Datasets:

ecwk

/

vulnerable-functions-and-commits_cvefixes-2022

like 1

CVE-2017-11462

False

False

False

False

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

NETWORK

LOW

NONE

PARTIAL

PARTIAL

PARTIAL

7.5

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

NETWORK

LOW

NONE

NONE

UNCHANGED

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

9.8

CRITICAL

3.9

5.9

nan

[{'url': 'https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/2FPRUP4YVOEBGEROUYWZFEQ64HTMGNED/', 'name': 'FEDORA-2017-10c74147f9', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/56f7b1bc95a2a3eeb420e069e7655fb181ade5cf', 'name': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/56f7b1bc95a2a3eeb420e069e7655fb181ade5cf', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1488873', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1488873', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://krbdev.mit.edu/rt/Ticket/Display.html?id=8598', 'name': 'http://krbdev.mit.edu/rt/Ticket/Display.html?id=8598', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}]

[{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-415'}]}]

HIGH

[{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14:alpha1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.15.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.15.1:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.15.1:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:26:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:25:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}]

[{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Double free vulnerability in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving automatic deletion of security contexts on error.'}]

2020-01-21T15:47Z

2017-09-13T16:29Z

Double Free

The product calls free() twice on the same memory address, potentially leading to modification of unexpected memory locations.

When a program calls free() twice with the same argument, the program's memory management data structures become corrupted. This corruption can cause the program to crash or, in some circumstances, cause two later calls to malloc() to return the same pointer. If malloc() returns the same value twice and the program later gives the attacker control over the data that is written into this doubly-allocated memory, the program becomes vulnerable to a buffer overflow attack.

https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/415.html

Greg Hudson

2017-07-14 13:02:46-04:00

Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a gss_ctx_id_t. CVE-2017-11462: RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing security context on a second or subsequent call to gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous, leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing security contexts on error until the caller deletes them. All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through 1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on error. ticket: 8598 (new) target_version: 1.15-next target_version: 1.14-next tags: pullup

56f7b1bc95a2a3eeb420e069e7655fb181ade5cf

False

krb5/krb5

mirror of MIT krb5 repository

2012-05-12 16:01:32

2022-08-18 23:14:09

krb5

414.0

324.0

gss_delete_sec_context

gss_delete_sec_context( minor_status , context_handle , output_token)

['minor_status', 'context_handle', 'output_token']

gss_delete_sec_context (minor_status, context_handle, output_token) OM_uint32 * minor_status; gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle; gss_buffer_t output_token; { OM_uint32 status; gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx; status = val_del_sec_ctx_args(minor_status, context_handle, output_token); if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) return (status); /* * select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and * call it. */ ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) *context_handle; if (GSSINT_CHK_LOOP(ctx)) return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT); status = gssint_delete_internal_sec_context(minor_status, ctx->mech_type, &ctx->internal_ctx_id, output_token); if (status) return status; /* now free up the space for the union context structure */ free(ctx->mech_type->elements); free(ctx->mech_type); free(*context_handle); *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; return (GSS_S_COMPLETE); }

128

True

CVE-2017-11462

False

False

False

False

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

NETWORK

LOW

NONE

PARTIAL

PARTIAL

PARTIAL

7.5

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

NETWORK

LOW

NONE

NONE

UNCHANGED

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

9.8

CRITICAL

3.9

5.9

nan

[{'url': 'https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/2FPRUP4YVOEBGEROUYWZFEQ64HTMGNED/', 'name': 'FEDORA-2017-10c74147f9', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/56f7b1bc95a2a3eeb420e069e7655fb181ade5cf', 'name': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/56f7b1bc95a2a3eeb420e069e7655fb181ade5cf', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1488873', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1488873', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://krbdev.mit.edu/rt/Ticket/Display.html?id=8598', 'name': 'http://krbdev.mit.edu/rt/Ticket/Display.html?id=8598', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}]

[{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-415'}]}]

HIGH

[{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14:alpha1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.14.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.15.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.15.1:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:1.15.1:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:26:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:25:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}]

[{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Double free vulnerability in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving automatic deletion of security contexts on error.'}]

2020-01-21T15:47Z

2017-09-13T16:29Z

Double Free

The product calls free() twice on the same memory address, potentially leading to modification of unexpected memory locations.

When a program calls free() twice with the same argument, the program's memory management data structures become corrupted. This corruption can cause the program to crash or, in some circumstances, cause two later calls to malloc() to return the same pointer. If malloc() returns the same value twice and the program later gives the attacker control over the data that is written into this doubly-allocated memory, the program becomes vulnerable to a buffer overflow attack.

https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/415.html

Greg Hudson

2017-07-14 13:02:46-04:00

Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a gss_ctx_id_t. CVE-2017-11462: RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing security context on a second or subsequent call to gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous, leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing security contexts on error until the caller deletes them. All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through 1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on error. ticket: 8598 (new) target_version: 1.15-next target_version: 1.14-next tags: pullup

56f7b1bc95a2a3eeb420e069e7655fb181ade5cf

False

krb5/krb5

mirror of MIT krb5 repository

2012-05-12 16:01:32

2022-08-18 23:14:09

krb5

414.0

324.0

gss_init_sec_context

gss_init_sec_context( minor_status , claimant_cred_handle , context_handle , target_name , req_mech_type , req_flags , time_req , input_chan_bindings , input_token , actual_mech_type , output_token , ret_flags , time_rec)

['minor_status', 'claimant_cred_handle', 'context_handle', 'target_name', 'req_mech_type', 'req_flags', 'time_req', 'input_chan_bindings', 'input_token', 'actual_mech_type', 'output_token', 'ret_flags', 'time_rec']

gss_init_sec_context (minor_status, claimant_cred_handle, context_handle, target_name, req_mech_type, req_flags, time_req, input_chan_bindings, input_token, actual_mech_type, output_token, ret_flags, time_rec) OM_uint32 * minor_status; gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle; gss_ctx_id_t * context_handle; gss_name_t target_name; gss_OID req_mech_type; OM_uint32 req_flags; OM_uint32 time_req; gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings; gss_buffer_t input_token; gss_OID * actual_mech_type; gss_buffer_t output_token; OM_uint32 * ret_flags; OM_uint32 * time_rec; { OM_uint32 status, temp_minor_status; gss_union_name_t union_name; gss_union_cred_t union_cred; gss_name_t internal_name; gss_union_ctx_id_t union_ctx_id; gss_OID selected_mech; gss_mechanism mech; gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle; status = val_init_sec_ctx_args(minor_status, claimant_cred_handle, context_handle, target_name, req_mech_type, req_flags, time_req, input_chan_bindings, input_token, actual_mech_type, output_token, ret_flags, time_rec); if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) return (status); status = gssint_select_mech_type(minor_status, req_mech_type, &selected_mech); if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) return (status); union_name = (gss_union_name_t)target_name; /* * obtain the gss mechanism information for the requested * mechanism. If mech_type is NULL, set it to the resultant * mechanism */ mech = gssint_get_mechanism(selected_mech); if (mech == NULL) return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH); if (mech->gss_init_sec_context == NULL) return (GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE); /* * If target_name is mechanism_specific, then it must match the * mech_type that we're about to use. Otherwise, do an import on * the external_name form of the target name. */ if (union_name->mech_type && g_OID_equal(union_name->mech_type, selected_mech)) { internal_name = union_name->mech_name; } else { if ((status = gssint_import_internal_name(minor_status, selected_mech, union_name, &internal_name)) != GSS_S_COMPLETE) return (status); } /* * if context_handle is GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT, allocate a union context * descriptor to hold the mech type information as well as the * underlying mechanism context handle. Otherwise, cast the * value of *context_handle to the union context variable. */ if(*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) { status = GSS_S_FAILURE; union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) malloc(sizeof(gss_union_ctx_id_desc)); if (union_ctx_id == NULL) goto end; if (generic_gss_copy_oid(&temp_minor_status, selected_mech, &union_ctx_id->mech_type) != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { free(union_ctx_id); goto end; } /* copy the supplied context handle */ union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; } else union_ctx_id = (gss_union_ctx_id_t)*context_handle; /* * get the appropriate cred handle from the union cred struct. * defaults to GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL if there is no cred, which will * use the default credential. */ union_cred = (gss_union_cred_t) claimant_cred_handle; input_cred_handle = gssint_get_mechanism_cred(union_cred, selected_mech); /* * now call the approprate underlying mechanism routine */ status = mech->gss_init_sec_context( minor_status, input_cred_handle, &union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id, internal_name, gssint_get_public_oid(selected_mech), req_flags, time_req, input_chan_bindings, input_token, actual_mech_type, output_token, ret_flags, time_rec); if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && status != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { /* * The spec says the preferred method is to delete all context info on * the first call to init, and on all subsequent calls make the caller * responsible for calling gss_delete_sec_context. However, if the * mechanism decided to delete the internal context, we should also * delete the union context. */ map_error(minor_status, mech); if (union_ctx_id->internal_ctx_id == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) *context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) { free(union_ctx_id->mech_type->elements); free(union_ctx_id->mech_type); free(union_ctx_id); } } else if (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) { union_ctx_id->loopback = union_ctx_id; *context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)union_ctx_id; } end: if (union_name->mech_name == NULL || union_name->mech_name != internal_name) { (void) gssint_release_internal_name(&temp_minor_status, selected_mech, &internal_name); } return(status); }

