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CVE-2012-3552 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | NETWORK | MEDIUM | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 7.1 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | HIGH | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.9 | MEDIUM | 2.2 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=853465', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=853465', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/08/31/11', 'name': '[oss-security] 20120831 Re: CVE Request -- kernel: net: slab corruption due to improper synchronization around inet->opt', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2012-1540.html', 'name': 'RHSA-2012:1540', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-362'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.0', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_eus:6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.'}] | 2020-07-31T11:33Z | 2012-10-03T11:02Z | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The program contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. |
This can have security implications when the expected synchronization is in security-critical code, such as recording whether a user is authenticated or modifying important state information that should not be influenced by an outsider.
A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc.
A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:
Exclusivity - the code sequence is given exclusive access to the shared resource, i.e., no other code sequence can modify properties of the shared resource before the original sequence has completed execution.
Atomicity - the code sequence is behaviorally atomic, i.e., no other thread or process can concurrently execute the same sequence of instructions (or a subset) against the same resource.
A race condition exists when an "interfering code sequence" can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. Programmers may assume that certain code sequences execute too quickly to be affected by an interfering code sequence; when they are not, this violates atomicity. For example, the single "x++" statement may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read (the original value of x), followed by a computation (x+1), followed by a write (save the result to x).
The interfering code sequence could be "trusted" or "untrusted." A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the program; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable program.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | 0 | Eric Dumazet | 2011-04-21 09:45:37+00:00 | inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | tcp_v4_connect | tcp_v4_connect( struct sock * sk , struct sockaddr * uaddr , int addr_len) | ['sk', 'uaddr', 'addr_len'] | int tcp_v4_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_in *usin = (struct sockaddr_in *)uaddr;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
__be16 orig_sport, orig_dport;
__be32 daddr, nexthop;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
int err;
if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin_family != AF_INET)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
nexthop = daddr = usin->sin_addr.s_addr;
if (inet->opt && inet->opt->srr) {
if (!daddr)
return -EINVAL;
nexthop = inet->opt->faddr;
}
orig_sport = inet->inet_sport;
orig_dport = usin->sin_port;
rt = ip_route_connect(&fl4, nexthop, inet->inet_saddr,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), sk->sk_bound_dev_if,
IPPROTO_TCP,
orig_sport, orig_dport, sk, true);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
if (err == -ENETUNREACH)
IP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
return err;
}
if (rt->rt_flags & (RTCF_MULTICAST | RTCF_BROADCAST)) {
ip_rt_put(rt);
return -ENETUNREACH;
}
if (!inet->opt || !inet->opt->srr)
daddr = rt->rt_dst;
if (!inet->inet_saddr)
inet->inet_saddr = rt->rt_src;
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = inet->inet_saddr;
if (tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp && inet->inet_daddr != daddr) {
/* Reset inherited state */
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent = 0;
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = 0;
tp->write_seq = 0;
}
if (tcp_death_row.sysctl_tw_recycle &&
!tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp && rt->rt_dst == daddr) {
struct inet_peer *peer = rt_get_peer(rt);
/*
* VJ's idea. We save last timestamp seen from
* the destination in peer table, when entering state
* TIME-WAIT * and initialize rx_opt.ts_recent from it,
* when trying new connection.
*/
if (peer) {
inet_peer_refcheck(peer);
if ((u32)get_seconds() - peer->tcp_ts_stamp <= TCP_PAWS_MSL) {
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = peer->tcp_ts_stamp;
tp->rx_opt.ts_recent = peer->tcp_ts;
}
}
}
inet->inet_dport = usin->sin_port;
inet->inet_daddr = daddr;
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (inet->opt)
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = inet->opt->optlen;
tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
/* Socket identity is still unknown (sport may be zero).
* However we set state to SYN-SENT and not releasing socket
* lock select source port, enter ourselves into the hash tables and
* complete initialization after this.
*/
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_SYN_SENT);
err = inet_hash_connect(&tcp_death_row, sk);
if (err)
goto failure;
rt = ip_route_newports(&fl4, rt, orig_sport, orig_dport,
inet->inet_sport, inet->inet_dport, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
rt = NULL;
goto failure;
}
/* OK, now commit destination to socket. */
sk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
if (!tp->write_seq)
tp->write_seq = secure_tcp_sequence_number(inet->inet_saddr,
inet->inet_daddr,
inet->inet_sport,
usin->sin_port);
inet->inet_id = tp->write_seq ^ jiffies;
err = tcp_connect(sk);
rt = NULL;
if (err)
goto failure;
return 0;
failure:
/*
* This unhashes the socket and releases the local port,
* if necessary.
*/
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE);
ip_rt_put(rt);
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
inet->inet_dport = 0;
return err;
} | 629 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2012-3552 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | NETWORK | MEDIUM | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 7.1 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | HIGH | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.9 | MEDIUM | 2.2 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=853465', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=853465', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/08/31/11', 'name': '[oss-security] 20120831 Re: CVE Request -- kernel: net: slab corruption due to improper synchronization around inet->opt', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2012-1540.html', 'name': 'RHSA-2012:1540', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-362'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.0', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_eus:6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.'}] | 2020-07-31T11:33Z | 2012-10-03T11:02Z | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The program contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. |
This can have security implications when the expected synchronization is in security-critical code, such as recording whether a user is authenticated or modifying important state information that should not be influenced by an outsider.
A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc.
A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:
Exclusivity - the code sequence is given exclusive access to the shared resource, i.e., no other code sequence can modify properties of the shared resource before the original sequence has completed execution.
Atomicity - the code sequence is behaviorally atomic, i.e., no other thread or process can concurrently execute the same sequence of instructions (or a subset) against the same resource.
A race condition exists when an "interfering code sequence" can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. Programmers may assume that certain code sequences execute too quickly to be affected by an interfering code sequence; when they are not, this violates atomicity. For example, the single "x++" statement may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read (the original value of x), followed by a computation (x+1), followed by a write (save the result to x).
The interfering code sequence could be "trusted" or "untrusted." A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the program; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable program.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | 0 | Eric Dumazet | 2011-04-21 09:45:37+00:00 | inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | tcp_v4_save_options | tcp_v4_save_options( struct sock * sk , struct sk_buff * skb) | ['sk', 'skb'] | static struct ip_options *tcp_v4_save_options(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ip_options *opt = &(IPCB(skb)->opt);
struct ip_options *dopt = NULL;
if (opt && opt->optlen) {
int opt_size = optlength(opt);
dopt = kmalloc(opt_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (dopt) {
if (ip_options_echo(dopt, skb)) {
kfree(dopt);
dopt = NULL;
}
}
}
return dopt;
} | 92 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2012-3552 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | NETWORK | MEDIUM | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 7.1 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | HIGH | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.9 | MEDIUM | 2.2 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=853465', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=853465', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/08/31/11', 'name': '[oss-security] 20120831 Re: CVE Request -- kernel: net: slab corruption due to improper synchronization around inet->opt', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2012-1540.html', 'name': 'RHSA-2012:1540', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-362'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.0', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_eus:6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.'}] | 2020-07-31T11:33Z | 2012-10-03T11:02Z | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The program contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. |
This can have security implications when the expected synchronization is in security-critical code, such as recording whether a user is authenticated or modifying important state information that should not be influenced by an outsider.
A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc.
A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:
Exclusivity - the code sequence is given exclusive access to the shared resource, i.e., no other code sequence can modify properties of the shared resource before the original sequence has completed execution.
Atomicity - the code sequence is behaviorally atomic, i.e., no other thread or process can concurrently execute the same sequence of instructions (or a subset) against the same resource.
A race condition exists when an "interfering code sequence" can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. Programmers may assume that certain code sequences execute too quickly to be affected by an interfering code sequence; when they are not, this violates atomicity. For example, the single "x++" statement may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read (the original value of x), followed by a computation (x+1), followed by a write (save the result to x).
The interfering code sequence could be "trusted" or "untrusted." A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the program; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable program.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | 0 | Eric Dumazet | 2011-04-21 09:45:37+00:00 | inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock | tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock( struct sock * sk , struct sk_buff * skb , struct request_sock * req , struct dst_entry * dst) | ['sk', 'skb', 'req', 'dst'] | struct sock *tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct tcp_sock *newtp;
struct sock *newsk;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;
#endif
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto exit_overflow;
if (!dst && (dst = inet_csk_route_req(sk, req)) == NULL)
goto exit;
newsk = tcp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (!newsk)
goto exit_nonewsk;
newsk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
sk_setup_caps(newsk, dst);
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
newinet->inet_daddr = ireq->rmt_addr;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->inet_saddr = ireq->loc_addr;
newinet->opt = ireq->opt;
ireq->opt = NULL;
newinet->mc_index = inet_iif(skb);
newinet->mc_ttl = ip_hdr(skb)->ttl;
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (newinet->opt)
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = newinet->opt->optlen;
newinet->inet_id = newtp->write_seq ^ jiffies;
tcp_mtup_init(newsk);
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newtp->advmss = dst_metric_advmss(dst);
if (tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss &&
tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss < newtp->advmss)
newtp->advmss = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss;
tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(newsk);
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
/* Copy over the MD5 key from the original socket */
key = tcp_v4_md5_do_lookup(sk, newinet->inet_daddr);
if (key != NULL) {
/*
* We're using one, so create a matching key
* on the newsk structure. If we fail to get
* memory, then we end up not copying the key
* across. Shucks.
*/
char *newkey = kmemdup(key->key, key->keylen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (newkey != NULL)
tcp_v4_md5_do_add(newsk, newinet->inet_daddr,
newkey, key->keylen);
sk_nocaps_add(newsk, NETIF_F_GSO_MASK);
}
#endif
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
sock_put(newsk);
goto exit;
}
__inet_hash_nolisten(newsk, NULL);
return newsk;
exit_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
exit_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
exit:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
} | 424 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2012-3552 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | NETWORK | MEDIUM | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 7.1 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | HIGH | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.9 | MEDIUM | 2.2 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=853465', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=853465', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/08/31/11', 'name': '[oss-security] 20120831 Re: CVE Request -- kernel: net: slab corruption due to improper synchronization around inet->opt', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2012-1540.html', 'name': 'RHSA-2012:1540', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-362'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.0', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_eus:6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.'}] | 2020-07-31T11:33Z | 2012-10-03T11:02Z | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The program contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. |
This can have security implications when the expected synchronization is in security-critical code, such as recording whether a user is authenticated or modifying important state information that should not be influenced by an outsider.
A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc.
A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:
Exclusivity - the code sequence is given exclusive access to the shared resource, i.e., no other code sequence can modify properties of the shared resource before the original sequence has completed execution.
Atomicity - the code sequence is behaviorally atomic, i.e., no other thread or process can concurrently execute the same sequence of instructions (or a subset) against the same resource.
A race condition exists when an "interfering code sequence" can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. Programmers may assume that certain code sequences execute too quickly to be affected by an interfering code sequence; when they are not, this violates atomicity. For example, the single "x++" statement may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read (the original value of x), followed by a computation (x+1), followed by a write (save the result to x).
The interfering code sequence could be "trusted" or "untrusted." A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the program; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable program.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | 0 | Eric Dumazet | 2011-04-21 09:45:37+00:00 | inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | udp_sendmsg | udp_sendmsg( struct kiocb * iocb , struct sock * sk , struct msghdr * msg , size_t len) | ['iocb', 'sk', 'msg', 'len'] | int udp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct flowi4 *fl4;
int ulen = len;
struct ipcm_cookie ipc;
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
int free = 0;
int connected = 0;
__be32 daddr, faddr, saddr;
__be16 dport;
u8 tos;
int err, is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int corkreq = up->corkflag || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE;
int (*getfrag)(void *, char *, int, int, int, struct sk_buff *);
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (len > 0xFFFF)
return -EMSGSIZE;
/*
* Check the flags.
*/
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB) /* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ipc.opt = NULL;
ipc.tx_flags = 0;
getfrag = is_udplite ? udplite_getfrag : ip_generic_getfrag;
if (up->pending) {
/*
* There are pending frames.
* The socket lock must be held while it's corked.
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (likely(up->pending)) {
if (unlikely(up->pending != AF_INET)) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EINVAL;
}
goto do_append_data;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
ulen += sizeof(struct udphdr);
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_in * usin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*usin))
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin_family != AF_INET) {
if (usin->sin_family != AF_UNSPEC)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
daddr = usin->sin_addr.s_addr;
dport = usin->sin_port;
if (dport == 0)
return -EINVAL;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
dport = inet->inet_dport;
/* Open fast path for connected socket.
Route will not be used, if at least one option is set.
*/
connected = 1;
}
ipc.addr = inet->inet_saddr;
ipc.oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
err = sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &ipc.tx_flags);
if (err)
return err;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sock_net(sk), msg, &ipc);
if (err)
return err;
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
connected = 0;
}
if (!ipc.opt)
ipc.opt = inet->opt;
saddr = ipc.addr;
ipc.addr = faddr = daddr;
if (ipc.opt && ipc.opt->srr) {
if (!daddr)
return -EINVAL;
faddr = ipc.opt->faddr;
connected = 0;
}
tos = RT_TOS(inet->tos);
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_LOCALROUTE) ||
(msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTROUTE) ||
(ipc.opt && ipc.opt->is_strictroute)) {
tos |= RTO_ONLINK;
connected = 0;
}
if (ipv4_is_multicast(daddr)) {
if (!ipc.oif)
ipc.oif = inet->mc_index;
if (!saddr)
saddr = inet->mc_addr;
connected = 0;
}
if (connected)
rt = (struct rtable *)sk_dst_check(sk, 0);
if (rt == NULL) {
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, ipc.oif, sk->sk_mark, tos,
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, sk->sk_protocol,
inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk)|FLOWI_FLAG_CAN_SLEEP,
faddr, saddr, dport, inet->inet_sport);
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
rt = NULL;
if (err == -ENETUNREACH)
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
goto out;
}
err = -EACCES;
if ((rt->rt_flags & RTCF_BROADCAST) &&
!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST))
goto out;
if (connected)
sk_dst_set(sk, dst_clone(&rt->dst));
}
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
saddr = rt->rt_src;
if (!ipc.addr)
daddr = ipc.addr = rt->rt_dst;
/* Lockless fast path for the non-corking case. */
if (!corkreq) {
skb = ip_make_skb(sk, getfrag, msg->msg_iov, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), &ipc, &rt,
msg->msg_flags);
err = PTR_ERR(skb);
if (skb && !IS_ERR(skb))
err = udp_send_skb(skb, daddr, dport);
goto out;
}
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(up->pending)) {
/* The socket is already corked while preparing it. */
/* ... which is an evident application bug. --ANK */
release_sock(sk);
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "udp cork app bug 2\n");
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/*
* Now cork the socket to pend data.
*/
fl4 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip4;
fl4->daddr = daddr;
fl4->saddr = saddr;
fl4->fl4_dport = dport;
fl4->fl4_sport = inet->inet_sport;
up->pending = AF_INET;
do_append_data:
up->len += ulen;
err = ip_append_data(sk, getfrag, msg->msg_iov, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), &ipc, &rt,
corkreq ? msg->msg_flags|MSG_MORE : msg->msg_flags);
if (err)
udp_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!corkreq)
err = udp_push_pending_frames(sk);
else if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)))
up->pending = 0;
release_sock(sk);
out:
ip_rt_put(rt);
if (free)
kfree(ipc.opt);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
* ENOBUFS = no kernel mem, SOCK_NOSPACE = no sndbuf space. Reporting
* ENOBUFS might not be good (it's not tunable per se), but otherwise
* we don't have a good statistic (IpOutDiscards but it can be too many
* things). We could add another new stat but at least for now that
* seems like overkill.
*/
if (err == -ENOBUFS || test_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) {
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
}
return err;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(&rt->dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags&MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto out;
} | 1142 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2012-3552 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | NETWORK | MEDIUM | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 7.1 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | HIGH | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.9 | MEDIUM | 2.2 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=853465', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=853465', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/08/31/11', 'name': '[oss-security] 20120831 Re: CVE Request -- kernel: net: slab corruption due to improper synchronization around inet->opt', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2012-1540.html', 'name': 'RHSA-2012:1540', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-362'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.0', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_eus:6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.'}] | 2020-07-31T11:33Z | 2012-10-03T11:02Z | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The program contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. |
This can have security implications when the expected synchronization is in security-critical code, such as recording whether a user is authenticated or modifying important state information that should not be influenced by an outsider.
A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc.
A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:
Exclusivity - the code sequence is given exclusive access to the shared resource, i.e., no other code sequence can modify properties of the shared resource before the original sequence has completed execution.
Atomicity - the code sequence is behaviorally atomic, i.e., no other thread or process can concurrently execute the same sequence of instructions (or a subset) against the same resource.
A race condition exists when an "interfering code sequence" can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. Programmers may assume that certain code sequences execute too quickly to be affected by an interfering code sequence; when they are not, this violates atomicity. For example, the single "x++" statement may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read (the original value of x), followed by a computation (x+1), followed by a write (save the result to x).
The interfering code sequence could be "trusted" or "untrusted." A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the program; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable program.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | 0 | Eric Dumazet | 2011-04-21 09:45:37+00:00 | inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock | tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock( struct sock * sk , struct sk_buff * skb , struct request_sock * req , struct dst_entry * dst) | ['sk', 'skb', 'req', 'dst'] | static struct sock * tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct inet6_request_sock *treq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp6_sock *newtcp6sk;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct tcp_sock *newtp;
struct sock *newsk;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;
#endif
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
/*
* v6 mapped
*/
newsk = tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst);
if (newsk == NULL)
return NULL;
newtcp6sk = (struct tcp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newtcp6sk->inet6;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(newinet->inet_daddr, &newnp->daddr);
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(newinet->inet_saddr, &newnp->saddr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->rcv_saddr, &newnp->saddr);
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_af_ops = &ipv6_mapped;
newsk->sk_backlog_rcv = tcp_v4_do_rcv;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
newtp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_mapped_specific;
#endif
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks count
* here, tcp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the comment in
* that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
/* It is tricky place. Until this moment IPv4 tcp
worked with IPv6 icsk.icsk_af_ops.
Sync it now.
*/
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
return newsk;
}
treq = inet6_rsk(req);
opt = np->opt;
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto out_overflow;
if (!dst) {
dst = inet6_csk_route_req(sk, req);
if (!dst)
goto out;
}
newsk = tcp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (newsk == NULL)
goto out_nonewsk;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks
* count here, tcp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the
* comment in that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
newsk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
__ip6_dst_store(newsk, dst, NULL, NULL);
newtcp6sk = (struct tcp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newtcp6sk->inet6;
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->daddr, &treq->rmt_addr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->saddr, &treq->loc_addr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->rcv_saddr, &treq->loc_addr);
newsk->sk_bound_dev_if = treq->iif;
/* Now IPv6 options...
First: no IPv4 options.
*/
newinet->opt = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
/* Clone RX bits */
newnp->rxopt.all = np->rxopt.all;
/* Clone pktoptions received with SYN */
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
if (treq->pktopts != NULL) {
newnp->pktoptions = skb_clone(treq->pktopts, GFP_ATOMIC);
kfree_skb(treq->pktopts);
treq->pktopts = NULL;
if (newnp->pktoptions)
skb_set_owner_r(newnp->pktoptions, newsk);
}
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
/* Clone native IPv6 options from listening socket (if any)
Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever,
but we make one more one thing there: reattach optmem
to newsk.
*/
if (opt) {
newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
if (opt != np->opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
}
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (newnp->opt)
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
newnp->opt->opt_flen);
tcp_mtup_init(newsk);
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newtp->advmss = dst_metric_advmss(dst);
tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(newsk);
newinet->inet_daddr = newinet->inet_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
/* Copy over the MD5 key from the original socket */
if ((key = tcp_v6_md5_do_lookup(sk, &newnp->daddr)) != NULL) {
/* We're using one, so create a matching key
* on the newsk structure. If we fail to get
* memory, then we end up not copying the key
* across. Shucks.
*/
char *newkey = kmemdup(key->key, key->keylen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (newkey != NULL)
tcp_v6_md5_do_add(newsk, &newnp->daddr,
newkey, key->keylen);
}
#endif
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
sock_put(newsk);
goto out;
}
__inet6_hash(newsk, NULL);
return newsk;
out_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
out_nonewsk:
if (opt && opt != np->opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
dst_release(dst);
out:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
} | 824 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2012-3552 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | NETWORK | MEDIUM | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 7.1 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | HIGH | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.9 | MEDIUM | 2.2 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=853465', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=853465', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/08/31/11', 'name': '[oss-security] 20120831 Re: CVE Request -- kernel: net: slab corruption due to improper synchronization around inet->opt', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2012-1540.html', 'name': 'RHSA-2012:1540', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-362'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.0', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_eus:6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.'}] | 2020-07-31T11:33Z | 2012-10-03T11:02Z | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The program contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. |
This can have security implications when the expected synchronization is in security-critical code, such as recording whether a user is authenticated or modifying important state information that should not be influenced by an outsider.
A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc.
A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:
Exclusivity - the code sequence is given exclusive access to the shared resource, i.e., no other code sequence can modify properties of the shared resource before the original sequence has completed execution.
Atomicity - the code sequence is behaviorally atomic, i.e., no other thread or process can concurrently execute the same sequence of instructions (or a subset) against the same resource.
A race condition exists when an "interfering code sequence" can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. Programmers may assume that certain code sequences execute too quickly to be affected by an interfering code sequence; when they are not, this violates atomicity. For example, the single "x++" statement may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read (the original value of x), followed by a computation (x+1), followed by a write (save the result to x).
The interfering code sequence could be "trusted" or "untrusted." A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the program; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable program.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | 0 | Eric Dumazet | 2011-04-21 09:45:37+00:00 | inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | l2tp_ip_sendmsg | l2tp_ip_sendmsg( struct kiocb * iocb , struct sock * sk , struct msghdr * msg , size_t len) | ['iocb', 'sk', 'msg', 'len'] | static int l2tp_ip_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int rc;
struct l2tp_ip_sock *lsa = l2tp_ip_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ip_options *opt = inet->opt;
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
int connected = 0;
__be32 daddr;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
return -ENOTCONN;
/* Get and verify the address. */
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_l2tpip *lip = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip *) msg->msg_name;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*lip))
return -EINVAL;
if (lip->l2tp_family != AF_INET) {
if (lip->l2tp_family != AF_UNSPEC)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
daddr = lip->l2tp_addr.s_addr;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
connected = 1;
}
/* Allocate a socket buffer */
rc = -ENOMEM;
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk, 2 + NET_SKB_PAD + sizeof(struct iphdr) +
4 + len, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
goto error;
/* Reserve space for headers, putting IP header on 4-byte boundary. */
skb_reserve(skb, 2 + NET_SKB_PAD);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb_reserve(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr));
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
/* Insert 0 session_id */
*((__be32 *) skb_put(skb, 4)) = 0;
/* Copy user data into skb */
rc = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len);
if (rc < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
}
if (connected)
rt = (struct rtable *) __sk_dst_check(sk, 0);
if (rt == NULL) {
/* Use correct destination address if we have options. */
if (opt && opt->srr)
daddr = opt->faddr;
/* If this fails, retransmit mechanism of transport layer will
* keep trying until route appears or the connection times
* itself out.
*/
rt = ip_route_output_ports(sock_net(sk), sk,
daddr, inet->inet_saddr,
inet->inet_dport, inet->inet_sport,
sk->sk_protocol, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto no_route;
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
}
skb_dst_set(skb, dst_clone(&rt->dst));
/* Queue the packet to IP for output */
rc = ip_queue_xmit(skb);
error:
/* Update stats */
if (rc >= 0) {
lsa->tx_packets++;
lsa->tx_bytes += len;
rc = len;
} else {
lsa->tx_errors++;
}
return rc;
no_route:
IP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EHOSTUNREACH;
} | 474 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-1759 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | LOCAL | HIGH | NONE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | 6.2 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0f22072ab50cac7983f9660d33974b45184da4f9', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0f22072ab50cac7983f9660d33974b45184da4f9', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=0f22072ab50cac7983f9660d33974b45184da4f9', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=0f22072ab50cac7983f9660d33974b45184da4f9', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/05/02/16', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110502 Re: CVE request: kernel (ARM): heap corruption in OABI semtimedop', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-189'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.38.8', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc8:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Integer overflow in the sys_oabi_semtimedop function in arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 on the ARM platform, when CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is enabled, allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (heap memory corruption) by providing a crafted argument and leveraging a race condition.'}] | 2012-06-14T04:00Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Numeric Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/189.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-04-29 15:48:07+01:00 | ARM: 6891/1: prevent heap corruption in OABI semtimedop
When CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is set, the wrapper for semtimedop does not
bound the nsops argument. A sufficiently large value will cause an
integer overflow in allocation size, followed by copying too much data
into the allocated buffer. Fix this by restricting nsops to SEMOPM.
Untested.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> | 0f22072ab50cac7983f9660d33974b45184da4f9 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | sys_oabi_semtimedop | sys_oabi_semtimedop( int semid , struct oabi_sembuf __user * tsops , unsigned nsops , const struct timespec __user * timeout) | ['semid', 'tsops', 'nsops', 'timeout'] | asmlinkage long sys_oabi_semtimedop(int semid,
struct oabi_sembuf __user *tsops,
unsigned nsops,
const struct timespec __user *timeout)
{
struct sembuf *sops;
struct timespec local_timeout;
long err;
int i;
if (nsops < 1)
return -EINVAL;
sops = kmalloc(sizeof(*sops) * nsops, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sops)
return -ENOMEM;
err = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nsops; i++) {
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_num, &tsops->sem_num, err);
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_op, &tsops->sem_op, err);
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_flg, &tsops->sem_flg, err);
tsops++;
}
if (timeout) {
/* copy this as well before changing domain protection */
err |= copy_from_user(&local_timeout, timeout, sizeof(*timeout));
timeout = &local_timeout;
}
if (err) {
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
mm_segment_t fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sys_semtimedop(semid, sops, nsops, timeout);
set_fs(fs);
}
kfree(sops);
return err;
} | 224 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-3638 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | HIGH | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.0 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | False | [{'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=747942', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=747942', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/667eff35a1f56fa74ce98a0c7c29a40adc1ba4e3', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/667eff35a1f56fa74ce98a0c7c29a40adc1ba4e3', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=667eff35a1f56fa74ce98a0c7c29a40adc1ba4e3', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=667eff35a1f56fa74ce98a0c7c29a40adc1ba4e3', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/10/24/2', 'name': '[oss-security] 20111024 Re: CVE Request -- kernel: ext4: ext4_ext_insert_extent() kernel oops', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'NVD-CWE-noinfo'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.0', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'fs/ext4/extents.c in the Linux kernel before 3.0 does not mark a modified extent as dirty in certain cases of extent splitting, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via vectors involving ext4 umount and mount operations.'}] | 2020-07-31T20:27Z | 2013-03-01T12:37Z | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | Insufficient Information | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | 0 | Yongqiang Yang | 2011-05-03 12:25:07-04:00 | ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <achender@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 667eff35a1f56fa74ce98a0c7c29a40adc1ba4e3 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized | ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized( handle_t * handle , struct inode * inode , struct ext4_map_blocks * map , struct ext4_ext_path * path) | ['handle', 'inode', 'map', 'path'] | static int ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
struct ext4_extent *ex, newex, orig_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex1 = NULL;
struct ext4_extent *ex2 = NULL;
struct ext4_extent *ex3 = NULL;
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block, eof_block;
unsigned int allocated, ee_len, depth;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock;
int err = 0;
int ret = 0;
int may_zeroout;
ext_debug("ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u\n", inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long)map->m_lblk, map->m_len);
eof_block = (inode->i_size + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1) >>
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (eof_block < map->m_lblk + map->m_len)
eof_block = map->m_lblk + map->m_len;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
allocated = ee_len - (map->m_lblk - ee_block);
newblock = map->m_lblk - ee_block + ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
ex2 = ex;
orig_ex.ee_block = ex->ee_block;
orig_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&orig_ex, ext4_ext_pblock(ex));
/*
* It is safe to convert extent to initialized via explicit
* zeroout only if extent is fully insde i_size or new_size.
*/
may_zeroout = ee_block + ee_len <= eof_block;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
/* If extent has less than 2*EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN zerout directly */
if (ee_len <= 2*EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN && may_zeroout) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zeroed the full extent */
return allocated;
}
/* ex1: ee_block to map->m_lblk - 1 : uninitialized */
if (map->m_lblk > ee_block) {
ex1 = ex;
ex1->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(map->m_lblk - ee_block);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex1);
ex2 = &newex;
}
/*
* for sanity, update the length of the ex2 extent before
* we insert ex3, if ex1 is NULL. This is to avoid temporary
* overlap of blocks.
*/
if (!ex1 && allocated > map->m_len)
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(map->m_len);
/* ex3: to ee_block + ee_len : uninitialised */
if (allocated > map->m_len) {
unsigned int newdepth;
/* If extent has less than EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN zerout directly */
if (allocated <= EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN && may_zeroout) {
/*
* map->m_lblk == ee_block is handled by the zerouout
* at the beginning.
* Mark first half uninitialized.
* Mark second half initialized and zero out the
* initialized extent
*/
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - allocated);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
ex3 = &newex;
ex3->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(map->m_lblk);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex3, newblock);
ex3->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path,
ex3, 0);
if (err == -ENOSPC) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex,
ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* blocks available from map->m_lblk */
return allocated;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/*
* We need to zero out the second half because
* an fallocate request can update file size and
* converting the second half to initialized extent
* implies that we can leak some junk data to user
* space.
*/
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, ex3);
if (err) {
/*
* We should actually mark the
* second half as uninit and return error
* Insert would have changed the extent
*/
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
path = ext4_ext_find_extent(inode, map->m_lblk,
path);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
err = PTR_ERR(path);
return err;
}
/* get the second half extent details */
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode,
path + depth);
if (err)
return err;
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
}
/* zeroed the second half */
return allocated;
}
ex3 = &newex;
ex3->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(map->m_lblk + map->m_len);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex3, newblock + map->m_len);
ex3->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated - map->m_len);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex3);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, ex3, 0);
if (err == -ENOSPC && may_zeroout) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zeroed the full extent */
/* blocks available from map->m_lblk */
return allocated;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/*
* The depth, and hence eh & ex might change
* as part of the insert above.
