Datasets:

free-law

/

pa_embeddings

like 0

Follow

FreeLaw 8

ORDER PER CURIAM. AND NOW, this 13th day of September 2006, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is granted limited to the following issues: Whether Schadler v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of WeiseNberg Twp., 578 Pa. 177, 850 A.2d 619 (2004), renders conditional land use permits approved in violation of the applicable MPC notice requirements void ab initio such that the statutory time period provided for appeals does not apply to challenges alleging procedural infirmities? Whether approval of a conditional land use permit without public notice violates Petitioners’ rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

OPINION BY PANELLA, J.: ¶ 1 The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered on July 5, 2005, in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, which granted the motion to suppress evidence of Appellee, J.A.K., a minor. After careful review, we reverse. ¶ 2 The trial court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history as follows: The Reading Police Department (“Police Department”) in Berks County, Pennsylvania, received a seat belt enforcement grant. On May 18, 2005, the Police Department conducted seat belt surveys to determine compliance with seat belt usage at the locations where the photographic safety checkpoints were to be held. These surveys were taken between 9:39 A.M. and 11:45 A.M. The Police Department employs written guidelines for the checkpoints that were developed in conjunction with the National Highway Safety Administration. The Police Department issued a media release announcing that it would be conducting traffic safety checkpoints within the City of Reading to coincide with a national and state effort to encourage seat belt usage. The release further stated that the officers would conduct a systematic checkpoint with a sequence number to be determined. It closes with the following statements: The common sense fact remains that utilization of all restraints provided in vehicles can help to prevent injury and/or death and in those extremely violent collisions can help to reduce the level of injury by preventing the driver or occupants from being thrown around inside the vehicle. The City of Reading Police Department wishes that all the citizens of Reading and Berks County, and visitors, have a safe and happy holiday season and that we will be doing our part to encourage utilization of vehicle restraint systems and enforcing violations. We are asking for the cooperation of all to achieve the desired result of increased restraint system usage and a lessening of the incidence of injury and death through this effort. Commonwealth’s Exhibit Number 12. On May 25, 2005, the Police Department conducted a checkpoint in accordance with the provisions of the grant and in conjunction with the “Click it Or Ticket” state awareness program. According to the written guidelines every third car or those with obvious violations, such as invalid inspections, would be checked. The safety checkpoint began at 11:00 P.M. Officer Jose Gonzalez was one of the officers who worked at the checkpoint on May 25, 2005. He was not the officer who directed vehicles. At 11:40 P.M. the juvenile was driving a vehicle that was diverted to the checkpoint stop. Since Officer Gonzalez did not direct the vehicles he is uncertain if the juvenile’s vehicle was a third vehicle in the sequence to pass the checkpoint. Three passengers were also in the car. The owner of the vehicle was not present. Officer Gonzalez does not remember if the juvenile used a seat belt. He did not cite the juvenile for not wearing a seat belt. He did not observe the juvenile make any moving violations. Officer Gonzalez approached the rear passenger’s side of the car with a flashlight. He looked inside the vehicle and observed a clear plastic bag of suspected marijuana on the floor of the vehicle on the right side of the rear passenger seat. He immediately removed the passengers and the juvenile. Officer Gonzalez then observed a clear bag of suspected marijuana between the juvenile’s legs as he was exiting the vehicle. He arrested the juvenile and placed him in handcuffs. He subsequently found forty-six (46) bags of suspected crack and two (2) additional bags of suspected marijuana in the juvenile’s right pocket. A preliminary Yaltox Test showed positive reactions to the suspected illegal substances. Sergeant Michael Kalin went to the checkpoint to assist the uniformed officers with the car. Prior to getting into the vehicle Sergeant Kalin looked under the front driver’s seat to ensure his safety and found a Remington .32 caliber pistol loaded with the clip in and one (1) round in the chamber. Criminal Investigator Joseph Walsh obtained a search warrant to search the vehicle. Nothing additional was found in the car. The juvenile was charged with the acts of possession of a controlled substance [35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16)], possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance [35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(3)], firearms not to be carried without a license [18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1)], and possession of firearm by a minor [18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6110.1]. Neither he nor any of the passengers were charged with violating any of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code, including the provisions of the seat belt laws. Based on the foregoing evidence, the [trial] court granted the juvenile’s motion for the suppression of the physical evidence. The instant appeal followed. Trial Court Opinion, 08/18/05, at 1-4. ¶ 3 On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issue for our review: Whether the [trial] [c]ourt erred in granting the motion for suppression of physical evidence? Appellant’s Brief, at 4. ¶ 4 Initially, we set forth our standard of review. When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Commonwealth v. Keller, 823 A.2d 1004, 1008 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 765, 832 A.2d 435 (2003); See also, Commonwealth v. Jones, 845 A.2d 821, 824 (Pa.Super.2004). ¶ 5 In the instant case, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred when it determined that “failure to comply with the mandatory seat belt law, in and of itself, was never intended to be a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code for which a motor vehicle could be stopped by a police officer,” and thus, “[t]he police lacked the authority to stop motor vehicles solely because their drivers and/or front-seat passengers over the age of four are not using seat belts.” Trial Court Opinion, 08/19/05, at 5, citing Commonwealth v. Henderson, 444 Pa.Super. 170, 663 A.2d 728 (1995). We disagree. ¶ 6 The authority to conduct a traffic safety checkpoint arises from 75 Pa. Cons. StatAnn. § 6308(b), which states in pertinent part: § 6308. Investigation by police officers b) Authority of police officer. — Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title. 75 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. § 6308(b) (emphasis added). ¶ 7 The trial court’s reliance upon Henderson for the proposition that police can never stop motor vehicles for seat belt violations is misplaced. In Henderson, this Court held that, “the fact that the occupants of a motor vehicle over the age of four are not using their seat belts, in and of itself, can never serve as articulable and reasonable grounds to stop a motor vehicle because the Motor Vehicle Code has not been violated under such circumstances.” Henderson, 663 A.2d at 737-38. However, in so deciding, this Court was not confronted with a situation in which an investigative stop was conducted under established, systematic procedures, but rather, with a vehicular stop conducted by a sole police officer, independent of prior administrative oversight. Thus, Henderson was only concerned with vehicular stops for seat belt violations under 75 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. § 4581(a)(2), which are secondary violations, and not vehicular stops for seatbelt violations pursuant to 75 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. § 6308(b). In the instant case, there is no suggestion that police officers were stopping cars at the roadblock to cite them for seatbelt violations, but rather, the police officers were merely insti'ucted to remind drivers that failure to wear a seatbelt is in violation of Pennsylvania law. As such, we find that this Court’s decision in Henderson is distinguishable from the instant factual developments. ¶ 8 Accordingly, we must next determine whether the legislature intended that the mandatory passenger restraint system under 75 Pa. Cons.StatAnn. § 4581 is an appropriate justification for an investigative stop conducted pursuant to a vehicle checkpoint. In order to interpret the statute, we turn to the rules