509

True

CVE-2017-15088

False

False

False

False

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

NETWORK

LOW

NONE

PARTIAL

PARTIAL

PARTIAL

7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

NETWORK

LOW

NONE

NONE

UNCHANGED

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

9.8

CRITICAL

3.9

5.9

nan

[{'url': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/pull/707', 'name': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/pull/707', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/fbb687db1088ddd894d975996e5f6a4252b9a2b4', 'name': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/fbb687db1088ddd894d975996e5f6a4252b9a2b4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1504045', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1504045', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=871698', 'name': 'https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=871698', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101594', 'name': '101594', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}]

[{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-119'}]}]

HIGH

[{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '1.15.2', 'cpe_name': []}]}]

[{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.15.2 mishandles Distinguished Name (DN) fields, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and application crash) in situations involving untrusted X.509 data, related to the get_matching_data and X509_NAME_oneline_ex functions. NOTE: this has security relevance only in use cases outside of the MIT Kerberos distribution, e.g., the use of get_matching_data in KDC certauth plugin code that is specific to Red Hat.'}]

2021-01-26T15:28Z

2017-11-23T17:29Z

Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

The software performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer.

Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data. As a result, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code, alter the intended control flow, read sensitive information, or cause the system to crash.

https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html

Greg Hudson

2017-10-17 18:50:15-04:00

Fix PKINIT cert matching data construction Rewrite X509_NAME_oneline_ex() and its call sites to use dynamic allocation and to perform proper error checking. ticket: 8617 target_version: 1.16 target_version: 1.15-next target_version: 1.14-next tags: pullup

fbb687db1088ddd894d975996e5f6a4252b9a2b4

False

krb5/krb5

mirror of MIT krb5 repository

2012-05-12 16:01:32

2022-08-18 23:14:09

krb5

414.0

324.0

X509_NAME_oneline_ex

X509_NAME_oneline_ex( X509_NAME * a , char * buf , unsigned int * size , unsigned long flag)

['a', 'buf', 'size', 'flag']

X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_NAME * a, char *buf, unsigned int *size, unsigned long flag) { BIO *out = NULL; out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem ()); if (X509_NAME_print_ex(out, a, 0, flag) > 0) { if (buf != NULL && (*size) > (unsigned int) BIO_number_written(out)) { memset(buf, 0, *size); BIO_read(out, buf, (int) BIO_number_written(out)); } else { *size = BIO_number_written(out); } } BIO_free(out); return (buf); }

121

True

CVE-2017-15088

False

False

False

False

AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P

NETWORK

LOW

NONE

PARTIAL

PARTIAL

PARTIAL

7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

NETWORK

LOW

NONE

NONE

UNCHANGED

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

9.8

CRITICAL

3.9

5.9

nan

[{'url': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/pull/707', 'name': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/pull/707', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/fbb687db1088ddd894d975996e5f6a4252b9a2b4', 'name': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/fbb687db1088ddd894d975996e5f6a4252b9a2b4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1504045', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1504045', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=871698', 'name': 'https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=871698', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101594', 'name': '101594', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}]

[{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-119'}]}]

HIGH

[{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '1.15.2', 'cpe_name': []}]}]

[{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'plugins/preauth/pkinit/pkinit_crypto_openssl.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) through 1.15.2 mishandles Distinguished Name (DN) fields, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and application crash) in situations involving untrusted X.509 data, related to the get_matching_data and X509_NAME_oneline_ex functions. NOTE: this has security relevance only in use cases outside of the MIT Kerberos distribution, e.g., the use of get_matching_data in KDC certauth plugin code that is specific to Red Hat.'}]

2021-01-26T15:28Z

2017-11-23T17:29Z

Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

The software performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer.

Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data. As a result, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code, alter the intended control flow, read sensitive information, or cause the system to crash.

https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html

Greg Hudson

2017-10-17 18:50:15-04:00

Fix PKINIT cert matching data construction Rewrite X509_NAME_oneline_ex() and its call sites to use dynamic allocation and to perform proper error checking. ticket: 8617 target_version: 1.16 target_version: 1.15-next target_version: 1.14-next tags: pullup

fbb687db1088ddd894d975996e5f6a4252b9a2b4

False

krb5/krb5

mirror of MIT krb5 repository

2012-05-12 16:01:32

2022-08-18 23:14:09

krb5

414.0

324.0

get_matching_data

get_matching_data( krb5_context context , pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx , pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx , X509 * cert , pkinit_cert_matching_data ** md_out)

['context', 'plg_cryptoctx', 'req_cryptoctx', 'cert', 'md_out']

get_matching_data(krb5_context context, pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx, pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx, X509 *cert, pkinit_cert_matching_data **md_out) { krb5_error_code ret = ENOMEM; pkinit_cert_matching_data *md = NULL; krb5_principal *pkinit_sans = NULL, *upn_sans = NULL; size_t i, j; char buf[DN_BUF_LEN]; unsigned int bufsize = sizeof(buf); *md_out = NULL; md = calloc(1, sizeof(*md)); if (md == NULL) goto cleanup; /* Get the subject name (in rfc2253 format). */ X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, &bufsize, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS); md->subject_dn = strdup(buf); if (md->subject_dn == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } /* Get the issuer name (in rfc2253 format). */ X509_NAME_oneline_ex(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), buf, &bufsize, XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS); md->issuer_dn = strdup(buf); if (md->issuer_dn == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } /* Get the SAN data. */ ret = crypto_retrieve_X509_sans(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, cert, &pkinit_sans, &upn_sans, NULL); if (ret) goto cleanup; j = 0; if (pkinit_sans != NULL) { for (i = 0; pkinit_sans[i] != NULL; i++) j++; } if (upn_sans != NULL) { for (i = 0; upn_sans[i] != NULL; i++) j++; } if (j != 0) { md->sans = calloc((size_t)j+1, sizeof(*md->sans)); if (md->sans == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } j = 0; if (pkinit_sans != NULL) { for (i = 0; pkinit_sans[i] != NULL; i++) md->sans[j++] = pkinit_sans[i]; free(pkinit_sans); } if (upn_sans != NULL) { for (i = 0; upn_sans[i] != NULL; i++) md->sans[j++] = upn_sans[i]; free(upn_sans); } md->sans[j] = NULL; } else md->sans = NULL; /* Get the KU and EKU data. */ ret = crypto_retrieve_X509_key_usage(context, plg_cryptoctx, req_cryptoctx, cert, &md->ku_bits, &md->eku_bits); if (ret) goto cleanup; *md_out = md; md = NULL; cleanup: crypto_cert_free_matching_data(context, md); return ret; }

