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Opinion by Mr. Justice Cohen, In this appeal we are .called upon to determine the constitutionality of the single-family dwelling provision of the Pittsburgh zoning ordinance as applied to the property of the appellant. The appellant, Pauline G. Best, is the owner of a home at 1008 Morewood Avenue, Pittsburgh, which contains twenty-two rooms and seven baths. The property is located in a “C” zoned district of the city and may be used only as a single-family dwelling. Within 200 feet of the home is a district in which multiple-unit dwellings are permitted. In 1950 the appellant applied for a variance and for a permit to allow occupancy by fifteen tenants. The application was denied as was an appeal taken to and heard by the. zoning board of adjustment. A further appeal was heard by the County Court of Allegheny County at which time the petition of the Morewood-Shadyside Civic Association to intervene as a respondent was granted. Appellant’s argument to the court below was twofold. First, she contended that she was entitled to a variance because of the financial hardship imposed upon her in maintaining the property as a single-family home and second, that the zoning ordinance as applied to her property was unreasonable, arbitrary, discrim inatory and confiscatory, and therefore unconstitutional. The county court found that the appellant’s home was not economically feasible for use as a single-family dwelling and that the use proposed by the appellant would not be adverse to the public health, safety or morals of the community. However, the court held that the proposed use would be adverse to the genéral welfare and contrary to the public interest, and for this reason concluded that the decision of the board of adjustment denying a variance was just and proper and that the zoning ordinance did not result in an unconstitutional invasion of plaintiff’s property rights. From the order of the court below sustaining the decision of the zoning board of adjustment this appeal has been taken. The contentions of the appellant with respect to the refusal of her request for a variance are without merit and, indeed, are not urged on this appeal. When appellant purchased the Morewood housé she knew or should have known of the provisions of the zoning or-1 dinance restricting the property to use as a one-family dwelling and of the large expenditures required to maintain and keep up the property. Thus, appellant took the property with the conditions of economic hardship staring her in the face, and she cannot now be heard to complain. Ward’s Appeal, 289 Pa. 458, 472, 137 Atl. 630 (1927) (concurring opinion). Cf. Edwards Zoning Case, 392 Pa. 188, 140 A. 2d 110 (1958). Moreover, as we said in Michener Appeal, 382 Pa. 401, 406-407, 115 A. 2d 367 (1955) : “The law is well established that a variance may be granted only where a property is subjected to a hardship unique or peculiar to itself as distinguished from one arising from the impact of the zoning regulations on the entire district.” See Act of June 24, 1931, P. L. 1206, §3107, as amended, 53 P.S. §58107. The financial hardship suffered by the appellant in this case is no different from that endured by the owners of other large homes in the neighborhood who through the appellee Civic Association have actively opposed appellant’s request for a variance. Appellant’s attack upon the constitutionality of the application of the Pittsburgh zoning ordinance to her property presents an issue which requires clarification. Zoning is the legislative division of a community into areas in each of which only certain designated uses of land are permitted so that the community may develop in an-orderly manner in accordance with a comprehensive plan. The authority of the legislature to permit the zoning of land is derived, as is all legislative authority, from the governmental power of the Commonwealth — the “police power.” This power is plenary except as limited by the State or Federal Constitutions. The only restrictions upon the power of the legislature to regulate private property rights are imposed by Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Section 1 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution establishes the right of “acquiring, possessing and protecting property . . . .” The requirements of this section are not distinguishable from those of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution — “nor shall any State deprive any person . .• . of property, without due process of law . . . .” However, neither the Fourteenth Amendment, broad and comprehensive as it is — nor any other constitutional provision — was intended to interfere with reasonable property regulations, whether established directly by the state or by some public body acting under its sanction, which are designed to accomplish a legitimate public purpose. Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 234 (1911); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 592 (1906) ; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31-32 (1885). Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Woodside v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 383 Pa. 1, 10-11, 116 A. 2d 833 (1955). In delineating the concept of a “legitimate public purpose” the courts have repeatedly held that property regulations which are substantially related to preserving or promoting the public health, safety, morals or general welfare are constitutionally not objectionable. And, thus, the test of constitutionality of a zoning ordinance is whether the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the inhabitants of that part of the community affected will be promoted by the application of the ordinance. Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 188 (1928). The City of Pittsburgh has undertaken to control the density of its population in accordance with a comprehensive plan drawn to promote the welfare of the community. It has provided residence districts for single-family homes, for two-family dwellings and for multiple-unit apartment houses. In this manner it has attempted, among other things, to control the demands upon community resources and to prevent an undue strain upon the facilities available in any section of the city. Such an undertaking is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and the constitutionality of single-family zoning restrictions have been generally upheld throughout the country as bearing a substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the community. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926) ; Miller v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925), error dismissed, 273 U. S. 781 (1927) ; Minkus v. Pond, 326 Ill. 467, 158 N.E. 121 (1927); Locatelli v. City of Medford, 287 Mass. 560, 192 N.E. 57 (1934) ; Sullivan v. Anglo-American Investment Trust, Inc., 89 N. H. 112, 193 Atl. 225 (1937); Collins v. Board of Adjustment of Margate City, 3 N. J. 200, 69 A. 2d 708 (1949). Indeed, tbe question cannot be considered an open one in Pennsylvania. Jennings’ Appeal, 330 Pa. 154, 160, 198 Atl. 621 (1938). Notwithstanding the constitutionality of the ordinance in its general outline, the appellant contends that its application to her property is • unconstitutional as being arbitrary, discriminatory, and confiscatory. The appellant seeks support for her contention that the application of the ordinance to her property is ar bitrary and unreasonable in tbe findings of tbe court below that the proposed use of the property as a multiple-family dwelling is not adverse to the public health, safety or morals. Since the court also found that such use of her property would be contrary to the public welfare, apparently it is the theory of appellant either that the general welfare is ejusdem generis with the public health, safety and morals, or that, standing alone, it will not justify the zoning ordinance herein questioned. More than fifty years ago this argument was presented to the United States Supreme Court in the case of Chicago, B & Q. Ry. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561 (1906). The answer then given by Mr. Justice Harlan is the one we now adopt: “The learned counsel for the railway company seem to think that the adjudications relating to the police power of the state to protect the public health, the public morals, and the public safety are not applicable, in principle, to cases where the police power is exerted for the general well-being of the community apart from any question of the public health, the public morals, or the public safety.”. . . . “We cannot assent to the view expressed by counsel. We hold that the police power of a state embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or thé general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public health, the public morals or the public safety.”. . . . “Private property cannot be taken without compensation for public use under a police regulation relating strictly to the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, any more than under a police regulation having no relation to such matters, but only to the general welfare. The foundation upon which the power rests are in every case the same.” 200 U. S. at 592-593. (Emphasis supplied). Recently the highest courts of the States of Massachusetts and New Jersey have reiterated that the concept of the general welfare is separate from and coordinate with those of the public health, safety and morals. In approving the constitutionality of a proposed zoning regulation designed to preserve the appearance of certain historic districts in Nantucket, the Massachusetts Supreme Court said: “The proposed act can hardly be said in any ordinary sense to relate to the public safety, health, or morals. Can it rest upon the less definite and more inclusive ground that it serves the public welfare? The term public welfare has never been and cannot be precisely defined. Sometimes it has been said to include public convenience, comfort, peace and order, prosperity, and similar concepts . . . .” Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E. 2d 557, 561 (1955). So also, in a case testing the constitutionality of an ordinance which prohibited the building of motels in residential zones but allowed boarding houses therein, the New Jersey high court said: “. . . [A]though earlier cases had confined zoning to such regulations as were needful for the public health, safety and morals, later cases had recognized regulations requisite for ‘public convenience’ and ‘general prosperity’ as promoting the general welfare.” Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N. J. 17, 118 A. 2d 401, 407 (1955). If we were to accept the appellant’s contention as the law, “then the whole plan and scheme of Zoning must be east aside because ... [no zone could be preserved from invasion] just so long as it could be shown that the proposed use would not adversely affect to any reasonable extent the public health, safety or morals. The statutory law of zoning would be replaced by the law of nuisance. . . .”. . . . “. . . If we were to hold that the Zoning Ordinance . . . was unconstitutional as applied to the appellant’s property, then we would throw every zone open to prohibited uses . . and. we would in effect put an end to all zoning.” Swade v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Springfield Township, 392 Pa. 269, 140 A. 2d 597 (1958). Hence, as we held in the Swade case, and now reaffirm, considerations of the general welfare alone support the constitutionality of zoning ordinances. . The broad scope of the concept of general welfare is illustrated by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954). The plaintiff in that case challenged the condemnation of his land under the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act as violative of the “due process” clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. A unanimous Court recognized that: “The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state many exercise over its affairs.”. . . : “We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police power.” 348 U. S. at 31-32. [Subject to constitutional limitations the legislature, as the main guardian of the public needs,- may declare the public interest and act in furtherance thereof]'. “This principle admits of no exception merely because the power of eminent domain is involved.” 348 U. S. at 32. “The concept of the public welfare is broad -and inclusive. [citations omitted]. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.” 348 U. S. at 33. “If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation’s Capitol should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is -nobbling in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.” 