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P-01(A)-643-08/2022	PERAYU KHOR KHENG LONG RESPONDEN Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Seberang Perai Selatan	Land reference - Whether the High Court in determining the market value and adequate compensation under the First Schedule of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 can give an award below the lesser amount given by the valuation reports - Whether buildings erected on the scheduled land are illegal buildings and thus not entitled to be compensated pursuant to subparagraph 1(3A) of the First Schedule of the Land Acquisition Act 1960	07/11/2023	Dato' Dr. Choo Kah SingKorumYA Datuk S. Nantha Balan A/L E.S. MoorthyYA Datuk Azimah binti OmarDato' Dr. Choo Kah Sing	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=97b138f9-867f-46b0-8cfd-d5685a4fc31a&Inline=true	Page 1 of 18 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA DI PUTRAJAYA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. P-01(A)-643-08/2022 ANTARA KHOR KHENG LONG (NO. K/P: 640723-07-5483) PERAYU DAN PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH SEBERANG PERAI SELATAN RESPONDEN `````````````````````````````````````````````````````` [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Di Pulau Pinang Di Dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang Rujukan Pengambilan Tanah No. PA-15-54-01/2021 Antara Khor Kheng Long (No. K/P: 640723-07-5483) Pemohon Dan Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Seberang Perai Selatan Responden] 07/11/2023 10:31:05 P-01(A)-643-08/2022 Kand. 28 S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 18 CORAM S. NANTHA BALAN, HMR AZIMAH BINTI OMAR, HMR CHOO KAH SING, HMR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 18 Introduction [1] This is a land reference appeal before this Court. The appeal was filed by the land owner (“the appellant”) against the decision of the High Court dated 28.7.2022 (“the HC decision”). [2] The grounds in the Memorandum of Appeal can essentially be dealt with within these two questions of law before this Court for determination: i) Whether the respondent / the High Court in determining the “market value” and “adequate compensation” pursuant to the legal principles under the First Schedule of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 can give an award below than the lesser amount between the two valuation reports adduced by the Government Valuer and the Private Valuer; ii) Whether the buildings situated on the scheduled land which were bought by the appellant together with the scheduled land and which were previously being occupied by the estate workers are illegal buildings and thus are not entitled to be compensated pursuant to subparagraph 1(3A) of the First Schedule of the Land Acquisition Act 1960. [3] The events leading to the above two questions of law raised before us for determination are set out below. S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 18 Background Facts [4] On 9.12.2020, a land enquiry was held by the Land Administrator to determine the market value of a scheduled land (Lot 10059, GRN 158668, Mukim 8, Daerah Seberang Perai Selatan) which belonged to the appellant. The size of the scheduled land is 24,873.00 square meters (m²) (or 267,732.972 square feet [ft²]). [5] In the enquiry, the appellant averred that the fair market value for the scheduled land was RM346.60 per m² as at 5.11.2020. The appellant sought compensation for the scheduled land in the sum of RM8,620,982.00 (24,873 m² x RM346.60). The appellant also sought, inter alia, for compensation of 20 units of residential building (“the buildings”) erected on the scheduled land the total value of which amounted to RM1,868,329.00. [6] During the enquiry, the Land Administrator referred to a meeting held between the appellant and the authority on 23.10.2020. The meeting minutes recorded that the appellant had agreed to accept an offer made by the authority to the appellant in a sum of RM4,500,000.00 as the compensation amount for the acquisition of the scheduled land. The Land Administrator took cognizance of the meeting minutes and recorded in the proceedings of the enquiry as follows: “Bayaran pampasan tanah yang dituntut oleh pemilik ialah RM4,500,000.00 berdasarkan perbincangan sebelum proses pengambilan seperti di dalam minit perbicangan” S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 5 of 18 “Beberapa siri perbincangan / perundingan telah di adakan dengan pihak tuan tanah. Persetujuan telah diperolehi dengan tuan tanah berkaitan nilai pampasan.” [7] Premised on the above finding, the Land Administrator awarded the compensation amount for the scheduled land in the sum of RM4,500,000.00 (approximately RM180.83 per m² x 24,873.00 m² [or RM16.80 per ft² x 267,732.972 ft²]). The Land Administrator did not award any compensation for the buildings. [8] The appellant was not satisfied with the decision of the Land Administrator and filed a Borang N to challenge the compensation award made by the Land Administrator at the High Court. The appellant averred that there was no agreement reached between him and the authority and submitted that he was entitled to challenge the Land Administrator’s award. The learned High Court Judge held that there was no agreement reached between the appellant and the authority and stated as follows: “[10] Having considered the affidavits filed by both parties, I am of the view that there was no agreement as far as the amount of compensation is concerned simply because it was still open for the applicant to challenge the said amount. Hence, I proceed to consider the reports prepared by both JPPH and AAPC as well as the Assessors’ opinions besides the submissions advanced by both parties.” [9] The learned High Court Judge, after having considered the appellant’s and respondent’s valuers’ reports respectively, referred to the comparables stated in the appellant’s valuer’s report and made S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 6 of 18 substantial changes to the market value based on the recommendation of the private assessor’s findings. The learned High Court Judge concluded that the market value of RM202.58 per m² (or RM18.82 per ft²) was a fair and reasonable market value as the compensation amount for the scheduled land. The reasoning of the learned High Court Judge could be found in his Alasan Penghakiman at paragraphs 11 to 14 as reproduced below: [11] There is no common comparable lot. I have considered the features in all comparable lots picked by both the valuers and the assessors. Both the JPPH and the Government Assessor prefer Lot 681. After making the allowances JPPH suggests RM270.00 per m² or RM25.08 psf while the Government Assessor suggest RM260.00 per m² or RM24.25 psf. I cannot accept taking Lot 681 alone as comparable. Granted Lot 681 was transacted on 15.9.2020 and it is the most recent among all available comparables but its size is too small i.e. 4,932.098 m² while the scheduled land is 24,873.000 m². Land of substantial difference in size according to the Federal Court in Superintendent of Lands and Surveys, Sarawak v. Aik Hoe & Co. Ltd [1966] 1 LNS 188; [1966] 1 MLJ 243 and Ng Tiou Hong (supra) was not suitable to use as comparable. Further the whole of Lot 681 is zoned for development. [12] I cannot accept Lot 7706 alone as suggested by the applicant as it is an interior land, undulated and below road level. All the comparables carry plus and minus points therefore to my mind preferring a single lot as comparable is not appropriate more so when all have different features except their location. S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 18 [13] Turning to the Private Assessor's assessment, I am of the view that her opinion is more realistic. She takes Lots 681, 680, 7706 and 6276 as comparables in making her assessment. Lot 680 was transacted on 25.7.2017, Lots 7706 and 6276 were both transacted in 2019. Lot 680 measures 20,386.0069 m² and Lot 7706 measures 20,430.00 m² while Lot 6276 is 11,280.00 m² hence, only slight adjustments need to be given. I am mindful of the fact that Lot 680 was transacted more than 3 years from the material date. Subparagraph 1(1A) of the First Schedule of Act 486 provides: “In assessing the market value of any scheduled land, the valuer may use any suitable method of valuation to arrive at the market value provided that regard may be had to the prices paid for the recent sales of lands with similar characteristics as the scheduled land which are situated within the vicinity of the scheduled land and with particular consideration being given to the last transaction on the scheduled land within two years from the date with reference to which the scheduled land is to be assessed under subparagraph (1).” However, it does not mean that Lot 680 cannot be considered at all. Further it is a first layer land similar to the scheduled land and abuts Lot 681. Lot 680 is of first layer while Lots 7706 and 6276 are interior land. [14] Although I agree that the three comparables offered by APPC are suitable, I find that the adjustments or allowances made are unreasonable. They are undulated and below road level and only Lot 7706 is squarish. I cannot agree with the huge adjustments given by APPC. For instance, he gives a +30% adjustment for the time factor for Lot 680 without providing any reasons. S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 8 of 18 [15] Having given the necessary adjustments to the four comparables, the Private Assessor obtains an average price of RM18.82 psf or RM202.58 per m². I find that the adjustments she gives are more sensible this figure is more sensible thus, I agree that RM18.82 psf or RM202.58 per m² is a fair and reasonable market value for the scheduled land. [10] With regard to the claim for compensation of the buildings, the High Court Judge held that the appellant was not the owner of the buildings, that the buildings were constructed and/or owned by squatters, and that the buildings were already in existence before the appellant acquired the land. The learned High Court Judge also held that since the buildings were constructed and occupied by the squatters, therefore, they were illegal and no compensation was to be awarded for the buildings. [11] On 28.7.2022, the High Court Judge ordered, inter alia, that the compensation award for the scheduled land be increased from RM4,500,000.00 to RM5,038,734.50 (based on RM RM202.58 per m² [or RM18.82 per ft²]). In other words, an additional compensation amount of RM538,734.50 was to be paid to the appellant on top of the RM4,500,000.00 which was awarded earlier by the Land Administrator. [12] The appellant was not satisfied with the High Court’s decision, and filed an appeal before us. The main complaint of the appellant is that the High Court Judge did not accept both the JPPH’s and appellant’s valuer’s reports’ recommendation of the comparables. Instead, the learned High Court Judge preferred a value recommended by the private assessor based on an average value premised on four comparables. The value accepted by the learned High Court Judge as fair market value, i.e. S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 18 RM202.58 per m² (or RM18.82 per ft²), was way below the recommended values of the appellant’s valuer and/or JPPH’s report. The appellant’s valuer recommended the fair market value as RM346.60 per m² (or RM32.20 per ft²) based on Lot 680, whereas, the JPPH / the respondent recommended the fair market value as RM270 per m² (or RM25.08 ft²) based on Lot 681. It is on this basis that the first question of law was framed for determination before this Court. [13] With regard to the second question of law, it concerns whether compensation should or should not be awarded to “illegal” buildings. The findings of this Court [14] The respondent’s counsel raised an objection to the appellant’s appeal before us. The respondent’s counsel submitted that there should be no appeal from a High Court decision to the Court of Appeal as to compensation pursuant to s. 49 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 (“the Act”), except that for an appeal on question of law. [15] The respondent’s counsel cited a string of Federal Court decisions in support of the legal proposition (see Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat [2017] 5 CLJ 526, FC; Amitabha Guha v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat [2021] 3 CLJ 1, FC; and Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor v Nusantara Daya Sdn Bhd [2021] 7 CLJ 1, FC). We are fully aware of the legal proposition enunciated in those cases. [16] However, in the present appeal the first question of law hinges on the power of a High Court Judge exercising his role in a land reference S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 10 of 18 court. Whether a High Court Judge could exercise his discretionary power to arrive at a compensation value which is below than that of an offer made by JPPH / the respondent or the appellant? The second question of law is whether an “illegal” building ought to be compensated in a land acquisition proceeding? [17] In this appeal, this Court is not asked to consider whether the application of valuation principles was correct or otherwise when the High Court computed the amount of compensation to be awarded, as opposed to the appeal in Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor v Nusantara Daya Sdn Bhd. The complaint in that case “essentially concerned issue of fact and / or application of valuation principles when computing the amount of compensation to be awarded for the acquisition.” [18] The first question of law concerns the ambit of the powers of a High Court judge in a land reference proceeding. The decision of this Court, if the first question of law is answered in the negative, will have a consequential effect on the compensation amount. The second question of law essentially deals with the legitimacy of a claim for compensation of an “illegal” building in an acquisition proceeding. On both scores, we are of the view that the appellant’s appeal has crossed the threshold of the proviso to s. 49 of the Act. The first question of law [19] The respondent’s counsel did not challenge the High Court’s finding that there was no agreement. The respondent’s counsel went on to submit before us that the learned High Court was entitled to adopt the S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 18 opinion of the private assessor that the fair market value could be lower than the JPPH’s offer. We could not agree with the submission. [20] In the first place, the High Court in a land reference proceeding is always guided by the evidence produced before it. The applicant’s valuer’s report is the fist evidence before the court. Clause 2(1) of the Third Schedule of the Act states: “the applicant’s valuer’s report alone must establish a prima facie case for the applicant.” This would be the first evidence before the court to guide the judge to arrive at a fair market value. [21] The consideration of the applicant’s valuer’s report is to be followed by the consideration of a rebuttal report by the respondent as further evidence for the High Court judge to consider what the fair market value for the scheduled land is. [22] It would be easier to narrow down a possible fair market value when there is a common comparable between the applicant’s valuer’s report and the respondent’s valuer’s report. If there is none, then the High Court judge would have to consider the best comparable available before him. [23] The High Court judge would be assisted by a private assessor and a government assessor in the examination of the comparables. The High Court judge is not bound by the decision, recommendation or advice given by the two assessors. Nevertheless, the High Court judge must be guided by the evidence presented before the court. S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 12 of 18 [24] The court is presented with various proposals of what the market value is by the applicant and the respondent. There will be the highest market value on one side and the lowest market value on the other side. [25] In the present case, the appellant’s valuer recommended the fair market value as RM346.60 per m² (or RM32.20 per ft²); whereas, the respondent’s valuer (JPPH) recommended the fair market value as RM270.00 per m² (or RM25.08 per ft²). The fair market values recommended by the two sides differ because both sides have used different comparables as the basis for evaluation and adjustment as there was no common comparable. The higher end of the spectrum was the sum of RM346.60 per m² (or RM32.20 per ft²) (as offered by the appellant’s valuer) and the lower end of the spectrum was the sum of RM270.00 per m² (or RM25.08 per ft²) (as offered by JPPH / respondent). [26] The government assessor agreed with the respondent’s valuer to use Lot 681 as the best comparable, and after taking into consideration the adjustment, the government assessor came to a sum of RM260.00 per m² (or RM24.25 ft²) as the fair market value. This amount is close to the lower end of the spectrum. However, the learned High Court Judge rejected this amount. [27] The learned High Court Judge adopted the private assessor’s recommendation that the fair market value ought to be RM202.58 per m² (or RM18.82 per ft²). This amount was far below the lower end of the spectrum. It was also lower than the government assessor’s recommendation, i.e., RM260.00 per m² (or RM24.25 ft²). S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 13 of 18 [28] We do not have the benefit of understanding how the private assessor could come to this conclusion because her report and reasoning were not provided in the appeal records before us. [29] This Court is of the view that the learned High Court Judge was not entitled within his power to accept and find the amount of RM202.58 per m² (or RM18.82 per ft²) as the market value. This is because the finding of the High court Judge was lower than the market value recommended and offered by JPPH / the respondent. [30] Article 13 of the Federal Constitution provides that “no person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law”, and “no law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of property without adequate compensation.” If JPPH / the respondent was of the opinion that the fair market value of the schedule land was, at the minimum, RM270.00 per m² (or RM25.08 per ft²) constitute adequate compensation, there is no legal basis as to why the appellant should only be entitled to compensation based on a value which was less than a “minimum” market value that JPPH / the respondent was willing to pay. [31] It is observed that the market value of RM270 per m² (or RM25.08 per ft²) offered by JPPH / the respondent at the High Court was the same amount as offered in the enquiry at the Land Office. [32] We agree with the appellant’s counsel’s submission that the compensation amount for a fair market value should fall somewhere in between the two recommended market values offered by the appellant’s valuer’s report on one side and the JPPH’s valuation report on the other S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 14 of 18 side. At the very least, the JPPH’s recommended market value should be regarded as the “minimum opening” fair market value. [33] We are of the considered view that the learned High Court Judge fell into error when his Lordship failed to address his mind to consider the “minimum opening” fair market value offered by JPPH in its report and accepted the private assessor’s market value which was far below than the “minimum opening” fair market value. [34] We are also of the considered view that it is not permissible for the respondent to now argue that the learned High Court Judge was correct to come to a market value which was lower than what it was previously willing to offer to pay per the JPPH’s report. [35] Although there is no doubt that the learned High Court was entitled to come to his own conclusion of what the fair market value was for the schedule land, his Lordship must be guided by the evidence presented before him. Here, the learned High Court Judge awarded a sum lower than the market value which JPPH / the respondent was willing to offer and pay. This could not be legally correct when viewed through the lens of “adequate compensation” from a constitutional right perspective. [36] Based on the above reasoning, we are of the considered view that the minimum amount that the appellant ought to be compensated should be based on the “minimum opening” market value of RM270.00 per m² (or RM25.08 per ft²) as offered in the JPPH report. Hence, our answer to the first question of law is in the negative, and this part of the appellant’s appeal is allowed. S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 15 of 18 [37] For the record, the appellant’s counsel has conceded before this Court to accept the sum of RM270.00 per m² (or RM25.08 per ft²) as the market value for the compensation of the scheduled land. The second question of law [38] As for the compensation for the buildings, there is no supporting evidence that those buildings were legally built in compliance with the relevant planning laws or State land law. The learned High Court Judge concluded that there was no dispute that the said buildings were built or owned by squatters. These were the learned High Court Judge’s findings: “[16] As regards the buildings, the following facts are undisputed namely, 16.1 the applicant is not the owner of the buildings; 16.2 the buildings were constructed and/or owned by squatters; 16.3 they existed before the applicant purchased the said land; Therefore, the applicant is not a “person interested” in the buildings found thereon (see Cahaya Baru Development Bhd v. Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia [2010] 8 CLJ 761). Further the buildings were constructed and occupied by squatters and hence illegal and no compensation ought to be given (see Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Petaling v. Swee Lin Sdn Bhd [1999] 3 CLJ 577 and subparagraph 1(3A) of the First Schedule of Act 486 ).” S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 16 of 18 [39] Insofar as the claim for compensation for the buildings is concerned, the burden was on the appellant to demonstrate that the buildings were legal in order to attract the requisite compensation. However, there is no probative evidence of legality in this regard. The mere fact that cukai pintu (assessment) was paid to the local authority does not prove the buildings were legally constructed with approvals. [40] We are not persuaded by the appellant’s counsel that the learned High Court Judge was wrong in disallowing compensation for the buildings. As such, the answer to the second question of law is positive in that those buildings were illegal, and therefore, the appellant was not entitled to compensation under paragraph 1(3A) of the First Schedule of the Act. Hence, this part of the appellant’s appeal is not allowed. Conclusion [41] Based on the above reasoning, this Court, in a unanimous decision, allows the appellant’s appeal in part. [42] This Court orders, inter alia, that the award of compensation for the appellant’s land (or the scheduled land) that was acquired is to be based on RM270.00 per m² and multiplied by 24,873.00 m² (or RM25.08 per ft² x 267,732.972 ft²). The compensation award for the scheduled land is, therefore, to be in the sum of RM6,714,742.94, and not RM5,038,734.50 as awarded by the learned High Court Judge. The respondent, therefore, is required to pay an additional amount of RM1,676,008.40 (RM6,714,742.94 - RM5,038,734.50) to the appellant. We hereby further order that interest at 5% per annum be chargeable on the sum of S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 17 of 18 RM1,676,008.40 from the date of the Borang K (dated 14.1.2021) until the date of full payment. [43] We make no order as to costs for the appeal. Date: 29.10.2023 -sgd- (CHOO KAH SING) Judge Court of Appeal (Note: The decision of this Court was delivered on 21.8.2023) S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 18 of 18 Counsel(s) for the appellant: Karin Lim (Shamshul bin Jamil with her) Messrs. Presgrave & Matthews Counsel(s) for the respondent: Roslinda Binti Mohd Shafie (Naizatul Zima binti Tajudin with her) State Legal Advisers S/N Tixl3GsEaM/dVoWk/DGg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	26,204	Tika 2.6.0
KLHC WA-22NCC-308-07/2021	PLAINTIF ONG KOH HOU @ WON KOK FONG [ IDENTITY CARD NO.: 490308055169 ] [ MESSRS ALFRED LAI & PARTNERS (KUALA LUMPUR) ] DEFENDAN WONG CHEE MENG [ IDENTITY CARD NO.: 580804085411 ] [ MESSRS JOSEPH TING & CO. (PUCHONG) ]	Loan Agreement — Whether Plaintiff granted a loan to Defendant — Defendant gave a cheque to Plaintiff for same amount as loan sum — cheque was countermanded upon presentation for payment — Whether Plaintiff is a holder for value of the cheque and whether the Defendant is liable to repay the loan pursuant to the Bills Of Exchange Act 1949 — Whether a duplicate claim was made for the same amount of the loan in another High Court	07/11/2023	YA Puan Liza Chan Sow Keng	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=719b6605-8a71-42fe-b312-8407337eb332&Inline=true	IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) SUIT NO. WA-22NCC-308-07/2021 BETWEEN ONG KOH HOU @ WON KOK FONG (NRIC NO.: 490308-05-5159) ... PLAINTIFF AND WONG CHEE MENG (NRIC NO.: 580804-08-5411) ... DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This Action was filed by the Plaintiff in respect of a sum of RM3,000,000 lent to the Defendant (“the loan”). [2] During trial agreed to be conducted virtually online by using the Zoom video conferencing platform, lasting 2 on 10.8.2023 and 11.8.2023, both Plaintiff and Defendant testified. The Defendant also called a Ms Chew Sow Kuan (DW2) as a witness. [3] I had on 29.9.2023 allowed the Plaintiff’s claim. This judgment contains the reasons for my decision. Background Facts [4] The Plaintiff and Defendant are shareholders and directors of Platinum Wholesales City Sdn Bhd (“PWCSB”) which owns a shopping 2 mall called Platinum Wholesales City (“the PWC mall”) in Kota Bharu. Besides the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the other directors of PWCSB are Tan Sri Guok Nguong Peng (“Tan Sri Guok”) and the Plaintiff’s 2 sons Ong Liang Yu, and Ong Hao You. The other shareholders of PWCSB are Guok Hui Shing (Tan Sri Guok’s daughter), Heng Kui Heng (Tan Sri Guok’s wife) and Ong Liang Yu (Plaintiff’s son”). [5] GNP Construction Sdn Bhd (“GNP”) is the main contractor appointed by PWCSB to construct the PWC mall. [6] According to the Plaintiff: 6.1 at the request of the Defendant, the Plaintiff has lent a sum of RM3,000,000.00 (“the Loan”) to the Defendant, vide a United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd (“UOB Bank”) Cheque bearing number 135206 dated 31.3.2017 (“the UOB Bank Cheque”) issued by the Plaintiff to GNP; 6.2 The Defendant promised that he will repay the loan by June 2017; 6.3 The Defendant issued a Maybank cheque no. 057524 in the amount of RM 3 million as repayment of the loan. However when presented for payment, it was stopped payment/countermanded; the Plaintiff has a right of statutory recourse under the Bill of Exchange Act 1949 (“the BEA”); and 6.4 Hence this action was filed. 3 [7] The Defendant on the other hand denied he took any loan from the Plaintiff and in essence pleaded that: 7.1 he incorporated on 11 April 2017 a company called A To Z Concept Sdn Bhd (No. 1226424-T) (“the Company”) for the business of buying and selling textile goods, clothing and fashion accessories where the Plaintiff’s wife holds 55% shares and the Defendant’s wife holds 45% shares in the Company. The Plaintiff and Defendant’s respective wives are directors of the Company; 7.2 the Plaintiff had proposed that he will inject RM 3,666,666.66 and the Defendant RM 3,000,000 into the Company; 7.3 The Defendant told the Plaintiff that the Defendant was not able to provide the RM3million for the Company whereupon the Plaintiff stated he will assist the Defendant get a loan and the Plaintiff asked the Defendant to issue an undated cheque of RM 3 million and without stating the payee’s name (“the RM3million cheque”) to be used as security for the loan to be obtained by the Plaintiff from his friends for the Defendant; 7.4 Based on the Plaintiff’s representation, the Defendant issued the RM3million cheque in early April 2017 in the manner requested by the Plaintiff; 4 7.5 the Company then issued purchase orders to suppliers to buy goods; 7.6 the Plaintiff failed to inject his portion of RM 3,666,666.66 into the Company as promised. The Plaintiff also failed to obtain the loan of RM 3 million for the Defendant from the Plaintiff’s friends; 7.7 as the Company has no funds to pay the suppliers, the Defendant has used other companies to pay for the goods ordered by the Company; 7.8 since the Plaintiff breached his promise to invest the sum of RM 3,666,666.66 and to get a loan for the Defendant, in early August 2017 the Defendant stopped payment/countermanded payment of the RM3million cheque; there was a total failure of consideration for the RM3million cheque. The date 30 August 2017 and payee’s name stated on the RM3million cheque was written by the Plaintiff without the Defendant’s knowledge and consent; 7.9 The Plaintiff has failed to give notice of dishonour of the RM3million cheque; and 7.10 the Plaintiff has included the claim for the Loan against GNP in the Kota Bharu High Court Suit No: DA22NCvC-66- 12/2021 (“the Kota Bharu Suit”) as additional construction costs which is inconsistent with the Loan claimed in this court; there is also duplicity in the claim for the Loan. 5 Issues [8] The issues to be tried in my view boiled down to 3 as follows: 8.1 Whether the Plaintiff has given a Loan of RM3,000,000.00 to the Defendant? 8.2 If so, whether the Plaintiff is a holder for value of the Maybank cheque for RM,3000,000 and whether the Defendant is liable to repay the Loan in the sum of RM3,000,000.00 to the Plaintiff pursuant to the Bills Of Exchange Act 1949; 8.3 Whether the Plaintiff is making a duplicate claim for the Loan in the Present Action? Burden of proof [9] The Plaintiff bears the legal and evidential burden to prove on a balance of probabilities of establishing a case against the Defendant throughout the trial. In the case of Dr Shanmuganathan v Periasamy s/o Sithambaram Pillai [1997] 3 MLJ 61, the Federal Court held: “Sections 101, 102, 103 and 106 of the Evidence Act 1950 deal with the burden of proof. Under s 101, it is provided that whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. Under s 102 the burden of proof lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Under s 103, the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the 6 proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. Under s 106, when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” [10] In Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan @ L Allagappan (as executor to SL Alameloo Achi alias Sona Lena Alamelo Acho, deceased) & Anor v Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLJ 697, Jeffrey Tan FCJ elucidated as follows: “[56] Thus, a plaintiff has both the burden of proof as well as the initial onus of proof. In Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 855, the Singapore Court of Appeal per VK Rajah JCA, delivering the judgment of the court, explained that at the start of the plaintiff’s case the burden of proof and the onus of proof coincide: … at the start of the plaintiff’s case, the legal burden of proving the existence of any relevant fact that the plaintiff must prove and the evidential burden of some (not inherently incredible) evidence of the existence of such fact coincide. Upon adduction of that evidence, the evidential burden shifts to the defendant, as the case may be, to adduce some evidence in rebuttal. If no evidence in rebuttal is adduced, the court may conclude from the evidence of the defendant. If, on the other hand, evidence in rebuttal is adduced, the evidential burden shifts back to the plaintiff. If, ultimately, the evidential burden comes to rest on the defendant, the legal burden of proof of the relevant fact would have been discharged by the plaintiff. The legal burden of proof — a permanent and enduring burden — does not shift. A party who has the legal burden of proof on any issue must discharge it throughout. Sometimes, the legal burden is spoken of, inaccurately, as ‘shifting’; but what is truly meant is that another issue has been engaged, on which the opposite party hears the legal burden of proof. 7 [57] The rule is that ‘the onus of proof of any particular fact lies on the party who alleges it, not on him who denies it; et incumbit probation qui decit, non qui negat, Actori incibit probation … The plaintiff is bound in the first instance, to show a prima facie case, and if he leaves it imperfect, the court will not assist him. Hence the maxim Potior est condition defendantis. A plaintiff cannot obviously advantage himself by the weakness of the defence. A plaintiff’s case must stand or fall upon the evidence adduced by him. When, however, the defendant, or either litigant party, instead of denying what is alleged against him, relies on some new matter which, if true, is an answer to it, the burden of proof changes sides; and he, in his turn, is bound to show a prima facie case at least and, if he leaves it imperfect, the court will not assist him. Reus excipendo fit actor’ (Woodroffe and Amir Ali, Vol 3 at pp 3190-3191). (Emphasis added) [11] I would thus remind myself that if the Plaintiff does not discharge his burden, the claim would be dismissed notwithstanding whether the defence is or is not established. I now deal with the issues. Whether the Plaintiff has given a Loan of RM3,000,000.00 to the Defendant [12] Considering the entire evidence adduced by the parties, the answer is YES. In this regard, I do not accept the Defendant’s argument that there is no loan just because there is no written evidence of a loan agreement nor written instructions to pay the loan sum to GNP for reasons as follows. [13] “Evidence” is not confined to documents and the Court is enjoined by s. 3 of the Evidence Act 1950 to consider oral statements by witnesses, the evaluation and assessment of the credibility (or otherwise), of the witnesses were crucial to the present case. In assessing credibility 8 of the witnesses, I have taken note that credibility of a witness embraces not only the concept of his truthfulness i.e. whether the evidence of the witness is to be believed but also the objective reliability of the witness i.e. his ability to observe or remember facts and events about which the witness is giving evidence and this court must pay attention to a number of factors which, inter alia, include the following as exposited by Gillen J in Sean Thornton (a minor by his mother and next friend) v Northern Ireland Housing Executive [2010] NIQB 4: (i) The inherent probability or improbability of representations of fact; (ii) The presence of independent evidence tending to corroborate or undermine any given statement of fact; (iii) The presence of contemporaneous records; (iv) The demeanour of witnesses e.g., does he equivocate in cross examination; (v) The frailty of the population at large in accurately recollecting and describing events in the distant past; (vi) Does the witness take refuge in wild speculation or uncorroborated allegations of fabrication; (vii) Does the witness have a motive for misleading the court; and (viii) Weigh up one witness against another 9 [14] Sir George Farwell in the Privy Council case of Bombay Cotton Manufacturing Company v Motilal Shivlal ILR 1915 39 Bom 386, PC, in addressing the credit of a witness upon cross-examination, said that ‘it is most relevant in a case where everything depends on the judge’s belief or disbelief in the witness’ story.’ Particularly so in the instant case as the loan agreement was not in writing. [15] In assessing the facts in issue on the basis of their “inherent probability or improbability”, I am also guided by the Federal Court in Md Zainudin Bin Raujan v Public Prosecutor [2013] 3 MLJ 773: “[33] It is trite that the inherent probability or improbability of a fact in issue must be the prime consideration in deciding whether a witness is credible or not. It is the duty of the court to sieve the evidence..... [16] From the evidence adduced before the court, there can be no dispute that RM3 million was paid to GNP by the Plaintiff. [17] The Plaintiff testified under cross-examination (pg. 14 and 15 notes of proceedings) that the RM3,000,000 loan by verbal agreement with the Defendant was paid on behalf of the Defendant to GNP. The sum was for construction costs. [18] Sophia Guok of GNP in April 2017 (a month after the loan was paid to GNP) mailed the Plaintiff to inform payment of RM3million was received and the email had a listing of payments made by the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The sum of RM3million was credited to the Defendant. [19] I reject the Defendant’s contentions that he does not owe GNP money, that he did not receive the email as it was not addressed to him 10 and further, as the Plaintiff did not call Sophia as a witness, he was therefore entitled to invoke s. 114(g) Evidence Act against the Plaintiff as I found them to be unmeritorious. [20] It is settled law that an adverse inference ‘can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence’. The Supreme Court in Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492 held: - “It is essential to appreciate the scope of section 114(g)of the Evidence act, 1950 lest it be carried too far outside its limit. Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but a material document by a party in his possession nor for non-production of just any witness but only an important and material witness to the case.” [21] The Federal Court in Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan (supra) referred to Munusamy’s case. [22] In my respectful view, Sophia Guok was not a material witness and nothing turns on the Defendant’s beating of drums on the alleged Plaintiff’s failure to call her. Further, in my opinion, any witness called is a witness of the court, whose testimony if relevant and admissible, assists the court in making its determination of the issues. In this regard I am reminded of the well-established principle that ‘there is no property in a witness’ - See the judgments of the Federal Court in Husdi v Public Prosecutor [1979] 2 MLJ 304; [1979] 1 LNS 33; and Suruhanjaya Sekuriti v Datuk Ishak bin Ismail [2016] 1 MLJ 733; [2016] 3 CLJ 19. 11 [23] It was incumbent on the Defendant to address sufficiently this issue of RM3million credited to his account at GNP. He could also have called Sophia Guok. The email and listing of payments are Part B documents; they are not fake or fictitious documents. The Defendant did not challenge credibly the entry of RM3million credited to his account in GNP is wrong. [24] Additionally, in my view, Sophia’s email and Listing of payments to GNP are contemporaneous evidence and supportive of the Plaintiff’s case that RM3million was credited to GNP to account of the Defendant. [25] The Plaintiff’s evidence is that Tan Sri Guok, Plaintiff and Defendant are involved together in PWCSB to develop a mall where construction costs according to the Plaintiff is RM200m. This evidence is not disputed by the Defendant. The Defendant however testified that his money must enter into Platinum (PWSB) first and thereafter, Platinum will use the money to pay GNP. However, this does not change the fact that GNP did credit RM3million into the Defendant’s account of payments. [26] In my view, it is inherently probable and more likely than not, that because of the loan by Plaintiff to the Defendant, and instructed by him to pay GNP, the Maybank cheque of RM3million was then given to the Plaintiff as repayment of the loan. In my view, it is highly improbable for any prudent businessman in the form of the Defendant to have given the Maybank cheque to the Plaintiff except for the purpose as asserted by the Plaintiff. 12 [27] I find there is not an iota of evidence led by the Defendant to give credence to his narrative that he had to pay the suppliers and creditors of the Company, A To Z Concept Sdn Bhd when the Plaintiff failed to invest the sum agreed and failed to get from the Plaintiff’s friends a loan of RM3million to invest in A To Z and therefore he stopped payment of the cheque. If as postulated by the Defendant that the Company had indeed purchased goods from suppliers, it was revealing that there was no evidence tendered by the Defendant on what goods were purchased, who were the suppliers and the amounts incurred. Glaringly too, not a single invoice nor payment voucher, cheque or receipt was tendered by the Defendant to lend weight to his defence that he had used other companies to pay for the goods ordered by the Company when the Plaintiff failed to invest the sum agreed and failed to get from the Plaintiff’s friends a loan of RM3million for the Defendant to invest in the Company. Given the implications, it would also have been reasonably expected that the names of the companies that the Defendant has allegedly used to make payment be disclosed in evidence but were not. I can thus be forgiven for finding that it is patently obvious that this totally unsubstantiated tale was drummed up as a disingenuous posturing and an artful machination to avoid payment of the loan paid into GNP. [28] A cheque for an amount of RM3million by anyone’s standard is not a small sum of money. I do not find the Defendant’s story credible as a prudent man will not give a RM3million cheque willy nilly as collateral upon the supposition that the Plaintiff will get him a loan for his share of investment in A To Z until there is at least on the horizon, prospect of such a loan being obtained by the Plaintiff from his friends. 13 Whether the Plaintiff is a holder for value of the Maybank cheque for RM,3000,000 and whether Defendant is liable to repay the Loan in the sum of RM3,000,000.00 to the Plaintiff pursuant to the Bills Of Exchange Act 1949 [29] Pursuant to s. 30 BEA, valuable consideration from the holder of the Maybank Cheque is presumed until the contrary is proven and the Defendant bears the burden of proving that the Maybank Cheque is tainted by fraud, duress, force and fear, illegality or there is a total failure of consideration on the part of the Plaintiff, see Ong Guan Hua v Chong (1963) 29 MLJ 6 and Ong Kee Chak v Au Heng Tong [1997] 5 CLJ 414. [30] Due to my finding on the 1st issue, it follows that I find that the Defendant has failed to discharge the burden that there is a total failure of consideration on the part of the Plaintiff for the Maybank cheque of RM3 million. [31] Next, the Defendant contended he was never issued any notice of dishonour in respect of the Maybank Cheque as required by s. 48 BEA 1949. However, I am of the view that this assertion is bereft of merits. As the Maybank cheque was countermanded by the Defendant, there is no need to issue a notice of dishonour pursuant to s. 50(2)(c)(v) BEA 1949 which reads: “50 (1)…. 2 Notice of dishonour is dispensed with – (a) when, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, notice, as required by this Act, cannot be given to or does not reach the drawer or indorser sought to be charged; 14 (b) by waiver express or implied; notice of dishonour may be waived before the time to giving notice has arrived, or after the omission to give due notice; (c) as regards the drawer in the following cases, namely- (i) where the drawer and drawee are the same person; (ii) where the drawee is a fictitious or a person not having capacity to contract; (iii) where the drawer is the person to whom the bill is presented for payment; (iv) where the drawee or acceptor is as between himself and the drawer under no obligation to accept or pay the bill; (v) where the drawer has countermanded payment. (d) ………. “ [32] As for the Defendant’s postulations that the cheque was not dated and no payee was stated, the short answer is found in s.3 (4) (a) BEA which provides that a bill is not invalid by reason that it is not dated. As for payee not being stated when the Defendant first handed the Maybank cheque to the Plaintiff, in my view the payee's name can be inserted before the cheque was presented to the bank for payment. At any rate, pursuant to s. 2 BEA, the Plaintiff in this case is holder of the cheque: “2 Interpretation In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires— … “holder” means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof;” 15 [33] As such, DW2 ’s evidence does not add to the defence. [34] The Plaintiff having been deemed to have become a party thereto for value pursuant to s. 30 of the BEA and when read with s. 55 BEA, it is manifestly plain that the Defendant has not defence at all. “55 Liability of drawer or indorser (1) The drawer of a bill by drawing it— (a) engages that on due presentment it shall be accepted and paid according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonoured, he will compensate the holder or any indorser who is compelled to pay it, provided that the requisite proceedings on dishonour be duly taken;” [35] The well-known dictum of Lord Denning MR in Fielding and Platt Ltd v Najjar [1969] 2 All ER 150 applies in the context that a cheque or promissory note is to be treated as cash, and is to be honoured unless there is some good reason to the contrary, and only in exceptional circumstances will a court deprive a claimant of judgment on a claim based on a cheque. [36] That a cheque is treated as payment of cash has been applied in both Singapore and Malaysian cases; to name a few, see : Yeo Hiap Seng v Australian Food Corp Pte Ltd & Anor [1991] 3 MLJ 144, Wong Fook Heng v Amixco Asia Pte Ltd [1992] 2 SLR 342 (decisions of the Singapore High Court and Court of Appeal respectively); Dato’ Francis Ng Tian Sang v Alexander Wong Shoon Choy & Ors [2002] 7 CLJ 301; Affin Bank Bhd v MMJ Exchange Sdn Bhd & Anor [2011] 9 MLJ 787; Raymond Mah Mun Kitt v Bengjaya Sdn Bhd [2014] 1 LNS 82; Ting Sie Chung (A) v Ors v Yeap Jing Fong [2009] MLJU 244, Uni Wall Architectural Product & 16 Services Sdn Bhd v Global Upline Sdn Bhd [2011] MLJU 517; Nulink Solutions Sdn Bhd v Afdilia Holdings Sdn Bhd [2016] 6 AMR 639; Axisjaya Sdn Bhd v B Cor Geotechnics Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 324; Yee Teck Fah v Lee Chee Meng [2020] MLJU 1054. [37] The 2nd issue is thus answered in the affirmative. Whether the Plaintiff is making a duplicate claim for the Loan in the Present Action? [38] I am satisfied and accept the Plaintiff’s justification that he had included the claim for the same RM3million against GNP in the Kota Bharu Suit on 31.12.2021 because the present action was struck out by the High Court on 1.12.2021. As such, when the Plaintiff commenced the Kota Bharu Suit on 31.12.2021, the Plaintiff had included the loan sum in the Plaintiff’s claim to safeguard his interest. It was also made demonstrably clear to this court that the Plaintiff was taking steps to exclude the RM3million from the Kota Bharu Suit. [39] In deciding the matter, I have preferred the evidence of the Plaintiff who I viewed as ‘more credible’ in support of the Plaintiff’s contentions, as compared to the evidence of the Defendant whom I found to be unconvincing. The Defendant’s narrative simply does not add up. I thus took his evidence with a pinch of salt. Even if there were discrepancies in the Plaintiff’s evidence, if at all, were minor and not relevant, and on the whole, his evidence was quite compelling, convincing and consistent with the documents and the overall probabilities of the case. In the context of the entirety of the evidence before the court, any lingering doubts that I have, I would resolve in favour of the Plaintiff. 17 [40] Evaluating and weighing the totality of the evidence as presented by the parties in the course of the trial, I am of the view that Plaintiff has succeeded on a balance of probability that he is a holder for value of the Maybank cheque for RM3million. I also find that the Plaintiff has made out a case for unjust enrichment. [41] In light of the findings made, it follows that the Plaintiff's Claim is allowed with interests and costs subject to allocator. Dated 7th November 2023 - signed - …………………………. Liza Chan Sow Keng Judge High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff : Alfred Lai Choong Wu (together with him, Toh Mei Swan) Messrs Alfred Lai & Partners For the Defendant : HY Lee (together with him, Joseph Ting and Alan Tan Fu Seng) Messrs Joseph Ting & Co. CASES CITED: Bombay Cotton Manufacturing Company v Motilal Shivlal ILR 1915 39 Bom 386 Md Zainudin Bin Raujan v Public Prosecutor [2013] 3 MLJ 773 Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492 18 Husdi v Public Prosecutor [1979] 2 MLJ 304; [1979] 1 LNS 33 Suruhanjaya Sekuriti v Datuk Ishak bin Ismail [2016] 1 MLJ 733; [2016] 3 CLJ 19 Ong Guan Hua v Chong (1963) 29 MLJ 6 Ong Kee Chak v Au Heng Tong [1997] 5 CLJ 414 Fielding and Platt Ltd v Najjar [1969] 2 All ER 150 LEGISLATION/STATUTE REFERRED: Section 3 and 114(g) of the Evidence Act Section 2, 3(4)(a), 30, 48, 50(2)(c)(v) and 55 Bill of Exchange Act 1949	26,195	Tika 2.6.0
WA-25-147-03/2022	PEMOHON SHAIFUL IZUANDI BIN SAHIME RESPONDEN 1. ) MAJLIS ANGKATAN TENTERA MALAYSIA 2. ) PEGAWAI MEMERINTAH MK 12 BGD DI MARKAS 12 BRIGED	Armed Forces — Misconduct — Offence under Armed Forces Act 1972 — Respondent charged under s 51 of the Armed Forces Act 1972 — Being involved in drug abuse — Issue on applicable guideline for urine test — Whether ‘Perintah Majlis Angkatan Tentera 4/2009’ (‘army guideline’) or ‘Garis Panduan Bahagian Kesihatan Perkembangan Perubatan Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia Bilangan 6/2002’ (‘KKM guideline’) applicable — Whether army guideline had force of law — Whether KKM guideline had force of law – Whether army guideline had been complied with	07/11/2023	YA Dato' Wan Ahmad Farid Bin Wan Salleh	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b43ad358-bf1d-4778-b793-1afbd3de322a&Inline=true	07/11/2023 11:50:44 WA-25-147-03/2022 Kand. 51 S/N WNM6tB2/eEe3kxr7094yKg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WNM6tB2/eEe3kxr7094yKg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WNM6tB2/eEe3kxr7094yKg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WNM6tB2/eEe3kxr7094yKg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WNM6tB2/eEe3kxr7094yKg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WNM6tB2/eEe3kxr7094yKg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WNM6tB2/eEe3kxr7094yKg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WNM6tB2/eEe3kxr7094yKg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WNM6tB2/eEe3kxr7094yKg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WNM6tB2/eEe3kxr7094yKg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WNM6tB2/eEe3kxr7094yKg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WNM6tB2/eEe3kxr7094yKg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WNM6tB2/eEe3kxr7094yKg *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—25—147—U3/2022 Kand. 51 aw/mznza 11 DALAM MAHKNIIAH IINGGI MALAVA DI KUALA LUMFUR DALAIII NEGERJ WILAVAH FERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPIIR (BAHAGIAN KUASA-KUASA KHAS) PEBMQHONAN SEMAKAN 5:355 MAN no wArz5-147-asrznzz Dawn Pemam Parumaun Pulkhnmixan Shiﬂul Imam Em Samme (No Yenlela 1151616). Dan Dalam Perkara Pemmmn swam Izxdarw kuasa (mun o\eh Psguwnu Mimlnrlih MK 12 sen Markas <2 Evéged Iemadap smnul Imam Em Samme (No Yenlern 11ﬂ1616)padaWApn\2D21‘ Dan mum F-Ikuva Kspulu n naym Mum: Angkalsn Yenlzla Mama Iemadali kapmusan verbcaman lam: Pegswﬂ Pamenmah Iemadup smwur lzuandl Em smug {Na Tuwala. 1151616) benankh and: 20 m..mn.« 2071, Dan Dawn Pm... Saluyun 5\| Akva Angkalan Tenlera um. Dan Dahm Parknm Plums?! Mnjls Angkulan Temera Ewlangan : Tlhun zoos, Pmseduv Pungulan dan Pengemalmn spzmman A» Kenanw untuk Unan Dhdah Bsmanaya Angkalan nmm Malawla‘ Dan Dzlam Perkara Surat Pam W Kema Pangaran Kssmanan Malaysia BHzmgln 5 Tamm mm Gan: ram." nag Uuzn Pengmnan Panymahgunzan Damian Damn Aw Knncmu om Kamamonan Kmmm Malaysm. Dan 1 sm wuumaz/as-:»ur7nMy1<v mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Dalam Perlram 5 dan Perknra s Penembngnan Paxakuluam Dan Dawn Pemara Pevenogan 1 Jsdual mam Akm Mnhkanuh Kmlknman 1964. Dan Dawn Perkara Alurzn 53 Kaedah—K1o¢a7I Mlmmmah 2o12 ANTARA SHAIFUL IZUANDI am SAHIME (Nu, YENIERA: 11511110) .FEMOHON DAN 1. NIAJLIS ANGKATAN TENTERA MALAYSIA z. FEGAWAI MEMERINTAH MK 12 set: ...RESPONDEN DI MARKAS 12 BRIGED -RESFONDEN JUDGMENT {1} The appliz:an\| wa: a member Mme Malaysian Armed Forces w1\|h me rank oveorporal before his sen/i was 1ermma1e¢ H1: ﬁnal mm was a1 Markas 12 Bnged, Kern Wan1iebum,Kua\|a Lumpur1“Ksm Wardleburrr) [2] me 1“ respondenx 15 me Armed Forces caunml \|‘Ccunci\|“) maolisma under An 137(1) at me Federxl Canslilulinn. which vmvides as louows Them mu he 1.. Ammd Fume: Ceunul, me» man be responsible urvdur mu genera! au\|hmI\|y 91 me Vang dlrPerIuar1 Agony 191 I112 mmmamx dsdulne ma mm.1m..11m1 at. and an own Inansvs Ielatlnqkx the armed farms. elherman mlllan mmng In 1r.e1rupe:.1.ona1 use The 2"“ respondent Is me commanding nmoer m the command 1:1 Kern Wardiehum m wumu/sz.ammw<v mm. s.1.1...m.m111... .1... w my 1... mm-1 mm: dun-mm VII mum v-max mewgelurkan sraeslmen at ttenoinanya ks aatam mot Kemuannnya, saya mengntihkan 1161815 Kpl snanut tzuanm mn Samme menum Bnlol Ian-bm am an nenwnrvgt lsmuli 1161616 Kpl Sham Izuamt hm Sﬂhmle ks mnia Dangujt (e) wnen asked by the 2” respondent, SP2 oanlumed mat va man, mpawa dart dipegang sandn man memo «pt Shmlul tmna. hm Sahtme pan benahel number lamara mmlmya (d) SP3 testmed that he was tnslrucled by Kept Mohd Ntzam Raﬁee, tne held at me opevaliun team, In conuun tne unne last on me applicant. uppn tne apptteant being escorted from \|hsIoIlel by SP2, SP3 ran metst on the apphcanfs unne and lounﬂ mat tt mnlamed Ketatntne. sr=a men marked and seated tne bottle. SP3 than Inslrucbed tne appltcanl to put me sea\ed home tn a bag, which he then locked and kept the key to mmsew The next day. SP3 handed the bag \|o Kpl Mohd Zairzn Muhsmid Yusal [SP1] (9) sm, In ms evtuenoe, leslrﬁed that na had nanded the bag contain-ng the unne specimen In the d'IeIT\|I51ll\|he JKM. SVII Fairuz [SP5]. Apocrmng tn SP5, the spectmen that she received was tn good condmon Under crpssexamtnanon by the appltcant, SP5 asserted tnat tne quarmiy nnne Spsctmerly wmun was 30ml, was stmiuient lor her In conduct the test [36] Unfortunately‘ Borang A, Borang a and Borang c were neimer menlmned nor exhibited by any oi tna wtlnesses as required tzy me army gun! e In shun, there was He oampllance wrm tne anny gutdeline, wmcn on tne aumanty of Mahd Nurul Ami has me lame of law The learned src urged this Court on conclude that me ttregutanty does not amount to a suustanttat mtscamage ov tusuee (0 make il amenable lo iudtctﬂl review [371 with respect, I cannul aweue to we Itne ofargumenl The Mute oi the appticanus a member attne Armed Forces is at stake He ought to be awarded me nghl speciﬁed m the army guideline. Any nan— compliance 5 not 5 mere Ilvegularily bu\| amounts (0 procedural m wumntxz/es-:>utr7muy1<v «mm. s.n.t ...n.mn .. n... m my t... pﬂmnnﬂly mm: dnuumnl VII mum v-mat Impmpvialy. In Suha‘ met: my learned brvlher Ahmad Kamal J new ms noun .5 M me view um I». umuduli or mIIedIon and harId\|Inq the urine samptes lnrme nrmy III accordance wnn Anny Gundelme mu many is mandatory and I1 rnusl he lulluwed suncny wnmm nny sxcunmnn Ind femurs by me Resrumdenls In abne by on lulu: wmch wave evened Imna Armed Fumes CoImcH his man: lhe pmoedure cl psngesahan aw kurvcrng I5 men I respecllufly agree [as] For me alomsavﬂ masons‘ Ihe demslons made bylhe responder“: are tainted wnn procedural Imprupnety which wananxs an InteNen\|>0rI. [39] Thls appncamcn Ior Iudlclal review is alluwed wnh no order as no costs. [40] Hcweven I am not makmu any order as Ia damages snnce I do not ﬁnd any eIemenIa1 mala nae on the pan ollhe respanaems. 7: kn: 7 NovImbIr2\|'l2J L4 (WAN AHMAD FARID BIN Wm SALLEH) Hakm: Muhkamah TInggI Kual: Lumpuv. sm wummxz/as-:Iur7nIMy1<II «mm. Snr1nIn-nhnrwmlxe I... M my me nrW\ruU\|Y mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ nFIuNa mm Pxhak-puhak Bag! Pm»: Pemnhan Ahmad zanam hm Muhalyar Yeman A M mm A Cu Eng: Pmak Resporvden Ahmad Hzmr bin HambaIy@A:wn src Lnyaru aw. Muhnmmnd ma rc Janenan Peauam Megan. Pulrapsya I 1 sm wummxz/as-:>ur7nruy1<v «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! [3] on 2.11 2020. the applicant underwent a urine drug screening test. The applicant's urine test was sent in the Depanmenl of crrernistry Malaysia (“JKM') on 3 ti.zu2o. The result at ltie analysis rriade by tne cnernist. siti Fatmz blnli Resli lrerri JKM, eonnrrned ttiet lne applicant's urine contained subslances known as Mitragynine [4] As a result oflhe chemist report, the applicant was charged under s 51 at the Armed Forces Act i972 (‘AFA”) tor me olfence cl disobedience k) a standing order. s 51(1) :71 tne AFA provides as ldllews: Every parser. umi-er to service law man! this An! me mntrivunss ertaile to mmply will] any provlsoon nierders ia wnrcn inie ucllorl apptiee, being a pmvlxlarl inrrrwn te nirri er wniar ne rrirentraarunanry ne expemed Ioltnnw,sh.nI. on mrwlcllon Dy mrunartiai, be liable ta irriprisdnnerrt ter a terrn m\| exceeding Mu yvars er any less punisnrriant pmwded hymls Ad on 19 4.2921, lne enaree against tne applicant was dealt with summarily by «he 2'” respondent. Tne applicant ms found guilly and sentenced in a line in 10 days‘ salary. [51 Subsequent to me ﬁnding et guillyi me 2-1 respondent reeernrnended tnat tne applicant be dismissed under r 61(1Km) oi ma Armed Forces (Terms at service lur Permanent Fereeat Regulations 2ot3 (“me 2013 RegulaIlons') The Deputy Commander oi the Army approved the recommendation on 14 7.2021 through the “Psrmahonan PembeII1a/1lianAskar Lssksf it was to lake etiect treni 14.5.2021 [6] Tne applicam tnen received a letter dated 15.7.2021 indicating \|hal: aereaniaaarria mi dirnaiuiran an a as (Pmdaari 1996» dan dexumendoxurnan perriuarrrentran di bawah Perahnan aitiltnrl Plrkllsdml n Alklr Lasyknl tru Trunk Llgl nkensndslii yang telan dllulusksn eiari Mamas in. am kaullhari parryaianpunaan dadeniraern dan mslakukan kesalahan ks ' yang bsmlarig IN wrwueuas.:iarmw<r «rim. s.ri.i nuvlhnrwm r. u... w may i... uirir.iiu MIMI dnuuvlnril r.. eFluNG vwul m Aggnevsd, the appllcanl, tnmugn his sollcnors, appealed Io ma Council agamsl ms oonmcnnn and sentence. The grounds of the appeal. as slated m one letter dated 27.5 2021. can be summarised as follows (a) The prosecution nad lulled w prove mat me Armed Fumes Standing Orders had been made known to me applicant. (h) Tne Drecedure taken by ma oparullon lgam In conﬂuc\|mg me lakmg and zesung oi the unne speclman am not comply mm the Pelinfah Ma//is Angkalan Tsnlsra Etlangan 4 Tahun 2009, Prossdur Pungulun dim Pengsndelisn Spastman Au Kencmg urmlk U/Ian Dsdah Berbalvaya Angkalsrv Tamera Mnlaysla (“the 2009 Order“) (a) The prosecution wilnesses had used we forms and documenls m avormaussued bylhe Mlnlslvy 0! Health mslead arms was Order (a) There was substantial Inlusllee and the oanviclmn should be quashed. [31 The appllcanfs soliclwvs agam wrote to ma Council, stating that me Cauncll had lalled to publlsh and announce the alleged lermmalion. Accoldmsl ID the sollcllcrs. in the cvwmslanoes. the EIDDlIcan\| should be treated as w he were slill in service, The Ieller. ualed 6 10 2021 fnler aha. stale: as follows Alubal keeuggzman‘ kaoualan uan pengabalan wank AYM unluk mlnylnkln um-\ oerxmdmanan anakguam um, um vrvws pinlmalan Dsrkhlﬂmalan sacam ms dan pilak ATM sekalnus mun menyuuhkan anakguam um. dan manyebabkan anzkguzm knmv usual unluk mmdapﬂkan mbuhan pemberheulmn perkmdmalan [91 The councn, mmugn its letter dated 20.12.2021. mformsd me appI>canI's sclxcnnrs, slalmg that El a meelmg held on 7.12.2021, "13 Council deaded lhal there was no cocuvranoe 0\| subslanual msliee av error 01 law in me declsvon made agamsl the applicant m wuumaz/as-:>ur7nruy1<v mm. Smnl ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII .mm vlmxl [to] Aagneved by the decision or the 1' respondent in oontirming the decision made against him, the applicant commenced this application tor iudioial review Yhl application tor Judicial rovltw [I1] in this application tor iudieral review. the applicant seetis rriier alia to quash the respondents‘ decisions relating to the summary iriat. review ol the summary andiiigs and the applicant's disdiarge trcrn serv e. [12] The apptioatron is supported by the attidavit oi the applirrt in Enci 31“AIS-3“). Leave to ooninieiioe this iudiclal review was graiiied by u1lS Cnurl on 18 4 2022 Tm applicant‘: Irulmwnl [13] The grounds on which the applicant sought judicial review can be summarised as toitews: (at There was a tailure of the respondents to adhere to the provision oi s 51 at the AHA (b) The respondents faiied to comply with the army g the 2009 order [14] Learned counsel tor the applicant reterred me to s 53(3)(b) ol the AFA. whtch provides that the standing orders dscribed under subsac n (2) may be putillehed in such rnanrier as may be determined by the Service chiet or each Service or any oihoer authorised by him [15] The applicants contention is that the respondents in the afridavits in reply have tailed to address the issue of the publication at the standing order. Learned oourreet lor the applicant then urged this Court to conclude that there was no puotieation niade. IN wumntaz/es-:turr7niuy1<v “Nair s.ii.i nuvlhnrwm a. u... w may i... nﬂnlnnﬂly MIMI dnumlnrll v.. .riuiie vtmxl [16] on me second issue. learned eaunsel idr llie appllcaril subirlllled inal lne respondents, in reaching Ih iespecwe decisions, had lalled lo eansrderlnai lne prosecmioii wiinasses did nelearnply wllli lne army guideline as slaled UV me 2009 order [17] Learned counsel lhefi relerled me In the Judgriienl of the Caurl cl Appeal in Mailrs Angknlaln realm Malaysia v Maud Nimll Ainr nli-i Mulid Basn'[2019] 2 ML] 4:: CA me Colin 0! Appeal neld Ihal lhe army guideline under the 2009 Older has me lame of law by virtue of S 15 aflhe AFA read Iogelher Wllh AH 137 of ihe Federal conslllulien Aeperding Io lrie courl cl Appeal, lne army grildeline was nod by Vic Secielaly ol the Armed Forces Council He signed ll Dengan Perlrllah Ma//is Arigkalari Terlfsra' ll was further neld by me Courl ol Aupeal liiai mere can ae no doubt lhallhe anny guideline ls a guldellna mail was issued pursuani lo a power glveri by law. [la] Leanrad counsel ldr lne applicanl inen eonlended lnal since lhe army guideline nad npl been complied Wllh. lnere was a serious Subslanllal lnluslioe curiimitled bylhe 2"’ resporidenl in con lng and senleneing me appIicariL [19] In sirlialrl iiiri Abu Kassiin ir Maills Angirmn Temer: Malaysia 5. Anor [2023] MLIU wall. a case heavily relied an by learned aaunsel ior llie applrcarii. the l-llgn cdurl nald lnal me 2"“ respdndenl in lllal case iailed le odnsider thai lne piosecullcn wllnesses dld ndl earnply wlth army guideline slaled in lne 2009 order wnlcn sel oiil llle nmoedures idr oollecllpn and riandllng of urine specimens among lne members or lne Malaysian Armed Forces in any event, in iliai ease. lne prcseeiillon ielied on me deciirnenla prepared by me Mlnlslry oi Healln l“l<l<M-l, which were dlllaienl man lhe lonnal sel oul under lne anny guldellne [2lJ] Fai llle aloresaid reasons. learned eounsel lnr me applicanl urged ltiis Coiirl lo allow lne appllcalidri iar ludlclal review Tlrn respondents’ response [21] Tne 2"“ respondenl. L\| Kol Knairul Azrnan blri Kormiri, ﬁled an aﬂidavll in reply in Encl 14(“AlR-14‘) The respandenls med analner alﬁdlvll in reply lnreugn Ll Geri Daluk serl Menarnrnad bin Ab d rn WNMIIEZ/sEn:lurr7nD4yKv “Nair s.n.l mmhnrwlll be i... M yaw ii. inin.lliy Mlhln dnuuvlnrll n. aFll.iNG Wm! Rahnian in Encl 1B (“AIR-18'). Let Gen Daiuk sen Muhammad is the then Deputy cmet o1Amty [224 There are other exchanges 01 the emdainte whien will be referred to as and when the need arises. [231 Vile learned senior Fedeml caunset reterred me in the standing order dated 31 .2020, which was imposed on the members of Jabalan Arah Jenlara. The appllcanl is a member 0! the Jabslan Aral: Jsnlela under para am at the Slandlng order, any member me had his urine laled and is lddnd to have traces at Mitragynine oomml\|s an oﬂenca under 3 5\| OI ma AFA and can be taken disciplinary action and punished under the sarne. [24] As to the publnahnn at the standing order, the learned ssc submitted that the applicant ought to have knowledge at the plolllslolls at the same. In shml. Since the applicariit, by his own edrriissrdn. had stated that M was were at the existent}: at the standing Order, the allegation that the requirement under s 51 at the AFA had not been complied with is thereldre retitled. [25] On the allegation that the rasanndanls had failed in uomply with the army gtm ' e under the zone order, the learned ssc contended the mllaction and handling 07 the applimnfs urine spectmen were done based on the anrry gurdeirne Awarding to the ieemed SFCV the appointed inilitary emeers were authorised to carry out the sdreening tests on the urine specimen [26] mil notwithstanding. the teamed src submitted that the suastenees analysis in the urine was conducted lay the JKM In any event, the use at the alleged KKM Form does not altect the procedure a1 dotlechon and handling at the applicants urine specimen in para 19(9) at AIR-14, the 2-= respdndent atrirrned as ldlldws Bnldu-nun knpada kalnrelwan sakst seriiasa Perhltarain Tami. saya mendapati iataearn pengambllan dnn nenpgaln spsslmerl unn pemahart ﬂ.Irt nnuun werinien wax ierptnue danpada niasa dianicii sehtnggalilt diseramtzn made Jubihn xiniia tn the circumtanoes. the 2'-1 respondent insisted that the procedure reheated in the army guideline had been complied with. 7 rn WMMIIEZ/eEn3iutr7nB4yKI «net. s.n.i nuvlhnrwlll be t... w my i... eniii.ii-y MIMI dnuuvlnril wa aFlt.lNG mi [271 The learned SFC lunrier eeriiended ilitiere is any irregularity in me propess and handling in me applicant's urine specimen as alleged, it is only regarding ine lnrrnai el ine lorin used, According to me leanied SFC. triealleged irregularily, ileiall. was not in tne samp ing process Relying on ltie ludgrrienl olltie ceun or Appeal in Gunaleri I/I rmiieelieiidren A ors y PF [mm] 4 Mu an ca, itie learned src sucrnined ltiet llie chain ol evidence is more iinponanl lor ltie period lrorn me iinie or recovery unlil ttie completion olirie analysis by ine etieniist [28] As to Motid Nurul Ami‘. lhe learned src argued ltial irie issue was ouer new rnany boﬂles pl urine samples were required in be\|akel1 ipr itie purpose of Ihe urine test. Under itie enny guideline, one taoiile was required, wriereas, underguideline No. 6/2002 issued by me KKM, two pottlei. were required i-tne KKM guideline“). in allowing trie appeal. we cpurl 0! Appeal neld lliat in tne cantexi or me case, the army guideline look precedence over lne KKM guideline. since ine procedure adopted py lne appellanl in \|aklrlg only one tiptile cllhe respondenrs urine specimen lei nis urine «est was in aoeordance with lrie arniy guideline, llie queslien iliat \|he appellani nad laieaetieu lne KKM guideline by nor taking two tmllles cf riis urine sarnple did nol arise [291 wriai is nieie inipenant. according la ttie learned SFC, is tliai me alleged iien-eonipliarioe cl lne arniy guideline, ii at all, inusl have led In sutisianual and grave inlustice to me applicanl up make it arnenaple lo iudiciel review, cap: Keriierul Azriieri blii Jiirrreluddlri v Ll Col W-In Abdul Majld lilri Abdullnll & on [1 an] 2 MLJ 4 Pc [:0] For irie aroresaid reasons, ine learned src urged triis Coun to eonelude tnai trie decisions made by respondents are net tainted witti illegality, irrelionaliiy or prccedurel irriprdpnety to make ltiern amenable to iudrciei review. Annlyuie [31] me (its: issue raised by itie appl n1 is on «is uueshorl oi publicalion oillie standing order, which is required unders 5113) oi «tie AFA, ll provides as lollows ru wuueieues.:lermiuyr<ii “Nair s.i.i nurlhnrwlll be u... re yaw i... prwlriullly MIMI dnumlnril n. nFluNG wnxl The my-um nrdevs or nlher mmim older: desmbed m subsection 42; may be (:7 made by, am (h) puhishsﬂ An such manner as may be detzrmmod by, Ina Service cmeﬂareaw Ssvvvca nrany mum Aulmnzbd by mm [32] Al ma summary man, ma applicant had admilled navmg read me sxandrng Order upon being asked by lha 2"“ reaaonaenr FegMemu\nlzn:Adakah kamu pemah msmhana Fennlah Bnhzagwln Panama vans! munylllkan llrangan am kzsmahan yang dnarluduhlklnu mac. karmr’ Swlluduh Mn Tunn [a3) Secondly, upon being cause to enter ms aevenoe, me appncam am not raise me Issue mar ne hld no knowxedga oi me sranumg order One can be lorgwan m oencludmg \|hal Ifus line of argumsnl is an aﬂerlhought. [34] me nexl rssua rs whether the procedure undenaken In the pmcess or lakmg and handlmg the appmznrs unne spacrman rs in uocotdsnee with ma army guiaelrne. Para 7 01 me army gumanne pmvruaa as loﬂaws: s-tar-n Dmsai Pemnlaman smesm, Pamungu\| spaamn hemlaklah menglsx mung permnhomn ujtan pengesanzn aaaan barbzhaya uaram an kencmg Yalacnm penyearann mung aaaran swam hankul {at Spesmxen Yang Dmimal Kn Pusal P-naulan Kemamuvinn xaarmun Maraysa m Pancanrmpex hendukmh mavvnm sendm Boning Mtuan Pemhen den mamndnlnrvnnm mung (smbm sekwanya belvuashatl denuan Ialzura Dtmﬁman Scesrmen yxa “Nana a.n.r ...n.mn .. met! a may r... nrwhuﬂly -mm: dnunmnl VI mum war dtlaksanakan Sallvun having tersebut eapem at Kambararl 5. tap Pemungul Spestmen nenasntan mung but-um Fanvtlnunrt -rt Fangesahan uaaan Dalam An Kenclng dangart netul ﬂan lepat Sillllan boring lersebm sepen. at KembermA tzsl Ruangan Pegawa. Vnng Membua\| Plmtlrttaan Mndnklzm dltamalartgzm nleh seunrvu pegnwal hanzullarl seﬂa ﬂloopkart x-we faint PE03Vvﬂl Yang Memmm Penvttlttaan nenaanan mernisitkin bvvlnq pamtlmaart one aengan lerlqkap. tens dart DEM sener-na p-meamlen ﬁr bmnrvg te-seam nentl mpoleng dart dllavldalnrtgnnl tn; spulnuen Vang Dlnnmar Kn Puul Pnngujlln Jlhlun K mt-y-t. l=-mungux Svestrmn hnndlklah menplst Borsng Pemmhonan bagl Psnenkiaan Fulertstkffokstkmogt dungan balul ﬂan tepet ssltnm banana sepem at Kcmbaaan c [35] Now, let us examine what Iransptred at the summarytnel. (a) SPI. Sjrt saltut Anuar bin Jaalar, lasllﬁed that he had glven the applicant tne eptten otselecllng one otthe banles le he used to take the sample atnis urtne Aﬂer tne spplx-.ant made the se\|er:\|it7n, SP1 marked tne bottle with me Ipplicanrs mllllaly mlmby The appllcanl was then escorted by Kat Mtthamad Shamsul [SP2] to the lmtet. where tne sample was taken. st=t was then tnlnrmed by PW II Rlduwnn Ahu semen [SP3] mat the unne test was tound to contain Ketamlne. tn) SP2 teamed Ihz\| he escorted tne eppticant to the lmtet In ms avtdenoe, SP2 seld as tellws DI datum (Indus seyn malllut um... ‘M61516 Kpi Snaﬂul lzuanm on. senme telen mcrtgnluarurt temeluay-mt ﬂan Hl sm wnnmeueaemmuwn “Nair s.n.t nuvthnrwlll e. H... e may he enwt-y -mm: dnuuvtml Vﬂ erlulta vtmxl	1,748	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
BA-41LB-38-12/2022	PERAYU Pendakwa Raya RESPONDEN ASHRANI AIZZUDDIN BIN ABD RAHNI	rayuan - seksyen 323 kanun keseksaan dibaca bersama seksyen 326A kanun keseksaan - kelemahan keterangan pengadu - kepincangan yang serius antara keterangan-keterangan pengadu dan doktor - sama ada kecederaan 'self inflicted' - kelewatan membuat laporan polis oleh pengadu - tiada penjelasan - kredibiliti pengadu.	07/11/2023	YA Dato' Norsharidah Binti Awang	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=0e57482c-94a2-40d9-b8c8-e9adefebc02e&Inline=true	07/11/2023 12:04:18 BA-41LB-38-12/2022 Kand. 28 S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N LEhXDqKU2UC4yOmt7vALg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal an-411.3-35-12/2022 Kand. 28 cm;/ms mama MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DI DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL ENSAN, MALAVSIA RAYUAN JENAVAH NO. BA»41LB-33-12/2022 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAVA PERAVU DAN ASHRANI AIZZUDDIN BIN ABD RAHNI RESPONDEN (No. K/P 521102-07.5395) ALASAN PENGHA I. PENGENALAN lm adalah rayuan oleh Pendakwa Raye Iemadap kepulusan Mahkamah TmggI Jenayah (7; Shah Nam, berlankh 4 Ogos 21:23 Mahkamah VII lelah menolak Iayuan Pemyu ﬂan mengekaman keputusan Mauslret yang IeIah melepas dan membebaskan Resnonden an akhir kes Pendakwaan Ianpa palm mpanggu unmk membeIa dln. Responden Ielah diluduh dI bawah seksyen 323 Kanun Keseiszan dlbaca bersama seksyen 326A Kanun Keseksaan II. I=ERruDUI-IAN Psrluduhan lemadap Respunden adaIan sepem benkut 5/N Lznxmxuzucwmzmg 3 )“NwIzI SIM! r..u..mu n. mod M my .. urwmlhly mm; ﬂwulnml w. -HUNG WM! 'Bahawa kamu vane as/us/2n )am labvh kurang 7.00 pemng. benempat dv Patkir kersla di kawasan Lambaga zakaz Seksyen 13. Shah Alain an aalam Daeran Fetahug‘ di damm Negev! suangor Darul Enaan, dengan sengapi mandanangkan kawdua keplda bekas Islerl kamu Mum Shahida Emli Shahman [nu kpl: 320913-71- 51ss). D\eh yang demnknan kamu Ialah mslakukan salu kesalanan yang bolsh amukum di hawah Seksyan 323 Kanun Kesaksaan ﬂan unzaca bersama seksyan 326A Kanun Kasuksaan. III. FAKTA KE5 [1] Fakla kas adalah sebagmmana an persnggan 3 Nngga 11 Kand.17. Hxqahan Puayu [2] nnumm dalam kes im lelah dlluduh m nawah salu peﬂuduhun pindaan ssksyen 323 Kanun Keseksnn aibara bersama seksyen 326A Kanun Kmexaaan. [3] Panda 5.3.2020, pads jam Vehih kurang 4.00 peiang, spw (mangsa) nsun berjumpa dengan Responder: unluk menghadm salu sesi kaunsalmg di Famny Firs! caunaeumg dl Shah Alan. [4] sm merupakan bekas men Responden ﬂan meveka lelah menauu kereta Resnnnden unluk ke sssu kaunseling (evsebut Sea! kaunselmg mi muruskan barikulan beberapa Isu yang dlbangknkan oleh Responden a. media sostalnya. m LEh><DqKU2UM‘/L)-m1vALq "9’ 1 °' 1" “Nan: am.‘ ...u..mu .. mad a my a. mm; mm. ﬂnumlnl a. mum wrm [37] I33] [39] am LErvXDqKU2UN‘/L)m11vALg “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my a. mm-y -mm: ﬂnulnunl n. IFVLING wrm membuat pangguan \|erus kapada pmak puns unluk memmla hanluan sekiranya berasa «am. Dalam me erkara W, Mahkamah menehu keoada Nola Kelevangan di dalam Rekod Rzyuan Jilid 2 di muka sure! 14 sepeni bsnkuL o :Makah kamu masuk semma dalam kere1a7 A . V95 0 : Mengapa masuk7 A v I was scare he would run over even W1 nan. D Ape beriaku lepas kamu masuk dalam kerela nu? A . Lepas ixu. on me way back home he stopped unmk Vsl mmyak sm mempunya\ beberapa peluang unluk melankan am jlka sebenamya harass kelakulan dsngan lindakan Responden Manehu kelerangan yang dlbeﬂkan nleh sm, Responden dikalakan mma berlindak ganas selegas pulang deal! 555! kaunselmg den secara khususnya selepas mukan malam an sehuah resloran an seksyen 13 Shah Nam Rujuk Laporan Polls oleh sm :1! Ekslbll P4. 9» dalam Eksxhit F4‘ spa menyavakan bahawa Respcnden mula berlindak ganas selelah makan ma\am dengan memaki sm sebagai -gasogmer: Fercubaan panama SP1 unluk maanxan am dlkalakan nenaxu semasa Respnnden mahu was :4 uza membual bayaran parkmg. Pada masa Ilulah Jugs: benakunya pergelman dengan Responden. [401 Responden umacakan [emu msnghalang maauan sm mahu melarikan am dengan menoengkam dengan kual kedua beran Iangan SP1. Dalam pergeluxan levsenullah SP1 mendakwa dmnya cevceaara [41] Selerusnya «em! Dma kepaaa Nola Kelerangan dl da\am Rekuu Rayuan Julia 2 an muka sum! 35, SP1 aemasa disnal balas menyaukan seperll herikul: I2 .ApabHa om selesan bayar ﬂkel, Fuan dengan behau menaxki Kerela bersama ada salu persmgganan sebelum bahk ks mmah \|e\ah smggan an bemampvran aksysn 1a.sau.,u7 A :Se(uju Iosk Petrun Q ‘Puan ada peluang Iankan a ‘ annbda on parking kerela llnggalkan Puan dalam kema dengan enun masm on. OKT ks kaunler Imluk mp up much u go lngat vak kejadlan nu? A : lngal [42] Jni adalah peluang selerusnya bag: SP1 umuk melarikan am temp: beliau (Idak bemual demlklan Sekuranya lakul dan mungkln duanggar semasa benaya larikan am xau penama di kawasan lelak kerela selepas makan, inl adalah peluang 5/N LErvXDQKUZUC4yL)m11vALq we I2 .4 1n “um sum ...u..mm .. mad a my a. mm-y -mm: ﬂnulnunl n. IFVLING wrm xenaauk kerana berada dv lempal awam yang mempunyai ramalorang. [431 Ssbammya SP1 kska\ herada di dalam kenana lanpa membual sebarang nnuakan menyslamalkan Perm dnngan bahawa SP1 an uararn Kes lni Bukanlah seorang awam hiasa dengan kurang pendvmkun Sebalnknya SP1 aaalan seorang Pensyaran Pembalan an Hoapual Universlu Kebangsaan dalam Reknd Malaysia. Rumk Nola pads Kelerangan Rayuan Jllid 2 an muka swat 4. [44] oxen ilu, Mahkamah mi bersetuju dengan dapalan Tuan Majlsuel yang manyalakan bahawa. 'se«e\|ah menemi kemrangan SP1 mannapan kmerangan SP1 yang masuk balik ks da\am karava betsama Ierluduh walaupun berssa amat lakul adalah naak munasabah dan sukar dipemayal. Mahkama bsrpendzpal spa ila seseumng dalam bahaya sudah pash akan melankan a ‘danpada bahaya, Dsﬂam kes mi. Imdakan Ienuduh masuk ballk ﬂa\am kenoeraan menumukkan seperll Inada hanaya yang bsvlaku.“ Kalarangan oxnn 55-3. [45] Pmak Perayu bemmah bahawa kelerangan SP3 adalah ke\|erangan yang kredIbe\. Perayu memjuk Kepada Nasan Fenghaldman Tuan Majlslrel yang mempersoalkan kmerangan spa ﬂan masa Kqadian. 5/N LErvXDqKUZUM‘/l)nn1vALg Page 4: at 2:- Mum s.nn ...n.mn .. mod n my n. nrwmlhly mm: ﬂnulnunl n. -Hum pun!‘ [46] Perayu msnghujahkan bahzwa hdak Iimbul Isu nilakan kecsderaan mu «mum. Menurul Perayu, SP1 ade\ah mangsa an dalam kes mi yang \|e\ah memben kelerangan secara jelas dv Mahkamah Ienlang bilakah die mendapnl kecederaan msemn. Menurul Pevayu, Am hukanlah sepem kes bunuh an mana mangsa Ielah meninggal duma dan Mahkamah lerpaksa berganhmg kspada kelerangan saksx lam seperli mam: unluk menenlukan bila lankh dan mass kemuan. [47] Hujah Perayu lag: bahawa, adalah munasabah umuk SP3 \|idak dapal meruemukzn uua ueceaeraan mauann oleh sun. spa bukanlah salts: m temps! kejadlan nenapx spa zenan menielaskan bahawa kenederaan yang d1a\aml (ﬂan sP1 adalah keaederaan baru mu dalam tempers 24 jamdsn lankh dan mass sm mpenxsa. (451 Peguam Responaen a damn mengnupnkan perkara menyavakan bahawa, uaaa apa-apa aalam kenerangan spa yang boleh menunjukkan secara Knnklusil haharwa Kaoederaan "sol! (Issue Injury‘ dwsebabkan uleh pemuauan Respunden [49] Dmujahkan juga bahawa, kegagalan spa untuk membenkan penenman nanxn kejaduan dengan yakin (mah memmhulkan keragusn munasabah dan seharusnya manlzal keraguan dbberikan kepada Respcnden dalam hal W [501 Feguam Resnnnden merujuk kepada Nssan Fenghaluman oleh Tuan Majlstnsl dalam mm 1 Rekcd Rayuan, paaa 5/N LEhXDQKUZUMYL)m11vALg vwe 14 um Mum: sum ...n,.mn .. mad a my a. nrwmlhly mm: ﬂnulnunl n. -Hum pun!‘ [51] [52] [53] am LEhXDQKUZU£‘AYL)m11vALq “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad a my a. WWW -mm: ﬂuulnlnl a. mum wrm peisnggan (22) di muka sure! 15 yang Isiah membua\| dapa\|an «am sepam henkut: 'Wa\|aupun da\am pemenksaan samula. spa pegawal perubzlan Ia\aI1 manpxaskan bslizu udak mengesahkan keoederaan berlaku pada 9 0905 21120 v.e\|ap\ kemungkinan boleh bensku pa-da 9 ages 2020." dapal Mahkzmah mu hsvseluju dangan dapalan Tuan Ma]\|slr2\| yang mendangav kas Isunya‘ adakah Kelerangan spa mencukupl unluk mambual guslmkasi keosderaan ilu duakukan aleh Responden Melalun kelemngan sn=3 pada Note Kelerangan aw dmam Rekud Rayuan JM 2 as muka sure! 15, beuau menielaskan bahawa Semasi! membual pemeriisaan den temubuzl nemadap SP1. sww \|elah mernakmmkan kepadanya bahawa keeederaan yang dIa\amI adalah kesan dnnpada pergelucan aengan bekas suarmnya Iawu Responaen. sanemsnya mwk pula pada muka sum 35 di dalam Rekad Rayuan yang sama. SP3 hdak menolak kemungkman bahawa kecederaan i\|u anakukan senmri oleh SP1, 0 ookmr tak boleh sahkan bsﬂaku dalam 24 jam Dnklor tak menolak lerpengaruh penyavaan an alas. Temapal kemungklnan bahawa kecederazn berpunca dan self Boleh tolak Inﬂlclion maksudnya dibuat sendln kemungkman levsebu\|7 Pamlsavzn A Kemungkman aﬂa 0 : Dok\|or mk bcleh lmak kemungkman sell vn : Belur. » Q :Maksudnya, nka pada mesa kejadian, doklm buat exammauon. Kalau vesakn «ax kala Va pergehnan antara mam! Is\|eN. Kamu Iak mpengamm oleh oerita mu. Dokior lengak keoederasn nu (anpa psnerangan Boleh kecederaan duakubalkan um sew in clion A .KemungkInan boleh. [54] (Man an adalah ‘alas hahawa keterangan yang dwberikan oleh spa hahawa SP1 yang lelah menyebabkan kecederaan kepsdanya hanyzrah barasaskan kalsrangan nlsh SP1 sahaja (anpa dusoknng oxen mana—mana kehavangan Vain v. DAPATAN MANKAMAH [551 Memjuk kepada seksyen180 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. puhak Pendakwaan perlu memhukllkan salu kes pmna lama til akmr Kanun Taiacava Jenayah, Mahkamah perm memmbang sama ads Pmak Pendakwaan beriaya membuklikan sualu kes pnma lame Ierhadap lerluduh aleu udak kes Psndakwaan. Selanjulnya, seksyen mm [56] D: davam kes Ellxchundrln Iwn PP [zoos] 2 MI_l :1: cﬂputuskan seperli bariku\|. 5/N LErvXDqKU2U£‘A‘/l)m11vALg Page 1- :4 2n ,m.,.,. sm‘ ...mmu .. mod w my a. .m.m mm: a.7...m. n. mm M.‘ 5/N LErvXDqKU2UN‘/L)m11vALg “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my a. mm-y -mm: ﬂnulnunl n. IFVLING warm ‘The :94: at me close ol the case for me pvossculian would merevors be’ is me evidence sulfcram to mnwc! me accused rl he slocts (0 remain silsnl’ II the answer Is /11 Iho arrnmem than 3 puma lame case has been mads out ms must, as nscasstly, Isqmrs a cons/data!/on ol lhe axrslence ol any such doubt there can be no puma rscls. As the sccussd nun be summed on the pnma fame evidence I! mus! have reached a slandard winch is capable ol suppomng a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.‘ [57] K2: oleh Parayu hanyalah bersandarkzn kepada kelerangan olsh sm. Terdapat beberapa kelerangan wng mggal dan ianya Iidak d\sckong nleh mena—mana kemangan sokongan yang lain. [551 sm 4. dalam kelerangannya menyalakan bahawa alasan Irdak melarikandinwalaupun berasa (erancam adalah kerana khuahr dilanggaroleh Responden. Narnun mangapakah spa naak bemndak melankan am semasa berada an Patron 9. Sana pash lama: nrang awam yang tmleh memhanhmya [59] Ke\|ika dnanya mengapa lidak menghubungl pcﬂs. SP1 menyaman bahawa beﬁau mask (ahu nombol leledon polis. Ruwk Nola Kelerangan dv dalam Rekod Rayuan Jilxd 2 an rnuka sum! as. Secara allemamnya mengapa max juga menghuhungx Abunya sebagaimana Ielah memaklumkan hahawa sm ﬂan Responden keluar makan bevsama selepas sesi kaunsehng selesav. Fugeﬂmln [an] Kaadasn mania! sm mga bo\eh dipersualkan Rujuk Eksnbn D5 dan D9‘ SP! dllihal menyerang paparun iacebook Respnnden hznya kerana Respcnden memaparknn svalusnya sebagai bapa Iungal dengan lvgn arnng nnak. ss-1 dl dalam D9 dilihal memarahi Responden alas slams lersebul kerana menghebnhkan alau *annaunced"perxara nu secara terbuka [an Dalam perkara im rujuk juga kepada Nana Kemangan an dalam Rekud Rayuan Jam 2 as muka sura\| 43 SP1 bersetuju hahawa beliau ama\| \|iﬂak bernuas nan dengan perkongsuan s(aIus lacebook (ersebul Slalus lersebul (e\ah dvmasukkan ke lscebook oleh Responder: pada an .Aula\ 2020. sxams selerusnya pada 3 Ogas 2D2Ddan lerdspal pemualsn ms\alu\ apllkasw Wnalsaph anvara meteka nemua dl Eksibll mum pads 3 0905 2020 juga. Keladlan yang mematﬂ ass kes pula bevlaku pada a Ogas 2020 Seklranya perkara W masih rnenjadl kemarahan olsh SP1‘ maka Iidak musvamn adznya kes an hadapan Mahkamah hay ' 'walaupun ianya dmaﬁkan oleh sm .1. dalam kelevangannya : hal [62] swan cemhuru SP1 \|emadap Responuen juga dapal semasa sm member! keterangan. Rnquk Nola Kslsrangan .11 da\am Rekod Rayuan Jil\d 2 di muka Surat 32 apablla Paguambeia Respunden memanggll Responden sebagaw Dr Aevapx max memanggwlnya dengan gelaran Dr, SP1 can I address somelhlng Tuan. MAH Va 5/N LErvXDQKUZUC4yL)m11vALq Pnwe In mm “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my a. mm-y -mm: ﬂnulnunl n. IFVLING wrm SAKSI: He can mm: mm now) as a docmr, can he address me as a doctor Ina? PB Sorry Tuan Mapslmt, : do not know where Ihis wrmng from. Kami semua panggH Puan sebab ow pun panggxl Puan \ dnn‘I mink Ihal is an wssue. [63] Selerusnya Mahkamah ml melihal kepada xsu kecederaan aleh SP1 Sehagaimana dmyavakan uleh Tuan Majxsuei as dalam masan Pengnaknuannya, keuedeman yang dIaIam\ aaaxan Udak dapalcﬂpastlkan berpunca danpada Responden. [54] 0' dalam Nasan Fenghakiman pada pevenggan 2e. Tuan Ma]I5Ire\| menyalakan bahawa dengan meru)uk kepada Eks x P5, Iahap kecedeman yang dmaml oleh SP1 adalah tarlalu mmlma bagi Mahkamah membual andalan Responden mam menoederekannya. [es] eamnamgambar pada Eksmk P5 sens kelerangan SP3 um dapat menunjukkan derlgall jelas kacederaan SP1. Ma\ahan Hada Laporan kesihatan dikemukakan kecuali Vapulan rawalan dangan caIa\|an lingkas uleh SP3 [as] Pada perenggan 29 yang sama, Tuan Mapsm msnyalakan bahawa memanuangkan uenumm ﬂan psngadu berdua sanaja dalam Kaela, sekiranya henar lerluduh bemia\| menoederakan pengadu, paslinya \|erIuduh bmeh bemndak Vebih kasar larhadap pengadu 5/N LErvXDqKU2UM‘/l)m11vALg vwe 49 rm to ,m.,.,. sm‘ ...mmu .. mod w my a. nrwmlhly mm: a.7...m. n. -Hum pun!‘ [57] [55] Pevayu gagal membukﬁkan dua elernen penung mu bahawa terluduh menyebabkan kesaknan lubuh badan kepada pengadu darn gagal menunyukkan mm menoederakan Eerdasarkan alasan-ahasan an aim, Mahksmah inn nerpenaapau bamawa rayuan ml adalan max bermeril Tuan Majwslrel udak melakukan khﬂaldarl segl undang-undang dan lakm Vang memerlukan Mahkamah temadav uapanan beltau. duolak. (uonsnnmn EINIIAWANG) Hakim Mahkamah Tmgg\|JenayaI1(7)Shah Va senankn .a.1.1.m2;s Pxhak~pmak;- Fem‘/U Puln Allwn Chan May Kam [Pqabal Trmbalan Pendakwa Raya] Respnnden Awang Almzdajzya 3. Arik Zakri Abdul Kadir [Teluzn Khalek Awzng 5 Assodales] 5/N LErvXDqKU2U£‘A‘/L)m17vALq “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my .. mmm -mm; ﬂwulnlnl n. IVMNG Wm! ml campunangan Oleh kerana nu rayusn Perayu man man [5] Smssa: sasr kaunsehng pads ‘am lebm kurang mo pevang den sewepas sons: Maghnb. metsks rem: mskan malam hsrsama dn mana snuui Igak lagang. [5] Kamudian, npablla merskl berads m da\am kerela Responder: Ie\ah herinku penengkaren amara maraka yang msnyehahkan mungsa mgm me\ankan am narmm sebahknya Raspunden Isiah mencengkarn Iangan mangsa dangan mm lalu menyubahkan keeederaan xeuana mangsa. [7] Mangsa kemudian berjaya Irmarikan din danpzda ksrela Respandan kerana berasa amal (aku\|. Namun_ mnngsa uaaa pnman leiapl unluk kembaln masuk ks dalam karma Responder: Unluk dihnmar pmang. [3] Aknbal danplda (indakan Respundan, mangsa Isiah mengllamn keeederaan dw langan kanzln sena blblmya. [91 Pads 9.5.2020, mangsa Ielﬂh membnal Iapcian polls barkenaan kqadian ml sepemmana dalem laporan palis m Ekshibl! P4 Mangsa Jugs rerun pergi ks Hospnal Shah Nam pads Iarikh yang sama unluk mandapalkan pemerlksaan donor hag: keoedersan yang dlalammya. [10] Psgawal parubalan (spa) yang msmeriksa mangsa mangesahkan bahawa mangsa mengaxamv kecsdevaan dn hangan kanan can an mun bawahnya Fagendlll m Lznxnqxuzuuvhmmm “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mu .. mad w my a. mm; mm ﬂnulnunl n. IFVLING wrm IV MUJAHAN PERAVU [11] Perayu dx dalam kes mu (elah memtailkan Pelisyen Rayuan bedankh 2a.3.2a23 eknd Rayuan Jxlud I muka sum 7 hmgga 10. [12] Perayu telah mengemukakan lapan alasan di dalam Peﬁsyen Rayuannya beikenaan dengan xeknnaran Majislret Namun an dalam hujahan oieh Ferayu‘ Lelah merumuskannya kepada (I9: is 12.1 sauna ads Responden ma»: menceaerakan SP1 12 2 Samadllmdaken SP1 mssuk ssmula ke dalam karma Responden wa\aupun SP1 berasa amal lakut adalah udak munaslbah dan suksr amsrcaym 12 :5 Kslerangan aleh SP3 lsu Sum: Am Ru poms.» 1. r. Mnmad akin SP1. [13] Perayu di da\am hujahannya menyalaken kelsrangan sm aaaxar. jslas dun mamap bshawa sm marsh dnoedenkan o\eh Rasvonden. [14] Kelerangan SP1 an muka suvaI1D Rsknd Rayuan J :1 2 peda 15 2 2a22 menya\|akan sepem benkur “I wanted to run away. he vomamny stopped by grabbing my arm and my (orearm very very hard and I Iall like my bones 5/N LErvXDQKUZUC4yL)m11vALg me ; m 20 “um sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my a. mm-y -mm: ﬂnulnunl n. IFVLING wrm was gang no break He also nwred my hp EvenIuaHy he let me go and I ran outside me cal ' [15] Perayu mm! d\ daham hujahannya merujuk kepada Nola Kelerangan as da\am Rekod Rayuan \|ersebuI an muka Surat 1: dan 14 yang menunjukkan bahawa Celah berlaku keoedevaan dan kesakﬂan Kecederaan Iersebul Uebam aw bahagian arm, nghl lorearm dan aua Iuka ax bawah mun) dan Ianya \|e\ah umuan oleh bekas suaminw wailu Responden. [151 Kelerangan sm lelah msoxong dengan kelerangan olen spa dan Ekslbll P5 dan P6 Pads Ekamn P5 dwlumukkan gambar- gambar keoederaan manakals ax Eksmut P6 aua\ah Laporan Pemenxsaan ke ama mangaa. Laporan lemebul msnyalakan terminal "abrssxon wound on Vawev up mm we ussua In/ury overnght unpev /ma (blu/5/ng am Iarearm and ngm arm)". Laporan pohs berkensan dsngan kejadlan (e\ah mxanaakan aeaagax Ekslbu P4. [17] (Nah im Pevayu di dalam Iuqahannya menghulahkan bahawa dengan auanya kaerangan sokcngan dan ke\|erangan yang konsislen aruara SP1 dan SP3, jekas hahawa lelah benaku keuadevaan dan keceasraan lsrsebul adalah axxnat perbualan oxen Respomien. Perayu menquk kepada kes R v.Easkurvi\|\|e[19I5]2 KB esa (Mahkamah Rayuan), mukn 591 yang menyacakan seperll berikul: ‘We now that av/uence in cormbalanon must be Independent testimony wmm armors me accused by M4 LEhXDQKUZUl‘AyL)m11vALg we 5 um: «am. am.‘ ...aa.mu a. mad a my a. am.“-V -mm: ﬂwulnunl a. mum wn-1 connscung or (ending 20 connacz mm mm (Ive crime In other words, :1 mus! as avuisnce which irnplicares mm, (ha! IS, which conﬁrms In some matenal particular not only awdence mat a crime has been comm/(led but am that ma pnsunsr committed il ’ [151 Pnhak Rssponden da\am wsu mu menghujahkan bahawa nada kekhilalan oleh Tuan Majlslreldr dalam mernbual kepulusan akhur kes Pendakwaan Anuuanya adalah kerana kelerangan SP3 lebih kunsxslen dengan kecederaan yang duaklbatkan cuieh SP1 sendiri [191 Tnada kelerangan dalipada sm bagl menevangkan puma kecederaan pads nimmya. Laporan paHs yang dlbual o\ehnya juga samar-Samar berkennan hagalmana kecederaan Iﬁjidl [20] Mankaman av dalam mambua\| psnilawen (erhadap isu ini barpandapal hahawa pengganlungan kepada kelerangan sw sanaja adalah musk memadai [21] Terdapan karaguan lerhadip ke\|srang:n SP1 dan lakmv SP1 akan diJe\askan nanu. Manakma ks\|s:angan SP3 juga lidak cukup unluk menyatakan bahawa sebsnamya kaoedaman yang lslah Ierjadi kapada SP1 adalah perbualan olah Responden [221 Rujuk kepada Noln Kenarangan an dalam Rsknd Rzyuan 2 an muxa sural as. am LErvXDQKUZUC4yL)m11vALg Pave s an “Nun: am.‘ ...u..mm .. mad a my a. mm-y -mm: ﬂnulnunl n. IFVLING wrm 0 . Duklor «ax bolen sahkan beriaku dalam 24 pm. Dakmr Ink menalak \|erpengaruh psnyalaan an alas. Tsvdapal kemungkman bahawa kscederaan berpunca uan sew mmcnon maksudnya dxbual send . Buleh Imak kemungkman neuseb-A7 A :Kemungkman ads. 0 : Dokmr (ak bmeh lolak ksmungkman semnmuion : Belul. > [231 Kelerangan SP3 berkenaan keoedsraan SP1 den dnkailkan dengan pevbualan men Respnndan adalah drpengaruhl oleh SP1 sendin semasa mendapalkan rawaian Ruwk Note Ke\|erangan a. dalam Rekod Rayuan Jmu 2 an muka sure! 75 semasa Isoalohzh Timba\an Pendakwa Raya seperh benkur Q . Ana pesakn maklumkan pada dokloﬂ : Pesaktl maklumkan pada saya beriaku pegexucan aw amam pesakn dan bekas suanu yang (e\ah sebabkan A kecederaan an anggala badan. [24] . alam pemeriksaan halas sewaklu auanya uleh Peguam Responaen, SP3 memaklumkan bahawa paua mass memberi kexerangan beliau ingal berkenaan dengan kepdlan saelan meru;uk kepada noui canlan pads Iekod pesaku sepem henkul: 5/N LEhXDQKUZUl‘AyL)m11vALg mg: 1 um “um: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my a. WWW -mm: ﬂwulnlnl n. mum wrm Q . DFP eanya. amara donor jawab um benaku pergalulan suemi den \s(en Macam mana doktar Inga! bstgelut aer-gen sum? A ‘Says ingal saya baca cahlan as rekod pssakit m nospnar. [25] sexerusnya mermuk Kennda tampon mass amara masa keﬁwan‘ \a\|10r2IrI nous dan masa rawalan dlbual membenkan keraguan kenada status kes W. [251 Kejadxan mi mkalakan beﬂaku selelah pmang clan sesu kaunseHng. solal Maghtih as Masjid Shah Nam dan sezelan makan ma\am :2. seksyen 1: Shah Nam pada 9.3 2020 Lsporan pens hanya dubual pa-da 9.5.2020 jam 3 20 petang. nuuk Exam P4. Rawalan pembavan pula dihual pada 9.a.2u2a, Jam ma pelang. [211 Rujuk kelevangan spa semasa seal bales pada Nma Kemrangan di da\am Rekod Rayuan Jilld 2 -11 muka sum as: 0 .Berkenaan dengan ume ﬂame. Mungkin kecedaraan harl sama. Mungkin wujud pada pagi yang sama7 A :Seluju. [231 Semasa Demeriksaan semma, SP3 um udak dapal mengesahkan bilakah sehenarnya keeederaan bstlaku. Rujuk pads No(a Kelerangsn m dalam Rekcd Rayuan Jilld 2 dmmka su1a(90 5/N LEhXDQKUZUE4yL)m11vALg me x mu “Nun: am.‘ ...u..mm .. mad a my a. mm-y -mm: ﬂnulnunl n. IFVLING wrm Q :Peguam jugs adalanya berkensanumelrama Peguam kaca mungkmkan kesederaan hari sama. Dokionawah mungxm. holeh ;elaskan7 A : saya lak bmeh oonlirm kecederaan hari nu kemungkman pads ham wlu alau da\am masa 1 nan [29] Jelaslah bahswa kemangan SP1 mak beqaya dlsakong dsngan Kelerangan-kmsrangan wam bag! menunjukkan bahawa keosdsrsan i\|u auakukan alsh Responder: [so] (Nah mu berdasarkan pevkara di alas, Mahkamah ml berseluju hahawa pengadu \|eIah mengalarm kecederaan namun Mahkamah meragm keoederaan nu berpunca danpada Respnnden. [31] Ru;uk kes Axlx Mullamad Dln v Fuhlln Pmsanumt (199511 MLRH an pads nerenyhan 22: ’R v. Ke//m [1933] 1 Qd R 425 was a case when ma accwed was charged wan maecam dos/mgs with and rape or his 12—yssr old stepdaughter. The swderms c1 ma comp/amanl was said (0 have been carmbcraled by medical evidence that her hymen was not mvac1. ms evrdence was cons/’:lenl w/Ih her account (ha! me accused Had raped mar, out since ma rupture was not established m have occurred at a nine or a place wmch involved me accused, this evidence was held m be incapable afallcldmg canubolalion ' 5/N LErvXDqKU2U£‘A‘/l)m11vALg Page 2 an 2n ,m.,.,. sum ulnblrwm .. mad a my a. .m.m mm: ﬂwulnunl w. IHUNG punt! Samadi Tlndakall SP1 Masuk Semula K2 Dalam Kenn Ruspondan Walaupull sm Berasa Amal T-kul Adulnh Yldnk Munasahall Dan Sukur Dlpercnyal. [321 Pendakwa Raye berhwah bahawa um sebab unluk Hakxm Bwcara meragul keterangan dan kyemmm sm hanya sekaﬂar berdasarkan keterangan spa masuk semula ke dalam kereu Responuen seueuas mceuenakan oleh Responden spc \|e\ah meneranykan bahawa sm Iakul dan yka d\a melarikan am, ma akan dﬂanggar oleh Responden. [33] Perayu yuga menyalakan hahawa bukanlah sualu yang aslng sektranya SP1 masuk semma ke dalam kerela Responden kerana ma ada\ah bekas suamn SP! naaa kmsrangan banawa Responaen ads mambawa senjala memahaya sepem patang auaupun semala lajam lam. J\ka lamapan senjala sepem nu maka aaalan max munasabah sekrranya sm max me\ankan an [341 Peguam Responden pula menghujahkan bahawa Tuan Mausuel «swan mempenimbangkan kelerangan am secara pemlauan makslma dan membual dapalan lakla lerhadapnya. [35] sm hanya menggunakan “!aku\|' sebagai arasan lanpa sebavang Peluelasan yang munasabah, bag: menerangkan nnengapa behau mernasmu semula kevela Responden. [35] Reaponden tum! mempersoalkan nndakan SP1 yang lidak melarikan um pada beberapa keadaan malallan hdak juga 5/N LEhXDQKUZU£‘A‘/L)m17vALg Pm In m 20 Mum: s.n.n ...n,.mn .. mad a my .. urwmlhly mm: ﬂwulnlnl n. .nune an.‘	2,627	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-22NCvC-67-02/2023	PLAINTIF CHANG SHENG YUH DEFENDAN WEALTH PLATEAU SDN. BHD.	On the issue of the date of vacant possession, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has sufficiently explained that Sam Zam Liang was authorised to sign the registration form for the Plaintiff and the details in the form also clearly stated the Plaintiff’ s name under the “Purchaser” column for the Unit. Thus, the Defendant’s contention does not hold water as the Defendant has indeed accepted the booking fee and acknowledged via an offer letter for the same Unit dated 17.01.2017.This issue was elaborated in the case PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Anor and other appeals [2021] 2 MLJ 60, where the Federal Court held that “…Where a developer fails to deliver vacant possession according to the time stipulated in the statutory sale and purchase agreement, the calculation of the LAD begins from the date of payment of the booking fee and not from the date of that statutory agreement.”.CONCLUSIONBased on the aforesaid reasons and on balance of probabalities, aftercareful scrutiny and judicious consideration of all the evidence before this Court,including the written and oral submissions of both parties, this Court finds thatthe Defendant has failed to raise any triable issue or defence to defeat thePlaintiff’s claim for a summary judgement. The Plaintiff’s application is allowed with cost.	07/11/2023	YA Dr Suzana binti Muhamad Said	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ca7e57ce-5339-4d79-aaf5-1c632ab6670f&Inline=true	IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF FEDERAL TERRITORY OF MALAYSIA SUIT CIVIL NO.: WA-22NCVC-67-02/2023 BETWEEN CHANG SHENG YUH (I/C NO.: 901007-14-6511) … PLAINTIFF AND WEALTH PLATEAU SDN BHD (COMPANY NO.: 800007-A) … DEFENDANT 07/11/2023 08:46:17 WA-22NCvC-67-02/2023 Kand. 28 S/N zldyjlTeU2q9RxjKrZnDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPLICATION) INTRODUCTION [1] This is the Plaintiff’s application to enter a summary judgment against the Defendant pursuant to Order 14 Rules of Court 2012 (ROC) claiming liquidated ascertained damages (LAD) for late delivery. BRIEF FACTS [2] The Defendant is the developer for a condominium development project known as “Paraiso @ the Earth” (Project). The Plaintiff entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement with the Defendant dated 27.07.2017 (SPA) to purchase a property with the address Unit No. B19-05 within Storey No. 19 of Building No. Block B, Paraiso @ The Earth Bukit Jalil, No. 2A, Jalan Jalil 2, Residensi Permai Impian, Bukit Jalil, 57000 Kuala Lumpur (Unit). [3] The SPA was in the prescribed form under Schedule H of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 (HDR 1989) under the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 (HDA 1966). Clause S/N zldyjlTeU2q9RxjKrZnDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25(2) provides that if the developer fails to deliver vacant possession within 36 months, the developer shall be liable to pay LAD to the purchaser. [4] The Defendant amended the delivery period for vacant possession of the Unit and completion of the common facilities of the Project from 36 months to 48 months as stipulated in clauses 25(1) and 29(1) of the SPA after obtaining approval from the Housing Controller. [5] Prior to signing the SPA, the Plaintiff made a payment of RM5,000.00 to the Defendant on 05.11.2016 as a booking fee for the Unit which was confirmed by the Defendant in a letter of offer dated 17.01.2017. However, the Defendant denied this as a booking fee because the payment by cheque was made by one Mok Choon Keat for the Plaintiff. The Defendant contended that vacant possession starts from the signing date of the SPA on 27.07.2017. The Defendant also disputed the validity of the registration form as the registration form was signed by one Sam Zam Liang and not the Plaintiff. [6] On 12.03.2021, the Plaintiff received a letter from the Defendant notifying the Plaintiff that delivery of vacant possession of the Unit and completion of the common facilities of the Project shall be delayed for 167 days (First Letter), pursuant to the Temporary Measures for Reducing the Impact of Coronavirus S/N zldyjlTeU2q9RxjKrZnDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Disease 2019 (Covid-10) Act 2020 (COVID-19 Act), and the new delivery date was set to 28.11.2021. [7] On 26.10.2021, the Plaintiff received a second letter from the Defendant notifying the Plaintiff that delivery of vacant possession of the Unit and completion of the common facilities of the Project is extended for another 289 days, until 30.03.2022 (Second Letter). [8] Finally, on 30.03.2022, the Plaintiff received a notice and delivery of vacant possession of the Unit. PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTION [9] The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant must comply with the statutory provisions to deliver vacant possession and complete common facilities within 36 months and not 48 months. [10] As such, the Plaintiff contended that the Defendant was late for 588 days in delivering vacant possession of the Unit and completing the common facilities of the Project. The Plaintiff claims a sum of RM125,023.81 from the Defendant as LAD in accordance to clauses 25(2) and 29(2) of the SPA. S/N zldyjlTeU2q9RxjKrZnDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [11] Timeline of the events and calculations: DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION [12] The Defendant contended that Schedule H of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 can be amended under Regulation Price of the said Unit RM646,736.00 Booking fees paid on 05.11.2016 Original date for delivery of vacant possession Before 05.11.2019 (36 months from date of booking fees paid) Actual date of delivery of vacant possession 30.03.2022 Number of days delayed (from 05.11.2019 to 30.03.2022) 877 days Number of days excluded 289 days (as per Defendant’s second EOT letter) Total number of days delayed 588 days Calculation of LAD claimable for the late delivery of vacant possession of the said Unit RM646,736.00 x 10% x 588 (days) / 365 = RM104,186.51 Calculation of LAD claimable for the late completion of common facilities RM646,736.00 x 2% x 588 (days) / 365 = RM20,837.30 TOTAL RM125,023.81 S/N zldyjlTeU2q9RxjKrZnDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11(3) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) (Amendment) Regulations 2015 (HDR 2015) and a letter dated 26.04.2017 confirmed this. [13] The Defendant also contended that the Plaintiff is bound by the SPA as the extention of time was included in the SPA before signing of the SPA. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Law on summary judgment [14] The law on Order 14 ROC is trite. In the case Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400, the Supreme Court held- “[11] In our view, basic to the application of all those legal propositions, is the requirement under O 14 for the Court to be satisfied on affidavit evidence that the defence has not only raised an issue but also that the said issue is triable. The determination of whether an issue is or is not triable must necessarily depend on the facts or the law arising from each case as disclosed in the affidavit evidence before the Court.” [15] The Plaintiff must fulfill the requirement that there is no triable issue raised by the Defendant. Once fulfilled, this burden then shifted to the Defendant to show triable issues, as per the Federal Court’s case in Cempaka Finance Bhd. v Ho Lai Ying & Anor [2006] 2 MLJ 685 which held- “(1) The appellant had the burden to prove its case in an application under O S/N zldyjlTeU2q9RxjKrZnDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 of the RHC by establishing the following conditions: (i) that the respondents had entered appearance; (ii) that the statement of claim must have been served on the respondents; (iii) that the affidavit in support must comply with O 14 r 2 of the RHC in that it must verify the facts on which the claim was based on and must state the deponent's belief that there was defence to the claim. When those conditions were fulfilled, the burden would be shifted to the respondents to raise issues to be tried.”. [16] This Court finds that these requirements have been fulfilled by the Plaintiff as reflected in the Plaintiff’s affidavit in support (Enclosure 8) affirmed on the 05.05.2023. Law on Delivery of Vacant Possesion under Schedule H of HDR 1989 [17] The key issue of law put forward by both parties is as to whether the standard clause on delivery of vacant possession and completing common facilities can be amended from 36 months to 48 months. The Housing Controller approved the Defendant’s request to extend the period of delivering vacant possession of the Unit and completing common facilities of the Project from 36 months to 48 months under Regulation 11(3) of HDR 2015 in a letter dated 26.04.2017. [18] The Supreme Court in Veronica Lee Ha Ling & Ors v Maxisegar Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 141 held that the object of the Housing Developers S/N zldyjlTeU2q9RxjKrZnDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal legislation “is to protect house buyers against the developers. A developer must execute the agreement set out in the schedule to the relevant subsidiary legislation. He cannot add other clauses in it.”. [19] In the case of Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd v. Hariram Jayaram & Ors And Other Appeals [2008] 1 MLRA 473; [2008] 4 MLJ 852; [2008] 4 CLJ 618, the Court of Appeal held that "The agreement in the case at hand was a special agreement. It was ordered and controlled by the Housing Development (Control and Licensing Regulations 1989 ('Regulations'). Parties in regular cases of agreement have the liberty of creating allowances among themselves, but a property developer is not privileged with this liberty. Therefore, parties to an agreement in Schedule H of the Regulations are not able to make an agreement out of the scheduled or planned form.”. [20] It is settled law that the Housing Controller has no right to rely on Regulation 11(3) HDR 2015 to amend the statutory provisions in Schedule H of the HDR 1989 as Regulation 11(3) HDR 2015 has been deemed ultra vires to the HDA 1966 as decided in the case of Ang Ming Lee & Ors v Menteri Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan & Anor and other appeals [2020] 1 MLJ 281 where the Federal Court held- S/N zldyjlTeU2q9RxjKrZnDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal “(1)The Controller had no power to waive or modify any provision in the Schedule H contract of sale because s 24 of the Act does not confer power on the Minister to make regulations for the purpose of delegating the power to waive or modify the Schedule H contract of sale to the Controller. Hence, reg 11(3) of the Regulations, conferring power on the Controller to waive and modify the terms and conditions of the contract of sale is ultra vires the Act. Having regard to the object and purpose of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966, the words "to regulate and to prohibit" in subsection 24(2)(e) should be given a strict construction, in the sense that the Minister is expected to apply his own mind to the matter and not to delegate that responsibility to the Controller. The Act being a social legislation designed to protect the house buyers, the interests of the purchasers shall be the paramount consideration against the developer. The legislative intent that the duties shall remain with the Minister, may be discerned from ss 11 and 12 of the Act. Since it is the Minister who is entrusted or empowered by Parliament to regulate the terms and conditions of the contract of sale, the Minister's action in delegating the power to modify the conditions and terms of the contract of sale may be construed as having exceeded what was intended by Parliament. By delegating the power, vide reg 11(3) to the Controller to waive or modify the prescribed terms and conditions of the sale of contract, it was now the Controller who has been entrusted to regulate the terms and conditions of the contract of sale. Further, by modifying the prescribed terms and conditions and by granting the developer the extension of time, the Controller had denied the purchasers' right to claim for LAD. This modification and the granting of extension of time to the developer, did not appear to protect or safeguard the purchasers but rather the developer and this militates the intention of Parliament. (paras 36, 40, 41, 51, 56 & 60) (2) On the letter dated 17 November 2015 which was to convey the decision of the Minister on the developer's appeal against the rejection by the Controller on the extension of time, the Federal Court held that the letter was not a valid S/N zldyjlTeU2q9RxjKrZnDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal letter granting an extension of time to the developer. The signatory to the letter had stated that he signed the letter on behalf of the Controller and not on behalf of the Minister. Surely this was not something that the signatory could choose to state either he was acting on behalf of the Controller or the Minister because an appeal cannot lie to the Controller against the decision of the Controller. Thus, it was necessary that the letter conveys the decision of the Minister and that the signatory signed on behalf of the Minister. More importantly, if the extension was granted by the Minister pursuant to an appeal against the dismissal by the Controller of the developer's application for extension of time, the applicable regulation is reg 12 and not reg 11. The fact that the letter was signed on behalf of the Controller to convey a decision by the Ministry (as opposed to the Minister) under reg 11, was clear that the decision to grant the extension of time to the developer was that of the Controller and not the Minister. This was fortified by the absence of any material before the court in the form of an affidavit by the Minister to explain the discrepancy and to state that he had indeed decided to allow the developer's appeal under reg 12 for the extension of time. (para 65)”.” [21] Further it was held in Ang Ming Lee (supra)- “[40] The Act being a social legislation designed to protect the house buyers, the interests of the purchasers shall be the paramount consideration against the developer. Parliament has entrusted the Minister to safeguard the interests of the purchasers and the Minister has prescribed the terms and conditions of the contract of sale as per Schedule H. We find no contrary indication in the language, scope or object of the Act that such duty to safeguard the interests of the purchasers may be delegated to some other authority. [51] Similarly here. It is the Minister who is entrusted or empowered by Parliament to regulate the terms and conditions of the contract of sale. The S/N zldyjlTeU2q9RxjKrZnDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Minister, however has delegated the power to regulate to the Controller by reg 11(3) of the Regulations. As power to regulate does not include power to delegate, the Minister's action in delegating the power to modify the conditions and terms of the contract of sale may be construed as having exceeded what was intended by Parliament. [60] On the above analysis, we hold that the Controller has no power to waive or modify any provision in the Schedule H contract of sale because s 24 of the Act does not confer power on the Minister to make regulations for the purpose of delegating the power to waive or modify the Schedule H contract of sale to the Controller. And it is not open to us to read into the section an implied power enabling the Minister to do so. We consequently hold that reg 11(3) of the Regulations, conferring power on the Controller to waive and modify the terms and conditions of the contract of sale is ultra vires the Act.”. [22] The issues raised by the Defendant in this case were also the issues raised in Ang Ming Lee (supra). As the law is well settled, thus this Court finds that there is no triable issue raised by the Defendant. Furthermore, this Court is bound by the doctrine of stare decisis. [23] The Defendant also contended that the extention of time (EOT) was inserted in the SPA before signing. This Court finds that eventhough the EOT was obtained before signing of the SPA, the EOT is unlawful (refer UE E&C Sanjia (M) Sdn Bhd v Lee Jeng Yuh & Anor and another appeal [2021] 6 S/N zldyjlTeU2q9RxjKrZnDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal MLJ 864 [CA]; Vignesh Naidu a/l Kuppusamy Naidu v Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2023] 2 MLJ 776 [CA]). [24] In Vignesh Naidu a/l Kuppusamy Naidu (supra) the Court of Appeal held- “(2) It is settled law that an ultra vires act, such as the extension granted by the Housing Controller under reg 11(3) cannot be legitimised through estoppel, waiver or agreement between parties. The doctrine of estoppel does not therefore apply against a statute or statutory agreement, such as in the instant case, which revolves around the clauses in a statutory contract as prescribed in Schedule H to the Regulations. The principle of waiver or estoppel is in other words not applicable when reg 11(3) of the Regulations is ultra vires the HDA. If allowed to operate in this case, an estoppel or waiver would also defeat the very purpose of the HDA, which is a social legislation enacted to control housing development and protect the interests of purchasers.”. [25] Although clauses 25(1) and 29(1) of the SPA did not conform with Schedule H of HDA 1966, that does not render the SPA as void. In the case of Ang Ming Lee (supra) though the extension of time provided by the Controller was held to be ultra vires, the entire Sale and Purchase Agreement was not. [26] On the issue of the date of vacant possession, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has sufficiently explained that Sam Zam Liang was authorised to sign the registration form for the Plaintiff and the details in the form also clearly stated the S/N zldyjlTeU2q9RxjKrZnDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Plaint i f f ’s name under the “Purchaser” column for the Unit. Thus, the Defendant’s contention does not hold water as the Defendant has indeed accepted the booking fee and acknowledged via an offer letter for the same Unit dated 17.01.2017. [27] This issue was elaborated in the case PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Anor and other appeals [2021] 2 MLJ 60, where the Federal Court held that “…Where a developer fails to deliver vacant possession according to the time stipulated in the statutory sale and purchase agreement, the calculation of the LAD begins from the date of payment of the booking fee and not from the date of that statutory agreement.”. CONCLUSION [28] Based on the aforesaid reasons and on balance of probabalities, after careful scrutiny and judicious consideration of all the evidence before this Court, including the written and oral submissions of both parties, this Court finds that the Defendant has failed to raise any triable issue or defence to defeat the Plaintiff’s claim for a summary judgement. S/N zldyjlTeU2q9RxjKrZnDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [29] The Plaintiff’s application is allowed with cost. (Y.A. DR. SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) Judicial Commisioner Civil High Court NCVC 1 Kuala Lumpur. Date: 4 November 2023 COUNSELS Solicitors for the Plaintiff Messrs. Kin Jong & Co. 43A Redwood, Empire Residence, Jalan PJU 8.1, PJU8, Damansara Perdana, 47820 Petaling Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan Solicitors for the Defendant Messrs. Nik Saghir & Ismail B16-15, i-Sovo, i-City, Persiaran Multimedia, Seksyen 7, 40000 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan. S/N zldyjlTeU2q9RxjKrZnDw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	19,984	Tika 2.6.0
BB-B52NCvC-31-04/2023	PLAINTIF MYDECOR MARKETING SDN. BHD. DEFENDAN 1. ) TAI WENG CONSTRUCTION & ENGINEERING SDN BHD 2. ) WONG YEW WOH	ATURAN 14 - PENGHAKIMAN TERUS - BANTAHAN AWAL OLEH DEFENDAN - KEPUTUSAN PERMOHONAN TIDAK BOLEH DITERUSKAN MEMANDANGKAN TERDAPAT SAMAN PEMULA DIFAILKAN DIBAWAH SESKYEN 404 DAN SEKSYEN 405 AKTA SYARIKAT 2016 - KESAN SEKSYEN 410 AKTA SYARIKAT	07/11/2023	Puan Sazlina binti Safie	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=bbc79d4b-5c7d-4109-bd84-c34abf0d31e9&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - AP - BB-B52NCvC-31-04-2023 - O.14 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN PETALING JAYA DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN WRIT SAMAN NO – BB-B52NCvC-31-04/2023 ANTARA MYDECOR MARKETING SDN. BHD. [Company No.: 200001015789 (518396-P)] [JASBEER NUR & LEE] …PLAINTIF DAN 1. TAI WENG CONSTRUCTION & ENGINEERING SDN BHD [COMPANY NO.: 201501043544 (1168865-X)] 2. WONG YEW WOH [IDENTITY CARD NO.: 740502145933] [GARY WONG & CO.] …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (RAYUAN INTERLOKUTORI) LATARBELAKANG KES Ini adalah rayuan Perayu-Perayu/Defendan-Defendan TAI WENG CONSTRUCTION & ENGINEERING SDN BHD [COMPANY NO.: 07/11/2023 11:58:21 BB-B52NCvC-31-04/2023 Kand. 27 S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 201501043544 (1168865-X)] dan WONG YEW WOH [IDENTITY CARD NO.: 740502145933] melalui Notis Rayuan di Lampiran 22 terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini bertarikh 21/9/2023 yang membenarkan Notis Permohonan Plaintif bertarikh 18/7/2023 (Lampiran 8) dengan kos RM2,000.00 dibayar oleh Perayu-Perayu/Defendan-Defendan kepada Responden/Plaintif. Mahkamah telah meneliti Notis Permohonan, Afidavit-afidavit, hujahan bertulis dan otoriti kedua-dua pihak. Alasan Mahkamah membenarkan Lampiran 8 adalah seperti berikut: [1] Notis Permohonan Lampiran 8 adalah permohonan Plaintif untuk merekodkan satu Penghakiman Terus di bawah Aturan 14 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 bagi perintah seperti berikut: a) Jumlah RM553,585.92 yang masih terhutang setakat 3/4/2023; b) Faedah pada kadar 1.5% sebulan (18% setahun) ke atas jumlah prinsipal sebanyak RM450,050.65 dari 5/4/2023 sehingga penyelesaian penuh; c) Kos tindakan ini; d) Kos tindakan atas dasar peguamcara dan anakguam; S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 e) Faedah pada kadar 5% setahun dikira atas kos dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga penyelesaian penuh menurut Aturan 59 Kaedah 24 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; dan f) Relief atau perintah selanjutnya yang difikirkan patut dan suaimanfaat oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini. [2] Alasan permohonan Plaintif adalah dinyatakan dalam affidavit sokongan yang mana antara lain menyatakan bahawa: 1) Atas permintaan Defendan Pertama melalui pesanan belian, Plaintif telah menjual dan menghantar serah barang-barang dan/atau perkhidmatan kepada Defendan Pertama dari semasa ke semasa. Pesanan Belian adalah dieksibitkan sebagai eksibit “A-2”. 2) Defendan Kedua merupakan Penjamin kepada Defendan Pertama melalui satu Jaminan yang ditandatangani oleh Defendan Kedua bertarikh 18/7/2019 dalam kapasiti sebagai Pengarah Defendan Pertama. Surat Jaminan dieksibitkan sebagai eksibit “A-3”. 3) Melalui Jaminan tersebut, Defendan Kedua telah bersetuju secara bersesama dan/atau berasingan untuk menjamin sebagai penghutang utama kepada Plaintif untuk membayar S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 keseluruhan hutang yang harus dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Plaintif. 4) Plaintif telah membekalkan dan menghantar serah barang- barang dan/atau perkhidmatan kepada Defendan Pertama dan menghantar inbois-inbois dan Nota Penghantaran (Delivery Note) dari semasa ke semasa yang mana butir- butirnya adalah dalam pengetahuan Defendan-Defendan. inbois-inbois dan Nota Penghantaran (Delivery Note) adalah seperti dalam eksibit “A-4”. 5) Defendan-Defendan telah mengaku terima barang-barang dan/atau perkhidmatan tersebut dan telah meletakkan cop syarikat dan/atau menandatangani pada Nota Penghantaran tersebut. 6) Barang-barang dan/atau perkhidmatan tersebut telah diterima dalam keadaan baik dan mengikut mutu, kualiti dan spesifikasi Defendan-Defendan. 7) Pada setiap masa material, Plaintif tidak pernah menerima aduan daripada Defendan Pertama dan/atau Defendan Kedua berkenaan barang-barang dan/atau perkhidmatan tersebut dan/atau inbois-inbois yang telah dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif. S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 8) Plaintif telah menuntut bayaran penuh daripada Defendan- Defendan untuk barang-barang dan/atau perkhidmatan tersebut yang telah dijual dan dihantar serah kepada Defendan-Defendan. 9) Defendan-Defendan telah membuat sebahagian bayaran sebanyak RM25,978.59 kepada Plaintif pada 26/7/2022 untuk inbois No.SV-40852. Salinan resit rasmi adalah dieksibitkan sebagai “A-5”. 10) Defendan-Defendan masih gagal, enggan dan/atau cuai untuk menyelesaikan baki jumlah yang tertunggak sebanyak RM450,050.65 dan faedah sebanyak RM103,535.27 yang dikira setakat 3/4/2023 dan faedah tersebut masih berterusan sehingga penyelesaian penuh. 11) Plaintif melampirkan bukti hutang sebagaimana dalam Penyata Akaun Penghutang (Debtor Statement) bertarikh 3/4/2023 serta Nota Debit (Debit Note) bertarikh 2/3/2023 yang dilampirkan sebagai eksibit “A-6”. RM553,585.92 beserta faedah. 12) Plaintif telah melalui peguamcaranya, Tetuan Jasbeer, Nur & Lee telah menghantar satu surat tuntutan bertarikh 16/3/2023 kepada Defendan-Defendan untuk menuntut jumlah yang S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 terhutang tersebut. Salinan surat tuntutan dieksibitkan sebagai “A-7”. 13) Plaintif percaya Defendan-Defendan tidak mempunyai pembelaan bermerit dan pembelaan Defendan-Defendan adalah penafian kosong semata-mata dan tanpa asas. [3] Defendan telah memfailkan pembelaan di lampiran 6 dan affidavit jawapan di lampiran 10 yang mana antaranya menyatakan seperti berikut: 1) Defendan Kedua mengikrarkan affidavit bagi pihak Defendan Pertama dan juga Defendan Kedua sendiri. 2) Defendan-Defendan menyatakan bahawa dalam Purchase Order dinyatakan “Payment shall only be processed after received your original invoices. Please be informed We DO NOT ACCEPT any EMAIL for Invoices, Debit Notes, Credit Notes, Statement of Account or Official Receipt Due to Our Own Company’s Policy.” 3) Oleh demikian, beban adalah ke atas Plaintif untuk membuktikan bahawa Salinan asal invois, penyata akaun, debit notes ada diserahkan kepada Defendan-Defendan. S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 4) Defendan-Defendan mengakui terma-terma dalam surat Jaminan. 5) Tidak ada bukti penerimaan dilampirkan kepada invois dan Defendan-Defendan tidak boleh membuat bantahan kepada kandungan inbois-inbois. 6) Defendan Pertama menyatakan bahawa mereka tidak menerima inbois dari Plaintif mengenai kadar faedah 1.5% sebulan di inbois dan pengenaan faedah ini tidak ada dalam pengetahuan dan persetujuan Defendan Pertama. 7) Defendan Pertama tidak menerima nota debit dan penyata akuan penghutang daripada Plaintif dan Plaintif diletakkan atas beban bukti yang kuat dalam membuktikan penyerahan dokumen tersebut. 9) Perenggan (c) dan (d) dalam Notis Permohonan jelas mengkehendaki Mahkamah memberikan kos sebanyak 2 kali iaitu kos tindakan ini dan kos tindakan ini atas dasar peguamcara dan anakguam. Ini adalah salah di sisi undang- undang. 10) Adalah menjadi syarat yang diperuntukkan dalam Purchase Order dan ini diketahui oleh Plaintif bahawa penyerahan Salinan asal inbois, Nota Penyerahan, Nota Debit dan penyata S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 akaun penghutang adalah perlu untuk Defendan Pertama menilai dan membuat bayaran jika perlu. 11) Oleh demikian, Defendan-Defendan memohon agar Notis Permohonan Plaintif ditolak dengan kos diberikan kepada Defendan-Defendan. [4] Plaintif dalam affidavit balasan di lampiran 11 menjawab kepada dakwaan Defendan-Defendan seperti berikut: 1) Plaintif menyatakan bahawa penyataan Defendan-Defendan yang dirujuk berhubung pembayaran hanya dibuat selepas menerima Salinan asal inbois-inbois hanya dinyatakan dalam Pesanan Belian terakhir daripada Defendan Pertama bertarikh 8/6/2021. 2) Penyataan ini tidak sekalipun dinyatakan dalam Pesanan- pesanan Belian terdahulu. 3) Dakwaan Defendan-Defendan bahawa mereka tidak menerima inbois-inbois, penyata akuan dan nota debit adalah bercanggah dengan tindakan Defendan-Defendan sediri yang membuat sebahagian bayaran berjumlah RM25,978.59 kepada Plaintif. S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 4) Berhubung dakwaan Defendan-Defendan tentang serahan Salinan asal inbois, Nota Penyerahan, Nota Debit dan penyata akaun penghutang, pihak-pihak telahpun menggunakan email sebagai platform komunikasi seperti dieksibit “AA-1” dan “AA- 2” serta inbois-inbois dan Penyata Akuan telah dihantar melalui penghantaran kurier GDex sebagaimana dieksibitkan di “AA-3” dan “AA-4”. 5) Sebelum memfailkan tuntutan ini, Plaintif juga telah melalui e- mail memberi peringatan kepada Defendan-Defendan untuk membayar jumlah tertunggak sebagaimana dieksibit “AA-5”. 6) Salinan nota debit juga telah dihantar kepada Defendan Pertama melalui email sebagaimana di eksibit “AA-6”. 7) Defendan-Defendan gagal mengemukakan sebarang isu berhubung surat jaminan oleh itu tiada isu untuk dibicarakan. [5] Setelah meneliti segala kertas kausa yang ada, Mahkamah percaya bahawa kes ini adalah satu kes yang jelas untuk diberikan satu perintah Penghakiman Terus. Defendan-Defendan gagal mengemukakan isu bermerit atau isu untuk dibicarakan. Semua dakwaan yang dibangkitkan telah dijawab dengan jelas melalui eksibit-eksibit yang dikemukakan. S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [6] Sebelum Mahkamah pergi kepada Notis Permohonan itu sendiri, Mahkamah merujuk kepada hujahan bertulis pihak Defendan- Defendan. Pihak Defendan-Defendan membangkitkan isu bahawa Defendan Pertama telah memfailkan satu Saman Pemula ex-parte untuk satu prosiding bagi mendapatkan “Judicial Management” dan berdasarkan seksyen 410 Akta Syarikat 2016, tidak ada apa-apa prosiding boleh diteruskan terhadap Defendan Pertama. [7] Berdasarkan seksyen 410 Akta Syarikat 2016 tersebut, segala prosiding untuk mengambil tindakan terhadap Defendan Pertama harus dihentikan sehingga keputusan muktamad oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur melalui Saman Pemula No. WA- 28JM-17-08/2023 yang mana pendengaran ditetapkan pada 26/9/2023. [8] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kronologi kes sebagaimana berikut: a) Writ saman dan penyataan tuntutan di failkan pada 6/4/2023. b) Notis Permohonan Lampiran 8 untuk satu perintah bagi Penghakiman Terus difailkan oleh Plaintif pada 18/7/2023. c) Tarikh pendengaran pertama bagi Lampiran 8 ditetapkan pada 1/8/2023. S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 d) Arahan bagi pemfailan affidavit dan hujahan bertulis diberikan pada 1/8/2023 adalah seperti berikut: i) 15/8/2023 – afidavit Balasan Defendan ii) 29/8/2023 – Afidavit balasan Plaintif iii) 14/9/2023 – Hujahan bertulis kedua-dua pihak serentak iv) 21/9/2023 - keputusan (melalui e-review) Lampiran 8 dan PTCM Lampiran 1. e) Pada masa ini, peguamcara Defendan-Defendan tidak ada menyebut tentang apa-apa prosiding atau perintah penggantungan dari mana-mana Mahkamah. f) Jika dilihat, tarikh Saman Pemula didaftarkan pada bulan 18/8/2023 iaitu selepas Notis Permohonan dan arahan melalui PTCM diberikan. g) Pada 15/9/2023, peguamcara Defendan-Defendan telah menulis kepada Mahkamah melalui Lampiran 14 memaklumkan bahawa pihak Defendan telah melantik Tetuan Dennis Nik & Wong dan telah memfailkan satu Saman Pemula Ex-Parte untuk Perintah Pengurusan Kehakiman menurut seksyen 404 dan seksyen 405 Akta Syarikat 2016. Pengurusan kes bagi Saman Pemula tersebut telah ditetapkan S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 pada 8/9/2023 dan bicara secara zoom ditetapkan pada 26/9/2023. h) Defendan dalam surat juga menyatakan bahawa berdasarkan seksyen 410 Akta Syarikat 2016, tiada prosiding lain dan tiada pelaksanaan atau proses undang-undang lain boleh dimulakan dan atau diteruskan terhadap Defendan atau hartanya kecuali dengan kebenaran Mahkamah dan tertakluk kepada apa-apa terma yang boleh dikenakan oleh Mahkamah. [9] Mahkamah telah membuat keputusan dan menolak bantahan awal pihak Defendan-Defendan. Daipada kronologi kes, adalah jelas perkara ini tidak pernah timbul atau belum pernah dimulakan sebelum arahan dan tarikh keputusan bagi Lampiran 8 diberikan. [10] Tambahan pula, peguamcara Defendan-Defendan dalam tindakan ini bukanlah peguam yang mengendalikan prosiding Saman Pemula yang dikatakan telah difailkan. Pada peringkat ini, tindakan jika sekalipun ada, ia adalah terhadap Syarikat Defendan Pertama dan tidak membabitkan Defendan Kedua. [11] Prosiding ini telah bermula lebih awal dan bukan dimulakan selepas Saman Pemula tersebut difailkan. Tiada apa-apa perintah atau arahan YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi pada peringkat ini. S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [12] Dalam apa jua keadaan, prinsip di bawah Seksyen 404 dan Seksyen 405 haruslah dipatuhi dan Mahkamah Tinggi perlu berpuashati terlebih dahulu berhubung permohonan ini sebelum memberikan apa-apa perintah (samada membenarkan atau menolak) apatah lagi ini adalah permohonan Defendan Pertama sendiri dan bukan oleh pengarah atau pemegang saham mereka. [13] Mahkamah merujuk peruntukan seksyen 410 Akta Syarikat 2016 seperti berikut: 410 Effect of application for a judicial management order During the period beginning with the making of an application for a judicial management order and ending with the making of such an order or the dismissal of the application- (a) no resolution shall be passed or order made for the winding up of the company; (b) no steps shall be taken to enforce any charge on or security over the company's property or to repossess any goods in the company's possession under any hire purchase agreement, chattels leasing agreement or retention of title agreement, except with leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court may impose; and S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (c) no other proceedings and no execution or other legal process shall be commenced or continued and no distress may be levied against the company or its property except with leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court may impose. [14] Jika sekalipun permohonan Defendan Pertama dibenarkan oleh YAH kelak, pihak Judicial Management (JM) boleh mengambil tindakan sewajarnya bagi pihak Defendan Pertama. [15] Mahkamah ingin merujuk 2 kes di bawah yang telah menjelaskan dengan sendiri kedudukan apabila sesuatu perintah Judicial Management (JM) diberikan. PANZANA ENTERPRISE SDN BHD v. MKP BUILDERS SDN BHD [2022] 1 LNS 309 Introduction [1] This is a consequential application for pay-out of monies in a stakeholding account held by solicitors pursuant to pay-in as ordered by the court consequential to an adjudication decision made under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA"). [2] The parties concerned Panzana Enterprise Sdn Bhd ("Panzana"), MKP Builder Sdn Bhd ("MKPB") and PC Geotechnic Sdn Bhd S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 ("PCG") are all private limited companies involved in the construction business. [33] Consequently the Pay-out Decision is in substance unaffected by s. 426 of the CA as so alleged by Panzana. [34] Furthermore, I also hold that by the nature and substance of the Pay-out Application, the relevant parties are MKPB, PCG and Messrs. Hakem Arabi & Associates only and the Pay-out Application does not therefore attract s. 410 (c) of the CA. PNL CAPITAL SDN BHD & ORS v. LOH TECK WAH & ORS & OTHER APPEALS, COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA, [2022] 1 LNS 2314 [132] The IJM applied in Kuala Lumpur OS No. WA-24NCC-43- 02/2021 to set-aside the said Consent Judgment [CCB, Encl 72, Page 214, Para 18(b)] against Fintree on the technical ground that upon filing the JM OS on 18.1.2021 no further proceeding can be had in Suit 623 including the recording of the Consent Judgment. The said Consent Judgment was set-aside by the Kuala Lumpur High Court on 30.11.2021 on ground that the OS having been filed on 18.1.2021, the Consent Judgment recorded on 19.1.2021 was invalid by virtue of s. 410(c) of the CA 2016 which reads as follows: S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 "Effect of application for a judicial management order 410. During the period beginning with the making of an application for a judicial management order and ending with the making of such an order or the dismissal of the application- (a) no resolution shall be passed or order made for the winding up of the company; .... (c) no other proceedings and no execution or other legal process shall be commenced or continued and no distress may be levied against the company or its property except with leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court may impose."(emphasis added).” [16] Mahkamah menolak bantahan awal Defendan-Defendan dan meneruskan dengan keputusan bagi Lampiran 8. Oleh itu, alasan Mahkamah bagi membenarkan lampiran 8 adalah seperti dinyatakan sebagaimana berikutnya. [17] Mahkamah merujuk kepada Aturan 14 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 telah memperuntukkan seperti berikut:- S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 “1. (1)Where in an action to which this rule applies a statement of claim has been served on a defendant and that defendant has entered an appearance in the action, the plaintiff may, on the ground that defendant has no defence to a claim included in the writ, or to a particular part of such a claim, or has no defence to such a claim or part thereof except as to the amount of any damages claimed, apply to the Court for judgment against that defendant.” [18] Dalam kes CEMPAKA FINANCE BHD V HO LAI YING (TRADING AS KH TRADING) & ANOR [2006] 2 MLJ 685 Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan bahawa:- “In an application under O14, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish the following conditions: that the defendant must have entered appearance; that the statement of claim must have been served on the defendant; that the affidavit in support must comply with r 2 of O14 in that it must verify the facts on which the claim is based and must state the deponent’s belief that there is no defence to the claim. Once those conditions are fulfilled, the burden then shifts to the defendant to raise triable issues.” [19] Dalam tindakan ini, Memorandum Kehadiran telah dimasukkan oleh pihak Defendan dan tiada pertikaian mengenai penyerahan Writ dan Pernyataan Tuntutan kepada Defendan. Defendan juga telah S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 memfailkan pembelaan dan dari apa yang Mahkamah lihat, pembelaan Defendan hanyalah meletakkan beban kepada pihak Plaintif untuk membuktikan tuntutan mereka. [20] Oleh demikian, melalui Notis Permohonan di lampiran 8, Mahkamah dapat lihat bahawa pihak Plaintif telah memenuhi Kaedah 2 Aturan 14 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dimana kesemua fakta mengenai tuntutan Plaintif telah diterangkan oleh pihak Plaintif melalui afidavit-afidavit yang telah difailkan di Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini beserta dengan eksibit-eksibit yang jelas menyokong tuntutan dan Notis Permohonan Plaintif. [21] Prinsip yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes NATIONAL COMPANY FOR FOREIGN TRADE V. KAYU RAYA SDN BHD [1984] 1 CLJ (REP) 283: "For the purpose of an application under O. 14 the preliminary requirements are: (i) the defendant must have entered an appearance; (ii) the statement of claim must have been served on the defendant; and (iii) the affidavit in support of the application must comply with the requirements of r. 2 of the O. 14 S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 (iv) If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these considerations, the summons may be dismissed. If however, these considerations are satisfied, the plaintiff will have established a prima facie case and he comes entitled to judgment. The burden then shifts to the defendant to satisfy the Court why the judgment should not be given against him [see O. 14, r. 3 and 4 (1) ]." [22] Mahkamah dalam kes CALTEX OIL MALAYSIA LTD V CLASSIC BEST SDN BHD & ORS [2006] 7 MLJ 13 telah membenarkan penghakiman terus terhadap defendan setelah mengambilkira tindakan Defendan yang tidak membantah atau mempertikaikan notis tuntutan yang diterima olehnya daripada Plaintif dimana telah menyatakan bahawa:- “The same goes for the letters of demand sent by the plaintiff. No protests or disputes were raised by the defendants.” [23] Dalam masa yang sama, Defendan-Defendan telah membuat sebahagian bayaran yang dituntut oleh Plaintif melalui dokumen- dokumen yang diserahkan. Defendan-Defendan mengakui perkara ini dalam pembelaan mereka dan tidak pernah mempertikaikan isu ini dalam mana-mana affidavit atau melalui eksibit. [24] Defendan-Defendan telah menerima semua dokumen yang didakwa tidak diserahkan oleh Plaintif. Plaintif telah menunjukkan dengan S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 jelas bahawa terdapat komunikasi atara pihak-pihak dan apa jua platform yang digunapakai, Defendan-Defendan telah secara nyata tidak pernah membangkitkan isu atau membuat bantahan. Bahkan ada pengakuan melalui sebahagian bayaran dan barang-barang dan/atau perkhidmatan yang dihantar serah adalah mengikut sepsifikasi dan permintaan Defendan-Defendan.oleh sebab itu, Defendan-Defendan tidak pernah membuat apa-apa aduan terhadap perkhidmatan dan/atau barangan yang dibekalkan. [25] Dakwaan Defendan-Defendan bahawa aduan tidak dapat dibuat kerana mereka tidak menerima dokumen-dokumen yang dinyatakan adalah satu dakwaan tidak berasas. Ini juga gagal dijawab oleh Defendan-Defendan yang mana Mahkamah aggap adalah satu pengakuan dan tidak memerlukan saksi untuk hadir dan memberi keterangan pada perkara yang telah jelas tidak lagi menjadi isu. [26] Walaupun Defendan-Defendan menggunakan penyataan dalam Pesanan Belian sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam affidavit jawapan, Plaintif telah menjelaskan bahawa ia hanya terkandung dalam pesanan belian terakhir dan tidak ada dalam mana-mana pesanan terdahulu. Pesanan-pesanan terdahulu telah diterima tanpa bantahan dan boleh dianggap sebagai satu akuan oleh Defendan- Defendan. S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [27] Berhubung isu faedah yang dikenakan, Plaintif telah dengan jelas merujuk kepada email bertarikh 8/1/2023 yang dieksibitkan sebagai “AA-5” berhubung perkara ini. Defendan-Defendan pula tidak pernah menafikan penerimaan mana-mana email yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif. [28] Mahkamah merujuk kepada Nota penghantaran yang mana jelas ada cop dan tandatangan syarikat Defendan-Defendan. Mahkamah beranggapan bahawa ia adalah satu pemikiran semula oleh Defendan-Defendan pada peringkat ini untuk membangkitkan perkara-perkara yang telah sedia ada dibuktikan oleh pihak Plaintif. [29] Dalam masa yang sama, Defendan Kedua tidak pernah menafikan bahkan mengakui tanggungjawab beliau sebagai penjamin melalui surat jaminan yang telah di tandatangani. [30] Mahkamah merujuk kes MEIDEN ELECTRIC ENGINEERING SDN BHD v MTRANS HOLDING [2006] 7 CLJ 519 “[10] Di dalam kes ini defendan tidak dapat menafikan mengenai janjinya dalam terma-terma Perjanjian Jaminan Koporat. Dalam kes Maplelee Property Sdn. Bhd. v. Tan Lee Fon [2005] 1 CLJ 599 Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa adalah menjadi tanggungjawab pengerenti untuk membayar hutang jika peminjam gagal membayar pinjaman.” S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [31] Prinsip undang-undang adalah jelas. Mahkamah rujuk kes ENG SAY KUANG v. HONG LEONG BANK BHD [2008] 10 CLJ 197 [3] The legal position is clear in that the only issue before the court in an application under O. 14 of the Rules of the High Court is whether there are triable issues meriting a full trial for its determination. Therefore, what needs to be proven by the defendant in an O. 14 application is to show that there is a triable issue or issues that ought to be heard in full. A single issue meriting trial is sufficient to deny the applicant a judgment under O. 14 (per Shaik Daud Ismail in South East Asia Insurance Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia [1998] 1 CLJ 1045. In short, to be entitled to defend one's case, he must be able to raise a triable or arguable issue that ought to be set down for trial. In Abdullah Rohani v. Punca Klasik Sdn Bhd [2004] 1 CLJ 773, Abdul Hamid Mohamad JCA said: We remind ourselves that this appeal arises from a summary judgment under O. 14 of the RHC 1980. It is trite law that in such an application the onus on the defendant (appellant) to be entitled to defend the action in a fall trial, is to satisfy the court that "there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried or that there ought for some other reason to be a trial..." O. 14 r. 3(1). Courts have described it as "arguable issue" or "triable issue". Thus in Voo Min S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 En & Ors v. Leong Chung Fatt [1982] 1 LNS 47 (SC) it was said that "... The issue raised must be an arguable issue." In Ng Hee Thong & Anor v. Public Bank Bhd [1995] 1 CLJ 609, the Court of Appeal asked the question "Is there a bona fide triable issue?. [32] Bilamana Defendan gagal mengemukakan satu pembelaan atau isu yang layak dibicarakan dan melalui dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif, tuntutan dapat dilihat dengan jelas, adalah wajar Plaintif diberikan haknya melalui satu penghakiman terus tanpa perbicaraan. Inilah tujuan undnag-undang ini digubal. [33] Dalam kes NG HEE THONG & ANOR V. PUBLIC BANK BHD. [1995] 1 CLJ 609; [1995] 1 MLJ 281, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (sebagaimana Yang Arif ketika itu) menyatakan: "In Malayan Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd v. Asia Hotel Sdn Bhd [1987] CLJ Rep 182; [1987] 2 MLJ 183 at p 185, Hashim Yeop A Sani SCJ explained the basis of the summary jurisdiction in clarity of language that is usually associated with that eminent judge: The underlying philosophy in the O. 14 provision is to prevent a plaintiff clearly entitled to the money from being delayed his judgment where there is no fairly arguable defence to the claim. The provision should only be applied to cases where there is no reasonable doubt that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment. Order 14 S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 is not intended to shut out a defendant. The jurisdiction should only be exercised in very clear cases." [34] Mahkamah percaya kes ini layak direkodkan satu penghakiman terus. Oleh demikian, Mahkamah membenarkan Notis Permohonan Plaintif bertarikh 18/7/2023 (Lampiran 8) dengan kos RM2,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif. Sekian untuk pertimbangan YAH. Disediakan oleh: ….Sazlina Safie…… Sazlina Bt Safie Hakim Sesyen, Mahkamah Sesyen 3 Sivil, Mahkamah Sesyen Petaling Jaya, Selangor. Tarikh :7/11/2023 S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 PEGUAMCARA PLAINTIF: CIK JEYSHINI NAIDU A/P G. KALI DAS [TETUAN JASBEER NUR & LEE] PEGUAMCARA DEFENDAN: CIK SITI ZUBAIDAH BINTI JEMADI [TETUAN GARY WONG & CO.] S/N S53Hu31cCUG9hMNKvw0x6Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	29,640	Tika 2.6.0
WA-24F-71-03/2023	PEMOHON Thraidevjeet Singh A/l Karamjit Singh RESPONDEN Bavani A/p Sivalingam	Family law - Maintenance - Spousal and Child maintenance - Whether Plaintiff husband obliged to pay amount demanded by Defendant wife - Whether Defendant wife had fulfilled 'means and needs' test - Whether amount offered by Plaintiff reasonable and fair - Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 sections 77, 78, 92, 93Family law - Custody - Access - Whether Plaintiff should have access to the Child - Whether access should remain supervised - Whether supervised access would be contrary to the interest of the welfare of the Child - Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 sections 88, 89	07/11/2023	YA Puan Evrol Mariette Peters	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6e891058-0347-40d8-9f9e-ef177de2c2b1&Inline=true	WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24F-71-03/2023 Dalam Perkara Seksyen-seksyen 77, 78, 88, 89 dan 93 Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang (Perkahwinan Dan Perceraian) 1976 BETWEEN RAI …PLAINTIFF AND AVA …DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 07/11/2023 09:07:49 WA-24F-71-03/2023 Kand. 24 S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 2 Introduction [1] This was the Plaintiff Husband’s application (“this Application”) for interim relief in relation to, inter alia, access of the child to the marriage, as well as the amount of child maintenance that he was obliged to pay to the Defendant Wife. [2] In view of the privacy of the parties and sensitivity of issues in these proceedings, the Plaintiff and Defendant have been anonymised in this judgment respectively as RAI and AVA. The factual background [3] The Plaintiff, 39, and the Defendant, 38 at the time of the hearing, were married in August 2015. Their union was graced with the birth of their daughter (“the Child”) in February 2021. Following their marriage, the Plaintiff and Defendant (collectively, “the Parties”), resided in several rented properties situated within the Klang Valley. [4] The marriage was marred by frequent disputes and physical altercations, leading to both parties filing police reports. They went through prolonged phases of attempting to reconcile and periods of living apart. However, since October 2022, the Plaintiff’s efforts to visit the Child, who had remained with the Defendant, had been thwarted, despite his persistent attempts personally and through his solicitors. [5] In March 2023, this Application was allowed partially, for the following reasons. S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 The issues [6] The issues that had to be addressed by this Court were as follows: (a) Concerning the Child, the primary question at hand was whether the Plaintiff should be granted access to the Child, and if so, what specific terms should govern such access. Additionally, there was a need to determine the appropriate amount of child maintenance the Plaintiff should be obligated to provide. (b) In terms of spousal maintenance, the central issue revolved around whether the Defendant had satisfied the assessment regarding her ‘means and needs’. Contentions, evaluation, and findings The Child Whether Plaintiff should have access to the Child [7] Given that the Child was merely two and half years old at the time of the hearing, the Plaintiff did not significantly challenge the issue of custody, care, and control. In any event, I took the view that the doctrine of tender years as outlined in section 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 (“Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act”), applied. The provision reads: Section 88 – Power for court to make order for custody … (3) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that it is for the good of a child below the age of seven years to be with his or her mother but in deciding S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 whether that presumption applies to the facts of any particular case, the court shall have regard to the undesirability of disturbing the life of a child by changes of custody. [Emphasis added] [8] It was also crucial to emphasise that despite the Parties’ separation, the Child had consistently resided with the Defendant. Consequently, it was undebatable that the Child remained reliant on the Defendant for her physical, emotional, and mental development. It was, therefore, not in the best interest of the Child’s welfare to remove her from her current environment. Numerous legal precedents, such as K Shanta Kumari v Vijayan [1985] 1 LNS 135, Gan Koo Kea v Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 1 LNS 440 and Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong [1977] 1 MLJ 234, have expounded on the principle that, especially when dealing with very young children, their well-being is best served by being in the care of their mother. [9] In Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong, the relationship between a young child and mother was explained by Raja Azlan Shah FCJ (as he then was) in the following passage: The youngest child, Bernard, is of tender years. In my opinion, his place right now is with the mother. "No thing, and no person," said Sir John Romilly MR, in the case of Austin v. Austin [1865] 35 Beav 259 263 "and no combination of them, can, in my opinion, with regard to a child of tender years, supply the place of a mother, and the welfare of the child is so intimately connected with its being under the care of the mother, that no extent of kindness on the part of any other person can supply that place.." This view has found judicial favour in many jurisdictions: in Australia, for example, in Kades v. Kades,(4) the High Court, in a joint judgment stated: "What is left is the strong presumption which is not one of law but is founded on experience and upon the nature of ordinary human relationships, that a young girl, should have the love, care and attention of the child's mother S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 and that her upbringing should be the responsibility of her mother, if it is not possible to have the responsibility of both parents living together." In Canada, Muloch CJ in Re Orr [1973] 2 DLR 77 commented that, "In the case of a father and mother living apart and each claiming the custody of a child, the general rule is that the mother, other things being equal, is entitled to the custody and care of a child during what is called the period of nurture, namely, until it attains about seven years of age, the time during which it needs the care of the mother more than that of the father... [Emphasis added.] [10] Consequently, the burden lay on the Plaintiff to rebut the presumption that favoured the Defendant, essentially by establishing the unsuitability of the Defendant as a mother. In the present case, no evidence was adduced to suggest that the Defendant had either neglected or abused the Child or displayed any other form of unfitness. Therefore, my ruling was to grant sole custody, care, and control of the Child to the Defendant. [11] Given the Defendant’s sole custody, care, and control of the Child, it was only fair and just that the Plaintiff be granted access. [12] At this juncture, it was essential to underscore the pivotal role fathers play in creating a nurturing environment for their children. This importance was significantly emphasised in the Singapore case of APE v. APF [2015] SGHC 17. In that case, Tan Siong Thye J referred to the enlightening article titled Contact and Domestic Violence - The Experts ' Court Report [2000] Fam Law 615, authored by Claire, Sturge, and Danya Glaser. This expert report illuminated the profound impact a father can have on his child’s life, highlighting their essential S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 6 role in promoting the child’s overall well-being and holistic development. [13] Indeed, it was crucial to acknowledge that both parents play indispensable roles in a child’s life, each providing unique, invaluable and irreplaceable contributions. I firmly believe that access to the child should be recognised as an inherent right belonging to the child, rather than solely the prerogative of the parents. Therefore, any effort to curtail the Plaintiff’s access to the Child would inherently amount to violation of the Child’s rights. [14] The legal precedent established in the case of Chow Sook Pheng v. Wong Maun Hoong [2011] 1 LNS 260 underscores the paramount importance of preserving the father-child bond. In that case, the court acknowledged that the child’s well-being and overall development are optimally served when the child maintains a meaningful connection with his father. Consequently, depriving a child of the opportunity to establish and nurture such a relationship can potentially result in adverse consequences for his emotional and psychological health. This perspective was eloquently expounded by Yeoh Wee Siam JC (as she then was), in the following passage: In my opinion, it is for the welfare and in the best interests of the children that they spend as much time as possible with not only their mother but also their father. Just because the parents' marriage has broken down, it does not mean that the 3 children should be alienated from either parent. I believe a child would develop better if he or she spends as much time as possible with both parents. What if, at the end of the case, the Respondent Husband is given custody of the 3 children? By then the damage would have been caused if, in the interim, the Respondent Husband was denied of access to S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 the 3 children resulting in their estrangement and discomfort with each other. This would not be for the welfare of the children. [Emphasis added.] [15] Furthermore, this Court has the authority to define precise terms and conditions within a custody order, as granted by the stipulations articulated in section 89 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 89 - Orders subject to conditions (1) An order for custody may be made subject to such conditions as the court may think fit to impose, and subject to such conditions, if any, as may from time to time apply, shall entitle the person given custody to decide all questions relating to the upbringing and education of the child. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), an order for custody may- (a) contain conditions as to the place where the child is to reside, as to the manner of his or her education, and as to the religion in which he or she is to be brought up; (b) provide for the child to be temporarily in the care and control of some person other than the person given custody; (c)provide for the child to visit a parent deprived of custody or any member of the family of a parent who is dead or has been deprived of custody at such times and for such periods as the court may consider reasonable; (d)give a parent deprived of custody or any member of the family of a parent who is dead or has been deprived of custody the right of access to the child at such times and with such frequency as the court may consider reasonable; or (e) prohibit the person given custody from taking the child out of Malaysia. [Emphasis added.] S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 [16] In the present case, the Defendant had put forth a series of allegations, contending that these claims warrant the Court’s consideration when determining the scope of the Plaintiff’s access to the Child. Specifically, the Defendant sought to limit the Plaintiff’s access to a two-hour window, from 10 am to 12 pm, occurring every third Saturday of the month, with the additional condition of supervision by the Defendant. [17] These allegations include assertions that the Plaintiff had made threats to abscond with the Child, exhibited rough behaviour towards the Child, displayed neglectful parenting, and engaged in objectionable habits such as vaping, substance abuse, and pornography addiction. The Defendant had also asserted that the Plaintiff has diabetes and hypoglycemia. Furthermore, the Defendant claimed to have secured an Interim Protection Order for herself and the Child due to allegations of domestic abuse by the Plaintiff. [18] After a thorough examination of the pertinent affidavits, I observed that a significant portion of these allegations were disputed and met with denial, while the remaining claims were reasonably clarified. As for the Defendant’s assertion regarding the Plaintiff’s diabetic and hypoglycemic conditions, it was noteworthy that the Defendant admitted in her own affidavit that these conditions had never posed an immediate threat to the Child, but that her concern was rooted in future possibilities. I found the Defendant’s argument unconvincing, as it would be unjust to restrict the Plaintiff’s access to the Child based on speculative fears. S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 [19] The Defendant cited the alleged physical abuse as a justification for restricting the Plaintiff’s access to supervised visitation. In my assessment, any physical abuse that may have occurred seemed to have been directed primarily toward the spouse, and it was noteworthy that the Plaintiff had likewise claimed physical abuse by the Defendant. It was evident that the interactions between the Plaintiff and Defendant tended to escalate tensions. Even if, hypothetically, the Plaintiff was responsible for mistreating the Defendant, this, in fact, should provide more grounds for access not to be supervised. [20] The Plaintiff vehemently contested all other allegations. It was imperative to emphasise, at this stage, that affidavit evidence, given its inherent conflicts, cannot serve as the sole basis for deciding the truth of the matters averred without the opportunity for cross- examination of the makers of the affidavits. To illustrate this principle, reference was made to the case of Diana Clarice Chan Chiing Hwa v Tiong Chiong Hoo [2002] 2 MLJ 97, in which the following was elucidated by Siti Norma Yaakob JCA (as she then was): Faced with such conflicting affidavit evidence, what the trial judge should have done was to sieve through such evidence, consider only those that are undisputed or uncontroverted and balance these with the consideration of what would work towards the betterment and interests of the four children. [Emphasis added.] S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 [21] The Plaintiff had also offered satisfactory explanations for some of the incidents cited by the Defendant. From my perspective, the Defendant’s references appeared to be isolated incidents taken out of context. Moreover, concerning the Interim Protection Order, the Defendant had failed to mention that, as of yet, no significant developments had arisen from such protection order. [22] In the final analysis, it was my view that the Defendant was intentionally obstructing the Plaintiff’s access to the Child, by presenting these various excuses. This was evident even from the outset of this hearing when the Plaintiff’s Counsel requested an adjournment due to the recent change in the Defendant’s solicitors. I denied such request as I took the view that although the Defendant had the right to change her legal representation at any time she pleased, it should not be at the expense of the Court or of the Plaintiff. This also suggested that the Defendant was deliberately seeking to delay the proceedings and, as a result, further impede the Plaintiff’s access to the Child. [23] At this point, it was vital to gain a clear understanding of the concept behind the phrase 'welfare of the child', a term frequently invoked in numerous cases, including Teh Eng Kim v. Yew Peng Siong, Mahabir Prasad v. Mahabir Prasad [1981] CLJ Rep 182; [1982] 1 MLJ 189, Tan Sherry v. Soo Sheng Fatt [2016] 1 LNS 1586, and Tan Erh Ling v. Ong Khong Wooi [2021] 1 LNS 1325. [24] I was also guided by the Federal Court in Sean O'Casey Patterson v Chan Hoong Poh & Ors [2011] 3 CLJ 722, which made reference to the Singapore case of Tan Siew Kee v. Chua Ah Boey [1987] 1 LNS S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 77. In the latter case, Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was), provided an explanation of the term ‘welfare of the child’ in the following excerpt: The expression 'welfare'... is to be taken in its widest sense. It means the general well-being of the child and all aspects of his upbringing, religious, moral as well as physical. His happiness, comfort and security also go to make up his well-being. A loving parent with a stable home is conducive to the attainment of such well-being. It is not to be measured in monetary terms. [Emphasis added.] [25] The Federal Court in Sean O'Casey Patterson v Chan Hoong Poh & Ors, through the opinion of James Foong FCJ, proceeded to explain ‘welfare of the child’ in the following passage: [53] According to Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn, reissue (Mackay edition), para 443 the term, "welfare principle" is a set of factors used when "a court determines any question with respect to the upbringing of a child or the administration of a child's property or the application of any income arising from it, the child's welfare must be the court's paramount consideration". In the English Children Act 1989, under the heading ‘welfare of the child’ is a set of factors that must be taken into account when deciding on such cases. These are for example: the wishes of the child; his feelings; his age; his sex and his background and the capabilities of the parties involved. Thus, this term "welfare principle" relates to certain factors to be considered and their priority during deliberation in such cases. [Emphasis added.] [26] To reach a well-informed decision, it was vital for this Court to contemplate the expansive scope of ‘welfare of the child’, considering all pertinent factors and meticulously assessing their relative importance. Given the distinct circumstances of each case, it was S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 12 impractical to furnish an exhaustive catalogue of specific considerations. [27] The Defendant had also raised concerns about the Child’s age, suggesting that unsupervised access by the Plaintiff might not be in the Child’s best interest, as the Child is too young. I thoroughly considered all of the Defendant’s arguments and agreed that initial access should indeed be supervised. [28] However, it was important to recognise that supervised access should not be a permanent arrangement, especially when the relationship between the Parties have become acrimonious. Moreover, it could hinder the Child’s ability to bond with the Plaintiff, as this bonding process may be inhibited when the Defendant is present. Thus, in light of the Defendant’s apprehensions about unsupervised overnight access and the Child’s limited familiarity with the Plaintiff, I opted for a phased access plan. This strategy was intended to facilitate a gradual and supported reconnection between the Child and the Plaintiff. [29] Consequently, the terms governing the Plaintiff’s access to the Child were as follows: a) Online/ virtual access to the Child by the Plaintiff for a duration of up to 30 minutes, anytime between 7 pm and 8 pm on Mondays. The Defendant is required to ensure this access without any interruption, interference, or attempts to frustrate it; b) Access, to be supervised exclusively by the Defendant, shall be granted solely to the Plaintiff on alternate Saturdays and Sundays S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 from 11 am to 3 pm, at a public location agreed upon by both Parties. This arrangement shall be in effect for a duration of six months, commencing on 6 September 2023, and concluding on 5 March 2024. c) With effect from 6 March 2024, and extending until 5 September 2024, the Plaintiff shall enjoy unsupervised access to the Child on alternate Saturdays and Sundays from 10 am to 7 pm. However, Father’s Day and Mother’s Day shall be allocated to the respective parent. d) With effect from 6 September 2024, the Plaintiff shall enjoy unsupervised access to the Child on alternate Saturdays from 10 am to Sundays 7 pm. Whether Plaintiff was obliged to maintain the Child [30] In terms of child maintenance, the Defendant requested a monthly sum of MYR4,000, whereas the Plaintiff argued that MYR1,500 was adequate. [31] It is trite law, pursuant to section 92 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act, that every parent has the duty to maintain his or her child, regardless of who has custody. The provision reads: Section 92 – Duty to maintain children Except where an agreement or order of court otherwise provides, it shall be the duty of a parent to maintain or contribute to the maintenance of his or her children, whether they are in his or her custody or the custody of any other person, either by providing them with such accommodation, clothing, S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 food and education as may be reasonable having regard to his or her means and station in life or by paying the cost thereof. [Emphasis added.] [32] Section 93 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act adopts an even more comprehensive approach by expressly outlining a man’s obligation to provide financial support for the welfare of his child. The provision states: Section 93 – Power for court to order maintenance for children (1) The court may at any time order a man to pay maintenance for the benefit of his child- (a) if he has refused or neglected reasonably to provide for the child; (b) if he has deserted his wife and the child is in her charge; (c) during the pendency of any matrimonial proceedings; or (d) when making or subsequent to the making of an order placing the child in the custody of any other person. … [Emphasis added.] [33] I had decided that the Plaintiff should be mandated to provide a monthly child maintenance of MYR2,000, and any health-related expenses shall be covered by the Plaintiff after being consulted and agreeing to such costs. In my view, this sum is adequate for a child of just two and a half years old. If the Defendant believes that this amount S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 is insufficient, then it is her responsibility to also share in the financial responsibilities of raising the Child. [34] The Defendant, on the other hand, contended that she was unable to work due to illness. However, I found no concrete evidence to support the claim that her health issues had hindered her from seeking employment. At the time of the hearing, the Defendant was 38 years old, physically capable, and fit for employment. Consequently, I could not endorse her assertion that she required a monthly child maintenance of MYR4,000. Spousal maintenance [35] Another pertinent matter for consideration was whether the Plaintiff was obligated to provide financial support to the Defendant who had sought a monthly spousal maintenance of MYR6,000. I decided that the Plaintiff should pay a monthly sum of MYR3,000, and this decision was based on the following rationale. [36] In determining the issue of maintenance, reference was made to section 77(1) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 77 – Power of court to order maintenance of spouse (1) The court may order a man to pay maintenance to his wife or former wife: (a) during the course of any matrimonial proceedings; (b) when granting or subsequent to the grant of a decree of divorce or judicial separation; S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 16 (c) if, after a decree declaring her presumed to be dead, she is found to be alive. [Emphasis added.] Whether Defendant had fulfilled her ‘means and needs’ test [37] In exercising its discretion to award maintenance to the Defendant, the Court is governed by the 'means and needs' test, outlined by section 78 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, which reads: Section 78 – Assessment of maintenance In determining the amount of any maintenance to be paid by a man to his wife or former wife or by a woman to her husband or former husband, the court shall base its assessment primarily on the means and needs of the parties, regardless of the proportion such maintenance bears to the income of the husband or wife as the case may be, but shall have regard to the degree of responsibility which the court apportions to each party for the breakdown of the marriage. [Emphasis added.] [38] To begin with, section 77(1) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act employs the term ‘may', indicating that the Court holds discretionary power in determining the merit of the Defendant’s claim for spousal maintenance. It was crucial to underscore that there is no automatic entitlement for a wife to receive spousal maintenance from her husband, particularly when she has the ability to generate her own income and support herself independently. The Court’s analysis relies on a comprehensive assessment of various factors, which collectively S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 17 contribute to the Court’s decision regarding the justification for maintenance from the Plaintiff. [39] In assessing whether spousal maintenance to the Defendant was warranted, I sought guidance from established legal precedents including Dr Shameni Pillai PB Rajedran v Dr S Arulselvam Sanggilly & Anor [2011] 6 CLJ 782, and V Sandrasagaran Veerapan Raman v. Dettarassar Velentine Souvina Marie [1999] 5 CLJ 474. These cases underscore the importance of considering several key factors, such as the following: (a) the income, earning capacity, property, or financial resources that each party presently possesses or is likely to possess in the foreseeable future; (b) the financial needs, obligations, and responsibilities that each party currently or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; (c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family prior to the breakdown of the marriage; (d) the age of each party and the duration of their marriage; (e) any existing health, physical, or mental disability of the parties; (f) the respective contributions made by each party to the welfare of the family; and (g) the duration of the marriage. S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 18 [40] The application of section 78 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act was seen in numerous cases including Sreedevi Naidu a/p T Sree Ramalu Naidu v Eelasegaran a/l T Nadarajah & Anor [2016] 3 MLJ 26 and Koay Cheng Eng v Linda Herawati Santoso [2008] 4 MLJ 863, where in the latter case, it was stated by Hashim Yusoff JCA, speaking for the Court of Appeal, in the following passages: What is needed to be decided now is the amount of maintenance to be awarded to the wife. It is an established principle that in deciding what amount of maintenance the husband should pay the wife, the court must take into consideration the means and needs of the parties. In assessing the means and needs of the parties the court has always had regard to the duration of the marriage, whether there were any children of the marriage, the age of the parties, whether the husband had financially supported the wife during the duration of their marriage, the parties earning capabilities and whether the divorce would have affected the husband's position financially. [26] We are of the view that with the standard and cost of living of the respondent, the sum awarded is justifiable. We are in agreement with the learned counsel for the respondent that the respondent is to be placed in a position to enjoy the same standard of living as she had during the existence of the marriage [Emphasis added.] [41] Reference was made also to the case of Ananda Dharmalingam v Chantella Honeybee Sargon [2006] 6 MLJ 179, where I drew guidance from the enlightening comments made by Faiza Thamby Chik J, in the following passage: Having dealt with the above facts, I will reiterate the two separate tests set out in the LRA (one for the wife and another for the children) that must be considered in considering maintenance for the wife and children herein. By virtue of s 78 of the LRA set out aforesaid, the only test that this court needs to adopt in deciding if (interim) maintenance should be awarded to the wife S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 19 in these proceedings is the means and needs of the parties. The wife in the application herein contends that she needs RM6,800 in maintenance. However, the wife has not satisfied or discharged her duty to evidence that she does indeed need this sum of money. Indeed, the breakdown put forward by the wife at para 8 of her affidavit affirmed on 21 June 2004 does not add up to the amount of RM6,800. Further, the matters detailed in the said breakdown have not been evidenced by any receipts or bills or any form of documentation or other evidence whatsoever. It is therefore my finding that the wife has not adequately and/or properly evidenced her needs and that the figure of RM6,800 claimed by the wife in the application herein is an excessive and unjustified amount. the husband in this case had been working in government service until recently. He left government practice at the end of last year. He only began working as a doctor in private practice from March 2004. In the circumstances, this is a husband who had only just started out in his career in private practice. [Emphasis added.] [42] Section 78 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act plays a pivotal role in guiding the Court’s decision-making process by necessitating an evaluation of the means and needs of both Parties. This provision ensures that the Court takes into consideration the financial circumstances and obligations of each individual involved. [43] While the Court should consider the conduct of the Parties pursuant to section 78 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act, at this stage, I took the view that delving into the causes of the breakdown of the marriage was not appropriate, given that this Application was based on affidavit evidence. With both Parties presenting conflicting versions, it was imperative to set aside their narratives of the breakdown for the time being. It is trite law that if one party makes allegations in his affidavit, and the opposing party credibly denies those allegations in his respective affidavit, the judge must disregard the disputed S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 20 allegations in the absence of oral evidence or cross-examination. This principle is supported by numerous cases such as Tay Bok Choon v. Tahansan Sdn Bhd [1987] CLJ Rep 24; [1987] MLRA 68; [1987] 1 MLJ 433; Gan Koo Kea v. Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 4 MLJ 770; [2003] 6 AMR 459; [2003] 4 CLJ 539, and Diana Clarice Chan Chiing Hwa v. Tiong Chiong Hoo [2002] 1 CLJ 721. [44] In this case, both the Plaintiff and Defendant had made several allegations against each other, all of which remained in dispute. Given the contested nature of these allegations, it was inappropriate for the Court to assign blame for the breakdown of the marriage at this stage. The determination of responsibility for the breakdown is best suited for the proper hearing of the divorce petition. Therefore, in these interim applications, only the ‘means and needs test’ was considered. [45] Since I took the view that the Defendant was 38 years old at the time of the hearing, physically capable, and fit for employment, the Plaintiff’s obligation to pay a monthly spousal maintenance of MYR3,000, was reasonable and fair. Conclusion [46] In the upshot, based on the aforesaid reasons, and after careful scrutiny of all the evidence before this Court, including written and oral submissions of both Parties, the Application was allowed partially, in that the Plaintiff was ordered to pay spousal maintenance in the monthly amount of MYR3,000, child maintenance in the monthly sum of MYR2,000, with all other health- S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 21 related expenses agreed to by the Plaintiff to be borne by him, and child access as stipulated in paragraph [26] above. Dated: 7 November 2023 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Plaintiff – Jasvinder Singh; Messrs Asyraf, Vivek & Wee For the Defendant – Emilia Van Buerle and Crystal Yeoh Xian Jing; Messrs Peter Ling & Co Cases referred to: ➢ APE v. APF [2015] SGHC 17 ➢ Ananda Dharmalingam v Chantella Honeybee Sargon [2006] 6 MLJ 179 ➢ Chow Sook Pheng v. Wong Maun Hoong [2011] 1 LNS 260 ➢ Diana Clarice Chan Chiing Hwa v. Tiong Chiong Hoo [2002] 1 CLJ 721, [2002] 2 MLJ 97, [2002] 2 AMR 1527 S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-71-03/2023 7 November 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 22 ➢ Dr Shameni Pillai PB Rajedran v Dr S Arulselvam Sanggilly & Anor [2011] 6 CLJ 782 ➢ Gan Koo Kea v. Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 1 LNS 440 ➢ K Shanta Kumari v Vijayan [1985] 1 LNS 135 ➢ Koay Cheng Eng v Linda Herawati Santoso [2008] 4 MLJ 863 ➢ Mahabir Prasad v. Mahabir Prasad [1981] CLJ Rep 182; [1982] 1 MLJ 189 ➢ Sean O'Casey Patterson v. Chan Hoong Poh & Ors [2011] 3 CLJ 722 ➢ Sreedevi Naidu a/p T Sree Ramalu Naidu v Eelasegaran a/l T Nadarajah & Anor [2016] 3 MLJ 26 ➢ Tan Erh Ling v. Ong Khong Wooi [2021] 1 LNS 1325 ➢ Tan Sherry v. Soo Sheng Fatt [2016] 1 LNS 1586 ➢ Tan Siew Kee v. Chua Ah Boey [1987] 1 LNS 77 ➢ Tay Bok Choon v. Tahansan Sdn Bhd [1987] CLJ Rep 24; [1987] MLRA 68; [1987] 1 MLJ 433 ➢ Teh Eng Kim v. Yew Peng Siong [1977] 1 LNS 138; [1977] 1 MLJ 234 ➢ V Sandrasagaran Veerapan Raman v. Dettarassar Velentine Souvina Marie [1999] 5 CLJ 474 Legislation referred to: ➢ Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 – sections 77, 78, 88, 89, 92, 93 Other sources referred to ➢ Contact and Domestic Violence - The Experts ' Court Report [2000] Fam Law 615 by Claire, Sturge, and Danya Glaser. S/N WBCJbkcD2ECfnu8XfeLCsQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	39,187	Tika 2.6.0