460

True

CVE-2018-5729

False

False

False

False

AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P

NETWORK

LOW

SINGLE

PARTIAL

PARTIAL

PARTIAL

6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

NETWORK

LOW

HIGH

NONE

UNCHANGED

LOW

LOW

LOW

4.7

MEDIUM

1.2

3.4

False

[{'url': 'https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/OIFUL3CPM4S5TOXTTOCQ3CUZN6XCXUTR/', 'name': 'FEDORA-2018-f97cb1c9b0', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/GK5T6JPMBHBPKS7HNGHYUUF4KKRMNSNU/', 'name': 'FEDORA-2018-391a1f3e61', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/e1caf6fb74981da62039846931ebdffed71309d1', 'name': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/e1caf6fb74981da62039846931ebdffed71309d1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1551083', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1551083', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=891869', 'name': 'https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=891869', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:3071', 'name': 'RHSA-2018:3071', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1042071', 'name': '1042071', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['VDB Entry', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2019/01/msg00020.html', 'name': '[debian-lts-announce] 20190125 [SECURITY] [DLA 1643-1] krb5 security update', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2019:0327', 'name': 'RHBA-2019:0327', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/09/msg00019.html', 'name': '[debian-lts-announce] 20210930 [SECURITY] [DLA 2771-1] krb5 security update', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}]

[{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-476'}]}]

MEDIUM

[{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionStartIncluding': '5-1.6', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:26:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:27:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_desktop:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_workstation:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}]

[{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'MIT krb5 1.6 or later allows an authenticated kadmin with permission to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) or bypass a DN container check by supplying tagged data that is internal to the database module.'}]

2021-10-18T12:11Z

2018-03-06T20:29Z

NULL Pointer Dereference

A NULL pointer dereference occurs when the application dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid, but is NULL, typically causing a crash or exit.

NULL pointer dereference issues can occur through a number of flaws, including race conditions, and simple programming omissions.

https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/476.html

Greg Hudson

2018-01-12 11:43:01-05:00

Fix flaws in LDAP DN checking KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data is intended to be internal to the LDAP KDB module, and not used in disk or wire principal entries. Prevent kadmin clients from sending KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data by giving it a type number less than 256 and filtering out type numbers less than 256 in kadm5_create_principal_3(). (We already filter out low type numbers in kadm5_modify_principal()). In the LDAP KDB module, if containerdn and linkdn are both specified in a put_principal operation, check both linkdn and the computed standalone_principal_dn for container membership. To that end, factor out the checks into helper functions and call them on all applicable client-influenced DNs. CVE-2018-5729: In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can cause a null dereference in kadmind, or circumvent a DN container check, by supplying tagged data intended to be internal to the database module. Thanks to Sharwan Ram and Pooja Anil for discovering the potential null dereference. CVE-2018-5730: In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can circumvent a DN containership check by supplying both a "linkdn" and "containerdn" database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within the container DN. ticket: 8643 (new) tags: pullup target_version: 1.16-next target_version: 1.15-next

e1caf6fb74981da62039846931ebdffed71309d1

False

krb5/krb5

mirror of MIT krb5 repository

2012-05-12 16:01:32

2022-08-18 23:14:09

krb5

414.0

324.0

krb5_ldap_put_principal

krb5_ldap_put_principal( krb5_context context , krb5_db_entry * entry , char ** db_args)

['context', 'entry', 'db_args']