*/
newdepth = ext_depth(inode);
/*
* update the extent length after successful insert of the
* split extent
*/
ee_len -= ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex3);
orig_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
may_zeroout = ee_block + ee_len <= eof_block;
depth = newdepth;
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
path = ext4_ext_find_extent(inode, map->m_lblk, path);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
err = PTR_ERR(path);
goto out;
}
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
if (ex2 != &newex)
ex2 = ex;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
allocated = map->m_len;
/* If extent has less than EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN and we are trying
* to insert a extent in the middle zerout directly
* otherwise give the extent a chance to merge to left
*/
if (le16_to_cpu(orig_ex.ee_len) <= EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN &&
map->m_lblk != ee_block && may_zeroout) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zero out the first half */
/* blocks available from map->m_lblk */
return allocated;
}
}
/*
* If there was a change of depth as part of the
* insertion of ex3 above, we need to update the length
* of the ex1 extent again here
*/
if (ex1 && ex1 != ex) {
ex1 = ex;
ex1->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(map->m_lblk - ee_block);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex1);
ex2 = &newex;
}
/* ex2: map->m_lblk to map->m_lblk + maxblocks-1 : initialised */
ex2->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(map->m_lblk);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex2, newblock);
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated);
if (ex2 != ex)
goto insert;
/*
* New (initialized) extent starts from the first block
* in the current extent. i.e., ex2 == ex
* We have to see if it can be merged with the extent
* on the left.
*/
if (ex2 > EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh)) {
/*
* To merge left, pass "ex2 - 1" to try_to_merge(),
* since it merges towards right _only_.
*/
ret = ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex2 - 1);
if (ret) {
err = ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
goto out;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex2--;
}
}
/*
* Try to Merge towards right. This might be required
* only when the whole extent is being written to.
* i.e. ex2 == ex and ex3 == NULL.
*/
if (!ex3) {
ret = ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex2);
if (ret) {
err = ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
goto out;
}
}
/* Mark modified extent as dirty */
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
goto out;
insert:
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, &newex, 0);
if (err == -ENOSPC && may_zeroout) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zero out the first half */
return allocated;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err ? err : allocated;
fix_extent_len:
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
} | 1407 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-3638 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | HIGH | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.0 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | False | [{'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=747942', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=747942', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/667eff35a1f56fa74ce98a0c7c29a40adc1ba4e3', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/667eff35a1f56fa74ce98a0c7c29a40adc1ba4e3', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=667eff35a1f56fa74ce98a0c7c29a40adc1ba4e3', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=667eff35a1f56fa74ce98a0c7c29a40adc1ba4e3', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/10/24/2', 'name': '[oss-security] 20111024 Re: CVE Request -- kernel: ext4: ext4_ext_insert_extent() kernel oops', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'NVD-CWE-noinfo'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.0', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'fs/ext4/extents.c in the Linux kernel before 3.0 does not mark a modified extent as dirty in certain cases of extent splitting, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via vectors involving ext4 umount and mount operations.'}] | 2020-07-31T20:27Z | 2013-03-01T12:37Z | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | Insufficient Information | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | 0 | Yongqiang Yang | 2011-05-03 12:25:07-04:00 | ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <achender@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 667eff35a1f56fa74ce98a0c7c29a40adc1ba4e3 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | ext4_split_unwritten_extents | ext4_split_unwritten_extents( handle_t * handle , struct inode * inode , struct ext4_map_blocks * map , struct ext4_ext_path * path , int flags) | ['handle', 'inode', 'map', 'path', 'flags'] | static int ext4_split_unwritten_extents(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
int flags)
{
struct ext4_extent *ex, newex, orig_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex1 = NULL;
struct ext4_extent *ex2 = NULL;
struct ext4_extent *ex3 = NULL;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block, eof_block;
unsigned int allocated, ee_len, depth;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock;
int err = 0;
int may_zeroout;
ext_debug("ext4_split_unwritten_extents: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u\n", inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long)map->m_lblk, map->m_len);
eof_block = (inode->i_size + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1) >>
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (eof_block < map->m_lblk + map->m_len)
eof_block = map->m_lblk + map->m_len;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
allocated = ee_len - (map->m_lblk - ee_block);
newblock = map->m_lblk - ee_block + ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
ex2 = ex;
orig_ex.ee_block = ex->ee_block;
orig_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&orig_ex, ext4_ext_pblock(ex));
/*
* It is safe to convert extent to initialized via explicit
* zeroout only if extent is fully insde i_size or new_size.
*/
may_zeroout = ee_block + ee_len <= eof_block;
/*
* If the uninitialized extent begins at the same logical
* block where the write begins, and the write completely
* covers the extent, then we don't need to split it.
*/
if ((map->m_lblk == ee_block) && (allocated <= map->m_len))
return allocated;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
/* ex1: ee_block to map->m_lblk - 1 : uninitialized */
if (map->m_lblk > ee_block) {
ex1 = ex;
ex1->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(map->m_lblk - ee_block);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex1);
ex2 = &newex;
}
/*
* for sanity, update the length of the ex2 extent before
* we insert ex3, if ex1 is NULL. This is to avoid temporary
* overlap of blocks.
*/
if (!ex1 && allocated > map->m_len)
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(map->m_len);
/* ex3: to ee_block + ee_len : uninitialised */
if (allocated > map->m_len) {
unsigned int newdepth;
ex3 = &newex;
ex3->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(map->m_lblk + map->m_len);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex3, newblock + map->m_len);
ex3->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated - map->m_len);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex3);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, ex3, flags);
if (err == -ENOSPC && may_zeroout) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zeroed the full extent */
/* blocks available from map->m_lblk */
return allocated;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/*
* The depth, and hence eh & ex might change
* as part of the insert above.
*/
newdepth = ext_depth(inode);
/*
* update the extent length after successful insert of the
* split extent
*/
ee_len -= ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex3);
orig_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
may_zeroout = ee_block + ee_len <= eof_block;
depth = newdepth;
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
path = ext4_ext_find_extent(inode, map->m_lblk, path);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
err = PTR_ERR(path);
goto out;
}
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
if (ex2 != &newex)
ex2 = ex;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
allocated = map->m_len;
}
/*
* If there was a change of depth as part of the
* insertion of ex3 above, we need to update the length
* of the ex1 extent again here
*/
if (ex1 && ex1 != ex) {
ex1 = ex;
ex1->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(map->m_lblk - ee_block);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex1);
ex2 = &newex;
}
/*
* ex2: map->m_lblk to map->m_lblk + map->m_len-1 : to be written
* using direct I/O, uninitialised still.
*/
ex2->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(map->m_lblk);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex2, newblock);
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex2);
if (ex2 != ex)
goto insert;
/* Mark modified extent as dirty */
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
ext_debug("out here\n");
goto out;
insert:
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, &newex, flags);
if (err == -ENOSPC && may_zeroout) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zero out the first half */
return allocated;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err ? err : allocated;
fix_extent_len:
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
} | 876 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-1927 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 5.0 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=64f3b9e203bd06855072e295557dca1485a2ecba', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=64f3b9e203bd06855072e295557dca1485a2ecba', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/64f3b9e203bd06855072e295557dca1485a2ecba', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/64f3b9e203bd06855072e295557dca1485a2ecba', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/05/18/2', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110518 Re: CVE request: kernel: net: ip_expire() must revalidate route', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'NVD-CWE-Other'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.38.8', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38:rc8:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.38.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ip_expire function in net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly construct ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED packets after a timeout, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid pointer dereference) via crafted fragmented packets.'}] | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Other | NVD is only using a subset of CWE for mapping instead of the entire CWE, and the weakness type is not covered by that subset. | Insufficient Information | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | 0 | Eric Dumazet | 2011-05-04 10:02:26+00:00 | net: ip_expire() must revalidate route
Commit 4a94445c9a5c (net: Use ip_route_input_noref() in input path)
added a bug in IP defragmentation handling, in case timeout is fired.
When a frame is defragmented, we use last skb dst field when building
final skb. Its dst is valid, since we are in rcu read section.
But if a timeout occurs, we take first queued fragment to build one ICMP
TIME EXCEEDED message. Problem is all queued skb have weak dst pointers,
since we escaped RCU critical section after their queueing. icmp_send()
might dereference a now freed (and possibly reused) part of memory.
Calling skb_dst_drop() and ip_route_input_noref() to revalidate route is
the only possible choice.
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 64f3b9e203bd06855072e295557dca1485a2ecba | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | ip_expire | ip_expire( unsigned long arg) | ['arg'] | static void ip_expire(unsigned long arg)
{
struct ipq *qp;
struct net *net;
qp = container_of((struct inet_frag_queue *) arg, struct ipq, q);
net = container_of(qp->q.net, struct net, ipv4.frags);
spin_lock(&qp->q.lock);
if (qp->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_COMPLETE)
goto out;
ipq_kill(qp);
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMTIMEOUT);
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_REASMFAILS);
if ((qp->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN) && qp->q.fragments != NULL) {
struct sk_buff *head = qp->q.fragments;
rcu_read_lock();
head->dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, qp->iif);
if (!head->dev)
goto out_rcu_unlock;
/*
* Only search router table for the head fragment,
* when defraging timeout at PRE_ROUTING HOOK.
*/
if (qp->user == IP_DEFRAG_CONNTRACK_IN && !skb_dst(head)) {
const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(head);
int err = ip_route_input(head, iph->daddr, iph->saddr,
iph->tos, head->dev);
if (unlikely(err))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
/*
* Only an end host needs to send an ICMP
* "Fragment Reassembly Timeout" message, per RFC792.
*/
if (skb_rtable(head)->rt_type != RTN_LOCAL)
goto out_rcu_unlock;
}
/* Send an ICMP "Fragment Reassembly Timeout" message. */
icmp_send(head, ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED, ICMP_EXC_FRAGTIME, 0);
out_rcu_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
out:
spin_unlock(&qp->q.lock);
ipq_put(qp);
} | 264 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2013-1943 | False | False | False | True | AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | LOCAL | MEDIUM | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 4.4 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | REQUIRED | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 7.8 | HIGH | 1.8 | 5.9 | False | [{'url': 'http://web.archive.org/web/20130329070349/http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://web.archive.org/web/20130329070349/http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=950490', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=950490', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1939-1', 'name': 'USN-1939-1', 'refsource': 'UBUNTU', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-20'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.0', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_eus:6.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_eus:6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:canonical:ubuntu_linux:10.04:*:*:*:-:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': "The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.0 does not check whether kernel addresses are specified during allocation of memory slots for use in a guest's physical address space, which allows local users to gain privileges or obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application, related to arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h and virt/kvm/kvm_main.c."}] | 2020-08-03T15:58Z | 2013-07-16T14:08Z | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. |
Input validation is a frequently-used technique
for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to
ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the
code, or when communicating with other components. When
software does not validate input properly, an attacker is
able to craft the input in a form that is not expected by
the rest of the application. This will lead to parts of the
system receiving unintended input, which may result in
altered control flow, arbitrary control of a resource, or
arbitrary code execution.
Input validation is not the only technique for
processing input, however. Other techniques attempt to
transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such
as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous
inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to
ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included
in output to another component. Other techniques exist as well
(see CWE-138 for more examples.)
Input validation can be applied to:
raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size
Data can be simple or structured. Structured data
can be composed of many nested layers, composed of
combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or
structured data.
Many properties of raw data or metadata may need
to be validated upon entry into the code, such
as:
specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax
lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic
equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data
Implied or derived properties of data must often
be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in
deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor
to improper input validation.
Note that "input validation" has very different
meanings to different people, or within different
classification schemes. Caution must be used when
referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it. For example,
some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control
to an attacker over an input when they should not be able
to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred
to as input validation.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the
distinctions between input validation and output escaping
are often blurred, and developers must be careful to
understand the difference, including how input validation
is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities,
especially when less stringent data types must be
supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection
scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a
query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation
step since it is a common last name in the English
language. However, this valid name cannot be directly
inserted into the database because it contains the "'"
apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or
otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the
apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it
would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name
would be recorded.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | 0 | Takuya Yoshikawa | 2011-05-07 16:35:38+09:00 | KVM: Validate userspace_addr of memslot when registered
This way, we can avoid checking the user space address many times when
we read the guest memory.
Although we can do the same for write if we check which slots are
writable, we do not care write now: reading the guest memory happens
more often than writing.
[avi: change VERIFY_READ to VERIFY_WRITE]
Signed-off-by: Takuya Yoshikawa <yoshikawa.takuya@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> | fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | FNAME( walk_addr_generic) | FNAME( walk_addr_generic)( struct guest_walker * walker , struct kvm_vcpu * vcpu , struct kvm_mmu * mmu , gva_t addr , u32 access) | ['walker', 'vcpu', 'mmu', 'addr', 'access'] | static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
gva_t addr, u32 access)
{
pt_element_t pte;
pt_element_t __user *ptep_user;
gfn_t table_gfn;
unsigned index, pt_access, uninitialized_var(pte_access);
gpa_t pte_gpa;
bool eperm, present, rsvd_fault;
int offset, write_fault, user_fault, fetch_fault;
write_fault = access & PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
user_fault = access & PFERR_USER_MASK;
fetch_fault = access & PFERR_FETCH_MASK;
trace_kvm_mmu_pagetable_walk(addr, write_fault, user_fault,
fetch_fault);
walk:
present = true;
eperm = rsvd_fault = false;
walker->level = mmu->root_level;
pte = mmu->get_cr3(vcpu);
#if PTTYPE == 64
if (walker->level == PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL) {
pte = kvm_pdptr_read_mmu(vcpu, mmu, (addr >> 30) & 3);
trace_kvm_mmu_paging_element(pte, walker->level);
if (!is_present_gpte(pte)) {
present = false;
goto error;
}
--walker->level;
}
#endif
ASSERT((!is_long_mode(vcpu) && is_pae(vcpu)) ||
(mmu->get_cr3(vcpu) & CR3_NONPAE_RESERVED_BITS) == 0);
pt_access = ACC_ALL;
for (;;) {
gfn_t real_gfn;
unsigned long host_addr;
index = PT_INDEX(addr, walker->level);
table_gfn = gpte_to_gfn(pte);
offset = index * sizeof(pt_element_t);
pte_gpa = gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn) + offset;
walker->table_gfn[walker->level - 1] = table_gfn;
walker->pte_gpa[walker->level - 1] = pte_gpa;
real_gfn = mmu->translate_gpa(vcpu, gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn),
PFERR_USER_MASK|PFERR_WRITE_MASK);
if (unlikely(real_gfn == UNMAPPED_GVA)) {
present = false;
break;
}
real_gfn = gpa_to_gfn(real_gfn);
host_addr = gfn_to_hva(vcpu->kvm, real_gfn);
if (unlikely(kvm_is_error_hva(host_addr))) {
present = false;
break;
}
ptep_user = (pt_element_t __user *)((void *)host_addr + offset);
if (unlikely(copy_from_user(&pte, ptep_user, sizeof(pte)))) {
present = false;
break;
}
trace_kvm_mmu_paging_element(pte, walker->level);
if (unlikely(!is_present_gpte(pte))) {
present = false;
break;
}
if (unlikely(is_rsvd_bits_set(&vcpu->arch.mmu, pte,
walker->level))) {
rsvd_fault = true;
break;
}
if (unlikely(write_fault && !is_writable_pte(pte)
&& (user_fault || is_write_protection(vcpu))))
eperm = true;
if (unlikely(user_fault && !(pte & PT_USER_MASK)))
eperm = true;
#if PTTYPE == 64
if (unlikely(fetch_fault && (pte & PT64_NX_MASK)))
eperm = true;
#endif
if (!eperm && !rsvd_fault
&& unlikely(!(pte & PT_ACCESSED_MASK))) {
int ret;
trace_kvm_mmu_set_accessed_bit(table_gfn, index,
sizeof(pte));
ret = FNAME(cmpxchg_gpte)(vcpu, mmu, table_gfn,
index, pte, pte|PT_ACCESSED_MASK);
if (ret < 0) {
present = false;
break;
} else if (ret)
goto walk;
mark_page_dirty(vcpu->kvm, table_gfn);
pte |= PT_ACCESSED_MASK;
}
pte_access = pt_access & FNAME(gpte_access)(vcpu, pte);
walker->ptes[walker->level - 1] = pte;
if ((walker->level == PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL) ||
((walker->level == PT_DIRECTORY_LEVEL) &&
is_large_pte(pte) &&
(PTTYPE == 64 || is_pse(vcpu))) ||
((walker->level == PT_PDPE_LEVEL) &&
is_large_pte(pte) &&
mmu->root_level == PT64_ROOT_LEVEL)) {
int lvl = walker->level;
gpa_t real_gpa;
gfn_t gfn;
u32 ac;
gfn = gpte_to_gfn_lvl(pte, lvl);
gfn += (addr & PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(lvl)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (PTTYPE == 32 &&
walker->level == PT_DIRECTORY_LEVEL &&
is_cpuid_PSE36())
gfn += pse36_gfn_delta(pte);
ac = write_fault | fetch_fault | user_fault;
real_gpa = mmu->translate_gpa(vcpu, gfn_to_gpa(gfn),
ac);
if (real_gpa == UNMAPPED_GVA)
return 0;
walker->gfn = real_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
break;
}
pt_access = pte_access;
--walker->level;
}
if (unlikely(!present || eperm || rsvd_fault))
goto error;
if (write_fault && unlikely(!is_dirty_gpte(pte))) {
int ret;
trace_kvm_mmu_set_dirty_bit(table_gfn, index, sizeof(pte));
ret = FNAME(cmpxchg_gpte)(vcpu, mmu, table_gfn, index, pte,
pte|PT_DIRTY_MASK);
if (ret < 0) {
present = false;
goto error;
} else if (ret)
goto walk;
mark_page_dirty(vcpu->kvm, table_gfn);
pte |= PT_DIRTY_MASK;
walker->ptes[walker->level - 1] = pte;
}
walker->pt_access = pt_access;
walker->pte_access = pte_access;
pgprintk("%s: pte %llx pte_access %x pt_access %x\n",
__func__, (u64)pte, pte_access, pt_access);
return 1;
error:
walker->fault.vector = PF_VECTOR;
walker->fault.error_code_valid = true;
walker->fault.error_code = 0;
if (present)
walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;
walker->fault.error_code |= write_fault | user_fault;
if (fetch_fault && mmu->nx)
walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_FETCH_MASK;
if (rsvd_fault)
walker->fault.error_code |= PFERR_RSVD_MASK;
walker->fault.address = addr;
walker->fault.nested_page_fault = mmu != vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
trace_kvm_mmu_walker_error(walker->fault.error_code);
return 0;
} | 1072 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2013-1943 | False | False | False | True | AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | LOCAL | MEDIUM | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 4.4 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | REQUIRED | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 7.8 | HIGH | 1.8 | 5.9 | False | [{'url': 'http://web.archive.org/web/20130329070349/http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://web.archive.org/web/20130329070349/http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=950490', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=950490', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1939-1', 'name': 'USN-1939-1', 'refsource': 'UBUNTU', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-20'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.0', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_eus:6.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_eus:6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:canonical:ubuntu_linux:10.04:*:*:*:-:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': "The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.0 does not check whether kernel addresses are specified during allocation of memory slots for use in a guest's physical address space, which allows local users to gain privileges or obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application, related to arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h and virt/kvm/kvm_main.c."}] | 2020-08-03T15:58Z | 2013-07-16T14:08Z | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. |
Input validation is a frequently-used technique
for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to
ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the
code, or when communicating with other components. When
software does not validate input properly, an attacker is
able to craft the input in a form that is not expected by
the rest of the application. This will lead to parts of the
system receiving unintended input, which may result in
altered control flow, arbitrary control of a resource, or
arbitrary code execution.
Input validation is not the only technique for
processing input, however. Other techniques attempt to
transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such
as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous
inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to
ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included
in output to another component. Other techniques exist as well
(see CWE-138 for more examples.)
Input validation can be applied to:
raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size
Data can be simple or structured. Structured data
can be composed of many nested layers, composed of
combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or
structured data.
Many properties of raw data or metadata may need
to be validated upon entry into the code, such
as:
specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax
lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic
equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data
Implied or derived properties of data must often
be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in
deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor
to improper input validation.
Note that "input validation" has very different
meanings to different people, or within different
classification schemes. Caution must be used when
referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it. For example,
some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control
to an attacker over an input when they should not be able
to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred
to as input validation.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the
distinctions between input validation and output escaping
are often blurred, and developers must be careful to
understand the difference, including how input validation
is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities,
especially when less stringent data types must be
supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection
scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a
query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation
step since it is a common last name in the English
language. However, this valid name cannot be directly
inserted into the database because it contains the "'"
apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or
otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the
apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it
would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name
would be recorded.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | 0 | Takuya Yoshikawa | 2011-05-07 16:35:38+09:00 | KVM: Validate userspace_addr of memslot when registered
This way, we can avoid checking the user space address many times when
we read the guest memory.
Although we can do the same for write if we check which slots are
writable, we do not care write now: reading the guest memory happens
more often than writing.
[avi: change VERIFY_READ to VERIFY_WRITE]
Signed-off-by: Takuya Yoshikawa <yoshikawa.takuya@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> | fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | __kvm_set_memory_region | __kvm_set_memory_region( struct kvm * kvm , struct kvm_userspace_memory_region * mem , int user_alloc) | ['kvm', 'mem', 'user_alloc'] | int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
int user_alloc)
{
int r;
gfn_t base_gfn;
unsigned long npages;
unsigned long i;
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
struct kvm_memory_slot old, new;
struct kvm_memslots *slots, *old_memslots;
r = -EINVAL;
/* General sanity checks */
if (mem->memory_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
goto out;
if (user_alloc && (mem->userspace_addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
goto out;
if (mem->slot >= KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS + KVM_PRIVATE_MEM_SLOTS)
goto out;
if (mem->guest_phys_addr + mem->memory_size < mem->guest_phys_addr)
goto out;
memslot = &kvm->memslots->memslots[mem->slot];
base_gfn = mem->guest_phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
npages = mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)
goto out;
if (!npages)
mem->flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
new = old = *memslot;
new.id = mem->slot;
new.base_gfn = base_gfn;
new.npages = npages;
new.flags = mem->flags;
/* Disallow changing a memory slot's size. */
r = -EINVAL;
if (npages && old.npages && npages != old.npages)
goto out_free;
/* Check for overlaps */
r = -EEXIST;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS; ++i) {
struct kvm_memory_slot *s = &kvm->memslots->memslots[i];
if (s == memslot || !s->npages)
continue;
if (!((base_gfn + npages <= s->base_gfn) ||
(base_gfn >= s->base_gfn + s->npages)))
goto out_free;
}
/* Free page dirty bitmap if unneeded */
if (!(new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
r = -ENOMEM;
/* Allocate if a slot is being created */
#ifndef CONFIG_S390
if (npages && !new.rmap) {
new.rmap = vzalloc(npages * sizeof(*new.rmap));
if (!new.rmap)
goto out_free;
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
}
if (!npages)
goto skip_lpage;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES - 1; ++i) {
unsigned long ugfn;
unsigned long j;
int lpages;
int level = i + 2;
/* Avoid unused variable warning if no large pages */
(void)level;
if (new.lpage_info[i])
continue;
lpages = 1 + ((base_gfn + npages - 1)
>> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level));
lpages -= base_gfn >> KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(level);
new.lpage_info[i] = vzalloc(lpages * sizeof(*new.lpage_info[i]));
if (!new.lpage_info[i])
goto out_free;
if (base_gfn & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
new.lpage_info[i][0].write_count = 1;
if ((base_gfn+npages) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
new.lpage_info[i][lpages - 1].write_count = 1;
ugfn = new.userspace_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/*
* If the gfn and userspace address are not aligned wrt each
* other, or if explicitly asked to, disable large page
* support for this slot
*/
if ((base_gfn ^ ugfn) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1) ||
!largepages_enabled)
for (j = 0; j < lpages; ++j)
new.lpage_info[i][j].write_count = 1;
}
skip_lpage:
/* Allocate page dirty bitmap if needed */
if ((new.flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) && !new.dirty_bitmap) {
if (kvm_create_dirty_bitmap(&new) < 0)
goto out_free;
/* destroy any largepage mappings for dirty tracking */
}
#else /* not defined CONFIG_S390 */
new.user_alloc = user_alloc;
if (user_alloc)
new.userspace_addr = mem->userspace_addr;
#endif /* not defined CONFIG_S390 */
if (!npages) {
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_memslots), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
memcpy(slots, kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots));
if (mem->slot >= slots->nmemslots)
slots->nmemslots = mem->slot + 1;
slots->generation++;
slots->memslots[mem->slot].flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID;
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
/* From this point no new shadow pages pointing to a deleted
* memslot will be created.
*
* validation of sp->gfn happens in:
* - gfn_to_hva (kvm_read_guest, gfn_to_pfn)
* - kvm_is_visible_gfn (mmu_check_roots)
*/
kvm_arch_flush_shadow(kvm);
kfree(old_memslots);
}
r = kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(kvm, &new, old, mem, user_alloc);
if (r)
goto out_free;
/* map the pages in iommu page table */
if (npages) {
r = kvm_iommu_map_pages(kvm, &new);
if (r)
goto out_free;
}
r = -ENOMEM;
slots = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_memslots), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!slots)
goto out_free;
memcpy(slots, kvm->memslots, sizeof(struct kvm_memslots));
if (mem->slot >= slots->nmemslots)
slots->nmemslots = mem->slot + 1;
slots->generation++;
/* actual memory is freed via old in kvm_free_physmem_slot below */
if (!npages) {
new.rmap = NULL;
new.dirty_bitmap = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES - 1; ++i)
new.lpage_info[i] = NULL;
}
slots->memslots[mem->slot] = new;
old_memslots = kvm->memslots;
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->memslots, slots);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(kvm, mem, old, user_alloc);
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&old, &new);
kfree(old_memslots);
return 0;
out_free:
kvm_free_physmem_slot(&new, &old);
out:
return r;
} | 1043 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2013-1943 | False | False | False | True | AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | LOCAL | MEDIUM | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 4.4 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | REQUIRED | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 7.8 | HIGH | 1.8 | 5.9 | False | [{'url': 'http://web.archive.org/web/20130329070349/http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://web.archive.org/web/20130329070349/http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=950490', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=950490', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1939-1', 'name': 'USN-1939-1', 'refsource': 'UBUNTU', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-20'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.0', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_eus:6.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_eus:6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:canonical:ubuntu_linux:10.04:*:*:*:-:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': "The KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.0 does not check whether kernel addresses are specified during allocation of memory slots for use in a guest's physical address space, which allows local users to gain privileges or obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted application, related to arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h and virt/kvm/kvm_main.c."}] | 2020-08-03T15:58Z | 2013-07-16T14:08Z | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. |
Input validation is a frequently-used technique
for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to
ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the
code, or when communicating with other components. When
software does not validate input properly, an attacker is
able to craft the input in a form that is not expected by
the rest of the application. This will lead to parts of the
system receiving unintended input, which may result in
altered control flow, arbitrary control of a resource, or
arbitrary code execution.
Input validation is not the only technique for
processing input, however. Other techniques attempt to
transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such
as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous
inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to
ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included
in output to another component. Other techniques exist as well
(see CWE-138 for more examples.)
Input validation can be applied to:
raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size
Data can be simple or structured. Structured data
can be composed of many nested layers, composed of
combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or
structured data.
Many properties of raw data or metadata may need
to be validated upon entry into the code, such
as:
specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax
lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic
equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data
Implied or derived properties of data must often
be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in
deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor
to improper input validation.
Note that "input validation" has very different
meanings to different people, or within different
classification schemes. Caution must be used when
referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it. For example,
some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control
to an attacker over an input when they should not be able
to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred
to as input validation.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the
distinctions between input validation and output escaping
are often blurred, and developers must be careful to
understand the difference, including how input validation
is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities,
especially when less stringent data types must be
supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection
scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a
query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation
step since it is a common last name in the English
language. However, this valid name cannot be directly
inserted into the database because it contains the "'"
apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or
otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the
apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it
would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name
would be recorded.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | 0 | Takuya Yoshikawa | 2011-05-07 16:35:38+09:00 | KVM: Validate userspace_addr of memslot when registered
This way, we can avoid checking the user space address many times when
we read the guest memory.
Although we can do the same for write if we check which slots are
writable, we do not care write now: reading the guest memory happens
more often than writing.
[avi: change VERIFY_READ to VERIFY_WRITE]
Signed-off-by: Takuya Yoshikawa <yoshikawa.takuya@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com> | fa3d315a4ce2c0891cdde262562e710d95fba19e | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | kvm_read_guest_page | kvm_read_guest_page( struct kvm * kvm , gfn_t gfn , void * data , int offset , int len) | ['kvm', 'gfn', 'data', 'offset', 'len'] | int kvm_read_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, void *data, int offset,
int len)
{
int r;
unsigned long addr;
addr = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gfn);
if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
return -EFAULT;
r = copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)addr + offset, len);
if (r)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
} | 78 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2517 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | 7.2 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.2', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.2', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=718152', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=718152', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/07/01/4', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110701 Re: CVE request: kernel: nl80211: missing check for valid SSID size in scan operations', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2011-1212.html', 'name': 'RHSA-2011:1212', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-119'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '2.6.39.2', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_workstation:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_desktop:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Multiple buffer overflows in net/wireless/nl80211.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.2 allow local users to gain privileges by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability during scan operations with a long SSID value.'}] | 2020-07-28T13:55Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The software performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. |
Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data.