of statutory construction, which require a court to construe the words of the statute according to their plain meaning. See 1 Pa Cons.Stat. Ann. § 1903(a). After review, we are convinced, by the plain language of 75 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. § 6308(b), that so long as a “systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers” is followed, then an investigative roadblock may be conducted to enforce any provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code. Indeed, the plain language of 75 Pa Cons.Stat.Ann. § 6308(b) clearly does not limit the situations under which such a roadblock may be conducted, other than to specify that such a stop must be “neces sary to enforce the provisions of [the Motor Vehicle Code].” See 75 Pa. Cons.Stat. ANN. § 6308(b). Therefore, we find that while 75 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. § 4581(a)(2) may prohibit a police officer from making routine traffic stops for a seatbelt violation, nothing in that provision prohibits an investigative roadblock that checks for general motor vehicle safety compliance, provided that a proper systematic program is implemented. Such roadblocks afford minimal personal interference, while furthering an important highway safety interest. ¶ 9 Having thus far decided that a checkpoint for seatbelt usage is lawful in Pennsylvania, we must lastly address whether the checkpoint in the instant case complied with specified procedural requirements outlined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277, 585 A.2d 1035 (1987), a plurality of the Supreme Court set forth guidelines to insure that an investigative roadblock is constitutionally acceptable: The possibility of arbitrary roadblocks can be significantly curtailed by the institution of certain safeguards. First, the very decision to hold a drunk-driver roadblock, as well as the decision as to its time and place, should be matters reserved for prior administrative approval, thus removing the determination of those matters from the discretion of police officers in the field. In this connection it is essential that the route selected for the roadblock be one which, based on local experience, is likely to be travelled [sic] by intoxicated drivers. The time of the roadblock should be governed by the same consideration. Additionally, the question of which vehicles to stop at the roadblock should not be left to the unfettered discretion of police officers at the scene, but instead should be in accordance with objective standards prefixed by administrative decision. Id. at 293, 535 A.2d at 1043. The Court held that a drunk-driver roadblock must be conducted “substantially in compliance” with the above guidelines. Id. These guidelines were adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Blouse, [531 Pa.] at 173, 611 A.2d at 1180. Commonwealth v. Ziegelmeier, 454 Pa.Super. 330, 685 A.2d 559, 561-562 (1996). See also, Commonwealth v. Stewart, 846 A.2d 738 (Pa.Super.2004), appeal denied, 584 Pa. 707, 885 A.2d 42 (2005). ¶ 10 In the instant case, J.A.K. conceded during the suppression hearing that the Commonwealth had complied with the appropriate prior administrative approval required for conducting investigative roadblocks. See N.T., 06/27/05, at 8-11. Moreover, J.A.K. also stipulated during the suppression hearing that the procedural guidelines for the roadblock as set forth in Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2, were ostensibly followed by the Commonwealth. N.T., 06/27/05, at 9. The procedures that J.A.K. agreed were followed included, inter alia: 1) every 3rd car would be directed to stop; 2) restraint usage would be checked, as well as whether the operator of the vehicle possessed a valid operator’s license, registration, and insurance; 3) other stations would be set up to follow-up with any discrepancies; and 4) individuals who were not properly restrained as required would be given a “click it or ticket” warning. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2. ¶ 11 Though these criteria, in fact, comport with the procedural guidelines for conducting a roadblock, the trial court nonetheless granted J.A.K.’s suppression motion, essentially on the grounds that “it is questionable that the real goal of the Police Department was to raise seat belt awareness since the checkpoint began at 11:00 P.M. ... By beginning the checkpoint only at 11:00 P.M., the police department was more likely to find criminal activity afoot and less need for vehicular safety.” Trial Court Opinion, 08/18/05, at 4. ¶ 12 The record does not support this observation. As noted in the Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 3, the Reading Police Department had previously conducted a safety checkpoint at the same location on three prior occasions. On one of these occasions, the police conducted the checkpoint at the same time as the checkpoint in question — from 11 p.m. to 3 a.m. — during which several non-driving violations of the motor vehicle code were discovered, including seatbelt/child seat violations. See id. Accordingly, the police clearly had a basis to conclude that the time and place selected for the checkpoint would target motor vehicle violations, including noncom-pliant restraint usage. Since the roadblock in the instant case was conducted substantially in compliance with the above-referenced guidelines, we find that it did not violate the Pennsylvania constitution. Cf. Commonwealth v. Worthy, 903 A.2d 576, ¶¶ 12-13 (Pa.Super.2006) (finding that sobriety checkpoint did not comport with established procedures governing operation of roadblock where the decision to suspend the checkpoint and resume the checkpoint was controlled by the arbitrary discretion of the police officers, rather than a prefixed, objective standard). ¶ 13 In conclusion, we find that a roadblock conducted, in part, to check restraint usage is permissible under the laws of this Commonwealth. Moreover, we find that the roadblock at issue in the instant case substantially comported with the constitutional guidelines as set forth by our Supreme Court. Because the roadblock was constitutionally valid, the officer’s plain view observation of the bag of marijuana in the back seat of J.A.K.’s vehicle constituted probable cause to initiate a search of the vehicle. We therefore reverse and vacate the Order of July 5, 2005, granting the Motion to Suppress. ¶ 14 Order reversed. Matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Panel jurisdiction relinquished. . This appeal is permissible as the Commonwealth has certified in good faith that the order submitted for our review substantially handicaps the prosecution and the appeal is not intended for delay purposes. See Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985); Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.Ann. . The statute provides, in pertinent part: § 4581. Restraint systems (a) Occupant protection.— (2) Except for children under eight years of age and except as provided in paragraphs (1) and (1.1), each driver and front seat occupant of a passenger car, Class I truck, Class II truck or motor home operated in this Commonwealth shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened safety seat belt system. A conviction under this paragraph by State or local law enforcement agencies shall occur only as a secondary action when a driver of a motor vehicle has been convicted of any other provision of this title. The driver of a passenger automobile shall secure or cause to be secured in a properly adjusted and fastened safety seat belt system any occupant who is eight years of age or older and less than 18 years of age. 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 4581(a)(2). . Although our caselaw dealing with checkpoint procedures focuses on DUI checkpoints, we analyze the facts of this case utilizing the same guidelines, as there is no reasonable distinction between DUI checkpoints and vehicle safety checkpoints. . In so deciding, we find it instructive that the police officers in the case sub judice were instructed to not only check compliance with seatbelt usage, but also to check whether the drivers of the vehicles possessed a proper driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 2. Thus, we cannot agree with the trial court's classification of the roadblock as one purely conducted to enforce restraint usage. Though seatbelt safety may indeed have been the main purpose of holding the roadblock, we do not find the checkpoint was based solely thereon. . ‘‘[I]n Blouse, the Court relied heavily upon the lead opinion in Tarbert to conclude that systematic, nondiscriminatory, nonarbitrary roadblocks instituted to detect registration, licensing, and equipment violations are consistent with Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, so long as they are conducted in conformance with the guidelines announced in Tarbert." Commonwealth v. Beaman, 583 Pa. 636, 646-647, 880 A.2d 578, 585 (2005).