krb5_ldap_put_principal(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *entry, char **db_args) { int l=0, kerberos_principal_object_type=0; unsigned int ntrees=0, tre=0; krb5_error_code st=0, tempst=0; LDAP *ld=NULL; LDAPMessage *result=NULL, *ent=NULL; char **subtreelist = NULL; char *user=NULL, *subtree=NULL, *principal_dn=NULL; char **values=NULL, *strval[10]={NULL}, errbuf[1024]; char *filtuser=NULL; struct berval **bersecretkey=NULL; LDAPMod **mods=NULL; krb5_boolean create_standalone=FALSE; krb5_boolean krb_identity_exists=FALSE, establish_links=FALSE; char *standalone_principal_dn=NULL; krb5_tl_data *tl_data=NULL; krb5_key_data **keys=NULL; kdb5_dal_handle *dal_handle=NULL; krb5_ldap_context *ldap_context=NULL; krb5_ldap_server_handle *ldap_server_handle=NULL; osa_princ_ent_rec princ_ent = {0}; xargs_t xargs = {0}; char *polname = NULL; OPERATION optype; krb5_boolean found_entry = FALSE; /* Clear the global error string */ krb5_clear_error_message(context); SETUP_CONTEXT(); if (ldap_context->lrparams == NULL || ldap_context->container_dn == NULL) return EINVAL; /* get ldap handle */ GET_HANDLE(); if (!is_principal_in_realm(ldap_context, entry->princ)) { st = EINVAL; k5_setmsg(context, st, _("Principal does not belong to the default realm")); goto cleanup; } /* get the principal information to act on */ if (((st=krb5_unparse_name(context, entry->princ, &user)) != 0) || ((st=krb5_ldap_unparse_principal_name(user)) != 0)) goto cleanup; filtuser = ldap_filter_correct(user); if (filtuser == NULL) { st = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } /* Identity the type of operation, it can be * add principal or modify principal. * hack if the entry->mask has KRB_PRINCIPAL flag set * then it is a add operation */ if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) optype = ADD_PRINCIPAL; else optype = MODIFY_PRINCIPAL; if (((st=krb5_get_princ_type(context, entry, &kerberos_principal_object_type)) != 0) || ((st=krb5_get_userdn(context, entry, &principal_dn)) != 0)) goto cleanup; if ((st=process_db_args(context, db_args, &xargs, optype)) != 0) goto cleanup; if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD) { unsigned int tree = 0; int numlentries = 0; char *filter = NULL; /* A load operation is special, will do a mix-in (add krbprinc * attrs to a non-krb object entry) if an object exists with a * matching krbprincipalname attribute so try to find existing * object and set principal_dn. This assumes that the * krbprincipalname attribute is unique (only one object entry has * a particular krbprincipalname attribute). */ if (asprintf(&filter, FILTER"%s))", filtuser) < 0) { filter = NULL; st = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } /* get the current subtree list */ if ((st = krb5_get_subtree_info(ldap_context, &subtreelist, &ntrees)) != 0) goto cleanup; found_entry = FALSE; /* search for entry with matching krbprincipalname attribute */ for (tree = 0; found_entry == FALSE && tree < ntrees; ++tree) { if (principal_dn == NULL) { LDAP_SEARCH_1(subtreelist[tree], ldap_context->lrparams->search_scope, filter, principal_attributes, IGNORE_STATUS); } else { /* just look for entry with principal_dn */ LDAP_SEARCH_1(principal_dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, filter, principal_attributes, IGNORE_STATUS); } if (st == LDAP_SUCCESS) { numlentries = ldap_count_entries(ld, result); if (numlentries > 1) { free(filter); st = EINVAL; k5_setmsg(context, st, _("operation can not continue, more than one " "entry with principal name \"%s\" found"), user); goto cleanup; } else if (numlentries == 1) { found_entry = TRUE; if (principal_dn == NULL) { ent = ldap_first_entry(ld, result); if (ent != NULL) { /* setting principal_dn will cause that entry to be modified further down */ if ((principal_dn = ldap_get_dn(ld, ent)) == NULL) { ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_RESULT_CODE, &st); st = set_ldap_error (context, st, 0); free(filter); goto cleanup; } } } } } else if (st != LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) { /* could not perform search, return with failure */ st = set_ldap_error (context, st, 0); free(filter); goto cleanup; } ldap_msgfree(result); result = NULL; /* * If it isn't found then assume a standalone princ entry is to * be created. */ } /* end for (tree = 0; principal_dn == ... */ free(filter); if (found_entry == FALSE && principal_dn != NULL) { /* * if principal_dn is null then there is code further down to * deal with setting standalone_principal_dn. Also note that * this will set create_standalone true for * non-mix-in entries which is okay if loading from a dump. */ create_standalone = TRUE; standalone_principal_dn = strdup(principal_dn); CHECK_NULL(standalone_principal_dn); } } /* end if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD */ /* time to generate the DN information with the help of * containerdn, principalcontainerreference or * realmcontainerdn information */ if (principal_dn == NULL && xargs.dn == NULL) { /* creation of standalone principal */ /* get the subtree information */ if (entry->princ->length == 2 && entry->princ->data[0].length == strlen("krbtgt") && strncmp(entry->princ->data[0].data, "krbtgt", entry->princ->data[0].length) == 0) { /* if the principal is a inter-realm principal, always created in the realm container */ subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->realmdn); } else if (xargs.containerdn) { if ((st=checkattributevalue(ld, xargs.containerdn, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { if (st == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY || st == KRB5_KDB_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) { int ost = st; st = EINVAL; k5_wrapmsg(context, ost, st, _("'%s' not found"), xargs.containerdn); } goto cleanup; } subtree = strdup(xargs.containerdn); } else if (ldap_context->lrparams->containerref && strlen(ldap_context->lrparams->containerref) != 0) { /* * Here the subtree should be changed with * principalcontainerreference attribute value */ subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->containerref); } else { subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->realmdn); } CHECK_NULL(subtree); if (asprintf(&standalone_principal_dn, "krbprincipalname=%s,%s", filtuser, subtree) < 0) standalone_principal_dn = NULL; CHECK_NULL(standalone_principal_dn); /* * free subtree when you are done using the subtree * set the boolean create_standalone to TRUE */ create_standalone = TRUE; free(subtree); subtree = NULL; } /* * If the DN information is presented by the user, time to * validate the input to ensure that the DN falls under * any of the subtrees */ if (xargs.dn_from_kbd == TRUE) { /* make sure the DN falls in the subtree */ int dnlen=0, subtreelen=0; char *dn=NULL; krb5_boolean outofsubtree=TRUE; if (xargs.dn != NULL) { dn = xargs.dn; } else if (xargs.linkdn != NULL) { dn = xargs.linkdn; } else if (standalone_principal_dn != NULL) { /* * Even though the standalone_principal_dn is constructed * within this function, there is the containerdn input * from the user that can become part of the it. */ dn = standalone_principal_dn; } /* Get the current subtree list if we haven't already done so. */ if (subtreelist == NULL) { st = krb5_get_subtree_info(ldap_context, &subtreelist, &ntrees); if (st) goto cleanup; } for (tre=0; tre<ntrees; ++tre) { if (subtreelist[tre] == NULL || strlen(subtreelist[tre]) == 0) { outofsubtree = FALSE; break; } else { dnlen = strlen (dn); subtreelen = strlen(subtreelist[tre]); if ((dnlen >= subtreelen) && (strcasecmp((dn + dnlen - subtreelen), subtreelist[tre]) == 0)) { outofsubtree = FALSE; break; } } } if (outofsubtree == TRUE) { st = EINVAL; k5_setmsg(context, st, _("DN is out of the realm subtree")); goto cleanup; } /* * dn value will be set either by dn, linkdn or the standalone_principal_dn * In the first 2 cases, the dn should be existing and in the last case we * are supposed to create the ldap object. so the below should not be * executed for the last case. */ if (standalone_principal_dn == NULL) { /* * If the ldap object is missing, this results in an error. */ /* * Search for krbprincipalname attribute here. * This is to find if a kerberos identity is already present * on the ldap object, in which case adding a kerberos identity * on the ldap object should result in an error. */ char *attributes[]={"krbticketpolicyreference", "krbprincipalname", NULL}; ldap_msgfree(result); result = NULL; LDAP_SEARCH_1(dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, 0, attributes, IGNORE_STATUS); if (st == LDAP_SUCCESS) { ent = ldap_first_entry(ld, result); if (ent != NULL) { if ((values=ldap_get_values(ld, ent, "krbticketpolicyreference")) != NULL) { ldap_value_free(values); } if ((values=ldap_get_values(ld, ent, "krbprincipalname")) != NULL) { krb_identity_exists = TRUE; ldap_value_free(values); } } } else { st = set_ldap_error(context, st, OP_SEARCH); goto cleanup; } } } /* * If xargs.dn is set then the request is to add a * kerberos principal on a ldap object, but if * there is one already on the ldap object this * should result in an error. */ if (xargs.dn != NULL && krb_identity_exists == TRUE) { st = EINVAL; snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("ldap object is already kerberized")); k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf); goto cleanup; } if (xargs.linkdn != NULL) { /* * link information can be changed using modprinc. * However, link information can be changed only on the * standalone kerberos principal objects. A standalone * kerberos principal object is of type krbprincipal * structural objectclass. * * NOTE: kerberos principals on an ldap object can't be * linked to other ldap objects. */ if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL && kerberos_principal_object_type != KDB_STANDALONE_PRINCIPAL_OBJECT) { st = EINVAL; snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("link information can not be set/updated as the " "kerberos principal belongs to an ldap object")); k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf); goto cleanup; } /* * Check the link information. If there is already a link * existing then this operation is not allowed. */ { char **linkdns=NULL; int j=0; if ((st=krb5_get_linkdn(context, entry, &linkdns)) != 0) { snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("Failed getting object references")); k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf); goto cleanup; } if (linkdns != NULL) { st = EINVAL; snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("kerberos principal is already linked to a ldap " "object")); k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf); for (j=0; linkdns[j] != NULL; ++j) free (linkdns[j]); free (linkdns); goto cleanup; } } establish_links = TRUE; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->last_success)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastSuccessfulAuth", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) { free (strval[0]); goto cleanup; } free (strval[0]); } if (entry->mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->last_failed)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastFailedAuth", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) { free (strval[0]); goto cleanup; } free(strval[0]); } if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) { krb5_kvno fail_auth_count; fail_auth_count = entry->fail_auth_count; if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT) fail_auth_count++; st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, fail_auth_count); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; } else if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT) { int attr_mask = 0; krb5_boolean has_fail_count; /* Check if the krbLoginFailedCount attribute exists. (Through * krb5 1.8.1, it wasn't set in new entries.) */ st = krb5_get_attributes_mask(context, entry, &attr_mask); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; has_fail_count = ((attr_mask & KDB_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_ATTR) != 0); /* * If the client library and server supports RFC 4525, * then use it to increment by one the value of the * krbLoginFailedCount attribute. Otherwise, assert the * (provided) old value by deleting it before adding. */ #ifdef LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT if (ldap_server_handle->server_info->modify_increment && has_fail_count) { st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount", LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT, 1); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; } else { #endif /* LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT */ if (has_fail_count) { st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, entry->fail_auth_count); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; } st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount", LDAP_MOD_ADD, entry->fail_auth_count + 1); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; #ifdef LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT } #endif } else if (optype == ADD_PRINCIPAL) { /* Initialize krbLoginFailedCount in new entries to help avoid a * race during the first failed login. */ st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount", LDAP_MOD_ADD, 0); } if (entry->mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbmaxticketlife", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, entry->max_life)) != 0) goto cleanup; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbmaxrenewableage", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, entry->max_renewable_life)) != 0) goto cleanup; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) { if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketflags", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, entry->attributes)) != 0) goto cleanup; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); strval[0] = user; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalname", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) goto cleanup; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->expiration)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalexpiration", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) { free (strval[0]); goto cleanup; } free (strval[0]); } if (entry->mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->pw_expiration)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpasswordexpiration", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) { free (strval[0]); goto cleanup; } free (strval[0]); } if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY || entry->mask & KADM5_KEY_HIST) { memset(&princ_ent, 0, sizeof(princ_ent)); for (tl_data=entry->tl_data; tl_data; tl_data=tl_data->tl_data_next) { if (tl_data->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA) { if ((st = krb5_lookup_tl_kadm_data(tl_data, &princ_ent)) != 0) { goto cleanup; } break; } } } if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY) { if (princ_ent.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((st = krb5_ldap_name_to_policydn (context, princ_ent.policy, &polname)) != 0) goto cleanup; strval[0] = polname; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) goto cleanup; } else { st = EINVAL; k5_setmsg(context, st, "Password policy value null"); goto cleanup; } } else if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD && found_entry == TRUE) { /* * a load is special in that existing entries must have attrs that * removed. */ if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, NULL)) != 0) goto cleanup; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) { if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, NULL)) != 0) goto cleanup; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_KEY_HIST) { bersecretkey = krb5_encode_histkey(&princ_ent); if (bersecretkey == NULL) { st = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } st = krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdhistory", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, bersecretkey); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; free_berdata(bersecretkey); bersecretkey = NULL; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA || entry->mask & KADM5_KVNO) { krb5_kvno mkvno; if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_mkvno(context, entry, &mkvno)) != 0) goto cleanup; bersecretkey = krb5_encode_krbsecretkey (entry->key_data, entry->n_key_data, mkvno); if (bersecretkey == NULL) { st = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } /* An empty list of bervals is only accepted for modify operations, * not add operations. */ if (bersecretkey[0] != NULL || !create_standalone) { st = krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalkey", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, bersecretkey); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; } if (!(entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL)) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->pw_expiration)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpasswordexpiration", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) { free (strval[0]); goto cleanup; } free (strval[0]); } /* Update last password change whenever a new key is set */ { krb5_timestamp last_pw_changed; if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(context, entry, &last_pw_changed)) != 0) goto cleanup; memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((strval[0] = getstringtime(last_pw_changed)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastPwdChange", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) { free (strval[0]); goto cleanup; } free (strval[0]); } } /* Modify Key data ends here */ /* Auth indicators will also be stored in krbExtraData when processing * tl_data. */ st = update_ldap_mod_auth_ind(context, entry, &mods); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; /* Set tl_data */ if (entry->tl_data != NULL) { int count = 0; struct berval **ber_tl_data = NULL; krb5_tl_data *ptr; krb5_timestamp unlock_time; for (ptr = entry->tl_data; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->tl_data_next) { if (ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE #ifdef SECURID || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_DB_ARGS #endif || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA || ptr->tl_data_type == KDB_TL_USER_INFO || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION_ACL || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_ADMIN_UNLOCK) continue; count++; } if (count != 0) { int j; ber_tl_data = (struct berval **) calloc (count + 1, sizeof (struct berval*)); if (ber_tl_data == NULL) { st = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } for (j = 0, ptr = entry->tl_data; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->tl_data_next) { /* Ignore tl_data that are stored in separate directory * attributes */ if (ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE #ifdef SECURID || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_DB_ARGS #endif || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA || ptr->tl_data_type == KDB_TL_USER_INFO || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION_ACL || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_ADMIN_UNLOCK) continue; if ((st = tl_data2berval (ptr, &ber_tl_data[j])) != 0) break; j++; } if (st == 0) { ber_tl_data[count] = NULL; st=krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbExtraData", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, ber_tl_data); } free_berdata(ber_tl_data); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; } if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_last_admin_unlock(context, entry, &unlock_time)) != 0) goto cleanup; if (unlock_time != 0) { /* Update last admin unlock */ memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((strval[0] = getstringtime(unlock_time)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastAdminUnlock", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) { free (strval[0]); goto cleanup; } free (strval[0]); } } /* Directory specific attribute */ if (xargs.tktpolicydn != NULL) { int tmask=0; if (strlen(xargs.tktpolicydn) != 0) { st = checkattributevalue(ld, xargs.tktpolicydn, "objectclass", policyclass, &tmask); CHECK_CLASS_VALIDITY(st, tmask, _("ticket policy object value: ")); strval[0] = xargs.tktpolicydn; strval[1] = NULL; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) goto cleanup; } else { /* if xargs.tktpolicydn is a empty string, then delete * already existing krbticketpolicyreference attr */ if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, NULL)) != 0) goto cleanup; } } if (establish_links == TRUE) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); strval[0] = xargs.linkdn; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbObjectReferences", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) goto cleanup; } /* * in case mods is NULL then return * not sure but can happen in a modprinc * so no need to return an error * addprinc will at least have the principal name * and the keys passed in */ if (mods == NULL) goto cleanup; if (create_standalone == TRUE) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); strval[0] = "krbprincipal"; strval[1] = "krbprincipalaux"; strval[2] = "krbTicketPolicyAux"; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "objectclass", LDAP_MOD_ADD, strval)) != 0) goto cleanup; st = ldap_add_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL); if (st == LDAP_ALREADY_EXISTS && entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD) { /* a load operation must replace an existing entry */ st = ldap_delete_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, NULL, NULL); if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) { snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("Principal delete failed (trying to replace " "entry): %s"), ldap_err2string(st)); st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_ADD); k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf); goto cleanup; } else { st = ldap_add_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL); } } if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) { snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("Principal add failed: %s"), ldap_err2string(st)); st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_ADD); k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf); goto cleanup; } } else { /* * Here existing ldap object is modified and can be related * to any attribute, so always ensure that the ldap * object is extended with all the kerberos related * objectclasses so that there are no constraint * violations. */ { char *attrvalues[] = {"krbprincipalaux", "krbTicketPolicyAux", NULL}; int p, q, r=0, amask=0; if ((st=checkattributevalue(ld, (xargs.dn) ? xargs.dn : principal_dn, "objectclass", attrvalues, &amask)) != 0) goto cleanup; memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); for (p=1, q=0; p<=2; p<<=1, ++q) { if ((p & amask) == 0) strval[r++] = attrvalues[q]; } if (r != 0) { if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "objectclass", LDAP_MOD_ADD, strval)) != 0) goto cleanup; } } if (xargs.dn != NULL) st=ldap_modify_ext_s(ld, xargs.dn, mods, NULL, NULL); else st = ldap_modify_ext_s(ld, principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL); if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) { snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("User modification failed: %s"), ldap_err2string(st)); st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_MOD); k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf); goto cleanup; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT) entry->fail_auth_count++; } cleanup: if (user) free(user); if (filtuser) free(filtuser); free_xargs(xargs); if (standalone_principal_dn) free(standalone_principal_dn); if (principal_dn) free (principal_dn); if (polname != NULL) free(polname); for (tre = 0; tre < ntrees; tre++) free(subtreelist[tre]); free(subtreelist); if (subtree) free (subtree); if (bersecretkey) { for (l=0; bersecretkey[l]; ++l) { if (bersecretkey[l]->bv_val) free (bersecretkey[l]->bv_val); free (bersecretkey[l]); } free (bersecretkey); } if (keys) free (keys); ldap_mods_free(mods, 1); ldap_osa_free_princ_ent(&princ_ent); ldap_msgfree(result); krb5_ldap_put_handle_to_pool(ldap_context, ldap_server_handle); return(st); }