BA-41S(A)-4-03/2023	PERAYU NUR HAKMAL BIN SIKRI RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman - s.15(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 – sama ada majistret yang bijaksana telah tersalah arah apabila memutuskan pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan setiap elemen pertuduhan di bawah Seksyen 15 (1)(a) ADB 1952 maka anggapan di bawah Seksyen 37 (k) ADB 1952 adalah terpakai - sama ada perayu berjaya mematahkan anggapan di bawah s.37(k) ADB 1952 di tahap imbangan kebarangkalian - kesan dan akibat kegagalan pihak Responden (pendakwaan) untuk memeriksa balas, menafikan dan/atau mencabar keterangan-keterangan saksi-saksi pembelaan berkaitan bahagian-bahagian penting kes (“crucial part of the case”)	07/11/2023	YA Dr Wendy Ooi Su Ghee	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=c9e37cff-7304-4d93-b058-30bfa91a820d&Inline=true	07/11/2023 10:17:36 BA-41S(A)-4-03/2023 Kand. 35 S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /3zjyQRzk02wWDC/qRqCDQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-41S(A)-4-03/2023 Kand. 35 mu/znzz mu : DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI PIALAVA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI ssuweon DARUL EHSAN PERBICARAAN JENAYAN No BA-41S 513-azlznza ANYARA PENDAKWA RAYA LAWAN nun HAKMAL am SIKRI mo KAD PENGENALAN nrmasvssy ALASAN FEN§ﬂA}ﬂMAﬂ paucsunuu m \m adalah vayuzn danpad: Pevayu Ierhadap sabrlan dan hukuman yang \|alah dualuhkan oleh mzpsuec yang buaksnn: ke alas Perzyu padz us 03 ms wanu hukuman peniala selama mm was (12; hulan peniara dzn 2 (shun pengawasan an bawa» Aqensx Anti Dadah Kebangsaan selspas tzmal memalanl hukuman pememalian m Purayu man dndakwa dw mahkzmnn ﬂengan pemmuhan a. hawah nsmm AH: Dadlh Earbahayz (ADE) 1952 yang dlnyalskan sepem benkul - 'éluhawa kamu ma 19 um mm mm kunsng uuspagg Donampalm ;=e,.m ~.mm~ mu ».;m: ms Duran Gomnam mam dasran Gombuk, -1./am Naval! Scmwurnnru/Elvsm amp-1: knmu m-mo-nkan mun. -1m sendm dadah berbahsya my fem: Ampwatnmma dun Msthamphelamme he ualam bsdan kamu seman, catch an kamu Man melukukun sum kcsalahalv ay bawan seksyen 15m(a/ Akla Dadslv . S/N132 RJNJTMNDC/QR Q “Nut: W Emmy: mm mm mm». dmukum m Dawnh nluyun «am AAII yum ms - [3] Pada as as 2023 Pevayu (elah dnsabn dengan kesalahan ax bawah L1:-(«lint A135 1952 dan di;a\|uhkan hukuman oleh majishet yang hljaksanz selepas pemauan penuh [41 Baqi kemudahan ruwkan Gan pemanaman, sl5(I)(a) ADE 1952 mamnerunmkksn sepeni belikul — -15 Pemocnmkapadldlmnnam (41 Mum-manlamngyang 4.; mznggums, mzvnlzmkan ksuma mmvya man may msﬂylku m-mum mm §mm.ng.n d-ngnn sdksydn 14 n-nqnn mlmbankln hnundarvyl mm. man: dadah bemanayi my mlelipkan ar Eahaylan m .1... 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Ienurmah kevadz venerimzan keberlarzn kﬂeranganrkelevangan Ievsebm hahaglan panlmg ﬂnlam kamangan saksl [35] Justem ﬂu‘ adalah aapavan davalan mahkamah im hahawa max ada kepenuan unluk Jen aupanggu nagv menaesankan pemualannya nu Maka, ha hicala Iek-ah cemunav apama memuluskan Kelerangan snz mengenal lakta W adalah rekaan semaza-mam pembelam dan Is lldak neman bevlaku memandzngkan Jen mu (ampﬂ mengesahkannya [as] Juga, mamandzngkan max ada keperman unluk pembelaan mem-ngsu Jen sehagau saksl pembalaan. man kegigalin pembelnan memanggH ml mu akan memhangkllkan Vnletens menenlung a. human .114 muzﬂan 1;.) Aids: Ketzrangan 1950 (AK 1950) men nu. muhkamah m. hersehuu dengan pmak Pevayu u S/N!aZlY\'JR1l<.4l2MNDCiqRQCDO “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my .. mmm -mm; ﬂwulnlnl n. IVMNG Wm! nanawa haklm Imam Ie\ah lerkrmal apabnz rnanggunapikai arlggzpin di bzwah 5 114 mualan my AK 1950 lerhadap pambellln ax alas keﬁiaalan memanim! M sebiaan saksl pemnexaan [371 Selaniumya, adzlah dapalan mahkamah W bahawa snz seding menjalznl hukumin pememamn .1. Peruam Kajang semasa hehau hadir di mzhkamah sehagaw saksu pembe\aan Tempah nukuman pememaraannya new akan berlalan aan lodak akan dlpendekkan hlarplm behzu memberi ketevangan yang mammak Kepada Pevayu Oleh nu, adalahdapaum mahkamah nu bihawa Udak ada keperluan snz unluk bemual demlluan [sax Dan non kawarangan‘ lelas memmjukksn snz membenkan mevangan lenlang apa yang bellau nampak dan lahu sahap Ianu m bailau narnpak naman lalaklnyi Jen membubuh me an scsvncy ke dilnm jag mmumm (enebul Ianpn pengelnhuan Pemyu dan on Fevnyu my. mbemzhu lanhngnya smepas hellau memmum mmurnan (eviebul my Kegagalan plhak Responder:/pendnkwann un\|uk menaﬁkan dan/alau mencabal sm Ienlang bahaniambahagwzn penling kes. telah Ieviumlah kepada nenenmaan kelevangan snz hahawa Perayu telah memmum din 1:9 mmuman Iarsebul «anpa penqalahuan ya menaanaunm rm Gan ecsrasy. my Bsrdzsarkan alasanalasan yang dlnyalakan .1. alas, adaiah dapalan mahkamih Im hahawa Fetayu «em neqaya Iuematahkan anggapan m hawzh s 370:) ADE 1952 m tahap imbangan kehavangkahzn Dzlam Dada nu, namm mam Aelah xzrkmlaf apawa n S/N!aZlY\'JR1l<.4l2MNDCiqRQCDO “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad a my .. mmm -mm; ﬂuulnunl n. IVMNG Wm! memuluskan pmak Responder: \|elah Denaya mamnukmkan kes mehmpauw keraguan munasabah (erhadap Pevayu an hawah 515(1) (a) Akta yang sama my Juslelu nu‘ manuamah Im membenarkan rayuan Pevayu Sahllan Perayu dmavakan, lmkuman dIke\|ep\kan uan Perayu dubehasksn ﬂan auenaskan uanpaaa peﬂuduhan an bawah s 15{1)(ay ADE 1952 Berlankll pada 2n Navember2023 (VA. DR. wsunv I su GHEE) Fesurumaya ehaklman Mahkamah Tmgm Shah Alam uenayan 5; Pmak-Pmak Pendakwaan Puan Mary Phoan Keal Mae, nmnavan Pendakwa Raya danpada Kama! Penasmzl Undang—Um1ang Negev! Selangcr Feguambela Dam‘ Haviharan Tara Singh dan Au mum Hocng aaupaaa TS.Hanharan 3. Partners am razM1R21<aNNDCI-zﬁucuo “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad a my .. am.“-V -mm; ﬂuulnunl n. IVMNG Wm! S/N!3ZlYUR1l<I)?oINDCiqRuCDO “Nun: sm.‘ ,..u..mu .. mad w my ». mmm -mm; ﬂuumlnl n. IHLING Wm! 52 5.3 lugasan ‘Ops Blue Dew!’ Kenna disyaki Ier\|iba\| dalzm penyzwangunaan daﬂah. Una" Ielsehm lelah dua\ankan nleh ASP Mchd Soﬁa" bin Kasudin (SP2) bersama aengan Knl Mohd Syaﬁzal bin RAdzuan(SP1jdan DlKpl mam Azahan dan Eahaman snsarxn Jenaysh Narkcnk urn Gumhak. Sebelum pemeliksazn an kencing mjalankan‘ Perayu man dlmaklumkan (emzng Ialacara pengamhﬂan air kennlng m hzuzn Permian Telap Kelua Polls Negara rm Kemuman Petayu \|eIzh mengambwl saw 117 bungkusan plasllk bevseal yang bum um 11; balul Imn Numbov Sm sNAnn251ao(“maI unn menu:-; (Eksmbu vac) selamuunya, svz belsama—sama DlKpI M6473 Ielah menglringl Perayu unmk manuapaman sampel an kencmg .1. Karma: an Pqahzl Narknnk IPD Gombak Namun, Perayu hanya dapal kencmg sednkk sahaga ke dalam mm mm (ersehul Fevayn kevnudlannya xe\ah marahkan menulup hzllk botnl unn \|ersehu\|ﬂan mengnkul SP2 halik ke Iuang regar Fegahat Nirkohk mu Gomlzak u. Sana‘ Perayu mhzﬂknn av: Coway umuk dimmum Sepamanu man mm mm lursebm dupagang oreh Palayu. Selepas 15 mlrm, 5P2 hevsama-same DlKp\| «em ukali Vagl mengwmgv Pavayu ke dalzm «mas din Pnrayu beriiya marluii aw kencmg ke dalam halal unn msebux aehmﬁua cukup cam izbelum dnarahkan menulup semula bowl unn lersebul Pevayu kemudlan dlavahkan membawa am an kencmg lersebul ke meja penguﬂ GI many legar maoan Nammk ; 5/N razmkmzwwnciqﬁqcuo “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my a. WWW -mm: ﬂwulnlnl n. mum wrm 54 55 55 57 IFD Gombak Du ma‘ sn (alah menpalankan upan temaﬂlp simvm an kenclng dengzn menggunakan s ‘ems lest smp yang dioelup secava sarenlak xe denim samDE\ air mu‘-In dﬂam bmcl unn msebul an haaapan Pevayu Hasu wan amapaci lest smp Arnnlvetamms dan Memmuhetamme adalah pwm Selanjmnyn SP2 lelan mammemkan halal um \|evsebul dnngnn seal mm ﬂan can pols: sen: manqmkln mildumil Favlyu sabelum kedul-dua Perayu din SP2 manandalsngam (11 ill: halal unn (arssbul Perayu ﬂan mm mm hxsehut \|eIah dlserahkan kepada pegawal penyiasa\| lnspek1ovMohd Syazwan hm Mamm (spa) besena Boning semn Tenma Enlang Kes (F5) Dada 19 n2 2020 @ n 45 pagl mas 2a 02 2020, spa telah menghamar bowl an Kenning (ersebul Ke pegawau salns kwma hayal, sunau bmu Adenan (SP4) a. Jahatan F-magi Hospital Kuala Lumpuvunmk dlanallsws Hasllanalxsws apalvssmpelalr kerlclng Pevayu mengandungn man ;emsAmphelam1ne dan Merampﬂelarnme mm dadah yang tersenaval an dalim mum Panama Bahaglan 3 ADE 1952 Puhak Perayu lelah memvenwlmkan bahawa up hada Iangkipin dnhum Iemadapnyn sebelum ujlan nnngan man an kanmrlg dllakukan kn alas hahw. my mun pen. mengwkul pmsedur. an air kencmg Iidak dualankan 5/N razwkzsamrwnciqﬁqcuo “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my .. mmm -mm: ﬂwulnlnl n. IVMNG wrm (my keraguan paua memm barang lvls ﬂan puhtsnyz rantman ketelangan berkanan pengenﬂillavl bamng keslevsebul. dan my Feguw FenyxaIal1SP3)gagaIuntuk mamalankun slasamn seczra sempums AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN [6] D. akhu kes pendakwaan, maustlel yang bnyaksana berpuashan ballawa pinzk penaakwaan (elah henaya membukuxan senap elemen penuduhan dw bawah Seksyen 15 (may ADE 1952 maka anggapan m bawah Seksyen 37 no ADE «ssz adalah \|erpakaI Invhzdap Perayu Dalam pads nu‘ maﬂsltm yang bxjakuma mendapau Responder: \|elah hanaya memuuxnxan kes puma lama xurhndap Perayu den Fevlyu dipanggl Imtuk membela dm KES PEIIIBELAAN m Perayu Celah memmn unmk memben kmevangan secala bevsumpan ﬂan memanggll secrang lag! sebagal saksx pembelaan um Denlen Tan 51 E21 ¢sn2) la; Secava mvgkas. pembelaan Perayu ada\ah pads 19 02.2020 @ mo pagi Pelayu Ae\ah pelgl e sebuah kelab di Jalan Puﬂu m seas pelamaan kawannya bemama Jeﬂ dan Ieman wznnanw aI\|u snz D1 sana‘ Perayu lelah dlmdangkan dengan ;ag mnmman [us mangga (mmuman Iersebmj yang mpesan «enemn dahnlu o\eh Jail. Perayu Ielah memlnum nan jag mmuman leisebm Se(e\an Perayu rmnunn ham snz memberilahu Pevayu hanawa sehenzmya Jeff \|elah membubuh we den scslasy ke dalam ;ag mxnuman \|ersebm sebelum 5 5/Nraz Rmmrwnciqi one “Nun: ‘¥‘;.n...n.Mn.,.JimMn....m.ny.,nnm..“.n.n..nune Wm! kexubnn Pnvayu .1. kelah msenm Femyu betas: man?! my mus helhenll mmum dun yag rmrluman \|erubu\| Pad: mm mm kuvlng 2.30 pm Perlyu \|alIh barvdnv um Kaleb telsebm ﬂan samhung bnkavja a1 urn Gombik Axum KE5 PEMBELAAN [51 Du akmr kes pemhmaan‘ majlslrel yang bqaksana \|e!ah memuluskan Pevayu gagal memavahkan Inggapnn a. bawah s cmk) ADE I952 dv unap Imblngln kebarnngkallm Dalam pada Ilu. pmak Rupmdan man bunny: mamhukukan kas melirrlpim kevisluan rmmasahah cemmp Pevayu dv blwah - 15 (1; (n; An: yang mm: Pmayu le\ah dilablkin dangan kenlahan din ananunkan hukum [In] Termlan dengan kepumsan mausnet yang buaksana, Perayu lelah mem1aHkzn Nalrs Rayuan Dad: 10 03.2023 suvum [111 Elarpun Pavayu \|e\ah mamvaukan Felisyen Rlyuan bmankh oz 05 202: yang rvwnyalakan dun puluh um (21) nlasnn, namun, me miss pandengaran rayuan Inn, pmak Pevayu hanya rnembanglulkan dun :2; wsu ulamz dz dalam rayuannya » up pencemaran mum aw xenmng Perayn dan (u; Pevayu nem- meminum mmuman iui mama (‘mmuman Kersebufy yang new. dnbubuh roe dam scslssy lanpa pengexanuan beliau [121 Se\an]umya‘ paaa han pzndzngaran Iayuan ml wga, pmak Perayu \|eIah menank ballk tsu panama ﬂan nanya benumpu kepada xsu keoua sahma 5/N razmbuuzwﬂnciqﬁqcuo “Nun: sum ...n..mu .. mod w my .. wwmlhly mm: ﬂuuunlnl y.. muye mm my Oleh yang demlkizn, dapalan ﬂan kepulunsn mahkamah dalim rayuan Im adahh bevkanan denqan isu keduz sahaja la\\|\|A Ferayu lelah memlnum mmumin (srseom yang man dvbubuh ice dan ecslasyianpa pengehanuan nenau. nnwxun MANKAMAH my S:\|e\ah menehl alasan pmgnamman, note kelevangan sena \|=enghu;ahan keduadua plhak Pelayu dan Responden sena bevgznﬂmg nengan ma Asu penoemavanconmh anrkenclng Pevayu. adalah uapanan mahkamah Am bahzwa kepulusan hakwm mar- aauxan new spatula memmuskan Responden \|elah beqaya membukllknn kes puma vaaa den m:mzmggH Peruyn mambala Gm [151 Tlmblhan pma‘ pembelazn Pelayu hanya berlumpu kepaﬂa kelelangin hnhma bellau (ehh memmum ﬂan jig mmumantelsebm (anpa mengetahm mlnuman (ersebut Mal: mbubuh res dan acsllsy [151 Memandaugkan kes pnma facfe telah dibuktikan aleh Respunden. Deban adalah xenemax :11 new hahu Perayu unluk mematahkan anggzpan m hawah s37(k7 ADE 1952 an tahav rmbangan kebarangkahan demi mempevalem pembehasan dan pelepasan dan pertuduhan «emaaapnya. [17] Sehagzw pembelaan, isu kedua Ielah mnangxnxan Iaﬂu Periyu zeran memmum mmumzn lersehul yang telah dihubuh rue dan ecszasyunpa pengezanuan beHau. Parayu Ielah memanggn omen Tan Si Bex senagm suz manakaxa Perayu sendm lelah member: kamangan sebzgaw sm 5/Nraz Rzmmwvnciqi one “Nut: '33.‘ nlnblrwmbuu‘LdIx:vvlVyIn1unvmIhIyM1ms a.,..n.m..mNe Wm! nu] Dmam pad: wm, permalnrmya adalah adakah kelerzngan sm dan sm dapal memalahkzn anggapan m bawall s am; ADB 1952 m Iahav mmanuan kabararlslkiharﬂ m1 Du vayuan x '. Demheiaan adalah — 1:) Jag minuman Ievsehul Ielah mpesan uleh Ieman \e\ak\ dalam bahaglarvbahaqwan penﬁnn kas snz yang bemama Jeff sebslum Perayu sampal dz kelah hevsebm. we dan ecszasyiamu dadah berbahay: lelah aumasuxxan Ke damn Jan mlnuman lersebul oleh Jeﬂ Yanpz pengetanuan Perayu, (II) (ni) Jag mmumzn lelsebul welsh dlbenkan mans Pevayu: dan my Perayu lelzh mervwwm mmuman lersehul yang mmanakan daﬂ nag minuman lersebul 1'bIlug\|In—hnhngl\|n plnllng kn mum-y my Ketavangamkelevingln lavlabul Ielih amenkan meh suz Mu amen Tan s. Bex nlaku Ieman wanna Jew a. penngka\| kes we-ubexaan [211 Biavpun Jeff tidak diganggn memben kelerangan dw mahkamah sernasa perbvlaan‘ namun soz man ﬂlpanggll sebagaw saksw psmbelaan Marah SD2 lelih member! ketevangan mam bellau senmunampauen memhubuh dadzh ‘ems we dan scstacy Ke damn ;ag minuman Iersebul lanpa Dengekahnan Perayu. SD2 \|elah bettanya kenaaa Jeff Muan bellau bemual aenuman Alaszn yang dlbeukan aleh Jell adalah supaya Perayu baleh '9/'yoy“dan ‘happy S/N!aZlY\'JR1l<.4l2MNDCiqRQCDO “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my .. mmm -mm; ﬂwulnlnl n. IVMNG Wm! no/2W" sum Juan Isa mmuman lerisbul pma dvnzsan leriebih dahulu nleh Jen dan bukarmya oleh Perayu [221 Rujukm adalah dibuat kepzda mukasural 152 Reknd Rayuan 2(a) semasa vemenisaan utima SD2 Dsnfen Tan sr Bel. u suave: kumz mm mmumm -pa rum mm mm mn A sm bayfvnnd m llruk nu/us mm-go nu m um acusy -in/um Mu malwo/us 0 mm Inn A Mam mm»: a la my mncam mm #5 mm 1.. kn alauuun Ann A Eukan m am, an m. hlsw dmn a suumuvw semasa kamu nampak boymend mm. cammn mmumuv muvgwus lusebm mg” -ndm mm’. aaxkahkamu nnuwzatulrvimpalﬁ A saw nzmp-ax o m: we mm." kumm kumu m-am A son Amy: mm m mm mscnm nr mam: clmvur mm mu dalam, ma kale unnm man ken kawarv says nu dalanv enjoy my n.,.,,,.;.aa;=v mu 0 Semasa nuymem kamu bum camwr, campmsn mm Ascsebul dnllm mngom mmm Innu ». mm A rank:-Im ms} nu. keleranaan saw an. snz, samemarmnya mdlvidu bemama Jeﬂ adulah seounu mu sewn mm In: Idalah kerana memmll pmzk pembelaan. Jeﬂ zﬂalah orang yaw membubuh we 5/N /azrmkzmzulwnciqﬁqcna “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mu .. mad w my a. mm; mm. ﬂnulnunl n. -Hum; wrm um acsrasy we swam .ag mmumnn Perayu vanpa pengecanuan Peuyu mu Saczvi amny ‘ Dihak naswndan/p-naaxwm Ida mennabarl mumperﬂkiukan kuleringan-keienngnn sm Gan sm semis: pemenksaan balas Namurl‘ uihak Rnvenden/vendakwaan wax mencabar I mampemkaxkin mavan «max menaman keszhman hahaglan-bahaglan pemmg kes lersebm sebagalmani yang dIIIya\|akan di alas [251 Sepanjang pemeviksaan bales sm dan suz, pmax Responder:/pendakwaan max peman menaﬁkan nemang kewumdan mumau yang bemama Jefflm Fmak Respnndenlpendakwazn juga max pemah memzdangkan hahawa Jew mm: rekasn semina- mala [25] Sebagai bandmgin. pnux Responden/pendakwaan telah mencldangksn bnhawa cams pembelaan Iznlnng Knperzl Jal darn Snuan Helm! mengmsap mkok peusamauma Pevayu dw vanau aaaxar. vakzan Iemalrmili[5i\|I\Iha\|mukIIura\|195 Rskod Rnyum Jmuzqau [211 Jun: separuana nemenksaan halas soz‘ Dmak Resvunden I pendzkwaan tmak pemah menaﬁkan dan/aizu mencabarkelerangan so: hahawa — m Jag nwwman letsebul dvpesan oleh Jefl: no me man ecslasylekah dimasukkan oleh Jeff ke dalam pg mmumzn Fcrayu in S/NV3z‘yGR1lul?0IWDCIqRqDDO “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mod w my .. wrwmlhly mm: ﬂuulnlnl n. JMNG mm	2,132	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-A72NCvC-4174-06/2023	PLAINTIF TETUAN RANIZAN ABDULLAH & ASSOCIATES DEFENDAN MOHD ZULHAFIZI BIN ABDUL KADIR	Order 14 Application allowed. Notice of appeal filed on the basis that the filing of the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim is premature following the provisions of Section 126 Legal Profession Act 1976 and the deponent does not have personal knowledge of the Affidavit in Support of the Order 14 Application. Protection for solicitors under Section 124 Legal Profession Act 1976.	07/11/2023	Puan Sangitaa a/p Subramaniam	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a4ecd163-240d-4430-8ae6-1b7d75ae81f3&Inline=true	07/11/2023 11:03:47 WA-A72NCvC-4174-06/2023 Kand. 23 S/N Y9HspA0kMESK5ht9da6B8w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Y9HspA0kMESK5ht9da6B8w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Y9HspA0kMESK5ht9da6B8w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Y9HspA0kMESK5ht9da6B8w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Y9HspA0kMESK5ht9da6B8w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Y9HspA0kMESK5ht9da6B8w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Y9HspA0kMESK5ht9da6B8w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Y9HspA0kMESK5ht9da6B8w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Y9HspA0kMESK5ht9da6B8w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Y9HspA0kMESK5ht9da6B8w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Y9HspA0kMESK5ht9da6B8w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Y9HspA0kMESK5ht9da6B8w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Y9HspA0kMESK5ht9da6B8w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal HA»A72m:vc—u7a—u5/2023 Kand. 23 mm/znu 11:03-:17 m mi umarnn: counr AI‘ «um LIJIIPHI :24 ms rsosm rsuuumnv, muvsu snwssu msssxs nuuzua Asnuum mu ASSOCIATES [Sling .. . rm; . Pumrlrr Ann mum zuuurlzl am new; um: .. nsrsnnlwr §m\|Lun.s_Qr_.uu&uEuI uoam on m Tm: u the daemon av me cowl m aﬂmmng Inn P\ammVs apoﬂcanen var summary yudgmoul pursulnl In cm 14 am. 1 3! m: was ac Calm 2012 Thu Cxzun .um.« we awht.-tum mm mm of Rm man no Yhe reasoning behmd this Can!!! dmnun .s dolwbaamton um um mnxmw Qummmm {2} Bxlcally‘ me namws dam .5 nu ma mramng sum M mmuo qouxsxanam Sum! rm Vega! suvkzs renueren to me Defmﬂzm lm purwmg ‘.9: men igmns\| an Vmuunna mmny my damages vdalaa \|n . mad autvdc-ul mvuwmg m. n.«u.san: (sorvlcn) sm vwsnnmmzsxswnauaew «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! [31 Aoconimg ta me munnn, ma S-ervuxs nave been grown lo (M nu-new nwluml m . Wurunl w an and 1 nu ma uulyukrsowmdgm ms nlgr-n mm. wemm Tm Sum:-I nmvudsd wvl mmmunlulod u (M new-n ..1 cm Mal anon um hry m. maminm bench mm Del-vrdim haw been pvleanlsd m the ‘mam m sunpan of us» Fummr: cm: «A Aaptmalﬁm :41 Ahnet uamuamng out me oummm Sum nanrmod herewuh No hem Owl 1 Pmfeumvw Fee 10? on RM5,wono Is/01/znmnuzsoooo) ‘ 2 Yvlnlporuﬂun and cum amsnooo mausemm. ‘ 3 vnmmun Fax Ydepmn: mzsauo Etc . Mmm:..,... mam ‘ ‘ i Yum mayo an ssv ass ‘ mm 4» Your Ohilvs nmmmg ssv muss u) f} 5 ‘msgam Rmum a Wnldsc-mum: Rmnann ; \|'Vv~A7:Iu—1IM:rzn1:) 7 Medn>i\RIpoII\|HUKM)2x Rmonou sm vwsnmnmzsxswnanaew % “Nan: sm-1 ...m.mm .. U... w my .. mmuny mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum Wm! [35] The com puusal av me Deﬂsnuanfs Aﬁnnvm m Rwy m ngpolng ma npnmon m Endcnme Ecnly mvulad m. :..mg. I) ‘Say: mevujuk xepnqn nlvmggzl 15 mm: 22 mm Sekangan V-r-but an man -myuuun mm Mmhh ml Iaonhm .1... hr1lu\lv-wldln Imamrnyu anal-umn’ mma nu ocac ammmuvsm; am: an rnowx waxznne sun sun 1202:: 1 LNS134,ItvI Cum mop-u Me n Voﬂwa. mu) m umui Vmpurunu .4 pm... mu m. cm u. 5. mm by In «W mmun ohm plndmgl Mme maul. hm I7-In llnnhlnuﬂ many: mm kw mm mums! rnnnmnuilvssnls at am awwmly We used my Mar tau reievanl usages Wm my Mu remmay mm deusmns mm. ape: Conn on um. mm mm». IM Faaem Own ﬂeasmn m am am -11 em zuswzzmms a. oousmucnous sou sun V vs» ens: sine a sons sou sun 1. mm: \|1m5} Icu 5:7‘ mama Mlllruum cus.a.nss.v.»..xm.x. cm mum mm Ima- 1421 mm m .. mu. 1-wmuuna pllmml w. bound hy M: own gmmmga. (SM a Run: Clnndmn ». !nﬂuI1nIVOwrIwt Mn"... I ma (19911 1 cu mm [mm 1 MLJ us. Amalaw Ammal I my . Abdul Kzveevn [ma] 1 mswssayc M\|J22:Gm\sI¢mCarp(M)SdnEm&hmrv mow Vnsurancuh Sun and [1951] < cu :23‘ [men cum») m2. neon 1 MLJ 3422 sc Jm cm Kn V Lain Sena VeK[I987]1 cm :94, \|<eoncu1Ran)uc2,KEP Mm.m.a Mnv xzp »m.m hma 11 sea} I ms 4w[1vs1]2MLJ to re) Yha piaammnnol wmmad lalmpmvluu pbmﬂmg w. my amarmannir ulhuv mm by my of an mmcanm (0 An-nu 012...»... m wwld .. uma. and Dltwdwaal ha me a.¢.«a.ms m we nlamw we new be :1 sm vvmnmxmzsxsmwnanaew «mm. 5...‘ ......mm .. HIQG w my .. mm-y mum. ﬂnunmnl VI mum Wm! aﬂmaed us ms: an Ismn that we: run am the aonlemplalmn cl me p.m.. m um. 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WA-27NCC-28-06/2023	PLAINTIF B BRAUN MEDICAL INDUSTRIES SDN BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) PYRAMID LINES SINGAPORE PTE LTD 2. ) CEVA FREIGHT HOLDINGS (M) SDN BHD 3. ) YCH DISTRIPARK SDN BHD	Application to stay proceedings based on an exclusive jurisdiction clause - Whether a "strong cause" has been shown by the Plaintiff - Whether Himalaya Clause permits the party to rely on the exclusive jurisdiction clause	07/11/2023	YA Tuan Ong Chee Kwan	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=38ab8ec4-8a56-48f1-b3e5-dc16feed83b4&Inline=true	1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) SUIT NO: WA-27NCC-28-06/2023 BETWEEN B. BRAUN MEDICAL INDUSTRIES SDN BHD (Company No: 19051-M) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. PYRAMID LINES SINGAPORE PTE LTD (Singapore Company No: 202036758N) 2. CEVA FREIGHT HOLDINGS (M) SDN BHD (Company No: 135334-M) 3. YCH DISTRIPARK SDN BHD (Company No: 275656-P) …DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT (Enclosures 11 and 13) Introduction [1] This judgment deals with the applications filed by the 1 st Defendant, 07/11/2023 15:27:34 WA-27NCC-28-06/2023 Kand. 58 S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Pyramid Lines Singapore Pte Ltd (“Pyramid Lines”) and the 2nd Defendant, Ceva Freight Holdings (M) Sdn Bhd (“Ceva Freight”) under Enclosures 11 and 13 respectively to stay all proceedings in this action on the ground that the Singapore High Court is the agreed exclusive forum between the parties in respect of the disputes arising from the claims by the Plaintiff, B. Braun Medical Industries Sdn Bhd (“B. Braun”) in this action. [2] The stay applications are made under Order 12 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court 2012 and or the inherent jurisdiction of the Courts. The applications are premised on Clause 1 of the Bill of Lading which is an exclusive jurisdiction clause providing any claims against B. Braun or arising from the contract of carriage to be determined by the Singapore High Court. [3] After perusing the cause papers and hearing oral submissions from learned counsel, I hold that B. Braun has established a strong cause to justify departing from the agreed exclusive jurisdiction clause. Background facts [4] B. Braun claims in this action that Pyramid Lines had agreed to carry a consignment of 166 packages (21 Pallets and 145 cartons) of Medical Products and or Medical Equipment (“the Cargo”) that were stuffed into one 1’ x 40’ Reefer Container No.: CCMU5072834 loaded on board Pyramid Lines’ vessel "SUPA BHUM" (IMO: 9158757) (“the Vessel”) for sail from Penang Port, Malaysia to Sihanoukville Port, Cambodia that was thereafter transited by truck to the end receiver (“the Consignee”) in Kandal Province, S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Cambodia. The Cargo was shipped under a non-negotiable bill of lading numbered PEN211149482 dated 23.9.2021 (the “Bill of Lading”). [5] B. Braun’s claims against Pyramid Lines and Ceva Freight are predicated on the basis that there is “a contract of carriage on the terms of the Bill of Lading is to be implied between B. Braun and Ceva and or Pyramid”. It is B. Braun’s case that when the Cargo arrived at the Consignee’s warehouse in Cambodia, it was discovered that the Cargo was frozen and damaged due to the failure to maintain the appropriate temperature for the containerized Cargo. [6] At the material times, Ceva Freight was the Malaysian freight agent of Pyramid Lines. Ceva Freight was the party who had corresponded, together with the 3rd Defendant (“YCH”) who was the bonded warehouse keeper in Penang Port, with B. Braun in arranging, booking, loading and stowing of the Cargo from Penang Port for the contract of carriage as evidenced by the Bill of Lading. [7] B. Braun’s causes of action against Pyramid Lines and Ceva Freight are for breach of duties as bailees and or under the contract of carriage. B. Braun’s cause of action against YCH is for breach of its duties as bailees. More specifically, B. Braun claims that they and or their respective employees or agents did not exercise reasonable care in handling the Cargo during shipment, resulting in extensive damage to the entire Cargo. The Cargo was sensitive to temperature and must be maintained within the temperature range of +5°C to +20°C at all times. S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [8] The parties to the Bill of Lading had expressly agreed under Clause 1 of the Bill of Lading to an exclusive jurisdiction clause which provides that: “any claim against Carrier or arising from the Carriage or in relation to the Goods shall be determined exclusively by the Singapore High Court to which jurisdiction Merchant irrevocably submit”. [9] Further, it was expressly agreed in Clause 1 that the contract evidenced by or contained in the Bill of Lading shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Singapore. [10] A brief chronology of the relevant events is set out below: On or about 30.8.2021: (a) B. Braun instructed Ceva Freight and or Pyramid Lines via email to store the Cargo in a reefer container as per the "detail and value based on the previous shipment"; (b) The details and value of the previous shipment were temperature thresholds of +5°C and +20°C; (c) YCH later confirmed and acknowledged the above instruction and temperature requirements in an email sent to B. Braun (copied to Ceva Freight) on 14.10.2021. S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 On 15.9.2021: (a) the temperature of the reefer container was set at 10.2°C, which was within the temperature threshold; (b) the Cargo were shipped on board the Vessel. On or about 16.9.2021: a) the temperature plummeted to -0.1°C, which is below the temperature threshold. On or about 23.9. 2021: a) Pyramid Non-Negotiable Seaway Bill No.: PEN211149482 was issued. On or about 12.10.2021: a) the Cargo arrived at the Consignee's warehouse in Cambodia with the reefer container's temperature at -18.1°C. The Cargo inside were found frozen and damaged. On or about 26.1.2022: a) Eurogal Surveys Ltd issued a Cargo Survey Report on behalf of B. Braun’s insurers, WK Webster Co. Ltd, confirming the temperature dropped on or about 16.9.2021. The Cargo Survey Report stated: S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 "The temperature of the reefer container No. CGMU5072834 was reported alarm and cool down from September 16, 2021, at 0036 hours. In our opinion, the reefer container was out of order during the shipment sea voyage to Sihanoukville port and transported to the consignee's warehouse." [11] Throughout the material time, the Cargo was under the care of Pyramid Lines, Ceva Freight and YCH at different junctures. [12] Based on the above facts, B. Braun framed the following issues to be determined at the trial: a) was the reefer container, supplied by Pyramid Lines as the carrier, through local agents Ceva Freight, initially defective? b) If the reefer container was not initially defective, did YCH correctly set the temperature at its warehouse? c) Alternatively, assuming YCH set the temperature correctly at its warehouse and the reefer container was functioning correctly, did Ceva Freight appropriately pack and load the reefer container onto the Vessel? d) Alternatively, did the temperature drop occur due to the inherent unseaworthiness of the Vessel during the voyage to Cambodia? [13] After entering appearance to this action, both Pyramid Lines and Ceva Freight filed their respective applications to stay B. Braun’s S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 legal action herein on the ground that the parties have by agreement agreed to the Singapore High Court to determine all their disputes under the said exclusive jurisdiction clause. [14] However, B. Braun contended that the Malaysian Court is the suitable forum for adjudicating this matter and that despite the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Bill of Lading, the Singapore High Court is a forum non conveniens. Court’s Analysis and Deliberations [15] In our present case, the events giving rise to these proceedings or those alleged to have transpired are situated in Penang, Malaysia. Specifically, the Bill of Lading was issued in Penang, and the Cargo was loaded and packed into the reefer container at the warehouse of YCH, in Penang. Subsequently, the Cargo was received by Ceva Freight and or Pyramid Lines at Penang Port, Malaysia, for transportation to Sihanoukville Port, Cambodia, aboard the Vessel. Also, both Ceva Freight and YCH are residents in Malaysia. [16] At the outset, the parties quite right conceded that the existence of the jurisdiction of the Malaysian Courts is not being challenged notwithstanding the exclusive jurisdiction clause. Section 23 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 provides that Malaysian Courts have the jurisdiction and power to preside over any case where the cause of action arises in Malaysia, where the defendant or one of several defendants resides or has his place of business in Malaysia or where the facts on which the proceedings are based exist or are alleged to have occurred in Malaysia. S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [17] The damage to the Cargo had likely occurred during two significant events: the loading and packing of the Cargo at YCH's warehouse or, alternatively, once the Cargo was stowed on the Vessel shortly after loading. Both of these critical occurrences took place in Penang and Penang Port. [18] However, notwithstanding that this Court has jurisdiction, by their respective applications, both Pyramid Lines and Ceva Freight are asking this Court not to exercise its jurisdiction since the parties had agreed to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore High Court and B. Braun ought not to be permitted to renege on its agreement. [19] In World Triathlon Corp v SRS Sports Centre Sdn Bhd [2019] 4 MLJ 394, the Court of Appeal held that: “[19] In the present appeal, just like the American Express case, the parties here had agreed to a foreign jurisdiction clause as well as to be governed not by the laws of Malaysia but by the laws of Florida/USA. Now, the law in relation to the exclusive jurisdiction or forum selection clause is not controversial. Although generally a forum selection clause does not oust the jurisdiction of the court, the court is nevertheless obliged to give effect to it as that is what the parties had agreed (see Globus Shipping & Trading Co (Pte) Ltd v Taiping Textiles Berhad [1976] 2 MLJ 154). Disregarding such a clause would effectively mean the courts condoning a breach of the agreement. [21] So, to surmise, where there is an exclusive jurisdiction clause, effect should be given to it and a stay ought to be granted, unless the party challenging the exclusive jurisdiction clause is able to show exceptional S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 circumstances amounting to a strong cause warranting a refusal. The burden is on the party challenging the exclusive jurisdiction clause to show why they should not be bound to honour the part of the contract where they had agreed to jurisdiction.” [emphasis added] [20] The position above was also followed in Open Country Dairy Ltd v. Able Food Sdn Bhd [2021] 7 CLJ 716 where the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[79] It is therefore clear that there was an exclusive jurisdiction clause per cl. 19.2 of the terms of trade and this was incorporated in the contracts for the purchase of the IWMP. Therefore, the respondent must be held to their bargain and a Malaysian court is obliged to give effect to the exclusive jurisdiction clause, unless the respondent, as the party seeking to avoid the application of the clause, are able to establish that there are exceptional circumstances to justify the contrary (see: World Triathlon).” [emphasis added] [21] Accordingly, it is clear that notwithstanding the exclusive jurisdiction agreement, B. Braun may still commence its action in Malaysia but it bears the onus to show exceptional circumstances amounting to “a strong cause” that effect ought not to be given to the exclusive jurisdiction or forum selection clause. [22] With regard to showing “a strong cause”, the Malaysian Courts have embraced the approach established in the English case of The Eleftheria [1969] 2 All ER 641. Specifically, our Federal Court has endorsed this approach in the case of Globus Shipping & Trading Co S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (Pte) Ltd v Taiping Textiles Berhad [1976] 2 MLJ 154 and more recently the Court of Appeal in United Overseas Bank Ltd & Ors v. United Securities Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) & Ors [2021] 6 MLJ 897 also took the same position. The test is stated thus: “(I) Where plaintiffs sue in [Malaysia] in breach of an agreement to refer disputes to a foreign court, and the defendants apply for a stay, the [Malaysian] court, assuming the claim to be otherwise within its jurisdiction, is not bound to grant a stay but has a discretion whether to do so or not; (II) The discretion should be exercised by granting a stay unless strong cause for not doing so is shown; (III) The burden of proving such strong cause is on the plaintiffs; (IV) In exercising its discretion, the court should take into account all the circumstances of the particular case; (V) In particular, but without prejudice to (IV), the following matters, where they arise, may properly be regarded: (a) In what country the evidence on the issues of fact is situated, or more readily available, and the effect of that on the relative convenience and expense of trial as between the [Malaysian] and foreign courts; (b) Whether the law of the foreign court applies and, if so, whether it differs from [Malaysia] law in any material respects; (c) With what country either party is connected, and how closely; (d) Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the foreign country, or are only seeking procedural advantages; (e) Whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to sue in the foreign court because they would- S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (i) be deprived of security for that claim; (ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced with a time-bar not applicable in [Malaysia]; or (iv) for political, racial, religious or other reasons be unlikely to get a fair trial.” [23] To be clear, although it may seem that the circumstances to be taken into account in the exercise of the Court’s discretion for a stay application premised upon an exclusive jurisdiction clause are similar to that to an application to stay where there is no jurisdiction agreement and or where there is a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, the test and burden are not the same. In the Commercial Conflict of Laws in Malaysia by Kwong Chiew Ee, Chai Phing Zhou, Daniel Chua Wei Chuen, Aravind Kumarr, Melvin Ng Yet Ting, published in 2022, the authors at para [2.234] sought to streamline the tests for the different 2 categories i.e. exclusive jurisdiction clause and non- exclusive jurisdiction clause as follows: [2.234] Thus, to summarise the legal position, the authors take the view in cases involving exclusive jurisdiction clause, the party seeking to depart from the clause must show "strong cause" based on the criteria set out in The Eleftheria. In cases of non- exclusive jurisdiction clauses, the court must examine the terms of the particular clause. The consequences which follow from such a clause depend on the precise construction of that particular non-exclusive jurisdiction clause. If the non-exclusive jurisdiction clause is to be construed as having the effect of an exclusive jurisdiction clause, then the "strong cause" should apply. Otherwise, the clause is relevant only as a factor in analysing whether Malaysia is forum non conveniens under the Spiliada test. This approach proposed by the authors is also not S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 inconsistent with the previous decisions of the Malaysian superior courts. The two apex court decisions that have applied the Spiliada analysis (American Express and Petrodar) involve non- exclusive jurisdiction clauses. The Federal Court's case of Globus Shipping on the other hand is a case on exclusive jurisdiction clause. As for UOB o USSB, it was a case involving a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause having the effect of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Thus, the "strong cause" test was rightly applied in Globus Shipping and UOB v USSB. [24] I would respectfully adopt the same analysis and further add that the test, in the case where a stay of proceedings for forum non conveniens is applied for where there is no jurisdiction clause at all, is the same as that of the case where there is a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause save that in the former case, the burden is on the defendant whilst in the latter case, the burden is on the plaintiff. Also, in all cases, the Court will always look at the question where the ends of justice will be best served. [25] For the reasons that I will set out below, I agree with Mr Jeremy Joseph, learned counsel for B. Braun that a strong cause has indeed been demonstrated in this case for this Court to exercise its discretion not to stay the action in favour of the Singapore High Court, which I find is the forum non conveniens. Governing law of the contract of carriage [26] The Malaysian Carriage of Goods by Sea (Amendment) Act 2020 and the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Amendment of the First Schedule) Order 2021 (“COGSA”) came into force on 15.7.2021 and gives force to the Hague-Visby Rules under its Schedule and S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 provides for its compulsory application to bills of lading and similar documents of title issued in relation to all outward-bound cargoes. [See: Trengganu Forest Products Sdn Bhd v. Cosco Container Lines & Anor [2007] 5 CLJ 720] [27] The Bill of Lading in the instant case in fact adopts the legislation. Clause 5.1 of the Bill of Lading provides as follows: “5.1 If the Carriage is a Port to Port Shipment, the responsibility of Carrier shall be limited to that Carriage from and during loading onto the Vessel up to and during discharge from the Vessel. The liability of Carrier shall be determined in accordance with: (a ) any applicable legislation making the Hague Rules or Hague-Visby Rules compulsorily applicable to this Bill of Lading;” [28] Simultaneously, Clause 6.2 of the Bill of Lading provides as follows: “6.2 If the stage of Carriage at which the loss or damage occurred is known or Merchant can prove such stage beyond reasonable doubt, the liability of Carrier shall be determined as follows: (a) if it is established that the loss or damage occurred at or during the stage of the Carriage referred to in Clause 5, then in accordance with the provisions thereof” [29] As the Vessel departed Penang Port, Malaysia with the Cargo on board to Cambodia, it is therefore indisputably clear that the Malaysia COGSA applies compulsorily in this case. This is a factor in favour of permitting the action to stay in Malaysia although on its own, it is not sufficient to satisfy ‘a strong cause’ test but there are S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 other factors in this case that make it so. The Plaintiff out of time to file in Singapore and is prejudiced by the stay. [30] There is no dispute that the one-year time limit stipulated by Article III, rule 6 of the Hague-Visby Rules is applicable to B Braun’s claims against Pyramid Lines and or Ceva Freight. This provision explicitly states that legal actions against the carrier must be initiated within one year from the delivery date of the goods. [31] In the current scenario, the Cargo was delivered to the Consignee in Cambodia on the 12.10.2021. According to the Hague-Visby Rules, B. Braun has until the 11.10.2022 to file their claims against Pyramid Lines and or Ceva Freight. [32] B. Braun lodged this lawsuit on the 30.9.2022, well within the one- year time frame specified by the Hague-Visby Rules. However, if a stay of this proceedings is granted, effectively pausing the ongoing proceedings in the present jurisdiction, B. Braun's ability to pursue its claim against Pyramid Lines or Ceva Freight in Singapore would effectively be out of time. Such an outcome would result in B. Braun’s claim herein being time-barred under the Hague-Visby Rules, causing substantial prejudice to its rights and denying B.Braun of the opportunity to seek legal redress. [33] As such, granting a stay in favour of the exclusive jurisdiction agreement, would lead to a grave miscarriage of justice as B. Braun will be deprived of the chance to have its case heard on its merits S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 and potentially recover the rightful compensation for the damages sustained. To my mind, this constitutes a compelling reason for this Court to permit B. Braun to deviate from the provision of the exclusive jurisdiction clause. Indeed, when learned counsel for Pyramid Lines was asked if Pyramid Lines would be prepared to waive raising the time bar defence in the event a stay is ordered, she was not prepared to give a positive response. [34] In Baghlaf Al Zafer Factory Co BR for Industry Ltd v Pakistan National Shipping Company and another [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 229, such a waiver was considered to be a relevant factor in considering whether a stay ought to be granted. “Where a Plaintiff has acted reasonably in commencing proceedings in England and in allowing time to expire in the agreed foreign jurisdiction, a stay of the English proceedings should only be granted on terms that the Defendant waives the time bar in the foreign jurisdiction”. [35] In this instant case, there is no suggestion that B. Braun has not acted reasonably in commencing proceedings in this Court and yet no waiver of the time bar was forthcoming from Pyramid Lines and or Ceva Freight at all in pursuing their respective applications for stay. The refusal to provide the waiver suggests that Pyramid Lines and Ceva Freight do not genuinely desire a trial in the Singapore High Court but are seeking to deprive B. Braun of a juridical advantage in the present proceedings. S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 Reasonable and appropriate for B. Braun to commence proceedings in Malaysia. [36] If there is any doubt, there are many factors in this case which, when viewed objectively, made it reasonable and to my mind appropriate for B. Braun to commence proceedings in Malaysia. These are as follows: (a) quite apart from Pyramid Lines and Ceva Freight being sued, B. Braun has also commenced this action against YCH who has no direct contractual relationship with B. Braun in respect of the carriage of the Cargo. Since YCH is resident in Malaysia and the cause of action against YCH arose in Malaysia, this makes the Malaysian Courts to be the appropriate and rightful venue for addressing the claims against YCH. In fact, YCH, quite rightly, has not suggested that Singapore is the appropriate forum to hear the disputes; (b) it is not submitted that B. Braun’s claim against YCH is otherwise than a genuine claim. As such, in the event this Court were to grant Pyramid Lines or Ceva Freight a stay of the present proceedings and compel B. Braun to commence its claims against them in the Singapore High Court, this may lead to an unsatisfactory situation where conflicting judgments or findings of facts regarding the parties’ responsibility for the damage being determined. The law regarding the avoidance of irreconcilable judgments where the facts of the disputes are the same has frequently been found to be decisive in favour of the place where all defendants can be sued, as the proper place. S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 This principle was enunciated in the UK Supreme Court case of Lungowe and others v Vedanta Resources plc and Another [2019] 2 All ER (Comm) 559: “If substantial justice was available to the parties in Zambia as it is in England, it would offend the common sense of all reasonable observers to think that the proper place for this litigation to be conducted was England, if the risk of irreconcilable judgments arose purely from the claimants' choice to proceed against one of the defendants in England rather than, as is available to them, against both of them in Zambia. For those reasons I would have concluded that the claimants had failed to demonstrate that England is the proper place for the trial of their claims against these defendants, having regard to the interests of the parties and the ends of justice.” [emphasis added] (c) If B. Braun has to pursue Pyramid Lines and or Ceva Freight in the Singapore High Court as agreed, separately from its claims against YCH, this will also result in B. Braun having to incur unnecessary legal costs and expenses. The position will be further aggravated in the event the two separate courts were to attribute fault differently resulting in no immediate recourse available to B. Braun; (d) There is also a not insignificant disparity in terms of legal costs between Malaysia and Singapore. Opting for a Malaysian venue offers a more cost-effective alternative regarding court charges, filing fees, hearing expenses, legal fees, and various administrative costs, thus alleviating the financial strains on S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 those involved in the litigation. [37] Further to the above, other than the fact that Pyramid Lines is a company based in Singapore, there is also no nexus between B. Braun’s claims and Singapore. More specifically: (a) the focal points of B. Braun’s claims revolve around the stowage, the precise temperature configuration, and the loading of the Cargo, all of which transpired in Penang, either at YCH's warehouse or during the transfer from the Penang load port to the Vessel by Ceva Freight. In this regard, both Ceva Freight and YCH are Malaysian-based entities; (b) as such, the evidence concerning the factual issues related to B. Braun's claims, including witnesses involved in the formation of contract terms and the parties' roles in configuring and stowing the cargo in respect of the temperature-sensitive reefer container in this case as well as the assessment of the extent of losses, are predominantly located and more readily accessible in Malaysia; (c) to compel all the witnesses to appear in Singapore would entail significant inconvenience and expenses for B. Braun. Considering the balance of convenience and costs, it is evident that holding the trial in Malaysia is more appropriate. If there are any witnesses based in Singapore, their evidence can be obtained through remote communication. Furthermore, if the Singapore-based witnesses were required to travel to Kuala Lumpur, it would not pose an undue inconvenience; S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 (d) more importantly, it may be necessary for parties to compel the attendance of relevant witnesses and given that these witnesses are mainly in Malaysia, to have the proceedings in Malaysia will mean that these witnesses can be compelled to attend court to testify. If the action is before the Singapore High Court, B. Braun may not be able to compel a material non- party witness to testify to its prejudice; (e) also, Pyramid Lines served as both the contractual carrier and owner of the Vessel. Pyramid Lines being headquartered in Singapore, they operate as an international cargo carrier. Consequently, Pyramid Lines is well-versed in navigating diverse legal systems and complying with various international conventions and treaties governing the transportation of goods by sea. Hence, there would be no prejudice to Pyramid Lines if this matter were to be heard in Malaysia. If fact, no prejudice has been demonstrated by Pyramid Lines or Ceva Freight at all. [38] The case of World Triathlon, which placed emphasis on the defendant's place of business as an important factor can be distinguished. In the World Triathlon Corp case, the circumstances revolved around a Malaysian plaintiff suing a Florida-based defendant concerning the termination of a contract with an exclusive jurisdiction clause designating Florida. Importantly, the act of termination central to the matter took place in Florida, and the factual issues and evidence were more readily accessible in Florida. In contrast, the focal points in our case are Penang making Malaysia clearly the jurisdiction which has the most real and substantial S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 connection with the action. [39] Even the Court in World Triathlon Corp accepted that the Court in considering an application to stay for forum non conveniens looks not to convenience but the suitability or appropriateness of the relevant jurisdiction: [17] … Lord Goff, in that case, also noted that the Latin tag ‘forum non conveniens’ does not mean the question is one of convenience but of the suitability or appropriateness of the relevant jurisdiction. In doing so, the court would look to the forum which has ‘the most real and substantial connection’ with the action. The then Supreme Court in American Express, agreed with this principle as expressed and also noted with approval Lord Goff’s observation on the meaning of forum non conveniens. [18] In establishing the forum which has the most real and substantial connection with the cause of action, Lord Goff observed that the court will look to several factors including convenience and expense, availability of witnesses, the law governing the relevant transaction, and the places where the parties resided or carried on business. [emphasis added] [40] Given these considerations, it is my judgment that this case presents compelling reasons to depart from the exclusive jurisdiction clause stipulated in the Bill of Lading. B. Braun has not only demonstrated to the satisfaction of this Court that Malaysia is the jurisdiction with the most real and substantial connection with the disputes but that there is “a strong cause” based on the criteria set out in The Eleftheria. S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Ceva Freight’s reliance on Himalaya Clause [41] As alluded to above, Ceva Freight was at all material times the Malaysian’s freight forwarder for Pyramid Lines. Ceva Freight is not stated as a party to the Bill of Lading although it did sign the Bill of Lading as agent for Pyramid Lines. Yet, in its application for stay before this Court, Ceva Freight is relying on the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Bill of Lading. [42] It is Ceva Freight’s case that it is entitled to rely on Clause 1 thereto by reason of B. Braun’s pleaded position that there is an implied contract with Ceva Freight (which for avoidance of doubt, the foregoing analysis and determination in respect of Pyramid Lines apply equally to Ceva Freight) and also based on Clause 4.3 which provides thus: “Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, every such person shall have the benefit of all the Rights and Defences of Carrier under or pursuant to this Bill of Lading as if the same were expressly made also for such person’s benefit. For the foregoing purposes, Carrier contracts for itself as well as agent and trustee of all such persons.” [43] The aforesaid provision is commonly known as the “Himalaya Clause”. The clause derives its name from the case, The Himalaya; Adler v Dickson and Another [1954] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 267. It is a contractual provision intended to confer rights and benefits on an entity that is not a direct party to that contract. [44] A Himalaya Clause extends the benefit of rights and defences conferred by the bill of lading on the carrier to the carriers’ agents, S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 service providers or independent contractors in a multimodal logistics chain. The UK Court of Appeal in the case of Adler v Dickson found that these benefits in a contract of carriage such as a bill of lading, are to exempt, as far as possible, the servants, agents, and independent contractors employed by the contractual carrier from liability to other parties to the contract, such as the shipper or consignee. [45] The House of Lords in the case of Midland Silicones Ltd. v. Scruttons Ltd. [1962] A.C. 446 at page 474 indicated how a Himalaya Clause would apply: "I can see a possibility of success of the agency argument if (first) the bill of lading makes it clear that the stevedore is intended to be protected by the provisions in it which limit liability, (secondly) the bill of lading makes it clear that the carrier, in addition to contracting for these provisions on his own behalf, is also contracting as agent for the stevedore that these provisions should apply to the stevedore, (thirdly) the carrier has authority from the stevedore to do that, or perhaps later ratification by the stevedore would suffice, and (fourthly) that any difficulties about consideration moving from the stevedore were overcome." [46] However, the Himalaya clause does not confer on Ceva Freight the right to the exclusive jurisdiction clause at all. That this is so has in fact been decided by Lord Goff sitting in the Privy Council on an appeal from the Hong Kong Court of Appeal in The Muhkutai [1996] AC 650. [47] In that case, the shipowners chartered their vessel to time charterers. The vessel was sub-chartered to shippers for the carriage of a cargo S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 from Indonesia to China. The time charterers issued a bill of lading which contained a Himalaya clause, i.e. a clause which purported to confer on subcontractors the benefit of “… all exceptions, limitations, provision, conditions and liberties benefitting the carrier”. It also contained a clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the Indonesian courts. [48] After discharge of the cargo, the cargo owners issued a writ against the vessel in Hong Kong claiming that the cargo was damaged on delivery. The shipowners sought to rely on the jurisdiction clause, as being a provision within the meaning of the Himalaya clause. The Hong Kong Court of Appeal held that the shipowners were not entitled to rely on the clause because they were not parties to the bill of lading. Nor had there been a bailment on terms which included the jurisdiction clause. [49] On appeal to the Privy Council which dismissed the appeal, Lord Goff of Chieveley traced the development of Himalaya clauses as a device to accommodate various situations arising in the context of carriage of goods by sea where there was a commercial expectation that the benefit of certain terms of the contract of carriage should be made available to parties involved in the adventure who were not parties to the contract - primarily stevedores, but in some cases also shipowners relying on terms in charterers' bills of lading to exempt them from possible liability to cargo owners and consignees. Lord Goff opined that that the exclusive jurisdiction clause did not come within the Himalaya clause because: “Such a clause can be distinguished from terms such as exceptions and limitations in that it does not benefit only one S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 party, but embodies a mutual agreement under which both parties agree with each other as to the relevant jurisdiction for the resolution of disputes. It is therefore a clause which creates mutual rights and obligations” [50] While the Himalaya clause in the contract in question referred to subcontractors enjoying the benefit of a 'provision' for the benefit of the carrier, this term must be interpreted ejusdem generis with “exceptions and limitations”. The function of a Himalaya clause was: “to prevent cargo owners from avoiding the effect of contractual defences available to the carrier by suing in tort persons who perform the contractual services on the carrier's behalf. To make available to such a person the benefit of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the bill of lading contract does not contribute to the solution of that problem.” [51] In our case, the Himalaya clause in Clause 4.3 of the Bill of Lading reads as follows: “Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, every such person shall have the benefit of all the Rights and Defences of Carrier under or pursuant to this Bill of Lading as if the same were expressly made also for such person’s benefit. For the foregoing purposes, Carrier contracts for itself as well as agent and trustee of all such persons.” [52] To my mind, the ‘benefit” stated in Clause 4.3 does not extend to the exclusive jurisdiction clause. It is also not necessary to the policy objective of the Himalaya clause. [53] Thus, Ceva Freight’s application to stay the proceedings on the basis S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 that it is entitled to rely on the exclusive jurisdiction clause in Clause 1 of the Bill of Lading under the Himalaya clause is wholly without any merits. Conclusion [54] In the premises, both Pyramid Lines’ and Ceva Freight's applications in Enclosures 11 and 13 respectively are dismissed with costs fixed at RM 7,000.00 for each application subject to payment of allocator. Dated the 6th day of November 2023 ONG CHEE KWAN Judge of the High Court of Malaya High Court of Kuala Lumpur, NCC2 Counsel: 1. Mr. Jeremy Joseph with Mr. Daniel Tan (PDK) for Plaintiff Messrs. Joseph & Partners (Kuala Lumpur) 2. Nurul Ameerah Natasya for 1st & 2nd Defendants Messrs. Shaikh David & Co. (Kuala Lumpur) 3. Hanna Suhaila Haizal for 3rd Defendant Messrs. Zain & Co. (Kuala Lumpur) S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Case Reference: 1. World Triathlon Corp v SRS Sports Centre Sdn Bhd [2019] 4 MLJ 394 2. Open Country Dairy Ltd v. Able Food Sdn Bhd [2021] 7 CLJ 716 3. Globus Shipping & Trading Co (Pte) Ltd v Taiping Textiles Berhad [1976] 2 MLJ 154 4. United Overseas Bank Ltd & Ors v. United Securities Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) & Ors [2021] 6 MLJ 897 5. Trengganu Forest Products Sdn Bhd v. Cosco Container Lines & Anor [2007] 5 CLJ 720 6. Baghlaf Al Zafer Factory Co BR for Industry Ltd v Pakistan National Shipping Company and another [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 229 7. Lungowe and others v Vedanta Resources plc and Another [2019] 2 All ER (Comm) 559 8. The Himalaya; Adler v Dickson and Another [1954] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 267 9. Midland Silicones Ltd. v. Scruttons Ltd. [1962] A.C. 446 10. The Muhkutai [1996] AC 650 Legislation Reference: 1. Section 23 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 2. Malaysian Carriage of Goods by Sea (Amendment) Act 2020 3. Carriage of Goods by Sea (Amendment of the First Schedule) Order 2021 4. Order 12 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court 2012 5. Article III, rule 6 of the Hague-Visby Rules Article / Book Reference: 1. Commercial Conflict of Laws in Malaysia by Kwong Chiew Ee, Chai Phing Zhou, Daniel Chua Wei Chuen, Aravind Kumarr, Melvin Ng Yet Ting, published in 2022 S/N xI6rOFaK8Uiz5dwW/u2DtA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	42,691	Tika 2.6.0
JA-22NCC-73-12/2019	PLAINTIF 1. ) TOPFLOW ENGINEERING SDN BHD 2. ) TEO GEE TECK 3. ) TEO GEE LIAN DEFENDAN 1. ) DS CONSTRUCTION & DESIGN SDN BHD 2. ) DAVID KUAH TAH WEI 3. ) DK CONSTRUCTION & DESIGN 4. ) TAN TOH AN	Statutory Winding-up Notice - in order for the Winding-up Notice pursuant to s. 466(1)(a) of the Companies Act 2016 to be valid, the debt on which the notice was based at the first place must be bona fide undisputed.director’s responsibility - to place the shareholders’ interest above his own and it is incumbent upon the director to show that he had acted as such.company secretary - must always act professionally, responsibly and honestly with reasonable care and due diligence - also must exhibit a high degree of skill and proficiency in discharging his duties	07/11/2023	YA Dato' Sri Shamsulbahri bin Haji Ibrahim	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=9befaf4b-f980-433d-8496-19d070dc1e76&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - topflow fiduciary JA-22NCC-73-12-2019 .docx 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO. JA-22NCC-73-12/2019 ANTARA 1. TOPFLOW ENGINEERING SDN BHD 2. TEO GEE TECK 3. TEO GEE LIAN ….…PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN 1. DS CONSTRUCTION & DESIGN SDN BHD 2. DAVID KUAH TAH WEI 3. DK CONSTRUCTION & DESIGN 4. TAN TOH AN …..…DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT [After the full trial] Brief background [1] As a brief background of facts, the 1st Plaintiff is a company dealing with trading and maintenance of environment and water treatment. The 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs are the 1st Plaintiff’s shareholders and directors while the 3rd Plaintiff is its managing director. The 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs are siblings. 07/11/2023 09:44:21 JA-22NCC-73-12/2019 Kand. 109 S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [2] The 2nd Defendant is the 1st Defendant’s sole shareholder and director while the 4th Defendant is its company secretary. The 2nd Defendant is also the 3rd Defendant’s sole proprietor and director. [3] Sometime towards the end of 2018, the 1st Plaintiff was engaged in building of a factory and workers’ hostel (“RHF Project”) in an industrial area known as SILC Gelang Patah in Johor for a company known as RHF Stone Sdn Bhd (“RHF”). Since the 1st Plaintiff did not have enough supply of manpower for the RHF Project, the company appointed the 1st and 2nd Defendants to carry out various aspects of works relating to the Project as they had access to workers from Indonesia and furthermore the 2nd Plaintiff had personal experience in the supervision of such workers together with the carrying out of civil and structural building works. [4] Based on this project, the 1st Plaintiff saw an opportunity to work together with the 1st and 2nd Defendants in respect of other building projects whereby the 1st Plaintiff will secure the work and then pass or sub-contract it to the 1st Defendant which will be carried out by the 2nd Defendant. As such, the Plaintiffs decided to invest in the 1st Defendant. [5] On 17.1.2019, the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs and the 1st and 2nd Defendants entered into the Shareholders’ Agreement (“Shareholders’ Agreement”) which contains the following, inter alia: (a) the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs’ investment in the 1st Defendant and entitlement to a profit-sharing arrangement; S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 (b) the purchase of the 2nd Defendant’s share in the 1st Defendant by the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs; (c) the legal relationship and rights between the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs and the 2nd Defendant in the 1st Defendant; (d) the internal affairs and operations of the 1st Defendant; and (e) the appointment of the 1st Defendant’s directors. As such, the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs are entitled to be appointed as directors in the 1st Defendant alongside the 2nd Defendant. [6] As a result of the Shareholders’ Agreement, the Plaintiffs had paid a sum of RM80,000.00 for the acquisition of the 2nd Defendant’s shares amounting to 40% equity in the 1st Defendant by the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs while the 2nd Defendant held the balance. The investment sum of RM80,000.00 was based upon the profit and loss statement prepared by the 1st Defendant’s accountant and presented by the 2nd Defendant to the Plaintiffs. [7] In August 2019, the 2nd Defendant secured a contract from Cuipo Stone Sdn (“Cuipo Stone”) for the construction of a factory in Johor worth of RM1.1 million (“Cuipo Project”). However, according to the Plaintiffs, the 2nd Defendant discreetly concealed and subcontracted the Project to the 3rd Defendant which he is the sole-proprietor instead of the 1st Defendant as to avoid the 40% profit share with the Plaintiffs. [8] The shareholding of the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs in the 1st Defendant did not last long. On 22.8.2019, the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs exited from being the 1st Defendant’s shareholders. Not long after, the 1st Defendant made a S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 claim vide a statutory notice of demand pursuant to s. 466(1)(a) of the Companies Act 2016 dated 21.10.2019 (“Winding-up Notice”) against the 1st Plaintiff for an amount of RM511,734.80 relating to the construction works in RHF Project. [9] On 23.12.2019, the 1st Plaintiff filed the present suit for the following reliefs, inter alia: (a) a declaration that the Winding-up Notice is invalid; (b) a declaration that the Plaintiffs are entitled to keep a sum of RM200,000.00 paid by RHF to the Plaintiffs; (c) an order that the 2nd Defendant is to prepare an account of profits which to be filed within 14 days from the order to show – (i) all monies received from Cuipo Stone by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants; (ii) particulars of cost for the Cuipo Project; and (iii) profits earned by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants; (d) a declaration for a breach of fiduciary obligation by the 2nd Defendant towards the Plaintiffs and the 1st Defendant; (e) a declaration for a breach of fiduciary obligation by the 4th Defendant towards the Plaintiffs; and (f) the Plaintiffs’ loss to be assessed. S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [10] On 10.2.2020, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants filed their Statement of Defence and Counter Claim in which they also sought the following reliefs, inter alia: (a) a declaration that the Statutory Notice dated 11.11.2019 issued by the 1st Plaintiff to the 1st Defendant is invalid; (b) a declaration for a breach of oral agreement by the 1st and 3rd Plaintiffs when the 1st Plaintiff failed to pay the sum of RM511,734.80 to the 1st Defendant vide a cheque dated 21.8.2019 and as such the 1st Defendant or the 2nd Defendant is not responsible to pay or give a discount of RM200,000.00 to the 1st Plaintiff; and (c) the 1st Plaintiff is to pay the 2nd Defendant a sum of RM200,000.00. [11] A full trial for this suit was conducted for six days where the Plaintiffs and the Defendants brought five and three witnesses, respectively to give evidence in this court. Whether the Winding-up Notice issued by the 1st Defendant is invalid [12] It is pertinent to note that s. 466(1)(a) of the Companies Act 2016 allows a creditor to serve a notice of demand (normally known as “winding-up notice”) to a company which is indebted to the creditor requiring the company to pay the sum due within 21 days of the notice failing which the creditor may file a petition to wind-up the company. S. 466 says – Definition of “inability to pay debts” S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 466. (1) A company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts if — (a) the company is indebted in a sum exceeding the amount as may be prescribed by the Minister and a creditor by assignment or otherwise has served a notice of demand, by himself or his agent, requiring the company to pay the sum due by leaving the notice at the registered office of the company, and the company has for twenty-one days after the service of the demand neglected to pay the sum or to secure or compound for it to the satisfaction of the creditor; (b) execution or other process issued on a judgment, decree or order of any court in favour of a creditor of the company is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; or (c) it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the company is unable to pay its debts and in determining whether a company is unable to pay its debts the Court shall take into account the contingent and prospective liabilities of the company [13] In the present case, before the 1st Defendant sent the Winding-up Notice to the 1st Plaintiff, the former had served the latter with three Statements of Account (“Statements of Account”) which stated the alleged debt as follows: (a) construction works at Factory SILC Gelang Patah (RHF Stone Sdn Bhd) RM122,140.00 S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 (b) Construct works at Factory SILC Gelang Patah (c) Floor slab & water tank structure work (Guan Chong Cocoa Manufacture Sdn Bhd) RM343,794.80 RM45,800.00 Total RM511,734,80 [14] The Plaintiffs contended that the Winding-up Notice is invalid as the amount of debt stated in the Statements of Account which is the sole basis for the Winding-up Notice was a false demand by the 1st Defendant. [15] The Plaintiffs averred that the 1st Defendant is not entitled to the claimed amount based on the following reasons: (a) the payment from RHF had not been received by the 1st Plaintiff. There was no evidence to show that the 1st Plaintiff received such payment; (b) the payment to the 1st Defendant will only be made after RHF has paid the 1st Plaintiff; (c) any payment from RHF is subject to the profit-sharing arrangement of 40% which is the Plaintiffs’ entitlement pursuant to the Shareholders’ Agreement; and (d) the Plaintiffs are entitled to RM200,000.00 being the 40% profit sharing based on their investment in the 1st Defendant who was given the subcontract by the 1st Plaintiff in the RHF Project. S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [16] After the trial, I find that the 1st Defendant failed to establish that the 1st Plaintiff had received the alleged payment from RHF to substantiate its allegation in the Statements of Account. On the other hand, the 1st Plaintiff has proven that, based on the Shareholders’ Agreement, the company is entitled to 40% of the 1st Defendant’s profit. A subpoena witness, Chan Choi Wan, Irene (SP2) who prepared the Income and Expenses Statement for the 1st Defendant revealed in her testimony that the company gained a profit of RM511,734.80 from the RHF Project. Thus, I agree with the Plaintiffs that the amount of RM200,000.00 being the 40% of the 1st Defendant’s profit should be given to and kept by the 1st Plaintiff. [17] On the 1st Defendant’s claim in the Statements of Account for the floor slab and water tank structure works at Guan Chong Cocoa Manufacture Sdn Bhd, it is no doubt that these works were subcontracted by the 1st Plaintiff to the 1st Defendant. Nevertheless, the 1st Plaintiff has proven that the 1st and 2nd Defendants failed to carry out the works according to the approved plan and specifications. As a result, the 1st Plaintiff had spent RM50,000.00 for rectification works. In light of this, I agree with the 1st Plaintiff that the 1st Defendant failed to establish any bona fide debt against the 1st Plaintiff. [18] It is my considered view that in order for the Winding-up Notice to be valid, the debt on which the notice was based at the first place must be bona fide undisputed (see Jurupakat Sdn Bhd v. Kumpulan Good Earth (1973) Sdn Bhd [1988] 1 CLJ Rep 618; [1988] 2 CLJ 649; [1988] 3 MLJ 49 and Christopher Michael Cheow v. ANS Builders Sdn Bhd [2012] 9 CLJ 727; [2012] 1 LNS 234; [2012] 10 MLJ 359). In the present case, the 1st Plaintiff has established that there are contestable issues and bona fide disputes on the alleged debt. S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [19] Further, the Plaintiffs had proven their claim that the 2nd Defendant had misled a staff at the 1st Plaintiff’s office to acknowledge the receipt of the Statements of Account. [20] To substantiate the claim, the Plaintiffs subpoenaed two witnesses namely SP2 who is a former worker of the 1st Defendant and Fatin Farhana (SP5) who is a former Assistant Accountant of the 1st Plaintiff to testify in court. SP2 testified that when she was still employed by the 1st Defendant, she was personally instructed by the 2nd Defendant to deliver the Statements of Account to the 1st Plaintiff with a specific instruction given by him that she must ensure that the 3rd Plaintiff was not in the 1st Plaintiff’s office which signified by his car not being there. In short, SP2’s mission on that day was only one i.e to send the Statements of Account when the 3rd Plaintiff was not around as to enable the Plaintiffs to accept the Statements of Account without any objection or argument. [21] After carefully listening and perusing her testimony, I accepted SP2’s evidence despite the 2nd Defendant (SD3) strenuously challenged and denied her narrative. I find that SP2 is a credible witness as she is a witness with no interest and there is no reasonable ground for her to lie in court. [22] Likewise the evidence from SP3 - when she was still working with the 1st Plaintiff, she admitted receiving the Statements of Account from SP2. Nevertheless, at that point of time she just chopped the 1st Plaintiff’s company chop at the column “confirm & accepted” on the Statements of Account without verifying the correctness of the amount claimed in the Statements. S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [23] Based on the evidence adduced, I find that the Statements of Account were deliberately delivered when the 3rd Plaintiff was not in the 1st Plaintiff’s office. If the Statements of Account were genuine, why the 2nd Defendant instructed SP2 to deliver them in such suspicious manner? A reasonable inference can be drawn that the motive was none other than to ensure that the Statements of Account were delivered and considered as admitted by the Plaintiffs so that the Winding-up Notice could be issued. [24] It is interesting to note that the 2nd Defendant, during the cross- examination, explained that the Winding-up Notice was issued based on the alleged oral arrangement between him and the Plaintiffs whereby it was agreed that the 1st Plaintiff would issue a RM511,734.80 cheque to him and in return, he would give the 1st Plaintiff a RM200,000.00 cheque. This exchange of cheques has to be done simultaneously. Nonetheless, the 2nd Defendant averred that the Plaintiffs failed to honour the arrangement which led him to issue the Statements of Account to the 1st Plaintiff. This narrative adds another reasonable doubt that the Winding- up Notice is not genuine and issued with mala fide. [25] In light of this I find that the Winding-up Notice was invalid and has no effect. Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to keep a sum of RM200,000.00 paid by RHF [26] As alluded to earlier, based on the Shareholders’ Agreement, the 1st Plaintiff is entitled to 40% share of the 1st Defendant’s profit. Since the Plaintiffs have proven vide SP2 that the 1st Defendant gained a profit of RM511,734.80 from the RHF Project, then the Plaintiffs are entitled to S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 keep the sum of RM200,000.00 being the 40% share of the 1st Defendant’s profit pursuant to the Shareholders’ Agreement. Whether there was a breach of fiduciary obligation by the 2nd Defendant towards the Plaintiffs and the 1st Defendant [27] It is pertinent to point out that the Companies Act 2016 requires a director to act in the best interest of his company and prohibits him from engaging in any business which is in competition with his company to gain personal benefit. Sections 214 and 218 of the Act read – Business judgment rule 214 (1) A director who makes a business judgment is deemed to meet the requirements of the duty under subsection 213 (2) and the equivalent duties under the common law and in equity if the director— (a) makes the business judgment for a proper purpose and in good faith; (b) does not have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the business judgment; (c) is informed about the subject matter of the business judgment to the extent the director reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and (d) reasonably believes that the business judgment is in the best interest of the company. (2) For the purposes of this section, "business judgment" means any decision on whether or not to take action in respect of a matter relevant to the business of the company. S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Prohibition against improper use of property, position, etc. 218. (1) A director or officer of a company shall not, without the consent or ratification of a general meeting— (a) use the property of the company; (b) use any information acquired by virtue of his position as a director or officer of the company; (c) use his position as such director or officer; (d) use any opportunity of the company which he became aware of, in the performance of his functions as the director or officer of the company; or (e) engage in business which is in competition with the company, to gain directly or indirectly, a benefit for himself or any other person, or cause detriment to the company. (2) Any person who contravenes this section commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine not exceeding three million ringgit or to both. [28] The question is whether the 2nd Defendant being one of the 1st Defendant’s director had acted in breach of his fiduciary duty by discreetly concealing and deliberately subcontracted the Cuipo Project to his sole- proprietorship company in the 3rd Defendant instead of the 1st Defendant? [29] It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs had invested in the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendant knew that the main purpose of the Plaintiffs putting their investment in the 1st Defendant was to gain profit and nothing else. S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [30] As alluded to earlier, in August 2019, the 2nd Defendant secured the Cuipo Project but subcontracted the Project to the 3rd Defendant to carry out the related works. All payments by Cuipo Stone to the 3rd Defendant were made when the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs were still the 1st Defendant’s shareholders. Nevertheless, surprisingly after the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs were no longer the 1st Defendant’s shareholder with effect from 22.8.2019, all payments by Cuipo Stone were paid to the 1st Defendant. This evidence shows the clear intention of the 2nd Defendant subcontracted the Cuipo Project to the 3rd Defendant is to avoid the sharing of profit from the Project with the Plaintiffs. [31] Further, during the trial there was no single reasonable explanation advanced by the 2nd Defendant on why he subcontracted the Cuipo Project to the 3rd Defendant instead of the 1st Defendant. [32] It is my considered view that one of a director’s responsibilities is to place the shareholders’ interest above his own and it is incumbent upon the director to show that he had acted as such. [33] Drawing the thread together, it is clear that the 2nd Defendant was in breach of his fiduciary duty when he discreetly concealed and deliberately subcontracted the Cuipo Project to his sole-proprietorship company instead of the 1st Defendant as to avoid the 40% profit share with the Plaintiffs and at the same time made secret profits for his own. Whether there was a breach of fiduciary obligation by the 4th Defendant towards the Plaintiffs S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [34] It is pertinent to note that the 4th Defendant being the then company secretary of the 1st Defendant had prepared the instruments for the appointment of the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs as directors of the 1st Defendant. These instruments were signed by of the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs on 21.1.2019. Nonetheless, the filing of the instruments with Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (SSM) was only done by the 4th Defendant two months later i.e on 11.3.2019. [35] The 4th Defendant admitted the delay but he averred the delay was caused by reasons outside his control namely the Chinese New Year which fell on 2.2.2019 and presentation of the stamp duty adjudication on the share transfer by the Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri (LHDN). With respect, I am not prepared to accept these reasons. The signing of the instruments was done almost 2 weeks before the Chinese New Year while LHDN would normally take not more than seven days to process the stamp duty adjudication. The delay depicts the 4th Defendant’s nonchalant attitude towards his responsibilities. [36] The 4th Defendant in denying the liability averred that the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs must be the shareholders of the 1st Defendant first before being appointed to its directors. Nevertheless, when being asked by learned counsel for the Plaintiffs, the 4th Defendant agreed that the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs could be appointed as the 1st Defendant’s directors immediately after the instruments for the appointment was signed by them. In addition, Evelyn Eng Hui Xian (SP4) the solicitor who prepared the Shareholders’ Agreement affirmed that the Agreement came into operation on the date of its signing and not when of the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs become the 1st Defendant’s shareholders. S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [37] The evidence adduced in this court shows that in between the date of the signing of the Shareholders’ Agreement and the filing of the instruments, the 2nd Defendant discreetly managed to withdraw a substantial amount of money namely RM117,080.00 from the 1st Defendant’s account without the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs’ consent despite they were directors by virtue of the Shareholders’ Agreement. This can be seen in the 1st Defendant’s Audited Account for 2018 (exhibit P41) where it was stated that cash in hand and at banks was only RM53,453.00. [38] It is my considered view that the 4th Defendant being the then company secretary must always act professionally, responsibly and honestly with reasonable care and due diligence. The 4th Defendant also must exhibit a high degree of skill and proficiency in discharging his duties. It is clear in the present case that due to the delay in filing of the instruments by the 4th Defendant, the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs suffered a great loss as they have significant shares in the 1st Defendant. [39] In the premise of the foregoing, I find that the 4th Defendant was in breach of his fiduciary obligation as the 1st Defendant’s company secretary towards the Plaintiffs which resulted of the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs suffering a substantial loss as the 1st Defendant’s directors and shareholders. The Defendants’ counter claim [40] The Defendants’ counter claim revolves around the sum of RM200,000.00 claimed by the Plaintiffs pursuant to the Shareholders’ Agreement. The failure of the 1st Defendant to pay the sum led the 1st Plaintiff to issue the Statutory Notice pursuant to s. 466(1)(a) of the Companies Act 2016 dated 11.11.2019 to the former. S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [41] It is pivotal to note that I have covered earlier why the Plaintiffs are entitled to the sum. As such I do not propose to repeat my grounds on that matter. Suffice it to say that I came to the conclusion that the Plaintiffs are entitled to keep the sum being the 40% of the 1st Defendant’s profit from RHF Project pursuant to the Shareholders’ Agreement. [42] In the upshot, I find that the Statutory Notice dated 11.11.2019 issued by the 1st Plaintiff is valid. [43] For the 2nd and 3rd reliefs, the Defendant pray that such the 1st Defendant or the 2nd Defendant is not responsible to pay the sum RM200,000.00 to the 1st Plaintiff. Again, as I mentioned it above, this issue has been dealt before. [44] In the premise of the foregoing, I find that there is no merit in the Defendants’ counter claim. Thus, the counter claim is dismissed. Conclusion [45] In the final analysis, having considered the facts and the circumstances of the present case, I find that the Plaintiffs on the balance of probability have proven their case. Hence, I allow the Plaintiffs’ claim with costs and damages to be paid by the Defendants. An assessment of cost and damages will be fixed. I also dismiss the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ counter claim with no order as to costs. Dated: 7.11 .2023 -SIGNED - (SHAMSULBAHRI BIN HAJI IBRAHIM) Judge, High Court of Malaya, Johor Bahru S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 Counsels:  For the Plaintiffs - Chang Tau Sian; Messrs. Henry Soong & Chang  For the Defendants - Jermaine Tay Yu Rong; Messrs. Dennis Nik & Wong Cases referred to:  Christopher Michael Cheow v. ANS Builders Sdn Bhd [2012] 9 CLJ 727; [2012] 1 LNS 234; [2012] 10 MLJ 359  Jurupakat Sdn Bhd v. Kumpulan Good Earth (1973) Sdn Bhd [1988] 1 CLJ Rep 618; [1988] 2 CLJ 649; [1988] 3 MLJ 49 Legislations referred to:  Companies Act 2016 - s. 214, 218 & 466(1) S/N S6/vm4D5PUOElhnQcNwedg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	26,806	Tika 2.6.0
AB-44-10-06/2023	PEMOHON HENDRA BIN MULANA RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	Criminal Procedure - Section 317 of CPC- Application to admit additional evidence - Applicant convicted of offences under s.8(b) of Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017 - Request for child pornography - The additional evidence was in respect of Applicant's defence under s.20 of 2017 Act - Whether Applicant did not know of true age of the victim - Failure of previous counsel to tender additional evidence to support defence case - Whether 4 conditions in R v Parks have been fulfilled - Application dismissed	06/11/2023	YA Puan Noor Ruwena binti Md Nurdin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d6b4dee7-705a-4bba-b574-5e97aa37d188&Inline=true	06/11/2023 12:04:09 AB-44-10-06/2023 Kand. 11 S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Aa—u—1u—os/2023 Kand. J1 zm,,2ozs nvza-09 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI TAIPING DALAM IIEGERI EERAK DARUL RIDZWAN PERMOHQNAN JENAVAH M0,: HENDRA BIN MULANA [N0 KF.: aonsI3o1e22u ...PEMoHoN v m PENDAKWA RAVA ...RESPDNDEN ggouuns OF JUDGMENT xs INYRODUCTION [1] The Appneem med Iwa (2; Nauoes u1App2a\| in the com dc Apnea! agemen the deasmn enme Cmm delivered an 4 9 2923 in respect ovcase Nos. AEA4—1l)-06/2023 and AEAL1106/2023 Denalning Io me 2.; applicalmns to edmu new evidence under me provisions ov Arts. a and 121 dc me Federal OOVISU ' n. ss.2s. 31 and 35 of me come of Judicature Ac’: 1954 and 5.317 0! me cnmmex Procedure Cnde (cps). The apphcmions were made in reepem o4 me appeal m the Tepmg men cdun Apbeal Nos. AB-42JSKS-2~02/2023 and Auznsksrzmz/zcza [24 Earner, me Applicant had been convicted by the Tawping Sessxons Counan16.2 2023 in Case No AB€2JSK—20r1 1/2019 aneme was found gmﬂy and oonvicled on m-ee (3) amended charges ol requeeung for cmm pomugraphy undev s, am or me Sexua\ Offences Against Children Act In 2D17(“\|hs 2m7 Act“) and one (1) charge under me eeme sedinn in cese 1 em 5n5nI\wum1aF6X»:umA -we Sum IHIWDIY WW be used m mm we nvwnnﬂly mm; dun-mm vn nF\uNG wrm 15 m No. AB-62JSK»21-1\|/2019. The Appllcanl was ssn\|enoed la 13 years lmpnsonment lrom ma dale of oanvlcllnn 15.2.2023 and 3 strokes of me mlan In respect -71 each charge and all lmpnsonmam sentences were lo mn ouncurvemly. He was alsa semenue lo undergo counselllng whlle In prlsnn and 3 years‘ puliue superv on aﬂe( completing ms lmpnsnnmanl senlenoe The Sessiuns Couﬂ allawad a stay olexecullon permmg appeal agalnsl canvlcuon and senlencs to me Hlgh calm. ms Grounds al Judgment sals out ms reasons for alsmlssal of mm appllcamns. THE APPLICATION [3] Allhnugh he was charged in September 2019, mal only commenced on 24 3 2021 due In the CDVId'19 pandemic The Applloanl at me luwer cclurlwzs vepmjenlsd by his solicitor Messrs. Hakiml, Lallma s. Mavdhiyah & Assoclales, Talplng. The Noll’: Unsl/I was ﬁled by a dlffsrent sollcllor Messrs Abdullah, Maxnah a Jew, Kuala Lumpur an was 2023 as per Encl. 1 together with the Amsvir Sokongan m End. 2 afﬁnned bylhe Appllaam mmsall The applicatlon was made furadmlsslnn of a purportedly new svldence that was not avallahls durlng the lrlal [4] The Noll: L/aul sought the cams leave fur the lullnwlng a Eahnwl: Femnhun/Pzmyu yang dlnamakan an alas dlharl kebenaran unmk merluemukakan cahman/emuk pmlxil akin»-Jkaun BIGO Parvgadu (SWO) seven: yaw ullamulman dalnm Aﬂdavll Sakmvg-In nswmu aw MULANA yang dllkulkarl pada 15.052023 yang mama dllallkan :1! sin] dulam menyvlmng Malls usul ml subagal bukll-hukll kelararlaan harwlarllularl urlluk dlhzca aan dlmjuk scram helsekzll unmkdan baglmluan pamurlgararl rayuarl an Mahkamah mm. Malaya Talmna lug. keg Raylmn Jeniyah Nu A:-azlsxs-24:2/zm (rayuarl \|ersebul’ N 5m1nIlwukmdFm(wlRlA was Sun! nnvlhnrwm be used M mm .. mlmlluy mm: dun-mm VI] .mm mm 1:1 25 15 m 35 mm (supra) wmn approval. n mscussed what was a whoHy sxcsp\|inna\ circumstance, and there M was m rsgam In Ignorance an the defence of murder. Wwth respecl, the decision m me Singaporean case was conﬁned In the rams of the case and me apex court had staled: ‘ .Wa are nal s»-ggunng an out mumam ma any -gnmanu onus \am on me pan acwumx shank! neussumy mu . pm-manywng m avsry case. The law mung to murd-r hawevur, 1: We mosl mnnsmenu: pomon nf aﬂ our waw n gnvems ma mndnlons m whhzh many may take nwiy Me‘ an almv m n: avnﬂcaunn may be such that n can nevsrbe renam- [151 The decision 01 me svngaporean court Is omy persuaswe am not bnndmg here and «ms Court onmes that u rs not an appxe-mpme oompanson as the \aw in re\aUon to me dsfencs (or me capital olfenos of murdsr could not be equated with the defence avaﬂalﬂe In an accused in 5 20 of the 2017 A01. The apex court oonunued: ‘In I11: event we «ma umsehres cnmpeﬂad tn . vary ﬁvm mw Va me man max had (run avdenne Iogelller mm the avidanca .5 m m. nature at he klﬂmgs been below: the mal awn and had me mw vamnng la the mmdenca and Quantum ovproonaeen ounec1\|ysla(edm\|heAufY(as Vlwssbmen m laasnnnme My wmd Posswbw have some to any concmsum other man lhat me dedenca M mmvmshsd vaspuvvilhllwly was made nul - [19] that: ‘n It ﬂu paramaum duly av we own to sea mu, m we Vast resort pushca -5 dune mvd any mwluimnge :11 mm mm In vlaw nﬂha «am mm m. Isnmad Judas came in Ms mnclusnon as . veault a! me demonsxmﬁon Elven by In: chemlsl we cannc\| say he was nm inﬂuenced by lhis additions! evfdeme which was nolshwnuo be nenewry and also Vmpmveﬂy admmed AJudII cnnnoi sllvlnly can Invaddlﬂona cvldcnctlusnosalliw his curiosity or dnum at to supwlumnnl a was: n ma Prouclmon. Alia. such Ivmnnnm vv nuanluvy. mun DI m pron-r vom. am: um In accorﬂancn mm m mm mu nflm Cnmm-I Plocldun Cudl' Vn Do] v usim v FF 1193711 ML! 115, the Supreme Cuun held [Emphasis added] N manummasmm um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm III In 15 [201 I nave considered ine alﬂdavil in suppon oi ine epplicaiion, ine submisslens and case laws cited and l have also nigriiignied ine relevant cases above. The coun needs to deiennine wheilier all me iour ocndiliclns have been satisﬁed as submmsd by the Applicant‘: counsel that they have done so Wilh regard \|a mndlllons Nos. 2 and 3. this Court does nol have difficulty to answer in me amrniaiive As clearly explained in «he ihird ecndiiion enunclaled in R vPark$ (supral. ii IS not me task ar INS caun lo decide wneiher ihe proposed evidence is lo be believed or ndi. Al this stage, ine iuncuon oi ine couri is only lo deierniine wneiner ine proposed evidenee, ii given, is capable oi bsllsl. [21] However, in my underslandlng of «lie llie ﬁrs\|ount1i\|lorl,llls(l1aI llie evidence must nut he avaiiauie ai ihe iriai. To recap, in paragraph 9 di Enci, 2. me Appiioani slated in nis iesiirnony, lie laid me sessions coun inei in nach amount SP10 had stand her age as 19. 22 2nd 2:. ln paraymph 10. «he Auplicarlt evened ihal he had nonesily aliernpied id eseenain her real age Neveriheless. mere was no such documentary evidence suibmmed by his previous counsel lo suppon his oral evidence in edun at liiai lime. Then in paragraph is, he oorlll-adlcled nirnsell by slaiing inai pursuarll (0 his newly appointed oouneers advice, he had euiained uie pnnlouls in Exhlini HM—3 as lunner evidence ior ine purpose onne appeal Hound Ihal unis purpunadly new ovidancn was almady available ul the «rial. as lie already knew ihen she had svaled uiree diﬁmniagas In nu BIGO account nruﬂlos. But as to why the previaus counsel did no\| adduce iheni at when iirne. only ihe Appllcnni and his delenee learn knew llie reason. Failure. ii any. oi «lie previous eounsel lo suuinii lne docurnenls liien, did nol niean lliey were not available 5! all. I concluded mm iiia Aupllcam has not mieiiad ilie ﬂrsl condltlon. :1 sin 5J5nIlVnukmdF®01ilRlA -use s.ii.i Ilnvlhll will be used m mm ve nllnlrullly Minis dun-vlnril vu .nune Wﬂxl in In [22] wiln regard lo me leurln condillon. l.e. alter oonsldsring lnal evidence, go en lo cnnslder wnelher lnere nilgnl have been a reasonable doubt ln lne inlnds ollne Jury aslo ma gulllellheappellanl lllnal svldencs had been given logelnei wlln lne elnerevidenoe al \|l'le lnal. As there is no lury nare, lnls oundlllan will relarlolne lnal calm. A perusal pnna grounds of iudgmerll ln Exllloil l-ill/M snowed that me scJ nad oonsldeied lne Appllcanrs evidence and deienoe abwl no: known; SFIO‘s We age (paragraphs 32 onwards). Then in paragraph 37 onwards \|he SCJ sraled why she dld nol believe his delerlce. [23] in paragiapn 75, 12" line onwards, ane alaled '...spal7lIa rarludun dapal rnalrnal aeaualu yang mencurrgakan lanlang umul sebemar spur .” She wanl en lo paragraph 71, wnlcn was me pass for nrs applicaliens Io adrnn addilidnal evidanoe The SCJ viewed mallhe Apphcanl should have mat SP10 ln persun In asoenain one age ollna g‘lr\| And then the SCJ also rnenlloned aooul lne Aoplicanvs acadernlc qualilioalion ls. Diploma ln Early childhood Educallon, which she corlsldersd as well lnal lne delenoe alsad dld nol oonvlnce nar lrlal he dld nm know Ihe victim's lme age [24] The Appllcarll was asking lo adnill lns addlllenal deoumenlary evidenue ev SWO‘: purported adull ages bu\| lne SCJ's epneluaien was llnal lia did nol mzko any eiion tn mael wm. SP1\|l in person l fuund lnal based on her oonolusions, lne addllienal doournenlary evldence ln Exnibil HM—3 “would nol have raised a reasonable doubt in lne mind of me sc.I as In lne gull: ol lrle Anpllcanl ii lrral evldende nad been glven lcgelher wI\|h me olhar evldenoe al the lnal' Thonlon, tin Appllunt hu also nol aatlsﬂnd tholounh com1l\|\|all.Whelher ornollne SCJ was ngm in convict lne Applicanl la a dlﬂerenl nialler and lnal la lerlnla ceun In declde at me appeal siege. 1; SW 5m1nIlwmlkmdFm<qllRlA -we s.n.l n-vlhnrwm be used m mm ms nﬂnlruﬂly sun. dun-vlnrrl via .neno Wm! in m [25] It tetnte tewtneretere, tnet not ontythe etreumeteneee must be mas\| excepﬂonal but the subject wntcn ts pmpased to be adduced by further evtaenee ts subject ta exeeptianet onndilians. It becomes necessary anty ite latlure anusttoe would nesutt trsucn aaantenet etndence was not taken and allowed wnen audtttonat (acts have come to ﬁght since tne date at met. The matter ts leﬂ entirety lo the discreltcn at the court. And me coun has exemtsed we dtecretton judtctausty tn accordance wttn establtshed teget pnnctptee. There was nolhtng new tn lhe addmortal evtdenee wnten lhs Appttcent sought tn be admmed tn tne Recom at Appeal as they were already known to me defence et me lrtal. Moreover, me SCJ would not have cumelu a diﬂeranlcnnclusiun svsn W1hedncuman1s\|osht1w 5910': ‘purponzd emer aduk ages’ had been admmed at me Inal CONCLUSION [25] Premtsed upon the above cortstderaltcns, tne Cuurlluund Ihers was no merI\| tn the appllcahuns and both were dtsmlssed aoeerdtngly Dzlnd s Novemberznzct / %,,_/ Moor Ruwuta Btnu Md. Nurdln Judlclal Commlssiomr Nlgll Cnuﬂ ul Malaya, Tzlplng IA syn mnttmmemwn -we s.n.t n-vthnrwm be ts... m mm me mm-y mt. dun-mm VI] .nune Wm! Regmemn all For the App cam‘ Mr. mu Bln Jalflr 5 Abdullah, Mumh a. Jefrl, Kunll Lumpur For the Relpondontz um: Szll Chzy Mac Ling P-jabnl Tlmbalau Plndnkwa Raya Mason Ferak. Cawangan Talping an 15 sw 5nsnI\wum1aF6XqumA -ms Sum M... M“ be used m mm u. nvVWuH\|Y mm; “Mm. VII mum pm an m 15 Buhawn Perwnhun/Pe<iyn dlbsrl kubenaran unluk memlanknn bukN— mu keleranwsn bsmllanlman yam: diwhnn leuebul ssbagai R-ken rawan Tambahan nag: kss Rawan Jenayah NoAE»J2JSKS-2-02r‘2023 (mm Iecsgk-ml’), Bahawa Pemohnn/Psrayu when kehznalan urvtuk rnemmda Fstrsyen Rzyuan hanallkh zsa 2023 smaran German Danmah am kebenlnn yang dwbavlkarl uaram plravvqcan (1) dan (2; an alas‘ amwa sehanjlmiya um semms dengin Ssksysn 317 Kanun Pmeaur Janlyarl mm 51:) ksteranuan ham/Vanjulan hen<a\Lan pmhﬂ mu» akaml BIGO Pnngadu (spun aummn dan dneﬂmn masuk umuk ﬂan Dag: mluan Dendenanmn layuan ur Mahkameh nnggr Mavaya Talpmg nag: kss Rayuan Jenayah Na AE—42.1SKS-2-a2l2\|723 (Wiyuan xerunmw Eahawa sekhanya am: clan 3 animal (will Rzyuan pada ma zuza duadualkan semmz ke lankh ham unluk membenarmn ketslangin barn/Vammnn sedcmlklan mmawmr. mgr human hujzhulrhujahan ﬂalam rayum dun dahm pendengavlll riyuan vamubm ar Mahkaman Muha rm: Rem sehrqulnyl yang Mahkamah Yang Mull: Im ﬁklrxan warer, Dihll den sum mamanl. The same prayers were snughl in respect 0! CrIm\|na\ Appeal No. AB42JSKS-$02/2023 «or Case No, AB-GZJSK-21-II/2019. The bﬂef reasons gwen in! ms appllcaﬂons ware um. the Aupllcanl was convicted on 15.2 2023 after a lull lnal an the (our charges. He had been sentenced to 13 years‘ Impdsunmenl mm the dale av common and 3 strokes each al me man; 2 sm 5«zmI\wuxmaFm<wvwrA “Nana smm n-nhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my r... mrmu-y mm: dun-mm VII mum vmm m m vu. ne was dissausned wun the decwsion 0! me Sessions Conn and had med appems In the Hugh com and men me Pelmon er Appeal was med en 25.4.2023: me Sessions court In smvlng at us deuswun had cnnsxdered the pmwsven of ‘Presumplion of age of a mild‘ under s.2o of the zen Am and deuided mac -rermun/Pmyu uuex menunjukkan Teduduh sda msnja/ankan usaha dan rkhlisr Lmluk bsdumpa dsngan spm ssndfli bagi memaslikan semade SP10 re/an seoreng dewasa eveu kanek»kanak': ne documentary ewdenae Derlammg to "caburarl/eksl'rak pmfaﬂ akaun-akaun 5/so /em Pengsdu (spmr were tendered aH.\|1elHa\| m the Sessxans Court and (hvs dwecily prejumced the defence or me Appellanl/Apphcanl; substantial prejudice would alsn ensue \f the 'cabutan/skslrsk pmlarl ekaunekeun BIGD tern Psngadu {SP1ll]" are not aﬂowed In be made as pen uflhs Recmd ufAppea\|; docurnenvary ewdence pena ng 10 ‘semen/eksLrek prulaﬂ akaun-akaun E/Go /err: Pengadu (SP10)‘ sought u: be tendered are very inter-related wnm the findings at me Sessions Courl: me sens documentary evidence sougm la be adrmlled herein are cremble decumemery evmenae and would raise a reeseneme doubt m the lower court re\at\ng to me Appllcanfs gum W015 sawd evfdenue nad been admitted along with u\|her evmenue Iherem. o syn manuxmmarmm -nee snrm n-nhnrwm be used m mm n. nrwhrnﬂly mm: dun-mm wa mum Wm I5 15 [s] The Deputy Pubhl: Prosecutor (DFP) ate not me any amttavtt In reply but obtected to the appttcettone in the wntten sutzmtestans of the Respondent ntett on the nterntng at t4.a 2023 The hearing al the appttcatten was nominated an 14.4% 2023 and adjourned lur decision on 4.9.2023. EVALUATION AND F mug; QE YHE COURT [7] addtttonal or runner evtdence states. The plovistun of s 317 atthe cwc which ptovtdes tot teeeptton at “Older ta take ttttthet etttaenae an (H tn aeattng wtth any apnnet undsr tttts crteptet a htage. n he wnks saatttanet emenee tn be neseuaty, may ettnettate such evtaence htrnaettar etteat tt ts be taken by a Magishilu (2; when the addmnnnl evidence ta taken by a hteatettate he ettatt eenny that evidence tn the htsh cetttt who ehatt then, us eeen ee may he. messed te atspoee nl the appeat tat Unless the Judas uthetwtse attests, the aeatteaa at he advucale shatt he wuent when the eaatttenet avtdunce ts taken. tmha tehna ul smdancs ttneenhte senmn utett, tatttte pttrpnsas orcheptet xxv, be dsemed te he nn ?nﬂu\ty' [9] The Appllcanl eubtntttea that the math reasan tot the appttcattens was due te the ﬁndings made tn the grounds of tttegntent uflhe Sessions com Judge (SCJ) in paragraph 77 which was tn E HMV1 ol Enat 2, where she had stated 'Tst1uduh/Pelayu I/dak menultitlkkan Tenuduh sda men/‘a/ankan usaha dart ikhtiar tmfuk bequmpa dsngan SP10 eencttn‘ bag!‘ I-nemasrikalv sarnada sum ia/ah seolang dewasa alau kanalokanak’. Referring to s.2o at the 2017 Act, counsel tor the Apptteent tntatntee the Cuuﬂ that the pt-vlons counsel tithe Sosllans Court did not presam 5 atn ettatttteeehttemattete ‘Nuns a.n.t I-vthnrwm be used a mm the .nttn.tt-y MW: dun-mm he .nette WM! in 15 15 the evidence wlilch they sought io ho adinllhd as panoftho doluiu ease The Aooirsani came to know the victim (SWO) through the itve streaming piaitsrrn knnwn as "B]GO‘. si=to had an assount wi\|h BIGO. The crux oitne deienoe case was exastiy that aitnouoh the Applicant had been eornrnunr 9 Via iaieu, telephone and wnarsApp with the victim tsi=to). he did not know her real age because BIGO was an aduitsoniy piationn and not intended iorsnyone under ta years o1sge.TheApoIicent sought to aoouse aooriionai evidence (he! SPIO owned more than one EIGO acoount and each oi them showed diitereni ages at SF10 (please reierto Exhibit Hit/i—3 in Enot. 2). itenoe, ms Appiioani had seen denied oi a iair tnai one to the neornpotsnee" oi the proviso: eounsei who conducted the ease and aid nut adduue the said Exhibit i-tM<a. [91 counsei reierred to a iew cases in its Bundle of Amhurilies and argued that the ease of uiuruqaynh v PF porn] 2 ML! 545 was apphssois here. The Apphcani wanted to show to the court that he did make etiorts to ascertain her age. The new evidence wduid satisfy the tour ssnortions In R u Parks moi] 2 AER us and it may raise a the mind onhs iriai iudge They prayer: that me courr aiiowed the ooauments to be aornnteo so that they wouid have a ehsnoe to argue the ease during the supsrantwe aopeai reastonabie dou [to] The DPP submmed that the Applicant knew that SWO lied aoour her age as the evidence would show. The printouts In Exhibit HM<S were inoancluslvs as two at ihern did not shtm ihe viclim‘s iace. iithe prinloms were admiued, the prosecution seuto not send them ior veniieanon and whether these pmliies were shii YVI existence. it was not known it the aiieged pmliles were used WI cummunimtiuns oetwsan the Applicant and SFID. itwher the Appiioant aiieged was true, Ex r it HM4 wouid have s SIN 5JiinIVVnukmdFDWVRiA None s.n.i n-rihnrwm rs used m mm ms oﬂninsiily Mimi dun-rinrrl VI] .nuue Wmi as an 15 existed during the tnal and therelora did not satisiy the corldﬂmns in R v Parks (supra). The DPP sutiinltted turther that the SCJ had assessed the credipllity at the witnesses arid came to a culmcl hriding at the tnat and the victim's cross-excrriinatlori at pages :s:s:l~3:s7 ot the Nuts t)1Evidenoe (which were not exhlbited in the application) showed that she had been asked the relevant qussllorls regarding her age. However, the Applicant did not adhere to the ccnect procedures to admit lurther evlderlce ler the purpose atthe appeal and prayed torthe application to be dismissed. she argued that in the ease of uurugayeri v PP tsupra), the court of Appeal had oleany explained the conditions in R v Parks tsupra). Hence, to allow the applications would be a travesty oriustide to the prosecution case after trial and a second bite at the cherry by the N7 ‘ rlt so to speak. I11] ln reply, counsel lor the Applicant submitted (rather puzzllngtyl that Muntglynh v PF (supra) could ae distinguished tiecause the application under s.3I7 oi the CPC was made about three years later whereas here End. 1 was tlled lrriniediately whlle pending the appeal ln the instant case, the existenoe of other also accotmls held py SP10 would show that she had stated ditterent ages (lied apout her real agei. ln paragmph sorsrict 2, the Applicant stated that in his testimony, he told the Sessions Cnurl that in each aecourrt SP1D had stated her age as la, 22 arid 23 sl=tu also told hlrh that she was studying in upper Form 6 and which was why he believed that she was rnore than 18 years‘ old. In paragraph to. the Applleantaveneo that he had honestly attempted to ascertalri her real age in paragraph t1, the Applicant stated that nevertheless, there was no such documentary evidence supinitted by the previous oourisel to support his eral evidence in cutm at that time He had peen supstantially preiudioed by the nndings at the sc.l in his deteriee because the iudge had applied am at the 2017 Act on the wrong evidence. 7 SN 5*JlinIlVnukmdFD(qiYRlA -use s.n.i In-vlhnrwlll re used is mm s. oﬂnlrrallly Mlhls dnunvlnrll vta aFlt.ING wnxl 2n so [12] In paragraph 12‘ The Appncanc stated that In March 2023 upon appoinwlg a dwrerem counsel to conduct his appeal and in prepareuon at me Penman M Apbeal. he had been asked about SP1D’s omer awso account pmmes. Pursuant merelc, m pamgraph 15 me Apgncann smeu that ne had (aken steps m obtain ms extrams ol SP1D‘s o\|her sweo account memes in order tor the documents to be admitted as and Inna! evidenoa for the purposes M me appeaxs. [1 :1] The coun win not dehbeme on me rnerivs of ms defence in regard to the apphcanons. But it \s peninent at this point. for completeness. lo stale the law in regard to sm anhe 2017 Amvmvch provides: 'Fve:umD\|mn ahsge nla mm 2n n Vs ml adeleme la a chmgefaranyoﬂenoe uMerIh>sAc1. or any Mlence Sbecmed m we seneaune wne.e me mum \s a em, man an accused neuem that me :98 av me mm: 45 an more man mm as specmaa m we rsspecllve pmwsmns m such nﬂencu 2\| the cm ma vﬂencu n aﬂeged 10 Ma been mmmmad umasx live nccuuaa muk an raamnahle steps «a men“ me 192 no the and - [141 The Applicant Vs relying on the phrase ‘unless ms accused look all reasonable slaps Ia ascsnam ms ags ofths chila’. Augusnns Paul JCA m Muruglylh vrr (supra) sialad: “s n wm be obsswad mm on vacephon oi lddmunzl amama Vs a matter :71 discvemn u .5 smiled um Ihal me exerdse M n dFs\|:re\|mn musl be m acmrdance wulh eslzbﬂshed mdlchal guldeﬂnes In me case at aaaumng addmonalev1asrme.lha wmdeimas were wen out m Laud vMarsha/M15413 All ER 745 m ma vonn unmua condmuni. In ehlzoralmn aims commons, Lard ParkarCJ sawd n R vPaﬂ<s[1961]J All ER 5:: at p 6: Thuclpdnclplll club: xummarludinlhlx way. rum. um uvldlncn um n I. wunlll to all mun bu uvldlncn which Wu not Ivallubll .1 um um Slcnndly, ma on. you wllhuul lylnq, It mull bu syn 5«zmI\wukmaFm<wvmA «-we sum ...n.mn be used m mm me mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm -vlﬂcncu .- van! 1.: 1h. lssun rhhs1Iy,h must bl ma...“ which Is cudlbla wldcnu 1.. In: nun that n 1. wull can-nu. .1 Del‘ 1 1 ....1 1... 1h1. cnunlndncldu -.h.1>m111s to h. hnlllvod ornol, but 11 ......1 by ...1.1.m which 1. capahn. or Iullﬂ. rounhuy, nhs soun will .1... cnnsld-ling muuvldnnu go 1... 1.; co..u.1..wh.mu1hm mlghl hm bun .. nuonlhlu .1......11.. 1h. ...1...1. anh. Jury 1.. 12.1 cum .1 Ch: anvnllam Wlhm ovldinct had bun gum Iannhu wlm 1h. o1hIr nvld-nu .1 1h. (rial. 7 The slalememotlhe 1.... 1.. R1/Park£II9§1]3AHERG33 hm: been adumsd and aonhea 1.1 ml cases such as Mohamed uh. Jamel V Pub/I: Prosecular[196ll1 MLJ 254: Del bln Laura I/Fumrc Pm.Iecw!ar[19B7] 1 MLJ 1161LoFarTﬂlarv L D751/F'ubhc Frusacumr[1966l1 MLJ 214 aha ChsD1n 1.1.. AhmadvPub/rcProwcutoI[1§16lI MU 259 1h. conditions an cumulatlvt ....: ....u..m. .h.....1. Ild .1..1...n.. lppnllanllnnnlsfy km mun hat they hm 1:... 1..mn..1 1... ch. Dln bin Ahmad v ;=..ou.= Pmser.-uIar[1D7bl 1 mm us). 11 Is 1.1.1,. - 1h. ......1 .mpnm1 nlrnumstzncns Ihallhe mun mu Ieuelve . ...1 mddnnwl Assyed A911 Earakbah J (as he men was) said 1.. Che om bln Ahmad u puuhu ;-.omu.ur\|w1s1 1 MLJ 259 a1 vb zasszgo: Naw,s 3171.1 111. 12.1.11...» Pmusduva cm: gwas : msm.1.ah in me .u.4geh1 heanng -unynvnealtn aﬂaw a.1.1111....a1 evldelvce .1 he mm such .s necessary. In cnnsldenina such avnhmlinn me nppeHaIz mull has a\ways adoptsd lhe almude that .1 1s my 1» 1h... ms. ExceDImna\ cucumsaanoes, and sumacn tau whal may be assmhea as ex=ep11e..a1 candnmns. mar (ha wun >5 aver wmmg to listen «.1 addmuna! awaenoe (Mohamnd 1.... u....../ V Pub/I: PmseL‘1lIor[19GJ] 1 MLJ 254, 255 per 11...“... LP. ﬂummg HaHe1 J ...1h. can ..1 .7 V .Iar1.1an(195E) m c. App R 152. 154) h is nlenr, 1ma1...c‘ 1h.1 nol nnly 1... cimumshmes must be men exnevlional but the suhilcl which s mono-an to In mum by Nrlher evldlnce Ls sunlect to -mmnohan condllh-mi. 11 hocomn h nsiry my I! a lallun nf i-mic. would mun iiluch addmonii Ividvnco was hm mm. and .u.y....1 whnn . .:.1...... cu hm w . 1.; light :1...» Int am 01 mu ....m . 1.41 ...u..1y huh: asm. .... nflhn c.....-1.~. [Emphasis added] [151 In Mulugayah v PP qsupra), (he accused was charged .1 me sessmns court WIH1 an nlfencs under 5.325 of the Penal Cnds far having caused grievous hurt to one Kantharupan who at me me! had identiﬁed 9 N 5ﬁ5nI\wu>1mdFww¥R1A 1.... s..1.1.......um.. used .. mm .. ..1.h.h. MW; dnu-mm VII .nu.uc pm... iii IS zu 15 an me aeeiised as one oi the coin peieens who had ahacxed him. The accused was oonvieted in Febmary 1997 and sentenced. He appeaied to the High cotinagainst the eenvietiaii and sentence. whiie the appeal was pending the accused made an appiicahen in the High ooiiit to adduee additional evidence puieiinnt I0 s :17 er the cue iioiii himseii, Kanlhanlpan and one Kiishnari His appiieetion was disiiiissed by the High Court He appealed against the High Courl decisien The hasls of his application wee that eoniotiino fter his conviction, in was. he was intoi-iiied by Kitetinan that Kenitiarupnn waa iiecuaity uuiiited tiy euiai pnrsons. He tater niet Kanthanipan who toid the aeeiieed that he had ideiitined the accused in cdiiit based on imoiniatien he obtained from a third F-any His appeal againstthe High cciiiitdecisioii was attdwad. The circumstances in that case was the proizosed evidenee ceiitd nut have been zivaiiaoie at the tnei and it went to the identity dnhe assaitant [161 Therelove, it appeared in the above case that the inieiniation seiigtii to DB admiltied as ﬂesh evidence WES DVIW awilabie in 1998 aﬂer the Ma‘ ended. The third and ioiiiiti condillons in R v Parks (sum) weie also not satisﬁed In that case To siininiaiise, the tour conditions are. 1 me endenee Ih-I\|!l ie lﬂughi la can must be evidenea which was net aveitaeie ai itie iiiai ii niiisi be evideiiee relevant to the iseves 3 ii must ee evidence which is eiedioie evidence in the ieiice that it Ii wail eaeeeie oi oeiieh, it It nut iei this cciiitio deeds Wﬂalharll im e. balievud W rial, but it iiiim be evidence which n eepaiii. af hlhaf 4 me com vnii aitenedinideniie thl\| evidence an en la caruidsr whelher ineie might have iieen ii renmnahle douhl in the niinds eiiheiury as to the eiiiii at the iiveeitani Iflhn\| evidence had eeen given \|age1her wilh lha oihei evideiiee ai the met [17] I have eiso iaoked at the case of Mohitmed Bin Jlmll v PP [1954 1 ML! 254 where the Fedei-ai court of Singapore which also cited R v iii N eeciiiiemdidmeiieie we s.ii.i nnvihnrwm be in... M mm ee nﬂnihnﬂly MIME dnunvilnl wa miiiic WM!	2,001	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
JA-A72NCvC-127-02/2020	PLAINTIF HADIN ENGINEERING SDN BHD DEFENDAN EASTERN PRETECH (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD	Perbicaraan penuh-beban pembuktian kes sivil-Kebolehterimaan keterangan dokumentar-Akta Jualan Barangan 1957-Jualan secara deskripsi-Anggapan seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950-Keterangan saksi pakar-Seksyen 45 Akta Keterangan 1950.	06/11/2023	Puan Noorfazlin Binti Hamdan	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b450aee6-0446-41b4-960a-cf53c052a312&Inline=true	1 DALAM PERKARA MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO: JA-A72NCVC-127-02/2020 HADIN ENGINEERING SDN BHD [ Company No.: 27816-T ] …PLAINTIF Dan EASTERN PRETECH (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD [ Company No.: 198901007471(184774-P) ] …DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (BICARA PENUH) PRAEFATIO: [1] Ini merupakan Alasan Penghakiman atas rayuan Defendan yang tidak berpuas hati terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Majistret Sivil (1) Johor Bahru di akhir kes perbicaraan penuh pada 30.08.2023 di mana Mahkamah telah membenarkan Tuntutan Plaintif dan menolak Tuntutan Balas Defendan. Rayuan ini adalah terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Mahkamah tersebut. [2] Sepanjang perbicaraan pihak-pihak telah memanggil saksi-saksi berikut: SAKSI PLAINTIF SP1-Ha Sze Seng 06/11/2023 08:17:18 JA-A72NCvC-127-02/2020 Kand. 78 S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 SP2-Dzul Yadaini Muhamad SAKSI DEFENDAN SD1-Abel Limmyros Bak Hock Swee SD2-Tee Bee Kim SD3-Nurul Ain Nasuha binti Mohd Radzi SD4-See Toh Wai Kue SD5-Muhammad Saifullah bin Hasim RINGKASAN KES: [3] Plaintif adalah sebuah syarikat kejuruteraan di Pasir Gudang, manakala Defendan adalah sebuah syarikat pembuatan dan penjualan produk konkrit precast dan kerja pemasangan tapak yang dijalankan di Jalan Seelong,Senai,Johor.Berdasarkan fakta kes, ini bukanlah kali pertama kedua-dua pihak menjalankan urusniaga bersama. [4] Pada 22.10.2019, pekerja Defendan iaitu SD2 telah menghantar 1 emel kepada Plaintif melalui SP1 meminta Plaintif menyediakan 1 tawaran sebutharga bagi 3850 steel brackets dengan spesifikasi 200mm x 200mm x 9mm dengan Lakaran steel brackets (selepas ini disebut Lakaran Pertama). [5] SP1 mendapati terdapatnya ralat pada lakaran steel brackets dari sudut spesifikasi. Oleh itu, SP1 menghubungi SD2 meminta pengesahan jenis steel brackets yang hendak digunakan iaitu keluli lembut (mild steel) kerana adanya catitan Grade S275 pada Lakaran Pertama. [6] SD2 telah menghantar emel kedua bertarikh 25.10.2019 dengan menyatakan spesifikasi yang dikehendaki iaitu 200mm x 100mm. SP1 seterusnya telah menyediakan 1 sebutharga bertarikh 24.10.2019 yang S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 berjumlah RM721,250-00 iaitu RM185/unit mild steel brackets (selepas ini disebut Sebutharga Pertama). [7] Pada 7.11.2019, Defendan telah mengurangkan kuantiti kepada 500 unit sahaja dan Plaintif masih meneruskan kontrak dengan Defendan.Kemudiannya, pada 8.11.2019 SD2 telah memaklumkan mengurangkan lagi kuantiti kepada 300 unit sahaja dengan mengarahkan Plaintif memulakan kerja dan membuat penghantaran pertama sebanyak 50 unit steel brackets pada 15.11.2019 tanpa sebarang pesanan pembelian rasmi. [8] Plaintif melalui SP1 telah meminta Defendan agar penghantaran dibuat pada 20.10.2019 atau selepas itu kerana bahan mentah hanya boleh diperolehi Plaintif pada 11.11.2019 sedangkan arahan Defendan hanya diberikan pada 8.11.2019. SD2 telah menghantar emel kepada SP1 memaklumkan persetujuan tarikh 20.11.2019 tetapi tidak berjanji jumlah steel brackets kekal 500 unit. Oleh itu, Defendan hanya mengeluarkan pesanan pembelian berjumlah 300 unit sahaja. [9] Pada 14.11.2019, SD2 telah menghantar Pesanan Pembelian bertarikh 11.11.2019 berjumlah RM70,500-00 bagi 300 unit steel brackets. Plaintif mendakwa atas kelewatan Defendan menghantar pesanan pembelian tersebut menyebabkan penghantaran pertama hanya boleh dibuat pada 21.11.2019. [10] Defendan melalui SD2 bersetuju dengan permintaan Plaintif tersebut menerusi emel bertarikh 19.11.2019 mengarahkan Plaintif menghantar 20 unit steel brackets kepada Defendan pada 21.11.2019 dan seterusnya sebanyak 50 unit steel brackets setiap hari bermula 25.11.2019. Plaintif telah memulakan kerja-kerja pembuatan steel S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 brackets tersebut tanpa sebarang pembayaran deposit daripada Defendan. [11] Plaintif telah membuat (2) kali penghantaran steel brackets seperti berikut: (i) Pada 21.11.2019, Plaintif telah menghantar 20 unit steel brackets kepada Defendan dan bukti akuan terima Defendan bertarikh 21.11.2019 (Rujuk P12 Ikatan B m/s 26) dan emel SD2 mengesahkan penerimaan (Rujuk P13 Ikatan B m/s 25). (ii) Pada 25.11.2019,Plaintif telah menghantar 100 unit steel brackets kepada Defendan dan bukti akuan terima Defendan bertarikh 21.11.2019 (Rujuk P14 Ikatan B m/s 27). [12] Ketika Plaintif sedang menyiapkan baki steel brackets, pada hari yang sama iaitu 25.11.2019 Defendan mengarahkan Plaintif menghentikan kerja-kerjanya serta-merta. Pada 26.11.2019, Defendan melalui SD1 mendakwa Plaintif gagal mengikut spesifikasi yang diberikan dan mengarahkan Plaintif membaiki semula steel brackets tersebut dengan kosnya sendiri. [13] Pada 27.11.2019, Defendan melalui pekerja bernama Suriana menghantar emel kepada Plaintif berserta Lakaran lain (selepas ini disebut Lakaran Kedua) yang didakwa oleh Plaintif mempunyai spesifikasi dan jenis steel brackets yang berbeza daripada Lakaran Pertama. Namun, perbezaan ini dinafikan oleh Defendan. Dalam emel tersebut inter alia Plaintif diminta membaiki semula 120 unit steel brackets dengan menggunakan High Tensil Deformed Bar dengan kosnya sendiri kerana jenis steel brackets yang dikehendaki adalah High Tensil Deformed Bar. S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [14] Plaintif telah tidak bersetuju dengan permintaan Defendan tersebut. Sebaliknya telah meminta Defendan perlulah membayar terlebih dahulu kos pembekalan 120 unit steel brackets dan kos bahan mentah bagi 300 unit steel brackets tersebut. Namun, permintaan Plaintif telah ditolak oleh Defendan menyebabkan Plaintif telah melantik Peguamcara dan mengisukan 1 Notis Tuntutan bertarikh 04.12.2019 dengan menuntut RM71,100-00 kepada Defendan. Defendan pula telah menafikan liabiliti tersebut dan membuat tawaran penyelesaian dengan sejumlah RM7,080- 41 dibayar kepada Plaintif dan ditolak oleh Plaintif. [15] Defendan juga telah membuat satu tuntutan balas sebanyak RM62,299-82 dan Ganti rugi Am kepada Plaintif atas alasan terpaksa menanggung kos dan perbelanjaan tambahan membaikpulih 120 unit steel brackets tersebut. Defendan juga telah mendapatkan khidmat kontraktor lain iaitu Silvermax Engineering bagi menghasilkan 180 unit baki steel brackets tersebut. BEBAN PEMBUKTIAN: [16] Beban pembuktian kes pihak Plaintif adalah di tahap imbangan kebarangkalian sepertimana diputuskan dalam kes Inas Faiqah Mohd Helmi v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2016] 2 CLJ 885 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan di para 13: “[13] The standard of proof in civil cases is the legal standard to which a party is required to prove its case, namely on a balance of probabilities. In civil litigation, the question of the probability or improbability of an action occurring is an important consideration to be taken into account in deciding whether that particular event had actually taken place or not…” S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [17] Begitu juga beban pembuktian Defendan atas Tuntutan Balas terhadap Plaintif adalah serupa. Oleh itu, berikut adalah isu-isu yang perlu dipertimbang oleh Mahkamah. ISU-ISU DIBICARAKAN & BERBANGKIT: (1)Penandaan dokumen ID29-ID34,ID35,ID37 dan ID38 sebagai ekshibit [18] Dokumen-dokumen yang bertanda ID yang dibantah oleh Defendan adalah seperti berikut: Tandaan Mahkamah Jenis Dokumen ID29 Invois Ikatan Dokumen C mukasurat 1 - 4 ID30 Invois Ikatan Dokumen C mukasurat 5 - 7 ID31 Invois Ikatan Dokumen C mukasurat 8 - 9 ID32 Invois Ikatan Dokumen C mukasurat 10 ID33 Invois Ikatan Dokumen C mukasurat 11 ID34 Invois Ikatan Dokumen C mukasurat 12 - 16 ID35 Invois Ikatan Dokumen C mukasurat 17 ID37 Notis berkenaan kadar caj daripada Lembaga Pelabuhan Johor Ikatan Dokumen D mukasurat 1 - 9 S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 ID38 Undang-undang Kecil Lembaga Pelabuhan Johor (Skala Caj) 2011 Ikatan Dokumen D mukasurat 14 - 15 [19] Mahkamah telah menerimamasuk kesemua dokumen ID di atas dengan membenarkan penandaan ekshibit P atas alasan-alasan seperti berikut:- (i)Mahkamah mendapati walaupun Plaintif gagal untuk memanggil pembuat-pembuat dokumen tersebut, namun wujudnya pengecualian bagi keterangan dengar cakap selaras seksyen 32(1)(b) Akta Keterangan 1950 yang berbunyi seperti berikut: Section 32 - Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc, is relevant (1)Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases: ... (b) when the statement was made by any such person in the ordinary course of business, and in particular when it consists of any entry or memorandum made by him in books kept in the ordinary course of business or in the discharge of professional duty; or of an acknowledgment written or signed by him of the receipt of money, goods, securities or property of any kind; or of a document used in commerce, S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 written or signed by him, or of the date of a letter or other document usually dated, written or signed by him. [20] Berbalik kes ini, Mahkamah berpendapat jika Plaintif memanggil setiap wakil syarikat yang membekalkan kesemua invois (ID29-ID35) tersebut akan mengakibatkan kelengahan dan perbelanjaan yang tidak berpatutan dalam kes ini. Sebagai pembeli bahan-bahan mentah tersebut, SP1 sememangnya ada pengetahuan penuh tentang kandungan invois-invois tersebut. [21] Malah, berdasarkan keterangan Defendan juga mengesahkan ada menempah steel brackets daripada Plaintif.Jika tiada, bagaimana Plaintif boleh menyerahhantar 120 unit steel brackets kepada Defendan dan mempunyai baki 180 unit steel brackets dalam kes ini. Oleh itu, Mahkamah berpuas hati sememangnya wujud modal bahan-bahan mentah yang perlu dibeli oleh Plaintif dalam kes ini dan fakta ini tidak dipertikaikan. [22] (ii) Penandaan ekshibit P29-P35 juga adalah selaras dengan Seksyen 73A AK 1950 yang berbunyi: Kebolehterimaan keterangan dokumentar dalam kes sivil, dsb. 73A. (1) Walau apa pun yang terkandung dalam Bab ini, dalam mana- mana prosiding sivil jika keterangan lisan secara langsung mengenai sesuatu fakta boleh diterima, apa-apa pernyataan yang dibuat oleh seseorang dalam sesuatu dokumen dan yang cenderung membuktikan fakta itu boleh, apabila dikemukakan dokumen asal, diterima sebagai keterangan mengenai fakta itu jika syarat yang berikut dipenuhi: (a) jika orang yang membuat pernyataan itu sama ada— S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 (i) mengetahui sendiri tentang perkara yang diperkatakan dalam pernyataan itu; atau (ii) jika dokumen yang berkenaan itu sebahagian atau menjadi sebahagian daripada rekod yang berupa sebagai rekod yang berterusan, telah membuat pernyataan itu (setakat yang perkara yang diperkatakan dalamnya tidak diketahui olehnya sendiri) dalam melaksanakan tugas merekodkan maklumat yang diberikan kepadanya oleh seseorang yang telah atau boleh semunasabahnya dianggap telah mengetahui sendiri tentang perkara itu; dan …”. Keterangan SP1 tersebut adalah mencukupi untuk mematuhi prasyarat yang dinyatakan di atas kerana SP1 mempunyai pengetahuan langsung tentang kewujudan invois-invois tersebut. Oleh itu, adalah wajar untuk Mahkamah membenarkan kesemua dokumen tersebut menjadi eskhibit P29-P35. [23] (iii)Penandaan ID37 dan ID38 pula didapati terjumlah sebagai dokumen awam mengikut seksyen 74,78 Akta Keterangan 1950 dan seksyen 57 Akta Keterangan 1950 sebagai Pengiktirafan Penghakiman (Judicial Notice) kerana dokumen-dokumen tersebut merupakan Notis daripada Lembaga Pelabuhan Johor dan Undang-undang Kecil Lembaga Pelabuhan Johor (Skala Caj) 2011. Oleh itu, Mahkamah membenarkan penandaan P37 dan P38. (2)Sama ada pembekalan 120 unit steel brackets oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan telah dibuat? [24] Isu utama yang dipertikaikan pihak-pihak adalah jenis steel brackets sebenar yang dipesan oleh Defendan kerana wujud (2) versi antara kedua-dua pihak. Plaintif mendakwa Defendan telah memesan 300 unit steel brackets menggunakan jenis “Mild Steel Rod”. Akan tetapi, S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Defendan mendakwa telah memesan steel brackets jenis “High Tensil Deformed Bar”.Kedua-dua ini mempunyai perbezaan yang ketara dari segi mata kasar dan pemakaiannya.Berikut adalah gambar kedua-dua jenis steel brackets yang menjadi pertikaian (Rujuk D44): Mild steel rod High Tensil Deformed Bar [25] Mahkamah merujuk kepada fakta-fakta yang dipersetujui (Ekshibit H &J) di mana dipersetujui urusniaga pemesanan steel brackets tersebut antara wakil pekerja Defendan bernama Jyn Tee (SD2) dengan wakil Plaintif iaitu Samuel Ha (SP1). Pada 22.10.2019, SD2 telah menghantar emel kepada SP1 Lakaran Pertama yang mengandungi spesifikasi berkenaan steel brackets tersebut yang disebut sebagai bracket hollow section beam di Ikatan Dokumen Plaintif B m/s1-2 seperti berikut: S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [26] Menurut SP1, maklumat pada Lakaran Pertama tersebut tidak lengkap di mana spesifikasi 200mmx200mmx9mm ketebalan juga kelihatan salah. Hal ini menyebabkan SP1 telah menghubungi SD2 dan memaklumkan kesilapan pada Lakaran Pertama meminta pengesahan tentang jenis steel brackets yang hendak digunakan kerana ada catatan S275 Grade bermaksud mild steel rod. [27] Mahkamah mendapati terdapat emel jawapan SD2 dengan SP1 bertarikh 25.10.2019 jam 9.42 yang telah membuat pembetulan akan spesifikasi seperti berikut sepertimana di Lakaran Pertama: S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [28] Keterangan SP1 menyatakan SD2 telah mengesahkan jenis steel bracket yang hendak digunakan adalah mild steel rod. Namun, emel tersebut didapati tidak ada menjawab pertanyaan Plaintif tentang jenis steel brackets yang digunakan melainkan ukuran yang diberikan. Apa yang ada, hanyalah simbol-simbol yang turut menjadi pertikaian pihak- pihak. [29] Mahkamah mendapati, pembelaan Defendan telah menafikan keterangan SP1 tersebut. SD2 menyatakan steel brackets yang ditempah sepatutnya High Tensil Deformed Bar kerana emel SD2 tersebut meletakkan H20 dan H16. Bagi menjawab isu ini, Mahkamah mendapati wujudnya keterangan-keterangan lain yang dapat menunjukkan jenis steel brackets yang ditempah pada mulanya menurut kontrak seperti berikut: (i) SP2 iaitu saksi pakar Plaintif telah menjelaskan amalan prosedur biasa industri dalam membuat tempahan kepada kontraktor S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 memerlukan perkara asas seperti nama barang/perkhidmatan yang diperlukan, kuantiti, jadual/tarikh penghantaran, gred bahan, Lukisan Kejuruteraan yang menyatakan saiz, ukuran dan bentuk, keperluan lain seperti mengecat atau salutan atau galvanizing, keperluan pemeriksaan mutu dan kawalan kualiti; (ii) SP2 juga menyatakan Defendan selaku pembeli perlu menilai sebut harga dan memberikan maklumat tambahan kepada Plaintif selaku penjual supaya faham keperluan hasil barangan tersebut. Keterangan SP2 ini disokong dokumentasi manual BS EN 10025:1993 (Rujuk P3 Ikatan C m/s 42); (iii) Keterangan tersebut telah dicabar kepada saksi pembelaan SD1 dan SD1 mengakui telah gagal mengamalkan sepenuhnya prosedur yang dijelaskan SP2 tersebut. (Rujuk NK m/s 80 para 8-32); (iv) Tindakan SP1 yang menerima tempahan tersebut walaupun Defendan gagal menggunapakai amalan prosedur biasa masih boleh diteruskan kerana menurut SP2, adanya lakaran diberikan oleh Defendan dengan dinyatakan nama barang tersebut “Hollow Section Beam & Gred S275”; (v) Berdasarkan standard piawai garis panduan penghasilan lakaran steel bracket yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Defendan (Rujuk D39 ikatan dokumen F m/s 9,10 dan 12) mengkehendaki Defendan menyatakan indikasi apakah standard yang digunakan untuk mentafsirkan lakaran dengan memasukkan perkataan “this schedule conforms to BS8666:2020”,jenis dan gred yang digunakan.Namun, Mahkamah mendapati tidak ada standard yang dinyatakan/dicatatkan dalam lakaran bracket tersebut.Ini diakui S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 sendiri oleh Defendan melalui SD5 (Rujuk NK m/s 33 para 13- 30 & m/s 34 para 9-30); (vi) Mahkamah mendapati SD5 mengakui salah faham atau kekeliruan dapat dielakkan jika lakaran steel bracket yang dibekalkan Defendan tersebut selaras dan mengikut dengan garis panduan yang dinyatakan; (vii) Oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati Defendan telah gagal membekalkan lakaran mengikut standard piawai garis panduan yang lengkap dan menyebabkan Plaintif telahpun menawarkan sebutharganya berdasarkan maklumat yang diberikan oleh Defendan iaitu Grade S275; (viii) Mahkamah mendapati sebutharga-sebutharga Plaintif secara jelas menyebut mild steel berserta harga. Defendan telahpun bersetuju dengan tawaran Plaintif tersebut dan mengeluarkan Pesanan Pembelian berdasarkan sebutharga Plaintif tersebut. Hal ini kerana, jika benar Defendan menempah steel brackets jenis High Tensil Deformed Bar,maka sudah pasti harga akan menjadi lebih mahal dan lebih tinggi menurut penjelasan SP1; (ix) Mahkamah juga berpendapat sekiranya Defendan berkehendakkan High Tensil Deform Bar maka kod yang perlu digunakan sepatutnya adalah gred 460-500 sepertimana diakui oleh SD5. Akan tetapi SD5 mengakui gagal menyatakan gred tersebut melainkan S275 sahaja di dalam lakaran tersebut. (Rujuk NK m/s 80 para 22-30 & m/s 81 para 1-7); (x) Kesemua lakaran steel brackets Defendan juga sangat mengelirukan kerana jika benar Defendan berkehendakkan High Tensil Deformed Bar maka sepatutnya ada lakaran fishbone mark/rib pattern sepertimana standard lukisan kejuruteraan seperti berikut: (Rujuk m/s 68 Ikatan Dokumen B) S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Tetapi kesemua lakaran Defendan langsung tiada sebarang tandaan lorekan rib/fishbone mark tersebut; dan (xi) Mahkamah juga mendapati tiada sebarang keterangan sokongan bebas lain yang dapat membantu pembelaan Defendan tersebut termasuklah keterangan SD5 sebagai saksi pakar Defendan tersebut. [30] Berdasarkan dapatan-dapatan di atas, Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa kontrak yang dimasuki bersama daripada Pesanan Pembelian Defendan pada 14 November 2019 sebenarnya adalah merujuk steel brackets jenis mild steel dan bukannya High Tensil Deform Bar seperti didakwa Defendan. (3)Sama ada Defendan telah menerima pembekalan 120 unit steel brackets Plaintif dan mengikut deskripsi? [31] Mahkamah mendapati memandangkan pembekalan steel brackets tersebut adalah berdasarkan lakaran, maka seksyen 15 Akta Jualan Barangan 1957 terpakai yang mana bagi kontrak menjual barangan secara deskripsi/perihal, terdapatnya satu syarat tersirat bahawa barangan sebenar yang hendak dijual hendaklah bersamaan/bertepatan dengan deskrispi yang diberikan. [32] Seksyen 12(2) Akta Jualan Barangan 1957 pula memperuntukkan kegagalan penjual untuk menyediakan barangan sebenar S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 bersamaan/bertepatan dengan deskrispi yang diberikan, akan memberikan hak kepada pembeli menolak kontrak tersebut. [33] Oleh itu, bagi mengenalpasti apakah deskripsi yang dikehendaki Defendan dan dipersetujui bersama menurut kontrak, Mahkamah perlu meneliti isu-isu tersebut terlebih dahulu: (i) Terdapatnya (3) buah lakaran yang dihantar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif: (i)Lakaran Pertama bertarikh 22/10/2019 yang dihantar oleh SD2 S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 (ii) Lakaran Pensel bertarikh 24/10/2019 yang dihantar WhatsApp SD2 (iii)Lakaran Kedua bertarikh 27/11/2019 yang dihantar oleh pekerja Defendan bernama Suriana (secara emel) [34] Antara Mesej emel pekerja Defendan Suriana kepada SP1 adalah berbunyi: Dear Mr.Samuel, Hi,I’m Suriana from EP Operation side,kindly informed for the bracket 120nos that your side to is is cannot be use,however your side still can rectified the item,The RHS(Rectangular Hollow Section) can still be used but the rebar need to be replaced by H bars (High Tensil Bar).It involves removing the R(Round bars)without damaging the RHS.The area of the RHS where H bars S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 to be welded cannot have galvanised material prior welding.It must be completely clean. Perhaps do a sample first. The welding of the bar also need to have 8mm as below sketch detail. For your info this item are structural item to hold 10 tonne panel and really need to make sure the welding work to be done properly follow the spec. [35] Berdasarkan kandungan emel bertarikh 27/11/2019 seperti di atas, Mahkamah mendapati informasi-informasi penting yang diberikan oleh pihak Defendan tersebut seolah-olah menunjukkan itulah kali pertama diberikan/dikongsikan kepada Plaintif seperti perlu menggantikan mild steel kepada High Tensil Deformed Bar,perlu membuat sample dahulu dan tujuan steel brackets tersebut hendak digunakan bagi menampung struktur 10 ton panel. [36] Hal ini disebabkan, jika benar kesemua informasi tersebut telah diberitahu kepada Plaintif sebelum kontrak dimasuki maka, sudah tentu Defendan akan cenderung menggunakan perkataan-perkataan yang bersifat mengingatkan (reminder) atas spesifikasi yang telah dibincangkan dan dipersetujui bersama sebelum itu. Malah, SP1 sendiri mengakui dan memahami keadaan jika steel brackets hendak digunakan bagi menampung struktur beban yang berat maka High Tensil Deformed Bar lebih sesuai digunakan. [37] Selain itu, Mahkamah mendapati berdasarkan Lakaran Pertama, secara jelas tercatit “Grade S275” yang bermaksud mild steel dan ini telah disahkan oleh SP2 (Rujuk WSSP2 m/s 7) dan ekshibit P3 Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan Plaintif B m/s 30-68. Mahkamah juga mendapati SD5 sewaktu diperiksa balas oleh Peguamcara Plaintif juga mengakui Grade S275 tersebut merujuk mild steel (Rujuk NK m/s 76 para 25-33). S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [38] Plaintif telah bertindak dengan mengisukan sebutharga masing- masing bertarikh 24/10/2019 dan 08/11/2019 yang mana harga masih kekal RM185-00 yang merujuk kepada mild steel. Apa yang diminta oleh Defendan hanyalah untuk mengurangkan kuantiti daripada 3850 unit kepada 500 unit steel brackets (Rujuk P2 Ikatan B m/s 4 dan P5 m/s 8). [39] Pada hemah Mahkamah, jika benar Defendan kehendaki High Tensil Deformed Bar sejak awal lagi, maka sudah pasti tidak dicatitkan Grade S275 pada Lakaran Pertama dan lakaran rib pattern/fishbone mark akan dinyatakan. Selain itu harga juga sudah berbeza kerana SP1 mengesahkan harga High Tensil Deformed Bar adalah jauh lebih tinggi berbanding mild steel (Rujuk NK m/s 52 para 22-27). Oleh itu, deskripsi Lakaran Pertama tersebut sebenarnya lebih cenderung merujuk kepada mild steel bar sepertimana difahami oleh Plaintif. (ii) Sama ada wujud perbezaan pada Lakaran Kedua? [40] Mahkamah mendapati berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan saksi, wujud 9 perbezaan yang berjaya ditunjukkan oleh Plaintif in toto. Keterangan SD5 juga mengakui wujudnya perubahan dari sudut dimensi dan ukuran steel brackets pada Lakaran Kedua tersebut (Rujuk NK m/s 107 para 5-13).Jika benar Defendan langsung tidak ada membuat perubahan deskrispi tersebut, maka sudah pasti tidak akan ada langsung 9 perbezaan yang dinyatakan tersebut. Keadaan ini menunjukkan Defendan sendiri berubah-ubah pendirian dalam memenuhi deskripsi sebenar yang dikehendakinya dan kini menafikan liabilitinya terhadap Plaintif. S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 (iii) Apakah maksud simbol-simbol berikut? (i)Simbol D [41] Isu ini timbul kerana berdasarkan sebutharga Defendan (Rujuk D59A Ikatan E m/s 21) menyatakan D20 Bar & D16 Bar bermaksud Deformed Bar yang bersamaan dengan High Tensil Deformed Bar seperti di bawah: [42] Sedangkan menurut Plaintif, simbol D tersebut bermaksud Diameter 20 dan Diameter 16 sepertimana yang tertera di dalam sebutharga-sebutharga Plaintif bertarikh 24/10/2019 dan 25/10/2019. Perbezaan versi pihak-pihak ini menjadikan Mahkamah perlu mempertimbang keterangan sokongan bebas lain untuk mencapai keputusan. [43] Mahkamah mendapati terdapatnya keterangan dokumentar Defendan yang menyokong dakwaan Plaintif iaitu di m/s 9 Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan Defendan F yang menyatakan simbol D merujuk kepada diameter sepertimana British Standard yang turut digunapakai oleh Singapura.Oleh itu, Mahkamah berpendapat simbol D bermaksud Diameter dan bukan Deformed Bar/High Tensil Deformed Bar sepertimana dakwaan Defendan. S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 (ii)Simbol H [44] Defendan melalui SD5 mendakwa simbol H di dalam lakaran Pertama merujuk kepada High Tensil Deformed Bar kerana mengikut standard Singapura (Rujuk WSSD5 m/s 3).Walau bagaimanapun,keterangan SD5 tersebut tidak mempunyai sebarang sokongan bebas lain termasuklah kegagalan memanggil wakil Syarikat Lum Chang yang dikatakan telah menghantar Lakaran Pertama secara emel kepada Defendan dan mengatakan simbol H bermaksud High Tensil Deformed Bar mengikut standard Singapura.Oleh sebab itu seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terpakai bagi isu ini ke atas Defendan. Malah, menurut saksi pakar SP2 apabila dirujuk simbol H di 2H20H tersebut,keterangan emel untuk lakaran tersebut adalah untuk saiz “Hollow Section” dan bukannya High Tensile Deformed Bar (Rujuk WSSP2 m/s 7 No 17). Oleh itu,keterangan Defendan tersebut adalah tidak benar dan wajar ditolak. (iii)Simbol T [45] Menurut versi Defendan, simbol T yang wujud dalam Lakaran Pensel Defendan seperti berikut adalah merujuk High Tensil Deformed Bar: S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [46] Walau bagaimanapun, Mahkamah mendapati Lakaran Pensel oleh SD2 didapati tidak mendapat pengesahan daripada SD5 sebelum dihantar kepada Plaintif (Rujuk keterangan SD2 NK m/s 37 para 12-25). Mahkamah juga mendapati penjelasan SD2 dan SD5 bercanggah sesama sendiri kerana SD2 mengatakan simbol T tersebut mengikut standard Singapura. Berbeza keterangan SD5 mengatakan simbol T mengikut standard Malaysia bermaksud High Tensil Deformed Bar.Perbezaan standard yang sepatutnya digunakan oleh pihak-pihak dalam kes ini menjadikan Mahkamah perlu lebih berhati-hati tentang versi Defendan tersebut. [47] Berbeza keterangan saksi pakar SP2 menyatakan berdasarkan lakaran yang diberikan Defendan, tafsiran untuk kerja-kerja fabrikasi adalah tepat berdasarkan gred bahan yang dinyatakan iaitu S275 (Rujuk WSSP2 m/s 6 no 15). SP2 menerangkan lagi, Defendan tidak menyertakan apa-apa kod rujukan dalam lakaran yang memberi tafsiran T bermaksud high tensil bar sebaliknya hanya menyertakan gred bahan secara jelas iaitu S275. Sebutharga Plaintif dibuat berdasarkan Lakaran Pertama dengan catitan Gred S275 bermaksud mild steel rod.Oleh itu, Lakaran Pensel tersebut sudah tidak lagi relevan dalam kes ini. S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [48] Oleh yang demikian, berdasarkan dapatan-dapatan di atas, Mahkamah berpuas hati deskripsi Defendan dalam Lakaran Pertama adalah merujuk mild steel rod telahpun berjaya disiaphantar oleh Plaintif sepertimana kontrak. Kemudiannya, Defendan telah mengubah deskripsi steel brackets tersebut melalui emel bertarikh 27/11/2019 berdasarkan Lakaran Kedua setelah menyedari kesilapannya tetapi menafikannya. Tambahan pula, sebarang kos wang pendahuluan langsung tidak dikeluarkan oleh Defendan lagi kepada Plaintif. (4) Sama ada Defendan telah membuat sebarang bayaran ketika atau sebelum membuat tempahan steel brackets? [49] Adalah fakta diakui bahawa Defendan tidak ada sama sekali membuat apa-apa bayaran pendahuluan sebelum membuat tempahan steel brackets tersebut. Hal ini kerana menurut Defendan, Plaintif langsung tidak meminta sebarang wang deposit untuk memulakan kerja- kerjanya. (5)Sama ada Defendan memaklumkan kepada Plaintif defek dalam tempoh 24 jam selepas penghantaran 120 unit steel brackets? [50] Plaintif mendakwa Defendan sepatutnya memaklumkan tentang sebarang kecacatan atau kesalahan 120 unit steel brackets tersebut dalam tempoh 24 jam dari masa penerimaan. Hal ini kerana, selaras dengan terma penghantaran Plaintif di ekshibit P12 Ikatan B m/s 26 yang berbunyi inter alia: “Delivery orders are conclusive evidence of delivery in good order and condition unless we are advised in writing of any defect in their quantity or quality within 24 hours after delivery”. [51] Manakala bagi Defendan tempoh masa untuk semakan 120 unit steel brackets tersebut memerlukan tempoh yang lebih panjang dengan S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 merujuk kepada Terma-Terma & Syarat-Syarat Pembelian Defendan (m/s 15 Ikatan Dokumen B) di para 5.9 seperti berikut:- “…shall not be deemed to have accepted any Goods until we shall have had a reasonable time and opportunity to inspect the Goods after the delivery…” [52] SD2 juga mengatakan emel yang diisukan kepada Plaintif hanyalah untuk memaklumkan tentang telah menerima steel brackets tersebut tetapi bukanlah bermaksud telahpun membuat pemeriksaan dan berpuas hati ke atasnya. [53] Dalam membuat penilaian isu ini, Mahkamah bergantung kepada seksyen 43(1) dan (2) Akta Pelindungan Pengguna 1999 berhubung tempoh masa yang munasabah untuk memaklumkan tentang sebarang kecacatan penerimaan sesuatu barangan. Memandangkan kedua-dua pihak hanya bergantung kepada dokumen masing-masing, maka adalah menjadi tanggungjawab Mahkamah melihat keterangan mengikut keadaan seperti situasi, jenis perniagaan,jenis barangan dan lain-lain faktor yang dijalankan kedua-dua pihak. [54] Pada hemah Mahkamah, disebabkan steel brackets ini mempunyai syarat tersirat iaitu secara deskripsi, Defendan harus diberikan masa yang munasabah untuk meneliti terlebih dahulu 120 unit steel brackets tersebut untuk berpuas hati dengan deskripsi dan kualiti produk. [55] Bukti cop penerimaan daripada Defendan bukanlah bukti konklusi bahawa 120 unit steel brackets tersebut adalah sempurna dari sudut kuantiti dan kualiti. Hal ini kerana menurut Defendan perniagaannya mempunyai banyak produk yang diterima dan memerlukan beberapa hari untuk diperiksa dengan mengambilkira hari cuti dan hari Jumaat. Oleh itu, S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 adalah tidak munasabah untuk Defendan terikat dengan tempoh masa 24 jam sepertimana terma penghantaran Plaintif. [56] Walau bagaimanapun, dapatan ini tidak bermaksud Plaintif telah gagal menyerahhantar steel bracket mengikut deskripsi kontrak sepertimana yang telah dijelaskan sebelum ini kerana Defendan sendiri yang telah gagal dan cuai dalam memberikan lakaran steel brackets mengikut standard industri yang sebenar. Kecuaian Defendan ini menjadikan Plaintif mengalami kerugian dari segi masa, tenaga, kos wang ringgit atas kesilapan dan kecuaian Defendan. (7) Sama ada 120 unit steel brackets yang tidak mengikut spesifikasi Defendan sepatutnya dikembalikan kepada Plaintif? (8) Sama ada 120 unit steel brackets yang tidak mengikut spesifikasi Defendan, maka Defendan berhak untuk membaiki sendiri tanpa membuat sebarang bayaran terlebih dahulu kepada Plaintif? (9) Sama ada 120 unit steel brackets yang tidak mengikut spesifikasi Defendan, maka Defendan berhak untuk membaiki sendiri steel brackets tersebut tanpa meminta persetujuan dan izin daripada Plaintif? [57] Ketiga-tiga isu ini digabungkan kerana saling berkaitan. Mahkamah merujuk kepada seksyen 45(2) dan (3) Akta Perlindungan Pengguna 1999 yang telah memperuntukkan tanggungjawab pembeli untuk mengembalikan semula barangan yang mempunyai kecacatan tersebut kepada penjual semula kerana ia melibatkan isu pemilikan. [58] Namun, Defendan tidak ada memulangkan 120 unit steel brackets tersebut kepada Plaintif.Sebaliknya, Defendan telah membaiki sendiri steel brackets dan tidak ada langsung membuat apa-apa bayaran lagi kepada Plaintif.Walaupun Defendan berhujah dengan bergantung kepada S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 terma-terma dan syarat-syarat kontrak Defendan, namun hakikatnya Defendan tidak menolak steel brackets tersebut tetapi sebaliknya telah menggunakannya setelah membaikinya sendiri. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah berpendapat Plaintif berhak untuk menuntut ganti rugi daripada Defendan dalam kes ini. (10) Sama ada Plaintif berhak menuntut jumlah RM71,000-00 untuk penyediaan dan pembekalan steel brackets tersebut? [59] Mahkamah mendapati tuntutan berjumlah RM71,000-00 oleh Plaintif adalah terhadap: (a)Sebanyak 120 unit steel brackets yang telah dihantar kepada Defendan berjumlah RM28,200-00. [60] Peguamcara Plaintif yang bijaksana telah berpandukan kepada seksyen seksyen 55 Akta Jualan Barangan 1957 dan Seksyen 71 Akta Kontrak 1950 dan berhujah Defendan sepatutnya menjelaskan bayaran RM28,200-00 kepada Plaintif kerana telahpun mendapat manfaat daripada steel brackets tersebut yang telahpun diserahantar kepada Syarikat Lum Chang di Singapura selepas diperbaikinya sendiri. Fakta jelas menunjukkan Defendan tidak pernah memulangkan 120 unit steel brackets tersebut kepada Plaintif sebaliknya membaikinya sendiri untuk manfaat Syarikat Lum Chang. Mahkamah bersetuju dengan pendirian Plaintif yang sememangnya berhak atas jumlah ini. (b)Kos bahan mentah dan pembuatan bagi baki 180 unit steel brackets yang diarahkan diberhentikan pembuatannya berjumlah RM42,300-00 [61] Berdasarkan fakta kes, ketika Defendan mengarahkan pembuatan baki steel brackets dihentikan kepada Plaintif pada 25/11/2019, sebenarnya Plaintif telahpun membeli bahan mentah lebih awal iaitu pada 14/11/2019 selepas menerima tempahan daripada Defendan.Ini telah S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 dijelaskan oleh SP1 dan disokong oleh bukti dokumentasi D29,D30,D31,D32,D33 dan D34(Rujuk Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan Plaintif C). [62] Menurut keterangan SP1 lagi, baki steel brackets tersebut mempunyai bukti dokumentasi iaitu gambar-gambar sepertimana di m/s 27-29 Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan Plaintif C yang mana kewujudan baki steel brackets ini tidak dipertikaikan oleh Defendan.Oleh itu,Plaintif sememangnya berhak ke atas jumlah tuntutan ini. (c)Kos pengangkutan 2 kali steel brackets dari Kilang Plaintif ke Kilang Defendan berjumlah RM600-00. [63] Mahkamah mendapati selain keterangan lisan SP1 bagi kos ini, terdapatnya bukti dokumentasi iaitu D35 yang menunjukkan kos pengangkutan 2 kali steel brackets tersebut berjumlah RM600-00. Malah, Defendan mengakui telahpun menerima penghantaran 120 unit steel brackets tersebut daripada Plaintif sebanyak 2 kali. Oleh itu, kos ini layak dituntut oleh Plaintif. (11)Sama ada Plaintif berhak menuntut kos simpanan baki bahan mentah bagi penghasilan steel brackets tersebut berjumlah RM100 sehari? [64] Mahkamah mendapati berdasarkan keterangan SP1 menyatakan setelah penghantaran 100 lagi steel brackets dibuat,SD2 telah menghantar emel mengarahkan Plaintif memberhentikan produksi baki steel brackets dan telah membatalkan baki pesanan 180 unit steel brackets.Oleh itu,bagaimana dengan baki bahan mentah yang masih tersimpan sepertimana di ekshibit P36 Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan Plaintif C m/s 27-29? S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [65] Bagi isu ini, Mahkamah mendapati terdapat inisiatif daripada Plaintif yang mencadangkan kepada Defendan agar dapat turun padang ke kilang Plaintif untuk menilai sendiri steel brackets dan membuat audit akan hasil kerjanya (Rujuk emel Plaintif m/s 30 Ikatan Dokumen Plaintif B). Namun, SD1 mengesahkan menolak cadangan Plaintif tersebut dan keadaan ini menjadikan Plaintif telah terhalang untuk meneruskan penghantaran baki steel brackets tersebut dan terpaksa menyimpan di stor dengan caj bayaran sewaan menyewa forklift dan tenaga kerja (Rujuk P37,P38 Ikatan Dokumen D m/s 1-9 &14-15). [66] Keterangan SP1 juga seperti berikut (Rujuk WSSP1A) “Maka,kadar caj simpanan baki bahan mentah 180 brackets untuk sehari adalah seperti berikut:- RM240-00 +RM70-00+(RM3-50 x 4.7 ton)=RM326-45 Namun begitu, Plaintif atas dasar niat baik hanya mengenakan dan menuntut daripada Defendan kos simpanan barang mentah yang munasabah sebanyak RM100-00 sehari sahaja.” Keterangan ini tidak dipertikaikan atau dicabar oleh Defendan. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah wajar membenarkan tuntutan kos ini. Isu-isu lain berbangkit: (a) Sama ada SP2 dan SD5 seorang pakar? [67] Defendan mempertikaikan keterangan SP2 sebagai pakar kerana tidak mempunyai kelayakan akademik dalam bidang kejuruteraan sivil. Berbeza dengan SD5, Defendan menyatakan SD5 mempunyai kelayakan akademik Ijazah Kejuruteraan sivil/awam dan oleh itu keterangan SD5 sebagai pakar hendaklah diterima. Defendan bergantung kepada kes Brijnandan Singh Bar @ Brijnandan Singh Bar a/l Gurcharan Singh S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 v BMW Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2019]1 LNS 1737 & Nur Adeena bt Mohd Syahmir v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2023]10 MLJ 580 dan berhujah SD5 tidak bersifat pilih kasih dalam memberikan keterangannya. [68] Bagi saksi SP2, Mahkamah mendapati SP2 sebenarnya mempunyai kelayakan akademik diploma kejuruteraan mekanikal yang mempunyai kaitan dengan kerja-kerja penghasilan fabrikasi logam seperti steel brackets juga. Selain itu,SP2 juga pernah menghadiri kursus-kursus latihan asas penyediaan lakaran, pelbagai disiplin kejuruteraan,kejuruteraan kimia,kejuruteraan mekanikal,sivil,intepretasi drawing,lakaran secara micro serta Autocard selain mempunyai pengalaman 7 tahun sebagai pengurus pengeluaran di MechMar Boiler dan MSET Engineering Corporation yang kesemuanya berkaitan dengan pembuatan besi (Rujuk NK m/s 39 para 1-16,m/s 29 baris 4-36). [69] SP2 juga telah mengemukakan sijil-sijil kelayakannya sepertimana P51 (Rujuk Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan 3 m/s7). Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah berpendapat SP2 adalah seorang pakar menurut seksyen 45 Akta Keterangan 1950 dengan pengalamannya bekerja dalam bidang kejuruteraan sivil dan mekanikal termasuk Lukisan Kejuruteraan yang relevan dalam kes ini seperti dinyatakan sebelum ini. [70] Selanjutnya, Defendan telah menyentuh isu hubungan SP2 dengan SP1 yang telah kenal sejak tahun 2005 menjadikan keterangan pakar SP2 hendaklah ditolak. Namun, adakah dengan kenal sahaja bermaksud mempunyai kepentingan peribadi dalam kes ini? SP2 menjelaskan dirinya tidak mempunyai sebarang hubungan dan kepentingan peribadi dengan Plaintif. [71] Malah, hubungan komersial Plaintif adalah dengan bekas majikannya adalah di luar bidang kuasa SP2 dan tidak memperolehi S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 sebarang manfaat daripada hubungan tersebut. Mahkamah berpendapat hubungan tersebut adalah bersifat profesional dan tidak mendatangkan sebarang keraguan kepada Mahkamah.Itu hanya andaian dan hujahan pihak Defendan tanpa sebarang asas untuk menunjukkan wujudnya kepentingan SP2 terhadap kes Plaintif. [72] Bagi SD5 pula, Mahkamah mendapati SD5 mempunyai kelayakan akademik Ijazah Kejuruteraan sivil/awam dan telah memberikan keterangannya berhubung kepakarannya. Oleh itu, seksyen 45 Akta Keterangan 1950 juga mengiktiraf SD5 sebagai seorang pakar. [73] Namun, Mahkamah mendapati SD5 bukan sahaja bekerja dengan Defendan, malah SD5 yang melukis lakaran yang dipertikaikan dalam kes ini. Hal ini bermaksud, SD5 telah hadir ke Mahkamah dengan serampang dua mata iaitu sebagai saksi pakar dan juga sebagai pekerja Defendan. Oleh yang demikian, keterangannya kini sebagai saksi berkepentingan perlu dipertimbang dan dinilai lebih berhati-hati. Mahkamah berpandukan kepada kes Ce Resources Sdn Bhd v. Owners of Ship Tanga’ [2016] MLJU 878 yang mempertimbangkan faktor motif seseorang saksi tersebut hadir ke Mahkamah seperti berikut: “..s. 8(1) EA has provided that motive is a relevant fact. As such, the Court should ascertain whether a witness is independent or otherwise. Self- serving testimony of a witness should be viewed with caution”. (b) Bilakah kontrak dimasuki? [74] Defendan mendakwa kontrak dimasuki seawal 9.11.2019 apabila Plaintif bersetuju untuk mempercepat kerja membuat steel brackets tersebut seperti berikut: “Thanks for your understanding.I will expedite the work”. S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 Plaintif pula membalas kontrak wujud bermula 14.11.2019 ketika Defendan menghantar pesanan pembelian untuk 300 unit steel brackets kerana kesemua elemen kontrak hanya sempurna pada tarikh tersebut. Kes dirujuk Cipta Cermat Sdn.Bhd v Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Kedah [2007] 1 CLJ 498 oleh Mahkamah Rayuan. [75] Berdasarkan prinsip kes Cipta Cermat (supra), satu kontrak mestilah mempunyai satu tawaran, penerimaan, balasan dan kesahihan pihak-pihak. Apabila dikaitkan dalam kes ini, Mahkamah berpuas hati emel Plaintif bertarikh 9.11.2019 di atas hanya sekadar janji untuk mempercepatkan kerja dan bukannya telah menerima tawaran Defendan tersebut. Sebaliknya, tawaran daripada Defendan hanya diterima oleh Plaintif pada 14.11.2019 apabila Defendan menghantar emel menghantar Pesanan Pembelian (Rujuk m/s 20 Ikatan Dokumen B) seperti berikut: Dear valued Supplier, Kindly acknowledge received PO & No Gift Policy Letter by return back signed copy via email. Please make arrangement according to Po delivery Our Hq Office has relocated,details please refet to attached file.For completed delivery/service,please submit original copy of TAX INVOICE to Procurement department,EPM Seelong Factory within 1 week. Plaintif juga mengesahkan telah menerima emel tawaran tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, jelaslah kontrak terbentuk pada 14.11.2019 dan bukannya sepertimana dihujahkan oleh Defendan. (12)Sama ada Tuntutan Balas Defendan wajar dibenarkan? S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 [76] Dalam kes ini,Defendan telah menuntut balas Ganti rugi Khas RM62,299-82 bagi: (a)Kos pembetulan 120 unit steel brackets; (b)Perbelanjaan yang ditanggung akibat menggunakan khidmat kontraktor lain untuk menghasilkan 180 unit steel brackets; (c)Kos pentadbiran untuk pembetulan 120 unit steel brackets dan penghasilan 180 unit steel brackets yang gagal dibekalkan oleh Plaintif; dan (d)Ganti rugi kelewatan sebanyak 2% [77] Dalam membuat penilaian Tuntutan Balas ini, Mahkamah mendapati Defendan gagal untuk mengemukakan sebarang bukti dokumentasi untuk menyokong kos-kos ditanggungnya. Manakala, bagi kos pengangkutan untuk membaiki 120 unit steel brackets, Mahkamah mendapati Invois daripada Haroon Logistic D53 Ikatan Dokumen E m/s 51 bertarikh 12.11.2019 dikeluarkan lebih awal daripada tarikh Plaintif menghantar 120 unit steel brackets iaitu pada 21.11.2019 dan 25.11.2019. Mana mungkin kos tersebut perlu ditanggung oleh Plaintif kerana isu masih belum berbangkit lagi. Oleh itu, D53 tersebut adalah tidak relevan untuk menyokong kes Defendan. [78] Bagi kos perbelanjaan & kos pentadbiran pembetulan (120 unit steel brackets) yang ditanggung akibat menggunakan khidmat kontraktor lain untuk menghasilkan 180 unit steel brackets pula, Mahkamah telah meneliti Pesanan Pembelian antara Defendan dengan kontraktor tersebut bernama Silvermax.Didapati, wujud perbezaan deskripsi dari segi ukuran spesifikasi 520mm x 925mm x 200mm dan kuantiti 500 pada Pesanan Pembelian tersebut dengan 120 unit steel brackets Plaintif tersebut (ukuran:100mm x 200mmx9mm dengan baki 180 unit steel brackets). S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 [79] Keterangan SD1 dan SD5 (wakil Silvermax) tentang kewujudan sebutharga, lakaran unit steel brackets dan emel perbualan Defendan dengan Silvermax telah dicabar oleh Plaintif sewaktu bicara dan akhirnya Mahkamah menyimpulkan tiada sebarang keterangan bebas yang dapat menyokong versi Defendan tersebut. Oleh itu, Defendan tidak berhak menuntut kos-kos tersebut. [80] Dan yang terakhir, bagi faedah ganti rugi kelewatan sebanyak 2% yang dituntut balas Defendan, Mahkamah mendapati Pesanan Pembelian Defendan tersebut meletakkan Jadual penghantaran seperti berikut: Delivery Schedule:- 1st 50 pcs by 20th Nov 2019 and No Later Follow by 50pcs/working days [81] Plaintif mengakui telah menerima emel tersebut, namun meminta menyerah hantar 50 unit steel brackets pertama pada tarikh 21.11.2019. Mahkamah selanjutnya mendapati hasil perbincangan semula, Defendan telah bersetuju untuk tarikh penghantaran kepada 21.11.2019 (20 unit steel brackets) dan 25.11.2019 (50 unit steel brackets) dihantar setiap hari (Rujuk P9 Ikatan B m/s 21). Begitu juga dalam emel Defendan bertarikh 22.11.2019 (Rujuk m/s 25 Ikatan B) mengesahkan telah menerima penghantaran 20 units steel bracket yang pertama pada 21.11.2019 sepertimana dijanjikan Plaintif seperti berikut: Samuel- Morning, We have rcv your 1st delivery 20 pcs bracket on 21st Nov as promised… S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 [82] Oleh yang demikian, pada hemah Mahkamah tindak-tanduk kedua- dua pihak ini menunjukkan Defendan sebenarnya telah bersetuju untuk mengubah(varied) tempoh/tarikh penghantaran daripada 20.11.2019 kepada 21.11.2019 daripada tarikh kontrak asal kerana adanya perkataan “ as promised” (sepertimana dijanjikan). Oleh itu, Defendan diestop untuk menuntut kadar bunga atas kelewatan kerana Plaintif telahpun mematuhi tarikh penghantaran baru tersebut tanpa sebarang kelewatan. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah menolak faedah kelewatan ini. Ganti rugi Am & faedah (Tuntutan Balas) [83] Mahkamah menolak tuntutan ini kerana tiada sebarang asas kerugian am yang ditanggung oleh Defendan secara keseluruhannya.Oleh itu,ia wajar ditolak. KEPUTUSAN: [84] Setelah mendengar, meneliti dan mempertimbang kesemua keterangan-keterangan saksi-saksi, dokumen-dokumen, ekshibit- ekshibit, hujahan-hujahan bertulis termasuk hujahan-hujahan balas kedua-dua pihak serta dapatan yang dinyatakan di atas, maka Mahkamah berpuas hati dan memutuskan pada tahap imbangan kebarangkalian Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan kes terhadap Defendan. Mahkamah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif seperti berikut: (i) Wang sejumlah RM71,100-00; (ii) Faedah sebanyak 18% atas jumlah penghakiman dari tarikh penghakiman hingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh; (iii) Kos simpanan bagi baki bahan mentah (raw materials) bagi batang rasuk keratan rentas kerangka (bracket hollow section beam) untuk RM100-00 sehari 14/1/2020 sehingga Defendan mengambil keluar kesemuanya dari kilang Plaintif; S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 (iv) Faedah sebanyak 5% ke atas kos simpanan tersebut dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh; dan (v) Kos mengikut skala. Tuntutan Balas Defendan ditolak. Curia Advisari Vult. Bertarikh: 5 November 2023 Diputuskan Oleh: NOORFAZLIN BINTI HAMDAN Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Sivil 1, Johor Bahru Pihak-pihak: Cik Kalpana Kumara & Cik Gunasundary Chandramohan dari Tetuan Kalpana & Partners- Mewakili Plaintif Mr.Cheah Soo Chuan,Mr.Lincoln Seow & Mr.Khor Wei Wen dari Tetuan Tay & Partners -Mewakili Defendan S/N 5q5QtEYEtEGWCs9TwFKjEg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	51,531	Tika 2.6.0
TA-22NCVC-28-05/2016	PLAINTIF BLUE ARCHIPELAGO BERHAD DEFENDAN TOKIO MARINE INSURANS (MALAYSIA) BERHAD	Kes ini adalah dua kes yang berbeza yang telah didengar dan diputuskan secara bersama. Guaman 28 ialah tuntutan Plaintiff terhadap Defendan iaitu Syarikat Isnurans Tokio Marine atas kerosakan yang telah berlaku pada saluran paip air yang mengalirkan air laut dari laut Cina Selatan ke sebuah ladang akuakulktur di Setiu. Guaman 35 difailkan kemudian di mana tuntutan yang sama dibuat terhadap Defendan Sepakat Setia Perunding Sdn Bhd. Mahkamah telah membenarkan tututan Plaintiff terhadap Tokio Marine iaitu syarikat isnsurans di Guaman 28 dengan kos sebanyak RM150,000.00 dibayar kepada Plaintiff dan Mahkamah telah menolak tuntutan Plaintiff di Guaman 35 dengan kos RM70,000.00 dibayar kepada Defendan. Mahkamah telah hanya membenarkan tuntutan di Guaman 28 kerana Mahkamah mempercayai bahawa polisi Insurans tersebut sewajarnya merangkumi kerugian yang dialami oleh Plaintif atas kerosakan saluran pair air tersebut.	06/11/2023	YA Dato' Haji Zainal Azman Bin Ab. Aziz	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7cb06636-79e8-42d6-b046-471aab010ed7&Inline=true	06/11/2023 17:11:32 TA-22NCVC-28-05/2016 Kand. 222 S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NmawfOh51kKwRkcaqwEO1w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 'n—22m:vc—2a—u5/2015 Kand. 222 ab/11/2221 mu-22 IN THE HIGM COURI or MALAVA AT KUALA TERENGGANU IN THE sure or TERENGGANU DARUL mm cwn. gym Mo. 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HIGH a M», .. mm., mm: ﬂmumnl VI mum pom! hapverwd Thstedove‘ may shomd wrlmul sxrong bass pm me mama an m. mm:-nu, wnllrurmcn Ind mun o1 ma pwpahne On ma mhernam. me Phmlnﬂm mus xunnas cleany derrmnsnated man nu prajecl has rsoewed aH Iaqwsne approvals mm at least 7 aumanuu bakm lhc pmgoci wn cummencld Compenanl wnnen such as 5777 has vaﬂaatad and defended one design Thus‘ n :5 mean that Tom Marine has waned co pm! to «ms hononala com man the damage to me pipeline was a mum a! me aeiauu nu ma uaugn The rapudlluon of Tom Manna um» um Dwgnau rnk dause is bound in «am Next Toklo Manna rm alw depended an anomor clause nzmeiy me tpscul Endmuamanl for Wen mm rum mm (pmry klluwn as Mumook me pusmm mat me damage M1 wvmm me exception clause se C\|ause1 1 2 Much exdudet damlge caused by “Normal Achon arm :31‘ wrm. NonuI\N:1\on otme San‘ Vs aannad as ‘2 I Nomuucuon ammo. mun. an ant: om. ul. which mnnmst itull upln no.8 on ma anmon Sczlu ' sm N...mamx.m..wzo«w «mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. UIQG m M», .. mmm, mum: ﬂnumml VI mum pom! 29 The mam ussue max Is needed no he proved ws wmemer me acllan om-o nu duvlng me me period while ma darvugaui me pwpalme rm nccurrad Ml: wvlmn me denimunn nl Nocmumcnon mm. Sea 30 rm and rmmm, mi: henorible own mum me an empname on am am um none at he p.mu knaw men, when mo aa-mo In an segments of ma plpedme Ins occurred mamm, n u umpcssme In mmme me seamen Scale allhe exam lime :1 The may mm a wu dlmlpcd m 91 around me um av - pamcular slonn Vs nmhmg am a hypalhesls Mal Imawlng when the damage occurred nrwhal has caused ma asmage cleany smms IhalTukvo Mame new never claim lha\| n was cauiad by a 'NomIII 3.: Action’ :2 Deanne eoneeamg that it was not poumve to com: «o a rehabie datarvrunzlnon .71 ms xuvnum a! ma mm m me mm location <21 Ina vuplumd pipe, rolauve no ma Enlulun Salt. mm Mama and not consult any mdependenl home: In ommn move ma at me behavnr Mine 53: m muse mumm Amamns smoe Ina expen wﬂnusei man has been culled upon has con ’ ny mmmny mm 35 am Nun:-umh51hKwRkmqwE01w «mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. UIQG a M», .. mm., mm: ﬂnuamnl VI murwa pom! ragams to ma condvhon ullhe sea. ma prtclsa came 01 me pwoeline dnrnagn am: nmamc unknown Takn—MarIne has hﬂed lo dnscharge me burden or regullnng ms Inability wxm max, nus mnouraue am! his cnncluded Ihalllley Ira rawormbleluv mu mm Incurrnd hymn Plulmifl‘ n porlemn m the AM am pone, smeu KM msmance palmy Is an AM Rnk Falncy‘ «ms noun Is :4 me new mac ll com: evurylhmu nxnopl on: ma nmcl undst me exclusmn clause ram Manna has lalled to plot)! la «ms court on ma balance M pvobanilmes man may are um uaue mums dam rm: mun and rum conmmne wbmnsmn by Tom Mnrme nu: ma damage 0! ma pipeilne Vs nuz unforeseen and suddsrl ma :3 be se Tom Marine am not mad such mama am IN; mun \s ol ma ww ma: n n In aﬂarmeuum The damage an me three seams at me pipeline is vieﬁnilely unforeseen and sudden Noni Mme pam expected me dlmage lo happen and nunaaflhe puma mw whnl mu mm n um: xx 2 normal cwcumnanoe and sandman me damage augm nm In have hapolnod but n am Thus, it I: sunny unvmmn and sudden wmch Ill mm snow. me mummna mm under me All Ru PuI\|r:y 37 VII: Wavmrlfs claim against ram Marine under sun 23 5 allawsd Ind mu com nu dnnussad the vlamorrn clavm .IgamI1SSP and aammu -moor sun 35 as «ms cmm suungxy believes max on Insuranne may omens me clam! coucLus\|9g as he phlmﬂfs claim m para ua) 11:) and m In suIl2B I! showed mm oos\ RM150.D00 oo Claim under para (1) was not allowed as me noun nu you \|o as tho RMIo_oaa,ouooc fume and «or me ﬂnmagon m be «mm Azruu am AB AZ\|l JUDGE HIGH COURI MALAVA or KUANTAN PANANG DARIJL muuun Iursu :15 octane»: mu m N...;..mmx..m..wzo«w “ mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e HIGH m M», .. mm., mm: ﬂnuamnl VI mum pom! so P miss u zucv 2341512016 A u- i Mr Pram Ramachnndrln wvlh Mr Shauvm rm; Tewan The Chambers at R Swagnanam a Assaults: SuIle16~IL Lave! 15. a sauna: mm sxmn sum: 2. KL Sonlm 50470 Kuala Lumpur R2! R5 2512 5. RS 2327 Emmi cumyﬂmcnamners com /gener2\@lsachambels com COUNSEL FOR n-1: ozregum u.22Ncvc.zMs/ms) vm Tunku Fznk bun Tunku mm with my Mogul Naqmddm pm Talunn Axum. Tunku Funk a. worm um: 54:3. Tmslkn 5 Msma Badzn Peguzm Mmaysva No 2 Lebuh Pnsuv Benn sense mu. Lump-u Ru 5 77 120(TFlmnp) Eman wmme kwan@aIM sum my I u«o@anw cam my 15 m N...;..mmx..m.uw.zow. mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! LF RIHEFIRSTDF TT NCVC»J5-09/2M7 M: Drnran Nonendrn wan Ms Samoa Rlmpal and Ms Shanmugz Jullu Teluan Nuvendvl L up No I,Ja\|an Temptmsi Lucky Garden Bangur‘ same Kua\a Lumpur an NYISSPIEH/2011/SR/pk Email nygnnrenmu-yup cam 1H cvc nwzun : MI Prem Ramachandran menuom an behan 2'” Dehndam Jabavan Insowerw Malaysxa 22‘ 23 24 dan 25. Mmira TH Perduna1001 man Sultan um-n, 5025:: Kuall Lumpuv m N...m.mmx..m..wzow. “ mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwHH>e HIGH w my .. mm-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! 2 The Plamuvnn mm mm nu ﬁled sun 25 m 2016 than wowed by Sull as m 2017 rm. nnnmua calm nu dlweveu me amnion far new cases on 12 I 2023 whereby ma wan rm alumea ma Plan-mrs clam against Tokn Mlrme \n s 5 only for pmyar (:2), (c) and (d)am1 cost amounllnu \|o RM1so,uuu 00 la be paid by Tokx: Manna 3 rms calm has msmxuea me PVHIMM can Iganul ssv um Ralnhm m sun :5 Wm amt amoummg u: RM7D,D0ﬂ.0D In be paid Iry me vlammv MAYEI3 5;, FACI8 or me cg: 4. Blue Alchlpelagu Berhad rwwmnr) at all material lime ws 2 suhsidwary M Khazanlh National Bemod and operates a bmlnasa ol nan-ng Shrimp Iqulcmlum pmﬂua: nu Plamlnﬂ aunbhlhud an Integrated aquacumwe hm at Se1m_Yersngganuwm:h man a supply offresh sea water 5 To me anon, Pmrum has engaged ssP ma Ramrull mu a law alhev subeormamms In consxma and man III underwater pwpelme ("p1pehne"\|m ovaw seawzlerlrom scum cma Sea me me ma mm m saw 1‘pm\|31:1') The Pl-m\|r\|V rm enlomd men an sm N...;...umx..m..wzo«w «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e UIQG m M», .. mm., mm: ﬂnuamnl VI mum pom! agveernenlmlh ssp dam 26 2 2009 am 30 5 Zﬂlowhere 55? IS npoomlnd as IM mnsuhnnl 101 me pmpecl Ru.-mm on me emu ma ma appointed as ma mnlramrx avuurvd 2412 2009 upon me vecornrnendanon at SSP A: - pan at me mnslmman agroumanl belwcen Pu-mm and Ramrml‘ Rummll his Iakan uu\| com-non‘ An Rusk Insurance Pom dated gas 2010 mm MUI Continental Insurance Berhad ('MUI') Thu nudity mm 9! me An RM Inwranoa Fohcy Is from 31:12 2009 until 31 10 mm Mun wn lhurI\| an am by ram Mznne an 22.5.2012 vu agreement cl sa\e and purchase av 1:391 anu Iuammy which mchmes me pclxcy Around SemzemIaerZ01L nw-s hum‘! mm mm nu dlmaaem me underwater pwpellne 35 murky am wake: was pumped mm ma pond cum aquaculture lalm On 1392011, mnmors am has ubuwad lbs um-wam plpehma and «am: out damaaos m 3 man: wnhm (M nmsoom 4:! ma pipeline TM mm mum MUI (naw ram Mnnnej vegardlng ma damages and lodged a palm Iepurl M me my um: day sm Nm:unuh51hKwRkmqwE01w «mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. UIQG m M», .. mm., mm: ﬂnuamnl VI mum pom! ID 11 Vxa : I-mar dalad 25 4 2012 MUI (rum Tuklo Manna) rm dunno all Immune: we was cm Dummy‘: Risk and Spam!‘ Enaovumuu our W91 Ruks‘ The Fhmlﬂl hnslhen sent a Name M Demand oeIed196 20151;: Tolua Mum we his men mm Mun to rename nu the dimlau men has occurred on me Dwpelme and no me :51-new mm In venavr me wno\e «zoom pipeline wmdw rs amounting la RMm.2an.ooc an Via a weam dated 15 5 2015, Tom Munms has once again named aH lemme: and upnalu swlular siami In MUI premm Vanar ﬂamed 2642012 Thus the Plzinnﬂ‘ nu mmanau suit 23 against mun Mums bemg ma Innuvnnca Complny m um um ssv and Rainmn ms wed under sum as separateiy because at mm mm ncumi wen ‘mum «so be m Insurance mm. mm Howevev, along (he way (1! me um n was ummnl Var ssp m be pmsenldue la me ploblem mm me emema (amend Thus, mm ssP and Rainhm was snagged along sm N...mamx..m..wzo«w «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e UIQG m M», .. mm., mm: ﬂnuamnl VI mum pom! FIND\|NGS or me couwr 12 u is I:rys(:\ clam mm bulh um 25 and sun 35 was eeneemaxee 2: mo Issues anse Vmm me same evem. Thu Jun e1 «me nun: Is In hm! wmch party ws name form: damages than has oecurraa on me pxpillnei 01 me propecl Though n Is two ieplrala suns, it Is obvious um n we mun Iﬂwn Ina mm m on: suit. me clam m me other sunwm be msmssed and vice warn 13 Yhe gmundi and nnamgs of «ms wurl mu be lucused on wnem-r mm Tokuo Mme e llnhla lav me «mega. men n namnee I1 Tam Manna II Mable am the All ﬁnk lruurunee Pohcy mvers me damages, men both SSP and Rammll would not be new Mable u my own I! very wen gmeea by me Court at Appell cue an»: In vulv lac GLOBAL son mm mm} IILJU 112 much was aka «evened to by me Plainoﬂ ‘ 7341 1». whole omen! ev mmmmg or fnlurprilmg Any agreement 1: In delanmrve ms Isa! mlsnban arms pames so me: me: can be gwen In men bargain Winn construing um intcrpnllng commucill agntmanb, my Com em N...mamx..m.ewzow. «we. smuw nmhnrwm .. e... e M», .. mmm, MINI ﬂnuamnl VI mum pans‘ fnquomly runlinﬁ is." to am bullnoss vfﬂcncy no on lprumonl: rn--1., uyholdinq man u oppond no uxnmlnlng mm u rfsomo ma specimen under . sclormfv mmsmpe smyecnng each and evuly word used m the agmamem to me kmd av scmnny max on! may depmy m a langungc and grummal axemfsl ' 15 Thus. (his mum has me duly to uphold the terms agreed upon nu ma AH Risk Pulley mherman mumnmng me mm: and language mm m wad Thu courl hu mu any in gun mum“ afﬁcacylo ma agmemems made us The main mm m me All Risk lnsumnca pain has named man -seem 14laIsnaIDamage The ummm hewsby ugms mm m. Insured mu: w m anynme durmg mu period nrcomm Hams orany pm rlwnolantomd m en. scmaun mu sulfur My unlunlcun ma Iuddoa physical loss om-m.-go Imm my uun, other man man splciﬂcally Ixcludod /n a manner rrscessrlatmg menu 0/ m N...m..mmx..m.uwzo«. mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e HIGH m M», .. mm., mm: ﬂnuamnl VI mum pom! replacement, me msmrs wut indemmfy ma rnsmm in impact nfsuch loss or dnmlge 17 wum memme In me clluse m me AI Rusk Policy alone‘ n Is elem mat the mum being Talon Mame will mdummfy me Insured m Iupoci al lcls ma dumogu mm are Iuuden mu unlureueen exoanl to! the ones mzl ave speoﬁcally excmea 1a. n ma beam into ucnilderaluon mm In All msk Policy Is a palm man cover: In: pvqanl during nl axaculmn mm \o, wmle KM pupecme Is being Installed‘ Iested and mmmmnea u Is not an Insurance policy «a pmnacnne plpehrle my when comumcuon has oemplema on apeemeauan 19 thus, me [widen ts aw on Tuklo Mannem pmnnanne damages acumen an me pwpellne dues nouallwmun the um/elag: Mme All Rmk Folscy 2n. Tom Marine has raised a (aw wounds «mm repudtanon dated 26 4 2012 when Ilwas mnﬁnedw Ipeclﬁc pmvsmn nu ma NI Ruk sm N...mamx..m..wzo«w «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrw\HI>e UIQG m M», .. mmm, mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum pom! 21 2: sm N...mamx..m..wzo«w «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrw\HI>e UIQG m M», .. mm., mm: ﬂnuamnl VI mum pom! Fohcy we. The Deswgner Rusk (Hausa and spam: Endorsement 607 Wan RM: WM! regards to the exclusscn undef KM Desgnel Rwsk chum. Tokic Marine muslbe able In proonoms humvahle mull Ihalihay would run he held Iumo u he u-magas uonunvd m me plpﬂna a due lo we may doxsgn ma canstruuion by ssw and Rlmmll ram Manna haslalled In dnchnrae its burden M brmqmg us can whlun « penlal Enclutlon mu m because than n nc\| In mu 0! emoenne from aquzlﬁed amen Iendered hy Tuluo Mum» to grant man Iha damages was used by a laulty design or cnnsmuauon Takno Marine has hm-1 men argument upon men auumm-ans as me wllneu lnr Yckm Mnrina memuwas are nnlura u no how am whylhe damage has nucunud Tm oourl Is :1! me. View man :1 u absum lcr Tokyo Manna m hlsu mm repua.-non under me Dougner Rusk Clause man may memsawes do no: know Now me damage nus oacunad Then conlsnhon Iha\| \|he damage wmd have been Ivondld was not Iuwomd by any uxpcrl ewoonu or wnnm mm mm rm 24 25 sm N...mamx.m..wzo«w «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e UIQG m M», .. mm., mm: ﬂnuamnl VI mum pom! oenssaermm Manna’: subnmmn where my assumed lhzt me mom uuu uaang In cm dnmlga «me NDPE Iubvuivmc pipeline was (he norm mduud hydmdynarmc «mm uclmg on me pvesenue 01 Infennr sat! back nu nm In beuuu Tome Mum nu mm In call a ungle wnm. mm coma renaer luwnony man no mwmme Ind oompemn aonuaaov -x norlsuhanl wow hav: dasngned, mm mptemema a Dmlocl m mu mannav The lac! man Toluo Mlnne has hosed men avgumam: an nypomeucal nssumphons only was dunha conceded by men witness so-2 ma so-3 vwm relevance to me me: of pmceedlnu Enclulura I67 ax page 521 Ind 522. sryz nu mnmea mun “anly God kmms when aauaﬂy ruppe«eu' Tms claaﬂy shawslhal ram mzmle memsswe: do ml know what had happened and what has uussd the dimaga no me rupakno sua neanmony has lmlher mnrmnea m when he leshﬁsd mat II was only - nyponmin and Iuppoulliun. Thus, n It: cm: «rm em Tokm Mum mm a knuwloduo as to why me a-mm m	2,132	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
AB-44-11-06/2023	PEMOHON HENDRA BIN MULANA RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	Criminal Procedure - Section 317 of CPC- Application to admit additional evidence - Applicant convicted of offences under s.8(b) of Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017 - Request for child pornography - The additional evidence was in respect of Applicant's defence under s.20 of 2017 Act - Whether Applicant did not know of true age of the victim - Failure of previous counsel to tender additional evidence to support defence case - Whether 4 conditions in R v Parks have been fulfilled - Application dismissed	06/11/2023	YA Puan Noor Ruwena binti Md Nurdin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d2eb83d8-8f24-4fb8-8ae9-70381f104f52&Inline=true	06/11/2023 12:10:35 AB-44-11-06/2023 Kand. 12 S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 2IPr0iSPuEK6XA4HxBPUg *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m In AB—ld—11—06/2023 Kand. HENDRA BIN MULANA [N0 KF.: aonsI3o1e22u ...PEMoHoN v PENDAKWA RAVA ...RESPDNDEN ggouuns OF JUDGMENT INYRODUCTION [1] The Appncam med Iwa (2; Nauoes u1App2a\| in the com ov Apnea! agaIns\| the deolsmn uﬂms Cmm delivered an 4 9 2923 in respect ovcase AEA4—1l)-06/2023 and AEAL1106/2023 pertaining Io ms applicalmns m admil new evidence under me provisions ov Arts. a and 121 cc the Federal oonsu ' n. ss.2s. 31 and 35 of ms cams of Judicature Ac’: 1954 and 5.317 0! me CrImma\ Procedure Cnde (cps). The apphcmions were made in respsm o4 ms appeal m the Tawpmg mgn coun Apbeal Nos. AB-42JSKS-2~02/2023 and Auznsksrzmz/zcza Nos. [24 Earner, the Applicant had been convicted by the Tawping Sesswons Counan16.2 2023 in Case No AB€2JSK—20r11/2019 aneme was found gmﬂy and convicted on «nee (3) amended charges ol requesung for cmld pomugraphy undev 5. am or me Sexua\ Offences Against Children Act 2017 (“me 2017 Act“) and one (1) charge under the same secﬂnn in Case 1 IN 2\PmxsPuEKAxA»<xaP\Jq -ms Sum IHIWDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII nF\uNG pm 12 25,1,/2023 11-2-45 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI TAIPING DALAM NEGERI EERAK DARUL RIDZWAN PERMOHQNAN JENAVAH M0,: 15 m No. AB-62JSK»21-1\|/2019. The Appllcanl was ssn\|enoed la 13 years lmpnsonment lrom ma dale of oanvlcllnn 15.2.2023 and 3 strokes of me mlan In respect -71 each charge and all lmpnsonmam sentences were lo mn ouncurvemly. He was alsa semenue lo undergo counselllng whlle In prlsnn and 3 years‘ puliue superv on aﬂe( completing ms lmpnsnnmanl senlenoe The Sessiuns Couﬂ allawad a stay olexecullon permmg appeal agalnsl canvlcuon and senlencs to me Hlgh calm. ms Grounds al Judgment sals out ms reasons for alsmlssal of mm appllcamns. THE APPLICATION [3] Allhnugh he was charged in September 2019, mal only commenced on 24 3 2021 due In the CDVId'19 pandemic The Applloanl at me luwer cclurlwzs vepmjenlsd by his solicitor Messrs. Hakiml, Lallma s. Mavdhiyah & Assoclales, Talplng. The Noll’: Unsl/I was ﬁled by a dlffsrent sollcllor Messrs Abdullah, Maxnah a Jew, Kuala Lumpur an was 2023 as per Encl. 1 together with the Amsvir Sokongan m End. 2 afﬁnned bylhe Appllaam mmsall The applicatlon was made furadmlsslnn of a purportedly new svldence that was not avallahls durlng the lrlal [4] The Noll: L/aul sought the cams leave fur the lullnwlng a Eahnwl: Femnhun/Pzmyu yang dlnamakan an alas dlharl kebenaran unmk merluemukakan cahman/emuk pmlxil akin»-Jkaun BIGO Parvgadu (SWO) seven: yaw ullamulman dalnm Aﬂdavll Sakmvg-In nswmu aw MULANA yang dllkulkarl pada 15.052023 yang mama dllallkan :1! sin] dulam menyvlmng Malls usul ml subagal bukll-hukll kelararlaan harwlarllularl urlluk dlhzca aan dlmjuk scram helsekzll unmkdan baglmluan pamurlgararl rayuarl an Mahkamah mm. Malaya Talmna lug. keg Raylmn Jeniyah Nu A:-azlsxs-24:2/zm (rayuarl \|ersebul’ N zlPmlsPuEKAxAoMxaPUq 3 ma Smnl n-vlhnrwm be used M mm .. mlmlluy mm: dun-mm VI] .mm mm mm (supra) wmn approval. n mscussed what was a whoHy sxcsp\|inna\ circumstance, and there M was m rsgam In Ignorance an the defence of murder. Wwth respecl, the decision m me Singaporean case was conﬁned In the rams of the case and me apex court had staled: ‘ .Wa are nal s»-ggunng an out mumam ma any Ignnranu onus xsm on me pan acwumx shank! neussumy mu . puss-msnywng m avsry case. The law mung to murd-r hawevur, 1: ms mosl mmsmsnu: pomon nf aﬂ our waw n gnvems ma mndnlons m whhzh many may mks nwiy Me‘ an almv m n: 1:: avnﬂcannn may be such that n can nevsr be mama- [151 The decision 01 me svngaporean court Is omy persuaswe am not bnndmg here and «ms Court opmes that u rs not an sppxe-mpms oompanson as the \aw in re\a(1on to me dsfencs (or me capital olfenos of 25 murdsr could not be equated with the defence avaﬂalﬂe In an accused in 5 20 of the 2017 A01. The apex court oonunued: ‘In ms event we «ma nmsehras cnmpeﬂed tn a very ﬁvm mm W me man max had (run eudenue iogelller mm \|he smsnss .s In m. nature at his klﬂmga been below: the mal awn and has me mw vamung lo we mmdenca and 2a Quantum ovproonaeen ounec1\|ysla(edm\|heAufY(as Vlwssbmen m laasnnnme My wmd Posswbw have some to any concmsum other man lhat me dedenca M mmvmshsd vaspuvvilhllwly was mzde nul - 15 [191 m Do] v usim v FF 1193711 ML! 115, ms Supreme Cmm held that: ‘n u 01: paramount duly n1 ms cowl to sea mu, m me ‘:51 msom pusuca I5 dune mu any mxluimnge :11 Mm mmsu In W aﬂha Vacl mm m. Islmad Judas came in ms conclusion as . veault a! me demonslmﬁon am by In: In chemlsl we canmﬂ say he was nm inﬂuenced by lhis additions‘ meme which was nolshowluo us nsnsaary and also Vmpmverw admmed um. c.....m suvlnly can Innddlﬂona cvldcncnlusnonlliiy ms curiosity or mm at to suplalumvll a win n ma Prouclmon. Alia. such Ivmnnnm N ...s..u.y. mun DI m pron-r com. am! um In accorﬂallcn wnn um 35 mm mu -mm c.........\| Pvocldun Cudl' [Emphasis added] 3 mm, smsw IIIVVDIVWW be used m mm .. mxmuuy mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm III In 15 [201 I nave considered ine alﬂdavil lrl suppon oi ine epplicailon, ine submisslens and case laws cited and l have also lngnilgnied lne relevant cases above. The coun needs to deiennlne whether all me iour ocndiliclns have been satisﬁed as submmsd by the Applicant‘: counsel that they have done so Wilh regard \|a mndlllons Nos. 2 and 3. this Court does nol have difficulty to answer In the affirmative As clearly explained in «he ihird ecndliion enunclaled in R vPark$ (supral. ll IS not me task ar INS caun lo decide wneiher ihe proposed evidence is lo be believed or Hot. N (hls siege, ine iuncuon oi ine coun IS only lo deiernnne wneiner ine proposed evidenee, ii given, IS capable oi bsllsl. [21] However, in my underslandlng of the the ﬁrs\|ount1i\|iorl,itlsmat line evidence must nei he avaiiauie ai ihe iriai. To recap, in paragraph 9 di Enci, 2. me Appiioani slated In nis iesiirnony, ne laid me sessions coun inei in nach amount SP10 had stand her age as 19. 22 2nd 2:. ln paraymph 10. «he Auplicarlt evened ihal he had nonesily aliernpied id eseenain her real age Neveriheless. mere was no such documentary evidence suibmmed by his previous counsel lo suppon his oral evidence in edun at lnai lime. Then in paragraph is, he oorlll-adlcled nlrnsell by slaiing inai pursuarll (0 his newly appointed oouneers advice, he had euialned lne pnnlouls in Exhlini HM—3 as lunner evidence ior ine purpose onne appeal Hound Ihal unis purpunadly new ovidancn was almady available ul the «rial. as he already knew ihen she had svaled mree diﬁmniagas In nu BIGO account rlruﬂlns. But as to why the previaus counsel did no\| adduce menu at when ilrne. only ihe Appllcnni and his delenee learn knew me reason. Failure. ll any. oi lne previous eounsel lo sumnli lne docurnenls then, did nol mean lney were not available 5! all. I concluded mm the Aupllcam has not mieiiad tho ﬂrsl condltlon. 11 in ZlPmlSPuEKAxA4MxBPU§ -use s.n.l ...n.. will be used m mm ve nllmnnllly Mlhls dun-vlnnl vu .nune Wﬂxl in In [22] wiln regard lo me leurln condillon. l.e. alter oonsldsring lnal evidence, go en lo cnnslder wnelher lnere nilgnl have been a reasonable doubt ln lne inlnds ollne Jury aslo ma gulllellheappellanl lllnal svldencs had been given logelnei wlln lne elnerevidenoe al \|l'le lnal. As there is no lury nare, lnls oundlllan will relarlolne lnal calm. A perusal pnna grounds of iudgmerll ln Exllloil l-ill/M snowed that me scJ nad oonsldeied lne Appllcanrs evidence and deienoe abwl no: known; SFIO‘s We age (paragraphs 32 onwards). Then in paragraph 37 onwards \|he SCJ sraled why she dld nol believe his delerlce. [23] in paragiapn 75, 12" line onwards, ane alaled '...spal7lIa rarludun dapal rnalrnal aeaualu yang mencurrgakan lanlang umul sebemar spur .” She wanl en lo paragraph 71, wnlcn was me pass for nrs applicaliens Io adrnn addilidnal evidanoe The SCJ viewed mallhe Apphcanl should have mat SP10 ln persun In asoenain one age ollna g‘lr\| And then the SCJ also rnenlloned aooul lne Aoplicanvs acadernlc qualilioalion ls. Diploma ln Early childhood Educallon, which she corlsldersd as well lnal lne delenoe alsad dld nol oonvlnce nar lrlal he dld nm know Ihe victim's lme age [24] The Appllcarll was asking lo adnill lns addlllenal deoumenlary evidenue ev SWO‘: purported adull ages bu\| lne SCJ's epneluaien was llnal lia did nol mzko any eiion tn mael wm. SP1\|l in person l fuund lnal based on her oonolusions, lne addllienal doournenlary evldence ln Exnibil HM—3 “would nol have raised a reasonable doubt in lne mind of me sc.I as In lne gull: ol lrle Anpllcanl ii lrral evldende nad been glven lcgelher wI\|h me olhar evldenoe al the lnal' Thonlon, tin Appllunt hu also nol aatlsﬂnd tholounh com1l\|\|all.Whelher ornollne SCJ was ngm in convict lne Applicanl la a dlﬂerenl nialler and lnal la lerlnla ceun In declde at me appeal siege. 1; rn zlProlsPuEKAxA4MxaPU9 -we s.n.l n-vlhnrwm be used m mm ms nﬂnlruﬂly sun. dun-vlnrrl via .neno Wm! in m [25] It tetnte tewtneretere, tnet not ontythe etreumeteneee must be mas\| excepﬂonal but the subject wntcn ts pmpased to be adduced by further evtaenee ts subject ta exeeptianet onndilians. It becomes necessary anty ite latlure anusttoe would nesutt trsucn aaantenet etndence was not taken and allowed wnen audtttonat (acts have come to ﬁght since tne date at met. The matter ts leﬂ entirety lo the discreltcn at the court. And me coun has exemtsed we dtecretton judtctausty tn accordance wttn establtshed teget pnnctptee. There was nolhtng new tn lhe addmortal evtdenee wnten lhs Appttcent sought tn be admmed tn tne Recom at Appeal as they were already known to me defence et me lrtal. Moreover, me SCJ would not have cumelu a diﬂeranlcnnclusiun svsn W1hedncuman1s\|osht1w 5910': ‘purponzd emer aduk ages’ had been admmed at me Inal CONCLUSION [25] Premtsed upon the above cortstderaltcns, tne Cuurlluund Ihers was no merI\| tn the appllcahuns and both were dtsmlssed aoeerdtngly Dzlnd s Novemberznzct / %,,_/ Moor Ruwuta Btnu Md. Nurdln Judlclal Commlssiomr Nlgll Cnuﬂ ul Malaya, Tzlplng Regmemn an For the App cant: Mr. Joﬁl Bln Jufnr 5 Abdullah, Mazmh a. Jefrl, Kuala Lumpur For the Rupondom: mar Szll Ohzy Mac Ling P-[abut Tlmbalau Plndnkwa Raya Mayan Forak. Cawangan Talping an 15 w z\PmxsPuEKaxA4MxaP\J9 -ms Sum M... M“ be used m mm u. nvVWuH\|Y mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm 2 Buhawn Perwnhun/Pe<ayn dlbsrl kubenaran umux memamn bukN— mu keleranwsn bsmllanlman yam: diwhnn leuebul ssbagai R-ken rawan Tambahan nag: kss Rawan Jenayah NoAE»J2JSKS-2-02r‘2023 (mm Iecsgk-ml’), s a Bahawa Pemohnn/Psrayu Mben kehznalan urvtuk memmda Fstrsyen Rzyuan hanallkh zsa 2023 smaran German Danmah am kebznlnn yang dwbavlkarl uaram plravvqgan (1) dan (2; an alas‘ amwa sehanjlmiya um semms dengin Ssksysn 317 Kanun Pmeaur Janlyarl mm 51:) ksteranuan ham/Vanjulan hen<a\Lan pmhﬂ mu.» an akaun BIGO Pnngadu gswwy dumml dan dneﬂmn masuk umuk ﬂan Dag: mman penaenamn nayunn ur Mahkameh nnggr Mavaya Talpmg nag: kss Rayuan Jenayah Na AE—42.1SKS-2-a2l2\|723 (-raym xeugnmw Eahawa sekhanya atﬂl clan 5 infant mm. Rzyuan pada ma mm 15 duadualkan semmz ke lankh ham unluk membenarmn kelnlangin ham/Varulnnn sedcmlklan mmawmn bag! human hujzhulrhujahan dalam rayum dun dshm pendengavlll riyuan Vamubm m Mahkamah Muha rm: s new :e\an;u\|nyI yang Mahkamah Yang Mull: Im nu-rrarr wa;er‘ Dihll In den sum mamanl. [5] The same prayers were snughl in respect 0! CrIm\|na\ Appeal No. AB«:2JsKs-3~oz/2023 (of Case No. AB-GZJSK-21-II/2019. The bﬂef reasons gwen for ma appncanons were um. the Aupllcanl was convicted on 15.2 2023 after a lull lnal an 15 the (our charges. He had been sentenced to 13 years‘ Impdsunmenl mm the dale av common and 3 strokes each al me man; sm zrmsmmxmxswg 3 mm. smm n-uhnrwm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. nrimnnﬂly mm: dun-mm VII mum perm ii ne was aieseusneu wun the decxsion 0! me sessions Conn and had med appems In the Hugh com and men me Pelmon av Appeal was med en 25.4.2023: m me Sessions court In smvlng an us deuswun had cnnswdered 5 the pmwsven of ‘Presumplion of age of a mild‘ under s.2o of the zen Am and deuided mac 'Tar1uduh/Psniyu uuex menunjukkan Teduduh Eda msnja/ankan usaha dan rkhlisr Lmluk bsdumpa dsngan spm ssndfli bagi memaslikan semade SP10 /a/ah seoreng dewasa eveu kanek»kanak': m iv. ne documentary ewdenee Derlammg to "caburarl/eksl'rak pmfaﬂ akaun-akaun 5/so /em Pengsdu (spmr were tendered aH.\|1elHa\| m the Sessxans Court and (hvs dwectly prejudmsd the defence ov me Appellanl/Apphcanl; V. substantial prejudice would alsn ensue nr the 'cabutan/skslrsk I5 pmlen ekaunekeun BIGD tern Psngadu {SP1l7]" are not aﬂowed In be made as pen uflhs Racmd ufAppea\|; w. deeumenvauy ewdence pena ng to 'cabuIarI/skslrak prulaﬂ akaun-akaun E/GO /ern Pengadu {SF-'10)‘ sought to be tendered are very inter-related wnn me findings 0! me 1.: Sessions coun: vn. me send documentary evmenee sougm la be adrmlled herein are cremble aecumemery evmenae and would raise a reeseneme doubt m the lower court re\at\ng to me Appneanrs gum W015 sad evfdenue had been admitted along with u\|her zs evmenue Iherem. yn z\PrmsPuEKAxAoMxaPU9 -nee smnw n-nhnrwm be used m mm n. nrW\nnU\|Y mm: dun-mm wa .nuNG Wm I5 15 [s] The Deputy Pubhl: Prosecutor (DFP) ate not me any amttavtt In reply but obtected to the appttcettone in the wntten sutzmtestans of the Respondent ntett on the nterntng at t4.a 2023 The hearing al the appttcatten was nominated an 14.4% 2023 and adjourned lur decision on 4.9.2023. EVALUATION AND F mug; QE YHE COURT [7] addtttonal or runner evtdence states. The plovistun of s 317 atthe cwc which ptovtdes tot teeeptton at “Older ta take ttttthet etttaenae an (H tn aeattng wtth any apnnet undsr tttts crteptet a htage. n he wnks saatttanet emenee tn be neseuaty, may ettnettate such evtaence htrnaettar etteat tt ts be taken by a Magishilu (2; when the addmnnnl evidence ta taken by a hteatettate he ettatt eenny that evidence tn the htsh cetttt who ehatt then, us eeen ee may he. messed te atspoee nl the appeat tat Unless the Judas uthetwtse attests, the aeatteaa at he advucale shatt he wuent when the eaatttenet avtdunce ts taken. tmha tehna ul smdancs ttneenhte senmn utett, tatttte pttrpnsas orcheptet xxv, be dsemed te he nn ?nﬂu\ty' [9] The Appllcanl eubtntttea that the math reasan tot the appttcattens was due te the ﬁndings made tn the grounds of tttegntent uflhe Sessions com Judge (SCJ) in paragraph 77 which was tn E HMV1 ol Enat 2, where she had stated 'Tst1uduh/Pelayu I/dak menultitlkkan Tenuduh sda men/‘a/ankan usaha dart ikhtiar tmfuk bequmpa dsngan SP10 eencttn‘ bag!‘ I-nemasrikalv sarnada sum ia/ah seolang dewasa alau kanalokanak’. Referring to s.2o at the 2017 Act, counsel tor the Apptteent tntatntee the Cuuﬂ that the pt-vlons counsel tithe Sosllans Court did not presam tn Z\PmtSPItEKAXAOMxBPU§ ‘Nuns a.n.t I-vthnrwm be used a mm the .nttn.tt-y MW: dun-mm he .nette WM! in 15 15 the evidence wlilch they sought io ho adinllhd as panoftho doluiu ease The Aooirsani came to know the victim (SWO) through the itve streaming piaitsrrn knnwn as "B]GO‘. si=to had an assount wi\|h BIGO. The crux oitne deienoe case was exastiy that aitnouoh the Applicant had been eornrnunr 9 Via iaieu, telephone and wnarsApp with the victim tsi=to). he did not know her real age because BIGO was an aduitsoniy piationn and not intended iorsnyone under ta years o1sge.TheApoIicent sought to aoouse aooriionai evidence (he! SPIO owned more than one EIGO acoount and each oi them showed diitereni ages at SF10 (please reierto Exhibit Hit/i—3 in Enot. 2). itenoe, ms Appiioani had seen denied oi a iair tnai one to the neornpotsnee" oi the proviso: eounsei who conducted the ease and aid nut adduue the said Exhibit i-tM<a. [91 counsei reierred to a iew cases in its Bundle of Amhurilies and argued that the ease of uiuruqaynh v PF porn] 2 ML! 545 was apphssois here. The Apphcani wanted to show to the court that he did make etiorts to ascertain her age. The new evidence wduid satisfy the tour ssnortions In R u Parks moi] 2 AER us and it may raise a the mind onhs iriai iudge They prayer: that me courr aiiowed the ooauments to be aornnteo so that they wouid have a ehsnoe to argue the ease during the supsrantwe aopeai reastonabie dou [to] The DPP submmed that the Applicant knew that SWO lied aoour her age as the evidence would show. The printouts In Exhibit HM<S were inoancluslvs as two at ihern did not shtm ihe viclim‘s iace. iithe prinloms were admiued, the prosecution seuto not send them ior veniieanon and whether these pmliies were shii YVI exnslerics. it was not known it the aiieged pmliles were used WI cummunimtiuns oetwsan the Applicant and SFID. itwher the Appiioant aiieged was true, Ex r it HM4 wouid have s IN ziPruisPuEKAxA»txaPU§ None s.n.i n-rihnrwm rs used m mm ms oﬂninsiily Mimi dun-rinrrl VI] .nuue Wmi as an 15 existed during the tnal and therelora did not satisiy the corldﬂmns in R v Parks (supra). The DPP sutiinltted turther that the SCJ had assessed the credipllity at the witnesses arid came to a culmcl hriding at the tnat and the victim's cross-excrriinatlori at pages :s:s:l~3:s7 ot the Nuts t)1Evidenoe (which were not exhlbited in the application) showed that she had been asked the relevant qussllorls regarding her age. However, the Applicant did not adhere to the ccnect procedures to admit lurther evlderlce ler the purpose atthe appeal and prayed torthe application to be dismissed. she argued that in the ease of uurugayeri v PP tsupra), the court of Appeal had oleany explained the conditions in R v Parks tsupra). Hence, to allow the applications would be a travesty oriustide to the prosecution case after trial and a second bite at the cherry by the N7 ‘ rlt so to speak. I11] ln reply, counsel lor the Applicant submitted (rather puzzllngtyl that Muntglynh v PF (supra) could ae distinguished tiecause the application under s.3I7 oi the CPC was made about three years later whereas here End. 1 was tlled lrriniediately whlle pending the appeal ln the instant case, the existenoe of other also accotmls held py SP10 would show that she had stated ditterent ages (lied apout her real agei. ln paragmph sorsrict 2, the Applicant stated that in his testimony, he told the Sessions Cnurl that in each aecourrt SP1D had stated her age as la, 22 arid 23 sl=tu also told hlrh that she was studying in upper Form 6 and which was why he believed that she was rnore than 18 years‘ old. In paragraph to. the Applleantaveneo that he had honestly attempted to ascertalri her real age in paragraph t1, the Applicant stated that nevertheless, there was no such documentary evidence supinitted by the previous oourisel to support his eral evidence in cutm at that time He had peen supstantially preiudioed by the nndings at the sc.l in his deteriee because the iudge had applied am at the 2017 Act on the wrong evidence. 7 IN ZlPmlSPuEKAXA4MxBPU§ -use s.n.i In-vlhnrwlll re used is mm s. oﬂnlrrallly Mlhls dnunvlnrll vta aFlt.ING wnxl [12] In paragraph 12‘ The Appncanc stated that In March 2023 upon appoinwlg a dwrerem counsel to conduct his appeal and in prepareuon at me Penman M Apbeal. he had been asked about SP1D’s omer awso account pmmes. Pursuant merelc, m pamgraph 15 me Apgncann smeu s that ne had (aken steps m obtain ms extrams ol SP1D‘s o\|her sweo account memes in order tor the documents to be admitted as and Inna! evidenoa for the purposes M me appeaxs. [1 :1] The coun win not dehbeme on me rnerivs of ms defence in regard no to the apphcanons. But it \s peninent at this point. for completeness. lo stale the law in regard to sm anhe 2017 Amvmvch provides: 'Fve:umD\|mn ahsge nla mm 2n n Vs ml adeleme la a chmgefaranyoﬂenoe uMerIh>sAc1. or any Mlence 15 Shaman m we seneaune wne.e me mum \s a em, man an accused neuem that me :98 av me mm: 45 an more man mm as specmaa m we rsspecllve pmwsmns m such nﬂencu 2\| the cm ma vﬂencu n aﬂeged 10 Ma been mmmmad umasx live nccuuaa muk an raamnahle steps «a men“ me 192 no the and - 2n [141 The Applicant Vs relying on the phrase ‘unless ms accused look all reasonable slaps Ia ascsnam ms ags ofths chila’. Augusnns Paul JCA m Muruglylh vrr (supra) sialad: 25 “s n wm be obsswad mm on vacephon oi lddmunzl amama Vs a matter :71 discvemn u .5 smiled um Ihal me exerdse M n dFs\|:re\|mn musl be m acmrdance wulh eslzbﬂshed mdlchal guldeﬂnes In me case at aaaumng addmonalev1asrme.lha wmdeimas were wen out m Laud vMarsha/M15413 All ER 745 m ma vonn unmua condmuni. In ehlzoralmn aims commons, Lard so ParkarCJsa\d\nRvPaIV<sl1961]JAlIER533aIP6(\| Thuclpdnclplll club: xummarludinlhlx way. rum. um uvldlncn um n I. wunlll to all mun bu uvldlncn which Wu not Ivallubll .1 um um Slcnndly, ma on. you wllhuul lylnq, It mull bu syn z\PnnsPuEKAxAoMxsP\Jq 3 «-we sum IIIVVDIVWW be used m mm me mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm .V1a..1.. .. VIII! 1.. 1h. 1.... 11.11.1111, 11 must 1.. .Vhu.... which Is c..a11.1. VVIGIVICC 1.. 1h. nun 111.1 11 1. w.11e:p.1.1. ..11..r 1 1 ...11...1h1. .....111...1.c1.1. -.1..111..111. 1. 1.. 1..11.v.11 ornol, 1.111 11 ......1 1.. .V1.1.m which 1. c....1.1. .1 1.11.1. rounhuy, 1h. com! 5 .111 .h.. .....1.1..1..g 11..1.V1a..... go 1... 1. co...1.1..wh.111..1h... 1.131.. 1.... 1..... .. ........1.1. .1....1.11.. 1h. ...11.1. 1.111.. 1.1V 1.. 11.1 auln ..11h. .np.11...1 n1h.1 .V11s..1.. had 1.... .11.... 1a11.1h.. wlm 1h. o1h.. nvld-nu .11h.1.1.1. .1. 7 111. slalememotlhe 1.... 1.1 12V1>.ms11ss11 cum an 533 1... 1.... adnmsd .1111 ao1>1ea 1.. Vocal cases such ..s11.1..1....1 .11.. Jamal V p..1.«.. Prosecular[1§6lI1 MLJ 254: Del 11.. Laura VFUMIC Pr1>.\|ecw!Or[1§B7] 1 MLJ 1161LoFarTﬂlarv L DVSVFMDDC Frusacumr[1965I1 MLJ 214 aha CheD1n 1.1.. Ahm1.aV1vV1.1c1=.om..1o1 11.161 1 MU 251 1h. conditions .1. ...1..1.1.11.. .5 ....: ...11..11.. .11.....1. .... .1..1...11.. ......11...11...11.rV 1h. 1.1.11 um 11... h.V. 1.... 1.11111... 1...c1.. Dln bin Ahmad V ;=..ou.= ms....11.r11m1 1 mm 2121. 11 Is 1.1.1,. - 1h. .....1 ..c.p11..1.1 .1m.....1.....s 1h.1111. mun 1.111 receive . ...1.V1.1...... Assyed A911 Earakbah 1 (as 11. 111... was) said 1.. Che pm 11.. Ahmad V P111. za Pvowculur 11121111 1 11111 259 .1 911 21112120: 11.... 317121111. Cnmmzl Pmosduva cm. 9.1.. . dwsaahan 1.. 11.. 1.14.... heanng ..hy.p1.e.11n ..11.......111.1......1e1........1=.11h..1..1n1. M1. .s necessary. 1.. cnnsldelina such avnhmlinn 11.. .1...11.1. .1... 1... 25 away: adopted 11.. .1111... 1h.1 11 1s my 11 11. ms. exceDImna\ .1.s1.ms1a..o.s, and suntan 1. wha\| may be dumbed as excepﬂcnm ...m1......111.1111.. own 1. .1... 1.11.9 1.11s1..11.. ..11111.....1 avwdenoe (111..h.m..1 1... ......1 V M1. 1=m.....1..[1seo1 1 111. 254, 255 1... 11...... 11>. mum... 11.1.1 J .. 11.. can .1 .1 V mu... 11115.; 411 c. 2.. Ann R 152. 15-1) 11 1. .1... 1h...1..... 1h... ...1 ....1, th- V1.......s1.ms ...1..1 1.. most exceptional 1.1.1 1h. sum... which . n..1=o.s11 1. 1.. adduced by Nrlher .V1¢..1=. 1s M11... 1. -xocmlonal condlllnni. 11 hocomn .. ..s.ry ....1y11. 1.11.... .1 i...11=. would 1.1.11 11....1. ..1.111.o1..1 IWHIIICO Vlii 1.1.11.1... ....1 3. .11.»... whnn . 11.1.... .1. 1.... w . 1. 1.71.1 .1... 11.. am .1 11.. ....n. . 1.11 ...u..1, huh: .11.... .. nflhn ......1.~. [Emphasis added] .1 [151 In Mulugayah V PP 1.1.1.1.), 11.e accused was chargsd .11 111. sessmns court WIH1 an nlfencs under 5.325 of the Penal Cnds far having caused grievous hurt to one Kantharupan who at me me! had identiﬁed 9 3 1.... s..1.1.......V11.. 1.... 1. mm 1.. ..1.h.1V MW; ........ V. .11.... 1.1.. iii IS zu 15 an me aeeiised as one oi the coin peieens who had ahacxed him. The accused was oonvieted in Febmary 1997 and sentenced. He appeaied to the High cotinagainst the eenvietiaii and sentence. whiie the appeal was pending the accused made an appiicahen in the High ooiiit to adduee additional evidence puieiinnt I0 s :17 er the cue iioiii himseii, Kanlhanlpan and one Kiishnari His appiieetion was disiiiissed by the High Court He appealed against the High Courl decisien The hasls of his application wee that eoniotiino fter his conviction, in was. he was intoi-iiied by Kitetinan that Kenitiarupnn waa iiecuaity uuiiited tiy euiai pnrsons. He tater niet Kanthanipan who toid the aeeiieed that he had ideiitined the accused in cdiiit based on imoiniatien he obtained from a third F-any His appeal againstthe High cciiiitdecisioii was attdwad. The circumstances in that case was the proizosed evidenee ceiitd nut have been zivaiiaoie at the tnei and it went to the identity dnhe assaitant [161 Therelove, it appeared in the above case that the inieiniation seiigtii to DB admiltied as ﬂesh evidence WES DVIW awilabie in 1998 aﬂer the Ma‘ ended. The third and ioiiiiti condillons in R v Parks (sum) weie also not satisﬁed In that case To siininiaiise, the tour conditions are. 1 me endenee Ih-I\|!l ie lﬂughi la can must be evidenea which was net aveitaeie ai itie iiiai ii niiisi be evideiiee relevant to the iseves 3 ii must ee evidence which is eiedioie evidence in the ieiice that it Ii wail eaeeeie oi oeiieh, it It nut iei this cciiitio deeds Wﬂalharll im e. balievud W rial, but it iiiim be evidence which n eepaiii. af hlhaf 4 me com vnii aitenedinideniie thl\| evidence an en la caruidsr whelher ineie might have iieen ii renmnahle douhl in the niinds eiiheiury as to the eiiiii at the iiveeitani Iflhn\| evidence had eeen given \|age1her wilh lha oihei evideiiee ai the met [17] I have eiso iaoked at the case of Mohitmed Bin Jlmll v PP [1954 1 ML! 254 where the Fedei-ai court of Singapore which also cited R v iii N Z\PnliSPuEKAXA6HxBPU§ 3 we s.ii.i nnvihnrwm be in... M mm ee nﬂnihnﬂly MIME dnunvilnl wa miiiic WM!	1,986	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
