The real effect of this law is that when an infringing derivative work is distributed and the owner wants to sue, the owner need not prove distribution. Proving creation of the derivative work is enough. The quoted comment asks about whether such a rule is "unconstitutional or something" and says that "You should be allowed to do whatever you want with your own stuff in your own home." The US constitution does not grant any such broad right. There are lots of things one might do in own's own home that are illegal: building a bomb for example. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution, sometimes called the Copyright Clause or the IP clause, grants Congress the power: To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. See the LII page "Intellectual Property Clause" and the page Nature and Scope of the Right Secured for Copyright where it is written that: Congress was within its powers in giving to authors the exclusive right to dramatize any of their works. Even as applied to pantomime dramatization by means of silent motion pictures, the act was sustained against the objection that it extended the copyright to ideas rather than to the words in which they were clothed. {Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). For other problems arising because of technological and electronic advancement, see, e.g., Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).} See also the Wikipedia article "Copyright Clause".

Regardless of the license associated with a document, there is no copyright protection on information. Copyright protection prevents copying "expression", e.g. the wording, but not the facts / opinions expressed through those words. The non-legal academic concept of "plagiarism" is where the notion of attribution primarily comes into play. There is a special exception under 17 USC 106A that imposes an attribution requirement for works of visual art. CC and other license schemes may add in an attribution requirement for actual copying of the expression (the "BY" attribute in CC). If a work is licensed under CC-BY, you may copy the actual expression provided that you follow the terms of the license, which primarily means that you have to attribute the work in the prescribed manner. This does not apply to extracting information from a work, because information is not protected by copyright.

Stopping a warrantless police search? In general, how much can a person do to stop a warrantless search beyond verbally refusing consent? Is there anything further that can be done to prevent the search in the first place or make legal action after the fact more likely to prevail? Most of the results I get to searches relate to what officers can legally do, but I'm more interested in the case where the search isn't legal (regardless of if the officer knows that). I kinda suspect the answer (excluding thing like taking recordings) is "nothing at that time" but that any officers involved who ignore that refusal will get in trouble. Would it be legal (ignoring the question of advisability) to passively obstruct such an illegal search, say by locking a door or standing in a doorway such that the police would have to physically touch/move you to continue?

Don't consent. Say so (ideally in a well documented way, like on video). Challenge the fruits of any unlawful search after the fact in a suppression hearing, or in a civil rights lawsuit. There is a decent chance that a court will find that the warrantless search is lawful – even if it isn't – but there isn't much that you can do about it that would be wise or legal. Also, recognize that in many circumstances, warrantless searches are legal.

In the circumstance you describe, you can refuse a breathalyzer test ("opt to not take it"), and doing so would not constitute probable cause for an arrest (the results of the test can be probable cause). That is when you are on the roadside. This is Washington's "implied consent" law. One of the first things that the law says is that the test is "subject to the provisions of RCW 46.61.506", which includes the requirement that the test be performed according to methods approved by the state toxicologist and by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the state toxicologist for this purpose. The state toxicologist is directed to approve satisfactory techniques or methods, to supervise the examination of individuals to ascertain their qualifications and competence to conduct such analyses, and to issue permits which shall be subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of the state toxicologist. There are other requirements regarding 15 minute prior observation. The legally required test is done in the police station by a specially trained technician, on an approved machine (the portable machine is not approved). The implied consent law also says that this test is "required" if arrested for any offense where, at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor You are not required to take the Portable Breath Test, which is optional (when you have been stopped) – it's the post-arrest "evidentiary" test that is obligatory, using the approved procedure. Note that failing the optional test gives probable cause for an arrest, however there can be other grounds such as failing the line-walking test. If the officer just tells you that the roadside test is mandatory, that is a defense which can be used at trial ('cuz the optional test is not mandatory). Whether or not the portable test is admissible in court depends on the state: in Kentucky it is statutorily not admissible, likewise in Washington per court ruling. The other tests (often known as Standard Field Sobriety Test) are also optional, so ultimately it reduces to whether they already have probable cause, that is, if "the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers at the time of arrest would warrant a reasonably cautious person to believe a crime has been committed". It is just not clear to me what actual circumstances distinguish mere reasonable suspicion (driving slow) from probable cause, but watery eyes, slurred speech and alcohol smell will make probable cause. I don't know if driving slow and having watery eyes is probable cause – I would think not. Dunno about "smell of alcohol plus driving slow". In Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 US ___ we find an example of a traffic stop with ample probable cause for an arrest (smell of alcohol, bloodshot watery eyes, driving into a ditch, failing the alphabet test and massively failing the voluntary breath test). The analogous North Dakota law is largely similar to Washington law, mandating only the "approved" more technical version of the test and not the roadside test. Defendant, in that case, refused the mandatory test. A crucial difference compared to Washington law is that while suspension of driving privileges follows from refusal under Washington law, refusal in North Dakota is itself a misdemeanor per N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01. The issue for SCOTUS is whether a law criminalizing refusal to submit to a breath test (but not a blood test) violates the 4th amendment: it does not.

Regardless of the context of the first solicitation, Officer Jones' second solicitation was made in willful refusal to accept Betty's unambiguous "no" for an answer; this is sexually coercive behavior, specifically postrefusal sexual persistence. If this question is assessed from the perspective of the "average" woman, then after her initial declination, extraction of a "yes" cannot be considered uncoerced. Here's a question: how many times does she have to say no before it starts to count? Before it counts against her finally being exhausted, harassed, or intimidated into capitulating? Because by that logic, he never has to stop; he can continue to harass her until he finally accomplishes his objective (grounds to arrest her) - in which case, why bother with the pretense? If it takes 200 "no's" to wear her down to "whatever", then the first 200 "no's" just didn't matter as much as the first "whatever", so why bother with the formality of pretending like the first mattered when it clearly does not? To demonstrate the significance of her initial "no, thanks" and his subsequent refusal to accept it from another perspective: if Betty and Jones were coworkers in the same office, if he continued to solicit her after being told no the first time, that would be the definition of sexual harassment on his part and it would not matter how genial or friendly or casual he thinks he's being; furthermore, if her workplace failed to intervene on her behalf, they would be engaging in sexually discriminatory behavior by creating a hostile work environment, regardless of how genial / friendly / casual, etc. It's hard to see how this could act as evidence of her having committed a crime in one context while being grounds for termination of his employment in another context. HTH.

Yes and no. Using deception to get someone to open the door so that you can execute a warrant is okay (United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432). Leading a criminal to believe that you are a crime-customer (e.g. for purposes of a drug sale) and not a police officer is okay (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206), but must be limited to the purposes contemplated by the suspect and cannot turn into a general search. Lying about whether you have a warrant is not okay (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747), nor is it okay to lie about the scope of a warrant (United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126). Misrepresenting the true purpose of entry, even when the person is identified as a government agent, negates consent (US v. Bosse, 898 F. 2d 113; United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131; United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297). However, there is no requirement to be fully forthright (US v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301) so you can gain entry saying that you "have a matter to discuss with X" even when the intent is to arrest X. In a case similar to what you describe, United States v. Wei Seng Phua, 100 F.Supp.3d 1040, FBI agents disrupted internet access and then posed as repairmen to gain access to the computer. Their efforts were wasted, as fruits of the poisonous tree.

An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all?

united-states It is not required for a person to formally assert a fifth- or a first-amendment right when questioned by the police. One can simply be silent, refuse to answer any questions, without giving any reasons. But probably more effective and just as legal is to say "I won't answer any questions until I have talked with a lawyer. I want a lawyer, now." That is perhaps less likely than using the words "plead the fifth" to be assumed to be a confession of guilt, although some people and some police may take almost anything as a confession of guilt. By the way some of the points you distilled from the video (which I have not watched yet) are correct, some are half-truths, and some are quite incorrect. For example: The 5th amendment was not designed as a shelter for the guilty (despite it often being used as such). It was designed to help prevent you from unknowingly incriminating yourself. As a matter of history, this is quite incorrect. It arose historically out of a reaction to government procedures deemed oppressive. See https://law.stackexchange.com/a/63690/17500 for more detail. But helping people avoid unintentionally incriminating themselves is one of its major current functions. You can't talk your way out of getting arrested. Sometimes you can, but it is never safe to count on it. You can't know in advance if it will work, and more often than not it doesn't. Everything you tell the police can be used against you but not to help you. Not quite. If your statement is recorded, as is likely nowadays, the whole statement must be given to your lawyer and entered into evidence if you are eventually charged. (See Brady vs Maryland) Things said in your own favor may be discounted as self-serving, but the judge and jury will still hear them. But they can be very risky.

Is asking police to justify their orders illegal? NO but the manner in which the "asking" is done may be.

Expunction may be possible for instance if you are acquitted, later proven innocent, pardoned, and various other things that fall short of being convicted and doing the time. The entire law is here (Texas code of criminal procedure 55.01). There is also the option of an order of non-disclosure, overviewed here. A requirement for such an order is that you were placed on and completed deferred adjudication community supervision, which from what I can tell is not what happened. "Background check removal" may range between simply taking your money and doing nothing, to doing what you could do yourself to get free of traces via radaris, intelius, spokeo, and so on to "request removal" from that web site. This will not make your record unavailable, because these websites don't have any special powers to reach into and manipulate state records.

Do (any) US State Governors have legal authority to preemptively pardon persons of a state crime? As I understand it, the President of the United States is empowered to pardon a person prior to being charged with a federal crime. I further understand that State Governors have the power (under their specific state Constitution) to grant pardons. However, what I don't know is if any states have empowered their governors to grant pardons to persons prior to being charged or convicted. For clarification, I am defining "preemptively" as anytime prior to actual conviction (whether charged or during the prosecution process) BTW, I was told by Politics.SE that is was a question that should be posted with Law SE rather than Politics. I looked at other Law SE questions and they did not seem to answer this question about preemptively pardoning

Twenty States Allow Pre-Conviction Pardons The default rule is that states follows the federal rule that a crime can be pardoned any time after it is committed, but cannot be pardoned before it is committed. It appears that this is the rule in 20 U.S. states (a compilation of state clemency laws and procedures can be found at this website and a compact chart for all 50 states is here). Admittedly, this evaluation relies on a third party summary that may not capture every fine nuance of the process or exception to the general rule. Four States Where Pre-Conviction Pardons Are Allowed Don't Actually Grant Them Under A Policy Which Is Actually Followed This list of 20 states include states where the Governor or Board or both working together, have the power to grant clemency in a very broad array of circumstances, but have adopted policies for how the current Governor or Board will handle applications that are more restrictive than the legal authority that the person issuing pardons has to grant them. In Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota and Nebraska, the pardon power is legally very broad but recent Governors, as a matter of personal pardon power policy, have refused to consider applications for pardons by people who have not completed their sentences many years earlier (5 years in IN; 7 years in MN; 10-15 years depending upon the offense in MA; 3-10 years depending upon the offense in NE). In addition to these four states, North Carolina's Governor has an informal five year from completion of sentence waiting period. But, North Carolina is not included because in practice, the Governors of North Carolina have granted almost all pardons awarded in cases where the Governor is commuting sentences due to a likelihood of actual innocence of a crime, notwithstanding this policy. Commutation Of Sentences And Pre-Conviction Pardons Are Very Rare In practice, however, commutation of a sentence for crimes, or pardons of people who have not completed sentences for their crimes of conviction are very rare in every state, although the frequency with which pardons are granted varies wildly from state to state. For example, in Alaska, the pardon power is legally very broad, but has been exercised only three times since 1995, while in Pennsylvania the hybrid Governor-Board pardon power is theoretically more narrow but about 150 pardons are granted per year (a rate about 1000 times greater before adjusting for population, and more than 30 times greater after adjusting for population). The vast majority of pardons are issued to people who have been convicted of a crime and served their sentences and shown good behavior after their release in order to relieve the applicants of the collateral consequences of having a criminal record, such as ineligibility for occupational licenses and loss of gun ownership rights. Pardons for people who have not been convicted of a crime and commutations of the sentences of people who have been convicted of crimes and are still serving their sentences are extremely rare in every state, and pardons for people who have not been convicted of a crime at the state level are less common than commutations of people who are currently serving sentences for crimes they have been convicted of by courts. There are probably fewer than twenty such pardons or commutations per year in the United States on average (excluding several cases in which a Governor has commuted the sentence of everyone sentenced to death to life in prison). The number of pardons of people who have not been convicted of a crime at the state level is probably less than five per year on average in the entire United States - although there are occasional spikes (e.g. in the case of pending prosecutions where serious doubt has been cast on a common source of evidence like a state informant or a crime lab). Most of the notable instances of pardons of people who have not been convicted of crimes (e.g. President Carter's pardon of Vietnam era draft dodgers) involve categorial pardons of a class of people rather than case by case evaluations of individuals, and resemble a legislative amnesty process to serve a political goal, rather than an individualized quasi-judicial consideration of a particular individual's case in the interests of justice tempered by mercy. Immunity From Prosecution On the other hand, even when a state limits the pardon power to persons who have been convicted of a crime in a court of law (which many appear to), there is something almost equivalent to the pardon power for people who have not been convicted of crimes that is routinely used by executive branch DAs (i.e. a grant of immunity from prosecution for a crime, for example, in exchange for testimony or cooperation with an investigation). This practice is quite common, although so far as I know, there are no comprehensive statistics available regarding immunity from prosecution grants, although there may be some estimates of how many are made in the academic literature. Governors v. Pardon Boards v. Hybrid Systems While it doesn't go to the thrust of your question, it is true, however, that while every state has a pardon power, not every state vests that power in the Governor of the state on the federal model. Many states (e.g. Georgia, Texas and Oklahoma) require the involvement of a Board of Pardons and Paroles (or an equivalent body) to be involved any time that a pardon is sought, sometimes independently of the Governor, and sometimes in coordination with the Governor. Wikipedia states that nine states have Boards of Pardon and Parole or the equivalent with exclusive power over pardons. In the other forty-one U.S. states the pardon power is vested either in both the Governor and a Board, or is vested entirely in a Governor. The pardon power of the President extends only to offenses recognizable under federal law. However, the governors of most of the 50 states have the power to grant pardons or reprieves for offenses under state criminal law. In other states, that power is committed to an appointed agency or board, or to a board and the governor in some hybrid arrangement (in some states the agency is merged with that of the parole board, as in the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board). Nine states in the United States have Boards of Pardons and Paroles that exclusively grant all state pardons. These states are: Alabama (Board of Pardons and Paroles), Connecticut (Board of Pardons and Paroles), Georgia (Board of Pardons and Paroles), Idaho (Commission of Pardons and Paroles), Minnesota (Board of Pardons), Nebraska (Board of Pardons), Nevada (Board of Pardon Commissioners), South Carolina (Board of Probation, Parole and Pardon), and Utah (Board of Pardons and Parole). In states that vest the pardon power in part or in full to a Board of Pardons and Paroles, as opposed making it a plenary power of the Governor personally which is not subject to review or limitation as in the federal model, as a practical matter, it is much harder to fit into the Board's bureaucratic process for processing pardon applications when there is not a conviction that has been entered, than it is in the less bureaucratic case when that power is vested solely and personally in the Governor on a plenary basis. The pardon board process in many states, at least as a practical matter, makes it impossible to obtain a pardon until there has been a conviction and in most cases, also a sentence imposed and sometimes a waiting period after a sentence has been fully served. For example, many states prohibit applications to the pardon board from being made until a sentence has been completed or until a certain number of years after a sentence has been completed (effectively limiting the power to restoration of civil rights rather than commutation of a sentence, or relief for someone who has not been convicted).

As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury.

The President has the power under Article II of the U.S. Constitution to faithfully execute the laws enacted by Congress. Any power that the President has to regulate international travel of non-U.S. citizens arises from statutes enacted by Congress that give the President (or the executive branch more generally) that authority. Immigration laws, in practice, give very substantial discretionary authority to the President, and public health laws probably also do so. I don't have chapter and verse to cite to you regarding which specific statutes provide that authority, without considerably more research, but that is the general idea. The primary statute regulating immigration is the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (and more generally, Title 8 of the United States Code). It is not uncommon in the United States for there to be disputes over how much discretion a President has under a particular statute in the United States, because unlike parliamentary systems of government, the execution of laws and the passage of law is split between different branches of the federal government in the Presidential system of the United States, rather than being fused with a Prime Minster who serves at the pleasure of the legislature.

Yes and No. The Federal U.S. Government as well as each individual state and territory claim Soverign Immunity to a limited degree. In the case of Federal Government, they claim Soverign Immunity to a near limitless degree (more on this in a moment), while States and Territories claim "State Soverign Immunity" which grants them immunity with respect to all soverign powers granted under the U.S. Constitution. To clarify, each U.S. State is seperately soverign in all matters not explicitly allocated to the Federal Government by the U.S. Constitution and all constitutionally written laws. Where the Constitution does not in writing claim a power for the federal government nor reserver a power for the state government, the power is assumed to be state government. So a State can claim immunity for a police situation but not a law it makes regarding immigration or foriegn policy, since that is the exclusive wheelhouse of the Feds. Per the 11th amendment, states can only be sued in state court by citizens of the state, while non-state citizens wishing to sue a state must sue in the Federal Court (Which for the purposes of the trial may adopt the defendant State's laws and regulations for the purposes of questions of fact and law brought up in the suit). All U.S. States and the Federal Goverment additionally wave Soverign Immunity under specific conditions outlined in laws. In the case of the Federal Government, the laws governing when this immunity is waived are governed by the Federal Torts Claims Act (1946) and the Tucker Act (1887). The FTCA covers intentional torts by the Federal Government, while the Tucker Act typically covers matters related to contractual obligations or monitary interactions with the federal government. Things that may be sued for include but are not limited too: Intentional Torts committed by Government Agents in their Official Capacity (i.e. When the FBI violates your rights or maliciously investigates you). Contractual disputes where the Government is a party to the Contract, either in written or implied terms. Constitutional Claims (i.e. The Government may have violated the Constitution. These tend to be for non-monitary relief such as mandemuses, though the 5th Amendment's Taking Clause can be invoked of the government took property and does not justly compensate.). Individual Agencies of the Government when the monitary claim is not drawn from the U.S. Treasury (the agencies own allocated budget is used to pay). Refund for taxes paid In all cases, a Judge will determin if the Government, under the laws, can be sued. If in the example of a government employee being sued, the Justice Department will first make a determination if the employee was acting as an agent of the government when they committed the tortious act, and then will declare themselves Respondent Superior through the agency of employement. From there, the case becomes a suit against the Federal Government and FTCA immunity waiver is determined by a Judge. For example, lets say you (Mr. Rapt) sue Special Agent Jimmy Jones of an intentional tort that he committed in the course of his duty as an FBI agent. The DOJ will first declare that they are Respondent Superior in the case of Rapt v. Jones, thus turning the case to Rapt v. United States Government, Department of Justice, Federal Beura of Investigations, and Jones (Rapt v. United States, et. al.). From here, the Judge who gets the case then determins if the U.S. Government under FTCA can be sued by Rapt, based on Rapt's citizenship status (usually permanent legal residents are covered as citizens for this point, but I can say for certain in this particular law), ripeness (the suit must be filed within 2 years of the incident or first knowledge), and immunity waiver under FTCA. In the case of the State Government, they should have similar laws, but I'm not going to identify all 50 individual laws here. Additionally, the 11th Amendment permits U.S. Congress to waive a State's immunity to suit in certain cases (mostly comes up with the Due Process Clause in the 14th Amendment.). As a fun point, in all cases where a government appears as a defendant in a suit, it is automatically a Bench Trial, as the government usually include a waiver of their right as defendant to a jury trial. The thinking here is that, as a country that was founded by rebelling against the government, a jury of 12 of the government's citizens aren't going to give them any slack at trial, where as a judge (who they pay) is much more likely. TL;DR: Both questions are yes. The immunity is waived under federal law for certain cases, but it is a judge who will make the ruling if the specific case meets the aformentioned waived immunity.

There's no settled legal answer to this, but there seems to be a general consensus that this would not be legal under the Impeachment Clause, which says: The President ... shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. There would be two main issues here: 1. Can a president pardon himself? It's never been tried, so it's never been challenged, so the courts have never had a chance to say whether it's legal. The main argument in favor of self-pardons is that the constitution grants broad pardon authority for any offense against the United States, making an exception for impeachment, but not for self-pardons. The response to that is that the constitution uses all kinds of broad language that everyone agrees is not as broad as it sounds; Congress is not allowed to abridge the freedom of speech, but perjury laws are nonetheless constitutional. There are several theories as to why the self-pardon would be illegal, but they mostly come down to two main ideas -- that our legal system does not permit anyone to be the arbiter of their own case, and that a person subject to impeachment may not be pardoned. 2. Can a president issue secret pardons? Again, it's never been tried, so it's never been challenged, so the courts have never had a chance to say whether it's legal. And again, the primary argument in favor of secret pardons is that the Pardon Clause grants broad pardon authority without requiring that pardons be publicized. The main arguments against are (1) that presidential pardons are inherently public acts, as they have no effect if the justice system doesn't know about them, and (2) that the Presidential Records Act requires official White House records to be transferred to the National Archives.

With regard to subpoenas, the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Trump v. Vance makes it clear that states can issue subpoenas to sitting presidents. (The case in question involved a subpoena to a third party for the president's records, not to the president himself, but the opinion makes it clear that the court would apply the same reasoning in either situation.) The questions of what actions a state may take to enforce such a subpoena if it is not complied with, or of arrest / indictment / trial by a state, have never arisen and thus have not been resolved by courts.

Generally, no. The party to the action will be the State (commonwealth). The prosecutor acts as the agent of the state. The sheriff is not a party and cannot appeal.

There is a relevant law, Title 18 section 907 which states that "A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally". So possession of lock picks is not a crime per se. In Com. v. Gendrachi 389 A.2d 604 we are reminded that "intent need not be directly proved, but may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the incident out of which the charges arise". The accused was busted in mildly suspicious circumstances at 5:20 am in the dead of winter, urinating. The court notes that "There is no evidence that appellant's hands were on the door or that he made an attempt to extract the tools from his pocket and apply them to the door. In fact, there is no act or statement by appellant that would lead one to infer that he intended to use the tools at that time", and that "appellant is a certified locksmith and it is not unreasonable to find the tools of his trade in his pocket, especially when he is wearing his work attire". Note that this is on appeal: he was convicted initially. The point is that there is a lot of slop in cashing out the legal concept of "intent". Pennsylvania does not, apparently, have any specific laws that refer to lock picks. It does have a statute that addresses having criminal tools, which are defined as (including) "Anything used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have". Mr. Gendrachi had those very tools, and the appeals court did not say anything to suggest that the tools were not "criminal tools" (and in FN 5 they actually point out that the Commonwealth cannot say that the tools were weapons, a ludicrous proposition never raised by anyone – so by failing to deny that lock picks are criminal tools, they are adoptively admitting that they are criminal tools). Thus I conclude that there is a law in PA, that lock picks are burglary tools, and that the government would have to prove intent to use criminally.

How should the parenthesised components of statute names be pronounced? For instance, consider the Housing (tenancy deposits) (prescribed information) order 2007 (Which reads quite naturally just strung sequentially together). Or the Torts (interference with goods) act 1977 Which is more troublesome. Or, the Homes (Fitness for Human Habitation) Act 2016. How should these less natural names be pronounced, as they sound incoherent when one cannot visually see the parentheses, and: what is the purpose of naming it this way, when it could much more naturally be named the "Fitness of Homes for Human Habitation Act," or the "Residential Fitness for Human Habitation Act." On the other hand, the Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016 reads together quite naturally in its natural sequential order. Why not just make more uniformly natural, coherent, and undisjointed names for laws in the first place instead of stringing together multiple incoherent separate fragments with parenthesised elements?

Legally, nothing Grammatically they mean what parenthesis always mean, that the parenthesised words are less important i.e. parenthetical. Organisationally they serve to group legislation together. This is particularly common in regulations and other subordinate legislation where the tradition is that the regulation takes the name of the Act it is created under. Where there is more than one, the specific function of the regulation is put in parentheses. For heavily legislated areas, like Housing, some parliaments do the same thing for Acts.

I was told that when you sign something in the UK, then it is your signature, no matter what name you are using. So if you sign a contract with my name, then it's your signature and you are bound by the contract. Things might be invalid because you signed and not me. For example, if you sign a contract selling my car in my name, then that contract is not valid. If some document needs signatures of two witnesses, and you sign with your name, then with my name, then there are no two signatures. As far as I know, signing under a false name is not in itself criminal, but might very well be supporting fraud, for example, and might therefore be illegal. The contract for the sale of my car, signed by you using my name, would very likely be part of fraud and therefore criminal.

We could start with what the statutes say (HSC 102425) (a) The certificate of live birth for a live birth occurring on or after January 1, 2016, shall contain those items necessary to establish the fact of the birth and shall contain only the following information; (1) Full name and sex of the child. It says nothing about the form of that name. Therefore, any prohibition of the letter Æ (or æ) etc. would have to come from the administrative interpretation of California Department of Public Health, Vital Records. There is a long handbook, which on p. 112 states the rule regarding child names. The rules note that The form must be completed using the 26 alphabetical characters of the English language with appropriate punctuation, if necessary. No pictographs (☺), ideograms (⇑), diacritical marks (è, ñ, ē, ç), or extraneous entries are allowed. So the short answer is, unless you feel like making a court case out of the matter and you have a lot of money, this name will not be allowed. The rule might be challenged in court as exceeding statutory authority, and might well be deemed to discriminate w.r.t. race and national origin. The rule could be defended on grounds of necessity, if we presume that the department is incapable of recording information other than the 26 letters and "appropriate punctuation" (undefined, presumably only apostrophe). It's not that in principle Unicode doesn't exist, it's that their system may not be capable of dealing with it (numerous problems would arise from the non-unique mapping from visual representation to Unicode number). There does not seem to be a court ruling on the matter.

This is known as the rule of lenity. A common formulation of the rule of lenity is as follows: If a federal criminal statute is grievously ambiguous, then the statute should be interpreted in the criminal defendant's favor. Importantly, the rule of lenity does not apply when a law merely contains some ambiguity or is difficult to decipher. As this Court has often said, the rule of lenity applies only when “ ‘after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,’ ” the statute is still grievously ambiguous. The rule “comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.” Kavanaugh J., concurring, in Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. ___ (2022), citing Ocasio v. United States, 578 U.S. 282, 295, n. 8 (2016), internal citations removed.

For the same reason you can’t ask the parties to a contract what they meant Legislation, once enacted, stands on its own independent of the people who drafted it, introduced it to Parliament and voted for or against it. These are not the same people in any event and since the legislation might have been passed anywhere between the 13th and 21st centuries, a lot of them will be dead. There’s a fundamental issue of fairness here. The people who are obliged to comply with the law (you and I) can’t ask the politicians so neither can the judges who have to decide if we did. Further, the judiciary cannot interact with the executive or the legislature in this way without violating the principle of separation of powers. Imagine you are charged with a crime and your guilt or innocence turns on the interpretation of the statute. Do you really want politicians who are looking at how the case plays out on Twitter telling the judge which interpretation to use i.e. effectively telling them whether you are guilty or not?

Regulations - Yes, Acts of Parliament - very rarely In in the united-kingdom diagrams are found in regulations, for example legislation dealing with roadside symbols. There are two kinds of legislation in the UK: Acts of Parliament and Statutory Instruments (normally called Regulations). The procedure by which an Act of Parliament is passed is that it has to be approved by both Houses of the legislature and then receive Royal Assent (Royal Assent is a formality). The procedure in each House is that the main debates occur at the Committee Stage when amendments are proposed and voted on. At the next stage (Third Reading) the House votes again on whether to approve the Bill in its amended form. Statutory Instruments (Regulations) are issued by the government (executive) and are known as delegated legislation because the government only has power to issue a regulation if an Act (called the parent Act) gives it power to do so. As you would expect there are safeguards. First of all the courts can declare invalid (ultra vires) any regulation whose terms go outside the limits of the power delegated by the Parent Act. Sometime the parent Act will provide that Regulations issued by the government under delegated powers become law without further involvement of Parliament but sometimes an Act will provide for some limited further Parliamentary scrutiny. This can be either by the Positive Resolution (the regulation will not become law until Parliament approve it) or by the Negative Resolution procedure (the regulation will become law unless Parliament passes a resolution annulling it). A key point, in the context of the question, is that neither the Positive nor the Negative Resolution procedure allows Parliament to amend the regulation - Parliament only has a binary choice to approve or disapprove. Of course if they disapprove then the government can issue a new amended regulation which then goes through the same process but the Positive/Negative resolution procedure does not allow Parliament itself to amend any regulation. I think this explains why diagrams which are sometimes found in regulations are rarely found in Acts. Constitutional proprieties require any Bill to be amendable and any member of the legislature can propose a amendment. If the Bill included diagrams then there would be huge practical problems because any member who wanted to amend a diagram would have to produce his own amended diagram which he might not be able to do/might not have time to do before parliamentary deadlines. So constitutional proprieties would normally mean that in practice Bills must be solely words. Regulations however cannot be amended by Parliament (see above) so such considerations do not prevent regulations from containing diagrams. Having said that normally Bills will only contain words, there is this example of an Act which includes a diagram of a symbol. That symbol, however, is defined in an international convention so in practice no parliamentarian would want to amend it. I know of no examples in the UK where a Bill (as distinct from regulations) contains an image which a member of the legislature might want to propose an amendment to.

This appears to be a fairly straightforward construction. Section 9(2) and 18b share a number of requirements, so 18b points back instead of repeating them. But not all requirements are shared. In particular, requirement 3 (covering pensions) does not apply to newly-graduated students. That's not strange since students are not paid wages. Also, they're not subject to the 5 year residence permit requirement. As for "sentences 2 to 6 shall apply accordingly.", this covers waivers to these requirements.

Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side.

Do atheistic men have the right to cover their heads (though not faces) with hijabs in mugshots in New York city? In 2020, the NYPD reached a settlement with three Muslim women who were forced to remove their hijabs (which obscured their heads, but not their faces) for the purpose of having their mugshots taken (https://ecbawm.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ClarkSettlement.pdf) As a result, Muslim women in New York are no longer required to remove their hijabs during mugshots. An obvious consequence of being able to cover one's head in a mugshot is that allows one to be less identifiable (to law enforcement, to the public who may see the mugshot on the news, etc) than someone whose entire head is visible. This may be advantageous for a number of reasons. Does the equal protection clause grant anyone in New York city - atheistic men, for example - the right to cover their head in a mugshot so long as their face is visible?

The order certifying the class action and the ruling provide circumstantial details that would bear on the applicability of that reasoning. The opinion frames the question as: Does the United States Constitution permit the New York City Police Department (the "NYPD") to require an observant Muslim woman to remove her hijab when sitting for an arrest photo? The Court holds that it does not. The agreed-to settlement includes instructions to police that are broader: A religious head covering worn pursuant to a sincerely held religious belief can be retained by the prisoner while in the custody of the Department. However, the religious head covering must be temporarily removed when conducting the mandatory Department search for weapons and/or contraband, but will be returned to the prisoner after that search unless the head covering presents a risk to the safety of the prisoner or others. The First-Amendment part of the ruling is that Clark and Aziz have no alternative means of exercising their right to wear a hijab in public, at all times. The Policy, although sometimes inconsistently applied, still requires that Clark and Aziz remove their hijabs and makes their photographs available to men. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that permitting observant Muslim women to wear a hijab while being photographed as part of booking procedure would have reasonably accommodated their beliefs and also would be less burdensome on the NYPD. Indeed, snapping a Booking Photograph of an arrestee with her religiously compelled covering would expend fewer resources than “requir[ing] dialogue with arrestees and additional time spent negotiating removal.” The First Amendment is equally available to males and females, and to Muslims and non-Muslims. This ruling cannot be interpreted to mean that only women or only Muslims have this right to religious expression. The courts have also declined to engage in religion-evaluation whereby some beliefs are certified as "true religion" and others are "false religion". See Schwarzentruber v. Gunite, where an employee was required to cover up his racist tattoos on the job, and sued on First Amendment accommodation grounds. The court states the relevant legal principle regarding such a suit:t To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1) he has a sincere religious belief, observance or practice that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he informed his employer of the conflict; and (3) the religious practice was the basis for the adverse employment decision. Plaintiff lost the case because he cannot show that he holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement. even though he alleges that the "Firey Cross" tattooed on his arm is one of that church's seven sacred symbols The crux of the defendant's failure is that he does not present admissible evidence, or even contend without evidence, that being required to cover up his tattoo at work conflicts with his religious beliefs, or that he told Gunite about any conflict with his beliefs and Gunite's demand that he cover his tattoo. Mr. Swartzentruber doesn't satisfy the first and second elements of a prima facie case. The atheist male hat-wearer would at a minimum have to contend that he has a deep-seated belief about the nature of the universe that he must (whatever the claim is). It is settled First Amendment law that a "religious belief" does not have to be theistic. This page sets forth the case law and reasoning leading to the conclusion that atheism must be treated as a religion. See Kaufman v. McCaughtry and citations therein. That court observes that a religion, for purposes of the First Amendment, is distinct from a “way of life,” even if that way of life is inspired by philosophical beliefs or other secular concerns. A religion need not be based on a belief in the existence of a supreme being (or beings, for polytheistic faiths) nor must it be a mainstream faith Without venturing too far into the realm of the philosophical, we have suggested in the past that when a person sincerely holds beliefs dealing with issues of “ultimate concern” that for her occupy a “place parallel to that filled by ․ God in traditionally religious persons,” those beliefs represent her religion. We have already indicated that atheism may be considered, in this specialized sense, a religion. See Reed v. Great Lakes Cos. (“If we think of religion as taking a position on divinity, then atheism is indeed a form of religion.”). Kaufman claims that his atheist beliefs play a central role in his life, and the defendants do not dispute that his beliefs are deeply and sincerely held. This sketches the claims that a person would have to make in order to rely on a Free Exercise exception to a general rule.

I see lots of possible issues here, including: Will the Apprendi decision be given retroactive effect? Were the constitutional issues raised at the time of trial, and if not will a court permit them to be raised later? Will a court agree with the law review publication? Will the facts in your case be sufficiently similar to the cited case? Beyond those, in a section 1983 suit many public employees have qualified immunity unless the legal point was already "well established" when the violation occurred. To pursue this you will need to work with a lawyer skilled in this area. No one on this forum can possibly given you a reliable answer as to whether you have a reasonable case.

germany In Germany, taking pictures - and publishing them - is legal, if they're taken from public areas, from the general perspective of a passer-by, and if the picture doesn't make individual persons recognizable. (There are some restrictions about making persons recognizable; if you take a picture of a monument or other building that would typically be photographed by tourists, and if the topic of the picture is clearly the monument, not a random bystander, then it's OK to publish even if the bystander's face is visible. But that doesn't work for individual's houses). Still, Street View got into trouble because their cameras are mounted on roofs of a car, in a height of 2.5-3 meters, so they violated the "perspective of a passer-by" rule. To return to the example of "bathroom", the camera could well be able to see you nude when a passer-by would only be able to see a small portion of the ceiling next to the window. Because of this, and because many Germans were uneasy with seeing their houses on the internet, as a condition to permit Street View at all, the German government insisted on allowing people to request their house to be removed; in 2010, approximately 250000 people made use of that (source: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-11595495). Because of the high resistance against Street View in Germany, Google published what they had in 2011, but stopped collecting more images. This is explained in https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/germany-street-view/, which also explains some of the reasons why Germans are so heavily biased for privacy.

Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.

This potentially (i.e. almost certainly) runs afoul of laws against religious discrimination. However, you can have such a requirement provided you make an accommodation for those with sincerely held religious beliefs or practices against bacon-eating. You can also have such a requirement (despite the beliefs) if not having the requirement imposes an undue hardship on the business. For example, if the job is "bacon taste-tester", then there's no reasonable accommodation. This applies to religious objections, since religion is protected class, but not "I don't like bacon" as an objection; nor does this apply to people who object to meat-eating on economic grounds.

Art. 25 of the Indian Constitution says (in part) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion. But, Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice; providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. The preamble does also declare that India is a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic, but this is not a clearly-enforceable article. There is no legal requirement that government action be entirely devoid of consideration for religion. What the law says is that the government must respect the rights of individuals to practice their own religion, but that does not preclude favoring a particular religion, e.g. using Hindu texts in official contexts. So far, the courts have not rules that government action must be entirely devoid of religious reference (for example the various Hindu family laws vs. Muslim family laws are not unconstitutional).

Isn’t this discrimination since nationals do not have to apply? Yes it is discrimination. But that does not make it illegal. In fact discrimination is in general legal unless it is based on some characteristic which is specifically forbidden as a basis for discrimination (e.g. race). And in general, all of the countries in the world allow and enforce discrimination based on nationality; for example non-nationals will not be able to run for Head of State (and additional restrictions may apply). The EU members allowing similar rights to the citizens of other EU countries is the exception, not the rule, and once the UK stops being bound by EU treaties it can impose its own legal system on non-nationals. And while EU treaties give lots of rights to EU member-countries citizens, they still allow for discrimination based on nationality (for example you cannot run for Prime Minister or MP of Spain as a foreign EU resident). Isn’t the UK Government breaking the law? This could go against EU treaties, but the point is that the UK will no longer need to comply with them. is the UK Government responsible for the harm and distress caused to the individual health and mental wellbeing? No, the UK Government is not responsible if you do not like its laws to the point that it affects your health. Is there any ground for challenging this scheme legality in court? Unlikely. In any case it will not be because you are frightened by it, any challenge would be in the grounds that the government actions act against some other UK law. For example, if the decision to make such a list was made by the Executive but it contradicts some law approved by the Parliament. If this list does not contradict any law, then there are no grounds for challenging it. Would there a breach of my human rights if I was not to apply for settle status and then subsequentially got deported (taken away from my children, home, business, etc.)? How about if I was refused, re-entry or access to public services (NHS for example)? If you do not apply you will not have any evidence that you were settled, and the government could legitimately believe that you are irregularly in the country and try to expel you; you probably would have an opportunity to prove that you were settled even if you were not in the list but that could be way slower, more expensive, riskier and stressful than just registering now. Get this clear: that settled person list is to help you to show that you were a UK resident before Brexit and to give you the protections that are being negotiated between the UK and the EU for expatriates. Probably you could choose not to enlist, but it would work against you.

The US Supreme Court only has jurisdiction in federal matters. So if someone is suing under federal law, or there is a constitutional question, the Supreme Court is the place to go for a definitive answer. However, states have their own laws. The Supreme Court cannot tell New York that it must apply the attractive nuisance doctrine, as it is neither a matter of federal law nor a constitutional matter. New York is free to make its own laws on the subject, and the New York courts are free to interpret those laws as they see fit. In fact, federal courts are required to defer to New York's interpretation if New York's laws apply to the case, even if the case is in federal court for some reason (like diversity of parties.) See the Erie doctrine (which, coincidentally, involves yet another case about railroad injuries.)

Why aren't programming languages infringing IEEE's POSIX trademark? POSIX is a standard for operating system API, trademarked by IEEE. It ensures "source-code" level compatibility between operating systems and applications. It receives triple designation and its full text can be obtained from IEEE, ISO, and OpenGroup. For logical reasons, many programming languages (Python for example) include modules whose name is "posix" (lower-case per identifier naming convention of respective languages). Even though these modules provide functionalities that are specified in the POSIX standard and claim obvious relationship to it, these modules and languages that provide them nonetheless don't infringe the POSIX trademark. So how is this possible?

A caveat to begin with: It's not definitive whether this particular use is or is not infringing, given that the circumstances haven't been tested in court. The usual scope for this kind of thing is called "nominative use" or "nominative fair use" in the U.S. context. The Python developers are offering a software module so that Python programs, when run on POSIX systems, can make use of capabilities of those systems covered by the POSIX standard. They have named their module posix so that Python programmers will have a fighting chance of guessing what it does. (The official documentation does say you ought to prefer use of os instead, but let's ignore that wrinkle.) Likewise, other parts of the standard library contain trademarks of other companies, such as Apple, Microsoft, and Oracle, in relation to Python code which interacts with those companies' products. These are all internal to the Python codebase and documentation, are not distributed separately, and "POSIX" is not part of the name of any product or service offered by the Python Software Foundation. Python is using that word "nominatively", describing some aspect of Python which relates to POSIX but is not POSIX. The module authors might consider it sensible to use the word "POSIX" in its name and documentation, for the reason that compatibility with POSIX is essential to its functionality. But the rightsholders might also object to its appearance as a bare word (as opposed to posixinterface or something), because they want to preserve the meaning of "POSIX" as referring to their specific standard, the commercial value of which depends on restricting which operating systems can describe themselves as POSIX-compatible. In the U.S., circuit courts have taken slightly different directions in trying to carve out whether trademark use like this is OK. In the Second Circuit, there is a recent case about nominative fair use of a certification mark, Int'l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2016). The plaintiff, (ISC)2, offers the mark "CISSP" for security professionals who have passed certain examinations that they administer. The defendant, SU, offered training classes where the instructor was described as a "Master CISSP", to which the plaintiff objected because consumers could be misled into thinking that (ISC)2 endorsed the classes, and their trademark was being diluted because "Master CISSP" is not a term they use. On appeal, the upper court found that for assessing consumer confusion, courts must consider the eight "Polaroid factors" (named for Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) and rephrased in the judgement): The eight factors are: (1) strength of the trademark; (2) similarity of the marks; (3) proximity of the products and their competitiveness with one another; (4) evidence that the senior user may “bridge the gap” by developing a product for sale in the market of the alleged infringer's product; (5) evidence of actual consumer confusion; (6) evidence that the imitative mark was adopted in bad faith; (7) respective quality of the products; and (8) sophistication of consumers in the relevant market. and also: (1) whether the use of the plaintiff's mark is necessary to describe both the plaintiff's product or service and the defendant's product or service, that is, whether the product or service is not readily identifiable without use of the mark; (2) whether the defendant uses only so much of the plaintiff's mark as is necessary to identify the product or service; and (3) whether the defendant did anything that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the plaintiff holder, that is, whether the defendant's conduct or language reflects the true or accurate relationship between plaintiff's and defendant's products or services. Other circuit courts have adopted subtly different phrasings and this divergence has yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court or by Congress. Whether this standard is met in the example of this question is a matter for argument on the detailed facts. In the EU, there is an explicit protection for this specific kind of use, by virtue of Article 14 of the latest trademark directive, Directive 2015/2436 of 16 December 2015: A trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using, in the course of trade: ... (c) the trade mark for the purpose of identifying or referring to goods or services as those of the proprietor of that trade mark, in particular, where the use of the trade mark is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a product or service, in particular as accessories or spare parts. Paragraph 1 shall only apply where the use made by the third party is in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. The posix library could be regarded as an "accessory" to a POSIX-compatible operating system, in this sense, but is nonetheless within scope if the word "POSIX" is essential to identify what the module does. A key case in the CJEU, concerning a previous version of the Directive but with the same provision, was BMW Nederland BV v Deenik [1999] C-63/97, where a garage owner advertised himself as able to repair BMW cars, with "BMW" being a trademark of the complainants since 1930. The court held that so long as Deenik didn't imply that he had any commercial relationship or endorsement by BMW, he could reasonably use the term "BMW" as part of describing his services. As with the U.S. system, whether there is actual infringement would depend on the precise situation, and the relevant factors end up being pretty similar. That is partly because of conscious international efforts to harmonize trademark law.

When you put a logo that is a legally recognized trademark or servicemark in an acknowledgements section of a document, you are not infringing on the mark. A mark if infringed by someone using it when it is used in a manner that falsely communicates an affiliation with, or an endorsement of, the mark owner of the type of good or service that is protected by the mark. Using a mark in an acknowledgment section doesn't communicate this message (unless, of course, the acknowledgement section falsely says otherwise, which it wouldn't in the case posed by the question). Instead, this use is what is called "nominative use", and this use also expressly acknowledges and reaffirms that someone else owns the mark and has not licensed it to the author of the work containing the acknowledgement. So, this use of these logos does not infringe on the trademarks or servicemarks that protect these logos.

You really asked two different questions, so let's take them one at a time: Publisher Within the scope of 47 USC 230, Stack Exchange is defined as a provider of an "interactive computer service," which is defined as follows: Interactive computer service The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions. Stack Exchange's users are defined as "information content providers": Information content provider The term “information content provider” means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service. (Small caps removed to aid in legibility.) Then, under paragraph (c) of that section: (1) Treatment of publisher or speaker No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. (2) Civil liability No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of— (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). Therefore, Stack Exchange is specifically and unambiguously excluded from being treated as the publisher of any user-generated content. Additionally, there's an explicit waiver of liability for moderation activities. This waiver does not contain any provision requiring Stack Exchange (or anyone else) to moderate "fairly" or to be "neutral," nor does it say anything about terms of service. Regardless, it's hard to see how they could violate these terms anyway: Stack Overflow reserves the right to refuse, suspend or terminate your access to the public Network if it determines, in its sole discretion, that you have in any way violated these Public Network Terms or are otherwise ineligible to access or use the Network or Services. If your actions are determined by us to violate these Public Network Terms, Stack Overflow may, in its sole discretion, try to remediate that violation by working with you individually, but is under no obligation to do so, and if any such remediation efforts are unsuccessful (in Stack Overflow’s sole discretion), then Stack Overflow may revoke your rights to the Network. (Emphasis added.) Public forum A "public forum" in American Constitutional law normally refers to a situation where an agent of the government contracts with a private entity to set up a space in which the general public may speak or otherwise express themselves. Because the private entity acts on behalf of the government, the First Amendment is extended to the private entity, at least in the context of the space which it has set up. Stack Exchange, to the best of my knowledge, has no such relationship with either the federal or any state government. So the doctrine is inapplicable. In California, the state constitution has a stronger provision which has been applied to private actors notwithstanding their lack of a relationship with the government. This case was Pruneyard v. Robins. In subsequent California caselaw, the courts have repeatedly refused to extend this logic beyond its original context (shopping malls with "common areas" where people may congregate), and it seems unlikely that it would apply to websites.

My understanding is that here "derived from the program" means "created by modifying the source code of the program" and not "created by running the program". Certainly that is the way all users that I have heard of treat the matter. Note that a commercial program, such as a word processor, will be fully protected by copyright, but the maker does not claim to have any rights over documents written using it. "Derived" here seems pretty clearly to mean "derivative work" in the sense in which that term is used in copyright law. In copyright law "derived work" is a term of art with a definition specific to that field.

The problem is that open source licenses incl AGPL have legal force because copyright prevents copying + modifying software by default (software is treated as a “literary work” and therefore enjoys copyright protection). But copyright on datasets and ML models is very different – if it is even recognized at all. Thus, similar copyleft techniques would only work in particular jurisdictions. For example, the EU recognizes “database rights”. A copyleft license that accounts for this is CC-BY-SA-4.0, meaning that in an EU context, databases based on the original database would have to use the same license. However, database rights are not recognized in the US (facts are not copyrightable, and the “sweat of the brow” doctrine is not recognized). Thus, the CC-BY-SA-4.0 license would not have any copyleft effect with respect to databases in an US context. Independently of copyright in the database as a whole, the data in the database might be copyrighted material, for example if the database contains text or images, complicating matters further. Machine learning models derived from a data set are much more difficult. Clearly, ML models that have been trained are not a creative work and are therefore not eligible for independent copyright protection. At most, it can be argued that the model is an automatically transformed version of the input data, so that copyright in the input data implies copyright in the model.1 Perhaps hyperparameter choices could reflect some creative input. This is very much an active topic of debate. Given this uncertainty, it would be impossible to create a public license that works reliably. 1. An interesting discussion topic is the potential effect on Microsoft's Copilot ML model which was also trained on GPL-licensed source code. Instead of deriving force from copyright law, it would be possible to impose conditions via a contract, i.e. EULA-like terms that only provide access to the material after the terms have been accepted. But again, this is difficult. Contract law differs wildly between jurisdictions. For example, a contract is defined by the “meeting of minds” in some jurisdictions; by offer, acceptance, and consideration in others. But how does such a contract ensure appropriate consideration? How can acceptance be ensured if the material is publicly available? For these reasons, I think that unless broad international agreement emerges about IP protections for machine learning models, such a copyleft system for ML models is impossible. It is worth noting that the lack of such protections is probably quite good for innovation and research, since researchers are free to improve each other's work without legal concerns. The idea of copyleft is a hack to subvert the “everything is forbidden by default” system of copyright, but “everything is allowed by default” might be better.2 2. To continue the Microsoft Copilot example: some copyleft advocates like Bradley M Kuhn are sceptical about Copilot's GPL compliance, but remind us that copyleft maximalism means copyright maximalism, and that this is not the goal of open source. https://sfconservancy.org/blog/2022/feb/03/github-copilot-copyleft-gpl/

Copyright In most (all?) jurisdictions, copyright protects creative expression, not ideas. In united-states doctrine, that is known as the idea-expression distinction, but that concept is not US-specific. Therefore, the text of a recipe, an accompanying image, and other similar elements can be copyrighted. However, the functional parts of the recipe (the exact ingredients, proportions, timing of steps etc.) are not. If the Youtube video reads out the text of the recipe, then it would be a derivative work, but if the script of the video is rewritten in different words, it is not. Even further, the creative elements are only protected insofar as the same underlying idea can be expressed in multiple ways (merger doctrine). The typical example is software code where the level of similarity required to show infringement is high: computer code is text, but that text has to follow strict rules to be valid when run through the computer, and industry best practices mandate additional similarities. Recipes are more flexible than computer code, but they still follow a guiding pattern. Similarities of content that would be considered close paraphrasing (hence infringement) in a free-form context could be deemed to not be infringement in a stricter-form context. For instance, in france, taking the recipes from a children’s cookbook and putting them into another children’s cookbook (in different words but the same "for-children" tone) was deemed to not be infringement: Ces recettes prennent la forme classique et stéréotypée d’une énumération des ingrédients puis d’une description étape par étape des opérations à effectuer. Si (...) la formulation prend en considération le jeune public auquel est destiné ces recettes, cette caractéristique qui n’est au demeurant pas innovante comme le montrent d’autres exemples de recettes destinées aux enfants versés au débat par la défenderesse qui adoptent un ton similaire, ne suffit pas à leur donner une forme ou un contenu qui porte l’empreinte de la personnalité du rédacteur. Aussi les recettes en cause ne relèvent pas d’une activité créatrice originale, et ne sont pas de ce fait protégées au titre des droits d’auteurs. Those recipes take the standard and stereotyped form of a list of ingredients followed by a step-by-step description of the operations to perform. If (...) the choice of words takes its young audience into consideration, that characteristic (which is not new, as proven by other examples of children-oriented recipes shown by the defendant) is not sufficient to give it a form or content bearing the mark of its creator’s personality. As such, those recipes are not considered an original creative work, and are thus not protected by copyright. Source: TGI PARIS 3ème 2ème section 24 janvier 2014 RG 12/00188, cited at this link. Other intellectual property rights Trademarks protect brand image. If John Doe publishes John Doe’s Recipe Book with a recipe for John Doe’s cookies, and fills out the appropriate trademark paperwork, you are allowed to follow the same recipe to make cookies (or another recipe that produces similar cookies), but you cannot sell them as "John Doe’s cookies". You can say that you followed the recipe of John Doe’s book, but you can not say or imply anything that could make anyone think John Doe approved your cookies. Patents protect inventions, which are novel and non-obvious solutions to (usually technical) problems. I am not familiar enough to know if a particularly inventive recipe could be patentable (I guess not, but the answer might vary across jurisdictions). However, most recipes are new takes on old ideas (add more of that ingredient, less of that, have a different texture etc.). Those are certainly not patentable because they are "obvious" (which, in the context of patent law, means that anyone who has read all existing cookbooks in all languages could imagine the modified recipe). There are other, highly jurisdiction-dependent rights. For instance, in france, the shape and presentation of John Doe’s cookies could be protected under a "dessins et modèles" (sketches and models) clause. (For most recipes, it is trivial to modify the appearance of the final product enough to escape that kind of protection, so it is best thought of as an extension of trademark - you cannot sell John-Doe-looking-cookies even if you make clear they are not John-Doe-approved.)

Not having immediate access to the source doesn't preclude a finding of copyright infringement. If you have seen the source material, subconscious infringement can happen. However, in this example, both the short phrases doctrine and the merger doctrine would likely prevent the is_prime function from having copyright. Words and short phrases are not individually copyrightable, so the name would be free to take. Regarding the implementing code, if it isn't an exact copy (i.e. copy and paste), courts will apply the abstraction-filtration-comparision test. They may find that you took the selection and arrangement of instructions from the original source, albiet using different names. That selection and arrangement would probably be considered a substantial similarity and, if not for the merger doctrine, infringement. However, given the limited number of ways to express the prime-detection algorithm means that the expression of that idea has merged with the idea, and thus is not protected by copyright. (Or in some jurisdictions, merger is a defence to infringement rather than a bar to copyrightability).

Your question mixes up two different aspects of intellectual property. From a copyright point of view, it is perfectly legal to reproduce the features of a one piece of software in another. The functionlity of the software is not copyright (although the detailed look and feel of the user interface might be). However you ask if you, as an employee, can do this by "looking into the code of software X". Presumably by doing this learn something of the organisation and algorithms used. Even if you avoid direct copying, you are likely to have learned trade secrets of your employer, and publishing these is at least a civil tort in the US, and in some states a crime.

Is it legal to use a VPN to buy things at a lower price? I have seen VPN companies and their sponsees openly advertise the fact that VPNs can be used to change the apparent country you are connected from, and pay lower rates for certain products and services, e.g., subscriptions on video streaming websites. I am aware of Is it legal to watch or steam region-restricted shows or movies?, but this is a different question since I am asking about using the VPN to save money. Thoughts Such VPN use is probably in violation of the terms of use of such services, but is it also illegal? I think it could be illegal since it sounds like theft of services, because they are not paying the right amount. Also, it sounds similar to malicious hacking. What is the difference between a hacker who finds a way to manipulate a website to pay less money by making it seem as if they are in a different country, and someone who uses a VPN to do the same thing? On the other hand, it seems weird that VPN companies advertise this openly and do not seem to have faced any action from Netflix, YouTube or other impacted providers. Example In this YouTube ad (starts at 2:26 in the video), a NordVPN sponsee informs a Western audience that they can get cheaper subscription prices by setting their VPN location to certain countries. Screenshot below.

I know the OP is asking about America, but its also worth knowing about other countries. This is legal if both subscriber and subscription are within the EU. There was also a court case about this. In another case in 2014 the pub lost, but that seems to have been because the decoder was only licensed for domestic use. These cases were for satellite decoders rather than Internet streaming, but the legal issues would be the same. Both these cases involved British pubs, so obviously this law doesn't apply to them since Brexit.

VirusTotal is no different than many internet companies which operate with user-supplied content (i.e. Facebook, Youtube, etc.), and they are no different in the way they protect themselves with a TOS that outlines all aspects of their use of any material contributed or licensed or sold. Their Terms of Service states that users must own the copyright for what they upload and give VirusTotal a license to use it and relicense it and profit from it. VirusTotal uses the "safe harbor" clause of the DMCA to limit their liability for illegal uploads and provide a recourse for users who claim a copyright violation of uploads. And VirusTotal clearly seek to limit their liability for their own service in the case of false positives by standard clauses that claim they "do not warrant or guarantee that the services are accurate, reliable or correct." They're really no different than many internet companies; read the Terms of Service. It's a legally binding contract for all users, though some jurisdictions may limit some aspects of it.

Your friend's relationship with the game company is one of contract. You don't say what the contract terms are, so it's impossible to say whether they were breached by your friend or the company. In any case, it is likely that the only remedy your friend could seek is damages, probably limited to whatever outstanding portion of the subscription they have not had the benefit of. It seems unlikely that it will be a large enough amount to be worth pursuing. As a private company the game provider can choose to contract with who they wish, or not as the case may be (unless they can be shown to be discriminating against protected characteristics).

The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed.

Custom is more important than the law AFAIK there is no legal requirement to provide concessional pricing for any goods or services. Custom dictates that this is more common for services than for goods but, for example, cinema’s often don’t provide concessional pricing for blockbuster movies.

The territorial scope of the GDPR is defined in Article 3. It covers "personal data of data subjects who are in the Union", whether they are EU citizens or not. So to answer your questions: 1) are EU users, but moved to USA a few years ago, and signed-up on my website? They are not in the EU, so are not covered. You don't need to know if someone is an EU citizen, just if they are currently in the EU. 2) went for holidays in USA, signed-up on my website, and then came back to EU? (note - potentially skipped any Consent questions at sign-up, because IP was from USA) If someone moves into the EU while using your service then they fall under the GDPR for the time they are in the EU. If their home address is in the EU then that is covered, and monitoring of their behaviour while in the EU is also covered. Your other two questions are about VPNs. If a VPN is used to evade IP address geolocation and you have no other clue about where someone is then you can't be blamed for not knowing where they are (although I'm not aware of any actual case law on this topic). But if someone with a USA IP address gives a home address in the EU then you should probably treat them as being in the EU to be on the safe side. Basically, if you don’t know if they are in the EU or not, you should treat them as if they were.

It is legal, and good policy, because the later explanation could create conflicting policies and notions as to what the "agreement" is. The TOS is probably created by a lawyer who interviewed the website owner to figure out what they wanted, then wrote legal language to do that. If you ask tech support how to interpret the TOS, you probably are not getting a legally-correct statement (assuming that the tech support guy isn't also a lawyer). Rather than take a risk that a customer would defend their action in court by arguing "they said I could!", the website may elect to not make promises that they don't want to keep. Instead, if you want to understand the agreement, you hire your own lawyer, then propose a hypothetical action, to see how the law interprets the language of the agreement. For example "can I rent out my Netflix password so that other people can use it?". The lawyer would then read the TOS and relevant cases law, and would advise you whether this is allowed under the TOS (it is not). Alternatively, you could read up on relevant aspects of the law and figure it out yourself. Website TOS is basically driven by copyright law, the technical necessity of some kind of automatic copying in order to use a web page, and the legal requirement that you can't copy without permission of the copyright holder. The TOS is the set of conditions that you must satisfy in order to be permitted to use the site. So many questions reduce to issues of copyright law and permission to copy *can you legally "permit" the copying of materials you upload?).

If the ability to get a Pannini is conditioned on buying paper towels for money, then he isn't really selling paper towels for $2 and the Pannini for free, he is really selling a package consisting of paper towels and a Pannini for $2, so it would probably still be illegal. The phrase lawyers and judges use to talk about attempts to create loopholes like this one is "too clever by half", which means: "Shrewd but flawed by overthinking or excessive complexity, with a resulting tendency to be unreliable or unsuccessful."

What is the difference between the terms defendant and Respondent? It seems that there is perhaps a trend toward less adversarial terminology, so I wonder if it is that defendant was a more traditional term used exclusively historically, while Respondent has now begun to be used in some contexts as a reflection of this trend toward less adversarial terminology. Is this at all accurate of a description of how that split has come to be? In any event, what contexts tend to use which term nowadays? And why?

Defendant is normally used as the opposing party to a plaintiff, in a civil cause of action. It also refers to the accused in a criminal matter. Respondent is normally used as the responding party to an applicant, in motions, in certain statutory relief, relief based in judicial review, etc. It is also used to refer to the opposing party to petitioners in various statutory and equitable matters (and in some jurisdictions, there is little to no distinction between petitions and applications). Before administrative adjudicative tribunals and in alternative dispute processes, respondent is often the party that is not the claimant. A plaintiff or defendant may also either be an applicant or respondent on various motions at different times throughout the litigation. Respondent also refers to the non-appellant party or parties on appeal. There are likely other contexts that I am missing. For more, look to the rules, practice directives, or forms for the particular forum and process you are wondering about.

This is a perfectly common question. "What is your full name?" "Do you have any aliases?" "What other names do you go by?" Like any other question, though, it must be relevant, and you should be prepared to explain why it is relevant. If the court allows the question, the defendant must answer.

The parties can be required under oath to explain what they understand the plain meaning of the words to be. Where they disagree about the plain meaning of the words, they can use expert witnesses to give weight to their interpretation. Once the judge determines the plain meaning of the words (either by agreement between the parties or by reference to expert witnesses or other evidence), it is a matter of standard contract interpretation. Even in the case of an idioticon, where no expert witnesses are available, if the disagreement between the parties surrounds only a few words, the judge could find that there is no actual ambiguity because the context. Also, the judge could refer to parole evidence if needed. The purpose of the written contract is to provide evidence of your agreement. It is a bad idea to create evidence that you both may want to rely upon at some point if nobody else can understand it.

This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.

The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 (it was revised between 1868-1869, but enacted in 1870) applied specifically to civil cases (i.e. disputes between private parties); it's organized by topic area, and is there to keep people from having to comb through every law ever passed that has to do with civil cases. The Revised Statutes of 1870 gathered all the laws of "general character" into one place, for the same reason. The difference between the two was almost certainly an error. In general, there is one official version of the law; other versions are a convenience. The official version normally defaults to the individual laws passed by the legislature (which are organized by date, not by anything useful for finding relevant laws), but that can be changed by statute. In this case, the Revised Statutes contains section 3990, which says in so far as there may be any conflict between the provisions of this act and any provision of the said Revised Civil Code and Code of Practice, that said Code shall be held and taken as the law governing So, the Civil Code took precedence. Your revisions of 1876 and 1882 were not successor laws; rather, they were compilations of the Revised Statutes and Civil Code of 1870 with the amendments to those that had since been passed. The Revised Statutes from 1876 were really the Revised Statutes of 1870, modified by later laws (that didn't touch the divorce provisions). Likewise, the Civil Code from 1882 was really the Revised Civil Code of 1870, modified by later laws. The Civil Code of 1870 still took precedence over the Revised Statutes of 1870, so the divorce provisions of the Civil Code were authoritative.

if necessary it is possible to simplify it to USA vs EU The European Union is by no means a homogeneous area of law. I will assume france because it is the one I am most familiar with, but bear in mind that much of what follows might not apply to Spain/Germany/etc. The USA is a federal state. In particular, Louisiana law is heavily influenced by civil law for historical reasons. Other states and federal law do, however, follow more or less the same general principles. in common law there is the idea of a precedent, while in civil law not The first part is true. Common law usually hold the principle of stare decisis according to which precedents are binding. That means that the holding of a court binds the same court to rule the same way on similar matters raised later. I would note, however, that courts can be... let’s say "creative"... in finding ways to differentiate the case at hand from the previous one, when the judge is motivated to do so. The latter part is false, or at least, exaggerated. It is true that courts in civil law are not bound by previous holdings; an appeal that raises as its only argument "the court’s decision in my case was different from that in another case without offering any differentiation" would be rejected. However, there is the concept of jurisprudence constante where repeated precedent is highly persuasive. In practice, even simple precedent is persuasive. Furthermore, lower courts are bound by the holdings of higher courts, both in civil law and common law jurisdictions. (That’s more or less the meaning of "higher court".) in common law a judge plays a role of a person evidence at a court is provided to, while in civil law a judge tries to investigate too in addition That is a distinction between the inquisitorial and adversarial systems. The distinction does not exactly map to the civil/common law systems, but in practice the criminal part of civil law systems is often inquisitorial whereas common law systems are often adversarial. I will first note that the "inquisitorial" part where the judge conducts investigations is vastly overblown. That only occurs in complex cases that require extended investigations with more coercitive powers (for instance seizing documents etc.) Wikipedia says: In 2005, there were 1.1 million criminal rulings in France, while only 33,000 new cases were investigated by judges.[5] The vast majority of cases are therefore investigated directly by law enforcement agencies under the supervision of [the equivalent of district attorneys]. The numbers sound plausible to me, but here’s the ref it gives if you want to check (which I did not bother to do). The most visible part of the distinction is the way witnesses at trial are handled. In an adversarial system, the parties will ask to cite certain witnesses. There are pre-trial motions to exclude certain witnesses for certain reasons, but parties have a wide latitude of which witnesses they want to call. Each witness will come labelled as to which party asked for its appearance. At trial, the witness will be asked questions by the party who called them (direct examination), which will usually take a long time and include nondisputed background information (who are you, for how long have you worked with the defendant, etc.). Then, the opposing party will ask questions (cross-examination), emphasizing points that cast doubt on the witness’s reliability (because they are lying, because they do not remember well, etc.) or on the other parties’ narrative (highlighting details that were conveniently "missed" in direct examination). In an inquisitorial system, witnesses are chosen by the judge. Parties can ask to have witnesses added to the list, but the list does not come with labels that X is coming from the prosecution, Y from the defense. When a witness is called, the judge will ask most of the questions at the start, before giving the floor to the parties. Roughly speaking, the judge does the direct examination, and parties do a cross-examination afterwards. Note that in many cases the parties will ask few or no questions - high-profile cases that you read about in the media are abnormal in that respect. In particular, an inquisitorial-system court maintains a list of expert witnesses, which are called when technical points are required. That expert is paid by the court, not by the parties (however, when one party requests an expertise and the other party opposes it, the requesting party has to pay the cost upfront - they will shift it to the other party if they win the case). That is very different to the adversarial system of having each party introduce testimony by an expert they commissioned and paid. distance between public law and private law is smaller in common law legal system I am not sure I understand that question. It is true that "private" (tort) law operates in an adversarial system both in civil-law and common-law. Therefore, one could argue that the distance between civil-law’s criminal system (inquisitorial) and tort system (adversarial) is higher than between common-law’s criminal and tort systems (both adversarial). However, that is in my view a highly artificial distinction. The distance between practice areas within a single (common law or civil law) jurisdiction is large in any case. You would not want a lawyer specialized in drug-dealing cases to take your case about sexual harassment or unlawful dismissal, and vice-versa, in any jurisdiction.

You asked, "could that guy as defendant claim self defense and win?" First let's try to make it clear what is meant by "win". In the Rittenhouse trial, the defendant was charged of the following crimes: First-degree reckless homicide First-degree recklessly endangering safety (x2) First-degree intentional homicide Attempted first-degree intentional homicide Possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18 (dismissed) Failure to comply with an emergency order from state or local government (dismissed) Rather than thinking of the defendant as a "winner", it might be more appropriate to say that he was "acquitted" of these charges. If someone that was involved in the conflict fired first, as you described here: "They encounter each other when each is leaning or reaching or tripping, or whatever it would take for them to unintentionally point their gun at your head. You react and you raise your gun in defense, he spots your move and points his at you. You both fire. You shoot each other and you both are gravely injured. Like, paralyzed", then would they also be acquitted of all of the non-dismissed charges listed above? If everything was as you described ("unintentional", "reactionary", and "in defense"), then likely they would also not be found guilty of those crimes. It's not like they would "win", it's more like they will not be found guilty of committing one of those crimes. The precise outcome will depend on all the facts involved in the case, and the jury's decision based on those facts. So there is no single answer that always applies to every situation, but it sounds like you're wondering about some hypothetical situation that appears to be paradoxical because in this case only one person was charged with crimes: if someone else was the first shooter, the sequence of following events would first of all depend on whether or not they got charged with a crime, and I wouldn't characterize the outcome as a "win" or "lose" but as an "acquittal" or "conviction", and yes it is possible to be acquitted if everything is "accidental" as you described, and presumably not "reckless" (often meaning that a reasonable person in the same situation would have done the same thing). About your more broad question: "Is mutual self defense a thing?" It depends on what crime is being charged against the defendant. In the Rittenhouse case there was only one person that was charged. If you're asking about a hypothetical situation in which two people involved in a 1-on-1 conflict both claim self-defense, I hope I can assume that they were both charged with a crime against which to defend themselves in court in the first place. It is indeed possible for a State to prosecute both parties of a 1-on-1 physical conflict, and for both of them to successfully claim self-defense in order to eventually be both acquitted. It wouldn't be called "mutual self-defense", but each defendant would make their own self-defense case individually.

In appellate cases, the party appealing is called the "petitioner", and the other party is called the "respondent". These cases are listed Petitioner v. Respondent. In your example, Twombly was the original plaintiff, and Bell was the defendant in a class-action. This initial action would have been referred to as Twombly v. Bell. The case was dismissed by the trial court. Twombly appealed to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals. This action would have been still been called Twombly v. Bell, since Twombly was the party petitioning for the appeal. The 2nd Circuit agreed with Twombly, and reversed the district court's decision. Bell, then on the losing side, decided to appeal to the US Supreme Court. Because Bell was the petitioner in this action, Bell gets listed first.

Can underage people who commit a crime while underaged but are later charged with the same crime after turning 18 be tried as an adult? U.S federal law specifically but are there other countries that do this and in USA is an affirmative defense possible in these cases where they are tried as an adult?

germany Defendants who are later accused of a crime committed when they were minor (under 18, or under 21 if the court finds that they had juvenile mental maturity) will be tried under juvenile rules. That can lead to people almost 90 years old being sentenced to juvenile detention. (A suspended sentence, not least because of the time that had passed.) [...] On July 23th, 2020, D. was given a suspended sentence of two years of juvenile detention for 5232 counts of accessory to murder and one count of accessory to attempted murder. [...] (my translation)

Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.

Yes, maybe australia In Australia, child abuse material is classified as the sexualised depiction of persons under 16 (or in some cases 18). This applies under both State and Commonwealth laws. Common charges in NSW will be possessing, disseminating or producing child abuse material under s 91(H) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Further Commonwealth offences can be found in circumstances where a communications carrier has been used for the purposes of delivering child abuse material. Within this field, there are subtle variations in circumstances. The court would need to decide if the pictures were a “sexualised depiction”. Context matters. I don’t know of any cases on point but convictions have been secured for sexualised cartoons of children and pictures of fully-clothed children in sexual poses.

If the younger person starts a civil suit against the older person for statutory rape, can the older person countersue for "actual" rape? There is no civil action counterpart to statutory rape. Is there any way that the older person can use the "actual" rape as a defense in either a civil or criminal charge? Statutory rape does not give the person who is defined as a victim of statutory rape to bring a civil action for money damages against the adult with whom that individual had sex. Sometimes there might be a civil action for breach of a fiduciary or confidential relationship, or intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrageous conduct. But that would be the exception, rather than the rule, and the civil action tort would not be a strict liability offense. While statutory rape is sometimes a "strict liability crime" in the sense that actual subjective consent is not a defense, and reasonable mistake of age is not a defense, a prosecution for statutory rape still requires proof of a voluntary act by the defendant charged with the offense. The claim that someone did not voluntarily have sex with the underaged person and instead was forced to engage in sex with the underaged person without their consent would be a valid defense to the crime. This is because it would prevent the prosecutor from proving that the defendant committed the voluntary act element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This kind of defense could also be conceptualized as the affirmative defense of duress which would still apply to this offense. My understanding is that if the older person has been convicted criminally for statutory rape, that would bar that person from prevailing in a civil suit for "actual" rape. Would this be true[?] One could bring a civil action for assault and battery in connection with a rape not implied in law by virtue of age (i.e. what you mean when you say "actual" rape). A criminal conviction for statutory rape (for which all appeals have been exhausted) would probably be a valid defense to such a civil action pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel (i.e. because a binding determination of the same issue with the same or stronger burden of proof was finally resolved on the merits in another case involving the same people). This is only true, however, because the lack of voluntary act defense would have been available in the criminal case for statutory rape. has such a sequence of events actually happened anywhere in the United States? Probably. The United States has had states with statutory rape laws for many, many decades and many hundreds of millions of people, if not billions of people, have lived in that time period. So, almost anything that could happen with respect to a widely enacted law involving activities that are possible for ordinary people to engage in has probably happened. This said, however, I've never heard of a legal case with this fact pattern in the news media or in reported case law (although admittedly, this isn't my area of practice). The more common case which does come up from time to time is a case of brother-sister incest where there is dispute over who should be charged (usually, but not always, the older sibling, and in rare instances, both are charged). Historically, in the overwhelming majority of cases where statutory rape charges could easily be proven, they are not brought by prosecutors. Sometimes this is because that is what the victim wants. Historically, victims have frequently wanted this outcome, either out of hope for an ongoing relationship with the adult, or doesn't want to relive a traumatic event, or out of the well founded believe of the victim that the case would do more to harm her reputation and well being than it would to suitably punish the adult (and keep in mind that statutory rape is often a misdemeanor offense which might be punished fairly lightly at sentencing depending upon the judge). Sometimes this is because the prosecutor sees keeping the perpetrator employed and able to pay child support when a pregnancy results as a preferable options. Sometimes this is because proving that sexual intercourse happened with someone beyond a reasonable doubt in cases that did not result in pregnancy, when the only witnesses are the alleged defendant and the allege child victim whose credibility may be questioned, was very difficult prior to DNA evidence, widespread use of rape kits, and cheap, ubiquitous video and photography use. Furthermore, factually, it is exceedingly uncommon for young minor girls to rape adult men, and until quite recently, the statutory rape laws applied only to female victims. Even now, with gender neutral statutory rape laws being the norm, prosecutors are much less likely prosecute an alleged statutory rape involving a male victim than a female victim. Finally, many prosecutors feel morally justified in invoking their authority to press statutory rape charges only when they believe that there was a non-consensual sexual act committed against the victim which happened even if it was hard to prove and are reluctant to bring such charges if the prosecutor believes under the circumstances that the act was consensual in fact, even if legally the defendant is still legally guilty in those circumstances. Generally speaking, attitudes towards this have grown more harsh towards men who have sex with young minors in recent years, but historically, this was a pretty important factor.

Double jeopardy does not bar him from facing federal charges, although U.S. Justice Department policy reserves such prosecutions for exceptional cases. Also, it depends to some extent upon whether there is a suitable federal crime that fits the conduct.

Aiden4's answer about Winconsin's statute 948.60 is correct, but incomplete and the complete reason is interesting/funny, so I'll expand on it: The statute reads: 948.60 Possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18. (1) In this section, “dangerous weapon" means any firearm, loaded or unloaded; any electric weapon, as defined in s. 941.295 (1c) (a); metallic knuckles or knuckles of any substance which could be put to the same use with the same or similar effect as metallic knuckles; a nunchaku or any similar weapon consisting of 2 sticks of wood, plastic or metal connected at one end by a length of rope, chain, wire or leather; a cestus or similar material weighted with metal or other substance and worn on the hand; a shuriken or any similar pointed star-like object intended to injure a person when thrown; or a manrikigusari or similar length of chain having weighted ends. (2) (a) Any person under 18 years of age who possesses or goes armed with a dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. (b) Except as provided in par. (c), any person who intentionally sells, loans or gives a dangerous weapon to a person under 18 years of age is guilty of a Class I felony. (c) Whoever violates par. (b) is guilty of a Class H felony if the person under 18 years of age under par. (b) discharges the firearm and the discharge causes death to himself, herself or another. (d) A person under 17 years of age who has violated this subsection is subject to the provisions of ch. 938 unless jurisdiction is waived under s. 938.18 or the person is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of criminal jurisdiction under s. 938.183. (3) (a) This section does not apply to a person under 18 years of age who possesses or is armed with a dangerous weapon when the dangerous weapon is being used in target practice under the supervision of an adult or in a course of instruction in the traditional and proper use of the dangerous weapon under the supervision of an adult. This section does not apply to an adult who transfers a dangerous weapon to a person under 18 years of age for use only in target practice under the adult's supervision or in a course of instruction in the traditional and proper use of the dangerous weapon under the adult's supervision. (b) This section does not apply to a person under 18 years of age who is a member of the armed forces or national guard and who possesses or is armed with a dangerous weapon in the line of duty. This section does not apply to an adult who is a member of the armed forces or national guard and who transfers a dangerous weapon to a person under 18 years of age in the line of duty. (c) This section applies only to a person under 18 years of age who possesses or is armed with a rifle or a shotgun if the person is in violation of s. 941.28 or is not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593. This section applies only to an adult who transfers a firearm to a person under 18 years of age if the person under 18 years of age is not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593 or to an adult who is in violation of s. 941.28. 2 things to note: (1) takes care to include, in the list of dangerous weapons: nunchaku, shuriken and manrikigusari. While the first 2 are more or less familiar to everyone knows anything about Japanese martial arts, the last one had to be looked up by everyone following the case to discover that it's the "secret weapon of the Ninja"(even more than the shuriken). (3.c) says that the whole of this entire section applies[adding the brackets to make following the formal logic easier] only if (the person under 18 is in violation of 941.28[barrel length under 16 inches]) or (is not in compliance with ss. 29.304[Restrictions on hunting and use of firearms by persons under 16 years of age] and 29.593[Requirement for certificate of accomplishment to obtain hunting approval]). In programming terms(for those so inclined), 3.C could be written as: IF ((barrelLengthInches < 16) OR (huntingUnder16Applies AND huntingCertificateApplies)) THEN statute948.60Applies ELSE statute948.60DoesNotApply Since the barrel length is over 16'' and Rittenhouse is over 16 and no hunting permit was required for his activities, the whole section of the law did not apply. Assistant District Attorney James Kraus argued that the exception renders the state’s prohibition on minors possessing dangerous weapons meaningless. In essence, that the legislators drafting that law spent too much time watching cheesy early 90's action movies and thinking of how to save Wisconsinites from the Ninja threat, to draft the law properly, so it should be read according to its intent from the title of the section. However, there is a binding Common Law precedent, dating back from the 16th century called the "Rule of Lenity", also called "Strict Constructionism" in the US, whereby if the legislature screws up, it's the legislature's problem. In the original case, the law in England forbade "felonious stealing of Horses, Geldings or Mares". A thief was caught, but argued that since he only stole one horse and the law specified horses, the law didn't apply to him. He was let off and the law hastily rectified. Pre-revolutionary Common Law precedent is binding in the US and it was re-affirmed multiple times, e.g. United States v. Wiltberger, where a US sailor got off with killing another US sailor in a Chinese estuary, because the law only applied on the "high seas". So, the charge was tossed and the defense didn't press the issue further. However, the really interesting bit is that even though it didn't get to be argued since Rittenhouse was 17, the way the law is actually written, this section only applies if (huntingUnder16Applies AND huntingCertificateApplies). That means that there is literally nothing in Wisconsin barring a 12 year old(under 12 is separately forbidden in the 29.304/huntingUnder16Applies section) from possessing and using an AR-15(or AK-47), as long as the barrel is >16'' and a hunting license isn't required for the activity. I think that the legislature will amend the law with haste, before it can be tested on 12 year olds. P.S. the other guy who gave him the gun will get off with this precedent too, since the statute for his charge is: This section applies only to an adult who transfers a firearm to a person under 18 years of age if the person under 18 years of age is not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593 or to an adult who is in violation of s. 941.28. i.e. the same 3 sub-sections as for Rittenhouse.

Modern legal systems frown on individual retribution. A victim of a crime is not allowed to punish the perpetrator of the crime; that falls to the state. The answer is therefore yes; the person could be arrested, tried, and punished, including by imprisonment.

In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense.

What are reasonable steps to ascertain or contact lost property's owner to avoid liability for theft by finding? Suppose one finds an item on the street that seems to have been lost by someone. What are examples of reasonable steps one could take to attempt to contact the item's rightful owner before concluding that it may in fact not be possible to do so? Once one has reasonably reached this conclusion, is one then legally entitled to keep the property for one's self?

Following the guidance of the police In summary: If the item is hazardous or dangerous you should report it to the police using the emergency number. If the item is non-hazardous and found in a private place, hand it to the owner of the premises - it's their responsibility to attempt to find the owner and the property becomes theirs if they can't. If the item is non-hazardous and found on public transport, hand it to the operator - they have their own by-laws about lost property. If the item is non-hazardous and found in a public place, if it has a serial number, hand it to the police - they may be able to trace the owner if it is a government document, hand it to the issuer if it is of low value, make reasonable efforts to find the owner "these could include asking people nearby or in offices or shops. You could also consider leaving a note with your details. If you can't find the owner there's nothing more we can do and you should dispose of the item." if it is of high value, make reasonable efforts to find the owner and if you can't hand it to the police.

If a trespasser openly and notoriously, exclusively and continuously possesses your property by building a fence on your land for the right time period, they automatically own the land. It still takes a court proceeding to record the passing of title (the trespasser has to prove in court that it is legally theirs). The trespasser would also have to establish that the recent survey was correct (survey errors do exist): was there an earlier survey in connection with the fence that established different boundaries? If (as it turns out) this has become his property, he abstractly has title to it, but only you and he know about it. The trespasser may have an interest in officially changing the property description, because it will officially increase the size of his lot and thus the value of the house+land. This also will increase their tax burden (while decreasing yours). The county has no knowledge of the fence: they go off of the official record, which says that you own that wedge. You also may have an interest in changing the property description, primarily to reduce your tax bite. There could also be issues with your resale of the property, since a mortgage company may require a survey of the property. Whether or not that is bad is hard to say: the consequence could be that the buyer is alerted to the fact that the lot is smaller than advertised and so on; in the current market I doubt anyone would care. If the fence goes away and you start using the land, then it will officially revert to you after a while. If you catch the party and complain within 10 years, you may recover the property (RCW 7.28.010). The limitations statute says that The period prescribed for the commencement of actions shall be as follows: Within ten years: (1) For actions for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof; and no action shall be maintained for such recovery unless it appears that the plaintiff, his or her ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years before the commencement of the action. That ship has (apparently) long since sailed. There is a different law pertaining to "Adverse possession under title deducible of record" which shortens the limit to 7 years, which is even less useful to the original owner. RCW 7.28.070 also shortens the time limit for an adverse possession case, to 7 years: Every person in actual, open and notorious possession of lands..who shall for seven successive years continue in possession, and shall also during said time pay all taxes legally assessed on such lands or tenements, shall be ... the legal owner of said lands There is another (more recent) tax-related provision, RCW 7.28.083. (1) A party who prevails against the holder of record title at the time an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession was filed, or against a subsequent purchaser from such holder, may be required to: (a) Reimburse such holder or purchaser for part or all of any taxes or assessments levied on the real property during the period the prevailing party was in possession of the real property in question and which are proven by competent evidence to have been paid by such holder or purchaser; This does not require them to have paid taxes, it say that the victor in the dispute may nevertheless be ordered to reimburse taxes paid by the other party (assuming the other party has paid the tax). So there is some chance of getting the taxes back. The reimbursement is at the court's discretion (continuing that section): (2) If the court orders reimbursement for taxes or assessments paid or payment of taxes or assessments due under subsection (1) of this section, the court shall determine how to allocate taxes or assessments between the property acquired by adverse possession and the property retained by the title holder. In making its determination, the court shall consider all the facts and shall order such reimbursement or payment as appears equitable and just. One should also pay attention to the last provision in that statute: (3) The prevailing party in an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession may request the court to award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The court may award all or a portion of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if, after considering all the facts, the court determines such an award is equitable and just. That means that the victor can request the loser to pay his attorney's fees. This is delicate math, balancing the chance of recovering some paid taxes vs. paying the other guy's costs. You could try calling the assessor to find out how much the decrease in lot size might net you (the land vs. improvement proportion of taxes is all over the map in KC, easily ranging from 60% to 250% depending on year). One additional feature of adverse possession is that it must be "hostile", i.e. without permission. If a neighbor builds on your land, you can explicitly give them revocable permission (to avoid "no you didn't" arguments, explicit and revocable written permission, signed by the neighbor, would bar an adverse possession claim). This raises an interesting question, to which I don't know the answer. Suppose the prior owner gave permission to the fence builder, and did not demand the removal of the fence when he sold the property or right after the neighbor sold his property (there was only on act of granting permission). Does the clock start from your acquisition of the property (whereupon the element of hostility is satisfied)? Or does it start from the point where they acquired the property and were in hostile possession of the land (I would bet a quarter that that's the answer). If (or, given that) the fence was moved further onto your property more recently, there is a chance to recover the newly-taken piece of land. If you grant them revocable permission to build a fence on your property, you would not be subject to an adverse possession taking for the newly-taken land. If at some point you tell them to tear down the fence and they refuse, you can sue them and the court will (almost certainly) order the removal of the fence. The neighbor might then initiate an action to quiet title on the originally-taken piece of land, so you'd be back to where you were 4 years ago. From a practical perspective, this is well-worth the small amount of money involved to consult with an attorney to get legal advice. The legal matter probably will not go away quickly, and they may be presently inclined to settle in a manner more in your favor.

The technical difference is that theft is illegal, and adverse possession is not. I'm assuming you're talking about why there's a difference. Historically, there are two basic reasons for adverse possession. First, land lasts for a very long time, and a sale is generally invalid unless the seller has valid title. That means that no property title is secure, because someone could always come out of the woodwork with a claim that your great-great-great-grandfather threw their great-great-great-grandfather off the land 300 years ago. Not only is all land title insecure, but you might not even be able to defend such a claim (do you know the history of your land for the past 300 years?) Adverse possession, then, is a way to let people know no one else can claim title to their land based on something so long ago no one remembers properly. Even with modern public land registries (which did not always exist), this situation can still arise if someone mistakenly believes that they own some land and starts using it. The second reason is that if someone isn't doing anything with the land for a long time, and someone else is doing something useful with it, the government would rather give it to the person doing something useful. People who lose property through adverse possession are unwilling to take the extremely minor steps needed to keep their property. It tends to move land from totally nonproductive users to productive users, and then keeps those nonproductive users from kicking out people who improved the land and keeping the improvements. The notion that leaving something for too long removes your right to claim it is not restricted to real estate. Almost everything in law has a time limit of some sort.

I would think that this would be treated the same as lost property. In most places, if you notice lost property (for example because the postman hands it to you) you have the choice of ignoring it (don't touch it, don't accept it from the postman), or you have to make reasonable efforts to find the owner and return it. If you as the sender had no idea who received the package so you cannot contact them, and there was nothing in the package identifying the sender, the receiver would be able to keep the package when their efforts of finding the owner fail. But if you manage to contact them, then the receiver knows the owner, so there is no legal excuse to keep the package.

An analogy to towing companies is tempting but misplaced, since towing is a statutorily-authorized and regulated activity (e.g. RCW 46.55). You therefore cannot just charge an arbitrary storage fee for uncollected equipment, and it is highly unlikely that there is any provision in the contract which authorizes you to charge for storage. The question is why you think you think they are responsible for picking up the excavator – presumably there is a clause in the contract that says that they will pick it up. Assuming that the contract doesn't say much, then your recourse would reside in the fact of their equipment trespassing on your property. You would need to officially withdraw permission for their equipment to be on your property (since you gave it in the first place). They would have a reasonable time to retrieve their goods, and if they don't do so, you would have a basis for suing them for damages. Also, the worst thing you could do is forcibly keeping their key until they pay you a storage fee: you'd need a court-ordered award, to get anything from them. The Connecticut towing law is here. Note that in order to call a towing company to get the equipment towed (if that's even possible), there has to be "conspicuous signage" warning of the possibility of towing "on such private commercial property"; but an overriding consideration is that you may tow if the vehicle is left for forty-eight or more hours. Two points to be noted are that although the law refers to "An owner or lessee of private property", the signage requirement implies that the property has to be commercial, not residential (this limitation to "private commercial property" is repeated in the statute, indicating a legislative intent to restrict the legal towing permission to commercial property). The law refers to "motor vehicles", but it is not clear whether an excavator counts as a "motor vehicle" (defined in para 54 of the definitions section). Although an excavator is a "vehicle propelled or drawn by any nonmuscular power", exceptions are carved out for agricultural tractors, farm implements, and "and any other vehicle not suitable for operation on a highway", which I think reasonably means that an excavator is not a motor vehicle. So since the towing statute does not authorize towing of something that is not a motor vehicle, that would not seem to be an option in this case (even if there were signage, and this is commercial property). And calling a towing company would only get the item removed from your property, but would not authorize you to collect a storage fee (the towing company can only do so after the police have been notified, which they must do withing 2 hours).

No. Your evidence of registration of the car would suffice to show that you are not receiving stolen property, although you are correct that not informing the police that it has been recovered could get you pulled over if the car has been reported as stolen. Given the circumstances of the question, I don't address the means by which the car is repossessed. Not every use of force would be justified to secure the return of the stolen car. Reporting the theft and recover to the police would also make it easier for you to make an insurance claim. Repossession of a car stolen by fraud (tricking you into signing over the car title to them in exchange for Monopoly money in an envelope that you don't check until after they are gone, or for a forged check), which is then sold to a bona fide third party individual for value, however, might constitute car theft.

The premise about couches is true in terms of popular beliefs, but false in terms of law. Taking the property of another person without permission, with the intention to keep it, is theft. However, taking it with permission is allowed. W.r.t. a couch, your belief works because you generally have implicit permission. A sign saying "free" is good evidence, in lieu of a personal interaction with the owner, that you have such permission. There are scenarios where a person is moving a couch into their house, leaves it outside for a break, and some prankster puts a "free" sign on the couch. You nab and leave, 911 is called, you get arrested (more likely there will be an interaction of the type "give him back his couch") and you defend yourself against a charge of theft on the grounds that you reasonably believed you had permission to take the couch. At present, a reasonable person would know that a scooter left by the side of the road is not actually "there for the taking", therefore you know (or should know) that you are committing a crime. Additionally, there are more stringent law regarding theft of vehicles as opposed to theft of couches, which expands the concept of "theft" to include "take in order to just temporarily use", thus "keeping" is not a requirement of vehicle theft laws. Rentascooter is generally and obviously locked in some way, which is further evidence that the item was not abandoned (this goes to your state of mind in taking the object), supporting the wrongfulness of this taking.

There are two separate questions here, it seems to me. First: are law enforcement officers required to respect your house rules and avoid making a mess? At least in the United States, the answer is unequivocally no. If the only "damage" suffered is that you need to sweep the floor, or put your clothes back in drawers, that's not the police's problem. You have not suffered any damages that a court is going to reimburse, and your best case scenario, even if you win a suit against the police, is an award of one dollar as nominal damages. Second: are law enforcement officers required to reimburse you for any physical damage they caused while executing the search warrant? The answer here is tricker, and depends on the search warrant. If the warrant is invalid, then the answer is yes. But remember: just because, for example, the cops are looking for the guy you bought your house from, who moved out a month ago, that doesn't mean the warrant is "invalid." Just because the cops got a bad tip, or suspected you wrongly, or were in some other way wasting their time--as long as the warrant is technically proper and they were able to convince a judge it was reasonable, the warrant is valid. Even if the warrant is invalid, you may need to sue the police to get anything reimbursed. If the warrant is valid, in practical terms, you will almost certainly need to sue the police to recover anything, and you will have to show the Court that the police's actions that damaged your property were so extreme that they were outside the reasonable scope of the warrant. For instance: the warrant is for a large item, like a stolen car: the police cannot smash holes in your walls to make sure the car isn't hidden inside. If they're looking for drugs, they may be able to. If the officers' actions are consistent with the scope of the warrant, then you are not going to recover anything. The warrant is, basically, permission from a judge to enter your home and perform those actions, and they will not be liable for them. A number of relevant cases are discussed in this article: http://www.aele.org/law/2010all01/2010-1MLJ101.pdf

If involved in an accident, while uninsured, for which the other driver is insured, can the other insurance company turn them in? A friend of a friend recently had this situation come up. They were driving uninsured as a result of one of their housemates having tossed the bills as they came in. They learned they were uninsured after another car struck them and, on contacting the insurance company, being told that they had missed their payment and that the company had suspended their account. I know that Corbin vs Khosla (2002) established that an uninsured motorist can hold the at-fault driver liable for their damages, but they're also worried that, if they contact the other insurance company, then they will be reported for uninsured driving (despite that they were unaware that they were uninsured at the time) and face fines or a license suspension. As I understand it, there were no police at the site of the accident, since it was so minor, so they exchanged information, but there was no official police presence. Is an insurance company allowed to threaten to report the uninsured driver to avoid having to pay for the driver who caused the accident? This is in Pennsylvania, in the Allegheny County area.

Threatening to report the uninsured driver to avoid payment would be blackmail and illegal / criminal. As a result, they are not going to do this. Reporting the uninsured driver on the other hand is their civic duty. So they can get your friend into trouble, but they can't get around paying. Is your friend insured now? If not, tell him to get insured IMMEDIATELY. And if they are very lucky, the other company doesn't figure out your friend was uninsured, and they get away with it when they make a claim. Alternatively, tell them to figure out how much the damage is, how much the repair will cost, and whether it is worth taking the risk.

In Spain, most traffic offenses are usually considered administrative sanctions and involve just a relatively small fine, and perhaps losing some points in your licence. In those cases, if the driver if the vehicle cannot be established (your example, or a far regular one of a parking violation in which the officer did not see who did park it and will not wait by the side of the parker until the driver appears), the fine just goes to the registered owner. When the fine is reported to the registered owner of the vehicle, he can report who was the actual driver who broke the law at the time of the offense. I do not know what would happen if the person named does not recognize his responsability, but my guess is that the owner has to pay the fine (HINT: do not lend your car to someone who cannot be trusted). If the infraction is so excessive that it becomes a matter of penal law then there must be a trial and then the accused must be established without reasonable doubt, so in that case such a stunt maybe could work.

Bad people are quite uncommon Most people behave in good faith most of the time - don't tie yourself in knots over the very few people who would be unscrupulous enough to try to do this. Burden of proof The person who makes the allegation has the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities. So the person who claims they didn't receive it has to prove that. If there are two equally credible witnesses, one saying they packed and posted the thing and one saying the thing was not packed then the burden has not been met. If the person who packed it has a photo of it packed and addressed then the other person has definitely not met their burden of proof. Insurance Insure it against loss or damage in transit. Then you can just replace it and claim on your insurance.

It seems that the Iowa authorities did attempt to notify the driver. If the letter of notification was returned because the driver changed his or her address, that is not the DOT's fault -- drivers are supposed to notify the authorities of changes of address -- indeed driving with a license with an out-of-date address is itself a violation in some US states. If the error was made by the postal service, that is still not the DOT's fault but they might be more willing to accept an appeal from the driver. In general, authorities must make a reasonable attempt to notify people of court or administrative actions, but if those notifications fail, the authorities can go ahead in many cases. Try explaining that one doesn't owe taxes because an IRS notice was misdelivered. It would be too easy to avoid unwanted governmental actions if nondelivery of mail were a valid excuse. It may well be that there is a procedure to get the suspension waived or ended early, perhaps involving taking the class that should have been taken, and perhaps paying an additional fine. Details of such procedures vary. A local lawyer who deals with traffic issues frequently would probably know what steps might be taken. It may well be that the original ticket mentioned a possible suspension, but it may not have. That also varies by state.

The question asks for analysis of a specific accident, and I'll leave that to other answers. This answer is focused on conceptual misunderstandings in the question itself. Where does fault lie in the following situation; and what tickets if any should be issued according to Illinois Motor Vehicle Code and why? Again who is at fault or what %'s of fault should be applied and why? Lawsuits v. Traffic Citations It is important to understand that whether tickets could be issued according to the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code, and legal fault in a lawsuit arising from an accident involving a motor vehicle are two very different legal concepts. Also, there isn't necessarily only one person at fault or only one person who has violated the Motor Vehicle Code. Motor Vehicle Code Violations Violations of the Motor Vehicle Code are analyzed one by one in a criminal or quasi-criminal traffic court proceeding where the issue is whether a fine or other punishment should be imposed for violating it. One person being cited does not mean that another person can't be cited as well. These proceedings would be brought by the "People of the State of Illinois" against each defendant by a government official at government expense. The government also has no legal obligation to bring charges for every violation that could in theory be legally supported by the facts. The outcome of the traffic court proceedings would be inadmissible evidence in a lawsuit arising out of the accident. Usually the police report will also be inadmissible evidence unless the police officer who wrote it is brought into court to testify in support of it, or the parties stipulate otherwise. Civil Liability In A Lawsuit In a lawsuit, brought by the private lawyer for a person who has suffered damages from the accident (called a "plaintiff") must show that someone else was negligent, which means that they failed to act with reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent harm to others, that this caused their damages, and must prove their damages. Private lawyers for the defendants whom the Plaintiff seeks to assign fault to are usually paid for by the defendants' insurance companies and argue against their clients having liability. A jury hears all of the evidence and assigns a percentage of fault to each party including the plaintiff. If the person injured is found by a jury to be at least 50% at fault, then there is no recovery. If the person injured is found to be less than 50% at fault, then the other parties at fault have legal liability to the plaintiff based upon their percentage of fault. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1116. Negligence in a lawsuit doesn't necessarily have to involve a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. A jury can find, for example, that someone was driving too fast for the conditions despite not violating the speed limit, or stopped too abruptly, even if those aren't Motor Vehicle Code violations and can find a percentage of fault based upon that conduct. A violation of the Motor Vehicle Code does not automatically translate to fault either. Violations of the Motor Vehicle Code are a basis for a finding of fault, in what is called negligence per se, if the code section violated was intended to prevent the kind of accident that actually happened. Failure to use a turn signal, for example, will rarely constitute negligence per se in an accident where one car rear ends another car. There are very simple cases where one can truly state with absolutely certainty that only one party is at fault for purposes of a negligence lawsuit. For example, comparative fault is hard to argue in a case where a garbage truck hits and damages a building while the driver isn't paying attention and the building owner sues the garbage truck driver and his employer, although even then the issue of what damages should be awarded can be litigated. (Full disclosure: I litigated this case for a building owner until it had to be transferred to new counsel due to a merger of my law firm with another law firm that represented the other side in the case.) But usually (at least in cases that go to trial) there is at least some colorable argument that more than one person involved failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances and if so, the jury must allocate fault percentages on a basis that it feels best allocates responsibility for the harm caused to a particular plaintiff by the accident as it sees fit in their good judgment using common sense. And, this allocation of percentage fault is almost impossible to overturn on appeal if there is any argument based upon any evidence introduced at trial that the people to whom fault were allocated indeed not totally without fault. It is impossible to say, as a matter of law, what percentage of fault should be assigned to each at fault party when more than one party is potentially at fault. This is question purely for the finder of fact (usually a jury, but the judge in a bench trial).

united-states I am skiing and cause unintentional injury to another slope patron/client. How would I protect myself from being sued? Use reasonable care to avoid harming others, and follow all applicable rules of the ski area. Keep your equipment in good repair. Don't ski when you are drunk or high or in circumstances you can't handle. Try not to collide with people. If you do collide with someone do what you can to mitigate their injuries, identify ways to document facts favorable to you, and promptly contact your insurance company. Is there insurance if sued that could protect my assets if found negligent and cover legal costs of lawyer and trial, regardless if found negligent? For this, you need liability insurance. In the United States, liability insurance is typically included in homeowner's or renter's insurance. These kinds of liability insurance typically cover the cost of a legal defense of a covered claim and any damages awarded or paid in a settlement of those claims (up to the policy limits). These kinds of liability insurance would typically cover liability arising from a skiing accident and most other claims for negligence, but would typically not cover claims related to intentional acts or a criminal prosecution. A homeowner's or renter's insurance policy would also not typically cover vehicle accidents (e.g. your liability while operating a snowmobile), claims related to a business or an occupation, or claims related to contractual liability.

You can sue anyone you want. But if you are talking about suing VW because they are one of the thousands of entities that contribute to the overall degeneration of our atmospheric quality, then you would lose. You'd have to be able to show that VW itself caused your respiratory problem to either exist or that their diesel cars exacerbated a pre-existing condition. The type of testimony this would require would be expert testimony, and you would have the burden of showing that VW was the root cause. This would be impossible. You could show negligence (maybe even gross negligence or intentional misrepresentation), but you could never show causation and likely not even damage (attributable to them). These are the three elements you would need to prove. I would wager you could not even hire an expert that would testify to this, because they would lose all credibility in their field if they said that one car manufacturer had a measurable/quantifiable negative effect on your health. Even if you could, the judge would probably not certify the testimony as expert as it's likely junk science, or, the expert would just be disbelieved. There is no way to accurately measure their complicity in having their cars automatically pass emissions tests. It may be that their cars were still low E, just not to the extent they claimed.

Legal action might be taken by the garage, because you had a contract to repair the gearbox which you cancelled (causing them some damages in time spent). You could hope that the store-owner will pay the invoice that you sent, but that seems to not be likely. The store owner can't sue you for sending him the invoice: the mechanic can sue you for not paying what the work billed for. But you do have a recourse, which is that you were acting on behalf of the store owner. I assume that you were in possession of the old gearbox, so it simplified matters if you took transported it to the mechanic, since the store owner was going to pay. In other words, you were acting as the store owner's agent: you were authorized to create a contractual arrangement between the garage and the owner. The one problem is that apparently the garage thought they were doing the work for you, and not for the owner. So they may sue you, and you may sue the owner. And suing anybody costs money. The owner is, perhaps, trying a strategy of not paying what he does actually owe, in the theory that the alternative of suing is too much time and bother (besides, it's the garage owner who would have to get the ball rolling – unless the shop owner first wants to sue to recover the gearbox). Given the information you have provided, I don't see a basis for the shop owner suing you. In order to sue someone, that person has to have caused you some damage. He could claim that he didn't authorize you to take the gearbox to the garage, or that you were negligent in making the arrangements with the shop (for instance if he said "but only if they will do the diagnosis for free"), in which case the court will have to decide whose story is more believable.

How are suits filed against federal officials under the First Amendment if there is no implied or express right of action? I construe a right of action to be the ability to sue somebody for injunctive and monetary relief. If there isn't a right of action for the First Amendment like how Bivens provided a right of action for the 4th Amendment, how is anybody able to sue a federal official for violating their first amendment rights?

In Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. ___ (2022), the Supreme Court held that "there is no Bivens action for First Amendment retaliation." The Court was unanimous on this point. This means that right now, there is no way to sue for a damages remedy for First Amendment retaliation by federal officials. The majority said that "Congress, not the courts, is better suited to authorize such a damages remedy."

The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted.

Yes, One Can In the United States, one may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify or otherwise give information that might tend to implicate the speaker in a crime. This is true in any court proceeding, civil or criminal, whether the person asserting the privilege is an accused, a witness, or a party to a civil case. It may be asserted in a Grand Jury or trial proceeding. One may also assert the privilege under police interrogation, or in an administrative proceeding. One may also assert it when testifying before Congress, a state legislature, or any local legislative body. One may also assert it when testifying before a government agency, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission. Asserting the privilege is often informally called "pleading the Fifth", although strictly speaking "pleading" is something that only an accused does (as in "I plead not guilty"). The availability of the privilege in civil cases has been true at least since the Saline Bank case of 1828 (see below). The privilege is not available when no criminal prosecution is legally possible, such as when the statute of limitations has expired, or when the law invoked has been held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, and no other valid law applies. Thus, if an authorized government official (usually a prosecutor) offers a grant of immunity, the privilege is no longer available on matters covered by the grant, and the person asserting it must then testify on such matters. The privilege may be asserted when the person doing so is actually guilty, or when the person is not guilty, but has a reasonable belief that the statements asked for might be used against the speaker in some current or future criminal proceeding. A person who has been tried for a crime nut had the case end in a mistrial, or a dismissal without prejudice, could still be re-tried for that accusation, and so may assert the privilege. Any assertion must be clear, but need not use a specific form of worfs. The standard form advised by many lawyers is I decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me. but less formal wording such as 'I take the Fifth" will also serve to assert the privilege. When the privilege is asserted in a court case, the Judge may question the person asserting it in private, off the record, to determine whether the fear of incrimination is reasonable. Case Law Saline Bank (1828) In the case of United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S. 100 (1828) Chief Justice Marshall wrote: It is apparent that, in every step of the suit, the facts required to be discovered in support of this suit would expose the parties to danger. The rule clearly is that a party is not bound to make any discovery which would expose him to penalties, and this case falls within it. [This case was cited in Murphy, below] Saline Bank was a civil suit by the US treasury in Federal curt against an apparently unincorporated bank, but a Virginia state law of the time made it a crime to operate or participate in a bank without a proper charter. Thus the Marshall Court held that a witness in a civil suit could assert the privilege against the future possibility of a state criminal proceeding. Kastigar (1972) In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) the US Supreme Court wrote (footnotes omitted): It [the privilege against self-incrimination] can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. This Court has been zealous to safeguard the values that underlie the privilege [Citing the Miranda case in a footnote]. (Kastigar was a case in which people subpoenaed before a Grand Jury asserted the privilege, were granted immunity, and still refused to testify, alleging that the grant of immunity was not enough to revoke the privialge. They were held in contempt, appealed, and the Court held that the immunity was sufficient to allow the witnesses to be compelled to testify. In the court of its opinion, the Kastigar Court reviewed the history of the privilege and of immunity statutes in some detail.) Murphy (1964) In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) the US Supreme Court wrote: We have held today that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be deemed fully applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. ... Petitioners were subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor concerning a work stoppage at the Hoboken, New Jersey, piers. After refusing to respond to certain questions about the stoppage on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminated them, petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey and New York. [Footnote 2] Notwithstanding this grant of immunity, they still refused to respond to the questions on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law, to which the grant of immunity did not purport to extend. [This case was cited in Kastigar above.] McCarthy v. Arndstein (1924) In McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (footnotes omitted, boldface added) The US Supreme Court wrote: The case is now before us on rehearing, granted in order to permit argument of the proposition, not presented by counsel before, that the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to an examination of the bankrupt made for the purpose of obtaining possession of property belonging to his estate. ... The contention now is that the privilege against self-incrimination ought to have been disallowed because, under the Constitution, it does not extend to the examination of a bankrupt in a bankruptcy proceeding. The government insists broadly that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in any civil proceeding. The contrary must be accepted as settled. The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it. The privilege protects a mere witness as fully as it does one who is also a party defendant. It protects likewise the owner of goods which may be forfeited in a penal proceeding. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 142 U. S. 563-564. The government urges more strongly a narrower contention. It claims that the constitutional privilege does not relieve a bankrupt from the duty to give information which is sought for the purpose of discovering his estate. It asserts that, in England, such an exception to the common law privilege prevails, and that the exception had been established there prior to the Declaration of Independence. Whatever may be the rule in England, it is clear that, in America, the constitutional prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination has not been so limited.

In case there is no way of knowing, thus no way to sue, would this seem like a loophole that practically abolishes the 4th amendment ? The 4th amendment only means that the officer needs a probable cause/reasonable suspicion to detain you. It absolutely does not mean that he has to tell you what that is. In fact, not telling you what the probable cause is is often a part of the officer's job because, if you are indeed a perpetrator, letting you know what the suspicions are could make you do things that would allow you to escape justice. There is certainly always a way to sue i.e. file a lawsuit, for which you do not need to know what the probable cause was. Instead, you contend that there was not any. And from this point the officer has to tell the court what it was, if any. If he fails to provide one, you win and get redressed for harassment — this is how your 4th amendment rights work. If he does provide a good probable cause, you lose because in this case you either: actually did something suspicious and knew there was a probable cause; OR jumped to the conclusion that the officer harassed you when he was simply doing his job.

Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so.