4197

True

CVE-2018-5730

False

False

False

False

AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N

NETWORK

LOW

SINGLE

PARTIAL

PARTIAL

NONE

5.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

NETWORK

LOW

HIGH

NONE

UNCHANGED

LOW

LOW

NONE

3.8

LOW

1.2

2.5

False

[{'url': 'https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/OIFUL3CPM4S5TOXTTOCQ3CUZN6XCXUTR/', 'name': 'FEDORA-2018-f97cb1c9b0', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/GK5T6JPMBHBPKS7HNGHYUUF4KKRMNSNU/', 'name': 'FEDORA-2018-391a1f3e61', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/e1caf6fb74981da62039846931ebdffed71309d1', 'name': 'https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/e1caf6fb74981da62039846931ebdffed71309d1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1551082', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1551082', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=891869', 'name': 'https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=891869', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:3071', 'name': 'RHSA-2018:3071', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1042071', 'name': '1042071', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}, {'url': 'https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2019/01/msg00020.html', 'name': '[debian-lts-announce] 20190125 [SECURITY] [DLA 1643-1] krb5 security update', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2019:0327', 'name': 'RHBA-2019:0327', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/09/msg00019.html', 'name': '[debian-lts-announce] 20210930 [SECURITY] [DLA 2771-1] krb5 security update', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}]