As a result, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code, alter the intended control flow, read sensitive information, or cause the system to crash.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html | 0 | Luciano Coelho | 2011-05-19 00:43:38+03:00 | nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> | 208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | nl80211_start_sched_scan | nl80211_start_sched_scan( struct sk_buff * skb , struct genl_info * info) | ['skb', 'info'] |
static int nl80211_start_sched_scan(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct genl_info *info)
{
struct cfg80211_sched_scan_request *request;
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = info->user_ptr[0];
struct net_device *dev = info->user_ptr[1];
struct nlattr *attr;
struct wiphy *wiphy;
int err, tmp, n_ssids = 0, n_channels, i;
u32 interval;
enum ieee80211_band band;
size_t ie_len;
if (!(rdev->wiphy.flags & WIPHY_FLAG_SUPPORTS_SCHED_SCAN) ||
!rdev->ops->sched_scan_start)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!is_valid_ie_attr(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]))
return -EINVAL;
if (rdev->sched_scan_req)
return -EINPROGRESS;
if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCHED_SCAN_INTERVAL])
return -EINVAL;
interval = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCHED_SCAN_INTERVAL]);
if (interval == 0)
return -EINVAL;
wiphy = &rdev->wiphy;
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES]) {
n_channels = validate_scan_freqs(
info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES]);
if (!n_channels)
return -EINVAL;
} else {
n_channels = 0;
for (band = 0; band < IEEE80211_NUM_BANDS; band++)
if (wiphy->bands[band])
n_channels += wiphy->bands[band]->n_channels;
}
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_SSIDS])
nla_for_each_nested(attr, info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_SSIDS],
tmp)
n_ssids++;
if (n_ssids > wiphy->max_scan_ssids)
return -EINVAL;
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE])
ie_len = nla_len(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]);
else
ie_len = 0;
if (ie_len > wiphy->max_scan_ie_len)
return -EINVAL;
request = kzalloc(sizeof(*request)
+ sizeof(*request->ssids) * n_ssids
+ sizeof(*request->channels) * n_channels
+ ie_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!request)
return -ENOMEM;
if (n_ssids)
request->ssids = (void *)&request->channels[n_channels];
request->n_ssids = n_ssids;
if (ie_len) {
if (request->ssids)
request->ie = (void *)(request->ssids + n_ssids);
else
request->ie = (void *)(request->channels + n_channels);
}
i = 0;
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES]) {
/* user specified, bail out if channel not found */
nla_for_each_nested(attr,
info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES],
tmp) {
struct ieee80211_channel *chan;
chan = ieee80211_get_channel(wiphy, nla_get_u32(attr));
if (!chan) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
/* ignore disabled channels */
if (chan->flags & IEEE80211_CHAN_DISABLED)
continue;
request->channels[i] = chan;
i++;
}
} else {
/* all channels */
for (band = 0; band < IEEE80211_NUM_BANDS; band++) {
int j;
if (!wiphy->bands[band])
continue;
for (j = 0; j < wiphy->bands[band]->n_channels; j++) {
struct ieee80211_channel *chan;
chan = &wiphy->bands[band]->channels[j];
if (chan->flags & IEEE80211_CHAN_DISABLED)
continue;
request->channels[i] = chan;
i++;
}
}
}
if (!i) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
request->n_channels = i;
i = 0;
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_SSIDS]) {
nla_for_each_nested(attr, info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_SSIDS],
tmp) {
if (request->ssids[i].ssid_len >
IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
memcpy(request->ssids[i].ssid, nla_data(attr),
nla_len(attr));
request->ssids[i].ssid_len = nla_len(attr);
i++;
}
}
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]) {
request->ie_len = nla_len(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]);
memcpy((void *)request->ie,
nla_data(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]),
request->ie_len);
}
request->dev = dev;
request->wiphy = &rdev->wiphy;
request->interval = interval;
err = rdev->ops->sched_scan_start(&rdev->wiphy, dev, request);
if (!err) {
rdev->sched_scan_req = request;
nl80211_send_sched_scan(rdev, dev,
NL80211_CMD_START_SCHED_SCAN);
goto out;
}
out_free:
kfree(request);
out:
return err; | 852 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2517 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | 7.2 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.2', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.2', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=718152', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=718152', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/07/01/4', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110701 Re: CVE request: kernel: nl80211: missing check for valid SSID size in scan operations', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2011-1212.html', 'name': 'RHSA-2011:1212', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-119'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '2.6.39.2', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_workstation:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_desktop:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Multiple buffer overflows in net/wireless/nl80211.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.2 allow local users to gain privileges by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability during scan operations with a long SSID value.'}] | 2020-07-28T13:55Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The software performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. |
Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data.
As a result, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code, alter the intended control flow, read sensitive information, or cause the system to crash.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html | 0 | Luciano Coelho | 2011-05-19 00:43:38+03:00 | nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> | 208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | nl80211_trigger_scan | nl80211_trigger_scan( struct sk_buff * skb , struct genl_info * info) | ['skb', 'info'] |
static int nl80211_trigger_scan(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = info->user_ptr[0];
struct net_device *dev = info->user_ptr[1];
struct cfg80211_scan_request *request;
struct nlattr *attr;
struct wiphy *wiphy;
int err, tmp, n_ssids = 0, n_channels, i;
enum ieee80211_band band;
size_t ie_len;
if (!is_valid_ie_attr(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]))
return -EINVAL;
wiphy = &rdev->wiphy;
if (!rdev->ops->scan)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (rdev->scan_req)
return -EBUSY;
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES]) {
n_channels = validate_scan_freqs(
info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES]);
if (!n_channels)
return -EINVAL;
} else {
n_channels = 0;
for (band = 0; band < IEEE80211_NUM_BANDS; band++)
if (wiphy->bands[band])
n_channels += wiphy->bands[band]->n_channels;
}
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_SSIDS])
nla_for_each_nested(attr, info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_SSIDS], tmp)
n_ssids++;
if (n_ssids > wiphy->max_scan_ssids)
return -EINVAL;
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE])
ie_len = nla_len(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]);
else
ie_len = 0;
if (ie_len > wiphy->max_scan_ie_len)
return -EINVAL;
request = kzalloc(sizeof(*request)
+ sizeof(*request->ssids) * n_ssids
+ sizeof(*request->channels) * n_channels
+ ie_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!request)
return -ENOMEM;
if (n_ssids)
request->ssids = (void *)&request->channels[n_channels];
request->n_ssids = n_ssids;
if (ie_len) {
if (request->ssids)
request->ie = (void *)(request->ssids + n_ssids);
else
request->ie = (void *)(request->channels + n_channels);
}
i = 0;
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES]) {
/* user specified, bail out if channel not found */
nla_for_each_nested(attr, info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES], tmp) {
struct ieee80211_channel *chan;
chan = ieee80211_get_channel(wiphy, nla_get_u32(attr));
if (!chan) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
/* ignore disabled channels */
if (chan->flags & IEEE80211_CHAN_DISABLED)
continue;
request->channels[i] = chan;
i++;
}
} else {
/* all channels */
for (band = 0; band < IEEE80211_NUM_BANDS; band++) {
int j;
if (!wiphy->bands[band])
continue;
for (j = 0; j < wiphy->bands[band]->n_channels; j++) {
struct ieee80211_channel *chan;
chan = &wiphy->bands[band]->channels[j];
if (chan->flags & IEEE80211_CHAN_DISABLED)
continue;
request->channels[i] = chan;
i++;
}
}
}
if (!i) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
request->n_channels = i;
i = 0;
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_SSIDS]) {
nla_for_each_nested(attr, info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_SSIDS], tmp) {
if (request->ssids[i].ssid_len > IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
memcpy(request->ssids[i].ssid, nla_data(attr), nla_len(attr));
request->ssids[i].ssid_len = nla_len(attr);
i++;
}
}
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]) {
request->ie_len = nla_len(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]);
memcpy((void *)request->ie,
nla_data(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]),
request->ie_len);
}
request->dev = dev;
request->wiphy = &rdev->wiphy;
rdev->scan_req = request;
err = rdev->ops->scan(&rdev->wiphy, dev, request);
if (!err) {
nl80211_send_scan_start(rdev, dev);
dev_hold(dev);
} else {
out_free:
rdev->scan_req = NULL;
kfree(request);
}
return err; | 803 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-1021 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 3.6 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/02/25/5', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110225 Re: CVE request: kernel: /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method can bypass module restrictions', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=680841', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=680841', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-264'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.9:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.9:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.9', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.9:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.9:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'drivers/acpi/debugfs.c in the Linux kernel before 3.0 allows local users to modify arbitrary kernel memory locations by leveraging root privileges to write to the /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method file. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2010-4347.'}] | 2012-06-22T04:00Z | 2012-06-21T23:55Z | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/264.html | 1 | Thomas Renninger | 2011-05-26 12:26:24+02:00 | ACPI: Split out custom_method functionality into an own driver
With /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method root can write
to arbitrary memory and increase his priveleges, even if
these are restricted.
-> Make this an own debug .config option and warn about the
security issue in the config description.
-> Still keep acpi/debugfs.c which now only creates an empty
/sys/kernel/debug/acpi directory. There might be other
users of it later.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Renninger <trenn@suse.de>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Acked-by: rui.zhang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> | 526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | acpi_custom_method_init | acpi_custom_method_init( void) | ['void'] | static int __init acpi_custom_method_init(void)
{
if (!acpi_debugfs_dir)
return -ENOENT;
cm_dentry = debugfs_create_file("custom_method", S_IWUSR,
acpi_debugfs_dir, NULL, &cm_fops);
if (!cm_dentry)
return -ENODEV;
return 0;
} | 43 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-1021 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 3.6 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/02/25/5', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110225 Re: CVE request: kernel: /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method can bypass module restrictions', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=680841', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=680841', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-264'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.9:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.9:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.9', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.9:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.9:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'drivers/acpi/debugfs.c in the Linux kernel before 3.0 allows local users to modify arbitrary kernel memory locations by leveraging root privileges to write to the /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method file. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2010-4347.'}] | 2012-06-22T04:00Z | 2012-06-21T23:55Z | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/264.html | 1 | Thomas Renninger | 2011-05-26 12:26:24+02:00 | ACPI: Split out custom_method functionality into an own driver
With /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method root can write
to arbitrary memory and increase his priveleges, even if
these are restricted.
-> Make this an own debug .config option and warn about the
security issue in the config description.
-> Still keep acpi/debugfs.c which now only creates an empty
/sys/kernel/debug/acpi directory. There might be other
users of it later.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Renninger <trenn@suse.de>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Acked-by: rui.zhang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> | 526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | acpi_debugfs_init | acpi_debugfs_init( void) | ['void'] | void __init acpi_debugfs_init(void)
{
acpi_debugfs_dir = debugfs_create_dir("acpi", NULL);
acpi_custom_method_init();
} | 19 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-1021 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 3.6 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/02/25/5', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110225 Re: CVE request: kernel: /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method can bypass module restrictions', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=680841', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=680841', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-264'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.9:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.9:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.9', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.9:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.9:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'drivers/acpi/debugfs.c in the Linux kernel before 3.0 allows local users to modify arbitrary kernel memory locations by leveraging root privileges to write to the /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method file. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2010-4347.'}] | 2012-06-22T04:00Z | 2012-06-21T23:55Z | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/264.html | 1 | Thomas Renninger | 2011-05-26 12:26:24+02:00 | ACPI: Split out custom_method functionality into an own driver
With /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method root can write
to arbitrary memory and increase his priveleges, even if
these are restricted.
-> Make this an own debug .config option and warn about the
security issue in the config description.
-> Still keep acpi/debugfs.c which now only creates an empty
/sys/kernel/debug/acpi directory. There might be other
users of it later.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Renninger <trenn@suse.de>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Acked-by: rui.zhang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> | 526b4af47f44148c9d665e57723ed9f86634c6e3 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | cm_write | cm_write( struct file * file , const char __user * user_buf , size_t count , loff_t * ppos) | ['file', 'user_buf', 'count', 'ppos'] | static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
static char *buf;
static u32 max_size;
static u32 uncopied_bytes;
struct acpi_table_header table;
acpi_status status;
if (!(*ppos)) {
/* parse the table header to get the table length */
if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&table, user_buf,
sizeof(struct acpi_table_header)))
return -EFAULT;
uncopied_bytes = max_size = table.length;
buf = kzalloc(max_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (buf == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
if ((*ppos > max_size) ||
(*ppos + count > max_size) ||
(*ppos + count < count) ||
(count > uncopied_bytes))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(buf + (*ppos), user_buf, count)) {
kfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
return -EFAULT;
}
uncopied_bytes -= count;
*ppos += count;
if (!uncopied_bytes) {
status = acpi_install_method(buf);
kfree(buf);
buf = NULL;
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
return -EINVAL;
add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE);
}
return count;
} | 241 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-3619 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 4.6 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a5b2c5b2ad5853591a6cac6134cd0f599a720865', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a5b2c5b2ad5853591a6cac6134cd0f599a720865', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a5b2c5b2ad5853591a6cac6134cd0f599a720865', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a5b2c5b2ad5853591a6cac6134cd0f599a720865', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/10/17/6', 'name': '[oss-security] 20111017 Re: CVE request: kernel/AppArmor local denial of service', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-20'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '3.0', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.0:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:3.0:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The apparmor_setprocattr function in security/apparmor/lsm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.0 does not properly handle invalid parameters, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and OOPS) or possibly have unspecified other impact by writing to a /proc/#####/attr/current file.'}] | 2013-06-10T04:00Z | 2013-06-08T13:05Z | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. |
Input validation is a frequently-used technique
for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to
ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the
code, or when communicating with other components. When
software does not validate input properly, an attacker is
able to craft the input in a form that is not expected by
the rest of the application. This will lead to parts of the
system receiving unintended input, which may result in
altered control flow, arbitrary control of a resource, or
arbitrary code execution.
Input validation is not the only technique for
processing input, however. Other techniques attempt to
transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such
as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous
inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to
ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included
in output to another component. Other techniques exist as well
(see CWE-138 for more examples.)
Input validation can be applied to:
raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size
Data can be simple or structured. Structured data
can be composed of many nested layers, composed of
combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or
structured data.
Many properties of raw data or metadata may need
to be validated upon entry into the code, such
as:
specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax
lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic
equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data
Implied or derived properties of data must often
be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in
deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor
to improper input validation.
Note that "input validation" has very different
meanings to different people, or within different
classification schemes. Caution must be used when
referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it. For example,
some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control
to an attacker over an input when they should not be able
to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred
to as input validation.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the
distinctions between input validation and output escaping
are often blurred, and developers must be careful to
understand the difference, including how input validation
is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities,
especially when less stringent data types must be
supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection
scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a
query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation
step since it is a common last name in the English
language. However, this valid name cannot be directly
inserted into the database because it contains the "'"
apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or
otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the
apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it
would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name
would be recorded.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | 0 | Kees Cook | 2011-05-31 11:31:41-07:00 | AppArmor: fix oops in apparmor_setprocattr
When invalid parameters are passed to apparmor_setprocattr a NULL deref
oops occurs when it tries to record an audit message. This is because
it is passing NULL for the profile parameter for aa_audit. But aa_audit
now requires that the profile passed is not NULL.
Fix this by passing the current profile on the task that is trying to
setprocattr.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | a5b2c5b2ad5853591a6cac6134cd0f599a720865 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | apparmor_setprocattr | apparmor_setprocattr( struct task_struct * task , char * name , void * value , size_t size) | ['task', 'name', 'value', 'size'] | static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
char *command, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
int error;
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
* the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
* so that AppArmor can null terminate them
*/
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
args[size] = '\0';
}
/* task can only write its own attributes */
if (current != task)
return -EACCES;
args = value;
args = strim(args);
command = strsep(&args, " ");
if (!args)
return -EINVAL;
args = skip_spaces(args);
if (!*args)
return -EINVAL;
arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
} else {
struct common_audit_data sa;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
sa.aad.info = name;
sa.aad.error = -EINVAL;
return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
&sa, NULL);
}
} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else {
/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!error)
error = size;
return error;
} | 383 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2518 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/07/01/5', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110701 Re: CVE request: kernel: tomoyo: oops in tomoyo_mount_acl()', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4e78c724d47e2342aa8fde61f6b8536f662f795f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4e78c724d47e2342aa8fde61f6b8536f662f795f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.2', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.2', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=4e78c724d47e2342aa8fde61f6b8536f662f795f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=4e78c724d47e2342aa8fde61f6b8536f662f795f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=139447903326211&w=2', 'name': 'HPSBGN02970', 'refsource': 'HP', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-20'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '2.6.39.2', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The tomoyo_mount_acl function in security/tomoyo/mount.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.2 calls the kern_path function with arguments taken directly from a mount system call, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a NULL value for the device name.'}] | 2020-07-26T23:43Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. |
Input validation is a frequently-used technique
for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to
ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the
code, or when communicating with other components. When
software does not validate input properly, an attacker is
able to craft the input in a form that is not expected by
the rest of the application. This will lead to parts of the
system receiving unintended input, which may result in
altered control flow, arbitrary control of a resource, or
arbitrary code execution.
Input validation is not the only technique for
processing input, however. Other techniques attempt to
transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such
as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous
inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to
ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included
in output to another component. Other techniques exist as well
(see CWE-138 for more examples.)
Input validation can be applied to:
raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size
Data can be simple or structured. Structured data
can be composed of many nested layers, composed of
combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or
structured data.
Many properties of raw data or metadata may need
to be validated upon entry into the code, such
as:
specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax
lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic
equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data
Implied or derived properties of data must often
be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in
deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor
to improper input validation.
Note that "input validation" has very different
meanings to different people, or within different
classification schemes. Caution must be used when
referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it. For example,
some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control
to an attacker over an input when they should not be able
to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred
to as input validation.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the
distinctions between input validation and output escaping
are often blurred, and developers must be careful to
understand the difference, including how input validation
is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities,
especially when less stringent data types must be
supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection
scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a
query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation
step since it is a common last name in the English
language. However, this valid name cannot be directly
inserted into the database because it contains the "'"
apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or
otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the
apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it
would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name
would be recorded.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | 0 | Tetsuo Handa | 2011-06-13 13:49:11+09:00 | TOMOYO: Fix oops in tomoyo_mount_acl().
In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, kern_path() was called without checking
dev_name != NULL. As a result, an unprivileged user can trigger oops by issuing
mount(NULL, "/", "ext3", 0, NULL) request.
Fix this by checking dev_name != NULL before calling kern_path(dev_name).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 4e78c724d47e2342aa8fde61f6b8536f662f795f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | tomoyo_mount_acl | tomoyo_mount_acl( struct tomoyo_request_info * r , char * dev_name , struct path * dir , char * type , unsigned long flags) | ['r', 'dev_name', 'dir', 'type', 'flags'] | static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, char *dev_name,
struct path *dir, char *type, unsigned long flags)
{
struct path path;
struct file_system_type *fstype = NULL;
const char *requested_type = NULL;
const char *requested_dir_name = NULL;
const char *requested_dev_name = NULL;
struct tomoyo_path_info rtype;
struct tomoyo_path_info rdev;
struct tomoyo_path_info rdir;
int need_dev = 0;
int error = -ENOMEM;
/* Get fstype. */
requested_type = tomoyo_encode(type);
if (!requested_type)
goto out;
rtype.name = requested_type;
tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rtype);
/* Get mount point. */
requested_dir_name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(dir);
if (!requested_dir_name) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
rdir.name = requested_dir_name;
tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rdir);
/* Compare fs name. */
if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT_KEYWORD)) {
/* dev_name is ignored. */
} else if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE_KEYWORD) ||
!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE_KEYWORD) ||
!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE_KEYWORD) ||
!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED_KEYWORD)) {
/* dev_name is ignored. */
} else if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND_KEYWORD) ||
!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE_KEYWORD)) {
need_dev = -1; /* dev_name is a directory */
} else {
fstype = get_fs_type(type);
if (!fstype) {
error = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
if (fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV)
/* dev_name is a block device file. */
need_dev = 1;
}
if (need_dev) {
/* Get mount point or device file. */
if (kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path)) {
error = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
requested_dev_name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&path);
path_put(&path);
if (!requested_dev_name) {
error = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
} else {
/* Map dev_name to "<NULL>" if no dev_name given. */
if (!dev_name)
dev_name = "<NULL>";
requested_dev_name = tomoyo_encode(dev_name);
if (!requested_dev_name) {
error = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
}
rdev.name = requested_dev_name;
tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rdev);
r->param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL;
r->param.mount.need_dev = need_dev;
r->param.mount.dev = &rdev;
r->param.mount.dir = &rdir;
r->param.mount.type = &rtype;
r->param.mount.flags = flags;
do {
tomoyo_check_acl(r, tomoyo_check_mount_acl);
error = tomoyo_audit_mount_log(r);
} while (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST);
out:
kfree(requested_dev_name);
kfree(requested_dir_name);
if (fstype)
put_filesystem(fstype);
kfree(requested_type);
return error;
} | 469 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2491 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/23/6', 'name': "[oss-security] 20110623 Re: CVE request: kernel: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests", 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=709393', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=709393', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.0/ChangeLog-3.0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Broken Link']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2011-1212.html', 'name': 'RHSA-2011:1212', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.0', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_workstation:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_desktop:5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Network Lock Manager (NLM) protocol implementation in the NFS client functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.0 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a LOCK_UN flock system call.'}] | 2020-07-31T20:22Z | 2013-03-01T12:37Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Trond Myklebust | 2011-05-31 15:15:34-04:00 | NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org | 0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | nlmclnt_unlock_callback | nlmclnt_unlock_callback( struct rpc_task * task , void * data) | ['task', 'data'] | static void nlmclnt_unlock_callback(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nlm_rqst *req = data;
u32 status = ntohl(req->a_res.status);
if (RPC_ASSASSINATED(task))
goto die;
if (task->tk_status < 0) {
dprintk("lockd: unlock failed (err = %d)\n", -task->tk_status);
goto retry_rebind;
}
if (status == NLM_LCK_DENIED_GRACE_PERIOD) {
rpc_delay(task, NLMCLNT_GRACE_WAIT);
goto retry_unlock;
}
if (status != NLM_LCK_GRANTED)
printk(KERN_WARNING "lockd: unexpected unlock status: %d\n", status);
die:
return;
retry_rebind:
nlm_rebind_host(req->a_host);
retry_unlock:
rpc_restart_call(task);
} | 117 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2208 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | NONE | NONE | 2.1 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-189'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Integer signedness error in the osf_getdomainname function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted call.'}] | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Numeric Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/189.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2( osf_getdomainname , char __user * , name , int , namelen) | ['osf_getdomainname', 'name', 'int', 'namelen'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_getdomainname, char __user *, name, int, namelen)
{
unsigned len;
int i;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, namelen))
return -EFAULT;
len = namelen;
if (namelen > 32)
len = 32;
down_read(&uts_sem);
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
__put_user(utsname()->domainname[i], name + i);
if (utsname()->domainname[i] == '\0')
break;
}
up_read(&uts_sem);
return 0;
} | 113 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2209 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 2.1 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-189'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Integer signedness error in the osf_sysinfo function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted call.'}] | 2012-06-13T15:14Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Numeric Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/189.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2( osf_getdomainname , char __user * , name , int , namelen) | ['osf_getdomainname', 'name', 'int', 'namelen'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_getdomainname, char __user *, name, int, namelen)
{
unsigned len;
int i;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, namelen))
return -EFAULT;
len = namelen;
if (namelen > 32)
len = 32;
down_read(&uts_sem);
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
__put_user(utsname()->domainname[i], name + i);
if (utsname()->domainname[i] == '\0')
break;
}
up_read(&uts_sem);
return 0;
} | 113 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2210 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | NONE | NONE | 2.1 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-264'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The osf_getsysinfo function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform does not properly restrict the data size for GSI_GET_HWRPB operations, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted call.'}] | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/264.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2( osf_getdomainname , char __user * , name , int , namelen) | ['osf_getdomainname', 'name', 'int', 'namelen'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_getdomainname, char __user *, name, int, namelen)
{
unsigned len;
int i;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, namelen))
return -EFAULT;
len = namelen;
if (namelen > 32)
len = 32;
down_read(&uts_sem);
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
__put_user(utsname()->domainname[i], name + i);
if (utsname()->domainname[i] == '\0')
break;
}
up_read(&uts_sem);
return 0;
} | 113 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2211 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | 7.2 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-264'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The osf_wait4 function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform uses an incorrect pointer, which allows local users to gain privileges by writing a certain integer value to kernel memory.'}] | 2012-06-13T16:15Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/264.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2( osf_getdomainname , char __user * , name , int , namelen) | ['osf_getdomainname', 'name', 'int', 'namelen'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_getdomainname, char __user *, name, int, namelen)
{
unsigned len;
int i;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, namelen))
return -EFAULT;
len = namelen;
if (namelen > 32)
len = 32;
down_read(&uts_sem);
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
__put_user(utsname()->domainname[i], name + i);
if (utsname()->domainname[i] == '\0')
break;
}
up_read(&uts_sem);
return 0;
} | 113 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2208 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | NONE | NONE | 2.1 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-189'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Integer signedness error in the osf_getdomainname function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted call.'}] | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Numeric Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/189.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3( osf_sysinfo , int , command , char __user * , buf , long , count) | ['osf_sysinfo', 'int', 'command', 'buf', 'long', 'count'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(osf_sysinfo, int, command, char __user *, buf, long, count)
{
const char *sysinfo_table[] = {
utsname()->sysname,
utsname()->nodename,
utsname()->release,
utsname()->version,
utsname()->machine,
"alpha", /* instruction set architecture */
"dummy", /* hardware serial number */
"dummy", /* hardware manufacturer */
"dummy", /* secure RPC domain */
};
unsigned long offset;
const char *res;
long len, err = -EINVAL;
offset = command-1;
if (offset >= ARRAY_SIZE(sysinfo_table)) {
/* Digital UNIX has a few unpublished interfaces here */
printk("sysinfo(%d)", command);
goto out;
}
down_read(&uts_sem);
res = sysinfo_table[offset];
len = strlen(res)+1;
if (len > count)
len = count;
if (copy_to_user(buf, res, len))
err = -EFAULT;
else
err = 0;
up_read(&uts_sem);
out:
return err;
} | 176 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2209 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 2.1 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-189'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Integer signedness error in the osf_sysinfo function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted call.'}] | 2012-06-13T15:14Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Numeric Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/189.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3( osf_sysinfo , int , command , char __user * , buf , long , count) | ['osf_sysinfo', 'int', 'command', 'buf', 'long', 'count'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(osf_sysinfo, int, command, char __user *, buf, long, count)
{
const char *sysinfo_table[] = {
utsname()->sysname,
utsname()->nodename,
utsname()->release,
utsname()->version,
utsname()->machine,
"alpha", /* instruction set architecture */
"dummy", /* hardware serial number */
"dummy", /* hardware manufacturer */
"dummy", /* secure RPC domain */
};
unsigned long offset;
const char *res;
long len, err = -EINVAL;
offset = command-1;
if (offset >= ARRAY_SIZE(sysinfo_table)) {
/* Digital UNIX has a few unpublished interfaces here */
printk("sysinfo(%d)", command);
goto out;
}
down_read(&uts_sem);
res = sysinfo_table[offset];
len = strlen(res)+1;
if (len > count)
len = count;
if (copy_to_user(buf, res, len))
err = -EFAULT;
else
err = 0;
up_read(&uts_sem);
out:
return err;
} | 176 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2210 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | NONE | NONE | 2.1 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-264'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The osf_getsysinfo function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform does not properly restrict the data size for GSI_GET_HWRPB operations, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted call.'}] | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/264.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3( osf_sysinfo , int , command , char __user * , buf , long , count) | ['osf_sysinfo', 'int', 'command', 'buf', 'long', 'count'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(osf_sysinfo, int, command, char __user *, buf, long, count)
{
const char *sysinfo_table[] = {
utsname()->sysname,
utsname()->nodename,
utsname()->release,
utsname()->version,
utsname()->machine,
"alpha", /* instruction set architecture */
"dummy", /* hardware serial number */
"dummy", /* hardware manufacturer */
"dummy", /* secure RPC domain */
};
unsigned long offset;
const char *res;
long len, err = -EINVAL;
offset = command-1;
if (offset >= ARRAY_SIZE(sysinfo_table)) {
/* Digital UNIX has a few unpublished interfaces here */
printk("sysinfo(%d)", command);
goto out;
}
down_read(&uts_sem);
res = sysinfo_table[offset];
len = strlen(res)+1;
if (len > count)
len = count;
if (copy_to_user(buf, res, len))
err = -EFAULT;
else
err = 0;
up_read(&uts_sem);
out:
return err;
} | 176 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2211 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | 7.2 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-264'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The osf_wait4 function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform uses an incorrect pointer, which allows local users to gain privileges by writing a certain integer value to kernel memory.'}] | 2012-06-13T16:15Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/264.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3( osf_sysinfo , int , command , char __user * , buf , long , count) | ['osf_sysinfo', 'int', 'command', 'buf', 'long', 'count'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(osf_sysinfo, int, command, char __user *, buf, long, count)
{
const char *sysinfo_table[] = {
utsname()->sysname,
utsname()->nodename,
utsname()->release,
utsname()->version,
utsname()->machine,
"alpha", /* instruction set architecture */
"dummy", /* hardware serial number */
"dummy", /* hardware manufacturer */
"dummy", /* secure RPC domain */
};
unsigned long offset;
const char *res;
long len, err = -EINVAL;
offset = command-1;
if (offset >= ARRAY_SIZE(sysinfo_table)) {
/* Digital UNIX has a few unpublished interfaces here */
printk("sysinfo(%d)", command);
goto out;
}
down_read(&uts_sem);
res = sysinfo_table[offset];
len = strlen(res)+1;
if (len > count)
len = count;
if (copy_to_user(buf, res, len))
err = -EFAULT;
else
err = 0;
up_read(&uts_sem);
out:
return err;
} | 176 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2208 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | NONE | NONE | 2.1 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-189'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Integer signedness error in the osf_getdomainname function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted call.'}] | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Numeric Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/189.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4( osf_wait4 , pid_t , pid , int __user * , ustatus , int , options , struct rusage32 __user * , ur) | ['osf_wait4', 'pid_t', 'pid', 'ustatus', 'int', 'options', 'ur'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(osf_wait4, pid_t, pid, int __user *, ustatus, int, options,
struct rusage32 __user *, ur)
{
struct rusage r;
long ret, err;
mm_segment_t old_fs;
if (!ur)
return sys_wait4(pid, ustatus, options, NULL);
old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs (KERNEL_DS);
ret = sys_wait4(pid, ustatus, options, (struct rusage __user *) &r);
set_fs (old_fs);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ur, sizeof(*ur)))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_sec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_usec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_usec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_stime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_stime.tv_sec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_stime.tv_usec, &ur->ru_stime.tv_usec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_maxrss, &ur->ru_maxrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_ixrss, &ur->ru_ixrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_idrss, &ur->ru_idrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_isrss, &ur->ru_isrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_minflt, &ur->ru_minflt);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_majflt, &ur->ru_majflt);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nswap, &ur->ru_nswap);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_inblock, &ur->ru_inblock);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_oublock, &ur->ru_oublock);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_msgsnd, &ur->ru_msgsnd);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_msgrcv, &ur->ru_msgrcv);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nsignals, &ur->ru_nsignals);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nvcsw, &ur->ru_nvcsw);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nivcsw, &ur->ru_nivcsw);
return err ? err : ret;
} | 391 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2209 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 2.1 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-189'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Integer signedness error in the osf_sysinfo function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted call.'}] | 2012-06-13T15:14Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Numeric Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/189.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4( osf_wait4 , pid_t , pid , int __user * , ustatus , int , options , struct rusage32 __user * , ur) | ['osf_wait4', 'pid_t', 'pid', 'ustatus', 'int', 'options', 'ur'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(osf_wait4, pid_t, pid, int __user *, ustatus, int, options,
struct rusage32 __user *, ur)
{
struct rusage r;
long ret, err;
mm_segment_t old_fs;
if (!ur)
return sys_wait4(pid, ustatus, options, NULL);
old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs (KERNEL_DS);
ret = sys_wait4(pid, ustatus, options, (struct rusage __user *) &r);
set_fs (old_fs);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ur, sizeof(*ur)))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_sec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_usec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_usec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_stime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_stime.tv_sec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_stime.tv_usec, &ur->ru_stime.tv_usec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_maxrss, &ur->ru_maxrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_ixrss, &ur->ru_ixrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_idrss, &ur->ru_idrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_isrss, &ur->ru_isrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_minflt, &ur->ru_minflt);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_majflt, &ur->ru_majflt);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nswap, &ur->ru_nswap);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_inblock, &ur->ru_inblock);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_oublock, &ur->ru_oublock);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_msgsnd, &ur->ru_msgsnd);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_msgrcv, &ur->ru_msgrcv);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nsignals, &ur->ru_nsignals);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nvcsw, &ur->ru_nvcsw);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nivcsw, &ur->ru_nivcsw);
return err ? err : ret;
} | 391 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2210 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | NONE | NONE | 2.1 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-264'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The osf_getsysinfo function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform does not properly restrict the data size for GSI_GET_HWRPB operations, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted call.'}] | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/264.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4( osf_wait4 , pid_t , pid , int __user * , ustatus , int , options , struct rusage32 __user * , ur) | ['osf_wait4', 'pid_t', 'pid', 'ustatus', 'int', 'options', 'ur'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(osf_wait4, pid_t, pid, int __user *, ustatus, int, options,
struct rusage32 __user *, ur)
{
struct rusage r;
long ret, err;
mm_segment_t old_fs;
if (!ur)
return sys_wait4(pid, ustatus, options, NULL);
old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs (KERNEL_DS);
ret = sys_wait4(pid, ustatus, options, (struct rusage __user *) &r);
set_fs (old_fs);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ur, sizeof(*ur)))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_sec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_usec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_usec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_stime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_stime.tv_sec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_stime.tv_usec, &ur->ru_stime.tv_usec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_maxrss, &ur->ru_maxrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_ixrss, &ur->ru_ixrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_idrss, &ur->ru_idrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_isrss, &ur->ru_isrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_minflt, &ur->ru_minflt);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_majflt, &ur->ru_majflt);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nswap, &ur->ru_nswap);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_inblock, &ur->ru_inblock);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_oublock, &ur->ru_oublock);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_msgsnd, &ur->ru_msgsnd);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_msgrcv, &ur->ru_msgrcv);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nsignals, &ur->ru_nsignals);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nvcsw, &ur->ru_nvcsw);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nivcsw, &ur->ru_nivcsw);
return err ? err : ret;
} | 391 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2211 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | 7.2 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-264'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The osf_wait4 function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform uses an incorrect pointer, which allows local users to gain privileges by writing a certain integer value to kernel memory.'}] | 2012-06-13T16:15Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/264.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4( osf_wait4 , pid_t , pid , int __user * , ustatus , int , options , struct rusage32 __user * , ur) | ['osf_wait4', 'pid_t', 'pid', 'ustatus', 'int', 'options', 'ur'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(osf_wait4, pid_t, pid, int __user *, ustatus, int, options,
struct rusage32 __user *, ur)
{
struct rusage r;
long ret, err;
mm_segment_t old_fs;
if (!ur)
return sys_wait4(pid, ustatus, options, NULL);
old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs (KERNEL_DS);
ret = sys_wait4(pid, ustatus, options, (struct rusage __user *) &r);
set_fs (old_fs);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ur, sizeof(*ur)))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_sec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_utime.tv_usec, &ur->ru_utime.tv_usec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_stime.tv_sec, &ur->ru_stime.tv_sec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_stime.tv_usec, &ur->ru_stime.tv_usec);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_maxrss, &ur->ru_maxrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_ixrss, &ur->ru_ixrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_idrss, &ur->ru_idrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_isrss, &ur->ru_isrss);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_minflt, &ur->ru_minflt);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_majflt, &ur->ru_majflt);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nswap, &ur->ru_nswap);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_inblock, &ur->ru_inblock);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_oublock, &ur->ru_oublock);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_msgsnd, &ur->ru_msgsnd);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_msgrcv, &ur->ru_msgrcv);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nsignals, &ur->ru_nsignals);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nvcsw, &ur->ru_nvcsw);
err |= __put_user(r.ru_nivcsw, &ur->ru_nivcsw);
return err ? err : ret;
} | 391 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2208 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | NONE | NONE | 2.1 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-189'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Integer signedness error in the osf_getdomainname function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted call.'}] | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Numeric Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/189.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5( osf_getsysinfo , unsigned long , op , void __user * , buffer , unsigned long , nbytes , int __user * , start , void __user * , arg) | ['osf_getsysinfo', 'long', 'op', 'buffer', 'long', 'nbytes', 'start', 'arg'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(osf_getsysinfo, unsigned long, op, void __user *, buffer,
unsigned long, nbytes, int __user *, start, void __user *, arg)
{
unsigned long w;
struct percpu_struct *cpu;
switch (op) {
case GSI_IEEE_FP_CONTROL:
/* Return current software fp control & status bits. */
/* Note that DU doesn't verify available space here. */
w = current_thread_info()->ieee_state & IEEE_SW_MASK;
w = swcr_update_status(w, rdfpcr());
if (put_user(w, (unsigned long __user *) buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case GSI_IEEE_STATE_AT_SIGNAL:
/*
* Not sure anybody will ever use this weird stuff. These
* ops can be used (under OSF/1) to set the fpcr that should
* be used when a signal handler starts executing.