Before the election, can a lawsuit prevent the amendment question from being put on the ballot? No. Generally speaking, the constitutionality of an otherwise procedurally proper ballot initiative is not ruled upon until after it has passed (eliminating the need to rule unnecessarily on the constitutionality of failed initiatives). Of course, if someone tried to put it in the ballot when the existing law conditions for putting it on the ballot were not met (e.g. because a deadline for doing so wasn't met) that could be challenged in court by a party with standing to do so. If passed into the constitution, would a court still have the ability to rule the restrictions unconstitutional? Probably not. The constitution as newly adopted doesn't sound like it would forbid doing that. This seems to be the whole point of the constitutional amendment in the first place and it the amendment to the constition is approved, that requirement is gone.

A president can be personally sued, and does not enjoy universal immunity while in office, see Clinton v. Jones, 520 US 681 – in that case, Clinton was represented by private counsel. There are differences between that case and the instant hypothetical, the most prominent being whether such statements might be shielded because of executive privilege. The primary procedural question would be whether a potentially defamatory statement was made in connection with official duties. The limits of executive privilege are not at all clear. That kind of constitutional issue could involve the solicitor general. Let us assume that SCOTUS finds (somehow) that a particular statement is completely outside the ambit of executive privilege (separation of powers). Then it is not an interest of the US government to defend the personal interests of a defendant even if he in in office (whereas it is an interest of the US goverment to defend the official interests of POTUS), and private counsel would represent the defendant. Any settlement or award would be out of the defendant's pocket (as was the case in Clinton v. Jones).

Yes, one has a right to privacy in such a case This right is clearly established, and so an officer or other government official or employee who listened in or authorized another to listen in could be personally sued under 42 US Code § 1983 often kn own simply as "section 1983). That law provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. The current version of section 1983 dates to 1979, but its hiostory goes much further back. This law derives from the Enforcement Act of 1871 also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, Third Enforcement Act, Third Ku Klux Klan Act, Civil Rights Act of 1871, or the Force Act of 1871. According to the Wikipedia article about it: The act was the last of three Enforcement Acts passed by the United States Congress from 1870 to 1871 during the Reconstruction Era to combat attacks upon the suffrage rights of African Americans. The statute has been subject to only minor changes since then, but has been the subject of voluminous interpretation by courts. According to the same article, Section 1983: is the most widely used civil rights enforcement statute, allowing people to sue in civil court over civil rights. According to the same article: A §1983 claim requires according to the United States Supreme Court in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. (1970) two elements for recovery: (1) the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the, "constitution and laws," of the US, and (2) the plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right 'under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory' (under color of law)

Which law regulates child labor for a teen that has dual citizenship? A teen with dual citizenship (Taiwan and U.S.) is seeking to work during his summer vacation. He's 14 right now (8th grade), which allows him to work by U.S. FLSA, but he is prohibited to work by Taiwan's child labor law which states that he must have graduated from 9th grade. He's currently applying to a U.S.-based international company for a remote job. Is he allowed by law to work for a U.S.-based company? He is living in Taiwan.

You'd have to look careful for example at the Taiwanese law. Does it disallow companies in Taiwan to hire minors, or does it disallow minors to take jobs in Taiwan? In 99.99% of all cases the effect would be the same, but in this case the minor is in Taiwan, and the company in the USA. If their law disallows minors to take jobs, then the matter is clear. If it disallows companies to hire minors, then there is the question if the US company hiring a remote employee is covered by this or not. On the other hand, if employment is against Taiwanese law, how can they enforce it? Normally enforcement is against the company, not the minor.

I assume that you were not born in the United States, and that your mother was/is not a US citizen. If these assumptions are incorrect, the answer below does not apply. A child born outside the United States to a US citizen and a non-US citizen will be a US citizen so long as the parent spent a certain amount of time physically present in the United States. For a child born before 1986 to gain US citizenship through a single parent, that parent would have had to spend 10 years total in the USA, of which at least 5 years were after the parent’s 14th birthday. So if your father was a citizen and lived in the US until at least 1966 or his 19th birthday (whichever was later), you would be a US citizen. However, the document you describe does not prove that your father was a US citizen. Instead, it only proves that your father was admitted to the US as an permanent resident (a so-called “green card”). If your father did become a citizen, he would have received a Certificate of Naturalization. This would be necessary to prove your father’s US citizenship and, by extension, yours.

In South Africa. the duty of care in regards to children and the schools they attend only begins when the child enters the classroom for the first time. All parents are advised that, in the case of primary school children, it is not sufficient to drop young kids of at school. Parents must take them to their specific classroom. The duty to care officially ends when the school day ends. For primary school children that is 13-15 and for highschool children that is 13-45. Teachers are expected to work until 16-00, but the legal obligation for children to attend school ends when the school day ends. A lot of schools don't transport children anymore and have blanket policies of parents being responsible to take children to any extra mural events outside the school. It has just become increasingly harder to ensure children's safety, and many schools are uncomfortable with the liability it creates. The duty of care can be extended to schools who have hostels. In this case, hostel parents take up the role of parents.

I think your confusion stems from assuming there is a universal definition of "minor" across laws, jurisdictions, and rights. 18 is the age of majority for the purpose of voting (26th Amendment), the death penalty, labor law (although age 14 is the minimum age for employment), and many other laws. But, 21 is the age required to buy alcohol in all states (by their own choice in order to receive highway funding). Nothing requires the age of majority to be consistent across different sections of code or statute or between jurisdictions (except when constitutionally prescribed, like voting age, or minimum age for certain elected offices). There are many counties that prohibit purchase of alcohol at any age. The age of consent varies between 14 and 18 across US states. Age 65 is a threshold for certain tax credits. You need to be 25 in order to be a member of the US House of Representatives, 30 to be a Senator, 35 to be President. You are only protected from age discrimination if you are 40 or older. Here is a rough list of various age-based thresholds for various rights, privileges, or responsibilities in the US. (I havn't vetted this whole list, and some are clearly satire, but the ones I know about are consistent with my understanding.)

@DaleM isn't wrong, but some elaboration is in order. You (almost always) gain your citizenship (or nationality) in the first instance, at birth, without the agreement or assent of you or your parents. It is thrust upon you. Usually, your country of citizenship must consent to end your citizenship (or authorize you to do so unilaterally) under that country's laws. Once you have citizenship or nationality, in practice, in most countries, you can generally only renounce your citizenship if you contemporaneously or already have a citizenship somewhere else. You are at a minimum strongly dissuaded from doing so and are not a sympathetic candidate for relief under laws related to statelessness if you willfully put yourself in this position knowing the consequences. This is a feature of the citizenship laws of most countries in order to implement international treaties designed to prevent statelessness which are widely adopted. When an adult is naturalized as a citizen of a new country, usually, their old citizenship is revoked by operation of law under the laws of their old country. In many countries, including the U.S., there are high fees and tax consequences for renouncing your citizenship. Any potential tax liabilities in the future that were not yet due under U.S. law (e.g. capital gains taxes an appreciated assets not yet sold, and estate taxes that would be due if the person renouncing their citizenship had died on that date) are owed immediately upon applying to renounce your citizenship. A stateless person is, subject to quite narrow exceptions, still subject to all of the laws of the place where they are located, including almost all of its criminal laws (except treason) and its tax laws (at least on income earned in that country). A stateless person lacks many rights. They can't travel internationally (there are exceptions under treaty in some cases, but obtaining those rights is cumbersome at a minimum). They can't vote. They typically aren't entitled to domestic welfare state benefits like national health insurance, disability payments, unemployment benefits, subsidized housing, old age or retirement benefits, etc. They can't work in a licensed or regulated profession. They may not even be able to sign a lease. They may not be allowed to own a company or serve as an officer or director of a company or as a trustee of a trust. They aren't entitled to diplomatic assistance. There are many fraudulent legal movements such as the "sovereign citizen movement" (and the Moorish Sovereign Citizens) that assert that citizenship is voluntary and that just by disavowing it in some official feeling way, they can be exempt from taxes, court jurisdiction, and/or other laws. This is false and people who act on this fraudulent misinformation often suffer serious legal consequences as a result.

Washington has such laws. RCW 28A.225.010 states the exceptions to the compulsory attendance requirement, which includes: is attending private school or extension program, receiving home schooling, unable to attend including is in jail, religion, over 16 full-time employed and with parental consent. Also, also has GDE or has already satisfied graduation requirements. It isn't clear what graduation requirements have not been satisfied, I assume that you still must complete 1 credit of Calculus to satisfy the requirements. Therefore, you must take attend school, even if you don't take that class. If you don't attend classes at the high school, the high school is required by RCW 28A.225.020 to provide written notice to the parents. Steps are taken to assure compliance with state law, i.e. phone calls and conferences with the parents, etc. It would be the responsibility of the school district to monitor the college's scheme that allows you to take high school classes at college. The primary legal mandate is imposed on the parent: All parents in this state of any child eight years of age and under eighteen years of age shall cause such child to attend the public school of the district in which the child resides and such child shall have the responsibility to and therefore shall attend for the full time when such school may be in session As described, the hypothetical child is not exempt, therefore the parents must compel the child to attend school, until the child becomes exempt. There is vast leeway in how that requirement can be satisfied, but it must be somehow satisfied.

The law doesn’t “defines a minor as a legal person below (some age)” It defines it as a natural person below (some age).

From the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) website: An employer must have a certain number of employees to be covered by the laws we enforce. This number varies depending on the type of employer (for example, whether the employer is a private company, a state or local government agency, a federal agency, an employment agency, or a labor union) and the kind of discrimination alleged (for example, discrimination based on a person's race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information). All employers are covered, whether or not a particular regulation covers a particular employer is dependent on the number of employees. For example, age discrimination is covered by employers who have more than 20 employees and Equal Pay Act coverage is for virtually all employers. From the same web site: People who are not employed by the employer, such as independent contractors, are not covered by the anti-discrimination laws. Figuring out whether or not a person is an employee of an organization (as opposed to a contractor, for example) is complicated. If you aren't sure whether a person covered, you should contact one of our field offices as soon as possible so we can make that decision. The EEOC has regulations covering: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act The Equal Pay Act of 1963 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Sections 102 and 103 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 The EEOC is an agency responsible for creating rules and regulations and enforcing civil rights laws against workplace discrimination. The regulations and enforcement actions are based on a large number of laws, any one of which may or may not apply to a particular employer. Exemptions are based on a particular anti-discrimination law, not on the agency itself. Each anti-discrimination law has a different set of entities to which the law applies and different sets of exemptions.

What can the President of the United States do when a national emergency renders Congress unable to do its job? A zombie virus is sweeping the nation! Every US Congressperson is either dead or in hiding. Either way, they're unreachable. Thankfully, we managed to keep the President and his Cabinet safe in underground bunkers. The judiciary is also safe. Unfortunately for us, some government watchdog is up our butts. They don't approve of the recently-enacted regulations and executive orders and will happily sue us the first chance they get to prove the executive is acting without authority from Congress. Which begs the question - until we can get a Congress assembled, what can the President do to restore peace and order?

It's not clear what the big deal is. Congress has already passed vast numbers of laws for POTUS to enforce, and has left the details of implementation up to the executive branch. The main limitation is that you need a Congress to fund any new federal government projects. The Constitution anticipates this problem, and there are clauses regarding filling vacancies (clearly applicable to the dead). Assuming that zombies are rioting in the streets, POTUS can invoke the National Emergencies Act, issuing an executive order to call out the National Guard.

Not less than a full house of Congress, and perhaps Congress as a whole, might have standing. It is hard to see anyone else who would. The law of Congressional standing (the link is to a report of the Congressional Research Service, a policy research arm of the Library of Congress that does research for Congress) is quite involved and is not perfectly consistent and clear. Congress would argue that it has suffered an institutional injury as an institution and perhaps authorize someone to bring suit on its behalf via a joint resolution. As the Court explained in Arizona State Legislature, an “institutional injury” is an injury that “scarcely zeroe[s] in on any individual member,” but rather “impact[s] all Members of Congress and both Houses . . . equally.” There is considerable uncertainty regarding how this would be applied which is not really at issue in this case at the present time since Democrats control both houses of Congress and support the President in this policy. Individuals legislators lack standing to sue in a case like this one. See also Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, "Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court", 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571 (2014); Matthew L. Hall, "Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation", 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1539 (2012). A blog entry from a law professor considers the question and comes up with the Congressional standing analysis above, the notion that a loan serving company paid on the dollar value of the loans serviced might have standing (which isn't inconceivable but is a stretch), and finally considers "competitor standing", a minority view that I do not think is sound in these circumstances (because the forgiveness is retroactive only and does not change competitive positions going forward).

Yes. This is legal, even though it is highly unlikely. There were very few, if any, instances of the federal pardon power being used this way historically, but it could happen, and President Trump, while he was in office, intimated that he might use the pardon power in this fashion. Realistically, it would be easier for the President to prevent someone from being prosecuted in the first place if the crime took place during his term, but he might pardon someone who committed the crime under a previous administration. The fact pattern in the question: “don’t be surprised if I pardon anyone that puts to death repeat heroin and fentanyl dealers dealing in amounts larger than 50 pounds” doesn't sound very morally palatable. But consider a slight variant of it which is much more plausible. Suppose that while running for office a Presidential candidate says: don't be surprised if I pardon someone who was convicted of homicide in a previous administration for killing someone who had been using them as a sex slave in a human trafficking network, or killing someone who was in the process of raping them shortly before their divorce became final but was not allowed to assert a self-defense argument at trial because marital rape was legal at the time. Now arguably that's different, because it doesn't induce someone to commit a future crime. But the President has broad discretion to make policy to de-emphasize certain kinds of criminal prosecutions in any case while in office even without the pardon power, and generally, this is not a basis for having a special prosecutor appointed at the federal level since there is no individualized conflict of interest. Of course, the U.S. President can only pardon someone from a federal crime and can't pardon state crimes or criminal convictions from other countries. So, even if the President pardoned someone of a federal crime in this situation, the state in which the murders took place could prosecute the individual for murder unimpeded (constitutional double jeopardy considerations would also not bar a state prosecution following the federal prosecution). Indeed, the vast majority of murder prosecutions are made under state law, and there are very few murders that take place which are beyond the jurisdiction of any U.S. state and any foreign country, that are in the jurisdiction of the U.S. government and covered by a federal homicide statute, in any year. As noted by @hszmv in a comment to another answer: Federal Murder charges are a thing and can be prosecuted, but are normally reserved for murders that either involve federal government employees (especially if they are murdered because of the duties the performed in the course of their duty or the status as a federal employee) OR murders that occur on Federally Owned Property OR the Murder involved crossing state lines OR is in U.S. Jurisdiction but not in a territory or state jurisdiction (usually applies to some uninhabited territorial islands or U.S./International Waters). Further, a pardon would not prohibit the victim's family for suing the murderer for wrongful death, and indeed, probably wouldn't prohibit them from using the murder conviction that was pardoned to conclusively establish liability in a civil case under the doctrine of collateral estoppel (I haven't researched that highly specific and technical civil procedure issue, however, but even if that wasn't possible, the murder trial transcript would be admissible in the civil case). A civil judgement for wrongful death was famously obtained against O.J. Simpson by the victim's family after O.J. Simpson was acquitted in a criminal murder trial. This tactic would really only be helpful to a prospective defendant with respect to cases where there is not a parallel criminal offense under state law.

Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings.

In Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. ___ (2022), the Supreme Court held that "there is no Bivens action for First Amendment retaliation." The Court was unanimous on this point. This means that right now, there is no way to sue for a damages remedy for First Amendment retaliation by federal officials. The majority said that "Congress, not the courts, is better suited to authorize such a damages remedy."

(The original title of your question suggested you might think that federal circuit precedent binds state courts: it generally does not, even on matters of federal law.) But regardless, Congress would not be able to legislatively lower the constitutional floor. If a certain police act is prohibited by the Constitution, Congress cannot legislatively allow that act, whether in a single state or uniformly across all states. That means that if the Fifth Circuit has decided that the use of some new investigatory tool is a search under the Fourth Amendment, no law that Congress passes could affect that holding. When congress creates laws that result in different effects for different people (e.g. people in Texas vs. people in Florida, as in your hypothetical), the distinction must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Many of the enumerated powers allow for local distinction, some prohibit it. Some examples where Congress has distinguished between states include: localized agricultural programs, time zones, voting rights protections, and various others listed in ohwilleke's review. Some distinctions between states could also intrude on principles of federalism and state sovereignty (e.g. the Supreme Court has said that the Voting Right Act does this). Maybe I am unimaginative, but I cannot think of a legitimate federal government purpose that would call for the powers that police have against the people to vary from state to state. Any such variation would have to come from the states themselves: from their state constitutions, or legislative choices to provide heightened protections. Discord between circuits is problematic (see a list of examples of existing splits), and this is why the Supreme Court of the United States will often hear an appeal where there is a circuit split on a question of constitutional rights.

What would happen? Nothing. The Courts would deem it to be a political question that was decisively and conclusively resolved when Congress ratified the electoral vote and the President was sworn in. To the extent that there was a possibility of challenging it, this would be considered untimely not later than the end of the President's term.

No, under US law, it is an "executive agreement", not a "treaty". The vast majority of US's international agreements are done as executive agreements, and not treaties; and the power of the executive branch to make executive agreements has been repeatedly upheld in the courts. Specifically, there are two types of executive agreements: "Congressional-executive agreements". These are the ones that require changes to legislation to be implemented. Congress passes the needed legislation just like any other normal legislation, i.e. a majority of both houses of Congress. Most trade agreements are passed as congressional-executive agreements. "Sole executive agreements". These are the ones that do not require changes to legislation to be implemented. Congress is not involved at all. This Iran nuclear agreement is a "sole executive agreement" because it does not require Congressional action to be implemented. (So it doesn't need to be passed by a simple majority by Congress.) The President already has the legal authority to implement all of the US's obligations under the agreement, which are the relief of certain Iran sanctions. Some of those sanctions were implemented by the President, and which the President can remove by himself. Some of these sanctions were implemented by Acts of Congress, but those Acts specifically give the President the authority to waive them. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (the "Corker bill"), passed by Congress in May 2015, also confirms that "It is the sense of Congress that: [...] this Act does not require a vote by Congress for the agreement to commence;" As to your question about whether something can "have the effect of a treaty if it's passed by a simple majority". The answer is yes (in the other way around). The Supreme Court ruled in the Head Money Cases that "treaties" (ratified by 2/3 of the Senate as specified in Article II) have the same legal effect in US law as regular legislation passed by Congress (by a simple majority of both houses), which means that Congress can modify or repeal (insofar as US law is concerned) any "treaty" that is ratified by the Senate, by passing a later law that contradicts it, just like it can with regular legislation. So, yes, any regular legislation passed by a simple majority (including for congressional-executive agreements) has the same legal effect as treaties.

What is the legal distinction between watching a YouTube video in a browser and downloading it for personal use? If the act of watching a YouTube video creates a temporary download in my internet cache, why is it illegal to use an app that intercepts the YouTube API to download music videos to listen to later when I don't have internet? When people buy a CD or mp3, they are allowed to listen to it as much as they want, because the royalties have already been paid. YouTube pays royalties via ads, so by this logic, the stream I listen to is legal because the royalties have already been paid by YouTube. But, what constitutes a stream? I can have a YouTube music video open in my browser, disconnect from the internet once it loads, and listen to it over and over provided I don't refresh the page. In that case, why is it illegal for me to download it to my computer to listen to later? If anyone can provide case law or something to that effect, I'd really appreciate it. I'm in the USA, so I'm looking for USA-specific copyright law. And, to clarify, I'm not asking about YouTube's TOS, but the overall legality of downloading music from YouTube in general.

Although you aren't interested in the TOS, you should be. You are not allowed to make any copy of other people's stuff without permission. The TOS is how you get permission. First, the author uploads his material to You Tube, because he has an account and the TOS associated with the account specifies the license that he grants to You Tube and the world – same thing with Stack Exchange. The TOS says (roughly) "when you upload stuff, you give permission for others to access your stuff using the You Tube interface". Content-consumers likewise are allowed to stream content using their interface, but not generally download. (The license terms changes over time – previously there were more license types). Specifically, You are not allowed to: access, reproduce, download, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, alter, modify or otherwise use any part of the Service or any Content except: (a) as expressly authorized by the Service; or (b) with prior written permission from YouTube and, if applicable, the respective rights holders; and they don't expressly authorize ordinary download, you have to use their interface. You might also directly contact the author of the work in question and negotiate a deal where you can directly acquire a license from the rights-owner. But if you want to access the material via You Tube, you have to do it in a way that is permitted, and You Tube says that you're not permitted to download. Any "copying without permission" is infringement.

It's legal as long as you follow these guidelines: They [The Cached Files] are created only for the purpose of viewing (In Your case listening) content The copies do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holders. The creation of the copies does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the works. Source: http://www3.ebu.ch/contents/news/2014/06/eu-court-rules-on-legality-of-in.html

The Moonlight Sonata itself is well out of copyright. Most countries have copyright terms equal to or less than 70 years after the author's death, 1827 in the case of Beethoven. However, particular performances of the Moonlight Sonata may be under the copyright of the performer or even the arranger. Also, downloading from Youtube is against their terms of service. Overall, using the Moonlight Sonata is fine, just make sure you find a good legal source for it.

No, it's not illegal... Ads are shown as a contract between the site that hosts it and the advertising company. The contract does not stipulate that customers need to buy something, in fact, the contract can't force the customer to buy anything! At best, the contract can pay the hosting site based on the ad being shown, clicked, or any sale made after it. ...but you will do exactly the opposite Advertizement is made to put your own brand into the head of people. In fact, most ads don't have any effect on people. As I am writing this, ads for a kid TV, travels to Turkey and the primetime films for the weekend on the TV-station I have on are shown. I have no intention of consuming any of these advertised products. Impact of a campaign is measured by two metrics: people reached, and people responding. People reached is measured in clicks. People responding is measured in changes in earnings or sales. Clicking the ad increases the reached rating. If the rating is bad, the ad campaign is just ineffective... which leads to the most paradoxical thing: Bad advertisement and good advertisement both lead to more advertisement - bad to level out the missing response, good to maximize the response. By clicking on the ad you just funnel more money to the ad industry. When does it get illegal? [DDOS] The only way it would become illegal is if John Doe sets up a computer - or rather a botnet - and has that network click the ads thousands of times per second. Google can handle easily 83,000 searches per second, twitter gets more than 9000 tweets that are distributed to millions of people, Tumbler and Instagram handle together about 2500 posts per second. In fact, every second, more than 100000 Gigabytes of traffic run through the net. To have an impact on one site, you need to be truly a large number of calls... and then it is called a DDOS. DDOS is illegal under the CFAA, in this case 18 UC 1030: (a)Whoever— (5) (A)knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; (b)Whoever conspires to commit or attempts to commit an offense under subsection (a) of this section shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. In the UK, you'd break the Computer Misuse Act of 1990 section 3, because denying someone else service via DDOS is unauthorized, clearly unauthorized, and prevents access to any data (the website) on any computer (the server): (1)A person is guilty of an offence if— (a)he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer; (b)at the time when he does the act he knows that it is unauthorised; and (c)either subsection (2) or subsection (3) below applies. (2)This subsection applies if the person intends by doing the act— (b)to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer But can a DDOS be protest? [NO!] Anonymous attempted to petition to make DDOS a legal form of protest in 2013. The petition got 6,048 of the 25000 signatures needed to warrant an answer by the white house - unlike people in 2016 asking for a Death Star. At least it prompted Joshua I. James to write a research paper about the proposal in March. He too points to the CFAA and Section 5A, especially the sentence I quoted above. Among a lot of stipulations, he points out that internet protest in the shape of a DDOS would need to follow the same rules as a legal protest on the streets - which for example demands that entrance to businesses can't be blocked, and one is not allowed to harass employees and customers. According to the general rules for legal protest as given, there are still a number of challenges. First and foremost, entrances to businesses should not be blocked. In terms of DDoS, if sustained denial of service takes place, then access (entrance) to the server (business)is effectively blocked. This means that, at a minimum, sustained denial of service should be considered as a non-legal approach to protesting. Thus, he concludes sustained DDOS is per se can't be a legal protest, and even a non-sustained DDOS would impact people using the site in a way they will deem harassing - which means that even a non-permanent DDOS can't be a legal protest. And then comes the final blow: DDOS, unlike a real protest on the streets, can't, by its very nature, inform people of why there is protest, even if it were a form of protest! This means that nobody knows it is meant to be a protest and not a normal DDOS, and as it can't convey what the action is about, it can't be a proper protest.

united-states In the US it is not unlawful to produce and display a video arguing for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, whether the intent is to support that invasion or to document the claims of those who do support it, and argue that they are invalid. Such a video would be protected by copyright, and copying it and redistributing it with subtitles might well be an infringement of that copyright, if done without permission. On the other hand, doing so with the intent of educating others about Russian claims might constitute fair use. If so, it would not be copyright infringement under US law. Aside from the copyright issue (which would be up to the copyright holder to take action on) US law does not really care what the motivation for posting such a sub-titled video might be. Whether or not it is "beneficial for the whole human civilization" is not relevant to US law. It is protected by the First Amendment against government suppression. That would not affect YouTube, as a private actor,, determining not to host it on their site.

"There is a free mp3 app from a friend who asked me to publish it in my account, which I didnt check properly." You violated Google's policies by uploading an App that you did not have full control over and/or was not developed by you. As well, the App possibly violated Google's policies in terms of violating licensing for code libraries that were included, had code included in the App that was malicious or violated privacy, or was otherwise not compliant with Google's terms. Google's policies are legal contracts which you agree to when you open an account. You reserve the right to end the contract by deleting your account. They reserve the right to end the contract when their policies are not followed. See https://play.google.com/about/developer-content-policy/ "This sudden termination comes as a shock and Google's decision seem very rude to me." You may think it is rude, but Google is fully within its rights to terminate your account because you violated their terms. It matters little that you did not get the previous warning emails from Google; you are responsible for monitoring the account email for policy updates. If you’ve reviewed the policy and feel this termination may have been in error, please reach out to our policy support team. Try that; you might attempt to explain that it was honest error on your side.

It is not illegal to view pornography. It is illegal to possess or receive certain kinds of pornography, namely child porn, under 18 USC 2252 and 18 USC 2252a (there is a subtle legal difference between "child pornography" and "visual depiction (which) involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct"). In order to view anything on the internet, you have to first receive it, so there is potential criminal liability. These sections allows one affirmative defense, if one knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an image of child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or that was produced using materials that have been mailed, or shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer; but also (1) possessed less than three images of child pornography; and (2) promptly and in good faith, and without retaining or allowing any person, other than a law enforcement agency, to access any image or copy thereof— (A) took reasonable steps to destroy each such image; or (B) reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and afforded that agency access to each such image. A person's belief that the website was moderated is not a defense. There are also state statutes, typically stronger, which outlaw possession of child porn. Crabtree v. Kentucky is an example of such a (successful) conviction. The court addresses the question of whether "merely viewing" can constitute actual possession: the court found that it did: Crabtree urges us to consider that his merely viewing child pornography images before deleting them should not be deemed to constitute actual possession. After reviewing the facts of this case, we are not persuaded that this is a valid argument in light of the Ninth Circuit's definition of possession in Romm, supra: that the act of seeking out child pornography and exercising control over it constitutes criminal possession—regardless of whether it is downloaded. Crabtree admitted to seeking out the material and to having it on his computer. It would be impractical to try to review 50 states' worth of child porn laws plus the federal statute, but there is also a “Temporary innocent possession” defense, which is conceivably applicable to the situation where you click a link and surprise! In the above case, defendant had to click a link that indicated the nature of the contents, and had to confirm file-saving of a file whose name was indicative of its content. Such circumstances overrule the presumption of temporary innocent possession. A question raised in the comments is whether a porn-ambush could lead to a conviction. Suppose that a web page has a number of embedded child-porn images which are saved to a user's computer without his knowledge. As pointed out in this report of the US Sentencing Commission, A conviction for receipt, however, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knowingly came into possession of child pornography at the time that the image or video was received with case law citations. The case of US v. Kuchinski, 469 F. 3d 853 is instructive, because defendant did knowingly seek out and download a number of child porn images, and was convicted. In 94 of those cases, he knew he was receiving child pornography; in over 10,000 other cases, such images were found in his system cache (this is relevant to sentencing). The court found that it matters that "Kuchinski had no knowledge of the images that were simply in the cache files", and the court concluded, in K's favor, that Where a defendant lacks knowledge about the cache files, and concomitantly lacks access to and control over those files, it is not proper to charge him with possession and control of the child pornography images located in those files, without some other indication of dominion and control over the images. To do so turns abysmal ignorance into knowledge and a less than valetudinarian grasp into dominion and control. Do you know about the system cache, and do you know how to control it? If not, you might avoid the charge. In other words, it depends on the circumstances surrounding the possession and the evidence of a knowing act, as well as the jurisdiction.

Any use of the song snippets in your App can be copyright infringement (in the US), Fair Use (U.S. Copyright Office) not withstanding. Not distributing the App and/or using the App only in a limited group for the study, or not making money from the App doesn't usually matter when it comes to copyright infringement. Fair Use does have some educational exceptions; read the link above and see if your case may fit. But the final assessment of educational use would be made by a court if you were sued for infringement. If the use in your App doesn't fall under the education exception, you still probably run little risk of the copyright holders finding out if the App use is private and within a small group, but that's your choice to make. You can always Google the name of the music/recording company; most provide ways online to request licensing of samples, but the cost may be prohibitive, or permission may simply not be available for popular songs.

Are there any laws against either excessively loud motorcycles or riding such motorcycles inconsiderately in residential areas at night? Loud disturbing motorcycles are awful but occasionally circle around certain roads after midnight up and down gratuitously if the objective is actually transportation. One would hope that there are laws on the books restricting the legality of such terribly loud machines in the first place, as a great portion of their appeal appears to be the disturbance caused to others, but if there are not, what is the status of riding them gratuitously at indecent hours? The public (neurological) health hazard is indeed great.

It’s illegal to modify the exhaust system to make a vehicle noisier after it has been ‘type approved’ (checked it meets environmental and safety standards). The police can also take action if your vehicle’s silencer doesn’t work in the way it was designed or if you’re driving in a way that creates too much noise. https://www.gov.uk/noise-pollution-road-train-plane

It may depend on the jurisdiction (although I can't readily think of one where this is not the case) but deliberately, recklessly or negligently putting a burning object next to someone else's property knowing that there is a real risk of it catching fire (and going ahead with it anyway) will almost definitely make one liable: especially if there is an ulterior motive. In england-and-wales This would be called arson - causing criminal damage by fire - an offence contrary to section 1(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 Cross posted with the jurisdiction defining comment

Huge difference between a car and a house. For example, at least in Pennsylvania no warrant is required to search a vehicle on public roads. In other states there are so many easy pretexts that you practically have little protection from a full vehicle search (although the pretext will have to withstand strict scrutiny if evidence found in a search is used to charge you with a crime). Your house, on the other hand, still enjoys very strong fourth-amendment protections: One of my favorite U.S. Supreme Court cases on the subject is Florida v. Jardines, in which SCOTUS ruled that even approaching the front door with a drug-sniffing dog without a warrant constituted an illegal search. (The majority opinion is worth reading for its illumination of current law on this question.)

From a comment on the question: They did damage the trailer door and headlight is smashed This seems like the best thing to focus on, especially if you can show that it was not damaged before they towed it. The unusual method of towing (with video evidence) may be a factor in whether they are considered negligent. If the damage to the door looks like they caused it directly by breaking in, that would also help your case. You also asked in your comment if you should go to the police or to a lawyer first. Might as well go to the lawyer and see what they tell you to do. I'm not sure what the police would do if there is no clear crime that has been committed. (The lawyer should have better advice about whether/why to go to the police.)

The legal hook is reported to be §129 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes use of force to disperse an illegal assembly, which this sort of is. No statute that I can find states that police can smack lawbreakers who are forced to disperse, but as is common in common law countries, the laws of India are not fully explicit on that which is allowed or forbidden for police to do. As this article indicates, systematic limits on police use of force remain to be developed.

Courts, particularly traffic courts, tend to take a police officer's word over that of an accused person. While legally the limit is 70, the driver has very little recourse if the officer claims falsely that the actual speed was over 70. But the deterant effect of a posted limit is lost, since drivers in general have no way to know that Officer O will ticket anyone going over 60. I suppose that driver D, or D's lawyer, could subpoena calibration records of any radar gun or other measuring devise used, and could insist on its being tested. However, unless they had reason to think there was an issue, I wonder if D and D's lawyer would go through that process. Some speed measuring devices print a paper slip showing the date and time along with the reading. If such a device was used that record would be harder to alter. Some cars are now equipped with devices provided by insurance companies that record speeds and other driving info in a secure way to help judge a driver's safety and allow individual rate setting. It might be that the record from such a device would be admissible to show the speed was under the posted limit. But there is a sense in which the law is what the police and the courts enforce. If anyone who drives the road over 60 is cited and must pay, one could say the effective limit there is 60.

California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.

In New York State, vehicle registration requirements (including the requirement to display license plates) are under Title IV of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Title IV refers to "motor vehicles." However, Section 125 of the law, which defines "motor vehicle" for the purposes of the law, states that: Every vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power [...]. For the purposes of title four of this chapter, the term motor vehicle shall exclude fire and police vehicles other than ambulances. [...] Fire and police vehicles in New York State are exempt from registration requirements, including the requirement to have a license plate. They can use license-plate-esque designs, and I believe they can get normal local government plates, but they do not have to. EDIT: Also, I just remembered the NYPD operates at least one ambulance. Per that section, one would expect the ambulance to use a state-issued license plate, not the NYPD fleet plates. And this is, in fact, the case:

After being Justice of the UK Supreme Court from 2010-2, why did Lord John Dyson demote to Master of the Rolls from 2012-6? Lord John Dyson was Master of the Rolls (President of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales and Head of Civil Justice) for four years until he retired in October 2016. He was a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom from April 2010 until October 2012. As you can see from the 2nd and 5th bullet points from below picture, JSC (Justice of the Supreme Court) outranks MR (Master of the Rolls). Dyson demoted himself, or got demoted. Right? But why this demotion? Did he bumble something? Why did he stop being JSC in 2012, and become MR?

"Why" someone did something is potentially off-topic, but in regards to your hierarchical image - it lacks provenance so cannot be tested, however according to the official judiciary website: The Master of the Rolls is second in judicial importance to the Lord Chief Justice.

If this judge is truly biased, won't the litigants be all the more glad to have a jury of their peers? You are proposing to abandon your duty to others. At trial you serve the community, not the judge. Back on scope for Law SE: If you refuse to serve on a jury, that could be a separate offense or general criminal contempt, for which you (this all depends on your jurisdiction) could get 30-90 days in jail. Edit: like several others have pointed out, I would not expect much trouble if you politely told the court that you felt you would be biased b/c of past connections. Even if the judge doesn't dismiss you, one of the litigants is likely to strike you. P.S. In most states, no one except a prosecutor (sometimes another state employee) can "take someone" to a criminal court. Individuals can only take someone to civil trial, where one cannot be sentenced, only ordered to pay a judgement.

First of all, the case US v Microsoft was originally a 1998 case, not 2001. Jackson entered his judgment in June 2000. Microsoft appealed timely. It went from Jackson's district court, straight to the Supreme Court, using 15 U.S.C. §29(b), and the Supreme court issued 530 US 1301. While the states filed for being heard, the Supreme Court declined them, remanding the whole case back to the lower courts. In No. 00-139, direct appeal [to the Supreme Court] is denied, and case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Clerk is directed to issue the judgment forthwith. In No. 00-261 [the request of the states to be heard], certiorari before judgment is denied. The case thus went to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, and due to the time it takes to schedule, became a 2000 case. The court noticed, that while Jackson was still on the case he had given interviews about it: The Court of Appeals held that: [...] (6) district judge’s comments to the press while the case was pending required his disqualification on remand. Immediately after the District Judge entered final judgment on June 7, 2000, accounts of interviews with him began appearing in the press. Some of the interviews were held after he entered final judgment. (p.107) Microsoft urges the District Judge’s disqualification under § 455(a): a judge ‘‘shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The standard for disqualification under § 455(a) is an objective one. The question is whether a reasonable and informed observer would question the judge’s impartiality. (p.114) Our application of Liljeberg leads us to conclude that the appropriate remedy for the violations of § 455(a) is disqualification of the District Judge retroactive only to the date he entered the order breaking up Microsoft. We therefore will vacate that order in its entirety and remand this case to a different District Judge, but will not set aside the existing Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law (except insofar as specific findings are clearly erroneous or legal conclusions are incorrect). (p.116) When Jackson gave the interviews, he violated the Code of Conduct for judges because the appeals process was not yet complete and he was still on the case. As such, he created the image, that he might not be impartial: Canon 3A(6). The admonition against public comment about the merits of a pending or impending matter continues until the appellate process is complete. If the public comment involves a case from the judge’s own court, the judge should take particular care so that the comment does not denigrate public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality, which would violate Canon 2A. A judge may comment publicly on proceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity, but not on mandamus proceedings when the judge is a litigant in an official capacity (but the judge may respond in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 21(b)). Jackson did not appear as he was to be heard in the Circuit Court. As shown above, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals found, he did violate the code of conduct and disqualified him under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). While this did suffice to overturn the verdict prescribed by Jackson, the court did not throw out the findings of fact that had been issued well before the interviews and noted that the traditional setup might be inadequate for this case. They remanded back to a different judge to decide a remedy under a different scope. The case didn't end there, Microsoft attempted to get even the findings of fact thrown out based on the very ruling that sent it back for remand, claiming that the judge had shown to be biased way earlier, during the trial and before the finding of facts. They did so by appealing a second time to the Supreme Court in August 2001 but the court rejected to hear the case in October. In the end, DoJ and Microsoft settled in November 2001, the settlement was accepted by the District Court in 2002, and affirmed by the appeals court in 2004, as some states didn't want that one.

"Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights" on the website you linked to is very clear that the Charter of Fundamental Rights only means the EU institutions can't discriminate based on age, and that EU law is not allowed to be age discriminatory. It doesn't mean that individual acts of age discrimination are illegal: In contrast, the provision in Article 21(1) does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws in these areas of Member State or private action, nor does it lay down a sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-ranging areas. Instead, it only addresses discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers conferred under the Treaties, and by Member States only when they are implementing Union law. The practice of youth and senior discounts is older than the charter of fundamental rights. The charter will be interpreted in the light of continuity, it definitely wasn't the intention to outlaw price discrimination. There are specific laws that make price discrimination based on certain principles legal, e.g. UK equality act: Age discrimination - when discrimination is allowed in the provision of goods or services

Lawyers neither try nor judge cases; they advise and argue them. Criminal cases in jurisdictions based on British law (which seems to be what you are asking about) are tried by prosecution and defence both putting their best arguments to the court (either a judge or a jury) who then reaches a verdict. There is no reason why the prosecuting lawyer should not be a police officer (assuming he is properly qualified), though in reality 'prosecuting advocate' is a full-time job, so the officer would need to transfer to the District Attorney's office or something similar. Actually, such an officer would be wasted by a transfer to advocacy. Somebody who knows not only what evidence is inadmissible and the leading cases on permitted searches but also where the local crime blackspots are and which officers, likely to fall apart on creoss-examination, should not be put up as the only witness is valuable enough that the authorities (whoever they may be) will make considerable efforts to use these talents to best effect.

australia Although the alleged victim has not been found, this case from the upi.com archives dated 25/09/1986 is worthy of note (emphasis mine): A woman jailed for murdering her husband had her conviction reversed when a witness testified she saw the man on television -- in a crowd at a cricket match -- three years after he allegedly was killed. The New South Wales Court of Appeal Wednesday overturned the murder conviction of Margaret Burton, saying the case against her relied on a web of circumstantial evidence and that the new evidence provided reasonable doubt of her guilt. Burton, however, still must complete an 8-year sentence for conspiracy to commit murder. She was sentenced to life in prison on Nov. 8, 1984, for the May 1983 murder of her husband. She and Ronald Burke, a close friend, also were sentenced to eight years in jail for conspiracy to murder her husband, Peter Burton. Peter Burton's body never was found. At the appeals court hearing, Judy Edmonds testified she is sure she saw Peter Burton in the crowd at a televised cricket match in January. Edmonds was shown a videotape of part of the cricket match and identified a man in sunglasses as Peter Burton. She said she was a close friend of his. Another witness, Jan Dyson, told the court the man in the videotape bore a remarkable resemblance to Peter Burton. Lawyers for Margaret Burton argued before the appeals court her conviction should be overturned because the prosecution failed to prove Peter Burton was dead. Appeals Court Chief Justice Sir Laurence Street agreed, saying it is not for the court to decide whether or not the person on the videotape is Peter Burton, but it is the court's responsibility to determine how a reasonable jury would have regarded the new evidence.

Florida bar membership is something that can be determined from public records to see if he is an attorney or not. I would be stunned if he was not. It could be that he was an enrolled patent agent prior to being admitted to the practice of law and has never updated the record. Alternatively, it could simply be that there was a data entry error. No large database is 100% accurate. For most purposes, the rights of an enrolled patent agent and an attorney admitted to patent law practice are the same in PTO practice, so correcting this error (assuming that it is one), even if it was discovered, wouldn't be an urgent priority.

Courts have inherent jurisdiction to reconsider/recall their own decisions. This rarely happens (especially if the decision has already been "sealed" i.e. issued in writing) but still possible. The principle of finality only applies to parties asking courts to reconsider; it does not constrain courts themselves. So, in this example, "the judge agrees to vacate them" but that decision hasn't been sealed yet. The judge can easily just change their mind (although, again, it rarely happens). No double jeopardy applies because it is still the same trial.

Am I legally able to use lethal force against a police officer in defense of another? Hypothetically, let's say I come across a police officer about to discharge his firearm at a person laying face down on the ground, hands in my clear view, clearly (to me) unarmed and apparently complying with the officer's instructions. Am I legally able to use my own firearm to use lethal force against the officer to protect the apparently unarmed man? How do laws that allow me to use lethal force against the general population apply when the individual I would be defending from is a police officer? Am I obligated to do anything before firing, such as instruct the officer to drop his weapon?

I'll use Washington state as my source, but laws will be similar in other states. RCW 9A.76.020 outlaws obstructing a law enforcement officer, which this would be: it is a gross misdemeanor. In using lethal force, you would have committed first degree murder, under RCW 9A.32.030. There is a defense that can be used, per RCW 9A.16.050, that homicide is justified when: In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. Law enforcement officers have access to justifiable homicide defenses as well under 9A.16.040, for example (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony The outcome of the case would hinge in part on whether the officer's arrest and use of force was lawful. To take two extremes, if the guy on the ground had just killed a dozen people and was aiming to rack up another dozen kills, the officer's arrest would almost certainly be held to be legal and his degree of force justified. Your personal belief that the suspect was compliant and unarmed might be refuted by the facts. On the other hand, if the guy on the ground had slept with the officer's sister and the officer wanted to rid the world of this vermin, then the arrest and force would almost certainly be held to be not legal. It can be legal to use deadly force to resist unlawful arrest. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, where the court held that if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant, and who had no right to arrest him, and if, in the course of that resistance, the officer was killed, the offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder, if the officer had had the right to arrest, to manslaughter The court also said where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction when the officer had the right to make the arrest from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. This ruling has been somewhat eroded, in US v. Simon: We recognize that law enforcement officers are frequently called on to make arrests without warrants and should not be held, so far as their personal security is concerned, to a nicety of distinctions between probable cause and lack of probable cause in differing situations of warrantless arrests. It is for this reason we believe that the force of John Bad Elk has been diminished The upshot of this is that (assuming no warrant), leeway is granted to officers in assessing probable cause (I'm not sure anybody really knows at a general conceptual level what constitutes "probable cause". The court seems to imply that the remote hearsay used as the basis for the arrest would not have been sufficient for a warrant, but it was "reasonable grounds" for believing accused had committed a crime). Your premise that the officer is about to shoot would have to be substantiated by some fact, such as a declaration "I'm gonna kill you". Otherwise, your belief that the officer was about to commit unjustified murder would itself be unjustified. With better fleshing out of the circumstances, you could manufacture a justified-homicide scenario.

I would just like to clarify, in addition to the other answers and what Dale M alluded to, one important detail: Unless you are carrying out the death penalty, no one under any circumstances is allowed to kill anyone else. What you are sometimes authorized to do, is to use deadly force. There is an important distinction between the two. When using deadly force, you are using extreme force to stop someone doing something, which may result in getting that person killed, but killing isn't the point, stopping whatever he is doing is. If instead of a knife you had a gun on the train, you shot the guy in the face, his crime spree came to and end, yet he was still alive but unconscious, and you decided to "finish the job" and shoot him some more, you'd be going to prison. The language is important. Even if in self defense situations, if you say that you were shooting to kill, you're going to be in serious trouble, but if you say you were shooting to stop, you're in the clear.

canada The person claiming self-defence must have the subjective belief that "a threat of force is being made against them or another person." Such belief must also be based on reasonable grounds. They must also act with the subjective purpose of protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force. This comes from the text of the defence, codified at s. 34 of the Criminal Code. It reads: 34 (1) A person is not guilty of an offence if (a) they believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against them or another person or that a threat of force is being made against them or another person; (b) the act that constitutes the offence is committed for the purpose of defending or protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force; and (c) the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances. "Unless the accused subjectively believed that force or a threat thereof was being used against their person or that of another, the defence is unavailable" (R. v. Khill, 2021 SCC 37, para. 52). The National Judicial Institute's model jury instructions slightly rephrases: [the accused] believed that force [or the threat of force] was being used against him/her [or against another person] and [accused]’s belief was based on reasonable grounds Regarding evidence in general: the court needs some evidence on which to give an "air of reality" to every element of this defence in order to place the burden on the Crown to rebut the defence beyond a reasonable doubt. This does not require the accused to testify about their subjective belief. The evidence about the subjective belief can come from elsewhere in the evidence. For example, even if an accused had no memory of the encounter, there may nonetheless be evidence about their subjective belief: video evidence of the encounter, hearsay evidence about what the accused said during the events, physical evidence revealing a defensive posture, etc. The evidence must support an inference of a subjective belief in a threat. It is not enough that the evidence shows that a subjective belief would have been reasonable. But none of that is relevant to the question of what the elements of self-defence are or whether an act taken without the subjective belief that the accused or another person is being threatened is self-defence. The question has helpfully taken the standard approach to legal hypotheticals of just asserting what the facts are in order to take questions of evidence off the table.

Because your buddy routinely points loaded firearms at you First, you should probably get friends who don’t do this but, even though this is objectively a threat, you know that you are in no danger (barring accidents). Self-defence is not justified. This is why there is the dual requirement that the danger is clear to both: an objective observer, and the person under threat.

No. Police are not permitted to impose any punishment whatsoever. Their role in the American justice system is to prevent and investigate criminal offenses. What you're describing is a punishment for a criminal offense, even though it is imposed outside the criminal justice system. The same principles that prevent an officer from punching a suspect in the face or demanding a cash payment to not write a ticket prohibit a police officer from imposing a punishment of his own design, with or without your consent.

ORS 166.220 suggests this would be illegal - specifically its "unlawful use of a weapon" if a person (emphasis mine): Intentionally discharges a firearm, blowgun, bow and arrow, crossbow or explosive device within the city limits of any city or within residential areas within urban growth boundaries at or in the direction of any person, building, structure or vehicle within the range of the weapon without having legal authority for such discharge. So what's "within range"? With a homemade bow of unknown construction, draw weight, and unknown arrows I'd say it's pretty much going to be something you find out when an arrow goes that far. I wouldn't expect it to match the range of high-end bows and arrows (I've seen 40lb recurves cover ~250 yards) but 100 yards plus doesn't sound ridiculous - more if it's got some elevation to it. The point is you really don't want to find out the hard way when a shot goes astray giving your neighbours the old King Harold treatment.

In the U.S. there is no law that requires you to ever say a word to a law enforcement officer, and lawyers generally encourage you to minimize what you communicate to them anyway. I can't think of any situation where a request for information could not be demanded in writing. As a practical matter, in some situations you will probably be subject to some extra scrutiny and inconvenience: E.g., in a stop-and-identify situation, you could hand the officer a note saying, "Please make any requests for information from me in writing." The officer may infer that you have some disability, but if he does not (or discovers you don't) he may get irritated enough to subject you to harassment for "contempt of cop". Of course, if you can understand him, you are still required to obey an officer's lawful orders no matter how they are communicated. But "speak" is not a lawful order.

Illegal weapons Weapons are defined and are made illegal by statute. In many states, it is illegal to possess brass knuckles. For example, California penal code 12020(a)(1) makes it illegal to possess "any metal knuckles", "writing pen knife", "any leaded cane", among other things. I don't know of any state where it is illegal to pick up a stick, or keys, etc. So, yes, there is a legal distinction between your four scenarios. The mechanic is committing a crime by merely possessing the brass knuckles. The others are not committing a crime by the mere possession of the things you mention (unless there are states where they've been made illegal). Effect on a self-defense analysis Courts would have the jury go through the same self-defense analysis in each of these cases, regardless of the legality of the weapon used. We've described that analysis here. A pure self-defense analysis does not factor in the legality of the weapon that is used. But, if the weapon has been made illegal because of its disproportionate ability to injure, etc. that might weigh against the reasonableness of the force that was used when choosing to use that weapon in self-defense. Possession of an illegal weapon might also weigh against the credibility of the owner of that illegal weapon.

Is Elon Musk's child name valid in California? Elon Musk and his partner want to name their child X Æ A-12. Is that name allowed in California, US?

We could start with what the statutes say (HSC 102425) (a) The certificate of live birth for a live birth occurring on or after January 1, 2016, shall contain those items necessary to establish the fact of the birth and shall contain only the following information; (1) Full name and sex of the child. It says nothing about the form of that name. Therefore, any prohibition of the letter Æ (or æ) etc. would have to come from the administrative interpretation of California Department of Public Health, Vital Records. There is a long handbook, which on p. 112 states the rule regarding child names. The rules note that The form must be completed using the 26 alphabetical characters of the English language with appropriate punctuation, if necessary. No pictographs (☺), ideograms (⇑), diacritical marks (è, ñ, ē, ç), or extraneous entries are allowed. So the short answer is, unless you feel like making a court case out of the matter and you have a lot of money, this name will not be allowed. The rule might be challenged in court as exceeding statutory authority, and might well be deemed to discriminate w.r.t. race and national origin. The rule could be defended on grounds of necessity, if we presume that the department is incapable of recording information other than the 26 letters and "appropriate punctuation" (undefined, presumably only apostrophe). It's not that in principle Unicode doesn't exist, it's that their system may not be capable of dealing with it (numerous problems would arise from the non-unique mapping from visual representation to Unicode number). There does not seem to be a court ruling on the matter.

if the child exchange time and locations are fixed, and the husband can no longer legally drive, does this effectively nullify his visitation rights? No. He can get a ride from someone or get an Uber or Lyft or Taxi or take a bus. The drop off location is near her house, not his, and even if public transportation were an option he would not be the type to use it. He's more the type that would ignore the suspension of his license and go pick up the kids in his car anyway. He is also the kind to try to attempt to manipulate the wife into doing what he wants regardless of what a court order says. Emotional abuse and manipulation were a big part of his game, but fortunately she has gotten much better at ignoring it. What he is inclined to do and why have nothing to do with whether or not it is legal. If he has his license revoked and attempts to pick up the children as always, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she allows him to pick up the kids? Practically speaking, no, particularly in light of a court order to transfer custody. Theoretically, it is remotely possible, even though it is very unlikely. In theory, she could be held liable for negligent child neglect by allowing this to happen, particularly if the children were then harmed in an automobile accident. If he was visibly drunk or intoxicated at the time of the transfer, however, her risk of criminal liability would be considerable. Would there be any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses to allow him to pick up the children himself with a suspended license/registration? Potentially, she could be held in contempt of court for refusing to follow a court order. Her better course would be to call the police when he arrived to report that he is driving with suspended license, to not transfer the children and wait until they arrive (seeking cover inside a home and advising the 911 operator again if the situation starts to escalate into a potentially violent situation), and to explain to the police that he is also attempting to endanger the children by trying to drive with them on a suspended license. There is a good chance that he would be arrested and that the police would leave her with the children. The police might, rather than arresting him, drive him home with the kids and tell him not to drive and cite him for driving with a suspended license. Then, she should make an emergency motion to the court, regardless of how it is resolved by the police, seeking permission to formally give her a right to refuse to transfer if he arrives unaccompanied with a suspended license. If he attempts to convince her to drop the kids off somewhere else (presumably at his house) due to the suspension of his license, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses? Probably not. This time he's not following the court order, not her. It would still be advisable for her to file an emergency motion with the court explaining the situation.

The name of a company is not necessarily a trademark, so you are conflating two different concepts: A company name is the legal identity of the company, like your name is for you. A brand is an advertising construct which identifies certain goods or services. For example, Microsoft is both a company name and a trademark while Windows is only a trademark. Company names are regulated by whomever it is in your jurisdiction who is responsible for this: in Australia this is the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). In general, within the same jurisdiction, you cannot have two company names that are the same. So, if you are not registering your company in the UK you should be fine. Trademark is about protecting brands and ensuring that there is no scope for confusion by the consumer that your goods and services are theirs (and vice-versa). Generally, if there is no room for confusion there is no trademark infringement. E.g., if your brand is about software and theirs is about agriculture then this is probably OK. If you both make software but you are a game company and they make accounting software this might be OK too, or it might not.

Your lawyers should understand that you're dealing with a private company that can make and enforce its own policies when it comes to allowing access to the their store. If Google's policy is to require you to do research and diligence on a possible trademark infringement of your App, that's legal, as long as Google's requirements don't not violate local or national laws of the variant of their store. The idea that another company or individual can allege infringement, yet not communicate sufficiently with you or Google, may not seem fair, but as a response to that, Google can play it safe and not open themselves up to liability by removing your App or making you resubmit under a new name. That is outlined in Google's TOS, which you agreed to. Your only recourse is to keep talking to Google and keep trying to contact the complainant.

What are our possibilities here? You could be sued for damages in Mexico, the country of origin of the copyright or any of the other signatories of the Berne Convention. You could also be charged with a criminal offence but that is less likely. how much can we get away with? Not a legal question. What you are proposing is illegal - how likely your getaway plan is to work is not for me to say. Is there any advantage on us being on México? No Is there any advantage on picking any either Dragon Ball or League of legends because of the country they are in? No Can they stop us from doing it? Yes

Your question lacks some details. So you registered a domain name, and later find someone else used that domain name (in the past) for a hobby website? Then no, you don't need to worry about it. If that person has a current trademark on the name used in the domain name, and your website provides/sells products or services in the same area, then you could have a problem. But that doesn't sound like it's the issue.

Are there actual laws written, or de facto situations (e.g. let's say another law specifies that a child can't be physically forced to go anywhere without causing abuse) where the child can refuse to attend? Are there "tiers" to the age; Is it true that a temper tantrum of a 5 year old would be seen as such, but the refusal of a 17 year would be legally accepted? This is a hard question to answer that doesn't have a neat resolution. Very little pertaining to the authority of a parent over a child is codified in statutory law and there is not a clear cut age at which a child has "freedom of conscience" vis-a-vis a parent. Most of the law related to children concerns allocation of parenting time and parental decision making between divorced, separated or unmarried parents; abuse and neglect; and juvenile delinquency. There is also usually a snippet of criminal law stating that certain kinds of uses of force to discipline children do not constitute crimes. But, part of why it doesn't come up very much is that older children are usually socialized in a manner that causes them to show a certain amount of respect for the wishes of their parents. It also doesn't come up much for children who aren't in their late teens, because the complete economic dependence of children on their parents or guardians gives the parents considerable power of their children that doesn't require the exercise of physical force. Also, it is quite dependent upon how the issue presents itself. No law enforcement agency is going to aid a parent in forcibly dragging a kid to church against their will. But, no social services agency is going to remove a kid from a home because his birthday party will be cancelled if he doesn't go to the church of his parents' choice the Sunday before his birthday. There are also some subtle but important distinctions between states on the issue of emancipation. In Colorado, emancipation is a statement about the empirical reality. If a child is self-supporting and lives apart from parents or guardians then the child is an emancipated minor. It is not a status granted by a court, it is a status acknowledged by courts when evaluating other issues. In California, a child is not emancipated unless a court grants a child that status and a child who is de facto emancipated without the leave of a court is guilty of a "status offense" (the New York State term for someone in this state is PINS for "person in need of supervision"). Basically, if a parent can force a child to go to church by means that don't constitute abuse or neglect and don't exceed the level of force authorize for child discipline in the criminal code, then they can do it, and if they can't manage that, then they can't do it. Many states have a "status offense" that allows government intervention with the cooperation of a parent or guardian in cases where an "uncontrollable" child is defiant and simply will not give any heed to the parent or guardian's instructions. In practice, the older a child is, the less likely someone viewing a parent's conduct forcing a child to do something is to be viewed as acceptable or legally justified. The legal rights of children in a school setting are also age dependent under the case law, although not always in a really well defined way. Controls on student expression that would be uncontroversial for elementary school students may be looked upon by the law with disfavor for high school students and clearly prohibited for adults. Perhaps one useful way to conceptualize it is that trying to make a child attend a particular kind of religious service is not considered an improper purposes for a parent of any minor to utilize the resources available to the parent to do so, but the range of resources available to a parent with regard to an adult child is much narrower.

In the UK, the law applicable to liability for child maintenance does not restrict it to children conceived in 'normal', conventional, or ongoing relationships. A biological parent has specific legal rights, AND a duty of ‘parental responsibility’ to look after the child. Mothers automatically have parental responsibility. A father has parental responsibility if he is married to the child’s mother, or is named on the birth certificate. Unmarried fathers do not have automatic parental responsibility, and neither do step-parents or grandparents. A proven biological father may not have parental responsibility, but will certainly have financial responsibility. In most cases fathers will have parental responsibility or can easily acquire it by way of an agreement or a court order. Unless there are compelling reasons, the courts are unlikely to refuse it. If a DNA test shows that the child is yours, then you are liable for the usual contribution to care at CSA rate of 15% of take home pay. When the baby is born the mother can apply to the CSA for maintenance naming you as the father. You will have a limited time within which to ask for (and pay for) a DNA test if you wish to challenge the issue. The cost is repaid if the child is not yours. Financial liability applies whether or not money has changed hands in return for the sex that led to the child's conception. The issue of casual sex leading to parenthood is a perennial one, and this page is as good as any: Dating site babies (Leiper Gupta Family Lawyers) Also in the UK, if you donate sperm through a Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) licensed clinic, you will not: be the legal parent of any child born have any legal obligation to any child born have any rights over how the child will be brought up be asked to support the child financially be named on the birth certificate If you use an unlicensed clinic to donate sperm, or an informal method, you will be the legal father of any child born from your donation under UK law. Legal rights for egg and sperm donors (UK Government)

Where is the Houston anti-Food Sharing Ordinance? Accoring to this article about the anti-Food Sharing Ordinance in Houston, Mayor Anise Parker and city council passed an anti-food sharing ordinance that bans serving charitable meals on properties, public or private, without consent from the Mayor's office. Where can I find this ordinance?

The ordinance is 2012-269 was signed by Mayor Parker in 2012 you can find it as AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 20 OF THE CODE OF ORDINANCES, HOUSTON, TEXAS, RELATING TO FEEDING THOSE IN NEED; CONTAINING FINDINGS AND OTHER PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE FOREGOING SUBJECT; PROVIDING FOR SEVERABILITY; AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY. The section amended landed in Chapter 20, Article V: Charitable Food Service.

To answer the question in your title: Yes, local authorities require planning permission. However, the question in your question is different. Removing a bus shelter or a lay-by probably wouldn't require planning permission if it was done by Tesco's in their car park - so the local authority doesn't require it either. There may be a requirement for consultation on such changes, but when Douglas Adams referred to It was on display in the bottom of a locked filing cabinet stuck in a disused lavatory with a sign on the door saying ‘Beware of the Leopard'. he was only half joking. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the bus shelter and lay-by are "roads", so if you don't live in a unitary authority would be handled by the County Council (or equivalent), whereas Planning is the responsibility of the District/Town/City Council.

I'm not going to comment on what your manager is doing specifically, since I don't know all the facts. But in general: As a general rule, businesses have freedom of contract. This means they can choose to do business with, or not do business with, anyone they want. There are specific laws that create exceptions to this freedom of contract. The most important are federal and state civil rights laws, which prohibit many businesses from discriminating on the basis of certain protected classes, such as race, sex, religion, etc. In general, "locals vs. out-of-towners" is not a protected class, and therefore no law explicitly prohibits this type of discrimination. However, it's possible a court could find that "locals" is a proxy for some actual protected class--for example, if the hotel is in a city and the "locals" are predominantly Black.

"Public place" is not a good description of a bar. "Public accommodation" would be a better description. But it isn't a public accommodation 24-7-365(366). It's only a public accommodation during the hours it is open to the public. Presumably the owner is free to close it to the public and rent it to some private group. During the rental period, it's up to the private group to decide who to admit. (The owner would have a veto for anyone who can't be admitted, for example, because the person isn't old enough to enter a bar.) The private group is not bound by the policies that prohibit unfair discrimination by public accommodations.

This was a resolution of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, passed on 1918-10-24 as the Chronicle reported the following day. "Everyone Is Compelled to Wear Masks by City Resolution". San Francisco Chronicle, 1918-10-25. page 1. The texts of resolutions may be obtained from the Clerk of the Board, but one needs to know the specific resolution number, or at least "reasonably describe" an identifiable resolution. It is possible that "mask wearing resolution passed on 1918-10-24" is a reasonable description. How many mask ordinances could the Board have passed that day? ☺ https://crmproxy.sfgov.org/Ef3/General.jsp?form=SSP_COB_Information&page=SSP_COB_Information Information from the Board on the WWW only goes back to 2000, and in the Legislative Research Centre to 1998. https://sfbos.org/resolutions

This could be a violation of the Fair Housing Act, but Fair Housing v. Roommate.com, 521 F.3d 1157 says that we find that the FHA doesn’t apply to the sharing of living units The crux of the argument is that a room in a house is not a "dwelling", since it is not a complete living unit. Whether or not courts outside the 9th Circuit follow suit remains to be seen. Florida state law (760.29) states exceptions to its anti-discrimination laws, covering for instance Any single-family house sold or rented by its owner, provided such private individual owner does not own more than three single-family houses at any one time. If that is the case, then the exemption exists if the rental a. Without the use in any manner of the sales or rental facilities or the sales or rental services of any real estate licensee or such facilities or services of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any such licensee or person; and b. Without the publication, posting, or mailing, after notice, of any advertisement or written notice in violation of s. 760.23(3) Another exemption exists if Rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his or her residence. Your attorney (hint) will be able to interpret that complicated section of the law.

While it is not illegal to own, it may still be illegal to ride on public property. Private property owners can ban them even if they were legal and need to be consulted individually. I have been unable to find out if new laws spoken about have been passed in New York since the beginning of the year. Based on what I have found (as of the end of 2015), it would be best to consider that they are illegal to use on public areas just as any other unlicensed motor vehicle. As of November 2015 Some property owners have banned them for liability reasons, as it is easy to see how a rider could trip on a bump or unexpected curb. And although they have taken the Upper East Side and other parts of New York City by storm, the state classifies them as motorized vehicles that cannot be registered, so riding them in public can incur a steep fine. Earlier this week, the NYPD's 26th Precinct tweeted: "Be advised that the electric hoverboard is illegal as per NYC Admin. Code 19-176.2*." and December 2015 some lawmakers were talking about making them legal. Truth or Fiction Collected on: 12/28/2015 gives the following summary A spokesperson for the New York City Department of Transportation has explained that the law’s definition of “electronic personal assist mobility device” was broad enough to include hoverboards, and that they would be regulated as such. In NYC, because the population is above 1 million people, electronic personal assist device riders must be licensed, and the devices must be registered with the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. Hoverboards are illegal, the spokesperson said, because the NYSDMV would refuse to register them for legal use: NYSDMV’s position is that these vehicles are likely “Electric personal assist mobility devices.” NYS Vehicle and Traffic Law 114-d defines “Electric personal assist mobility device” as “Every self-balancing, two non-tandem wheeled device designed to transport one person by means of an electric propulsion system with an average output of not more than seven hundred fifty watts (one horsepower), and the maximum speed of which on a paved level surface, when propelled solely by its electric propulsion system while ridden by an operator weighing one hundred seventy pounds, is less than twelve and one-half miles per hour.” NYS VTL 125 generally defines “motor vehicles” as “Every vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power.” However, VTL 125 specifically excludes some classes of vehicles from the definition of “motor vehicles.” Under VTL 126(a-1), “electrical personal assistive mobility devices operated outside a city with a population of one million or more” are not considered motor vehicles. However, in NYC, because the city population is greater than one million, NYSDMV considers “hoverboards” that meet the definition of “electric personal assist mobility devices” the same as motor vehicles. Based on that interpretation, it would be illegal to operate a hoverboard in NYC without a valid license to drive a motor vehicle. Beyond that, the motor vehicle would need to be registered by NYSDMV (which NYSDMV will not do), inspected, insured, and otherwise treated as, and subject to regulation like, any other motor vehicle. A person who operates a hoverboard in NYC (or any other NYS city with a population greater than a million) would be subject to arrest and prosecution for myriad NYS VTL violations, including, but not limited to, driving a motor vehicle without valid registration or insurance.

LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision.

What if a child dies in school detention? Suppose that a child behaves badly in class and is detained after class. The child has some illness, which isn't easy to notice, but he is too shy to tell his teacher. His teacher doesn't know of his illness, does not notice his illness, and does nothing special relating to his illness. Sadly, the child dies during his detention. Will the teacher be considered responsible for this by law?

In the US, detention does not add anything: we can generalize the principle to any time when a student is in the custody of the teacher (classroom, field-trip, sporting event...). One question, for the scenario that you describe, is whether the injury was foreseeable. Suppose the injury is an abdominal aortic aneurysm – this is not foreseeable. The question that the court would ask is whether a person exhibiting reasonable caution and care would know that there is a possibility that the child has some condition. The details regarding this condition "not being easily noticeable" are essential to the outcome of the case. A child coughing up blood should be immediately treated medically, it is not reasonable to assume that a child who sneezes (once) is in imminent danger. The teacher's response is also important, and again this is a very fact-intensive inquiry. A child who has a heart attack should not be told "go talk to the nurse" (let's assume that the teacher correctly notices that this is a heart attack happening), 911 is the correct (minimal) remedy. Perhaps using the auto-defibrillator also part of the reasonable standard of care for a teacher (assuming there is one, and that the teacher has been trained how to use it). Then finally, the teacher is not liable if their actions / inactions don't cause the injury. In the case where a student suddenly dies, the fact that the teacher didn't somehow prevent the death doesn't make the teacher liable. But if the child is bleeding and the teacher decides "We can deal with this when detention is over" and the child bleeds to death in the interim, we would conclude that the teacher's lack of care caused the child's death. The school might also be liable on various grounds, for example if the school has no nurse and has no practical way for the teacher to contact emergency medical services. Some school policy which unreasonably restricts the teachers exercise of reasonable care could make the school liable. At any rate, "the child died" does not cause absolute liability, what confers liability is the actions and inactions of a party.

If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment.

No, the GDPR does not apply to dead persons. Consequently, no data subject rights exist that could be exercised. However, member state law may recognize such rights (perhaps derived from posthumous personality rights), and there is a variety of approaches between jurisdictions.

He does not need to be mirandized unless he is being arrested and the officers want to use things he will say as evidence. The officers in your situation seemed content to let the matter be handled through the school. If they had wanted to arrest him, they could easily have done so as soon as he pulled out the joint and handed it to the director. The "write a confession or you will leave in handcuffs" pretty much invalidates it in a court of law. Even if it weren't excluded, his testimony as to why he wrote it looks pretty bad in front of a jury. That said, I doubt that's where this case is headed. My understanding is this: The school director and two police officers caught your son smoking marijuana on school property. The punishment they sought is that he admit culpability and that he continue school online, and (presumably) on probation. In the grand scheme of how these cases could go, this isn't that bad. There are some procedural irregularities you could press, but there's enough evidence without the irregularities that work against your son. Having said that, sign nothing without consulting a lawyer. But it could be worse.

There is no nationwide prohibition on physical contact between teachers and children. But there are positive duties for child safeguarding which might result in a local policy that is more restrictive. The exact legal background is different depending on whether this is happening in England, Scotland, etc., or on whether it's a state or private school, but the net result is the same. For music tuition which takes place outside school, bodies such as the Independent Society of Musicians (the UK's main professional association for musicians and music teachers) will have their own policies for members. For example, for state schools in England, the governors must "make arrangements for ensuring that their functions relating to the conduct of the school are exercised with a view to safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children who are pupils at the school" (Education Act 2002 s.175(2)). This is a bit of a mouthful, but the rough idea is that the school has to implement certain policies in the interests of the child, including protecting them from sexual abuse and grooming. The school has to take account of statutory guidance from the Department for Education. In addition, there are standards for teachers' conduct which are used to assess their performance, and include language around safeguarding duties as well as "proper and professional regard for the ethos, policies and practices of the school in which they teach". Now, there is nothing here to say that a teacher can never make physical contact with a pupil. There are rules about how allegations of abuse are meant to be handled, as well as the general employment law around unfair dismissal, which would mean that accidentally touching a child ought not to result in immediate sacking. A particular school could decide that on balance, the appropriate policy is one of no physical contact at all, or they could be more nuanced (which is likely). Whatever policy they do have must be communicated to the teaching staff, who naturally are meant to follow it - although again, there are requirements of fairness on the employer as to how they handle noncompliance. Given that overall framework, scenarios of accidental touching, or administering first aid, or breaking up a dangerous situation, are different from physical contact as part of normal instruction. Even a local policy which ostensibly says "no touching ever" would have to give way to the Education and Inspections Act 2006, s.93 which specifically authorises our hypothetical teacher at an English state school to use reasonable force to stop a pupil injuring someone else, among other examples. That is also in line with the teachers' duty of care towards the wellbeing of their pupils. These examples are not really the same as what is happening in an ordinary music lesson. Meanwhile, outside the school gates, the Independent Society of Musicans has its own Code of Conduct which includes specific rules about touching in Annex 2, paragraph 20. Physical contact between teachers and pupils is only appropriate in very limited circumstances. Teachers should consider using other strategies such as demonstrating for the student to copy or using a mirror. If a teacher intends to use any physical contact in their teaching, they should state this in writing before lessons begin and ask the parent or guardian to sign that they have read the document. Explain the type of touch involved, where on the body and why, and make sure the pupil is aware of the reason for physical contact. Explain this orally to parents, guardians and pupils, and keep them informed of any need to modify the type of touch required as pupils progress. It is not advisable to touch a child on the trunk of the body unless there is a justifiable reason (e.g. to administer first aid). It is not appropriate to touch a child around the chest, waist, diaphragm or ribs in order to teach breathing. These rules are also made in the context of safeguarding, with the threat of terminating ISM membership (at least in principle). Note that this does not say that touch is disallowed, but does ask it to be limited and respectful, and clearly signalled to the child and their parents or guardians. Other professional societies may well have their own rules. All of this is happening at the level of law and policy, and so it's a little removed from the highly emotive social question of what sorts of behaviour are considered acceptable. Someone who teaches music in the UK would be exposed to a range of strongly-held views on the topic, which don't necessarily relate very clearly to the legal minimum requirements.

If the pill contained a harmful or noxious substance, this is battery, which is a crime in Lousiana ("the intentional administration of a poison or other noxious liquid or substance to another"). There is a specific crime in LA, battery of a teacher, which is dealt with somewhat more severely than non-teacher battery. It is not a crime to observe a crime being committed and not warn the victim, but it is a crime to aid the commission of the crime (for example to help the perp remove the lid, to supply the drug). Under section Title 17, a teacher battered by a student can file a school-system internal complaint which may lead to the student being expelled (this is ultimately covered by district-specific procedure). This is independent of criminal charges.

Probably Not In general, the law gives a school significant discretion on how to run its courses and grade its exams. And it is unlikely that getting into a lawsuit over a grade will be a good way to proceed. You could explain more fully to your instructor why you feel unfairly treated, and if not satisfied by the response, go to the department chair or other higher authority as the structure of the school may provide. I would suppose that the instructor had permission to require the 3rd party software, or that school policy gives an instructor that option. It might be worth confirming that, however. For future tests you might be able to shutdown or suspend all popups to avoid the problem happening again. A "game mode" sometimes will do that.

Modern legal systems frown on individual retribution. A victim of a crime is not allowed to punish the perpetrator of the crime; that falls to the state. The answer is therefore yes; the person could be arrested, tried, and punished, including by imprisonment.

Can you sign a shared physical custody contract before impregnation? I was wondering if it exists the possibility of signing a legal agreement before impregnation that states legally that both parents compromise into offering shared physical custody of the child to each other in case of divorce or separation. Do theses types of contract exists? are they legal? I currently live in Switzerland, but the question is meant generally.

Short Answer I was wondering if it exists the possibility of signing a legal agreement before impregnation that states legally that both parents compromise into offering shared physical custody of the child to each other in case of divorce or separation. Do theses types of contract exists? are they legal? I currently live in Switzerland, but the question is meant generally. Agreements of this type are not valid in Switzerland, the U.S., Australia, or any other jurisdiction of which I am aware. There are some fine nuances to this general rule, however, that are explored below. Obviously, of course, there are many countries in the world, and there could be an outlier out there somewhere. Exceptions For Choice of Family Religion Agreements In particular, in some countries, such as Israel and India, the substantive family law rules that apply to a married couple and their children are governed by the religion of that family as determined by law. Thus, Muslims families and Hindu families in India, for example, are governed by different laws related to child custody. In these countries, there is a legislatively approved set of family laws for each faith, but the laws for members of one religion are not the same as the laws for members of another religion, and there are typically rules to determine which sets of family law to apply in cases where the parents of a child belong to different religions. Pre-nuptial agreements in these countries may govern, to some extent, how a married couple's religion is determined for intra-national choice of law purposes, although they cannot specifically resolve custody issues on a pre-dispute basis. U.S. Law In General This would not be enforceable in most U.S. states. Agreements between parents in matters involving children (even post-dispute) are generally not legally binding, because the court has an independent duty to evaluate the best interests of the child under the circumstances as they actually present themselves. Courts can and do appoint third-party guardians ad litem to evaluate the best interests of the children when they have any reason to doubt the judgment of the parents. Put another way, pre-nuptial agreements and post-nuptial agreements, may govern property division and maintenance and restoration of name and inheritance rights and enforcement of economic provision rules, in the event of death or divorce, but may not govern parental responsibilities or child support or the circumstances under which the marriage may be terminated. Post-Dispute Agreements In practice, if parents come to a post-dispute agreement that happens to track the outlines of a non-binding pre-dispute agreement regarding parenting time and parental responsibilities, and the agreed resolution seems reasonable after perfunctory due diligence, a Court would usually ratify that agreement without much second guessing. But, the pre-dispute agreement would be only marginally relevant in the event of a dispute and would not have legal validity. It might be considered by a court as one factor among many in addressing the parenting dispute, as a source of ideas for a resolution and to ascertain the expectations and perspectives of the parents, but would not be given much weight in most cases. Exceptions For Dispute Resolution Method Agreements The exception would be that in some jurisdictions, a mediation or arbitration clause for parenting disputes in a material agreement would be honored, although the same substantive law would apply, in theory. Exceptions For Assisted Contraception And Surrogacy Agreements Note, however, that most jurisdictions in the U.S., do honor and give legal effect to a contract regarding the intended parent in a medically assisted conception or surrogacy contract, in which a pregnancy arises through some means other than intercourse between a man and a woman which of the source of the sperm and egg from that man and that woman that gives rise to a fertilized egg (e.g. cases of sperm donation, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, etc.). In those cases, the default rule is generally that the legal parents of the resulting child are the intended parents under the contract. But, this is purely an agreement governing paternity, and not parenting once a child is born. Swiss Law While I do not have first hand knowledge of Swiss law, a digest of Swiss law prepared by Westlaw (a major law book publisher and online legal research provider) does state the rule of Swiss law clearly, however: The areas a pre-nuptial agreement can cover are fairly limited. The following cannot be determined in advance: The preconditions for a divorce, nullification or separation of a marriage are ultimately governed by law. Any agreements that are not compliant with the law are invalid. Agreements on arrangements for children, in particular about parental responsibility, visiting rights or maintenance, made in advance, are not binding. Any amounts saved in pension funds during a marriage are divided in the event of a divorce. Waiving such a division is only possible under very restrictive conditions. Agreements in a marital contract that are not compliant with the law are invalid. This source also identifies the precise statutes and treaties that apply to resolve these questions of Swiss law. Choice of Law and Forum Related Issues There is also an implicit choice of law issue presented. Choice Of Law and Forum Agreements Are Usually Void Generally speaking, under U.S. law, these issues are governed in domestic cases by the state that is the "home state" of a particular child under a statutory test and the parents may not contractually agree to a choice of venue. In international cases by the state and country that are the home state and country of the child under a test established by treaty which may not be contractually agreed to in advance. Since the applicable statutory tests in the U.S. usually direct a court to apply the laws of the state with which the child has the strongest residential connection (except for Native American children whose family law disputes are subject to tribal law), and since laws relating to divorce and parenting are matters of state and not federal law for the most part (except as to choice of law and choice of forum issues, and certain federal welfare program guidelines for child support that states have economic incentives to comply with and all do), the law governing parental rights and responsibilities (and over the circumstances when a couple may get divorced) may change over time as the family (and each particular child) moves over the course of their lives. In international cases where there is not treaty in place between the potentially relevant countries (and in which diplomatic personnel or members of foreign royal families or families of heads of state are not involved), a U.S. court will generally apply the law of its own state in all cases where it has jurisdiction over the child, or of both parents. Jurisdictional disputes and inconsistent decrees are resolved in part through diplomatic channels at the national level in these cases. There Is Little Variation In U.S. Substantive Custody Law In practice, this isn't a very important observation in domestic cases, however, because almost every U.S. state gives judges extremely broad discretion to handle custody disputes on a case by case basis under a "best interests of the child" standard during the last several decades (even though this isn't constitutionally required), subject only to the barest U.S. constitutional limitations prohibiting decisions that amount to a termination of a legal parental relationship without certain forms of due process, and there aren't huge differences in the case law applying that standard in practice between states. The differences between particular judges in a particular county would typically be as great or greater than the difference between different states, when it comes to final outcomes in disputed and litigated cases. Before the best interests of the child standard was adopted more or less universally, many states had a sex specific "tender years doctrine" that presumptively gave custody of younger children to mothers and older children to fathers. But that standard was held to be unconstitutional because it discriminated based upon sex. In each state where the tender years doctrine or similar sex specific custody doctrines were held to be unconstitutional, the "best interests of the child" standard was adopted rather than a gender neutral standard that provided more guidance to judges such as a dictate to maintain the status quo as much as possible such as a "primary caretaker presumption" (which many judges applying the "best interests of the child" standard actually apply in practice). Most European countries also follow the "best interests of the child" rule for child custody. One of the big differences between jurisdictions in their laws typically involve issues like the standing of people other than parents to intervene in parenting litigation, such as grandparents, stepparents and social workers, and the rights of these third-parties vis-a-vis the legally recognized fathers and mothers of a child, and the circumstances under which an adoption and related relinquishment of parental rights is valid. The procedures that apply in family law cases also often differ significantly between jurisdictions. Exception For Post-Dispute Choice of Law and Forum Agreements However, once there has been a litigated dispute in the first instance, that jurisdiction will generally retain authority over the parenting of the child set forth in a decree. But if there is an agreement of the parents which has been ratified by a court regarding choice of law and venue that will be honored in a post-dispute settlement agreement. Also, there are typically statutory circumstances that cause the original jurisdiction to address a parenting dispute to lose authority over the child. For example, suppose that a couple divorces in England with a separation agreement approved by a court that states that the divorce court in London shall have continuing jurisdiction over future custody and child support disputes and the London divorce court approves that agreement. A U.S. or Swiss court would usually defer to the London divorce court for these matters at that point, unless some emergency or change of circumstances undermined the relevance of London to future disputes involving the child.

Child support arrangements can be negotiated by the parties, however, approval of the court is required to make them binding. Courts will reject arrangements that deviate too far from what a court would impose.

This is indeed an area of law where the answer does depend on the jurisdiction. As a 2015 article on the subject noted (and I am loathe to refer to less current sources as this is a rapidly changing area): The United States has no national laws or regulations governing assisted reproduction. However, many states have piecemeal legislation. Some aspects are regulated, while others are not; some states have strict laws or regulations whereas others are looser. As a 2017 American Bar Association article with citations notes, this isn't entirely true. There are some national laws that apply, but they aren't comprehensive and probably don't control the situation described in the OP. It also notes that: Certain states, like California, have created a legislative environment supportive of surrogacy by providing for the validity and enforcement of commercial surrogacy agreements and enacting legislation to define the resulting nontraditional parental relationships.10 Others, like New York, explicitly prohibit commercial surrogate parenting contracts,11 requiring most residents and potential surrogates in the state to seek desirable surrogacy arrangements in other states. However, so many aspects of ART are simply not addressed by the states:12 there is no state regulation of the number of children that may be conceived by an individual donor, no rules regarding the types of medical information and updates that must be supplied by young donors as they age, no standards regarding genetic testing on embryos, no limits on the age of donors, and virtually no regulation of the gametic13 material market. (Gametic material means sperm and eggs.) The American Bar Association has more resources on related issues here. A 2014 article surveyed the issue broadly. Colorado has a law that permits arrangements like these and makes them enforceable if the formalities of the statute are followed. It is not easy to figure out exactly which states do and do not allow this because: (1) there is a model act to authorize this but many states that allow it crafted their own legislation rather than following the model act (Article 6 of the Model Act is the part relevant to the OP), and (2) some states have allowed this kind of arrangement via case law rather than statutory law. There are also states with no statutes on the subject and no clear case law one way or the other. As of 2010 all but a handful of states had some kind of legislation, but as noted above, some of that legislation disallowed rather than authorized certain practices or only address some issues and not others. This article reviews in detail the facts and rulings in several cases that are on point to this issue, for example, from California, Minnesota and Montana.

Are there actual laws written, or de facto situations (e.g. let's say another law specifies that a child can't be physically forced to go anywhere without causing abuse) where the child can refuse to attend? Are there "tiers" to the age; Is it true that a temper tantrum of a 5 year old would be seen as such, but the refusal of a 17 year would be legally accepted? This is a hard question to answer that doesn't have a neat resolution. Very little pertaining to the authority of a parent over a child is codified in statutory law and there is not a clear cut age at which a child has "freedom of conscience" vis-a-vis a parent. Most of the law related to children concerns allocation of parenting time and parental decision making between divorced, separated or unmarried parents; abuse and neglect; and juvenile delinquency. There is also usually a snippet of criminal law stating that certain kinds of uses of force to discipline children do not constitute crimes. But, part of why it doesn't come up very much is that older children are usually socialized in a manner that causes them to show a certain amount of respect for the wishes of their parents. It also doesn't come up much for children who aren't in their late teens, because the complete economic dependence of children on their parents or guardians gives the parents considerable power of their children that doesn't require the exercise of physical force. Also, it is quite dependent upon how the issue presents itself. No law enforcement agency is going to aid a parent in forcibly dragging a kid to church against their will. But, no social services agency is going to remove a kid from a home because his birthday party will be cancelled if he doesn't go to the church of his parents' choice the Sunday before his birthday. There are also some subtle but important distinctions between states on the issue of emancipation. In Colorado, emancipation is a statement about the empirical reality. If a child is self-supporting and lives apart from parents or guardians then the child is an emancipated minor. It is not a status granted by a court, it is a status acknowledged by courts when evaluating other issues. In California, a child is not emancipated unless a court grants a child that status and a child who is de facto emancipated without the leave of a court is guilty of a "status offense" (the New York State term for someone in this state is PINS for "person in need of supervision"). Basically, if a parent can force a child to go to church by means that don't constitute abuse or neglect and don't exceed the level of force authorize for child discipline in the criminal code, then they can do it, and if they can't manage that, then they can't do it. Many states have a "status offense" that allows government intervention with the cooperation of a parent or guardian in cases where an "uncontrollable" child is defiant and simply will not give any heed to the parent or guardian's instructions. In practice, the older a child is, the less likely someone viewing a parent's conduct forcing a child to do something is to be viewed as acceptable or legally justified. The legal rights of children in a school setting are also age dependent under the case law, although not always in a really well defined way. Controls on student expression that would be uncontroversial for elementary school students may be looked upon by the law with disfavor for high school students and clearly prohibited for adults. Perhaps one useful way to conceptualize it is that trying to make a child attend a particular kind of religious service is not considered an improper purposes for a parent of any minor to utilize the resources available to the parent to do so, but the range of resources available to a parent with regard to an adult child is much narrower.

The first question would be whether those papers are indeed "legit", and we don't do product reviews. Assuming the company didn't mess up and she was legally served, the next question would be whether she responded (in the legal sense) or not. If she failed to respond at all within 21 days (add 9 days if she is out of state), then your next step would be to file default divorce paperwork (presumably that's covered in the service you paid for). If she agreed to the divorce and the courts knows that, then you file some more paperwork and she doesn't have to show up to anything. If she disagreed, there will be an "answer" and possibly a counterpetition. There is an exchange of paperwork w.r.t. assets, a mandatory mediation stage, more paperwork, disclosures etc. and a pre-trial conference, followed by a trial. If you are at this stage, attendance is mandatory. As long as you have proof of service, nobody requested a postponement, and there is some evidence to support your claim, a default judgment can be issued. It's not clear what "divorce proceeding" you are referring to that involves her attendance. However, you can file divorce paperwork yourself or using an online service, and using an online service does not render the paperwork illegitimate. It's not guaranteed that the service did what would be necessary for you to get the outcome you desire, but that's beyond the scope of what we can tell you.

the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.

You say the permission was "public", therefore I am going to assume that it cannot be argued that there was no agreement. There are two possibilities: If Company B has given consideration for the promise then there is a binding contract and Company A may be able to end it but could not seek redress for when it was in place. If there is no contract then the principle of promissory estoppel should have essentially the same effect. An agreement, including an IP licence, does not have to be in writing nor does it have to have any particular form.

is this absolutely required to be considered a valid document in most jurisdictions, most notably, the European Union? Not at all. There is no legal requirement that contracts, terms of service, and so forth be drafted, devised, or even validated by a lawyer. Law requires that certain types of contract be notarized. That refers to the moment where the parties sign/formalize the contract, which is different from --and independent of-- whether its terms were written by a lawyer. A messaging service like the one you have in mind definitely is not subject to such requirement either.

Is it true that men are forced to pay child support for children they didn't consent to have? According to many in the men's rights movement, a woman who, in any way, gets pregnant from a man will be able to get child support from him, which in most states is proportional to a man's wealth. This is even if the man clearly didn't consent to have children. For example, Drake once allegedly put Tabasco in a used condom to avoid fathering a child with a woman he doesn't want to have children with. Many say that if a woman successfully takes semen from a discarded condom and impregnates herself, then she is not punished, but the father would be forced to pay child support. Is it true that there are no laws that protect men from non-consensual reproduction? The child is really his biologically The man consented to sex, but not to having children The woman did something non-consensual so that the man would impregnate her The woman is eligible for child support anyway Jurisdiction? Any country you know. In Indonesia, I know that a man can choose not to support any child. So I have never heard a case of stealthing against men. Of course, if the child is really the man's child and the sex is consensual and the child is not there due to malicious acts, quite often the man chooses to take care of the child anyway.

Is it true that men are forced to pay child support for children they didn't consent to having? Yes. This is true in every U.S. jurisdiction, in the U.K., and in every jurisdiction of which I am aware in the E.U., and it is the rule in many other jurisdictions. The duty to pay child support in these jurisdictions flows from the relationship between the father and the child, and is not a contractual concept based upon consent. The primary exceptions to this general rule are cases where a parental relationship is legally terminated (e.g., in connection with the adoption of a child born out of wedlock), and cases in which someone becomes a sperm donor in a statutorily authorized arrangement that generally does not involve sexual intercourse. Historically, roughly speaking in the early 19th century, and earlier in English common law, and most other European and European-colonist jurisdictions, a man only had a duty to support the children of his wife or the children of his deceased former wife if he was a widower. Even further back, in the Roman empire from which the foundations of Roman civil law were derived, a father had a right in his sole and absolute discretion to commit infanticide, killing his infant children, a right which was a major political issue in the Roman empire from sometime in the 100s CE until it collapsed. Some jurisdictions, such as Japan, only established a legal duty to pay child support to a custodial parent in any circumstances in the late 20th century, although those jurisdictions still recognized the legal duty of a father to support a child in his custody. It is also worth noting that women in every country of which I am aware have a duty to support the children to which they give birth, whether or not they consented to impregnation (e.g. even if they were raped), or to giving birth (e.g. even if they wanted an abortion but were denied access to abortion by law or otherwise). This support obligation persists in almost every case, even if the woman's child is in the custody of another parent or guardian, and a woman is much more likely to face criminal prosecution for failure to support her child than an uninvolved father (although criminal prosecutions of men for non-support do happen). So, the claim that this constitutes sex discrimination is ill-founded.

Married (or married at the time of birth) fathers have equal rights to custody as mothers in AZ. There are no (active) laws establishing that a mother is to be given more rights to a child in a custody arrangement than a father. This is a little different for unmarried fathers because paternity is not assumed, it must be established. Married fathers are presumed to be the father of the child automatically. AZ used to follow the tender years doctrine where preference was given to mothers during the child's younger years. There is an entire somewhat interesting history there on the linked page. This has mostly been phased out in the United States in favor of the "best interest of the child" doctrine. So provided that you are financially stable, have a stable living environment, and can provide for your child, you as the father should have equal standing in a court with regards to custody. I say "should" because many judges still lean towards the mother. For your specific case I'd immediately talk to a family court advocate. They can get you in front of a judge with your estranged wife either being "in absentia" (not present) or ordered to be in court and produce an order to return the child to the home state. It will also help a custody case later on to establish that you are actively seeking a relationship with the child and you are being denied that (keep records of everything, phone calls, texts, letters, emails, etc).

Generally, in non-emergency situations, the state with jurisdiction over parenting issues related to children including relinquishment and adoption is vested in the courts of the "home state" of the child. A child's "home state" is defined by statute by a coordinated definitions set forth in parallel laws at the state (the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction And Enforcement Act in 49 states) and federal (the Parental Kidnapping Prevent Act) level. This definition of "home state" provides a fairly precise definition of something that approximately matches your intuition regarding the state where the child resides in most cases. There is also an international treaty with a similar home state definition. The state where the child was born ceases to be relevant at the point at which that state ceases to be the child's "home state". But, once a state's courts take jurisdiction over parenting issues for a child, the barrier to divest that state of jurisdiction is higher than it would be if there was no prior litigation. So, the state establishing the child support decree would often be the "home state" in the fact pattern set forth in this question. I will refrain from discussing the substantive law of voluntary relinquishment following an acknowledgment of paternity and payment of child support at length in this post as it is beyond the scope of what was asked. Suffice it to say that this is generally disfavored and is sometimes impossible. Also, the actions that could lead to involuntary termination of parental rights (even for mere non-support) also often have parallel felony criminal sanctions associated with them.

This occurred in Hong Kong, so Hong Kong law applies here. Hong Kong law's definition of rape is explicitly male on female (nonconsensual male-male is covered by sodomy laws instead). It is impossible for her to be charged with rape. Assuming you were over 16 at the time, the only offence that could be possible is indecent assault. As far as I can tell, there is no statute of limitations. However, the chance of her being charged is basically zero.

The solicitor is allowed not to accept a case. If your ex-wife asked him to prepare papers, and he feels that she is getting ripped off, it is absolutely understandable that he won't prepare these papers for her, because he doesn't want to be sued or badmouthed when the deal goes wrong. "We would also reserve the right to take our own professional advice as to our efforts on your behalf." means simply he is not specialised in some subject, and will prefer to ask someone who is. Like a medical doctor asking for a second opinion before going ahead and cutting your leg off. Now I would have preferred if the solicitor had said concretely what exactly is wrong with the contract. Also, it would be obvious that you would be very comfortable with anything that he would advice her against. If he thinks that it is a good deal for you but not for her, he should advice against it. (Your comment to another question seems to indicate that she should be paid a lot more than you offered, so her solicitor seems to have been perfectly right).

As a general rule, countries tend to recognize marriages performed abroad - even if those marriages could not legally be performed in the country. (So a 14 year old couple from North Carolina would be considered "married" in the UK. Note: that doesn't mean they can legally have sex.) There are exceptions: countries which don't permit polygamy often don't recognize polygamous marriages performed where they are legal. There would need to be evidence of the marriage though (as Jerry Hall found to her cost when she "divorced" Mick Jagger, and he successfully claimed that their wedding in Bali was not official).

Fraud involves gain. It does not have to be financial gain. By the way, he's probably right about free education etc. to some extent - as the father he will be (partially) responsible for child support.

If I were a DA (District Attorney) looking out "stamp out" statutory rape, I would make the rounds of the hospitals, identify women who gave birth, or were impregnated when underaged, and go from there. But few, if any DAs, do this. No, you wouldn't. First, you have neither the time nor the budget to do this. Second hospitals are not public property, you would need a warrant which the court won't give you because you don't have probable cause to believe a crime has or is being committed. As a DA, I would of course, follow up on any complaints lodged by the victim, or even by her/his parents. And maybe I would prosecute a case where people were "caught in the act, or there were nude pictures, etc. May even an especially egregious PDA (public display of affection). No, you wouldn't. You would follow up on complaints to the extent that you have the time, budget and manpower to do so and you would prosecute cases where you believe that you have a reasonable prospect of getting a conviction and where prosecution is, in your opinion, in the public interest. In the real world, that means where the police hand you a brief of evidence that is a lay-down misere and (for statutory rape) where there is a real power imbalance between the perpetrator and the victim - giving 2 willing 15 year old kids the label of 'sex offender' for life is probably not in the public interest. But suppose there were no complaints or smoking guns. Could someone investigate based on something like a teenager "holding hands" with someone much older? To make the question objective, what has historically caused DAs to prosecute people outside of the above parameters? With some exceptions, it is not the role of the DA to initiate or conduct investigations of criminal actions - that is the role of law enforcement officers, usually for this particular crime, police officers. Notwithstanding, the general rule in western, liberal democracies (which the United States, with a certain generosity of spirit, can still be considered) is that citizens are allowed to get on with their lives without day-to-day interference from the state. That is, law enforcement officers do not 'go fishing' for crimes, they investigate crimes that they have a probable cause to believe have actually happened, either because they themselves saw it happen or someone has reported it to them as having happened. The term for having a law enforcement officer following you around waiting for you to break the law is 'harassment' and may itself be illegal. A law enforcement officer can initiate an investigation based on anything but as no law enforcement agency has unlimited resources, they tend to follow only those investigations that might lead somewhere. For example, it has been known for parents to hold the hands of their children and even to publicly display affection towards them and parents are often "much older" then their children - this would not generally be grounds for initiating a statutory rape investigation.

Is it legal to carry a child around in a “close to you” child carrier? While in a car, a child must be in a special seat. When I leave the car must I take the child seat (it’s detachable) with me together with the child. Or is it okay to place child in a “close to me” child carrier (image below). Suppose the child is a 7 pound newborn (10 days old). Is it okay to carry the child in the street and in the hospital inside of this carrier? Or should it be a “car seat” type carrier?

There is no legal reason that you can't carry your baby any way you want outside of your vehicle (as long as you aren't physically harming the child). Baby slings or "baby wearing" is recognized by many pediatric doctors as not just good for the child, but good for the parent too (read more). Some hospitals (it was this way for my children) won't let you leave the hospital after birth without placing the child in an approved child seat. This is hospital policy though, not law. The purpose here was to verify that you are capable of putting your child in the seat, have the seat restraints positioned correctly, and understand the placement in the vehicle. Improper use can result in injury or death and this is a lot easier to examine in the hospital room than it is in your car.

If there is no reasonable suspicion of a crime having been committed or about to be committed, then there is no reason to seize you, and the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated". Even if a state has a "stop and identify" statute, reasonable suspicion is a minimum requirement for seizing your person, even temporarily. Texas is not a state with an obligation to identify statute. I would not expect the state to be very helpful, given the facts as you report them. There might be others, such as the ACLU, who may be happy to discuss the particulars of your case. The police need to justify a stop in court, and not to the person being seized. I don't know if there is any case law saying that a false police statement to a detainee ("No, I don't have a reasonable suspicion") precludes claiming in court that there was reasonable suspicion, but it should at least make the claim of reasonable suspicion less credible. They do have to have reasonable suspicion, and they do not have to tell you what that suspicion is. OTOH if they are just harassing bicyclists, that would be illegal.

In the US, detention does not add anything: we can generalize the principle to any time when a student is in the custody of the teacher (classroom, field-trip, sporting event...). One question, for the scenario that you describe, is whether the injury was foreseeable. Suppose the injury is an abdominal aortic aneurysm – this is not foreseeable. The question that the court would ask is whether a person exhibiting reasonable caution and care would know that there is a possibility that the child has some condition. The details regarding this condition "not being easily noticeable" are essential to the outcome of the case. A child coughing up blood should be immediately treated medically, it is not reasonable to assume that a child who sneezes (once) is in imminent danger. The teacher's response is also important, and again this is a very fact-intensive inquiry. A child who has a heart attack should not be told "go talk to the nurse" (let's assume that the teacher correctly notices that this is a heart attack happening), 911 is the correct (minimal) remedy. Perhaps using the auto-defibrillator also part of the reasonable standard of care for a teacher (assuming there is one, and that the teacher has been trained how to use it). Then finally, the teacher is not liable if their actions / inactions don't cause the injury. In the case where a student suddenly dies, the fact that the teacher didn't somehow prevent the death doesn't make the teacher liable. But if the child is bleeding and the teacher decides "We can deal with this when detention is over" and the child bleeds to death in the interim, we would conclude that the teacher's lack of care caused the child's death. The school might also be liable on various grounds, for example if the school has no nurse and has no practical way for the teacher to contact emergency medical services. Some school policy which unreasonably restricts the teachers exercise of reasonable care could make the school liable. At any rate, "the child died" does not cause absolute liability, what confers liability is the actions and inactions of a party.

This varies greatly by state, but the pedestrians "right of way" is quite a common misconception. Pedestrians do not always have the right of way, but you're also not allowed to just run them over if they're in the middle of the street. That's why states have jaywalking laws, and a lot of people don't realize that they can be ticketed for it - because it's a huge safety concern for a pedestrian to walk in the street outside the designated areas. The NCSL provides a Pedestrian Crossing 50 State Summary that outlines the laws regarding pedestrian crossing. Particularly, there are two lines that frequently repeat throughout all the states: Pedestrians may not suddenly leave the curb and enter a crosswalk into the path of a moving vehicle that is so close to constitute an immediate hazard. Pedestrians must yield the right-of-way to vehicles when crossing outside of a marked crosswalk or an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection. Bottom line: if there is a pedestrian randomly in the middle of the street somewhere, you are fully obligated to attempt to not hit them with your vehicle. Feel free to curse them out (if that's your thing) because in most states they are themselves breaking a law. If an accident can't be prevented due to a pedestrian's actions, then the pedestrian is fully at fault and you will not be held responsible in any way.

Using two states as examples: In California, emergency vehicle operators are exempt from pretty much the entirety of the rules of the road (VC 21055). They can pass you on the right if they want to. Department policy might say no, but that depends on department policy and the details of their emergency vehicle operation course. However, California law requires all drivers to pull to the right when an emergency vehicle approaches (VC 21806). Even though an ambulance driver legally could pass you on the right, you are required to pull right. According to the BLM's emergency response policy for fire personnel in California, this means passing on the right is heavily disfavored: the emergency vehicle operator doesn't know that the driver (who is clearly not paying much attention) won't suddenly notice them and comply with the vehicle code, cutting them off or running into them. Other policies/things which seem to reflect policies say similar things, and all make it clear that operators need to be careful that the car they're passing won't drive into them. In Maryland, the law is a bit different. Section 21-405 of the Maryland Code obligates drivers to move to the edge of the roadway. This means either edge, so on a divided highway you might pull left. On a non-divided road, you obviously pull right. In this case, the vehicle may end up passing you on the right, but again: they are going to be careful about it, and would rather you get out of their way so they don't have to worry that you'll suddenly see them and drive into them.

I couldn't find any decisions on CanLII where someone was punished for a fictitious or out-of-province front plate in Alberta, however the Traffic Safety Act states the following: 1(1)(s) “licence plate” means a licence plate that is issued under this Act and includes an object that is recognized under this Act as a licence plate; (9) For the purposes of sections 1(1)(rr) and 11.1 and Part 8, licence plate includes a licence plate issued in another jurisdiction. 53(1) Except as otherwise permitted under this Act, a person shall not do any of the following: (b) display on a motor vehicle or trailer a licence plate other than a licence plate issued or authorized for use on that vehicle; (c) operate or park a motor vehicle or trailer on a highway with an expired licence plate displayed on it; (Part 8) 168(1) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe (a) that a vehicle is displaying licence plates that (i) were not issued for that vehicle . . . the peace officer may seize and take possession of the licence plates displayed on that vehicle. 169(1) A peace officer may arrest a person without warrant if the peace officer, on reasonable grounds, believes . . . (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the following are the provisions for which a person may be arrested without a warrant: (c) section 53(1)(b) relating to the displaying of a licence plate other than one authorized under this Act; While the connection of the extended definition in s.9 to s.53(1) is a little vague, the connection to Part 8 is not, and therefore I can confidently say that the Act clearly states it is a violation to use out-of-province plates on the front of a vehicle. The plates can be seized and you may be arrested. It may further be a violation of the BC Motor Vehicle Act if/when you travel there.

4511.71, "driving on a closed road", doesn't apply here: it requires that the closure be done using a sign, rather than a generic "traffic control device". It also appears to be intended to apply specifically to construction closures, not closures in general. However, what you describe is, at a minimum, a violation of: 4511.25, lanes of travel: (A) Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle or trackless trolley shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows: [exceptions that don't apply] where "roadway" is defined in 4511.01 as (EE) "Roadway" means that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, except the berm or shoulder. and 4511.28, passing on the right: (A) The driver of a vehicle or trackless trolley may overtake and pass upon the right of another vehicle or trackless trolley only under the following conditions: (1) When the vehicle or trackless trolley overtaken is making or about to make a left turn; (2) Upon a roadway with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for two or more lines of vehicles moving lawfully in the direction being traveled by the overtaking vehicle. In short, the road is "closed" in the sense that there is no legal way for you to drive past the police car. And it doesn't really matter which offense you're charged with: all three are classified as "minor misdemeanors", carrying the exact same penalties.

You are not reading a law book here and you should not interpret a driving test so literally. It's quite clear that the question implies you should follow all of their instructions regarding how to proceed through traffic. Sometimes those instructions do involve "breaking laws" such as driving on the wrong side of the road or proceeding through a traffic signal that was not turned off. The B option clearly does not mean they have the power to disobey all laws in existence, only those concerning traffic as evidenced by the examples given. You are not Sheldon Cooper and you should know how to interpret a vague question correctly. You are also not a gopher, and you can correctly deduce that crashing into another car or driving off the cliff into the water is not in your best interests, and that calling the police to report someone abusing their position is probably a good idea. If you're concerned by the wording, try contacting the California DMV to have them clarify the wording.

Is it a crime to have child outside of wedlock? If a legally married man has a child with another woman, what are the consequences for that child? Who will be the legal father of this child on the child's birth certificate? Can this child use his or her biological father's last name? Is it a crime to have sex with another woman while you have married? Is it crime to father a child outside of marriage?