OPINION BY Judge SMITH-RIBNER. Barbara Jean Lopez appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County that found her guilty of thirty-four counts of violating Section 201 of the Dog Law, Act of December 7, 1982, P.L. 784, as amended, 3 P.S. § 459-201, relating to applications for dog licenses, and guilty of twenty-nine counts of violating Section 8 of the Rabies Prevention and Control in Domestic Animals and Wildlife Act (Rabies Act), Act of December 15, 1986, P.L. 1610, as amended, 3 P.S. § 455.8, relating to vaccinations required, both of which are summary offenses. Lopez questions whether these provisions applied to her in this case and whether the trial court had evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Lopez owned all of the dogs that the trial court found that she owned. A non-jury trial in this matter was conducted on December 14, 2004. The sole witness, Roland Yochum, stated that he is employed by the Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Dog Law, as a Dog Warden primarily in Crawford County. He testified that on April 24, 2004 he and another person went to the residence of Lopez on Route 408 in Troy Township by appointment to determine if the kennel license previously issued for the property had been renewed or if the property no longer needed a license. He indicated that Lopez came out from the mobile home on the property and met them at the gate. There were approximately twelve pens in which dogs were housed around the driveway and the home, and Lopez took Yoc-hum and the person with him to each of the pens and identified the dogs by names, types and gender. Yochum observed half-full bowls of food and water in the pens, and he saw Lopez fork straw into a pen. Yochum additionally testified that Lopez told him that she and her husband, Mr. Lopez, were separated and that he had moved out. The dogs remained at the residence, and she was caring for them. There were thirty-four dogs, and Yochum determined that by their size and the amount of their hair they were all mature dogs. Lopez did not have a license for any of the dogs. Yochum also determined that Lopez did not have rabies vaccination certificates for twenty-nine of the dogs. He agreed that a licensed kennel had existed at the premises previously and that the premises appeared to be the same as when it was a licensed kennel, although there was no current kennel license. In its opinion and verdict of December 14, 2004 and in its opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P.1925 on Lopez’ statement of matters complained of on appeal, the trial court noted that when a kennel is being operated it is not necessary for each dog to be registered so long as the kennel has a kennel license issued by the Department of Agriculture. Section 207 of the Dog Law, 3 P.S. § 459-207. However, there was no evidence that a kennel was being operated at the time of the visit, and there was no kennel license. The court quoted the definition of “kennel” in Section 102 of the Dog Law, 3 P.S. § 459-102, which lists as examples various purposes for which dogs in a kennel are kept, including breeding, training and rental, and it concluded that there was no evidence that the premises met that definition. Therefore, the individual dogs were required to be licensed. As to whether Lopez was the “owner” of the dogs and so required to secure the licenses, the court quoted the definition of “owner” in Section 102 of the Dog Law, which includes both a person who has a property right in a dog and a person who keeps or harbors a dog and has it in his or her care. The trial court determined that the Commonwealth established that Lopez was harboring and caring for the dogs and permitting them to remain at her property. As for the charged violations of the Rabies Act, the court noted that neither the act nor the implementing regulations define “owner,” but the court concluded that it made sense to use the same definition as in the Dog Law. The court found Lopez guilty of the sixty-three citations and ordered that she pay a fine of $25.00 and costs for each. Lopez first contends that Section 201 of the Dog Law and Section 8 of the Rabies Act do not apply; rather, the kennel laws apply to the dogs at issue. Lopez states that there was no credible evidence that Mr. Lopez failed to apply timely to renew his kennel license or that he was ever advised that his license would not be renewed and afforded due process of law. She refers to testimony of Yochum stating that he made the appointment to follow up on why the kennel license was not renewed for the year 2004, N.T. p. 6, Reproduced Record (R.R.) 31; that they went there to find out if the kennel license had been renewed or if the operation had been closed, downsized or moved, N.T. p. 7, R.R. 32; and that Yochum knew that Mr. Lopez had not applied for a license, N.T. p. 22, R.R. 47. Lopez states that the trial court did not allow questioning on cross-examination to show that the kennel remained in operation as a kennel, citing N.T. pp. 25-28, R.R. 50-53. Yochum did testify, however, that basically nothing about the operation had changed since the time when he knew that there was a license. Lopez quotes the definition of “kennel” in Section 102 of the Dog Law, see n. 1 above, and she points out that the definition makes no reference to a license. Rather, the license requirement is stated in Section 206, 3 P.S. § 459-206, which provides in part: (a) Applications, kennel license classifications and fees. — Any person who keeps or operates a Class I, Class II, Class III, Class IV or Class V Kennel, Boarding Kennel Class I, Boarding Kennel Class II, Boarding Kennel Class III or nonprofit kennel shall, on or before January 1 of each year, apply to the department for a kennel license.... A kennel license is required to keep or operate any establishment that keeps, harbors, boards, shelters, sells, gives away or in any way transfers a cumulative total of 26 or more dogs of any age in any one calendar year. All kennel licenses shall expire on December 31. Lopez asserts that under the statute a license is something applied for because a kennel exists, not something that makes a kennel exist. She maintains that Section 207(a.l), 3 P.S. § 459-207(a.l), sets forth the procedure for dealing with a kennel operating without having or renewing its license. Lopez argues that this is a case where a kennel not belonging to her is alleged to have failed to renew its license. She characterizes Yochum’s testimony as conflicting in regard to whether he knew that the license had not been renewed, and she states that he never spoke to the kennel’s owner, Mr. Lopez, to find out. She submits that the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence that the kennel had ceased to exist so as to permit a person who worked at the kennel to become the dogs’ owner, and she finds no evidentiary support for the trial court’s statement that no license had been issued and therefore for its conclusion that the operation did not meet the definition of a kennel. Rather, the kennel law applied but instead of following procedures set forth in Section 207(a.l), the authorities inappropriately charged Lopez. Under the assertedly overbroad wording in the definition of owner, any worker at a kennel would be the owner of all the dogs for which he or she cared. Without citation, Lopez argues that the statutory definition permits ownership to attach in an arbitrary manner based on casual human to dog contact and permits the imposition of serious financial responsibility upon a person without his or her knowledge due to the failure of the kennel owner to act. Lopez’ closely related second argument is that there was no evidence before the trial court to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she owned all of the dogs that it determined she owned. Although familiar with the statutory definition of owner, Yoc-hum responded “no” when asked if he had anything to prove that Lopez was the owner of the dogs. N.T. p. 24, R.R. 49. He stated that Lopez told him that Mr. Lopez had all of the information concerning current licenses and vaccinations. Further, she asserts that there was nothing of record to show that she owned the trailer or the land, and she contends that it is only an assumption that the area where the kennel was located was part of the parcel with the trailer in which she resided. Without sufficient proof that the dogs were at Lopez’ residence, she is not established as the owner under the statute, and the conviction cannot stand. The Commonwealth states that the proper standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner and to accept as true all evidence and reasonable inferences upon which, if believed, the fact finder could have based the verdict and to determine whether such evidence and inferences are sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, citing Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 Pa. 537, 510 A.2d 1217 (1986). It responds to the second argument first, stating that at the summary appeal trial it provided the trial court with evidence that proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Lopez owned all of the dogs found at the premises. Yochum testified that Lopez told him that her husband had moved out, that she lived alone at the premises and that she was the one taking care of the dogs. She identified each of them by name, and she was providing food and water. Countering Lopez’ assertions regarding lack of proof of her ownership of the premises, the Commonwealth notes that Section 102 of the Dog Law does not require that a person be the land owner; it merely requires that she be a person who “keeps or harbors such dog or has it in [her] care” or who “permits such dog to remain on or about any premises occupied by [her].” Second, the Commonwealth argues that Section 201 of the Dog Law and Section 8 of the Rabies Act apply. Section 8 of the Rabies Act provides in part: “(a) Requirement. — Every person living in this Commonwealth, owning or keeping a dog or cat over three months of age, shall cause that dog or cat to be vaccinated against rabies.” Pursuant to Section 201(a) of the Dog Law: “the owner of any dog, three months of age or older, ... shall apply to the county treasurer of his respective county ... for a license for such dog.” Although Lopez argues that the matter should be treated as one where a kennel was in operation and the operator failed to reapply for a license, the fact is that Lopez never owned or operated a kennel. After her husband left and she assumed the care of the dogs, she became the private owner of thirty-four dogs under the terms of Section 102 of the Dog Law. She could have applied for a kennel license, but she did not; hence, she was subject to the requirements of licensing and securing vaccinations. Under the facts established, the Court must affirm the order of the trial court. First, there is no question whatsoever that the credited testimony of Yochum supported a finding that Lopez was caring for the dogs and permitting them to remain “on or about” a premises occupied by her. That finding brought her within the definition of “owner” in Section 102 of the Dog Law, which by its express terms is broader than a person simply having a property interest in a dog. The plain intent of the statute is that dogs be licensed, and if one having the property interest in a dog does not perform that function, then the statute requires one harboring or caring for the dog to perform it. The object of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and to give effect to the intent of the legislature. See Section 1921(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a). Furthermore, Yochum’s testimony that the former kennel license had not been renewed supported the trial court’s determination that no license was in effect. Under Section 206 of the Dog Law, a kennel license is required to operate any establishment that keeps, harbors or transfers twenty-six or more dogs in a calendar year. In the absence of a valid kennel license, this was not a kennel. The Court notes that had a charge of operating a kennel without a license been successfully prosecuted, the minimum fine of $100 per day under Section 207(a.l) would have resulted in substantially greater fines. The Court’s review of the statutory appeal in this case where the trial court heard the matter de novo is limited to determining whether its findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence, whether it committed an error of law and whether it abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Hake, 738 A.2d 46 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999). Based on its review, the Court holds that the trial court’s findings were sufficiently supported and that it did not misapply provisions of the Dog Law or the Rabies Act in arriving at its conclusions. Id. The Court therefore affirms. ORDER AND NOW, this 28th day of September, 2006, the order and verdict of the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County is affirmed. FRIEDMAN, J., files dissenting opinion. . Section 102 defines "Kennel” as "[a]ny establishment wherein dogs are kept for the purpose of breeding, hunting, training, renting, research or vivisection, buying, boarding, sale, show or any other similar purpose and is so constructed that dogs cannot stray therefrom.” . Section 102 defines "Owner” as follows: When applied to the proprietorship of a dog, includes every person having a right of property in such dog, and every person who keeps or harbors such dog or has it in his care, and eveiy person who permits such dog to remain on or about any premises occupied by him. . On cross-examination Lopez' counsel questioned whether it was the responsibility of a kennel owner, rather than others, to take care of the dogs. Counsel for the Commonwealth objected on the grounds of relevance, and the trial court sustained the objection stating that there had been no showing that there was a kennel because there was no showing of a license. . Section 207(a.l) provides: Prohibition to operate; injunction; fines. — It shall be unlawful for kennels described under section 206 to operate without first obtaining a kennel license from the department. The secretary shall not approve any kennel license application unless such kennel has been inspected and approved by a State dog warden or employee of the department. The secretary may file a suit in equity in the Commonwealth Court to enjoin the operation of any kennel that violates any of the provisions of this act. In addition, the secretary may seek in such suit the imposition of a fine for every day in violation of this act for an amount not less than $100 nor more than $500 per day. . Although dogs in a licensed kennel need not have individual licenses under Sections 206 and 207 of the Dog Law, all dogs must be vaccinated for rabies, with owners of certain kennels permitted to administer the vaccine pursuant to Section 8(b) of the Rabies Act, 3 P.S. § 455.8(b).