348 U. S. at 33. If the legislature has the power to compel a property owner to submit to a forced sale for the purpose of creating an attractive community, it has the power to regulate his property for such objectives. Accord: Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois, supra, 200 U. S. at 592-593. Not only is the preservation of the attractive characteristics of a community a proper element of the general welfare, but also the preservation of property values is a legitimate consideration since “[Ajnything that tends to destroy property values of the inhabitants of the . . . [community] necessarily adversely affects the prosperity, and therefore the general welfare, of the entire . . . [community].” State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W. 2d 217, 222 (1955). “We are satisfied that at long last conscientious municipal officials have been sufficiently empowered to adopt reasonable zoning measures designed towards preserving the wholesome and attractive characteristics of their communities and the values of taxpayers’ properties.” Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N. J. 17, 118 A. 2d 401, 408 (1955). See also West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of West Hartford, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A. 2d 640, 643 (1956) ; Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E. 2d 557 (1955) ; Sullivan v. Anglo-American Investment Trust, Inc., 89 N. H. 112, 193 Atl. 225, 227 (1937) ; Fischer v. Bedminster Township, 11 N. J. 194, 93 A. 2d 378 (1952). Cf. Kerr’s Appeal, 294 Pa. 246, 250, 144 Atl. 81 (1928) (aesthetic values may be considered in connection with the question of general welfare). In the case before us the appellant has introduced no evidence whatsoever tending to show that the application of the zoning ordinance to her property would not promote the general welfare of that part of the community which is affected thereby. We are unable to say that requiring the appellant to use her property in conformance with the provisions of the zoning ordinance would not serve to preserve the attractive characteristics of the community and the property values therein. Therefore, the attack upon the reasonableness of the application of the ordinance to appellant’s property must fail. The appellant finds discrimination in the provisions of the ordinance which establish a “sliding-scale” of residential districts which permit one, two and multiple-family dwellings. Indeed, the appellant points out that only 200 feet away from her property the ordinance permits apartment houses. If single-family dwellings promote the public welfare, so her argument runs, why are not all residential districts so zoned? The answer is that no one type of housing satisfies the varied needs of a community. Some families prefer the conveniences of an apartment, others may like the efficient living facilities of a modern duplex, and still others might choose the snugness of a row house. Each type of residential development requires different supplies of public facilities. But since the facilities available vary from one area of a community to another the legislative body may permit only the type of housing for which facilities in a particular district are adequate. It is therefore apparent that the general welfare is promoted by a zoning ordinance which allocates particular types of housing to specific residential areas. No weight can be given to the fact that appellant’s property is close to an area zoned to permit multiple- family homes. If we grant the community the right in the first instance to zone areas for different uses, then it is a matter of accident that appellant’s property happens to be one which is located near the zoning boundary line of a particular district. Finally, we consider appellant’s contention that the application of the ordinance to her property is confiscatory and represents an unconstitutional taking of her property without compensation therefor. Appellant’s evidence on this issue amounts to no more than that she is prevented by the ordinance from putting her property to its most profitable use. This is not a constitutional objection. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394 (1915). Order affirmed. Even before the landmark , case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926), we recognized that zoning was a proper subject for legislative action in White’s Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 266, 134 Atl. 409 (1926). However, the standard of constitutionality set forth in White’s Appeal — “clearly necessary to preserve the health, safety or morals of the people”, 287 Pa. at 265, has been modified by the standard promulgated in the Euclid, case. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 387 (1926). Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 233 (1911) ; House v. Mayes, 219 U. S. 270, 282 (1911). Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. (4 Otto) 113, 123-124 (1876) ; Sharpless v. Mayer of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 160-164 (1853). Art. X, §10 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania providing inter alia, “. . . [N]or shall private property be taken or applied to public use, without authority of law and without just compensation being first made or secured,” is a limitation on the Commonwealth’s right of eminent domain and its power to appropriate property. Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 166-167 (1853) ; Pittsburgh v. Scott, 1 Pa. 309 (1845). This provision does not apply to regulations affecting the use to which property may be put. Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal Co., 232 Pa. 141, 81 Atl. 148 (1911), aff’d, 232 U. S. 531 (1914). In re District of Pittsburgh, 2 W. & S. 320 (1841) ; Case of the Philadelphia and Trenton R. R. Co., 6 Whart. 25 (1840). See also Art. 16, §§3, 8 and compare Art. I, §9. Commonwealth ex rel. Woodside v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 383 Pa. 1, 116 A. 2d 833 (1955) ; Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A. 2d 464 (1948). Cf. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 386 (1926) ; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 90 (1890). Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 188 (1928) ; Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U. S. 603, 610 (1927) ; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 366 395 (1926) ; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 232 (1911) ; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 592-593 (1906); Commonwealth ex rel. Woodside v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 383 Pa. 1, 10, 116 A. 2d 833 (1955) ; Ward’s Appeal, 289 Pa. 458, 462-463, 137 Atl. 630 (1927) ; Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N. J. 17, 118 A. 2d 401, 407-408 (1955) ; Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E. 2d 557 (1955). One who undertakes to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of a regulatory enactment has a heavy burden of persuasion to discharge. “. . . [W]e can declare an Act of Assembly void, only when it violates the constitution clearly, palpably, plainly; and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation on our minds.” Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 164 (1853). See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. (4 Otto) 113, 123 (1876.) ; Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States, 99 U. S. (9 Otto) 700, 718 (1879) ; Hadley’s Case, 336 Pa. 100, 104, 6 A.2d 874 (1939). The fact that the regulation is in the form of a municipal ordinance rather than a state statute does not alter the burden upon the party asserting its unconstitutionality. “. . . [I]t must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 395 (1926). Accord: Zahn v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 274 U. S. 325, 328 (1927) ; Kerr’s Appeal, 294 Pa. 246, 249-250, 144 Atl. 81 (1928). Cf. Liggett’s Petition, 291 Pa. 109, 118, 139 Atl. 619 (1927). And even “. ... if the validity of the legislative . ... [judgment] be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.” Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra, 272 U. S. at 388; Zahn v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, supra, 274 U. S: at 328. See also New Orleans Public Service v. New Orleans, 281 U. S. 682, 686 (1929).

Opinion by Me. Justice Benjamin R. Jones, We have before us an appeal in each of two distinct actions: a personal injury action and an equity action, the latter seeking to render void a release given to one of three alleged joint tortfeasors by the plaintiff in the personal injury action. The basic issue is the impact, if any, upon this release of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (herein called Uniform Act) of July 19, 1951, P. L. 1130, 12 PS §§2082-2089. Shortly after midnight on June 4, 1950, two automobiles — owned by Joseph Falcone and Ruth P. McBeth, respectively- — were standing upon state highway 712, Upper Mount Bethel Township, Northampton County, with the bumpers of both automobiles interlocked. Herbert Smith, aiding Falcone and McBeth, was engaged in attempting to disengage the interlocked bumpers. An automobile driven by Donald Fenner then came along the highway, struck the McBeth automobile and Smith causing the latter very serious personal injuries. Smith instituted an action for his personal injuries against Falcone and McBeth alleging they were, severally and jointly, liable for the happening of the accident. Falcone and McBeth then joined Fenner as an additional defendant on the theory that Fenner was either solely, or, jointly with them or either of them, liable to Smith, or liable over to them or either of them. Fenner, in his answers to Smith’s complaint and to Falcone’s and McBeth’s complaint, affirmatively defended on the ground that Smith, on May 28, 1952, had given him a written release which precluded any liability on his part not only to Smith but. also to Falcone and McBeth. Falcone’s and McBeth’s answer to Smith’s complaint averred that this release effectuated not only a release by Smith of Fenner, but also of Falcone and McBeth. Falcone and McBeth filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings raising two questions: (1) whether Smith’s release of Fenner released Falcone and McBeth; (2) the apxfiicability of the Uniform Act to this cause of action which arose prior to the effective date of the Act. President Judge Barthold held that, while the Uniform Act was inapplicable, judgment could not be entered - on the pleadings since Smith, despite the release of Fenner, could recover if he proved that Falcone and McBeth were alone liable: Smith v. Falcone et al., 85 Pa. D. & C. 463. When the matter came for.trial before Judge Wood-ring and a jury, the court, while submitting the case to the jury generally, presented six specific questions for the jury’s determination. The jury returned a verdict generally for $110,833.17 against all three defendants — -Falcone, McBeth and Fenner — and specifically found: (a) Smith was not con tributarily negligent; (b) neither Falcone nor McBeth nor Fenner was solely liable; (c) that joint negligence of Falcone and McBeth was not the legal cause of the accident; (d) that the joint negligence of Falcone, McBeth and Fenner was the legal cause of the accident. Motions for judgment n.o.v. were granted and judgment entered for Falcone, McBeth and Fenner. From the entry of such judgment an appeal was taken. That judgment was entered upon the theory that Smith’s release of Fenner released Falcone and McBeth as well as Fenner. Approximately six months after rendition of the verdict in the personal injury action, Smith instituted jin equity action against Falcone, McBeth and Fenner seeking to cancel, or modify the terms of, the release. In this action, Smith’s theory, as alleged, was that, since Fenner now claimed that the release exonerated not only him but also Falcone and McBeth, Fenner '“is engaged in an’attempt to avoid his own release; and such conduct is a fraud in fact and in law; and, therefore, by his own act [Fenner] has made said release null and void”. Preliminary objections filed in this action were upheld and the court below dismissed the complaint. From that decree an appeal has been taken. The appeal in the personal injury action commands our initial consideration. The nub of that appeal is the efficacy of the release so far as Falcone and McBeth are concerned which, in turn, depends upon the applicability to the release of the provisions of the Uniform Act. In passing upon the motion for judgment on the pleadings President Judge Barthold well stated the status of the law in the pre-Uniform Act- period: “Prior to the passage of the Uniform Act the rule was well established in Pennsylvania that a release of one joint tortfeasor operates as a release of the other joint tortfeasor. In Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209 (1937), the Supreme Court at pages 212, 213, said: ‘For the same injury, ... an injured party can have but - one satisfaction and the receipt of such satisfaction, either as payment of a judgment recovered or consideration for a release executed by him, from a person liable for such injury, necessarily works a release of all others liable for the same injury and prevents any further proceedings against them: . . . the principle which underlies • the rule is that the injured person is given a legal remedy only to obtain compensation for the damage done to him, and when that compensation has been received from any of the wrongdoers, his right to further remedy is at an end.’ “See also Mason C. Lewis v. Lavine, Inc., 302 Pa. 472 (1931); Smith v. Roydhouse, Arey & Company, 244 Pa. 474 (1914); Peterson v. Wiggins, 230 Pa. 631 (1911). The rule was applicable ‘even though it was intended, or the release expressly stipulated, that the other wrongdoers should not thereby be released:’ Union of Russian Societies of St. Michael and St. George, Inc. v. Koss, et al., 348 Pa. 574 (1949); Thompson v. Fox, supra, 213; Williams v. LeBar et al., 141 Pa. 149 (1891) ; Seither v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 125 Pa. 397 (1889); and it was immaterial whether the tortfeasors involved committed a joint tort or concurrent or successive torts. The rule applied where both were liable for the same damage no matter upon what theory their respective liabilities were predicated: Thompson v. Fox, supra, 213. “It was also a well-established rule in Pennsylvania prior to the passage of the Uniform Act, that before there could be a joint tort there must be a community tof fault which occasioned the accident: Cleary v. Quaker City Cab Co. et al., 285 Pa. 241 (1926); Holstein et al. v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Company et al., 348 Pa. 183 (1943) ; Landis, Admx. v. Conestoga Transportation Company et al., 349 Pa. 97 (1944). If there was no community of fault there was no joint tort; hence, a release of one not shown to be liable would not release a tortfeasor: Koller v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 351 Pa. 60, 63 (1944); Union of Russian Societies of St. Michael and St. George, Inc. v. Koss, supra; Turner v. Robbins et al., 276 Pa. 319 (1923); Masters et al. v. Philadelphia Transportation Company et al., 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 (1947); Tomlinson v. Goldberg, 121 Pa. Superior Ct. 125 (1936) ; McClure v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 53 Pa. Superior Ct. 638 (1913). “The law was equally clear prior to the passage of the Uniform Act that the introduction of a release established prima facie that the alleged joint tort feasor was a joint tortfeasor, and that at this point the burden of going forward with the evidence shifted back to plaintiff and plaintiff then had to prove that defendant was alone negligent or else the court would find for defendant as a matter of law: Mason v. Lavine, supra; Koller v. Penna. Railroad Co., supra; Masters et al. v. P.T.C. et al., supra; Smith v. Roydhouse, Arey & Co., supra; Peterson v. Wiggins, supra.” Mr. Justice McBride, speaking for our Court in Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A. 2d 648, said (p. 272) : “It is clear that under the common law of Pennsylvania plaintiff could bring separate actions against several defendants for a joint trespass, obtain judgment against each and issue execution on the one he found most satisfactory; but once he received satisfaction, and either gave a release or satisfied the judgment of record, he could not thereafter execute or bring action against any other defendant. Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103; Seither v. Phila. Traction Co., 125 Pa. 397, 17 A. 338.” The Uniform Act drastically changed the law on this subject. Section 2(3) thereof provides: “(3) A joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished by the settlement.”: Section 4 provides: “A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced if greater than the consideration paid”: Section 5 provides: “A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor does not relieve him from liability to make contribution to another tortfeasor, unless the release is given before the right of the other tortfeasor to secure a money judgment for contribution has accrued and provides for a reduction to the extent of the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor of the injured person’s damages recoverable against all the other tortfeasors”. If, applicable, the provisions of this statute preclude recognition of the instant release as a bar to the action against Falcone and McBeth. The accident, i.e., that which gave rise to Smith’s cause of action, took place on June 4, 1950 — thirteen months prior to the Uniform Act’s effective date — and Smith’s release of Fenner was given on May 28, 1952— eleven months after the effective date of the Act. We agree thoroughly with Judge Barthold’s general discussion of the retroactive application of statutes in Smith v. Falcone, supra, (pp. 468, 469) wherein he stated: “It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that statutes other than those affecting procedural matters must be construed prospectively, except where legislative intent that they shall act retroactively is so clear as to preclude all question as to the intention of the legislature: Farmers Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Berks County Real Estate Co. et al., 333 Pa. 390 (1939) ; Painter v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 339 Pa. 271 (1940); Commonwealth ex rel. Greenawalt v. Greenawalt, 347 Pa. 510 (1943); Commonwealth v. Repplier Coal Co., 348 Pa. 372 (1944). This principle has been embodied in article IV, sec. 56, of the Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, 46 PS §556, which provides: ‘No law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the Legislature.’ It is also funda mental that: ‘Retrospective laws may be supported when they impair no contract and disturb no vested right, but only vary, remedies, cure defects in proceedings otherwise fair, and do not vary existing obligations contrary to their situation when entered into and when prosecuted’: Barnesboro Borough v. Speice, 40 Pa. Superior Ct. 609, 612.” On June 4, 1950 — the date of this accident — a cause of action arose against all three appellees. Any one or all three appellees might have been liable for all of Smith’s damages. As the law stood at the time of the happening of the accident if any one of the three appellees had entered into a settlement of Smith’s claim against that particular appellee and if Smith had given a release to such appellee, the other two appellees would thereby have been released from any claim by Smith. The Uniform Act changed the effect of such release, if given,' but it effected no change in the cause of action nor did it increase what could have been the liability of any one or all appellees at the time the cause of action arose. None of the appellees had any vested right to be exonerated from liability at the time of securing of a release by one or the other appellees. The change effected by the Uniform Act did not disturb any substantive right of any of appellees. When the instant release was executed the parties knew or should have known of the provisions of the Uniform Act. It was not within the power of either Falcone or MeBeth to prevent Fenner from securing or Smith tendering this release, nor did this release increase the measure of liability of either Falcone or MeBeth. The Act clearly is applicable in the present situation. In view of the conclusion reached in the appeal in the personal injury action it is unnecessary to dwell at length on the merits of the appeal in the equity action. Suffice it to say that the court below very properly upheld the preliminary objections and dismissed Smith’s complaint. The appeal in the personal injury action must be sustained and the appeal in the equity action dismissed. The jury, by its special verdict, found that the legal cause of this accident was the joint negligence of Falcone, MeBeth and Fenner. Under the provisions of the Uniform Act and the terms of the release, Smith can recover from Falcone and MeBeth their joint pro rata share of the verdict, i.e., $73,888.78 and costs. Neither Falcone nor MeBeth have any right of contri button against Fenner whose liability has been settled by the release given by Smith. In Appeal No. 36 January Term 1959 the decree is affirmed. In Appeal No. 37 January Term 1959 judgment is reversed and judgment entered on the verdict in favor of Smith and against Falcone and McBeth for |73,888.78 and in favor of Smith and against Fenner for |36,944.39. This release reads as follows: “Know all men by these presents, that . . . Smith, being of legal age, for and in consideration of the payment of Four Thousand five hundred ($4,500) Dollars by Willis Fenner and Donald Fenner the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have released and discharged, and by this release do for myself, my heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, release and discharge the said [Fenners] from all claims, damages, actions and suits of whatsoever kind, known or unknown prior to and including the date hereof, and particularly for all injuries to person or damage to property, known or unknown, resulting from or to result from an accident which occurred on or about the 4th day of June, 1950, at or near Route 712 east of Bangor, Pennsylvania. “Should it appear that two or more persons or entities are jointly or severally liable in tort for the said injuries to person or damage to property resulting from or arising out of said accident, the consideration for this release shall be received in reduction of the total damages recoverable against all the other tortfeasors to the extent of the pro rata share of the said [Fenners] and I specifically reserve all claims and causes of action arising out of the above-mentioned accident against all the other tortfeasors. “The payment made to me is upon my warranty that I have not received heretofore any consideration whatever for, nor have I released heretofore any person, firm, or corporation from any claim or liability for any injuries to person or property arising from said accident, and I agree to hold harmless and indemnify the said [Fenners] and his Insurance Carrier of and from any loss, claim, liability, cost or expense growing out of any claim against them or either of them for contribution by any alleged joint tortfeasor under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. “I further state I have carefully read the foregoing Release aiid know the contents thereof, and that I am signing the same as my own free act. I further intend to be legally bound by the promises herein contained.” As to the effect of the Uniform Act: Daugherty v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A. 2d 730; Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348, 123 A. 2d 422. In U. S. v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 67, 77 L. ed. 619, Mr. Justice Cardozo stated: '“A ‘cause of action’ may mean one tiling for one purpose and something different for another. ... At times and in certain contexts, it is identified with the infringement of a right or the violation of a duty. At other times and in other contexts, it is a concept of the law of remedies, the identity of the cause- being then dependent on that of the form of action or the writ. Another aspect reveals it as something separate from writs and remedies, the group of operative facts out of which a grievance has developed.” “There is no difficulty in defining the phrase ‘cause of action’. It obviously means what this Court in Martin v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 227 Pa. 18, 75 A. 837, said'it meant, to wit: ‘The.negligent act or acts which occasioned the injury.’”: Cox v. Wilkes-Barre Railway Corp., 334 Pa. 568, 570, 6 A. 2d 538, 539 ; Openbrier et al. v. General Mills, Inc., 340 Pa. 167, 169, 16 A. 2d 379, 380. See also: Shaffer’s Estate, 228 Pa. 36, 40, 76 A. 716, 717; Alpha Claude Neon Corporation, for use v. Pennsylvania Distilling Company, Inc., 325 Pa. 140, 142, 188 A. 825, 826; Philadelphia v. Heinel Motors, Inc., 346 Pa. 528, 530, 31 A 2d 104, 105. Deuscher v. Cammerano, et al., 256 N. Y. 328, 176 N.E. 412; Halifax Chick Express Co. v. Young (Del.), 137 A. 2d 743. Cf; Keller Crescent Printing etc. Co. v. Rosen et al., 135 F. Supp. 22, 24; Commercial Casualty Insurance Co. v. Leonard (Ark.), 196 SW 2d 919; Kansas City Railway Company v. McDaniel, 131 F. 2d 89. Davis v. Miller, 385 Pa. 348, 123 A. 2d 422. The latter judgment is to be marked satisfied by reason of the satisfaction thereof through the medium of the release given by Smith to Fenner.