MA-24NCvC-182-05/2023	PEMOHON 1. ) LOO KIAN AIK 2. ) GOLDHILL AFFLUENCE SDN BHD RESPONDEN 1. ) ALIRAN RAYA SDN BHD 2. ) SIAH CHONG YENG	"Section 326 & 417 of the National Land Code - Plaintiff's action to extend caveat - parties into an agreement to purchase properties ('ATP') - Plaintiff is purchaser - agreement is subject to signing of a Sale and Purchase Agreement - earnest deposit paid - SPA in advanced stage of negotiations - issue : whether the ATP grants the Plaintiff caveatable interest - held: (a) ATP only grants the Plaintiff a right in personam and not right in rem; (ii) ATP was a contract to contract subject to SPA; (iii) payment of earnest deposit and advanced negotiations did not grant Plaintiff caveatable interest - application dismissed"	06/11/2023	YA Tuan Mohd Radzi Bin Abdul Hamid	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=3cc01328-8dd8-4a78-9512-db341da35940&Inline=true	06/11/2023 09:08:51 MA-24NCvC-182-05/2023 Kand. 42 S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N KBPAPNiNeEqVEts0HaNZQA *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m—2uIcvc—1a2—u5/2023 Kand. 42 ab/11/inn um;-:1 IN THE HIGH COURT or IAALAVA AT MELAKA ORIGINATING sumllous NO: MA-ZANCVC-1B2~05I2023 In the mansr aI Iand held under GRN 14641 Lot I22 and GRN 21779 Lot I24, both In ‘Kiwisan 5-nae: xxv. Daerah Melaka rengan, Megan Melaka“ And III we malter of a Dnvale caveat anlerad an (ha above Imus by GaIdmII Aﬂluenoe sun BM (ﬁegmrulvun No 201701024022 tczzamwn wde Prnsamallon Ne uaoaszuzzounsa and regmerad an 12 I0 2022 And In mallevs of season 325 and 417 aI me Nannnal Land caae 1955 And In me matters I)! Ordev 1 and 9 Rules A oune Rmes ai com 2012 sm KEPAPNIN-EI:VEI:nHaNzuA nine s.n.I In-vIhnrwHI be mad M mm he nnmmu-y Mm. m.n.m VII .rIuNG WMI BETWEEN 1. L00 KIAN AIK 2. GOLDHILL AFFLUENCE sou .EHD. PLAINTIFFS AND 1. ALIRAN RAVA sou. END. 2. SIAH CHUNG VENG DEFENDANTS llNE£ InA1'rER BEFORE THIS COURT [11 ms a decnsmn on an appucamn brought by me Plammls m endusuve 1 (’App\Icatvon‘) var an order mat me pnvale caveal No a4uua2o22uu4794 entered by me Seound F'\a1rmﬂ on a ‘and known as GRN 1451 1.02122 and GRN 21779 Lot 124 be extended ellher — (a) mum me propemes m questmn wmcn are me sub]ec1 of an mended sale between me mamuns and the Defendants ave 1rans1eneu1u me Plalnllﬂs ur sw »<apm1.N.z.va;n+m1zuA .111. 5.1.1 ...m.mm be 1;... 1. mm 1.. mmuny wk. dun-mm VIZ muNG pm [25] The lac! that more was payment olaamssl dsposrr amnhar n should as rsrundscle nod no! Ipso vacm pmwds lo I/UM ca»/salable mlerext m the sen land Mere pecuniary rnlerest m land does not mm/e a person to lodge a caveat unoer s32: or the Code (sea Regtstraml Ttllss ./ohole V Temervggong Securmes Ltd) [I3] Thus, a: beat. me ATP gwes me Plalnflﬂs e um m personam Igaxmt the Defendants lur any new hm not . nghl m mm m me am Al the pom! the ATP was executed me Plamulls merely acquired a ocnlmgent ornmue Interest am not a presem ur exlslvng uegmraue Interest m we lands Vn Soon opmm Slim and. v. Ind Duvllopmonl Sdn. Bhd. (mu 7 cu m /[2912] a Am 475 me Federal com held » I39] H rs also our comrderud View lh-9! [Its caveator unders 323(1)(a)o/me NLC mus! have a present males! as opposed to a potential Interest In ms land The regrstrable Interest that me cavellor »: clalmmg hr, must be an axlslmg mlsrasf The cawulnr undsrs 323(1)(aJ DI the NLC must he Immed to those who are claiming fa an extsfmg Interest m ms /and or right to such sxrsl/Ag wares! and cannot Include polelmal mlerust or rnlsresl m luluro m KEFAPMN-EqVEl:9H:NzuA mm. Snr1n\nunhnrwH\I>e med M mm he nrW\n\|U\|Y MM‘. dnuumnl VII muNG pm 110) ms principle is nnnly smbedded m cur Torrens system Trns can no sun n ma deer:/on enne supreme court rn Tart Hana Pan V Tan Econ Thong 5 or: [1952] 2 ML! t In mat case, a caveat lodged by a resrduary benelruary ms ardered (L7 be removed because rne adntinistnanan anne aslals wee still rneornp/ere at me nrne me caves! was lodged. as such nrs rnveres: rn the /and was szru unssmtrnneore Mohamed A1m1SCJ{as ne men was) In :19/we/vng me judgment of ma war! at p 5 new as Inﬂows — In ourvrevn the rec: tnar me caveator was entmed um»! (src) Me wru to rr ans-srxm snare rn me erghr parcels ol /and, drd not mean mat ma snare was aacertarnapre belara aamrnrstrauan was comp/ale. As expressed tn the deceased's mu, the cavealar was rn Iact enmted Io an/y ans snare, and pm 4 al me wm empowered me executor ta sen and convert any part of me estate in meet to pay me tesratars debts apart from me iunsml and testamentary expenses As sucrn unnr the mtrnunstranon was complete, me vs/us or extent ol tne rssrdus on wrncn ms arts-srxln snare n1spsnd9d,{2012] 6 ML./ 475 at 459 remarrred urrcerrarn on eszanlrsrred aufhormes cleany me caveular m me present appeal had no cnveernate cleun er mrerssls rn any oltne property when rne cavsal was entered There was no m KaFAPNtNaEqvEtenH:NzuA 12 we. e.nn nmhnrwm be met! a may r... nrW\ruU\|Y mm: dnuumnl VI muNa vwm [19] svrdence that me adrmmsfralmn or me estale was already camp/ere la ascerram ma .acrua/ worth ofthe Ies»dua ro:rma/ drsfnbulron. [£11 In Goa Hee smg v VVr//R515 A Alvor (199313 ML./ 610 at p 513 Mahsdev shankau (as he then was) punt as fa/laws: ma pammowsmrs that me claim mus! be to We ora ngm memo m pnwssrm, and no! In sum connngem ms or ngm Marsh: 11-: /uluro [U] In me pnssm case. even though ma respondent was grven me opnon lo purchase the mm It developed and trunsler (I15 urms lo nselmir chansss to do so, mar ngm has yet to be exermsed at me me when the caveat was fudgad Therefore‘ me right has not npanoamm an Interest m the /and Appsymg the aecman m S-con Oplians. Ims own ﬁnds max smce Ihe sale and purchasa av me lands -n nus Agphranm u sun Lu\|:;ec1 lo the execuuan ul 3 SPA. lhe Pwmmms ngms have not npenaa me an Imeresl In the lands [201 On anomer Dcim «ms coun does run ﬁnd mm me advance stage at negeuannns 0! me SPA even up lo me point where me Plamulls allege me: n was ready (or axeounon‘ gave mam a regwsimme and caveaeame Inieresl The can remains man the Defendants had not concluded mew na9u\|Iu\|Iuns on (he terms at me swx when they oenunued to change thew posmons Whether this Is aeeepcame Io meme-mms under me law ofconlracts us anahermaner It Is a basic men nffreadnm n1 eunum «rm puma; can optla nmcmmluﬂa any con\vac1. a\be\I at me nsk 01 payment of damages 0! specmc rellel As opmee by me Federa\ com m lnsmut mmorogt Federal (supra) nsgouatmns tor . Colman‘ nu manerhuw zdvanmd. cannot armum m a ooruracl — I231 /nciniermally n ‘rs ammanc ma: negonanons rm a comma: nowevemmncod, do not amount la a comma: unm Md unless a purchassrhas an envomsanle conrmcilorme sale olland, ne curl my no clam: to me me lo Iﬁglslarbd /and A lnmon, he has no rrneresl that As capabre ol pmtecvon by the entry of a caveat’ per Boos! Sn Ram ./CA m Mumgagpa Chums! Lskshmanan v Lee Tack Mock (19951 1 MLJ 752 (see slsaAys: I-mam Tm Dradgmg Malaysia arm v vc Chm Enlerpnsss 5117: am: /199412 ML] 754) [Y1] 1251 From the lads es drscmssd m me afﬁdawts Med and Form 195 we would say rrrer ar mas! is me: mere was nepolralnm on me sure rm no concluded rrensecrrorr cams rrrru exrstsncs Negolrahons [or a canlvact, no rnener haw advanced cannot arnounl m a contract rrre posmnn anne names rn Mrs eppeemrus comes withm me wow expressed by we noun m rmzmy, «ma Cnun rs oonslramed Io agree with me Phlnmfs that me case cl mcorr Enginlon Sdn. Ehd. v. Gan Moo! Yln[1.v7ﬂ) 2 ML] / [1976] 1 LNS 67, assrst merr case The lads N1 «M1 case show that parlles had aneady entered mm a sa\e arm puvchase agraemenh and aclmg an that agveumem eencrcars lor me vendors mere remmded me purduassis to same the balance purchase pm on me dexermmed date. However, In me present case no sud! ngm has been accorded yet to me Defend-ncs arm nemnez has me ublrgalum lo makalhe peyrnem em: zr-wanna purchase pnee ansan undev the ATP, I! the ATP was Imended In be me gumnmg contract br me sa\e of me wands. men me Delendams wnmd have already demanded payment. and me Flzmlrﬂs would have been under me nnngauon In uenaenne same Yhelactlhal nemerwns done only shwwslhal pames mended in: me SPA In ﬁrs! come we belnre altendmg to all men respective ubhgalluns DECISION [12] To aonctude. «ms coun fmdslhal me Plamuffs have tuned to satisfy we com that may have veglslrilﬂe and cweatahla mleresls psmymg a claxm lor xn extension of ma navaac The Appnunan Is hereby dismissed wan costs 01 RM5,0DD Dated ms 23"‘ October 2023 ;Mlm;A noun RADZI am Aaﬁuu. puma JUDGE men coum. MELAKA PARTIES AT THE HEARING: : Ms Amy Chis Advocates and Sollcilovs Messrs K H Tan .9. Co No 5-13 Tmgkat 1 Jihn Ybmhnm moo Muar, Jnhor : Ms Vnoh Koay Phlng Ms Sm NuvDmIe Lun1uMnI1d Zauix Advocates and Solicitor: Messn How A Yeah c—1.2 Wansan cnywew Block c Jalan 3/SSA, on Jalan Chem: 56100 KLIBVEI Lumpur sw KEPAPN\|NaEqVEliDH:NZuA 7 um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm 3») mm me msposm of em: MA-2ZNr:VC-I7-D4/2023 that \s snll pending between mam BACKGROUND FACTS [21 Wde a dncumem known as Agreemm nu Pumhase (‘ATP’) dated 11 7 2022 arllavad Inlc belwaen We FWII FVIVHMI acting on ham!" 0! me Second we-mm and Ihe FwsIDe12ndantacIIng on hehall at the Second Dedendant me Dekndsnls agreed to sell and me Pxamcms agreed I0 Durchase MD DVSES of ‘and new under GRN 14641 Lot 122 and can 21779 Lo: :24 In the ski: ol Mehka «or 2 Iowa! purchase oonslderatmn so was 200.000 oo {3} PuIsuan1toIhatATP. a sum of RM96.ooo 00 new earnest deposrl was pm by (he Phalnnffs Ohhat amount RM16‘GDO cu ms and no me Fun! Delendanl mu lhe ba\ance was pm to 2 realty agent Robin Ream aslhetv lees [41 Yhere aruse a dvspule uverme purchase when me Plamuﬂs Illeged me: me Dehndunts had ram, refused ov neglacled In mmplele me sale 0! me warm to me P\amlIH That mspme resumed m .-. sun was MA—22NCvC-17-04/2023 wnare me Plammls seek‘ xnlenaha‘ a m KEFAPN\|N-EqVEl:nH:NZuA % we smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m may he mm-y M1 x. dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [5] [9] specmc perrarrnance er the sale or me Lands The! sun ls snll pendlrlg The Flllnhﬂs believe that by anlsrlng lnlo the ATP they have Icqulled a csvenlaule lnleresl In me lanes and therefore filed the same vlde Reglstrauon No 201701024022 (I23B18B-UH undev Presenlallen No 04005202200094 and raglszerad on 12 10 2022 The Delendanls men sougm to cancel the caveat puvsuant 1a semen 326 more Mammal Land Codaarldlhe RegIs1vnv‘s Furm19C daled 24.11 2022 was served on me Plalnllﬂs on 21 3 2023 The Delemanrs mlenlian lo cancel the caveat Dvnmpled me Plalnnffs In an to preserve lhe caveat by ﬁllng We Applrceclan The Applwenon rs svuvonea by the amdavll ul the 1" vlsrmm In enclosure 3 The Dsaenaunrs response can be luurld ln me 2nd Defendants aﬂidavlt ln reply In enclosure 7 ISSUES [7] The cove Issue rn ms Appllcallnn rs vmemer ATP corllened upon me Plamnlrs a cavealahle Imeresl m the lands and mereaore me ngm la enter a pnvale caveat on them mclumng the nghl to extend nslenn ARG UMENTS OF PARTIES [91 Learned Counsel for the mamrrm contend that the Plalrmﬂs have a cavealable in(eres\| m the Lands based an me lnllawnng «actors — (a) \|haK the ATP Is by operauan M clause 41¢) a bmdmg conuaa and Vegaﬂy bmdmg agveemenl between me pames. (bi varymsnt a! earnest deposit, arm (27 we progress m negolnanons ul me Sale and Purchase Agreement A‘SFA') brought pames In near exeouuon of ms SPA .1 not luv Iasurunuce changes In (erms mslslad lay me netendams [91 Ta suppon the Flalnlulfs case reference was made to the aeusrorrs m mm. Erlyirlnors Sdn Blvd v. Goh Nooi YIn[1!76] 2 ML./ 5: / mu) 1 ms a7; Muruguppl Clnﬂlu Llklnmamn v. Ln rm uoak[1ss5]1 MLJ nz /1199512 CLJ 545; cnmes Greater Sdn. IN KEPAPN\|N-EqVEln9H:NzuA % ’NnI2 saw nnuhnrwm .. U... w my me mm-y M1 r. dun-mm VII nF\uNG v-mm [V01 Bhd. v. Lau Wing Hung 1199:) J MLJ :21 /(19971 1 cu us: cipt. Cor-mm sun. and. v. Porbadanun Kamljuln mam mun paw) 2 MLJ m /(2007) 1 cu an; S/nar Wang Sdn. Bnd. V. Mg Kae Sally mos] 2 ML! 42 /(200415 AMR cu; Aye! Hiram Dlidginv Malaysia and. y. vc Chin Elmrprises Sm snutmsq 2 ML] 154/1199413 out 133 and Sou vong v. Yuzin ouwuttan @ >49 Yuzln 1299414 MLJ my mom] umn ztn On the clher hand. Learned caunsel for Ihe Detenaams argues than the ATP did rtolmn1er\|he Ptarntms any caventabte In\|eres\| tn the land based upon the tar: tnar — (at \he earnest aepestt ts tetundaute under me ATP and ts not a vonenatate pan payment. (by tne ATP ts sutztect to the execuhcn of a tarmat SPA as stated tn clause 1. and (C) pames had not reach Ml canctmenoe or :1! terms and condmuns at the SPA VI parltcular wrttr regards ta retenttun sum penod tn rutease balurme purchase pnce and penad «or payment 0! redemption sum [11] Reference was made In aemeena In‘ mlav-all: - Lugnlgl utambmm (M) Sin. and. V. Tln Hot Tang 5 Amumssj 1 MLJ 719 / [1995] 1 cu 520,- Boulevard Resldenu Sdn. sna. nannezty known as Seucan Developmlnt sdn. Blvd) v. Rmnaya Prwerﬁus sun Blvd. [21122] MLJU 215:: /mm] 1 LNS 2106,- Lumen Group credn Sdn. and. v. Lee Shoo Khoon L Ors[1Dll] I ML] :15 Inna) cu Hop 515; Balnkong Dcvolopmenl Sdn. Bhd. v. Loo Kak men 5 Ann! (1999) 2 ML! 540 /(19991: cu 13,- score Options Sdn. and. v. Menland Dwelapmem sdn. BM. [2012] 7 cu 592 /(201215 MLJ 475,- and Insmu: Teknoloqi Fsdvnl sun Bhd v. mm Educntion Sdn. Bhd. (201771 1 ML! 1: / mm] 1 cu us. DELIEERATIONS {:21 Yo begun n should be stated as a matter was: max at me date 0! me heanng of mu: Applwcanan‘ no SPA (or me wands has been executed by me Fame; Learned Cuunsel for me F\amWs had marmea «ms com mat me neguuauons to flnahze me terms of the SPA wece sun "I progress. ahhnugh nm r:omp\ele\y agreed to by CounseHcrIh: Devenaams the {act \|ha\| some key levms anne SPA were sml m sw KEPAPN\|NaEqVElinH:NzuA 1 we saw ...m.mm be used m mm .. mxmuuy mm: dun-mm VI] aﬂuNG wrm ltmbo and no consensus was reached between tne pantes azmrtg tnmugn tnerr respectwe sohctlars can be seen tram the documents reterred to WI exhthl\|$ ‘LKA~5“ lo ‘LKA-1D“u1 endasuve 3 [131 Now, emer ednsrdenng tne terms 01 the ATP, tnrs Ccurl does not doubttttat tne ATP Isa tegatty tatndtng contrau between tne Pames Not only rt ta blndmg because 01 ctause 4 Ac), cut more tundementetty, the pames and subteﬂ matter at me agreement are renarn and tnttrat constderatron Ill tne Idrrn otan earnest depostt has moved trorn tne Plalnltﬂs to the Defendants [I4] However‘ does the btndmq eﬂect of the AW gtve nse to E cavateahle rmerest In the land? counsel lcrlhe vtarntrws submtllod mar nnoe tnts Onurl ﬁnds tne ATP . bmdtng contract VI respect or In: purdtas: of \|he Wands‘ E caveatabte Interest mus! IGHOW for the nenant M tne Platnuffs as purchasers [15] In true Court a vtewtnat rs not neoessanly so wnrlst tne ATP can be a btndtng agreement wttn raped la mer mermon \|o purmase and sell tne lands‘ Iha\| hvndmg effect extends only to the duties and obhgaltons at pames to execute a SPA and me consequences that ru KaFAHnN-EqvEtet'MaNzuA % we s.n.r nmhnrwm r. u... M my r... annmuu M1 r. m.n.n n. mune Wm! follow In me evenlelthar panyranm execute me SPA Theta: out me AYP prowden for me consequences av Ihe Iaulure of erlher parly in execule me SPA must mean that me ATP Ts nvl me aoncluswe aacumem mm regards to the purchase and sale Ewmer pany may withdraw lrum me uansacmn by uetusmg to exewle the SPA subject In me consequamlnl vonemna o! ms earnest aeposn ar payment 0! damages‘ whichever may be me case [15] Clause 4A uffhe ATP maraly pmvwdes ma mnaamemal terms ov me sale that man be Incorpomed ma me SPA but max does not ammmt la the my Ierms of me sa\e The lacl that a Vull SPA was prenived and negotiated means mama ATP was no: no he mended and construed as me only am mncmswe document guvermng Ihe vansxcinon In mm Cauns view‘ me lrlnsacnun was subjaul To me execuhon at the SPA mm all Ievms In be Imxwrparzled Tums, the ATP was just a comma cu comma and not the sme gavemlng eennamov me sa\e onne lands As aeaaea by the coun of Annual W7 cum Gronlor Sdn. arm. v. Llu mug Hong[199ﬂ] .1 ML! :21 /(199711 CLJ us . m KEPAPMN-EqVEl:nHaNZuA mm. Sum! ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 M may he mm-y MT. dun-mm VII mum v-max Meanmv no drsrssnecr Io oounso/, we oanuder the sap/meme pnnmpls to be capable avsmernem rn lira-rmplertamvs men he nes sought to do An egreernem ta make en egreernenz does not result n a contract /1 rs fur me court m each case to oonszme ms correspondences exonangeo between me names and 10 say wnemennens me Issullmrended by me pmres /Hive mun reaches an apposne wndusian, men were rs an enlarceeme oonllac.‘ [17] To uormnue. this com ﬁnds «nan the paymem ofthe earnest depnsn s not sumcrent lo wnler any cuvealabhu mares: In ms land Mm pecuniary Interns! does not lead to a mgnstrame Imam: Is nodded by me Com o1Appeal m Ir-emu: mmorog: Fudanl Sdn. and. v. MUM Educ-uon Sdn. and. 12001) 7MLJ 2:/[ma] 1 CLJ 745:- 1271 It rs settled that czivsalabls rnrerm mus! be a deﬁnite ngm rvlalmg Ia /and and capable orenrorcernen: and a caveetw must be n e pasmon Ia Insfrfula e sun rorspecriic perrorrnnnoe o/clenn Tins positron ol IIUM was rneoe worse as u did not even commence ecnon a: at 31 December 2004 wnen cne eppnoenon by FIT ror me rsmovslolrha caveat was heard Indeed I! was no! reburled ma: no acnan was med to dale rn connecuan mm the caveat rn »<emm.N.zqva.nn;Nzm mm. M.‘ mmhnrwm .. U... w my me mm-y MAR. dnuumnl Vﬂ murm Wm!	2,262	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-83-8530-12/2021	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH 1. ) ZULFAHMI 2. ) ZULPELI	Kastam-Pemilikan barang terlarang Seksyen 135(1)(d) Akta Kastam 1967 - pemilikan eksklusif tidak dibuktikan apabila saksi awam lain yang mempunyai akses tidak dipanggil.	06/11/2023	Puan Wong Chai Sia	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6568d5c9-4d57-4eb6-9db1-a909e4b5ef35&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUALA LUMPUR (BIDANG KUASA JENAYAH) DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (DALAM KES JENAYAH NO: WA-83-8530-12/2021) ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA DAN 1. ZULFAHMI 2. ZULKEPLI ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN A. LATAR BELAKANG [1] Tertuduh-tertuduh telah dituduh dengan pertuduhan di bawah Seksyen 135(1)(d) Akta Kastam 1967 seperti dalam pertuduhan di bawah: PERTUDUHAN PERTAMA Bahawa kamu, Zulfahmi (No Passport: C7502254) bersama Zulpeli (sebagai orang yang masih bebas) pada 23 November 2021 jam lebih kurang 2.00 petang di rumah beralamat di 11-A, Lorong B, Kampung Pandan, 55100 Kuala Lumpur memiliki barang larangan iaitu : 1. Rokok jenama Canyon Signature (merah) sebanyak 400 peket x 20 batang 2. Rokok jenama Zon King International 780 peket x 20 batang 3. Rokok jenama Joe sebanyak 700 peket x 16 batang 06/11/2023 17:11:32 WA-83-8530-12/2021 Kand. 61 S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 4. Rokok jenama L.A Light sebanyak 1900 peket x 16 batang 5. Rokok jenama L. A Menthol sebanyak 300 peket x 20 batang 6. Rokok jenama DJI Sam Soe 234 Fatsal-5 sebanyak 500 peket x 20 batang 7. Rokok jenama DJI Sam Soe 234 Super Premium sebanyak 200 peket x 20 batang 8. Rokok jenama L.A Bold sebanyak 500 peket x 20 batang 9. Rokok jenama Diplomat Impact sebanyak 190 peket x 16 batang . Jumlah keseluruhan: 93,440 batang Yang bernilai RM 10,960.40 yang mana barang tersebut adalah dilarang import di bawah Butiran 1, Bahagian II, Jadual Ketiga Perintah Kastam (Larangan Mengenai Import) 2017 dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan dibawah Seksyen 135(1)(d) Akta Kastam 1967 dan kamu boleh dihukum mengikut Seksyen 135(1)(v)(aa) Akta yang sama dan di baca bersama Seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. PERTUDUHAN KEDUA Bahawa kamu, Zulfahmi (No Passport: C7502254) bersama Zulpeli (sebagai orang yang masih bebas) pada 23 November 2021 jam lebih kurang 2.00 petang di rumah beralamat di 11-A, Lorong B, Kampung Pandan, 55100 Kuala Lumpur dalam milikan apa-apa barang yang di atas duti eksais yang boleh dilevi di sisi undang-undang tidak dibuktikan sebagai telah dibayar iaitu : 1. Rokok jenama Canyon Signature (merah) sebanyak 400 peket x 20 batang 2. Rokok jenama Zon King International 780 peket x 20 batang 3. Rokok jenama Joe sebanyak 700 peket x 16 batang 4. Rokok jenama L.A Light sebanyak 1900 peket x 16 batang 5. Rokok jenama L. A Menthol sebanyak 300 peket x 20 batang 6. Rokok jenama DJI Sam Soe 234 Fatsal-5 sebanyak 500 peket x 20 batang 7. Rokok jenama DJI Sam Soe 234 Super Premium sebanyak 200 peket x 20 batang 8. Rokok jenama L.A Bold sebanyak 500 peket x 20 batang 9. Rokok jenama Diplomat Impact sebanyak 190 peket x 16 batang S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Jumlah keseluruhan: 93,440 batang Yang mana duti eksais sebanyak RM 37,376.00 yang dikenakandi bawah Perintah Duti Eksais 2017 tidak dibuktikan dibayar dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 74(1)(a) Akta Eksais 1976 dan kamu boleh dihukum mengikut Seksyen 74(1)(iv)(A) Akta Eksais 1976yang sama dibcada bersama Seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. [2] Pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil seramai 4 orang saksi untuk menyokong kes pendakwaan iaitu: SP 1- Hasan Nusi bin Ramli (Ketua Serbuan) SP2 – Normanjalina binti Hassan (Pegawai Klarifikasi) SP3 – Faizul Arif bin Mohd Karim Anggota Serbuan /Jurugambar) SP4 – Mohd Hafiez bin Mohd Raali (Pegawai Penyiasat Ganti) [3] Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan kes prima facie ke atas tertuduh pertama (OKT1) dan pihak pendakwaan merayu ke atas keputusan Mahkamah ini. B. KES PENDAKWAAN [4] Pada 23.11.2021 jam lebih kurang 1400 hrs petang, ketua serbuan, SP1 telah membuat serbuan ke atas sebuah rumah beralamat di 11-A, Lorong B3, Kg Pandan, 55100 Kuala Lumpur. [5] SP1 memperkenalkan diri dengan menunjukkan kad kuasa kepada seorang lelaki warganegara Indonesia yang berada dalam rumah tersebut. [6] Hasil pemeriksaan, anggota serbuan mendapati sejumlah rokok yang tidak sah. SP1 mengesahkan bahawa pasukan menemui sejumlah rokok di kawasan ruang tamu rumah tersebut. Pasukan kastam telah menahan tertuduh pertama (OKT1) yang berada di dalam premis tersebut ketika serbuan dilakukan. S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [7] SP3 telah mengambil gambar tempat kejadian bersama barang kes dan menyediakan pelan lakar tempat kejadian. SP1 telah mengeluarkan dan menyerahkan sesalinan borang bongkar P2 dan notis sitaan P1 kepada tertuduh. [8] SP1 turut memberi keterangan bahawa beliau telah menyerahkan tertuduh, barang-barang kes dan dokumen berkaitan kepada Pegawai Penyiasat melalui Borang Serahan Kes. [9] Barang kes telah dihantar ke jabatan kimia untuk dianalisa. Laporan kimia mengesahkan bahawa barang kes rokok bertanda E1 dan E2 mengandungi tembakau manakala E3 sehingga E9 mengandungi tembakau dan cengkih. SP4 telah mengambil alih siasatan daripada pengawai penyiasat asal, Mohd Fazil. SP4 telah memperoleh laporan penjenisan yang daripada SP2. SP2 mengesahkan barang kes bertanda E1 dan E2 mempunyai kod tarif 2402.20.9000 manakala E3 sehingga E9 tergolong dalam kategori kod tarif 2402.20.2000. C. PERUNTUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG [10] Menurut seksyen 180 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, pihak pendakwaan perlu membuktikan satu kes prima facie di akhir kes pendakwaan. Begitu juga di dalam seksyen 173 (h) (i) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Peruntukan tersebut menyatakan bahawa apabila kes pendakwaan berakhir, mahkamah akan menimbangkan sama ada pendakwaan telah membuat suatu prima facie kes terhadap tertuduh. [11] Pengujian kes secara prima facie telah diputuskan di dalam kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan iaitu Balachandran v PP [2005] 2 MLJ 302 dan kes Looi Kow Chai & Anor v PP (2003) 1 CLJ 734 d dinyatakan sebagai; “A judge sitting alone must subject the prosecution evidence to the maximum evaluation and ask himself the question “ if I decide to call upon the accused to enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am I prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence contain in the S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 prosecution case?” If the answer was in the negative, then no prima facie case had been made out and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal…” D. PEMBUKTIAN ELEMEN PERTUDUHAN [12] Bagi pertuduhan pertama, OKT1 telah dituduh memiliki barangan larangan di bawah Butiran 1, Bahagian II, Jadual ketiga, Perintah Kastam (Larangan Mengenai Import) 2017 yang merupakan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 135(1)(d) Akta Kastam 1967 bersama dengan OKT2 yang masih bebas. [13] Seksyen 135(1)(d) Akta Kastam 1967 memperuntukkan seperti berikut: Penalty relating to smuggling offences, evasion of duty, fraud, etc. 135. (1) Whoever— (d) (d) knowingly harbours, keeps, conceals, or is in possession of, or permits, suffers, causes or procures to be harboured, keptor concealed, any uncustomed or prohibited goods; [14] Hukuman adalah dinyatakan di bawah seksyen 135(1)(v)(aa) iaitu: v) in the case of cigarettes containing tobacco or intoxicating liquor which are prohibited goods— (aa) be liable for the first offence to a fine of not less than ten times the value of the goods or one hundred thousand ringgit, whichever is the greater amount, and of not more than twenty times the value of the goods or five hundred thousand ringgit, whichever is the greater amount, or to imprisonment for a term of not less than six months and not more than five years or to both; [15] Merujuk kepada Seksyen 135(1)(d) dan juga kes yang diputuskan seperti PP v Jasni bt Jaafar & Anor [2017] 1 LNS 211 di mana elemen pertuduhan adalah seperti berikut: a) barang kes adalah barang larangan import; b) tertuduh mengetahui bahawa barang kes adalah barangan larangan import dan; S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 c) tertuduh mengetahui bahawa tertuduh meyimpan, menyembunyikan barang kes atau barang tersebut berada dalam milikan tertuduh. [16] Takrifan barang-barang dan barang larangan dijelaskan di bawah Seksyen 2 Akta Kastam seperti berikut: “goods” includes animals, birds, fish, plants and all kinds of movable property; “prohibited goods” means goods the import or export of which is prohibited, either absolutely or conditionally by an order under section 31 or by any other written law; [17] Perintah Kastam (Larangan Mengenai Import) 2017 adalah satu perintah di bawah seksyen 31 sebagaimana yang diperuntukan oleh seksyen 2(1) Akta Kastam 1967. Perintah 7, Perintah Kastam (Larangan Mengenai Import) 2017 memperuntukkan bahawa barang-barang yang dinyatakan dalam ruang (2) dan (3) Bahagian II Jadual Ketiga adalah dilarang import ke Malaysia kecuali mengikut cara yang diperuntukkan dalam ruang (5) Bahagian II Jadual Ketiga iaitu hendaklah dilekatkan setem cukai bagi setiap rokok dan minuman keras. [18] Item 1 Jadual Ketiga, Perintah Kastam (Larangan Mengenai Import) 2017 syarat yang ditetapkan untuk setiap kotak rokok adalah: A. Amaran kesihatan pada setiap paket rokok, B. Maklumat kesihatan pada setiap paket rokok, dan C. Setem cukai yang diluluskan oleh Ketua Pengarah Kastam [19] Berdasarkan laporan penjenisan, ahli kimia telah menganalisa sampel bertanda E1 sehingga E9 dan mengesahkan kesemuanya mengandungi tembakau. Dalam laporan penjenisan, rokok diperjeniskan di bawah kod 2402.20.9000 dan 2402.20.2000 di mana tergolong sebagai “Cigarettes containing tobacco: others” di bawah Perintah Duti Kastam 2017.” [20] Secara umum, beban bukti adalah pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan semua elemen pertuduhan. Namun begitu, Akta Kastam telah memperuntukkan S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 beban bukti beralih kepada pihak defendan atau tertuduh di bawah Seksyen 119 Akta Kastam 1967. Burden of proof Section 119 If in any prosecution in respect of any goods seized for non-payment of duties or for any other cause of forfeiture or for the recovery of any penalty or penalties under this Act, any dispute arises whether the customs duties have been paid in respect of such goods, or whether the same have been lawfully imported or exported or lawfully landed or loaded, or concerning the place whence such goods were brought or where such goods were loaded, or whether anything is exempt from duty under section 14 then and in every such case the burden of proof there of shall lie on the defendant in such prosecution. [21] Selain Seksyen 119 Akta Kastam, pihak pendakwaan juga bergantung kepada anggapan pengetahuan di bawah Seksyen 135(2) Akta Kastam di mana anggapan pengetahuan tertuduh mengenai barang larangan sehingga dibuktikan sebaliknya oleh defendan. 135 (2) In any prosecution under this section or section 139 any dutiable, uncustomed or prohibited goods shall be deemed to be dutiable, uncustomed or prohibited goods, as the case may be, to the knowledge of the defendant unless the contrary be proved by such defendant. [22] Sebelum pihak pendakwaan boleh mengguna pakai anggapan dan mengalihkan beban bukti kepada pihak defendan atau tertuduh, pihak pendakwaan perlu membuktikan bahawa barang larangan berada dalam milikan tertuduh seperti yang diputuskan kes-kes PP v Sekaran A/L Odayam [2010] MLJU 1729. [23] Dalam kes Pendakwa Raya v Sekaran A/l Odayam [2010] MLJU 1729 Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi menyatakan seperti berikut: S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 “I agree with the contention of the learned defence counsel that before the prosecution can invoke the presumption under s. 135(2) of the Customs Act, 1967, the element of possession of the prohibited items by the Respondent/Accused has to be established. In other words, that this is a "parasitic presumption" which does not stand alone but relies on the proof of possession. Without proof of possession the element of "knowingly concerned" cannot be established. There is no dearth of authority for counsel's proposition that the "possession" referred to has to be "exclusive custody or control" or "custody or control to the exclusion of all others". See Toh Ah Loh & Kak Thim v Rex [1949] 15 MLJ p. 54 dan Leow Nghee Lim v Reg [1956] 22 MLJ p. 28 ]. The question was whether the facts of this case were consistent with the Respondent/Accused having had exclusive custody or control of the seized goods at the material time?” [24] Pihak pendakwaan menghujahkan bahawa elemen pertuduhan pertuduhan pertama tentang pemilikan atau mempunyai kawalan rokok telah dibuktikan melalui keterangan berikut: I. SP1 telah memberi keterangan bahawa semasa serbuan ke atas premis, tertuduh pertama berada di dalam rumah tersebut. SP1 dan SP3 menyatakan tiada kerjasama diberikan oleh tertuduh pertama dan berlaku tolak menolak pintu masuk rumah. II. SP1 dan SP3 melihat barang kes tanpa dilindungi daripada penglihatan di bahagian ruang tamu rumah tersebut. III. Sampel barang kes yang dihantar ke Jabatan Kimia telah disahkan minuman keras mengandungi Etil Alkohol dan rokok mengandungi tembakau. IV. Keterangan saksi pendakwaan mengatakan bahawa hasil pemeriksaan yang dilakukan terhadap rokok-rokok yang dirampas adalah tersenarai di bawah butiran 1, bahagain II, Jadual Ketiga Perintah Kastam (larangan mengenai import) 2017. Tertuduh pertama tidak mengemukakan sebarang dokumen berkaitan cukai yang telah dibayar bagi kesemua barang kes yang dirampas. S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [25] Berkenaan dengan pertuduhan kedua, pihak pendakwaan mengemukakan fakta kes sama dan keterangan yang sama bagi pembuktian pertuduhan kedua (pindaan). Bagi pertuduhan pindaan kedua iaitu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 74(1)(a) Akta Eksais 1976, terdapat tiga elemen yang perlu dipenuhi di bawah Seksyen 74 (1) (a) Akta iaitu: I. OKT memiliki barang-barang berduti eksais; II. Barang-barang tersebut adalah berduti eksais; III. Barang-barang berduti tersebut tidak dibuktikan telah dibayar. [26] Bagi pembuktikan elemen pertama, pihak pendakwaan merujuk Seksyen 74 (2) Akta Eksais 1976 yang memperuntukkan: “Dalam sesuatu pendakwaan di bawah seksyen ini, apa-apa barang- barang berduti hendaklah disifatkan sebagai barang-barang berduti dengan diketahui oleh pihak yang didakwa melainkan jika dibuktikan sebaliknya oleh pihak yang didakwa itu” [27] Pembuktian elemen kedua adalah merujuk kepada beberapa seksyen dan perintah seperti berikut: i)Seksyen 2 Akta Eksais 1976 mentakrifkan barang-barang berduti: “ertinya barang-barang yang tertakluk kepada pembayaran duti eksais dan yang atasnya duti itu belum dibayar”. ii) Seksyen 6(1) Akta Eksais 1976 memperuntukkan: “Menteri boleh, dari semasa ke semasa, melalui perintah yang disiarkan dalam Warta, menetapkan duti-duti eksais yang hendaklah dilevi dan dibayar atas— (a) apa-apa barang yang dikilang dalam Malaysia; atau (b) apa-apa barang yang diimport ke dalam Malaysia, dan boleh menetapkan cara-cara yang mengikutnya duti itu hendaklah dilevi dan dibayar.” iii) Perintah Duti Eksais 2017 adalah satu perintah yang dibuat oleh Menteri di bawah seksyen 6(1) Akta Eksais 1976. Berdasarkan kepada Laporan Kimia P66 dan Laporan Penjenisan/Klasifikasi P55, kod tariff bagi barang kes dalam pertuduhan kedua ini adalah 2402.20.9000 di mana kesemua barang kes ini tersenarai di bawah Perintah Duti Eksais 2017 sebagai barang berduti eksais. S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [28] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah elemen ketiga adalah bahawa barang-barang berduti tersebut tidak dibuktikan telah dibayar duti eksais. Beban adalah pada tertuduh pertama untuk membuktikan bahawa duti eksais dibayar mengikut seksyen 59 Akta Eksais 1976 yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut: Jika, dalam sesuatu pendakwaan berkenaan dengan apa-apa barang- barang yang disita kerana tidak dibayar duti eksais, atau kerana sebab lain penyitaan atau bagi mendapatkan apa-apa penalti atau penalti- penalti di bawah Akta ini, suatu pertikaian timbul mengenai sama ada duti telah dibayar berkenaan dengan barang- barang itu, sama ada barang-barang itu telah secara sah dikeluarkan, ditapai, disuling, disadap atau dikilang atau diimpot, atau berkenaan dengan tempat daripada mana-mana barang-barang berduti telah dibawa atau di mana barang-barang berduti itu telah dimuat atau disimpan, maka dalam tiap- tiap satu kes itu, beban membuktikannya terletak pada pihak yang didakwa dalam pendakwaan itu. [29] Kedua-dua pertuduhan memerlukan pembuktian pemilikan barang-barang yang tidak dibayar duti import dan duti eksais. Setelah pihak pendakwaan, membuktikan pemilikan barangan larangan, beban bukti adalah pada OKT1 untuk membuktikan sebaliknya dan OKT1 gagal membuktikan sebaliknya. Pihak pendakwaan bergantung kepada keterangan bahawa OKT1 berada di premis semasa serbuan dan OKT1 bertindak agresif untuk membuat inferens bahawa OKT1 mempunyai pemilikan dan pengetahuan barang kes. E. ISU (a) Sama ada pihak pendakwaan membuktikan pemilikan dan kawalan [30] Pihak pembelaan berhujah bahawa pihak pendakwaan tidak berjaya membuktikan pemilikan bagi OKT1. Pihak pembelaan menyatakan bahawa adalah fakta yang tidak dipertikaikan bahawa rumah yang diserbu mempunyai penghuni yang lain. Dua penyewa atau penghuni rumah tidak berada di rumah semasa serbuan dilakukan tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi. Adalah dihujahkan bahawa kedua-dua penyewa rumah mempunyai akses ke atas rumah termasuk ruang tamu. S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [31] Pihak pembelaan berhujah bahawa rakaman percakapan Hariono dan Abdul Gafur telah dirakam tetapi tiada sebarang penjelasan diberikan untuk tidak memanggil mereka sebagai saksi. Juga, pemilik rumah atau wakilnya dalam kes ini turut tidak dipanggil. [32] Pihak pembelaan berhujah bahawa tiada siasatan dilakukan untuk mengenal pasti pemilik barang-barang tersebut. Pihak pembelaan merujuk kepada kes PP v Mohd Sairi Abdul Samat [2013] 10 CLJ 30 dan juga Azizan Yahaya v PP [2012] 8 CLJ 405 bahawa terdapat keperluan untuk memanggil saksi lain atau pihak ketiga yang mempunyai akses ke atas barang terlarang. [33] Walaupun saksi ditawarkan kepada pihak pendakwaan, pihak pembelaan berhujah bahawa pihak pendakwaan tidak terlepas daripada beban untuk membuktikan kes mereka. [34] Pihak pembelaan menyatakan bahawa siasatan tidak dilakukan seperti pengesanan cap jari atau DNA tidak dilakukan ke atas barang kes bagi mengaitkan OKT1. [35] Pihak pendakwaan bergantung kepada tindakan OKT1 yang dikatakan bertindak agresif dan telah meminta untuk tidak dikenakan tindakan. Pihak pembelaan berhujah bahawa tindakan pihak pendakwaan meggunakan kata-kata OKT1 adalah tidak terpakai. Hal ini adalah disebabkan saksi pendakwaan tidak memberikan amaran kepada OKT1 terlebih dahulu sebelum pernyataan OKT1 diterima. (b) Ketidakpatuhan dari segi prosedur [36] Pihak pembelaan berhujah bahawa pihak pendakwaan gagal mematuhi prosedur seksyen 120 Akta Kastam 1967 dan seksyen 60 Akta Eksais 1976. Kedua-dua seksyen memperuntukkan bahawa suatu anggapan bahawa yang terkandung dalam peket yang tidak dibuka adalah sama jenis, kuantiti dan kualiti dan dengan barang-barang yang didapati dalam peket-peket yang sama jenis S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 yang telah dibuka dengan syarat sekurang-kurangnya 5% daripada daripada jumlah peket yang sama jenis. [37] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa pemakaian seksyen-seksyen apabila pemeriksaan dibuat berdasarkan 5% sahaja daripada setiap bungkusan atau bekas yang mengandungi barang-barang tersebut. Dalam kes ini, setiap bungkusan rokok dibuka dan dikira satu persatu. Pihak pendakwaan menyatakan bahawa seksyen 120 Akta Kastam digunakan untuk barangan kontraband seperti rokok di mana kaedah dan sistem pembungkusan rokok yang sistematik diamalkan oleh pengilang. [38] Pihak pembelaan membangkitkan isu bahawa laporan kimia dan penjenisan tidak boleh diterima kerana tidak dibuktikan bahawa kedua-dua laporan diberikan kepada OKT1 dalam tempoh 10 hari sebelum tarikh perbicaraan bermula. Apabila kedua-dua laporan tidak boleh diterima pakai, maka pihak pendakwaan tidak boleh bergantung kepada laporan bagi membuktikan bahawa barang kes adalah rokok yang mengandungi tembakau dan nilaian harga setiap jenis rokok sepertimana yang dikehendaki undang-undang. [39] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa laporan kimia dan juga laporan penilaian harga telah diberikan kepada tertuduh seperti mana yang diakui penerimaan oleh peguam bela pada 27.5.2022. Peguam bela tidak menghantar notis kepada pihak pendakwaan untuk memanggil ahli kimia dan juga tidak membantah semasa laporan kimia yang dikemukakan melalui SP4. Juga, apabila pihak pendakwaan memohon laporan penilaian dikemukakan melalui SP4, turut direkodkan bahawa peguam bela bersetuju memandangkan tiada perubahan dengan harga asal seperti borag serahan kes bersama dengan kiraan cukai P4 dan laporan penilaian turut diserahkan kepada OKT1 melalui peguamnya pada 19.1.2022. D. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [40] Berkenaan isu pemilikan atau kawalan barang kes, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa adalah pada beban pihak pendakwaan membuktikan pemilikan barang S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 kes oleh OKT1 dan beban hanya beralih kepada Defendan setelah pemilikan dapat dibuktikan. [41] Mahkamah ini merujuk Lau Kieng Chung v Public Prosecutor, [1993] 3 MLJ 295, di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa beban beralih kepada Defendan untuk membuktikan bahawa barangan bukan barangan import atau duti import telah dibayar. Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut: “…Merujuk kepada unsur kedua, iaitu bahawa barang-barang itu tidak terbayar duti kastam, s 119 tidak menimbulkan sebarang anggapan tetapi ianya hanya memindahkan beban membukti kepada tertuduh supaya menunjukkan duti telah dibayar ke atas barang-barang itu. Tentang unsur ketiga, pihak pendakwa boleh menggunakan anggapan boleh patah yang terkandung di dalam s135(2) Akta itu untuk membuktikan pengetahuan. (2) Pihak pendakwa telah bergantung kepada s119 Akta itu untuk membuktikan bahawa barang-barang itu tidak terbayar duti kastam dan perayu telah gagal untuk menunjukkan bahawa barang-barang itu tidak diimpot atau duti ke atasnya telah dibayar. Oleh itu, alasan rayuan pertama ditolak. [42] Mahkamah ini juga merujuk keputusan Mahkamah ini terdahulu iaitu yang telah disahkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Dalam Park In Keun v Public Prosecutor [2021] MLJU 1283, Mahkamah Tinggi merujuk kepada kes berikut bagi isu pemilikan: “[22] In Chan Pean Leon v. PP [1956] 1 LNS 17; [1956] 1 MLJ 237; [1956] 1 MLRH 44, the court remarked that there can be no possession without knowledge and there can be no possession without some power of disposal. The court hasten to add that the most important ingredient of all in determining whether one has possession is whether there was an intention as the owner, in case of need, to exercise that power of disposal to the exclusion of other persons. This is commonly referred to S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 as the animus possidendi. In illustrating the meaning of the term “possession”, His Lordship Thomson J. observed said as follows: “ ‘Possession’ itself as regards the criminal law is described as follows in Stephen’s Digest (9th Ed page 304): A movable thing is said to be in the possession of a person when he is so situated with respect to it that he has the power to deal with it as the owner to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in the case of need.”. [24] Knowledge may only be proved by reasonable inference based on the circumstances of a particular case. In the present appeal, it can be safely inferred that the accused had knowledge of the intoxicating liquors found in the refrigerator at his business premises as he was the one who managed the business. [25] It is well-established that possession need not be exclusive to a particular person. The issue of exclusivity in cases of possession merely relates to the power by the possessor to exclude others from the enjoyment of the property. (See: Leow Nghee Lim v. Reg [1955] 1 LNS 53; [1956] 1 MLJ 28; [1955] 1 MLRH 614). [26] In PP v. Denish Madhavan [2009] 2 CLJ 209 FC; [2009] 2 MLJ 194; [2008] 3 MLRA 116; [2009] 2 AMR 757, after discussing the meaning of the term “possession” by reference to the cases of Leow Nghee Lim v. Reg (supra.) and Chan Pean Leon v. PP (supra.), the Federal Court made the following remarks: “[19] Once the elements needed to constitute possession are established, including the element of exclusive power to deal, then what is established is possession, not exclusive possession. So much for exclusive possession”. S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [43] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes seperti Public Prosecutor v Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2005] 6 MLJ 393 di ms 402, Mahkamah Persekutuan menegaskan bahawa: Possession, in order to incriminate a person, must have the following characteristic. The possessor must know the nature of the thing possessed, must have in him power of disposal over the thing. If these factors are absent, his possession can raise no presumption of mens rea without which (except by statute) possession cannot be criminal … [44] Dalam kes Leow Nghee Lim v Reg [1956] 1 MLJ 28; [1955] 1 MLRH 614, Taylor J menyatakan: “There is no presumption of custody … Unless custody was established, the chain of reasoning is broken. Custody means having care or guardianship; goods in custody are in the care of the custodian and, by necessary implication, he is taking care of them on behalf of someone else. You cannot take care of goods unless you know where they are and have the means of exercising control over them. Custody therefore implies knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of the goods and the power of control over them, not amounting to possession. The prosecution must therefore prove that the appellant and his wife had custody or control of the drugs. To do this, the prosecution must establish a common intention between the appellant and his wife. The case against the appellant cannot succeed unless there is evidence of such common intention or evidence from which such common intention can properly be inferred.” [45] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Public Prosecutor v Anya Michael Onyedikachi [2017] MLJU 371 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi mendapati terdapat keraguan tentang pemilikan barang kes apabila premis tersebut boleh diakses oleh orang lain. “ Having analysed at length and detail scrutinized of the prosecution case, it is my considered view that the mere fact a bunch of keys with three other keys and one access card was found on the accused and the fact that the accused had lead the police to the Unit Condominium, the least possible would be the accused would have stayed and having S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 custody and control over the Unit Condominium. This could not be translated into having custody and control over the said drugs in the absence of other incriminating evidence against the accused. It could not giving rise to such an inference that the said drugs belong to the accused person.” [46] Berdasarkan fakta kes, berdasarkan keterangan saksi pendakwaan, bahawa barang kes tidak boleh diketahui adalah rokok sehingga dibuka. Maka, bahawa inferens pengetahuan OKT1 tentang barang yang disimpan di ruang tamu adalah rokok tidak dapat dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. Kesemua barang kes dijumpai di ruang terbuka iaitu ruang tamu yang boleh diakses oleh mana-mana individu yang mempunyai kunci rumah tersebut. Namun, tiada siasatan dijalankan ke atas siapa yang memiliki kunci rumah termasuk OKT2. Oleh itu, tiada bukti bahawa OKT1 sahaja bersama dengan OKT2 yang masih bebas mempunyai pemilikan ke atas barang kes. Saksi pendakwaan telah bertindak membuka barang kes tanpa menggunakan sebarang sarung tangan menyebabkan siasatan cap jari dapat dijalankan. Maka, tiada bukti seperti cap jari atau DNA yang boleh mengaitkan barang kes dengan OKT1. [47] Mahkamah juga merujuk keterangan berikut mengenai pemilikan barang kes yang bermungkinan oleh pihak ketiga. Peguam :Saya katakan bahawa, premis boleh diakses Gafur, Hariono, permilik rumah dan zulpeli? SP4 :Setuju Peguam :Saya katakan bahawa Abdul Gafur mengakui bahawa rokok ini dimiliki oleh zulpeli? SP4 :Setuju Peguam :Kesemua saksi awam tidak menyatakan rokok kepunyaan okt? SP4 :Setuju [48] Berdasarkan keterangan yang dikemukakan, adalah amat jelas bahawa terdapat akses oleh pihak ketiga yang tidak pernah dipanggil untuk memberikan keterangan. Pegawai penyiasat asal yang merakam percakapan turut tidak S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 dipanggil sebagai saksi. Pihak pendakwaan juga gagal membuktikan pemilikan bersama di mana identiti Zulpeli masih tidak dapat dikenal pasti oleh mana-mana saksi pendakwaan. Oleh itu, pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan pemilikan atau kawalan apabila tidak dapat ditunjukkan atau inferens boleh dibuat bahawa OKT1 mempunyai pengetahuan barang kes yang berada di ruang tamu adalah rokok terlarang. Pihak pendakwaan gagal membukti pemilikan eksklusif di mana kewujudan pihak ketiga adalah tidak pertikaikan malahan tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi bagi pembuktikan pemilikan eksklusif oleh OKT1 bersama OKT2. Hanya disebabkan OKT1 seorang yang berada sahaja berada di rumah ketika serbuan adalah tidak memadai membuktikan pemilikan. Apa yang dapat dibuktikan adalah OKT1 mempunyai akses ke rumah tersebut bersama dengan penyewa yang lain. Tiada sebarang bukti dapat ditunjukkan bahawa sejak bila barang kes telah berada di dalam rumah tersebut yang boleh mengaitkan hanya OKT1 mempunyai pemilikan eksklusif ketika serbuan. [49] Berdasarkan kes-kes yang dirujuk di atas, pihak pendakwaan tidak boleh hanya bergantung “mere possession” atau “passive possession” namun perlu membuktikan pemilikan yang mempunyai pengetahuan kewujudan barangan tersebut dan juga mempunyai kawalan dan mempunyai niat berurusan dengan barangan tersebut. [50] Keterangan tindakan OKT1 yang dikatakan agresif semasa pegawai kastam ketika meminta OKT membuka pintu diberikan oleh SP1 dan SP3 tidak dinyatakan pernyataan saksi mahupun laporan polis. Pengawai penyiasat asal yang merakam percakapan SP1 dan SP3 tidak dipanggil untuk mengesahkan keterangan SP1 dan SP3. Mahkamah mendapati adalah tidak selamat hanya bergantung semata-mata kepada inferens kelakuan OKT1 apabila terdapat keraguan dan kelompangan tentang pemilikan dan kawalan oleh OKT1 terhadap barang kes. [51] Berkenaan dengan ketidakpatuhan Seksyen 120 Akta Kastam dan Seksyen 60 Akta Eksais, Mahkamah merujuk kes Meh Kim Lai & Anor v Public Prosecutor [2019] MLJU 16 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi telah menyatakan seperti berikut: S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 b) Non-compliance with section 120 of the Act Section 120 of the Act reads: 120. Proportional examination of goods seized to be accepted by courts (1)When any goods suspected of being prohibited or uncustomed or otherwise liable to seizure have been seized, it shall be sufficient to open and examine five per centum only of each description of the package or receptacle in which such goods are contained. (2)If it is necessary to test any goods seized under this Act, it shall be sufficient to test only a sample not exceeding five per centum in volume or weight of the goods examined under subsection (1). (3)The court shall presume that the goods contained in the unopened packages or receptacles are of the same nature, quantity and quality as those found in the similar packages or receptacles which have been opened. [27] Sub-section (1) of section 120 concerns examination of the suspected goods whereas sub-section (2) is with regard to testing of the goods. Sub-section (1) obviously therefore relates to the act of physical examination and in such a case it is sufficient to open and examine five per centum only of each description of the package or receptacle in which such goods are contained. [28] Sub-section (2) states that if it is necessary to test any goods seized under this Act, it shall be sufficient to test only a sample not exceeding five per centum in volume or weight of the goods. [29] Sub-section (2) obviously refers to chemical testing. The necessity of testing the goods arises when it needs to be shown that the goods are all of a particular type, in this case, that they contained alcohol. …….. S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [33] As stated, a total of 14 cans of beers from each receptacle were sent for analysis to the Chemistry Department for testing. This was in accordance with the requirements of section 120(2) of the Act which states that it shall be necessary to test only a sample not exceeding five per centum in volume or weight of the goods. [34] The Chemist Report dated 16.3.2016 was admitted as exhibit (P35) and the results confirmed that each can contained varying amounts of ethyl alcohol. [35] It is important to note that sub-section (2) does not state “five per centum or more” nor does it state “not less than five per centum” but rather “not exceeding five per centum”. [36] The fact that one can from each receptacle or carton amounting to 14 cans in total were sent for analysis had thus fulfilled the requirement under section 120(2) of the Act thus triggering the presumption under section 120(3). [37] The court was thus entitled to rely on the presumption that the goods contained in the unopened packages or receptacles were of the same nature, quantity and quality as those found in the similar packages or receptacles which had been opened and tested.” [52] Berdasarkan kes di atas, bantahan oleh peguam mengenai ketidakpatuhan seksyen 120 Akta Kastam dan seksen 60 Akta Eksais adalah tidak berasas. Jumlah sampel dibuka adalah berdasarkan karton dan bukannya peket rokoknya. Satu carton telah dibuka dan diperiksa, adalah memadai bagi setiap jenis dan apabila satu karton dibuka, dua peket daripada karton telah diambil untuk diperiksa oleh Jabatan Kimia. Mahkamah mendapati tiada ketidakpatuhan seperti yang dibangkitkan oleh peguam bela terpelajar. [53] Apabila peguam bela tidak membuat sebarang bantahan apabila laporan kimia dan laporan penjenisan dikemukakan di Mahkamah dan hanya menimbulkan S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 bantahan dalam hujahan dan setelah pihak pembelaan telah memeriksa balas dengan dokumen tersebut dengan SP4 tanpa menimbulkan bantahan ketidakpatuhan ketika perbicaraan, Mahkamah mendapati bantahan ketidakpatuhan yang dibuat semasa hujahan adalah tidak berasas. [54] Setelah mempertimbangkan segala keterangan dan penilaian maximum dibuat ke atas keterangan saksi pendakwaan, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan kes prima facie ke atas OKT1 atas sebab kegagalan pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan OKT1 mempunyai pemilikan atau kawalan ke atas barang kes. Oleh itu, OKT1 dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan Pegawai pendakwa : Ongkar Singh Peguam bela :Dony Abdullah, Ahmad Ishrakh Saad, Akmal bt Jusoh Disediakan oleh: Wong Chai Sia Majistret Mahkamah Kuala Lumpur S/N ydVoZVdNtk6dsakJ5LXvNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	38,246	Tika 2.6.0
PA-42JSKS(A)-1-08/2022	PERAYU MUHAMMAD AKIF AIMAN BIN AB SHUKOR RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	Seksyen 14(a) dan 15(f) Akta Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-kanak 2017 - Rayuan perayu adalah dibenarkan-sabitan dan hukuman ke atas perayu bagi kedua-dua pertuduhan adalah diketepikan - Perayu dilepas dan dibebaskan daripada kedua-dua pertuduhan.	06/11/2023	YA Puan Rofiah Binti Mohamad	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ffb8080b-3310-4184-89c1-463fa474ab9d&Inline=true	06/11/2023 16:58:35 PA-42JSKS(A)-1-08/2022 Kand. 37 S/N Cwi4/xAzhEGJwUY/pHSrnQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Cwi4/xAzhEGJwUY/pHSrnQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Cwi4/xAzhEGJwUY/pHSrnQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Cwi4/xAzhEGJwUY/pHSrnQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Cwi4/xAzhEGJwUY/pHSrnQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Cwi4/xAzhEGJwUY/pHSrnQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Cwi4/xAzhEGJwUY/pHSrnQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Cwi4/xAzhEGJwUY/pHSrnQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Cwi4/xAzhEGJwUY/pHSrnQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Cwi4/xAzhEGJwUY/pHSrnQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Cwi4/xAzhEGJwUY/pHSrnQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Cwi4/xAzhEGJwUY/pHSrnQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PA—I2JS‘KS(A) —1—ua/2u22 l<and. 37 :a,x,,:n2: 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH YINGGI MALAVA DI GEORGETOWN DALAM NEGERI PULAIJ PINANG PERBICARAAN JENAVAN No: PA-45JSKS{A)-1-03/2022 ANTARA MUHAMMAD AKIF AIMAN BIN AB sHuKoR (N0. KAD PENGENALAN:930123-07-5151) ...PEnAvu DAN PENDAKWA RAVA ..,REsPoNDEN ALASAN PEMGHAKIMAN PENGENALAN [11 W walah rayuan Pevayu \|Perayu) terhadap sabitan ﬂan hukuman yang ﬂualuhkan o\eh Hakim Mahkamah Ses‘/eh Jenayen (2) Geurgeluwn selelah menaapaci Perayu bersaxan darn dxsabxtkan kesawahannya bag! dua peﬂuduhan :1. bawah Ana Kesslahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadsp Kanak—Kanak 2017 (Ana) [2] Due penumman barkenaan ada\ah masing—mas\|ng an bawah seksyen 14(5) den 15 (0 Akta yang dlperluvunkan semula sepem herikul Ferluduhan Penama sw cwmxnnzamuv/vHsmn mm Sum M... M“ be used M mm u. am.“-V mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm Bahawa ksmu pads 2 5.2023 [Sm Iebm Kurang s.oo paiang an Surau sum Jambul lndah di dalam Daerah 1'imur Lam an uaiam Nsgen Puiau Pinang telah meiaxukan amang seksual iizmai. ianu rnenyenluh bahagian kemaman vamadap kanak-kanak bemama Muhammad Nor Fansn irinan Bin Maria Nomm (No. KIF: 070820-D7»D515) yang barumur 12 Iahun 3 hulan. oien yang aaniixian. kamu lelah maiakukan suatu kesalahan m hawah samyan 1A (a) Akla ><asaianan—i<esaianan Seksual Tsmadap Kanak—Kanak 2017 yang bolen dihukum an bawah seksyen 14 Akia yang sania. Penuduhan Kedua iaanawa kamu paua 2.5 202013!“ lebih kurang 5 an pelang .1. Swan am Janmm indan di dalam Daerah 'Fmur Lam di daiam Negen Pulau Pinang ieian melakukan amang saksuai bukan nzikai. iaiiu membualkari kamik- kanak bemama Muhammad Nor Farish Irman ain Mona Nnrdm (No K/P‘ 07052!)-07-0615) yang berumur 12 ianun s bulan melakukan onam. oiar. yang demiklan, kamu (elah melakukan suaiu kesaianan di bawah seksyen 15 (0 Ana Kasaiananxuaianan Seksual Temadap Kanak—K,anak 2017 yang mien dihukum di hawah seksyen 15 Akla yang same [3] Perayu Iidak mengaku saian avas kedua—dua Denuduhan (ersebut den pemicamn permh ieian dijalarikan. ni akhir kes pembelaan, Hakim Mahkamah Sesysn barkanasn msndapali perayu bersalah ﬂan disabllksn kesalahannya hag: ksdua-due penuaunan Iersebul [41 aagi panuuuhan panama, Perayu Ielah tuhkan hukuman 5 ianun penjala dan larikh sabﬂan (0432022) an 2 sebaian mlan. Manakaia bani kesaianan kedua, 5 umun penjara nan larikh yang sania (serenlak) den 2 sebaian man. Rayuan ini adalah lerhadap kedua-dua sabilan dan hukumari letsebul. 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(6) xv you do not award 01 mm the ac<:uisd’l lxpianallun and man axpaanauon dons nm nine m your mind a reasnnnme duublasm his gm“ Oarwia (at u ynu an not umsvl ur beﬂevs ma wcusmfs sxmaneunn nu: nevenhmess u rams; in your rmnd . veisoname mum us In Ms gum Acqull Magmvacas wnmd nsslsnns apnsnme Cnun may mdlnala m melruvounds man may are aware ul me (:51: ‘and damn In s«eps1¢)a-we manovu Apmx lﬂuwsd Konnzusnn [:3] Ala: a\asan-akasan yang man dlnyatakan, adalah aapanan saya hahawa ada\ah Iwiak se\amal unluk Mahkamsh um mengekslkan sabwan ks alas perayu hagx ksduadua penuduhan lersebul. sw cmrxAmE:;muv/wsmn “ «ma Snr1n\nnnhnrwH\I>e used m mm .. mxmuuy mm: dun-mm VII .mm mm [341 Dengan yang demlkwan‘ rayuan pemyu adam dmenarkan. sabnan ﬂan hukuman ks alas perayu bagx kedua-due psnumman adalah dukelepxkan. Psrayu anspas dan dwbehaskan danpada Ksdua-due Derluduhan (/Iv ROFIAH amn MOHAMAD PESURUHJAVA KEHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI JENAVAN GEORGETOWN PULAU PINANG TARIKH : as JULAI 2023 Balm Encwk v. Partmpan Temsn v. Psnmpan 3. co Peguambexa a. Paguamcara No.33 Fm moor Bishop snsen 10200 Ganrgatwwn PULAU FINANG gl Plhak Raagonu n Puan Preeya Darrsmi alp Sugumaran 'Fmha\an Pendakwa Rays F'sJabal Penasmat Undang-Undang Negeri Fulau Fmang Arss 10, Bsngunan Persekuluan Jalan Anson 10400 PULAU FINANG [5] dua Dmak Gan sa\|s\ah manams dengan teliti kesemua rekad ayuan yang Setelah menelm dan memmbangkan penghujahan benuns kedua- bsrsena dengan slasan penghakxman Mahkamah Sasyen hsmanaan. Keduadua samcan dan hukuman dwkelepikan. peruyu mlepas dan dlbebaskan din kedus-dua perluduharv yang mxenaxan. I51 dapalan dan memuluskan saaamman saya \|e\ah membenarkan rayuan perayu Eerlkul adalah ahasan penghaklman says an da\am mencapav PROSIDING nl MAHKAMAH SESVEN Ku Pundakwnnn [7] Secsra naram. kss psndakwsan lemadap pemyu ada\ah saparu benkul. [3] msndapah mangsa hzlum pulang ke mmah walhal wsklu berbuka nuasa (keuka ﬂu bulan Ramadnan) \eIah hampv. Alas penmnvaan SP1,SPZIa1Iu abang kepada mangsa telah keluar mencan mangsa ax kawasan perseknaran kemaman merexa an B\ak 1F can jugs an hlak barman vamu Elok1Etetapxgagalmensmuimangsa Pada 02.5.2020 uankh kejadian) SP1, iailu kakak kepada mangsa [9] Kstika sedang menggunakzn oangga belakang Blnk 1E, SP2 perasan Vampu surau menyala Merasa curiga kema sspamlnya uada orang ke sur-nu berkenaan kerana penman kawzﬂan Berger-akan (PKP) akuaan wabak CovId19 sedang berxuaxkuasa, SP2 lmah mengendap melalw lmgkap balakang surau berkenasn. nu] Melalun Ingkaﬂsrssbul, SP2 nampak adiknya (mangsa)sedang berbanng sambil me\acap dengan menggunakan new (ekmm P5) aw cm4rxAmE<;nuuV/wsmn -ma Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm ua nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm rnanakaxa Ferayu duduk di sebelah sedang mengajar adlknya melacap. SP2 mengalaksn nampak langsn Perayu memegang kemaman adrknys. SP2 max mendengar apa—apa parcakapan dan mereka. [11] SP2 Ielan merakamkan adengan Iersebul dengan mengaunakan lelelon bimbllnya. Rakaman wdeo mi man dlkemukskan sebagaw akhibil P14. [121 spa adalah mangsa sandm yang herumur 12 oamm a bulan kevlika kqadlan dan 1A oanun semasa membenkan kelerangan Menuru\| spa, pads him keladwan dia ke surau berkenaan unluk membayar duil kasul yang dlhehnya dari Peruyu. spa mengesahkan dua anamau yang kevnacan dalam rakaman waeo (Pm berkanaan adalah Ferayu ﬂan spa ssndiri [131 Menurul spa, waktu kejadwan, llada seswapa di surau bevkenaan kecuah spa darn Fevayu. Pevayu yang benugas sebagaw bwlal di surau berkenaan Ielah memaksa SP4 rnelacap. SP4 hanya n-enunn arahnn Fersyu. Sewaklu SP4 sedang melacap, Perayu duduk di sebelannya nan hsnya mellhat behsu me\acap Msnurul swa, Perayu mga ads mamegang kamaman SP4. Ks: Plmbllun [14] Pevayu lidak men n bahawa benau adalah vndwvidu yang kehhalan di dalam rakaman wdeo P14 \|ersebul bersarna-same dengan mangsa. [15] D: dakam pembekaannya‘ versu yang mkexanganxan oleh Parayu adalah‘ mass kejadxan behau berada m surau barkenaan untuk nersnag» siap hagw me\aungkan azam dan berbuka puasa‘ Pada ketika nu, ayan Ferayu (502) den seuvang kawan ayah Ferayu aua dalang ke surau syn cm4rxAmE<;nuuV/wsmn Nuns sum ...n.. WW be used m mm n. nﬂmnnﬂly mm; dun-mm VI] mum pm (ersebm me\a\m pinlu dapuv dengan mernbawa iuadah berbuka unluk Perayu [16] Msnuruc Perayu. sebaik bahau kemar dan dapuv swan, bshau Ielah nsmpak SP4 sedang melacap, Valu behau pergw ke arah SP4 dan duduk di sebelah sm unluk menegur dan menasmaxkan spa agar bsrhenu nan bevbual demman, [17] Ferayu (idak peman memaksa can/sxsu mengqar sm Imluk malacap dan Ferayu mga Ndak memegsng kemaman SP4 [131 Paaa malam kejadian se\epas solat wsyak, abang SP4 dan enam orang mkannya Ielah da\|ang dan memukul Persyu dx hadspan surau berkenaan sambﬂ benanyakan spa yang Perayu nsxan bual Kepada SP4. Perayu rmnla mereka benanyakan senmn kspada spa yang Kehka nu nanys mam dan menangls. [19] Apabua dnumukkan ‘buklr rakaman video tersebul. Perayu tehh menje\asKan keberadaannya di sebelah SP4 bukan unluk mengazarcecapi manegur SP4. Namun, Perayu masih dituduh menga]arSP4 mekacap. Dapaun nun Kopuluun Mnklm Mahknmah Snyon [20] Di akhir kes pambeban, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen herkenaan lelah menyalakan bshawa nembe\aan Perayu adalah salu versi yang msngsnu nan uaak masuk aka\. Justeru, pambexaan Pevayu Ie\ah dilmak semra \|oIa\ dan Parayu te\ah didapan bersahh dun disatman avas keduadua penuduhan. Ruyuln Ini [21] Amara isu yang lelah dlumhmkan oleh Perayu dw dalam Pemsyen Rayuan adalah dlpetlk sapam bankur syn cm4rxAmE:;:wuv/pnsmn -ma sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm a. nﬂmnnﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm Tuan Hakim yang bijaksana telah menggunapakai lahap pemnukuan yang salah da\am menllal kelerangsn Persyu dan Juga kenerangan saksl pelayu. M Tuan Hakim yang bijaksana nams memuluskan same ada perayu telah membangknkan keragusn munasahah dalam kes pendakwaan dan bukannya rnanexapkan salu beban psmhuklian (smadapnya. 4.2 Tuan Hakim yang bijaksana Ielah menyalaharahkan diri damn pennnnn xennxm-an yang dibual olehnya alas segala kelemngan akibat dari menggunakan when pembukuan yang salah axas kes penmalasn. Eldnng Kuasa Dan mgas lllahkamah ln\| [22] Mahkamah yang mandangar sesualu rayuan aualnn jalas darn rnancap. Ruman amuax kenada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Camona Lim Xlang Kim v Pubhn: Prosecutor [2019] MLJU 325‘ [2020] 1 cm as an mana Tengku Mslmun HMR (pada Keuka v\|u)te1ah menyaoakan sepeni nenkun Pnnswp undang—undang mengenal bidang kuasa dan Iugas [191 A: a mallerof principle‘ In Ipp6l\|i\|e noun wm nm mwena mm a daemon m 3 ma! mun whh mam the law ammsu -n. primary msk M evmuaning me evwdence rm awenzxa noun wumd amy mlervens w u \s convinced that Ihere was no ;udn:\|a\ apuvuuannn try me insruﬁad Mme evmncs aumma at Ma Ma! and that the «nan mun wns smwn m be mainly wrung in anwwlg at as dsuuvn (as: us» Gmlw and (previously known .5 Un/lad Engineer: mm; mm V Ganhya /nmmm System Pm ud s Mar um} supp ML! 363, Harm! lam Mamsm A Dr: V Psnvvasa Tansh dun Survur s Ana! and mmw aunoax [2005] 3 MLJ 23:, Pub»: Prosecutor V Ahmad Fvdaus hm zulkr/h'[2a17] 3 MM 492) syn cm4rxAmE<;nuuV/wsmn Nuns smm n-nhnrwm be used m mm n. nnnmun mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm [29] In Davemnv Smgh Sher Smqh V PF[2D12]1LNS 2m , Azzlur Manannnaa JCA (as he men was) had We to say on avbeﬂate xncemmmn (at p e): M. Nunmnanm n wwld mm In us to unsallhe nnmnws made by 3 Mel M699 .1 Mn. Vmdmg us ml “ppm: by ewdenue arm: Gasman Isicamslma weight Mme ewdenee a» mu - no proper gm’ an eva\u:\|\iun of ma vvwdsnco N mm m mlsdlmﬂlun In llw onhe Mal mun hu Iundmnmuly inmdiuoI1.. tnnnakanan anarnnan) uzpaun Mahkamah lni [231 Memandangkan isu yang diumbulkan aw dsﬂam pelisyen rayuan an persnggin 4 - 4.2 d\ acas aaauan salu Isu yang(e\|1s(¢undamanta\),saya tehah menenu dsngan tauu aan oemamn i sellap rekod rayuan yang dxlaﬂkan [241 Berdasarkan rekud rayuan ma 1 m/s 51. Mahkamah um menaapau spa yang lelah dmyatakan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen uz Darenggan 235 alasen penghakinmnnvﬁ. adalah aspen: benkul “Mahkamah di dalam membual kspulusan samada di penngkat pembelasn W. an an: Imbangan kabarnngknllan yang munanbah DKT dan saksi Ielah berjaya memmbulkan ape-apa pembalaan den sslamutnya te\ah beriaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah ks ztas kes pendakwain terlebwh dahmu merma- ketevangan om’ (penakanan dilambah) [25] Manakaxa di dakam nola pmsi ng yang \|srkarmung dw da\am Jma Rayuan 23 an m/s 333. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkenaan kehka Ielah mana menyampaikan kepmusannya dx akhlr pembelaan menyalzkan seperll mpenx benkm: syn cm4rxAmE<;nuuV/wsmn -ma sum In-nhnv M“ be used m mm n. nﬂmnnﬂly mm; dun-mm VI] mum pm “Sele\ah mendengar kelerangan sakslrsaksi pembelaan dan selelah manaum aannna ssmua ketevangan saksi-saksi seaamang kes rm dwbwcerakan, dan selekih rnenaxm semula ekshmu-akahmu my lelah dwkemukakan ks mahkaman dan juga sslelah msmhaca keaarnua hujanan-nmahan yang mvanxan Atas lmbnugan xabmngk n yang munaaahan, mahkamah rnendapan hahawa pmak paunnelaan leLah gagal unluk memmbulkan apa-apa penmelaan den sewuumya lelah gags! untuk menimbulkan sebering keraguan (emadap kas pendakwaan bag! kedua—dua penuduhan yang dmadapu man on.- (penekanan tmamhah) [25] Adalan pnrlswp un-1ang—undang yang mamap bahawa bebsn membukllkan penuduhan di sspamang permcayaan adalah lsrpikul an bahu pendakwaan. Manakala. seklranya pembmaan maanggu, unluk nenaya menrmhulkan keragusn yang munasabah ke avas kes pervdakwaan. pembelaan nanya perlu mengamukakan kelerangan yang Kacuan da\am keadsan pendahwaan hevgamung kepada anggapan yang awaamnmxan nleh undangamdang (Vegal praaumanonay yang mans aaauan mak aerkenaan dalam kes ‘mi, pernnawaan hdak mempunyax sebamng beban mm: perundangan (Iega> bumenj unmk mbukhkan. [27] olah yang demlklan, aaalah dapatan saya bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen herkensan Ie\ah lerkmlal dan tersalah am?! yang senus apaana mengenakan sualu beban yang naak diperuntukkan di hawah undangmndang dan yang lsbm bera\| ke bahu perayu hagl menyarvgkal (lebullmg) pendakwaan kelidakbersalahannya iamu Dada (ahap alas wmbangan kebarangkalsan yang rvumasabah. kes nan memhukhkan aw cwnrmmiamuvmusmn "Nuns a.nn In-nhnv M“ be used m mm a. nﬂmnnﬂly mm; dun-mm VI] anum pm [23] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen bsrkenaan di dawn alasan penghaklmannya setebal 46 muka sura\| dengan 295 perenggan mu, max Vangsung manyalakan mjukannya kepada rnana»nIana nas undangr undang yang bemmnu msngensx prinsip dan pemndangan yang terpakaw as da\am menangani dan menﬂal kelerangan dun pembexaan. Jusleru mahkamah im xidak di dalam kedudukan dan uada jusllﬁkasl unmk menyala den menynnpulmn banawa berkemungklnan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkenaan nanya can-map an dawn penggunaan lrasa bahasa ssdangkan. bellau sebsnamya telah nlemfuk dan mengaplwkasikan pnns' »pr\ns1p dan gans panduan perundangan yang new di da\arrI memlai kelevangan da\sm pambelaan dan dw dilam msncapai pengha Imannya. [29] Dalam kaadaan inn, mahksmah Im Mada pnhhan selam dari menerima dan member! nlakna kepada apa yang Iersulal dan yang mana Hakim Mahkaman Sesyen barksnaan sendiri teVah nyalakan deng,arIje\as lanpa kesamaran iailu beliau lelah melelakkan satu (snap pembuklwan wailu ‘alas bangan kebarangkalian yang munasabah’ kepada pembelaan [301 Memandangkan sangal Jekis dalam panghakimannya‘ bahawa Hakwm Mahkaman Sasyen berksnaan ceran mengenakan dan menggunakan Oanap pemhuklxan yang salan ks alas pembebnan dan setarusnya ui aﬁas neraca yang sa\ah mi lah pma. Halum Mahkarnah Sesyen berkenaan mendapah dan memuluskan bahawa versi vembelaan yang diularakan oleh perayu ada\ah mengsrm dan udak masuk aka!‘ Dada hemal says, \|e\an heriaku kegsgalan keatﬂlan lemadap perayu di da\am pendskalan yang lelah mamhil oxen Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen ini 131} Sebagsx canton, kalerangan perayu beliau duduk dw sebelah mangsa kexana beﬁau sedang nnenasmaci dan menegur mangsa yang syn cm4rxAmE:;nuuv/wsmn 9 -um s.nn In-nhnv wm be used m mm n. nﬂmnnﬂly mm; dun-mm VI] muNG wrm sedang melacap lalah dilokak Sebahknya, versi permakwaan sehagalmana ksterangan SP2, bahawa perayu dudukdi sebaxan mangsa kerana perayu sedang mengajav mangsa meklcap lelah dwerima. Sedangkan, SP2 mengakm bahawa raksman video (srsebut lidak mengandungw apa-apa suara dan nenau wga udak Insndengar spa»apa sua:-a/pemakapan dan Fer-ayu slau mangsa semasa beliau mengendap karana keauuma mereka «max bercakap Jadi. apakah perbualan, sﬂuasw alau hal keadaan yang membawa kepada kafuharnan aan keswmpuhan o\eh suz darn Ham. Mihkimah Sesyen berkensan sendm sebagm’ 'perayu sedang mengamr mangsa melacap‘. Ferkara uni uaak pemah dibenlang dan dibukukan ma\aIm mana»mana ksterangan. Semenlmah pma, mangsa sendin wailu spa, mdak pemah pada b\la—bHa masa sepanjang kelemngannya menmenumu Mahkamah sayen bsrkenaan nan.-ma Perayu Iekuh atau ada mengamrnya melacap [32] Dalam siluasi Rayuan di hadanan says W. says \|e\ah merujuk kepada kss klasik yang udak ssmg Vagw dan yang duatilkan panduan sehlngga kw IEICLI Mal v PubHc Pmsecumr [1963] 1 LNS 32‘ an mana Slﬂﬁan J telah mervyaiakan seperli berikut’ Tm: tweak xx aﬂowud orﬂy on one around. The appeﬂam charged wm men 07 IM: cmckeru and nnernmivew wnh ﬂishuniwy mum»; stolen prupsiw namely we chicken wave evwdenue and named wnnesses Vn ms deﬁance 31 me and at mm he w.. covvw:1sd becauue m ms wards onha Veumed uunsme “on me mm. \ am unable m balnevemedelence - \ aqIeIw1\|?I Vnchaclmsll Counsm lovms appeﬂant «mum lenmed «mm has senausiy mm hnmulvns m ma mnmng Mme bumtn M WW1? W the accused m eaves when H Vs nscessary Var mm In Iebul me Dmsemﬂnn cars agamtt n.... m mrvacl law Var Mngmmtea In my is as Inﬂows It you acoep\| the explarunon mn by or on men 01 we assumed‘ yam musl M mm acqun am mm mm. rum amnlewu in cormn W you do not behswe mac sxmanuuan. vm ha .5 sun snlmed In an 1:1 N cm4rxAmE<;:wuv/wsmn um Snr1n\nnnhnrwH\I>e used m mm .. nﬂmnnﬂly mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm	1,623	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-24C-116-06/2022	PEMOHON CONCRETE EMPIRE SDN BHD RESPONDEN TURNPIKE SYNERGY SDN BHDPIHAK TERKILANPANZANA ENTERPRISE SDN BHD	Enclosure 1. The Plaintiff herein has applied for direct payment from the Defendant who is the principal of the one Panzana Enterprise Sdn Bhd (“Panzana”) pursuant to section 30 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”) for an Adjudication Decision obtained by the Plaintiff against Panzana on 11.10.2021 for the sum of RM1,308,958.30 (Panzana AD).	06/11/2023	YA Tuan Nadzarin Bin Wok Nordin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=73d16436-16c7-4638-b648-830e23e50502&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - 35. Concrete Empire v Turnpike Synergy. s30 & Interpleader (1) - appeal 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO. WA-24C-116-06/2022 In the matter of an Adjudication No. AIAC/D/ADJ/3689-2021 between Concrete Empire Sdn Bhd (Company No. 404411-U) and Panzana Enterprise Sdn Bhd (Company No. 964307-M) pursuant to the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 And In the matter of an Adjudication Decision dated 11.10.2021 by Sivabalan Sankaran And In the matter of Section 30 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012; And In the matter of Order 7, Order 28, Order 69A rule 2 and Order 92 rule 4 Rules of Court 2012. BETWEEN 06/11/2023 16:34:24 WA-24C-116-06/2022 Kand. 68 S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 CONCRETE EMPIRE SDN BHD (Company No.: 404411-U) …PLAINTIFF AND TURNPIKE SYNERGY SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 964307-M) …DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) [1] The Plaintiff herein has applied for direct payment from the Defendant who is the principal of the one Panzana Enterprise Sdn Bhd (“Panzana”) pursuant to section 30 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”) for an Adjudication Decision obtained by the Plaintiff against Panzana on 11.10.2021 for the sum of RM1,308,958.30 (Panzana AD). [2] The Defendant has however obtained an order to interplead in this action (Interpleader). In the said Interpleader, the Defendant submits inter alia that: a. It is currently holding as stakeholder the sum of RM 1,356,122.70 as stakeholder b. the Defendant is a disinterested party in the proceedings [3] Panzana as the aggrieved party claims that it has however obtained an Adjudication Decision against the Defendant on 14.12.2021 S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 (Turnpike AD) for the sum of RM28,457,038.75 and that the Defendant has made payment thereto in the sum of RM24,470,570.04 to Panzana but has yet to release the sum of RM3,986,468.71. [4] The Defendant has thus taken a neutral stance in the matter and states that it will abide with this Court’s Order. Factual Background [5] The Plaintiff has succeeded in its adjudication claim against Panzana (“Panzana AD”) and was awarded, among others, the Adjudicated Sum of RM1,308,958.30 and total costs of RM47,164.40 (“Awarded Sum”). The Awarded Sum remains unpaid as to date. [6] On 27.10.2021, the Plaintiff initially made a demand for direct payment against the Defendant under section 30 of CIPAA 2012 but at that material time, the Defendant denied the existence of any monies due or payable by the Defendant to Panzana. [7] On 14.12.2021, Panzana succeeded in its adjudication against the Defendant and was awarded the sum of RM28,457,038.75 (“Turnpike AD”). By then, there is already money due and/or payable by the Defendant to Panzana (which is not disputed). [8] Subsequently, the Defendant’s solicitors had vide letter dated 20.12.2021 to Panzana indicated amongst others that: S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 “4. … b) if you fail, refuse and/or neglect to provide us with such proof within the abovementioned timeframe or at all, then our client shall make direct payment of such portion of the Awarded Amount to Concrete Empire up to such amount that is due or payable by us to Panzana, without further reference to you” [9] Further on 06.01.2022, the Defendant wrote to Panzana as a final opportunity for Panzana to provide proof of payment pursuant to section 30(2) CIPAA 2012, failing which the Defendant ‘will be constrained to pay the adjudicated amount sum of RM1,308,958.30 to the Plaintiff pursuant to section 30(3) CIPAA 2012. [10] On 18.02.2022, the Plaintiff made another demand for direct payment of the Adjudicated Sum of RM1,308,958.30 by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. (Both notices dated 27.10.2021 and 18.2.2022 will be referred to as the ‘2 Notices’) [11] As the Defendant has failed, refused and/or neglected to accede to the Plaintiff’s request, the Plaintiff initiated this present suit (“Suit 116”). [12] In the course of the proceedings for Suit 116, the Defendant filed an application to interplead (“Enclosure 14”) together with its Affidavit in Support affirmed by Fareez Bin Zahir on 01.11.2022 (“Enclosure 15”). [13] Amongst the grounds in Enclosure 14 is that the Defendant has filed a Judicial Management Application at the Shah Alam High Court (JM Application). S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Court’s Findings [14] The Plaintiff opposes the Interpleader and submits i. there are no competing claims, ii. the Defendant’s JM Application is irrelevant iii. the Defendant is statutorily obligated to make payment of the Adjudicated Sum to the Plaintiff [15] Panzana on the other hand contends that: i. there is no amount due and payable by the Defendant to Panzana at the time the 2 Notices were received by the Defendant ii. the 2 Notices are invalid under sections 410 and 426 of the Companies Act 2016 (“CA”) [16] It is not disputed that the Turnpike AD was obtained after the Panzana AD and that at the time of the 1st Section 30 CIPAA Notice issued by the Plaintiff to the Defendant dated 27.10.2021, the Turnpike AD was not in existence. [17] I am also aware from the chronology of facts and evidence before me that: 17.1 the Plaintiff has obtained the Panzana AD on 11.10.2021 17.2 as at todate the Panzana AD has not been paid yet by Panzana to the Plaintiff S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 17.3 it is not disputed that the Defendant is the principal to Panzana based on the facts of the matter 17.4 the Defendant had in its Affidavit in Support affirmed on 15.7.2022 in enclosure 3 stated that there were at 24.1.2022, at the material time, willing and able to make payment of the Adjudicated Sum under the Panzana AD to the Plaintiff herein 17.5 Panzana has obtained the Turnpike AD on 14.12.2021 17.6 the Defendant had filed a JM filed on 22.11.2021 17.7 the Plaintiff has made 2 demands on the Defendant pursuant to section 30 CIPAA i.e on 27.10.2021 and 18.2.2022 respectively 17.8 the Defendant has admitted to holding the sum of RM 1,356,122.70 as stakeholder 17.9 the Turnpike AD has not todate been set aside [18] This Court must first decide whether there are monies owed by the Defendant to Panzana at the time of the receipt of the Notices. This principle can be seen in the decision of CT Indah Construction Sdn Bhd v BHL Gemilang Sdn Bhd [2017] MLJU 2275 where Lee Swee Seng J (as His Lordship then was) held: S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 “[26] However I must add a qualification to the mandatory use of the word “shall” in subsections (2) and (3) and it is that they are still subject to subsection (5) in that section 30 may only be invoked if money is due or payable by the principal to the Respondent in the Adjudication, BHL Builders at the time of the receipt of the request under subsection (1). [27] Thus if there is no money due then the law does not by section 30 create a separate independent obligation on the Defendant as the principal as Developer to BHL Builders as its Contractor, to pay the Claimant as the Subcontractor of the Project. [28] Thus the learned authors, Lam Wai Loon and Ivan Y. F. Loo, of Construction Adjudication in Malaysia (First Edition) Lexis Nexis did at page 417 caution and clarify as follows: “(e) Fifthly, and most importantly, there is money due or payable by the principal to the losing party at the time of its receipt of the written request for payment from the winning party. In this regard, the principal is only obligated to make payment to the extent of the sum due or payable by the principal to the losing party, or the adjudicated amount, which ever is lower? (emphasis added)” [19] As mentioned above in my grounds herein, from the chronology of events presented to this Court it has been proven to the satisfaction of this Court that there are monies owed by Defendant, as the principal, to Panzana at the date of the 2 Notices being received by the Defendant and that the Defendant has failed to accede to the Plaintiff’s request for the said payments to be made pursuant to section 30 CIPAA. S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [20] Thus, based on CT Indah Construction Sdn Bhd (supra), the principal i.e the Defendant herein is obligated to make payment of the sum due to the Plaintiff as the winning party under the Panzana AD as at the time of the 2 Notices there are monies due or payable by the principal/ Defendant to the losing party/Panzana. The fact that the Turnpike AD was not in existent at the time of the first Notice dated 27.10.2021 being issued is in my opinion irrelevant. My reasons for the same can be found herein my grounds below under the heading ‘Specific Legislation” and relates to the effect of section 30 CIPAA. Judicial Management [21] With regards the JM which was filed subsequently by the Defendant and which they claim makes the section 30 CIPAA claim under the Panzana AD as invalid as it is now contrary to sections 410 and 426 of the CA; my decision is as follows. [22] Section 410 of the Companies Act 2016 states: During the period beginning with the making of an application for a judicial management order and ending with the making of such an order or the dismissal of the application: (a) no resolution shall be passed or order made for the winding up of the company; (b) no steps shall be taken to enforce any charge on or security over the company's property or to repossess any goods in the company's possession under any hire purchase agreement, chattels leasing agreement or retention of title agreement, except S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 with leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court may impose; and (c) no other proceedings and no execution or other legal process shall be commenced or continued and no distress may be levied against the company or its property except with leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court may impose [23] Section 426 of the Companies Act 2016 provides: (1) Any transfer, mortgage, delivery of goods, payment, execution or other act relating to property made or done by or against a company which is unable to pay its debts as the debts become due, from the company's own money in favour of any creditor or any person in trust of any creditor with the intention to give such creditor a preference over other creditors shall be void in the event of the company being placed under judicial management on an application for a judicial management order presented within six months from the date of making, taking, paying or suffering the transfer, mortgage, delivery of goods, payment, execution and every such act. (2) Any transfer or assignment by a company of all its property to trustees for the benefit of all its creditors shall be void. (3) This section shall not affect the rights of any person making title in good faith and for valuable consideration through or under a creditor of the company placed under the judicial management [24] The above sections would on the face of the same be in direct contradiction to the provision in Section 30 of CIPAA which reads: S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (1) If a party against whom an adjudication decision was made fails to make payment of the adjudicated amount, the party who obtained the adjudication decision in his favour may make a written request for payment of the adjudicated amount direct from the principal of the party against whom the adjudication decision is made. (2) Upon receipt of the written request under subsection (1), the principal shall serve a notice in writing on the party against whom the adjudication decision was made to show proof of payment and to state that direct payment would be made after the expiry of ten working days of the service of the notice. (3) in the absence of proof of payment requested under subsection (2), the principal shall pay the adjudicated amount to the party who obtained the adjudication decision in his favour. (4) The principal may recover the amount paid under subsection (3) as a debt or set off the same from any money due or payable by the principal to the party against whom the adjudication decision was made. (5) This section shall only be invoked if money is due or payable by the principal to the party against whom the adjudication decision was made at the time of the receipt of the request under subsection (1). [25] Applying the maxim of generalibus specialia derogant , I hold that sections 410 and 426 of the CA must be read subject to section 30 CIPAA as the former sections in the Companies Act 2016 are general sections on the powers of the Court at the hearing of the JM as compared to section 30 CIPAA which is a specific section on the powers of this Court in a construction industry claim under CIPAA, S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 which is itself an Act which deals with specifically construction industry claims only, to grant the party who obtained an adjudication decision under CIPAA in its favour, being the Plaintiff herein, to make a written request for payment of the adjudicated amount direct from the principal of the party, i.e the Defendant, against whom the Panzana AD is made i.e Panzana. [26] The application of this maxim can be found in Language Distributor (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng [1995] 3 CLJ 520 where Goal Sri Ram CJA (as he then was) stated: "......the rule of construction expressed in the maxim generalibus specialia derogant. Where there are two provisions of written law, one general and the other specific, then, whether or not these two provisions are to be found in the same or different statutes, the special or specific provision excludes the operation of the general provision" Specific Legislation [27] It must be borne in mind that CIPAA was enacted for the very specific purpose of enabling the construction industry to realise cashflow issues affecting contractors who had difficulty to resolve payment disputes and that these disputes have to be quickly resolved in a cost- effective manner to ensure the smooth execution of the construction projects. [28] This is consonant with the main intent of CIPAA which has been held in Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and Anor appeal [2020] 6 MLJ 224 where it was held by the Federal Court amongst others that the interpretation expounded by the majority of the Court S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 of Appeal in that case was consistent with the purpose and structure of the adjudication process outlined in the CIPAA 2012 and that it was clear from the Preamble, the Explanatory Notes to the Bill and the speech of the Deputy Minister when tabling the CIPAA Bill that the primary objective of the CIPAA 2012 was to alleviate cash flow issues by providing an effective and economical mechanism. [29] I would also like to quote and apply CT Indah Construction Sdn Bhd v BHL Gemilang Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 CLJ 75 to support my decision on the effect of section 30 CIPAA where the Court of Appeal held: “[14] In the instant case, the liability of the respondent to make payment is imposed by statute, ie, by s. 30(3) of CIPAA. Thus, payment made by the respondent to the appellant would not be from the assets of BHL Builders, but because the adjudicated sum is paid by the respondent, it will be a debt due from BHL Builders to the respondent (once the respondent makes direct payment to the appellant) which the respondent will have to recover from BHL Builders pursuant to sub-s. 30(4). [15] We agree with learned counsel for the appellant that a legal obligation to pay may arise either by statute (as in the present case) or by contract. In fact, an obligation imposed by statute, in this case by sub-s. 30(3) of CIPAA, is stronger because in the absence of proof of payment by BHL Builders as requested by the respondent under sub-s. (2), it becomes mandatory for the respondent as the principal to pay the adjudicated sum of RM9,065,335.67 to the appellant. It is a requirement of law which the respondent has no discretion not to comply with it. (emphasis mine) S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [16] We are also in agreement with learned counsel for the appellant that s. 30 of CIPAA creates an independent statutory obligation on the part of the respondent, as a principal in its own right, to pay the appellant and that this is a separate obligation to pay imposed by statute which exists in parallel with BHL Builder's obligation as the main contractor to pay the appellant under the adjudication decision.” [30] Following from the above, I hold that section 30 CIPAA is thus a separate and distinct statutory obligation imposed on the principal to make payment under an adjudication decision on behalf of the losing party in the Adjudication proceedings to the Plaintiff herein as the winning party and must take precedence over the general sections 410 and 426 of the CA in the matter before this Court. [31] For the record, after this court had heard the respective counsels submit on the matter on 8.8.2023 and fixed the same for decision on 15.9.2023, Panzana’s solicitors, Messrs Hakem Arabi & Associates (Panzana’s Solicitors) had attempted to make further submissions via its letter dated 11.9.2023, which is just a few days before this Court was about to deliver its decision on the matter. [32] I had then instructed the learned Senior Assistant Registrar to contact the Plaintiff’s solicitors for its comments on the same, after which a letter dated 12.9.2023 was then received by the court from the Plaintiff’s solicitors, Messrs Macy Chong & Associates (Plaintiff’s Solicitors), who had vehemently objected to the said further submissions on inter alia the grounds that Panzana was trying to ‘steal a march’ and an afterthought. S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [33] After giving due consideration to the said Panzana’s Solicitors letter of 11.9.2023 and the Plaintiff’s Solicitors letter dated 12.9.2023 respectively mentioned above, this Court had decided not to entertain any further submissions in any form on the matter as the parties had been given ample opportunity to submit on the matter orally on 8.8.2023 as well as to submit their Written Submissions earlier on which the parties counsels had done so as directed by this Court. [34] It would not be fair to the parties and to this Court’s precious time to reopen submissions on the same as it would amount to allowing the parties to make its submissions by instalments which this Court abhors and finds the same as being improper. [35] This Court must surely prevent such an abuse. There would be no end to the litigation process if the Court were, in such circumstances, to allow such further submissions. [36] I was on the eve of delivering my decision informed that 2 other letters had arrived, one from Panzana’s Solicitors dated 14.9.2023 inter alia informing this court that a JM Order had been granted by the Shah Alam High Court on 23.8.2023 and thereafter making further submissions on the same points raised in their earlier letter dated 11.9.2023. This was followed up by the Plaintiff’s Solicitors letter of even date objecting to the contents of the said Panzana’s Solicitors dated 14.9.2023. [37] After perusing both the said letters this Court holds that there is no change to my decision that the JM and now the JM Order will have no effect on section 30 CIPAA as it is a separate and distinct statutory S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 obligation imposed on the principal to make payment under an adjudication decision and should thus take precedence over the general sections 410 and 426 of the CA in the matter before this Court on the reasons I have already stated above. [38] That being the case I hereby allow the Plaintiff’s claim as per prayers 1, 2.1 to 2.3 and 3 of enclosure 1. Dated: 15th day of September 2023 sgd. NADZARIN WOK NORDIN HIGH COURT JUDGE CONSTRUCTION COURT 1 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF: Mohd Rezan Ezra bin Muhammad, Nandakumar a/l S. Haridas and Chong Mei Zhi (Messrs Macy Chong & Associates] COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT: Vatsala Ratnasabapathy and Constance C.J Pau [Messrs Zain & Co.] COUNSEL FOR PANZANA: Ganesh a/l Magenthiran and Suronmani a/p Krishnan [Messrs Hakem Arabi & Associates] S/N NmTRc8cWOEa2SIMOIUFAg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	22,751	Tika 2.6.0
BL-45SOM-16-08/2022	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH 1. ) ROSLI BIN KITAN 2. ) RUSLI BIN GENEP 3. ) AJIMAN BIN RAHMAN 4. ) ZAINAL BIN LAMPE	- Seksyen 26A Akta Anti Pemerdagangan Manusia dan Anti Penyeludupan Migran 2007- Perayu-perayu mengaku salah atas pertuduhan yang dikenakan terhadapnya dan faham sebab akibat akan pengakuan mereka- Perayu-perayu didalam rayuannya memohon diringankan hukuman- Perayu-perayu telah menyeludup 37 orang migran warga Bangladesh ke Malaysia- Hukuman yang diperuntukkan untuk kesalahan ini adalah berat kerana ianya melibatkan keselamatan negara- Selain mengambil kira mereka adalah pesalah pertama dan telah mengaku salah; turut mengambil kira keselamatan negara	06/11/2023	YA Puan Norliza Binti Othman	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7b1852b2-3367-48d8-9b03-215a1f25202e&Inline=true	06/11/2023 14:53:04 BL-45SOM-16-08/2022 Kand. 90 S/N slIYe2cz2EibAyFaHyUgLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N slIYe2cz2EibAyFaHyUgLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N slIYe2cz2EibAyFaHyUgLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N slIYe2cz2EibAyFaHyUgLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N slIYe2cz2EibAyFaHyUgLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N slIYe2cz2EibAyFaHyUgLg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N slIYe2cz2EibAyFaHyUgLg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BL—l5SOM—16—OE/2022 Kand. sc awn/ma ,4 22 04 mun MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI Kuus mum NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO‘: BL-ASSDM-1605I2\|)22 ANYARA 1. man am KIYAN 2. RUSLI am GENEP 3. AJMAN am RAHMAN 4. znmu. am LAIIPE FERAVU-FERAVU LAWAN FENDAKWARAYA RESPDNDEN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PENGENALAN m Persyu-perayu lelah mmdun dengan salu xesaranan m bawah Ssksyen 26A Akla Ann Pemerﬂagangan Manusia ﬂan Ami Panyeludupan Mwgrin 2uu7 [Anna 5701 yang huleh mhukum mbawah Akta yang sama mmaca harsama dengsn sexsyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan [2] [:9] Hukuman yang dwparumukkun adalah penjari hdak me\ebih: 15 vamm ﬂan boleh jugs dlkanakan danda. Pada1710.2ll23‘ ivablla penuuunan dmacakan kepada Psrayu— parayu, merska lalah mengaku salah was perwduhan yang dnkenakan Iemedannya ﬂan vanam sebab akxhat zkan pengakuan mereka setalah Mahkamzh mmjshasken bahswa spams mereku msngaku salah, maka pmsk pendakwaln ﬂdak Vagi akan mingemukakan ssksx-aaksx dan manaka akan duanm hukum dnn hukuman man mpeqeuaskan kspadn kenga-nga Perayu. Maraka «arm can mash kekal dengan psngakuan salah msreka. Fihak pandakwaan kamudlan membacaksn fakla ks: den mengemukakan eksmon-exsnlm ﬂan diakui o\eh Peraywperayu. Mahkamah blah memberikan paluang kepada Favayu—paray\ umuk mambual rayuan Peraywemyu dldalam rayuannya memonon dvingankan hukuman ksrana msreka mananggurvg kamarga m mdonssla. Ini aaalah kssalahan panama dan maleka Ielah insal akan pemuenan meteka [41 Dldalam huiahan pembenamn pula‘ pmak pendakwaan memahon salu hukuman saumpal dijaluhkan ksvana kasalahan yang dﬂakukan ulsh Psrayu-perayu sdalah msllbalknn kseslamanzn negara ksranu ara lalah msnysludup 37 ulang rrﬂqlan warga Bang\a-ﬂesh ke Ma\aysia. Vni salu kesalahan yang max bo\eh dlpandang nngan kerani negara klm dihanﬂri uleh Iamai warganagara asing yang hdak msmpunyal dokumen penaxannn yang 55h. Ksbanjlmn memka membswa banyak masalah kenada mean. [51 Selelah Mahkamah mendengar human mmgasi ﬂan Psrayu» perayu nan hujahan pembaralan clan pillak psndakwaan, Mahkamah lelah mansabn Sam. Parayu-perayu dengan pertuduhan mbawan Saks)/an 26A ma Ann Pamerdaganuan Msnusla an AM: Penyeludunan Mwgrzn 2uo7 . aua bersama dengan Saksyen an Kanun Keseksaan dan menluluhkan hukuman penjnm s mhun din canxn lanqkap. Perayu-perayu ﬁdak belpuax nan dsngan hukuman mi, maka memka msmbual Iayuan KEPUTUSAN IIIAHKAMAH [51 Mahkamah ml dawn merllnmhkan hukuman kellas Perayu-pe(ayu «swan mengammlkxra den msnimbangkan lakkmlaklur Pelayw 3 perayu adalah pesaxan panama. pengakuan savah Perayu-perayu, wavar belakang Peraywpevayu dan kassnusan kasalahan yang dﬂakukan o\eh Fsrayu-persyu Mahkamah msfuluk kapada kepulusan kas Yuilnann Sanuudin v PP (19991 4 cm 291 men VA Dale‘ sm Norma Yaskoh Ikenka YA HMR) dvmana neuau manyalakan. -rm prlmzpiu m Imlendng have M been enlrevmhoa and wax nﬂlsd m ourL1ImIniI\lw]uv\spvudem>e and a noun mm with sum ...mm .; amynwund to m. m amount m. Mlwwvlg wnslduauonr mm mmm seriuusness D4 zmnm mmmmed. mm gum mm nmeoedmxs‘ and (sbmepublwlnluvu m Hukuman yang mpscunnukxan nlsh undang-undarvg unmk kasaluhan umamah seksyen 26A dalah hukuman hukuman penjara Iidak melsbml I5Lahun dun wen mu dlkenukan hukuman nsnas III! was msnunjukkan hukuman yang dlpelumukkan unluk kesalahan adalah haral kevana wanya mslxbalkan kaselamamn negara Seksyen 26A ma Arm Pamraagangan Manusua dan An . Penyemdupan Ian 2on7 adalah kssalallan yang disenarawkan amawan Ealwagian MIA Akta make Jadual Penama 'secumy N suv uzawrauyugm um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm (menses [Special Measures) Am 2012 ('SOSMA”) adalan carpakax. Vanyz salu kssalahan yang senua. Apakan msksud hukuman yang mnnpal dengan kesakansn ynng dilakukan, Mahkamah melujuk kepads kes Ponnnkwa my: lawn Mnhamad nanny Manama Jodi 12:11:] 1 LNS so, Muhd Zamw\ salren HMR (pads ka\|ika Kn) membuul pememillin berlkulz - - me: one serllance n m nessofme mtnunr-um rm: in semen av Wﬂvbﬂmnzhly was uplamod m INC Caltnman Supume Oaun ms. vi R V man [2012] 5cc1a,\|2n<2]1 sm us In wag-nun :7 .. Imkwa “Pmwmmnmy x: n. ..n. qua non of a jusl sencwn. n mung‘: mama um: : Animal m ; mgm mm ﬁg gm»/1\|y A1101: uﬂenm ms \: dandy use to ma objoatve no danunuinlim I\|pmmolaAu:11naVor mwnu and mum pawn: mnﬂdervu: n. me man mt-n. @ § gggmglma gm... m. mm nuammgnmgg ,4 pg man In IN: sense. an pnnmnlll -ewes a nnmnq or Ieslmwnu Yundicn and snsuvm mm fur m. olfwoevf [31 Namun begun, Mahkaman dalam menjaluhknn hukumsn tarhadap Psmyu-pemyu, salawn mengarnbn kna meraka adalah pesalah panama dan lalah mangaku salan; mm! mengsmbu Idra 5 syn suv uzawranwgm mm smm n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. nVW‘nlWY mm: dun-mm VII mum pm xeaavamanan nagara yang lldak bnlsh mpanaang sen: hegllu sahaia. Sekwanya mxuman yang ringan ameri (hukuman makamum aaulan 15 Iahun perI[am) wanya hdak akan membali pengiuaran kepada wamanegura aamg bahkan wargansgara Malaysla aanmn yang uemmak sehaaaw urang Kangah membawa mzsuk alau membawa kemar warganagara asing rne\a\m' ;a\|an lidak sah kerans wang yang marakslanma ssbagal upah sangan mmayan. Hukuman 5 (shun panjala dari uanxn langkap adamn wajar den aau Kealas Peraytuaerayu selspas mengambﬂ ma mareka adalsh pasanan panama clan sshagai pengmamn kepada msrska agar «max Va mengulanw kesalahan In! apebila babes ><e\ak aenarixn 11 Oklohor 2:123 (uonuu MAN) H IM MAHKAMAH we VMALAVA KLANG aw auv.2uzawr.wuam -ma saw ...m.mm be used m mm ma mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm sm su mm. wan I-aux vemwmsnvuwu um rmx I-EmAKwAu4 zuzaaaymwgm snmnw swan :. Auocmnu «am mm Flmnl n cn.y.».cm w.m.n...n, Amo Fun Kmq‘ sat-nw Pun Mum Sylzvam lhu >.,.m mm mm Mann 5 Mm swam, Aum-A Paruwmmnsaan mm". Mum-1. Kemlmnan Datum mm nu ma Mukrm mu. urw mm Aver Gum» mm .\ ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm	978	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
AB-44-10-06/2023	PEMOHON HENDRA BIN MULANA RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	Criminal Procedure - Section 317 of CPC- Application to admit additional evidence - Applicant convicted of offences under s.8(b) of Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017 - Request for child pornography - The additional evidence was in respect of Applicant's defence under s.20 of 2017 Act - Whether Applicant did not know of true age of the victim - Failure of previous counsel to tender additional evidence to support defence case - Whether 4 conditions in R v Parks have been fulfilled - Application dismissed	06/11/2023	YA Puan Noor Ruwena binti Md Nurdin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d6b4dee7-705a-4bba-b574-5e97aa37d188&Inline=true	06/11/2023 12:04:09 AB-44-10-06/2023 Kand. 11 S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 59601lpwuku1dF6XqjfRiA *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Aa—u—1u—os/2023 Kand. J1 zm,,2ozs nvza-09 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI TAIPING DALAM IIEGERI EERAK DARUL RIDZWAN PERMOHQNAN JENAVAH M0,: HENDRA BIN MULANA [N0 KF.: aonsI3o1e22u ...PEMoHoN v m PENDAKWA RAVA ...RESPDNDEN ggouuns OF JUDGMENT xs INYRODUCTION [1] The Appneem med Iwa (2; Nauoes u1App2a\| in the com dc Apnea! agemen the deasmn enme Cmm delivered an 4 9 2923 in respect ovcase Nos. AEA4—1l)-06/2023 and AEAL1106/2023 Denalning Io me 2.; applicalmns to edmu new evidence under me provisions ov Arts. a and 121 dc me Federal OOVISU ' n. ss.2s. 31 and 35 of me come of Judicature Ac’: 1954 and 5.317 0! me cnmmex Procedure Cnde (cps). The apphcmions were made in reepem o4 me appeal m the Tepmg men cdun Apbeal Nos. AB-42JSKS-2~02/2023 and Auznsksrzmz/zcza [24 Earner, me Applicant had been convicted by the Tawping Sessxons Counan16.2 2023 in Case No AB€2JSK—20r1 1/2019 aneme was found gmﬂy and oonvicled on m-ee (3) amended charges ol requeeung for cmm pomugraphy undev s, am or me Sexua\ Offences Against Children Act In 2D17(“\|hs 2m7 Act“) and one (1) charge under me eeme sedinn in cese 1 em 5n5nI\wum1aF6X»:umA -we Sum IHIWDIY WW be used m mm we nvwnnﬂly mm; dun-mm vn nF\uNG wrm 15 m No. AB-62JSK»21-1\|/2019. The Appllcanl was ssn\|enoed la 13 years lmpnsonment lrom ma dale of oanvlcllnn 15.2.2023 and 3 strokes of me mlan In respect -71 each charge and all lmpnsonmam sentences were lo mn ouncurvemly. He was alsa semenue lo undergo counselllng whlle In prlsnn and 3 years‘ puliue superv on aﬂe( completing ms lmpnsnnmanl senlenoe The Sessiuns Couﬂ allawad a stay olexecullon permmg appeal agalnsl canvlcuon and senlencs to me Hlgh calm. ms Grounds al Judgment sals out ms reasons for alsmlssal of mm appllcamns. THE APPLICATION [3] Allhnugh he was charged in September 2019, mal only commenced on 24 3 2021 due In the CDVId'19 pandemic The Applloanl at me luwer cclurlwzs vepmjenlsd by his solicitor Messrs. Hakiml, Lallma s. Mavdhiyah & Assoclales, Talplng. The Noll’: Unsl/I was ﬁled by a dlffsrent sollcllor Messrs Abdullah, Maxnah a Jew, Kuala Lumpur an was 2023 as per Encl. 1 together with the Amsvir Sokongan m End. 2 afﬁnned bylhe Appllaam mmsall The applicatlon was made furadmlsslnn of a purportedly new svldence that was not avallahls durlng the lrlal [4] The Noll: L/aul sought the cams leave fur the lullnwlng a Eahnwl: Femnhun/Pzmyu yang dlnamakan an alas dlharl kebenaran unmk merluemukakan cahman/emuk pmlxil akin»-Jkaun BIGO Parvgadu (SWO) seven: yaw ullamulman dalnm Aﬂdavll Sakmvg-In nswmu aw MULANA yang dllkulkarl pada 15.052023 yang mama dllallkan :1! sin] dulam menyvlmng Malls usul ml subagal bukll-hukll kelararlaan harwlarllularl urlluk dlhzca aan dlmjuk scram helsekzll unmkdan baglmluan pamurlgararl rayuarl an Mahkamah mm. Malaya Talmna lug. keg Raylmn Jeniyah Nu A:-azlsxs-24:2/zm (rayuarl \|ersebul’ N 5m1nIlwukmdFm(wlRlA was Sun! nnvlhnrwm be used M mm .. mlmlluy mm: dun-mm VI] .mm mm 1:1 25 15 m 35 mm (supra) wmn approval. n mscussed what was a whoHy sxcsp\|inna\ circumstance, and there M was m rsgam In Ignorance an the defence of murder. Wwth respecl, the decision m me Singaporean case was conﬁned In the rams of the case and me apex court had staled: ‘ .Wa are nal s»-ggunng an out mumam ma any -gnmanu onus \am on me pan acwumx shank! neussumy mu . pm-manywng m avsry case. The law mung to murd-r hawevur, 1: We mosl mnnsmenu: pomon nf aﬂ our waw n gnvems ma mndnlons m whhzh many may take nwiy Me‘ an almv m n: avnﬂcaunn may be such that n can nevsrbe renam- [151 The decision 01 me svngaporean court Is omy persuaswe am not bnndmg here and «ms Court onmes that u rs not an appxe-mpme oompanson as the \aw in re\aUon to me dsfencs (or me capital olfenos of murdsr could not be equated with the defence avaﬂalﬂe In an accused in 5 20 of the 2017 A01. The apex court oonunued: ‘In I11: event we «ma umsehres cnmpeﬂad tn . vary ﬁvm mw Va me man max had (run avdenne Iogelller mm the avidanca .5 m m. nature at he klﬂmgs been below: the mal awn and had me mw vamnng la the mmdenca and Quantum ovproonaeen ounec1\|ysla(edm\|heAufY(as Vlwssbmen m laasnnnme My wmd Posswbw have some to any concmsum other man lhat me dedenca M mmvmshsd vaspuvvilhllwly was made nul - [19] that: ‘n It ﬂu paramaum duly av we own to sea mu, m we Vast resort pushca -5 dune mvd any mwluimnge :11 mm mm In vlaw nﬂha «am mm m. Isnmad Judas came in Ms mnclusnon as . veault a! me demonsxmﬁon Elven by In: chemlsl we cannc\| say he was nm inﬂuenced by lhis additions! evfdeme which was nolshwnuo be nenewry and also Vmpmveﬂy admmed AJudII cnnnoi sllvlnly can Invaddlﬂona cvldcnctlusnosalliw his curiosity or dnum at to supwlumnnl a was: n ma Prouclmon. Alia. such Ivmnnnm vv nuanluvy. mun DI m pron-r vom. am: um In accorﬂancn mm m mm mu nflm Cnmm-I Plocldun Cudl' Vn Do] v usim v FF 1193711 ML! 115, the Supreme Cuun held [Emphasis added] N manummasmm um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm III In 15 [201 I nave considered ine alﬂdavil in suppon oi ine epplicaiion, ine submisslens and case laws cited and l have also nigriiignied ine relevant cases above. The coun needs to deiennine wheilier all me iour ocndiliclns have been satisﬁed as submmsd by the Applicant‘: counsel that they have done so Wilh regard \|a mndlllons Nos. 2 and 3. this Court does nol have difficulty to answer in me amrniaiive As clearly explained in «he ihird ecndiiion enunclaled in R vPark$ (supral. ii IS not me task ar INS caun lo decide wneiher ihe proposed evidence is lo be believed or ndi. Al this stage, ine iuncuon oi ine couri is only lo deierniine wneiner ine proposed evidenee, ii given, is capable oi bsllsl. [21] However, in my underslandlng of «lie llie ﬁrs\|ount1i\|lorl,llls(l1aI llie evidence must nut he avaiiauie ai ihe iriai. To recap, in paragraph 9 di Enci, 2. me Appiioani slated in nis iesiirnony, lie laid me sessions coun inei in nach amount SP10 had stand her age as 19. 22 2nd 2:. ln paraymph 10. «he Auplicarlt evened ihal he had nonesily aliernpied id eseenain her real age Neveriheless. mere was no such documentary evidence suibmmed by his previous counsel lo suppon his oral evidence in edun at liiai lime. Then in paragraph is, he oorlll-adlcled nirnsell by slaiing inai pursuarll (0 his newly appointed oouneers advice, he had euiained uie pnnlouls in Exhlini HM—3 as lunner evidence ior ine purpose onne appeal Hound Ihal unis purpunadly new ovidancn was almady available ul the «rial. as lie already knew ihen she had svaled uiree diﬁmniagas In nu BIGO account nruﬂlos. But as to why the previaus counsel did no\| adduce iheni at when iirne. only ihe Appllcnni and his delenee learn knew llie reason. Failure. ii any. oi «lie previous eounsel lo suuinii lne docurnenls liien, did nol niean lliey were not available 5! all. I concluded mm iiia Aupllcam has not mieiiad ilie ﬂrsl condltlon. :1 sin 5J5nIlVnukmdF®01ilRlA -use s.ii.i Ilnvlhll will be used m mm ve nllnlrullly Minis dun-vlnril vu .nune Wﬂxl in In [22] wiln regard lo me leurln condillon. l.e. alter oonsldsring lnal evidence, go en lo cnnslder wnelher lnere nilgnl have been a reasonable doubt ln lne inlnds ollne Jury aslo ma gulllellheappellanl lllnal svldencs had been given logelnei wlln lne elnerevidenoe al \|l'le lnal. As there is no lury nare, lnls oundlllan will relarlolne lnal calm. A perusal pnna grounds of iudgmerll ln Exllloil l-ill/M snowed that me scJ nad oonsldeied lne Appllcanrs evidence and deienoe abwl no: known; SFIO‘s We age (paragraphs 32 onwards). Then in paragraph 37 onwards \|he SCJ sraled why she dld nol believe his delerlce. [23] in paragiapn 75, 12" line onwards, ane alaled '...spal7lIa rarludun dapal rnalrnal aeaualu yang mencurrgakan lanlang umul sebemar spur .” She wanl en lo paragraph 71, wnlcn was me pass for nrs applicaliens Io adrnn addilidnal evidanoe The SCJ viewed mallhe Apphcanl should have mat SP10 ln persun In asoenain one age ollna g‘lr\| And then the SCJ also rnenlloned aooul lne Aoplicanvs acadernlc qualilioalion ls. Diploma ln Early childhood Educallon, which she corlsldersd as well lnal lne delenoe alsad dld nol oonvlnce nar lrlal he dld nm know Ihe victim's lme age [24] The Appllcarll was asking lo adnill lns addlllenal deoumenlary evidenue ev SWO‘: purported adull ages bu\| lne SCJ's epneluaien was llnal lia did nol mzko any eiion tn mael wm. SP1\|l in person l fuund lnal based on her oonolusions, lne addllienal doournenlary evldence ln Exnibil HM—3 “would nol have raised a reasonable doubt in lne mind of me sc.I as In lne gull: ol lrle Anpllcanl ii lrral evldende nad been glven lcgelher wI\|h me olhar evldenoe al the lnal' Thonlon, tin Appllunt hu also nol aatlsﬂnd tholounh com1l\|\|all.Whelher ornollne SCJ was ngm in convict lne Applicanl la a dlﬂerenl nialler and lnal la lerlnla ceun In declde at me appeal siege. 1; SW 5m1nIlwmlkmdFm<qllRlA -we s.n.l n-vlhnrwm be used m mm ms nﬂnlruﬂly sun. dun-vlnrrl via .neno Wm! in m [25] It tetnte tewtneretere, tnet not ontythe etreumeteneee must be mas\| excepﬂonal but the subject wntcn ts pmpased to be adduced by further evtaenee ts subject ta exeeptianet onndilians. It becomes necessary anty ite latlure anusttoe would nesutt trsucn aaantenet etndence was not taken and allowed wnen audtttonat (acts have come to ﬁght since tne date at met. The matter ts leﬂ entirety lo the discreltcn at the court. And me coun has exemtsed we dtecretton judtctausty tn accordance wttn establtshed teget pnnctptee. There was nolhtng new tn lhe addmortal evtdenee wnten lhs Appttcent sought tn be admmed tn tne Recom at Appeal as they were already known to me defence et me lrtal. Moreover, me SCJ would not have cumelu a diﬂeranlcnnclusiun svsn W1hedncuman1s\|osht1w 5910': ‘purponzd emer aduk ages’ had been admmed at me Inal CONCLUSION [25] Premtsed upon the above cortstderaltcns, tne Cuurlluund Ihers was no merI\| tn the appllcahuns and both were dtsmlssed aoeerdtngly Dzlnd s Novemberznzct / %,,_/ Moor Ruwuta Btnu Md. Nurdln Judlclal Commlssiomr Nlgll Cnuﬂ ul Malaya, Tzlplng IA syn mnttmmemwn -we s.n.t n-vthnrwm be ts... m mm me mm-y mt. dun-mm VI] .nune Wm! Regmemn all For the App cam‘ Mr. mu Bln Jalflr 5 Abdullah, Mumh a. Jefrl, Kunll Lumpur For the Relpondontz um: Szll Chzy Mac Ling P-jabnl Tlmbalau Plndnkwa Raya Mason Ferak. Cawangan Talping an 15 sw 5nsnI\wum1aF6XqumA -ms Sum M... M“ be used m mm u. nvVWuH\|Y mm; “Mm. VII mum pm an m 15 Buhawn Perwnhun/Pe<iyn dlbsrl kubenaran unluk memlanknn bukN— mu keleranwsn bsmllanlman yam: diwhnn leuebul ssbagai R-ken rawan Tambahan nag: kss Rawan Jenayah NoAE»J2JSKS-2-02r‘2023 (mm Iecsgk-ml’), Bahawa Pemohnn/Psrayu when kehznalan urvtuk rnemmda Fstrsyen Rzyuan hanallkh zsa 2023 smaran German Danmah am kebenlnn yang dwbavlkarl uaram plravvqcan (1) dan (2; an alas‘ amwa sehanjlmiya um semms dengin Ssksysn 317 Kanun Pmeaur Janlyarl mm 51:) ksteranuan ham/Vanjulan hen<a\Lan pmhﬂ mu» akaml BIGO Pnngadu (spun aummn dan dneﬂmn masuk umuk ﬂan Dag: mluan Dendenanmn layuan ur Mahkameh nnggr Mavaya Talpmg nag: kss Rayuan Jenayah Na AE—42.1SKS-2-a2l2\|723 (Wiyuan xerunmw Eahawa sekhanya am: clan 3 animal (will Rzyuan pada ma zuza duadualkan semmz ke lankh ham unluk membenarmn ketslangin barn/Vammnn sedcmlklan mmawmr. mgr human hujzhulrhujahan ﬂalam rayum dun dahm pendengavlll riyuan vamubm ar Mahkaman Muha rm: Rem sehrqulnyl yang Mahkamah Yang Mull: Im ﬁklrxan warer, Dihll den sum mamanl. The same prayers were snughl in respect 0! CrIm\|na\ Appeal No. AB42JSKS-$02/2023 «or Case No, AB-GZJSK-21-II/2019. The bﬂef reasons gwen in! ms appllcaﬂons ware um. the Aupllcanl was convicted on 15.2 2023 after a lull lnal an the (our charges. He had been sentenced to 13 years‘ Impdsunmenl mm the dale av common and 3 strokes each al me man; 2 sm 5«zmI\wuxmaFm<wvwrA “Nana smm n-nhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my r... mrmu-y mm: dun-mm VII mum vmm m m vu. ne was dissausned wun the decwsion 0! me Sessions Conn and had med appems In the Hugh com and men me Pelmon er Appeal was med en 25.4.2023: me Sessions court In smvlng at us deuswun had cnnsxdered the pmwsven of ‘Presumplion of age of a mild‘ under s.2o of the zen Am and deuided mac -rermun/Pmyu uuex menunjukkan Teduduh sda msnja/ankan usaha dan rkhlisr Lmluk bsdumpa dsngan spm ssndfli bagi memaslikan semade SP10 re/an seoreng dewasa eveu kanek»kanak': ne documentary ewdenae Derlammg to "caburarl/eksl'rak pmfaﬂ akaun-akaun 5/so /em Pengsdu (spmr were tendered aH.\|1elHa\| m the Sessxans Court and (hvs dwecily prejumced the defence or me Appellanl/Apphcanl; substantial prejudice would alsn ensue \f the 'cabutan/skslrsk pmlarl ekaunekeun BIGD tern Psngadu {SP1ll]" are not aﬂowed In be made as pen uflhs Recmd ufAppea\|; docurnenvary ewdence pena ng 10 ‘semen/eksLrek prulaﬂ akaun-akaun E/Go /err: Pengadu (SP10)‘ sought u: be tendered are very inter-related wnm the findings at me Sessions Courl: me sens documentary evidence sougm la be adrmlled herein are cremble decumemery evmenae and would raise a reeseneme doubt m the lower court re\at\ng to me Appllcanfs gum W015 sawd evfdenue nad been admitted along with u\|her evmenue Iherem. o syn manuxmmarmm -nee snrm n-nhnrwm be used m mm n. nrwhrnﬂly mm: dun-mm wa mum Wm I5 15 [s] The Deputy Pubhl: Prosecutor (DFP) ate not me any amttavtt In reply but obtected to the appttcettone in the wntten sutzmtestans of the Respondent ntett on the nterntng at t4.a 2023 The hearing al the appttcatten was nominated an 14.4% 2023 and adjourned lur decision on 4.9.2023. EVALUATION AND F mug; QE YHE COURT [7] addtttonal or runner evtdence states. The plovistun of s 317 atthe cwc which ptovtdes tot teeeptton at “Older ta take ttttthet etttaenae an (H tn aeattng wtth any apnnet undsr tttts crteptet a htage. n he wnks saatttanet emenee tn be neseuaty, may ettnettate such evtaence htrnaettar etteat tt ts be taken by a Magishilu (2; when the addmnnnl evidence ta taken by a hteatettate he ettatt eenny that evidence tn the htsh cetttt who ehatt then, us eeen ee may he. messed te atspoee nl the appeat tat Unless the Judas uthetwtse attests, the aeatteaa at he advucale shatt he wuent when the eaatttenet avtdunce ts taken. tmha tehna ul smdancs ttneenhte senmn utett, tatttte pttrpnsas orcheptet xxv, be dsemed te he nn ?nﬂu\ty' [9] The Appllcanl eubtntttea that the math reasan tot the appttcattens was due te the ﬁndings made tn the grounds of tttegntent uflhe Sessions com Judge (SCJ) in paragraph 77 which was tn E HMV1 ol Enat 2, where she had stated 'Tst1uduh/Pelayu I/dak menultitlkkan Tenuduh sda men/‘a/ankan usaha dart ikhtiar tmfuk bequmpa dsngan SP10 eencttn‘ bag!‘ I-nemasrikalv sarnada sum ia/ah seolang dewasa alau kanalokanak’. Referring to s.2o at the 2017 Act, counsel tor the Apptteent tntatntee the Cuuﬂ that the pt-vlons counsel tithe Sosllans Court did not presam 5 atn ettatttteeehttemattete ‘Nuns a.n.t I-vthnrwm be used a mm the .nttn.tt-y MW: dun-mm he .nette WM! in 15 15 the evidence wlilch they sought io ho adinllhd as panoftho doluiu ease The Aooirsani came to know the victim (SWO) through the itve streaming piaitsrrn knnwn as "B]GO‘. si=to had an assount wi\|h BIGO. The crux oitne deienoe case was exastiy that aitnouoh the Applicant had been eornrnunr 9 Via iaieu, telephone and wnarsApp with the victim tsi=to). he did not know her real age because BIGO was an aduitsoniy piationn and not intended iorsnyone under ta years o1sge.TheApoIicent sought to aoouse aooriionai evidence (he! SPIO owned more than one EIGO acoount and each oi them showed diitereni ages at SF10 (please reierto Exhibit Hit/i—3 in Enot. 2). itenoe, ms Appiioani had seen denied oi a iair tnai one to the neornpotsnee" oi the proviso: eounsei who conducted the ease and aid nut adduue the said Exhibit i-tM<a. [91 counsei reierred to a iew cases in its Bundle of Amhurilies and argued that the ease of uiuruqaynh v PF porn] 2 ML! 545 was apphssois here. The Apphcani wanted to show to the court that he did make etiorts to ascertain her age. The new evidence wduid satisfy the tour ssnortions In R u Parks moi] 2 AER us and it may raise a the mind onhs iriai iudge They prayer: that me courr aiiowed the ooauments to be aornnteo so that they wouid have a ehsnoe to argue the ease during the supsrantwe aopeai reastonabie dou [to] The DPP submmed that the Applicant knew that SWO lied aoour her age as the evidence would show. The printouts In Exhibit HM<S were inoancluslvs as two at ihern did not shtm ihe viclim‘s iace. iithe prinloms were admiued, the prosecution seuto not send them ior veniieanon and whether these pmliies were shii YVI existence. it was not known it the aiieged pmliles were used WI cummunimtiuns oetwsan the Applicant and SFID. itwher the Appiioant aiieged was true, Ex r it HM4 wouid have s SIN 5JiinIVVnukmdFDWVRiA None s.n.i n-rihnrwm rs used m mm ms oﬂninsiily Mimi dun-rinrrl VI] .nuue Wmi as an 15 existed during the tnal and therelora did not satisiy the corldﬂmns in R v Parks (supra). The DPP sutiinltted turther that the SCJ had assessed the credipllity at the witnesses arid came to a culmcl hriding at the tnat and the victim's cross-excrriinatlori at pages :s:s:l~3:s7 ot the Nuts t)1Evidenoe (which were not exhlbited in the application) showed that she had been asked the relevant qussllorls regarding her age. However, the Applicant did not adhere to the ccnect procedures to admit lurther evlderlce ler the purpose atthe appeal and prayed torthe application to be dismissed. she argued that in the ease of uurugayeri v PP tsupra), the court of Appeal had oleany explained the conditions in R v Parks tsupra). Hence, to allow the applications would be a travesty oriustide to the prosecution case after trial and a second bite at the cherry by the N7 ‘ rlt so to speak. I11] ln reply, counsel lor the Applicant submitted (rather puzzllngtyl that Muntglynh v PF (supra) could ae distinguished tiecause the application under s.3I7 oi the CPC was made about three years later whereas here End. 1 was tlled lrriniediately whlle pending the appeal ln the instant case, the existenoe of other also accotmls held py SP10 would show that she had stated ditterent ages (lied apout her real agei. ln paragmph sorsrict 2, the Applicant stated that in his testimony, he told the Sessions Cnurl that in each aecourrt SP1D had stated her age as la, 22 arid 23 sl=tu also told hlrh that she was studying in upper Form 6 and which was why he believed that she was rnore than 18 years‘ old. In paragraph to. the Applleantaveneo that he had honestly attempted to ascertalri her real age in paragraph t1, the Applicant stated that nevertheless, there was no such documentary evidence supinitted by the previous oourisel to support his eral evidence in cutm at that time He had peen supstantially preiudioed by the nndings at the sc.l in his deteriee because the iudge had applied am at the 2017 Act on the wrong evidence. 7 SN 5*JlinIlVnukmdFD(qiYRlA -use s.n.i In-vlhnrwlll re used is mm s. oﬂnlrrallly Mlhls dnunvlnrll vta aFlt.ING wnxl 2n so [12] In paragraph 12‘ The Appncanc stated that In March 2023 upon appoinwlg a dwrerem counsel to conduct his appeal and in prepareuon at me Penman M Apbeal. he had been asked about SP1D’s omer awso account pmmes. Pursuant merelc, m pamgraph 15 me Apgncann smeu that ne had (aken steps m obtain ms extrams ol SP1D‘s o\|her sweo account memes in order tor the documents to be admitted as and Inna! evidenoa for the purposes M me appeaxs. [1 :1] The coun win not dehbeme on me rnerivs of ms defence in regard to the apphcanons. But it \s peninent at this point. for completeness. lo stale the law in regard to sm anhe 2017 Amvmvch provides: 'Fve:umD\|mn ahsge nla mm 2n n Vs ml adeleme la a chmgefaranyoﬂenoe uMerIh>sAc1. or any Mlence Sbecmed m we seneaune wne.e me mum \s a em, man an accused neuem that me :98 av me mm: 45 an more man mm as specmaa m we rsspecllve pmwsmns m such nﬂencu 2\| the cm ma vﬂencu n aﬂeged 10 Ma been mmmmad umasx live nccuuaa muk an raamnahle steps «a men“ me 192 no the and - [141 The Applicant Vs relying on the phrase ‘unless ms accused look all reasonable slaps Ia ascsnam ms ags ofths chila’. Augusnns Paul JCA m Muruglylh vrr (supra) sialad: “s n wm be obsswad mm on vacephon oi lddmunzl amama Vs a matter :71 discvemn u .5 smiled um Ihal me exerdse M n dFs\|:re\|mn musl be m acmrdance wulh eslzbﬂshed mdlchal guldeﬂnes In me case at aaaumng addmonalev1asrme.lha wmdeimas were wen out m Laud vMarsha/M15413 All ER 745 m ma vonn unmua condmuni. In ehlzoralmn aims commons, Lard ParkarCJ sawd n R vPaﬂ<s[1961]J All ER 5:: at p 6: Thuclpdnclplll club: xummarludinlhlx way. rum. um uvldlncn um n I. wunlll to all mun bu uvldlncn which Wu not Ivallubll .1 um um Slcnndly, ma on. you wllhuul lylnq, It mull bu syn 5«zmI\wukmaFm<wvmA «-we sum ...n.mn be used m mm me mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm -vlﬂcncu .- van! 1.: 1h. lssun rhhs1Iy,h must bl ma...“ which Is cudlbla wldcnu 1.. In: nun that n 1. wull can-nu. .1 Del‘ 1 1 ....1 1... 1h1. cnunlndncldu -.h.1>m111s to h. hnlllvod ornol, but 11 ......1 by ...1.1.m which 1. capahn. or Iullﬂ. rounhuy, nhs soun will .1... cnnsld-ling muuvldnnu go 1... 1.; co..u.1..wh.mu1hm mlghl hm bun .. nuonlhlu .1......11.. 1h. ...1...1. anh. Jury 1.. 12.1 cum .1 Ch: anvnllam Wlhm ovldinct had bun gum Iannhu wlm 1h. o1hIr nvld-nu .1 1h. (rial. 7 The slalememotlhe 1.... 1.. R1/Park£II9§1]3AHERG33 hm: been adumsd and aonhea 1.1 ml cases such as Mohamed uh. Jamel V Pub/I: Prosecular[196ll1 MLJ 254: Del bln Laura I/Fumrc Pm.Iecw!ar[19B7] 1 MLJ 1161LoFarTﬂlarv L D751/F'ubhc Frusacumr[1966l1 MLJ 214 aha ChsD1n 1.1.. AhmadvPub/rcProwcutoI[1§16lI MU 259 1h. conditions an cumulatlvt ....: ....u..m. .h.....1. Ild .1..1...n.. lppnllanllnnnlsfy km mun hat they hm 1:... 1..mn..1 1... ch. Dln bin Ahmad v ;=..ou.= Pmser.-uIar[1D7bl 1 mm us). 11 Is 1.1.1,. - 1h. ......1 .mpnm1 nlrnumstzncns Ihallhe mun mu Ieuelve . ...1 mddnnwl Assyed A911 Earakbah J (as he men was) said 1.. Che om bln Ahmad u puuhu ;-.omu.ur\|w1s1 1 MLJ 259 a1 vb zasszgo: Naw,s 3171.1 111. 12.1.11...» Pmusduva cm: gwas : msm.1.ah in me .u.4geh1 heanng -unynvnealtn aﬂaw a.1.1111....a1 evldelvce .1 he mm such .s necessary. In cnnsldenina such avnhmlinn me nppeHaIz mull has a\ways adoptsd lhe almude that .1 1s my 1» 1h... ms. ExceDImna\ cucumsaanoes, and sumacn tau whal may be assmhea as ex=ep11e..a1 candnmns. mar (ha wun >5 aver wmmg to listen «.1 addmuna! awaenoe (Mohamnd 1.... u....../ V Pub/I: PmseL‘1lIor[19GJ] 1 MLJ 254, 255 per 11...“... LP. ﬂummg HaHe1 J ...1h. can ..1 .7 V .Iar1.1an(195E) m c. App R 152. 154) h is nlenr, 1ma1...c‘ 1h.1 nol nnly 1... cimumshmes must be men exnevlional but the suhilcl which s mono-an to In mum by Nrlher evldlnce Ls sunlect to -mmnohan condllh-mi. 11 hocomn h nsiry my I! a lallun nf i-mic. would mun iiluch addmonii Ividvnco was hm mm. and .u.y....1 whnn . .:.1...... cu hm w . 1.; light :1...» Int am 01 mu ....m . 1.41 ...u..1y huh: asm. .... nflhn c.....-1.~. [Emphasis added] [151 In Mulugayah v PP qsupra), (he accused was charged .1 me sessmns court WIH1 an nlfencs under 5.325 of the Penal Cnds far having caused grievous hurt to one Kantharupan who at me me! had identiﬁed 9 N 5ﬁ5nI\wu>1mdFww¥R1A 1.... s..1.1.......um.. used .. mm .. ..1.h.h. MW; dnu-mm VII .nu.uc pm... iii IS zu 15 an me aeeiised as one oi the coin peieens who had ahacxed him. The accused was oonvieted in Febmary 1997 and sentenced. He appeaied to the High cotinagainst the eenvietiaii and sentence. whiie the appeal was pending the accused made an appiicahen in the High ooiiit to adduee additional evidence puieiinnt I0 s :17 er the cue iioiii himseii, Kanlhanlpan and one Kiishnari His appiieetion was disiiiissed by the High Court He appealed against the High Courl decisien The hasls of his application wee that eoniotiino fter his conviction, in was. he was intoi-iiied by Kitetinan that Kenitiarupnn waa iiecuaity uuiiited tiy euiai pnrsons. He tater niet Kanthanipan who toid the aeeiieed that he had ideiitined the accused in cdiiit based on imoiniatien he obtained from a third F-any His appeal againstthe High cciiiitdecisioii was attdwad. The circumstances in that case was the proizosed evidenee ceiitd nut have been zivaiiaoie at the tnei and it went to the identity dnhe assaitant [161 Therelove, it appeared in the above case that the inieiniation seiigtii to DB admiltied as ﬂesh evidence WES DVIW awilabie in 1998 aﬂer the Ma‘ ended. The third and ioiiiiti condillons in R v Parks (sum) weie also not satisﬁed In that case To siininiaiise, the tour conditions are. 1 me endenee Ih-I\|!l ie lﬂughi la can must be evidenea which was net aveitaeie ai itie iiiai ii niiisi be evideiiee relevant to the iseves 3 ii must ee evidence which is eiedioie evidence in the ieiice that it Ii wail eaeeeie oi oeiieh, it It nut iei this cciiitio deeds Wﬂalharll im e. balievud W rial, but it iiiim be evidence which n eepaiii. af hlhaf 4 me com vnii aitenedinideniie thl\| evidence an en la caruidsr whelher ineie might have iieen ii renmnahle douhl in the niinds eiiheiury as to the eiiiii at the iiveeitani Iflhn\| evidence had eeen given \|age1her wilh lha oihei evideiiee ai the met [17] I have eiso iaoked at the case of Mohitmed Bin Jlmll v PP [1954 1 ML! 254 where the Fedei-ai court of Singapore which also cited R v iii N eeciiiiemdidmeiieie we s.ii.i nnvihnrwm be in... M mm ee nﬂnihnﬂly MIME dnunvilnl wa miiiic WM!	2,001	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
CB-41S-1-02/2023	PERAYU RAHIMI BIN ABU SAMAD RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara]	Rayuan jenayah terhadap sabitan dan hukuman di bawah seksyen 41 (1) APJ 1987 - Majistret tidak mempertimbangkan pembelaan dengan sewajarnya - Tidak selamat untuk disabitkan di bawah seksyen 41 (1) APJ 1987 - Digantikan dengan sabitan di bawah seksyen 43 (1) APJ 1987.	06/11/2023	YA Tuan Roslan bin Mat Nor	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=fa28d5f9-0486-4a3f-a60e-173fae1ac078&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - CB-41S-1-02-2023 RAHIMI ABU SAMAD v PP - edited 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: CB-41S-1-02/2023 ANTARA RAHIMI BIN ABU SAMAD (NO. K/P: 761012065343) … PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA ... RESPONDEN [Dalam Perkara Mahkamah Majistret Di Maran Dalam Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur Kes Jenayah No. CE-83-87-11/2020 Antara Pendakwa Raya Lawan Rahimi bin Abu Samad (No. K/P: 761012065343)] 06/11/2023 11:50:26 CB-41S-1-02/2023 Kand. 21 S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah rayuan terhadap hukuman berkenaan dengan pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 41 (1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan (APJ) 1987. Perayu telah dituduh seperti berikut: “Bahawa kamu pada 27/11/2018 jam lebih kurang 8.45 pagi bertempat di Jalan Besar Jengka 13 di dalam Daerah Maran, di dalam Negeri Pahang telah didapati memandu motolori bernombor pendaftaran AFJ 5333 jenis Hicom Perkasa telah memandu secara bahaya selelah mengambil perhatian tentang segala hal keadaan sehingga menyebabkan kematian ke atas Mohd Mahyudin bin Yusof, No. KPT: 420825-02-5319. Oleh demikan kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 41(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987.” [2] Perayu telah disabitkan dengan pertuduhan tersebut dan telah dijatuhkan hukuman oleh Majistret sebanyak 3 tahun penjara bermula dari tarikh sabitan 14.02.2023, denda RM6,000.00 jika gagal bayar 6 bulan penjara, catitan sabitan direkodkan pada lesen memandu Tertuduh dan lesen Tertuduh dibatalkan bagi tempoh 3 tahun dari tarikh sabitan. S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [3] Perayu merayu terhadap sabitan dan hukuman tersebut. Rayuan tersebut adalah berasaskan kepada bahawa Majistret telah gagal mempertimbangkan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Perayu bahawa terdapatnya kenderaan motor treler yang menyebabkan Perayu perlu mengambil tindakan sehingga mengakibatkan kemalangan dan kematian mangsa dalam kes ini. Isu-isu [4] Dalam kes ini mahkamah berpendapat terdapat dua isu yang boleh diputuskan oleh mahkamah iaitu: (a) adakah Majistret telah mempertimbangkan dengan sewajarnya pembelaan Perayu; dan (b) adakah mahkamah ini perlu campur tangan dalam dapatan berkenaan dengan sabitan dan hukuman yang dikenakan. Dapatan Majistret [5] Penelitian kepada Rekod Rayuan adalah didapati bahawa keterangan dalam kes ini telah dinyatakan dengan terang dan jelas oleh Majistret di perenggan [5], [6] dan [7] seperti berikut: “[5] Pihak pendakwaaan melalui Timbalan Pendakwa Raya yang terpelajar telah memanggil seramai 6 (enam) orang saksi pendakwaan dan disokong oleh sembilan (9) dokumen- S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 dokumen eksibit yang telah dikemukakan di Mahkamah bag membuktikan satu kes prima facie ke atas Tertuduh. [6] Secara ringkas, pada 27 November 2018 jam lebih kurang 8.45 pagi, satu kemalangan maut telah berlaku melibatkan sebuah motolori dengan nombor pendaftaran AFJ 5333 yang dipandu Tertuduh dengan sebuah motosikal nombor pendaftaran WPP 8962 yang ditunggang ole simati, Encik Mohd Mahyudin Bin Yusof di Jalan Besar Jengka 13, Maran. Simati dikatakan telah meninggal dunia di tempat kejadian akibat daripada impak perlanggaran dan jenazah simati kemudiannya dibawa ke Hospital Jengka untuk urusan selanjutnya. [7] Kemalangan dipercayai berlaku akibat motolori Tertuduh dikatakan memasuki laluan motosikal simati dan berlaku perlanggaran di laluan motosikal simati.” [6] Mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa Majistret telah menyediakan alasan penghakiman yang mengandungi 130 perenggan yang meliputi penilaian keterangan di akhir kes pendakwaan dan penelitian pembelaan di akhir kes pembelaan. Ia adalah satu tindakan terpuji Majistret yang menyediakan alasan penghakiman yang mendalam. Ini dapat membantu mahkamah untuk meneliti dapatan-dapatan yang dibuat oleh Majistret serta mempertimbangkan rayuan pihak Perayu sama ada ia adalah wajar untuk menyatakan Majistret telah tidak mempertimbangkan pembelaan dengan sewajarnya. S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [7] Mahkamah ini juga mendapati bahawa di akhir kes pendakwaan Majistret telah menimbangkan elemen-elemen pertuduhan dan telah menggunapakai kes Ng Beng Kok v PP [2017] 7 CLJ 157 dan memutuskan di akhir kes pendakwaan di perenggan [79] seperti berikut: “[79] Selaras seksyen 173(f)(i) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, Mahkamah ini setelah mendengar dan merekodkan keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh saksi-saksi pendakwaan, dan juga setelah meneliti dan memperhalusi terhadap segala keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan berkaitan dengan elemen-elemen di dalam pertuduhan dan setelah juga memastikan keterangan- keterangan tersebut tidak diselubungi sebarang keraguan yang munasabah dengan berpaksikan kepada satu penilaian yang maksimum sebagaimana yang dituntut dalam kes "LOO KOW CHAI & ANOR v. PP [2003] 1 CLJ 734", kes "BALACHANDRAN v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85" dan kes "PP v. MOHD RADZI ABU BAKAR [supra]", maka adalah didapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya untuk membuktikan satu kes prima facie ke atas Tertuduh di dalam kes ini.” [8] Adalah juga didapati Majistret telah mempertimbangkan berkenaan dengan versi yang menyatakan terdapat kenderaan motor treler. Ini adalah berdasarkan kepada keterangan Pegawai Penyiasat (SP6) yang mana ia telah diteliti oleh Majistret di perenggan [39], [40] dan [41] seperti berikut: S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 “[39] SP6 semasa pemeriksaan semula oleh pihak pendakwaan menyatakan bahawa: Q-awak ada siasat keterangan OKT berkaitan perkara ini? A-ada Q-dapatan awak? A-tiada pembuktian menyatakan wujudnya m/trailer tersebut sebelum kemalangan. Q-ada siasat kesan di bahu jalan laluan m/lori tersebut? A-ada siasat tetapi tiada kesan di bahu jalan laluan motolori tersebut. [40] Merujuk kepada keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP6 semasa disoal semula oleh pihak pendakwaan, SP6 mengesahkan bahawa siasatan Tertuduh di tempat kejadian mendapati tiada kesan di bahu jalan laluan motolori tersebut bagi menyokong versi Tertuduh tersebut. [41] Pada hemat Mahkamah, tiada sebab yang jelas dan tiada keperluan yang mendesak untuk Tertuduh memandu masuk ke laluan simati walaupun kononnya Tertuduh telah terbabas akibat cuba mengelak sebuah mototreller yang datang dari arah bertentangan.” S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [9] Seterusnya Majistret di akhir kes pembelaan telah menyatakan berkenaan dengan pembelaan Perayu dalam kes ini dan telah meneliti keterangan Perayu dan membuat dapatan seperti di perenggan [104], [105], [106], [107] dan [124] alasan penghakiman seperti berikut: “[104] Di dalam membuat dapatan berkaitan perkara ini, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada keterangan bergambar iaitu Gambar Eksibit P3C, P3D dan P3K di mana kesemua gambar menunjukkan ada kesan tayar lori dan geseran tanah di bahu jalan laluan motosikal tersebut. Walaupun cuaca cerah dan tiada berlumpur akibat hujan di tempat kejadian, masih wujud kesan geseran tayar motolori di atas tanah di bahu jalan laluan motosikal. [105] Pada pandangan Mahkamah, sekiranya benar dakwaan Tertuduh sepertimana versi kemalangan yang diceritakannya, pasti juga wujud sekurang-kurangnya sedikit kesan geseran tayar lori di atas tanah bahu jalan laluan motolori tersebut. Ini kerana secara lumrahnya, apabila sesuatu kenderaan mengelak secara mengejut lalu terjatuh ke bahu jalan, pasti pemandunya akan menekan brek bagi mengelakkan terbabas lebih jauh ke bahu jalan atau gaung di tepi bahu jalan tersebut. [106] Kilasan stereng secara paksa oleh Tertuduh juga ketika mana dalam cubaannya untuk naik semula ke bahu jalan, pasti sedikit sebanyak akan meninggalkan kesan geseran di S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 atas tanah sepertimana wujudnya kesan geseran tanah di bahagian bahu jalan laluan simati. [107] Seterusnya, Tertuduh menyatakan bahawa wujudnya sebuah mototreller yang dipandu secara berbahaya yang telah menyebabkan Tertuduh jatuh ke bahu jalan lalu terbabas masuk ke laluan simati. Pada pandangan Mahkamah keterangan Tertuduh tersebut sukar untuk dipercayai oleh Mahkamah. [124] Justeru, Mahkamah ini membuat penemuan dan dapatan bahawa keterangan Tertuduh bahawa wujudnya mototreller yang dipandu secara berbahaya telah menyebabkan Tertuduh jatuh ke bahu jalan lalu terbabas masuk ke laluan simati adalah merupakan satu pembelaan yang direka-reka dan bercanggah dengan keterangan- keterangan khususnya keterangan SP6 dan keterangan dokumentari senyap lain yang telah dikemukakan di hadapan Mahkamah ini.” [10] Berdasarkan kepada alasan penghakiman Majistret adalah didapati bahawa Majistret telah menolak pembelaan Perayu berdasarkan kepada keterangan SP6 dan penelitian Majistret terhadap eksibit-eksibit terutamanya gambar tempat kejadian yang pada hemat Majistret tidak menyokong keterangan pembelaan Perayu. Ini telah mendorong Majistret memutuskan bahawa tiada sebarang motor treler di tempat kejadian semasa kemalangan itu berlaku sehingga S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 menyebabkan Perayu tidak dapat mengawal kenderaannya yang membawa kepada kemalangan maut ini. Analisa [11] Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang jelas bahawa dapatan hakim bicara tidak sewajarnya diganggu oleh mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan. Prinsip ini telah jelas dinyatakan dalam kes Cantona Lim Yee Chuan Xiang Kim v PP [2020] 1 CLJ 63 seperti berikut: “[19] As a matter of principle, an appellate court will not intervene with a decision of a trial court with whom the law entrusts the primary task of evaluating the evidence. The appellate court would only intervene if it is convinced that there was no judicial appreciation by the trier of fact of the evidence adduced at the trial and that the trial court was shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. (see UEM Group Bhd v. Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor [2010] 9 CLJ 785; [2018] Supp MLJ 363; Hamit Matusin & Ors v. Penguasa Tanah dan Survei & Anor & Another Appeal [2006] 2 CLJ 251; [2006] 3 MLJ 289; PP v. Ahmad Firdaus Zulkifli [2017] 1 LNS 113; [2017] 3 MLJ 492). [20] In Davendar Singh Sher Singh v. PP [2012] 1 LNS 261, Azahar Mohammed JCA (as he then was) had this to say on appellate intervention (at p 6): S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [9] ... Nonetheless, it would be open to us to upset the findings made by a trial judge if such a finding is not supported by evidence or the decision is against the weight of the evidence or there is no proper judicial evaluation of the evidence or there is misdirection in law or the trial court has fundamentally misdirected itself. In this regard, judicial appreciation and evaluation of evidence is at the heart of the duty of the learned trial judge. It is the duty of the learned trial judge to undertake a positive evaluation of the evidence, which includes a careful analysis of the credibility and reliability of the witnesses for the prosecution (see: Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85). It is also his duty to consider the entire evidence presented before him, including the evidence which favours the defence. On what constitutes judicial appreciation of evidence, it is apt to bear in mind the following words of Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in Lee Ing Chin & Ors v. Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 CLJ 19; [2003] 2 MLJ 97: A judge who is required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. He must, when deciding whether to accept or to reject the evidence of a witness, test it against relevant criteria. Thus, he must take into account the presence or absence of S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 any motive that a witness may have in giving his evidence. If there are contemporary documents, then he must test the oral evidence of a witness against these. He must also test the evidence of a particular witness against the probabilities of the case. A trier of fact who makes findings based purely upon the demeanour of a witness without undertaking a critical analysis of that witness' evidence runs the risk of having his findings corrected on appeal. It does not matter whether the issue for decision is one that arises in a civil or criminal case: the approach to judicial appreciation of evidence is the same.” [12] Rasional prinsip di atas ialah hakim bicara mempunyai peluang untuk melihat saksi-saksi semasa memberi keterangan. Hakim bicara dapat membuat penilaian terhadap tingkah laku saksi-saksi semasa memberi keterangan yang boleh memberikan gambaran terhadap kebolehterimaan keterangan-keterangan tersebut. Keistimewaan tersebut tidak dimiliki oleh hakim yang mendengar rayuan. Hakim yang mendengar rayuan hanya berdasarkan kepada catatan di dalam nota keterangan yang dilakukan oleh hakim bicara. Namun begitu sekiranya hakim bicara gagal menggunakan keistimewaan mendengar keterangan dan melihat saksi-saksi serta membuat dapatan yang bercanggah dengan prinsip undang-undang maka mahkamah bicara berkewajipan untuk campur tangan dalam dapatan hakim bicara. S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [13] Dalam kes ini Mahkamah juga perlu memberi perhatian berkenaan bagaimanakah Mahkamah bicara perlu meneliti pembelaan yang dikemukakan oleh Tertuduh. Ini dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Ganapathy a/l Rengasamy v PP [1998] 2 MLJ 577 seperti berikut: “It needs to be remembered that however weak a defence may be, trial judges being judges of both fact and law should not just brush aside the defence on the basis that the prosecution witnesses are to be believed and not the defence. Where the law casts the onus of giving an explanation upon an accused person, and the explanation is given, which is consistent with innocence, the court is duty bound to consider whether it might reasonably be true, although not convinced of its truth. On the issue of the court's duty to consider the defence, the age old decision in Mat v PP [1963] MLJ 263 is still good law today as it was then. This was followed by the Supreme Court in Mohamad Radhi bin Yaakob v PP [1991] 3 MLJ 169.” [14] Sementara itu dalam kes Mohamad Radhi bin Yaakob v PP [1991] 3 MLJ 169 Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyatakan berkenaan hal yang sama seperti berikut: “To earn an acquittal, the court may not be convinced of the truth of the defence story or version. Raising a reasonable doubt in the guilt of the accused will suffice. It is not, however, S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 wrong for the court to be convinced that the defence version is true, in which case the court must order an acquittal. In appropriate cases it is also not wrong for the court to conclude that the defence story is false or not convincing, but in that instance, the court must not convict until it asks a further question, that even if the court does not accept or believe the defence explanation, does it nevertheless raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt? It is for this reason that in dealing with the defence story or explanation, the majority of judges rightly prefer to adopt straightaway the legally established 'reasonable doubt' test, rather than to delve in the 'believable and convincing' test before applying the 'reasonable doubt' test.” [15] Dalam kes ini Perayu telah menyatakan berkenaan dengan kehadiran motor treler tersebut seawal laporan polis yang dibuat oleh Perayu dalam Trafik Maran/001876/18 yang ditandakan sebagai eksibit D1 di halaman 139 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1. Dalam laporan tersebut dinyatakan seperti berikut: “PADA 17/11/2018 JAM L/KURANG 0845 HRS SEMASA SEDANG MEMANDU M/LORI NO PEND: AFJ 5333 JENIS HICOM DARI TEMERLOH HENDAK KE BANDAR PUSAT JENGKA APABILA SAMPAI DI JALAM BESAR JENGKA 13 BERHAMPIRAN SIMPANG UTAMA JENGKA 13 M/LORI YANG SAYA PANDU TELAH TERJATUH KE BAHU JALAN KERANA MENGELAK DARI BERLANGGAR DENGAN S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 SEBUAH M/TRAILER YANG DATANG DARI ARAH BERTENTANGAN. SAYA CUBA MENGAWAL SEMULA M/LORI TETAPI GAGAL LALU MASUK KE LALUAN BERTENTANGAN DAN TIBA-TIBA SEBUAH M/SIKAL NO PEND: WPP 8962 JENIS HONDA WAVE DATANG DARI ARAH HADAPAN TERUS MELANGGAR M/LORI SAYA. AKIBAT DARIPADA ITU M/LORI SAYA MENGALAMI KEROSAKAN BUMPER DEPAN PECAH, BODY DEPAN KEMEK, CERMIN DEPAN PECAH, LAMPU DEPAN SEBELAH KIRI PECAH, LAIN-LAIN KEROSAKAN BELUM DI KETAHUI. SAYA TIDAK MENGALAMI SEBARANG KECEDERAAN. SEKIAN REPOT SAYA.” [16] Seterusnya semasa mengemukakan pembelaan Perayu telah memperihalkan berkenaan dengan kewujudan motor treler tersebut dengan menyatakan seperti berikut: “Di kawasan simpang Jengka 13 juga, keadaan jalan itu tidak rata dan agak sempit. Apabila sampai di kawasan simpang Jengka 13, ada sebuah mototreller muatan kelapa sawit yang memandu laju dan merbahaya, saya telah mengelak pada mototreler tersebut lalu jatuh ke bahu jalan tanah merah berbatu yang lebih rendah dari jalan raya. Mototreler dari BPJ ke Temerloh, saya dari Temerloh ke BPJ, arah bertentangan. Apabila saya naik semula ke atas jalan raya, saya tidak nampak ada sebuah motosikal yang berada di belakang S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 mototreler tersebut. Kemudian, saya terlanggar motosikal tersebut yg berada di tengah jalan. Apabila saya terlanggar motosikal tersebut, barulah saya sedar ada sebuah motosikal di tengah jalan tersebut. Ketika itu, saya memandu kurang daripada 70km/J. Sekiranya saya tidak mengelak mototreler tersebut, kemungkinan saya akan berlanggar dengan mototreler tersebut. Keputusan saya membawa motolori saya turun ke bahu jalan adalah utk mengelakkan kemalangan dgn mototreler tersebut. Saya tidak nampak ada sebuah motosikal yg berada di belakang mototreler tersebut bila mana saya naik semula ke atas jalan. Ketika itu kelajuan saya tidak laju sebab dah jatuh ke bahu jalan ketika saya kilas untuk naik semula ke jalanraya. Tepi bahu jalan raya tersebut tiada orang, cuma ada lubang besar di hadapan. Kemudian, saya terlanggar motosikal tersebut yg berada di tengah jalan.” [17] Malahan semasa pemeriksaan balas ke atas Perayu yang menimbulkan isu berkenaan kewujudan motor treler tersebut Perayu masih menyatakan bahawa kewujudan motor treler tersebut bukan satu rekaan tapi adalah suatu yang benar. Di samping itu beliau menolak dakwaan bahawa ketika memandu kenderaan tersebut dia telah mengantuk. Cebisan keterangan Perayu ini dapat dilihat semasa pemeriksaan balas seperti berikut: S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 “Q - Saya cadangkan sekiranya melihat kepada tempat kemalangan, awak boleh nampak mototreler kalau betul datang dari arah bertentangan? A - Setuju Q - Setuju kalau betul mototreler itu ada, awak sepatutnya kawal motolori awak dengan baik sebelum mototreler sampai? A - Setuju Q - Setuju sekiranya awak kawal motolori awak dengan baik, keadaan jalan itu adalah selamat untuk laluan motolori dan mototreler tesebut? A - Tidak setuju Q - Setuju kemalangan awal pagi jam 8.45 am, awak mengantuk semasa itu? A - Tidak setuju Q - Setuju yang awak mengantuk, gagal kawal lori, masuk laluan motosikal dan langgar motosikal? A - Tidak setuju” [18] Malahan beliau tidak setuju dengan cadangan Timbalan Pendakwa Raya motor treler itu tidak wujud. S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [19] Berdasarkan kepada laporan polis yang dibuat pada hari kejadian, keterangan Perayu semasa pembelaan adakah Majistret boleh mengenepikan pembelaan tersebut semata-mata disebabkan oleh keterangan SP6 dan ketiadaan tanda-tanda kesan motor treler di dalam gambar-gambar yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah dan pada kelajuan 70 km/J Perayu sepatutnya dapat mengawal kenderaan tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati tiada keterangan yang bebas menunjukkan bahawa dengan kelajuan 70 km/J Perayu boleh mengawal kenderaan tersebut. Ia hanyalah suatu pandangan Majistret dalam kes ini yang tidak disokong dengan mana-mana keterangan. [20] Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa Tertuduh tidak dikehendaki untuk membuktikan ketidakbersalahannya terhadap pertuduhan yang dikemukakan. Apa yang perlu dilakukan oleh pihak pembelaan ialah menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah. Ini dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Rosli bin Yusof v Public Prosecutor [2021] 4 MLJ 479 seperti berikut: “[45] It is trite law that it is not the duty of the appellant to prove his innocence or to call a particular witness to support his defence (see Tan Foo Su v Public Prosecutor [1967] 2 MLJ 19; Sandra Margaret Birch v Public Prosecutor [1978] 1 MLJ 72). The law places upon the prosecution the burden to prove guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and not on the appellant to prove his innocence. Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the appellant must rest not on the weakness of the defence but on the S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 strength of the prosecution. This principle is the corner stone of our criminal law.” [21] Sementara itu tatacara yang perlu digunakan oleh mahkamah dalam mempertimbangkan kes pembelaan dan pendakwaan dalam suatu perbicaraan jenayah telah dinyatakan dalam kes Mat v PP [1963] 29 MLJ 263; [1963] 1 MLJ 263. Begitu juga dalam kes PP v Murugaiah [1941] 10 MLJ 17; [1940] 1 LNS 59 seperti berikut: “Even if the goods are satisfactorily identified as having been stolen seven weeks beforehand then the explanation offered by the accused was not treated fairly by the Magistrate. It is not necessary for him to convince the Magistrate of the truth of his explanation; it is sufficient if the explanation may reasonably be true even if the Magistrate is not convinced of its truth-Rex v. Schama, 11 Cr App R 45. Moreover there was no evidence to rebut this explanation. The Magistrate's mind may have been affected by the evidence of Long Che bin Naim (Probationary Inspector). His evidence being a statement made in the course of the investigation was inadmissible as part of the evidence of the prosecution - (s 113(i) Criminal Procedure Code).” [22] Persoalannya dalam kes ini adakah Majistret telah mempertimbangkan pembelaan Perayu dengan sewajarnya. Ini adalah disebabkan bagi pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 41 (1) APJ 1987 pihak pendakwaan adalah bertanggungjawab untuk membuktikan bahawa S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 kemalangan tersebut diakibatkan oleh tindakan salah Perayu. Dalam erti kata lain satu kemalangan maut yang menyebabkan kehilangan nyawa tidak secara automatik menyebabkan sabitan di bawah seksyen 41 (1) APJ 1987 boleh diletakkan. Ini telah dinyatakan dalam kes R v Guilfoyle [1973] 2 All ER 844 seperti berikut: “Cases of this kind fall into two broad categories; first, those in which the accident has arisen through momentary inattention or misjudgment, and secondly those in which the accused has driven in a manner which has shown a selfish disregard for the safety of other road users or of his passengers, or with a degree of recklessness. A subdivision of this category is provided by the cases in which an accident has been caused or contributed to by the accused's consumption of alcohol or drugs. Offenders, too, can be put into categories. A substantial number have good driving records, a fair number have driving records which reveal a propensity to disregard speed restrictions, road signs or to drive carelessly, and a few have records which show that they have no regard whatsoever for either the traffic law or the lives and safety of other road users.” [23] Begitu juga dalam kes R v Gosney [1971] 3 All ER 220 yang menyatakan: S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 “We would state briefly what in our judgment the law was and is on this question of fault in the offence of driving in a dangerous manner. It is not an absolute offence. In order to justify a conviction there must be, not only a situation which, viewed objectively, was dangerous, but there must also have been some fault on the part of the driver, causing that situation. 'Fault' certainly does not necessarily involve deliberate misconduct or recklessness or intention to drive in a manner inconsistent with proper standards of driving. Nor does fault necessarily involve moral blame. Thus there is fault if an inexperienced or a naturally poor driver, while straining every nerve to do the right thing, falls below the standard of a competent and careful driver. Fault involves a failure; a falling below the care or skill of a competent and experienced driver, in relation to the manner of the driving and to the relevant circumstances of the case. A fault in that sense, even though it might be slight, even though it be a momentary lapse, even though normally no danger would have arisen from it, is sufficient. The fault need not be the sole cause of the dangerous situation. It is enough if it is, looked at sensibly, a cause. Such a fault will often be sufficiently proved as an inference from the very facts of the situation. But if the driver seeks to avoid that inference by proving some special fact, relevant to the question of fault in this sense, he may not be precluded from seeking so to do.” S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [24] Kes Regina (supra) telah diterima dalam kes Ramiah v Public Prosecutor [1972] 1972 2 MLJ 258: “It is not the law under section 34A of the Road Traffic Ordinance that merely because an accident had happened and a person had been killed, danger had in that sense arisen and therefore it must follow, as the night, the day, that the appellant was driving in a manner dangerous to the public. In a case under section 34A, two things must be established. First, there must be a situation created by the accused which, viewed objectively, is dangerous. Dangerous driving is not defined in the Road Traffic Ordinance and it is up to the court to come to a decision on the evidence. Reported cases can only serve as illustrations. For instance as illustrated in Public Prosecutor v Cheong Kam [1946] MLJ 12, to overtake a cyclist who is far from steady at the moment when a heavy lorry is approaching from the opposite direction is to take an unjustifiable risk and constitutes dangerous driving. In Public Prosecutor v Low Yong Ping [1961] MLJ 306, driving into the path of an oncoming traffic is dangerous driving. Recently in Lau Lim Peng v Public Prosecutor [1968] 2 MLJ 14, where a lorry approaching a dangerous bend at a speed far in excess of the speed limit and in order to avoid the vehicle from overturning knocked into the front of another vehicle it was held it was dangerous driving. In the present case turning right into the side road without stopping to give way to through traffic is dangerous driving. S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 Secondly, the prosecution must prove that when creating such a situation the appellant must be at fault. "Fault involves a failure; a falling below the care and skill of a competent and experienced driver, in relation to the manner of driving and to the relevant circumstances." A competent and careful driver would have stopped at this junction before turning into the side road. This is because section 18 of the Highway Code says that when turning left or right, drivers must always give way to through traffic, including pedestrians. Now, section 59(4) of the Road Traffic Ordinance provides that any court may take into consideration any failure to observe the provisions of the Highway Code. To sum it all, the accused was at fault in creating that dangerous situation. I think the principle of what I have said here is set out fully in R v Gosney [1971] 3 All ER 220.” [25] Penilaian keterangan yang perlu dilakukan oleh Majistret semasa pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 41 (1) APJ 1987 telah dinyatakan dalam kes Sam Ke Ting lwn. PP [2023] 5 CLJ 704 apabila Mahkamah Rayuan memberikan suluh panduan seperti berikut: “[49] Secara khususnya, Majistret dengan betulnya memutuskan: (i) apabila ada dua inferens mengenai kelajuan kereta perayu, inferens yang memihak kepada perayu iaitu S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 perayu memandu di bawah had laju 50km sejam yang harus dipilih. (ii) situasi berbahaya bukan diwujudkan oleh perayu berasaskan keterangan pegawai penyiasat (SP46) bahawa perayu memandu di laluan beliau yang sah; perayu tidak memasuki jalan bertentangan, tidak memotong kenderaan, tidak memandu melawan arus trafik dan tidak terbabas. Cara pemanduan perayu tidak wujudkan keadaan berbahaya kepada pengguna jalan raya yang boleh menyebabkan risiko kematian kepada orang lain yang menggunakan jalan tersebut. (iii) laluan perayu mendaki bukit, berselekoh dan gelap. Perayu tidak boleh nampak kumpulan basikal lajak di sebalik bukit. Perayu tidak mungkin dapat menjangkakan kehadiran kumpulan basikal lajak yang berada di sebalik bukit pada jam tiga pagi. (iv) kumpulan basikal lajak (30 hingga 40 basikal) merentangi dan menghalang laluan perayu. (v) pegawai penyiasat kes (SP46) mengakui bahawa situasi berbahaya dicipta oleh kumpulan basikal lajak yang berkumpul di atas jalan tar. Penunggang basikal mesti dianggap tahu dan mengambil risiko mengundang padah sendiri kerana jalan raya itu bukan tempat untuk berkumpul ramai-ramai untuk lumba basikal. (vi) kewujudan kumpulan basikal yang menutupi hampir keseluruhan laluan perayu menjadikan kemalangan ini S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 mustahil dapat dielakkan kecuali kereta terbang melepasi halangan.” [26] Oleh yang demikian Mahkamah ini berpendapat Majistret yang mendengar kes ini telah tidak mempertimbangkan pembelaan Perayu dengan sewajarnya. Ini adalah disebabkan Perayu telah membangkitkan berkenaan kewujudan motor treler tersebut daripada awal dan semasa pembelaan. Dapatan Majistret yang menyatakan bahawa keterangan pembelaan tersebut tertolak disebabkan kebergantungan kepada keterangan SP6 dan gambar-gambar tersebut tidak mencukupi untuk menolak pembelaan Perayu dalam kes ini. Ini adalah disebabkan sekiranya Mahkamah mempertimbangkan pembelaan berkenaan kewujudan motor treler tersebut ia akan menyebabkan kemalangan tersebut tidak disebabkan oleh kesengajaan dan semata-mata kesilapan Perayu. Ini telah menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah kepada kes pendakwaan bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 41 (1) APJ 1987. [27] Dalam kes ini Mahkamah berpendapat kegagalan Majistret meneliti pembelaan Perayu dengan sewajarnya telah menyebabkan kekhilafan yang tidak boleh dipertahankan bagi mengekalkan sabitan di bawah seksyen 41 (1) APJ 1987 berpandukan kepada kes Mohamad Radhi bin Yaakob (supra), Ganapathy a/l Rengasamy (supra) dan Mat v PP (supra) dan PP v Murugaiah (supra). [28] Semasa meneliti pembelaan seseorang Tertuduh dalam satu kes jenayah perkara penting yang perlu diberikan perhatian adakah S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 pembelaan tersebut adalah suatu yang telah menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah. Ia bukannya sama ada keterangan atau versi yang diberikan oleh Tertuduh itu boleh dipercayai atau tidak. Dalam kes ini sekiranya keterangan berkenaan dengan motor treler tersebut hanya ditimbulkan oleh Perayu semasa pembelaan maka ia wajar ditolak. Namun begitu dalam kes ini kewujudan motor treler tersebut telah ditimbulkan dalam laporan polis dan pembelaannya. Isu sama ada ia boleh dipercayai oleh Majistret ataupun tidak bukanlah faktor penentu bagi menentukan bahawa Perayu telah gagal menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. Dalam konteks ini mahkamah perlu mengambil perhatian bahawa tugas membuktikan kes ini melampaui keraguan munasabah adalah terletak kepada pihak pendakwaan dan bukannya tanggungjawab Perayu untuk membuktikan ketidakbersalahannya seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Rosli bin Yusof (supra). [29] Frasa keraguan yang munasabah telah dinyatakan oleh Hakim Denning dalam kes Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 1 All ER 372 seperti berikut: “Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence “of course it is possible, but S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 not in the least probable,” the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice.” [30] Dalam kes ini mahkamah ini berpendapat adalah tidak wajar untuk Majistret mengenepikan pembelaan tersebut dengan hanya bersandarkan kepada keterangan SP6 dan gambar-gambar serta pandangan peribadi Majistret berkenaan dengan keupayaan dalam kelajuan 70 km/J untuk Perayu mengelak daripada kemalangan tersebut. Ini bermakna sekiranya Majistret mempertimbangkan pembelaan Perayu dengan sewajarnya Majistret akan membuat dapatan yang berbeza dalam kes ini. Oleh itu kegagalan Majistret membuat penilaian pembelaan dengan sewajarnya menyebabkan adalah tidak selamat untuk sabitan di bawah seksyen 41 (1) APJ 1987 dikekalkan. [31] Dalam konteks ini sebagai pelengkap adalah menarik untuk menelusuri sejarah kewujudan prinsip keraguan yang munasabah yang dinukilkan menerusi makalah yang bertajuk The Origin of Reasonable Doubt [2005] Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1 oleh Profesor James Q. Whitman seperti berikut: “Nevertheless, the old Christian culture that produced the “reasonable doubt” rule underwent a slow process of decline after 1800. Indeed, it was not just the old Christian culture that went into decline: More broadly, the old world of pre-modern anxieties, of which Latin Christendom was just one part, began to vanish. S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 By the early or mid-twentieth century, few people still had the old vivid sense of the “heavy and painful” responsibilities of judging. Unavoidably, this altered the moral structure of jury trial. Indeed, over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the common-law world gradually underwent the same change that had probably already taken place in the culture of the judges of the sixteenth-century Continent. As we have seen, sixteenth- century continental jurists were already in a kind of modern condition: They betrayed little sense of any moral or spiritual anxiety in judging. By the sixteenth century, continental judges had probably already come fully to inhabit their professional roles. In consequence, the medieval theology of doubt, a theology of anxiety, gave way to something else on the Continent: It gave way to a continental law of proof that was just a law of proof, not a law of moral comfort. Continental judges, fully professionalized and feeling a diminished need for moral comfort, could treat trial simply as a process of attaining certainty. Yet “reasonable doubt” was never designed to be a proof rule, and it cannot possibly work as one. Therein lies the heart of our current dilemma. When the “reasonable doubt” formula was addressed to the moral anxieties of Christian jurors, as it was in its original form in the 1780s, it made sense: It was capable of achieving a practical goal. After all, Christians experiencing moral anxiety can be comforted. If they know the terminology and traditions of the moral theology of doubt, and if they are guided by judges who seem concerned and trustworthy, they can overcome S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 their doubts, and vote to convict. By contrast, achieving complete certainty in criminal cases is not a practical goal. There is no such thing as a procedure that will always produce objectively correct answers in a criminal trial; and there is no possible formula, in any jury instruction, that will meaningfully guarantee that the ends of proof have been reliably attained. The formula “reasonable doubt,” in particular, is of no use in the pursuit of objective truth. It is a rule addressed to the subjective state of mind of the anxious Christian.” Seterusnya Profesor Whitman menyatakan seperti berikut: “How then should we approach “reasonable doubt”? First, there is no point in trying to be faithful to the original intent of the phrase. This is in part because there is no original drafter of the “reasonable doubt” rule: Not only does the phrase not appear in the Constitution, it was never crafted by anybody in particular. It emerged in a process of collective European rehashing of the precepts of Christian moral theology. It was created not only by English jurists, but also by English moralists—and by Italian and Spanish and French moralist and lawyers as well. There is thus no original intent to interpret. All that we can do is try to understand the rule in its original context, which is something different. Second, there are better and worse ways to understand the rule in its original context. The worse way is to try to reformulate it in ways that somehow are intended to be faithful to its original purpose. There is more than one way tomake this S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 mistake. It would be a mistake, for example, to begin by observing that the original purpose of the rule was to make conviction easier, not harder; and then to draw the nasty conclusion that a modern jury instruction should tell the jury to get over its qualms and convict. This would make little sense in our world, simply because the problems of our world are not the problems of the eighteenth century. Jurors today bring relatively few Christian qualms to the process of judgment, and we have no need for a rule intended to coax them into convicting. It would make equally little sense to observe that the rule originally had to do with blood punishments, and therefore to restrict it to capital cases. While the rule undoubtedly has a place in capital cases—perhaps the last cases where jurors still fully feel some of the old anxieties—it has a place elsewhere as well, if it has any place at all. The world of punishment has changed since the early modern period. Unlike our ancestors, we no longer think of non- blood punishments as mild punishments. Indeed, in the current American atmosphere, it would be a wholly tragic error to refuse to recognize the harshness of our nonblood punishments, and the correspondingly high moral stakes in inflicting them. The right lesson to draw from the history of “reasonable doubt” is not a lesson about how to make sense of “reasonable doubt,” either in its original intent or in its original context. Those are senseless goals. The right lesson is a lesson about the consequences of the great moral changes of the last two S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 centuries. The real root of our dilemmas has to do with the fact that we have forgotten how morally fearsome the act of judging is. We have allowed ourselves to become people who condemn offenders precisely in the way Saint Augustine said offenders must never be condemned: with “passion,” and most especially with the passion of self-righteousness. We have lost any sense that we should doubt our own moral authority when judging other human beings, forgetting what Christian jurists knew in the fifteenth century: [I]f the judge glories in the death of a man, as no small number do in our age, he is a murderer.” I say this not in order to preach, as the crazies of the 60s did, that we should honor criminals as “revolutionaries,” or anything of the kind. The old moral theologians were right: We must condemn criminals. It is a part of our sober public duty. But we must condemn them in a spirit of humility, of duteousness, of fear and trembling about our own moral standing. That is what our ancestors understood; and they were right. It is because they understood this that they spoke about “reasonable doubt.” We can never return to the moral world of our ancestors: The theology that taught them the lesson of “reasonable doubt” is lost to us for good. But the lesson is one that we must find some way to re-learn. Most especially it, we must learn it when it comes to jury trial. Indeed, if there is any advantage to jury trial, it is that jurors have not fully come to inhabit the hardened, professionalized attitude of the sixteenth- century continental judge. Lay jurors can still find something shocking and fearful in what they do, at least in capital cases. Even in capital cases, though, jurors must be reminded of what is S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 at stake: As Eisenberg, Garvey and Wells write, “it would be better to openly and routinely instruct jurors that the decision they are about to make is, depite its legal trappings, a moral one and that, in the absence of legal error, their judgment will be final.” It would indeed, and not just where death is involved. Instructing jurors forcefully that their decision is “a moral one” about the fate of a fellow human being, is, in the last analysis, the only meaningful way to be faithful to the original spirit of “reasonable doubt.”” [32] Penelitian yang sama boleh dibuat kepada artikel bertajuk The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, Steve Sheppard, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1165 (2003) bagi menghadam dan memahami sulur galur sejarah prinsip keraguan yang munasabah. [33] Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa ia menunjukkan bahawa pembelaan telah dapat menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. Ini bermakna kewujudan motor treler tersebut adalah sesuatu keterangan yang munasabah yang sepatutnya dipertimbangkan oleh Majistret. Sekiranya pertimbangan yang wajar berdasarkan prinsip dalam kes Mohamad Radhi bin Yaakob (supra), Ganapathy a/l Rengasamy (supra) dan Mat v PP (supra) dan PP v Murugaiah (supra), ia adalah satu pembelaan yang menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah kepada pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 41 (1) APJ 1987. Ini adalah disebabkan dengan wujudnya motor treler tersebut ia telah menyebabkan kemalangan tersebut bukannya S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 disebabkan oleh kesilapan Perayu semata-mata berdasarkan kepada keadaan semasa kemalangan tersebut yang menyebabkan ia tidak boleh dikategorikan sebagai kesalahan di bawah seksyen 41 (1) APJ 1987 seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Sam Ke Ting (supra). Oleh itu mahkamah berpendapat disebabkan Majistret tidak mempertimbangkan pembelaan Perayu dengan sewajarnya maka sabitan di bawah seksyen 41 (1) APJ 1987 dalam kes ini adalah tidak selamat untuk dikekalkan. [34] Namun begitu keterangan dalam kes ini menunjukkan bahawa kemalangan yang melibatkan kematian mangsa adalah disebabkan oleh Perayu. Keterangan yang ada pada hemat Mahkamah mencukupi untuk sabitan bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 43 (1) APJ 1987. Oleh itu Mahkamah ini mensabitkan Perayu di bawah seksyen 43 (1) APJ 1987. Mahkamah akan mendengar rayuan mitigasi dan pemberatan sebelum menjatuhkan hukuman yang sewajarnya kepada Perayu. Bertarikh: 06hb. November 2023 (ROSLAN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Perayu Ahmad Nizam Hamid Tetuan Sazali & Lim Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur Bagi Pihak Responden Ain Nur’Amiyerra Awod Abdullah Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur S/N dUooYEP0qmDhc/rhrAeA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	48,207	Tika 2.6.0
JA-61R-7-02/2019	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH MOHD SHARIFF BIN AHMAD	Three charges pursuant to the MACC Act 2009 - decision at the close of the defence's case - corruptly soliciting a bribe - corruptly agreeing to receive a bribe - corruptly obtaining a bribe - accused was convicted on the first two - acquitted on the third - an appeal by the accused - no appeal by the PP - accepting parts of the complainant's evidence - rejecting what was not plausible - determining the implicit apart from the explicit - the intrinsic evidence against the accused.	06/11/2023	Datuk Ahmad Kamal Arifin bin Ismail	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=aa86ad03-4efe-49c7-99ef-f653ac0270ca&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN BAGI KES JA-61R-7-02-2019 MOHD SHARIFF BIN AHMAD IN THE SESSIONS COURT JOHOR BAHRU IN THE STATE OF JOHOR, MALAYSIA CRIMINAL CASE NO: JA-61R-7-02/2019 (CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: JA-42R(A)-2-08/2023) BETWEEN MOHD SHARIFF BIN AHMAD … APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ... RESPONDENT [In The Matter of the Sessions Court At Johor Bahru Criminal Case No: JA-61R-7-02/2019] Between Public Prosecutor v. ... Mohd Shariff bin Ahmad 07/11/2023 12:19:23 JA-61R-7-02/2019 Kand. 186 S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] Mohd Shariff bin Ahmad, the accused, was charged at the Sessions Court with three charges pursuant to the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 [Act 694] (the Act). They are reproduced in their original forms below: Pertuduhan Pertama “Bahawa kamu pada 3 Disember 2017 jam lebih kurang 6.30 petang semasa berada di 1002-C, Felda Taib Andak, dalam daerah Kulai, dalam Negeri Johor, telah secara rasuah meminta suatu suapan, iaitu wang tunai RM10,000.00 daripada Muhammad Audi bin Musa, sebagai dorongan untuk kamu sebagai pegawai badan awam iaitu Koperal Polis di Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah Kulai, bagi tujuan untuk membantu tutup kes ganja Muhammad Audi bin Musa yang sedang disiasat oleh Bahagian Narkotik Ibu Pejabat Daerah Polis Kulai, Johor dan dengan itu kamu melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 24 Akta yang sama”. Pindaan Kepada Pertuduhan Kedua “Bahawa kamu pada 04 Disember 2017 jam lebih kurang 9.25 malam, semasa berada di hadapan Bengkel RMB Workshop No 476, Jalan Gemilang 6, Taman Gemilang, di dalam Daerah Kulai, di dalam Negeri Johor telah secara rasuah bersetuju untuk menerima suatu suapan iaitu wang tunai berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Muhammad Audi bin Musa (No. KP: 860118-01-5639) sebagai suatu S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 dorongan untuk kamu sebagai pegawai badan awam iaitu Koperal Polis di Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah Kulai, untuk tidak melakukan suatu perkara yang dengannya badan awam itu terlibat iaitu untuk membantu tutup kes ganja Muhammad Audi bin Musa (No. KP: 860118-01-5639) yang sedang disiasat oleh Bahagian Narkotik Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah Kulai, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 16(a)(B) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 24(1) Akta yang sama”. Pindaan Kepada Pertuduhan Ketiga “Bahawa kamu pada 6 Disember 2017 jam lebih kurang 8.45 malam, semasa berada di hadapan Bengkel RMB Workshop No 476, Jalan Gemilang 6, Taman Gemilang, di dalam Daerah Kulai, di dalam Negeri Johor, sebagai seorang ejen Kerajaan Malaysia iaitu Koperal Polis di Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah Kulai, telah secara rasuah memperoleh untuk diri kamu suatu suapan iaitu wang tunai berjumlah RM3,000.00 daripada Muhammad Audi bin Musa (No. KP: 860118-01-5639) sebagai dorongan bagi tidak melakukan suatu perbuatan berhubungan dengan hal ehwal prinsipal kamu, iaitu, membantu untuk tutup kes ganja Muhammad Audi bin Musa yang sedang disiasat oleh Bahagian Narkotik Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah Kulai, Johor, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 17(a) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 dan boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 24(1) Akta yang sama”. [2] The accused, who was a policeman, claimed trial to all charges and was represented by a Counsel. The prosecution was conducted by Prosecuting Officers from the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission. At the close of the case for the prosecution, this court found that the prosecution S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 had made out prima facie cases against the accused on all three charges. The accused was called upon to enter on his defence on all three. [3] At the close of the case for the defence, this court found that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt only on the first charge and the second charge against the accused. [4] For the first charge, the accused was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment from the date of the sentence and a fine of RM60,000.00 (in default 12 month’s jail). On the second charge, the accused was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment and a fine of RM20,000.00 (in default 6 month’s jail). Both imprisonment sentences were ordered to run consecutively. [5] In respect of the third charge, this court found that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the accused was acquitted and discharged from the third charge with regard to the offence of corruptly obtaining RM3,000.00. [6] Being dissatisfied, the accused is now appealing to the High Court on the convictions and sentences. There was no appeal by the prosecution concerning my decision on the third charge. Prosecution’s case [7] To prove its case, the prosecution called 16 witnesses. I will only narrate the salient facts on the first two charges since there was no appeal on the third. They were as follows. S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [8] PW1, the complainant, was a religious teacher working with the Johor Religious Department. On 3.12.2017, he was informed by his friend, PW2, that the accused said PW1 was in peril. This was due to PW1’s involvement with cannabis. The accused was a policeman working as a photographer with the Criminal Investigation Division of Kulai District Police Headquarters. [9] Later on the same day, PW1 went to the accused’s mother’s house at Felda Taib Andak in Kulai to see him. PW1 met with the accused and the accused asked for RM10,000.00. This was to close the complainant’s case from being investigated by the police. The accused said that he would try to help PW1 because he sympathised with PW1. PW1 replied that he did not have that sort of money. The accused agreed to give PW1 time to get the money. Later at night, PW1 met with PW10, a Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) officer, and informed him about what happened with the accused. [10] On 4.12.2017, PW1 made a MACC report at the MACC’s department in Johor Baru (exhibit P1). After the report was made, PW1 was brought into a room by MACC officers to intercept his telephone conversation with the accused. Subsequently, a conversation through handphones between PW1 and the accused was intercepted and recorded by the MACC. [11] In the conversation, PW1 told the accused that he only had RM1,000.00. The accused asked PW1 to meet him at the RMB Workshop in Kulai. On the same night, PW1 went to the place with PW10. MACC gave RM1,000.00 to PW1 to give to the accused. S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [12] At the location, PW1 met with the accused and informed him that he only had RM1,000.00 with him. The accused refused to take the money and told PW1 to keep it. He told PW1 to get RM10,000.00 as previously instructed. PW1 replied that he did not have that kind of money. The accused said PW1 should have at least RM5,000.00 to give to him. PW1 pleaded with the accused for a lesser amount. The accused later agreed to receive RM3,000.00 which was the subject matter for the second charge against him. [13] Afterward, the accused was arrested on 6.12. 2017 at the RMB Workshop in Kulai by the MACC officers in relation to the third charge against him. Discussion and analysis [14] For the first charge, the accused was charged with ‘corruptly solicits’ RM10,000.00 pursuant to section 16(a)(B) of the Act which provides: 16. Any person who by himself, or by or in conjunction with any other person – (a) corruptly solicits or receives or agrees to receive for himself or for any other person; or (b) corruptly gives, promises or offers to any person whether for the benefit of that person or of another person, any gratification as an inducement to or a reward for, or otherwise on account of– (A) any person doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 or transaction, actual or proposed or likely to take place; or (B) any officer of a public body doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction, actual or proposed or likely to take place, in which the public body is concerned, commits an offence. [Emphasis added] [15] In the second charge, the accused was charged with ‘corruptly agrees to receive’ RM3,000.00 also under section 16(a)(B) of the Act: 16. Any person who by himself, or by or in conjunction with any other person– (a) corruptly solicits or receives or agrees to receive for himself or for any other person; or (b) corruptly gives, promises or offers to any person whether for the benefit of that person or of another person, any gratification as an inducement to or a reward for, or otherwise on account of– (A) any person doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction, actual or proposed or likely to take place; or S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 (B) any officer of a public body doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction, actual or proposed or likely to take place, in which the public body is concerned, commits an offence. [Emphasis added] [16] It was clear to me that section 16(a)(B), as with other penal provisions in the Act, provided for more than one distinct offence for the prevention of corruption. In fact, there were numerous distinct offences in section 16(a)(B). Therefore, the provision must be carefully studied and dissected to determine every offence. It was for the prosecution to decide any of the offences to be charged based on the investigation provided there was no duplicity in the charges, the charges were not of unknown offences, and they were not defective in law. In this case, the prosecution charged the accused with two charges which were ‘corruptly solicits’ RM10,000.00 and ‘corruptly agrees to receive’ RM3,000.00 respectively. [17] In perusing the charges, I think that they could have been better drafted. As stipulated in section 16(a), they should explicitly spell out whether the two offences were committed by the accused himself and for himself. The two charges preferred did not categorically state so in view of other distinct offences in the said section with the phrases such as “by or in conjunction with any other person” and “for any other person.” It is worthwhile to note that section 16(a) of the Act is in pari materia with section 3(a) of the old Prevention of Corruption Act 1961. Section 3(a) drew a distinction between a receipt by any person for himself or for any other S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 person: PP v. You Kong Lai [1984] 2 CLJ (Rep) 429 at p. 433. The prosecution did not apply to amend the charge. And I did not think that section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Code (the Code) imposed any duty upon the court in this instant case to alter or amend a charge. Rather, it was for the prosecution as it thinks fit to apply to the court to exercise its power: per Spenser-Wilkinson J in Public Prosecutor v. Heng You Nang [1949] 15 MLJ 285. In the premises, were the charges damaging and fatal to the prosecution in the instant case? I did not think so. [18] On the facts, there was sufficient evidence adduced by the prosecution that the offences committed were by the accused himself and it was not by or in conjunction with any other person. Further, the gratification was for the accused himself and not for any other person. There was no evidence at all that the gratification was by or in conjunction with any other person and that it was for any other person other than the accused. In my considered opinion, the words “ any other person” in the context of section 16(a) means the person must be known. It cannot be the case that an unknown person would suffice or anyone in general. This was because if a charge provided gratification by or in conjunction with any other person and for any other person, then they became parts of the ingredients of the offence to be proved as stipulated in the provision. They are distinct and separate offences. That “any other person” must be identified and named in the charges. As such, the evidence must be adduced to prove each ingredient of the offence. I will say more on the evidence in the subsequent discussion. [19] Having said all that, the charges that were framed sufficiently gave the accused notice and particulars together with the manner in which the S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 offences were committed. The two charges framed did not refer to anyone else apart from the accused. And this was not a situation where the accused did not know with what he was charged or that he was unable to answer the charges accordingly. In point of fact, the accused never alleged that he was misled, prejudiced, or that the gratification asked was not by or for himself, or that it was unfair to him not to know what he was alleged to have committed in order to mount an effective defence. This ruling was only for the instant case and does not necessarily apply across the board for other cases before this court. [20] In the circumstances, the prosecution was required to prove all 3 ingredients of the offence for the first charge which were: (a) that the accused himself corruptly solicited RM10,000.00 for himself from PW1; (b) that the gratification was an inducement for the accused to close an actual investigation against PW1; and (c) that the accused was an officer of a public body in which the public body was concerned. [21] For the second charge, the 3 ingredients of the offence to be proved were: S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (a) that the accused himself corruptly agreed to receive RM3,000.00 for himself from PW1; (b) that the gratification was an inducement for the accused to close an actual investigation against PW1; and (c) that the accused was an officer of a public body in which the public body was concerned. The first charge [22] For the first ingredient of the offence, the word ‘corruptly’ was discussed in Public Prosecutor v. Jamil bin Mahmod & Anor [1998] 1 LNS 312. It was stated that: The key word in both ss.3 and 4 is “corruptly”. When used in a statute, this term generally imports a wrongful design to acquire some pecuniary or other advantage. ( Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed). The word “corruptly” ... sounds the keynote to the conduct ... the giving of a gift or consideration, not bona fide but mala fide, and designedly, wholly or partially, for the purpose of bringing about the effect forbidden by the section : R v. Gross [1946] OR 1 at p. 9, per Roach JA. ... it means an act by one man knowing that he is doing what is wrong, and knowing so with evil feelings and evil intentions ( Lim Kheng Kooi & Anor v. R [1957] MLJ 199 at p. 205, per Sheperd J), an act which the law forbids as intending to corrupt ( Wellburn [1979] 69 Cr APP R 254). [Emphasis added] S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [23] In PP v. Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris (No 2) [1977] 1 MLJ 15, Raja Azlan Shah FCJ ( as His Royal Highness then was) had this to say: But what is or is not “corrupt” is a question of intention. If the circumstances show that what a person has done or has omitted to do was moved by an evil intention or a guilty mind, then he is liable under the section. [Emphasis added] [24] It is instructive that in Public Prosecutor v. Jamil bin Mahmod & Anor (supra), the meaning of the word “solicit” was also considered. The court said that: The ordinary meaning of ‘solicit’ is to ask repeatedly or earnestly for or seek or invite (The Concise Oxford Dictionary 9th Ed). Indeed, in PP v. You Kong Lai [1985] 1 MLJ 298, Shankar J (as he then was) likened ‘solicit’ in s 3 to ‘invite’. When used in the context of solicitation of a bribe, it means ‘asking, enticing or requesting’. It is a word which implies a serious request, but ‘requires no particular degree of opportunity, entreaty, imploration or supplication’ (Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed), citing People v. Phillips 70 Cal App 2d 449). [Emphasis added] [25] In addition, the court in PP v. You Kong Lai (supra) ruled that: The presence of the word “solicit” in the section, to my mind, clearly shows that if a person invites the payment of monies so that it may allegedly use the same to bribe a member of a public body, he has already committed an S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 offence. The fact that the corrupt purpose was not carried out does not matter. [Emphasis added] [26] What was the evidence that the accused corruptly solicited for himself RM10,000.00 from PW1? On 3.12.2017, PW1 met with the accused at the house of the accused’s mother. According to him, the accused himself asked him to prepare the amount of RM10,000.00 to close his case from being further investigated by the police. To close and settle his case, the accused said RM10,000.00 was required. There was no one else present when this conversation took place between the two of them. PW1 said the accused knew PW1 smoked cannabis before. It was clear to me that the accused himself asked PW1 to give the money to him and he did not say that it was for any other person. The accused only said that he would assist PW1 and further suggested the money was also for the police who were investigating PW1. At no time did the accused specify who the money was for. [27] During the cross-examination, the defence applied to admit IDD16 as evidence. IDD16 was a police report made by the accused on 20.3.2019 after the accused was charged in court. The police report was a public document. I disallowed the application to accept IDD16 as D16. It did not comply with the conditions to be satisfied pursuant to the Code and the Evidence Act 1950 [Act 56] to be admitted as evidence. Purportedly, IDD16 was a certified copy of the original. It was signed on behalf of the Officer in Charge of the Police District (OCPD) of Kulai Jaya, Johor. That signing on behalf did not comply with the requirement under section 108A of the Code S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 which provides that it must be signed by the OCPD himself. Further, IDD16 did not comply with section 76 of Act 56 which requires the certification to be written at the foot of the copy. It was also not dated and it was not subscribed by the officer with his name and official title. Thus, sections 77 and 79 of Act 56 would not assist the defence. [28] There was a second application by the defence to admit the same police report again through a certified copy. This was an attempt to comply with the conditions precedent under the law. This time, it appeared that it was signed by the OCPD of Kulai Jaya, Johor himself and it was written at the foot of the copy. However, it was not dated. If the certificate was not dated then it was not a certified copy and therefore it was not admissible: In re Tan Ah Chuan & Anor [1954] MLJ 135; Lutpi bin Ibrahim & Anor v. Ketua Polis Negara [1998] 3 MLJ 375. In the circumstance, I declined to admit the copy as evidence and it was only marked for identification as IDD33. In my view, the conditions that were imposed by Act 56 must be strictly complied with despite the report might have been made by PW1. This could also be understood from the clear implications of sections 77 and 79 of the said Act. [29] Independent of IDD16 and IDD33 that attempted to absolve him, the accused put in his defence during the cross-examination of PW1 that there was a misunderstanding by PW1 as to what happened between the two. And PW1 admitted that there was a misunderstanding on his part or in his Malay language “salah faham”. That was the reason he made the police report after lodging P1, his MACC report. This court had analysed what he actually meant by the misunderstanding and this will be discussed further. S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [30] In his cross-examination, PW1 contradicted what he had testified in his examination-in-chief and in P1. The testimony showed: S : Dalam report in En. Audi ada menyatakan tujuan report ini dibuat adalah untuk menyatakan hal sebenar dan tidak mahu mereka-reka cerita atas salah faham dan sebagainya. Soalan saya maklumat dalam report polis ini di mana En. Audi menyatakan bahawa En. Audi tak nak menganiaya En. Shariff ini berkenaan dengan report SPRM P1 dengan kejadian yang berlaku ini itulah maklumat yang sebenarnya En. Audi? J : Ya. Further, S : En. Audi untuk maklumat yang En. Audi nyatakan di dalam laporan polis ini, ia berbeza dengan apa yang En. Audi nyatakan dalam laporan polis SPRM P1. Soalan saya antara maklumat di dalam IDD16 ini dengan aduan P1 ini yang manakah ia merujuk kepada perkara sebenar yang berlaku berkaitan dengan kejadian ini En. Audi antara IDD16 dengan P1 ini? J : IDD16. In addition, S : En. Audi setuju dengan saya di dalam kes ini tidak pernah pada bila- bila masa En. Shariff ini ada meminta wang suapan daripada En. Audi dan apa yang berlaku ini adalah satu salah faham? J : Betul. S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [31] However, the answers above that were in favour of the accused differed from other answers that PW1 gave in his same cross-examination. They were as follows: S : En. Audi di dalam kejadian yang dilaporkan pada 3/12/2017, bolehkah En. Audi bersetuju dengan saya bahawa En. Shariff ini beliau tidak pernah pada bila-bila masa meminta wang suapan sebanyak RM10,000.00 daripada En. Audi dan benda ini adalah satu salah faham, setuju? J : Tidak setuju. Further, S : En. Audi setuju dengan saya tidak pernah pada bila-bila masa En. Shariff ini ada meminta wang daripada En. Audi untuk membantu bagi menutup kes ganja En. Audi, betul? J : Tidak betul. S : Saya cadangkan tertuduh ini juga tidak pernah pada bila-bila masa ada pernah meminta wang daripada En. Audi bagi apa-apa tujuan berkaitan untuk menutup kes ganja, setuju? J : Tidak setuju. [32] Thus, what PW1 testified in his cross-examination not only contradicted his evidence in his examination-in-chief but also contradicted his other answers in the same cross-examination. On this point, I think that the duty S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 of a trial court is not merely to accept any evidence as presented. The court is also required to carefully consider and analyse the totality of the evidence. I did not think that simply because there were contradictions in a witness’s testimony then his whole evidence must be rejected. This approach is also consistent with the principle of maximum evaluation where the evidence must be scrutinised properly and not by way of cursory consideration. A trial court must thoroughly analyse all the evidence. [33] In Khoon Chye Hin v. Public Prosecutor [1961] 1 LNS 41, Thomson CJ opined that: If a witness demonstrably tells lies on one or two points then it is clear that he is not a reliable witness and as a matter of prudence the rest of his evidence must be scrutinised with great care and indeed with suspicion. To say, however, that because a witness has been proved a liar on one or two points then the whole of his evidence ‘must in law’ be rejected is to go too far and is wrong. Further, in PP v. Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris (No 2) (supra): The question is whether the existence of certain discrepancies is sufficient to destroy their credibility. There is no rule of law that the testimony of a witness must either be believed in its entirety or not at all. A court is fully competent, for good and cogent reasons, to accept one part of the testimony of a witness and to reject the other. [34] Whereas in Mohamed Alias v. Public Prosecutor [1983] 2 MLJ 172, the court said: S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 The fact that there are discrepancies in a witness’ testimony does not straight- away make him an unreliable witness and make the whole of his evidence unacceptable. It is open to the court having observed the demeanour of the witness and after careful consideration of such discrepancies to accept parts of the witness’ evidence if it considers them to be true [35] The Court of Appeal in Andy bin Bagindah v. Public Prosecutor [2000] 3 MLJ 644 held: There is no dearth of authorities to say that in every case, there are bound to be contradictions and discrepancies. The question to be decided by the trial judge is whether those contradictions and/or discrepancies are material ones so as to strike at the very root of the charge. It is for the trial judge to consider this since he was the one who saw and heard the evidence. [36] Guided by the above-quoted principles, I was not prepared to reject the whole evidence by PW1. In my considered opinion, his evidence that was adverse to the prosecution must be carefully evaluated in light of what he meant regarding the misunderstanding. Let us look closer at his testimony in the re-examination where the prosecution asked for an explanation. [37] His answers in re- examination were the following: S : Tadi peguam bela ada tanya kamu, Shariff tidak pernah bila-bila masa setuju untuk terima RM3,000.00 sebagai duit suapan dan kamu setuju? J : Betul. S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 S : Jadi kenapa kamu jawab setuju, boleh kamu jelaskan? J : Saya setuju sebab permintaan duit itu bukan untuk En. Shariff. Further, S : Tadi rakan peguam bela ada bertanya tujuan kamu buat report ini adalah untuk menyatakan berkaitan dengan salah faham dan kamu menjawab setuju. Jadi boleh tidak kamu jelaskan berkaitan dengan jawapan kamu? J : Boleh. Waktu saya buat report SPRM itu saya merasanya benda itu betul. Tapi setelah saya timbal balik berdasarkan siasatan, saya bertanyakan pendapat keluarga, kawan berkaitan kes saya, saya membuat keputusan saya rasa salah faham. In addition, S : Tadi rakan bijaksana saya ada bertanya dalam kes ini tidak pernah bila-bila masa Shariff minta suapan dan apa yang berlaku adalah salah faham dan jawapan kamu betul. Boleh jelaskan kenapa kamu jawab betul? J : Sebab duit itu bukan untuk En. Shariff. Moreover, S : Apa yang kamu faham berkaitan dengan “Tak boleh sogok” itu? J : Jadi duit yang dia minta itu bukan untuk En. Shariff tapi untuk orang lain. S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Later PW1 said: S : Kemudian rujuk pada baris 10 daripada atas, tadi rakan peguam bela ada bertanya “A: Masalah. Masalahnya aku tak cite duit pun dengan dia”. Dan kamu jawab betul. Boleh kamu jelaskan berkaitan maksud “Masalahnya aku tak cite duit pun dengan dia”.? J : Ini yang saya faham dengan duit yang dia dapat itu dia cuba selesaikan masalah saya dengan pegawai lain, itu dia tak cerita dulu. Saya menyangkakan memang dia nak bantu saya. On the question of the money, this was what PW1 said: S : Tadi rakan bijaksana saya ada bertanya pada transkripsi no.2 ini iaitu ID7 ini tidak ada dibincangkan ataupun disebut berkaitan dengan RM10,000.00. RM4,000.00 dan RN3,000.00 dan kamu menyatakan betul. Dengan izin Datuk, saya merujuk PSSP1. Dalam PSSP1 ini memang ada menyebut berkaitan dengan RM10,000.00, RM4,000.00 dan RM3,000.00. Boleh kamu jelaskan? J : Berkaitan duit semua saya bincang waktu jumpa, waktu 3hb di rumah. [Emphasis added] [38] Based on the notes of the evidence above, it was clear to me the reason, why PW1 said he misunderstood, was because, upon his further reflection, the money was not for the accused but for someone else. That was the sole and only reason why he said he misunderstood, and that he did not wish to victimise the accused. The penetrating question was this. When S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 and how did PW1 come to this conclusion? He said that “ itu dia tidak cerita dulu”. The prosecution did not see it fit to ask for further clarification. Nevertheless, PW1 did not categorically testify and affirm that the accused himself never asked for the money. This was also patently clear from the explanation given by him where he said the discussion about the money was done in the house when he first met the accused. No reasonable doubt could be raised by simply and merely saying that he misunderstood something without any intelligent and proper basis. [39] In my analysis, it was not plausible nor believable for PW1 to assume the money asked was not for the accused himself but for others. In other words, it was not for PW1 to decide there was a misunderstanding and as a result of it, to say something exculpatory for the accused. It was for this court to determine. I have considered and analysed with great care every aspect of the evidence by PW1. This court was tasked to make its ruling based on the evidence presented. At the same time, this court had the advantage of seeing and hearing this witness. The evidence must not only be evaluated but also filtered accordingly. And this court did not misunderstand the evidence by PW1 that the accused himself solicited RM10,000.00 for himself from PW1. In any event, there was no evidence at all that the money was solicited by the accused for any other person apart from the suggestion by that the money was for an unknown person who was investigating PW1’s case. [40] In the circumstances, I accepted PW1’s evidence that the accused himself corruptly solicited the money for himself from PW1. I rejected PW1’s S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 assumption that it was a misunderstanding between him and the accused. His whole credibility was not tainted and destroyed. I found that his evidence was sufficiently credible that the accused asked for a bribe from him. The alleged misunderstanding could not exonerate the accused. There was certainly no mistake by PW1 that the accused himself did ask money for himself from PW1. There was no doubt in my mind the only reason the accused wanted to meet PW1 was to solicit the money for himself and not for any other person. It was obviously not a social gathering between long- lost friends. It was also not uncommon for an accused in a corruption case to say he sympathised with someone and to offer assistance. And on the evidence adduced, I did not think the offer to help came from the goodness of his heart. [41] The meeting between him and PW1 was a wrongful design by the accused knowing that what he was doing was wrong in order to acquire some pecuniary advantage: Public Prosecutor v. Jamil bin Mahmood & Anor (supra). As alluded to previously, the intention by the accused was clearly moved by a guilty mind to obtain improper advantage from PW1: PP v. Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris (No 2) (supra). In addition, the fact that the accused asked for the payment so he might allegedly use the same to bribe the police proved that he committed the offence, and the fact that the corrupt purpose was not carried out did not matter: PP v. You Kong Lai (supra). [42] Aside from that, the prosecution provided the transcripts from the telephone conversation between PW1 and the accused that was intercepted and recorded by the MACC. They were P3 and P7 and transcribed by PW6, S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 a MACC officer. The conversation in P3 was recorded on 4.12.2017 using a cassette tape (P2) whereas P7 was recorded on 6.12.2017 with a cassette tape (P6) as well. PW6 was the recording officer on both counts. Both recordings were played and heard in court during the trial: see PP v. Jowy Manjoro [2004] 1 LNS 724; Mohd Ali Jaafar v. PP [1998] 4 CLJ Supp 208. I found that what was played and heard was the same as what was transcribed by PW6. The accused did not challenge the authenticity of the tapes and the recordings played. Further, the accused did not even contest that the transcripts were the conversation recorded between him and PW1. It was also not disputed that P3 and P7 were transcribed by PW6 and the interception by the MACC was done in accordance with section 43 of the Act. [43] In perusing P3, I found the transcript corroborated PW1’s evidence that the accused solicited the money from him. Granted that nowhere in P3 the amount of RM10,000.00 was mentioned. However, the court must determine the meaning and the context of what was said after they met earlier at Felda Taib Andak. What was also implicit in the content of P3 must be considered and evaluated properly. Not only what was explicit. Surely, the accused could not be expected to speak carelessly or candidly over the telephone on the bribe that was asked. As a matter of fact, P3 showed the accused repeatedly cautioned PW1 not to speak freely over the telephone. In P3, A represented the accused and B was PW1. Amongst others, P3 showed: A : Di...jangan cite dalam handphone B : Arrr? A : jangan cite dalam handphone S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [Emphasis added] Further, B : Haa .... Saya balik kerja ni. Daripada Johor ni saya ke. Ke Kulai terus boleh ke bang A : Kulai karang ada. Arrr. aku bagi ko location B : Arrr...Bang duit takde arrr ni bang...macamane bang... A : Arrr. nanti cite. Nanti cite. Nanti cite B : Apa? A : Nanti cite .. (tak jelas) benda. Ko pegi jumpa aku terus B : Dekat Kulai bang? A : Ha B : Tu ar. Saya on the way balik kerja ni A : K. K. Nanti aku bagi location dekat kau [Emphasis added] [44] Therefore, the transcript supported PW1’s evidence that after the money was solicited, the accused asked to meet him in Kulai so the money could be given to him. This was the only reasonable explanation that could be deducted and accepted from the telephone conversation. The plain implication was the accused wanted the bribe. I will further discuss the rest of the content in P3 and P7 in the discussion for the second charge against the accused. S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [45] Moving on to the evidence by PW2. He was the one the accused first approached to convey the message that PW1 was in trouble. The accused told PW2 there was a drug case involving PW1. Thereafter, PW2 informed PW1 that the accused would like to see him. PW2 was present near the house when the conversation between PW1 and the accused took place. He did not hear what was said but he saw that they were in a conversation. [46] When the conversation was over, PW2 asked the accused how to settle the case. The reply was that PW2 had to think for himself. Later, PW2 said PW1 asked to borrow some money from him but he had none. PW1 did not inform him how much was needed and did not say how much the accused asked to settle the case. Based on PW1’s appearance, PW2 tried to calm PW1 down and to figure out how to get the money. [47] The evidence by PW2 strengthened the testimony of PW1. In my view, an inference from PW2’s evidence could be made that the accused had corruptly solicited the money from PW1. The inference must not be hastily drawn from my own assumption or speculation but must be from proven facts. It has been held that a finding must be based on proven facts or inferences drawn from proven facts, and not on conjecture: Ibrahim Mohamad & Anor v. PP [2011] 4 CLJ 113. Further, in Liew Kaling & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1960] 1 LNS 60, a rule was laid down before a valid inference could be considered. It must comply with two conditions, which were: (i) it must account for all the known facts; and S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 (ii) it must be the only reasonable inference which will account for all the known facts. [48] In addition, the word ‘inference’ was discussed in Nasrul Annuar Abd Samad v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 193 where Jones v. Dunkel [1959] 10 CLR 298 was referred to. It was held: One does not pass from the realm of conjecture into the realm of inference until some fact is found which positively suggests, that is to say provides a reason, special to the particular case under consideration, for thinking it likely in that case a specific event had happened or a specific state of affairs existed. [49] So what were the proven facts before the inference could be made? As discussed earlier, I had accepted PW1’s credible direct evidence that the accused solicited the money from him. It was also proved it was to close an investigation against PW1 who was using drugs. Then there was the transcript. The evidence by PW2 as shown supported the testimony by PW1 on what happened in the meeting. Thus, it could be inferred from the proven facts the accused corruptly solicited RM10,000.00 for himself from PW1 based on the evidence of PW2. [50] Why did the accused think he could solicit the bribe from PW1? And where did the design come from? In my view, the answer was in the evidence by PW12. He was a policeman with the Narcotics Investigation Division of Kulai District Police Headquarters. On 22.11.2017, he received information from his trusted source concerning a trafficking case of cannabis by a Malay S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 man in Felda Taib Andak. The man was known as Audi and he worked with the Johor Religious Department. Audi was also suspected as a cannabis addict. PW12 was instructed by his superior officer to conduct further investigation and to gather intelligence on the case. [51] Since the accused was working together with him in the same police district headquarters, PW12 sought his assistance. He asked whether the accused knew anyone from Felda Taib Andak to continue his investigation. Subsequently, on 4.12.2017, PW12 met the accused. The accused told him Audi was only involved with cannabis addiction and not with trafficking. On being asked why, the accused said he met with Audi. [52] Having heard this, PW12 instructed the accused not to gather any more intelligence, not to be involved with the case anymore and not to see Audi again. He was not pleased with what the accused had done. This was because the information from his source had been leaked by the accused. From that onward, PW12 said he himself would continue the investigation and arrest Audi. There was no challenge by the defence that what PW12 testified did not happen or that he was not telling the truth. Further, it was never challenged or put to PW12 that the accused himself did not solicit the money for himself, or that he was by or in conjunction with any other person and for any other person from the Narcotics Criminal Division in which PW12 was a member. S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [53] Therefore, the effect in law was that the evidence was deemed admitted by the defence: Wong Swee Chin v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 LNS 138. In my view, PW12’s evidence further supported the prosecution’s case that the accused solicited the money from PW1 to stop the investigation. Evidently, the accused took advantage of the information received to ask for a bribe himself and for himself. Thus, there was no proof that the gratification solicited by him was by or in conjunction with any other person and for any other person. [54] The defence failed to raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. I was guided by the often-quoted principle that a reasonable doubt must be a doubt arising from the evidence or want of evidence and cannot be imaginary doubt or conjecture unrelated to evidence: Public Prosecutor v. Saimin & Ors [1971] 1 LNS 115. I also read and considered the written submission by the defence. In its written submission, what was said was not on the totality of the evidence. It merely submitted bits and pieces in seclusion to support the speculation and conjecture. Any real or perceived imperfections in the evidence were not material and the evidence of witnesses must not be evaluated in isolation. To my mind, the submission was not crafted through an issue-based approach and did not properly address the ingredient of the offence. [55] It is always possible to conjure different inferences and conjectures against the totality of the evidence. The reminder by the Court of Appeal in Tan Ong Keong v. PP [2012] 4 CLJ 223 is fitting: S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 To put it in another way, it was always possible to structure an interpretation or inference consistent with innocence. But if in every case an accused is acquitted simply because it is possible to construct an interpretation or inference, the law cannot be enforced. Indeed, not only will the law become impossible to be enforced, but the courts will be viewed as being naive and gullible. Although this might be much appreciated by the accused, the courts will cease to be respected by the general public who expects the courts to exercise at least some modicum of wisdom. [56] I am also guided by the decision of Abdul Rahman Sebli JCA (as he then was) in Wen Wuzhuang v. PP [2018] 1 LNS 1676. In paragraph 43, his Lordship said: Any finding of fact must be based on evidence and nothing else and this applies even where the burden is merely to raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. The Court does not deal in conjecture or speculation and there are good grounds for this which we need not elaborate on. [Emphasis added] [57] To conclude, I found the evidence by the prosecution’s witnesses was sufficiently cogent and credible. Thus, it was my firm finding the prosecution had proved the first ingredient of the offence against the accused. [58] I now turn to the second ingredient that the gratification was an inducement for the accused to close an actual drug case against PW1. There S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 was no dispute that the gratification solicited was in the form of money. Section 3 of the Act provides: “gratification” means – (a) money, donation, gift, loan, fee, reward, valuable security, property or interest in property being property of any description whether movable or immovable, financial benefit, or any other similar advantage; ........................................ ........................................ ........................................ [Emphasis added] [59] I am further guided by the decision in PP v. Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris (No 2) (supra) where the word inducement was explained: The word “inducement’ evidently refers to a future act. What is forbidden, generally speaking, is soliciting a gratification as an inducement to do any matter or transaction .......... The gravamen of the offence is soliciting a gratification as an inducement to do any official act or conduct. This need not be proved by explicit evidence but may be inferred from surrounding circumstances. Just as “corruptly solicit’ may be inferred from all the surrounding circumstances,......... so can “inducement” be inferred from acts or conduct from the relevant circumstances. [Emphasis added] S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 [60] As discussed earlier, I found the accused asked for a bribe so that he could close an actual investigation against PW1. There was indeed an actual investigation as testified by PW12 from the narcotics division. The gratification of RM10,000.00 was clearly an inducement for the accused to do something in his capacity as a policeman. I found that the defence failed to raise any reasonable doubt on the material particulars. On the facts and the circumstances, it was inherently improbable that PW1 was not telling the truth as to what had occurred. In any case, there was no evidence to impute any motive by PW1 to lie in order to implicate the accused. Was it not the accused who sought and hoped to meet PW1 and not the other way around? [61] Thus, I was constrained to find the prosecution had proved the second ingredient of the offence against the accused. [62] On the third ingredient that the accused was an officer of a public body in which the public body was concerned, I found the evidence further supported the prosecution’s case. Section 3 of the Act reads: “public body” includes – (a) the Government of Malaysia; ........................................ ........................................ (d) any department, service or undertaking of the Government of Malaysia, .... ........................................ ........................................ S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 [63] The same section 3 provides: “officer of a public body ”means any person who is a member, an officer, an employee or a servant of a public body, and includes a member of the administration, a member of Parliament, a member of a State Legislative Assembly, a judge of the High Court, Court of Appeal or Federal Court, and any person receiving any remuneration from public funds, and, where the public body is a corporation sole, includes the person who is incorporated as such; [64] The prosecution called PW11 to admit evidence pursuant to section 55 of the Act which stipulates: Certificate of position or office held 55. (1) A certificate issued by a principal or an officer on behalf of his principal shall be admissible in evidence in any proceedings against any person for any offence under this Act as prima facie proof that the person named in such certificate – (a) held the position, office or capacity as specified in such certificate and for such period as so specified; and (b) received the emoluments as specified in such certificate. (2) A certificate issued under subsection (1) shall be prima facie proof that it was issued by the person purporting to issue it as principal or on behalf of the principal without proof of the authority of such person to issue it. [Emphasis added] S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 [65] In 2017, PW11 was the acting Head of the Management Division of Kulai District Police Headquarters. Through him, P26 in 3 pages was purportedly a certificate under section 55 was admitted as evidence. P26 was prepared, signed, and dated 14.12.2017 by PW11. The content of P26 showed the accused held the office as a photographer with the Criminal Investigation Division of Kulai District Police Headquarters on the dates the offences were committed. P26 further showed the emoluments received by the accused. [66] There was also another page attached together with P26 as Lampiran A that was supposedly the list of roles and responsibilities of the accused. This attachment was not required in proof of section 55 of the Act. It had nothing to do with proof concerning the office held by the accused and the emoluments received. The prosecution needed only to prove relevant evidence as stipulated by the law and nothing more. The defence chose not to cross-examine PW11. This meant the accused did not dispute the evidence that was adduced. And I was satisfied to admit P26 as evidence. [67] Apart from that, I think there was another less time-consuming and simpler way to adduce evidence under the provision of the Act. That provision concerned a certificate. It was not required for the prosecution to call a witness such as PW11, a pensioner, to testify. What was needed was only a certificate complying with the provision and with Act 56, perhaps on the admissibility of certain aspects of documentary evidence. The certificate may be tendered through the Investigation Officer. The provision did not make it a must for a principal or an officer on behalf of the principal to come S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 to court and testify. After all, the certificate shall be a prima facie proof of the evidence without proof of the signature of the person who issued it and without proof of the authority of such person to issue it. There was no need to present to the court a whole service book too. [68] The evidence that was adduced established that the accused held his office and received his emoluments working as a policeman with Kulai District Police Headquarters. And he was an officer of a public body as stipulated in section 3 of the Act. The investigation initiated against PW1 was by the same police headquarters albeit by the Narcotics Investigation Division. The accused solicited the bribe so that the investigation could be closed by his department. [69] As such, there was no doubt in my mind the accused was an officer of a public body in which the public body was concerned. Thus, I found the prosecution had proved the third ingredient of the offence. The second charge [70] With regard to the first ingredient, the phrase “corruptly agrees to receive” does not impute that gratification has been received. In the instant case, it only meant the accused agreed to receive RM3,000.00 at a future date. This was after PW1 pleaded for a lesser amount that was solicited by the accused. The accused has yet to actually receive the money from PW1. The money did not change hands. S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 [71] PW1 testified that the accused agreed to receive RM3,000.00. This evidence was clear from paragraphs 28 to 34 of his written statement (PSSP1). Now, the second part of the transcript in P3 supported his evidence that they met at the RMB Workshop in Kulai where the agreement was made. P3 showed: A : Eh ko tau bengkel RMB tak? B : Bengkel RMB? Dekat mana bang? A : Arrr...Taman Gemilang ko tau tak? B : Taman Gemilang? A : Haa... B : Gemilang dekat mana bang? A : Nanti aku bagi ko location lah. Nanti aku bagi ko location. [72] As before, the accused was using the defence that there was a misunderstanding or mistake by PW1. The problem with largely relying on this defence which was rejected by the court was that the accused did not specifically challenge or dispute other evidence that was adverse to him. Amongst others, it was not challenged that PW1 met him near the workshop, that the meeting was to plead for a lesser amount, and of course that the accused agreed to receive the reduced amount. The Court of Appeal in Shamim Reza bin Abdul Samad v. Public Prosecutor [2009] 2 MLJ 506 had this to say: S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 We found no evidence of the appellant seriously challenging any of the prosecution’s witnesses at the stage of the cross-examination let alone testing his defence at the earliest opportunity i.e. the prosecution stage. Without such challenge the credibility of the prosecution witnesses especially SP10 must remain intact. [73] The MACC officer, PW10, was present nearby when the accused met PW1 on 4.12.2017. The incriminating evidence by PW10 could be seen in paragraphs 15 to 23 of his witness statement (PSSP10). What PW10 saw and heard was direct oral evidence by him and must not be disregarded by this court: see section 60(1)(a) and (b) of Act 56. Amongst others, PW10 said he saw the accused come to talk to PW1. He heard PW1 ask the accused to reduce the amount of the bribe and he heard the accused repeatedly say it was a big case. He further heard PW1 said he did not have so much money. At the end of it, he heard the accused agreed to receive RM3,000.00 and for PW1 to keep the RM1,000.00 that was brought by him. This evidence corroborated the evidence by PW1 that the accused met with him near the place and agreed to receive RM3,000.00. In the cross-examination of PW10, the defence put in its challenges that PW10 was not telling the truth and that he did not hear what was said. However, PW10 disagreed with the challenges. [74] These challenges could also be regarded as suggestions by the accused. They were not evidence. As I understood it, the principle is a mere suggestion in cross-examination that is only indicative of the case put forward or the stand taken by the defence, but to no extent whatsoever can it be substituted for evidence if it is repudiated or disagreed by a witness: Emperor v. Karimuddi AIR 1932 Cal 373; Public Prosecutor v. Dato’ Seri S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 Anwar bin Ibrahim (No.3) [1999] 2 MLJ1. The finding would not be the same if PW10 agreed with was what put to him. [75] In the cross-examination, the accused brought PW10’s attention to certain parts in the content of P7 where an attempt was made to exculpate the accused. They referred to what the accused said which were “Tak boleh sogok” and “Masalahnye aku tak cite duit pun dengan dengan dia”. The same conversation on what the accused said was argued in the defence’s written submission. Obviously, all these were to cast a reasonable doubt that the accused did not agree to receive the bribe. In my view, it would be a long shot to convince the court to find any reasonable doubt based only on a little bit of what was said. Essentially, what the accused argued was a mere conjecture and speculation without evaluating the true meaning of what was said and without regard to the rest of the conversation in P7. Let us look at the other evidence in the transcript. [76] As alluded to before, P7 was the conversation made on 6.12.2017. It was after the accused agreed to receive the amount on 4.12.2017 near the workshop. In P7, I found there was evidence that revealed the accused agreed to receive the amount to close the investigation. As with P3, the capital letter A represented the accused, and B, PW1. The transcript showed: A : Ye B : Apa ni. Duit tu tak banyak. Tak banyak dapat bang. Ade sikit ni. A : Ok lah tu S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 B : Yang haritu abang cakap yang paling rendah. Cuba cuba juga cari. 3K ni kan. A : Aha... B : Tapi takde pengampunan ke bang. Untuk saya bang A : Boleh. Boleh... Tak tau tapi tu untuk cover kau (tak jelas) B : Takdelah...... Hadoi...Saya rasa...pengampunan yang kata lindungi saya tak boleh ke bang A : Ha itu cite. Itu benda sejuk untuk cover kau... Untuk tak kacau kau In addition, A : (tak jelas) Aku faham. Semua orang faham. Tapi jangan sampai kena pegang B : Eaa...Tu yang minta extend dengan abang tu... A : Ha...Minta. Nama dah kena petik. Jangan kau masuk (tak jelas) Kau rasa Alhamdulillah tak akan dia kacau kau je. Itu je B : Iyela A : Benda tu untuk. Untuk tampal mulut dia je. So jangan kacau kau. B : Hmm... [Emphasis added] [77] As such, it cannot be gainsaid at all that the accused was innocent of the crime. The transcript was sufficiently clear the accused asked for a bribe and it did show the amount of money that was agreed upon. It was RM3,000.00. And it also supported the evidence that the bribe asked was to S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 close an ongoing investigation against PW1 so he would not be apprehended by the police. [78] On another point, some questions were asked in the cross- examination of PW10 and the answers given strengthened the prosecution’s case that the gratification was to prevent PW1 from being arrested and that the accused agreed to receive RM3,000.00. The defence chose to ask those questions. The dos and don’ts for an effective cross-examination should not be underestimated or dismissed. They were essential parts of advocacy skills in an adversarial system. The answers obtained were detrimental to the accused and were inconsistent with any misunderstanding as alleged. The notes of evidence showed: PB : Seterusnya, saya rujuk saksi ini kepada PSSP10 di perenggan 23 baris 3 hingga 5. S : Kamu kata ada dengar tertuduh mengatakan kepada pengadu supaya mempercepatkan untuk dapatkan wang sekiranya tidak mahu ditangkap, betul ada? J : Betul. S : Daripada perenggan 23 ini kenyataan itu seolah-oleh diberikan selepas pengadu mendakwa tertuduh bersetuju untuk kurangkan daripada ke RM3,000.00, kronologi begitu betul? J : Betul. [Emphasis added] S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 [79] The point was the accused asked PW10 to agree with him. By the nature of what was asked and answered in no uncertain terms, PW10 agreed with the accused. He agreed he heard the accused say to PW1 to expedite the receipt of the bribe if he did not wish to be arrested. Further, he agreed that by chronology, the accused agreed to receive the reduced amount of RM3,000.00. Therefore, this evidence that was so adverse to the accused could not be reconciled with the rest of his challenges that he did not commit the crime. It followed that the accused committed a wrongful design to acquire the bribe, the intention was moved by a guilty mind and he knew what he was doing was wrong. [80] In the premises of the foregoing, there was sufficient evidence to inculpate the accused coupled with the absence of any reasonable doubt. Thus, I found that the prosecution had proved the first ingredient of the second charge against the accused. [81] As with the first charge, the second and third ingredients of the offence for the second charge against the accused were the same. On the evidence and the principles that were discussed, there was no doubt in my mind that the agreement to receive RM3,000.00 was an inducement for the accused to close an actual investigation against PW1. It was also proved that the accused was an officer of a public body in which the public body was concerned. S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 [82] Thus, I found that the prosecution had proved all the ingredients of the offence for the second charge against the accused. The presumption under section 50 (1) of the Act [83] Section 50(1) of the Act reads: Where in any proceedings against any person for an offence under section 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22 or 23 it is proved that any gratification has been received or agreed to be received, accepted or agreed to be accepted, obtained or attempted to be obtained, solicited, given or agreed to be given, promised, or offered, by or to the accused, the gratification shall be presumed to have been corruptly received or agreed to be received, accepted or agreed to be accepted, obtained or attempted to be obtained, solicited, given or agreed to be given, promised, or offered as an inducement or a reward for or on account of the matters set out in the particulars of the offence, unless the contrary is proved. [Emphasis added] [84] As discussed and found, the primary facts and ingredients required to invoke the presumption were proved. It is a rebuttable presumption. For the first charge, it was proved that the accused himself solicited the gratification for himself. And for the second charge, it was proved that the accused himself agreed to receive the gratification for himself. As such, I was satisfied to apply the presumption, until the contrary is proved, that the gratification was corruptly solicited and corruptly agreed to receive as an inducement for the matters set out in the particulars of the offences. The accused was called S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 upon to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities: Public Prosecutor v. Yuvaraj [1969] 2 MLJ 89. I had accordingly informed the parties that the presumption was applied during the decision delivered at the close of the prosecution’s case. Conclusion at the close of the prosecution’s case [85] I have scrutinised and evaluated the credibility of the witnesses together with the reliability of the evidence. This court found the prosecution had adduced credible evidence to prove all the ingredients of the offence against the accused. Credible evidence is evidence that has been filtered and has gone through the process of evaluation, and any evidence that is unsafe should be rejected: PP v. Ong Cheng Heong [1998] 4 CLJ 209. [86] Thus, a prima facie case had been made out against the accused on the offence charged and the accused must be called upon to enter on his defence: section 173(h)(i) of the Code. A prima facie case is where the prosecution had adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction: section 173(h)(iii) of the Code. The three options to defend himself were explained by the court to the accused. [87] This court was guided to subject the whole evidence to a maximum evaluation which was explained by the decision in PP v. Lee Hock Lai [2004] 1 CLJ 57: S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 In my view, the ‘maximum evaluation’ refers to a proper and complete evaluation of all the evidence adduced to determine whether a prima facie case has or has not been made out. Thus, all the evidence adduced has to be scrutinised properly and this should not be just a perfunctory, cursory evaluation or an exercise of skimming over the surface of the evidence only. The prosecution must make out the ingredients of the charge with the evidence adduced. If the evaluation of the evidence results in doubts in the prosecution’s case at this stage of the proceedings itself then it cannot be said that a ‘prima facie’ has been made out. The defence ought not to be called merely to clear or clarify the doubts. The benefit of the doubt, if any, at the end of the prosecution’s case must go to the accused. [Emphasis added] [88] The totality of the evidence against the accused was sufficient for the defence to be called, and this court was prepared to convict the accused on the two charges if he had elected to remain silent: Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85; PP v. Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457. The defence’s case [89] The accused elected to give sworn evidence from the witness’s box. There were 5 other witnesses called to testify for him. However, their testimonies were all about the third charge that the accused was acquitted of. The five were present at the workshop on 6.12.2017 and had nothing to do with the events on 3.12.2017 and 4.12.2017. As such, for the first two charges that the accused was convicted on, there was no other witness called. S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 [90] This court had put to the test the evidence by the accused against the ingredients of the offence that had been proved by the prosecution. There was no requirement in law for me to re-visit the prosecution’s case on the findings given that I had made a maximum evaluation of the evidence and found the witnesses were credible and reliable. It is wrong in law to revisit the findings. The decision by the Federal Court in Ariff Arhannan Che Udin v. PP [2022] 1 LNS 342 is a reminder that the trial court must be mindful not to revisit its earlier findings at the close of the prosecution. [91] Earlier, the Federal Court in Duis Akim & Ors v. PP [2013] 9 CLJ 692 ruled that: [38] We note that when assessing the defence the learned trial judge surprisingly revisited his earlier findings upon which he called for the defence. Such approach is quite contrary to the principle of maximum evaluation of the evidence adduced at the close of the prosecution’s case. Indeed in his judgment the learned trial judge made it very clear that he had conducted a maximum evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution before calling for the defence. [Emphasis added] [92] Therefore, this court was only required to put to the test and compare the evidence by the accused at this stage with the evidence of the prima facie cases that had been established by the prosecution. In addition, to decide whether the accused was able to raise any reasonable doubt on the S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 prosecution’s case and whether he was able to rebut the presumption under section 50(1) of the Act on the balance of probabilities. At the end of it, whether the prosecution would be able to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt on the two charges. Thus, it would be wrong for this trial court to approach the issues by revisiting or re-evaluating its earlier findings at the close of the prosecution’s case. Accused’s evidence [93] The accused relied wholly on his witness statement (PSSD1) for the examination-in-chief. No additional question was asked by his Counsel apart from what he testified in PSSD1. In paragraphs 3 and 4, he denied he solicited the bribe. He said he never promised to meet PW1 and PW2. It was PW2 who contacted PW1 and asked him to come and discuss with the accused. It was PW2’s own initiative. The accused supported this version by referring to paragraph 6 of PW2’s witness statement (PSSP2). [94] Paragraph 6 of PSSP2 did state that PW2 asked PW1 to come back to the village and for PW1 himself to speak with the accused. However, this alone could not vindicate the accused. I further considered why did PW2 do that. The preceding paragraphs 3 to 5 of PSSP2 were the answer. They showed that PW2 met with the accused earlier. The accused informed PW2 there was a drug case involving PW1 and whether PW1 was pushing drugs. The accused also asked PW2 for PW1’s telephone number. What was informed to PW2 by the accused was indeed something serious. PW2 knew PW1. As a matter of logic and as a result of the information from the accused, S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 it was to be expected that PW2 would tell his friend to meet with the accused. It was a natural course of events. In any case, there was no evidence that the accused refused to meet PW1 and that it was forced upon him. Irrespective of who actually asked PW1 to meet the accused or who came to whose house or that the accused did not order PW1 to do so, the meeting was the consequence of the accused who met PW2 earlier in the day. And the accused never disputed the fact he met with PW1 at the house. [95] Moving on to paragraph 5 of his written statement, the accused said he advised PW1 on PW1’s involvement with drugs and to prepare money to pay for a fine in court or for bail. Was this put to PW1 when he testified in court? The defence did not do so. This was an afterthought and of recent invention: Public Prosecutor v. Lin Lian Chen [1992] 4 CLJ 2086; Megat Halim Megat Omar v. PP [2009] 1 CLJ 154. Be that as it may, the law is also clear that the failure of the defence to challenge PW1 can never, by itself, relieve the prosecution of its duty to establish the charge against the accused; Sakri Yusuf v. PP [2011] 1 LNS 480; Alcontra a/l Ambrose Anthony v. PP [1996] 1 MLJ 209. However, such failure also meant that the testimony could not be disputed at all: AEG Carapiet v. AY Derderian AIR Cal 359. And the prosecution managed to establish the two prima facie cases. This court had considered the defence of the accused and put to the test the afterthought against the evidence of PW1. [96] To my mind, it was inherently improbable that the accused would be so kind, and what was talked about was only about a fine and bail. After all, PW1 never admitted to that. There was no other evidence on the same. In addition, after their first meeting in the house, both of them met in front of the S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 workshop at night on 4.12.2017. For what purpose? Given that it was clear that the so-called advice was already made in the first meeting, then why the need for a second one at a different location? And nothing was said about any amount of fine or bail in the transcripts that were recorded by the MACC. If it was true the reason the accused met PW1 was so blameless and legitimate, then the challenge should have been made to PW1 at the earliest available opportunity. This was not done. Therefore, I rejected this afterthought defence after testing and comparing it with the evidence that was established by the prosecution. [97] In paragraph 18 of his written statement, the accused said if it was true he asked bribe from PW1, then he would not involve PW2 because his bad intention would be known. Further, there was no need for him to ask for PW1’s telephone number, there was no need for a middleman, and he could make the dealing directly with PW1. In my considered opinion, this was just a hypothetical self-serving version and purely self-exculpatory. Of course, there was no need for him to get PW2 involved to solicit the bribe. But the fact of the matter was, he chose to get PW2 involved for his own design. I did not accept this as raising any doubt in the prosecution’s case. [98] In paragraphs 26 and 27, the accused contradicted his version in the previous paragraph 25. He said if true there was a call between PW1 and PW2, but this evidence was not proved. He added that PW1 embellished the evidence against him. I could not accept this argument because of the contradiction and given the evidence that PW2 did call PW1. The accused never challenged or disputed the evidence anyway. Was it, not he who relied on the defence of a misunderstanding that was rejected by this court before? S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 I found this was another hypothetical and purely exculpatory version without any proper basis. [99] In paragraphs 28 to 37, the accused said it was untrue what was said by PW10. He said PW10 was not telling the truth that the accused gave PW1 until midnight on 3.12.2017 to bribe him. It was a clear defamation against him. This was because the prosecution did not bring this matter to PW1. And if it was true, then this important piece of evidence should be asked by the prosecution and PW1 should be recalled to testify. I found that this again was a mere speculation by the accused and it was very hard for this court to accept given other evidence that was proved. [100] Further, during the trial, the accused never disputed nor did he challenge PW10 that it was untrue. Thus, it was deemed admitted. To say later that it was unfair for him did not hold water. If it was so important for the accused, why didn’t he ask PW10 during the cross-examination? And now the accused suggested that the prosecution’s case was not proved since it did not apply to recall PW1 to testify again. However, this court had allowed PW1 to be recalled on the application by the accused himself. But nothing was asked by him to PW1 on the subject. What was applied by the accused was merely to admit IDD33 as evidence to support his failed defence of a misunderstanding. [101] I now turn to the paragraphs involving the second charge in his written statement. From paragraphs 38 to 43, the accused denied that he agreed to receive the reduced amount of RM3,000.00 from PW1 during the second meeting near the workshop. He said he saw PW1 in a confused situation and S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 that was why PW1 wrongly assumed that a bribe was asked. The reason he wanted to meet PW1 again was to prevent any misunderstanding and to prepare the fine if charged in court. However, it was never put to PW1 that he was confused during the second meeting. PW1 never said he was confused during the meeting. The transcripts recorded did not show anything that PW1 was confused. [102] In my view, the transcripts were independent corroborative evidence against the accused. They supported the mens rea by the accused that he agreed to receive for himself the RM3,000.00. The accused could hardly dispute his actus reus too. The transcripts were intrinsic evidence that was directly connected to the factual circumstances of the crime and provided contextual information to incriminate the accused. The information was necessary for the determination by this court on the charges against the accused. Thus, the accused failed to raise any reasonable doubt that PW1 was confused or anyone else for that matter. [103] I now come to the last part of his written statement concerning the second charge. The accused asked this court to compare what was said by PW1 in paragraph 34 of PSSP1 and what was said by PW1 in paragraph 38 of the same. Paragraph 34 was the event on 4.12.2017 and PW1 said he pleaded to the accused to reduce the amount to RM3,000.00. The accused agreed with RM3,000.00 and to give PW1 time to get it. Whereas in paragraph 38 which was the event on 6.12.2017, PW1 said he asked to reduce from RM10,000.00 to RM3,000.00 because he had no money. Based on the two paragraphs, the accused alleged that if true he agreed to reduce to RM3,000.00 as was alleged in paragraph 34, then why did PW1 call him S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 on 6.12.2017 asking for RM10,000.00 to be reduced since the issue was resolved on 4.12.2017? The accused further said that was a contradiction by PW1. [104] The accused urged this court to compare only two paragraphs in order to raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. In my considered opinion, the difference in both paragraphs was only trivial and immaterial. They were not diametrically opposed to each other at all. In any event, it did not prove that the accused disagreed with receiving RM3,000.00. To my mind, what PW1 said on 6.12.2017 did not mean the accused did not agree to receive the amount on 4.12.2017. It only repeated PW1’s wish that the amount be reduced since he had no money. Further, it was pertinent to note the accused did not touch on the last sentence in paragraph 38. In the last sentence, PW1 said the accused told him RM3,000.00 was to “tutup mulut kes” or to close the case. This was almost the same as what was in the transcript of P7. Therefore, the accused only pointed to certain parts that he thought might exculpate him and did not point to a part that showed his wrongdoing. The last sentence strengthened the evidence against him that he agreed to receive RM3,000.00. [105] Did the accused ask PW1 in the cross-examination why the two paragraphs were different as alleged? Did he challenge PW1 on what was later disputed? He did not do both. PW1 was not given any opportunity to explain or to agree or deny the suggestion. The principles in the famous case of Browne v. Dunn [1893] 6 The Reports 67 are instructive and expressly describe the requirement of the law. The relevant passage was reproduced in the case of A.E.G Carapiet v. AY Derderian (supra) : S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 Lord Chancellor Herschell, observed: Now, my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact, by some questions put in cross-examination showing that that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which it is suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses. Lord Halsbury, the other member of the House of Lords said: My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the evidence was given in this case, I cannot too heartily express my concurrence with the Lord Chancellor as to the mode in which a trial should be conducted. To my mind nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not to cross-examine witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give them such an opportunity, to ask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although not one question has been directed either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they were deposed to. Mukharji J., in this Indian case said: The law is clear on the subject. Wherever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all. It is wrong to think that this S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 is merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice. It serves to prevent surprise at trial and miscarriage of justice, because it gives notice to the other side of the actual case that is going to be made when the turn of the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is being made comes to give and lead evidence by producing witnesses. It has been stated on high authority of the House of Lords that this much a counsel is bound to do when cross-examining that he must put to each of his opponent's witnesses in turn, so much of his own case as concerns that particular witness or in which that witness had any share. If he asks no question with regard to this, then he must be taken to accept the plaintiff's account in its entirety. Such failure leads to miscarriage of justice, first by springing surprise upon the party when he has finished the evidence of his witnesses and when he has no further chance to meet the new case made which was never put and secondly, because such subsequent testimony has no chance of being tested and corroborated. [Emphasis added] [106] In Timhar Mindani Ong & Anor v. PP [2010] 3 CLJ 938, the Court of Appeal said: It is trite that if the defence had any misgivings on the authenticity or suspicious nature of any narration of the evidence by the prosecution’s witness, then that witness should have been cross-examined on that disputed fact so that an explanation can be given to be properly assessed by the trial court. [Emphasis added] [107] Thus, the accused preferred to keep up his sleeve about the alleged contradiction in paragraphs 34 and 38. He did not give PW1 any opportunity to explain himself. The cross-examination is really a rule of essential justice and by not challenging PW1 during the trial, the accused is taken to have S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 accepted the version by the prosecution without any dispute. The accused could no longer dispute the evidence after PW1 had been dispensed with and only by way of his written statement. [108] In PP v. AG Bahrun Mat Yassin [2012] 5 CLJ 337, Abdul Rahman Sebli J (as he then was) held in no uncertain terms that: [6] In our adversarial system of criminal justice it is imperative that if the testimony of a witness is not accepted his evidence must be challenged in cross-examination. It is wrong to let his evidence pass by without challenge and then, when the witness has gone home, to contend that his evidence is untrue. The purpose of challenging the witness’s testimony is to give him the opportunity to either confirm, deny or qualify the suggestions. It will also give the trial judge the opportunity to observe the witness’s demeanour when answering the questions. The way he responds to the questions can sometimes be useful in assessing his trustworthiness as a witness. [7] To constitute effective challenge, the questions must condescend on the disputed particulars of the witness’s testimony and not merely by questioning him generally without imputing that the disputed part of his evidence is not accepted, and if the accused has a different version of the events, that version must be put to the witness. Failure to do so will render his version untenable if he gives evidence later in his defence. [Emphasis added] [109] To recapitulate, I have carefully considered and assessed the evidence by the accused in its entirety. I compared and tested the evidence concerning all the ingredients of the offence that were established by the prosecution. I S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 could not but find that his written statement consisted of afterthoughts, matters that were not asked and challenged before, bare denial, and repetitions. [110] A denial without any evidence to support was not sufficient to create reasonable doubt and to force out the prosecution case. Therefore, the term ‘bare denial’. In this circumstance, what is the weight to be given? As I understood it, no weight could be given to bare denial against the evidence by the prosecution. A bare denial is no defence: Paramasivan & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor [1948] 1 LNS 90; PP v. Reza Mohd Shah Ahmad Shah [2002] 1 LNS 157; Losali v. PP [2012] 2 CLJ 178. This court found that the accused did not give any reasonable explanation for the case against him. Be that as it may, the nature of an explanation is more important than any explanation. On this, I was guided by a decision from the Court of Appeal in Ong Hooi Beng & Ors v. PP [2015] 3 MLJ 812 where Abdul Rahman Sebli JCA (as he then was) said: In our opinion whether or not a defence amounts to a mere denial is to be determined not by the fact it is coupled with an explanation but by the nature of the explanation. A denial may well be coupled with an explanation but if the explanation is merely to deflect the prosecution’s case evidence without answering the real questions in controversy to reasonably dislodge the prosecution evidence it remains a mere denial for what it is worth. [Emphasis added] [111] And this was exactly what happened with the evidence of the accused. His explanation did not answer the real questions in controversy. He did not S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55 reasonably answer the ingredients of the offence that was established previously by the prosecution. In the premises, I found that the nature of his explanation could not be accepted in light of the facts and the circumstances that were proved. [112] As alluded to before, his written statement also consisted of repetitious accounts. In Mohd. Mocta Shariff v. Public Prosecutor [1983] 2 CLJ 216, Mahadev Shankar J (as he then was) said: Mere repetition however exact cannot ensure an acquittal because that will be tantamount to requiring a Court to acquit merely on the basis of the face value of the evidence given. An accused person has a greater onus than that cast upon him. He must go further and throw a reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s evidence or else at least give a version which is equally consistent with his innocence which version has to have the required degrees of credibility. [113] It is purely a question of fact whether the explanation of the accused is capable of raising a reasonable doubt: Azhar Lazim v. PP [2012] 1 LNS 262. The phrase reasonable doubt was explained further in Public Prosecutor v. Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors [1977] 1 MLJ 180 where Eusoffe Abdoolcader J (as he then was) said: It is not necessary for the defence to prove anything and all that is necessary for the accused to do is to give an explanation that is reasonable and throws a reasonable doubt on the case made out for the prosecution. It cannot be a fanciful or whimsical doubt or imaginary doubt, and in considering the question as to whether a reasonable doubt has been raised, the evidence adduced by and the S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 case for the defence must be viewed in at least some amount of light, not necessarily bright sunlight, but certainly not against the dark shadows of the night. [114] The existence of reasonable doubt is dependent upon the totality of the evidence and on an examination of all the evidence in a fair and reasonable manner: Ahmad bin Ibrahim v. PP [2012] 6 MLJ 305. On the correct approach to a decision in a criminal case, I was further guided by the proposition in Mohamed Yatin bin Abu Bakar v. PP [1950] MLJ 57 where it was held: That it is not the correct approach to a decision in a criminal case to approach the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused on the basis of deciding which of two stories the Court should believe, but the court should consider whether the story of the accused has thrown a reasonable doubt on the truth of the prosecution’s case and if so, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. [115] After careful deliberation on the evidence, I did not accept or believe the accused’s explanation and the explanation did not raise in my mind any reasonable doubt as to his guilt: Mat v. PP [1963] 1 LNS 82. The decision in Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 347 further explained what is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It was held: That degree is well settled. It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 dismissed with the sentence ‘of course it is possible, but not in the least probable’, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice. [116] I now come to the question of whether the accused managed to rebut the presumption of section 50(1) of the Act on the balance of probabilities. As explained earlier, this court had applied the presumption given that I found the gratification was corruptly solicited by the accused for himself, and corruptly agreed to receive for himself as an inducement for the matters set out in the particulars of the offences. It is trite that this legal burden is heavier than raising a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case for the accused to obtain an acquittal. It was for the accused to give an innocent explanation which the court considered more likely than not that it was true, i.e on the balance of probabilities, the test applied in civil proceedings: Thavanathan Balasubramaniam v. Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 CLJ 150 FC. Based on the analysis of the evidence by the accused that was discussed earlier in the foregoing, I was constrained to find that the accused failed to rebut the presumption. [117] What then, will constitute sufficient proof for the accused to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities? I think that the proof must relate to the probabilities of each particular case. On the evidence, this court could not find that it was more probable than not the accused had managed to do so. I think it would be against all probabilities of the case to hold the evidence as having that effect. Lord Denning in Miller v. Minister of Pensions (supra) said: S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 58 If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say ‘we think it more probable than not’ the balance is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not. [118] Another point is this. If the accused was unable to succeed in his defence on the lighter burden of raising a reasonable doubt, then I did not think that he could be found to have successfully rebut the legal presumption on the heavier burden. Further, this heavier burden could not be discharged by merely making conjectures or raising possibilities, and this was what the accused had adduced in his testimony. The accused was expected to do more in that in law he was required to disprove the evidence by the prosecution. Section 3 of Act 56 stipulates ‘disproved’ as: ‘disproved’: a fact is said to be ‘disproved’ when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non- existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of a particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. [119] As I understood it, in general, there was no burden on an accused to call witnesses for his defence. And no adverse inference could be drawn on such failure to do so. However, a statute such as the Act may impose an onus on the accused through a statutory presumption. On this I was guided by the decision in PP v. Mohd Farid bin Mohd Sukis & Anor [2002] 8 CLJ 814 where Augustine Paul J (as he then was) held that: S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 59 Generally in a criminal trial there is no burden on an accused to call witnesses (see Goh Ah Yew v. PP [1949] MLJ 150; Abu Bakar v. R [1963] MLJ 288; Tan Foo Su v. PP [1967] 2 MLJ 19). Thus, no adverse inference can be drawn against the defence for a failure to call witnesses. However, such an inference may be drawn where there is an onus on the accused to prove an issue (see Baharom v. PP [1960] MLJ 249). An onus may be placed on the accused in certain instances by statutory presumptions. The legal burden is then on the accused to negate the presumed fact. In order to discharge the burden there will be an onus on the defence to call material witnesses (see Liew Siew & Anor v. PP [1969] 2 MLJ 232). Failure to do so will warrant the drawing of an adverse inference. In this case a presumption of trafficking has been drawn against the first accused. The onus is on him to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he was not trafficking in the drugs. An adverse inference would be drawn against him for failure to call material witnesses on this issue. [Emphasis added [120] Similarly, section 50(1) of the Act placed an onus on the accused to discharge his legal burden. He did not call any witnesses nor adduce any relevant documents apart from wholly relying on the content of his written statement. A heavier burden was on him to rebut the statutory presumption on a balance of probabilities. The duty was on him to prove something. It was to prove he did not corruptly solicit and agree to receive the bribe. He did call witnesses for the third charge that he was acquitted of but failed to call any for the first two charges. Thus, this court drew an adverse inference against him for the failure to call any material witnesses to discharge the burden. S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 60 [121] It was important to differentiate the difference between the duty to cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case and the duty to prove a defence on the balance of probabilities. The distinction between the two burdens was succinctly explained by the Court of Appeal in Abdul Aziz Miew Yiong v. PP [2014] 1 LNS 1875 where Abdul Rahman Sebli JCA (as he then was) opined: In law there is a distinction between the duty to merely cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case and the duty to prove a defence on the balance of probabilities. In the former case all that the accused needs to do to entitle him to an acquittal is to cast a reasonable doubt in the trial judge’s mind as to his guilt: Mat v. PP (supra). He has no duty to prove or disprove anything whereas in the latter case affirmative admissible evidence of the facts constituting the defence must be established, failing which he will be convicted of the offence charged. [Emphasis added] [122] Based on the reasons discussed, I found that none of what the accused alleged in his written statement could be accepted as affirmative admissible evidence. He failed in his duty to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities. Therefore, the accused failed to rebut the presumption under section 50(1) of the Act. Conclusion at the close of the defence’s case [123] At the conclusion of the trial, this court found that not only did the accused fail to raise any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution, S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 61 but he also failed to rebut the legal presumption on the balance of probabilities that he corruptly solicited the bribe and corruptly agreed to receive the bribe as an inducement for matters set out in the particulars of the offences. [124] Irrespective of whether a court is otherwise convinced in its own mind of the guilt or innocence of the accused, its decision must be based on the evidence adduced and nothing else: Sia Soon Suan v. Public Prosecutor [1966] 1 MLJ 116. Having considered all the evidence adduced, it was my firm finding that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused: Section 173(m)(i) of the Code. [125] Therefore, I found that the accused was guilty of the two charges that he was facing, and accordingly, he was convicted of the same. The sentence [126] Section 24(1) of the Act reads: Any person who commits an offence under sections 16, 17, 20, 21, 22 and 23 shall on conviction be liable to- (a) imprisonment for a term not exceeding twenty years; and (b) a fine of not less than five times the sum or value of the gratification which is the subject matter of the offence, where such gratification is capable of S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 62 being valued or is of a pecuniary nature, or ten thousand ringgit, whichever is the higher. [127] The section provides that if found guilty, the accused must be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment not exceeding twenty years. Further, sentences of fine have to be imposed as well. The fine depends on whether the gratification is in the nature of a sum or a value as long as the fine is not less than five times the sum or the value of the gratification, or ten thousand ringgit, whichever is the higher. For the two charges that he was convicted on, the gratification involved the sum of money. For the first charge, it involved a sum of RM10,000.00 and the minimum sentence of fine must be at least RM50,000.00. On the second charge, a sum of RM3,000.00 was the gratification and the fine must be the minimum of RM15,000.00. [128] Therefore, it could be gathered that the provision provides a stiff penalty for those who committed the offences under the Act. It mirrored the intention of the Act to come out with the provision to prevent and combat corruption in a special statute. [129] In the mitigation by his Counsel, the accused pleaded for a lenient sentence because he had served the police department for a long time without having any bad disciplinary record. He is a father of five children and his wife works as a government servant. From the time he was first arrested until the completion of the trial, he gave good cooperation to the MACC. In arguing for a lesser sentence, his Counsel urged this court to avoid any disparity of sentence. He supported this argument through the case S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 63 authorities provided and implored this court to compare the sentences that were imposed to come out with a decision. Further, this court should agree to a shorter term of imprisonment and a minimum fine against the accused. The defence did not say the accused was repentant nor remorseful. [130] Notwithstanding the absence of any previous criminal conviction, the prosecution asked for a severe and appropriate sentence for the public interest and a deterrent effect. The offences committed by the accused were serious and public interest should be the foremost consideration. As a mature person and as a policeman, the accused should have known the difference between what was right and what was wrong. Moreover, the accused had tarnished the image of the police force. [131] I acknowledged that the accused’s plea in mitigation must not be lightly disregarded despite being found guilty after a full trial. It must be considered equally with the public interest as represented by the prosecution. I thought this was the best way to strike a balance to decide on the sentence against the accused. Having said that, no sentence can be assessed by a simple mathematical formula because many factors must be taken into consideration based on the facts and circumstances in each case: Mohamed Jusoh bin Abdullah and Another v. Public Prosecutor [1947] 1 LNS 73. [132] I took into consideration that the accused was found guilty after a full trial had taken place. So many witnesses had come to testify and a lot more time was needed for the trial to come to its conclusion. I would have considered imposing a lesser sentence of imprisonment and fine if he had pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity. If he had done so and said he was S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 64 remorseful, then this would have been more convincing as compared to after a full trial if he said he had repented. Be that as it may, I had factored in the fact that this was his first criminal conviction. The consideration would of course be much different if the accused was a habitual offender with many previous convictions. [133] What was the nature and the type of crime that the accused was found guilty of? They were two offences of corruption involving soliciting and agreeing to receive a bribe. The accused took it upon himself to commit them after he was informed of a pending investigation. He took advantage of the office held by him as a policeman to acquire some pecuniary benefit. He created a design. In other words, he abused what was entrusted to him for private gains. Much has been said about the damaging impacts of corruption. The impacts go beyond the accused to the erosion of our criminal justice system and the trust of the public at large. Corruption is truly a despicable and heinous crime impacting the society and the nation. As such, in my view, the public interest must override the interest of an accused and a deterrent sentence must be imposed. [134] On the fine, if he pleaded guilty, I would have considered imposing a minimum fine of RM50,000.00 and RM15,000.00 on the two offences respectively. Given that he was found guilty after a full trial, I was of the considered opinion that the fine of RM60,000.00 and RM20,000.00 was proper and suitable. In this circumstance, a minimum fine would no longer be fitting. S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 65 [135] To decide on the terms of imprisonment, this court was guided by the one transaction rule and the totality principle: Bachik Abdul Rahman v. PP [2004] 2 CLJ 572. Based on the one transaction rule, where two or more offences are committed in the course of a single transaction, the sentence of imprisonment should be concurrent rather than consecutive. For the one transaction rule to be applicable, any one of the four elements must be present. They are the proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action, and community of purpose: SA Jamil Md Yusof v. PP [2002] 7 CLJ 132 at p. 137; Public Prosecutor v. Loh Ang Sing [1965] 2 MLJ 129 at p. 130; Amrital Lal Hazral v. Emperor 42 Cal 957. However, the one transaction rule is not absolute because there may be situations where consecutive sentences of imprisonment are necessary for a deterrent effect: Bachik Abdul Rahman v. PP (supra). I think the rule is not cast in stone and must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. [136] The offence of soliciting the bribe was committed on 3.12.2017 and the agreeing to receive the bribe was on 4.12.2017. The gratification sought was for an inducement to close an investigation. In the circumstances, the offences were committed by continuity of action and for a community of purpose. The one transaction rule was applicable. However, I declined to apply the rule. As alluded to, there is an exception to the rule. To my mind, a concurrent sentence of imprisonment of 4 years, would not have the desired effect in view of what the accused, a policeman, had designed and done to commit the crime. Then there was the harm caused by him to an investigation by the police. A concurrent sentence of imprisonment would not serve as a deterrent effect for others. S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 66 [137] I was also of the opinion that a consecutive sentence of imprisonment for both offences did not offend the totality principle. The principle required this court to consider whether the aggregate was just and appropriate to ensure that the sentences were not excessive. In my view, the total length of eight years of imprisonment imposed did not constitute a crushing effect for the accused to reform and return to a desirable life with his family. The accused should have many more years to live as a responsible member of society after serving his sentence. [138] It is true that justice must be tempered with mercy. But at the same time, justice cannot be substituted for mercy. What this means is that the court must consider not only the interest of the accused but also the public interest. Thus, it was my considered opinion that the sentences against the accused were just and appropriate. The sentences were not manifestly excessive on the facts and the circumstances of the case. Dated on this day, 18 October 2023 -sgd- (DATUK AHMAD KAMAL ARIFIN BIN ISMAIL) Judge Sessions Court Johor Bahru S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 67 For the prosecution : Ikhwan Ikhsan bin Jalaludin Nik Lokman Hakim bin Nik Mohd Noor Norsyarina binti Raizan For the accused : Fazaly Ali bin Mohd Ghazaly S/N A62Gqv5Ox0mZ7/ZTrAJwyg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	110,093	Tika 2.6.0
JA-56WS-22-12/2021	PLAINTIF 1. ) SUZIE BALUNG 2. ) MUHAMMAD RAJA IMRAN SHAH DEFENDAN S & D WIN SDN BHD	Ini adalah rayuan Perayu/Penghutang Penghakiman Ke-2, S & D WIN SDN BHD [Company No.: 599251-V] melalui Notis Rayuan di Lampiran 45 terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini bertarikh 21/9/2023 yang telah membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden/Pemiutang-pemiutang Pelaksanaan untuk meminda perintah bertarikh 9/3/2022 melalui Lampiran 26.	06/11/2023	Puan Sazlina binti Safie	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=87fa3ac5-b271-4445-a221-c4d7745b4d1e&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM PERMOHONAN PELAKSANAAN (WRIT PENYITAAN & PENJUALAN JA-56WS-22-12/2021 ANTARA 1. SUZIE BALUNG [IDENTITY CARD NO.: 720318135710] 2. MUHAMMAD RAJA IMRAN SHAH [IDENTITY CARD NO.: 600702015477] [G.K. SRITHARAN & CO.] …PLAINTIF/PEMIUTANG PENGHAKIMAN DAN S & D WIN SDN BHD [Company No.: 599251-V] [G RAVI] …DEFENDAN/PENGHUTANG PENGHAKIMAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (RAYUAN INTERLOKUTORI) 06/11/2023 12:26:18 JA-56WS-22-12/2021 Kand. 46 S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 LATARBELAKANG KES Ini adalah rayuan Perayu/Penghutang Penghakiman Ke-2, S & D WIN SDN BHD [Company No.: 599251-V] melalui Notis Rayuan di Lampiran 45 terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini bertarikh 21/9/2023 yang telah membenarkan permohonan Responden-Responden/Pemiutang- pemiutang Pelaksanaan untuk meminda perintah bertarikh 9/3/2022 melalui Lampiran 26. Mahkamah telah meneliti Notis Permohonan, Afidavit-afidavit, hujahan bertulis dan otoriti kedua-dua pihak. Alasan Mahkamah membenarkan Lampiran 26 adalah seperti berikut: [1] Notis Permohonan Lampiran 26 adalah permohonan Plaintif- Plaintif/Pemiutang-Pemiutang Penghakiman untuk meminda perintah bertarikh 9/3/2022 di bawah Aturan 20 Kaedah 11 dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 untuk perintah-perintah seperti berikut: 1) Bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif/Pemiutang-Pemiutang Penghakiman diberi kebenaran dan/atau kebebasan untuk meminda dan/atau membuat tambahan pada perintah bertarikh 9/3/2022 dengan cara yang ditunjukkan dalam warna merah sepertimana dalam “Cadangan Perintah Terpinda” yang dieksibitkan di Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Sritharan a/l K Govindan (No. K/P:690521-01-5357) yang difailkan Bersama-sama ini; 2) Kos ini ditanggung oleh Defendan Kedua/Penghutang Penghakiman Kedua; dan 3) Apa-apa relief lain yang dianggap suaimanfaat oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini. [2] Alasan permohonan Plaintif adalah dinyatakan dalam affidavit sokongan yang mana antara lain menyatakan bahawa: 1) Defendan Kedua/Penghutang Penghakiman Kedua telah memfailkan satu Notis Permohonan bertarikh 10/2/2022 di Lampiran 9 bersama-sama satu affidavit sokongan di Lampiran 11. 2) Plaintif-Plaintif/Pemiutang-Pemiutang Penghakiman telah memfailkan affidavit jawapan di Lampiran 16 dan kedua-dua pihak telah memfailkan hujahan bertulis masing-masing. 3) Mahkamah telah menetapkan tarikh pendengaran pada 9/3/2022 dan selepas mendengar hujahan lisan pihak-pihak, Mahkamah telah pada hari yang sama telah memberikan perintah iaitu permohonan Defendan Kedua/Penghutang S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Penghakiman Kedua di Lampiran 9 adalah dibenarkan kecuali prayer (a) tidak dibenarkan. 4) Peguamcara Defendan Kedua/Penghutang Penghakiman Kedua telah memfailkan Perintah tersebut namun perintah tersebut tidak membayangkan keputusan sebenar yang diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah Sesyen Johor Bahru pada 9/3/2022. 5) Pindaan yang dicadangkan hanyalah untuk meminda nama pihak-pihak dengan nyata dan jelas iaitu daripada Defendan- Defendan kepada Defendan Kedua. 6) Perintah sedia ada merujuk kepada Defendan-Defendan yang mana merujuk kepada keempat-empat Defendan dalam tindakan asal. 7) Writ Penjualan dan Penyitaan yang difailkan oleh Plaintif- Plaintif adalah terhadap Defendan Kedua sahaja dan Notis Permohonan yang difailkan oleh Defendan Kedua sahaja dan perintah Mahkamah yang diberikan hanyalah berkait dengan Defendan Kedua sahaja. 8) Terdapat keperluan untuk pindaan ini disegerakan kerana Defendan Keempat telah memulakan satu tindakan pengkomittan terhadap Plaintif-Plaintif dan juga peguamcara S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Plaintif-Plaintif atas alasan Plaintif-Plaintif telah melaksanakan Writ Penyitaan dan Penjualan terhadap Defendan Keempat. 9) Permohonan ini adalah dibuat secara suci hati (bona fide), niat yang baik (good faith) dan tidak memprejudiskan Defendan Kedua langsung. [3] Defendan keempat telah memfailkan affidavit jawapan yang mana beliau mengikrarkan affidavit sebagai pengarah S & D WIN SDN BHD iaitu Penghutang Pelaksanaan Kedua dan juga sebagai Penghutang Pelaksanaan Keempat yang telah diberi kuasa untuk mengikrarkan affidavit bagi pihak Penghutang Pelaksaaan Kedua. [4] Dalam affidavit Jawapan, Penghutang Penghakiman Kedua antaranya menyatakan seperti berikut: 1) Bantahan awal berhubung kelewatan 1 bulan untuk Plaintif- Plaintif memfailkan Notis Permohonan ini dan Mahkamah tidak mempunyai kuasa untuk memberikan lanjutan masa selepas tarikh 1 bulan seperti yang diperuntukkan undang- undang. 2) Plaintif-Plaintif gagal menunjukkan wujudnya keadaan- keadaan khas yang mendedahkan bahawa perintah bertarikh 9/2/2022 tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan. S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 3) Pada 22/11/2022, satu perintah ex parte untuk memulakan prosiding komittal telah diberikan dimana terdapat suatu “prima facie” kes ke atas Pemiutang-pemiutang Pelaksanaan dan juga Peguamcara mereka dan peguamcara Pemiutang Pelaksanaan tidak berhak meminda perintah tersebut yang mana ianya jelas akan menggangu kesan-kesan ke atas perintah “ex parte” tersebut. 4) Tindakan peguamcara Pemiutang-pemiutang Pelaksanaan untuk meminda perintah ini adalah satu pemikiran semula (after-thought) dan Peguamcara Pemiutang-pemiutang Pelaksanaan adalah dihalang (estopped) untuk berbuat demikian apabila perintah tersebut telah dimeteraikan oleh Mahkamah. 5) Tindakan Peguamcara Pemiutang-pemiutang Pelaksanaan ini adalah merupakan satu helah daripada bertanggungjawab ke atas prosiding komittal yang telah difailkan. [5] Mahkamah telah meneliti kesemua kertas kausa dan hujahan serta otoriti pihak-pihak dan akhirnya Mahkamah membenarkan pindaan sebagaimana dicadangkan dalam “cadangan pindaan” yang dimasukkan. S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [6] Berhubung bantahan awal pihak Penghutang Penghakiman, Mahkamah menolak bantahan awal pihak Penghutang Penghakiman. Jika dirujuk daripada kertas kuasa yang difailkan di Mahkamah, jelas menunjukkan bahawa draf perintah yang difailkan adalah dipertikaikan. [7] Harus diingat bahawa surat menyurat atau apa jua dokumen yang difailkan melalui system CMS adalah satu bentuk dokumen yang diterima pakai dan akan dirujuk dalam prosiding Mahkamah dan ia adalah satu dokumen yang sah. [8] Di bawah Aturan 1 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dinyatakan seperti berikut: Definitions (O. 1, r. 4) “document” means anything in which information of any description is recorded and includes a claim, summons, application, judgment, order, affidavit, witness statement or any other document used in a Court proceeding; [9] Mahkamah merujuk Lampiran 2 iaitu surat bantahan daripada pihak Peguamcara Pemiutang Pelaksanaan memaklumkan bahawa perintah difailkan tanpa mengambilkira pindaan yang dibuat dan memohon satu tarikh klarifikasi ditetapkan oleh Mahkamah. S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [10] Dalam keadaan ini, Mahkamah mendapati surat bantahan tersebut bertarikh 3/6/2022. Perintah diberikan pada 9/3/2022. Draf perintah hanya kemudiannya difailkan pada 24/5/2022 oleh peguamcara Penghutang-Penghutang Pelaksanaan. Oleh demikian, bantahan awal dan hujahan pihak peguamcara Penghutang-Penghutang Pelaksanaan sendiri tidak berasas kerana tempoh masa 1 bulan yang dinyatakan hanya timbul selepas pertikaian draf perintah yang difailkan mereka sendiri selepas hampir lebih 2 bulan daripada perintah yang diberikan Mahkamah. [11] Prinsip pindaan Permohonan Plaintif-Plaintif dibuat di bawah Aturan 20 Kaedah 11 KKM 2012 yang mana dinyatakan seperti berikut: 11. Amendment of judgment and orders (O. 20 r. 11) “Clerical mistakes in judgment or orders, or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission, may at any time be corrected by the Court by a notice of application without an appeal." [12] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes SHELL MALAYSIA TRADING SDN BHD V. LEONG YUET YENG & ORS [1990] 1 LNS 166; [1990] 3 MJ 254 jelas menyatakan bahawa, " Once a judgment has been passed and entered, the court has no jurisdiction to amend it under the "slip rule" unless there has been an accidental slip in S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 drawing up the judgment, or unless the judgment as drawn up does not correctly state what the court actually decided and intended.” [13] Dalam tindakan ini, Mahkamah kembali semula kepada permohonan asal di mana perintah bertarikh 9/3/2022 yang dimohon melalui Lampiran 9. [14] Jika dirujuk kembali kepada Lampiran 9, ia adalah satu Notis Permohonan yang difailkan oleh Defendan Kedua di mana dinyatakan “…untuk mendengar satu permohonan bagi Defendan Kedua seperti yang dinamakan di atas…” [15] Defendan Kedua adalah S & D WIN SDN BHD [Company No.: 599251-V]. Jika dilihat maklumat dalam pendaftaran kes JA-56WS- 22-12/2021 dalam system CMS, Plaintif-Plaintif adalah SUZIE BALUNG [Identity Card No.: 720318135710] dan MUHAMMAD RAJA IMRAN SHAH [Identity Card No.: 600702015477] yang diwakili oleh Tetuan G.K. SRITHARAN & CO. manakala pihak Defendan adalah S & D WIN SDN BHD [Company No.: 599251-V] yang diwakili oleh Tetuan G RAVI. [16] Walaupun begitu, dalam kertas kausa asal iaitu satu permohonan Writ Penyitaan dan Penjualan, Plaintif-Plaintif telah menamakan 4 Defendan (termasuk Defendan Kedua). S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [17] Memandangkan Notis Permohonan di Lampiran 9 adalah permohonan Defendan Kedua sahaja, ia menunjukkan hanya Defendan Kedua yang memohon perintah tersebut. Oleh itu, adalah wajar perintah pada 9/3/2022 dipinda dan ditukar menjadi “Atas permohonan Defendan Kedua…” sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam permohonan dan cadangan pindaan oleh pihak Plaintif- Plaintif di Lampiran 26. [18] Pindaan hanya menggambarkan apa yang dipohon dalam permohonan. Ia tidak mengubah karektor permohonan atau perintah yang diberikan. [19] Defendan-Defendan mungkin berhujah bahawa Lampiran 9 tersebut disertakan dengan affidavit sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Defendan Keempat. Mahkamah mengambilkira bahawa Defendan Keempat sendiri mengikrarkan affidavit atas kapasiti sebagai seorang Pengarah Defendan Kedua pada masa itu memandangkan Defendan Kedua adalah sebuah syarikat yang tidak boleh mengikrarkan affidavit. [20] Jika niat Defendan-Defendan adalah Notis Permohonan tersebut difailkan oleh pihak kesemua Defendan, kenapa tidak dinyatakan dengan jelas bahawa ini adalah permohonan Defendan-Defendan dan bukan hanya Defendan Kedua sahaja? S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [21] Mahkamah merujuk kepada keputusan Augustine Paul JC (pada masa itu) dalam kes ARAB-MALAYSIA FINANCE BHD V. MALACCA DEVELOPMENT CORP SDN BHD & ORS [1997] 3 CLJ 51 yang membuat keputusan berikut: "...It is settled law that after a judgment or order has been perfected amendments may only be made to it in relation to clerical errors, accidental slips and omissions as provided by O. 20 r. 11 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (see Khoo Cheng Tat v. Lim Soon Teck [1982] 1 MLJ 289; Tak Ming Co. Ltd. v. Yee Sang Metal Supplies Co. [1973] 1 WLR 300; Hock Hua Bank Bhd. v. Shari bin Murid [1981] 1 MLJ 143). However, the Court has an inherent power to correct errors to give a clear expression to its intentions in the judgment or order which has been perfected (see Pearlman (Veneers) SA (Pty) Ltd. v. Bernhand Bartels [1954] 1 WLR 1457). Such a power exists to enable the Court to correct the record to make it consistent with the judgment or order which it obviously meant to pronounce (see Hotel Ambassador (M) Sdn. Bhd. v. Seapower (M) Sdn. Bhd.[1991] 1 CLJ Rep 174; [1991] 1 CLJ 656; [1991] 1 MLJ 221; Hatten v. Harris [1892] AC 560; Koperasi Perumahan Kotawira Bhd. v. Kadir bin Kassim & 2 Ors. [1991] 2 CLJ 1529). A Judge may set aside an order founded S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 wholly upon his own error as to a fact, and not upon any mistake in his deliberation, even though the order be passed and entered (see Hall v. Harris [1900] 25 VLR 455)". [22] Dalam kes DING LAI HUA lwn. MEGAH TEGUH SDN BHD [2014] 1 LNS 737 pula diputuskan: [12] Hakikatnya, peruntukan Aturan 20 Kaedah 11 KKM 2012 memperuntukkan bahawa perintah yang telah disempurnakan 'may at any time be corrected by the Court by a notice of application without an appeal'. Dengan itu, kuasa untuk membuat pindaan di bawah Aturan tersebut adalah jelas dan isu mahkamah functus officio tidak berbangkit sama sekali bila mahkamah menjalankan budi bicaranya di bawah slip rule. Perkara tersebut boleh dilihat dalam keputusan kes Munusamy di mana Abdul Malik Ishak HMR dalam keputusannya telah membuat pemerhatian berikut: "My learned brother Low Hop Bing, JCA while sitting on the High Court bench, had occasion to ventilate his views in regard to the "slip rule" pursuant to O. 20 r. 11 of the RHC as well as the inherent power of the court to amend an earlier order together with the doctrine of functus officio. The headnotes would bear out what his Lordship had said in that case (see pp. 171 to 172 of the report): S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [a] Errors arising from accidental slips or omissions may be corrected under the slip-rule pursuant to O. 20 r. 11 of the RHC, even though the judgment or order as drawn does in fact represent the intention of the court at that time. The slip-rule would also appear to cover the errors made by a litigant or his counsel. [b] Additionally, the court has the inherent power to correct errors to give a clear expression to its intentions in the judgment or order which has been perfected. Such a power exists to enable the court to correct the record to make it consistent with the judgment or order which it obviously meant to pronounce. [c] The doctrine of functus officio does not forbid the amendment of any judgment or order under the slip-rule. (The slip-rule may be regarded as an exception to the doctrine). The doctrine also cannot subjugate the inherent jurisdiction of the court to dispense justice in a particular case". [23] Sebagai satu kesempurnaan, Mahkamah merujuk minit prosiding dan rekod CMS pada 9/3/2022. Dalam rekod, Cik Sugania Gobind hadir bagi Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua manakala En. Siva Shankar mewakili S & D WIN SDN BHD [ Company No.: 599251- V]. Jika dilihat dalam Writ Penyitaan dan Penjualan, S & D WIN S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 SDN BHD [ Company No.: 599251-V] adalah Defendan Kedua/Penghutang Pelaksanaan Kedua. [24] Oleh demikian, Mahkamah berpuashati pindaan ini boleh dibenarkan dibawah slip rule dan ia juga tidak mengandungi sebarang variasi terma atau apa-apa tambahan bagi apa yang telah diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah. [25] Mahkamah juga berpendapat bahawa pindaan tidak sesekali memprejudis Defendan disebabkan ianya adalah perintah yang sama dengan perintah bermeterai 9/3/2022 dan ia merujuk secara spesifik seperti niat sebenar Mahkamah. [26] Oleh demikian, permohonan Responden-Responden/Pemiutang- pemiutang Pelaksanaan untuk meminda perintah bertarikh 9/3/2022 melalui Lampiran 26 dibenarkan. Sekian untuk pertimbangan YAH. Disediakan oleh: …Sazlina Safie… Sazlina Bt Safie Hakim Sesyen, S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Mahkamah Sesyen 4 Sivil, Johor Bahru, Johor. Tarikh :3/11/2023 PEGUAMCARA PLAINTIF: EN. SRITHARAN A/L K GOVINDAN [TETUAN G.K. SRITHARAN & CO.] PEGUAMCARA DEFENDAN: CIK AIDA BINTI HAJI HASSAN [TETUAN G. RAVI] S/N xTr6h3GyRUSiIcTXdFtNHg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	17,424	Tika 2.6.0
WA-11BNCvC-19-03/2022	PERAYU 1. ) Teo Boon Chuan 2. ) Teo Boon Chong RESPONDEN Fuji Xerox Asia Pacific Pte Ltd	This is an appeal by the defendants against the decision of the learned Magistrate in allowing the plaintiff’s claim for services rendered.	06/11/2023	YA Dato' Ahmad Shahrir B. Mohd Salleh	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=9bb5936f-9c6d-4dd0-87a0-17e9257fc34a&Inline=true	06/11/2023 14:58:29 WA-11BNCvC-19-03/2022 Kand. 29 S/N b5O1m22c0E2HoBfpJX/DSg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N b5O1m22c0E2HoBfpJX/DSg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N b5O1m22c0E2HoBfpJX/DSg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N b5O1m22c0E2HoBfpJX/DSg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N b5O1m22c0E2HoBfpJX/DSg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—11B\|lCvC—19—03/2022 Kand. 29 Db/11/202] may-22 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA A1’ KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA. CIVIL AFPEAL No. WA — IIENCVC — I9 — ua/2u22 BETWEEN 1 TEO BOON CHUAN 2 TEO BOON CHONG APPELLANTS AND FUJI XEROX ASIA PACIFIC PTE LTD RESPONDENT (In one mailer oi MagIstmIe‘s caun Kuala Lurnpui In me Federal Temtery. Maiaysia Summons No: WA- A‘/ZNCVC - 5399 - 10/2017 BETWEEN FUJI XEROX ASIA PACIFIC PTE LTD PLAINTIFF AND 1 TEO soon CHUAN 2 TEO BOON CHUNG . DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT Inlmducllon m in (his iuagmeni, pamas are referred to as iney were before lhelrial court, Tnis IS an appeal byine defendants against [he d!GISIOn at me Ieamed Maglslrale In auawing Ina pIaIrIIIﬂ's claim lor services rendered. Brlef ullonl mu [2] Tna piainim pmwdes Ina services of reniai lor IIS phaloccipy niacnines and charges iis Cus1orrIers based on photocopy usage Pursuant \|a an agreement between me names, a pneiocavv macmna was Tamed aux Io Ina dafandlnts subieni to me Ierms onne agresineni. IN >5mni22¢.0EzHnEYp~IX1D9I “Nair s.n.I nmihnrwm be LAIQ4 M may he nr1nIn.IIIy mm: dnuuvinnl VII muna WMI [:1 Ttre agreement bemreen tne platntrtt and tne detendants eanststett enwo parts The ltrst ts tne servtee Agreement and tne second ts tne Ran\|al Agreement. The Servlce Agreement made prdyrsrons tor tne senrrdes rendered by me pletnrttt la the detendants wntcn tnetuded aemee, malnlenance, consumables and tecnnreal support and upgrades tor saﬂwara tor me ptretoeopy macntne Tne Rental Agreement made pnwlsiuns ldr rentet at the pnorecepy macnrne together wttn dertatn ttbensed edttware. [4] tt was posrted by the ttetendante tnat the tenure ldr the agreement was tor tne pertod M an momhs hm tne plairutﬂ contended that tnere was automatic renewal. ‘tne plarntttt tssued out tnverees lo the delendants amounting to RM76.6e4.ne as at 05 07 2017 but the delendants deleutted tn maklng payments. The plaintltt than commenced an idmn agarnst tne delenttanls to reddver the amount oltne uneatd Invaloss. Anllylls end ﬁndings [51 tn dealing wttn appeals, an appellate oourl wlll not Intervene In Me declstcn at the lnal balm unless I! 15 shown that the decistcn of lhe trial cuun ts plainly wrong T ' ' a well- awepled ennetele at law (See Tegas Sejatf sun and v. Ponlndblr Ynnah DIOIIII Hula Lrlrlgrll 5 Ana! And Another App“! [2023] s cu 259 CA; [2023] 3 Mu 795; (20231 4 MLRA MI, [2023] AMEJ na52) [6] The learned counsel [or Illa delendartts challenged Ina admlssl rltty at tne Rental Agreement for tne prrdtoeopy rnacrrrnea Durlng tnal, tne plalrlhﬂ larled to produce the dngrnat agralmenl The learned counsel for Ina defendants submiﬂad that the nne whtch was pmduoed was not slamped and as such I\| was no! admlsslble pursuant In secllon 52(1) 0! \|ne Stamp Act 1949. m t must say at tne onset tnat tne quesnon ol adrnrssrbrttty at a panlcular document is dtrttnct and separate lrurn rrre queslmn of tls yelrdrt, Adrnrssrbrlrty of a document may become a central tssue t1 parties lo tne dtspute rely solely on ttre tmpugned document and nottrtng else However. tt lno tseue to be decided may be detenntned based on evtdenoe otnertnan tne lnadmlsslble document, tne last that the impugned document m e5mrnz2r.oEzMnEVp~lX1D9I «war. s.n.t nmthnrwttt r. u... m my r... nnntnnllly enn. dnuuvtnrtl n. eFlt.lNG vtmxl was ndi siamped is iireievani and Gould niii negatelhe existence dune reievani {ad which parties sdiigm in pmve [31 The an as contained In sediion szm Mme siarnp Act 1949 IS diear siioseciidn (1; is a prohibilicn againsi admissibility or an inslmmem which was criargeabie wiiri duly but was not duly stamped when was produced (See Lew sen Kin v. Data’ sin Young Ming [2012] 7 ML! 717) m In ine cumext of me piesenr appeal, proviso (8) I0 siibsecucn (1) creaies a sramidry saving ii me my enargeabie and penaiiy iinppsed on me mslrumenl were paid me may be done by ins iserned inei iiidge icsne were la employ ine powers under section 51 o! the Stamp Act 1949 la impound the Renlal Agreement and gws direciioris ior il I0 be siarnped aceoidingiy so inai ii wiH become adin s we as evidence, [See Mllayan Bulking End V. Agencies seivise aiiiesu Sdn and 5 Drs [1952] cu Rep 217 sc) [10] in American Express innriisiioiisi Banking carperaiiari V. Tun Loon swan [1992] \ cu Rep I so, [1992] 1 ML! 727, ins inen supreme cdiin issued a pron-pr in counsels beﬁtung ineirposnion as umders 0Hhe dpiinra draw the aneniion di the noun ii: me provisions oi sermons 5211) and 51 oi me SEND AC1 1949 Since these were not done in the present appeal, the Rsnial Agieemenl remained inatimissibie [111 The nensieinping dune agreemem did ndi render ine agieerneni Invalid bu! nieieiy inadrnissiiiis, II is [0 be ndied mat olhel inan criaiienging ins amounl said ll.) be due and ins ieniire dune agreeriieni, iha deiendanis did nei dispuie me vaiidiiy or me agresrrisrn 1121 Aiineugii I agree wilh me I:un\|armun or me iesined ppunsei tor uie defendant: that me agresrneni admissible, mere are diner evidence wnien Suppﬂﬂs me iadi inai «nerd was an agreerneni beiwaen the piainim end me defundanls ior services rendered by me plainuii in me ﬁrs! piade, ins deiendanis dld not dispute irie iaci inai may nad sxeculed me agreement. ins deiendania ipe did rim dispins iiia ieiine pr ine agreement or the iaci that me pndioodpy rnacnine was sin in meir pdssessipn. In Crux wiiar was dispiiied by ins deiendanis IN b5D1niZ2¢.0EZHnEYpJXlD9I «war. s.i.i nuvihnrwm be i... a vsﬂi i... nﬂﬂinnﬂly MVMI dnuuvinnl w. AFVLING pnai was ins oreacn as aiieged oyine piaiiirii, irie arnoiini payable we the piainim and me ieniire dime agreement [131 The coniraciuai arrangemunis neiween me penies sridiiid not oe soieiy deierrnined by wriiien instruments as me Ienns oi an aereeirieni need not be based on e wrmen dooiiineni. The piainirirs case was not soieiy oased on me agreenienii. The plainml aiso produced the invoices wriicn were made rd ine deiendenis. ii was nor ine deiendani: sass inai iney did not siioscrioe no the services provided oy me piiiiniiu. [44] In iriis regard, DWI in his \|es(Imony agreed mail The charges payable to me oia i« «or me pnoiooopy were determined eased on usage This was in iaci a cenhrniacion none oiher inen by me deiendani nirnseiionne iaci dune reniai onne photocopy mach e and irie reie oi cnardea payable Pwi produced the unpaid Invoices as evidenee These invoices were marked dclieciiveiy as Exhlbil P1. The sisiienieni oiadooiini was marked as Exnioii P2. [45] in respeci dune algumenl inei ine agisenieni nad iapsed iiner expiry oi so nionins irorn ins dais ri was enierad, I ani er ihe considered viewinaiine iecuhaiine pnoiodooy niachine was never reiiirned in me piainmi di ihai ins phlinllﬂ did noi lake possession oi ir is a niievani van in be considered under seciion ii oi ihe Ewdenoe Ad 1950 Tnis facl when oonsideied in cdnneciion wilh oiiicr evidenoe is reievani In snow on me oaiance oi pmha s that ii wns highly orooeoie in me dirciirnsaances met I e agreerneni was sun in suosisience between me pames The eirier evidence reievani id be wnsidend are as «dime- (ei rirsiiy, the iesiinidny di PW2 ihai me a reeineni wdiiid be aiiioinaiicaiiy renewed aﬂer irie in ai 60 mon\|hs iiniess terminated by irie Customefi (bi secondly. the last man «he piainmv did receive Nquests ior rnainienanoe even in December 2012, and (:2) inirdiy, ine ducurrlarll vdiiinie lrend circa ociooer 2014. rn b5D1niZ2¢.0EZHnEYpJXlD9I “None s.n.i nuvihnrwm be UIQG M new i... nﬂmruﬂly MIMI dnuuvinnl vn nFiuNﬂ Wm! [16] In cunlendlnsl tnal tne agreement had lapsed alter 60 months. are defendant lrr effect was Plmirlg a defence 01 llnlllauun, Thls was evlﬂeru al pavagraph 5 ol lne slaternenl ul aelenee. ll was ler lne delendents to prme lhe defence of llrnrleuen by shuwlng that me agreement ned lepsed on lne reels and evldanca, I am or lne oonsldered vlew lne aelendents had not drscnerged Ihls burden and sum tne delence o1 hmilallnn had falled Concllulon [11] I ﬁnd nn nrent M me present appeal Tnere are no ougerlt reasons Io demonstrate that me learned lnel lud es {mdmgs are plernly wrong ln lhe circumstances‘ l hereby dismiss lne appeal with Rmuuou on cost. Dated 29 Oclobar 2023 AHMAD S RIR MOHCI SALLEH JUDGE HIGH COURT or MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR For the appellants Albert Koo Tan sp Hun (Messvs zen, cnyuen a. Farlrze) For me respondent. Tay Pt): Hal’ (Messrs Slmrerl/eel Tay & Ca ) IN p5mnlz2r.oEzHnalp-IXIDSI “Nate s.n.l nuvlhnrwm rs. tr... m my r... nﬂﬂlnlmy mm. dnuuvlml Vﬂ .nurta vtmxl	728	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
BA-14-2-08/2022	PERAYU 1. ) ENG CHIN TIAN 2. ) LIM CHIN LEE 3. ) TEH HENG LEE 4. ) Ang Kwee Sin [Merayu Sebagai Wasi Harta Pusaka Lim Kee Yik, No. K/p: 620906-10-5085] RESPONDEN KETUA PENGARAH LEMBAGA HASIL DALAM NEGERI	This is an appeal by the appellant on the question of law pursuant to paragraph 34 of Schedule 5 of the Income Tax Act 1967 -	06/11/2023	YA Dr Shahnaz Binti Sulaiman	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=323d608f-fd9c-4279-8900-07dcc2a899ea&Inline=true	1 BA-14-2-08/2022 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: BA-14-2-08/2022 ANTARA 1. ENG CHIN TIAN (No. K/P: 591225-10-6357) 2. LIM KEE YIK (No. K/P: 620906-10-5085) 3. TEH HENG LEE (No. K/P: 671021-10-5627) 4. LIM CHIN LEE (No. K/P: 640423-10-7391) …PERAYU-PERAYU DAN KETUA PENGARAH HASIL DALAM NEGERI …RESPONDEN [Dalam perkara Pesuruhjaya Khas Cukai Pendapata di Putrajaya Rayuan No. PKCP(R) 81/2018 (Y/A 2004), PKCP(R) 82/2018 (Y/A 2004), PKCP(R) 83/2018 (Y/A 2004) dan PKCP(R) 84/2018 (Y/A 2004) ANTARA 1. ENG CHIN TIAN (No. K/P: 591225-10-6357) 2. LIM KEE YIK (No. K/P: 620906-10-5085) 3. TEH HENG LEE (No. K/P: 671021-10-5627) 4. LIM CHIN LEE (No. K/P: 640423-10-7391) …PERAYU-PERAYU DAN KETUA PENGARAH HASIL DALAM NEGERI …RESPONDEN] 06/11/2023 16:14:59 BA-14-2-08/2022 Kand. 32 S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 BA-14-2-08/2022 JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an appeal by the appellant on the question of law pursuant to paragraph 34 of Schedule 5 of the Income Tax Act 1967 (“ITA”). [2] This appeal stems from a notice of assessment issued by the respondent dated 4 May 2017 for the year of assessments (“Y/A”) 2004. Brief Facts [3] The facts of this appeal are as follows. Syarikat Gagah Makmur Sdn Bhd (“Gagah”) is the beneficial owner of a piece of agricultural land under Sandakan Lease No: 085330016 in Sungai Lokan Telupid di Daerah Beluran, Sabah with a land area of 906.60 acres. The appellants are the shareholders of Gagah, which is a real estate company. [4] On 27 April 2004, Gagah entered into Sales and Purchase agreement with Express Credit Sdn Bhd (140202-W) to acquire a land under Sandakan Lease No. 08533016 in Sungai Lokan Telupid, Daerah in Beluran, Sabah (“the said Land”) for the sum of RM6,799,500.00. [5] Gagah obtained a loan facility from Public Bank Berhad for a sum of RM 4,000,000.00 for the purchase of the said land. S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 BA-14-2-08/2022 [6] On 30 November 2004, the appellants and others entered into Share Sales Agreement to dispose their shares in Gagah to Yap Lam Boon and Ang Kun Huat, the new shareholders. [7] Only two (2) appellants, namely Eng Chin Tian and Lim Kee Yik, filed Form CKHT 1 on 26 September 2012, while the other two appellants, namely Teh Heng Lee and Lim Chee Lee did not. [8] The respondent issued Form K dated from 28 April 2017 and 4 May 2017 for the appellants for Y/A 2004. [9] The appellants appealed to the Special Commissioner of Income Tax who dismissed the appellants’ appeal. [10] The appellants then lodged an appeal in this court. Law Pertaining to Appeals from the SCIT [11] With regard to whether, the High Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the SCIT, paragraph 34 of Schedule 5 of the ITA provides as reproduced below: “(1) Either party to the proceedings before the Special Commissioners may appeal to the High Court on a question of law against a deciding order made in those proceedings.” [12] Furthermore, paragraph 39 of Schedule 5 of the ITA further reads: “The High Court shall hear and determine any question of law arising on an appeal under paragraph 34 and may in accordance with its determination thereof— S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 BA-14-2-08/2022 (a) order the assessment to which the appeal relates to be confirmed, discharged or amended; (b) remit the appeal to the Special Commissioners with the opinion of the court thereon; or (c) make such other order as it thinks just and appropriate.” [13] In the case of Kenny Heights Development Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2015] 5 CLJ 923, the Court of Appeal stated: “[24] We make the general observation that courts, acting in accordance with the law, are at all times bound by the legislation placing jurisdiction and authority in specialised bodies such as the SCIT. The legislation specified that the deciding order of the SCIT is final and allowed appeals to the court on question of law and not any grievance. It underlines, within the SCIT’s jurisdiction, its authority, and prevents the courts being buried under an avalanche of tax appeals by parties unhappy with the determination of the KPHDN and the SCIT.” [Emphasis added] [14] Morever, in the case of Saujana Hotel Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2011] 9 MLJ 213, the court held: “[8] It is trite that it is open for the High Court to review the decision SCIT, if SCIT. (a) misdirect themselves on the law; S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 BA-14-2-08/2022 (b) answer the wrong questions; (c) omit to answer a question which they ought to behave answered; (d) took into account factors which they ought not to have; (e) reached a conclusion on facts which is not supported by the evidence before them; and (f) made a finding of facts which no reasonable person in the circumstances would arrive at.” [15] In the Director General Inland Revenue v Rakyat Berjaya [1984] 1 MLJ 248, the Federal Court stated: “In Chu Lip Kong’s case the Privy Council reversed the Commissioners’ decision on the ground that it was wrong in law. The approach is similar to that of the House of Lords in Edwards v. Bairstow & Harrison [1956] AC 14; [1955] 3 All ER 48; [1953] 36 TC 207, a case universally acknowledged as the leading authority on the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law. It was also referred to by the learned Judge. He was fully conscious of the critical distinction between questions of fact and law. He stated the position succinctly and accurately before citing a passage from the above case. At p. 54 of the Appeal Record he reminded himself in the following words: ... The power of the Court to interfere is quite limited where the findings of the Special Commissioners are basically findings of facts. The Court will interfere only if there is no evidence to justify the finding or where they have applied erroneous tests in arriving at their S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 BA-14-2-08/2022 conclusions or have drawn a wrong inference on the facts or have misdirected themselves in law ...” [Emphasis added] [16] Founded on the provisions of the law and the authorities stated, the High Court may hear appeals from the SCIT on a question of law. Analysis and Findings [17] The question of law posed for this court’s consideration is whether the learned SCIT was correct in law in deciding that the disposal price of Gagah is RM6,799,500.00. [18] The facts disclose that Gagah is a real property company whose shareholders are the appellants. In this regard, when the matters involves a real property company, the provision of the law that is applicable is paragraph 34A of the Second Schedule of the Real Property Gains Tax Act 1976 (“RGPT Act”), which is reproduced: “Acquisition and disposal of shares in real property companies 34A. (1) An acquisition of shares in a real property company (hereinafter referred to in this paragraph as “the relevant company”) shall be deemed to be an acquisition of a chargeable asset, and where such shares are disposed of, such a disposal shall be deemed to be a disposal of a chargeable asset notwithstanding that at the time of disposal of such shares the relevant company is not regarded as a real property company. S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 BA-14-2-08/2022 (2) The chargeable asset in this paragraph shall be deemed to be acquired— (a) on the date the relevant company becomes a real property company; or (b) on the date of acquisition of the chargeable asset. (3) For the purposes of this paragraph, the acquisition price of a chargeable asset shall— (a) where subparagraph (2)(a) applies, be deemed to be equal to a sum determined in accordance with the formula— 𝐴 𝐵 𝑥 𝐶 where A is the number of shares deemed to be a chargeable asset; B is the total number of issued shares in the relevant company at the date of acquisition of the chargeable asset; and C is the defined value of the real property or shares or both owned by the relevant company at the date of acquisition of the chargeable asset; (b) where subparagraph (2)(b) applies, be determined in accordance with paragraph 4 or 9. (4) Notwithstanding paragraph 5, the disposal price of the chargeable asset in this paragraph is the amount or value of the consideration in money or money’s worth for the disposal of the chargeable asset. S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 BA-14-2-08/2022 (5) This paragraph shall not apply to an acquisition or a disposal of any shares under paragraph 34. (6) For the purposes of this paragraph— “controlled company” means a controlled company as defined under the Income Tax Act 1967; “defined value” means the market value of real property or the acquisition price of shares as determined under subparagraph (3); “real property company” means— (a) a controlled company which, as at 21 October 1988, owns real property or shares or both, the defined value of which is not less than seventy-five per cent of the value of its total tangible assets; or (b) a controlled company to which subparagraph (a) is not applicable, but which, at any date after 21 October 1988, acquires real property or shares or both whereby the defined value of real property or shares or both owned at that date is not less than seventy-five per cent of the value of its total tangible assets: Provided that where at any date the company disposes of real property or shares or both whereby the defined value of real property or shares or both owned at that date and thereafter is less than seventy-five per cent of the value of its total tangible assets, that company shall not be regarded as a real property company as from that date; “shares” refers to shares owned in a real property company; S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 BA-14-2-08/2022 “value of its total tangible assets” means the aggregate of the defined value of real property or shares or both and the value of other tangible assets.” [19] At the crux of this appeal is the consideration paid by the purchasers for Gagah shares pursuant to the Share Sale Agreement. [20] What then, amounts to consideration. Section 2 of the RPGT Act defines consideration as follows: “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires— “consideration” means consideration in money or money’s worth;” [21] Subparagraph 34A(4)of the Second Schedule of the RPGT Act provides: “(4) Notwithstanding paragraph 5, the disposal price of the chargeable asset in this paragraph is the amount or value of the consideration in money or money’s worth for the disposal of the chargeable asset.” [Emphasis added] [22] The Osborne’s Concise Law Dictionary (Seventh Edition) defines consideration as: “Consideration in the sense of law may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other.” S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 BA-14-2-08/2022 [23] In the case of Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v. Tan Teik Kin [2010] MSTC 7, 117 reference was made to consideration from Pollock’s Principles of Contract (12th Edition) as follows: “Consideration means not so much that one party is profited as that the other abandons some legal right in the present, or limits his legal freedom of action in the future, as an instrument for the promise of the first. It does not matter whether the party accepting the consideration has any apparent benefit thereby or not: it is enough that he accepts it, and that the party giving it does thereby undertake some burden, or lose something which in contemplation of law maybe of value.” [24] Founded on the definition of consideration as alluded to above, it could be concluded that consideration may take the form of not only money but the value of money. This means that consideration includes one party gaining profit, rights, advantages, or another party bearing losses, damages, and responsibilities. [25] Coming back to this instant appeal, the consideration stated in the Share Sale Agreement between the appellants and the purchasers dated 30.11.2004 states: “J. Subject to the fulfilment of the terms in recital G above, the vendors have agreed to sell all their Ordinary Shares in the said company together with the said property to the said company together with the said property to the said purchasers and/or their nominees have agreed to purchase the said same at the agreed purchase price of Ringgit Malaysia Six Million Seven Hundred Ninety Nine Thousand and Five Hundred (RM6,799,500/-) S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 BA-14-2-08/2022 only (hereinafter referred as to as “the Purchase Price”) [the agreed price for the ordinary shares stands at RM6.7995 per shares] upon the terms and conditions hereinafter contained.” [Emphasis added] [26] From a reading of clause J in the Share Sale Agreement, the purchase price of Gagah’s ordinary shares was agreed between parties at RM6,799,500.00. This amount was further confirmed by the appellant’s witness at the SCIT hearing. Moreover, one of the purchasers of Gagah’s shares, Mr Yap Lam Boon had, vide a letter stated that the purchase price of Gagah’s shares is RM6,799,500.00 including the loan which amounts to part of the purchase price. [27] The appellants contend the consideration is the amount paid by the purchasers to the appellants which is RM2,799,500.00, not RM6,799,500.00. [28] In this regard, this court looked to clause 2 of the Share Sale Agreement as reproduced below: “Klausa 2 In considering of sum of Ringgit Malaysia Two Million Seven Hundred Ninety-Nine Thousand and Five Hundred (RM2,799,500/-) only paid by the purchasers directly to the Vendors’ Solicitor as stakeholder upon the execution of this agreement being deposit and the part payment of the purchase price… … the Vendors do hereby sell all the purchasers and/or their nominees do hereby purchase the said company, the said shares and the said property together with vacant S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 BA-14-2-08/2022 possession at the agreed purchase price Ringgit Malaysia Six Million Seven Hundred Ninety-Nine Thousand and Five Hundred (RM6,799,500/-) only upon the terms and conditions hereinafter contained but subject to the existing loan.” [Emphasis added] [29] From a reading of clause 2 of the Share Sale Agreement, it is plain that the RM2,799,500.00 is part payment of the purchase price. The amount of RM2,799,500.00 is not the purchase price as contended by the appellants. The applicants argued that there is the outstanding loan facility amounting to RM4,000,000.00. Based on clause 2 above, it would appear that the consideration for the appellant’s Sale of Share is RM6,799,500.00. [30] Pertaining to the loan from Public Bank Berhad, clause 3 of the Share Sale Agreement states: “Klausa 3 The purchasers shall ensure that the principal sum of RM 4,000,000/- in the respect of the said loan together with interest and all other sums levied by Public Bank Berhad are duly paid by the company at the same times and in the manner required by Public Bank Berhad. The purchasers shall be deemed to have full knowledge of the terms and condition thereof AND shall have the option to pay the said sum of RM4,000,000/- in cash within seven (7) days of the Completion Date so that the loans could be cancelled forthwith.” S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 BA-14-2-08/2022 [31] Based on clause 3 of the Share Sale Agreement, the purchasers are given an option to pay the full sum of RM4,000,000.00. This option was not taken by the purchasers. The amount of RM4,000,000.00 being the principal sum of a loan from Public Bank Berhad. The purchasers are to ensure the RM4,000,000.00 and all others sums due to Public Bank Berhad is to be paid by Gagah which has now been purchased by the purchasers. [32] As the purchasers did not take the option to pay off the loan with the principal sum of RM4,000,000.00, the loan from Public Bank Berhad which was taken by Gagah, is still due. This consequentially means Gagah (and Gagah’s new owners) are tasked to make the installments for the loan. This is evident from clause 3 of the Share Sale Agreement which states that the purchasers shall ensure the principal sum of RM4,000,000.00 in respect of the loan together with the interest and all other sums levied by Public Bank Berhad are duly paid by the company (Gagah) at the times and manner required by Public Bank Berhad. [33] This entails that the loan which was the responsibility and/or liability of the appellants has now, in accordance with the Share Sale Agreement, become the responsibility of the purchasers. The Public Bank Berhad loan is no longer the responsibility and/or liability of the appellants. The appellants are no longer liable or required to make payments towards the loan. It could be concluded that the appellants had benefited by no longer having to ensure the payment of the loan to Public Bank Berhad. [34] This benefit, in the considered view of this court, amounts to a consideration under the Share Sale Agreement. The purchase price S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 BA-14-2-08/2022 of the shares in Gagah as per the Share Sale Agreement is RM6,799,500.00. [35] Moreover, the Share Sales Agreement plainly and clearly states the purchase price is RM6,799,500.00. In this regard, reference is made to the case of Mulpha Pacific Sdn Bhd v. Paramount Corn Bhd [2003] 4 CLJ 294. [36] Therefore, this court is of the considered view the purchase price or the consideration for the sale of ordinary shares in Gagah is RM6,799,500.00. This court is also of the considered view the appellants had benefited as the appellants are no longer required to pay of the loan of RM4,000,000.00 from Public Bank Berhad. Conclusion [37] For the aforementioned reasons, this court is satisfied that the SCIT did not err in law. The decision of the SCIT is hereby upheld and affirmed. This appeal is dismissed with costs of RM3,000.00 subject to allocator. Date: 06 November 2023 (SHAHNAZ BINTI SULAIMAN) Judge High Court of Malaya, Shah Alam S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 BA-14-2-08/2022 Counsel: For the Appellant: Gan Boon Yi Tetuan Yeong & Mak Advocates & Solicitors No. 5-2, Jalan Temoh, Off Jalan Tapah, 41400 Klang, Selangor klg@ym.com.my +6 03 3344 2902 / 11 For the Respondent: Nur Aina Mohd Jaffar, Intan Natasha binti Yusri Bahagian Litigasi Cukai, Jabatan Undang-Undang, Ibu Pejabat Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia, Menara Hasil, Aras 11, Persiaran Rimba Permai, Cyber 8, 63000 Cyberjaya, Selangor. +6 03 8313 8888 S/N j2A9Mpz9eUKJAAfcwqiZ6g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	20,993	Tika 2.6.0
WA-24-39-07/2022	PEMOHON GULATIS EXCLUSIVE SDN. BHD. RESPONDEN 1. ) TRIBUNAL RAYUAN CUKAI BARANG DAN PERKHIDMATAN 2. ) KETUA PENGARAH JABATAN KASTAM DIRAJA MALAYSIA	Goods and Services Tax Act 2014 – DG Customs issue Bill of Demand to Applicant – Applicant Appeal against the DG’s decision to Customs Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) – CAT dismissed the AppealGST Act – s 62(1) - Applicant made an application for remission of the amount stated in BOD to the Minister of Finance - Application to the Minister rejectedGST Act -– Applicant Appeal against the DG’s decision to Customs Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) – CAT dismissed the Appeal – Appeal dismissed without hearing the meritsAdministrative Law — Judicial review — Whether CAT has jurisdiction to hear appeal once application for remission under s 62(1) rejected by the Minister – Whether there was a breach of natural justice	06/11/2023	YA Dato' Wan Ahmad Farid Bin Wan Salleh	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d471cc3b-3be0-49fd-9994-a420dd10c324&Inline=true	06/11/2023 09:42:52 WA-24-39-07/2022 Kand. 22 S/N O8xx1OA7/UmZlKQg3RDDJA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O8xx1OA7/UmZlKQg3RDDJA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O8xx1OA7/UmZlKQg3RDDJA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O8xx1OA7/UmZlKQg3RDDJA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O8xx1OA7/UmZlKQg3RDDJA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O8xx1OA7/UmZlKQg3RDDJA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N O8xx1OA7/UmZlKQg3RDDJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal wA—24 39—o7/2022 Kand. 22 Eb/ll/202] 29:42-52 DALAM MANKMIIAH TINGGI MALAVA DI KUALA LUIIPUR DALAM WILAVAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAVSIA BAHAGIAN RAVUAN um KIJASA.-KIIASA KHAS smgu EEMQLA no WA-24-ZN-OZ 12:; Damn Perkin mlnganm mam pamlohunan m bawzh Amman 55A mm.» 1 Kaedzrr Knodah Mahkamah 2m2 Dan Dmam perm: mamana Seksyen :3, Saks)/an um um zcy, seksyaﬁ sump, nan Sevsyen 364:7 Akla cum Earang nan FaII\Ndma(an 201o(Am my Dan Daham Deﬂmm Inengenaw S-Kiyen 5 ma cum smug dun Fukrmmlun Psmansuhan 2D1E(AkIa aosv Dan Dnlam pemara menpenm am: Yummzn dengan Mum mum KE WBUSAKBZ/0B)D§3a[CAG)\|\|5W bcnnnkn 25012917. zsoezmv, omzon, can u B12018 Dan Dalzm Derkam Rayuan Na mcapw 91512015 dangan Ivlukan Kapmusan mm no. L0943198272 dzn L2D47I)-Hwn nan Kapulusnn Tn\|1un.I\ Rayuln Kzslam pads mun 2022 Dan D.-mm venom Alwan SSA Kaodah 1 Kasuaruuaaan Mahkamzh 2012 Dan 0. m gamma mm...m mm!-writ pemorm. berlankh nmznzz din zamzuzt xapm Maman Kzwangan I sm uaxxmn/umz1KuniRDmA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! nnmk rnyuin penyeleaalan pevmayaran cukal/dull G51’ ANTARA GULATIS EXCLUSIVE SDN. EH\|l (NO. SVARIKAY: 22723741) ...r-ERAVU DAN 1. TRIBUNAL RAVUAN KAsrAM DIRAJA MALAVSIA 2. KEruA PENGARAH KASTAM l:llRuA MALAVSIA ...REsl=oNDEN-RESPONDEN gynsmsur [1] Thsle is befnre me an appeal by way 91 an Org axlng Summons cos‘; wed bylhe appellant‘ Glllalis Exclusive sun Bhd. against me declsloﬂ pl lne Custom Appeal Tribunal (“the Trlburlzll“). The maunal had dlsmlsscd ma eppellanrs appeal agalnsl me Dlfﬂdcf General ol cusloms (‘me DGC“) aeclslpn la lssue a lalll of Demand (‘EOD“) dated H 7.201s [2] This 05 ls supported by the alﬁuavil pl Pavllélr smgn a/l Manleel slngn ln End 2 (‘ms-2“) Enclk Pavliar is one ailne dlreolors of the appellanl company [3] The hnellaciual badmruund lnal leads lo lnls appeal is as lollows. [A] As alluded to earller, on 11.7 2018‘ me Dec, who Is me 2"“ vespondenl hereln, lssued me BOD up the appellant \|o demand lne appellanl pm; me goods and sun/lees lax (‘est’) arnaunllng lo RM24uAglgBE10 (51 The EDD lrllar aha slalas as lollws. Dlmaklumkan bahaws luan lelan kurang mumbayav Cukai amng dun Pnlkmumman lemvoh Dercukal dzn 014”-2ﬂ15lIlrlgga won zma Dsngsn ml‘ menplkul semen as Akla cm. Earaw darl Pemnlamalan 2m4. man 2 m uaxxlun/umzlKuniRDl).lA «ma s.n.l n-nhnrwlll a. LAIQ4 w my a. nﬂmnallly mm: dun-nun: VII arlum Wml ndnlah dmmml untuk membua\| bayanan a.k.. Iupam ax aa\zm LAMPIEAN A yang benumlan am 2.049523 10 [6] Aaqrievea mm lha ussuanoe or ma son‘ the appeHan\ appeared in one Tnhunal At tho Tribunal m AtIheTribuna\,1he warned Chairman took mu) oonslderahon a lelwer Iran! the Mmslry ui Finance, which reveneu In me appncanon made by Its: appellam dated 25 4 202! for 5 remlssmn of the amount slalad in the BOD The \|e\|\|Bt [mm Ihe Ministry‘ dated 24‘122021, slated «name Mln sueyorrmanoenaa rqecied meappuuaanon made by me appﬂcanl. It says as follows. Pevmohunan Gmshs bnzluswu Sdn um um marvﬂnpalhn ramm Iebanyak sn-/. ua am amaun tunwakan ssr betjumuh nmvnmse so man pun unaum elm vs Mtnlen xawangau dun dlmikmmkan bahavra pelmnmrun mam max mlmuskan [3] Aﬂer navmg referred to me MmIslry‘s waner, me learned cnawv-an was 0! me view that the Tribunal had no mnsmctian tn hear me appeal The Tribunal made me (allowing ﬁn gs. Memlndangkan nenan aaa kzvulusan vs Murvtun Kuvansian be auaa aum mu... Puviyu bennnkh 2a ApN2ﬂ21alas pemam yang sauna yang dﬂmlkln ulih Puayu dlhm ruyunnnyn kc mhunal wanu imaun ma. Gsr beramaun RNI2,04Q,9£s.1a damn: an mm" bmunkh 1: Juli: me man Tnbunal hdak rnnmpulvyaw bsdzmgkuua uruuk mendengarrayuan mu [9] In short, the appeal belore the Tribune! was strud< cm. 1 am uaxxmn/umz1KuniRDmA «mm. saw nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! At the High court [10] The lssue In lhls appeal before me rs very elrarghltorward It concerns me applicalrpn cl 5 mmll) o1 me Customs Act 1967, mad lpgemerwlm 5 I26 cl me seeps and saruioee Act 2014 (“GET Act“) and s 5 01 me Goods and Samoa: Tax (Repeal) An 2018 (‘GST1R)A5l’\| [11] For CIBVW, s I41M(1joHhe cuslorns Acl ls reproduced here. we Tnburlal shall have lullsdsclinn lo oelernnne my anvall made unaer sevnnn us cl lne Acl. secmn :7 :1! me Buclu Ad «we, smsealarl 96(5) o+ lra Sales Tax Acl Em‘ seenon al or meservlee TaxAc12D1B am secllon126o1lhe raplalod Guods ma Servlcal Tu Acl zuu .- provraoe urudev secllun 5 al me Good: and same. Ynx (ﬁapeal) Acl zols [Acl mm 112] My undersrnnoing cl me proeeuure to be adopted by an aggrlaveﬂ parly Is as lollows. Sumac! lo s m al are (EST A421. en sggvlsved person may appeal lo me Tribunal on any uecreron made by the nec under s 126(1) or [he GST Acl. [13] Under s 127m) of me GST Acl, me Trlbunal shall have jurisdiulon lo delermlne appeals reaung lo goods and senrreee lax except on mailers specmsd lrl the Fourlh Schedule Now‘ what are me mailers epecmeo In lrre Fourth Schedule’ Para lx) onrre Founrr Schedule prcvldes lnal lne Trlbunal has no llmsdlollon la hearany appeal ll il mvolves any lelusal by lhe DGC lo rsmll any penalty or surcharge may 5 52(2) [14] s 52(2) pl me GST Acl prouulee lnnl lne DGC may rernll me whole or any pan 04 me penalcy payable er surcharge accmed unper lne Acl wnere ll Is Just and equluole lo do so. [151 Learned counsel lor me appellanl look umbrage in me manner me Trlbunal condulﬂed me appeal To begin wlln, leemea counsel wncedsd mat the refusal 0! "Is DGC Io remll any penalty or surcrrarge unders 52(2) onrle ssr Acl n rlotappealahle However. learned counsel oonlenoeo lhal rne Mlnlsler‘s rqeclnn or me remlsslon does um fall wllhln [M ambll of para (kl 0! me Fuurlh Schedule ollhe EST AC1. IN uaxxmA7lLlrnzlKun‘IRDl).lA “Nair Smnl mmhnrwlll a. u... m my r... pﬂnlrrnllly ml. dnuuvlnrrl wa nFluNG vmul [ls] AI msl blush, lhls Ilne nlargumerll ls Indeed very penuaslvs. [171 Hnwever, allow me In analyse lurlher [18] An application for remission can be made lo the Mlnisler undev s 82(1)cl‘\|Ile GST Actor In the us under s 52(2). [19] ln nus 05, me appllcallall [or remlsslon ln me letter daled 26.4.2021 was made In the Mlnllue: under s 62(1) and no! lo me DG. ln exemislng hls dlscrellon. lhe Mlnisler had ruler.-tea me appllcallorl Vlde me Mlnls\|ry‘s leller dated 24 122021 In my oorlsldered view, once we relecllon was made under s 62(1), me proper lurum lllal la open to me appellant ls la challenge the ﬂllrllslellal declslon of way of a Judicial revlew prooeedlng under 0 53 of lhe Rules el calm 2u12 lzal So, and I say the wlul respect, me Tribunal was carved In naming Ihal V1 hld no junsdlcllun kl quail me deolslon OI Ihe M ’ er In rlelacllng the application (or remlsslorl. The ]\|JVlSdlCll0fl belongs excluslvaly lo the High Court under para ‘l of me Schedule cf the Couns o[Judlca\|ure M1 1954 [21] The second oomplalm M me ipuellsnl IS mat the dismlssal or me appeal by me Tnbunal was in a summary marlrlarand had breached (he principles cl natural luslxce. Aomldlrlg 10 learned cwnsell (he appeal was ﬁxed var neanng belore the Tribunal url 27.6.2022. Two weeks balm: the hearing, there was a case rrlanagemenl (‘CM“) before me Tribunal an 1A 6 2022 The mlnules of me cm on 14.5.2022 are reproduced llele Purayu raaa dakunlen lull Nzmyi Penyalz SIks4. Peguam Clk Flm-lull walla Covld—I9 Ehllau akaﬂ avlail Trlhunal Kzwmsnn Raylnn pevayu aoalanlan [221 The ocmplalnl made by me apaenanl IS mal the aeclslon all me Tribunal ls perverse In that. la) The Tnbunal dlsmlssea the appeal wllrloul rlearlrlg lhe menls :2! me appeal, wlllm was ﬁxed Iur heanrlg melely Iwo weeks away. m uaxxlun/umzlKu)‘IRDl:uA “Nair Smnl nuvlhnrwlll a. HIGH M my l... nﬂnlnallly ml. dnuuvlnnl vu aFluNG ml ib) The appellant was ncl given a reasonable opporiuniiy io be naard wnicn included irie submission ol legal issues periainirig lo me appeal (c) Tne appeal was dismissed in ine absence cl ine appsiieiirs appoinied oourisei, inereby denying ine appellarii an opppnunicyio subrnli on me issue ol the Tnbunais iunsdiciion to hear Ihe appeal. [23] To my Nllndi the real queslicn is, would ine presence cl me counsel or ccriilnuaiion oi me lieanng oi Ihe appeal sews any purpcee7 wiiii respeci, ldo noiinink so. As l alluded io earlier, ins Tribunal had no iurisdiciion lo cuasn a decision niade by me Min er Tnere was no decision niada by me D6 cn the issue oi ienii ri Even ii mere was, a decision niads by ins DG, uiwnicn more 5 no evidence lo ma: effect, is noi appealable under ;xara(k\|o1Ihe Founh Schedule oi irie GST Act. [215] in my considered view, mare is no poini in rernming ihe rnanario ine Tribunal, as urged by learned counsel lor ine appellani, wlien irie end resuii wuuld be lhe same [25] Does iliis mean inai irie appellanl ls leﬂ wiin no remedﬂ I believe iiie appaiian is noi li eiher wiihoui remedy since ine decision was made by Ina Minisier. ine appellant could commence leave seeking iudioal review against inai decision. However, ineappeilarii inusi ﬁisi cross one nurdle crexieriding ine iinie under 0 53 r 3(7) oi the ROC [26] rriis OS is dianiissad wiin no order as io oosls Tiiillilii a November 2023 LA (wan AHMAD FARID am WAN SALLEH) Hakim Mahkamah rincg. i<uaia Lunipur. s rn DlxxIDA7/UMZIKDDWDDIA “None s.n.i In-vlhnrwlll i. ii... a may i... nﬂnlnallly MIMI dun-vlnril wn nFluNG Wﬂxl Pmax-pmak. Eagw Pmak Pariyu Nschahs Mark Pere<Ia muan Juan‘ mu, we 5 Nair Bag: Pmak Respondent Nur um Emu Murah src Bahsqlln wammanuan, mm... Knstzm n-up Malayswa 7 sm uaxxmn/umz1KuniRDD.IA «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm!	979	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
BL-12BNCvC-4-02/2023	PERAYU LESLIE TAN CHIN SIANG RESPONDEN FUN N CHEER SDN. BHD.	- Appeal after full trial- Appeal by the Appellant against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge who dismissed part of the - Appellant’s counter claim for abuse of process- The Respondent company claim against the Appellant for breach of employment contract- Appellant then counter claimed for unpaid salary and tort of abuse of process- The Industrial Court find in favour of the Appellant and ordered the Respondent to pay Appellant the sum of RM 186,200.00 as compensation for terminating his employment without just cause and excuse- The Sessions Court Judge then proceeded with the trial in the absence of the Respondent- High Court had was not provided with Session Court Judge ground of judgment in the records of appeal- Order 35 rule 1(2) of the Rules of Court 2012- In the absence of any challenged made by the Respondent on the Appellant’s evidence, the trial judge under a duty to consider and accept in total the evidence put forward by the Appellant in defending his counter claim for damages on tort of abuse of process	06/11/2023	YA Puan Norliza Binti Othman	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e6bfc9ba-1661-4a56-baf9-466c31ae4eb8&Inline=true	1 IN THE HIGH COURT IN KLANG IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN CIVIL APPEAL NO.: BL-12BNCVC-4-02/2023 BETWEEN LESLIE TAN CHIN SIANG APPELLANT AND FUN N CHEER SDN BHD RESPONDENT (IN THE SESSIONS COURT IN KLANG) SUIT NO: BL-A52NCVC-13-03/2021 FUN N CHEER SDN BHD PLAINTIFF AND LESLIE TAN CHIN SIANG DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGEMENT This is an appeal by the Appellant against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge on 2 February 2023 who dismissed part of the Appellant’s counter claim for abuse of process. 06/11/2023 15:12:22 BL-12BNCvC-4-02/2023 Kand. 22 S/N usm/5mEWVkq6UZsMa5OuA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 A. BACKGROUND [1] The Respondent company Fun N Cheer Sdn. Bhd. filed a claim against the Appellant at the Klang Sessions Court vide Suit No. BL- A52NCvC-13-03/2021 for breach of employment contract. Appellant then counter claimed for unpaid salary and tort of abuse of process as the suit was filed for the purpose to exert pressure on him to drop his case against the Respondent for unfair dismissal at the Industrial Court. [2] On 29.6.2022, the Industrial Court find in favour of the Appellant and ordered the Respondent to pay Appellant the sum of RM 186,200.00 as compensation for terminating his employment without just cause and excuse. [3] On 14.12.2022, Respondent filed a suit in the Klang Sessions Court hence where this appeal arose. When the case came up for trial, Respondent refused to take part in the trial after the Court turned down their request for adjournment. The Sessions Court Judge then proceeded with the trial in the absence of the Respondent. Only Appellant gave his evidence on the day of trial without any challenge from the Respondent. On 2.2.2023, the learned Sessions Court S/N usm/5mEWVkq6UZsMa5OuA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Judge dismissed the Respondent’s claim and allowed the Appellant’s counterclaim on unpaid salary but dismissed the counter claim on tort of abuse of process. Hence, the Appellant filed this appeal. B. RESPONDENT’S REPLY [4] The Respondent’s claim against the Appellant is amongst others declarations for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust and damages from those breaches. The Respondent submits that the claim falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court. [5] Respondent submits that they had rightfully filed their claim in the Sessions Court as it could not have brought this matter up in the Industrial Court. It is a bona fide and just claim which is supported by cogent evidence. It is further submitted that the Respondent’s claim in the Sessions Court and their claim in the Industrial Court concerns two distinct and separate matters. The Appellant is claiming for reinstatement and back wages, whereas the Respondent claim against the Appellant is for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust. S/N usm/5mEWVkq6UZsMa5OuA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [6] Both issues and elements need to prove both claims are different. The Industrial Court cannot decide and award damages for breach of fiduciary duty and/or breach of trust as these matters can only be decided and awarded by the civil courts. Furthermore, Respondent has filed this action on 19.3.2021, 8 months before the Industrial Court concluded its proceedings on 16.11.2021. Hence, it cannot be said that this action is tantamount to an abuse of process by the Respondent. [7] The Respondent has pleaded the details of breach of fiduciary duty as well as breach of trust in great length at paragraphs 8 to 17 of the Respondent’s Statement of Claim. The Respondent genuinely believed that the Appellant has committed breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust against the Respondent. This is a bona fide action against the Appellant before the Industrial Court concluded its proceedings on 16.11.2021. [8] The Respondent reiterates and further submits that the Industrial Court’s jurisdiction and remedy available are limited to reinstatement, compensation in lieu of reinstatement and/or back wages only. The Industrial Court has no jurisdiction or power to S/N usm/5mEWVkq6UZsMa5OuA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 grant any form of damages to the Respondent in respect of any breach of fiduciary duty and/or trust by the Appellant in this matter. [9] As for the absence of the Respondent’s at trial was not the fault of the Respondent. It is unfortunate that the Respondent and its previous solicitors had a dispute before the trial began. As a result, the Respondent’s previous solicitors refused to continue with the trial. In essence, it is the Respondent’s position that the Respondent’s previous solicitors had failed to uphold the interest of the Respondent by not attending the trial. Further, it cannot be said that the Respondent has failed to attend court. In fact, the representatives of the Respondent were present in Court. This shows that the Respondent wishes to proceed with the action but the solicitors refused to do so. B. DECISION [10] The Court of Appeal in UMW Motor Sdn Bhd & Anor v Allan Chong Teck Hin [2021] 5CLJ 193 had laid down principles regarding appellate intervention when it comes to decision that is premised on a finding of fact through evidence from witnesses by the trial judge. The Court of Appeal held: “Principles of Appellate Intervention S/N usm/5mEWVkq6UZsMa5OuA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [28] Foremost on our minds are the two tests, namely, “plainly wrong test” and “insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence” test for appellate interference in subordinate court’s findings. In respect of the two tests, the Court of Appeal held as follows in Lee Eng Chin & Ors v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2CLJ 19; [2003] 2 MLJ 97 at pp.90 to 99: (2) Generally, an appellate court will not intervene unless the trial court was shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision or where there had been no or insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence. Judicial appreciation of evidence meant that a judge who was required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. He must, when deciding whether to accept or to reject the evidence of a witness, test it against relevant criteria. Thus, he must take into account the presence or absence of any motive that a witness may have in giving evidence. Where contemporaneous documents existed, he must test the oral evidence of a witness against these. He must also test the evidence of a particular witness against this. He must also test the evidence of a witness against the probabilities of the case. The principle central to appellate interference is that a decision arrived by a trial court without judicial appreciation of the evidence may be set aside on appeal. [29] The Court of Appeal has reiterated in Ong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors & anor appeal [2019] 1LNS26; [2019] 3MLRA 322 at pp 329 that: - S/N usm/5mEWVkq6UZsMa5OuA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 (25) We are mindful of the limited role of the appellate court in relations to the findings of court made by the court of first instance. The general principle is that the conclusion of a trial judge is a finding of fact on the oral evidence based on the demeanour and credibility of the finding ought not to be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is plainly wrong. It would not be sufficient to warrant an appellate court interference merely because the appellate court entertains doubt whether such finding is right. (see: Lee Ing Ching Ors v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003]2CLJ 19, [2003] 1 MLRA 95. Gan Yook Chin & Anor v Lee Ing Chin Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309, [2004] 2 MLRA 1). [11] This Court had no privilege in reading the learned Sessions Court Judge grounds of judgment for it was not provided by her in the records of appeal. This is a finding of fact after full trial, but this Court in exercising its appellate jurisdiction, did not know as to how the learned Sessions Court Judge derived at her decision in dismissing part of the Appellant’s counter claim i.e. damages for abuse of process. All and all, this court had to rely on the parties submissions and records of appeal minus the grounds of judgment. [12] The Appellant raised two issues in this appeal: - (i) Whether the trial judge erred in disregarding the binding authority of Takako Sakao v Ng Pek Yuen & Anor [2010] 1 S/N usm/5mEWVkq6UZsMa5OuA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 CLJ 381 FC, where evidence given by a party is accepted as true in the absence of any evidence from the other side; (ii) Whether the trial judge erred in not drawing an adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Respondent for not adducing evidence to prove their claims against the Appellant. [13] Respondent did not gave evidence at the trial, though they are the one who filed the suit. In other words, they did not proved their claim in court. It is only the Appellant who testify and the Court accept his evidence without being challenged by the Appellant. Unfortunately, part of his counter claim against the Respondent for damages for abuse of process was dismissed by the learned Sessions Court Judge. Here is the handicapped that this court in hearing this appeal facing, i.e. not able to perused the reasoning by the learned Sessions Court as to her finding on this particular issue since no grounds of judgement provided by her. [14] The Respondent filed this suit in the Sessions Court on the ground that the Industrial Court cannot decide and give remedies in respect of breach of fiduciary duty and/or trust by the Appellant. S/N usm/5mEWVkq6UZsMa5OuA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Respondent’s submits that the Appellant had only provided bare assertions to alleged that the Respondent had filed their for collateral purpose of pressuring the Appellant to drop his case in the Industrial Court. No evidence was produced to proved this and no documents are before the Court to substantiate the allegation of any pressure exerted by the Respondent on the Appellant to withdrew its claim. [15] In this case, according to the Respondent’s solicitors, representative of the Respondent did attend court on the trial date but did not testify on behalf of the Respondent as in defending their claim or challenging the Appellant’s counter claim. Under Order 35 rule 1(2) of the Rules of Court 2012, the Judge may proceed with the trial in the absence of the other party. “ O.35 rule 1(2) – If, when the trial of an action is called on, one party does not appear, the Judge may proceed with the trial of the action or any counterclaim in the absence of that party, or without trial give judgment or dismiss the action, or make any other order as he thinks fit. The Appellant’s solicitors refers to the Federal Court decision in Takako Sakao v Ng Pek Yuen & Anor [2010] 1 CLJ 381 at pp 388 -399 that set out the two consequences of a party who failed to attend court or to take part in trial: S/N usm/5mEWVkq6UZsMa5OuA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (i) the presumption that the evidence given by the other party against him to be true; and (ii) the presumption of adverse inference being drawn against him. [16] Since the representative of the company though present did not take the witness stand and testify, the learned Sessions Court Judge proceed with the testimony of the Appellant without any challenge from the Respondent. In KPF Niaga Sdn Bhd v Vigour Builders Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 141 it states: “ [37] ….It is trite law where a party raises a material fact and this is not contradicted , the fact would be treated as unrebutted evidence in support of the party who adduces the fact (see, inter alia Ng Hee Thoong v Public Bank Bhd [1995] 1 MLJ 281 and Seruan Gemilang Makmur (via his secretary Dato’ Ahmad Tajudin bin Sulaiman) [2010] 8 MLJ 57. [17] As for the issue that the company initiated the suit at the Sessions Court for a collateral purpose to exert pressure on the Appellant to drop his case at the Industrial Court. During trial in the Sessions Court, the Appellant gave evidence that the Respondent commenced the action in the Sessions Court 6 months before the S/N usm/5mEWVkq6UZsMa5OuA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 trial at the Industrial Court was “to exert pressure on me to withdraw the Industrial Court case”. The evidence given by the Appellant as to the issue of collateral purpose to exert pressure on the Appellant as to withdraw the suit in the Industrial Court against the Respondent was not challenged by the Respondent; so, this must be taken as the truth. [18] So, in the absence of any challenged made by the Respondent on the Appellant’s evidence, the trial judge under a duty to consider and accept in total the evidence put forward by the Appellant in defending his counter claim for damages on tort of abuse of process. Her failure to consider an unchallenged evidence on this issue tantamount to miscarriage of justice to the Appellant. In fact, she should have ruled that the presumption of adverse inference should been drawn against the Respondent for failure to adduce evidence in defending the counter claim put forward by the Appellant. [19] Based on the above reasons, this court finds that the learned Sessions Court Judge had erred in law and fact in dismissing the counter claim of the Appellant for tort of abuse of process against the Respondent. Therefore, the appeal by the Appellant hereby allowed with cost of RM3,000.00. As for the damages for tort of S/N usm/5mEWVkq6UZsMa5OuA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 abuse of process, this case will be remitted back to the Sessions Court for assessment of damages. Dated 4 October 2023 -sgd- (NORLIZA BINTI OTHMAN) JUDGE HIGH COURT KLANG PEGUAMCARA BAGI PIHAK PERAYU : Law Office of B H Khor C-1-1, Clubhouse Mont Kiara Sophia No. 2, Jalan Kiara 1 Mont Kiara 50480 Kuala Lumpur PEGUAMCARA BAGI PIHAK RESPONDEN : Enho Grace & Partners C-26-05, 3 Two Square 2, Jalan 19/1 46300 Petaling Jaya, Selangor S/N usm/5mEWVkq6UZsMa5OuA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	15,734	Tika 2.6.0
PA-24NCvC-494-04/2023	PEMOHON OOI THYE PENG RESPONDEN 1. ) PENDAFTAR BESAR KELAHIRAN DAN KEMATIAN JABATAN PENDAFTARAN NEGARA MALAYSIA 2. ) KETUA PENGARAH JABATAN PENDAFTARAN NEGARA 3. ) Ketua Setiausaha Kementerian Dalam Negeri 4. ) Kerajaan Malaysia	Constitutional Law: citizenship – by operation of law – whether child found exposed or abandoned – section 19B of Part II of the Federal Constitution – Article 14(1)(b) read with section 1(a) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution. - Article 14(1)(b) read with section 1(e) and subsection 2(3) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution –whether the Applicant was ‘not born a citizen of any country’ - Whether the present matter ought to have been commenced via Judicial Review.The Court finds it not fatal to proceed via Originating Summons. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the elements under Article 14(1)(b) of the Federal Constitution read together with Second Schedule Part II Section 1(a) and Second Schedule Part III Section 19B of the Federal Constitution and Article 14(1)(b) read together with Section 1(e) Part II, Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution.The Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to prove that he was a new born child found abandoned in any place as the Plaintiff’s adoptive father is the one who received the Plaintiff from the Plaintiff’s birth mother. Jus sanguinis not established.The Plaintiff’s application herein is dismissed with no order as to costs.	06/11/2023	YA Dato' Anand Ponnudurai	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=c16b572b-24f7-4990-97fa-b03e661da54b&Inline=true	06/11/2023 17:03:48 PA-24NCvC-494-04/2023 Kand. 24 S/N K1drwfckkEmXrAZh2lSw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N K1drwfckkEmXrAZh2lSw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N K1drwfckkEmXrAZh2lSw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N K1drwfckkEmXrAZh2lSw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N K1drwfckkEmXrAZh2lSw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N K1drwfckkEmXrAZh2lSw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of 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document via eFILING portal S/N K1drwfckkEmXrAZh2lSw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N K1drwfckkEmXrAZh2lSw *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 1>A—2am:vc—49¢—oI/2023 Kand. 24 Cb/H/201] 1": DALAM MAHKAMAH TIIIGGI DI PULAU PINAN6 (BAHAGIAN SIVIL) SAMAN PEMULA 140.: PA-2ANcvc.Mwo4Im2a Dalam Perkara Anikel 5. 5, 14(1)(b), 15. 19‘ 30, 31 dan Fas:\ Kadua Bahaguan ‘nga Perlembagazn Parsekuluan Malaysia. Din Dalam Psrkarl Akla Penuavuran Kskahvan dan Kamahan 1957. Dan Dalam Perkara 5(3)(a) Peraluranv Pemluran Pendaﬂarzm Negara 1990 den Am Pendnﬂaran Negara Dan Dmam Perkara Awran 7 den 7:: Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. ANTARA 001 THVE PENG (No. sun Kelamran CI 92075) PLAINTNF DAN sw Ktamckkzmxrnnzww "'I 1 °’ “ ma Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm u. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm 1 PENDANAR BESAR KELAHIRAN DAN KEMATWAN. MALAYSIA 2 KETUA PENGARAH FENDAFTARAN NEGARA, MALAVSIA 3. KETUA SETIAUSAHA KEMENTERIAN DALAM NEGERI 4. KERAJAAN MALAVSIA DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Illroducllon [1] Th s is vet am7lhe( case or an indlvxdual seeking me Ccun‘s mcewenocn In oonver cmzenshiv slams Dursnanl m Aniu\|u14(1)(h) of mo Fodnrul connlmon read «ogemer mun alhar pnwrsrons of me Fudull Couammlnn. [2] Tnraugn Endosurz 1, the Plalnuﬂ sought mlel-aha several declarannns reaaung to ms quasi to he oonverrea Malaysian zensmp. The dedaralbons suugm are premised on [he Iouowing. n. pursuant In Anicln aux») o1 mo Fndcrnl Colulllullon lead \|ogemer wrm me second Schndulu (prayer: 1 to 3)‘ o. pursuant to Anlcln 15(2) Ind 15A 0! mo Fudorll consmuuon (prayer: 4 and 5), srn Ktamckkzmxrnnzww vase I on- me sum no-nhnv MU he used m mm no mwmnnuly MW; mmn vn mum wrm "min is widely aceepied inai noi every decision made by an au»rcn'iair'-ne body is suriaoie ior iudieei review Ta quaiuy mere rnusi be a suﬁcien! public iew eiemeni in me oeeisien made For rnis, it is neeessaryin examine pain are source oiine power and me name onne decision made, whether me aecrsron was made undare siaiuiorypowar (see pers. 61 Halsbury Laws oIEngIam1, an edn, 2am Reissue, vol. 1(1)) To illusvaxe xnrs, we will refer to is number oi aumormes involving drsnrrssai [mm service by a public euineriry or a purported pupirc authority (:2) we abssrvad me: a chal/ange on me use of appropriate procedure is very much iaci based. rnus, i! is necessary for a judge when deciding on such maiier lo iirsr eseenern Whether mere is a pubiis law eierneni in ma drspure. ii rhe dawn for iniringerneni is based eoieiy on suosrenuua principles cnzubiic /aw men me appmpviale process snouid be ny weyci o 5.: RHC Iii‘! is a mixture oi public and prrvaie iaw man ma court rnusi ascenern wnren oi me (we is more predominani. ll ri nss a suzrsrannai public iew element men me procedure under 0, 53 RH!) musi be aocpreu. oinerwrse, ii may be set aside on [be ground that K auusas me courts process. But iv me rnarier is under prime law mougir concerning e public aumcriiy, me mode in cornmencc susn action under 0. 53 RHC is Iva! suitable. Aside from uris, mere could pa omsl cireumsiances like me kind in my Dela’ Dr. zsrnory, Muen depends on me leave of me case. But gansrally me com snouio be circumspecl In allowing a mans: which snouiu be ay way era 53 Rncio proceed /II another Iornr To say rim :4 is open to an appiicanz ssekmg]uL1)ciLI/Ioviow lo aieci any made he preisrs. as implied In Kuenmg wsierrroni, IN mannmsnxnaznzieu me :1 am we s.n.i n-nhnrwm as used m yam .. mn.u.y MIME dun-mm vu muue we would, in our covisidersd opinion, he rendering 0 53 RHCIsduridari1 niis is oerfam/y not the intention olrhe dmllars onriis ruie who had a purpcse in mind mien ins purpose amiis ru/a is in the interest or good adniinisiiarion, man INS ruia must be adhered to. except in Me iimiied arid exoepﬁonal circumstances discussed " [241 in my view, having cansidared an maneis, mere IS eenainiy some merit In the Dedermants‘ mntention that there is pubiic law element in me displﬂe at iianc HUWEVOI, i am also ol me View Ihﬂl mere is indeed a mixlure v1 publicaiid private iaw eieinenis and as such, il 1! men ioi ine com to aseenaiii at me two is predominant. The deteniiinauon oi unis issue mucri depends on me vacis olmch se. on me one riand, meie is no dispute that ooiisidenng ii is a decision at a pubiic body max is being criaiiengec, ii would be indimtive oi a predominant pubiic law eiemeril Hawever, on me other hand, mnsidemig met me anpiicaumi peﬂalns in a ngrii of uiiizensiiip oi‘ an individual pursuant In the Fodoral Camﬂtullnn, ii is also arguable mac uie uledominanl element is private law. [25] As sucn. I am unabie id wriclude wiin any uerlairily mat uie piedominani eiemem IS eixnei public or piwaie um but, in my view. quiie balanced i have aisc noted iiom ma iaw (spoils that simiiai appliulions far cinzenanin have men been decided ina onginaiing Summons and as sucn, in oidai nm In cause any iniusuca no me Plairihﬂ, lwlll pruaeed \|o eensideima mania cimeappiicaiian in any event, the Deleriulrils hive mo submllled iuiiy on me mums oi lhe PlalnIiIl's appiieaiion for oiiizananip by opeiaiion di law IN KiﬂrwlckkEmXrAlhZi$u Page uni u -use a.n.i In-vihnrwiii be used a van; me nﬂgiriniily Mimi dun-vinril Va nFiuNG wmi [26] in passing, in so iaras the Deienoants oontention that this application was inoornpatent due to a failure to sla\|e the relevant pmvislons in the intituierrient, I ﬁnd no rnant in the same The basis at the otaany one trial concerns the requirement at the intitulenien primacy of the rule against titrgation by surprise. [27] in this case. the Plaintm has in the intitulernent clearly refewed to order 1 of III: Rul of court 2011. the Birth: and Doalhs Registration Act 1351 and its various ruies as well as the various imdes of the Federal Comllttmon Thi , in my Vlewt is olearty sumcient and the Detenaartt cannot be at an be said \|o be surprised in any manner in that the nature of the appitcation is imrnediateiy ioentziiattle [25] As such, I will now dent with the subs\|anItve issue at this case and the merits oi the Piaintiirs application for citizenship Gov Illﬂ Pnnclg rr gns p [291 on generai prmuples gwemlng citizenship py operation o1\aw,lhe same has been dadared by me Feoerat court as a turioanieritat right and at reiateu homes are bound to aornpiy with its dictates izeriship. both substantively and proaeaurniiy, including interpretation of the crlizenslvp provisions are exotusivety housed in the Fndanl constitution and nwhere eise inotuaing other statutes. song a leaving no room for discretion The provisions on tunoarnantat right, it has been held that otizenshtp pmrvisinris must be oanstrueo as proaaty as pusslble without changing or warping in K1drwlckkEmXrAlhZ\$u was as at II we s.ii.i Illﬂhlt M“ be used M van; aa migiruﬂly MIN; dnunmrtl VIZ aF\t.ING am the 'basa' meaning WVIIVB pmvislons which hmll lhase Hams must be ounslmed as nalmwly as possible [See the cases aroma AAnor v. Kotu: Pungarah Pondafurln Nngnrn. Malaylla a on [2021] 4 MLJ 2:5 and ccu 5. Anal v. Pondlfur auar Bagi Kolahlran mu Komnin . MIlIysi:[2IZ21 1 cu 11. [30] on ounslﬂullonal unxarpreaanon, me Federa\ court m Khairuddln Abu N-sun v. Datuk Sari Hnjl Ahmad Humxall & or: And AnotmrAppuI [2019] 5 MLRA 459 enunciated as folluws “Sumac n « we mar In me case L7! Data‘ Sen 1: H1 Muhammad Nizar Jamaluddm V. Data’ Sen Dr Zambry Abdul Kean, Allnmey Geneva! (lnlervener) [2010] 2 ML! 235 where where Annn Zakaria (CJ (Malaya)) (as he men was) sal [27] One alher nnponanz gums n. rnlerplelarion ofCons1nubon .5 Ihal‘, ‘The consemman must be consniered as a wnwe, and so as to give elem, as Ia: as pussmls, In all us przmsions 1: is an eslab/rshed canon cfconstrlubonal aonsmmnon ma: no one pm/man onne Conslmman »s in be sapalaled from aﬂ ma others, and consnisled alone, but (he! all ma pmvnslons bearing upon a parltcularsulyecl ale to be brougmmln View and to be so mrslprelad as to arracz-ma me great purpuse ol lhe Instrument. An elementary rule 0! ccnslmctron I; ma! if posubla. effect shou/I1 be gmn 2.: every part and every want are conar/moon and (hat unless (hers is some clear reason m the connary, no pomon of the Iumlamcntal law should be muted as snpamuoua. (See Danananu Urus Sdn IN Ktamckkzmxrnnzww Page 11 am -ma sum In-nhnv M“ be used .a van; me m\g\ruHIy mm; m.n.n VIZ mum puns! Bhd v Kekarong sdn Bm1(Bsr Cwnc/[Malaysia inlsrvaner) [2004] 2 MLJ 257)“ [31] As seen eamer, the Plamnw submits that he \5 armed to duzensmp an M0 grounds . Amcle max») of me Federal Canslrlulmn read tcgelhev with Second Schedule Fan II sscnon 1(a) and Second Sshedme Pan Ill Section 195 of the Federal Cnnsmlmun‘ and u Amcle 14(I)(b)read wgelhevwim seam ue) Pan n, Samnd Schedute cl me Fedem Cunsllhmon. [32] I mu naw endeavour Io address each ollhe above gmund In delaﬂ. AnicIn1g1uh mm Federal connmmon md Iggumerwlm s-com: schodulu Pm II Section 1;: and Second schodulu Pm III suctlun we aim: Fndunl Conslitulioll [33] Arllcle 14(1xn) oflhe Federal Ccmllmtlon pmwaes as lollmvs: ‘Part //I CITIZENSHIP Chapler 1—Acqms4'I:run or Cmzsnsmp cmnnsmp by opmdon on-w IN m~.mzmxrAznzm 7:5: 15 mu -m Sum In-nhnv WW he .15.. m van; M mIg\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VII mum puns! 14. (1) Subjec? lo [M prov/slons onhis Parr, Ma following pevszms are amzans by operation oi/aw. ma: rs to say: (-9) (:2; avarv DOISOH bom on at any Mu/qua Dag. and hm/ina nnv al the gualiﬂcaﬂons sggurmd in PM ll :7! me Second Schedule [34] The re\evan\| pnruon of run II of mo sucuua Scludulo of tin Fudlnl comlmuen is reproduced belw as lulluws ‘PART u [Article 14(1)(n)] CIWZENSHIF av OPERATION or LAW OF PERSONS BORN on GR AFTER MALAYSIA DAY 1 Subjocllo the ﬂvssmns orpan m ol Inf; Qmm mg,‘ Hue rul/awmsnzinm: mm m 5: gﬂur Mglagra Day an cit;-tens by Emma ofgw Illa! is I0 5!)’ (1!) W917 of Whose gram: one amen is a :13 um ggm mg‘ gm: 3 gifiunol gnnansnﬂy resmnpg ng agmgm and rw - (HF IN Ktamckkzmxmznzww vane 15 um «um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [35] A mm! reaamg ohhe abvve es1abhshes that a person wiH be emmed to Malaysuan ciuzenshwp by operaﬁon at raw provided me fallmvmg premnamons are Mmled: a. a person must be born on ur anev Mmaysxa Day, 17 mm wrtmn lha Fsderaman, and c. The person's parents one at Vans! \s an the time of me birth em-era cmzen or pennanenuy resident in me Federauon [as] In sum, me provxsion ciAniI:Iu14(1)(b)Ieadlogelharwim smion l(a) of Pan II of mu Socnvld Schedule of am Fod .\| Constllullon anoumpasses me lwm concept of ‘ms 30/1‘ and /us sangmms'. [371 These concepts were mqﬂamed and applied by the Com nmppea: m me case omnuatur Hour Kalnhlun dun Klmadan, lll mu. v Plug Wu See 5 Anor (applylng on man burial! and as uugmon npn mum my Pnng Chang Chum, nchlld) [mm 3 IIILJ cm which n. summansed Is Voﬂcws: a. \n determining me cllizensmp 0\| a person, the concepts 01/11: sun and jus ssngmnts are appllcabb I7. Jus sonwmcn mean ‘r\gh\| oHha s '91 mn Hghl omxznsmp wmcn Is the rim of anyone bum In ma Iamtnry ov a same In IN K1drwlckkEmxrAlhZ\$u nu mm 'NnI2 Sum ...n.. WW he .15.. m van; M m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VII mum puns! naltunalny orcmzenshlp which determined based on me place or Iemtnry where a person was born‘ c Jus sanguims, wmm means ‘ugh! of blood‘. 15 a prmcwple at nauanalny law by which cilizenship is determined by havmg one nr mm parems Wha are cmlens ovme slate. and d. Aniclu 14(1)(b) uad with Suction nu), Pm II, smma Schndulo M mo Fodural Conslimliun Is a pmvwswon which .5 anchored on the Memems of bum me concepts by [us sangurms and jus salr, whereby u. cmzenshlp ova person \s Vaoesble to me place at bnnn (jus salt’) namely, Ma\ays\a, and n we or the person‘: parents (the Hghl of blood or ms sanguinis) at me lime umue persons um I: a Malayssan ulizen. [an] The Court 01Appeal m the case 0! Ping Wu 5.. (supra) were unanimous in Ihewr decwsinn that (ha ward “parsnIs' VI Aﬂlcll 1A(1)(b) read wm. smlon 1(a), Fin In, Second Schndulo of an Fndunl comuumon mars CD bbnbgman parents and luum um the applicants dwd N1 {mm m crucial bkllnglcil, or the [us sanguims, criterion as emmgea under (he sawd arlnde [39] Applymg the above lathe prssaanlcase‘ in my mew the Plaumm ws mt enmled ID clhzenship by bgsraum of law as wmlsx me Plamzm wns mesa Dam wumn Ihe Fedenanun speullcally m sexapux, Kualn IN Ktarwtckkimxwznzmu me u 0' an ab» smm n-nhnrwm be used m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! Lumuur, tne Ptaunttﬁ V3 unabte to esmbﬁsh that etmet ms b\okJg\|ca\ parents at the ante ol nta man were 8 Malaysian unzen or permanent mstdanl. [401 ll IS mle law mm ne who asserts must prnve The burden Vs an the Plamliﬂw nrwe that ma Ptainms bio\ogu2\ mother and/or fatheris a Malaystan ciuzen or permanent resident in Matsysia. nus IS established tn me use at Lim Jon Mslan a. Alto! v. Kntua Pnngarlll J. nun Pnndaﬁlrnn Nngar: 1. an [Inn] a cu 412 Where tne caun a1Appea\ neta as fcllmls: -[33] ll la a wallaszaallshatl pnnclpla ol law that ne wna asserts must prove Thls ls pamculsrly 51: VI naspact cl lacls wnlclt are wlllun lha appellants‘ knawlaaga. ma burden olpmcfls on ma appellants In aslaollal. on ma balance olpmbamlllles (hat the second appellant, ‘was not born a cmzen of any country’ Such rule of evldenca ls enunciated tn s. 103 oltna Evidence Act 1950 men prowdes The burden ol pmol as to any particular lac! has an mat person who wtsnss the cam! 10 be/rave M It: axlslence, unless I! IS pwwded by any law the! proof annat last shall lie on any pal-tlcu/at person. [34] ln lna case all Ong Boon Hula 5 Anor u Manlan Hal Enwal oalam Nsgarl, Malaysla 4 ms 1200315 cm 42. ll was held mat ma lmman IS on ma apphcenl to prove nls cmzanshlp sklllus by Ills ralal/an! documents, (ha absence of WNCIV would be fnlal to prove ms clalm “ IN K1dlwlckkEmXrAlhZ\$u ml! Is all] ‘Nata Sam ...n.mn as as... m yaw ms mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] mulls Wm! [M] In lne prvsenl case‘ ll cannot be dlspulad that line iderrllty ur lna parents are unknown as OKN nor ulnar wllnassas are unable la pmvide any eaganl evidence la aslanllsn lnal al the lime of lna Plaimwrs lalnn, ma Plalnws magical rnolner orvalnar IS anher a Malaysian cllllsn or a permanen\| vasldanl in Malaysla [42] II ls pamnenl la nole that lna only lnd ual wno has petsmal knuwledge uflne Plalnlilrs history belore and me ﬁrs1 few rnontns of lne Plalnllrrs mm: ls OKH [43] Meanwhlla, ma Plainlllrs grananlolner, 0KH's uncle and OKH’s mend have derlved lnlormallan from OKH and nut lnraugn dlracx oammunlcalmn wlln Ina Plalnllrs biuloglcal molner [44] ln my view, lna delalls (2! me lzialogrcal rnolner ol the Plalrlllﬂ ara mdeed sparse, lo say l.l1eleasLlnlhevarious statutory ueclarallans, lrllerview nolas as well as palms rapoﬂ lodged, l note lnal no lnlunnanon was plovlded In relatlml lolna mological mother save for lna lacnnal sne was an Indlarl woman named suula aboul 1B or 19 years cl age. I an rlcle however that OKH '5 lnend. one Olhmlrl Bin Monarnea Said nas sualaa In ms alalulary declamliun also 25» January zoos lnal DKH naa lakan ma Plalnllll From a Malaysian Indian lany named Suslll Hawever, wllh respau. I am unable lo plaue any reliance on Ihls as he oenalnly lacked any personal knnwlauga as ln nls prlov slalulory declaralkm alnnnea two years aarllar an 2'-1 Augusl zoos where he slnlea as lollowa. rn marwmznxraznzlsu lag. In oil] Nuns a.n.l n-vlhnrwm be used m van; was nﬂglnnllly MIN: dun-mm vla nrlum ma [3] I4] [5] c e declarallorl lnel lrre amendments we Aniclo 14 of un- Fldornl Oomlllullan are urlcens1llImonnI and agarnsl lne haslc slnrclure aoanne (prayers 5 lo 8) The Plelnliw seeks lunner various arrallary orders sun as directlorls lo me Delenoenls lo issue e new lzlrm eenlrmle, a MVKAD as well as damages and oosls (prayers 9 In 13). Huwever. pursuant to me ﬁllng u1a9ﬁl1avlIs,arld prlor lo me rrearlng ol mls origlnenng summons, learned counsel lor me Plairnm lnlomled that me Pleinnlr was wllhdlawlng prayers 4 la 8 at me orlgrnepng summons and would only be seeklng are players In paragraphs 1 ln 3 as well as me enullary orders In paragraphs 9 to 13 onno Onginallng summons Upon hearing me panles orally wnn lhe ald cl lner wrluen suornlsslons, I oisrnlssed the Plernmrs application. l wlll now set out me badlground lasts, me penles‘ respeclrve conssnlrons/supnnssrons end my reasons lor rlavlrlg alsmrsseo the Plernulrs dalm aﬂer rlavlng enerysea lne evldenoe and me appllcakzls law ln relauon no me issues at hand. Backgrorrnu F ch [3] l7} rn K1drwlckkEmXrAlhZl$u -use s.n.l n-vlhnrwm be used m mm r.. nﬂnlruﬂly MIN: m.n.n VI] nFluNG pm The sallerll laols that can be gleaned lronr me vanaus amoaurrs relloo upon by pmies can be sumrnoneea as lallaws: The Flairlllﬂ was bum on 8" June 1986 and ll ls Illa P\|ain\|ﬂT3 case Ihal he was rnlornreo by ms ndoplod lemer. Mr Del Kaal Hoe vallumn '2) SAYA MENGENALI KELKIARGA w/ DAR] TAHUN 195.7 DAN MENGETAHUI ool KEAT HOE ADA MENGAMB/L ANAK ANGKAT PADA TAHUN 1955. DAN Elm DIBERITAHU ANAK TERSEBUT ADALAH ANAK INDIA LAHIR DI SETAPAK KUALA LUMPUR " [45] As such, I and that me Plammv has «awed \|o discharge me burden of establishing max amnar malogucax plnanl us a Malaysian amen nr Dlrmlnenl residsnt Amcla 14 I] b] ol mo Fodurul Consmullun mu nogmm wm: 5-mm: scluaulo Pm II and Sncond Snhndulc Pm lll Snctlon ms ohm ndlrnl conmmnlou [45] The Pharnuﬂ mmevar oonlands he >5 enmlad «a Malaysian ahzunsmp by apenalmn :11 law by vmua a1Ar\IoIo um(n) 91 Put II 01 mo Sncand Schiduln at an Fadorll Connltutlan and Staten we of Pan III M tho Slcnnd Scllldult am an Fodurul Cannilnllon [471 The Prawn soaks lo asuansr. ma satisfaction eflhe requuamamav ms sangurni: by relying on Somlon 193 of Fun of III: Socond schod u M nu Fudcr com: u Ion wmoh pm-«ides as voucws ‘PART III [Amde 31) SUPPLEMENTAR‘/PROV/S/DNS RELATING TO CIT/ZENSHIF IN Ktamckkzmxrnnzww run :1 nln -ma Sum ...m.. M“ be used m van; me m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VIZ mum puns! Inlerpvetafbn "195 For the purposes ol Part I and H 01 [his Schedule any new born cm round exposed in any Mace shall be presumed, unm the contrary is shown, to have been Dom there of a mother psnnansrmy resident (here, and n he IS hated by virtue of this sacrum as so born, the date tithe ﬁndmg shall be raken In be the dale oflhe man.‘ [As] ll \s In be noted um Socﬂon «:5 M Pun III of mu Sncond Scludull 04 mt Fadanl Conllltvﬂon is npplicame by virlue nf Armin :1 M In: F. ural consmuuon which pm: es as rouaws '31 Apyllclﬂan alsneond Senodulu Unit! Fnmamsnz atherwiss pm»/lass, Me supplomenlury provfsrons contained In Fun In or ma Sacond Schedu/9 shall have effect fol the purposes olgls 9. [49] Areadlng otsmlan 193 at Pm III of me Slwnd Sclludulo of mo Fodual Conslllullun ls Ihallhe presumpuan than me Plum! 5 mother Vs a permanznt Iesiden! and me date of the ﬁndmg man be taken to be me data av ma nmn would only be triggered pursuanl Ia socuon 135 M van III nf nu. Soccnd Schudulo of mu Fcdoul connnuuon pnmdod Ihul me P\aInIIﬂ IS awe to aslahllsh max ne us '5 new born child found sxposedm anyplace‘ IN Ktamckkzmxrnnzww me xx mu Nuns s.nn n-nhnrwm be used m van; .. nnmruﬂly mums dun-mm VIZ mum puns! [so] The Fedcril com in the case oi can 1 Am: (lupra) had (M oppmunﬂy to expound the applicalinn Msocﬂnn19B of Fun III of the second schedule em» Fodual Conslltmion where wlwas held as louows. 75:] The operslrve words m s 195 Ala ‘any new born om Iaund exposedm any place‘. rne purpose or lm: section, when mud n context, mus! be 10 cover new mm cmidren who are Isl! and drscnvarad In e place without any me 0! (hair Dialog/cal palsnts we tuke[udr'c1aIno1It:a enne harsh realities ol me we mdudu new born cnudren Iell abandoned near dumpsvtss, baby hatches, poem or school lollets, mm 0/ worsmp end so an. A mere: meaning o1 ‘exposed’ suggests . new bum amid who was Titscovured’ exposed at any oflhese locations [54] As such, the broadest pomtble interpretarionol the ward ‘round exposed‘ is to accovd R a meaning to include a child abandoned at the place at birth by the turth mother whose Identity IS unknown. The operative word ‘exposed’ in s 195 must therefore encompass me plight of abandoned new bum children. ovherwrse the ovaramhmg intent of pnavenung ststelsssneu would be defeated or rendered illusory.“ [51] In shun, me pnnopnes that can bedenved mm the dadskzn in con & Anor (suprn) are as muons. IN Ktdmckkzmxmzhzmu age 7.: oil) -we s.nn ...n.mn be used m vary .. nnmhnﬂly MVM5 m.n.n VIZ mum we a The purpose oi section 195 oi Pan lll oi lilo Slcand schuduls of the Feds I consmutiun musl he to cover newborn diildrsrl who are leil and dismvsied in a glass wllhoul any trace dithen olnldoical parents I: A lnelal meaning oi “exposed“ suggests a newborn child who was “dlsoovered" exposed near dumosites, baby halcnes, publlc or school toilets. places of warahlo and so on, c the moadssl pnssible interpretation of Iris word ‘loulid exposed" I510 Include a child abandoned at the plane oi birth by the birth momerwhase identity is unknown, d. Drloe n is shown or avensd trial a newbom child IS 'todnd exposed" [or abandoned), Mn Lhlngs are presumed, that IS. I mat the child is burn to a mother who is psnnanenuy resldem at the place where ms ﬁndlng was made (the lus sarlgulrlls pvesumptlon), and ll. the date or me ilndlng is taken as the date oi lha birth. a. once section ma ls Invoked. any pany challaiiglng any oi these presumpnons must enhsr show that: i. the dllld was not born of I movie! parinanenuy rasldaiil at the plam where ins newborn clilld was iouno, 0! n ma d-is oi lhe ilndlng ls nol lhe dale dithe blnh. IN Kldmckkimxmzhzlw Page 11 M II -we s.n.l in-ilharwlll as tn... M van; ..e nﬂgliullly sun. mm. VIZ .nuna wiul [521 In my view, n Is (or me Fkawnliﬁlo ﬁrsﬂy show that he vans wmmn me man or me broader meaning oi the word vourm exposed’ Only when lhe above cmerinn V5 eslablishad. Ihe burden men shmsm me Defendams In Iebm me presumpuan that has ansen by establishmg mat: a, the Plamm was not born of a momer permanently leswdam, h. me Plavmﬂ was not born at the mace whera he Is found, and c the date Mﬁndmg is not me date of him: [531 Based on me mainly or evidence before me mdmilng me venous documentation pmvlded by om n <5 dearlo me that me Pkawmifl was handed over by the Pl:mI\ﬂ‘s biological movher, Suslla to am when me Pia-mm was around 3 m 4 mums 01d as evldenosd .n ma (allowing: a. Surat Akuan amrmed by OKH on 24“ January I991 Much scam.-. as lolkwvs: '2. Pads 8hb../Ame, 1967, seorang kawan says (perempuan) Isiah nre/ahirkan searang bay: Islam‘, suami kawan saya Iersshm Isiah lama meninggalkan belrau Isnpa berira darr lidak pulang /sg: sehmgga bay: (srsabul drlsmrkan. IN mrwrmzmxrmzm y... 25 mu -m Snr1n\n-nhnrwmbe used m van; .. nrimnnﬂly mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! 3 Kawan says tsrsebut relish dating bar/umpa ssya dan menyevahkarv bayr lerssbur yang dinarvlakarv Om Thye Psng, kapsda sew oleh kerana uenau mak mampu meluaga bayi lerssbul” u sum Akuan Serklnun Permohonan Pandaﬂarln Le.-mu Kalahlran dated 2'“ Augus\| mus wmch Indudas as [allows 'LEBEH KURANG UMOR KANAK-KANAK IN! 3 ATAU 4 Bl/MN, SEORANG PEREMFUAN KENALAN BANGSA INDIA BERNAMA SUSILA TELAH MENYERAH KANAK KANAK KEPADA SAVA (001 KEAT HOE) DENGAN nmx MEMEERIAPA AFA DOKUMEN PENYERAHAN KANAKKANAK IN! 0/ KUALA LUMPUR: :2. Pnhce Reporl by OKH daled 31-I Deoambel zoua whereby n was slated as «ouws: “PADA TARIKH TIDAK INGAT EULAM SEPTEMBER TAHUN 1985, SA‘/A TELAH AMBIL SEORANG ANAK LELAK! DARI SEORANG PEREMPUAN IND/A YANG BERNAMA SUSILA, YANG MENYERAHKAN KANAK- KANAK TERSEBUT KEPADA SAYA DAN SAYA AMBIL KANAK—KANAK TERSEBUT SEEAGAI ANAK ANGKAT TANPA SEBARANG DOKUMEN DAN PENGENALAN DIR!‘ .1. Sum! Akuan by OKH dalsd 24'“ August 2009 wnereby it was ammued as (allows sw K1drwlckkEmXrAlhZ\$u ran: as mu um smm ...m.mm be used m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! 'sAvA TELAH MENEPIMA SEORANG saw HEMNGSA IND/A PADA usm 3 HINGGA 4 BI./LAN PADA TAHUN 7986 YANG DISERAHKAN OLEH /BL/NVA SEND/RI KEFADA SAVA. SEMASA F-ENVERAHAN BAVIINI, TIADA SEBARANG DOKUMEN D/BER/KAN KEPADA SAVA DLEHIBUNYA ' 3 Huang Kenyabln Temuduga Daﬂar Lama! sum Ke\ahman by OKH ml 2a- Angus! 2009 when m was shied as follows dunng ma enquiry wI(h\|ha1" Delandnm: -9. Bempa /amakuh Iuan/puun mangsna/I ksnak-kanak dan rbubapa kn/n3I<—kanak7 SAVA KENAL EMAK DIA LEBIH KURANG SATU TAHUN. MASA ITU SA‘/A SELALU PERGI HANT/IR BAJU EERNIAGA DEKAT KEDA/ KAWASAN MAK DIA EERNIAGA 17 B//aknh dun a; mans kanak-kanak Im anaman den umumya sakamng? 0551995 YANG SAYA TAHU DEKAT semux UMURNYA SEKARANG 23 nwun 33 Sfla ceritakan may bslakang kemarga mi dun kanekr kanak yang ruun/puan ketahuf. MASA JUMPA IBU. UMURNVA LEBIH KURANG 1.9 H/NGGA 19 TANUN MASA /TU DIA ADA JUAL KUEH sw Ktamckkzmxmznzww run n .:u um smm ...m.mm be used m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! DAN GOP/NG PISANG DENGAN sov FR/END D/A DEKAT JALAN RA./A LAUT KUALA LUMPUR. MASA SAVA KEN/IL am. DIA SEDANG MENGANDUNG SELEPAS EERSAUN D/A ADA MINTA SAYA PUNYA KAWAN AME/L DIA Pun/VA ANAK TAP! KAWAN SAVA TAK MAU. SAVA KATA SAVA MAL/, LEPAS ITU DIA LETAKATAK KUSYEN DI HOTEL TEMPAT SAYA TIDUR LEPAS ITU D/A TERLIS H/LANG, SEBELUM /Tu SAVA TANYA B/LA WIBUDAKLAHIR DIA BAG! SAYA TARIKH DAN TEMPAT D/A BERSALIN TAP! BILA SAYA PERGI TENGOK DAN TANYA-TANYA SEMUA TAKADA: [54] In my view, ills clearly aviaem um me PVamliW does not fall wrxmn ma bmadesl possrble irnerpraxaunn ol the ward “Vxwnd exposed“ grverr by me Federa\ Court In cent a. Anor (luprn) winch us '1_q Indudaa c d abandoned he laos olbmh b the n mother whose iuermg is unknuwn as s. Thu Pxainmv was elmady 3 or 4 mnmrrs 01¢ at the lime mo Pluinllﬂ was hlnded over In DKH (rml abandunsd but me Plnmlilfs moths! arms: to give me Flamliﬂ In OKH)‘ b The Fhainliﬂ was Dam rn selab-kr Kualu Lumpur before being handed over by lhe P\ain\|IW‘s hm ruomer In OKH at a hotel where me Plenum was staying (nn\| abandoned at the place or birth)‘ sru K1arwtckkEmxrAzn2mu vane n alu Nuns smm nnnhnrwm be used m van; .. nrimrrnuly mm: dun-mm VIZ mum wrm c The dale of Iha Fiainiiirs birth IS known to OKH («he presumption under Suction 195 of Pan III of mu Sucond Schnd at my Fodlrul Constitution In Malian to ‘me dale of ma ﬁnding shall be taken to be the date oi the tmiv does not arise), d The F\|aInMF‘s mnn mother was sumeone OKH knew a yesv prior lo the Piamirirs man (the issue that me menmy ai me biﬂh manner is unknown also does not arise). and e. OKH had received me Plainniv of ms own voimon lmm the birth mother, Susila wmiam obtaining any dnoumenialion [55] Having umsiaeiea an matters and in panicular the lads as set oul WI me preceding paragraphs, Ihe Inevitable umciusion must be than me Piainuﬁ has laiied to ﬂismalga me man burden or pruving man he was 3 newborn dlild lound exposed Ia enable him to raly on or trigger me presummion I am not satisﬁed that the Plainlﬂf has established trial he was abandoned or can be wnsmeted a ‘new ham child imma exposed‘ See the Federal Coun case oi Roslha on Ibrahim v Knrapan mgui Sullngor 5 Ant [2021] 2 MLJ ml. Arllclo 1 1 mad I -in with suction 1 Pan ll sacond §I:hudul ohm Fndcrg 9913;; mg m [56] I mm move on to ocrmaar me other around raiiaa upon by the Piainmi I a., Arum I4(1){b)reai1logeIherwiih Sncnon i(-) Fm: Snwnd Scllndull an an Faun Conltilutlon. IN K1drwlckkEmXrAlhZiSu mg 1! nu] ma Sum mm. WW he HSQG m van; me niigiruiily MIN; dun-mm VII mum Wm [571 wmm it \s no! disputed man the P\aInM was Indeed born wnmn mo Feoeranon, mo Plawmﬂ iurlher relies on SoI:\imI1(o)ofdIu Fudarul Cunsﬁluﬁon read Iogelher mm Sucﬁsn 1(3) of Fin n m Iho Socovld somoouo of mo room: Cnnilitullon .n that he was rm born n omzen o1 anmher munlry or awuired any meromzensmp wunin one year 0! being born [55] on this issue, the Detonaoncs submil that me Plainlﬂf cans to approcme me mom of me pmeomsnes to be Mﬁﬂed to obtam omzensmo by operation ov ‘aw pursuant lo Anlnlc M(1)(h),FanIl read mm Snnlon1(u)nfmu Fudnral consumuan. ‘Pan m C/T/ZENSH/P cnapm 1—Acomsmon ofcillzenship citiunship by opunﬁon allow 14. (1) Subject re the provisions aﬂms Pan, ms Io/lowing persnns are citizens by operation ollaw. that is no say‘ Is) (.5) every person born on or after Malaysia Dex and navmg any oi the qunlrﬁcsrfans speciﬁed in Pan u onne Secand Schedule ' syn Ktamckkimxrnnzww rue mm 4; Nuns sow ...n.mm be used m van; me mn.ny mm: mmn wa mum puns! (neramaﬂer referred to IS “OKWI lhal lhe F min was adopted at me age M 4 manms rrom ms mu mmher knvwn my as susrus, Them ware no accnmpanylng persona: aaeumencs idenhfymg ma Plairmﬁ or Suswla [a] Six years Ianer, on 9'" .\|u\y 1992, um applied to the National Ragrsuanan Depanmsnx, Wilayah Parsekuluan (hereinaﬁer reverred to as ‘the 1" Defendant“) to conduct a search on Ins Pwarrurirrs bmh ceniﬂcale [9] On 30"‘ my 1992‘ was Iener hum the 1‘ Delendarut, OKH was Informed that no rmormauon m Manon to the Plairum could be untamed [10] On 19" Navember 1992‘ OKH amnued a svammry declaration to conﬁrm that he was me adnpmve tamer of me Plaumﬂwev since the Plaimm was 4 months old [111 Naming much seems to have occurred fvom 1992 until 2005 save me: me P1amlIN veoewed his pnmary and secondary educalnn in Penang mlmmahng in mm mncmdmg me SPM m 2003. [12] mereaner, on 24“ Aorrl 2006, OKH ounducwd urromsr search on the mm reguslralmn In me 1- Derermarws emee wheraafler om recewed a team dated 23”‘ May 2005 hum me 1-‘ Defendant naquaslmg suppomng documents. [1 :1 On 22"“ June zoos. ma 1- nsvendam rssued meir ‘kepulusen carven da/am wear in which. mus: admuwlodglng ma: me Flamlm was r~ Ktemckkzmxmznzmu am 4 am -we Snr1n\:unhnrwHH>e used m mm ms mrmu-y mm: dun-mm VI] nF\uNG Wm [59] The relevanl padlon 94 Pm II or IM Sicond Scllldu reproduced harem as (cums- ‘PART H [Amcla 14{V){b)] CIYIZENSHIP av OPERATION or LAW OF PERSONS BORN ON OR AFTER MALAYSIA DAY 1 Sumac! lo we pmvrsions alPan 11/ mm: Consltlulion. lha ramming persons born on or am! Ma/lysm Day am rmzens by opera!/on ullsw. mans Io say (5) {0} re) (4) - rs) am grson born wﬁ hm [he Fsdsralion who rs ng bom s cmzen 0! any Q nn omalwrss man by -mus of II-us gagggh. 2. ma gum u; M g gliun by vlrfue ofpﬂgggum (5 doIao1:ec1&‘g1my{hgtrmeoInlsbﬂL7_,’ ﬁg lgﬁ ﬁg beings Dtfrtirl Aim mm immung from S I I :3 1.: IS 7! envoy O/B sogign A accredited to lg Ygnq :— n or ’ ri lhsn an a IN Ktamckkzmxmznzww um: um «um smm ...m.mm be used M van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! alren and the bum occms /n a E under the occugoon g me enemy (2) (3JFOrme u fara henIssclioIv1a arson rs to be heated as having at man any cmzsnshtg which ne aguires wimin gne ﬁr wnus olsn avrsions cone mi’ to ;;a_raﬁm (Q grtnarsecnan or amsrwise." [50] M the aulse\|. u Is perlInan\| \|o rmla man smxon 1(n) of Pun II of mu Sacond 5cIIoduII mus! not my he read wun sncuon 2(3) Pun II at an Sucond Schudull am alxm 241) Fun II 01 mo sceond Schudulo [an Essenﬂllly. mm am two pmnqulsiles undev Sncllon 1(.) of Pm II who smanu scnmulo more a person can acquire c zanship namewyz a. The person mm: be born mm: the Fadarztvon, and b The person must NOT be born a dnzen ofany DIM! country. [52] The Devendams submit manna law does not classwy a person as “NOT burn a ciﬁzen oi any mner counlry" on «ha mere convention that ho had not aoquurea any cnizsnsmp at any mherooumry within one year (mm the dale al his birth IN Ktamckkzmxmznzmu File :2 M61 -um smm ...m.mn be used m yam .. mnn.y mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! [53] Aruclu 14(1)(b) read wnrr s-cum 1(0) of Pan ll of mu Socond schudulo embodies two prmclma olacqulring nalxmalvly Ls. /us sun (‘right ov me son‘) and /us sanguims rnghn 0! blood‘). [64] To acquire cmzenshup under «ms provision. me Plamw must prove lhal his birm occurred warm the Federalvnn and at me same time musl pmve that at me lime onus hm, he am not aequrrc ulizenshlp many other ommlry mmugh the lineage 0! ms h\|o4ogLca\ parents. [551 This can be seen in the com L71Appe=\ case vfﬂlan sum Bang .1. Anal v. Km. Plnnnrall Jabalan Fondlﬂarun Megan a On mm a cu1a where irwas unammously held thaIAniu\|u 1441 )1») of In: Fndoral Cuvlsliuninrn emtapsmales the requirement of cmzensmp by [us soli‘ . place of mm, while paruqrapll \|(e) of Pan n mm Sucond Schedule oﬂha Feduul Conslillnion (‘not born a uﬂzen M any country‘) encapsulales the reqmrement cl cnizensmp by [us ssngufnis Le. by blood or lineage. n was held as iullvws “[23]AnicIs 14mm) or the Federal Consmurton encapsu/ares me requrremenf ol cmzsnship by /us so/I Ae p/ace oi mrrn; wmoe para 1(e) of Part u of ms Second scneume of me Fadsral Cansmubon (‘not born a cmzen afany ooumry) encapsulates the requiramenf ol orrrmsnip by [us sangumls :9 by blood or lineage. sw K1amnckkEmxrAzn2mu rm )1 V1 u we sum In-nhnv WW re used m van; me m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VII mum wrm [24] Thus, ir wuuld eppaar lnar me saoond appellenl would need In salisly Dom me requlramenls olius soil and /us sanvulnis rn 041197 10 lulﬁl the requlramsnts olan 14(1)(p) and para 1(e) ol Pan ll. second scnedule aflhs Federal Cunsmulian (refer lo Chm Kaol Nan (sump on behalfnf hlmselfsnd as /iﬁgarlon representative Ia Cnm Jla Nee, enlld) v Pandaliar Beser Kelaniran den Kemanan, Malaysia [2016] 7 ML! 717) ' (271 me oorllsnllolls lssue is in respect pllne raqmrernenr of/us sangmme ln para 1(9) al Pan H ol lna second scneaule ol the Federal Conslllubon, as expressed by me pluaaa, wna ls not born a swan olany counlry: For the purposes nflhls requeemenl me malarial am In derenmne ma slams of me second appellanrs lineage Is al me llme ol nls blnn. [35]A plarn reedlng olpara 1(9) was not born a cnlzan pl any I>uunlIy'IE1sI:' to me re/aliansnrp um-e second appellant ru his blologlcal and lawlul perenrs at the nrne afhls mnn Tne only available documenlary evldenee, me second appellenrs bu-In cenlﬁcate (’exh TSE6) ounlemed no rnfwmalmn perlalnmg In me bl‘oVogl'caI parents and the refevanl parncu/ars were endorsed with ‘Maklumat Tldak D: perolanl'.,, (Emphasis added] [36] srnca lne ldenllly ollne cnllds lawlul and blologlcal parents were unknown, it was not poealole lo delovmfne ma Iinsags ol me second appellant ma: would enable are second rn Ktamckkzmxmznzlw Pa]; :4 M u we Snr1n\lnnnhnrw\HI>e used m van; ms mn.u.y MIME dun-mnl VIZ mum we apps//am lo be conferred cfhzanshlp by /ineaga re. /‘us sangum. /371 Thus m our view. me second appellsnl had not lu/ﬁlled mo ruquflsmsnl to be a cmzsn by opmaon a! raw wllhm me rneamng ols 1(3) oIPan‘ //oflhs Second Schsdwe arms Fade/al consmmian " [See a\so the mgr. Own case of Chin Kool um (mung on mun M Illmsall and u Imgmon rIprnsuIIzl\|vI lo Ghln JII N ., chlld) v Fandalhr Bun! K-mumn ﬂan K-matlnn, u. yall [ms] 7 MLJ nu. [66] The alaremenhoned pnno4p\e 15 also eufmad by Ina (‘AIM 0' Appaal m Lllll Jill Hnlnn IAIIOPV Kiln! PIIIBIIIN JIBIIIII Fandnﬁnrnn Ntﬂlrl 5 Or: [2013] I ML] 545 where Ihe Omm olAppsaI HEM Ihal Flruﬂraph 1(I) 01 Pin sncond Schoduln VF Illa Fudlrll Corulllullon (nal ham 3 cmzsn M any country) ancapsulmas ma requimmaut or cmzanship byjus sanguinis ha , by mm or nmgg. [$7] The posmon had been racermy reueralad by me court ompaeal If! on case 01 Axlmnh in Ham»: v Km: Pcnnuuh Juhlhn Pqndlﬂnrln Nnglrn L on (202313 Mu 217 where M was held as fellows‘ ‘[15] As In! ms second requirement, the learned mgr: Court/udge relenad lo we dscrsron of ms com m ‘Hun Sraw Bong L Am V Kama Pangavah Jabalan Pendaltaran Nsgars s Or: IN Ktamckkimxrunzww up as .m -m smm ...m.mm be used m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! R017) 5 MLJ 552 and hehi that fa ma purposes 0/: 1(9) 0: Panllollha Second Schodulelhe burden olpmofhss on me appev/am to establish an a bn/Lance av pmbabimies that the appenam was not mm a citizen olsny country See 5 103 a! me Evvdence Ac! 1950 and also ms cases of Um Jen Hsfsn & Anor vxenm Pengsrah Jabalan Psndaﬁalan Nsgala 5 Ors (201516 MLJ 543 and Onq Boon Hua @ Chin Peng & Anew Menlen Hal Ehwal oaram Megan‘, Ms/sysrs [2008] 3 ML! 625; (2009) 5 cu 42. [15] ms Isqmpnm.-ipoe is well established and we do not wish m elaborate any Iimhsl. [171 This mun had m Than SAsw Bang L Anor v Kelua Pengamn Jabatan Pandaftaran Negam 5 Or: 1201715 MLJ 662 held that as a mans: of law any person msxmg to rely on an 1m)(n) read mm 5 1(9) oIPavt u nlrhe Second scnsuule of me Fedeval Conslmnmn kv eszabnsh cdizensmp by opemnon 0! law would have to eslab/fsn the requimmsnls or both [us so(i and/us sangulnis [15] Learned counsellor (ha appellant submrts by mfslancs to [ho )9gr‘s/arfve history of an 14(1;(n) and 5 my :1! Part 1: ol the Second Schedule OI the Fsdusl Constitution III!!! [as sangurnfs is cmzansmp by bland Ilnssga, 5 not 5 mqumsment or feature ol 5 1(5) of Part II of the Second Schsduls of the Federal Conslmmon. Vﬁllﬁ respect, we UH unable to scoop! that conlsrmon. The pronouncsmenl OHM: own in Then Siuw Bang 5 Ana! V Kalua Pullgarah Jubelurl sw Ktamtckkzmxnxznzmu Vageﬁovll um smm ...m.mm be used m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! Pandailaran Negara & Ors (2oi7] 5 Mu 562 is very oiaar, in maria: sangumis is one ol the principles that me court looks at In datamiina whether the appailani rhmugh Iinaaga was ‘riolbam a citizen arany murwy‘ We do not /ind any reason to depan from that decision, and in any even! we are bound by me doom/is of stare decfsix to roiiw lhal decision. sea.- Keiumlaraan smzai Kmdsnka Sdn Bhd v Fang soon Learig (202112 ML./ 234, (202115 cu 1 (CA) and Deli}: Bnagwan Singh v Public Prosecutor [1993] 4 ML] 1; [1997] 4 cu 645 (F0) (19) Furrhev, as to whsmauus ssnguims is a necessary feature Ill an application for miizsnship under para 1(2) oIPan ii of the second Schedule onha Federal consmumn, this coun had in Than Siew Bang 5 Ann! v Kstua Pengarah ./abaran Fendakaran Negara 5 ors [2017] 5 ML./ 562 Said. 121}/n this regard, we concur mm me High com ins! ma appe/iam has to prove mama was slale/ess 51 me am onmmnn lo avail ol her rights undel s 1(9) 0/ Part I: of ma Second Schedule of ma Fuderai Canstimuan. The blmien to plan! that fact reﬂs upon the appellaril " [68] Having wnsldered me above, it Is dear Ihal span from the prerequisile man the P\|sinIiW 5 born Wilhln me Fedeiatinn, it is also a oonsmuuonal requirement that me urizensnip of me bioiagical parents to be de(emIined in order to sausiy the oondninn that the Plainmr is not born citizen of any o\|her caunny. SIN K1drwlckkEmXrAlhZ\§u vase kw all] ma s.n.i nnvihnrwm be used m van; .. nﬂgiruﬂly MIN: dun-mm VIZ mum mi [69] W13 requrrement to prove hneage was lurlher frmirred by suction 2(1) Fan ll of Sooand scrroduln which drsquelmes a person from dhzenshlp should at me mme cf his bmrr a rrer (amen rm! bemg a nmzan, panama such Vmmunity from sun and legal Dmcess as is accordsd in an srrvpy uh: merergn pewereecrsauae la ms Yang dw-Pertuan Agung‘ :2. her fume! rs than an enemy ahen, and : born In a plan under me occupauan oi the enamY 17a] Since me reerrmy omre PlaInlm“s lawfm and brplpgrcal parents were unknuwn. was not pnssvhla xp denermrne me Plammfs lmeaga lo errame me Plamnﬂ m be eprrterrea cmzenslvp by Imeepe ie.. jus sangumis [711 The burden of pnwf rs on the Plaimm to establish an a balance of prubabiliﬁes that he was not born a emu of another oounlry On an examlnalmn 01 me «am a« «ms ease, Ihe evmerrne reveass that me Piavmﬂ nor om have knweage or me nrowogreel parents save mar OKH reuervea me Plmnlrﬁfrom srrsua Assucn, me «acts do not reveal that me Plainlxﬂ was ”no!bcm a cizrzerr afany oounmf [721 Learned Counsel var me Plairmw is aware and concedes lhal me com 0! appeal decision In Azimlh Nanlzzh (supra) has held am: delemuned that an Appl m has to esxabhsh ham requrremems a1 jus son‘ and ms sanguims Hcmeven learned Counsel nmremelere IN Kterunckkzmxnxznzwu Page an M11 ‘Nata Snr1n\n-nhnrwmlxe used m mm r.. m1mrr.uIy mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm contends Mal [here is no need in establish [us sanguims and mammad YD persuade me lo deparl ‘mm \|he dedsmn oi the com oiAPneaI in Azlmah MIm1.Ih(sIll=r=)unlhe basis that me cmm uf Appeal had erred as «here was nu express reverence in ms word parents VI Suction 1(9) (75 iii. of [hi Fodnral conuinriion. II was also suggesred that I may depart lmm lhe aecision oi Azlmah Nalnzlh (mm) as being made pelmcuriam or anemaineiy fnlkm me aecisian Mlhe Conn a1Appezl in Azlnuh Humuh (supra) um ior me ha suggest that me com of Appeal decision In Azimah Hannah (supra) be reviewed as] Having wnsidered such submissmnisuggesnon, I am wim respect, mi persuaded in lake either course of anion as suggwea by me Plalnliﬂ. This coin is mindlul oi ms DfInclD\|e oi slare dectsis and is inereiare bound by Iris dedsion oi me cam 0! Appeal In Azlmah Hamzah (supra). Appiyirg the same, iwouia hold ms: armuplicanl nas in sausfy mm euerneriis al]us son and ms sangui Al. A5 I have mnduded Ihal the Applimm has lalisd to sausly bath eiemenls, me inevivable conciusion is that \|his Orlginaling Summons is dismissed. In any event. since me Flalnhﬂ has appeaied against my decision main‘ the coun MAppsal will have Ihe apponunlty to cansider me issue again in K1drwlckkEmXrAlhZ\$u rare xs um Nuns s.n.i ...n.mn be ﬂied M mm .. nﬂmnnﬂly sun. dun-mm VI] nﬂuNG pm.) conclusion ‘n ma upshot for an the reasons above. and upon I jumcious oonswdarlvuon ollho feels And me law‘ I dismrss this Origmaling Summon: wnn na order as to cash. Da\|e* 6"‘ Navsmber 2023 ANAMD PONNUDURAI Judge Hugh Court Georgetown Pmau Pinang Counsel Mr. Robm Lim and Mr. Rain Smgh Worn Messrs Raiil em & Co upon) to: me Plsmtﬂi. Fuan Kogllambigau Mulhusamy, ssnzarreasrsn caunsel lmm AGC for me Defendants §§£§)_ve_Lm¢_te: Ahmad Jefn hm Mohd Jenn @ Md Jonan v Fengarah Kebudayaan 5. Kesenlan Johar a. o:s{2o1u13 MLJ 145 syn ><1arwtckkEnuxrAzn2\w me an 1:!!! ms s.n.‘ n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. mxmuuy mm: dun-mm VI] sﬂuNG pm born on 5"‘ June 1966 to one strstta with detatle orttte tamer being unknown. ttne omcret reoont oi the search statee as ‘trade rekod". [14] Thereaflen true 1- Deteneant nae on 2'-1 August zoos reeeivee an appticatrorr vie Form JPN.LMD1 with a statutory ueciaration tor tne late regtslmtlort ot the birth at a baby boy wttn ttte toiiwing partrotrtars, amongst ottrers: (a) tie name of tne baby boy had been stated as Oct Thye Feng oorn on am June was in setepek, Kueta Lumpul, to) the motrrere name had been stated as strsrta and no otner rntormatton nae been suhmmed in reiattan to the mother, tot no rntorrnatton had been strornmea wttn respect to me tettrer; and (d) the informant had been stated as Dot Keat Hoe [15] on 3\|" Deoembe1200S, OKH ioogea a police report stating Inter- atia tnat one Sustla sornerirne WI September 1988 had handed over a ctrria to trim requesting to be adopted taut wrttratrt any documamatim whatsoever. in the Said pattoe report, OKH stats that he use looked atter the child since the age on rnontne and tnat his attempts \|o oblatn a birlh oertttieate have Wuved lulile. Such police report was ttren eent to me I" netenaenrs otiioe eooontpenying yet amlher request in oonerret a seven on tne Platn\|m‘s ointr certificate. in KtarwlckkEmXrAlhZ\$u Page 5 mu -nae e.n.t ...nt.mn r. or... m mm r.. oﬂmnaitly sun. dun-mm n. ariuNG Wm! Azimah btHamzaI1 v Kelua Perlgarah Jabalan Pendaﬂaran Negam a. Ors [2023] 3 MLJ 227 CCH &Arlor v Pendaﬁar SesarB8gi Kelahiran Dan Kemallan, Malaysia [2022] 1 on 1 Ohm Kanl Nah (sulrlg on berlallaf mmasll and as llllgallon replesenlalwe Io Chin Jla Nee, child) v Pendalﬂar Besar Kelahlran dan Kemallan‘ Malalmia [2016] 7 MLJ 717 CTEB 8. Anor v. Kama Pengarah Pendsﬂararl Negara, Malaysla ls Ora [2021] 4 MLJ 23:1 Lim Jen Hslan &Anor v Kelua Pengamn Jalzalan Pandaﬂararl Nsgara 5. ors [mm a CLJ 412 Penaallar Besar Kelamran aan Kemallan, Malaysla v Pang Wee See A Anor (apvwlng on \|he<r benall and as lmgallon raprsernauves luv Pang Chang Chuen, a cm1d\|[2017] 3 MLJ we Ruben Cheah Fooog Chiew v Lembaga Jurutera Malaysia [zoos] 1 ML! 676 Rashza m lbrahlm v Karajaan Negsn Salarlgnr & Anal [2021] 2 MLJ «en mar: Slam Bang &Anur v. Kalua Pengarah Jabalan Fendaﬂarxn Nagala &ofS [2017] BCLJ1ﬂ Illorl s nhrndto Federal Cnnsumllan‘ Anlda 14mm Anide 15(2) and 15.2, Second Schedule Part II sacllonlla). 1(2), Pan Ill saellon 19a Rules of calm 2n12,0n1er 7, 53 Rules omlgh colm193o.ordar53 alnrla and Deaths Reglslmmn Am W57 aw K1drwIckkEmXrAlhZ\$u Pauumu ma a.n.1 ...m.m111 be la... M mm 1.. mln.11-y MIN: ﬂan-mm VI] .m1a ma [15] Aocurdmg to me Devenuams, as set out m msrramuavu m Reply, pursuam Io lhe appucanon ror Ihe late regrslrannn or bmh. an GNQINV was men conducted by the 1‘ Defendant‘: nﬁoe W101 OKH ror me purposes of ms Plsmsrs appncsuon for a bmh eeruncane. In me course 01 oormucnng such an enquiry and m order to process such appncanon, statements were recorded from me lnllawmg persons a oxu (Plammfs auopme lather) was “Balsng Ksrryataan Temuduga DaﬁarLewar SurarKelahiran” daled 25* August 2009‘ :2. Any Ah Lnan (PLain1ifl's grandmmher) was “Boring Kenyaraan Temuduga Dakar Lewal Surat Kelahilsn" dated 25- August 2009. c. Any Ah Ba (OKH‘s uncle) was “Borang Kenyarsan Temuduga Daﬂar Lewal Surat Ksrsmranwaxea 26“ August zoos, and d Olhman bin Mohamed Said l0KH‘s friend) was “Borang Kerryalaan Temuduga Daﬂar Lewat SurafKeVah1ran" dated zsm Augusl2D09 (‘Dre Various 'Borarrg Kervyaraarr rerrruduga Dakar Laws! Surat Kelaiman” have been annexed lo the Dererrdarrrs' Alrdavrt in Raply]. [17] Thoreamr‘ appmr/3! was given on 17' June 2010 107 me Plaimnrs Vale rugusnrauon cl rmn and a hm oemﬁcale beanng number CI 92076 was issued sru K1drwlckkEmXrAlhZ\$u me car an um Snr1n\n-nhnrwmbe used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mrrl VI] nnum pm i.in the name of Ooi Thye Peng and Ihe dale 07 biﬂh has been neordad as 08JUN was and me plaueafburlh has been recorded as smapak, Kuala Lumpur, mm mother‘: mvunnaman has been renamed an “susILA" c.\|ne lather‘: Irdomuallon his bean nmmea “Maklurnaf rmx Dipamlahfm and u Ihe Plaimm ciuxonsrvp slalus has been classmea as 'BL'KAN WARGANEGARA1 [18] n Vs not mspmea thal me PI-mm nor OKH had ever awned lov aﬂzenshxp unm me commencement onnesa pmneadings nunulmm com.-munulsubml nu [19] The aux of me Plairmﬂs ounIemnnsIsuhm\ss<ons m supporl av ms appﬂuauon to be granted mu MaVays\an liuzeclsmp status are summarised as lol\ow:: a. he was born m Malaysia altar Malaysia Day. in he has been a permanent resident of Malaysia and ms nmrer Ian its shares. c. ms mother, Sumlam was In all likelihood n Mnlavsuan omzeﬂ‘ yn mnnmzmxnaznzm an 1 M u -m smm ...m.mn be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm d na was an abandcned cnild and II inereiore entitled to be oonsidered a duzen at Malaysia by operalion at law by V/H106 or the Fndoul constimion, and e that here is no avidenw ID prove lhil the Plain“? hid acquired any utizenshlp of any country wiinin one (1) year oi his being born. l\|onlI5uhm nu Dckn D an: [23] on [ha nmai iiana, the Defendants‘ conianiions/submissions in opposing inis appiimiian can be summarised as vonaws: a Fiisuy. an objecllon is uken on lha made oi aoinnianixinieni oi lhsse Dnweodlﬂss wneieby ll was mrilandsd max I! cughl In have been cammancod via Judlunl Review prooaedings puisu-ni me am: 5: of lilo Rulu of Court 2012. Fmnai and in any mm, ii is oonlnnded man [he iniiiuianiani to this Originating Summnn: is aaisiana, b Tne aacisiari In clmsﬁy the Pininmrs uiizansnip Is “EUKAN WARGANEGARA'was mnaci var ma hllwwing manna: I. ma rugistrargeneml gr ninni. and doalhs ior Mninyssa found (hm there IS nu evidence adduced by any panic! in prvva that the Pliinliﬂ is a newtmm baby rauna abandoned or dumped; in KmrwlckkEmXrAlhZ\§« me - MAI Nuns s.ii.i iuvihnrwm be in... M mm i.. nﬂmnnﬂly MIME m.i.n VI] nF\uNG WM! n. ma Mainuﬂ had been handed aver by the motogmar mother, Suslla to OKH mar OKH sawed Kn adnm me Plaumﬂ u. there is no poﬁue repon vodgoa by DKH lo suppoﬂ the P\a\’nuﬂ's avarmenl men he was dumped uv abandoned by the Pxammrs bmwogucal malner, iv me Plaintiff‘: yrzlndmothev had mconnea that she does not have any knawlaige regarding the background ol the P\amM'slam1ry and me Puammrs background, and V. no mhsr delaxls mm respect In me ioenmy of me Planmms bmlogK:a\ mother and falhev had been adduced by om apart «mm «no name lo( the purpose or oevemumng lhe cmzenswp status. lssun In be decided [21] Having uunsiderad Ihu cams and me suhmvssvms. me two main issues \|o be oonsldevud are u Inﬂows‘ u whelher lhe Flumllﬂ has mrrectiy oommenoao these pmeeedmg: vil Onginaling summons, and IN Kmrunckkzmxnxznzwu no: 5 m II who Snr1n\n-nhnrwmlxe used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm h tr tssue (a) is answered In tne amnnatnra, Ihen wttatrter me Pfamltﬂ ts enlllied In trte deutarations snugrtt let that he ts status by uperaunn of law enlrﬂed to be uunferved cttizerts Orin n usummonxouua IIRIVUVI [22] In trus regard, trte nerendams have oomended In KNEW amautts and have tttereaner submined tttat smoe rt IS not dtsputed mat the F-Iatrtws rrtatn cause at wmplatnl is that ttte aeetston at me 1-! Detertaant daled 17'» June 2a1u mane pursuant to ttte amt-e And nmttu Regmmtten net 1957 In dasstly mm as “BUKAN WARGANEGARA“, a JudinIa\ Ravsew applicaﬂon nugttt in be uornrrtenoea pursuaru \|u outer 5: otttte Rulu of court 2012 (M perhaps Ordlr 5: of me puvloul Rulu oi tttgtt cetm «mt. As suert, II IS cunlended tnet trte nung 0! mt; Ongmallng Summons ts years aﬂar Ihe tntpugneu aecteton Is In abuse of Ihe court process and mart tnorumate aetey ougttt ta be ratat. [see the use at Robin cnutt Foong CHIIW v Lcmhngl Junmn Mnllylln [zone] I MLJ an]. [231 Avid Irom (M tune of delay, the Detanaanta atsa my on the lows Elaztlticus dauswn 01 the Faderat Court In the cute 07 Ahmad Jofrl bin uotta Jnhri @ Ma Jatutn v Punﬁlrull Kubudlyun 5 Kat: .n Jotuu a. on [2121 n] 3 ML: 145 wrtere ll wae Inter-alia held trtat ma court must be cvcumspect tn allowing matters wtuett should be brought by jua-ctat review prooeadingslo be commenced in any other totrn In that case. the Federal Conn enunciated as lollows IN K1drwlckkEmXrAlhZ\$u -ace wat u we amt n-vthnrwm be used M mm t.. mtr.u-y mt. dun-mm r.. mum wrut	5,254	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