Is it a crime to have child outside of wedlock? Giving birth itself, regardless of the circumstances, is never a crime in the United States. Some sexual acts which can sometimes result in the conception of a child are crimes (most obviously rape and incest). Circumstances other than rape (including statutory rape and abuse of a position of trust rape), and incest, where a sexual act that can result in the conception of a child are a crime based upon the marital status of one or both of the parties to the sexual act are discussed below. If a legally married man has a child with another woman, what are the consequences for that child? 1- Who will be the legal father of this child in the child's birth certificate? It depends upon how the process is handled. The mother's husband is the presumed parent whether or not he is listed on the birth certificate. In some states, "the other man" does not have the right to bring a paternity proceeding, although the husband or the mother would. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that this kind of limitation on paternity lawsuits is constitutional. But, if the mother indicates the biological father's name on the birth certificate (some states require the biological father's voluntary acknowledgement as well), that can supersede this presumption. The biological father always has some process (sometimes difficult for even a non-blameworthy father to comply with) to assert paternity in cases where the mother of the child is unmarried (or was unmarried at the time of conception at least), however, except that in a minority of U.S. states, rapists do not have the status of legal parents of their biological children with a rape victim. There is usually a statute of limitations for the paternity of a father shown on a birth certificate to be contested for the purpose of using that as a defense to a child support claim. Sometimes another statute of limitations applies, however, in other circumstances, such as a lawsuit to collect child support brought by the mother of the child, or the child, where paternity hasn't previously been established, or for inheritance purposes. The exact process by which paternity is established when the biological parents are not married differs from state to state and is the subject of several separate state specific answers at Law.SE. The process is frequently different when the mother is married to someone else than it is when the mother is not married. Some states (including California) permit a child to have more than two parents in some circumstances, and to have two parents who have the same sex in some circumstances. The fact of a genetic parent-child relationship is, as a general rule, neither necessary, nor sufficient, to establish a parent-child relationship, although it is a very important factor to be considered by a court. There is a special body of law governing paternity in cases of "assisted reproduction" (such as artificial insemination or when donated eggs are used or when there is a surrogate parent who gives birth to a child after having a fertilized egg from a different biological mother and father implanted in her). The majority rule in these cases, where assisted reproduction is intended and all parties to the process consent, is that an assisted reproduction agreement of the parties governs paternity. But not all possible scenarios have been the subject of clear law, and there is not uniformity among states regarding the relevant law. For example, there is not much guidance regarding the legal considerations that apply in a case where a man artificially inseminates a woman causing her to become pregnant without her consent or knowledge at the time that this happens, and only subsequently learns what happens, or when the sperm of an intended sperm donor is substituted for sperm by another donor, in an artificial insemination procedure to which the woman otherwise consented. Termination of parental rights and the parent-child relationship is something that, once established, is hard to effect legally in most cases and is a situation in which an indigent defendant facing a parental rights termination has a constitutional right to counsel. But termination of parental rights in adoptions, when the paternity of the father hasn't been established legally, can be done much more easily. 2- Can this child use her/his biological father's last name? A child can have any name agreed to by the parents designated on the birth certificate. It is customary to assign a child the father's last name (unless no father is listed on the birth certificate or publicly disclosed), but in the United States, the issue of what someone is named is almost completely unregulated. The child's surname, for example, does not have to be either the father's surname or the mother's surname. Many children, for example, have surnames that are hyphenations of their father's surname and their mother's surname, even if the parents did not change their names upon marriage. The tradition in Iberia and much of Latin America is for children to take both their father's surname and their mother's surname in a double name surname which is often not hyphenated even though both parts of the name are part of the full surname. The U.S. allows parents to continue to follow this custom as a matter of law, although some governmental and private bureaucratic systems for dealing with people's names in computerized databases don't allow for these kinds of entries and also often disallow hyphens as characters in the name database entries. The process for naming a child when two parents are designated and they can't agree varies from state to state. Usually, a court would decide, or an unmarried mother would decide. Also, some states have the common law rule that your legal name includes any name by which you are commonly called and acknowledge as your own, even without a formal bureaucratic change on a birth certificate or other governmental legal process. Every state, however, also, at least, has a bureaucratic or court process by which a person's name can be changed. 3- Is it a crime to have sex with another woman while you have married? In a large majority of U.S. jurisdictions, adultery is no longer a crime (assuming the sexual act is consensual and not incestuous) including 33 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and the several U.S. territories. "States which have decriminalised adultery in recent years include West Virginia (2010), Colorado (2013), New Hampshire (2014), Massachusetts (2018), and Utah (2019)." Adultery is rarely enforced criminally in the 17 states, as of 2021, that still do have adultery laws on the books. This is, in part, due to doubts about the constitutionality of these crimes under federal and state constitutions, in part, due to changing norms, and in part, due to the limited benefit of a misdemeanor or felony prosecution to all persons involved (and the state) in such cases. The birth of a child who is conceived with a father other than the mother's husband while the mother is married is not automatically conclusive proof of the crime of adultery under either state law or under the U.S. Code of Military Justice. For example, under South Carolina law adultery involves either "the living together and carnal intercourse with each other" or, if those involved do not live together "habitual carnal intercourse with each other" which is more difficult to prove. Similarly, in Florida, the crime is "Living in open adultery". Also, in the case of a prosecution of an unmarried man, knowledge that the woman is married would typically be an element of the crime of adultery, and it is similarly never a crime to be raped in the U.S., even if you are married. In 13 of the states where adultery is still a crime (Arizona, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Virginia), it is a petty offense (the maximum punishment in Maryland is a $10 fine), or is a misdemeanor. But it continues to be a felony in four states (Idaho, Oklahoma, Michigan, and Wisconsin) and is punishable most severely among those states in Michigan who someone convicted of adultery faces up to four years in prison. It is a crime that is actively enforced for active duty members of the U.S. military under the U.S. Code of Military Justice. In the U.S. military, adultery is a potential court-martial offense, falling under the General article (Art. 134). The Manual for Courts-Martial defines (para. 99) "Extramarital sexual conduct" as being: "Elements.(1) That the accused wrongfully engaged in extramarital conduct as described in subparagraph c.(2) with a certain person; (2) That, at the time, the accused knew that the accused or the other person was married to someone else; and (3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was either: (i) to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces; (ii) was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces; or (iii) to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces and of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces". . . . The law on adultery was revised in 2019 in order to include same-sex encounters in the offense. Neither the U.S. military, nor any U.S. state, has penalties for adultery that differ depending upon whether or not the adultery results in the birth of child. The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of adultery crimes since its ruling in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) which decriminalized any kind of sex between consenting unmarried adults that does not constitute prostitution, as a matter of constitutional law (including sex between married adults with each other). 4- Is it crime to father a child outside of marriage? No (assuming that rape or incest is not an issue). Laws prohibiting unmarried consenting adults (or consenting adults who are married to each other) from having sex (including anal sex) or children (in non-incestuous relationships and not in violation of a position of trust) are unconstitutional in the United States pursuant to Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). So, even in states where there are laws prohibiting people who aren't married from having sex with each other or living with each other on the books (the former were called "fornication" laws, and the latter were laws prohibiting "cohabitation" of unmarried couples), those laws are unconstitutional (and in the case of laws barring cohabitation are also prohibited by federal fair housing statutes). Unconstitutional fornication laws, which effectively make all forms of sex outside marriage illegal remain in the law books without being formally repealed in six states: Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, South Carolina and Utah. Related Non-Criminal Matters Civil Lawsuits Involving Adultery Or Rape In a handful of U.S. states a husband can bring a lawsuit for money damages (called alienation of affections or "criminal conversation" despite the fact that it is a civil lawsuit) against someone who has sex with his wife. The vast majority of U.S. states have abolished such lawsuits, however. In fiscal years 2000–2007, there were an average of 230 alienation of affections filings in North Carolina per year — a bit over 0.5% of the number of all divorces. The tort is also recognized in Hawaii, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Utah, but it is frequently litigated only in North Carolina and in Mississippi. Many of the states where the tort is not commonly used impose restrictions on it that make it less attractive. In Illinois, Hawaii and New Mexico, these limitations make it exceedingly difficult to prevail in an alienation of affections case and recover substantial monetary damages. The standard of proof is lower in Utah and South Dakota, which continue to have actively litigated alienation of affections suits, although not used as often in these states as in North Carolina and Mississippi, for reasons that are presumably unrelated to the relevant legal standards that apply to these lawsuits. Also, in a rape case, a rape victim can bring a civil lawsuit for money damages against the rapist for assault and battery in most cases, and in those cases, many states allow a spouse of a rape victim to bring a parallel lawsuit against the person who committed the assault that is called a lawsuit for loss of consortium. The right to sue for loss of consortium is not specific to rape cases; it applies in all lawsuits for personal injury where it is available. Relevance To Divorce Cases In most U.S. state, divorce is granted without regard to marital fault and adultery is not considered in alimony awards or property divisions. While every U.S. state has some form of no fault divorce, and number of U.S. states also have fault based divorce, and a number of U.S. states, however, allow consideration of adultery as a form of marital fault in divorce proceedings, including how much, if any alimony is awarded and in property divisions. No state would consider being raped an act of marital fault, however, even if this caused a wife to give birth to a child whose biological father was not her husband, and even if the husband wanted her to have an abortion. Relevance To Children's Rights Adultery generally can be considered in child custody cases only to the extent that it impacts paternity or it was something that a child perceived personally, because every U.S. jurisdiction uses a "best interests of the child" standard for making child custody decisions, and because child support is subject to indirect federal regulation by conditioning federal welfare funding to states based upon following federal regulations related to child support. Parents do not automatically have priority over non-parents in proceedings to determine child custody although there is a strong presumption in favor of parents in such cases, even when termination of parental rights is not at issue. A legally recognized parent has a right to only minimal, roughly annual, sometimes supervised, visitation with a child. Parents do not have the full rights of a legal guardian with respect to their children and the rights that they do have with respect to their children are often not spelled out affirmatively in detail in statutes or case law. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that it is illegal for a U.S. law (including a state or local law) to treat a child born out of wedlock whose paternity is established differently from a child born to married parents. For example, the biological father of a child conceived in an act of prostitution with an unmarried mother can be legally established as the father of the child by the mother in every state. Prior to these rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, many states did not allow children born out of wedlock to inherit from the intestate estates of their fathers, and did not create a right to child support connected to children born out of wedlock. Also, it was historically much harder for a child with a U.S. citizen father and a non-U.S. citizen mother born outside the United States to claim citizenship than it is today, although this still requires a legal process to establish citizenship that is more difficult than for other children when paternity was not promptly legally established between that father and that child. But the courts have permitted fairly onerous burdens to be placed on a child or a father seeking to establish paternity in either an out of wedlock birth or a birth to a married woman when the biological father is not her husband.

is spousal immunity a defense for a forced restraining order by a biological father if he won't even speak to a suitor (i.e. may I take your daughter on a date)? There is no such thing as "spousal immunity". Your post is replete with unclear references, unclear statements, and seemingly unrelated questions. But it is noteworthy that spousal privilege (not "immunity") does not preclude obtaining and enforcing a restraining order. The only relevance of spousal privilege is the evidentiary issue of precluding a spouse's testimony from being obtained and entered as admissible evidence in the court proceedings to which the respondent is a party. In the context of restraining orders, spousal privilege might be available only if the respondent invokes it during the proceedings for civil or criminal contempt that resulted from respondent's violation of the restraining order. If the restraining order is pursuant to, or in the context of, divorce proceedings, spousal privilege is inapplicable. See, for instance, MCL 600.2162(3)(a) and other exceptions listed therein. At least in theory (since courts often do whatever they want), a party's conduct & statements (in or outside of court) regarding his/her spouse may forfeit spousal privilege regardless of whether the respondent or spouse ever spoke to a suitor (whatever that means) at all.

if the child exchange time and locations are fixed, and the husband can no longer legally drive, does this effectively nullify his visitation rights? No. He can get a ride from someone or get an Uber or Lyft or Taxi or take a bus. The drop off location is near her house, not his, and even if public transportation were an option he would not be the type to use it. He's more the type that would ignore the suspension of his license and go pick up the kids in his car anyway. He is also the kind to try to attempt to manipulate the wife into doing what he wants regardless of what a court order says. Emotional abuse and manipulation were a big part of his game, but fortunately she has gotten much better at ignoring it. What he is inclined to do and why have nothing to do with whether or not it is legal. If he has his license revoked and attempts to pick up the children as always, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she allows him to pick up the kids? Practically speaking, no, particularly in light of a court order to transfer custody. Theoretically, it is remotely possible, even though it is very unlikely. In theory, she could be held liable for negligent child neglect by allowing this to happen, particularly if the children were then harmed in an automobile accident. If he was visibly drunk or intoxicated at the time of the transfer, however, her risk of criminal liability would be considerable. Would there be any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses to allow him to pick up the children himself with a suspended license/registration? Potentially, she could be held in contempt of court for refusing to follow a court order. Her better course would be to call the police when he arrived to report that he is driving with suspended license, to not transfer the children and wait until they arrive (seeking cover inside a home and advising the 911 operator again if the situation starts to escalate into a potentially violent situation), and to explain to the police that he is also attempting to endanger the children by trying to drive with them on a suspended license. There is a good chance that he would be arrested and that the police would leave her with the children. The police might, rather than arresting him, drive him home with the kids and tell him not to drive and cite him for driving with a suspended license. Then, she should make an emergency motion to the court, regardless of how it is resolved by the police, seeking permission to formally give her a right to refuse to transfer if he arrives unaccompanied with a suspended license. If he attempts to convince her to drop the kids off somewhere else (presumably at his house) due to the suspension of his license, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses? Probably not. This time he's not following the court order, not her. It would still be advisable for her to file an emergency motion with the court explaining the situation.

There are only a few areas of law of which I am aware that U.S. law treats people who are engaged to be married differently (although perhaps with more thought I could expand the list). Fiance(e)s come under a special immigration status when applying for a visa. There is a body of law related to whether an engagement ring is an absolute gift or is conditional upon being married (this is not uniform from state to state and I don't recall what the majority rule in those cases is under the common law). In South Carolina, ownership disputes over engagement rings are litigated as breach of promise to marry actions. Pre-marital agreements governing a future marriage can be made by people who are engaged (although a post-nuptial agreement is also equal in effect in most cases). People who are engaged, like spouses, are generally considered to be in a "confidential relationship" with each other which imposes higher duties with respect to fairness in their dealings with each other than strangers, but generally less high duties than fiduciaries. While not strictly arising from the status of being engaged, adult cohabitants are generally agents for service of process of each other at their shared home, and are often considered to have a legally significant relationship for purposes of domestic violence statutes (usually related to either domestic violence crimes or temporary restraining orders). I am not familiar enough with the law of France to fully answer the balance of the question, which someone more familiar with that law can expand upon. But, there is similarly a special immigration status in French law for a fiance(e). And, French law, in a flourish so romantic it could scarcely be any other country's law, also allows people who are engaged a right to marry after one of them has died in certain circumstances: "The legislation that allows posthumous marriages stems back to when a dam burst in 1959 and killed 420 people in southern France." It was most recently invoked in 2014 when a grieving French woman was granted permission by the French President to marry her former fiancé, who tragically died in 2012, just a month before they were due to wed. To be eligible the bride to be had "to convince the President of France that her’s was a special case and that her love for Michael went beyond the grave. It took four letters to the president and 20 months of waiting, desperately hoping for a positive response." The President's discretion in this matter is somewhat similar to the pardon power in U.S. law. This French law was also invoked in 2009. The law in question is set forth at Articles 171 of the French Civil Code. In English translation this states: Article 171 The President of the Republic may, for serious reasons, authorize the celebration of the marriage if one of the future spouses is dead providing a sufficient gathering of facts establishes unequivocally his consent. In this case, the effects of the marriage date back to the day preceding that of the death of the spouse. However, this marriage does not carry with it any right of intestate succession to the benefit of the surviving spouse and no matrimonial regime is considered to have existed between the spouses. I am aware of one documented case where a court entered a post-humous marriage in the United States between people who were engaged, but I am not familiar with any legal authority actually authorizing that action.

Can I choose to not register my child as a US citizen? No. Your child will be a US citizen regardless of whether you register anything, and (unless you have spent less than 5 years in the US, or less than 2 years after you turned 14) regardless of the place of birth, because (in that case) even if the child is born outside the US he or she will be a US citizen under 8 USC 1401(g). Can I register them with an 18yoa deadline for them to choose citizenship? No. Your child probably (depending on your wife's citizenship, and assuming birth in the US) will be a dual citizen from birth without the need or the ability to choose. On turning 18, the child will be able to renounce either citizenship, but will not be required to renounce US citizenship and will probably not be required to renounce the other citizenship either. (I am not familiar with all EU countries' citizenship laws, so the law of that country might have a requirement to choose, but there is no such requirement in the countries whose laws I am familiar with. If the other country is the Netherlands, the child will risk losing Dutch citizenship on turning 28 unless he or she takes steps to avoid that or unless the law changes.) As pointed out in a comment on Putvi's answer, if you successfully avoid letting the US know about your child's birth, you would be in the awkward position of needing to get a visa for the child if you ever want the child to leave and reenter the country. Otherwise, the child would be an illegal alien in the eyes of the US (this assumes you've managed to hide the child's place of birth). There is no process available to get visas in the US for (non-diplomatic) children born in the US, of course, because such children are citizens of the US.

TLDR: get a divorce. Basically, the US (as with most countries) recognizes valid marriages from other jurisdictions that would be valid if performed by the couple in the US. Which means that same sex marriages before Oberfell would not have been recognized but are now. Marriage with minors are not recognized. Multiple simultaneous marriages are not recognized (no second or third husbands or wives). Some common law marriages can have problems with this, as there is no record of the marriage.

In the US, only a few states allow conjugal visits by prisoners: California, Connecticut, New York and Washington. Details of implementation for Washington are here (it is called "Extended Family Visiting"). There are various limitations, for example you can't have committed homocide within the last 5 years, you can't be on death row, and so on. Although they don't explicitly say you can have sex, you can, and they have (a small sample of) contraceptive and STD-preventing technology for prisoners to avail themselves of. If you fail to take advantage of contraceptives, then yes it is possible. There is no provision pertaining specifically to mass murder.

Let's look at what they say: Pennsylvania does not have any statutory laws governing assisted reproductive technology. True Pennsylvania’s laws regarding sperm donors come only from case law that are specific to the facts of the case being considered by the court. True and trivial given the previous sentence. Pennsylvania courts have found sperm donor contracts to be legally enforceable. True, that's what Ferguson v McKiernan says in the first paragraph of the decision. Your statement that "PA case law falls strongly on the side of not respecting donor contracts" is, at least as far as the case you cite, flatly wrong. In other cases, the contract may or may not be enforcable indeed the court agrees with this specifically: Although locating future cases on this spectrum may call upon courts to draw very fine lines, courts are no strangers to such tasks, and the instant case, which we must resolve, is not nearly so difficult. This also directly supports the previous sentence. Therefore, even if you go through a fertility clinic, a contract between the donor and the intended parents would need to be in place before the conception. True, this is exactly what Ferguson v McKiernan says. You assert that Ferguson v McKiernan says "donation through a clinic does not make a sperm donor the legal father", however, it doesn't say that at all. The status of the doner as the father was never an issue - both parties agreed that he was the biological father and the court accepted that. What was at issue is if he had the rights and obligations of a father that had been removed by the contract. The lower courts held that the contract was unenforcable as being contrary to public policy because it removed rights from the children who were not parties to the contract. However, the State Supreme Court held that the contract was enforcable. TL;DR What they say on their website is not misleading.

Can a child have a different last name from both their father and mother? In the US, you can change your last name as you could with your first name. So imagine as a father, you changed your last name from the one your family gives to you. Can you choose your child to use your family's last name not your changed last name?

No law in the US requires that parent and child have the same last name. It is usual that a child's name match that of at least one parent, but not required. A parent can change his or her name, without changing the names of any existing children. Also, when a child is adopted, the child's name need not be changed to match the name of the parents, or either of them. I have read of cases where a widow remarries, and takes the name of her new husband, but an adolescent child retains his or her birth surname. I suppose this would also be possible legally if it is the husband who changes name on remarriage, but i have not read of such a case. I think, but I am not sure, that a child's name could be changed to a different name than the name of either parent. It may be that this would only be done if the child is old enough to understand and agree to the change.

German law applies As your mother was a German national, German law applies to all her property worldwide. US state law applies As your mother was a permanent resident of a US state, its law applies. Conflict of Laws It is unlikely (read impossible) that you will be able to comply with both laws simultaneously. You, therefore, have a conflict of laws problem that can only be resolved by the courts. In most cases where this particular conflict occurs, the local courts will accept that they have jurisdiction, and will also accept the court of nationality's determination that the applicable law is that where the property is - i.e., they will ‘accept the renvoi', and apply their own law to the inheritance of the property. You will need to apply to the German court who will probably decide that the US portion be dealt with using US state law and the German portion be dealt with using German law. You then need to take that decision to your state court who will probably acquiesce. Probably. Fortunately, as the US and Germany have a tax treaty, you will only need to pay inheritance tax once.

Can you always ask for an independent genetic testing when you are asked by the court to support your wife's or your partners children? No. Only sometimes. (Literally, you can always ask, but sometimes the answer will be clearly "no", as a matter of law.) Some presumptions of paternity are conclusive (either immediately or after a statute of limitations to contest paternity expires) and can't be overcome by contrary genetic evidence. Other presumptions of paternity are rebuttable. The specifics vary in important details from state to state. The theory behind the conclusive presumption is primarily that the presumed parent in those circumstances becomes the psychological parent, and it is not in the best interests of the child to dislodge a psychological parent, even if that parent is not a biological parents. Put another way, a conclusive presumption is really part of the definition of what a father is under the law. Several other answers at Law.SE have addressed this in the context of specific U.S. states. An answer here considers California law and another answers the question under New York law.

Can Alice still get child support, or will she be denied because she can not definitively prove which man is the child's biological father? The legal standard is a preponderance of the evidence (i.e. more likely than not) and there is plenty of evidence that can be offered in addition to DNA evidence, such as testimony under oath from people in a position to know who was having sex with whom at the relevant times. Contrary to a common misconception, testimony under oath is still solid evidence that can support a verdict on appeal. Alice had neither a long standing romantic relationship with Bob nor anyone that was a witness to the sexual act, thus making the question of who she slept with difficult to prove. It isn't that hard to prove. Q to Alice's physician: Based upon an ultrasound, when did Alice conceive? A: April 5-8, 2021. Q to DNA expert: Based upon the DNA test, who could the father be? A: Billy or Bob. Q to Alice: Did you have sex with Billy between April 5-8, 2021? A: No. Q to Alice: Did you have sex with Bob between April 5-8, 2021? A: Yes. Q to Billy: Did you have sex with Alice between April 5-8, 2021? A: No. Q to Billy: Why not? A: I was at the Shuffleboard World Cup in Tibet, I have time stamped pictures. Q to Bob: Did you have sex with Alice between April 5-8, 2021? A: -- if Yes, judge says he believes Bob and Alice and the case is over. -- if No, the judge decides who among Bob, Billy, and Alice the judge believes based upon other evidence. Ultimately, the judge has to rule between the two based upon non-genetic evidence and resolve credibility disputes just as in any other case that doesn't involve DNA evidence (which is the vast majority of cases). Also, the edge cases are few are far between. Identical twins are rare to start with, and few women have sex with more than one identical twin in the several day period when she could have conceived or didn't know which twin she had sex with. It has happened at least once in history (post-DNA testing), but you can probably count the number of times that it has ever happened on one hand. For example, presumptions from cohabitation, marriage, and claims of paternity often resolve paternity disputes without DNA evidence. Further, to the extent that there is good faith uncertainty (perhaps everyone agrees that the mother has sex with both twins on the only possible day of conception and nobody really knows), the downsides to a mistake in the larger cosmic sense of the overall paternity law system are minimal, as identical twins very rarely become deeply alienated from each other and instead tend to be close and intensely cooperative once they discover each other, and tend to be similar to each other in almost every respect depriving the child of little if the court gets it wrong. Realistically, identical twins are particularly likely to settle out of court so the judge doesn't have to decide. In one of the only two actual cases I could locate that went to trial (in Brazil), both twins were ordered to pay child support because the evidence showed that they actively conspired with each other to confound the mother and the court regarding who the father was, and conspiracies can support joint and several liability. The other case reported in a news story had convincing circumstantial evidence supporting one identical twin over the other that probably establish a presumption of paternity for one twin and not the other. One of the twins, who cannot be named for legal reasons, went to court last summer in the hope of forcing the mother to grant him access to the child. Although his name is not on the birth certificate, he claims he is the only father the boy has known, cared for him every other weekend, provided financial support and was even known to him as 'papa'. But then the man's relationship with his girlfriend broke down and the visits halted. When he began legal proceedings to prove his paternity, the mother made her claim that she had been sleeping with his twin at around the same time. The twins have said they knew they were both having sex with the woman, but argue that only one had sex during the period of conception. Both refused to undergo a DNA test: the complainant refused to pay the £335 charge while his brother, who has since married and fathered children, does not consider himself involved in the dispute. Now, however, Judge Jolin has asked the complainant to take a DNA test by 1 December to ensure he can claim even possible paternity, while his brother may also be tested. (The second case is in Quebec and the cost of the test in pounds is apparently a currency conversion value.) (It is possible in principle to distinguish even identical twins from each other with high coverage whole genome tests that would reveal a few random mutations in each twin out of billions of possible mutations, but it is currently prohibitively expensive to do so.) Can she even get a paternity test given that it would not be definitive proof which man was the father? Yes. This rules out all 4 billion men in the world minus two of them. It has great probative value, narrowing the list of possible fathers down to two.

There isn't any kind of legal reason for the distinction; it's just a matter of custom and convenience. The normal rule is that you would shorthand a case name by referring to the first-named party, but there are lots of times where that is not the case. With Casey, the issue is that Planned Parenthood is a serial litigant, so if you were to just refer to "Planned Parenthood," there would be some ambiguity as to whether you were referring to Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), or Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), or any of the many other cases Planned Parenthood has litigated in the circuit and district courts. For the same reason, criminal cases are typically named after the defendant, as we would otherwise have tens of thousands of cases named "California" or "New York" or "United States."

Since Probate had already closed (12/20), is it legal for the Probate court to, in essence, change the terms of the will? I have several witnesses willing to provide affidavits to the effect that my mother, the deceased, made it clear that I would get the real-estate and that the grandson in question would get nothing. Often, for a relatively short period of time after an estate is closed, it can be reopened and the judgment closing the estate can be set aside for good cause. This is also true in most other kinds of lawsuits. if I cannot beat this challenge, can I remove myself as beneficiary and have the Probate court declare that all 5 blood-related grandchildren will get equal shares? Removing yourself as a beneficiary is called filing a "disclaimer" in legalese. It means to refuse to accept a gift or inheritance. But you can't do that if you have already received any personal benefit from the estate and there are other statutory restrictions. For tax purposes, the deadline to do is nine months after the date of death, but the state law deadline could be different. What would happen if you do so depends upon the language of the will. Usually, gifts to a group of people are made "per stirpes" (also called "by representation") which means that if a child predeceases or makes a timely disclaimer that their children share in the share that their parent would have received only. It is possible that it says something different, but that would be by far the most common provision. Under the original Probate interpretation, when the real-estate sold, I invested the proceeds in the stock market and there have been losses. If the challenge wins, will I have to come up with the delta--since the investment losses occurred under the original interpretation? If you had the authority to sell the real estate (which you probably did if a third-party title company went through with the transaction), then their claim would almost surely be limited to the proceeds of the real estate and not "the delta" unless the person entitled to take could show that you breached your fiduciary duties in the manner in which you invested the proceeds, for example, by investing all of it in a small number of penny stocks, rather than a diversified portfolio suitable for the purposes of the estate. Also, there is a question over whether the stock investment was made by you as the executor, and was subject to fiduciary standards, or was instead made after it was distributed to you outright. Further, there is the question of whether the estate can actually be opened if you gave notice of the closing of the estate to everyone who was entitled to it, including the grandchild, and whether the grandchild was entitled to it. You really need to hire a WV lawyer who handles probate cases at this point and would be doing yourself great harm by trying to represent yourself. Probate procedures are too arcane for you to reasonably have faith that you are doing it right for yourself.

Can a woman living in Brazil collect child support from someone in the United States? Yes. There would need to be first, a legal establishment of paternity if that is not already in place, and then an application to a court for a child support order. The question of whether one should proceed in a U.S. court or a Brazilian court is a tactical one that would be evaluated based upon the circumstances by the lawyers involved in doing so. Generally, that would open the door to child custody proceedings as well in the same, or a parallel case.

I was told that when you sign something in the UK, then it is your signature, no matter what name you are using. So if you sign a contract with my name, then it's your signature and you are bound by the contract. Things might be invalid because you signed and not me. For example, if you sign a contract selling my car in my name, then that contract is not valid. If some document needs signatures of two witnesses, and you sign with your name, then with my name, then there are no two signatures. As far as I know, signing under a false name is not in itself criminal, but might very well be supporting fraud, for example, and might therefore be illegal. The contract for the sale of my car, signed by you using my name, would very likely be part of fraud and therefore criminal.

High School forced labor for grades? I have a friend in a high school computer science course in Texas. This is a course required for graduation and is not a volunteer thing. Apparently, the teacher is having the students develop an official app that the school intends to eventually use. This app deals with collecting and maintaining personal information about students in this particular school, as well as information about what classes they are enrolled in. They are not paying the students to do this. My friend says his entire course grade will be based on this app. I'm an industry professional programmer, and this sounds extremely illegal to me, for a number of reasons, the first being that inexperienced programmers (kids) are not only being given access to protected information about minors (and thus is extremely likely to be exploitable/leakable), but also that they are being asked to work for the school without pay via threat of not graduating. I looked briefly at the Texas child labor laws but they only seem to cover willful paid employment, which this is clearly not. Is this legal?

Various elements could be legal, or not. For example, it is legal to require students to do things in order to pass a class. It is legal to require a student to write a program for a course (entirely, or in part). It is legal for a teacher to give a "group grade". It is not clear whether it is legal to require the student to assign copyright or license to the teacher / school – it may be legal to require a student to pay for their class, and copyright transfer might be valuable consideration for such a contract (assuming that there is a contractual relation at all as opposed to a statutory mandate – e.g. "high school"). If this is a public school, you can't make students pay for a mandatory class, therefore you cannot require assignment of copyright. It is very probably illegal for the student to access the educational records of other students, but the app could be developed with dummy data.

You are in general correct, KBurchfiel. A code snippet such as import math; or For i := 1 to 10 print i; has no originality, and is not protected by copyright. A post eplaining the meaning an usage of such a snippet might well be original enough to be protected by US copyright, indeed it probably would. But the code on its own would not be. Anyone could read such a post, and if s/he understood it, use the code snippet and not be in violation of copyright, not compelled to place the entire program in which such a snippet was used under a CC-=BY-SA license. The creative commons people would prefer that a CC license not be applied to a publication that is not protected by copyright, and if it is so applied it is legally meaningless. But they have no legal way to enforce such a preference. A stack exchange post that consisted of nothing but such an uncopyrightable code snippet, with no explanation r discussion, might well be downvoted or even deleted. But that is a matter of site policy on what is a useful answer, not a matter of copyright. Using an excerpt from a copyrighted work so small that the excerpt alone would be uncopyrightable, would probably be fair use under US law, and might well be fair dealing in UK law. Something that is fair use does not compel the reuser to abide by the terms of a CC license, because those terms apply only when the content could not be reused without the CC license's permission. However, a code snippet does not need to be very much more original than the above examples before it becomes copyrightable. Whether it can be used via fair use rather than via the CC-BY-SA license is a very fact-based decision (the usual four-factor analysis is spelled out in 17 USC 107).. But if the snippet can be rewritten to express the same concepts but in a different expression, then there is no copyright issue, and again the CC license will not apply. If the snippet is complex and original enough to be copyrightable (a fairly low bar) and it is re-used unchanged, under conditions where fair use does not apply, then the CC-BY-SA license's terms must be complied with for the use to be legal. That is several "IFs" however. The exact details of a specific case will matter in such cases, there is not one rule for all snippets, all posts, or all programs.

You have a third option: Sue the district for violating state or local law. There are lots of recent news stories about people doing just this and winning. The US Constitution Can't Help You: The school district is not violating your constitutional rights by installing lights at the stadium. The only constitutional protection remotely connected to your situation is the "takings clause" of the 5th Amendment. It says, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Unfortunately, the "takings clause" only applies if there is a "taking." A "taking" is generally understood to be exactly that -- you lose your property. The loss can be literal -- the government takes title to your house and turns it into a football field or freeway on-ramp -- or figurative -- the disturbance from the football field or on-ramp is so pervasive that your property becomes worthless. Since having the lights on will not destroy the value of your property, the takings clause does not apply to you. As one Justice said in a related case, the lesson here is simple: "the federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is intensely undesirable." State or Local Law Might Help You: Even though you don't have a constitutional claim, depending on what state and city you live in, you may have a claim under state or local law. (These might be statutes, regulations, ordinances, or even your state constitution.) For example, in 2010 a group of home owners in Atherton, California who lived near the local high school sued when the school announced plans to install stadium lights. The suit claimed the lights violated local height limits, and that the night games would violate noise ordinances. The suit, plus a savvy pr campaign, got the school to agree to limits on night games. Atherton is not alone. All the way across the country, in Greenwich, Connecticut, neighbors upset about stadium lights sued and got an agreement about the use of lights. A search using high+school+lights+neighbors+sue turns up plenty of other examples. You will have to talk to a local attorney to find out what state or local laws you can use.

Without knowing the specifics on Florida Goverment's regulations, the term Umbrella School is used to designate school like organizations that over see multiple homeschoolers and that they are meeting state educational expectations. Often they will hold events which will allow homeschoolers to compete in school sports as well as set curriculums (sometimes), and field trips and social events (A stereotype of Home School Students is that they are poorly socialized compared to those who attend traditional public or private schools.). They should meet legal qualifications, but it's a bare minimum at best. I would recommend calling a local school administration office for best guidance, but saying Home School (Florida Unschoolers Umbrella School) would likely cover your bases. I'm sure you're not the first person to ask this question.

I am wondering if anyone here could say if it is worth going into law, particularly when coming from a good law school (and assuming I have a real interest in the subject and enjoy research, etc.). Is it true that the profession is contracting, and that it could be hard to find a decent job? Is there decent upward mobility in the profession, or should one expect a sub-60-70k salary for many many years after school? Is there anyone here that thinks not going into law (ie pursing a Ph.D. instead) is a better choice? I went into a top law school (the University of Michigan, ranked #8 when I matriculated, graduated in the top 25%, cum laude, with an editorship of a law journal under my belt) with almost the same academic background (undergraduate math major) and a similar LSAT score to you. It was a somewhat easier choice for me. I was a solid A- math student, but didn't have the chops and talent to pursue a PhD in math and make an academic career out of it, even though I was something of a math prodigy. I also didn't have the passion for it. I saw that I was spending my free time focused on the humanities, social sciences and campus politics and journalism, rather than on math (although tutoring and grading paid my way for all of my personal and living expenses). A legal job definitely provides a secure lifetime of decent employment, can be intellectually challenging in some subfields (other kinds of practices not so much), and provides a certain amount of interpersonal interaction and immediate, easily understood relevance that you can't secure as an academic mathematician. It isn't that hard to find a decent job for a graduate of a top law school, and the profession is not meaningfully contracting. Indeed, almost no occupation has been less impacted economically by the pandemic. Post-law school compensation is bimodal. A minority (maybe 30-40%) start at large law firms (sometimes after a judicial clerkship) and make very good money (low 100s) right off the bat. The rest get decent middle class jobs at first. Most, from both routes, end up eventually self-employed in small and medium sized law firms, although a lucky few (maybe 5%-10%) end up as partners in big law firms and a similar share end up as senior civil servants. The problem is that the instincts you learn getting as far into math as you have are not very advantageous to a Big Law career, which places a huge premium on social skills, upper middle class to upper class social capital, and hard work as what amounts to being a super-bureaucrat at relatively menial details for long uncreative hours that are only dimly connected to results. A lawyer needs to be smart, but being a "genius" intellectually doesn't provide much marginal benefit. Most economically successful lawyers have quite narrow and specialized practices that present fewer intellectual challenges as you mass produce the same kind of work over and over, and lawyers derive a lot of their income from their capacity to market their services effectively to the affluent and the powerful. Also, a lot of your compensation in law is basically for your marketing, for taking on highly stressful responsibility, and for dealing with very unpleasant situations. It often isn't the most enjoyable life style unless you have a very particular type A, competitive, extraverted personality who understands people extremely well but isn't academically oriented. Corporate law, in particular, values your interpersonal skills very highly and doesn't place much of a premium on your intellectual legal knowledge and research ability. Those things are factors of production in corporate law but they aren't what leads to success there and are often pawned off on junior associates who never have a shot at making partner. I could have done better economically (I basically took what amounted to a mommy track for various reasons), but didn't understand the profession, or what the work involved, or what was critical to get ahead at the time and in my early career and had other priorities and a set of values and world views ill suited to the work. If I was doing it all over again, I would have chosen a quantitative heavy but non-math PhD path (maybe Economics or physics or operations research or statistics) or would have become an actuary, rather than becoming a lawyer. I love knowing the things that I know because I went to law school (which I loved) and because I've have an incredibly diverse (although not terribly well paying) legal practice for 25 years. I was a professor (in a gradate estate planning program for financial planners) for a while, and it was the best job I've ever had and I still enjoy teaching a lot. I also spend lots of time in math related hobbies to exercise and enjoy math related talent that I have but can't use very often at work. If I were in your shoes, with publications already and an acceptance in a top graduate math PhD program, I would definitely take that path. It is a field within academia with a healthy trend line of stability or growth within academia, and being a professor (which you have a viable shot at doing) is a wonderful way to live. There are fewer job seekers per open position for PhDs in math than in most academic disciplines. I've never met a math prof whose regretted his choice (and I know many, having grown up all my life as a child of a professor and a college administrator in a small college down and having been a math major).

No. I can't give a more detailed answer without reference to a specific statute. But just about every state anti-bullying statute in the U.S. restricts the definition to...well, bullying. There is a good summary of state bullying and cyberbullying statutes here. The laws are varied, but they invariable contain words like "harassment", "abuse", "threatening," "fear," and "hostile environment." Would it be possible to "cyberbully" someone on Stack Exchange under some of these statutes? Sure. You could do it in comments; in answers; even in questions. "Question: Is Bill in my algebra class a dork, or a tool?" Comment: "This is a terrible question, and I'm going to burn your house down. Downvoting." You could probably fit something like that under some of the broader statutes--although they still for the most part haven't been tested for First Amendment issues. But I don't know of any statute broad enough to include downvoting a question or answer, on a site people post on knowing that the whole purpose of posting is to allow their posts to be upvoted and downvoted. If there was such a statute--and again, I don't know of any--it would almost certainly be unconstitutional. There is no law against hurting people's feelings, at least in the United States, and a law that allows people to seek legal redress for someone saying "I disagree with you" is pretty much the poster child for a First Amendment violation.

There is a subtle difference between NSF policy and enforceable obligation. The primary stick that goes with the carrot is being excluded from future funding. Current policy does not generally force material in the public domain, but it is a possibility in "exceptional circumstances". There no doubt is a paper record somewhere in D.C. indicating whether such a codicil was added to any of these grants. NSF generally does not have contracts with individuals, they have contracts with institutions who have relations (typically employer-employee) with individuals, so even if there were a policy requiring works to be put in the public domain, NSF would have to go after the institution, who would have to go after the author. Since that would conflict with longstanding NSF policy on copyright, it is unlikely that they would want to pursue such an approach. The statement that McGraw-Hill Book Company announces that the material, which is copyrighted, will be available for use by authors and publishers on a royalty-free basis on or after April 30, 1970 is not itself a license, it is a suggestion that a license will com into existence. A present-tense declaration "this work is dedicated to the public domain effective April 30, 1970" can be interpreted as a license effective of a date certain. Similarly, "will be available to all publishers for use in English after December 31, 1970, and in translations after December 31, 1975" does not say that it is in the public domain effective of some date. One might say that the copyright statement is simply not well written and the author really intended the books to be in the public domain as of those dates. But without compelling evidence that the book was actually released into the public domain, a court is very unlikely to abrogate a person's property rights.

Read the terms It’s quite likely that, if you took this to court, the employer would be liable to pay your daughter interest on the underpayment and possibly be fined by the state for failing to follow the law. The terms probably are offering to pay the back pay with no interest and your daughter agreeing to confidentiality about the breach. Probably - I haven’t read them. In other words, they’re asking her to sign a contract saying she gets $XXX now, and can’t make any further claims against them. Such releases are commonplace when setting a dispute and there’s probably nothing underhanded going on. Probably - I haven’t read them. Because minors can void contracts if they are not in their interest, they want you, as her legal guardian, to also sign so that can’t happen. A relatively prudent precaution on their part. The alternative is to not sign the document and they presumably won’t pay. It will then be up to you whether to sue them which will cost you money, possibly more than you will get if you win. As to whether there is a dispute: they want your signature, you don’t want to sign - that’s a dispute. Any admissions they have made in their settlement offer are almost surely without prejudice, meaning they are inadmissible in court. If you want to sue, you would have to prove the underpayment without relying on their admissions. As stated above, maybe there is no underpayment. Only you and your daughter can decide if this is a good deal.

Would a summer camp responsible for caring for a child have any alternative other than refunding money if child intentionally misbehaves? This is a hypothetical situation for a potential story. Let's say Bob is a minor whose parents have already pre-paid for him to attend a religious summer camp as daycare for the entirety of summer. Unfortunately, due to some assorted disagreements with the owners of the camp, Bob is no longer comfortable attending said camp and wishes to stay home. His parents have told him they already paid for the camp, and they are going to force him to attend unless they can get a refund, which the camp refuses to provide. In response, Bob decides to force the camp to refund his parents so he can stay home by ensuring the camp won't want him to keep attending. He physically stands where he knows he will be in the way and refuses to move, vocally protests the camp and its owners, and makes through anti-religious statements designed to encourage the other children to question their religion and thus anger those children's parents. He refuses to cooperate with authorities of the camp in any way. However, he does not knowingly break any laws or put anyone in danger, he simply makes himself as much of a hated nuisance as he can. He threatens to report assault if anyone attempts to physically compel him to behave or move. At this point, the camp doesn't want him either, but they don't want to refund an entire summer's worth of daycare costs either. What are the camp's options for handling Bob? I imagine there is little they can do with Bob other than to expel him from the camp, they have little ability to enforce behavior on Bob if he refuses to cooperate as far as I know. The real question is: do they have to refund the rest of the summer camp fees if Bob is expelled due to his own intentional misbehavior? Would a camp have any legal ability to prevent Bob from attending while keeping the full camp costs already paid by Bob's parents?

The real question is do they have to refund the rest of the summer camp fees if Bob is expelled due to his own intentional misbehavior? Not if the contract was written by a good lawyer, or even by a merely competent lawyer. In that case, the contract will provide that there is to be no refund in the event of expulsion.

Yes that seems to be the case. The section after the one you quoted, 551:11 Share of Unnamed Child says: If the property not devised nor bequeathed shall be insufficient to satisfy the just share of such child, after allowing advancements received by him, the same shall be made up in just proportion from the property devised or bequeathed to others. The page "Can I Disinherit My Child?" from a law firm blog, says: New Hampshire has a strong policy of protecting “pretermitted heirs,” which are heirs that were not mentioned in a Will. N.H. R.S.A 551:10 states that [e]very child born after the decease of the testator, and every child or issue of a child of the deceased not named or referred to in his will, and who is not a devisee or legatee, shall be entitled to the same portion of the estate, real and personal, as he would be if the deceased were intestate. Simply put, you do not name or refer to your child in the Will, then he can claim an inheritance as if you died without a Will. Historically and currently, the rationale is that if you did not mention him anywhere in your Will, you most likely forgot about him, because it is human nature to forget things. However that same blog page also says: There are various ways to disinherit a child. The most often used method is to specifically name or refer to the child, or a class, such as “my children” or “my son, Alex, and his issue,” that you intend to disinherit, and you must then state that you intend to disinherit that child. Another way to disinherit a child is to state that you give that particular child one (1) dollar, or a small sum of money. So it would seem that if one chose to include language such as: I leave to any other children I might have, and to their issue, if any, the sum of $10, jointly. then such possible surprises are covered. This would be after mentioning specifically any children one wanted to leave larger amounts to.

In the US, no, courts would not enforce such a contract. It would be deemed not in the public interest, perhaps unconscionable. Of course, two willing adults could make and honor such an agreement but that would only work as long as the woman didn't change her mind. What is "fair" in a situation like this is a little tricky but, ultimately, any child's welfare is going to be a major consideration in any court decision.

Minors can negotiate and enter contracts. The idea they can’t is a myth - if they couldn’t, they wouldn’t be able to ride the bus or buy an ice cream as these are both contracts. However, unless the contract is for necessities, the minor can void it at any time while they remain a minor (and for a reasonable time after their majority) so they carry considerable risk for the adult party. Of course, a contract that has been completed can’t be voided. If a third person (like a guardian) is involved then either they are entering into the contract as well and would be (typically) jointly and severally liable with the minor or they would be standing as guarantor for the minor's performance of the contract and would be liable if the minor didn't perform - which it is will depend on the construction of the contract. However, the minor can still void the contract on their own behalf leaving the co-signer on the hook.

No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.

This question makes me sad. I think the answer will likely not be a legal one but, rather, an emotional one. Courts have many reasons to be reluctant to impose a duty of visitation upon a recalcitrant parent; so courts typically will not. I think the best course of action is for mom (or maybe a helpful third party, but coming from mom first would be best) to call and make an emotional appeal to dad something along the following lines: Despite what happened between us, your son loves you very much. I know that despite what happened, you are a good man. (Even if nobody else actually believes that, be sure dad believes it. So it will be helpful to say this.) I know you love your son too. Your son wants to be closer to you. I would be happy to change the visitation order to whatever you like. (Like above, even if not totally true, it's very helpful to say. It opens hearts, minds and communication channels. If he wants to take her up on this. She should listen and be open to it.) Please visit your son. He wants and needs a relationship with you. Be proactive and appeal to dad's emotions while lowering the overall level of acrimony. Since I'm commenting, I'll also add this in parting. As a practical matter, so many legal actions have unintended adverse consequences and therefore just because we can do them it doesn't mean we should do them in order to get the best outcome. Visitation orders and jail time to enforce child support are good examples of this. Sometimes the acrimony involved in taking away or reducing the amount of time a parent is entitled to spend with their children can cause the parent to spend even less time with the child and ultimately hurt the child. Whose interests and wellbeing should be everyone's top concern. Similarly to the point, putting parents behind bars for not paying child support can make it even more difficult for them the earn the money with which to pay the support they are required to pay. It's a crazy world.

Bob appears to have committed "attempted larceny" by extortion, contrary to § 155.05(2)(e)(v): (e) By extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: ... (v) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; See § 110.00: Attempt to commit a crime. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime. And see § 110.10 which covers the "impossibility" that Bob actually had compromising images from Alice's non-existent webcam: Attempt to commit a crime; no defense. If the conduct in which a person engages otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime pursuant to section 110.00, it is no defense to a prosecution for such attempt that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as such person believed them to be. (NB Bob's sentence, if found guilty, would depend the value of his attempted extortion)

If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear.

Is it legal to save a picture from the internet and then send it to my friends? I'm talking about pictures of cats or flowers or a meme, nothing extreme. Is it technically legal or illegal for me to do this?

Generally speaking, it is illegal for you to do this. Copyright gives the creator of the image the exclusive right to copy it, and just making copies to send to other people is probably not going to be fair use. Making copies without a license from the copyright holder would therefore be copyright infringement. Are there likely to be any consequences for doing this? Probably not.

You have the copyright on all your pictures. He had no permission to copy any of them, so he has committed copyright infringement on a massive scale. You can just get a solicitor who will happily take him to court for you. You shouldn't be overdoing it, $750 per infringed work (per picture) as statutory damages should be fine. If you want it cheaper, the solicitor will write a letter for you that asks him to destroy all the pictures, sign that he has destroyed all the pictures, pay the solicitor's fees, or otherwise be taken to court for copyright infringement (see above). Now I am not a lawyer, so you go to a lawyer which will correct whatever I got wrong here. Just forgot: In addition to having the copyright, if he publishes pictures of people (like you and your family), he needs permission of these people. So if anything gets published, that goes on top of the copyright infringement.

A translation is a devivative work - the copyright owner has the exclusive right to these So, yes, translation is prima facie copyright infringement. Strictly speaking, if you translate it, it's a derivative work because you exercised creativity in making the translation; what Google translate does is not a derivative work, it's a copy because there is no creativity. Either way, only the copyright owner can do (or authorise) this. Whether it's legal or not depends on if what you are doing falls within one of the exceptions to the applicable copyright law such as fair use or fair dealing. Attributing the original author does not, of itself, allow translation. Additionally, I'm not able to find the copyright documentation for the site link I provided above. What is "copyright documentation"? Copyright exists the moment a work is created and no further documentation is required. Essentially, I could translate the whole documentation by myself to avoid this problem. No, you can't - see above. If copy-pasting the google translate is illegal, then exactly how much must I edit, move around sentences, change words, and such until the text is no longer plagiarized? All of it. If you were, based on your own knowledge of the software, to write a manual without any copying o the existing manual, that would not be copyright infringement. Is this plagiarism or copyright infringement? It's copyright infringement - plagiarism is an academic misconduct issue not a legal one. where can I check the copyright for the above link? The site you linked has "Copyright © 2020 Acquia, Inc. All Rights Reserved" in the bottom left corner which identifies the copyright holder, the date and prohibits all copying ("all rights reserved"). This isn't necessary but it is helpful. If you really want to do this, contact Acquia, Inc and ask for permission.

As stated in the answer to What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings?; if either of the participants is in Australia than unless all parties have given consent then the recording is illegal. Notwithstanding its legality, property in the recording vests in the person who made it. There is no law against him keeping it. There is no law against him publishing it unless the material contained is offensive, hate speech or defamatory (see Customer feedback gathering in Australia).

This a bit dubious. You write "I know you can make a digital copy of a book or CD you own." but that is true only under limited circumstances. Making such a copy for one's own personal use would likely be fair use (in the US). Selling copies would pretty clearly be copyright infringement. Giving away free copies to significant numbers of people would also be infringement. Temporarily lending copies ro a small number of people might be considered fair use or might not. For the board game, you could allow others to play with the copy you own in person. But COVID makes that unsafe. Assuming the game art is under copyright protection (some older games might have protection expired) selling such images or making them widely available would clearly be infringement. Making them available only during the course of play to a limited group, with technical measures to prevent or discourage copying and no fee charged might pass as fair use, and the game company might well not want to pursue the matter in any case. If you create new art which can be used for the same game, it would be somewhat less likely to be considered infringing/ Even then selling access would probably be trademark infringement, and perhaps infringe the copyright on the rules of the game. There would be legal risk in doing this sort of thing.

You can do whatever you like with posts made after you change the rules - you have to leave the previous stuff alone. The contributors' have accepted the terms of the licence: They own the copyright or have permission from the copyright holder to post it (the promise) They agree that it can be edited altered or removed CC-BY-SA allows people to copy the stuff off the website and republish it - this is way outside what the contributors agreed to. These people have given permission for their work to be altered but not copied.

This may well be infringement, but I agree that you should start by reaching out to the instructor. You don't want to pay a lawyer if the matter can be be adjusted peacefully. In the US there is a special limited exemption to copyright for "use in classroom instruction" which might apply in such a case. I am not sure if there is a similar provision in Canadian copyright law. But the instructor is likely to change his practice if you notify him of your objection, even if he has the technical right to use the photo. At least it is worth finding out. If he won't, then you can always consult a lawyer.

Per a decision of the US Copyright Office last month, AI generated images are not subject to copyright. That means you can use the generated images for any purpose you want1, but so can anyone else. However, the specific usage of a given image might be protected - so if you put a caption on the image and arrange it in the form of a comic (as the artist in that example did), that specific text and arrangement can be protected, but the underlying image can't be. Laws may differ elsewhere in the world, but that's the current stance in the US. 1 Subject to any appropriate laws, including any copyright laws which the new image itself may violate. Just because the image isn't protected itself doesn't mean that it can't infringe on someone else's copyrights. See the other answer for more details.

What's the legality (and potential recourse) of selling something as Tuna that isn't Tuna at all In the US many sushi places sell "white tuna" which actually isn't a Tuna at all but Escolar, a fish from a different family and genus. That seems to be primarily a popular marketing ploy: Tuna is substantially more expensive than Escolar. It also doesn't remotely taste like tuna either. The practice is akin to selling chicken as "white beef" at beef prices. Is is not only is it grossly misleading, it is also potentially dangerous. Escolar is banned in (for example) Japan and Italy because they consider it toxic. Being banned in Japan is particularly ironic for a Sushi fish. Anyway: Tuna is much less of a health risk than Escolar. Is this legal or what is the legal interpretation of this mislabeling? What legal recourse does a customer have if they come across it? If locality matters, let's start with US, Massachusetts.

Federal deceptive advertising regulations do not apply to restaurant menus, and sale of escolar is legal in the US. Legal recourse would have to be via state law. Such legal action is conceivable, for example it would be "menu fraud" to sell chuck steak as "Kobe beef", and the practice of selling shark meat disks as scallops is likewise illegal. Fish are problematic since multiple species can be commonly called by a single name (sole, halibut, cod, snapper, sardine, herring). It is possible that in a certain market, "white tuna" is standardly understood to be albacore tuna, therefore it would be fraudulent to sell escolar as "white tuna". That would be the point that has to be proven in a legal action, that the term has a specific interpretation. Analogously, there are a number of creamed vegetable products sold as "hummus" which contain no chickpeas (by original definition, hummus is chickpeas and not soybeans). By dint of such variant use over time, it is not deceptive to sell mashed soybeans as "hummus". The tuna industry may well hope to limit the use of the term "tuna", but there is no regulation defining "white tuna". It should be noted that there is a regulation, 21 CFR 161.190 for canned tuna, dictating that only albacore tuna may be called "white meat tuna".

It seems that your friend is taking part in a multi-level marketing scheme. However, this does not necessarily exclude a pyramid or snow ball scheme. Both can be illegal in Germany and Switzerland under the respective unfair business practices codes, because the systems do not rely on the sales of goods and services, but on the continuous recruitment of further sales persons. To clarify whether your friend's system is illegal, you could report the scheme to the competent watchdogs. In Germany the "Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs" in Bad Homburg is recommendable. As the company is operating from Switzerland, German law not be applicable without more. Therefore also contacting the Swiss authorities may be advisable. This seems to be the "Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft SECO" in Bern.

You mean like Unilever, and countless others do? Yes. Many, many companies control a stable of brands, often of competing products. This is particularly prevalent in grocery lines (cleaning, food, beauty products) and motor vehicles (there are dozens of brands of motor vehicle but only a handful of automotive companies). Clearly, these products have different features (improvements) – you are entitled to segment your market anyway you like. If they are actually produced by the same company, keeping that secret would be virtually impossible. If they were separate companies (even with licencing agreements etc.), well, they are not the same company even if they have common ownership. As for having a monopoly: if you hold a patent you are allowed to have a monopoly, if you don't, expect to see knock-off rocket boots on the shelf in a week.

Intellectual property law varies considerably by jurisdiction, and doesn't just involve copyright, but also trademarks, and patents. The first problem you are going to run into is that "Risko!" is probably protected as a commercial trademark rather than copyright. In the US at least, making minor changes to a trademark generally doesn't get you off the hook for unlicensed use. The owner of the "Risko!" trademark could bring suit against you for trademark infringement and it would be up to a judge or possibly a jury to decide whether "Risko" is different enough from "Risko!" that confusion would be unlikely. If they won the suit they could collect damages and their legal costs. There was a protracted and important trademark lawsuit in the US over the names "Monopoly" and "Anti-Monopoly" for board games. An economist, Ralph Anspach, had introduced a game he called "Anti-monopoly". He was sued by the Parker Brothers company for infringing on their trademark for "Monopoly". After 10 years the US Supreme Court ruled in Anspach's favor, finding that "Monopoly" had become a generic term for a type of board game and was no longer a valid trademark. You can't necessarily count on being "small potatoes" so that they'll simply ignore your possible infringement. In US law, failure to enforce their trademark rights can lead to the loss of trademark rights and remedies, so companies are less likely to let minor infringements slide. The situation in Italy may be different. Your artwork and graphical components are another potential problem. Those probably are covered by copyright. Again, the holder of the copyright for the "Risko!" artwork could sue you for violating their copyright on the artwork. A judge or jury would then evaluate whether your artwork was "derivative" of the "Risko!" artwork. If the court finds that your artwork is derivative, you might have to pay damages and legal costs. There are actually a ton of Risk inspired games already available online, but they seem to stay away from names that sounds anything like "Risk" and anything that looks like the Risk artwork.

First of all, the site you found is governmental, so a rather good find in the first place. It indicates: Au restaurant, la carafe d'eau ordinaire en accompagnement du repas est inclue dans le prix du repas. En outre, les établissements de restauration et débits de boisson doivent indiquer la possibilité pour les consommateurs de demander de l'eau potable gratuite. In the restaurant, the carafe of plain water to accompany the meal is included in the price of the meal. In addition, catering establishments and drinking establishments must indicate the possibility for consumers to request free drinking water. The relevant law cited in the further article is Order No. 25-268 of June 8, 1967, which was repealed in 2016, but speaks about that such a charge needs to be included in the price. However, a different order concerning the display of prices from 1987/1990 is still active. This specifies in Article 5: Les cartes et menus doivent comporter, pour chaque prestation, le prix ainsi que la mention "boisson comprise" ou "boisson non comprise" et, dans tous les cas, indiquer pour les boissons la nature et la contenance offerte. Cards and menus must include, for each service, the price as well as the mention "drink included" or "drink not included" and, in all cases, indicate for the drinks the nature and the capacity offered. Likewise, an environmental law in the shape of Article L541-15-10 demands the following: A compter du 1er janvier 2022, [...] Les établissements de restauration et débits de boisson sont tenus d'indiquer de manière visible sur leur carte ou sur un espace d'affichage la possibilité pour les consommateurs de demander de l'eau potable gratuite. Ces établissements doivent donner accès à leurs clients à une eau potable fraîche ou tempérée, correspondant à un usage de boisson. From 1 January 2022, [...] Restaurants and drinking establishments are required to indicate in a visible manner on their menu or on a display space the possibility for consumers to request free drinking water. These establishments must give their customers access to fresh or temperate drinking water, corresponding to the use of beverages. Since the latter law actually requires them to give access to free drinking water (which is tap water) on request, they are allowed to not bring it out with the meal, as long as they have the required note that tells about it. However, many restaurants will deliver a flask of it on its own, sometimes even before you order. As a side note: the serving of free water to meals is pretty much a custom in France, even if the waste reduction law of 2022 is very new still and the old law that had mandated it went away in 2016. When I last was in Paris in about 2005, I had to ask for water in one restaurant as they didn't deliver it on their own with the meal, upon which the server asked if I would prefer it chilled or warmed. In none of the about 10 different food places I visited in the week, water or table charges did show up on the bill, very much in accordance with the 1987/90 law. In one restaurant also the slices of baguette served while we choose our meals were off the bill, even though we asked for a refill of those.

Not under that name In common law countries, like Canada, the concept is known by the delightfully visceral term price gouging or, in emergency circumstances, profiteering. This is not regulated at a Federal level in Canada. A brief overview of provincial level laws can be found here. Typically, they require prices that are not just excessive - they need to be unconscionable which is a very high bar.

People running web servers are generally liable for contributory culpability, when some user breaks the law by putting the material on the server. There are legal mechanisms for relieving the server guy from this burden. The best-known mechanism is "DMCA takedown", where you publish contact information so that an offended person can serve up a proper legal claim that you are distributing material that they own copyright to. If you follow the rules, you may enjoy "safe harbor" protection against contributory liability: one of the requirements is that you have to take infringing material down. The specific requirements can depend on the nature of the liability and jurisdiction, but generally involves a "hands off" involvement where the person has no knowledge of what's going on on his server. So just disclaiming responsibility does not work. There are other more serious violations, such as distribution of child porn or transmission of top secret information. Jurisdiction is not totally central to internet questions, and I could sue you (the server guy) in US courts, or (depending on the offense: copyright infringement of a particular item) in UK courts. Nailing this down specifically to Sweden is harder, but recall that The Pirate Bay had a whopping judgment against them.

Yes, it can First, your argument is scientifically vacuous - Sodium and Chlorine are highly dangerous substances - Sodium bursts into flame on exposure to air and Chlorine is both toxic and corrosive. Sodium Chloride is table salt - dangerous in its own way but not in the same class. The same is true in reverse of petrol and superphosphate (fertiliser) apart they are relatively benign, together they are a mining explosive. Second, even if your science was valid, it wouldn't matter. If the government wants to ban substance A and not substance B they have the legal power to do so.

Is it legal to use force against a person who is trying to stop you from rescuing another person? Alice has been severely injured or is otherwise in danger. Eve wants to help Alice, but Bob is somehow preventing her from getting to Alice. Assume that Bob is not threatening to harm Eve; he is only preventing her from helping Alice. Perhaps Eve needs to walk down a narrow hallway and Bob is blocking it and refusing to move; there is no alternative way to rescue Alice. Is it legal for Eve to use physical force against Bob in order to rescue Alice? Does it matter whether or not Bob is responsible for Alice's injury or endangerment?

germany Bob through his actions is harming Alice. Thus Eve may use the minimum necessary force to help Alice as Nothilfe, which is defined as using §32 StGB (Self protection/Notwehr) and §34 StGB (justifying state of emergency/Rechtfertigender Notstand). As a result, it is allowed to harm someone to the degree of self protection for the benefit of someone else that can't protect themselves - such as Alice. However, the amount of force allowed must be proportional to the harm done to Alice - so Eve may use the least needed amount of force to get Bob from stopping Eve from helping Alice. As an example, Eve might shove Bob out of the way, hit him, or use the threat of serious harm (which is usually illegal!) to deter Bob from getting in the way, but unless Alice is actually at risk of dying from Bob keeping her from applying pressure on a lacerated artery this very moment, she can't shoot at Bob - that would overstep the Notwehr, but might not be punished if the overstepping is for the right reasons defined in §33 StGB. Bob also is liable for not rendering aid, §323c StGB unterlassene Hilfeleistung/Behinderung von hilfeleistenden Personen (Failure to provide assistance/hindering persons providing assistance).

There is no clear rule on this matter, but there is a reasonable prospect for using an entrapment defense in this case, when deliberate deception is employed. There are two tests for entrapment: the subjective test and the objective test. The former focuses on the defendant's state of mind: whether the defendant is predisposed to commit the crime without law enforcement pressure. The latter is where the officer uses tactics that would induce a reasonable, law-abiding person to commit the crime. It depends in part whether the jurisdiction recognizes one of these defenses. An example of objective entrapment: "A reasonable, law-abiding person could be tempted into committing prostitution for a substantial sum of money like $10,000." Similarly, applicable to this question: A reasonable, law-abiding person could be tempted to undertake a pleasurable action having been assured that the action is actually legal. Where the subjective test applies: The fact of asking about the legality of an action is evidence that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime.

Self-defence has nothing to do with whether you are performing an arrest (lawful or otherwise) Self-defence is a plea that you used reasonable force to protect yourself, others and in some jurisdictions, property, from immediate harm. There is, as you say, a “whole spectrum” of both the perception of the threat and the force used that go into determining if the actions of the defendant amounted to self-defence or not. That’s why it’s up to the jury to decide on a case by case basis. A person who has the power of arrest (law enforcement officers and citizens who actually witness a crime) is authorised to use reasonable force to effect that arrest. Of course, effecting an arrest may cause a situation to escalate to the point where self-defence becomes an issue.

Does "duty to rescue" apply to a child that one has no direct responsibility for? And I am, certainly under English law, guilty of a crime. No, not necessarily, because a failure to act does not automatically create criminal liability in England and Wales. Most offences require a combination of a physical act and the intent to carry it out - often referred to as the coincidence of actus reus and mens rea. If one or both of these elements are missing (or cannot be proved) then there is no offence unless there is a specific Duty of Care imposed by law which obligates a person to prevent, or mitigate the risk of, harm coming to someone or something. There is a simple mnemonic that may assist with identifying whether or not there is such a DUTY Dangerous situation created... In R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161 Miller fell asleep while smoking a cigarette, then woke up to see his matress smouldering. Instead of calling for help or doing anything about it, he went to sleep in another room so was convicted of arson - not for setting the fire but for failing to do anything about it. This would be analogous with someone tampering with the signs to incorrectly say that the deep end of the pool is the shallow end thus causing the child to be out of his depth and drown. Under statute, contract or by public office... In R v Dytham [1979] QB 722 a police officer was convicted of misconduct in a public office because he stood by and did nothing as a man was beaten to death. For the OP: a lifeguard will have a duty of care, under contract, to act in order to rescue the child in the OP. Take it upon oneself... In R v Stone & Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354 the defendants took on the responsibility for caring for a vulnerable person who later died due to their neglect. In the OP's scenario, this might equate to someone announcing they will act as an impromptu lifeguard but then do nothing to save the child from drowning. Young persons... Anyone who has a parental relationship with a child has a legal obligation to look after the health and welfare of that child. In the OP's scenario, if the parent was absent, too drunk etc so could not raise the alarm this may be a breach of this duty of care and make them liable for the death of their child.

Claim is irrelevant. Specific to Maryland Law, Assault occurs when one makes or attempts to make physical contact with another OR intentionally frightens another. Alice saying she helped to steal the car and your definition of the theft as "accosted Carol" implies one of the three forms of Assault took place. Alice just admitted to commiting the crime she thought was wrongly charged to her. The crime she was trying to get out of is called "Assault and Battery" which is where Assault leads to actual injury or physical harm to the victim OR attempts to actually injure or harm another OR puts them in fear of such action. In Maryland Law, the Battery portion almost always is paired with assault while in other states, it might be possible to commit Battery without Assault (though in these states, normally a separate assault charge to Battery is usually added.). As a helpful tip, the two words general break down as follows: Assault: The act of threatening harm or making unwanted non-injurious contact with another person. Battery: Causing Injurious Harm to another person. In Maryland, Alice was rightly charged with assault. Upon capture, Bob will recieve an "Assault and Battery" charge for hitting Carol with the stolen card and may get an addition simple Assault charge for the threats before he drove away.

In 50/50 custody you have the right to stand your ground to ensure the safety and well being of your children. You do not need to involve police unless it is an emergency. "911 Operator, what is the emergency". Only call them when you feel your children are in grave danger. For example, you know for sure that the other parent is drunk and driving, or the other parent is drunk and on the ground unable to move and the child is in danger, etc. If you involve the police over your partner excessive drinking than, and they find that she was not excessively drinking, you will face false accusation charges and her lawyer will try to make you look like the bad guy trying to take away her children. how drunk does my ex have to be for me to deny a drop-off? Is it entirely based upon outward signs or blood-alcohol level? You should not search for drugs or alcohol, or administer tests, as to avoid the accusation of an illegal search. You can, however, based on your judgment of common sense assess the situation and see how drunk (s)he is and make your decision based on that circumstances. Make a 1-page log to document the date, time, situation description (3-5 sentences of what you see and why you make that decision.) It would be wise to have a witness around, so write down the person name as well for reference, (NOT MANY PEOPLE LIKE TO BE WITNESSES, But you can write down the people names that you know were around that incident.) Don't tell your partner that you are making the log. Suprise them in the court when you have a full page of incidents due to drinking. Am I correct in assuming that in order to protect myself from being accused of denying visitation, that (in the future) I need to involve the police if I suspect her of being intoxicated? *Always protect yourself! Be Your Own Advocate. * Don't involve the police unless its am emergency, read the first comment above. If I involve the police, do I need to be sure that she is extremely intoxicated in order to avoid a "false alarm"? (Obviously, this scares me as I'd prefer she didn't drink at all) This drinking incident is alarming itself. However, you should consult with your family law attorney. I would say that document five issues if it exceeds 5 in one month than filing a motion with the court to adjust the drinking problem, and that you request the child to be with you 60/40 custody. You must be able to demonstrate that you have the time, commitment and resources to take over the 60/40 custody. What options do I have, if any, if she drinks around him in her own home? Is she within her legal right as long as she doesn't get in a car, doesn't pass out or does something blatantly abusive? File a motion to adjust the custody, speak with your family law attorney.

In Connecticut, this is covered by the firefighter's rule. Police and fire personnel entering a property as part of their official duties are considered licensees, which limits the duties of the landowner. The rules are as follows: You can't intentionally hurt or lay a trap for the licensee. If you know or should know the licensee is there, you need to exercise due care with them. You don't have to worry about obvious hazards (but keep in mind that it's harder to see stuff at night). If you're doing something dangerous, you need to watch out for them. If you know about a hidden hazard, you must warn them. I'm not sure how in-depth you need to go with the warnings; various things I find suggest the duty to warn might only be there when you know or should know the licensee is present, but signs are a good idea regardless. On the other hand, if you do need to warn them, you might need to mention the specific locations of the pits you actually know about. However, there's no duty at all to proactively look for possible hazards. This rule originated as a rule for professional firefighters responding to a negligently-started fire: the idea is that professional firefighters sign up to do a dangerous job, and letting them sue for hazards inherent in their job (they aren't called without a fire) is a bad idea. Also, since they cannot be denied entry, go in places not open to the public, and can arrive at any hour, needing to keep the property safe for them is an unreasonable burden. Of course, there's an exception if a law is passed to protect their safety, because statutes override common law. The rule has since been extended in some states to police, and to situations besides the very problem they were called for. Other states have abolished it. In any event, this is for civil liability only: this is when cops can sue for injuries caused to them.

Illinois has a "Castle Doctrine" which includes dwellings and other qualified buildings, but not a general "Stand your Ground" doctrine. Normally, to claim self-defense one has to show that they were not able to retreat and had to use force, but in Illinois you do not have a duty to retreat if you are preventing criminal interference with a dwelling or with real property that you or a family member owns, or you have a legal duty to protect (see Ill Code 720-2 and Ill Code 720-3). In order to use deadly force in any case, it must be to prevent a forcible felony, which is defined as (720 ILCS 5/2-8): "Forcible felony" means treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual. So, assuming you have no legal duty to protect the 7-11, you would not be justified in using deadly force against rioters merely on the basis that they were committing a forcible felony against the building. On the other hand, if you were in the store or could see someone in the store being attacked, you may be able to successfully defend deadly force used to protect yourself or that person.

Do the Ohio sheriffs suing Afroman have any legal standing in their claim of "invasion of privacy and misappropriation of their likenesses" lawsuit? From this article “Afroman Sued by Sheriffs for Allegedly Profiting from Raid on his Home. Afroman is reportedly being sued by a number of Ohio sheriff deputies for allegedly profiting off the raid they conducted on his home last summer. The Adams County Sheriff’s Department ran up on Afroman’s home last August, where officers searched for illegal narcotics but failed to find anything. Afroman filmed the entire raid via his security cameras, and in the months since the raid has compiled the footage together to turn it into a music video called “Will You Help Me Repair My Door.” This has reportedly upset the Ohio sheriff’s deputies involved in the raid as they believe Afroman to be profiting off their hard work. In turn, the police are suing for invasion of privacy and misappropriation of their likenesses, and are claiming the music video has caused them emotional distress, ridicule, humiliation, loss of reputation and embarrassment. “My house is my property, my video camera films, everything on my property as they begin, stealing my money, disconnecting plus destroying my video camera system, they became my property,” Afroman said. “Criminals caught in the act, of vandalizing and stealing money. My video footage is my property. I used it to identify the criminals who broke into my house, and stole my money. I used it to identify criminals, who broke into my house, stole my money and disconnected my home security system.” Do the Ohio sheriffs suing Afroman have any legal standing in their claim "invasion of privacy and misappropriation of their likenesses" lawsuit?

The deputies have standing, but they're probably going to lose. "Standing" is just a legal principle that limits the legal process to people who have suffered certain types of injuries. Jen's answer offers a good explanation of why the answer is yes, they do have standing. But I assume you're less interested in whether the officers are capable of bringing the case than in whether their case is likely to succeed. The answer to that is no. Claim 1 alleges a violation of Ohio's right-of-publicity statute. But that statute includes a carveout for any "use of the persona of an individual that is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as long as the use does not convey or reasonably suggest endorsement by the individual whose persona is at issue." Ohio Rev. Code 2741.09 . So the officers lose if Afroman's videos are protected by the First Amendment. And they almost certainly are, as the assumption is that all speech is protected unless it falls into one of several very narrow categories -- incitement, defamation, fighting words, etc. -- that are pretty clearly not applicable here. Claim 2 alleges misappropriation of persona. This claim strikes me as the strongest, but probably still pretty weak. To win this claim, the deputies must prove: that Afroman appropriated to his own use or benefit the reputation, prestige, social or commercial standing, public interest or other values of their name or likeness; that their names or likenesses have some intrinsic value; and that that value was taken by defendant for its own benefit, commercial or otherwise. Jackson v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983). See also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) ("No social purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally pay."). It seems like it will be difficult to argue that the deputies' names or likenesses have any intrinsic value on which to premise damages. If the idea of this tort is to give the plaintiff the benefit of the commercial value of the misapporpriation, the court must evaluate whether there's any commercial value to the use of the deputies' names or images. Are these deputies moonlighting as models? Would they have licensed the use of their likenesses if Afroman had so requested? It seems unlikely. Instead, the value of using them in these contexts arises only from their connection with a newsworthy event on which Afroman wishes to comment. That seems to move us out of privacy territory and into protected speech territory, which means Claim 2 should fail. Claim 3 alleges false-light invasion of privacy. To win this claim, the deputies must prove: that Afroman gives publicity to a matter concerning them; that the publicity placed the deputies before the public in a false light; that the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and that Afroman acted with actual malice. Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St. 3d 464, 473 (2007). The complaint does not identify any statements Afroman made that were false or that placed the deputies in a false light before the public. The only things I can see as possibly "false" are the hyperbolic statements mocking the police officers, such as those suggesting that a female deputy is actually a man because her voice was "three octaves lower" than his, or his suggestions that the police are members of the KKK. Without something more substantial that reasonable people would have been likely to truly believe was true, this claim is likely to fail also, as hyperbole and opinion are generally protected under the First Amendment. Vail v. the Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 72 Ohio St. 3d 279, 283 (Ohio 1995) (“The ordinary reader would accept this column as opinion and not as fact. Therefore, the statements are protected.”). Claim 4 alleges unreasonable publicity given to private lives. To win this claim, the deputies must prove: there is publicity; the facts disclosed concern an individual's private life; the matter publicized was one that would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities; the publication was made intentionally, rather than negligently; and the matter publicized was of no legitimate concern to the public. Cox v. Hausmann, No. 3:17-cv-02420, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181458, at *33 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 30, 2020). From my review of the complaint and some of Afroman's media, it doesn't look like Afroman has publicized any facts that are subject to a legitimate claim of privacy. Instead, Afroman has published video of government officials, engaged in the work of government, and commented on those videos. Those are matters about the deputies' public lives, not private, and the conduct of police is of legitimate concern to the public. Claim 4 should therefore also fail. It seems more likely that this case was brought to intimidate Afroman or to create some kind of leverage in the civil-rights claim Afroman will probably be bringing based on potential violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. If this is correct, the deputies will be lucky to have the case simply dismissed. Sanctions and an abuse-of-process counterclaim are more likely.

I'd imagine that testimony from the defendant is rare enough that in the majority of cases, prosecutors do not meaningfully prepare for a cross examination. To the extent they do, I'd expect the preparation is similar to that for basically any other witness. So I wouldn't expect complicated flowcharts, because the general rule at trial is that you only ask questions whose answers are both known and helpful. So if I need to place the defendant at the OK Corral at 3 p.m., I'm only going to ask him where he was at 3 p.m. if I have evidence showing that fact is true -- maybe he gave a written statement to the sheriff, maybe he posed for a daguerrotype, whatever. I expect him to deny it, so I don't ask the question unless I have evidence more convincing than his denial. In this way, a defendant -- like any hostile witness -- is used less to provide any facts of their own, but rather as an involuntary narrator of my own story, authenticating evidence and validating the facts consistent with my theory of the case.

"Checking someone's digital footprint" could be stalking, depending on the circumstances. The better question to ask is about the legality of a certain action, and not the specific name used in a jurisdiction (although indeed in Washington there is a defined crime of "stalking"). I don't know what you mean by "checking someone's digital footprint", and it is not defined by law. Looking at RCW 9a.46.110, we can first discern that it does not matter for the definition of the crime where these people live or where the robbery took place. If two people from Alberta travel to Alaska and harass or murder a person from Texas, Washington law does not enter into the equation. The crime that you're asking about is the snooping, so for Washington to have jurisdiction, the snooping has to be "in" Washington. That does not mean that both parties have to be in Washington – there can be complex jurisdictional laws if the accused is in another state or country. The accused can easily be prosecuted in his own state, he can also be prosecuted in a foreign country, if he is caught there or if he is extradited to that country. For the act to be stalking, the first element is that "He or she intentionally and repeatedly harasses or repeatedly follows another person; and...". Harassment is defined in that section as a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner, or when the course of conduct would cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of his or her child. Since there was no communication between the parties, there is no harassment in the legal sense. There is no "following" either, therefore the act fails to constitute stalking w.r.t the first elements. Since the crime is defined by a conjunction of elements and your scenario fails on the first conjunct, it is not "stalking" (it is also not "harassment" as defined in RCW 9A.46.020, 9A.46.060.

These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information.

§Sec. 54-212 of the ordinance states (a) It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, sell, offer or display for sale, give, lend, transfer ownership of, acquire, carry or possess any assault weapon or large capacity magazine in Cook County So if the gun is an assault weapon, it is not legal to sell. That ends the legal inquiry. Beyond that, we can only conjecture as to possibilities, for example (1) you may be mistaken in your assessment of some particular firearm, (2) the authorities don't know yet so haven't taken action or (3) they do know and they have taken action. Your link did not lead to any obvious things that count as an assault weapon, perhaps you could be more specific.

I'll use Wisconsin as a jurisdiction. If you file a false death certificate, that's a felony. But you probably wouldn't go that far. It could be disorderly conduct. In Wisconsin disorderly conduct is described as follows: Whoever, in a public or private place, engages in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. There's also a statute prohibiting "Disrupting a funeral or memorial service" but it won't apply in this case unless disorderly conduct applies. It would raise the penalty to a class A misdemeanor (or a class I felony if you somehow did it again after being convicted once.) On the civil side, there could be an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, either for the false report of your death, or for a "corpse" suddenly coming to life. This kind of lawsuit requires "extreme and outrageous conduct", but if this isn't, I don't know what would be.

As a legal matter, you need to call or visit your local police station, report that you found some lost money, answer their questions honestly and dispassionately (they don't care about your hate etc. unless it's causing an active situation they have to deal with, and even then they don't much want to hear you go on about it), and then let them deal with it. You can tell your neighbor, if he inquires, that you have handed the matter to the local police and he can inquire with them about claiming it; feel free to ask the police to affirm that's the suitable course of action. You can expect to be given legal possession of it if they are unable to determine the true owner in accordance with local law. You can ask the police for details on that, though they'll probably just tell you as a matter of procedure without prompting.

Publishing government records is pretty classic First Amendment-protected activity. Keeping in mind that one can find a lawyer to sue for anything, I think that person would likely be operating well within the law. One thing in particular that I'd recommend staying aware of is how one might attempt to monetize this endeavor. There have been a lot of sites publishing arrest records, court records, and mugshots, and then charging people to have them removed to keep them from popping up in a Google search for those people's names. That is -- rightly -- regarded as sketchy behavior; while several states have passed laws prohibiting that business model, I don't believe any such law exists in Washington State at this point.

Could Julian Assange have elected for the portions of his extradition proceedings conducted at Westminster magistrates to have been in crown court? Parts of the extradition proceedings thus far of Julian Assange have taken place in Woolwich Crown Court, others in the old Bailey, others like his post-triumph bail hearing and also monthly case management hearings and also the “approval” of the extradition order happened at Westminster magistrate’s court which is apparently statutorily designated to handle extradition request proceedings for England and Wales. In most Criminal cases however, perhaps as an additional safeguard on people’s due Process rights, they have an option to elect for a crown court (ie jury) trial if they like. Why was this principle not available for Julian? (Or was it?) Furthermore, why was the first iteration of his extradition proceedings (I gather based on the original indictment) at Woolwich crown court, when the proceedings related to the superseding and second superseding indictments were undertaken seemingly all at the old Bailey? Does this not imply that these “substantive” rather than “ceremonial” parts of the proceedings actually were at crown courts in both cases, including at the old Bailey / central criminal court? Even if so, why was the first iteration at Woolwich and the second in central London? And finally, if it was in fact at a crown court in both cases, does that imply that there was a jury involved? (I assume not because then they would have been mentioned in many of the countless media reports on the proceedings. )

Extradition is a special procedure that is tightly governed by statute - currently the Extradition Act 2003. That Act provides that, for extradition from England (as opposed to Scotland, etc.) to the United States (an example of a Category 2 Territory), an initial hearing is to take place before "the appropriate judge". This is, per s.139(1)(a), a designated "District Judge (Magistrates' Courts)". A DJMC sits in a magistrates' court, and is a professional judge as opposed to a layperson like an ordinary Justice of the Peace. The hearing is meant to resemble summary proceedings in the magistrates' court, but it has its own special rules. Those include a special appeals procedure which is different from the ordinary way that criminal cases can be appealed. Some things that could normally happen in a magistrates' court cannot happen here, such as varying an order at a later date (see R (Mann) v Westminster Magistrates Court [2010] EWHC 48 (Admin)). The way that this is phrased means that the jurisdiction is not conferred on the magistrates' court (which happens to have a DJ sitting in it), but on the DJMC themselves. The Criminal Procedure Rules 2014, Rule 17.2(a) are careful to say that when they say "magistrates' court" in this context, they are talking about the court that the judge has convened for the purposes of the Extradition Act. These rules are only applicable because the Act specifically provides for them in its s.210; they don't come in automatically as they would for criminal proceedings in a magistrates' court, because this is a special process with its own law, as expounded in the Explanatory Notes to the rules. In the Assange case, the DJMC was Vanessa Baraitser, including at Woolwich and the Old Bailey. The proceedings were under the Extradition Act as explained above. The court chose to sit in various buildings, other than Westminster Magistrates Court, for practical reasons due to the high level of public interest in the case, and related security considerations. The hearing was booked to last four weeks, which is very unusually long. Proceedings were live-streamed to other court buildings to allow members of the public and media to follow along. All of that does not mean that the proceedings were in a Crown Court or County Court. They were in buildings used by those courts, but took place before the designated DJMC according to the special procedure of the Extradition Act. That procedure, among other things, means that the extradition hearing cannot take place as a hearing of some other court, and there is no jury no matter how much the defendant wants one.

I find it very easy to believe that a prosecutor would want to know the location of the body notwithstanding an existing conviction. The prosecutor represents the state an the state stands for, among other things, justice and the protection of its citizens. It is both just and good for the wellbeing of the loved ones of the victims that the body is returned to them and dealt with appropriately. To this day, countries spend millions of dollars exhuming and identifying their war dead - even for wars a century ago: victims of crime deserve no less

If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically.

This is explained at paragraphs 2-4 of the decision you link. There were two proceedings: a claim in the county court and an application to the Tribunal. The county court claim was transferred to the Tribunal to be consolidated with the application, and they were to be heard together. (Although, technically there should be no literal "transfer" or "consolidation"; the claim is always a county court claim, separate from the tribunal application. It is just that the matters are heard at the same occasion by inviting a tribunal judge to sit in their capacity as a county court judge. See commentary on City, University of London v. Vodafone Limited (2020).) In that circumstance, Judge Nicol was sitting as both a tribunal judge and as a county court judge. This is possible because: On 22 April 2014, the Crime and Courts Act 2013 Sch.9(1) para. 4 was brought into force, providing that judges of the First-tier Tribunal are judges of the county court and therefore able to exercise the jurisdiction of the county court, providing that a claim form has been issued and the matter has been listed for hearing by them. Stephen Jourdan, K.C., "FTT Judges sitting as judges of the county court" (January 2019) See also this previous Q&A where this was explained.

They could be prosecuted in any state where there was evidence that part of the crime was committed. Realistically, either State A or State B could prosecute for conspiracy to murder as an additional charge, because the conspiracy clearly spanned more than one state, even if they can't prove where the crime was committed, although physical evidence (e.g. traces of camp sites, footprints, testimony about landmarks, evidence of poop with human DNA from the victim in it), would usually make it possible to show that some part of the crime was committed in the state. There is probably also a federal crime that could be implicated such as "murder involving flight across a state line" (hypothetical, but I'm sure that there is something similar on the books). I'm not going to address the further hypothetical as it is too bizzare and law is ultimately very context specific. Find a more plausible fact pattern, perhaps with a different crime, and ask a separate question if you want to really address the issue.

england-and-wales Yes, double jeopardy applies The common law pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict apply equally to foreign offences; this is black letter law in Halsbury's Laws of England. Scotland is "foreign" for these purposes. There is no analogue to the odd US dual sovereignty doctrine. The general exception to double jeopardy regarding the re-trial of serious offences under Part 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not apply here, because of an odd anomaly created by the statute due to criminal justice being devolved to the Scottish Parliament. As a result, according to the Crown Prosecution Service: There are no provisions dealing with qualifying offences [for retrial after acquittal] in Scotland as criminal justice is a matter for the Scottish Parliament. At present, the law in Scotland has not been changed so that these provisions do not apply to acquittals that take place in Scotland.

The privilege of peerage in criminal proceedings was abolished by s. 30 of the Criminal Justice Act 1948. As for why, see Colin Rhys Lovell, "The Trial of Peers in Great Britain", The American Historical Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Oct., 1949). There were "grave disadvantages in the procedure to the accused peer, who could not waive it." The accused could not challenge the jurors or appeal their decisions. It was ultimately decided that the procedure had "outlived its usefulness." See also some justification from Hansard: [...a peer] cannot say, "Waive all this, and treat me like anybody else." The existing law is that he must be tried by this grotesque and antiquated arrangement. It is a Court, but it is a very ancient Court, and it is high time that provisions were made that a Peer who is charged with a felony should be treated in the same way as anybody else.

Like many US legal questions, there is a Congressional Research Service report about this. It is not generally a violation of US law to do things in another country where the only connection with the US is that the offender is a US citizen. However, there are a number of general situations where the US has jurisdiction over federal crimes if either the victim or offender is a US citizen: if a place isn't within the jurisdiction of any country (e.g. Antarctica); a place used by a US government entity (like an embassy or airbase); crimes by American soldiers and those employed by or accompanying the military; etc. These are considered to be within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the US. Other laws apply if they say so. For instance, any US national committing war crimes inside or outside the US can be punished under US law; ditto for treason. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes it illegal for a US national to bribe a foreign official anywhere outside the US for business reasons (if it's inside the US, there are more requirements). For instance, you aren't allowed to pay kickbacks to a foreign government's acquisition officer to buy your product. The CRS report has more (it doesn't include the FCPA, but that appears to be an oversight). Note that extraterritorial jurisdiction doesn't just apply if the person is a US national. US laws can also confer it if the victim is a US national, if the offense has a significant US component, if it's directed towards the US, if it's in violation of international law and the offender later turns up in the US, etc. For your scenarios: Dual citizenship doesn't matter. A US citizen is a US citizen, and is required to obey all laws that apply to US citizens, unless those laws explicitly exempt dual citizens. A dual citizen isn't treated differently by the government; as far as the US government is concerned, their US citizenship is all that matters (except for certain specific purposes like security clearances). In Kawakita v. United States, a US-Japanese dual citizen was convicted of treason against the US for aiding Japan in WWII. Depends. Plenty of these laws have no requirement that anything related to the crime actually happen in the US; for sex tourism, the subsection about traveling in foreign commerce for the purposes of engaging in illicit sexual conduct is followed by a subsection about engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. "Travel with the purposes of X" or "with intent to X" means you must have intended to do X at the time you traveled, but most extraterritorial laws don't control travel with intent to X (they cover X directly). Depends on the law. Some laws (like child sex tourism) apply to any permanent resident of the US as well as any citizen. Some apply to anyone, because they're based on a conspiracy started in the US. Others apply just to US nationals; a noncitizen isn't bound by them (for instance, no one but a US national can be charged with treason against the US, for obvious reasons). Still others apply to anyone who later turns up in the US, even if that is literally the only connection between the US and the offense (this is basically reserved for crimes against international law, like genocide).

Does property include money in the sense of ECHR right of peaceful enjoyment? ECHR protocol 1 article 1 protects the right to peacefully enjoy one’s property. Does this include money? For example if one has frozen, seized or confiscated by fines, would this be Applicable as much as with forfeiture of a house?

The ECHR protocols are not meant (and not generally understood) to prohibit taxation or fines by the state in accordance with the rule of law. See e.g. this explanation by the Council of Europe. As to the specific question, this explanation enumerates shares and leases as property, and the text makes it clear that bank accounts or cash would also be covered: [...] in the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or penalties; [...]

Yes; While contracts can be made in written and oral form bigger acquisitions normally are in written form. Also consider this: They can't prove that they told you that the balcony is not usable. Thats a big negative in buying a property and they would need to have it documented. If they still refuse consider seeking professional help. In my country lawyers offer "fast help" that isn't legally binding but costs you only 10$ and helps you finding out if your case has any possibility to get accepted/if you're right. EDIT: Regarding the reservation fee: You can dismiss that. You didn't reserved that object, you reserved a house with balcony.

Of course you'd be in legal trouble, the contract is still valid. I also don't know why you don't consider virtual goods to be goods. Take this example: You buy a 1 year subscription for (example) netflix. The next day they cancel your subscription but don't give you the money back because its not a "real good". This should make it clear that virtual goods are goods too in the eyes of the law. Question is if police/lawyers care about it as much as for "real" goods.

She has no legal right to your stuff, and every legal right to the apartment. The only way adjudicate such a conflict of rights is with a restraining order. A temporary order would expire in 3 weeks. Item 14 in the petition requests exclusive use, possession, and control of the property. However, that path of restraints is tailored to domestic violence, so item 27 has you describe the alleged abuse: Abuse means to intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to you; or to place you or another person in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or to harass, attack, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, keep you under surveillance, impersonate (on the Internet, electronically or otherwise), batter, telephone, or contact you; or to disturb your peace; or to destroy your personal property. Note that the description refers to destroying your personal property, not pawing through it. It's really impossible to know if the judge will exercise his discretion to include "reasonable fear of destruction (or theft) of personal property", since the ex-roommate has no further interest in the apartment. There is an alternative path of a harassment restraining order, which does not require a defined domestic relationship (such as ex-roommate), where "harassment" is violence or threats of violence against you, or a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed you and caused you substantial emotional distress. A course of conduct is more than one act and that seems even less likely.

If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected.

This is the cited article. Thankfully, the interviewee provided a scan of the police letter he received, so the rest of this question is relatively easy to answer. He was specifically charged with Störung der öffentlichen Ordnung (lit. Disturbance of the public order) persuant to § 81(1) of the Sicherheitspolizeigesetz, which reads (after putting it through Google Translate): Who by a behavior that is likely to arouse legitimate annoyance, disturbs public order, commits an administrative offense and is punishable by a fine of up to 500 euros, unless the behavior is justified, in particular by the use of a constitutionally guaranteed right , In the event of aggravating circumstances, instead of a fine, imprisonment can be imprisoned for up to one week, or up to two weeks for repeated offenses. This law is almost certainly constitutional as it specifically allows exercise of constitutional rights. Note this also includes human rights, as Austria has included the European Convention on Human Rights as part of its constitution. Given that, I'm guessing if the interviewee had wanted to, he would have had a decent shot at having this charge dismissed.

There are certain requirements of Statehood according to the Montevideo Convention on Statehood of 1933, which is just a codification of international customary law: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Is it "legal" to buy a piece of land and claim it to be another country than before(either inventing a new one or migrating it to an already existing one)? According to international law, it is. Sure. But just because you say something is the case, doesn't mean it is. Always. Sometimes it is. But for present purposes, let's say that if you found an uninhabited island and said that you were a country, that wouldn't be the case - nor if you bought it from a man living on it. If you found some land that belonged to another country and decided to claim it as that of an existing country, then it would depend on the specific circumstances. That's exactly what happened to the Krim island in the Ukraine(now Russia maybe?), right? I don't think so. As far as I know, the annexation of territory isn't considered sale. In any case, the ownership of this land is still under dispute. So, if it's possible without the influence of these international institutions, trying this in an area with their influence would be easier, right? If trying this means declaring some land you have purchased to be a new sovereign state Nope. You probably still don't meet the requirements for statehood. If trying this means the acquisition of some land by an existing sovereign state Maybe. Probably not. The Montevideo Convention requires that statehood not be gained through force; while member states' interests may be greater where they are more invested, the requirements for acquisition of territory are the same no matter where you are. What would prevent me from creating my own nation? Money, defensibility, recognition, the fact that you probably don't own any land that you "buy" (depending on the jurisdiction and real estate system), the fact that you generally can't unilaterally declare yourself a sovereign state.

18 USC 960 states that Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. "At peace" is not defined, but we can assume that a nation that the US is at war with would be exempt from this provision, then again it depends on what it means to be "at war" with a nation.

Under what conditions could a police force enlist the help of a minor? Would it be illegal for a fourteen year old to assist the police in solving a murder in New York City? What kind of red tape would the department need to navigate in order to enlist their help?

There are various ways in which a minor cannot assist a police investigation, and it might be useful to say in what ways any civilian could do so (TV shows notwithstanding). A civilian cannot conduct a custodial interrogation, nor can most of them gather physical evidence (so that a proper evidence log is maintained including relevant information on method of collection, the evidence isn't contaminated etc. – stuff that requires a modicum of training). They cannot execute a search warrant. On the other hand, anyone can provide information that is useful to the police, and it can be done without giving your name or indicating that you are a minor. A minor can serve as a witness at a trial, and it can be helpful to police to know that they have a witness to a crime. A minor can also be used the same way an adult is used, as a confidential informant. There is not a lot of data on that practice given the confidentiality of juvenile records, but there is an article to read ("Juvenile Police Informants: Friendship, Persuasion, and Pretense". The article does suggest that parental consent may be necessary in some cases (such as wearing a wire to a drug transaction). There is a law in Washington requiring every county's prosecutor to have a local protocol for using informants, and there should be guidelines developed by a work group, however the results (if any) of that group's meetings are not available on the internet. It is possible that there are specific restrictions on the use of minors as informants in some jurisdiction. The article explores the subtle distinction between "informant" and "friend", applied to minors. California has a law that limits the use of minors – none under 15, those above with approval of a judicial officer and parent, though those 13 and older can be used as bait in a cigarette or alcohol sales case. New York does not have a blanket prohibition against using a minor as an informant, but there may be relevant guidelines for a particular department.

Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.

1. I want use a friend who has no legal training as my "counsel," do the police have any legal recourse from allowing me to talk to him prior to interrogation? E.g., can they insist that my counsel be a member of the bar in the state where I have been arrested? Yes. If they don't want you to, you cannot talk to a friend, only a lawyer. If you got an OUI, and you're not being a jerk, they will probably let you talk to whomever you want (within reason – it's not social hour). However, they can keep you from speaking to anyone but a lawyer as that person could gain information from you that can corrupt their investigation. (E.g., they arrest you with 10 lbs. of methamphetamine. They know it's "fresh" and likely came from a local lab that they suspect you of running. You cannot be allowed to talk to just anyone, as they could help get the lab broke down, moved, destroyed). In TV shows you see attorneys doing this type of illicit thing, but in reality that is very rare. When you enter the police station to speak with a client, you must present your bar card (license to practice). Friends are not allowed in, even if you value their counsel – they are not counselors! 2. I want to consult a "team" of qualified counselors. Are there legal grounds or regulations to limit the number of individuals I consult prior to interrogation, and who I have present during interrogation? No. You can have your entire legal team with you, while preparing for court, or while being questioned, within reason. They do not need to rent a conference room to fit your 30 person legal team, but if you want 3 or so lawyers in with you, and you can afford paying each $250-$500 per hour, then have at it. Most lawyers would counsel you against this, as it creates an undue impression of limitless (hence likely illegal) funds. (But if you're a hedge fund manager, and you can show your money is legally earned, it's really your choice.) I have had occasion to go in to meet a client with co-counsel numerous times (especially in early years of practice when there is a lead attorney and second chair, so to speak, even for interrogation (which means silence by the client). They can "impede" access to some extent, though they typically don't. They can play games with your lawyer and make them wait and make you wait, but not while they are in with you, and only for so long. Once your lawyer arrives they should leave you alone. (Some courts say once you ask for counsel they need to leave you alone, but this only really matters if they get a confession from you (or any evidence) before you've (and this is what they're hoping for) recant your request for counsel and your right to remain silent.) 3. Can my contact with counsel be proscribed in any way? E.g., can the police limit the duration or schedule of contact with counsel? Can they impede or delay access to me by someone who claims to be my counsel? Once you've called your lawyer, they need to to let him or her meet with you for a reasonable amount of time before questioning. This is typically a quick meeting, just long enough to make sure you will not say a word. Even completely innocent people should keep their mouth shut – innocent people do occasionally get arrested and convicted! No matter what the police say, there is no benefit, ever, from talking to them. Some police, who know it's their last shot to get a confession and know once your lawyer gets there will never talk to you again (and they have enough to go forward without your confession in the event you just start blabbing "you did it" before they can get you to invoke your rights) will keep talking to you and tell you not to comment, just to listen, even while your lawyer sits outside. They can say you're being processed, or there's a security issue, any number of reasons for short delays if they need it. They will then go on and on about "how they can maybe help you out if you talk now, but once your lawyer arrives all bets are off." These are just tricks to get you to recant/revoke your rights and to obtain your confession. You will usually see your lawyer shortly after arrival. Can they impede or delay access to me by someone who claims to be my counsel? Yes, if your lawyer doesn't have adequate ID or cannot verify he is licensed in that state, or in another state and with local counsel. The police do not have a duty to research your lawyer's credentials, and don't have to go online and look your attorney up in the bar directory to make it easier for him or her to get to you. However, if they know the attorney, and he or she forgot his bar card, they would probably lose the confession if you confessed while they make him go get it. Most lawyers carry their bar card in their wallet, so this is not a typical problem. 4. What do police have to do to facilitate my access to my desired counselor(s)? E.g., how long can I be held after requesting an attorney without being allowed to attempt to contact one? You have a right to contact a lawyer. There is no explicit right to a phone call, although some form of contact is implied. Hence, you can usually be held 3 hours before they have to let you "contact" someone, and this is after processing. You can be held until your lawyer gets there or until your arraignment, whatever comes first. If your lawyer doesn't show up, you will be given another opportunity by the court to get your lawyer of choice there for arraignment. If you can't, and you don't want to go forward, a public defender will move to waive your right to a speedy trial and seek a continuance until you can get your counsel of choice there. If this happens, consider getting a new lawyer. What means must I be granted to find and contact the counsel of my choice? This actually differs depending on where you are and what you did. Again, you have a right to counsel but they can determine how you get this done. Sometimes there are local laws that say you get any number, or 3, or 1 completed phone call to reach your counsel of choice. If there is an overriding risk that you will call someone to communicate information that could put the investigation in jeopardy or would be adversely impact their evidentiary value in some way, even when these laws exist the police can refuse you direct contact with anyone and may implement a strict "they call" policy, where they will call the lawyer and tell them, or call your family to let them know, and they can call the lawyer. They cannot hold you for a protracted amount of time without giving you some way to get word to a lawyer; it must be reasonable. There is not a lot of law out there about what is not reasonable, because the police know, and for the most part accept, that once right to counsel has been invoked they are done. There is case law saying that 3 hours is reasonable. What is not reasonable? That is fact dependent.

If A reasonably suspects that B committed a felony, A may arrest B, which means that A may also use reasonable force to detain B. They can also arrest for a misdemeanor committed in their presence, if it constituted a breach of peace. It is, of course, up to A to be correct that the act is a felony or a breach of peace, and to know what is reasonable force. If your arrest is in fact not lawful, you may be sued (battery or false imprisonment) or prosecuted (battery or unlawful imprisonment). Punching a person in the shoulder is the felony of battery, and direct observation creates highly reasonable suspicion. In such circumstances, anyone could have arrested the child. Unlike a police arrest, a citizen is not required to Mirandize an arrested suspect. This memo summarizes citizens arrest law including case law for Washington state. The right to perform citizen's arrest is statutorily recognized as a defense under RCW 9A.16.020 The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases: ...(2) Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has committed a felony and delivering him or her to a public officer competent to receive him or her into custody

None No law requires police to keep people apart when making statements. Doing so is good police practice. In some police organizations internal regulations or procedures may specify that officers should do so. But those are not laws. In some cases witnesses may have had a chance to confer and agree on a story before police arrive, the police cannot prevent that. The trier of fact can take into account that witnesses had a chanc to agree on a false story.

You don't say who is telling you that you need to do these things, and it does matter. Educational institutions are required to maintain a discrimination-free environment, so if a student makes inappropriate remarks to another student, they have to address the matter (if they ignore it, saying "Boys will be boys", they can get sued). They will have previously spelled out procedures for addressing such accusations, which probably include giving a good talking-to to the guilty party, and maybe some harsher sanction like suspension. The school district might then have in mind a parent-teacher conference, with the underlying threat being to turn the matter over to the police: did the letter come from the school district? A minor can commit a crime, such as assault or threatening: in Oklahoma, this includes Ok. Stat §21-1172, which makes it a crime to send a message that is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, and a first violation of the law is a misdemeanor. For an adult, the penalty can be a year in prison and $500 fine, but that is unlikely for a minor. There may be a hearing in Juvenile Court with some disposition, and if the charges are proven then the court has wide latitude in meting out punishment. Did the letter come from the juvenile court system? The Oklahome law regarding children and juveniles is here. When the Office of Juvenile Affairs engages in "the intake process", they are investigating the case to make a recommendation to the DA. "Intake" is defined as a mandatory, preadjudicatory interview of the juvenile and, if available, the parents, legal guardian, or other custodian of the juvenile, which is performed by a duly authorized individual to determine whether a juvenile comes within the purview of the Oklahoma Juvenile Code, whether nonadjudicatory alternatives are available and appropriate, and if the filing of a petition is necessary Since "intake" is juvenile justice jargon, I assume this is a legal proceeding, not a parent-teacher conference. An actual criminal charge might result from the hearing, which is brought about by a referral. Because detention is a real possibility, consulting an attorney is wise. Whether or not it is a good idea to have the attorney present for the proceeding is something only your attorney can say (in his professional judgment). There is really no way to know in advance what they already know.

Of course The prosecution just needs to prove that the crime happened (or the defendant believed it to have happened) and you helped (in brief, there will be specific elements of the crime that each need to be proved). This would be easier if the primary crime had a convicted perpetrator but it’s not impossible without. Allow me to illustrate with an example. I will set out facts which are somewhat contrived and would not be so clear cut in a real case but for the purposes of the example please take them as undisputed and fully supported by evidence. John and Jill are in a relationship. This relationship is well known to be argumentative with frequent shouting matches and one or the other storming out. This does not amount to domestic violence by either party. John's friend Alan believes (wrongly) that there is domestic violence. During an argument Jill drops dead of a heart attack. John rings Alan distraught and says "I've killed her." Alan assumes (wrongly) that John has murdered Jill. Alan says "i'll take care of it. You go to your dad's". Alan (alone) disposes of the body. John is not guilty of murder (or indeed, anything). Alan is guilty of accessory to murder even though the actual crime never happened. The fact that Alan believed it happened is enough.

Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.

common law vs civil law differences I am trying to get a better understanding of differences between common law and civil law legal systems. Here is what I was able to find online: in common law there is the idea of a precedent, while in civil law not in common law a judge plays a role of a person evidence at a court is provided to, while in civil law a judge tries to investigate too in addition distance between public law and private law is smaller in common law legal system Are these three points correct? What are other differences between common law and civil law legal systems? (if necessary it is possible to simplify it to USA vs EU) Thank you.

if necessary it is possible to simplify it to USA vs EU The European Union is by no means a homogeneous area of law. I will assume france because it is the one I am most familiar with, but bear in mind that much of what follows might not apply to Spain/Germany/etc. The USA is a federal state. In particular, Louisiana law is heavily influenced by civil law for historical reasons. Other states and federal law do, however, follow more or less the same general principles. in common law there is the idea of a precedent, while in civil law not The first part is true. Common law usually hold the principle of stare decisis according to which precedents are binding. That means that the holding of a court binds the same court to rule the same way on similar matters raised later. I would note, however, that courts can be... let’s say "creative"... in finding ways to differentiate the case at hand from the previous one, when the judge is motivated to do so. The latter part is false, or at least, exaggerated. It is true that courts in civil law are not bound by previous holdings; an appeal that raises as its only argument "the court’s decision in my case was different from that in another case without offering any differentiation" would be rejected. However, there is the concept of jurisprudence constante where repeated precedent is highly persuasive. In practice, even simple precedent is persuasive. Furthermore, lower courts are bound by the holdings of higher courts, both in civil law and common law jurisdictions. (That’s more or less the meaning of "higher court".) in common law a judge plays a role of a person evidence at a court is provided to, while in civil law a judge tries to investigate too in addition That is a distinction between the inquisitorial and adversarial systems. The distinction does not exactly map to the civil/common law systems, but in practice the criminal part of civil law systems is often inquisitorial whereas common law systems are often adversarial. I will first note that the "inquisitorial" part where the judge conducts investigations is vastly overblown. That only occurs in complex cases that require extended investigations with more coercitive powers (for instance seizing documents etc.) Wikipedia says: In 2005, there were 1.1 million criminal rulings in France, while only 33,000 new cases were investigated by judges.[5] The vast majority of cases are therefore investigated directly by law enforcement agencies under the supervision of [the equivalent of district attorneys]. The numbers sound plausible to me, but here’s the ref it gives if you want to check (which I did not bother to do). The most visible part of the distinction is the way witnesses at trial are handled. In an adversarial system, the parties will ask to cite certain witnesses. There are pre-trial motions to exclude certain witnesses for certain reasons, but parties have a wide latitude of which witnesses they want to call. Each witness will come labelled as to which party asked for its appearance. At trial, the witness will be asked questions by the party who called them (direct examination), which will usually take a long time and include nondisputed background information (who are you, for how long have you worked with the defendant, etc.). Then, the opposing party will ask questions (cross-examination), emphasizing points that cast doubt on the witness’s reliability (because they are lying, because they do not remember well, etc.) or on the other parties’ narrative (highlighting details that were conveniently "missed" in direct examination). In an inquisitorial system, witnesses are chosen by the judge. Parties can ask to have witnesses added to the list, but the list does not come with labels that X is coming from the prosecution, Y from the defense. When a witness is called, the judge will ask most of the questions at the start, before giving the floor to the parties. Roughly speaking, the judge does the direct examination, and parties do a cross-examination afterwards. Note that in many cases the parties will ask few or no questions - high-profile cases that you read about in the media are abnormal in that respect. In particular, an inquisitorial-system court maintains a list of expert witnesses, which are called when technical points are required. That expert is paid by the court, not by the parties (however, when one party requests an expertise and the other party opposes it, the requesting party has to pay the cost upfront - they will shift it to the other party if they win the case). That is very different to the adversarial system of having each party introduce testimony by an expert they commissioned and paid. distance between public law and private law is smaller in common law legal system I am not sure I understand that question. It is true that "private" (tort) law operates in an adversarial system both in civil-law and common-law. Therefore, one could argue that the distance between civil-law’s criminal system (inquisitorial) and tort system (adversarial) is higher than between common-law’s criminal and tort systems (both adversarial). However, that is in my view a highly artificial distinction. The distance between practice areas within a single (common law or civil law) jurisdiction is large in any case. You would not want a lawyer specialized in drug-dealing cases to take your case about sexual harassment or unlawful dismissal, and vice-versa, in any jurisdiction.