Opinion by Judge MacPhail, Lucille L. Sweigart (Claimant) appeals to this Court from a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) affirming an order of the Office of Employment Security (Office) which denied unemployment compensation benefits to Claimant. The Office found that Claimant voluntarily terminated her employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature and, therefore, was ineligible to receive benefits. Section 402 of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. [1937] 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(b)(1). Claimant raises two issues for our consideration: whether she voluntarily terminated her employment and, if she did, whether she had cause of a necessitous and compelling nature for doing so. We hold that Claimant did not voluntarily terminate her employment and we remand this case for further proceedings. In an appeal from a decision of the Board finding against the party who bore the burden of proof before the Board, this Court is limited to determining whether the Board’s findings of fact are consistent with each other and with the Board’s conclusions of law and its order and whether the findings can be sustained without a capricious disregard of competent evidence. Baird v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 30 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 118, 121, 372 A.2d 1254, 1257 (1977), Whether an employee voluntarily terminates his or her employment or is discharged is a question of law and properly subject to our review. Rettan v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 15 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 287, 290, 325 A.2d 646, 647 (1974). In the instant ease, Claimant had worked as a nurse’s aide for Conestoga View (Employer), a nursing home, for approximately three and a half years prior to her termination. During that time, Claimant had a history of personnel problems which she characterized as harassment by other employees. She requested several times that her work shift or floor assignment be changed; Employer granted many, although not all, of the requests. Claimant last worked for Employer on May 8, 1977. She did not work during the following week because of an illness which she reported to Employer. On May 13, 1977, Employer’s Administrator sent to Claimant a letter which summarized the difficulties between Claimant and Employer and concluded by stating: It is my opinion that further discussion on all of these matters is pointless. I am requesting that you come to a realization that Conestoga View is not a suitable place of employment for you. Therefore, I would similarily request your resignation effective immediately. I am very sorry that we have no other recourse in this matter. On May 19, she resigned. Initially, the question before us is whether Claimant’s resignation was a voluntary termination of her employment or whether she was, in fact, discharged. In her summary interview with the Office, Claimant wrote that she “quit” her job because of heavy lifting, an unmanageable workload, and harassment by other employees. The Office denied her benefits finding that she left her employment voluntarily without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature because “she felt she was being harrassed [sic] and that the lifting was too heavy.” The Board affirmed this decision finding that Claimant voluntarily terminated her em ployment because of “alleged harassment by her supervisors and fellow employees.” Following rehearing and reconsideration, the Board again affirmed the Office’s decision finding that Claimant voluntarily terminated her employment “because she felt she was being unduly harassed at her job and was being given too much heavy work to do. ’ ’ Claimant’s acknowledgement in her written interview that she “quit” is not determinative of the voluntary termination issue. All parties agree that Claimant submitted her resignation to Employer and, therefore, that she technically “quit” her job. We are not concerned, however, with the physical act of quitting but with whether Claimant did so of her own volition or whether she was compelled to do so by Employer. In Labor and Industry Department v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 133 Pa. Superior Ct. 518, 3 A.2d 211 (1938), the Superior Court defined voluntary as leaving on one’s own motion and as the opposite of discharge. “[W]here the employe, without action by the employer, resigns, leaves or quits his employment, his action amounts to ‘voluntarily leaving work,’ . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 522, 3 A.2d at 214. In cases similar to the one before us now, we have held that in order for an employer’s language to be interpreted as a discharge, it must possess the immediacy and finality of a “firing.” Lawlor v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 380, 385, 391 A.2d 8, 11 (1978); Rizzitano v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 32 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 59, 62, 377 A.2d 1060, 1061 (1977). The degree of certainty in an employer’s language resulting in a termination has often been the difference between those cases in which the Courts have found that an employee’s termination was voluntary and those in which the employer’s rather than the employee’s act was deemed to effect the ter ruination. Cf. Smith v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 41 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 57, 398 A.2d 256 (1979) (where we held an employee’s resignation in response to a supervisor’s telling her that he would recommend to the agency director that she be fired to be a voluntary termination because of the uncertainty that the director would have accepted the supervisor’s recommendation) and Thomas v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 398, 322 A.2d 423 (1974) (where we held an employee’s failure to return to work after he had been told by his employer that if he did not work on a certain Sunday, which he did not do, that he need not return at all, to be a discharge). What was the intent if not the clear meaning of the language we have quoted from the Employer’s letter? Did the Claimant have any choice other than to resign? We think not. Employer’s representative testified: At that point harrassment [sic] that we were undergoing by employee, that [sic] we felt it was necessary to terminate the employee. QB: Actually then you had asked her then to leave; is that correct? AE: In a sense, yes. I verbally at that time felt that we had attempted every possible resolution to the problems that Mrs. Sweigert had and we felt that there was really little more that could be done to work out the multitude of problems.... (Emphasis added.) That testimony reveals what was intended by the last words in the letter, u[W]e have no other recourse in this matter.” (Emphasis added.) Had the matter of resignation been a voluntary choice for Claimant, those words would have no meaning or purpose at all. The “finality” requisite of Lawlor v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is satisfied by the statement that “Conestoga View is not a suitable place of employment for you.” The “immediacy” requirement is found in the words, “I would similarly request your resignation effective immediately(Emphasis added.) On a review of the facts of this case, we must find that the Board erred as a matter of law in concluding that Claimant voluntarily terminated her employment with Employer. We need not reach the question, then, of whether she had cause of a necessitous and compelling nature for doing so. Our inquiry, however, does not end here. Employer had the right to terminate Claimant’s employment. In order for Claimant to be eligible for unemployment compensation benefits following that termination, it must be determined that her discharge was not due to willful misconduct. The mating of specific findings concerning willful misconduct is within the province of the Board, not this Court. See Endres v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 567, 570, 391 A.2d 61, 62 (1978). “[W]e cannot assume on this record that the Board would [or would not] have found willful misconduct on the part of the claimant when it did not consider that question.” Firmstone v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 29 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 158, 161, 370 A.2d 749, 750 (1977). We must reverse the order in this case, then, and remand the matter to the Board for proceedings and determinations not inconsistent with this opinion. Order And Now, this 28th day of November, 1979, the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Decision Number B-149398-B, dated May 22, 1978, is reversed and the above-captioned matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The opinion of the Court was delivered, by Black, C. J. — This was ejectment. The plaintiffs below claimed the land in dispute under a deed from the sheriff, who sold it as the property of William M. Covanhovan. John Covanhovan, the defendant below, who is a brother of William, relies upon a deed made to him by his brother before the plaintiffs obtained their judgment. The consideration of the deed was alleged to be a debt equal to the value of the property, and due from William to John. The Court charged that, though the debt was believed by the jury to be. honestly due, and a fair price for the land, yet the defendant’s deed was void if he was not moved to the purchase by honest and upright motives — that if John knew of William’s indebtedness to other persons, and took the property to place it beyond their reach, to hinder, delay, and defraud them, it would taint the purchase with fraud; and this whether the claim for which he took it was true or false. If a debtor, with the purpose to cheat his creditors, converts his land into money because money is more easily shuffled out of sight than land, he of course commits a gross fraud. If his object in making the sale is known to the purchaser, and he, nevertheless, aids and assists in executing it, his title is worthless, as against creditors, though he may have paid a full price. But the rule is different when property is taken for a debt. One creditor of a failing debtor is not bound to take care of another. It cannot be said that one is defrauded by the payment of another. In such, cases if the assets are not large enough to pay all, somebody must suffer. It is a race in which it is impossible for every one to be foremost. He who has the -advantage, whether he gets it by the preference of the debtor or by his own superior vigilance, or by both causes combined, is entitled to what he wins, provided he takes no more than his honest due. To pay a creditor his just debt in land, at a fair valuation, is no more a fraud upon other creditors than to pay him in bank notes or silver dollars. Neither is it any worse or more fraudulent for a creditor to secure himself by taking a conveyance, than it would be to enter up a judgment. He gets no greater advantage by the former means than by the latter. The notion of the defendants in error seems to be that the creditor of an insolvent man cannot avoid the imputation of fraud in any way except by cheating himself. But they themselves did not act upon that principle. They struggled to get a lien upon the very property in dispute; and if they had succeeded, would have done to the plaintiff the same injury (if it be an injury), which he did to them by taking the conveyance. The judge said in his charge that little room is left to attribute fraudulent motives, when a debt is actually due from the vendor nearly equal to the value of the property. He should have said there is no room at all. A human tribunal can take no cognisance of feelings and intentions which are not manifested by external conduct. We are not permitted to assign a bad motive to an act which is not wrong either in itself or in its necessary consequences. A creditor is not acting wrongly when he receives payment or takes security for his debt, though he knows that other persons, who have the same rights with himself, may be less vigilant or less fortunate. The act being right, no secret feeling can change its character. Indeed it may be said that the motive which results in proper action cannot be a bad one. It cannot be denied that there is authority in our books for the decision of the Court below. The unfortunate case of Summer’s Appeal, Ashmead v. Hean (1 Harris 587), and some others, decided about the same time, would sustain it if they could be themselves sustained. But reason and justice have vindicated their supremacy against these judicial invasions of it. The legislature did what it could to restore the law, and this Court has been compelled, by considerations heretofore fully stated, to abandon the error. A rule which requires a man to take care of his neighbor’s interests at the expense of his own, is utterly impracticable in the present state of human society. It runs against the bent of a natural feeling which will not be crushed or extinguished. Naturam expelías furca ; tamen usque reeurret. The attempt to enforce it had no result but intolerable mischief. This was a question of actual, and not of legal or constructive fraud. If the debt was not real and honest, but merely pretended, or if it did not amount to a fair price for the land, the conveyance was fraudulent and void. But if that was established to the satisfaction of the jury, and if the land was given in good faith to satisfy the debt, the knowledge of the vendee that there were other creditors who would take the property if he did not, or the fact that he took the conveyance to prevent them from securing their .claims by the loss of his, is not enough to make the transaction illegal. These general remarks on the charge make it unnecessary to advert more particularly to the several specifications of error, which the defendant has put on the record. There are eight exceptions to the admission and rejection of evidence, which it is proper we should notice, and we will do so briefly: 1. The facts contained in the first hill were within the wide range which the rules of evidence allow such investigations to take. 2. If the Court below was satisfied with the proof of Biddle’s absence, we ought not to reverse, and the rule is that we never do, unless the facts proved are palpably insufficient to excuse the non-production of the witness. Here the proof was ample and clear. 3. If the plaintiffs below produced any evidence whatever tending to show that the sale to the defendant was not made in good faith, and if the continued possession of the premises by the vendor was one of the circumstances relied on for that purpose, it was proper to let in proof that the vendee had also exercised acts of ownership upon the land. We think, therefore, that the evidence contained in the third bill was erroneously rejected. 4. The pecuniary condition of the parties to an alleged fraudulent transfer, at, and about the' time of the transactions under investigation, is generally competent and important proof, for it helps the jury to judge of the reasonableness of their conduct. We think it was competent for the defendant to show that when his brother began to keep store, he was not possessed of any considerable means or property. 5. A witness who has been examined and dismissed, may be recalled and cross-examined by permission of the Court, and the decision of the Court allowing or refusing it is not generally the subject of exception. When the object of recalling the witness is to lay the foundation for proving his declarations out of Court, it must always be allowed. If it be refused, and if proof of the witness’s declarations be rejected because he had no previous opportunity of explanation, it is error. 6. William’s declarations that John was indebted to him, though made before the date of the obligation which he incurred to John, do not relate to a collateral matter. If the fact was so, it had an important bearing on the main question in dispute. The declarations were very properly admitted. 7. A rule of the Common Pleas requires that a witness whose deposition has been taken, shall be subpoenaed if he be a resident of the state and within forty miles of the court-house; otherwise the deposition shall not be read. A witness in this ease was paralytic, and absolutely unable to attend the trial, or even to rise from his bed. An officer in whose hands the subpoena had been placed, went to the house, but knowing his condition did not intrude into the sick room to make a service. The rule must have a reasonable construction. What good would a service have done ? or what injury did the defendant suffer from the omission ? Lex neminem eogib ad vana seu impossibilia. Things which are merely vain are placed by this maxim in the same category with impossi bilities. Suppose the witness to be so sick that. the service could not be made without doing him injury; or insane, so that he could not be approached with safety to the officer ? Is the rule so inflexible that it would not yield to the justice of such a case ? And if it bends at all, why should it not bend as far as reason requires ? 8. The evidence offered and set forth in the eighth bill of exceptions, ought to have been received. The inquiry into the business of the two brothers and their pecuniary relations with one another, had been carried back by the plaintiffs as far as 1838. Circumstances somewhat remote, and loose declarations of the parties had been relied on to establish .John’s indebtedness to William. Here was an offer to prove the contrary by a witness who knew the state of their accounts during the same period of time. We think it was a fair answer. If it had been offered out of time, and the Court had rejected it for that reason, there would have been no error that we could correct. But it was tendered as soon as the defendant could get it in, after the Court had heard that to which it was a reply. Judgment reversed and ven. de novo awarded.