OPINION BY KELLY, J.: ¶ 1 Appellant, Progressive Halcyon Insurance Company, appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying in part and granting in part its motion for summary judgment in a matter presenting the question of whether an insured party injured in a car covered by the full tort option can be denied full tort benefits because he also owns an uninsured vehicle. We affirm. ¶2 Appellee, Anthony Kennedy, was a named insured of an automobile insurance policy issued by Appellant. In that policy, which covered Appellee’s 1997 Ford and 1989 Toyota, he had selected the full tort option as provided in § 1705(a) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1701-1799. Appellee also owned a 1986 Nissan that was not insured under any policy. On or about January 28, 2004, Appellee was involved in a motor vehicle accident while operating the Ford. He claims the accident was caused by an unknown vehicle swerving into his lane. He suffered injuries and presented Appellant with a claim for first-party benefits and an uninsured motorist claim. On November 3, 2004, Appellant filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether Appellee was entitled to recover first-party benefits, and whether he was subject to limited tort provisions on the uninsured motorist claim. On August 1, 2005, Appellant moved for summary judgment on both counts. On September 30, the trial court granted summary judgment on the issue of first-party benefits and denied summary judgment on the issue of the uninsured motorist claim. This timely appeal followed. ¶ 3 Appellant raises the following issue for our review: BECAUSE THE LANGUAGE OF 75 PA.C.S.LA] § 1705(a)(5) IS IDENTICAL TO THE LANGUAGE IN 75 PA. C.S.[A.] § 1714 AND BECAUSE THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT HAS HELD THAT THE LANGUAGE OF 75 PA.C.S.[A.] § 1714 REQURIES AN INSURED TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR EACH AND EVERY MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTERED IN THAT PERSON’S NAME, WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT [APPELLEE] IS ELIGIBLE FOR FULL TORT COVERAGE FOR ANY UNINSURED MOTORIST CLAIM? (Appellant’s Brief at 4). ¶ 4 Appellant alleges that because Appellee owned an uninsured vehicle, even though that vehicle was not involved in the accident, he is deemed to have chosen limited tort coverage under § 1705(a)(5). Appellant relies on Swords v. Harleysville Ins. Companies, 584 Pa. 382, 883 A.2d 562 (2005), for the proposition that the requirement of financial responsibility applies to all registered vehicles, not just the vehicle involved in the accident. Applying that holding, Appellant reasons that Appellee is deemed to have selected limited tort coverage for all vehicles registered in his name and asserts that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment as to the uninsured motorist claim. We disagree. ¶ 5 Summary judgment is appropriate where there remains no genuine issue of any material fact. Id. at 566. In considering motions for summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. We may reverse summary judgment only when there has been a manifest abuse of discretion or an error of law, such as a mistaken interpretation of the MVFRL. See id. at 567. ¶ 6 In Berger v. Rinaldi, 438 Pa.Super. 78, 651 A.2d 553 (1994), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 641, 664 A.2d 971 (1995), this Court held that § 1705(a)(5) was not intended to preclude a full tort claim where the plaintiff owned an uninsured vehicle that was not involved in the accident from which the claim arose. Id. at 556. Later, in Swords, supra, our Supreme Court held that the language of § 1714 unambiguously prevented a motorist, who owned an uninsured vehicle, from collecting first-party benefits, whether or not the uninsured vehicle was being operated. Id. at 568; see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b) (stating that unambiguous statutes should be given their plain meaning). This raises the issue of whether the analysis of § 1714 in Swords changes previous interpretations of § 1705(b)(2) that have allowed an in jured party to recover full tort benefits in certain situations even where they own an uninsured vehicle. We find that it does not do so in this case. ¶ 7 In Berger, supra, the plaintiff was injured in an auto accident while driving a vehicle owned and insured with full tort coverage by his mother. Id. at 558. Because the plaintiff lived with his mother, he was considered insured under her policy even though he owned another vehicle and did not himself purchase any insurance. Id. at 554. The Berger Court found that § 1705(b)(2) contained two mutually exclusive scenarios: [Part One:] The tort option elected by a named insured shall apply to all insureds under the private passenger motor vehicle policy who are not named insureds under another private passenger motor vehicle policy. [Part Two:] In the case where more than one private passenger motor vehicle policy is applicable to an insured and the policies have conflicting tort options, the insured is bound by the tort option of the policy associated with the private passenger motor vehicle in which the insured is an occupant at the time of the accident if he is an insured on that policy and bound by the full tort option otherwise. Id. at 557 (quoting 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(b)(2)) (emphasis removed). This Court held that part one applied when one policy was involved, and part two when the injured party could be covered by more than one policy. Id. In holding that § 1705(a)(5) did not apply when the uninsured car was not in the accident, this Court held that when part two applied, the policy on the vehicle involved in the accident determined the applicable coverage. Id. In other words, even if the plaintiff Berger was deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative for his uninsured vehicle under § 1705(a)(5), since he was insured under his mother’s policy while driving her car he was considered a full tort plaintiff for an accident involving that car. See id. ¶ 8 We find it significant that our Supreme Court recently affirmed this rule in Hoffman v. Troncelliti, 576 Pa. 504, 839 A.2d 1013 (2003). The Court held that the plaintiff was eligible for full tort relief when she was injured as a passenger in her mother’s car because, although she had selected the limited tort option for her own vehicle, she was considered insured under her mother’s full tort policy. Id. at 1016. The Supreme Court’s analysis mirrored that of our Court in Berger, supra, which found that § 1705(b)(2) had two mutually exclusive parts and that when applying part two, the court should look to the tort option of the vehicle in which the party was injured. Hoffman, supra, at 1016. ¶ 9 In Swords, our Supreme Court addressed the specific language of § 1714. There, a son was injured in an accident while driving a car owned and insured by his father. Id. at 564. Though considered insured under his father’s policy, the son separately owned a vehicle for which he had not purchased insurance. Id. The Court held that, under the plain meaning of § 1714, the son must have his own financial responsibility to receive first party benefits. Id. at 568. Rather than overturning the previous rule established by Henrich v. Harleysville Ins. Companies, 533 Pa. 181, 620 A.2d 1122, 1124 (1993), in which the plaintiff was allowed to recover under the uninsured motorist provision when she was not operating her own uninsured vehicle, the Court