There are certain legal arrangements that are implied in law when a project or activity is carried out without forming a legal entity. The classification of the legal arrangements in question govern the legal rights of the parties. These arrangements are surveyed below. This is followed by a brief list, for contrast and completeness, of the main different kinds of entities that must be formed expressly and registered to come into existence. This overview is then applied to the specific questions asked. One is a trust. A trust arises by operation of law when a person (called a settlor) provides money or other property or legal rights to another person (the trustee) for the benefit of one or more persons (people who are called beneficiaries) and often for some purpose specified by the settlor. In the U.S. this was historically governed by case law from both courts of law and courts of equity. The concept of a trust and the broader concept of a fiduciary as a general concept are particular to common law systems and don't have a direct analog in civil law legal systems, although there are legal arrangements in civil law countries that have material differences from common law trusts that can be used in circumstances where trusts are used in common law countries. But, now, many states have adopted a statutory trust code that covers most issues of trust law fairly comprehensively. Guardians, conservators, and receivers, sometimes with rights arising by operation of law, or a private non-governmental appointment, but more often arising from a court order, are close cousins of trustees of trusts. Trustees, guardians, conservators, receivers, and agents are part of a group of kinds of people who are often collectively grouped in a larger category of people in charge of other people's property or rights called "fiduciaries." Most often, the enterprises and properties managed by fiduciaries are not considered to be entities, even though the arrangement is similar to an entity. Some jurisdictions require some kinds of fiduciaries to file some sort of registrations or public filings, but these statutes typical regulate people who are already fiduciaries by operation of law or a court order, rather than requiring registration for the legal arrangement to come into existence. A related form of entity, which requires government registration as an entity in some jurisdictions, and can be formed without registration or similar formalities in others, is a business trust which will often have transferrable beneficial interests, the most common examples of which is a real estate investment trust (REIT) or a mutual fund, both of which are sometimes, but not always, organized as business trusts. Most businesses organized as business trusts are subject to considerable government regulation as securities and under tax law, and also under other laws specific to those entity forms. Another related concept in common law countries is a "bailment" (holding the property of another for safekeeping) by a bailee for a bailor and an escrow arrangement. France has a similar set of concepts in its civil code translated into English as "deposits" meaning "bailments" and "sequestrations" meaning escrow arrangements and similar relationships in Articles 1915 to 1963 of its Civil Code. Another is a general partnership. A general partnership arises by operation of law when two or more people jointly carry on business for the purpose of making a profit (whether or not they actually do), without forming some other entity. There is a uniform state law adopted in every state in some version or another, with minor state-specific variations, that governs general partnerships. A joint venture is almost indistinguishable from a general partnership. While codified now, in common law countries, general partnership law is a natural and organic outgrowth of the laws of trusts, fiduciaries and agency, that has evolved and been modified in the process of codification; while in civil law countries, general partnerships are just another kind of entity that isn't necessarily registered as an entity per se (although civil law countries generally have a category of registration-like regulation and accounting and banking rules that apply to all "merchants" whether or not they operate through entities). A third is an unincorporated association. An unincorporated association arises by operation of law when two or more people jointly carry on an activity for purposes other than making a profit, without forming some other entity. In some jurisdictions this is governed by a statute pertaining to them, while in others (and in part, even in states that have a statute) it is governed by common-law case law (drawn historically from both courts of law and courts of equity). In France, the civil code provides for a similar kind of unregistered entity known in English translation as a "Partnership for Non-Commercial Purposes" in Articles 1845 to 1870 of its civil code. A fourth and related notion, which is somewhere between an unincorporated association and a simple contract – which is not a general partnership because it is not carried out for profit – is a domestic partnership or civil union which is sometimes just a subcategory of contract, but in other cases is treated as a special kind of arrangement subject to case law or statutory regulation. Many state and local governments, and some national governments outside the United States, adopted domestic partnership and/or civil union laws that vary widely in their details, before same sex marriage became legal in the United States, to address the needs of same sex couples and/or unmarried opposite sex cohabitants and/or domestic arrangements involving more than two people. Along the same lines, while all countries allow qualified opposite sex couples and sometimes qualified same sex adult couples to form a marriage with a license from the government or government registration, some jurisdictions recognize marriage-like relationships that can be formed without government registration such as common law marriage, putative marriage, and de facto relationships that have legal rights associated with them. France, for example, in Article 515 of its civil code, has "civil covenants of solidarity" (PACS) akin to a civil union in the U.S. which must be formally registered giving rise to formal rights that are significant but less so than those created by marriage. French civil code Article 515 also defines a different category of relationship translated as "concubinage", which is roughly equivalent to "cohabitation" in English which gives rise only to very limited legal rights, and may be (but need not be) governed by a custom drafted domestic partnership agreement called a "convention de concubinage" in French and can, but need not be, formally recognized in a "certificat de concubinage" or a "declaration sur l'honneur" which has only slight legal effect. The law of a "convention de concubinage" is somewhat akin to the kind of contract contemplated in the OP as it is an "atypical" contract that is not heavily regulated and not entered into primarily for the purpose of making a profit. A fifth is a contract. Sometimes a legal arrangement is contractually entered into and has the character of assigning people legal rights and obligations vis-a-vis each other without constituting an unincorporated entity or trust. A contract would typically involve less discretion than an unincorporated entity or a trust, although this isn't a hard and fast rule. In some respects, all entities are basically standardized and regulated contracts. Often, but not always, contractual rights are assignable. Corporations have their roots in the laws of trusts, contracts, and general partnerships, and eventually were given a statutory treatment not directly derived from those sources. This is governed mostly by case law. One kind of contract that bears similarity to what you describe in your example is called in economics a "dominant assurance contract" also known by the registered trademark specific provider of such arrangements known as "Kickstarter" contracts with a refund bonus, and similar in principle but without profit-making objectives, to a subscription agreement. It also bears similarity to a gift registry. Many leases create de facto partnerships and unincorporated associations, as do some real estate covenants. Another important (and heavily regulated) type of contract, which is often mistaken for an entity type since it is used in lieu of a parent-subsidiary relationship between a business headquarters and a particular location of a business, is a franchising agreement, in which the franchisor receives a share of gross profits and a fee from a franchisee who gets the right and the obligation to conduct business under a trademark in accordance with highly detailed central rules regarding how the business is conducted on a day to day basis, even though particular business locations are not enterprises owned by the franchisor. Legal multilevel marketing arrangements, and very similar illegal pyramid schemes are likewise typically organized on a contractual basis. There is also terminology for certain kind of contractual arrangements for non-business purposes, similar to those described in the question, in many civil law countries such as France (as opposed to countries with common law legal systems), but I am not familiar with all of this terminology itself (much of which lacks a direct and exact English language equivalent). A distinction is made procedurally, and in some formalities and requirements, between commercial contracts on one hand, and a category of contracts often translated as "non-commercial contracts" or "civil contract" on the other. For example, in France, arbitration clauses are usually not permitted in non-commercial contracts, and lawsuits to enforce non-commercial contracts must normally be brought at the defendant's domicile. Civil law countries also make a stronger distinction between "typical" contracts, which are spelled out in detail by statute and to which many default rules of law and mandatory rules apply, and "atypical contracts" which are treated with more skepticism by civil law courts and require more detailed express enumeration of the rights of the parties and of the reasons that the government should enforce those rights, than in common law country jurisprudence (although France eliminated this concept from its civil code in lieu of provisions enforcing substantive fairness in many cases, in an October 2016 overhaul of the contract law provisions of its civil code which had only been lightly amended before that since its original adoption in 1804). A sixth is co-ownership of property or other legal rights. Sometimes more than one person owns property and they have legal rights that arise from co-ownership of that property, even in the absence of any contract formation related to their co-ownership, in the absence of any imposition of a trust relationship on someone as a trustee for someone who is not the legal owner of property, and without an intent to carry out any particular enterprise or project with or without an intent to make a profit. This is mostly governed by case law but typically with modest statutory regulation of specific issues (like the right to bring a partition action if one party wants to end the co-ownership relationship). Sometimes co-owners also have a contract governing their respective rights (or a covenant, which is a contract that runs to successive owners of property, usually real estate). France recognizes along these lines "Agreements Relating To The Exercise of Undivided Rights" in Article 1873 of its Civil Code. A seventh is that when someone conducts business for the purpose of making a profit without working jointly with someone else, and without forming an entity, the enterprise is called a "sole proprietorship" (if business is actively conducted) or an "investment" (if profits arise mostly from passive ownership of property). Custom dictates that certain activities, like renting real estate, are considered investments, even when significant active management is involved, while other activities are usually considered to be sole proprietorships, even when they don't involve particularly pro-active conduct. The common law of agency and tax law are important to the operation and regulation of these businesses. In a related issue, a sole proprietorship or other entity (whether or not registered with the government) may often, either by formal registration or merely by dint of using it in the course of business, depending upon the jurisdiction, acquire legal rights in a trade name of an enterprise (also known as a "doing business as name" or "dba") and/or trademarks associated with goods or services sold by an enterprise or sole proprietorship. An eighth is that when someone engages in a project for purposes other than making a profit without working jointly with someone else, or with an intent to make a profit that is consistently not achieved most of the time for a statutory number and proportion of years, and without forming an entity, that has a character similar to conducting a business, the enterprise is called a "hobby" for tax law purposes. This isn't comprehensive, however. Some economic activity undertaken without involving someone else or forming an entity, and without an intent to make a profit, simply doesn't have any name other than "consumer spending" or a "personal and/or household activity." In contrast, entities formed by registration with the government, more or less exclusively, include corporations (both for profit and not for profit, including most corporations sole which are similar to trusts), limited liability companies, limited liability partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability limited partnerships, limited partnership associations, mutual companies, and cooperatives. Entity formation is typically cheap and easy, although some kinds of entities such as national banking associations require special regulatory permission. Municipal governments, local governments such as school districts and special districts, and many independent government agencies are also often organized as governmental corporations and governed by specific statutes that apply to them. Is this possible at all or do you automatically found some sort of legal entity the moment you do this? This is often, but not always, the case when more than one person is involved, as the list above illustrates. Does such a stock issue have to be registered with the country’s equivalent of the SEC or are they exempt? If the latter, do you have to apply for such an exemption or is it granted automatically? It depends. In the U.S., the threshold question is whether an interest in the project is a "security". There are many kinds of debt and equity investments that are automatically securities (even debt issued by a natural person, rather than an entity, which is transferrable and sold to members of the general public, could be a security). There is also a residual category called an "investment contract" which counts as a security if it meets a multi-factor legal test. There are various exemptions from the securities laws, and some are automatic, while others are not. But there are also some securities laws that apply to transactions involving securities even if the securities are exempt from formal registration with a government entity. The most notable of these is federal SEC regulation 10b-5 that imposes securities fraud liability when there is fraud within the meaning of the regulation in any transaction involving the purchase or sale of a security, even if that security is exempt from registration as such with a governmental entity. Some transferrable rights that are not necessarily securities but have some similarities to them are publicly traded commodities, security entitlements, negotiable instruments, warehouse receipts (particularly negotiable ones), and cryptocurrencies. In addition to regulation under state and federal securities laws, certain kinds of joint activities have other very specific regulations that apply to them (e.g. churches, or pooled investment funds, or cooperatives, or home owner's associations, or political parties, or election campaigns, or buyer's clubs, or timeshares) and there is really no way to know, in general, what those activities will be, without just learning about them from a general knowledge of a jurisdiction's laws. Is this regulated on a federal, state, or municipal level or does the issuer have to comply with the law on all levels? You have to comply with the laws on all levels. Normally, the legal rights of the parties primarily arise under state law in the U.S., and the disclosure requirements normally arise under both federal and state law. But no one level of government has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate private activities and it isn't unprecedented, for example, for local governments to authorize certain kinds of private enterprises (e.g. neighborhood associations in places that don't have HOAs, or composting co-operatives). Many local governments require all businesses that operate in their territory to be registered or licensed with them, no matter how they are legally organized, and state and local governments also often require special licenses for all businesses (regardless of form of organization) which are obligated to collect particular taxes such as lodging taxes, sales taxes, value added taxes, fuel taxes, alcohol or cigarette taxes, or "head taxes". Similarly, many occupations and professions require government licenses at one level of government or another, and sometimes, more than one level of government. Some licenses are mostly federal (e.g. investment advisors and securities brokers), some are primarily state level (e.g. doctors and lawyers), and some are primarily local (e.g. street vendors and many construction trades). Are there relevant court cases that show what the penalties are for getting this wrong? Yes. But the question is too broad and vague to meaningfully discuss them. These cases are usually particular to the specific type of transaction involved. Does it make a difference in practice if the market capitalization of the project is almost certainly always well below $1 million? This is relevant to the kind of securities law exemptions that apply when a transaction is deemed to be a security under federal and state securities regulations. There are many exemptions and most of them have dollar limitations attached (although some do not). The background is that I want to start an online platform to make this easier for people, but of course I don’t want to get into legal trouble and I don’t want my customers to get into trouble. You haven't even begun to scratch the surface of the myriad legal issues presented. Your example sounds more like some sort of transferrable contract right, rather than a security (although it could be both), since it appears to be purchased primarily for use rather than as a profit making investment. It bears a fair amount of similarity to certain kinds of timeshare rights (and might even qualify as a timeshare under the regulatory and consumer protection rules of some jurisdictions which define them broadly). You need to develop a far more specific idea of what you plan to do and then meet with a lawyer to discuss the entire concept start to finish to spot as many legal issues as possible. This is not something you should try to do without a lawyer.

You've basically described two of the ends of the pole in theories of jurisprudence (there are dozens of ends). There is no theory of law that relies purely on "spirit" (also no theory that actually relies on the letters uses=d in writing law), instead, everybody interprets the text (the words enacted by the government) and some people supplement their interpretation with consideration of "other factors", such as assumed legislative purpose. Certain scholars and judges are inclined to put most weight on the actual wording of the law, while others are inclined to let purposive considerations dictate the interpretation of a law. Interpreting law by W.N. Eskridge is an informative guide to supplementing a reading of the statute with anciliary considerations. Antonin Scalia is the best-known proponent of the textualist approach.

As others have said, the reason for this is that the US Constitution grants a jury trial as a right in criminal proceedings. The reason for that right to be granted is to be a check against (that is, a limitation of) the power of the government, generally, and judges, specifically. To answer your specific question of why "the judge system is not reformed and stays like this and is more vulnerable to take a wrong decision because they do not know the law, thus the verdict depends on people’s morals?" Firstly, the jury does know the law (or at least, the specific portions of the law that are relevant to the case), by the time they render their judgement. An important part of the judge's responsibility in a criminal case is to craft "jury instructions" that are given to the jury before they are sequestered for deliberations. These instructions should have an explanation of what questions they need to collectively answer, and what evidence they can and cannot consider. Secondly, there are two central dogmatic difference between the points of view that your question seems to promote or be based on, and the one generally held by the US Founding Fathers, who wrote the US Constitution. Your question seems to assume that: judges are sacrosanct, or at least trustworthy; and rule by law is the foremost concern In contrast, the general view of the US Founding Fathers was that: judges have power, and thus need to be checked (in the US system, a judge's power is checked by the prosecutor, the jury, the chief executive, and by courts of appeal); and protection of the citizenry from the power of the government is the first concern. One thing to note, is that this second point means that the judge in a US trial can actually override a criminal jury, but only in the defendant's favor.

The concept of "jury nullification" is not really applicable to civil litigation, whether it's a bench or a jury trial. The short answer is: generally in the United States, civil judges, and civil juries, have to follow the law. If the jury doesn't follow the law, the judge can entertain and grant a JNOV motion on the basis that no reasonable jury could have reached the verdict in question. If the judge doesn't follow the law, the aggrieved party can appeal the judgment as an abuse of discretion or on similar grounds. Jury nullification occurs when a criminal jury returns a verdict of "not guilty" although they feel the defendant was in fact guilty under the law. That is the only circumstance where no legal review can reverse the verdict. Civil "jury nullification" is not a particularly meaningful concept.

Different socities, including some that are not considered sovereign nations, create laws, that is enforceable rules of conduct, in different ways. Not all write them down. But they are all Law in that they are rulwa that societies can and will enforce mon their members. I recommend reading Legal Systems Very Different from Ours by David D. Friedman (Professor of Law at Santa Clara University). There are free versions available on the web, and the final version is available from Amazon. It includes chapters on several systems where law is not written, including: Pirate Law Prisoners’ Law Romani Law Comanche, Kiowa and Cheyenne: The Plains Indians Somali Law Other chapters deal with systems where law may have been written, but its method of formation and operation are very different from the models usually discussed on this site. This include Roman law, Imperial Chinese law, Jewish law, Early Irish Law, and the law of saga-period Iceland.

The concept of "ignorance" of laws isn't about the individual. It's about administratibility of the system. The argument is that a system with a wide-ranging ignorance defense would struggle to produce results—just or otherwise. So the American system presumes knowledge of the law and then carves out narrower exceptions, such as mistake of law. For example, the law wasn't published, or it had been overruled. Alas, the question about why there isn't a hotline belongs on another site.

I think you misunderstand some of the relationships between laws, decisions, and justifications, and you're conflating two separate areas of jurisprudence. The linked real-world example you provide is happening in the employment context, but also in a government context (since it is a public school). But all the examples in your list have nothing to do with employment law and would be purely statutory/regulatory prohibitions. I will attempt to answer broadly enough to cover both domains. Laws and regulations can be challenged as discriminatory The things you have listed under "decency law" would be criminal or regulatory matters. A preliminary question would be whether the laws as written even capture the behaviours you've described. To the extent that they result in discrimination, the laws could be challenged as breaches of s. 15 (right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There may be other Charter arguments too, if the laws affect expression or life, liberty, or the security of the person. (Public decency / nudity laws are more frequently challenged on grounds of free expression.) Decisions of school boards are subject to the Charter The Charter almost certainly applies to decisions of public school boards and schools. See Elementary Teachers Federation of Ontario v. York Region District School Board, 2022 ONCA 476, paras. 39-41. These decisions could be challenged by judicial review (i.e. court review of an administrative decision-maker's decisions) and would be analyzed for reasonableness, including whether the decision strikes a proportionate balance between the Charter right and the statutory objectives (Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12). Even if there is an infringement, the government gets a chance to justify it If you're looking for some sort of a "line" it is found in the justification or reasonableness analysis. Where a law or regulation is challenged, and if a breach of s. 15 is established, then the onus is on the government to justify the breach as a reasonable limit as allowed by s. 1 of the Charter. This will depend on the importance of the government objective, whether there is a rational connection between the objective and the law, whether the law is minimally impairing, and whether the impact on the claimant is proportional to the salutary effects of the law. When a court reviews an administrative decision for reasonableness, it is "engaged in balancing somewhat different but related considerations, namely, has the decision-maker disproportionately, and therefore unreasonably, limited a Charter right. In both cases, we are looking for whether there is an appropriate balance between rights and objectives, and the purpose of both exercises is to ensure that the rights at issue are not unreasonably limited" (Doré, para. 6). In each of your examples, the judgments would be highly fact-based and it is fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show. Relevance of association with minors You ask whether it would matter "if the person in question was primarily associating with minors." This likely would not matter if a law was challenged, because such challenges are about the validity of the law, not the factors that might render its applicability to a particular person to be more or less justified. But if the law itself had the purpose of protecting children, or if the law itself was targetted solely at those associating with minors or those in positions of authority over minors, this would be a factor weighing in favour of justification of the infringing law (Irwin Toy, R. v. Sharpe). Whether the person in question was primarily associating with minors would matter in the context of an administrative decision, because these decisions are case-specific. Some anti-discrimination statutes provide more protections Ontario's Human Rights Code potentially contains even further protections. Section 5 says that every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of sex, gender identity, gender expression, and other enumerated factors. Section 24 provides for exceptions to that right in educational settings (and some others) where what would otherwise be discrimination is actually a bona fide qualification of the employment and if it cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the employer. These judgments are also highly fact-based and it would be fruitless to speculate about what the evidence might show.

germany insurance company is asking for their referral bonus back after they said it is mine I was wrongly transferred a referral bonus of 12k euros spanned across 10 transactions for a year starting Summer 2021 from my insurance company. I did not refer anyone however. I reported the problem after the 2nd transaction saying that I wasn't expecting any money and I just got around 5k in 1 day as I did not submit any invoices for reimbursement or anything of that sort. The insurance company replied back a day later saying this is indeed my money and thank me for all my referrals. I just assumed someone was using my referral code and didn't bother to bring this up again especially when it's cumbersome to find an english speaking support agent here. Fast forward, I get around 7k in 8 transactions in around 9 months bringing the total to 12k in 1 year (ended in Summer 2022). A week ago, I get a letter from my insurance company saying that they have found a glitch in their system and I was wrongfully transferred 12k during the time period mentioned above and kindly ask me to transfer it back as well as acknowledging that I reported this problem back in Summer 2021 but they weren't able to detect it. From a legal point of view, what are my chances of keeping the money based on the above information?

From a legal point of view, what are my chances of keeping the money based on the above information? None, unless a period of more than 3 years (§195 - Standard limitation period ) has past before the return request was made. §812 - Claim for restitution - German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch BGB) (1) A person who obtains something as a result of the performance of another person or otherwise at his expense without legal grounds for doing so is under a duty to make restitution to him. This duty also exists if the legal grounds later lapse or if the result intended to be achieved by those efforts in accordance with the contents of the legal transaction does not occur. §818(3) would also not apply (where you no longer have the money), since you have acknowledged that the reception of the money was incorrect (i.e. you spent it knowning that it was not yours) §818 Scope of the claim to enrichment ... (3) The liability to undertake restitution or to reimburse the value is excluded to the extent that the recipient is no longer enriched. ...

I assume you are talking about this case: FORIS GFS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD vs THEVAMANOGARI MANIVEL. For that amount, most people would be willing to break the law to keep it, and good advice what to do would be “ask a lawyer”. Needs citation. I certainly wouldn't: a) I think taking money that I know doesn't belong to me is wrong, b) even if I didn't believe that, the amount is so large the bank will certainly eventually come after it. The amount is so large I won't credibly be able to claim an innocent mistake. Simply hiding the money won't work, since the bank will be able to demonstrate that the money was deposited in my account, and I did withdraw it. I would be required to make restitution. This is exactly what happened to the defendant in the above case: they split up the money among friends and bought a house. The house is now being sold by the court, with the proceeds used to reimburse the plaintiffs. Would a lawyer be allowed to give me legal advice to help me keeping this money, for example by giving 500,000 each to twenty reliable friends, moving to Panama, or whatever would allow me to keep and spend the money? (Not asking whether two strategies that I came up with in ten seconds would actually work). Especially if it is advice if the form “X is illegal, but you can get away with it”. No. For example, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation & Allocation of Authority Between Client & Lawyer states: (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. That's just a suggested ethical standard, but most countries will have something along those lines. Note also that in the US there is also a "Crime-Fraud" exception to attorney-client confidentiality. If a lawyer assists a client in carrying out a criminal or fraudulent scheme then their communications are no longer privileged and can be subpoenaed and introduced as evidence in court.

If the employee has the choice - bonus and membership, or no bonus - then I expect the offer to be legal. Since it is a real bonus and part of your salary you will have to pay income tax on it. What might be illegal, but not your concern, is if your company tells investors how well the company is doing, and how well the membership scheme is doing, when in reality 80% of members are employees paying effectively nothing.

Choice of jurisdiction: You’re pretty much free to choose your jurisdiction. You don’t have to contract under German law. The German state will intervene though if you’re doing criminal stuff. Legally, the best is of course to draft a written agreement. You’re completely free in the terms (unless it becomes immoral, § 138 BGB), but a loan, § 488 BGB (Darlehensvertrag), with a 0% interest rate (if it’s meant as a short-term aid) is standard. The next level is to collateralize your loan, specifically with a pledge, §§ 1204 ff. BGB, i. e. your friend gives you a valuable item which you may (and actually have to) sell for profit if he doesn’t return the loan. However, unlike contract law, in property law you are not completely free regarding the terms (numerus clausus of property law, Typenzwang des Sachenrechts). Here it becomes too difficult though for the layman, so I wouldn’t recommend that unless you know what you’re doing. Ultimately, I/we think it’s nice of you to consider helping out your friend, but as Nike Dattani already portrayed it can get really nasty if you intend to legally enforce such matters. Trish mentioned the saying: Friendship ends where business begins. I, too, suggest to refer your friend to a pawnshop, research (third-party) microloan opportunities, and help him without directly giving him cash, dine together and offer company (i. e. address the psychological dimension financial troubles entail). PS: § 9 SGB Ⅰ: Germany is (to some degree) a welfare state. Maybe your friend is eligible for some kind of assistance. However, and probably typical of Germany, if you want to get money, you have to fill in forms.

Normally the statute of limitations is five or six years (I think it's different between Scotland and the rest of the UK). The reason for the limitation is that if your employer asks for money back, you obviously should be able to defend yourself, for example by proving that you never received that money. After five or six years it is assumed that you wouldn't be able to provide any such evidence, so nobody can ask for the money back anymore. That's not specific to overpaid wages but quite general. In addition there is the question whether the pilots should have known they were overpaid. For example, I'm quite happy with my salary, but if it was less, I would look for and find a different job that pays better. If the company claimed in five years time that I had been overpaid all the time, then I would say that if they had given me the "correct" lower payment, I would have found a better job elsewhere, so asking me to repay the money seems quite unfair. (Why do you need to defend yourself? Maybe your salary was £3,000 per month. Someone in the right position records that they are paying you £4,000 but puts £3,000 into your account and £1,000 into their own. Then that person has an accident and their replacement finds that you were overpaid according to their records.)

Is it illegal to ask a company for money in exchange for information on a bug in their software/website? That in itself is legal. Indeed, the company would incur unjust enrichment if it coerced you to disclose your discovery for free. Only if you threatened the company to divulge to others your discovery unless the company pays you, it would be illegal and trigger charges such as extortion (likewise, legislations outlaw the unjustified delivery of programs or instructions for hacking a software/network/etc., although this goes beyond your actual question). Can the company take legal action against me? That seems doubtful, futile, and it could backfire (please note I have not done any research on legal precedents about this). Although the terms and conditions of the website or the End User License Agreement (EULA) of software might prohibit you to reverse engineer (RE)/decompile/etc. the application, anti-RE clauses are unenforceable and the remedies therefor are indeterminate because the sole act of conducting reverse engineering does not subject the company (or third parties) to any losses. The company's decision to take legal action for your discovery could backfire from two standpoints. First, it calls attention to the fact that the software at issue is defective and unsafe. And second, the bug is likely to be detected by someone else anyway, thereby potentially compromising customers' systems.

Threatening to report the uninsured driver to avoid payment would be blackmail and illegal / criminal. As a result, they are not going to do this. Reporting the uninsured driver on the other hand is their civic duty. So they can get your friend into trouble, but they can't get around paying. Is your friend insured now? If not, tell him to get insured IMMEDIATELY. And if they are very lucky, the other company doesn't figure out your friend was uninsured, and they get away with it when they make a claim. Alternatively, tell them to figure out how much the damage is, how much the repair will cost, and whether it is worth taking the risk.

There are several plausible possibilities. This is a scam and isn't actually from the public transit authorities, in which case paying them hasn't helped you, and has contributed to this being a problem in the future for others. The payment information may have some subtle differences from the correct information and may actually go to the fraudster. The EBE number discrepancy makes this the most likely scenario in my opinion. There was a technical error. Maybe someone with a name similar to your was really cited, but due to a typo, your name was entered instead and the street address and corrected name were entered via some sort of autocorrect function. Somebody got lucky and avoided the ticket that should have gone to them. Maybe somebody went into the wrong field in the ticket entry system which could also explain the EBE number error. Someone has stolen your identity (perhaps a refugee) and is going around with a fake ID using your name and address. This doesn't explain the EBE number discrepancy, however. I've also heard of cases in some big cities where two people have the same name and birthdate and are constantly getting tickets meant for the other person but don't discover this fact for many years. Maybe someone like that recently moved into your town. This also doesn't explain the EBE number error. The bottom line is that even though it would perhaps be cheaper and less time consuming in the short run to just pay the fine, I would not recommend doing that in this case. In scenario 1, you really have a moral civic duty to take a little extra effort to identify a fraudster who is preying on lots of people in your community. In scenario 2, you again, have something of a moral civic duty to help the transit system get this problem fixed, and who knows, it might be a technical problem that is prone to recur and if you don't address it the first time, people will assume that your "confession" of fault by paying the first ticket undermines your credibility if it happens again. In scenarios 3 and 4, the problem is likely to recur and so you have an interest beyond this transaction in sorting out the situation. While your bare assertions that this didn't happen might fall on somewhat deaf ears as potentially self-serving, when corroborated by the fact that you have a monthly pass, I think that the likelihood that you would be found to be credible and beat the ticket is great in your case. Germany is less corrupt in bureaucratic matters like this than most countries on Earth. If this is a scenario 1 situation, the legitimate transit agency wouldn't even have a record of the existence of a ticket in the system, so you could be reassured that you would be at no risk if you didn't pay it. Given the EBE number problem, it is quite possible that even if you did try to pay it and it was simply a human data entry problem or something (or maybe your ex or a high school bully you defied and forgot about is now a transit cop and trying to inflict revenge) that you might not get proper credit for it anyway, so talking to a person at the agency is probably necessary anyway. So, my advice would be to talk to a human being in their office, ideally by telephone (without using the ticket to determine the proper telephone number as the number on the ticket would be a scam in scenario 1), but in person, if necessary, to get to the bottom of this. If this didn't work, I would write a letter or email with a copy of the ticket enclosed. If this falls on deaf ears, I would even consider making a police report of a suspected fraud, or even enlisting a local newspaper reporter or television news reporter in pursuing this situation because it is odd and would resonate with the general public. All of this will be a pain and won't necessary make narrow economic sense, but we don't always have a choice about when duty calls to fix a problem or what problem that will end up being.

are there any states that allow broad powers to the supreme court? Are there any states where judges have broad powers to interpret the constitution to the point of even allowing them to exceed clear language and legislative intent ?

The United States would be one such country. I'm sure it is not the only one. In the case of countries with constitutional courts there is basically no one to second guess their interpretations which is also true when the apex court in a country provides an opinion. Since no one can overrule many of these courts, they are allowed to do what they want.

As Mark's answer indicates, you are evidently thinking of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. "Public acts" being laws, it may seem at first glance that states must fully respect the laws of other states. But the interpretation of this clause by the courts is rather different, and has evolved a bit over time. The short of the (modern) matter is that it mostly applies to matters concerning the judiciary. SCOTUS has recognized a "public policy exception" to the clause, which limits the ability of the clause to force a state to abide by laws which are in conflict with their own (for the most part: they don't have to). Driving privileges, and more generally who is licensed to do what (doctors, hunting, concealed carry, etc.), within a state falls under that public policy exception. So Texas does not have to obey New Hampshire's laws concerning the legal privilege to drive. As a basic sanity test, if this were not the case, then why wouldn't everybody in Texas not simply bounce off to New Hampshire for a summer to get their license there and then return to Texas and never bother with insurance? It entirely undercuts the state's sovereignty and ability to set their own laws if any other state can so easily create loopholes around them. Moreover, despite what the name might suggest, a "driver's license" is more a certification that you have the requisite skills, physical performance (passing an eye test), and knowledge to drive safely and in accordance with that state's traffic laws. It certainly makes sense for a state to require you to demonstrate at least that much, but they may also impose additional requirements. A requirement for insurance demonstrates your ability to handle financial liabilities that may reasonably result from your driving. All states currently accept a valid out-of-state license in the above sense: that you are certified to have the requisite skills, that it is valid proof of age, etc. Though if you become a permanent resident there they may require you to take new tests. However to legally drive in any particular state you must not only have such certification (a driver's license) but also satisfy any other conditions, such as age requirements and insurance requirements. As an aside, such state-by-state variations as to who is licensed to do what are in fact quite common, especially across history, even on very prominent issues. But even nationwide resolutions of those issues via SCOTUS have never, to my knowledge, utilized the Full Faith and Credit clause to do so. And, really, how could they? By saying since some state could force all other states to do X via the clause, then X must be a constitutional requirement? Or that any one state could unilaterally dictate laws in all other states? Madness! For one example, anti-miscegenation laws, which outlawed (certain) interracial marriages, were quite common until 1967, when SCOTUS struck them all down using the 14th amendment. More recently, gay marriage was forced to be recognized in all states, also via the 14th amendment. In both cases, before those SCOTUS rulings, the courts had generally recognized that the Full Faith and Credit clause did not compel the state to recognize (out-of-state) marriages it did not want to recognize. These both fell under the public policy exception.

So, as I understand the decision, it's a little more subtle than that. By default, states have sovereign immunity and can't be sued without their consent. Congress can remove ("abrogate") this immunity by law in some circumstances. They tried to do so for copyright infringement cases with the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990. However, in the present case of Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court held that this part of the CRCA is unconstitutional. The idea is that under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate state immunity when it's necessary to ensure people's right to due process, but only in a "congruent and proportional" way. Now if a state unintentionally or negligently infringes someone's copyright, that does not violate the person's right to due process, but an intentional infringement might. At the time the CRCA was passed, when Congress went looking for instances where states infringed on copyrights, they found several cases of unintentional or negligent infringement, and just a couple where they may have infringed intentionally. SCOTUS argued that to respond to this by completely abrogating state immunity in all copyright cases was disproportionate, and therefore unconstitutional. But the Court suggests in the opinion that Congress could pass a different law to abrogate immunity in copyright cases, if it were narrower. For instance, a law that only stripped immunity in cases of intentional infringement would likely be constitutional, especially if there were evidence that intentional infringement was happening enough to be a significant problem. So I think the answer is that as of right now, a state could deliberately infringe someone's copyright (e.g. by pirating software) and be immune from suit. However, Congress has the power to "fix" this, and most likely will, especially if there seems to be egregious abuse. (By the way, the decision contains an impressive quantity of pirate jokes. I guess since it's not only about copyright infringement (aka "piracy"), but actually alleges infringement of a video about a sunken pirate ship, the justices just couldn't resist.) Your "eminent domain" idea is separate from this. Seizing copies of the software wouldn't give the state the right to use them, as the software itself would still be copyrighted. The state would have to seize the copyright, and I don't know whether that is possible - it's not necessarily property in that sense. But if they did so, then they wouldn't be infringing the copyright at all (since the state itself would now own the copyright) and this case would be irrelevant. On the other hand, when a state uses eminent domain to seize property, they must as you say pay fair market value for it, and that means the market value before they seized it. So the value of the copyright in such a case wouldn't be "nothing" - it would be more like the amount a competitor would have had to pay the software maker to buy all the rights to that product. Likewise, if the state seizes your lovely house and bulldozes it to build a toxic waste dump, they owe you what someone would have paid for the house, not the value of a dump that nobody wants.

The Supreme Court does not handle hypotheticals. The court has interpreted Article III Section 2 Clause 1 of the Constitution, the Case or Controversy Clause as a limit on the powers of the judicial branch. The courts have jurisdiction over various types of cases and controversies but only those listed in the Constitution. This limits courts to hearing actual cases and prevents them from issuing advisory opinions. Additionally, in order to bring a case, the plaintiff must have standing to bring the suit. You can't sue the government just because you don't like a law (well, you can, your suit will just be dismissed because it lacks standing). You have to show That you have been, or will imminently be, injured (injury-in-fact) That there is a direct correlation between that injury and the law (causation) And that a favorable court decision will redress the injury (redressability) As a practical matter, the courts are already overwhelmed by the number of actual cases that come up and the Supreme Court can only hear a tiny fraction of the cases they are asked to hear. If they added the ability to hear hypothetical cases as well, the court could easily be overwhelmed by Senators and Representatives asking them to weigh in on every remotely controversial bill or amendment before Congress or interest groups bringing cases for speculative grievances.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), majority opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia: Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited ... Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. (emphasis mine)

This would establish a new precedent (I assume) You assume correctly. However, a precedent is only binding on lower courts and persuasive on courts at the same level so a trial judge precedent is not very far-reaching. Does this statute takes precedence over (overrules) the previous court precedent? Not exactly. The precedent was good for the old (common) law. Now the law has changed and the old precedent is irrelevant. Courts only interpret the law and legislatures are free to change the law within the limits of their constitutional power. Indeed, a fair number of laws are enacted because the legislature does not agree with how courts are ruling.

You are confusing a few concepts. One is the distinction between what are known as "common law" jurisdictions derived from the English legal system, and "civil law" jurisdictions derived from one of the continental European legal systems that is ultimately derived from Roman law. Another is the distinction between determining the meaning of ambiguous legislation, which all courts do by definition, and the power of judicial review, which overturns legislation which is invalid for some reason rather than merely trying to interpret an ambiguous provision. Ambiguous means "unclear" or "capable of being interpreted in more than one way" and every time every court encounters unclear legislation it must decide what it means, even if it is not invalidated. In contrast, some judiciaries that have the power of judicial review and those that do not. Judiciaries that can declare a law to be invalid have the power of judicial review. Judiciaries that cannot declare a law to be invalid do not have the power of judicial review. Every state and federal U.S. Court at every level (not just the U.S. Supreme Court) has the power and obligation to declare that a law violated the U.S. Constitution. In many countries, no court, or only a "constitutional court" has the power to make declare legislation to be invalid by exercising judicial review. Every time that a legislature passes a statute on a subject covered by common law (i.e. judge-made law derived from case decisions that serve as precedents), it shrinks the scope of common law relative to statutes. And, in principle, almost all of the common law could be replaced by statutes without all that much difficulty. But, in civil law countries, statutes are frequently comprehensive and are the sole source of legal authority about their subject matter superseding all case law, while in common law countries, statutes are often piecemeal tweaks to a common law background that is assumed by the statute. For example, every civil law country would have a comprehensive statute setting forth the principles of contract law, while a typical common law jurisdiction might have a statute that declares that certain contracts must be in writing but does not comprehensively set forth the law of contracts in all circumstances. There are some features of civil law countries, such as the absence of jury trials, which cannot be constitutionally changed to the civil law system, even in jurisdictions such a Puerto Rico and Louisiana in the United States which have civil law roots prior to joining the U.S. (at least in criminal cases and in the federal courts). The power of judicial review (i.e. the power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional and void) is also inherent in the U.S. Constitutional system of government and could not be removed without a constitutional amendment. There are common law countries, e.g., England, which did not historically have the power of judicial review, which was an innovation for a common law countries such as the United States when it was first invoked. (For what it is worth, India goes one step further; its Supreme Court asserts and exercises the right to declare portions of its own constitution to be unconstitutional.) There are other aspects of civil law legal systems which would probably also be declared unconstitutional in the United States as well, such as the lack of a prohibition on the introduction of hearsay evidence in criminal trials which violates a provision of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights known as the "confrontation clause." It is unclear to me whether the principle that case law precedents have binding legal effect in future cases, which is part of the common law system that is absent in the civil law system, has a constitutional dimension or could be displaced by law. But, most aspects of a civil law legal system could be adopted in the United States if the relevant legislatures so desired. Indeed, many aspects of the U.S. legal system have moved in that direction. For example, only a handful of U.S. states now recognize the concept of a "common law crime". Almost all states now only allow criminal sanctions for crimes codified by statute, which was not the case at the time of the American Revolution, when few crimes were codified. Obviously, with a constitutional amendment, almost any change to the U.S. legal system is possible.

No. The Fourteenth Amendment says: nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; The Supreme Court has determined that this clause incorporates much of the Bill of Rights. The logic is mildly tortured, but it's basically that "due process of law" means "due process of a law that is compatible with the fundamental rights of a free society." This logic is known as "substantive due process," because it reads in to "due process of law" requirements about what those laws can do (as opposed to procedural due process, which is about the actual procedures being used). It's pretty settled that the Bill of Rights, after the 14th Amendment, should apply to the states. There's another possible way to get there: the 14th Amendment says "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," which Justice Thomas recently thought meant that the Second Amendment applies to the states in a concurring opinion. But as of now, substantive due process is the standard logic for it. Virtually all of the Bill of Rights is incorporated against the states. There are a couple things which aren't (like juries in lawsuits, and grand juries), but the Establisment Clause is incorporated (see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1).

Must an Incoming Passenger Card/Arrival card be done as a citizen Are you legally required to do a customs declaration before you enter into Australia/any other western country? As a citizen with a valid passport it seems crazy that a tiny piece of cardboard could prevent us entry into the country of our birth, provided customs found no evidence of law breaking. I am struggling to find an example where someone is forced to make a declaration before being able to access a location they have full legal rights to be in. It might even be in breach of self criminalisation protections. Does anyone know what would happen? Thanks

No, you can pay the fine instead MIGRATION REGULATIONS 1994 - REG 3.08 Offence--failure to complete a passenger card (1) A person who is required by these Regulations to complete a passenger card must not fail to do so. Penalty: 10 penalty units. (2) Strict liability applies to subregulation (1). This is presently $2,750. You have 2 business days after you arrive to provide the card, otherwise you get the fine.

If the Attorney General has officially determined that you renounced US citizenship for the purpose of avoiding taxation, you have a lifetime ban under INA 212(a)(10)(E), and there is no immigrant waiver for this ban. See 9 FAM 302.12-6. I am not sure if the Attorney General has ever made such a determination about anyone. Otherwise, I don't see anything that would prevent you from immigrating to the US like any other foreigner.

Is it legal to cross the channel in a private rowing boat or sailing boat? Yes. Can he land on any old beach, or does he have to go to a port to identify himself? It depends. Who is on board, where did they come from, what have they got in their pockets, etc. This may be helpful Notice 8: sailing your pleasure craft to and from the UK When arriving direct from a country outside the EU (the Channel Islands are regarded as outside the EU for this purpose), you must phone the National Yacht line on Telephone: 0845 723 1110. You will need to inform the Yachtline if any of the following apply: etc etc Since France is in the EU, whether you need to phone the NYL to report your departure from the UK depends on a complicated bunch of conditions you can read in the link above. Maybe the French have similar rules? The RYA say Some countries specify ports of entry (ports where one may lawfully enter a country), which should be used by a vessel arriving from abroad. It is often a requirement that you proceed directly to such a port of entry on entering territorial waters. A vessel arriving in a country from outside its customs territory should fly the Q flag until it has been given clearance from the authorities. Even once clearance has been given, some countries may ask to inspect the vessel’s papers periodically, for example at each port of call. and so on.

From the Texas Department of Public Safety brochure listing the types of documents that indicate how to demonstrate "Proof of US Citizenship or Lawful Presence:" Birth certificate or birth record issued by the appropriate State Bureau of Vital Statistics or equivalent agency from a US state or local government, a US territory, or the District of Columbia A birth certificate issued by a county in the State of California would qualify. Note that most government agencies require a certified copy of the birth certificate be used. A certified copy will generally have an endorsement via a stamp indicating that it is a certified copy and, for California, would be available from the county vital records department. A "U.S. Certificate of Citizenship" is for U.S. citizens born abroad. A "Certificate of Naturalization" is for people who became citizens through the naturalization process. Neither of these documents would apply to someone who was born in the United States.

Citizenship is essentially an imaginary label that sovereign states assign to people to say "this person is one of us". How those imaginary labels are granted, recorded, proved, maintained etc. is up to the sovereign state to decide. I assume that citizenship is any time period in which all officers of a given state would agree to issue identification documents for that human. Not accurate. Identification documents simply identify persons. They may or may not convey information about citizenship. Some (like driver's licences) do not. Other (like alien's passports) explicitly mean that the holder is not a citizen of the issuing sovereign state. Conversely, having troubles to get a passport does not necessarily mean that the person is not a citizen. In some circumstances it may be difficult to prove citizenship (e.g. emigrated as an infant with no birth record), and court proceedings may be needed to convince the authorities.

The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem.

Per Art 12(6), they are allowed to ask for additional identify verification: where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. Additionally, Recital 64: The controller should use all reasonable measures to verify the identity of a data subject who requests access, in particular in the context of online services and online identifiers. A controller should not retain personal data for the sole purpose of being able to react to potential requests. There is no consensus regarding what this means in practice: Must the controller use all measures that they can be reasonably be required to use? Or only those measures to verify the identity to a reasonable level of certainty? I agree with you that asking for a passport is excessive, and that email verification would be sufficient. However, that is just my personal opinion. The GDPR can also be interpreted in a way that asking for a copy of your passport is OK. Where they process a copy of your passport, that is personal data as well. You also have data subject rights with regards to this processing, for example the right to be informed of the purpose of this processing and of when the data will be deleted. If it is only used for the purpose of verifying your identity, the copy of your passport should be deleted immediately afterwards. The data controller may have additional obligations because a passport or ID card is a very sensitive document. E.g. Art 87 allows member states to impose additional rules. Most sensible controllers will therefore want to avoid processing passports, unless they only operate in specific EU member states.

The picture shown is not fraudulent or problematic. Fraud involves using a false representation (or concealing a fact) in order to obtain a result that would not have been possible to secure without the misstatement or concealment. No one is using the photograph of the exterior of a passport (which is identical for all U.S. passports) to obtain any immigration benefit or for a non-U.S. citizen to obtain citizenship. All that is being done is visually associating international travel (which would usually be done using a passport) with a credit card that can be used internationally. Since a passport is a federal government document, it is also not protected by trademark or copyright laws -- the exterior, generic design of a passport is in the public domain. It can't be used for a purpose to mislead someone about citizenship or immigration benefits, but otherwise, it can be used for any purpose. I suppose that you could be interpreting the photograph (on a Spanish language speaker's facebook feed) as implying that by getting this credit card you will also get a U.S. passport and cool sunglasses, but that would be a patently unreasonable assumption in this context, particularly in light of the clarifying caption at the bottom, and, of course, many people who speak Spanish as a primary language have legitimate U.S. passports (including more or less all passport holders in Puerto Rico). You could also, I suppose, be interpreting the appearance of the passport as some sort of implicit government endorsement of the product when the government does not, in fact, endorse the product, but again, nothing in the advertisement that I can see that can be reasonably interpreted as conveying that message.

Would funding the Sentinel Program violate the equal Protection clause? For today's exercise into comic book law, let's take a look at another X-men storyline. As we previously established using the Purifiers as an example, people can talk all they want about wanting to murder other people as long as no imminent lawless action happens. That's the Brandenburg test. However, let's look at what happens if that rhetoric is finding its way into the government and there actually is action. So for our thought experiment of today, let's use Days of Future Past as the basis, which was also the basis for the film version. Let's take the synopsis as following as true as the amalgamation of which facts both stories tell: Senator Robert Kelly is assassinated in 1980 (1973 in the film) by a carrier of the X-Gene. As a result, Kelly's advocating for funding the Sentinel Program by Bolivar Trask is getting traction. The publicly known target of the Sentinel Program is to hunt down and kill X-Gene carriers, especially US Citizens. The funding goes through and Trask starts building hunter-killer robots for the government. For our analysis, let's stop here, as the rest of the plot is time-travel shenanigans. Does the funding count as government action, making the program an action or law that violates the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment?

In the comic timeline (seen in Uncanny X-Men #141, Jan 1981), as mainly narrated by Kitty Pryde, In 1984, "a rabidly anti-mutant candidate was elected President", and "within a year" had arranged to pass "the first Mutant Control Act". This is struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. Then (let's say this is 1985-1986ish), "the Administration responded by activating the Sentinels", who promptly proceed to take over the country. Whoops! There is a further Mutant Control Act in 1988, which makes mutants "pariahs and outcasts" to be hunted down and for the most part killed. Presumably this is under the Sentinel-controlled version of the U.S. government. By 2013, society is split between baseline humans (H), "anomalous" carriers of the mutant gene (A), and full-blown mutants (M). The A-class people are forbidden from reproducing. All this is said to derive from, and be in accordance with, the law of 1988. While we don't know what the 1985 law did, it's presumably not too different from the 1988 version. The newer one is only constitutional insofar as the Sentinels have taken over. Their orders, made in response to the Supreme Court's action, were to "eliminate the mutant menace once and for all", and deposing the government is their chosen path to that end. Although the robot coup was not what the President was hoping for, we can still interpret that the intent behind using the Sentinels was to (1) achieve similar effects to the rejected law of 1985, and (2) do so in a way that the Supreme Court could not block. The idea is that the use of the Sentinels probably is just as unconstitutional as the original law, but is something the government could get away with. In the movie, Trask says that Congress refused to fund the program, and so he is appealing to the executive branch for clandestine financing: this is a similar dynamic of trying to evade the lawful process. It is plausible that the grounds for striking down the 1985 law would include equal protection, as well as protection against search and seizure, and requirements of due process. It would have been a broad enough ruling that the administration felt justified in taking an entirely different approach, rather than attempting to tweak the law. For example, if the Supreme Court held that mutants were not a protected class, and not even human anyway, but that the proposed law infringed the rights of humans in some minor way, then the creation of the Sentinels seems less obvious as a response. They must have concluded something broad enough to cover anti-mutant laws in general. I'd estimate that whether or not mutation was deemed within scope of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the other obvious civil rights violations are more likely to be biting. Certainly in the case of the giant murderbots, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are clearly engaged, and the Supreme Court might be more comfortable applying them straightforwardly, compared to reading a novel class into the Fourteenth. Politically - and the use of Nixon in the film makes this apt - the problem was not to stay within the bounds of the law, but to evade its power. Secretly funding a private-sector program doesn't make the outcome any more or less constitutional, but it does make it harder for plaintiffs to challenge. They have to find out about it. They have to demonstrate standing, which is difficult - see for example U.S. v Richardson 418 U.S. 166 (1974) holding that a taxpayer did not have standing to challenge Congressional funding of the CIA. And if the Sentinels haven't been turned on yet, then nobody has been actually harmed; all we have is a robot that might hurt mutants. Once they are activated, the secret is out, but at that point if all goes "well" then there are no mutants left to object. In the event, a legal challenge was impossible for different reasons (robot tyranny).

In part, we don't know because there are currently no rules that address certain outcomes, so it will depend on who is on the Supreme Court when the issue is raised. A warrantless search will not be legal beyond current doctrines regarding crime in progress and imminent danger, even if it involves time travel. So you will need a warrant, and you will need probable cause to get it. Currently, if you break into a person's house to discover that there is a body there, you can't get a warrant to legitimize that illegal search. Adding time travel does not change anything. In situation 1, I assume they have probable cause and a warrant but the evidence was destroyed by the time of the search at time T+n. As long as prior time T is still after the crime, a warrant to search at time T would not be a problem. In scenario 2, there is nothing preventing them from stopping the crime or arresting the perpetrators in the act. However, if they travel back in time and break in to a suspect's house in order to witness the crime, that is an illegal search. You could likewise arrest a person before he escapes to the phantom zone, if you have probable cause that he had committed a crime – by the time of the arrest. Forward time travel poses a more serious challenge, as articulated in Minority Report. It would, or should, be very difficult to issue an arrest warrant at time T based on knowledge of a crime committed at T+n. Because of the arrest, the crime was not committed and there was no probable cause, so there should have been no warrant (oh no, paradox).

No, it is not. Section 1 allows legislatures to infringe all Charter rights under certain reasonable circumstances. Section 33 is an alternative method by which legislatures can completely ignore the Charter rights that it can be applied to (ss. 2 & 7 to 15). Section 33 is a legislative procedural provision, it is not in itself an inherent right which would be subject to Section 1. Furthermore, reading Section 1 to apply in this way to Section 33 would completely eviscerate the meaning of Section 33 since it is a stronger mechanism for violating Charter rights. Case law on this is few due to the relative rarity of legislatures invoking the Section 33 notwithstanding clause and the fact that invoking it is generally a shield to judicial review. However, while not explicitly confirming what I said, Ford v. Quebec (AG) [1988] 2 SCR 712 basically takes for granted the above and applies it (note it can be a confusing read due to three different Charters being involved). In it, ss. 58 & 69 of Quebec's Charter of the French Language were disputed. Due to legislative hijinks*, it was unclear whether either section was covered by an invocation of the notwithstanding clause. The Court first undertook a procedural analysis to determine whether the notwithstanding clause applied and found that s. 58 was covered, but s. 69 was not (para. 34). Only after that did it address the substantive rights issues. While still analysing both ss. 58 & 69 to fall within the guarantees of Charter s. 2(b), the court only concluded s. 69 to infringe the Charter since (implicitly) s. 58 was not eligible for such a determination by virtue of the notwithstanding clause (para. 60). As Charter rights were found to be infringed, the Court then examined whether s. 69 could saved under Section 1. It could not, thus rendering it an unjustifiable infringement of the Charter (para. 73). *To keep this answer both short and focussed on law, we really do not have time to get into the Quebec government's initial responses to the passage of the Constitution Act, 1982.

Federal facilities are required to adhere to the flag code. Non-federal governmental entities are not, and the explanation is more complicated. In theory, the federal government should have very little power over the decision-making of state governments -- this is a principle of federalism and is expressly stated in the 10th Amendment. In practice, however, the federal government has a lot of power over state governments. Congress can condition the allotment of federal monies to states, i.e. block grants, as long as such a condition meets the five point test spelled out in South Dakota v. Dole. The most stringent of these points is that the condition "must not be coercive" so as to apply "irresistible pressure", creating a false choice where accepting money is the only realistic option (thus complying with the conditions). I couldn't find a clause within USC Title 4, Chapter 1 for withholding funds from states in the event of noncompliance, similar to one that exists for the national drinking age. Therefore states (state, county, municipal all treated as an extension of state power under the US Constitution) are not required to to adhere to the flag code. Theoretically, Congress could pass a new law that would condition the receipt of some federal funds on the states' compliance with the flag code. But the new low could face additional hurdles, since the condition must be "directly related to one of the main purposes for which... [the funds] are expended" (quoting from Dole). This restriction is the reason why states were given the right to opt out of the Obamacare medicare expansion without losing their pre-existing Medicaid funding (567 U. S. ____ (2012) at 51), and is also the reason why the recent "Sanctuary Cities Ban" is having legal trouble. It would be unlikely that any law like this would hold up. It's also worth noting that most states have their own flag law, which makes this whole discussion of the federal law's effect on state facilities. As you noted, since US v. Eichman, all criminal penalties for violating any flag code have been unenforceable against individuals. My best guess is that the proper method of enforcement in federal buildings is simply administrative action, since violating the code can provide cause for firing federal employees under Chapter 75 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.

I believe you are using rule of law when you mean due process. The former refers to equality before the law and the subjugation of executive government to the law while the latter refers accepted measures of justice and fairness in the administration of the law and, in the United States, to the supremacy of the judiciary over the legislature (the situation is reversed in the UK). Assuming that to be the case, the due process clause in the fifth amendment provides that "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...". That is, actions against Huawei must only be taken as permitted by the law. The law that permits the President to institute the Huawei ban is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. As such, at face value, this is a legitimate exercise in executive power. Huawei has the right to challenge the ban in US courts, as such, they have been afforded due process.

Since the US Federal government didn't try to pass any such law (nor would it have been politically possible in the period shortly before the US Civil War), there is no way to know with assurance how such a hypothetical law would have been addressed by the Supreme Court of the day, nor by the various states. Congress legally could have prohibited the importation of slaves after 1808, the constitution specifically grants this power. Congress legally could have prohibited interstate commerce in slaves. Congress could have repealed the Fugitive Slave Act. Congress legally could have imposed heavy taxes on the ownership of slaves. If heavy enough these could have been a de facto abolition. A series of Presidents could have appointed Justices inclined to overturn the Dred Scott decision (denying the possibility of citizen ship for most Negros, and denying that a "free" state could free slaves temporarily resident there). Congress could have passed laws requiring negro votes to be counted in federal elections. Various of the above hypothetical measures might have made slavery less economic, and thus less common, in time. Note that it is not likely that any actual Congress would have passed most of them. But I do not see how, absent a constitutional amendment, and absent a war, a simple Federal statute could have constitutionally abolished slavery de jure throughout the US. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was legally justified as a war measure, a confiscation from those in rebellion. It did not affect loyal slave states, such as Maryland. And it was never seriously tested in court anyway.

School districts / states do generally have the power to set the curriculum including the viewpoint that will be officially conveyed. One well-known major restriction on such viewpoint restrictions is that the schools cannot restrict the free exercise of a religion, and cannot take a position on a religion. Apart from the religion third-rail, schools have pretty free reign in setting the curriculum, see Evans-Marshall v. Tipp City for one instantiation. In this case, the teacher assigned various books, including Heather Has Two Mommies, one of the books that prompted an outcry. The upshot of that case is that a teacher cannot invoke the First Amendment to override policy. This article (draft version, easier to handle) (published version, annoying footnote structure) reviews the topic, and section III covers prior cases. It notes that the cases of Lawrence, Windsor, Obergefell do not address the constitutionality of these education laws, though the reasoning in the prior cases might be applicable if there were a suit over curriculum. There is an implication that some of these rules have been enforced in the past, but most of the evidence is in the form of news stories (Beall v. London City School BOE is not available in the open). The article does engage in a somewhat deeper study of enforcement in Utah, where it was enforced (until it was repealed). Enforcement is necessarily indirect. The law require school districts to have a particular curriculum; violation would come when an individual teacher taught contrary to the prescribed curriculum. Those laws do not contain any provision like "a teacher who violates these rules gets fired", instead, punishment is via the general rule that you have to teach what is in the state-mandated curriculum. Rather than officially terminating a teacher for violating this curricular guideline, districts use vague reasons for non-renewal such as "due to problems with communication and teamwork" (from Evans-Marshall).

Unequivocally yes. An Australian judgement asserted this by (happily) adopting the reasoning of the US courts: The matter also came up for discussion in the Communist Party case where Justice Dixon adopted the U.S. view that: ... it is within the necessary power of the Federal government to protect its own existence and the unhindered play of its legitimate activities. And to this end, it may provide for the punishment of treason, the suppression of insurrection or rebellion and for the putting-down of all individual or concerted attempts to obstruct or interfere with the discharge of the proper business of government ... A plane (or ship, or train etc.) that is not responding to hails and acting to put citizens at risk is a legitimate target of military force. It doesn't matter if it is acting that way because of a deliberate decision of its controllers (e.g. terrorists), because it's not under control or because it's controllers are idiots.

Is there a law that punishes cowardly cops? In the military, According to 10 U.S. Code § 899 - Art. 99. Misbehavior before the enemy. Acts of cowardly conduct are punishable. Any member of the armed forces who before or in the presence of the enemy— runs away; shamefully abandons, surrenders, or delivers up any command, unit, place, or military property which it is his duty to defend; through disobedience, neglect, or intentional misconduct endangers the safety of any such command, unit, place, or military property; casts away his arms or ammunition; is guilty of cowardly conduct; quits his place of duty to plunder or pillage; causes false alarms in any command, unit, or place under control of the armed forces; willfully fails to do his utmost to encounter, engage, capture, or destroy any enemy troops, combatants, vessels, aircraft, or any other thing, which it is his duty so to encounter, engage, capture, or destroy; or does not afford all practicable relief and assistance to any troops, combatants, vessels, or aircraft of the armed forces belonging to the United States or their allies when engaged in battle; shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct. Is there a similar law that punishes cops who show acts of cowardly conduct?

The only time cops are violating the law for cowardice is when they fail to intervene in misconduct by another cop, see, e.g., here at page 10 (two police carry out a blatantly unlawful arrest, but there is also liability for the two other junior officers watch and do nothing about their superiors' misconduct), or when an arrested or incarcerated person has been placed in peril by the cop, see, e.g., here (police arrest woman and put her in a squad car on train tracks and fail to try to rescue her when a train is about to and then does smash into the squad car where she is helplessly handcuffed and locked in). This said, cops are routinely disciplined or fired for cowardice as an employment matter (see, e.g., here where a policeman who fails to rush in to stop a school shooting in progress was "suspended in the immediate aftermath of the attack and later resigned" and also here in a similar case). But, they are rarely disciplined or fired for being too aggressive even if it crosses the legal line unless the facts are unequivocally clear.

The police officers themselves are covered by Qualified Immunity - to put it briefly, a government official acting in their official capacity in a discretionary act (as in, they have some discretion in whether/how they carry out the act) is immune from suit so long as they pay reasonable deference to relevant law. In the case of the police, so long as the search or seizure itself is reasonable (either because there is a warrant, or because they had probable cause), they can take appropriately destructive measures to carry out their duty. Even if the search or seizure is later found to have been unreasonable, an officer may still have Qualified Immunity unless their action violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable person would have known" (Harlow v. Fitzgerald). However, a search/seizure doesn't give the police license for arbitrary destruction, whatever they do has to be reasonably pursuant to the legal search/seizure. For example, if a suspect is barricaded in a house with a gun, they can knock down doors, windows and walls to apprehend them. On the other hand, that does not mean the officers can then break open safes to try and find evidence - once their probable cause for the entry is fulfilled (apprehending the suspect), they need to get a warrant to do more than a plain sight search of the house. Warrants will specify what items are being searched for, so even with a warrant the police have to take reasonable measures to carry it out - an example of an unreasonable measure would be to tear into walls in order to try and find a stolen bicycle. On the other hand, tearing into walls could be justified if their warrant included searching for drugs from a dealer, where it is not uncommon to hide them in the walls. States and the Federal Government enjoy Sovereign Immunity from suits in most cases. There are some exceptions, but none would apply in this case so long as the general policy of the police department was not illegal or unconstitutional. However, county and city governments do not enjoy Sovereign Immunity and state governments and the Federal Government often allow suits against them for negligence from their actors, so someone injured by unreasonable police action can usually try to recover damages from the officer's department.

How far can one go to defend him/herself from an unreasonable search and seizures, in the same sense of one defending him/herself from an unlawful arrest? Not very far. Basically all you can do is try to talk the officer out of it. He thinks he sees evidence in sight... If the police officer reasonably believes that there is evidence of a crime in plain view, then the officer can proceed to seize the evidence. If the property owner tries to use force to prevent the seizure, then the officer can arrest the property owner. ... the property owner ... highly believes there is no possible way he could have seen the evidence from outside his property. It doesn't matter what the owner believes (unless the owner can somehow convince the officer before the search). What matters is what the court believes. But the owner cannot bring the matter to court before the officer enters the shed. If the officer insists on entering the shed and the owner can establish in court that the officer couldn't see the evidence and that there was no other lawful basis for a warrantless search or seizure, then the evidence will be inadmissible. The owner might also be able to prevail in a civil suit for the violation of civil rights, but the bar for such a suit is very high, so the likelihood is very small.

In the United States, the government has, multiple times, destroyed homes while trying to catch a fugitive. And the homeowner sometimes makes a claim in federal court that this is an unconstitutional taking without compensation in violation of the 5th Amendment. In Lech v. Jackson, the 10th Circuit decided that the police and city were not liable for destroying a house while trying to arrest a criminal who had fled there. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case. But in Baker v. City of McKinney, Texas, less than 3 months ago, a district court declined to dismiss a case in which police destroyed a home to catch a fleeing criminal. Allegedly, in this case the police were given a key to the door, a garage door opener, and the code to the back gate by the homeowner - and instead of using those, they used explosives on the garage door and used a BearCat to knock down the fence and the front door. I'm not sure to what extent those facts, perhaps showing that the scale of the destruction was unnecessary, matter. To the best of my knowledge the case is still ongoing.

Even if you had grounds for a lawsuit, you could not make it come out of the officer’s pocket. Under Chapter 4.64 of the Seattle Code, the City of Seattle is generally required to defend and indemnify city employees who are sued for doing their job. If you sue a police officer, the city pays his lawyer; if you win or if the city decides your claim is legitimate, the city pays whatever damages there were. The provision does not cover “claims and/or litigation arising from any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious acts or omissions of officers or employees of the City,” but that requires a lot more than “I wasn’t parked illegally,” and in any event you cannot force that issue -— only the city can. That’s between the officer and the city, and has nothing to do with you. This provision is pretty common in employment, including government employment. If I’m working for you and am acting in good faith, doing things for your benefit under your instructions, it’s only fair for you to shoulder the costs if I mess up. When it comes to government employees (whose job often makes people very angry at them), indemnification is extremely common. If police officers faced the risk of financial ruin for innocent mistakes, it’d be very hard to find anyone willing to do the job.

In short, no, that cant be a pardon for those police officers who would be now influenced to take more violent actions towards those they detain. Pardons are only applicable to past actions. You may be pardoned before charges are filed, but the actions must have already occured. Though I less certain about this, simply because Ive never heard such a thing proposed, I would also note that it is highly improbable that the actual statement he made - generic and during a speech - could everbe interpreted as an affirmative act intending to grant pardons to anyone who may act in that manner in the future.

TL; DNR: No. Charging the Councilwoman under §2383 for making a speech would violate the First Amendment, and "levying war" in the §2381 means actually fighting, not conspiring to fight. 18 USC §2383 Since §2383 is a statute, it must conform to the Constitution. To charge Sawant for what she said in a speech would violate the 1st Amendment, which says, "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech..." Even without the First Amendment problems, §2383 would not apply. The words "rebellion and insurrection" in §2383 are usually read to mean real violence, not vague words that may or may not involve violence. Not even Cliven Bundy, the Nevada rancher who has had several armed standoffs with the government, was charged under §2383. 18 USC §2381 Since §2381 is based on Art. 3, §3, the Treason Clause of the Constitution, the First Amendment does not apply to it. Following the Treason Clause, §2381 has two prongs. To be guilty of treason, one must either: a) Levy war against the United States; or b) Adhere to its enemies. "Enemies" has been interpreted to mean enemies in a real war, so the second prong does not apply. Since Sawant is not actually levying war against the United States, §2381 can only apply to her if it covers a conspiracy to levy war against the United States. The Supreme Court decided it did not in 1807, in Ex Parte Bollman. Bollman was charged with conspiring with Aaron Burr to carve a new country out of the US. The Court ordered Bollman released. In his opinion, John Marshall explained why: However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert by force the government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war, and actually to levy war, are distinct offenses. Marshall’s narrow reading of the Treason Clause was consistent with the views of the Founders. In Federalist 43, James Madison explained that in the past, “violent factions” had often used “new-fangled and artificial" definitions of treason to “wreck their alternate malignity on each other…” To keep from repeating this sorry history, the Constitution “opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger,” by defining what constituted treason and specifying how it was to be proved.

Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.

US: Using a fake name and profile photo to provide freelance services online - anything illgeal? I want to anonymously perform freelancing services online, so I used an AI generator to create a picture of a human face and chose a fake name. That fake name is also the business name on my PayPal business account. Recently, I've also launched a website that sells the freelance services under that fake name. I'm planning to deduct the costs associated with the website as business expenses when doing taxes. Sometimes I also use that name to sign contracts with a made-up signature by me. Will any of this be questionable to the IRS, count as potential employee fraud, or somehow counts as impersonation? Edit: the wording of this might be confusing, but I'm NOT using any fake names or images when filing taxes or dealing with the government. It's just towards clients.

If you aren't publicly registering a trade name you are probably engaged in illegal conduct. Among other things, by doing this, you are effectively hiding yourself from any lawsuits arising from the business that accurately name the defendant. You can have a business mascot or trade name, but you have to disclose that this is what it is and provide a means by which a reasonable person who needs to sue you could properly identify you.

Can the name of my LLC include the phrases "Software Engineer", "Software Engineering", or similar derivations thereof? No. Not based on what you've posted. Go to the definitions to see how engineer is defined. It may be they are talking about actual structural engineers or environmental engineers, where if you're wrong people die. But based on above, you can't use the word engineer unless you're licensed as such. Is there even a license for computer engineer? This seems more like it could be a term of use but not actually descriptive of what you're doing. IDK. You'd have to see the definitions and exceptions. Can my resume, curriculum vitae, or my advertising or promotional materials accurately report the subjects I studied in college as the subject matter of "Software Engineering", to the extent that this information is true and accurate? Yes, your CV is supposed to say what you have done, and learned and especially published (lest it's just a resume), but the answer as far as promotional materials, is NO. This, because you don't post your cv on your ad's and if you put that, you will likely be found to be trying to pose as a licensed professional based on a technicality. If that happens the licensing authority will probably censure you by disallowing a license when your qualify. If asked directly by a client, am I even allowed to divulge my area of study accurately,(of course, but you'd also have to divulge the fact that you are not licensed and cannot act in that capacity) Would it be a violation of the law to claim I had engineering knowledge since I have studied (and practiced) software engineering in the past (for instance, at previous places of work in states which did not have these kinds of limitations, or for corporations which did not offer my services to the general public)? It could be if the person reports that you are soliciting work as an engineer w/out a license. It's like a person who went to law school, passed the bar, but never got sworn in. They cannot solicit business as a lawyer. Unless there is a license for being a computer programer, there is nothing barring you from using that terminology. You could be, that if you look up the definition prior to the statue, that it says something like "for the purposes of this section the term engineer means…", In which case it doesn't even apply to you.

In the abstract, two businesses that cooperate in violating a third party's copyright could both face liability. Applying that information to the facts you gave would amount to legal counsel. If you don't want to tell the client 'no,' you should speak to a lawyer about your potential liability. Beyond the legalities, do you really want your portfolio to advertise that you design sites by ripping other sites off?

Copyright exists whether they make that statement or not. Giving such notice informs the public that the work is copyrighted, who owns it, and when it was published. If the work is infringed, the defendant will not be able to use an innocent infringement defense. There's nothing special about using the domain name, as it's probably the name or DBA of the business that owns the domain.

I know in general freelance work is not taxed Your “knowledge” is wrong. In general, all income is taxed. Some jurisdictions may exempt certain income derived from hobbies that are not businesses but this is by no means universal.

First, when using profiling third party services (Analytics is "profiling" as defined by the GDPR), your main concern is not such a trivial thing as cookie compliance, but the security of processing I've analyzed Google's IP anonymization in some detail (as part of the DPIA I do for clients). My conclusion is that for most of the web-sites we manage, Google's IP anonymization is adequate to ensure security of processing as required by the DPIA process. However, on some sites that are likely to visited by users interested in what the GDPR calls "special categories of personal data" (Article 9), we either do not use Google Analytics, or we add additional layers of security in case the USA Government orders Google to disregard the stipulations in the DPA and hand over the data (yes, the US Government can legally do that - read the fine print in the Privacy Shield accord). As for Facebook Analytics, I think you've simply misunderstood their policy. Nowhere in that policy document does Facebook say that they "are not collecting Personal Identifiable Information". AFAIK, they collect tons of it, in all sorts of obnoxious and sneaky ways. What they actually say about PII in the context of Analytics is this: We do not share information that personally identifies you (personally identifiable information is information like name or email address that can by itself be used to contact you or identifies who you are) with advertising, measurement or analytics partners unless you give us permission. Let me remind you that one of their "analytics partners" was Cambridge Analytica, so if this promise not to share is true, it looks like a pretty new policy. OK, moving on to cookie compliance. To you (the controller), both Google and Facebook are processors. Given the history of the NSA and the methods it have used and AFAIK still use to get US-based companies to hand over the personal data about Europeans through orders issued by secret FISA courts, plus the fact that total nutcases currently are in charge in the USA, I am not going to rely on the privacy policy of any US-company for protection of personal data. So if I make use of Google Analytics (and I often do, they provide a great service), I always make sure that my users opt-in on that (hard cookie concent), even I make use of their IP anonymization feature (YMMV). As for Facebook, the fact that they promise not to share PII with third parties is irrelevant because they collect personal data. You will always need consent from your users to hand over their PII to Facebook in the first place. This is not optional. PS: If was a user, that consent would never been granted, no matter how great or valuable your site might be. If you have any sort of relationship with Facebook, I'll give you my personal data when you pry it from my cold, dead hands.

Disclaimer: I'm from the US and don't claim to know German or Turkish law. So let me discuss some general principles here, but details may well be different in Germany and Turkey. You're mixing together three very different things: trademark, copyright, and patent. Copyright protects the expression of an idea, in this case, the exact computer code, images, etc. If you didn't copy his code, the chance that you would coincidentally write identical code is remote. The fact that you both have a line of code that says x=x+1 wouldn't give him any grounds for a lawsuit. He'd have to show substantial portions of the code were identical. If you didn't deliberately copy his code, this isn't going to happen. Barring some extraordinary and unbelievable coincidence, you can't violate copyright accidentally. Trademark protects names and symbols used to identify a company or a product. If you decided to call your software company "Microsoft", then that other Microsoft could sue you for trademark infringement. Likewise if you copied somebody else's logo or other distinctive graphics. This is very different from copyright. It is quite possible to violate someone's trademark accidentally. Especially if he gave his company or product a rather generic name. Like if someone called his product, say, "Password Manager", someone else might make a product with the same name without ever having heard of the original. Ditto if he has some simple logo or other graphics. If you did accidentally duplicate a name or graphic elements, well, in the US a court would likely order you to change your name or graphics and that would be the end of it, unless you refused, in which case you'd end up in court. US Courts have ruled that very generic names have limited trademark protection. An example I saw recently was "Main Street Auto Repair". A court said that the owner of that name could prevent someone else from opening a shop in the same town with the same name, but he couldn't sue someone in another town who happened to use the same name. This is why, by the way, companies often use made-up words for their product names. In your case, this should be a trivial issue. If he is claiming trademark to the look of the main menu screen, just change the colors or move some buttons around. If it actually went to court, you should be able to argue that the similarity was accidental and when you were informed you promptly changed it, and that should be the end of it. Depending, I guess, on how hard-nosed the judge is, etc. Patents are different still. A patent gives the owner the exclusive right to use an invention or process for a specified period of time. It doesn't matter if you invented the same thing entirely independently. Whoever filed the patent first has exclusive rights. There have been cases where an inventor lost out to someone with a similar invention because he submitted his patent application one day later. If this other person has patents that you are infringing, you are pretty much out of luck.

It's best to use formal names in legal documents. For example, Ringo Starr's musical compositions are credited to Richard Starkey. If you have a business that wishes to do business under a name other than its legal name, you can investigate d/b/a ("doing business as") designation. For the purpose of a single contract or other document, you can usually include language that designates a name for the business such as "this agreement is between Full Name Incorporation, Inc, hereinafter known as Trademark®, and...." You shouldn't do any of this in real life, however, without first discussing it with your lawyer. If you believe that there is business value in calling your company "Foo" when its actual name is "Bar Corp," then surely that value warrants some expense to find a lawyer who will defend the validity of the company's contracts in court, should that become necessary.

Is it legal in England for unpasteurised dairy products to be sold in retail stores? I understand that it is not legal to sell unpasteurised dairy products in retail stores in England, at least in the case of raw milk. (It must be purchased directly from farmers.) But then one sees other dairy products like raw butter or crème fraîche. In particular, I understand that the Isigny Ste Mère dairy production cooperative produces raw dairy products and see their butter and crème fraîche sold in chain grocery stores. What is the legality of that?

It’s legal The regulations provide limits on various bacteria. If the product is made from raw milk, the manufacturer must implement a testing regime for those bacteria. If it’s made from treated milk, they avoid this cost.

Arizona law operates in terms of "spirituous liquor", which is defined as containing more than 0.5% alcohol by volume. You'd have to send the cheese to a lab to determine the actual alcohol content, but it is likely that the product has less than the threshold amount of alcohol. It is not clear why vanilla extract is not classified as a spirituous liquor, since it satisfies the definition (as a mixture of alcohol with another substance, and it is indeed capable of inducing intoxication).

On the first page of https://www.gov.uk/duty-free-goods/overview you find: "You can bring some goods from abroad without having to pay UK tax or ‘duty’ (customs charges), as long as they’re for your own use." And on the next page "... will use them yourself or give them away as a gift". This clearly doesn't cover anything that you bring into the UK to sell it. And a bit further on the site it says "You must tell customs (known as ‘declaring’) on arrival in the UK if you have goods: ... that you plan to sell". Since you are asking here, it is quite obvious that you intend to sell :-) You said "e.g. say this guys comes every month from Russia to France for unrelated business, each time he fills up his luggage with the maximum allowed amount of goods that comply with custom laws". If this guy sells the stuff to you, then the maximum allowed amount of goods to import without paying taxes is zero. Once he is willing to pay taxes, there is no limit. Obviously regularly importing things from Russia or France and selling in the UK at a profit means that he is running a business in the UK, which means he would have to register a business, pay corporation taxes etc. It's all a matter of degree; for small amounts nobody cares (up to some limit you don't need to register a business or pay taxes; I don't know the details).

In England and Wales and Scotland, 'licensed premises', i.e. premises authorised to serve alcohol, are obliged to provide free drinking water to customers on request. Unlicensed premises are not obliged to provide drinking water. In England and Wales, all licensed premises "must ensure that free potable water is provided on request to customers where it is reasonably available". https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2014/9780111116906/schedule?view=plain In Scotland, all licensed premises are obliged to provide "tap water fit for drinking" free to customers on request. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2005/16/schedule/4/paragraph/8/2005-12-21?view=plain In Northern Ireland there is no law providing for giving customers free water on request. Schools in Great Britain (i.e. not Northern Ireland) are obliged to supply free drinking water. England https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/1943/made Scotland https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ssi/2020/153/regulation/7/made Wales https://www.legislation.gov.uk/mwa/2009/3/section/5 All UK workplaces must provide workers an "adequate supply of wholesome drinking water". https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1992/3004/regulation/22/made

The relevant guidance is here, at sections 3.4 and 3.6. It is surprisingly(?) confusing, the result of trying to account for exceptions both historical and otherwise motivated. The biscuit/cake distinction is not the one to focus on, because some biscuits are zero-rated (I think this category is basically the fairly plain biscuits like custard creams or bourbons) and some are standard-rated (those with chocolate, but also some others as far as I can tell). The following are supposed to be standard-rated: biscuits wholly or partly covered in chocolate (or some product similar in taste and appearance) any item of sweetened prepared food, other than cakes and non-chocolate biscuits, which is normally eaten with the fingers Later, in the 'zero-rated' column of a table of examples we have both Cakes including sponge cakes, pastries, eclairs, meringues, flapjacks, lebkuchen, marshmallow teacakes and Scottish snowballs and Biscuits coated with icing, caramel or some other product different in taste and appearance from chocolate There is some further clarification here: In most cases, the borderline between cakes and confectionery causes few problems, but there are products whose status as cakes is not self-evident. They will normally be marketed as cakes, through bakeries and supermarkets rather than through confectionery outlets, and will be displayed with cakes and biscuits rather than in the confectionery section. The style of packaging used will also normally follow the pattern for bakery products, with a number of individual portions boxed and cellophane wrapped so the contents are revealed. They are also usually eaten as part of a meal rather than between meals as confectionery. Later in that page they discuss flapjacks vs. cereal bars and admit that flapjacks are classed differently because flapjacks were around when VAT was introduced and cereal bars weren't. Based on this, I think fig rolls are likely classed as confectionery rather than cakes, so get standard-rated for tax. If they wanted to invest in the legal battle that Jaffa Cakes had, they might well win, but 'to the man on the street' they are a sweet product sold for eating between meals in its own packaging, and so they naturally fall into that intended category. EDIT: After all that, I found this wholesaler who states that fig rolls are zero-rated. Perhaps they do get classified as cakes or plain biscuits, then.

Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...".

It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.

No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.

Vandalism, or free speech? I'm in Michigan. There are a few scenarios. I hang a sign by a string to a person's car I attach a sticker to the window of a car Using washable window paint, I draw on a car window. Are any of these illegal? Are any considered to be vandalism, defacing, or malicious destruction?

Damaging someone else's property is not protected free speech in the US. Nor is using someone else's property without permission and against the owner's wishes. Scenario 3 would surely be vandalism or "Malicious Mischief" or some similar offense, even if the paint can be fairly easily removed. The same would be petty surely true of scenario 2, as it would take at least some effort to remove the sticker, and it could be a safety hazard until it is removed (obstructed vision). Scenario 1 would probably not be even a minor crime, unless perhaps the person trespassed to attach the string. But the person has no right to insist that the car's owner not remove the sign. I am assuming that the car is owned by someone else, and the the person placing the sign, sticker or paint acted without permission from the owner or any authorized person.

Short answer: tinted windows are banned in most of Mexico, and rolling down the windows (at least the front windows) should keep you out of trouble in >99% of cases. Long answer: First, the law (mirror) seems to say that tinted windows are forbidden in most (all?) Mexico: [In all] Mexico, tinted windows are prohibited. They are banned. Except some tinted windows made by manufacturers. http://forums.bajanomad.com/viewthread.php?tid=46637: This article says the Mexican federal highway police will now be confiscating cars with tinted windows so dark that they cannot see inside, until the owners remove the polarizing paper. This is in accordance with Article 13 of the federal tranportation rules. It does not say what will happen with cars with factory tinting, since that cannot be removed. Second, on the enforcement of this law, it is sometimes enforced: TIJUANA – Hundreds of drivers have been stopped in Tijuana and ordered to remove after-market tint from the windows of their vehicles this week after a new law intended to help reduce crime went into effect. More sources. The enforcement seems very random. I did witness it myself that it is still currently enforced, at least in Tijuana. Regarding the effectiveness of rolling down one's windows to avoid triggering the police, http://www.city-data.com/forum/san-diego/321508-warning-message-those-who-driving-their.html says: I talked with the Police at the Ocho Street station last week. When driving in Tijuana, rolling down your front windows is OK for a tourist. Do it as you approach the border and while in Tijuana. It is only a ban in Tijuana, Rosarito and south is OK. https://www.tripadvisor.ca/ShowTopic-g150774-i256-k1967450-Dark_window_tint_banned_in_Tijuana-Rosarito_Baja_California.html: I went to the 8th street Police station (Tijuana) to find out what was up. I was told that the ban applies to only the front side windows. Rear side and back are OK (as in California). NO tint (other than factory) is permitted, even my light tint. They told me that, as a tourist, when in Tijuana just keep the front windows down, no problem. It's what I do, and -- no problem. https://www.reddit.com/r/tijuana/comments/92grg1/tijuana_window_tint_info/ When I get lit up, I immediately roll down all four windows in the car and when I pull over, I turn on the interior lights for them if it's at night. In the very unlikely event one gets pulled over despite having rolled down one's windows, one can use this trick: And while I have not had to do this, several of my Amigos have had great luck with not speaking Spanish to the cop (whether or not they know Spanish) and then saying they don't understand the cop's accent or why they were pulled over - being polite the entire time - and say they are going to call 078 to get help translating (078 is the Baja California tourist help line - it is staffed by English speaking operators). Invariably, the cops all the sudden get a more important call and have to leave immediately and let you off with a verbal warning. https://www.bajanorte.com/en/assistance-078/ Note that, from the same source: if you have Cali plates, you are at a higher likelihood for being pulled over, regardless of tint or actions.

This recently came up in a local PA homeowner association. Legally they own the roads in their development, but they have erected stop signs to make it clear who has the right of way and asked the township police to enforce them. A resident challenged the right of the police to enforce traffic laws on private property, but lost his appeal (albeit at the municipal level). The judge explained that the residents and any visitors had a reasonable expectation that the traffic signs would be obeyed, and that therefore violating them was just as dangerous as violating them on public roads, and that the same law and penalties would therefore be applied.

There is no law against a person creating and distributing such a poster, to the best of my knowledge. However such a poster pretty clearly implies that the person shown is guilty of a crime, or at least strongly suspected. If the store somehow made an error, pulling the image of a person who did not use the stolen card or there is some other error, the person pictured might well suffer a significant loss of reputation, and might sue for defamation. Damages could possibly be significant. Such suits have, I believe, happened when surveillance photos were posted but there later proved to have been an error. Mary might wish to double check how sure the store is that the photos are of the person who actually used the stolen card.

Canadian law defines "theft" thus: Every one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything, whether animate or inanimate, with intent (to deprive the owner, pledge as security, mess it up) In this case, you accepted what seemed to be an offer of a free pizza, so if you took and consumed the pizza you did so with a colorable claim of right and without fraud. Perhaps you misunderstood, but it is not a crime to misunderstand another person's intent. They could sue you for the cost of the pizza (assuming that you took it and did not pay), in which case the question would be whether whatever they said to you could reasonably be interpreted as an offer of a free pizza (if not, pay for the pizza). As an advertising stunt, this would not be unusual. However, if they fix the pizza but then demand money before handing over the pizza, you now know that you have no right to the pizza (if you abscond with the pizza in that circumstance, it would be theft). You may of course pay for the pizza, but you can also not pay and not take the pizza. Again, they could sue you, and in this case your defense would be that there was no contract (no agreement). An important question would be how reasonable it is to believe that you were offered a free pizza. People are offered "free" steak dinners all the time (at the cost of sitting through a sales pitch), so that is a reasonable belief. If a Lexus yacht salesman appears to be offering you a free $5M yacht, it is not reasonable to think that this is an ordinary advertising stunt, if you're not a celebrity.

Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz.

I think it's important to keep in mind the essence of your actions. @Mowzer gave a great answer on the matter in hand, but I'd like to add a point of view. Is it illegal to eat while driving? Like pointed out by @Mowzer, if no law prohibits it, it's allowed by default (lots of countries have this premise). But what about the consequences of your actions? Maybe there's no law against eating in the car, but there sure is one in my country that specific says that you are not allowed to drive without using both hands in the wheel. The only exception to this rule is to take out your hand from the wheel to use the stick to change gears. Another point of view to add is the liability. Let's say you're minding your own business while driving and a lunatic trying to commit suicide jumps in front of your car. It's a pretty straight-forward case, you have no reason to be blamed. Now, let's add to the same scenario your snack; with a small change, you are now facing a accident that may have been caused by reckless driving (another thing commonly illegal). To sum up, the law is not really like math that have axioms that determine true or false statements without any distinguishment. That's why every case is single handled in the law by it's particularities.

Portable signs are legal and you have to obey then. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/27/section/65 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/482498/2-11.pdf

Would federal copyright be constitutional without the Copyright Clause? If the Constitution did not contain the Copyright Clause, would Congress still be able to implement copyright under the Commerce Clause or another part of the Constitution? Assume that the Constitution never contained the Copyright Clause, rather than the clause being repealed.

Eventually. This was a state matter prior to the enactment of the Constitution. Without the Copyright Clause, it would have been up to each state to enact such a law (apparently Delaware did not bother). This would have quickly led to inter-state disputes (a New York author being infringed by a New Jersey party), therefore the matter would have been heard by the federal courts. The current understanding of the Commerce Clause easily allows Congress to enact a copyright law, because copyright is quite commercial and potentially crosses state lines. It took a while for that clause to be interpreted by the courts the way it is now. This is a brief summary of historically shifting views on the Commerce Clause.

No, you can only patent: any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof 35 USC 101 The courts have read into this (along with being informed by constitutional constraints) judicial exceptions which preclude abstract ideas, laws of nature, and mathematical formulas from being patentable subject matter.

"I understand that a transcript of a podcast or video is a derivative work, and only the copyright owner can authorise creating a derivative work." You've answered your own question, at least for the US and Berne Convention (Wikipedia) signatories.

No. There are certain provisions of section 230 that carve out what liability these companies have for third party (i.e. User) speech on their web pages in 230(e). 230(e)(2) says that nothing in Section 230 may be construed to limit or expand laws reguarding intellectual property. These services are still on the hook if users post trademark or copyright infringing material to the site. Other such matters similarly not permitted include obscenities laws, exploitation of children laws, state laws, communications privacy laws, and sex trafficing laws. As a special note that section 230 was created to allow for emerging internet technologies and buisness to not have to worry about third party speech on their platform from holding them liable as a publisher. Thus, if I was to sue youtube for defamation of character based on a video you uploaded, calling me a Sith Lord, I could not sue Youtube (who has lots of money) but would rather have to sue you (who I presume does not have lots of money... at least not youtube/Google levels of money). Thus youtube cannot be civilily liable. It can still be criminally liable and liable for copyright infringement.

In the United States, individual members (States) of the union are allowed to make their own constitutions and state laws & regulations. This includes laws that may contradict Federal law, although this is a grey area. It usually comes down to enforcement: Federal laws are usually enforced by Federal law enforcement as they can not force states to do so. Further more, State prosecutors will usually not attempt to prosecute you for a Federal law infraction. Only Federal prosecutors OR the department of justice will do this. To see a more detailed explanation on this, look at this "How Stuff Works" article.

The right belongs to the federal government because the Constitution says it does, in Article 1 (section 8, clause 3). This, and the other rights listed in that section, are known as enumerated rights - that is, somebody has explicitly listed them out. The section begins The Congress shall have power .. and each clause may be read separately with that phrase prepended. They should each all be read together with the final clause, which is To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. In the context of the Constitution, this enumeration means that Congress alone has the authority to make such laws. In particular, Congress is the only legislature with the right to make laws governing commerce between states and each other, states and Indian nations, or states and foreign nations. Other sections and their clauses enumerate rights explicitly reserved to the States and the People, and further clarify that any rights not enumerated are also reserved thusly.

No Any such law would violate the US First Amendment as an improper restriction of speech and of the press. If done by the court rather thiygh a law, it would also conflict with 17 USC 105 which says that: Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government Courts have restricted video and still photography of court proceedings, on the ground that the presence of cameras would disturb court sessions and distract witnesses and jurors. But that would not apply to the proceedings of an appellate court.

There are a number of areas in which the US states can pass laws only to the extend that they do not conflict with Federal laws passed by Congress. When a federal law clearly says that states may not pass laws on a given subject, the issue is clear. When it specifically invites state laws, the issue is also clear. But when a Federal law imposes certain regulations in a given area, it may not be clear if a state may go beyond the Federal requirements. Sometimes it can. For example, there is a Federal Minimum Wage. But states are free to impose higher minimum wage levels, and some have done so. So when a court decision or legal article says "Congress having occupied the field" it means that a set of Federal laws is intended to be a compelte regulation of a given area, and states may not add additional regulations of their own in that area. I am not sure what rules apply to disclosure of information by the Capitol police.

UK Law - Legal consequences of marriage/divorce I'm trying to find a list of legal rights that partners within an existing family with children gain when they get married (or lose when they get divorced, while still living together). For example, in some situations a married couple may get certain rights (immigration scenarios). Is there a comprehensive list of rights that partners with children gain when they get married (or lose when they get divorced)? I'm interested in UK law specifically.

Short Answer Is there a comprehensive list of rights that partners with children gain when they get married (or lose when they get divorced)? No. There are lots, and lot, and lots of things in the law that depend upon marital status or involve rights gained in connection with marriage. These are scattered across the law and no one primary source or official government source compiles them all in one place. It isn't possible to comprehensively list them all in one answer in this forum, due to restrictions of answer writer time and length. You could easily write an 80 page law review article on the subject if you wanted to be really thorough and you also wanted to cover all U.K. jurisdictions. Many, but not all, of the rights and legal consequences associated with marriage can be created with agreements and legal instruments outside of marriage. But for an unmarried couple, this has to be done piecemeal in order to deviate from the default rules in the absence of marriage one by one. In contrast, marriage has many legal consequences for spouses that arise by default without additional documentation, and there are a few rights and legal consequences of marriage that can not be conferred upon someone in any other way than marriage. Nonetheless, this answer highlights the more notable and important distinctions below. Caveats Regarding The Scope Of the Answer Rights v. Consequences It is more helpful to think in terms of "legal consequences incident to marriage" rather than "marital rights" as some of the legal consequences of marriage are less natural to explain in terms of rights. U.K. Law Is Mostly Not Uniform On This Subject Unless otherwise clearly indicated, I am referring solely to the law of England and Wales. Most laws related to rights incident to marriage are not uniform in the U.K. Instead, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and England and Wales, each have their own separate laws on these subjects, although the differences between them are more differences of detail than of broad conceptual structure at a "forest" level. All references to England below are to England and Wales whether this is expressly stated or not. Who Is Compared? The comparison I am making is generally between married people and unmarried cohabitants, as the law that applies between total strangers isn't really analogous in most cases. (Even though it is theoretically possible to have a married couple that never significantly cohabitates.) While the question is specific to a couple with children, formal rights in relation to the children of a couple are only slightly different in theory. But, as discussed below, the limited size of child support payments make the differences between married couples with and without children in divorce cases, significant anyway because there is a right to property division and spousal maintenance in addition to child support for married couples but not for unmarried couples. Marriage v. Civil Partnerships In England In most, if not all, circumstances, couples in a "civil partnership" receive the same legal treatment as married couples in English law, and you may assume that they are mostly equivalent for the purposes described below. England also has same sex marriage, but a significant number of civil partnerships, most entered into between 2004 when they become available and 2013 when same sex marriage was allowed, remain in existence and have not been converted into marriages. Getting Married And Ending A Marriage Common Law Marriage v. Formal Marriage Despite being the source of the doctrine historically, England no longer has "common law marriage". Common law marriage was abolished in England in the Marriage Act (1753), although it wasn't as clearly established as it is now in common law marriage jurisdictions even before then. An unmarried couple can now become a legally married couple in England and Wales only by filling out the proper government forms and presenting them to the proper government officials. According to the same source, Scotland began formal marriage registration in 1855 (which was previously documents only by the church) and once had four forms of "irregular marriage", three of which were abolished prospectively (i.e. new marriages could not be formed in this way) in 1940, and the last of which was abolished prospectively in 2006. Common law marriage outside of England and Wales, when it did exist elsewhere in the British Commonwealth, was or became closer to the Scots law practice than the historical English practice. Other parts of the British Commonwealth and United Kingdom mostly also abolished common law marriage, but did so later than England did. India, however, has a legal doctrine quite similar to common law marriage today as a legacy of British law, for members of some religions, and Australia, Canada, and Ireland have recognized somewhat similar concepts by statute or local case law innovations. Notably, common law marriage had not been abolished in the American colonies at the time that the United States gained independence in 1776 (although it took a while for the British to diplomatically recognize this political reality). In the time period from 1753 to 2006, the formalities required to get married were more lax in Scotland than in England, so it was common in that time period for couples for whom the formalities of the English marriage system were inconvenient to travel to Scotland to marry. In addition to the reality of this situation, this is a prominent feature in many fictional novels set in this time period. As a result, there is an ample case law in English and Scottish courts over choice of law issues related to this reality. This case law was referred to regularly in the late 19th century and early 20th century by U.S. courts addressing choice of law issues related to marriage and divorce, particularly in cases involving marriages and divorces entered into in Mexico and the Caribbean in an effort to evade legal restrictions present in the home states of the couples involved. In most circumstances, however, the law of England and Wales will recognize the validity of a marriage which was legally entered into under the law of the place where the marriage where it was entered into, even if that marriage didn't comply with English law regarding what is necessary to get married. Terminating A Marriage In England Then And Now Also, like all other common law jurisdictions (and so far as I know, all other civil law jurisdictions), but unlike the situations in Islamic law, it is impossible in England and Wales to end a validly existing marriage by any means other than the death of a spouse or a court order decreeing that the marriage has been dissolved. Also, if a couple was not validly married, even though there could reasons someone might think that they were validly married, a court can clarify the situation by annulling a putative marriage. Historically, since England Christianized for the last time (after becoming almost entirely pagan after Anglo-Saxon invasions by the end of the 6th century that had been preceded by partial Christianization). The restoration of Christianity in England began about 600 CE, and had run its course well before the Norman invasion of 1066 CE, which is at the root of the modern English legal system. Divorce was then prohibited in England until the Anglican Church broke away from the Roman Catholic Church in 1532 in the English Reformation. The first Christian era marriage in England terminated by divorce since long before the Norman invasion in England was in the case of King Henry VIII's marriage to Anne which was terminated in 1552. The next divorce in England took place no earlier than 1670 (although there were a handful of aristocratic annulments in that time period), and divorce was only available by parliamentary decree until 1857 when the Matrimonial Causes Act (1857) was enacted, with just 324 divorces granted by parliament from 1670 to 1857. The same source notes that: Only four of the 324 cases were brought by women. A husband needed to prove adultery to obtain a divorce. By contrast, a wife was required to prove adultery and some other especially aggravating circumstance to have the same grounds. Over the years, women learned that brutality, rape, desertion and financial chicanery did not count. Under the 1857 Act divorce could be granted on the grounds of marital fault, for which adultery by itself sufficed for a man seeking a divorce and adultery by a husband together with cruelty, or rape and/or incest of someone else was required for a wife seeking a judicial divorce. Then according to the same source: A private members’ bill in 1923 made it easier for women to petition for divorce for adultery – but it still had to be proved. In 1937, the law was changed and divorce was allowed on other grounds, including drunkenness, insanity and desertion, although there was a bar on petitions for the first three years of the marriage. Divorce remained particularly rare even after judicial divorce was authorized, especially prior to the 1923 reforms in English divorce law. In the first decade of the 20th century, there was just one divorce for every 450 marriages. . . . it was not until the Divorce Reform Act 1969 that they reached the level we are familiar with today. This legislation marked an important shift not merely because it added further grounds for divorce, on the basis of two years' separation with the other party's consent, or five years' without, but because it removed the concept of ‘matrimonial offences' and hence the idea of divorce as a remedy for the innocent against the guilty. Today, there are just two marriages for every divorce each year. Finally, starting in April 2022 the divorce regime there became an almost fully no-fault divorce regime. So, basically, either member of a married couple can unilaterally divorce at will, without that five year waiting period required from 1969 to 2021, but with still having the economic consequences discussed below. Ummarried Couples Compared Unmarried couples can break up at will, and court intervention is only available to resolve specific disputes over title to specific property, child custody type issues, and child support type issues, which married couples if they broke up would address in a divorce case. If unmarried couples resolve all issues of property division, child custody, and child support by mutual agreement without ever having resorted to court intervention, court involvement in their break up is not required at all. As noted here: In response to the increase in cohabitation, several legal changes were made in the UK in recent years. In Scotland, the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 provides cohabitants with some limited rights. [ed. England does not currently have similar legislation in force.] In addition, since 2003 in England and Wales, 2002 in Northern Ireland, and 2006 in Scotland, an unmarried father has parental responsibility if he is listed on the birth certificate. . . . While 49% of cohabiting couples that aren't married or in a civil partnership believe they have rights under a 'common law marriage', common law marriage has no legal standing in England and Wales. Cohabiting couples aren't automatic beneficiaries or have protections regarding non-joint bank accounts, mortgages, tenancies or pensions, unless the other person is explicitly mentioned as a joint account holder or in the terms as a beneficiary, for example in the event of death. Notable Legal Implications Of Marriage In England and Wales I'll list only a sampling of the legal incidents of marriage which are now, or have historically been, among the most important (some of which have been repealed but are mentioned because many people are not aware that the historic legal situation is no longer the case): Paternity Marriage creates a strong legal presumption (which is in some cases rebuttable) that children born to a married woman are children of her husband. Until officially declared otherwise, a man is deemed to be a child’s legal father if he is married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth[.] Rape England no longer recognizes an immunity between spouses for rape. Spousal rape is a crime in England just as it would be for non-married cohabitants. Duty of Support A spouse has a duty to economically support a current spouse (beyond child support), while unmarried cohabitants do not have a duty of support to each other. If your partner won't support you, you can ask a court to order them to support you. When it was nearly impossible or at least very difficult to get legally divorced, this right was used in about a dozen cases a year almost always by women, often in the form of a lawsuit seeking divortium a mensa et thoro ("separation from bed and board") in the canon law courts of the Anglican Church, usually on the basis of adultery or life threatening cruelty and usually with the woman receiving regular spousal maintenance but losing all custody of her children as a result unless there were extenuating circumstances. These days, most spouses who are not being supported simply get divorced and receive spousal maintenance and a share of marital property (and possibly child support as well), instead, so the right to bring a lawsuit to enforce this right has largely fallen into dessitude and is rarely utilized in practice. The doctrine is mostly used to justify policies in other areas of the law that assume spouses provide economic support for each other (which they usually do even though this right is rarely enforced with lawsuits). Property Rights During Marriage During a marriage, the property rights of spouses are essentially identical to those of non-spouse cohabitants. This is as a result of the Married Women's Property Act (1870) which abolished the doctrine of coverture (which treated a husband and wife as a single economic unit managed by the husband) in England and Wales. During the marriage title to property controls who owns and controls property in England and Wales for the vast majority of purposes for members of the married couple, just as it does for unmarried cohabiting couples, even though title may be disregarded for married couples in a divorce, and in some cases in connection with inheritance rights. As discussed in Part 9 below, England and Wales does not have a "community property" regime that is effective during the course of a marriage (although it might recognize the "community property" character of property acquired during a marriage while the couple lived in a community property jurisdiction for some purposes. Income Taxation Marriage has income tax implications in he U.K. If you’re married or in a civil partnership You may be able to claim Marriage Allowance to reduce your partner’s tax if your income is less than the standard Personal Allowance. Government Benefits, Pensions, And Employee Benefits Marriage is relevant to rights under some government benefit including "welfare", programs, but the details are too numerous to set forth here. Likewise, marital status is frequently relevant to the rules for public and private pension plans, and sometimes for other public and private sector employee benefit plans as well. One isolated area where cohabitation can confer rights similar to marriage, however, is in English Social Security laws: Social security law Living together has been part of the law since the beginning of the modern welfare state in 1948. The term "Living together as husband and wife" was introduced from 4 April 1977 to mean the same as "cohabiting with a man as his wife" which was used before that date. The term is now "living together as a married couple". To be regarded as "living together as a married couple" or cohabitating, there are various questions to consider. The question of cohabitation should take into consideration all the six questions, and looking at the relationship as a whole. Additional details on the six factor test for recognition of an unmarried couple for English Social Security benefits purposes can be found here. Court Testimony Historically, England had a privilege that excluded from evidence in court cases certain testimony from spouses against each other and certain testimony about confidential communications between spouses. This has now been abolished. The form of privilege, restricting the admissibility into evidence of communications between spouses during a marriage, existed in English law from 1853 until it was abolished in 1968 (for civil cases) and in 1984 (for criminal cases). The testimonial part of the spousal privilege was mostly abolished in the late 1800s with further clarification through 1984 in certain domestic violence settings. Immigration Spousal status is relevant to an immigration application when one spouse is a British subject and the other is not. Also known as a UK marriage visa, a spouse visa allows married partners of UK citizens to immigrate to the UK because they are married to someone who is 'settled in the UK' - i.e. a person who is ordinarily resident in the UK and has no immigration restrictions on how long they can stay in the UK. Rights Upon A Divorce Or Breakup As a practical matter, differing rights if the couple breaks up are the single most important difference between being a cohabiting unmarried couple with kids and a married couple with kids. The difference matters because the less affluent member of the couple gets a much better deal upon a break up if the couple is married than if they couple is not married. The strong rights of a less affluent member of a couple primarily matter because this makes it economically safer for a woman in married couple who has kids to sacrifice her own economic prospects to focus on those kids than for a woman who is an unmarried cohabitant. This also matters because the economic incentive for a husband not to divorce a wife who is economically dependent upon him is much stronger than the economic incentive for an unmarried cohabitant boyfriend/father to not break up with an unmarried cohabitant girlfriend/mother. Upon divorce, a divorced spouse is entitled to share of the couple's property and/or spousal maintenance (a.k.a. alimony) in excess of child support, which are far in excess of the rights of a non-spouse cohabitant, especially in the case of a long marriage in which the couple's wealth has grown during the marriage. Non-spousal cohabitants who split up divide their property based upon title to property and have no spousal maintenance obligations to each other so only child support (if applicable) is at issue. Child support and custody are still present between unmarried cohabitants or co-parents who have children together. In the arena of property division, England does not have what in the U.S. is called "community property". There is, instead, a distinction between marital property acquired during the marriage and separate property, and England and Wales has an "equitable division" regime rather than one in which there is a fixed percentage right of each spouse, and marital property rights remain inchoate (rather than vested and presenting existing) until death or divorce. If a property settlement is not reached by mutual agreement a court considers factors including: Each partner’s individual assets Contributions to the marriage or civil partnership, both financially and emotionally Time out of the workplace Earning capacity Standard of living before the break-up Requirements such as catering for disabilities Length of marriage How old you both are In practice, the fact that a couple has children together also tends to influence what is equitable in a property division. The presence or absence of spousal maintenance greatly impacts the practical effect of a split up for a couple with children who are married v. a couple with children who are not married. A marital property settlement and spousal maintenance in addition to child support makes life a lot easier for a less affluent ex-spouse than child support alone. Inheritance Upon death, a surviving spouse has inheritance rights different from and greater than a non-spouse cohabitant, in the estate of the deceased spouse. Generally speaking, if there is no will, a spouse has significant inheritance rights, while a non-spouse cohabitant does not. There are also legal limitations on the extent to which a spouse can be denied an inheritance even if there is a will. While in general, a spouse has testamentary freedom to disinherit a spouse in English law (unlike the vqst majority of U.S. and civil law jurisdictions), in England, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act (1975) "sets out categories of people that have the legal standing to challenge another person's Will on the basis that they have not been left reasonable financial provision." Spouses also have greater rights at death than unmarried cohabitants with regard to management of a probate estate of a decedent partner and disposition of a partner's body, at least in the absence of estate planning documents to the contrary. Transfers to a spouse at death are also exempt from inheritance taxation. Marital status is also highly relevant in England to the rules for succession to aristocratic titles and for the titles of someone who is married to someone with an aristocratic title. While English law normally makes little or no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children (which is a function of whether their parents were married), in the area of succession to aristocratic titles and eligibility for titles that imply marriage to someone with an aristocratic title (like the former Queen's Consort), the distinction between married couples and their children, and unmarried couples and their children is very important. Incapacity Unlike most U.S. jurisdictions, marriage does not, in and of itself, grant strong rights relative to a cohabitating partner, to a role in medical decision making or guardianship proceedings in England. An adult's "next of kin" is generally their spouse or civil partnership partner, which is not automatic in the case of a cohabitating partner. But, the rights associated with next of kin status are generally limited to notice or information until another basis to be involved in decision-making is established: As far as the law is concerned next of kin means nothing with the exception of children aged under 18. The next of kin of a child under 18 may be legally entitled to make decisions for or on behalf of the child. The term usually means your nearest blood relative. In the case of a married couple or a civil partnership it usually means their husband or wife. Next of kin is a title that can be given, by you, to anyone from your partner to blood relatives and even friends. It is also possible to name more than one person as your next of kin. This is a title that is primarily used in order for emergency services to know who to keep informed about an individual’s condition and treatment. This means that you have no legal rights as a result of this title. This can create difficulties if you haven’t put additional measures in place to manage your relative or loved one’s affairs. If you do not have any legal rights, you cannot make decisions on their behalf. Similarly, pretty much anyone can be appointed to be an adult's guardian in England, with no absolute priority for a spouse or a blood family member over a cohabitating partner or any other person expressing interest in the care of an incapacitated person. Marriage is just one factor among many considered in a fairly wholistic manner when deciding between competing applications to serve as someone's guardian. Cohabitation Post-Divorce By A Formerly Married Couple A married couple with children that gets divorced and then cohabits post-divorce are not on quite the same footing as a cohabiting couple with children who have never married. The starting point in such a couple for the rights of the former spouses vis-a-vis each other begins with the divorce decree and any incorporated settlement between the spouses in connection with the divorce. Provisions related to child custody and child support may be modified over time as the children grow and circumstances change. In some unusual but not unheard of circumstances, spousal support duties arising from the prior marriage can be imposed long after the divorce even if spousal support was not immediately imposed at the time of the divorce or was only nominal at that time. Provisions related to court ordered child custody arrangements, child support, and spousal support normally continue in force until they are spent by the their own terms (e.g. when the children become adults or spousal support established for a fixed time period ends), are modified by a later court order, or the couple remarries. It is uncommon, but not completely unheard of, for the children of a couple for whom child custody arrangements have been imposed between unmarried coparents or in a divorce at one point, to ever cease to be subject to some sort of court order related to child custody. Court orders related to children or spousal maintenance cannot normally be adjusted by mutual agreement after a divorce without court intervention. Remarriage will generally abrogate and cause to become void all provisions in a divorce decree, settlement, or post-divorce court order related to the children, and all provisions with spousal maintenance, while the property ownership and debt obligations of the parties to the remarriage restart from scratch at whatever state they were in immediately prior to the remarriage. Sometimes a remarriage after a divorce legitimatizes the paternity of children born between the marriages. First Marriages Of A Cohabiting Couple With Children When a cohabiting couple with children marry, they have all of the incidents of a married couple. Sometimes, but not always, this will help establish the father's paternity of their children. Court orders related to the custody and child support of their shared children will usually be dissolved (I don't know if any formal legal action is required to do this or not). Property acquired by the couple prior to marrying while cohabiting will generally be separate property owned by the spouse who was in title to that property prior to getting married. In a subsequent divorce of that couple, the length of the marriage will not include the full time of their cohabitation, but their cohabitation prior to marriage is a factor which a divorce judge is not prohibited from considering entirely in making an equitable division of marital property and in awarding spousal maintenance.

united-states Overview If someone owns a house before marriage, would that house be exempt from asset division in divorce? For simplicity, assume that otherwise, asset picture is fairly simple and even (2 working spouses with similar income, no children, a shared savings/checking account, similarly sized retirements accounts, no other properties or investments). This seemingly simple question doesn't have a simple answer. This is in part because state law on the subject varies so much. Would the answer depend on any factors other than whether the state is Equitable Distribution vs community property? Yes. The other reason that this is a difficult question to answer is that there are many other potentially relevant factors. This answer will provide some examples of some of the relevant facts that were not provided in the question. State Law Varies Greatly It is necessary to look to particular states, such as the New York and California, as suggested in the question, regarding this matter, as there is no uniformity or even guidance in federal law (there is even a common law exception to federal court jurisdiction that actually specifically prohibits federal courts from handling divorces and other domestic relations matters). There are two extreme starting points in terms of how this question is handled under state law, but many states are hybrid systems that borrow from each of these systems. Also, there are very practically important differences in detail with respect to how final outcomes are determined, even in states that have the same basic systems. Once critical details are considered, there are probably at least half a dozen basic sets of rules among the fifty U.S. states concerning the question of how a house acquired prior to marrying by one spouse before marriage is treated in a property division during a divorce, and each of those basic sets of rules has some state specific variations. This also sets aside the ubiquitous possibility in every U.S. state that these rules have been modified by a marital agreement between the spouses (such as a prenuptial agreement). There are also significant differences between states, beyond the scope of this question, regarding the inheritance rights of a spouse in a house acquired by the other spouse before the marriage began in that spouse's sole name, at death. Equitable Division One of the two extremes in U.S. law is the pure traditional equitable division rule, in which all property of each spouse (regardless of whose name it is titled in) may be distributed in a manner that the judge finds to be equitable, rather than equal, and the concepts of separate and marital or community property does not exist. In the traditional equitable division regime, and in some states, but not others, a divorce court may consider marital fault in some (but not all) divorces, in deciding what is equitable in divorces commenced on fault based grounds. Each of these states has both fault based and no-fault divorces, a marital fault in not considered in property divisions in no-fault divorces in these states. New York State, for example, has a mixed fault and no-fault based divorce system. In equitable division states, often a business or a pension will be allocated entirely to a spouse who is active in the business or occupation associated with that asset, and a house will be allocated to a spouse who is not involved with the business or the occupation that gave rise to the pension. Community Property Another of the extremes in U.S. law is the community property regime, in which property acquired before the marriage and by a gift or inheritance are separate property not subject to division in a divorce, and everything acquired during the marriage is owned 50-59 by the spouses. In a community property state, property acquired by either spouse during the marriage automatically becomes property that is owned 50-50 by the spouses immediate and often some kinds of property formally titled in only one spouse's name can't be transferred without the consent of both spouses. For example, in California, which is a community property state, a house purchased in the name of one spouse before the couple marries is initially, at least, on the day of the wedding, entirely the separate property of the spouse who owns it. But, considerations discussed below regarding appreciation and the source of payments to related to the house will sometimes muddy the waters of this analysis. New York State: A Hybrid System New York State is strictly speaking an equitable distribution state and a spouse does not have a present ownership interest in property titled in their spouse's name which is acquired during the marriage. But, New York State does make a distinction between separate property and marital property at the time of a divorce, so it is really a hybrid of a traditional equitable division regime and a community property regime, unlike some other states that are more pure examples of the traditional equitable division system. During the divorce both spouses have to tell the judge about their income and any debts they owe. When the court grants a divorce, property will be divided equitably (though not always equally) between the spouses. New York's Equitable Distribution Law recognizes marriage as an economic as well as a social partnership. The law requires that a judge divide property as fairly as possible. The Equitable Distribution Law talks about two types of property for purposes of divorce: marital property and separate property. Marital property will be divided between the two spouses. Marital Property: all property either spouse bought during the marriage, regardless of whose name is on the property. Pension plans and other retirement plans are considered marital property. The portion of marital property earned during the marriage will be divided by the court. Separate Property: property a spouse owned before the marriage, or any inheritance or personal injury payments or gifts from someone other than the spouse during the marriage. To see the factors a court should consider in making an equitable distribution award, see Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d). (Source) In New York State, separate property and marital property is defined as follows: c. The term "marital property" shall mean all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held, except as otherwise provided in agreement pursuant to subdivision three of this part. Marital property shall not include separate property as hereinafter defined. d. The term separate property shall mean: (1) property acquired before marriage or property acquired by bequest, devise, or descent, or gift from a party other than the spouse; (2) compensation for personal injuries; (3) property acquired in exchange for or the increase in value of separate property, except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse; (4) property described as separate property by written agreement of the parties pursuant to subdivision three of this part. (Source) The factors to be considered in the equitable property division in New York State, per the same source, are as follows: Disposition of property in certain matrimonial actions. a. Except where the parties have provided in an agreement for the disposition of their property pursuant to subdivision three of this part, the court, in an action wherein all or part of the relief granted is divorce, or the dissolution, annulment or declaration of the nullity of a marriage, and in proceedings to obtain a distribution of marital property following a foreign judgment of divorce, shall determine the respective rights of the parties in their separate or marital property, and shall provide for the disposition thereof in the final judgment. b. Separate property shall remain such. c. Marital property shall be distributed equitably between the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. d. In determining an equitable disposition of property under paragraph c, the court shall consider: (1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the time of the commencement of the action; (2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties; (3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects; (4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage as of the date of dissolution; (5) the loss of health insurance benefits upon dissolution of the marriage; (6) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part; (7) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party. The court shall not consider as marital property subject to distribution the value of a spouse's enhanced earning capacity arising from a license, degree, celebrity goodwill, or career enhancement. **However, in arriving at an equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider the direct or indirect contributions to the development during the marriage of the enhanced earning capacity of the other spouse; (8) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property; (9) the probable future financial circumstances of each party; (10) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party; (11) the tax consequences to each party; (12) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse; (13) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration; (14) whether either party has committed an act or acts of domestic violence, as described in subdivision one of section four hundred fifty-nine-a of the social services law, against the other party and the nature, extent, duration and impact of such act or acts; (15) in awarding the possession of a companion animal, the court shall consider the best interest of such animal. "Companion animal", as used in this subparagraph, shall have the same meaning as in subdivision five of section three hundred fifty of the agriculture and markets law; and (16) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper. e. In any action in which the court shall determine that an equitable distribution is appropriate but would be impractical or burdensome or where the distribution of an interest in a business, corporation or profession would be contrary to law, the court in lieu of such equitable distribution shall make a distributive award in order to achieve equity between the parties. The court in its discretion, also may make a distributive award to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of marital property. f. In addition to the disposition of property as set forth above, the court may make such order regarding the use and occupancy of the marital home and its household effects as provided in section two hundred thirty-four of this chapter, without regard to the form of ownership of such property. g. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision and such may not be waived by either party or counsel. h. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision the court shall, where appropriate, consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage, as defined in subdivision six of section two hundred fifty-three of this article, on the factors enumerated in paragraph d of this subdivision. Thus, in New York State, unlike Colorado (discussed below), appreciation in the value of separate property during the marriage is separate property and not marital property. Section 234 of the New York Domestic Relations Law referenced in the bolded language above states: § 234. Title to or occupancy and possession of property. In any action for divorce, for a separation, for an annulment or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, the court may (1) determine any question as to the title to property arising between the parties, and (2) make such direction, between the parties, concerning the possession of property, as in the court's discretion justice requires having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. Such direction may be made in the final judgment, or by one or more orders from time to time before or subsequent to final judgment, or by both such order or orders and final judgment. Where the title to real property is affected, a copy of such judgment, order or decree, duly certified by the clerk of the court wherein said judgement was rendered, shall be recorded in the office of the recording officer of the county in which such property is situated, as provided by section two hundred ninety-seven-b of the real property law. Usually, the authority granted by Section 234 is used to enter temporary orders granting a spouse possession and use of a residence titled in the name of the other spouse until the case is concluded, although it could be applied to a post-decree decision as well. Also, while New York State now finally has "no fault" divorces (it was the last state in the U.S. to make this option available), it also allows spouses to commence a fault based divorce. In a fault based divorce, marital fault (e.g. having an affair) can be considered as a factor by the court in equitably dividing the couple's property in the divorce if fault is successfully established. Fun Fact: In New York State, family court judges don't have jurisdiction over divorces, which are instead handled by the general jurisdiction trial court in the state known as the "Supreme Court". New York State's apex court is called the "Court of Appeals". Complicating Factors The reality, however, is more complicated than these extremes in most cases. Many states adopt parts of each regime, develop their own special rules, or implement the same basic system of marital property ownership and property division upon divorce in different ways. Appreciation And Payment Of Carrying Costs During The Marriage For example, Colorado is not technically a community property state, and community property rights of a spouse in marital property are not recognized during the marriage. But in Colorado, upon divorce, there is a distinction between separate property and marital property that is very similar to that found in community property states. And, in Colorado, while property owned before a marriage is not marital property, appreciation in the value of separate property during the marriage, and income from separate property, is marital property. Another issue is what payment of mortgages and other costs of maintain real estate that is separate property from funds earned from wages or investments of either spouse during the marriage, will often muddy the waters. California's rule in this situation is non-obvious from general community property principles ands is quite tricky and technical. California allocates some appreciation of separate property which has had mortgage principal paid for in part from income earned during the marriage or marital property to community property and some of the appreciation to separate property, on a pro-rated basis determined at the time that the property is valued for divorce purposes. For example, in California, if the home was worth $100,000 net of a $100,000 mortgage at the time of the marriage, and then is then sold free and clear net of costs of sale for $400,000, then $100,000 of the proceeds are separate property, $100,000 of the proceeds are community property, and $200,000 of the proceeds are appreciation is is pro-rated between the two, in this case, evenly. so $200,000 of the proceeds is separate property and $200,000 of the proceeds is marital property. But, taxes, insurance payments, and interest payments as opposed to principal payments, do not add to the community property value of the house, as they are current expenses that don't change the value of the property under California law, even though money is fungible. In general, some states that distinguish between separate and marital property, or separate and community property, at the time of a divorce, treat appreciation in separate property and payment of carrying costs for separate property as giving rise to some marital or community property interest in that property that is traceable to appreciation during the marriage or income acquired during the marriage, while other states continue to treat property acquired before the marriage entirely as separate property even if it appreciates, and/or even if carrying costs for the property are paid for from income acquired during the marriage. In states where appreciation in the property and/or payment of carrying costs with income earned during a marriage, gives separate property a partial marital property status, these two factors often convert a house that was originally separate property almost entirely into marital property after a long marriage, while modifying its separate property status only slightly after a short marriage. In the same vein, different states that distinguish between separate property on one hand, and marital or community property on the other, treat income from separate property earned during a marriage such as rent, interest, and dividends, differently than other states do and sometimes differently than appreciation in the asset itself. Quasi-Community Property A third complicating issue is the question of "quasi-community property." If property is acquired as separate property or community property in a community property state, many states which are not community property states will treaty property acquired or owned by one or more members of the couple while they lived in that community property state as if it were governed by the community property laws of the place where the property is located, or the laws of the place where it was located before it was sold and reinvested in property in the state where the divorce case is being litigated. Other jurisdictions recognize property acquired while a couple lived in a community property state and its proceeds to retain its community property v. separate property status with a "quasi-community property" doctrine. But, these jurisdictions, rather than applying the community property laws of the state where particular property was acquired, applies a generic set of community property laws to property acquired in any community property state during the marriage. Sanctions For Economic Waste Also, in both traditional equitable division regimes that make a separate v. marital property distinction, and in community property regimes, sometimes if the owner of the house that would otherwise be classified as separate property commits "economic waste" that destroys the value of marital property out of spite, or without good cause. When that happens, a court may order that the harm to the marital or community property caused by the economic waste of a spouse be remedied with a contributions from the guilty spouse's separate property. Marital Agreements Finally, almost every state allows married couples to modify the property division rules of the state as applied to that couple, in a prenuptial agreement or a postnuptial agreement (collectively, "marital agreements") if it is prepared with the proper disclosures and formalities, and informed consent is given to the agreement. For example, one of the common terms of a marital agreement (especially for late in life remarriages of widows and widowers, but also in many other cases) states that upon a divorce, legal title to property will be followed strictly when making a property division, with the value of any jointly owned property split exactly equally. In other words, a marital agreement will often provide that property will be divided upon a divorce in the same way that it would be divided if the couple had never married. This is sometimes called a "your's is your's, and mine is mine" prenup. Marital agreements like this also often waive any right to alimony to the full extent permitted by law (which economically is almost equivalent to treating the members of the couple as if they had never married) and often waive any inheritance rights of a surviving spouse upon their spouse's death.