[{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-90'}]}]

MEDIUM

[{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:mit:kerberos_5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionStartIncluding': '5-1.6', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:26:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:27:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_desktop:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_workstation:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}]

[{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'MIT krb5 1.6 or later allows an authenticated kadmin with permission to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database to circumvent a DN containership check by supplying both a "linkdn" and "containerdn" database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within the container DN.'}]

2022-04-18T17:30Z

2018-03-06T20:29Z

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an LDAP Query ('LDAP Injection')

The software constructs all or part of an LDAP query using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended LDAP query when it is sent to a downstream component.

https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/90.html

Greg Hudson

2018-01-12 11:43:01-05:00

Fix flaws in LDAP DN checking KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data is intended to be internal to the LDAP KDB module, and not used in disk or wire principal entries. Prevent kadmin clients from sending KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data by giving it a type number less than 256 and filtering out type numbers less than 256 in kadm5_create_principal_3(). (We already filter out low type numbers in kadm5_modify_principal()). In the LDAP KDB module, if containerdn and linkdn are both specified in a put_principal operation, check both linkdn and the computed standalone_principal_dn for container membership. To that end, factor out the checks into helper functions and call them on all applicable client-influenced DNs. CVE-2018-5729: In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can cause a null dereference in kadmind, or circumvent a DN container check, by supplying tagged data intended to be internal to the database module. Thanks to Sharwan Ram and Pooja Anil for discovering the potential null dereference. CVE-2018-5730: In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can circumvent a DN containership check by supplying both a "linkdn" and "containerdn" database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within the container DN. ticket: 8643 (new) tags: pullup target_version: 1.16-next target_version: 1.15-next

e1caf6fb74981da62039846931ebdffed71309d1

False

krb5/krb5

mirror of MIT krb5 repository

2012-05-12 16:01:32

2022-08-18 23:14:09

krb5

414.0

324.0

krb5_ldap_put_principal

krb5_ldap_put_principal( krb5_context context , krb5_db_entry * entry , char ** db_args)

['context', 'entry', 'db_args']