held that the MVFRL uniquely prevented a plaintiff who owned an uninsured vehicle from recovering first party benefits but did not prevent the same plaintiff from “recovering damages for injuries sustained as a result of automobile accidents.” Swords, supra at 569. The Court reasoned that in enacting § 1714, the Legislature clearly intended to prevent owners without insurance from collecting first party benefits, regardless of whether they were injured in the uninsured vehicle, but nowhere did it enact similar language limiting uninsured motorist claims. Id. ¶ 10 Instantly, unlike the plaintiffs in Swords, Hoffman, and Berger, Appellee seeks to enforce a policy that he himself had purchased from Appellant and in which he was a named insured; he does not rely on coverage under a policy purchased by someone else. Compare Swords, supra at 564; Hoffman, supra at 1016; Berger, supra at 554. Since the instant case involves only one policy, we look to part one of § 1705(b)(2) and apply the full tort option chosen by Appellee. See Hoffman, supra at 1016; Berger, supra at 556. We find it especially noteworthy that, in Hoffman, even where the insured had selected and paid only for limited tort coverage on her own policy, our Supreme Court still applied the full tort coverage of the vehicle in which she was injured. See id. Here, Appellee’s claim is even stronger because he himself had selected and paid for full tort coverage. Appellant attempts to distinguish the instant case from Berger by arguing that Appellee was a named insured under his own policy but not financially responsible because his third vehicle was uninsured, while the plaintiff Berger relied on a policy of which the owner was financially responsible. (Appellant’s Brief at 10). However, we find this distinction untenable since it is hardly true that Berger, who had not purchased any insurance, was himself financially responsible. See Berger, supra at 554. Finding Berger “financially responsible as a resident/relative insured under his mother’s policy,” this Court reasoned that a plaintiff need not be financially responsible personally, but rather need only be financially responsible with respect to the car involved in the accident. Id. at 557. If anything, the distinction drawn by Appellant illustrates that Appellee, who had purchased insurance on two of his three vehicles, has an even stronger claim for full tort coverage than did Berger. ¶ 11 Appellant argues that since § 1705(a)(5) provides that an owner who does not have financial responsibility has been deemed to have chosen the limited tort option, and § 1782(a) of the MVFRL provides that proof of financial responsibility includes coverage for every registered vehicle, the limited tort provision should govern all of Appellee’s claims. (Appellant’s Brief at 8-9). We find that these statutory gymnastics ignore the plain meaning of § 1705(b)(2) and the holding of Hoffman. Because Appellee was a named insured under his own policy, and that policy is the only one in question, part one of § 1705(b)(2) requires that his choice of coverage be honored. See id. Since § 1705(a)(5) uses singular, nonexclusive language in applying to “an owner of a ... vehicle” (emphasis added), it does not on its face apply to every vehicle owned, and so Appellant’s interpretation requires us to read the words “of all owned vehicles” into the statute after “financial responsibility.” See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b) (limiting courts to plain meaning of statute if clear). This we decline to do. Even if we were to grant Appellant’s claim and apply a limited tort option to Appellee’s uninsured vehicle, we would merely be presented with conflicting policies as in Hoffman. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s rule, we would find that under part two of § 1705(b)(2) we would apply the policy of the vehicle involved in the accident, making Appellee a full tort plaintiff. See id. ¶ 12 Appellant’s interpretation would also lead to an absurd result. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922 (stating courts should avoid statutory constructions that lead to absurd result). The purpose of the MVFRL was to address rising insurance costs by encouraging motorists to purchase insurance and to deny unlimited protection to those who did not choose full tort coverage. Swords, supra at 567. Application of this reasoning to a motorist who has actually bought and paid for full tort coverage on the vehicle involved in the accident fails signally to fulfill the purpose of the statute. See Hoffman, supra at 1018 (holding that purchased full tort protection was consistent with statutory purpose); Swords, supra at 569 (quoting Hen-rich, supra) (“[W]e will not attribute ‘harsh motives to the legislature unless they were clearly spelled out.’ ”). ¶ 13 We are also persuaded that any conflict about the interpretation § 1705 should be resolved in favor of Ap-pellee, as the MVFRL should be construed liberally in favor of the insured. See Hoffman, supra at 1019 (citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(c)). Moreover, “in virtually every circumstance where there is a question about [which] coverage will apply, there is a conscious attempt to rule in favor of the full tort alternative.” Berger, supra at 557 (quoting House Legislative Journal, 2/7/90, at 214). Therefore, we must allow Appellee’s full tort claim and find no ambiguity in § 1705 as applied instantly. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly decided that Appellee is entitled to full tort protection. ¶ 14 Finally, Appellee contends that Appellant’s actions have unreasonably delayed the claim and asks for sanctions in the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees. (Appellee’s Brief at 13). We may impose such a sanction if we determine that the appeal is frivolous or taken solely for delay, or if Appellant’s conduct is dilatory, obdurate or vexatious. Pa.R.A.P. 2744. Because we find Appellant’s conduct does not meet these criteria, Appellee’s request for sanctions is denied. ¶ 15 Order affirmed. . The uninsured motorist claim is based on 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702, which defines an uninsured motor vehicle as, inter alia, “[a]n unidentified motor vehicle that causes an accident.” . That section states, "An owner of a currently registered private passenger motor vehicle who does not have financial responsibility shall be deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a)(5). . Appellee does not challenge the trial court order granting Appellant’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of first-party benefits. .An “ineligible claimant” who cannot recover first party benefits is described in § 1714, in relevant part, as "[a]n owner of a currently registered motor vehicle who does not have financial responsibility.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1714. . Under the MVFRL, a driver who resides in the same household as a named insured and is a spouse, relative or minor in custody of the named insured is deemed "insured.” 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1702. . Appellants argue that allowing Appellee to recover non-economic damages but not first party benefits leads to an absurd result. (Appellant's Brief at 12 n. 3). However, the Supreme Court provides a valid reason for such a distinction in Swords, supra, reasoning that, to avoid an overly harsh outcome for an injured party, the Legislature intentionally left available the ability to sue for damages. Id. at 569.