The legal system advances practitioners on a number of criteria, not all of which relate to their legal education. It's essentially the same for all professions - your schooling/education may or may not determine your success in the field. Also relevant would be the social circles you navigate, your achievements post-education, and so on.

No However, only the first wife is recognised as a wife under US law. Please note that it is not illegal to live in a polyamorous relationship in the US: only to marry in the US while still married to another person.

Not much. Consider the following: The father can not force the mother to abort the pregnancy. Ex post facto agreements of non-payment are, in all likelihood, unenforceable. The father will be obligated to pay child support under the laws of the state with jurisdiction over the paternity. The abortion angle won’t work. Setting aside commentary regarding the politics or ethics of abortion. I think we can agree it is a highly charged and emotional topic for some people. I point to the fact it always seems to be an issue during Supreme Court nominations and presidential elections. Given the explosive nature of the issue of whether abortions should be legal or not (in the case where the mother does not want to carry full term) could you imagine how much more dynamite it would add to the debate if the question were whether or not to allow the father to force the mother to terminate the pregnancy against the mother's wishes! One can only imagine how much more bombastic the abortion debate might then become. You can’t escape child support (most likely). To give you a sense of how difficult it is to escape the obligations of child support. Consider the following... A Kansas man was ordered to pay child support when he thought he was being a sperm donor only and signed numerous agreements with the lesbian couple he thought he was helping. In that case, the court justified its ruling on the grounds that a doctor was not involved in the insemination process. But nothing prevents future courts from making the same ruling in cases where a doctor is involved in the insemination process. Especially if that state either withdraws from the The Uniform Parentage Act, amends it, repeals it, or never adopts it in the first place. Sperm Donors and Child Support: Even in cases in which the donor is known, but holds himself out as unknown, some courts have held the donor legally obligated to pay child support. Read more here. Ex post facto agreements are problematic. Now that you've edited the question, the above link is even more useful for providing a possible avenue to try (albeit unlikely to work): a non-payment agreement. The discussion in that link describes that even if you could somehow convince the mother to go along with it, it is unlikely (though not impossible) to be enforced by the courts. It depends on the facts (e.g., intercourse vs. in vitro), circumstances (e.g., relationship vs. no relationship between the parties), timing (e.g., before vs. after the agreement), etc. of the impregnation itself. Notwithstanding all the above, if you still have questions, you might consider floating an idea of an approach you think you might try (in a separate question) and get reactions to that specific proposal.

Yes The only accurate thing in the linked article is: "I am not a Constitutional lawyer." That could be taken further into "I have no real idea how our legal and political systems work." One of the tasks of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is to interpret the laws of Massachusetts including the Massachusetts Constitution. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health the court decided that the Constitution provided for equal protection and due process and that if the state wished to discriminate against people on the basis of sex they needed a good reason. The reasons the state put forward were: providing a 'favorable setting for procreation'; ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the department defines as 'a two-parent family with one parent of each sex'; and preserving scarce State and private financial resources. On 1. the court said marriage is irrelevant for procreation and vice-versa. On 2. they said Massachusetts law on child welfare dealt with the "best interests of the child" and that it is not in those interests for the state to deprive the child of benefits because it doesn't like the sexual orientation of the parents. On 3. they said equal protection means equal protection. In a common law legal system like Massachusetts where courts have the power to strike down legislation then that takes effect as soon as the decision is published. The law ceases to exist without the legislature or the executive doing anything. Now, the people of Massachusetts are free to amend their constitution to outlaw same-sex marriage or remove equal protection rights if they want. However, at the time and subsequently, the majority don't want.

The first step is for the parents of the child to seek a court order for child support. This would be based on your friend being the actual father, and the non-mother not having adopted the child (extinguishing the obligations of the father). Many states, but not Michigan, have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act which covers assisted reproduction, but even in those states, this does not constitute assisted reproduction. The "agreement" is legally invalid (surrogate parentage contracts are unenforceable), and that, folks, is why you should hire an attorney rather than devising a legal theory on your own. This article summarizes the various paternity laws of Michigan. Under the Paternity Act, this may be a child born out of wedlock, if the child is a child begotten and born to a woman who was not married from the conception to the date of birth of the child, or a child that the court has determined to be a child born or conceived during a marriage but not the issue of that marriage where the meaning of the last expression would have to be determined by the court. Probably the court would say "this child is not the 'issue' of the marriage", given legislative intent. Under the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, unmarried parent can by signing a statement "define" the parentage of a child, but the statute is specifically limited to a man acknowledging paternity, and cannot apply to a lesbian couple. The clearest statement of the law of parentage for lesbian couples in Michigan is Lefever v. Matthews where (just one year ago) the court held that both of two women were parents – but in that case, the eggs came from one of the women and they were implanted into the other woman. An important distinguishing feature is that in this case, the woman at a statutory disadvantage sought parental rights, whereas your question is about a legal parent seeking to avoid a legal obligation to the child. Courts generally do everything possible to protect a child's right to support by the parents. The prospects that an actual father could avoid that obligation are slim.

You don't need to "report" it to anyone in the US or do anything else. The US doesn't have any national registry of marriage. Any marriage or divorce conducted anywhere in the world is automatically recognized anywhere in the US (with some exceptions like polygamous marriages); the same is true in many other countries. How does the U.S. find out, for tax or insurance purposes? Obviously there's a little box that says [] Married but how would they know if I lied if I'm not registered in the United States? They don't, and don't need to. (The same is true for marriages in the US -- they don't directly "know".) You are required to use an appropriate filing status for your marriage status at the end of the year for each year's tax returns. If you don't, you are committing fraud. There are lots of things that you can intentionally lie about on tax returns, and they may not immediately "find out"; but when they do, you are in big trouble. Am I legally required to report it when I return? No. Would the Canadian/provincial government inform the U.S./state government? No.

What provision of the CPR requires any parties who might possibly be claimants to an action to be made defendants if they are not? A blog site mentions a provision requiring all parties who might be a party to a claim to be listed as defendants if they are not participating as claimants, but I cannot find it again now that I want to. What provision of the civil procedure rules is this, what is the logic of it, and how does it actually work in practice?

Civil Procedure Rule 19.3 provides Provisions applicable where two or more persons are jointly entitled to a remedy: (1) Where a claimant claims a remedy to which some other person is jointly entitled with him, all persons jointly entitled to the remedy must be parties unless the court orders otherwise. (2) If any person does not agree to be a claimant, he must be made a defendant, unless the court orders otherwise. (3) This rule does not apply in probate proceedings. My reading is that it is a technical device to deal with circumstances where a number of people are severally jointly entitled to a remedy or redress but not all wish to make a claim for some reason or another. Imagine the simplistic scenario (but hopefully not too simplistic that it loses its meaning) where Dave the defendant destroys an asset jointly and severally owned by Alice, Bob and Carol thus causing a loss to all three. Carol does not wish to be a party to the claim so she becomes a co-defendant next to Dave, but she remains a joint and several owner - for now anyway. If Alice's and Bob's claim is successful one potential outcome is that an order is made to award Carol's "share" ownership of the asset jointly and severally over to Alice and Bob - in effect removing Carol from the equation. Dave is then ordered to pay Alice and Bob damages. One example of joint ownership is joint tenants who... ...have equal rights to the whole property – neither one [of you] has a specific “share” in the property

No. A plaintiff may travel to the defendant's jurisdiction to file suit if desired. Nobody usually does this, though, due to travel and logistical considerations. The defendant is the one who decides whether to challenge jurisdiction. Good contacts will include a forum selection clause which would lay out what happens where in the event of a dispute. And this can be anywhere, it is not limited to the locations of the plaintiff and the defendant. N/A.

"Legal requirement" can and in this case simply means "it's what is required in order for us to be reasonably able to offer you this service", noting that it would be unreasonable for such a dangerous business to operate, when one moron slipping and suing them could put them out of business. It's a little surprising that you've never had to sign a waiver before, but there are quite a number of similar waivers out there, such as REI (Seattle), The Edge (Vt), Croc Center (Coeur d'Alene), YMCA (MI) and U. Nebraska. They all have in common the requirement of a signature (indicating that you've waived your right to sue them), birth date, date of signature. This is the bare minimum that's required to have a valid waiver, and more info would be better (to uniquely identify the customer out of the 1000 John Smith's in the state and 500,000 in the US). If you break yourself and try to sue, they will trot out the waiver to put an end to the suit. Name, address, phone number and birth date do a long ways towards proving that the person who signed the waiver is indeed you.

The main rules in a civil case are the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, and a set of largely unwritten rules governing issues such as the order in which matters are presented in a trial and courtroom conduct. Basically, the rules of evidence are really a subset of a larger set of written and unwritten rules about courtroom conduct the unwritten parts of which are assumed to be known by people using them. Robert's Rules of Order do not apply to courtroom proceedings. The judge also has the "direct contempt" power to summarily punish disrespectful conduct in the courtroom without a trial, with fines or incarceration, even if it wouldn't be a crime outside the courtroom. But what if a party to the proceedings who does not "have the floor" wishes to do things like the following: Obtain a restatement (perhaps because it was unintelligible, or perhaps as a ploy for emphasis) of something uttered by another. If you are a party asking a question (or more likely an attorney for a party asking a question on behalf of a party) it is not improper to say, "I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you." It is also not generally improper for a non-questioning party to interject and state that they can't hear a witness to a judge. Obtain clarification of a statement. This can be done by a party only when it is the party's turn to cross-examine or redirect as the case may be. A judge can ask for clarification, but a party cannot do so when it is not their turn. Determine or clarify the purpose of an ongoing statement or line of questioning Generally the party not asking a question objects and the court asks the party asking the question to clarify the reason. Sometimes, in a jury trial, the party asked to clarify will say "may we approach the bench" and a private discussion will be held between counsel for both sides and the judge regarding an ongoing issue. Determine whether the judge will allow something later in the proceedings. (E.g., "At some point I hope to speak to point X. May I do that now? Or will I be afforded that opportunity at some later point before the conclusion of this hearing?") Lawyers are expected to know this for the most part without having to ask. Also, usually before the court starts to take evidence, and at breaks, the judge will ask "are there any preliminary matters that need to be addressed?" or "are there any procedural matters that need to be addressed?" and questions such as this can be raised at that time.

Anywhere in the world, do parties to court hearings have no absolute right to access those transcripts (or recordings)? I have not checked every common law jurisdiction but I suspect that as all (?) such courts have their own inherent powers to make directions the answer is probably: NO. That said, a close-but-no-cigar example may be found at Rule 79.30 of the Civil Procedure Rules concerning terrorist financing proceedings in england-and-wales: Unless the court directs otherwise, rule 5.4 (Register of Claims), rule 5.4B (Supply of documents from court records – a party) and rule 5.4C (Supply of documents from court records –a non-party) do not apply to any proceedings to which Section 2 or 3 of this Part applies or to any document relating to such proceedings. "Sections 2 and 3 of this Part" refers to applications to set aside financial restrictions and appeals against being designated as being linked to terrorism. The relevant cited Rules are: 5.4 (1) A court or court office may keep a publicly accessible register of claims which have been issued out of that court or court office. (2) Any person who pays the prescribed fee may, during office hours, search any available register of claims. And 5.4B (1) A party to proceedings may, unless the court orders otherwise, obtain from the records of the court a copy of any document listed in paragraph 4.2A of Practice Direction 5A. (2) A party to proceedings may, if the court gives permission, obtain from the records of the court a copy of any other document filed by a party or communication between the court and a party or another person.

In an adversarial legal system, the parties are responsible for framing the issues in dispute and adducing relevant evidence. The parties, and perhaps more importantly their lawyers, also have an obligation of candour to the court. Courts routinely accept unchallenged assertions because there are serious consequences for misleading the court, and the opponent (rather than the court which should remain neutral) is in the best position to investigate and prove any suspected dishonesty. It is a matter for the party commencing proceedings (plaintiff or prosecutor) to decide how the parties will be named. People often change their names, and may use multiple spellings. It is not uncommon for typographical or other errors to appear. Generally, it is in the interest of at least one party to name the parties "correctly," ie. consistently with other government records that will be used to enforce any judgment, but a person's name is ultimately a formal matter that can be corrected if necessary. In cases of uncertainty, aliases can be specified, as occurred in Microsoft v McDonald (aka Gary Webb) [2006] EWHC 3410 (Ch). A person who is genuinely known by an alias (ie. the use of the alias is not part of an attempt to mislead the court) should use their "real" name in court, but could potentially conduct litigation using the alias without anybody noticing. However, court proceedings are public and this would not necessarily protect the person's identity. To achieve this, an anonymity order under CPR 39.2 is required, as explained in XXX v Camden London Borough Council [2020] EWCA Civ 1468 [13]–[22].

As someone who acts for both landlords and tenants I would say that I have never seen exclusions for personal injury or death in a commercial lease. I would recommend that you have the whole lease reviewed by a solicitor dealing in commercial property, particularly as, as has been stated in another reply, exclusion of liability for personal injury or death is prohibited by UCTA. This would suggest there may be other provisions which, if not prohibited, are unreasonable and you should be aware of the commitments you are taking on prior to signing This pure speculation, but the fact that those clauses would not be in a standard lease precedent does make me wonder if the landlord has done a DIY job and produced a lease from the internet suitable for another jurisdiction.

Does the party have any legal leverage to engage the police (or other competent authorities apart from private investigators) to help locate the witness and serve the summons on them? Not really. Legal process is not infrequently served by a sheriff's deputy. But the deputy will not generally take any initiative to locate a person to be served beyond what it provided by the litigant. The main reasons to have a sheriff's deputy serve someone with process is the fear that the person served might react violently. Or is it just the party's bad luck that the witness cannot be located and served on? Pretty much.

Is a company liable if someone leaves their bank logged in on a company PC? If a company sets up computers in a break area for employees to access their timecard, payroll, bank accounts, etc., can the company get in trouble if an employee leaves their private accounts logged in?

The party providing the computer, ISp connecting the computer to the internet, or manufacturer of the computer would not be liable. A person wishing to sue for damages would have to establish that the defendant was negligent in their action. The underlying premise is that all parties have some obligation to all other parties to care, to some extent. The inquiry ask haw a reasonable prudent person would behave in this context when pursuing their goals to avoid harming others. A reasonably prudent person would not provide a rack of sharp carving knives on the floor of a daycare center. A reasonably prudent person would provide a rack of sharp carving knives on a work-table at a fish-cleaning business. In both cases, it is possible that a person might cut themselves. In the daycare center, the toddlers on the floor are not assumed to share any of the burden of care, in the fish-store, the employees are assumed to share some of the burden of care. The ISP knows that it is possible that a person will harm themselves when they surf the web, but that does not make them liable for damages when an irresponsible party deliberately and knowingly connects to a nest of viruses, likewise the computer maker. The alternative is that providing an internet connection always makes you liable, or building a computer: that would be the end of SE. Two parties can significantly and reasonably mitigate the risk: the bank, and the customer. The customer can either decline to use this unsafe computer, or they can take precautions, in particular remembering to log out. The bank can also do certain things without harming their interest: providing ample warnings (which they do), or automatically logging a customer out after a period of inactivity (a metric of the fact that the customer just up and left). Banks do that too. The only control that could be reasonably be expected from the company, short of simply not providing a computer in the break room, would be filtering to prevent any access to certain kinds of web sites, such as porn sites, banks, or SE. Filtering for the first type of site is overall consistent with reasonable company objectives (which is to accommodate reasonable employee interests in accessing or transmitting information during the work day). Given the reasonable goals of the company, the jury would not likely find that the company had breached their duty to the employee. The jury balances these interests of the parties, and would determine that the company could not be expected to filter out connection requests to banks, and that they can reasonably rely on prudent actions by the employee and bank to prevent whatever happened.

I believe in this case, your company (OrgX) is a data processor and your customer's organization (OrgY) is the data controller. OrgY is responsible for establishing a lawful basis for sending you (OrgX) the personal data for their employees. Note that consent is just one of six lawful bases outlined in article 6(1). I'm no expert, but I believe OrgY's admin can claim they have a legitimate interest in sending their employee's personal data for training sake. In either case, the data processor is not responsible for establishing the lawful basis for processing. Of course, data processors aren't completely off the hook. GDPR outlines specific requirements for data processors (see chapter 4, particularly article 28).

Could the victim report this as fraud, theft or some other related crime? They could, but it's unclear whether they would be successful. A criminal conviction would require intent on the part of the company or an employee, and that will probably be difficult to prove. In a big system like this, individuals can usually claim misunderstandings and errors of omission, which makes such a proof difficult. They could try to establish criminal corporate liability, but again this is difficult to prove. So while possible, it's probably not worth it. Would the answer to the previous question differ based on whether the victim was eventually able to recover the money through litigation or by disputing the charge with their bank? Probably not. For a criminal conviction, it's necessary to prove that the company or an employee deliberately took money they knew was not theirs. Whether they later gave it back is not relevant for determining guilt (though it may reduce the sentence). Would the company itself or the specific employees involved be liable? In principle, both could be held liable. Again, this depends on what can be proved in court. Would a binding arbitration clause in the contract have any effect on criminal liability No, arbitration clauses cannot protect from criminal liability, only from civil liability (within limits). Off-topic: The fastest way to resolve such situations is usually to write one stern letter explaining why you are owed the money. If that does not work, sue them - if the situation is clear-cut, you will most likely win, or the company will settle. Many jurisdictions have simplified court proceedings for clear cases like this, for example the Mahnverfahren in Germany.

In New Zealand, employers have a duty to take all practicable steps to ensure their workplace is safe for employees and for others who come onto the premises (Health and Safety in Employment Act s6). So if there was a wasp nest and they didn't do anything about it, presumably they would be liable. If it was a random bee, I doubt they would be liable, because they couldn't practicably prevent a bee flying in if, say, someone opened the door. The state would have to charge the company as HSEA is a criminal provisions act. If the plaintiff brought a claim based on the tort of negligence, they would have to prove that the company had a duty of care, breached that duty, the breach caused damage, and the damage was not too remote from the breach. The company does have a duty of care to their patrons. The standard for this is what a reasonable person would have done in the circumstances. If they didn't remove a wasp nest they may have breached their duty of care. The breach will have caused damage (a wasp sting). It wouldn't have been too remote since had they removed the wasp nest, the person wouldn't have been stung. However if a random bee flew in, the company probably wouldn't have breached their duty of care, and if the court found that they had, the damage would probably be too remote or not have been caused by them directly.

Liable, yes. How much liable, depends. There would be copyright infringement, and with copyright infringement the exact facts count. Like did you commit copyright infringement to make money, were you aware that you committed copyright infringement etc. With your contract, it seems clear you didn't set out to commit copyright infringement to make money (because you paid someone else telling them not to commit copyright infringement). Up to the point where you learned what happened, you didn't know it was copyright infringement. After this, you better remove all the infringing works, because now you know it's copyright infringement, and now you are saving money by not hiring a second developer. Obviously you can sue the employee for damages.

Yes. In the United Kingdom it is illegal under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. In other jurisdictions there may not be a law directly aimed at computer crime but if you sell it knowing that a crime is going to be committed with it that makes you an accomplice. Most computer crime is prosecuted under laws not directly aimed at computer misuse.

No. You cannot be held liable for violating the EULA if you have never used the software and are only reporting what people who did use it told you. Of course, people bring groundless lawsuits all the time and you might have to defend such a lawsuit if you are sued. In some places you could be subpoenaed to disclose your sources, and in others, a reporter's privilege would allow you to quash such a subpoena.

What's the worst that can happen? If you do nothing, it's a bit inconvenient. If you delete all that company's stuff, who knows what they could sue you for. I'm not saying they would be right, but being sued can be expensive, no matter whether you are wrong or right. Send a letter by registered mail, with a witness to the contents, that you are the only one with admin rights to these sites, and asking them how they would like to take over these sites, and informing them that you will delete anything on your personal email after a reasonable time if you don't hear from them. And since anything you do is work for you, you should expect some appropriate compensation. Deleting their property, even if it affects you, is risky.

Is murder unconstitutional? I've heard a number of times now that the U.S. Constitution regulates the government and not private entities. This is why, for example, private organizations can limit free speech but the government cannot. I got to thinking: Is murder unconstitutional? Obviously, I know of no state that allows murder, but would anything in the U.S. Constitution bar one private person from taking the life of another private person? Again, murder is both illegal and immoral, but to ensure I'm following just how far the Constitution does not regulate private persons, would the U.S. Constitution alone fail to prohibit murder? It's wrong and illegal, but is it unconstitutional?

The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law

It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common.

Strictly speaking, that principle isn't even true everywhere in the US. The maxim "nulla poena sine lege" (i.e. "no punishment without a prior penal statute") was historically applicable to civil law systems, such as are found in continental Europe. In common-law systems, there was never a tradition in which a crime wasn't a crime unless it violated a penal law, because crimes themselves were traditionally defined by court precedent instead of by statute. In US federal court, the only allowable common-law offense is contempt of court. This is due to a court decision (United States v. Hudson), in which the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts do not have the constitutional authority to hear a case in which someone is accused of committing a common-law crime. Even so, and even though there is a federal contempt statute, the Supreme Court has ruled that contempt is an inherent power of any court, and statutes around it only regulate the power (but the power would be there even without a statute). At the state level, some states have explicitly passed laws saying something is not a crime if it doesn't violate the penal code (although this doesn't necessarily apply to contempt); see section 6 of the California Penal Code for an example. In other states, like Florida, common-law crimes still exist; Florida has a statute saying that any common-law offense is still a crime unless a statute has explicitly covered that same subject matter (section 775.01), and specifies a generic penalty for anything which is an offense at common law and not addressed by any Florida penal statute (section 775.02). While this is sort of statutory (as it's a statute giving the penal provision), it's also basically not (as no statute has to say "X is illegal," because it's enough that English common law makes X illegal).

The right to free speech is a right that is guaranteed against the federal and state governments only. It is not a right that is secured against private individuals and corporations. It is also neither absolute nor unconditional, as there are a number of exceptions/limits. Alex Jones could not walk into your home and start "exercising free speech" and leave you with no recourse whatsoever to remove him from your home. If you don't consent to him being there, you may legally tell him to leave and have him removed by force if he fails to comply. Facebook etc. are the "homes" of the relevant corporations. They simply told Alex Jones to get out and go somewhere else. He retains his right to free speech; he simply never had a right to speak wherever he wanted. An always relevant XKCD.

Is it true that a teacher can't engage/attack a shooter from behind during a school shooting that is in progress? No. Any use of force of any kind that only harms or kills the shooter who is actively engaged in a school shooting (and indeed, even if it caused bodily injury that isn't grave or deadly to someone else who is innocent) is always justified. You can't shoot someone who is not an ongoing threat to others if they flee, in order to arrest or punish them (e.g. an unarmed shoplifter), but under the leading constitutional case, Tennessee v. Garner, this limitation doesn't apply to murderers and mass shooters anyway, at least if they continue to pose a future threat.

Generally, no. Legislatures pass laws. The fact that someone else knows more about the thing they're passing laws about is utterly irrelevant -- the power to make laws is given to the legislature, not to experts. If the legislature thinks experts should make the rules on something, they can delegate (this is why the FDA approves medicine rather than Congress), but the legislature of a state generally has the power to pass any law that is not unconstitutional. Your analogy to paper money is a poor one: that's a federalism thing, not an expertise thing. Congress has established a system of paper money, and states can't interfere with that. It's not that the Fed thinks paper money is good, it's that Congress said paper money shall be a thing. That could stop a state from banning an FDA-approved drug; however, since marijuana is illegal under federal law, it would be odd to conclude that banning it at the state level as well is preempted. Legislators aren't inherently experts on anything (except being elected). That doesn't matter. They have the authority to pass laws, even if those laws directly go against the views of people who are recognized experts in the area. You appear to think there must be a judicial remedy against bad policy. You would be wrong. The role of the courts is not to decide what policies are good or bad; they are concerned only with what is legal. Deciding what policies are good or bad is a matter for the democratically elected representatives of the people, or for the people themselves in states with ballot questions. It is not the job of the courts.

If a law is struck-down as unconstitutional, but all the precedent used to find it unconstitutional gets reversed; what becomes of the law? In U.S. law, the law has effect again, unless it has been amended or repealed in the meantime. Is it totally dead, needing be passed anew? In the U.S., no. It is not totally dead. It is merely dormant. It stays on the books and legislators may decide not to repeal it as a political statement. It also might be considered for interpretive purposes when construing another part of the same law. For example, the meaning given to a phrase in an unconstitutional part of the law might be applied to a different part of the law that is constitutional. Can the judiciary be asked to reinstated, after which point it can be used again? In the U.S., any court can determine that a law is unconstitutional, but the extent to which that ruling is binding precedent on other courts or other parties than those to the case before it depends upon the court in question and upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel (a.k.a. issue preclusion). For example, the legal fight in the U.S. to hold bans on same sex marriage to be unconstitutional was fought in and resulted in ruling in dozens of courts at the trial court and state appellate court, and federal intermediate appellate court level before a uniform ruling was established by the U.S. Supreme Court. Further, even if the issue arises in another case where there is a controlling precedent, attorney ethics permit an attorney to make a good faith argument for a change in the law to any court, so if there is some good faith argument for doing so, the attorney can push that the issue be reconsidered. Of course, usually the answer from the court will be "no." Or can it just be enforced again without any formal process; so long as nobody sues and gets it killed again by a lower court? Sometimes government officials enforce laws that have been held unconstitutional, either because they aren't aware of the relevant court decisions, or because they think that their facts are distinguishable from those under which the law was held unconstitutional (which sometimes happens on an "as applied" basis rather than on a "facial" basis that applies to all cases), or because they think the judge before them might rule differently despite the precedent. Also, would the answer differ according to country? If so, could you please give me some examples of countries handling this differently. Yes. Many countries with legal systems based upon the legal system of countries of continental Europe like France and Germany and Spain, which are called "civil law" countries have a very different process of handling unconstitutional laws, as does the European Court of Human Rights and the highest court of the European Union. In Germany, for example, questions of the constitutionality of a law may be raised only in the Constitutional Court and not in other courts. This ruling is usually final. And, unlike U.S. courts, the Constitutional Court can rule a law unconstitutional during the legislative process, rather than in connection with an actual case or controversy relating to the law taking effect (in which case the law never gets on the books in the first place). I don't know what happens when the Constitutional Court declares a law unconstitutional. I do know, however, that in the case of the European Court of Human Rights and the highest courts of the E.U. that one of the usual remedies will be an order directed at a member state to amend its statutes to remove the offending law, with sanctions imposed if the member state fails to do so. Obviously, once such a law is repealed in this fashion, it would have to be re-enacted to take effect even if the precedent holding that the law was unconstitutional was undermined.

Trivially, yes The First Amendment was adopted on December 15, 1791. Every time there has been a dispute about what it means that has gone to court since then, the judgement of that court has established, overturned or clarified precedent - that's what common law courts do. The government can limit your speech The Supreme Court has recognized categories of speech which receive lesser or no protection from the First Amendment. For example, inciting lawless actions, fighting words, true threats, obscenity, child pornography etc. They have also determined that it doesn't limit the government's power to impose reasonable time, place or manner restrictions on speech. As Justice Holmes put it in Schenck v. United States (1918), "Even the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing panic." It applies to parts of government which derive their power from Congress Which is, in most cases, all government. The executive actually has surprisingly little power granted by the Constitution (Article II, Section 2). All the other powers of the executive are technically delegated powers of Congress and are therefore subject to the First Amendment. Similarly, only the Supreme Court draws its mandate without going through Congress Article III, Section 1) - all other courts are subject to First Amendment restrictions. It only restricts government The limitation is a negative one on the US Congress (and through incorporation, the states). It does not, of itself, restrict private actors who are free to restrict speech however they want within their own property, including both physical and online spaces. It is open to the government to enact laws that would extend an affirmative right to free speech onto non-state actors (see Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins (1980)), however, the Federal government has not done so and neither have most states.

Is it ever illegal to spread true facts with malicious intent? Crimes such as defamation usually require that the statement being said is false - truth is an absolute defense. Are there any situations or jurisdictions where truth is not a defense against defamation, incitement to hatred, or similar crimes or torts? For example: Malicious gossip: widely spreading word that someone cheated on their wife. Their employer hears about it and fires them. Otherwise their employer had no reason to know this. Facts out of context: "Mr XYZ won't deny being a pedophile" but only because he hangs up every time the reporter asks. Plain old defamation, in some jurisdictions. Contextual implication: "Black people commit more than 50% of violent crimes" [because they are inherently violent beings and something should be done to control them] Stock price manipulation: "XYZ Corp is doing terribly" [so is every company in that sector but I want the price of XYZ Corp in particular to go down]

england-and-wales Yes As well as the general offence of comtempt of court by publishing facts in breach of a court order, there are also two statutory provisions making it an offence if those facts reveal a person's identity (maliciously or not): section 1, Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992: (1) Where an allegation has been made that an offence to which this Act applies has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person’s lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed. (2) Where a person is accused of an offence to which this Act applies, no matter likely to lead members of the public to identify a person as the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed (“the complainant”) shall during the complainant’s lifetime be included in any publication. [...] The relevant offences are listed in section 2 (being rape and a number of other serious sexual offences). section 49, Children and Young Persons Act 1933: (1) No matter relating to any child or young person concerned in proceedings to which this section applies shall while he is under the age of 18 be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify him as someone concerned in the proceedings. (2) The proceedings to which this section applies are— (a) proceedings in a youth court; (b) proceedings on appeal from a youth court (including proceedings by way of case stated); (c) proceedings in a magistrates' court under Schedule 7 to the Sentencing Code (proceedings for breach, revocation or amendment of youth rehabilitation orders); (d) proceedings on appeal from a magistrates' court arising out of any proceedings mentioned in paragraph (c) (including proceedings by way of case stated). [...]

If an AI chatbot such as Bing Chat or ChatGPT said factually untrue things that did measurable harm to a real person's reputation, would that person have a case against the company that owns the chatbot for defamation? There can be liability for defamation, although the circumstances would determine who the liable party is. For instance, an owner's warning to the user about a risk of inaccuracies may have the effect of shifting to the user the issue of requisite degree of fault. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 593 (2015). The user ought to be judicious as to whether to publish the chatbot's output. Ordinarily, negligence suffices for liability in a scenario that involves special damages, i.e., concrete, ascertainable harm. My understanding is that a key part of defamation is malicious intent, which does not really apply to a non-sentient piece of software. Under defamation law, malice is not about feelings or emotional state. The term refers to reckless disregard for the truth or falsity or the statement or to publication despite publisher's awareness of the falsity of the satement. Id at 593. Regardless, malice needs to be proved only if the plaintiff is a public figure or in claims of defamaton per se, where damage to a person's reputation is presumed (and hence the damage does not need to be proved). What if the company was aware of the harm being done but chose not to take action? The terms of use might protect the company against liability. Absent any such protections, the company might be liable because its awareness and inaction are tantamount to the aforementioned reckless disregard for the truth of its product's publications.

Defamation Defamation (also known as calumny, vilification, libel, slander, or traducement) is the oral or written communication of a false statement about another that unjustly harms their reputation and usually constitutes a tort or crime. In several countries, including South Korea, a true statement can also be considered defamation. Under common law, to constitute defamation, a claim must generally be false and must have been made to someone other than the person defamed. So, to protect yourself, don't say things that could harm the ex-employer's reputation, or, if you do, be sure you can prove that what you said is objectively true or obviously a statement of personal opinion. "Joe is a a dickhead" is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. If you say "Joe is a thief", you better be able to produce the record of his conviction for larceny. Non-disparagement clauses If your contract with an ex-employer with such a clause then you must abide by it. This will limit what you can say about the ex-employer as spelled out in the contract - it may be you can't say anything negative but it may also be that you can't say anything at all. Breach of confidence Legally enforceable obligations to maintain confidence may arise in contract and equity. A contractual obligation of confidence can arise from express terms in a contract, but also by implication. An equitable obligation of confidence can arise where the formalities for the formation of a contract are not present. The obligation arises where information with the necessary quality of confidence is imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. Such circumstances will exist where the information is imparted on the understanding that it is to be treated by the confidant on a limited basis, or where the confidant ought to have realised that in all the circumstances the information was to be treated in such a way. Breach of the obligation occurs where there is an unauthorised use, not only where there is unauthorised disclosure, of the information. Fiduciary duties Depending on your role with the ex-employer, you may retain fiduciary duties that continue beyond the end of your relationship. Ex-directors certainly have such duties but sufficiently tightly placed non-director executives (C suite level) may also have these.

In the US, there are no (and can be no) laws against hate speech. You also cannot sue a person for using an ethnic or similar epithet. A false accusation, however, might be grounds for a defamation lawsuit. Word connotations do not matter, what matters is the denotation, for example calling someone a "rapist" denotes a specific criminal act. Even calling someone a rapist isn't necessarily defamatory, since hyperbole abounds especially on the internet, so in order to actually be defamation, the statement would have to be understood as a particular accusation (a form of unlawful sexual assault). A defamatory statement has to be made with reckless disregard for the truth of a statement, which is not the case in the situation you describe (perhaps the person correctly said that so-and-so is a therapist, but was ineffective in their use of English).

What legal options do I have here? I don't think I can sue for defamation of character since the email was sent to me only. Your rationale about defamation is accurate with respect to the establishment (henceforth "company"). But you may sue the person(s) who approached the company to falsely accuse you of that crime. Being banned certainly qualifies as special damage (that is, concrete damage), whence you have a viable claim of defamation per quod. If the crime that was falsely imputed to you is a felony or serious crime, then you additionally have a viable claim of defamation per se. I was thinking that I may have some legal recourse since the email clearly threatens to defame my character if I re-enter the establishment You have legal remedies, although not necessarily from this angle. The company can credibly argue that it sought to discourage you from contravening the "safety measure" it adopted in response to the accusations made about you. If it turns out that the company fabricated any false accusations it divulges, though, then you could sue the company for torts related to --and in addition to-- its defamatory falsehoods. So far the information you share here shows no signs of company's involvement in inventing the false accusations. What legal options do I have here? You need to ask the company for source and details of the information. In line with this comment, you should also ensure the company is aware of the mistaken identity. If the company declines to listen to you --and ideally see any proofs you have--, that could evidence some sort of tortious conduct on the company's part. Beware that in Florida a defamed person is required to demand a retraction of the false accusations prior to filing a defamation suit. Absent that request for retraction, it will be very easy for the sued defamer(s) to have your complaint dismissed. If the company refuses to disclose the source of the false information, then you need to seek injunctive relief in court. That means suing the company so as to (1) compel the company to identify the person(s) who accused you, and perhaps (2) strike the ban that the company put in place as a result of the false accusations. Even if you don't prevail in striking the ban, the court proceedings would give you the occasion to set the record straight and prevent the company from defaming you if you legitimately expose (to the public) the arbitrariness of its ban. To be clear, the company can always indulge in defaming you for the sake of justifying its ban, although that would be dumb in light of what you will have proved in court by then. In jurisdictions where a request for retraction is not mandatory, a plaintiff who does not know the identity of his defamer(s) may (1) file suit against "Doe defendants", (2) subpoena the non-party company so as to obtain records related to the false accusations (obviously ensuring that these reveal the authorship thereof), and (3) upon production of subpoena records and requesting the identified defamer for a retraction, amend the complaint to properly identify the defendant. This would be more efficient than filing two suits (one for injunctive relief against the company, and another against the defamers). However, I am uncertain of whether this would work in Florida, given its pre-suit requirement of request for retraction.

It's hard to say, given how little we know about the case and the information, also what you mean by "corrupted" and what your evidence is. Here are two hypothetical cases that illustrate different possibilities. 1: The accused instructs the lawyer to tell the judge "My client has an alibi against the robbery charge: at the time, he was murdering his brother". Lawyer deems this to be a bad argument because murder is punished more severely than robbery. The lawyer is doing his job, protecting the interest of the client. No crime or civil wrong. 2: The accused instructs the lawyer to tell the judge "My client has an alibi against the robbery charge: at the time, he was in church". The lawyer doesn't understand that this is exculpatory evidence, thinking "they never asked about church, there's no point in me raising this issue". The client can probably sue for incompetence. There are possible criminal charges possible, for example if the lawyer is working for The Mob he might be involved in an actual criminal conspiracy.

First thing is, the statement has to be with a specific governmental sphere, such as in a submission to a court, or a document with some legal weight submitted to a party where the government has mandated that the declaration be "sworn" (an employment application involving security clearances; a DMCA takedown notice which has a connection to copyright law). Second, the statement has to be material, i.e. has "a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed" Kungys v. US, 485 U.S. 759. Third, you have to know that the statement is false (mistakes of knowledge are not perjury): the lie has to be willful. Fourth, the statement has to be literally false (Bronston v. US, 409 U.S. 352). W.r.t. the Bronston standard, a desire to not reveal a fact when testifying in a proceeding does not render the statement perjurious, when the statement is literally true but incomplete, thus telling the whole truth is not required (attorneys are expected to detect incomplete responses and press the issue on things not said). The edges of "literal truth" are a bit murky. What distinguishes Bronston from a number of cases of literally true perjury is that Bronston's testimony contained a clear sign that it was incomplete, but other "literally true" false statements (de Zarn, for example) contained nothing that an alert attorney could focus on. See US v. Robbins where defendant offered "11th and MacArthur" as the name of a corporation, the one in question, then falsely testified that it had no assets – the name of the corporation was actually "MacArthur and 11th Properties, Inc.".

Is it legal to publish a cease and desist letter that I have received? Generally speaking, yes. My interpretation of your post is that you published your opinion about a business or businessperson, and the businessperson now is trying to intimidate you or deter you from sharing with others your opinion. The phrase "the actionable statements listed are clearly statements of my opinion" is otherwise unclear. Under defamation law, only false statements of fact are actionable whereas statements of opinion are not. The businessperson is not entitled to your silence. If your criticism is about the business, the cease and desist letter sounds in unfair and misleading practices to the extent that the business is trying to conceal from the public some inconvenient information that you as actual or potential customer possess. Even if you published as a competitor, your statements would have to be untrue and misleading for these to constitute disparagement. See the Black's Law Dictionary definition of disparagement [of Goods]. For the reasons stated in the other answer, copyright issues are not a matter of concern. It is preferable to publish the letter as is. Transparency preempts confusion as to "I said, he said". By contrast, paraphrasing the letter for the purpose of avoiding an imaginary violation of copyright creates a risk of you inadvertently giving him grounds for a claim of defamation.

Can a corrupt sherriff cause all cases from a department to be dismissed? A video detailing the incident Victor Hill, the former sheriff of Clayton County, Georgia, was charged with seven counts of willfully depriving detainees at the Clayton County Jail of their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable force by law enforcement officers. Specifically, the grand jury who indicted him alleged that Hill caused the seven victims to be strapped into restraint chairs at the jail without any legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and for a period exceeding that justified by any legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose. The grand jury further alleged that these offenses caused physical pain and resulted in bodily injury to the victims. The trial is already over. On October 26, 2022, a jury convicted Hill on six of the seven counts. As to each of those six guilty counts, the jury further found that the offense caused physical pain and resulted in bodily injury to 6 different victims. It's safe to assume that if leadership at a department is corrupt. Rank & File officers were likely corrupt as well. Can a corrupt sheriff cause all cases from his department to be dismissed while he was in charge?

Can a corrupt sheriff cause all cases from his department to be dismissed while he was in charge? There have been cases of mass dismissals when the corruption by the law enforcement officer involves a pattern and practice of falsification of evidence provided to courts in those cases. One of the most notable such cases was this one: More than 24,000 convictions in 16,449 cases tainted by former state chemist Sonja Farak have been dismissed in a court case brought by the ACLU of Massachusetts, the Committee of Public Counsel Services (CPCS), and law firm Fick & Marx LLP. The new numbers appear in a report issued by a court-designated “Special Master.” . . . For nearly nine years, former state chemist Sonja Farak used drugs that she stole from or manufactured in the Amherst Lab, causing thousands of people to be wrongfully convicted of drug crimes based on unreliable evidence. Since her arrest in 2013, Farak’s lab misconduct has been compounded by prosecutorial misconduct, including by former prosecutors with the Attorney General’s Office who – according to a judge’s findings – intentionally deceived a court and defense lawyers about the massive scope of Farak’s misconduct. In 2017, the ACLU of Massachusetts and CPCS, together with Fick & Marx LLP, called for dismissal of every case tainted by Farak and subsequent years of prosecutorial misconduct. In April 2018, the Supreme Judicial Court ordered that thousands of convictions be dismissed. But, misconduct in how detainees are treated in jail does not go to the guilt or innocence of those defendants and therefore would not usually lead to mass dismissals. A prosecutor could decide on a non-legal basis that a defendant has suffered enough from mistreatment in jail and dismiss the charges, and sometimes this is done on an isolated basis. But, mistreatment of detainees would rarely if ever be a basis for a mass dismissal of charges and would be in the sole discretion of the prosecutor as an exercise of discretion not compelled or suggested by any legal requirement.

I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.

The district court judge, as reported in this news story has held that there was probable cause to arrest Daniel Robbins in this case, and that his rights were not violated. If this ruling stands, officers acted legally, although they might still be required to return the phone with the images. Whether there is probable cause for an arrest (or a search) is always a very fact-based issue. I have not found the judge's actual decision, only a news summary of it, which can often be misleading. Specific facts about exactly what Robbins did or said may be important in determining whether there was in fact probable cause. It appears that Robbins intends to appeal this decision. If he does there may be an opinion from a Circuit Court of Appeals expanding on whether there was probable cause or any violation of rights, and why. Previous cases have established that normally there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for acts performed in public; that one my photograph or video record such public acts legally from anywhere that one may legally be; that there is a right photograph or record police officers engaged in official actions or the use of police powers; and that laws attempting to forbid such recording are unconstitutional when so applied. However, it seems from the news story that here the police officers were off-duty and not engaging in any official acts or use of police powers. That might change the ruling. I rather expect the district court's decision to be overturned, but there is no case exact;ly on point that i know of, and one can never be absolutely sure what a court will do in a particular case. I can see why police officers may have felt threatened, and why the Judge may have been inclined to sympathize with them, although I think the decision was incorrect. But a Judge of the Appeals Court might possibly feel the same way. Until the Appeals Court rules, one cannot be sure what the law in this matter will finally be. (It is possibly, but statistically a bit unlikely, there there will eventually be a ruling from the US Supreme Court on this case.) This article from Nolo Press discusses the issue of recording police, primarily in the context of police who are performing their official duties. It says: Almost every court to consider the issue has determined that the First Amendment gives you the right to record (pictures, video, and audio) police officers in public while they are performing their duties. But that doesn’t mean you’re allowed to record if you’re doing so surreptitiously (secretly), interfering with the officer, or otherwise breaking the law. The courts' primary rationale for allowing police officer recording is that the First Amendment includes the right to freely discuss our government, and the right of freedom of the press and public access to information. Given the prevalence of personal filming devices, more and more “news” is being gathered and disseminated by members of the public. The courts have found that freedom of the press applies to citizen journalists and documentarians just as it does to formal members of the press. (See, for example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).) The Nolo article goes on to discuss whether a Section 1983 Federal suit against police officers who arrest someone recording their actions will succeed, indicating that this will depend on the specific facts of the case. The Nolo article mentions that one is not allowed to interfere with an officer during process of recording. What exactly constitutes "interference" is not fully clear, and will depend on the facts of a specific case. The Nolo article mentions other circumstances when recording an officer may not be legal.

Yes. In a civil case, there are two parties and the case is about finding out who has which obligations to whom. In a civil case, the plaintiff has to prove that they actually incurred damage through the actions of the defendant. A criminal case is the state vs. the defendant. The "wronged party" is the society as a whole, usually represented by the prosecutor. The victim, if there is one, just plays the role of yet another witness to find out if the defendant needs to be punished and how. There are also examples of crimes which are completely victimless but still punished by some societies. For example, in many places sexual intercourse between two consenting adult siblings is a crime (incest), even though there is no victim. Also, for some crimes it is even a crime to attempt to commit it. So one can be punished in a criminal court even though they didn't actually succeed in causing any damage to anyone. Example: I throw a rock at your car. When I hit, you can sue me in a civil court and force me to pay for the repairs. When I miss, I caused no damage to you, so there is nothing you could sue about. But what if I throw a rock at you and miss? That's attempted assault, maybe even attempted murder. When law enforcement finds out about it, I could be arrested, prosecuted and convicted to a prision sentence, even though you are perfectly fine.

Would a U.S court honor his request, based on his prior commitment? You are not specifying the purpose of the court hearing, or whether Adam is pro se litigant (which sounds unlikely if this plaintiff is a movie star). If plaintiff Adam is represented by an attorney, Adam's presence is unnecessary in most or all court hearings. In fact, typically neither parties nor their lawyers have to show up in court, whence their absence does not constitute contempt of court. Absence merely implies that they miss the opportunity to [orally] argue their position before the court, and thus would depend on whether the judge bothers to actually read their brief. If you mean a hearing in which Adam needs to be present, his request to reschedule the hearing is most likely to be granted. His contract is strong evidence that his request is not a vexatious attempt to delay proceedings. Since the hearing would be in month 4, the particularity that his contract goes up to month 4 implies that rescheduling would not significantly delay proceedings. Regarding your comment, rescheduling can (and does) happen multiple times even in criminal cases. This post includes an excerpt of the Register of Actions of criminal case 16-870-FH in Michigan state court (Washtenaw county), highlighting several instances of rescheduling as requested by the defense counsel and despite prosecutor's objection. I believe the case got rescheduled a few more times beyond what the snapshots reflect.

In Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 defendants were found liable for "grossly negligent and reckless release of prisoner Mitchell Thomas Blazak" resulting in death. That case led to a significant holding, we now abolish the absolute immunity previously granted to public officials in their discretionary functions In Tarter v. NY, 113 A.D.2d 587, liability was found for release of a convict who then injured a person: the board negligently failed to follow statutory criteria and the board's own guidelines, not acting "in accordance with law". With respect to the decision by the parole board to release a prisoner, the statute directs that certain factors and criteria be considered, mandates that the parole board follow guidelines established for that purpose, and provides that any determination is deemed a judicial function and shall not be reviewable if done in accordance with law The key here is that states may have laws governing the release of prisoners, so parole is not a purely discretionary act, there may be statutory limits.

Of course The prosecution just needs to prove that the crime happened (or the defendant believed it to have happened) and you helped (in brief, there will be specific elements of the crime that each need to be proved). This would be easier if the primary crime had a convicted perpetrator but it’s not impossible without. Allow me to illustrate with an example. I will set out facts which are somewhat contrived and would not be so clear cut in a real case but for the purposes of the example please take them as undisputed and fully supported by evidence. John and Jill are in a relationship. This relationship is well known to be argumentative with frequent shouting matches and one or the other storming out. This does not amount to domestic violence by either party. John's friend Alan believes (wrongly) that there is domestic violence. During an argument Jill drops dead of a heart attack. John rings Alan distraught and says "I've killed her." Alan assumes (wrongly) that John has murdered Jill. Alan says "i'll take care of it. You go to your dad's". Alan (alone) disposes of the body. John is not guilty of murder (or indeed, anything). Alan is guilty of accessory to murder even though the actual crime never happened. The fact that Alan believed it happened is enough.

In most US States (probably all of them) failure to follow the Lawful orders of a police officer is itself a crime, and is grounds for the officer to arrest the person, even if the person had not done anything wrong prior to that. This obviously leads to the question: what orders are lawful? The officer has a pretty broad range of discretion. Ordering a person out of a car, or to roll down a car window, is pretty clearly lawful. Ordering a person to commit a crime would not be lawful. Neither would ordering a person to submit while the officer rapes or robs the individual be lawful. In practice, the officer will usually think that all of his or her commands are lawful, and might feel threatened by any failure to comply. In which case, the officer might shoot. This might not be upheld later if the command was not lawful and/or the officer's fear was not reasonable, but that will do the person shot little good. It is usually wise to comply with any commend, unless it puts you very directly at serious risk. Remember you don't know what else has happed to the officer that day. Has the officer had a fight with his/her spouse that morning? Just been denied a promotion? Been turned down for a mortgage? None of that should matter, legally, but it will affect the officer's attitude, and can lead to escalation, even if the person stopped is in no way at fault. An instruction to "shut up" is probably not going to provoke an officer to shoot if it is disobeyed, but it might help to escalate the situation. It is probably lawful, depending non the exact circumstances. As to the first amendment issues, that would probably come under the 'time, place, or manner" regulations that may be applied to speech. And even if it is not held to be lawful, the time to contest it is in court, not during the stop. If the officer feels safer with the window fully rolled down so that the officer could reach in, that is probably a lawful command.

Religion is a "protected class" in California. Does that extend to things like homophobia/transphobia due to religion? In California, I'm pretty sure employers aren't allowed to discriminate based on religion (e.g. you can't not hire someone just because they're Jewish). In other words, religion is a "protected class". So Eric the Employer hires Chris the Christian. Afterwards, Chris goes to his personal social media and posts I believe in the Bible, which says "The woman shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man, neither shall a man put on a woman's garment: for all that do so are abomination unto the LORD thy God." - Deuteronomy 22:5 The public sees this as extremely transphobic, and it leads to a huge backlash against Eric's company (and Eric personally may find such views repugnant). Does Eric have any grounds to fire Chris, or is Chris protected from being fired over it? To be clear, Chris isn't just spouting things like "I hate trans people" or calling for violence against them or anything. He is explicitly making religious statements that link directly to his commonly-accepted religion. While I gave a random specific example here, my question is more general. If any religion has any views (e.g. homophobia, or they don't like pineapple on pizza, or what have you) that are controversial, is an employer not allowed to discriminate based on that?

The fact pattern that The public sees this as extremely [objectionable], and it leads to a huge backlash against Eric's company gives cover to Eric to fire Chris. That decision would be, provably, based on the expected impact on the company business, not on Chris’ views. The exact nature of the statement does not matter. For example, any of the following could conceivably snowball into a social media uproar: "homosexual sex is sinful" "pineapple does not belong on pizza" "dogs are better than cats" Of course, that is only the theoretical view when everyone agrees on what happened. In the real world, Chris would argue that Eric fired him for his views, Eric would argue that it was because of the public backlash, and the finder of fact would have to decide which is more credible. Some factors in play would be : if the "social media uproar" is five Twitter accounts with ten followers each, Eric's defense of "there was an angry mob, I had to fire him" will not seem very credible. if Eric unwisely wrote to Chris that they are fired "because of their statement", or worse, "because of your fundamentalist Christian views", that will make Eric’s lawyer job much harder. On a side note (not asked in the OP but raised in comments), Chris’s statement is undoubtedly protected speech under the First Amendment. That means the government cannot take legal action against Chris. However, other people can: Eric can fire him, Twitter can ban him, his buddy can stop going to the pub with him, his girlfriend can dump him, etc. As the trope goes, freedom of speech does not mean freedom from consequences.

They can ask, but there is nothing in law - that I can find - which obligates an answer. (There may be some exceptions that require a previous employer to provide a reference which might include this detail, but that does not appear relevant here.) As an aside, there is an ongoing #EndSalaryHistory campaign by the Fawcett Society which is focused on equal pay and sexual equality in the workplace, and they are calling on employers to: stop asking salary history questions...

Trump was an officer of the government, and Twitter wasn't. The First Amendment forbids the government and its agents from viewpoint discrimination, but private companies are not bound by it and can discriminate as much as they please. (There was a question as to whether such discrimination might affect whether the company enjoys a shield from liability under 47 USC 230, but even so they have the right to block and censor as they wish if they are willing to risk that liability.)

Such discrimination will in SOME cases probably be unlawful An employer refusing to hire a person because of obesity might be in violation of the California CFEHA, or the Federal ADA, or both. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act (CFEHA) will in some cases prohibit such discrimination. Specifically, CA Code section 12940 says: It is an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or, except where based upon applicable security regulations established by the United States or the State of California: (a) For an employer, because of the race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or veteran or military status of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the person or to refuse to select the person for a training program leading to employment, or to bar or to discharge the person from employment or from a training program leading to employment, or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. (Emphasis added) CA Code section 12926 defines "physical disability": (m) “Physical disability” includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: (1) Having any physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss that does both of the following: (A) Affects one or more of the following body systems: neurological, immunological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory, including speech organs, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine. (B) Limits a major life activity. For purposes of this section: (i) “Limits” shall be determined without regard to mitigating measures such as medications, assistive devices, prosthetics, or reasonable accommodations, unless the mitigating measure itself limits a major life activity. (ii) A physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss limits a major life activity if it makes the achievement of the major life activity difficult. (iii) “Major life activities” shall be broadly construed and includes physical, mental, and social activities and working. (2) Any other health impairment not described in paragraph (1) that requires special education or related services. (3) Having a record or history of a disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or health impairment described in paragraph (1) or (2), which is known to the employer or other entity covered by this part. (4) Being regarded or treated by the employer or other entity covered by this part as having, or having had, any physical condition that makes achievement of a major life activity difficult. (5) Being regarded or treated by the employer or other entity covered by this part as having, or having had, a disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or health impairment that has no present disabling effect but may become a physical disability as described in paragraph (1) or (2). (6) “Physical disability” does not include sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, or psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from the current unlawful use of controlled substances or other drugs. Serious cases of obesity would probably be included in 12926 (m) (1). Less serious cases might be included in 12926 (m) (4) or 12926 (m) (5). In addition, the US Federal Americans with Disabilities act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101) provides in section 12112 that: (a) General rule No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. (b) Construction As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term "discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability" includes (1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee; (2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship with an employment or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of the covered entity, or an organization providing training and apprenticeship programs); (3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration (A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; (B) that perpetuates the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative control; The ADA defines disability in section 12102: Sec. 12102. Definition of disability As used in this chapter: (1) Disability The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)). (2) Major Life Activities (A) In general For purposes of paragraph (1), major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working. (B) Major bodily functions For purposes of paragraph (1), a major life activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions. Whether a particular obese individual will be regarded as having a disability under either the CFEHA or the ADA is a matter of individual determination. Not all obese people will be considered to have a disability as defined by either act (and note that the definitions are quite similar). If a person is so regarded, then to refuse to hire that person because of that disability is unlawful. Note that if a person is unable to perform the essential duties of a job, even with a reasonable accommodation, an employer is free not to hire such a person. There are other limitations and exceptions in each act. To determine if a particular person is protected in regard to a particular job would require an employment lawyer or other employment professional with access to the specific facts of the case.

Is blocking certain people while allowing everybody else to view some content discrimination Yes. and violate anti-discrimination laws Probably not, at least in the US. There is no federal law prohibiting "discrimination" in general. There are specific laws regarding discrimination against certain groups in certain contexts. They would probably not apply to an individual determining who is allowed to view their social media posts. That said, there are some specific contexts where this might be illegal. They would generally involve non-personal use of the account. The courts recently ruled that Donald Trump may not block people on his Twitter account, because he's using it in an official presidential capacity rather than just his individual capacity. Also, racial discrimination in housing is illegal, so if you're selling your house and you block all black people from viewing your house photos, that would probably be illegal as well. Also is not being able to consume information available on a public platform a violation against right to freedom. I'm not sure what you think a "right to freedom" would entail. But I don't think you have the right to demand that a person allow you to access their social media accounts.

how does hiring only women comply with our Civil Rights Act (which outlaws discrimination based on sex)? It is compliant. The Civil Rights Act includes an exception where the discrimination or limitation based on sex (or any other protected category) "is a bona fide occupational qualification for employment". That exception is located at the end of 42 USC 2000e-3(b). Although literally referring to employer's publishing of that preference, the very existence of that statutory exception implies a permission to discriminate [for certain occupations] on the basis of sex. At the outset, it would be unreasonable to allow the employer to explicitly state his criteria for hiring and yet be prohibited to implement them. But a more important reason for that exception is the premise of bona fide occupational qualification. That premise indicates that the legitimate purpose of the employment at issue takes priority over the general intent of the Civil Rights Act. The actual & occupational purpose of cheerleading in the NFL context is not to shake pom poms and do choreography on field grass, but to amuse men, who comprise the vast majority of the customer base in the football business. Accordingly, the issue is not whether males are fit or unable to cheerlead, but that male cheerleaders simply would not amuse the average football fan. The occupational purpose would be frustrated if females were replaced with males. The legislative intent of the Civil Rights Act is to preclude discrimination for employment where the protected category (be it sex, religion, etc.) is irrelevant to the actual fulfillment of the occupational purpose.

Yes, it is illegal in North Carolina, which defines your sex as what's on your birth certificate. At any point in your transition, even when it's long complete, you'll still have to use the restroom for the gender on your birth certificate (hypothetically assuming the law is still in place). See e.g. this CNN coverage and this followup. Will you actually be arrested? Probably only if there's a complaint. The police haven't yet figured out how they're supposed to enforce this law.

In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a similar provision in Maryland's constitution violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced. So presumably the North Carolina provision is similarly unconstitutional and unenforceable. It's not clear why it wasn't removed in 1971. I found references to a 2009 incident in which an avowed atheist named Cecil Bothwell was elected to the Asheville, NC city council. Opponents apparently threatened to mount a legal challenge to his eligibility under the Article VI provision. It's not clear if they actually tried to do so, but in any event, Bothwell served his full four-year term and was then re-elected for another.

Can my mom take away my phone on police order? Let's say there is a minor. He/she buys and currently pay for his/her phone. The minor's guardian demanded that the minor relinquish his/her phone and the minor did not agree. After the police were called the officer claimed it is a parent's right to discipline a child. Police quite essentially claimed minors have no rights. Is this true, and if it is, in what law is it mentioned?

I guess you are interpreting the answer of the officer the wrong way. Minors do have rights. Plenty of them. But using a phone to contact people their legal guardian does not approve, or to consume media their legal guardian does not approve, is usually not a right minors have. And to make those restrictions stick, your mother took your phone away. Ask for it on your 18th birthday. But when one of you has called the police on a family situation like this, both of you have a problem that goes way beyond property rights. Do you have an adult you can talk to? A teacher? An uncle or aunt? A coach? Try talking to them. If they all side with your mother, consider that she might be right and you are wrong. But often both sides talk themselves into a corner, and a neutral viewpoint helps. If you are truly desperate about your situation, call Child Protective Services. But that could backfire if they believe your mother, and make the family situation worse. Taking a phone away is not neglect or abuse.

Etiquette is not "above" the law in the sense that an etiquette rule excuses a violation of law. However, at least in the US, the police are not required to investigate every alleged violation of law, nor is a prosecutor required to proceed against every lawbreaker, and the decision to proceed may be influenced by a perceived etiquette violation. It should also be mentioned that while a third person has no right to prevent you form talking to anyone who is willing to talk to you (unless the 3rd person is the parent of guardian of an underage person you wish to address), it is not in any way illegal to instruct you not to do so, even if the instructions are incorrect as a matter of law. Assaulting you is, of course, a different matter.

The police (and any other involved public agencies) do not work for Steve. They make their own decisions. You didn't specify a location, and requirements to consent to a search vary by location. It wouldn't be surprising, though, if Steve can't legally consent to a search of someone else's room (but possibly could consent to search of common areas). One possibility you don't seem to have considered is that the police or prosecutor would, if Steve is willing to testify, use Steve's testimony as probable cause to get a warrant. Then they could obtain text messages from Mike's service provider (even if he's deleted them from his phone), search his room without his consent, etc. Details again vary by location. Finally, any jail/prison term is typically up to a judge or jury, not the police. Pre-trial detention is typically up to a judge or magistrate. (Also, outside the scope of your question, but if there is any chance Steve has allowed himself to become involved in the misdeeds, even slightly, Steve would be wise to talk to a lawyer. Or if he suspects the police could believe that.)

Keep in mind that a warrant doesn't require proof that you stole the property or have the property. Instead, the warrant is just authorization to look for that proof. The standard for securing a warrant is probable cause, which is a much lower bar to clear than people seem to think. It just requires that given everything the officer knows, there's a "substantial probability" that a piece of evidence will be in a given place at a given time. If the officer swore to a judge that a reliable source had told him that the letter was stolen, then seen in your front yard, and not seen since, I wouldn't be at all surprised if the judge gave him a search warrant.

I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.

Legally you face no problem. The section 66A of the Indian IT Act, which used to be previously misused for penalizing anyone who dared insult a politician, has been struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India. But the police could still detain you for 48 hours (legally) without giving any grounds; they are required to do that, but the police are seldom held accountable. The supporters of the said politician can vandalize your home and office without fear of legal action. I am not a lawyer. Whatever is posted above is my opinion and data that I believe to be true to the best of my knowledge and resources available to me. Please contact a lawyer for professional advice.

Beware: The details will depend not only on jurisdiction, but also on the details of the parents, the parenting agreement and, of course, on the situation of the child. However, here are some general guidelines (mostly independent of jurisdiction): Ideally, you should resolve the problem by non-legal mechanisms. However, you may have to resort to legal means if this fails. I would advocate a gradual escalation of your reaction: First, do not assume malice. Nicely ask parent A why the plan was not followed. Maybe it was a simple oversight, maybe there was an emergency? Try to find out, and decide whether the change was warranted. If there is no satisfactory answer, clearly remind A that the parenting plan is binding for everyone, and that it is important for both the child and the parents that they can rely on it. Stress that any last-minute changes must be discussed as soon as possible, even in emergencies. This should be done in writing, maybe even by registered mail. If the problem repeats, send a last letter indicating that you will seek legal remedy if the problem persists. This letter may work better when sent by a lawyer. A letter from your lawyer to A's lawyer (assuming you both have one) may also prompt A's lawyer to explain to A that they are hurting the child and themselves by violating the parenting plan. Finally, if all the above fails, go to court. You could ask for a change in the parenting agreement, maybe with less frequent changeovers, or with changeovers that are easier to arrange, or at an earlier time, such that a delay causes less problems. You could also ask for a formal permission to have the child fetched by the police or similar on subsequent violations (though that is a rather desperate option, and may not be available). If you reach this point, following the previous steps should give you a fighting chance to prevail in court, as you have demonstrated that you tried everything to make the agreement work. Courts generally take a dim view of people who violate an official agreement. In Georgia specifically, like in most US states, violation of a court-ordered parenting agreement by one parent is a serious matter. The other parent can ask the court to hold the parent in contempt of court. The court can then order a number of consequences for these violations, such as awarding the other parent extra visits or monetary compensation, up to and including sending the parent to jail (this only happens in extreme cases). The article Violation of Custody and Visitation Orders in Georgia gives a good overview.

You acted illegally in assaulting your fellow student. When you are in public, a person can legally take your picture, and you are not allowed to assault a person because you do not like their legal actions. Any degree of force is excessive except in certain responses to illegal fource, and even the threat of force is excessive. You also have no right to demand that a person prove that they didn't take your picture, and certainly no right to enforce that demand with physical violence.

Penalty for trespassing on a gas station parking lot in Kentucky My brother was parked at a gas station before they opened at 4:45 am to rest his eyes. At 5:00 am when they opened, he went inside, used the restroom, and did not buy anything. Owner asked him to leave and that it was not a rest area. Owner of gas station called the cops, cops showed up gave him a chance to leave, but he told them he was tired and didn't feel safe to drive yet. They arrested him for criminal trespassing. What type of punishment could he face?

This violation of KRS 511.080, criminal trespass in the third degree, is a "violation", which results in a fine not more than $250. The fine shall not be imposed if he is indigent pursuant to KRS Chapter 31.

Certainly, "Tortious interference" comes to mind. While it's a difficult one to prove, there are typically 6 elements: The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial business relationship between two parties (possible problem here). Knowledge of that relationship by a third party. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship to breach the relationship. (or refuse to enter one). Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce such a breach. (no right to do so via some other aspect of law). The contractual relationship is breached. (the normally-accessible-to-anyone transaction is prevented). Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs The only real "stretch" here is that Tortious Interference is written for cases where you already have an existing business relationship or contract in place. You're talking about a situation where a vendor normally proffers its service to any member of the public, and you'd argue there's an implied contract that they do business with any comer. In real estate particularly, it gets a lot more complicated because of Fair Housing laws. The apartment could get in big trouble being caught refusing to do business with someone, if the reason for the refusal was sourced in something related to race, creed, religion, sexual orientation and a bunch of other no-no's. Even if that's not your motive, if they (plural: victim and attorney) can convince a judge or jury that it is your motive, you and the apartment could owe them a lot of money. Fun fact: conspiracy to commit a Federal crime is a felony, even if the crime isn't. Regardless... I think if you are paying the vendor to snub the customer, courts would find that to be a perverse and unjustifiable behavior, and would see harm in that, especially if it was part of a pattern of behavior that constituted harassment. They would tend to assume the worst motives unless you could show other motives. I suspect they could even get a restraining order blocking you from interfering in their business relationships anywhere. You would also be subject to discovery, and would be compelled to disclose anywhere else you interfered, and pretty much anything they want to ask you. You can't refuse to answer ... unless ... your answer would incriminate you of a crime. But that's the kiss of death in a civil trial, because the jury hears that, and infers you are a crook. Game over lol.

The policeman ordered, right as he took a step out of his car "Turn it off!" - which is a lawful demand to prevent the biker from possibly kicking the gas and running. As the driver did not seem to comply (from the policeman's PoV) during his walk over to the bike, he enforced the order himself by turning off the bike and confiscating the key for the moment. Having made it safe that the driver couldn't leg it, he guided traffic around him so he could get to the side of the road. We don't know what happened after the driver reached the curb to be lectured and/or arrested, the bike could be impounded or the confiscation might be temporary. So all we can do here is discuss the action of demanding that a motor vehicle be turned off, the doing of such and taking the keys. Demanding a vehicle to be shut off is standard procedure in police stop, as it is ensuring the safety of everybody involved. In a somewhat recent case (trying to find it again!), a driver did not shut off the car and had to stand on the brake to keep it where it was. As commands came conflicting (keep your hands where we can see them, get out of the car!) and he could not comply or the car would jump forward and ram somewhere, things escalated and the driver was shot. But back to the first step. Was the stop lawful? ACLU in NY tells us: Police may stop and briefly detain you only if there is reasonable suspicion that you committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime. Don’t bad-mouth a police officer or run away, even if you believe what is happening is unreasonable. That could lead to your arrest. There was a crime committed: Splitting is illegal in NY (among others: Section 1122, overtaking on the right), so the stop was justified under NY CPL 140.50. From my own experience, it is not uncommon for bikers to try to evade police by swerving back into traffic and using their higher mobility to get away. On its face, this makes it reasonable to demand the bike be shut off as the policeman advanced, and I'd like to congratulate the officer for taking the less escalating step and just turning the bike off himself on the noncompliance instead of drawing his gun and possibly escalating it to a use of force. Most lawyers suggest to drivers pulled over to do things akin to "After you brought your car to a complete stop [on the curb], roll down your window and shut off the engine". Like this one. Possibly confiscating the keys might be an overreach by the policeman, but the demand to turn it off clearly is not.

Not all illegal things are crimes. Lack of evidence. They are asked to testify, and they say "what I said in my book was a lie". There is no general law against lying, except when under oath. Statute of limitations. Saying "10 years ago I did smoke drugs" means that any offence is no longer prosecutable. Lack of details. Which jurisdiction were they in? When did they commit the act, how many acts? You cannot be arrested for being a "bank robber" or a "murderer". You are charged with "robbing Bank X on 123 Fake Street the Thursday 25 April 2018" or "murdering Jim Thio in January 2017". Otherwise the defendant would have a hard time defending himself (how to prove that you have not killed anyone at any time?) All of the above combined with prosecutorial discretion in the form that any possible prosecutor will most likely determine that bringing charges would be just a waste of time and resources. UPDATE February 2018: Just for the sake of completeness, a reference to the situation of Jacques Cassandri, who did boast about a serious crime(a robbery in a Societe Generale vault in 1976) in a book. Unfortunately for him, he made some kind of mistake/miscalculation and the crime had not yet expired, so he has become an example of someone being prosecuted by confessing a crime in a book.

There is, in most countries at least, no law requiring a business to treat a customer fairly. In general, a business may refuse to serve a would-be customer for any reason or none, provided that the reason is not membership in a protected class (racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual bias, mostly). Exactly which classes are protected depends on the local law (in the US, there can be such laws at all of federal, state, and municipal levels). If a customer is asked to leave and does not do so, s/he could be charged with defiant trespass (or local equivalent). More likely, security, or the police, could simply escort the customer out of the business, using as much force as is reasonably needed for that purpose. Unless there are grounds for action not mentioned, I see no basis for a successful suit by the customer.

This story is plausible but the technical legal details are probably wrong. It is completely illegal to transport a pistol in a car in New York State if you do not fall into the list of exceptions § 265.01-b: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm when he or she: (1) possesses any firearm or; (2) lawfully possesses a firearm prior to the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand thirteen which added this section subject to the registration requirements of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter and knowingly fails to register such firearm pursuant to such subdivision. Since the question mentions the firearm locked in a glovebox I'm assuming it is a pistol. Comments have suggested and certain exemptions in the law suggest that there isn't a licensure or registration requirement for manual action long guns, but I have not found the specific section exempting them from the possession law. There is a long list of exemptions to the possession law in § 265.20, but the only one that could be applicable to a person just travelling through the state might be section 13: 13. Possession of pistols and revolvers by a person who is a nonresident of this state while attending or traveling to or from, an organized competitive pistol match or league competition... Notably, for a regular citizen they must have a New York State carry permit to possess a handgun, and their long guns must be registered with the state: 3. Possession of a pistol or revolver by a person to whom a license therefor has been issued as provided under section 400.00 or 400.01 of this chapter or possession of a weapon as defined in paragraph (e) or (f) of subdivision twenty-two of section 265.00 of this article which is registered pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter or is included on an amended license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of this chapter. Neither applies to someone simply travelling through the state to another state who hasn't fulfilled the appropriate license or registry requirements. What may apply, however, is the federal Firearm Owners Protection Act, which in part codifies 18 U.S. Code § 926A: Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. The notwithstanding in this case preempts state law and affirms that transporting a firearm between two states that allow the person to carry that firearm cannot be a crime assuming they meet the statutory requirements on carrying the firearm and ammunition. However, he failed to meet those requirements by keeping the firearm in the glove box, which the federal law specifically does not protect. Therefore, NY State law is allowed to apply and he can be charged with possession without a license under NY State law. The part about whether or not he stayed overnight being a distinction may be a retelling error or conflating this law with similar state laws that allow transporting firearms that are inaccessible in the vehicle as long as the vehicle doesn't stop in the state beyond minor pit stops (e.g. for gas).

Note: I am not familiar with Washington law, but I can make an educated guess as to what is happening here. I am guessing that the couple in question are the joint registered owners of the motor vehicle. In many jurisdictions, motor vehicles are treated differently from "normal" things, they are treated as inherently dangerous and thus ownership carries a certain set of responsibilities. (Similar to e.g. owning a firearm, which carries with it certain restrictions on how it can be stored, for example.) One of those responsibilities is to keep track of who is operating the motor vehicle. Therefore, unless the operator of the motor vehicle can clearly be identified without incurring unreasonable cost, tickets for traffic violations are generally addressed to the registered owner, who can then forward them to the responsible operator. (Note that "unreasonable cost" does not have to be monetary. It could also be an invasion of privacy: it is less invasive to just ask the owner to identify the operator than to e.g. surveil the owner's property to find out who is using the vehicle or run facial recognition against the owner's family, friends, and colleagues.) In many jurisdictions, there is a form attached to the ticket (or downloadable from some website) which will look something like this: I accept the ticket: [ ] I do not accept the ticket [ ] because … I was operating the vehicle, but I did not run the red light [ ] I was not operating the vehicle [ ] … the vehicle was operated by: name ___, address ___ … I do not know who was operating the vehicle at that time [ ] If you claim not to know who was operating the vehicle at the time in question, that might have other consequences. In some jurisdictions, you can then be ordered to keep a logbook, for example. If the vehicle then gets caught again and you again claim to now know who was operating it, or you cannot produce the logbook, you might get fined for violating the court order to keep a logbook.

What do I do? Contact the police, and henceforth make sure that all your interactions with the business owner are in writing. That evidence will facilitate the police investigation in this fact-intensive matter. Can I actually be arrested? Yes, you are at risk of getting arrested regardless of whether you eventually prove the business owner is the one who broke the law. Hence the importance of contacting the police before it proceeds on the basis of his fraudulent accusations. The business owner has committed crimes including --but not limited to-- forgery, larceny, and attempted extortion (People v. Ramos, 34 Misc.3d 914, 920 (2012) and Matter of Spargo, 68 A.D.3d 1242 (2009) reflect that also the attempt of extortion leads to being charges and convicted, respectively). The timing of events could be indicative of the extent to which the business owner's criminal conduct was premeditated. For instance, it is unclear whose idea was keep the vehicle in his company's name notwithstanding that you had not acquired the company yet. If it was his idea, this will tend to weaken his denials of mens rea (given his subsequent course of action). Likewise, it is unclear what dissuaded you from purchasing the business. You need to assess whether he lured you in order to get your money for the car, and thereafter cause you to change your mind about the business.

Is it illegal to block, on social media, a person who sends a legal threat? I live in the middle east, and two weeks back I left a negative factual review on a certain hostel in Abu Dhabi. They gave me a scare threat today, saying that they will file a police case for this. I responded by blocking them. They responded with contacting another one of my family member with the same, stating that blocking them would only increase the problem. Is what they say really correct? Does blocking communications with those giving legal threats make things worse?

There does seem to be a meme in the UAE of people threatening legal action for negative reviews, as a form of defamation. The police will simply tell them that this is not a crime, go hire a lawyer if you want to sue them. If you block them, perhaps they don't have any other way to contact you (seems that was the point of blocking them), which means that you cannot receive their offer "If you pay us AED 1,000 we will not sue you", which could be a problem if they win their court case. Still, it is perfectly legal to ignore or block them, up to the point that you are actually served with legal papers. When they actually sue you, "blocking" is irrelevant, they will hire a process server to hand you the legal papers that command you to appear in court.

So I can block children under 13, but I can't tell them that? You can tell them after they fail, you cannot tell them on the asking screen. Then what is the correct way to block children under 13 to access my website and still comply with COPPA? I agree with you that it is odd that they recommend using a cookie but they do!* So you have a entry page with a simple question, "Please indicate your age" and then block based on the response. That's it. Note that the rule is neutral. This means that you do not need to disguise your purpose or try to trick people into entering their correct age. *I think that what is happening here is that any parent who wants to complain to their legislator can be met with the response, "If your kid is so sneaky that they are using different computers to lie about their age what do you want us to do about it?" The fact is, this scheme keeps innocent kids from seeing stuff they shouldn't; the sneaky ones are going to find a way.

This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs.

In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful?

It is illegal in Scotland. There is currently no law specifically against it in the rest of the UK. If you find this is unbelievable, yes it is. There are attempts now to change the laws. PS. There are no photos taken "of the act". Taking the photo is the act. The pervs use a selfy stick or just get down on the floor to take photos, or take photos on stairs. PPS. News on Jan 16th 2019: "A new law will now be introduced in the next couple of months. It could mean that perpetrators might face up to two years in prison and are added to the sex offenders register."

You could sue them for commercially exploiting your image without permission, so the waiver is necessary. It is entirely legal to require of tenants (even if weird) that they be part of an advertising campaign, in a specified way: it's also your right to refuse to sign. There is a minuscule chance that there is a local ordinance prohibiting such a clause.

Submit emails in their totality Your testimonial affidavit can quote or cite them as applicable. There is no protection of anyone’s privacy in court. By the way, the email where admissions were made is probably inadmissible if it was sent were in the course of bona fide negotiation to resolve the dispute. If the other party objects they will be thrown out - I wouldn’t hang my case on them.

(Assuming the jurisdiction is the US.) Your question I was wondering whether there are any limitations on using photos of private individuals on websites. is the least of your potential problems. Photos of the public taken in public are mostly legal to use and publish, and you own the copyright on the photo, and generally don't need a model release. But your plan of posting the photo with accompanying information about (alleged) fraud: There's a fraud conducting business in my state and I want to create a website that warns others of his fraudulent practices. is potentially legally problematic. As phoog indicates in his comment, you need to be aware of defamation, both at the federal level and among states, as some have criminalized defamation (Wikipedia). Libel is the publication of provably false facts by one person about another person. For a full outline of defamation (libel and slander, and including private and public figures), see Libel and Slander | Nolo.com. What you want to do is publish "facts" about this alleged fraud on the website with a photo of the individual, linking the fraud allegations to them. That is potentially libelous. The facts of the fraud may be provably true, or they may be provably false; that remains to be seen. But the facts don't matter when considering what actions the person can take against you if you publish such information on your website. If this business and the individual(s) feel they are not committing fraud, they can sue you for libel in civil court, alleging that you have damaged their reputation and impacted their business by publishing those facts on your website with the photo identifying the person and their business. If they take legal action, and you can prove the business and the individual(s) are committing fraud with provable facts - hard evidence of fraud, such as legal documents and court judgments - than you should (no guarantees) be able to successfully defend yourself in a libel suit brought against you by that person. Even if the business and the individual(s) are aware of facts that prove their fraud, and know they will probably not prevail in court, they can still take you to court, and it will cost you whatever time and money it takes to defend yourself. My responses above concern what legal actions the alleged could take against you if you published the website with the photo and information about the alleged fraud. No one here is advising you to put up the website with the photo and the "facts" as you see them, even if you have hard proof of the facts of the fraud; you should find legal representation before taking any action with the website. And, no one here is advising you to open any legal action against the person; that's your choice in terms of determining your case and if you can show actual harm that was caused by the alleged fraud by the individual, and you should find legal representation before taking any action.

Fired (seemingly) for finding paycheck inconsistencies. What kind of legal recourse might exist? Not me, but a friend. They found some paycheck inconsistencies for them and a bunch of other employees, and asked about it. The response from management was "oh, oops. We'll fix it" A few days later she came in to fill a shift for someone, but was blocked from coming in and told she was fired. Being somewhat in shock, she tried to ask why, to which they responded "we'll call the cops if you don't leave right now." There had been no issues up until this point, so the whole thing kind of reeks of red flags. Is there any recourse for this? My sense is that this should be investigated, some amount of auditing should be done, and -- if it seems plausible she was fired for finding it -- unemployment might be an option.

united-states Protections for workers from wrongful termination from employment in the U.S. are among the weakest in the developed world. Unemployment benefits If you are fired and there is not a "good cause" basis to fire you, you are entitled to unemployment insurance in almost all U.S. states (at least if you have worked for the employer long enough). Firing you because you discovered a payroll accounting problem and brought it to the employer's attention would ordinarily not constitute "good cause" for unemployment insurance purposes. Unemployment benefits last only a limited period of time, are for only a fraction of what you earned when you were employed, and can be terminated if you fail to actively look for work or find new employment. Whistleblower protections There are whistleblower statutes that prohibit employers from firing someone for reporting certain kinds of employer misconduct (although the remedy is usually a large dollar damages award - typically more than unemployment benefits, rather than reinstatement). But it isn't entirely clear that one would apply in this case, particularly without knowing which state if it is in the U.S., is involved. There is not one omnibus whistleblower protection statute at the federal level or in most U.S. states that prohibits firing or punishing an employee in every case where misconduct is revealed (this kind of conduct by an employer is also sometimes called "retaliation" or a "retaliatory firing"). Instead, there is a patchwork of whistleblower protections for particular kinds of misconduct that is reported by the employee. One would have to determine if this particular kind of misconduct would fit one of those statutes. For example, there are at least five different agencies that enforce whistleblower protections at the federal level: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) With the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Congress created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to ensure safe and healthful working conditions for workers by setting and enforcing standards and by providing training, outreach, education and assistance. Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) The U.S. Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) helps to reduce deaths, injuries, and illnesses in the nation's mines with a variety of activities and programs. The Agency develops and enforces safety and health rules for all U.S. mines, and provides technical, educational and other types of assistance to mine operators. Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), protects workers, promotes diversity and enforces the law. OFCCP holds those who do business with the federal government (contractors and subcontractors) responsible for complying with the legal requirement to take affirmative action and not discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, national origin, disability, or status as a protected veteran. In addition, contractors and subcontractors are prohibited from discharging or otherwise discriminating against applicants or employees who inquire about, discuss or disclose their compensation or that of others, subject to certain limitations. Wage and Hour Division (WHD) The Wage and Hour Division (WHD) mission is to promote and achieve compliance with labor standards to protect and enhance the welfare of the nation's workforce. The agency enforces federal minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping, and child labor requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. WHD also enforces the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, wage garnishment provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, and a number of employment standards and worker protections as provided in several immigration related statutes. Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (VETS) The Veterans’ Employment and Training Service prepares America's veterans, service members and their spouses, for meaningful careers, provide them with employment resources and expertise, protect their employment rights and promote their employment opportunities. There are also typically whistleblower protections related to union activity at an employer. Employees of the government and government contractors have stronger protections for whistleblowers than most employees. The Wage and Hour division whistleblowing rules might apply, but that would depend upon detailed facts not present in the question about the exact nature of the errors in the payroll system. Whistleblower protections might apply under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, but typically that protects only employees of large or publicly held companies. Similarly, whistleblower protections arising from securities laws are typically only applicable to publicly held companies or companies that are going public.

A. Yes it is clearly illegal to fire employees for unionizing. B. Companies get around this all the time by closing the facility. That means the managers lose their jobs too, which is incentive for management to keep a union from forming.

If you want to protect yourself or any property interests you may have in this circumstance you have to talk to a lawyer. You cannot get (or trust) legal advice from the internet. I will, however, make the following personal observations: I only provide a W-9 to people who are paying me money, and who request it as a condition of paying me. I don't know of a legal requirement to supply it after the fact. However, not providing it to someone who did pay you more than $600 in a tax year could certainly make it difficult for them to comply with their tax filing obligations. I do not sign any agreements, assignments, or contracts, without what I consider to be fair consideration. E.g., if on leaving a job (as has happened) I am asked by a former employer to sign something that I am not already obligated to sign due to some prior contract, then I negotiate what is commonly called a "severance package." They pay me and/or extend benefits, and I sign something that limits their liability.

They can't simply keep the money; that's against the law. But in a situation like this, it's easy to get lost in the bureaucracy. The company may be in violation of different laws, re: For Your Information | United States Department of Labor, so you can try pointing this out in another email or letter. The threat of the Feds or other enforcement agency looking into the matter may make something happen. Or, try this: find the CEO (or a similarly high-ranked executive) on LinkedIn; many have open messaging in interest of good PR. Message/email them and carefully (and nicely) explain the situation. (A CEO will likely have an assistant monitoring their LinkedIn account. But, there are many stories of Steve Jobs, Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos personally responding to emails.) Someone will make it happen and the employees who have not been helpful will be in hot water.

The customer list is indeed a trade secret if the shop kept its customer list secret and has an advantage from having that customer list, while others don’t have it. And I would think that is the case, because a competitor laying their hands on the list could for example send special offers to the customers in the list. The question is whether your two hairdressers took that customer list and whether the store has reasonable evidence that they did. If customers find out where their favourite hairdresser moved to that’s no legal problem. Can’t understand why no attorney wants to take the case. To the attorney it doesn’t make a difference whether they took the list or not. If they took the list then his or her job is to end the case with the smallest possible amount of damages being paid. PS. Just read in the comments that there is an accusation of "intentional interference with economic relationship". I would want a lawyer who knows the difference between perfectly legal competition which includes trying to get customers to move their business, and "intentional interference with economic relationship". PS. Really make sure that these guys appear in court. With a lawyer. Not appearing means that if the plaintiff says "Judge, these guys did X, punish them!" and they are not there to say "We absolutely didn't do X, prove it if you can", the judge will assume that they did X.

As a general rule, if a business, like a bank, is legally required to keep information confidential, and an employee breeches confidentiality, then your recourse is to sue the business for damages. See for example ch. 35 of Title 12. The bank cannot claim "It's not our fault, an employee did it" (the Latin for this is "respondeat superior", whereby a part is also responsible for the acts of their agents). As far as I know, there is no law against asking for information that can't be given. This does assume, however, that your mother does not have a legal right to the information (which could arise from some form of co-signing). Also, would assume that they have a normal privacy policy, and not one where they say "We will tell your mother if she asks" (they would have informed you of that, so read the privacy policy). This is a question best answered by your own attorney, to whom you would reveal all of the details.

Can an employer charge employee/contractor a processing fee for payment? No. The matter depends on whether the person qualifies as employee for purposes of the British Columbia Employment Standards Act. Your description suggests that you meet criterion (b) of the definition of employee insofar as you are (i.e., if you are) "a person an employer allows, directly or indirectly, to perform work normally performed by an employee". See section 1(1) of the Act. Section 21(1) prohibits an employer to "directly or indirectly, withhold, deduct or require payment of all or part of an employee's wages for any purpose", and item (2) prohibits the employer to "require an employee to pay any of the employer's business costs except as permitted by the regulations". There is no indication that the alleged business cost of e-transfers would be one such exception. do I have any recourse for such a small amount of money that isn't worth starting a law suit over? You have the option to file a complaint in "an office of the Employment Standards Branch". See sections 74 et seq for further details. You are not specifying the amount of the e-transfer that is being deducted from your compensation. The smaller the amount(s) at issue, the more important it will be for your complaint to persuasively explain how it is not "frivolous, vexatious or trivial". See section 76(c). Directing the employer's attention to the aforementioned statutory prohibition prior to filing a complaint tends to disprove allegations of vexation. That is because you are giving the employer an opportunity to mend its conduct and avert the proceedings that otherwise would take place. That being said, a very occasional cost of few cents is very likely to lead to a conclusion of vexation or bad faith regardless of your preliminary steps. In most other contexts, though, it is in your best interest to stay aware of the obligations that are being presented/proposed to you so that your actions do not constitute an acceptance of terms & conditions you would rather reject. Not all contracts come in the form of a written document signed by the parties.

Is it illegal to ask a company for money in exchange for information on a bug in their software/website? That in itself is legal. Indeed, the company would incur unjust enrichment if it coerced you to disclose your discovery for free. Only if you threatened the company to divulge to others your discovery unless the company pays you, it would be illegal and trigger charges such as extortion (likewise, legislations outlaw the unjustified delivery of programs or instructions for hacking a software/network/etc., although this goes beyond your actual question). Can the company take legal action against me? That seems doubtful, futile, and it could backfire (please note I have not done any research on legal precedents about this). Although the terms and conditions of the website or the End User License Agreement (EULA) of software might prohibit you to reverse engineer (RE)/decompile/etc. the application, anti-RE clauses are unenforceable and the remedies therefor are indeterminate because the sole act of conducting reverse engineering does not subject the company (or third parties) to any losses. The company's decision to take legal action for your discovery could backfire from two standpoints. First, it calls attention to the fact that the software at issue is defective and unsafe. And second, the bug is likely to be detected by someone else anyway, thereby potentially compromising customers' systems.

Can I use MasterCard and Visa logos as examples in a scientific publication? I have a peer-reviewed paper about to get published, in an experimental psychology topic. (The journal is Memory.) In one of the figures in the paper I used MasterCard and Visa card logos as examples (which were also used in my experiment). An editor however highlighted that there might be a copyright problem with this. It would be nice if I could include these logos, but it is not crucial. Should I play it safe and remove them? I tried to google this issue but all I can see that these logos can be used for relevant business purposes (e.g., at stores where these cards can be used) -- using them as examples in a scientific paper seems to be a different matter. I'm looking for a fairly definitive legal source that decides on the matter. If there is none, I'll just remove the logos.

I will note from the outset that journal editors might require things from you that go beyond what is legally necessary. A typical case is that they will require one to obtain permission before reusing a figure from another article/journal/author (even though in the vast majority of cases no such permission would be needed). The legal answer might allow you to push back on the editor’s demands, but they still have the last word. There are two kinds of intellectual property to consider. Unless otherwise noted, this answer is valid for france and united-states. Trademark is almost certainly not an issue Trademark is a right to branding. A trademark holder can prevent others from using certain elements to promote their own products. The elements need not be complex, they just need to be recognizable by the public as related to the brand in question. For instance, "Tesla" is the name of an 19th century Serbian-American inventor known among other things for discoveries related to radio transmission. You would probably be able to market a radio transmitter under a "Tesla" brand (assuming there are no existing trademarks, which I have not checked). If you try the same thing with electrical vehicles, you will get sued. For a research paper, as long as you do not imply that Visa or MasterCard support your research or its results in any way, that should not be an issue. I assume, but cannot guarantee, that the above applies to most Western jurisdictions. Copyright Copyright is a protection or creative elements. Whoever authors a creative work can forbid others from distributing it under certain conditions. Are the Visa and MasterCard logos copyrighted? The first question is whether the elements at hand are protected under copyright. In the case of the Visa and MasterCard logos, this might depend on the jurisdiction. The criterion for "creativity" varies a lot. Some jurisdiction have adopted (some version of) the sweat of the brow doctrine, according to which work suffices to produce a "creative element" with copyright protection. The typical example are databases of facts where each individual entry is unoriginal but the collection might take some time to collect, curate and maintain (such as a phone book). In the united-states, the Supreme Court rejected the sweat of the brow doctrine in 1991. Accordingly, a work needs to reach the threshold of originality. Determining whether the threshold is met for a given work is done on a case-by-case basis at trial. However, it seems very likely that both logos are not protected by copyright in the United States. The Visa logo is a simple font with no significant creative elements; the MasterCard logo contains two overlapping circles. I note that Wikimedia Commons hosts both logos on their website and claims they are public-domain under that rationale (Visa, MasterCard). Wikimedia Commons usually follows copyright fairly closely, and they are a high-profile website hence a prime target for takedown requests by IP lawyers at Visa or MasterCard, so that is weak evidence that their claim is correct. But there is always the possibility that Visa / MasterCard just have not decided to sue yet. In france, the statute makes no explicit reference any threshold of originality: (article L-112-1 of the code of intellectual property) Les dispositions du présent code protègent les droits des auteurs sur toutes les oeuvres de l'esprit, quels qu'en soient le genre, la forme d'expression, le mérite ou la destination. The present code [containing all copyright statutes] protect copyrights for any works of mind, whatever their style, form of expression, artistic worth, or intended use. However, various court cases have tended to require "works of mind" to exhibit some amount of intellectual originality. For instance, Civ. 1ère 22 janv. 2009, n°08-11404 held that a perfume cannot be copyrighted because la fragrance d'un parfum, qui procède de la simple mise en oeuvre d'un savoir-faire, ne constitue pas la création d'une forme d'expression pouvant bénéficier de la protection des oeuvres de l'esprit par le droit d'auteur the smell of a perfume comes from the simple application of a know-how and does not constitute the creation of a form of expression subject to the protection of works of mind by copyright After a fifteen-minute look at various cases, I still do not have any strong idea of whether the Visa or MasterCard logo would be copyrighted in France. Let’s assume for the sake of the argument that they are. "Fair use" Even copyrighted works can be used without the copyright holder’s agreement under certain exceptions. Here again, any precise answer is jurisdiction-specific. "Fair use" is a US-specific doctrine, resulting from a string of court cases eventually codified into law (Wikipedia has a decent history). It is a rather general doctrine (any use case can be analyzed under the four balancing factors) and results can be hard to predict. I believe research articles usually fall on the right side, but because the logos under discussion are not under copyright in the US (see above), I will not attempt to make any in-depth analysis. Pedantic note: it is sloppy wording to use the term "fair use" for similar clauses in other jurisdictions. "Fair use" is a US doctrine. In france, the corresponding doctrine is given by a rather strict but precise statute at article L122-5 of the code of intellectual property: Lorsque l'oeuvre a été divulguée, l'auteur ne peut interdire : (...) 3° Sous réserve que soient indiqués clairement le nom de l'auteur et la source : a) Les analyses et courtes citations justifiées par le caractère critique, polémique, pédagogique, scientifique ou d'information de l'oeuvre à laquelle elles sont incorporées ; When the work has been published, the author cannot forbid: (...) 3° As long as the name of the author and the source are clearly mentioned: a) Analysis and short citations justified by the inclusion in a work with an aim of criticism, debate, pedagogy, science or information A research article is the typical case of a "work of science" (science means here "scholarly research", not STEM). I have little doubt that it would be a covered use, especially if the paper discusses the reason behind the choice of those logos (easily recognizable by test subjects? simple shapes? etc.).

The resulting figure could surely be covered by copyright, if it is original. A new set of folds to make a known figure might not be separately protectable under US law. In this news story A court in Japan is said to have held that: the folding instructions are indeed a copyrightable subject matter, because (i) the author’s selection of 10 out of 32 folding steps were subject to alternative modes of expression; (ii) the author’s folding instructions, including the organization of the diagrams, the texts, and the drawings, had elements of “style”; (iii) taken in its entirety, one admittedly found room for creative expression (Tokyo District Court Opinion: Case No. Heisei 23 (2011) (Wa) 18968 (Tokyo D.Ct., May 20, 2011). But it further held that the particular diagram displayed was not an infringement of the claimed source. In this tech dirt podcast a suit over an artwork derived from a folding pattern is reported. Tech dirt thinks it is an obvious case of fair use. The British Origami society says: The issue of how the laws of copyright affect origami diagrams and models is an important one. Groups such as the Origami Artists and Creators are working towards an internationally agreed set of guidelines. Dr. Robert Lang has presented his interpretation on his website. Until a common statement is agreed, we refer people to the terms in our constitution. (1) The Society and its Members shall respect all copyrights, registered trademarks and registered designs in all models, designs, diagrams, photographs, books and writings and shall observe the laws of copyright, registered trademarks, registered designs and patents and all other provisions relating to intellectual property which are applicable in all the separate countries throughout the World. (2) This article shall apply to all models, designs, diagrams, photographs, books and writings whether existing in writing or print on paper or any other hard copy or existing in electronic form, photocopy or microfiche in libraries, public or private archives or on the internet or on recorded discs or tapes of any kind or in any other kind of electronic record and whether made commercially or otherwise publicly or made privately. (3) Before reproducing any model, drawing, photograph or text contained in any publication, a member of the Society shall obtain the consent of the copyright owner before publication. (4) As a matter of courtesy, whether or not required to do so by law, the Society and its Members shall give proper acknowledgement to the original author of any model, design or diagram demonstrated or reproduced in any manner. Origami USA says that: OrigamiUSA is very concerned about protecting and respecting the rights of origami artists, authors, and diagrammers. While "traditional" origami models are in the public domain, the vast majority of published origami designs are of recent authorship and therefore cannot be published or used commercially without obtaining permission from their creators and/or diagrammers. It seems that few suits on origami copyright have been filed, and then appealed to where opinions are published and thus accessible to a non-professional's search.