*/
break;
case GSI_UACPROC:
if (nbytes < sizeof(unsigned int))
return -EINVAL;
w = (current_thread_info()->flags >> UAC_SHIFT) & UAC_BITMASK;
if (put_user(w, (unsigned int __user *)buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
case GSI_PROC_TYPE:
if (nbytes < sizeof(unsigned long))
return -EINVAL;
cpu = (struct percpu_struct*)
((char*)hwrpb + hwrpb->processor_offset);
w = cpu->type;
if (put_user(w, (unsigned long __user*)buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
case GSI_GET_HWRPB:
if (nbytes < sizeof(*hwrpb))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, hwrpb, nbytes) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
default:
break;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
} | 263 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2209 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 2.1 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-189'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Integer signedness error in the osf_sysinfo function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted call.'}] | 2012-06-13T15:14Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Numeric Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/189.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5( osf_getsysinfo , unsigned long , op , void __user * , buffer , unsigned long , nbytes , int __user * , start , void __user * , arg) | ['osf_getsysinfo', 'long', 'op', 'buffer', 'long', 'nbytes', 'start', 'arg'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(osf_getsysinfo, unsigned long, op, void __user *, buffer,
unsigned long, nbytes, int __user *, start, void __user *, arg)
{
unsigned long w;
struct percpu_struct *cpu;
switch (op) {
case GSI_IEEE_FP_CONTROL:
/* Return current software fp control & status bits. */
/* Note that DU doesn't verify available space here. */
w = current_thread_info()->ieee_state & IEEE_SW_MASK;
w = swcr_update_status(w, rdfpcr());
if (put_user(w, (unsigned long __user *) buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case GSI_IEEE_STATE_AT_SIGNAL:
/*
* Not sure anybody will ever use this weird stuff. These
* ops can be used (under OSF/1) to set the fpcr that should
* be used when a signal handler starts executing.
*/
break;
case GSI_UACPROC:
if (nbytes < sizeof(unsigned int))
return -EINVAL;
w = (current_thread_info()->flags >> UAC_SHIFT) & UAC_BITMASK;
if (put_user(w, (unsigned int __user *)buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
case GSI_PROC_TYPE:
if (nbytes < sizeof(unsigned long))
return -EINVAL;
cpu = (struct percpu_struct*)
((char*)hwrpb + hwrpb->processor_offset);
w = cpu->type;
if (put_user(w, (unsigned long __user*)buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
case GSI_GET_HWRPB:
if (nbytes < sizeof(*hwrpb))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, hwrpb, nbytes) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
default:
break;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
} | 263 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2210 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | NONE | NONE | 2.1 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}, {'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-264'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The osf_getsysinfo function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform does not properly restrict the data size for GSI_GET_HWRPB operations, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a crafted call.'}] | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/264.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5( osf_getsysinfo , unsigned long , op , void __user * , buffer , unsigned long , nbytes , int __user * , start , void __user * , arg) | ['osf_getsysinfo', 'long', 'op', 'buffer', 'long', 'nbytes', 'start', 'arg'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(osf_getsysinfo, unsigned long, op, void __user *, buffer,
unsigned long, nbytes, int __user *, start, void __user *, arg)
{
unsigned long w;
struct percpu_struct *cpu;
switch (op) {
case GSI_IEEE_FP_CONTROL:
/* Return current software fp control & status bits. */
/* Note that DU doesn't verify available space here. */
w = current_thread_info()->ieee_state & IEEE_SW_MASK;
w = swcr_update_status(w, rdfpcr());
if (put_user(w, (unsigned long __user *) buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case GSI_IEEE_STATE_AT_SIGNAL:
/*
* Not sure anybody will ever use this weird stuff. These
* ops can be used (under OSF/1) to set the fpcr that should
* be used when a signal handler starts executing.
*/
break;
case GSI_UACPROC:
if (nbytes < sizeof(unsigned int))
return -EINVAL;
w = (current_thread_info()->flags >> UAC_SHIFT) & UAC_BITMASK;
if (put_user(w, (unsigned int __user *)buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
case GSI_PROC_TYPE:
if (nbytes < sizeof(unsigned long))
return -EINVAL;
cpu = (struct percpu_struct*)
((char*)hwrpb + hwrpb->processor_offset);
w = cpu->type;
if (put_user(w, (unsigned long __user*)buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
case GSI_GET_HWRPB:
if (nbytes < sizeof(*hwrpb))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, hwrpb, nbytes) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
default:
break;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
} | 263 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2211 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | 7.2 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'name': 'http://ftp.osuosl.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.39.4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/15/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110615 Re: CVE request: kernel: alpha: fix several security issues', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Patch']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-264'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.6.39.3', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.39:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The osf_wait4 function in arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.4 on the Alpha platform uses an incorrect pointer, which allows local users to gain privileges by writing a certain integer value to kernel memory.'}] | 2012-06-13T16:15Z | 2012-06-13T10:24Z | Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls | Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/264.html | 1 | Dan Rosenberg | 2011-06-15 15:09:01-07:00 | alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 21c5977a836e399fc710ff2c5367845ed5c2527f | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5( osf_getsysinfo , unsigned long , op , void __user * , buffer , unsigned long , nbytes , int __user * , start , void __user * , arg) | ['osf_getsysinfo', 'long', 'op', 'buffer', 'long', 'nbytes', 'start', 'arg'] | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(osf_getsysinfo, unsigned long, op, void __user *, buffer,
unsigned long, nbytes, int __user *, start, void __user *, arg)
{
unsigned long w;
struct percpu_struct *cpu;
switch (op) {
case GSI_IEEE_FP_CONTROL:
/* Return current software fp control & status bits. */
/* Note that DU doesn't verify available space here. */
w = current_thread_info()->ieee_state & IEEE_SW_MASK;
w = swcr_update_status(w, rdfpcr());
if (put_user(w, (unsigned long __user *) buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case GSI_IEEE_STATE_AT_SIGNAL:
/*
* Not sure anybody will ever use this weird stuff. These
* ops can be used (under OSF/1) to set the fpcr that should
* be used when a signal handler starts executing.
*/
break;
case GSI_UACPROC:
if (nbytes < sizeof(unsigned int))
return -EINVAL;
w = (current_thread_info()->flags >> UAC_SHIFT) & UAC_BITMASK;
if (put_user(w, (unsigned int __user *)buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
case GSI_PROC_TYPE:
if (nbytes < sizeof(unsigned long))
return -EINVAL;
cpu = (struct percpu_struct*)
((char*)hwrpb + hwrpb->processor_offset);
w = cpu->type;
if (put_user(w, (unsigned long __user*)buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
case GSI_GET_HWRPB:
if (nbytes < sizeof(*hwrpb))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, hwrpb, nbytes) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
default:
break;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
} | 263 | True | 1 |
||
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | alpha_perf_event_irq_handler | alpha_perf_event_irq_handler( unsigned long la_ptr , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['la_ptr', 'regs'] | static void alpha_perf_event_irq_handler(unsigned long la_ptr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct perf_event *event;
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
int idx, j;
__get_cpu_var(irq_pmi_count)++;
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
/* Completely counting through the PMC's period to trigger a new PMC
* overflow interrupt while in this interrupt routine is utterly
* disastrous! The EV6 and EV67 counters are sufficiently large to
* prevent this but to be really sure disable the PMCs.
*/
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_DISABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
/* la_ptr is the counter that overflowed. */
if (unlikely(la_ptr >= alpha_pmu->num_pmcs)) {
/* This should never occur! */
irq_err_count++;
pr_warning("PMI: silly index %ld\n", la_ptr);
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_ENABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
return;
}
idx = la_ptr;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
for (j = 0; j < cpuc->n_events; j++) {
if (cpuc->current_idx[j] == idx)
break;
}
if (unlikely(j == cpuc->n_events)) {
/* This can occur if the event is disabled right on a PMC overflow. */
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_ENABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
return;
}
event = cpuc->event[j];
if (unlikely(!event)) {
/* This should never occur! */
irq_err_count++;
pr_warning("PMI: No event at index %d!\n", idx);
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_ENABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
return;
}
hwc = &event->hw;
alpha_perf_event_update(event, hwc, idx, alpha_pmu->pmc_max_period[idx]+1);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (alpha_perf_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx)) {
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, regs)) {
/* Interrupts coming too quickly; "throttle" the
* counter, i.e., disable it for a little while.
*/
alpha_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
}
wrperfmon(PERFMON_CMD_ENABLE, cpuc->idx_mask);
return;
} | 282 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | armv6pmu_handle_irq | armv6pmu_handle_irq( int irq_num , void * dev) | ['irq_num', 'dev'] | armv6pmu_handle_irq(int irq_num,
void *dev)
{
unsigned long pmcr = armv6_pmcr_read();
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct pt_regs *regs;
int idx;
if (!armv6_pmcr_has_overflowed(pmcr))
return IRQ_NONE;
regs = get_irq_regs();
/*
* The interrupts are cleared by writing the overflow flags back to
* the control register. All of the other bits don't have any effect
* if they are rewritten, so write the whole value back.
*/
armv6_pmcr_write(pmcr);
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
for (idx = 0; idx <= armpmu->num_events; ++idx) {
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask))
continue;
/*
* We have a single interrupt for all counters. Check that
* each counter has overflowed before we process it.
*/
if (!armv6_pmcr_counter_has_overflowed(pmcr, idx))
continue;
hwc = &event->hw;
armpmu_event_update(event, hwc, idx, 1);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!armpmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 0, &data, regs))
armpmu->disable(hwc, idx);
}
/*
* Handle the pending perf events.
*
* Note: this call *must* be run with interrupts disabled. For
* platforms that can have the PMU interrupts raised as an NMI, this
* will not work.
*/
irq_work_run();
return IRQ_HANDLED;
} | 206 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | armv7pmu_handle_irq | armv7pmu_handle_irq( int irq_num , void * dev) | ['irq_num', 'dev'] | static irqreturn_t armv7pmu_handle_irq(int irq_num, void *dev)
{
unsigned long pmnc;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct pt_regs *regs;
int idx;
/*
* Get and reset the IRQ flags
*/
pmnc = armv7_pmnc_getreset_flags();
/*
* Did an overflow occur?
*/
if (!armv7_pmnc_has_overflowed(pmnc))
return IRQ_NONE;
/*
* Handle the counter(s) overflow(s)
*/
regs = get_irq_regs();
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
for (idx = 0; idx <= armpmu->num_events; ++idx) {
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask))
continue;
/*
* We have a single interrupt for all counters. Check that
* each counter has overflowed before we process it.
*/
if (!armv7_pmnc_counter_has_overflowed(pmnc, idx))
continue;
hwc = &event->hw;
armpmu_event_update(event, hwc, idx, 1);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!armpmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 0, &data, regs))
armpmu->disable(hwc, idx);
}
/*
* Handle the pending perf events.
*
* Note: this call *must* be run with interrupts disabled. For
* platforms that can have the PMU interrupts raised as an NMI, this
* will not work.
*/
irq_work_run();
return IRQ_HANDLED;
} | 203 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | xscale1pmu_handle_irq | xscale1pmu_handle_irq( int irq_num , void * dev) | ['irq_num', 'dev'] | xscale1pmu_handle_irq(int irq_num, void *dev)
{
unsigned long pmnc;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct pt_regs *regs;
int idx;
/*
* NOTE: there's an A stepping erratum that states if an overflow
* bit already exists and another occurs, the previous
* Overflow bit gets cleared. There's no workaround.
* Fixed in B stepping or later.
*/
pmnc = xscale1pmu_read_pmnc();
/*
* Write the value back to clear the overflow flags. Overflow
* flags remain in pmnc for use below. We also disable the PMU
* while we process the interrupt.
*/
xscale1pmu_write_pmnc(pmnc & ~XSCALE_PMU_ENABLE);
if (!(pmnc & XSCALE1_OVERFLOWED_MASK))
return IRQ_NONE;
regs = get_irq_regs();
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
for (idx = 0; idx <= armpmu->num_events; ++idx) {
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask))
continue;
if (!xscale1_pmnc_counter_has_overflowed(pmnc, idx))
continue;
hwc = &event->hw;
armpmu_event_update(event, hwc, idx, 1);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!armpmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 0, &data, regs))
armpmu->disable(hwc, idx);
}
irq_work_run();
/*
* Re-enable the PMU.
*/
pmnc = xscale1pmu_read_pmnc() | XSCALE_PMU_ENABLE;
xscale1pmu_write_pmnc(pmnc);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
} | 224 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | xscale2pmu_handle_irq | xscale2pmu_handle_irq( int irq_num , void * dev) | ['irq_num', 'dev'] | xscale2pmu_handle_irq(int irq_num, void *dev)
{
unsigned long pmnc, of_flags;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct pt_regs *regs;
int idx;
/* Disable the PMU. */
pmnc = xscale2pmu_read_pmnc();
xscale2pmu_write_pmnc(pmnc & ~XSCALE_PMU_ENABLE);
/* Check the overflow flag register. */
of_flags = xscale2pmu_read_overflow_flags();
if (!(of_flags & XSCALE2_OVERFLOWED_MASK))
return IRQ_NONE;
/* Clear the overflow bits. */
xscale2pmu_write_overflow_flags(of_flags);
regs = get_irq_regs();
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
for (idx = 0; idx <= armpmu->num_events; ++idx) {
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask))
continue;
if (!xscale2_pmnc_counter_has_overflowed(pmnc, idx))
continue;
hwc = &event->hw;
armpmu_event_update(event, hwc, idx, 1);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!armpmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 0, &data, regs))
armpmu->disable(hwc, idx);
}
irq_work_run();
/*
* Re-enable the PMU.
*/
pmnc = xscale2pmu_read_pmnc() | XSCALE_PMU_ENABLE;
xscale2pmu_write_pmnc(pmnc);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
} | 237 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | ptrace_hbptriggered | ptrace_hbptriggered( struct perf_event * bp , int unused , struct perf_sample_data * data , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['bp', 'unused', 'data', 'regs'] | static void ptrace_hbptriggered(struct perf_event *bp, int unused,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct arch_hw_breakpoint *bkpt = counter_arch_bp(bp);
long num;
int i;
siginfo_t info;
for (i = 0; i < ARM_MAX_HBP_SLOTS; ++i)
if (current->thread.debug.hbp[i] == bp)
break;
num = (i == ARM_MAX_HBP_SLOTS) ? 0 : ptrace_hbp_idx_to_num(i);
info.si_signo = SIGTRAP;
info.si_errno = (int)num;
info.si_code = TRAP_HWBKPT;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)(bkpt->trigger);
force_sig_info(SIGTRAP, &info, current);
} | 132 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | swp_handler | swp_handler( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned int instr) | ['regs', 'instr'] | static int swp_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int instr)
{
unsigned int address, destreg, data, type;
unsigned int res = 0;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, regs->ARM_pc);
if (current->pid != previous_pid) {
pr_debug("\"%s\" (%ld) uses deprecated SWP{B} instruction\n",
current->comm, (unsigned long)current->pid);
previous_pid = current->pid;
}
address = regs->uregs[EXTRACT_REG_NUM(instr, RN_OFFSET)];
data = regs->uregs[EXTRACT_REG_NUM(instr, RT2_OFFSET)];
destreg = EXTRACT_REG_NUM(instr, RT_OFFSET);
type = instr & TYPE_SWPB;
pr_debug("addr in r%d->0x%08x, dest is r%d, source in r%d->0x%08x)\n",
EXTRACT_REG_NUM(instr, RN_OFFSET), address,
destreg, EXTRACT_REG_NUM(instr, RT2_OFFSET), data);
/* Check access in reasonable access range for both SWP and SWPB */
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (address & ~3), 4)) {
pr_debug("SWP{B} emulation: access to %p not allowed!\n",
(void *)address);
res = -EFAULT;
} else {
res = emulate_swpX(address, &data, type);
}
if (res == 0) {
/*
* On successful emulation, revert the adjustment to the PC
* made in kernel/traps.c in order to resume execution at the
* instruction following the SWP{B}.
*/
regs->ARM_pc += 4;
regs->uregs[destreg] = data;
} else if (res == -EFAULT) {
/*
* Memory errors do not mean emulation failed.
* Set up signal info to return SEGV, then return OK
*/
set_segfault(regs, address);
}
return 0;
} | 237 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | do_page_fault | do_page_fault( unsigned long addr , unsigned int fsr , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['addr', 'fsr', 'regs'] | do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct *mm;
int fault, sig, code;
if (notify_page_fault(regs, fsr))
return 0;
tsk = current;
mm = tsk->mm;
/*
* If we're in an interrupt or have no user
* context, we must not take the fault..
*/
if (in_atomic() || !mm)
goto no_context;
/*
* As per x86, we may deadlock here. However, since the kernel only
* validly references user space from well defined areas of the code,
* we can bug out early if this is from code which shouldn't.
*/
if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->ARM_pc))
goto no_context;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
} else {
/*
* The above down_read_trylock() might have succeeded in
* which case, we'll have missed the might_sleep() from
* down_read()
*/
might_sleep();
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
if (!user_mode(regs) &&
!search_exception_tables(regs->ARM_pc))
goto no_context;
#endif
}
fault = __do_page_fault(mm, addr, fsr, tsk);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, addr);
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR)
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0, regs, addr);
else if (fault & VM_FAULT_MINOR)
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0, regs, addr);
/*
* Handle the "normal" case first - VM_FAULT_MAJOR / VM_FAULT_MINOR
*/
if (likely(!(fault & (VM_FAULT_ERROR | VM_FAULT_BADMAP | VM_FAULT_BADACCESS))))
return 0;
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM) {
/*
* We ran out of memory, call the OOM killer, and return to
* userspace (which will retry the fault, or kill us if we
* got oom-killed)
*/
pagefault_out_of_memory();
return 0;
}
/*
* If we are in kernel mode at this point, we
* have no context to handle this fault with.
*/
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS) {
/*
* We had some memory, but were unable to
* successfully fix up this page fault.
*/
sig = SIGBUS;
code = BUS_ADRERR;
} else {
/*
* Something tried to access memory that
* isn't in our memory map..
*/
sig = SIGSEGV;
code = fault == VM_FAULT_BADACCESS ?
SEGV_ACCERR : SEGV_MAPERR;
}
__do_user_fault(tsk, addr, fsr, sig, code, regs);
return 0;
no_context:
__do_kernel_fault(mm, addr, fsr, regs);
return 0;
} | 321 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | handle_associated_event | handle_associated_event( struct cpu_hw_events * cpuc , int idx , struct perf_sample_data * data , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['cpuc', 'idx', 'data', 'regs'] | handle_associated_event(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,
int idx, struct perf_sample_data *data, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
mipspmu_event_update(event, hwc, idx);
data->period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!mipspmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
return;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 0, data, regs))
mipspmu->disable_event(idx);
} | 97 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | simulate_llsc | simulate_llsc( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned int opcode) | ['regs', 'opcode'] | static int simulate_llsc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int opcode)
{
if ((opcode & OPCODE) == LL) {
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS,
1, 0, regs, 0);
return simulate_ll(regs, opcode);
}
if ((opcode & OPCODE) == SC) {
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS,
1, 0, regs, 0);
return simulate_sc(regs, opcode);
}
return -1; /* Must be something else ... */
} | 83 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | simulate_rdhwr | simulate_rdhwr( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned int opcode) | ['regs', 'opcode'] | static int simulate_rdhwr(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int opcode)
{
struct thread_info *ti = task_thread_info(current);
if ((opcode & OPCODE) == SPEC3 && (opcode & FUNC) == RDHWR) {
int rd = (opcode & RD) >> 11;
int rt = (opcode & RT) >> 16;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS,
1, 0, regs, 0);
switch (rd) {
case 0: /* CPU number */
regs->regs[rt] = smp_processor_id();
return 0;
case 1: /* SYNCI length */
regs->regs[rt] = min(current_cpu_data.dcache.linesz,
current_cpu_data.icache.linesz);
return 0;
case 2: /* Read count register */
regs->regs[rt] = read_c0_count();
return 0;
case 3: /* Count register resolution */
switch (current_cpu_data.cputype) {
case CPU_20KC:
case CPU_25KF:
regs->regs[rt] = 1;
break;
default:
regs->regs[rt] = 2;
}
return 0;
case 29:
regs->regs[rt] = ti->tp_value;
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
}
/* Not ours. */
return -1;
} | 217 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | simulate_sync | simulate_sync( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned int opcode) | ['regs', 'opcode'] | static int simulate_sync(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int opcode)
{
if ((opcode & OPCODE) == SPEC0 && (opcode & FUNC) == SYNC) {
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS,
1, 0, regs, 0);
return 0;
}
return -1; /* Must be something else ... */
} | 53 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | do_ade | do_ade( struct pt_regs * regs) | ['regs'] | asmlinkage void do_ade(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int __user *pc;
mm_segment_t seg;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS,
1, 0, regs, regs->cp0_badvaddr);
/*
* Did we catch a fault trying to load an instruction?
* Or are we running in MIPS16 mode?
*/
if ((regs->cp0_badvaddr == regs->cp0_epc) || (regs->cp0_epc & 0x1))
goto sigbus;
pc = (unsigned int __user *) exception_epc(regs);
if (user_mode(regs) && !test_thread_flag(TIF_FIXADE))
goto sigbus;
if (unaligned_action == UNALIGNED_ACTION_SIGNAL)
goto sigbus;
else if (unaligned_action == UNALIGNED_ACTION_SHOW)
show_registers(regs);
/*
* Do branch emulation only if we didn't forward the exception.
* This is all so but ugly ...
*/
seg = get_fs();
if (!user_mode(regs))
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
emulate_load_store_insn(regs, (void __user *)regs->cp0_badvaddr, pc);
set_fs(seg);
return;
sigbus:
die_if_kernel("Kernel unaligned instruction access", regs);
force_sig(SIGBUS, current);
/*
* XXX On return from the signal handler we should advance the epc
*/
} | 164 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | emulate_load_store_insn | emulate_load_store_insn( struct pt_regs * regs , void __user * addr , unsigned int __user * pc) | ['regs', 'addr', 'pc'] | static void emulate_load_store_insn(struct pt_regs *regs,
void __user *addr, unsigned int __user *pc)
{
union mips_instruction insn;
unsigned long value;
unsigned int res;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS,
1, 0, regs, 0);
/*
* This load never faults.
*/
__get_user(insn.word, pc);
switch (insn.i_format.opcode) {
/*
* These are instructions that a compiler doesn't generate. We
* can assume therefore that the code is MIPS-aware and
* really buggy. Emulating these instructions would break the
* semantics anyway.
*/
case ll_op:
case lld_op:
case sc_op:
case scd_op:
/*
* For these instructions the only way to create an address
* error is an attempted access to kernel/supervisor address
* space.