Opinion by Woodside, J., This is a workmen’s compensation case in which the question is whether the board’s finding that the claimant suffered the permanent loss of the use of his leg should be sustained. The claimant, Frank J. Curran, broke his leg (fractured the right tibia and fibula) in the course of his employment with the defendant on January 30, 1952. He received workmen’s compensation for total disability under an open agreement until October 21, 1953, when the defendant petitioned to modify the agreement alleging that Curran was no longer totally disabled. The referee, after hearing testimony, found as a fact that the claimant was still totally disabled, and dismissed the petition to modify. Upon appeal by the defendant, the Workmen’s Compensation Board affirmed the findings of the referee, and on September 7, 1955, dismissed the appeal. On October 24, 1955, the defendant filed another petition to modify, this time alleging that the claimant’s injury had finally resulted in the loss of the use of his right leg. The referee found as a fact that “the claimant now suffers industrial loss of use of his right leg as a result of the accident.” Upon appeal by the claimant to the board, it amended the above finding of the referee by deleting “industrial”, and concluded that the claimant should be awarded compensation for the loss of use of his right leg. As this award limited the claimant’s compensation to 215 weeks from February 7, 1952, instead of the longer period for which he might have received compensation for total or partial disability, he appealed the order to the Court of Common Pleas No. 2 of Philadelphia. That court first sustained the appeal and reversed the order of the board, and then amended its order and remitted the record to the board. The defendant appealed to this Court. To understand the problem here involved we must examine section 306(c) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 77 PS §513, and see how it differs from paragraphs (a) and (b) of the same section. The relevant parts of paragraph (c) are: “For all disability resulting from permanent injuries of the following classes, the compensation shall be exclusively as follows: . . . For the loss of a leg, sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of wages during two hundred and fifteen weeks . . . “. . . Permanent loss of the use of a hand, arm, foot, leg, eye, finger, or thumb, great toe, or other toe, shall be considered as the equivalent of the loss of such hand, arm, foot, leg, eye finger, or thumb, great toe or other toe.” Paragraph (a) of section 306 (77 PS §511) relates to total disability, and paragraph (b) relates to partial disability (77 PS §512) while paragraph (c), supra, relates to the compensation for permanent injuries to certain specified parts of the body. The capacity to work is involved in the compensation payable under paragraphs (a) and (b), but not in the compensation payable under paragraph (c) ; in it the right to compensation is measured by the extent of the injury. The legislature fixed the amount to be paid for the injuries described in paragraph (c) without considering, but including, all incapacity to labor that may be connected therewith, whether such incapacity be total, partial or no incapacity at all. The compensation allowed in paragraph (c) is restricted by precise language, regardless of the fact that a permanent injury might otherwise affect capacity to work. Lente v. Luci, 275 Pa. 217, 220, 119 A. 132 (1922); Camizzi v. E. T. Fraim Lock Co., 151 Pa. Superior Ct. 3, 8, 10, 29 A. 2d 425 (1942). It is to be noted that tbe defendant first petitioned to modify by alleging that tbe claimant no longer suffered total disability. At tbe hearing on that petition it attempted to establish partial disability. Instead of appealing from tbe board’s order on that petition, tbe defendant filed another petition alleging that tbe claimant’s injury had finally resulted in tbe permanent loss of use of bis right leg. Tbe claimant contends that by failing to appeal from tbe order of tbe board on the first petition, the defendant lost its right to litigate tbe question raised in tbe second petition. Tbe answer to this contention is that tbe questions raised in tbe two petitions are not only different questions, but also depends upon different determinations. Loss of wages and capacity to work are involved in tbe question raised in tbe first petition, but they are not involved in the question raised in tbe second petition. It is possible for one to be totally disabled by a leg injury, and still not have suffered tbe permanent loss of use of the leg. It is also possible to have suffered tbe permanent loss of use of tbe leg and not be totally disabled. What was litigated on tbe first petition was tbe extent of tbe disability. Tbe defendant, and tbe claimant if it should happen to be to bis advantage, are entitled to have determined whether or not tbe claimant has lost the permanent use of his leg. This question bad never been considered by tbe referee or the board until, they acted upon tbe second petition. The burden is upon the defendant to support the allegations of its petition to modify. He must establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the claimant has suffered the permanent loss of the use of his leg. Monarko v. Culmerville Coal Co., 159 Pa. Superior Ct. 126, 47 A. 2d 295 (1946); Snyder v. Hoffman, 159 Pa. Superior Ct. 392, 48 A. 2d 78 (1946). Whether the defendant has met this burden is a question of fact for the referee and the board and not for the court. A court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or to substitute its findings for those of the compensation authorities if there is legally competent evidence to support them. Savolaine v. Matthew Leivo & Sons, 131 Pa. Superior Ct. 508, 510, 200 A. 243 (1938); Flood v. Logan Iron & Steel Co., 145 Pa. Superior Ct. 206, 20 A. 2d 792 (1941); McClemens v. Penn Auto Parts, 181 Pa. Superior Ct. 542, 544, 124 A. 2d 623 (1956). The question for us, as it was for the court below, is, therefore, not what we would find from the evidence if sitting as a fact finding tribunal, but whether the finding of the permanent loss of the use of the leg is supported by competent evidence. Savolaine v. Matthew Leivo & Sons, supra, and McClemens v. Penn Auto Parts, supra. As the board found for the defendant we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant and give it the benefit of all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Rice v. Public Meat Market, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 328, 329, 70 A. 2d 443 (1950). Before considering this, it is advisable to examine the test to be applied in determining the “permanent loss of the use” of an injured member of claimant’s body. The legislature and courts have vacillated concerning this test. It has been said that the test to be applied is whether the injured member “has become useless in any employment for which (the claimant) is mentally and physically qualified.” Rice v. Public Meat Market, supra; Morrow v. James S. Murray & Sons, 136 Pa. Superior Ct. 277, 282, 7 A. 2d 109 (1939); Corniak v. Cohen, 150 Pa. Superior Ct. 140, 146, 27 A. 2d 560 (1942); Zellner v. Haddock Mining Company, 139 Pa. Superior Ct. 16, 10 A. 2d 918 (1940). Ignoring the statutory distinction between the first two paragraphs and the third paragraph of section 306, this rule was first pronounced in Chovic v. Pittsburgh Crucible Steel Co., 71 Pa. Superior Ct. 350, 353 (1919) which was decided before Lente v. Luci, supra, 275 Pa. 217, 119 A. 132 (1922). The legislature adopted this rule in 1937 and it was the correct test for compensable injuries occurring between January 1, 1938 and July 1,1939 during which time the Act of June 4, 1937, P. L. 1552 was effective. That act inserted into section 306(c) the phrase “for industrial purposes”, so that it read “Permanent loss of the use of a . . . leg . . . for industrial purposes, shall be considered as the equivalent of the loss of such . . . leg . . .” The Act of June 21, 1939, P. L. 520, removed the phrase “for industrial purposes”, so that in this respect the section was in the same form that it was prior to the Act of 1937, supra. See Criner v. McKee Glass Co., 162 Pa. Superior Ct. 627, 629, 60 A. 2d 595 (1948). The case of Camizzi v. E. T. Fraim Lock Co., supra, 151 Pa. Superior Ct. 3, 12, 29 A. 2d 425 (1942), involved an industrial injury when the amendment of 1937 was the law, and the court there properly referred to the claimant’s permanent loss of the use of her hand “for industrial purposes”. Apparently following the Chovic case, supra, the courts applied “the industrial use” interpretation to some cases occurring both before and after the period when the legislature directed it to be applied. The correct test to determine whether a claimant is entitled to compensation under section 306(c) is whether the claimant has suffered the permanent loss of use of the injured member for all practical intents and purposes. Diaz v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 155 Pa. Superior Ct. 177, 182, 38 A. 2d 387 (1944); Wildman v. Pa. Dept. of Highways, 157 Pa. Superior Ct. 301, 303, 43 A. 2d 342 (1945); Criner v. McKee Glass Co., supra, 162 Pa. Superior Ct. 627, 629, 60 A. 2d 595 (1948). This is now settled judicial construction. Stachowski v. Incorporated Real Estate Investors, 174 Pa. Superior Ct. 152, 154, 100 A. 2d 140 (1953). The cases holding that the loss of use means that the injured member has become useless in any employment for which the claimant is mentally and physically qualified have been overruled by Stachowski v. Incorporated Real Estate Investors, supra. The test to be applied is whether the claimant has suffered “the permanent loss of use of the injured member for all practical intents and purposes.” This is not the same test as the “industrial use” test although the two would often bring the same result if applied in particular cases. Generally the “all practical intents and purpose” test requires a more crippling injury than the “industrial use” test in order to bring the case under section 306(c) supra. However, it is not necessary that the injured member of the claimant be of absolutely no use in order for him to have lost the use of it for all practical intents and purposes. For example, in Criner v. McKee Glass Co., supra, 162 Pa. Superior Ct. 627, 60 A. 2d 595 (1948), it was held that the claimant was entitled to compensation for the permanent loss of the use of his left eye, even though it appeared that were he to lose the use of his right eye he would have vision in his damaged left eye. See also Stachowski v. Incorporated Real Estate Investors, supra, 174 Pa. Superior Ct. 152, The evidence here establishes an injury very simi-156, 100 A. 2d 140 (1953), and Thatcher v. Weinstein, 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 368, 35 A. 2d 549 (1944). lar to that of the claimant in Thatcher v. Weinstein, supra, where it was held that there was a loss of use of the leg requiring compensation to he paid under paragraph (c) instead of total disability under paragraph (a) of section 306. The claimant here is 62 years old. Iiis injury was confined to the leg. He testified that since he suffered the fracture, he has not been able to move around without the assistance of a cane because his leg “would creak”; the “leg goes one way and the knee the other . . .” “[creating] a state of unbalance all the time”. He suffered pain, even when in bed. He could not sit for any appreciable length of time without getting up to flex his muscles and exercise. Dr. Wieder testified the claimant had some use of the leg. Dr. Tomasco said he had no usefulness, except that he was able to stand on it, and that the use of it was lost even with a brace. Dr. Harold Lefkoe, testifying for the claimant, admitted that “if this man had his leg amputated and was properly fitted and could use an artificial appliance, he’d be much better off than he is today”. In the eye cases cited above, it was determined that the employees had lost the use of the injured eyes even though the claimants were better off with their injured eyes than without them. In the case before us there is testimony that the claimant would be better off without the leg than with it. This is evidence from which the board could find that the claimant permanently lost the use of his leg for all practical intents and purposes. There is evidence from which the board might have found that the claimant did not lose the use of his leg for all practical intents and purposes. There was evi dence lie could stand on it, and with the use of a brace and cane be could walk on it for a short distance, and there was medical testimony that be bad some use of tbe leg. But, as has been said many times, it is not for the court to weigh the testimony and determine the facts. We must consider only whether there is sufficient credible evidence to ¡support tbe finding of tbe board. If the board believed tbe testimony that tbe claimant would have been better off with tbe leg amputated, it could properly find that he bad lost the use of the leg for all practical intents and purposes. There was sufficient credible evidence to support tbe board’s finding- The order of the court below is reversed, and the order of the Workmen’s Compensation Board reinstated. Although it has no bearing on our determination of this case, it is a matter of interest that this unfortunate claimant fell and again broke his right leg, and that it was amputated on August 28, 1957.