I want to use a couple of lines from "What is life?" by Erwin Schrödinger as quote on the front of my thesis. Would i need permission for that form publisher or would that be convered in fair use? There are close cases of fair use, but this is not one of them. This is unequivocally and clearly fair use. It is a brief excerpt of a much larger body of work, it is for non-commercial use by a student, and it is for educational and academic purposes (presumably to advance science). Also do i need to attribute the quote properly Yes. This is necessary both because of the moral rights of the author under E.U. copyright law (assuming that works by Erwin Schrödinger are still in copyright), and for reasons of academic ethical considerations. It is still in copyright, because he died on January 4, 1961, which is 58 years ago. So, in countries that protect copyrights for the life of the author plus 50 years (the minimum required by the Berne Convention) this is out of copyright, but in countries that protect copyrights for the life of the author plus 70 years (e.g. Germany), the copyright is still in force until January 4, 2031. Also, even if the work were out of copyright, as a matter of academic integrity, you would be required to attribute the quote in an academic thesis in any case. Quoting someone without attribution in academic work is considered plagiarism, and could result in your thesis being stricken and also in your degree being revoked in a serious case. Government ministers in the E.U. have been forced to resign over plagiarism in their academic work as students in recent years. This is taken much more seriously in Europe than it is in the U.S.

In the US, the relevant law is 17 USC 401 which provides in relevant part: (a) General Provisions.—Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a notice of copyright as provided by this section may be placed on publicly distributed copies from which the work can be visually perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. [emphasis added] (b) Form of Notice.—If a notice appears on the copies, it shall consist of the following three elements: (b)(1) the symbol © (the letter C in a circle), or the word “Copyright”, or the abbreviation “Copr.”; and (b)(2) the year of first publication of the work; in the case of compilations or derivative works incorporating previously published material, the year date of first publication of the compilation or derivative work is sufficient. The year date may be omitted where a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, with accompanying text matter, if any, is reproduced in or on greeting cards, postcards, stationery, jewelry, dolls, toys, or any useful articles; and (b)(3) the name of the owner of copyright in the work, or an abbreviation by which the name can be recognized, or a generally known alternative designation of the owner. (c) Position of Notice.—The notice shall be affixed to the copies in such manner and location as to give reasonable notice of the claim of copyright. The Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation, as examples, specific methods of affixation and positions of the notice on various types of works that will satisfy this requirement, but these specifications shall not be considered exhaustive. (d) Evidentiary Weight of Notice.—If a notice of copyright in the form and position specified by this section appears on the published copy or copies to which a defendant in a copyright infringement suit had access, then no weight shall be given to such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based on innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages, except as provided in the last sentence of section 504(2). Note that this section lists the three elements in the order 1) symbol or word, 2) year, 3) owner's name. However, it does not explicitly require this order. As the notice is no longer required at all, and as the sole purpose is "to give reasonable notice of the claim of copyright" and to defeat a defense of "innocent infringement", the order is probably not significant. But I would follow the text of the law and list the elements in teh same order that 17 USC 401 (b) does, that is, word or symbol fist, year second, name third. For example Copyright © 2022 Jane Jones But other forms probably have identical legal significance. Note that "Copyright ©" is a redundancy and perhaps I should not have used it in the example here. But it is what I in fact use, and many commercial publishers do the same. I do it because I think the word will be clearest to many English-speaking people, but the symbol will be clearest internationally, Note also that a notice is no longer legally required. Under US law, until 1 January 1978 (the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act) any publication without a notice caused the work to enter the public domain at once. After that, until 1 March 1989, any publication without a notice caused the work to enter the public domain in five years, unless the work was registered within that time. Once a work enters the public domain, there is no copyright in that work at all. Ever since 1 March 1989, omission of a notice never causes a work to enter the public domain under US law, and currently, to the best of my understanding, a notice is not legally required in any country in the world, although it has some legal value under US law.

"Plagiarism" is an academic concept, not a legal one Plagiarising the work of another without attribution is academic misconduct in every reputable academic facility and can lead to disciplinary action. But it's not against the law, and you can't be sued for doing it. Copyright violation is against the law You violate copyright when you copy or make a derivative work from the copyrighted work of another without permission or without an exemption under the law. In some jurisdictions, authors and artists have moral copyright, which operates alongside proprietary copyright and gives certain rights, including the right of attribution and the right for their work to be treated respectfully. In those jurisdictions, even if you have the copyright holder's permission, you must still respect the moral rights. Let's make some things explicit by considering a particular artwork. Say, this one: This particular piece is not subject to copyright because a) it was created before there was such a concept, and b) da Vinci died in 1519, so if there had been a copyright law, copyright in this work would have long expired. So, you can make as many copies of this as you like. Now, let's consider what the situation would be if Leonardo's alchemical pursuits had been more successful and instead of dying in 1519, he died last Tuesday. If you want to make a copy of this image, you must have Leonardo's heir(s) permission or be operating under an exemption under copyright law in your jurisdiction. When you train your AI, you will need to make a copy of the image. Do you have permission? Do you have a relevant exemption? If you obtained your images by scraping websites then the answers are no and (probably) no. Whether the image has metadata identifying the author is irrelevant to answering the questions. Whether there is any way of identifying the artist is also irrelevant - you still need their permission even if you don't know who to ask. If your AI, when prompted, generates an image that is strikingly similar to a copyrighted image it was trained on, that is a derivative work and you need permission for that. Under current law, the programer(s) are likely the copyright violators rather than the users of the AI.

The CC-ND license seems to be what you are looking for. However, Sec. 2(a) has two conditions, one allowing copying and distribution of the unmodified original (as stated in A), but also allows the user to modify but not distribute a modified version of the work (they may "produce and reproduce, but not Share, Adapted Material"). This would mean that a reader could rewrite your paper, as long as they keep it to themselves. If this bothers you, I think you could not rely on a standard named license, instead you'd have to provide your own – such as CC-ND 4.0 without clause (2)(a)(B). Rewriting a legal document is a risky proposition, even for a legal professional, because you have to carefully think through all of the implications of any new punctuation, adjectives, and deletions. If you contemplate deleting clause (2)(a)(B), you should come up with a line of reasoning that compels you do delete it in order to accomplish your goal, and check that the deletion doesn't thwart that goal. That is why people pay money to lawyers (and also why you need to make your goal clear to that lawyer, lest the agreement be inconsistent with your goal).

Can he use another commercial product that is copyrighted, e.g. a map of a location (the map is a political map and has nothing to do with trees), for his tree research purposes, if such a map won't be part of the book he works on? Yes. Copyright protects particular expressions of ideas and knowledge, not the ideas and knowledge themselves. Using a map for research purposes when the map or a modified version of it does not appear in the final work does not make the final work a "derivative work" covered by copyright.

There is no such thing, legally, as "an attack on someone's writing". The only way in which any use of one person's writing by another could be the subject of legal action would be if it infringed copyright. But individual words, short phrases, and individual numbers are not subject to copyright protection. In theory such things might be protected as trademarks, but that would give protection only if they were being used "in trade", that is, to sell or advertise something, and then only if it is in the same industry or market. But a license plate is not selling anything. You may have assigned code meanings to particular numbers. Many people have done this before, using many different schemes or codes. It would be hard to demonstrate that a license plate is referring to your coded meaning and not to some other code. But even if the user admitted an intent to reference your use of a particular number, you have no legal cause of action. You might as well ignore such references, because you cannot do anything to prevent them. Plagiarism is not a crime, nor a tort when there is not copyright or trademark infringement, even if it is openly admitted. If you could prove harassment or some sort of stalking you might have a case, but nothing you have described (in the question or associated comments) comes close to that. If a police car actually hit yours intentionally or negligently you would clearly have a case, but the plate numbers would be no part of it. Response to recent comment: The source of authority (which is not the same thing as jurisdiction) to place license plate numbers on police cars is state MV laws and regulations. To the best of my understanding, such numbers are assigned automatically and sequentially, and have no reference whatever to anyone's blog or political statements. No evidence seems to be cited to show otherwise. The question asks What jurisdiction authorizes these reappropriations of my work/writing/speech? But no one authorizes tjhings that did not happen, and as far as i can see no appropriation occured. Jurisdictions, by the way, do not authorize things, people and organizations do. The question asserts: For my writing I coined "317" and "037" but no one can "coin" a number, and people use numbers in many ways. Use of a similar number on a license plate need not be a reference of any sort to a particular blog or writing.

Mobile network in 915 MHz ISM frequency band Is it legal in the United Stated to operate a mobile/cellular network in the "unlicensed" 915 MHz ISM frequency band? I mean given I have all other permissions needed (mobile network service license etc.) except the frequency spectrum license. The technology used may be GSM/UMTS/LTE. The mobile network frequencies (2G/3G/4G) partially overlap the 902-928 MHz ISM band so this should be technically possible (channels in 902-915 + 925-928 MHz) even though naturally this limits the network bandwidth while respecting the maximum ISM band radio power.

Yes you can, subject to your equipment meeting applicable FCC Part 15 regulations. Ricochet Wireless did exactly what you proposed, running a mobile data network at 900 MHz. Currently, carriers including Verizon run LTE in the 5 GHz Wi-Fi band. However, there's a potentially better choice, the Citizens Broadband Radio Service. This is a "lightly" licensed service, with cheaper and free licenses that are coordinated in shared spectrum. Companies run private CBRS LTE and you can buy small base stations like Wi-Fi access points. More importantly, many commercial handsets support this frequency band, like newer iPhones.

Assuming that the police have a warrant to seize your cell phone, the scope of what can be seized is specified in the warrant. It is not automatic that seizing a phone entails seizure of some or all online accounts (e.g. automatic backups, collections of passwords in a Google account) and it does not automatically "freeze" or block a person's access to their accounts including phone accounts. It's not that it is impossible to seize an account, it's that it is not automatic: it has to be in the scope of the warrant. Here is a collection of petition templates, asking the court to allow the seizure of various things for various reasons (mostly electronic), including access to bank accounts. If the police suspect that information might be available online after it has been deleted from a phone, they would need to include online accounts in the scope of the petition(s). There is even a template for "give me everything", called "Frankenstein".

Might depend on where you are. I think it's illegal in North Korea. In the US, it is legally encouraged, by the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, especially the part that says "Congress declares that the general welfare of the United States requires that the Administration seek and encourage, to the maximum extent possible, the fullest commercial use of space". Previously, Congress passed the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, which first expressed an interest in allowing commercial flights, but there was substantial opposition to non-government entities in space. There are a number of legal private space adventures from numerous countries. As Nate Eldridge points out, you still need government (FAA) permission. So it's legal to blast yourself into space in the same sense that it's legal to drive or to open a business.

You do need to know the location of both parties. U.S. Federal law (18 USC 2511(2)(d)), which prohibits the interception of wire and electronic communication, states: It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State. California Penal Code 632 requires the consent of all parties to a confidential communication in order for the conversation to be recorded. The statute defines a "confidential communication" as follows: The term “confidential communication” includes any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a communication made in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the public, or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded. Once AT&T, or anyone else for that matter, states that the communication is being recorded, it is no longer considered a confidential communication requiring the consent of all parties in order for any party to record it. Part of the California Civil Jury Instructions for this code requires that the plaintiff must prove, among other things, that the plaintiff had a "reasonable expectation that the conversation was not being overheard or recorded." You can see the full jury instructions here: https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/docs/caci/1800/1809.html

This article is from an official Emirates news agency, which confirms the change (Federal Law 12/2016). This is a change to Federal Law 5/2012, replacing Article 9 (the translation into English is odd because the verb phrase goes first). The level of the penalty has increased (minimum 150K → minimum 500K; maximum 500K → 2M). Incarceration is changed from "imprisonment" to "temporary imprisonment", which might mean that previously the term was life. In either case, they have an "and" problem that the punishment is "(temporary) imprisonment and a fine ... or either of these two penalties". Presumably the Arabic version is dispositive. Apart from that, the new version of the law identifies the offender as Whoever uses a fraudulent computer network protocol address (IP address) by using a false address or a third-party address by any other means for the purpose of committing a crime or preventing its discovery whereas the old law only said whoever uses a fraudulent computer network protocol address by using a false address or a third-party address by any other means for the purpose of committing a crime or preventing its discovery. Thus the meaning of "computer network protocol address" is defined as being equivalent to "IP address". In other words, there is no substantive change beyond the stiffer penalty. There does not seem to any provision allowing one to ask for exceptions. Article 30 of the underlying law strongly suggests that there is no exception and you should not ask. On a separate note, only Etisalat and Du are authorized to provide telecommunications services, pursuant to Federal Decree Law No. 3/2003. This article from August 24, 2015 also links to a number of related articles indicating that everything is illegal.

IANAL, just a programmer with an interest in legal rules. Due to the very permissive nature of the MIT license, no, it does not appear that anything illegal has been done. Specifically, the section to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software (emphasis mine) grants everyone the right to modify your code and share those modifications, provided one includes the license. Since this person has included your license (including your copyright notice), they have followed the conditions of the license and are able to share your stuff. Legally. Ethically, I still think its ****. This might be a good starting point in selecting a license (note the Modification column). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_free_and_open-source_software_licenses The CC-BY-SA license family, as mentioned by Ron Beyer in comments is on this list, for example. TL;DR: You unfortunately granted a more permissive license than what you wanted/needed to. This was a BadThing(TM), analogous to giving too broad of access rights to a method or class. Determine your desired permissions, then select a license that matches what you'd like to grant.

Since no jurisdiction is specified, I decided to search in maryland in the united-states As far as I can tell, there is no state or federal law which prohibits a private individual from owning a decommissioned military tank. Most public highways and roads have weight limits, and many tanks would exceed them. Most tanks, or at least most older tanks, are not in any case "street legal" not having required headlights, brake lights, air bags, and other safety devices. Treads must be modified to avoid road damage. None of this would be relevant if the tank was kept on private land and not used on public roads or streets. If somehow the main gun or a mounted machine gun were still in place, and not disabled, permits would be required that are almost impossible to obtain. Specifically: "State Laws and Published Ordinances – Maryland Statutes current through chapter 18 of the 2020 session lists Code section 4-401 which provides that: (c) Machine gun. "Machine gun" means a loaded or unloaded weapon that is capable of automatically discharging more than one shot or bullet from a magazine by a single function of the firing device. Section 4-402: (a) Evidence of possession. The presence of a machine gun in a room, boat, or vehicle is evidence of the possession or use of the machine gun by each person occupying the room, boat, or vehicle. ... (c) Registration of possession. (1) A person who acquires a machine gun shall register the machine gun with the Secretary of State Police: (i) within 24 hours after acquiring the machine gun; and (ii) in each succeeding year during the month of May. Section 4-501 (b) Destructive device. (1) "Destructive device" means explosive material, incendiary material, or toxic material that is: (i) combined with a delivery or detonating apparatus so as to be capable of inflicting injury to persons or damage to property; or (ii) deliberately modified, containerized, or otherwise equipped with a special delivery, activation, or detonation component that gives the material destructive characteristics of a military ordnance. (2) "Destructive device" includes a bomb, grenade, mine, shell, missile, flamethrower, poison gas, Molotov cocktail, pipe bomb, and petroleum-soaked ammonium nitrate Section 4-503 (a) Prohibited. A person may not knowingly: (1) manufacture, transport, possess, control, store, sell, distribute, or use a destructive device; or (2) possess explosive material, incendiary material, or toxic material with intent to create a destructive device.

The law 'doesn't care' how the call is recorded. What matters is whether or not you should inform / should have informed the participant(s) in the circumstances. In circumstances where you are acting as an ordinary member of the public, in the course of a purely personal or household activity, not in a journalistic capacity, regulated business or other circumstances where the rules may differ: In the UK it is not unlawful for a private person to record a phone call without the permission or foreknowledge of the other participant(s) - provided the recording is for 'personal use'. If you intend to share the content of the call with a third-party or make it public, then you must inform the person ahead of recording it. If you try to use a covertly recorded call as evidence in court, the court may or may not exclude it depending on the circumstances.

Why is it really bad to publicly talk about a case you are involved in on social media? I was inspired to ask this question due to these related Reddit AMA I’m Jaime Rogozinski, Founder of WallStreetBets and I’m suing Reddit. AMA. Help me understand the trademark battle for WallStreetBets The author of the questions is suing Reddit for trademark violations. These links are him publicly talking about his case. In both of the links, the commenters tell him that what he is doing is really bad (for him) and that his lawyer would most definitely advise against it. Did your lawyers advise you to not do this AMA? I can't imagine a sane lawyer that would advise this... "I have the worst fucking client." - his attorney My question is, what is so bad about what he is doing? People who sue others go on news all the time to talk about the case. Just by searching google news for is suing over trademark violation leads to many articles regarding a trademark lawsuit. In many of those cases there is a statement from at least one of the sides. Are all those results (I know, many are about the same case, but still, a lot) full of stupid clients?

It's a bit like talking to the police: anything you say might be used against you, so the conventional wisdom is to say nothing. It is a good rule of thumb. When you are paying a professional to represent you, why make things complicated by speaking on your own behalf about the same issue? As you point out, not everyone follows this rule. In some circumstances there might be benefits to discussing your case publicly, such as fundraising or deterrence. Whether the risk outweighs the benefits will depend on the details of the legal case and your role in it. Lawyers are likely to emphasise the following risks: If you are a witness whose credibility is in issue, any public statement could potentially become a prior inconsistent statement which is used against you in cross-examination. Again, one of the purposes of hiring a lawyer is to be careful about how you communicate your position on a litigious matter and reduce the risk of careless remarks having unexpected consequences. Speaking publicly undermines this goal. In Commonwealth countries, there is a significant risk that public comment on a case before the court could amount to sub judice contempt of court. Attempting to litigate the case in the media can be perceived as undermining the authority of the court. Lawyers are expected to uphold public confidence in the administration of justice and would be reluctant to condone anything that could be regarded as a contempt. This contributes to a culture where discussing active litigation is "not the done thing" and may itself cause problems with a witness's perceived credibility, aside from the risk of a contempt allegation. Speaking publicly about litigation is risky and the consequences are difficult to predict, which is why people often engage lawyers to do it. When the client continues to make their own statements without legal advice, it makes the lawyer's risk management job more difficult, so they are likely to advise against it.

There is a general belief that a term being trademarked means that it's illegal to use the term without permission from the trademark holder, but that is false. It is illegal only if it is done in a manner that suggests endorsement by the trademark holder. For instance, selling a football as a "Super Bowl football" would be trademark infringement, as it implies NFL involvement in the production of the football. Simply talking about the Super Bowl, such as saying "Our construction company built the stadium the Super Bowl is being played in" is not trademark infringement. Simply using a trademarked term to discuss the thing it refers to, without implying endorsement, is known as "nominative use". However, even if one would be on solid legal footings and could win a lawsuit on the basis of nominative use, one might avoid using a trademark to avoid the hassle of being sued.

In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source.

What Big Tech is doing is spending a lot of money on lawyers and appeals – doesn't matter if it costs millions if you can make money in the meanwhile. Facebook stores a lot of user data in the US. Initially, this was allowed because the US was recognized as offering an adequate level of data protection under the Safe Harbor and later the Privacy Shield Framework. Then Schrems I and Schrems II happened and the adequacy recognition was ruled to be invalid. Does Facebook pull back their user data? No. The GDPR offers alternative reasons why you might process data in foreign countries, such as “standard contractual clauses” (SCCs) or “binding corporate rules” (BCRs). Now, Facebook claims that they are using SCCs. Is this valid? Almost certainly not due to the issues of US law analyzed in the Schrems II case, but it can take years for the next round of court cases to work its way through the system. And when Facebook's use of SCCs is ruled invalid they will probably try BCRs next, and once that is over a decade will have passed and the US might actually have achieved an adequate privacy level by then. You do not have Facebook-style money to spend on lawyers and endless rounds of appeals, so you should avoid legally risky things such as outsourcing data processing activities to companies in the US (this doesn't mean you can't be compliant if you are a US entity). I mentioned adequacy decision previously. There is a list of countries that the EU considers to be sufficiently safe. Currently, the more notable countries involve Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, in addition to EU/EEA countries of course. If you want to process data in a location that is OK for both the UK and the US, then looking at companies in one of these countries is a good idea. For example, if most of your users are in the US but you would like your servers to be in a country with an EU adequacy decision, then looking at Canada could make sense. Even outside of this list, you can process data if you implement additional safeguards via SCCs. However, this requires a case by case analysis of the legal environment in that country. One problem with the US is that it has national security laws that impose requirements on companies in a manner that is incompatible with SCCs. A company bound by these US laws cannot enter into such a contract where it guarantees the privacy of your user's data. Countries other than the EU have much more tedious data residency laws. The GDPR does not impose any data residency requirements in the sense that data must not leave a particular country – you just have to ensure that the data is properly protected. In contrast, Russia and China have real data residency requirements that are fundamentally incompatible with the GDPR.

Repeating a defamatory statement is itself defamatory This is known as the repetition rule and is illustrated in Brown v Bower & Another [2017] EWHC 2637 (QB). In essence, the "local news site" is responsible for the reputational damage suffered by their publication and you are responsible for the damage caused by your amplification of that publication. So if the local news article was seen by a few dozen people locally, the damages might be relatively modest. If your publication caused it to be seen by millions of people and caused nationwide or worldwide damage to the person's reputation so that they are at risk of losing income or opportunities in the future, the damages can be vast. How you shared it is important. If you endorsed it, which includes forwarding it without commentary, then it is likely defamatory. If you were more circumspect and said something that shows an open mind to the allegations like "This is an interesting story, I can't wait to see how it plays out", then it's likely not defamatory. Of course, if the allegations are true then you have nothing to worry about; truth is a complete defence to defamation. You can prove that they are true, right? I mean with real evidence like a conviction for fraud. Or, at the very least, pending or actual charges from the police. Or, failing that you have good evidence that you yourself have been scammed specifically by this person. Or that you have had people who have been scammed tell you personally exactly how it happened? No? Well, I wouldn't count on a truth defence if I were you.

united-states That is going to depend greatly on the circumstances. In the US generally anyone may express an opinion on the value or merits of an investment, indeed that is protected speech under the first amendment. However, a person with an interest in a stock or other security who publishes an opinion or statement intended to deceive people, with the further intent of profiting by the deception, may well have committed securities fraud. If the published text contains false statements of fact, known to the author to be false, or that the author knows have not been checked and might well be false, that is additional evidence of such fraud. There are other cases in which such posting of an alleged "opinion piece" might be criminal or an actionable tort. But that would not make the site illegal. It would be the specific acts by specific people that would be illegal. Only if the site were routinely used for such unlawful purposes and seemed to have no legitimate purpose would one be likely to say that the site was illegal, and even then it is a stretch.

You should probably get a lawyer, but my reading is this: The company whose SDK you use owns their SDK, owns their code, and is free to take any of your ideas how to improve their code without paying you. But they say that ideas are ten a penny, so this is mostly there to prevent pointless lawsuits. On the other hand, it says that everything you do with your product is yours. I might be completely wrong, that's why you should get a lawyer.

Yes, such a site can be created without infringing copyright Facts about the game are facts.They are not protected by copyright. Criticism of, and comment about the game, is an activity protected by the US First Amendment. Making such comments is very likely to be fair use under US copyright law. In general the author of a work, such as a book or a game, or the maker of a product, has no right to grant or withhold permission to discuss or comment on the work. This is true not only under US law, but also in the law of most countries (perhaps of all countries). The name of the game might well be protected as a trademark. But that does not allow the trademark owner to prevent discussion of the game, clearly identified by the name of of the game. As long as nothing is being sold or rented, or advertised for sale or rental under that name, and there is no attempt to claim that the site is sponsored or approved by the trademark owner, and there is no likelihood of confusion, there is no trademark infringement. This is true under US law, and under the trademark laws of most other countries. A wiki is a specific technology. It can be used for community discussion, or for a company's internal documentation, or for any of many other purposes. Wikipedia has popularized this technology. Not all community discussion sites are wikis, however, nor are all wikis for community discussion. Just as not all novels are books printed on paper, and not all books are novels. In any case, setting up a wiki about a topic such as a game, a movie, or a novel does not require permission from the owner or creator of the game or of any trademarks associated with the game or work. The same would be true for a discussion forum about such a game or work that is not a wiki. If a wiki uses excessive quotes from game dialog, or uses the game's logo without permission, or reproduces other game assets, such as character art, maps, and the like without permission, that might be copyright infringement.

What is the maximum number of countries in which one can simultaneously be tax resident? Inspired by this Reddit thread and other stories of people working remotely from all over the world, apparently without giving too much thought to the legal implications, Working abroad remotely and UK taxes: I work remotely abroad for most of the year (usually a new country every month). I'm registered as self employed in the UK and pay 40% on tax. I've taken the UK tax residency test on the Gov UK website and it states i'm not a tax resident of the UK. I don't pay tax in any other country and the company i'm contracting for is not registered in the UK (its in the EU). I'm confused about where / if i should be paying tax. I am wondering - what is the worst-case scenario? Could one hypothetically end up in a situation in which two (or more) countries all simultaneously consider one to be tax resident for the same year, and each demand their headline rate of income tax on the same income? Tie-breaker - which combination of simultaneous tax residencies would result in the highest total marginal rate of income tax? Is a figure of over 100% possible? For full credit, answers should take into account: The tax residency rules of each country (obviously!) All relevant double tax treaties All instances where one country would offer a tax credit/refund based on tax paid in any of the others, based on its own domestic law, in the absence of a treaty. You may assume any nationality or level of income you like as long as you state it in your answer. After undertaking a small amount of initial research, it turns out that owning or leasing a private residential property is a very easy way of acquiring tax residency in a large number of countries. On reflection, however, since this question was inspired by digital nomads, let's also assume that the individual in question is reasonably nomadic and owns or leases a private residential property for their personal use in at most one country.

Sample answer: Be a US citizen - automatic US tax residency Own a UK property and live there for 91 days to gain UK tax residency Spend 60 days in India plus a total of 365 days over the previous 4 years Spend 62 days in Norway, having been tax resident there the previous year. If I understand correctly, this status can be maintained indefinitely by spending 62 days there per year once first gained. Spend 120 days in Paraguay On the last day of the tax year, start working in the Philippines on an indefinite contract Spend 183 days or more in Singapore during the prior tax year Spend a total of 270 days in Mauritius over the current tax year and the previous two years (our calendar is getting pretty constrained at this point but I think this is still all technically possible) Have access to a spare room that a friend informally keeps available for you in Germany Be a member of the crew of a vessel registered in Mozambique Have at least one essential connection to Sweden, having been tax resident there less than 5 years previously Have a spouse who lives as a permanent resident in Spain and is somehow a contributing member of the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (triggering Australian tax residency) Total tax residencies: 13 Total marginal income tax rate after double tax treaties and reliefs for the tie break: no idea

Yes it is kind of possible what country would the legal action need to originate from? Would one file in the US and note the foreign defendant or would one file, as a foreigner, in the home country of the defendant? You can go either way. It is not obtaining the judgment that is the biggest trouble here, but enforcing it. You will need: A UK mailing address. Services like ScanMyPost will suffice. Some money to pay the court fees. Time, tenacity and patience to follow through the procedure and fill all necessary forms. Be lucky in that the defendant actually has something to pay the debt with. There are two stages: Obtain a court judgment in your favour. Unless the defendant pays you, enforce the judgment. Obtaining court judgment in the UK In the UK, the "small claims court" functions are executed by HM Courts & Tribunals Service. The specific service is called "Claim for money" which can be filed online via their old or new system. So, basically, you file the online form, pay the fee by credit card and wait for defendant's response. If they do not respond, you ask the court to make a judgment (in my case it took 10 weeks from filing claim to getting judgment). If the defendant responds and defends themselves, expect much longer wait and uncertain outcome. Enforcement So, you and the defendant have both received court judgment saying that they must pay you. But they are not paying. There is a range of options you can choose from: County Court Warrant of Control (claims from £50 to £5,000). Court bailiff will go to the defendant's address and try to seize goods that can be easily sold. High Court Writ of Control (claims from £600). Attachment of earnings order (you ask the court to order the defendant's employer to deduct his earnings in your favour). Third-party debt order (a.k.a. "Garnishee Order") — if you know the defendant's bank account details. Read about potential pitfalls here. Charging order: you will only get paid if the defendant sells their land. Bankrupt the defendant (big court fees!). Alternatively, you could always hire a UK lawyer but then you would probably not need this answer.

It depends on the state. In some states the Secretary of State holds the records for business entities and in others, such as Arizona, it's an organization known as the Arizona Corporation Commission. Regardless of the state's organization that keeps the information, one of the pieces of information you will find when you look at a company's records is the "registered agent", "resident agent" or "statutory agent." The agent, whether a person or a representative corporation, must be located within the state where business is conducted. That agent is who or what gets served with papers for a lawsuit. Here's a good explanation at legalzoom. A personal example that may help: I am an owner in a business that does business in Louisiana and Arizona. Our LLC is registered in Louisiana and is registered as a "foreign corporation" in Arizona. However, we are required to have a registered agent in each state. We pay a company to act as our registered agent in each state and the registered agent has a physical address in each state in which we are registered. If someone wants to sue my company then they can look up the name of my company in either state and will find my registered agent along with the registered agent's physical address. Service to the registered agent counts as service to my company. The agent will forward to me any service which is made to them. EDIT: if you don't known the name of the entity, i.e., the name on the door of the business does not represent the name of the company, then you need to find the "doing business as," or DBA record of the company. I don't know what state you're in but all the states in which I've done business maintain a "Doing Business As" system that can be searched. I guess it's possible that you're in a state that doesn't maintain DBA filings or require them. Typically, you can search either way - search by owner or search by the DBA name. Some states, such as Arizona, record DBA names at the county level. I've seen some states allow searching by address also.

TL;DR: No. In the United States, schools tend to be funded by property taxes locally, occasionally with an added income tax. Those funds go to the schools' local taxing authority. That taxing authority may cover multiple schools. At minimum, it will almost certainly cover an elementary school and a high school, but it often covers multiple elementary schools and may cover multiple high schools. For example, in many cities, all public (government-run) schools are funded by the same taxing authority. If you had children, you might, in some places, be able to choose the school they attended and thereby direct some money to that school or schools. But that wouldn't be related to the amount that you paid in any way. That amount may be more or less than the amount that you pay. It would have some relation to the amount that the child pays. There is no way to redirect the funds that you pay. They always go to the local taxing authority. If you want to pay a different local taxing authority, then you need to buy your property in an area covered by that taxing authority. For example, you might prefer to live in the city rather than a suburb. You can donate additional money above and beyond your taxes to an individual school. Contact the individual school for details. But this won't change the taxes that you owe. Schools also get funding from the state and federal governments, mostly state. Given that you are subject to taxation by a particular state, you can't transfer those taxes either. Same thing with the US as a whole. It won't allow you to choose to pay your income taxes to a different country without changing your residence (and might not then).

If you are on Tier 4 (students on full-time degree), you have more restrictions besides the number of hours. One of this is no self-employment (which includes freelance and consultancy or creating your own company).

Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable.

Yes, you can borrow tax-free Bitcoin (or really, any currency not your home currency) is a security like a stock or bond. Whenever you take a loan using a security as collateral, that is not a taxable event, and so you do not owe taxes on the money you borrowed. Perfect world, you pay it back and this is not taxable either: the loan/repayment is a non-event to the tax authorities. (Although interest might be tax deductible). When this goes wrong: you default If you default and keep your collateral, at some point, the lender decides you'll never pay, and forgives aka "writes off" the loan. This forgiveness is considered ordinary income and it is taxable in the year forgiven. In the US this is waived if you can show that you were insolvent at the time of default. When this goes wrong: forced sale of collateral The collateral is still your property. The bank just has a lien on it or other form of control, like it's in your brokerage account in their bank such that they can flag it, force sale, and intercept funds. When the bank forces sale of your collateral to pay your debt, that is a sale of the security for tax purposes. The proceeds go to you (as far as the tax person is concerned), even though the bank certainly will intercept the proceeds. So the tax liability goes to you. Note that standard capital gains rules apply, so if you owned it less than 1 year when you signed up for the loan, yet the bank forced the sale after 1 year of ownership, then it counts as holding the security longer than 1 year for tax purposes. (e.g. qualifying for the lower "long term capital gains" rate in the US).

Anyone can claim asylum Whether that person qualifies as a refugee depends on the law in the country where they make the claim which usually involves an administrative decision making process. If a country is a signatory to the UN convention on refugees then local law will reflect that in some way. This outlines the process in australia. Under the convention a refugee is a person who: ... owing to well‐founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it ... Being a citizen or a resident of a state with an authoritarian government does not, of itself, make one a refugee. The individual must have a “well‐founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Most citizens of most authoritarian countries are not persecuted or at risk of persecution. They also must be outside their home country. You can always emigrate The UK has no general restrictions on people leaving the country in search of more freedom. However, you need to choose carefully. At last count the UK is less authoritarian than 151 of the 167 countries in the world. If you are going to emigrate there are 15 places you could go that are better. Fortunately, 4 of them have English as a primary language and, not coincidentally, a system of government in the UK model.

Outsourcing work without informing the employer: is that illegal or punishable? I'm a freelancer and many times I simply outsource or hire a subcontractor (all ghost subcontractors) from like UpWork to do what my clients' ask from me. My clients generally do not know that I outsource my tasks, and they think that they are just simply hiring me. Obviously, if they find out, they might decide to not work with me anymore, but on the legal aspect, would this count as some sort of employee fraud? If the work I submitted to the client damaged relationships with their clients due to the lack of quality from my subcontractor, would I take legal responsibilities? Lastly, I believe this outsourcing can be deducted as business expenses when doing taxes. However, this might lead to that business expense being somewhat high. If the IRS founds out about this, would that cause any problems?

What does your contract with your client say? What does your contract with your sub-contractor say? Typically the client contract will not specify HOW the work gets done, just the deliverable(s), the price and the liability. Unless your client contract says otherwise, it's perfectly legal for you to farm out the work. It's also perfectly fine for you to deduct the cost of the sub. As long as that's profitable the IRS will have no problem for that at all: that's a perfectly normal business practice. Things are a bit more complicated if you farm out at a loss since that could be interpreted as a tax evasion scheme. However, as long as it's reasonable, that's fine. If there are defects in the work product, the client will come after you, regardless of who did the work. It's generally your responsibility to fix the issues, cover damages etc. You, in turn, can try to recover your damages from the sub, but that depends on the nature of the contract you have with the sub.

"Backlogged" has no legal status. Under usual contract terms, all intellectual property you generate as part of your employment belongs to your employer. But "intellectual property" is a category of rights, such as patents, trademarks and copyrights. An idea by itself is not intellectual property. "Wouldn't it be great if ..." cannot be owned by a company. However, specific ideas can be trade secrets, and trade secrets are protected. It's likely that your idea is a trade secret, if the idea applies to the sort of business that your ex-employer is involved in. The fact that it's called promising by the company reiterates that.

Links are in French. As the author of a work, you would generally hold copyright unless there's a contract otherwise. L113 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle determines who is the rights holder of a given work and I don't see anything there that changes things for you as a contractor. Even if you assigned some rights to your employer through a contract, France has moral rights which can never be ceded. In fact, even if you were a salaried employee, you still hold the rights by default, unlike the US. There are a few exceptions to that though: software, inseparable joint works, and works where the creative process was purely directed by your superiors.

This question sounds to me like there is an inferred intent of the person giving the invoice to manipulate their value added tax rate due to the misclassification, and then an unrelated issue related to an overly high charge for the services which are basically independent. Is the classification of the job material in some way to either of those issues in a non-obvious way that you haven't clarified in your question? I will answer on the assumption that it is not, because at first glance, it is hard to see why this would matter with respect to either issue. A CVR listing is sort of half way between a U.S. Secretary of State company listing and a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission company listing with more than just bare bones contact information but less than a full fledged public company's disclosure statement. The fact that the company's business type classification is not a precise match for the kind of work that they did for you on this job is not obviously material to either what VAT taxes would be due (which usually depends upon the particular kinds of goods and services involved in the transaction) or the rate that a company can charge for a particular kind of work done. The fact that a company is classified in one category that describes the overall enterprise doesn't mean that every last thing done by the company must precisely fit that description. The mismatch could also conceivably be nothing more than a clerical error made by somebody preparing the CVR listing, in which case, again, the answer is "so what?" Therefore, as far as I can tell from the limited information in the question, this is just an immaterial error with no relevance to any of the likely disputes that you might have in this case. Usually, an immaterial error in a public record or invoice would not be a ground to object the amount that a company charged for the work, nor would it be something that would be appropriate to complain about in any way that would bring you an advantage that I can see in this transaction. This doesn't mean that you don't potentially have grounds to object to the invoice and dispute the higher than expected charges. But, bringing up the issue of the CVR code doesn't appear to add anything to your rights in this dispute. This said, I can certainly imagine circumstance where the wrong CVR code could be a hint that something else really is amiss. For example, suppose that you need a license to do a cleaning job since it involves environmental hazards and waste disposal, but you don't need a license to do management consulting, because who cares if someone is stupid enough to take your bad management advice. In that situation, the company might be misclassified because it doesn't have and perhaps cannot get for some reason, the business license that it needs to do the cleaning job. Charging for services while not having the proper business license might very well be illegal and a ground not to pay, and the error in the CVR filing might actually be an attempt to circumvent this problem. But, that kind of possibility relies upon pure speculation and without more facts there is no good reason to assume that something nefarious is going on here.

With respect to the first question, discussing an idea in a non-encrypted email is not a publication that forfeits the right to patent an idea, even though it is not 100% secure. In the same way, talking about an idea for a patent with your patent lawyer in a secluded booth of a coffee shop in person does not constitute publication of the idea for this purpose, even if someone is secretly spying on you at the time. Since I am at the moment employed by a company, even though the idea originates from myself, it seems that I should quit my job first not to have my current company have any claim over my idea. It is possible that the contract makes even ideas that you come up with yourself while employed by the company the property of the company. If so, you are legally in the wrong and the idea belongs to the company. But, proving the reality that you are stealing the idea from the company is harder if there is nothing in writing. An email discussing an idea while you are employed would have to be disclosed in litigation with your employer over whether the patent applied for belongs to you or to your employer under an employment agreement. If you didn't put it in an email, it wouldn't exist to turn over in litigation.

That is, you don't even have to give them a copy of the contract. In the same way you might reference some legal code without actually copying the legal code directly into the contract. If you do not communicate material terms of the contract to your contractor, the contract will be unenforceable due to lack of meeting of minds. Referencing "some legal code", provided that that code is publicly available is fine: your contractor can look it up and decide if they are happy with it. But doing the same with "Independent Contractor Agreement #123" will only work if you provide a copy of it to your contractor. For example, it can be attached to the paper being signed as a Schedule. So, in a nut shell, abstracting prose out is fine as long as it is communicated/attached.

You cannot do this legally General rules Under US law you are required to file a Form 1099 with the IRS for this payment if it was for a trade or business purpose. ( $1,000.00 is above the current reporting limit of $600.) This you cannot do without the recipient's name (personal or business) and address. You will also need their SSN or TIN. Failure to file the 1099 may be a violation of law. Private people, as well as businesses, get 1099s which are also filed with the IRS. I myself have received 1099s as a private individual for freelance work. (Corporations mostly do not get 1099s.) Private individuals as well as businesses report payments on 1099s. Such a person might be involved in unlawful tax evasion, and the demand for payment in bitcoin might support a reasonable suspicion of this. If so, you might be accused of being an accessory. If the person is foreign (non-US) and the work was not done in the US it may not need to be reported, but if you do not know the person's location you cannot safely assert that it is outside the US. If you intend to deduct the payment on your own taxes as a business expense, you may also need to have a receipt showing the recipient of the money. It would seem that if the payor/client is in the US and the work was done for a trade or business (which includes a non-profit, but not a hobby or personal site) and the amount is $600 or more, there is no safe and legal way to hire a person or firm without knowing the name, address, and (in most cases) TIN (taxpayer identification number) of the contractor, or at least using ones "best efforts" to obtain the TIN. See the various IRS instructions below for details. IRS Instructions According to the Form 1099-Misc/1099-NEC insatructions Report on Form 1099-MISC [or 1099-NEC] only when payments are made in the course of your trade or business. Personal payments are not reportable. You are engaged in a trade or business if you operate for gain or profit. However, nonprofit organizations are considered to be engaged in a trade or business and are subject to these reporting requirements. Generally, payments to a corporation (including a limited liability company (LLC) that is treated as a C or S corporation) [are not reportable]. If you are required to file Form 1099-MISC, you must furnish a statement to the recipient. Enter [in Box 3] other income of $600 or more required to be reported on Form 1099-MISC that is not reportable in one of the other boxes on the form. File Form 1099-NEC, Nonemployee Compensation (NEC), for each person in the course of your business to whom you have paid the following during the year: At least $600 in ... Services performed by someone who is not your employee (including parts and materials) (box 1); Generally, you must report payments to independent contractors on Form 1099-NEC in box 1. If the following four conditions are met, you must generally report a payment as NEC. You made the payment to someone who is not your employee. You made the payment for services in the course of your trade or business (including government agencies and nonprofit organizations). You made the payment to an individual, partnership, estate, or, in some cases, a corporation; You made payments to the payee of at least $600 during the year. Instructions for Form 1042-S specify that one must report for foreign payees: Compensation for independent personal services performed in the United States. General Instructions for Certain Information Returns says: Recipient names. Show the full name and address in the section provided on the information return. If payments have been made to more than one recipient or the account is in more than one name, show on the first name line the name of the recipient whose TIN is first shown on the return. ... TINs. TINs are used to associate and verify amounts you report to the IRS with corresponding amounts on tax returns. Therefore, it is important that you report correct names, social security numbers (SSNs), individual taxpayer identification numbers (ITINs), employer identification numbers (EINs), or adoption taxpayer identification numbers (ATINs) for recipients on the forms sent to the IRS.

I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.

Is there a requirement to provide personal information other than identity to a financial institution to activate a Power of Attorney? If a person has a durable power of attorney that becomes active in the event the Principal becomes disabled, is an investment company for the Principal required to obtain personal financial information, (such as income and net worth) from the Attorney-in-Fact prior to accepting the document and granting access to the account information of the Principal? Presume that other required documents such as letters attesting to the disability are provided along with the POA.

One set of disclosures would be those necessary to comply with anti-money laundering, counter-terrorism financing regulations, and international sanctions laws (e.g. related to the Ukraine war). Involvement as an agent who is subject to these restrictions would still be something that the firm needs to rule out. Another might be compliance with "know your customer" laws which are a bit tricky because the POA agent is only the "customer" in a partial and limited sense. On one hand, the law wants to avoid exploitation of a vulnerable POA agent to the detriment of the principal by knowing the agent's level of financial sophistication, risk tolerance, and investment goals. On the other hand, ultimately it is the principal's finances that are at stake. The disclosures described in the question seem to be questions related to accredited investor status, and it isn't clear that the POA agent needs to financially meet the requirements for accredited investor status.

Attorneys are universally required to tell the truth at all times and generally, they do. They are not allowed to lie on behalf of their clients or themselves. This doesn't mean that someone else's attorney necessarily has your best interests at heart. And, attorneys can, for example, fail to mention options that exist, but might not be the best for the attorney's client. Also, if an attorney's client lies to him or her about the facts, the attorney could conceivably say something inaccurate while believing it to be true. In the kind of meeting you are describing, however, most likely, the attorneys are simply going to explain your parents' estate plan, over which you have no control or say in any case, and there is no reason for suspicion or paranoia.

In the united-states, attorneys are almost never placed under oath. Their statements -- whether they are assertions of fact or legal arguments -- are not evidence, and they are not subject to cross examination. There are limited circumstances in which an attorney would be competent to present actual evidence. In such cases, the attorney would be sworn in as a witness and subject to cross examination, but the attorney would likely also be disqualified from acting as an attorney in such a situation under Model Rule 3.7.

It would be legal for a healthcare professional to sign an NDA prohibiting them from revealing certain information to a patient. Some examples: the password to the computer system; the home phone number and address of the chief of staff. It would not be legal to use an NDA as a basis for denying a patient the right to access their medical records when the HIPAA privacy rule mandates disclosure to the patient (with exceptions).

Powers of Attorney die with the principal Once the subject dies, they are null and void. For a person who dies intestate, the next of kin can apply to the court for an Administrator (not an Executor) to be appointed. This may be a person all the beneficiaries agree on or it may be a government public trustee.

A litigant could issue a subpoena to you demanding the information on your phone relevant to their case. If your employer or you are parties to a lawsuit, you can also be required to provide information through what is a called a "request to produce" issued by one party to another party without a subpoena, and under general information disclosure requirements in some lawsuits that apply to parties and people affiliated with them. For purposes of this answer, a subpoena, a request to produce, and a disclosure obligation of some other kind are all basically equivalent in the ways that matter. The search warrant process in criminal investigations, however, is quite different, but this is rarely used in the contexts that you are concerned about in your question. Usually, the obligation would be to provide a copy of the relevant data (e.g. emails and text messages and phone call history and metadata related to the case), rather than to turn over the phone itself, and this would usually involve a couple of weeks notice or more. Absent extreme circumstances (e.g. you are a flight risk defendant, or only technical means can get access to secret malware not accessible to an ordinary user on it), you are usually allowed to participate in sorting out what is and is not responsive to the request and they cannot just demand "everything on your phone." If the subpoena demand is overbroad, you (or perhaps your employer's attorney), can move to quash the subpoena or limit its scope before you have to comply in the court that issued the subpoena. You could also make objections based on, for example, attorney-client privilege or the 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination, in an effort to object to the subpoena's demands for information. Absent a criminal case where you are a suspect, it would be very rare to actually seize the entire phone itself or to search all of its contents without your involvement. Note that this is a risk that almost everyone who communicates about business by phone faces. For that matter, even people who don't communicate about business by phone face this risk. For example, suppose you see a plane crash into a house while you are on the phone with your brother talking about last night's baseball game, and then mention that fact when interviewed by police investigating the crash that you witnessed. You and your brother's metadata from your calls with each other from that afternoon could be subpoenaed, in connection with a wrongful death or property damage lawsuit arising out of the crash, to help determine precisely when the plane crashed. It doesn't matter who owns the phone. Usually the subpoena will apply to all accounts and devices within your possession, custody and control. So, even if you don't have the phone in your possession when you are served with the subpoena (e.g. your son borrowed it for the week), and even if you made a call on your spouse's phone, if you have the legal right or practical ability to get the information, you must provide it. The apps installed on the phone don't matter. What matters is whether there is information relevant to the case (or potentially relevant to the case) that can be accessed with your phone, and whether the subpoena has asked for it.

Businesses are not required to do what the card says, they are required to do what the card-holder says, to the extend that what the card holder says relates to giving or denying consent to be vaccinated. Since they don't vaccinate people who are unconscious, consent will always be directly obtained from the patient and the card has absolutely no effect. Also, control subjects are selected at random and the subject does not know what group they are in. Possession of such a card therefore has zero scientific effect.

IANAL, But the information commissioners office (UK) describe personal data as: (bolding mine) The GDPR applies to ‘personal data’ meaning any information relating to an identifiable person who can be directly or indirectly identified in particular by reference to an identifier. This definition provides for a wide range of personal identifiers to constitute personal data, including name, identification number, location data or online identifier, reflecting changes in technology and the way organisations collect information about people. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/key-definitions/ So I would say that in your case it is personal information. In principle, regardless of if you can identify an individual, personal data is that which can be used to potentially identify an individual. For an extreme example of why this is important: Lets say your app sells AIDs medication. Can a hacker who got in and stole your database, be able to use that with information they stole elsewhere to identify people with AIDs and blackmail them, in a way that they wouldn't if you had not stored this identifier? Plus, if you want to err on the side of caution, there's no legal penalty for telling the user about non-personal information you store.

When is threatening legal action illegal? Follow up to this question. When is it illegal to threaten someone with taking them to court?

Threat of lawsuit can't be illegal It is a basis of functioning legal systems, that if you have a case, you can sue. However, nothing in any such legal system requires them to sue. Instead, offering a resolution out of court - like arbitration or offering to relinquish a claim for payment - is legal. Adding pressure by saying "This is my offer, otherwise I sue" is not extortion, because after the suit is filed, it is with the courts. Should the claimant file a frivolous lawsuit, then the court will deal with it - dismissing the case and sanctioning the claimant and their lawyer. See also these questions: Why is threatening to sue not considered extortion? Why should one never threaten to sue? What is the point of sending a demand letter?

If you are arrested for assault, you have available to you the defense of the right to defend real or personal property: you "may use reasonable force to protect that property from imminent harm. Reasonable force means the amount of force that a reasonable person in the same situation would believe is necessary to protect the property from imminent harm". The level of force proposed is clearly within the boundaries of the reasonable.

Legally there is no problem. What you say is protected speech under the 1st Amendment as long as it is either true or a matter of opinion. However Ron Beyer's comment is a good one; while legal this sounds very inadvisable. You would be far better off hiring a lawyer. The Mr Dicks of this world make money from the widespread fear of legal action. He will probably fold as soon as he sees a letter from a lawyer threatening a lawsuit. Until then stalling doesn't cost him anything so he will carry on doing it. BTW, don't delay. I don't know about the US, but over here in the UK there are a number of ways that people like Mr Dick can make it hard to collect. Don't give him time to play shell games with his assets.

You have pretty well enumerated when it is legal. On the face of it it appears that the 11 year old acted illegally. So, if he is not being prosecuted, why not? Age of criminal responsibility. Below a certain age (I don't know about Alabama but in NSW it is 12) a person cannot by law be held criminally responsible because they are deemed to lack the emotional and mental maturity to distinguish right from wrong; this is particularly relevant when the same action can be legal or illegal depending on rather nuanced circumstances. Public interest. A DA may consider that prosecution of this child in these circumstances is not in the public interest. Prospect of conviction. A sensible DA may decide that there is very little prospect that a jury will convict notwithstanding that there is adequate evidence to prove guilt. This is a subset of the public interest; it is in no one's interest to spend time and money on a trial that will probably end with an acquittal.

The term "illegal" is also often used for actions that the law prohibits, but that give rise to civil liability, rather than criminal prosecution. We see such use a lot in questions on Law.SE. One also says that a person "is liable" when there are grounds for a civil suit against that person. One might also say that such a person "has commited a tort" or "has civil liability" or "could be held liable". In the specific cases of copyright, trademark, and patent law, one says that a violator "his infringed" or has committed infringement" and that an act contrary to those laws "is an infringement".

You tag the question with "criminal law", suggesting that by "illegal" you mean "is it a crime" -- that would depend on jurisdiction, but in the US or my state, it is not a crime. There are crimes that you could commit with such an account, but violating the TOS is not itself a crime. However, it is illegal, a breach of contract, as you can see from the TOS "You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission".

I'm not sure a case of harassment could be made out (it would depend on the circumstances in which you purportedly did those things or threatened her, except for touching her. Sexual assault The Sexual Offences Act 2003 defines sexual assault as: (1) A person (A) commits an offence if— (a) he intentionally touches another person (B), (b) the touching is sexual, (c) B does not consent to the touching, and (d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. (2) Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents. To your questions: What is the law on a 16 year-old doing the things listed above with a 14 year-old? Same as the above, except what would happen if it was made out that there was not consent? For sexual assault, it is presumed that if the person is between the ages of 13 and 16, they do not have the capacity to consent. That is - if there is no proof of consent, you are guilty of the offence, if the requisite mens rea - intent - to touch them can be proved. For everything else - it might amount to harassment but that is probably a stretch, I don't see the elements being made out. However, there are certain limits to what people can consent to - you can't consent to someone murdering you in most jurisdictions, for example. ... what would be the best way to go about disproving (in a court scenario) that I did all of these things? You do not have to disprove that you did these acts - it is the job of the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond reasonable doubt that you have done so. You can present evidence that satisfies an evidentiary burden that you did not do these acts, such as not being able to do so (by being in another place), or not intending to do the act. However, you would need to prove that you had consent and believed she was 16 or over to stand a reasonable chance of escaping conviction for the above crime, if prosecuted. As Martin has said - you need to get a lawyer for the right answer here.

There does seem to be a meme in the UAE of people threatening legal action for negative reviews, as a form of defamation. The police will simply tell them that this is not a crime, go hire a lawyer if you want to sue them. If you block them, perhaps they don't have any other way to contact you (seems that was the point of blocking them), which means that you cannot receive their offer "If you pay us AED 1,000 we will not sue you", which could be a problem if they win their court case. Still, it is perfectly legal to ignore or block them, up to the point that you are actually served with legal papers. When they actually sue you, "blocking" is irrelevant, they will hire a process server to hand you the legal papers that command you to appear in court.

Procedural Rules v Federal Law? This question is inspired by @ohwilleke response to my previous question. In his response, ohwilleke highlighted the following point: Isn't the the Appellate Division in NJ required to uphold the ruling of the Third Circuit in such matters? It is not. There can be no conflict on procedural issues between the Third Circuit, which is interpreting federal rules of civil and appellate procedure, and a ruling of a New Jersey court which is interpreting state rules of civil and appellate procedure. What's the difference between state laws that are subject to federal law & "procedural" issues ("state rules of civil procedure") that apparently are not? At the heart of Coinbase v. Bielski is whether the FAA intended that an appeal divests the district court's jurisdiction of the case. It is not a question of federal "procedure". If the FAA so intended, what legal right does a state court have to devise a "procedural" rule that is in direct conflict with federal law? A rule that is in violation of federal law is no better than a state law that violates federal law. Assuming the intent of the FAA was to divest jurisdiction when an appeal is filed, on what basis can a state create a "rule" that gives it jurisdiction? If the state were to create a law that is inconsistent with federal law it would be struck down as illegal. Why does that change because it is a state rule? I might be missing something basic but something doesn't sound right. Can someone explain the difference in approach between a rule and a law that is in direct conflict with federal law?

The interpretation of state rules of civil procedure is a matter purely for state courts. Whether a state procedural rule (or even substantive approaches to jurisdiction) violates federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is a question of federal law, but state courts are still competent to answer such questions that arise in the process of state litigation, subject only to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. I may be starting to just repeat things now, but even if the legal issue you're interested in (the extent to which trial courts are divested of jurisdiction during non-frivilous interlocutory appeals in matters controlled by the FAA) is substantive or jurisdictional rather than procedural, Federal circuits do not bind state courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States can provide binding prcedent on federal law that state courts must apply. I could see the reasons in Coinbase being written broadly enough to apply to both state and federal proceedings.

The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit are binding precedents on the lower federal courts of the 9th Circuit. The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit are binding precedents on the lower federal courts of the 7th Circuit. These decisions are not binding precedents, even as to federal law, on state courts, or in any other circuits, although they are persuasive authority in all jurisdictions that don't have a contrary binding precedent. When two circuits reach contrary legal conclusions in binding precedents, this is called a circuit split. Sometimes, circuit splits are resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court (a large share of its docket is devoted to such cases). Sometimes Congress wakes up and enacts a law that resolves the dispute if it involves a non-constitutional issue. Sometimes (arguably, most of the time), circuit splits go unresolved for years or even decades, and the meaning of a federal law or a treaty in one part of the United States is different from the meaning of a federal law or a treaty in another part of the United States. In some other circuit where the legal issue that is the subject of the circuit split is question of first impression with no binding case law decided in that circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, the parties will offer up persuasive authority from the 7th and 9th Circuits that have previously issued binding precedents on the issue and will try to argue that the one that favors them is correct, or that there is a third way to consider the issue that also favors them. Indeed, often the U.S. Supreme Court deliberately refrains from resolving circuit splits until a clear majority has emerged favoring one view or the other. Even simply counting how many circuit splits exist is a surprisingly tricky matter. For example, one database estimates that 29%-41% of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in recent years resolved circuit splits (at the same link) but that was realistically an underestimate. the question is whether geographic or the temporal instancy in opposing decisions makes one over the other binding authority. There is not. There is no procedural rule that resolves a circuit split.

That is a bit of queer provision. I'm not going to answer your first question because I think that it is a gray area with no definitive answer. In answer to your second question, my strong suspicion is that it is drafted in the shadow of a particular state consumer protection act. An arbitration clause is allowed to change your procedural rights, but cannot change substantive rights that cannot be waived by a pre-dispute contractual agreement. If it does that, it is void and you can go to court instead of an arbitration forum. Many consumer protection laws provide that a prevailing party is entitled to minimum statutory damages in lieu of actual damages if they are smaller, in addition to your reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation costs if you prevail. This is done to make it economically viable for private citizens to sue over violations of the consumer protection law that would otherwise involve actual damages too small to be worth suing over, without having to bring a class action. If the relevant consumer protection law has a minimum $5,000 statutory damages amount for some claims covered by the clause, this clause would prevent it from being invalidated, while allowing the merchant to still have access to the consumer unfriendly arbitration forum in which class action lawsuits are probably also barred while class action lawsuits would not be in court. For a big merchant, it is far better to have to pay $5,000 and attorneys' fees to the handful of people who bring arbitrations and win them, than to lose a single class action lawsuit for millions of dollars.

The appellate court reviews based upon the trial court record. To the extent that it turns on questions of law, including interpretations of written documents whose authenticity is not in question, this review is de novo. Likewise, decisions on this issue made on a paper record and argument of counsel, without an evidentiary hearing that resolved material disputes of fact between the parties, are reviewed de novo. So are procedural question, like whether an evidentiary hearing should have been held. But, in cases where there is a mixed issue of fact and law, the appellate court defers to all findings of fact made in the trial court from an evidentiary hearing held in the trial court that are supported by admissible evidence in the trial court record. Since the material facts relating to the enforceability of arbitration are frequently not in dispute in a case like this and arbitration rulings are often made without evidentiary hearings, as for example, in this case and in this case, an appellate court often does engage in de novo review. But, the appellate court is not permitted to re-weigh the credibility of witnesses, for example, in a manner contrary to the trial court's findings of fact supported by admissible evidence in the record, if an evidentiary hearing was held and this was necessary to resolve disputed issues of fact that were material to the question of whether arbitration could be compelled. While what I have said above is somewhat different than the standards, for example, in New Jersey as stated in this document quoted below, this is to some extent a function of the facts of the referenced cases. None of which involve a refusal to compel arbitration following an evidentiary hearing involving disputed findings of fact. Appellate courts "review de novo the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration." Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020). See Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020). "Under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7, either party may move to confirm an award within three months of the date of its delivery. Once confirmed, the award is as conclusive as a court judgment. N.J.S.A. 2A:24-10." Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 292 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 158 N.J. 392, 398 (1999). N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 provides a court may vacate an arbitration award for: 1) corruption, fraud or undue means; 2) evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators; 3) misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; or 4) the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. "Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 276 (2010)). "To foster finality and 'secure arbitration's speedy and inexpensive nature,' reviewing courts must give arbitration awards 'considerable deference.'" Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201-02 (2013)). "[A]n arbitrator's award resolving a public sector dispute will be accepted so long as the award is 'reasonably debatable.'" Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013)). "An arbitrator's award is not to be cast aside lightly. It is subject to being vacated only when it has been shown that a statutory basis justifies that action." Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Kearny PBA Loc. # 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979)). Certain statutes, including the Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -30, set "strict limits on the appeal of an arbitration award." Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 228, 235 (App. Div. 2008). In support of a contrary view that even the findings of fact of the trial court are subject to de novo review are statements like this one (from this case): The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., L.L.C., 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). But, the cited cases don't mean precisely what they are purported to say in the rare case where the decision rests, for example, on resolved a disputed credibility decision between two witnesses over whether the purported arbitration document is authentic in an evidentiary hearing. Those cases are merely dicta as applied to that fact pattern. The case containing this quote was decided at the trial court level on the pleadings alone without receiving any testimony or documents in an evidentiary hearing (see footnote 1 at page 2). Hirsch was decided in motion practice without an evidentiary hearing (see page 184) and the case itself says (at page 186): Orders compelling arbitration are deemed final for purposes of appeal. R. 2:2–3(a); GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572, 587, 17 A.3d 177 (2011). We review those legal determinations de novo. See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995) (“A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.”). The decision in Frummer was similarly qualified and also relied upon interpretation of written instruments whose execution was undisputed that was resolved in motion practice without any mention of an evidentiary hearing. The Court in Frummer said at page 13: We review the denial of a request for arbitration de novo. See Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 393 N.J.Super. 560, 572-73, 925 A.2d 22 (App.Div. 2007). "A `trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" Id. at 573, 925 A.2d 22 (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995)). See also this case stating that: The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). Again, however, I would question whether this holding is dicta because it involves the interpretation of written instruments whose authenticity is in doubt, and not, for example, a dispute over whether the person who signed the documents is the same person who is a party to this litigation and not someone else with a very similar name that was resolved in an evidentiary hearing.

What exactly would a prosecutor charge? State? Federal? It depends on whether it is a state or federal prosecutor. It appears that the president has at least flirted with violating both federal and state law, in which case he may be charged by both the federal and state prosecutors, each one laying charges under the relevant body of law. Would Trump be vulnerable to Federal prosecution of the phone call after he leaves office? Yes, if the facts support such a prosecution. It's not clear to me that the conversation constituted an unambiguous violation of the federal statute, but I have no knowledge of any precedent that might inform such a determination.

Websites are not ships that can choose a flag of convenience to govern which country's laws govern them. Generally speaking an analysis of which jurisdiction's law applies (which is strictly speaking a "choice of law" question as much as it is a jurisdiction question) isn't undertaken on a website by website, or business by business basis. Instead, jurisdiction and choice of law are evaluated on a claim by claim basis. The owners of a website may be subject to some claims in India, to some in Bhutan, and to others in the United States, depending upon the claim. Without knowing who is trying to sue for what, you can't know. Generally speaking, a business that operates in multiple jurisdictions, like a website, will be subject to the laws of all of the jurisdictions in which it does business in regard to claims with a connection to those jurisdictions. Of course, as a practical matter, only claims that can be enforced against the owners of the website are relevant, which usually means that only claims brought where the owners reside or own assets are relevant. If the website owners own property or have amounts payable to them in India, there is a very good chance that India can, as a practical matter, assert jurisdiction over them. And, it is likely, as a practical matter, that Saudi Arabia or China would not be able to assert jurisdiction over them in a meaningful way. The fact that businesses can be conducted through legal entities further complicates the analysis. But, at any rate, the place to begin is to realize that the question "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall?" is basically a category error. You need to ask "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall when it is sued or prosecuted for X kind of matter by someone who lives in Y?" So, really, this one question is actually dozens or hundreds of questions that each have to be analyzed individually.

Most prosecuting attorney positions in a District Attorney, or State Attorney General's office are full time salaries positions that prohibit individuals holding those positions from having any other legal employment. They are also, often, conceptually a division of state government, even if the DA is locally elected. So, any criminal defense engagement in the same state court system would also be a conflict of interest, and the reality of joint task forces discussed below would also make almost any federal case criminal defense engagement in the same state a conflict of interest in most cases because state prosecutors would gain confidential information about pending federal criminal prosecutions (and vice versa). In theory, a criminal defense engagement in the next state over, for example, say, in Gary, Indiana for a prosecutor employed in Chicago, Illinois, would not be a conflict of interest, but it would still be prohibited in most cases because the prosecutor is a full time salaried employee whose full efforts are required to be devote to that position. (In practice, de minimis civil transactional work for the assistance of friends and family members, even for a small fee, or representation of such persons in small civil lawsuits would probably be tolerated, however, and maybe even a defense of a civil ordinance violation like a traffic ticket brought by a separate local government as discussed below, for a friend or family member for free, might be tolerated.) Local governments such as cities, towns, and counties, however, sometime have an office separate from the DA's office or State Attorney General's office often called a city attorney, town attorney, or county attorney, who works part-time on a contract basis for that government and has limited authority to prosecution violations of that local government's own ordinances in the name of that governmental entity, rather than on behalf of the People as part of the state government. In those cases, it is generally ethically permissible for the city attorney (for example) to serve as a criminal defense attorney in cases outside that city that do not otherwise pose a conflict of interest from having been adverse to various criminal defendants in the city attorney role. But there might be a conflict of interest, if, for example, there was a joint task force of the city attorney, the local DA, and the federal assistant U.S. attorney to prosecute people in a coordinated fashion on federal, state and local charges of various kinds, in connection with a rash of gun violence. And, if one of the city attorney's clients were arrested for an ordinance violation in the city, a non-conflicted counsel would have to be retained by the city for that case. Often, in those cases, however, even though it is not a prohibited conflict of interest, the lawyers involved would view a criminal defense representation as a "business development conflict" that would risk non-renewal of the city/town/county attorney position if undertaken. Incidentally, government attorneys, unlike almost all other government employees, are usually employees at will, as a matter of legal professional ethics, unlike almost all other fixed term contract or civil service employees, even if they have other contractual or civil service employee rights.

Jurisdiction is a complex topic, and any detailed answer is going to depend on the national law of the states in question. However, there are two general principles to bear in mind: Jurisdiction is rarely exclusive; it is possible to be subject to civil or criminal jurisdiction in any state where you do business; and Jurisdiction can (usually) be accepted or waived by contract. This is the practical answer to your question: almost every contract contains a clause saying something like: "The Parties agree that the law of Norway applies to all matters arising under this agreement and agree that all lawsuits concerning the subject matter of this agreement shall be brought exclusively in the Norwegian Super Deluxe Court for the district of Oslo. The parties waive, to the extent possible under the relevant law, all rights to litigate matters related to this Agreement in any other court." These choice-of-forum provisions are not 100% enforceable--and, again, a lot is going to depend on the law of the forum you're disclaiming--but they often are, in both common law and civil law jurisdictions.

At What Point Does a Supreme Court Ruling Become Binding on Lower Courts? When the Supreme Court hears a case it can take a while for it to issue a verdict. Typically, after hearing oral arguments, the Justices have to decide the case. They do so at what is known as the Justices' Conference. When Court is in session, there are two conferences scheduled per week – one on Wednesday afternoon and one on Friday afternoon. After each Justice states their views on the casein confrence, the justices cast their vote starting with the Chief Justice. When exactly does the Supreme Court's decision become binding on lower courts in the country? Does the opinion become binding right after the justices cast their vote or not until they publish their opinion months later? Assuming not until later, would a unanimous decision be binding right away? If not, are lower courts free to disregard the Supreme Court's votes until an official opinion is published during the summer?

The Supreme Court's order is not official and binding until it is "delivered in open Court." See uscourts.gov, "Supreme Court Procedures." Until that point in time, the Court has not produced any legal information for lower courts to follow or disregard. When the Court hears an appeal on the merits, it will generally delay issuing its order until the reasons are prepared. On emergency motions (e.g. requesting a stay of execution), these orders are often released immediately after the Court votes, and often without reasons. If there were an urgent matter requiring an order as soon as possible after hearing, I do not see anything that would prevent the Court from announcing the order and delaying written reasons until later, but even in Bush v. Gore, they were able to decide the case and produce written reasons in one day. There is also a narrow and seldom-used ground for the Court to revisit a final order by petition for rehearing (see Rule 44 and Brian De Vito, "When U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Are Not Final: An Examination of the Rehearing Rule and the Court's Application of it in Kennedy v. Louisiana" (2010)).

The interpretation of state rules of civil procedure is a matter purely for state courts. Whether a state procedural rule (or even substantive approaches to jurisdiction) violates federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is a question of federal law, but state courts are still competent to answer such questions that arise in the process of state litigation, subject only to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. I may be starting to just repeat things now, but even if the legal issue you're interested in (the extent to which trial courts are divested of jurisdiction during non-frivilous interlocutory appeals in matters controlled by the FAA) is substantive or jurisdictional rather than procedural, Federal circuits do not bind state courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States can provide binding prcedent on federal law that state courts must apply. I could see the reasons in Coinbase being written broadly enough to apply to both state and federal proceedings.

The Constitution does not state your opinion of SCOTUS's job, instead it just says that there shall be one supreme court with judicial power, and it says what kind of cases are within the jurisdiction of that court. Thus The Constitution does not mandate whether rulings will adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis, will be based only on a narrowly literal interpretation of The Constitution, or will be based on a general sense of justice. The Constitution also does not say anything about the rules of that Supreme Court, therefore the court is free to set its own rules, and to allow or to not allow amicus briefs. Many points raised in amicus briefs fall on deaf ears, sometimes because they are based on non-shared legal assumptions. You can read a very brief summary of the over 140 amicus briefs in this case here. If you read various SCOTUS opinions over the past 225+ years, you will see that the court does make reference to fact, not just statements of the law and constitution. This brings it well within the scope of "potentially relevant" to determine some fact. The lawyers get to argue how facts relate to legal conclusions, but the basic fodder for any legal decision is some set of facts. The specific briefs you mentioned are: Pro-Life Obstetricians and College of Obstetricians. The latter's argument is self-summarized as Amici’s position is that laws regulating abortion should be evidence-based, supported by a valid medical or scientific justification, and designed to improve—not harm—women’s health Pro-Life Obsetricians' position is self-summarized as support for a law that rationally furthers Mississippi’s interest in protecting women’s health from risks posed by later- term abortions, which are now well established in the literature These statements refer to interpretive doctrines previously established by SCOTUS, but not literally expressed in The Constitution. In US v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 introduced concepts of constitutionality (not literally stated in The Constitution) whereby cases could be reviewed either with "strict scrutiny" for protection of Constitutional rights or else discernment of a "rational interest" in government taking a certain action. Either of these kinds of judicial review require a comparison of law to "the facts". Hence "the facts" can be legally relevant.

SCOTUS blog regularly does posts on that kind of topic (see, e.g., their Stat Pack) and if you looked at their sources or the authors of those posts, you could probably easily find more. There are people who do that and make their findings publicly available, but I don't know them off hand.

Generally speaking, courts take whatever time they need to write their decision and then release it close to immediately. In cases where a judge believes she has the information she needs, she may rule "from the bench," announcing a decision and entering an order for the parties to comply, and then follow up with a written order later. The research process is fairly open-ended, but legal research databases are pretty advanced, and a good researcher can generally get his hands on the vast majority of what he'll need in very short order. But practically speaking, there are few limits on how long that process takes. A litigant who was growing impatient could seek a writ of procedendo to force a court to move faster, but my experience indicates that most attorneys wouldn't attempt that move unless a decision had been pending for at least a year with no action, which would be unusual.

You are quoting standards that are applicable during an appeal. So in this case, the defendant was brought to trial, was found guilty by a jury, and is now appealing that conviction. During that initial trial, the evidence was supposed to have been weighed neutrally. In an appeal, the appellate court is not attempting to re-litigate the entirety of the case. That would be costly and slow in addition to burdensome on witnesses that might have to be called again to testify. Instead, it defers to the trial court for things like the determination of facts. The standards you quote show that an appellate court is only going to overturn a lower court's verdict as insufficient if the lower court's ruling is manifestly unjust. The prosecution and the defense presented evidence on a particular element of the crime at trial. The jury determined that the prosecution met its burden, and proved the element beyond a reasonable doubt. The appeals court is not going to substitute its judgement for that of the jury particularly when the jury had the opportunity to assess the credibility of different witnesses that may not be possible from a simple text-based transcript. If the trial court convicted and the appeals court determines that the conviction was reasonable if the evidence was viewed from the standpoint most favorable to the prosecution, then the sufficiency standard would be met and the appeal would be denied. The appeals court would only overturn the verdict as insufficient if no reasonable juror could possibly have concluded that the state met its burden of proof given the evidence presented.

In an instant run-off, there are multiple rounds of voting (two, in this case). In the first round, everyone voted for their preferred candidate. In the second round, Jane's voters still vote for Jane, Joe's voters still vote for Joe, and John's voters vote for either Jane or Joe depending on their preferences. So everyone gets a vote in every round. To make an argument against this, you'd have to explain why this "instant system" is unconstitutional while conventional run-off elections, in which everyone votes again on a later day, are constitutional. (Some states use this system if no candidate meets a 50% threshold; for example, the special Senate election in Mississippi recently ended with a run-off.) The only real distinction between these two systems is that Jane's and Joe's voters can't change their minds between the two rounds of voting. So-called "jungle primaries" used in California and Washington effectively work on the same two-round structure, and have been found to be constitutional. If you want some legal precedent, in 2009 the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically refuted this argument in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. City of Minneapolis (bolding mine): The central premise of appellants' unequal weighting argument is that in the second round, first-choice votes cast for continuing candidates were exhausted in the first round and have no further opportunity to affect the election. Appellants claim that, in contrast, voters who cast their first-choice vote for the eliminated candidate get a second chance to influence the election by having their second-choice votes, for a different candidate, counted in the second round. Appellants assert that the same is true in subsequent rounds—voters for continuing candidates have exhausted their ability to affect the election, while voters who had selected the next eliminated candidate get yet another opportunity, as their next choice is counted. Like the district court, we reject the central premise of appellants' unequal weighting argument: that the vote for a continuing candidate is exhausted in the first round in which it is exercised and then is not counted and is of no effect in subsequent rounds. On the contrary, the vote for a continuing candidate is carried forward and counted again in the next round. Just because the vote is not counted for a different candidate in the new round (as is the vote originally cast for an eliminated candidate), does not mean that the ballot was exhausted, that the vote for the continuing candidate is not counted in the subsequent rounds, or that the voter has lost the ability to affect the outcome of the election. See Stephenson v. Ann Arbor Bd. of Canvassers, No. 75-10166 AW (Mich.Cir.Ct. Nov. 1975) (rejecting a claim that an IRV system for election of mayor gave more weight to votes of some voters than others because those who voted for an eliminated candidate had their second choice counted while the second choice of voters whose candidate remained in the race were not counted). Indeed, it is only because votes for continuing candidates are carried forward and combined with subsequent-choice votes of voters for eliminated candidates that any candidate can eventually win. Moreover, this aspect of the IRV methodology is directly analogous to the pattern of voting in a primary/general election system. In a nonpartisan primary election, each voter's vote counts in determining which two candidates survive to reach the general election. In essence, those primary votes are the voters' first-choice ranking of the candidates. As a result of the primary, all but the top two candidates are eliminated. Then, in the general election, voters who voted for candidates eliminated in the primary are allowed to cast another ballot, which necessarily will be for a different candidate-presumably, their second choice. This is no different than the counting of the second-choice votes of voters for eliminated candidates in instant runoff voting. At the same time, in the general election, voters who voted in the primary for either of the two surviving candidates are allowed to vote again, and they are most likely to vote again for their choice in the primary (unless, perhaps, they were voting strategically in the primary and did not vote for their actual first choice in an effort to advance a weaker opponent for their first choice to the general election). This is the equivalent of the continuing effect of the first-choice votes for continuing candidates in instant runoff. A vote in the general election still counts and affects the election, even though it is for the same candidate selected in the primary. Appellants attempt to distinguish the primary/general election system on the basis that those elections are separate, independent events, but the effect in terms of the counting of votes is the same.

State supreme courts are not allowed to defy binding supreme court precedents and are quickly slapped down if they do. But not all U.S. Supreme Court rulings have that character. For example, even if a state has rules of civil procedure which are verbatim identical to the federal rules of civil procedure, it does not have to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of an identical rule. For example, many states have rules of civil procedure 8, 9 and 12 which are verbatim identical to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 9 and 12. But, when the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted FRCP 8, 9, and 12 in a new way in cases known as Iqbal and Twombly, not all state courts adopted the new interpretation and this was not a defiance of binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent, because the U.S. Supreme Court's precedents only apply to federal laws and rules. Similarly, many states have state constitutional rights in a bill of rights which are worded with language identical to that of parallel rights under the U.S. Constitution as amended. But, state courts don't always interpret that language in the same way that the U.S. Supreme Court does. If the federal constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court is more protective of a right than the state constitution, then the U.S. Supreme Court interpretation sets a floor of protection (except in the small number of circumstances like the right to a civil jury trial, or the requirement that serious crimes be pre-approved by grand juries, where a federal right is not applicable to state and local governments). But, if the state constitution is interpreted by the State Supreme Court in a manner more protective a right than the U.S. Supreme Court, this is allowed and does not conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of identical language in the United States Constitution.

Minimum penalty for extradition makes no sense? I have been looking into extradition law, focusing on the United Kingdom (England and Wales jurisdiction) wanting to extradite an individual back from a country abroad. There are many factors to consider when it comes to an extradition, however just focusing on the minimum sentence part I am rather confused. Admittedly, I might be interpreting things rather literally. Usually, the minimum sentence for a crime has to be 12 months for an extradition to be allowed. This, however, makes no sense to me. Many crimes (even serious crimes) have a minimum sentence of a fine, and a maximum sentence of perhaps decades in prison. We could use the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 as an example, where the minimum is community service and the maximum is 16 years in prison as I quoted below. Offence range: High level community order – 16 years’ custody Does this mean that a hypothetical offender could commit a crime, disappear to another country, and successfully fight the extradition because the minimum sentence was under a year? It seems like a rather serious loop-hole in the law...

You might be misreading the extradition criterion The UK–USA extradition treaty has an example of the clause you're asking about: An offense shall be an extraditable offense if the conduct on which the offense is based is punishable under the laws in both States by deprivation of liberty for a period of one year or more or by a more severe penalty. Similar wording is used in all other treaties that I have reviewed: UK–Algeria ("offences which are punishable under the laws of both Parties by imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty for at least a period of one year") UK–Argentina (no extradition when "the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for less than one year") UK–Bolivia (same as Argentina) UK–Chile (same as Argentina) ... UK–U.A.E. ("offence is based is punishable under the laws of both Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of at least one year") If there is a treaty that requires there to be a mandatory minimum punishment of at least one year, I have not found it. While you say that "[u]sually, the minimum sentence for a crime has to be 12 months for an extradition to be allowed" and "[e]xtraditions are based on minimum sentence in the UK," my review of the treaties makes me doubt that. The rest of this answer explains how to interpret the clauses quoted above. It is enough that the offence gives rise to the "possibility of a term of imprisonment or other form of detention of more than one year." The inquiry is focused on the offence that the conduct is alleged to give rise to and the range of punishment available for that offence generally. E.g. an offence with a minimum punishment of a fine and a maximum punishment of 16 years in prison is an offence that is "punishable... by deprivation of liberty for a period of one year or more." Said another way: it is not necessary that the offence have a mandatory minimum of one year imprisonment. It is enough that the offence gives rise to the "possibility of a term of imprisonment or other form of detention of more than one year." See Canada v. Barrientos, 1995 ABCA 468 (CanLII) at para 103, Hetherington J., dissenting; but appeal allowed, for the reasons of Hetherington J. by the SCC in Canada v. Barrientos, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 531. In Barrientos, the courts were interpretating Article 2 of the Canada–U.S. extradition treaty, with wording substantially similar to the UK extradition treaties I reviewed above: "provided these offenses are punishable by the laws of both Contracting Parties by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year." One remaining question is whether the decision-maker needs to consider the specific facts of defendant's conduct and make a preliminary estimation as to whether in fact a term of imprisonment more than one year is likely. This position has not been adopted in Canada. At the stage where a judge or Minister of Justice is determining the authority to proceed, this is not to become a "sort of sentencing hearing." See USA v. English, 2002 BCSC 1902 at para 23.

This issue was addressed in United States v. Meng, 2020 BCSC 785. The authority to extradite is via the extraditing state's treaty with the U.S. and its domestic implementing legislation. In Canada, this is the Extradition Act. Extradition requires consent of the extraditing state and for the requesting state to follow the extraditing state's domestic procedure. The question you raise is how sanctions of requesting state affect the interpretation of the domestic offence for the purpose of establishing the double criminality requirement. Critical in this case was that the charged offence was fraud against HSBC (albeit based on alleged concealment of sanctions violations). See para. 23: The double criminality question in the committal hearing is therefore whether Ms. Meng’s alleged conduct, had it occurred in Canada, would have amounted to fraud contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. Ms. Meng argued: that the conduct cannot amount to fraud because in essence the proposed prosecution is to enforce US sanctions laws against Iran, measures that are not part of Canadian law and which, indeed, Canada has expressly rejected. The Attorney General argued: that the double criminality analysis may properly take the US sanctions into account as part of the foreign legal backdrop against which the essential conduct is to be understood. The court agreed with the Attorney General: The effects of the US sanctions may properly play a role in the double criminality analysis as part of the background or context against which the alleged conduct is examined.

united-states He'd be looking at ~6+ more years in prison in the second scenario In the United States, this would be attempted murder in both cases, though in the case of actual physical harm, the prosecutor could charge related offenses such as battery, which is "an intentional offensive or harmful touching of another person that is done without his or her consent." Note that though most attempted murders would likely be state crimes, I'm going to answer the rest of this from the perspective of a federal prosecution for attempted murder. The result would likely be similar for states, though the exact mechanism would be different. Sentencing for people convicted of serious federal crimes is guided by the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines. An "offense level" is determined, then combined with the offender's criminal history and checked against the sentencing table to determine a suggested sentencing range for the judge. Specifically, for Assault with Intent to Commit Murder; Attempted Murder, §2A2.1. states that: (a) Base Offense Level: (1) 33, if the object of the offense would have constituted first degree murder; or (2) 27, otherwise. (b) Specific Offense Characteristics (1) If (A) the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, increase by 4 levels; (B) the victim sustained serious bodily injury, increase by 2 levels; or (C) the degree of injury is between that specified in subdivisions (A) and (B), increase by 3 levels. (2) If the offense involved the offer or the receipt of anything of pecuniary value for undertaking the murder, increase by 4 levels. So in this case, it sounds like Joe suffered a life-threatening injury in the scenario where he got shot. Let's assume that this is Bob's first offense, and that it would have constituted first degree murder. If Bob missed, he'd be looking at 135-168 months (11.25-14 years) in prison. If he shot Joe successfully, he'd be instead looking at 210-262 months (17.5-21.83 years) in prison.

People are routinely and almost universally defended by lawyers in serious criminal cases in both civil law country and common law country legal systems. The availability of counsel for the indigent in cases involving petty crimes varies, but not in a way systemically related to the common law v. civil law distinction. It has more to do with the available supply of lawyers. The lawyer's job isn't very different, despite the fact that the lawyer has an audience of a panel of judges rather than a judge presiding over a decision making jury, although obviously lots of fine details (e.g. concerning the procedures for presenting evidence) are different. In both cases, defense lawyers call the attention to the facts favorable to the defendant's case, offer up evidence that tends to exonerate the defendant if the lawyer can obtain it, argues to the court regarding how the evidence should be interpreted and what inferences should be drawn from it, and argues regarding any ambiguities in how the law should be applied to these particular facts. Furthermore, in most criminal cases, in both civil law countries and in common law countries, guilt or innocence is not the primary issue. The primary issue for criminal defense counsel in most cases is assisting the judges in determining the right sentencing option on the right charges for a defendant who pleads guilty or is found guilty at trial of some crime, based upon the character of the crime and offender that is presented to the court by the lawyer. This part of the process is very similar indeed in the two systems. Typical issues might include an assault case where the issue is whether there was serious bodily injury, justifying a more serious sentence, or mere ordinary bodily injury, justifying only a less serious sentence, in a case where it isn't clear cut at the guilt and innocence phase, or arguing whether probation and a fine, or incarceration is a better fit to a minor offense, in the sentencing phase. It isn't entirely or primarily about "legal loopholes" in any system, although "legal loopholes" tend to be more important in U.S. criminal law than in many legal systems. There are some places in which civil law courts are more open to consider a defendant's arguments than others (and many civil law countries decide serious criminal cases with a panel that is a mix of legally trained judges and lay jurors), but that can vary wildly from country to country and within a country as well.

It is possible in principle, in the US, under the Bureau of Prison Treaty Transfer program, so that one could serve your time in Australia for example -- but not New Zealand, which isn't part of a bilateral or multilateral treaty with the US: here is the list. Canada and Australia are on the list via the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. New Zealand is (by choice) not a participant.

Germany If we actually talk about criminal law, your question is answered by §§ 1 and 2 StGB (the German penal code) – official but of course not binding translation: § 1 [No punishment without law] An act may only be punished if criminal liability had been established by law before the act was committed. § 2 [Jurisdiction ratione temporis; lex mitior] (1) The penalty and any ancillary measures shall be determined by the law which is in force at the time of the act. (2) If the penalty is amended during the commission of the act, the law in force at the time the act is completed shall be applied. (3) If the law in force at the time of the completion of the act is amended before judgment, the most lenient law shall be applied. (4) A law intended to be in force only for a determinate time shall be continued to be applied to acts committed while it was in force even after it ceases to be in force, unless otherwise provided by law. (5) Subsections (1) to (4) shall apply mutatis mutandis to confiscation, deprivation and destruction. (6) Unless otherwise provided by law, measures of rehabilitation and incapacitation shall be determined according to the law in force at the time of the decision. (Note that the last section has been voided in part by the Federal Constitutional Court but this is not relevant here.) which is a legal principle given by the German constitution, in particular by Article 103 para. 2: An act may be punished only if it was defined by a law as a criminal offence before the act was committed. To answer your specific questions with the above rules in mind: The law you are sued for is deleted while your process is going In that case you would not be punished. The law you are sued for is deleted before a case is raised against you (what you did was illegal while you did it) Same answer, you would not be punished. The law you are sued for is deleted after your process is finished (could you question the judgement?) You are out of luck. Only if there would be a new decision for an unrelated reason, your punishment would be taken back. There is a new law while your process is going The new law has no relevance at all. There is a new law after your process is finished (could you question the judgement?) Again, no relevance to your case. In another areas of the law the answers to your questions could actually be different but there would be too many cases to consider for a comprehensive answer.

In the US, only crimes that involve death or crimes against the state can be punished with death, see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (this was a child rape case and execution was held to be unconstitutional). There is a consideration of "proportionality" whereby execution is not an option for all crimes involving death. The court doesn't include or exclude non-death cases, they explicitly kick the can down the road ("We do not address, for example, crimes defining and punishing treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin activity, which are offenses against the State"). Therefore, there is no ruling that bars execution for treason, but there is for rape and burning someone's stack of hundreds. This is a list of 2008 pre-Kennedy non-murder "surviving" state capital offenses (most of the cases listed in the article are for rape, which was ruled unconstitutional): Treason (Arkansas, Calif., Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Washington) Aggravated kidnapping (Co., Idaho, Il., Missouri, Mont.) Drug trafficking (Fl., Missouri) Aircraft hijacking (Ga., Mo.) Placing a bomb near a bus terminal (Mo.) Espionage (New Mexico) Aggravated assault by incarcerated, persistent felons, or murderers (Mont.) However, in Washington the death penalty is now unconstititional. The Missouri penalty for treason has been since reduced to a maximum of life imprisonment. On the other hand, Florida still has a "capital drug trafficking" penalty if you import 300+ kg of cocaine, knowing that "the probable result of such importation would be the death of any person" (death does not have to actually result). Here is a list of federal crimes that allow execution, which includes only large-scale drug trafficking, espionage and treason in the non-death crimes.

Does this mean all countries law applies to it? Basically yes. If the videos are in english and are about science in general does this mean if some country some day bans ( imprisonment ) science videos or use of a specific colour in videos can they extraterritorialy enforce this imprisonment if they are in some other country like USA or India? With respect to criminal cases, only if it can arrest that person or convince another country to arrest and extradite that person. Generally speaking, countries will only extradite someone if it is a serious offense under the domestic laws of the country of arrest as well as the country requesting that the person be handed over, and also only if the crime occurred in or was targeted at the requesting country. Sometimes the arrest is not legal in the place where it is made. For example, in this case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court (the quote is from the official syllabus to the case): Respondent, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was forcibly kidnapped from his home and flown by private plane to Texas, where he was arrested for his participation in the kidnapping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and the agent's pilot. After concluding that DEA agents were responsible for the abduction, the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico (Extradition Treaty or Treaty), and ordered respondent's repatriation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Based on one of its prior decisions, the court found that, since the United States had authorized the abduction and since the Mexican government had protested the Treaty violation, jurisdiction was improper. Held: The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a United States court for violations of this country's criminal laws. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). I mean can a country just bring to jail any youtuber outside its borders ( using its national language as the language of the video ) who uploads content of international appeal because of some law? If the country can manage to arrest the person, yes. There are high profile cases from Saudi Arabia where that has happened. See, e.g., here and here (a blogger and his sister arrested in Saudi Arabia, while his wife and children flee to Canada), here (journalists for Lebanese periodical arrested in Saudi Arabia in relation to years old publications) here (more journalists arrested in Saudi Arabia), here ("A male Saudi Arabian teenager has been arrested in Riyadh over a series of online videos of conversations between him and a female Californian streaming-video star that went viral."), here (Yemeni blogger), and here (Washington Post journalist tortured and killed in Saudi Arabian embassy in Turkey at the direction of a senior member of the Saudi Arabian royal family). Also can a country just hold liable for youtube's data privacy practices a youtuber outside its borders and enforce the judgement if the practices of both youtuber and their chanell and youtube is legal in their home country? A country can hold anyone liable for anything its domestic laws allow it to hold someone liable for, and can enforce that judgment against any assets it can exert power over. Some countries with similar legal systems recognize each other's court judgments widely. Countries with very different legal systems often don't recognize each other's judgements. For example, most European countries do not recognize U.S. money judgment for torts (i.e. civil wrongs such as personal injury awards). Similarly, the U.S. does not recognize most foreign defamation judgments, and does not recognize most judgments of Saudi Arabian courts. One last thing is wether inclusion of ads make a difference? Usually not. But it can matter for purposes of assertions of lawsuit liability over someone outside the jurisdiction seeking to impose liability for something that harmed someone in their country. If conduct amounts to "doing business" in the country seeking to impose liability or amounts to a "purposeful availment" of the laws of the country seeking to impose liability in some why, an imposition of extraterritorial liability is more likely, and that tends to happen more in cases where there are ads that are commercial targeting the people of the country where the courts seek to impose liability.

Does publishing a copyrighted painting, for the purpose of making fun of the artist, constitute parody? (USA) I want to write a short story that re-imagines the lives of several prominent artists, and uses their paintings to tell a new, fictional, story of their lives. An example would be using Picasso paintings to tell a story about how he was actually a famous musician, and then using that platform to make fun of both Picasso and musician culture. The paintings would serve as a reference point for how the story relates to the real life artist. For example the painting "The Old Guitarist" would be renamed to "My First Guitar Teacher" and then some paragraphs written telling the story of the teacher and his relationship to Picasso, which is entirely fiction (this painting is actually in the public domain, but let's pretend it's not). Would this type of work count as a parody, and therefore allow me to use copyrighted works in a for-profit publication? If not, why?

First, there's a step missing: parody does not "therefore" allow you to copy protected works. You have to determine whether this is "fair use", where you get in the neighborhood of parody in identifying "purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ..., scholarship, or research". Therefore you have to go through the balancing act that is fair use analysis. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., SCOTUS considered parody as a form of criticism or comment, noting that "This Court has only once before even considered whether parody may be fair use, and that time issued no opinion because of the Court's equal division". For that case, the court continues Suffice it to say now that parody has an obvious claim to transformative value, as Acuff Rose itself does not deny. Like less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, it can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one. We thus line up with the courts that have held that parody, like other comment or criticism, may claim fair use under § 107. The important step in this ruling is tha For the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the definitions, and the heart of any parodist's claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author's works. If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another's work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its commerciality, loom larger. In other words, you can't catch a free ride on "parody" to reach a fair use judgment. Even if it were parody, "parody may or may not be fair use", as the court said. That does not preclude establishing that the work in some other way comments or criticizes. Get a lawyer before you go doing this, in case you end up involuntarily making new law.

If I lock you in a room without access to anything and tell you "Write a novel" and you write a novel with characters, you have copyright in the work. But it's not absolute: If you use your own characters, you own all the copyright in the work, but not in the idea, as ideas are not copyrightable, see Feist v Rural. If you use someone else's characters extensively (as in more than a short hommage/cameo), you very likely make a derivate. You own a copyright in your part, as in the expression of the story or pictures you created, but you do not gain property interest in the existing characters' expression. Since the copyright to the characters lies with the owner of their IP, you need their OK to release (and also to even make) your work - as with the owner of a copyright is the sole right to decide on distribution and creation of derivates under 17 USC § 106 (2). Also remember that making an unlicensed derivate work risks having nothing you can sue for in case the original copyright owner lifts your ideas and scenes-a-faire parts and adapts them for their own derivate, see Anderson v Stallone The strange case of fanfiction chains... Now, there is a strange situation when a work is based on a work which is based on a work... Then, publishers and editors start with red ink and the result is, that what people know as Twilight now has nothing to do with the fanfiction it started as (It wasn't Vampires in the original draft), and 50 Shades of Grey ended up striking any and all supernatural from it, despite it having been a Twilight fanfiction originally. By making own characters and own expression of the world, there could be no copyright infringement. US law vs Egypt law? Both Egypt and the US have signed the Berne convention, meaning that copyright is very very similar in the broad strokes that the right to allow or disallow derivates is with the copyright holder. Also, since Ben10's copyright owners are to the best of my knowledge in the US (Cartoon Network Studios & Men of Action Studios), they will sue in a US federal court.

Such clauses are called "copyright assignment", "invention assignment", and/or "works for hire" clauses, partly depending on the clause's intent and wording. They're pretty common in employment contracts for software development and some creative positions. Frankly, the clauses don't actually do much, at least in the US -- copyright law already recognizes the concept of works made for hire (which belong to the employer), and claims too far beyond that are often rejected if they aren't obviously related to company business. With that said, your hypothetical programmer's painting is safe unless it depicts, say, the contents of an email from the CEO. :) Even if the clause technically entitles the employer to claim ownership, the employer has no legitimate interest in doing so. Likewise, that app created outside work is safe as long as it is created using no company resources and is unrelated to the employer's business. If the app is obviously related, that's where things get hairy.

In the US, the author would be able to wind an infringement lawsuit against the re-publisher. Title 17, the US copyright law codified, grants the author the exclusive right to authorize republication, and does not require that a person use their real name. The argument "It was on the internet, it's in the public domain" is utterly without legal merit. The same goes for the assertion that a person loses his rights if he is uncontactable. The author has stated the terms of the license, so there isn't even a reasonable argument that the infringement is innocent (unknowing: "I thought it was with permission). There is no requirement that you have to allow a potential user to hassle you about the license terms. The one thing that is special regarding anonymous and pseudonymous works is that under 17 USC 302, "copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first". For a work whose author is identified, copyright "endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death". This assumes that the host site has not preempted author's license: Stack Exchange, for example, preempts an author's exclusive right, so you can copy stuff from here accorting to the SE terms of usage.

First off, the work is almost certainly not in the public domain in the US. Works are generally copyrighted upon creation or publication, but in this case the work was probably explicitly copyrighted. The fact that a work is out of print generally has no bearing on its copyright status. US copyright law changed several times in the last century. The 1985 copyright year means the board game was probably published then, and it's since it's a Disney copyright it's a corporate work, which would give it a copyright term of 95 years, meaning that it should be covered under copyright until 2080. See this factsheet on copyright from the US Copyright office. Works Created on or after January 1, 1978 For works made for hire and anonymous and pseudonymous works, the duration of copyright is 95 years from first publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is shorter International laws will vary, but many countries adhere to the Berne Convention, which means that international laws will probably be at least similar. Either way, the work isn't very old from an intellectual property perspective. Fair use is an exception to copyright law that allows portions of copyrighted works to be used without permission or compensation in certain circumstances; academic or scholarly use is one of them. Generally, your use of the work has to be the minimum necessary amount to serve your purposes, and cannot harm the commercial value of the work. (The fact that the work is out of print may help with the latter.) The problem with fair use is that it's always determined on a case by case basis. The only way to know for sure if a particular use is fair use is to wait for the copyright holder to sue you and then make a fair use defense in court. I was going to suggest that you discuss this with the editor of your journal, but re-reading your question it looks like you're planning to publish to a personal blog rather than an academic journal. In the end, it's up to you (or your attorney, if you choose to hire one) to analyze the relevant legal concepts and rules and decide if and how much of the work to use.

Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz.

Facts cannot be copyrighted. Such a project does not violate copyright law, and if you're in the United States, it is protected by the First Amendment.

All of your works would be considered to be a derivative work. This is because your work, is based on the work of someone else's. A good test for this to see if something is a derivative work is to see whether the new work can effectively exist without the original. Most copyright laws worldwide are similar, thanks to the Berne Convention for copyrighted works. Since derivative works are normally a right that is exclusive to the copyright holder, you can't make such works without permission (generally through a license or expiry of copyright). So now, let's take a look: The Mona Lisa was made hundreds of years ago. It's definitely in the public domain. You're in no breach of copyright laws here. Yes, of course. Microsoft retains copyright on their icons, and possibly trademarks as well. However, they may have trademark guidance that allows you to use their icons - as long as you follow it. Likely the same as microsoft - you can assume it's similar for most large companies. Code is copyrighted as a literary work - the layout and visual aspect is copyrighted as an artistic work. That artist retains copyright, unless you obtain the work with a license, or the copyright is expired. If you create a derivative work, you infringe on their rights.

What are some jurisdictions where a "no-strike clause" is illegal? This paper (PDF file) gives the following example of a typical no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement in the United States (the paper is from 1984, so I'm not sure to what extent it reflects the current reality in the US): The union agrees that it will not collectively, concertedly or individually engage in or participate, directly or indirectly, in any strike, slowdown, stoppage or any other interference with or interruption of the work or operations of the employer during the term of this agreement; and the employer agrees that during the term of this agreement it will not lock out any of the employees in the bargaining unit covered by this agreement. What are some jurisdictions where this kind of clause would be legal/illegal? If the scope of the question is too large, I'm interested in particular in European Union countries. The question is simply for my personal culture relative to workers' rights. Thanks,

In germany, this is called Friedenspflicht. Both employers and employees (and their unions) are required to refrain from strikes and lockouts in disputes on issues which are covered by a currently valid collective bargaining agreement. The agreement may also stipulate that there will be no labor actions on issues which are not covered, as long as the agreement is in force, but that is not necessary. Example: There is a collective bargaining agreement on wages, which is still running. Strikes for higher wages are prohibited. Strikes to get better staffing for the night shift would be allowed, if the agreement doesn't say how many employees should be on duty even during slack hours.

A limitation has to be expressed in lease and must not violate laws related to housing discrimination that apply to the place where the leased property is located. There are also other terms of a lease that are statutorily prohibited or prohibited at common law (e.g. imposition of a penalty interest rate in excess of the rate allowed by usury laws). But, the general rule is that anything not prohibited by law is allowed. A secondary analysis is that one of the common law prohibitions in contracts is a "penalty" which means a fixed monetary sanction not easily calculable based upon the measurable economic harm to a party to the contract after the fact. In those cases, the clause, called a "liquidated damages" clause must be a reasonable attempt within reason ex ante to quantify the harm caused by a breach of the contract triggering the liquidated damages clause. If the termination of a lease for a violation of a lease term involving a tangential personal life activity unrelated directly to the premises, and has the effect of making a tenant subject to liability for the balance the lease payments, it might be disqualified as a penalty which is void as contrary to public policy. On the other hand, if it simply operated to terminate the lease as the next convenient juncture (perhaps the next of the next month more than 30 days from the violation) with no financial penalty involved, it would probably be valid.

The entire purpose of the Entire Agreement clause is to say that this contract is the agreement, and anything previously negotiated is not part of the agreement. I don't know why they would fail to include that in the contract.

Probably not. This condition is what's known as a penalty clause, which is not universally allowed. This article discusses penalty clauses in EU law. In the English-Belgian variety, the clause is simply not enforceable. In the Dutch-French and German-Swiss models, such a clause might be enforceable, but the judge can adjust disproportionately high amounts – 250 times the normal price strikes me as disproportionately high. It isn't clear what amount the courts would deem to be reasonable and fair: but the infringer would have to request a reduction in the amount.

Mediation is non-binding Mediation and conciliation are non-binding methods of dispute resolution. If properly conducted, a mediator does not make any suggestions as to how the parties might resolve a dispute; they simply maintain a space where such a resolution might occur. If the parties reach an agreement, that agreement might be a legally binding contract. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? If it is, then it could be enforced by a court. If it isn't then compliance is voluntary. What you describe is not mediation However, the agreement facilitated by Bob & Fred's mutual friend either is or is not a contract and the same circumstances follow.

It is not illegal to treat the employees differently. As long as nobody is being paid for less than the time worked, this is legal. Treating employees differently because of protected characteristics is unlawful discrimination. However, the duration you have worked there is not a protected characteristic. It is perfectly legal for the employer not to mandate new employees clock in and out. It would even be legal (if not a great idea) to hire new employees for twice as much.

Jurisdiction has not been provided, so I've written a general answer: Not necessarily; often, such provisions clauses will have their own expiration dates, for example "for five years after signing, X", with X still being valid after cancellation up to 5 years(so if you cancel after 3 years, X is still valid for 2 more years), or "for two years after cancellations, Y"(especially common with non-compete clauses) where the time-limit of Y starts when the contract is cancelled. Other clauses are meant to indeed be enforced forever, such as some non-disclosure, non-disparagement, or indemnity clauses. For example, an indemnity clause in a contract that prevents a party from suing the counter-party for work done under the contract would be pointless if it could be bypassed by a party terminating the agreement. There are lots of legal limits, based on the terms of the provision, and its nature, all governed by the contract law of the jurisdiction under which the contract was drafted under and/or is governed by (this is generally obvious, except for some cross-border contracts, which generally will have a declaration as to whose laws apply). It is not inherently abusive, but can certainly be abused. What is considered abusive often varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (not only on this issue, but on legal issues in general). It depends on the jurisdiction, and generally on the terms of the provision itself. If the court asked to enforce the terms of the agreement feels that the provision is illegal or abusive, they won't be enforced (and possibly the entire document declared null and void, depending on the central-ness of the illegal or abusive provision; some provisions specifically state that invaliding the provision doesn't invalidate the whole contract to try to prevent this). If they don't feel the provision is illegal or abusive, they will generally enforce it.

Provincial jurisdiction may need to be specified. But in general, assuming you are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, you can be terminated for any reason or even no reason, as long as the contract is followed, the actual or apparent reason is not discriminatory or otherwise illegal and the termination procedure meets the provincial employment standards. The labour law usually provide requirements for notice periods or severance pay (or both), unless there exists a just cause (e.g. extreme disregard of duty, theft, repeated insubordination, etc.; lack of funds on the part of the employer is not a just cause). shouldn't the employer be fully responsible for the salary coverage of his employee in the course of his contract? Yes, but the contract is saying it can be terminated under certain conditions, after which time you are no longer "in the course" of your contract. Termination due to lack of funds is usually not considered discriminatory or otherwise illegal. You remain entitled to wages for any period you have worked. Additionally, the employer needs to respect the required notice period or severance pay under the provincial employment standards related to termination with or without cause, regardless of the funding situation.

Can a bank sue someone that disseminates information that starts a bank run that destroys the bank? Specifically, could Silicon Valley Bank sue the Founders Fund and other VCs that had companies they invested in withdraw their funds? Has any bank ever successfully done this? To clarify, I'm not asking about the act of withdrawing funds, but encouraging others to do so.

Can a bank sue someone that starts a bank run that destroys the bank? No (assuming, of course, as is the usual case, that the person who starts the bank run is not engaged in perpetrating a defamatory falsehood). Most bank runs are, and certainly the Silicon Valley Bank bank run was, based upon wide disclosure of a true fact. In the case of SVB, the bank run was triggered by the fact that its balance sheets failed to reflect the true value of fixed nominal rate bonds that it held as assets. In the usual case, a lawsuit also isn't a very helpful option to a bank that suffers a bank run. In the case of SVB, the bank had a book value (which is often a fair measure of a bank's value since its assets are so monetized) of $34 billion which was reduced to a pittance by the run on it. Even if someone who started a run on the bank had a moderately high net worth of $3.4 million that could be collected in a money judgment, that would cover a mere 0.01% of the loss to the bank, and there would be serious issues over the causation of any loss (i.e. how much of the losses suffered bound to occur sooner or later anyway due to causes unrelated to someone who triggered a panic). Another fine point of procedure is that when a bank becomes insolvent, it is promptly taken over by the FDIC or similar regulatory agency, which installs a receiver. This makes it effectively impossible for the bank itself to sue anyone. If the bank would otherwise have had a right to sue, the receiver for the bank would have the right to sue rather than the bank itself. But, this subtly while not irrelevant, doesn't capture the core reason for the question.

Adding to what Martin Bonner said: If you are a startup, and your grand plan is to be bought by a big company for a lot of money, and that big company thinks your use of React makes it risky to buy you, then you will lose out. It doesn't matter whether there is a risk, what matters is whether a potential buyer believes there is a risk. And if that is your plan, then you need to re-read Martin's answer from the point of view of a bigger company. You may not have any valuable patents, but that bigger company might. If I have an LLC with no money, then I can say "I don't care if Facebook sues me for 100 millions, I'll just let the LLC go bankrupt and start another one". If the company is worth millions or more, then the risk is much higher.

There is certainly precedent. This list of the 10 biggest class action lawsuits in the world indicates that 8 of the 10 were by investors against their own company. In any event your analysis is flawed. The people who initiate the class action may (probably are) no longer be investors because they sold their shares and realised their losses. Further a legacy investor who didn't buy on the basis of the company's wrongdoing would not be entitled to damages. Finally, an investor who bought at say $100 on the basis of false information (like the cars were legal when the company knew they weren't) and now hold shares worth $40 will wait many years (if ever) to make good their losses: a lawsuit will be quicker and more certain.

Hacking into a computer owned by someone else and accessing the data stored on it without permission is a misdemeanor according to StGB 202a (de|en). But only if it's successful. So a failed attempt isn't a misdemeanor yet. When you notice that someone might have committed a criminal offence (regardless of whether you are a victim or just a witness), then the usual procedure is to report it to the police. If they consider the crime serious enough to investigate, then they will request the identity from the ISP. But the copyright lawsuits which are filed in bulk by law firms working with media companies are not crime reports. They are civil lawsuits. A civil lawsuit is when someone had a tangible damage because of something someone else did, and now they want money in compensation. When there is no damage, then there is nothing to sue for. So when you want a judge to file an injunction to force an ISP to give them the identity of one of their users, then you would first have to explain to them how much financial damage you had because of that person and that this is enough damage to make it worth everyone's time. That might be quite challenging for nothing but a failed SSH login attempt. But it might be possible if a single person made so many login attempts that it incurred you non-negligible bandwidth cost or even caused a denial-of-service.