JB-12B-2-06/2022	PERAYU Tenaga Nasional Berhad RESPONDEN Grand Major Property Sdn. Bhd	Appeal – Decision from Sessions Court – After full trial - Defendant’s sub-station - Built inside a shop lot – With consent and lease from previous owner – However failed to register the lease – Statement of Defence - Failed to plead the existence of a lease – Plaintiff becomes new proprietor – Whether must give notice for sub-station to remain – Continuing trespass – Whether Plaintiff entitled for damages – On the basis of monthly rental.	05/11/2023	YA Tuan Suria Kumar a/l Durairaj Johnson Paul	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=9b434230-a0c9-47cf-a2f2-2b7e8c988d60&Inline=true	jb-12b-2-06/2022 [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI MUAR DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: JB-12B-2-06/2022 ANTARA TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD (No. Syarikat : 199001009294/200866-w) … PERAYU DAN GRAND MAJOR PROPERTY SDN BHD (No. Syarikat : 937697-V) … RESPONDEN (DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI SEGAMAT DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: JD-A52-01-07/2020 ANTARA GRAND MAJOR PROPERTY SDN BHD (No. Syarikat : 937697-V) … PLAINTIF DAN TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD (No. Syarikat : 199001009294/200866-w) … DEFENDAN 05/11/2023 12:03:32 JB-12B-2-06/2022 Kand. 30 S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 2 CORAM: SURIA KUMAR A/L DURAIRAJ JOHNSON PAUL JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER  JUDGEMENT  INTRODUCTION [1] This is an Appeal against the decision of the learned Sessions Judge of the Segamat Sessions Court on 30.05.2022 in allowing the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant for loss of rental in the sum of RM150,500.00 from the period March, 2017 until September 2020 with interest and cost. [2] Defendant being dissatisfied with the said decision, appeals to this Court now. [3] Parties will be referred to as Plaintiff and Defendant respectively in this Judgement. BACKGROUND FACTS [4] Plaintiff purchased a double storey shop lot held under Pajakan Negeri No. 20942, Lot 9264, Mukim Buloh Kasap, Daerah Segamat, Johor Darul Takzim (“the said Land”) from the developer, Ishtihar S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 3 Properties & Development Sdn Bhd (“the Developer”). Plaintiff was registered as the owner with effect from 12.3.2017. [5] Prior to purchasing the shop lot, Plaintiff knew the existence of the Defendant’s sub-station on the ground floor of the shop lot. The sub-station occupies approximately half of the ground floor. [6] In all likelihood, Plaintiff must have purchased the shop lot based on the representation made by the Developer that they could request the Defendant relocate the sub-station elsewhere. [7] This must be the reason why Plaintiff made a request to the Defendant vide their letter dated 3.7.2017 to relocate the sub- station. [8] However, there was no response from the Defendant. Plaintiff then engaged the services of solicitors to send a notice to the Defendant demanding them to forthwith relocate the sub-station and to pay rental in the sum of RM5,000.00 per month with effect from March, 2017 until the substation is relocated. [9] Following the Plaintiff’s solicitors notice, both parties had several discussions and the Defendant agreed to relocate the sub-station vide their letter to the Plaintiff dated 26.6.2017. [10] However, despite agreeing to relocate the sub-station, Defendant did nothing. This prompted the Plaintiff to issue a second notice of demand against the Defendant demanding them to forthwith relocate the sub-station and to pay rental in the sum of RM5,000.00 S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 4 per month with effect from March, 2017 until the substation is relocated. [11] Defendant failed to comply with the Plaintiff’s demand to relocate the sub-station. Plaintiff then commenced an action in the Sessions Court against the Defendant on 21.7.2020. [12] Next on 10.8.2020, Plaintiff received a notice from Segamat Land Office to attend a hearing for the acquisition of the said Land by the Defendant pursuant to Section 3(1)(a) of the Land Acquisition Act 1960. The said Land on which the shop lot is situated was declared to be acquired pursuant to Section 8 of the said Act. [13] The hearing was held on 23.9.2020 and the Land Administrator awarded RM980,000.00 for the value of the said Land and the shop lot. [14] The compensation sum RM980,000.00 was paid to the Plaintiff and the land was transferred to the Defendant. [15] Thereafter Plaintiff’s claim which was pending in the Sessions Court for an order to relocate the sub-station was amended to limit the claim for loss of rental of the shop lot for the period from March, 2017 until September, 2020 as the said Land was already acquired by the Defendant. DECISION OF THE SESSIONS COURT [16] The decision of the Learned Sessions Judge can be summarised as follows:- S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 5 (i) That the Plaintiff upon becoming the registered owner on 13.3.2017, acquired an indefeasible title until it is proven otherwise by the Defendant. (ii) That Plaintiff is not a party to the agreement between the Defendant and Developer wherein the Defendant was granted permission to build the sub-station on the said land. She found the said Agreement binding on the Plaintiff. (iii) Defendant failed to comply with the requirement of Section 11(1) Electric Supply Act 1996. (iv) As the lawful registered proprietor of the land, Plaintiff is entitled to charge rental from the Defendant for the occupancy of the sub-station on the land. (v) That the Defendant failed to register the lease for 30 years as required under NLC 1965. (vi) The continued existence of the sub-station for purpose of public interest cannot outweigh the Plaintiff’s right as the registered owner. (vii) Plaintiff’s claim is not for damages for trespass but for loss of rental. (viii) The compensation sum pad for acquisition of the land is for forcibly acquiring the land and does not include the claim for loss of rental. S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 6 (ix) Plaintiff’s claim for loss of rental RM3,500.00 per month being a lesser sum than the pleaded sum RM5,000.00 per month is allowed for a total of 43 months amounting to RM150,500.00. PRINCIPLES OF APPELLATE INTERVENTION [17] This Court is mindful of the fact that in hearing this appeal, it only exercises appellate jurisdiction and is guided by the principles propounded by the Federal Court in S Quarry Sdn Bhd v. Desaru Development Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 6 MLRA 350 as follows :- “[13] Accordingly, it falls upon this court to determine whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the basis of the relevant law and/or the established evidence. In so doing, this court was perfectly entitled to examine the process of evaluation of the evidence by the trial court. The requirement for the trial judge to have made a decision which was ‘plainly wrong’ before an appellate court may intervene is well settled in our appellate jurisprudence and practice. This strict requirement underscores the rationale that the appellate court should not reverse or disturb the trial judge’s finding even if the appellate court is of the view that it would not have arrived at the same conclusion as the trial judge did on the evidence on the record before it. [14] A plainly wrong decision happens when it can be shown that there is insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 7 by the trial court. The requisite or correct standard to be applied is that no reasonable judge, on the evidence on record, could have reached the conclusion of the trial judge. The adverb ‘plainly’ does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appellate court that it would have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty that the appellate court considered that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached. [15] Whilst the aforesaid principles are well-settled, it may be appropriate to set out some instances where a decision may be described as perverse such that the judgment cannot be explained or justified by the special advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses testify and being tested before him. Some instances demonstrative of such occasions on the part of the trial judge include the following. It should be noted, however, that the instances are not meant to be exhaustive: - Misdirected itself on the evidence; - Failed to judicially appreciate the evidence; - Failed to consider any material evidence; - Acted on some irrelevant evidence so as to render the decision wholly erroneous; - Made wrong inference from facts; - Misapprehended the facts; or S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 8 - Gave reasons which are unsatisfactory or contradictory of each other.” [18] Guided by these principles, I will now proceed to consider whether the learned Sessions Judge committed any errors which requires this Court to intervene. APPELLANTS’ GROUNDS OF APPEAL [19] Defendant attacks the learned Sessions Judge’s decision on four grounds. I shall deal with each of the ground below :- The sub-station was built with the consent from previous owner or Developer [20] Defendant relies on the existence of a 30 years old lease up to 2031 granted by the Developer to them. [21] It is not in dispute that the said lease was never registered by the Defendant. [22] Defendant submits that even if the lease is not registered, it does not change the fact that there is indeed an agreement between the Defendant and the Developer for a lease of the said land for a period of 30 years ending on 2031. [23] Apart from producing a form titled “Borang A” issued by the Defendant to the Developer stating that the Developer agrees to lease the said land for a period of 30 years for a nominal payment of RM10.00, Defendant did not produce any agreement for lease S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 9 containing the terms and conditions nor a duly executed Form 15A pursuant to Section 221 National Land Code 1965 in evidence. [24] To make things worse, Defendant did not even plead in their Defence that they had a lease from the Developer. Since no objections was raised by the Plaintiff, the Learned Sessions Judge proceeded to consider this issue. [25] Defendant further submits that the Plaintiff cannot now complain since they purchased it on a as is where is basis i.e. knowing the existence of the sub-station on the shop lot. [26] Although Defendant is estopped from raising this issue for failing to plead the same, however for completeness I will address this issue. [27] I am of the considered view that the Plaintiff’s submission on this ground has no basis since in the first place there is no valid surrender in the form of a lease to bind the Plaintiff. On this point, I find support in the decision of the Federal Court in Bayangan Sepadu Sdn Bhd v Jabatan Pengairan Dan Saliran Negeri Selangor & Ors [2022] 1 MLJ 701. In that case, the Appellant had purchased a piece of land from auction and thereafter only noticed that a big portion of the land was covered with retention pond and other buildings. However, searches conducted by the Appellant in that case prior to and after the auction did not reveal any third parties interest registered on the said land. The Federal Court found that since there was no valid surrender of the land to Jabatan Pengairan Dan Saliran Negeri Selangor, as such the issue of as is where is has no bearing on the outcome of that case. Federal Court also held S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 10 that surrender of any private land must comply with the relevant statutory provisions of the National Land Code. [28] This can be seen from the Judgment of Zawawi Salleh FCJ in that case reproduced below :- “[22] The first leave question is premised upon an assumption that the land which is Lot 18903 was the agreed lot to be surrendered to Majlis Perbandaran Shah Alam although the appellant denied this. The crux of the matter is whether the promise to surrender the land by the previous owner prior to the charge of the said land to CIMB and the transfer of the same to the appellant is valid in law or it is in contravention of ss 89 and 340 of the NLC. [27] It is trite that land law in Malaysia is based on title and interest by registration which is derived from the Torrens System. There are two fundamental principles of the Torrens System, namely the mirror principle and the curtain principle. The mirror principle portrays a concept in which the land title mirrors all relevant and material details that a perspective purchaser, lessee and chargee ought to know. This mean that a person can obtain all such material information of the land, based on what is endorsed on the register of document of title and issue document of title. On the other hand, the curtain principle is a concept that dispenses with the need to look beyond the register — as the land itself provides all relevant information reflecting the validity of S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 11 the same. Ostensibly, the ‘curtain’ is where the principle took its name from. [37] In this instant appeal, we observed that the appellant did not inspect the site based on the statement given by the PW1 that the appellant’s agent only informed the appellant about the auction a day before it. Nevertheless, even if the appellant takes steps to inspect the site and later discovered that big portion of the land was covered with the retention pond and the structures, the ownership on the paper (register document of title) as revealed in the land searches conducted by the appellant remains unchanged. In addition, given the fact that the respondents took few months to revert on the status of the land and the file for the project went missing, it is reasonable to infer that the appellant had no knowledge or reason to believe about the alleged surrender of the land by the previous owners to the State Authority. [41] We agree with the submission of learned counsel for the appellant. The case at hand is regarding validity of the surrender of the land and the appellant did not dispute on the condition of the land. Hence, the issue on the basis of ‘as is where is’ has no bearing on the outcome of the present case. [51] It is clear that in order to be a valid surrender, the procedure under s 200 of the NLC must be complied with. With respect, we are of the view that the High S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 12 Court and the majority in the Court of Appeal erred in law in reaching the decision that there was a valid surrender as the previous owners did not object to the construction of the retention pond and structures on the land. On the factual matrix of the present case as alluded to earlier in the judgment, there was no evidence to show that any of the procedures in ss 196, 200 and 201 of the NLC had been adhered to. There was no consent in writing from the person or body who has registered interest in the land (CIMB/chargee) as required by s 196(1)(c) read together with s 196(2)(a) of NLC. [52] We would like to emphasis that the surrender of any private land must be made with the consent of both the registered proprietor and the State Authority and must be strictly complied with the relevant statutory provisions of the NLC. We venture to say that these provisions are made for the purpose of safeguarding the interest of the registered proprietor. Where the procedures as stipulated by the provisions of the NLC are not adhered to, grave doubts are cast on the validity and/or legality of the surrender. In the absence of the consent of CIMB/chargee and by merely relying on the documents and/or letters produced by the respondents as enumerated in para [7] of this judgment, it cannot be assumed that all mandatory requirements under the provisions of the NLC had been adhered to when the State Authority gave its consent for the transfer. S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 13 [53] In the premises and consistent with the Torrens System that registration is everything, coupled with the fact that neither the previous owners nor the MBSA attempted to legalise the surrender pursuant to the procedure and provisions under the NLC, the second leave question must be answered in the negative.” [29] Whereas learned counsel for the Plaintiff also cited the decision by the Court Appeal in Tenaga Nasional Berhad v Teobros Development Sdn Bhd [2000] 6 MLJ 391 to rebut the Defendant’s contention. In Teobros Development (supra), although Tenaga Nasional Berhad had issued a notice under Section 11(2) of the Electricity Supply Act, 1990 to the previous owner of the lands and thereafter possessed a way leave right over the lands and was by virtue of this right, licensees of the lands, however they failed to comply with the requirement in Section 11(10) of the Act on registering their interest in the document of title. [30] Court of Appeal speaking through Abdul Malik Ishak JCA in Teobros Development (supra) decided as follows:- “Held, (2) If the High Court judge was not supposed to consider and construe s 11(10) of the Act, how could he consider and construe s 11(5) of the Act in isolation. Section 11(5) of the Act had to be viewed in its correct perspective because on its own it did not create any right of entry for the appellant. Section 11 and its ten subsections were legislatively enacted to provide a mechanism for a S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 14 licensee under the Act to obtain a right to enter land to construct electricity pylons and/or lay electricity cables, to protect the rights of the owners and occupiers of the land who are affected by such a right of entry and to ensure that the endorsement of the register document of title of the affected land by giving notice to those who conduct a title search in the future. Although the process starts with the licensee issuing a notice under s 11(2) of the Act to the owner or occupier, for the notice under s 11(2) of the Act to create any right of entry under s 11(5) of the Act, the licensee must first obtain a statement from the District Land Administrator stating that there was no objection lodged by the owner or occupier. If there is any objection lodged by the owner or occupier of the land then s 11(5) of the Act does not create any right of entry at all. This is because the effect of a notice under s 11(2) of the Act is completely nullified even if there was a verbal objection lodged by an occupier. Therefore, the High Court judge had exercised his discretion judiciously in finding that the respondent had a bona fide serious issue to be tried as to whether a licensee could be said to acquire rights under s 11(5) of the Act without complying with s 11(10) (see paras 40– 44 & 57). (3) It is now trite law that the failure to endorse on the register document of title was fatal. Therefore, this again showed that there were serious bona fide issues for the High Court to consider (see paras 103–104); Pow Hing S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 15 & Anor v Registrar of Titles, Malacca [1981] 1 MLJ 155 (folld) followed. (4) … (5) Although the provision of electricity by the appellant is definitely a public purpose activity, this public purpose is not intended to grant blanket immunity to all licensees under the Act. The public purpose factor is intended to literally put the interest of the public above other considerations. At this point it was therefore necessary to consider if 'public purpose' could be used as a shield by the appellant to avoid the consequences of failing to comply with an important provision of the Act i.e s 11(10) of the Act. At the same time, it is necessary to bear in mind that non-compliance with s 11(10) of the Act defeats the conclusiveness of the register document of title. The fact remains that the National Land Code is based on the Torrens system of conclusiveness of the register document of title. Therefore, the respondent who had purchased the land from an auction held in the Malacca High Court and not from the previous registered proprietor and who was on the balance of probabilities a bona fide purchaser for value of the lands was entitled to presume that there was no error in the register document of title. In addition, the appellant's failure to comply with s 11(10) of the Act had nothing to do with the public purpose of providing electricity. Thus, based on the facts, it was only fair and reasonable to conclude that a licensee under the Act, such as the S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 16 appellant, was entitled to invoke public purpose only when it concerned their public purpose function of supplying electricity. Otherwise it would be tantamount to granting the appellant absolute immunity to ignore the provisions of the Act, which had been carefully drafted to protect the interests of the public (see paras 62–68).” [31] In the foregoing, I find this ground of appeal has no merit. Whether notice must be given to the Respondent as the new registered proprietor for the Appellant’s sub-station to continue remain on the said land [32] It is not on dispute that the Defendant failed to produce any documentary evidence that they had complied with the requirement of issuance of notice pursuant to Section 11(1) of the Electricity Supply Act, 1990 and registration of the notice with the Land Administrator pursuant to Section 11(1) of the Act. [33] As such, there is no evidence before the Court that they had complied with Section 11(1) of the Electricity Supply Act 1990 prior to entering the land. [34] The decision in Ahmad Hj Bakar lwn. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2007] 10 CLJ 22 cited by learned counsel for the Defendant can be distinguished and does not apply to the facts of our present case. The facts in that case related to where Tenaga Nasional Berhad had to re-enter the land to carry out maintenance works and the High Court therein held that there was no need to for issuance of a fresh S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 17 notice pursuant to Section 11 of the Act in order to carry out the maintenance works. [35] Learned counsel for the Defendant submitted the case of Tenaga Nasional Berhad v. Yep Lee Na & Ors (unreported) an appeal from the Sessions Court on an application pursuant to Order 14A or Order 33 Rules 3 and 2 of Rules of Court 2012 decided by Her Ladyship Evrol Mariette Peters J which held that permission granted by previous developer for a sub-station to be built on the land binds the current proprietors and as such there was no need for any fresh approval from the latter. [36] However, I find that this case does not consider the apex Court’s decisions in Teobros Development (supra) and Bayangan Sepadu (supra) with regards to the importance of registration of a valid surrender or way-leave right granted by the previous owners’ and the mirror principle under our Torrens system of land law. [37] Furthermore, the decision in Yep Lee Na (supra) was overturned on Appeal by the Court of Appeal via Civil Appeal No: W- 04(IM)(NCVC)-391-08/2022 and the matter was ordered to go for full trial in the Sessions Court. [38] Back to the facts in our present case, the permission granted by the Developer to the Defendant does not bind the Plaintiff since the lease was never registered in the first place in accordance with requirements of the National Land Code. [39] Furthermore, the sub-station was already built inside the shop lot and this rather peculiar than the usual places where a sub-station is S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 18 normally located. It occupies approximately half of the ground floor in the shop lot. [40] As such, the issue whether Defendant has complied with the requirement of issuance of notice pursuant to Section 11(1) of the Electricity Supply Act, 1990 and registration of the notice with the Land Administrator pursuant to Section 11(1) of the Act is a non- issue and does not require any determination. [41] As such I also find that there is no merit in this ground of Appeal. No issue of continuing trespass [42] Next Defendant argues that the Plaintiff’s claim is premised on trespass. According to the Defendant, there is no trespass and continuing trespass. I find this argument is misconceived. [43] As highlighted above, the sub-station is built inside the shop lot on the ground floor and occupies almost half of the ground floor till the back of the shop. [44] Plaintiff commenced this action for an order that the Defendant relocates the sub-station and for rental for occupying the shop lot. [45] Plaintiff is denied of quiet enjoyment of the shop lot and is unable to let out the shop lot and collect rental. [46] Prior to commencing this action, Plaintiff gave notice to the Defendant that if they fail to relocate the sub-station, then rental charges will be imposed on them. S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 19 [47] The term trespass only arose when Plaintiff referred to it in their submissions for computation of the loss of rental. This was in respect of the necessity to prove losses in cases of trespass by referring to the decision in Terra Damansara Sdn Bhd v Nandex Development Sdn Bhd [2006] 6 MLJ 24. [48] This was also inadvertently followed by the Learned Sessions Judge in paragraph 29 of her grounds of judgement when she said that the Plaintiff was entitled for compensation from the Defendant for trespass when they failed to relocate the sub-station. However, in para 30 of her grounds, the learned Sessions Judge said that the Plaintiff is only seeking for rental only in this claim and not damages for trespass. [49] Essentially, the Plaintiff’s claim is for loss of rental due to the Defendant’s sub-station occupying the ground floor of the shop lot. The Plaintiff was denied quiet enjoyment and the opportunity to let out the shop lot and collect rental due to the presence of the Defendant’s sub-station on the ground floor of the shop lot. [50] Thus, the Plaintiff’s claim is certainly not premised on trespass. The Plaintiff is not entitled to the damages/rental payment [51] Learned counsel for the Defendant submits that the Plaintiff is not entitled for rental payment since the payment of RM980,000.00 for the acquisition of the land is full compensation. In other words, this sum would have considered any losses suffered by the Plaintiff due to existence of the sub-station. S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 20 [52] With due respect to the learned counsel for the Defendant, this Court disagrees with his contention. As rightly pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge, the award sum paid for the acquisition of the land was for the value of the land which was being forcibly acquired and was not inclusive of any rental claim. [53] Furthermore, Plaintiff had already filed their claim for rental prior to the land being acquired and the claim was pending in Court whilst the acquisition proceeding is taking place. [54] Next, Defendant argues that the Plaintiff should not be allowed to quote an amount to be claimed without any prove and or documents. [55] I find this contention by the Defendant has no merit. Plaintiff has produced oral and documentary evidence to establish their claim for loss of rental. [56] Plaintiff’s witness (PW1) testified that the shop lot could not be let out due to potential tenant not interested and turning away upon seeing the existence of the sub-station. PW1 further testified that due to the existence of the sub-station, there is no exit from the back of the shop lot and this poses a danger in case of an emergency. [57] PW1 also produced rental agreements for a shop lot in the vicinity located in the middle. One agreement was for the ground floor at rental rate RM1,400.00. The other was for the upper floor at a rental rate of RM380.00. Both agreements were tendered in evidence and marked as exhibit P5. S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 21 [58] Defendant failed to rebut this evidence by producing any comparable or other evidence to challenge the rental rates adduced by the Plaintiff. [59] Although, Plaintiff had initially claimed RM5,000.00 per month for loss of rental, however in their written submissions, they had conceded to claim only for RM3,500.00 per month based on the evidence adduced at the trial. [60] This sum was arrived at by using the multiplicand 1.7 for the Plaintiff’s shop lot which was an end lot and bigger than the middle shop lot and multiplying it with RM1,780.00, being the rental income for a middle shop lot as follows :- 1.7 x RM1,780.00 = RM3,026.00 Thereafter Plaintiff had rounded the figure RM3.026.00 to RM3,500.00. [61] Learned counsel for the Defendant attacks the Learned Sessions Judge’s decision in granting compensation sum based on a monthly rental of RM3,500.00 when the actual computation show the loss of monthly rental is RM3,026.00. [62] In Voo Nyuk Fah & anor v. Lam Yat Kheong & anor [2012] 5 CLJ 229, Court of Appeal held as follows :- “Taking of accounts and assessment of damages is an exercise of judicial discretion and hence seldom disturbed except where there is clear error on the S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 22 principles of law or the amount is erroneous and without any basis or justification. (Flint v. Lovell, refd) (para 4)” [63] Further, assessment of damages must conform to the principle of restitution in integrum. Please see Hiew Kon Fah and Anor v Kwan Ngeh Wah & Ors [2008] MLJU 95. [64] I do not find any error in the learned Sessions Judge awarding RM3,500.00 per month. The Tenancy Agreement produced in evidence to establish the loss of monthly rental RM1,780.00 was for the year 2017. Whereas Plaintiff’s claim for rental is from the period March 2017 till September 2020. Plaintiff had submitted that RM3,500.00 is an average upon factoring the increment for the years 2018, 2019 and 2020. [65] In the foregoing, the award of loss of rental RM3,500.00 per month is justified and I do not find any error on the part of the learned Sessions Judge. [66] Lastly, Appellant submits that Respondent should not be allowed to amend its claim through their written submissions. Respondent pleaded claim for loss of rental was initially RM5,000.00 per month. However, in their written submissions, Respondent reduced this sum to RM3,500.00 per month without making any amendment to their Statement of Claim. [67] I am of the considered view that the reduction in the quantum claimed as highlighted in the written submissions to a lesser sum than the one pleaded does not prejudice the Appellant. Further, S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 23 appellant is unable to show how are they prejudiced by this reduction of the claim. CONCLUSION [68] In the upshot, based on the foregoing reasons, I find there is no merit in the Defendant’s Appeal and the Appeal is hereby dismissed with cost. [69] The decision of the Learned Sessions Judge dated 30.5.2022 is upheld. Dated this 18th June 2023 at Muar in the State of Johore. t.t. SURIA KUMAR A/L DJ PAUL Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Muar Johore Darul Ta’zim Counsels: For the Appellant : Muhammad Adam Abdullah For the Respondent : G. Visvanathan Nair S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [JB-12B-2-06/2022] June 19, 2023 24 Solicitors: For the Appellant Messrs Adam Abdullah & Mani Advocates & Solicitors 3B-1, Tingkat 3, Wisma Dang Wangi No. 38, Jalan Dang Wangi 50100 Kuala Lumpur [Ref. No. : AAM/2069/2020/AA] For the Respondent Messrs Maniam Nair & Co Advocates & Solicitors No. 117, Tingkat Dua Jalan Genuang 85000 Segamat Johor Darul Takzim [Ref. No. : SGT/GSN/NOD 580/18/pr] Hearing Date : 5th March 2023, 19th April 2023 Decision Date : 19th June 2023 S/N MEJDm8mgz0ei8itjJiNYA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	36,108	Tika 2.6.0
PA-45A-34-06/2019	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH AMIR BIN AYOB	Pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 [Akta 234] - Elemen-elemen kesalahan – Sama ada versi pembelaan mengenai kewujudan Orang bernama "Mat Zahir" dan “Zamizan” adalah benar atau rekaan semata-mata - Sama ada pihak pembelaan berjaya mematahkan anggapan pemilikan dan pengetahuan di bawah seksyen 37(d) Akta 234 atas imbangan kebarangkalian - Sama ada pihak pembelaan berjaya membangkitkan keraguan munasabah berhubung dengan elemen pengedaran - Prinsip penghukuman	05/11/2023	YA Puan Fathiyah Binti Idris	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=23c12fae-9ce0-45b4-a1f0-934150c8d838&Inline=true	Page 1 of 32 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI BUTTERWORTH DALAM NEGERI PULAU PINANG, MALAYSIA PERBICARAAN JENAYAH: PA-45A-34-06/2019 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA DAN AMIR BIN AYOB ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PENDAHULUAN [1] OKT telah dituduh dengan satu (1) pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan adalah seperti berikut:- “Bahawa kamu pada 19.2.2019 jam lebih kurang 7.00 petang di alamat No. 9 Lintang Bertam Indah 1, Taman Bertam Indah, Kepala Batas, Dalam Daerah Seberang Perai Utara, di dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang telah di dapati mengedar dadah berbahaya jenis Cannabis seberat 1029.9 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh di hukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.”. 05/11/2023 22:28:47 PA-45A-34-06/2019 Kand. 119 S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 32 [2] OKT mengaku tidak bersalah ke atas pertuduhan tersebut dan meminta dibicarakan. Seramai 7 orang saksi pendakwaan telah memberi keterangan. Mereka ialah:- SP1- Sjn Mohd Zaidi Omar - Penjaga Stor SP2- Abdul Jalil Abdul Rahman - Ahli Kimia SP3- L/Kpl Amirul Aini bin Mohd Basri - Jurufoto SP4- Insp Tanapalan a/l Krishna - Pengadu SP5- Insp Rozila binti Remali - Pegawai Penyiasat SP6- Norlina binti Jaafar – Isteri tertuduh / Pemilik Rumah SP7- Kpl Mohd Yazid bin Muhammad Jamil - Pegawai Forensik FAKTA KES PENDAKWAAN [3] Pada 19.02.2019 jam lebih kurang 7 petang, semasa SP4 menjalankan tugas OPS Tapis, Pengadu bersama anggota dari Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah Narkotik, Ibu Pejabat Daerah Seberang Perai Utara (BSJND IPD SPU) telah pergi ke alamat No.9, Lintang Bertam Indah 1, Taman Bertam Indah, 13200 Kepala Batas, Pulau Pinang. Rumah kejadian adalah rumah taman. [4] Sampai di alamat tersebut, SP4 bersama anggota serbuan mendapati pintu hadapan dalam keadaan terbuka. SP4 bersama anggota serbuan terus masuk ke dalam rumah dan pergi ke bahagian dapur dan mendapati seorang lelaki Melayu (OKT) sedang berdiri di hadapan sebelah kanan kabinet dapur. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 32 [5] SP4 terus perkenalkan diri sebagai pegawai kanan polis dengan menunjukkan kad kuasa. Pada masa itu, SP4 nampak di atas kabinet di hadapan OKT terdapat beberapa paket plastik lutsinar berisi tumbuhan kering disyaki Ganja. Seterusnya dengan disaksikan OKT, SP4 menjalankan pemeriksaan lanjut di atas kabinet dapur tersebut dan menjumpai:- a. (5) Peket plastik lutsinar setiap satu berisi tumbuhan kering disyaki dadah jenis Ganja; b. (1) bekas tin berpenutup bertulis “OAT” krunch di dalamnya mengandungi (3) peket plastik lutsinar setiap satu berisi tumbuhan kering disyaki Ganja. c. (1) bekas tin berpenutup bertulis M&M"s di dalamnya mengandungi (13) peket plastik lutsinar setiap satu berisi tumbuhan kering disyaki Ganja. d. (1) bekas tin berpenutup bertulis TOY STORY di dalamnya mengandungi (13) peket plastik lutsinar setiap satu berisi tumbuhan kering disyaki Ganja; dan e. (1) bekas tin tidak berpenutup bertulis MICKEY & MINNIE di dalamnya mengandungi (6) peket plastik lutsinar bertulis UNGGUL setiap satu berisi tumbuhan kering disyaki Ganja. [6] Seterusnya, SP4 telah merampas kesemua barang kes. SP4 turut merampas sebilah pisau, satu paket plastik berisi peket-peket plastik kosong, satu alat sealer dan satu alat timbang digital dari kabinet yang sama. [7] Setelah selesai membuat pemeriksaan tersebut, SP4 telah membawa balik OKT dan rampasan ke Pejabat Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah Narkotik Daerah IPD Seberang Perai Utara untuk tindakan lanjut. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 32 [8] Kesemua barang kes yang dirampas dan disyaki dadah telah dihantar ke Jabatan Kimia Malaysia, Pulau Pinang untuk dianalisis dan hasil analisis telah disahkan oleh Ahli Kimia Encik Abdul Jalil Bin Abdul Rahman bahawa ianya mengandungi Cannabis seberat 1029.9 gram. Tugas Mahkamah Di Akhir Kes Pendakwaan [9] Di akhir kes pendakwaan, adalah menjadi tugas dan tanggungjawab Mahkamah untuk memutuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan suatu kes prima facie seperti mana yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 180(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. "When the case for the prosecution is concluded, the Court shall consider whether the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the accused." [10] Kes prima facie berjaya dibuktikan apabila pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan yang kukuh bagi membuktikan setiap elemen pertuduhan, sekiranya gagal dipatahkan oleh pembelaan, akan membolehkan sabitan terhadap tertuduh. Mahkamah merujuk seksyen 180(4) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah yang menyatakan: "For the purpose of this section, a prima facie is made out against the accused where the prosecution had adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction.". S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 5 of 32 [11] Mengenai prinsip tugas mahkamah di akhir kes pendakwaan ini telah dijelaskan dalam kes tersohor iaitu PP v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457 yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan seperti berikut: "[15] For the guidance of the court below, we summarise as follows the steps that should be taken by trial court at the close of the prosecution's case: (i) the close of the prosecution's case, subject the evidence led by the prosecution in its totality to a maximum evaluation. Carefully scrutinise the credibility of each of the prosecution's witnesses. Take into account all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. If the evidence admits of two or more inferences, then draw the inference that is most favourable to the accused; (ii) ask yourself the question: if I call upon the accused to make his defence and he elects to remain silent am I prepared to convict him on the evidence now before me? If the answer to that question is "Yes", then a prima facie case has been made out and the defence should be called. If the answer is "No" then, a prima facie case has not been made out and the accused should be acquitted;" Dapatan Mahkamah di akhir kes Pendakwaan [12] Mahkamah telah meneliti dan menilai keterangan semua saksi pendakwaan secara penilaian yang maksimum dan mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan satu kes prima facie apabila pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kesemua elemen pertuduhan seperti berikut:- S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 6 of 32 Elemen Pertama: Dadah tersebut adalah dadah berbahaya [13] En. Abdul Jalil Bin Abdul Rahman (SP2), seorang ahli kimia dan telah memberi keterangan sebagai seorang pakar. Beliau telah menjalankan analisis kimia terhadap kesemua dadah yang diterimanya. Beliau telah mengesahkan bahawa dadah yang dinyatakan di dalam pertuduhan adalah dadah berbahaya jenis Cannabis seberat 1029.9 gram (rujukan ekshibit P26A-P26E, P29A- P29C, P32A-P32M, P35A-P35M) dan P38A-P38F)). [14] SP2 telah menyediakan Laporan Kimia (P9) bagi mengesahkan hasil uji kaji / analisis kimia yang telah dijalankan dan Cannabis adalah sejenis dadah yang disenaraikan dalam Jadual Pertama Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. [15] SP2 telah camkan kesemua barang kes dadah dan mengesahkan bahawa ianya merupakan barang kes yang sama seperti yang telah diserahkan kepada beliau. [16] SP2 telah mengemukakan Penyata Saksi yang mana jelas menunjukkan kelayakan dan pengalaman beliau di dalam menganalisis bahan yang dipercayai dadah berbahaya. Mahkamah mendapati pihak pembelaan tidak mempertikaikan kelayakan dan pengalaman SP2. Di dalam kes Munusamy Vengadasalam v. PP [1987] CLJ (Rep) 221, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan seperti berikut: "...the Court is entitled to accept the opinion of the expert of its face value, unless it is inherently incredible of the defence calls evidence in rebuttal by another expert to contradict the opinion. So long as some credible evidence is given by the Chemist to support his opinion, there is no necessity for him to go into details of what he did in the laboratory, step by step." S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 32 [17] Oleh itu berasaskan kepada kelulusan, pengalaman dan kepakaran SP2, tiada sebab untuk Mahkamah ini meragui kredibiliti SP2 sebagai seorang Ahli Kimia yang berwibawa. Maka Mahkamah ini menerima keterangan SP2 sebagai seorang ahli kimia yang berkelayakan untuk menjalankan analisis ke atas dadah-dadah tersebut. [18] Mahkamah ini juga menerima keputusan analisis yang dibuat oleh SP2 berkaitan dengan identiti dan kuantiti dadah berbahaya tersebut dan adalah dapatan Mahkamah ini, bahawa di akhir kes pendakwaan pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan elemen pertama pertuduhan ke atas OKT iaitu dadah tersebut adalah dadah berbahaya yang termasuk dalam Jadual Pertama Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 iaitu jenis Cannabis seberat 1029.9 gram. Elemen Kedua: OKT mempunyai pemilikan (jagaan dan kawalan) dan pengetahuan terhadap dadah tersebut [19] Elemen kedua ini juga adalah penting dan mesti dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan, sebagaimana keputusan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Ibrahim Mohamad & Anor. v. PP [2011] 4 CLJ 113, seperti berikut: "[6] It is trite law that possession is an important ingredient in the charge of trafficking. Unless there is direct evidence of trafficking, the prosecution must prove the ingredient of "possession" and the trial judge must make an affirmative finding of "possession" before the presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da) of the Act can be invoked." S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 8 of 32 [20] Untuk membuktikan elemen ini, terdapat dua unsur utama yang perlu dibuktikan, yang pertama mengenai elemen milikan fizikal yang merujuk kepada jagaan dan kawalan fizikal ke atas dadah berbahaya tersebut dan yang kedua mengenai elemen mental iaitu pengetahuan tertuduh (mens rea possession). [21] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes tersohor yang seringkali dirujuk iaitu kes Chan Pean Leon v. PP [1956] 1 LNS 17; [1956] 22 MLJ 237, di mana Hakim Thomson telah menjelaskan tentang kedua- dua unsur tersebut pada muka surat 239 seperti berikut: "A movable thing is said to be in possession of a person when he is situated with respect to it that he has the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of all other persons and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need. To put it otherwise, there is a physical element and mental element which must both be present before possession is made out.". [22] Berpandukan kepada nas yang tersebut, adalah menjadi suatu prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa bagi membuktikan seseorang itu mempunyai "milikan", perlulah dibuktikan bahawa seseorang itu mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan ke atas sesuatu barang tersebut dan bebas berurusan atau mengendalikan barang tersebut tanpa penglibatan orang lain dan dia mempunyai pengetahuan ke atas sesuatu barang tersebut. [23] Berdasarkan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan, Mahkamah ini mendapati OKT mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan terhadap barang kes dadah tersebut berdasarkan fakta bahawa serbuan telah dibuat di rumah tempat tinggal OKT dan keluarganya. Rumah tersebut atas nama isterinya (SP6), maka sebagai suami, OKT mempunyai akses terhadap rumah tersebut. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 32 [24] SP6 telah camkan barang rampasan selain dadah iaitu seluar dan baju (eksibit P44 dan P55) yang dirampas oleh SP4 dari bilik pertama rumah tersebut dan beliau sahkan bahawa baju dan seluar adalah milik OKT sendiri. [25] SP4 dalam keterangannya mengesahkan bahawa semasa serbuan dilakukan OKT dalam keadaan berdiri berseorangan di hadapan kabinet dapur, iaitu di tempat barang kes dadah dijumpai dan hanya OKT seorang berada di dalam rumah tersebut. Ini menunjukkan semasa serbuan, OKT mempunyai akses kepada barang kes tersebut. [26] Keterangan SP4 dan SP6 adalah konsisten bahawa semasa serbuan, OKT berada berseorangan di rumah tersebut dan OKT sedang berdiri di hadapan cabinet dapur dan keadaan barang kes (exhibit P26 (a – e) berada dalam paket plastic lutsinar yang dapat dilihat. [27] Kedua-dua saksi tersebut berada di tempat kejadian semasa OKT ditangkap dan mereka menyaksikan apa yang berlaku pada masa tersebut. Mahkamah ini tidak mendapati apa-apa keterangan yang mencadangkan atau menunjukkan bahawa kedua-dua saksi ini mengada-adakan cerita atau cuba menganiaya OKT. [28] Selanjutnya bagi membuktikan bahawa OKT mempunyai pengetahuan mengenai dadah yang berada dalam milikannya, Mahkamah ini berpandukan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2008] 4 CLJ 764 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “It is true that mens rea possession is an element of the offence of trafficking. But it is an element like the mental element in other crimes which cannot be established by direct evidence save in a case where an accused expressly S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 10 of 32 admits the commission of the offence. It has, like the mens rea in other offences, to be established by circumstantial evidence. In other words it is an ingredient that is to be inferred from the totality of the circumstances of a particular individual case.” [29] Berpandukan kes di atas, dapatlah dirumuskan bahawa berdasarkan keterangan mengikut keadaan secara keseluruhannya, satu inferens boleh dibuat bahawa OKT mempunyai pengetahuan tentang dadah berbahaya tersebut. Tambahan pula pada masa serbuan tersebut OKT berseorangan di dapur rumah tersebut dan dadah dijumpai berhadapan OKT dalam keadaan yang terdedah [P26 (a – e)] di mana OKT boleh nampak kandungan dalam paket plastik lutsinar tersebut. [30] Cara pembungkusan lima paket plastik lutsinar yang jelas kelihatan dan terdedah, adalah sama dengan cara pembungkusan paket- paket plastik yang berada dalam eksibit P31, P34 dan P37. Ini menunjukkan bahawa dadah-dadah tersebut adalah daripada jenis yang sama. Selain itu turut dijumpai beberapa peralatan lain iaitu 1 alat sealer dan 1 penimbang digital serta terdapat paket-paket plastic kosong yang boleh digunakan untuk mengisi dadah-dadah tersebut. [31] Mahkamah ini juga membuat inferens bahawa OKT mempunyai pengetahuan tentang dadah berbahaya tersebut berdasarkan kelakuan (conduct) OKT yang terkejut apabila pihak polis membuat serbuan keatasnya. Mahkamah setuju bahawa reaksi terkejut adalah satu reaksi normal apabila diserbu oleh sekumpulan lelaki yang tidak dikenali, tetapi semasa diserbu, pihak polis telah menjerit “Polis”, maka reaksi terkejut OKT adalah satu respons bahawa OKT S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 32 mempunyai pengetahuan tentang barang salah yang dimilikinya dan barang salah itu adalah dadah berbahaya. [32] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Chan Pean Leon v PP (1956) 1 MLJ 237, yang menyatakan: “Here again knowledge cannot be proved by direct evidence, it can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Again the possible variety of circumstances which will support such an inference is infinite. There may be something in the accused's behaviour that shows knowledge, or the nature of the thing may be so obvious that it is possible to say "he must have known what it was" or, again in cases under the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, there may be a statutory presumption which fills a gap in the evidence.” [33] Berdasarkan fakta yang tersebut di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan elemen kedua iaitu OKT memiliki dadah-dadah berbahaya tersebut dan Mahkamah ini menggunapakai anggapan di bawah seksyen 37(d) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952, iaitu sesiapa yang ada dalam jagaannya atau dalam kawalannya adalah dianggap mempunyai pengetahuan mengenai dadah tersebut. Elemen Ketiga: OKT mengedar dadah berbahaya tersebut. [34] Mahkamah ini telah menilai dan menghalusi keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan khususnya oleh SP4 dan mendapati ianya adalah menjurus kepada elemen pengedaran dadah seperti yang didefinisikan di bawah Seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 12 of 32 [35] Definisi pengedaran di bawah Seksyen 2 Akta adalah merangkumi perbuatan "concealing” atau “keeping” dadah tersebut. Berdasarkan definisi tersebut, adalah dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa perbuatan OKT mengedar dadah tersebut adalah dengan cara “keeping” atau “concealing” dadah tersebut. [36] Mahkamah ini merujuk kes Teh Geok Hock v. PP [1989] 1 CLJ Rep 160; [1989] 2 CLJ 977; [1989] 3 MLJ 162 yang telah memberi penjelasan maksud "pengedaran" seperti berikut: "True, the definition in the Act sounds artificial and not according to the ordinary meaning of the word 'trafficking' which is normally understood to mean to trade in, buy or sell, any commodity, albeit often with sinister implication. See also the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. The definition of 'trafficking' in the Act is wide and includes not only buying and selling, but also carrying, concealing and keeping." [37] Berdasarkan keterangan SP4, semasa dadah dijumpai, ada dadah yang dalam keadaan terdedah dan ada yang tersimpan dalam bekas snek, yang mana keadaan ianya disimpan seperti hendak menyembunyikannya dari dikesan oleh orang lain. [38] Penggunaan bekas tersebut menunjukan satu tindakan “over act” kerana, adalah sukar untuk mengesan dadah dalam bekas makanan, apatah lagi apabila ianya disimpan di bahagian dapur rumah. [39] Selanjutnya penemuan alat penimbang digital dan alat sealer serta paket-paket plastik yang kosong juga boleh diandaikan bahawa dadah-dadah tersebut adalah untuk diedarkan dengan jumlah berat tertentu dalam paket-paket plastik yang akan di-seal menggunakan alat sealer. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 13 of 32 [40] Mahkamah ini juga berpendapat dadah-dadah tersebut bukanlah untuk kegunaan peribadi OKT, sebaliknya adalah untuk tujuan pengedaran. Dengan berat dadah sejumlah 1029.9 gram adalah jelas ianya bukanlah untuk kegunaan peribadi OKT, malahan pihak pembelaan tidak pernah mencadangkan bahawa dadah tersebut untuk kegunaan tertuduh sebagai “drug dependant”. Oleh itu Mahkamah boleh membuat inferens bahawa tertuduh memiliki dadah tersebut bagi tujuan pengedaran. [41] Mahkamah ini merujuk dan berpandukan kepada kes Konradt Prosch v. PP [2020] 1 LNS 2065 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “[22] Coming back to the present case, the appellant was carrying grammes of methamphetamine, which was a large quantity of drugs and clearly not for his own consumption. Hence, the inference is that, the appellant was carrying or transporting the drugs for the purpose of trafficking which need plausible explanation from the appellant which the appellant had failed to do. As such, the trial judge was correct in his finding that the element of trafficking under section 2 of the DDA had been proven by the prosecution.” [42] Selanjutnya Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Mohamed Yazri Minhat v. PP [2003] 2 CLJ 65 yang telah menerima pakai inferens bahawa semakin banyak dan semakin berat dadah berbahaya yang dimiliki, maka semakin kuat inferens yang boleh dibuat bahawa seseorang itu mengedar dadah berbahaya tersebut: “As a matter of common sense the larger the quantity of drugs involved the stronger the inference that they were not intended for the personal consumption of the person carrying S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 14 of 32 them, and the more convincing the evidence needed to rebut it.” [43] Berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan yang telah dikemukakan berkenaan serbuan keatas rumah OKT dan penemuan dadah berbahaya itu serta jumlah dadah yang besar, Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa suatu inferens yang boleh dibuat iaitu OKT menyimpan (keeping) dadah jenis cannabis tersebut bagi tujuan pengedaran (trafficking). Faktor-Faktor Lain Yang Dipertimbangkan Rantaian Keterangan [44] Setelah rampasan ke atas bahan yang disyaki dadah berbahaya dibuat oleh SP4, barang kes tersebut telah diserahkan oleh SP4 kepada SP5 iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat. [45] Selepas itu, SP5 telah menyimpan barang kes tersebut di dalam almari berkunci yang mana hanya beliau seorang sahaja yang mempunyai akses. [46] Setelah proses dusting dan rakaman gambar barang kes selesai dilaksanakan, SP5 telah menyerahkan barang kes tersebut kepada SP2 untuk analisis kimia. [47] SP2 selanjutnya mengesahkan bahawa setiap barang kes dadah dalam keadaan baik sewaktu diterima daripada SP5. Setelah barang kes dadah tersebut dianalisis, SP2 mendapati barang kes yang dirampas merupakan dadah berbahaya jenis Cannabis sebagaimana yang tersenarai dalam Jadual Pertama Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 15 of 32 [48] Selepas itu, SP2 telah seal-kan semula dengan meterai Jabatan Kimia Malaysia. Selanjutnya, SP2 semasa ditunjukkan dengan barang kes di Mahkamah turut mengesahkan bahawa seal tersebut masih dalam keadaan baik. [49] Identiti barang kes dadah juga telah dicamkan oleh saksi-saksi pendakwaan. [50] Walaupun pihak pembelaan cuba mencabar identiti barang kes semasa pemeriksaan balas ke atas SP4 dan SP5 dengan mencadangkan bahawa barang kes yang dicamkan di mahkamah bukan barang kes yang dirampas, SP4 dan SP5 secara konsisten tidak bersetuju dengan cadangan tersebut. [51] Dalam kes Loh Kah Loon v. PP [2011] 5 CLJ 345, Mahkamah telah memutuskan yang berikut: “The real question is whether the exhibits recovered by the police is the same exhibits sent to and examined by the chemist and subsequently produced in court as evidence. We have no doubt that it was the same exhibits” [52] Berpandukan prinsip yang digariskan dalam kes ini berhubung dengan rantaian keterangan dan setelah menghalusi keterangan saksi-saksi, Mahkamah ini mendapati barang kes yang dirampas oleh SP4 adalah barang kes yang sama yang telah dianalisis oleh SP2 dan hasil analisis menunjukkan bahawa barang kes tersebut merupakan dadah berbahaya yang menjadi hal perkara pertuduhan ke atas OKT. [53] Kesimpulannya, Mahkamah ini mendapati rantaian keterangan berhubung dengan pengendalian barang kes dadah tidak terputus dan dapat dijaga dengan baik oleh saksi-saksi pendakwaan. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 16 of 32 Kredibiliti saksi-saksi pendakwaan [54] Pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil 7 orang saksi pendakwaan untuk memberi keterangan dalam kes ini. Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP1 hingga SP7 adalah credible, konsisten serta saling menyokong antara satu sama lain. Sekiranya terdapat percanggahan antara keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan, ia tidak menyentuh perkara asas atau perkara pokok serta tidak menjejaskan atau ‘fatal’ kepada kes pendakwaan. [55] Mahkamah ini juga tidak mempunyai sebab untuk tidak mempercayai keterangan yang diberikan oleh saksi-saksi pendakwaan. Oleh yang demikian, adalah mustahil untuk mempercayai jika dikatakan pasukan serbuan tersebut mengada- adakan cerita berkenaan rampasan dadah berbahaya tersebut. Keputusan Di Akhir Kes Pendakwaan [56] Setelah mendengar keterangan saksi-saksi dan meneliti hujahan pihak-pihak, serta membuat penilaian maksimum terhadap keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan, maka Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes prima facie bahawa dadah yang dijumpai sepertimana dalam pertuduhan ini merupakan dadah berbahaya yang ditakrifkan di bawah Seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. [57] Selanjutnya Mahkamah mendapati OKT mempunyai milikan ke atas dadah yang dijumpai berdasarkan keterangan terus pihak pendakwaan dan wujudnya anggapan di bawah Seksyen 37(d) ADB 1952 yang menunjukkan pengetahuan OKT ke atas dadah yang dijumpai dan tindakan OKT pada masa tersebut terjumlah kepada S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 17 of 32 aktiviti pengedaran sepertimana yang ditakrifkan di bawah Seksyen 2 Akta yang sama. [58] Mahkamah dengan ini memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan satu kes prima facie terhadap OKT sepertimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Seksyen 180(4) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Oleh itu OKT dengan ini dipanggil untuk membela diri di bawah pertuduhan ini. [59] Mahkamah ini telah menerangkan 3 pilihan kepada OKT , iaitu memberi keterangan secara bersumpah (sworn statement) dari dalam kandang saksi (witness box), memberi keterangan tidak bersumpah (unsworn statement) daripada kandang tertuduh atau berdiam diri. OKT kemudiannya telah memilih untuk memberi keterangan secara bersumpah. Ringkasan Kes dan Hujahan Pembelaan [60] Pihak pembelaan telah mengemukakan dua orang saksi iaitu Amir Bin Ayub – OKT (SD1) dan Amran Bin Ibrahim - Saksi Awam (SD2). Berdasarkan keterangan mereka, pembelaan yang diketengahkan adalah seperti berikut: - a. SD1 merupakan seorang kontraktor binaan dan dia mempunyai dua orang pekerja bernama Hamizan Bin Osman dan Zahir Bin Khalid. SD1 menyimpan barang- barang pembinaan di dalam bilik stor rumah tersebut, iaitu bilik ke 3 yang bertanda F di dalam Ekshibit P13. b. Kedua-dua pekerja tersebut mempunyai akses untuk keluar dan masuk rumah tersebut. Pada setiap masa pintu pagar rumah dan pintu tepi di bahagian dapur tidak pernah dikunci untuk membolehkan kedua-dua pekerja S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 18 of 32 tersebut mengambil dan menyimpan barang-barang pembinaan. Untuk masuk ke bilik yang bertanda F, kedua-dua pekerja akan melalui bahagian dapur di mana dadah di temui. c. Menurut SD1, pada 19 Februari 2019 jam lebih kurang 9 pagi, kedua-dua pekerjanya ada datang ke bilik F tersebut. Mereka bekerja dari pagi hingga tengah hari. Pada hari yang sama, jam lebih kurang 7.00 malam, SD1 balik ke rumah. Pada masa itu isterinya (SP6) telah keluar untuk mengambil anak di sekolah. d. Pada petang tersebut SD1 berseorangan di rumah dan menyiram pokok. Setelah itu SD1 pergi ke tandas dan berada di dalam tandas selama lebih kurang 15 minit. Semasa di dalam tandas, SD1 mendengar suara di luar rumah dan suara isteri sedang bercakap. SD1 keluar dari rumah dan nampak isterinya bersama beberapa orang lelaki sedang bercakap di luar rumah, kemudiannya mereka masuk ke dalam rumah. e. SD1 berasa hairan apabila beberapa orang lelaki tersebut masuk ke dalam rumah. Lelaki tersebut juga bertanya “adakah ini pekerja awak?”. SD1 menjawab “Ya”. SD1 mengesahkan Zamizan adalah pekerjanya dan pada masa itu tangan Zamizan bergari. f. Polis bersama Zamizan telah masuk ke dalam bilik bertanda F dan menggeledah bilik tersebut. Kemudiannya SD1 ditahan oleh seorang anggota polis di ruang tamu. Dalam masa yang sama, seorang lagi pekerjanya iaitu Mat Zahir sampai ke rumah tersebut S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 19 of 32 untuk menyimpan water jet. Kemudiannya Mat Zahir turut ditangkap oleh pihak polis. g. Polis telah menjumpai barang kes dadah di dalam bilik F dan barang-barang tersebut adalah barang kes dadah dalam kes ini. SD1 menyatakan dia tidak pernah melihat barang-barang tersebut. h. Menurut SD1, bahagian dapur selalu digunakan olehnya dan ahli keluarga serta pekerja-pekerjanya. SD1 juga menyatakan bahawa Hamizan mengaku kepada polis bahawa barang-barang tersebut adalah kepunyaannya. i. SD2 merupakan seorang “siak masjid”. Keterangannya di Mahkamah ini bahawa beliau mengenali SD1. SD2 mengesahkan bahawa SD1 bekerja sebagai penggali kubur di Masjid Al-Khalidiah dan juga membuat kerja- kerja mengecat tembok di masjid. Pada bulan Februari 2019, SD1 bekerja pada setiap hari. [61] Berdasarkan keterangan oleh SD1 dan SD2, maka pihak pembelaan telah mengemukakan hujahan bertulis yang diringkaskan seperti berikut:- a. OKT telah memberi keterangan bersumpah dan cadangan-cadangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pembelaan di dalam kes pendakwaan telah dibuktikan (crystalized) berdasarkan keterangan bersumpah OKT. Keterangan bersumpah oleh OKT tidak dapat disangkal dalam pemeriksaan balas atau melalui apa-apa keterangan lain. b. Keterangan bersumpah SP6 (Pemilik Rumah dan isteri OKT) telah membuktikan pembelaan OKT. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 20 of 32 c. Laporan akhbar IDD45 telah mengesahkan bukan hanya OKT di tahan dalam operasi yang di jalankan. Laporan akhbar ini menyokong, membuktikan pembelaan dan versi OKT. d. Gambar-gambar sidang media (IDD46 [a] – [e]) mengenai operasi yang di jalankan menunjukkan bukan hanya barang kes ini dikemukakan, tetapi terdapat juga barang kes tangkapan lain, ini membuktikan bukan hanya OKT seorang di tahan tetapi ada orang lain di tahan juga dengan barang kes lain. e. SP5 mengesahkan bahawa beliau ialah pegawai polis di dalam gambar tersebut (IDD45 dan IDD46 [a] – [e]). IDD45 dan IDD46 boleh dijadikan ekshibit pembelaan berdasarkan prinsip dalam kes Muhamad Zafir Kamil v. PP & Another Appeal [2019] 6 CLJ 761 di mukasurat 36 bahawa memandangkan Pegawai Penyiasat kes sendiri telah mengesahkan kesahihannya dan gambarnya sendiri dalam keratan tersebut, ia boleh di terima sebagai ekshibit oleh Mahkamah. f. Keterangan saintifik dalam kes Pendakwaan tidak membuktikan OKT yang mengendalikan barang-barang kes ini kerana tiada kesan cap jari OKT pada barang kes (termasuk sealer, penimbang, bekas – bekas plastik dan tin yang di jumpai), juga tiada kesan dadah pada tangan dan pakaian OKT. Ini membuktikan bukan OKT yang mengendalikan barang kes. g. OKT tidak cuba melarikan diri semasa ditahan menunjukkan tiada apa yang hendak di sembunyikan S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 21 of 32 dan menunjukkan OKT tiada pengetahuan mengenai kewujudan dadah. h. Sekiranya OKT tahu kewujudan dadah di rumah tersebut yang membawa kepada hukuman berat, sudah pasti OKT akan cuba melarikan diri melalui pintu dapur rumah [bertanda J pada Ekshibit P13] yang tidak berkunci menyedari ada polis datang dan berada di luar rumah bersama isterinya SP6. i. Keterangan SD2 mengesahkan pembelaan OKT bahawa OKT bekerja di masjid dan mempunyai pekerja- pekerja yang juga di tahan. Terdapat dua set keterangan bersumpah, iaitu satu keterangan menyokong kes pendakwaan dan satu keterangan menyokong kes pembelaan. Tugas pembelaan sepanjang perbicaraan adalah untuk menimbulkan satu keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. j. Tidak boleh wujud dua versi keterangan di dalam satu kes kerana beban yang di tanggung pendakwaan adalah untuk membuktikan versinya sahaja yang betul dan benar tanpa apa-apa keraguan munasabah. Sekiranya ada versi kedua yang wujud dari keterangan kes, pendakwaan perlu negate versi tersebut. k. Peguam berhujah bahawa keterangan SP6 telah menimbulkan kesangsian terhadap kes pendakwaan dan menyokong keterangan OKT yang konsisten semasa kes di peringkat pendakwaan lagi. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 22 of 32 Analisis dan dapatan Mahkamah [62] Di akhir perbicaraan adalah menjadi tugas Mahkamah ini untuk mempertimbangkan semula semua keterangan yang telah dikemukakan di hadapan mahkamah dan memutuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan kes melampaui keraguan yang munasabah seperti mana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 182A Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. [63] Mahkamah juga hendaklah mempertimbangkan sama ada keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pembelaan itu telah menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. Walaupun keterangan yang dikemukakan itu lemah, Mahkamah masih bertanggungjawab untuk memberikan pertimbangan yang sewajarnya ke atas keterangan tersebut dan menentukan sama ada pembelaan sedemikian mampu menimbulkan keraguan munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. [64] Mahkamah ini berpandukan keputusan Mahkamah persekutuan dalam kes Ganapathy Rengasamy v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 CLJ 1, yang telah memutuskan seperti berikut:- “It needs to be remembered that however weak a defence may be, trial judges being judges of both fact and law should not just brush aside the defence on the basis that the prosecution witnesses are to be believed and not the defence. Where the law casts the onus of giving an explanation upon an accused person, and the explanation is given, which if consistent with innocence, the court is duty bound to consider whether it might reasonably be true, although not convinced of its truth.” S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 23 of 32 [65] Mahkamah ini mendapati secara umumnya, pembelaan OKT adalah berdasarkan kepada versi OKT yang keseluruhannya berbeza dengan versi Pendakwaan. Pada peringkat ini Mahkamah perlu menimbangkan dan membuat penilaian maksimum serta merumuskan sama ada dari keseluruhan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan dengan dibandingkan dengan keterangan oleh saksi- saksi pembelaan telah menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah (Rujuk; Kesavan Krishnan lwn. PR [2015] 6 CLJ 163; [2014] MLRAU 542). [66] Di dalam kes ini, versi pihak pendakwaan adalah jelas bahawa tangkapan terhadap OKT adalah berikutan satu operasi tapis dan semasa serbuan di rumah tersebut, OKT telah ditahan semasa sedang berdiri di hadapan barang kes dadah yang terletak di atas kabinet di dapur rumah tersebut. Kredibiliti SP4 (pegawai serbuan) dan kewujudan dua individu yang lain [67] Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah telah menilai keterangan SP4 secara maksimum dan mendapati bahawa keterangan SP4 adalah kukuh berkenaan dengan serbuan, tangkapan dan rampasan barang kes dadah. SP4 tidak bersetuju dengan beberapa cadangan pihak pembelaan semasa disoal balas. [68] Kini, Mahkamah menilai semula keterangan SP4 dan membandingkannya dengan keterangan OKT. SP4 dalam keterangannya menyatakan beliau dan pasukannya semasa menjalankan ops tapis telah membuat serbuan ke rumah tempat kejadian dan OKT ditemui sedang berdiri di hadapan kabinet dapur S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 24 of 32 di ruangan dapur rumah tersebut. Di atas kabinet tersebut terdapat barang kes dadah yang merupakan subjek dalam pertuduhan ini. [69] Manakala versi OKT bahawa barang kes dijumpai di dalam bilik ketiga rumah tersebut semasa pihak polis menggeledah bilik ketiga dan pada masa tersebut pihak polis membawa bersamanya seorang bernama Zamizan. Zamizan dikatakan bebas untuk keluar dan masuk ke rumah tersebut. [70] Adalah penting untuk Mahkamah ini membuat perbandingan kedua- dua versi ini untuk menentukan sama ada wujud keraguan yang munasabah ke atas kes Pendakwaan. [71] OKT di dalam keterangannya menafikan terus penglibatannya dengan kewujudan barang kes dadah tersebut. OKT menyatakan barang kes dadah tersebut diletakkan dan dimiliki oleh Zamizan dan Mat Zahir. [72] Sekiranya Mahkamah menerima dan berpegang kepada versi OKT, maka bekas-bekas logam dan barang kes dadah tersebut mungkin diletakkan oleh Mat Zahir dan / atau Zamizan. [73] Namun penelitian Mahkamah terhadap keterangan OKT, tidak mendapati apa-apa keterangan OKT yang menunjukkan mana- mana dari dua orang tersebut telah dilihat oleh OKT membawa barang kes dadah tersebut dan meletakkan di atas kabinet di dapur tersebut. [74] Selain itu, pihak pembelaan juga tidak pernah mengemukakan soalan kepada mana-mana saksi Pendakwaan bagi meletakkan versi bahawa barang kes tersebut telah dibawa oleh polis atau dengan kata yang lain, pihak polis telah menganiaya OKT dengan penemuan barang kes dadah tersebut. Oleh itu timbul persoalan ke atas kesahihan versi pembelaan yang kononnya barang kes dadah tersebut dijumpai di dalam bilik ketiga dan bukannya di dapur. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 25 of 32 [75] SP4 dalam keterangannya menafikan cadangan-cadangan pembelaan yang diajukan kepadanya. SP4 adalah anggota polis yang menjalankan tugasnya dan beliau tidak mengenali OKT dan OKT juga tidak mengenali SP4 dan anggota serbuan yang lain sebelum kejadian. [76] Mahkamah mendapati tiada apa-apa motif untuk SP4 mengada- adakan cerita ke atas OKT. Mahkamah ini merujuk dan berpandukan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Dickson Levy Maria George v. PP [2018] 1 LNS 135, yang menyatakan: "[47] Also, there was no rhyme nor reason for the police officers in this case to frame up the appellant with the impugned drugs, as they were just performing their duty. (See the cases of Mohd Ali Jaafar v. PP [1998] 4 CLJ Supp 208 and Goh Han Heng v. PP [2003] SGHC 226 [2003] 4 SLR 374).” [77] Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa tiada sebab untuk SP4 mereka-reka cerita apatah lagi untuk menganiaya OKT. Mahkamah merumuskan bahawa SP4 adalah seorang saksi yang boleh dipercayai dan kewujudan Zamizan dan Mat Zahir adalah diragui. SD2, kewujudan Mat Zahir dan Zamizan [78] Setelah meneliti keterangan OKT (SD1), Mahkamah berpendapat ianya merupakan satu fikiran kemudian (afterthought). Ini dapat dilihat apabila pihak pembelaan mengemukakan SD2 sebagai saksi. [79] Pembelaan memanggil SD2 sebagai saksi adalah untuk mengukuhkan keterangan SD1 bahawa SD1 mempunyai dua orang S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 26 of 32 pekerja. Tetapi peranan SD2 tidak pernah dikemukakan kepada mana-mana saksi Pendakwaan sepanjang kes pendakwaan. [80] SD2 dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa beliau kenal SD1 yang membuat kerja-kerja mengecat tembok masjid dan sebagai penggali kubur, tetapi SD2 tidak mengenali pekerja OKT. [81] SD2 menyatakan pekerja OKT ialah warganegara asing dan bukan orang tempatan. Berdasarkan keterangan SD2, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa sebenarnya SD2 tidak tahu mengenai pekerja OKT. [82] Keterangan SD2 telah menimbulkan keraguan mengenai Mat Zahir dan Zamizan yang dikatakan oleh OKT sebagai pekerjanya, dan keterangan SD2 telah menyangkal pembelaan OKT bahawa dadah tersebut kepunyaan Zamizan dan Mat Zahir. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa kedua-dua watak tersebut adalah watak rekaan oleh OKT. [83] Mahkamah mendapati teras pembelaan tertuduh adalah menjurus kepada bagaimana barang kes dadah tersebut ditemui. Pembelaan berhujah bahawa dadah tersebut dijumpai di dalam bilik bertanda F, maka “bagaimana dadah ditemui”, “di mana dadah ditemui” telah menimbulkan keraguan kepada kes pendakwaan. [84] Mahkamah telah menilai perkara ini sejak kes pendakwaan dan mendapati versi pendakwaan adalah jelas, iaitu dadah dijumpai di atas kabinet dapur di dapur rumah yang didiami oleh OKT. Pada masa itu tertuduh sedang berdiri di hadapan kabinet tersebut. [85] Versi pembelaan bahawa terdapat tangkapan yang lain sebelum tertuduh ditangkap dan tangkapan yang pertama tersebut telah membawa pihak polis ke rumah OKT dan membawa kepada penangkapan OKT. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 27 of 32 [86] Pembelaan mencadangkan bahawa Zamizan merupakan tangkapan pertama dan pihak Pembelaan telah membentangkan naratifnya. Versi pembelaan yang tersebut telah dinafikan oleh SP4 [87] Selanjutnya, SP4 semasa disoal balas mengenai watak-watak Zamizan dan Mat Zahir, beliau menjawab “tidak tahu”. Ini menunjukkan watak-watak tersebut tidak berkaitan dalam penemuan dadah oleh SP4 pada hari tersebut. [88] Mahkamah berpendapat jika SP4 terlibat dalam serbuan pertama seperti yang dicadangkan oleh pembelaan kepada SP4, sudah pasti SP4 mengakuinya. Memandangkan SP4 menafikan penglibatan beliau dalam serbuan pertama yang dicadangkan oleh pembelaan, ini bermakna beliau tidak terlibat dalam serbuan yang dimaksudkan oleh pihak pembelaan. [89] Mahkamah sedar bahawa SP6 dalam keterangannya ada menyebut mengenai dua watak tersebut tetapi SP6 tidak mengesahkan bahawa barang kes dadah itu kepunyaan dua watak tersebut dan keterangan SP6 juga tidak menafikan mengenai penemuan barang kes dadah oleh SP4. [90] Keterangan SP6 yang menyebut mengenai dua watak tersebut tidaklah melemahkan kes pendakwaan kerana SP6 tidak berada di dalam rumah semasa serbuan dilakukan dan beliau tidak melihat apa yang sedang dilakukan oleh OKT sebelum dan semasa serbuan tersebut. [91] Berdasarkan penelitian dan penilaian Mahkamah terhadap keterangan SD1 dan SD2, Mahkamah berpendapat ianya tidak menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. Keterangan SD2 jelas menunjukkan beliau tidak mengenali Zamizan dan Mat Zahir, dan beliau menyatakan pekerja OKT adalah warganegara asing. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 28 of 32 [92] Mahkamah berpendapat keterangan SD2 telah menjejaskan kredibiliti keterangan OKT sendiri dan menimbulkan persoalan mengenai kewujudan Zamizan dan Mat Zahir. [93] Mahkamah juga mendapati keterangan SP4 dan SP5 bukanlah sesuatu yang inherently improbable. Mahkamah merujuk kepada keputusan oleh Thompson CJ di dalam kes PP v. Mohamed Ali [1962] 1 LNS 129; [1962] 1 MLJ 257 yang menyatakan: "When a Police witness says something that is not inherently improbable his evidence must in the first instance be accepted. If he says he saw a cow jumping over the moon his evidence is, of course, not to be accepted, but if he says he saw a cow wandering along one of the main streets of Kuala Lumpur (the sort of thing we all see every day of our lives) there is not the slightest justification for refusing to believe him. Of course if his evidence is contradicted by other evidence or is shaken by cross-examination then it becomes the business of the Magistrate to decide whether or not it should be accepted. In the absence of contradiction, however, and in the absence of any element of inherent probability the evidence of any witness, whether a Police witness or not, who gives evidence on affirmation, should normally be accepted." [94] Mahkamah juga menilai keterangan SD1 berkenaan penama- penama tersebut dan mendapati dari keterangan yang diberikan, SD1 langsung tidak memberi sebarang perincian tempat tinggal atau butiran diri berkaitan penama-penama tersebut selain mereka adalah pekerjanya. Ini menimbulkan persoalan mengenai kewujudan penama-penama tersebut dan kewujudan mereka amat meragukan. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 29 of 32 [95] Dalam isu ini, Mahkamah ini bersandarkan kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Muhammad Kamil Abdullah & Satu Lagi lawan PP [2019] 1 LNS 74 yang diputuskan: "[20] Walaupun pihak ketiga "Rajah" telah ditimbulkan seawal kes pendakwaan, kegagalan pihak polis untuk menyiasat mengenai "Rajah" adalah tidak memudaratkan kes pendakwaan. Semasa pemeriksaan balas Pegawai Tangkapan (SP4) di m.s. 57 Rekod Rayuan Jld. 2, jelas menyatakan bahawa Perayu 1 tidak memberitahu SP4 bahawa dadah dan barang-barang lain yang berkaitan adalah kepunyaan "Rajah". Seterusnya dari penelitian kami, Perayu 1 juga tidak memberitahu Pegawai Penyiasat (SP5) mengenai butir-butir peribadi, alamat, nombor telefon dan sebagainya mengenai "Rajah" (rujuk m.s. 81 Rekod Rayuan Jld. 2). Kegagalan berbuat demikian bererti syarat-syarat "Alcontara Notice" tidak dipatuhi. Kami juga mendapati bahawa Percakapan Beramaran Perayu 1 tidak dikemukakan untuk menentukan sama ada butir-butir peribadi "Rajah" telah diberikan oleh Perayu 1 atau tidak. [21] Keperluan "Percakapan Beramaran" bukanlah meletakkan beban berlebihan ke atas pembelaan. Ianya adalah wajar apabila Pegawai Tangkapan (SP4) menafikan bahawa Perayu 1 ada memberitahu SP4 bahawa dadah dan barang-barang berkaitan adalah kepunyaan "Rajah". Malah keterangan Pegawai Penyiasat (SP5) walaupun mengakui Perayu 1 ada memberitahu bahawa secara lisan mengenai "Rajah" tetapi Perayu 1 tidak memberitahu butir-butir peribadi "Rajah". Otoriti tersohor PP v. Ling Tee Huah [1980] 1 LNS 212; [1982] 2 MLJ 234 menyatakan: S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 30 of 32 "a mere denial without other proof to reasonably dislodge the prosecution's evidence is not sufficient...".” [96] Sehubungan dengan itu Mahkamah merumuskan bahawa naratif atau versi pembelaan bukan saja tidak munasabah untuk dipercayai bahkan telah gagal menimbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah ke atas kes yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Pendakwaan. Kesimpulan [97] Setelah membuat penilaian maksimum dan menimbangkan keseluruhan keterangan pihak pendakwaan dan pembelaan, serta meneliti kredibiliti saksi-saksi pendakwaan dan pembelaan, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa atas imbangan kebarangkalian, pihak pembelaan telah gagal mematahkan anggapan pemilikan dan pengetahuan di bawah seksyen 37(d) ADB 1952. [98] Berdasarkan keterangan saksi-saksi pembelaan, versi pembelaan adalah diragui dan tidak munasabah. Pembelaan yang dikemukakan adalah bersifat penafian semata-mata berkaitan pemilikan dadah, pengetahuan dan penglibatan dalam aktiviti pengedaran dadah. [99] Mahkamah turut berpuashati bahawa pembelaan juga secara keseluruhannya telah gagal menimbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan mengikut prinsip yang diputuskan dalam kes Mat v. Public Prosecutor [1963] 1 LNS 82; [1963] 1 MLJ 263. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 31 of 32 [100] Akhirnya, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati dan mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kesnya melampaui keraguan yang munasabah terhadap OKT bagi pertuduhan yang dihadapkan ke atas OKT. Mahkamah dengan ini mendapati OKT bersalah dan disabitkan kesalahannya atas pertuduhan yang dihadapinya. Hukuman [101] Di dalam rayuan untuk peringanan hukuman, pihak pembelaan memohon Mahkamah ini mempertimbangkan hukuman dalam bentuk pemenjaraan seumur hidup. Pihak pembelaan juga telah merujuk kes Pendakwa Raya vs Umaphati Ganesan [2023] 9 CLJ 625 yang diputuskan oleh YA Hakim di Mahkamah Tinggi Melaka. Dalam kes ini, Mahkamah Tinggi telah mempertimbangkan hukuman pemenjaraan seumur hidup dan sebatan berikutan dengan penggubalan Akta Pemansuhan Hukuman Mati Mandatori 2023 khususnya seksyen 54 berhubung dengan pindaan kepada seksyen 39B Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. [102] Setelah mempertimbangkan rayuan OKT dan faktor pemberatan yang dibentangkan oleh pihak pendakwaan, maka Mahkamah dengan ini menjatuhkan hukuman penjara seumur hidup ke atas OKT bermula dari tarikh tangkap. Selaras dengan seksyen 289(c) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, hukuman sebatan tidak dikenakan memandangkan OKT telah berumur lebih 50 tahun. S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 32 of 32 [103] Semua ekshibit diserahkan kepada pihak pendakwaan untuk simpanan selamat sehingga selesai rayuan. Bertarikh: 5 November 2023 ……………………….….. (FATHIYAH BINTI IDRIS) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Butterworth Pulau Pinang PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi pihak pendakwaan: Kirubini a/p G. Subramaniam Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Pulau Pinang Bagi pihak pembelaan: Hussaini bin Abdul Rashid Peguam Bela dan Peguam Cara Tetuan Hussaini & Co. Pulau Pinang S/N ri/BICctEWh8JNBUMjYOA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	51,112	Tika 2.6.0
DJ-83-104-06/2021	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH MOHD NASIR BIN ISMAIL	Principle of Sentencing-Consideration-Road Transport Act-Section 41(1) of the same act-Mitigating Factors-Aggravating Factors-Bond of Good Behavior-Conviction Recorded-Public Interest-Plea of Guilt-First Offender-Health of the Accused	05/11/2023	Tuan Mohd Izdham Naim bin Che Ani	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e047cfc5-fcec-4108-92f2-ce7a1ca1a6da&Inline=true	DJ-83-104-06/2021 Page 1 of 7 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI PASIR MAS DALAM NEGERI KELANTAN DARUL NAIM, MALAYSIA KES JENAYAH NO: DJ-83-104-06/2021 PENDAKWARAYA -LAWAN- MOHD NASIR BIN ISMAIL GROUND OF JUDGMENT 1. These are my grounds for my decision for this case. The charge meted against the Accused is as follows:- Bahawa kamu Pada 3/02/2020 Jam Lebih Kurang 2130 Hrs Di Jalan Gual Mesa, Jalan Rantau Panjang Dalam Daerah Pasir Mas, Dalam Negeri Kelantan Sebagai Pemandu M/Kar No. Pendaftaran DBN 8026. Telah Memandu Kenderaan Tersebut Diatas Jalanraya Dengan Secara Merbahaya Sehingga Menyebabkan Kematian Kepada Penunggang M/Sikal No VDE 6704, bernama: Muhamad Fadzli Bin Muhamed Bastamam, Umur: 18 Tahun No. Kad Pengenalan: 020809-08-027 . Oleh Itu Kamu Telah Melakukan Kesalahan Dan Boleh Dihukum Dibawah Seksyen : 41 (1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987. Hukuman:- Jika Disabitkan Dengan Kesalahan Penjara Tempoh Tidak Kurang 2 Tahun Dan Tidak Lebih 10 Tahun Dan Denda Tidak Kurang Rm 5,000.00 Dan Tidak Lebih Rm 20,000.00 2. The Court is satisfied upon charge meted against him. Upon reading the charge which the Court also made him understand the nature of the charge, the Accused pleaded guilty and it were unreserved and unequivocal. The consequences of the plea also been meted out to him 05/11/2023 12:05:26 DJ-83-104-06/2021 Kand. 50 S/N xc9H4Oz8CEGS8s56HKGm2g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal DJ-83-104-06/2021 Page 2 of 7 and still he pleaded guilty. Having satisfied with this matter, this Court found the Accused guilty and convicted him on the preferred charge. 3. This Court refer to Court of Appeal in Public Prosecutor v Morah Chekwube Chukwudi [2017] MLJU 958, where it laid down the jurisprudence in relation of sentencing:- Jurisprudence relating to sentence [5] It is well established that there are a number of factors that courts take into consideration before sentencing. Some of them are as follows: (a) the gravity or severity of the facts constituting the offence; (b) the circumstances in which it was committed; (c) the rampancy of such offence in the area; (d) the offender’s previous record; (e) the offender’s contribution and support to his family members; (f) the offenders means; (g) the effect of conviction and sentence on his job opportunities; (h) the age and health of the accused; (i) whether it is his first offence; (j) whether the accused had cooperated with the police after the commission of the offence; (k) whether the accused had pleaded guilty; (i) status of the accused; (m) whether there was violence during the crime; (n) public interest, etc. 4. For our case at hand, I draw attention to Section 294 of the CPC which, in regards to first offenders provides: Section 294 First offenders (1) When any person not being a youthful offender has been convicted of any offence punishable with imprisonment before any Court if it appears to the Court that regard being had to the character, antecedents, age, health or mental condition of the offender or to the trivial nature of the offence or to any extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed it is expedient that the offender be released on probation of good conduct, S/N xc9H4Oz8CEGS8s56HKGm2g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal DJ-83-104-06/2021 Page 3 of 7 the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond with or without sureties and during such period as the Court may direct to appear and receive judgment if and when called upon and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. (2) The Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that the offender shall pay the costs of the prosecution or some portion of the same within that period and by such instalment as may be directed by the Court. Section 432 shall be applicable to any direction made under this subsection. (3) If a Court having power to deal with the offender in respect of his original offence, or any Court of summary jurisdiction, is satisfied by information on oath that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of his bond, it may issue a warrant for his apprehension. (4) Any offender when apprehended on any such warrant shall, if not immediately brought before the Court having power to sentence him, be brought before a Magistrate, and the Magistrate may either remand him by warrant until the time at which he is required by his bond to appear for judgment or until the sitting of a Court having power to deal with his original offence, or may admit him to bail with a sufficient surety conditioned on his appearing for judgment. (5) The offender, when so remanded, may be committed to prison and the warrant of remand shall order that he be brought before the Court before which he was bound to appear for judgment or to answer as to his conduct since his release. (6) This section shall not apply — (a) if the offender is charged with a serious offence; or (b) if the offender is charged with the commission of an act of domestic violence as defined under section 2 of the Domestic Violence Act 1994. 5. In the case of Jayanathan v Public Prosecutor [1973] 2 MLJ 68; [1973] 1 LNS 56, the Federal Court concisely explained the effect of s 294 of the CPC where Ong Hock Sim FJ delivering the judgement ruled: S/N xc9H4Oz8CEGS8s56HKGm2g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal DJ-83-104-06/2021 Page 4 of 7 This section vests the court before which a person is convicted with power to suspend sentence for such period as the court may direct, and, if the offender behaves himself during such period, he would escape punishment for his offence. If he fails to observe the conditions of his bond, he would be liable to be apprehended and dealt with for his original offence. As Thomson J (as he then was) said in Public Prosecutor v Idris [1955] 1 LNS 93: Section 294 which only applies in the case of adult offenders can only be made use of where a person has been convicted and where his conviction is for an offence punishable with imprisonment without the option of a fine. I do not wish to lay down any hard and fast rule, which in any event would be difficult to prove, but magistrates would be well-advised only to make use of s 294 where an offence which is generally of a serious nature and which is punishable with imprisonment has been committed. By an adult offender and where it is considered desirable to place him on probation In our view, if the Legislature intended that s 294 is to cease to have application in respect of an offence under s 15 of the Prevention of Crime Ordinance, it should be so expressed in the clearest possible language. We can find no such provision. 6. To put into context of our current case, I find that the accused is guilty and convicted him on the charge preferred. At the end of the proceeding I sentenced him to a bond of good behavior under section 294 of the CPC. Section 294 of the CPC would only be applicable to penal provisions which carry a term of imprisonment of less than ten years. In this case, there was no illegality when the court applied s 294 of the CPC for the offence of desertion pursuant to s 41 RTA as the offence carried an imprisonment of a not more than 10 years. The discretion to apply s 294 of the CPC was well within the powers and S/N xc9H4Oz8CEGS8s56HKGm2g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal DJ-83-104-06/2021 Page 5 of 7 ambit of the magistrate after considering the severity of the charge, facts and reflecting upon the mitigating and aggravating factors 7. The offence committed by the Accused was one which did not involve malice or brutality. The courts in determining the sentence to be imposed, was at liberty to take this as a factor to be considered. However, apart from this case, crimes which were overtly violent and heinous should never be given a light sentence as the correct purpose of sentencing would be aimed at deterrence and retribution. A person who commits an offence as such must be shown abhorrence by the justice system. The respondent in this case was a first offender and he had no prior convictions. It had been a long judicial principle to award leniency to first offenders. The court was of the view that, upon consideration of the mitigating and aggravating factors and deliberating upon the facts of the case, a bond of good behavior pursuant to s 294 of the CPC served the principles and purposes of sentencing and was in line with established judicial principles. Under principle of sentencing, it is considered after considering on other facts such as time, place, the nature of the case and rampancy of such crime. This Court also noted that in passing a sentencing a light sentence can be rejected in light of public interest. 8. The Accused age 58 during the proceeding, married and with 1 child. He was the breadwinner of the family and former armed forces. The learned counsel for the accused tendered that the accused suffers from various type of diseases and suffers spine disease which put him under vegetative condition. The learned counsel attached his medical report S/N xc9H4Oz8CEGS8s56HKGm2g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal DJ-83-104-06/2021 Page 6 of 7 during the mitigation. During the proceeding, which conducted at the compound of the court, I had the opportunity of observing the accused condition. The learned deputy public prosecutor on the other hand, avers that commensurate sentence should be given after taking the effect of accused action which resulted in death of the driver. I have taken on these factors, I opt that bond of good behavior is most appropriate for this case. As for rehabilitation, which is often seen solely as a way to aid an accused in becoming an efficacious member of society but it is also aimed benefiting society. By rehabilitating offenders, it is hoped that the accused will be equipped with the right mind set and skills to live a life by making choices that are well reasoned and grounded. 9. Having due regards on the facts and circumstances herein above, this Court find that the Accused guilty and convicted him on the preferred charge. However, having considered the above factors, I ordered him under bond of good behavior under section 294 Criminal Procedure Code for 2 years with 1 surety. I also order that the accused is disqualify from holding driving license for 5 years. This sentence is appropriate, proper and just. Thus it should be maintained. This Court so orders. S/N xc9H4Oz8CEGS8s56HKGm2g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal DJ-83-104-06/2021 Page 7 of 7 DATED 5 NOVEMBER 2023 …………………………………………... MOHD IZDHAM NAIM BIN CHE ANI Magistrate Magistrate’s Court Pasir Mas Kelantan Darul Naim Parties:- Deputy Public Prosecutor, Kelantan Darul Naim: Mr Aiman Syahmi The Accused; YBGK: Ms Aisyah Abdullah Decision: 28 August 2023 CRIMINAL LAW- Principle of Sentencing-Consideration-Road Transport Act- Section 41(1) of the same act- Mitigating Factors-Aggravating Factors-Bond of Good Behavior-Conviction Recorded-Public Interest-Plea of Guilt-First Offender-Health of the Accused S/N xc9H4Oz8CEGS8s56HKGm2g **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	12,067	Tika 2.6.0
JA-A73KJ-1230-10/2021	PLAINTIF 1. ) MUHAMMAD SYAFIQ AIMAN BIN NORDIN 2. ) MOHAMAD AZRUL AMIRUL BIN AZMI DEFENDAN 1. ) SARVINAKUMAR GUNALAN 2. ) LIZAWATI BINTI MOHAMED HASSANPIHAK KETIGAXVIPI SINERGI SDN BHD	Perbicaraan Penuh-Kes kemalangan jalan raya-Beban pembuktian kes sivil-Identiti Pemandu Kereta tersebut diragui-Plaintif Pertama tidak mempunyai lesen memandu pada masa kemalangan-Plaintif Pertama gagal mengambil langkah proaktif sebelum kemalangan & tiada liabiliti ke atas Defendan Kedua-Pegawai penyiasat asal tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi-Kuantum-Ganti rugi Am & Khas	05/11/2023	Puan Noorfazlin Binti Hamdan	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=dd069669-6e46-4f20-9539-2ba1a4cc4635&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TA’ZIM GUAMAN SIVIL NO: JA-A73KJ-1230-10/2021 ANTARA 1.MUHAMMAD SYAFIQ AIMAN BIN NORDIN [ No.Kad Pengenalan: 990312015435 ] 2.MOHAMAD AZRUL AMIRUL BIN AZMI [ No.Kad Pengenalan: 020118010609] ...PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN 1.SARVINAKUMAR GUNALAN [ No.Kad Pengenalan: 040319011139 ] 2. LIZAWATI BINTI MOHAMED HASSAN [ No.Kad Pengenalan: 830521045398 ] ...DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN DAN XVIPI SINERGI SDN BHD [ No.SYARIKAT: 1223052-M ] ...PIHAK KETIGA ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PERBICARAAN PENUH PRAEFATIO: [1] Ini adalah rayuan Defendan Kedua yang tidak berpuas hati terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Majistret Sivil (1) Johor Bahru pada 28.08.2023 di mana Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa Plaintif telah berjaya 05/11/2023 09:45:25 JA-A73KJ-1230-10/2021 Kand. 72 S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 membuktikan kes terhadap Defendan-Defendan dengan liabiliti 100%. Mahkamah seterusnya memutuskan jumlah gantirugi bagi kecederaan yang dialami Plaintif. Rayuan ini adalah terhadap sebahagian keputusan liabiliti dan kuantum oleh Defendan Kedua. FAKTA KES: [2] Kes kemalangan jalan raya ini berlaku pada 29.05.2019 antara motorsikal No.VCK 5247 (motorsikal tersebut) yang ditunggang oleh Plaintif Pertama dan pembonceng (Plaintif Kedua) dengan motorkar Proton Alza No. WB 2511 X (motorkar tersebut) yang dipandu oleh Defendan Pertama. Defendan Kedua ialah pemilik berdaftar motorkar tersebut yang mana Defendan Kedua telah memasuki satu Perjanjian Pajakan Motorkar bertarikh 29.1.2019 (“Perjanjian tersebut”) bersama Pihak Ketiga. [3] Tujuan pajakan motorkar tersebut untuk tujuan sewaan yang mana pada masa kemalangan, motorkar tersebut telahpun disewakan kepada seorang penama, R. Manimaran A/L Ramman (penyewa tersebut) yang mana Defendan Kedua tidak mengenali penyewa tersebut dan Defendan Pertama. [4] Satu Penghakiman Ingkar Kehadiran juga telah dimasukkan ke atas Defendan Pertama pada 11.04.2022. PRINSIP UNDANG-UNDANG: [5] Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang mantap bahawa onus probandi pada tahap imbangan kebarangkalian adalah di pihak Plaintif selaras seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut: S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Beban membuktikan 101. (1) Sesiapa yang berhasrat supaya mana-mana mahkamah memberikan penghakiman tentang apa-apa hak atau tanggungan di sisi undang-undang, dengan bergantung kepada kewujudan fakta yang ditegaskan olehnya, mestilah membuktikan bahawa fakta itu wujud. (2) Apabila seseorang terikat untuk membuktikan kewujudan apa-apa fakta, dikatakan bahawa beban membuktikan terletak pada orang itu. [6] Prinsip ini juga adalah dinyatakan di dalam kes Wong Thin Yit v Mohamad Ali[1971] 2 MLJ 175, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan: “In a negligence action, the onus of proof rests wholly on the plaintiff, whether or not the defendant gives evidence and the plaintiff cannot succeed without proof of the defendant’s negligence”. PENILAIAN MAHKAMAH (i)ISU LIABILITI (a)Identiti Pemandu Kereta tersebut diragui. [7] Peguamcara Defendan Kedua berhujah wujudnya keterangan yang menunjukkan Plaintif Pertama (SP2) gagal mengenal pasti identiti pemandu motorkar tersebut semasa disoalbalas. [8] Mahkamah telah meneliti pliding pihak-pihak dan didapati isu identiti pemandu motorkar (Defendan Pertama) tidak pernah dipertikaikan. Namun, Defendan Kedua hanya memplidkan tidak mempunyai pengetahuan langsung bahawa motorkar tersebut dipandu dan/atau dikendalikan oleh S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Defendan Pertama sahaja. Tiada juga sebarang pertikaian tentang identiti Defendan Pertama bukanlah pemandu motorkar tersebut di dalam mana- mana repot polis yang dilaporkan sepertimana P3 dan ID4 yang merujuk motorsikal SP2 dan motorkar Defendan Kedua yang sama. [9] Penjelasan juga telah diberikan SP2 tentang identiti pemandu motorkar tersebut yang menunjukkan kejadian berlaku agak pantas dengan cuaca hujan boleh menjadi faktor percanggahan identiti Defendan Pertama sama ada lelaki atau perempuan India oleh SP2 ketika itu (Rujuk NK m/s 29): “S : Encik tadi cakap kepada peguamcara defendan bahawa pemandu kereta itu adalah india perempuan tetapi encik juga cakap tadi encik tidak sempat pun jumpa pemandu itu sebab encik terus dihantar ke hospital. Mana satu yang betul encik? J : Saya nampak dia keluar daripada kereta semasa dia langgar itu saya bangun saya tengok Azrul selepas itu perempuan india itu keluar daripada kereta. Dia pun tidak ada cakap apa – apa. Saya terus 25 angkat Azrul. Saya pergi klinik. Azrul pergi klinik. Memang benda itu berlaku dengan cepat sebab masa itu masih hujan renyai lagi”. [10] Mahkamah dipandukan dengan kes Mahkamah Persekutuan menerusi kes Tua Kin Ling v. PP [1970] 1 LNS 161; [1970] 2 MLJ 61, 63 Thompson C.J. memutuskan: "No doubt the rule is that if a witness had lied on one, or two points it does not necessarily follow that his whole evidence should be rejected (Khoon Chye Hin v. PP [1961] 1 LNS 41; [1961] MLJ 105). But it is the duty of the S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 court to sieve the evidence and to ascertain what are the parts of the evidence tending to incriminate the accused which could be accepted'." [11] Oleh itu, Mahkamah berpendapat fakta tersebut tidak menjejaskan kes Plaintif kerana percanggahan tersebut bersifat minor dan bukan semua saksi mempunyai daya ingatan/kefahaman yang serupa atas sesuatu perkara yang disaksikannya. Kredibiliti SP2 tidak terjejas atas keterangan tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah menolak isu dibangkitkan Defendan Kedua ini. (b)Plaintif Pertama tidak mempunyai lesen memandu pada masa kemalangan. [12] Peguamcara Defendan berhujah bahawa disebabkan SP2 tidak mempunyai lesen kerana telah tamat sebelum kejadian iaitu pada 29.05.2021. Walaubagaimanapun, Mahkamah mendapati fakta sebenar menunjukkan sebaliknya. Keterangan SP2 seperti berikut: (Rujuk NK m/s28): “S : Jika dirujuk pada mukasurat 58 iaitu lesen encik rakan bijaksana saya ada tanyakan tempoh sah lesen encik iaitu kalau dari dokumen ini sejak dari 30/5/2019. Adakah encik mempunyai lesen sebelum 30/5/2019 tersebut? J : Ya ada”. Penjelasan ini diberikan selepas disoal balas oleh Peguamcara Defendan Kedua seperti berikut: (Rujuk NK m/s 21) S : Kalau kita tengok pada tempoh sah lesen itu bertarikh berapa 25 haribulan? Boleh En. Syafiq maklumkan kepada Mahkamah? J : 30/5 S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 S : Jadi pada 30/5 baru lesen itu hidup. Betul? J : 29/5 hidup. 30 renew baru.” [13] Keterangan-keterangan SP2 di atas menunjukkan sewaktu kemalangan, SP2 masih mempunyai lesen memandu yang sah yang kemudiannya telah tamat hari esoknya iaitu 30.05.2019 dan telah dihidupkan semula pada tarikh yang sama. Malah, di dalam pliding Plaintif telahpun menafikan dakwaan Defendan tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, isu berbangkit ini juga wajar ditolak oleh Mahkamah. (c) Plaintif Pertama gagal mengambil langkah proaktif sebelum kemalangan & tiada liabiliti ke atas Defendan Kedua. [14] Peguamcara Defendan Kedua berhujah bahawa SP2 mengakui telah melihat kehadiran motorkar tersebut namun telah gagal mengambil tindakan yang sepatutnya/proaktif untuk mengelakkan kemalangan berlaku. [15] Mahkamah mendapati SP2 telahpun memberikan penjelasan tentang keadaan dan kedudukan kedua-dua kenderaan sewaktu perlanggaran berlaku.SP2 telah menunjukkan motorsikal SP2 telahpun berada di hadapan simpang untuk bergerak terus, namun motorkar tersebut telah keluar simpang dan terus merempuh bahagian kanan motorsikal SP2 di laluan utama. Keterangan SP2 disokong SP3 yang mengesahkan motorsikal mereka dari arah kanan menuju ke arah kiri iaitu di jalan utama sepertimana di dalam rajah kasar. [16] Mahkamah juga mendapati keterangan SP2 disokong oleh hasil siasatan pegawai penyiasat kes yang mana menurut SP1 (pegawai penyiasat warisan) berdasarkan siasatan menunjukkan kemalangan berlaku apabila pemandu motorkar tersebut membelok ke simpang kanan tiba-tiba S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 datang motorsikal tersebut sedang bergerak tidak sempat mengelak motorkar tersebut.Malah, Mahkamah mendapati SP2 menyatakan punca kemalangan disebabkan pemandu motorkar gagal memberikan laluan kepada motorsikal yang berada di jalan utama sebelum membelok keluar simpang.Keputusan siasatan kes juga telah mengeluarkan saman ke atas pemandu motorkar di bawah Kaedah 3(2) Kaedah-kaedah Lalulintas Jalan 1959. [17] Selain itu, keterangan senyap lain seperti gambar-gambar kerosakan motorsikal & motorkar tersebut P2A-H juga telah menyokong versi keterangan Plaintif. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah menyimpulkan kemalangan ini diakibatkan oleh kecuaian Defendan Pertama yang tidak memberikan laluan kepada pengguna di laluan utama sebelum membelok keluar simpang tersebut walaupun SP2 telah nampak motorkar tersebut. [18] Sepertimana diputuskan di dalam kes Govinda Raju & Anor v. Laws [1965] 1 MLRH 401; [1966] 1 MLJ 188 , Mahkamah memutuskan: " Applying these tests, it is clearly established that the defendant failed to keep a proper look out before he swerved to the right, resulting in the accident”. Defendan Pertama sepatutnya berhenti untuk memastikan jalan selamat dengan memberikan laluan pengguna di laluan utama dan bukannya meneruskan jalan begitu sahaja. [19] Mahkamah telah berpuas hati kecuaian 100% berpunca daripada Defendan Pertama.Isu seterusnya adakah Defendan Kedua sebagai pemilik berdaftar motorkar turut bertanggungan bersama-sama?Pada hemah Mahkamah, sebaik sahaja Defendan Kedua menandatangani Perjanjian S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Pajakan tersebut dengan Pihak Ketiga maka sudah semestinya Defendan Kedua sedar,faham dan tahu motorkarnya akan digunakan untuk tujuan sewaan walaupun tidak kenal siapakan penyewa berkenaan.Situasi ini adalah selaras dengan pemakaian seksyen 109(2) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 bahawa pemilik berdaftar bertanggungjawab atas pemanduan motorkar tersebut kerana Defendan Kedua dengan rela hati telah menyewakan motorkar tersebut untuk tujuan sewaan. [20] Defendan Kedua pula dalam kes ini telahpun menarik Pihak Ketiga yang didakwa bertanggungjawab atas sebarang kecuaian yang berlaku dalam kes ini dan Mahkamah juga telah memutuskan membenarkan tuntutan Defendan Kedua terhadap Pihak Ketiga dengan liabiliti 100%. (d)Pegawai penyiasat asal tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi. [21] Peguamcara Defendan Kedua juga berhujah bahawa kegagalan Plaintif memanggil pegawai penyiasat asal menjadikan kes adalah fatal dan keterangan SP1 sebagai pegawai penyiasat warisan tidak boleh diterimamasuk. [22] Dengan hormatnya, Mahkamah tidak lihat bagaimana keterangan SP1 tersebut wajar ditolak kerana SP1 telahpun memberikan penjelasan pegawai penyiasat asal Sjn Razib bin Sarkam telahpun bersara dan tidak dapat dihubungi.SP1 telah diarahkan oleh Ketua Bahagian Trafik Seri Alam untuk hadir ke Mahkamah bersama-sama dengan Kertas Siasatan untuk memberikan keterangan dan kesemua keterangannya berdasarkan hasil siasatan semata-mata. Oleh itu, seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 tidak terpakai ke atas Plaintif atas kegagalan memanggil pegawai penyiasat, Sjn S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Razib bin Sarkam kerana tiada sebarang fakta yang cuba disembunyikan di pihak Plaintif. [23] Sebagai panduan, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Zainuddin bin Uyub v Jalil bin Tumirin [2010] 9 MLJ 538 yang mana Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan keterangan pegawai penyiasat warisan boleh diterimamasuk berdasarkan dokumen-dokumen asal di dalam Kertas Siasatan.Oleh itu, isu yang dibangkitkan Defendan Kedua ini wajar diketepikan. (e)Wujudnya satu Perjanjian Pajakan Motorkar bertarikh 29.1.2019 (“Perjanjian tersebut”) bersama Pihak Ketiga. [24] Peguam cara Defendan Kedua yang bijaksana berhujah Defendan Kedua tidak mempunyai liabiliti ke atas Plaintif-Plaintif kerana motorkar tersebut telahpun diserahkan kepada Pihak Ketiga menerusi satu Perjanjian Pajakan Motorkar bertarikh 29.1.2019 (“Perjanjian Pajakan tersebut”) bersama Pihak Ketiga dengan merujuk Klausa 5 Perjanjian Pajakan tersebut. [25] Mahkamah mendapati Klausa 5 Perjanjian Pajakan yang diplidkan Defendan Kedua sebenarnya tidak terpakai kerana secara jelas klausa 5.3 menyatakan klausa 5.1 dan 5.2 tidak terpakai bagi Perjanjian Pajakan Tetap yang dimasuki antara Defendan Kedua dan Pihak Ketiga tersebut. Berikut dinyatakan semula Klausa 5: S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Oleh itu, hujahan peguamcara Defendan Kedua tersebut tidak bermerit. [26] Berdasarkan Perjanjian Pajakan tersebut juga, Mahkamah mendapati Defendan Kedua juga dengan rela diri bersetuju untuk motorkar tersebut dipajakkan sepertimana dinyatakan seperti berikut: [27] Keadaan ini menunjukkan Defendan Kedua bersetuju dan bersedia untuk berhadapan segala risiko atas apa yang berlaku ke atas motorkar tersebut demi mencapai maksud perjanjian pajakan tersebut walaupun tidak mengenali siapakan penyewa dan/atau pemandu motorkar tersebut. Hal ini kerana, Defendan Kedua turut menikmati nisbah keuntungan sebanyak S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 RM900-00 sepertimana dinyatakan di dalam Klausa 7 Perjanjian Pajakan tersebut walaupun Defendan Kedua tidak kenal siapakah penyewa motorkar/pemandu motorkar tersebut. [28] Malah, bagi isu pemilikan, pihak-pihak juga telah bersetuju berdasarkan Klausa 3.1.3 tidak berlaku sebarang pertindihan milikan terhadap motorkar tersebut atau sebarang hak mana-mana pihak ketiga yang lain, selain nama Pelabur sahaja iaitu Defendan Kedua dalam kes ini. Oleh yang demikian, berdasarkan dapatan-dapatan di atas, Mahkamah berpuas hati Defendan Kedua sebagai pemilik berdaftar sememangnya bertanggungjawab atas kecuaian Defendan Pertama dalam kes ini. (ii)ISU KUANTUM [29] Prinsip undang-undang berhubung ganti rugi boleh dilihat menerusi kes Datuk Mohd Ali Hj. Abdul Majid & Anor v. Public Bank Bhd [2014] 6 CLJ 269 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan: [33] Therefore, in a claim for damages, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to merely state the amount of damages that he is claiming, he must prove the damage that he had in fact suffered to the satisfaction of the court. This principle is borne out in the case of Bonham-Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel [1948] 64 TLR 177 where Lord Goddard CJ observed: Plaintiff's must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write down the particulars, and, so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying: This is what I have lost, I askyou to give me these damages". They have to prove it.". S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [30] Mahkamah juga dipandukan dengan kes Sabri Abdul Talib & 1 Other V Tiong Mee Kooi [2021] 1 LNS 2275 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi seperti berikut: [41] I am mindful that the Compendium of Minimum and Maximum Awards for Personal Injury Claims (“the Compendium”) is a useful gauge for the awards prescribed for personal injury claims, as was stated by S Nantha Balan J (as he then was) in Abdul Waffiy Wahubbi & Anor v. AK Nazaruddin Ahmad [2017] 5 LNS 52: It is axiomatic and imperative that when awarding damages for pain and suffering for personal injuries, the court must endeavour to ensure that the sum awarded falls within the range as stipulated in the Compendium and it would be wrong for trial courts to ignore the range of damages as recommended in the Compendium and to pluck a quantum from the air and make an award for a particular injury which does not resonate with the range in the Compendium. Berikut adalah ganti rugi-ganti rugi yang diaward oleh Mahkamah berdasarkan kecederaan-kecederaan dialami Plaintif-Plaintif sepertimana dinyatakan di dalam Laporan-Laporan Perubatan yang dikemukakan. (a)Plaintif Pertama: Ganti rugi Am: (i) Deep Laceration Wound Over right upper limb & lower limb [31] Peguamcara Plaintif memohon RM10,000-00 bagi kecederaan ini kerana Plaintif Pertama mengalami jahitan yang banyak di bahagian tangan S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 kanan dan kaki. Peguamcara Defendan pula mencadangkan RM2500-00 kerana mengambil kira umurnya yang masih muda iaitu 20 tahun. [32] Mahkamah telah mengaward RM7,000-00 dengan mengambil kira kadar antara RM2,500-00 hingga ke RM9,500-00 di dalam Revised Compedium of Personal Injury Awards 2018 (Circular No255/2018) (Compedium 2018) dan juga banyaknya luka jahitan di anggota badan yang berbeza. (ii) Pain & swelling both knee joints [33] Peguamcara Plaintif memohon RM10,000 kerana mendakwa Plaintif Pertama mengalami soft tissue injury di kedua-dua belah lutut yang menjadikannya terpaksa memakai tongkat. [34] Mahkamah berpendapat jumlah RM10,000-00 tersebut adalah munasabah dengan keadaan dan kecederaan Plaintif Pertama yang terpaksa bertongkat untuk bergerak. Ganti rugi Khas: [35] Mahkamah membenarkan kos rawatan dari Klinik Kota Masai sebanyak RM60-00 kerana resit disertakan (Rujuk Ikatan Dokumen B m/s 34). (b)Plaintif Kedua: Ganti rugi Am: (i)Closed fracture of midshaft right tibia [36] Peguamcara Plaintif berhujah RM30,000-00 adalah amaun yang munasabah bagi kecederaan ini kerana Plaintif Kedua mengalami keilatan S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 yang banyak akibat kemalangan menurut Doktor Jeyaratnam T Satkunasingam di dalam Laporan Pakar Plaintif Kedua (Rujuk Ikatan Dokumen Plaintif m/s 6-20). Peguamcara Defendan Kedua pula berhujah jumlah yang sesuai adalah maksimum RM18,000-00 mengambil kira umurnya 17 tahun dan akan mudah sembuh. [37] Mahkamah telah mengaward RM 25,000-00 kerana jumlahnya masih dalam lingkungan Compedium 2018 dan keilatan yang begitu banyak dialami sepertimana Laporan Pakar Plaintif . Berdasarkan latar belakang Laporan Pakar mencatatkan Plaintif Kedua masih lagi seorang pelajar Diploma di Kolej yang pada hemah Mahkamah semestinya memerlukan pergerakan dan aktiviti yang aktif seperti berjalan, berlari, memanjat dan sebagainya di Kolej.Oleh itu, jumlah tersebut adalah munasabah dan adil. (ii)Laceration wound at the proximal anterior thigh [38] Peguamcara Plaintif memohon RM5,000-00 bagi kecederaan ini, manakala Peguamcara Defendan Kedua mencadangkan tidak melebihi RM2,500-00 kerana usianya masih muda. Mahkamah membenarkan award sebanyak RM 4,000-00 berdasarkan Compedium 2018 dengan luka berjahit yang dialami oleh Plaintif Kedua tersebut. (iii)Multiple abrasion wounds [39] Peguamcara Plaintif memohon sebanyak RM10,000-00 kerana kecederaan tersebut di banyak tempat iaitu left forehead,left knee,right knee & right foot.Manakala, Peguamcara Defendan mencadangkan tidak melebihi RM4,000-00 kerana usia mudanya. [40] Mahkamah mengaward sebanyak 5,000-00 kerana bukan sahaja kecederaan tersebut dialami di anggota badan yang berbeza-beza malah S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 ianya masih dalam ruang lingkup Compedium 2018 serta usia Plaintif Kedua yang masih muda. (v)Scars [41] Mahkamah telah membenarkan award sebanyak RM 10,000-00 kerana mengambil kira Plaintif Kedua mengalami kesan-kesan parut yang banyak seperti berikut: (Rujuk Laporan Perubatan Mahkota Medical Centre m/s 9 Ikatan B) 1. a 2cm hypertrophic scar over the anterior aspect of the right thigh 2. a 4cm hypertrophic surgical scar over the anterior aspect of the right knee 3. two,1cm x 1cm hypertrophic scars over the medial aspect of the right knee 4. two, 2cm x 1cm hyperpigmented scars over the anterior aspect of the right knee 5. two,10cm each hyperpigmented scars over the lateral aspect of the right leg 6. a 5x 1cm hyperpigmented scars over the medial aspect of the right leg 7. a 4x 6cm hyperpigmented scar over the anterior aspect of the right leg 8. a 3x 5cm hyperpigmented scar over the anterior aspect of the right leg 9. two,1x1cm each, hypertrophic surgical scars over the medial aspect of the right ankle S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 Ganti rugi Khas [42] Mahkamah telah membenarkan ganti rugi-ganti rugi Khas Plaintif Kedua seperti berikut dengan mengambilkira adanya dokumen-dokumen sokongan dan/atau cadangan Laporan Pakar. Ganti rugi Jumlah award (RM) (i)Kos rawatan Hospital Sultan Ismail 208-00 (ii)Kos membeli tongkat 55-00 (iii)Kos membeli implant 7,500-00 (iv)Kos membaiki motorsikal 975-00 Jumlah besar 8,738-00 Faedah yang dibenarkan: [43] Mahkamah merujuk kepada Aturan 42 Kaedah 12A Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 yang mana kecuali yang dipersetujui pihak-pihak, kadar faedah bagi award Mahkamah ditentukan oleh YAA Ketua Hakim Negara.Menurut Arahan Amalan Bil 1 tahun 2012 yang berkuatkuasa bermula 1 Ogos 2012, berikut faedah yang dibenarkan: (a)Faedah sebanyak 2.5% setahun untuk Gantirugi Khas dari tarikh kemalangan sehingga ke tarikh penghakiman; S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 (b)Faedah sebanyak 5% setahun untuk Gantirugi Am dari tarikh penyampaian saman sehingga ke tarikh penghakiman. (c)Faedah sebanyak 5% setahun untuk kesemua jumlah penghakiman dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga ke tarikh penyelesaian penuh dan muktamad. Kos mengikut skala. Gratias Tibi Ago,Curia Advisari Vult. Bertarikh: 16 Oktober 2023 NOORFAZLIN BINTI HAMDAN Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Sivil 1 Johor Bahru PIHAK-PIHAK: 1) Amalia Aina binti Zakaria dari Tetuan Sukhdev & Associates - Peguamcara Plaintif-Plaintif 2) Fatimah Zulaikha Ahmad Bashri & Noor Syafiqa Nafisah Agoestono dari Tetuan Faizal Rahman & Co- Peguamcara Defendan Kedua 3) Khairil Ahmad dari Tetuan Khairil, Hafizullah & Hanisah- Peguamcara Pihak Ketiga S/N aZYG3UZuIEVOSuhpMxGNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	23,940	Tika 2.6.0
JE-83-147-10/2020	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Polis Diraja Malaysia (PDRM)] TERTUDUH DARVIN RAJ A/L GUNASELAN	i) OKT didapati bersalah dan disabitkan atas kesalahan Pertuduhan Pertama S.41(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987.ii) Pihak pendakwaan telah menarik balik pertuduhan kedua S.44(1) APJ 1987 di akhir kes pembelaan menurut S.254(1) CPC iii) Mahkamah telah lepas dan bebaskan OKT daripada pertuduha kedua S.44(1) APJ 1987 menurut S.254(3) CPCiv) Isu Misjoinder of Charges di bawah S.165 CPC	05/11/2023	Puan Lee Kim Keat	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=c1d815c9-f08a-4d87-98fe-9ef5191965cb&Inline=true	DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET TANGKAK DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TA’ZIM KES JENAYAH NO. JE-83-147-10/2020 ANTARA PENDAKWARAYA … PENDAKWA DAN DARVIN RAJ …TERTUDUH ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PENDAHULUAN 1) Pihak pembelaan telah membuat rayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah yang menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 3 tahun dari tarikh sabitan dan hukuman denda RM8,000 jika gagal bayar penjara 4 bulan serta OKT hilang layak untuk mengambil lesen memandu D selama 3 tahun dari tarikh sabitan setelah Mahkamah mendapati OKT bersalah dan disabitkan atas kesalahan bagi pertuduhan pertama S.41(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987. Rayuan pembelaan adalah terhadap sabitan dan hukuman. 2) Sementara itu, terdapat rayuan silang daripada pihak pendakwaan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah yang melepaskan dan membebaskan OKT daripada pertuduhan kedua di bawah S.44(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 selepas pihak pendakwaan menarik balik pertuduhan kedua di akhir kes pembelaan. PERTUDUHAN 3) Dalam kes ini, OKT telah dituduh bagi dua pertuduhan seperti berikut: 05/11/2023 23:16:38 JE-83-147-10/2020 Kand. 49 S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Pertuduhan Pertama: “Bahawa kamu pada 30.07.2020 jam lebih kurang antara 1802hrs hingga 1815hrs di KM5 Jalan Sialang, dalam Daerah Tangkak, di dalam negeri Johor Darul Takzim, sebagai pemandu m/kar No.WVG 2016 telah memandu kenderaan tersebut di jalan dengan cara yang, setelah mengambil perhatian tentang segala hal keadaan (termasuk jenis, keadaan dan saiz jalan, dan kesesakan lalu lintas yang dijangkakan yang ada atau mungkin ada di jalan itu) merbahaya kepada orang awam, sehingga menyebabkan kematian kepada penunggang m/sikal No.MCM2122 Nama: Siti Nur Syahira binti Yazid No. KPT: 011114040313 dan pembonceng m/sikal No.MCM2122 Nama: Nur Syaza Nadihra binti Md Selan No. KPT: 981021045584. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah S.41(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 dan boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan kedua: “Bahawa kamu pada 30.07.2020 jam lebih kurang antara 1802hrs hingga 1815hrs di KM5 Jalan Sialang, dalam Daerah Tangkak, di dalam negeri Johor Darul Takzim, sebagai pemandu m/kar No.WVG 2016 telah memandu kenderaan tersebut di jalan dan mempunyai sebegitu banyak alcohol dalam badan kamu sehingga kadar alcohol di dalam air kencing kamu melebihi had yang ditetapkan iaitu 115miligram per 100 mililiter air kencing, dan menyebabkan kematian kepada penunggang m/sikal No.MCM2122 Nama: Siti Nur Syahira binti Yazid No. KPT: 011114040313 dan pembonceng m/sikal No.MCM2122 Nama: Nur Syaza Nadihra binti Md Selan No. KPT: 981021045584. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah S.44(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 dan boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal FAKTA KES SEPERTIMANA KETERANGAN SAKSI PENDAKWAAN 4) Untuk kes pendakwaan, pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil seramai 12 orang saksi seperti berikut: SP1 Dr Sangeethat a/p Paramasivam (Pegawai Perubatan Forensik) SP2 Mohd Isa bin Suparman (Ahli Kimia, Seksyen Kriminalistik, Bahagian Forensik) SP3 Abdul Hakim bin Abd. Rauf (Ahli Kimia, Seksyen Toksikologi, Bahagian Analisis Sains Forensik) SP4 Salmi biniti Mustafa (Ibu kepada mangsa Siti Nur Syahira binti Yazid) SP5 Lans Koperal Jailani bin Abas (Jurugambar) SP6 Lans Koperal Mohamad Nizzar bin Salleh (L/Koperal Kaunter Trafik) SP7 Lechiyamuthu a/l Letchumanan (penumpang belakang kereta WVG2016) SP8 Siti Aishah binti Misbah (saksi mata kemalangan) SP9 Maniraj a/l Maruthan (Pengurus PUSPAKOM cawangan Segamat) SP10 Zulkefli bin Kasim (saksi mata kemalangan) SP11 Raven a/l Palaniappan (pemilik dan penumpang kereta WVG2016) SP12 Inspektor Ahmad Faizal bin Ismail (Pegawai Penyiasat) 5) Bagi saksi SP1 hingga SP7, saksi-saksi telah memberi keterangan di mahkamah di hadapan Puan Majistret terdahulu dan Puan Majistret telah ditukar ke Jabatan lain atas kenaikan pangkat. Kes ini telah diambil alih dan disambung bicara dengan saksi SP8. 6) Mahkamah ini meneruskan perbicaraan kes dengan bergantung kepada nota keterangan yang telah disediakan oleh Puan Majistret terdahulu dan juga rujukan kepada rakaman system “court recording and transcription (CRT)”. Mahkamah mengikuti keterangan SP 1 sehingga SP 7 dengan cara mendengar dan melihat semula keterangan mereka melalui CRT. Maka S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal mahkamah turut menilai 'demeanor' saksi SP1 hingga SP7 dalam alasan penghakiman ini. 7) Berhubung dengan perkara ini, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada S.261 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut: "261 Change of Magistrate during hearing Whenever any Magistrate after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in a trial ceases to exercise jurisdiction in it and is succeeded by another Magistrate who has and who exercises such jurisdiction, the Magistrate so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by his predecessor, or partly recorded by his predecessor and partly recorded by himself, or he may re- summon the witnesses and recommence the inquiry or trial: Provided as follows: (a) in any trial the accused may, when the second Magistrate commences his proceedings, demand that the witnesses or any of them be re-summoned and re-heard; (b) the High Court may, whether there be an appeal or not, set aside any conviction had on evidence not wholly recorded by the Magistrate before whom the conviction was had, if that Court is of opinion that the accused has been materially prejudiced thereby, and may order a new trial." 8) Pihak Pendakwaan juga telah mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen berikut yang telah diterima oleh Mahkamah dan dijadikan sebagai eksibit pendakwaan: P1 (1-45) 45 keping Gambar P2 Laporan Post Mortem Mangsa Siti Nur Syahira Binti Yazid P3 Laporan Post Mortem Mangsa Nur Syaza Nadihra Binti Md Selan P4 Sampul Surat Kimia No. Makmal 20-FR-M-02564 S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal P5 Sampul beserta kandungan berisi Eksibit A Smear Cat Asing P6 Sampul beserta kandungan berisi Eksibit B Smear Cat Asing P7 Eksibit sebahagian daripada M/sikal Mangsa bertanda A1 P8 Laporan Kimia No. Makmal 20-FR-M-02564 P9 Resit Kimia No. Makmal 20-FR-M-02084 P10 Beg Keselamatan Jabatan Kimia Malaysia, No. Makmal 20-FR-M- 02084 P11 Tiub Plastik bertanda A, No. Makmal 20-FR-M-02084 P12 Tiub Plastik bertanda B, No. Makmal 20-FR-M-02084 P13 Botol Kaca bertanda C, No. Makmal 20-FR-M-02084 P14 Laporan Kimia No. Makmal 20-FR-M-02084 P15 Trafik Ledang/1952/20 P16 Salinan Geran Kenderaan Motosikal no. pendaftaran MCM 2122 milik Mangsa Siti Nur Syahira Binti Yazid P17 A Laporan Pemeriksaan Kemalangan oleh Puspakom bagi Motosikal no. pendaftaran MCM 2122 P17 B Laporan Pemeriksaan Kemalangan oleh Puspakom bagi M/Kar no. pendaftaran WVG 2016 P18 Rajah Kasar P18K Kunci Rajah Kasar P19 Sekeping CD mengandungi gambar-gambar oleh Jurugambar P20 Sijil Perakuan di bawah seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan oleh Jurugambar P21 Trafik Ledang/1946/20 P22 Trafik Ledang/1947/20 P23 Trafik Ledang/1949/20 P24 Salinan Geran Kenderaan M/Kar no. pendaftaran WVG 2016 milik Raven A/L Palaniappan P25 Trafik Ledang/2469/20 P26 Trafik Ledang/4267/20 P27 Trafik Ledang/1951/20 S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9) Secara ringkasnya, dalam kes pendakwaan, fakta yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan adalah seperti berikut: “Pada 30/07/2020, jam lebih kurang antara 6.02 petang hingga 6.15 petang, di KM 5, Jalan Sialang, Tangkak, Johor, telah berlaku satu kemalangan jalanraya. Kemalangan berlaku apabila OKT memandu m/kar no. WVG 2016 dari arah Tangkak menghala ke Jasin. Semasa di tempat kejadian iaitu di KM 5, Jalan Sialang, Tangkak, OKT telah memandu dengan laju di selekoh jalan sehingga mencerobohi jalan bertentangan lalu melanggar tiang lampu pertama sehingga patah. Susulan perlangaran tersebut OKT terus terlangar sebuah m/sikal no. MCM 2122 yang ditunggangi dan dibonceng 2 orang mangsa (selepas ini dikenali sebagai Si Mati) dari arah Jasin menghala ke Tangkak, menyebabkan kedua-dua Si Mati tercampak daripada m/sikal tersebut. Momentum pelangaran kereta tersebut akhirnya terhenti dengan terlangar tiang lampu yang kedua. Akibat perlanggaran itu, kedua-dua Si Mati mengalami kecederaan parah di bahagian badan, kepala dan telah meninggal dunia di tempat kejadian. Semasa kejadian, kereta yang dipandu oleh OKT turut dinaiki oleh dua orang penumpang iaitu SP7 dan SP11 di mana kedua-dua saksi telah memberi keterangan di mahkamah bahawa OKT merupakan pemandu kereta tersebut. Selain itu, kejadian kemalangan tersebut turut disaksikan oleh sepasang suami isteri iaitu SP8 dan SP10 yang pada masa kejadian sedang memandu di laluan jalan bertentangan dengan OKT. Hasil analisa oleh ahli kimia, Jabatan Kimia Malaysia ke atas specimen air kencing OKT yang diambil pada hari kejadian mengesahkan kuantiti S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal alkohol yang terkandung dalam air kencing OKT adalah melebihi had yang ditetapkan iaitu 115 mg per 100 ml air kencing.” PERUNTUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG S.41(1) dan S.44(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalanraya 1987 10) S.41 (1) APJ memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “41. Menyebabkan kematian kerana memandu dengan melulu atau membahayakan. (1) Mana-mana orang yang memandu suatu kenderaan motor di jalan dengan melulu atau dengan kelajuan atau dengan cara yang, setelah mengambil perhatian tentang segala hal keadaan (termasuk jenis, keadaan dan saiz jalan, dan kesesakan lalu lintas yang dijangkakan yang ada atau mungkin ada di jalan itu) merbahaya kepada orang awam, menyebabkan kematian mana-mana orang, melakukan suatu kesalahan dan apabila disabitkan hendaklah dihukum penjara selama tempoh tidak kurang daripada dua tahun dan tidak lebih daripada sepuluh tahun dan denda tidak kurang daripada lima ribu ringgit dan tidak lebih daripada dua puluh ribu ringgit.” 11) Elemen-elemen pertuduhan Seksyen 41(1) adalah sepertimana yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes PP v Wan Khairil Wan Isa [2007]9CLJ557 seperti berikut: “The essential ingredients then of the offence created under s.41(1) of the Act are: a) A person who; b) By driving a motor vehicle recklessly; or c) By driving a motor vehicle at a speed; or d) By driving a motor vehicle in a manner which having regard to the circumstances (including the nature, S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal condition and size of the road and the amount of traffic which is or might be expected to be on the road) is dangerous to the public; e) Causes the death of a person shall be guilty of an offence…” 12) Dalam erti kata yang lain, dalam kes ini, bagi pertuduhan pertama, pihak Pendakwaan hendaklah membuktikan elemen-elemen kesalahan seperti berikut: i. OKT telah memandu m/kar no. WVG 2016 di atas jalan raya; ii. OKT telah memandu kenderaan secara merbahaya di atas jalanraya; dan iii. Cara pemanduan OKT yang berbahaya telah menyebabkan kematian kedua-dua mangsa 13) Sementara itu, Seksyen 44 (1) APJ pula memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “44. Memandu semasa berada di bawah pengaruh minuman yang memabukkan atau dadah. (1) Mana-mana orang yang, semasa memandu sesuatu kenderaan motor di jalan atau tempat awam lain- (a) berada di bawah pengaruh minuman yang memabukkan atau dadah, setakat yang menyebabkan tidak berdaya mengawal kenderaan itu dengan sepatutnya; atau (b) mempunyai sebegitu banyak alcohol dalam badannya sehingga kadar alcohol di dalam nafas, darah atau air kencingnya melebihi had yang ditetapkan, dan menyebabkan kematian mana-mana orang melakukan suatu kesalahan dan, apabila disabitkan, hendaklah dihukum penjara selama tempoh tidak kurang daripada tiga tahun dan tidak lebih daripada sepuluh tahun dan dedenda tidak kurang daripada lapan ribu ringgit dan tidak lebih daripada dua puluh ribu ringgit.” S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14) Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes Olivia Chong Oi Yun v. PP [2020] 4 CLJ 246, telah menyenaraikan elemen bagi pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 44 (1) APJ, di bawah limb kedua, iaitu kematian disebabkan pemanduan dengan mempunyai sebegitu banyak alkohol dalam badannya sehingga kadar alcohol di dalam badan melebihi had yang ditetapkan, seperti berikut: “[47] What required to be proven for the purpose of the charge under s. 44(1)(b) of RTA as highlighted by the learned SCJ are: that the appellant was the one driving the said motor vehicle on a road or public place and it was the said motor vehicle which caused the whole accident; that the alcohol level in the appellant's body exceeded the "prescribed limit", the limit allowed by the law is 80mg of alcohol in 100ml of blood; and, that the reckless driving of the appellant had caused the death of four persons and injury to another person.” 15) Merujuk pada otoriti di atas, bagi pertuduhan kedua, pihak pendakwaan perlu membuktikan elemen-elemen seperti berikut: i. OKT telah memandu m/kar no. WVG 2016 di atas jalan raya; ii. OKT telah memandu kenderaan dengan mempunyai sebegitu banyak alkohol dalam badannya sehingga kadar alkohol di dalam air kencingnya melebihi had yang ditetapkan iaitu 107mg alcohol dalam 100ml air kencing; dan iii. pemanduan OKT telah menyebabkan kematian kedua-dua mangsa. BEBAN PEMBUKTIAN DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN 16) Adalah undang-undang yang mantap bahawa beban pembuktian sentiasa terletak di atas pihak pendakwaan dan pihak pendakwaan memikul beban tersebut dalam membuktikan satu kes Prima Facie sepertimana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 173(f) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17) Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Balachandran v PP [2005]1CLJ85 telah menyatakan seperti berikut, antara lain: “A prima facie case is therefore one that is sufficient for the accused to be called upon to answer. This in turn means that the evidence adduced must be such that it can be overthrown only by evidence in rebuttal. The phrase ‘prima facie case’ is defined in similar terms in Mozley and Whiteley’s Law Dictionary 11th Ed as: A litigating party is said to hava a prima facies case when the evidence in his favour is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then is one which is established by sufficient evidence, and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced by the other side. … In order to make a finding either way the court must, at the close of the case for the prosecution, undertake a positive evaluation of the credibility and reliability of all the evidence adduced so as to determine whether the elements of the offence have been established. As the trial is without a jury, it is only with such a positive evaluation can the court make a determination or the purpose of s.180(2) and (3)… …The test at the close of the case for the prosecution would therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facies case has been made out. This must, as of necessity, require a consideration of the existence of any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution, If there is any such doubt there can be no prima facies case.” S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18) Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes PP v Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457 juga telah menjelaskan Prima Facie seperti berikut: “After the amendments to ss. 173(f) and 180 of the CPC, the statutory test has been altered. What is required of a subordinate court and the High Court under the amended sections is to call for the defence when it is satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out at the close of the prosecution case. This requires the court to undertake a maximum evaluation of the prosecution evidence when deciding whether to call on the accused to enter upon his or her defence. It involves an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses called by the prosecution and the drawing of inferences admitted by the prosecution evidence. Thus, if the prosecution's evidence admits of two or more inferences, one of which is in the accused's favour, then it is the duty of the court to draw the inference that is favourable to the accused. (para 12) [3] If the court, upon a maximum evaluation of the evidence placed before it at the close of the prosecution case, comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case has not been made out, it should acquit the accused. If, on the other hand, the court after conducting a maximum evaluation of the evidence comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out, it must call for the defence. If the accused then elects to remain silent, the court must proceed to convict him. It is not open to the court to then re-assess the evidence and to determine whether the prosecution had established its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The absence of any evidence from the accused that casts a reasonable doubt on the S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal prosecution's case renders the prima facie case one that is established beyond a reasonable doubt. 19) Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes tersebut juga telah menurunkan prinsip atau ujian penilaian maksima seperti berikut: “For the guidance of the courts below, we summarise as follows the steps that should be taken by a trial court at the close of the prosecution's case:- (i) the close of the prosecution's case, subject the evidence led by the prosecution in its totality to a maximum evaluation. Carefully scrutinise the credibility of each of the prosecution's witnesses. Take into account all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. If the evidence admits of two or more inferences, then draw the inference that is most favourable to the accused; (ii) ask yourself the question: If I now call upon the accused to make his defence and he elects to remain silent am I prepared to convict him on the evidence now before me? If the answer to that question is "Yes", then a prima facie case has been made out and the defence should be called. If the answer is "No" then, a prima facie case has not been made out and the accused should be acquitted.” 20) Berbalik kepada kes ini, di akhir kes pendakwaan, isu yang perlu diputuskan oleh Mahkamah adalah sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap OKT di mana semua elemen pertuduhan S.41(1) dan S.44 Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 telah dibuktikan melalui keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan? S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Pertuduhan Pertama S.41 Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 21) Bagi Pertuduhan Pertama, pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan 4 orang saksi yang mengesahkan identiti pemandu m/kar WVG2016 ialah OKT. Mereka terdiri daripada 2 orang kawan OKT yang turut terlibat dalam kemalangan ini masing-masing ialah SP 11 yang duduk di sebelah tempat pemandu dan SP 7 yang merupakan penumpang yang duduk di belakang. Manakala 2 orang yang lain merupakan saksi mata awam yang turut berada di tempat kejadian yang telah menyaksikan kemalangan tersebut. 22) Mengikut keterangan SP8 semasa pemeriksaan utama melalui penyata saksinya, di soalan 6 dan 8, SP8 telah menyatakan seperti berikut: “Pemeriksaan Utama SP8 S.6. Saya berasa amat terkejut dan suami saya terus perlahankan kenderaan kami dan berhenti di sebelah kereta Proton Persona itu.Suami saya telah turunkan tingkap pemandu dan saya dapat lihat dengan jelas tanpa apa-apa halangan dimana terdapat tiga orang lelaki berbangsa India di dalam kereta Proton Persona itu. Suami saya menjerit kepada mereka bertanyakan samama mereka ok atau tidak. Saya dapat lihat dengan jelas, melalui pintu hadapan pemandu kereta Proton Pesona yang terbuka luas, terdapat seorang lelaki berbangsa India yang berada di tempat duduk pemandu memandang kami dalam keadaan separa sedar dan memakai baju warna kelabu. Saya lihat terdapat seorang lelaki berbangsa India berbadan kecil yang memakai baju berwarna hitam, sedang berada di tempat duduk penumpang hadapan, juga dalam keadaan separa sedar. Manakala terdapat seorang penumpang di bahagian tempat duduk belakang, juga seorang lelaki berbangsa India sedang memakai baju bercorak bunga- bunga. Setelah kami dapat pastikan keadaan mereka, lebih S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal kurang 3 minit hingga 5 minit kemudian, suami saya telah pandu kereta ke hadapan untuk meletakkan kenderaan di tepi jalan.” (penekanan ditambah) “S.8 Semasa saya menutupi mayat-mayat tersebut, tiba-tiba saya lihat terdapat ramai orang awam yang menjerit-jerit sambal memukul penumpang hadapan kereta Proton Persona yang memakai baju berwarna hitam itu. Saya bergegas menenangkan mereka dan menyatakan bahawa pemandu kereta Proton Persona tersebut ialah lelaki berbangsa India yang memakai baju warna kelabu dan lelaki yang dipukul itu bukanlah pemandu kereta Proton Pesona itu, dan sebaliknya hanya penumpang. Saya dapati pemandu kereta Proton Persona yang memakai baju kelabu itu tidak lagi berada di tempat kejadian.” (penekanan ditambah) 23) Semasa pemeriksaan balas SP8 oleh peguambela, SP8 telah ditanya berkenaan dengan proses pengecaman OKT di balai polis pada malam kejadian dan keterangan SP8 adalah seperti berikut: “Pemeriksaan Balas SP8 S: Kawad cam itu, peserta tak boleh lihat puan, puan boleh lihat mereka. Adakah dibuat? J: Ada buat tapi di luar balai, sampai di balai saya keluar dari pintu balai, saya diri di situ, dari luar boleh nampak mereka, mereka dari dalam tak boleh tengok saya S: Berapa orang berada di sana semasa cam? J: Tiga tiga ada, ada polis juga. Tak ada orang awam, dan mereka masih pakai baju yang sama S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S: Pada masa itu, insiden pertama, sebelum park kereta, puan tidak tahu siapa yang memandu, siapa duduk berselahan atau belakang J: Saya boleh cam dengan baju, mimic muka S: Puan cam mereka berdasarkan baju? J: Ya S: Puan camkan orang yang duduk di belakang juga berdasarkan baju? J: Ya S: Saya cadangkan, semasa puan dan suami puan melalui kereta pesona, insiden pertama, orang yg memandu pesona, budak yang pakai baju hitam J: Tak setuju S: Selepas puan dan suami puan park kereta, dan datang balik, budak baju hitam masih di pesona J: Tak setuju S: Orang awam telah memukul budak baju hitam kerana dia pemandu pesona, setuju? J: Tak setuju S: Setuju dengan saya, puan telah buat pengecaman tiga orang temasuk OKT dan 2 orang lagi Puan hanya camkan mereka berdasarkan ketinggian? J: Ya, ketinggian dan muka juga S: Saya cadangkan, puan hanya boleh camkan mereka melalui ketinggian sahaja J: Setuju S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S: Tertuduh dalam kandang ini, bukan orang yang bawa Pesona pada masa kejadian J: Saya tak setuju” 24) Semasa pemeriksaan semula oleh TPR, keterangan SP8 yang berkaitan adalah seperti beriktu: “Pemeriksaan Semula SP8 S: Apabila peguam tanya pasal insiden pertama, masa itu puan tak tahu siapa mereka. Puan kata, saya nampak, saya cam dengan baju, mimic muka. Puan kata saya camkan berdasarkan baju, Puan kata kalau insiden pertama ya. Boleh jelaskan? J: Maksud saya masa kami lalu, suami saya perlahankan kereta, dan berhenti di tepi pesona, saya tinjau melalui tingkap, saya boleh nampak dengan jelas mukanya, bajunya dengan jelas, nampak yang duduk di tempat pemandu lelaki india baju kelabu, sebelahnya baju hitam, belakang baju bunga bunga J: Saya memang jelas, yang duduk sebelah driver itu, muka dia ada jangkut, dia lebih gelap dari yang lain dan kecil daripada yang lain. S: Selain daripada itu, soalan akhir Peguam, Puan camkan baju lelaki kelabu hitam, bunga bunga melalui ketinggian sahaja pada hari ini, Puan setuju. Tapi jawapan Ini bercanggah dengan kenyataan awal, cam dengan mimik muka dan ketinggian, puan camkan berdasarakan apa? J: Kalau hari ini, memang dengan ketinggian dan muka mereka. Lepas itu, budak baju hitam itu camkan kerana dia paling kecil. Masa kejadian, memang dari baju dari mimic muka mereka.” S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25) Mahkamah mendapati keterangan SP8 adalah konsisten tanpa ada kecacatan walaupun diuji dengan soal balas bertubi-tubi melalui peguambela yang bijaksana. Mahkamah mendapati keterangan SP8 adalah berkredible dalam mengesahkan OKT sebagai pemandu kereta serta SP8 juga mampu mengecam SP7 dan SP11 sebagai penumpang kenderaan WVG 2016 tersebut. Berdasarkan penyaksian SP8 di tempat kejadian, SP8 telah berjaya mengecam kesemua mereka di balai polis pada malam kejadian. Selain itu, SP8 turut dapat mengecam ketiga-tiga lelaki berbangsa India tersebut di dalam mahkamah terbuka. 26) Selain daripada keterangan SP8, SP10 iaitu suami kepada SP8, turut hadir ke mahkamah dan memberi keterangan. Antara keterangannya yang berkaitan dengan pengecaman OKT sebagai pemandu WVG2016 semasa pemeriksaan utama adalah seperti berikut: “Penyata saksi SP10 6. Saya dan keluarga berasa amat terkejut dan terus perlahankan kenderaan saya. Saya telah pandu ke arah Proton Persona warna kelabu gelap kerana ingin melihat keadaan pemandu dan penumpang kereta tersebut. Saya memberhentikan kereta saya bersebelahan kereta Proton Persona itu. Saya turunkan tingkap dan dapat lihat dengan jelas tanpa apa-apa halangan dimana pintu hadapan sebelah pemandu telah terbuka. Saya dapati pemandunya seorang lelaki berbangsa India memakai baju berwarna kelabu sedang bersandar ditempat duduk pemandu dalam keadaan separa sedar. Disebelah tempat duduk penumpang hadapan terdapat seorang lelaki berbangsa India memakai baju berwarna hitam manakala seorang lagi penumpang tempat duduk belakang memakai baju corak bunga-bunga.? S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27) SP10 turut mengecam OKT, dan penumpang-penumpang kereta WVG2016 di dalam Mahkamah terbuka dan keterangan adalah seperti berikut: “Pemeriksaan Utama SP10 S: Lihat pada perenggan 6, individu dalam Proton Pesona, pakai baju, anda masih boleh camkan mereka hari ini? J: Boleh S: Pemandu berbangsa india, ada di mahkamah hari ini? Peg: TPR tanya 3 orang individu, lebih elok, panggil ketiga- tiga sekali untuk pengecaman TPR: Tiada masalah. Pohon ketiga-tiga dipanggil masuk ke Mahkamah S: Yang pertama, pemandu pakai baju kelabu, adakah dia di Mahkamah hari ini? J: Ada S: Di mana dia? J: Di Kandang tertuduh, dia sebagai pemandu, yang pakai baju kelabu S: Macam mana boleh pasti? J: Sebab saya memang pasti dan jelas, masa saya lalui kenderaan beliau, dia di dalam kereta saya turunkan tingkap, dia dalam kereta, dia di tempat memandu S: Masa encik lihat, pencahayaan kawasan macam mana? J: Pencahayaan terang dan jelas, tiada apa-apa halangan S: Encik pasti ini orang ya? S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal J: Ya saya pasti SP10 mengecam OKT sebagai Pemandu Motorkar S: Penumpang hadapan berpakaian baju hitam ada di mahkamah hari ini? J: Yang pakai baju merah pada hari ini S: Macam mana pasti? J: Masa kejadian dia di tempat penumpang hadapan, saya memang pasti dan jelas S: Berdasarkan apa kamu cam dia penumpang di hadapan? J: Berdasarkan pemerhatian saya pada masa kejadian, sebab saya buka tingkap dan nampak S: Apa yang encik nampak? J: Yang duduk sebelah pemandu, baju hitam, yang belakang ada seorang lagi S: Baju merah ini penumpang depan? J: Ya SP10 mengecam Raven sebagai penumpang depan S: Siapa seorang lagi? J: Yang berpakaian baju bunga bunga ini S: Macam mana pasti? J: Sebab saya nampak dengan jelas masa kejadian, dia duduk di belakang, keadaan terang S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S: Berapa jarak? J: Saya berhenti di tepi kereta persona, sangat dekat, saya buka tingkap, saya nampak keadaan mangsa dalam kenderaan dan sempat bertanya, ok tak? Tapi tak ada respon daripada dia orang SP10 mengecam SP7 sebagai penumpang belakang” 28) Semasa SP10 diperiksa balas oleh peguambela OKT, SP10 telah dengan pasti mengulangi pengecamannya terhadap OKT dan 2 orang penumpang kenderaan WVG2016 dan keteranganya adalah konsisten dan disokong oleh keterangan SP8. Antara keterangan SP10 yang berkenaan adalah seperti berikut: “Pemeriksaan Balas SP10 S: Selepas budak baju hitam keluar dari kereta, adakah dia cuba lari ke tempat lain? J: Tiada S: Hanya di hadapan kereta? J: Dia cuma jelaskan, dan orang ramai kerumuni, surrounding S: Semasa itu, polis dah sampai? J: Belum sampai, sebab kejadian, saya masih kawal lalu lintas, saya minta isteri untuk terangkan kepada orang kampung, yang dia bukan pemandu S: Saya cadangkan, sebaik kemalangan berlaku, pemandu berbaju hitam, keluar dari kereta dan lari dan dia ditangkap oleh orang kampung, setuju? J: Tidak setuju S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S: Saya katakan, sebenarnya, OKT yang duduk di sebelah kiri pemandu pesona J: Tidak, dia di tempat pemandu S: Orang yang memandu pesona berbaju tshirt hitam J: Tidak, dia duduk sebelah pemandu Pemeriksaan Semula SP10 S: Soalan terakhir peguam, peguam tanya pada hari ini, Encik camkan mereka berdasarkan bangsa dan ketinggiain dan Encik cakap dan juga warna baju. Boleh jelaskan? J: Sebab saya memang pasti dan jelas, ketiga-tiga memang dalam kenderaan, bangsa dan ketinggian, dan warna baju, dan masa buat laporan polis di pejabat polis tangkak, masa itu tn inspector ada menunjukkan, saya tak pasti itu kawad cam atau apa, saya ingat balik, kedudukan mereka berdasarkan ketinggian, bangsa dan warna baju yang mereka pakai. Sebab baju yang sama, baju yang mereka pakai di tempat kejadian, pada malam saya buat laporan tersebutlah” 29) Selain daripada keterangan pasangan suami isteri SP8 dan SP10 di atas, terdapat keterangan daripada dua orang saksi yang merupakan penumpang dalam kenderaan WVG2016 iaitu SP7 dan SP11 yang mana kedua-dua mereka merupakan kawan kepada OKT telah memberi keterangan bersumpah di mahkamah bahawa OKT merupakan pemandu kenderaan WVG2016 semasa kejadian. 30) Semasa SP7 disoal balas oleh peguambela OKT, SP7 telah menafikan cadangan bahawa OKT bukan pemandu. “Pemeriksaan Balas SP7 S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S: Dari rumah nenek ke rumah kakak Raven, Raven juga yang bawa kereta betul? J: Ya S: Daripada rumah kakak Raven ke bengkel siapa yang bawa kereta? J: Raven S: Sekarang saya katakan pada kamu daripada bengkel sehingga kereta jalan di selekoh, kereta sebenarnya dipandu oleh Raven? J: Tidak” 31) Dalam isu identiti pemandu kereta, terdapat cadangan daripada Peguambela OKT yang menyatakan bahawa SP11 sebagai pemilik kenderaan tersebut sebenarnya merupakan pemandu kereta yang mengakibatkan kemalangan dalam kes ini. Namun demikian cadangan peguambela OKT ini telah dinafikan oleh kemempat-empat saksi pendakawaan. 32) Peguambela juga berhujah bahawa bahawa prosedur pengecaman OKT oleh SP8 dan SP10 di balai polis pada malam kejadian tidak teratur. Dalam isu ini, Mahkamah semasa menilai keterangan SP8 dan SP10 adalah dengan sangat cermat dan menitikberatkan keterangan mereka. Mahkamah mendapati kedua-dua saksi mata awam ini tidak mempunyai sebarang hubungan dengan kedua-dua Si Mati ataupun mana-mana saksi pendakwaan dan mereka bebas daripada apa-apa kepentingan dalam kes ini. 33) Semasa perbicaraan, mereka telahpun jelas dan yakin dengan keterangan mereka bahawa OKT merupakan pemandu pada hari kejadian dan kedua- S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal dua SP8 dan SP10 telah mengecamkan kedudukan OKT, SP7 dan SP11 dalam kenderaan WVG2016 semasa kejadian. 34) Mahkamah dalam menerima keterangan SP8 dan SP10, turut sangat berhati-hati dan berwas-was kerana kedua-dua mereka hanya melihat kedudukan ketiga-tiga orang OKT, SP7 dan SP11 lebih kurang 3-5minit sahaja. Mahkamah juga mengambilkira pemerhatian Mahkamah terhadap ketiga-tiga orang OKT, SP7 dan SP11 yang merupakan lelaki berbangsa India, saiz badan dan ketinggian mereka yang lebih kurang sama dan adakah wujud kesilapan pengecaman oleh SP8 dan SP10 terhadap mereka setelah hanya melihat mereka pada hari kejadian dan semasa tarikh perbicaraan, masa telah berlalu lebih daripada 2 tahun, dan mungkin wujud perbezaan ketinggian dan saiz badan pada OKT, SP7 dan SP11. 35) Namun demikian, keterangan mereka telah diuji dan dicabar oleh peguambela yang bijaksana melalui pemeriksaan balas. Tiada percanggahan yang material yang mampu mengoncang kredibiliti mereka dan mereka masih dapat mengecamkan kesemua lelaki berbangsa India tersebut dengan jelas dan yakin di mahkamah. Mahkamah berpendapat keterangan mereka adalah selamat untuk diterima sebagai keterangan. 36) Mahkamah juga mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah menyempurnakan beban pembuktian dalam isu identiti pemandu kereta. Pihak pendakwaan telah tepatnya memanggil SP 7 dan SP 11 yang berjaya mengecualikan bahawa mereka adalah pemandu sebenar dalam kemalangan tersebut. Ini menunjukkan keterangan SP8 dan SP10 yang turut disokong oleh keterangan SP7 dan SP11 yang menunjukkan tanpa sebarang keraguan bahawa OKT merupakan pemandu kenderaan WVG2016 pada masa kejadian. Oleh itu, elemen pertama pertuduhan pertama di bawah S.41 APJ telah dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37) Berkenaan dengan elemen kedua pertuduhan S.41(1) APJ 1987 iaitu memandu dengan merbahaya, tiada definasi dalam APJ 1987. Namun demikian, dalam kes PP v Bala a/l Arulappan [2008] 7 MLJ 726. Mahkamah dalam penghakimannya (perengan 8) telah mentafsirkan memandu dengan cara merbahaya dengan merujuk kepada kes Lim Chin Poh v Public Prosecutor [1969] 2 MLJ 159 (m/s 161) yang mana, Hakim Choor Singh memutuskan bahawa – “… my opinion the expression driving in a manner which is dangerous to the public indicates some dangerous act or manoeuvre on the part of the driver of a vehicle. There must be some positive act on the part of the driver which is dangerous having regard to all circumstances.” (penekanan ditambahkan) 38) Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Ong Kia Chian [2006] 7 MLJ 230 (m/s 237) telah memutuskan: “ “ In a case of dangerous driving, the prosecution must establish that: (a) a situation created by the accused is dangerous (b) when creating such a situation the accused was at fault. Fault involves a failure; a failing below the care and skill of a competent and experienced driver in relation to the manner of driving and the relevant circumstances (per Raja Azlan Shah) in Ramiah v Public Prosecutor at pp 258–259.” (penekanan ditambahkan) 39) Bagi membuktikan cara pemanduan OKT adalah merbahaya, keterangan saksi-saksi mata iaitu SP8 dan SP10 serta keterangan saksi SP7 iaitu penumpang belakang kenderaan WVG2016 adalah penting bagi menyokong kes pendakwaan. Mengikut SP7, semasa pemeriksaan utama, SP7 telah menyatakan seperti berikut: S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal “Pemeriksaan Utama SP7 S: Mr Letchu, pada tarikh saya sebut tadi 30 Julai 2020, apa berlaku? J: Pada Tarikh 30.7.2020 .... Di bengkel kami minum banyak arak. Raven telah jadi terlalu mabuk. Raven telah pergi ke kereta dan baring di kereta. Darvin telah ambil kunci dan start kereta mereka ajak saya sekali tapi saya bagitau kita pergi lepas Raven bangun. Darvin sendiri telah start kereta dan bawa kereta dan suruh saya naik dan saya pun naik. Semasa di selekoh saya tengok meter kereta 160km sebelum kemalangan. Selepas itu Raven telah sedar dari tidur dan suruh bawa kereta perlahan. S: Masa encik cakap tadi, semasa di selekoh, nampak meter 160km per hour tahu, macam mana encik boleh pasti nampak meter? J: Saya nampak meter 160km, saya tengok masa itu meter tunjukkan 160. Masa itu saya duduk di belakang ditengah- tengah.” (penekanan ditambahkan) 40) Semasa pemeriksaan semula SP7, SP7 sekali lagi menjelaskan cara pemanduan OKT seperti berikut: “Pemeriksaan Semula SP7 S: Soalan peguam juga, kamu hanya lihat kereta ambil selekoh sahaja dan kamu kata ya, sedangkan ianya bercanggah dengan cerita pada awalnya yang kamu nampak kereta dipandu laju 160km/jam, tayar terangkat dan masuk laluan sebelah. Boleh jelaskan? J: Semasa sampai di kawasan selekoh meter kereta tunjukkan 160km/jam, kereta telah terangkat stereng S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal telah terpusing masa itu kereta berada di line sebelah saya tengok rajah kasar baru tahu dia telah pergi ke line sana dan langar. Saya tak nampak macam mana perlanggaran berlaku sebab kereta bergoyang dan kepala saya pening dan tak nampak macam mana kemalangan itu berlaku. (penekanan ditambahkan) 41) Selain keterangan SP7, SP8 yang menyaksikan bagaimana kemalangan tersebut berlaku di depan matanya telah memberi keterangan seperti berikut: “Penyata saksi SP8 5. Semasa sampai di tempat kejadian iaitu di KM5, Jalan Sialang, Tangkak, saya nampak dengan jelas ketika sebuah kereta nombor pendaftaran tidak pasti jenis Proton Persona warna kelabu gelap dari arah Tangkak menghala ke Jasin sedang dipandu dengan sangat laju pada laluan bertentangan dengan kereta kami. Semasa kereta Proton Persona warna kelabu gelap itu dipandu dengan laju dan sedang melalui sebuah selekoh, tiba-tiba ianya telah dipandu laju dan masuk menghala ke lorong kereta kami. Saya berasa amat terkejut dan menjerit kerana menyangkakan kereta Proton Persona itu akan melanggar kami. Saya meminta suami memperlahankan kenderaan bagi mengelak dari pertembungan. Tiba-tiba, saya lihat kereta Proton Persona itu meluncur dengan laju dan merempuh tiang elektrik pertama di sebelah kiri jalan sehingga patah. Setelah itu, kereta Proton Persona warna kelabu gelap itu berpusing dan merempuh motorsikal yang dinaiki oleh dua orang perempuan tersebut dengan kuat secara berdepan dan kedua-dua mangsa telah melambung dari motorsikal S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal tersebut. Seterusnya, kereta Proton Persona warna kelabu gelap itu berpusing beberapa kali sebelum kereta itu melanggar tiang elektrik yang kedua dan terhenti di situ. Saya telah melihat perlanggaran itu berlaku di hadapan kereta saya pada anggaran jarak kurang dari dua buah kereta.” (penekanan ditambahkan) 42) SP10 turut menjelaskan bagaimana kemalangan tersebut berlaku seperti berikut: “Penyata saksi SP10 5. Semasa sampai di tempat kejadian iaitu di KM5, Jalan Sialang, Tangkak, saya lihat terdapat sebuah kereta nombor pendaftaran tidak pasti jenis Proton Persona warna kelabu gelap dari arah Tangkak menghala ke Jasin sedang dipandu dengan sangat laju pada laluan bertentangan dengan kereta saya. Semasa kereta Proton Persona warna kelabu gelap itu dipandu dengan laju dan melalui sebuah selekoh, tiba-tiba ianya telah dipandu laju dan masuk menghala ke lorong kereta saya dan merempuh tiang elektrik pertama di sebelah kiri jalan sehingga patah. Setelah itu, kereta Proton Persona warna kelabu gelap itu berpusing dan merempuh motorsikal yang dinaiki oleh dua orang perempuan tersebut dengan kuat secara berdepan dan kedua-dua mangsa telah melambung dari motorsikal tersebut. Seterusnya, kereta Proton Persona warna kelabu gelap itu berpusing beberapa kali sebelum kereta itu melanggar tiang elektrik yang kedua dan terhenti di situ. Saya telah melihat perlanggaran itu berlaku di hadapan kereta saya pada anggaran jarak kurang dari dua buah kereta.” (penekanan ditambahkan) S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43) Hasil siasatan SP12 juga menunjukkan bahawa penunggang motorsikal no MCM 2122 yang sedang berada di laluan A3-A4 pada rajah kasar (P18) tidak sempat mengelak apabila m/kar dipandu OKT meluncur laju memasuki laluan m/sikal si mati. Akibat itu, telah berlaku perlanggaran antara kedua-dua kenderaan, sebelum m/kar dipandu OKT melanggar tiang lampu kedua dan tersadai. Kesemua saksi mata dan saksi awam serta SP12 mengesahkan bahawa semasa kejadian kemalangan tersebut berlaku, laluan jalan adalah tidak sibuk dimana tiada kenderaan lain melainkan m/kar dipandu OKT, m/sikal ditunggang mangsa dan m/kar dipandu SP10, cuaca adalah baik dan pencahayaan jelas dan terang. 44) SP12 telah melakarkan lorong A3-A4 pada P18 menunjukkan laluan yang dilalui oleh motorsikal no MCM 2122 semasa kejadian berlaku. Menurut SP12 lagi, motorsikal si mati telah berlanggar dengan m/kar no WVG 2016 semasa kejadian di mana lokasi perlanggaran dapat dikenalpasti iaitu melalui serpihan komponen kenderaan yang berada “di laluan dari Jasin menghala ke Tangkak” iaitu di laluan A2 hingga A5. Tambahan lagi, selepas m/kar no WVG 2016 melanggar m/sikal yang terlibat dalam kemalangan, kedua-dua kenderaan masih berada di tempat kejadian dan tidak dialihkan kedudukan masing-masing, seperti mana dalam gambar P1 1-45. 45) SP8 dan SP10 mengesahkan kesan kemalangan pada kenderaan yang terlibat di mana selari dengan versi penceritaan dan hasil siasatan SP12. SP9 iaitu saksi dari PUSPAKOM yang mengemukakan ekshibit P17A dan P17B telah menunjukkan laporan pemeriksaan kenderaan yang diperiksa selepas kemalangan dan terdapat impak perlanggaran yang disahkan antara Motorkar yang dipandu oleh OKT dan m/sikal ditunggang si mati yang telah mengalami kerosakan yang pelbagai akibat kemalangan jalan raya. S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46) SP9 juga menyatakan bahawa berdasarkan kesan kerosakan kenderaan, perlanggaran pada m/sikal berlaku di bahagian hadapan. Ini adalah selari dengan keterangan SP12. 47) Hakim Raja Azlan Shah (pada ketika itu) di dalam kes Ramiah v Public Prosecutor [1972] 2 MLJ 258 di mukasurat 258 telah menyatakan: “Dangerous driving is not defined in the Road Traffic Ordinance and it is up to the court to come to a decision on the evidence.”. 48) Berdasarkan prinsip di atas dan keterangan lisan OKT dan juga keterangan dokumen seperti gambar dan laporan PUSPAKOM berkenaan dengan kerosakan kenderaan, Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah membuktikan bahawa cara pemanduan kenderaan WVG2016 oleh OKT semasa kejadian adalah merbahaya. Walaupun SP7 tidak nampak sendiri bagaimana pelanggaran antara kereta WVG2016 dan motorsikal MCM2122 bertempung kerana dia telah pengsan, namun demikian, sebelum SP7 pengsan, dia telah nampak bahawa OKT memandu sehingga 160km/j di selekoh sebelum pertembungan berlaku. 49) Pemanduan dengan kelajuan 160km/j di selekoh jalan persekutuan dan bukannya di lebuhraya yang lurus adalah cara pemanduan yang amat berbahaya. Keterangan SP7 tersebut adalah konsisten dengan penerangan SP8 dan SP10 yang menyaksikan bagaimana perlanggaran kedua-dua kenderaan tersebut di depan mata mereka seperti keterangan di atas, jelas menunjukkan bahawa pemanduan OKT dengan kelajuan di selekoh yang melampau sehingga memasuki laluan bertentangan dan melanggar tiang lampu dan motorsikal kedua-dua mangsa adalah sangat merbahayakan. 50) Mahkamah juga mengambilkira keterangan hasil siasatan SP12 dan juga keterangan-keterangan gambar di tempat kejadian. SP12 telah memberi S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal keterangan bahawa had laju yang dibenarkan di tempat kemalangan yang melibatkan bentuk jalan selekoh adalah 70 KM/J. Walaubagaimanapun, berdasarkan kepada rajah kasar, gambar tempat kejadian, dan hasil siasatan SP12 juga mengesahkan keterangan saksi-saksi mata bahawa kenderaan itu dipandu laju melebihi had yang ditetapkan berdasarkan tiga kesan brek yang panjang, dimana setiap kesan brek tayar iaitu F-F1 sepanjang lebih kurang 40.00 meter, F2-F3 sepanjang lebih kurang 22.30 meter, F4-F5 sepanjang lebih kurang 5.20 meter (P18 dan P18 K adalah dirujuk). 51) Selain itu, sebagai pemandu m/kar WVG 2016, OKT juga melakukan kesalahan apabila gagal memastikan dirinya adalah seorang yang mempunyai kelulusan dan kemahiran pemandu yang cekap dan berpengalaman berkaitan dengan cara memandu dalam keadaan yang berkaitan. Hal ini terbukti apabila SP12 mengesahkan bahawa OKT tidak mempunyai sebarang lesen memandu. Tambahan pula, OKT yang tidak mempunyai lesen memandu itu telah bertindak untuk memandu m/kar WVG 2016 tersebut, namun gagal mengawal kenderaan semasa melalui kawasan selekoh apabila memandu dengan laju, dimana sepatutnya lebih berhati-hati termasuk menjangkakan terdapat pengguna jalanraya lain yang berada di laluan tersebut. Cara pemanduan oleh OKT ini telah menimbulkan situasi merbahaya sehingga menyebabkan kemalangan yang membawa maut. 52) Secara keseluruhannya, pihak pendakwaan dalam mengemukakan bukti- bukti elemen S.41APJ di atas, pihak pembelaan tidak mempertikainya banyak isu dan berulang kali membangkitkan bahawa satu-satunya isu untuk dipertikaikan dalam kes ini, ialah siapakah pemandu sebenar kereta WVG2016 pada masa kemalangan berlaku dan pembelaan telah mengemukakan cadangan bahawa OKT bukan pemandu sebaliknya pemilik kenderaan iaitu SP11 merupakan pemandu kenderaan. Jika diteliti hujahan bertulis pihak pembelaan pada akhir kes pendakwaan, boleh dilihat S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal hujahan tersebut hanya terjurus kepada isu pengecaman OKT sebagai pemandu dan tatacara kawad cam di balai polis tidak teratur. 53) Oleh itu, bagi elemen kedua pertuduhan pertama S.41 APJ, Mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikannya. 54) Seterusnya bagi elemen ketiga, pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil saksi doktor forensik dan juga waris kepada mangsa bagi membuktikan cara pemanduan OKT secara merbahaya tersebut telah menyebabkan kematian kepada dua mangsa. Pengecaman kedua-dua si mati dibuat oleh waris si mati sepertimana disahkan oleh SP4. 55) Keterangan doktor Hospital Tangkak SP1 yang melakukan post mortem ke atas mangsa-mangsa juga mengesahkan kematian mereka akibat kemalangan jalan raya, seperti berikut: “Pernyataan Saksi SP1: 11. Secara kesimpulannya, punca kematian mayat Siti Nur Syahira Binti Yazid adalah 'Polytrauma' disebabkan oleh kemalangan jalan raya dimana mengalami kecederaan parah di kepala dan anggota kedua-dua peha dan kedua-dua lengan tangan 'deformed'. 12. Manakala punca kematian mayat Nur Syaza Nadihra Binti Md Selan adalah 'Polytrauma' disebabkan oleh kemalangan jalan raya dimana mengalami kecederaan parah pada bahagian tulang punggung 'deformed', kedua-dua tangan 'deformed' dan kaki kiri 'deformed'. 13. Pada pendapat saya, kesemua kecederaan tersebut adalah sesuai dengan corak kemalangan jalanraya. Secara Kesimpulannya: S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14. Kedua-dua mayat adalah perempuan dewasa Melayu yang mana secara positif telah dikenalpasti oleh nama-nama seperti disebut di atas. 15. Tiada tanda signifikan penyakit biasa pada tubuh yang boleh menyebabkan secara langsung atau menyumbang kepada kematian kedua-dua mayat pada ketika itu. 16. Kedapatan pemeriksaan kedua-dua bedah siasat adalah konsisten dengan corak kemalangan jalanraya.” 56) Pihak pendakwaan juga telah mengemukakan laporan post mortem si mati iaitu eksibit P2 dan P3 melalui SP1. Selain itu, keterangan SP8, SP10 dan SP12 turut menunjukkan bahawa kedua-dua mangsa telah meninggal dunia di tempat kejadian terutamannya keterangan SP8 dan SP10 yang telah menyaksikan pertembungan tersebut dan telah membantu menutup mayat kedua-dua Si Mati dengan kain di tempat kejadian. 57) Selain itu, tiada bantahan mahupun pertikaian oleh pihak pembelaan mengenai punca kematian Si Mati. Pihak pembelaan juga tidak menyoal balas doktor SP1 dan juga waris mangsa SP4. Oleh itu, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan pihak pendakwaan bahawa elemen ketiga ini iaitu Si Mati meninggal dunia akibat pemanduan OKT yang merbahaya juga berjaya dibuktikan. 58) Dalam hujahan pihak pembelaan di akhir kes pendakwaan, selain daripada menafikan OKT merupakan pemandu WVG2016 semasa kejadian, pihak pembelaan turut membangkitkan isu bahawa terdapat percanggahan keterangan oleh saksi-saksi pendakwaan di mana SP12 iaitu pegawai penyiasat telah menyatakan bahawa ketiga-tiga orang lelaki berbangsa India tersebut telah pergi ke tempat kemalangan dari rumah kakak SP11. Namun demikian keterangan SP7 dan SP11 telah menyatakan bahawa sebenarnya, dari rumah kakak SP11, mereka telah pergi ke bengkel pakcik S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal SP11 untuk minum arak dan dari bengkel pakcik SP11, mereka bertolak menghala ke Melaka dan berlaku kemalangan tersebut. 59) SP7 dan SP11 juga menyatakan bahawa dari rumah kakak SP11 ke bengkel pakcik SP11, pemandu WVG 2016 merupakan SP11. Namun demikian, kedua-dua orang saksi ini telah menyatakan dari bengkel pakcik SP11 ke tempat kemalangan, OKT merupakan pemandu. Pihak pembelaan berhujah bahawa percanggahan keterangan antara SP7, SP11 dan SP12 ini telah mewujudkan 2 versi yang berbeza dan versi SP12 yang berpihak kepada pembelaan harus diterima. 60) Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan pembelaan ini dan berpendapat bahawa perbezaan deskripsi urutan destinasi yang dilalui oleh ketiga-tiga lelaki berbanga India iaitu SP7, SP11 dan OKT bukan satu percanggahan keterangan dan tidak fatal terhadap kes pendakwaan, tetapi lebih kepada satu kesilapan pegawai penyiasat dalam mengingati dan menyatakan semula fakta kes yang disiasat olehnya 2 tahun lepas. Berbanding dengan SP12, SP7 dan SP11 merupakan saksi yang terlibat dalam kejadian dan semestinya mereka lebih jelas dan ingat pada hari kejadian, mereka telah pergi ke mana dan dari mana mereka bertolak sehingga ke tempat kejadian. 61) Mahkamah mendapati perbezaan keterangan SP12 dengan saksi-saksi lain ini hanya terjurus kepada tempat yang dilalui dan tidak memberi kesan kepada identiti pemandu dimana kesemua saksi-saksi ini telah mengecam OKT sebagai pemandu kenderaan tersebut. 62) Selepas menilai kesemua keterangan pihak pendakwaan secara maksimum, Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan satu kes prima facie terhadap OKT bagi pertuduhan pertama dan OKT dipanggil untuk membela diri bagi pertuduhan tersebut. S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Pertuduhan Kedua S.44(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 63) Bagi Pertuduhan Kedua, berkenaan dengan pembuktian elemen pertama dan elemen ketiga, beban pembuktian kedua-dua elemen tersebut adalah sama dengan elemen pertama dan ketiga pertuduhan pertama, maka Mahkamah mengulangi perenggan 21 hingga 36 bagi pembuktian elemen pertama dan perenggan 54 hingga 57 bagi pembuktian elemen ketiga seperti di atas dan mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah membuktikan kedua-dua elemen tersebut. 64) Bagi membuktikan elemen kedua pertuduhan S.44(1) APJ 1987, pihak pendakwaan perlu membuktikan bahawa OKT telah memandu kenderaan dengan mempunyai sebegitu banyak alkohol dalam badannya sehingga kadar alkohol di dalam air kencingnya melebihi had yang ditetapkan iaitu 107mg alcohol dalam 100ml air kencing. 65) Mengikut S.45G APJ, tafsiran seksyen 44 dan 45B hingga 45F, "had yang ditetapkan" ertinya- (a) 35 mikrogram alkohol dalam 100 mililiter nafas; (b) 80 miligram alkohol dalam 100 mililiter darah; atau (c) 107 miligram alkohol dalam 100 mililiter air kencing;” 66) Dalam hal ini, SP12 telah mengarahkan sampel darah dan air kencing OKT diambil pada hari yang sama selepas kejadian. OKT telah dibawa ke Hospital Tangkak, dan sampel air kencing OKT telah diambil di Hospital Tangkak. Lanjutan itu, specimen tersebut telah dimasukkan di dalam satu botol kaca dan telah dimeterai dan diseal kan di hadapan SP12 bersama OKT. Kemudian, SP12 telah menyerahkan sampel yang sama kepada SP3 untuk dianalisa. 67) SP3 juga mengesahkan keadaan sampel yang bermeterai “KEMENTERIAN KESIHATAN MALAYSIA UNIT PERUBATAN FORENSIK S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal HOSPITAL TANGKAK JOHOR” dan dalam keadaan baik semasa penerimaan di Jabatan Kimia Melaka, eksibit P9 sehingga P13 adalah dirujuk. SP3 juga telah melakukan analisa ke atas specimen tersebut dan mengesahkan bahawa kuantiti etil alkohol yang terkandung dalam specimen air kencing OKT adalah pada kadar 115 miligram per 100 mililiter. SP3 juga telah menyediakan laporan kimia sebagaimana P14. 68) Pihak pendakwaan telah membuktikan elemen ini secara konklusif melalui s.45F (2)(b) APJ 1987. S.45F(2)(b) APJ1987 memperuntukkan: “Keterangan mengenai kadar alcohol di dalam suatu specimen nafas, darah atau air kencing boleh, tertakluk kepada subseksyen (4) dan (5), diberikan dengan mengemukakan dokumen atau dokumen-dokumen yang berupa sebagai sama ada- (a) suatu pernyataan yang dikeluarkan secara automatic oleh suatu alat penganalisi nafas yang ditetapkan dan suatu perakuan yang ditandatangani oleh seorang pegawai polis…..; atau (b) suatu perakuan yang ditandangani oleh seorang pengamal perubatan kerajaan atau ahli kimia kerajaan tentang kadar alcohol yang terdapat di dalam specimen darah atau air kencing yang dikenal pasti dalam perakuan itu.” 69) Dalam keadaan SP3 dan SP12 telah dipanggil untuk memberikan keterangan berkaitan specimen ini, pihak pendakwaan telah memenuhi “best evidence rule”, di mana dalam laporan kimia P14 telah menunjukkan kadar alcohol di dalam air kencing OKT adalah 115 miligram per 100 mililiter air kencing, dan telah melebihi had yang ditetapkan (107 miligram alkohol dalam 100 mililiter air kencing). 70) Selain keterangan SP3 dan SP12, pihak pendakwaan juga mengemukakan keterangan melalui saksi SP7 dan SP11 yang menyatakan bahawa OKT bersama-sama dengan SP11 telah meminum arak iaitu beer dan todi yang S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal memabukkan di bengkel pakcik SP11 dan kemudiannya kenderaan WVG2016 dipandu oleh OKT sehingga menyebabkan kemalangan tersebut. 71) Keterangan SP7 yang berkaitan adalah seperti berikut: “Pemeriksaan Utama SP7 S: Di rumah kakak buat apa? J: Di rumah kakak mereka minum arak disitu. Hanya mereka berdua minum arak tapi mereka berdua minum sedikit sahaja tidak minum banyak. Selepas itu telah pergi ke bengkel. S: Tadi Encik ada cakap di bengkel, minum banyak arak. Siapa yang minum arak di bengkel? J: Yang minum arak di bengkel kedua-dua mereka. S: Kalau Raven sudah mabuk dan tidur dan tak tahu apa berlaku, bagaimana pula dengan keadaan Darvin? J: Darvin Raj mabuk juga S: Tadi cakap minum arak, arak apa yang diminum? J: Mereka minum arak daripada pokok – arak todi dan beer. Tak minum beer banyak, minum todi banyak.” 72) Keterangan SP11 yang berkaitan adalah seperti berikut: “Pemeriksaan Utama SP11 S: Berapa banyak minum air todi di situ? J: Sebungkus, dalam plastik S: Darvin Raj dan pakcik pun minum? Darvin minum air apa? J: Air todi dengan beer tiger S: Macam mana dengan Lechiamuthu? J: Dia tak minum” S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 73) Mahkamah mendapati keterangan saksi-saksi tersebut adalah konsisten dan menyokong satu antara sama lain dan oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati elemen kedua ini turut dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. 74) Dalam hujahan pihak pembelaan di akhir kes pendakwaan, pihak pembelaan tidak membangkitkan sebarang hujahan berkenaan dengan elemen pertuduhan kedua ini dan hanya berhujah bahawa atas kegagalan pihak pendakwaan membuktikan satu prima facie kes di bawah S.41(1) APJ 1987 terutamanya dalam isu siapa pemandu kenderaan tersebut, maka pihak pendakwaan juga gagal membuktikan satu prima facie kes di bawah S.44(1) APJ 1987. 75) Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak pembelaan tersebut dan berdasarkan penilaian Mahkamah terhadap keterangan lisan saksi dan keterangan dokumen seperti yang dihuraikan di atas, Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah membuktikan satu kes prima facie di bawa pertuduhan kedua S.44(1) APJ 1987 dan OKT dipanggil untuk membela diri terhadap pertuduhan tersebut. 76) Secara kesimpulannya, berpandukan pada kesemua keterangan saksi pendakwaan dan setelah menilai keterangan tersebut secara maxima serta kredibiliti semua saksi Pendakwaan, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes Prima Facie terhadap OKT bagi pertuduhan pertama iaitu S.41(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 dan juga pertuduhan kedua iaitu S.44(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987. Oleh itu, OKT dipanggil untuk membela diri dan Mahkamah telah memaklumkan 3 pilihan pembelaan kepada OKT dan OKT telah memilih untuk memberikan keterangan secara bersumpah. S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal FAKTA PEMBELAAN 77) Pada peringkat Pembelaan, OKT telah memilih untuk memberi keterangan bersumpah dan hanya terdapat seorang saksi pembelaan sahaja iaitu OKT sendiri. Satu-satunya pembelaan OKT ialah bahawa dia bukan pemandu kereta WVG2016 semasa kejadian pada 30 Julai 2020 dan OKT menyatakan pemandu sebenar ialah saksi pendakwaan SP11 Raven yang juga merupakan pemilik kenderaan tersebut. 78) Keterangan OKT semasa pembelaan berkenaan dengan turutan destinasi mereka adalah sama dan konsisten dengan penerangan SP7 dan SP11 iaitu pada tarikh kejadian, mereka bertiga telah menduduki kereta tersebut yang dipandu oleh SP11 dari Melaka, pergi ke rumah kakak SP11 di Tangkak, kemudiannya mereka bertiga telah pergi ke bengkel pakcik SP11 dengan kereta yang dipandu oleh SP11 untuk minum arak todi di bengkel pakcik SP11. DI bengkel SP11 hanya SP11, OKT dan pakcik SP11 yang minum arak. Keterangan ini adalah konsisten dengan keterangan SP7 dan SP11. 79) Yang berbeza dengan keterangan SP7 dan SP11 adalah bahawa dari bengkel pakcik SP11, OKT menyatakan orang yang memandu kenderaan tersebut bukan dia sebaliknya SP11. OKT menyatakan bahawa dia merupakan penumpang hadapan kenderaan WVG 2016 dan SP11 yang memandu semasa kemalangan berlaku. Semasa SP11 memandu dengan laju, OKT telah tidur dan apabila dia bangun dari tidur, kemalangan telah berlaku di hadapan, dan dia terus lari bersama dengan SP7 dari kereta. 80) Dalam pembelaan, OKT telah membangkitkan keterangan buat pertama kalinya bahawa semasa di hospital untuk mengambil darah dan ujian kencing, SP11 telah berbincang dengannya dan meminta OKT untuk mengaku sebagai pemandu kenderaan, antara keterangan-keterangan OKT yang berkaitan adalah seperti berikut: S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal “Pemeriksaan Utama OKT S: Pada masa itu, Raven ada bincang dengan kamu atau apa? J: Ada S: Apa dia bincang? J: Dia cakap dengan saya, suruh saya mengaku saya yang bawa kereta S: Kenapa? J: Dia cakap, hari ini dia keluar dulu, besok dia keluarkan saya S: Kamu cakap apa? J: Saya tanya dia betul ka kamu akan keluarkan saya? Dia cakap betul S: Selepas itu, kamu cakap kamu ingin mengaku? J: Ada S: Bila sudah balik balai, apa berlaku? J: Raven cakap dengan Inspector, Darvin Raj akan mengaku salah S: Selepas itu, Inspektor beritahu apa? J: Inspektor bagitahu ok S: Rujuk saksi pada P27, laporan polis Ledang 1951/2020. Cuba lihat, ini laporan polis yang kamu buat betul? J: Ya S: Siapa suruh buat laporan polis ini? J: Inspektor S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S: Apa yang Inspektor beritahu kamu sebelum kamu buat? Kerana kamu beritahu, kamu di lokap, ada dia datang jumpa kamu di lokap? J: Ya S: Apa dia beritahu kamu? J: Dia bertiahu saya, u mengaku salah, sebab saya bawah umur” 81) Semasa disoalbalas oleh TPR, OKT mengaku bahawa dia tidak mempunyai lesen memandu kereta dan motorsikal, namun demikian, OKT turut menyatakan bahawa walaupun tiada lesen motorsikal, dia telah belajar sendiri dan menunggang motorsikal sejak 15 tahun. OKT turut bersetuju dengan cadangan TPR bahawa keterangannya berkenaan dengan semasa di hospital, SP11 ada bercakap dengannya “hari ini saya keluar, esok akan keluarkan kamu” dan juga keterangan bahawa “Raven yang cakap dengan Inspektor, yang Darvin akan mengaku” hanya buat kali pertama dikemukakan dalam perbicaraan ini, tanpa disoal kepada SP11 ataupun SP12. Keterangan OKT yang bersetuju dengan cadangan TPR tersebut tidak diperiksa semula oleh peguambela untuk OKT menjelaskannya. PENILAIAN MAHKAMAH 82) Pada peringkat ini, Mahkamah perlu menentukan sama ada pihak pembelaan telah berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah. Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes PP v Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006]1CLJ457 menyatakan: “For the guidance of the courts below, we summarise as follows the steps that should be taken by a trial court at the close of prosecution’s case:- (i)… S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (ii)… (iii)… (iv) after defence is called, the accused elects to give evidence, then go through the steps set out in Mat v. Public Prosecutor [1963]MLJ263” 83) YA Suffian dalam kes Mat v PP [1963]MLJ263 menyatakan: “The position may be conveniently stated as follows:- (a) If you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the accused’s guilt – Convict (b) If you accept or believe the accused’s explanation – Acquit (c) If you do not accept or believe the accused explanation – Do not convict but consider the next steps below. (d) If you do not accept or believe the accused explanation and that explanation does not raise in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt – Convict (e) If you do not accept or believe the accused explanation but nevertheless it raises in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt – Acquit” 84) Berkenaan dengan pembelaan OKT bahawa dia bukan pemandu kenderaan WVG2016, semasa kes pendakwaan, pihak pembelaan telah mencadangkan bahawa OKT bukan pemandu sebenar dan cadangan tersebut telah dikemukakan kepada beberapa orang saksi pendakwaan termasuk saksi mata iaitu SP8 dan SP10, penumpang belakang kenderaan SP7, pemilik kenderaan SP11 dan juga Pegawai penyiasat SP12, namun demikian, jawapan kesemua saksi tersebut adalah negatif dan semua saksi pendakwaan tersebut tidak bersetuju dengan cadangan tersebut. 85) Apabila pembelaan dipanggil, OKT telah memberi keterangan secara bersumpah dan mendedahkan bahawa dia bukan pemandu, maka S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal keterangan tersebut bukan satu keterangan pemikiran kemudian (afterthought) dan Mahkamah harus mengambilkira pembelaan tersebut. Tugas Mahkamah adalah menilai keseluruhan keterangan yang diberikan oleh pembelaan dan pihak pendakwaan. 86) Dalam isu ini, walaupun pembelaan tersebut bukan afterthought, Mahkamah mendapati keterangan OKT tersebut adalah bersifat penafian kosong (bare denial) tanpa disokong oleh sebarang keterangan saksi lain ataupun keterangan dokumen. Pembelaan penafian kosong tersebut gagal menimbulkan keraguan munasabah pada kes pendakwaan. 87) Dalam kes ini, penafian OKT adalah bersandarkan bahawa dia seorang yang bawah umur semasa kejadian iaitu 18 tahun 3 bulan dan oleh itu SP11 telah meminta dia mengaku salah. Namun demikian, OKT juga bersetuju dengan cadangan TPR bahawa SP11 telah berbincang dengan dia untuk dia mengaku salah hanya ditimbulkan semasa peringkat pembelaan. Mahkamah mendapati keterangan ini bersifat afterthought. Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa sebarang keterangan pemikiran terkemudian tidak boleh diterima dan hendaklah ditolak oleh Mahkamah. 88) Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Megat Halim Megat Omar v PP [2009] 1 CLJ 154 pada perenggan 63 muka surat 167 memutuskan bahawa: “Although in our criminal jurisprudence, there is no burden on an accused person to prove his innocence but merely for him to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, it is trite that his defence should be put to the prosecution at an early stage during the prosecution case. Failure to do so may move the trial court to dismiss a particular line of defence as an afterthought, or a recent invention as happened in this case… S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal In our adversarial system, that principle is applicable in both civil and criminal trials. The appellant’s defence can be ascertained not merely from his own evidence but also the line of cross-examination of the prosecution’s witnesses. (see Kuli & Ors v. Emperor AIR [1930] Cal 442, cited in PP v. Dato’ Seri Anwar Bin Ibrahim (No. 3) [1999] 2 CLJ 215). This has been termed as a rule of essential justice.” 89) Selain itu, keterangan OKT yang menyatakan bahawa dia tiada mempunyai lesen motorsikal tetapi telah menunggang motorsikal sejak 15 tahun, turut memberi satu inferens bahawa walaupun dia tidak mempunyai lesen memandu, tidak mustahil untuk OKT juga belajar sendiri dan tahu memandu kereta. 90) Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak pendakwaan bahawa sesuatu penafian tanpa keterangan sokongan daripada saksi merupakan satu penafian kosong. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v PP & Another Appeal [2015] 2 CLJ 145 telah mengesahkan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan yang menyatakan: “The bare denial by the Respondent does not amount any doubt whatsoever.” Mahkamah Persekutuan selanjutnya menambah: “A mere denial does not amount to a credible defence.” Memandangkan tiada keterangan lain untuk menyokong keterangan OKT, ia kekal sebagai satu penafian kosong semata-mata. 91) Dalam perbicaraan ini yang telah dijalankan lebih dari 2 tahun, saksi-saksi pendakwaan bukan sahaja menafikan cadangan pembelaan, malahan secara jelas menunjukkan bahawa OKT ialah pemandu kereta WVG2016 semasa kejadian berlaku. Saksi pendakwaan tersebut terdiri daripada 2 S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal orang kawan OKT yang juga penumpang dalam kereta tersebut dan juga 2 orang saksi awam SP8 dan SP10. Maka, Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah menyempurnakan beban dalam pembuktian identiti pemandu dalam kes ini iaitu OKT. 92) Pembelaan OKT tentang penafian apa yang berlaku di dalam kes ini tidak mencukupi untuk membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah kerana kesemua saksi pendakwaan telah memberi keterangan yang konsisten sepanjang kes pendakwaan. 93) Mahkamah juga mendapati sepanjang perbicaraan kes ini, rantaian keterangan tidak pernah terputus dari saksi pertama sehingga saksi akhir pendakwaan di dalam kes ini. Barang kes bagi pertuduhan di bawah S.44(1) APJ juga telah ditandakan dan dicamkan secara jelas oleh saksi-saksi. Tiada sebarang cabaran daripada pihak pembelaan tentang rantaian keterangan terputus sepanjang perbicaraan kes pendakwaan mahupun pembelaan. Malahan, setelah meneliti kesemua keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan, tiada percanggahan yang material yang secara efeknya menimbulkan keraguan terhadap intipati asas pertuduhan-pertuduhan. 94) Oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kedua-dua pertuduhan terhadap OKT melampaui keraguan munasabah. ISU SAMA ADA TERDAPAT MISJOINDER OF CHARGES S.165 KANUN TATACARA JENAYAH? 95) Dalam kes ini, setelah pihak pembelaan menutup kes, atas permohonan pembelaan untuk lanjutan masa, Mahkamah telah memberi masa lebih dari 2 bulan untuk pihak-pihak memfailkan hujahan bertulis. Namun demikian, pihak pembelaan gagal memfailkan sebarang hujahan berkenaan keseluruhan kes ini. S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 96) Mahkamah setelah menerima hujahan pendakwaan yang difailkan mengikut masa dan 3 minggu sebelum tarikh keputusan, Mahkamah melalui emel kepada pihak-pihak, telah mengarahkan pihak-pihak mengemukakan penyelidikan dan hujahan lanjut mengenai S.165 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah iaitu sama ada terdapat misjoinder of charges dalam kes ini memandangkan OKT telah dituduh bagi S.41(1) dan juga S.44(1) APJ 1987 bagi satu kejadian kemalangan maut. 97) Atas arahan Mahkamah tersebut, akhirnya pembelaan memfailkan hujahan pembelaan dan dalam hujahan bertulis 10 mukasurat tersebut, pihak pembelaan telah berhujah bahawa mengikut S.165 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, OKT tidak boleh dipertuduhkan dengan kedua-dua pertuduhan tersebut kerana elemen pertuduhan adalah berbeza. Tiada sebarang hujahan berkenaan sama ada pihak pembelaan telah menimbulkan keraguan munasabah pada kes pendakwaan. 98) Pihak pembelaan telah berhujah bahawa kedua-dua pertuduhan tersebut adalah bertentangan antara satu sama lain kerana pertuduhan pertama di bawah S.41(1) APJ 1987 adalah tanpa alcohol, manakala pertuduhan kedua di bawah S.44(1) APJ 1987 adalah dengan pengaruh alcohol. Elemen-elemen pertuduhan kedua-dua pertuduhan adalah berbeza, dan terdapat defective of charges yang tidak boleh dipulihkan. OKT telah diprejudiskan kerana tidak tahu dari awal patut menimbulkan keraguan munasabah terhadap pemanduan merbahaya ataupun di bawah pengaruh alcohol. 99) Berkenaan dengan isu ini, Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak pembelaan dan mendapati hujahan tersebut lebih kepada satu hujahan pemikiran terkemudian. Sepanjang perbicaraan kes ini, isu ini tidak pernah ditimbulkan malahan satu-satunya pembelaan OKT adalah bahawa dia bukan pemandu kenderaan WVG2016. Sekiranya diperhalusi elemen pertuduhan kedua-dua pertuduhan S. 41(1) dan S.44(1) APJ 1987, elemen S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal pertuduhan mengenai identiti pemandu adalah sama dan dalam isu ini, Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan sememangnya telah membuktikan elemen tersebut melampaui keraguan munasabah bahawa OKT merupakan pemandu kenderaan semasa kejadian. 100) Walaubagaimanapun, berkenaan dengan isu ini, Mahkamah mendapati isu ini telah menjadi akademik berikutan dengan penarikan balik pertuduhan kedua S.44(1) APJ 1987 oleh pihak pendakwaan mengikut S.254(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah iaitu sebelum Mahkamah menyampaikan keputusan perbicaraan akhir. PENARIKAN PERTUDUHAN KEDUA S.44(1) APJ 1987 OLEH PENDAKWAAN 101) Sebelum Mahkamah memberi keputusan, pihak pendakwaan telah memohon untuk menarik balik pertuduhan kedua S.44(1) APJ 1987 di bawah S.254(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah atas alasan mungkin terdapat arahan lanjut di masa akan datang berkenaan dengan kes ini dan pihak pendakwaan memohon supaya OKT dilepaskan tanpa dibebaskan (DNAA) bagi pertuduhan S.44(1) APJ 1987. Pihak pembelaan telah membantah dan memohon supaya OKT dilepaskan dan dibebaskan atas alasan terdapat misjoinder of charges dan tidak adil untuk OKT DNAA sahaja. 102) Mahkamah sedia maklum dengan kuasa penarikan balik pertuduhan oleh pihak pendakwaan di bawah Perkara 145 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan dibaca bersama S.254(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, iaitu “at any stage of any trial, before the delivery of judgment”, pihak pendakwaan masih boleh menarik balik pertuduhan walaupun kedua-dua pihak telah menutup kes dan kesemua keterangan telah dikemukakan. Namun demikian, pelepasan tersebut adalah tertakluk pada budibicara Mahkamah mengikut S.254(3) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah yang menyatakan bahawa “such discharge shall not amount to an acquittal unless the Court so directs”. S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 103) Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes PP v Ambika a/p M.A. Shanmugam [2021]2CLJ522 telah memutuskan bahawa “[14] The phrase "unless the court so directs" in s. 254(3) is plain and clear which should be given its literal meaning. It clearly means that although the discharge shall not amount to an acquittal but the court is also given the discretionary power to direct for discharge amounting to an acquittal. [19] The discretionary power to direct an acquittal pursuant to s. 254(3) is also recognised by this court in the case of Mohamed Kanathi Meerah Mydin v. PP [2019] 2 CLJ 28 where it states: [39] We observed that even though the learned trial judge had a discretionary power to direct an acquittal under sub-s. 254(3) of the CPC, nevertheless he did not exercise his discretionary power in the instant case... There is ample persuasive authority for the proposition that unless some good grounds are shown, it would not be right to leave PW1 saddled with a charge hanging over his head for an indeterminate period. However, PW1 himself did not apply for a discharge amounting to an acquittal. (K Abdul Rasheed v. PP [1985] 1 LNS 54; [1985] 1 MLJ 193). (emphasis added) [23] It is also a trite principle of law that the prosecution must show good grounds in order to obtain a discharge not amounting to an acquittal pursuant to s. 254(3) of the CPC. S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (see Mohamed Kanathi (supra ); PP v. Mat Zain [1984] 3 LNS 21; [1948-49] MLJ Supp 142; Tan Ah Chan v. Regina [1955] 1 LNS 155; [1955] 1 MLJ 218; Koh Teck Chai v. Public Prosecutor [1967] 1 LNS 72; [1968] 1 MLJ 166).” 104) Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengekalkan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dan Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes PP v Ambika tersebut di atas pada tahun 2022 untuk melepaskan dan membebaskan OKT dan menegaskan sekali bahawa DNAA hanya akan dibenarkan sekiranya alasan baik (good reasons) diberikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. 105) Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Vigny Alfred Raj Vicetor Amratha Raja v PP [2022]8CLJ1 turut memutuskan bahawa: “[80] In PP v. Au Seh Chun (supra), Suriyadi J in discussing when an order for a DAA may be ordered by the court under s. 173(f) alluded to a hypothetical scenario where a request for an adjournment of an ongoing trial is sought on the basis that investigation is yet to be completed. His Lordship explained that it would be quite proper for the court to consider the charge as being groundless under s. 173(f) if it be a summary trial as "no self-respecting Deputy Public Prosecutor will charge a person unless the investigation is considered complete. It is only at the end of the investigation that the executive action is determined." By executive action, His Lordship was referring to the decision to charge. [81] I agree with that view. There should not have been a charge in the first place if the investigations were "still going on" or incomplete. It would be an aberration and a travesty on the administration of criminal justice if the courts were seen to condone a practice of charge now, investigate later. The S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal prosecution's reason for a direction of DNAA under s. 254(3) borders on abuse and oppression that cannot be endorsed by the court. In effect, had this been a summary trial, it would have shown that the prosecution had a groundless case and the accused must be acquitted and discharged.” (penekanan ditambahkan) 106) Berbalik kepada kes di hadapan Mahkamah, Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan gagal mengemukakan alasan yang baik untuk DNAA diberikan. Alasan yang diberikan oleh pihak pendakwaan bukan satu alasan yang baik untuk DNAA diberikan oleh Mahkamah. Memandangkan kedua-dua pihak telah menutup kes dan kes adalah ditetapkan untuk keputusan, adalah tidak adil dan akan memprejudiskan OKT, jika pihak pendakwaan menarik balik dan memohon DNAA untuk sebarang arahan lanjut pada masa akan datang. Kehidupan OKT akan dihantui oleh pertuduhan tersebut bagi satu tempoh yang tidak menentu. 107) Sekiranya perintah DNAA diberikan, ia juga akan dilihat sebagai satu penyimpangan dan persendaan terhadap pentadbiran keadilan jenayah kerana pihak-pihak telah menutup kes dan kesemua keterangan telah dikemukakan dan dinilai oleh Mahkamah. Dalam kes ini, Mahkamah bukan sahaja telah mendapati pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan kes prima facie, malahan turut mendengar pembelaan OKT dan mendapati pihak pembelaan gagal menimbulkan sebarang keraguan munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. Sekiranya DNAA diberikan dan pihak pendakwaan memutuskan untuk menuduh OKT pada masa akan datang, semestinya OKT akan disabitkan dan dikenakan hukuman padahal OKT mungkin pada masa akan datang tersebut, telah habis menjalani hukumannya di bawah pertuduhan pertama. S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 108) Mahkamah dalam kes PP v Ambika (Supra) dengan merujuk pada kes PP v. Syed Abdul Bahari Shahabuddin [1975] 1 LNS 137 turut menyatakan bahawa: “[24] Further, in PP v. Syed Abdul Bahari Shahabuddin [1975] 1 LNS 137; [1976] 1 MLJ 87, Abdoolcader J said this: ... Sub-section (iii) of section 254 specifically enacts that a discharge under that section shall not amount to an acquittal unless the court so directs. It is settled law that unless there are good grounds to the contrary, a discharge under this provision should amount to an acquittal. Good grounds for a discharge not amounting to an acquittal would arise where the prosecution is unable to proceed for the time being but can satisfy the court that the temporary impediment is not unsurmountable and that it will proceed within a reasonable time. This seems to be the raison d'etre for the scheme providing for a discharge not amounting to an acquittal. (emphasis added)” 109) Pihak pendakwaan juga tidak menyatakan apakah halangan sementara yang tidak dapat diatasi untuk kes ini diteruskan dan perlu ditarik balik dan kes diDNAA. Berdasarkan prinsip-prinsip kes dan alasan-alasan di atas, Mahkamah menggunakan budi bicara untuk melepaskan dan membebaskan OKT dari pertuduhan kedua mengikut S.254(3) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. HUKUMAN PERTUDUHAN PERTAMA 110) Berkenaan dengan rayuan OKT terhadap hukuman kesalahan pertuduhan pertama, sebelum Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman, pihak pembelaan telah mengemukakan rayuan dan memohon satu hukuman S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal yang paling minima dikenakan dengan mengambilkira faktor-faktor seperti berikut: i. OKT berumur 18 tahun 6 bulan semasa kejadian, dan dia hanya seorang penuntut semasa kejadian, dan tinggal bersama dengan keluarganya; ii. Ini merupakan kesalahan pertama OKT, sejak daripada kejadian tersebut, OKT tidak melakukan sebarang kesalahan, dan OKT telah hadir ke mahkamah setiap hari; iii. OKT kini bekerja sebagai seorang operator bersama ayahnya dan tinggal bersama ayahnya; dan iv. OKT memohon maaf atas apa yang berlaku dan menyesal, dengan apa yang berlaku, dan berjanji untuk tidak melakukan kesalahan pada masa akan datang. 111) Pihak pembelaan juga memohon penangguhan pelaksanaan hukuman penjara dan hukuman denda, sementara pelupusan rayuan dan berhujah bahawa setiap kali perbicaraan, OKT telah hadir. Kali pertama tak hadir ialah semasa dia tidak sihat. Mengambilkira usianya yang amat muda dan rayuan dibuat, dan sekiranya rayuan dibenarkan, dan jika hukuman penjara dijalankan, ia akan memprejudiskannya 112) Bagi pihak pendakwaan, TPR telah memohon satu hukuman berat kepada OKT atas alasan-alasan seperti berikut: i. Perbicaraan telah dijalankan selama 2 tahun dan makan masa dan kos pelbagai pihak; ii. Kesalahan S.41 merupakan satu kesalahan yang serious, ia bukan sahaja mempunyai penjara minima dan denda minima, malahan juga penggantungan lesen memandu; iii. Pemanduan OKT telah mengakibatkan dua orang mangsa meninggal dunia; S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal iv. Pemanduan OKT adalah merbahaya dan mementingkan diri, tidak mengambilkira jalanraya juga diguna oleh pengguna lain; v. Semasa pertuduhan OKT sudah 18 tahun, iaitu sudah dewasa, dan boleh fikir dengan baik dan matang, dan vi. pohon hukuman berat untuk kepentingan awam dan pengajaran untuk tidak memandu secara penting diri, dan satu perintah supaya OKT hilang kelayakan untuk ambil lesen. 113) Pihak pendakwaan juga membantah penanggunhan pelaksanaan hukuman dan berhujah tiada special circumstances dan memandangkan OKT telah dijatuhkan hukuman, OKT mempunyai risiko melarikan diri yang lebih tinggi. Tanpa penangguhan pelaksaan, ia tidak akan memprejudiskan OKT memandangkan kes rayuan akan dilupuskan dengan cepat sebelum 2 tahun. 114) Mahkamah setelah menimbangkan rayuan OKT dan hujahan pemberatan TPR, telah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 3 tahun dan hukuman denda RM8,000 id penjara 4 bulan ke atas OKT. OKT juga hilang kelayakan untuk mengambil lesen memandu D selama 3 tahun dari tarikh sabitan 30 Ogos 2023. 115) Dalam menjatuhkan hukuman tersebut Mahkamah ini telah mengambil maklum akan prinsip-prinsip dalam menjatuhkan hukuman. Adalah undang-undang yang mantap bahawa pertimbangan yang utama adalah terhadap kepentingan awam sebagaimana yang diputuskan dalam kes R v. Ball [1951] 35 Criminal Appeal Report 164. Hilbery J dalam R v. Ball (supra) telah memutuskan bahawa: “In deciding the appropriate sentence, a court should always be guided by certain considerations. The first and foremost is the public interest. The Criminal Law is publicly enforced, not only with the object of punishing crime, S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal but also in the hope of preventing it. A proper sentence, passed in public, serves the public interest in two ways. It may deter others who might be tempted to try crime as seeming to offer easy money on the supposition, that if the offender is caught and brought to justice, the punishment will be negligible. Such a sentence may also deter the particular criminal from committing a crime again, or induce him to turn from a criminal to an honest life. The public interest is indeed served, and best served, if the offender is induced to turn from criminal ways to honest living. Our law does not, therefore, fix the sentence for a particular crime, but fixes a maximum sentence and leaves it to the court to decide what is, within that maximum, the appropriate sentence for each criminal in the particular circumstances of each case. Not only in regard to each crime, but in regard to each criminal, the court has the right and the duty to decide whether to be lenient or severe.” 116) Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes PP v. Morah Chekwube Chukwudi [2017] 1 LNS 864 telah menggariskan prinsip-prinsip hukuman yang akan menjadi faktor pemberat ataupun faktor pengurangan. Mahkamah menyatakan bahawa: "[5] It is well established that there are a number of factors that courts take into consideration before sentencing. Some of them are as follows: (a) the gravity or severity of the facts constituting the offence; (b) the circumstances in which it was committed; (c) the rampancy of such offence in the area; (d) the offender's previous record; (e) the offender's contribution and support to his family members; S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (f) the offenders means; (g) the effect of conviction and sentence on his job opportunities; (h) the age and health of the accused; (i) whether it is his first offence; (j) whether the accused had cooperated with the police after the commission of the offence; (k) whether the accused had pleaded guilty; (l) status of the accused; (m) whether there was violence during the crime; (n) public interest, etc.". 117) Faktor utama Mahkamah dalam menjatuhkan hukuman hendaklah mempertimbangkan kepentingan awam, tanpa mengabaikan kepentingan peribadi OKT. Mahkamah hendaklah mengimbangi kepentingan kedua-dua pihak sebelum menjatuhkan hukuman yang berpatutan. 118) Adalah menjadi pengetahuan umum bahawa kemalangan jalanraya merupakan salah satu pengaut nyawa tertinggi di Malaysia. Bilangan kemalangan jalanraya maut turut meningkat setiap tahun dan akibatnya ramai keluarga bahagia telah kehilangan ahli keluarga kesayangan mereka dalam nahas jalan raya. 119) Menurut satu laporan akhbar The Star pada 13 Jun 2023, Kementerian Pengangkutan Malaysia telah mengesahkan pada tahun 2022, sebanyak 545,588 kes kemalangan jalanraya berlaku, daripadanya terdapat 6,080 kematian. Sementara itu untuk tahun 2021 pula, sebanyak 370,286 kes kemalangan dengan 4,539 kematian. Secara puratanya, hampir 1 kematian akibat nahas kemalangan direkodkan dalam setiap 90 minit di Malaysia. S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 120) Dalam jawapan bertulis kepada soalan parlimen daripada Ahli Parlimen Kuala Pilah tersebut, Menteri Pengangkutan turut menyatakan bahawa kajian yang dijalankan oleh Institut Penyelidikan Keselamatan Jalan Raya Malaysia (Miros) mendapati kemalangan jalan raya kebanyakannya disebabkan oleh tingkah laku manusia, diikuti oleh reka bentuk, keadaan infrastruktur jalan dan keadaan kenderaan. (penekanan ditambahkan) 121) Dalam kes ini, pemanduan OKT secara merbahaya dengan kelajuan 160km/j sehingga masuk ke laluan bertentangan telah mengakibatkan dua orang mangsa yang masing-masing berumur 19 tahun dan 22 tahun meninggal dunia. Dalam kes ini, cara pemanduan OKT bukan sahaja merbahayakan, malahan OKT seorang yang tidak mempunyai lesen memandu dan tidak layak langsung untuk memandu di atas jalanraya. 122) Dalam kes ini, walaupun semasa pertuduhan, OKT hanya berumur 18 tahun dan 6 bulan, namun setelah perbicaraan lebih daripada 2 tahun, OKT kini berumur 21 tahun 4 bulan, dan bukan lagi seorang pesalah muda (youthful offender) iaitu pesalah antara 18 tahun ke atas dan bawah daripada 21 tahun, di mana Mahkamah boleh menggunakan kuasa untuk menjatuhkan hukuman mengikut S.293 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah antaranya memerintahkan OKT menjalani perintah khidmat masyarakat dan perintah lain. 123) Mahkamah sedia maklum dengan pindaan pada hukuman S.41 APJ 1987 melalui Rang Undang-Undang A1618 oleh Parlimen yang berkuatkuasa pada 23 Oktober 2020 dengan meningkatkan hukuman penjara minima dari 2 tahun ke 5 tahun dan hukuman denda minima dari RM5,000 ke RM20,000 bagi kesalahan ini. 124) Walaupun pindaan 2020 tersebut tidak berkuatkuasa ke atas kes ini, namun hasrat dan tujuan pindaan undang-undang oleh Badan S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Perundangan dan Badan Eksekutif tersebut mestilah dicerminkan melalui hukuman oleh Mahkamah. Hukuman Mahkamah hendaklah mencerminkan keseriusan kesalahan ini agar memberikan pengajaran kepada OKT dan menjadi satu peringatan dan langkah pencegahan orang lain agar tidak sesekali melakukan kesalahan tersebut di masa hadapan. 125) Dalam kes ini, OKT didapati bersalah dan disabitkan setelah proses perbicaraan penuh dijalankan dengan 12 orang saksi pendakwaan dan 1 saksi pembelaan. Oleh itu, hukumannya semestinya adalah berbeza berbanding dengan OKT yang mengaku bersalah pada pertuduhan pertama dibacakan dan dapat menikmati diskaun yang dibenarkan oleh undang-undang. 126) Dalam mempertimbangkan faktor umur OKT dan juga keseriusan kesalahan yang dilakukan, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan pemberatan TPR dan menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 3 tahun dan hukuman denda RM8,000 terhadap OKT. Mahkamah berpendapat hukuman ini tidak keterlaluan berat mengambilkira faktor mitigasi OKT dan masih dalam ruang lingkup hukuman yang dibenarkan. Hukuman ini juga tidak terlalu ringan mengambilkira kepentingan awam yang perlu diutamakan. 127) Walaubagaimanapun, Mahkamah telah membenarkan penangguhan pelaksanaan hukuman penjara dan hukuman denda tertakluk pada notis rayuan difailkan. Jaminan turut dinaikkan dari RM14000 ke RM20000 dan OKT perlu melapor diri pada setiap 7hb ke balai polis berdekatan dengan rumah OKT iaitu Balai Polis Kandang. KESIMPULAN 128) Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kesnya melampaui keraguan munasabah terhadap OKT sepertimana di dalam pertuduhan pertama S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S.41(1) APJ 1987 dan OKT didapati bersalah dan disabitkan sepertimana di dalam pertuduhan pertama ini. Mahkamah juga berpendapat hukuman yang dijatuhkan terhadap OKT bagi kesalahan pertuduhan pertama di bawah S.41(1) APJ 1987 adalah memadai, wajar dan selaras dengan peruntukan dan prinsip undang-undang. BERTARIKH 5 NOVEMBER 2023 LEE KIM KEAT MAJISTRET MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET TANGKAK Bagi Pihak Pendakwaan: Pejabat Pengarah Pendakwaan Negeri Johor Timbalan Pendakwaraya … Puan Nor Syamilah binti Jalaluddin Bagi Pihak Pembelaan: Tetuan Paul, Amy Chong & Associates No.271-G, Jalan Haruan 5/7, Pusat Komersial Oakland II, 70300 Seremban, Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus …Encik Paul Krishnaraja Puan Amy Chong S/N yRXYwYrwh02Y/p71GRllyw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	95,148	Tika 2.6.0