OPINION BY HUDOCK, J.: ¶ 1 In this class action suit for breach of contract and bad faith, James Mee (Mee) appeals from the order granting summary judgment to Safeco Insurance Company of America (Safeco). Finding that the trial court misapplied this Court’s holding in Gilderman v. State Farm Insurance Company, 437 Pa.Super. 217, 649 A.2d 941 (1994), we reverse and remand for further proceedings. ¶ 2 Mee purchased a homeowner’s insurance policy from Safeco covering his home at 4540 Garland Road, Bensalem, PA 19020, with an effective date of August 29, 2001, to August 29, 2002. The policy provided replacement cost coverage, but also allowed for the possibility of loss settlement based on actual cash value. The policy defines actual cash value as follows: ‘When the damage to property is economically repairable, actual cash value means the cost of repairing the damage, less reasonable deduction for wear and tear, deterioration and obsolescence.” Policy Definitions, page 20, at ¶ 1(a). ¶ 3 On May 20, 2002, Mee suffered direct physical loss to his home as the result of an overflowing toilet. Mee reported the loss to Safeco the same day. On May 23, 2002, Safeco sent a general contactor, First General/Lewis Builders, Inc. (Lewis Builders), to inspect the damage to Mee’s home and to provide Safeco with a repair and replacement cost estimate. Lewis Builders submitted an estimate to Safeco of $3,892.38. This estimate did not include a line-item cost for a general contractor’s overhead and profit (O & P). Safeco also hired John Dwyer of Com-Search (ComSearch) to conduct an adjuster summary of Lewis Builders’ estimate. ComSearch concluded that the cost of repair to Mee’s home was $3,368.83, a difference of $523.55 from Lewis Builders’ estimate. Meanwhile, Mee hired a public adjuster, John Hansen, to inspect the damage and to provide a repair and replacement cost estimate. Using his own esti mate, John Hansen submitted a proof of loss form to Safeco on behalf of Mee in the amount of $7,112.09. The major difference between John Hansen’s estimate and Corn-Search’s estimate was the cost of replacing the hardwood floor in Mee’s family room. ¶ 4 On July 22, 2002, Safeco issued a check in the amount of $2,284.15 to Mee and his wife and John Hansen. This amount purportedly represented the cost of repairs, less Mee’s $500.00 deductible and twenty percent for O & P. Mee accepted the check as "partial settlement” of his claim. Then, in a letter from John Hansen to Safeco dated December 11, 2002, Mee presented a claim for twenty percent O & P based on the repair and replacement cost estimates. Safeco sent a letter on December 17, 2002, offering Mee O & P with regard to the unresolved flooring issue only and requesting that Mee provide the name of the general contractor who would be doing the repairs, as indication that Mee would incur an O & P expense. Mee did not respond to Safeco’s request. ¶ 5 On May 19, 2003, Mee filed suit against Safeco alleging breach of contract, insurance bad faith under 42 Pa.C.S.A. section 8371, and violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 P.S. sections 201-1-201-9.3. As noted, Mee brought this suit as a class action on his own behalf and as the representative of a class of similarly situated homeowners in Pennsylvania. Safeeo’s preliminary objection to the UTPCPL claim was sustained on December 18, 2002. Following discovery, Safeco filed a motion for summary judgment on December 1, 2004, to which Mee responded on December 29, 2004. Then, on February 14, 2005, Safeco filed a joint motion for summary judgment along with several other defendants in separate, related cases. The trial court granted summary judgment to Safeco on June 15, 2005. This appeal followed. ¶ 6 Mee asks us to review the following questions: 1. Did the trial Court commit error when it granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurance company, even though the record contained expert custom and usage evidence that whenever more than one trade is reasonably required to make repairs, a general contractor’s services (with the contractor’s overhead and profit) are reasonably required? Does Safeco’s’ [sic] homeowners insurance policy, together with relevant custom and usage, require that Safeco automatically and unconditionally pay, to a property damage claimant, general contractor’s overhead and profit whenever more than one construction trade is reasonably required to make the repairs or restoration? Mee’s Brief at 4. These questions challenge the trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on its finding that Safeco was not required to pay O & P to Mee because he did not use a general contractor to repair the damage to his home. Our scope of review of an order granting summary judgment is plenary. We apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered. All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly implicate the plaintiffs proof of the elements of her cause of action. Summary judgment is proper “if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury.” Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. In other words, “whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense, which could be established by additional discovery or expert report and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” summary judgment is appropriate. Id. Thus, a record that supports summary judgment either (1) shows the material facts are undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action or defense. Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions. The appellate [cjourt will disturb the trial court’s order only upon an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law on facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing and consideration. Consequently, the court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking reason. Similarly, the trial court abuses its discretion if it does not follow legal procedure. Where the discretion exercised by the trial court is challenged on appeal, the party bringing the challenge bears a heavy burden. It is not sufficient to persuade the appellate court that it might have reached a different conclusion if ... charged with the duty imposed on the court below; it is necessary to go further and show an abuse of the discretionary power. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused. Chenot v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 55, 60-62 (Pa.Super.2006) (internal quotations and most internal citations omitted). ¶ 7 At the heart of the present dispute is conflicting interpretations of this Court’s decision in Gilderman v. State Farm Ins. Co., 437 Pa.Super. 217, 649 A.2d 941 (1994). According to Mee, Gild-erman stands for the proposition that, in any claim where more than one trade is required to perform the repairs, it is “reasonably likely” that the services of a general contractor will be required and, accordingly, the insurance company must include 0 & P as part of its actual cash value payment, even if the insured makes the repairs himself, hires a handyman instead of a team of subcontractors, or chooses not to make the repairs at all. Mee’s Brief at 15, n. 8, and 17. Safeco, on the other hand, interprets Gilderman as imposing a requirement that an insurer look at the facts of each case in making its determination of whether the use of a contractor is reasonably likely. Because Mee did not hire a general contractor but did the work himself, Safeco argues, use of a general contractor was not reasonably likely, and, therefore, Mee was not entitled to 0 & P. Safeco’s Brief at 8. The trial court agreed with Safeco, finding that Mee did not hire a general contractor; therefore, “[t]he use of a general contractor was never ‘reasonably likely’ because no general contractor was needed.” Opinion, 11/28/05, at 4. Both these interpretations miss the mark. Consequently, because the trial court misapplied our decision in Gilderman, it committed an error of law. ¶ 8 The Honorable John Hester stated the issue in Gilderman as “whether an insurer, which has agreed to pay repair or replacement costs less depreciation in advance of actual repair or replacement of a covered loss, may automatically withhold both depreciation and a flat twenty percent representing contractor overhead and profit from its advance payment.” Gilderman, 649 A.2d at 942. Tailoring the Gilderman issue to fit the case at hand, the question becomes whether an insurer, which has agreed to pay actual cash value in advance of the repair and replacement of a covered loss, is required to include twenty percent for 0 & P in its advance payment where no general contractor was used because the homeowner made the repairs himself. The answer to that question depends on whether use of a general contractor was reasonably likely. Whether use of a general contractor was reasonably likely is a question of fact for the jury- ¶ 9 Like the case at hand, Gilderman involved a replacement cost coverage insurance policy. Therein, the homeowner instituted a class action alleging that, since January 1, 1991, State Farm always deducted twenty percent from the top of its repair or replacement estimates for purposes of computing the actual cash value of a loss. Gilderman, 649 A.2d at 944. The homeowner argued “that contractor overhead and profit must always be included in repair or replacement cost estimates [because repair or replacement costs necessarily include contractor overhead and profit]. State Farm counter[ed] that contractor