If you used some creative work of mine without my permission (I'm the copyright holder, and you have no license giving you permission) then I can sue you to make you stop using my work, to get payment for damages, and to get payment for statutory damages. If you used my work because someone else told you wrongly that you had a license, that's very unfortunate for you, but is no reason why I wouldn't or shouldn't sue you. Obviously in this situation that third party did something badly wrong. I can sue both of you together to make sure that I get payment from whoever has deeper pockets. You can also sue that third party if you think that their lying, or being mistaken, about a non-existing license caused you damages, or if there is a contract or something that makes them responsible.

I reported this to my bank as soon as I found out, and Chase said that the money would be reimbursed once they completed their investigation (within 10 business days). Chase was likely indicating that the money will be reimbursed within 10 business days of completing their investigation; not 10 business days from the date you told the that someone forged checks on your account. This would make sense when you think about it, as they need to make sure that you were not complicit in the crime (you would be surprised how many people have had someone cash multiple checks from their account only to split the money with them and file a claim for fraudulent transfer/forgery). Further, checks are a negotiable instrument, unlike a credit/debit card, where specific protections exist pursuant to its terms and conditions of use. You have a duty to keep a negotiable instrument safe, and while most banks will reimburse you if it can be established that you had no involvement and you were not grossly negligent in the keeping of the instruments, it is a different animal in and of itself. It has now been 13 business days, and I have checked on the status twice and was told both times that there had been no status update, and they were unable to provide an updated ETA. Unless your bank indicated in the disclosures of the checking account application and acceptance documentation that in the event of a stolen check you will be reimbursed in X amount of days, they have the absolute right to complete their investigation before reimbursing any funds to your account. It's a fairly large amount of money, and I need to get it back as soon as possible. I'm trying to figure out if I have legal footing here. Does the law protect me from this type of fraud? And if so, does it require the bank to respond within any particular timeframe? Federal banking regulations provide broad protections to consumers when it comes to fraud involving credit/debit cards, as these are easily stolen from all sorts of means. That said, checks do not carry the same protections, although oftentimes some. National banks may be required to reimburse customers for forged checks. However, based on individual circumstances, the bank can investigate to determine if the customer is entitled to a reimbursement. There is not duty to reimburse until the investigation is complete. This is why I think you've potentially misconstrued what they said about how long it would take. They cannot promise a time certain when they don't know how long the investigation will take. Whether the bank is liable for the customer's loss depends on the specific circumstances of the case. Generally, a bank is liable for accepting a check that has been forged, altered, or improperly endorsed. However, if the bank can prove two things — that it accepted the check in good faith and exercised ordinary care and diligence in handling the transaction — it may not be liable. If your actions — the way the check or checkbook was handled, issued, completed, or made payable — contributed to the making of the forgery, you may be at least partially liable. Generally, the bank will require you to complete an affidavit. It may also request that you file a police report. ** Addition: I forgot to mention that if the checks were not "cashed" (i.e. filled out to cash or cashed in person), but rather were presented to a 3rd party for payment in receipt of goods or services, you are also going to need to contact those individuals or businesses (their name is on the check) and alert them to the fraud, and allow them to contact their banks, lest you will be assessed fees by them for insufficient funds if your bank later takes the money back as a result of the investigation. Also, in the event the checks were recreated rather than stolen, or if you don't know exactly how many were stolen, you are going to need to close your account while you wait for the investigation to bear fruit (hopefully), and open a new account, as you now have a duty to account for any and all checks stolen at that event (so, if you know a book is out there and 10 checks have cleared you know there are 15 remaining that the bank is not going to cover if you don't take steps to protect yourself). One would think they've asked you this and have already done something to prevent further checks from coming in, but if not, you need to get on it. Also, you may want to hire your own investigator if you have the funds to do so. While stolen cards are often strangers, stolen checks (unless it's one washed check) is nearly always someone you know.

In my opinion, your question is no different from "If I steal money from a bank to pay off my credit card in the same bank, can I be held liable for stealing". I think the obvious answer is yes for both your question and the modified one, for exactly the same reason.

No, because leaking is also a form of insider trading if the person you leak to takes advantage of the information. Even if you leaked it in a public forum you still have to wait 6 months before it is considered truly public knowledge, and by that time you might have learned something else. If you think that Company X is going to be pulled down along with the rest of the market then your best bet is to short (or buy "put" options on) a representative basket of shares other than Company X. This has the advantage of being 100% legal without having to wait.

Have wives ever been legally a man's property in the US? I'm studying A Level English literature at the moment and we are reading The Great Gatsby. I have a teacher who alluded that during the time the text was written, 1925, wives were considered to be a man's property. This raised red flags for me, as I know this may be true figuratively, but I want to know if that was legally the case ever in the United States, and particularly in 1925.

Not exactly, There were limited instances of the institution of wife selling in Britain in the early modern period, but this practice was never transferred to the United States and received as part of its common law. The institution of wife selling had been abolished long, long before the year 1925 in Britain and had never existed in the U.S., and was quite rare even when it had existed in Britain (where it functionally served as a poor man's alternative to divorce if a substitute husband could be located for an unfaithful or unwanted wife). Also, even in the early English common law, a marriage only arose with a woman's consent (sometimes implied from cohabitation or pregnancy in cases of common law marriage), even though de facto arranged marriages were common. While the wedding ceremony, in part, contemplated a notion that a father sold his daughter to the groom and at some times a father actually did have veto power over his children's marriage in England (causing many elopements to Scotland), the woman actually still had to consent in England, at least in principle, to the marriage. Married women did have greatly diminished legal rights, but they lacked important aspects of being property such as transferability. At common law, the legal status of a married woman was very different from that of an unmarried adult woman (a "femme sole"), and was more like that of a child, and the legal rights of men and women in marriage were, in general, very different. Phoog's answer is correct in identifying the doctrine of coverture and the suspension of the legal personality of the wife upon marriage as the dominant aspect of the differential treatment of women in marriage, but I will spell out in this answer the pervasive nature of the doctrine as applied since some of the practical consequences of this general idea are not obvious. In the most pure version of the traditional English common law, rules included the following: Upon marriage, all property of the married woman became property of her husband instead, which the husband had sole authority to manage. A wife's earnings were her husband's property and not her own. But, trusts could be established by third parties (often a father or uncle) for the benefit of a married woman that did not become a husband's property, and her blood relations would often give a woman gifts that in the case of personalty were not always in the full control of the husband. A married woman could not enter into binding contracts except for "necessities", and could not enter into executory contracts (i.e. contracts to be performed in the future). There was no criminal liability for offenses other than murder committed by a husband against a wife or vice versa (e.g. rape and domestic violence of a husband directed at a wife was legal). A husband had a right to physically discipline his wife or to hire a third-party public official to do so on his behalf and many local governments had an official whose responsibilities included physically disciplining wives at a husband's request for a scheduled fee. Adultery was a crime and wives were generally the ones most likely to be prosecuted for it. A wife was legally obligated to maintain her domicile with her husband and could be legally compelled (with third-party assistance if necessary) to return to it. There was no civil liability between spouses who were one person under the law (i.e. spouses could not sue each other in court). This changed mostly in the mid-20th century. But, a husband was often held to civil liability for the acts of his wife to a similar extent to the liability he would have for the acts of his children or his dogs and livestock. Wive could not (and still cannot in most circumstances) testify against their husbands in court on any matter. A lawsuit of a wife against a third person would generally be brought by the husband either on her behalf or in cases such as personal injury suits for "loss of consortium" (a legal right of the man to companionship and service from his wife). Wives generally had no right to inherit from their own families (at least for real property, inheritance of personalty in early common law England was vested in the Church of England, another part of the common law not carried over to the U.S.), and spousal inheritance rights were governed by principles of curtsey and dower (often leaving a surviving spouse a life estate in property, rather than ownership of it). Women, in general, could not vote or run for public office or serve on juries or be drafted to serve in the military. In the early common law era, divorce could only be secured by legislation, not by a court. A wife could, however, apply to a court for "separation from bed and board" that would leave the marriage intact, but would allow her to live at a different domicile and to have her husband compelled to support her with what amounted to alimony. This was available on grounds comparable to early 20th century fault based divorce. Custody of children and full authority over them in the event of a dispute was generally vested in a husband. Children born during a marriage were conclusively presumed to be a husband's children even if this was highly implausible as a matter of fact, and children born outside of marriage were illegitimate and had no legal rights at all vis-a-vis their fathers. But, in most cases, a free adult femme sole (as opposed to an indentured servant or slave) had the same legal rights as a man. In practice, this was only viable for wealthy women or self-employed women as few forms of regular employment were available to women (most commonly entering into a relationship with an employer as a domestic servant which was a bit like indentured servitude except that the servant was paid money in addition to room and board, and had the right to quit). Also, a man could vest authority to manage the couple's estate in his wife, which would not be uncommon, particularly if the husband was away at war or on business. Not every U.S. state followed this regime in a pure manner, but a substantial part of this regime governing the rights of married women was adopted almost everywhere in the U.S. at some point (except for the states entering the union in the 20th century). This changed on a state by state basis, partially due to evolution of the common law, but in substantial part due to the passage of "Married Women's Property Acts" mostly in the 19th century. Remaining vestiges of this regime that were not changed legislatively by the 20th century were mostly later struck down by courts, often on 14th Amendment grounds, although removal of some of the criminal law immunities (the last of which was the marital rape exemption) was legislative and came in the later 20th century. The 19th century was also the time period during which legislative divorce was replaced on a state by state basis with court-granted fault-based divorce, which in turn was replaced on a state by state basis in the late 20th century and early 21st century (New York State was the last to adopt no-fault divorce). I have a teacher who alluded that during the time the text was written, 1925, wives were considered to be a man's property. This raised red flags for me, as I know this may be true figuratively but I want to know if that was legally the case ever in the United States, and particularly in 1925. In 1925, most U.S. states had passed Married Women's Property Acts (including the states featured in the Great Gatsby), and court-granted divorces on the basis of fault were available (although rare), but there were still many residual aspects of the early common law regime in place. Divorce was, in practice, hard to obtain and expensive. Adultery was a crime and marital rape was not. A husband was generally immune from criminal liability concerning a wife, although often this would be in the form of a privilege similar to the self-defense privilege for "reasonable discipline of a wife" similar to the exclusion today for reasonable discipline of children, rather than an absolute immunity from liability. Civil liability exemptions would have still existed. Many "heart balm torts" (which allowed civil remedies for adultery for example against the other man) would have been in existence (a few U.S. states still have them), which effectively gave a husband some "property rights" in his wife's fidelity that had to be observed by third parties. But, by 1925 many states were starting to legislatively repeal cause of action for "heart balm" torts. Inheritance laws would not have been gender neutral but would not have so decisively disfavored married women either. In divorces, the "tender years doctrine" which awarded children under 12 to wives and older children to husbands would have been in the process of development. Some of the presumptions about a husband's authority over a wife's property and a woman's obligation to share a domicile with her husband would have been widely understood even though the legal basis for this living law would have been eroding and it would be outrageous in that time period to use third-party physical force to compel a woman to return to a domicile or to discipline a wife. In short, while a wife was not a husband's property in 1925 and had many more legal rights than she did in the early common law era, a wife still had many legal disabilities at that point in time and in the living law in the minds of ordinary people, her rights were even more diminished than the relatively progressive legal rights that she had under relatively newly enacted legislation. The mindset of wives as property, while not strictly true, still have a residual influence and relevance in the form of residual legal disabilities of married women.

It is certainly true that different states who share a Head of State can have different succession rules. Thus William IV of the United Kingdom was also King of Hannover. The UK allowed female succession, so Victoria was Queen of the United Kingdom; Hannover didn't, so he was succeeded by Ernest Augustus there. At the moment, all the Commonwealth Realms of which Elizabeth is Head of State have the same rules of succession. They all changed the rules regarding whether a first-born girl would be heir apparent together. They could decide to have different rules of succession, but they probably won't.

Yes The child owns what they own - it would be illegal for the parent to take the item and dispose of it or otherwise permanently keep if from the child (once they became an adult). However, parents are their children’s legal guardians and are responsible for the raising of their children including matters of discipline. It is both legal and appropriate for a parent to limit access of a child to their possessions.

This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources.

The "Crabs" game can be legal if it is seen as a form of parody. That is one of the forms of "fair use" that allows copying (within limits). This is to allow the use of limited amounts of copying for critical or "mocking" pieces, which are considered a form of free speech. Two other issues come into play under "fair use." The first is whether or not this is "commercial" (yes) or non-commercial (e.g educational) use. That is mildly negative for "Crabs" but by no means dispositive. The second is the likely market impact, whether the new use tends to compete with the old use in its "home" market, or whether it is likely to open a new market of a very different, perhaps "opposite" audience that might later buy the original as a "crossover." The "Crabs" game seems to address the "green" or at least "pro animal" (PETA) market. If the defendant can show that the "Cards" market addresses e..g., your "inner Nazi," making it "opposite," that would be ideal. It would be less convincing if "Cards" were addressing e.g. human rights, because that might be seen to overlap with the green market in terms of social conscience.

You certainly can't legally steal anything, ever. If it is legal, it is not stealing. In particular, if it is your property, it isn't stealing. The question is really, "is it your property"? This will be jurisdiction dependant. I am familiar with England and Wales, and other common law jurisdictions may be similar. The fact you co-signed for the car definitely does not make it your property. It just means that out of the goodness of your heart, you agreed to reduce the finance company's risk by promising to pay if your ex-friend didn't. In E&W, I don't think it is possible to register a car jointly, but there is a long page explaining that the registered keeper is not necessarily the owner of the car. My guess is that the car probably does not belong to you, so if you take it you will probably end up with a conviction for theft.

The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 (it was revised between 1868-1869, but enacted in 1870) applied specifically to civil cases (i.e. disputes between private parties); it's organized by topic area, and is there to keep people from having to comb through every law ever passed that has to do with civil cases. The Revised Statutes of 1870 gathered all the laws of "general character" into one place, for the same reason. The difference between the two was almost certainly an error. In general, there is one official version of the law; other versions are a convenience. The official version normally defaults to the individual laws passed by the legislature (which are organized by date, not by anything useful for finding relevant laws), but that can be changed by statute. In this case, the Revised Statutes contains section 3990, which says in so far as there may be any conflict between the provisions of this act and any provision of the said Revised Civil Code and Code of Practice, that said Code shall be held and taken as the law governing So, the Civil Code took precedence. Your revisions of 1876 and 1882 were not successor laws; rather, they were compilations of the Revised Statutes and Civil Code of 1870 with the amendments to those that had since been passed. The Revised Statutes from 1876 were really the Revised Statutes of 1870, modified by later laws (that didn't touch the divorce provisions). Likewise, the Civil Code from 1882 was really the Revised Civil Code of 1870, modified by later laws. The Civil Code of 1870 still took precedence over the Revised Statutes of 1870, so the divorce provisions of the Civil Code were authoritative.

This is unlawful sex discrimination In fact, its incredibly close to the example given on this website: A nightclub allows women in for free but you have to pay because you’re a man. This is unlawful discrimination because of your sex. How do they get away with it? Did you complain or report them? No? That’s how.

A Swiss watch company seized my watch, saying it was stolen. I bought it 10 years ago. Is that legal? I have a watch from Blancpain that I bought in 2014 from an individual in Poland (I have a written contract). I've sent the watch to Blancpain in Switzerland for periodic inspection and they seized it, explaining the watch was stolen 10 years ago in Germany. In Poland, there is a law that when you bought a thing in good faith, you become the owner after 3 years even if seller was unauthorized to sell, didn't have rights to sell the item, or the item was stolen, etc. Is there a similar law in Switzerland? Or, if the item was stolen, it doesn't matter when and you bought it in good faith (a written contract, no special price, so no suspicion of unlawful possession by seller), do I have to give it back? Or is Blancpain wrong and they can't seize it?

switzerland "Gutgläubiger Erwerb gestohlener Dinge" (buying of stolen goods in good faith) is a big topic in law. Different jurisdictions handle it differently, but most European (civil law) systems have some kind of rule that accept the ownership of a buyer in such a case. Here is a good article that compares different jurisdictions on exactly such an issue. Luxury watches are a kind of art. According to Swiss law (Art 934 ZGB), the item must be returned when discovered within 5 years of the theft. However, the rightful owner must pay for any expenses you had. Since the theft was more than 5 years ago, the watch is, in my opinion, rightfully yours. Since Blancpain is in Switzerland, they are obviously bound to Swiss law. Also, they are not the police, so they cannot seize an item. They can only safekeep it and report to the authorities. I would also contact a lawyer for help. It seems to me like a case you should win.

The court in France would not enforce a debt collection against you; but the person who owed you the money could - very easily. They would apply to the court in Scotland to enforce the judgement of the French court, the Scottish court would look at it, say "yup, the French court has made a decision", and then tell you to pay up. After that, the French company has the same range of options as a Scottish company would. I think (but I could be wrong), that the decision of the French court might well not go on your credit record - but the corresponding decision of the Scottish court would. Note that a CCJ doesn't go on your credit record if you pay within a short period (seven days?). In your case though, the right thing to do is Pay the amount you don't dispute you owe Wait for them to sue (they may well not). Defend the case (probably in writing, not in person). If you lose, pay up straight away (at this point the court has decided that you were wrong, and you do owe the money. As such you should pay.)

First off, I wouldn't assume that this is always a prank. This is a rather infamous tactic used by bike thieves. These thieves add a second lock to "discourage" the owner from taking their bicycle, wait a few days, and then remove both locks, thus stealing your bike. Don't wait, get your bike out right away. As long as this is your own bike, you don't have much to worry about. It would generally be helpful to call the police, so that they might make a note of it. They might not be able to help you cut the lock, but they will make a note of the incident. It might also be a good idea to register your bike. Getting into the law part... If you were to ever be charged with a property-related offence (which I doubt would happen), you probably wouldn't be able to be found guilty. In Canada, the relevant section would be §35 of the Criminal Code. To summarize that, it basically means that you can't be guilty of an offence if you believe that another person is about to render your bike inoperative (through addition of the second lock), and that your act that constituted the offence would be preventing or stopping that. Don't forget, the bike has to be yours as well.

This (as always) depends on jurisdiction, but usually - No, just taking the money is not legal.. In most jurisdictions, if you have a claim (the rent, in your case) against a debtor , and the debtor does not pay, you are not allowed to take any enforcement action (taking property, coercing the debtor) yourself. Instead, you must obtain a court or administrative judgement confirming your claim. Even then, often only a court officer or the police may actually enforce payment of the debt. This is mostly to protect the debtor from unwarranted enforcement action (such as taking more than you are owed, or collecting a disputed debt). For example, in Germany, to enforce a debt the creditor must first obtain what is called a Vollstreckungstitel or just Titel (title) - an official document confirming that there is an outstanding claim. This is on top of any contracts already existing. A Titel is obtained either through a regular court judgment, or through an abbreviated, administrative process called Mahnverfahren (essentially, you ask the court to send the debtor a letter about your claim, and if the debtor does not file an objection, you get the Titel). Once you have a Titel, the creditor can enforce it any time they choose (with a Titel, the statute of limiation is extended from the usual three years to 30 years). However, actual enforcement must be performed by an officer of the court (Gerichtsvollzieher). Only they may do things such as collecting the debtors property, force open doors and even imprison uncooperative debtors. I don't know the exact situation in the USA, but I believe it is roughly similar. For example, the equivalent of a Vollstreckungstitel is a Writ of execution.

Generally speaking, the police will not return property known to be stolen to someone other than the owner of the property, even if it is illegally seized in a search that violates the 4th Amendment. While stolen property is not strictly speaking, contraband, it also isn't something that the person who would seek its return would be entitled to reclaim. This is particularly true when, in a circumstance like this where the motorcycle's ownership can be confirmed with a VIN number on file with a government agency linking the VIN number to the true owner of the vehicle, so the fact that it is stolen can be confirmed with great certainty. If the police do not return the property voluntarily, which they would not do, the person in possession of it would have to bring a suit for possession against the police who are in possession of it. In the face of a civil lawsuit to regain custody of the property from the police after they failed to return it, the police could insist that the true owner be joined to the action and could also raise the issue of unclean hands or similar defenses. A court filing claiming property known to be stolen by someone who is not the true owner would also provide evidence of the stolen property charge that would probably not be tainted "fruit of the poisonous tree" and instead, would be treated as an independent confession to the crime that was dismissed for lack of evidence after the original seizure under the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule.

Following the guidance of the police In summary: If the item is hazardous or dangerous you should report it to the police using the emergency number. If the item is non-hazardous and found in a private place, hand it to the owner of the premises - it's their responsibility to attempt to find the owner and the property becomes theirs if they can't. If the item is non-hazardous and found on public transport, hand it to the operator - they have their own by-laws about lost property. If the item is non-hazardous and found in a public place, if it has a serial number, hand it to the police - they may be able to trace the owner if it is a government document, hand it to the issuer if it is of low value, make reasonable efforts to find the owner "these could include asking people nearby or in offices or shops. You could also consider leaving a note with your details. If you can't find the owner there's nothing more we can do and you should dispose of the item." if it is of high value, make reasonable efforts to find the owner and if you can't hand it to the police.

An incomplete list: Getting the money. How did you plan to get paid? Credit card? Paypal? Integrating those into a website in compliance with their terms of service is not easy. (I wouldn't touch credit card numbers, in particular, even with a ten-foot pole. Too much liability risk for weak implementations. Too many highly skilled attackers to pounce on any mistake.) Distributing the App. Places like the Apple App Store have their own terms of service, especially regarding payment and in-app purchases. At a guess, Apple would reject your app, but if they allowed it, how does your withdrawal policy fit with the 30% cut they want from the initial transaction? Holding the money. So there are user accounts with a credit balance that can be withdrawn again. Would you be able to repay them if all users withdraw at the same time? Where do you keep the money? Currency risks. Say international customers pay in currency A, which the payment provider transforms into currency B. Then they want their money back, but exchange rates have changed. What do they get? Knowing your customer. There would be money laundering concerns. Do you have the infrastructure to identify your customers? Can customers change the (re)payment method from one account to another? Can you handle withdrawals if a user no longer has the same credit card, for instance? Scammers leaving you to hold the bag. Say a scammer tricks a victim into making a deposit, and then finds a way to redirect the withdrawal (see above). Would you be able to deal with the legal and administrative fallout?

We have made a complaint about this decision to the local administrative and highest courts of Finland. Both of these courts rejected our complaint (the highest court rejected our right to even file a complaint!) without even looking into the details of the matter at hand. Did you hire a lawyer? If the court rejected your complaint without even considering it, it may have been procedurally improper. Generally speaking, once your complaint is rejected by a court with proper jurisdiction, the matter is resolved and you lost. End of story, too bad. You have no recourse but to accept the action of the local government as lawful even though you believe that your case was wrongfully decided. In any case, I doubt that the local government's action in your context is illegal. This is an issue of "condemnation" and not zoning. Generally speaking, the government has a power of eminent domain to seize property for a public use so long as a process is in place for the owner to obtain compensation for the seizure. A government owned recreation center would generally be considered a public use. Certainly, nothing you have described would violate the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010/C 83/02, Article 17. As you note: No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. This is a case where the deprivation is in the public interest, in which the Finnish courts have decided that the conditions provided by law for doing so have been met, and in which you acknowledge that you have a right to compensation. Since it appears that the compensation has not yet been determined, it is premature to say that the compensation you receive will not be fair or paid in good time, and you need to participate actively and vigorously in the compensation process to make sure that you do make the best case you can for fair compensation. Also, as you note, this has happened many times in Finland. This strongly support the conclusion that this action is legal under Finnish law, even if you would prefer to interpret its laws in another manner. Of course the compulsory purchase will not be paid with a fair market price but with a much lower price, which is technically a legalized robbery as it has many times occurred in similar cases in Finland. My next step is to file a complaint to the European Union Fundamental Rights commission in hopes that they can help me. An appeal to the European Union sounds futile to me, as everything you have said suggests that your rights under the E.U. Charter have not been violated. Call it robbery if you will from a moral perspective, but as you note, it is legalized robbery in much the same way that taxes are "legalized theft." Your efforts would be better sent hiring a lawyer to help you negotiate with the local government over the price. If you make a strong evidentiary case that the land is worth more than you have been offered, you have a decent chance of getting more than you have been offered, even if it is less than what you believe it is worth. You also have a better case of winning on appeal on the issue of an unfair price in a second instance court in Finland, than you would on the issue of whether the condemnation was legal, on which the settled law in Finland and under international law is that it generally is legal in your circumstances.

Can adult detransitioners who underwent treatment when they were minors, bring a class action lawsuit and against whom? I notice that, on social media, there are numbers of videos by detransitioners, or those unable to reverse their procedures, expressing their regret for a childhood decision that was facilitated by medical and other professionals but now regretted. They may now be adults or indeed still minors but what they have in common is that they transitioned as minors. If they wanted to band together and bring a class action, who might they sue and on what grounds? I am mainly interested in US and UK law but other countries are of interest. Doctors Have Failed Them, Say Those Who Regret Transitioning Written by Alicia Ault March 22, 2022 https://www.webmd.com/sex-relationships/news/20220322/doctors-have-failed-them-say-those-who-regret-transitioning 'I feel angry': Why some people regret and reverse their transgender decisions 'I’m angry that every single doctor and therapist we saw told us this was the one and only option' Author of the article:Tom Blackwell Published Dec 14, 2020 https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/i-feel-angry-why-some-people-regret-and-reverse-their-transgender-decisions Blockquote

Informed consent is required for a surgical procedure. "Informed" includes having knowledge of the risks. The relevant legal question would be whether the doctor in question did adequately apprise the patient of the risks. On an individual basis, patient A could sue doctor X for the resulting harm. It is possible that 5 patients might sue the same doctor on this basis, which gets expensive and inefficient. If there is a well-defined and large-enough class, it may be possible for the action to be certified as a class action. 20 people might be a large-enough class. The defendant would be "whoever is responsible for the wrong". That might be a single practitioner, or a hospital that the practitioner(s) work for. The hospital is an obvious plaintiff, if they failed in their duty to assure that their employees adequately informed patients of the risk.

This situation is unlikely to come about in practice. If you were born into such extreme poverty, your parents would considered guilty of child neglect, and CPS/social services would take you into foster services where you would be given clothes. If you previously had clothes, but recently became poor, it is very unlikely that any creditors would repossess your last shirt off your back. It would probably be illegal for them to leave you in that situation, and a used shirt wouldn't be worth much. For the same reason, it's unlikely you would sell your last shirt to, eg. pay for food: Who would buy it? For how much? In many countries, there are extensive welfare systems and private charities that private food, free clothing and other resources to the very poor. Even before you lost your last clothes, you could go to these for assistance. So again you are unlikely to involuntarily end up in this position. Also, technically the amount of clothes you are required to wear is usually very small. I believe you are usually only required to cover the groin and breasts if female. In theory you could easily collect a discarded plastic bag, piece of paper, scrap fabric, cardboard box or some other trash to fashion a crude loincloth. Lastly, when the police do show up and arrest you, you will likely have the opportunity to explain to them your situation. They would probably try to get you some basic clothing and other assistance. But if they do end up pressing charges, you would be able to either convince the judge to let you off or challenge the law itself for failing to consider poor people like you. Generally, laws are designed such that there is always an option to follow them and nobody would be "too poor" to comply, failing to do this could make a politician extremely unpopular. Many laws with significant cost burden offer alternatives to the poor. Courts will also tend to be sympathetic to cases such as this. But as I said, the situation is very unlikely to come about.

A problem with the question is that it uses the loaded term "victim". If you change the question to "Are there actions that you can perform involving another person, which are crimes even if the other person consents to participating in the action", then there are very many. Selling alcohol to a minor; selling heroin to anyone; selling sex in most US jurisdictions; selling firearms to a convicted felon. Also, for a physician to assist a person in suicide, in most states. Formerly in the US, various forms of sexual intercourse were acts that consent did not make legal. Whether or not the person is a "victim" in these cases is open to debate. In the case of physician-assisted suicide in Washington, the doctor is allowed to prescribe (oral) drugs that the person ingests: only a doctor is permitted to do this, both under the DWD Act and as a consequence that only a doctor can prescribe the drugs. There seems to be a belief that it is a crime to assist a person in committing suicide, which is probably correct if the assistance is shooting the person in the head, or in general directly causing the death (thus, "I give you permission to shoot me in the head" doesn't cut it). But from what I can tell, it is not generally against the law in Washington to help a person who commits suicide (e.g. supplying the means of self-dispatching). In some countries, suicide and helping with suicide is illegal, e.g. in Kenya Penal Code 225 says Any person who (a) procures another to kill himself; or (b) counsels another to kill himself and thereby induces him to do so; or (c) aids another in killing himself, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for life. No exception is created if the person consents to being aided to kill himself.

In April 2017, a US District court on Colorado ruled that a law prohibiting women from exposing their breasts in public was an unconstitutional discrimination against women. The law was ordinance 134 passed by Fort Collins, Colorado in May 2016. The group opposing it was led by the activist organization "Free the Nipple." This ruling is not binding in other states, however. See this Snopes report for more details. The case is being appealed to the Tenth Circuit. A similar ordinance has been taken to state court in New Hampshire on similar grounds as described in this AP story and this US News story A similar claim in Illinois in 2017 resulted in a law against 'public indecency" being upheld (in Tagami v. City of Chicago) at the Federal Appeals Court level, according to this Reason story A similar law in Ocean City, Maryland, was challenged in federal court in the summer oif 2018 according to this news story. in 1991 in United States v. Biocic the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a similar law against a similar challenge. This Munknee article lists states where a woman going topless is legal and illegal. According to a Time Article (which gives a similar list): The vast majority of states actually have laws on the books making clear that women can’t be arrested under state law solely for being topless in settings where it’s OK for men. But many local ordinances ban the practice anyway. In short, it is not yet fully settled if there is a US constitutional right for a woman to go topless, and state and local laws vary widely. Local laws do not always conform to the laws of the state, but would probably require a court challenge to enforce the state law. Laws in other countries will vary, but many places ban such exposure.

The COVID restrictions are new enough that there are few court decisions on how to interpret them. There are frequent requests for court injunctions seeking temporary relief. Some pass, some are denied. The website might accuse locations listed there of breaking the restrictions. Making such an accusation in public sounds like a very bad idea, especially if there is no solid documentation. But the aggrieved party would be any location falsely listed. The site may or may not be hosted in Germany. If it is not, it becomes a really interesting question which law applies. You might inform the authorities, but beyond that, forget it.

A witness who disobeys a court order has automatically broken the law. Indeed, this is the most fundamental of laws; you can't decide "If I turn up to the hearing I may be punished for my crime; but not attending isn't against the law, so goodbye." A witness who goes out of the jurisdiction cannot, of course, be punished while there (though when he returns he may have to explain why he chose to leave having been warned that he must attend or face penalties- that is the meaning of sub poena). But your assumption that anybody who fails to attend probably had a good reason betrays a fundamental, though common, misunderstanding. A court has determined that your evidence is necessary for justice to be done. There is therefore no good reason not to attend. It may well be that a doctor would prefer that you did not go to court that day, and if you apply to the court it may be possible to find some arrangement. But you are not allowed to decide 'my convenience is more important than discovering whether the defendant should go to jail or not". Civilised countries have people who are empowered to make that decision; they are called judges, and the decision has been made.

"Medical lawyer" is really the wrong focus, this is an issue of civil rights. The question would be, is it a violation of your civil rights to prevent you from taking your baby home; is it legal for the federal government to investigate people who refuse to take a covid test? You can take the question along with pertinent evidence to a civil rights attorney. To pick a non-random hospital's web page, they note that "Any person having surgery or a procedure, including birth, at a Texas Health hospital will be tested for COVID-19 to provide appropriate care for the patient, and for the protection of visitors and the care team", and "you will need to be tested at admission to help safeguard you and the care team". In answer to the question whether you can decline testing, they say "Testing is recommended to promote the health of you and your baby. Patients who have COVID-19 can have a weakened immune system and may have inflammatory symptoms that can compromise healing. We encourage you to speak with your provider about the best decision for you", which doesn't explicitly say "No you may not", nor "Yes, you may". However, they cannot literally force you to take the test: at most, they can refuse to treat you. In answer to the question "Will I be separated from my baby if I test positive for COVID-19?", they say "Texas Health will follow guidelines from the American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of OB/GYN and the Centers for Disease Control for how to keep you and your baby safe during your hospital stay. Ultimately, any decisions about care for you and your baby will be between you and your provider, based on what is best for you both". This is also not crystal clear. There are three primary legal issues, putting a worst spin on their policy. They say up front that you will be tested prior to admission: the question is whether you can decline to take the test but force them to admit you. Now we are closer to the realm of a medical negligence attorney – they can refuse to treat you, but that might leave them liable. The second question is whether they can temporarily take the infant away, against the mother's wishes (for example, hold the infant in a separate facility while the mother is in the hospital). The third question is whether they have direct authority to take the infant away when you leave the hospital. The third question gets a plain and simple no. The Texas Dept. of Family and Protective Services has some authority in such a matter, but taking a child requires an investigation and a court order.

First, it is quite unlikely that a US court would take on the case. Someone will have more details, but for example in EU law if you move away from the place you last lived together, you can only file for divorce in the country where your partner is living (in this case, India). Annullment is a much more serious matter than divorce, so I doubt any American court would take this case: Annulment would mean that a US court would have to decide that an Indian registry office didn't do its job right. Second, A needs convincing evidence. Frankly, "masculine appearance" and "typical masculine voice" are just opinions and therefore not evidence. Even if the court were convinced that B has a "masculine appearance" that's not evidence for being a male. A has to show the evidence, and as half of us know and the other half learned in their biology lessons, there is some pretty convincing evidence that someone is a man which A didnt' mention. And I'd ask anyone not to edit this out, because it is quite essential to the case. B doesn't have to visit a doctor and get a statement that she is a woman (which would destroy any case immediately), because based on the available evidence, A will lose the case anyway. On the other hand, after that court case has finished, B can at any time (after appropriate waiting times according to US law) come to the USA and file for divorce.

Is it legal for a company to require you to delete your account to unsubscribe from marketing emails? I'm subscribed to "Visual Studio Dev Essentials" (so that I can download older versions of Visual Studio from the Microsoft website), but they are sending me unwanted marketing emails regarding both Visual Studio Dev Essentials, and other products. In the footer of the email, it says that to unsubscribe from the emails, I must unsubscribe from the service, which I don't want to do. Is this legal? Note that I'm based in the UK, but Microsoft (the parent company at least) is based in the US.

No, it's not legal. The General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) apply given that you are in the UK (regardless of where the Data Processor is based). The UK GDPR is slightly modified due to Brexit, but the same principles apply. The only plausible legal basis for this actions would be that you consent to it, and you're entitled to withdraw that consent at any time. Some may claim that Article 6.1(b) applies, i.e. that it's necessary to send marketing email in order to fulfil the contract, but GDPR is clear that bundling such consent into a contract for service simply to permit the data processor additional actions isn't allowed, as I'll demonstrate. UK GDPR requires that consent to use your personal information (in this case, your email address) for the stated purpose be freely given. Consent to use your information for direct marketing is not freely given if it's inseparable from the consent to use it for some other service, as per para 43: Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. And Article 7.4 backs this up with When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. The intent of Article 6.1(b) is that only the processing required for the service you have bought is allowed (e.g. if you supply your address for delivery of stuff you've bought, the data processor can use that address to send you the stuff, but is not allowed to add a contract term that allows them to send you unwanted stuff). Examples of emails that Article 6.1(b) would allow (in my assessment) include things such as notification of upcoming downtime, or a reminder that subscriptions are due, but not unsolicited advertisements for other products. There's a grey area that's open to interpretation, where adverts are piggybacked onto actual service messages.

Making the game free makes very little if any difference to the position here. There are two kinds of IP issues that could possibly be involved: copyright and trademark. Note: both copyright and trademark are civil, not criminal issues (except in very limited circumstances which do not apply to the situation described in the question). You will not "face charges" but might possibly be sued. If you are asked to take down such a game and comply, this might end the matter, but if an IP holder claimed that damages had occurred before the game was taken down a suite might possibly still be brought against the developer. Copyright Names, like titles and other short phrases, cannot be protected by copyright. As long as no other text from anyone else, and no images are copied or imitated, copyright is not infringed. This means that there are no copyright issues. Game mechanics and rules cannot be copyrighted, although the words of game rules can be. Therefore, fair use which is a strictly US copyright legal concept, is not involved here. Neither is fair dealing, a somewhat similar legal concept from the UK and some commonwealth and European countries. Trademark Here is the main issue for this situation. The names of individual Pokémon characters are probably (almost surely) protected as trademarks. That means you cannot use them to identify your game, or any other product or service, and you cannot use them to advertise or market your game. This is true even if the "selling price" is $0. The use here does not seem to be nominative use, as you are not intending to refer to Pokémon or any of its variants. You are just reusing the names. As long as you make it very clear that your game is not made by, nor in any way authorized or endorsed by the makers of Pokémon, this is probably not trademark infringement. But if the makers of Pokémon become aware of your game, they might well send you a cease and desist letter, and they might file a trademark infringement suit. Even if you were to win such a suit, as I think you might well do, it might be costly to defend. Could you alter the names to ones you invent form yourself? That might save a lot of trouble and hassle. What is the value to you in reusing the well-known Pokémon names?

What legal options do I have here? I don't think I can sue for defamation of character since the email was sent to me only. Your rationale about defamation is accurate with respect to the establishment (henceforth "company"). But you may sue the person(s) who approached the company to falsely accuse you of that crime. Being banned certainly qualifies as special damage (that is, concrete damage), whence you have a viable claim of defamation per quod. If the crime that was falsely imputed to you is a felony or serious crime, then you additionally have a viable claim of defamation per se. I was thinking that I may have some legal recourse since the email clearly threatens to defame my character if I re-enter the establishment You have legal remedies, although not necessarily from this angle. The company can credibly argue that it sought to discourage you from contravening the "safety measure" it adopted in response to the accusations made about you. If it turns out that the company fabricated any false accusations it divulges, though, then you could sue the company for torts related to --and in addition to-- its defamatory falsehoods. So far the information you share here shows no signs of company's involvement in inventing the false accusations. What legal options do I have here? You need to ask the company for source and details of the information. In line with this comment, you should also ensure the company is aware of the mistaken identity. If the company declines to listen to you --and ideally see any proofs you have--, that could evidence some sort of tortious conduct on the company's part. Beware that in Florida a defamed person is required to demand a retraction of the false accusations prior to filing a defamation suit. Absent that request for retraction, it will be very easy for the sued defamer(s) to have your complaint dismissed. If the company refuses to disclose the source of the false information, then you need to seek injunctive relief in court. That means suing the company so as to (1) compel the company to identify the person(s) who accused you, and perhaps (2) strike the ban that the company put in place as a result of the false accusations. Even if you don't prevail in striking the ban, the court proceedings would give you the occasion to set the record straight and prevent the company from defaming you if you legitimately expose (to the public) the arbitrariness of its ban. To be clear, the company can always indulge in defaming you for the sake of justifying its ban, although that would be dumb in light of what you will have proved in court by then. In jurisdictions where a request for retraction is not mandatory, a plaintiff who does not know the identity of his defamer(s) may (1) file suit against "Doe defendants", (2) subpoena the non-party company so as to obtain records related to the false accusations (obviously ensuring that these reveal the authorship thereof), and (3) upon production of subpoena records and requesting the identified defamer for a retraction, amend the complaint to properly identify the defendant. This would be more efficient than filing two suits (one for injunctive relief against the company, and another against the defamers). However, I am uncertain of whether this would work in Florida, given its pre-suit requirement of request for retraction.

There are no laws requiring that any company must publish all opinions from its customers. I'll admit it's fundamentally dishonest to only publish the positives, but there's no prohibition against it either. Look at movie advertisements, for example. They'll paraphrase or selectively quote a review, citing only what seems to be positive, yet if you read the review and quote in context, you'll understand the review quite differently. How exactly would you police it if you were to require companies to publish all reviews? Would you have some kind of litmus test to determine whether the critique is justified and fair? How often do people post false reviews (good or bad), and how would you account for them? Company web sites offering reviews form their own customers are doing nothing more than using the web as an extension of their marketing, so one has to expect some manipulation of the information in order to present products and services in their best possible lights. Why, for example, would I tell you how much someone hates my product when my goal is to sell it to you? This is why it would be better to use independent third-party review sites that have no dog in the hunt when it comes to honest feedback about the companies they cover.

While not categorically illegal, there is a risk that using a trademark in an email name is something that is being done with a purpose to defraud people into thinking that you are affiliated with that company (and indeed, such emails are frequently used for that purpose as are misleading domain names). So, while it isn't outright forbidden, it is generally unwise.

If a data controller fails to fulfil your data subject rights, lodge a complaint with your data protection authority. In Hamburg, the appropriate form is here. However, they are not required to investigate your complaint. Independently from a complaint, you could consider suing Wordpress for compliance – Automattic has a subsidiary in Ireland so this might actually be feasible. I'm not quite sure though that Automattic is indeed the data controller for wordpress.org, as opposed to the .com domain – the privacy policy isn't quite GDPR compliant. While your GDPR Art 17 Right to Erasure might not apply in this case, there's a definite GDPR violation because the data controller failed to respond to your request within a month as per Art 12(4). That your posts on the bugtracker were deleted doesn't look like an issue in this context, what does matter is that they didn't respond to emails to the addresses mentioned in their privacy policy. Whether you have a right to erasure depends on the legal basis for storing your data. In general, you have a right to erasure if: the data is no longer necessary; processing is based on consent (because you can always withdraw consent); or processing is based on a legitimate interest and they have no overriding legitimate grounds to continue processing despite your objection (Art 21). The data is still necessary to identify you for your actions on the bugtracker, but depending on your particular situation you may be able to object successfully and force them to anonymize your posts.

When someone registers at your website, they enter a contract with you. You need an email address, because you need to be able to contact them (at least for the password recovery). You probably want to verify the email address, otherwise you might not be able to contact them in the future. So the email verification is required as part of the performance of the contract. But also anti-spam laws might require you to use confirmed opt-in before you are allowed to send automatic emails. So at least Article 6(1)(b) (performance of a contract) would apply, but for the confirmed opt-in also Art. 6(1)(c) (compliance with a legal obligation) might apply. That means sending the verification mail is lawful. However you probably want to write this down in the privacy policy as Greendrake commented. Note that there must not be an option for users to agree with the privacy policy, it is just a statement which you make.

No AFAIK there is no such legal requirement. Why this company told you there was I can’t speculate. But I will. There may be under contract with MicroSoft to put their OS on every box they sell - that would be a legal requirement. Or the just don’t sell boxes without this and they employee told you it was a legal obligation to get out of the conversation.

Can someone be prosecuted for something that was legal when they did it? This sounds similar to this question, which keeps being used in AI and web search queries: What if I did something that was a crime, but has now become legal? Can someone be prosecuted for something that was legal when they did it?

In the US usa, at least, the concept of ex post facto laws, which is what you have described, are specifically prohibited: Article I, Section 9, Clause 3: No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

Generally speaking, all these examples would be perfectly legal. American speech law starts from the presumption that speech is protected from government punishment, and then asks if it fits into one of several categories of unprotected speech, which are laid out in other answers. Name-calling generally doesn't fit into any of those categories, so none of your examples would be illegal. The answer might change if the name-calling went far enough to suggest some false assertion of fact about your subject. Calling someone "murderer" or "pedophile" might cross the line into libel, which is unprotected, or it might be punished as "fighting words" if it could be expected to provoke the subject to violence. Another qualification is that the government has a bit more leeway to regulate speech when it is acting as an employer rather than as the government. So if you were a clerk at the license bureau, the government might be able to require you to use people's preferred names or pronouns; if you refused to do so, you might be subject to employment-related discipline, but not to criminal or civil sanctions.

When you are in another country, you are subject to their laws - you may be arrested and go through the due process as defined by that countries laws. This potentially means anything from a fine, to incarceration or deportation or even execution, depending on the local countries laws. A good example is the caning of American citizen Michael Fay in 1994 by the Singapore authorities, as a judicial punishment for vandalism, or the case of Swiss citizen Oliver Fricker, who was also caned in 2010 for vandalism.

No. Causing someone "pain and suffering" is not against the law; it is merely one kind of damages that can be awarded when someone has done something that is against the law. You may, for instance, endure pain and suffering from a car accident or shooting, in which case you could collect damages for your pain and suffering after proving that the other party committed the torts of negligence or battery, which are illegal. But if you were enduring pain and suffering from the last episode of Lost, you could not collect damages for your pain and suffering because it is not against the law to write a crappy finale. So in your case, cannot sue for pain and suffering based simply on the existence of a secret audio recording. North Carolina allows secret audio recordings, and it does not make exceptions for audio recordings that hurt someone's feelings. But to go beyond your explicit question, there still remains the possibility that you could pursue a legal action. If the other party used that recording in a way that violated the law, that might give rise to a tort that would support an award of damages for pain and suffering. If they publicly distributed a recording of themselves having sex with someone, that might constitute the tort of public disclosure of private facts. If they edited the recording to make it sound like someone had said something that they had not and then gave it to someone else, that might be grounds for a libel action.

Given that a murder and an involuntary manslaughter are two different offenses, could a jury be asked to adjudicate on both counts? This happens routinely. Could it find the defendant guilty of both? Only for certain offenses. See lesser included offense. Could the DA even accuse the defendant of both during the same trial? Yes, which is how juries are asked to adjudicate multiple offenses as noted above. What about in different trials? All the crimes associated with a given act have to be tried at once. If you've been acquitted of murder in connection with one act, you can't subsequently be tried for involuntary manslaughter for the same act, nor vice versa. And what about murder and attempted murder? I don't think it's possible to be tried for an attempt when the crime has been successful; certainly, the opposite is true. But again, if the charges are based on the same act (i.e., we know you tried to kill the victim, and we know someone succeeded, but we don't know whether it was you) then the charges would have to be tried at the same time.

You don't specify a jurisdiction but taking the US as an example, yes you could be charged with 2nd Degree Murder - you intended to harm them but not specifically to kill them: A second situation that constitutes second-degree murder is where the perpetrator intends only to cause serious bodily harm but knows that death could result from the act. For example, in the situation above, instead of shooting Bill, Adam grabs a shovel and whacks Bill in the head with all his strength. While Adam didn't specifically intend to kill Bill when he hit him, he did intend to strike him with the shovel knowing that such a blow to the head carried with it a distinct possibility of death. Adam killing Bill in this way would be classified as murder in the second degree. In English law you'd be facing charges for Voluntary Manslaughter

Crimes are prosecuted either where they were committed, or where the harm was intentionally caused, or both.[1] The statute of limitations that applies is the statute of limitations in the country where the crime is prosecuted. Other statutes of limitations for crimes are irrelevant. Generally speaking, if a crime is still prosecutable in the place where it is committed and is a serious felony, an extradition treaty will require the country where the suspect is located to be extradited to the country where the crime was committed and the country where the crime was committed (in this case Norway), goes through the proper channels under the extradition treaty. (There are exceptions in death penalty cases, but neither of these countries have the death penalty.) The statute of limitations for murder in Portugal would not protect someone who committed a murder in Norway. Also, even if there was a statute of limitations in Norway (say it was an armed robbery not resulting in serious bodily injury instead), most countries don't count time that a suspect spends outside the country fleeing law enforcement against the statute of limitations. [1] There is an obscure exception to this for what amount to crimes against humanity that is not applicable in the case presented by the question.

Police continue to investigate Following an acquittal, there are two possible positions for the police: they are certain the acquitted person performed the act but they were not guilty (for all sorts of reasons). The investigation is closed because although the police know who did it, there was no criminality due to the not guilty verdict. The evidence in the court shows that the accused did not commit the act. Ergo, someone else did. The police will keep looking for that someone else. Note that the proposed scenario is highly dangerous for you. First, the exculpatory evidence may be inadmissible, particularly if it is an alibi (see Can I surprise the prosecution with an alibi defense at trial?). To rely on an an alibi defence, it must be raised with the prosecution before the trial. You would have to have said that you were where the phone footage was shot before the trial starts and the police may have therefore discounted you as a suspect from the get go. Second, you are now committing a crime, usually called an attempt to pervert the course of justice and this action may also make you an accomplice to the murder after the fact. You beat the rap on the murder and then spend a lot of time in prison for those two.

What is plagiarism legally? We all learn from books and our environment. I was trying to teach my kids what is money so I told and wrote: "Money is the third good that everyone wants." The above is an idea that I read in some book long time ago (I cannot recollect the name of the book) or some teacher/friend told me in class/conversation (I could not even remember). If I was writing that statement in the school or some other public settings, who should I give the credit to? On a more simple level, if I write following two statements. Earth is larger than moon. Sun is larger than earth. Then who should I give credit for so I am not blamed for plagiarism?

Plagiarism is an academic category about the thoughts from another scholar/author. Copyright is a legal category about the words of another writer. When a student or a degree candidate present a paper or a thesis, they implicitly or explicitly claim that it is their original work, except for sections which are marked as the work of others. With a thesis for a degree, there may be a form where the candidate confirms this in writing, which brings the law back into the academic sphere. There are many situations in a school or even university context where there is no such claim of originality. Imagine the exam question "what is the third law of thermodynamics?" There would be no need for the student to give a source, because nobody asked for it and nobody could possibly believe that the student just invented that law. If the question was about who discovered the third law, they should say so. Schools which prepare their students for academic work should introduce both concepts and train their students in proper citation at some point. But not too early.

There is no legal difference, really. There may well be a practical difference. It is much easier to steal a wheelbarrow than it is a 20-foot section of 2-foot wide iron conduit. But doing either is theft, and the legalities are pretty much the same. It is indeed easier to copy a song lyric, or a poem, then the text of a novel, say. But if done without permission, either would be copyright infringement, unless of course an exception to copyright, such as fair use (in the US) or fair dealing (in the UK and some other countries) applies. (Or unless the text is out of copyright. One may lawfully copy Shakespeare, for example. Or Mark Twain.)

Various elements could be legal, or not. For example, it is legal to require students to do things in order to pass a class. It is legal to require a student to write a program for a course (entirely, or in part). It is legal for a teacher to give a "group grade". It is not clear whether it is legal to require the student to assign copyright or license to the teacher / school – it may be legal to require a student to pay for their class, and copyright transfer might be valuable consideration for such a contract (assuming that there is a contractual relation at all as opposed to a statutory mandate – e.g. "high school"). If this is a public school, you can't make students pay for a mandatory class, therefore you cannot require assignment of copyright. It is very probably illegal for the student to access the educational records of other students, but the app could be developed with dummy data.

You are confusing two separate concepts: trademark and copyright. I'll give you a broad overview of both of these, although the details will differ depending on what country's law we're talking about. A copyright is held by the creator of a work of artistic expression. It gives the creator certain exclusive rights, including the right to create copies of the work and to prepare derivative works. For example: The movie "Star Wars" is a work of artistic expression. You cannot copy "Star Wars," or any significant part of it--including the script, the music, etc.--without the permission of the copyright owner, unless your use fits into one of the exceptions to copyright in your jurisdiction. Likewise, you cannot write your own book featuring the Star Wars characters: that would be a derivative work, a work based on the original work, and would violate the rights of the copyright holder. Without having read the book in question, I'm not going to comment on whether it does or doesn't infringe the film's copyright. But ideas can't be copyrighted. A film review, for instance, isn't a copyright violation--and a longer work discussing the ideas involved in a film isn't necessarily a copyright violation, either. Copyright only protects the expression itself--the language, the images. You are very limited in how much of that you can copy, but as long as you're using your own words, copyright protection is less of a concern. Trademarks, on the other hand, are intended to protect a business from customer confusion. Trademarks are not protected in the same way as copyrights; the key analysis of a trademark infringement lawsuit is: does it create confusion about the origin of the goods? For example: if you slap a swoosh on a shoe, Nike will sue you. If you use a swoosh in a political cartoon criticizing Nike, they won't, because nobody is going to think Nike wrote the political cartoon. So: If you write a book and call it: "Ewoks Gone Wild: A Star Wars Story," Disney will sue you, because it would be reasonable for someone who saw that book in a store to think that Disney authorized that book. If you wrote a book called "Forcing the Issue: The Hermeneutics of Science Fiction Movies from Star Wars to Inception", the case would be less clear-cut. But the important thing to understand is that these issues are complicated. There are exceptions to these rules; there are applications that may not be obvious to the non-lawyer ("initial interest confusion" is one minefield in U.S. trademark law), there are national and EU-specific considerations, there are safe harbors, and there are practical considerations, like whether you can afford to fight a lawsuit even if you're in the right. Therefore, I'm not going to tell you whether your hypothetical work would infringe anyone's copyright or trademark, and I'm not going to give you a set of rules on how to avoid it. The only person you should be listening to that sort of advice from is a real, non-anonymous-internet lawyer, licensed to practice in your jurisdiction, who is familiar with the specific details of your specific situation.

They have copyright in their additional text, and possibly in things like their visual design choices (fonts, layout etc). They may also have introduced a few deliberate typos to detect any literal copies from their version (rather as mapmakers add a few imaginary features to their maps). None of this creates any rights to the original text. You are still free to produce your own copies of the original text. Just get it from some other source so you can be sure not to include anything of theirs.

It depends on where you are For example, in USA copyright exists in a literary or artistic work stored in permanent form like a book, a movie, an audio recording, a building etc. In contrast, in Australia there is no requirement for the work to be stored - that means copyright can exist in a spoken lecture. The owner of the copyright (usually, but not necessarily the creator) has the right to choose if and how their work is copied and if and how any derivative works may be made from it. For your example, the book is an original work in which copyright vests with the author(s), your notes are a derivative work in which copyright vests in you. However, you presumably did not have permission to make your derivative work so that makes it prima facie a copyright infringement. Fortunately, in the USA there exists a Fair Use defence and in Commonwealth countries the slightly less permissive Fair Dealing defence (if you are somewhere else you will need to do your own research). Search this site or read the copyright article on Wikipedia to learn about these defences. Long answer short (too late!), taking notes to aid your own study is almost certainly Fair Use/Dealing. So is sharing it with your friends. Publishing it may or may not be depending on all sorts of factors; for example, if you were to write a study guide for say a Harry Potter book for use by English literature students this is probably OK even if it is a for profit activity, because criticism is Fair Use/Dealing. Citing work is not necessary to comply with copyright law. Failing to cite may be academic misconduct but that is not a legal matter; its a matter for your academic institution.

Unfortunately, the "but everyone does that" (BEDT) argument doesn't hold water as evidenced by prosecutions of looters. Would uploading this video be a copyright infringement? It would be hard to answer this part of the question without knowing where and from whom the clips had come from. If the clips came from a company like ESPN or a YouTuber that doesn't give you permission to be able to use their clips then yes this might be a copyright infringement. If you use video/clips that are labeled as creative commons then nt it wouldn't be an infringement. YouTube has a feature for this. Would my actions be fair use? First, we'll need to understand what fair-use is. Fair use is the ability to use copyright material under certain circumstances without permission. To best determine if using copyright-protected material in your work you should weigh it against the four factors of fair use. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; The nature of the copyrighted work; The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. More information about fair-use here Youtube outlines their fair use guidelines here

Facts are not subject to copyright. Only a specific expression of a fact. When you describe a fact in your own words, then you are the sole copyright owner of that description, no matter who taught you that fact. But keep in mind that in the world of academia it is customary to always state your sources. But that's not a legal requirement. That's a topic for Academia Stack Exchange.

What is the “prayer” in a claim? A blog refers to certain things not having been pleaded/specified in the “prayer”. What does this refer to?

the Legal Dictionary includes this definition: the specific request for judgment, relief and/or damages at the conclusion of a complaint or petition.

Freedom of Religion Concerns I doubt that this policy would be held to be unlawful on First Amendment freedom of religion grounds. Indeed, such requirements usually exclude church-related service. Also, I don't see how this policy discriminates against your religion specifically. It seems on its face to apply to all religions equally. Even if "Church-related" is read broadly to include both service that benefits a church, and also service that is organized by a church, that doesn't preclude you from coming up with some other kind of service that is neither of these things. Why would you be prevented from coming up with service that is neither of these things when other students do not? Unless you have also undertaken Holy Orders or something, in which case 100% of your time away from school would be devoted to your church, it is hard to see what the problem would be with this requirement for you as opposed to someone else. And, it would probably be improper for a public school to allow you to use religious activities to satisfy a graduation requirement - that would sound like an establishment clause violation. Some of the relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases are: Engel v. Vitale (1962) and Abington School District v. Schempp (1963) This pair of cases shaped the modern understanding of how the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment constrains prayer in public schools. In Engel, the Court struck down a New York State rule that allowed public schools to hold a short, nondenominational prayer at the beginning of the school day. The Court decided that these prayers amounted to an “official stamp of approval” upon one particular kind of prayer and religious service, and said that, since teachers are agents of the federal government, the scheme violated the Establishment Clause. The reasoning in Engel was also applied in Schempp, in which the Court struck down a Pennsylvania policy that required all students to read 10 Bible verses and say the Lord’s Prayer at the beginning of each day. While a student could get an exemption with a parent’s note, the Warren Court decided that this still amounted to an unconstitutional government endorsement of a particular religious tradition. Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) This case adjudicated a different sort of Establishment Clause challenge, where the controversy dealt with a statute providing financial support for teacher salaries and textbooks in parochial schools. The Burger Court unanimously decided that this financial aid scheme violated the Establishment Clause and delineated the governing precedent for Establishment Clause cases known as the Lemon test. Under Lemon, statutes (1) must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) must have primary effects that neither inhibit nor advance religion; and (3) cannot foster an “excessive government entanglement with religion.” The Court held that this scheme violated the third prong of the Lemon test. Allowing Church-related community service projects could implicate both the second and third prongs of the Lemon test. In a pertinent ruling, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a state constitutional requirement that no public funds be used to assist religious organizations, even if this prevented a facially neutral voucher program from treating religious and non-religious schools equally. The opinion in this 2015 case reviews some of the relevant law. A critical portion of the analysis is that aid to religious institutions must be limited to institutions that do not discriminate on the basis of religion and that supporting religious institutions at the K-12 level is more of a concern than doing so at the higher educational level. A Church, however, would (and should) discriminate on the basis of religion. In General There has been consideration of whether community service requirements, in general, are constitutional. Generally, courts have upheld the programs. See also here. In particular, Rhode Island is in the 1st Circuit of the federal courts, which has expressly ruled that community service requirements are constitutional. A 1999 law review article in the Duke Law Journal considers the issue from several perspectives. So does a 1997 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review article. A 1916 case called Butler v. Perry is a particularly strong precedent in favor of the proposition that mandatory service is constitutional, despite arguments to the contrary under the 13th Amendment. The issue was discussed in the New York Times in a 2003 article. Both are concerned about the involuntary servitude aspect of the requirement, but given that school attendance may be mandatory, and a community service requirement is one, relatively unconstrained aspect of mandatory educational activity, this isn't a very easy case to make.

An affirmative defense is a way of avoiding conviction by acknowledging you did the act claimed, but that such act was among the exceptions provided by the law which makes such acts otherwise an offence. That is, you affirm (acknowledge, admit) your action of using the device, but you are claiming that your use of the device (handsfree as a GPS guide) is okay, and therefore you should not be convicted. For all intents and purposes in this situation, your "2" and "3" are the same thing. The device is supported by something other than you holding it, and you are able to keep both hands on the wheel while using it in this way. Finally, a plain language reading of the definition for "hands-free accessory" suggests that using an object in the car to support the device where it can be seen, or using a feature of the device that speaks directions which you can hear, neither of which requires moving your hands off the wheel, will be considered such an accessory. It is also worth pointing out that such usage of a device (placed in a cradle or on the dashboard or turned up so it is heard) will be well-known to the legislators, and there is a reasonable interpretation of the law that would allow such usage. If this ever went to court, and somebody used this defence for this situation, they would probably be okay.

I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire!

Bad people are quite uncommon Most people behave in good faith most of the time - don't tie yourself in knots over the very few people who would be unscrupulous enough to try to do this. Burden of proof The person who makes the allegation has the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities. So the person who claims they didn't receive it has to prove that. If there are two equally credible witnesses, one saying they packed and posted the thing and one saying the thing was not packed then the burden has not been met. If the person who packed it has a photo of it packed and addressed then the other person has definitely not met their burden of proof. Insurance Insure it against loss or damage in transit. Then you can just replace it and claim on your insurance.

Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later.

No. I can't give a more detailed answer without reference to a specific statute. But just about every state anti-bullying statute in the U.S. restricts the definition to...well, bullying. There is a good summary of state bullying and cyberbullying statutes here. The laws are varied, but they invariable contain words like "harassment", "abuse", "threatening," "fear," and "hostile environment." Would it be possible to "cyberbully" someone on Stack Exchange under some of these statutes? Sure. You could do it in comments; in answers; even in questions. "Question: Is Bill in my algebra class a dork, or a tool?" Comment: "This is a terrible question, and I'm going to burn your house down. Downvoting." You could probably fit something like that under some of the broader statutes--although they still for the most part haven't been tested for First Amendment issues. But I don't know of any statute broad enough to include downvoting a question or answer, on a site people post on knowing that the whole purpose of posting is to allow their posts to be upvoted and downvoted. If there was such a statute--and again, I don't know of any--it would almost certainly be unconstitutional. There is no law against hurting people's feelings, at least in the United States, and a law that allows people to seek legal redress for someone saying "I disagree with you" is pretty much the poster child for a First Amendment violation.

No-ish, it is not. The relevant sticking point would be in their DMCA takedown notice, where they have to follow 17 USC 512(c)(3)(A) and include in their notice (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. The key here is having a "good faith belief". There is a credible scenario where a company A could file multiple notices for the actually same material B posted by the exact same person C, where the person has the right to post that material, and do so in good faith. If A was not able to locate evidence of the permission to C, then they would shift the burden of proof to C – "good faith belief" doesn't mean that they have to be right, just that they have to actually think they are. If C also uses the name D, A would not be able to determine that the work was licensed to D based on the fact (once they know that) that it is licensed to C. DMCA abuse is not an permanently open escape hatch. 17 USC 512(4) states Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section— (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it. See Automattic Inc. v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011. The ruling judge found that "Defendant could not have reasonably believed that the Press Release he sent to Hotham was protected under copyright". The appeal court drew on precedent and dictionary to fill in gaps w.r.t. "good faith belief", that the person should have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that it was making misrepresentations In this case, the abuser was flagrantly abusing the takedown system, and there is some reason to believe that in the instant case, the abuser had actual knowledge of non-infringement. Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America provides an alternative outcome. In this case, Rossi operated a website that appeared (note the word appear) to offer free downloads of movies, and the rights-holder MCAA filed a takedown notice. In fact, it did not offer any such downloads, but MCAA's investigation stopped prematurely. This court held that "good faith belief" is subjective, so Rossi did not prevail. It is no doubt crucial that Rossi actually counted on his customers thinking that you could get actual downloads of protected material. Whether or not a DMCA abuse suit would succeed would depend very much on the factual details of why the material is not infringing, and how easily the rights-holder could know that there was no infringement.

Amazon 3rd party seller shipped me a book in US which clearly say "For sale in Indian subcontinent only" What legal options do I have if an Amazon 3rd party seller shipped me a book in US which clearly says "For sale in Indian subcontinent only" ? I'd like to get a US edition book and get some penalties enforced on the seller who is selling illegal items in US. I ordered a new book in US from a 3rd party seller on Amazon.com, to be shipped to a US address.

First, the seller has not violated copyright law by selling you this book. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. provides the precedent. The Supreme Court ruled that the First Sale doctrine applies to "grey market" imports of books, so buying a book cheaply in another country and then shipping it to the USA is entirely legal, regardless of what the publisher would like. The court wrote: Putting section numbers to the side, we ask whether the “first sale” doctrine applies to protect a buyer or other lawful owner of a copy (of a copyrighted work) lawfully manufactured abroad. Can that buyer bring that copy into the United States (and sell it or give it away) without obtaining permission to do so from the copyright owner? Can, for example, someone who purchases, say at a used bookstore, a book printed abroad subsequently resell it without the copyright owner’s permission? In our view, the answers to these questions are, yes. Wikipedia also has an article on the case. As for your recourse against the seller, this would seem to be very limited unless they specifically promised you the US edition, or the content is materially different between US and Indian editions. You don't say what kind of book this is. Textbooks typically have identical content. Fiction and other entertainment books generally have local idioms and terminology changed (e.g. "pavement" versus "sidewalk") but will otherwise be the same. You might be able to claim that this is a material difference, but its likely to be difficult.

Private carriers typically (and UPS in particular) only have a contractual obligation to the person who pays to send the package. Unless you're the one directly paying UPS to deliver the package you have no legal recourse because you're not a party to the "contract of carriage." It does seem like you're suffering due to contractual and operational failures of UPS, but your recourse is against the merchant you paid for the goods, because you also paid them for delivery. The merchant has recourse against UPS under their contract if they want to pursue it. Legally: UPS does not have a monopoly on shipping, and their contractual duty is only to their customer. The best you can do is encourage those from whom you purchase to aggressively claim against UPS for delays, and to use other carriers when possible.

A simple EULA does not absolve you from legal responsibility. The law that you need to be acquainted with, if you are dealing with the US (i.e. might be sued in the US), is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, in particular Title II, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act which states the "safe harbor" provisions. Aspects of DMCA safe harbor are covered in many Law SE questions. In essence, you have to provide a way for rights holders to complain that someone has infringed their copyright on there site, and you have to take down allegedly infringing material: and there are a number of legal formalities to attend to in doing this. The main point is that you can't just ignore the problem and hope it goes away, and you can't just say it is not your responsibility, which is what a simple EULA does. To be protected, you need a "designated agent" where complainers can contact you. You provide the information online (as well as stating the DMCA policy, which can be in the EULA), and also register that information with the Copyright office (online). The complaint has to be in writing, and most of the burden is on the author of the complaint, but you still have to be sure that the complaint is legally conforming. The complaint has to say what was infringed (e.g. the URL), the identity of the protected content (title of the book, for instance), and provide the complainer's signature and contact information. It also requires the complainer to say that they have a good faith belief that the material is illegally copied (no permission, and not otherwise allowed by law), and a perjury statement that the foregoing is accurate and authorized by the copyright holder. When you have a conforming notice, you must "expeditiously" remove / disable the infringing material (there is no definition of "expeditious"), notify the user, then wait for a proper counter-claim (same general form as the take-down claim but where the user denies the posting the material was illegal. If you get a counter-claim, you notify the alleged copyright owner and wait for them to file suit in 10 days. If they don't do that, you restore the material. Here is a sample complaint, and a sample counter notice. Also, this document (look for the download tab) reorganizes the legal language so that requirements are put in logical order and not randomly scattered throughout the US Code.

Your terms and conditions must comply with the laws in: Your jurisdiction (California) Your customer's jurisdiction (each of the US states, Canadian provinces and ultimately countries and sub-jurisdictions in Europe) If they do they will generally be enforceable; if they don't then they will not be enforceable and you may be exposing yourself to civil and criminal sanctions. While not immediately relevant to you, Australian Consumer Law has such sanctions to goods sold into Australia from anywhere in the world; I am not familiar with other jurisdictions. With respect to your comment that you will not accept returns or refunds, this would expose you to potential fines in Australia of $220,000 for an individual or $1,100,000 for a corporation - under Australian Consumer Law returns and refunds are a consumer right. I strongly suspect that most of the jurisdictions you are selling into would take a similar position. A general "catch-all" like "to the extent permitted by law" may reduce the risk of being prosecuted but it would not eliminate it entirely. Again, in Australia, the provision is that you must not engage in deceptive and misleading conduct - merely suggesting that you will not give a refund even with the limitation above - may still be deemed "deceptive and misleading" if the court feels that a reasonable consumer might assume that they are not entitled to a refund. You need professional legal advice on this.

The reason that you are being asked to comply with a US law is because PayPal, a US company, is required to comply with US laws. If you do not comply, it is likely that they will be non-compliant and subject to sanctions. For more background, FATCA reporting is used to identify businesses that a company does business with. In this scenario PayPal does business with you, 'Kenorb Inc', and so must prove to the regulatory agencies that you are not a US based company, hence the need for the W-8BENE. In a similar way - people from other countries cannot simply ignore UK law when dealing with your business. As for your quotes - they are not contradictory.

This is a case of nominative use. In general, it is fine to use trademarks to refer to the products trademarked, provided that a reasonable person would not be confused about who creates or provides the product, and would not think that the trademark holder has endorsed, authorized, or sponsored the book or other product that refers to the trademark. It is common to include a disclaimer stating that trademarks are owned by specific parities, and the author or publisher is not claiming them, nor claiming any endorsement or affiliation. Such a disclaimer makes the nominative function of the trade mark use clearer, and would make it harder for the trademark owner to prevail in an infringement suit. See This law.se question and answer for more info.

No. You have to ask for specific permission to send marketing emails, and can't make it a condition of making a purchase since marketing emails are clearly not necessary for that. When accepting the terms you need a separate tick box for marketing emails, and it must be unticked by default (opt-in).

It may be illegal under product labelling regulations that apply to that kind of product (or under a general deceptive trade practices act), but even then, only if you are interpreting the numbers, whose meaning is not clearly spelled out, correctly. But, to be actionable as fraud it must, among other things, be a misrepresentation as to a material fact (which if the goods, such as cordless drills, are not perishable it probably isn't) and the recipient of the misrepresentation must have justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation (which is necessary not true in the case of a representation that it was made in December 2018 on a product sold no later than July of 2018). It is also not entirely clear that this is a "made on" date. It could refer, for example, to the the twelfth batch or lot or shipment of products made in 2018, and not to the month of December, or it could refer to a product made in 2018 at factory number 12. @NateEldredge in the comments also makes the plausible observation that it could be a week number which is a common system in manufacturing which would put it in a more reasonable March 2018 time frame. You probably shouldn't do anything, because you haven't been harmed by this cryptic string of numbers embossed on the product, and even if you were, your damages would not be worth the time or money involved to pursue it as anything other than part of a class action lawsuit.

What if I did something that was a crime, but has now become legal? There was a question recently about what happens if I do something that is legal today but becomes illegal in the future. The obvious question is what happens in the opposite case? If I do something today that is a crime by today's laws, and next week the law changes and makes the act legal? Can I be convicted by a judge for something that is today legal? Where everyone in the court room, including the judge, would be allowed to do it today? Does it make a difference if I got caught before or after the law change? Would a judge have legal leeway (that is it's up to him to decide if I should be prosecuted or not?) If I was already convicted, would I have reasons for an appeal with the argument that my actions are not illegal (anymore)?

According to United States federal law, 1 U.S. Code § 109 - Repeal of statutes as affecting existing liabilities: The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. The expiration of a temporary statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the temporary statute shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. So it depends on whether Congress expressly said what to do, and if they didn't say anything, it defaults to being able to still prosecute. But this only applies to federal laws, not state laws. There's also an exception to this. In United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934), the Supreme Court said that a prosecution for a violation of the National Prohibition Act could not be continued. However, this was a special case, as the constitutional provision (the 18th Amendment) that allowed the act in the first place had just been repealed (by the 21st Amendment).

(assuming United States law here, though I'd be surprised if it were significantly different in other jurisdictions with such restrictions) Your friend is incorrect: that would be a new offense, for which Person A could be prosecuted anew. If your friend's logic were correct, once a person is convicted of robbing a store, they'd be free to rob that store without repercussions for life. It's worth noting that the conviction isn't relevant: the prohibition of double jeopardy in the United States prevents even multiple prosecutions (except, in some cases, for separate state and federal prosecutions or foreign prosecutions).

Would it be legal to jump into an unlocked car and start it? No. Same situation, different object.

You will still have to pay A ticket can be ammended if the state so chooses (they can look up what color and model your car is). The car is probably on video. The officer can testify if they wrote your car info down somewhere else. And if they identified you inside the car as the violator, the car's color hardly matters. The idea that minor mistakes or omissions on tickets can get you off is a myth. From an actual lawyer

Is such legislation that effectively overrules a court imposed sentence even allowable? Yes. Amnesty legislation is allowed. For example, the U.S. Congress recently passed such legislation with regard to crack cocaine sentences. Legislation changing sentences for crimes is presumed to be prospective only, but this presumption can be overcome with clear statutory language to the contrary. As a political matter, however, district attorneys usually lobby strenuously against amnesty legislation, feeling that it sets a bad (political) precedent. an existing NH truth in sentencing statute would seem to conflict with the notion that any such change is possible. In the event of a direct conflict between an older statute and a newer statute that can't be resolved by any other interpretive method, the newer statute prevails over the older one, even if this result isn't expressly identified in the legislation.

Is this legal for the county to enforce? Yes. And can I sue if they try to enforce it? You could, but you would very likely lose your lawsuit. A more fruitful approach would be to go to the county planning board and seek a variance to permit you to do what you want to do.

You are right, the entry and exit photos are only evidence that you were there. This is something they need to prove so the photos may only be for that. Their statement that you didn’t display a valid ticket/permit is, at present an unevidenced assertion. If you contest this, they will provide evidence that you didn’t (e.g. the actual records they refer to) and you would provide evidence that you did and, if it goes to court, the judge will decide what evidence they prefer. As this is not a criminal matter, they need to prove the offence on the balance of probabilities. However, there are almost certainly administrative remedies which will allow you to contest the fine without going to court. This would involve you sending them a copy of the permit and them assessing whether their belief that you didn’t display it is justified or not.

The jury never finds there was “no crime” They either find that the state has proven that this particular defendant committed this particular crime (guilty) or they have not proven it (not guilty). Another jury at another time may find the opposite - this does sometimes happen where a guilty verdict is appealed and the appeals court orders a retrial. For another defendant charged with a different crime (e.g. accessory to the first crime) before another jury, the result of another trial is both irrelevant and inadmissible.

Why is it called Civil Law? What's "civil" about it? Why is a civil legal system referred to as a system of “civil” law? In what sense is it “civil”? Does the name derive from origins in or association with the civil code or code civil? In this case, what was “civil” about the civil code? Was it distinct from a separate criminal code?

Civil comes ultimately from civis, meaning citizen, but its roots lie in (reconstructed) proto-Italic *keiwis, meaning "society," coming from the Indo-European *ḱey, meaning "to settle." The obvious semantic connection is through the concept of a settlement, a village or town (indeed, by Latin times, civitas, "city"). Civil codes themselves are concerned with the orderly operation of society, defining and governing relationships that people have with each other and with the state. It is therefore not difficult to see how this relates to both senses for which the civ- root has been used, denoting both social constructs that bind people together as well as the people so bound. The people who came up with the name "code civil" did not likely have all of this etymological history in mind; but I would add to Dale M's correct assertion "civil means of the citizen" that it also means of society.

"Codes" are usually collections of previously existing laws. The Code of Hammurabi and the Code of Justinian were both collections of laws, gathered for easy reference. In the US, the US Code (USC) is an almost comprehensive collection of current law, much of which was passed in separate statutes before it was codified. In this contest, to codify is to include a law in the code, altering formatting and numbering to make it consistent with the rest of the code. Laws in the US are normally passed and go into effect before they are codified. In modern usage "code" is not normally used for a single law. There is also the US Code of Federal Regulations or CFR which is a collection of regulations passed by various federal agencies to implement law. They are not laws, but in many respects thy have the force of law. I believe that several other legal systems use "code" or a word that might be translated as "code" in a similar way. In a wider sense, "code" can be used to refer to an entire system of law, as "the Mosaic code" or "the Anglo-American code". It can also be used for the precepts of a non-legsal system as "an ethical code" or "the architect's code of practice". A bill is a proposed law not yet passed by a legislature. In modern US usage, codes only include statutes passed by legislatures, not constitutions. This is because codes collect the work of legislatures, but written constitutions come from different and special sources. The term "act", in modern usage, is a synonym for "statute". In historic usage not all acts were statutes, only those important enough to be routinely quoted verbatim, not paraphrased.

The naming conventions for legislation in the United States and the United Kingdom have evolved over time and have undergone various changes and adaptations. It is difficult to pinpoint a specific time when the naming conventions for legislation in the two countries diverged, as the process has likely been a gradual one. In general, the United States and the United Kingdom both have a long history of using names or titles to identify and refer to legislation. In the United States, legislation is typically given a short and descriptive title, such as the "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act" or the "Sarbanes-Oxley Act." In the United Kingdom, legislation is often referred to by its short title, which may include the year in which it was enacted, such as the "Companies Act 2006" or the "Bribery Act 2010." These naming conventions have evolved over time and have been influenced by a variety of factors, including changes in the political and legal systems of the two countries. It is likely that the naming conventions for legislation in the United States and the United Kingdom will continue to evolve and change in the future.

Organically rather than by design, laws and courts preceded the theoretical constitutional basis. Kings developed a practice of legislating in council, rather than solo, meaning that their edicts went out not as "the King decrees XYZ" but "the King, with the assent of the archbishops, bishops, abbots, barons, etc., decrees XYZ". This eventually became the Parliamentary system, wherein only Parliament could make laws (especially about raising taxes) and the King alone could not. Because of the gradual evolution, it's not easy to point to the first such statute or even the first proper "Parliament". The form was not settled. Nowadays we expect Acts to start with a set "enacting formula", to be published in a set way, and to be called "Acts" at all. Earlier laws lacked these elements. It was common for Parliaments to transact a variety of business, such as appointing officials or distributing money, without strictly distinguishing a category of what we would now call a "public general Act", something setting out broadly applicable rules under the tenor of law. To take an early example, the Domesday Book was undoubtedly commissioned by William I in council in 1085, but we could argue for a long time whether that really counted as a law made by the King alone or through a proto-parliamentary approach. The Assize of Clarendon in 1166 is closer - we have the text and it refers to the counsel of all the barons - but still not obviously "an Act". Magna Carta came in 1215 and was repeatedly confirmed by successive monarchs in slight variations; only the 1297 version is currently deemed to be an Act still partially in force. At the same time as this legislative activity, a bewildering array of courts applied essentially customary law for local cases. If you commit a murder in Durham in 1300 and would like to not be executed, then you would be appealing (I think?) to the mercy of the Prince-Bishop in his own court. A few dozen miles away and the process and authority was different. Things gradually became more uniform and systematized, and by the sixteenth century there was enough critical mass of legal philosophy to try to "explain" the legal system more formally and in recognizably modern terms. We may as well take Edward Coke's Institutes of the Laws of England (1628-1644) as a turning point: four volumes setting out a comprehensive view of what English law was all about. In contrast, take Bracton's similar work of 1235, which was the first real analysis of case law in England. Bracton was writing in a context without a general idea of precedent, and where the binding extent of Roman civil law was not clear. By Coke's time that was well established. But they are both trying to make sense of the law as they found it: giving explanations for the data, if you like. (A parallel course was taking place in Scotland with its institutional writers, although they ended up with a different system from England's. They were equally trying to explain what they saw.) Some of the early modern authors contributed to figuring out which decisions of past Parliaments or councils should be taken to be Acts, as such. Coke, in particular, also set out the criterion that an Act should purport to have been made by all three of the King, Lords and Commons. Our modern consolidated versions of the statute book derive from this time, and on legislation.gov.uk you can see the oldest Act still in force, The Statute of Marlborough 1267. That's different from the oldest Acts ever made, as discussed above, a more slippery concept. Ideas such as the separation of powers are reverse-engineered in this way. Indeed, it's not obvious that Britain has that separation. It may not be the right way to understand the governmental and legal order that has developed. John Locke might have thought it would be a good idea, but Walter Bagehot denied it was a useful frame for analyzing the interrelationships of various public bodies.

There are laws against animal cruelty What counts as cruel is a social convention that changes over time. It is a fundamental principle of common law jurisdictions (like most of the united-states) that courts have the power to interpret (and re-interpret) the law so that as society’s standards change, so does the law.

What is the equivalent for “Consideration” (English common law) in Spanish speaking countries? Prestación. Perhaps not all Spanish speaking countries adopt a one-word term, but the notion of consideration definitely exists in civil law. It is quite mistaken to presume that the concept is unique to common law systems. The Civil Code of both Spain (see art. 1257) and México (art. 1793) are in terms of "transmission or transfer of rights", which fits the meaning of consideration. The Civil Code of Spain in its art. 1254 refers to "[consent] to give something or perform [prestar] a service" (brackets added for clarity), whence the term prestación qualifies as consideration in several --if not all-- types of contract. In fact, article 1274 literally mentions "prestación or promise".

Its worth actually reading through the law again - they're meant for different categories of drugs - and its worth looking up the relevant laws as a whole. You can't cherrypick which law you charge them under in this case. It depends on what the suspect has in posession, and if you have more serious charges, they're probably going to be preferred unless the prosecution decides to throw the entire library at the suspect and charge them with everything they can, or a larger subset. A quick search on the internet - which shouldn't be taken as legal advice, brings up this link. Category 1 drugs are addictive and seen as therapeutically useless - you shouldn't have any realistic reason to have quantities of it in your posession. Category 3 is drugs with therapeutic use - stuff like codine. You could get a prescription for that, but there's potential for abuse. They're aimed at different classes of drugs - and the confusion is over a misinterpretation of what the law is about. As an aside, this is why you need to usually read more than just a specific statute or law to get what its about.

This is a purely linguistic question, despite the hope to discover a special legal process. Somebody uses a word or phrase in order to communicate an specific idea. Somebody else thinks "That's a good way to put it" and uses the same or very similar expression to convey that idea. Enough people do this and it becomes "conventional". The word itself is not made up, it already existed, and was simply applied in a specialized way (e.g. "tort" is an ordinary French word meaning "wrong, mistake" taken into English in a more specialized manner). If you want to know the history of a legal term, you have to read relevant historical rulings to see when the word was first used. That is how we know that current technical term "consideration" derives, from around the time of Henry VIII, that it derives from rulings referring to "assumpsits" which were made "in consideration of" an obligation. "Trover" is a sufficiently old term in law that you will have a hard time pinning down first use and the pattern of expansion.

Is Entrapment illegal by the officer committing it? It's fairly well known that Entrapment can be considered a valid affirmative defense for the person who was induced to commit a crime. However, say that a police officer entrapped someone to, e.g.: Commit a murder or assault. Commit a "victimless" crime, e.g. an officer induces someone to pay for a prostitute. Would that officer be committing a crime or doing something illegal? The officer could be charged for e.g. coercion or as an abettor. But, is entrapment itself illegal for the officer? Do officers who commit entrapment get charged with a crime or penalized somehow? Answers for different countries and legal systems are welcome, but, I understand that most potential answers will be from the US, and that's okay. The US has a great legal corpus and I enjoy reading about precedent, especially from the SCOTUS.

It depends on where you are. In the US, entrapment is a defense to a criminal charge. There is a threshold question: is "solicitation" sufficient encouragement, there must be "inducement" by the government agent which is at least persuasion or mild coercion... pleas based on need, sympathy, or friendship... extraordinary promises of the sort 'that would blind the ordinary person to his legal duties' such that 'a law-abiding citizen's will to obey the law could have been overborne', or that the government created 'a substantial risk that an offense would be committed by a person other than one ready to commit it'" Any person can be charged with the crime of "solicitation" (RCW 9a.28.030 in Washington), which however pairs some sort of request with a reward (money or other valuable thing). In Nevada, solicitation refers to a person who "counsels, hires, commands or otherwise solicits another", but also the crimes are limited to kidnapping, arson and murder. A police officer is not rendered immune from criminal prosecution just because he intended the criminal act to have a "good outcome" such as leading to the criminal conviction of a bad person. But whether what he said is a crime depends on what the officer said, and what the laws of that state are.

I know one can "make a complaint" but I'm wondering if there's generally any legal obligation for these complaints to be taken seriously, and if there's any feasible way a driver could validate the encounter. . . . Furthermore, even with evidence, is there any way a citizen could ensure that legal action be taken against the officer for a proven traffic violation? Beyond reporting it to the department and hoping for the best? A prosecutor is under no legal obligation to press charges (and police have no affirmative duty to enforce the laws on the books) ever, even if there is blatant and clear evidence of murder, let alone a traffic violation. Usually, there is absolutely no way to compel charges to be brought against the offender (with a handful of states providing an exception where one can seek the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute if the circumstances warrant that would never be invoked for a mere traffic offense). Very few states allow anyone other than a prosecutor (or sometimes in minor cases, a law enforcement officer) to bring criminal or quasi-criminal charges. Of course, if compelling evidence of a violation is found and shared with the media, there may be powerful political pressure to bring a prosecution, but how that is developed would entirely depend upon the circumstances. Still, the relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement is so symbiotic, that prosecutors are loathe to press charges against law enforcement officers in all but the clearest of cases, especially for offenses occuring while a law enforcement officer is on duty in his home jurisdiction. Legally speaking, do civilians have any right to apprehend an officer for a traffic violation? While this would depend upon state law, most states treat traffic violations as a class of offense different from other misdemeanors and infractions and never authorize a citizens arrest for a traffic violation. Normally, only law enforcement officers can stop and cite people for traffic violations that aren't actually misdemeanor crimes. For example, in Colorado, true traffic infractions are defined as civil matters for which someone may be stopped and subjected to a citation but not arrested (even by a law enforcement officer). See Colorado Revised Statutes § 42-4-1701(1). In Colorado, only more serious traffic offenses (e.g. hit and run) are crimes subject to arrest. In the case of a traffic offense which is a crime (probably not speeding), the general rules applicable to citizens arrests would usually apply.

The legal question here is whether police have an enforceable power to enjoin a person from visiting a particular person or from entering a particular jurisdiction (especially the one where they have police powers). The obligation to obey police orders generally ends at matters regarding arrest, traffic orders, or crowd control. Freedom of travel is a fundamental constitutional right, along with freedom of association. That does not mean that you can go absolutely anywhere you want and do anything you want with whoever you want, but it does mean that any restriction have to be encoded in law, and such laws have to pass strict scrutiny. Any enforceable legal restrictions would have to emanate from the courts.

The basic reason to avoid speaking to police is the concern that something that you say will provide the police with a basis for arresting you or someone you care about, or charging you or someone you care about with a crime. Often, the reason that the police are talking with someone is specifically for the purpose of developing probable cause or a case to convict someone of a crime, when without your information they wouldn't have that information. Statements far short of a confession to committing a crime can be critical lynch pins in establishing a case against you. For example, a statement that confirms that you were in a particular place at a particular time could link you to a crime that happened at or near that location at that time, when otherwise the police might have no idea where you were at that time and might never link you to the crime. Also, it isn't uncommon for a request for police assistance to end badly, with the police assistance being deployed against you, or the means used by the police to resolve a situation having a deadly or undesired outcome. On the other hand, often you will need to communicate with police. You may need to report a crime for insurance purposes. You may need help when you or someone around you is currently being victimized by someone committing a crime. Cooperating with police to provide information may help to remove someone who is a potential threat to you or someone you care about from the streets. A better rule than "never talk to the police" is really more along the lines of "think twice before talking to the police". You should thoughtfully evaluate if what you hope to gain from doing so is greater than the risk that a case against you as a suspect could be established and is also greater than the risk that if the police do respond when you communicate with them that the situation could end badly. As you do this, try to see yourself from a police officer's perspective. How will you look? Also, are you capable of saying what needs to be said and then stopping, rather than blabbering on out of nervousness. A related notion is that you should be much more wary about talking to the police when the police initiate the conversation than you are when you are the one initiating the conversation. This is because ulterior motives on the part of police that could harm you or people you care about are much more likely when the police initiate the conversation than when you do. Yet another consideration is how much you understand about the situation you are in, how sophisticated you are in dealing with the police, and how glib you are compared to the average person. For example, there are people who a guilty of a crime and are in a situation that they understand well where they are at high risk of being implicated in a crime, where smooth talking can deflect police attention away from you and onto another person or a non-existent suspect. But, not many people are smooth enough and understand their circumstances well enough to pull that off. In general, the more that you fit "the profile" of someone the police are likely to suspect of a crime (e.g. if you are a young adult African American man in a "high crime neighborhood"), the more you should assume that responding to a police inquiry directed to you is a bad idea.

It isn't clear that the example you give is illegal police action, but let's assume that it is for the sake of this question, since it doesn't affect the analysis. If possession is not compelled, then it is voluntary.

Does this mean all countries law applies to it? Basically yes. If the videos are in english and are about science in general does this mean if some country some day bans ( imprisonment ) science videos or use of a specific colour in videos can they extraterritorialy enforce this imprisonment if they are in some other country like USA or India? With respect to criminal cases, only if it can arrest that person or convince another country to arrest and extradite that person. Generally speaking, countries will only extradite someone if it is a serious offense under the domestic laws of the country of arrest as well as the country requesting that the person be handed over, and also only if the crime occurred in or was targeted at the requesting country. Sometimes the arrest is not legal in the place where it is made. For example, in this case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court (the quote is from the official syllabus to the case): Respondent, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was forcibly kidnapped from his home and flown by private plane to Texas, where he was arrested for his participation in the kidnapping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and the agent's pilot. After concluding that DEA agents were responsible for the abduction, the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico (Extradition Treaty or Treaty), and ordered respondent's repatriation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Based on one of its prior decisions, the court found that, since the United States had authorized the abduction and since the Mexican government had protested the Treaty violation, jurisdiction was improper. Held: The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a United States court for violations of this country's criminal laws. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). I mean can a country just bring to jail any youtuber outside its borders ( using its national language as the language of the video ) who uploads content of international appeal because of some law? If the country can manage to arrest the person, yes. There are high profile cases from Saudi Arabia where that has happened. See, e.g., here and here (a blogger and his sister arrested in Saudi Arabia, while his wife and children flee to Canada), here (journalists for Lebanese periodical arrested in Saudi Arabia in relation to years old publications) here (more journalists arrested in Saudi Arabia), here ("A male Saudi Arabian teenager has been arrested in Riyadh over a series of online videos of conversations between him and a female Californian streaming-video star that went viral."), here (Yemeni blogger), and here (Washington Post journalist tortured and killed in Saudi Arabian embassy in Turkey at the direction of a senior member of the Saudi Arabian royal family). Also can a country just hold liable for youtube's data privacy practices a youtuber outside its borders and enforce the judgement if the practices of both youtuber and their chanell and youtube is legal in their home country? A country can hold anyone liable for anything its domestic laws allow it to hold someone liable for, and can enforce that judgment against any assets it can exert power over. Some countries with similar legal systems recognize each other's court judgments widely. Countries with very different legal systems often don't recognize each other's judgements. For example, most European countries do not recognize U.S. money judgment for torts (i.e. civil wrongs such as personal injury awards). Similarly, the U.S. does not recognize most foreign defamation judgments, and does not recognize most judgments of Saudi Arabian courts. One last thing is wether inclusion of ads make a difference? Usually not. But it can matter for purposes of assertions of lawsuit liability over someone outside the jurisdiction seeking to impose liability for something that harmed someone in their country. If conduct amounts to "doing business" in the country seeking to impose liability or amounts to a "purposeful availment" of the laws of the country seeking to impose liability in some why, an imposition of extraterritorial liability is more likely, and that tends to happen more in cases where there are ads that are commercial targeting the people of the country where the courts seek to impose liability.

2019 Manual for Courts-Martial, Rule 916(h): (h) Coercion or duress. It is a defense to any offense except killing an innocent person that the accused’s participation in the offense was caused by a reasonable apprehension that the accused or another innocent person would be immediately killed or would immediately suffer serious bodily injury if the accused did not commit the act. The apprehension must reasonably continue throughout the commission of the act. If the accused has any reasonable opportunity to avoid committing the act without subjecting the accused or another innocent person to the harm threatened, this defense shall not apply. So, if your hypothetical soldier asserts they had a reasonable apprehension that they would have immediately suffered serious bodily injury if they didn't reveal the intelligence, then they should not be convicted by a court-martial, unless the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this was not the case (Rule 916 (b)(1)).

We need to assume that the stop was legal (not a high hurdle to clear), that is, there was some reason to stop you. Even so, following Utah v. Strieff, police don't actually have to have a reasonable suspicion to stop you and if in the course of an ID check they discover that you have a warrant out for your arrest, the arrest is still legal. So if the police stop you, RCW 46.61.020(1) says: It is unlawful for any person while operating or in charge of any vehicle to refuse when requested by a police officer to give his or her name and address and the name and address of the owner of such vehicle, or for such person to give a false name and address, and it is likewise unlawful for any such person to refuse or neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any police officer or to refuse upon demand of such police officer to produce his or her certificate of license registration of such vehicle, his or her insurance identification card, or his or her vehicle driver's license or to refuse to permit such officer to take any such license, card, or certificate for the purpose of examination thereof or to refuse to permit the examination of any equipment of such vehicle or the weighing of such vehicle or to refuse or neglect to produce the certificate of license registration of such vehicle, insurance card, or his or her vehicle driver's license when requested by any court. Any police officer shall on request produce evidence of his or her authorization as such. There is no law that says "you have to provide ID only if accused of a crime", or "police can pull you over only if you are suspected of a crime". Various traffic infractions will get you pulled over but are not crimes; random sobriety checks are legal. However, note that the requirement to provide ID applies to the operator. There is no law requiring citizens to carry identification papers (but there is a law requiring a vehicle operator to carry a specific form of ID). In some states there are "stop and identify" laws which allow police to demand ID from a person suspected of a crime, but Washington does not have such a law.

Does a purely accidental act preclude civil liability for its resulting damages? A recent answer by Dale M. States that: A pure accident without any negligence on your part does not expose you to liability. Is this the general rule? What is the basis for that being so if it is? If you weren’t negligent then sure you didn’t do anything wrong, but it’s definitely more your fault than the person whose property you damaged, so why should they have to suffer rather than you? All jurisdictions welcome, but please specify a particular jurisdiction for which your answer applies when answering.

In Common Law Countries In common law countries, Dale M. is right (the vast majority of the time). Without negligence there is usually no liability for damage to property in an accident. The general rule in the common law rule is that "shit happens" and no one is responsible for the damage, when no one was negligent and everyone defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances. The "shit happens" defense is generally a valid defense to a claim for property damages or personal injury in common law countries. "No negligence despite causation" findings are rare in auto accident or plane crash cases (absent truly extraordinary weather conditions or freak intervening causes like meteors falling from the sky that cause car accidents), but are common, for example, in professional malpractice cases. For example, suppose a reasonably competent surgeon does surgery on you in a fairly high risk case. The best surgeon in the hospital could have saved you. You didn't get that surgeon and died. There is no basis for a suit for medical malpractice against the surgeon since the surgeon was not negligent, even though the surgeon was not perfect. Also, sometimes the victim is the person primarily or totally at fault. For example, suppose a drunk driver T-bones your WellsFargo armored cash delivery car, which is built like a tank, in violation of a red light, with their SmartCar, and the SmartCar is totaled, while your armored car doesn't even have a scratch. Your car was a cause of the damage to the drunk driver's vehicle, but you have no liability for the drunk driver's losses, because you weren't negligent. Strict Liability Exceptions To Negligence Based Liability There are some exceptions if you have provided a warranty, guarantee, or insurance that the property won't be damaged (since contractual liability is generally strict liability unless otherwise provided by agreement). For example, you might be liable under a lease for any damage in excess of reasonable wear and tear from any cause other than the landlord's negligence. Sometimes there can be negligence by someone your are responsible for even if you aren't personally negligent (which is called "vicarious liability"). There is strict liability for accidents caused by defective products even in the absence of negligence, and for accidents caused by ultra-hazardous activities (e.g. explosives). U.S. states are divided about liability for animals that roam free with the main divide being between fence in states (mostly in the eastern U.S. and other more urbanized places) and fence out states (mostly in the west and more wild frontiers). There are a few other exceptions, but they are rare and somewhat inconsistent between jurisdictions. Comparative Fault Also, the modern trend in common law countries is to allocate liability for accidents based upon comparative fault or modified comparative fault. So, everyone who was negligent (including the victim), or would otherwise have had strict liability for the damage, is assigned a percentage of fault (adding up to 100%) that is their share of responsibility for the overall loss. If no one is negligent at all, there is no recovery. In modified comparative fault, if the victim is at least either 50% or 50%+ at fault (depending upon the state), there is no recovery. Some systems of comparative fault make negligent people who owe money jointly and severally liable with a right to contribution if you pay more than your fair share of the loss. Other systems limit each person's liability to their percentage of fault with no implicit guarantee of other negligent parties who are judgment proof. Who Determines Liability And Damages? In the U.S., and a small number of other jurisdictions, liability and damages are frequently decided by juries (and there is a right to a jury the vast majority of the time even if it isn't always elected). In most common law jurisdictions, liability and damages are always or almost always decided by judges (exceptions apply in perhaps 1% or less of cases). In Civil Law Countries In civil law countries (continental Europe, Quebec), the standard of liability for accidents in the absence of special cases like the ones discussed in the common law is that you are liable for damage that is your "fault." See, e.g. this article discussing civil law tort liability under Central American civil codes. It states: Much like in Europe (think of art. 1382 of the Napoleonic Code), in the Central American civil codes, the concept of tort ordinarily rests on a general clause imposing fault-based liability, though it is possible to identify among these civil codes some interesting variations. For example, only in Honduras (art. 2236) and Panama (art. 1644) tort liability is characterized using elements such as: action or omission, fault or negligence, and obligation to compensate. Whereas, Costa Rica (art.1045) and Nicaragua (art. 2509) add other elements to the characterization, such as fault and imprudence, and in the Nicaraguan text, the notion of malicious acts is also included. The Salvadoran Civil Code (arts. 2065 and 2080) is rooted in the classic construction of delict, quasi-delict or fault, although it also adds features such as malice and negligence. The exception to this trend will be the Guatemalan Civil Code (art. 1645). Although it uses terms such as intention, carelessness or recklessness as defining criteria, this provision is not really describing a fault based liability model, because it contains a rebuttable presumption of fault or negligence. The civil law concept of tortious fault is not spelled out in great detail in civil codes, although there are a few specific situations that are covered (e.g. bailments when your property is in the possession of another person and collapsing buildings). Civil law countries have instead been developed in legal doctrine in those countries that is not apparent from the civil code text. Basically, civil law tortious fault involves some culpability greater than mere "but for" causation of an accident, but involves a lower threshold of wrongfulness than the concept of "negligence" in the common law, which is a failure to act as reasonable person would have to prevent harm to others under the circumstances. You can have civil law tortious fault even if you were acting as a reasonable person, but you still have to have at least done something slightly wrong. So, there is still a "shit happens" defense in civil law countries, but it tends to be much harder to establish. Who Determines Liability And Damages? In civil law countries, the call is always made by judges (or by panels of judges in cases involving larger damages).

Can I sue? (Shall I sue? Is up to you) Yes, anyone can sue anybody but that doesn't mean it will be successful. The likely candidate for making a claim seems to be under the tort of Emotional Distress, however, note that... Since the definition of offensive conduct is subjective by its very nature, the courts have set high standards to make out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional harm. To be successful, the plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct which caused severe emotional distress to another person. Source ...but according to the OP and comments, this criteria does not appear to be have been met.

I'm not sure there would be any need - or any ability to bring - any civil action. Forgery would appear to count as a Category D felony under Section 205.090 and, "In addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the person to pay restitution.", so person "a"'s damages should have been met under the process of the criminal prosecution of person "b" for forgery, with nothing further to claim. Person "c" will have stolen a car. Whether that car was legitimately owned by person "a" may only be relevant if person "c" is using their belief that it belonged to person "b" as mitigation (for example recovery of a debt - though it won't help much as this should have been done through proper channels), which again would be a criminal proceeding.

Kansas evaluates these kinds of cases, known as premises liability cases, under the general law of negligence (which is a common law claim governed by case law in Kansas, rather than a statute, except as modified by specific statutes in some respect or other). When you own or control a piece of property, you are responsible for making reasonable efforts to ensure that visitors are safe. If you fail to identify safety risks that you should have reasonably known about, or if you fail to correct potentially hazardous conditions, you could be held liable for any injuries that result. The law is just that vague and is interpreted by judges and juries on a case by case basis. When that happens Kansas uses a comparative negligence system that evaluates the percentage of the fault attributable to everyone who is alleged to have been negligent including the person injured. Damages are allocated based upon those percentages (unless the person injured is more than 50% at fault, in which case the person injured recovers nothing in the lawsuit). Kansas is not among the states that make a formalistic distinction between the duties owed to "invitees", "licensees" and "trespassers" as the common law historically did. If a risk is foreseeable and you could have taken affordable precautions (relative to the value of the activity the not taking the precaution made possible) to address it, and you didn't, you could be held liable. Trespassing is just one of an infinite number of factors that the jury considers in assigning comparative fault. The main pro-active actions that you can take are to purchase homeowner's insurance with reasonable liability policy limits and ideally umbrella insurance as well (which increases your policy limits at a modest additional cost), and to communicate in writing to the neighbor (in a way that you can prove if anything happens later) warning your neighbor of the risks that you foresee and urging your neighbor to take care to avoid those risks. The statute of limitations in these cases in Kansas is usually two years although exceptions apply.

I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!).

The fact that the employer has vicarious liability for acts of its employees "within the scope of employment" does not mean the employees are not also liable for their own acts. In reality, however, the employer is more likely to have insurance for such "acts or omissions" of employees. The plaintiffs can "sue everyone in sight" and let them figure out who actually pays when they are found liable. That way, when the employee's actions are (for instance) ruled a "personal frolic" or otherwise outside the scope of the employer's liability (in tort or contract), the case doesn't get dismissed for failure to name all the proper parties. One policy goal is to place financial liability as close as possible to the person most likely to have been able to avoid the harm, thus discouraging such risks, without placing the entire burden on individuals employed in hazardous occupations and without artificially limiting potential sources of compensation.

Given that Bob has no obligation to pay anything to Charles, who has no legal duty to do anything, I don't see how Charles could have liability to Bob. If Charles wants to, he can decline to pay a reward to Bob or can pay an amount smaller than Charles hoped for as a reflection of Charles' delay.

Maybe, but probably not, although this would be a question of fact to resolve on a case by case basis under broad legal standards by a jury, and would also depend upon the state where it took place, and upon the nature of the employer of the paramedic. The hypothetical facts in this case are rich enough and ambiguous enough that the case could go either way depending upon how it was presented and what could be proven at trial. This is a case it would be good to take to a medical malpractice/personal injury lawyer in the jurisdiction where it happened to be evaluated. Usually a PI lawyer would not charge you for doing so or would ask for only a nominal fee. Additional factual investigation would probably also be necessary regarding some of the key facts identified below. It's complicated and there are multiple issues presented in this case where the law is not uniform from state to state. The general rule is that a medical professional has to carry out the delivery of medical care to a patient with the reasonable care that would be taken by a medical professional of that type. If the medical professional fails to take reasonable care, and that negligence failure to do so causes injury, then there is civil liability for medical malpractice. A threshold issue would be whether a medical professional-patient relationship was established. This would be a question of fact for a jury and would be a question upon which various potentially applicable state and federal laws would often not be uniform. On these facts, it could easily go either way. In federal court and in a majority of state courts (although there is variation from state to state) you need to know the name of the paramedic you dealt with who provided the bad advice to bring a successful lawsuit before suing. In a minority of states, you could sue first and get the name of the paramedic in discovery through the court process from the hospital after the lawsuit was commenced. The standard of reasonable care liability in this case would be judged by the standard of a reasonable paramedic, not a reasonable doctor. But, often states would have statutes that would limit the liability of paramedics in these situations to liability for gross negligence (which the facts in the question would probably not suffice to show), but not for ordinary negligence (which a jury could come out either way upon and which would hinge heavily on expert testimony). These tort reform type laws differ considerably from state to state. Whether or not particular conduct was negligent or grossly negligent, is a question ultimately decided by a jury under very broad and general legal standards after the fact in a trial, based largely upon expert testimony, on a case by case basis, unless the facts are unequivocally clear one way or the other, which is rarely the case. With my layman's level of knowledge about what a reasonable paramedic should be able to diagnose, I could see this determination going either way. Two cases with identical facts in front of the same judge in separate trials, in which juries are presented with exactly the same evidence could come out differently. The resolution of one case of the question of whether a particular act constituted negligence giving rise to liability is not binding as precedent and is not admissible as evidence in another case (subject to a narrow exception called "collateral estoppel" which applies when the same individual is sued by multiple people for the same conduct in different lawsuits that have resulted in final orders resolving key questions of fact that the lawsuits have in common). Many states would require that someone suing the paramedic have a medical professional certify that the paramedic's actions constituted legal negligence before the suit could go forward in a court. If there is a medical professional-patient relationship, and if the medical professional was found to have negligently caused injury, the medical professional's employer would have vicarious liability in some (but not all) states under a respondiat superior doctrine. Usually, the paramedic at an ER would be an employee of a private EMS ambulance company or a municipal fire department, and not of the hospital that runs the ER. But, some hospitals have their own in house paramedics. Also, some hospitals are run by for profit or nonprofit private companies, some are state or local governmental agencies, and some a federal government agencies. Usually only a small minority of the medical professionals in a hospital are employed by that hospital, and most of them merely have "privileges" to provide medical services for which they bill patients separately while working for their own professional corporation through which they are self-employed. Legally, the hospital itself is more like a hotel or a WeWork office space than to being a firm that directly provides medical services, although it isn't quite that black and white. Holding the ER directly responsible for failing to have good triage policies, as opposed to holding the paramedic responsible and assigning vicarious liability to the employer of the paramedic, would be very difficult, although not necessarily impossible if the ER had official policies that fell far below the standard of care for emergency room triage. It would be very uncommon for an ER to have bad policies of this type. Typically, ERs are only held directly liable for bad triage policies when, for example, they have a policy of not evaluating at all someone who does not have health insurance, which is a practice expressly prohibited by federal law. If the paramedic's employer was a government entity such as a fire department or a government owned hospital, the paramedic would be entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless an exception applied. Usually there is an express exception to absolute immunity for medical malpractice liability by a medical doctor who has established a doctor-patient relationship with a patient, when the medical doctor is employed by a state or local government, usually there isn't when the doctor is employed by the federal government. But these laws differ from state to state in fine details that matter in a case like this one regarding whether the exception to immunity from liability is limited to medical doctors or applies also to paramedics. Causation would also be an important factual issue for trial. There is liability only to the extent that taking a non-negligent action could have prevented the harm. If you are infected with COVID, one common consequence is a stroke, and if someone had a stroke while infected with COVID, the case that taking them to the ER would have prevented the stroke from doing serious damage in the long run is weaker. On the other hand, guessing that a stroke was really something else, might or might not be reasonable. The injured person would also have to prove that the EMS response occurred at a time within the roughly 1-2 hours after the start of a stroke when it is possible to take medical action that could do something about a stroke. If the stroke had already happened an hour and a half later and it was rush hour and would have taken half an hour to get to the nearest hospital, causation might be absent and there would be no liability. There would be a legitimate question of fact over whether there was an actual diagnosis and treatment, or whether there was a refusal to get treatment. The reasonable care test is a balancing test. It takes into consideration not just the potential benefits of taking action, but also the cost that would be incurred if action was taken, and the downside risks of a proposed action. The paramedic's concerns about getting a COVID infection at the ER when the person responded to didn't appear to have it at the time would make the cost of a false positive diagnosis higher and would thus influence what would constitute reasonable care in this situation as the jury applies the relevant legal test. Liability would be evaluated based upon what the paramedic reasonable understood he was being told. This would be a question of fact for the jury. It is likely that different people who were present understood what was being said differently. Even if bystanders understood what was being said and meant, what matters is what the paramedic reasonably understood was being said and meant. Given the communication difficulties involved, that question could go either way.