J-01(IM)(NCvC)-114-03/2022	PERAYU 1. ) Choo Heng Yong 2. ) Chin Siew Han RESPONDEN 1. ) PENGARAH HOSPITAL SULTANAH AMINAH JOHOR BAHRU 2. ) Jabatan Kesihatan Negeri (JKN) 3. ) KETUA PENGARAH KESIHATAN KEMENTERIAN KESIHATAN MALAYSIA 4. ) Kerajaan Malaysia	A fire broke out on 25.10.2016 (Fire) in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of Sultanah Aminah Hospital, Johore Bahru (Hospital). Six patients in the Hospital’s ICU perished in the Fire (6 Deceased Persons).The plaintiffs (Plaintiffs) in the above three suits (3 Suits) are the parents and dependents of three out of the 6 Deceased Persons. The first defendant is the Hospital’s Director while the third defendant is the Director-General of the Ministry of Health (MOH). This judgment shall refer to all the defendants collectively in these 3 Appeals as the “Defendants”.	03/11/2023	YA Datuk Wong Kian KheongKorumYA Dato' Lee Swee SengYA Dato' Sri Mariana binti Haji YahyaYA Datuk Wong Kian Kheong	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a9aa40c7-881e-4e0c-b246-0b53a28e143e&Inline=true	03/11/2023 14:58:39 J-01(IM)(NCvC)-114-03/2022 Kand. 20 S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N x0CqqR6IDE6yRgtToo4UPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal J—n1(m) (ncvc)—1u—u3/2022 Kand. 20 as/mm: 1:1 59-22 m we coon or A an ur muvsu (APFEu.AYE Jumsmcnuur asrwssu 1 Knlsxmsmv um xuppusmmmc Mu.un:<1«.mm z massvm Mr summon Mun no mm-zusup . . nrmum: Am 1. mmun mswm suI.n>4n< Altman 1 rsuauux xssumm usssrwunux‘ uamm Kssmnnu Msesm mm ;. mu. mum «mum. xsusmsmm xamm muvsm 4. «swam mum nss»-ounsms (mm. maumm. ><m.co.m.n Juhorsmlu Jamr. Maw!- Cm! Sun Nu ¢A.2< NCvc.2§-03/2o2n Barman Knuxruszvvyn/1 Kuwunmy(NR\C Nu s2oaw.uunaa> 2 Nluewun up Kiynmbon we Na. a7n:u4.u&56361 Vmnum Am 1 Few -n Hasumlsunumnwnun 2 mm» Kecmaian Nagen lehov Jab-nan Km-nan Nogamlohur a ma Fensarah xesmmn, ><.m.mn.y. xmm way» A Karalaanmalnyﬁa Dd-Mimi] sw xocrukaxnzuyﬁyltamuvv um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm menu: magma»: wvmy an we com of mm or mmm uwaurs .mIusm\|:1\|oN) g 3, am pm J-AH myncyc , aw; asvwzsn :. woo NENG vuusowc no we-mmexay 2 cm slaw mm mm: Mn. mun-1n£n<I) .. mamas mo 1. vinamm nnsvlul nuunuu mm 2. mama xssmmu uscem man mm» mmm NEEEI man : mm vznsuun xsumm, xsusmsmm xsalxnnu muvsln . mum mm» . ass-mans [M the miter .11 me Nah cam m Jew am, Jaw Mahyﬁi gnu ; ‘ Nu wcvc mmzn am..." cm. Hang Vang wmcuu smun-m.55B3; 2 Chm Sxaw Hm («me No ssaslznosum mm. Anﬂ mam awn-1 Sunur-In Amman my-.n xgmm mm mm Jabalan x..mm mm Jana Kelul Pwvnn Keswmrzn‘ Knrmnunan x.m.y. mum «gm-an Man-ysu o4m.nu1 sw xocrukaxnzuyﬁyltamuvv um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm m. s...g.pm my» cum can nlwung Nong Yoy 5 Mar v mu: Pwloemorﬂsasj 1 um 55; .: 557. La! Klw mm mm \|nll0n1Ivl1 lull am arm. than slnnapar-‘s mm of me supremo cum umm: [slngspnnll ~-mm.“ III: mu...:..:y nu. mms: m. aumsmn cl nnrsay evidovvcc‘ omm my. 5 Rsc zsmgapm; :; unum In nur may 41 ru): 4 ac om: 4v rulc am Inn 4:; ac mm. 4 lxzupllmu whlnln ... mum: my cormlln heuny evwdenca, nunery when moms an -pm-nan alllra Voﬂowmg. 1.; Omar Vlrure 212; RC my Orusrvlru/s 6(2]RD In) Ora-rum!-SIZJRC and «:1 3 Court may has new mm Md" own as m». 341; no" (emphasis added), and (2) me nemaanxs 3 smug om Appucauans are “tnlstiocumry proceedings“ within the muamng 010 41 ( 5(2) no Then 3 Appeals emznah from me Defendants‘ 3 smkmg om Appucauons Consequenﬂy, premued on Ten! Corporation we may apwy o 41 v 5(2) ac read mm 1 4 an m lake lulu account lhe mmenls cl Dr senanudaaan-s amdavh m mesa 3 Appeals We furlher my an ma voumnq mdgmenls m we HC - 1;) m Daluk Amlr Kahnr bin run Haj‘ Musunha v Tun Mohd Said hi Knnuk 5 on [1994] 3 Mm 737, to n N xoo.1.amuzm,\|r..,4up, mm Sum In-nhnv WW he .15.. m van; M m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VII mum puns! dalsvmina In Ippluznnn «a nuke em a mm Ahdu!Kan1Iv Sulamun J (as he man wa57 had adrmllsd an mam pursuant to o 41 r 5(2) RC According to Daluk Amlv Kahlv, zip 741 In 742- “Thu ddilndnnu‘ mm-nan r: umtw a u r 1910(1), in mud Id] mm mm. at m NM: cam mu rm. mac) and undu mu mnmnuumatczvon ur me cowl. n. ppllclﬂan ls suppanod by an Mdnvlr cl Wong Klan Knoorly nllmmd an 7 sop:-mu mu rm um nﬁdlvil mnrsiy nfuu In mm I/ﬁdnvvll-In-nply of ma dofond-wt: mm as room: In rat nmmm mlln npnlitnllon m the on'grn.n'»a summons. Ensed on mos: nmamwm-Mn Inn mom: mvry bolrcvu am 291- angmunn summam of me pmmm discloses no ruionahh cm. 4:! Action mm: all or my or Inn uofnndanu, and/or 1: mum-m, rmrm, vexukm: an!/oi I: an abusl n! ma Pious: M m. court. In oppaamun to ma uprlcnuen ol an dclnndanls. tn- plalnllll mun u. .-maul: m nppalltlnn amrlmd on n son:-mm an In 29.. aﬂldnvll In annosruan at m- vl-mmr, ne an-mm Me prvpwy or man nmmmamply nicrvld to hy 2». dlponlnl of m- mmn m supp-m or w: lPnU¢a1lon, smu mun nlﬁdnviu .2 mm M m. mi!/having cl ma anulnaung summns wan am Mon mm for nanny. 5:, the mvmedme issue which all: Io: . doclsfan ls wnunu ma apuuuuon on an dtlondamls Hui-can 1.. um um of mu nnmn al an .«mm In sum»-x. am: 45 I 1: am not mu out mu ruqulrvmlnt u! my .m4.m ». support 91 an nppﬂcallnn rm: )5 m/mu: hum an apphcﬂlrm main mm o :4 mm by r 2m memo! m. applmutmn mus! 11 be men by Kwnmons nuppc-mu by an amdawl Simﬂaﬂlf wun an uwlnrulron mIﬂIrO 51, mm: by mm mlluuﬂ an arrmm >5 rsawwd for me annmuon Agam, an Buphcaban undov a 49 r 2 m rammed In he supamlaa or an amdavu Svmdaw wnn an apmmalrnn under o 50 r J. wlvzle 1n. apalvcmmn mm. sIl\|7D01lzdbyunsRaavIl ra cuts ye: anolhsrinrm uiapohcanon rs an apohcahum under o 23 r 1r2/ at m. 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(1; “Iurthsr svtdem:s' much u mended to he used by in appucann mapllcnmp m -menocunory appucanons m me CA [Funhnv Evidence (lnlaerloculary on Applicniunll‘ (2) “lunher evidence‘ which mended tn be when an by an Apphcanl in me heanng m an apueal m the CA [rumm- Evldencl (Appum but me Funhﬂ Emence (Appeal) my name we being me: me heanng m me H!)/Subordinale Conn (Subuquanl Evldence). and u sw xno-uksxnibyﬁyltamuvv -um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm 13) Fwlhsr Ewdenee mppeax) was avaﬂahle la me Appﬁcanl at me (ulna af me heamvg m we HC/Submdinatz Cuun bu\| was nut adduced m me HO/Subordinate com (Exitllnl Evldonco) 21 we 1(3A)RCA my a\|lnws“(uI1Ils/avrdem>e'(o be admmed al Ihe “Ilssrmg 0/ ms appear -1 me «duawmg Mo wndmcns are samsned cumulamexy by me Apphaaln (2 Condition: [r 10;“) (1) me mm olthe 2 Condmuns [r 7(3A)] (1-- (land an 1: mm)» 15 provided m r7(3A)(a) RC and has Ivm aksmalwe nmbs, namew 43) the -runner ewde:-ca’ wit not muame Io me Apphcam ac the Ilearmq In me Hcrsuomdmane Cmm [1-I All-rnalivu Llmh (1-- condmnnu The 1-‘ Ahemahvs I7 11" Cnnduiunj concams Subsequent Evmence‘ or my me 'Iurmsr awdsnmr exmsa ac me nunng In and HC/Subordinate Cmm but was na\| avaﬂable \|a the Appllcanl despite me exemse av veasanahle dﬂigenoa by me Apphnant {2'- All-nutiu Limb (1-I Condlﬂonll The 2~ Ahemalwe Limb A1“ Cundmnnl men In Exnslsnt Evidence. 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(a) would have had a aalan-mnlng inﬂuence upon ma declslon cl ma no/sulmmlnala own [I'' Altnrnnllvn Limb lz"-1 Cundlﬂom]. or lb) would have been Ilxely Co have a uelenn-nlng lnlluanoe upon lne aeclslpn el me HOSubamlna(e Court [zu- Altunniva Limb la" Cnnd an]] 22 Rule mix) RCA only apphes \|a Flmhev Evldence (Appeal) and ml to Funher Evidanca1lntarIL7cu\|uly CA Appllcallon) Aceonllngly. lna llnsl pen of a selzl cu am (he flrsl pan or r 7(2) RCA allpw an Appllcanl lp use runner Evidence (lnlevlcculary CA Appllcauon) wllhoul any leave cl CA 2: ll is cleav lnal Y 713A) non applies la Existeru Evlpenpe and an Apphcanl can unly dlschsrge lhe burden lo pelauaae lne CA (L: glam leave lo aﬂmn lne Exlslenl Evidence al ma hearing 01 me appeal -n CA v me 2 cenalllans [r 1(3A)] ale aallalleu cunullzllualy 24 rue quesunn lnal anaea I5 wnemar Y ma) RCA apphes la sllpaeqllenl Evldance ln me CA case or sln Hnp Ln-Mmnenl St!!! and v vlp shou slun [2005] l MLJ 515 » (1) Mnkhlar Sidln JCA deﬂverad the 2-l malonly aeclslon [MnJmlIy Judslrmnt lsln Hun Lie-Maruhonij] as lpllewa al [10] \|u [12] nnd [15] la [la] 7 ‘[142] m am, In! In: lpplinllmn to n nllnwnd ill: Jpplliant had m may m. Lumillmns -1 mm In pm lw. rnu. l.I na mm In my nl/mt that mm m- wvllam umnploa to nroducc Wu . ﬂlPDlnIng an.’ m. mu )6 SN xDCﬂ§R5\DE5yFV\|Yap4UPV V we Sum ...n.. wm a. used w my ..a ann.l.y an; dun-mm VII mane W m; At mm mm urlllr, 2». lppuﬂlnl zurrcldad m.: an ..a.:.»c- Irnandad to be zdduced my not nuur won tho ma! 12/ away mu mat. n uccwnd rung arnlrllu mr In an mun Cam my my. concluded. u I: clear In me mn ma avldlncc rnxumu 2.: n. aﬂduud m In mm: a! In mumm tang um: um lncldlnl and if!!! m. mu. TN: nwvencu was m. aullablllxy oi-Iv Allnmlllvu um. road tn 1):: responmrs ram: long arm mu Mal Ialmocl my yen: mu m rupwldcnt nu illod mu pnunt Imun). I: vs char in ms nu: evklmce was not my not ayauanu al ml Yhe second nu: u muted by Dar: «A; Is that m. Hm mam. r1lnll.WuuIH n. . m or vmuld luv: bun llnly to my: . ummrnrny Inﬂuence upon me decision or m my» com 1751 1: Is cloarlmm the um um me mm evidence that m. appallant nmnm 1.: mm mum m an m. anumpﬁon mu m- nmmd loyal or an mm mum bv brought down nu: ma. wn nu .ua...;. um um um m. This -numpdon was hand on em rm mil mu. wu- sum: umwum on ma ritpnnuynllx ma Ind m. Idlmnirrs land. may those oarmwonts, mo HFBN/an! ulumod that ran mpmom llrvd amid a. «mum the olive: nelvhhauriuv hifiaininv lot which was to be muapea mm In y-rx ma 2»: rupovd-m n-'1 ﬁl-d am: mm. an my vinw, mos: has my: naming u: do mm m aamay-s mm--1 by rm mponom To mm In .u.m.m. mud to Ms mm was the respamenrs my nation In mm ma upun-um am 4:! N5 ma not In urlgmll mm mu! M Dunn dulroyud [151 m lgpnﬂlrn m mu! .mu.m m ugly nfﬂrmld ny smug cmn Chem on 1: Juryma cormrmod. my vm. mu! 1». ipplmlnun m ndducl Iruh mam. val my in mike an lssummion andassenwn as mm «mm «ax m; m my mtnisis nun-wanna: um anlyln nmmmton wen rm -up-um mm mm: «my me am. n. my vlaw, mm 1.1 no hull evtdmcz m m: an»4I=a2«on.u:I [151 1;. my vluw, m. .,.p::=.u.». am not lllsly the condmoni /mm-.1 by r 7 IRCAI. For In: rulun, or mujnﬂfy dnclllnn, wu dlsmlssld m. lppllclllan ny tin -manna‘ (mar-asas added)‘ and 12) Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA (as he men was) delivered me foHA7wmg dlssenlmg magmem [Dlunmlng Judgment (Sin Hun L Mnvuhonl)L at [73] to {as}- ‘mr mu -pnunmn -nun:-.1. an Hour: olmucfun, Inr mm ‘In in: mm ma! luv: u nu--ury: lo mmu rum-r avmnnzi n. my .pp..:. 11.. lunn-I .w.1em was as to 4 mam! mu mama arm mu m- or 1». mmon or m. ﬂlgh Cuun nu tar: as. nnmlly, tvldancn HI .x2...;m emnwolks that won army canm out on m- mpermm um um. n wn cl ma, wauld bnnp down an ‘plntlwm 1:-my M the mm. The mam pumon oltne tvhimcn was to plvw mm mm would nu Inngav n. lny nu-d 2.; conumcl - rat-Wnv war! 2.: nublrrn the wake of mu rnpnnﬂant’: mm an Inn :1 . mlllnmg will m. um uaulmd, mm In ms! muld M av-my Induced ‘due In mu 1: ol rum manna: 4w-rum ol sail)’. so nu ma rnmmnutafi dimJ9\I would mzw nntbu .. much .u my Rum mmmn In-1 wns mama 1741 m mpumm appluld m. -lppllrltlun. In his .mum: n. mx-nu-4, nmcnn mm tniws, that m. r-com urmwoﬂti am not mm III: n-Inn: Ind canngmuan a! ma um, um it i: not nemlissfhle to ask ma meuau cam w rusun ﬂlmlgu mu n. . bun pruplriy nuussd .: mg my um um. In my mm, the evidence mm to nmry um um cnndmnru far It: rlzupﬁun lundusload m. mm candlﬂons 2» be mm that may be drawn mm Ir nw Ru) 1751 w. mm: m ﬂnllnllnn mm commenclnv to hair mu mm: It wu alunnua by . mnjmvry dnclslun wvllmm 1: mn: mmod cmmnl Io! ma nsnondunl. r was mm vm, mu nurlng m. mbmllslun aim: .pp.::.m rumm zclmsnl m: not mm: the ommmny to Mar mu submission of ma nsponaonxk ll-mad mu-un mu m. nsl rnn cannon oi me am»: Amt nc-puan av Iunnu Iwdoncc for clvﬂappllls (a m. Cuurt nrappur f1 dull mm In . HIE./AI my I: 15 um fmm mm 12: um u m. mum lwdmzl 7: u 2., mum mum um occumd um me mlsron -malea from, n my a. glvnn 1;. my an my luv: u rvquma. m. glvvny nliurmuv uvidmze .5 to put- declxlon mmen‘ rs a mam! ur rlghl u vs -1.14: c u mm. m. ward: m. u m mltlurs muq...m .. .rm...aw. ma 1:; ma: mo rldulnnmm or lpocul wo-um um ar 1; luv: mu down ny rm sub-5 do nazappty Ia Dos!-chclslon mums ma; am: an m. was ‘Appeals to ma cm: or App r mu o. By way at rvnunng, Ind m million In such lypIllS' in nab-5 m, the whoh ol 5 u, .u m m n4b—uv.1(oru 1:! re. Inn, mm my ulgnz nmmmm dvWu:rvce.1, rrvmlund in r wzcu. mu ﬁve sub-sections mommy um Ilvn pm; on». rm: 1;. um. um: urdur. m urm air 1 wt: Mzourse the same u em or: :9. 45 hr .u putdvemnn mm... ... mmm-a, m. qwmq of man: wldcncn Is: mule! arm: pa: mm a provision of .n An 12! p.m.m.m mm nal bu rt-omclud In subsldllry liwslallcn, because me re onasmunx will a. mm, ... um, um nu rm nrlnoncu, M. u tum oflls own. Runovo IL and mu law A: still mm in an Act Furtmr, n m. Io-nnn¢1manH.I mm nmamauan. m. maﬂtlicntinn Vs um: vlns and lnolhcuvn D-cauu n -vekr 2.; Huh mudlilclﬁnn m m. law tnmugll .uammy lrqislntfnn in In no. that Pamam-nx has «mm: iol, mu... m pawn In mnmiy 1. lxprnnly glvnn Dy Flrmmunl. The modiﬂc-ﬁon mu mmnvy am arms mu m menmln-nt mllv nrmpugnnnl m m. pmvu/an .- nnntlud by Pmlnmenl. and subzfdmy /eylsmvon Is mam». or dn/ng mu /ea} mm :9 any .u can bonus: In nu r 1 ms Jmervdod bylnlmﬂuclng m. Iulmwmg par: {u}: M rm .. Inc pmynnh mu Vmsminnod arm: in mmmm mm mu mm sandman: in 9. 112111114 1: Impolu rllmzlmru m... m. uutnd mm. mum. mo rrqulremem In pm 11:; mu am now evmnnco woufd zn (awn roosmzn wmu IN mi mum nr APPEAL or umvsn u nun-s musuucnam clvn. u- azrwszw 4 Muulmov All. mmuuvxmuc Nu I1n1a:-02515!) 2 mumuum ms smmme mm: no Izmmluw) .. »9sLLmvs Am: 4. rzueam uosP1nL mum z new-um xaumuu «scam moon mum Kismnnu Miami JONDR :. mu. psmm xzsmmu, xzmamzmn K£amAm4 Iuuvsu ¢ xsmmu uumm xsspouusxts [M m: mallswfllaa Hm cm m Jmmrﬁivm mm Mahm- cmxsunna mr2uNcv<>2sasI2n2n Bamaen Munundylll K:m1uamHNR\c Na a7aw:—Dz—57M7) 2 MunumnuhlIpS.In1MuvW(NR\C Nu 7:nz1Ms»5s1a1 Fmnmli Ann Pewavuw ms»-m Swan-h mm Plrwavah Keswnatan Ntgay1.!nMv,1ahzIan mum" N-9-«mu KIN: Famgaran Knmmzn Kuvventnmn Kumntznm-Ways: Knralaan mum Devendnnbl coma: LEE swzz szma, .mA mmnu mm mm. Jan wens mm xuzous, JCA 3 sw xocrukaxnzuyﬁyltamuvv um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm nave ms: or would Mu bun Iﬂroly to um nm a dntxrmfninytnﬂunnci on the decnslon um was mad-. mm mm ma 4-» ‘aura mpg-st max nmnu wrdonu would -mly he Allowed :5 to mmers rn exlslonu mm 2»- d-cmon, mama P'W‘ou:1.Y mm... maam u M pun- dlnlalon mutton was nl)owed,:m1u mmuua 1:21 ma mwu mug:-v mm by pm mu MV- not am. mm (9 s 61 Since pm «A; seeks to am to r 7. and um: 1 has no lxl.:l4n:n,II1- mm. nUL\| own, um I: m-rlly an am or 5 n, r (W 75 ncrnlny mare mu M ulelvlbl by -unaramy V-glslltlnn In mnﬂlly . 5:. ma lﬂumpl u ulln vlns hocausn subsidiary I-gmamm I5 rm aapawa nl mndlfylny in Au 1:! Pnmamlnl. Ilrclpl Dy «mu numarily on-amamm, wnrcn am not ammu- Iaaj I war :3! ma mw. mmrm, ma: 1 as 1: mil nﬁedad ny Dan M and further mama. as to pen- docmon mum my mm B: gnrul, And a. of right. rnamm, mevely 1.1 . rmamy in distal my -man, Vuvo mum 175 Man lo mu lPpI4I-rm to 9.... ma mm» moans. ml! may mm 2.: give. me quamm :2! ns warm and a col mum DI minors to M carllrdund m m. -aneunsarr“ (emnham added! 25 m mu mew, leave oi CA IS um req-men lav Subsequenl Evidence because Ihe secann pan of 5 69(2) CJA (z~- Pan 1- 59(1) cm) sud me second pan L71 r 7(2) RCA (2"- rare [r 712) RCA]) havn expIess\y auuwea smasequam Emanoe us be used an me neanng ol appezk wvlhnut any weave MCA In Hus vegans- (1) me Mamrily Judgment (Sm Huap Leememnenu had memxssea me avnlmauon lor weeve or c»: to addnoe “(urfhsr emencr on me around nu: ma ippﬁcahon vms based on an “essumpIIan' and (here was nu ‘further evidence’ «.2 be adduced at lhe hearing 0! me apyaa m mal can Furmemme. me Mammy Judgmunl (Sm Heap Lee-Maruhem) am not discuss me 2"‘ Pen [5 6912) cm em 2'»! Pan [r n2) RCA]: and 12) we take the Dnwrwmly la appnws me Dlssenlmg Judgment (Sm Heap Lee.Memeem) men can be suppmled by me «euewmg reasons » (a) awarding In 5 2(1)(e) ov me Inmvpretanon Acls 1943 and 1967 (IA). Pan x IA avnhes la RCA neceuse RCA are made me: 31.121963 pursuant Ia CJA when has been vevised under me Rewsxan cl Laws MI was seeuen 23(1) VA on Pam IA) Dmvvdas M the uocmne 01 um wres asfollowa: “Any subsidiary agar-rm’. mu 1- mmmm with m At! rumuwng Inc 4.: urvdur men n. mum", Vngulnnon was me.) man e. vent tn rm nmm cl u..:m.....1.,.ey.‘ (emphasis added) The apphnallun L715 23(1) IA has been exwamed by Mohd. Zawawi Salleh FCJ m we Federal Cuurl we) use ov Pihak serkum Tauhnib Majlit Porbamurun 22 IN xno-ukaxnzuyﬁylremuvv we sew ...m.mm be used m mm ms mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] nﬂuNG pm sobcnng Perai a. Anor V Muxildi Illukhhr [mu] 1 cu Lz([81].ask1ll:1ws “[511 m: cm: matsubsrdlary or H-Voyuml rogmanan mu not be bruder man in: onabllrrg Iogluallnn. YNI glnural pnnclyll u! nllulary intorpnallon I5 eodmod m s 2: nu " lempnlsls added), and an RCA are made under s 17 CJA I! r 713A) RCA apphet to Subsequent Emuenoa, Hus means r may RCA Is \ncons\s\|an\| mm the 2"“ PIr1[5 69(2) CJA] and lay Wine 01 1 23(1) vx, r mm RCA us van in the extent 0\| such an mccnsmency 26 As explamed m the suave paragraph 25, by reason arms 2'“ Pan [5 s9(2) CJA] and 2"‘ Pan [r 712) RCA], me Plamnm do not lemme reave of the CA \a use Dr sawahuadeenrs amaavn m these 3 Appeals F. Should CA gum “X, 19: Pliméffs to Ina Dr. Se\|ihuddnon'I yngavn in a Aggalﬁ 27 Noawnnscanumg om apmpn m my above parigviph 25. we are 5! me mew mac ma Plaintiﬂs have sansnaa me 2 commons [r 7(3A)] as (allows (1; me 1-1 Anemame Limb 11“ Common) 15 (umuea because Dv. salanuaueervs amdavn was not avaﬂuble to me Plamums mmng me heanng ov me Delendams‘ 3 sm mg OmApp\|IcaI\ons‘ and 2: IN xmzqqﬁawnzuyﬁyttamuﬁy -ma saw ...m.mm be pg... m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! 12) as sxmamed wn parigrinh as helm me comsms M Dr Se\ahuddeen‘s amaavn would have been llkely \|a have a dalermlnmg mauem an we 3 HC nacismns In mhev wmds‘ me 2"‘ Allernanve Limb 12"‘ Cundmon) has been taxisﬂed by me Plainmfs Franused on me above reasons, ma F'\|ImMIs' 3 Leave Apphcahons (Dr. SeIahuddeen's alﬁdavﬂ) an answer: by ms cmm wnnom any ovdsv as to costs 5. wh-um noun can Igglx guitzhle enoggl doctrino with Egzrd In Thne-Vur Linn Ian Furiod 28 The Tmse»Vaav Lmmanon Pernod us vrwldad In s 21:) PAPA wmen reads as lollows -2 wnm, mu m. coming Ame fart: nrmu AL: lny MIL acllvll Drosszutron or om-r pmcudlng :. cnnlmuvcud in m. Fnd-ntiun -mm myneuon an: my m dune rn Wnunnce or cxecumzn or Irmmua lxocullnn a1 Iny mm». law III 1:! my puhlrr my a. numurify or m mam alnny «mm mm or datum m the mcuuon of any such mm... 1..., may or mm mm rmwmg pravlslnns sin!/luv: mm (3) me man. man, Prowcunorv or pmuedmg mu not 1.. nr o. .mm.a unlsu n u cammnncnd mm. 70-57:: moms nu! -rm rm cu. Mglurt or ac!-uu comnllmod 1:! or, m me use pr . mnnnuunce a/mju/Y ar mum wvlnm mmw manllvs net! am: my clnsmg (h¢Iunl' (emphasis added) 24 N xoo-uksxnibyﬁylramuvv um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm 29 In Alma Yamplnlon a. On v Law Val Hnldings Sdn Ehd a. Ann: [1999] 2 ML.) 202 Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he man was) has exnlained m me HC man a defendant may be snapped lrom remng on a nmmon devenoe pvovlued by me umnanon Ad 1953 (LA), n \s dec ed m Allmd Tnmplulon‘ al p 244 M7 245‘ as lulluws ~: mint lully zcnsrdu um." ..n. In ulnp an-ull um 11! m. Llmltutmn m m xou Nanny V was cmng Kmﬂw mm Lmmu1Ac u may Mu 45, . name” 1:! Inc pm Cuuncll Imm m. mm Federal Court of Marayxla. m a ran av mmyvmms, mm Lon1.IMp.I um mm an statute: which, vrouyh dwlarfnﬂ m..cum m 1.. .4.....;.»a...:. nr .,.,..:, ... nevennelass rm! .m:-my pmmouory and so do nu! pncludu .m,,...r. On mm. a: 1:... .. m. smut- »: mm I-we Mlmphrru V Numnrmes mm 2 KB 5:1 :4 m wmm .: ma nu mm conndlnd mu the shunt om: m n. mm: as regular/W pmcldun, rml .. ...m..g .2 usnntlll vnlldllm .. . mun am: 1:51 u. may Is to :5): mm.’ m. raw m.:....m.m. me wanna an n. am. .. ,.,.,.....x. mm puucy 2.: which m. noun mutt pm rm: In 2». .m.«..: :1 m. Wm punluﬂy 9. lam! nzrlnn .7: 2». Dublin, mun. any rules or ovmcnco if mm... u.......m. mu m. pnmu mly a... cum by m... canducl or oumwm mu wold: arv wmuly arm. Ind Juggul mu m Lmumlon Ac! run 31!! vny la oslogpel. rmma, mm tn mm In fumuvmn y Wu! Nlm CorpnrItmrl[1D5(7]2 KB M507 2 K5 209 2; which uyye-x mu . an!-mtlnl mu rm! :2. mm tn My an . mm. ofltmv Hon Imls acts arslatomoms during m. mmm nllhopulod nnw mam. m. plllnﬂﬂtu u.:.y pmmamg. And, rn amm... 1 Anal v Mo:-1197212 ML.I15s any c4 um sumo: al mnnmm M...» an 1». ..:m....m 01 . ngm ny action ..a me: of Dmcednm only: see 24 Nusaury. Llws at 5...... my Eu; P m . right which meme. unenfemubfe merely ny recson ul Unmatlan u... no! [pun hm parish ar mm. Inln mm .11. a. helmet v cmnu mm] 1 wm ass whom n nu. mm mm .41....» um... . ms; .1 m. ummuon Act 1m, aman of mum. lnm-st mntllndlrvg 1.. man u... .1. yams ... :...m...m. by um, um manmws mu or-ry ommod la n. uzumou rvmuﬂy .1 mdumpllon pruvvd-d that my am .0 uvenrs or mnyay: mm.-., wmnu mm blmd or m N, .. m mu 5..., .q.n.u. rvynl: am not new.» by mass. or nmmmm, an 015 Sam: ﬂoluncn n. ..: up n... n. my 2». am. at . honeflclar own! to be granted Ms mm to me /29»! am so 1.. .s mly n. Maury. I mum mm: m: baled an Mes: mu. m. Llmllallan Act :. pululy pruzodunl: ... um»... um Amar V ma 119721 2 ML1 15: um uIMVcholl v mm: smnunnv Co Ltd mm 2 us my 1m. And, mm“, 1.. an... urcumxtlncls, an. an eslap Mosul! om mm mum. Act by conduit " (emphasis added) sw .ooaq>wnzay»=.ur..,4up. Nut»! 5...‘ IHIVVDIY WW .. .5... .4 mm .. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII .mm mm an 31. 32 33 The abave declswon m mm: Tlmpllmn has been appnwed by the FE m the lollawlng judgment dehvered by Gopal sn Ram JCA (as na men mu) m Eoulund Tmilng usns) Sdn Bhd v Arab- Mnmann Morchnm Bunk and 1199514 cu 253‘ n: 294 "saw mu». n. 1, 1-: M an-n ms) In In ruunmunv /udymlnl In Ylmlllltun y. Law m ﬂnldlrrgt sun. and. [ass] 2 mm 201 m apmm mg doclnm In . mm nnu mun: inman lo pmrtnl a ﬂuhndnnt rmn rulylrlg upnn ma pmvlsluru aim! ILA] ' femvhasxs added) The Phrase my person lorany act done In pursuance oraxeeuwn ur Intended sxscuﬁorv 0/ any wrmen w ar 0/ any puzm duly nr numonzy m m rsspecl or any alleged rveglanl or aerau/r In the execurmn many such wnnsn /aw, my maumont;/' In 5 2(3) PAPA rere-s to any person we perlorms a wnllen lnw. public duty and/or public aumamy For ease ol convenience‘ .n this ‘udgmem we wvll describe me pelsun envisaged m s 2(a) PAPA as 2 ‘uublic oﬂrcsf We are unable (:7 «no any prevxoui Malaysian case much has decided on me appncauon ol me docmne of sq-nnahxe esﬁcphm m a puhm: omcer who has relveu on me Three-Yes! Llmnahon Penna m s 2137 PAPA u is our view mac — (1) a publsc alﬁner (X), and 2: (2) me Fedara\ Govemmcm, sme Government or pumu: aulhmm’ Aulhomy) whn ts vu:aneus\y liable for (Governmenwu x‘: am. umlsslnn and/arconducl may be esmpped by any 5\a\|emeM and/ov conduct by — (a) X, on a pubhc ofﬁoer nlhsr man x (V), and/ur (c) suuemmem/wumn: Aulhorw lvam re\ymg on me Three«Year Lmmamon Penud The abwe mum suvnoned by me Mlawmg reasons’ (I) ma Three-Year Llmﬂahon Penod is a procedural delanm and no! a subsuarmvs ans There may be a slatsmenl and/nv mndud by x‘ v and/or Government/Publvz: Authomy whrch makes m meqmtable «or x and/or Gavarnmanl/Publu: Aumorky (o rely on me ThreeVear Limnanon Period. on Alma nmpmon Ind aousmn mama have recugmaed me appmauan ai me dncmne mi equuame eslnppe\ «a bar a panys vshanoe an 2 Ivmtatiun defence pmsuam \|n LA Theve is nu veasun m prmclyla and palm, why aqmcable e5lopp€\ doclnne cannot be Invukarl agﬁmst Public amcau and/or sovemmenr/Puonc Amhonlv m rewecl of the Tme-year Ltmllahon Pemd: am 2: 35 (m m acwldanue mm good uubhc governance‘ puhluz Mﬁoers and Gevernmen\|IPuhhc Aumamy should not mike smemems and/av canduct \|hemse\ves m a manner wmah may cause any person to he mepmmy plqudwced Was man a lrilbln um. um Dclsndznli wm ulnggd bx Summontl Dr. solahuaalnlnr. Aman vrom nl u on num- Llmltlllon ad? m these 3 sum, mars Is a (mole mus ragummg whe1her me Defendnms are eslupped by Statements (Dr Sslahuddm/DI Aman) «mm rerying on me maawear Ltmllaﬁan Penod (mam. Inn") The Tnable Issue xi mpponsd by the Vullnwmg evxdenoe and reason: (1) me nc was lonned by MOH and was headed ray 3 rained JCA The Plamtiﬂs knew al ms rarmanon N no am as mqmry, (2) at the maIeria\ lime. Dv Se\ahudmn and Dr Amun were the Jnhnre State Nsamw Dlremm and Haspnars vector rssps1:\|rva?y. In mher mm‘ Dr sawammuin and Dr Aman hs¥d man was m MOH an meume ollhe maxmg enne Smemem: my Sela)-mddm/Dv Amnn), (3; me S(alamanIs1Dv Selahuddin/D7 Aman) weve made In the ramny Members (6 Deceased Persons) 3\| me Meelings Minutes (Meetings) had been prepared by MOH n \s merevme dear me: me Statements 10: Sehhuddxn/Dr Aman) weve made In me course of mg empluymem or Dv Selahuddm and 29 sw xno-uksxnibyﬁyltamuvv -um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm up Aman The slalamenls (Dr Selanuddlrllﬂr Aman) were no: made w9Hhe—cufl wimnul any lrllarltlnrl by me Delendanls Io be no-um by Ike slalamanu (Dr Salahuddln/Dr Amanl and (4) any reasonable clalmalll ln me woman oﬂha Plalnlllls who had been Informed M me smemenls (Dr Selanudliln/Dr. Amanbl would be lulled mm a lalsa pl onmplarerlcy la llle a sull -«er ma pruparatmrl 01 ma ll<:'s Repon and aller me lapse 01 me Thre>Vear Llmilatlorl Plrloli In mm won1I,Ihs Plalmiffs did not ﬁle me 3 Suns WI m the was-vear Llmllallon Period because ma vlamulls had yelled on me slalen-ems (Dr Selahuddlrl/Dr Aman). ln lms sense‘ n ls alguable that the nelemams are eslopbad by ma Statemenls lm Selahuddlrl/Dr. Amanl [ram lelylug on me Thrac-:»Vaal nanorl Parlod lo supper! me Deiendnnls' 3 Slrlkmg oul Appllcancrlt consequenlly. me oumenls ol DY 5a\aVluddeen's alﬁuavn would have been hkaly up have a “deIumll'rllrlg Inﬂuence’ on me 3 HC neclslona wllmn me meanlng of me 2"‘ Allematlve p lzw Corldillan) as ln vlew arms maple lssue — (1) n ls up: a plain and Dbvlnus case luv me H!) to strike om Ihe 3 Sulls - please refer lo we Judgmenl M me Supreme Cowl uelwem by Mom Dzaluam SCJ la: he man was) in Bandar aulluu sun arm a. on v Unlnd Malayan Banking Carper-lion and 11993} 3 ML] 35, an -as, l2) ma 3 sulls are neﬂher hlvalnus nor valiuous wnlun me maanlng pro 18 r19(1)(\|1)RC, and 30 IN xDCﬁ§RKlDE5yRv\|Yap4UPv -mp s.n.l n-vlhnrwm be up... w mm ms mm-y MIN: ﬂan-mm VI] arlum pm cwounns or JUDGMENT A. Imvodunllgn 1 Tha above mree appeals (3 Appelln) use a navel queshon 01 whether me Federa\ eovemmm um Duf-lldlnl) may he emppea by stalamenls made by‘ among amers‘ Johore Stale Hem Dvectur mi Dolundanv.) hem re\ymg on me lmse~yeav «mnamm period (mm-vur Llmitalion Plrind) pmweed m s 212) 01 me Public Aumevmes Pmtzclmn Am 194: wrap. a. Elclxground 2 we shah relarlo palllas as they wave nu ma Hugh com me) 3 A me luck: out on 25102016 (Fin) In me Vnlenuve Cale Uml ucu) arsuuanan Ammah Haspna1,.Ienare Bahru moapnal) 4 sux pananls m me HaspI\|al's mu perished m me Fire (6 naeund Furious) 5 The plmmms (Plainlilfih m the above three mils (3 sum) are me panams and dependenls anhrae cute! me e Deceased Persons 5 The ﬁrs! defendant is me Hospital‘: wecoov wvme me we dedandanl Is the Dweclnr-General 0! me Mmuscry av Heaun (MON) Tm: wdgment snau uelena all me delendans cnI\ec\|lva\y m mese 3 Apvﬁals as me “D¢fendanh" 7. Ana: the Fwe‘ MOH lnrmed a sevelunemher Vmiepsndsrll Inquiry Camrnmes" In mqulre m\|u me cause 0! the Fire arm to make me o aw xooeqﬁswnztvyﬁyttmawﬁy ‘Nata Sum ...m.. M“ be used m van; me m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VIZ mum ma (3; me 3 Sulls do um cL7ns\|llule abuse: cl cwrl proceas as underslood in 0 1K r 19M ml) and o 92 r 4 no \|\| is lo be born: m mm I1la\|evanlVa pleaded clalm IS weak and ls nal llxely to succeed, the us nol a ground m usell \|l: s1nks am the clalnl ~ sumraulla-r sun slm, al p 44 In any evenl, me Trlable Issue can urlly be les/ah/ed at a vial and me: by way cl afﬁdavll avldence I Shuuld Plan «in: In allowed up lmend me Blahmant: :1! cl m soon 37 0 ‘K o 2 r l(z) and 0 15 v 95(1) RC Dmvlde as lulluws ‘o M In aanumu-my mm Rulcs, mo Cowl nr . Judge mu nun mm to me nvomvlrlv lnlonrt ollusm nnd nnl only (-2 m. lncnnlcnl nan-carnplllnzu mm mun Ruin c 2, 1121 rm. mm are a Droeedlml made me subleu in ma onmdlny an/mm cl emu"; m. Court to dual mm uni /my m Plrvlts m Iwulm: to users: the Cam! in mum mu uvlmdmq aﬂjiclun o 18r1P(7I me Cour! my u my sure am. mmalm nrdlr tn 1:. mm nut ur umm any prualng M M: uldornnmlz or any wm ln me mm, nr anyway in my pl-ndmn arln rm .m:m.m.n; an m. gmurrd MIL la; H melons no Iuasonabln cause of lclmn W nclsnce, as Illa saw may De, la; it is aundalous, Ilivolous or vezuuous, zl N xDOﬁ§R5lDE6yRv\|Yap4UPv we Sum mm. WW he HSQG m mm we nllmrullly MIN; dun-mm VII .mm mm vs; rrmay are/um, embarrass or near me mu m/ .1 me mm (a; n I: om-rwiu In mu: 0! um mm. cl um com um mly mun! um. mm. In a. mm or aumrma nrludgmuvl to an mxenunccomrngrx as In use m-y an (emphasis added) as n Is deemed by me He m vup Ch Koong Halrllnna sun Bhd v Buamupulllan Amu. Sdn ams{2o221e cm 754‘ an [ea], mat the com net ma lalluwmg ﬁva dmcrellonaly powers under 0 1a rI9(1) ac ‘(:91 m courl nu ma vouowlng live mmemn-rr P°we:i Dursunnl In a m am RC 11; the cam! my am. am a nlsndmy, nmdarsumsm‘ an n plnamlvg, an um ur counlomratm. :2; m. mun mly um... . pm, 2.: um; . pludlng endorse/vvanlon apisadmy. um armunlovdarm‘ 13/ the mun may say an mm orcuummclnml‘ N we cam may mmmn aclmn anmmmm W 15} we court may emer aludamont m an anlmn ar wunlemmm ‘ (emphasws added) as In accordance mm 0 1A and o 2 r 142) Re, HC's discreﬁanaly Dcvwers nummu to c 15 r 19(1) RC should be axamsea mm regard Io Ihe ovemamg mbevesl ouusuce In me dusposal nf ma 3 :2 41 Appeals, by vlrlue cf 5 6911) cm, lne CA has all the powers 0! lne HC. . in View ol lne Slzlamems (Dr selannanln/Dr. Amanl and lne Tnable lsenel n la only just lor in-a coun lo gran! leave under 0 15 r 19(1) no rend wnn o \A and o 2 r 1(2) RC lei lne Plainlllvs Io amend ma soon so as M: include a plea g that me Delendanls are sslnpped by me slanemenle lo: Selahulidlrl/Dr Amen) from lelylng on me Three-Year Llmllal-on Period 1EIIoppIl Finding) Nu lniushce ls owasianeﬂ \|c lne uelenanms by allowing me Plaimms in amend me soc: be se — in lna neiennancs are enlilied lo amend lnen neaenoe Ill me 3 Sims wnn legard Io lne Esioppel Pleading‘ and in lrresvscilve cl lne Esloppel Pleading‘ lne Delenuanlx ale at lmeny in aelanu themselves al lne lnnl M me 3 sun: as may see rn n I inn Plemlsed on me above leasnns nnn on Selahuddeerfs alrnnvil ma 3 Appeals aia allowed will. lna lullawinu nldel. (1; me 3 HC‘s Decisions iv! sex asidal (2; ma 3 suns are remilled in me H0 \|u be mad belnm anumer Judge lzr JO. (3) leave ll gramed In me 3 Plalnlllla \|n amend meir secs In lnciuue lne Eslanpel Pleading wilnin 14 dlys lrom me date at 3; the me: at mus com lwlm leave in me Delenaancs ca amenu men Delenoe m we 3 suns in respunaa la me amended SDC!\|.irld la; coals ol the 3 Avbeals and Defendants‘ 3 Slllklllg om Appllcallorls will follow me evenl ol me lrial ul me 3 Suits DATE: 2 NOVEMBER 2023 wane KIAN KHEONG Judge com at Appeal, Malaysia For me Appellants (3 Appeals) M: s Gunassgamn 4 Ms Tall PoAu (Messrs Zamsn & Auocleles) For me Rsspondsnls (3 Appsah) Puul Zahllah BI. Mohammad man (SenlarFsdemI comer; A Pusn Syezana Bl. Abdul Luﬂs (Johan Stale Legalnamors crime; 34 IN xDOrl§Rl1lDEl7yRv\|Yap4UPv -we Smnl ...m.mm be ﬂied m mm .. mm-y MIN: dun-mm VI] .mm mm c. necessary lecornmerldallmls lo me 4'" uelanuant (Ilc) Ths llc was headed by a relllad Judge cl Conn ol Appaal (JIM). mm‘ San Mohd. Hllhamuﬂln am Mahd Vunus In June 2019‘ IIC handed as report (lIC’: Rlpuﬂ) la MOH unlll lhe dale al lm: wnnen llldgmem, IlC's Report has ml baerl released co Ihe pubhc Lggll Emcacdingi cm. 3 5 9 ID 11 12 The Plaimms med the 3 suns ln me no on 2 9 2020 The Delendarus med wee awllcatlorls to strike am the 3 Sims on ma glvund \|ha( me 3 Sulls had been lnsmuled aﬂellhe axplry olme Three-Veal Llmlla\|iL7rI Perlod on 25.10 mm (Dal-nnanw J Striklnu om App\|\|::l\|onI) On 1522022 lhe learned lualclal Commlssloner (JD) nu ma HC allaweu me Defendants‘ 3 Slliklng om Appllcamms mm ousls n1 Rn/l2.5uu.oo Io Ihe Delendams «or each ml the 3 sum; (3 no Doclslonlj The Plalrmﬂs hava ﬁled ms 3 Avnaals lo ma com or Appeal (CA) agalnsl me cl HE Declalurls The Plainmls have applled to CA arm obtained an oraev lor mess 3 Appeals \|n be mm together [Jolnl Hurlng (J AppulI)] sw xDGqqR5lDEL7yRylYup4UPy -um Sum ...m.. WW be HSQG M van; M nllglrullly MIN; dun-mm VIZ nrlum Wm 0(2). Joirn Nurring aggmlx 13 14 For the Dumose or me Joml Heanrrg rs Appeals), me Plamulfs men mraa names of rrrouarr for weave or ca m adduoe an amaayn arrrrrrraa an 54202: by Dr serarruaaeerr Em Abdm Am (Dr. semrudrmrr) «or the purpose ol the rrearrng or these 3 Appeals [Flaintmf z um Applluuom (Dr. Sa\Ihudﬂe:n'1 -ma-vrm Dr salanuausaru amaavn surea as Iouows, among others‘ (1) Dr Selahuﬂdaen was Juhcre srare Heallh Drrecmr from February 2019 urml 0c1ober 2019‘ (2) belween February 2913 and Oclubav 2:219. Dr Salahuddeen (as nrra man Johcre sure Heanrr Drrector) mer wrlh ranuxy members or rrre 6 Deceased Persons Uncludmg me Prarnrws; [Family marrrbm (s Dccaand Parsunlll mm or Aman Em Rahu (Dr. Amln) (me Hasprcars Director ar mar me) mleourrqs) Al me Meenngs » (a) Dr selarwduoerr urevmaa uwanea to ma rarnuy Members 16 Deceased Persons) regarmng me scams M lIC‘s mqmry 41:) Dr sarrrrruaaeen and Dr Aman had mlmrned me Famﬂy Members rs Deceased Pelsuns) man nor Report was nor ready arm ma qaarcrorr or campsnsaung ma Farrriry Members (5 Daueasad Ferrous) warm nmy be cnrwldared by me 4'" Dersrruanr arcer ma comprerrorr of use Repcn [Slat-mlnh (Dr. Salahuddnnnlbr. Arnarrn and sw xoonuksrnibyﬁyltamuvv -aaa sarm I-rrhnr M“ be used a mm a. nvVﬂ\rrnU\|Y mm; dun-mrrl wa aﬂuNG wrm cm. Dnfundant e "cc" to) mmulss 01 me Mamas were Drupared by MOH [mu-nu (Moslingl)] but oy Selarmddsen eie rm! have Iocess In me Mmulss lMseIings) as he had retired «mm public service m Oclnber 2019‘ 13) belore Dr Selahuddeerfs reuremem, he mended a MOH meelmg cnmrea by me when Mmuoer ul Health and was meermea eime fnHuwmg makers — (3) me we Repurl had been prepaved and submmad xe Monana my me use Rspnrl coma nut be released 1» me publwc becaun (he cums: had yet so spams :1: rebase, and 147 Dr Selnhuddsan coma not moo-m me ramw Members (6 Deceased Pars/ans) men me we Rzpun had been prepalvd because he had already revnred scuhuanu nu ullldnvll 15 we lepruduee beluw me relevam parts 01 s 69 of the com: av Jumcaxure Ad 1964 (cu), : 7 :2! the was ol me com on Appeal I9941RCA)and o 41 r 5 anhe Rules ev Cour! 2012018) “S 522 cu Haring ereeeur. m Au.»-us in m. Cnun a1Apa-nl mu .. by my aim- nanny. and In Marlon to ma appeals the Caurl of Axum! may run .u m. pawn! and mums, -Is to Imervdrrwrv! at omeme ol the ma com. Rosana with ma cﬁsrrouon-rv 7 sw xncrmksmilvyﬁylteewvv -we Sum ...m.. M“ be used m mm we nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG Wm powlr lo mcuvu mun.’ Iwdunu by bra! aummulmn in mm or lnmuwh a romule cammumcanorl ncnnmoyx by -mam: or by nsposumn 1am Dsfum in lxarmnsr nrmmrmssnmar /21 The tunnel evmeucn mly be won wanna: luv: an Vrmﬂoculury zppllcltiunl, M m lrvy El . u Io mntor which hm nccumd arm the am av mn dvcltlnrv mam wnrcn mu lppullx hmuglll (3; Upon appult hvm - Iudvm-In, me: am or holnrvg of my own annmu upon m. mm, m. Iuvlnnrnvldmce, an n to mums subuvu-nl as afannlﬂ, mu an ﬂmmud an Ipnclnl ground: my, Am! mzl v/imam my. cl m. cum of Aiken! mm Fuwwoiﬂaurl la amend admit Iurlmr tvltlmco or dmw rnlsmnpee mm m rn. Conn so-u nm ll! mu pawn: and mm 5: m amendment or annwnse, emu -ppuwovm my» Court, lnylmnr mm M: ﬂﬂuullunlry pawn 4.. mcnvl Iunll-I vwdlnct by oral sxammarmn m Cowl. by umvn or by debosmon taken bsfuvw .n Ixammsrurcamnusstonzr 127 Such mm: nvldcnn my be glv-n wlllmm luv: an mmvuuwry lF\|)H:Ittun.I, at In Iny cu: . :2 muen which Iv-n occurred mu m: can or can .1-c/unn mm mm,-n In- appul :. bruuym vs; I/Plan mum lmm ummom, am: may or Manny o! my mm or nutkr upun m. mlnﬂ. mn Iurlnar wldmco, m. u to mums suhzequenl Is -rmnm. mm M mntm on men! ymunas onry. -nu nut wmum um aim: Court (am at m. mung mm Appnl /man mm» mu not be nlmllled umus m Cour! 1: mmm mm syn xno-ukswnznyﬁylrumuﬁv nan Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm n. mnn.u-y mm; dun-mm vn mum pm vs; at an manna won an mgr: com! ar 1» subontmala court. u m. can mly n. m. nnw .wa.m ms nu! ma 1.: mi pm suklnﬂ in us. n, or max masonahh -an;-nu «my-nu would nu! am ma. :2 so . my m. rww .m.m, yr Inn, would Ivavn had ol would ﬂaw Dom may to but my . ﬂlilrmlnlng nnnum. upon m. declsinn clme mm. com or um suhordlnm court, as M: can man. a u r5RC comanu mmmn m sun/-cc to am Vt. Mu 1(1) and 4(2), 2.; pmgr-pn (2) a! mu ml: ma 2.; my my mnde anal: cum 1:, rule 5, M mmm may cumm unly such fun! as rm a-par-an us my av nu awn krmwlldgl la mm 42; An amdivll mm for ma purpau al D-my uud In mtuﬂaculury pmzlldingl mny mm» um-maul: of Womluion u bullllwtm m. mumu Ind ground: nmnr (emphasis named) 15 The xeamea semor Fedam Cumin‘ mm: renrerented me Delandzrns m mass 3 Apnealsr has opnosed the Plaxntﬂfs‘ 3 Leave Apphcaticns (Dr Salahurideerfs amewn an the lolbwlng two grounds: (1; me cements ol Dv Se\ammdeen‘s amam cnnsmuled hearsay evidence and were not admissible m me 3 Appaaxs zwmding men ysmac, and N xno-ukswnznyﬁylrumuﬁv mm Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm u. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm (2; even il Dv. Selahuddeerfs aifmawt am not oonlam muay evmence, me coun should nut auaw me mainms In use Dr Selahuddeerfs amdawl m m 3 Appeals Tm wmems of D: Se\ahudr1aen's amdavﬂ um um ounssm the Thraa»Yaar Llmnahon Penna and woum not have a because we 'delemww1g Inﬂuence’ on me 3 Hr: necisms wilmn me meanmg ol r 1(3A)(b) RCA 5;; 5 DECISION D. mgm 0 41 r gm RC um zdmiuion ul Dr. Sc\|ahudd«n'I E 17 RCA are sum regavdmg use or swam [or me menu; or appsah m CA Conseuuenﬂy. r 4 RCA prev-ues that ac “shall apply munalts I-numndIs' mm regard m Ihe questim at whether CA can take ima aocounl me mmems ul Dr Sa\:huddoan'I amaavn In these 3 Appaaxs we H Dr sewamaasa-u amaawe Is admwssime as ‘h1rtnsrevIdsrme' m me 3 Apnsaxs (blaase reler to Fans E and F below). we are or me mew mat me cnnlenls av ny 5e\ahuddeen‘s amdawl may be wnsldered by me CA The kmowmg masons support mus damsmn (1) m Iukzi Corporlliun v DKSH lhlaynia sun Ehd [2016] MLJU 521, at [16(2)]. mo HC has explumeﬂ me scape at o 41 r 5(1) and (2) RC as lollaws - “nsau omm mil 5(1) ac pmwﬂu In-1 m -ma-vln may contain my such has n m. ﬂlpmvlnl 1.1! m. nmm r. .m. :71 m. at my own Anawtudan m wave In 1n IN xno-ukawnzuyﬁyltamuvv -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm	4,441	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
JA-12B-16-04/2022	PERAYU KOIT KAI SIANG RESPONDEN HOO TIAN RONG	Road Accident - appeal from Session Court - appeal and cross appeal against liability and quantum - whether the Session Court Judge has sufficient judicial appreciation on evidence - whether the award of the damages are excessive or manifestly inadequate	03/11/2023	YA Puan Wong Mee Ling	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=93277ba2-032e-4d77-9db4-7913e2209df1&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - GOJ Koit Kai Siang(Wong) (4).docx IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN JOHOR BAHRU IN THE STATE OF JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO. JA-12B-16-04/2022 BETWEEN KOIT KAI SIANG … APPELLANT AND HOO TIAN RONG …RESPONDENT (IN THE SESSION COURT IN JOHOR BAHRU IN THE STATE OF JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO. JA-A53KJ-421-06/2019) BETWEEN HOO TIAN RONG ...PLAINTIFF AND KOIT KAI SIANG ...DEFENDANT ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ GROUNDS OF JUDGEMENT ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ 03/11/2023 23:27:23 JA-12B-16-04/2022 Kand. 24 S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal INTRODUCTION [1] For ease of reference, the Appellant will be referred as Defendant and the Respondent will be referred as Plaintiff as parties were at the trial court. [2] This is an appeal by the Defendant against the decision of the Sessions Court Judge (“SCJ”) on the issue of liability and quantum. Liability was decided at 100% against the Defendant and that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the Plaintiff. [3] The Plaintiff had filed a cross appeal against the said decision on the issue of quantum. [4] After having read the grounds of the judgment of the SCJ, the Appeal records, Parties’ written submissions, and after having heard the oral submissions of the Parties, the Court dismissed the Defendant’s appeal with costs of RM 1,500.00 to the Plaintiff. [5] The Court further decided that the Plaintiff’s cross appeal is allowed partially with no order as to costs. The award for the items are as follows: (a) posterior cruciate ligament injury right knee RM20,000.00 (b) stiffness/limitation of right knee joint RM20,000.00 (c) gait impairment RM10,000.00 S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (d) loss of removal of nail over left tibia RM14,000.00 (e) pain and suffering for 3 past surgeries RM5,000.00 (f) loss of earnings of Plaintiff - actual loss of earnings (pre-trial) - loss of earning capacity RM10,566.45 RM120,389.75 The award for other damages of the SCJ remain unchanged. The claim for aggravated damages is dismissed. [6] Dissatisfied with the said decision, the Defendant have in turn appealed further to the Court of Appeal. BACKGROUND FACTS [7] The Plaintiff at the material time was a rider of a motorcycle bearing registration No: JPS 1108. The Defendant is the owner and driver of a car bearing registration No: JMU 3689 at the material time. [8] The case involves a road accident between the two vehicles that took place on 26.05.2018 at around 12 p.m. at Jalan Persiaran Perdana Taman Tan Sri Yaacob Iskandar Puteri, Johor. As a result of the accident, the Plaintiff had sustained injuries as stated below: (a) right clavicle fracture with A-C joint disruption; (b) right femur fracture; (c) right tibia comminuted fracture; (d) right fibula fracture; (e) chest injury with pneumomediastinum; S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (f) right lower lobe lung contusion; (g) wounds at right thigh, knee & lower leg; (h) posterior cruciate ligament right knee; (i) right anterior cruciate ligament laxity; (j) residual pain due to soft tissue damage and contracture; (k) stiffness / limitation of right knee joint; (l) muscle wasting; (m) permanent scars over right thigh, knee & lower leg; (n) reduced muscle power; and (o) gait impairment. [9] SCJ had on 20.04.2022 awarded damages for the following injuries: General Damages (a) closed right proximal 1/3 tibia fracture and a midshaft fibula fracture (shortening 2.14 cm of right fibula/difficulty in brisk walking, squatting and carrying heavy objects, inability to play badminton /gait impairment RM50,000.00 (b) right midshaft femur fracture (0.77 cm lengthening) (pains over right thigh aggravated by cold weather and prolonged standing & walking / weakness of right lower limb RM50,000.00 (c) right clavicle fracture (malunited) with right acromioclavicular joint disruption RM 38,000.00 (d) chest injury with pneumomediastinum RM 10,000.00 (e) right lower lobe lung contusion RM 6,000.00 S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (f) wounds at right thigh, right leg & ankle RM 8,000.00 (g) complex horizontal tear at the anterior and posterior horn of the right lateral meniscus and sprain of right anterior cruciate ligament with small partial tear at its tibia insertion site (Plaintiff has Grade 1 Right Anterior Cruciate Ligament Laxity) RM 50,000.00 (h) residual pain due to soft tissue damage & contracture (limitation in the right knee / ankle and subtalar movements) RM 10,000.00 (i) muscle wasting RM 7,000.00 (j) extensive scarring RM 20,000.00 (k) cost of removal of nail over left tibia RM 4,700.00 (l) physiotherapy RM 3,000.00 (m) pain and suffering for future surgery RM 5,000.00 The total items for (a), (b), (f), (g) and (h) will be deducted 10% due to overlapping. (n) actual loss of earnings (RM1,174.05 x 7 months) RM8,218.35 (o) loss of earnings capacity RM40,000.00 Special Damages (a) medical bills RM54,629.95 (b) cost of care RM6,000.00 S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (RM1,000.00 per month x 6 months) (c) travelling expenses for family members to Columbia Asia (RM50.00 x11 days) RM550.00 (d) travelling expenses for further treatment at Columbia Asia (RM50.00 x 6 days) RM300.00 (e) clothing RM200.00 [10] The Defendant has appealed against the decision of the SCJ for the followings: (a) liabilities; and (b) quantum for the general and special damages. [11] The Plaintiff on the other hand has appealed against the awards by SCJ for the followings: (a) general damages; (b) actual loss of earnings; (c) loss of earning capacity; and (d) aggravated damages. COURT ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Principles Governing Appeals [12] The Court of Appeal in the case of Sivalingam s/o Periasamy v. Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395 where at page 398 His Lordships Gopal Sir Ram JCA (as he then was) and Mahadev Shankar JCA held that— S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal “It is trite law that an appellate court will not readily interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the trial court to which the law entrusts the primary task of evaluation of the evidence. However, the appellate court has a duty to intervene where a trial court has so fundamentally misdirected itself, that one may say that no reasonable court which had properly directed itself and asked the correct question would have arrived at the same conclusion.”. [Emphasis added] [13] The Court of Appeal in the case of Perumbun (M) Sdn. Bhd. v. Conlay Construction Sdn. Bhd. (Civil Appeal No: W-02-2155-2010), where the learned Judge at page 5 held the following: “There is almost no limit to the range within which cases in Court may vary. At one end, there are cases that involve solely questions of law, and no facts are disputed. Within these cases there may be cases with disputed facts that involve solely interpretation and inferences leading to a conclusion on a finding on the disputed fact, and there may be other cases with disputed facts that involve solely oral evidence and the finding depends entirely upon an assessment of the credibility of witnesses who testified and were tested before the trial judge. Hence, the proper approach is that if (a) it is shown the judgment cannot be explained or justified by the special advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen or heard the witnesses testify and being tested before him, and (b) an injustice is demonstrated to have been occasioned by any error by the trial judge, for example: (a) the judgment is based upon the wrong premise of fact or of law; (b) there was insufficient judicial appreciation by the trial judge of the evidence of circumstances placed before him; (c) the trial judge has completely overlooked the inherent probabilities of the case; (d) that the course of events affirmed by the trial judge could not have occurred; (e) the trial judge had e unwarranted deduction based on faulty judicial reasoning from admitted or established facts; or S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (f) the trial judge had so fundamentally misdirected himself that one may safely say that no reasonable Court which had properly directed itself and asked the correct questions would have arrived at the same conclusion: an appellate court will intervene to rectify that error so that injustice is not occasioned.”. [Emphasis added] [14] Hence, the court will only interfere if— (a) the trial judge acted on a wrong principle of law; (b) the damages awarded was so extremely high or low to make it entirely erroneous estimate of damages or in other words it is plainly unreasonable, or (c) the trial judge omitted to consider some relevant materials or admitted some irrelevant considerations resulting in the award of damages being wholly inaccurate. Liability The Defendant’s submission [15] The Defendant submitted that the SCJ has erred in making a finding of fact that the Defendant has entered the right junction without making sure that it was safe to do so and when the SCJ accepted the Plaintiff’s version that he was driving with the speed of approximately 40- 50km/h before the accident. The Defendant argued that he in fact has stopped and made sure that the road was clear before he turned right. [16] On the issue of SD1’s (the Defendant) statement on why the fact that he stopped and turned on the indicator light was not included in the police report, the Defendant submitted that this is due to the reason that S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal he was not asked in regard to this by the police who took his report. [17] Further to that, the Defendant argued that PW1’s (the Investigating Officer, “IO”) testimony on the absence of brake marks showed no attempt to brake to avoid the collision on the Plaintiff’s part. The Defendant too submitted that the Plaintiff was careless in riding his motorcycle when PW3 (Plaintiff) gave the testimony that he did not see the Defendant’s car before the accident. If the Plaintiff was riding the motorcycle at the speed of 40-50km/h, the Plaintiff could have seen the Defendant at far distance and could have avoided the collision. The Defendant submitted that the fact that the Plaintiff did not see the Defendant’s motorcar before the collision or noticed the motorcar at the distance 2-3 feet showed that Plaintiff was riding the motorcycle fast and did not pay full attention on the Defendant’s motorcar that has turned on indicator light to turn right. [18] The Defendant submitted that there was numerous inconsistencies and discrepancies on the Plaintiff’s testimony in which his credibility comes to question. The Defendant referred to the case of Faizul Amri Mohamad Alli v Chew Chin Loi & Anor [2014] 2 PIR and Nui Chai Kian v Hasbi bin Omar [2021] AMEJ 0607 in supporting his contention that the liability should be apportioned 30% against the Defendant and 70% against that the Plaintiff for the accident. The Plaintiff’s Submission [19] On the issue of liability, the Plaintiff submitted that the Defendant is indeed 100% liable to the accident and that there is no contributory negligence on the part of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff submitted that the statements from Plaintiff and the IO shows that the accident was caused S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal by the Defendant's car that entered the right junction from the opposite direction of the Plaintiff negligently and without giving way to the Plaintiff's motorcycle which was moving straight on the main road. The Plaintiff strenuously submitted that the Plaintiff who was riding his motorcycle on the main road has the valid right of way when the accident occurred. The Plaintiff has cited the case of Chan Kim Hee v Karam Singh [1981] 2 MLJ 273, Mohamad Khirul Mizan Sdn. Bhd. v Yue Ah Kai [2002] 6 MLJ 471 and Govidan Raju v Laws [1966] 1MLJ 188 to support his arguments. [20] Further, the Defendant has admitted that he did not notice the Plaintiff’s motorcycle before the collision and was negligent when he entered the right junction. The Plaintiff submitted that the Plaintiff was traveling on the main road and has the right of way. The Defendant who was turning into the right junction has to give way to the Plaintiff. Consequently, the Defendant was summoned under Rule 3(2)(b) Road Traffic Rules 1959 [LN 166/1959]. In this regard, the Plaintiff cited the case of MA Clyde v Wong Ah Mei & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 183 and Ong Cheng Wah v Supramaniam A/L Arjunan [2001] 1MLJU 291 to support his contention. [21] The Plaintiff submitted that the Defendant’s contention that the Plaintiff was riding his motorcycle fast was not corroborated with any statement from any parties or by any evidences before this Court. Hence, that contention should not hold water. By referring the Court to the case of KR Taxi Service Ltd v Zaharah [1969] 1 MLJ 49, the Plaintiff submitted that the duty of the Plaintiff is to exercise "reasonable care" and not "perfect care" in riding his motorcycle. S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Court Analysis and Findings [22] On the issue of liability, the Court is of the view that the SCJ did not err in law or in fact in arriving her conclusion. From the whole evidence including the sketch plan, the Defendant was rightly held liable for the said accident. The SCJ found the Defendant has entered the junction without ensuring it was safe before he did so. The Defendant informed that he did not notice the Plaintiff’s motorcycle before he turned into the junction as he was paying attention on the other motorcycle ridden by an Indian man who was at the junction to turn right at that time. His evidence was consistent with the police report (D10) made by him two (2) hours after the accident. [23] Apart from that, the Defendant has admitted in this testimony that he was negligent by entering into the junction. This Court finds that the Plaintiff who was traveling on the main road and has the right of way. Therefore, the SCJ has made a correct finding that the Defendant has entered the junction without due care and failed to keep a proper look out, has caused the collision with the Plaintiff’s motorcycle. There was no evidence to prove that the Plaintiff was travelling fast prior to the collision. Applying the test set by the Federal Court on contributory negligence in KR Taxi Service Ltd & Anor v Zaharah & Ors [1969] 1 MLJ 49 and Tan Tsin Keong v A Somanaidu (FCCA No 23 of 1972), the Plaintiff was obviously blameless and the Court finds that that the appeal against liability has no merit whatsoever. [24] Hence, the Court finds there is no reason to interfere with the findings of the SCJ on the apportionment of liability and the Court decides that the decision of the SCJ on liability is affirmed. S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Quantum The Defendant’s submission [25] On the issue of quantum, the Defendant’s submissions are summarized in the following table: No. Injuries SCJ’s Award Defendant’s Submission 1. Closed right proximal 1/3 tibia and midshaft fibula fracture RM 50,000.00 RM 30,000.00 2. Right Midshaft femur fracture with shortening - Plaintiff’s Specialist Report: 1cm shortening - Defendant’s Specialist Report: 1.37cm shortening RM 50,000.00 RM 25,000.00 3. Right Clavicle fracture with Acromioclavicular joint disruption RM 38,000.00 RM 25,000.00 4. Chest injury pneumomediastinum RM 10,000.00 Not appeal 5. Right lower lobe lung contusion RM 8,000,00 RM 5,000.00 6. Posterior cruciate ligament injury right knee (PCL) RM 50,000.00 RM 20,000.00 7. Residual pain due to soft tissue injury damage and contracture (Muscle Wasting) • 1 cm wasting of the right quadriceps muscle • 1 cm wasting of the right calf muscle RM 10,000.00 RM 3,000.00 8. Extensive scarring • 25 cm scar on the right thigh RM 20,000.00 RM 8,000.00 S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal • 3 cm and 2 cm scar on the right thigh • 5 cm scar on the buttocks • 5 cm scar on the right knee • 5 cm, 7 cm, 1 cm and 6 cm scar on the right leg • 1 cm, 3 cm scar on the right leg • 9 cm scar on the right leg • 5 cm hyper- pigmented, abrasion wound scar over the right flank of the abdomen [26] On the issue of loss of earnings, the Defendant submitted for a period of 5 months because the Plaintiff was paid by his employer for a period of 2 months when he was not working. According to the Defendant, the calculation for loss of earnings for the Plaintiff should be as follows: Loss of income = [RM 1,200.00 – 1/3 (living cost)] x 5 months = RM 799.99 x 5 months = RM 3,999.95 [27] The Defendant further submitted that the SCJ was wrong when she made a finding that although the Plaintiff had worked again and was earning more than his pre-accident income (RM 3,000.00 per month), the Plaintiff deserved to be given loss of earning capacity. The Defendant argued that the SCJ has erred in accepting the fact that the Plaintiff's income after the accident was greater than before the accident and at the same time allowed for the loss of earning capacity. S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [28] On the quantum of medical expenses, the Defendant relied on the case of Harcharan Singh A/L Saudagar Singh v Hassan bin Ariffin [1990] 2 CLJ 393 and Khairul Sham Ahmad & Anor v Yesudass Michaelsamy [2005] 2 CLJ 195, submitted that the Plaintiff is only eligible to be awarded 1/3 of the costs that have been incurred for treatment at Columbia Asia Hospital which amounts to RM1,378.20 (1/3 x RM4,134.61). [29] Finally, the Defendant argued that the cost of physiotherapy should be deducted since the Plaintiff can practice exercises at home without having to go to the hospital. The Plaintiff’s submission [30] On the issue of quantum, the Plaintiff’s submission on quantum is summarized in the following table: No. Injuries SCJ’s Award Plaintiff’s Submission 1. Closed right proximal 1/3 tibia and midshaft fibula fracture • Dr. Yoga (orthopedic of the Plaintiff): - x-ray findings: right leg malunited fracture of the proximal right tibia. An interlocking nail is in situ. Malunited fracture of the right fibula • Dr. Preba (orthopedic of the Defendant) - malunited fracture proximal third right tibia and midshaft of right fibula seen, overlapping of fragments with shortening seen RM 50,000.00 RM 60,000.00 S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal - right tibia measures 32.59 cm whereas left tibia measures 34.83 cm –shortening of right tibia 2.14 cm 2. Right midshaft femur fracture (with lengthening of 0.77 cm) • Dr. Preba (orthopedic of Defendant) - right femur measures 41.46 cm whereas left femur measures 40.49 cm - shortening of right femur 0.77cm RM 50,000.00 RM 60,000.00 3. Right clavicle fracture (malunited) RM 38,000.00 (Right clavicle fracture + acromioclavicular joint disruption) Separate amount of RM 30,000.00 4. Right acromioclavicular joint disruption RM 38,000.00 (Right clavicle fracture + acromioclavicular joint disruption) Separate amount of RM 48,000.00 5. Chest injury pneumomediastinum RM 10,000.00 RM 20,000.00 6. Right lower lobe lung contusion RM 6,000,00 RM 10,000.00 7. Wounds at right thigh, right leg and ankle RM 8,000.00 RM 12,000.00 8. Posterior cruciate ligament injury right knee (PCL) • Dr Chooi from Columbia Asia Hospital – Posterior cruciate ligament (PCL) injury right knee • Clarification Report from Sultanah Aminah Hospital • Dr Preba (orthopedic from Defendant) Disallowed RM 30,000.00 9. Grade I Right Anterior Cruciate Ligament Laxity (ACL) • Clarification Report from Sultanah Aminah Hospital • Dr Chooi from Columbia Asia Hospital • Dr Yoga (orthopedic of the Plaintiff RM50,000 (Global award for Grade I ACL + Complex horizontal tear at the anterior and posterior horn of the right lateral meniscus) RM 30,000.00 separately S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10. Complex horizontal teat at the anterior and posterior horn of the right lateral meniscus • Clarification Report of Dr Chooi from Columbia Asia Hospital - the final diagnosis for right knee injury, please refer to MRI examination of right knee done on 18.2.2020. Complex horizontal tear at the anterior and posterior horn of right lateral meniscus; sprain of the right anterior cruciate ligament with small partial tear at its tibial insertion site • MRI scan from Columbia Asia Hospital – complex horizontal tear at the anterior and posterior horn of the right lateral meniscus RM50,000 (Global award for Grade I ACL + Complex horizontal tear at the anterior and posterior horn of the right lateral meniscus) RM 30,000 separately 11. Residual pain due to soft tissue injury damage and contracture (Muscle Wasting) • 1 cm wasting of the right quadriceps muscle • 1 cm wasting of the right calf muscle RM 10,000.00 Maintained 12. Stiffness / Limitation of right knee joint Disallowed RM 20,000.00 13. Muscle wasting (2cm) RM 7,000.00 Maintained 14. Extensive scarring • 25 cm scar on the right thigh • 3 cm and 2 cm scar on the right thigh • 5 cm scar on the buttocks • 5 cm scar on the right knee • 5 cm, 7 cm, 1 cm and 6 cm scar on the right leg • 1 cm, 3 cm scar on the right leg • 9 cm scar on the right leg RM 20,000.00 RM 30,000.00 S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15. Gait impairment Disallowed RM 20,000.00 16. Cost of removal of nail over left tibia RM 4,700.00 RM 14,000.00 17. Physiotherapy RM 3,000.00 Maintained 18. Pain and suffering for 3 Past surgeries Disallowed RM 15,000.00 19. Pain and suffering for future surgery RM 5,000.00 Maintained [31] The Plaintiff submitted that the SCJ was correct in allowing the award for actual loss of earning capacity and has awarded RM10,566.45 (RM1,174.05 x 9 months). However, the Plaintiff argued that the amount allowed is manifestly inadequate. The award for loss of earning capacity allowed by SCJ is too low and not commensurate with the Plaintiff's income, injury, disability and age. The Plaintiff was not working for nine (9) months after the accident. This evidence was not challenged by the Defendant. The Plaintiff’s witness, PW3 informed the court that the Plaintiff was paid two (2) months basic salary during the period of nine (9) months in order to comply the Employment Act. [32] The Plaintiff submitted that although the Plaintiff was paid for two (2) months, he is still entitled to claim pursuant to paragraph 28A(1)(c) Civil Law Act 1956 [Act 67] as the payment was made under section 60J Employment Act 1955 [Act 265]. Therefore, it shall not be considered in assessing damages recoverable by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has cited the cases of Saravanan a/l A. Muthu (Johor Bahru Civil Appeal No: JA-11B- 25 -11/2017), Mohd. Tamizi Mat Hassan [2014] 1 LNS 1005 and Sevasangar a/l P. Ramasamy v Abdul Nazar [2014]8 MLJ 236 to support their arguments. [33] The SCJ has decided that the average salary of the Plaintiff is RM1,254.05 per month from December 2017 till May 2018 and the living S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal expenses of the Plaintiff is RM80.00 per month. The Plaintiff’s evidence as to his living expenses of RM80.00 per month was not challenged by the Defendant and therefore the said amount should be maintained. Hence, multiplicand is RM1,174.05 per month (RM1,254.05 - RM80.00) and therefore, the actual loss of earnings is RM10,566.45 (RM1,174.05 x 9 months). [34] For the loss of earning capacity, the Plaintiff submitted that after the accident, the Plaintiff was not able to work as mechanic at Auto Services Sdn. Bhd. due to the injury he is sustained. The Plaintiff submitted that although the Plaintiff has worked in another company with a higher salary which is RM3,000.00 a month, the Plaintiff is still eligible to claim loss of earning capacity. The Plaintiff cited the case of Alan Tiew Chung Yik & 2 Ors v wakil diri kepada Chew Gee Geong, si mati [2018] 1 PIR [42], Mohd Khairul Nizam bin Idris v Mohamad Shahuddin bin Mat Nusi [2014] AMEJ 1435 and Lau Ho Wah v Yau Chi Biu [1985] 1 W.L.R. 1203 to support their contentions. [35] The Plaintiff further submitted that the right approach in calculating the loss of earning capacity is to apply the multiplier- multiplicand. Hence, based on the age of the Plaintiff, the statutory multiplier pursuant to section 28A Act 67 is 16 years. As for the multiplicand, the Plaintiff argued that 50% of the Plaintiff's salary is used as a multiplicand by considering his injury and disability. As such, the Plaintiff submitted that loss of earning capacity should be calculated as follows: Loss of Earning Capacity = RM627.03 x 16 years x 12 months = RM120,389.76 S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [36] On medical expenses, the Plaintiff averred that the amount of medical expenses of RM54,629.95 as awarded by the SCJ should be maintained. The Plaintiff submitted that he is eligible to claim RM54,629.95 in full without deduction by relying on the cases of Dr Kok Choong Seng [2018] 1 MLJ 685 ([2017] MLJU 1448), Lim Wee Heong v Nai Wah Hing [1996] MLJU 394 and Lim Chia Wee v Wan Mee Fong (JBHC JA-12B-96-12/2020). The Plaintiff also submitted that the Plaintiff is entitled to choose the best treatment for himself in the hospital of his choice. The Plaintiff relied on the case of Tajuddin Sheikh Daud v Wong Kim Yin [1989] 2 CLJ Rep 546, Batumalee A/L Masilamani v Thong Chan Leng [2003] 4 MLJ 391 and Romuloo A/L Appalasamy v Tan Seng Kee [2000] 5 MLJ 665 to support their contentions. [37] On their cross appeal, the Plaintiff submitted that the SCJ has erred in dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim for aggravated damages. The Plaintiff averred that there is an aggravating feature in this case because this is a clear-cut case due to the following reasons: (a) the Defendant had entered the junction while the Plaintiff was travelling on the main road; (b) it is settled law that the Defendant who was entering the junction must gave way to the Plaintiff who was travelling on the main road; (c) the Defendant has been summoned for this case. The Defendant did not object when he was summoned or when he was paying the summons; (d) the Defendant admitted that he was negligent in his testimony; and (e) the Plaintiff has offered few times to the Defendant to S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal concede liability in the clear-cut case yet the Defendant has refused to take up the offer and insist to proceed with the trial. [38] Albeit that, the Defendant has denied his liability in his defence, including at this appellate stage. In view of this, the Plaintiff submitted that aggravated damages should be awarded against the Defendant. [39] In support of this propositions, the Plaintiff referred to the case of Ahmad Radhiq Arbee bin Ahmad Rejal Arbee (as a husband and dependant of Sharifah Shalihah binti Sayed Abdullah, deceased) & Ors v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2020] 10 MLJ 459 in which the similar principles have been applied in the case of Yap Sao Leong & Anor (both suing as administrators to the estate of Yap Yi Hong, deceased) v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2021] MLJU 86. [40] In addition, the Plaintiff reiterated that the principles in regards to aggravated damages are also applicable in road traffic accident cases by relying on the case of Su Hung Tung (suing on his own behalf and also in his capacity as the administrator of the estate of the late Wong Hia Hong (f) (the deceased) v Biaramas Express Sdn. Bhd. & 3 Ors [2014] 2 PIR [101]. Since the aggravated damages are general damages, it was decided that in the case of Hassnar bin MP Ebrahim @ Asainar v Sulaiman bin Pong & Ors. [2018] 1MLJ 346 that it needs not to be pleaded. [41] Hence, the Plaintiff submitted that an amount of RM 300,000.00 should be awarded as aggravated damages. S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Court Analysis and Findings [42] In considering the award for the damages, the Court is guided by the Federal Court decision in the case of Yang Salbiah & Anor v Jamil bin Harun [1981] 1 MLJ 292 where the Federal Court held that – “It must be remembered that the purpose of damages is to try, so far as humanly possible, to put the victim back to the position he would have been in but for the accident. The damages must be fair, adequate and not excessive.”. [Emphasis added] [43] Therefore, an award for general and special damages is compensatory in nature, and is intended to provide some redress for what the Plaintiff has suffered. It is not intended to be punitive and still less a reward. Posterior Cruciate Ligament Injury Right Knee [44] The Court has perused the grounds of judgement of the SCJ at paragraph 51 (see pages 18-19 of RRT Part I), the Court finds that the SCJ has given global award for the complex horizontal tear at the anterior and posterior horn of the right lateral meniscus and sprain of right anterior cruciate ligament with small partial tear at its tibial insertion site which include the Posterior Cruciate Ligament Injury Right Knee. The SCJ has taken into account the clarification report prepared by Dr. Chooi Wai Kit dated 12.6.2020 (see page 339 RR Jld. 2) which stated that “posterior cruciate ligament injury right knee was an initial diagnosis, was diagnosed by intraoperative clinical examination done on 27.5.2018. The final diagnosis for right knee injury, please refer to MRI examination of right knee done on 18.2.2020. Complex horizontal tear at the anterior and posterior horn of the right lateral meniscus, sprain of right anterior cruciate S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ligament with small partial tear at its tibial insertion site.” . [45] The injury is consistently reported by both the specialists in their medical reports, prepared by Dr. Chooi Wai Kit from Columbia Asia Hospital dated 3.8.2018 (see pages 277 to 278 RR Jld.2) and Orthopaedic Specialist Medical Report by Dr. Yoga Raj from Columbia Asia Hospital dated 15.1.2019 (see pages 279 to 284 RR Jld.2) respectively. The clarification report by Dr. Lee Chee Siong from the Emergency and Trauma Department of Hospital Sultanah Aminah (HSA) dated 16.11.2020 (see pages 351 to 353 of RR Jld.2) has confirmed that the injury of Posterior Cruciate Ligament Injury Right Knee could not be detected during the Plaintiff’s treatment in HSA due to the presence of fracture of right femur, tibia and fibula. Hence clinical assessment of integrity of ligaments around the knee joint was not possible as it would further displace the fracture of bones which would have caused more harm to the Plaintiff. [46] Based on the specialists’ analysis on this injury, the Court finds that the injury for Posterior Cruciate Ligament Injury Right Knee should be awarded separately. The Court agrees with the Plaintiff’s arguments that both ligaments have different functions and therefore it should be awarded separately. In reference to the Revised Compendium of Personal Injury Awards (2018), this Court is of the opinion that RM20,000.00 would be a reasonable amount for this injury and awards as such. Therefore, the Court allows the Plaintiff’s cross appeal for this injury. Stiffness/Limitation of Right Knee Joint and Gait Impairment [47] The Plaintiff submitted that the Plaintiff has suffered S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal stiffness/limitation of right knee joint and gait impairment. These injuries was confirmed by Dr. Yoga Raj, the Plaintiff’s orthopaedic specialist via medical reports dated 15.1.2019 and 12.11.2019 respectively. The Court agrees with the Plaintiff’s submission that the SCJ was erred for not awarding damages for these injuries suffered by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has cited the claim for these injuries are allowed in the case of Samad bin Bahari & Anor v Abd Rahman bin Ibrahim [2010] 1 PIR [6] to support their arguments. The SCJ did not explained in her grounds of judgment the reasons for not allowing this injury. [48] As for gait impairment, this Court is guided by the case of VMR S Buhvanieswarar a/l Selvaraj & Anor v Masri bin Khalid & Anor [2019] 2 PIR [30] as submitted by the Plaintiff. These injuries, as confirmed by Dr. Yoga Raj in his report, is permanent and consequently, the Plaintiff will have difficulties in his daily works. [49] As such, the Court allows the Plaintiff’s cross appeal in view of this injury and awards a sum of RM20,000.00 for stiffness/limitation of right knee joint suffered by the Plaintiff and RM10,000.00 for gait impairment. Loss of Removal of Nail Over Left Tibia [50] The Plaintiff submitted that the cost for loss of removal of nail over left tibia should be awarded at RM14,000.00. In scrutinising this issue, this Court is guided by Dr. Yoga Raj’s report in relation to the removal of nail over left tibia. [51] The SCJ did not give any justification of deducting 1/3 from the costs of RM14,000.00 as suggested by Dr. Yoga Raj in his medical report S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal dated 15.1.2019 (see page 284 RR Jld.2). The Court is of the view that even the amount suggested by the Plaintiff at the highest speculation, they do not, affect the reasonableness of the amount put forth by the Plaintiff. This is the amount derives from the figure stated by the Plaintiff’s specialist, who gave his estimation in his capacity as the consultant orthopaedic surgeon at the Columbia Asia Hospital, where the Plaintiff decided to get the respective treatment and it was not rebutted by the Defendant. [52] As such, this Court awards RM14,000.00 for loss of removal of nail over tibia. Pain and Suffering for Three (3) Surgeries [53] Based on the reports from Columbia Asia Hospital, it can be seen that the Plaintiff have undergone three (3) surgeries namely, plating of right femur, interlocking right tibia, and wound debridement in the right thigh, leg and left ankle. These surgeries have undoubtedly caused some pain and sufferings on the Plaintiff. As such, this Court is of the opinion that this injury should be awarded accordingly. [54] As such, based on the case of Wong Win Kong (Civil Appeal No. JA-12B-95-11/2018) and the case of Phua Hian Kue (Civil Appeal No. JA- 12B-79-10/2020), this Court allows an amount of RM5,000.00 being the amount awarded for pain and sufferings suffered by the Plaintiff during the course of his treatment. Actual Loss of Earnings [55] The Plaintiff submitted that the SCJ was right in awarded the S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal actual loss of earnings for RM10,566.45 (RM1,174.05 x 9 months). However, the Plaintiff argued that the amount allowed is manifestly inadequate as it does not commensurate with the Plaintiff's income, injury, disability and age. [56] The Plaintiff worked as a mechanic at Auto Services Sdn. Bhd. at the time of accident and his monthly income was RM1,254.05 and his daily expenses was RM80.00. The Court agrees with the Plaintiff submission that although the Plaintiff was paid two (2) months basic salary during the period of nine (9) months, the Plaintiff is still entitled to claim as the payment of two (2) months pursuant to paragraph 28A(1)(c) Act 67. Therefore, it shall not be taken into account in assessing damages recoverable by the Plaintiff. [57] The Court has perused the grounds of judgment of the SCJ in particular, paragraph 64 (see page 22 RRT Part I), the award made by the SCJ for loss of actual earnings (partial) is RM8,218.35 (RM1,254.05- RM80.00) x 7 months MC). However, in the Judgment stated in page 16 of RR Jld. 1, the actual loss of earnings (partial) is RM10,566,45 (RM1,174.05 x 9 months). There is discrepancy in the amount awarded by the SCJ. Hence, the award of the SCJ of RM8,218.35 is to be substituted with the award of RM10,566,45. Loss of Earning Capacity [58] The Plaintiff has submitted that the learned SCJ is right in awarding loss of earning capacity to the Plaintiff. The Court agrees with the Plaintiff’s contention. In this regard, the Court refers to the case of Tay Tong Chew v Abdul Rahman Bin Haji Ahmad [1985] 1 MLJ 50, where the S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Federal Court decided as follows: “As stated earlier, we are of the view that the respondent should be entitled to some compensation for loss of earning capacity on a lump sum basis. He has to undergo a second operation later on in his life both on the knee and hip joints. Accordingly, there is a substantial or real risk that he will sometime in the future suffer loss of earning capacity. It is important to realise that there is a difference between an award for loss of earnings as distinct from compensation for loss of earning capacity. Compensation for loss of future earnings is awarded for real assessable loss proved by evidence. Compensation for diminution in earning capacity is awarded as part of general damages" — per Lord Denning in Fairley v John Thompson Ltd [1973] 2 L1 LR 40, 42 which was cited with approval by this Court in Ti Huck & Anor v Mohamed Yusof [1973] 2 MLJ 62, 66.”. [Emphasis added] [59] Hence, when there is a real risk that the Plaintiff will suffer loss of earning capacity in the future, the Court ought to award damages for loss of earning capacity, provided that this damage is substantiated with evidence. In the present case, the evidence of the Plaintiff is corroborated and verified by the specialist doctors’ in their respective medical reports as follows: (a) Dr Yoga (Plaintiff’s Orthopaedic Specialist): RR Jld. 2 page 280 - difficulty in walking - limps while walking - pain while climbing stairs - difficulty in squatting for long periods of time RR Jld. 2 page 283 Disabilities And Opinion 4. Limitation Of Joint Movement: The limitations in the right knee, ankle and subtalar movements is due to soft tissue contracture following the fractures. This will give rise to: - difficulty in walking briskly and running - difficulty in squatting for more than short periods S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Limitations in joint movement will remain PERMANENT. 5. PAIN: There will be residual pain due to soft tissue damage and contracture. (b) Dr Peraba (Defendant’s Orthopaedic Specialist): RR Jld. 2 page 324 - occasional pains over the right lower leg, the pains are aggravated by cold weather and after prolonged standing and walking; - walks with a limp - weakness of right lower limb - not able to squat for long RR Jld. 2 page 327 The injuries have resulted in: c. Reduced muscle power of the right thigh, knee and lower leg [60] The disabilities reported by these two (2) specialist doctors are disabilities that could affect the Plaintiff's ability to work. As a mechanic, the Plaintiff has to lift heavy works and use strong energy, squatting or lying down under the car for a long time. The specialists have confirmed that the Plaintiff is and will be having trouble performing these tasks. [61] In this regard, the Court referred to the case of Shanmugam A/L Gopal v Zinal Abidin Bin Nazim [2003] 3 MLJ 76 (among others) in which Singapore case of Noe Kim Seng v Clough Petrosen Pte Ltd [1996] 3 SLK was cited in that case. Judith Prakash J has not only made an award for loss of future earning but also a sum of RM25,000.00 for loss of earning capacity, as she held that if ever the Plaintiff lost his job, he would be at a disadvantage in his search for a new job. [62] This Court is guided by the said decision and has applied the same principle in considering whether damages for loss of earning capacity should be awarded or not. S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [63] As such, the Court finds that damages for loss of earning capacity as awarded by the SCJ has been rightly decided. However, this Court agrees with the Plaintiff’s submission that the amount awarded is indeed manifestly inadequate. The Court finds the SCJ failed to justify how she arrived at the figure of RM40,000.00 for loss of earnings capacity. [64] In the case of Sivakumar A/L Avolasamy v. Chan Hoong Kok [2012] 1 LNS 52, the Court has provided guidelines on the calculation of “loss of earning capacity” as follows: “In this case, the specialist reports of the Plaintiff and the Defendant confirm that due to his injuries, the Plaintiff will no longer be able to work as a fitter at a shipyard and only suitable for sedentary work. Plaintiff is unlikely to find an equally well-paid job. There was firm evidence of the earnings of the Plaintiff, the correct method of assessing the loss is the multiplier - multiplicand method. The starting point should be the amount the Plaintiff was earning at the time of the accident and the multiplier. As the Plaintiff was 32 years of age at the time of the accident, the multiplier applicable is 11.5 years. At the material time, the Plaintiff was earning RM 96.00 per day; taking in account off days, it is reasonable to estimate that the Plaintiff's earnings per month is RM 96.00 x 23.95 = RM 2,300.00. The SCJ awarded RM 66,000.00. The award made by the SCJ is so extremely small as to make it an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage. In the circumstances of this case, the award for loss of earning capacity should be RM 1000.00 x 11.5 x 12 = RM 138,000.00. Accordingly, the award of RM 66,000.00 is substituted with an award of RM 138,000.00.”. [Emphasis added] [65] In the present case, the Plaintiff was at the age of 17 years at the time of accident and according to subparagraph 28A(1)(c)(iii) Act 67, the statutory multiplier would be 16 years. Based on the guidelines given in the case of Sivakumar A/L Avolasamy (supra), the Court decides that 50% of the Plaintiff’s monthly income of RM1,254.05 x 50% = RM627.03 is reasonable to be considered in calculating the loss of earnings capacity S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal of Plaintiff. Hence, the Court awards the sum of RM 120,389.76 (RM627.03 x 16 years x 12 months = RM120,389.76) and the award of the SCJ of RM40,000.00 is to substituted with the award of RM120,389.76. Aggravated Damages [66] The Court now deals with the Plaintiff’s claim on aggravated damages. In dealing with this issue, it is wise to note that it is fundamental and trite that a Plaintiff who is claiming for damages has to prove his damage. Given such, even if the Plaintiff is otherwise entitled in principle to recover damages, it cannot simply make a claim without providing the Court with sufficient evidence of the loss it has suffered. However, the law does not require the complainant to prove with absolute certainty that he has sustained a certain amount of damage. [67] In the case of Lim Guan Eng v Ruslan Kassim & Anor Appeal [2021] 4 CLJ 155 it was held — "Now, aggravated damages are classified as a species of compensatory damages, which are awarded as additional compensation where there has been intangible injury to the interest of personality of the Plaintiff, and where this injury has been caused or exacerbated by the exception conduct of the Defendant.". [Emphasis added] [68] This is a case purely stemmed on a road traffic accident and the word ‘accident’ speaks for itself. The Court disagree with the Plaintiff that it is a clear cut case and the Plaintiff has failed to prove that the injury has been caused or exacerbated by the exception conduct of the Defendant. Therefore, this Court finds no exceptional circumstances that could warrant a judicial interference to allow a claim for aggravated damages. S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Thus, the SCJ was rightly dismissed the claim for aggravated damages as it ought to have done so. [69] As for other awards made by the SCJ, the Court finds the awards made by the SCJ are reasonable and commensurate with the Plaintiff's injury suffered by the Plaintiff. Further, the amounts are within the Revised Compendium on Personal Injury Awards (2018). CONCLUSION [70] Based on the above findings, the Court dismisses the Defendant’s appeal and allows the Plaintiff’s cross-appeal partially for the following injuries and substituted the damages awarded by SCJ as follows: (a) posterior cruciate ligament injury right knee RM20,000.00 (b) stiffness/Imitation of right knee joint RM20,000.00 (c) gait impairment RM10,000.00 (d) loss of removal of nail over left tibia RM14,000.00 (e) pain & sufferings for three (3) past surgeries RM5,000.00 (f) actual loss of earnings (pre-trial) RM10,566.45 (g) loss of earning capacity RM120,389.76 [71] The Court further decides that costs of RM1,500.00 subject to cost of allocator fees, to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. The rest of the awards decided by the SCJ remain unchanged. S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Dated 30th October 2023 Signed by: …………………….. Wong Mee Ling Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Johor Bahru Johor Darul Ta’zim. Counsel/Solicitor: For the Appellant/Defendant : Mr. Syukri Tetuan Othman Hashim & Co. LP Floor, Unit No. LP0S-09 Menara TJB No. 9, Jalan Syed Mohd Mufti 80000 Johor Bahru, Johor. For the Respondent/Plaintiff : Mr. Teo Han Ley Tetuan Teo & Associates Wisma SK Teo No. 84 & 86 Jalan Padi 1, Bandar Baru Uda 81200 Johor Bahru. S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Cases referred to: 1. Faizul Amri Mohamad Alli v Chew Chin Loi & Anor [2014] 2 PIR 2. Nui Chai Kian v Hasbi bin Omar [2021] AMEJ 0607 3. Harcharan Singh A/L Saudagar Singh v Hassan bin Ariffin [1990] 2 CLJ 393 4. Khairul Sham Ahmad & Anor v Yesudass Michaelsamy [2005] 2 CLJ 195 5. Chan Kim Hee v Karam Singh [1981] 2 MLJ 273 6. Mohamad Khirul Mizan Sdn. Bhd. v Yue Ah Kai [2002] 6 MLJ 471 7. Govidan Raju v Laws [1996] 1 MLJ 188 8. MA Clyde v Wong Ah Mei & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 183 9. Ong Cheg Wah v Supramaniam A/L Arjunan [2001] 1 MLJU 291 10. KR Taxi Service Ltd v Zaharah [1969] 1 MLJ 49 11. Saravanan A/L A. Muthu (Johor Bahru Civil Appeal No. JA-11B-25- 11/2017) 12. Mohd. Tarmizi Mat Hassan [2014] 1 LNS 1005 13. Sevasangar A/L P. Ramasamy v Abdul Nazar [2014] 8 MLJ 236 14. Alan Tiew Chung Yik & 2 Ors v wakil diri kepada Chew Gee Geong, si mati [2018] 1 PIR [42] 15. Mohd Khairul Nizam bin Idris v Mohamad Shahuddin bin Mat Nusi [2014] AMEJ 1435 16. Lau Ho Wah v Yau Chi Biu [1985] 1 W.L.R. 1203 17. Dr. Kok Choong Seng [2018] 1 MLJ 685 [2017] MLJU 1448 S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18. Lim Wee Heong v Nai Wah Hing [1996] MLJU 394 19. Lim Chia Wee v Wan Mee Fong (JBHC JA-12B-96-12/2020) 20. Tajuddin Sheikh Daud v Wong Kim Yin [1998] 2 CLJ Rep 546 21. Batumalee A/L Masilamani v Thong Chan Leng [2003] 4 MLJ 391 22. Ramuloo A/L Appalasamy v Tan Seng Kee [2005] 5 MLJ 665 23. Ahmad Radhiq Arbee bin Ahmad Rejal Arbee (as a husband and dependant of Sharifah Shalihah bt Sayed Abdullah, deceased) & Ors v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2020] 10 MLJ 459 24. Yap Sao Leong & Anor (both suing as administrators to the estate of Yap Yi Hong, deceased) v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2021] MLJU 86 25. Su Hung Tung (suing on his own behalf and also in his capacity as the administrator of the estate of the late Wong Hia Hong (f) (the deceased) v Biaramas Express Sdn. Bhd. & 3 Ors [2014] 2 PIR [101] 26. Hassnar bin MP Ebrahim @ Asainar v Sulaiman bin Pong & Ors. [2018] 1 MLJ 346 27. Sivalingam s/o Periasamay v. Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395 28. Perumbun (M) Sdn. Bhd. v Conlay Construction Sdn. Bhd. (Civil Appeal No. W-02-2155-2010) 29. Tan Tsin Keong v A Somanaidu (FCCA No. 23 of 1972) 30. Yang Salbiah & Anor v Jamil bin Harun [1981] 1 MLJ 292 31. Samad bin Bahari & Anor v Abd Rahman bin Ibrahim [2010] 1 PIR [6] 32. VMR S Buhvanieswarar A/L Selvaraj & Anor v Masri bin Khalid & S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Anor [2019] 2 PIR [30] 33. Tay Tong Chew v Abdul Rahman Bin Haji Ahmad [1985] 1 MLJ 50 34. Shanmugam A/L Gopal v Zinal Abidin bin Nazim [2003] 3 MLJ 76 35. Noe Kim Seng v Clough Petrosen Pte Ltd [1996] 3 SLK 36. Sivakumar A/L Avolasamy v Chan Hoong Kok [2021] 1 LNS 52 37. Lim Guan Eng v Ruslan Kassim & Anor Appeal [2021] 4 CLJ 155 Legislation referred to: 1. Civil Law Act 1956 [Act 67] 2. Employment Act 1955 [Act 257] Date of Hearing: 16.01.2023 Date of Decision: 26.04.2023 S/N onsnky4Dd02dtHkT4iCd8Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	53,656	Tika 2.6.0
AB-22NCvC-23-10/2022	PLAINTIF KLIFE GLOBAL SDN BHD DEFENDAN GREEN RAY TECHNOLOGY SDN BHD	Civil Procedure - O. 29 r.1 - Application for Erinford Injunction - Suit by the Plaintiff to recover its property which is now in the Defendant's possession -Interim mandatory injunction was granted by the Court - Defendant appealed against the Court's decision - Considerations whether to allow the application - Whether to maintain Status Quo - Where the Balance of Convenience lie - Whether there are serious issues to be tried - Whether damages are adequate - Application dismissed	03/11/2023	YA Puan Noor Ruwena binti Md Nurdin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=20fd0194-ff44-42f4-b06a-14a7f6778d2b&Inline=true	02/02/2024 09:18:48 AB-22NCvC-23-10/2022 Kand. 62 S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N lAH9IET/9EKwahSn9neNKw *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m 1; an éﬁ 1us—22Ncvc—23—1u/2022 Kand. 62 2,:n2a M ,2-4; DALAM MAHKAMAH RAVUAN MALAVSIA DI PUTRMAVA }._1 RAVUAN SIVIL NO zu24 ANTARA GREEN RAY TECHNOLOGY sun BHD (No. Syarikat: 1n9u4e-wy ...PERAVU DAN KLIFE GLOBAL sun BHD (Nu. Syirikat: 543731-U) ...RESFONDEN [DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI YAIPING DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARIIL RIDZWAN ANTARA KLIFE GLOBAL sou BHD (No. Syarikal: eaa1a1-u) ...FLAlNTIF mm GREEN RAY TECHNOLOGY snu But: (No. Syarikal: 1098446-W) ...DEFENDAN 1 5w mmmznnzxwansnun-Nxw mm Sum M... M“ be used m wow u. nvwvuﬁlv mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm 10 15 Gnguug or Jggngmsm Un resvan m Enclosure 36) INTRODUCTION [1] The names m urns appeal wm be referred In as they were aune mgn com. on 15.12.2023, «ms coun had msmisasd Ihe De(endan('s appucauan (or an Ennford /nyuncnon in End. as (‘Order No 2') pursuant to an earﬂer Order dated 19102023 whereby ma cam granled an inIarlm:u\|ory mandatory in;unI:1inn lha\| the Plainnm prayed fur (-ems: No 1"; in End 13 The Defendzm appaaxeu against mg order No, 1 and now ' suna Order No 2 This Gmunds auuagmem contains my reasons lor msnmssmg Encl. 36. ms Ned an appeal ag BACKGROUND [2] The Plamhlf \s a uampany inoorporaxea wn Malaysxa and having us registered address wn Sectmn 3, Petalmg Jaya, Se\angor and ms busmess address In sscuan 26, snan Alam, Se\angor The Defendant Vsa company incorporated m Ma\ays\|a and having us regxslered admass in Nnhong Tehai, Pmau Pinang and H5 business address in Pant euncan Pevak The Plaimiﬁ nas been waned under at nacawarsmp cl Baker Tilly lnsowency FLT, Kua\a Lumpur (“Ihe R&M') by me Small and Medmrn Enterprise Dsvebpmem Bank Maxnysia aerhad (“SME Bank“) on 20.7.2022 pursuant to a Debenlure on 255.2012. [:4] The mam sun was ﬁled by me Plannlm m respect a! a sa\e and purmasslmnsacnnn toms Ds1erIdaMnf2 pieces of and known as Geran Mukwm 194:), L01 9537, Tempal Sungai Rawa, Mukim Pam Eunlav. Daerah Karian, Negen Pemk and Geran Mukun 1941. Lot 9535. Tampa! Sungan Rawa, Mukim Pam aumsr. Daemh Kerian. Negen Pemk owned IN wmmznvzxwansnw-Nxw Nuns Sum In-uhnv WW be used m mm n. nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm wa .mm mm In In 15 quo should be preserved pending ihe dlspnsal oi ihe appeal. The ooun iound that based on lhe avennenis in line aliidavils and applying eouiiable principles, eauiiy dieiaies liiai me s1aIus qua canncl be irrainlained in lhis case as ihal would mean ihe slams line which lhe Deiehdarii sbughi to preserve ihe eonirael and hci be evicled irorri lhe croperlies would noi be in line wiih lhe balance cl convenience oi lhe case which clearly lies wllh the Plalniiﬂ (as I have decided in Ehcl. la apbliealienl. hence, lhe eiaius quo issue dues hol anse here. balance di oonvenienae [20] siinilarlpihe principle enunciated in American cyaiiuriild cc Case (supral. ihe Caun weighed lhe balance oicbnvenierice by considering ihe uoleniial liarrn ihai eimer pally wculd suwer il ihe Erinicrd /rjuriciicn is reiused or gianied. ln ihis case. iris coun had icuhd ihai ihe balehce cl convenience lies in iavour oi irie Flainliii because ii would sulier greener hardship ii lhe Erin/ord injunction was granled in me Deiendenl. [211 Fmm ilie avernisnis, iiie Deiendanl was using ihe Properly lb operaie iis business and having li as ils business address. Despile nel having a licence to operate and prohibited iroin eanying but bperaiipns in ihe uncenilied building. ihe Deiendani acled ic ihe ccnlrary Due lo ihe Delendariirs Ecllorlsi ihe Plalnliri had been denied oi ils righl to use lhe Prouertyic generaie income in order In enable ii to bay oﬂlis lean lo SME Bank Hence ihe Plalniiii has been laui under receivership and suiiersd hardship pursuani iiierelb. The crux oi llie Plainiilrs case is lhai ihe sale of ilie Pmperty would ensur llewever, lo benlinue in be lied under me SPA lpr an indelerrninaie pencd conllnued survival as a guing ooneern or dine was unreasenable while the neiendam was sull trying to obtain nnaneing ibr me Pmperly which ii had been unable lo do so since 2019 is in lAHVlEYiVEKwahSrlﬂmNKw -use Smnl in-vlhnrwlll be used a mm ms bﬂnlhullly MIN: dnunvlnrll via nFluNG wrul 1a m 15 There are onnlladuclnons in ma amaavils :1! ma Defendant mus was aonnrmea m paragraphs 10 and 11 m Encl 40), and (mature, on a balance u1pmaammias,me versmn uflhe Plammf man me Delendanl was Illegally opevaung on me Properly was more pmbable than me uefendanrs demal [22] The Plamlifl averted further that u gave me Delendanl permlsslon lo use [ha Property as storage laclllly unly while oblainmg the CCC and renlal of RM‘/5,000.00 was agreed In by his Defendant (refer in Eﬁllblls A-19). Hawever, me Defendant delaulled an the rental payment In July 2020 and allegedly awed RM2.775‘DGDlDO ln venlal and inlsres1s1o(he Plainllfi Hence, me neveaaaac had been Illegally occupying the Property um now without paymg anything at an Nugalogy [23] An lmponanl pnnclple ln consldenng me aiam Injunctlon was whelher the avpllcanl (Dslenﬂanll would have any lama enfmcmg the result 0! lhelr appeal should ll be successful. If SD‘ the Erinlald Injunction shauld be granted. ln Kllnng Kosflrnl Elsa (supra), (here was no svldence that the delendam was not ﬁnancially capable of hunouring any judgment ﬂlhe appeal succeeds. ln the prasem case, me Puaimm is under reaaiversmp, but n has this valuable Pmpeny which has been snld (or am 1 ‘ooamm on to another buyer. The Plslnfff would be able m pay at: its debts to its credrwrs and ensure Ils survival This la a substantial conslderatlan as I! would be a wane of the Cuurfs Iesuumes ll the Dsdermanl Is unsuooesslul in N3 appeal Thus, the Defendant's appeal waulﬂ not be rendered nugatcry ln the event they ale sucoesslul ya lmvlznvzxwansnw-Nxw -ma am.‘ In-nhnrwlll be used m mm a. mm-y MIN: dun-mm Va anum pm se 15 ze 25 an Damage as an Adguala Remedy [24] As a generax prmmple, wnmncliuns will not he gvanled i1 damages wdmd he a suname and adaquala Iemedylorlhe apphnam In me Kuang Kosfann Case lsullral. Ihe Hwgh Com held that damages would be suﬂwcxenl as «here was s clause \n ma conlrack wmch requires (ha deiendsm me compensate \|ha plainm upon wrengl-my lermlnalmg the cnmracl. Admueneuy. the Iaeuneune plenum had elanned (orgensral end exsmwery damages indwcatad that damages weuld he an adequate ramsdyforlhe plairmlf, smnrany m me present case, n vs noted that m (:5 Na. 15. me uevendann had allemallvew claimed luv damages m me ﬁgure of around RM1 5 mimun The com concluded that me Imuﬂclmrl apphed cor dsmun be Qranled. [25] The Delendenc contended thanhere were seneus Issues me be mad, the Deﬁance ei convemenee Ines wun me Defendanl due to the Ilreparabb damage would suuer compared with me poemen onne P\a\nuff ms Vs because the Flaintifl would sun be ame to sen me Pmpeny even if me Court deedes in its vavem at me end or me man (Kekatong Sdn Ehd v. Dananana Urut sdn and mm] sou :73) and damages are inadequate remedy due ([1 me mamdrrs mahilily in pay its dems In me Delendam II 15 nvled that me Kokndny Casi, lhe Ccurl dmpneal nerd: ‘On In: «ads mat wuve waned before me Veamed Mae m In men, M our new. wnme ms balanoo av wnvemarloe Hes. K has m we plammfs «avem, u (M mlunnlnn no not eumad nu pllinlill um.-s (M nu: 01 Iulnu nu immnvlhll pmpany funvlv. By mum... .4». lmunmion is a um‘ um- mend dﬂumnnfs nghl, u lny, ovlr \|hI diuzmnd pvuplny as m Iy Doslvnmd In am am." [Emphasis edded1 IN \AHmEYmEKwahSrmmNKw -use sum In-uhnv MU be used e mm we nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] mum wrm 15 m [26] x enso rersr la me case 0! Wang song 5 Dr: V Hlnp Lu Manufacturing Induntlu Sdn. Ehd many 1 cu «:01 where (he laamed Judge sealed: “{5} rns smmy sr nu sppnunr In hnnuuv his Imdlllakmg as m dam-Igers .s . rnsrsnsx «mm m the nsrsnse nl mnvanlence mu ms mulls wm llnl deny me avnhmm an rmsnosumry nnmnnsan srmpry because he Vs a1Hmiledﬂnsnn\a\ rnssns. in V5 me duly al me spnussnc m snsw to the com! me cucumslsnces man may sum ms vame onne undanzkma.’ [27] Iasﬂy. rn Linn Kauw Sdn. Bhd v Ovorsou credit Firunca Sdn. Bhd [1931] 2 uILJ1s2wss a\so uselm guidance vor (his Courl m arriving al us decrsuon. Paruculany. this Court has Vaund thal there are senous Issues In be mad but rt rs nut concerned an the rnems oi the alarm at this stage‘ baanng m mrna what me Federal coun deemed In thal case as loHcws. ‘An mtalluwlrary Inruncnan rs a lempnnly and dI:I:rE\mni1y remmy To consider whelher us grim n W rs reﬁne «n. wurl 1. ma! cwlclrnnl mm on nhlm:-5 51 mm. In mum. av In ppannms In pmvlnn mm c I sulullhulnnhcnminnlrl n-mrus ma sums lunzllnmta wilunbthn avldunct and matorhls men n nu ma: vurnnso. rm so-m ls sumnly con:-mod wnn what II has to an In nu munllnu m era-no nrousuns rrgmsnn. parlhs In manna nmpmm. Injury would bu caundlu . .r aflh-m “ [Ernpnssrs added] [251 Accuvdmg kzlhe Hsmm Itwuuld suwer irvepavable injury bylusing ms Properly Vorever whereas lhe nsvenuanvs ngms would omy be posmoned to aner (riat Kokitonyﬂs cars. (supra), 129] Forths rewm,u1s caurmecmea Vn respect of Encl 13 that me SPA was a cunlmganl mnlracl wmsn can only be pervormsa my on me 7u\Nmen\|D1\|he oundihons precedent. II was me Defendant‘: case matthe F\ainlm‘s faﬂure to c<HJDera\e wrm u had prevented me Defendant from ,4 N rmrsrrssxwsnsrmnxw Nuns sum In-uhnv WW be used m mm rs. nvVn\ruU\|Y MW; ﬂan-mm VI] muNG wrm in 15 m 25 so mmlnng ma CF under me SPA. The P\aIrmfl demed m and contended me Mﬂlmenl D! we CP was the ubligauon or the Delsnaanvs. Tms would be me main wssue lor Iris! as was dedded by “us cmm when i\| dwsmwssed EncI.16 0! cs N015 CONCLUSION [30] Prermsed upon the above considerations. me Cour! dlsmwssad me Defendenfs apphcanun m End as wmu cus1s. Order accomungxy Dated 2 February 202; /é--+ Nun! Ruwana E ii Md. Nurdlu Judlclnl Commlulonor High Courl. raiping For me Fla . us. Nor Sllalladnh Blntl sun Mosm. Shukal Baljit u. Firlnevs, Kuala Lumpur. For Iho Dofenuam: Mr. Muhammad Haﬁz Bin Hood Mosm Haﬁz Runlnl & co., Kuala Lumpur. w wmvwznvzxwansnw-Nkw -ma Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used m mm a. nﬂmruﬂly mm; mm. VII aF\uNG pm in In 1; by the Plalntif1(hereinaﬂer relerred to as -the Property‘). The sale and Purchase Agreement cf the Propeny was executed on 7.1 1.2c1a between the Deiendant and the Plaintiff t-the spa‘). The SPA was allegedly unilaterally terminated by the Plaintitl via letter dated 25.11.2021 due to the Deiendants inability to satisfy the conditions llreoedent (op) in accordance with the SPA‘s requirement, namely to settle the pumhase pnee, rental or the Properly and lnlerssls on late payment to the Plaintiii as the owner at the Properly. [4] The Defendant allegad that the unilateral temllnaticln of me SPA was illegal as there has been no Cclurl under In mnflml the same Further, it had expended a lot at costs on the purchase price including fess tor appointment oi urolessionat consultants in its etion to satiety the op. The agreed purehase price was RM19.0DD.000. The payments were to be made by it an earnest deposit at RMZGD ooo.uu il) balance or deposit amount at RM520,DDCl.DD unon execution at the sea and HI) balance at the purchase price ofRM18,Z2D,00D.00 WiU’IIV\| 4 months from Ihe da\|e of obtaining the Certlﬁcala of completion and ooniplianee (met from the relevam lclcal authorities oy the purchaser or purchaser‘: solicitor as ed hy the vendor ('Cump\|2Iiun Data’). The Delendant alsu alleged that the t=laintitt did not give its wdperation to the Detendant as it was obligated to under the sea in order to obtain the ccc. [5] The Plairiml earlier had ﬁled en Onglnaling summons No AB» ZANCVC-H11/2022 dated 5.1 2022 at the Talplrtg High court In ahlaln iraoant possession oi the Property imrn the netendant under 0.39 at the ROC (‘the 05"). That 05 was subsequently withdrawn due lo the wrong made under whiah it was tiled The nelendant then filed a writ oi summons and statement of Claim on 22.5.2022 in civil suit AB-22NCVC- 3 in lAMVlEYlVEKwahSnﬂruNKw -wee s.n.i In-vlhnrwﬂl be used a yaw has nﬂnlhallly MVMS dun-vlnhl via aFlt.lNG Wml 15 1503/2022 against "18 Plaintiff and also named the RGM as the 2"‘ Defendant ('IletelnaHsr ietenea \|o es as he 15'). The as Na. is. amongst pthers, spught speciﬁc peitpnnanee of the tennlneteu SPA The Ptaintiii an 17.10.2022 tiled this writ at Summons Nu. AE—22NCVC»23- 10/2022. [5] There had mean an onslaught oi interlocutory applications med in cs No. is entt the present sun. one at them wee iei an interim prohibitive llqunﬂﬁun ﬁled by the t:-etenttent in as No. is. inter elre. to stop the Plainliﬁ train alspesing the selit Preperty pr to stop the ueleiiaent (rein etstaining a pusiness Imence and/ctr operating an the Property tor the purpose 0! getting the sec. [7] End. t3 in 05 No 15 was ﬁled by the present uerenaent an 29.3 2923 In maintain the sums qua oi the Pmiaerw because the Dslendanl in this suit had veiled In ppuiin the interlocutory Pfohlb VE iniunctlpn (Vida Encl 4) pending the that. The court achtally granted an interim enter en 9.9.2022 eiter an ex-parte hearing at the senie. Huwever. the interim uiiler lapsed etter zt days due to non-cnmplianoe with 0.29 it (ZEN [3] In this Gmurlds v1 Judgrnenl. lwill also relei to my den: 13 since Encl. as was inside pursuant to the granting ol the Order No 1 in Encl For ease at relerenee, the prayers gtariteu to the Plairititi in outer No i were as totlaws: (aj sstii peiinnh sllplya neieiiaan merlyerahknn mllikan kasorig tteiteiiah yant: aipetienu atpeweh eeren Muxlni mu, \|.oN3537 dart Gamrl Muklrrl 1941.LuIB5£lE kadnaduanya peneriipat dl SUIIQII Ram, Muklm Pam aiintiir, Daemh Kerian dl Nagarl Parak dl maria teiitapai setu my unit barvgunan psmm limaﬂmkal ﬂan sehuah kimna an avmsnyﬂ [Nnnnnah Tersehm) kenadz mamuraanam tampon 7 haw den taﬂkh vsvllmh‘ my Pevinlah sunayn P\amM-iibenkan nluss dun laman unluk memasuxx den 5 memema Haﬂanah Tersehm: 1:; Elhawa Plmnm ﬂan/Emu wakir «mm pangkhiﬂmalnyn yang dlbenksn kuasa denuan sempuma «mum kebenamn umuk menralankan manaemana kuasa unmk malvnamml mmuan many an Hanarmh Imam (ct) Eahawa mm panman lemadap nevenaan umuk manank balnk kavsal plrsandwlarl yang mmalukkzn nus Hananah Teuehul all: pirxmih-In mauoz/2m dawn uempon 7 man nan mam varmuh mman mbeﬂkan 15 Rapid: mam mm Muan msmahnkan kulwksna perm-nzan untnk mundavilkzn ccc, dsn 19) Kus In HEARING OF ENCLOSURE CW [9] “we cause papers in resuecl cums applicaliun were as luﬂawse x, me Wril Samar: dan Pernmaan Tunlulan daled me 2022 [Ends 1 and 2): u. me uerendanvs Pembehaan dated 21 11.2022 (End. 5). 25 m. me Plammn Jswanan kepada Pemnewaan dated 5.12.2I122(Em-J 5); W. the PLEVHHWS /ntsr-pans appﬂcaﬂon dated 2.5.2023 (Encl. 13); v, me Fla-nms Aﬂdavil Sokcngan by Andvew Heng on an 2.5.2023(Encl 14): ‘ the Defendanfs Andavn Balasan by um Yong Fang on 25 5.2023 (Encl. 19). vu. me Plainmrs Aﬂdavil Jawapan by Andrew Hang on 12.5.2023 (End. 20). viu. me Flamliffs Aﬁdavil Tambahan by Andrew Hang on 27.5.2123 (Encl. 22). 5 Vx. the Deaenaanrs mter-pans appucaunn dated 1.11.2023 (End. 36]‘ x me Defendanfs Anuavn Sukangan by om Vang Fang un1,11.2o2a (End 31); xi. me Drummers Aﬁdaw: Balasan by Andrew Hang on m 14.11.2023 (End. 40); and xix. ms netenaanrs Amavix Jawapan by on Yong Fang Hang on 21.1I.2023(End. 4:4). [1 n] In End. as, me Deiendam prayed for: 15 H) San: mmku .u xnunm unlukmnnyekal wammam. ad: mm um..- mu ms4a\ui pekerja-pekeqanya‘ ejen-qennya‘ pangkhndmnh pengkmamamya den/alau me\a¥uI apa Aua cam sekahvun aanpaaa malupusuan, mvuual dan/ahu msnjahnkan sobalang hansaku ks Itas uanmmmmn yang dlkenaﬂ mm: Gavin Mummaa, La! 95:1, 20 Temnatsunazl Rawa‘ Mum Pam Bunvan Daerzh Kenan. Neaen Fnrak dan Gavan Mulam 1941, Lm me, Tlmpul Sung Rawa, mm Pam Human Daemh Kerian, Nsgen hm {selepnl ‘ 'hanun:h—hanan2h IarsebIn'). semrwwa panaawm nndnkan um, (2; Emu m,....»m .4 "mm .mm manghnlzng Pllmlﬂ ulna ad: Jetzra 1; sendm mu mmu. pekzuarpekzrpnya‘ eiewepennya. nangkhmmnl— Dsnikhmmamyd ﬂan/zluu new spa lua earn sekmlvun daﬂpuds malkiapallun mlhkan kuuung harvanah-hananah mum dlﬂpﬁda Defendan sehmgqa pmgakmran mmnun mi, 13) Szlu lnlunksl mvluk msnyekel P\zmM semz ads mm senam alau so malllm nuksni-Dakanarvya‘ awn-Ilannyiv nanakmamar pengkmdnulnyn dam/nlau mama up-I ins can sekaliﬂun daripnda wk uhagm srN\AMmEm1EKw SnvmNKw mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm mehluuskan. ......,uax ﬂan/clan menjamnkan sebnnang Aransaiw kealas haﬂznarmananah menu‘ sshmuua venyeleianan din kepumsan aw... nhh Dzﬂlndan k. M.r.x..u... aw... ...m.., kapulusan Mahkamnh yam: Mulm .m a....m 19.10 am; 5 (4) Sam lnlunkil nmuk mmahalarlél Plamm Sam: Ida iucara isndlﬂ ilau mslahu ,,m.,-3. mam-, Ix-H-aim-yn‘ n-nsxvm-n-«- Denﬁkhudmnlnyn dnnlanau melahab ans Jun mm seknhnun dnnvadn msndupatkan mm mm. hnnaruarmnnnnah «mum uzripaaz Defarvdun snhwlsa Puﬁyebsawan darn kapnlulan Ra)/urn olsh m mm." x. Mlhkamnh mm" mmadav mums." Mahkamah yana MuI\z\n\benankh1E1l) 2023‘ (5) Bahawl Flmlcavian Imsv Pﬁlles pelmuhnnln ini akan dilsupkarvdahm Iempoh mm Duluh sa\u(217 han dun mnkn pertnu ' (BY Bahawa semua kosdmn Yam] \|er1vba\| dan Hmhm daﬂpada Dérmohanan is ‘N Mndaklah dlbﬁyaf Nah Flalmf klwda Defend: ,dan (7) RAM Iain den Vanlmnn sebagmmuna Mahkamah yang MuUn\nH\kir1un Dalnldansesuzw [11] The reasons (or me above prayers were H1 2n (5) Pada 123 112.2023, Mahkamah yam: Mulla mu telah mambenarknn pelmohanln Plamm mm mjunkm mdalul Lampllan 13 benankhzs 2023. (m Delendan ksmumannw lelah memlaukan sam rayuan ks Mahkamah zs Rayuan Pads 2:: In 2023, meriyu tzmldap kepumszm Mahkamlh yang Muha mu; (0) Dalam kemunukman Deumah xmunmyana mpomm da\am Pemmhnnan ml udak mbmkan, mum akan munemskanunluhnalupurkan aanmau bemmun dengan nammnmman mam, run an Make‘ Pemmhcnan um henﬂmdan dlhenarkan men Mahkamah yaw mm m\ nae: msnuskzlkan status am: am klwlbawaan mu-an den bag: memaslikin bahawa mm" lemsbu\| mm mlniadl ua-sun, Ikadermk ﬂan semalamuana salu usana yang mans! srN\AMmEm1EKw SnvmNKw mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm in in ERINFORD lmuucllou [12] Alllieugri lne ouurt rias dlsmisssd an appllcahon liar an iiilerloculery injunction, il slill rias iunseielieri lo giaril llie unsucoesslul applicaril ari inlerlocmnry iniuneiian pending appeal agalnst sueli dismissal iri enierlo preirenl me decision ollrie couri omppeal irorri belng rendered nugalnry should ll reverse me High courrs GECVSVOVL Erlnlnru Prepanles Ltd. v clinhln couiily Council [1974] cli 2611 [1974] 2 All ER us (refer to Malsyslan cml Procedure 2021, volume 1 at page 441 [13] ll appears lhal an Eririrerd In/unl1l'on is similar in an order ler slay er pmoeedlngsi but lriis is eisliriguislieu H1 Kllang Kotflrrll sun Bhd v Kasrna Nusanlara and [2nn2] : Cu 155. Trierei me High Cuurl recognised Ihal wnilsline same legal oonsidelaliuns are appiiaaaie la \|he (wu orders, may are Mo dislincl types at alder An Elinloni Injunmrcrl is an original application on izsawri wizri no pnar orderw be execuleu by any parry, wriereas a slay Order would be souglil up slay lrie exewllori or an order nsriairig lrie disposal olari appeal againsl sum order. [14] The prlnclpls was alﬁrmsd in llie High Court case el nlian sl- Corp Sdn and v Elnk lalarn Malaysia Bhd (Na. 1) [24:04] 5 CLJ I31, wriere it was riele llial Secllon 43 e1 llie couris er Judicature Aal 1964 [CJA) recognises ma lnherenl powev ullhe High Cuurun gram an Erinford lrrjuricziari to prevent me Courl or Appeal ruling being rendered nugatury wrieri would an Er/Noni irijunclipri be grarlled’! The couns riave olieri relerree lo me Kllang Kosrami Sdn Bhd case (supra) lorguidariee. The lens were under an oil Palm Flamallan operation and Mainienance oerilract, lhs nlairilm was appeinled in eparale and iriainlain an oil palm eslale owned by me eerenearil tor a periee el 20 years Aside lmm IN lAMvlEYlvEKwariSriﬂruNKw -we s.ii.i Ilnlﬂhll will he used m mm ea nllnlriallly MVM5 dun-rlnrrl vn aFlLlNG Wﬂxl In 15 IV sulleciing the truils, the coniian enabled me plaiiitilf lo puvchase me harvested iriiils. [15] some lime iaier, msir raiaiisnsnip had gone sour wnersin the defendant ended the said eonlrac\| and omered the plainllli ID slop its opevallons and leave the estate Pursuant to the oanlracl termination, (hs plaintiff applied fur an ax parts lnlunctian to compel the defendant to surrender pnssessiori 0' MD pieces 01 land and In restrain them {mm inieneiing wiin ins plainiiirs carvylng oiii iis contractual esiigaiions. The ax pane injiinciion ended and me pleiniilvnieil an inner panes apphcaiiun iniiinsiion wiiii ine aim lo eaniiniie resiieining the delenaani. The High Court dismissed the inter panes application on the grounds that me saianae nfuunvanlence lies in lauoiir oi ins aelenaeni and iriei damages would he a suitable and adequate remedy for the plﬂlnllﬂ. [16] Folluwing me dismissal oflhe appllcallon, «lie plainrm applied for an Erinlord lniuncliori pending disposal at is appeal. Aﬂer considering lne applicable principles forms grain imlie Eri'ri1i;ri1 In/unzffan, lire Higii coiin again dismissed ine plainiilfs ’iapp\|llz\iun The High com lollowad me decision in so Tsuw Giinn v Klrin Joe Holdlrrgs sdri End a. Dr; [1 we] 1 AMR 3733 wlilcn sets oul me cansideralions wneirier lo grant the Eririlard lriluncilan as lollowe: (i) wneiner me slaliis qiio must be maintained were the nearing of me appeal; (ii) wneiner lne oalanoa or convenience lies in lavpiir 0f the nleiniilv: (iii) wneinerllieappealwoiild be rendered nugalory ilsiicaessliil; and in lAMV\EY!VEKwihSnﬂmNKw -nee s.n.i nnvlhnrwm ie in... M van; In! nﬂglruﬂly Mimi dnunvlnnl VII .riiiiie mi ID zn (iv) wneiner damages would pe an adequate remedy (or me piainmi. [17] The Deiendani argued me: a) mere were inenis in me appeai of me Defendant and b) laking min addduni ine anieeedeni iaas dr [his case, there was a need to preserve me siaius duo owns case until me disposai oi ine Deiendenrs appeal in me Court di Appeei Tne Delendant sirnpiy euprnmed iriax me balance or edrwerrience ievdured IL that were was nd gueranieeirie Piainuri wouid be able io pay damages and damages wouid noi he an adequate remedy. Funrier, me F-Iainiiii aiiegediy did no: amen wnen me Defendanl «m moved meirasseis amp the prdpeny. ‘re mid, ine Plainliif reeppnded me: me approval was dniy for inern in store lhe Deiendanvs rnednineries bul ncll IO uperals pn me property EVALUATION AND F\|ND\|NGS OF THE COURT [131 The burden or proof IS on me applicant (De1endan\) Io seusiy the 4 eensidereiions above. ‘rriereiore, the coun has perused me emdavns and exrnpns med id determine wrremer ine neiendene had done so The oeun oi Appeai in see new Gunn (supra) neid that wniie me eppreaen IS that rm sueeessiui appeal sneuid pe rendered nugalnry, ii does not jusniy me greniing ufa resiraining order. The requirernenis laid down in American Cyanlmid Ca V. Elhicoll Ltd [I575] AC 396. [1 975] I All ER am wouid sdii have to be renewed sieius Ouo [IS] The stams qua is denned as lhe sieie oi anairs max exisled priar id ine plsinhlf ﬁling inerr wnl di summons and applicatiun ior Injunction: Garden Coinga Food: Ltd v Mllk uinkanng Board mu] AG in. me cdud win adapt eduiiahie prinerpies in determining wnemer slams siNiAMi1iEYivEKwansnnr-Nxw 1“ 'NnI2 Sum ...n.r MU he used e mm we niimruﬂly MIN; dun-mm vn ariurm wnxi	2,005	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
BA-23NCvC-17-04/2022	PLAINTIF CHIN FELIX DEFENDAN GERALDINE S. BIGAR	Slander – When an impugned statement will be regarded as defamatory – Publication – Absolute privilege – Credibility of witnesses – Quantum – Evidence Act 1950, s, 101.Costs – Indemnity Basis	03/11/2023	YA Dr Choong Yeow Choy	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=dec2f959-6145-4a06-92da-d34874c9b26d&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: BA-23NCvC-17-04/2022 ANTARA CHIN FELIX (NO. K/P: 781013-14-6127) … PLAINTIF DAN GERALDINE S. BIGAR (NO. K/P: 831017-71-5078) … DEFENDAN JUDGMENT Introduction [1] It is customary that on the happy occasions of weddings, family members and guests alike will gather to wish the newlyweds the best of wishes and to “kekal bahagia sehingga ke anak cucu”. [2] Unfortunately for the Plaintiff and the Defendant in the present case, their marriage does not appear to be destined for life. Despite having been married for over 20 years and having raised three beautiful children, they are in the midst of an ongoing divorce/custody battle. The Plaintiff is currently under investigations resulting from police reports made by the 17/11/2023 16:08:37 BA-23NCvC-17-04/2022 Kand. 45 S/N WfnC3kVhBkqS2tNIdMmybQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Defendant and the Defendant is sued by the Plaintiff for slander in this Court. [3] The primary concern before this Court is the claim by the Plaintiff against the Defendant for slander. The Overriding Issues [4] The prevailing issue in this matter is straightforward. The question is whether a number of impugned statements allegedly uttered by the Defendant amount to slander of the Plaintiff. [5] In the event that the above answer is in the affirmative, the consequential question relates to the defences available to the Defendant in the present case. [6] If the Defendant is not able to rely on any of the defences, the final issue pertains to the appropriate quantum of damages that should be awarded to the Plaintiff. The Parties and the Background Facts Leading to the Present Claim [7] The Plaintiff, Chin Felix, is the estranged husband of the Defendant. [8] The Defendant, Geraldine S Bigar, is the Plaintiff’s estranged wife. [9] The impugned statements complained of pertain to a household exchange that occurred on the 9th March, 2022 at the couple’s residence. The impugned statements raised during trial are that: S/N WfnC3kVhBkqS2tNIdMmybQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 “Felix took a metal broom and threatened to hit Lexie if she doesn’t go out with him” (“first impugned statement”); “Felix got angry and went amok, hit me with a metal rod and broke my leg and I had to go to the hospital” (“second impugned statement”); and “Felix has been abusing and hurting me and the 3 kids” (“third impugned statement”). [10] Lexie, as referred to in the first impugned statement is one of the Plaintiff and Defendant’s three children. [11] It is the Plaintiff’s contention that the Defendant “gossips and utters the Offending Statements amongst her friends, the Plaintiff’s friends, neighbours, and their family members” and that “the poisonous allegations” have been “spreading like wildfire”. [12] The Plaintiff draws this Court’s attention to the recently concluded acrimonious defamation proceedings between Johnny Depp and Amber Heard and submits that in many facets, that proceedings have parallels to this present suit. According to the Plaintiff, once we “strip away the glitz, glamour, sensationalism and celebrity status of the parties, … what you have is a common occurrence in many marriages that have fallen apart – which is that people have very uncharitable things to say about their ex- spouse [sic]”. S/N WfnC3kVhBkqS2tNIdMmybQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 The Law and the Submissions by the Parties [13] The Plaintiff’s position is simply that the three impugned statements are defamatory in nature, were made in reference to the Plaintiff and have been communicated to the third parties. [14] It is the Plaintiff’s contention that the Defendant had only pleaded and relied on the defence of absolute privilege. [15] The Plaintiff submitted that the law on the defence of absolute privilege is well-established. The Plaintiff referred this Court to the case of S Ashok Kandiah & Anor v Dato’ Yalumallai Muthusamy & Anor [2011] 2 AMR 1; [2011] 1 CLJ 460; [2010] MLJU 2218; [2010] 3 MLRA 109, where the Court of Appeal held that absolute privilege defence is attached to statements made during judicial proceedings. [16] The Plaintiff argued that the defence of absolute privilege is not applicable in this case as the Plaintiff's cause of action is not based on a libel arising from a police report. The Plaintiff also alluded to the fact that he has successfully raised this point in an earlier striking out application brought by the Defendant in Enclosure 7. [17] More importantly, the Plaintiff relied on the Federal Court case of Noor Azman bin Azemi v Zahida bt Mohamed Rafik [2019] 2 AMR 421; [2019] 3 CLJ 295; [2019] 3 MLJ 141; [2019] AMEJ 0052, that said in clear terms in paragraph [47] that “there is no valid reason of public policy why the maker of a police report should be free from accountability by way of defamation action to publish the defamatory words contained in the police report to the world at large”. S/N WfnC3kVhBkqS2tNIdMmybQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [18] The Plaintiff then went on to further submit that the Defendant was not a credible witness and had given conflicting evidence. [19] Last but not least, the Plaintiff averred that adverse inference should be drawn against the Defendant for her failure to call Lexie, her mother and the maid as witnesses. [20] On the question of when an impugned statement will be regarded as defamatory, the Defendant referred this Court to Hisham bin Tan Sri Halim v Teh Faridah bt Ahmad Norizan & Anor [2021] 6 CLJ 56; [2021] 10 MLJ 683, where it was explained that a statement is defamatory if it: (a) tends to lower the Plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, (b) causes the Plaintiff to be shunned or avoided; (c) exposes the Plaintiff to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or (d) imputes to the plaintiff any dishonorable or discreditable conduct or motives or a lack of integrity on his part. [21] The crux of the Defendant’s case can be distilled into the following, namely, (a) that the Plaintiff has failed to prove his case against the Defendant “by failing to satisfactorily prove at all that the Defendant had even uttered the Offending Statements at all against the Plaintiff” as mandated by section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950; and (b) that the Plaintiff’s witnesses, including the Plaintiff himself, are not credible witnesses. The Trial and the Witnesses [22] The trial took place over two days, that is, on the 8th and 9th of May, 2023. A total of 4 Witnesses testified. S/N WfnC3kVhBkqS2tNIdMmybQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [23] The Plaintiff called 3 witnesses, namely, i. Chin Felix (PW1), the Plaintiff; ii. Suah Char Bou @ Chua Soon Tee (PW2), the Plaintiff’s mother; and iii. Mohamad Azlan Ezuddin bin Jumari (PW3), the Plaintiff’s business partner. [24] The only witness that testified for the Defendant, Geraldine S Bigar (DW1), was the Defendant herself. This Court’s Findings and Decision [25] At the outset, it is this Court’s finding that the three impugned statements, on their own, would have a tendency to lower the standing of the person referred to in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally and/or would cause the person referred to in the statements to be shunned or avoided and/or would expose the person referred in the statements to hatred, contempt or ridicule and/or would impute to the person referred in the statements a lack of integrity. Hence, the impugned statements are defamatory. [26] The issue that follows is whether the three impugned statements referred to the Plaintiff. This is a prerequisite element that must be present in an action for slander. That the three impugned statements are made in reference to the Plaintiff is neither challenged nor denied. [27] Thus, this leaves us with the remaining crucial poser of whether there was indeed publication of the three impugned statements. S/N WfnC3kVhBkqS2tNIdMmybQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [28] On this important element of publication, the Plaintiff had submitted before this Court that, and as noted in para [10] above, the Defendant “gossips and utters the Offending Statements amongst her friends, the Plaintiff’s friends, neighbours, and their family members” and that “the poisonous allegations” have been “spreading like wildfire”. [29] From all these friends of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant, neighbours and their family members, the Plaintiff only chose to call three witnesses, including himself. [30] As for PW1, the Defendant’s contention that PW1 was evasive in his answer is not totally without basis. PW1 had on numerous occasions refused to answer questions posed to him, responding with the usual “get it from my lawyer” or “refer it to my lawyer”. While, questions such as evidence on the conferment of the Plaintiff’s Dato Sriship title/award are irrelevant and have been disregarded by this Court, this Court finds that PW1 was not forthright in his answers. [31] Although PW2 appeared feeble, she was upfront with her answers. She very ably summed up this entire dreadful episode between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, as nothing more than usual squabbles between spouses and that one should not read too much into these tiffs. In other words, PW2 has outright disregarded the impugned statements, if at all these statements were uttered to her, as mere grievances by a spouse undergoing a difficult period in a relationship. [32] PW3 is the Plaintiff’s business partner. In the examination-in-chief, he testified that the Defendant had uttered the three impugned statements when they met on two separate occasions at two separate restaurants at S/N WfnC3kVhBkqS2tNIdMmybQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 the Tropicana Gardens Mall. However, PW3 did not adduce any evidence to corroborate his testimony. [33] Based on the balance of probabilities, the Plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden of proving that the Defendant had uttered the impugned statements to any third party. [34] In view of the above findings, it is not necessary for this Court to consider the defence of absolute privilege. However, in the event that the Plaintiff appeals against this decision and the Court of Appeal disagrees with this finding, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned statements are indeed statements found in two police reports lodged by the Defendant. Be that as it may, based on the decision of the Federal Court in Noor Azman bin Azemi v Zahida binti Mohamed Rafik (supra), the defence of absolute privilege does not apply to the present case. [35] This brings us to the issue of the quantum of damages (if the two earlier issues outlined in paragraphs [4] and [5] above are answered in the affirmative). The Plaintiff is not seeking any damages against the Defendant. What the Plaintiff seeks are the following prayers: (f) Satu perintah bahawa Defendan menerbitkan satu permintaan maaf bertulis di dalam akhbar-akhbar dan majalah-majalah dalam bentuk dan terma-terma yang akan ditentukan oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini; dan (g) Satu perintah bahawa Defendan membaca penarikan balik dan permintaan maaf tersebut dalam Mahkamah terbuka dengan kehadiran Plaintif. S/N WfnC3kVhBkqS2tNIdMmybQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [36] In the event that the Appellate Court disagrees with the findings made by this Court on the issue of liability, this Court is of the considered view that a nominal damages of RM100.00 is appropriate and prayers (f) and (g) as outlined in the preceding paragraph are to be disallowed. This is based on the fact that the there was very “limited publication”. [37] On the issue of costs, as the prayers sought by the Plaintiff was well within the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court, the costs of the proceedings in this Court is to be borne by the Plaintiffs, on an indemnity basis. Dated: 31 October, 2023 sgd [CHOONG YEOW CHOY] Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Counsel: Andrew Ewe with Nickson Yew for the Plaintiff (Messrs. Ewe Chong & Khoo) Jazzmine Khoo with Rasika Dharmasena and Ho Shu Ping for the Defendant (Messrs. Jazzmine Khoo & Associates) S/N WfnC3kVhBkqS2tNIdMmybQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	13,574	Tika 2.6.0
MA-A52NCC-68-10/2020	PLAINTIF HAP SENG CREDIT SDN. BHD. DEFENDAN 1. ) Makmur Agrofuture Sdn. Bhd. 2. ) Mohd Zukime Bin Mat Junoh 3. ) Muhamad Annas Bin Mohamad Anuar	I) Permohonan untuk mengenepikan penghakiman ingkar yang dibuat setelah hampir 3 tahun masa berlalu selepas penghakiman tersebut diperolehi tanpa diberikan sebab yang munasabah adalah selayaknya ditolak oleh Mahkamah ini.II) Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan telah diserahkan kepada Defendan Ketiga berdasarkan klausa 9 perjanjian secara pos biasa berbayar dahulu "prepaid ordinary mail” diikuti oleh bukti pengeposan “certificate of posting”, manakala serahan sempurna telah berlaku pada 1.11.2020 iaitu 48 jam selepas tarikh pengeposan. Oleh itu Mahkamah mendapati bahawa serahan Writ dan Pernyataan Tuntutan bertarikh 27.10.2020 tersebut adalah serahan yang sempurna, teratur dan sah di sisi undang-undang mahu pun sah berdasarkan kontrak perjanjian jaminan yang telah ditandatangani.	03/11/2023	Tuan Mohd Sabri Bin Ismail	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1535a4fa-f5b6-4d48-9d68-de5d9ddcdeb9&Inline=true	03/11/2023 10:05:53 MA-A52NCC-68-10/2020 Kand. 29 S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N qQ1Fbb1SE2daN5dndzeuQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m\—As2m:c—5a—1u/2020 Kand. 29 cam/zen 1u:n5-E3 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN 0\| MELAKA GUAIIAN SIVIL N0. MA-ASZNCC-GB-10 TAHUM 2020 ANTARA HAP sane CREDIT sun am) PLNNTIF (NO $YARIKAT E850!-H) DAN 1 MAKMURAGROFUTURE sou am) (No SVARIKAT 2ov5o1ou7144m3z477,T) DEFENDAN PERTAMA 2 MOHD ZUK\ME am MAT JUNOH (No KIP 760525-as-5173) DEFENDAN KEDUA 3 MUHAMAD ANNAS BIN MOHAMAD ANUAR (N0 K/F asu4zs~u2-5:45) DEFENDAN KETIGA ALASAN FENGHAKINIAN FENDAHULUAN (1) lm aazxan Alasan Penghaklman berhubung penoxakan Mahkamah dengan kos RM1 sou lerhadnp permohanan Defendan xenga yang mnuax melamn Mans Pevmahonan (Kandungan 9; berlankn 12 Jun 2023 ﬂan Afudavnl Sokangan yang dnkvarkan men Muhamad m uumam SE21-Nsdndx-nu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Anna: am Mohamed Anuar pada 9 Jun 2023 un\|uk lanjman masa mamhllkan permohonan an Vamplran 9 lulebul din mengeneplkan Perakuan Kemiakhudlran benankh 25112020 sena Penghakxman mgkar benankh 2711 2020 m nokumemoxumen benkut yang Ielah aranxan m Mahkamah Yang Mulla ml mam dnmjuk sehagaumana benkul 37 m wm saman benankh 2710 202:) (salepas Im muqux sebaglx -wm Saman tersehul“\|, Pumyallan Tnn\|uLIn bedlnkh 21102020 (wens um dnuwk sebagal “Pernya(aan Tumlnan Imsehut‘) Aﬁdavll Pinynmpalin Mohd Hanaﬁah Bin Suboh yang dukrarkan pad: 2112020 (selepla ml duujuk sebagm ‘Almavn Penyimpalan lersebufl. Fsiikuin Kemaknaauan beninkh 25 11 2020 (mega; ml dlﬂquk sehagan ‘Perakuan xemzxnzawan xevseum“; Panghaklmnn wunxn 2-mzczo (sewspas Im dvuwk sehagal “Penghakxman nenebun m uumam SE21-Nsdndx-nu mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! rnelahu pus buasa berbayar dahulu “ptepaid ordinary man" dukulv oleh mm. pengepasan iiemﬁcate o1 pus1mg' atau dvlmggalkan dw alamat (evakmr Derenaan yang mxevarnn us] Pada masa yang sama klausa lersehul .uga menyilakan banawa api-Ina nan: Iumutan wnn saman alau pun prose: Slman Femma yang amanm melalul pas axan dxanggap dnenma secala xonklnswalen Delenaan Kemga aaram nempon empal pnlun lapan may 1am selepas tankh pengepasan walau pun levdapal mm. yang banenlangin [111 D1 dmam has In: wm Saman dan Pemyalaan Tunnnan le\ah ulserahkan kapaaa unvenaan Kehga berdasarkan Mania 9 (ersebm mu paaa aomzozo secara pas masa bemayar aahulu "plepmd nrdmary man‘ mm men mom pengeposan -cenmcaue ov posting” nuanakaxa serahan sempuma (e\ah nenaku pada 1 11 2020 Iallu 45 [am selepas tankh pengeposan. [13] Namun‘ se(e\ah wm saman dan Pemyalaan Tunlutan sempurnz mseyankan, Defendan Kenya masm gaga\ un\|uk mamasukkan xenaauan dalim lampoh 14 Ma din Kankh 1 112020 Izrsecul menyebabkan P\amm \|elah memramun Ferzkuan m uumam SE21-Nsdndx-nu mm. snnnw ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 w my n. annmun mm: dnuumnl VII mum v-max Keudakhadwran pada 26112020 ﬂan se\erusnya Penghaklman berlankh 27 10 2020 (ersebul [I9] Eerdasalkan dl alas Mahkamah mendavau bzhiwa serihan Wnl ﬂan Femyalaan Tunlutan beﬂankh 27 102020 Izrsebul adauh sevahan yang sempuma, \|era('ur dan sah an 515: undangamdang manu pun sah berdusarkan kumrak Derjinuan ‘amlnin yang lelah anmaaungam :20] Nalmm sebahknya pma‘ Deaenaan Kenya feluh gagal mnmqumn mahu pun rnemhuklwkan mengapi sarihan lersabul max mlznma a\|au 'Invuke“ Idausa 9 Paqanjuan Jamman “Jmn\| a. Seveval Guarantee 5 mdsmmly‘ herlankh zsezow tenebul Ma\ahan Mahkamah ma pevcaya semngqa nan ml Delendan Kenya masm lagr menelan din menggunakan alamax-axamac yang dmyaxakan an dalam wm Saman ﬂan Pemyslnn Tunlulan lelsebul ma dapat sumac menalm Amavn Sokangan dan Aﬁdavlt Jiwapan yang (e\ah dukrzrkan oleh Defendan Keuga an ﬂa\am pelmohonan vm se\an;u(ny:‘ sehmgga hzn Im ma nuns mlkmman pevpmdahan a{ama\| dllenma aleh wamm ﬂanpada Deiendxn Kehg: hank secala hsm mahu pun berluls m uumam SE21-Nsdndx-nu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [211 Mahkamah Vang Mulxa rm merwuk kepada Atumn 1o Kasdah 3 mm) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 yang menyalakan sepem benkm Service nlwm m Duvsuance M mmmu to ID‘ .31 3 1n Where (I) my 11!: ounlracl pmvbﬂas mm n. (he even! M any .\|o:Mm m mu-u Mme mnIm:1 bemn begun mg umczs by wmm 4: . begun may be served on ma nae-nun: av M such mnn person on hm hem" .. mly be suecvfni m ms mn\|r:n . Inch manmr ov a« such pvaca {whamarvnmln ur on! Mme junsmuwn} as my be 5m wecmod. Then nan mm m maven arm mmmcl ‘s mm m live mmm live WM 1,, mm m E bagun 5 served m Iumdnnce mm ma mNr:L1.lhI Wm mu, slmed m Dirlﬁrlﬁh 171 be deemsd In have been dulv sewed on me detendam [21] DI dalam kas Wire 8. Wire/ass S417! Bhd vs Mohd Tslb Bm Hassan a Ors[10Z3] MLJU me m mans Ham Mahkamah Tmggl dw dmam menclak permnhonan Devenaan unluk mengenepwkan penghaklman mgkar \|e\ah menya\|akan sepem henkut [us] The mods or mm: .3 agrccd h, Lhc mm m thus: 9 m m: oumm H pmnma by the Rulz< 0} Cam 2012. ms .5 upmssxy prmided m Onler in rule s« \| uh) nflhz Rum m (‘nun zmz Sen/1:: u sm uumam sm sane:-nu «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! ofwril in pursuan<eol‘mn\n(I ism ascrrplaﬁerxceqmnn m the am gmeml mndcs prescnbcd vn om. ll) me 1 «rm: mes ofC<wn zmz Once it has been dcmnnmcd by me pmm as 1:: like spcclﬁc mod: vn Much seine: 0! a uni I: I0 be effected. me ml: which kquums a vml to be served m persmam, or an :1, parnnld A :1 regxsmvd pas! addrrssed w ms Lu know! addmss. or mm b; means ummm...c comnmnlmuon ... acnonluncewlh ..., pmcum-dIv¢c\|Inn 1ssu:d lonlm purpuse mu no Longer Bppl) [23] Malahan, Panel Hakwm Mahkamah Pe¢seku(uan di dalam kes Amanah Merchant Bank BM vs Lrm Taw cnoonI1994]1 MLJ M3 damn membenarkan rayuan Ferayu mm: memutuskan sepem benkut xx, am :1 Ma: ma»/,«I.ud mm the mm of dummy] uuv rem Ihramzh me mu m an enrelnpe arldresml to the 1.“: mm. ylane ../ addrerra/I/Ia defendant <'1I7nppImd mm rwlnecvsmrv my me appe/[um 10 mo» mm m» 413 mu ma rm. rammed my atlrnmnledgn-<1/nr mm In hovz haw 4/gum SZVWA? of my rrolwu 0/ zlurmutd Sama add Perakuin Kulidalllladiran boﬂirikh 26.11.2020 adalah mm mating, um ssh, um belkuaﬁmasa dan wa/at amuaprkan [24] neveman Kelnga ‘uga an da\am avmawmya Ie\ah menyatakan bahawa dusehabkan uevenaan Keuga udak menenma wm saman dan u m uumam SE21-Nsdndx-nu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Pemyalaan Tunlulan rnaka Ferikuan Kanaaknaa-ran benankh 25 1 v 2020 yang uun-asumn adbtah pta mung, udak szh ﬂan hdzk mien mxuztxuasakan [251 Namun dermklan Mihkamah manﬂapall bahawa memandingkan seralun Wm saman dun Fenyalaan Tunlman sena kenasrkenas kausa \|e\ah dlserahkan kepada Delendan Keuga berdasarkan klausa 9 penanuan yanunan ‘Jam! 5. sever.-an Guaranlee 5 lndemmry berlankh 2aa2u1s lersebm dun merupakan sarahin yang sempuma dun ugn unaong-unaang, maka Ferakuan Kemakhaduran yang lelan mmxan selepas lempoh 14 han mbenkan kepada Defendan Iupm, Ianya ada\ah sam Pevakuan Keudakhzdnran yang xemur (vagmar) malang dan bmeh dlkuulkuasakan Plamm sewmsnya bemujah bahawa amsan-ahsan yang dubenkan olan weman Keuga Iersebul adalah Ianpa mem ﬂan gagax dubukllkan olen Defendan Kehga dl dalam Aﬂdavn Jawavannya [251 Mahkamah yang Mulla Am meruyux kepaﬂa Kes CVMB Bank and vs Camsa Layer Fanns Sdn BM 5 Anor [2011] 2 MLJ 113 an man: Yang Am Pesururyaya Kenakunan JWS Ko dalam menahk rlyuan palayu man menymakan sepem benkul 15 m mlnam SE21-Nsdndx-nu mm. smnw ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 m mm he mm-y mm: dnuumnl wa mum Wm! / mm WES am. no mcvvl m the Vcrvmd <left'rrdanI « mnlcrvmm (Int/mlmw Ia serve Ihe wt! .2: m regmzr2dadd.rexx um hm Br cl 5 .2; we guarantee agrvemwvt me /im nlejtruhml mt been conmtuml as the xewnd defendanﬂx agent /0 actepl Aervre and since nu.» plumnff mu II/ﬂlilrd mw...- 0/ my my IN! my fin: xlejumluru X nwnw In/IUVJA‘ an n-rvm» L:”z‘L.‘ltK UN .1" mum: LIL/(‘Ill/llﬂl mu regular mm mm AM good \I:n!«- H/I'M’ an: m Ihv «wad dcfendanlx mmm oddrvrx or pvmam 071729 or rt/In/malwelv zlxmugh an ﬁrxnlq/endan! (1: I/!( Axgnnl/orrhescmnd agmim The mime aha reerned m xwporl the mm um: um second defendant Mm aworc u/M5 wnl mt lhe/lulgmenl m dq/i1uIlIhaIjnlIawed(::c pmw msuw [211 Selaluutnyi Plamm oalah menunzuxm bahawl sstelah penghakvmin berunkh 2711 2020 aupemem Plavmw \|ug\| tam: pun menghanvar sesallnan Fenghakwnan xusebm kepada Delenuan Kemg. melam sural beﬂankh 27 11 mm mm penyenhan henankh 1 12 2020 wga Ielah meksmbnkan an dalam eksmm “P'I'T—I” Aﬁdavll Ba\as.In Pnamnv ylng ﬂukmrkan pm 26s2a2a Namun. Deiendan Kehga guga msm gagal menulankan nulm yang man dlkunukakan temenut [2a1 men yang uemman, m sebahk luduhan nevenuan Kenna banawa behau gags! mensnma wm dan Pemyalaan Tunmcan yang is vehh dmamar bamzsaman Idausa 9 “Jam! a Seveval Guaramee & maamury benankh 2a 5 2019 yung man: with smxukun Blah ma-um mu ierahannyl adalan temlur (regular) dan 5.57: a. sum us. undangr undang melalul anuavmaﬁuavn wng dnaulkan, Defender: Kenga juga gagal membukhkan sebahknya ﬂan hehau ‘uga gagal memhuklvkan banawa beliau mempunyar men! mahuvun vambelaan yanu Davlu dubscavlkan dx dam» amavnnya [291 on dalam kes Bank Bum/pulm Malaysia BM vs Ma//Is Amanah Rakyal [1979] 1 MLJ 23, Pane! Ham Mahkamah Persekuluan dalam menclak psrmohonan Perayu le\ah menyacakan sepem benkui n a~ axmmalic mm n‘ ma Jlnlgmcnl ., Irgu\|nr.1h<lHlI< an mﬂeiqhle mlnhal (hem mustIx-an:\|ﬂ1dmIloIm:nls.malIs. m\amdzv.ix slzmng mm mm“; m -ls-Vans’: an mcril» (so) Selamulnya di daiam xaa Tarsma Mama 3 are Insurance Ca LTD v Wang Pan Peng & Ors (197611 MLJ 7s Hakim Mohamed Axmi relah menalak pemmhnnan unluk mengenepllran penghaauman dengan alasan sepem benkut (1; the upphcanl had no! shown 3 pnma ram mm: on lhc mtnls m law or m [an and therefore an applicnlvun mum hr dummed m umam SE21-Nsdndx-nu mm. saw ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Sum: ada dakwaan Dcilndan K-riga lidak mnganali snimy Tm Choc monq dun lnnamngan yang mm 0‘! mm 1. sum: Eulranku zunarvkn 25.1.2019 wan dip-Iluhln momplkln nlu pvmbolun. 1:1) Selaruulnya Defendan Keuga m dalam Ahdavn Sukungannya yzng dukmrkan ma 9 5 2023 Juan man msnvyalakan bahawa hellau Inak mengenah Shmey ran Choc Hanng dzn landatangan yang uanm a. dull!!! Jam! 5. Sevelal Guarantee benlnkh 25 a 2019 man mvllsukan [:21 Namun. Mahkarnah mendapalv bahawa hada mum yang msnyokong pengaxaan neoenaan Kanga lelsebm Mmahan Nada undakan yang mamml clan Detenaan xeuga oagx membuktlkan bahawa Iandalangan benau Ielah dlvalsukan Sebagaw lambahan Deiendan Kehgl Jug: gagax rnenumukkan sebnrans usana (elah mam: hag: menmawa perkara lersebm ke pemaman Plamm ssbelum nous pennononan uu dlfaﬂkan bagl membukukan fandahngan an dalam Penanuan Jamman Jam! 5 Several Guarantea a. Inﬂemrmy berlankh zsezms ada\ah benar—benar \anda\|angan yang palsu sedangkan Ianyz adauan suanu luduhan yang sangal senusdan P\aImw‘ bemak dumaldumkan mengenalnya sesegeva yang rmmgkln u m uumam SE21-Nsdnax-nu ma saw n-nhnrwm a. LAIQ4 m mm he mm-y mm: dun-mm wa mum v-max 13:1 Mahkamah \|uga bevpelldapal bahawa pengallan wenaan Kahga larsebul hanyabah semala-mall aluin unluk mengenepvkln Penghaklman bedankh 2711 zozu Innpa dnsnkong men asas mm yang kukuh Sepalumya hndakan Vebm \|egas din senus (elah mamml pka lunar-benanandalangan (emebm adalah pa\3u Defendan Kenya nanya mengambll lmdakan apanua lakla ml dlllmhulkan man peguuncara Ptalnw an dnlam Andavul s-man yang aumman pm 13 7 2023 (nquk pacla pevenggan s Aﬂdavn aalasan my Puamm warm an man: Decendan Kenga semnpnnya Ie\ah membua\| sam laporan puns pads: 25 7 2023 bag: mengavakan buhawa (Indalangan bellau hellh dlvalnukan tmmk Eksmbn MAA-2 AﬂdIv\lJIwlpan(2yD:1=rvdan mg; yang unkrzrkan paua 2e 7 2023 [:4] Jews pemualan Defendan Ketm lariebul adalah sehagxl salu lac!/cl! manoewlv (mun mushhll) yang am: amalsuknn sehlgal sam penyzxangunaan moses Mahkamah Vang Muha ml Jlka henav candarangan Delendan Kenya (e\ah mparsukan, maka beuau sepamlnya mengamm hndakan dan awal unmk mendiuavlkan buklw» mu yang pedu. mengalankan nmnan Iaruul mahupun mambuat Vapour: pans leblh awn! agar undakan segue dapai mamml m uumam SE21-Nsdndx-nu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [351 Berkenain dengan isu Inn. Mahkamah Vang Muha ml rmrmuk ksvada kes Dllo’ Tun Hang cnaw vs Tan xun Hora. Dr: [2005] 7 ML! 154 a. man Haldm Ana-n Mnllk J dalam msmhenarkan layuan Flamm telah menyalakan sepeni benkul m m mun ﬁsund that m pmywsed amzndmenls to an vlatemenl ofclnlm wzs naming more Khan . Lm.1iu\|manocuvn.- which could he mmlrurd Is an nbuw arm: pnxess arm» coun lT=I\un Tamung Tmas & 0:5 vs Tetuzn Syn Tai Hung Trading son and [anus] 4 vu : 465 The pmpnvsed unenunmns w m: mnmenuorcmn. would hm: the ma cl‘ nullifymg nn.n...1 tnnucmunx and ...1nn..anns mm the pamts had mad: in the ‘statement ofagmd rm: and wauld also mvdcr [ht exams: of secunng nu» ‘hgtcd issucs n. n: mad‘ meﬂbclual or uulas. Th: coun also found that m: proposed mnendmunu m mg Vlalunzvll 0} claim Imghl be conslruui as an allempt to have n second but at the proverbial then) especially aﬁer havmg Lhc Ln-nus. uf hunng Ihu suhmN\Iun~' n! ma Ieamrd munsael for me defendants befon lh: (rial gudgqsee pan Say, [:51 sewarqumya, Mahkarnah Jug: memmuskan banawa heban pembukuan (burden nfproo/7 Dig: membukukan dokumen Jomr 5 Several Guarantee 5 lrldsmmly beﬂalikh 25 9 2019 mm mpnlsukan sebagaumana yang dmakwa mg: Ieﬂelak pada Devenann Kenya Namun‘ nan: buktl-bukll sedenuklan dleksmhukln an dalam Anaavu m n Nah: Permnhnnan Benznkh 12 s 202: (seleoas 4m dlvujuk sebagal ‘Nous Permohonan le:sebu(“)‘ gu Anasvu Snkonqan yang mmsmsn oleh Munanua Annas Em Mohamad Anuar pads 9 s 202: (wlepu ml dvrupnk sebagat -Anuavn Sokongan Deleudan Kenya nersenum ny Armavu Bikaaan Pnamm y-ng dnkurkln oleh Flong wk Yaa pada 2s 3 2023 (selepas Im mrumk sebagax Amavu Barassn Pwaunmersebmw up Afndavn Jswapan uevsnaan Ksnga yang mxrsmsn men Muhamad Annas Em Mahamad Anuar pada 912323 tselepai Im dvumk ssoagm “Aidan Jawapan De{end-In Kehga magnum darn .) Hujahan Berlulls nsvenaan Kehga berlankh 132023 (sehpis m. dnruluk saoagm “Hwamn Benulls Def-mam Kednga \|evsehuI'D m mum simmsanax-nu mm. s.n.\ nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w may he nrW\nnU\|Y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Sukurlgan mahupun Aﬁdavn Jawapan Plainm msumun rapan pulls yang album pad: 25 72023 an anti! kapada paklr mum Inngan wga yang hanya dnbual pads 57 2:12: unluk membual pamenksaan ke alas Iandavangan Delendan Keuga yang masm bemm dlpisllkan kepumsannya (m;\.I( Exsmm MAA-1 dan MAAVZ Aﬂdavn Jawapan 12) Defandan Kenya yang uukrarkan pm 25 7 may Sukysn 101 Akla Katsmngan 1950 memperumukan sepem berkul Burden av mac mi m Vvmoever dares any mmm glvejuﬂgmum me any \e9a\ mm Cu lnlbxlly depend! on m. axrslwu cl um Much he asseﬂs mus! p/we mm Imse lam em! L2; way. : pnrwn Is buund m prove the existence amy rm :1 Vs gum the human ad prwl Hts on ma! pevwn [371 on dz\am kes Lelchumanan ChemaIAlagappan @ L Allagappan (sahagar pelaknna Wasml/Exsculor Kvpada SL Mame/no Achr A/Ia: Sana Lana A/amen; Ache. Sr Man; 5 Ancr vs seem P/amanoa sun am: [2011] MLJU :79 Nam Mankamah Femekuluan sehulal sham mecwyalakan sepem hevlkul -> An action a..(m.d mus! nu\|]mlplunlx~im\|1\:graremuu that fraud ts alleged but zlso me speciﬁc basis arm: allegxuon. 1 .- me rm; uhed upon an Swan » S:ddon [2011] I WLR mo :1 pamgmph as an n gen=:1\|ru\|e.Ih: more serious me alltgarion nrnnseonann. me grnlrr .5 me nerd fur n.n.en1.n In be givrvl which rxphms Ih: basis for me auegannn. ms Is expemm. so when zh: nﬂeganon mm is bring mndz is uf and mm or dtslmilut) me pom! ts wzﬂ established by zulhonly .n me case offnud“ mnee Rhus Duslricl cnnneu V Guvemor xnﬂ Company nvme Bank of Enghnd mo 3) [20423] 2 AC In pm 51 per Loni Hope, Lard Slcyn and Human .n agmmenn ‘The rms must be so smed as In show msuncny max fund is chatgedqciuden Neplunc v. Om\|dtnxn\|[l98*1] \ L\|yml‘« Rn, xosaox: Davy \ <1»-emxm 7 mu 473 n oxen" usunena Luke se lambs supra n sun r [:31 Du di\am kes Umred Asran Bank and vs Ta» Soon Hang Cansln/ctron Sdn Blvd 11993) 1 ML! uaz naxnn Mamunnan Pcvsekuman man sebulzn mm menolak rayuan Perayu dengzn menyalakan sepem benkur (4) Th: mu: Mmher . stgnzmm on . dmnmml ms been men ix’ a qu:sIIon 0! cm I! Is a malwr for :h: nm court m aewnnne me: mns\d:1ing\|hL- en-dab.m_» onne mlmssﬂs n ms sun and hard nnn uking into account my exp:I\ evidence on me paml. 45: \|n e cnil use Ind mom 53 n .e e min]! em me cvidxnc: nrnn expert on handwriting nnsuppanea by mgem am showing me pmccss by which >n- um: 10 ms condusiun us wnnnn-ee and . y reliant: upon such evidmcc would commute 3 serious mnsduecinm ~Aarmn\|\|ng inredercnce by an nppenne mbmml“ sm numm Sim Sdndznuﬁ “Nana snn ...n.mm be n... n vsﬂy ne mmnuuly mum: m.n.n VI mum Wm! [19] man yang demvklan bevdasirkan kes-kes yang dmyalikan an anas sena peruelasan yang mbenkan Mahkamah W berpendapal bahawa tandatangan pa\su {forgery} ada\an suatu xsu yang sangal senus dan ndak mnen dlnandang remeh dengan hanya menyalakan hahawa hnﬂalangnn (ersehm adalah (andnlangbn palw dengln nanya aam Iaporan pans d\bua\| mahupun swat bag: memenksa tandalangan (ersebul Ia nams datanq aangan buklv-bukll padat, (ervenncv dan manaalam bag: menpelaskzn kesahhan memalsuknn landalangan Iersehmdan bukan nanya sekanarsebman atau muuhan iebagavnana Kenyalaan De4endan Kebga Izersebul Oleh nu. beban pembuknan yang xanecax kepada uevanaan Kehga lersebut mas-n hdak Ienepasmevahn kepada Plamm semngga xun lsu bukailan tindnkan Plainlil mamong nlrlng»bnnnq uengan nilai yang manuan, nunggulung xynnknlnnyn pldl 1a.11.2uz1 dan mm; mendadlnkan human Ielongan. [Mn Semvuulnya Delendzn Keuga jugs le\ah memmbulkan -su-nu bahawa xsaranﬂarangan xelan a-Iaxong dengin Mal yang lelendlh Iaﬂu pada hzvga RM25e7212, P\a\|rml udak mevualankan aue m uumam SE21-Nsdndx-nu ma s.nn n-nhnrwm a. LAIQ4 m mm a. nrW\nnU\|Y mm: dun-mm y.. .num v-max amgenoe (kajlan mam) remadap Dembeli‘ Plamm beruvusan aengan Mahd A1 Km: Em Znmal Pllmm nanya menggulung syankal pana «a 1 1 mm nunnaukan hndikan kubunklupun paua I910 2022 ﬂan mg: um menamnun buuran Ialongin mam yang amuax selepas penggulungarl syankal pads 18 1x 2021 [411 Berkenzzn semua Isu yang mbangkilkan dr atas‘ adalah dlperhahkan nanzwa semua Ian tersebul hdak pernan dmlmkan atau dlumhulkan dldalam marwmana Aﬂdavn Sokongan mahupun Amavu Jawavan uevenmn xemg. oxen nu Mzhkamah Vang Mull: . memvunyau kuasa dun mm: mean unluk max meng-n-an ma mu-Iw tenehul Dada lamp mu ﬂan Ianya lug: um keperluzn bag: P\aInIIl unmk maruawabny: [421 D\ da\am kes Kuan Pek Sang @ Alan Kuan v Ruben Duran 3 on and other appeals [2013] 2 MLJ 174 Hakim Mahkamah Raynan vehh menyaiakan sepem benkut rs; Ilc mun could mvl wmmn me orders aglmsx the mm drfmdanrs. not only becaus: oflhe mu olmc pleadings and ptxyens and KM absence ofpmnfof 1.»; oocassvoned by each and ever} other dtftndlnl. but also bmm um ﬁndings or Ihe cuurl heluw an dtslmnest asslsslance IEH slum om: reqmxemcnls of Law The mun 1. m uumam simmsannx-nu mm. smm ...n.mn .. U... w my me DVWMIWY mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! nlso am no. supply an nn.i.<son nHh: cmul below, in fund dishonest nssiunnoe Gvvm ma mm were no pludzd bus upon which Ih: alleylion ofdnshoncsty was foundlsd and no vleudm has upon wmcn rvllancrwuplaeedlo demonslmluhal\|hcnbi:cuvc\(-st was aalisﬁzd. and goon um n was not sansfncmrul) shown: um um sum and 13rd defendznu wen n. a msnonen sure of mmnl when may zmamd nno me am ma. or sale mu mm-u deeds nfv:sa1e.Ih:I: vus no reason In supply me ammmn of mp cuurl below cu furlher mu mm was no pnx1fu{Ih= Iussuccasslnlvrd on mos: mm: A‘k-pdsofsalc and three de:d$ 01' mayo. the cnnn um no reason wlnxsnver (n suppcruhc mun brlsvw in MS 11...: mm agnmsllhe nxm, ism. mm. nun and 23 defrndanus. Thane was nu pwuuca lius upon which me unngnnnn nraimonesy was {minded and no p\|e1d:d facts upon Much reliance was pump to demonsnm that Ihc wjzcllv: res: W13 sausﬁed. In no mun. mm «are no ﬁnding: offncls upon wnm. an allegation or aisnpnesn, was [waded and upon Whlch rcllnnte wns placed to demonstrate Lhmlheohjecliwlesi \~assax\|sﬁzd{s¢: pm; 93, 247-xx)" [43] D. dalam mnahan Phvnnf. Plalrmf nemum bahawu semul mu- Isu yang mo-npxmn elm nevenaan xemga 4. am udak pemnh dlphdkln nan dmmhulkan plan Plamm an dalam Wm saman ﬂan Pemwtaan Vunuucan, mahu pun Midavn Jawnpanamavn Jawapan mamm lnv adaxan kemna pada misa wm saman a-n Pemyalaan Tunlman dﬂalkan. F\aIImfIe\Ih gagll mam nubnn unluk mengamhll semma hakmmk kendevaan tersebuf sm pomm sap ﬁdndz-nu “Nana s.nn lunhnrwm n. med n mm o. nrW\n\|H\|Y MIMI dnuamnl VI muua vmm [u] Plavrmf hanyi berjayz nuengamw semura mwkin xenaeraan \ersehu\| smepas Penghaklman mpemxem ﬂan man melelang kendeqan Ievsebul nagx mengurangkan punlan yang Ievhmang an mana haml juI\an belsnh uawangan man anenma pad: 2952022 sehanyak RM25,e7212 Plamhl wga wan memulakan llndakan peusyan venggulungan (erhadap Defendan Panama ham mendzpalkan keseluruhan ‘umhh yang havhmang ubagmmani Penghaklman yang (elan dlpemlenl paaa 2711 2020 [451 Se\:n]u\|nya, mam yuga bemujah mnawa xemua unaaxan pehksanaan sepem Peusyen Penggulungan dzn Nuns Kehankrapan yang mamnn Ierhadap Defendan Penama ﬂan Delendan xeuga auamh berdaurkln Kevan: Penghalumin henankh 27 I1 znzn an mana Fkamm layak «emaaapnya yememelah semngga klm oaua pennlah pengganlungan pelaksanan mbenxan oleh Mahkamah Yang Muna um lelhadap Piaxnhl [As] Darlpada hwahan Fhlnnf ml hmbul persnman lenlzng bagalmanzkah Delandnn Kehga boloh mendapilkin kesemul mlklurrul ax alas sedangkan semua kejmﬂan yang msebm an alas benaku weom awal dan asas pelmohanln Detenaan xenga umuk mengenepnkan Pengnaknnan henankh 21 11 202a adalan Defendan 15 m uumam SE21-Nsdndx-nu ma sanaw ...n.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: m.n.n VII mum Wm! Kenya wax msnenma wm samm ﬂan Pevnyataan Tunlulan sen: tandalangan nmenuan Kahgl man mpmuxan lwny: a. mu adalah “Pengslahuaw nevenuan mempunyan pengehtman Iemaoap semua mdakan an azas namun mengambll pendekalan unmx «max mengamml 2pa—apa mdakan lanpn pad: waklu Wu [An ma seluranya Defendzn Keuga tzelah mengelahm semna maklumal dw alas weom awal‘ mengapz Defendan Keuga lldzk mengxmbn unumn mam sanus dengzn mengalanksn smsalan terpenncl paua waklu nevsenux bagalmana Iandalangannya aupassukan mahunun mengnaxzng F\a\|nN ﬂan meneruskan tmdakan pewaksanaan mama: xemaaap Delendan Kanya ﬂan msmmhmn lmdakan \|emadav pmak yang man mavwu unaanngannyz mahu pun memfzﬂkin pevmnhanan un\|uk mengeneplkan Penghakvman mw dan iwal Iago lm pus manuruukkan Deaenaan Kellga mempunyaw mushhat hulk (tactical manoeuvre; bersehndung an seballk pemwhonan mu mahupun seugma mereka-Ieka masan lair Penghakxman berlsnkn 27 11 202:: dnkelepxkan dan Defendan Keuga memapan meM<ma1I habuan dan tmdakan lersebul Seballknya Plamm m da\am kes ml yang akan menga\amI keruglan zkIba\| turlnaikan rmlanﬂ max herbayir ﬂan dlprepudwlakan Iermdlp wmakan Detemzn Keuga ml 17 m uumam SE21-Nsdndx-nu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! [u] Berkenaan Isu .n.. Mahkamah Vang Mull: .... ma msnuuk e. um... kss Man smg Pmnemes Sdn an.../so Pvsslrgs 5.1.. smzozu a MLJ so: a. man: Hzknm Mahkamah nngg. am... monolak rayuan necennan unwk memlnda pembelaannyi (em. msnyllllun seperll benkul m 1).: an... M15 on (he ..W........ m Furmsh a reasonxwbk e<..1a..a .o.. m explain mg dﬂa) ... mm; 2.. zppliczvim. and ...z. . we .0 do 5.. would .c...1. ... lhc ...,...u.i.... hcing disallowed. An ayplkauan would also be dxsnllowcd .r i. was made as 2. Limits} nunutuwe I. was zxmhﬁshrd ma. mg Fedrral Court ... Hung Leong Bhd » 1...». mm Hoe and Anmher Appeal [ms] . MU ml rm. .4.s....c:a mz pnnclplts enuncmwd ... Yamaha Motor Co Lxd . Vamaha (M) s.1.. mm [.933] . \1L12n 0.. .....c...1....... nfpludmgs, .4 sun. application was mad: at . me. mg: of pmoecdmgs. was imp:nuve ...z. me xpphcalian .0 mm .....s. be ........ .. an ally mg. 9. mg proceedmgi and when .1»: apphmlion was made at a lane: suge mm .....s. be wgem and mliunahlv £\phuu:\\|un v... ma dzlny L52: pans mm ur- PENUTUP [491 Eerdasarkan masanalasan dan L7lorIlH)\|onlI yang mnyalakin d. akas. Moms Permohonan hag. Varyulan masa .1a.. bag. mengeneplkan .. sm uumam Sim s.m...u «mm. 5.... .......w... .. ...... m may .. ..«....u.. mm: dnuamnl VI mum pm... Penghakvman benankh 2711 2020 (Lampvan 9) adalah drlalak dangan has DI dalam permahanan Im Delanﬂan Kemga gagal mernbarlkan alasan yang munasabah aan menumukkan wujudnya Isu yang perm dlblcarakan nag. mengenepwkan Penghaklman beaankn 2711 2020 lelsebul Dmenaan Kenga hanya mewwudkan wsu fraud xanpa membulmknnnyz hevsamrsama alasan lam samau-Mala bag: mengeuukkan prosndmg pellksinaan dnlevuskan Iemadapnyl EERTARIKH 2 HB VDVEMBER 2023 MOHD M4 ISMAIL Ham Sesyen Mahkamah Sesyen Melzka Pihak-pmak Bag: mm mamm cm Numl Sahswah mrm Vsmaﬂ Teluan Andrew T 5 Goh & Knam 75000 Melaka 29 m uumam SE21-Nsdndx-nu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Bagl pmak Defendan kelnga cm Mehgala Mumgawa Teluan Mengnxa 3. Campany 12100 Eunarworlh 4am words m uumam SE21-Nsdndx-nu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! LAYAR EELAKANG KES. m Dl alas pemllnlzzn oelanuan Panama. Plalnllllelah memasukl salu Peﬂlmlan Sewn Bell benarlkh 233 2019 G1 man. Plalnm lelnrl laen.elu;u nnluk menyewa kepada Delendan Panama salu (1 l unn Dam “0WDiarmlraz:toIs ctwlnelollawlng slnnaam acoemnes al Lavvelllng Buckzt ls) Grin sunken :1 also plaugn up Ply dlsc nannw, e) Rolarvy llller, 0 Fuvmwev ridge! g) Dlsc nagers M Cassava p\|an\|er (selepas VIII mnnux sebagal Peqannan Sew: Bell lsrsebm). [4] Manakala Dalenaan Kellga bersama-sums aengan Delenaan Kedua adalan penlamnuaenlamln melalul Sam Jam .5 Several enaunlee 5. lndemnlly yang lelan dnanditarlgarll pads 22 52mg Delandarl Kauga bersem Detendan man. man bellelulu umuk rllerljamln pembayalarl pada lepal masa kesgmua lumlall yang kerla dnhayzr kepada Plalnm an nawan Peqannan Sewa Bell lersebul aan lzeraemu umuk merlarlggung rugl lemaaap segala keluglarl yirlg dlzlaml .Iklba\| kemgkararl Delendan Fenama [5] Mamandangkarl uelendan Panama Delenuan Kedua darl wenaan Kehga man gagal unluk rnemlmal bayararl nnaulan bulanarl an nawan Penanllarl Sewn Bell lelsebul‘ maka Plalnllllelzn munlallxan m uulrml SE21-Nsdndx-nu ma s.n.l ...n.mn a. med w my n. mn.ny mm: dnuuvlnnl wa nFluNG vtmxl wm Samin aan Punyaxaan Tunluun berlinkh 27102020 sanavan Wm Samar: dan Pemyalaan runxman benankh 27 to 2020 sempuma duserahkan kepada semua Detendan Iermasuk Delerman Keoga nmngm kamrak din uaua kehadlran dlmasukkan uleh Defendan xeng. «eusnm, maka Plamm (sun mamvauuan um Ferakunn xemaknaavan berlankh 25112020 selemsnya memrauxan Pengnaxunan herunkh 27 11 2020 [51 Maka mm 52121571 namwuga (3) [shun nenam Deleman Kama Ielah memasukkzu Nuns Permnhonan hellankh 12e2c2a unmk mengenepwkan Penghalumnn bedankh 27 11 2D20(eIsebu1 UNDANG-UNDANG MENGENEPIKAM PENGHAKIMAN m Undangﬂndzng yang memhzngunkzn nnnssp manganepman Pengnamman mgka: aaanan sam pvuseduv undangundang yang (elah mmapxan Penmnenan un\|uk mengenepwkan Pengnaxunan yang mpemlahl mesmah dIbna\| dalzm lempuh Hg: puluh (30)harI dan lankh Penghaklman lersebul dlperulehl Proms! yang berkanan dengannya bdeh dwdzpali dw dalam Aturan 42 Kaedah 13 KaedaIv—Ka2L1ah Mahka/nan 2012 Yhng men‘/a\|akan sepem henkm m uumam szzamsanax-nu ma saw nmhnrwm a. 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KA-41LB-12-11/2022	PERAYU Pendakwa Raya [TIMBALAN PENDAKWA RAYA ] RESPONDEN MUHAMD RASHID BIN ABD RAOUF	Rayuan terhadap keputusan lepas dan bebas di akhir kes pembelaan. Rayuan atas isu 'revisiting of finding of prima facie' dan isu pemilikan terhadap barang-barang larangan.	03/11/2023	YA Puan Evawani Farisyta binti Mohammad	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=57f4ef62-de29-478d-9e8d-98d1ed46778b&Inline=true	DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI ALOR SETAR DALAM NEGERI KEDAH DARUL AMAN RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: KA-41LB-12-11/2022 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA …PERAYU DAN MUHAMD RASHID BIN ABD RAOUF (NO KP : 840106-02-5911) …RESPONDEN (Di dalam perkara Mahkamah Majistret Jitra, Kedah No: KC-83-117-07/2019) Pendakwa Raya Lawan Muhamd Rashid Bin Abd Raouf) ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PENDAHULUAN [1] Rayuan Perayu ini adalah terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Majistret yang telah melepas dan membebaskan Responden di akhir kes pembelaan bagi satu kesalahan di bawah perenggan 135(1)(d) Akta 03/11/2023 17:41:01 KA-41LB-12-11/2022 Kand. 30 S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Kastam 1967 [Akta 235] dan boleh dihukum di bawah subperenggan 135(1)(v)(aa) Akta yang sama. [2] Pertuduhan terhadap Responden adalah seperti berikut: “BAHAWA KAMU pada 26.06.2019 kira-kira jam 9.15 malam di sebuah premis perniagaan yang beralamat di Jalan Megat Dewa, Pekan Megat Dewa, Dalam Mukim Putat, 06100 Kodiang, Dalam Negeri Kedah dengan disedari mempunyai dalam milikan kamu barang-barang larangan iaitu: i. 36 paket x 20 batang Rokok John D/blend; ii. 65 paket x 20 batang Rokok John British; iii. 29 paket x 20 batang Rokok Gudang Garam 20’s; iv. 78 paket x 20 batang Rokok John Limited; v. 91 paket x 20 batang Rokok John Black; vi. 346 paket x 20 batang Rokok John Kelabu; vii. 62 paket x 20 batang Rokok John D/blend; viii. 4 paket x 20 batang Rokok John White; dan ix. 8 paket x 16 Rokok Surya Gudang Garam 16’s yang kesemuanya ditaksirkan bernilai RM1,791.60 yang mana barang-barang tersebut adalah barang yang dilarang pengimportannya di bawah Perintah Kastam (Larangan Mengenai Import) 2017 dan dengan demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 135(1)(d) Akta Kastam 1967 yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 135(1)(v)(aa) Akta yang sama.”. S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [3] Setelah mendengar rayuan ini, Mahkamah ini telah menolak rayuan Perayu dan mengekalkan keputusan Mahkamah Majistret. Terkilan dengan keputusan Mahkamah ini, Perayu telah mengemukakan rayuan selanjutnya ke Mahkamah Rayuan. KES PENDAKWAAN [4] Pada 26.6.2019, SP5 telah menerima maklumat berkaitan aktiviti penjualan rokok di sebuah premis perniagaan di Pekan Megat Dewa, Kodiang, Kedah (“premis tersebut”) yang dipercayai dan disyaki menjual rokok-rokok yang tidak sah. Hasil maklumat tersebut, SP5 bersama sepasukan anggota daripada Jabatan Kastam DiRaja Malaysia (“JKDM”) telah pergi ke premis tersebut untuk menjalankan pemeriksaan. [5] Sampai di premis tersebut, SP5 telah memperkenalkan diri kepada seorang lelaki Melayu yang berada di kaunter di dalam premis tersebut yang kemudiannya dikenali sebagai Responden. SP5 telah mengarahkan anggota JKDM untuk membuat pemeriksaan ke atas premis tersebut dengan kehadiran Responden. Hasil pemeriksaan, anggota JKDM telah menemui beberapa jumlah rokok pelbagai jenama yang disorokkan di dua tempat berasingan di dalam premis tersebut iaitu di kaunter dan di dalam bilik tidur ruang rehat. Rokok- rokok tersebut didapati tidak mempunyai setem cukai yang diluluskan dan beberapa rokok mempunyai label MDNP (Malaysian Duty Not Paid) yang merupakan barang-barang larangan. Responden juga telah gagal mengemukakan sebarang dokumen berkenaan rokok-rokok tersebut apabila diminta oleh SP5. Responden berserta rokok-rokok yang dirampas telah dibawa S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal pulang ke pejabat Cawangan Penguatkuasaan Bukit Kayu Hitam untuk siasatan lanjut. KEPUTUSAN DI AKHIR PENDAKWAAN [6] Di akhir kes Pendakwaan, Mahkamah Majistret telah memutuskan bahawa pihak Pendakwaan (Perayu) telah gagal membuktikan satu kes prima facie terhadap Responden dan telah melepas dan membebaskan Responden daripada pertuduhan. [7] Rayuan Perayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi telah dibenarkan pada mana Mahkamah Tinggi telah mengetepikan keputusan Mahkamah Majistret dan memutuskan bahawa satu kes prima facie telah berjaya dibuktikan oleh Perayu dan Mahkamah Tinggi telah memerintahkan Responden membela diri. Perbicaraan di peringkat pembelaan telah didengar di hadapan Majistret yang lain. KES PEMBELAAN [8] Pada peringkat pembelaan, Responden telah memberi keterangan bersumpah dan menegaskan bahawa perniagaan di premis tersebut bukan milik Responden sebaliknya merupakan perniagaan yang didaftarkan atas nama ibu Responden, Intan binti Goi. Menurut Responden lagi, ibu dan ayah Responden turut tinggal dalam premis tersebut, dan pada tarikh kejadian, Responden telah singgah bersama-sama isteri ke premis tersebut untuk melawat ibu dan ayah Responden. S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [9] Semasa Responden berada di hadapan premis tersebut, sepasukan pegawai Kastam telah menyerbu premis tersebut dan menjumpai sejumlah rokok di bawah kaunter juruwang dan di dalam bilik tidur di dalam premis tersebut. Ketika serbuan, isteri, ibu dan ayah Responden serta beberapa jiran ibu Responden turut berada di bahagian belakang rumah di premis tersebut. [10] Responden telah memberitahu pihak Kastam bahawa perniagaan runcit tersebut milik ibu beliau dan beliau menjalankan perniagaan menjual kredit pra-bayar telefon dan aksesori atas nama Freetel Northern Enterprise yang didaftarkan atas alamat yang sama dengan premis tersebut. Responden telah mengemukakan dua (2) salinan pendaftaran syarikat dengan Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia bagi premis tersebut iaitu eksibit D11 (pendaftaran perniagaan premis tersebut atas nama Intan binti Goi) dan D12 (pendaftaran syarikat Responden atas nama Freetel Northern Enterprise). Kedua-dua eksibit D11 dan D12 menunjukkan alamat pendaftaran perniagaan yang sama iaitu di alamat premis tersebut sebagaimana dalam pertuduhan. KEPUTUSAN DI AKHIR KES PEMBELAAN [11] Di akhir kes pembelaan, Mahkamah Majistret telah memutuskan bahawa Responden telah berjaya menimbulkan keraguan munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan dan memutuskan bahawa Perayu telah gagal membuktikan kes pada tahap melampaui keraguan yang munasabah dan memerintahkan Responden dilepas dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan. S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ISU-ISU RAYUAN [12] Rayuan Perayu memfokuskan kepada 2 isu utama seperti berikut: a) Majistret telah khilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila ‘revisit the finding of prima facie’ yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi; dan b) Majistret telah khilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta apabila hanya menilai keterangan Responden semata-mata dan gagal membuat penilaian maksimum terhadap keseluruhan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan (Perayu). ANALISA DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [13] Dalam melaksanakan bidangkuasa rayuannya, Mahkamah ini mengambil maklum tugas dan fungsi Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan dan prinsip bahawa Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan tidak akan mengganggu atau mengubah keputusan fakta mahkamah yang membicarakan kecuali jika mahkamah yang membicarakan telah membuat keputusan yang bertentangan dengan undang-undang atau dapatan faktanya adalah jelas salah (“plainly or blatantly wrong”) (rujuk kes Low Kian Boon & Anor v Public Prosecutor [2010] 4 MLJ 425 and Public Prosecutor v Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2005] 6 MLJ 393). Isu (a) : Puan Majistret khilaf dari segi fakta dan undang-undang apabila ‘revisit the finding of prima facie’ yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [14] Berhubung isu ini, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Mahkamah Majistret telahpun membuat penilaian semula terhadap elemen- elemen pertuduhan yang perlu dibuktikan oleh Perayu iaitu yang berkaitan dengan elemen pemilikan dan pengetahuan. Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa apa yang telah dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Majistret di peringkat pembelaan ini adalah ‘revisiting the finding of prima facie’ di mana berdasarkan prinsip undang-undang yang mantap dan juga prinsip stare decisis, bahawa setelah Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan wujudnya kes prima facie bagi pertuduhan terhadap Responden dan Responden diperintahkan membela diri, keputusan tersebut hendaklah dipatuhi oleh Mahkamah Majistret. [15] Sebagaimana yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes NwiteIkechukwu Ogbonnaya lwn PP [2018] 1 LNS 674: “[14] Pada pandangan kami, pendekatan yang diambil oleh hakim bicara adalah betul di sisi undang-undang. Adalah menjadi undang-undang mantap bahawa apabila Mahkamah Rayuan telah mengakaskan keputusan hakim bicara dan memerintahkan agar Perayu dipanggil membela diri terhadap pertuduhan yang dikemukakan terhadapnya, tugas hakim bicara ialah untuk memutuskan sama ada pembelaan Perayu telah berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan, dan jika apa-apa anggapan statutory telah digunapakai, sama ada anggapan tersebut telah dipatahkan atas imbangan kebarangkalian. [15] Hakim bicara adalah tidak dikehendaki untuk mengulangkaji keputusan yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Rayuan S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal bagi menentukan sama ada satu kes prima facie telah berjaya dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan…” [penekanan ditambah] [16] Dalam keadaan kes rayuan ini, apa yang patut dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Majistret adalah untuk menilai keterangan Responden di peringkat pembelaan dan sama ada keterangan Responden tersebut berjaya membuktikan suatu keraguan yang munasabah atau tidak terhadap kes pihak Pendakwaan (Perayu). [17] Ini selaras dengan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Norol Rojik Jun v PP [2018] 8 CLJ 186 yang telah memutuskan seperti berikut: “[11] We found no merit in this ground of appeal. First of all, the calling of the appellant’s defence to the original murder charge was on the order of this court, which must be taken as if it was made by the trial judge himself. It was therefore not open to the succeeding judge to reopen the issue of whether a prima facie case had been established by the prosecution. Nor was it open to us, being a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, to do so. [12] The trial judge’s duty after the order was made by this court was only to consider whether the appellant’s explanation, if any, had cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. But of course in doing so, the learned judge was bound by s. 182A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (“the CPC”) to consider all the evidence adduced before the court, which S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal necessarily includes evidence adduced by the prosecution at its stage of the case.” [penekanan ditambah] [18] Namun begitu, walaupun dalam keadaan di mana Mahkamah Majistret telah ‘revisit the finding of prima facie’ yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi, ia tidaklah secara langsung boleh mengakibatkan sesuatu keputusan Mahkamah Majistret tersebut (sama ada sabitan ataupun lepas dan bebas) sebagai tidak sah. Apa yang perlu dilakukan selanjutnya oleh Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan adalah meneliti dan menilai sama ada keputusan Mahkamah Majitret tersebut adalah selamat dan berlandaskan kepada prinsip undang-undang yang betul. Isu (b) : Puan Majistret khilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta apabila gagal mengambil kira keterangan SD1 yang mengakui mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan penjualan rokok seludup di kedai; dan hanya menilai keterangan Responden semata-mata dan gagal membuat penilaian maksimum terhadap keseluruhan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan (Perayu) [19] Responden dalam rayuan hari ini telah memilih untuk memberikan keterangan bersumpah dan hanya Responden sahaja yang telah memberikan keterangan bagi pihak pembelaan. [20] Asas pembelaan Responden adalah bahawa barang-barang larangan yang dijumpai di premis tersebut adalah kepunyaan ibu beliau. Dalam erti kata lain, pembelaan yang hendak diketengahkan S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal oleh Rerponden adalah beliau tiada milikan atas barang-barang larangan tersebut. [21] Pihak Perayu telah menghujahkan bahawa keterangan Responden bahawa perniagaan di premis tersebut milik ibu Responden adalah suatu afterthought kerana isu tersebut tidak dibangkitkan oleh pembelaan semasa kes pendakwaan. Perayu juga membangkitkan bahawa Mahkamah Majistret gagal mengambil kira pengakuan Responden semasa pemeriksaan balas yang Responden mengetahui penjualan rokok seludup tersebut. [22] Dalam pertuduhan bagi kesalahan seperti yang dipertuduhkan terhadap Responden, salah satu elemen yang perlu dibuktikan adalah elemen pemilikan. Pemilikan bererti jagaan atau kawalan terhadap barang-barang larangan tersebut dan juga pengetahuan terhadap barang-barang larangan tersebut. [23] Fakta bahawa Responden mengakui yang beliau mengetahui wujud penjualan rokok seludup di premis tersebut, hanya membuktikan bahawa Responden mempunyai pengetahuan. Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan Responden bahawa hanya dengan pengetahuan tidak cukup untuk membuktikan bahawa Responden telah melakukakan kesalahan seperti dipertuduhkan. Elemen pemilikan perlu dibuktikan iaitu bahawa Responden mempunyai jagaan atau kawalan ke atas barang-barang larangan tersebut dan Responden mempunyai pengetahuan bahawa barang-barang tersebut adalah barang-barang larangan. S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [24] Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Denish a/l Madhavan [2009] 2 MLJ 194 telah merujuk kepada kes Chan Pean Leon v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 MLJ 237 dan memutuskan seperti berikut: “[18] Thomson J in Chan Pean Leon v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 237, said that 'possession' for the purposes of criminal law involves possession itself — which some authorities term 'custody' or 'control' — and knowledge of the nature of the thing possessed. As to possession itself he cited the following definition in Stephen's Digest (9th Ed), at p 304), in which the exclusive element mentioned by Taylor J appears: A moveable thing is said to be in the possession of a person when he is so situated with respect to it that he has the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need.” [25] Di dalam kes Chan Pean Leon v Public Prosecutor (supra) di atas Mahkamah telah memutuskan seperti berikut: “To put it otherwise, there is a physical element and a mental element which must both be present before possession is made out. The accused must not only be so situated that he can deal with the thing as if it belonged to him, for example have it in his pocket or have it lying in front of him on a table. It must also be shewn that he had the intention of dealing with it as if it belonged to him should he see any occasion to do so, S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal in other words, that he had some animus possidendi. Intention is a matter of fact which in the nature of things cannot be proved by direct evidence. It can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Whether these surrounding circumstances make out such intention is a question of fact in each individual case. If a watch is in my pocket then in the absence of anything else the inference will be clear that I intend to deal with it as if it were my own and accordingly I am in possession of it. On the other hand, if it is lying on a table in a room in which I am but which is also frequently used by other people then the mere fact that I am in physical proximity to it does not give rise to the inference that I intend to deal with it as if it belonged to me. There must be some evidence that I am doing or having done something with it that shews such an intention. Or it must be clear that the circumstances in which it is found shew such an intention.” [penekanan ditambah] [26] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa dapatan fakta oleh Mahkamah Majistret bahawa Responden telah berjaya menimbulkan keraguan munasabah terhadap elemen pemilikan berdasarkan faktor kehadiran individu-individu lain di premis tersebut dan bahawa pemilik perniagaan di premis tersebut adalah ibu Responden (disokong oleh keterangan eksibit D11) adalah satu dapatan fakta yang betul. [27] Mahkamah ini mengakui bahawa hakmilik (ownership) ke atas perniagaan di premis tersebut tidak secara langsung membuktikan pemilikan ke atas barang-barang larangan tersebut (rujuk kes Leow Nghee Lim v Reg [1956] MLJ 28). Namun begitu, merujuk S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal keputusan di dalam kes Chan Pean Leon (supra) di atas, walaupun Responden telah ditahan semasa berada di kaunter premis tersebut di mana sebahagian barang-barang larangan ditemui di bawah kaunter, fakta tersebut semata-mata tidak membuktikan bahawa Responden mempunyai jagaan atau kawalan atas barang-barang larangan tersebut. Tiada keterangan menunjukkan bahawa Responden telah berurusan dengan barang-barang larangan tersebut yang membolehkan elemen pemilikan dipenuhi. Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Mahkamah Majistret telah membuat dapatan yang betul dalam memutuskan bahawa ‘tiada bukti atau dokumen yang menunjukkan Responden mampunyai kuasa dalam menentukan, mengetahui mahupun memiliki apa-apa jenis barang yang hendak dijual di kedai runcit yang dimiliki ibunya’. [28] Dalam rayuan ini, Mahkamah Majistret telah turut memutuskan bahawa setelah meneliti keterangan secara menyeluruh dan dibandingkan dengan kes pendakwaan dan pembelaan serta merujuk prinsip dalam kes Mat v Public Prosecutor [1963] 1 MLJ 263, Majistret telah mendapati bahawa pembelaan Responden adalah bukan afterthought. Keterangan Responden adalah bersifat penjelasan dan Majistret menerima penjelasan tersebut. [29] Dalam hujahannya, Responden telah menegaskan bahawa pemilikan perniagaan di premis tersebut bukanlah perniagaan beliau sebaliknya adalah perniagaan milik ibu beliau. Responden telah mengemukakan dokumen sokongan eksibit D11 dan D12 daripada Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (“SSM”) di mana eksibit D11 mengesahkan bahawa perniagaan ibu Responden di premis S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal tersebut telahpun mula didaftarkan sejak 5.12.2006 dan masih lagi berstatus aktif. [30] Mahkamah ini turut mendapati bahawa Mahkamah Majistret telah membuat dapatan yang betul bahawa pihak pembelaan telah berjaya membuktikan keraguan yang munasabah atas kes pendakwaan dan telah melepas dan membebaskan Responden daripada pertuduhan. [31] Perayu turut mengetengahkan peruntukan seksyen 119 Akta 235 yang secara ringkas meletakkan beban pembuktian kepada Responden sekiranya wujud pertikaian (dispute) tentang sama ada duti kastam bagi sesuatu barangan itu telah dibayar ataupun tidak atau sama ada barangan tersebut telah diimport mengikut undang- undang ataupun tidak. [32] Apa yang ingin ditegaskan oleh Perayu adalah bahawa beban pembuktian Responden di peringkat pembelaan adalah di atas imbangan kebarangkalian dan bukannya sekadar menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah, sebagaimana yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Majistret. [33] Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah ini tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan Perayu kerana asas pembelaan Responden adalah Responden tiada pemilikan atas barang-barang sebagaimana dalam pertuduhan. Responden tidak pernah menimbulkan pembelaan bahawa Responden percaya yang barang-barang larangan tersebut telah dibayar duti kastam yang mana boleh membangkitkan peruntukan seksyen 119 Akta 235. Sehubungan itu, Mahkamah ini berpendapat S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal bahawa beban pembuktian Responden di peringkat pembelaan sebagaimana dapatan oleh Mahkamah Majistret adalah betul, iaitu Responden hanya perlu menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah atas elemen pemilikan Responden terhadap barang-barang larangan tersebut. KESIMPULAN [34] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa tiada kekhilafan di pihak Mahkamah Majistret dalam dapatan beliau terhadap keterangan pembelaan Responden. Mahkamah ini juga mendapati bahawa Mahkamah Majistret telah menggunapakai prinsip undang-undang yang betul dalam penerimaan keterangan pembelaan Responden. Sehubungan itu, Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa keputusan Mahkamah Majistret yang telah melepas dan membebaskan Responden di akhir kes pembelaan adalah dikekalkan. Dengan ini, rayuan Perayu adalah ditolak. Evawani (Evawani Farisyta binti Mohammad) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah (2) Alor Setar, Kedah 3 November 2023 S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Bagi pihak Perayu: Gayathri a/p Sambath Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Jabatan Kastam Diraja Malaysia Bagi pihak Responden: Siti Salwa binti Ja’afar Tetuan Khairul Suhail Salwa & Co. S/N Yu/0VynejUeejZjR7UZ3iw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	22,698	Tika 2.6.0