overhead and profit never has to be included in repair or replacement cost estimates since contractors are not always used to repair or replace damaged property.” Id. at 944. ¶ 10 Before addressing the parties’ arguments, Judge Hester made an initial observation: “Repair and replacement costs logically and necessarily include any costs that an insured reasonably would be expected to incur in repairing or replacing the covered loss.” Gilderman, 649 A.2d at 945 (emphasis supplied). Turning to the homeowners’ claim that repair or replacement costs estimates “necessarily” include twenty percent for a general contractor’s overhead and profit, Judge Hester opined: We believe that there clearly are certain types of property damage claims which will not require the services of a general contractor. An example is where the loss involves only a damaged pipe, and a plumber alone normally would be called to perform all necessary repairs. In this respect, we therefore agree with State Farm’s position that there are some types of covered losses where the services of a general contractor normally would not be utilized. Thus, in some cases, contractor expenses would not have to be included in repair or replacement cost estimates. Indeed, [Gildermans] implicitly concede that general contractors are not always needed, noting that “it is generally accepted in the budding trade that if more than three trade categories of subcontractors are involved in the repairs, the owner is entitled to the services of a general contractor to obtain bids, hire the subcontractors and coordinate/supervise the work.” On the other hand, however, there are types of property damage where a homeowner would use the services of a general contractor. There are many instances where the insured reasonably would be expected to call a contractor, especially where there is extensive damage to a home [emphasis supplied] requiring the use of more than one trade specialist. Thus, State Farm may not make repair or replacement estimates and then deduct twenty percent representing contractor’s fees when those expenses reasonably are expected to be incurred. Id, Based on this reasoning, Judge Hester rejected the homeowners’ argument that 0 & P must always be included in repair and replacement cost estimates. ¶ 11 Judge Hester then addressed State Farm’s reasons for always deducting 0 & P from its advance payments: State Farm defends its actions first by observing that a contractor’s costs are contingent and may never be incurred. State Farm posits that it is unfair for an insured to receive advance payment for such expenses. We make two observations in regard to this argument. First, contractor expenses may well be contingent; however, the same can be said of all repair or replacement costs. For example, the insured may be a plumber, repair a covered loss himself, and incur no labor costs. The insured may be able to obtain goods at wholesale, used, or free and never incur the retail cost of parts. All repair and replacement costs are, in theory, “contingent” prior to being incurred. Second, and more importantly, the issue is not whether a given cost is contingent. The issue is what State Farm, agreed to pay to its insureds prior to actual repair or replacement. It agreed to pay “actual cash value,” which means “repair or replacement cost less depreciation.” Thus, the real inquiry is what is included in “repair and replacement costs.” We hold that repair or replacement costs include any cost that an insured is reasonably likely to incur in repairing or replacing a covered loss. In some instances, this will include use of a general contractor and his twenty percent overhead and profit. Gilderman, 649 A.2d at 945. ¶ 12 Like State Farm, Safeco complains that, because Mee did not use a general contractor, he did not incur an 0 & P expense; therefore, paying him 0 & P would result in a windfall. The trial court expressed the same concern. Opinion, 11/28/05, at 4 (“The purpose of insurance is to cover a loss, not to create financial windfalls ... ”). Judge Hester addressed this issue: State Farm offers a second rationale for its practice [of never including 0 & P], arguing that an insured would receive a windfall if permitted to recover a repair or replacement cost which may never be incurred. In this respect, we note that insureds under these policies have paid an additional premium for replacement cost coverage so that the insured can afford to repair or replace a loss at current market value and essentially keep the value of his property the same.... It can hardly be said that an insured reaps a -windfall by obtaining payment of actual cash value determined in a fair and reasonable manner when that is precisely what the insurer has agreed to pay under its policy in advance of actual repair or replacement. Gilderman, 649 A.2d at 946. According to Judge Hester, no windfall occurs where the insured receives benefits for which he has paid and to which he is entitled, even if repair or replacement costs are not incurred. Id. ¶ 13 In Gilderman, Judge Hester did not adopt a bright line rule for determining when an insurer should pay 0 & P based on the number of trades required to make repairs. Rather, Judge Hester established an objective standard by which an insurer may determine on a case-by-case basis whether to pay 0 & P, i.e., payment of 0 & P is required where use of a general contractor would reasonably be likely. Judge Hester suggested certain factors to be considered in reviewing the insurer’s decision regarding payment of 0 & P, i.e., the extent of the property damage, the number of trades required to repair the damage, and expert evidence of building industry standards regarding the correlation between use of a general contractor and the number of trades required to repair damage. Gilderman, 649 A.2d at 945. ¶ 14 From Gilderman, we take the following legal principles: (1) actual cash value includes repair and replacement costs; (2) repair and replacement costs include 0 & P where use of a general contractor would be reasonably likely; (3) because a homeowner pays higher premiums for repair and replacement coverage, he is entitled to 0 & P where use of a general contractor would be reasonably likely, even if no contractor is used or no repairs are made; (4) expert testimony about industry standards may be used to answer whether use of a general contractor is reasonably likely; and (5) whether use of a general contractor is reasonably likely depends on the nature and extent of the damage and the number of trades needed to make repairs. This last principle necessarily requires consideration of the degree of coordination or supervision of trades required to make the repairs. ¶ 15 Herein, the record establishes the following: (1) Mee paid premiums for a full value repair and replacement policy; (2) Mee suffered a covered loss; (3) Safeco agreed to pay Mee the actual cash value for repairs and replacement; (4) multiple trades would be needed to repair the damage to Mee’s bathroom, stairwells, family room, and foyer, e.g., plumbing, flooring, drywall, carpentry, painting, and electrical; and (5) Mee presented expert opinions as to when use of a general contractor is reasonably likely. ¶ 16 Applying the Gilderman principles to this case, Mee is entitled to the benefit for which he contracted with Safeco, i.e., 0 & P, if he can establish that use of a general contractor would be reasonably likely; the fact that Mee chose to — or was required to — make the repairs himself does not necessarily preclude him from recovering 0 & P. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mee as the non-moving party, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether use of a general contractor would be reasonably likely under the facts of this case. We further conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Safeco acted in bad faith by not paying 0 & P on Mee’s claim. Because resolution of these questions is for a jury, the entry of summary judgment in favor of Safeco was improper. Thus, we remand for further proceedings. ¶ 17 Order reversed and case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished. . The significance of the $523.55 difference, which ComSearch designates "Adjusted Amount,” is not clear from a review of Lewis Builders’ and ComSearch's estimates. However, a handwritten notation on a copy of the cover letter accompanying Safeco’s payment to Mee et al., dated July 22, 2002, suggests that this amount represents a deduction for O &P. . Given our inability to reconcile the amount paid by Safeco to Mee ($2,284.15) with either ComSearch's or Lewis Builders' estimates, less O & P and a $500.00 deductible, we are troubled by the possibility that Safeco withheld O & P which, Safeco admits, was not included in the original defense estimates, thereby further reducing the insurance proceeds paid to Mee. . We are aware of this Court's recent decision in Kane v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 841 A.2d 1038 (Pa.Super.2003) . (involving State Farm’s practice of deducting depreciation from insureds’ settlements for partial loss claims), which rejects the definition of actual cash value originally stated in Canulli v. Allstate Ins. Co., 315 Pa.Super. 460, 462 A.2d 286 (1983), and relied upon in Gilderman as non-binding dictum. Kane, 841 A.2d at 1046. Our use of "actual cash value” in the present case neither contradicts the definition set forth in Kane nor undermines our interpretation of or reliance on Gilderman.