Can I build something that is patented? Assume I don't share, sell or profit off the item I found a few posts but they were a bit ambigous a a lot was left to the uneducated imagination of mine. Title says it all really. Say I wanted to build a special type of laser, I do NOT want to sell OR profit off the device. All I know is this device has a global patent, or perhaps a UK one, whats the difference if it was a UK patent and I was in the UK or what if it was a UK patent and I was in the USA? Say if this laser was very good at cutting things in a 3D printer but I didn't sell any of the items that the 3D printer produced. Is this illegal? I'm in the UK BTW. But I would also really appreshiate it if you just assumed it was what ever your country is. Thanks.

Yes you can do this in the UK. Section 60 of the Patents Act 1977 has a specific carve-out for this kind of activity: (5) An act which, apart from this subsection, would constitute an infringement of a patent for an invention shall not do so if; (a) it is done privately and for purposes which are not commercial; (b) it is done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the invention; So if you build and operate your laser without selling anything you are in the clear. You can also experiment with potential improvements. There is no such thing as a "global patent": patents are issued in each country and the national law of each country applies (except for Europe). If an inventor wants patent protection in lots of countries they have to file for a patent in each country. So if this laser is patented only in the USA and you are in the UK then you could make and sell as many lasers as you wanted, as long as you didn't export them to the USA. And vice-versa for a UK patent and a USA engineer.

By "unlicensed" you mean that it doesn't state a license for use (MIT, GPL, etc.)? Those licenses are just a codified bundle of terms of use that cover many many edge cases. You have in place a much simpler agreement that covers the primary situation: you using/modifying the code for your own use. It's just like borrowing a car. You will ask a friend "hey, could I borrow your car for a bit?" "sure!". You know there's a possibility that you'll get in an accident or something weird will happen, but you think the chances of that are minimal and you would be able to work it out. If you ask a car rental company, they'll give you a full contract covering every situation that may happen. Similarly, a large company would be hesitant to borrow a car for corporate use without a legal framework surrounding it. So you will likely be in the clear if you are just using it for a small project with minimal legal/financial implications. If you plan on turning your project into a multi-billion dollar empire, you should revisit your agreement.

This would be infringement. It generally doesn't matter that you're giving things away for free. Keep in mind that the point of these laws is not only to prevent third parties from making money off the creator's ideas, but also to protect the creator's ability to make money. If you're providing free knock-off Winnie the Pooh products, that cuts into the market for the creator's legitimate products.

The chief legal problem might be (depending on how you build and operate the thing) the amount of Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) that you're causing. You are not exempt from FCC regulations, but § 15.23 Home-built devices. (a) Equipment authorization is not required for devices that are not marketed, are not constructed from a kit, and are built in quantities of five or less for personal use. (b) It is recognized that the individual builder of home-built equipment may not possess the means to perform the measurements for determining compliance with the regulations. In this case, the builder is expected to employ good engineering practices to meet the specified technical standards to the greatest extent practicable. The provisions of §15.5 apply to this equipment. Since the question assumes "the builder knows what he's doing", we may assume the FCC demand "the builder is expected to employ good engineering practices" is met. But that also would assume that the builder knew about EMI in the first place.

Bob can probably print the firearm for personal ownership if Bob is not prohibited from possessing a firearm himself, but after that it gets problematic. This is ignoring any potential safety violations and liability issues or patent violations which might arise. According to an ATF spokesman quoted in this article : it is legal for Americans to build their own firearms without a license so long as they are not prohibited by law from possessing firearms, the firearms are legal to own, for personal use, and not for sale or transfer to others. Whether the gun parts are printed, created by other ways of manufacturing, or legally purchased from a licensed dealer has no impact on whether it is legal for an American to build a gun for personal use, though some states like California have placed additional requirements on the process. So transfer of ownership is possibly problematic. It's notably not a way to avoid normal firearm possession restrictions : Knight [the ATF spokesman] emphasized it is not legal for felons or somebody otherwise prohibited from possessing firearms to build their own guns under any circumstance. "Title 18 of the United States Code, section 922(g) prohibits several categories of persons (i.e., persons convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than a year) from possessing firearms in or affecting interstate commerce," Knight said. "Title 18 of the Unites States Code, section 922(d) prohibits persons from disposing of any firearm to a person the transferor has reason to believe is prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law." Finally there's a rather crucial point to note about the design of such firearms : He said the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 outlaws the manufacture or possession of firearms that can pass through a walk-through metal detector or X-ray machine commonly employed at airports without being detected. "A person or manufacturer cannot produce an undetectable firearm as prescribed in Title 18 of the United States Code, section 922(p)," he said. So making a weapon that's undetectable by a metal detector is not allowed (at least according to the ATF).

As you have agreed, by contract, not to reverse engineer the product, technically it would be a "breach of contract" to do so, assuming such terms are enforceable where you live (or wherever the EULA selects as the choice of forum).

The title of your question suggests that a patent is involved, but it isn't clear from the rest of your question if that is really the case. Simply seeing a product on the internet does not mean that there are any patent rights attached to it. If a patent does exist, then that patent's protection is defined by its claims. In the US, if you make or use an object that includes all the elements of the claims of a granted patent, then you are infringing that patent. It does not matter whether you share the object or attempt to make money from it—simply making or using it is enough to qualify as infringement. That said, based on your intended use, the patent owner is highly unlikely to ever find out about your infringement. Further, even if they did, enforcing patent rights in court is incredibly expensive (typically involving multi-million dollar legal budgets), and they wouldn't stand to recover much from you, so it is even less likely that they would sue you for the infringement.

Sculptural works can be copyrighted and a car design would qualify. Also the car design or aspects of it (grill for example) could be covered by a design patent. See this Suzuki for example. Or this Land Rover grill.

Can data protection rights of a subject be voluntarily waived? Presumably not on protrusion by a service provider as a condition of their service. But what if someone writes to someone super busy whom they admire and says “look I really respect you and don’t want to get on your nerves so I don’t intend to compel you to prepare a SAR response for me but if it happened to be really convenient and you felt like doing it then it would be really helpful to me to have this information. Just don’t feel compelled to comply with this request as a statutory obligation.” Would that be a valid waiver of one’s subject access entitlement?

GDPR rights and obligations cover different things: A duty of the data processor towards the government of the country where they operate to present certain documentation, and to implement technical and organizational measures to protect data. These would be audited by government agencies, not the individual customer. A single data subject cannot waive them. A duty of the data processor to process and store personal data only with a legal justification. User consent is one possible justification, if it is informed, revokable, etc. So a single data subject can waive a "ban" on storing his or her data in a database along with all the other users who waived that "ban," but the duties towards the government regarding that data would still apply. A duty of the data processor to respond to an Article 15 request by the data subject in a certain way and timeframe. If a data subject writes a letter to the data processor and explicitly states that the letter is not an Article 15 request, then Article 15 does not apply. The data subject would of course have the right to make an Article 15 request at a later time.

Does GDPR prohibit reading unsolicited emails from people who have not explicitly opted in to a mailing list? tl;dr: No. I have never heard of this, and I don't see how this could follow from the GDPR. You should follow up with the Secretary to find out how she came to her conclusion. Detailed reasoning: The GDPR restricts the processing of personal data, so it does in principle cover reading email, since reading counts as "processing", and an email may contain personal data. However, Article 2 (emphasis mine) says that: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. I would read this to mean that a human reading emails is only covered by GDPR if the emails are part of a "filing system" or intended to be. So reading the emails is ok, it's only problematic if you intend to systematically store them. Even filing them, while covered by GDPR, would presumably be allowed, because to actually act on the email, you would have to keep it, and Article 6 allows processing of personal data to "take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract" and when "processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller". One caveat: If the email contains data that falls under special categories of personal data (Article 9) you may need explicit consent for storage. That covers things like racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs and health information. So if someone discloses a health problem or their religious belief in their mail, you may need to ask them for permission to keep it. In summary: At most, GDPR would require you to promptly delete the email once you no longer need it (which could be immediately if the email is irrelevant to you). If the email contains data you legitimately need (e.g. a complaint you need to follow up on), you are allowed to keep it as required (based on Article 6 (f)). Note that in both cases no explicit consent is required from the email sender, unless the email contains particularly sensitive data, such as political/religious beliefs or health data.

For land ownership records and other similar scenarios such as business directors, the requirement for these to be public will be in legislation rather than a contract - this provides the legal basis, see GDPR Article 6(1c). Additionally when government departments are doing it they also have 6(1e) as lawful basis: "1. Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: ... (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; ... (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;" -- GDPR, Article 6(1c,e). I'm not familiar enough with the specific legislation that will apply here but pretty sure this will be the case, and having said this you may well find public registries also become less public going forward. The reason ICANN has come under fire, is partly because under GDPR privacy is a protected fundamental right and therefore to comply personal data should be kept private by default and privacy never something you would be required to pay extra for. Any contract ICANN have in place with their registrars will not override legislation, it is in fact the other way around. "2. The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons." -- GDPR, Article 25(2). This doesn't stop ICANN from maintaining a register of domain name owners (registrants), but it does mean they can't just publish all records upon request to anyone anymore - whether people will be granted access to personal data will now depend on if they have a lawful basis for this, and in these cases their processing of the personal data will be limited to those purposes. Being nosey doesn't count! "When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of the contract." -- GDPR, Article 7 (4) - Conditions for consent. What this means essentially, is that if the consent is conditional for the contract it will not be treated as freely given, and therefore not valid - it will no longer be acceptable to contractually bind the provision of a product or service with consent to publish personal data or any other form of processing such as marketing mailing lists. Looking now at the specific points you have raised: "GDPR article 6 allows for processing of personal data on a contractual basis (section 1b)" Whilst this is true, this is only part of it - it doesn't allow for unlimited processing for any purpose and sharing it with any people, if you look at Article 5(b) it states that the information is collected for specific explicit legitimate purposes. Each purpose requires its own legal basis and needs to be compatible with the principles of GDPR. Without consent, ICANN currently does not have a legal basis to make the WHOIS records public for EU citizens and should have adopted some technical controls to require them to opt-in if they wish to be included in the public register. They're coming under fire for non-compliance having been given 2 years to prepare and change their systems/processes. "processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;" Again whilst this is true, not all processing is necessary for the performance of a contract. In the same way people must give consent to receive marketing communications, they must freely give consent for their information to be shared/published (separate to the contract for provision of service) in the absence of other lawful basis for this processing. "Also section 1c, processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;" There is no legislation which requires them to publish the personal data of domain name registrants. In this paragraph 'legal obligations' refers to those required by legislation (i.e. statutory obligations), not contracts (or non-statutory obligations) which are covered under Article 6(1b). "And finally section 1e, processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;" ICANN has no official government-assigned authority, and publishing the personal data globally is not in the interests of the data subject's or others' welfare or well-being - this is what is meant by 'public interest'. As far as I can see what ICANN are actually doing to comply seems to be accepted by the European Data Protection Board, they are only 'under fire' as you say because they are late in doing so. The deadline was 25th May 2018 and they had 2 years to prepare like all other organisations.

Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway.

According to my knowledge I am not allowed to share other people's full name nor phone number nor email address without their permission. That is not correct. According to GDPR Article 2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data ... ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; GDPR Recital 18 states in relevant part: (2) Personal or household activities could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. Personal data that is not processed by "automated means", for example data which is transmitted verbally, by hand writing, or by manually sent email, is not covered by the GDPR. Data which is used by a natural person for "personal activities" is also not covered. Consulting one's personal lawyer might well be a personal activity unless it is a business matter. Even if such a transfer of data were in scope for the GDPR, consent of the data subject (DS) is not the only available lawful basis. GDPR article 6 permits any of several possible lawful bases to be used, particularly paragraph 1 point (f) which reads: (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Also possibly relevant is point (c) which reads: processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; In short, providing one's personal lawyer with the names and addresses of relevant people in connection with a legal issue is not at all likely to be prohibited by the GDPR, nor to require the consent of the people whose names and contact info are provided. However, a comment by user PMF reads: The Data Protection laws are mostly for companies, not for individuals. This is an overstatement. The laws do apply to natural persons as DCs, although enforcement is largely targeted at businesses, particularly large, for-profit businesses.

No, it's not legal. The General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) apply given that you are in the UK (regardless of where the Data Processor is based). The UK GDPR is slightly modified due to Brexit, but the same principles apply. The only plausible legal basis for this actions would be that you consent to it, and you're entitled to withdraw that consent at any time. Some may claim that Article 6.1(b) applies, i.e. that it's necessary to send marketing email in order to fulfil the contract, but GDPR is clear that bundling such consent into a contract for service simply to permit the data processor additional actions isn't allowed, as I'll demonstrate. UK GDPR requires that consent to use your personal information (in this case, your email address) for the stated purpose be freely given. Consent to use your information for direct marketing is not freely given if it's inseparable from the consent to use it for some other service, as per para 43: Consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. And Article 7.4 backs this up with When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. The intent of Article 6.1(b) is that only the processing required for the service you have bought is allowed (e.g. if you supply your address for delivery of stuff you've bought, the data processor can use that address to send you the stuff, but is not allowed to add a contract term that allows them to send you unwanted stuff). Examples of emails that Article 6.1(b) would allow (in my assessment) include things such as notification of upcoming downtime, or a reminder that subscriptions are due, but not unsolicited advertisements for other products. There's a grey area that's open to interpretation, where adverts are piggybacked onto actual service messages.

GDPR seems quite clear that if you are recording calls, video and/or audio, you must get consent. Wrong. The GDPR requires that your have a legal basis for processing personal data. Consent is a legal basis but there are others. With respect to note taking, the GDPR only applies to “personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.” So, if they notes are not about an individual (and many B2B phone calls will not be) or are neither automated nor filed, the GDPR does not apply. If they are captured by the GDPR, you need to have a legal basis for the notes. Again, consent is one but it is not the only one.

united-states Is a personal text (like a diary), submitted without the consent of the author, admissible evidence? Usually, it is admissible evidence. There is no legal right to keep your diary private. Production of a diary may be compelled by subpoena and admitted into evidence subject only to general considerations regarding whether particular entries in the diary are inadmissible for some other reason (e.g. lack of relevance, they recite the contents of an otherwise privileged discussion, they contain hearsay, they recite the terms of a settlement offer, the recite inadmissible prior act evidence, etc.). If the diary revealed information that could place the diarist at risk of criminal prosecution, the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination could arguably be claimed even in a civil case, but at the risk of an adverse inference to be drawn from that decision in civil matters. I haven't ever seen how that issue is resolved legally.

If a man's name is on the birth certificate, but all were aware that he is not the blood father, and the couple separates, is he responsible legally? Mother was already pregnant with twins when they got back together. She asked him to be on the birth certificate so that the bio dad couldn't have any claims on them. The bio dad has not ever even asked about them or their well being. The man in question here, has helped raise them, in doing 90% of the care for the twins who are now six. The couple separated and she now is trying to threaten him with having to keep the kids 50% of the time and pay child support and they're not even really his children. Can she do this???

british-columbia Parentage For all purposes in British Columbia law, a child's parent is the person determined under Part 3 of the Family Law Act (see s. 23(b)). Outside of the context of assisted reproduction, there are a series of presumptions that apply unless the contrary is proved. A "male person" is presumed to be a child's biological father in any of the following circumstances: he was married to the child's birth mother on the day of the child's birth (s. 26(2)(a)) he was married to the child's birth mother and, within 300 days before the child's birth, the marriage was ended by his death, a divorce, or voiding (s. 26(2)(b)) he married the child's birth mother after the child's birth and acknowledges he is the father (s. 26(2)(c)) he was living with the child's birth mother in a marriage-like relationship within 300 days before, or on the day of, the child's birth (s. 26(2)(d)) he has acknowledged that he is the child's father by having signed a statement to register as the father on the birth certificate or agreement (s. 26(2)(e)) he has acknowledged that he is the child's father by having signed an agreement under section 20 of the Child Paternity and Support Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 49 (s. 26(2)(f)) If by operation of the presumptions, more than one person may be presumed to be the biological father, then no presumption applies. If parentage can be resolved by one of these presumptions (based on the facts in the hypothetical, it is possible that presumption s. 26(2)(d) might apply, and also likely s. 26(2)(e), since he is on the birth certificate), that answers the question, unless someone attempts to prove that the presumption is incorrect. If someone wants to disprove the presumption, they can apply for an order declaring parentage. When hearing such an application, the judge will consider all relevant evidence, including testimony of parties and witnesses, physical evidence, genetic testing, expert opinion, etc. The burden is on the party seeking the order to displace the presumption, on a balance of probabilities. Parenting arrangement Parenting arrangements ("trying to threaten him with having to keep the kids 50% of the time") can not be imposed by one party on another. Parenting arrangements must be by agreement, or by court order (s. 40). If done by court order, the court "must consider the best interests of the child only" (s. 37). Child support If a person is a parent, they generally have a duty to provide child support for the child (s. 147). Child support from stepparent Even if the person demonstrates that they are not a parent, they can owe child support by court order if they are a stepparent ("a person who is a spouse of the child's parent and lived with the child's parent and the child during the child's life") who has contributed to the support of the child for at least one year (s. 147(4), (5)).

Married (or married at the time of birth) fathers have equal rights to custody as mothers in AZ. There are no (active) laws establishing that a mother is to be given more rights to a child in a custody arrangement than a father. This is a little different for unmarried fathers because paternity is not assumed, it must be established. Married fathers are presumed to be the father of the child automatically. AZ used to follow the tender years doctrine where preference was given to mothers during the child's younger years. There is an entire somewhat interesting history there on the linked page. This has mostly been phased out in the United States in favor of the "best interest of the child" doctrine. So provided that you are financially stable, have a stable living environment, and can provide for your child, you as the father should have equal standing in a court with regards to custody. I say "should" because many judges still lean towards the mother. For your specific case I'd immediately talk to a family court advocate. They can get you in front of a judge with your estranged wife either being "in absentia" (not present) or ordered to be in court and produce an order to return the child to the home state. It will also help a custody case later on to establish that you are actively seeking a relationship with the child and you are being denied that (keep records of everything, phone calls, texts, letters, emails, etc).

What would be the best course of action now? It has been six months with no communication from him or his estate lawyer, and no will has been filed with the court. Since it's not entering probate, is there any guarantee that he has to faithfully execute the conditions of the will at all or notify any of the beneficiaries? Without probate, can he simply choose to not execute the will? A will has no effect or validity until it is admitted to probate. You can't do anything with a will outside a probate proceeding. Usually state law requires that a will that is in someone's possession be lodged with the court, whether or not they plan on opening up a probate estate, but this requirement is widely ignored. Unlike a will, a trust can be administered without court supervision, without being admitted to probate, although usually, the trust is required to file a notice of its existence with the court if it has become irrevocable (a requirement that is also widely ignored). The trustee of a trust has a fiduciary duty to administer the trust in accordance with its terms and to keep the beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about it. Again, sometimes the notice to the beneficiaries is overlooked. Also, it wouldn't be unusual for someone to inaccurately say that a will provided that a certain thing happen, when, in fact, that was a provision in a trust. People are sloppy in ordinary conversation about the distinctions between wills and trusts. If a trust was drafted to avoid probate, the will is probably just a "pour over will" which states that if there is any property that is not in the trust as her death that it is hereby transferred to the trust. Normally, a person would not have both a trust designed to avoid probate and a will with substantive provisions at the same time. If you suspect that you know who the trustee is, the first step would be to write a formal letter that you can prove was sent and received (e.g. via certified mail or FedEx), asking if there is a trust, and if there is one, if you are a beneficiary of that trust, and asking for the trust agreement (or at least the parts of it pertinent to you status as beneficiary). If the person that you suspect is trustee is a trustee, he has a legal duty to let you know these things (which doesn't mean that he necessarily will do so). If you fail to receive cooperation or a response after this initial inquiry, you may need to hire counsel to attempt to obtain this information through the courts.

My lawyer answers my question, thinking he is giving legal advice to a non-client when he is actually answering a client's question. But if you read the FAQ, posts at law.stachexchange are not legal advice. In fact, questions that are so specific as to risk becoming a request for legal advice are routinely closed. But let's go further: The issue at hand is not the one your lawyer is hired to help you with. He is not your lawyer for that issue. Even if we considered the relationship through law.stackexchange legal representation, the conversation would not be privileged. You are posting in a public forum, and expecting reply in the same way. You are free to waive the privilege of communication with your lawyer, and you are doing that by using this way of communicating with him. At this point, the only thing your lawyer would have done would be voluntarily giving for free some info that he could have billed you for. What exactly would be the issue here? It is exactly what pro bono is for. The only way to breach confidentiality would be if your lawyer were to convey things that you said to him confidentially to the public, but here it would not be relevant if the OPs author were already his customer or not.

Imputed income is a legitimate concept, but it is hard to prove, particularly when there is an earning history to back up the claim that there is no malingering. Ultimately, the question is what that particular individual could earn and whether that particular individual was intentionally being lazy in order to influence child support. At a minimum an earnings history and testimony from Mary would be strong evidence disproving the claim, and it would probably take expert testimony to make any kind of credible claim that more income should be imputed that would still be unlikely to succeed. If more money were at stake, a battle of the experts with experts on each side with one testifying that Mary could earn more and the other debunking that expert's testimony, would be appropriate. But, for $300 a month at issue, it probably doesn't make economic sense for either party to hire any kind of expert. And, a judge is usually going to take some random statistical study much less seriously than a history of earnings and testimony from the franchise owner about why it earned more or less than average.

It depends on the jurisdiction. The term you are looking for is “paternity fraud”, and depending on where you are in the world, you can challenge paternity even after accepting the child as your own. The wikipedia page lists several examples where the man has been successful. It also lists several examples where the man has been unsuccessful and has been ordered to continue paying child support.

north-carolina A parent is responsible for supporting their minor child, therefore they cannot "kick out" their child (they can arrange for someone else to take care of the child but they are financially responsible for this arrangement). This is true even if the parent is a minor. In that case, the grandparents and the parent (who is herself a minor child) are both responsible for the grandchild. We can turn to NCGS § 50-13.4(b) which states the hierarchy of responsibilities: In the absence of pleading and proof that the circumstances otherwise warrant, parents of a minor, unemancipated child who is the custodial or noncustodial parent of a child shall share this primary liability for their grandchild's support with the minor parent, the court determining the proper share, until the minor parent reaches the age of 18 or becomes emancipated. If both the parents of the child requiring support were unemancipated minors at the time of the child's conception, the parents of both minor parents share primary liability for their grandchild's support until both minor parents reach the age of 18 or become emancipated. The details could be different in another jurisdiction.

Yes, but that doesn't make the theft not theft At the time of the crime, Joe committed theft. The state can prosecute Joe for that theft. Alice's subsequent gift does not change this although it would prevent her from suing for recovery. As a practical matter, if Alice was willing to lie and say that the gift preceded the theft or she had given permission for the item to be taken, this would almost surely create reasonable doubt in any prosecution. However, on a pure "these are the facts" basis, the theft is a theft.

Is there a path through the courts to sue the US government to allow a national referendum? I know there’s not an existing avenue to get a national referendum on the ballot, but is there a path through the court system, the damages being that the elected representatives are benefiting from a system (specifically campaign funding) that actually hurts the democratic processes and all citizens?

This would require a constitutional amendment (overriding the First Amendment), which can be done in two ways. Congress can write an amendment and submit it to the states; or the states can call for a convention. None of these methods can be implemented by any number of courts.

As a comment by @DavidSchwartz notes, this is not wrong. Questions of law but not fact are allowed. It is worth noting that the line drawn is arbitrary. In Colorado, where I practice, jurors issue written questions (pre-reviewed by the judge and counsel for all parties before being presented) to witnesses at the close of the testimony of each witness called by a party to testify. This is very helpful to counsel, as it provides indirect evidence of whether the jury understands what they are being told, and often juries will directly ask questions that for tactical reasons, both parties have refrained from asking that go to the heart of the matter. It also frequently clarifies misunderstandings that trained legal professionals assumed were not made about terminology. This is more problematic in criminal trials, where jury questions could provide evidence pushing a case over the threshold of proof needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution failed to provide, than in civil cases with a preponderance of the evidence standard. Also, as a matter of reality, when jurors ask questions, counsel often loathe to object even when they have valid grounds to do so, for fear of offending the decision-maker, unless it is really critical to keep certain information away from the jury.

The courts do not supersede your constitutional rights, although you may believe that you have a constitutional right that isn't actually there. This article discusses the position that "due process forbids convicting an individual of a crime unless the government proves the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt". This standard is actually not stated anywhere in the US Constitution, but it has been assumed as an implicit meaning of "due process". It sounds like you were charged with a crime, and there is most likely an applicable statute in your state that is analogous to RCW 26.50.110 in Washington. So you have the right to a trial and the prosecution would have the obligation to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appears that you did violate the applicable law and you were willing to plead guilty, as urged by your attorney. You are correct that you don't technically have to prove your innocence, but there is a practical problem that if the prosecution provides some weak evidence that you violated the law, then the jury might decide that your failure to refute the evidence means that there is no reasonable doubt. The problem is that there is a tendency for jurors to think that the defendant has to create a doubt. States differ somewhat in how they explain the burden of proof to jurors, and you might fare better in a state where the instruction is that "you must be firmly convinced". Since the attorney seems to have said that "the constitution doesn't apply to this", this is a puzzle. I would not assume (though it is possible) that the attorney was incompetent. It is possible that he was speaking of a non-criminal matter, and it is possible that you were talking at cross purposes. There is no legal situation where "the constitution doesn't apply to this", but perhaps "that constitutional limitation doesn't apply to this specific situation". Regardless of what the attorney said, your attorney doesn't violate your rights, even if he gives you bad advice. The actual court might, and then you would have a cause for an appeal. Similarly, if the district attorney reasonably believes that you are a danger to society and is prosecuting you, that is not a violation of your constitutional rights. An improper conviction would be a violation of those rights, although it might take an appeal to get the court to recognize that fact.

A lawsuit would be unsuccessful. Prosecutors have discretion to prioritize whichever offenses they think are most important, and they are generally immune from civil liability. This is a political grievance, and it comes with a political remedy; voters can recall the DA or vote for a new one when his term ends.

The government can’t withdraw The government does not have a right to unilaterally withdraw charges once the case is before the court. All they can do is ask the court to dismiss the case as they have done here. It’s up to the court (judge) to decide whether to grant the motion to dismiss or not. It granted, then the case has gone to completion and the defendant is legally not subject to punishment as they were not convicted of the crime, notwithstanding any previous guilty plea. Now, while it would be unusual for a judge to refuse such a motion it’s not impossible and they might do so if they felt that the interests of justice are better served by completing the trial in the usual way. This is possibly more common in civil litigation where a losing plaintiff might not be permitted to settle if the judge doesn’t feel an innocent defendant is being adequately compensated.

Sending a letter to the Governor is legal You can do it, I can do it and the elected officials of Lancaster County can do it. Thanks to the first amendment, that letter can say pretty much anything you like subject to limits that themselves are subject to strict scrutiny - things like threats and defamation. Outlining a course of action that you propose to take is legal even if that course of action is itself illegal. I will also point out that people - sometimes even politicians - have been known to say things they don't mean. However, that just begs the question ... This article explains what's going on and, more importantly, the actual letter is here. I've read it. Twice. I can't see where the county proposes to do anything concrete that might be considered illegal. Apart from the first paragraph, the entire letter appears to be a case for why the county should be permitted to move from red to yellow on May 15 and they are asking for the Governor's support. Even the first paragraph is ambiguous; while it asks the Governor to move the county from "red" to "yellow" and states that they "intend to move forward with a plan" it is by no means clear that that plan is moving from "red" to "yellow" even though you could get that impression on a casual reading. Basically, what they intend to do is so vague that it's impossible to tell if it's legal or not. Of course, just because something is illegal doesn't mean it can't be done. The USA is a free country and the fundamental freedom is to reap the consequences of your actions. If the county does something1 then the state can take them to court - the court will decide if it's legal or not. 1 Or threatens to do something sufficiently concrete that an injunction against it could be issued.

No. The Flag Code is not a criminal law, so the government is not permitted to bring criminal prosecution for violating it, and it therefore cannot secure a proper conviction for such a violation.

In broad terms, in a three pillar democracy, the job of the legislature is to make the law, the job of the executive is to enforce the law and the job of the courts is to interpret the law. The courts may find that a piece of legislation is invalid, either in whole or in part for any number of reasons. The legislature can respond by: Repealing the legislation Changing the legislation to remove the invalidity Doing nothing. Your first question is why would they go for option 3? I can, off the cuff, think of several reasons: Time pressures, a legislature can only deal with so many pieces of legislation per year - it may not be a worthwhile investment of time to "tidy up" the statute books. Possibility of appeal, the precedent may be open to appeal or having an alternative ruling in a higher court. Precedent, unless and until the decision reaches the Supreme Court or equivalent then the decision is only binding on lower courts. Possibility of change to superordinate legislation, in the particular circumstance you cite, the local authority may leave the law on the books in the hope or expectation that the state law may be repealed or overturned - the local law would then be valid. For your second question, the judge is supposed to know. That said, judges make mistakes so a wise plaintiff/defendant will draw the judge's attention to the current state of the law. It would certainly look bad for them on appeal if it emerged that they did know and allowed the judge to make a mistake. Firstly, they are officers of the court and secondly, justice is blind but justices may remember you made them look like a fool! For your third question ... maybe. However, such a claim would be limited to what you actually lost through your lawyer's malpractice. It can't be the case because you couldn't win it anyway - the law was against you! You may be able to argue that the lawyer should be responsible for some of the costs or losses that arose from you failing to settle earlier. Good luck with that.

Does a YouTuber have any copyrights over a mirrored video? On YouTube, it is common for users to upload videos that they have created or own the rights to. However, some users may attempt to avoid copyright infringement by uploading mirrored versions of videos that they do not own the rights to. In these cases, does the original YouTuber still have any copyrights over a mirrored version of their video? Can they still make a claim against the uploader for using their content without permission?

First of all, taking a video made by someone else, making alterations and then distributing the resulting work is probably already a copyright violation. There are exemptions like fair use (check the comments for an example), but just taking a whole video, mirroring it and reposting it without any own contribution very likely does not constitute fair use. The people who do that don't avoid copyright infingement. They just try to avoid getting caught by any automatic system YouTube has in place to detect copyright infringements. But avoiding automatic filters does not mean to avoid DMCA takedown notices, cease&desist letters or lawsuits from real humans who find a mirrored version of their video and feel that their copyright was violated. However, alterations to a creative work can be a creative work in itself. So regardless of the fact that one violated copyright in creating a derivative work, that derivative work might still be eligible for copyright in its own right. That means someone who reposts a video originally made by party A and then altered by party B would violate the copyright of both A and B at once and thus expose themselves to potential legal actions from either party. But the question is if simply mirroring a video constitutes the necessary threshold of originality to make the resulting work eligible for copyright. In most courts, it probably would not.

See https://stackoverflow.com/legal/terms-of-service and https://law.stackexchange.com/help/licensing. As with most social media sites, your contribution of content does not transfer ownership of any copyright in the content; rather, you grant to the platform a non-exclusive license. Because the license is not exclusive, you can grant similar or different licenses to other parties, which generally happens when you post the same content on other sites. (Of course, you can only grant licenses when you own the copyright or have a license that allows you to grant a further license, so posting content created by others can be complicated; this seems to be beyond the scope of the question, though, so I mention it only in passing.) To answer with respect to a specific site, of course, you have to look at the site's terms of service.

Public domain means that there is no (longer) copyright in the given work. This means that all rights associated with copyright are not controlled by anyone and there is no way to run afoul of copyright laws (note that in some countries a true "public domain" doesn't exist). Assuming you're correct that these works are in public domain, answers to your particular questions are: Does that mean I can play the video's as much as I want to any size crowd I wanted? Could I charge money to watch the videos? Yes and yes. If something is in the public domain does that mean all the parts of that thing are? This kind of begs the question. A work in public domain has no copyright in it. If one of its part has copyright, then it's not really public domain is it? What about the characters in the videos, could I make a new Bugs Bunny or Might Mouse animation on my own? If I wanted to use Popeye or Betty Boop or daffy duck in a video game could I? Copyright isn't your issue here, trademarks are. The characters are most likely trademarked, meaning you generally can't use them in your own works without licensing.

No, one cannot safely assume that because some people have done a thing without being sued, that it is OK to do a similar thing and no suit is possible. It is possible that people who upload a video, or a section of it, have permission. It is perhaps more likely that the copyright owner does not choose to sue, for whatever reason. But a different owner of a different video might make a different choice. Uploading a video, or even a section of a video, without permission, will be copyright infringement, unless an exception to copyright such as fair use or fair dealing applies. Such an infringement gives the copyright owner valid grounds to bring a suit. But the owner can choose whether or not to sue. An owner can sue in one case of infringement but not in another, for any reason or none. If the expected damages are small, it many not be worth the time, trouble, and costs to sue. In the US, one must register a copyright before bringing suit for infringement of that copyright, and there is a fee for registration. Some owners feel strongly about the use of their work, and will sue on any pretext. Some may prefer to tacitly support uses that they approve of by not bringing suit. One cannot tell the attitude of a particular owner unless that owner has stated what his or her view is. Short films are just as protected as full-length feature films, and suit can be filed for infringing the copyright on a short film. But the more expensive a film was to make, and the more money the owner expects it to earn, the more likely it is that the owner will choose to sue. Many people infringe by uploading short films or videos, gambling that the copyright owners will never learn of this, or will not trouble to sue. Sometimes such infringers are correct, and sometimes they get sued. I do not understand what the OP means by the part of the question that reads "There should be more detail and complex lines over here" What additional detail is wanted? Who does the OP expect to provide it? What sort of "lines" does this refer to?

This has some basis in law. You need permission from a person to commercially exploit their likeness especially in California, and a waiver is a way of staving off future lawsuit over right of publicity. YT has a privacy policy whereby a person who have been filmed can request removal of the video (see also this, because they don't explain the policy in a single place). Because YT is commercially exploiting people's personalities, this is necessary.

No license can create patent protection for the subject of your videos. Licenses apply to the copyright that is inherently created when you create the video. Patents can only be obtained by applying for them through patent offices. Your video would act as prior art if anyone (including yourself, with some exceptions) later tries to apply for patent protection of any of the inventions shown in the video. For you, the US (and a few other countries) offers a 1 year grace period following your public disclosure, during which you are still allowed to file a patent application on the inventions without the video counting as prior art; in most other countries, the video would immediately disqualify you from protecting the subject inventions, unless you file a patent application before publishing the video.

It would be copyright infringement. You had the copyright holders permission to make one copy of the song by downloading it. At that time, if you gave me a copy of that song, it could be argued that very, very little damage was caused because I just had downloaded that song myself with practically the same effect. Today, that argument is not valid anymore. So this is definitely copyright infringement. That's your question answered. I doubt that anyone would take action if you gave a copy to someone and it was found out. Making it available to the world for free download is another matter. That could easily get you into trouble; in the USA there could be a fine up to $150,000 without any proof of actual damages needed.

Go to court and find out There is no doubt that humming a tune and recording it (or performing it in public) is a derivative work - a right reserved to the copyright owner. Whether it is fair use depends on the specifics of the case. From the tweet, we simply don’t have enough information, however, at a guess, it is probably not fair use. Fair use in law is Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 17 U.S.C. § 106 and 17 U.S.C. § 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include: the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Most people miss “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,” - if you aren’t doing one of those things then you start behind the 8-ball when yo move to the 4 factor test. Note that the “criticism, comment, news reporting,” etc. must be about the copyrighted work - I can’t use your copyrighted work to, for example, parody a politician unless you are that politician. Many people have completely the wrong idea about what copyright infringement and fair use actually are, in part because the use of music on YouTube is allowed, not because it’s fair use but, because YouTube was smart enough to negotiate and pay for a permissive licence with music producers. For a full explanation, see this video.

Legal recognition of polygamy around the world? Are you aware of any country of the world in which polygamy (with no restrictions over the gender of the involved people) is legally recognized or at least there is some battle for it?

Nowhere is this legal. Polygamy is legal in 58 countries, polyandry is possibly legal in Sri Lanka and Bhutan. Neither country recognizes same-sex marriage, ruling out a marriage between three women. The law of Bhutan is clear on the requirement of male-female mixing, only allowing marriage between 1 man and 1 woman at a time. In Sri Lanka, the Kandyan Marriage and Divorce Act also allows multiple husbands for a woman, but only for Kandyans (Buddhist from the former provinces of the Kandyan Kingdom).

There is no such law in the US, although there many laws prohibiting specific forms of harm, for example laws against murder, theft, assault, arson. All laws are predicated on the idea that an illegal act causes harm, but I don't get to deem, for example, that you are harming society by opposing Satan. There are no laws prohibiting any belief in the US, and such a law would be unconstitutional (in violation of the First Amendment). So being a Satanist could not possibly be illegal.

Sure, but Qatar is not in the jurisdiction of the ECHR! For the ECHR to apply in a jurisdiction, Qatar would need to have signed it or be in the EU or at least have been in it. It never has been. In fact, not even Den Haque would have power over Qatar unless they allowed it to - and that court rules on matters of war crimes... Qatar does not guarantee the same rights you might be familiar with from most western countries. In fact, not even all western countries are the same. In America, you can use the Sieg Heil gesture, in Germany, you can end in jail for it.. Same for Propaganda materials.

If you want to sue them, you should start with the US Constitution (as a model), in particular the Free Exercise clause: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof". The question is whether one could overturn homicide statutes on the grounds that an individual holds to traditional beliefs that a human sacrifice is required every few months. Or, is it an unconstitutional prohibition of the Mormon belief in polygamy to outlaw polygamy, see Reynolds v. US, 98 U.S. 145. The court held that the statute immediately under consideration is within the legislative power of Congress. It is constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of action for all those residing in the Territories, and in places over which the United States have exclusive control. This being so, the only question which remains is whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship; would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Observe that a religious exception to the law would be unconstitutional, as establishing religion as a means of gaining extra rights. The reductio ad absurdum of the unfettered religious-belief excuse is: Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and, in effect, to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances. The "wall of separation" was modified more recently in the 60's and 70's. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, the issue was compulsory education imposed on Amish children, where higher education was held to be antithetical to the Amish doctrine of a simple life. The court rules that The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children and especially it was incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish There were additional holdings pertaining to the legitimacy of the purported belief (that is, is there really such a doctrine – clearly yes). You might have better luck purporting to be a Rastafarian or Hindu, so I will set aside that complication. The core question will be whether the government has a "compelling interest" in the restriction, also whether the restriction is narrowly tailored. In the case of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, Sherbert's employer required her to work 6 days a week (a change in policy during her time of employment), which she refused to do (as a member of SDA) and was fired. Sherbert was denied unemployment benefits because the firing was for cause. The court ruled that Disqualification of appellant for unemployment compensation benefits, solely because of her refusal to accept employment in which she would have to work on Saturday contrary to her religious belief, imposes an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of her religion. and There is no compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute which justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's right to religious freedom under the First Amendment. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 brings us to the neighborhood that you are interested in living in. The relevant detail is that Smith (and Black) were fired for ingesting peyote in connection with a ceremony at a Native American church. The court ruled that The Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit sacramental peyote use, and thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use To be more precise, Although a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" in violation of the Clause if it sought to ban the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts solely because of their religious motivation, the Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons. We can contrast this with Lukumi v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520. The city of Hialeh passed an ordinance forbidding animal sacrifice, specifically to suppress the Santeria church. The Supreme Court said, no, you may not do that: Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability. However, where such a law is not neutral or not of general application, it must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny: It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied ... The ordinances' texts and operation demonstrate that they are not neutral, but have as their object the suppression of Santeria's central element, animal sacrifice. At least so far, restrictions on drug use have not been overruled as conflicting the the Free Exercise clause, although if e.g. Washington state were to prohibit Mormons from purchasing marijuana (where others can), that would surely be struck down as unconstitutional. There are a number of other relevant developments, for example Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993, in reaction to Employment v. Smith, and that law statutorily mandating that strict scrutiny be applied to the question of whether a law violates the 1st: but this was ruled unconstitutional as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507. Then in Gonzales v. O Centro, 546 U.S. 418 (Schedule 1 tea for religious purposes), the court ruled that The courts below did not err in determining that the Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling interest in barring the UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca which is to say, we have a case where the federal government was prohibited from enforcing a drug prohibition involving religion. A challenge of the type which you have in mind will surely also involve the question of the legitimacy of the purported religion, where UDV was founded in 1961 whereas one might suspect that your claimed religion is a pretext to smoke pot (hence the Rastafarian suggestion). The WWII era conscious objector cases held that the CO exception to military service is not limited to governmentally-approved religions, but as a general rule, the courts have not ruled that you can simply claim to have a religious belief which is being infringed on and thereby be excempt from the law. The basic issue would be whether either the US government of the state of Kentucky have a compelling interest in preventing the use of marijuana. The Kentucky Supreme Court does indeed recognize the concept of "strict scrutiny", so the case is not doomed from the start.

Some people seem to believe that just because something happens 'in the internet' it is somehow outside normal jurisdictions. Wrong. In may be harder to investigate and prosecute crimes in the internet, but the laws apply all the same. There are some problems when it is unclear 'where in the world' something did happen -- in the jurisdiction of the perpetrator, the victim, or the service provider? But problems of jurisdiction apply e.g. to international fraud cases in the non-web-world as well. In many jurisdictions, the informed and voluntary consent makes some things legal which would otherwise be illegal. For instance, if two boxers get into the ring, it is understood that each of them did consent to be hit by the other. But usually two fighters could not legally agree to a fight to the death, because even if there are laws on assisted suicide, they do not apply to a fight. Insults, libel, and slander are not on the same level as homicide. There are jurisdictions where they are not prosecuted without the request of the victim. But an insult might also violate other laws, e.g. disturbing the peace. So don't bet on such an app unless you know for sure which jurisdictions are involved.

The law was first promulgated on June 8, 1940 By the 76th Congress. The original text is here. It doesn’t seem to be a particularly important piece of legislation and I can find commentary on it and I’m not going to read the debates - if you do, please get back to us. Two points to note, it was passed at a time when most of the rest of the world was at war and the US was quietly preparing to be at war and it seems to be intended to fill a gap in state law since conviction under state law is a defence under Federal.

The first thing to note is that your question is kind of the wrong way around. US states are sovereign and generally have the ability to make any kind of laws they want, unless they violate some specific tenet of federal law or the US Constitution. You suggest, for instance, that arguments which are "culturally founded" have no place in the law, but that's just your opinion, and there isn't generally anything preventing a state from making law based on such things, should its elected legislature see fit to do so. (Indeed, one could argue that nearly all laws are in some sense "culturally founded", since they are based on some notion of what kind of behavior is or is not appropriate, and those tend to be culturally based.) So legally speaking, the states aren't, by default, obligated to give any sort of justification for the laws they made. The burden of proof is on the other side. Someone seeking to overturn those laws would have to convince a court that the laws violated some specific provision of the Constitution (or another superior law). If they couldn't convince a court of this, the law would stand. From what I have read, before the US Supreme Court's 2015 legalization of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, the previous precedent was set in 1971 by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Baker v. Nelson. The decision itself is quite short and is worthwhile to read. Quoting Wikipedia's summary, the plaintiffs claimed that Minnesota's restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples violated several provisions of the US Constitution: First Amendment (freedom of speech and of association), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), Ninth Amendment (unenumerated right to privacy), and Fourteenth Amendment (fundamental right to marry under the Due Process Clause and sex discrimination contrary to the Equal Protection Clause). The Minnesota court determined that none of the plaintiffs' objections were valid. Again, I'll refer you to the decision for the details, but the court mainly focused on their Fourteenth Amendment arguments (the others may have been addressed by the trial court, whose opinion I can't find online). They wrote: The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, like the due process clause, is not offended by the state's classification of persons authorized to marry. There is no irrational or invidious discrimination. They specifically rejected any analogy to bans on interracial marriage, which had been held unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia: But in commonsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex. Baker appealed to the US Supreme Court, but his appeal was dismissed "for want of a substantial federal question," without any further explanation. (Nobody quite seems to understand what they meant by that, but here is an essay discussing the situation in a little more depth.) The effect of the dismissal was that the Minnesota court's decision became binding precedent upon the whole nation - laws against same-sex marriage didn't violate those provisions of the Constitution. And that was how matters stood for 44 years until Obergefell. (Of course, there was nothing to stop individual states from deciding to allow same-sex marriage, and some in fact did so in the meantime.) You have suggested that laws against same-sex marriage were religiously motivated. This might suggest an argument that they would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs in Baker didn't raise that point, so it wasn't considered in the Minnesota court's opinion. I don't know whether any other courts have considered it; no such argument was mentioned in the opinion in Obergefell.

Independent Thought vs Union Of India (2017) apparently states the law of India, presently, and the answer is, 18. India being a common law country, the Supreme Court has the power to interpret the law when the statutory language might suggest something else. The issue is that marital intercourse is often an exception to rape laws (India does not recognize rape between husband and wife). The court ruled that "sexual intercourse with a girl below 18 years of age is rape regardless of whether she is married or not". The court found the legal distinction between married girls and unmarried girls to be unnecessary and artificial, discriminatory, and not in the best interest of the girl child. They leave untouched the lack of application of rape law to married couples over 18. This extends legal prohibitions beyond what is stated in POCSO, a law discussed in para 37 ff of the ruling. One can detect in degree of dissatisfaction on the court's part with the legislature's failure to reach the conclusion that they announce.

Why no right to a jury trial in Espionage Act trials? Why are defendants in trials for alleged criminal violations of the 1917 US Espionage Act, -- as, say, Julian Assange would be if extradited to the US -- not afforded the same right to an open and public jury trial that all other defendants in criminal cases are allowed? Is this patent violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial written into the Espionage Act itself,or is it justified by arguments from other legal precedents?

There is no exception arising from the Espionage Act, indeed in Gorin v. US, 312 U.S. 19, one of the holdings is that "In a prosecution under §§ 1(b) and 2 of the Espionage Act, the jury determines whether the acts of the defendants were connected with or related to the national defense under proper tests laid down by the instructions". This does not mean that the prosecution will not be eager to avoid the possibility of jury nullification and may hope for a bench trial. Here is the transcript of the jury verdict in the trial of the Rosenbergs, and another report of an espionage conviction in a trial by jury. There is no evidence that Assange "would not be afforded a trial by jury" if he requested it.

While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court.

In the US, a person is "within their rights" to invoke the Fifth Amendment, i.e. refuse to self-incriminate. However, the government can give a person immunity from prosecution for offenses having to do with the testimony, in which case he can be compelled to testify. A person is not required to guess about whether they could actually be convicted based on their testimony. It is the privilege of the court (judge) to determine whether a witness has "a reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer" (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17).

This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal.

An existing law actually prohibits using census data "against" a person, see this recent question. The 5th Amendment ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself") is not interpreted to imply an absolute privilege to not answer, it means that your answer cannot be used against you in a criminal case. You can be compelled to testify "against yourself" if you are granted immunity from prosecution.

I think you're referring to this image: This is the prosecutor pointing the AR-15 at the jury. Evidence, including guns, is allowed in the courtroom, but the prosecutor was widely criticized for his dramatic antics: pointing it directly at the jury, with his finger on the trigger (the rifle should have been checked for being empty, but not having your finger on the trigger unless you intend to shoot, no matter what, is elementary gun safety).

How would jury selection work for a trial of Donald Trump? Just like it does for everybody else - using the rules for criminal procedure in the relevant jurisdiction. For example, in New York, each juror must be fair and unbiased: A juror who cannot provide unequivocal assurance or whose credibility about the assurance is in doubt would properly be excused for cause. Jurors (like judges) are not blank slates; they have opinions about all sorts of things. That doesn't matter. What matters is if they can set those opinions aside and make a decision based only on the evidence. It is not necessary for juror's minds to be empty, just that they be open.

You do need to know the location of both parties. U.S. Federal law (18 USC 2511(2)(d)), which prohibits the interception of wire and electronic communication, states: It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State. California Penal Code 632 requires the consent of all parties to a confidential communication in order for the conversation to be recorded. The statute defines a "confidential communication" as follows: The term “confidential communication” includes any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a communication made in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the public, or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded. Once AT&T, or anyone else for that matter, states that the communication is being recorded, it is no longer considered a confidential communication requiring the consent of all parties in order for any party to record it. Part of the California Civil Jury Instructions for this code requires that the plaintiff must prove, among other things, that the plaintiff had a "reasonable expectation that the conversation was not being overheard or recorded." You can see the full jury instructions here: https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/docs/caci/1800/1809.html

How much money can the owners of an LLC pay themselves to not be accused of "shielding funds from a lawsuit"? (Context: This question is about US law). Let's say an LLC has two owners and it makes 300k a year in profit. The owners each pay themselves a (reasonable) 150k salary each year, leaving the assets of the LLC itself 0. In the event the LLC is sued, can a court pierce the corporate veil and go after the salaries that the owners paid themselves? If I understand correctly, it would have to justify that by saying the owners used the LLC as their personal bank account, with the intent to shield the money from lawsuits. But in this case the salaries are reasonable amounts, so how can the court prove illegal intent? In general, is there a maximum salary the owners can collect from an LLC before it's considered as 'shielding funds'?

If your LLC made 300K before paying salaries, and paid 300K total in salaries, that seems quite reasonable. You might have a point if the order of events was: LLC pays 100K in salaries, LLC gets sued for 200K, LLC raises salaries by 200K. Note that the owners have to pay income tax on 300k earnings, plus whatever else employers and employees have to pay. And an LLC doesn't pay salaries to owners, it pays salaries to employees who be sheer coincidence are also owners. It's a different matter if the company pays dividends. A company must keep dividends low enough so that it can run its business, including paying damages for lawsuits that it knows about. So if the company planned all along to pay 300k in dividends, then is sued for 200k, they likely have to reduce the dividends.

Normally the statute of limitations is five or six years (I think it's different between Scotland and the rest of the UK). The reason for the limitation is that if your employer asks for money back, you obviously should be able to defend yourself, for example by proving that you never received that money. After five or six years it is assumed that you wouldn't be able to provide any such evidence, so nobody can ask for the money back anymore. That's not specific to overpaid wages but quite general. In addition there is the question whether the pilots should have known they were overpaid. For example, I'm quite happy with my salary, but if it was less, I would look for and find a different job that pays better. If the company claimed in five years time that I had been overpaid all the time, then I would say that if they had given me the "correct" lower payment, I would have found a better job elsewhere, so asking me to repay the money seems quite unfair. (Why do you need to defend yourself? Maybe your salary was £3,000 per month. Someone in the right position records that they are paying you £4,000 but puts £3,000 into your account and £1,000 into their own. Then that person has an accident and their replacement finds that you were overpaid according to their records.)

What §670 BGB basically says is that the default is that companies have to reimburse you for expenses that you incurred for interviewing with them. If they don't want to reimburse you, they have to tell you so in writing before you incur any costs. That way it's your decision if you still want to go if you have to pay for expenses yourself. It does not mean your expenses have to be paid, it means you should know beforehand whether they will be paid. So what I take from your story is that you never actually asked the company for reimbursement, expecting the Agentur für Arbeit to pay that for you. Well, no company is going to pay your expenses if you don't ask for it. And that's not a crime. You also never told the Agentur für Arbeit that you were not informed beforehand that your expenses would not be paid. They asked for proof, you delivered proof. It's not their job to find out how or when you got handed this written statement and if that constitutes a violation of §670. And as a little reality check: paying your expenses (probably something along the lines of a cab fare or bus ticket?) is way more cost effective for the AA than suing a small company for the same amount. Just the time of the lawyer filing the suit will probably cost more than your public transportation ticket for the next year.

No more than using your own phone, eyeglasses or underwear while working for the LLC. These are all tools of trade than one wold expect employees of the LLC to bring to their job (especially underwear). There is potentially a problem if assets of the LLC are alienated for personal use rather than the other way around. However, that would be subject to a reasonableness test - using your work computer to book a personal holiday is eminently reasonable. Where there is a real liability issue is if the use of that personal asset caused damage to third parties e.g. if the personal computer was hacked and damage resulted. This would allow a potential plaintiff to bypass the LLC and sue the owner directly (or, more likely, as well).

Both law and accounting are subject to state regulation, so, at a minimum, work done remotely by non-licensed persons must be reviewed substantively and blessed by a local admitted professional before being shared with a client, and there are limits on what contacts with the client the back office can have. In a legal context, the back office is limited to what a paralegal can do, and that varies considerably from one U.S. state to another, especially with respect to real property matters. Mere "book keeping" as opposed to accounting is rarely a regulated profession under state law, but as in the case of legal services, the distinction between accounting that requires a license and activities that do not require a license varies from state to state (although less dramatically). The notion of selling "forms" is well recognized, but what crosses over the line from selling a "form" to selling legal or accounting advice varies and can be treacherous. I don't know off hand if this is true for accountants in most states, but in most U.S. states non-lawyers are prohibited from having an equity or profits based interest in a law firm, and referral fee compensation is also subject to significant professional ethics regulation. Non-competition clauses involving lawyers are also subject to heavy professional ethics regulations not common to non-legal professional activities. Without a more concrete example of what the dropservicing business model would entail, it is impossible to do a very definitive analysis. Your model seems to be based upon obtaining services from a third-party and re-selling those services. For the most part, that isn't a workable business model from a regulatory perspective in the U.S. Instead, you need licensed "white label" providers as the face of the business and you may potentially provide services behind them in the back office. There are some services along this line currently in existence with varied business models involving somewhat similar concepts: Legal forms companies like the recently succeeded Bradford Publishing. Hyatt Legal Services Plans Private legal services insurance such as Legal Shield. H&R Block and also tax services. The legal services provided by the JAG Corps to military service members. Nolo.com Union sponsored legal services plans such as Union Plus. Title insurance companies such as First American Title and related transaction execution companies. The legal defense provided incident to a liability insurance policy by companies such as Allstate. Governmental shared risk pools such as CIRSA. Donation driven non-profits such as the ACLU. The Ann Arbor Tenants Union. Temp agencies providing paralegals to companies such as this one. A few also make contract attorneys' available for a firm's one time big project. Tax software companies like TurboTax (a division of Inuit). Westlaw LexisNexis Wolters Kluwer (f.k.a. CCH).

This is a civil case, taking away your freedom is only for criminal offenses. Not paying your bills is not a criminal offense. It is up to the creditor to look for your assets, etc. A court can make you show up and answer questions about your assets and income. While you are in court the judge can make you give your gold watch to your creditor. Outside the parameters of the question there are circumstances like failure to pay child support when you do have the funds that can lead to incarceration. In some places you can be jailed for contempt of court if the court requires your presence to let the creditor have the ability to try to get access to your assets and you do not show up.

It would depend on how the ownership contract is written. 30% sounds like a minority stake, so I don't know how they could block new investments unless the contract requires a super-majority to approve new rounds of financing. How does the remaining 70% of ownership feel about this? If they are abiding by the terms of the ownership contract I don't see that this is questionable behavior on their part. This is a business relationship. Business partners may come to have different outlooks on the future of the company, and the best way to protect their investment. Consider flipping the viewpoint: "I'm a minority owner in a company I no longer have confidence in. I would like to dissolve the company and sell off the assets to re-coup as much of my original investment as I can. The other owners want to chase this to the bitter end, and do a new round of financing, which will significantly dilute my shares, without (in my opinion) giving the company a real chance of success. What can I do?" When the founder of your friend's company accepted money for shares in the company, they gave up absolute control over the company's direction. Assuming none of the parties are acting in violation of the ownership contract, the most reasonable way to resolve a conflict like this is to buy out the dissenting shareholders.

There is no general law making it illegal to lie about debts, or anything else. It is illegal to lie to a law enforcement officer in the course of an investigation. (And of course it is illegal to lie in court testimony or when otherwise under oath.) But it is in no way unlawful to decline to answer, unless a proper court order has been obtained, or other lawful means of compelling an answer. I would expect any law office to respond to such a question with something like "Am I/we being investigated? If so, send the appropriate notice and our lawyer will consider what we should tell you. If not, tell us what information you want, and we will consider and provide a written response in due course." If a taxpayer has been found to be delinquent in paying taxes, in some cases a court order may be obtained seizing assets, including unpaid debts. But no IRS agent can make such a claim on the spot, and indeed for a client to make such a payment without such a court order, or the order of an IRS tribunal (or the creditor's written consent) would itself be unlawful and would subject the lawyer to a suit by the PI (Private Investigator). When the lawyer pays a service provider, a 1099 must be filed with the IRS. If the PI is a corporation, a different form is used, but a record of payment is still required. As failure to timely file such a form is a violation of the tax code, an accusation of paying without filing would permit the lawyer to decline to answer under the Fifth amendment. If the lawyer did pay and did file a 1099 or other documentation, the IRS would know what had been payed, and would not need to confront the PI. Also, as the comment by Hilmar points out, a PI would be likely to use the cash accounting method, and so would own no tax on work performed but unpaid (as yet). So unless the IRS agent thinks the PI was paid "off-the books" and is intentionally failing to report the payment, there would be no point to such a question. And if that were he case, the lawyer would be very likely to decline to answer. I find the story quite implausible.

In Ratatouille, did Linguini have a legally legitimate reason to fire Skinner? In Ratatouille, when Linguini took over Gusteau's by proving he inherited the restaurant, Skinner seemingly lost his job. Was there legal precedent for Skinner to lose his job; would Skinner hiding the fact that Linguini was Gusteau's son be legitimate grounds for dismissal, or would the fact that there was no station left for Skinner (as his former station as sous chef was replaced) be enough (redundancy)?

It's been a while since I've seen the film (and what I remember of it is the ending), but if I recall, Skinner was conspiring to conceal evidence that the restaurant was legally Linguini's so that Skinner could become the legal owner under Gusteau's will. As such, under French Law, an employer may fire an employee for disciplinary reasons that fall into three categories: "Faute Simple", "Faute Grave", "Faute Lourde". In likelihood, since legally Skinner was attempting to steal from the owner of the restaurant, this would likely fall under "Faute Lourde." This is defined as when "when an employee intentionally and willfully attempts to harm the employer or other employees. In this case, the employer must demonstrate intentionality." If not, it would certainly be Faute Grave, which is the same as "Faute Lourde" although the reason does not have to show the intent was malicious, but that it simply harmed either the employer or an employee. At best, Linguini was within his right to fire Skinner without a notice period or pay for the unintentional concealment of his ownership of Gusteau's, though if I recall, Skinner's malicious intention was clear to Linguini by the time he was declared the legal owner. (source)

If you say something twice, eventually they’ll be in conflict Law codes are vast. They deal with many things and sometimes, as here, they deal with the same thing twice. If they duplicated themselves, rather than cross-referencing, every time the law was changed, every single instance would have to be tracked down and changed. Admittedly, that is not as big a problem with digital codes (but still not infallible and definitely time-consuming) but when these would have to be found by hand, it was damn near impossible. Written this way, change it once and it’s changed everywhere. My first boss taught me that. The fired was engineering rather than law but the principle is the same.

I don't know Canadian rental law, but as a general rule in civil cases you don't get to play Perry Mason and bring in evidence at the last minute. If you have evidence that the landlord broke the law then disclose it immediately and use it to pressure him into settling. His later lies to you are less important than the fact that he broke the law in the first place. However you can certainly testify about what he said as evidence that he has acted in bad faith.

We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered.

A reasonable hypothetical example of where your clause "C" would be applied: A defendant is written a citation for "spitting on the sidewalk," in violation of a hypothetical Portland city ordinance. In presenting extenuating details, the defendant indicates that the expectoration occurred because she had taken a bite of vended food that was belatedly discovered to have been infested with maggots. The notion of encountering rotted food would clearly not have been contemplated by the definition of the "spitting on the sidewalk" ordinance, where the notion of having a cheekful of chewing tobacco definitely would be.

There are a couple of indications that a bouncer may not confiscate an ID. This policy document adopting licensing policies to Require licensees with fake ID violations to temporarily or permanently hire on-site law enforcement or certified security guards who are properly trained to check IDs during regular or peak hours to deter the use of fake IDs and give gatekeepers the opportunity to pass suspected fakes to an officer or guard for a second opinion and potential confiscation. Where appropriate, jurisdictions could empower the gatekeeper to confiscate fake IDs so they are not returned to the underage drinker and sent back into circulation. To ensure compliance with legal issues (e.g., property rights, bailment issues), arrange for the on-call or on-site presence of local law enforcement. Local bar and restaurant associations, especially those in concentrated entertainment zones, can join together to share the expense of law enforcement resources. That implies that the bouncer does not already have that authority, and also indicates that the confiscation should be performed by the police. This bouncer training manual says that Even though you may consider the ID to be fake, it is not considered the server's property. Therefore servers and sellers should not confiscate IDs they suspect to be fake. Rather... follow up with a call to the police to verify suspected false IDs. However, a jurisdiction may grant servers that power, as in the case of Colorado. Washington doesn't do that, so bouncers would need to call the police (not that they always do, since passing a fake ID is somewhere between a misdemeanor and a felony). The general principle is that you may not confiscate another person's property, but the police can seize property if it is reasonable to do so. A state may pass a law authorizing a licensee to do likewise (though it does raise questions about the bouncer's understanding of "reasonable cause to believe"). The Colorado statute is restricted to licensee and their employees, and does not apply to "anyone who suspects an ID", nor does it allow civilian confiscation of other property such as an automobile that is suspected of being stolen.

There are a variety of reasons a judge might be disqualified. It could be that the judge was previous an attorney who represented someone (defendant, victim, key witness) involved in the case, it could be that the judge was a family member or former employer of the defense attorney, it could be that someone close to the judge or the judge personally was a victim of another crime committed by the person, it could be that the defendant or the defendant's family was a personal or family friend. The prior involvement in the protective order case could be a factor as well. The record isn't detailed enough to know. "Held" in this context means that the hearing scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on that date noted was actually conducted, rather than being continued or vacated for some reason. Your guess is as good as mine regarding "CFW" and "DB" in this context. My best guess for DB is "daily booking" and CFW might be either the removed or replacement judge's initials (e.g. Carol Francis Wilson) but those are just wild guesses. Neither appears on a list of Oregon Department of Corrections acryomns or this criminal background check abbreviation list, or this list of Oregon law enforcement abbreviations. The only matches on this list of law enforcement abbreviations and none of the matches to DB (dog bite, dead body, detective bureau) make a lot of sense in this context.

Depending on the bleach, you could have just killed the customer, so why in hell are you worried about being sued (to which the answer is a solid “yes”, by the way)? Most bleaches are a horrific poison for which there is little recourse once swallowed - it can easily result in death or permanent life altering injuries. Being arrested for manslaughter or assault is a real likelihood here, both yourself and your manager. Get legal advice, now.

what courts are bound by the decisions of the privy council? Which levels of other courts are its decisions binding or not binding on, if English courts don’t actually appeal to it? To rephrase the question for greater clarity: Essentially, of courts that don’t get appealed from to the JCPC (ie most typical domestic English courts), which are nonetheless bound by its decisions?

The JCPC's appellate jurisdiction The courts/jurisdictions from which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) hears appeals is listed here. I will just list a few: The High Court of Chivalry Jersey (a Crown dependency) Antigua and Barbuda (with leave from the lower court in the Commonwealth) The Bahamas (with leave from the lower court in the Commonwealth) The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (an independent republic within the Commonwealth) Bermuda (an overseas territory) Cayman Islands (an overseas territory) Dhekelia (a sovereign base area in Cyprus) Precedential value of old JCPC judgments in jurisdictions that no longer have the JCPC at the apex For jurisdictions that previously had appeals to the JCPC, most now are of the view that their trial and intermediate appellate courts are still bound by the JCPC holdings until the jurisdiction's now highest court says otherwise (Oliver Jones, "Do the Law Lords Bind Lower Courts?" (2013) 87 Australian Law Journal 383; Bank of Montreal v. Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp. (1990), 44 B.C.L.R. (2d) 247: "[the] decision of the Judicial Committee, rendered while Canadian appeals were still carried to the Privy Council, is binding upon us"). Precedential value of "foreign" JCPC decisions Many jurisdictions (e.g. Canada, Barbados, probably New Zealand) also treated/treat "foreign" Privy Council decisions (meaning coming to the JCPC from a different source jurisdiction) as binding, to the extent that there is no difference in the applicable law (Jones, p. 387). The precedent at issue in Bank of Montreal (cited above), for example, was one that arose from an appeal from the West Indian Court of Appeal affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court of Trinidad and Tobago. It was held to be binding in Canada in 1990, long after Canadian appeals to the JCPC were abolished. Precedential value of JCPC judgments in England and Wales The normal approach is as follows (Willers v. Joyce and another, [2016] UKSC 44, paragraph 12): Decisions of the JCPC "cannot be binding on any judge of England and Wales." When the JCPC has decided based on common law, these judgments should be normally regarded by any judge, including justices of the Supreme Court "as being of great weight and persuasive value." The JCPC should regard itself as bound to follow decisions of the House of Lords or Supreme Court when applying the law of England and Wales. However, given the overlap in composition of the JCPC and the UK Supreme Court, and the fact that the president of both is the same person, there is a procedure by which a party can ask the JCPC overrule previous decisions of the House of Lords or Supreme Court and bind domestic courts: In any case where the Practice Direction applies, I would hold that the following procedure should apply from now on. The registrar of the JCPC will draw the attention of the President of the JCPC to the fact there may be such an invitation. The President can then take that fact into account when deciding on the constitution and size of the panel which is to hear the appeal, and, provided that the point at issue is one of English law, the members of that panel can, if they think it appropriate, not only decide that the earlier decision of the House of Lords or Supreme Court, or of the Court of Appeal, was wrong, but also can expressly direct that domestic courts should treat the decision of the JCPC as representing the law of England and Wales.

It has to be 'liquidated damages', since a penalty clause is unenforceable. It has to have a reasonable relation to the party's legitimate interest. The point is that it has to represent a good faith estimate of the actual damage.

united-states In U.S. practice in almost all jurisdictions, court orders must be memorialized in a signed or electronically signed writing transmitted to the parties and/or counsel. But, this can be a bare recitation of the result. The extent to which it must be reasoned is discretionary, and the reasoning can be supplied by an oral statement of the judge in lieu of a writing. Oral statements of reasoning in lieu of written judgments are common in courts of limited jurisdiction comparable to English County Courts, but written opinions are issued now and then in more complex cases or where legal issues were argued in closing arguments. A ruling of a judge sitting without a jury may be vacated and remanded by an appellate court for further proceedings, if the factual and legal basis for the ruling is not articulated with sufficient clarity to allow an appellate court to determine if the trial court's decision was legally correct and supported by the trial court record. Juries, of course, are not requires to articulate their reasoning and enter a bare verdict of liability and damages, or guilty and not guilty as to each charge (and in rare instances also answer one or more "special verdict" questions) in the manner set forth on the jury verdict form provided to the jury. In limited jurisdiction courts where the sole appeal is a trial de novo in a higher court, called "courts not of record", a written statement of reasons is unnecessary as any appeal will not be based upon the trial court record.

Not generally. While double jeopardy considerations does not apply in Canada until the final verdict (i.e. all appeal processes have been exhausted by decision or failure to appeal within the time limit), the right to a jury trial for serious offences, both under the Constitution Act, 1982 (or the Charter, its bill of rights Part) and the Criminal Code (section 471, which not only makes the jury trial a right, but also the compulsory mode of trial unless both prosecutor and the accused consent), exist. Under common law principles, the jury's verdict, in the fact-finding role exclusive to the jury, is almost sacrosanct. Even if in Canada an appeal court can set aside a jury's verdict of acquittal or conviction, they may only do so if there is a reviewable legal error (for appeals from the Crown and the accused), or if the verdict of conviction is plainly unreasonable and cannot be supported by evidence (or otherwise may constitute a miscarriage of justice). In the first case, the reasoning is that the jury's verdict was defective due to e.g. insufficient or wrongful instructions, seeing evidences that should not have been admitted or failure to see evidences that should have been admitted. In the second case, the appeal court acts as a safeguard, much like in the U.S., for the accused to prevent wrongful convictions however it may occur. Even then, the appeal court cannot in essence conduct a new trial from the appeal records and substitute its own factual findings for those made by a jury, unless it finds that no properly instructed jury can reasonably convict the accused based on the evidences presented (R. v. W.H.). Now going back to what the trial judge can do after a jury's verdict. The proper course of action in case where the Crown's case cannot support a conviction is for the accused to seek a directed verdict before presenting any evidence. If the judge grants the motion, the judge (not the jury) enters a verdict of acquittal, which can be appealed for errors of law. Otherwise, the trial judge has no capacity to usurp the fact finding role of the jury. The judge can, however, in exceptional circumstances, declare a mistrial or stay of the proceedings (i.e. the proceeding is concluded without a verdict, due to e.g. abuse of process by the state or other considerations to preserve the integrity of the justice system) following the jury's verdict. All most all cases on this issue followed a verdict of conviction. In one unusual case (R. v. Burke), a verdict of "acquittal" was involved. The verdict is in quotes because in this case, the court recorded a verdict of acquittal apparently contrary to the jury's intention, as the jury foreman had coughed before pronouncing "guilty as charged" and the judge (along with the court reporter, the prosecutor and the defence lawyer) misheard "not guilty as charged". After seeing the accused in the parking lot, some jury members were confused and returned to the court and reported the error. However, not all jury members could be immediately contacted and the jury had only reconvened in the court with the accused a couple days after the original verdict, and after some newspapers had reported on the situation. The trial judge decided to enter the intended verdict of "guilty". The accused appealed and the Supreme Court decided in this particular case that: the trial judge can nonetheless exercise a limited jurisdiction after the jury's discharge; the judge could enter the intended verdict if it did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; in this case, due to the media reports and relatively long delay between the original verdict and the reconvening of the jury, which may have improperly influenced the jury, a mistrial should have been the appropriate remedy instead of entering the intended verdict. On the appropriateness of a mistrial, the Supreme Court said In declaring a mistrial, the trial judge therefore turns his or her mind to the question of whether a mistrial is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This determination will necessarily involve an examination of the surrounding circumstances. Injustice to the accused is of particular concern, given that the state with all its resources acts as the singular antagonist of the individual accused in a criminal case. This factor should be balanced against other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the offence, protection of the public and bringing the guilty to justice. It may be fitting to allow the announced verdict to stand where the period the accused has been at liberty and under the mistaken impression that he or she had been acquitted has been lengthy, and where the charge is not so egregious as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. As has already been stated, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the circumstances of each individual case and select the most appropriate remedy. This case does not directly apply to a case where the jury intended an acquittal, but the considerations may still be applied in extremely limited circumstances. While no one but the jury is privy to their deliberation process and no judge can overturn a jury's acquittal because they think the jury's verdict is unreasonable, it could be imagined that, for example, if a jury reports an acquittal and a member of jury before being discharged makes a claim of jury intimidation or the Crown presents clear evidence of jury manipulation, the trial judge might still have the authority to declare a mistrial. But this has not been clarified in jurisprudence.

Generally speaking, a decision from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is binding only in the District of Columbia. Courts of other jurisdictions are not required to adhere to its decisions. If the issue came up again in Virginia or Maryland, courts there would have no obligation to follow it. Virginia tort law is different from D.C. tort law, so Virginia courts would need to determine whether their law is different on this particular point.

Such things are in fact legal in some US jurisdictions, as part of plea bargains. In fact such pleas are not uncommon. More usual is the case where a person pleads guilty to a lesser crime, so as to qualify for a lower sentence, when all involved know that the lesser crime was not committed by anyone. It is simply a device to get a compromise sentence and avoid a trial. In some jurisdictions the Judge, in the course of accepting a guilty plea, requires that the accused admit specific facts that form a minimal legal basis for conviction of the crime pled to. In others no such admission is made. But even where such an admission is made, the truth of such an admission is not usually checked. The Judge will generally make sure that the accused understands the effect of a guilty plea, the rights given up by such a plea, and the possible range of sentences that will result. If the Judge believes that the plea constitutes a miscarriage of justice, for example that a totally innocent person is yielding to improper pressure from the prosecutor, the Judge can refuse the plea, but this is very rare in practice.

When a judge decides a case there will be An order - e.g. "Smith shall pay Jones £100,000" Reasons for the decision - i.e. a description of the evidence, and the judge's findings of fact and legal reasoning. Sometimes a party, even though they have completely won, is nevertheless aggrieved by some things the judge has said in the Reasons (or in the way the judge has handled the trial - e.g. the judge's interventions). For example the judge may have said that the winning party was not a credible witness but they nevertheless won because of the evidence of other witnesses who were found to be credible. The rule in England and Wales is that you can only appeal orders. So if the order is completely in your favour you cannot appeal just because you don't like the reasons.

What Do England And Wales Share Legally? Why are they so closely associated with each other as to have just one tag on the site, but Northern Ireland and Scotland each seem to be their own worlds? Most laws of general applicability, such as criminal law, and private law (i.e. the law governing the interactions of private parties like property law, contract law, landlord-tenant law, employment law, etc.) are enacted by the National Parliament at Westminster (or effective as part of a shared English common law of case precedents) and shared by England and Wales which have a uniform integrated court system. In contrast, Scotland and Northern Ireland have greater autonomy to enact laws of general application because more authority has been devolved to those regional governments than to the National Assembly of Wales. They also have their own court systems. Historic Causes Wales was basically fully integrated into England starting in the 1200s and subsequently restored some autonomy. Scotland never lost its high level of autonomy and was initially joined to England only by virtue of having the same monarch, rather than being the same country. The United Kingdom was formed first by the personal union of monarchs from 1603 (under King James VI of Scotland a.k.a. King James I of England) followed by a federal style merger of governments approved by the Scottish and English parliaments in 1706-1707, rather than by conquest and it has much more government autonomy in generally applicable legislation and its judicial system than Wales does, and more than Ireland had when it was ruled by England. On the other hand, Scottish sentiment towards independence was not exactly unanimous in support of staying with the U.K. in the last referendum in 2014 when 44.7% of votes cast were for independence with 84.6% voter turnout (including voters as young as age 16). Northern Ireland's story is a bit more complicated as Ireland had a legal status similar to Wales from a similar medieval era, but this was complicated by the Irish independence struggle ultimately leading to the creation of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The fine line and complexity of the situation in Northern Ireland is illustrated by this map, and strong autonomy was necessary to allow it to maintain the fragile Protestant-Roman Catholic balance in a divided society there: Each of the components of the United Kingdom has a separate and historically determined status that is not exactly parallel to any of the others. England has no national assembly of its own, sufficing to use the national parliament for its laws despite the fact that some seats in that parliament that govern it are selected in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Likewise, before the U.S. gained independence, different parts of the U.S. had distinct relationships to the U.K., as did the various colonial possessions of the U.K. (e.g. India, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Kenya, Tanzania, Hong Kong). The U.K. is an exemplary example of the philosophy that consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds. To pluck out just one more random example of the English tendency, "Scotland Yard", the national police force headquarters in the City of Westminster within the City of Greater London in England, has jurisdiction over England and Wales, but not over Scotland. Legal Distinctions Between England And Wales To provide a few other examples in addition to the example of language related laws noted by @WeatherVane (noted on my recent visit to England and Wales) and to embellish on that point a little further, the Welsh language is resurgent in Wales where it is a mandatory subject in public schools (often in the North with Welsh as the primary language of instruction) with about 30% of the population (more than 800,000 people) who either speak it as a first language (which is common among the very old and among young people in Northern Wales) by people who are mostly bilingual with English (but may reach for an English word or two now and then) or as a fluent second language. The Anglican Church is the established church in England, but not in Wales where it was disestablished in 1916. The legal implications of this are subtle, but not non-existent. Government agencies are not required to hoist the British flag with primacy over the Welsh flag, and indeed, the British flag is rarely seen there. Primary and secondary education are administered separately in England and Wales with attendant laws on issues like truancy, dress codes, financial arrangements, testing, and certain holidays. This distinction primarily exists to facilitate Welsh language instruction, which is the primary language of instruction in some schools, and a secondary language in others. More generally, the manner in which many government services (e.g. public housing) is administered, and in which tax dollars are expended is not precisely the same between England and Wales. Certain laws regulating immigrants (related to immigrant financial security and leases to immigrants, more or less) differ between England and Wales, although this is a temporary matter and the long term plan is for these laws to be integrated across the United Kingdom. The Welsh Senedd (a.k.a. National Assembly for Wales, i.e. the regional parliament) has some independent legislative power, although honestly, the scope of its legislation is typically closer to what you might see in a U.S. home rule city or a school board, than in a U.S. state government. In particular: The 20 areas of responsibility devolved to the National Assembly for Wales (and within which Welsh ministers exercise executive functions) are: Agriculture, fisheries, forestry and rural development Ancient monuments and historical buildings Culture Economic development Education and training Environment Fire and rescue services and promotion of fire safety Food Health and social services Highways and transport Housing Local government National Assembly for Wales Public administration Social welfare Sport and recreation Tourism Town and country planning Water and flood defences Welsh language I suspect, but do not know, that land use regulation and occupational and business licensing in Wales is less favorable to big businesses and franchises, based upon the fact that such businesses are far more common in England than in Wales, even controlling for places that are similar in population density. But this could be due to historic or economic factors.

Jury (mis)conduct If I have to attend a jury in Australia, is it illegal for me to dress up in the goofiest manner? Is it possible for me to be accused of misconduct on that ground?

Yes When you are called for jury duty, you are given a list of expectations and duties. For example, Queensland requires everyone to dress neatly and New South Wales similarly so. The wording from NSW is: What you should wear You do not have to wear a suit and tie, but you should dress in neat, comfortable clothes. Do not wear thongs or shorts. As you may be sitting for long periods of time it is important to be comfortable, whilst still showing respect for the court. Why? Because wearing clothes that can be seen as disrespect to the court - e.g. very flashy or goofy ones - can get you expelled from court, fined or even jailed for contempt of court [NSW]. Victoria has a specific Juries Act, which includes the following language to point to its own contempt of court section: 84 Contempt of court Nothing in this Part affects the power of a court to deal with a contempt of court summarily of its own motion. 85 Enforcement of fines If a court fines a person under Division 2 or for contempt of the court, the fine is enforceable under the Sentencing Act 1991 as if the person had been found guilty of an offence

What you are talking about here is the tort of negligent misstatement, a subset of the tort of negligence. First, there is no presumption in any jurisdiction that I am aware of that anyone is or is not a lawyer (or doctor, or engineer etc.). If people knew that you were, however, then it is reasonable that they would give your statements more weight then if they did not know. It may also be reasonable if they suspected you were. The practical purpose of such a disclaimer is to ensure that they know you aren't. For the specific facts you give, you would certainly be in a better position if you said: "But I'm not a lawyer, so you should seek professional advice"; not so much because you told them you weren't a lawyer but rather because this changes your advice to "seek professional advice". It's impossible to be wrong with that advice! The standard form in Australia is: "this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice". If the statement is limited to "I'm not a lawyer" or if your neighbour knew you were, for instance, a dog catcher with no professional qualifications, then you could still potentially be liable. Your neighbour would need to demonstrate: You had a duty of care; by giving advice you potentially do, however, a for negligent misstatement there must be a 'special relationship' [Hawkins V Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539, MLC Assurance V Evatt]. You breached that duty; the advice given was "unreasonable". There was a factual cause in a "cause and effect" sense; 'but for' your advice there would have been no loss. There was a legal (proximate) cause; damage to the neighbour as a result of the advice must be foreseeable. Harm; the neighbour must suffer real loss. The main point of the disclaimers is on the 2nd point: what is "unreasonable" for a professional is different than for a "lay person". Oh, and by the way: this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice.

I think it's important to keep in mind the essence of your actions. @Mowzer gave a great answer on the matter in hand, but I'd like to add a point of view. Is it illegal to eat while driving? Like pointed out by @Mowzer, if no law prohibits it, it's allowed by default (lots of countries have this premise). But what about the consequences of your actions? Maybe there's no law against eating in the car, but there sure is one in my country that specific says that you are not allowed to drive without using both hands in the wheel. The only exception to this rule is to take out your hand from the wheel to use the stick to change gears. Another point of view to add is the liability. Let's say you're minding your own business while driving and a lunatic trying to commit suicide jumps in front of your car. It's a pretty straight-forward case, you have no reason to be blamed. Now, let's add to the same scenario your snack; with a small change, you are now facing a accident that may have been caused by reckless driving (another thing commonly illegal). To sum up, the law is not really like math that have axioms that determine true or false statements without any distinguishment. That's why every case is single handled in the law by it's particularities.

Based on these two sources: http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/juryselect.html http://criminal.lawyers.com/criminal-law-basics/reasons-for-rejecting-potential-jurors.html my understanding is that in an official sense there's nothing that's considered an invalid reason to challenge a juror for cause. In other words, whatever it is that the attorney feels makes the juror unsuitable, he can take it to the judge, and the judge will rule based on what he thinks.

I've contested many of my own traffic tickets in a state where traffic tickets are also considered misdemeanor criminal violations. I would appear in court before the time limit on your ticket. I'd plead not guilty, and I would not waive any rights- which means I would request a trial by jury. Under Georgia law you do have the right to a jury trial IF your ticket is not considered a petty offense. Otherwise you can have a bench trial. If your case starts in a Municipal Court and you request a jury trial, the case will be sent to the State or Superior Court of that county. Jury trials on traffic citations are rare, but it is probably a good tactic because you might be able to work out a better solution than you can in Municipal court. Once the court accepts your plea, then I would make sure the court set a pre-trial hearing. At this hearing make a motion to the judge that you would like the dash-cam video of the officer and the vehicle he stopped you in. If the prosecutor argues that it's not relevant (and they might) explain to the judge why they are relevant (the officer didn't realize exactly what intersection you were at). IMPORTANT: Introduction of your own evidence requires that you 'lay the foundation' of the evidence. This usually means that you must declare officially in court, in front of the prosecution, that your evidence (pictures you take, etc.) are taken by you, and that they are 'true and correct' representations of the location where the alleged offense took place, and that the date and time was (whatever it was). You usually must state this while under oath. OTHERWISE, the prosecution will object to your evidence most likely on the grounds of no foundation. Please read up on how to lay the foundation in either a trial or in a pre-trial setting. For something like this you might need to just present the evidence and lay your foundation at trial. So you'll need to read up on how to lay foundation and present your evidence at trial. You could get lucky and the officer won't show up at trial. So in that case I would make a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution (you can't cross examine a witness that didn't show up) You'll get to choose jurors, etc. in a process called Voire Dire. So read up on that too. You will not be forced to testify if you don't want to (because of the constitutional right to not incriminate yourself) but if you do choose to testify, the prosecution can ask you questions).

Based on the question, this was not perjury; if the officer did not review the footage, the fact that his testimony was in error indicates a mistake, nothing more. To even consider a perjury charge, the prosecuting authorities would need evidence that the officer knew the testimony was wrong when he gave it. You do not indicate the jurisdiction, so nobody can say whether an appeal would lie (since new evidence has come to light), whether the conviction could be quashed for procedural failure (if multiple requests for evidence were really not received) or whether a complaint could be made against the prosecutor, the defence lawyer, or even the judge. But no case has ever been strengthened by brandishing about words like 'perjury' without being able to substantiate them.

Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me.

This is an excellent explanation. All Australian jurisdictions have (in general) common road rules. In NSW these are enacted by Road Rules 2014 regulation under the Road Transport Act 2013. The relevant provision is Clause 306: 306 Exemption for drivers of emergency vehicles A provision of these Rules does not apply to the driver of an emergency vehicle if: (a) in the circumstances: (i) the driver is taking reasonable care, and (ii) it is reasonable that the rule should not apply, and (b) if the vehicle is a motor vehicle that is moving-the vehicle is displaying a blue or red flashing light or sounding an alarm. From your statement (a)(i) and (b) would seem to apply so it becomes a question if (a)(ii) does. Well, you don't know the circumstances so you can't judge if it is reasonable that the rule not apply: if the police car were involved in a collision, caught on a red light camera or booked then the driver would have to show that it was. It is worth noting that some road offences like drink or dangerous driving are not in the Road Rules, they are in the Crimes Act and so the exemption doesn't apply to them. It is also not a shield from civil liability although the difficulty of proving negligence goes up because disobeying the road rules is no longer enough.

Do tribunals have inquisitorial powers? In England, tribunals are intended to be more informal and therefore accessible venues of justice where the parties cannot be expected to conduct proceedings with full legal competence. In a pure adversarial system which England is mostly, judges are a passive audience largely precluded from making proactive inquiries (i.e. inquisitorial powers). Is it that in order to bridge the gap and enable tribunals to have more just outcomes, tribunals' judges are afforded greater latitude to exercise inquisitorial roles than judges in courts?

In answer to the queation in the OP's title, although it isn't actually a "tribunal" the Coroner’s Court is inquisitorial: An inquest is a fact-finding inquiry to establish who has died, how, when and where the death occurred. It is not a trial – no one is on trial in a Coroner’s Court. Unlike other Courts, whether civil or criminal, there is no prosecution or defence. The Coroner’s jurisdiction is inquisitorial rather than adversarial or accusatorial. Source

The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.

Parliament in the UK is sovereign: Parliament [is] the supreme legal authority in the UK, which can create or end any law. Generally, the courts cannot overrule its legislation and no Parliament can pass laws that future Parliaments cannot change. If parliament passed a law saying that it was a crime for "a black American woman sat at the front of the bus" and provided that it repealed all existing laws that would invalidate that law (e.g. the European Charter of Human Rights); then there is no defence to that crime if the prosecution proves the elements beyond reasonable doubt i.e. that you are a) black, b) American, c) a woman and d) sat at the front of the bus. In the UK there is no higher law that can be appealed to like a constitution. Over the years, UK parliaments have passed laws limiting their sovereignty, however, any current or future parliament could (in theory) repeal those limits. Just like the USA could (also in theory) repeal the Bill of Rights amendments to their constitution (or even replace the Constitution as a whole); albeit the process is different and less likely to succeed. The limitations on this are political, not legal.

No Parliament is sovereign: Parliamentary sovereignty is a principle of the UK constitution. It makes Parliament the supreme legal authority in the UK, which can create or end any law. Generally, the courts cannot overrule its legislation and no Parliament can pass laws that future Parliaments cannot change. Parliamentary sovereignty is the most important part of the UK constitution.

It's hard to know why people choose the venues they choose. But, the UK is known for having very plaintiff-friendly libel law (although less-so now). Libel tourism was much more feasible in 1996, when David Irving brought his suit. But, as of 2014, "claimants wanting to sue defendants who do not live in Europe will have to prove that England is the most appropriate place for the case." (New Law Makes Suing for Libel Harder in England) Further, in the U.S., the SPEECH Act of 2010 makes foreign libel judgements unenforceable in the U.S. unless the defendant would have been found liable even under U.S. Law.

The reference to "most junior counsel present" does literally mean the most recently qualified barrister who happens to be in the court. That is confirmed by Polter's response: "I was only called last term!" The story takes place in 1860. By this time, it was common for the court to assign a barrister who happened to be in court to conduct the defence of an accused person. According to Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the 19th Century (1998), p 110–111: Assignment was a practice developed by the judges as a means of ensuring that prisoners facing grave charges did not go undefended for want of means. The judge would ask one of the counsel present in court to undertake the prisoner's defence without fee, a request never in practice refused … During the debates on the Prisoners' Counsel Bill of 1834, one of the arguments used against the assignment of counsel clause which it contained was that the judges already had power to assign counsel, and that counsel never refused to act … So far as one can judge from trial reports, assignment of counsel to poor prisoners in felony cases was, and remained, a rare occurrence during the late 1820s and 1830s, but became increasingly common during the 1840s and 1850s. But I can't find any historical analogue to Polter's virtuosic success in prosecuting a "dock brief" on behalf of the Crown. As Bentley explains, the practice of assigning counsel evolved for the benefit of the accused, not the Crown. And the barrister assigned was not invariably the "most junior counsel present" (p 114): The selection was made from amongst those in court not already engaged in the case. Sometimes the judge would call on the most senior counsel in court. Sometimes one of the barristers present in court would volunteer his services. Occasionally the accused would be invited to choose from the barristers in court. Modern practice The scenario in the story, where the advocate briefed to appear is in another court, having assumed (or hoped) that the present matter would not be reached in the judge's list, remains common in busy criminal courts throughout the common law world. Judges have various ways of dealing with this situation, where a hearing cannot proceed efficiently because of a lack of legal representation. Some matters, such as hearings at which an accused person must decide whether to plead guilty or not guilty, or make scheduling arrangements for trial, or be sentenced for a minor offence, are still routinely handled by lawyers who receive instructions on the day of the hearing. This is usually formalised through systems like the duty solicitors scheme operated by the Legal Aid Agency. When duty lawyers are unavailable, it is not unheard of for judges and magistrates to ask counsel physically in the courtroom to provide limited pro bono assistance to an unrepresented party. Such requests are limited to the kind of representation ordinarily provided by duty lawyers, and would not extend to conduct of a jury trial with zero preparation. As well as being significantly more demanding due to the greater complexity of modern criminal law practice, this would today be considered a breach of the right to a fair hearing. I have personally seen lawyers present in the courtroom, in suburban magistrates' courts around Australia, appointed to represent defendants at procedural hearings when there is no duty lawyer available. Lawyers volunteer for this as part of their professional duty to the administration of justice, or even as a way to find new clients. However, this never applies to a prosecution brief. At worst, an irritated judge might force another prosecutor in court for unrelated cases to account for their colleague's absence, or dismiss the case for want of prosecution.

At the time of writing, there 642 various UK Procedure Rules and amendments. These are all secondary legislation (discussed here). Taking the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 as an example, these Rules are made under primary legislation found at section 69 of the Courts Act 2003: 69 Criminal Procedure Rules (1)There are to be rules of court (to be called “Criminal Procedure Rules”) governing the practice and procedure to be followed in the criminal courts. (2)Criminal Procedure Rules are to be made by a committee known as the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee. (3)The power to make Criminal Procedure Rules includes power to make different provision for different cases or different areas, including different provision— (a)for a specified court or description of courts, or (b)for specified descriptions of proceedings or a specified jurisdiction. (4)Any power to make Criminal Procedure Rules is to be exercised with a view to securing that— (a)the criminal justice system is accessible, fair and efficient, and (b)the rules are both simple and simply expressed

Barristers are advocates, and their other roles fall out of that core role. I think of it this way: your solicitor takes care of your legal risk; your barrister is the 'big gun' you bring in for specific important legal advice and to represent you in person. I'll give you my experience from the perspective of working in a large government agency. For us, 'barrister' often equates to 'Queen's Counsel' (now called 'Senior Counsel'), which is a particularly senior barrister. I am also speaking from Australia. We have the same split profession as the UK, but there are probably differences. You generally don't stop using a solicitor and start using a barrister. Rather, you have a solicitor the whole way through and then you engage a barrister through your solicitor. You can engage a barrister directly, e.g. if you have in-house counsel, but it is not common to do so. Even if you have in-house counsel, you will usually engage more specialised external solicitors to handle litigation. The barrister's role is generally to (1) provide advice on specific issues (after the solicitors have sifted the evidence and provided a brief to the barrister) including advising on your prospects in particular litigation and (2) represent you in court i.e. write submissions and speak to the court. It is not uncommon to have a barristers represent you in proceedings other than a trial (if you have the financial resources to afford a barrister). For example, a barrister may represent you in mediation or may accompany you to an examination by some regulatory authority. (Furthermore, a regulatory authority may even hire a barrister to question you, since barristers are often good at that based on their in-court role; or you and the party you are having a dispute with might appoint a barrister as the arbitrator or mediator.) You may have a barrister you prefer to use; more likely, however, your solicitor would know barristers and would recommend an appropriate one. Barristers are specialised so you would use a different barrister for a tax dispute, contractual dispute, employee dispute, etc. An organisation large enough to sustain constant legal disputes would have a number of barristers that it would go to as and when they were needed, on the basis of their particular skills and availability. There is no such thing as a firm of barristers. Each barrister is independent. A barrister's office will be in 'chambers', which is an organisation that leases office space and hires clerks to manage member barristers' business. But the barristers in a chambers are not in business together as members of a firm of solicitors are. Barristers are proud of their independence, and they all want to be appointed as judges so they have to appear impartial. To further illustrate how you might use a barrister: sometimes you get legal advice from a barrister and you cannot read the advice. You can see the words but it's gibberish. Your solicitor will interpret it for you.

Merchandise damaged prior to purchase Imagine one is browsing items in the aisles of a grocery store and drops one of them accidentally on the floor so it breaks. Must any grocery store would generally write it off and tell a customer not to worry about an innocent mistake. Of course if you dropped it after checking out and processing it you don’t get to swap it for a new one and it is the customer’s loss. But what is the legal position here? (Criminal implications? Civil matter only?) If the store wishes to pursue you for leaving without paying with the only recourse be to sue you for the value in civil court? What if you don’t cooperate to give an address for service? Can you be compelled or are they SoL?

One analysis is in Bow Cycle & Motor Co. Ltd. v. Murray, 2006 ABPC 366, by Judge O'Ferrall (now Justice of the Court of Appeal of Alberta). The defendant sat on a motorcycle, positioned it fully upright, and when he returned the motorcycle to rest on the kickstand, the bike crashed to the floor. There were three potential paths to liabilty argued, none successfully: negligence (for example, if the defendant had repositioned the kickstand at any point—there was no evidence of this) trespass to goods (but this would have required intentional or negligent treatment of the good) contract (which would have required a clear "you break it, you buy it" policy with express statement that the customer would be liable even for non-negligent damage—there wasn't) Context mattered. Liability might be made more strict more easily in a china shop. The judge wrote: in the end, this case must turn on the presence or absence of negligence because, at least in the circumstances of a motorcycle shop, a “break it, you buy it” arrangement would have required an element of fault on the part of the breaker, absent a very clearly communicated term that the customer pays irrespective of negligence. There being no such term and negligence having not been proven, I find the Defendant not liable. In so doing, I considered the china shop analogy. It may be that in a china shop one could infer that the customer pays for broken items irrespective of fault because there is no need to touch the item in order to make the purchase decision. But in order to make an informed purchase of a motorcycle, the purchaser must try it on for size and the fact that he must do so makes it much more difficult to infer a no-fault promise to pay for damage howsoever caused.

Short Answer You are legally entitled to the cost of an adequate replacement (possibly a lightly used previously owned computer) reduced by the amount refunded. This is sometimes called a "benefit of the bargain" measure of the relief to which you are entitled. But as a practical matter, there is no cost effective way of enforcing your legal rights under these facts, that doesn't deeply compromise you chances of success. But, trying to litigate the case on the cheap, because it is unlikely to succeed, makes the effort to enforce your rights even less worthwhile. Your best options are those you could take outside the formal legal process (such as social media gripes, or complaining to "the manager" of the person you dealt with first if they refuse to give you what you want or are entitled to under the law). Long Answer Applicable Law The default rules of law, absent an express contractual term to the contrary, are as follows: In every U.S. jurisdiction in an intra-U.S. transaction, this is governed by the following section of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which apart from section and subsection numbering conventions is substantially identical in all of these jurisdictions. It states: § 2-713. Buyer's Damages for Non-delivery or Repudiation. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach. (2)Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival. In international transactions between signatory countries, the relevant body of law of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (1980). The primary applicable provisions of that Convention (to which the U.S. is a party) are: Article 45 (1) If the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention, the buyer may: (a) exercise the rights provided in articles 46 to 52; (b) claim damages as provided in articles 74 to 77. (2) The buyer is not deprived of any right he may have to claim damages by exercising his right to other remedies. (3) No period of grace may be granted to the seller by a court or arbitral tribunal when the buyer resorts to a remedy for breach of contract. Article 46 (1) The buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement. . . . Article 47 (1) The buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable length for performance by the seller of his obligations. (2) Unless the buyer has received notice from the seller that he will not perform within the period so fixed, the buyer may not, during that period, resort to any remedy for breach of contract. However, the buyer is not ­deprived thereby of any right he may have to claim damages for delay in performance. Article 48 (1) Subject to article 49, the seller may, even after the date for delivery, remedy at his own expense any failure to perform his obligations, if he can do so without unreasonable delay and without causing the buyer ­unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer. However, the buyer retains any right to claim ­damages as provided for in this Convention. (2) If the seller requests the buyer to make known whether he will accept performance and the buyer does not comply with the request within a reasonable time, the seller may perform within the time indicated in his request. The buyer may not, during that period of time, resort to any remedy which is inconsistent with performance by the seller. (3) A notice by the seller that he will perform within a specified period of time is assumed to include a request, under the preceding paragraph, that the buyer make known his decision. (4) A request or notice by the seller under paragraph (2) or (3) of this article is not effective unless received by the buyer. Article 49 (1) The buyer may declare the contract avoided: (a) if the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract; or (b) in case of non-delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods within the additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1) of article 47 or declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed. . . . Article 74 Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract. Article 75 If the contract is avoided and if, in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time after avoidance, the buyer has bought goods in replacement or the seller has resold the goods, the party claiming damages may recover the difference between the contract price and the price in the substitute transaction as well as any further damages recoverable under article 74. Article 76 (1) If the contract is avoided and there is a current price for the goods, the party claiming damages may, if he has not made a purchase or resale under article 75, recover the difference between the price fixed by the ­contract and the current price at the time of avoidance as well as any further damages recoverable under article 74. If, however, the party claiming ­damages has avoided the contract after taking over the goods, the current price at the time of such taking over shall be applied instead of the current price at the time of avoidance. (2) For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, the current price is the price prevailing at the place where delivery of the goods should have been made or, if there is no current price at that place, the price at such other place as serves as a reasonable substitute, making due allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the goods. Article 77 A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss should have been mitigated. Your Legal Rights This brings us to the question: What buyer protections are there for this? Will I be able to easily sue the manufacturer for monetary losses if the manufacturer refunds me anyway instead of letting me wait for the item to come back in stock? The buyer is legally entitled to the fair market value of obtaining a replacement (perhaps in the secondary market for used laptops) that is equivalent to what was ordered reduced by the amount of money refunded. Practical Vindication Of Your Legal Rights But it is much easier to get the refund than it is to prevail in a lawsuit for the additional damages to which the buyer is legally entitled, a prevailing buyer will probably not get their attorney fees if they prevail, and there is a good chance that the dispute will be sent to arbitration which is, generally speaking (according to strong empirical evidence) a forum with a strong anti-consumer bias (although consumer arbitration can be fairly inexpensive to litigate in, is somewhat more tolerant of lack of legal expertise by a self-represented party, and sometimes despite everything, you win, or can even get an unfair result that works in your favor rather than that of the seller). If you are fighting over $1,500 to $2,500, and you have a fairly complex case to prove that will require expert testimony (and expert witness fees and court costs would be awarded to a prevailing party in addition to the actual damages to which they are legally entitled even though attorney fees are not recoverable in most cases), it will be very hard to find a lawyer willing to take the case. This is because it will take far more than 5-12 hours of attorney work to take the case to its conclusion, which is your maximum cost effective litigation budget, even if everything you win goes to the attorney and you receive no actual benefit. To get even a 50% recovery, your lawyer needs to get the job done ins 2-6 hours depending on your lawyer's hourly rate, which is close to impossible when your legal argument is as difficult to prove as it is in this case. So, basically, the only cost effective way to litigate the case is without a lawyer in small claims court or consumer arbitration, even though representing yourself without a lawyer greatly reduces your chances of success on the merits. On balance, you would usually be better off accepting a refund and acknowledging that you have been damaged in a manner for which the law provides no reliable and cost effective remedy, because the harm is too small. Bad mouthing the offending company on social media (which sometimes results in a PR driven instead of lawyer driven, favorable resolution) would probably be a more fruitful strategy. Complaining to a manager or writing a letter to the President of the company might also be a more fruitful strategy. Sometimes small disputes can be resolved with class action lawsuits, but this isn't a case where this is an option, since it involves just a single individual or a handful of individuals who are harmed. This is also not the sort of case where a state consumer protection agency or attorney general's office or federal consumer protection agency is likely to get involved, since it doesn't involve a systemic deceptive trade practice, just an unfair to you bad situation. Why have these laws if they are so hard to enforce in consumer cases? As my commercial transactions professor in law school (James J. White, the author of the leading legal treatise on the subject) was fond of saying: all legal issues become more interesting if you add more zeros to the amount in controversy. If the computer system you bought had a price of $150,000 that had since gone up to $300,000, this dispute would absolutely be worth litigating. Furthermore, since you could litigate it adequately on the litigation budget that this amount in controversy would make possible, your prospects of successfully vindicating your rights as a buyer, at only a modest discount for unrecoverable litigation costs, would be much greater. Essentially, our system is designed to get close to justice in the most important disputes, as measured by the amount in controversy, while it tolerates small injustices that are not as damaging (in raw absolute dollar terms) as big disputes. This is unfair, but the source of this unfairness is intrinsic to the nature of the problem (rather than simply being a matter of artificial bias created by the people who designed the civil justice system). Also, this unfair bias comes close to maximizing the aggregate improvement in economic value that the legal system as a whole can provide for a given legal of expenditure on this system. Basically, at a fundamental economic level, the economic costs of justly resolving small wrongs can be greater due to the deadweight loss of litigation expenses for the economy as a whole, than the economic benefits of resolving the wrongs fairly (which provides not only justice to those involved but also provides an incentive to act justly in future transactions before one knows whether a problem or dispute will arise).

The person getting the item by fraud didn't get any ownership. Therefore when you bought it, you didn't get ownership either. It's still the company's property, and they can do with it what they like (within reason, they wouldn't be allowed to make it blow up in your face). If you sent back the item, good on you, because the item is now with its rightful owner. If you don't like it, you can sue the person who sold the item to you.

I'm confident that there has been no successful breach of contract lawsuit on that basis: that is not the right legal basis. Actions against a shoplifter would either be under tort law or, much more likely, criminal law. Put simply, theft is a crime, encoded in the laws of all nations, and the government will shoulder the burden of punishing a shoplifter. Since the goal of criminal law is to guarantee a well-ordered society (not to restore the victim of the crime), a victim of theft may have to pursue their own legal case against the criminal, if they want to be restored for their loss (let us say that the criminal also ate the evidence).

In general As Dale M explained, if you give the money to someone who is not obviously authorized by the business to accept money and sell stuff in exchange, you have not entered into a valid sales contract. That means you are taking things without permission. Therefore the shop could sue you for any damage this causes (maybe you took something the shop did not want to sell, or the person at the information desk was not an employee and ran away with the money). However, whether this constitutes a crime such as theft will depend on jurisdictions. Germany In Germany, for example, it would probably not, because by definition a theft requires "intention to take posession in violation of the law" (StGB §242). You could argue that you did not intend to violate the law, because you paid the required amount, and only gave the money to the wrong person by mistake. Of course, I cannot guarantee that will convince the judge... England and Wales Similarly, the law in England and Wales defines "theft" in section 1 of the Theft Act 1968: A person is guilty of theft, if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it; [...] Furthermore, section 2 says: A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest— [...] (b) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or [...] So, similar to the situation in Germany, you could argue in court that you intended to buy the item legally, and believed that the shop would be okay with that.

Typical in any of the several united-states No, this fails to meet two of the core elements of libel. The statement must be Adverse (fails) Stated by one party To a second party About a third party (fails) The case you're thinking of, where a company brags excessively about their company or products, are covered by a variety of securities and trade laws, such as false advertising. Many of these are applicable in the Federal domain, i.e. are Federal rather than state laws. Edit: Now I see you've changed the question a bit to claiming to be first. Yes, the injured party can sue for that, but they are more claiming false advertising than libel. Accusing someone of not being first-to-market is not a particularly powerful or damning claim. Oreo didn't invent the sandwich cookie nor did Apple invent the computer. So such a claim is really a lot more about the publicity than actual, provable damages; so the controversy is more likely to be aired outside the court system, or in the courts but mainly for the publicity. (an example of the latter being the "Taco Tuesday" trademark-busting action; IIRC Taco Bell even paid the other party's legal fees, despite prevailing.)

As far as I can tell, that would be a criminal act. Georgia law § 16-8-2 - Theft by taking says: A person commits the offense of theft by taking when he unlawfully takes or, being in lawful possession thereof, unlawfully appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of the property, regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated. Georgia law § 16-7-21. Criminal trespass says: A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she intentionally damages any property of another without consent of that other person and the damage thereto is $500.00 or less or knowingly and maliciously interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without consent of that person. If you know the store is refusing to sell you a product, and you eat that product anyway, that is theft. If you don't eat the food but just open it, that's still criminal trespass. Even if you're leaving them money, you're still taking and/or damaging their property without their consent. Additionally, if they told you to leave, and you refused and instead started opening food items, you might be guilty of trespassing in the more traditional sense: A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she knowingly and without authority... Remains upon the land or premises of another person... after receiving notice from the owner, rightful occupant, or, upon proper identification, an authorized representative of the owner or rightful occupant to depart. As to whether it was legal to give the candy to your daughter before the disagreement and refusal of service, that may depend on what the standard practice is. It seems to me that in most clothing stores you're supposed to pay before consuming the product - this isn't a sit-down restaurant. But if there's nothing else going on, I think the average store would refrain from calling the police if the person did not try to hide the evidence (for example, by stuffing the empty box on a shelf) and if the merchandise was paid for before the person attempted to leave the store, regardless of whether it's technically illegal.

Do I have recourse against seller? Is the seller liable or obligated to disclose this and if so what are my options? Probably not. The general rule is that you accept any condition which could be discovered with reasonable inspection. When "At the time of sale I waived inspection and did As-Is" you are greatly limiting your claims. If the seller believe that the work done fixed the problem, you probably have no remedy. It could be that the seller made a false representation in the disclosure (you'd have to look at the exact language) but even then proving it with only the kind of circumstantial evidence provided would be very challenging. In particular, as a practical matter, it isn't really economic to sue in a $10,000 non-disclosure case without open and shut clarity of fault, as opposed to some suggestive but ultimately inconclusive indicators. You could always ask and state the case in a demand letter, but if you came to me as a potential client, I wouldn't take your case because the high cost combined with the low likelihood of success would make it unlikely that an attorney could bring the case in a way that would generate net value to the client.