WA-22IP-42-07/2020	null	Plaintiff's claim against the Defendants for:(i) breach of confidentiality; (ii) breach of fiduciary duty and/or duty of fidelity; (iii) breach of confidence;(iv) unlawful interference with the Plaintiff’s trade/business; and (v) conspiracy to injure the Plaintiff’s trade/business by unlawful means. Application dismissed.	03/11/2023	YA Tuan Azlan bin Sulaiman	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=64fb6e22-557e-4910-80a0-a5633353ef4c&Inline=true	9-.~<-'ve I-".bs-’.~.- IN THE HIGH couRT or KUALA LUMPUR [couIIIIERcIAL DIVISION) CIVIL sun NO‘ WA»22\|F 42 a7/znzo BETWEEN OAG ENGINEERING SDN BHD CIAG OFFSHORE PIPELINE SERVICES SDN BHD OAG INTERNATIONAL PIPELINE SERVICES LTD — ABU DHAEI OAG INTERNATIONAL PIPELINE SERVICES LTD SETIA OFFSHORE SERVICES sI:IN EHD . . PLAINTIFFS AND NG HOE KEONG DEVANDRAN A/L ARuNIuGAM SUN MARINE coATING (M) SDN mm SVAHIRAH EINTI SAHARUDIN THEVAGAR AIL GURUNATHAN . DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT [F mum’ Aapllualion (Enclosurv 361)] Introduction The FVETHUNS ave pan 0! (ha OAG Group wmch specmllzes In oﬂshure and nnshuva works m pnpelme ﬂew pm caaung servncss and wakimg Sarvmes Vega ) 6’ ll TPle1“.2"‘.4"‘ and 5“ nelendanvs were previously employed by lne Plainlifis Alier leaving the employ or me 1‘ Plainlili in Nuvember 2017, me 1' Delendam lonineo U18 3” Defendam in Apdl 2018, in lne same lnduslry as llie Flalntlﬁs, and me 2. 4'" and 5“ Defendants supsequenlly mined him there in July zozoi the Plainiius brought lnls actlon agalns1 me Delendants. alleging lhal lney had used lhe Plalnllﬂs‘ ponﬁoeniial inlonnanon (‘F'\|aln\|rﬁs‘ ln1urvnaIion")lo runner Ike 3"’ Delsndanls buslnass Oonsequenlly, ineir claims ageinsl llie nelenpanls were «or ii) breach or conndenlielily; (ill breach olriouclery duly and/ov duly olﬁde\|l\Yi lilil meecn ol conﬁdence: (iv) unlawful inlerlerenoe wiln ine Plainlirrs lrade/business: and Iv) conspiracy in iniuie ole Plainiilrs nape/business by unlewlul means siniunaneously wiln ﬁling ine wnl, lrie Pleiniins also applies: ex— pane lei vanaus imerlm reliel, lrlcludlng lei an Anlnn Pillei Order and umlectlve oioeis (coliecllvely. “the APO“)Io lelrlerve and pieces: the Plalrlliﬂs‘ lnlornialion alleged to be in me Delenpenls possession lion: iurlher use and disclosure. ano to preserve any of n or des\|ruc1lon max would lhwarl lne Plainiirrs aonon agalrlsl inem (“the Plaln(lWs' Application“) il lmni alsseinin PI]: 2 a1 1: 20. 22 Pmper execuuon olan Amen Prller Order l$ rml \|\|A$\| conﬁned to the search and exlracllon plvcess at me deslgnaled premises, but also extends lo oover all sols lheleaﬂer when the lruws om-al search and exlraclion are lnspeﬁeds examlned and recorded Thus‘ ll ls lmperalrve lhal superwsmg solve-tors must be Invulvad m all slages ol the execullon or an Anion Plller Order In my vlevw loo, me lactlhallhe APOcalled lot three Iawﬁrms lo acl as supervlslng sullcltors also indlcales lhal supervlsing snllcllnvs mus\| he mvulveu in me execullon aflhs APO al all Ilmes One would ordinarily play lhe predamlnarll role wm. the other Mo slendmg by In case cl unavallahlllly or lncapaclly ol lhe main player so, an all limes there would be supsrvlsing sollcllcrs on hand Funher, lha presence .21 supervising sollenor sl all stages of lhe execullan olarl Anlnn Plller Order ls not msna ensure lhal me rlghls M me aelsnaanl are pmlecled and honoured. but also (hal M me plamllff. ll lhe Plamms. me Plalnhifs Sohulors and VL Cunsulling are allowed m lnsped the APO DBVWBS or APO Documems al will oulsme ullne walchlul eye ol me Sunervlslng Sollcilor, lhen il l5 nnl dlmoull Io rmagine allegallona M abuse and wrongdoing levelled againsl Ihem lnspeenuns belure me supemslng Sollcllor are deslgned and lnlended \|o be saleguam agsmsl lhal ll ls therefore 9 espec-ally lor lhe Plemms salialms. no he so readlly mlllng lo dlsparlse mm lhat saleguard rather surprl -..e n at u 23. 24. 25 26 27 tn eamttert «the Ptaintrtvs truty behaved that wha\| it IS asking for In the P\|atrmf1s‘App\|tca(torI was already provided for m paragraph 9 of me APO, it would rrut have men the Ptatrtttrve Appttcztiun In the ﬁrst ptace. It would have lake a cusmdy of the APO names which the APO was executed at the Defendanls’ premises to August znzu. U\ltma\|e\y. in my view. the orders soughl by the Ptatntm W the Ptetr-tirrs Apphcalton tau aulstde ptthe custody, analysts, Inspedtan and search prpteeets expressly prescribed WI lhe APO, arm eonetrtute an attempt bythe Ptatnhrt \|o vary the terms at the APO That the orders sought by the Plairnrrr VII the Platrrtnrs Appltcattort cunsmute an attempt by the Ptatrttirr to vary the terms at the APO ts a teed-in to the second reasnn fnrreieciing the Ptarnhws Apphcatten. The Pluinturs Applicatian does net lall within the pcrmlltnd exceptions to vary g Ihn terms ohm APO As I had notnled em earner‘ paragraph 10 (r) at the APO expreesty provtdes ‘any such tiara mated, exlmcfed down/oadvd nhototzmphed and/DI recotded as wdeo must be kept m the custody at the Sullsrvnsmg Sotlcunvs at an rrrrres mm? the ﬁnal arsposat emauer nerem ~ As the Ptatntm IS new apptytrug, rrrter al/at tor the APO Devtoes and the APO Documents to be reteasea to the Ptatnmrs Sulicﬂors, and tar them, the Ptamtin and VL ocnsmtamsy \|u have M! and unpundnronet access to them. then whatttre Ptatr-tirrs Apphcatton IS Ian :2 at 1\| really seekmg lo do ws Io amend lhe APO by dexenng paragnapn 10 (up onne APO and replacing it with me orders it seeks in me F\aInM‘s Appncauan It \s Inte law man‘ once a Court order ar ‘udgmenl has been drawn- up‘ there an only a llmvled number o1 ways in which ms terms can be varied or amended In sxonn World Sdn Bhd v Enganh (M) Sdn Bhd [mo] 12 MLJ 237. Namm Falmanalhan FCJ sans, .n paragraphs my, (171 and [151 at Her Lidysmps Judgment -n rs settled law me: one: 3 mm! has pmnocmeed a ﬁnal arm! 1: ans: nu! mmss me aullvomy to reopen, alter amend and supplement the ﬁnal order am1;udgmenl mlnlmg m the mspura n has admdrcalsd upon 7!:/5 rule, known .5 ma docmna av Iurvau: n/nan, sham: Irom Ina pnnnnnn nl/m-My n Vmgnlroll Thar: would be great uneenamry and mm rf courts warn psnnmw ta revrew andmwnsmcl ﬁnal mtsrx anamgmenu ~ 'YIIern are nmrlsd and dvscmls smusuan: when M: cmm may Inch: 3 lumps: mm sucsaquarll m Ms pmvloas sealed order These suuaumvs Include (a) an alnernfmsnl of a plvvruus omnr to reuse! mo ongma! mtenbon ac‘ me court wmch .5 ewaent fmm me pm»-ws and Myrna! mm. at the bow al memigment a/me olrgmal mm an arms: mn sup rule 0 2:; r u 0! III: Ruins 5/ com 2912 (ms Ruins] as name: 5 mncar em)! or 5 nmtw (arm alum‘ lauxlulll 30 :41. 32 (0) me zanﬁcalrun, sapwplumsrvllny av av arrmvd/nan! or a prewuus ardmsa as to we ma (0 me mgmal aniernndelthe lvbevly m apply‘ pmvvsmvvs‘ ma (4; mm 1: pmvrs/on rn mo Rmss in mm ... nngrnalomar m as w anluyn me Ibccmsd V ‘These ans wul/-Iucoymssd and amspted catewnes where the prmcvale nl ﬁnahty as re/feast! m the (me or mnms amau If not v:o7at¢L1' In my v\ew, me orders sougm m \|he F\amu(V‘s Appncanen do not fall wumn any ollhese low nmnea and dvscrele svluallons lor amending me APO n is nu! In! many dUec\|mns, mu to amend me APO to remove me cuslndy of me APO Devices and APO Documems from me supervising sanuwrs. Al me nsk nl repelmon, me APO had always Amended ior me supemsmg sohcuors \|a have cusmdy and mum! cl lhe APO Dewoes and me APO Documents Yhe grounds emu by me Pmnnmvorm. FI:\|nuNs' Applicaunn do not justify cm anion/nllu suughl Al me \|an—end 01 me Plamﬁﬂs‘ Application, ma Plamnﬂs said: my swunda m support HIE a5 Dnzvvded for m um mmmrs mam: m Suppod Much has been I:/ea Imnm The grounds m support [arms P\|aIn\|n1s' Appﬂcahun can be gleaned rrom paragraphs ts-an arm: Flzlrmﬂs‘ Amaaw m suppun, and may be summanzeu Is fu\|lL7ws' vueunvn :53 (r) en dune Devendancs‘ appncanons and appeals to challenge we APO snows (hat Ihey had been gain; over and oeyond and atlemptmg every means (D deny me PVamW‘s access lo (he APO Devroes and the APO Documents‘ tn) me APO Devroes and me APO Documents laﬂ wunrn me APO, (Hi) the Defendants nad wMuHy refused to enend me win! rnspecmons of me APO Devmes and the APO Documerﬂsr (rv) desone the P\errmas' request the Supervlsmg Sohcllor having custody oi lhe APO Devroes and the APO Documenls reiused Io rerease Ihem: sorrcnors wnnen M the APO Devxces and me APO Documents uught to oe released to the Plalnhﬁs and la VL consunanoy, and more shnuld no longer be rssmcted access ln menu, (vr) the undarlakmgs pmwded by the me Ptarrruﬂs and to VL censunancy are suﬁicienl safeguards‘ and (mu) wrmom that unresmcned access, the Ptamnﬁs win not be able to properly and ruuy dresenn cneir case at me max In my vrew. none onnese grounds eulher srngulany or ooHecIrve\y » even iv they were true — juemy Ine Supervising Snhcllnrs being ordered In reirnqursmng ::us\|ody or the APO Deyrces and me APO Inronnauon and Iermem \|o be released In me I=\ain1irr,:ne Plarnmrs Sollcllovs and VL ceneunaney wun MI and uncendmonal access m. 15 .r n 34. In pamcular (ll (AI) (ml llv) (v) The Delendams had eyery nghl ln law In anernpl ld challenge the APO, and just because all bnnerr appllcahons and appeals to do so lallea does rml deprive them ol that righl, A vallure or refusal cl lhe Delendarrls ID allervd a imm- lnspealcn ls lmmalerlah as paragraph won) allows the lnspecuan \|o proceed in men absence. whlch ls what had acmally happened WI 2020 and 2021: The Supervlsing sellcnar had acted correctly in reluslng to release the APO Dances and the APO Dacuments to lhe Plalrlliﬂs and lhe Plernlllrs sblicilnrs. even r1 lhe Detendanls‘ sollcilors had nal oblectsd to ll. The Plalnllﬂs have lalled In Show In any way whatsoever thal lhe Supervlslng Snhdlnrs have acted Impmperly or W derellcuen In lhe dlscharge ul Ihelr dlnles. ln lne absence 0! any clear evldenoe :2! that. (ms ceun lakes excapllan lo any suggeshcn that they have. more sn when he Supervislrlg Scllcllors are ms! and loremasl rlfflcers of the Court desplle hi!/lrlg been lnlllally rmmlnafed by the Flalntlﬂsz Even in a scenario where supervlslng eblmlene have ecled wrongly or lrnbreperly on lhe exeemidn cl an APO, (which ls cerullnly ncl lhe case here). lhe allernauve would be to appclnl clher supervislng sdllclcors ln (heir slead and non do away or dlsnense wnh supervlslng sollcllors enogelher. me ls .l n (Vl) Under me terms 0! lhs APO‘ lhe Plernllusr lrre Plalnhﬁs‘ Snllclmrs and lo VL Consultancy are rrbl entllied lo unreslncled or unsupervlsrsd access lo the APO Devices and me APO Documenls; (yu) The urvdervaklngs prumea by me the Plalnllffsr me Plilrlllﬂs‘ Suhcilors and VL Oorlsuﬂancy under paragraph 1.1 1 m1 1 3 cl lhe APO are nn\|sumclenlsz1eguandsIo abuse by them in me absence of me Supervislrlg sblrclrors: lvlul Tbe Plalnllﬂs had already conduded lnspeclluns of ma APO Devices and me APO Dbeumems ln mm and 2021 W they had ncl lully eonauelea lnsnecllans allbe APO Del/lees and the APO Documenle urrlil now, same 2 years on‘ man lhal is Ihelr own lolly Glven «be harsh nalule blarr APO, plalnllrrs who oblaln one are expeeled lb lake (lmely and reasonable steps arm acllurra to carry oul rrrspeclicns ol me lrulls of lne search and axlranmrr, and oenairrly cannot vlsrl lhelr own lrlactlvlly or laokadaisrcal oonducl or push lhe blame lorrl onlo me De1arrdarr1s. and (ix) Timely inspeclloni ol lhe APO Delllces and APO Documents under me walchiul gaze and supervislon bl supervlsmg ebllcrlors enuld just as easily have enabled lhe Plamms 1o pmperly and fully prasenl [hair case al are lrral If may ave unable to do swam lheirawn delay, lrIactIvi\|y or lackadalslcal cmducl, men may have unly merrrselues I0 blame. but u .1 n Cunclusiurl 35 I\ \s Io: lhese reasons ma\| I msnussea me Plamlrﬁs‘ Appllca n wilh costs 01 RM7.500 uo. suhjecl la aﬂocatov Dated one 3"‘ day of Dznaber 2023 ner Lumpur Hlgh Coun counson: mg Hua Keong mgemer wmh Teh zm Yuan (Messrs Ling 5 Mok) for the Plamlllls Foong Chang Lsong mgalher wllh Law m cm (Menu Foong cmg Leong 4 Co) (or me Delendanls. cues Arlhur Anderson 5 co. v lmsrfund Sdn am [2005] 6 MLJ 239 Makonka Elecxromc Sdn Bhd v Ebclrlcal lnuuslry Workers‘ Umon & 078 [1997] MLJU 93 Stone wand Sdn Bhd v ErIgareh1M)Sdn am1[2o2o] 17 MLJ 237 Universal Themmsensors L\d v Hnbben [1992]1 WLR 540 Pu: u u! n on 5.23.2020, tms ceurt atteued tne Ptaintiffs‘ Annlrcatron ex-pane. Tne APO was trrerr exeuned tnar same mentn by the seercn Party whase members are expressry tdenhﬁed rn the APO They mclude me tnree raw ttnns apparnted as the Sttpervtstng Sohciturs tcollecllvetyr “Supervtstng setrertersm and up to 12 otner persons «rent the Plaintiffs‘ 5 ms. trre Ptarntrtvs and representattve ot lhe tr oompany engaged by the Matnttﬂs eaued vrrdos Lrma consultancy (M) sdn Bhd (“VL cpnsuttarreyt AH oflhe devrdes aueged to euntam tne Platnliﬁs‘ trrtorrrretrpn (collecllvstyr “APO Davrcaef) setzed hum the premises al wrucn the APO was executed have been rn the cttsmdy ottrre supervtsrng sdtrcrtdrs since tnen. on 25 3 2020, tms courttnen made an adrnrerrrn ordertertne APO Io eennnue unlll the drsposet at PIam\|tﬁs' Apptrcatron rrrter panes on 21 s 2023‘ after being heard rnrer panes‘ tne Platnlrﬂs‘ Appllcallon was eltewed teuowrng the inter panes nearing e1 me Pternttns‘ Applrcatron. with tne APO and PO ordered to conunus end remam rn ptaee unit! the drsposat dnnis actrdn In that trme red. tne Defendants rrad med severat apphcaltons and appears to essentiany chenenge tne grantrrrg and executron of me APO‘ but all 01 lhern Jetted Further. rrdm I4 9 202a td ta 3 2021, from 4,11 2020 to 6 4 2921. and from 19 4 2023 to we 5 2023, the APO Devrces (drsputed and nowdtsputed) and the rntormetren and documents gleaned lmm tndee rnspeetrdns (“altegedly APO Documents") were rnspeeted. atwaye tn tne presence or me Supervising sottcttors, and wrtndut tne APO Devtces or tne APO Documents Iver teavrng me custody o1\|he supervrsing Soltctlors a... ; at u Aﬂev changing sollellors on 15 5 2023 and WM! me full lnal new learning in Iale October and early Nnvember, under the guise of applying lor lurlner mrecuons, an 20 July 2023 lhe Plainlm applied for ordeis, inler alia (ll Forme Supervising solicitors In release lne APO Deviees and (he APO Documenls in me Plamms' sallcnors, and i) upnn lnal release‘ lhat lhe Plainlills‘ Sallcllars and/or VL Consullancy be allowed in lake. pmcess and/nr analyse and/or review arm/or make necessary mpies oi lne APO Devices and APO Dacumenls lor the purpose ollrlalz (ml The Plainln1s' expert, vl. be allowed lull and uneendiluonal access le me said APO Devices and APO Documerllsl (N) VL be permilled lo carry em all lne necessary keywnrd eearenesrlnecessa . lv) A copy oi all data sxlracleu lmm the APO and me APO Documents Davloes by VL In be given lo ms Delendants‘ eollcilurs. I dismissed me Plalnlllfs Anplirallan on me lollev-mg lniee main gmunds 4.) The lens 0! the APO require me Supervising sallcilers lo retain custody olthe APO Devices and APO Docunienls an all limes and do not perrnil lneir release or me relinauisnmeni cf Page 4 al ll 10 mm custody \|o «he P\aIn\|IWs' saluumrs or to me Plamlwi or In VL Consultancy: ("J The PIainm1s' Apphcatlon amoums xo an allemm la amend me APO‘ yet the gmunds (or rx no not van vmhm me perrmned exoemmns (or varymg Ihe terms more APO, and (m) The gmunds cried by me Plammsvorms Pla\|nm1s' Appllcallan do not justify the ovders/relief saugm. The [arms of the APO wquin mu Suporvislng solicitor: to ' custody omm Dcvioss Ind do not pormn their nlnw or the nlinquismmm of max custody u For me purpose or me Plainuﬂs Appncauor. me relevant «arms nf me APO are paragraphs 9 and 10 Paragraph 9 exprasary pmvides as loI!L7ws' "That the oerenaarrn andhrarvynnrsonls) wvromay appealmbe m mrmr 0/ ma Frvrmsss rrum rmmedvalery hsndawav m ma P/srnhfls somzm awd/bv thew reprmrmws‘ any and/or all al the Lzsled Hams m the Second Schecmle v/mm M: m rm possestron cuamy. cunlml um‘!/bl povmr or me Delendanls and/or such parsonfsj Mm may sppllr ra Ln In mnlrvl arm Pvsmvsa: sava Ialarvy um um rmgrar to any oompultr Any rum. and/or documarvlshwv mm‘ M man In drsmne am mm»: meyare pan ofme Lxsted /Isms rrr ma Second Scweduﬁe mus! rmmedraraly be handed owl am/or mm muama for me mu amt dwect 5:22;: B’ In: Supervising salvation lav se/akeepmg or ma same, pemimg delemunanan olws Court as lo ms drsptlte um‘!/ui any /m-Inn Omar or me saw: no mnda. hp 5 ar u 11 12. 13 Thu shall no wvmoulpvuiudrce no me Search Paw bema Demwmed and hem: Dmvned run and mm.-1 access (or m- P¢l’D0s¢s of mspmm at any Pelsoms), any ve/-ude(:) and/or any storage / apaaa /memum D: Ilpnysacaﬂy and/or IIaL1rurvca!/y, Icavmg am/or atlsmphng to wave ms Prlwuxes, ror ma purpose: or 1». Lame Ham: m In: Second Schsdulf rha Plnmmh supmn ma\| the hm whence 01 paragraph 9 of the APO emme ma Wairmﬁs‘ Solialcvs to lake cuslady M the APO Devices and APO Dccumenls. They oomenu max a reading at that ﬁrs! sennenaa wrnh me mam semenpe means mar nnly any narha and/ordocumenlahan mar aradxspuled omy need lobe handad war (0 the supervisrng Solnzwtursr and thawlura any uems and/or documenlahon me: are nn\| dlsouled can be handed over to me F\amhWs' Salvcilors. ldxsagree. Frrscry, lhal paragraph 9 0! lbs APO p In remron lo Ihe execulmn oflhe APO an lhe Devunaahcs‘ arumraea by (he Seamh Panyg and must na read In oamunchon wuh and cannot overvide or lake precedence over paragraph 10 a! me APO. The handover mm paragraph 9 speaks or Is nm custody arm oonrrox at mass Lwslad hams. Under paragraph 10 of lhe APO, the dsla contained In Llsled IIBMS in the Second Schedule (Which would mcmde APO Devmes Ind Ihe ﬂP0 Docurnenlsh was (0 have been "Isad, dawn/nadsd, axvamad, copmd. phooographad and/or recanted as video by the Search Parry". That was done when he APO was execmed In August 2020‘ Ind lhal dava is mnrainaa In «ha APO De»/Vcaa. Sulraaragrauh h) 0! paragraph mm of the APO Ihan expressly provvdes. Pageﬂnhll 14 15 ‘any such data wooed exiracled, awn/puma ;7h0f0s7ViD"W and/or recoruni as me must he Are»: In the cuxmdy ofthn Supurvisirrq Solicitors at all mm my me am disposal al malls! harem ' (amohasws aaaam l\| \s not m dxspule Ihal the APO Demos: and APO Dvx:umen\|s have at all (miss vmm me execulmn or me APO up will now been kepl \n ma ousmdy av ma Supervising soncners. Suhparagraphs my and and APO Ducumenls \. ma Delendanvs must pemm me Seamh Party \|o analyse, mspeol and/or search 5H such data copied‘ extracted, downloaded‘ photographed and/or recorded as wdeo, at VL consunancy (A-3~3 Tropicana Avenue, Fersnaran Tropicana, Tmpxcana sue a Country Reson, «mu Pelahng Jaya, Semngor Dam Ensan, Mmayssa), oratsuch Iocauon / venue and/or ume agreed he as behueen the Derenaama am one supemsing soncwors. In any event, we Supervxslng saluumrs mus\| pelrml we search, mspecllon and/or anmyzalinn :2! any such data copied. exuacled downloaded. phclugraphed and/or renamed as video‘ In pluceed m we absence oi the Defendants should me Delendanl Ian, revuse and/or Hue 1 a! n ) M pavaglaph 10 111 me APO men expvessly prcv\desVar\|nspec1mn of man dale m the APO Dewoes 16 neglect lo be present wllhln a reasonable perlod ol lime upon sennce of (ms Ordev on me Delenasnls. My reading of lhese provlsions le lhls‘ (i) (l) on; (M any analyse, lnspecllnn or searen :71 me am in me APO Devlces and APO Documenls can only lake place at lne premises on/L Consultancy‘ Ihe Plalnlllrs ll> Expen. unless we Delendanl and me supennslng sullcllms agvee on anolner venue or llmel lne Defendanls shall be Dermlltad to be present al such analysis, Inspection or seven unless lney lall. refuse and/or neglecl 10 be presenl ll :0, lnen me Supsrvlslng Sallclmrs nave me dlscrvllon lo allow lnal analysls, lnspediun or seansn to proceed in may absence‘ and me APO envlsages that all me lnms nf me APO execullnn (wnleh would lnclude lne APO Devlces and me APO Documents) must be kepl IVI lne cuslody ol lhe supemslng Sollcilors al all llmes unlil lhe ﬁnal dlsvosal oflhe men, and mere is no provlslon whalsosuer WI me APO rm me supennslng Sollcltors la release av relinqulsh custody onne APO Devices nr APO Documerusl espee-ally in me Plalnuff. lne Plainlllrs Sollcﬂms or lo vl. consullensy. »....am 17, la. l9 same. ole aeeepled pmomls ler iVla1ySlS.¥HSDeI:1iﬂH nl Search nf aevlces or data omailled llum an APO search do nut permit Ihe appointed supervislng sallcnols lo release nv lellnqulan custody of me APO Devices or APO Documenls, especially to the plallmn lll AnlmrAnuelson a. co. v lmorfoud Sdn Bhd [2005] n ML! 231 the Calm of Aapeal noted one cl me many nbservallons o1 slr Donald Nlcnelas vc ln llnivursal Tlmmosonsor: Ltd v Klbbcn [1992] 1 WLR unl namely- ‘Anton PMS! amsrs lnvanably plwlae lar sxarvlae In by mum by a sallcllol The mun rallss Ilsavlly orl me sollcllol as an Dmlner al the owl, lo see that the my IS pmpzdy execmad ' In AIIhlArAnn1sIsan, supm, the calm ol Appeal also agreed mall the lollawlng obselvallulls of Abdul Wahab J ln Mlkonka Eleermnic sun am v Electrical lndumy Worker!‘ Union a. On man ull..lu 93 we Arlllwl-Plllw mm L; . valuable pvocedum and am: (L1 be pmsovmd m olﬁcicy Imwavv, cl mu mall PI/lei pvocsdum dvpends vmrlmll an all lll. DJIIVW-I semlg a "H0 balance In pmlﬁcl mall IE-wettlve VHIEOEMS and "VIII! A wlm acfwq rel an apoilranl mus! lemamoel at all llmes Ina! he ls Sn almzv cl llle mm and to EVISWIE that the appllcanoll my /5 mung forward mnlallls aaequale slegllams el me D3311? IVQMS of Me OMIV parry. /t ls llor that as ls alwgod [D m Inf the emel Barty but mal Ila II DDIAHU In onsum Ills mm.” is not abuser! He must pm Iarwud . mmem. upallcallvﬂ fﬂls In a mlmlllaa Na snoulalel example arlsun Pig: 5 M n The! mere u MI and hank drsdoium oia/I mmm mI'nrmal»on ma Uwdlnce musnry me [me afllre enter me am muslbs drawn sum an.m.xu»a; no mnnsllnan mo mlmmum Muauatylo acwm Am prlnrvnuorv 0/uwdanzu much my bu ummm nmavad a. dulmy-I1. me apvbcslrun rnduocs ﬁrs! anernanve played in! mien‘ to pvoduae anaaeumspecmc nwdwwo omyupmmemsponaw.:s' Iarlurs lo Pmvuce and «am such evidence wuuld rm ufhev was sung Anton F‘/her order are to mm mm Meet ‘Du: mm alter . ‘loss dramnlun mun: nsussuy“ approach‘ and by Ipaafymg ma swarm.‘ m In pmdumd mm mm umodilpons and wmoeesslry mvaszan mm ummua mromunon ma: me applicelvon cnnlams um and specmc umenakmgs ma! IIrewdsIwﬂ7bese:vsdbya3obc:tarwIvuw:ﬂnrmesomeIIme supply a nanny um-e upmmn .Im1II/ amdavls and aocunhams put bdfow lho judge m mamg III: nppllmllon, alplum as mm mm In M: Imlpmriovvl, odwu mm 1» ant: rnwmdmlo luau am/uxnrudmathchasawlsonablemlemdoso rnmms app/Hztron oamam. clear undedulrmgx Inrdumlsgss. and mat the ewdenc: oblalrmi wﬂl not be used In any other pmcesdlngs wnhaul the mnsan! of mo com A: . nmm uayum. to have . capstan mm. to “mm ma -xvcuhon by me nppﬂconh‘ go/futon, and 90731711: wha m to auamllinrvy mm an In bu named m the my mmatmey may be rﬂenmed by Me raspon¢unI' p... m M .-	22,617	Pytesseract-0.3.10
BA-45SOM-25-10/2019	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya] TERTUDUH Kogila A/p Krishnan	i) Kes melibatkan penyeludupan migran kanak-kanak warganegara Sri Lanka untuk ke Paris oleh tertuduh dari Malaysia.ii) Tertuduh membawa kanak-kanak migran menaiki pesawat ke Oman Air dengan mengemukakan boarding pass atas nama SP3 tetapi dapat dipatahkan apabila ditahan di Muscat Oman dan dihantar balik ke Malaysia.iii) Rakaman cctv pergerakan tertuduh serta SP3 di KLIA telah dikemukakan di mahkamah.	03/11/2023	YA Puan Julia binti Ibrahim	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=aff3b3bd-5dcc-41c6-af4c-b6f2203467f0&Inline=true	PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO: BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA LAWAN KOGILA A/P KRISHNAN [NO. KP : 850805-01-6788] PENGHAKIMAN LATAR BELAKANG [ 1 ] Seorang kanak-kanak, Jeyarajasingam Piramilan (“kanak-kanak migran”) berumur 13 tahun dan berasal dari Sri Lanka telah memulakan perjalanan menaiki penerbangan Malindo Air dari Sri Lanka ke Malaysia pada 24 September 2019. Migran ini akan menukar penerbangan Oman Air dari Malaysia ke Muscat, Oman dan meneruskan perjalanan ke Paris pula. Dia ditemani seorang ejen bernama Selvarajani (“fasilitator”) yang akan menemani kanak-kanak migran ini sehingga ke Malaysia. Tugas menemani kanak-kanak migran ke Muscat, Oman dan Paris akan diambil alih oleh seorang warganegara Malaysia bernama Kogila. Kanak-kanak 03/11/2023 15:02:14 BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 Kand. 164 S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 2 migran ini hanya menurut urusan perjalanan yang diatur untuk memenuhi hasrat bapanya agar dia dapat meneruskan pelajaran di Paris yang akan diuruskan oleh bapa saudaranya di sana. [ 2 ] Tiada masalah untuk kanak-kanak migran ini daftar masuk dan menaiki penerbangan ke Malaysia menggunakan pasportnya sendiri. Di KLIA, Malaysia kanak-kanak migran dikenalkan kepada Kogila a/p Krishnan (“Tertuduh”), yang akan menemaninya ke Muscat, Oman dan Paris. Kedua-dua mereka telah menaiki pesawat Oman Air menuju ke Muscat, Oman pada 25.9.2019 tanpa masalah. Walau bagaimanapun, harapan kanak-kanak migran ini dihampakan di lapangan terbang Muscat, Oman semasa menunggu penerbangan ke Paris. Kakitangan yang membuat pemeriksaan terhadap pasport yang dikemukakan oleh Tertuduh dan membandingkan dengan wajah kanak-kanak migran beberapa kali telah mengatakan ada masalah. [ 3 ] Kanak-kanak migran yang merasa tidak sedap hati telah memaklumkan perkara sebenar kepada kakitangan bertugas bahawa pasport Malaysia itu bukan miliknya serta sejarah pergerakannya dari Sri Lanka. Akibatnya, kanak-kanak migran dan Tertuduh dihantar pulang ke KLIA untuk disiasat dan kanak-kanak migran itu kemudiannya dihantar balik ke Sri Lanka. [ 4 ] Pihak Imigresen Malaysia telah menjalankan siasatan ke atas kejadian ini dan hasil siasatan, Tertuduh telah berdepan pertuduhan di bawah Seksyen 26C Akta Antipemerdagangan Orang Dan Antipenyeludupan Migran 2007 (“ATIPSOM”) seperti berikut – S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 3 “Bahawa kamu pada 25.9.2019 di antara jam 8.30 pagi sehingga 9.00 pagi di pintu berlepas C3, Lapangan Terbang Antarabangsa Kuala Lumpur (KLIA), di dalam daerah Sepang, di dalam negeri Selangor telah membawa dalam transit seorang migran yang diseludup iaitu Jeyarajasingam Piramilan (L/12.4.2006/No. Pasport: Tiada) menerusi Malaysia melalui udara dan dengan demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 26C Akta Antipemerdagangan Orang Dan Antipenyeludupan Migran 2007. Hukuman: Pemenjaraan tidak melebihi 7 tahun, denda atau kedua-duanya.” [ 5 ] Tertuduh telah melalui perbicaraan penuh dan disabitkan dengan pertuduhan di atas pada 14 Julai 2023 dan dihukum penjara empat tahun bermula dari tarikh keputusan. Permohonan Tertuduh untuk penggantungan hukuman dibenarkan sementara rayuannya ke Mahkamah Rayuan didengar. FAKTA KES PENDAKWAAN [ 6 ] Pada 26.9.2019 lebih kurang jam 1100hrs, di Pejabat Imigresen Bahagian Operasi, Aras 3, Main Terminal Building KLIA kakitangan Oman Air (SP5) telah menyerahkan satu (1) orang kanak-kanak lelaki dan satu (1) orang wanita berbangsa India pemegang pasport Malaysia yang merupakan deportee dari Muscat, Oman yang tiba dengan pesawat WY821. Pegawai Imigresen SP4 telah menahan kedua-dua penumpang tersebut untuk tindakan lanjut. Wanita tersebut adalah Kogila a/p Krishnan (Tertuduh) menggunakan Pasport Malaysia: A36098892 dan kanak- kanak lelaki itu menggunakan pasport Malaysia atas nama Diviyan a/l Magendaran (Pasport Malaysia: A34812845). S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 4 [ 7 ] Siasatan pihak Imigresen mendapati kanak-kanak lelaki tersebut adalah seorang migran warganegara Sri Lanka bernama Jeyarajasingam Piramilan yang menyamar sebagai pemegang pasport Malaysia bernama Diviyan a/l Magendaran (SP3) semasa menaiki penerbangan dari KLIA ke Muscat, Oman. Siasatan selanjutnya mendapati Tertuduh telah daftar masuk penerbangan ke Oman untuk dirinya dan SP3 di kaunter daftar masuk tetapi hanya Tertuduh yang memasuki balai berlepas. Pasport dan boarding pass atas nama SP3 dipegang oleh Tertuduh. SP3 hanya dibawa ke kaunter daftar masuk dan setelah Tertuduh memasuki balai berlepas SP3 dihantar pulang oleh rakan Tertuduh dikenali sebagai Meera. Setelah menemui kanak-kanak migran di pintu 2, balai pelepasan antarabangsa dengan fasilitator, Tertuduh memberi sehelai baju T yang mirip dengan baju yang dipakai oleh SP3 dan membawa kanak-kanak migran itu menaiki pesawat ke Oman dengan mengemukakan boarding pass atas nama SP3. Tertuduh tidak dapat meneruskan perjalanan apabila ditahan di Muscat, Oman dan dihantar balik ke KLIA, Malaysia. ANALISA KES PENDAKWAAN [ 8 ] Di akhir kes pendakwaan, mahkamah perlu memutuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes prima facie atas pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh. Dalam membuat keputusan ini, mahkamah hendaklah membuat penilaian maksima semua keterangan yang telah dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan semua elemen pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh. Lihat kes-kes PP v Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2005] 6 MLJ 393; Looi Kow Chai & Anor v. PP [2003] 2 MLJ 65; Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85. S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 5 ELEMEN PERTUDUHAN DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 26C, ATIPSOM YANG PERLU DIBUKTIKAN OLEH PIHAK PENDAKWAAN [ 9 ] Seksyen 26C ATIPSOM memperuntukkan seperti berikut – “Kesalahan berhubung dengan migran yang diseludup dalam transit 26c. Mana-mana orang yang membawa dalam transit seorang migran yang diseludup menerusi Malaysia melalui darat, laut atau udara atau selainnya mengaturkan atau memudahkan perbuatan itu melakukan suatu kesalahan dan hendaklah, apabila disabitkan, dihukum dengan pemenjaraan selama tempoh tidak melebihi tujuh tahun, dan boleh juga dikenakan denda, atau kedua-duanya.”. [ 10 ] Elemen-elemen pertuduhan yang perlu dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan adalah – a. Tertuduh telah membawa seorang migran yang diseludup; b. Tertuduh telah membawa dalam transit satu (1) orang migran yang diseludup menerusi Malaysia melalui udara; dan c. Tertuduh telah mengaturkan atau memudahkan perbuatan membawa dalam transit bagi satu (1) orang migran yang diseludup tersebut. [ 11 ] Bagi tujuan analisis keterangan, beberapa terma dalam peruntukan kesalahan telah diberi tafsiran dalam undang-undang. Penyeludupan migran di bawah seksyen 2, ATIPSOM sebagai – S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 6 “penyeludupan migran” ertinya— (a) mengatur, memudahkan atau merancang, secara langsung atau tidak langsung, kemasukan seseorang secara tidak sah ke dalam atau melalui, atau pengeluaran seseorang secara tidak sah dari mana-mana negara yang orang itu bukan warganegara atau pemastautin tetap sama ada dengan mengetahui atau mempunyai sebab untuk mempercayai bahawa kemasukan atau pengeluaran orang itu adalah tidak sah; dan (b) merekrut, mengangkut, memindahkan, menyembunyikan, melindungi atau menyediakan apa-apa bantuan atau perkhidmatan bagi tujuan melaksanakan perbuatan yang disebut dalam perenggan (a);”. “migran yang diseludup” ertinya seseorang yang menjadi objek perbuatan penyeludupan migran, tidak kira sama ada orang itu turut serta dalam perbuatan penyeludupan migran itu;”. [ 12 ] Berkaitan pemakaian peruntukan ATIPSOM pula, seksyen 3 Akta menyatakan – “Ruang lingkup pemakaian 3. Kesalahan di bawah Akta ini terpakai, tidak kira sama ada perbuatan memulakan kesalahan itu berlaku di dalam atau di luar Malaysia dan apa jua kerakyatan atau kewarganegaraan pesalah itu, dalam hal keadaan yang berikut: (a) jika Malaysia ialah negara penerima atau negara transit atau pengeksploitasian berlaku di dalam Malaysia; atau (b) jika negara penerima atau negara transit ialah negara asing tetapi pemerdagangan orang atau penyeludupan migran bermula di dalam Malaysia atau transit di Malaysia.”. S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 7 Keterangan-keterangan yang membuktikan elemen-elemen pertuduhan [ 13 ] Terlebih dahulu, mahkamah menegaskan bahawa kesemua elemen-elemen pertuduhan telah dibuktikan atas penilaian maksima melalui keterangan lisan saksi-saksi pendakwaan, keterangan bertulis saksi, rakaman percakapan kanak-kanak migran dan Tertuduh, keterangan dokumentasi serta rakaman kamera litar tertutup (“cctv”) yang menunjukkan pergerakan Tertuduh, Diviyan a/l Magendaran (SP3), Tertuduh dan penama Meera ketika sampai di KLIA dan kaunter daftar masuk sehingga pertemuan Tertuduh dengan kanak-kanak migran serta fasilitator di dalam balai berlepas KLIA dan rakaman pergerakan Tertuduh dan kanak-kanak migran menaiki pesawat ke Muscat, Oman. [ 14 ] Rakaman-rakaman cctv yang diperolehi oleh pegawai siasatan (SP15) menunjukkan kronologi pergerakan Tertuduh bersama penama Meera, memperalatkan SP3 di kaunter daftar masuk penerbangan untuk mendapatkan boarding pass, kemasukan Tertuduh seorang diri ke balai berlepas melalui pemeriksaan polis bantuan dengan membawa pasport dan boarding pass milik SP3 sehingga pertemuan dengan kanak-kanak migran dan fasilitator di dalam zon penerbangan antarabangsa diringkaskan seperti di bawah – Pergerakan kanak-kanak migran dan fasilitator Pergerakan Tertuduh dan SP3, pergerakan kanak-kanak migran dan Tertuduh 25.9.2019 - cctv 25.9.2019 cctv S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 8 P50(1)(a) Folder 1 Subfolder 1 @ 6:52:34 am – menunjukkan fasilitator (Kanesalingam) dan kanak-kanak migran sampai ke KLIA di gate 8 P50(1)(a) Folder 2 Subfolder 1 @ 6:58:16:309 am, menunjukkan jalan di luar lobi pelepasan KLIA – kereta grand livina silver sampai menurunkan Tertuduh, Meera dan Diviyan (SP3) Subfolder 2 - @ 7:33:59 – tunjukkan Tertuduh diiringi wanita berbaju biru dikenali sebagai Meera. Di depannya berbaju kelabu/hitam ialah SP3. Selepas daftar masuk, Tertuduh bergerak ke arah pemeriksaan polis. Subfolder 3 - @ 7:39:12:239 am, menunjukkan Tertuduh berbaris melepasi pemeriksaan polis berseorangan hingga escalator. Subfolder 4 - @ 7:42:51:049 am, menunjukkan Tertuduh bersendirian untuk pemeriksaan imgresen di kaunter 3 untuk pelepasan antarabangsa tanpa kanak-kanak SP3. S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 9 Subfolder 2 - @ 8:09:46:744 am. Menunjukkan kanak-kanak migran bersama fasilitator bergerak menuju central hub i.e. G1 – G10 iaitu ruang tengah ke earotrain Subfolder 3 - @ 8:23:29..am. Menunjukkan fasilitator bersama kanak-kanak migran menuju ke aerotrain atau ke pintu keluar imigresen – kaunter ketibaan, tapi tidak keluar dari KLIA Subfolder 4 - @ 8:24:50:361 am, menunjukkan kanak-kanak migran dan fasilitator tidak keluar dari pintu kaunter imigresen (tidak keluar dari KLIA ke luar – masih dalam KLIA) Subfolder 5 - @ 7:46:08:531 – Tertuduh berbaju hijau ambil beg setelah melepasi pemeriksaan kastam menuju ruang ke pintu antarabangsa (arrival/departure). Subfolder 6 - @ 8:31:21:474 am, menunjukkan Tertuduh masih seorang diri menuju laluan gate G S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 10 (ketibaan/pelepasan) – di kawasan centre hub pier. Subfolder 7 - @ 8:32:14:506 am, menunjukkan Tertuduh bergerak seorang diri ke tempat duduk berdekatan dengan jam di gate G2. Di situ Tertuduh bertemu fasilitator dan kanak-kanak migran. Selepas 4 minit, Tertuduh meninggalkan kawasan itu bersama kanak-kanak migran tanpa fasilitator (8:37:27:984 am). Mereka menuju ke aerotrain untuk ke bangunan satelit bagi penerbangan antarabangsa. Subfolder 8 - @ 8:41:37:783 am, menunjukkan Tertuduh dan kanak- kanak migran menuju aerotrain ke pelepasan antarabangsa C3 di bangunan satelit (8:41:41:465 am). Subfolder 9 - @ 8:46:14:104 am, menunjukkan Tertuduh dan kanak- kanak migran tiba dengan aero S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 11 train di ruang perhentian aerotrain di bangunan satelit. Rakaman cctv P50(2)(J)] dan P149(A)(1) Menunjukkan pergerakan Tertuduh dan kanak-kanak migran yang diseludup menuju masuk ke pesawat untuk penerbangan ke Muscat. [ 15 ] Terdapat keterangan dari SP3 dan SP2 (ibu SP3) yang rakan Tertuduh dikenali “CK” telah membeli 2 baju T yang kelihatan hampir sama dari segi warna, corak dan tulisan (P11 dan P67) di mana sehelai baju tersebut diberikan kepada SP3 untuk dipakai semasa ke KLIA dan keterangan menunjukkan sehelai lagi dibawa oleh Tertuduh untuk diberikan kepada kanak-kanak migran untuk dipakai bagi penerbangan dari KLIA ke Muscat, Oman. Dapat disimpulkan tujuan perbuatan Tertuduh ialah supaya pihak-pihak berwajib dapat dikelirukan dengan memastikan kedua-dua kanak-kanak migran dan SP3 memakai baju yang kelihatan hampir sama. [ 16 ] Menurut SP2, pasport SP3 telah diuruskan oleh CK. Lebih kurang pada 25.9.2019, SP2 telah diminta membawa pasport tersebut bersama SP3 ke KLIA dan keterangan menunjukkan pasport SP3 (P7) ada bersama Tertuduh dan digunakan oleh kanak-kanak migran untuk menaiki pesawat ke Muscat, Oman. S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 12 [ 17 ] Deposisi kanak-kanak migran telah diambil dan dikemukakan sebagai P83. Deposisi ini menerangkan urusan perjalanannya dari Sri Lanka ke Malaysia ditemani fasilitator dan bertemu dengan Tertuduh di Malaysia untuk penerbangan ke Oman di mana dia dan Tertuduh telah ditahan. Kanak-kanak migran telah mengakui kepada kakitangan di Muscat, Oman bahawa dia bukan orang yang dinyatakan dalam pasport milik SP3. Alasan bagi perjalanan kanak-kanak migran menuju Paris bukanlah kerana dia kononnya didera, tetapi untuk tinggal bersama bapa saudaranya bagi tujuan belajar. [ 18 ] Ekstrak imej dan teks daripada telefon bimbit Tertuduh yang dikemukakan (P12) yang dimuat naik dalam satu pendrive (P75) merupakan cetakan gambar yang dipilih oleh SP15 [eksibit P75A(1- 36)] antaranya gambar 24 dan 35 menunjukkan gambar Tertuduh bersama kanak-kanak migran di dalam penerbangan dari KLIA ke Oman. [ 19 ] Tertuduh telah memudahkan perbuatan membawa dalam transit kanak-kanak migran yang diseludup tersebut. Peranan Tertuduh membawa pasport dan boarding pass milik SP3 untuk digunakan kanak- kanak migran menaiki penerbangan ke Muscat, Oman tanpa melalui apa- apa pemeriksaan imigresen di KLIA, memberi kanak-kanak migran baju yang hampir serupa dari segi warna dan tulisan yang telah dipakai oleh SP3 semasa di kaunter daftar masuk adalah cubaan mengelirukan pihak berkuasa supaya kanak-kanak migran dapat dibawa dalam transit seperti dirancang. [ 20 ] Perancangan Tertuduh dan penama lain tidak berjaya disempurnakan. SP1 telah menerima emel dari Oman Air disertai dengan S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 13 borang-borang P15, P15A, P16 dan P16A iaitu borang Inadmissible passenger and deportee information (“INAD”) mengenai tahanan kanak- kanak migran dan Tertuduh yang akan dihantar balik ke KLIA. Ketua Pramugari penerbangan Oman Air di KLIA telah menyerahkan dua (2) pasport Malaysia atas nama Diviyan Magendaran (SP3) dan Kogila Krishnan (Tertuduh). SP1 kemudian telah menyerahkan senarai penumpang penerbangan WY0822 KL-Muscat dan WY0821 dari Muscat- KL (Eksibit P9) ke pejabat imigresen. Dokumen menunjukkan penumpang bernama Diviyan Magendaran (SP3) dan Tertuduh duduk di kerusi 25A dan 25B dalam penerbangan KL-Muscat dan kerusi 34E dan 34D untuk penerbangan balik Muscat-KL. [ 21 ] Pemeriksaan imigresen mendapati kanak-kanak migran telah menggunakan pasport orang lain iaitu milik SP3 bagi penerbangan dari KLIA ke Muscat, Oman. SP12 mengesahkan tiada pergerakan keluar negara berkaitan SP3 pada tarikh material (P47). Kanak-kanak migran telah dikeluarkan Perintah Penahanan di bawah seksyen 34(1) Akta Imigresen 1959/63 dan dikeluarkan Perintah Pengusiran di bawah seksyen 31 Akta Imigresen 1959/63 pada 10.10.2019 (Ekshibit P84). Rakaman Deposisi Migran di bawah seksyen 61A ATIPSOM 2007 juga telah dirakam (Ekshibit P83). [ 22 ] Percakapan Tertuduh turut dikemukakan sebagai P77 dan di dalam percakapan itu, Tertuduh mengakui telah membawa kanak-kanak migran dari KLIA ke Muscat, Oman. Walau bagaimanapun, Tertuduh meletakkan segala kesalahan mengatur urusan perjalanan itu ke atas bahu orang lain seperti CK, Meera, Ramesh dan fasilitator di KLIA. Tertuduh mendakwa dimaklumkan tujuan membawa kanak-kanak migran S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 14 ke Paris adalah untuk menyelamatkannya dari didera. Tetapi alasan ini berbeza pula dengan kata-katanya kepada SP4 bahawa kanak-kanak migran itu adalah anak tirinya. Kata-kata Tertuduh ini yang tidak benar menunjukkan pengetahuan Tertuduh bahawa perbuatannya membawa kanak-kanak migran transit melalui KLIA ke Muscat, Oman adalah salah. Tiada keterangan yang menunjukkan OKT telah dipaksa melakukan perbuatan tersebut. Tiada juga usaha ditunjukkan oleh Tertuduh untuk memastikan alasan sebenar perjalanan kanak-kanak migran selain menerima bulat-bulat dakwaan pihak lain. Kejahilan yang disengajakan (Willfull ignorance) dan kelalaian Tertuduh mendapatkan kepastian bukanlah satu pembelaan. [ 23 ] Hakikat bahawa Tertuduh menyimpan pasport dan boarding pass SP3 untuk digunakan oleh kanak-kanak migran menunjukkan Tertuduh bukanlah seorang yang naïve dan mudah ditipu. Malah, peranannya amat penting kerana kesalahan itu tidak boleh dilaksanankan tanpa Tertuduh menjadi pemudahcara kepada pihak-pihak lain yang terlibat. Semua elemen pertuduhan telah dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. Isu berbangkit – penglibatan penama lain dan kredibiliti saksi pendakwaan [ 24 ] Tertuduh membangkitkan isu penglibatan lain-lain pihak seperti penama CK, Meera, Ramesh dan lain-lain yang tidak dituduh. SP15 telah mengesahkan siasatan masih berjalan berkaitan penama-penama lain yang terlibat dan walaupun siasatan belum selesai perkara ini tidak menidakkan peranan dan perbuatan Tertuduh sendiri. Sementara itu, S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 15 mahkamah mendapati saksi-saksi pendawaan adalah kredibel dan keterangan mereka tidak tercabar sepanjang kes pendakwaan. KEPUTUSAN DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN [ 25 ] Setelah meneliti keterangan yang disampaikan melalui saksi-saksi pendakwaan, kesemua 85 ekshibit yang dikemukakan, menimbang penghujahan yang telah disampaikan oleh kedua-dua pihak, serta setelah diaplikasikan penilaian maksima terhadap kesemua keterangan langsung dan mengikut keadaan yang dikemukakan, mahkamah memutuskan yang pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes ‘prima facie’ terhadap Tertuduh sepertimana pertuduhan. Sehubungan itu Tertuduh diperintahkan untuk membela diri. KES PEMBELAAN [ 26 ] Tertuduh memberi keterangan bersumpah (SD1) dan mengemukakan Pernyataan Saksi (PSD1). Ringkasnya, Tertuduh tidak mencabar dan tidak menafikan kronologi dan fakta kes pendawaan. Pembelaan Tertuduh adalah menafikan pengetahuan bahawa perbuatannya membawa kanak-kanak migran transit melalui KLIA adalah satu kesalahan. Tertuduh hanya ingin membantu seorang kanak-kanak yang dimaklumkan sebagai telah didera kepada keluarga sebenarnya di Paris. Tertuduh mendasarkan persetujuannya untuk membantu kanak- kanak migran tersebut kepada latar belakang Tertuduh yang juga pernah mengalami penderaan dalam hubungan dengan pasangannya. Keadaan mental dan emosi Tertuduh yang tertekan mendorong Tertuduh S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 16 menerima tawaran CK untuk membantu membawa kanak-kanak migran ke Paris sambil turut menenangkan dirinya. ANALISA KES PEMBELAAN [ 27 ] Di akhir kes pembelaan tugas mahkamah ialah untuk menimbangkan pembelaan Tertuduh dengan keterangan pihak pendakwaan dan kredibiliti saksi-saksi pendakwaan dan juga pembelaan serta keseluruhan keterangan sebelum memutuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kesnya melampaui keraguan yang munasabah mengikut seksyen 182A Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (KTJ) seperti berikut – Procedure at the conclusion of the trial. (1) At the conclusion of the trial, the Court shall consider all the evidence adduced before it and decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. (2) If the Court finds that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall find the accused guilty and he may be convicted on it. (3) If the Court finds that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall record an order of acquittal. [ 28 ] Di peringkat pembelaan Tertuduh memikul beban untuk membangkitkan keraguan munasabah ke atas kes pendakwaan untuk membolehkan Tertuduh mendapat perintah pelepasan dan pembebasan. Dalam menimbangkan pembelaan Tertuduh, mahkamah dibimbing oleh S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 17 prinsip yang dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Ganapathy a/l Rengasamy v PP [1998] 2 MLJ 577 – “It needs to be remembered that however weak a defence may be, trial judges being judges of both fact and law should not just brush aside the defence on the basis that the prosecution witnesses are to be believed and not the defence. Where the law casts the onus of giving an explanation upon an accused person, and the explanation is given, which is consistent with innocence, the court is duty bound to consider whether it might reasonably be true, although not convinced of its truth. On the issue of the court’s duty to consider the defence, the age-old decision in Mat v. PP [1963] MLJ 263 is still good law as it was then. This is followed by the Supreme Court in Mohamad Radhi bin Yaakob v. PP [1991] 3 MLJ 169”. [ 29 ] Penafian Tertuduh yang dia tiada pengetahuan tentang status kanak-kanak migran yang diseludup ataupun penafian pengetahuan perbuatannya adalah memudahkan transit kanak-kanak migran tidak disokong oleh keterangan yang ada di hadapan mahkamah. Tertuduh mendakwa tidak tahu tentang SP3 dan pasportnya didaftar masuk kerana semua urusan daftar masuk dibuat oleh Meera. Tetapi fakta yang pasport dan boarding pass SP3 yang berada dalam miliknya sehingga ditahan tidak dapat dijelaskan dengan memuaskan. [ 30 ] Tertuduh sendiri menyatakan dalam PSD1 (para 84 dan 87) setelah urusan daftar masuk oleh Meera, dia menyerahkan pasport Tertuduh dan SP3 serta boarding pass kepada Tertuduh yang diletakkan dalam beg tangan Tertuduh. Ini menunjukkan Tertuduh mengetahui bahawa pasport dan boarding pass SP3 ada bersamanya dan disimpan kerana SP3 sendiri tidak ikut bersama ke balai berlepas. S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 18 [ 31 ] SP3 semasa memberi keterangan menyatakan nampak Meera menunjukkan pasport yang kelihatan seperti pasport miliknya di kaunter daftar masuk. Tetapi apabila ditanya, Meera menafikan dan mengatakan pasport milik SP3 telah hilang. SP3 kemudian nampak Meera menyerahkan pasport tersebut dengan boarding pass kepada Tertuduh. [ 32 ] Mahkamah juga mendapati adalah tidak munasabah nama sebenar kanak-kanak migran tidak dimaklumkan kepada Tertuduh semasa pertemuan di dalam KLIA dengan fasilitator dan dalam penerbangan. Jika Tertuduh tidak bertanya butiran ini, perbuatan itu merupakan sikap kejahilan yang disengajakan Tertuduh – suatu kecuaian yang tidak diterima sebagai pembelaan. Sifat tawaran ke Paris yang diberikan oleh CK diakui oleh Tertuduh sebagai “last minute” sepatutnya meningkatkan sikap berhati-hati Tertuduh untuk memastikan tiada sesuatu yang di luar aturan berlaku. [ 33 ] Tertuduh tidak menyatakan dia telah menerima dari fasilitator pasport dan boarding pass asal kanak-kanak migran semasa di balai berlepas. Juga tiada penjelasan dari Tertuduh kenapa pasport dan boarding pass untuk kanak-kanak migran (jika betul dia menyangka pasport SP3 adalah pasport kanak-kanak migran) ada bersamanya di kaunter daftar masuk penerbangan sedangkan diberitahu kanak-kanak migran telahpun berada di dalam Terminal. [ 34 ] Pembelaan ini juga tidak menyangkal keterangan kes pendakwaan (SP4) tentang alasan yang diberikan Tertuduh bahawa kanak-kanak migran adalah anak tirinya semasa ditahan oleh pihak berkuasa. Berkaitan dakwaan tidak cam perbezaan wajah SP3 dan S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 19 kanak-kanak migran kerana pertama kali berjumpa; keterangan menunjukkan SP3 berada berdekatan dengan Tertuduh ketika proses daftar masuk di dalam KLIA dengan keadaan cahaya yang terang. Begitu juga kanak-kanak migran dijumpai dalam terminal yang terang bercahaya dan bersama Tertuduh dalam tempoh masa yang lama dalam penerbangan. Kenyataan Tertuduh ini amat tidak munasabah. [ 35 ] Mengenai hujah bahawa kanak-kanak migran melepasi pemeriksaan pasport dan boarding pass di pintu berlepas – ia adalah munasabah, mahkamah mengambil notis kehakiman (judicial notice) dari urusan lazim menaiki pesawat bahawa petugas hanya ada waktu yang sangat singkat saja berdepan dengan kanak-kanak migran sebelum mengendalikan penumpang lain. Malah, similarities atau persamaan antara SP3 dan kanak-kanak migran dari segi umur, bangsa dan pakaian itulah the point or the reason penggunaan pasport SP3 supaya transit kanak-kanak migran yang diseludup ini tidak mudah dikesan pihak berkuasa. Ditambah dengan penggunaan baju yang hampir serupa yang dipakai oleh SP3 pada malam itu dan baju yang Tertuduh serahkan kepada kanak-kanak migran di dalam terminal; semua menjurus kepada tujuan untuk mengaburi pihak berkuasa KLIA dan pihak penerbangan. Hakikatnya Tertuduh berjaya melakukan kesalahan ini sehingga ke Muscat, Oman. [ 36 ] Pembelaan Tertuduh kononnya dia tidak tahu tentang rancangan dan situasi sebenar tidak menyakinkan kerana peranannya amat spesifik untuk membantu kejayaan transit kanak-kanak diseludup itu iaitu dengan membawa pasport dan boarding pass SP3, berjumpa kanak-kanak migran di dalam terminal KLIA, memberikan baju yang hampir serupa S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 20 dengan baju SP3 untuk dipakai dan menggunakan pasport dan boarding pass SP3 itu untuk membolehkan kanak-kanak migran menaiki penerbangan ke Muscat, Oman. [ 37 ] Tentang alasan Tertuduh kononnya baju diberikan kepada kanak- kanak migran kerana bajunya koyak tidak dipercayai kerana dakwaan ini hanya timbul semasa kes pembelaan. Ia merupakan suatu pemikiran semula (afterthought) yang jelas direka. [ 38 ] Penglibatan lain-lain penama seperti CK, Meera dan Ramesh yang didakwa Tertuduh menguruskan segala urusan penerbangannya, daftar masuk dan lain-lain; perkara ini tidak dinafikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. Mahkamah juga menerima bahawa kesalahan ini memerlukan kerjasama orang-orang lain dan tidak dapat diuruskan oleh Tertuduh sahaja. Walau bagaimanapun, keujudan penama lain tidak mengurangkan kepentingan peranan Tertuduh dalam rantaian kesalahan ini. Tanpa Tertuduh yang membawa pasport serta boarding pass SP3, kanak-kanak migran ini tidak dapat dibawa hingga ke Muscat, Oman melalui penerbangan. KEPUTUSAN DI AKHIR KES PEMBELAAN [ 39 ] Mahkamah telah menilai kes pembelaan terhadap kes pendakwaan dan menimbangkan secara keseluruhan semua keterangan yang dikemukakan. Mahkamah mendapati keterangan pembelaan adalah bersifat penafian pengetahuan Tertuduh semata-mata dan juga berbentuk pemikiran semula. Pembelaan Tertuduh telah gagal menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PENGHAKIMAN AP/BA-45SOM-25-10/2019 (uo) 21 [ 40 ] Kredibiliti saksi-saksi pendakwaan tidak berjaya dicabar oleh pihak pembelaan sehingga ke akhir kes. Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes mereka melampaui keraguan yang munasabah. Oleh itu, Tertuduh dengan ini disabitkan di atas kesalahan seperti mana pertuduhan. HUKUMAN [ 41 ] Hukuman yang diperuntukkan bagi kesalahan ini ialah pemenjaraan tidak melebihi tujuh (7) tahun, denda atau kedua-duanya. Dalam mitigasinya peguam Tertuduh menyatakan bahawa – • Tertuduh terdesak melakukan kesalahan ini akibat penderaan yang dihadapinya dan mencari ketenangan dengan pergi jauh dari negara; • Belajar hanya sehingga darjah 6; • Tertuduh bukan dari keluarga berada, dia menanggung 2 orang anaknya bersendirian; • Tertuduh memohon hukuman yang wajar kerana Tertuduh tidak lagi bekerja setelah dipanggil membela diri; • Kesalahan penyeludupan dipatahkan sebelum sempurna; • Tiada harm ke atas mana-mana pihak kerana kesalahan dipatahkan dan kanak-kanak migran dihantar pulang ke negara asal. S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N vbPzr8xdxkGvTLbyIDRn8A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	33,133	Tika 2.6.0
J-01(IM)(NCvC)-113-03/2022	PERAYU 1. ) Krishnasamy A/l Kuppusamy 2. ) Nagesvari A/p Kayamboo RESPONDEN 1. ) PENGARAH HOSPITAL SULTANAH AMINAH JOHOR BAHRU 2. ) Jabatan Kesihatan Negeri (JKN) 3. ) KETUA PENGARAH KESIHATAN KEMENTERIAN KESIHATAN MALAYSIA 4. ) Kerajaan Malaysia	A fire broke out on 25.10.2016 (Fire) in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of Sultanah Aminah Hospital, Johore Bahru (Hospital). Six patients in the Hospital’s ICU perished in the Fire (6 Deceased Persons). The plaintiffs (Plaintiffs) in the above three suits (3 Suits) are the parents and dependents of three out of the 6 Deceased Persons. The first defendant is the Hospital’s Director while the third defendant is the Director-General of the Ministry of Health (MOH). This judgment shall refer to all the defendants collectively in these 3 Appeals as the “Defendants”.	03/11/2023	YA Datuk Wong Kian KheongKorumYA Dato' Lee Swee SengYA Dato' Sri Mariana binti Haji YahyaYA Datuk Wong Kian Kheong	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=9e0b3572-31a8-4281-9a12-424075a28ad1&Inline=true	03/11/2023 14:51:28 J-01(IM)(NCvC)-113-03/2022 Kand. 45 S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N cjULnqgxgUKaEkJAdaKK0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal J—n1(m) mcvc)—113—u3/2022 Kand. 45 as/mm: 1:1 51-224 m we coon on an ur muvsumrrsmuuumsmcnum asrwssu 1 Knlsxmsmv um xuppusmmmc Mu.un:<1«.mm z massvmurumaaumuxncuo mm-zusup .. nrmum: Am 1. mmun mswm suI.n>4n< Altman 1 rsuauux xssumm usssrwunux‘ uamm Kssmnnu Msesm mm ;. mu. mum «mum. xsusmsmm xamm muvsm 4. «swam mum nss»-ounsms (mm. maumm. ><m.co.m.n Juhorsmlu Jamr. 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Anﬂ mam awn-1 Sunur-In Amman my-.n xgmm mm mm Jabalan x..mm mm Jana Kelul Pwvnn Keswmrzn‘ Knrmnunan x.m.y. mum «gm-an Man-ysu o4m.nu1 « z 3 A sw qULrv<mxaUKaEuAn:><K0G m. s...g.pm my» cum can nlwung Nong Yoy 5 Mar v mu: Pwloemorﬂsasj 1 um 55; .: 557. La! Klw mm mm \|nll0n1Ivl1 lull am arm. than slnnapar-‘s mm of me supremo cum umm: [slngspnnll ~-mm.“ III: mu...:..:y nu. mms: m. aumsmn cl nnrsay evidovvcc‘ omm my. 5 Rsc zsmgapm; :; unum In nur may 41 ru): 4 ac om: 4v rulc am Inn 4:; ac mm. 4 lxzupllmu whlnln ... mum: my cormlln heuny evwdenca, nunery when moms an -pm-nan alllra Voﬂowmg. 1.; Omar Vlrure 212; RC my Orusrvlru/s 6(2]RD In) Ora-rum!-SIZJRC and «:1 3 Court may has new mm Md" own as m». 341; no" (emphasis added), and (2) me nemaanxs 3 smug om Appucauans are “tnlstiocumry proceedings“ within the muamng 010 41 ( 5(2) no Then 3 Appeals emznah from me Defendants‘ 3 smkmg om Appucauons Consequenﬂy, premued on Ten! Corporation we may apwy o 41 v 5(2) ac read mm 1 4 an m lake lulu account lhe mmenls cl Dr senanudaaan-s amdavh m mesa 3 Appeals We furlher my an ma voumnq mdgmenls m we HC - 1;) m Daluk Amlr Kahnr bin run Haj‘ Musunha v Tun Mohd Said hi Knnuk 5 on [1994] 3 Mm 737, to n dalsvmina In Ippluznnn «a nuke em a mm Ahdu!Kan1Iv Sulamun J (as he man wa57 had adrmllsd an mam pursuant to o 41 r 5(2) RC According to Daluk Amlv Kahlv, zip 741 In 742- “Thu ddilndnnu‘ mm-nan r: umtw a u r 1910(1), in mud Id] mm mm. at m NM: cam mu rm. mac) and undu mu mnmnuumatczvon ur me cowl. n. ppllclﬂan ls suppanod by an Mdnvlr cl Wong Klan Knoorly nllmmd an 7 sop:-mu mu rm um nﬁdlvil mnrsiy nfuu In mm I/ﬁdnvvll-In-nply of ma dofond-wt: mm as room: In rat nmmm mlln npnlitnllon m the on'grn.n'»a summons. Ensed on mos: nmamwm-Mn Inn mom: mvry bolrcvu am 291- angmunn summam of me pmmm discloses no ruionahh cm. 4:! Action mm: all or my or Inn uofnndanu, and/or 1: mum-m, rmrm, vexukm: an!/oi I: an abusl n! ma Pious: M m. court. In oppaamun to ma uprlcnuen ol an dclnndanls. tn- plalnllll mun u. .-maul: m nppalltlnn amrlmd on n son:-mm an In 29.. aﬂldnvll In annosruan at m- vl-mmr, ne an-mm Me prvpwy or man nmmmamply nicrvld to hy 2». dlponlnl of m- mmn m supp-m or w: lPnU¢a1lon, smu mun nlﬁdnviu .2 mm M m. mi!/having cl ma anulnaung summns wan am Mon mm for nanny. 5:, the mvmedme issue which all: Io: . doclsfan ls wnunu ma apuuuuon on an dtlondamls Hui-can 1.. um um of mu nnmn al an .«mm In sum»-x. am: 45 I 1: am not mu out mu ruqulrvmlnt u! my .m4.m ». support 91 an nppﬂcallnn rm: )5 m/mu: hum an apphcﬂlrm main mm o :4 mm by r 2m memo! m. applmutmn mus! 11 be men by Kwnmons nuppc-mu by an amdawl Simﬂaﬂlf wun an uwlnrulron mIﬂIrO 51, mm: by mm mlluuﬂ an arrmm >5 rsawwd for me annmuon Agam, an Buphcaban undov a 49 r 2 m rammed In he supamlaa or an amdavu Svmdaw wnn an apmmalrnn under o 50 r J. wlvzle 1n. apalvcmmn mm. sIl\|7D01lzdbyunsRaavIl ra cuts ye: anolhsrinrm uiapohcanon rs an apohcahum under o 23 r 1r2/ at m. 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Wang x..n Kllncmg In ml: an r. rm dolocuve noun.“ arm . n-rmnn in mm: Ilrdnviu. ha dxpusad mm bum an on nlnmnld amdavls. nu vvnly MIMI: that nu urrglnlllng summon: n! m. plllnllﬂ nilcrm-.1 nu vnsaruhh mm Al aeﬂon against all or any of un. u syn quurmxauk-EuAn:»<Knn an-nu-nu mm 1. 15-min/nus, mare»-, v-nttaus And/or A: In was. all" pmcou armu m m- cmumsmms, mepmnmrs om-man has no mean" (emphasus adaed)‘ and my me above wdgment m Datuk Amlr Knhnr has been apphed m Knrllun Mnlayuia v mm: Englnauina a. Cnnllruclinn Bhd[2D19]MLJU 1aB0,at[§]. E. wmn can Iummeviaunc bu aamimm in on 19 Fuulfy. “Ium:sr9wdunca" in 5 6511)lc(3)C.JA.1 1(1), 42;. m and (SA) RCA (R mm sututory Provl-Ionl) mean: ewuence which no nol been adﬂuned m me HC av submdmale mun [NC/Subordlnlln Cmm) 2n Semnd\y_ mvae calequnes av ‘further evrdsncs' can be mammm m the Rmavam Slammry Provimns, namely. (1; “Iurthsr svtdem:s' much u mended to he used by in appucann mapllcnmp m -menocunory appucanons m me CA [Funhnv Evidence (lnlaerloculary on Applicniunll‘ (2) “lunher evidence‘ which mended tn be when an by an Apphcanl in me heanng m an apueal m the CA [rumm- Evldencl (Appum but me Funhﬂ Emence (Appeal) my name we being me: me heanng m me H!)/Subordinale Conn (Subuquanl Evldence). and u 13) Fwlhsr Ewdenee mppeax) was avaﬂahle la me Appﬁcanl at me (ulna af me heamvg m we HC/Submdinatz Cuun bu\| was nut adduced m me HO/Subordinate com (Exitllnl Evldonco) 21 we 1(3A)RCA my a\|lnws“(uI1Ils/avrdem>e'(o be admmed al Ihe “Ilssrmg 0/ ms appear -1 me «duawmg Mo wndmcns are samsned cumulamexy by me Apphaaln (2 Condition: [r 10;“) (1) me mm olthe 2 Condmuns [r 7(3A)] (1-- (land an 1: mm)» 15 provided m r7(3A)(a) RC and has Ivm aksmalwe nmbs, namew 43) the -runner ewde:-ca’ wit not muame Io me Apphcam ac the Ilearmq In me Hcrsuomdmane Cmm [1-I All-rnalivu Llmh (1-- condmnnu The 1-‘ Ahemahvs I7 11" Cnnduiunj concams Subsequent Evmence‘ or my me 'Iurmsr awdsnmr exmsa ac me nunng In and HC/Subordinate Cmm but was na\| avaﬂable \|a the Appllcanl despite me exemse av veasanahle dﬂigenoa by me Apphnant {2'- All-nutiu Limb (1-I Condlﬂonll The 2~ Ahemalwe Limb A1“ Cundmnnl men In Exnslsnt Evidence. Ind (2; r vmxm RC pmudes «or the second of me 2 cdnduidns [r mm] (W Conﬂlllon [r 1(:Ay]) There ave Mo ahemznve hmbs of me 2* canduidn [: 713A)] namaxy, me “Iu/mar evidence‘, Mme — u 22 2: 24 (a) would nave mm a delerrmmng inﬂuence upon me demsnn cl me HE/Subcrdmam com {1-' Altnrnnllvn Limb (zm cunaluenn. or my wemu have been I\ke\y «e have a ueaenmmna unnuenoe upon me decxslan on me nusmnmnme Court [zu- Altunniva Limb (2"‘ Cnnd an]] Riﬂe 7(3A) RCA amy apphes la Fullhev Ewdence (Appeal) and N7! In Funher Evidanca tlntarluculaly CA Applucalmn) Aceordlngw. [ha nnn pen of 5 sea; cu and (he flrsl pen at r 7(2) RCA allaw an Appncenc (a use Furmer Emence (Incenccmmy CA Apphcauon) wxlhoul any leave cl CA II is cleav mm 1 713A) non applies to Existenl Evldanoe and an Apphcam can unly dvschsrge me burden N persuade the CA «a gram leave to aﬂmn me Exlslenl Evidence at me hearing at me eppeew -n CA v we 2 Commons [r 1(3An ave saueneu cumulzuuexy The quesunn man arises Is wnamer 1 ma) RCA awhe: m sunsequem Ewaance nu ma CA case or Sin Hnp Ln-Mmmonx Sdn Bhd v Ylp shou sum [2005] I MLJ 515 » (1) Mnkhlar Sidln JCA dewerad the 2-1 mmonly aecmon [M:JmlIy Judgrmm [sun Hun Lu-Maruhoni]] as «cums, al [101 \|u [121 ma [:5] la [is] 7 ‘[142] m my In: an lpplinllmn to n .uuw.4 m. Jpplltant mm m may m. madman: .. mm In pm 424;. Thu: .1 na mm In my mm that mm m- ippvﬂinl nlkmplod m produce wu . hlpglnlng mu nu. ma m; At mm mm urlllr, 2». lppuﬂlnl zurrcldad m.: an ..a.:.»c- Irnandad to be zdduced my not nuur won tho ma! 12/ away mu mat. n uccwnd rung arnlrllu mr In an mun Cam my my. concluded. u I: clear In me mn ma avldlncc rnxumu 2.: n. aﬂduud m In mm: a! In mumm tang um: um lncldlnl and if!!! m. mu. TN: nwvencu was m. aullablllxy oi-Iv Allnmlllvu um. road tn 1):: responmrs ram: long arm mu Mal Ialmocl my yen: mu m rupwldcnt nu illod mu pnunt Imun). I: vs char in ms nu: evklmce was not my not ayauanu al ml Yhe second nu: u muted by Dar: «A; Is that m. Hm mam. r1lnll.WuuIH n. . m or vmuld luv: bun llnly to my: . ummrnrny Inﬂuence upon me decision or m my» com 1751 1: Is cloarlmm the um um me mm evidence that m. appallant nmnm 1.: mm mum m an m. anumpﬁon mu m- nmmd loyal or an mm mum bv brought down nu: ma. wn nu .ua...;. um um um m. This -numpdon was hand on em rm mil mu. wu- sum: umwum on ma ritpnnuynllx ma Ind m. Idlmnirrs land. may those oarmwonts, mo HFBN/an! ulumod that ran mpmom llrvd amid a. «mum the olive: nelvhhauriuv hifiaininv lot which was to be muapea mm In y-rx ma 2»: rupovd-m n-'1 ﬁl-d am: mm. an my vinw, mos: has my: naming u: do mm m aamay-s mm--1 by rm mponom To mm In .u.m.m. mud to Ms mm was the respamenrs my nation In mm ma upun-um am 4:! N5 ma not In urlgmll mm mu! M Dunn dulroyud [151 m lgpnﬂlrn m mu! .mu.m m ugly nfﬂrmld ny smug cmn Chem on 1: Juryma cormrmod. my vm. mu! 1». ipplmlnun m ndducl Iruh mam. val my in mike an lssummion andassenwn as mm «mm «ax m; m my mtnisis nun-wanna: um anlyln nmmmton wen rm -up-um mm mm: «my me am. n. my vlaw, mm 1.1 no hull evtdmcz m m: an»4I=a2«on.u:I [151 1;. my vluw, m. .,.p::=.u.». am not lllsly the condmoni /mm-.1 by r 7 IRCAI. For In: rulun, or mujnﬂfy dnclllnn, wu dlsmlssld m. lppllclllan ny tin -manna‘ (mar-asas added)‘ and 12) Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA (as he men was) delivered me foHA7wmg dlssenlmg magmem [Dlunmlng Judgment (Sin Hun L Mnvuhonl)L at [73] to {as}- ‘mr mu -pnunmn -nun:-.1. an Hour: olmucfun, Inr mm ‘In in: mm ma! luv: u nu--ury: lo mmu rum-r avmnnzi n. my .pp..:. 11.. lunn-I .w.1em was as to 4 mam! mu mama arm mu m- or 1». mmon or m. ﬂlgh Cuun nu tar: as. nnmlly, tvldancn HI .x2...;m emnwolks that won army canm out on m- mpermm um um. n wn cl ma, wauld bnnp down an ‘plntlwm 1:-my M the mm. The mam pumon oltne tvhimcn was to plvw mm mm would nu Inngav n. lny nu-d 2.; conumcl - rat-Wnv war! 2.: nublrrn the wake of mu rnpnnﬂant’: mm an Inn :1 . mlllnmg will m. um uaulmd, mm In ms! muld M av-my Induced ‘due In mu 1: ol rum manna: 4w-rum ol sail)’. so nu ma rnmmnutafi dimJ9\I would mzw nntbu .. much .u my Rum mmmn In-1 wns mama 1741 m mpumm appluld m. -lppllrltlun. In his .mum: n. mx-nu-4, nmcnn mm tniws, that m. r-com urmwoﬂti am not mm III: n-Inn: Ind canngmuan a! ma um, um it i: not nemlissfhle to ask ma meuau cam w rusun ﬂlmlgu mu n. . bun pruplriy nuussd .: mg my um um. In my mm, the evidence mm to nmry um um cnndmnru far It: rlzupﬁun lundusload m. mm candlﬂons 2» be mm that may be drawn mm Ir nw Ru) 1751 w. mm: m ﬂnllnllnn mm commenclnv to hair mu mm: It wu alunnua by . mnjmvry dnclslun wvllmm 1: mn: mmod cmmnl Io! ma nsnondunl. r was mm vm, mu nurlng m. mbmllslun aim: .pp.::.m rumm zclmsnl m: not mm: the ommmny to Mar mu submission of ma nsponaonxk ll-mad mu-un mu m. nsl rnn cannon oi me am»: Amt nc-puan av Iunnu Iwdoncc for clvﬂappllls (a m. Cuurt nrappur f1 dull mm In . HIE./AI my I: 15 um fmm mm 12: um u m. mum lwdmzl 7: u 2., mum mum um occumd um me mlsron -malea from, n my a. glvnn 1;. my an my luv: u rvquma. m. glvvny nliurmuv uvidmze .5 to put- declxlon mmen‘ rs a mam! ur rlghl u vs -1.14: c u mm. m. ward: m. u m mltlurs muq...m .. .rm...aw. ma 1:; ma: mo rldulnnmm or lpocul wo-um um ar 1; luv: mu down ny rm sub-5 do nazappty Ia Dos!-chclslon mums ma; am: an m. was ‘Appeals to ma cm: or App r mu o. By way at rvnunng, Ind m million In such lypIllS' in nab-5 m, the whoh ol 5 u, .u m m n4b—uv.1(oru 1:! re. Inn, mm my ulgnz nmmmm dvWu:rvce.1, rrvmlund in r wzcu. mu ﬁve sub-sections mommy um Ilvn pm; on». rm: 1;. um. um: urdur. m urm air 1 wt: Mzourse the same u em or: :9. 45 hr .u putdvemnn mm... ... mmm-a, m. qwmq of man: wldcncn Is: mule! arm: pa: mm a provision of .n An 12! p.m.m.m mm nal bu rt-omclud In subsldllry liwslallcn, because me re onasmunx will a. mm, ... um, um nu rm nrlnoncu, M. u tum oflls own. Runovo IL and mu law A: still mm in an Act Furtmr, n m. Io-nnn¢1manH.I mm nmamauan. m. maﬂtlicntinn Vs um: vlns and lnolhcuvn D-cauu n -vekr 2.; Huh mudlilclﬁnn m m. law tnmugll .uammy lrqislntfnn in In no. that Pamam-nx has «mm: iol, mu... m pawn In mnmiy 1. lxprnnly glvnn Dy Flrmmunl. The modiﬂc-ﬁon mu mmnvy am arms mu m menmln-nt mllv nrmpugnnnl m m. pmvu/an .- nnntlud by Pmlnmenl. and subzfdmy /eylsmvon Is mam». or dn/ng mu /ea} mm :9 any .u can bonus: In nu r 1 ms Jmervdod bylnlmﬂuclng m. Iulmwmg par: {u}: M rm .. Inc pmynnh mu Vmsminnod arm: in mmmm mm mu mm sandman: in 9. 112111114 1: Impolu rllmzlmru m... m. uutnd mm. mum. mo rrqulremem In pm 11:; mu am now evmnnco woufd zn (awn roosmzn wmu IN mi mum nr APPEAL or umvsn u nun-s musuucnam clvn. u- azrwszw 4 Muulmov All. mmuuvxmuc Nu I1n1a:-02515!) 2 mumuum ms smmme mm: no Izmmluw) .. »9sLLmvs Am: 4. rzueam uosP1nL mum z new-um xaumuu «scam moon mum Kismnnu Miami JONDR :. mu. psmm xzsmmu, xzmamzmn K£amAm4 Iuuvsu ¢ xsmmu uumm xsspouusxts [M m: mallswfllaa Hm cm m Jmmrﬁivm mm Mahm- cmxsunna mr2uNcv<>2sasI2n2n Bamaen Munundylll K:m1uamHNR\c Na a7aw:—Dz—57M7) 2 MunumnuhlIpS.In1MuvW(NR\C Nu 7:nz1Ms»5s1a1 Fmnmli Ann Pewavuw ms»-m Swan-h mm Plrwavah Keswnatan Ntgay1.!nMv,1ahzIan mum" N-9-«mu KIN: Famgaran Knmmzn Kuvventnmn Kumntznm-Ways: Knralaan mum Devendnnbl 1 2 a . sw qULrr4vxaUKaEuAn:><Kur2 coma: LEE swzz szma, .mA mmnu mm mm. Jan wens mm xuzous, JCA 3 nave ms: or would Mu bun Iﬂroly to um nm a dntxrmfninytnﬂunnci on the decnslon um was mad-. mm mm ma 4-» ‘aura mpg-st max nmnu wrdonu would -mly he Allowed :5 to mmers rn exlslonu mm 2»- d-cmon, mama P'W‘ou:1.Y mm... maam u M pun- dlnlalon mutton was nl)owed,:m1u mmuua 1:21 ma mwu mug:-v mm by pm mu MV- not am. mm (9 s 61 Since pm «A; seeks to am to r 7. and um: 1 has no lxl.:l4n:n,II1- mm. nUL\| own, um I: m-rlly an am or 5 n, r (W 75 ncrnlny mare mu M ulelvlbl by -unaramy V-glslltlnn In mnﬂlly . 5:. ma lﬂumpl u ulln vlns hocausn subsidiary I-gmamm I5 rm aapawa nl mndlfylny in Au 1:! Pnmamlnl. Ilrclpl Dy «mu numarily on-amamm, wnrcn am not ammu- Iaaj I war :3! ma mw. mmrm, ma: 1 as 1: mil nﬁedad ny Dan M and further mama. as to pen- docmon mum my mm B: gnrul, And a. of right. rnamm, mevely 1.1 . rmamy in distal my -man, Vuvo mum 175 Man lo mu lPpI4I-rm to 9.... ma mm» moans. ml! may mm 2.: give. me quamm :2! ns warm and a col mum DI minors to M carllrdund m m. -aneunsarr“ (emnham added! 25 m mu mew, leave oi CA IS um req-men lav Subsequenl Evidence because Ihe secann pan of 5 69(2) CJA (z~- Pan 1- 59(1) cm) sud me second pan L71 r 7(2) RCA (2"- rare [r 712) RCA]) havn expIess\y auuwea smasequam Emanoe us be used an me neanng ol appezk wvlhnut any weave MCA In Hus vegans- (1) me Mamrily Judgment (Sm Huap Leememnenu had memxssea me avnlmauon lor weeve or c»: to addnoe “(urfhsr emencr on me around nu: ma ippﬁcahon vms based on an “essumpIIan' and (here was nu ‘further evidence’ «.2 be adduced at lhe hearing 0! me apyaa m mal can Furmemme. me Mammy Judgmunl (Sm Heap Lee-Maruhem) am not discuss me 2"‘ Pen [5 6912) cm em 2'»! Pan [r n2) RCA]: and 12) we take the Dnwrwmly la appnws me Dlssenlmg Judgment (Sm Heap Lee.Memeem) men can be suppmled by me «euewmg reasons » (a) awarding In 5 2(1)(e) ov me Inmvpretanon Acls 1943 and 1967 (IA). Pan x IA avnhes la RCA neceuse RCA are made me: 31.121963 pursuant Ia CJA when has been vevised under me Rewsxan cl Laws MI was seeuen 23(1) VA on Pam IA) Dmvvdas M the uocmne 01 um wres asfollowa: “Any subsidiary agar-rm’. mu 1- mmmm with m At! rumuwng Inc 4.: urvdur men n. mum", Vngulnnon was me.) man e. vent tn rm nmm cl u..:m.....1.,.ey.‘ (emphasis added) The apphnallun L715 23(1) IA has been exwamed by Mohd. Zawawi Salleh FCJ m we Federal Cuurl we) use ov Pihak serkum Tauhnib Majlit Porbamurun 22 26 27 sobcnng Perai a. Anor V Muxildi Illukhhr [mu] 1 cu Lz([81].ask1ll:1ws “[511 m: cm: matsubsrdlary or H-Voyuml rogmanan mu not be bruder man in: onabllrrg logluallnn. YNI glnural pnnctyll u! nllulary intorpnallon I5 eodmod m s 2: nu " lempnlsls added), and an RCA are made under s 17 CJA I! r 713A) RCA apphet to Subsequent Emuenoa, Hus means r may RCA Is \ncons\s\|en\| mm the 2"“ PIr1[5 69(2) CJA] and lay Wine 01 1 23(1) vx, r mm RCA us van in the extent 0\| such an mccnsmency As explamed m the nave paragraph 25‘ by reason arms 2'“ Pan [5 s9(2) CJA] and 2"‘ Pan [r 712) RCA], me Plamnm do not lemme reave of the CA \a use Dr sawahuadeenrs amaavn m these 3 Appeals Should CA gum nu Igr Pliméffs Io Inc Dr. selanuddnrn yﬂgnvlt in a Aggalﬁ Nodwwhsmnmng our apmnn w my above paragviph 25. we are 5! me mew mac ma vuamxma have sansnaa me 2 Commons [r 7(3A)] as (allows (1; me 1-1 Anemame Limb 11“ Common) 15 (umuea because Dv. salanuaueervs amdavn was not avaﬂuble to me Plamums mmng me heanng ov me Delendams‘ 3 sm mg OmApp\|IcaI\ons‘ and 28 12) as sxmamed wn parigrinh as helm me comsms M Dr Se\ahuddeen‘s amaavn would have been llkely \|a have a dalermlnmg mauem an we 3 HC nacismns In mhev wmds‘ me 2"‘ Allernanve Limb 12"‘ Cundmon) has been taxisﬂed by me Plainmfs Franused on me above reasons, ma F'\|ImMIs' 3 Leave Apphcahons (Dr. SeIahuddeen's alﬁdavﬂ) an answer: by ms cmm wnnom any ovdsv as to costs wh-um noun can Igglx guitzhle enoggl doclrinn with Egzrd In Thne-Vur Linn Ian Furiod The Tmse»Vaav Lmmanon Period us vrwldad In s 21:) PAPA wmen reads as lollows -2 wnm, mu m. coming Ame fart: nrmu AL: lny MIL acllvll Drosszutron or om-r pmcudlng :. cnnlmuvcud in m. Fnd-ntiun -mm myneuon an: my m dune rn Wnunnce or cxecumzn or Irmmua lxocullnn a1 Iny mm». law III 1:! my puhlrr my a. numurify or m mam alnny «mm mm or datum m the mcuuon of any such mm... 1..., may or mm mm rmwmg pravlslnns sin!/luv: mm (3) me man. zctlom Prowcunovv or pvumamg mu not 1.. nr o. .mm.a unlsu n u cammnncnd mm. 70-57:: moms nu! -rm M: an, Mylar! or ac!-uu comnllmod 1:! or, m me use pr . mnnnuunce a/mju/Y ar mum wvlnm mmw manllvs net! am: my clnsmg (h¢Iunl' (emphasis added) 24 29 In Alma Yamplnlon a. On v Law Val Hnldings Sdn Ehd a. Ann: [1999] 2 ML.) 202 Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he man was) has exnlained m me HC man a defendant may be snapped lrom remng on a nmmon devenoe pvovlued by me umnanon Ad 1953 (LA), n \s dec ed m Allmd Tnmplulon‘ al p 244 M7 245‘ as lulluws ~: mint lully zcnsrdu um." ..n. In ulnp an-ull um 11! m. Llmltutmn m m xou Nanny V was cmng Kmﬂw mm Lmmu1Ac u may Mu 45, . name” 1:! Inc pm Cuuncll Imm m. mm Federal Court of Marayxla. m a ran av mmyvmms, mm Lon1.IMp.I um mm an statute: which, vrouyh dwlarfnﬂ m..cum m 1.. .4.....;.»a...:. nr .,.,..:, ... nevennelass rm! .m:-my pmmouory and so do nu! pncludu .m,,...r. On mm. a: 1:... .. m. smut- »: mm I-we Mlmphrru V Numnrmes mm 2 KB 5:1 :4 m wmm .: ma nu mm conndlnd mu the shunt om: m n. mm: as regular/W pmcldun, rml .. ...m..g .2 usnntlll vnlldllm .. . mun am: 1:51 u. may Is to :5): mm.’ m. raw m.:....m.m. me wanna an n. am. .. ,.,.,.....x. mm puucy 2.: which m. noun mutt pm rm: In 2». .m.«..: :1 m. Wm punluﬂy 9. lam! nzrlnn .7: 2». Dublin, mun. any rules or ovmcnco if mm... u.......m. mu m. pnmu mly a... cum by m... canducl or oumwm mu wold: arv wmuly arm. Ind Juggul mu m Lmumlon Ac! run 31!! vny la oslogpel. rmma, mm tn mm In fumuvmn y Wu! Nlm CorpnrItmrl[1D5(7]2 KB M507 2 K5 209 2; wnlcn uyye-x mu . 44...... will rm! :2. mm in My M. . mm. ofllmv Hon Imls acts arslatomoms during m. mmm alum puma nnw lndu-:11 m. plllnﬂﬂtu u.:.y pmmamg. And, rn amm... 1 Anal v Mo:-1197212 ML.I15s any c4 um suuuu al mnnmm M...» an 1». ..:m....m 01 . ngm ny action ..a me: of Dmcednm only: see 24 Nusaury. Llws at 5...... ma Eu; P m . right which meme. unenfemubfe merely by recson al unm.m... u... no! [pun hm parish ar mm. Inln mm .11. a. helmet v cmnu mm] 1 wm ass whom n m. mm mm .41....» um... . ms; .1 m. Llmlnauon Au 1m, mum of mum. llmnsl mntllndlrvg 1.. man u... .1. yams ... :...m...m. by action. m. munmors mu or-ry ommod la n. uzumou rvmuﬂy .1 mampuon pruvvd-d that my am .0 uvenrs or marvyaw lrmrvn, wnunu mm blmd or ..L N, .. m mu 5..., .q.n.u. rvynl: am not new.» by mass. or rrmmzvan, can 015 Sam: name. a. ..: up n... n. my 2». am. at . o...emI.r own! to be granted Ms mm to me /29:4 am so 1.. .s mly n. necsniy. I mum mm: m: baled an Mes: mu. m. Llmlollan Act :. pululy pruzodunl: ... um»... um Amar V ma mm] 2 ML1 15: um ulwcholl v mm: Ewlnoulnv Co Ltd mm 2 us my 1m. And, mm“, 1.. cunln urcumxtlncls, an. an eslap Mosul! om mm mum. Act by curmuzt " (emphasis added) an 31. 32 33 The abave declswon m mm: Tlmpllmn has been appnwed by the FE m the lollawlng judgment dehvered by Gopal sn Ram JCA (as na men mu) m Eoulund Tmilng usns) Sdn Bhd v Arab- Mnmann Morchnm Bunk and 1199514 cu 253‘ n: 294 "saw mu». n. 1, 1-: M an-n ms) In In ruunmunv /udymlnl In Ylmlllltun y. Law m ﬂnldlrrgt sun. and. [ass] 2 mm 201 m apmm mg doclnm In . mm nnu mun: inman lo pmrtnl a ﬂuhndnnt rmn rulylrlg upnn ma pmvlsluru aim! ILA] ' femvhasxs added) The Phrase my person lorany act done In pursuance oraxeeuwn ur Intended sxscuﬁorv 0/ any wrmen w ar 0/ any puzm duly nr numonzy m m rsspecl or any alleged rveglanl or aerau/r In the execurmn many such wnnsn /aw, my maumont;/' In 5 2(3) PAPA rere-s to any person we perlorms a wnllen lnw. public duty and/or public aumamy For ease ol convenience‘ .n this ‘udgmem we wvll describe me pelsun envisaged m s 2(a) PAPA as 2 ‘uublic oﬂrcsf We are unable (:7 «no any prevxoui Malaysian case much has decided on me appncauon ol me docmne of sq-nnahxe esﬁcphm m a puhm: omcer who has relveu on me Three-Yes! Llmnahon Penna m s 2137 PAPA u is our view mac — (1) a publsc alﬁner (X), and 2: (2) me Fedara\ Govemmcm, sme Government or pumu: aulhmm’ Aulhomy) whn ts vu:aneus\y liable for (Governmenwu x‘: am. umlsslnn and/arconducl may be esmpped by any 5\a\|emeM and/ov conduct by — (a) X, on a pubhc ofﬁoer nlhsr man x (V), and/ur (c) suuemmem/wumn: Aulhorw lvam re\ymg on me Three«Year Lmmamon Penud The abwe mum suvnoned by me Mlawmg reasons’ (I) ma Three-Year Llmﬂahon Penod is a procedural delanm and no! a subsuarmvs ans There may be a slatsmenl and/nv mndud by x‘ v and/or Government/Publvz: Authomy whrch makes m meqmtable «or x and/or Gavarnmanl/Publu: Aumorky (o rely on me ThreeVear Limnanon Period. on Alma nmpmon Ind aousmn mama have recugmaed me appmauan ai me dncmne mi equuame eslnppe\ «a bar a panys vshanoe an 2 Ivmtatiun defence pmsuam \|n LA Theve is nu veasun m prmclyla and palm, why aqmcable e5lopp€\ doclnne cannot be Invukarl agﬁmst Public amcau and/or sovemmenr/Puonc Amhonlv m rewecl of the Tme-year Ltmllahon Pemd: am 2: 35 (m m acwldanue mm good uubhc governance‘ puhluz Mﬁoers and Gevernmen\|IPuhhc Aumamy should not mike smemems and/av canduct \|hemse\ves m a manner wmah may cause any person to he mepmmy plqudwced Was man a lrilbln um. um Dclsndznli wm ulnggd bx Summontl Dr. solahuaalnlnr. Aman vrom nl u on num- Llmltlllon ad? m these 3 sum, mars Is a (mole mus ragummg whe1her me Defendnms are eslupped by Statements (Dr Sslahuddm/DI Aman) «mm rerying on me maawear Ltmllaﬁan Penod (mam. Inn") The Tnable Issue xi mpponsd by the Vullnwmg evxdenoe and reason: (1) me nc was lonned by MOH and was headed ray 3 rained JCA The Plamtiﬂs knew al ms rarmanon N no am as mqmry, at the maIeria\ lime. Dv Se\ahudmn and Dr Amun were the Jnhnre State Nsamw Dlremm and Haspnars vector rssps1:\|rva?y. In mher mm‘ Dr sawammuin and Dr Aman hs¥d man was m MOH an meume ollhe maxmg enne Smemem: my Sela)-mddm/Dv Amnn), (2) me Smamanls my Selahuddin/D7 Aman) weve made In the ramny Members (6 Deceased Persons) 3\| me Meelings Minutes (Meetings) had been prepared by MOH n \s merevme dear me: me Statements 10: Sehhuddxn/Dr Aman) weve made In me course of mg empluymem or Dv Selahuddm and (3) 29 up Aman The slalamenls (Dr Selanuddlrllﬂr Aman) were no: made w9Hhe—cufl wimnul any lrllarltlnrl by me Delendanls Io be no-um by Ike slalamanu (Dr Salahuddln/Dr Amanl and (4) any reasonable clalmalll ln me woman oﬂha Plalnlllls who had been Informed M me smemenls (Dr Selanudliln/Dr. Amanbl would be lulled mm a lalsa pl onmplarerlcy la llle a sull -«er ma pruparatmrl 01 ma ll<:'s Repon and aller me lapse 01 me Thre>Vear Llmilatlorl Plrloli In mm won1I,Ihs Plalmiffs did not ﬁle me 3 Suns WI m the was-vear Llmllallon Period because ma vlamulls had yelled on me slalen-ems (Dr Selahuddlrl/Dr Aman). ln lms sense‘ n ls alguable that the nelemams are eslopbad by ma Statemenls lm Selahuddlrl/Dr. Amanl [ram lelylug on me Thrac-:»Vaal nanorl Parlod lo supper! me Deiendnnls' 3 Slrlkmg oul Appllcancrlt consequenlly. me oumenls ol DY 5a\aVluddeen's alﬁuavn would have been hkaly up have a “deIumll'rllrlg Inﬂuence’ on me 3 HC neclslona wllmn me meanlng of me 2"‘ Allematlve p lzw Corldillan) as ln vlew arms maple lssue — (1) n ls up: a plain and Dbvlnus case luv me H!) to strike om Ihe 3 Sulls - please refer lo we Judgmenl M me Supreme Cowl uelwem by Mom Dzaluam SCJ la: he man was) in Bandar aulluu sun arm a. on v Unlnd Malayan Banking Carper-lion and 11993} 3 ML] 35, an -as, l2) ma 3 sulls are neﬂher hlvalnus nor valiuous wnlun me maanlng pro 18 r19(1)(\|7)RC, and A. cwounns or JUDGMENT Imvodunllgn ma above mree appeals (3 Appelll) use a navel queshon av whether me Federa\ eovemmm um Duf-lldlnl) may he emppea by stalamenls made by‘ among amers‘ Johore Stale Hem Dvectur mi Dolundanv.) hem re\ymg on me lmse~yeav «mnamm period (mm-vur Llmitalion Plrind) pmweed m s 212) 01 me Public Aumevmes Pmtzclmn Am 194: wrap. Elclxground we shah relarlo palllas as they wave m ms Hugh com me) A we hvake out on 25 10 2016 (Fin) In me Vnlenuve can Uml ucu) arsuuanan Ammah Haspna1,.Ienare Bahru moapnal) sux panams m the HaspI\|al's mu perished m me Fire (6 naeund Pomona) The plmmms (Plainlilfij m me above three tuils (3 sulm are me panams and dependenls anhrae cute! me e Deceased Person: The ﬁrs! defendant is me Hospital‘: wecoov wvme me we dedandanl Is the Dweclnr-General 0! me Mmuscry av Heaun (MON) Tm: wdgment snau uelena all me delendans cnI\ec\|lva\y m mese 3 Apvﬁals as me “D¢fendanh" Ana: the rue, MOH lnrmed a sevelunemher 'lm29psndsrlIlm1uIry Camrnmes" In mqulre m\|u me cause 0! the Fire arm to make me (3; me 3 Sulls do um cL7ns\|llule abuse: cl cwrl proceas as underslood in 0 1K r 19M ml) and o 92 r 4 no \|\| is lo be born: m mm I1la\|evanlVa pleaded clalm IS weak and ls nal llxely to succeed, the us nol a ground m usell \|l: s1nks am the clalnl ~ sumraulla-r sun slm, al p 44 In any evenl, me Trlable Issue can urlly be les/ah/ed at a vial and me: by way cl afﬁdavll avldence I Shuuld Plan «in: In allowed up lmend me Blahmant: :1! cl m soon 37 0 ‘K o 2 r l(z) and 0 15 v 95(1) RC Dmvlde as lulluws ‘o M In aanumu-my mm Rulcs, mo Cowl nr . Judge mu nun mm to me nvomvlrlv lnlonrt ollusm nnd nnl only (-2 m. lncnnlcnl nan-carnplllnzu mm mun Ruin c 2, 1121 rm. mm are a Droeedlml made me subleu in ma onmdlny an/mm cl emu"; m. Court to dual mm uni /my m Plrvlts m Iwulm: to users: the Cam! in mum mu uvlmdmq aﬂjiclun o 18r1P(7I me Cour! my u my sure am. mmalm nrdlr tn 1:. mm nut ur umm any prualng M M: uldornnmlz or any wm ln me mm, nr anyway in my pl-ndmn arln rm .m:m.m.n; an m. gmurrd MIL la; H melons no Iuasonabln cause of lclmn W nclsnce, as Illa saw may De, la; it is aundalous, Ilivolous or vezuuous, zl vs; rrmay are/um, embarrass or near me mu m/ .1 me mm (a; n I: om-rwiu In mu: 0! um mm. cl um com um mly mun! um. mm. In a. mm or aumrma nrludgmuvl to an mxenunccomrngrx as In use m-y an (emphasis added) as n Is deemed by me He m vup Ch Koong Halrllnna sun Bhd v Buamupulllan Amu. Sdn ams{2o221e cm 754‘ an [ea], mat the com net ma lalluwmg ﬁva dmcrellonaly powers under 0 1a rI9(1) ac ‘(:91 m courl nu ma vouowlng live mmemn-rr P°we:i Dursunnl In a m am RC 11; the cam! my am. am a nlsndmy, nmdarsumsm‘ an n plnamlvg, an um ur counlomratm. :2; m. mun mly um... . pm, 2.: um; . pludlng endorse/vvanlon apisadmy. um armunlovdarm‘ 13/ the mun may say an mm orcuummclnml‘ N we cam may mmmn aclmn anmmmm W 15} we court may emer aludamont m an anlmn ar wunlemmm ‘ (emphasws added) as In accordance mm 0 1A and o 2 r 142) Re, HC's discreﬁanaly Dcvwers nummu to c 15 r 19(1) RC should be axamsea mm regard Io Ihe ovemamg mbevesl ouusuce In me dusposal nf ma 3 :2 41 Appeals, by vlrlue cf 5 6911) cm, lne CA has all the powers 0! lne HC. . in View ol lne Slzlamems (Dr selannanln/Dr. Amanl and lne Tnable lsenel n la only just lor in-a coun lo gran! leave under 0 15 r 19(1) no rend wnn o \A and o 2 r 1(2) RC lei lne Plainlllvs Io amend ma soon so as M: include a plea g that me Delendanls are sslnpped by me slanemenle lo: Selahulidlrl/Dr Amen) from lelylng on me Three-Year Llmllal-on Period 1EIIoppIl Finding) Nu lniushce ls owasianeﬂ \|c lne uelenanms by allowing me Plaimms in amend me soc: be se — in lna neiennancs are enlilied lo amend lnen neaenoe Ill me 3 Sims wnn legard Io lne Esioppel Pleading‘ and in lrresvscilve cl lne Esloppel Pleading‘ lne Delenuanlx ale at lmeny in aelanu themselves al lne lnnl M me 3 sun: as may see rn n I inn Plemlsed on me above leasnns nnn on Selahuddeerfs alrnnvil ma 3 Appeals aia allowed will. lna lullawinu nldel. (1; me 3 HC‘s Decisions iv! sex asidal (2; ma 3 suns are remilled in me H0 \|u be mad belnm anumer Judge lzr JO. (3) leave ll gramed In me 3 Plalnlllla \|n amend meir secs In lnciuue lne Eslanpel Pleading wilnin 14 dlys lrom me date at 3; the me: «:1 ms com lwlm leave to me Delenaancs ca amenu men Delenoe m we 3 suns in respunaa la me amended SDC!\|.irld la; coals ol the 3 Appeals and Defendants’ 3 Slllklng om Appllcallorls will follow me evenl ol me \|rial ul me 3 Suits DATE: 2 NOVEMBER 2023 wane KIAN KHEONG Judge com at Appeal, Malaysia For the Appellants {3Appea1s) M: s Gunassgamn 4 Ms Tall PoAu (Messrs Zamsn & Amcleles) For me Rsspondsnls (3 Appsah) Pm Zahllah 52. Mohammad Yusoﬂ (SenlarFsdamI Courlss/) .5 Push Syezana Bl. Abdul Luﬂs (Johan: Stale Legalncmors crime; 34 necessary lecornmerldallmls lo me 4'" uelanuant (Ilc) Ths llc was headed by a relllad Judge cl Conn ol Appaal (JIM). mm‘ San Mohd. Hllhamuﬂln am Mahd Vunus a. In June 2019, IIC handed us report (lIC’: RlpuII)Io MOH unlllme dale al lm: wnnen llldgmem, IlC's Report has ml baerl released co Ihe pubhc c. Lggll Emcacdingi cm. 3 5 9 The Plaimms med the 3 suns ln me no on 2 9 2020 ID The Delendarus med wee awllcatlorls to strike am the 3 Sims on ma glvund \|ha( me 3 Sulls had been lnsmuled aﬂellhe axplry olme Three-Veal Llmlla\|iL7rI Perlod on 25.10 mm (Dal-nnanw J Striklnu om App\|\|::l\|onI) 11 On 1522022 lhe learned lualclal Commlssloner (JD) nu ma HC allaweu me Defendants‘ 3 Slliklng om Appllcamms mm ousls n1 Rn/l2.5uu.oo Io Ihe Delendams «or each ml the 3 sum; (3 no Doclslonlj The Plalrmﬂs hava ﬁled ms 3 Avnaals lo ma com or Appeal (CA) agalnsl me cl HE Declalurls :2 The Plairlliﬂx have applled to CA and obtained an aide! lor these :4 Appeals \|n be heard logelher [Jolnl Hurlng (J AppulI)] 0(2). Joirn Nearing aggmlx 13 For (he vumose or me Joml Heanrrg rs Appeals), me Plamulfs man was names of rrrouaa for weave or ca m adduoe an amaayn arrrrrrraa an 54202: by Dr serarruaaeerr Em Abdm Am (Dr. semruddurr) «or the purpose ol the rreanng or these 3 Appeals [Flaintmf z um Applluuom (Dr. Sa\Ihudﬂe:n'1 -ma-yum 14 Dr selanuausaru amaavn surea as Iouows, among others‘ (1) Dr Selahuﬂdaen was Juhcre srare Heallh Drrecmr from February 2019 urml 0c1ober 2019‘ (2) belween February 2913 and Oclubav 2:219. Dr Salahuddeen (as nrra man Johcre sure Heanrr Drrector) mer wrlh ranuxy members or me 6 Deceased Persons Uncludmg me Prarnrws; [Family mambm (s Dccaand Parsunlll mm or Aman Em Rahu (Dr. Amln) (me Hasprcars Director ar mar me) mleourrqs) Al me Meenngs » (a) Dr selarwduoerr urevmaa uwanea to ma F.\|mHY Members 16 Deceased Persons) regarmng me scams M lIC‘s mqmry 41:) Dr sarrrrruaaeerr and Dr Aman had mlmrned me Famﬂy Members rs Deceased Pelsuns) man nor Report was nor ready arm ma qaarcrorr or campsnsaung ma Farrriry Members (5 Daueasad Ferrous) warm nmy be cnrwldared by me 4'" Dersrruam arcer ma corrrprerrorr of use Repcn [Slat-mlnh (Dr. Salahuddnnnlbr. Arnarrn and 1c) mmulss 01 me Mamas were Drupared by MOH [mu-nu (Moslingl)] but oy Selarmddsen eie rm! have Iocess In me Mmulss lMseIings) as he had retired «mm public service m Oclnber 2019‘ 13) belore Dr Selahuddeerfs reuremem, he mended a MOH meelmg cnmrea by me when Mmuoer ul Health and was meermea eime fnHuwmg makers — (3) me we Repurl had been prepaved and submmad xe Monana my me use Rspnrl coma nut be released 1» me publwc becaun (he cums: had yet so spams :1: rebase, and 147 Dr Selnhuddsan coma not moo-m me ramw Members (6 Deceased Pars/ans) men me we Rzpun had been prepalvd because he had already revnred cm. Dnfundant e "an" scuhuane nu ulllunvll 15 we lepruduee below me relevam parts 01 5 69 of me ceum av Jumcaxure Ad 1964 (cu), : 7 :2! the was ol me com on Appeal I9941RCA)and o 41 r 5 anhe Rules ev Cour! 2012018) “S 522 cu Haring ereeeur. m Au.»-us in m. Cnun a1Apa-nl mu .. by my aim- nanny. and In Marlon to ma appeals the Caurl of Axum! may run .u m. pawn! and mums, -Is to Imervdrrwrv! at omeme ol the ma com. Rosana with ma cﬁsrrouon-rv powlr lo mcuvu mun.’ Iwdunu by bra! aummulmn in mm or lnmuwh a romule cammumcanorl ncnnmoyx by -mam: or by nsposumn 1am Dsfum in lxarmnsr nrmmrmssnmar /21 The tunnel evmeucn mly be won wanna: luv: an Vrmﬂoculury zppllcltiunl, M m lrvy El . u Io mntor which hm nccumd arm the am av mn dvcltlnrv mam wnrcn mu lppullx hmuglll (3; Upon appult hvm - Iudvm-In, me: am or holnrvg of my own annmu upon m. mm, m. Iuvlnnrnvldmce, an n to mums subuvu-nl as afannlﬂ, mu an ﬂmmud an Ipnclnl ground: my, Am! mzl v/imam my. cl m. cum of Aiken! mm Fuwwoiﬂaurl la amend admit Iurlmr tvltlmco or dmw rnlsmnpee mm m rn. Conn so-u nm ll! mu pawn: and mm 5: m amendment or annwnse, emu -ppuwovm my» Court, lnylmnr mm M: ﬂﬂuullunlry pawn 4.. mcnvl Iunll-I vwdlnct by oral sxammarmn m Cowl. by umvn or by debosmon taken bsfuvw .n Ixammsrurcamnusstonzr 127 Such mm: nvldcnn my be glv-n wlllmm luv: an mmvuuwry lF\|)H:Ittun.I, at In Iny cu: . :2 muen which Iv-n occurred mu m: can or can .1-c/unn mm mm,-n In- appul :. bruuym vs; I/Plan mum lmm ummom, am: may or Manny o! my mm or nutkr upun m. mlnﬂ. mn Iurlnar wldmco, m. u to mums suhzequenl Is -rmnm. mm M mntm on men! ymunas onry. -nu nut wmum um aim: Court (am at m. mung mm Appnl /man mm» mu not be nlmllled umus m Cour! 1: mmm mm vs; at an manna won an mgr: com! ar 1» subontmala court. u m. can mly n. m. nnw .wa.m ms nu! ma 1.: mi pm suklnﬂ in us. n, or max masonahh -an;-nu «my-nu would nu! am ma. :2 so . my m. rww .m.m, yr Inn, would Ivavn had ol would ﬂaw Dom may to but my . ﬂlilrmlnlng nnnum. upon m. declsinn clme mm. com or um suhordlnm court, as M: can man. a u r5RC comanu mmmn m sun/-cc to am Vt. Mu 1(1) and 4(2), 2.; pmgr-pn (2) a! mu ml: ma 2.; my my mnde anal: cum 1:, rule 5, M mmm may cumm unly such fun! as rm a-par-an us my av nu awn krmwlldgl la mm 42; An amdivll mm for ma purpau al D-my uud In mtuﬂaculury pmzlldingl mny mm» um-maul: of Womluion u bullllwtm m. mumu Ind ground: nmnr (emphasis named) 15 The xeamea semor Fedam Cumin‘ mm: renrerented me Delandzrns m mass 3 Apnealsr has opnosed the Plaxntﬂfs‘ 3 Leave Apphcaticns (Dr Salahurideerfs amewn an the lolbwlng two grounds: (1; me cements ol Dv Se\ammdeen‘s amam cnnsmuled hearsay evidence and were not admissible m me 3 Appaaxs zwmding men ysmac, and D. 17 13 (2; even il Dv. Selahuddeerfs aifmawt am not oonlam muay evmence, me coun should nut auaw me mainms In use Dr Selahuddeerfs amdawl m m 3 Appeals Tm wmems of D: Se\ahudr1aen's amdavﬂ um um ounssm the Llmnahon Penna and wouhi not have a because we Thrae»Yaar 'delemww1g Inﬂuence’ on me 3 Hr: necisms wilmn me meanmg ol r 1(3A)(b) RCA 5;; 5 DECISION mgm 0 41 r gm RC um zdmisrion ul Dr. Sc\|ahudd«n's E RCA are sum regavdmg use or swam [or me menu; or appsah m CA Conseuuenﬂy. r 4 RCA prev-ues that ac “shall apply munalts I-numndIs' mm regard m Ihe questim at whether CA can take ima aocounl me mmems ul Dr Sa\:huddoan'I amaavn In these 3 Appaaxs rt Dr sewanuaasauu amaawe Is admwssime as ‘h1rtnsrevIdsrme' m me 3 Apnsaxs (blaase reler to Fans E and F below). we are or me mew mat me cnnlenls av ny 5e\ahuddeen‘s amdawl may be wnsldered by me CA The kmowmg masons support mus damsmn (1) m Iukzi Corporlliun v DKSH lhlaynia sun Ehd [2016] MLJU 521, at [16(2)]. mo HC has explumeﬂ me scape at o 41 r 5(1) and (2) RC as lollaws - “nsau omm mil 5(1) ac pmwﬂu In-1 .n -Mann may contain my sue» has n m. HIPM-m 1.1! m. nmm r. .m. :71 m. at my own Anawtudan m wave In 1n	4,441	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-22NCC-433-08/2022	PLAINTIF Yang Amat Mulia Tengku Syarif Bendahara Perlis Dato' Seri Diraja Syed Badarudin Jamalullail Ibni Almarhum Tuanku Syed Putra Jamalullail DEFENDAN 1. ) Zaqrul & Associates Sdn. Bhd. 2. ) Mohd Zaqrul Razmal bin Mohd Podzi 3. ) Mohd Eddy Hamzani bin Mohd PodziPIHAK TERKILAN1. ) Stella Healthcare Holdings Sdn Bhd 2. ) Stella Kasih Healthcare Sdn Bhd	"application by the Plaintiff for an interlocutory Mareva injunction- The applicant (plaintiff) must have a strong arguable case-The defendant has assets within the jurisdiction of the Court-There is a real risk of the assets being dissipated or removed before the judgment or the full and final disposal of this action-Breach of contract-Misrepresentation and fraud against all the Defendants-Conspiracy to injure by fraudulent misrepresentation-Creation of a constructive trust".	03/11/2023	YA Tuan Wan Muhammad Amin Bin Wan Yahya	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=57871cd7-777e-4c78-9df6-e9b8cf7e5071&Inline=true	DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN DAGANG) SAMAN PEMULA NO.: WA-24NCC-551-12/2021 ANTARA YANG AMAT MULIA TENGKU SYARIF BENDAHARA PERLIS DATO’ SERI DIRAJA SYED BADARUDIN JAMALULLAIL IBNI ALMARHUM TUANKU SYED PUTRA JAMALULLAIL (NO. K/P: 450101-09-5079) … PLAINTIF DAN 1. ZAQRUL & ASSOCIATES SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 201001000146 (884712-V) 2. MOHD ZAQRUL RAZMAL BIN MOHD PODZI (NO. K/P: 771208-04-5423) 3. MOHD EDDY HAMZANI BIN MOHD PODZI (NO. K/P: 820618-03-5947) … DEFENDAN - DEFENDAN JUDGMENT (Enclosure 3) [1] This was an application by the Plaintiff for an interlocutory Mareva injunction in Enclosure 3 (“this Application”). [2] The 2nd Defendant had been declared bankrupt and as such the Plaintiff only proceeded with this Application against the 1st and 3rd Defendants. 03/11/2023 11:43:17 WA-22NCC-433-08/2022 Kand. 76 S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 14 A] THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE [3] The Plaintiff’s case against the Defendants is based on the following causes of action: i) Breach of contract against the 1st Defendant; ii) Misrepresentation and fraud against all the Defendants; iii) Conspiracy to injure by fraudulent misrepresentation against all the Defendants; and iv) Creation of a constructive trust in respect of all the Defendants and for the relief of tracing. [4] The 2nd Defendant was a director of the 1st Defendant from 6.9.2010. The 3rd Defendants was a director of the 1st Defendant from 1.9.2016 until 21.09.2020. The 2nd Defendant is the majority shareholder of the 1st Defendant holding 99,999 shares in the 1st Defendant out of 100,000 shares. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants are brothers. [5] The 1st Defendant, through the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, represented to the Plaintiff as follows: i) That the 1st Defendant, through its agents, employees and/or contractors including specifically the 2nd and 3rd Defendant, would set up a facility known as Hospital Pakar Wanita & Kanak-kanak Kasih Putrajaya at Putrajaya, Wilayah Persekutuan; ii) Through Form 2 dated 7.3.2017 issued by the Director General of the Ministry of Health Malaysia (“Ministry of Health”) entitled “Kelulusan untuk Menubuhkan atau Menyenggarakan Kemudahan atau Perkhidmatan Jagaan Kesihatan Swasta”, that the 1st Defendant was given a valid approval by the Ministry of Health (“the Approval”) and the Approval would be used by the 1st Defendant to set up the hospital (which would be known as “Hospital Pakar Wanita & Kanak-kanak Kasih Putrajaya”) (“the Hospital”); S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 14 iii) That the 1st Defendant only needs RM3,750,000.00 for it to execute the setting up/incorporation and the operation of the Hospital and that after the 1st Defendant receives the RM3,750,000.00 the 1st Defendant, including the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, would set up/incorporate and/or operate the Hospital on or before 22.2.2022. (“Representations”) [6] In support of the Representations the 2nd Defendant had given to the Plaintiff the document entitled “Kelulusan untuk Menubuhkan atau Menyenggarakan Kemudahan atau Perkhidmatan Jagaan Kesihatan Swasta” dated 7.3.2017 with the Serial No. 001703. [7] Relying on the Representations the Plaintiff paid a total of RM3,750,000.00 to the 1st Defendant and thereafter entered into a “Investment Agreement” dated 1.3.2019 with the 1st Defendant (“Agreement”). Preamble A of the Agreement states as follows: “Prior to the execution of this Agreement a total sum of RM3,750,000/- (Investment Amount) was paid by the Investor to the Hospital Operator for the purpose of setting up a new specialist hospital for women and children at Putrajaya with the breakdown and conditions as follows: (i) RM1,750,000/- is designated as a soft loan without any security or interest but subject to a repayment as follows: RM100,000/- every 3 months commencing January 2019 until full repayment (ii) RM2,000,000/- designated for investment for a 20% equity to be given to the Investor in the Hospital (as stipulated in Recital B)” [8] The Plaintiff later discovered that the Representations were not true in that: i) Despite that the 1st Defendant had received the RM3,750,000.00, the 1st Defendant, through its agents, employees and/or contractor including specifically 2nd Defendant and 3rd Defendant, did not set up the Hospital in Putrajaya, Wilayah Persekutuan on or before 22.02.2020 or at all. S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 14 ii) The 1st Defendant, through its agents, employees and/or contractor including specifically the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, allowed the Approval to expire and that it is no longer valid for the Hospital to be set up by the 1st Defendant. iii) Through a Facebook page entitled “Hospital Pakar Wanita & Kanak-kanak KASIH, Putrajaya”, it was advertised that “Hospital Kanak-kanak dan Wanita Kasih” would purportedly soon be set up but by “Kasih Holdings” (instead of the 1st Defendant). iv) The Facebook page is owned and/or administered by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants as: a) It contains a video posted by the 2nd Defendant on 5.5.2020; and b) The company Kasih Holdings Sdn. Bhd. (Company No.: 1238784X), which was incorporated on 14.7.2017 was owned by the 3rd Defendant who is also its director. B] THE DEFENDANTS’ DEFENCE [9] The Defendants Defence (also contained in their Affidavit In Reply to this Application (Enclosure 11)) can be summarised as follows: i) The Plaintiff had handed the 1st Defendant RM1,750,000.00 in 2017 without any written agreement. ii) The Plaintiff then signed the Agreement on 1.3.2019 and increased his investment by RM2,000,000.00. iii) The fact that the Plaintiff increased his investment by another RM2,000,000.00 (totalling RM3,750,000.00) shows that the Plaintiff is aware that there is no misrepresentation and fraud and that the documents regarding the investment and Hospital are true. iv) The Plaintiff’s action is premature as there is no breach of the Agreement by the 1st Defendant. Under Clause 5 of the Agreement, the 1st Defendant’s obligation to pay only arises S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 5 of 14 when the “Hospital is formally operational” and the Hospital is not yet formally operational. v) The Plaintiff entered into the Agreement willingly and without any force by the Defendants. vi) The Defendants deny all the Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud, misrepresentation or breach of contract. C] PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE IN A MAREVA INJUNCTION APPLICATION [10] The principles and law governing a Mareva injunction application is trite. For the grant of a Mareva injunction the Plaintiff has to satisfy 3 main criteria as laid out in the Supreme Court case of Aspatra Sdn Bhd & 21 Others v. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 97 (see also Creative Furnishing Sdn Bhd v. Wong Koi [1989] 2 MLJ 153; Leisure Farm Corporation Sdn Bhd v. Kabushiki Kaisha Ngu & Ors [2013] 10 CLJ 401; SRC International Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dato Sri Mohd Najib bin Hj Abd Razak [2022] 5 CLJ 949) and they are as follows: i) The applicant (plaintiff) must have a strong arguable case; ii) The defendant has assets within the jurisdiction of the Court; iii) There is a real risk of the assets being dissipated or removed before the judgment or the full and final disposal of this action. [11] In this regard the Court of Appeal in Menk Sdn Bhd v. Joerg Hugo Schmidt [2009] 4 CLJ 795 held as follows: “[19] In order to succeed in satisfying the above requirements of a good arguable case, much depends on the circumstances of the case, and invariably will depend on the available evidence, normally gleaned from the affidavits. Whether there is any asset within the jurisdiction likewise will depend very much on factual evidence, though more often than not, defendants are more co-operative on this matter. The issue of risk of whether the assets will be removed from the Malaysian jurisdiction before judgment is satisfied, is more difficult to prove, and issues of probity may arise. It may S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 6 of 14 touch on the conduct of the defendant, the clandestine manner the assets are being removed and the like. …..” (own emphasis added) D] A GOOD ARGUABLE CASE [12] The definition and application of what constitutes “a good arguable case” were decided in the following cases: i) S&F International Limited v. Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 62 where the Supreme Court held: “Mustill J held in Ninemia Maritime Corporation v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft m.b.H. UND CO. K.G. [1984] 1 All ER 398 that: (1) Before a Mareva injunction will be granted, a plaintiff must show first that he has a good arguable case, which is more than being barely capable of serious argument, but not necessarily one that the Judge believes has got more than a fifty per cent chance of success;” (own emphasis added) ii) Biasamas Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Kan Yan Heng & Anor [1998] 4 CLJ 754 where the Court of Appeal held: "What is a good arguable case is difficult to define. The respondents need not show that they have a case so strong as to warrant summary judgment nor even a strong prima facie case. It would generally be sufficient if the respondents can show on the evidence available, there is a fair chance that they will obtain judgment against the appellants (see Ninemia Maritime Corporation v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG:; The Nieder Sachsen [1984] 1 All ER 398, on appeal to CA [1984] 1 All ER 413: [1983] 1 WLR 1412)". (own emphasis added) [13] Therefore, to establish a good arguable case, it is sufficient for the Plaintiff to show that, based on the evidence available, there is a fair chance that it will obtain judgment against the Defendants. The Plaintiff is not required to show that it has a case that is so strong S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 14 to warrant summary judgment nor even a strong prima facie case (Biasamas (supra)). [14] In the present case, having considered the submissions of counsel for the Plaintiff and that of the 1st and 3rd Defendants and after examining the affidavit evidence, I am of the considered view that the Plaintiff has met the threshold of a good arguable case based on the following causes of action against the 1st and 3rd Defendants: i) Breach of contract against the 1st Defendant; ii) Misrepresentation and fraud against all the Defendants; iii) Conspiracy to injure by fraudulent misrepresentation against all he Defendants; and iv) Creation of a constructive trust in respect of all the Defendant and for the relief of tracing. [15] In arriving at the decision that the Plaintiff has a good arguable case, I have taken into consideration, inter alia, that: i) The Defendants do not dispute that the Plaintiff has paid a total RM3,750,000.00 to the 1st Defendant; ii) The Defendants do not dispute and also rely on the Agreement which contains, inter alia, the payment terms in Preamble A of the Agreement (reproduced in paragraph 7 above); iii) No monies have been repaid to the Plaintiff by the 1st Defendant to-date; iv) That there was no specific and clear explanation provided by the Defendants regarding: a) the current status of the construction or operation of the Hospital; and b) the reason as to why the Hospital was not constructed or set up by 22.2.2020. S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 8 of 14 v) The averments made by the Defendants or documents which the Defendants have exhibited to show that: a) A joint venture agreement was entered between the owner of the 1st Defendant, Kasih Holdings Sdn Bhd, and two companies known as Stella Healthcare Holdings Sdn Bhd dan Stella Kasih Healthcare Sdn. Bhd. (“the Stella Companies Joint Venture Agreement”); b) Based on the Stella Companies Joint Venture Agreement, the Ministry of Health amended the Approval which approval was now given to Stella Healthcare Holdings Sdn Bhd to construct/maintain the Hospital, valid from 18.3.2021 to 22.2.2022. c) The Approval involving the 1st Defendant was amended. vi) The Plaintiff’s averment that he had no knowledge of the Stella Companies Joint Venture Agreement and matters that transpired between the Stella Companies and the 1st Defendant, and that there were no documents to show that the Plaintiff was notified of these matters by the 1st Defendant. vii) Clauses 1 and 3 of the Agreement which states as follows: “2. APPROVAL All and any government approval and from time to time (including the cost thereof) for the setting and running of the Hospital shall be the sole responsibility of the Hospital Operator and which copies shall be extended to the Investor within seven (7) working days from the receipt thereof by the same. 3. DELIVERY OF DOCUMENTS Upon execution of this Agreement, the Hospital Operator shall deliver the following documents to the Investor’s Solicitors: (a) a certified true copy of the Hospital Operator’s Form 24, Form 44, Form 49, the Memorandum & Articles of Association and the resolution authorising the Hospital Operator to enter into this Agreement upon the terms and conditions herein contained; S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 14 (b) other relevant documents incumbent upon the Hospital Operator to furnish to the relevant government authority which are necessary for the completion of this Agreement.” [16] Thus, the main issues in this action involve, inter alia, the interpretation of the Agreement and the Defendants’ conduct in respect of the Agreement, the status of the construction and operation of the Hospital and how the RM3,750,000.00 was applied by the 1st Defendant and/or 2nd and 3rd Defendants. E] ASSETS WITHIN JURISDICTION [17] The 1st Defendant is a company incorporated under the laws of Malaysia with its registered and business address in Malaysia. It was granted the original Approval by the Ministry of Health to construct/manage the Hospital. Meanwhile the 3rd Defendants is a Malaysian citizen residing in Malaysia. [18] Based on the search reports issued by the Companies Commission of Malaysia on the 1st Defendant and Kasih Holdings Sdn Bhd, it is evident that: i) the 1st Defendant has assets in Malaysia; ii) the 3rd Defendant is the sole shareholder of Kasih Holdings Sdn Bhd and owns 2,000,000 shares in the said company. [19] In any event, there is no specific denial by the 1st and 3rd Defendants that they do not have assets within the jurisdiction of this Court. [20] Hence, I concluded that the 1st and 3rd Defendants have assets within the Court’s jurisdiction. F] RISK OF THE ASSETS BEING DISSIPATED [21] The lack of probity and honesty is a consideration in assessing the risk of dissipation in a Mareva injunction application. The Court of S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 10 of 14 Appeal in Ang Chee Huat v. Engelbach Thomas Joseph [1995] 2 MLJ 83 held as follows: “Having considered the evidence, I am of the view that the conduct of the appellant in this matter is lacking in probity and honesty. In the circumstances, I conclude that there is a real risk that the assets of the appellant will dissipate should the respondent succeed at the trial. I feel that I am justified in arriving at this conclusion in the light of the decisions in the following two cases: in Petowa Jaya Sdn Bhd v Binaan Nasional Sdn Bhd [1988] 2 MLJ 261, Peh Swee Chin J (as he then was) said at p 264: The second condition laid down by Mustill J [in Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave SGmbH & Co KG [1984] 1 All ER 398], duly approved by the Federal Court [in S & F International Ltd v Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 62 ], was also satisfied, ie there was solid evidence that the probity of the defendant could not be relied on. The undisputed detention and use of the plaintiff's equipment, without the consent of plaintiff, and above all, the undisputed detention of 98% of progress payments No 22 and 23, without paying the same to the plaintiff, would indicate that the probity of the defendant could not be relied on with regard to the agreed retention sum with which the Mareva injunction was concerned; in other words, the defendant would, far more probably than not, dissipate the agreed retention sum in question without paying it to the plaintiff, or dealing with it not for the purpose that was intended. The risk of dissipation was not just a mere possibility, but almost a certainty. In Amixco Asia Pte Ltd v Bank Negara Indonesia 1946 [1992] 1 SLR 703, the Singapore Court of Appeal decided that there was overwhelming objective evidence of prima facie dishonest conduct on the part of Amixco/Kosen/Quek, and in the full circumstances of the case, a real risk of Amixco dissipating their assets to avoid satisfying BNI's judgment.” (own emphasis added) [22] The Court is entitled to draw inferences from the surrounding circumstances. In the High Court case of Robert Doran & Ors v. Kuan Pek Seng & Ors [2010] 6 CLJ 105 it was held as follows: “[11] As in most cases, the most difficult area relates to the examination of the available evidence to ascertain whether there is a risk that the assets would be dissipated so as to justify the granting of the Mareva injunction. The difficulty arises because invariably a dishonest defendant will cover his/her S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 14 tracks, making it difficult for the plaintiff to produce the necessary relevant evidence. It is for this reason that the courts have over a period of time pronounced that when determining the risk of dissipation, the court is entitled to draw inferences from the defendant's previous action which show that his probity is not to be relied upon or that the corporate structure of the defendant is not to be relied upon. Of course, in considering the probity of the defendant or the lack of it, the court should also examine closely the evidence raised by way of rebuttal by the defendant.” (own emphasis added) [23] In allowing this Application I had taken into account the 1st and 3rd Defendants lack of probity, inter alia, as follows: i) There is no record before the Court of any financial returns submitted by the 1st Defendant after 3.6.2014. In EHQ Projects Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. v. Equipro Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2008] 7 CLJ 343 the High Court had considered the non- filling of financial or profit and loss statements in the context of the risk of dissipation, and held, inter alia, as follows: “[28] The purpose of their application at this stage is only to arrest the money which MIDF had released to the first defendant and which the second and third defendants (who were signatories of the first defendants bank account), had taken out. Given that the RM 1.5m were so hurriedly and surreptitiously withdrawn from the bank account of the first defendant by the second and third defendants and given that the search conducted by the plaintiffs at the Registry of Companies had disclosed that the first defendant had not filed any financial nor any profit and loss statements since it was incorporated on 2 September 2005, the risk of dissipation is therefore real and not improbable.” (own emphasis added) ii) The 2nd Defendant, who held about 99% shares in the 1st Defendant, was adjudged bankrupt on 13.11.2019 about 8 months after the Agreement was entered but this was not disclosed to the Plaintiff. iii) The 2nd and 3rd Defendants are brothers and the 3rd Defendant is the sole director and shareholder of Kasih Holdings Sdn Bhd, the company which entered the Stella Companies Joint S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 12 of 14 Venture Agreement. This then led to the Approval for the construction/management of the Hospital to be given by the Ministry of Heath to Stella Healthcare Holdings Sdn Bhd. iv) The licence holder of the Approval was originally the 1st Defendant. However, it was then changed to Stella Kasih Healthcare Sdn Bhd. The Plaintiff was not informed of this change or the Stella Companies Joint Venture Agreement. v) Under the Agreement the 1st Defendant was responsible for the construction/maintenance of the Hospital and the change to Stella Kasih Healthcare Sdn Bhd ought to have been disclosed to the Plaintiff. This is because it has the effect of removing the 1st Defendant’s interest/right in the Hospital. Clause 4 of the Agreement provides for the right for the Plaintiff or his nominee to a permanent seat on the Board of Governance for the day to day running of the Hospital. The change of the Approval to Stella Kasih Healthcare Sdn Bhd could deprive the Plaintiff of this right. [24] Therefore, there is a real risk that if the Mareva injunction sought in this Application is not granted the 1st and 3rd Defendants would likely dissipate their assets before this action is decided. G] CONCLUSION [25] For the reasons stated above, I allowed this Application against the 1st and 3rd Defendant, prayers I, IV and V with some changes and prayers VI and VII as prayer for. Dated this 30th day of October, 2023 -SGD- (WAN MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN WAN YAHYA) Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division (NCC 3)) S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 13 of 14 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF Nizam Bashir Messrs Nizam Bashir & Associates C3-2-5, No. 1, Jalan Dutamas 1 Solaris Dutamas 50450 Kuala Lumpur. Tel: 03-6413 5545 Email: info@nizambashir.com COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS Muhamad Ilyasa Iqbal Abu Bakar Messrs Shahrul Hamidi & Haziq Suite 36A, Level 36 (PO Box No. 79) Menara Dato’ Onn (PWTC) Jalan Tun Ismail 50480 Kuala Lumpur. Tel: 03-4050 3330 Email: general@shahrulhamidi.com CASES CITED 1. Ang Chee Huat v. Engelbach Thomas Joseph [1995] 2 MLJ 83 2. Aspatra Sdn Bhd & 21 Others v. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 97 3. Biasamas Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Kan Yan Heng & Anor [1998] 4 CLJ 754 4. Creative Furnishing Sdn Bhd v. Wong Koi [1989] 2 MLJ 153 5. EHQ Projects Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. v. Equipro Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2008] 7 CLJ 343 S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 14 of 14 6. Leisure Farm Corporation Sdn Bhd v. Kabushiki Kaisha Ngu & Ors [2013] 10 CLJ 401 7. Menk Sdn Bhd v. Joerg Hugo Schmidt [2009] 4 CLJ 795 8. Robert Doran & Ors v. Kuan Pek Seng & Ors [2010] 6 CLJ 105 9. S&F International Limited v. Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 62 10. SRC International Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dato Sri Mohd Najib bin Hj Abd Razak [2022] 5 CLJ 949 S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	24,686	Tika 2.6.0
WA-22NCC-433-08/2022	PLAINTIF Yang Amat Mulia Tengku Syarif Bendahara Perlis Dato' Seri Diraja Syed Badarudin Jamalullail Ibni Almarhum Tuanku Syed Putra Jamalullail DEFENDAN 1. ) Zaqrul & Associates Sdn. Bhd. 2. ) Mohd Zaqrul Razmal bin Mohd Podzi 3. ) Mohd Eddy Hamzani bin Mohd PodziPIHAK TERKILAN1. ) Stella Healthcare Holdings Sdn Bhd 2. ) Stella Kasih Healthcare Sdn Bhd	"application by the Plaintiff for an interlocutory Mareva injunction- The applicant (plaintiff) must have a strong arguable case-The defendant has assets within the jurisdiction of the Court-There is a real risk of the assets being dissipated or removed before the judgment or the full and final disposal of this action-Breach of contract-Misrepresentation and fraud against all the Defendants-Conspiracy to injure by fraudulent misrepresentation-Creation of a constructive trust".	03/11/2023	YA Tuan Wan Muhammad Amin Bin Wan Yahya	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=57871cd7-777e-4c78-9df6-e9b8cf7e5071&Inline=true	DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN DAGANG) SAMAN PEMULA NO.: WA-24NCC-551-12/2021 ANTARA YANG AMAT MULIA TENGKU SYARIF BENDAHARA PERLIS DATO’ SERI DIRAJA SYED BADARUDIN JAMALULLAIL IBNI ALMARHUM TUANKU SYED PUTRA JAMALULLAIL (NO. K/P: 450101-09-5079) … PLAINTIF DAN 1. ZAQRUL & ASSOCIATES SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 201001000146 (884712-V) 2. MOHD ZAQRUL RAZMAL BIN MOHD PODZI (NO. K/P: 771208-04-5423) 3. MOHD EDDY HAMZANI BIN MOHD PODZI (NO. K/P: 820618-03-5947) … DEFENDAN - DEFENDAN JUDGMENT (Enclosure 3) [1] This was an application by the Plaintiff for an interlocutory Mareva injunction in Enclosure 3 (“this Application”). [2] The 2nd Defendant had been declared bankrupt and as such the Plaintiff only proceeded with this Application against the 1st and 3rd Defendants. 03/11/2023 11:43:17 WA-22NCC-433-08/2022 Kand. 76 S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 14 A] THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE [3] The Plaintiff’s case against the Defendants is based on the following causes of action: i) Breach of contract against the 1st Defendant; ii) Misrepresentation and fraud against all the Defendants; iii) Conspiracy to injure by fraudulent misrepresentation against all the Defendants; and iv) Creation of a constructive trust in respect of all the Defendants and for the relief of tracing. [4] The 2nd Defendant was a director of the 1st Defendant from 6.9.2010. The 3rd Defendants was a director of the 1st Defendant from 1.9.2016 until 21.09.2020. The 2nd Defendant is the majority shareholder of the 1st Defendant holding 99,999 shares in the 1st Defendant out of 100,000 shares. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants are brothers. [5] The 1st Defendant, through the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, represented to the Plaintiff as follows: i) That the 1st Defendant, through its agents, employees and/or contractors including specifically the 2nd and 3rd Defendant, would set up a facility known as Hospital Pakar Wanita & Kanak-kanak Kasih Putrajaya at Putrajaya, Wilayah Persekutuan; ii) Through Form 2 dated 7.3.2017 issued by the Director General of the Ministry of Health Malaysia (“Ministry of Health”) entitled “Kelulusan untuk Menubuhkan atau Menyenggarakan Kemudahan atau Perkhidmatan Jagaan Kesihatan Swasta”, that the 1st Defendant was given a valid approval by the Ministry of Health (“the Approval”) and the Approval would be used by the 1st Defendant to set up the hospital (which would be known as “Hospital Pakar Wanita & Kanak-kanak Kasih Putrajaya”) (“the Hospital”); S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 14 iii) That the 1st Defendant only needs RM3,750,000.00 for it to execute the setting up/incorporation and the operation of the Hospital and that after the 1st Defendant receives the RM3,750,000.00 the 1st Defendant, including the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, would set up/incorporate and/or operate the Hospital on or before 22.2.2022. (“Representations”) [6] In support of the Representations the 2nd Defendant had given to the Plaintiff the document entitled “Kelulusan untuk Menubuhkan atau Menyenggarakan Kemudahan atau Perkhidmatan Jagaan Kesihatan Swasta” dated 7.3.2017 with the Serial No. 001703. [7] Relying on the Representations the Plaintiff paid a total of RM3,750,000.00 to the 1st Defendant and thereafter entered into a “Investment Agreement” dated 1.3.2019 with the 1st Defendant (“Agreement”). Preamble A of the Agreement states as follows: “Prior to the execution of this Agreement a total sum of RM3,750,000/- (Investment Amount) was paid by the Investor to the Hospital Operator for the purpose of setting up a new specialist hospital for women and children at Putrajaya with the breakdown and conditions as follows: (i) RM1,750,000/- is designated as a soft loan without any security or interest but subject to a repayment as follows: RM100,000/- every 3 months commencing January 2019 until full repayment (ii) RM2,000,000/- designated for investment for a 20% equity to be given to the Investor in the Hospital (as stipulated in Recital B)” [8] The Plaintiff later discovered that the Representations were not true in that: i) Despite that the 1st Defendant had received the RM3,750,000.00, the 1st Defendant, through its agents, employees and/or contractor including specifically 2nd Defendant and 3rd Defendant, did not set up the Hospital in Putrajaya, Wilayah Persekutuan on or before 22.02.2020 or at all. S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 14 ii) The 1st Defendant, through its agents, employees and/or contractor including specifically the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, allowed the Approval to expire and that it is no longer valid for the Hospital to be set up by the 1st Defendant. iii) Through a Facebook page entitled “Hospital Pakar Wanita & Kanak-kanak KASIH, Putrajaya”, it was advertised that “Hospital Kanak-kanak dan Wanita Kasih” would purportedly soon be set up but by “Kasih Holdings” (instead of the 1st Defendant). iv) The Facebook page is owned and/or administered by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants as: a) It contains a video posted by the 2nd Defendant on 5.5.2020; and b) The company Kasih Holdings Sdn. Bhd. (Company No.: 1238784X), which was incorporated on 14.7.2017 was owned by the 3rd Defendant who is also its director. B] THE DEFENDANTS’ DEFENCE [9] The Defendants Defence (also contained in their Affidavit In Reply to this Application (Enclosure 11)) can be summarised as follows: i) The Plaintiff had handed the 1st Defendant RM1,750,000.00 in 2017 without any written agreement. ii) The Plaintiff then signed the Agreement on 1.3.2019 and increased his investment by RM2,000,000.00. iii) The fact that the Plaintiff increased his investment by another RM2,000,000.00 (totalling RM3,750,000.00) shows that the Plaintiff is aware that there is no misrepresentation and fraud and that the documents regarding the investment and Hospital are true. iv) The Plaintiff’s action is premature as there is no breach of the Agreement by the 1st Defendant. Under Clause 5 of the Agreement, the 1st Defendant’s obligation to pay only arises S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 5 of 14 when the “Hospital is formally operational” and the Hospital is not yet formally operational. v) The Plaintiff entered into the Agreement willingly and without any force by the Defendants. vi) The Defendants deny all the Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud, misrepresentation or breach of contract. C] PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE IN A MAREVA INJUNCTION APPLICATION [10] The principles and law governing a Mareva injunction application is trite. For the grant of a Mareva injunction the Plaintiff has to satisfy 3 main criteria as laid out in the Supreme Court case of Aspatra Sdn Bhd & 21 Others v. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 97 (see also Creative Furnishing Sdn Bhd v. Wong Koi [1989] 2 MLJ 153; Leisure Farm Corporation Sdn Bhd v. Kabushiki Kaisha Ngu & Ors [2013] 10 CLJ 401; SRC International Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dato Sri Mohd Najib bin Hj Abd Razak [2022] 5 CLJ 949) and they are as follows: i) The applicant (plaintiff) must have a strong arguable case; ii) The defendant has assets within the jurisdiction of the Court; iii) There is a real risk of the assets being dissipated or removed before the judgment or the full and final disposal of this action. [11] In this regard the Court of Appeal in Menk Sdn Bhd v. Joerg Hugo Schmidt [2009] 4 CLJ 795 held as follows: “[19] In order to succeed in satisfying the above requirements of a good arguable case, much depends on the circumstances of the case, and invariably will depend on the available evidence, normally gleaned from the affidavits. Whether there is any asset within the jurisdiction likewise will depend very much on factual evidence, though more often than not, defendants are more co-operative on this matter. The issue of risk of whether the assets will be removed from the Malaysian jurisdiction before judgment is satisfied, is more difficult to prove, and issues of probity may arise. It may S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 6 of 14 touch on the conduct of the defendant, the clandestine manner the assets are being removed and the like. …..” (own emphasis added) D] A GOOD ARGUABLE CASE [12] The definition and application of what constitutes “a good arguable case” were decided in the following cases: i) S&F International Limited v. Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 62 where the Supreme Court held: “Mustill J held in Ninemia Maritime Corporation v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft m.b.H. UND CO. K.G. [1984] 1 All ER 398 that: (1) Before a Mareva injunction will be granted, a plaintiff must show first that he has a good arguable case, which is more than being barely capable of serious argument, but not necessarily one that the Judge believes has got more than a fifty per cent chance of success;” (own emphasis added) ii) Biasamas Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Kan Yan Heng & Anor [1998] 4 CLJ 754 where the Court of Appeal held: "What is a good arguable case is difficult to define. The respondents need not show that they have a case so strong as to warrant summary judgment nor even a strong prima facie case. It would generally be sufficient if the respondents can show on the evidence available, there is a fair chance that they will obtain judgment against the appellants (see Ninemia Maritime Corporation v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG:; The Nieder Sachsen [1984] 1 All ER 398, on appeal to CA [1984] 1 All ER 413: [1983] 1 WLR 1412)". (own emphasis added) [13] Therefore, to establish a good arguable case, it is sufficient for the Plaintiff to show that, based on the evidence available, there is a fair chance that it will obtain judgment against the Defendants. The Plaintiff is not required to show that it has a case that is so strong S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 14 to warrant summary judgment nor even a strong prima facie case (Biasamas (supra)). [14] In the present case, having considered the submissions of counsel for the Plaintiff and that of the 1st and 3rd Defendants and after examining the affidavit evidence, I am of the considered view that the Plaintiff has met the threshold of a good arguable case based on the following causes of action against the 1st and 3rd Defendants: i) Breach of contract against the 1st Defendant; ii) Misrepresentation and fraud against all the Defendants; iii) Conspiracy to injure by fraudulent misrepresentation against all he Defendants; and iv) Creation of a constructive trust in respect of all the Defendant and for the relief of tracing. [15] In arriving at the decision that the Plaintiff has a good arguable case, I have taken into consideration, inter alia, that: i) The Defendants do not dispute that the Plaintiff has paid a total RM3,750,000.00 to the 1st Defendant; ii) The Defendants do not dispute and also rely on the Agreement which contains, inter alia, the payment terms in Preamble A of the Agreement (reproduced in paragraph 7 above); iii) No monies have been repaid to the Plaintiff by the 1st Defendant to-date; iv) That there was no specific and clear explanation provided by the Defendants regarding: a) the current status of the construction or operation of the Hospital; and b) the reason as to why the Hospital was not constructed or set up by 22.2.2020. S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 8 of 14 v) The averments made by the Defendants or documents which the Defendants have exhibited to show that: a) A joint venture agreement was entered between the owner of the 1st Defendant, Kasih Holdings Sdn Bhd, and two companies known as Stella Healthcare Holdings Sdn Bhd dan Stella Kasih Healthcare Sdn. Bhd. (“the Stella Companies Joint Venture Agreement”); b) Based on the Stella Companies Joint Venture Agreement, the Ministry of Health amended the Approval which approval was now given to Stella Healthcare Holdings Sdn Bhd to construct/maintain the Hospital, valid from 18.3.2021 to 22.2.2022. c) The Approval involving the 1st Defendant was amended. vi) The Plaintiff’s averment that he had no knowledge of the Stella Companies Joint Venture Agreement and matters that transpired between the Stella Companies and the 1st Defendant, and that there were no documents to show that the Plaintiff was notified of these matters by the 1st Defendant. vii) Clauses 1 and 3 of the Agreement which states as follows: “2. APPROVAL All and any government approval and from time to time (including the cost thereof) for the setting and running of the Hospital shall be the sole responsibility of the Hospital Operator and which copies shall be extended to the Investor within seven (7) working days from the receipt thereof by the same. 3. DELIVERY OF DOCUMENTS Upon execution of this Agreement, the Hospital Operator shall deliver the following documents to the Investor’s Solicitors: (a) a certified true copy of the Hospital Operator’s Form 24, Form 44, Form 49, the Memorandum & Articles of Association and the resolution authorising the Hospital Operator to enter into this Agreement upon the terms and conditions herein contained; S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 14 (b) other relevant documents incumbent upon the Hospital Operator to furnish to the relevant government authority which are necessary for the completion of this Agreement.” [16] Thus, the main issues in this action involve, inter alia, the interpretation of the Agreement and the Defendants’ conduct in respect of the Agreement, the status of the construction and operation of the Hospital and how the RM3,750,000.00 was applied by the 1st Defendant and/or 2nd and 3rd Defendants. E] ASSETS WITHIN JURISDICTION [17] The 1st Defendant is a company incorporated under the laws of Malaysia with its registered and business address in Malaysia. It was granted the original Approval by the Ministry of Health to construct/manage the Hospital. Meanwhile the 3rd Defendants is a Malaysian citizen residing in Malaysia. [18] Based on the search reports issued by the Companies Commission of Malaysia on the 1st Defendant and Kasih Holdings Sdn Bhd, it is evident that: i) the 1st Defendant has assets in Malaysia; ii) the 3rd Defendant is the sole shareholder of Kasih Holdings Sdn Bhd and owns 2,000,000 shares in the said company. [19] In any event, there is no specific denial by the 1st and 3rd Defendants that they do not have assets within the jurisdiction of this Court. [20] Hence, I concluded that the 1st and 3rd Defendants have assets within the Court’s jurisdiction. F] RISK OF THE ASSETS BEING DISSIPATED [21] The lack of probity and honesty is a consideration in assessing the risk of dissipation in a Mareva injunction application. The Court of S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 10 of 14 Appeal in Ang Chee Huat v. Engelbach Thomas Joseph [1995] 2 MLJ 83 held as follows: “Having considered the evidence, I am of the view that the conduct of the appellant in this matter is lacking in probity and honesty. In the circumstances, I conclude that there is a real risk that the assets of the appellant will dissipate should the respondent succeed at the trial. I feel that I am justified in arriving at this conclusion in the light of the decisions in the following two cases: in Petowa Jaya Sdn Bhd v Binaan Nasional Sdn Bhd [1988] 2 MLJ 261, Peh Swee Chin J (as he then was) said at p 264: The second condition laid down by Mustill J [in Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave SGmbH & Co KG [1984] 1 All ER 398], duly approved by the Federal Court [in S & F International Ltd v Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 62 ], was also satisfied, ie there was solid evidence that the probity of the defendant could not be relied on. The undisputed detention and use of the plaintiff's equipment, without the consent of plaintiff, and above all, the undisputed detention of 98% of progress payments No 22 and 23, without paying the same to the plaintiff, would indicate that the probity of the defendant could not be relied on with regard to the agreed retention sum with which the Mareva injunction was concerned; in other words, the defendant would, far more probably than not, dissipate the agreed retention sum in question without paying it to the plaintiff, or dealing with it not for the purpose that was intended. The risk of dissipation was not just a mere possibility, but almost a certainty. In Amixco Asia Pte Ltd v Bank Negara Indonesia 1946 [1992] 1 SLR 703, the Singapore Court of Appeal decided that there was overwhelming objective evidence of prima facie dishonest conduct on the part of Amixco/Kosen/Quek, and in the full circumstances of the case, a real risk of Amixco dissipating their assets to avoid satisfying BNI's judgment.” (own emphasis added) [22] The Court is entitled to draw inferences from the surrounding circumstances. In the High Court case of Robert Doran & Ors v. Kuan Pek Seng & Ors [2010] 6 CLJ 105 it was held as follows: “[11] As in most cases, the most difficult area relates to the examination of the available evidence to ascertain whether there is a risk that the assets would be dissipated so as to justify the granting of the Mareva injunction. The difficulty arises because invariably a dishonest defendant will cover his/her S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 14 tracks, making it difficult for the plaintiff to produce the necessary relevant evidence. It is for this reason that the courts have over a period of time pronounced that when determining the risk of dissipation, the court is entitled to draw inferences from the defendant's previous action which show that his probity is not to be relied upon or that the corporate structure of the defendant is not to be relied upon. Of course, in considering the probity of the defendant or the lack of it, the court should also examine closely the evidence raised by way of rebuttal by the defendant.” (own emphasis added) [23] In allowing this Application I had taken into account the 1st and 3rd Defendants lack of probity, inter alia, as follows: i) There is no record before the Court of any financial returns submitted by the 1st Defendant after 3.6.2014. In EHQ Projects Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. v. Equipro Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2008] 7 CLJ 343 the High Court had considered the non- filling of financial or profit and loss statements in the context of the risk of dissipation, and held, inter alia, as follows: “[28] The purpose of their application at this stage is only to arrest the money which MIDF had released to the first defendant and which the second and third defendants (who were signatories of the first defendants bank account), had taken out. Given that the RM 1.5m were so hurriedly and surreptitiously withdrawn from the bank account of the first defendant by the second and third defendants and given that the search conducted by the plaintiffs at the Registry of Companies had disclosed that the first defendant had not filed any financial nor any profit and loss statements since it was incorporated on 2 September 2005, the risk of dissipation is therefore real and not improbable.” (own emphasis added) ii) The 2nd Defendant, who held about 99% shares in the 1st Defendant, was adjudged bankrupt on 13.11.2019 about 8 months after the Agreement was entered but this was not disclosed to the Plaintiff. iii) The 2nd and 3rd Defendants are brothers and the 3rd Defendant is the sole director and shareholder of Kasih Holdings Sdn Bhd, the company which entered the Stella Companies Joint S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 12 of 14 Venture Agreement. This then led to the Approval for the construction/management of the Hospital to be given by the Ministry of Heath to Stella Healthcare Holdings Sdn Bhd. iv) The licence holder of the Approval was originally the 1st Defendant. However, it was then changed to Stella Kasih Healthcare Sdn Bhd. The Plaintiff was not informed of this change or the Stella Companies Joint Venture Agreement. v) Under the Agreement the 1st Defendant was responsible for the construction/maintenance of the Hospital and the change to Stella Kasih Healthcare Sdn Bhd ought to have been disclosed to the Plaintiff. This is because it has the effect of removing the 1st Defendant’s interest/right in the Hospital. Clause 4 of the Agreement provides for the right for the Plaintiff or his nominee to a permanent seat on the Board of Governance for the day to day running of the Hospital. The change of the Approval to Stella Kasih Healthcare Sdn Bhd could deprive the Plaintiff of this right. [24] Therefore, there is a real risk that if the Mareva injunction sought in this Application is not granted the 1st and 3rd Defendants would likely dissipate their assets before this action is decided. G] CONCLUSION [25] For the reasons stated above, I allowed this Application against the 1st and 3rd Defendant, prayers I, IV and V with some changes and prayers VI and VII as prayer for. Dated this 30th day of October, 2023 -SGD- (WAN MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN WAN YAHYA) Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division (NCC 3)) S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 13 of 14 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF Nizam Bashir Messrs Nizam Bashir & Associates C3-2-5, No. 1, Jalan Dutamas 1 Solaris Dutamas 50450 Kuala Lumpur. Tel: 03-6413 5545 Email: info@nizambashir.com COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS Muhamad Ilyasa Iqbal Abu Bakar Messrs Shahrul Hamidi & Haziq Suite 36A, Level 36 (PO Box No. 79) Menara Dato’ Onn (PWTC) Jalan Tun Ismail 50480 Kuala Lumpur. Tel: 03-4050 3330 Email: general@shahrulhamidi.com CASES CITED 1. Ang Chee Huat v. Engelbach Thomas Joseph [1995] 2 MLJ 83 2. Aspatra Sdn Bhd & 21 Others v. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 97 3. Biasamas Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Kan Yan Heng & Anor [1998] 4 CLJ 754 4. Creative Furnishing Sdn Bhd v. Wong Koi [1989] 2 MLJ 153 5. EHQ Projects Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. v. Equipro Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2008] 7 CLJ 343 S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 14 of 14 6. Leisure Farm Corporation Sdn Bhd v. Kabushiki Kaisha Ngu & Ors [2013] 10 CLJ 401 7. Menk Sdn Bhd v. Joerg Hugo Schmidt [2009] 4 CLJ 795 8. Robert Doran & Ors v. Kuan Pek Seng & Ors [2010] 6 CLJ 105 9. S&F International Limited v. Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 62 10. SRC International Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dato Sri Mohd Najib bin Hj Abd Razak [2022] 5 CLJ 949 S/N 1xyHV353eEyd9um4z35QcQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	24,686	Tika 2.6.0
WA-25-502-09/2022	PEMOHON 1. ) SHASHI KUMAR A/L SHANMUGAM 2. ) NG KIM HO 3. ) BOBBY ANAK WILLIAM 4. ) CHAN TUCK LOONG 5. ) SRI RAMESH A/L V.KANNAN RESPONDEN 1. ) KETUA POLIS NEGARA, MALAYSIA 2. ) Peguam Negara Malaysia	Leave to commence judicial review - Order for certiorari to quash the Respondents' decision that no action shall be taken against Ustaz Mohd Syakir Nasoha in relation to a talk held by him in 2017 at Masjid Abu Bakar,Bakar Arang,Sg Petani, Kedah - Order for Mandamus to instruct the Respondents to take action against Ustaz Nasoha - Whether leave should be granted - The threshold for leave stage will be subjected to a higher standard of review.	03/11/2023	YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=15b0f375-fcb7-44c2-a945-df6308bed211&Inline=true	03/11/2023 15:27:03 WA-25-502-09/2022 Kand. 22 S/N dfOwFbf8wkSpRd9jCL7SEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dfOwFbf8wkSpRd9jCL7SEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dfOwFbf8wkSpRd9jCL7SEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dfOwFbf8wkSpRd9jCL7SEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dfOwFbf8wkSpRd9jCL7SEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dfOwFbf8wkSpRd9jCL7SEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dfOwFbf8wkSpRd9jCL7SEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dfOwFbf8wkSpRd9jCL7SEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dfOwFbf8wkSpRd9jCL7SEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dfOwFbf8wkSpRd9jCL7SEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dfOwFbf8wkSpRd9jCL7SEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dfOwFbf8wkSpRd9jCL7SEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dfOwFbf8wkSpRd9jCL7SEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dfOwFbf8wkSpRd9jCL7SEQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal w.\—25—5o2—o9/2022 Kand. 22 £2/Juznza 15:21-as mum umxmm nussn uuum m KUALA wurun nu»: wruvm renszxuvum KLIALA LLIMPIIR IBANAGIAN KuAsu<uA5A sous) pzmonomu umux ssmxm KENAKIMAN Nu w»2ssa2—uu/zozz Da\am pmy. umvnn-Law:-n Pun: lemadap um: Mnhd Syaiur am «mas, Din Dalam Pemam Kzpmusan Fahs Dun]: Malaysm banankh was-znzz suviyi udak menaamun Hnaakan xemadap Llsuz Muhd Syaluv Em Nasohl Dan Dawam Pemiva Muvan 5: Kasaanxaeaan Mnhklmah 2m 2 Din Dilam Fzrkara Ahkel a den us Flnnmhagxan Parwb<u\|uan‘ Dan Dalam Fenkara Seksysn 41 Am Ram spumuma, Dan Damn: Felxava Arman 92 Kasdah 4 »<m.n.x..m Mahk-mm zmz ANTARA vznelsﬂu sm momM.spm.:uszu «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! i SMASH! KUMAR A/L SHANMUGAM (No.K/F 731m1u5iza9) 1Fresideri Global Human Rigms Faderaimi1GHRF\) 2 NG KVM no mo K/P 6104041351977 meme" Slrlwak Auocilwn Fur Pecpla 5 Aspir:1liL7II(SAPA)\| 3 soaav ANAK WILUAM [No KIP amumsum (Pverudsn Pam Bans: Dayak Sarawak (P505)! I cum mcx LOONG 1No.K/P 610904105891) main Prsndan Falsnluln am. Painplr Barpendidikan Sekniah Ema Malaysia) 5 SRI RAMESH A/L v KANNAN (Na K/P‘ vmazsmsssii {Pruﬂan Penubumn M.i.y.i. Ylmiiavr Munnllfi Kaiasiam) PEMOHOMPEMOHON um i KETUA POUS NEGARA nous i=irwA MALAvsiA 2 PEGHAM NEGARA muwsm RESFONDENRESPONDEN Juagmnm Introduction 1 On 15 Semember 2022, me Applicants ﬁled a notice at applicauen Var leave «or Judicial IEVIBW (En-;i-aum I) under Order 53 oi me miss of Com 2012 (ROE) seeking \|he ioiiowmg reliala‘ mew :4 sm mu-/Fhramspﬁniiclvsin “Nair s.n.i navihnrwm .. UIQG w may he nﬂninnﬂly mm: mm. VI nFiuNa Wm! 11121 Amnle msm L71 Ina so mo»/Mes me AGIPP mm a vode mwrellon tn Vnsulula. mnducl M dnconllnua Iny pmcammg (or . nnmvm oﬂamx ms wade msuemn mean: (ha AGIFP has sale and excmswe dvscremn m Ihsl umy he/BM can emcm such pumsv. uawmr, ma AG/PP noes not have absmule ar unlelversd uucmm. under an145(31 As minded to m m pruedmg mscuusxan and mnwng «mm n, m ‘s an wdglwnl mu m avumpnlm ram and axatplmrul mu Inch dllcvvllon u amenzbie ca mun revlsw. {us} In an dIaHenge5 aa-Inn ms dscmons 01 me AG/PP enercxsmg ms pmaers nndevarII45(3)a1lhe rc‘ me pomm u Iha\| ms ducmnns ave cloaked wnh Ihe nresunphan mmmy The oneruui Dwain Iivs nnlhe nmﬂengng pany m xwelmme the slmng pnsumpuuu av legamy mm eamplﬂmq pﬂml Ilene nidsnca M grmma: m rsvltw my AG/FF: aeasxan wwlhwn (M ruwgmsed reasons lorjudncnar vevxew [1141 Ezsed an mmmam mrmonlles‘ vlcan be surmsod mn\|nnyI:h.IllarIqi muﬂmsveﬁore pass 2 Iwwslepmrshold mm mus\| be sausnea anhe luv: mg. on any awhuluun (Ur wdxcml vwnw [H5] Fwslly. ll» burden av pvooi Has on me appHcaI\( The npp\IcIn\|w1l\ nm in shawlhavl he hit a legal bins to maﬂenge ma aeam. D7015 AG/PP rm wiars to me nammmx glmmdi av mama! review am other bmes wmplwcmy mwnrused try an un vpudnmcnls an ml: mm‘ Including hux nol Imnad lo. a) meaalny‘ In) nmsaurax xmmwnsry re 3 brush mm: rule! ofna1ura\pus1Ace!‘ (C) milaonahly Vconlpdenng umavm mnmamons or unonng Mavam and mahuna\|:ormdera1\ans): and re» ma»: ms. [1 16] Once In above new ground) av any at mm m clearly sal aux, Inn apvhcam wm men have In addune wmuung and pnmaoaoe prom mat the daemon nr nnusuon of Ina AGIFF mu wvtmn man grounds or my one anmm m umalwoms me mun; mete nrssums. haw-g rsgam to the doclnne at seunrnlnun ur powers, that an or any av me grounds mg rm made out mum ma wmnoe ulany lands m an mmnve oundusnun ma (hey we been maﬁa - 39 Danny the submnsswon, me weamea Senior Federa\ Counsel (src) submilled that the Aophcams have cause (u cross the plesumpbon M legihly Vn Ihe exercise OI prosecuwrm dlscramon of the AGIFF. The learned Chief Jusuee m Sundr: Rajoo (supra) had made m Page :1 am sm mwma..s.smv.msea «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! clear lrial lne Applicarils rnusr preseril compelling prinia ipcie evidence lo rebut lrie preeurnpliori oi legalily 40, the learned SFC iunner subrnilleo lrial ecl oi exhi ing \|hs police repone aria qubleo excarpl ol lrie speeones lall shun cl lne requirerrienr lo provioe compelling pnrne facle evidence wlncn is required to challenge Ihe seoorio Respondenfs prosecucpnal power A1 Triis Court is ol me View man the Applicarlls rvlus1 come wllh mote lnen police repons and quoted exeerp\| cl lne speeches. wilrioul compelling prime lecie evldence lo rebullhe urssumpllon nl legalily, lliis mun does riol lieye lne pwer lo intervene me conslilulipnal oiscrelior. M are AG/PP solely based on me Said police repons and ouoieo excerpl ol me speecries oblaineo lrorn social media. The Applicanls rriusl al leasl eslablisn mala ﬁde on lhe pan bl me AG/PP. 42 luexe oogriisarioe lnal me leller dplec 17 June zozl showed lnel irivesligalioris lieu been carried out by me PDRM The rnaner was relerreo 10 0\|! AGC lor its irislruclion. upori oorisioerelipri pl rne outcome or the invesligaliori. lrie AGIPP liao exerciseo lls oonslilulional proseculorial discreliori urlderArul:le145(3)olme FC and decided nol lo preler s crierge eoeirisl uslaz Mohd Syaklr nie AG/PP‘: inslruciiori was no lunhsr actmn lo be iaken because lne yiral pans of me presclies were eoileo lrorn rlie original rmxxrdlng Aﬂsr considering lrio enlire oorilexl cf lbe video. lne AG/FF was oi llie view lnal lnere were no any slalernenl iouclied upon religious eerisiliuiry in Malaysia. as C0rlS4derIng lrie presiirripnori or legaliry. rl is reasonable lb assume that me AG/PF wrieri making me impugned oecision. look inro eooounl nol iusl me polroe reporis erio excerp\| onrie speeches but also olner releveril lacwrs The Iacl or this rnaner relaleo to issue on religion eno race wnicli ooulo cause dlshafmony ario orsunily in niulli-religious Malaysia Ageiri, wilri lne presuinplion oi legalny, lne AG/FP‘s oecision musl be given me benem oi ooubl lriel it is legal, raiional, reasonable, proporuonale, pmoedural propnely and bone ﬁde unlil rebuneo by oornpe ng prime lacie euioence to prove olrierwise. rm n ai ll ru muwfhr3~4ASvRn‘1lCL75EG “Nair Smll mmhnrwlll .. UIQG e may i... brwlrullly MVMI dnuuvlml Vﬂ nFluNﬂ Wm! 44 \n the exemse or the AG/PF‘: dusorahan not m pmsecule Usxaz Mom Syakw, me AG/PP be-ng me guarman o1 pubhc meresn, n Vs veascnabw assume Ina! may had considered other wmpunam facials which are run awilame to me Applmants nor the court As mdrcaled by Ihe learned cmei Jusuoe, «ms mun. by cunsuImiuna\ design‘ aces not have me same heneﬁl Conclusion 45. An apphcaliun lur iud\cIa\ review M me decnsxon of me AG/PP ws sumectla mgnersoandard or review as decided bylhe Fedsra\ Court m Sundra Rajuo (supra) as Fmmwmg me decwsion pisumm R:1oo(supra),lhe exemse onhe pmseemonax powerolme AG/PP unaemmcue 14513) of me so Vs evoakea wun me preaumphun at uegamy 47 wnh praumplron cl legality, :1 Is presumed me: me AG/PP acted Vegaﬂy m making me decwsmn pv “Nu Furlhar Ac\|ion“ to be \|aken against usxaz Mahd syaku 48. In order to succeed in (ms appllcahorl '01 ]ud1CIi\ review‘ "'13 Apphcams have In rebul me slrong presumpllnn of legality with oompemng pnma lame ewdence o1 grounds w-«run me recognised reasons fnrjud\c\a\ revwerw. 49 The Apphcams must pruwde move man pohee repons em excervts av speeches \|o cnauenge me strong presumpﬂon eneg ly. Fahos reports and edmed wens uploaded on social meme, wimaun more, do nu\| consume aompallung pnma vacie or oonvlncmg ewdence \|u rebut me urasumnlion ol Iegemy so. Anolher way lo rebuuhe presumption uflhe Vegalny ollhe AG/PP m exercvsmg ms dwscraﬂun under AmcIel4§13) of me so We \|o demonslrale that me AG/PP ecvea mm mala when making such a decision However. Ihe Apphcams have em IaHed to snow lhal Iha AG/PP meue the aecem wnh mane we 51. As «ms nature 01 appncauan vequlres a rugner svandard 01 rewew. m Is my waw max me Auphcanls have lalled to cross the rugn mresnmd van is .m m muwrhrs«4mSpRnﬁK:L7sEG «me sew ...m.mm .. H... e may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum we 52 In admﬁun, me Applrcarrre have named me improper parly m mrs epplreanrorr The Frrsr Respondent vs nal me deocsmn maker a! me rmpugrred aeersron In me wim me decision in Arrrblun up sre-nevasarr (supra), (here Is no decision by me Fvrst Respondent man that re sumecl to review by we mm! on «me basis mane, Hus ipphcanon ougm to he struck out 53 Hence, this leave appllzzaucn ro commence me guducual revrew pmeeearrrgs ougm \o be refused wﬂh no order as \|n arms. Dated 12} November 2023 /WA Ahmad Kamal bin Mu Sham! Judge Hugh coun Kuaxa Lumpur counsels For me Apphaarrr. Err. Gunaseelan Thambmalhan (Dk Uma Gunasee\an wrm mm) Tetuan Gunassslln A Associates Paguimbela den Feguamcara Unit B-24, VIVA, No: :75, Jalan lpah‘ 51 zuu Kuala Lumpur (Ru; Tuan: Te/2:04/22/L) For the Honourable Arromey Gannral En. Ahmad Hanir hm Hambaly mm. Samar Federa\ Counsel (crx Noar Amqah bl Zama\ A): n, Federal Oorunsei wmr mm) Jabalan Peguam Negara. Bahagran Guzman. No 45. Persraran F-eruena. Fresml A szmu Pmvajaya 9... u .4 u m muwrhramspknﬁnznsin “Nana Snr1\|\nanhnrw\HI>e U... m may r... mmnnuly mm: dnuamnl VI mum v-max (ii That Applicants be allowed ena glven exlenslon onlme to ﬁle judlclal revrew applleellon under Order 53 me am who ROG (lr needed): (II) All order at eenlorari be granted by Ihls Honourable COM?! (0 quash lne Respondenls' oeclslon nol lo lake acllon agalnsl Uslaz Molld Syaklr bin Nasaha (usuz Mono Syaklr) m relallon la a talk held by mm m zon in Maspd Arm aexar, aeksrmng, Sg Pelenl. Keoen, (ml An order or mandamus be granlsd by lnls Hpnoumble Cnurl lo lnslrucl lne Respondents to lake ecnon agemel uslez Mohd syaklr. (IV) A declarallcn lnel lne oeclslpn pr lne Rssponaenls nulla lake echo" age-nsl uslez Mahd Syaklr VI relahon lo a talk held by mm ln 2ol7 at Masllcx Abu Baker, Eakar Amrlg, Sg pelanl, Kedah VS Invalid in law and an abuse or power or me Respondents (y) Any lunnev order lnis Harlow-able Ccun deems HI, lust and/or appmpnale: em on) Cam. in the cause 2. Afler the nearing. I dlsrnlssoe lne Appllcanls appllcahen rm leave ror luoloal revlew (Enclosure 1). Thus luogmenl slales lne reasons ler my decislnn Penles 3 me ml Appllcanl 15 one preslaenl 0! Global Human Rlgnls Faderallunl The Second Appllcant K5 {he Presldenl L11 Sarawak Assuclaliorl ror People‘: Asompn The Third Applicant ls lne Presxienl or Party esnss Dayak Sarawak The Fuunh Applicant 15 me Fvasldenl or Ferszluan Bakns Pulllar Barparldldlklrl Sakolih CW3 Malays and the Mn Aypllcanl lslhe Preslden(MPenuhuhan Malaysla Ta rr Munnetra Kslagsm. la... s s: u m muwrhramspknﬁlcnsin woe Smnl luvlhnrwlll s. UIQG e may he nﬂnlnnllly sun. dnuavlml VI .rluNa we 4 The First Respondent ls me lrrspeelor General of Police, Royal Malaysla Pam‘: and the Second Respondent is the Attorney General of Maleysra lac) Faclual aackqraurrd 5 The Appllcarrls Iodgea aolree reporls ag rusraz Mahd Syaklrnn lnree separale occaslons 3 ocmher 2021, 9 Oclohev 2021 and 10 October 2021. These reports were made due In uslaz Mend syexrra alleged lnsull and delamnllan of lzuaahrsm, Hinduismr Dayak ocmmunrty and mner ncmlslamlc hellels ln Malaysla durrng lrrs preaches al lne mosque. The sala preaches warn subsequently uploaded la vanous soeral meme planarrna and wan\| viral 5 During nls preaenrngr uslaz Mom: Syakir allegedly spread hatred and lnsullad lo alner numlslamlc believers ln Malaysra 7 In a lener dated 17 June 24:22, me PDRM lrllcrrned lne Human Rlghls carnrnreeran av Malaysia lnlor alra lnnl lne lnvesllgahon repon had been larwarded lo the Allorney General‘: cnarnaers (AGC)on13 December 2o2l Tne AGC‘s Insvucllon was to lake no lunharacllun on me case Thus declslorl was made because me vrral parts of lne preaches had been edlted lmm lne anglnal reenrarng, and II was found lhatlhew were no slalenrenls louchrng on relrgrous eensr lvlly in Malaysla a. Dlssausﬁed wrln xhal declsronr lrre Applrcanls an ls seplernber 2022 me: an applrcalron ler leave la commence ludlclal rel/law proueedlrlgs pursuant to Order 53 of the ROC. The Applicant; seek to revlew lne dsclslon 01 me AG under Anrcle 145 of me Federal Conlllluilcrl (FC), which decllrled to lrulala proceodlngs igelnsl UsLa1 Mona Syaklr for an allegedly eurllanllous talk held by mm In 2017 at Maslld Abu Baker, aakar Arena, 59. Felanl. Kedah Grounds cor Judlclal Review 9. In me irrslarrl case belore the noun, lne Applrcanna are seekrrrg reliefs 07 an order of cemorarl \|o quash ma Respondenw declslon Ihal no aclren snall be laken againsi Uslaz Mona Syaklr, an urderur vuelalu rn muwrhrsmspkaﬁltznsia “Nana s.n.l nuvlharwm rs. UIQG a may r... anrnnlrr mm: dnuuvlml Vﬂ .nane war mandamus to inslrumlte Respondents to lake actton agatnst Uslaz Mohd Syaklft and a declaratmn tnaune declston oltne Respondents not In lake actton against Uslax Mona Syaklr IS invalid in law and an abuse ol power to In the statement (Enclosure 2) glven oyme Appltcants, the reasons are based on the lollowlng grounds. 11 Fuel, there were poltce reports lodged agalllsl uslaz Mahd Syaklr lor Insulllrlg and delarnt Buddhlsm. Hlndutsm, Dayak eommumty and olher nomlstarntc bellels tn Malaysta dunng ms preacnes at the mosque l2 secondly. the satd preaches were reoarded and uploaded to vanous saclal rnedla plalforms, where they went vlral. Usllz Mona syaktr was alleged to be spreadlng natred and tnsultlng otner non-lslsmlc bellevers ln Malaysta. 13. Tntrdly, uslaz Mohd syaktr IS alleged to nave committed several ollenoes 13 1 under secllorl 298 ol tne Penal Code tor uttenng words etc , wilh deltlaerale lrl\|erl\| to wound lne rell nus leelmgs ot any person, 132 under secmon 298A ot me Penal code tor can 9, etc, drsharrnony, dnunuy. orleettngs n1artmtty,ha\|led or m w ll or orejudtctng, etc., the rnairnenanee ot hamlorty or uruly, on grounds olreltglo : 13.3 under sectton 505 (c) o1 lhe Penal code (or statements eonductng to publlc rmscmel; and 13 A under section 233 ol the connnontcattons and Mullimedla Act 1995 lor trnproper use ol nemork tactlt res or network SE?‘/met etc. 14. Lastly, dssplle pnlloe vepons were lodged agalnsl the sand preacher suppnnad by reoordmoe of me commverslal preaches‘ me Respondents nod woe lls letter dated 17 June 2021 decided Ihal no furllter auion would be Iaken agatnet the preacher me s cl 1: rn muwrhramspknﬁlclvsin “None amt luvtherwm be .r.... a may r... ntwlrullly -mm: dnunvtnrtl VI erluNa vtmxl 15 is 17 is In paragmph 4 pl Enclosure 2, the Respondents slaled that ihe aeaisian M no lunhei aciion ip be iaiien against Uslax Mohd sya r made on 17 June 2021 (impugned decision) il lainled wiiti lrrallanallly, iinieaspnatzieness and male tides in paragraph 5 at Enclosure 2. ihe Reepanaenls eiaied itial itie impugned decision contravenes Article 3 Mine FC and is arbitiary. In paragraph 3 or Enclosure 2, the Respondents luiiner slated trial the Second Respondent the AG has failed to cany out his aiity olovlded under Article 145 pl itie FC when he aeciaea no ltlrmer nation io he \|akan againsi ustaz Mahd syaliir The Applicants submitted inai the impugned ilec’ ion ol lhe AG/Pubilc Proseculor (FF) is irraiianal, uniaasanaole Ind iainiea wiiti rnala (ides ior the AGIPP's nail decided not to take tpnner action against ustaz Motto Syaklrdesplle ihelact trial police reports were rnaae and recordings oi the conlmiverslal weechee had gone viral on social media piatiarrns. Ii is to be emphasized here that this iupieiel review applicalian is to shailerige the decision made byme second Responi1eni.Therelure, ihe low lhrestiald lest set out in variaus case laws is na longer applicable to ltiis application The inresnpla forlhis leave application will be sub]ec1ed\|o a higher eleman: pl review. This tiigri standard ol review has been piscuseea in me lollawing cases pelow. a) Rpsli Dahlarl V Tan sri Abdul sani Detail 5. Dis l 2014] MLRHU :49; [2014] 1\| MLJ 48‘! [2019] 9CL.l 2254 at Psguam Negam Malaysia V. cnin Chee Kcw (as secreiary ol Persaluarl Kebajlkarl dsn Amal Liam Hood Thong Char Serig Thuan) aria anamerapueal [2019] 3 MLRA1S3:[2I7i913 MLJ 443; [2019] 4 cm 561. [2019] 3 AMR 525, ct Sundm Raioo Nadareiah v Menlen Liiar Negeri. Malaysia 5. Ors [will 5 MLRA1: [20Z1]5 MLJ 209; [2021] 6 Cu 199 and us.. 5 nl II N muwfhm4MSvRn‘1lCL7SEG “Nair a.i.i nuvihnrwiii a. ii... In may i... pﬂninnilly mi. m.i.n Vﬂ nFit.INﬂ Wm! 20 2i 22. 2: d) sivakuniar all Sockialirigam ai Anor v. Vang aerhorniai Feguam Negara, Malaysia [2023] 2 MLRH am [2022] MLJU 2946 Arlicle i45(3l onne FC provide: lrie power onne AG io rrislilular oondud. or discontinue any proceedings ior an oﬂenoe Anicle 145(3) oi lhe Fc reads as loilows: -irie Altnmey General sriaii have power exercisable ai his drscrmian. in inslllme. mriducl pr disooniiniia any proceedings ior an oiienoe. airer inan proceedings were . sy.n.n mun, n naliva opiiri or. peunmrirai i Tne law concerning irie power 0! AG rias undergone sorne davelanmenl Fvavinuslyr irie ooun wrislanily neid inai ine decision of AG under Article 14513) oi irie FC in lnsllluler eonduci, or diseoniiriue erirn al proceedings is noi amenable io judicial review. l-ioweirer. ine ooiiri sraried lo recognise inai euen power oi AG i3 ieviewabie in zzerlaln exoeplianai clmumslanoes. This position allaw can be illusireied in several cues irienlioned in paragrapn 19 above nia epuri was el irie yiew iiiei only in appropriare. rare and exoepiional cases supli disereaiori is amenable lo iudipial review The decision made by Ina AG is doakad by me preeurnpiien ol iegaliiy rnerelora, irie burden has on ilie eriallenging pariy io repui me vresumplion oi iegalily by addueing a earnpelling prima facle euidenoe Al ine leave siege lor any challenge oi inis kind, ine Applieeni rnuiii lrllilrfy ine Mu-slap iriresnoid as volume- a. Firsi slep threshold’ The Applicanl needs no snow lie rias me legal oasii. ro cnallenge Ihe decision at ine AGIPP on lrie iradiiionai grounds o1 judicial review wriicn among oiners includes iliegaucy. procedural implopnelyi lnallonalily and male ndes Thu burden oi prooi lie: on ine Applicanl. 1) Second step threshold The Applicant needs I0 adduce 5 compelling and prima lacie proof that Lhe decision or omission M irre new falls wiiriin one of lhe grounds or any one of them Once, the threshold is crossed, the burden lies on me AGIPP In justify his anions ar Irilclioris in court l>:\|e7 .m ru uiDwfh7aM\SvRﬂYlCL75EG “None s.n.i luvihnrwiii rs. UIQG a may i... inrin.iiir MIMI dnuaviml VI .riuno mi 24. From me judgments above, n 15 apparent that me AG's power under Amcle 145(3) at me FC mcugh reviewable n. sumem \|u a men mresnold of scrulmy, Tne Respondenxs must rebul me presumplmn 01 me Vegahly ov the AG‘s demsxon mm oonnpellmg prima vaeie ewdence Flndlngs 25. 26. 27, 25 29. 30, the AGC nad objected lo mu. eppncauon on me ground me: me Appncanxs leaned \|o sa\|isiyme1wb~sIep\|hresho\|d sec cul m me casa o1SImdra RI[oo(supra) m ordeno chaﬂenge me decision made by Ina AG. From the Judgments sel oul m Roall Dahlan, Chin Chen Kaw. Sundrn nujoo and slvakumor (supra), .1 us clear mat one power 01 Iha AG us reviewihle In apnmpnate, rare and exoepmonal oases Apmying Sundra Rude (supra) .n lha present case. n is to be noned thal at this leave Sings. the (esl apphcalﬂe V5 no Veneer law but sumea ll) a hwghersvandard 0! revwew The AG‘: decwsxon ws cloaked wvlh {he presumpuon M legahly. Hence, the Apphcanvs needs IO salisfy \|he two-slap threshold in overcome (his pfesumplron and ID chavenge lhﬁ decxsion M the AG In order to satisfy me ﬁrsl step lhreshold, me Applicants nad based meirjudiciax rewew eppncenon on Ihegmunds cl unreasonameness and procedural vmpmpnety Fur me second slep Ihreshold, me Apphcams need to pmmde a oompeumg pnm: fame ewdance in suppon Mlhewr gmunds v1 judmal rewew. Iwﬂl ﬁvsl deal wilh the wssue of nammg \|ha improper parly The AGE nad objected this appwceuon on me ground that n was Draught agamsl lhe wrong party as the First Respondent named In ums application IS not the dacismn maker cl Ihe Vmpugned decwsinn. Having perused me muse papers, n Is ewdenl that mus applmalmn pnmarily chaﬂengas me nmpugned decnuon made by me second Respondent. 1 e. the AG The Fvrsl Respondent, being me mvesugecwe body, dud net make me impugned dectswon There \s no apparerﬂ purpose In name me Fvsl Respondent as u party W1 W3 eppucaupn. Furthermore. the amdavn m suppan does not pmvide a mum- m dvuwrhrs«mspRd‘1:::L7sEG «nu. Snr1\|\nuuhnrwH\I>e med u may he mn.u-y -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum v-ms! reason ldr this inuuslori. Gwen lrial this is a judicial review applicalierii ii is sumcleril to only name we second Respondent, wrid exercises his public euly regarding whelner lp prosecute or not under Arliele 145(3) of the FC 31 This applicalidri is made under order 53 of iris not; The provision ei ordersa rule 2(4)d1lhe ROC IS as follows 'Ariy narwn Mia is adnruly xlhclld by RM dncllinn, -man nr omlllion in nlnllml mum -relu aim: Dublin duty nrhrrmroii sriali be erilillee in "ink: me lvhllcaliun - (emphasis added) 32. This court is allhe View lhal lhe Appireanls musl acwraleiy identify lhe party responsible ldr me impugned decision er in relalidn id lne exa e or his public du\|y er funnioni which is being challenged. in rhis case, the impugned decision is made by lhe AG/PP el ‘No l=unherAelion“ in he laken againsl usrax Mdhd Syakll. As lhe Firsl Respcndenl is rial llie decis n rriaker el me impugned decision iudicial review does rim apply There is no decision by lrie First Respunderil mar is supiecl lo review by lriis ceun 33 in Amhiga elp sreenevasan v. Kmire Fengarah lrnigresen. Illllylll 5. on [Z\|1I2] 1 ull..l 92 I201!) 9 MLRH 572, [20:21 7 cu 170.01: Applicanl rriade an applicalian ldr leave id vevlew me decision oi the Perigarah lrnigresen Sarawak (the secarid Reeporideriri which denied her enlry inlo lne slale el Sarawak The Resporidenl obiecled mar lhe Firsl Respandam (Kelua Perigaraii lrriigreseri Malaysia) and Third Respendenl (Keliua Merileri Sarawak) were no: me proper panies Io lriis appliealidn since «he Second Respandenlwas me one acling under me aulhorily ollrie svale aulhorlty and not the nrsl and Third Respondent. 34. Roheria Vusuf J [as she lheri was) in dismissing rhis leave application liad s\a\|ed as lollowsz '[H] H was submmad by Elwik nmimy THOMZI rhal even IV lriis nppilcahon cried wrung panies ll could he saved by Viﬂua L71 015 r s dune RHC Urvﬂu o is r 5, no cause or mm. mill [:5 deiuied because or rriispnider ai pariies and me cam musl sr. deemime iilua alleclirid ma pvopel my rmwever, inn eanierirpri canml hmd good because lhe Federal Cam in Maiiis Mama isiani Selarvgar V aang eeen Oman 4. or: [2009] 5 MN aw rzooele cl.J4u§ haihald rriaro is reiziuees riol appiy lo epaiieeien mndl irmu o 5: easing on me mixlm r...9em IN uluwfhranmsvknﬁlcnsid “Nair Semi luvlhnrwiii .. UIQG a may i... nﬂmnniily mi. dnuavlml VI eFluNﬂ Wm! generalwa speclalmus no aevogsnr Aomrmng In me Fsdum Cowl M ml use 0 I5 vem carmm be ‘Invoked m ovaman meme pm»/man m an o 53 awhcamn [12\| Thus, slnn an ﬁrs! n wndonl and mm mm nipondcnl in not me a ' on makus er the lmvuumd aeensxen. ludlct-I nvllrw clnno -wnmn-m. Yo pumain-mmy, llura in nu duklon nu ma ms! um xlcnnd nlvnnd-III: mm Ls mm lhls mum to mam. On ml: wound Ilunl, nu ppllcnlnn want In In Ilmck om." (emphasis added) 35 As can be observed m Amhiua up Sralnevasan (supra), only me aeason makev 0! the impugned decision . e we Second Raspondsrﬂ ms), mound have been made as the only Respondent in HHS avhllcanon lorjudlmal revwew 38 Ba max as V! may‘ ms courl should nevertheless process to delermme vmether wwlh both the sand pence reports and quoted excerpt ov speeches cumemeu m me relevant cause paper oomd cross the m her standard 13! FEVIBW vn (DIS avnhoulxon. To succeed In lhvs application luv wdicia\ revvew‘ the Applicants must provide nompewng prima lacie proof IO rebut the AGS consumlionm presecumnal dlscrehnn which us Masked wmn pvesumplwon ol Iagahly 31. It Is crystal clear that me oommuuanel pmsecmcfial dlscrmmn undevAmc\|e (4513)aHhe FC belongs m me AG/PP and me AGIPP has sole and excluswe mscreuen m that omy he can exercxse such power The provision or Article 14513) :2! me FC Vs pmwdaa as follows: "rm Alhmny emu: um: um paw, . maul. a nu uhcnllon. In mum-, cnmiucl or dlllmnllnun any mmamgs my an onem olher Ihan pvuneadmgs bciors a Syariah mun. . Mhve mun ov . wulwnamal.‘ (emphasws addedh as The Federal Cmm m Suudr: Rnioo (supra) held lhal wme me AGlPF‘s powers are revlewable‘ me exercwse nl prusewtonal dvacrelion under A.-me msm or me PC. as a maner of policy‘ remems sumecl In a higher threshold of scrutiny Tengku Mawmun (:4, m ﬂelwenng\|he1udgmenlaHhe apsx marl, he\d mar me u M u sm mmrMspm.:usea «mm. smm ...m.mm be H... e may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm!	1,876	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
J-01(IM)(NCvC)-115-03/2022	PERAYU 1. ) Muniandy A/l Kandasamy 2. ) Muniammah A/p Santhiavoo RESPONDEN 1. ) PENGARAH HOSPITAL SULTANAH AMINAH JOHOR BAHRU 2. ) Jabatan Kesihatan Negeri (JKN) 3. ) KETUA PENGARAH KESIHATAN KEMENTERIAN KESIHATAN MALAYSIA 4. ) Kerajaan Malaysia	A fire broke out on 25.10.2016 (Fire) in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of Sultanah Aminah Hospital, Johore Bahru (Hospital). Six patients in the Hospital’s ICU perished in the Fire (6 Deceased Persons). The plaintiffs (Plaintiffs) in the above three suits (3 Suits) are the parents and dependents of three out of the 6 Deceased Persons. The first defendant is the Hospital’s Director while the third defendant is the Director-General of the Ministry of Health (MOH). This judgment shall refer to all the defendants collectively in these 3 Appeals as the “Defendants”.	03/11/2023	YA Datuk Wong Kian KheongKorumYA Dato' Lee Swee SengYA Dato' Sri Mariana binti Haji YahyaYA Datuk Wong Kian Kheong	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=0986682f-6f0e-4340-9f34-2d77f4c55d98&Inline=true	03/11/2023 15:09:25 J-01(IM)(NCvC)-115-03/2022 Kand. 18 S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N L2iGCQ5vQEOfNC139MVdmA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal J—n1(m) (ncvc)—115—u3/2022 Kand. 18 as/mm: 15:09-23 m we coon or A an ur muvsu (APFEu.AYE Jumsmcnuur asrwssu 1 Knlsxmsmv um xuppusmmmc Mu.un:<1«.mm z massvm Mr summon we no mm-zusup . . nrmum: Am 1. mmun mswm suI.n>4n< Altman 1 rsuauux xssumm usssrwunux‘ uamm Kssmnnu Msesm mm ;. mu. mum «mum. xsusmsmm xamm muvsm 4. «swam mum nss»-ounsms (mm. maumm. ><m.co.m.n Juhorsmlu Jamr. Maw!- Cm! Sun Nu ¢A.2< NCvc.2§-03/2o2n Barman Knuxruszvvyn/1 Kuwunmy(NR\C Nu s2oaw.uunaa> 2 Nluewun up Kiynmbon we Na. a7n:u4.u&56361 Vmnum Am 1 Few -n Hasumlsunumnwnun 2 mm» Kecmaian Nagen lehov Jab-nan Km-nan Nogamlohur a ma Fensarah xesmmn, ><.m.mn.y. xmm way» A Karalaanmalnyﬁa Dd-Mimi] sw LzxGcu5mEowNc1:wMv¢n.A menu: magma»: wvmy an we com of mm or mmm uwaurs .mIusm\|:1\|oN) g 3, am pm J-AH myncyc , aw; asvwzsn :. woo NENG vuusowc no we-mmexay 2 cm slaw mm mm: Mn. mun-1n£n<I) .. mamas mo 1. vinamm nnsvlul nuunuu mm 2. mama xssmmu uscem man mm» mmm NEEEI man : mm vznsuun xsumm, xsusmsmm xsalxnnu muvsln . mum mm» . ass-mans [M the miter .11 me Nah cam m Jew am, Jaw Mahyﬁi gnu ; ‘ Nu wcvc mmzn am..." cm. Hang Vang wmcuu smun-m.55B3; 2 Chm Sxaw Hm («me No ssaslznosum mm. Anﬂ mam awn-1 Sunur-In Amman my-.n xgmm mm mm Jabalan x..mm mm Jana Kelul Pwvnn Keswmrzn‘ Knrmnunan x.m.y. mum «gm-an Man-ysu o4m.nu1 « z 3 A sw LzxGcu5mEowNc1:wMv¢n.A m. s...g.pm my» cum can nlwung Nong Yoy 5 Mar v mu: Pwloemorﬂsasj 1 um 55; .: 557. La! Klw mm mm \|nll0n1Ivl1 lull am arm. than slnnapar-‘s mm of me supremo cum umm: [slngspnnll ~-mm.“ III: mu...:..:y nu. mms: m. aumsmn cl nnrsay evidovvcc‘ omm my. 5 Rsc zsmgapm; :; unum In nur may 41 ru): 4 ac om: 4v rulc am Inn 4:; ac mm. 4 lxzupllmu whlnln ... mum: my cormlln heuny evwdenca, nunery when moms an -pm-nan alllra Voﬂowmg. 1.; Omar Vlrure 212; RC my Orusrvlru/s 6(2]RD In) Ora-rum!-SIZJRC and «:1 3 Court may has new mm Md" own as m». 341; no" (emphasis added), and (2) me nemaanxs 3 smug om Appucauans are “tnlstiocumry proceedings“ within the muamng 010 41 ( 5(2) no Then 3 Appeals emznah from me Defendants‘ 3 smkmg om Appucauons Consequenﬂy, premued on Ten! Corporation we may apwy o 41 v 5(2) ac read mm 1 4 an m lake lulu account lhe mmenls cl Dr senanudaaan-s amdavh m mesa 3 Appeals We furlher my an ma voumnq mdgmenls m we HC - 1;) m Daluk Amlr Kahnr bin run Haj‘ Musunha v Tun Mohd Said hi Knnuk 5 on [1994] 3 Mm 737, to n N LZ\GCQ5vDED?NC13VMvdrnA mm Sum In-nhnv WW he .15.. m van; M m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VII mum puns! dalsvmina In Ipplllznnn «a nuke em a mm Abdu!Kan1Ir Sulamun J (as he man wa57 had adrmllsd an mam pmsuam to o 41 7 5(2) RC According to Daluk Amlv Kahlv, zip 741 In 742- “Thu mmamu‘ mu:-nan »g .....s« a u r 1910(1), in mud Id] mm mm. at m my» cum mu rm. RNC‘) and undu mu mnmnuumatczvon ur me cowl. n. ppllclﬂan ls suppanod by rm Mdnvlr cl Wong Klan Knoorly nﬂmmd an 7 sop:-mu mu rm um nﬁdlvil mnrsiy nfuu In mm lfﬁdnvvll-In-nply of mu dofond-wt: mm as room: In rat nmmm mlln .pnrmuo.. m M: on'grn.n'»a summons. Ensed on non nmamwm-Mn Inn mom: vnﬂly bolnvu am 291- anmmunn summam of me pmmm diuroses no ruionahh cm. 4:! Action mmu all or my or Inn uofnndanu, and/or 1: sandal-nus, Mvnlous, vexuhlu an!/oi I: an anus: n! ma Pious: M m. court. In oppaamun to ma Appllnllcn ol an dchndanls. mu plalrmll mun u. .-maul: m nppnlltlnn amrlmd on 22 son:-mm an In 29.. mum In annomlan at m- Mammr. ne 4-mama we prvpwy or man ./nmns.«mpIy nhnld to hy 2». dlponlnl of m- mmn m supp-m or w: lPnU¢a1lon, smu mun lﬂidnvili .2 mm m m. mi!/hearing cl ma cﬂﬂlnadny sumnm wan am Mon mm for nanny. 5:, the hnmedme issue which all: Iol . doclsfan ls wnunu ma apurmuon on an dtlond-Imu dli-clln 1.. ma ugm of mu nntun al an zrlldnvir In supporl. om: 45 r 1: am not mu out mu ruqulrvmlnt u! my -muum ». support 91 an nppﬂcallnn rm: )5 m/mu: hum an apphcﬂlrm madu mm o :4 mm by r 2m memo! m. apphcuimrl mus! 11 be men by Kwnmons nuppc-mu by an amdawl Simﬂaﬂlf wun an uwlnrulron mIﬂIrO 51, mm: by mm mlluuﬂ an arrmm >5 rsawwd for me annmuon Agam, an Buphcaban undov a 49 r 2 m rammed In he supamlaa or an amdavu Svmdaw wnn an apmmalrnn under o 50 r J. wlvzle 1n. apalvcmmn mm. sIl\|7D01lzdbyunsRaavIl ra cuts ye: anolhsrinrm uiapohcanon rs an apohcahum under o 23 r 1r2/ at m. Rn: V/Md! must be suwaned by an nmanm mum um o is I 19, 11 merely rsqwn-as an mu/cmn to be made There .5 rm mautrumsnt m ms ml: al an amdavﬂ ieeompenymp ma awmoamn An npphcllton by summvnulwchlmbuu :. nn mm .n rnrenoculorv brueetdtny nna a :1 r :12; Mormon: nn .m.m mm m m p-«rpm vi mm: and "- Mtemaemofr mmamvs. Bun /rv Mt nbuvlce curvy ..p.... riqm min! of .n liﬁdlwl la ...p.m ﬁn -amnuon In a 1: r 19, 71!: my vhw mu lor In lnnlkllian undev the Ink, me -mama rn support cl mu nanlrcmn u not mnmory. In Mo mcumunm ma nmmu M Wong mnn xmnn In suvmn of mi: wucauon arm: m.n.:.m rs ofno unmuono. or lfynlllcmcl n my ounl. m nmvnvnl In hnldlny man an nmdavll If not a pm-qmux. for an -wnomn nnu«o1:r1n,a»nnema:ng:ao41.sm,.n nmmn Iwnm for mu pumou ul helm: and In mhrluullory procndmy: nuy cnnllm nnmn-rm al Infomullon or new Mm m «mm mm gwundn mmn m ml hum, m. llﬁdlvvt 1:! Wang x..n Kllncmg In ml: an r. rm dolocuve noun.“ arm . n-rmnn in mm: Ilrdnviu. ha dxpusad mm bum an on nlnmnld amdavls. nu vvnly MIMI: that nu urrglnlllng summon: n! m. plllnllﬂ nilcrm-.1 nu vnsaruhh mm Al aeﬂon against all or any of un. u an-nu-nu mm 1. 15-min/nus, mare»-, v-nttaus And/or A: In was. all" pmcou armu m m- cmumsmms, mepmnmrs om-man has no mean" (emphasus adaed)‘ and my me above wdgment m Datuk Amlr Knhnr has been apphed m Knrllun Mnlayuia v mm: Englnauina a. Cnnllruclinn Bhd[2D19]MLJU 1aB0,at[§]. E. wmn can Iummeviaunc bu aamimm in on 19 Fuulfy. “Ium:sr9wdunca" in 5 6511)lc(3)C.JA.1 1(1), 42;. m and (SA) RCA (R mm sututory Provl-Ionl) mean: ewuence which no nol been adﬂuned m me HC av submdmale mun [NC/Subordlnlln Cmm) 2n Semnd\y_ mvae calequnes av ‘further evrdsncs' can be mammm m the Rmavanl Slammry Proviuons, namary. (1; “Iurthsr svtdem:s' much u mended to he used by in appucann mapllcnmp m -menocunory appucanons m me CA [Funhnv Evidence (lnlaerloculary on Applicniunll‘ (2) “lunher evidence‘ which mended tn be when an by an Apphcanl in me heanng m an apueal m the CA [rumm- Evldencl (Appum but me Funhﬂ Emence (Appeal) my name we being me: me heanng m me H!)/Subordinale Conn (Subuquanl Evldence). and 1. IN LZ\GCQ5vDED?NE13VMvdrnA -um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm 13) Fwlhsr Ewdenee mppeax) was avaﬂahle la me Appﬁcanl at me (ulna af me heamvg m we HC/Submdinatz Cuun bu\| was nut adduced m me HO/Subordinate com (Exitllnl Evldonco) 21 we 1(3A)RCA my a\|lnws“(uI1Ils/avrdem>e'(o be admmed al Ihe “Ilssrmg 0/ ms appear -1 me «duawmg Mo wndmcns are samsned cumulamexy by me Apphaaln (2 Condition: [r 10;“) (1) me mm olthe 2 Condmuns [r 7(3A)] (1-- (land an 1: mm)» 15 provided m r7(3A)(a) RC and has Ivm aksmalwe nmbs, namew 43) the -runner ewde:-ca’ wit not muame Io me Apphcam ac the Ilearmq In me Hcrsuomdmane Cmm [1-I All-rnalivu Llmh (1-- condmnnu The 1-‘ Ahemahvs I7 11" Cnnduiunj concams Subsequent Evmence‘ or my me 'Iurmsr awdsnmr exmsa ac me nunng In and HC/Subordinate Cmm but was na\| avaﬂable \|a the Appllcanl despite me exemse av veasanahle dﬂigenoa by me Apphnant {2'- All-nutiu Limb (1-I Condlﬂonll The 2~ Ahemalwe Limb A1“ Cundmnnl men In Exnslsnt Evidence. Ind (2; r vmxm RC pmudes «or the second of me 2 cdnduidns [r mm] (W Conﬂlllon [r 1(:Ay]) There ave Mo ahemznve hmbs of me 2* canduidn [: 713A)] namaxy, me “Iu/mar evidence‘, Mme — u IN LZ\GCD5vDED?NE1lVMVdmA -um smm ...m.mm be used m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! (a) would have had a aalan-mnlng inﬂuence upon ma declslon cl ma no/sulmmlnala own [I'' Altnrnnllvn Limb lz"-1 Cundlﬂom]. or lb) would have been Ilxely Co have a uelenn-nlng lnlluanoe upon lne aeclslpn el me HOSubamlna(e Court [zu- Altunniva Limb la" Cnnd an]] 22 Rule mix) RCA only apphes \|a Flmhev Evldence (Appeal) and ml to Funher Evidanca1lntarIL7cu\|uly CA Appllcallon) Aceonllngly. lna llnsl pen of a selzl cu am (he flrsl pan or r 7(2) RCA allpw an Appllcanl lp use runner Evidence (lnlevlcculary CA Appllcauon) wllhoul any leave cl CA 2: ll is cleav lnal Y 713A) non applies la Existeru Evlpenpe and an Apphcanl can unly dlschsrge lhe burden lo pelauaae lne CA (L: glam leave lo aﬂmn lne Exlslenl Evidence al ma hearing 01 me appeal -n CA v me 2 cenalllans [r 1(3A)] ale aallalleu cunullzllualy 24 rue quesunn lnal anaea I5 wnemar Y ma) RCA apphes la sllpaeqllenl Evldance ln me CA case or sln Hnp Ln-Mmnenl St!!! and v vlp shou slun [2005] l MLJ 515 » (1) Mnkhlar Sidln JCA deﬂverad the 2-l malonly aeclslon [MnJmlIy Judslrmnt lsln Hun Lie-Maruhonij] as lpllewa al [10] \|u [12] nnd [15] la [la] 7 ‘[142] m am, In! In: lpplinllmn to n nllnwnd ill: Jpplliant had m may m. Lumillmns -1 mm In pm lw. rnu. l.I na mm In my nl/mt that mm m- wvllam umnploa to nroducc Wu . ﬂlPDlnIng an.’ m. mu )6 ln L2lGCu5vDEDrNC1:wMvdmA ‘Nata s.n.l ...na.. pm be used m mm a. nllmruﬂly MIN; dun-mm wa arlum Wm! m; At mm mm urlllr, 2». lppuﬂlnl zurrcldad m.: an ..a.:.»c- Irnandad to be zdduced my not nuur won tho ma! 12/ away mu mat. n uccwnd rung arnlrllu mr In an mun Cam my my. concluded. u I: clear In me mn ma avldlncc rnxumu 2.: n. aﬂduud m In mm: a! In mumm tang um: um lncldlnl and if!!! m. mu. TN: nwvencu was m. aullablllxy oi-Iv Allnmlllvu um. road tn 1):: responmrs ram: long arm mu Mal Ialmocl my yen: mu m rupwldcnt nu illod mu pnunt Imun). I: vs char in ms nu: evklmce was not my not ayauanu al ml Yhe second nu: u muted by Dar: «A; Is that m. Hm mam. r1lnll.WuuIH n. . m or vmuld luv: bun llnly to my: . ummrnrny Inﬂuence upon me decision or m my» com 1751 1: Is cloarlmm the um um me mm evidence that m. appallant nmnm 1.: mm mum m an m. anumpﬁon mu m- nmmd loyal or an mm mum bv brought down nu: ma. wn nu .ua...;. um um um m. This -numpdon was hand on em rm mil mu. wu- sum: umwum on ma ritpnnuynllx ma Ind m. Idlmnirrs land. may those oarmwonts, mo HFBN/an! ulumod that ran mpmom llrvd amid a. «mum the olive: nelvhhauriuv hifiaininv lot which was to be muapea mm In y-rx ma 2»: rupovd-m n-'1 ﬁl-d am: mm. an my vinw, mos: has my: naming u: do mm m aamay-s mm--1 by rm mponom To mm In .u.m.m. mud to Ms mm was the respamenrs my nation In mm ma upun-um am 4:! N5 ma not In urlgmll mm mu! M Dunn dulroyud [151 m lgpnﬂlrn m mu! .mu.m m ugly nfﬂrmld ny smug cmn Chem on 1: Juryma cormrmod. my vm. mu! 1». ipplmlnun m ndducl Iruh mam. val my in mike an lssummion andassenwn as mm «mm «ax m; m my mtnisis nun-wanna: um anlyln nmmmton wen rm -up-um mm mm: «my me am. n. my vlaw, mm 1.1 no hull evtdmcz m m: an»4I=a2«on.u:I [151 1;. my vluw, m. .,.p::=.u.». am not lllsly the condmoni /mm-.1 by r 7 IRCAI. For In: rulun, or mujnﬂfy dnclllnn, wu dlsmlssld m. lppllclllan ny tin -manna‘ (mar-asas added)‘ and 12) Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA (as he men was) delivered me foHA7wmg dlssenlmg magmem [Dlunmlng Judgment (Sin Hun L Mnvuhonl)L at [73] to {as}- ‘mr mu -pnunmn -nun:-.1. an Hour: olmucfun, Inr mm ‘In in: mm ma! luv: u nu--ury: lo mmu rum-r avmnnzi n. my .pp..:. 11.. lunn-I .w.1em was as to 4 mam! mu mama arm mu m- or 1». mmon or m. ﬂlgh Cuun nu tar: as. nnmlly, tvldancn HI .x2...;m emnwolks that won army canm out on m- mpermm um um. n wn cl ma, wauld bnnp down an ‘plntlwm 1:-my M the mm. The mam pumon oltne tvhimcn was to plvw mm mm would nu Inngav n. lny nu-d 2.; conumcl - rat-Wnv war! 2.: nublrrn the wake of mu rnpnnﬂant’: mm an Inn :1 . mlllnmg will m. um uaulmd, mm In ms! muld M av-my Induced ‘due In mu 1: ol rum manna: 4w-rum ol sail)’. so nu ma rnmmnutafi dimJ9\I would mzw nntbu .. much .u my Rum mmmn In-1 wns mama 1741 m mpumm appluld m. -lppllrltlun. In his .mum: n. mx-nu-4, nmcnn mm tniws, that m. r-com urmwoﬂti am not mm III: n-Inn: Ind canngmuan a! ma um, um it i: not nemlissfhle to ask ma meuau cam w rusun ﬂlmlgu mu n. . bun pruplriy nuussd .: mg my um um. In my mm, the evidence mm to nmry um um cnndmnru far It: rlzupﬁun lundusload m. mm candlﬂons 2» be mm that may be drawn mm Ir nw Ru) 1751 w. mm: m ﬂnllnllnn mm commenclnv to hair mu mm: It wu alunnua by . mnjmvry dnclslun wvllmm 1: mn: mmod cmmnl Io! ma nsnondunl. r was mm vm, mu nurlng m. mbmllslun aim: .pp.::.m rumm zclmsnl m: not mm: the ommmny to Mar mu submission of ma nsponaonxk ll-mad mu-un mu m. nsl rnn cannon oi me am»: Amt nc-puan av Iunnu Iwdoncc for clvﬂappllls (a m. Cuurt nrappur f1 dull mm In . HIE./AI my I: 15 um fmm mm 12: um u m. mum lwdmzl 7: u 2., mum mum um occumd um me mlsron -malea from, n my a. glvnn 1;. my an my luv: u rvquma. m. glvvny nliurmuv uvidmze .5 to put- declxlon mmen‘ rs a mam! ur rlghl u vs -1.14: c u mm. m. ward: m. u m mltlurs muq...m .. .rm...aw. ma 1:; ma: mo rldulnnmm or lpocul wo-um um ar 1; luv: mu down ny rm sub-5 do nazappty Ia Dos!-chclslon mums ma; am: an m. was ‘Appeals to ma cm: or App r mu o. By way at rvnunng, Ind m million In such lypIllS' in nab-5 m, the whoh ol 5 u, .u m m n4b—uv.1(oru 1:! re. Inn, mm my ulgnz nmmmm dvWu:rvce.1, rrvmlund in r wzcu. mu ﬁve sub-sections mommy um Ilvn pm; on». rm: 1;. um. um: urdur. m urm air 1 wt: Mzourse the same u em or: :9. 45 hr .u putdvemnn mm... ... mmm-a, m. qwmq of man: wldcncn Is: mule! arm: pa: mm a provision of .n An 12! p.m.m.m mm nal bu rt-omclud In subsldllry liwslallcn, because me re onasmunx will a. mm, ... um, um nu rm nrlnoncu, M. u tum oflls own. Runovo IL and mu law A: still mm in an Act Furtmr, n m. Io-nnn¢1manH.I mm nmamauan. m. maﬂtlicntinn Vs um: vlns and lnolhcuvn D-cauu n -vekr 2.; Huh mudlilclﬁnn m m. law tnmugll .uammy lrqislntfnn in In no. that Pamam-nx has «mm: iol, mu... m pawn In mnmiy 1. lxprnnly glvnn Dy Flrmmunl. The modiﬂc-ﬁon mu mmnvy am arms mu m menmln-nt mllv nrmpugnnnl m m. pmvu/an .- nnntlud by Pmlnmenl. and subzfdmy /eylsmvon Is mam». or dn/ng mu /ea} mm :9 any .u can bonus: In nu r 1 ms Jmervdod bylnlmﬂuclng m. Iulmwmg par: {u}: M rm .. Inc pmynnh mu Vmsminnod arm: in mmmm mm mu mm sandman: in 9. 112111114 1: Impolu rllmzlmru m... m. uutnd mm. mum. mo rrqulremem In pm 11:; mu am now evmnnco woufd zn (awn roosmzn wmu IN mi mum nr APPEAL or umvsn u nun-s musuucnam clvn. u- azrwszw 4 Muulmov All. mmuuvxmuc Nu I1n1a:-02515!) 2 mumuum ms smmme mm: no Izmmluw) .. »9sLLmvs Am: 4. rzueam uosP1nL mum z new-um xaumuu «scam moon mum Kismnnu Miami JONDR :. mu. psmm xzsmmu, xzmamzmn K£amAm4 Iuuvsu ¢ xsmmu uumm xsspouusxts [M m: mallswfllaa Hm cm m Jmmrﬁivm mm Mahm- cmxsunna mr2uNcv<>2sasI2n2n Bamaen Munundylll K:m1uamHNR\c Na a7aw:—Dz—57M7) 2 MunumnuhlIpS.In1MuvW(NR\C Nu 7:nz1Ms»5s1a1 Fmnmli Ann Pewavuw ms»-m Swan-h mm Plrwavah Keswnatan Ntgay1.!nMv,1ahzIan mum" N-9-«mu KIN: Famgaran Knmmzn Kuvventnmn Kumntznm-Ways: Knralaan mum Devendnnbl coma: LEE swzz szma, .mA mmnu mm mm. Jan wens mm xuzous, JCA 3 sw LzxGcu5mEmNc1:wMv¢n.A nave ms: or would Mu bun Iﬂroly to um nm a dntxrmfninytnﬂunnci on the decnslon um was mad-. mm mm ma 4-» ‘aura mpg-st max nmnu wrdonu would -mly he Allowed :5 to mmers rn exlslonu mm 2»- d-cmon, mama P'W‘ou:1.Y mm... maam u M pun- dlnlalon mutton was nl)owed,:m1u mmuua 1:21 ma mwu mug:-v mm by pm mu MV- not am. mm (9 s 61 Since pm «A; seeks to am to r 7. and um: 1 has no lxl.:l4n:n,II1- mm. nUL\| own, um I: m-rlly an am or 5 n, r (W 75 ncrnlny mare mu M ulelvlbl by -unaramy V-glslltlnn In mnﬂlly . 5:. ma lﬂumpl u ulln vlns hocausn subsidiary I-gmamm I5 rm aapawa nl mndlfylny in Au 1:! Pnmamlnl. Ilrclpl Dy «mu numarily on-amamm, wnrcn am not ammu- Iaaj I war :3! ma mw. mmrm, ma: 1 as 1: mil nﬁedad ny Dan M and further mama. as to pen- docmon mum my mm B: gnrul, And a. of right. rnamm, mevely 1.1 . rmamy in distal my -man, Vuvo mum 175 Man lo mu lPpI4I-rm to 9.... ma mm» moans. ml! may mm 2.: give. me quamm :2! ns warm and a col mum DI minors to M carllrdund m m. -aneu Itself “ (emnham added! 25 m mu mew, leave oi CA IS um req-men lav Subsequenl Evidence because Ihe secann pan of 5 69(2) CJA (z~- Pan 1- 59(1) cm) sud me second pan L71 r 7(2) RCA (2"- rare [r 712) RCA]) havn expIess\y auuwea smasequam Emanoe us be used an me neanng ol appezk wvlhnut any weave MCA In Hus vegans- N LZ\GCQ5vDED?NC13VMvdrnA Nab! Sum In-nhnv WW he used .a mm a. nvwhuﬂly MIN; dun-mm VII mum pm (1) me Mamrily Judgment (Sm Huap Leememnenu had memxssea me avnlmauon lor weeve or c»: to addnoe “(urfhsr emencr on me around nu: ma ippﬁcahon vms based on an “essumpIIan' and (here was nu ‘further evidence’ «.2 be adduced at lhe hearing 0! me apyaa m mal can Furmemme. me Mammy Judgmunl (Sm Heap Lee-Maruhem) am not discuss me 2"‘ Pen [5 6912) cm em 2'»! Pan [r n2) RCA]: and 12) we take the Dnwrwmly la appnws me Dlssenlmg Judgment (Sm Heap Lee.Memeem) men can be suppmled by me «euewmg reasons » (a) awarding In 5 2(1)(e) ov me Inmvpretanon Acls 1943 and 1967 (IA). Pan x IA avnhes la RCA neceuse RCA are made me: 31.121963 pursuant Ia CJA when has been vevised under me Rewsxan cl Laws MI was seeuen 23(1) VA on Pam IA) Dmvvdas M the uocmne 01 um wres asfollowa: “Any subsidiary agar-rm’. mu 1- mmmm with m At! rumuwng Inc 4.: urvdur men n. mum", Vngulnnon was me.) man e. vent tn rm nmm cl u..:m.....1.,.ey.‘ (emphasis added) The apphnallun L715 23(1) IA has been exwamed by Mohd. Zawawi Salleh FCJ m we Federal Cuurl we) use ov Pihak serkum Tauhnib Majlit Porbamurun 22 IN LzxGcu5mEowNc1:wMvan.A we sew ...m.mm be used m mm ms mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] nﬂuNG pm sobcnng Perai a. Anor V Muxildi Illukhhr [mu] 1 cu Lz([81].ask1ll:1ws “[511 m: cm: matsubsrdlary or H-Voyuml rogmanan mu not be bruder man in: onabllrrg Iogluallnn. YNI glnural pnnclyll u! nllulary intorpnallon I5 eodmod m s 2: nu " lempnlsls added), and an RCA are made under s 17 CJA I! r 713A) RCA apphet to Subsequent Emuenoa, Hus means r may RCA Is \ncons\s\|an\| mm the 2"“ PIr1[5 69(2) CJA] and lay Wine 01 1 23(1) vx, r mm RCA us van in the extent 0\| such an mccnsmency 26 As explamed m the suave paragraph 25, by reason arms 2'“ Pan [5 s9(2) CJA] and 2"‘ Pan [r 712) RCA], me Plamnm do not lemme reave of the CA \a use Dr sawahuadeenrs amaavn m these 3 Appeals F. Should CA gum “X, 19: Pliméffs to Ina Dr. Se\|ihuddnon'I yngavn in a Aggalﬁ 27 Noawnnscanumg om apmpn m my above parigviph 25. we are 5! me mew mac ma Plaintiﬂs have sansnaa me 2 commons [r 7(3A)] as (allows (1; me 1-1 Anemame Limb 11“ Common) 15 (umuea because Dv. salanuaueervs amdavn was not avaﬂuble to me Plamums mmng me heanng ov me Delendams‘ 3 sm mg OmApp\|IcaI\ons‘ and 2: IN LZ\GCQ5vDED?NE13VMvdmA -ma saw ...m.mm be pg... m van; .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! 12) as sxmamed wn parigrinh as helm me comsms M Dr Se\ahuddeen‘s amaavn would have been llkely \|a have a dalermlnmg mauem an we 3 HC nacismns In mhev wmds‘ me 2"‘ Allernanve Limb 12"‘ Cundmon) has been taxisﬂed by me Plainmfs Franused on me above reasons, ma F'\|ImMIs' 3 Leave Apphcahons (Dr. SeIahuddeen's alﬁdavﬂ) an answer: by ms cmm wnnom any ovdsv as to costs 5. wh-um noun can Igglx guitzhle enoggl doctrino with Egzrd In Thne-Vur Linn Ian Furiod 28 The Tmse»Vaav Lmmanon Pernod us vrwldad In s 21:) PAPA wmen reads as lollows -2 wnm, mu m. coming Ame fart: nrmu AL: lny MIL acllvll Drosszutron or om-r pmcudlng :. cnnlmuvcud in m. Fnd-ntiun -mm myneuon an: my m dune rn Wnunnce or cxecumzn or Irmmua lxocullnn a1 Iny mm». law III 1:! my puhlrr my a. numurify or m mam alnny «mm mm or datum m the mcuuon of any such mm... 1..., may or mm mm rmwmg pravlslnns sin!/luv: mm (3) me man. man, Prowcunorv or pmuedmg mu not 1.. nr o. .mm.a unlsu n u cammnncnd mm. 70-57:: moms nu! -rm rm cu. Mglurt or ac!-uu comnllmod 1:! or, m me use pr . mnnnuunce a/mju/Y ar mum wvlnm mmw manllvs net! am: my clnsmg (h¢Iunl' (emphasis added) 24 N LZ\GCQ5vDED?NC13VMvdrnA um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm 29 In Alma Yamplnlon a. On v Law Val Hnldings Sdn Ehd a. Ann: [1999] 2 ML.) 202 Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he man was) has exnlained m me HC man a defendant may be snapped lrom remng on a nmmon devenoe pvovlued by me umnanon Ad 1953 (LA), n \s dec ed m Allmd Tnmplulon‘ al p 244 M7 245‘ as lulluws ~: mint lully zcnsrdu um." ..n. In ulnp an-ull um 11! m. Llmltutmn m m xou Nanny V was cmng Kmﬂw mm Lmmu1Ac u may Mu 45, . name” 1:! Inc pm Cuuncll Imm m. mm Federal Court of Marayxla. m a ran av mmyvmms, mm Lon1.IMp.I um mm an statute: which, vrouyh dwlarfnﬂ m..cum m 1.. .4.....;.»a...:. nr .,.,..:, ... nevennelass rm! .m:-my pmmouory and so do nu! pncludu .m,,...r. On mm. a: 1:... .. m. smut- »: mm I-we Mlmphrru V Numnrmes mm 2 KB 5:1 :4 m wmm .: ma nu mm conndlnd mu the shunt om: m n. mm: as regular/W pmcldun, rml .. ...m..g .2 usnntlll vnlldllm .. . mun am: 1:51 u. may Is to :5): mm.’ m. raw m.:....m.m. me wanna an n. am. .. ,.,.,.....x. mm puucy 2.: which m. noun mutt pm rm: In 2». .m.«..: :1 m. Wm punluﬂy 9. lam! nzrlnn .7: 2». Dublin, mun. any rules or ovmcnco if mm... u.......m. mu m. pnmu mly a... cum by m... canducl or oumwm mu wold: arv wmuly arm. Ind Juggul mu m Lmumlon Ac! run 31!! vny la oslogpel. rmma, mm tn mm In fumuvmn y Wu! Nlm CorpnrItmrl[1D5(7]2 KB M507 2 K5 209 2; N LZ\GCQ5vDED?NC13VMvdrnA ma Sum In-nhnv M“ be used m mm ua nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm which uyye-x mu . an!-mtlnl mu rm! :2. mm tn My an . mm. ofltmv Hon Imls acts arslatomoms during m. mmm nllhopulod nnw mam. m. plllnﬂﬂtu u.:.y pmmamg. And, rn amm... 1 Anal v Mo:-1197212 ML.I15s any c4 um sumo: al mnnmm M...» an 1». ..:m....m 01 . ngm ny action ..a me: of Dmcednm only: see 24 Nusaury. Llws at 5...... my Eu; P m . right which meme. unenfemubfe merely ny recson ul Unmatlan u... no! [pun hm parish ar mm. Inln mm .11. a. helmet v cmnu mm] 1 wm ass whom n nu. mm mm .41....» um... . ms; .1 m. ummuon Act 1m, aman of mum. lnm-st mntllndlrvg 1.. man u... .1. yams ... :...m...m. by um, um manmws mu or-ry ommod la n. uzumou rvmuﬂy .1 mdumpllon pruvvd-d that my am .0 uvenrs or mnyay: mm.-., wmnu mm blmd or m N, .. m mu 5..., .q.n.u. rvynl: am not new.» by mass. or nmmmm, an 015 Sam: ﬂoluncn n. ..: up n... n. my 2». am. at . honeflclar own! to be granted Ms mm to me /29»! am so 1.. .s mly n. Maury. I mum mm: m: baled an Mes: mu. m. Llmllallan Act :. pululy pruzodunl: ... um»... um Amar V ma 119721 2 ML1 15: um uIMVcholl v mm: smnunnv Co Ltd mm 2 us my 1m. And, mm“, 1.. an... urcumxtlncls, an. an eslap Mosul! om mm mum. Act by conduit " (emphasis added) an The abave uecusmn m mm: Tlmpllmn has been appnwed by the FE m the lollawlng judgment dehvered by Gopal sn Ram JCA (as na men mu) m Eoulund Tmilng usns) Sdn Bhd v Arab- Mnmann Morchnm Bunk and 1199514 cu 253‘ n: 294 "saw mu». n. 1, 1-: M an-n ms) In In ruunmunv /udymlnl In Ylmlllltun y. Law m ﬂnldlrrgt sun. and. [ass] 2 mm 201 m apmm mg doclnm In . mm nnu mun: inman lo pmrtnl a ﬂuhndnnt rmn rulylrlg upnn ma pmvlsluru aim! ILA] ' femvhasxs added) 31. The Dhrase my person lorany act done In pursuance oraxeeuwn ur Intended sxscuﬁorv 0/ any wrmen w ar 0/ any puzm duly nr numonzy m m rsspecl or any alleged rveglanl or aerau/r In the execurmn many such wnnsn /aw, my maumont;/' In 5 2(3) PAPA rere-s to any person we perlorms a wnllen lnw. public duty and/or public aumamy For ease ol convenience‘ .n this ‘udgmem we wvll describe me pelsun envisaged m s 2(a) PAPA as 2 ‘uublic oﬂrcsf 32 We are unable (:7 «no any prevxoui Malaysian case much has decided on me appncauon ol me docmne of sq-nnahxe esﬁcphm m a puhm: omcer who has relveu on me Three-Yes! Llmnahon Penna m s 2137 PAPA 33 u is our view mac — (1) a publsc alﬁner (X), and 2: N LZ\GCD5vDED?NC1lVMvdrnA Nuns snnnw n-nhnrwm be used m yaw n. nrwhuﬂly mm: m.n.n VI] .nuNG pm (2) me Fedara\ Govemmcm, sme Government or pumu: aulhmm’ Aulhomy) whn ts vu:aneus\y liable for (Governmenwu x‘: am. umlsslnn and/arconducl may be esmpped by any 5\a\|emeM and/ov conduct by — (a) X, on a pubhc ofﬁoer nlhsr man x (V), and/ur (c) suuemmem/wumn: Aulhorw lvam re\ymg on me Three«Year Lmmamon Penud The abwe mum suvnoned by me Mlawmg reasons’ (I) ma Three-Year Llmﬂahon Penod is a procedural delanm and no! a subsuarmvs ans There may be a slatsmenl and/nv mndud by x‘ v and/or Government/Publvz: Authomy whrch makes m meqmtable «or x and/or Gavarnmanl/Publu: Aumorky (o rely on me ThreeVear Limnanon Period. on Alma nmpmon Ind aousmn mama have recugmaed me appmauan ai me dncmne mi equuame eslnppe\ «a bar a panys vshanoe an 2 Ivmtatiun defence pmsuam \|n LA Theve is nu veasun m prmclyla and palm, why aqmcable e5lopp€\ doclnne cannot be Invukarl agﬁmst Public amcau and/or sovemmenr/Puonc Amhonlv m rewecl of the Tme-year Ltmllahon Pemd: am 2: (m m acwldanue mm good uubhc governance‘ puhluz Mﬁoers and Gevernmen\|IPuhhc Aumamy should not mike smemems and/av canduct \|hemse\ves m a manner wmah may cause any person to he mepmmy plqudwced H. Was man a lrilbln um. um Dclsndznli wm ulnggd bx Summontl Dr. solahuaalnlnr. Aman vrom nl u on num- Llmltlllon ad? 34 m these 3 sum, mars Is a (mole mus ragummg whe1her me Defendnms are eslupped by Statements (Dr Sslahuddm/DI Aman) «mm rerying on me maawear Ltmllaﬁan Penod (mam. Inn") 35 The Tnable Issue xi mpponsd by the Vullnwmg evxdenoe and reason: (1) me nc was lonned by MOH and was headed ray 3 rained JCA The Plamtiﬂs knew al ms rarmanon N no am as mqmry, (2) at the maIeria\ lime. Dv Se\ahudmn and Dr Amun were the Jnhnre State Nsamw Dlremm and Haspnars vector rssps1:\|rva?y. In mher mm‘ Dr sawammuin and Dr Aman hs¥d man was m MOH an meume ollhe maxmg enne Smemem: my Sela)-mddm/Dv Amnn), (3; me S(alamanIs1Dv Selahuddin/D7 Aman) weve made In the ramny Members (6 Deceased Persons) 3\| me Meelings Minutes (Meetings) had been prepared by MOH n \s merevme dear me: me Statements 10: Sehhuddxn/Dr Aman) weve made In me course of mg empluymem or Dv Selahuddm and 29 IN LZ\GCQ5vDED?NE13VMvdrnA -um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm up Aman The slalamenls (Dr Selanuddlrllﬂr Aman) were no: made w9Hhe—cufl wimnul any lrllarltlnrl by me Delendanls Io be no-um by Ike slalamanu (Dr Salahuddln/Dr Amanl and (4) any reasonable clalmalll ln me woman oﬂha Plalnlllls who had been Informed M me smemenls (Dr Selanudliln/Dr. Amanbl would be lulled mm a lalsa pl onmplarerlcy la llle a sull -«er ma pruparatmrl 01 ma ll<:'s Repon and aller me lapse 01 me Thre>Vear Llmilatlorl Plrloli In mm won1I,Ihs Plalmiffs did not ﬁle me 3 Suns WI m the was-vear Llmllallon Period because ma vlamulls had yelled on me slalen-ems (Dr Selahuddlrl/Dr Aman). ln lms sense‘ n ls alguable that the nelemams are eslopbad by ma Statemenls lm Selahuddlrl/Dr. Amanl [ram lelylug on me Thrac-:»Vaal nanorl Parlod lo supper! me Deiendnnls' 3 Slrlkmg oul Appllcancrlt consequenlly. me oumenls ol DY 5a\aVluddeen's alﬁuavn would have been hkaly up have a “deIumll'rllrlg Inﬂuence’ on me 3 HC neclslona wllmn me meanlng of me 2"‘ Allematlve p lzw Corldillan) as ln vlew arms maple lssue — (1) n ls up: a plain and Dbvlnus case luv me H!) to strike om Ihe 3 Sulls - please refer lo we Judgmenl M me Supreme Cowl uelwem by Mom Dzaluam SCJ la: he man was) in Bandar aulluu sun arm a. on v Unlnd Malayan Banking Carper-lion and 11993} 3 ML] 35, an -as, l2) ma 3 sulls are neﬂher hlvalnus nor valiuous wnlun me maanlng pro 18 r19(1)(\|1)RC, and w IN LZlGCu5vDEDVNC1:wMvdmA -mp s.n.l n-vlhnrwm be up... w mm ms mm-y MIN: ﬂan-mm VI] arlum pm cwounns or JUDGMENT A. Imvodunllgn 1 Tha above mree appeals (3 Appelln) use a navel queshon 01 whether me Federa\ eovemmm um Duf-lldlnl) may he emppea by stalamenls made by‘ among amers‘ Johore Stale Hem Dvectur mi Dolundanv.) hem re\ymg on me lmse~yeav «mnamm period (mm-vur Llmitalion Plrind) pmweed m s 212) 01 me Public Aumevmes Pmtzclmn Am 194: wrap. a. Elclxground 2 we shah relarlo palllas as they wave nu ma Hugh com me) 3 A me luck: out on 25102016 (Fin) In me Vnlenuve Cale Uml ucu) arsuuanan Ammah Haspna1,.Ienare Bahru moapnal) 4 sux pananls m me HaspI\|al's mu perished m me Fire (6 naeund Furious) 5 The plmmms (Plainlilfih m the above three mils (3 sum) are me panams and dependenls anhrae cute! me e Deceased Persons 5 The ﬁrs! defendant is me Hospital‘: wecoov wvme me we dedandanl Is the Dweclnr-General 0! me Mmuscry av Heaun (MON) Tm: wdgment snau uelena all me delendans cnI\ec\|lva\y m mese 3 Apvﬁals as me “D¢fendanh" 7. Ana: the Fwe‘ MOH lnrmed a sevelunemher Vmiepsndsrll Inquiry Camrnmes" In mqulre m\|u me cause 0! the Fire arm to make me o IN LzxGcu5mEmNc1:wMvan.A ‘Nata Sum ...m.. M“ be used m van; me m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VIZ mum ma (3; me 3 Sulls do um cL7ns\|llule abuse: cl cwrl proceas as underslood in 0 1K r 19M ml) and o 92 r 4 no \|\| is lo be born: m mm I1la\|evanlVa pleaded clalm IS weak and ls nal llxely to succeed, the us nol a ground m usell \|l: s1nks am the clalnl ~ sumraulla-r sun slm, al p 44 In any evenl, me Trlable Issue can urlly be les/ah/ed at a vial and me: by way cl afﬁdavll avldence I Shuuld Plan «in: In allowed up lmend me Blahmant: :1! cl m soon 37 0 ‘K o 2 r l(z) and 0 15 v 95(1) RC Dmvlde as lulluws ‘o M In aanumu-my mm Rulcs, mo Cowl nr . Judge mu nun mm to me nvomvlrlv lnlonrt ollusm nnd nnl only (-2 m. lncnnlcnl nan-carnplllnzu mm mun Ruin c 2, 1121 rm. mm are a Droeedlml made me subleu in ma onmdlny an/mm cl emu"; m. Court to dual mm uni /my m Plrvlts m Iwulm: to users: the Cam! in mum mu uvlmdmq aﬂjiclun o 18r1P(7I me Cour! my u my sure am. mmalm nrdlr tn 1:. mm nut ur umm any prualng M M: uldornnmlz or any wm ln me mm, nr anyway in my pl-ndmn arln rm .m:m.m.n; an m. gmurrd MIL la; H melons no Iuasonabln cause of lclmn W nclsnce, as Illa saw may De, la; it is aundalous, Ilivolous or vezuuous, zl N LZlGCu5vDEDrNC1:wMvdmA we Sum mm. WW he HSQG m mm we nllmrullly MIN; dun-mm VII .mm mm vs; 1: may are/um‘ embarrass or delay the mu m/ .1 me mm (a; 1: la otmrwiu nu mm of um pm»: cl um com um mly until u. Lllun In a. sum or aumrma nrludgmuvl to an mxenunccomrngrx as In use my an (emphasis added) as n Is deemed by the HC m Yup Ch Koong Halrllnna sun Bhd v Buamupulllan Avcnul Sdn ams{2o221e cm 754‘ an [ea], mat the court he: ma lalluwmg ﬁva dmcrehcnaly powers under 0 1a rI9(1) ac ‘(:91 m courl nu ma vouowlng live dluravan-W P°we:i Dursunnl In a m am Re 411 the cam! my am am a granny, nmdarsumsm‘ an . pumg, in man ur eosmlwcralm. :2; m. mun mly lllmv . pm, 1.: um; . pludlng endotsemsnlon apisadmf. union arwunlscdarm‘ 13/ me mun may slay an mm m.mmu.m., 14) ms court may dlamrssun aclmn arcaunlerdarm W 15} I115 court may em aludamont m an amen ar munlemmm ‘ (emphasws added) as In aowrdanoe mm 0 1A and o 2 r 142) Re, HC's discreﬁanaly Dcvwers nummu to c 15 r «em RC should be axamsea mm regm Io lhe ovemdmg waves: 0! msuce In me disposal nf ma 3 :2 N l1\GCD5vDEDVNE1lVMVdmA um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm Appeals, by vlrlue cf 5 6911) cm, lne CA has all me powers 0! lne HC. M3. in View oi me slaiemenla (Dr selanuamn/Dr. many and lne Tnable lseuel II is only ml lor in-a calm in grant leave under 0 15 V will no rend wnn o \A and o 2 r 1(2) RC la: lne Plainlllvs Io amend ma some so as M: include a plea g that me Delendanls are aslnpped by me sialemenle lo: Salahulidlrl/Dr Amen) lmm ielylng on me Three-Year Llmllalion Period 1EIIoppIl Finding) Nu lnlusoce is owes-mien \|c lne Deienannts by allowing me Plaimms in amend me soc: be se — in ma neienuancs are enlilied lo amend lnelr neaenoe Ill me 3 Suits wlln vegard lo the Esioppel Pleading‘ and in lrresvscilve cl (he Esloppel Pleading‘ lne Delenuanlx ale at lmeny in aelanu themselves al me lnal M me 3 sun: as may see in J. n I inn 41 Plemlsed on me above lessons and DY Selahuddeerfs amduvll ma 3 Appeals aia allowed will. lna lullawinu nldel. (1; me 3 HC‘s Decisions ale sex asidai (2; ma 3 Suns are remilled in me H0 \|a be mad belnm anumer Judge at JC. (3) leave if gramed In me 3 Plalnllila \|n amend meir secs In inciuue ine Eslanpel Pleading wilmn 14 dnys lrom liie date at 3; IN LZlGCu5vDEDﬁNC1:wMvdmA ‘Nata s.n.l n-vlhnrwm be ﬂied m mm ms nﬂﬂlnnﬂly MVMS dun-mm VI] .nune mm the me: at mus com lwlm leave in me Delenaancs ca amenu men Delenoe m we 3 suns in respunaa la me amended SDC!\|.irld la; coals ol the 3 Avbeals and Defendants‘ 3 Slllklllg om Appllcallorls will follow me evenl ol me lrial ul me 3 Suits DATE: 2 NOVEMBER 2023 wane KIAN KHEONG Judge com at Appeal, Malaysia For me Appellants (3 Appeals) M: s Gunassgamn 4 Ms Tall PoAu (Messrs Zamsn & Auocleles) For me Rsspondsnls (3 Appsah) Puul Zahllah BI. Mohammad man (SenlarFsdemI comer; A Pusn Syezana Bl. Abdul Luﬂs (Johan Stale Legalnamors crime; 34 IN l_2lGCu5vDEDlNEl zlwlvama -we Smnl ...m.mm be ﬂied m mm .. mm-y MIN: dun-mm VI] .mm mm necessary lecornmerldallmls lo me 4'" uelanuant (Ilc) Ths llc was headed by a relllad Judge cl Conn ol Appaal (JIM). mm‘ San Mohd. Hllhamuﬂln am Mahd Vunus a. In June 2019, IIC handed us report (lIC’: RlpuII)Io MOH unlllme dale al lm: wnnen llldgmem, IlC's Report has ml baerl released co Ihe pubhc c. Lggll Emcacdingi cm. 3 5 9 The Plaimms med the 3 suns ln me no on 2 9 2020 ID The Delendarus med wee awllcatlorls to strike am the 3 Sims on ma glvund \|ha( me 3 Sulls had been lnsmuled aﬂellhe axplry olme Three-Veal Llmlla\|iL7rI Perlod on 25.10 mm (Dal-nnanw J Striklnu om App\|\|::l\|onI) 11 On 1522022 lhe learned lualclal Commlssloner (JD) nu ma HC allaweu me Defendants‘ 3 Slliklng om Appllcamms mm ousls n1 Rn/l2.5uu.oo Io Ihe Delendams «or each ml the 3 sum; (3 no Doclslonlj The Plalrmﬂs hava ﬁled ms 3 Avnaals lo ma com or Appeal (CA) agalnsl me cl HE Declalurls :2 The Plairlliﬂx have applled to CA and obtained an aide! lor these :4 Appeals \|n be heard logelher [Jolnl Hurlng (J AppulI)] IN L2lGCu5vDEDrNE13wMvdmA -um Sum ...m.. WW be HSQG M van; M nllglrullly MIN; dun-mm VIZ nrlum Wm 0(2). Joirn Nearing aggmlx 13 For (he vumose or me Joml Heanrrg rs Appeals), me Plamulfs man was names of rrrouaa for weave or ca m adduoe an amaayn arrrrrrraa an 54202: by Dr serarruaaeerr Em Abdm Am (Dr. semruddurr) «or the purpose ol the rreanng or these 3 Appeals [Flaintmf z um Applluuom (Dr. Sa\Ihudﬂe:n'1 -ma-yum 14 Dr selanuausaru amaavn surea as Iouows, among others‘ (1) Dr Selahuﬂdaen was Juhcre srare Heallh Drrecmr from February 2019 urml 0c1ober 2019‘ (2) belween February 2913 and Oclubav 2:219. Dr Salahuddeen (as nrra man Johcre sure Heanrr Drrector) mer wrlh ranuxy members or me 6 Deceased Persons Uncludmg me Prarnrws; [Family mambm (s Dccaand Parsunlll mm or Aman Em Rahu (Dr. Amln) (me Hasprcars Director ar mar me) mleourrqs) Al me Meenngs » (a) Dr selarwduoerr urevmaa uwanea to ma F.\|mHY Members 16 Deceased Persons) regarmng me scams M lIC‘s mqmry 41:) Dr sarrrrruaaeerr and Dr Aman had mlmrned me Famﬂy Members rs Deceased Pelsuns) man nor Report was nor ready arm ma qaarcrorr or campsnsaung ma Farrriry Members (5 Daueasad Ferrous) warm nmy be cnrwldared by me 4'" Dersrruam arcer ma corrrprerrorr of use Repcn [Slat-mlnh (Dr. Salahuddnnnlbr. Arnarrn and rn LzrGcu5vDEDrNc1:wMvarrrA -aaa sarm I-rrhnr M“ be used a mm a. nrVn\ruH\|Y mm; dun-mrrl wa aﬂuNG wrm 1c) mmulss 01 me Mamas were Drupared by MOH [mu-nu (Moslingl)] but oy Selarmddsen eie rm! have Iocess In me Mmulss lMseIings) as he had retired «mm public service m Oclnber 2019‘ 13) belore Dr Selahuddeerfs reuremem, he mended a MOH meelmg cnmrea by me when Mmuoer ul Health and was meermea eime fnHuwmg makers — (3) me we Repurl had been prepaved and submmad xe Monana my me use Rspnrl coma nut be released 1» me publwc becaun (he cums: had yet so spams :1: rebase, and 147 Dr Selnhuddsan coma not moo-m me ramw Members (6 Deceased Pars/ans) men me we Rzpun had been prepalvd because he had already revnred cm. Dnfundant e "an" scuhuane nu ulllunvll 15 we lepruduee below me relevam parts 01 5 69 of me ceum av Jumcaxure Ad 1964 (cu), : 7 :2! the was ol me com on Appeal I9941RCA)and o 41 r 5 anhe Rules ev Cour! 2012018) “S 522 cu Haring ereeeur. m Au.»-us in m. Cnun a1Apa-nl mu .. by my aim- nanny. and In Marlon to ma appeals the Caurl of Axum! may run .u m. pawn! and mums, -Is to Imervdrrwrv! at omeme ol the ma com. Rosana with ma cﬁsrrouon-rv 7 IN LZ\GCD5vDED?NE1lVMVdrnA -we Sum ...m.. M“ be used m mm we nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG Wm powlr lo mcuvu mun.’ Iwdunu by bra! aummulmn in mm or lnmuwh a romule cammumcanorl ncnnmoyx by -mam: or by nsposumn 1am Dsfum in lxarmnsr nrmmrmssnmar /21 The tunnel evmeucn mly be won wanna: luv: an Vrmﬂoculury zppllcltiunl, M m lrvy El . u Io mntor which hm nccumd arm the am av mn dvcltlnrv mam wnrcn mu lppullx hmuglll (3; Upon appult hvm - Iudvm-In, me: am or holnrvg of my own annmu upon m. mm, m. Iuvlnnrnvldmce, an n to mums subuvu-nl as afannlﬂ, mu an ﬂmmud an Ipnclnl ground: my, Am! mzl v/imam my. cl m. cum of Aiken! mm Fuwwoiﬂaurl la amend admit Iurlmr tvltlmco or dmw rnlsmnpee mm m rn. Conn so-u nm ll! mu pawn: and mm 5: m amendment or annwnse, emu -ppuwovm my» Court, lnylmnr mm M: ﬂﬂuullunlry pawn 4.. mcnvl Iunll-I vwdlnct by oral sxammarmn m Cowl. by umvn or by debosmon taken bsfuvw .n Ixammsrurcamnusstonzr 127 Such mm: nvldcnn my be glv-n wlllmm luv: an mmvuuwry lF\|)H:Ittun.I, at In Iny cu: . :2 muen which Iv-n occurred mu m: can or can .1-c/unn mm mm,-n In- appul :. bruuym vs; I/Plan mum lmm ummom, am: may or Manny o! my mm or nutkr upun m. mlnﬂ. mn Iurlnar wldmco, m. u to mums suhzequenl Is -rmnm. mm M mntm on men! ymunas onry. -nu nut wmum um aim: Court (am at m. mung mm Appnl /man mm» mu not be nlmllled umus m Cour! 1: mmm mm vs; at an manna won an mgr: com! ar 1» subontmala court. u m. can mly n. m. nnw .wa.m ms nu! ma 1.: mi pm suklnﬂ in us. n, or max masonahh -an;-nu «my-nu would nu! am ma. :2 so . my m. rww .m.m, yr Inn, would Ivavn had ol would ﬂaw Dom may to but my . ﬂlilrmlnlng nnnum. upon m. declsinn clme mm. com or um suhordlnm court, as M: can man. a u r5RC comanu mmmn m sun/-cc to am Vt. Mu 1(1) and 4(2), 2.; pmgr-pn (2) a! mu ml: ma 2.; my my mnde anal: cum 1:, rule 5, M mmm may cumm unly such fun! as rm a-par-an us my av nu awn krmwlldgl la mm 42; An amdivll mm for ma purpau al D-my uud In mtuﬂaculury pmzlldingl mny mm» um-maul: of Womluion u bullllwtm m. mumu Ind ground: nmnr (emphasis named) 15 The xeamea semor Fedam Cumin‘ mm: renrerented me Delandzrns m mass 3 Apnealsr has opnosed the Plaxntﬂfs‘ 3 Leave Apphcaticns (Dr Salahurideerfs amewn an the lolbwlng two grounds: (1; me cements ol Dv Se\ammdeen‘s amam cnnsmuled hearsay evidence and were not admissible m me 3 Appaaxs zwmding men ysmac, and N LZ\GCQ5vDED?NC13VMvdrnA mm Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm u. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm (2; even il Dv. Selahuddeerfs aifmawt am not oonlam muay evmence, me coun should nut auaw me mainms In use Dr Selahuddeerfs amdawl m m 3 Appeals Tm wmems of D: Se\ahudr1aen's amdavﬂ um um ounssm the Thraa»Yaar Llmnahon Penna and woum not have a because we 'delemww1g Inﬂuence’ on me 3 Hr: necisms wilmn me meanmg ol r 1(3A)(b) RCA 5;; 5 DECISION D. mgm 0 41 r gm RC um zdmiuion ul Dr. Sc\|ahudd«n'I E 17 RCA are sum regavdmg use or swam [or me menu; or appsah m CA Conseuuenﬂy. r 4 RCA prev-ues that ac “shall apply munalts I-numndIs' mm regard m Ihe questim at whether CA can take ima aocounl me mmems ul Dr Sa\:huddoan'I amaavn In these 3 Appaaxs we H Dr sewamaasa-u amaawe Is admwssime as ‘h1rtnsrevIdsrme' m me 3 Apnsaxs (blaase reler to Fans E and F below). we are or me mew mat me cnnlenls av ny 5e\ahuddeen‘s amdawl may be wnsldered by me CA The kmowmg masons support mus damsmn (1) m Iukzi Corporlliun v DKSH lhlaynia sun Ehd [2016] MLJU 521, at [16(2)]. mo HC has explumeﬂ me scape at o 41 r 5(1) and (2) RC as lollaws - “nsau omm mil 5(1) ac pmwﬂu In-1 m -ma-vln may contain my such has n m. ﬂlpmvlnl 1.1! m. nmm r. .m. :71 m. at my own Anawtudan m wave In 1n IN LZ\GCD5vDED?NE13VMvdrnA -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm	4,441	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