krb5_ldap_put_principal(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *entry, char **db_args) { int l=0, kerberos_principal_object_type=0; unsigned int ntrees=0, tre=0; krb5_error_code st=0, tempst=0; LDAP *ld=NULL; LDAPMessage *result=NULL, *ent=NULL; char **subtreelist = NULL; char *user=NULL, *subtree=NULL, *principal_dn=NULL; char **values=NULL, *strval[10]={NULL}, errbuf[1024]; char *filtuser=NULL; struct berval **bersecretkey=NULL; LDAPMod **mods=NULL; krb5_boolean create_standalone=FALSE; krb5_boolean krb_identity_exists=FALSE, establish_links=FALSE; char *standalone_principal_dn=NULL; krb5_tl_data *tl_data=NULL; krb5_key_data **keys=NULL; kdb5_dal_handle *dal_handle=NULL; krb5_ldap_context *ldap_context=NULL; krb5_ldap_server_handle *ldap_server_handle=NULL; osa_princ_ent_rec princ_ent = {0}; xargs_t xargs = {0}; char *polname = NULL; OPERATION optype; krb5_boolean found_entry = FALSE; /* Clear the global error string */ krb5_clear_error_message(context); SETUP_CONTEXT(); if (ldap_context->lrparams == NULL || ldap_context->container_dn == NULL) return EINVAL; /* get ldap handle */ GET_HANDLE(); if (!is_principal_in_realm(ldap_context, entry->princ)) { st = EINVAL; k5_setmsg(context, st, _("Principal does not belong to the default realm")); goto cleanup; } /* get the principal information to act on */ if (((st=krb5_unparse_name(context, entry->princ, &user)) != 0) || ((st=krb5_ldap_unparse_principal_name(user)) != 0)) goto cleanup; filtuser = ldap_filter_correct(user); if (filtuser == NULL) { st = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } /* Identity the type of operation, it can be * add principal or modify principal. * hack if the entry->mask has KRB_PRINCIPAL flag set * then it is a add operation */ if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) optype = ADD_PRINCIPAL; else optype = MODIFY_PRINCIPAL; if (((st=krb5_get_princ_type(context, entry, &kerberos_principal_object_type)) != 0) || ((st=krb5_get_userdn(context, entry, &principal_dn)) != 0)) goto cleanup; if ((st=process_db_args(context, db_args, &xargs, optype)) != 0) goto cleanup; if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD) { unsigned int tree = 0; int numlentries = 0; char *filter = NULL; /* A load operation is special, will do a mix-in (add krbprinc * attrs to a non-krb object entry) if an object exists with a * matching krbprincipalname attribute so try to find existing * object and set principal_dn. This assumes that the * krbprincipalname attribute is unique (only one object entry has * a particular krbprincipalname attribute). */ if (asprintf(&filter, FILTER"%s))", filtuser) < 0) { filter = NULL; st = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } /* get the current subtree list */ if ((st = krb5_get_subtree_info(ldap_context, &subtreelist, &ntrees)) != 0) goto cleanup; found_entry = FALSE; /* search for entry with matching krbprincipalname attribute */ for (tree = 0; found_entry == FALSE && tree < ntrees; ++tree) { if (principal_dn == NULL) { LDAP_SEARCH_1(subtreelist[tree], ldap_context->lrparams->search_scope, filter, principal_attributes, IGNORE_STATUS); } else { /* just look for entry with principal_dn */ LDAP_SEARCH_1(principal_dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, filter, principal_attributes, IGNORE_STATUS); } if (st == LDAP_SUCCESS) { numlentries = ldap_count_entries(ld, result); if (numlentries > 1) { free(filter); st = EINVAL; k5_setmsg(context, st, _("operation can not continue, more than one " "entry with principal name \"%s\" found"), user); goto cleanup; } else if (numlentries == 1) { found_entry = TRUE; if (principal_dn == NULL) { ent = ldap_first_entry(ld, result); if (ent != NULL) { /* setting principal_dn will cause that entry to be modified further down */ if ((principal_dn = ldap_get_dn(ld, ent)) == NULL) { ldap_get_option (ld, LDAP_OPT_RESULT_CODE, &st); st = set_ldap_error (context, st, 0); free(filter); goto cleanup; } } } } } else if (st != LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) { /* could not perform search, return with failure */ st = set_ldap_error (context, st, 0); free(filter); goto cleanup; } ldap_msgfree(result); result = NULL; /* * If it isn't found then assume a standalone princ entry is to * be created. */ } /* end for (tree = 0; principal_dn == ... */ free(filter); if (found_entry == FALSE && principal_dn != NULL) { /* * if principal_dn is null then there is code further down to * deal with setting standalone_principal_dn. Also note that * this will set create_standalone true for * non-mix-in entries which is okay if loading from a dump. */ create_standalone = TRUE; standalone_principal_dn = strdup(principal_dn); CHECK_NULL(standalone_principal_dn); } } /* end if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD */ /* time to generate the DN information with the help of * containerdn, principalcontainerreference or * realmcontainerdn information */ if (principal_dn == NULL && xargs.dn == NULL) { /* creation of standalone principal */ /* get the subtree information */ if (entry->princ->length == 2 && entry->princ->data[0].length == strlen("krbtgt") && strncmp(entry->princ->data[0].data, "krbtgt", entry->princ->data[0].length) == 0) { /* if the principal is a inter-realm principal, always created in the realm container */ subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->realmdn); } else if (xargs.containerdn) { if ((st=checkattributevalue(ld, xargs.containerdn, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { if (st == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY || st == KRB5_KDB_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION) { int ost = st; st = EINVAL; k5_wrapmsg(context, ost, st, _("'%s' not found"), xargs.containerdn); } goto cleanup; } subtree = strdup(xargs.containerdn); } else if (ldap_context->lrparams->containerref && strlen(ldap_context->lrparams->containerref) != 0) { /* * Here the subtree should be changed with * principalcontainerreference attribute value */ subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->containerref); } else { subtree = strdup(ldap_context->lrparams->realmdn); } CHECK_NULL(subtree); if (asprintf(&standalone_principal_dn, "krbprincipalname=%s,%s", filtuser, subtree) < 0) standalone_principal_dn = NULL; CHECK_NULL(standalone_principal_dn); /* * free subtree when you are done using the subtree * set the boolean create_standalone to TRUE */ create_standalone = TRUE; free(subtree); subtree = NULL; } /* * If the DN information is presented by the user, time to * validate the input to ensure that the DN falls under * any of the subtrees */ if (xargs.dn_from_kbd == TRUE) { /* make sure the DN falls in the subtree */ int dnlen=0, subtreelen=0; char *dn=NULL; krb5_boolean outofsubtree=TRUE; if (xargs.dn != NULL) { dn = xargs.dn; } else if (xargs.linkdn != NULL) { dn = xargs.linkdn; } else if (standalone_principal_dn != NULL) { /* * Even though the standalone_principal_dn is constructed * within this function, there is the containerdn input * from the user that can become part of the it. */ dn = standalone_principal_dn; } /* Get the current subtree list if we haven't already done so. */ if (subtreelist == NULL) { st = krb5_get_subtree_info(ldap_context, &subtreelist, &ntrees); if (st) goto cleanup; } for (tre=0; tre<ntrees; ++tre) { if (subtreelist[tre] == NULL || strlen(subtreelist[tre]) == 0) { outofsubtree = FALSE; break; } else { dnlen = strlen (dn); subtreelen = strlen(subtreelist[tre]); if ((dnlen >= subtreelen) && (strcasecmp((dn + dnlen - subtreelen), subtreelist[tre]) == 0)) { outofsubtree = FALSE; break; } } } if (outofsubtree == TRUE) { st = EINVAL; k5_setmsg(context, st, _("DN is out of the realm subtree")); goto cleanup; } /* * dn value will be set either by dn, linkdn or the standalone_principal_dn * In the first 2 cases, the dn should be existing and in the last case we * are supposed to create the ldap object. so the below should not be * executed for the last case. */ if (standalone_principal_dn == NULL) { /* * If the ldap object is missing, this results in an error. */ /* * Search for krbprincipalname attribute here. * This is to find if a kerberos identity is already present * on the ldap object, in which case adding a kerberos identity * on the ldap object should result in an error. */ char *attributes[]={"krbticketpolicyreference", "krbprincipalname", NULL}; ldap_msgfree(result); result = NULL; LDAP_SEARCH_1(dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE, 0, attributes, IGNORE_STATUS); if (st == LDAP_SUCCESS) { ent = ldap_first_entry(ld, result); if (ent != NULL) { if ((values=ldap_get_values(ld, ent, "krbticketpolicyreference")) != NULL) { ldap_value_free(values); } if ((values=ldap_get_values(ld, ent, "krbprincipalname")) != NULL) { krb_identity_exists = TRUE; ldap_value_free(values); } } } else { st = set_ldap_error(context, st, OP_SEARCH); goto cleanup; } } } /* * If xargs.dn is set then the request is to add a * kerberos principal on a ldap object, but if * there is one already on the ldap object this * should result in an error. */ if (xargs.dn != NULL && krb_identity_exists == TRUE) { st = EINVAL; snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("ldap object is already kerberized")); k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf); goto cleanup; } if (xargs.linkdn != NULL) { /* * link information can be changed using modprinc. * However, link information can be changed only on the * standalone kerberos principal objects. A standalone * kerberos principal object is of type krbprincipal * structural objectclass. * * NOTE: kerberos principals on an ldap object can't be * linked to other ldap objects. */ if (optype == MODIFY_PRINCIPAL && kerberos_principal_object_type != KDB_STANDALONE_PRINCIPAL_OBJECT) { st = EINVAL; snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("link information can not be set/updated as the " "kerberos principal belongs to an ldap object")); k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf); goto cleanup; } /* * Check the link information. If there is already a link * existing then this operation is not allowed. */ { char **linkdns=NULL; int j=0; if ((st=krb5_get_linkdn(context, entry, &linkdns)) != 0) { snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("Failed getting object references")); k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf); goto cleanup; } if (linkdns != NULL) { st = EINVAL; snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("kerberos principal is already linked to a ldap " "object")); k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf); for (j=0; linkdns[j] != NULL; ++j) free (linkdns[j]); free (linkdns); goto cleanup; } } establish_links = TRUE; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->last_success)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastSuccessfulAuth", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) { free (strval[0]); goto cleanup; } free (strval[0]); } if (entry->mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->last_failed)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastFailedAuth", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) { free (strval[0]); goto cleanup; } free(strval[0]); } if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) { krb5_kvno fail_auth_count; fail_auth_count = entry->fail_auth_count; if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT) fail_auth_count++; st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, fail_auth_count); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; } else if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT) { int attr_mask = 0; krb5_boolean has_fail_count; /* Check if the krbLoginFailedCount attribute exists. (Through * krb5 1.8.1, it wasn't set in new entries.) */ st = krb5_get_attributes_mask(context, entry, &attr_mask); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; has_fail_count = ((attr_mask & KDB_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_ATTR) != 0); /* * If the client library and server supports RFC 4525, * then use it to increment by one the value of the * krbLoginFailedCount attribute. Otherwise, assert the * (provided) old value by deleting it before adding. */ #ifdef LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT if (ldap_server_handle->server_info->modify_increment && has_fail_count) { st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount", LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT, 1); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; } else { #endif /* LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT */ if (has_fail_count) { st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, entry->fail_auth_count); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; } st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount", LDAP_MOD_ADD, entry->fail_auth_count + 1); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; #ifdef LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT } #endif } else if (optype == ADD_PRINCIPAL) { /* Initialize krbLoginFailedCount in new entries to help avoid a * race during the first failed login. */ st = krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLoginFailedCount", LDAP_MOD_ADD, 0); } if (entry->mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) { if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbmaxticketlife", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, entry->max_life)) != 0) goto cleanup; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) { if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbmaxrenewableage", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, entry->max_renewable_life)) != 0) goto cleanup; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) { if ((st=krb5_add_int_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketflags", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, entry->attributes)) != 0) goto cleanup; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); strval[0] = user; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalname", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) goto cleanup; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->expiration)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalexpiration", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) { free (strval[0]); goto cleanup; } free (strval[0]); } if (entry->mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->pw_expiration)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpasswordexpiration", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) { free (strval[0]); goto cleanup; } free (strval[0]); } if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY || entry->mask & KADM5_KEY_HIST) { memset(&princ_ent, 0, sizeof(princ_ent)); for (tl_data=entry->tl_data; tl_data; tl_data=tl_data->tl_data_next) { if (tl_data->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA) { if ((st = krb5_lookup_tl_kadm_data(tl_data, &princ_ent)) != 0) { goto cleanup; } break; } } } if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY) { if (princ_ent.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((st = krb5_ldap_name_to_policydn (context, princ_ent.policy, &polname)) != 0) goto cleanup; strval[0] = polname; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) goto cleanup; } else { st = EINVAL; k5_setmsg(context, st, "Password policy value null"); goto cleanup; } } else if (entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD && found_entry == TRUE) { /* * a load is special in that existing entries must have attrs that * removed. */ if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, NULL)) != 0) goto cleanup; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) { if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, NULL)) != 0) goto cleanup; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_KEY_HIST) { bersecretkey = krb5_encode_histkey(&princ_ent); if (bersecretkey == NULL) { st = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } st = krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpwdhistory", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, bersecretkey); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; free_berdata(bersecretkey); bersecretkey = NULL; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA || entry->mask & KADM5_KVNO) { krb5_kvno mkvno; if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_mkvno(context, entry, &mkvno)) != 0) goto cleanup; bersecretkey = krb5_encode_krbsecretkey (entry->key_data, entry->n_key_data, mkvno); if (bersecretkey == NULL) { st = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } /* An empty list of bervals is only accepted for modify operations, * not add operations. */ if (bersecretkey[0] != NULL || !create_standalone) { st = krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbprincipalkey", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, bersecretkey); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; } if (!(entry->mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL)) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((strval[0]=getstringtime(entry->pw_expiration)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbpasswordexpiration", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) { free (strval[0]); goto cleanup; } free (strval[0]); } /* Update last password change whenever a new key is set */ { krb5_timestamp last_pw_changed; if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(context, entry, &last_pw_changed)) != 0) goto cleanup; memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((strval[0] = getstringtime(last_pw_changed)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastPwdChange", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) { free (strval[0]); goto cleanup; } free (strval[0]); } } /* Modify Key data ends here */ /* Auth indicators will also be stored in krbExtraData when processing * tl_data. */ st = update_ldap_mod_auth_ind(context, entry, &mods); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; /* Set tl_data */ if (entry->tl_data != NULL) { int count = 0; struct berval **ber_tl_data = NULL; krb5_tl_data *ptr; krb5_timestamp unlock_time; for (ptr = entry->tl_data; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->tl_data_next) { if (ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE #ifdef SECURID || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_DB_ARGS #endif || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA || ptr->tl_data_type == KDB_TL_USER_INFO || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION_ACL || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_ADMIN_UNLOCK) continue; count++; } if (count != 0) { int j; ber_tl_data = (struct berval **) calloc (count + 1, sizeof (struct berval*)); if (ber_tl_data == NULL) { st = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } for (j = 0, ptr = entry->tl_data; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->tl_data_next) { /* Ignore tl_data that are stored in separate directory * attributes */ if (ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE #ifdef SECURID || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_DB_ARGS #endif || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA || ptr->tl_data_type == KDB_TL_USER_INFO || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION_ACL || ptr->tl_data_type == KRB5_TL_LAST_ADMIN_UNLOCK) continue; if ((st = tl_data2berval (ptr, &ber_tl_data[j])) != 0) break; j++; } if (st == 0) { ber_tl_data[count] = NULL; st=krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbExtraData", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE | LDAP_MOD_BVALUES, ber_tl_data); } free_berdata(ber_tl_data); if (st != 0) goto cleanup; } if ((st=krb5_dbe_lookup_last_admin_unlock(context, entry, &unlock_time)) != 0) goto cleanup; if (unlock_time != 0) { /* Update last admin unlock */ memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); if ((strval[0] = getstringtime(unlock_time)) == NULL) goto cleanup; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbLastAdminUnlock", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) { free (strval[0]); goto cleanup; } free (strval[0]); } } /* Directory specific attribute */ if (xargs.tktpolicydn != NULL) { int tmask=0; if (strlen(xargs.tktpolicydn) != 0) { st = checkattributevalue(ld, xargs.tktpolicydn, "objectclass", policyclass, &tmask); CHECK_CLASS_VALIDITY(st, tmask, _("ticket policy object value: ")); strval[0] = xargs.tktpolicydn; strval[1] = NULL; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) goto cleanup; } else { /* if xargs.tktpolicydn is a empty string, then delete * already existing krbticketpolicyreference attr */ if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbticketpolicyreference", LDAP_MOD_DELETE, NULL)) != 0) goto cleanup; } } if (establish_links == TRUE) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); strval[0] = xargs.linkdn; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "krbObjectReferences", LDAP_MOD_REPLACE, strval)) != 0) goto cleanup; } /* * in case mods is NULL then return * not sure but can happen in a modprinc * so no need to return an error * addprinc will at least have the principal name * and the keys passed in */ if (mods == NULL) goto cleanup; if (create_standalone == TRUE) { memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); strval[0] = "krbprincipal"; strval[1] = "krbprincipalaux"; strval[2] = "krbTicketPolicyAux"; if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "objectclass", LDAP_MOD_ADD, strval)) != 0) goto cleanup; st = ldap_add_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL); if (st == LDAP_ALREADY_EXISTS && entry->mask & KADM5_LOAD) { /* a load operation must replace an existing entry */ st = ldap_delete_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, NULL, NULL); if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) { snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("Principal delete failed (trying to replace " "entry): %s"), ldap_err2string(st)); st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_ADD); k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf); goto cleanup; } else { st = ldap_add_ext_s(ld, standalone_principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL); } } if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) { snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("Principal add failed: %s"), ldap_err2string(st)); st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_ADD); k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf); goto cleanup; } } else { /* * Here existing ldap object is modified and can be related * to any attribute, so always ensure that the ldap * object is extended with all the kerberos related * objectclasses so that there are no constraint * violations. */ { char *attrvalues[] = {"krbprincipalaux", "krbTicketPolicyAux", NULL}; int p, q, r=0, amask=0; if ((st=checkattributevalue(ld, (xargs.dn) ? xargs.dn : principal_dn, "objectclass", attrvalues, &amask)) != 0) goto cleanup; memset(strval, 0, sizeof(strval)); for (p=1, q=0; p<=2; p<<=1, ++q) { if ((p & amask) == 0) strval[r++] = attrvalues[q]; } if (r != 0) { if ((st=krb5_add_str_mem_ldap_mod(&mods, "objectclass", LDAP_MOD_ADD, strval)) != 0) goto cleanup; } } if (xargs.dn != NULL) st=ldap_modify_ext_s(ld, xargs.dn, mods, NULL, NULL); else st = ldap_modify_ext_s(ld, principal_dn, mods, NULL, NULL); if (st != LDAP_SUCCESS) { snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("User modification failed: %s"), ldap_err2string(st)); st = translate_ldap_error (st, OP_MOD); k5_setmsg(context, st, "%s", errbuf); goto cleanup; } if (entry->mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT_INCREMENT) entry->fail_auth_count++; } cleanup: if (user) free(user); if (filtuser) free(filtuser); free_xargs(xargs); if (standalone_principal_dn) free(standalone_principal_dn); if (principal_dn) free (principal_dn); if (polname != NULL) free(polname); for (tre = 0; tre < ntrees; tre++) free(subtreelist[tre]); free(subtreelist); if (subtree) free (subtree); if (bersecretkey) { for (l=0; bersecretkey[l]; ++l) { if (bersecretkey[l]->bv_val) free (bersecretkey[l]->bv_val); free (bersecretkey[l]); } free (bersecretkey); } if (keys) free (keys); ldap_mods_free(mods, 1); ldap_osa_free_princ_ent(&princ_ent); ldap_msgfree(result); krb5_ldap_put_handle_to_pool(ldap_context, ldap_server_handle); return(st); }

4197

True

CVE-2018-20217

False

False

False

False

AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P

NETWORK

MEDIUM

SINGLE