*/
case ldl_op:
case ldr_op:
case lwl_op:
case lwr_op:
case sdl_op:
case sdr_op:
case swl_op:
case swr_op:
case lb_op:
case lbu_op:
case sb_op:
goto sigbus;
/*
* The remaining opcodes are the ones that are really of interest.
*/
case lh_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 2))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (".set\tnoat\n"
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tlb\t%0, 0(%2)\n"
"2:\tlbu\t$1, 1(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tlb\t%0, 1(%2)\n"
"2:\tlbu\t$1, 0(%2)\n\t"
#endif
"sll\t%0, 0x8\n\t"
"or\t%0, $1\n\t"
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.set\tat\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
case lw_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 4))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tlwl\t%0, (%2)\n"
"2:\tlwr\t%0, 3(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tlwl\t%0, 3(%2)\n"
"2:\tlwr\t%0, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
case lhu_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 2))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (
".set\tnoat\n"
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tlbu\t%0, 0(%2)\n"
"2:\tlbu\t$1, 1(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tlbu\t%0, 1(%2)\n"
"2:\tlbu\t$1, 0(%2)\n\t"
#endif
"sll\t%0, 0x8\n\t"
"or\t%0, $1\n\t"
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.set\tat\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
case lwu_op:
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
/*
* A 32-bit kernel might be running on a 64-bit processor. But
* if we're on a 32-bit processor and an i-cache incoherency
* or race makes us see a 64-bit instruction here the sdl/sdr
* would blow up, so for now we don't handle unaligned 64-bit
* instructions on 32-bit kernels.
*/
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 4))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tlwl\t%0, (%2)\n"
"2:\tlwr\t%0, 3(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tlwl\t%0, 3(%2)\n"
"2:\tlwr\t%0, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"dsll\t%0, %0, 32\n\t"
"dsrl\t%0, %0, 32\n\t"
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
/* Cannot handle 64-bit instructions in 32-bit kernel */
goto sigill;
case ld_op:
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
/*
* A 32-bit kernel might be running on a 64-bit processor. But
* if we're on a 32-bit processor and an i-cache incoherency
* or race makes us see a 64-bit instruction here the sdl/sdr
* would blow up, so for now we don't handle unaligned 64-bit
* instructions on 32-bit kernels.
*/
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, 8))
goto sigbus;
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tldl\t%0, (%2)\n"
"2:\tldr\t%0, 7(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tldl\t%0, 7(%2)\n"
"2:\tldr\t%0, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%1, 0\n"
"3:\t.section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%1, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=&r" (value), "=r" (res)
: "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt] = value;
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
/* Cannot handle 64-bit instructions in 32-bit kernel */
goto sigill;
case sh_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, 2))
goto sigbus;
value = regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt];
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
".set\tnoat\n"
"1:\tsb\t%1, 1(%2)\n\t"
"srl\t$1, %1, 0x8\n"
"2:\tsb\t$1, 0(%2)\n\t"
".set\tat\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
".set\tnoat\n"
"1:\tsb\t%1, 0(%2)\n\t"
"srl\t$1,%1, 0x8\n"
"2:\tsb\t$1, 1(%2)\n\t"
".set\tat\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%0, 0\n"
"3:\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%0, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=r" (res)
: "r" (value), "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
break;
case sw_op:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, 4))
goto sigbus;
value = regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt];
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tswl\t%1,(%2)\n"
"2:\tswr\t%1, 3(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tswl\t%1, 3(%2)\n"
"2:\tswr\t%1, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%0, 0\n"
"3:\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%0, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=r" (res)
: "r" (value), "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
break;
case sd_op:
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
/*
* A 32-bit kernel might be running on a 64-bit processor. But
* if we're on a 32-bit processor and an i-cache incoherency
* or race makes us see a 64-bit instruction here the sdl/sdr
* would blow up, so for now we don't handle unaligned 64-bit
* instructions on 32-bit kernels.
*/
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, 8))
goto sigbus;
value = regs->regs[insn.i_format.rt];
__asm__ __volatile__ (
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
"1:\tsdl\t%1,(%2)\n"
"2:\tsdr\t%1, 7(%2)\n\t"
#endif
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
"1:\tsdl\t%1, 7(%2)\n"
"2:\tsdr\t%1, (%2)\n\t"
#endif
"li\t%0, 0\n"
"3:\n\t"
".section\t.fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"
"4:\tli\t%0, %3\n\t"
"j\t3b\n\t"
".previous\n\t"
".section\t__ex_table,\"a\"\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t1b, 4b\n\t"
STR(PTR)"\t2b, 4b\n\t"
".previous"
: "=r" (res)
: "r" (value), "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT));
if (res)
goto fault;
compute_return_epc(regs);
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
/* Cannot handle 64-bit instructions in 32-bit kernel */
goto sigill;
case lwc1_op:
case ldc1_op:
case swc1_op:
case sdc1_op:
/*
* I herewith declare: this does not happen. So send SIGBUS.
*/
goto sigbus;
/*
* COP2 is available to implementor for application specific use.
* It's up to applications to register a notifier chain and do
* whatever they have to do, including possible sending of signals.
*/
case lwc2_op:
cu2_notifier_call_chain(CU2_LWC2_OP, regs);
break;
case ldc2_op:
cu2_notifier_call_chain(CU2_LDC2_OP, regs);
break;
case swc2_op:
cu2_notifier_call_chain(CU2_SWC2_OP, regs);
break;
case sdc2_op:
cu2_notifier_call_chain(CU2_SDC2_OP, regs);
break;
default:
/*
* Pheeee... We encountered an yet unknown instruction or
* cache coherence problem. Die sucker, die ...
*/
goto sigill;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
unaligned_instructions++;
#endif
return;
fault:
/* Did we have an exception handler installed? */
if (fixup_exception(regs))
return;
die_if_kernel("Unhandled kernel unaligned access", regs);
force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
return;
sigbus:
die_if_kernel("Unhandled kernel unaligned access", regs);
force_sig(SIGBUS, current);
return;
sigill:
die_if_kernel("Unhandled kernel unaligned access or invalid instruction", regs);
force_sig(SIGILL, current);
} | 1010 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | cop1Emulate | cop1Emulate( struct pt_regs * xcp , struct mips_fpu_struct * ctx , void * __user * fault_addr) | ['xcp', 'ctx', 'fault_addr'] | static int cop1Emulate(struct pt_regs *xcp, struct mips_fpu_struct *ctx,
void *__user *fault_addr)
{
mips_instruction ir;
unsigned long emulpc, contpc;
unsigned int cond;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, xcp->cp0_epc, sizeof(mips_instruction))) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = (mips_instruction __user *)xcp->cp0_epc;
return SIGBUS;
}
if (__get_user(ir, (mips_instruction __user *) xcp->cp0_epc)) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = (mips_instruction __user *)xcp->cp0_epc;
return SIGSEGV;
}
/* XXX NEC Vr54xx bug workaround */
if ((xcp->cp0_cause & CAUSEF_BD) && !isBranchInstr(&ir))
xcp->cp0_cause &= ~CAUSEF_BD;
if (xcp->cp0_cause & CAUSEF_BD) {
/*
* The instruction to be emulated is in a branch delay slot
* which means that we have to emulate the branch instruction
* BEFORE we do the cop1 instruction.
*
* This branch could be a COP1 branch, but in that case we
* would have had a trap for that instruction, and would not
* come through this route.
*
* Linux MIPS branch emulator operates on context, updating the
* cp0_epc.
*/
emulpc = xcp->cp0_epc + 4; /* Snapshot emulation target */
if (__compute_return_epc(xcp)) {
#ifdef CP1DBG
printk("failed to emulate branch at %p\n",
(void *) (xcp->cp0_epc));
#endif
return SIGILL;
}
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, emulpc, sizeof(mips_instruction))) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = (mips_instruction __user *)emulpc;
return SIGBUS;
}
if (__get_user(ir, (mips_instruction __user *) emulpc)) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = (mips_instruction __user *)emulpc;
return SIGSEGV;
}
/* __compute_return_epc() will have updated cp0_epc */
contpc = xcp->cp0_epc;
/* In order not to confuse ptrace() et al, tweak context */
xcp->cp0_epc = emulpc - 4;
} else {
emulpc = xcp->cp0_epc;
contpc = xcp->cp0_epc + 4;
}
emul:
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS,
1, 0, xcp, 0);
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(emulated);
switch (MIPSInst_OPCODE(ir)) {
case ldc1_op:{
u64 __user *va = (u64 __user *) (xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RS(ir)] +
MIPSInst_SIMM(ir));
u64 val;
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(loads);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, va, sizeof(u64))) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGBUS;
}
if (__get_user(val, va)) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGSEGV;
}
DITOREG(val, MIPSInst_RT(ir));
break;
}
case sdc1_op:{
u64 __user *va = (u64 __user *) (xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RS(ir)] +
MIPSInst_SIMM(ir));
u64 val;
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(stores);
DIFROMREG(val, MIPSInst_RT(ir));
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, va, sizeof(u64))) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGBUS;
}
if (__put_user(val, va)) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGSEGV;
}
break;
}
case lwc1_op:{
u32 __user *va = (u32 __user *) (xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RS(ir)] +
MIPSInst_SIMM(ir));
u32 val;
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(loads);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, va, sizeof(u32))) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGBUS;
}
if (__get_user(val, va)) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGSEGV;
}
SITOREG(val, MIPSInst_RT(ir));
break;
}
case swc1_op:{
u32 __user *va = (u32 __user *) (xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RS(ir)] +
MIPSInst_SIMM(ir));
u32 val;
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(stores);
SIFROMREG(val, MIPSInst_RT(ir));
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, va, sizeof(u32))) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGBUS;
}
if (__put_user(val, va)) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = va;
return SIGSEGV;
}
break;
}
case cop1_op:
switch (MIPSInst_RS(ir)) {
#if defined(__mips64)
case dmfc_op:
/* copregister fs -> gpr[rt] */
if (MIPSInst_RT(ir) != 0) {
DIFROMREG(xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RT(ir)],
MIPSInst_RD(ir));
}
break;
case dmtc_op:
/* copregister fs <- rt */
DITOREG(xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RT(ir)], MIPSInst_RD(ir));
break;
#endif
case mfc_op:
/* copregister rd -> gpr[rt] */
if (MIPSInst_RT(ir) != 0) {
SIFROMREG(xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RT(ir)],
MIPSInst_RD(ir));
}
break;
case mtc_op:
/* copregister rd <- rt */
SITOREG(xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RT(ir)], MIPSInst_RD(ir));
break;
case cfc_op:{
/* cop control register rd -> gpr[rt] */
u32 value;
if (MIPSInst_RD(ir) == FPCREG_CSR) {
value = ctx->fcr31;
value = (value & ~FPU_CSR_RM) |
mips_rm[modeindex(value)];
#ifdef CSRTRACE
printk("%p gpr[%d]<-csr=%08x\n",
(void *) (xcp->cp0_epc),
MIPSInst_RT(ir), value);
#endif
}
else if (MIPSInst_RD(ir) == FPCREG_RID)
value = 0;
else
value = 0;
if (MIPSInst_RT(ir))
xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RT(ir)] = value;
break;
}
case ctc_op:{
/* copregister rd <- rt */
u32 value;
if (MIPSInst_RT(ir) == 0)
value = 0;
else
value = xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RT(ir)];
/* we only have one writable control reg
*/
if (MIPSInst_RD(ir) == FPCREG_CSR) {
#ifdef CSRTRACE
printk("%p gpr[%d]->csr=%08x\n",
(void *) (xcp->cp0_epc),
MIPSInst_RT(ir), value);
#endif
/*
* Don't write reserved bits,
* and convert to ieee library modes
*/
ctx->fcr31 = (value &
~(FPU_CSR_RSVD | FPU_CSR_RM)) |
ieee_rm[modeindex(value)];
}
if ((ctx->fcr31 >> 5) & ctx->fcr31 & FPU_CSR_ALL_E) {
return SIGFPE;
}
break;
}
case bc_op:{
int likely = 0;
if (xcp->cp0_cause & CAUSEF_BD)
return SIGILL;
#if __mips >= 4
cond = ctx->fcr31 & fpucondbit[MIPSInst_RT(ir) >> 2];
#else
cond = ctx->fcr31 & FPU_CSR_COND;
#endif
switch (MIPSInst_RT(ir) & 3) {
case bcfl_op:
likely = 1;
case bcf_op:
cond = !cond;
break;
case bctl_op:
likely = 1;
case bct_op:
break;
default:
/* thats an illegal instruction */
return SIGILL;
}
xcp->cp0_cause |= CAUSEF_BD;
if (cond) {
/* branch taken: emulate dslot
* instruction
*/
xcp->cp0_epc += 4;
contpc = (xcp->cp0_epc +
(MIPSInst_SIMM(ir) << 2));
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, xcp->cp0_epc,
sizeof(mips_instruction))) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = (mips_instruction __user *)xcp->cp0_epc;
return SIGBUS;
}
if (__get_user(ir,
(mips_instruction __user *) xcp->cp0_epc)) {
MIPS_FPU_EMU_INC_STATS(errors);
*fault_addr = (mips_instruction __user *)xcp->cp0_epc;
return SIGSEGV;
}
switch (MIPSInst_OPCODE(ir)) {
case lwc1_op:
case swc1_op:
#if (__mips >= 2 || defined(__mips64))
case ldc1_op:
case sdc1_op:
#endif
case cop1_op:
#if __mips >= 4 && __mips != 32
case cop1x_op:
#endif
/* its one of ours */
goto emul;
#if __mips >= 4
case spec_op:
if (MIPSInst_FUNC(ir) == movc_op)
goto emul;
break;
#endif
}
/*
* Single step the non-cp1
* instruction in the dslot
*/
return mips_dsemul(xcp, ir, contpc);
}
else {
/* branch not taken */
if (likely) {
/*
* branch likely nullifies
* dslot if not taken
*/
xcp->cp0_epc += 4;
contpc += 4;
/*
* else continue & execute
* dslot as normal insn
*/
}
}
break;
}
default:
if (!(MIPSInst_RS(ir) & 0x10))
return SIGILL;
{
int sig;
/* a real fpu computation instruction */
if ((sig = fpu_emu(xcp, ctx, ir)))
return sig;
}
}
break;
#if __mips >= 4 && __mips != 32
case cop1x_op:{
int sig = fpux_emu(xcp, ctx, ir, fault_addr);
if (sig)
return sig;
break;
}
#endif
#if __mips >= 4
case spec_op:
if (MIPSInst_FUNC(ir) != movc_op)
return SIGILL;
cond = fpucondbit[MIPSInst_RT(ir) >> 2];
if (((ctx->fcr31 & cond) != 0) == ((MIPSInst_RT(ir) & 1) != 0))
xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RD(ir)] =
xcp->regs[MIPSInst_RS(ir)];
break;
#endif
default:
return SIGILL;
}
/* we did it !! */
xcp->cp0_epc = contpc;
xcp->cp0_cause &= ~CAUSEF_BD;
return 0;
} | 1522 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | do_page_fault | do_page_fault( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned long write , unsigned long address) | ['regs', 'write', 'address'] | asmlinkage void __kprobes do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long write,
unsigned long address)
{
struct vm_area_struct * vma = NULL;
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
const int field = sizeof(unsigned long) * 2;
siginfo_t info;
int fault;
#if 0
printk("Cpu%d[%s:%d:%0*lx:%ld:%0*lx]\n", raw_smp_processor_id(),
current->comm, current->pid, field, address, write,
field, regs->cp0_epc);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
/*
* This is to notify the fault handler of the kprobes. The
* exception code is redundant as it is also carried in REGS,
* but we pass it anyhow.
*/
if (notify_die(DIE_PAGE_FAULT, "page fault", regs, -1,
(regs->cp0_cause >> 2) & 0x1f, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
return;
#endif
info.si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
/*
* We fault-in kernel-space virtual memory on-demand. The
* 'reference' page table is init_mm.pgd.
*
* NOTE! We MUST NOT take any locks for this case. We may
* be in an interrupt or a critical region, and should
* only copy the information from the master page table,
* nothing more.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
# define VMALLOC_FAULT_TARGET no_context
#else
# define VMALLOC_FAULT_TARGET vmalloc_fault
#endif
if (unlikely(address >= VMALLOC_START && address <= VMALLOC_END))
goto VMALLOC_FAULT_TARGET;
#ifdef MODULE_START
if (unlikely(address >= MODULE_START && address < MODULE_END))
goto VMALLOC_FAULT_TARGET;
#endif
/*
* If we're in an interrupt or have no user
* context, we must not take the fault..
*/
if (in_atomic() || !mm)
goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto bad_area;
if (vma->vm_start <= address)
goto good_area;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto bad_area;
if (expand_stack(vma, address))
goto bad_area;
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
good_area:
info.si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
if (write) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
goto bad_area;
} else {
if (kernel_uses_smartmips_rixi) {
if (address == regs->cp0_epc && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
#if 0
pr_notice("Cpu%d[%s:%d:%0*lx:%ld:%0*lx] XI violation\n",
raw_smp_processor_id(),
current->comm, current->pid,
field, address, write,
field, regs->cp0_epc);
#endif
goto bad_area;
}
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_READ)) {
#if 0
pr_notice("Cpu%d[%s:%d:%0*lx:%ld:%0*lx] RI violation\n",
raw_smp_processor_id(),
current->comm, current->pid,
field, address, write,
field, regs->cp0_epc);
#endif
goto bad_area;
}
} else {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)))
goto bad_area;
}
}
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault.
*/
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, write ? FAULT_FLAG_WRITE : 0);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM)
goto out_of_memory;
else if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS)
goto do_sigbus;
BUG();
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ,
1, 0, regs, address);
tsk->maj_flt++;
} else {
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN,
1, 0, regs, address);
tsk->min_flt++;
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return;
/*
* Something tried to access memory that isn't in our memory map..
* Fix it, but check if it's kernel or user first..
*/
bad_area:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
bad_area_nosemaphore:
/* User mode accesses just cause a SIGSEGV */
if (user_mode(regs)) {
tsk->thread.cp0_badvaddr = address;
tsk->thread.error_code = write;
#if 0
printk("do_page_fault() #2: sending SIGSEGV to %s for "
"invalid %s\n%0*lx (epc == %0*lx, ra == %0*lx)\n",
tsk->comm,
write ? "write access to" : "read access from",
field, address,
field, (unsigned long) regs->cp0_epc,
field, (unsigned long) regs->regs[31]);
#endif
info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
info.si_errno = 0;
/* info.si_code has been set above */
info.si_addr = (void __user *) address;
force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, &info, tsk);
return;
}
no_context:
/* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault? */
if (fixup_exception(regs)) {
current->thread.cp0_baduaddr = address;
return;
}
/*
* Oops. The kernel tried to access some bad page. We'll have to
* terminate things with extreme prejudice.
*/
bust_spinlocks(1);
printk(KERN_ALERT "CPU %d Unable to handle kernel paging request at "
"virtual address %0*lx, epc == %0*lx, ra == %0*lx\n",
raw_smp_processor_id(), field, address, field, regs->cp0_epc,
field, regs->regs[31]);
die("Oops", regs);
out_of_memory:
/*
* We ran out of memory, call the OOM killer, and return the userspace
* (which will retry the fault, or kill us if we got oom-killed).
*/
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
pagefault_out_of_memory();
return;
do_sigbus:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die */
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
else
/*
* Send a sigbus, regardless of whether we were in kernel
* or user mode.
*/
#if 0
printk("do_page_fault() #3: sending SIGBUS to %s for "
"invalid %s\n%0*lx (epc == %0*lx, ra == %0*lx)\n",
tsk->comm,
write ? "write access to" : "read access from",
field, address,
field, (unsigned long) regs->cp0_epc,
field, (unsigned long) regs->regs[31]);
#endif
tsk->thread.cp0_badvaddr = address;
info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = BUS_ADRERR;
info.si_addr = (void __user *) address;
force_sig_info(SIGBUS, &info, tsk);
return;
#ifndef CONFIG_64BIT
vmalloc_fault:
{
/*
* Synchronize this task's top level page-table
* with the 'reference' page table.
*
* Do _not_ use "tsk" here. We might be inside
* an interrupt in the middle of a task switch..
*/
int offset = __pgd_offset(address);
pgd_t *pgd, *pgd_k;
pud_t *pud, *pud_k;
pmd_t *pmd, *pmd_k;
pte_t *pte_k;
pgd = (pgd_t *) pgd_current[raw_smp_processor_id()] + offset;
pgd_k = init_mm.pgd + offset;
if (!pgd_present(*pgd_k))
goto no_context;
set_pgd(pgd, *pgd_k);
pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
pud_k = pud_offset(pgd_k, address);
if (!pud_present(*pud_k))
goto no_context;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
pmd_k = pmd_offset(pud_k, address);
if (!pmd_present(*pmd_k))
goto no_context;
set_pmd(pmd, *pmd_k);
pte_k = pte_offset_kernel(pmd_k, address);
if (!pte_present(*pte_k))
goto no_context;
return;
}
#endif
} | 986 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | perf_event_interrupt | perf_event_interrupt( struct pt_regs * regs) | ['regs'] | static void perf_event_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int i;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct perf_event *event;
unsigned long val;
int found = 0;
int nmi;
if (cpuhw->n_limited)
freeze_limited_counters(cpuhw, mfspr(SPRN_PMC5),
mfspr(SPRN_PMC6));
perf_read_regs(regs);
nmi = perf_intr_is_nmi(regs);
if (nmi)
nmi_enter();
else
irq_enter();
for (i = 0; i < cpuhw->n_events; ++i) {
event = cpuhw->event[i];
if (!event->hw.idx || is_limited_pmc(event->hw.idx))
continue;
val = read_pmc(event->hw.idx);
if ((int)val < 0) {
/* event has overflowed */
found = 1;
record_and_restart(event, val, regs, nmi);
}
}
/*
* In case we didn't find and reset the event that caused
* the interrupt, scan all events and reset any that are
* negative, to avoid getting continual interrupts.
* Any that we processed in the previous loop will not be negative.
*/
if (!found) {
for (i = 0; i < ppmu->n_counter; ++i) {
if (is_limited_pmc(i + 1))
continue;
val = read_pmc(i + 1);
if (pmc_overflow(val))
write_pmc(i + 1, 0);
}
}
/*
* Reset MMCR0 to its normal value. This will set PMXE and
* clear FC (freeze counters) and PMAO (perf mon alert occurred)
* and thus allow interrupts to occur again.
* XXX might want to use MSR.PM to keep the events frozen until
* we get back out of this interrupt.
*/
write_mmcr0(cpuhw, cpuhw->mmcr[0]);
if (nmi)
nmi_exit();
else
irq_exit();
} | 254 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | record_and_restart | record_and_restart( struct perf_event * event , unsigned long val , struct pt_regs * regs , int nmi) | ['event', 'val', 'regs', 'nmi'] | static void record_and_restart(struct perf_event *event, unsigned long val,
struct pt_regs *regs, int nmi)
{
u64 period = event->hw.sample_period;
s64 prev, delta, left;
int record = 0;
if (event->hw.state & PERF_HES_STOPPED) {
write_pmc(event->hw.idx, 0);
return;
}
/* we don't have to worry about interrupts here */
prev = local64_read(&event->hw.prev_count);
delta = check_and_compute_delta(prev, val);
local64_add(delta, &event->count);
/*
* See if the total period for this event has expired,
* and update for the next period.
*/
val = 0;
left = local64_read(&event->hw.period_left) - delta;
if (period) {
if (left <= 0) {
left += period;
if (left <= 0)
left = period;
record = 1;
event->hw.last_period = event->hw.sample_period;
}
if (left < 0x80000000LL)
val = 0x80000000LL - left;
}
write_pmc(event->hw.idx, val);
local64_set(&event->hw.prev_count, val);
local64_set(&event->hw.period_left, left);
perf_event_update_userpage(event);
/*
* Finally record data if requested.
*/
if (record) {
struct perf_sample_data data;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, ~0ULL);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR)
perf_get_data_addr(regs, &data.addr);
if (perf_event_overflow(event, nmi, &data, regs))
power_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
} | 281 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | perf_event_interrupt | perf_event_interrupt( struct pt_regs * regs) | ['regs'] | static void perf_event_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int i;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct perf_event *event;
unsigned long val;
int found = 0;
int nmi;
nmi = perf_intr_is_nmi(regs);
if (nmi)
nmi_enter();
else
irq_enter();
for (i = 0; i < ppmu->n_counter; ++i) {
event = cpuhw->event[i];
val = read_pmc(i);
if ((int)val < 0) {
if (event) {
/* event has overflowed */
found = 1;
record_and_restart(event, val, regs, nmi);
} else {
/*
* Disabled counter is negative,
* reset it just in case.
*/
write_pmc(i, 0);
}
}
}
/* PMM will keep counters frozen until we return from the interrupt. */
mtmsr(mfmsr() | MSR_PMM);
mtpmr(PMRN_PMGC0, PMGC0_PMIE | PMGC0_FCECE);
isync();
if (nmi)
nmi_exit();
else
irq_exit();
} | 170 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | record_and_restart | record_and_restart( struct perf_event * event , unsigned long val , struct pt_regs * regs , int nmi) | ['event', 'val', 'regs', 'nmi'] | static void record_and_restart(struct perf_event *event, unsigned long val,
struct pt_regs *regs, int nmi)
{
u64 period = event->hw.sample_period;
s64 prev, delta, left;
int record = 0;
if (event->hw.state & PERF_HES_STOPPED) {
write_pmc(event->hw.idx, 0);
return;
}
/* we don't have to worry about interrupts here */
prev = local64_read(&event->hw.prev_count);
delta = (val - prev) & 0xfffffffful;
local64_add(delta, &event->count);
/*
* See if the total period for this event has expired,
* and update for the next period.
*/
val = 0;
left = local64_read(&event->hw.period_left) - delta;
if (period) {
if (left <= 0) {
left += period;
if (left <= 0)
left = period;
record = 1;
event->hw.last_period = event->hw.sample_period;
}
if (left < 0x80000000LL)
val = 0x80000000LL - left;
}
write_pmc(event->hw.idx, val);
local64_set(&event->hw.prev_count, val);
local64_set(&event->hw.period_left, left);
perf_event_update_userpage(event);
/*
* Finally record data if requested.
*/
if (record) {
struct perf_sample_data data;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, nmi, &data, regs))
fsl_emb_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
} | 262 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | ptrace_triggered | ptrace_triggered( struct perf_event * bp , int nmi , struct perf_sample_data * data , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['bp', 'nmi', 'data', 'regs'] | void ptrace_triggered(struct perf_event *bp, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_event_attr attr;
/*
* Disable the breakpoint request here since ptrace has defined a
* one-shot behaviour for breakpoint exceptions in PPC64.
* The SIGTRAP signal is generated automatically for us in do_dabr().
* We don't have to do anything about that here
*/
attr = bp->attr;
attr.disabled = true;
modify_user_hw_breakpoint(bp, &attr);
} | 46 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | do_page_fault | do_page_fault( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned long address , unsigned long error_code) | ['regs', 'address', 'error_code'] | int __kprobes do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
unsigned long error_code)
{
struct vm_area_struct * vma;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
siginfo_t info;
int code = SEGV_MAPERR;
int is_write = 0, ret;
int trap = TRAP(regs);
int is_exec = trap == 0x400;
#if !(defined(CONFIG_4xx) || defined(CONFIG_BOOKE))
/*
* Fortunately the bit assignments in SRR1 for an instruction
* fault and DSISR for a data fault are mostly the same for the
* bits we are interested in. But there are some bits which
* indicate errors in DSISR but can validly be set in SRR1.
*/
if (trap == 0x400)
error_code &= 0x48200000;
else
is_write = error_code & DSISR_ISSTORE;
#else
is_write = error_code & ESR_DST;
#endif /* CONFIG_4xx || CONFIG_BOOKE */
if (notify_page_fault(regs))
return 0;
if (unlikely(debugger_fault_handler(regs)))
return 0;
/* On a kernel SLB miss we can only check for a valid exception entry */
if (!user_mode(regs) && (address >= TASK_SIZE))
return SIGSEGV;
#if !(defined(CONFIG_4xx) || defined(CONFIG_BOOKE) || \
defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64))
if (error_code & DSISR_DABRMATCH) {
/* DABR match */
do_dabr(regs, address, error_code);
return 0;
}
#endif
if (in_atomic() || mm == NULL) {
if (!user_mode(regs))
return SIGSEGV;
/* in_atomic() in user mode is really bad,
as is current->mm == NULL. */
printk(KERN_EMERG "Page fault in user mode with "
"in_atomic() = %d mm = %p\n", in_atomic(), mm);
printk(KERN_EMERG "NIP = %lx MSR = %lx\n",
regs->nip, regs->msr);
die("Weird page fault", regs, SIGSEGV);
}
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
/* When running in the kernel we expect faults to occur only to
* addresses in user space. All other faults represent errors in the
* kernel and should generate an OOPS. Unfortunately, in the case of an
* erroneous fault occurring in a code path which already holds mmap_sem
* we will deadlock attempting to validate the fault against the
* address space. Luckily the kernel only validly references user
* space from well defined areas of code, which are listed in the
* exceptions table.
*
* As the vast majority of faults will be valid we will only perform
* the source reference check when there is a possibility of a deadlock.
* Attempt to lock the address space, if we cannot we then validate the
* source. If this is invalid we can skip the address space check,
* thus avoiding the deadlock.
*/
if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
if (!user_mode(regs) && !search_exception_tables(regs->nip))
goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto bad_area;
if (vma->vm_start <= address)
goto good_area;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto bad_area;
/*
* N.B. The POWER/Open ABI allows programs to access up to
* 288 bytes below the stack pointer.
* The kernel signal delivery code writes up to about 1.5kB
* below the stack pointer (r1) before decrementing it.
* The exec code can write slightly over 640kB to the stack
* before setting the user r1. Thus we allow the stack to
* expand to 1MB without further checks.