OPINION BY PANELLA, J.: ¶ 1 Appellant, Anthony Wayne Hughes, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on August 15, 2005 by the Honorable Robert E. Dalton, Jr., Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County. After careful review, we affirm. ¶ 2 On September 14, 2004, Troopers Robert J. Wolbert and Jason Miller of the Pennsylvania State Police were on midnight patrol traveling northbound in a marked patrol car on SR-15, a limited access highway in Liberty Township, Tioga County. The Troopers were traveling in the left northbound lane when, at approximately 12:40 a.m., they noticed Hughes’ vehicle traveling in front of them in the right northbound lane. The Troopers intended to pass Hughes until they observed his vehicle swerve right onto the berm, then back into the right lane, and then left across the white dotted line into their lane. According to Trooper Wolbert, their patrol car was within approximately three to four car lengths when thirty to forty percent of Hughes’ vehicle drifted across the dotted line and then back into the lane without a turn signal. At that point, the Troopers slowed down and began to follow Hughes’ vehicle in the right northbound lane. They followed Hughes’ vehicle for one-half to three quarters of a mile and observed his vehicle swerve into the other lane two more times. ¶ 3 Trooper Wolbert initiated a traffic stop to investigate the cause of Hughes’ erratic driving. Upon approaching the driver-side window, Trooper Wolbert noticed a strong odor of alcohol. In answering questions from Trooper Wolbert, Hughes stated that he had consumed alcohol. Trooper Wolbert also asked Hughes if he had any medical reason for not wearing his seatbelt and Hughes replied that he did not. Trooper Wolbert then proceeded to administer field sobriety tests, which Hughes, by his own admission, was unable to complete. Trooper Wolbert determined that Hughes was unfit to operate a vehicle and placed him under arrest. Hughes submitted to a blood test less than hour after being arrested and his blood alcohol content was 0.198 percent. ¶ 4 Prior to trial, Hughes filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking to suppress the evidence obtained from the vehicle stop leading to the arrest for driving under the influence, claiming that there was no probable cause to stop his vehicle. The trial court held a hearing on Hughes’ motion to suppress on January 17, 2005 after which, the motion was denied. Following a bench trial, Hughes was convicted of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Careless Driving, and Failure to Use Safety Belt System. Hughes was sentenced to a minimum of ninety days to sixty months incarceration. This timely appeal followed. ¶ 5 On appeal, Hughes raises the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence as Appellant’s arrest was illegal? 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in accepting the arresting officer’s testimony concerning the basis for the traffic stop when conflicting testimony was presented at the preliminary hearing, suppression hearing, and trial? Appellant’s Brief at 6. ¶ 6 Initially, we note that our standard of review when an appellant appeals the denial of a suppression motion is well established. We are limited to determining whether the lower court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are correct. We may consider the evidence of the witnesses offered by the Commonwealth, as verdict winner, and only so much of the evidence presented by defense that is not contradicted when examined in the context of the record as a whole. We are bound by facts supported by the record and may reverse only if the legal conclusions reached by the court were erroneous. Commonwealth v. O’Black, 897 A.2d 1234, 1240 (Pa.Super.2006), citing Commonwealth v. Scott, 878 A.2d 874, 877 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 586 Pa. 749, 892 A.2d 823 (2005). ¶ 7 With this standard in mind, we address Hughes’ first claim that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence because the arrest was illegal. A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the individual is engaging in criminal conduct. Commonwealth v. Conrad, 892 A.2d 826, 829 (Pa.Super.2006), appeal denied, 588 Pa. 747, 902 A.2d 1239 (2006). “This standard, less stringent than probable cause, is commonly known as reasonable suspicion.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Cook, 558 Pa. 50, 57, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (1999). In order to determine whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. In re D.M., 566 Pa. 445, 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001). In making this determination, we must give “due weight — to the specific reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Cook, 558 Pa. at 57, 735 A.2d at 676 (citation omitted). Also, the totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, “even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.” Cook, 735 A.2d at 676. ¶ 8 Based on his experience as a law enforcement officer, Trooper Wolbert had sufficient reason to suspect that Hughes was committing a crime based upon his observation of Hughes’ erratic driving, and therefore the detention and subsequent DUI arrest were both justified. The statutory standard for investigation by police officers provides that, “whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop the vehicle.... ” 75 Pa.CoNS.Stat.AnN. § 6308(b). ¶ 9 Trooper Wolbert, who had been employed as a Trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police for nine years at the time of arrest, had a reasonable basis to suspect that Hughes was driving while intoxicated. He and Trooper Miller were going to pass Hughes’s vehicle but deemed it unsafe because Hughes’ vehicle was swerving across the divided line into the other lane. They followed Hughes for less than a mile and observed him commit the same traffic vio lation at least twice before initiating the stop. Swerving in and out of a lane of traffic was a violation indicative of a DUI offense in Trooper Wolbert’s experience. ¶ 10 Upon approaching the vehicle, Trooper Wolbert, who was trained in observing violations indicative of DUI offenses as well as administering standard field sobriety tests, noticed a strong odor of alcohol from Hughes and that his eyes were extremely bloodshot. Hughes admitted that he had been drinking. After administering the field sobriety tests, which Hughes failed, Trooper Wolbert determined that Hughes was unable operate a vehicle safely and arrested him. The blood test revealed that Hughes’ blood alcohol level was 0.198 percent. ¶ 11 Considering the facts within the totality of circumstances and Trooper Wol-bert’s experience as a trained police officer, we find that Hughes’ traffic violations provided an adequate basis for reasonable suspicion justifying the initial traffic stop, and that the evidence of Hughes’ intoxication from his odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and failure to perform the field sobriety tests were sufficient to justify the arrest for DUI. ¶ 12 Hughes next contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to accept Trooper Wolbert’s testimony concerning the basis for the traffic stop because conflicting testimony was presented at the preliminary hearing, suppression hearing, and trial. Hughes is essentially challenging the trial court’s determination of Trooper Wolbert’s credibility, claiming that there were “significant discrepancies in the arresting officer’s testimony as the case progressed through the court system”. Specifically, Hughes argues that Trooper Wolbert testified at the preliminary hearing that his patrol car was “five, six or seven car lengths” behind Hughes’ vehicle when he first noticed him swerve, but at trial Trooper Wolbert testified that the distance between the vehicles was “three to four car lengths”. Hughes also argues that Trooper Wolbert’s recollections about how erratically the vehicle was swerving and by how many inches it crossed the dotted line changed. Appellant’s Brief at 19-20. ¶ 13 It is well established that our Court will not reverse a trial court’s credibility determination absent the court’s abuse of discretion as fact finder. In a bench trial, as in a jury trial, “the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Zingarelli 889 A.2d 1064, 1069 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, 579 Pa. 692, 856 A.2d 834 (2004). Additionally, “the evidence at trial need not preclude every possibility of innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Emler, 903 A.2d 1273, 1276 (Pa.Super.2006). ¶ 14 We fail to see how the trial court’s conclusions were an abuse of discretion. As the fact-finder, the trial court was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony and other evi dence. Even if Hughes is correct in arguing that there were inconsistencies in Trooper Wolbert’s testimony, we do not agree with his argument that these were “significant discrepancies”; rather, they were innocuous in light of the overwhelming evidence beyond Trooper Wolbert’s testimony to support Hughes’ convictions. ¶ 15 Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. . 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 3802(a)(1); 75 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. § 3802(C). . 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 3714. . 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 4581(A)(2). . 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 3309(1) provides that, "A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safely." . 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann § 3802(c) categorizes any alcohol concentration above 0.16 percent as the "Highest rate of alcohol”.

"OPINION BY\nPOPOVICH, J.:\n¶ 1 Burchick Construction Company, Inc. (Burchick), appeals from the gr(...TRUNCATED)

"OPINION BY\nJudge SIMPSON.\nGambone Brothers Development Co. (Gambone Brothers) and College Woods, (...TRUNCATED)

"CLARK, J.,\nOn November 28, 1987, defendants were vacationing in Aruba with their minor son. At tha(...TRUNCATED)

"KERNS, Member,\nPursuant to Rule 208(d)(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, t(...TRUNCATED)