Opinion by Arnold, J., This appeal is from an order suspending support of a three year old child because the mother took the child out of Pennsylvania, thereby depriving the father of the right of visitation. Harriet Firestone, the relatrix-appellant, obtained an absolute divorce from Frank Firestone when their child was about eighteen months old. The divorce adjudicated that the wife was the injured and innocent spouse; and it also adjudicated that the husband was the guilty and offending spouse. Such innocent spouse is not only free to remarry but also free to live where she chooses, without regard to the accommodation or convenience of her delinquent husband who, of his own choice, disrupted both the family and their common home. In cases involving custody of children, this court has frequently said, (a) that the only substantial consideration is the welfare of the child; (b) that as to a child of tender years such welfare is promoted by the custody of the mother, unless reason to the contrary appears; (c) and this will not be affected by the mere fact that the mother is a non-resident of the state: Commonwealth ex rel. Lamberson v. Batyko et al., 157 Pa. Superior Ct. 389, 43 A. 2d 364; Commonwealth ex rel. Stack v. Stack, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 147, 15 A. 2d 76; Commonwealth ex rel. Keller v. Keller, 90 Pa. Superior Ct. 357; Commonwealth ex rel. Black v. Black, 79 Pa. Superior Ct. 409; Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binney 520; Act of 1895 P. L. 316 sec. 2, 48 P.S. 92; Act of 1917, P. L. 817, 12 P.S. 1874. A father of sufficient means must support his child, and it is not a defense that either the mother-custodian, or the child itself, has independent means. The support is to be commensurate with the means arid station in life of the father. This eighteen months old child remained with the mother at her parents’. On his writ of habeas corpus issued merely to enforce his “right of visitation”, and not to obtain custody either because the wife was unfit or the welfare of the child improved, the court fixed definite hours each week for the father to have and to visit the child. At the same time, on the mother’s application, the court decreed support of $10.00 per week against the father. Both matters were incorporated in one order: Commonwealth ex rel. Berardino v. Berardino, 97 Pa. Superior Ct. 380. The relatrix had sinusitis and on advice of her physician, who testified, went to Florida for the winter, taking her child, now three years old, with her. She notified the court’s parole officer that she had left. On the father’s •petition the court suspended “for the time being” the support for the child because of the mother’s “defiance of the court” and of the “rights of the father”. The mother applied for reinstatement of the order and set forth that she intended to remarry and permanently live in Florida. The court denied her petition, holding that “the removal of the child to a distant place deprived him [the father] of that right [of visitation, etc.]”, and thus relieved him of that support. We think this erroneous. His right to visitation or temporary custody is enforcible by habeas corpus. A bond may be required. But the duty of the father to support a three year old child is well nigh absolute. Here the court relieved the father of this duty to support because of some conduct of the mother not affecting her fitness for custody. Indeed, we held in Commonwealth ex rel. Newman v. Stark, 97 Pa. Superior Ct. 166, that where a husband divorced his wife in New York State for adultery, and where that court awarded custody to the mother who thereafter married the co-respondent, the courts of Pennsylvania will not relieve the father of the support of the child. Custody and support are two different things. If this mother, by depriving the father of the right of visitation, toere guilty of contempt of court (which we do not hold), it could subject her, but never the child, to penalties; and it does not relieve the father of the duty to support the child under circumstances such as these. Suspension of an order of support is not a substitute for attachment for contempt nor for habeas corpus. The order of the court below is reversed. The order of June 19, 1944, that Prank Firestone pay $10.00 per week for the support of the minor child, Ellis M. Firestone, is reinstated as of June 8,1945, and the defendant, Frank Firestone, is directed to pay the same, with costs.

OPINION OF THE COURT NIX, Chief Justice. The question here presented is whether an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977), should be permitted from the denial of a motion to dismiss an information on double jeopardy grounds where the hearing court has determined the motion to be frivolous. Having fully considered that issue, we conclude that in such circumstances an interlocutory appeal is unwarranted and review must be sought by means of a direct appeal following retrial. I. Appellee James Brady was charged with violating section 3731 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, “Driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance.” Prior to trial the Court of Common Pleas, on motion of appellee, excluded any testimony concerning his prior admission to an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (“ARD”) program in connection with a prior violation of section 3731. Trial commenced on January 8, 1985. During trial the arresting officer was asked by the prosecution if he had had an opportunity to observe appellee. In responding, that officer testified that appellee mentioned to another officer at the scene that he (the officer testifying) had stopped appellee on a previous occasion. Defense counsel then made a motion for a mistrial, which was granted. On January 28, 1985, appellee filed a motion to dismiss the information asserting a double jeopardy claim. After conducting a hearing on the motion, the hearing court issued a memorandum opinion finding that there had been no intentional prosecutorial misconduct, concluding that the double jeopardy claim was frivolous, and denying the motion to dismiss on January 30, 1985. That same day, having been advised that appellee had filed a notice of appeal in the Superior Court, the Court of Common Pleas by separate order declined to stay retrial pending appeal. Later in the day Judge Cavanaugh temporarily stayed a retrial, and on February 1, 1985, the temporary stay was continued pending disposition of the appeal before that Court. The Commonwealth filed an application to “Lift Stay of Criminal Trial” in this Court. The Commonwealth subsequently filed a second application requesting this Court to assume plenary jurisdiction of the matter. We granted the application to assume plenary jurisdiction, directed a transfer of the pending Superior Court appeal to this Court, and consolidated that appeal and the application to lift the stay. We further directed that the case be listed for oral argument with briefing limited to the question of the applicability of Commonwealth v. Bolden, supra. II. The threshold issue in Commonwealth v. Bolden, supra, was whether an immediate appeal should be permitted from an order denying a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The question there considered was whether a double jeopardy contention established the exceptional circumstance which would require a departure from the basic rule limiting an appeal to the review of a final judgment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hogan, 482 Pa. 333, 393 A.2d 1133 (1978); Commonwealth v. Myers, 457 Pa. 317, 322 A.2d 131 (1974); Commonwealth v. Bunter, 445 Pa. 413, 282 A.2d 705 (1971) (plurality opinion); Commonwealth v. Sites, 430 Pa. 115, 242 A.2d 220 (1968); Commonwealth v. Swanson, 424 Pa. 192, 225 A.2d 231 (1967). After an analysis of the scope of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Bolden plurality concluded that the denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds presented exceptional circumstances justifying an immediate appeal: The basic purpose of the double jeopardy clause mandates that a defendant who has a meritorious claim have an effective procedural means of vindicating his constitutional right to be spared an unnecessary trial. Acquittal upon retrial or belated appellate recognition of a defendant’s claim by reversal of a conviction can never adequately protect the defendant’s rights. The defendant is deprived of his constitutional right the moment jeopardy attaches a second time. His loss is irreparable; to subject an individual to the expense, trauma and rigors incident to a criminal prosecution a second time offends the double jeopardy clause. The clause establishes the “right to be free from a second prosecution, not merely a second punishment for the same offense.” Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218, 224 (5th Cir.1973). Without immediate appellate review, a defendant will be forced to undergo a new trial, precluding any review of his claim that he should not be tried at all. “Because of the nature of the constitutional right ... assert[ed], no post-conviction relief, either state or federal, is capable of vindicating [appellant’s] interest.” United States ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034, 1037 (3d Cir.1975). As Judge Adams observed in Webb, “forcing [appellant] to trial would defeat the constitutional right he seeks to preserve.” Id. at 1039. Exceptional circumstances exist under Pennsylvania law warranting appellate review prior to judgment of sentence. Therefore, we hold that denial of a pretrial application to dismiss an indictment on the ground that the scheduled trial will violate the defendant’s right not to be placed twice in jeopardy may be appealed before the new trial is held. Id., 472 Pa. at 631-33, 373 A.2d at 104-05 (footnotes omitted). While Bolden was a nondecisional opinion, Commonwealth v. Haefner, 473 Pa. 154, 373 A.2d 1094 (1977), a majority of the members of this Court have agreed with the proposition that “pretrial orders denying double jeopardy claims are final orders for purposes of appeal.” Id., 473 Pa. at 156, 373 A.2d at 1095. See also Commonwealth v. Murry, 498 Pa. 504, 447 A.2d 612 (1982); Commonwealth v. Virtu, 495 Pa. 59, 432 A.2d 198 (1981); Commonwealth v. McElligott, 495 Pa. 75, 432 A.2d 587 (1981); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 492 Pa. 297, 424 A.2d 870 (1981); Commonwealth v. Hude, 492 Pa. 600, 425 A.2d 313 (1980); Commonwealth v. Fields, 491 Pa. 609, 421 A.2d 1051 (1980); Commonwealth v. Starks, 490 Pa. 336, 416 A.2d 498 (1980); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 488 Pa. 75, 410 A.2d 1232 (1980). Although the Bolden plurality did not expressly focus upon the question, its reasoning clearly required a stay of retrial, in addition to the right to an immediate review, to satisfy the defendant’s double jeopardy rights. Moreover, Rule 1701 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure further buttressed the requirement of a stay of retrial pending appeal. Rule 1701 provides in pertinent part: (a) General rule. Except as otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other government unit may no longer proceed further in the matter. Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). Thus the Bolden principle, in conjunction with the automatic stay provision of Rule 1701, resulted in delaying retrial indefinitely while a double jeopardy claim interposed in a criminal prosecution was reviewed on direct appeal. A few months after the Bolden decision, the United States Supreme Court, in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977), recognized a similar right of appeal under the relevant federal jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Abney Court found that a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds satisfied the criteria of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), which established the “collateral order” exception to the final judgment rule. Such an order was therefore a “final decision” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and the Court of Appeals could properly exercise jurisdiction over an appeal therefrom. Thus, as in Bolden, an exception to the final judgment rule was carved out for the federal judicial system. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that such appeals could be employed merely to delay retrial but suggested that such problems could be handled administratively: Admittedly, our holding may encourage some defendants to engage in dilatory appeals as the Solicitor General fears. However, we believe that such problems of delay can be obviated by rules or policies giving such appeals expedited treatment. It is well within the supervisory powers of the courts of appeals to establish summary procedures and calendars to weed out frivolous claims of former jeopardy. Abney v. United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 662 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. at 2042 n. 8. In response to the Abney Court’s suggestion, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted a rule designed to prevent the use of frivolous double jeopardy appeals as a dilatory tactic. United States v. Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 926, 100 S.Ct. 3022, 65 L.Ed.2d 1120 (1980). Faced with the question of whether the filing of an Abney appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction, the court saw the need to weigh the consequences to the defendant of failure to review his double jeopardy claim before trial against the effect of divestiture of jurisdiction, which “leaves the court powerless to prevent intentional dilatory tactics, forecloses without remedy the nonappealing party’s right to continuing trial court jurisdiction, and inhibits the smooth and efficient functioning of the judicial process.” Id. at 988, quoting United States v. Hitchmon, 602 F.2d 689, 694 (5th Cir.1979) (en banc). The rule formulated by the Fifth Circuit attempts to accommodate these competing and significant interests: Situations of this kind call for a rule which is both reflective of practical common sense and protective of the essence of the right of appeal recognized in Abney. We hereby adopt such a rule under our supervisory powers. The Supreme Court suggested in Abney that the problem of frivolous and dilatory appeals could be met through expedited treatment and summary procedure at the court of appeals level. 431 U.S. at 662 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2034 [at 2042 n. 8]. An appropriate balance of conflicting interests should be initially achieved in the trial court itself by identifying frivolous claims of former jeopardy and preventing them from unduly disrupting the trial process. Henceforth, the district courts, in any denial of a double jeopardy motion, should make written findings determining whether the motion is frivolous or nonfrivolous. If the claim is found to be frivolous, the filing of a notice of appeal by the defendant shall not divest the district court of jurisdiction over the case. If nonfrivolous, of course, the trial cannot proceed until a determination is made of the merits of an appeal. United States v. Dunbar, supra at 988. The court further indicated that it was empowered to stay the proceedings below pending appeal or issue a writ of mandamus or prohibition, which would sufficiently safeguard the defendant’s right not to be tried pending appeal from the denial of a nonfrivolous double jeopardy claim. Id. at 989. In United States v. Leppo, 634 F.2d 101 (3d Cir.1980), the Third Circuit adopted an identical procedure. Other circuits have subsequently embraced the Dunbar rule. See United States v. Cannon, 715 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1045, 104 S.Ct. 716, 79 L.Ed.2d 178 (1984); United States v. Head, 697 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132, 103 S.Ct. 3113, 77 L.Ed.2d 1367 (1983); United States v. Hines, 689 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bizzard, 674 F.2d 1382 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 973, 103 S.Ct. 305, 74 L.Ed.2d 286 (1982); United States v. Grabinski, 674 F.2d 677 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829, 103 S.Ct. 67, 74 L.Ed.2d 67 (1982); United States v. Lanci, 669 F.2d 391 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Liberatore v. United States, 457 U.S. 1134, 102 S.Ct. 2960, 73 L.Ed.2d 1350 (1982). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court, while it has not addressed the precise question of the suspension of proceedings pending disposition of a frivolous appeal on double jeopardy grounds, has indicated that the claim in an Abney appeal must be “colorable.” Richardson v. United MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 862, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 1553, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978). It thus appears that the federal courts have uniformly concluded that frivolous double jeopardy appeals must not be permitted to delay retrial. III. We are now being urged to carve out an exception to the application of Bolden and Rule 1701 in instances of appeals from orders denying a claimed double jeopardy violation which has been found to be frivolous by the hearing court. We must therefore determine whether such an exception strikes an appropriate balance between the defendant’s interest and those of the public at large. The obvious effect of a rule which does not permit an interlocutory appeal of certain double jeopardy claims is that some defendants may be tried notwithstanding a contention that the retrial itself violates double jeopardy principles. However where the double jeopardy claim advanced is obviously frivolous, an interlocutory appeal will serve only to delay prosecution. The defendant will have the opportunity to initially assert his claim before a tribunal and retrial is not permitted unless the claim is shown to the satisfaction of that court to be frivolous. Further, a defendant may challenge the finding of frivolousness in the context of a request for a stay from an appellate court. Moreover, there will be an appellate review of the merits of the claim on direct appeal following retrial. Such an approach will provide full protection for a legitimate double jeopardy claim and at the same time afford some degree of assurance that this right will not be abused. Admittedly, it is conceivable that a legitimate claim may on rare occasions be overlooked by both a hearing court and the appellate court in which a stay is sought. Such a risk is at best minimal and in any event counterbalanced by the numerous meritless claims that will be identified and excluded. The priority for an expeditious disposition of criminal cases justifies this minimal risk. The public, on the other hand, “has an overriding interest in the prompt trial of the criminally accused.” Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa. 214, 221, 364 A.2d 1345, 1349 (1976). See Commonwealth v. Earp, 476 Pa. 369, 382 A.2d 1215 (1978) (plurality opinion); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127 (1972). From the point of view of the public, a speedy trial is necessary to preserve the means of proving the charge, to maximize the deterrent effect of prosecution and conviction; and to avoid, in some cases, an extended period of pretrial freedom by the defendant during which time he may flee, commit other crimes, or intimidate witnesses. ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 12-1.1 Commentary (2d ed. 1980). The stay of a criminal trial pending appeal necessitates what may be lengthy delays in the prosecution of the defendant. The availability of an automatic stay upon filing a Bolden appeal encourages the use of frivolous appeals as a means of avoiding prosecution. The trial court should not be powerless to prevent such intentional dilatory tactics. United States v. Hines, supra; United States v. Dunbar, supra; United States v. Hitchmon, supra. The needless delays engendered by frivolous appeals hinder the administration of justice as well as the public interest. We therefore conclude that an appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds should not be permitted where the hearing court has considered the motion and made written findings that the motion is frivolous. Absent such a finding, an appeal may be taken from the denial of the motion. Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court staying trial is vacated. The appeal on the merits of appellee’s double jeopardy claim is quashed as interlocutory. LARSEN, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion. . The instant record establishes that, in preparation for the proceedings, the assistant district attorney assigned to the case specifically instructed witnesses not to make reference to this prior incident. . The lead opinion authored by Justice Roberts was joined only by Justice Manderino. Justice Pomeroy filed a concurring opinion, while then Chief Justice Eagen concurred in the result. This writer filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice O’Brien joined. Former Chief Justice Jones did not participate in the decision. . Section 1291 provides: The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. . This procedure provides at least a preliminary review by an appellate judge of the finding of frivolousness prior to a retrial.

The opinion of the court was delivered, January 17th 1867, by Strong, J. — The agreement upon which the plaintiffs below rest their right to recover in ejectment is singularly obscure. The avowed motive that induced it was a desire of the owner of the land that an exploration might be made to ascertain whether it contained mineral oil. But what rights it was intended to give to Samuel Baird, the explorer, it is difficult to determine from the language used by the parties. And the difficulty is increased by the fact that the stipulations respecting the island and those respecting the farm are diverse, and yet they are mingled together. So far as it relates to the conveyance of any interest in the lands, the contract is executory. No doubt it amounts to an engagement to sell the island on a certain contingency, but there is no absolute covenant to sell. McGuire undertook to make a conveyance of the island if Baird should find oil upon it. To allow to the agreement a reasonable construction, it must, of course, be held that the discovery of oil must be made within a reasonable time. But what interest, if any, did McGuire agree to give in the body of the farm ? The plaintiff insists that the agreement amounts to a sale of the oil itself; and that the oil being a part of the land, is a corporeal hereditament, to recover possession of which ejectment will lie. But if it be conceded that by the contract there was a-grant of the oil, it by no means follows from that alone that ejectment is maintainable. Oil is a fluid, like water, it is not the subject of property/except while in actual occupancy.,' A grant of water has long been considered not to be a grant of anything for which an ejectment will lie. It is not a grant of the soil upon which the water rests: Coke Lit. 4, v. It would' confound all legal notions were it held that an action can be maintained for the recovery specifically of the possession of a subterranean spring or stream of water, no matter whether the waters are mineral or not. There is a manifest difference between a grant of all the coal or ore within a tract of land, or even the grant of an exclusive right to dig, take and carry away all the coal in the tract (which we held in Caldwell v. Fulton to be a grant of a corporeal interest), and a grant of the waters in or on the tract. The nature of the subject has much to do with the rights that are given over it, and to us it appears that a right to take all the oil that may be found in a tract of land, cannot be a corporeal right. The contract in this case is in some particulars not unlike that under consideration in Clement v. Masser, or Youngman v. Walter, 4 Wright 341. Like that it is the grant of an exclusive right, but no present consideration is agreed to be paid for the oil. It contains no covenants of the grantee either to search for the oil or to become a lessee of wells on the main farm; and what is exceedingly important, it provides for a future conveyance of the island and assurance of rights on the main land, in the event that oil should be discovered. This provision is very clearly indicative of an intention that no present estate should pass, either corporeal or incorporeal. If the agreement referred to in Clement v. Masser and Youngman v. Walter was correctly ruled to convey no corporeal hereditament such as is essential to the maintenance of an ejectment, much more must the contract here be held to be no grant of a corporeal interest, in any portion of the farm. There is also no distinct assertion that Baird should have all the oil. At most, his rights are made to extend only to so much as he might find. McGuire does indeed covenant to grant an exclusive right to sink wells for obtaining oil, but even after the grant shall be made it is only for such wells as he shall continuously pump oil from, that the covenantee is to pay rent. The only clause which expressly grants any right to take the oil is the last, and that is, “ Should oil be .found, the right to pump oil from the wells shall continue” as the rent is paid. This surely is not a grant of all the oil. Moreover, Baird is expressly authorized to remove his buildings or machinery, in case he fail to find oil. This provision is unnecessary if a corporeal right was granted. And the removal of buildings, &c., determine all rights under the contract. In such a contingency the ijjilOO paid are to be in full of every demand. These stipulations point to an- intention that nothing more was in contemplation of the parties than a license before the proposed explorations should prove successful, and we think a license is all that Baird acquired. He obtained not' even an easement on the land, for it is essential to an easement that there should be both a dominant and a servient tenement. But the right or privilege assured by this contract was not for any other tract of land, but solely for Baird himself. Regarding, then, the agreement, not as a conveyance of corporeal estate, but as a license, we proceed to the consideration of its effect. Generally a parol license is revocable at the pleasure of the licenser, and it is none the less revocable because a consideration has been paid for it: Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that Maguire might have revoked the license in this case had it been given by parol at any time before Baird had expended labor or money on the faith of it, in prosecuting the explorations. By so doing he might have subjected himself to a liability to respond in damages, but his right to withdraw the permission given would have been