*/
if (address + 0x100000 < vma->vm_end) {
/* get user regs even if this fault is in kernel mode */
struct pt_regs *uregs = current->thread.regs;
if (uregs == NULL)
goto bad_area;
/*
* A user-mode access to an address a long way below
* the stack pointer is only valid if the instruction
* is one which would update the stack pointer to the
* address accessed if the instruction completed,
* i.e. either stwu rs,n(r1) or stwux rs,r1,rb
* (or the byte, halfword, float or double forms).
*
* If we don't check this then any write to the area
* between the last mapped region and the stack will
* expand the stack rather than segfaulting.
*/
if (address + 2048 < uregs->gpr[1]
&& (!user_mode(regs) || !store_updates_sp(regs)))
goto bad_area;
}
if (expand_stack(vma, address))
goto bad_area;
good_area:
code = SEGV_ACCERR;
#if defined(CONFIG_6xx)
if (error_code & 0x95700000)
/* an error such as lwarx to I/O controller space,
address matching DABR, eciwx, etc. */
goto bad_area;
#endif /* CONFIG_6xx */
#if defined(CONFIG_8xx)
/* 8xx sometimes need to load a invalid/non-present TLBs.
* These must be invalidated separately as linux mm don't.
*/
if (error_code & 0x40000000) /* no translation? */
_tlbil_va(address, 0, 0, 0);
/* The MPC8xx seems to always set 0x80000000, which is
* "undefined". Of those that can be set, this is the only
* one which seems bad.
*/
if (error_code & 0x10000000)
/* Guarded storage error. */
goto bad_area;
#endif /* CONFIG_8xx */
if (is_exec) {
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU
/* Protection fault on exec go straight to failure on
* Hash based MMUs as they either don't support per-page
* execute permission, or if they do, it's handled already
* at the hash level. This test would probably have to
* be removed if we change the way this works to make hash
* processors use the same I/D cache coherency mechanism
* as embedded.
*/
if (error_code & DSISR_PROTFAULT)
goto bad_area;
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU */
/*
* Allow execution from readable areas if the MMU does not
* provide separate controls over reading and executing.
*
* Note: That code used to not be enabled for 4xx/BookE.
* It is now as I/D cache coherency for these is done at
* set_pte_at() time and I see no reason why the test
* below wouldn't be valid on those processors. This -may-
* break programs compiled with a really old ABI though.
*/
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) &&
(cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_NOEXECUTE) ||
!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE))))
goto bad_area;
/* a write */
} else if (is_write) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
goto bad_area;
/* a read */
} else {
/* protection fault */
if (error_code & 0x08000000)
goto bad_area;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_WRITE)))
goto bad_area;
}
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault.
*/
ret = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, is_write ? FAULT_FLAG_WRITE : 0);
if (unlikely(ret & VM_FAULT_ERROR)) {
if (ret & VM_FAULT_OOM)
goto out_of_memory;
else if (ret & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS)
goto do_sigbus;
BUG();
}
if (ret & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
current->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0,
regs, address);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SMLPAR
if (firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_CMO)) {
preempt_disable();
get_lppaca()->page_ins += (1 << PAGE_FACTOR);
preempt_enable();
}
#endif
} else {
current->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return 0;
bad_area:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
bad_area_nosemaphore:
/* User mode accesses cause a SIGSEGV */
if (user_mode(regs)) {
_exception(SIGSEGV, regs, code, address);
return 0;
}
if (is_exec && (error_code & DSISR_PROTFAULT)
&& printk_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_CRIT "kernel tried to execute NX-protected"
" page (%lx) - exploit attempt? (uid: %d)\n",
address, current_uid());
return SIGSEGV;
/*
* We ran out of memory, or some other thing happened to us that made
* us unable to handle the page fault gracefully.
*/
out_of_memory:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (!user_mode(regs))
return SIGKILL;
pagefault_out_of_memory();
return 0;
do_sigbus:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (user_mode(regs)) {
info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = BUS_ADRERR;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)address;
force_sig_info(SIGBUS, &info, current);
return 0;
}
return SIGBUS;
} | 811 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | do_exception | do_exception( struct pt_regs * regs , int access , unsigned long trans_exc_code) | ['regs', 'access', 'trans_exc_code'] | static inline int do_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int access,
unsigned long trans_exc_code)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long address;
unsigned int flags;
int fault;
if (notify_page_fault(regs))
return 0;
tsk = current;
mm = tsk->mm;
/*
* Verify that the fault happened in user space, that
* we are not in an interrupt and that there is a
* user context.
*/
fault = VM_FAULT_BADCONTEXT;
if (unlikely(!user_space_fault(trans_exc_code) || in_atomic() || !mm))
goto out;
address = trans_exc_code & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
if (access == VM_WRITE || (trans_exc_code & store_indication) == 0x400)
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
retry:
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto out_up;
if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > address)) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto out_up;
if (expand_stack(vma, address))
goto out_up;
}
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & access)))
goto out_up;
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
address &= HPAGE_MASK;
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault.
*/
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, flags);
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR))
goto out_up;
/*
* Major/minor page fault accounting is only done on the
* initial attempt. If we go through a retry, it is extremely
* likely that the page will be found in page cache at that point.
*/
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
tsk->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0,
regs, address);
} else {
tsk->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
/* Clear FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY to avoid any risk
* of starvation. */
flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
goto retry;
}
}
/*
* The instruction that caused the program check will
* be repeated. Don't signal single step via SIGTRAP.
*/
clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_PER_TRAP);
fault = 0;
out_up:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
out:
return fault;
} | 351 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | ptrace_triggered | ptrace_triggered( struct perf_event * bp , int nmi , struct perf_sample_data * data , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['bp', 'nmi', 'data', 'regs'] | void ptrace_triggered(struct perf_event *bp, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_event_attr attr;
/*
* Disable the breakpoint request here since ptrace has defined a
* one-shot behaviour for breakpoint exceptions.
*/
attr = bp->attr;
attr.disabled = true;
modify_user_hw_breakpoint(bp, &attr);
} | 46 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | handle_unaligned_access | handle_unaligned_access( insn_size_t instruction , struct pt_regs * regs , struct mem_access * ma , int expected , unsigned long address) | ['instruction', 'regs', 'ma', 'expected', 'address'] | int handle_unaligned_access(insn_size_t instruction, struct pt_regs *regs,
struct mem_access *ma, int expected,
unsigned long address)
{
u_int rm;
int ret, index;
/*
* XXX: We can't handle mixed 16/32-bit instructions yet
*/
if (instruction_size(instruction) != 2)
return -EINVAL;
index = (instruction>>8)&15; /* 0x0F00 */
rm = regs->regs[index];
/*
* Log the unexpected fixups, and then pass them on to perf.
*
* We intentionally don't report the expected cases to perf as
* otherwise the trapped I/O case will skew the results too much
* to be useful.
*/
if (!expected) {
unaligned_fixups_notify(current, instruction, regs);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
ret = -EFAULT;
switch (instruction&0xF000) {
case 0x0000:
if (instruction==0x000B) {
/* rts */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0)
regs->pc = regs->pr;
}
else if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x0023) {
/* braf @Rm */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0)
regs->pc += rm + 4;
}
else if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x0003) {
/* bsrf @Rm */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0) {
regs->pr = regs->pc + 4;
regs->pc += rm + 4;
}
}
else {
/* mov.[bwl] to/from memory via r0+rn */
goto simple;
}
break;
case 0x1000: /* mov.l Rm,@(disp,Rn) */
goto simple;
case 0x2000: /* mov.[bwl] to memory, possibly with pre-decrement */
goto simple;
case 0x4000:
if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x002B) {
/* jmp @Rm */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0)
regs->pc = rm;
}
else if ((instruction&0x00FF)==0x000B) {
/* jsr @Rm */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0) {
regs->pr = regs->pc + 4;
regs->pc = rm;
}
}
else {
/* mov.[bwl] to/from memory via r0+rn */
goto simple;
}
break;
case 0x5000: /* mov.l @(disp,Rm),Rn */
goto simple;
case 0x6000: /* mov.[bwl] from memory, possibly with post-increment */
goto simple;
case 0x8000: /* bf lab, bf/s lab, bt lab, bt/s lab */
switch (instruction&0x0F00) {
case 0x0100: /* mov.w R0,@(disp,Rm) */
goto simple;
case 0x0500: /* mov.w @(disp,Rm),R0 */
goto simple;
case 0x0B00: /* bf lab - no delayslot*/
break;
case 0x0F00: /* bf/s lab */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0) {
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SH4) || defined(CONFIG_SH7705_CACHE_32KB)
if ((regs->sr & 0x00000001) != 0)
regs->pc += 4; /* next after slot */
else
#endif
regs->pc += SH_PC_8BIT_OFFSET(instruction);
}
break;
case 0x0900: /* bt lab - no delayslot */
break;
case 0x0D00: /* bt/s lab */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0) {
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SH4) || defined(CONFIG_SH7705_CACHE_32KB)
if ((regs->sr & 0x00000001) == 0)
regs->pc += 4; /* next after slot */
else
#endif
regs->pc += SH_PC_8BIT_OFFSET(instruction);
}
break;
}
break;
case 0xA000: /* bra label */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0)
regs->pc += SH_PC_12BIT_OFFSET(instruction);
break;
case 0xB000: /* bsr label */
ret = handle_delayslot(regs, instruction, ma);
if (ret==0) {
regs->pr = regs->pc + 4;
regs->pc += SH_PC_12BIT_OFFSET(instruction);
}
break;
}
return ret;
/* handle non-delay-slot instruction */
simple:
ret = handle_unaligned_ins(instruction, regs, ma);
if (ret==0)
regs->pc += instruction_size(instruction);
return ret;
} | 604 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | misaligned_fpu_load | misaligned_fpu_load( struct pt_regs * regs , __u32 opcode , int displacement_not_indexed , int width_shift , int do_paired_load) | ['regs', 'opcode', 'displacement_not_indexed', 'width_shift', 'do_paired_load'] | static int misaligned_fpu_load(struct pt_regs *regs,
__u32 opcode,
int displacement_not_indexed,
int width_shift,
int do_paired_load)
{
/* Return -1 for a fault, 0 for OK */
int error;
int destreg;
__u64 address;
error = generate_and_check_address(regs, opcode,
displacement_not_indexed, width_shift, &address);
if (error < 0) {
return error;
}
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
destreg = (opcode >> 4) & 0x3f;
if (user_mode(regs)) {
__u64 buffer;
__u32 buflo, bufhi;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, (unsigned long) address, 1UL<<width_shift)) {
return -1;
}
if (__copy_user(&buffer, (const void *)(int)address, (1 << width_shift)) > 0) {
return -1; /* fault */
}
/* 'current' may be the current owner of the FPU state, so
context switch the registers into memory so they can be
indexed by register number. */
if (last_task_used_math == current) {
enable_fpu();
save_fpu(current);
disable_fpu();
last_task_used_math = NULL;
regs->sr |= SR_FD;
}
buflo = *(__u32*) &buffer;
bufhi = *(1 + (__u32*) &buffer);
switch (width_shift) {
case 2:
current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[destreg] = buflo;
break;
case 3:
if (do_paired_load) {
current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[destreg] = buflo;
current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[destreg+1] = bufhi;
} else {
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[destreg] = bufhi;
current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[destreg+1] = buflo;
#else
current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[destreg] = buflo;
current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[destreg+1] = bufhi;
#endif
}
break;
default:
printk("Unexpected width_shift %d in misaligned_fpu_load, PC=%08lx\n",
width_shift, (unsigned long) regs->pc);
break;
}
return 0;
} else {
die ("Misaligned FPU load inside kernel", regs, 0);
return -1;
}
} | 385 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | misaligned_fpu_store | misaligned_fpu_store( struct pt_regs * regs , __u32 opcode , int displacement_not_indexed , int width_shift , int do_paired_load) | ['regs', 'opcode', 'displacement_not_indexed', 'width_shift', 'do_paired_load'] | static int misaligned_fpu_store(struct pt_regs *regs,
__u32 opcode,
int displacement_not_indexed,
int width_shift,
int do_paired_load)
{
/* Return -1 for a fault, 0 for OK */
int error;
int srcreg;
__u64 address;
error = generate_and_check_address(regs, opcode,
displacement_not_indexed, width_shift, &address);
if (error < 0) {
return error;
}
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
srcreg = (opcode >> 4) & 0x3f;
if (user_mode(regs)) {
__u64 buffer;
/* Initialise these to NaNs. */
__u32 buflo=0xffffffffUL, bufhi=0xffffffffUL;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (unsigned long) address, 1UL<<width_shift)) {
return -1;
}
/* 'current' may be the current owner of the FPU state, so
context switch the registers into memory so they can be
indexed by register number. */
if (last_task_used_math == current) {
enable_fpu();
save_fpu(current);
disable_fpu();
last_task_used_math = NULL;
regs->sr |= SR_FD;
}
switch (width_shift) {
case 2:
buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg];
break;
case 3:
if (do_paired_load) {
buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg];
bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1];
} else {
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg];
buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1];
#else
buflo = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg];
bufhi = current->thread.xstate->hardfpu.fp_regs[srcreg+1];
#endif
}
break;
default:
printk("Unexpected width_shift %d in misaligned_fpu_store, PC=%08lx\n",
width_shift, (unsigned long) regs->pc);
break;
}
*(__u32*) &buffer = buflo;
*(1 + (__u32*) &buffer) = bufhi;
if (__copy_user((void *)(int)address, &buffer, (1 << width_shift)) > 0) {
return -1; /* fault */
}
return 0;
} else {
die ("Misaligned FPU load inside kernel", regs, 0);
return -1;
}
} | 388 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | misaligned_load | misaligned_load( struct pt_regs * regs , __u32 opcode , int displacement_not_indexed , int width_shift , int do_sign_extend) | ['regs', 'opcode', 'displacement_not_indexed', 'width_shift', 'do_sign_extend'] | static int misaligned_load(struct pt_regs *regs,
__u32 opcode,
int displacement_not_indexed,
int width_shift,
int do_sign_extend)
{
/* Return -1 for a fault, 0 for OK */
int error;
int destreg;
__u64 address;
error = generate_and_check_address(regs, opcode,
displacement_not_indexed, width_shift, &address);
if (error < 0) {
return error;
}
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
destreg = (opcode >> 4) & 0x3f;
if (user_mode(regs)) {
__u64 buffer;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, (unsigned long) address, 1UL<<width_shift)) {
return -1;
}
if (__copy_user(&buffer, (const void *)(int)address, (1 << width_shift)) > 0) {
return -1; /* fault */
}
switch (width_shift) {
case 1:
if (do_sign_extend) {
regs->regs[destreg] = (__u64)(__s64) *(__s16 *) &buffer;
} else {
regs->regs[destreg] = (__u64) *(__u16 *) &buffer;
}
break;
case 2:
regs->regs[destreg] = (__u64)(__s64) *(__s32 *) &buffer;
break;
case 3:
regs->regs[destreg] = buffer;
break;
default:
printk("Unexpected width_shift %d in misaligned_load, PC=%08lx\n",
width_shift, (unsigned long) regs->pc);
break;
}
} else {
/* kernel mode - we can take short cuts since if we fault, it's a genuine bug */
__u64 lo, hi;
switch (width_shift) {
case 1:
misaligned_kernel_word_load(address, do_sign_extend, ®s->regs[destreg]);
break;
case 2:
asm ("ldlo.l %1, 0, %0" : "=r" (lo) : "r" (address));
asm ("ldhi.l %1, 3, %0" : "=r" (hi) : "r" (address));
regs->regs[destreg] = lo | hi;
break;
case 3:
asm ("ldlo.q %1, 0, %0" : "=r" (lo) : "r" (address));
asm ("ldhi.q %1, 7, %0" : "=r" (hi) : "r" (address));
regs->regs[destreg] = lo | hi;
break;
default:
printk("Unexpected width_shift %d in misaligned_load, PC=%08lx\n",
width_shift, (unsigned long) regs->pc);
break;
}
}
return 0;
} | 417 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | misaligned_store | misaligned_store( struct pt_regs * regs , __u32 opcode , int displacement_not_indexed , int width_shift) | ['regs', 'opcode', 'displacement_not_indexed', 'width_shift'] | static int misaligned_store(struct pt_regs *regs,
__u32 opcode,
int displacement_not_indexed,
int width_shift)
{
/* Return -1 for a fault, 0 for OK */
int error;
int srcreg;
__u64 address;
error = generate_and_check_address(regs, opcode,
displacement_not_indexed, width_shift, &address);
if (error < 0) {
return error;
}
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
srcreg = (opcode >> 4) & 0x3f;
if (user_mode(regs)) {
__u64 buffer;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (unsigned long) address, 1UL<<width_shift)) {
return -1;
}
switch (width_shift) {
case 1:
*(__u16 *) &buffer = (__u16) regs->regs[srcreg];
break;
case 2:
*(__u32 *) &buffer = (__u32) regs->regs[srcreg];
break;
case 3:
buffer = regs->regs[srcreg];
break;
default:
printk("Unexpected width_shift %d in misaligned_store, PC=%08lx\n",
width_shift, (unsigned long) regs->pc);
break;
}
if (__copy_user((void *)(int)address, &buffer, (1 << width_shift)) > 0) {
return -1; /* fault */
}
} else {
/* kernel mode - we can take short cuts since if we fault, it's a genuine bug */
__u64 val = regs->regs[srcreg];
switch (width_shift) {
case 1:
misaligned_kernel_word_store(address, val);
break;
case 2:
asm ("stlo.l %1, 0, %0" : : "r" (val), "r" (address));
asm ("sthi.l %1, 3, %0" : : "r" (val), "r" (address));
break;
case 3:
asm ("stlo.q %1, 0, %0" : : "r" (val), "r" (address));
asm ("sthi.q %1, 7, %0" : : "r" (val), "r" (address));
break;
default:
printk("Unexpected width_shift %d in misaligned_store, PC=%08lx\n",
width_shift, (unsigned long) regs->pc);
break;
}
}
return 0;
} | 359 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | do_fpu_inst | do_fpu_inst( unsigned short inst , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['inst', 'regs'] | int do_fpu_inst(unsigned short inst, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fpu = &(tsk->thread.xstate->softfpu);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
if (!(task_thread_info(tsk)->status & TS_USEDFPU)) {
/* initialize once. */
fpu_init(fpu);
task_thread_info(tsk)->status |= TS_USEDFPU;
}
return fpu_emulate(inst, fpu, regs);
} | 89 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | do_page_fault | do_page_fault( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned long writeaccess , unsigned long address) | ['regs', 'writeaccess', 'address'] | asmlinkage void __kprobes do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long writeaccess,
unsigned long address)
{
unsigned long vec;
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct * vma;
int si_code;
int fault;
siginfo_t info;
tsk = current;
mm = tsk->mm;
si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
vec = lookup_exception_vector();
/*
* We fault-in kernel-space virtual memory on-demand. The
* 'reference' page table is init_mm.pgd.
*
* NOTE! We MUST NOT take any locks for this case. We may
* be in an interrupt or a critical region, and should
* only copy the information from the master page table,
* nothing more.
*/
if (unlikely(fault_in_kernel_space(address))) {
if (vmalloc_fault(address) >= 0)
return;
if (notify_page_fault(regs, vec))
return;
goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
}
if (unlikely(notify_page_fault(regs, vec)))
return;
/* Only enable interrupts if they were on before the fault */
if ((regs->sr & SR_IMASK) != SR_IMASK)
local_irq_enable();
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
/*
* If we're in an interrupt, have no user context or are running
* in an atomic region then we must not take the fault:
*/
if (in_atomic() || !mm)
goto no_context;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto bad_area;
if (vma->vm_start <= address)
goto good_area;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto bad_area;
if (expand_stack(vma, address))
goto bad_area;
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
good_area:
si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
if (writeaccess) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
goto bad_area;
} else {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_WRITE)))
goto bad_area;
}
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault.
*/
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, writeaccess ? FAULT_FLAG_WRITE : 0);
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM)
goto out_of_memory;
else if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS)
goto do_sigbus;
BUG();
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
tsk->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0,
regs, address);
} else {
tsk->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return;
/*
* Something tried to access memory that isn't in our memory map..
* Fix it, but check if it's kernel or user first..
*/
bad_area:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
bad_area_nosemaphore:
if (user_mode(regs)) {
info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = si_code;
info.si_addr = (void *) address;
force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, &info, tsk);
return;
}
no_context:
/* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault? */
if (fixup_exception(regs))
return;
if (handle_trapped_io(regs, address))
return;
/*
* Oops. The kernel tried to access some bad page. We'll have to
* terminate things with extreme prejudice.
*
*/
bust_spinlocks(1);
if (oops_may_print()) {
unsigned long page;
if (address < PAGE_SIZE)
printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel NULL "
"pointer dereference");
else
printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel paging "
"request");
printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n", address);
printk(KERN_ALERT "pc = %08lx\n", regs->pc);
page = (unsigned long)get_TTB();
if (page) {
page = ((__typeof__(page) *)page)[address >> PGDIR_SHIFT];
printk(KERN_ALERT "*pde = %08lx\n", page);
if (page & _PAGE_PRESENT) {
page &= PAGE_MASK;
address &= 0x003ff000;
page = ((__typeof__(page) *)
__va(page))[address >>
PAGE_SHIFT];
printk(KERN_ALERT "*pte = %08lx\n", page);
}
}
}
die("Oops", regs, writeaccess);
bust_spinlocks(0);
do_exit(SIGKILL);
/*
* We ran out of memory, or some other thing happened to us that made
* us unable to handle the page fault gracefully.
*/
out_of_memory:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
pagefault_out_of_memory();
return;
do_sigbus:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* Send a sigbus, regardless of whether we were in kernel
* or user mode.
*/
info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = BUS_ADRERR;
info.si_addr = (void *)address;
force_sig_info(SIGBUS, &info, tsk);
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die */
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
} | 708 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | do_page_fault | do_page_fault( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned long writeaccess , unsigned long textaccess , unsigned long address) | ['regs', 'writeaccess', 'textaccess', 'address'] | asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long writeaccess,
unsigned long textaccess, unsigned long address)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct * vma;
const struct exception_table_entry *fixup;
pte_t *pte;
int fault;
/* SIM
* Note this is now called with interrupts still disabled
* This is to cope with being called for a missing IO port
* address with interrupts disabled. This should be fixed as
* soon as we have a better 'fast path' miss handler.
*
* Plus take care how you try and debug this stuff.
* For example, writing debug data to a port which you
* have just faulted on is not going to work.
*/
tsk = current;
mm = tsk->mm;
/* Not an IO address, so reenable interrupts */
local_irq_enable();
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
/*
* If we're in an interrupt or have no user
* context, we must not take the fault..
*/
if (in_atomic() || !mm)
goto no_context;
/* TLB misses upon some cache flushes get done under cli() */
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma) {
#ifdef DEBUG_FAULT
print_task(tsk);
printk("%s:%d fault, address is 0x%08x PC %016Lx textaccess %d writeaccess %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__,
address,regs->pc,textaccess,writeaccess);
show_regs(regs);
#endif
goto bad_area;
}
if (vma->vm_start <= address) {
goto good_area;
}
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN)) {
#ifdef DEBUG_FAULT
print_task(tsk);
printk("%s:%d fault, address is 0x%08x PC %016Lx textaccess %d writeaccess %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__,
address,regs->pc,textaccess,writeaccess);
show_regs(regs);
print_vma(vma);
#endif
goto bad_area;
}
if (expand_stack(vma, address)) {
#ifdef DEBUG_FAULT
print_task(tsk);
printk("%s:%d fault, address is 0x%08x PC %016Lx textaccess %d writeaccess %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__,
address,regs->pc,textaccess,writeaccess);
show_regs(regs);
#endif
goto bad_area;
}
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
good_area:
if (textaccess) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
goto bad_area;
} else {
if (writeaccess) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
goto bad_area;
} else {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_READ))
goto bad_area;
}
}
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault.
*/
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, writeaccess ? FAULT_FLAG_WRITE : 0);
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM)
goto out_of_memory;
else if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS)
goto do_sigbus;
BUG();
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
tsk->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0,
regs, address);
} else {
tsk->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
/* If we get here, the page fault has been handled. Do the TLB refill
now from the newly-setup PTE, to avoid having to fault again right
away on the same instruction. */
pte = lookup_pte (mm, address);
if (!pte) {
/* From empirical evidence, we can get here, due to
!pte_present(pte). (e.g. if a swap-in occurs, and the page
is swapped back out again before the process that wanted it
gets rescheduled?) */
goto no_pte;
}
__do_tlb_refill(address, textaccess, pte);
no_pte:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return;
/*
* Something tried to access memory that isn't in our memory map..
* Fix it, but check if it's kernel or user first..
*/
bad_area:
#ifdef DEBUG_FAULT
printk("fault:bad area\n");
#endif
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (user_mode(regs)) {
static int count=0;
siginfo_t info;
if (count < 4) {
/* This is really to help debug faults when starting
* usermode, so only need a few */
count++;
printk("user mode bad_area address=%08lx pid=%d (%s) pc=%08lx\n",
address, task_pid_nr(current), current->comm,
(unsigned long) regs->pc);
#if 0
show_regs(regs);
#endif
}
if (is_global_init(tsk)) {
panic("INIT had user mode bad_area\n");
}
tsk->thread.address = address;
tsk->thread.error_code = writeaccess;
info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_addr = (void *) address;
force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, &info, tsk);
return;
}
no_context:
#ifdef DEBUG_FAULT
printk("fault:No context\n");
#endif
/* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault? */
fixup = search_exception_tables(regs->pc);
if (fixup) {
regs->pc = fixup->fixup;
return;
}
/*
* Oops. The kernel tried to access some bad page. We'll have to
* terminate things with extreme prejudice.
*
*/
if (address < PAGE_SIZE)
printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference");
else
printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel paging request");
printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n", address);
printk(KERN_ALERT "pc = %08Lx%08Lx\n", regs->pc >> 32, regs->pc & 0xffffffff);
die("Oops", regs, writeaccess);
do_exit(SIGKILL);
/*
* We ran out of memory, or some other thing happened to us that made
* us unable to handle the page fault gracefully.
*/
out_of_memory:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
pagefault_out_of_memory();
return;
do_sigbus:
printk("fault:Do sigbus\n");
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* Send a sigbus, regardless of whether we were in kernel
* or user mode.
*/
tsk->thread.address = address;
tsk->thread.error_code = writeaccess;
tsk->thread.trap_no = 14;
force_sig(SIGBUS, tsk);
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die */
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto no_context;
} | 762 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | perf_event_nmi_handler | perf_event_nmi_handler( struct notifier_block * self , unsigned long cmd , void * __args) | ['self', 'cmd', '__args'] | static int __kprobes perf_event_nmi_handler(struct notifier_block *self,
unsigned long cmd, void *__args)
{
struct die_args *args = __args;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct pt_regs *regs;
int i;
if (!atomic_read(&active_events))
return NOTIFY_DONE;
switch (cmd) {
case DIE_NMI:
break;
default:
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
regs = args->regs;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
/* If the PMU has the TOE IRQ enable bits, we need to do a
* dummy write to the %pcr to clear the overflow bits and thus
* the interrupt.
*
* Do this before we peek at the counters to determine
* overflow so we don't lose any events.
*/
if (sparc_pmu->irq_bit)
pcr_ops->write(cpuc->pcr);
for (i = 0; i < cpuc->n_events; i++) {
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->event[i];
int idx = cpuc->current_idx[i];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
u64 val;
hwc = &event->hw;
val = sparc_perf_event_update(event, hwc, idx);
if (val & (1ULL << 31))
continue;
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!sparc_perf_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, regs))
sparc_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
return NOTIFY_STOP;
} | 232 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | kernel_unaligned_trap | kernel_unaligned_trap( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned int insn) | ['regs', 'insn'] | asmlinkage void kernel_unaligned_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int insn)
{
enum direction dir = decode_direction(insn);
int size = decode_access_size(insn);
if(!ok_for_kernel(insn) || dir == both) {
printk("Unsupported unaligned load/store trap for kernel at <%08lx>.\n",
regs->pc);
unaligned_panic("Wheee. Kernel does fpu/atomic unaligned load/store.");
} else {
unsigned long addr = compute_effective_address(regs, insn);
int err;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, addr);
switch (dir) {
case load:
err = do_int_load(fetch_reg_addr(((insn>>25)&0x1f),
regs),
size, (unsigned long *) addr,
decode_signedness(insn));
break;
case store:
err = do_int_store(((insn>>25)&0x1f), size,
(unsigned long *) addr, regs);
break;
default:
panic("Impossible kernel unaligned trap.");
/* Not reached... */
}
if (err)
kernel_mna_trap_fault(regs, insn);
else
advance(regs);
}
} | 190 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | user_unaligned_trap | user_unaligned_trap( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned int insn) | ['regs', 'insn'] | asmlinkage void user_unaligned_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int insn)
{
enum direction dir;
if(!(current->thread.flags & SPARC_FLAG_UNALIGNED) ||
(((insn >> 30) & 3) != 3))
goto kill_user;
dir = decode_direction(insn);
if(!ok_for_user(regs, insn, dir)) {
goto kill_user;
} else {
int err, size = decode_access_size(insn);
unsigned long addr;
if(floating_point_load_or_store_p(insn)) {
printk("User FPU load/store unaligned unsupported.\n");
goto kill_user;
}
addr = compute_effective_address(regs, insn);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, addr);
switch(dir) {
case load:
err = do_int_load(fetch_reg_addr(((insn>>25)&0x1f),
regs),
size, (unsigned long *) addr,
decode_signedness(insn));
break;
case store:
err = do_int_store(((insn>>25)&0x1f), size,
(unsigned long *) addr, regs);
break;
case both:
/*
* This was supported in 2.4. However, we question
* the value of SWAP instruction across word boundaries.
*/
printk("Unaligned SWAP unsupported.\n");
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
unaligned_panic("Impossible user unaligned trap.");
goto out;
}
if (err)
goto kill_user;
else
advance(regs);
goto out;
}
kill_user:
user_mna_trap_fault(regs, insn);
out:
;
} | 259 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | handle_ld_nf | handle_ld_nf( u32 insn , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['insn', 'regs'] | void handle_ld_nf(u32 insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int rd = ((insn >> 25) & 0x1f);
int from_kernel = (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) != 0;
unsigned long *reg;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
maybe_flush_windows(0, 0, rd, from_kernel);
reg = fetch_reg_addr(rd, regs);
if (from_kernel || rd < 16) {
reg[0] = 0;
if ((insn & 0x780000) == 0x180000)
reg[1] = 0;
} else if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
put_user(0, (int __user *) reg);
if ((insn & 0x780000) == 0x180000)
put_user(0, ((int __user *) reg) + 1);
} else {
put_user(0, (unsigned long __user *) reg);
if ((insn & 0x780000) == 0x180000)
put_user(0, (unsigned long __user *) reg + 1);
}
advance(regs);
} | 205 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | handle_lddfmna | handle_lddfmna( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned long sfar , unsigned long sfsr) | ['regs', 'sfar', 'sfsr'] | void handle_lddfmna(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long sfar, unsigned long sfsr)
{
unsigned long pc = regs->tpc;
unsigned long tstate = regs->tstate;
u32 insn;
u64 value;
u8 freg;
int flag;
struct fpustate *f = FPUSTATE;
if (tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)
die_if_kernel("lddfmna from kernel", regs);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, sfar);
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
pc = (u32)pc;
if (get_user(insn, (u32 __user *) pc) != -EFAULT) {
int asi = decode_asi(insn, regs);
u32 first, second;
int err;
if ((asi > ASI_SNFL) ||
(asi < ASI_P))
goto daex;
first = second = 0;
err = get_user(first, (u32 __user *)sfar);
if (!err)
err = get_user(second, (u32 __user *)(sfar + 4));
if (err) {
if (!(asi & 0x2))
goto daex;
first = second = 0;
}
save_and_clear_fpu();
freg = ((insn >> 25) & 0x1e) | ((insn >> 20) & 0x20);
value = (((u64)first) << 32) | second;
if (asi & 0x8) /* Little */
value = __swab64p(&value);
flag = (freg < 32) ? FPRS_DL : FPRS_DU;
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & FPRS_FEF)) {
current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] = FPRS_FEF;
current_thread_info()->gsr[0] = 0;
}
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flag)) {
if (freg < 32)
memset(f->regs, 0, 32*sizeof(u32));
else
memset(f->regs+32, 0, 32*sizeof(u32));
}
*(u64 *)(f->regs + freg) = value;
current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] |= flag;
} else {
daex:
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, sfar, sfsr);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, sfsr, sfar);
return;
}
advance(regs);
} | 445 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | handle_ldf_stq | handle_ldf_stq( u32 insn , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['insn', 'regs'] | int handle_ldf_stq(u32 insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr = compute_effective_address(regs, insn, 0);
int freg = ((insn >> 25) & 0x1e) | ((insn >> 20) & 0x20);
struct fpustate *f = FPUSTATE;
int asi = decode_asi(insn, regs);
int flag = (freg < 32) ? FPRS_DL : FPRS_DU;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
save_and_clear_fpu();
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] &= ~0x1c000;
if (freg & 3) {
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] |= (6 << 14) /* invalid_fp_register */;
do_fpother(regs);
return 0;
}
if (insn & 0x200000) {
/* STQ */
u64 first = 0, second = 0;
if (current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flag) {
first = *(u64 *)&f->regs[freg];
second = *(u64 *)&f->regs[freg+2];
}
if (asi < 0x80) {
do_privact(regs);
return 1;
}
switch (asi) {
case ASI_P:
case ASI_S: break;
case ASI_PL:
case ASI_SL:
{
/* Need to convert endians */
u64 tmp = __swab64p(&first);
first = __swab64p(&second);
second = tmp;
break;
}
default:
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
if (put_user (first >> 32, (u32 __user *)addr) ||
__put_user ((u32)first, (u32 __user *)(addr + 4)) ||
__put_user (second >> 32, (u32 __user *)(addr + 8)) ||
__put_user ((u32)second, (u32 __user *)(addr + 12))) {
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
} else {
/* LDF, LDDF, LDQF */
u32 data[4] __attribute__ ((aligned(8)));
int size, i;
int err;
if (asi < 0x80) {
do_privact(regs);
return 1;
} else if (asi > ASI_SNFL) {
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
switch (insn & 0x180000) {
case 0x000000: size = 1; break;
case 0x100000: size = 4; break;
default: size = 2; break;
}
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
data[i] = 0;
err = get_user (data[0], (u32 __user *) addr);
if (!err) {
for (i = 1; i < size; i++)
err |= __get_user (data[i], (u32 __user *)(addr + 4*i));
}
if (err && !(asi & 0x2 /* NF */)) {
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, addr, 0);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, 0, addr);
return 1;
}
if (asi & 0x8) /* Little */ {
u64 tmp;
switch (size) {
case 1: data[0] = le32_to_cpup(data + 0); break;
default:*(u64 *)(data + 0) = le64_to_cpup((u64 *)(data + 0));
break;
case 4: tmp = le64_to_cpup((u64 *)(data + 0));
*(u64 *)(data + 0) = le64_to_cpup((u64 *)(data + 2));
*(u64 *)(data + 2) = tmp;
break;
}
}
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & FPRS_FEF)) {
current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] = FPRS_FEF;
current_thread_info()->gsr[0] = 0;
}
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flag)) {
if (freg < 32)
memset(f->regs, 0, 32*sizeof(u32));
else
memset(f->regs+32, 0, 32*sizeof(u32));
}
memcpy(f->regs + freg, data, size * 4);
current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] |= flag;
}
advance(regs);
return 1;
} | 885 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | handle_popc | handle_popc( u32 insn , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['insn', 'regs'] | int handle_popc(u32 insn, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
u64 value;
int ret, i, rd = ((insn >> 25) & 0x1f);
int from_kernel = (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) != 0;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
if (insn & 0x2000) {
maybe_flush_windows(0, 0, rd, from_kernel);
value = sign_extend_imm13(insn);
} else {
maybe_flush_windows(0, insn & 0x1f, rd, from_kernel);
value = fetch_reg(insn & 0x1f, regs);
}
for (ret = 0, i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
ret += popc_helper[value & 0xf];
value >>= 4;
}
if (rd < 16) {
if (rd)
regs->u_regs[rd] = ret;
} else {
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
struct reg_window32 __user *win32;
win32 = (struct reg_window32 __user *)((unsigned long)((u32)regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]));
put_user(ret, &win32->locals[rd - 16]);
} else {
struct reg_window __user *win;
win = (struct reg_window __user *)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS);
put_user(ret, &win->locals[rd - 16]);
}
}
advance(regs);
return 1;
} | 275 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | handle_stdfmna | handle_stdfmna( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned long sfar , unsigned long sfsr) | ['regs', 'sfar', 'sfsr'] | void handle_stdfmna(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long sfar, unsigned long sfsr)
{
unsigned long pc = regs->tpc;
unsigned long tstate = regs->tstate;
u32 insn;
u64 value;
u8 freg;
int flag;
struct fpustate *f = FPUSTATE;
if (tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)
die_if_kernel("stdfmna from kernel", regs);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, sfar);
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
pc = (u32)pc;
if (get_user(insn, (u32 __user *) pc) != -EFAULT) {
int asi = decode_asi(insn, regs);
freg = ((insn >> 25) & 0x1e) | ((insn >> 20) & 0x20);
value = 0;
flag = (freg < 32) ? FPRS_DL : FPRS_DU;
if ((asi > ASI_SNFL) ||
(asi < ASI_P))
goto daex;
save_and_clear_fpu();
if (current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flag)
value = *(u64 *)&f->regs[freg];
switch (asi) {
case ASI_P:
case ASI_S: break;
case ASI_PL:
case ASI_SL:
value = __swab64p(&value); break;
default: goto daex;
}
if (put_user (value >> 32, (u32 __user *) sfar) ||
__put_user ((u32)value, (u32 __user *)(sfar + 4)))
goto daex;
} else {
daex:
if (tlb_type == hypervisor)
sun4v_data_access_exception(regs, sfar, sfsr);
else
spitfire_data_access_exception(regs, sfsr, sfar);
return;
}
advance(regs);
} | 321 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | kernel_unaligned_trap | kernel_unaligned_trap( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned int insn) | ['regs', 'insn'] | asmlinkage void kernel_unaligned_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int insn)
{
enum direction dir = decode_direction(insn);
int size = decode_access_size(regs, insn);
int orig_asi, asi;
current_thread_info()->kern_una_regs = regs;
current_thread_info()->kern_una_insn = insn;
orig_asi = asi = decode_asi(insn, regs);
/* If this is a {get,put}_user() on an unaligned userspace pointer,
* just signal a fault and do not log the event.
*/
if (asi == ASI_AIUS) {
kernel_mna_trap_fault(0);
return;
}
log_unaligned(regs);
if (!ok_for_kernel(insn) || dir == both) {
printk("Unsupported unaligned load/store trap for kernel "
"at <%016lx>.\n", regs->tpc);
unaligned_panic("Kernel does fpu/atomic "
"unaligned load/store.", regs);
kernel_mna_trap_fault(0);
} else {
unsigned long addr, *reg_addr;
int err;
addr = compute_effective_address(regs, insn,
((insn >> 25) & 0x1f));
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, addr);
switch (asi) {
case ASI_NL:
case ASI_AIUPL:
case ASI_AIUSL:
case ASI_PL:
case ASI_SL:
case ASI_PNFL:
case ASI_SNFL:
asi &= ~0x08;
break;
}
switch (dir) {
case load:
reg_addr = fetch_reg_addr(((insn>>25)&0x1f), regs);
err = do_int_load(reg_addr, size,
(unsigned long *) addr,
decode_signedness(insn), asi);
if (likely(!err) && unlikely(asi != orig_asi)) {
unsigned long val_in = *reg_addr;
switch (size) {
case 2:
val_in = swab16(val_in);
break;
case 4:
val_in = swab32(val_in);
break;
case 8:
val_in = swab64(val_in);
break;
case 16:
default:
BUG();
break;
}
*reg_addr = val_in;
}
break;
case store:
err = do_int_store(((insn>>25)&0x1f), size,
(unsigned long *) addr, regs,
asi, orig_asi);
break;
default:
panic("Impossible kernel unaligned trap.");
/* Not reached... */
}
if (unlikely(err))
kernel_mna_trap_fault(1);
else
advance(regs);
}
} | 395 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | vis_emul | vis_emul( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned int insn) | ['regs', 'insn'] | int vis_emul(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int insn)
{
unsigned long pc = regs->tpc;
unsigned int opf;
BUG_ON(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
pc = (u32)pc;
if (get_user(insn, (u32 __user *) pc))
return -EFAULT;
save_and_clear_fpu();
opf = (insn & VIS_OPF_MASK) >> VIS_OPF_SHIFT;
switch (opf) {
default:
return -EINVAL;
/* Pixel Formatting Instructions. */
case FPACK16_OPF:
case FPACK32_OPF:
case FPACKFIX_OPF:
case FEXPAND_OPF:
case FPMERGE_OPF:
pformat(regs, insn, opf);
break;
/* Partitioned Multiply Instructions */
case FMUL8x16_OPF:
case FMUL8x16AU_OPF:
case FMUL8x16AL_OPF:
case FMUL8SUx16_OPF:
case FMUL8ULx16_OPF:
case FMULD8SUx16_OPF:
case FMULD8ULx16_OPF:
pmul(regs, insn, opf);
break;
/* Pixel Compare Instructions */
case FCMPGT16_OPF:
case FCMPGT32_OPF:
case FCMPLE16_OPF:
case FCMPLE32_OPF:
case FCMPNE16_OPF:
case FCMPNE32_OPF:
case FCMPEQ16_OPF:
case FCMPEQ32_OPF:
pcmp(regs, insn, opf);
break;
/* Edge Handling Instructions */
case EDGE8_OPF:
case EDGE8N_OPF:
case EDGE8L_OPF:
case EDGE8LN_OPF:
case EDGE16_OPF:
case EDGE16N_OPF:
case EDGE16L_OPF:
case EDGE16LN_OPF:
case EDGE32_OPF:
case EDGE32N_OPF:
case EDGE32L_OPF:
case EDGE32LN_OPF:
edge(regs, insn, opf);
break;
/* Pixel Component Distance */
case PDIST_OPF:
pdist(regs, insn);
break;
/* Three-Dimensional Array Addressing Instructions */
case ARRAY8_OPF:
case ARRAY16_OPF:
case ARRAY32_OPF:
array(regs, insn, opf);
break;
/* Byte Mask and Shuffle Instructions */
case BMASK_OPF:
bmask(regs, insn);
break;
case BSHUFFLE_OPF:
bshuffle(regs, insn);
break;
}
regs->tpc = regs->tnpc;
regs->tnpc += 4;
return 0;
} | 319 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | do_mathemu | do_mathemu( struct pt_regs * regs , struct task_struct * fpt) | ['regs', 'fpt'] | int do_mathemu(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *fpt)
{
/* regs->pc isn't necessarily the PC at which the offending insn is sitting.
* The FPU maintains a queue of FPops which cause traps.
* When it hits an instruction that requires that the trapped op succeeded
* (usually because it reads a reg. that the trapped op wrote) then it
* causes this exception. We need to emulate all the insns on the queue
* and then allow the op to proceed.
* This code should also handle the case where the trap was precise,
* in which case the queue length is zero and regs->pc points at the
* single FPop to be emulated. (this case is untested, though :->)
* You'll need this case if you want to be able to emulate all FPops
* because the FPU either doesn't exist or has been software-disabled.
* [The UltraSPARC makes FP a precise trap; this isn't as stupid as it
* might sound because the Ultra does funky things with a superscalar
* architecture.]
*/
/* You wouldn't believe how often I typed 'ftp' when I meant 'fpt' :-> */
int i;
int retcode = 0; /* assume all succeed */
unsigned long insn;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
#ifdef DEBUG_MATHEMU
printk("In do_mathemu()... pc is %08lx\n", regs->pc);
printk("fpqdepth is %ld\n", fpt->thread.fpqdepth);
for (i = 0; i < fpt->thread.fpqdepth; i++)
printk("%d: %08lx at %08lx\n", i, fpt->thread.fpqueue[i].insn,
(unsigned long)fpt->thread.fpqueue[i].insn_addr);
#endif
if (fpt->thread.fpqdepth == 0) { /* no queue, guilty insn is at regs->pc */
#ifdef DEBUG_MATHEMU
printk("precise trap at %08lx\n", regs->pc);
#endif
if (!get_user(insn, (u32 __user *) regs->pc)) {
retcode = do_one_mathemu(insn, &fpt->thread.fsr, fpt->thread.float_regs);
if (retcode) {
/* in this case we need to fix up PC & nPC */
regs->pc = regs->npc;
regs->npc += 4;
}
}
return retcode;
}
/* Normal case: need to empty the queue... */
for (i = 0; i < fpt->thread.fpqdepth; i++) {
retcode = do_one_mathemu(fpt->thread.fpqueue[i].insn, &(fpt->thread.fsr), fpt->thread.float_regs);
if (!retcode) /* insn failed, no point doing any more */
break;
}
/* Now empty the queue and clear the queue_not_empty flag */
if (retcode)
fpt->thread.fsr &= ~(0x3000 | FSR_CEXC_MASK);
else
fpt->thread.fsr &= ~0x3000;
fpt->thread.fpqdepth = 0;
return retcode;
} | 285 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | do_mathemu | do_mathemu( struct pt_regs * regs , struct fpustate * f) | ['regs', 'f'] | int do_mathemu(struct pt_regs *regs, struct fpustate *f)
{
unsigned long pc = regs->tpc;
unsigned long tstate = regs->tstate;
u32 insn = 0;
int type = 0;
/* ftt tells which ftt it may happen in, r is rd, b is rs2 and a is rs1. The *u arg tells
whether the argument should be packed/unpacked (0 - do not unpack/pack, 1 - unpack/pack)
non-u args tells the size of the argument (0 - no argument, 1 - single, 2 - double, 3 - quad */
#define TYPE(ftt, r, ru, b, bu, a, au) type = (au << 2) | (a << 0) | (bu << 5) | (b << 3) | (ru << 8) | (r << 6) | (ftt << 9)
int freg;
static u64 zero[2] = { 0L, 0L };
int flags;
FP_DECL_EX;
FP_DECL_S(SA); FP_DECL_S(SB); FP_DECL_S(SR);
FP_DECL_D(DA); FP_DECL_D(DB); FP_DECL_D(DR);
FP_DECL_Q(QA); FP_DECL_Q(QB); FP_DECL_Q(QR);
int IR;
long XR, xfsr;
if (tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)
die_if_kernel("unfinished/unimplemented FPop from kernel", regs);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_EMULATION_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, 0);
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
pc = (u32)pc;
if (get_user(insn, (u32 __user *) pc) != -EFAULT) {
if ((insn & 0xc1f80000) == 0x81a00000) /* FPOP1 */ {
switch ((insn >> 5) & 0x1ff) {
/* QUAD - ftt == 3 */
case FMOVQ:
case FNEGQ:
case FABSQ: TYPE(3,3,0,3,0,0,0); break;
case FSQRTQ: TYPE(3,3,1,3,1,0,0); break;
case FADDQ:
case FSUBQ:
case FMULQ:
case FDIVQ: TYPE(3,3,1,3,1,3,1); break;
case FDMULQ: TYPE(3,3,1,2,1,2,1); break;
case FQTOX: TYPE(3,2,0,3,1,0,0); break;
case FXTOQ: TYPE(3,3,1,2,0,0,0); break;
case FQTOS: TYPE(3,1,1,3,1,0,0); break;
case FQTOD: TYPE(3,2,1,3,1,0,0); break;
case FITOQ: TYPE(3,3,1,1,0,0,0); break;
case FSTOQ: TYPE(3,3,1,1,1,0,0); break;
case FDTOQ: TYPE(3,3,1,2,1,0,0); break;
case FQTOI: TYPE(3,1,0,3,1,0,0); break;
/* We can get either unimplemented or unfinished
* for these cases. Pre-Niagara systems generate
* unfinished fpop for SUBNORMAL cases, and Niagara
* always gives unimplemented fpop for fsqrt{s,d}.
*/
case FSQRTS: {
unsigned long x = current_thread_info()->xfsr[0];
x = (x >> 14) & 0xf;
TYPE(x,1,1,1,1,0,0);
break;
}
case FSQRTD: {
unsigned long x = current_thread_info()->xfsr[0];
x = (x >> 14) & 0xf;
TYPE(x,2,1,2,1,0,0);
break;
}
/* SUBNORMAL - ftt == 2 */
case FADDD:
case FSUBD:
case FMULD:
case FDIVD: TYPE(2,2,1,2,1,2,1); break;
case FADDS:
case FSUBS:
case FMULS:
case FDIVS: TYPE(2,1,1,1,1,1,1); break;
case FSMULD: TYPE(2,2,1,1,1,1,1); break;
case FSTOX: TYPE(2,2,0,1,1,0,0); break;
case FDTOX: TYPE(2,2,0,2,1,0,0); break;
case FDTOS: TYPE(2,1,1,2,1,0,0); break;
case FSTOD: TYPE(2,2,1,1,1,0,0); break;
case FSTOI: TYPE(2,1,0,1,1,0,0); break;
case FDTOI: TYPE(2,1,0,2,1,0,0); break;
/* Only Ultra-III generates these */
case FXTOS: TYPE(2,1,1,2,0,0,0); break;
case FXTOD: TYPE(2,2,1,2,0,0,0); break;
#if 0 /* Optimized inline in sparc64/kernel/entry.S */
case FITOS: TYPE(2,1,1,1,0,0,0); break;
#endif
case FITOD: TYPE(2,2,1,1,0,0,0); break;
}
}
else if ((insn & 0xc1f80000) == 0x81a80000) /* FPOP2 */ {
IR = 2;
switch ((insn >> 5) & 0x1ff) {
case FCMPQ: TYPE(3,0,0,3,1,3,1); break;
case FCMPEQ: TYPE(3,0,0,3,1,3,1); break;
/* Now the conditional fmovq support */
case FMOVQ0:
case FMOVQ1:
case FMOVQ2:
case FMOVQ3:
/* fmovq %fccX, %fY, %fZ */
if (!((insn >> 11) & 3))
XR = current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] >> 10;
else
XR = current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] >> (30 + ((insn >> 10) & 0x6));
XR &= 3;
IR = 0;
switch ((insn >> 14) & 0x7) {
/* case 0: IR = 0; break; */ /* Never */
case 1: if (XR) IR = 1; break; /* Not Equal */
case 2: if (XR == 1 || XR == 2) IR = 1; break; /* Less or Greater */
case 3: if (XR & 1) IR = 1; break; /* Unordered or Less */
case 4: if (XR == 1) IR = 1; break; /* Less */
case 5: if (XR & 2) IR = 1; break; /* Unordered or Greater */
case 6: if (XR == 2) IR = 1; break; /* Greater */
case 7: if (XR == 3) IR = 1; break; /* Unordered */
}
if ((insn >> 14) & 8)
IR ^= 1;
break;
case FMOVQI:
case FMOVQX:
/* fmovq %[ix]cc, %fY, %fZ */
XR = regs->tstate >> 32;
if ((insn >> 5) & 0x80)
XR >>= 4;
XR &= 0xf;
IR = 0;
freg = ((XR >> 2) ^ XR) & 2;
switch ((insn >> 14) & 0x7) {
/* case 0: IR = 0; break; */ /* Never */
case 1: if (XR & 4) IR = 1; break; /* Equal */
case 2: if ((XR & 4) || freg) IR = 1; break; /* Less or Equal */
case 3: if (freg) IR = 1; break; /* Less */
case 4: if (XR & 5) IR = 1; break; /* Less or Equal Unsigned */
case 5: if (XR & 1) IR = 1; break; /* Carry Set */
case 6: if (XR & 8) IR = 1; break; /* Negative */
case 7: if (XR & 2) IR = 1; break; /* Overflow Set */
}
if ((insn >> 14) & 8)
IR ^= 1;
break;
case FMOVQZ:
case FMOVQLE:
case FMOVQLZ:
case FMOVQNZ:
case FMOVQGZ:
case FMOVQGE:
freg = (insn >> 14) & 0x1f;
if (!freg)
XR = 0;
else if (freg < 16)
XR = regs->u_regs[freg];
else if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
struct reg_window32 __user *win32;
flushw_user ();
win32 = (struct reg_window32 __user *)((unsigned long)((u32)regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]));
get_user(XR, &win32->locals[freg - 16]);
} else {
struct reg_window __user *win;
flushw_user ();
win = (struct reg_window __user *)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS);
get_user(XR, &win->locals[freg - 16]);
}
IR = 0;
switch ((insn >> 10) & 3) {
case 1: if (!XR) IR = 1; break; /* Register Zero */
case 2: if (XR <= 0) IR = 1; break; /* Register Less Than or Equal to Zero */
case 3: if (XR < 0) IR = 1; break; /* Register Less Than Zero */
}
if ((insn >> 10) & 4)
IR ^= 1;
break;
}
if (IR == 0) {
/* The fmov test was false. Do a nop instead */
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] &= ~(FSR_CEXC_MASK);
regs->tpc = regs->tnpc;
regs->tnpc += 4;
return 1;
} else if (IR == 1) {
/* Change the instruction into plain fmovq */
insn = (insn & 0x3e00001f) | 0x81a00060;
TYPE(3,3,0,3,0,0,0);
}
}
}
if (type) {
argp rs1 = NULL, rs2 = NULL, rd = NULL;
freg = (current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] >> 14) & 0xf;
if (freg != (type >> 9))
goto err;
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] &= ~0x1c000;
freg = ((insn >> 14) & 0x1f);
switch (type & 0x3) {
case 3: if (freg & 2) {
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] |= (6 << 14) /* invalid_fp_register */;
goto err;
}
case 2: freg = ((freg & 1) << 5) | (freg & 0x1e);
case 1: rs1 = (argp)&f->regs[freg];
flags = (freg < 32) ? FPRS_DL : FPRS_DU;
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flags))
rs1 = (argp)&zero;
break;
}
switch (type & 0x7) {
case 7: FP_UNPACK_QP (QA, rs1); break;
case 6: FP_UNPACK_DP (DA, rs1); break;
case 5: FP_UNPACK_SP (SA, rs1); break;
}
freg = (insn & 0x1f);
switch ((type >> 3) & 0x3) {
case 3: if (freg & 2) {
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] |= (6 << 14) /* invalid_fp_register */;
goto err;
}
case 2: freg = ((freg & 1) << 5) | (freg & 0x1e);
case 1: rs2 = (argp)&f->regs[freg];
flags = (freg < 32) ? FPRS_DL : FPRS_DU;
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flags))
rs2 = (argp)&zero;
break;
}
switch ((type >> 3) & 0x7) {
case 7: FP_UNPACK_QP (QB, rs2); break;
case 6: FP_UNPACK_DP (DB, rs2); break;
case 5: FP_UNPACK_SP (SB, rs2); break;
}
freg = ((insn >> 25) & 0x1f);
switch ((type >> 6) & 0x3) {
case 3: if (freg & 2) {
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] |= (6 << 14) /* invalid_fp_register */;
goto err;
}
case 2: freg = ((freg & 1) << 5) | (freg & 0x1e);
case 1: rd = (argp)&f->regs[freg];
flags = (freg < 32) ? FPRS_DL : FPRS_DU;
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & FPRS_FEF)) {
current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] = FPRS_FEF;
current_thread_info()->gsr[0] = 0;
}
if (!(current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] & flags)) {
if (freg < 32)
memset(f->regs, 0, 32*sizeof(u32));
else
memset(f->regs+32, 0, 32*sizeof(u32));
}
current_thread_info()->fpsaved[0] |= flags;
break;
}
switch ((insn >> 5) & 0x1ff) {
/* + */
case FADDS: FP_ADD_S (SR, SA, SB); break;
case FADDD: FP_ADD_D (DR, DA, DB); break;
case FADDQ: FP_ADD_Q (QR, QA, QB); break;
/* - */
case FSUBS: FP_SUB_S (SR, SA, SB); break;
case FSUBD: FP_SUB_D (DR, DA, DB); break;
case FSUBQ: FP_SUB_Q (QR, QA, QB); break;
/* * */
case FMULS: FP_MUL_S (SR, SA, SB); break;
case FSMULD: FP_CONV (D, S, 1, 1, DA, SA);
FP_CONV (D, S, 1, 1, DB, SB);
case FMULD: FP_MUL_D (DR, DA, DB); break;
case FDMULQ: FP_CONV (Q, D, 2, 1, QA, DA);
FP_CONV (Q, D, 2, 1, QB, DB);
case FMULQ: FP_MUL_Q (QR, QA, QB); break;
/* / */
case FDIVS: FP_DIV_S (SR, SA, SB); break;
case FDIVD: FP_DIV_D (DR, DA, DB); break;
case FDIVQ: FP_DIV_Q (QR, QA, QB); break;
/* sqrt */
case FSQRTS: FP_SQRT_S (SR, SB); break;
case FSQRTD: FP_SQRT_D (DR, DB); break;
case FSQRTQ: FP_SQRT_Q (QR, QB); break;
/* mov */
case FMOVQ: rd->q[0] = rs2->q[0]; rd->q[1] = rs2->q[1]; break;
case FABSQ: rd->q[0] = rs2->q[0] & 0x7fffffffffffffffUL; rd->q[1] = rs2->q[1]; break;
case FNEGQ: rd->q[0] = rs2->q[0] ^ 0x8000000000000000UL; rd->q[1] = rs2->q[1]; break;
/* float to int */
case FSTOI: FP_TO_INT_S (IR, SB, 32, 1); break;
case FDTOI: FP_TO_INT_D (IR, DB, 32, 1); break;
case FQTOI: FP_TO_INT_Q (IR, QB, 32, 1); break;
case FSTOX: FP_TO_INT_S (XR, SB, 64, 1); break;
case FDTOX: FP_TO_INT_D (XR, DB, 64, 1); break;
case FQTOX: FP_TO_INT_Q (XR, QB, 64, 1); break;
/* int to float */
case FITOQ: IR = rs2->s; FP_FROM_INT_Q (QR, IR, 32, int); break;
case FXTOQ: XR = rs2->d; FP_FROM_INT_Q (QR, XR, 64, long); break;
/* Only Ultra-III generates these */
case FXTOS: XR = rs2->d; FP_FROM_INT_S (SR, XR, 64, long); break;
case FXTOD: XR = rs2->d; FP_FROM_INT_D (DR, XR, 64, long); break;
#if 0 /* Optimized inline in sparc64/kernel/entry.S */
case FITOS: IR = rs2->s; FP_FROM_INT_S (SR, IR, 32, int); break;
#endif
case FITOD: IR = rs2->s; FP_FROM_INT_D (DR, IR, 32, int); break;
/* float to float */
case FSTOD: FP_CONV (D, S, 1, 1, DR, SB); break;
case FSTOQ: FP_CONV (Q, S, 2, 1, QR, SB); break;
case FDTOQ: FP_CONV (Q, D, 2, 1, QR, DB); break;
case FDTOS: FP_CONV (S, D, 1, 1, SR, DB); break;
case FQTOS: FP_CONV (S, Q, 1, 2, SR, QB); break;
case FQTOD: FP_CONV (D, Q, 1, 2, DR, QB); break;
/* comparison */
case FCMPQ:
case FCMPEQ:
FP_CMP_Q(XR, QB, QA, 3);
if (XR == 3 &&
(((insn >> 5) & 0x1ff) == FCMPEQ ||
FP_ISSIGNAN_Q(QA) ||
FP_ISSIGNAN_Q(QB)))
FP_SET_EXCEPTION (FP_EX_INVALID);
}
if (!FP_INHIBIT_RESULTS) {
switch ((type >> 6) & 0x7) {
case 0: xfsr = current_thread_info()->xfsr[0];
if (XR == -1) XR = 2;
switch (freg & 3) {
/* fcc0, 1, 2, 3 */
case 0: xfsr &= ~0xc00; xfsr |= (XR << 10); break;
case 1: xfsr &= ~0x300000000UL; xfsr |= (XR << 32); break;
case 2: xfsr &= ~0xc00000000UL; xfsr |= (XR << 34); break;
case 3: xfsr &= ~0x3000000000UL; xfsr |= (XR << 36); break;
}
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] = xfsr;
break;
case 1: rd->s = IR; break;
case 2: rd->d = XR; break;
case 5: FP_PACK_SP (rd, SR); break;
case 6: FP_PACK_DP (rd, DR); break;
case 7: FP_PACK_QP (rd, QR); break;
}
}
if(_fex != 0)
return record_exception(regs, _fex);
/* Success and no exceptions detected. */
current_thread_info()->xfsr[0] &= ~(FSR_CEXC_MASK);
regs->tpc = regs->tnpc;
regs->tnpc += 4;
return 1;
}
err: return 0;
} | 3327 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | do_sparc_fault | do_sparc_fault( struct pt_regs * regs , int text_fault , int write , unsigned long address) | ['regs', 'text_fault', 'write', 'address'] | asmlinkage void do_sparc_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, int text_fault, int write,
unsigned long address)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
unsigned int fixup;
unsigned long g2;
int from_user = !(regs->psr & PSR_PS);
int fault, code;
if(text_fault)
address = regs->pc;
/*
* We fault-in kernel-space virtual memory on-demand. The
* 'reference' page table is init_mm.pgd.