inseparable from the nature of the arrangement. Here, however, the license was not parol, it was given by deed. It is not so clear that a license given by deed is revocable at the pleasure of the grantor. See the Law of Mines, Minerals and Quarries, by Arundel Rogers, a late English, elementary treatise, p. 313. Without pausing to inquire how this may be, how stands the case when a license has not only been granted by deed, but acted upon, and when the licensee, on the faith of it, has made large expenditures ? It must be admitted that the license to Baird authorized him to go upon the land, to bore or sink wells and to erect the machinery and buildings necessary for obtaining oil, or at least for ascertaining whether it existed on the land. The privilege included a right to occupy so much of «the surface as was required to enable him to enjoy the main thing granted. These privileges, though not all expressly given, are plainly implied. They would be, were no reference made to them. They are, however, spoken of in such a manner as to leave no doubt that it was intended they should go with the right to sink wells. And the evidence given at the trial shows that in the enjoyment of his license Baird did occupy portions of the land, that he expended a large sum of money in sinking wells, and the verdict of the jury establishes that there has been no abandonment. It has been held in this state that even a parol license executed may become an easement upon the land, and that when acts have been done by one party in reliance upon a license granted to another, the latter will be equitably estopped from revoking it to the injury of the former: Lefevre v. Lefevre, 4 S. & R. 241; Resick v. Kern, 14 Id. 267; Lacy v. Arnett, 9 Casey 169. These are cases, it is true, where the license was not personal, hut where a servitude had been imposed for the benefit of another tenement. In them an easement was allowed in favor of the dominant tenement, appurtenant to it, and passing with it to a grantee of the license, as held in McKellip v. McIlhenny, 4 Watts 317. The same reasons which were controlling in these decisions appear to us to be applicable to the present case. Admitting, as we must, that we are not to confound the contingent covenant to sell the island, and to accept Baird as a tenant of wells on the main land, with the antecedent rights given to explore, we have still the facts that under the license to explore he was in possession of certain portions of the land, that such possession was authorized, that in taking it and continuing it large expenditures had been made, and that neither the occupancy itself nor the right to maintain it has ever been abandoned. Add to this the fact that if oil should be discovered as a result of his search, Baird was assured that he would be entitled to a conveyance of the island and a lease of wells on the main land, and it would seem grossly unjust in McGuire to make all his expenditures fruitless to him, and by revoking the license deprive him of the right, the expectation of which induced his expenditure. If in Lefevre v. Lefevre, there was enough to raise an estoppel and prevent the licenser from denying to the licensee the fruit of his expenditure, there surely is in this. Taking the occupancy of so much land as was necessary for the allowed explorations as was authorized, it was authorized for a consideration, and so was the continuance of the occupation. Call this what we may, an easement, which is an incorporeal right, or a temporary right to possession, defeasible, and ended when it shall be ascertained that the land does not contain oil, it was not for Mr. McGuire to take it away. Neither his conveyance of the laud nor a re-entry by himself, could deprive Baird of the rights obtained by him in virtue of the license and the action under it. If, therefore, the case stood upon this ground alone, we should be of opinion that the plaintiffs below were entitled to recover the possession of so much of the island and farm as the licensee had taken the occupancy of for the purpose of sinking wells and ascertaining whether oil is to be found. Thus far the disseisin of McGuire or his grantees would be regarded unlawful, and we should feel ourselves justified in sustaining an ejectment to restore a possession wrongfully taken away. But this ejectment was brought by the grantees of Baird, not by himself. We are, therefore, brought to a consideration of the effect of his grant. Looking to the contract, it is plain the license was a personal privilege. It was given to Samuel Baird, and not j to his assigns. And it was a privilege to be enjoyed exclusively on the land of McGuire. It was not for the benefit of any other tenement. It was not appurtenant to any other lands, but it belonged exclusively to the person of the grantee. This is affirm-able not only of the right to explore but of the right to occupy lands for the purpose of exploration. The latter is only an incident of the former. It is but adjutory of the former. When the right to search for oil is gone, the right to occupy land for such a search is gone with it. That a license is a personal privilege, and not assignable, is a well-settled principle. It is induced almost always by confidence in the character of the licensee. A man may well accord a privilege upon his lands to one person, which he would refuse to all others. Hence it is held that a personal license is not assignable, and that an assignment by a licensee determines his right. Though a licenser may be estopped from recalling the privilege granted, the licensee may destroy it. He may abandon or release. He cannot substitute another to his right. The cases are numerous in which it has been held that his assignment puts an end to the license: The King v. Hewton, Bridg. 115 ; Hull v. Babcock, 4 Johns. 418 ; Prince v. Case, 10 Conn. 375 ; Emmerson v. Fisk, 6 Greenl. 200. It is true that in Muskett v. Hill, 5 Bing. N. C. 694, it was ruled that a license to search for and raise metals, and also to carry them away and convert them to the licensee’s own use, passes an interest capable of being assigned. But in that case the license was by indenture, it was given to the licensees, their executors, administrators and assigns, and the indenture contained an express provision that the license and authority should be assignable by deed. The case, therefore, is not in conflict with the rule that a personal license is not assignable, in which respect it differs from a grant which carries an interest. Whatever, therefore, might have been Baird’s rights had he retained the privilege given to him by the agreement, his grantees cannot recover in ejectment. This view of the case dispenses with the necessity of considering any other than the 4th assignment of error. The judgment is reversed.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by (3-ibson, C. J. —An important, if not a decisive feature of the case is, that the hides were charged at cost, with five per cent commission, and interest after six months. So far the transaction appears distinctly in the garb of a sale, at a profit of five per cent and a credit of six months. The plaintiff would doubtless have been willing to sell without stipulating for a re-sale, provided the purchaser had substituted casli for it, or satisfactory security. What had he principally in view ? Undoubtedly to part with the property at a given profit; to effect which, required but an ordinary sale; and the transaction certainly took that shape in the first instance, the ulterior arrangements having respect but to security for the price. Annexed to the principal contract was an accessory agreement that the hides, when tanned, should be returned to the plaintiff and re-sold by him; and that the proceeds should be paid to the manufacturer, “ the price agreed upon for the hides,” as it was aptly but significantly called, together with five per cent for commission and guarantee being first deducted. Now, what was the purpose of all this? Not to give the plaintiff the rise of the market, for he was to have no interest in it. If it were any thing but security for the price of the raw material, what was it? Not to reserve a further profit in the shape of commission for re-sale and guarantee of solvency, for that was ostensibly to be but compensation for the risk and trouble. But why a commission for selling the plaintiff’s own goods; and why a guarantee of solvency if the sale were not on account of the party to be secured by it? The very provision indicates not only that the sale was to be on account of the manufacturer, but that it would otherwise have been at his risk. It will scarce be thought that he might not have entitled himself to dispense with the sale by payment or tender of the original price. Most certainly he might have done so by tendering enough to cover the additional commission. The only plausible objection to it is suggested by the want of a corresponding stipulation on the part of the manufacturer to make good the difference, should the proceeds of the manufactured article fall below the price of the raw material. The truth seems to be that such a contingency was not anticipated, for its occurrence was barely within the range of possibility. A depression of the market sufficient to counterbalance the increase of value from the labour of the manufacturer, was in the last degree improbable; and to provide for it would have been an excess of caution. The hides were charged as in the ordinary case of a sale; and if the subsequent proceeds of them to be put to the manufacturer’s credit, were less than the debit, he would, of course, have remained liable for the difference on the original contract : and this without any particular stipulation to that effect. In the ordinary case of materials worked up for the owner, which this is erroneously said to be, the artisan has a fixed price, or at least a quantum meruit, for his labour. Not so where what is more properly a profit than a compensation is to depend on the product of a sale; and where, if he be not essentially the owner of the article, it is not easy to comprehend how he can be legitimately affected by the state of the market. Can we shut our eyes to the true nature of the transaction so as not to see that it was in substance a sale; and that the re-sale was a device to elude the wholesome principle of the common law, which forbids a lien to bp created on chattels as a security separate from the possession? / There is no reason why the vendor of the raw material should be secured to the detriment of the public, or in preference to the manufacturer; and if both cannot be so, the contract must be construed in a way to make it consist with rules of policy for the suppression of fraud, by uniting the ownership to the possession./'It will scarce be thought that the vendor’s creditors could have deprived the manufacturer of the fruit of his labour by an execution. Yet he certainly would have been exposed to that contingency, had he not been an owner, at least to the extent of the increased value. But he could be a part owner only on the basis of a partnership resulting from .an agreement to furnish raw material on the one side, and labour, as well as skill, on the other, the profits being ascertainable and divisible in definite, proportions, by means of the re-sale. But profits are contingent, and there is nothing to indicate that the prime cost and commission were viewed as such, or to show that contingent losses were to be borne equally, by the material and labour put in as stock. By the express terms of the agreement, the price of the hides was to be paid out of the proceeds of the re-sale, in the first place; and community of profit and loss is a primary condition of the contract of partnership. But to declare the manufacturer a partner, would equally sustain the judgment, as it would justify the execution. But it is impossible to see how the plaintiff can have been either a joint or separate owner. If the effect of the contract were even doubtful, the construction of it would be influenced by considerations of policy./ To tolerate a lien severed from the possession by any device whatever, would be pregnant with all the mischiefs of colourable ownership; and to sanction it at the expense of the community, could be justified but by the accomplishment of more important objects than individual accommodation. Policy and fair dealing require the courts to. be as unsparing of transactions, whose effect is to impart a delusive credit or protect the property of debtors from their creditors, and to be as regardless of devices and forms, as they have ever been of transactions prohibited by the statutes of usury. The resources of ingenuity are inexhaustible ; and to give entire effect to principles of policy, it is necessary to look at substance without respect to form. It is said that this species of transaction is so prevalent, that an immense amount of property will fie affected by our decision^' So much the more urgent is the demand for its suppression. If the dealers in raw hides themselves cannot trust the tanners, they certainly cannot expect that they will be suffered to secure the benefit of their custom by means which may induce others to trust them. Such were the means resorted to here; and whether the form of the action were well or ill chosen, it is sufficient for the purposes of the judgment, that the attempt to cover the property from the creditors of the vendee, is prohibited by policy and statute. Judgment affirmed.