*
* NOTE! We MUST NOT take any locks for this case. We may
* be in an interrupt or a critical region, and should
* only copy the information from the master page table,
* nothing more.
*/
code = SEGV_MAPERR;
if (!ARCH_SUN4C && address >= TASK_SIZE)
goto vmalloc_fault;
/*
* If we're in an interrupt or have no user
* context, we must not take the fault..
*/
if (in_atomic() || !mm)
goto no_context;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* The kernel referencing a bad kernel pointer can lock up
* a sun4c machine completely, so we must attempt recovery.
*/
if(!from_user && address >= PAGE_OFFSET)
goto bad_area;
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if(!vma)
goto bad_area;
if(vma->vm_start <= address)
goto good_area;
if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto bad_area;
if(expand_stack(vma, address))
goto bad_area;
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
good_area:
code = SEGV_ACCERR;
if(write) {
if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
goto bad_area;
} else {
/* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */
if(!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC)))
goto bad_area;
}
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault.
*/
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, write ? FAULT_FLAG_WRITE : 0);
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM)
goto out_of_memory;
else if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS)
goto do_sigbus;
BUG();
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
current->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0,
regs, address);
} else {
current->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return;
/*
* Something tried to access memory that isn't in our memory map..
* Fix it, but check if it's kernel or user first..
*/
bad_area:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
bad_area_nosemaphore:
/* User mode accesses just cause a SIGSEGV */
if (from_user) {
do_fault_siginfo(code, SIGSEGV, regs, text_fault);
return;
}
/* Is this in ex_table? */
no_context:
g2 = regs->u_regs[UREG_G2];
if (!from_user) {
fixup = search_extables_range(regs->pc, &g2);
if (fixup > 10) { /* Values below are reserved for other things */
extern const unsigned __memset_start[];
extern const unsigned __memset_end[];
extern const unsigned __csum_partial_copy_start[];
extern const unsigned __csum_partial_copy_end[];
#ifdef DEBUG_EXCEPTIONS
printk("Exception: PC<%08lx> faddr<%08lx>\n", regs->pc, address);
printk("EX_TABLE: insn<%08lx> fixup<%08x> g2<%08lx>\n",
regs->pc, fixup, g2);
#endif
if ((regs->pc >= (unsigned long)__memset_start &&
regs->pc < (unsigned long)__memset_end) ||
(regs->pc >= (unsigned long)__csum_partial_copy_start &&
regs->pc < (unsigned long)__csum_partial_copy_end)) {
regs->u_regs[UREG_I4] = address;
regs->u_regs[UREG_I5] = regs->pc;
}
regs->u_regs[UREG_G2] = g2;
regs->pc = fixup;
regs->npc = regs->pc + 4;
return;
}
}
unhandled_fault (address, tsk, regs);
do_exit(SIGKILL);
/*
* We ran out of memory, or some other thing happened to us that made
* us unable to handle the page fault gracefully.
*/
out_of_memory:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (from_user) {
pagefault_out_of_memory();
return;
}
goto no_context;
do_sigbus:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
do_fault_siginfo(BUS_ADRERR, SIGBUS, regs, text_fault);
if (!from_user)
goto no_context;
vmalloc_fault:
{
/*
* Synchronize this task's top level page-table
* with the 'reference' page table.
*/
int offset = pgd_index(address);
pgd_t *pgd, *pgd_k;
pmd_t *pmd, *pmd_k;
pgd = tsk->active_mm->pgd + offset;
pgd_k = init_mm.pgd + offset;
if (!pgd_present(*pgd)) {
if (!pgd_present(*pgd_k))
goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
pgd_val(*pgd) = pgd_val(*pgd_k);
return;
}
pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, address);
pmd_k = pmd_offset(pgd_k, address);
if (pmd_present(*pmd) || !pmd_present(*pmd_k))
goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
*pmd = *pmd_k;
return;
}
} | 754 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | do_sparc64_fault | do_sparc64_fault( struct pt_regs * regs) | ['regs'] | asmlinkage void __kprobes do_sparc64_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned int insn = 0;
int si_code, fault_code, fault;
unsigned long address, mm_rss;
fault_code = get_thread_fault_code();
if (notify_page_fault(regs))
return;
si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
address = current_thread_info()->fault_address;
if ((fault_code & FAULT_CODE_ITLB) &&
(fault_code & FAULT_CODE_DTLB))
BUG();
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)) {
if (unlikely((regs->tpc >> 32) != 0)) {
bogus_32bit_fault_tpc(regs);
goto intr_or_no_mm;
}
}
if (unlikely((address >> 32) != 0)) {
bogus_32bit_fault_address(regs, address);
goto intr_or_no_mm;
}
}
if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) {
unsigned long tpc = regs->tpc;
/* Sanity check the PC. */
if ((tpc >= KERNBASE && tpc < (unsigned long) __init_end) ||
(tpc >= MODULES_VADDR && tpc < MODULES_END)) {
/* Valid, no problems... */
} else {
bad_kernel_pc(regs, address);
return;
}
}
/*
* If we're in an interrupt or have no user
* context, we must not take the fault..
*/
if (in_atomic() || !mm)
goto intr_or_no_mm;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
if ((regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) &&
!search_exception_tables(regs->tpc)) {
insn = get_fault_insn(regs, insn);
goto handle_kernel_fault;
}
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto bad_area;
/* Pure DTLB misses do not tell us whether the fault causing
* load/store/atomic was a write or not, it only says that there
* was no match. So in such a case we (carefully) read the
* instruction to try and figure this out. It's an optimization
* so it's ok if we can't do this.
*
* Special hack, window spill/fill knows the exact fault type.
*/
if (((fault_code &
(FAULT_CODE_DTLB | FAULT_CODE_WRITE | FAULT_CODE_WINFIXUP)) == FAULT_CODE_DTLB) &&
(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) != 0) {
insn = get_fault_insn(regs, 0);
if (!insn)
goto continue_fault;
/* All loads, stores and atomics have bits 30 and 31 both set
* in the instruction. Bit 21 is set in all stores, but we
* have to avoid prefetches which also have bit 21 set.
*/
if ((insn & 0xc0200000) == 0xc0200000 &&
(insn & 0x01780000) != 0x01680000) {
/* Don't bother updating thread struct value,
* because update_mmu_cache only cares which tlb
* the access came from.
*/
fault_code |= FAULT_CODE_WRITE;
}
}
continue_fault:
if (vma->vm_start <= address)
goto good_area;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto bad_area;
if (!(fault_code & FAULT_CODE_WRITE)) {
/* Non-faulting loads shouldn't expand stack. */
insn = get_fault_insn(regs, insn);
if ((insn & 0xc0800000) == 0xc0800000) {
unsigned char asi;
if (insn & 0x2000)
asi = (regs->tstate >> 24);
else
asi = (insn >> 5);
if ((asi & 0xf2) == 0x82)
goto bad_area;
}
}
if (expand_stack(vma, address))
goto bad_area;
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
good_area:
si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
/* If we took a ITLB miss on a non-executable page, catch
* that here.
*/
if ((fault_code & FAULT_CODE_ITLB) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
BUG_ON(address != regs->tpc);
BUG_ON(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV);
goto bad_area;
}
if (fault_code & FAULT_CODE_WRITE) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
goto bad_area;
/* Spitfire has an icache which does not snoop
* processor stores. Later processors do...
*/
if (tlb_type == spitfire &&
(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) != 0 &&
vma->vm_file != NULL)
set_thread_fault_code(fault_code |
FAULT_CODE_BLKCOMMIT);
} else {
/* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */
if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC)))
goto bad_area;
}
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, (fault_code & FAULT_CODE_WRITE) ? FAULT_FLAG_WRITE : 0);
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM)
goto out_of_memory;
else if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS)
goto do_sigbus;
BUG();
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
current->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0,
regs, address);
} else {
current->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
mm_rss = get_mm_rss(mm);
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
mm_rss -= (mm->context.huge_pte_count * (HPAGE_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE));
#endif
if (unlikely(mm_rss >
mm->context.tsb_block[MM_TSB_BASE].tsb_rss_limit))
tsb_grow(mm, MM_TSB_BASE, mm_rss);
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
mm_rss = mm->context.huge_pte_count;
if (unlikely(mm_rss >
mm->context.tsb_block[MM_TSB_HUGE].tsb_rss_limit))
tsb_grow(mm, MM_TSB_HUGE, mm_rss);
#endif
return;
/*
* Something tried to access memory that isn't in our memory map..
* Fix it, but check if it's kernel or user first..
*/
bad_area:
insn = get_fault_insn(regs, insn);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
handle_kernel_fault:
do_kernel_fault(regs, si_code, fault_code, insn, address);
return;
/*
* We ran out of memory, or some other thing happened to us that made
* us unable to handle the page fault gracefully.
*/
out_of_memory:
insn = get_fault_insn(regs, insn);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)) {
pagefault_out_of_memory();
return;
}
goto handle_kernel_fault;
intr_or_no_mm:
insn = get_fault_insn(regs, 0);
goto handle_kernel_fault;
do_sigbus:
insn = get_fault_insn(regs, insn);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* Send a sigbus, regardless of whether we were in kernel
* or user mode.
*/
do_fault_siginfo(BUS_ADRERR, SIGBUS, regs, insn, fault_code);
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die */
if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)
goto handle_kernel_fault;
} | 949 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | x86_pmu_handle_irq | x86_pmu_handle_irq( struct pt_regs * regs) | ['regs'] | static int x86_pmu_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct perf_event *event;
int idx, handled = 0;
u64 val;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
/*
* Some chipsets need to unmask the LVTPC in a particular spot
* inside the nmi handler. As a result, the unmasking was pushed
* into all the nmi handlers.
*
* This generic handler doesn't seem to have any issues where the
* unmasking occurs so it was left at the top.
*/
apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, APIC_DM_NMI);
for (idx = 0; idx < x86_pmu.num_counters; idx++) {
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask)) {
/*
* Though we deactivated the counter some cpus
* might still deliver spurious interrupts still
* in flight. Catch them:
*/
if (__test_and_clear_bit(idx, cpuc->running))
handled++;
continue;
}
event = cpuc->events[idx];
val = x86_perf_event_update(event);
if (val & (1ULL << (x86_pmu.cntval_bits - 1)))
continue;
/*
* event overflow
*/
handled++;
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!x86_perf_event_set_period(event))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, regs))
x86_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
if (handled)
inc_irq_stat(apic_perf_irqs);
return handled;
} | 194 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | intel_pmu_handle_irq | intel_pmu_handle_irq( struct pt_regs * regs) | ['regs'] | static int intel_pmu_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
int bit, loops;
u64 status;
int handled;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
/*
* Some chipsets need to unmask the LVTPC in a particular spot
* inside the nmi handler. As a result, the unmasking was pushed
* into all the nmi handlers.
*
* This handler doesn't seem to have any issues with the unmasking
* so it was left at the top.
*/
apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, APIC_DM_NMI);
intel_pmu_disable_all();
handled = intel_pmu_drain_bts_buffer();
status = intel_pmu_get_status();
if (!status) {
intel_pmu_enable_all(0);
return handled;
}
loops = 0;
again:
intel_pmu_ack_status(status);
if (++loops > 100) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "perfevents: irq loop stuck!\n");
perf_event_print_debug();
intel_pmu_reset();
goto done;
}
inc_irq_stat(apic_perf_irqs);
intel_pmu_lbr_read();
/*
* PEBS overflow sets bit 62 in the global status register
*/
if (__test_and_clear_bit(62, (unsigned long *)&status)) {
handled++;
x86_pmu.drain_pebs(regs);
}
for_each_set_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&status, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX) {
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[bit];
handled++;
if (!test_bit(bit, cpuc->active_mask))
continue;
if (!intel_pmu_save_and_restart(event))
continue;
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, regs))
x86_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
/*
* Repeat if there is more work to be done:
*/
status = intel_pmu_get_status();
if (status)
goto again;
done:
intel_pmu_enable_all(0);
return handled;
} | 266 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | __intel_pmu_pebs_event | __intel_pmu_pebs_event(struct perf_event*event,struct pt_regs*iregs,void*__pebs) | [] | static void __intel_pmu_pebs_event(struct perf_event *event,
struct pt_regs *iregs, void *__pebs)
{
/*
* We cast to pebs_record_core since that is a subset of
* both formats and we don't use the other fields in this
* routine.
*/
struct pebs_record_core *pebs = __pebs;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct pt_regs regs;
if (!intel_pmu_save_and_restart(event))
return;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
/*
* We use the interrupt regs as a base because the PEBS record
* does not contain a full regs set, specifically it seems to
* lack segment descriptors, which get used by things like
* user_mode().
*
* In the simple case fix up only the IP and BP,SP regs, for
* PERF_SAMPLE_IP and PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN to function properly.
* A possible PERF_SAMPLE_REGS will have to transfer all regs.
*/
regs = *iregs;
regs.ip = pebs->ip;
regs.bp = pebs->bp;
regs.sp = pebs->sp;
if (event->attr.precise_ip > 1 && intel_pmu_pebs_fixup_ip(®s))
regs.flags |= PERF_EFLAGS_EXACT;
else
regs.flags &= ~PERF_EFLAGS_EXACT;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, ®s))
x86_pmu_stop(event, 0);
} | 141 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | intel_pmu_drain_bts_buffer | intel_pmu_drain_bts_buffer(void) | [] | static int intel_pmu_drain_bts_buffer(void)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct debug_store *ds = cpuc->ds;
struct bts_record {
u64 from;
u64 to;
u64 flags;
};
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[X86_PMC_IDX_FIXED_BTS];
struct bts_record *at, *top;
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_event_header header;
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct pt_regs regs;
if (!event)
return 0;
if (!x86_pmu.bts_active)
return 0;
at = (struct bts_record *)(unsigned long)ds->bts_buffer_base;
top = (struct bts_record *)(unsigned long)ds->bts_index;
if (top <= at)
return 0;
ds->bts_index = ds->bts_buffer_base;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
regs.ip = 0;
/*
* Prepare a generic sample, i.e. fill in the invariant fields.
* We will overwrite the from and to address before we output
* the sample.
*/
perf_prepare_sample(&header, &data, event, ®s);
if (perf_output_begin(&handle, event, header.size * (top - at), 1, 1))
return 1;
for (; at < top; at++) {
data.ip = at->from;
data.addr = at->to;
perf_output_sample(&handle, &header, &data, event);
}
perf_output_end(&handle);
/* There's new data available. */
event->hw.interrupts++;
event->pending_kill = POLL_IN;
return 1;
} | 270 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | p4_pmu_handle_irq | p4_pmu_handle_irq( struct pt_regs * regs) | ['regs'] | static int p4_pmu_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc;
struct perf_event *event;
struct hw_perf_event *hwc;
int idx, handled = 0;
u64 val;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0);
cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
for (idx = 0; idx < x86_pmu.num_counters; idx++) {
int overflow;
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask)) {
/* catch in-flight IRQs */
if (__test_and_clear_bit(idx, cpuc->running))
handled++;
continue;
}
event = cpuc->events[idx];
hwc = &event->hw;
WARN_ON_ONCE(hwc->idx != idx);
/* it might be unflagged overflow */
overflow = p4_pmu_clear_cccr_ovf(hwc);
val = x86_perf_event_update(event);
if (!overflow && (val & (1ULL << (x86_pmu.cntval_bits - 1))))
continue;
handled += overflow;
/* event overflow for sure */
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!x86_perf_event_set_period(event))
continue;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, regs))
x86_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
if (handled)
inc_irq_stat(apic_perf_irqs);
/*
* When dealing with the unmasking of the LVTPC on P4 perf hw, it has
* been observed that the OVF bit flag has to be cleared first _before_
* the LVTPC can be unmasked.
*
* The reason is the NMI line will continue to be asserted while the OVF
* bit is set. This causes a second NMI to generate if the LVTPC is
* unmasked before the OVF bit is cleared, leading to unknown NMI
* messages.
*/
apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, APIC_DM_NMI);
return handled;
} | 231 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | kgdb_hw_overflow_handler | kgdb_hw_overflow_handler( struct perf_event * event , int nmi , struct perf_sample_data * data , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['event', 'nmi', 'data', 'regs'] | static void kgdb_hw_overflow_handler(struct perf_event *event, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
if (breakinfo[i].enabled)
tsk->thread.debugreg6 |= (DR_TRAP0 << i);
} | 67 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | ptrace_triggered | ptrace_triggered( struct perf_event * bp , int nmi , struct perf_sample_data * data , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['bp', 'nmi', 'data', 'regs'] | static void ptrace_triggered(struct perf_event *bp, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int i;
struct thread_struct *thread = &(current->thread);
/*
* Store in the virtual DR6 register the fact that the breakpoint
* was hit so the thread's debugger will see it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < HBP_NUM; i++) {
if (thread->ptrace_bps[i] == bp)
break;
}
thread->debugreg6 |= (DR_TRAP0 << i);
} | 76 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | do_page_fault | do_page_fault( struct pt_regs * regs , unsigned long error_code) | ['regs', 'error_code'] | do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct task_struct *tsk;
unsigned long address;
struct mm_struct *mm;
int fault;
int write = error_code & PF_WRITE;
unsigned int flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE |
(write ? FAULT_FLAG_WRITE : 0);
tsk = current;
mm = tsk->mm;
/* Get the faulting address: */
address = read_cr2();
/*
* Detect and handle instructions that would cause a page fault for
* both a tracked kernel page and a userspace page.
*/
if (kmemcheck_active(regs))
kmemcheck_hide(regs);
prefetchw(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (unlikely(kmmio_fault(regs, address)))
return;
/*
* We fault-in kernel-space virtual memory on-demand. The
* 'reference' page table is init_mm.pgd.
*
* NOTE! We MUST NOT take any locks for this case. We may
* be in an interrupt or a critical region, and should
* only copy the information from the master page table,
* nothing more.
*
* This verifies that the fault happens in kernel space
* (error_code & 4) == 0, and that the fault was not a
* protection error (error_code & 9) == 0.
*/
if (unlikely(fault_in_kernel_space(address))) {
if (!(error_code & (PF_RSVD | PF_USER | PF_PROT))) {
if (vmalloc_fault(address) >= 0)
return;
if (kmemcheck_fault(regs, address, error_code))
return;
}
/* Can handle a stale RO->RW TLB: */
if (spurious_fault(error_code, address))
return;
/* kprobes don't want to hook the spurious faults: */
if (notify_page_fault(regs))
return;
/*
* Don't take the mm semaphore here. If we fixup a prefetch
* fault we could otherwise deadlock:
*/
bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
/* kprobes don't want to hook the spurious faults: */
if (unlikely(notify_page_fault(regs)))
return;
/*
* It's safe to allow irq's after cr2 has been saved and the
* vmalloc fault has been handled.
*
* User-mode registers count as a user access even for any
* potential system fault or CPU buglet:
*/
if (user_mode_vm(regs)) {
local_irq_enable();
error_code |= PF_USER;
} else {
if (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
local_irq_enable();
}
if (unlikely(error_code & PF_RSVD))
pgtable_bad(regs, error_code, address);
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
/*
* If we're in an interrupt, have no user context or are running
* in an atomic region then we must not take the fault:
*/
if (unlikely(in_atomic() || !mm)) {
bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
/*
* When running in the kernel we expect faults to occur only to
* addresses in user space. All other faults represent errors in
* the kernel and should generate an OOPS. Unfortunately, in the
* case of an erroneous fault occurring in a code path which already
* holds mmap_sem we will deadlock attempting to validate the fault
* against the address space. Luckily the kernel only validly
* references user space from well defined areas of code, which are
* listed in the exceptions table.
*
* As the vast majority of faults will be valid we will only perform
* the source reference check when there is a possibility of a
* deadlock. Attempt to lock the address space, if we cannot we then
* validate the source. If this is invalid we can skip the address
* space check, thus avoiding the deadlock:
*/
if (unlikely(!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem))) {
if ((error_code & PF_USER) == 0 &&
!search_exception_tables(regs->ip)) {
bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
retry:
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
} else {
/*
* The above down_read_trylock() might have succeeded in
* which case we'll have missed the might_sleep() from
* down_read():
*/
might_sleep();
}
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (unlikely(!vma)) {
bad_area(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
if (likely(vma->vm_start <= address))
goto good_area;
if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))) {
bad_area(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
if (error_code & PF_USER) {
/*
* Accessing the stack below %sp is always a bug.
* The large cushion allows instructions like enter
* and pusha to work. ("enter $65535, $31" pushes
* 32 pointers and then decrements %sp by 65535.)
*/
if (unlikely(address + 65536 + 32 * sizeof(unsigned long) < regs->sp)) {
bad_area(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
}
if (unlikely(expand_stack(vma, address))) {
bad_area(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
good_area:
if (unlikely(access_error(error_code, vma))) {
bad_area_access_error(regs, error_code, address);
return;
}
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault:
*/
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, flags);
if (unlikely(fault & (VM_FAULT_RETRY|VM_FAULT_ERROR))) {
if (mm_fault_error(regs, error_code, address, fault))
return;
}
/*
* Major/minor page fault accounting is only done on the
* initial attempt. If we go through a retry, it is extremely
* likely that the page will be found in page cache at that point.
*/
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
tsk->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0,
regs, address);
} else {
tsk->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
/* Clear FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY to avoid any risk
* of starvation. */
flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
goto retry;
}
}
check_v8086_mode(regs, address, tsk);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
} | 651 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | perf_event_task_sched_out | perf_event_task_sched_out( struct task_struct * task , struct task_struct * next) | ['task', 'next'] | static inline void perf_event_task_sched_out(struct task_struct *task, struct task_struct *next)
{
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_CONTEXT_SWITCHES, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
__perf_event_task_sched_out(task, next);
} | 34 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | perf_sw_event | perf_sw_event( u32 event_id , u64 nr , int nmi , struct pt_regs * regs , u64 addr) | ['event_id', 'nr', 'nmi', 'regs', 'addr'] | perf_sw_event(u32 event_id, u64 nr, int nmi, struct pt_regs *regs, u64 addr)
{
struct pt_regs hot_regs;
if (static_branch(&perf_swevent_enabled[event_id])) {
if (!regs) {
perf_fetch_caller_regs(&hot_regs);
regs = &hot_regs;
}
__perf_sw_event(event_id, nr, nmi, regs, addr);
}
} | 69 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | __perf_event_overflow | __perf_event_overflow( struct perf_event * event , int nmi , int throttle , struct perf_sample_data * data , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['event', 'nmi', 'throttle', 'data', 'regs'] | static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event, int nmi,
int throttle, struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int events = atomic_read(&event->event_limit);
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
int ret = 0;
/*
* Non-sampling counters might still use the PMI to fold short
* hardware counters, ignore those.
*/
if (unlikely(!is_sampling_event(event)))
return 0;
if (unlikely(hwc->interrupts >= max_samples_per_tick)) {
if (throttle) {
hwc->interrupts = MAX_INTERRUPTS;
perf_log_throttle(event, 0);
ret = 1;
}
} else
hwc->interrupts++;
if (event->attr.freq) {
u64 now = perf_clock();
s64 delta = now - hwc->freq_time_stamp;
hwc->freq_time_stamp = now;
if (delta > 0 && delta < 2*TICK_NSEC)
perf_adjust_period(event, delta, hwc->last_period);
}
/*
* XXX event_limit might not quite work as expected on inherited
* events
*/
event->pending_kill = POLL_IN;
if (events && atomic_dec_and_test(&event->event_limit)) {
ret = 1;
event->pending_kill = POLL_HUP;
if (nmi) {
event->pending_disable = 1;
irq_work_queue(&event->pending);
} else
perf_event_disable(event);
}
if (event->overflow_handler)
event->overflow_handler(event, nmi, data, regs);
else
perf_event_output(event, nmi, data, regs);
if (event->fasync && event->pending_kill) {
if (nmi) {
event->pending_wakeup = 1;
irq_work_queue(&event->pending);
} else
perf_event_wakeup(event);
}
return ret;
} | 290 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | __perf_sw_event | __perf_sw_event( u32 event_id , u64 nr , int nmi , struct pt_regs * regs , u64 addr) | ['event_id', 'nr', 'nmi', 'regs', 'addr'] | void __perf_sw_event(u32 event_id, u64 nr, int nmi,
struct pt_regs *regs, u64 addr)
{
struct perf_sample_data data;
int rctx;
preempt_disable_notrace();
rctx = perf_swevent_get_recursion_context();
if (rctx < 0)
return;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, addr);
do_perf_sw_event(PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE, event_id, nr, nmi, &data, regs);
perf_swevent_put_recursion_context(rctx);
preempt_enable_notrace();
} | 79 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | do_perf_sw_event | do_perf_sw_event( enum perf_type_id type , u32 event_id , u64 nr , int nmi , struct perf_sample_data * data , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['type', 'event_id', 'nr', 'nmi', 'data', 'regs'] | static void do_perf_sw_event(enum perf_type_id type, u32 event_id,
u64 nr, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct swevent_htable *swhash = &__get_cpu_var(swevent_htable);
struct perf_event *event;
struct hlist_node *node;
struct hlist_head *head;
rcu_read_lock();
head = find_swevent_head_rcu(swhash, type, event_id);
if (!head)
goto end;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(event, node, head, hlist_entry) {
if (perf_swevent_match(event, type, event_id, data, regs))
perf_swevent_event(event, nr, nmi, data, regs);
}
end:
rcu_read_unlock();
} | 122 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | perf_bp_event | perf_bp_event( struct perf_event * bp , void * data) | ['bp', 'data'] | void perf_bp_event(struct perf_event *bp, void *data)
{
struct perf_sample_data sample;
struct pt_regs *regs = data;
perf_sample_data_init(&sample, bp->attr.bp_addr);
if (!bp->hw.state && !perf_exclude_event(bp, regs))
perf_swevent_event(bp, 1, 1, &sample, regs);
} | 67 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | perf_event_comm_output | perf_event_comm_output( struct perf_event * event , struct perf_comm_event * comm_event) | ['event', 'comm_event'] | static void perf_event_comm_output(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_comm_event *comm_event)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_sample_data sample;
int size = comm_event->event_id.header.size;
int ret;
perf_event_header__init_id(&comm_event->event_id.header, &sample, event);
ret = perf_output_begin(&handle, event,
comm_event->event_id.header.size, 0, 0);
if (ret)
goto out;
comm_event->event_id.pid = perf_event_pid(event, comm_event->task);
comm_event->event_id.tid = perf_event_tid(event, comm_event->task);
perf_output_put(&handle, comm_event->event_id);
__output_copy(&handle, comm_event->comm,
comm_event->comm_size);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, &handle, &sample);
perf_output_end(&handle);
out:
comm_event->event_id.header.size = size;
} | 163 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | perf_event_mmap_output | perf_event_mmap_output( struct perf_event * event , struct perf_mmap_event * mmap_event) | ['event', 'mmap_event'] | static void perf_event_mmap_output(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_mmap_event *mmap_event)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_sample_data sample;
int size = mmap_event->event_id.header.size;
int ret;
perf_event_header__init_id(&mmap_event->event_id.header, &sample, event);
ret = perf_output_begin(&handle, event,
mmap_event->event_id.header.size, 0, 0);
if (ret)
goto out;
mmap_event->event_id.pid = perf_event_pid(event, current);
mmap_event->event_id.tid = perf_event_tid(event, current);
perf_output_put(&handle, mmap_event->event_id);
__output_copy(&handle, mmap_event->file_name,
mmap_event->file_size);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, &handle, &sample);
perf_output_end(&handle);
out:
mmap_event->event_id.header.size = size;
} | 159 | True | 1 |
|
CVE-2011-2918 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'name': 'http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'name': 'http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/08/16/1', 'name': '[oss-security] 20110816 Re: CVE request -- kernel: perf: fix software event overflow', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=730706', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-400'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '3.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.'}] | 2020-07-31T10:19Z | 2012-05-24T23:55Z | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.
There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage
Not closing/returning a resource after processing
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | 0 | Peter Zijlstra | 2011-06-27 14:41:57+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | False | torvalds/linux | Linux kernel source tree | 2011-09-04 22:48:12 | 2022-08-26 19:08:15 | torvalds | 136917.0 | 44307.0 | perf_event_output | perf_event_output( struct perf_event * event , int nmi , struct perf_sample_data * data , struct pt_regs * regs) | ['event', 'nmi', 'data', 'regs'] | static void perf_event_output(struct perf_event *event, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_event_header header;
/* protect the callchain buffers */
rcu_read_lock();
perf_prepare_sample(&header, data, event, regs);
if (perf_output_begin(&handle, event, header.size, nmi, 1))
goto exit;
perf_output_sample(&handle, &header, data, event);
perf_output_end(&handle);
exit:
rcu_read_unlock();
} | 92 | True | 1 |