TA-B52NCvC-10-11/2022	PLAINTIF 1. ) KHAIROL ANUAR BIN SULONG 2. ) NURUL FARHANA BINTI YAHYA DEFENDAN 1. ) AHMAD NAUFAL BIN SA'ARI 2. ) SA'ARI BIN ABDULLAH	1.Permohonan pihak plaintif untuk penghakiman terus ditolak. 2. Terdapat isu-isu untuk dibicarakan di dalam kes ini. 3. Saksi-saksi perlu dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan di Mahkamah.4. Oleh itu kes Plaintif bukan satu kes yg jelas bagi membolehkan penghakiman terus dimasukkan terhadap pihak Defendan-Defandan.	02/11/2023	Puan Norashima Bt Khalid	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=61df8e35-885d-4373-a447-39e94d82e866&Inline=true	TA-B52NCvC-10-11-2022(SCANl) 02/11/2023 09:45:30 TA-B52NCvC-10-11/2022 Kand. 34 S/N NY7fYV2Ic0OkRznpTYLoZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NY7fYV2Ic0OkRznpTYLoZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NY7fYV2Ic0OkRznpTYLoZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NY7fYV2Ic0OkRznpTYLoZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NY7fYV2Ic0OkRznpTYLoZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NY7fYV2Ic0OkRznpTYLoZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NY7fYV2Ic0OkRznpTYLoZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NY7fYV2Ic0OkRznpTYLoZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NY7fYV2Ic0OkRznpTYLoZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N NY7fYV2Ic0OkRznpTYLoZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m—a52m:vc—1u—11/2022. Kand. :4 12,11/222129-4: an mum MAHKAMAN §§svEN nl xunun gnzmssnuu nnuu usazm mnsnrsmnu DARQL IMA'N unuvsu smm N0 : YA-E52N§VC-10-1'/TANUN mg ANTARA 1. KHAIROL ANUAR am summs mo K/P: uwmmmszss) 2. NLIDIUL FARNANA sum unu (No K/P:un7au-1Msu; ...pumnr4=uuum= out 1. AHMAD NAUFAL am SNARI mo KIP: 900321-11-5053) (Pnmllik Tunggal P-mbagun nu a-mm Nlma can Guy: Fzlnaron Emma“) (No P-manaun ssm: znommnzs [rRmm+1s—1)> 2. SA‘ARl am ABDULLAH (N0 Kl .s4as2u1-sorry ...nEFEMDAM-DEFEDIDAN W & m In: Idalah rayuan yang dukemukakan om. pthek perayu P\aInM-plainlw yang max berpuas nan dengan kepumsan Mihkamah pada 3 Okmber 202: yang mnnalak parmohonln pihak mam plamlil unmk nanghlkmun Imus mamuul mm... m. Kaaﬂnh 1, Kaedzh-kaudah Mnhkamah zmz sepemmana Kandungan 12 aengan kos sehanyak RMZGDD on kepada pihzk Defendin-delendan. {2} News permuhonzn vlhik F\amIil—p\|aIrml upenmznz Kandungun I2 mamomn pennlah Mahkarnah rm saptm benkui 1 Daktatasn bahawa Plalnlw-plalnm selaku pemwk baldaﬂar znalan bevhak kepada tamh mg dvkanah sabagar us»: 1317 PT232EEP Dusunﬁaiav. Muklm Kuala N-nus, Kuam Na'u:,Tenngg:nuDaN7 lman sun. mun" kcsangnvya 2 Ftnghuman Delendan-dehndan an Ianah Iersehul adalan szlah nan mcruoskan sa\|u penwobonan ke atas man rmllk Flamm- phinﬁflersebm 3. Defsndandefondun hnmizklah dnlam tumor: :0 nan dinpldl (ankh pangnsmmm mambah‘ mngalmnn samua suuklur hmaln din mengnsongkan Ianah l.ersebu\| N Nv7wv2I«.aokRznpWLnZa um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm 4. Daiundumelendan memblyar KnrugLs_n dan ganu rug! peranlaraan mm: mm my aunanu men Pln1nm~p7zAn1il amm penghuman salan din nenoembahzn oiah pmak Defendan- deiendan m alas mnah \|ersabul pm: kgdur RM2,0I7n.W sahulan danuaaa mm. a Man 2022 snhmggl (mikn pengvvaluman ﬂan nlapts rlu samngga lankh Delendan-defendan mengalvhkan dan mengnsnngkan sImk\|u1 .1. was lanah tersehm 5. Dafemandefendan membayav ram»: ma kadar 5-/. mam» Iva alas pumllh av (4) dan (ankh wm Saman semngga larllm punghukmun pemm am muklamun. 6 Kosbagrpermahonan wudan: 7 Lam-Warn pennlahlrahel lam yang aunggap wan! ﬂan rum munanan olth Mihkamah Amara alasan hag? permohonan pmak Plawml-p\|aInI\|lnda¥m' 1 Melahn saw panama Juzl Bail benankh 5 Men 2022, PIaIrml- Plairmllelah memneti snhldang hnah yang oikenan sebanal us»: 1377 Pl'23Z96P Dusun Elszr, Mukwm Kuara News, Kuala Nerus. Temngganu namx lman danplda penaml Puln Lujan bum Ismail [pen1uaHe:sebu\|)aengIn hnrga Dalian sebanyak amuommou sahqa. ﬂ 5'“ “'£":”5"“‘§“"’W'"“" vamInsnr1g\nnHIyM1Ms m.m.w..mm W «M, . ..m IVW Ixeusedm 2 Hum dinpada lawman Plzlnlﬂ-p nm kg Iaplk unah lmsabul mnaapan hahnwa leruapalsebuah Iumahdan prerms permigazn yang dmunl am d’uz\anK3n oxen Demnaan Kedua (anpi mendapat keoenaran aanpaaa nmak nenml «menu: den iuwa Flamm- plamm ' 3. Plamnf-y nwmmnuxunum men pnnwil tersehui hahuwa halmu Mak parnah munyawakan am member! kabenaran axau memzsulu sebarang peqanusn dengaan Delendarmetendan bagl membenzrkan Danendarmeveman me«'n=ma stmkmv mmah dan man than memsnyz mongmmi Ianah lnrsebu\| Komsauna. nun yllly dlruiuk a. Non: permohnnan Kandungan 12. a mum iokonuan Kandungan 11. a Aﬁdsvn ;awapan Kindungan 13 a Amm baluan Kandungln vs. e AﬁdavI\|balisan Kandungan16 ¢. Aﬁdavll lambnhnn Kandunnan :7 N.m..m,. Y‘/l W [ill 9 Hnuahan bemllss Flamﬁl Kamlungnn 19 n mnahan bemms Def Kandmgan 20. . mnarnn berluhs Dalandnn Karvdungln 21 i Hmahan ba\asan mamm Kanﬂungln 23. mngkmn lalarbelakang m PIa.nu1»pIa.nurnannn msmbdl \|anIh yang alkenali sebagal usm m7 PTZSZSEF Dusun Basal, Mmm Kuila News. Kua\a News, rmnggann Darul lman danpada panama Puzn Lnan bum: Ismau (psniuzl cersanmy melalul saw Penanuan Jual Eel: bcnankh 5 Mev 2022 ﬂangan nary! am some on Slllruulnyua Plamul mendupuu llnnn (arsehm (zlah dmuduku clah Dafundln-defendan yang «um maniaranuan nemlagaan a. pramis yang dlhma an em Ianah lelsemn. Mas alasanl . pmak Flam-plamnnaxan menunmldanpada newsman- devenunn pmyuanan mllikan koiong Ianah Cevwbul kuplda mardna bersam: pomhaylvan ganu mg: uaranlaman mosm yam am an Nvvwvzimoknmptvlula "Nuns am n-nhnrwm be used m mm n. annmun mm: dun-mm wa .num v-mm nenghunian sahh am penmvobuhan Dulandanvéefendan a. Mu mm mm PIamIAl-plmnul lersebul Dnpllln Manklmlh [51 Setelnn menellln kmawcenas kausa sane‘ n ma kadua-duz whak. Mulknmuh mtmuluskan pgmmman pmak Ha-um-nnamm unluk penghaiumln terns Iemldap pmx Delenda»-deiandzn auouk dengan kos arebanyak RM3000 av. Alasan-alasan Mahkarmh: 1 Bardusarknn rm. km, Mnhkamnn berpsgldapal Imdakan plhlk planar-pl:-nmmmaan Delenuan-delenda-n um bukanlah saw kes yang lelas bag: membmehkan penqhaklman Ierus menmul Away. on Kaeda»-kaedah Mahkamah ﬁendah mmnukkan ke mar mhak Dnlendan-dafendan 2 Daupada taxman: yang dinyzlakan m dalzm Aﬁdavu-afvdawt pmak P:am«n—mam«n clan Delendan-delennan‘ lardaml M-Vin yang pm dwpmuskln um: ptmlngnllan salts:-saksu. Anllllnya adnlah peﬂlud um um. panama Pn Lm nmn Ismall yang dmyaukan uleh pmuk PIamM~plamuf kzanawa bellau (paws! e Imﬂkﬂm Y‘/l W lersehulj max psmah nlembanlvkun Dclendan-defnndzn mendudulu unah larsebm mlnukala pmak Delsndan-dsfendan pula menyalakan bahawa pequax Iavsehm mempunyai pengennuan bsrkenzzn kedudukan newsman-cam-«an an alas unah lersebu\| saw seunjumya yang peﬂu doanggi! adalah penama Mansor hm Alv yang dmyavakan men phak Dnfendarmeiecudnn sebagax pemlllk mu lanah Iunehm yuna man dkaleprkan kcpsnnngannyl Ilas mam lnrsebm uk:ha\| bnvllkunya /mm samua pembahagwan lanah umsenux Sekirinya sates:-uksw m. dapal membnvvkm klleringan semasa plrmcavann penuh um. bolan d\sm\ ba\aI clan keduu-dun pm P1aInm—p\mn(Il dan Defanann-dnfendan‘ Mahkamah skan mendaua\| gambaran secam nun jelas berlunlan >su yang Iimbul aw datam ﬁndakan W. a. Temanal Isu-M umuk a mrakan a. dllim kes mi mu. zmamnya ‘ Samaria plnlull u nu larnblﬂ vunu Puan Lush him: lsmau mempunyaw pengslahuan (znlang muuukan Delendan-dedemian ﬂu alas um wersebm semasz rnawd lanah uussbm kepada mhak FIamw.pmnm sw Nv7nrv2I«.0okRznpWLnZa «-um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm sw mnmzmmmpm u sa-um pcniuul l. in lug: msnganall Mansor um AH yang ddakwa ael. plhak Delsndan-defendall «neg.-ll pem herliﬁslal laruh lnrsebul din selemsnya rnemberlkavl kebenaran kevada Defenﬂandaierldan lmluk manauauklam marullzrlkan pemiagl n :1 ms lunar: ms-nul m sum. kebmaran yang allnrlnun aleh Mansor hm N1 ml kepada plhak Defendan-delendan Dig! mandudukl (shah lersehul selak Juli: 2003 adalah ssh slau subaliknya iv. Samzda knduwkun nalanaammmman dl Ila: Ianah yang dlhell oieh Plenum» plallﬂl adllan dlanglgan senagnl psncsrohan a v Ssmada Plainlllmlalnlﬂ bal_a_h merlunlul mesrre pm dznpad: plhak Defendarvdelendan Jalam llndakan lni. nzi mm Sum! ...m.mm be ﬂied M mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII .mm mm 4 Dengan aﬂnnya Isu-vsu -mm dlbmarlkln damn Hndakan . Mahkamln herpe«ﬂapa\| hahawa lunlulan pmak PIa\|n\|\Ha\|aHIlW bemadap pxhak perzyu narenaan-ueveman bukanleh sua\|u nndskan yang was yang dapal mewapruan pmak mainm.pvamm unmk memasukkan penghikiman mus nairma-p p m DailndIn- dalenﬂnn dalum llnﬂakan um Hanyz dalam ksskes yang Mas sens kelvadaan isu-xsu dan pzmbslaan be<mevI( unluk dmlcarukan, maka mnyn an: n salu m ylng sesuai unluk panghaklman mus m Mahkamah mm manquk kes nus sum. 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WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019	PLAINTIF 1. ) Ryan Koh Yue Loong @ Koh Teck Loong 2. ) Tan Guat Lian DEFENDAN 1. ) Koh Shing Yee 2. ) Cheong Ali SinPIHAK KETIGAKOH CHING KEW	1. The suits before this Court, pertains to competing claims by the parties (alleged survivors from three families) over the estate of the Kor Seng Kar @ Koh Hai Sew (the Deceased) who died intestate on 23.03.2019.2. After full trial, I find that the Plaintiffs and the intervener have failed to prove their case and it was dismissed with costs. 3 The Defendants counterclaim is allowed with costs and for damages to be assessed.	02/11/2023	YA Puan Hayatul Akmal binti Abdul Aziz	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a6b14f53-9e6c-415e-93c6-2af378611f53&Inline=true	WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: WA-22NCVC-649-09/2019 ANTARA 5 1. RYAN KOH YUE LOONG @ KOH TECK LOONG (NO. PASPORT SINGAPURA: K0979473N) 2. TAN GUAT LIAN (NO. PASPORT SINGAPURA: E6390244D) … PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF 10 DAN 1. KOH SHING YEE (NO. PASPORT SINGAPURA: E6275648K) 2. CHEONG LAI SIN 15 (NO. PASPORT SINGAPURA: E6274983L) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN DAN KOH CHING KEW (No. K/P: 640306-10-6365) … PENCELAH 20 Digabungkan dan dibicarakan dengan SAMAN PEMULA No.: WA-31NCVC-702-04/2019 Dalam perkara harta pusaka Koh 25 Seng Kar @ Koh Hai Sew (No. K/P: 430719-10-5509) (“Si Mati”) Dan Di dalam perkara Akta Probet dan Pentadbiran 1959 30 Dan Di dalam perkara Aturan 71 Kaedah 5 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 35 KOH SHING YEE (NO. PASPORT SINGAPURA: E6275648K) PEMOHON RYAN KOH YUE LOONG @ KOH TECK LOONG (NO. PASPORT SINGAPURA: K0979473N) PENGKAVEAT 40 02/11/2023 16:23:54 WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 Kand. 258 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 2 JUDGMENT PREFACE The suits before this Court, pertains to competing claims by the parties (alleged survivors from three families) over the estate of the Kor Seng Kar @ Koh Hai Sew (the Deceased) who died intestate on 23.03.2019. 45 INTRODUCTION [1] There are two suits to be heard and determined together, i.e.: (a) Civil Suit No: WA-22NCVC-649-09/2019 (Suit 649); and (b) Ex-parte Originating Summons No: WA-31NCVC-702-04/2019 (OS 50 702). Parties are as follows: 1.1 The First Plaintiff (P1) and Second Plaintiff (P2), [referred as the Ps, collectively] claim to be the biological son and the lawful widow from the Deceased’s 2nd marriage (customary) on 19.02.1988 that was 55 never registered in the Republic of Singapore. 1.2 The First Defendant (D1) and Second Defendant (D2) [referred as the Ds, collectively] claim to be the lawful biological daughter and the lawful widow from the Deceased's monogamous marriage registered under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952 on 04.05.1979 in Malaysia. 60 1.3 The Intervener claims to be the biological son from the Deceased's 1st purported customary marriage to Ho Ah Nya @ Ho Cheng Bak (Ho Ah Nya) in 1962-1963. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 3 [2] The parties filed two (2) separate suits, as follows: 65 2.1 Civil Suit No: WA-22NCVC-649-09/2019 (Suit 649) filed by the Ps on 03.09.2019, seeking a declaration that P1 is the issue of the Deceased and P2 as the lawful wife of the said Deceased and other prayers. 2.2 Ex-Parte Originating Summons No: WA-31NCVC-702-04/2019 (OS 702) filed by D1 on 16.04.2019 for a Letter of Administration (LA) of 70 the Deceased estate and P1 as the caveator. 2.3 Under a Consent Order dated 24.07.2020, OS 702 was consolidated and to be heard together with Suit 649. 2.4 Under the Court Order dated 28.04.2021, the Intervener was granted leave to intervene in the combined Suit of Writ 649 and OS 702. 75 2.5 For completeness, it is to be noted that the Defendants had in their counter claim referred to another suit Originating Summons No: WA- 31NCVC-901-05/2019 (OS 901) filed by the Ps seeking a Letter of Administration for the estate of the Deceased. However, this OS was later withdrawn by them on 06.09.2019 with costs of RM2,120.88 paid 80 to the Ds. Suit 649: 22NCVC-649-09/2019 [3] The Ps case: 3.1 Is anchored on the claim by P2 that she and the Deceased had allegedly 85 conducted a customary marriage ceremony on 19.02.1988 in the Republic of Singapore. However, it is to be noted that the evidence at the trial could not definitively evince the supposed marriage. That said, the purported S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 4 customary marriage was never registered under the Women’s Charter 90 of Singapore as legally required, rendering it invalid. 3.2 Since that purported customary marriage, it is claimed that they allegedly lived together in Singapore as husband and wife for over 30 years until the Deceased’s demise. Again, evidence at the trial places substantial doubt on this claim. 95 3.3 P1 claimed to be the child/biological son of the Deceased from that supposed customary marital union, though his birth certificate named the Deceased’s adopted brother (Koh Seng Lee/PW1) who worked for the Deceased, as his father. Evidence at the trial is merely speculative, with no definitive evidence 100 that P1 is the biological offspring of the Deceased. 3.4 In defending the position he’s taken and to facilitate his case in insisting that the Deceased was his biological father, one (1) month before he filed Suit 649, P1 took out a suit in the High Court of Kuala Lumpur (No. WA-22NCVC-543-08/2019 (Suit 543) against Koh Seng Lee (his uncle). 105 P1 secured an Order of the High Court on 10.12.2019 that: (a) Declared Koh Seng Lee was not his father, and P1 is not the child of Koh Seng Lee. (b) Koh Seng Lee is to deliver within fourteen days from the order a statutory declaration that he is not the father of P1. 110 (c) A mandatory injunction was granted to compel Koh Seng Lee to remove his name from the birth certificate of P1 within fourteen days of the Order, complying with all requirements of the Immigration & Checkpoints Authority of Singapore and (d) Koh Seng Lee is to take a DNA test. 115 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 5 3.5 The Court records show that Koh Seng Lee (PW1) did not appeal the findings of the High Court of Kuala Lumpur to the Court of Appeal as an aggrieved party: (i) I do take cognisance that throughout the course of the present trial, no replacement/rectified Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births 120 from the relevant Singaporean Authority was adduced by P1 since the Kuala Lumpur High Court Order was granted three years ago. The Original Birth Certificate with Koh Seng Lee as the father remains on official record in Singapore and herein in this proceeding. It has not been proven otherwise with persuasive evidence. 125 (ii) This is a matter within the domain of the Singaporean Government. The Order of the High Court of Kuala Lumpur on 10.12.2019 cannot be taken to alter that position since P1’s Certificate of Extract from Register of Births is an official document of the Government of the Republic of Singapore. This legal issue must necessarily involve the reciprocal 130 enforcement of foreign judgments (Kuala Lumpur High Court Order) in Singapore. (iii) There is no evidence that it was done. It cannot be that the High Court Order was merely taken for the purpose of the present proceeding and was never intended to be ultimately taken up with the Singaporean 135 Authority for whatever reason. If so, that can amount to an abuse of process, as it reflects poorly on the intent of P1 and Koh Seng Lee. If the findings in Suit 543 are to stand legal scrutiny. It must be ultimately addressed and determined by the relevant Singaporean Authority on the matter leading to the rectification of the Register of Births concerning 140 P1. (iv) There is no convincing evidence before me during the trial. (v) It begs the question: Why was this legal issue that is serious in nature in attempting to vary an official document issued by the Government of Singapore, not raised 145 in the High Court in the Republic of Singapore? (vi) Notwithstanding the said High Court of Kuala Lumpur Order dated 10.12.2019, as it stands, on the official record, Koh Seng Lee remains the father as named in the Certificate of Extract from Register of Births (No: S8908403B, Enclosure 95, p.440) of P1 issued by the Registrar of 150 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 6 Birth unless a new rectified Certificate of Extract from Register of Births by the relevant Singaporean Authority is produced to state expressly otherwise. (vii) Consequently, it is my considered view that even the self-serving Statutory Declaration by P1 on 18.04.2019 (enclosure 92, p.31) that the 155 Deceased was his biological father cannot alter the Certificate of Extract from Register of Births No: S8908403B by the Singaporean Government. To take a legal position that it has would be a grave error in judgment. In the circumstances, it has no probative value for the purpose. 160 3.6 In OS 702, P1, as the caveator in opposing D1’s application for the LA, he alleged that the Ds had acted oppressively and unfairly against the Ps by depriving their rights to be the administrators of the Deceased’s estate. 3.7 P1 and the Deceased had allegedly lived together as father and son for 165 more than 30 years (unproven at trial) since P1 was born until the Deceased’s demise on 23.03.2019. [4] Briefly, the Ps in Suit 649 claims in the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim as follows: 170 “a) Perintah deklarasi bahawa Seksyen 5 Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang (Perkahwinan dan Perceraian) 1976 yang melanjutkan bidang kuasanya di luar Malaysia adalah diluar bidang kuasanya dan adalah salah dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan ke atas Plaintif Kedua yang pada setiap masa material adalah diluar bidang kuasa; 175 b) Perintah deklarasi bahawa undang-undang yang menyekat, menghalang dan/atau melucutkan hak waris seseorang anak luar nikah atas alasan beliau adalah anak di luar nikah adalah menindas ("oppressive"), tidak adil ("injustice"), diskriminasi, salah, bercanggahan dan bertentangan dengan Artikel 8 Perlembagaan Malaysia, adalah undang-undang buruk ("bad law') dan 180 bertentangan dengan keadilan asasi ("against natural justice")·dan adalah terbatal dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan ("null and void''); c) Perintah deklarasi bahawa Akta Pembahagian 1958, terutamanya Seksyen 3 dan 6, tidak boleh ditafsirkan bagi maksud menyekat, menghalang dan/atau S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 7 melucutkan hak waris seseorang anak berdasarkan status undang-undang atau 185 klasifikasi/golongan anak tersebut dan tafsiran tersebut adalah menindas .("oppressive"), tidak adil ("injustice"), diskriminasi, salah, bercanggahan dan bertentangan dengan Artikel 8 Perlembagaan Malaysia, adalah undang-undang buruk ("bad law') dan bertentangan dengan keadilan asasi ("against natural justice") dan adalah terbatal dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan ("null and void''); 190 d) Perintah deklarasi bahawa perkahwinan antara Si Mati dan Defendan Ke.2 telahpun dibubarkan apabila Si Mati meninggal dunia pada 23.03.2019; e) Perintah deklarasi bahawa setelah perkahwinan antara Si Mati dan Defendan Ke-2 dibubarkan apabila Si Mati meninggal dunia pada 23.03.2019, Defendan- Defendan tiada hak untuk mewaris atau memohon surat kuasa wakil bagi harta 195 pusaka Si Mati; f) Perintah deklarasi bahawa perkahwinan di antara Si Mati, dan Plaintif Ke-2 adalah sah mengikut kepercayaan, adat istiadat dan/atau budaya mereka yang terpakai pada masa itu· g) Perintah deklarasi bahawa Plaintif Ke-2 adalah isteri sah kepada Si Mati; 200 h) Perintah Deklarasi bahawa Plaintif Pertama adalah anak (kandung lelaki dan/atau zuriat dan/atau keturunan dan/atau baka dan/atau "issue" kepada kepada Si Mati; i) Surat Kuasa Mentadbir bagi harta pusaka Koh Seng Kar @ Koh Hai Sew (No. K/P: 430719-10-5509) yang tersebut diberikan kepada Plaintif-Plaintif secara 205 bersama-sama; j) Plaintif-Plaintif diiktirafkan sebagai benefisiari dan waris kadim bagi harta pusaka Koh Seng Kar @ Koh·Hai Sew (No. KIP: 430719-10-5509), Si Mati yang dinamakan di atas, dan nama Plaintif-Plaintif dimasukkan dan dinyatakan sebagai benefisiari dalam senarai benefisiari bagi harta pusaka Koh Seng Kar @ 210 Koh Hai Sew (No. KIP: 430719- 10-5509), Si Mati; k) kos; dan. l) apa-apa relif dan perintah lain yang dianggap sesuai dan patut oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini.” 215 4.1 The witnesses for the plaintiffs are as follows: PW1 - Koh Seng Lee; PW2 - Tan Beng Kiow; PW3 - Cheng Chin Yong; PW4 - Tan Guat Lian (P2); and 220 PW5 - Ryan Koh Yue Loong @ Koh Teck Loong (P1). 4.2 The witnesses for the defendants are as follows: DW1 - Cheong Lai Sin (D2); DW2 - Koh Shing Yee (D1); DW3 - Teo Siok Khoong; and 225 DW4 - Poonam Lachman Michandani. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 8 4.3 The witnesses for the Intervener are as follows: IW1 - Ho Hock Keong; IW2 - Koh Ching Kew; IW3 - Koh Sing Puck; and 230 IW4 - Koi Ah Long. [5] After perusing and considering all the evidence, relevant cause papers and the respective written submissions/replies by the learned counsels on 07.09.2023, I find that: 235 5.1 The Ps and the intervener failed to discharge their burden to establish their case with compelling evidence. 5.2 Their claims were dismissed with costs: (i) as against P1-P2: global costs of RM100,000.00 to be paid to D1- D2 within 30 days; and 240 (ii) against the intervener RM15,000.00 to be paid to D1-D2 within 30 days. 5.3 The Ds counterclaim is allowed with costs and for damages to be assessed. Prayer (c) interest at 5%. However, prayers d, e, and f are disallowed (no appeal was filed by the Defendants). 245 5.4 D1’s application for the Grant of LA in OS 702 is allowed with costs. [6] Dissatisfied with the above decisions, the plaintiffs and the intervener are appealing against the said decisions. Since both suits were jointly tried and to avoid duplicity, I will only prepare a single judgment and my reasons 250 are as follows: BRIEF FACTS [7] The brief facts are as follows: 7.1 From the parties' cause papers, it has been discerned that: 255 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 9 (a) The Deceased, born in Pulau Ketam in 1943, was a Malaysian citizen and domiciled in Malaysia. The Intervener claims that sometime in 1962-1963, the Deceased and one Ho Ah Nya underwent a customary marriage in Pulau Ketam (1st Marriage). 260 This purported union resulted in the alleged birth of the Intervener on 06.03.1964 (Intervener’s Birth Certificate at PDF 5, pg.2, Enclosure 179). Sometime in 1968, the Deceased left Ho Ah Nya and Pulau Ketam and never returned. 265 (b) The Deceased married D2 in 1973 in a customary Chinese tea ceremony in Singapore (PDF 48-49, pp 459-460, Enclosure 95). Six years later, on 04.05.1979, this 2nd marriage was registered in Malaysia under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952 (The Marriage Certificate: PDF6, pg.417, Enclosure 95). D1 was later born on 270 27.07.1980 from this marital union (Birth certificate: PDF7, pg.418, Enclosure 95), with the Deceased confirmed as the father. (c) The Ps took the position that sometimes on 19.02.1988, the Deceased allegedly took a 3rd marriage when he and P2 275 underwent a purported customary tea ceremony in Singapore (Ps Statutory Declaration: PDF43-86, pp.34-78, Enclosure 92). On 08.05.1989, P1 was born, but his Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births indicates that Koh Seng Lee (the uncle) is his father (Certificate of Extract from Register of Births No: 280 S8908403B: PDF29, pg.440, Enclosure 95). S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 10 I take cognisance, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the Ds, that: (i) The deponents of the Statutory Declarations (witnesses listed by the Ps) to support the alleged 3rd customary marriage 285 between the Deceased and P2 were not called by the Ps. (ii) I also take cognisance that the witness who claimed to be the photographer who allegedly took photos of the purported 3rd marriage was also not called. (iii) The witnesses listed by the Ps, supposedly the interpreters 290 who prepared the translation and transcripts of the recordings in the CDs marked as IDP1-6, were also not called. In the circumstances, those issues above in this trial remained unproven for the Ps case. (d) The crux of the suit before the Court, therefore, pertains to 295 competing claims by these three families over the estate of the Deceased: (i) 1st purported customary marriage in Pulau Ketam Malaysia, 1962-1963, being pursued by the Intervener. (ii) 2nd customary marriage in Singapore in 1973, but registered 300 on 04.05.1979 under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952 in Malaysia being pursued by Ds, and (iii) 3rd purported customary marriage in Singapore, 19.02.1988, that was not registered under the Women's Charter of Singapore being pursued by the Ps. 305 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 11 7.2 During the course of the proceeding, the Federal Court ruled in Tan Kah Fatt & Anor on the position of an illegitimate issue in the estate of the deceased’s father. I had then instructed parties to examine how the Federal Court ruling in Tan Kah Fatt & Anor v Tan Ying [2023] 2 MLJ 583, FC could impact the outcome of the present proceeding. In 310 that case, the FC observed: (i) That an illegitimate issue is entitled to inherit from the deceased parent’s estate under sections 3 and 6 of the Distribution Act 1958. (ii) It further observed that accepting the testimonies of the illegitimate issue’s mother and paternal grandparents that the mother had a reasonable belief 315 (at the time of the solemnisation of the marriage) that the marriage was valid, the issue was a legitimate child who was entitled to inherit under her deceased father’s estate. Applying s.75 LRA 1976. (iii) The FC overruled the HC and CA’s determination that the Child was illegitimate because her parents’ Chinese customary marriage was not a 320 valid marriage under the LRA 1976 and, as such, was not entitled to inherit under sections 3 and 6 of the Distribution Act 1958. (iv) The FC opined that the “issue” concerning the deceased did not depend on the legitimacy of the issue or the descendant of the deceased. The Court adopted the purposive approach to interpretation over a literal interpretation 325 of the Distribution Act 1958. (v) It reasoned that the word ‘includes’ in the definition of ‘issue’ suggests an enlarging or non-exhaustive definition and is intended to “expand or enlarge the category of persons who may succeed or inherit, consonant with the purpose” of the DA 1958. In contrast, the more definitive or comprehensive 330 word ‘means’ is used in the definition of ‘child’. The Court concluded from its survey of the respective dictionary definitions of ‘issue’ in relation to the deceased that the term ‘issue’ “suggests descendants by blood lineage, not dependent on the matter of legitimacy of the descendant”. The DA 1958 does not, whether expressly or by implication, state that only legitimate children 335 may inherit in the case of intestacy. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 12 7.3 The position taken by the learned counsels of the parties herein on Tan Kah Fatt & Anor, FC, on the outcome of this present proceeding are as follows: 340 (a) The Ps: (i) The learned counsel argued that the FC had clarified the inheritance rights of children born in void marriages. It will benefit many children of void marriages. It would protect children’s rights and not be discriminated against simply because their parents were not legally 345 married. (ii) It is a positive development for the law of succession in Malaysia. (iii) The FC ruling in Tan Kah Fatt & Anor is binding on this Court since the Ps case is closely like it. Stare decisis applies. 350 (b) The Intervener: (i) As with the position the Ps took, the learned counsel for the Intervener submitted that stare decisis applies to this Court. (c) The Ds: 355 (i) The learned counsel for the Ds took the legal position and strongly argued that Tan Kah Fatt & Anor does not apply to the facts of the present case, whose views provided some valuable food for thought and interesting insights from the legal perspective of a senior legal practitioner in family matters, and its continuing development 360 notwithstanding the binding effect of the FC ruling. (ii) The learned counsel, in distinguishing facts, in a nutshell, respectfully argued that: (a) The per-incuriam decision by the FC goes against legislation precisely placed to deal with the issue of succession rights of 365 illegitimate children. (b) There is no ambiguity in Sections 3 and 6 of the Distribution Act 1958. The word "issue" in Section 6 must be read together with Section 3 of the Distribution Act provides: S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 13 "child" means a legitimate child, and where the deceased is 370 permitted by his personal law, a plurality of wives includes a child by any of such wives but does not include an adopted child other than a child adopted under the provisions of the Adoption Act 1952 [Act 257]. "Issue" includes children and the descendants of deceased 375 children. She cited Re Tan Cheng Siong Deed; Charles Clement Dunman v Tan Seng Hwee; Tan Chin Tuan [1937] 1 MLJ 87, per McElwain CJ said that there is no doubt that the ordinary 380 meaning of "child" is a person born by a woman to her lawful husband. A bastard, annulus filius, is not a son….as said by Arden M.R. in Godfrey v Davis 6 Ves Jun 43 noted that "Such persons only could be intended, who could entitle themselves as children by the strict rule of law; and no illegitimate child can claim 385 under such a description unless particularly pointed out by the testator." (c) The term “issue”, as it is, already had a more comprehensive application than “children”. It includes all lineal descendants of the legitimate child(ren), i.e., children, grandchildren, and great-390 grandchildren. Because it does not include illegitimate children, it would not be rendered ‘otiose and redundant’. (d) The Distribution Act 1958 contemplates a situation where the deceased and the person they leave behind were married. The references to "child," "children", and "issue" must necessarily refer 395 to the legitimate daughter or son of that marriage and their descendants. The context would militate against reading the word "issue" to include an illegitimate child of the deceased with another woman or man to whom the deceased was never married. Under common law, reference in a statute to "child" or "children" would 400 prima facie mean a legitimate child or legitimate children: see Galloway v Galloway [1956] AC 299 at 316 (per Lord Oaksey), at 318 (per Lord Radcliffe and at 323 (per Lord Tucker). (e) The learned counsel argued further that the position taken by the FC in Tan Kah Fatt on the interpretation of “issue” and/or “children” 405 would render redundant other legislation in the country. When a child is illegitimate, its mother would be the sole guardian to the exclusion of the father. Section 11 of the Legitimacy Act 1961 allowed an illegitimate child to inherit from the mother's estate, but S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 14 only if the mother did not have other legitimate children. Section 6 410 of the Legitimacy Act 1961 was to legitimise a person so that they may inherit under their parents’ estate. In this premise, if an illegitimate child is permitted to inherit without being legitimised, section 6 would be redundant. (f) Section 13 of the Births and Death Registration Act 1957 only 415 permits a father to be named on an illegitimate child’s certificate if it is at the joint request of the mother. (g) Section 1 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 distinguished between guardians of legitimate and illegitimate children. In this case, the former is the father, and the latter is the mother. 420 (h) To date, illegitimate children cannot be conferred citizenship by their father because of this: CTEB & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 4 MLJ 237, FC. (i) The learned counsel also argued that in the context of the inter vivo transfer of immovable properties from a parent to a child, the 425 exemption of stamp duty under the Stamp Duty (Exemption)(No.3) order 2023 might only benefit legitimate children, stepchildren, or legally adopted children. Notably, illegitimate children are excluded from such exemption of stamp duty. (j) It was further argued that Article 8 of the Federal Constitution of 430 Malaysia deals with equality, which was amended to prohibit discrimination. It has no application concerning personal law. Article 8(5)(a) clarifies that the Article does not invalidate or prohibit any provision regulating personal law. (k) By Article 8(5)(a), any provisions regulating personal law, including 435 questions of marriage, divorce, and succession, even if discriminatory, are not invalidated or prohibited. As the issues of marriage and succession fall within areas of personal law, Article 8 has no part to play in the matter. Article 8(2) of the Federal Constitution further permits discrimination against non-440 citizens. Thus, there is no breach of any of the Ps' constitutional rights as alleged. (l) In children born out of wedlock, the father is under a limited legal duty to an illegitimate child. He must only provide maintenance by Section 3 of the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950. 445 (m) The learned counsel made her argument that applications by illegitimate children competing with the claims of legitimate children, whether under a will or intestacy, unnecessarily burdens the courts and causes profound injustice to the legal expectations of the legal wife and legitimate offspring by rendering the 450 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 15 succession law uncertain, particularly if they may not know any other illegitimate dependants who might still make succession claims. (n) In Singapore, the default position is still that illegitimate children are not entitled to inherit in respect of their parent's estate. 455 However, the High Court and Court of Appeal have called upon Parliament to consider changes to be made to the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children: AAG v Estate of AAH [201O] 1 SLR 769 at [41]-[43]. (o) The learned counsel went further to point out that in other 460 jurisdictions, the entitlement of illegitimate children to inherit has explicitly been legislated for, like in the United Kingdom (UK) via the Family Law Reform Act 1987, Hong Kong via the Intestates' Estates Ordinance (IEO). It was also noted that the UK and Hong Kong laws especially provide that the rights 465 under the intestacy of a person dying before the relevant sections come into force remain unaffected. (p) It was also argued that some of our laws have already been amended. Section 75 of the LRA 1976 recognises an otherwise illegitimate child to be legitimate if the parents were under a 470 reasonable belief that their marriage was valid. Its wording is like Section 1 of the UK's Legitimacy Act 1976. (q) Tan Kah Fatt & Anor, in paragraphs [97] to [100], considered and applied Section 75(2) to find the second appellant to be a legitimate child and entitled to inherit. This was not the case in 475 the present proceeding. (r) Section 18 (2A) UK Family Law Reform Act 1987 even makes special provisions for children born of surrogacy and artificial insemination, who would otherwise be entitled to inherit from their biological parents' estates. However, this was not considered in 480 Tan Kah Fatt (supra). As it stands now, even a child born from a surrogacy arrangement or sperm/egg donors will have a right to inherit from their unknowing / unsuspecting parents. (s) In her closing arguments, the learned counsel emphasised that the separation of powers should be fortified. The Court's powers are 485 confined to interpreting legislative and constitutional provisions. It ought not to encroach into legislative powers within the strict purview of Parliament. Though Tan Kah Fatt & Anor is a Federal Court decision, it may be revisited in future cases with similar facts as the plethora of authorities had shown: PP v Kok Wah Kuan 490 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 16 [2008] 1 MLJ 1, FC; Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd v. Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance (Malaysia) Bhd [2008] 6 CLJ 1, FC. (t) The learned counsel asks that the Ps and the Intervener’s claim of inheritance under the deceased’s estate in Suit 649 ought to be dismissed, and D1’s application for the LA in OS 702 is allowed. 495 THE PLAINTIFFS (Ps) CASE [8] I observed the Ps' arguments in canvassing and ventilating for their position in Suit 649 and OS 702 as follows: 8.1 It is the position of P1 that the Deceased and P2 married customarily 500 on 19.02.1998 and have cohabited as husband and wife for more than thirty years since then in the Republic of Singapore. P1 was born a year after the marriage on 05.03.1989 (Certificate of Extract from Register of Births: L95, pg.440). P1 claims that the Ds has denied his right to be the administrator of the Deceased's estate. The Ps seek an 505 order from the Court to place and cement their position in the Deceased's estate. However, as I have observed and addressed in paragraph 3.4 hereof: (a) The Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births stated that Koh Seng Lee (PW1) is the father of P1. Notwithstanding the 510 10.12.2019 High Court of Kuala Lumpur Order finding that Koh Seng Lee is not the father, nothing has been done by either P1 or Koh Seng Lee to rectify the Singaporean Certificate of Extract from Register of Births or to bring up this matter with the relevant Singaporean Authority. There is no evidence from either party that 515 it had been done. (b) For all intent and purpose, Koh Seng Lee remains on Singapore's official record as the father of P1. It is my view that fact cannot be S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 17 ignored. That the said Koh Seng Lee has been complicit in the Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births of P1 debacle for 520 the past thirty-plus years, and necessarily with the knowledge of P2 as the mother of P1, gives me grounds for concern about the veracity of their evidence. (c) The High Court Order of 10.12.2019 was explicit in ordering (mandatory injunction) that Koh Seng Lee (PW1) must remove his 525 name from the Register of Births in Singapore within fourteen days from the date of that Order, and P1 has done nothing about it since more than three years ago. (d) In his evidence, P1 said that he did not know of the contents of his Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births, that he doesn’t 530 know Kho Seng Lee was named as his father. I find the evidence too far-fetched to be believed. The Certificate of Birth is an essential, primary document you must use as you grow up in Singapore or Malaysia for education, work, etc. (e) Claiming complete ignorance of Koh Seng Lee being the named 535 father for over thirty years in the birth certificate, premised on the facts before me, is just so improbable. This outright denial does not assist, nor does it augur well for the credibility of P1. (f) This does not augur well for their credibility, nor does it instil confidence in the truth of their evidence before me. In the 540 circumstances, I read the facts against P1 and Koh Seng Lee (PW1), who appear to be acting in concert. I will regard the official document of the Government of Singapore (the Certificate of Extract from Register of Births No: S8908403B, in Enclosure 95, p.440) as still valid and subsisting unless official evidence from the 545 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 18 Singaporean Authority to the contrary is produced. (g) It is my considered judgment that the Kuala Lumpur High Court order of 10.12.2019, though valid and enforceable in Malaysia, unless it is set aside, varied, or stayed, it cannot, however, invalidate an official governmental document of a foreign 550 sovereign nation. (h) Save for the Intervener; all other parties (the Ps and the Ds) are Singaporean nationals in this proceeding. (i) As for the customary marriage of P2 to the Deceased, it is irrefutable at the trial that the said union was never registered 555 under the Singaporean Women’s Charter as required by the law in the Republic of Singapore. DW4: Ms Poonam Mirchandani (an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore), an expert from Singapore, gave evidence that the purported customary union of P2 and the Deceased is void since it was never 560 registered under the Women’s Charter. I find this evidence to be relevant to this proceeding and admit the evidence of the said expert. I see no basis for the objection by the Ps to exclude it. In the circumstances, irrespective of the duration (alleged over thirty years) that the Deceased cohabited with P2 in the customary 565 union, it was still not sanctioned by the law in Singapore for failure to register. (j) With the unregistered status of the purported customary marriage of P2 to the Deceased confirmed, any child born from such a marriage in the circumstances would not be legitimate in 570 Singapore, just as it is in Malaysia under section 22(4) LRA where it says expressly that every marriage purported to be solemnised S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 19 in Malaysia shall be void unless a certificate for marriage or a license has been issued by the Registrar or Chief Minister or a statutory declaration under sub-section (3) has been delivered to 575 the Registrar or Assistant registrar, as the case may be. (k) However, it must be pointed out that, illegitimate or not, when there is doubt about the child's lineage, it would be required to be satisfactorily proven that the child is the biological offspring of the Deceased. This doubt is created by the official Singaporean 580 Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births, which clearly says that Koh Seng Lee (PW1) is the father of P1. To date, there is no other official document from the Singaporean Authorities to state otherwise as it involves their national. The Kuala Lumpur High Court order of 10.12.2019 cannot officially or unofficially alter that 585 official Singaporean position. If that biological connection (the illegitimate biological offspring of the Deceased) cannot be conclusively established, Tan Kah Fatt, FC (supra) would not apply. (l) As I have addressed the position of the Intervener in this 590 proceeding, there is no other definitive evidence to establish P1 as a lineal descendant (biological offspring) of the Deceased than a relationship DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) report that would constitute compelling evidence for genetic or hereditary information (paternity/ancestry testing): 595 (i) But there is none in this proceeding. (ii) Talking about or being willing to do is not sufficient. (iii) It is the Ps suit, and P1 must manage how best to do it. The Court will not conduct his case for him. (iv) As the cumulative evidence stands in this proceeding, I am in doubt 600 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 20 as to the lineage of P1 to the Deceased. Irrespective of how much time the Deceased spends with P1 (that remains unproven), as alleged, it is inconsequential if the biological link cannot be established for succession purposes. (v) What the Ps have offered thus far is fundamentally speculative 605 evidence at best in the hope that it is sufficient to tilt the scale of evidence. Well, legally, it doesn’t for this proceeding. (vi) I agree with the learned counsel for the Ds that the burden lies on the Ps to prove their assertion that P1 is the biological offspring of the Deceased (s.101 Evidence Act 1950). 610 (vii) The Ps could have applied for a Court Order to compel the DNA test by the parties, but that was not done. (viii) Adverse inference against the Ds is unjustified in the circumstances. (ix) The burden of proof lies on the Ps throughout the proceedings. 615 (m) That said, there is also no evidence that the Deceased had lawfully adopted P1 to protect the interest of P1 considering the status of an unregistered customary marriage in Singapore, there is no conclusive evidence save for bare assertions of any purported gifts of property (movable or immovable) before death to P1 by the 620 Deceased, and there is no convincing evidence to show that the Deceased expressly brought P1 into his life and his work, as the Deceased did with D1 and D2. It is sad to say, but those are the facts which cannot be denied. 625 8.2 During the trial, I directed the parties to submit on the admissibility of the audio-video recording (IDP1-IDP6) tendered by P1 to support his case. P1 argued: (i) Cited s.3 Evidence Act 1950 that the audio-video recording constitutes a document under the EA 1950. Therefore, s.90A EA 630 applies to IDP1-IDP6, where a certificate under s.90A had been S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 21 submitted as Exhibit P8, enclosure 202. Tan Guat Lian (P2) was called to testify as she did the recording using her mobile phone. (ii) The phone was produced in Court for inspection but could not be powered on. The original contents have been lost for examination. 635 The Ps argued that IDP1-IDP6 should nevertheless be admitted as secondary evidence under s.65(1)(c) EA 1950. (iii) Therefore, the objections the Ds raised should be denied. (iv) The transcripts for the video recordings in IDP1-IDP6 were agreed to be placed in Part B Documents, which would still require its 640 contents to be proven. IDP1-IDP6 are recordings purportedly of P1 and the Deceased. (v) Though the video recordings were referred to during the trial, it has not been admitted as exhibits for this proceeding. The Ps pray that IDP1-IDP6 be admitted. 645 I observed: (a) The video recordings were edited into IDP1-6 segments when it was evident that it was a continuous recording. The Ds learned counsel pointed out that the recording was for a continuous recording on the same day, while IDP5 appears to have been 650 taken on a different day. The Ps have yet to offer a plausible explanation for why the recordings were edited into five segments. The Ds’ counsel further pointed out that IDP1-6 were placed in Part C Documents in 2020, which require proof of both source and content. But on 09.03.2023, on the 7th day of the trial, the Ps 655 informed the Court that the device could no longer be powered on. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 22 (b) The learned counsel for the Ds argued that notwithstanding the s.90A certificate by P2, the edited recordings should not be admitted because they do not provide complete, accurate or reliable evidence. She cited: Dato Kanalingam a/l Vellupillai v 660 Majlis Peguam Malaysia [2022] 3 MLJ 699, CA said that it is authentic as in a precise reproduction of the event and the relevant contents have not been tampered with unless the appellant is saying that the part not produced would exonerate him. In Mohd Ali Jaafar v PP [1998] 4 CLJ SUPP 208, HC, it 665 was noted that the tapes' integrity, accuracy, and continuity were relevant and admissible. There must be no tampering. In Lim Peng Hock & Anor v Chuah Peng San & Anor [2021] 1 LNS 119, CA, it was ruled that the Court cannot take it lightly as to digital evidence. It is very fragile and could be easily altered. 670 Therefore, the issue of authenticity and reliability are essential for digital evidence. The plaintiffs had not proved the issue of non- tempering. (c) The learned counsel of the Ds further drew the Court’s attention to the fact that there is no proof adduced to confirm the identity of 675 the voice recorded in IDP1-6 was that of the Deceased. Citing Lim Peng Hock & Anor (supra), the law requires the voice of the speaker to be duly identified, and since the 1st defendant disputes, strict proof is necessary to determine the identity of the speaker (PP v Zul Hassan & Anor [2013] 7 CLJ 141). It was said in Mohd 680 Ali Jaafar (supra) that proof of identity of the conversation is the most crucial element to be established when introducing evidence S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 23 of a tape recording. Therefore, it was argued that IDP1-IDP6 should not be admitted as exhibits. (d) Considering the arguments and respective positions taken by the 685 parties, I believe the integrity of the IDP1-IDP6 is suspect. Without the original continuous recording, it would be impossible to compare and ascertain its authenticity and degree of tempering, if any. When the continuous recording has been cut/edited into six parts, it would have involved some element of editing, no matter 690 how you argue it. Without editing works, it cannot be segmented into six pieces. As the Court of Appeal in Lim Peng Hock (supra) said, the Court must exercise caution when dealing with digital evidence as it is susceptible and prone to digital alteration. I observed that with today's sophisticated equipment and 695 technology, once the audio-video recordings are digitised, they can be edited and altered to angle support to any proposed issue or purpose. (e) Therefore, it is my considered judgment that IDP1-IDP6 documents in Part C should not be admitted as exhibits in this 700 proceeding. Their integrity is suspect without the original recording to confirm their contents and the part that had been excluded, if at all. The duty to preserve the integrity of the said evidence falls squarely on the Ps. In the circumstances, the Ps failed to observe that duty if IDP1-6 is fundamental to their case. 705 There is no one to be faulted but the Ps themselves. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 24 8.3 P2 submitted laboriously on the customary wedding of P2 and the Deceased, as shown in the various pictures in enclosure 93, and many repetitive pages in their arguments. (a) I find no evidence to definitively support the alleged customary 710 marriage of P2 and the Deceased. What has been produced is highly speculative evidence suggesting an alleged customary wedding. (b) Even if the alleged customary wedding took place, it does not change the fact that it was not registered under the Women’s 715 Charter 1961 as required by the law in Singapore, rendering it void. Since it had been rendered invalid, P2 would not derive any rights under it, and there is no arguing out of it. That is the law as it stands. Legislation supersedes customs and practises save where it is excepted. 720 (c) The legal consequences of that incompliance have been stated in the preceding paragraph. It is my observation that Ps submission places so much emphasis and time on the peripherals and unsupported suppositions rather than on the fundamental root issue that would ultimately determine the entitlement of the Ps in 725 this suit. (d) From the facts before me, it is irrefutable that: (i) The Deceased took a 2nd customary marriage to D2 in 1973 in Singapore. Six years later, in 1979, they registered the marriage in Malaysia under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952 (CMO). 730 (ii) Section 4(1) CMO disallows a subsequent marriage to be contracted while the subsisting marriage subsists. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 25 (iii) A subsequent marriage in default of that prohibition, the women and any issue from that prohibited union shall not have any succession rights of the man if he dies intestate. 735 (iv) LRA 1976, which superseded the CMO under section 5(1), which also extended such prohibition as in s.4 of CMO. Section 6 (1) and (2) void such marriages in contravention of the prohibition in s.5, and no rights of succession or inheritance shall be granted to the women or any issue from such a prohibited union. 740 (v) In 1978, the Deceased purportedly took a 3rd customary marriage with P2 in Singapore but did not register the said marriage under the Women’s Charter in Singapore. SEDW4: Ms Poonam Mirchandani, an expert from Singapore, gave evidence that the purported customary union of P2 and the Deceased is void since it was never registered 745 under the Women’s Charter. Evidently, P2 cannot claim any inheritance right in the Deceased's estate by law. 8.4 The P1 claimed to have: (i) The original title deed of the property held under HS(D) No. 13953, PT No. 750 MLO 8301, Mukim Plentong, Daerah Johor Baru, Negeri Johor; (pg 371 – 375 of Enclosure 94). (ii) The property held under Geran Hakmilik No. 92354, Lot No. Lot 1544, Mukim Tebrau, Daerah Johor Bahru, Negeri Johor (pg 356-359 of Enclosure 94) (under WSI). 755 (iii) The property held under Title No. 6994, Presentation No. 168055, Lot No.1545, Mukim Tebrau, Daerah Johor Bahru, Negeri Johor (pg 385-387 of Enclosure 94) (under WSI). (iv) The property held under Title No. 6995, Presentation No. 168056, Lot No. 1546, Mukim Tebrau, Daerah Johor Bahru, Negeri Johor (pg 388-390 of 760 Enclosure 94) (under WSI. (v) The original Share Certificates of the 500,001 unit of shares in the company named WSI Sdn Bhd; (pg 392, 394 of Enclosure 94), and (vi) The original Share Certificates of the 10,000 units of shares in the company named Herald Heights Sdn Bhd (pg 395 of Enclosure 94). 765 He claimed that the Deceased handed them over to him during his lifetime. Other than that, and bare assertions, no cogent evidence is S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 26 adduced that it was intended as a gift (inter vivos) to him. The Ps referred to the video recordings with the transcripts that had been 770 disallowed. It was also argued that the Ds never challenged his evidence on the properties being gifted to him, and therefore, they ought to be taken out or excluded from the list of the Deceased assets. My attention has been drawn to the fact: (a) The assets in paragraphs (ii), (iii), (iv) and (vi) above were never 775 pleaded by the Ps (O.18. r.12.RC 2012). (b) In the circumstances, I believe these four assets are to be excluded from the Ps claim on gifts inter-vivos. (c) Save for self-serving unsupported statements by the Ps, I find no compelling or persuasive evidence to support the Ps' claim that the 780 Deceased had intended the assets pleaded by the Ps as gifts inter- vivos. 8.5 The Ps cited section 34 LRA 1976, that says nothing in the Act, or the rules made thereunder shall be construed to render valid or invalid any 785 marriage which otherwise is invalid or invalid merely because it has been or is not registered. I observed: (a) This argument is wholly misplaced and unnecessary since LRA is applicable in Malaysia. The purported customary marriage that is the subject matter of this proceeding is in the Republic of 790 Singapore, where the Singapore Women’s Charter applies for marriages solemnised and registered there. Evidence has been produced that if at all it took place (the 3rd customary wedding), it is void for failure to register. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 27 (b) It would be too farfetched for the Ps to suggest or imply that the 795 provisions of the LRA apply in the Republic of Singapore. If it is rendered invalid for legal incompliance in Singapore, it could not be validated by the LRA provision in Malaysia under the LRA. (c) There is no evidence that this 3rd customary marriage by the Deceased with P2 was intended to be registered in Malaysia as 800 the Deceased did with the customary marriage with D2. (d) Because of the registration of the 2nd marriage to D2 under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952 on 04.05.1979 (L.95, pg.417), the Deceased would not be able to lawfully take a 3rd marriage as he did with P2 as the CMO 1952 expressly prohibits it. 805 (e) The purported 3rd marriage would not receive any legal recognition while the 2nd marriage subsists to ensure monogamy in civil marriages. 8.6 On the issue of OS 901 that had been withdrawn, an issue in the counterclaim by the Ds, the Ps argued that it is no longer a relevant 810 issue to be considered since it is no longer before the parties after it was withdrawn by the Ps with cost already paid to the Ds. Therefore, it should no longer be an issue with the Ds. OS 901 and Suit 649 were not taken for any collateral purpose as alleged by the Ds to constitute an abuse of process. Any purported technical incompliance should not 815 be taken to impair the proceedings. The Ps had no choice but to file OS 901 after the Defendants had excluded the Ps from claiming their right to administer and inherit the Deceased’s estate by filing the ex-parte OS 702. The sole purpose of S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 28 filing OS 901 was to include both the Ps and the Defendants (without 820 having the Intervener, whose existence at the material time was not within the knowledge of the Plaintiffs) to ensure that all relevant parties would be heard. The Plaintiffs also filed applications to consolidate and transfer OS 702 and OS 901 to expedite the process. These applications were later withdrawn with OS 901 by the Plaintiffs 825 on 06.09.2019 due to the filing of the current suit 649 on 03.09.2019. The Ds have failed to prove what damage they have suffered because of it to justify their claim for damages as a result thereof. 8.7 On the issue of the Intervener, the Ps took the position that it is incumbent on the Intervener to prove that he was the legitimate son of 830 the Deceased. Shanmugam v Pappah [1994] 1MLJ 144, HC held that the plaintiff had the burden of establishing that he was the legitimate son of the deceased to establish his right to succeed to the estate of the deceased who died intestate, the plaintiff must not only prove that he was the son of the deceased but must, because of the 835 Distribution Act 1958, also prove that he was the legitimate son of the deceased. However, this issue is now rendered academic due to the ruling in Tan Kah Fatt, FC (supra). 8.8 The Ps asks: (i) A declaration that s.5 LRA (Disability to contract marriages 840 otherwise than under the Act) does not apply to P2, a Singaporean and has never been within the local jurisdiction of this Court. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 29 (ii) An Order declaring any law restricting and preventing an illegitimate child from claiming contradicts Article 8 of the Federal Constitution. 845 (iii) An Order declaring s.3 and 6 of the Distribution Act cannot be construed to deprive a child of their entitlement based on their legal status. (iv) An Order declaring the marriage by the Deceased to D2 is null and void. The Ds has no right to claim over the estate of the 850 Deceased. D1 is not the lawful child of the Deceased. (v) The customary marriage between P2 and the Deceased is valid, and P1 is the lawful heir of the Deceased. The Ps will be granted the Letter of Administration to administer the Deceased's estate. (vi) An Order declaring that the Deceased had given all his shares, 855 interest, and title in WSI Sdn Bhd, Isotank Container Services Sdn Bhd, and the property held under the deed title H.S.(D) No. 13953, PT No. MLO 8301, Mukim Plentong, Daerah Johor Baru, Negeri Johor, to the Plaintiffs as gifts inter vivos, and an Order giving effect for the ownership in those assets to vest in the Ps. 860 In the premise, the Ps pray for order in terms of their prayers and cost. THE DEFENDANT (Ds) CASE [9] I observed the Ds' arguments in canvassing and ventilating for their position in Suit 649 and OS 702 as follows: 865 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 30 9.1 It was submitted that: (a) It is the Ds contentions that: (i) the Deceased had lived with them at all material times. Sometime in 1987, they resided at No.52 Bayshore Road, 870 Ruby Tower# 06-01, Bayshore Park, Singapore 469978. (ii) But from 2009 until his passing, they lived at No. 53, Jalan Awan Cina, Taman Yarl, 58200 Kuala Lumpur, while D1 continued to reside at the Bayshore Residence in Singapore. 875 (iii) On 23.03.2019, the Deceased passed away at the Taman Yarl Residence in Kuala Lumpur (Death Certificate: PDF4, pg.1, Enclosure 91). (b) During his lifetime, the Deceased: (i) Named D2 as his wife in his tax returns/statements (Tax 880 Statement: PDF12-23, pp.423-43, Enclosure 95). (ii) His official documents were sent to the Bayshore residence in Singapore or the Taman Yarl residence in Kuala Lumpur. (iii) D2 was named his sole beneficiary in his Great Eastern Insurance Policy (PDF40-41, pp.451-452, Enclosure 95). 885 9.2 In opposing Suit 649 by the Ps, the Ds argued that: (a) The inheritance rights are governed under s.6 of the Distribution Act 1958. (b) The late Ho Ah Nya of the purported 1st customary marriage 890 (1968) in Malaysia to the deceased would be disentitled to make any claim on his estate by predeceasing the Deceased. In the S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 31 circumstances, she would not be entitled to claim even if her purported customary marriage was valid at the time. (c) As for D2, the lawfully registered spouse in the Deceased’s 2nd 895 customary marriage (1973 in the Republic of Singapore) but subsequently, six years later, registered it under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952 (CMO) in Malaysia on 04.05.1979 (L.95, pg.417). (d) Under section 4(1) CMO, the Deceased could not take a subsequent marriage lawfully for so long as the 2nd marriage 900 subsists. S.4(1) says that a male person married by the provisions of this Ordinance shall be incapable of contracting a valid marriage with any third person, whether as a principal or secondary marriage. (e) The learned counsel also drew my attention to s.5(1) CMO, which 905 makes clear the inheritance position of the Ps in this suit: "(1) If any male person lawfully married under this Ordinance shall thereafter during the continuance of such marriage contract a union with a woman which but for such marriage would confer rights of succession or inheritance upon such woman or upon the issue of such union, no 910 issue of such union shall be legitimate or have any right of inheritance in or succession to the estate of such male person, and no such woman shall have any right by reason of the death intestate of such male person". (f) Subsequently, the LRA 1976 came into force on 01.03.1982. 915 (g) The 3rd customary marriage to P2 was on 18.02.1988 in Singapore, six years after the LRA came into force, which would have certainly rendered it void (s.5(1) LRA 1976). Section 5(1) says: 920 "(1) Every person who on the appointed date is lawfully married under any law, religion, custom or usage to one or more spouses shall be S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 32 incapable, during the continuance of such marriage or marriages, of contracting a valid marriage under any law, religion, custom or usage with any other person. Whether the first-mentioned marriage or the 925 second-mentioned marriage is contracted within Malaysia or outside Malaysia. Section 6(1) and (2) LRA says: (1) Every marriage contracted in contravention of section 5 shall be void. (2) If any male person lawfully married under any law, religion, custom, or 930 usage shall during the continuance of such marriage contract another union with any woman, such woman shall have no right of succession or inheritance on the death intestate of such male person. (h) Evidently, P2 cannot claim any inheritance right in the Deceased's estate by law. 935 9.3 Of the three, P1, the Intervener and D1, only D1, the legitimate child of the Deceased from a lawfully registered 2nd customary marriage, is entitled to a claim in the Deceased's estate. The Deceased is named the father in her Birth Certificate (PDF7, pg.418, L.95). 940 9.4 At this juncture, I agree with the arguments of the Ds that the Birth Certificate of the Intervener is indeterminable, as I had addressed in my observation in the Intervener’s submissions. For P1, as I observed, Koh Seng Lee is named the father in the official Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births in Singapore. Till now, no rectified certificate 945 has been produced from the relevant Singaporean authority to say otherwise. 9.5 During the trial, P2 agreed that because the Deceased was married to D2, he refused to put his name on P1’s birth certificate. 9.6 Tan Kah Fatt was distinguished in that, even though the 1st customary 950 marriage, in that case, could not be proven with photographs, evidence S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 33 from the relevant family members shows that the 2nd appellant was accepted into the Deceased’s family as a grandchild. Therefore, it was argued that even if Tan Kah Fatt, FC (supra) did not determine the issue of an illegitimate child, s.75 LRA would have stepped in and 955 saved the 2nd appellant as a legitimate child and eligible for inheritance. Section 75 (2) says: "(2) Subject to the provisions of this section, the child of a void marriage shall be treated as the legitimate child of his parent if, at the time of the solemnisation of the marriage, both or either of the parties reasonably 960 believed that the marriage was valid." 9.7 There is no compelling evidence produced by either P1 or the Intervener that they had at any time been accepted into the family of the Deceased, nor were they treated as part of the Deceased’s family. 965 During the trial: (a) P2 admitted she had never met the Deceased’s mother. (b) P1 admitted he had never met the Deceased’s family or Koh Seng Lee before the Deceased's passing. (c) P1 agreed that the Deceased did not live with him and P2 seven 970 days a week. (d) P2 admitted that she and P1 did not participate in the Deceased’s funeral rite ceremony on 26.03.2019. (e) P2 admitted that she only told Koh Seng Lee at the Deceased’s funeral that P1 was the Deceased’s son. 975 (f) P2 agree that she was not introduced as Mrs Koh at the Deceased’s funeral, (g) P2 agreed that the Ps never celebrated Chinese New Year with the Deceased’s family in Malaysia. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 34 (h) P1 admitted that the Deceased never spent Chinese New Year’s 980 Eve with the Ps. (i) P2 admitted that she did not attend the Deceased’s mother’s funeral on 08.11.2004. (j) The Ps were not named as family members in the Deceased’s late mother’s obituaries. 985 (k) P1 admitted that he never went to pay any respects to the Deceased’s ancestors in Malaysia. (l) The intervener also admitted that he was never accepted as part of the Deceased’s family. (m) The intervener admitted that he did not attend the Deceased’s 990 funeral, and he and his mother, Ho Ah Nya, were not named in the obituaries. (n) The Intervener admitted that he had never met the Ds or the Ps before this proceeding. (o) The Intervener admitted he never celebrated Chinese New Year 995 with the Deceased’s family. (p) The Intervener did not attend the Deceased’s mother’s funeral. (q) The Intervener could not produce any supporting document on the claim that the Deceased had given to the late mother, Ho Ah Nya, RM100,000.00 to rebuild their house after it burnt down. 1000 9.8 The Intervener could not produce compelling evidence of the purported 1st customary marriage between his mother, Ho Ah Nya, and the Deceased. He merely relied on the unsupported evidence of: S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 35 (i) Ho Hock Keong (IW1) was not even familiar with the name of the 1005 Deceased, nor has he ever met the deceased’s family, and nor has he attended his funeral. (ii) Koh Sing Puck (IW3) could not prove his relationship with the Deceased and had not met him for over twenty years. (iii) Koi Ai Long (IW4) provided untrue evidence of his alleged 1010 relationship with the late Ho Ah Nya or the Deceased 9.9 The purported 1st customary marriage either did not exist or was not consensual. The Deceased had left Pulau Ketam and never returned. He never took the late Ho Ah Nya as part of his family. 1015 9.10 Regarding the purported 3rd customary marriage, the Ps rely primarily on the Statutory Declarations from P2’s brother, sister, and in-laws. None were affirmed by the Deceased’s family (SD at PDF 42-86, pp.34-78, enclosure 92). None of the deponents of the Statutory 1020 Declarations were called to own up to their SDs during the trial. P2 admitted that none of the Deceased’s family members attended the purported 3rd customary marriage. The photographic evidence could not prove definitively that there was a customary marriage. P2 admitted in evidence that she did not serve tea to the Deceased’s 1025 mother or D2. 9.11 The Ps family knew that the Deceased could not marry P2, and such a union was invalid. The evidence Ps witnesses: (i) P2’s bother, Tan Beng Kiow (PW2): 1030 (a) admitted he knew the 3rd customary marriage was not registered. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 36 (b) He knew that the Deceased was not named as the father of P1 in the birth certificate. (c) He also agreed that the Deceased did not live or stay with the 1035 Ps. (d) He also knew that the Deceased and P2 could not register the purported customary union as required under Singaporean law. (e) The Deceased did not spend Chinese New Year's Eve with 1040 the plaintiff or their family: (ii) Koh Seng Lee (PW1) is a witness with a vested interest in the outcome of this proceeding: (a) He is a director and shareholder of K Seng Seng Corporation 1045 Berhad, founded by the Deceased. (b) His evidence is contrary to other evidence adduced in Court: (i) He pleaded ignorance of his name on the birth certificate of P1, which I find improbable. (ii) The Intervener informed the Court on 20.4.2021 that he 1050 was told about this proceeding by Koh Seng Lee, though Koh Seng Lee denied that he did. (iii) He claimed that he could not remember when the Deceased left Pulau Ketam but could remember that the late adoptive mother allegedly told him that the Intervener 1055 was the deceased’s son. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 37 (iv) In preparing the obituaries of the Deceased and the deceased’s mother, he did not name Ho Ah Nya or the Ps. 9.12 It is highly improbable, given the circumstances, that P1 did not know 1060 throughout his growing up years that Koh Seng Lee was the named father in his birth certificate until this proceeding began, as he is an educated person (Degree in Accountancy and a Degree in Business). He only sought a declaratory order from the Kuala Lumpur High Court that Koh Seng Lee was not his father on 10.12.2019, nine months after 1065 the Deceased’s passing. 9.13 The evidence of P2 that she did not know that the Deceased was a married man when she was working as his administrative assistant in Singapore (1983-2012) is also highly improbable in the circumstances. 1070 9.14 While there is clear evidence that the Deceased did not include the Ps and the Intervener in his life and businesses when he did not make them directors or shareholders in his companies, he made the Ds directors and shareholders of KSK Realty Sdn Bhd (PDF 62, pg.575, 1075 enclosure 101) as the Deceased intended to transfer all immovable assets under KSK Realty Sdn Bhd where D2 would be a shareholder. 9.15 Regarding the inter-vivos claim by the Ps. The Ds argued that: (a) The Ps relied fundamentally on IDP1-IDP6 to support their 1080 arguments on the purported gifts inter-vivos by the Deceased. Since I have disallowed the said recordings, it would not be necessary to address these recordings as their evidence. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 38 (b) The Deceased did not take steps to realise and/or perfect the alleged inter-vivo gifts. Therefore, it is incomplete and ineffective: 1085 Tan Chong Kiat v Kwan Ah Soh & Anor [1998] 3 MLJ 884, HC. In this regard: (i) WSI Sdn Bhd: The Ps were not made directors or shareholders of the company. There is no evidence that he 1090 had taken any steps to do so (PDF 66-71, pp.579-584, enclosure 101). (ii) Isotank Container Services Sdn Bhd: The Ps were not made directors and shareholders of the company, and neither is there any evidence that the Deceased has taken steps to do 1095 so (PDF 4-9, pp.639-644, enclosure 105). (iii) Property H.S.(D) No.13953, PT No. MLO 8301, Mukim Plentong, Daerah Johor Bharu (GRN 485717, Lot 9625, Mukim Plentong, Daerah Johor Bharu). This property was not gifted to the Ps but was transferred to D1 (PDF 78-79, 1100 pp.591-592, enclosure 101). It is trite that the Court will not perfect an imperfect gift: Milroy v Lord (1862) 45 ER 1185; Re Rose (deceased) Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Co Ltd v Rose and Others [1948] 2 All ER 971; Kwan 1105 Teck Meng & Ors v Liew Sam Lee [1963] 1 MLJ 333; Kumarappa Chettiar Son of Raman Chettiar of Klang v the Federated Malay States [1938] 1 MU 9. 9.16 On the Ds counterclaim against the Ps, it was argued by the Ds that: 1110 (a) At the time the Ps filed their several suits against the Ds, it was before the Federal Court decided Tan Kah Fatt, FC (supra). It was S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 39 a time when the Ps had no right to interfere and intervene in the Ds' succession rights in the Deceased’s estate. (b) Those action taken by the Ps was an abuse of process designed 1115 to extort or oppress the Ds to secure an outcome for which they had not but for Tan Kah Fatt (supra). Provided the conditions can be proven; otherwise, the P1 would not be entitled. Malaysian Building Society Berhad v Tan Sri Ungku Nazruddin Bin Ungku Mohamed [1998] 2 MLJ 425, CA cited 1120 Lord Denning in Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd & Ors [1977] 1 WLR that it is abused when it is diverted from its true course to serve extortion or oppression: or to exert pressure to achieve an improper end. When it is so abused, it is a tort, a wrong known to the law. The judges can and will intervene to stop it. They will stay 1125 the legal process they can before any harm is done. If they cannot stop it in time, and harm is done, they will give damages against the wrongdoer. Neither malice nor the termination of the proceedings in the plaintiff’s favour are necessary elements of this tortuous wrong. It is only upon proof of the elements that make up 1130 the tort of collateral abuse of process that a plaintiff is entitled to an award of damage: (i) The process complained of must have been initiated. (ii) The dominant purpose for initiating that process must be for some other purpose than to obtain genuine redress, and 1135 (iii) The plaintiff has suffered damage or injury in consequence. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 40 (c) I have examined the chronology of events (OS 901 and Suit 649) meant to suppress the Ds in claiming their rights of succession to the Deceased’s estate initiated by the Ps as set out in the Ds 1140 arguments, from April 2019 – 01.08.2022. (d) The Ps has no right or legitimate interest in the Deceased’s estate to protect. To date, P2 still has no such right. As a result of the Ps action, the Ds have (1) suffered mental stress and a waste of time 1145 and energy, (2) cost and expenses incurred of approximately RM86,183.26 (breakdown given) as at the date of their defence and Counterclaim in Suit 649 on 10.10.2019. (e) Therefore, the Ds in their counterclaim asks for: 1150 (a) Damages to be assessed. (b) General Damages. (c) Interest at the rate of 8% from the date of defence and counterclaim to the date of full realisation. (d) An injunction against the Ps from dealing with any media and 1155 K Seng Seng until the final disposal of OS 702 and Suit 649. (e) The Ps are declared vexatious litigants under clause 17 of the Schedule to Section 25(2) of the Court of Judicature Act 1964. (f) The Ps are prohibited from filing and proceedings in any 1160 Court without the Court’s permission against the Ps and the Ps solicitors, and such an Order must be gazetted before such proceedings can be filed. (g) The Ps is subject to committal in default thereof. (h) Costs for the Counterclaim. 1165 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 41 9.17 In the circumstances, the Ds pray that: (a) Suit 649 be dismissed with costs. (b) The Grant of Letters of Administration in Enclosure 1 of OS 702 1170 is allowed with costs and (c) The Ds counterclaim is allowed with costs. THE INTERVENER’S CASE [10] I observed the Intervener canvassing his position as follows: 1175 10.1 To support the alleged purported customary marriage of his mother (Ho Ah Nya) with the Deceased, he argued that section 4 LRA Act 1976 stipulating that the Act shall not affect the validity of any marriage solemnised under any law, religion, custom or usage before the 1180 appointed date. That such marriage, if valid under the law, religion, custom or usage under which it was solemnised, shall be deemed to be registered under the act. In his Counterclaim, the Intervener is asking for the following: 1185 “(i) Perintah deklarasi bahawa perkahwinan antara Si Mati dan ibu Pencelah iaitu Ho Ah Nya@ Ho Cheng Bak adalah sah mengikut kepercayaan, adat istiadat dan/atau budaya Cina; (ii) Perintah Deklarasi bahawa Pencelah iaitu Koh Ching Kew NO. K/P:640306-10-6365) adalah anak kandungan lelaki dan /atau zuriat 1190 kepada Si Mati; (iii) Pencelah, Koh Ching Kew (NO. K/P:640306-10-6365) diiktirafkan sebagai benefisiari dan waris kadim harta pusaka Koh Seng Kar @ Koh Hai Sew (NO. K/P: 430719-10-5509), Si Mati yang dinamakan di atas dan nama Pencelah, Koh Ching Kew (NO.K/P:640306-10-6365) 1195 dimasukkan dan dinyatakan sebagai benefisiari dalam senarai benefisiari bagi harta pusaka Koh Seng Kar @ Koh Hai Sew (NO.K/P: 430719-10-5509); S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 42 (iv) Kos; dan (v) Apa-apa relif lain yang dianggap sesuai dan patut oleh Mahkamah Yang 1200 Mulia ini.” (a) I observe that s.4 LRA would not validate an invalid or void marriage. The reading of the said section is obvious. It only applies to valid marriages. In a legal article by Mr Balwant Singh 1205 Sidhu: Married or Not married? -That is the Question [2002] 3 MLJ xxix, the learned author pointed out that by s.4 LRA, subsisting valid marriages are deemed to be registered under the Act. However, these marriages are still open to challenge as to their validity according to the law, religion, custom or usage under 1210 which they were solemnised. In addition, in the absence of actual registration, subsisting customary marriages would still have to be proven. Parties to any marriage solemnised prior to the appointed date of the LRA may apply to the Registrar for the registration of the marriage. 1215 (b) To demonstrate the workings of s.4, in Sabrina Loo Cheng Suan v Eugene Khoo Oon Jin [1995] 1 CLJ 875, the High Court in Penang had to determine the legality of a second marriage under Chinese custom while the man was still married to his first wife. The Chinese customary marriage was in 1973, before the 1220 enforcement of the Act. The Court held that in 1973, there was no legal impediment against the plaintiff and the defendant entering a Chinese customary marriage between themselves while the defendant was married to one Dorothy Khoo, thus making the latter the principal wife and the plaintiff the second wife. Although 1225 polygamous, Chinese customary marriages entered before March S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 43 1, 1982, were valid. Therefore, the plaintiff’s marriage to the defendant was valid under sections 4(1) and (2) of the Act. (c) After the Act comes into force, a second marriage contracted while a first marriage is still in subsistence is invalid under s.5(1). 1230 Section 34 of the LRA says that nothing in the Act or the rules made thereunder shall be construed to render valid or invalid any marriage which otherwise is invalid or invalid merely because it has been or is not registered. The decision by the Court of Appeal in Chai Siew Yin v Leong Wee Shing [2004] 1 CLJ 752 was 1235 reversed in the Federal Court Appeal No: 02-10-2003(W) when the FC ruled that s.34 must not be read in isolation but must be construed in harmony with other provisions of the Act which encapsulates the overall intention of the legislature. To do otherwise would defeat the intent and purpose of the Act, which is 1240 to provide for monogamous marriages and the solemnisation and registration of such marriages. (d) Therefore, s.4 cannot be read in isolation but must be in tandem/harmoniously with other relevant provisions of the Act. One must do more than angled it to support an 1245 unsustainable/unproven position. That would not be tenable and most certainly be a misplaced effort. (e) In the present case, it must be pointed out that the alleged customary marriage between the Deceased and Ho Ah Nya had yet to be proven or established by the Intervener to the satisfaction 1250 of the Court. There is no compelling evidence save for unsupported and sweeping hearsay oral evidence that is vague S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 44 on the existence of the alleged marriage. It is neither here nor there with no definitive value. 1255 10.2 The Intervener had exhibited his Birth Certificate (Enclosure 179, part B, pg.5 PDF) to prove that he is the biological son of the Deceased. However, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the Ds, I observed that the details of the Deceased had not been correctly stated. It says the Deceased is not a Malaysian, the Deceased is a permanent 1260 resident, and the Deceased has been identified as Hokkien, which does not accord with the present information in the Deceased’s death certificate adduced by the Intervener in Enclosure 179, pg.4 PDF. that he was just Chinese. No evidence was found at the trial to prove the information on the Birth Certificate. This is a ground for concern on 1265 the integrity of the information stated that can only be resolved by the Registration Department. But unfortunately, no officer from the said department was called to clarify the discrepancies in the details concerning the alleged Deceased. (a) It is my legitimate concern that if it can happen in the Certificate 1270 of Extract from Register of Births for P1, it can also occur with the Intervener. A common person in these two issues is Koh Seng Lee (PW1), who appears to have played a covert role in both instances. (b) The Intervener’s Birth Certificate is a Part B Document that 1275 requires the contents to be proven, though the authenticity is not disputed. As it stands, I am not persuaded by the contents, which require clarification from the appropriate party/authority on the discrepancies. To reiterate, no officer from the Registration S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 45 Department was called to clarify those discrepancies. It is not for 1280 the Court to conduct the Intervener’s case, but it is entirely up to him to manage it and do what is necessary to persuade the Court with cogent evidence. (c) Any attempt at evidence by implication would not be sufficient in the premise. Other than the said Birth Certificate with 1285 discrepancies in the details that have not been clarified, there is no other evidence to establish the Intervener as a lineal descendant (blood relation) with the Deceased, such as a relationship DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) report that would constitute a definitive prove for genetic or hereditary information 1290 (paternity/ancestry testing). What was produced before the Court was merely unsupported postulation or evidence by implication and uncorroborated oral hearsay evidence. What matters most is that a definitive piece of evidence (DNA Report) that would have tilted the scale of evidence in his favour was never produced. 1295 Therefore, even before the Court can consider the issue of legitimacy or otherwise, a blood relation with the Deceased must be satisfactorily established before the Court. (d) DNA test by the Department of Chemistry Malaysia: Paternity testing simply means establishing fatherhood. Paternity is done to 1300 confirm or exclude the biological father of a child. The DNA test is accurate, rapid, and affordable, with a power of discrimination (accuracy) as high as 99.9999%. DNA paternity tests can be performed on individuals of any age. It has become the most accepted method to determine identity within the legal scientific communities. 1305 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 46 (e) As it is, there is no convincing evidence of the purported customary marriage between the Deceased and the mother of the Intervener, rendering the claim by the Intervener highly speculative. The legal position is trite that the Court does not act 1310 on mere speculation or supposition. 10.3 The Intervener relied fundamentally on the oral hearsay evidence of his witnesses, saying the Deceased and the late Ho Ah Nya were purportedly married in 1968 and cohabited as husband and wife. Other 1315 than that, no definitive or persuasive evidence was adduced to corroborate that contention. The intervener claimed that there was no photograph to evince the tea ceremony to indicate the wedding as a fire in Pulau Ketam had destroyed a shophouse owned by Ho Ah Nya that the Intervener currently occupies. He cited Seow Beng Hay v 1320 Seow Soon Quee [1933] 11 MLJ, which held that such customary marriage could be established by oral or circumstantial evidence. (a) It is my observation that it cannot be any oral or circumstantial evidence but must be cogent or persuasive oral evidence for the 1325 Court to make a favourable finding. At this point of the proceeding, I find no compelling evidence to favour the Intervener. Oral hearsay evidence is never good evidence to establish a fact. (b) Ho Hock Keong (IW1), the younger brother to Ho Ah Nya, gave evidence that Ho Ah Nya told him that she and the Deceased were 1330 married. No corroboration was provided. (c) Koi Ah Long (IW4) gave a sweeping statement that the Deceased and Ho Ah Nya were married to each other. All seniors in Pulau S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 47 Ketam know they were married. But no relevant seniors were called to corroborate that statement. 1335 (d) Koh Seng Lee (PW1) said that the Deceased had never mentioned to him that the deceased was married in Pulau Ketam. Only that their mother and father allegedly informed him. No tangible evidence was adduced to corroborate the position taken. 1340 To reiterate, I am unpersuaded with the foregoing unsupported evidence. 10.4 The Intervener further claimed that the Deceased had presented a payment of RM100,000.00 to the late mother, but he could not prove 1345 it since the mother had passed away long ago. Maybank does not want to disclose any financial information, though requested by his solicitor due to secrecy provisions under the Financial Services Act 2013. 10.5 He relied fundamentally on the testimony of Koh Seng Lee (PW1), the 1350 adopted brother of the Deceased, who was complicit in the Certificate of Extract from Register of Births of P1 debacle addressed in the foregoing paragraph 3.4 herein. It was claimed that Koh Seng Lee had notified the Intervener for whatever reason that the Deceased was married in Pulau Ketam. There was no cogent evidence to corroborate 1355 that statement. (a) I observed that Koh Seng Lee (PW1) seems to have played a role everywhere in this proceeding. The fact that the said Koh Seng Lee (PW1) has been complicit in the Certificate of Extract from the 1360 Register of Births of P1 debacle for the past thirty-plus years, and S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 48 necessarily with the knowledge of P2 as the mother of P1, gives me grounds for concern about the veracity of his unsupported oral evidence. (b) The very debacle that has yet to be addressed and resolved by 1365 the relevant Singaporean Authorities and what action is to be taken, if any, on the Kuala Lumpur High Court Order that had made some findings on the details of the P1 Certificate of Extract from Register of Births. (c) The deafening silence by both P1 and Koh Seng Lee (PW1) on 1370 the matter can only mean that the issue had not been raised with the relevant Singaporean Authority since the day the Order was granted (more than three years ago) for whatever reason that only they know and do not wish to be forthcoming about it. (d) The High Court Order of 10.12.2019 was explicit in ordering 1375 (mandatory injunction) that Koh Seng Lee (PW1) must remove his name from the Register of Births in Singapore within fourteen days from the date of that Order. This does not augur well for their credibility in this Court. In those foregoing circumstances, the Intervener prays for order in terms of 1380 his counterclaim. THE LAW [11] It is trite in law that all cases are decided on the legal burden of proof being discharged: 1385 11.1 It is the acid test applied in any particular case. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 49 (a) Lord Brandon in Rhesa Shipping Co.SA v Edmunds [1985] 1 WLR 948 at 955 said: 1390 “No judge likes to decide cases on the burden of proof if he can legitimately avoid having to do so. There are cases, however, in which, owing to the unsatisfactory state of the evidence or otherwise, deciding on the burden of proof is the only just course to take.” 1395 (b) In Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 it was said that: “The Court’s decision in every case will depend on whether the party concerned has satisfied the particular burden and standard of proof imposed on him. Since the terms ‘proved’, ‘disproved’, and ‘not proved’ are statutory 1400 definitions contained in the Evidence Act (Cap 9), 1997 Rev Ed), the term ‘proof’. Wherever it appears in the Evidence Act and unless the context otherwise suggests, means the burden to satisfy the Court of the existence or non-existence of some fact, that is, the legal burden of proof”. 1405 (c) The burden of proof in establishing its case is on the plaintiff. It is not the Ds' duty to disprove it. The evidentiary burden is trite that those who allege a fact are duty-bound to prove it (see s.101, 102, and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950). 1410 (d) In Selvaduray v Chinniah [1939] 1 MLJ 253, 254 (CA) held: "The burden of proof under section 102 of the Evidence Enactment is upon the person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side, and accordingly, the plaintiff must establish his case. If he fails to do so, it will not avail him to turn around and say that the defendant has not established his. 1415 The defendant can say it is wholly immaterial whether I prove my case or not. You have not proved yours". S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 50 (e) In Johara Bi bt. Abdul Kadir Marican v. Lawrence Lam Kwok Fou & Anor [1981] 1 MLJ 139, held: 1420 "It was all a matter of proof and that until and unless the plaintiff has discharged the onus on her to prove her case on a balance of probabilities, the burden did not shift to the defendant, and no matter if the defendant's case was completely unbelievable, the claim against him must in these circumstances be dismissed. With respect, we agree with this judicial 1425 approach." 11.2 Distribution Act 1958 (Act 300): Section 3. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires— 1430 "child" means a legitimate child and where the deceased is permitted by his personal law a plurality of wives includes a child by any of such wives but does not include an adopted child other than a child adopted under the provisions of the Adoption Act 1952 [Act 257]. 1435 "issue" includes children and the descendants of deceased children; "parent" means the natural mother or father of a child, or the lawful mother or father of a child under the Adoption Act 1952; "Peninsular Malaysia" has the meaning assigned thereto in section 3 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 [Act 388] and includes the Federal 1440 Territory. Section 4 (1) The distribution of the movable property of a person deceased shall be regulated by the law of the country in which he was 1445 domiciled at the time of his death. (2) The distribution of the immovable property of a person deceased intestate shall be regulated by this Act wherever he may have been domiciled at the time of his death. Persons held to be similarly related to deceased. 1450 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 51 Section 6 (1) After the commencement of this Act, if any person shall die intestate as to any property to which he is beneficially entitled to an interest which does not cease on his death, such property Distribution 7 or the proceeds thereof after payment thereout of the expenses of due 1455 administration shall, subject to the provisions of section 4, be distributed in the manner or be held on the trusts mentioned in this section, namely-- (a) if an intestate die leaving a spouse and no issue and no parent or parents, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to the whole 1460 of the estate; (b) if an intestate die leaving no issue but a spouse and a parent or parents, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-half of the estate and the parent or parents shall be entitled to the remaining one-half; 1465 (c) if an intestate die leaving issue but no spouse and no parent or parents, the surviving issue shall be entitled to the whole of the estate; (d) if an intestate die leaving no spouse and no issue but a parent or parents, the surviving parent or parents shall be entitled to 1470 the whole of the estate; (e) if an intestate die leaving a spouse and issue but no parent or parents, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-third of the estate and the issue the remaining two-thirds; (f) if an intestate die leaving no spouse but issue and a parent or 1475 parents, the surviving issue shall be entitled to two-thirds of the estate and the parent or parents the remaining one-third; (g) if an intestate die leaving a spouse, issue and parent or parents, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-quarter of the estate, the issue shall be entitled to one-half of the estate and 1480 the parent or parents the remaining one-quarter; (h) subject to the rights of a surviving spouse or a parent or parents, as the case may be, the estate of an intestate who S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 52 leaves issue shall be held on the trusts set out in section 7 for the issue; 1485 (i) if an intestate die leaving no spouse, issue, parent or parents, the whole of the estate of the intestate shall be held on trusts for the following persons living at the death of the intestate and in the following order and manner, namely: Firstly, on the trusts set out in section 7 for the brothers and 1490 sisters of the intestate in equal shares; but if no person takes an absolutely vested interest under such trusts, then Secondly, for the grandparents of the intestate, and if more than one survives the intestate in equal shares absolutely; but if there are no grandparents surviving, then 1495 Thirdly, on the trusts set out in section 7 for the uncles and aunts of the intestate in equal shares; but if no person takes an absolutely vested interest under such trusts, then Fourthly, for the great grandparents of the intestate and if more than one survives the intestate in equal shares absolutely; but if there are 1500 no such great grandparents surviving, then Fifthly, on the trusts set out in section 7 for the great grand uncles and great grand aunts of the intestate in equal shares. (j) In default of any person taking an absolute interest under the foregoing provisions the Government shall be entitled to the 1505 whole of the estate except insofar as the same consists of land. (2) If any person so dying intestate be permitted by his personal law a plurality of wives and shall leave surviving him more wives than one, such wives shall share among them equally the share which the wife of the intestate would have been entitled to, had such intestate left 1510 one wife only surviving him. (3) When the intestate and the intestate's husband or wife have died in circumstances rendering it uncertain which of them survived the other, this section shall, notwithstanding any rule of law to the contrary, have effect as regards the intestate as if the husband or 1515 wife had not survived the intestate. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 53 11.3 Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952: Section 4: (1) A male person married in accordance with the provisions of this 1520 Ordinance, shall be incapable during the continuance of such marriage, of contracting a valid marriage with any third person. whether as principal or secondary wife. Section 5: 1525 (1) If any male person lawfully married under this Ordinance shall thereafter during the continuance of such marriage contract a union with a woman which but for such marriage would confer rights of succession or inheritance upon such woman or upon the issue of such union, no issue of such union shall be 1530 legitimate or have any right of inheritance in or succession to the estate of such male person, and no such woman shall have any right by reason of the death intestate of such male person. 11.4 The Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA) 1535 Section 4: (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect the validity of any marriage solemnized under any law, religion, custom or usage prior to the appointed date. (2) Such marriage, if valid under the law, religion, custom or usage 1540 under which it was solemnized, shall be deemed to be registered under this Act. (3) Every such marriage, unless void under the law, religion, custom or usage under which it was solemnized, shall continue until dissolved— 1545 (a) by the death of one of the parties; (b) by order of a court of competent jurisdiction; or (c) by a decree of nullity made by a court of competent jurisdiction. 1550 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 54 Section 5: (1) Every person who on the appointed date is lawfully married under any law, religion, custom or usage to one or more spouses shall be incapable, during the continuance of such marriage or marriages, of contracting a valid marriage under any law, religion, 1555 custom or usage with any other person, whether the first mentioned marriage or the purported second mentioned marriage is contracted within Malaysia or outside Malaysia. (2) Every person who on the appointed date is lawfully married under any law, religion, custom or usage to one or more spouses and 1560 who subsequently ceases to be married to such spouse or all such spouses, shall, if he thereafter marries again, be incapable during the continuance of that marriage of contracting a valid marriage with any other person under any law, religion, custom or usage, whether the second mentioned marriage or purported third 1565 mentioned marriage is contracted within Malaysia or outside Malaysia. (3) Every person who on the appointed date is unmarried and who after that date marries under any law, religion, custom or usage shall be incapable during the continuance of such marriage of 1570 contracting a valid marriage with any other person under any law, religion, custom or usage, whether the first mentioned marriage or the purported second mentioned marriage is contracted within Malaysia or outside Malaysia. (4) After the appointed date, no marriage under any law, religion, 1575 custom or usage may be solemnized except as provided in Part III. Section 6: (1) Every marriage contracted in contravention of section 5 shall be 1580 void. (2) If any male person lawfully married under any law, religion, custom or usage shall during the continuance of such marriage contract another union with any woman, such woman shall have S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 55 no right of succession or inheritance on the death intestate of such 1585 male person. (3) Nothing in this section shall affect the liability of any person to pay such maintenance as may be directed to be paid by him under this Act or any other written law. 1590 Section 22: (1) Every marriage under this Act shall be solemnized— (a) in the office of a Registrar with open doors within the hours of six in the morning and seven in the evening; (b) in such place other than in the office of a Registrar at such 1595 time as may be authorized by a valid licence issued under subsection 21(3); or (c) in a church or temple or at any place of marriage in accordance with section 24 at any such time as may be permitted by the religion, custom or usage which the 1600 parties to the marriage or either of them profess or practise. (2) A valid marriage may be solemnized under paragraph (1)(a) or (b) by a Registrar if a certificate for the marriage issued by the Registrar or Registrar concerned or a licence authorizing the 1605 marriage is delivered to him. (3) A valid marriage may be solemnized under paragraph (1)(c) by an Assistant Registrar if he is satisfied by statutory declaration that— (a) either— (i) each of the parties is twenty-one years of age or over, 1610 or, if not, is a widower or widow, as the case may be, or (ii) if either party is a minor who has not been previously married and the female party not under the age of sixteen years that the consent of the appropriate 1615 person mentioned in section 12 has been given in writing, or has been dispensed with, or has been given by a court in accordance with section 12; (b) there is no lawful impediment to the marriage; S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 56 (c) neither of the parties to the intended marriage is married 1620 under any law, religion, custom or usage to any person other than the person with whom such marriage is proposed to be contracted; and (d) in so far as the intended marriage is a Christian marriage and is to be solemnized in accordance with the rites, 1625 ceremonies or usages of a Christian religious denomination, the provisions of the canons of such religious denomination relating to the publication of banns or the giving notice of the intended marriage have been complied with or lawfully dispensed with in 1630 accordance with such canons. (4) Every marriage purported to be solemnized in Malaysia shall be void unless a certificate for marriage or a licence has been issued by the Registrar or Chief Minister or a statutory declaration under subsection (3) has been delivered to the Registrar or Assistant 1635 Registrar, as the case may be. (5) Every marriage shall be solemnized in the presence of at least two credible witnesses besides the Registrar. (6) No marriage shall be solemnized unless the Registrar is satisfied that both the parties to the marriage freely consent to the 1640 marriage. Section 75: (2) Subject to the provisions of this section, the child of a void marriage shall be treated as the legitimate child of his parent if, 1645 at the time of the solemnisation of the marriage, both or either of the parties reasonably believed that the marriage was valid. FINDINGS OF THIS COURT [12] I have examined all-cause papers, the evidence and/or the lack thereof 1650 at the trial, and the parties' respective submissions in canvassing for their position in the present suit. Considering my observation in paragraph [3] 3.4 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 57 and my observations in the parties' respective arguments in paragraphs [8] 8.1-8.8, [9] 9.1-9.18, and [10] 10.1-10.5 hereof, and in addition to, it is my considered determination that: 1655 12.1 The Ps and the Intervener have failed to discharge their burden of proof to establish their respective claim of entitlement to the estate of the Deceased under ss 101-103 Evidence Act 1950: Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855. 1660 12.2 Evidently, the Ps and the Intervener failed to adduce the required compelling evidence to tilt the scale of evidence in their favour. The arguments and assertions by the Ps and the Intervener are simply speculative at best, and the Court will not act on speculation. As 1665 observed by the Federal Court in Guan Soon Tin Mining Co v Wong Fook Kum [1969] 1 MLJ 99, FC, that there was no positive proof, but only a possibility. In the circumstances, it is not good enough. 12.3 It is trite in law that the burden of proof in establishing its case is on 1670 the Ps and the Intervener. It is not the Ds' duty to disprove it. The evidentiary burden is that those who allege a fact are duty-bound to prove it (see s.101, 102, and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950). [13] It is an established foundation that in Malaysia, marriage under the 1675 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (Act 164) (LRA) anchors on registration for legal recognition of marital union. A similar position would apply under the Women’s Charter 1961 in the Republic of Singapore. It is trite; a customary wedding does not constitute, nor does it satisfy, the legal requirement of a valid registration under the LRA. In our present case, the 1680 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 58 Deceased elected to register his customary marriage to D2 in Malaysia under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1954 on 4.5.1979 (L.95, pg.417) before the LRA superseded it. It is trite that registration is to facilitate monogamy in civil unions and that is the basic principle behind it. It is my considered judgment that the 2nd customary marriage by the Deceased to D2 is a lawful 1685 marriage under the CMO. Consequently, the birth of D1 (PDF7, pg.418, L95) under this lawful marriage cements her succession rights to the Deceased's estate with her mother (D2). The Ds are, undoubtedly, the lawful heirs (lawful daughter and widow) from the duly registered marriage of the Deceased: 13.1 I find the Intervener’s claim to be entitled as the supposed son of the 1690 purported 1st customary marriage of the Deceased in the 1960s fundamentally flawed with no compelling evidence to establish his claim save for hearsay evidence and utter speculation as I had observed in paragraph [10] hereof. 13.2 The Ps claim to be the lawful son and widow of the Deceased arising 1695 from an unproven customary marriage (19.02.1988) that was not registered under the Women’s Charter 1961, as legally required in Singapore, is unsustainable. I have addressed this in paragraph [9] hereof. 13.3 Among others, the plaintiffs alleged that the Deceased had gifted 1700 specific properties inter-vivo (gifts before death) to them, but no evidence was adduced that the said gifts had been duly completed or perfected during the Deceased's life. No evidence of the Deceased’s intention was produced save for self-serving assertions by the Ps. I observed that this claim by the Ps had been entirely negated by the Ds 1705 arguments in paragraph [9] 9.6 hereof. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 59 13.4 From the entirety of the evidence before, it is evident that: (a) No rectified Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births for P1 from the relevant Singaporean Authority exists. Koh Seng Lee remains the named father on the official record. There are no 1710 definitive materials other than suggestive/speculative materials that the Deceased is the biological father of P1. In failing to establish factually that P1 is the natural offspring of the Deceased (legitimate or illegitimate), P1 has no claim on the Deceased's estate. Tan Kah Fatt, FC (supra), is distinguished and is of no 1715 assistance in the circumstances. (b) Grounding her claim on the Deceased’s estate on an invalid customary marriage (non-registration under the Women’s Charter 1961) provides P2 with no right to succession. Otherwise, an Order from the Singaporean High Court would have been sought 1720 for reciprocal enforcement in Malaysia. The Ps objection to the expert evidence from Singapore on the legal status of the purported customary marriage of D2 to the Deceased is dismissed. The Ps did not offer an expert of their own to say otherwise. This invalid marriage cannot be used to premise a 1725 claim for succession in Malaysia as well. This invalidity caused by the non-registration of the customary marriage would sever her claim for succession to the estate of the Deceased. Even if the Deceased and P2 elect to register this 3rd customary marriage, they could not do so. At the same time, there is evidence of an 1730 existing 2nd customary marriage to D2 that had been registered under the CMO in Malaysia at the time. The said 2nd customary S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 60 marriage is still subsisting. A will or perfected gifts inter-vivos would have assisted her, but there is none to be proven in this case. 1735 (c) The Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952, the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 in Malaysia, and the Women’s Charter 1961 in Singapore are predicated on promoting and maintaining monogamy in civil marriages and the protection of women’s rights and interests as well as their valid offsprings. Customary rites 1740 personal to the parties cannot be used to override legislative requirements for validity. (d) The owners of the self-serving Statutory Declaration (SDs’ at PDF 42-86, pp.34-78, enclosure 92) were not called to verify the contents of their respective SD to support the Ps position on the 1745 existence of the alleged 3rd customary marriage. It renders the contents unproven. Though the SDs’ are Part B documents, their contents must still be proven. However, it cannot alter nor exculpate the 3rd customary marriage for invalidity due to non- registration. 1750 (e) IDP1-IDP6 (the video recording) is disallowed. It cannot be referred to or used to support the claim and arguments of the Ps in this proceeding. As a Part C Document, its authenticity and contents need to be satisfactorily proven, and it wasn’t. Editing the recording into six segments is an indication to it being edited in 1755 one way or another. The Ps are to be blamed for not ensuring the integrity of the evidence as required by law since it is fundamental to their case. The interpreter who carried out the transcript was S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 61 not called to verify the proposed evidence and its contents. The transcript may have been placed in Part B Documents, but the 1760 contents still need to be proven to the satisfaction of the Court. Without IDP1-IDP6 and the transcript, the Ps have lost a fundamental part of their supposed evidence to support their claim. Without fundamental supporting evidence, their claim must naturally fail. 1765 (f) Concerning the Ds counterclaim on the tort of collateral abuse of process against the Ps. It is my considered judgment that after considering the facts and the relevant law, the Ds has proven the requirements for the alleged tortious wrong by the Ps: (i) The process complained of must have been initiated: 1770 OS 901 and Suit 649 were started much before the FC’s decision in Tan Kah Fatt was delivered. (ii) The dominant purpose for initiating that process must be for some other purpose than to obtain genuine redress: At the time the action was taken, the Ps had no succession rights over 1775 the estate of the Deceased, and from the facts of proceedings herein, still, today has none that can be proven in this proceeding. (i) The plaintiff has suffered damage or injury in consequence: (ii) Tabulated by the Ds in paragraph 139, enclosure 233 from April 2019 – 01.08.2022, with expenses incurred as tabulated in enclosure 233, 1780 pp.58-59. Malaysian Building Society Berhad v Tan Sri Ungku Nazruddin Bin Ungku Mohamed [1998] 2 MLJ 425, CA cited Lord Denning in Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd & Ors [1977] 1 WLR, made it clear that neither malice nor the termination of the 1785 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 62 proceedings (OS 901) in the plaintiff’s favour (with costs ordered to be paid to the Ds) are necessary elements of this tortuous wrong. Only upon proof of the elements that make up the tort of collateral abuse of process is a plaintiff entitled to an award of damage. 1790 (g) Concerning the Intervener claiming to be the lawful natural offspring of the Deceased by his purported 1st customary marriage to Ho Ah Nya, no compelling evidence was adduced to establish the marriage or that the Deceased was his biological father. The Birth Certificate he produced in Court at trial is indeterminable due 1795 to discrepancies in its information. The Intervener failed to call the officer from the Registration Department to clarify the ambiguity and doubt. In such circumstances, no DNA Report was produced to establish that he is the biological offspring of the Deceased for Tan Kah Fatt, FC (supra) to apply. Just like P1, he did not pursue 1800 for an Order from the Court to compel a DNA test to be carried out. For want of convincing evidence, the Intervener’s claim must be dismissed with costs. The Court will not act on speculative evidence. (h) It is a cardinal rule in litigation that parties cannot conduct nor 1805 pursue their respective cases by instalments. [14] It is my considered judgment that the Ps and the Intervener have failed to establish their claim. To cite Lord Brandon in Rhesa Shipping Co.SA v Edmunds [1985] 1 WLR 948 at 955, that no judge likes to decide cases on 1810 the burden of proof if he can legitimately avoid having to do so. There are S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 63 cases, however, in which, owing to the unsatisfactory state of the evidence or otherwise, deciding on the burden of proof is the only just course to take. Accordingly, the respective claims by the Ps and the Intervener are dismissed with costs. 1815 CONCLUSION [15] In light of the foregoing and after closely scrutinising and examining all evidence adduced before me, it is my considered judgment that: 15.1 On the balance of probability, I find that the scale of evidence had tilted 1820 in the Ds' Favor. 15.2 I hold that the Ps and the Intervener failed to discharge their burden and prove their case. 15.3 Their claims (Ps and the Intervener) were dismissed with cost: (a) Against P1-P2: Global costs of RM100,000.00 to be paid to 1825 D1-D2 within 30 days, and (b) Against the Intervener: RM15,000.00 to be paid to D1-D2 within 30 days. 15.4 After considering the parties’ arguments for the tort of collateral abuse of process, I find for the Ds. The Ds’ counterclaim: 1830 (a) Prayer (a) and (b) are allowed with costs and for damages to be assessed. (b) Prayer (c) interest at 5%. (c) Prayers (d), (e), and (f) are disallowed. 1835 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 64 15.5 Grounded on the facts in present Suit 649 and its appropriate dismissal thereof, there is no more impediment to OS 702 for the Grant of the letter of Administration to the Deceased’s estate. Consequently, it is granted to D1 as prayed with costs. 1840 Dated 02.11.2023. 1845 (HAYATUL AKMAL ABDUL AZIZ) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA 1850 KUALA LUMPUR Parties: 1855 Mr. Trevor George De Silva, together with Mr. Beh Chee Wei and Ms. Peyton Yap Messrs. Beh & Co. Counsels for the plaintiffs 1860 Ms. Goh Siu Lin, together with Ms. Denise Lim Hsui Yen Messrs. Kee Sern, Siu & Huey. Counsels for the defendants Mr. Wong Kok Yih 1865 Messrs. Gary Wong & Co. Counsel for the intervener S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	120,165	Tika 2.6.0
W-01(A)-347-06/2021	PERAYU KETUA PENGARAH HASIL DALAM NEGERI MALAYSIA RESPONDEN SYARIKAT TAN CHANG YONG HOLDINGS SDN BHD	-Aggrieved -additional assessment -Director General of Inland Revenue -Year of Assessment -Special Commissioners of Income Tax -section 99 -Income Tax Act 1967-testimonies of witnesses -obligation -no error -questions of law -warrant intervention-incorrect returns -tax audit-timber concession -license fee -extract the timber -prohibited -deduction -ignorance of the law is no defence -ignorantia juris non excusat-clear provision of law	02/11/2023	YA Dato' Che Mohd Ruzima Bin GhazaliKorumYA Datuk Abdul Karim Bin Abdul JalilYA Dato' Che Mohd Ruzima Bin GhazaliYA Datuk See Mee Chun	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e740ee7a-d9a9-4c27-86f6-02701d308118&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: W-01(A)-347-06/2021 ANTARA KETUA PENGARAH HASIL DALAM NEGERI … PERAYU DAN TCY JAYA SDN BHD … RESPONDEN (Sebelum ini dikenali sebagai Syarikat Tan Chang Yong Holding Sdn Bhd) (Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur Bahagian Kuasa-Kuasa Khas Rayuan Sivil No. WA-14-36-07/2020 Antara Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri … Perayu Dan TCY Jaya Sdn Bhd … Responden (Sebelum ini dikenali sebagai Syarikat Tan Chang Yong Holding Sdn Bhd) (Kes Dinyatakan oleh Pesuruhjaya Khas Cukai Pendapatan Bagi Pendapat Mahkamah Tinggi Menurut Perenggan 34 Jadual 5, Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967 Dalam perkara Pesuruhjaya Khas Cukai Pendapatan Rayuan No. PKCP(R) 23/2010 Rayuan No. PKCP(R) 84/2010 02/11/2023 14:31:34 W-01(A)-347-06/2021 Kand. 34 S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Antara Syarikat Tan Chang Yong Holding Sdn Bhd … Perayu Dan Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri … Responden) CORAM ABDUL KARIM BIN ABDUL JALIL, JCA CHE MOHD RUZIMA BIN GHAZALI, JCA SEE MEE CHUN, JCA JUDGMENT Introduction [1] Aggrieved by the additional assessment made by the Director General of Inland Revenue (DGIR) in respect of Year of Assessment (YA) 2004 and 2005 in the amount of RM186,636.11 and RM295,818.85 respectively, TCY Jaya Sdn Bhd (TCY) appealed to the Special Commissioners of Income Tax (SCIT) pursuant to section 99 of the Income Tax Act 1967 (ITA 1967). By a majority decision, SCIT allowed TCY’s appeal. Dissatisfied with the decision, DGIR appealed to the High Court. At the High Court, the learned High Court Judge (LHCJ) found that the SCIT had considered the testimonies of witnesses and all documents tendered in deciding the obligation of TCY to pay the additional assessments and there was no error in its determination on the questions of law based on the evidence before it and in its application to the facts to S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 warrant intervention by the court. The LHCJ dismissed the DGIR appeal with cost. Aggrieved by the said decision, the DGIR appealed to this court. Brief Facts [2] TCY is a taxpayer. The principal business activity of TCY is connected with logging and the buying and selling of timber logs. It has business premises in Segamat, Johor. From 5.11.2007 to 7.11.2007, the DGIR conducted a tax audit at TCY’s business premises. [3] As a consequence of the tax audit, DGIR issued an additional Notice of Assessment dated 16.7.2009 which disallowed TCY’s claim for the deduction in the sums of RM1,148,000.00 for the payment made to Keck Eng Timber (KET) in YA 2004, and the additional assessment and penalty charged against TCY was RM186,636.11. [4] For the same reason, the DGIR issued another additional Notice of Assessment dated 25.3.2010 against TCY for the amount of RM896,000.00 for YA 2005, and the additional assessment and penalty charged was RM295,818.85. [5] Dissatisfied with the additional assessments, TCY filed Notices of Appeal in Form Q to SCIT dated 16.7.2009 and 25.3.2010 respectively. Both TCY’s appeals were heard together on 1.4.2012, 23.8.2012, 19.9.2012 and 19.10.2012, and the decision of the SCIT was delivered on 22.8.2014. [6] The findings of facts by the SCIT as mentioned in paragraph 8 of the Case Stated dated 29.6.2020 are as follows: (i) Responden telah menjalankan audit di tempat perniagaan Perayu di Segamat pada 5.11.2007 sehingga 7.11.2007. (ii) Semasa audit dijalankan Responden dimaklumkan oleh Perayu bahawa tiada perjanjian bertulis diantara Perayu untuk membeli balak dengan Keck Eng Timber. S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 (iii) Perayu mendakwa bahawa perbelanjaan berjumlah RM1,148,000.00 pada tahun TT 2004 dan RM896,000.00 pada tahun TT 2005 adalah kos pembelian balak daripada Keck Eng Timber. (iv) Perayu mendakwa bahawa ujudnya perjanjian lisan untuk membeli balak daripada Keck Eng Timber atas dasar persahabatan dalam perniagaan. (v) Perayu telah menjadikan perjanjian lisan untuk membeli balak dengan Keck Eng Timber kepada perjanjian bertulis yang telah dimatikan setem hasil. (vi) Keck Eng Timber memperolehi hak untuk memotong balak daripada konsesi balak kepunyaan KDYMM Sultan Pahang. (vii) Perayu memasuki perjanjian lisan untuk membeli balak daripada Keck Eng Timber. (viii) Perayu telah mengupah kontraktor Kemajuan Sinar Trading Sdn. Bhd. untuk memasuki kawasan konsesi balak untuk memotong balak. (ix) Perayu tidak mempunyai konsesi balak dan untuk menjual balak Perayu telah membeli konsesi balak daripada Keck Eng Timber. (x) Saksi Responden bersetuju ujudnya kos untuk membeli balak dan mengatakan anggaran yang diberikan ialah RM7,000.00 seekar adalah terlalu tinggi. (xi) Peguam Responden telah menggugurkan isu sama ada bayaran adalah berbentuk modal dan tidak dibenarkan di bawah seksyen 39(1) Akta. The SCIT Decision [7] By majority, the SCIT held that TCY has proved that it is entitled to tax deductions under S. 33(1) of the ITA 1967 for expenses incurred for the purchase of timber and allowed TCY’s appeal. The Deciding Order dated 22.8.2014, inter alia, was as follows: ADALAH DIPUTUSKAN SECARA MAJORITI bahawa peruntukan belian untuk mendapatkan konsesi balak sebanyak RM1,148,000.00 bagi Tahun Taksiran 2004 dan berjumlah RM896,000.00 bagi Tahun Taksiran 2005 boleh dibenarkan sebagai perbelanjaan di bawah subseksyen 33(1) Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967; S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 ADALAH DIPUTUSKAN SECARA MAJORITI bahawa penalti yang dikenakan di bawah seksyen 113(2) Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967 bagi Tahun-Tahun Taksiran 2004 dan 2005 berkaitan dengan rayuan ini diketepikan; MAKA DENGAN INI ADALAH DIPERINTAHKAN SECARA MAJORITI bahawa rayuan ini dibenarkan; [8] However, by way of a minority decision, the learned panel chair held that TCY’s substantive appeal should not be allowed because TCY had only made payments to KET in 2010 and 2011 and is entitled to deduct the disputed expenses in the YA 2010 and 2011, not as part of its expenditure for the YA 2004 and 2005. In relation to the issue of imposition of penalty under subsection 113(2) of the ITA 1967, the learned panel chair agreed with the majority that no penalty should be imposed. [9] Aggrieved by the decision of the SCIT, the DGIR filed a notice of appeal to the High Court. The High Court Decision [10] The SCIT had considered the testimonies of the witnesses and the relevant documents in determining the obligation of TCY to pay tax for the payments made to KET in YA 2004 and 2005. There was no error in the SCIT’s majority decision on the questions of law based on the evidence before it and in its application to the facts to warrant intervention by the court. [11] As for the minority decision of the learned panel chair, there is an error of law in the decision. The word incurred does not only mean paid, an expenditure can be incurred without actually being disbursed. Therefore, it is irrelevant that TCY had only paid off the amount due under the merchantable timber purchase agreement in 2010 and 2011 since the crucial date is the date of the expenditure incurred, that is in 2004 and 2005. S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [12] As regard to the penalty under subsection 113(2) of the ITA 1967, the SCIT is correct in determining that TCY should not be subject to any penalty in circumstances where the DGIR had mechanically imputed the penalty without proper consideration of relevant circumstances of the case and had been changing its basis in raising assessments thereby causing hardship to TCY. In addition, subsection 113(1) and (2) of the ITA 1967 does not cover situations where there is a difference of opinion on the interpretation of a particular provision of the act even where the Court ultimately finds in favour of the Appellant. The Appeal [13] Being dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court, DGIR appealed to this court. Fourteen grounds of appeal were listed in the Memorandum of Appeal. However, the learned Senior Revenue Counsel (SRC) in his submission condensed all issues into one, that is, whether based on the facts found and stated by the SCIT, the decision of the High Court is correct in law. Meanwhile, the learned counsel for TCY submitted that the main issue for determination in this appeal is whether the High Court and the SCIT were wrong in law to determine that the disputed expenses claimed by TCY as its cost of producing its gross income should be allowed under subsection 33(1) of the ITA 1967. Our Decision [14] The law on appeal from the SCIT to the High Court is trite. Paragraph 34 of Schedule 5 of the ITA 1967 stipulates that: 34. Either party to proceedings before the Special Commissioners may appeal on a question of law against a deciding order made in those proceedings (including a deciding order made pursuant to paragraph 26(b) or (c) by requiring the Special Commissioners to state a case for the opinion of the High Court and by paying to the Clerk at the time of making the requisition such fee as may S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 be prescribed from time to time by the Minister in respect of each deciding order against which he seeks to appeal. [15] In Chua Lip Kong v Director General of Inland Revenue [1982] 1 MLJ 235 the Privy Council dealt with the question of whether the appellate court can interfere with the primary facts found by the SCIT. At p 236, Lord Diplock held as follows: Their Lordships cannot stress too strongly how important it is that, in every Case Stated for the opinion of the High Court, the Special Commissioners should state clearly and explicitly what are the findings of fact upon which their decision is based and not the evidence upon which those findings, so far as they consist of primary facts, are founded. Findings of primary facts by the Special Commissioners are unassailable. They can be neither overruled nor supplemented by the High Court itself; occasionally they may be insufficient to enable the High Court to decide the question of law sought to be raised by the Case Stated, but in that event, it will be necessary for the Case to be remitted to the Commissioners themselves for further findings. It is the primary facts so found by the Commissioners that they should set out in the Case Stated as having been "admitted or proved". In Director-General of Inland Revenue v Khoo Ewe Aik Realty Sdn. Bhd. [1990] 2 MLJ 415, Gunn Chit Tuan SCJ delivering the decision of the Supreme Court held that: It is hardly necessary for any lawyer to be reminded that under our Income Tax Act 1967(paras 34, 39, 41 and 42 of Schedule 5 of the Income Tax Act 1967) one may only appeal to the High Court and thence to the Supreme Court on a question of law. The decision of the Special Commissioners of Income Tax as to the facts is therefore conclusive. In this connection, it is interesting to note the following statement by Lord Denning on the powers of the High Court on appeal in Griffiths v JP Harrison, (Watford) Ltd [1962] 1 All ER 909 at p 916: Now the powers of the High Court on an appeal are very limited. The judge cannot reverse the commissioners on their findings of fact. He can only reverse their decision if it is 'erroneous in point of law'. Now here the primary facts were all found by the commissioners. They were stated in the case. They cannot be disputed. What is disputed is their conclusion from them. It is now settled, as well as anything can be, that their conclusion cannot be challenged unless it was unreasonable, so unreasonable that it can be dismissed as one which could not reasonably be entertained by them. It is not sufficient that the judge would himself have come to a different conclusion. Reasonable people on the same facts may reasonably come to different conclusions: and often do. Juries S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 do. So do judges. And are they not all reasonable men? But there comes a point when a judge can say that no reasonable man could reasonably come to that conclusion. Then, but not till then, he is entitled to interfere. A court would not therefore disturb findings of fact by the Special Commissioners unless it considers that the only reasonable conclusion on the evidence contradicts the determination of the Special Commissioners (see Edwards v Bairstow 36 TC 207, Director-General of Inland Revenue v LCW [1975] 1 MLJ 250 at p 251 and Kota Kinabalu Industries Sdn Bhd v Director- General of Inland Revenue [1981] 2 MLJ 186 at p 190). [16] Back to the appeal before us, the primary finding of facts made by the SCIT can be seen in paragraph 8 of the Case Stated, see pp 73 and 74 Common Core Bundle (CCB) in Enclosure 14, and is reproduced in paragraph [6] above. To determine whether the TCY’s disputed payments to KET in YA 2004 and 2005 were payments of all outgoings and expenses wholly and exclusively incurred in the production of gross income to enable TCY to make a deduction as provided under subsection 33(1) of the ITA 1967, the facts finding by the SCIT is pertinent. For ease of reference, the provision under subsection 33(1) of the ITA 1967 is as follows: Adjusted income generally 33. (1) Subject to this Act, the adjusted income of a person from a source for the basis period for a year of assessment shall be an amount ascertained by deducting from the gross income of that person from that source for that period all outgoings and expenses wholly and exclusively incurred during that period by that person in the production of gross income from that source, including – … [17] Upon perusing the facts found by the SCIT, we are of the view that there are inconsistencies in the said finding. At subparagraph 8 (vii) of the finding of facts, the SCIT found that TCY entered into an oral agreement to purchase timber from KET, a transaction that involved payment of outgoings and expenses incurred in the production of gross income that enabled TCY to make a deduction under subsection 33(1) of S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 the ITA 1967. However, in the same finding of facts in subparagraph 8 (ix), the SCIT made a contradictory finding that TCY does not have any timber concession to sell timber and it had purchased the timber concession from KET, a transaction involved payment that would constitute either payment for the use of licence or permit to extract timber which the deduction from the gross income is disallowed under paragraph 39(1)(g) of the ITA 1967. Again, for ease of reference, the provision under paragraph 39(1)(g) of the ITA 1967 is as follows: Deductions not allowed 39. (1) Subject to any express provision of this Act, in ascertaining the adjusted income of any person from any source for the basis period for a year of assessment no deduction from the gross income from that source for that period shall be allowed in respect of – … (g) any sum, by whatever name called, payable (otherwise than to a State Government or with the approval of the Minister, a statutory authority, or other body the capital or fund of which is wholly or substantially owned by a State Government or a statutory authority) for the use of a licence or permit to extract timber from a forest in Malaysia; [18] Obviously, from the finding of facts as listed in the Case Stated, we observed that the SCIT itself is not certain of the status of the disputed payments made by TCY to KET in YA 2004 and 2005. Based on the uncertainty in the finding of facts, we are of the view that the SCIT is incapable of making a correct decision in addressing the issue at hand. From the grounds of judgment (GOJ), the LHCJ failed to address his mind on the said uncertainty. [19] Besides that, we also observed and considered the submission raised by the learned SRC that there is another glaring error of law S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 committed by the SCIT as reflected in the Deciding Order where the SCIT stated as follows: ADALAH DIPUTUSKAN SECARA MAJORITI bahawa peruntukan belian untuk mendapatkan konsesi balak sebanyak RM1,148,000.00 bagi Tahun Taksiran 2004 dan berjumlah RM896,000.00 bagi Tahun Taksiran 2005 boleh dibenarkan sebagai perbelanjaan di bawah subseksyen 33(1) Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967. The learned SRC submitted that since the SCIT found that the disputed payments were for the purchase of timber concession as opposed to the purchase of timber or standing logs, the decision that such payments are allowable under subsection 33(1) ITA 1967 is manifestly wrong in law. This is because the effect of the finding that the payments were for the purchase of timber concession is, the payments would then constitute either payments for the use of a licence or permit to extract timber in which the deduction is disallowed under paragraph 39(1)(g) of the ITA 1967. [20] From the above observations, we find that there are two main questions of law that need to be addressed and decided by the High Court. Firstly, on the issue of the status of the disputed payments made by TCY to KET in YA 2204 dan 2005, and secondly, if the disputed payments are allowable under subsection 33(1) ITA 1967, whether the said disputed payments are subject to the restriction under paragraph 39(1)(g) of the ITA 1967. First Issue – Status of the Disputed Payments [21] It is an undisputed fact that TCY entered into an agreement with KET to extract and remove the timber from the concession owned by KDYMM Sultan of Pahang. In the beginning, there was only an oral agreement between TCY and KET. Then, TCY turned the oral agreement S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 to a written agreement dated 3.3.2004 and was stamped on 12.3.2004 (the said Agreement). See CCB at pp 140-142 in Enclosure 14. [22] TCY claimed that the said Agreement was entered into to buy timber or standing logs from KET, not the timber concession. Therefore, the disputed payments were the cost of producing gross income and they were deductible under subsection 33(1) of the ITA 1967. In contrast, the DGIR took a different stand. It was argued that the tax audit shows that TCY acquired a timber concession from KET. [23] As mentioned before, the LHCJ did not address this issue in his GOJ. To determine the dispute, we need to sieve through the appeal records. Unfortunately, no notes of evidence before the SCIT were produced in the appeal records even though the Case Stated clearly mentioned that two witnesses, each one witness from TCY and the DGIR had given oral testimony before the SCIT. Be that as it may, there are other documents and numerous correspondences between TCY and the DGIR in the appeal records that can be taken into consideration when it comes to a judicial fact-finding process. Those relevant documents and correspondences were listed in the CCB Enclosure 15, and can be considered as contemporaneous evidence in determining the status of the disputed payments. [24] To begin with, we refer to said Agreement. In Recital (A), it is stated that KET has secured the exclusive right to extract and remove all merchantable timber from the concession area in Compartments 96-A and 97-A. In Recital (B), KET agreed to sell and TCY agreed to purchase all merchantable timber found at the concession area subject to the terms and conditions, among others, as follows: 1. In consideration of the sum of Ringgit Malaysia: Two Million Forty-four Thousand Only (RM2,044,000.00), (hereinafter referred to as “the S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Purchase Price”). The 1st Party hereby agrees to sell and the 2nd Party hereby agrees to Purchase all merchantable timber found at the Concession Area subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter appearing. 2. All expenses payable to Jabatan Perhutanan Negeri Pahang stated in the Letter of Award dated 29th April 2003 and 13th June 2003, necessary for issuance of logging license for all the compartments and the Concession Area shall be the responsibility of the 2nd Party. 3. Any increase in the payment of the above expenses as stated in clause 2, especially payment of premium shall be borne by the 2nd Party. 4. The 2nd Party shall have the exclusive right to manage all matters relating to logging activities at the Concession Area especially concerning extraction and selling of timber logs. 5. All timber logs extracted from the said Concession Area shall be sold by the 2nd Party and all proceeds of sale shall belong to 2nd Party absolutely. 6. The 2nd Party shall perform the logging activities strictly in accordance withal the rules and regulations set by Jabatan Perhutanan. From the terms and conditions of the said Agreement, we conclude that it reveals the following facts: i. TCY secured the exclusive right from KET to manage all matters relating to logging activities at the concession area; ii. TCY own all the extracted timber and has the right of disposal and all proceeds thereto absolutely belong to TCY; and iii. TCY is to bear all the expenses payable to Jabatan Perhutanan Negeri Pahang as stated in the Letter of Award dated 29.4.2003 and 13.6.2003. [25] The other contemporaneous evidence that needs to be taken into consideration is the correspondence between the parties. We observed that the earlier correspondences from TCY’s tax agent to the DGIR alluded that the disputed payments are for the purchase of timber concession, and not for timber or standing logs. Via a letter dated S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 9.4.2008, see CCB at pp 295-297 in Enclosure 15, TCY’s tax agent in its appeal to the DGIR inter alia, submitted as follows: Tahun taksiran 2004 (a) Perjanjian jual beli konsesi Untuk makluman tuan, pelanggan kami telah memasuki satu urusniaga berkaitan pembelian kawasan balak dengan pihak penjual, Keck Eng Timber. Kawasan balak berkenaan adalah berkaitan dengan kawasan kurniaan KDYMM Sultan Pahang di daerah Lipis, Pahang Darul Makmur. Kawasan Konsesi balak berkenaan meliputi kompartmen 96-A dan 97-A, Hutan Simpan Ulu Jelai, daerah Lipis, Pahang Darul Makmur. Bersama-sama ini kami kemukakan dokumen-dokumen berikut berkaitan dengan urusniaga berkenaan seperti berikut untuk tindakan pihak tuan selanjutnya: (a) Perjanjian pembelian kawasan konsesi balak di antara Keck Eng Timber (penjual) dan Tan Chang Yong Holding Sdn Bhd (pembeli); (b) Surat kelulusan daripada Jabatan Perhutanan Negeri Pahang berhubung kelulusan kawasan pembalakan di atas kompartmen 96-A, Hutan Simpan Ulu Jelai, daerah Lipis, Pahang Darul Makmur bertarikh 29 April 2003; dan (c) Surat kelulusan daripada Jabatan Perhutanan Negeri Pahang berhubung kelulusan kawasan pembalakan di atas kompartmen 97-A, Hutan Simpan Ulu Jelai, daerah Lipis, Pahang Darul Makmur bertarikh 13 Jun 2003. (emphasis added) Subsequent correspondences from TCY’s tax agent to DGIR dated 7.7.2008 (see CCB at pp 175-177 in Enclosure 15), 11.12.2008 (see CCB at pp 203-205 in Enclosure 15), 22.12.2008 (see CCB at pp 206-209 in Enclosure 15) and 6.1.2009 (see CCB at pp 211-217 in Enclosure 15) also clearly show that TCY had admitted to the fact that the said Agreement is for the purchase of the timber concession and not for buying timber or standing logs from KET. S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [26] Then, by a letter dated 26.2.2009 (see CCB at pp 219 in Enclosure 15) the DGIR responded to TCY’s tax agent letter dated 6.1.2009. In the said letter, the DGIR expresses his view on TCY’s expenses in relation to the disputed payments as follows: 2. Adalah dimaklumkan, berdasarkan kepada fakta-fakta kes yang diterima perbelanjaan yang dilakukan adalah perbelanjaan untuk mendapatkan hak penebangan balak dan bukan pembelian kayu balak dari Keck Eng Timber. 3. Oleh itu Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia berpendapat perbelanjaan yang dibayar kepada Keck Eng Timber tidak layak mendapat potongan cukai di bawah seksyen 39(1)(g) Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967. Consequent to that, TCY changed its stance. Thereafter, the correspondence sent by TCY’s tax agent to the DGIR no longer refers to the purchase of timber concessions. Instead, the said Agreement is said to be for the purchase of timber or standing logs, see TCY’s tax agent letter dated 23.3.2009 at pp 221-225 CCB, 11.5.2009 at pp 227-229 CCB, 8.6.2009 at pp 230-236 CCB and 16.6.2009 at pp 238-246 CCB, all in Enclosure 15. [27] Apart from those contemporaneous evidence, there is another relevant fact that is not disputed by TCY. The fact is that TCY had paid all expenses under the said Agreement. First and foremost, TCY admitted that it paid the royalty and the premium for 164 acres of the concession area at RM7,000.00 per acre in the amount of RM1,148,000.00. Other than that, TCY also admitted that it had paid the concession license and road permit to the forestry department. All receipts of payments were acknowledged by TCY. See TCY’s tax agent letter dated 11.12.2008 at p 204 CCB, 22.12.2008 at p 208 CCB and 6.1.2009 at pp 213 and 216 CCB, and 23.3.2009 at p 222 CCB, all in Enclosure 15. S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [28] Finally, we also look at the Journal Voucher dated 31.8.2004 which can be seen at p 291 CCB in Enclosure 15. As documented in the Journal Voucher, it is crystal clear that the payment made is for the purchase of timber concession, not for timber or standing logs. For ease of reference, the Journal Voucher is as follows: [29] Looking at the contemporaneous evidence, we are of the considered view that the SCIT’s finding of fact in subparagraph 8 (ix) of the Case Stated is correct as compared to the facts found in subparagraph 8 (vii), that is, TCY had purchased the timber concession from KET. Our view is in line with the nature of the right given to TCY in the said Agreement. The exclusivity of the right given to TCY to extract and remove all merchantable timber from the concession area is akin to the right of a concessionaire. Coupled with the fact that the amount to be paid by TCY to KET is in a fixed sum regardless of the number of the standing S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 logs available in the concession area, negates the proposition that the said Agreement is for the purchase of timber or standing logs. [30] Moreover, the condition that TCY must bear all expenses for the logging license issued by the State Forestry Department, and the fact that TCY did pay for all the expenses including the royalty and the premium for the concession area, the concession licence and road permit further strengthen our view that TCY had purchased the timber concession and not merely purchasing the standing logs from KET. Above all, the Journal Voucher issued in the transaction clearly stated that the payment was a provision for the purchase of the timber concession. [31] Besides that, TCY through its tax agent had lucidly admitted that the said Agreement is to purchase the timber concession. This can be seen in TCY’s tax agent's earlier letters of appeal to the DGIR. Only after knowing that the payment to purchase a timber concession is not allowable for deduction under the tax law did TCY change its stand. On this matter, the legal maxim of law on estoppel - Allegans contraria non est audiendus or ‘he who alleges contradictory things is not to be heard’ shall apply. In the case of Yamamori (Hong Kong) Ltd v Davidson [1992] 2 MLJ 410 at 418, Ian HC Chin JC (as he then was) refers to Broom’s Legal Maxims (1st Ed) at p 103 where it is stated as follows: This elementary rule of logic, which is frequently applied in our courts of justice, will receive occasional illustration in the course of this work. We may for the present observe that it expresses, in other language, the trite saying of Lord Kenyon, that a man shall not be permitted to ‘blow hot and cold’ with reference to the same transaction, or insist, at different times, on the truth of each of two conflicting allegations, according to the promptings of his private interest. Halsbury's Laws of England (4th edition) at paragraph 1507 stated that: Approbation and reprobation. On the principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate, a species of estoppel has arisen which seems to be S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 intermediate between estoppel by record and estoppel in pais. The principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate expresses two proposition: (1) that the person in question, having a choice between two courses of conduct, is to be treated as having made an election from which he cannot resile; and (2) that he will not be granted, in general at any rate, as having so elected unless he has taken a benefit under or arising out of the course of conduct which he has first pursued and with which his subsequent conduct is inconsistent. In Bato Bagi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak & Another Appeal [2011] 8 CLJ 766; [2011] 6 MLJ 297 the Federal Court cited with approval the English Court of Appeal's decision in Verschures Creameries, Limited v. Hull and Netherlands Steamship Company, Limited [1921] 2 KB 608 wherein Scrutton LJ held: A plaintiff is not permitted to "approbate and reprobate." The phrase is apparently borrowed from the Scotch law, where it is used to express the principle embodied in our doctrine of election - namely, that no party can accept and reject the same instrument: Ker v. Wauchope (1); Dougias-Menzies v. Umphelby (2). The doctrine of election is not however confined to instruments. A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. That is to approbate and reprobate the transaction. Therefore, TCY shall not be permitted to ‘blow hot and cold’ or ‘approbate and reprobate’ to suit its own private interest, that is, to escape from paying tax. [32] Based on the said reasons, we reiterate that the SCIT’s finding of fact in subparagraph 8 (ix) is perfectly correct. TCY had purchased the timber concession from KET and not the timber or the standing logs. Thus, even though the disputed payments can be considered as outgoings and expenses wholly and exclusively incurred in the production of gross income, and claimable for deduction of tax under subsection 33(1) of the ITA 1967, regard must be made to the restriction as stipulated under paragraph 39(1)(g) of the ITA 1967. S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 Second Issue - the Restriction Under Paragraph 39(1)(g) of the ITA 1967. [33] The SCIT’s finding of fact in subparagraph 8 (xi) of the Case Stated shows that the learned SRC who represents the DGIR had dropped the issue of whether the disputed payments are capital in nature and therefore was not allowed under paragraph 39(1)(g) of the ITA 1967. In other words, the learned SRC had abandoned the issue on the applicability of paragraph 39(1)(g) of the ITA 1967 in TCY’s appeal before the SCIT. In his submission before us, the learned counsel for TCY had specifically stressed that the DGIR could not revisit the issue that had been abandoned before the SCIT and was not argued before the High Court. The learned SRC admitted and acknowledged the said fact. However, the learned SRC did submit before us that paragraph 39(1)(g) of the ITA 1967 shall apply to the disputed payments. Therefore, the question before us is whether the principle of estoppel apply against DGIR in such a situation. [34] The law on estoppel in pais, that is estoppel by words or conduct against the statutory provision is well settled. There are numerous high authorities decided on this matter. Among others, in Puran Singh v Kehar Singh; Bahadur Singh [1939] 1 MLJ 71, Thomas CJ held as follows: The main question argued at the appeal was that the learned trial Judge having held that the registration of Kehar Singh as proprietor of certain lands had been obtained by means of an insufficient or void instrument, viz., an invalid power of attorney, and that it was in consequence void under section 42 (iii) of the Land Code, he was wrong in holding that the plaintiff was estopped by his conduct from objecting to the registration. In support of this contention, he cited Borrow's case (1880) 14 ChD 432 in which it is stated by Bacon, V.C., in the course of his judgment that: "… the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied to an Act of Parliament. Estoppel only applies to a contract inter partes and it is not competent to parties to a contract to estop themselves or anybody else in the face of an Act of Parliament." S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 This view is followed in the case of Abdul Aziz v Kanthen Mallik 38 ILR Cal 512 515 in which at page 515 a long list of authorities has been set out. The Court there decided that it was not prepared to accede to the argument that the principle of estoppel overrides the provisions of either section 78 of the Land Registration Act or section 60 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 300; [1964] MLJ 49, the Privy Council had considered the plea of estoppel in the face of a statute and held as follows: The respondent has invoked in support of its defence a principle which appears in our law in many forms, that a party cannot set up an estoppel in the face of a statute. Thus, a corporation on which there is imposed a statutory duty to carry out certain acts in the interest of the public cannot preclude itself by estoppel in pais from performing its duty and asserting legal rights accordingly. See Maritime Electric Co Ltd v General Dairies Ltd and Southend-on-Sea Corpn v Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd. Given a “statutory obligation of an unconditional character” it is not open to the court to allow the party bound by that obligation to be barred from carrying it out by the operation of an estoppel. Similarly, there is, in most cases, no estoppel against a defendant who wishes to set up the statutory invalidity of some contract or transaction on which he is being sued, despite the fact that by conduct or other means he would otherwise be bound by estoppel; see Re a Bankruptcy Notice, in particular per Atkin LJ ([1924] 2 Ch at p 96). Supreme Court in Hotel Ambassador (M) Sdn Bhd v Seapower (M) Sdn Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 404 at p 407; [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 174 at p 179, held that: On the question of issue estoppel, we agree with the learned judge that on the facts of this case the appellants cannot invoke the doctrine of issue estoppel. There can be no estoppel as against statutory provisions. … In Teruntum Theatre Sdn Bhd v Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2006] 4 MLJ 685, commenting on the same issue, the Court of Appeal had this to say: [18] Estoppel is a rule of evidence which can only be invoked in special circumstances. The estoppel relied upon by the taxpayer against Revenue in this case is that of estoppel in pais, i.e. estoppel by words or conduct. In our view, the Special Commissioners were not wrong to reject the suggestion that the assessment by the respondent of a taxpayer under the RPGT was an irrevocable act. Estoppel cannot be invoked against the Director General of S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Income Tax when he is put to notice that an incorrect assessment has been made under the RPGT. The Director General cannot raise an estoppel against himself from discharging his statutory duty to raise a correct assessment under the appropriate law if the basis of treating the gain as a capital gain was not within the meaning ascribed to it by the RPGT and no real property gains tax is payable. In such a situation, the Director General is not absolved from discharging his duty of raising the correct assessment in accordance with the relevant law. No person can raise an estoppel against himself so as to defeat a positive duty imposed upon him by a statute (Maritime Electric Co Ltd v General Diaries Ltd [1937] AC 610 at pp 620–621), The duty of both parties, the Director General and the taxpayer, is to obey the law. Guided by the clear settled principle of law enunciated in those authorities, we find that the learned SRC who represented DGIR is not estopped from raising the issue of the restriction stipulated under paragraph 39(1)(g) of the ITA 1967 even though the matter was abandoned before the SCIT and also not argued before the High Court. [35] Based on our reasoned finding that the SCIT had made a correct finding of fact in subparagraph 8 (ix) of the Case stated, the disputed payments fall under the category of any sum paid for the use of a licence or permit to extract timber from the concession area. Thus, TCY is prohibited from claiming deduction under subsection 33(1) of the ITA 1967 by virtue of paragraph 39(1)(g) of the ITA 1967. [36] In such a situation, we find that the LHCJ had failed to exercise his appellate function to consider and decide on the question of law, that is, whether the SCIT had correctly addressed the law in determining whether TCY is entitled to deduct the disputed payments as its cost of producing gross income under subsection 33(1) of the ITA 1967 by virtue of the restriction under paragraph 39(1)(g) of the ITA 1967. We agree with the learned SRC’s contention that both the SCIT and the High Court had erred in law by arriving at a conclusion not supported by the facts found and thereby, applying the wrong provision of law in determining the appeal. S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Penalty Under Section 113 of the ITA 1967 [37] Finally, we will address the issue of the penalty imposed by the DGIR against TCY. The law on the penalty imposed on the incorrect returns sent by the taxpayer to the DGIR is trite. Section 113 of the ITA 1967 provides as follows: Incorrect returns 113. (1) Any person who - (a) makes an incorrect return by omitting or understating any income of which he is required by this Act to make a return on behalf of himself or another person; or (b) gives any incorrect information in relation to any matter affecting his own chargeability to tax or the chargeability to tax of any other person, shall, unless he satisfies the court that the incorrect return or incorrect information was made or given in good faith, be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine of not less than one thousand ringgit and not more than ten thousand ringgit and shall pay a special penalty of double the amount of tax which has been undercharged in consequence of the incorrect return or incorrect information or which would have been undercharged if the return or information had been accepted as correct. (2) Where a person - (a) makes an incorrect return by omitting or understating any income of which he is required by this Act to make a return on behalf of himself or another person; or (b) gives any incorrect information in relation to any matter affecting his own chargeability to tax or the chargeability to tax of any other person, then, if no prosecution under subsection (1) has been instituted in respect of the incorrect return or incorrect information, the Director General may require that person to pay a penalty equal to the amount of tax which has been undercharged in consequence of the incorrect return or incorrect information or which would have been undercharged if the return or information had been accepted as correct; and, if that person pays that penalty (or, where the penalty is abated or remitted under subsection 124(3), so much, if any, of the penalty as has not been abated S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 or remitted), he shall not be liable to be charged on the same facts with an offence under subsection (1). Under subsection 113(2), if a taxpayer is not prosecuted, the DGIR may require the taxpayer to pay a penalty equal to the amount of tax that was undercharged due to the incorrect returns. In other words, the DGIR has discretionary power to impose penalty up to 100% of the amount of tax due, a discretion that cannot be exercised at whim and fancy. See Supreme Court decision in Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v Kim Thye & Co [1992] 2 MLJ 708. [38] From the facts, it is not disputed that the filing of incorrect returns by TCY in YA 2004 and 2005 was discovered during the tax audit by the DGIR at TCY’s business premises in Segamat, Johor which was held from 5.11.2007 to 7.11.2007. By the nature of the business transaction with KET, that is, TCY had bought the timber concession and was under obligation to pay all expenses including the licence fee to extract the timber, TCY should have known that the disputed payments were prohibited from claiming deduction as provided under paragraph 39(1)(g) of the ITA 1967. It is a general legal principle that ignorance of the law is no defence - ignorantia juris non excusat. TCY cannot claim ignorance of the clear provision of law. [39] Furthermore, good faith is not a defence against the imposition of penalty under subsection 113(2) of the ITA 1967. The Court of Appeal decision in Syarikat Ibraco-Peremba Sdn Bhd v Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2017] 2 MLJ 120 at p 139 held that: [38] It is without doubt that s 113(2) of the Act gives a discretion to the respondent to impose a penalty on a person who has failed to observe the requirements of the law as provided in para 2(a) or (b) of s 113. Hence the use of the phrase ‘the Director General may require that person to pay a penalty’. There is a clear distinction between sub-s 113(1) and sub-s 113(2). Although paras 113(1)(a) and (b) and paras 113(2)(a) and (b) are almost identical, but S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 the effect of sub-s 113(1) is different from sub-s 113(2). Sub-section 113(1) provides for an offence being committed in the circumstance provided for in para (a) or (b) unless that person ‘satisfies the court that the incorrect return or incorrect information was made or given in food faith’. Whereas sub-s 113(2) provides for a situation where there is no prosecution under sub-s 113(1) has been instituted in the circumstances provided for in para 113(2)(a) or (b), the Director General may require that person to pay a penalty. That being the case, the defence of ‘good faith’ as found in sub-s 113(1), and not found in sub-s 113(2), does not apply to the Director General’s discretion under sub-s 113(2). We therefore disagree with the appellant’s submission on this score. See also the Court of Appeal decision in Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v Classic Japan (M) Sdn Bhd [2022] 3 MLJ 894 at pp 916-917. [40] Having considered the facts and the applicable law on this issue, we find that the DGIR had correctly exercised his discretion pursuant to subsection 113(2) of the ITA 1967. We do not find any reason to disturb the DGIR's discretion in imposing a penalty of 45% for incorrect returns, instead of 100% allowable under the law. Conclusion [41] For the above reasons, we are unanimous in our decision that there are merits in the DGIR’s appeal which warrant appellate intervention. We therefore allow the DGIR’s appeal and set aside both the judgment of the High Court and the decision of the SCIT with cost of RM20,000.00 here and below to be awarded to DGIR subject to the allocator. Dated: 01.11.2023 sgd CHE MOHD RUZIMA BIN GHAZALI Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 For The Appellant : Ahmad Isyak bin Mohd Hassan (Together with Syazana Safiah Rozman) [Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri (LHDN), Cyberjaya] For The Respondent : Francis Tan Leh Kiah (Together with Brandon Shen Shi Han) [Azman Davidson & Co.] S/N eu5A56nZJ0yG9gJwHTCBGA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	48,003	Tika 2.6.0
PB-44-6-05/2023	PEMOHON SUKDEV SINGH A/L KERTHA SINGH RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	Permohonan jenayah - Bidang kuasa – Permohonan untuk relif – Sama ada permohonan mengikut kehendak undang-undang – kepentingan menyatakan Tajuk perkara atau ‘intitulement’ dalam permohonan – Sama ada mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar permohonan berkenaan permohonan relif-relif – sama ada Kuasa-kuasa tambahan di bawah s. 25(2) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 terpakai – sama ada menamakan pendakwa raya sebagai responden teratur.	02/11/2023	YA Puan Fathiyah Binti Idris	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a98a0f9a-937f-4599-8f68-86253a33c8c9&Inline=true	Page 1 of 20 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI BUTTERWORTH DALAM NEGERI PULAU PINANG PERMOHONAN JENAYAH NO: PB-44-6-05/2023 Dalam perkara Mahkamah Majistret Bukit Mertajam, Seberang Perai Tengah No. Kes: PC-83-322-04/2023 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Laporan Polis No Report Seberang Jaya 001787/23, No. Report Seberang Jaya 002043/23, No. Report Seberang Jaya 002044/23, dan No. Report Seberang Jaya 002190/23 Dan Dalam perkara Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 Dan Dalam perkara Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (Akta 593) Dan Dalam perkara Akta Imegresen 1959 / 1963 Dan Dalam perkara Bidang Kuasa Sedia Ada Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Butterworth 02/11/2023 22:35:35 PB-44-6-05/2023 Kand. 16 S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 20 ANTARA SUKDEV SINGH A/L KERTHA SINGH (No. K/P: 811114-08-5719) …PEMOHON DAN PENDAKWA RAYA …RESPONDEN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PENDAHULUAN [1] Melalui satu Notis Usul bertarikh 28.5.2023, Pemohon telah memohon untuk mendapatkan perintah-perintah seperti berikut: - a) Penama Jaspreet Kaur (pemegang Pasport India No: V 3554652) ditahan di Depot Imigresen Juru dan / atau dihalang daripada diusir ke negara asalnya sehingga kes PC-83-322- 04/2023 dan semua siasatan berkaitan 4 laporan polis oleh Pemohon dan isteri Pemohon diselesaikan. b) Pihak Polis Diraja Malaysia (PDRM) dan Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia tidak memohon dan / atau mengeluarkan Perintah Pengusiran ke atas Jaspreet Kaur (pemegang Pasport India No: V 3554652) sehingga kes PC-83-322-04/2023 dan semua siasatan berkaitan 4 laporan polis oleh Pemohon dan isteri Pemohon diselesaikan. S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 20 [2] Di dalam Afidavit Sokongan (Kandungan 2) yang diikrarkan oleh Pemohon telah menyatakan antara lain fakta-fakta seperti berikut: - a) Sukdev Singh a/l Kertha Singh, K/P: 811114-08-5719 (Pemohon) telah dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Bukit Mertajam di bawah seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan, dengan nombor kes PC-83-22-04/2023. b) Mangsa yang dinyatakan di dalam pertuduhan tersebut ialah pembantu rumahnya iaitu Jaspreet Kaur, pemegang Pasport India No: V 3554652 (selepas ini dikenali sebagai Jaspreet). Pada 17.3.2023 Pemohon telah membuat satu laporan polis No: Seberang Jaya 001787/23) ke atas Jaspreet, di mana Pemohon melaporkan bahawa Jaspreet telah melarikan diri dari rumah Pemohon bersama-sama dengan barang kemas dan duit Pemohon, anggaran kerugian yang dialami oleh Pemohon adalah sebanyak RM3850.00. c) Selanjutnya pada 28.3.2023, Pemohon dan isterinya telah membuat dua laporan polis ke atas Jaspreet, iaitu Laporan Polis Seberang Jaya 002043/23 dan 002044/23. d) Di dalam Laporan Polis Seberang Jaya 002043/23, Pemohon menyatakan bahawa pada 17.3.2023, Jaspreet telah mencuri barang kemas dan duit perniagaannya. Jaspreet juga telah melarikan diri daripada rumah Pemohon dan dipercayai tinggal dengan 1 lelaki India bernama Sathiasilan a/l Ravi. e) Di dalam Laporan Polis Seberang Jaya 002044/23, isteri Pemohon yang bernama Sandeep Kaur menyatakan bahawa Jaspreet telah melarikan diri bersama barang-barang kemas yang dicurinya. Sandeep Kaur percaya bahawa Jaspreet S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 20 telah membuat satu laporan polis yang menafikan beliau mencuri barang-barang kemas. Sandeep Kaur juga percaya bahawa Jaspreet telah ditahan di rumah perlindungan dan akan dihantar pulang ke negara asal. f) Seterusnya pada 3.4.2023, Sandeep Kaur telah membuat satu lagi laporan polis ke atas Jaspreet, iaitu laporan polis Seberang Jaya 002190/23. Sandeep Kaur melaporkan bahawa sekitar bulan Mac 2023, dua orang anaknya sering didera dan dibuli oleh Jaspreet. Kedua-dua anak tersebut telah mendapat rawatan di klinik atas kecederaan yang dialami. Sandeep Kaur juga percaya bahawa Jaspreet telah membuat satu laporan polis yang menyatakan bahawa Jaspreet telah didera oleh Sukdev (Pemohon) dan Sandeep Kaur. g) Selanjutnya Pemohon menyatakan bahawa setelah Pemohon membuat laporan polis bertarikh 17.3.2023, pihak polis tidak mengambil apa-apa tindakan terhadap Jaspreet. Pada 18.3.2023, Jaspreet telah membuat laporan polis dan pada hari yang sama Pemohon telah ditangkap dan direman selama tujuh (7) hari. Pada 25.3.2023, Pemohon telah dituduh di Mahkamah Majistret Bukit Mertajam di bawah seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan. h) Pada 18.4.2023, pihak Imigresen telah menyoal siasat Pemohon mengenai maklumat pekerjaan, permit dan pasport Jaspreet. Pemohon telah dimaklumkan bahawa Jaspreet telah dihantar ke Depot Imigresen Juru dan dalam proses untuk dihantar balik ke negara asal. S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 5 of 20 i) Pada 3.5.2023, Pemohon melalui peguambela telah menghantar surat kepada Pegawai Penyiasat dan pada 16.5.2023 Pemohon melalui peguambela telah menghantar surat kepada Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Mahkamah Majistret Bukit Mertajam, Pengarah Pendakwaan Negeri Pulau Pinang dan Jabatan Peguam Negara Malaysia, untuk mendapatkan status siasatan mengenai laporan-laporan polis yang telah dibuat oleh pemohon dan isterinya Sandeep Kaur. j) Sehingga permohonan ini difailkan, pemohon masih belum mendapat sebarang keputusan dan jawapan terhadap persoalan yang dikemukakan dalam surat / e-mel tersebut. Pemohon kemudiannya mendapat maklumat bahawa prosiding deposisi sedang dijalankan ke atas Jaspreet. k) Pada 19.5.2023, Pemohon telah menghantar surat kepada Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia Pulau Pinang dan bertanyakan sebab-sebab penahanan Jaspreet di Depot Imigresen Juru. Pihak pemohon tidak menerima apa-apa jawapan berkaitan pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang diajukan dalam surat tersebut. [3] Terdapat dua lagi Afidavit iaitu Kandungan (6) dan (7) yang telah difailkan oleh pihak pemohon, yang mana pemohon memberi penjelasan, penafian dan jawapan-jawapan kepada Afidavit Responden (Kandungan 5). S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 6 of 20 Hujahan Responden [4] Responden dalam membantah permohonan ini menghujahkan seperti berikut:- i) Notis Usul yang difailkan oleh Pemohon ini merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah. Ini kerana cabaran terhadap tindakan Responden yang merupakan pihak berkuasa awam yang menjalankan tugas-tugas awam hanya boleh dimulakan melalui Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman di bawah Aturan 53 Keadah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. ii) Pemohon juga tidak mempunyai apa-apa kausa tindakan terhadap Responden. Ini kerana Responden bukan pihak yang sepatutnya dinamakan sebagai pihak di dalam tindakan ini dan Responden tidak mempunyai kuasa untuk memutuskan perkara berkenaan dengan pengusiran penama tersebut. iii) Berdasarkan Perkara 145(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan Seksyen 376(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, perkara berkaitan dengan urusan di dalam prosiding di Mahkamah adalah kuasa prerogative Pendakwa Raya untuk menentukan siapa yang akan dipanggil sebagai saksi. Hujahan Pemohon [5] Peguam pemohon di dalam hujahannya telah membangkitkan semula perkara-perkara yang dinyatakan oleh pemohon di dalam afidavitnya seperti yang telah dinyatakan di awal tadi. Secara ringkasnya, hujahan peguam pemohon seperti berikut: - S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 20 i) Pengarah Pendakwaan Negeri (PPN) boleh memberi arahan terus, tetapi PPN telah memohon untuk mendapatkan Kertas Siasatan daripada pihak polis. ii) Selanjutnya deposisi telah diambil oleh Pegawai Penyiasat berdasarkan arahan PPN. Jika penama (Jaspreet) diusir setelah deposisi diambil, maka pihak pendakwaan tidak boleh mengambil tindakan untuk mendakwa Jaspreet. iii) Tindakan pihak Imigresen adalah bergantung kepada arahan PPN Analisa Dan Dapatan Mahkamah [6] Berdasarkan relif-relif yang dipohon di dalam Notis Usul ini, Mahkamah mendapati ianya termasuk dalam kategori mandamus, injunksi/perintah larangan. [7] Oleh itu, isu yang mesti ditentukan terlebih dahulu adalah berkenaan dengan bidang kuasa Mahkamah berhubung dengan permohonan dan relif yang dipohon. [8] Bidang kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi telah dinyatakan dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan iaitu di bawah Perkara 121(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan seperti berikut: - “Perkara 121, Kuasa Kehakiman Persekutuan (1) Maka hendaklah ada dua Mahkamah Tinggi yang setara bidang kuasa dan tarafnya iaitu: - (a) satu di Negeri-Negeri Tanah Melayu, yang dikenali sebagai Mahkamah Tinggi di Malaya dan yang mempunyai pejabat pendaftarannya yang utama di S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 8 of 20 mana-mana tempat di Negeri-Negeri Tanah Melayu yang ditentukan oleh Yang Di-Pertuan Agong; dan (b) satu di negeri Sabah dan Sarawak, yang dikenali sebagai Mahkamah Tinggi di Sabah dan Sarawak dan yang mempunyai pejabat pendaftarannya yang utama di mana-mana tempat di Negeri Sabah dan Sarawak yang ditentukan oleh Yang Di-Pertuan Agong; (c) (dimansuhkan) Dan mana-mana mahkamah bawahan yang diperuntukan oleh undang-undang persekutuan dan Mahkamah Tinggi dan mahkamah bawahan itu hendaklah mempunyai apa-apa bidang kuasa dan kuasa yang diberikan oleh atau di bawah undang-undang persekutuan.” [9] Di dalam kes PP v. Kok Wah Kuan [2007] 6 CLJ 341; [2008] 1 MLJ 1 diputuskan seperti berikut: - "If we want to know the jurisdiction and powers of the two High Courts, we will have to look at the Federal law. If we want to call those powers ‘judicial powers’, we are perfectly entitled to. But, to what extent such judicial powers are vested in the two High Courts depend on what Federal law provides, not on the interpretation the term judicial power as prior to the amendment." [10] Maka dapatlah difahami bahawa berdasarkan Perkara 121(1) Perlembagaan Persekutan, bidang kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi dalam perkara jenayah adalah diberikan oleh undang-undang Persekutuan di bawah Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964, Kanun Tatacara Jenayah dan kuasa sedia ada Mahkamah Tinggi. S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 20 [11] Kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi yang diberikan di bawah Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 dapat dilihat dalam seksyen 22 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: - “(1) The High Court shall have jurisdiction to try: (a) all offences committed: (i) within its local jurisdiction; (ii) on the high seas on board any ship or on any aircraft registered in Malaysia; (iii) by any citizen or any permanent resident on the high seas on board any ship or on any aircraft; (iv) by any person on the high seas where the offences in piracy by the law of nations; and (b) Offences under Chapters VI and VI A of the Panel Code, and under any of the written specified in the Schedule to the Extraterritorial Offences Act 1976, or offences under any other written law the commission of which is certified by the Attorney General to the affect the security of Malaysia committed, as the case may be: (i) on the high seas on board any ship or on any aircraft registered in Malaysia; (ii) by any citizen or any permanent resident on the high seas onboard any ship or on any aircraft; (iii) by any citizen or any permanent resident in any place without and beyond the limits of Malaysia; (iv) by any person against a citizen of Malaysia; S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 10 of 20 (v) by any person against property belonging to the Government of Malaysia or the Government of any State in Malaysia located outside Malaysia, including diplomatic or consular premises of Malaysia; (vi) by any person to compel the Government of Malaysia or the Government of any State in Malaysia to do or refrain from doing any act; (vii) by any stateless person who has his habitual residence in Malaysia; (viii) by any person against or on board a fixed platform while it is located on the continental shelf of Malaysia; or (ix) by any person who after the commission of the offence is present in Malaysia. (2) The High Court may pass any sentence allowed by law” [12] Di dalam Notis Usul di hadapan Mahkamah ini, relif yang dipohon sepertimana yang dinyatakan di awal tadi bahawa pemohon hendak menghalang pihak Imigresen dari mengambil tindakan menghantar Jaspreet Kaur pulang ke negara asalnya iaitu India, sehingga perbicaraan terhadap pertuduhan yang dihadapi oleh pemohon dan siasatan pihak polis dalam empat laporan polis yang dibuat oleh pemohon selesai disiasat. [13] Berdasarkan relif yang dipohon, saya berpendapat bahawa mahkamah ini tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk memberikan relif-relif tersebut kerana tidak terdapat peruntukan di bawah Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 atau Kanun Tatacara Jenayah yang memberi kuasa kepada mahkamah ini untuk berbuat demikian. S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 20 [14] Secara khususnya relif-relif yang dipohon, adalah untuk mencabar kuasa Ketua Pengarah Imigresen mengeluarkan Perintah Pengusiran di bawah seksyen 33 Akta Imigresen. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada seksyen 33 Akta Imigresen 1959/63 yang menyatakan:- “Removal of Persons unlawfully remaining in Malaysia (1) Where the presence of any person in Malaysia is unlawful by reason of section 9, 15 or 60 the person shall, whether or not any proceedings are taken against him in respect of any offence against this Act, be removed from Malaysia by order of the Director General.” [15] Berdasarkan seksyen 33 yang tersebut, hanya Ketua Pengarah Imigresen Malaysia yang mempunyai kuasa untuk mengusir seseorang ke negara asalnya. [16] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak Responden bahawa apa-apa permohonan untuk mencabar keputusan, tindakan atau peninggalan oleh penjawat awam hanya boleh dimulakan dengan permohonan Semakan Kehakiman di bawah Aturan 53 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan bukannya melalui Notis Usul (Permohonan Jenayah pelbagai). [17] Oleh kerana pihak Imigresen merupakan pihak berkuasa awam, maka sebarang cabaran kepada keputusan, tindakan atau peninggalan oleh pihak berkuasa awam hanya boleh dimulakan melalui Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman di bawah Aturan 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. [18] Mahkamah ini merujuk keputusan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Ketua Pengarah Imigresen Malaysia vs Heng Peo (2007) 2 CLJ S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 12 of 20 111, yang memutuskan secara muktamad bahawa untuk mencabar tindakan / keputusan pihak berkuasa awam adalah melalui Semakan Kehakiman. [19] Jelasnya dari permohonan yang dibuat oleh Pemohon dalam kes ini, adalah tidak mematuhi Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 berkaitan perkara-perkara yang dipohon seperti Aturan 53 bagi permohonan untuk mandamus atau seksyen 44 dan 45 Akta Relif Spesifik 1950. Tajuk-tajuk perkara atau "intitulements" yang dinyatakan adalah tidak mencukupi [20] Mengenai ‘intitulement’ atau tajuk-tajuk perkara, di dalam Notis Usul ini Pemohon telah menyatakan intitulement seperti berikut: - “Dalam perkara Mahkamah Majistret Bukit Mertajam, Seberang Perai Tengah No. Kes: PC-83-322-04/2023 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Laporan Polis No Report Seberang Jaya 001787/23, 002043/23, 002044/23 dan 002190/23 Dan Dalam Perkara Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 Dan Dalam Perkara Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (Akta 593) Dan Dalam perkara Akta Imegresen 1959 / 1963 Dan S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 13 of 20 Dalam perkara Bidang Kuasa Sedia Ada Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Butterworth”. [21] Intitulement ini hanya menyatakan secara umum di bawah undang- undang atau kaedah-kaedah mana permohonan ini disandarkan bagi menyokong permohonan Pemohon. Tajuk-tajuk perkara tersebut tidak menyatakan peruntukan undang-undang yang betul dan bersesuaian yang mana permohonan tersebut dibuat atau dibenarkan dibuat. [22] Dalam perkara ini, Mahkamah ini sekali lagi merujuk dan bersandarkan kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Ketua Pengarah Imigresen Malaysia lwn. Heng Peo (2007) 2 CLJ 111, di mana Zulkefli Makinudin (HMR pada ketika itu) menyampaikan penghakiman Mahkamah menyatakan: “[14] Sungguhpun salah satu daripada tajuk-tajuk perkara kepada permohonan tersebut ada menyatakan Kanun Acara Jenayah ("KAJ"), persoalannya adalah di bawah peruntukan mana KAJ ianya dibuat. Sesuatu permohonan jenayah yang boleh dibuat adalah terhad kepada apa yang dibenarkan dipohon di bawah KAJ tersebut dan atas bidang perkara tertentu sahaja antara lainnya seperti berikut: (i) Permohonan untuk suatu bon kehadiran orang kena tuduh di mahkamah di bawah s. 49. (ii) Permohonan untuk suatu bon kehadiran pengadu dan saksi-saksi di bawah s. 118. (iii) Permohonan untuk mengemukakan harta benda atau dokumen di mahkamah di bawah s. 51. (iv) Prosedur permohonan oleh pihak polis berkenaan rampasan harta benda di bawah s. 413. S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 14 of 20 (v) Permohonan untuk tahanan di bawah s. 117. (vi) Permohonan oleh seseorang yang bercadang untuk merayu di mana ianya dilarang berbuat demikian melainkan dibenarkan oleh Hakim atas kepentingan keadilan di bawah s. 310. (vii) Permohonan untuk suatu penggantungan penghakiman sementara menanti rayuan di bawah s. 311. (viii) Permohonan untuk suatu writ habeas corpus di bawah ss. 365 dan 366. [15] Di dalam kes ini apa yang dapat dilihat daripada perintah atau relif yang dipohon oleh pemohon adalah ianya tidak tergolong langsung dalam bidang perkara yang dibenarkan di bawah KAJ, tetapi ianya pada pandangan kami sepatutnya dibuat dan dipohon di bawah undang-undang yang lain. Relif yang dipohon oleh pemohon adalah berbentuk suatu perintah mandamus dan dalam hal perkara ini pemohon sepatutnya memulakan prosiding permohonan semakan kehakiman untuk relif tersebut melalui tatacara yang ditetapkan di bawah A. 53 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 ("KMT 1980"). Mengikut peruntukan A. 53 k. 2 KMT 1980 sesuatu permohonan untuk semakan kehakiman hendaklah dalam bentuk Borang 111A dan ini tidak dilakukan oleh pemohon. Mengikut peruntukan A. 53 k. 3 KMT 1980 pemohon hendaklah memperolehi kebenaran mahkamah terlebih dahulu untuk suatu permohonan semakan kehakiman difailkan dan kehendak ini juga tidak patuhi oleh pemohon. Sekiranya tiada kebenaran terlebih dahulu diperolehi oleh pemohon dalam kes sekarang ini maka mahkamah dianggap telah bertindak tanpa bidangkuasa dalam membenarkan pemohon untuk memohon suatu perintah mandamus. (Sila lihat kes S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 15 of 20 Mersing Omnibus Co. Sdn. Bhd. v. Minister of Labour & Manpower and Anor. [1983] 2 CLJ 7; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 266). [16] Perintah mandamus juga boleh dipohon oleh pemohon terhadap pengkhidmat awam untuk melaksanakan sesuatu tindakan melalui kaedah permohonan yang diperuntukkan di bawah ss. 44 dan 45 Akta Relif Spesifik 1950 (Akta 137). Tiada kebenaran ("leave") diperlukan diperolehi terlebih dahulu sebelum permohonan untuk relif atau remedinya dipohon melalui kaedah yang diperuntukkan di bawah ss. 44 dan 45 Akta 137. (Sila lihat kes Metro Pacific Sdn. Bhd. v. Ketua Pengarah Kesatuan Sekerja & Anor. [2002] 8 CLJ 660) Di dalam kes sekarang ini pemohon tidak berbuat demikian dan tidak ada menyatakan peruntukan berkenaan sebagai tajuk perkara kepada permohonan yang difailkan.” [23] Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan yang disampaikan oleh YA Tengku Maimun bt Tuan Mat (pada masa itu HMR) yang telah mengesahkan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes Uthayakumar Ponnusamy v. YAB Dato’ Sri Najib Tun Razak, Perdana Menteri Malaysia & Ors (2017) 6 CLJ 297 yang memutuskan seperti berikut: - "Tajuk-tajuk perkara ini bukan sahaja penting kepada responden-responden antara lain untuk menyediakan hujahan undang-undang berkenaan dengan berkesan tetapi juga penting kepada mahkamah antaranya untuk mempertimbangkan keesahan permohonan berdasarkan undang-undang termasuk kaedah-kaedah yang dinyatakan. Kepentingan tajuk-tajuk perkara ini telah dijelaskan dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan Cheow Chew Khoon v. Abdul Johari Abdul Rahman [1995] 4 CLJ 127; [1995] 1 MLJ 457 di ms. 142 (CLJ); ms. 477 (MLJ) seperti berikut: The plaintiff, as noted earlier, S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 16 of 20 says that if one were to undertake a careful scrutiny of the originating summons and the affidavit in support, one would come to the conclusion that it is not an application made under O. 89. The summons does not, as I observed very early in this judgment, state any particular rule of court in its intitulement. Now, I think that that is not only the court to determine which rule of court the plaintiff is invoking unless he explicitly specifies it? If a defendant and the court should have not to conduct a close examination of the supporting affidavit in each case in order to determine the particular jurisdiction or power that is being invoked by an originating summons or other originating process that requires an intitulement, then a plaintiff will be at liberty to shift from one rule to another or indeed from one statute to another as it pleases him without any warning whatsoever to his opponent or the court. It would make a mockery of the principle that there must be no surprise in civil litigation. If the’ submission of counsel be the law, then it is wrong. But I am firmly of the view that it is not. In my judgment, this matter, which is a point of practice and procedure, is to be resolved by reference to the fundamental principle that a party must not take his opponent or the court by surprise. It is my opinion that an originating process requiring an intitulement must state, with sufficient particularity, either in its heading or in its body, the statute of rule of court under which the court is being moved: otherwise it would be an embarrassing pleading and be may be liable to be struck out, unless sooner amended." S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 17 of 20 Kuasa Tambahan - Seksyen 25 (2) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 [24] Di dalam intitulement, pemohon juga ingin bergantung kepada seksyen 25(2) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman apabila pemohon menyatakan “bidang kuasa sedia ada Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Butterworth.” [25] Kuasa tambahan di dalam Seksyen 25(2) yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut: - “25. Powers of the High Court: (1) ... (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) the High Court shall have additional powers set out in the Schedule: Provided that all such powers shall be exercised in accordance with any written law or rules of court relating to the same. Schedule (Section 25(2)) Additional Powers Of High Court 1. Prerogative writs Power to issue to any person or authority directions, orders or writs of the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrants and certiorari, or any others, for the enforcement of the rights conferred by part II of the Constitution, or any of them or for any purpose.” [26] Kuasa tambahan ini boleh digunakan selaras dengan undang- undang bertulis atau Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 berhubung perkara yang sama, sepertimana yang telah diputuskan oleh S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 18 of 20 Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Ketua Pengarah Imigresen Malaysia lwn. Heng Peo (supra) seperti berikut: - "[19] Persoalannya sekarang adalah sama ada remedi-remedi yang dipohon oleh pemohon boleh diperolehi melalui sesuatu Permohonan Jenayah Pelbagai dengan adanya rujukan kepada peruntukan seksyen 25(2) dan perenggan 1 Jadual kepada Akta 91 tersebut sebagai tajuk perkara atau ‘intitulement’ kepada permohonan tersebut. Kami berpendapat kuasa-kuasa tambahan yang diberi kepada mahkamah oleh seksyen 25(2) Akta 91 seperti yang diperuntukkan di bawah perenggan 1 Jadual tersebut hendaklah dilaksanakan mengikut kehendak undang-undang bertulis atau kaedah- kaedah mahkamah mengenainya. Kehendak undang-undang bertulis atau kaedah-kaedah mahkamah yang dimaksudkan dan terpakai dalam hal perkara ini adalah A. 53 KMT (sila lihat kes Pahang South Union Omnibus Co Bhd v. Minister of Labour and Manpower & Anor [1981] 2 MLJ 199). Di dalam kes rayuan sekarang ini pemohon telah menggunakan prosedur melalui Permohonan Jenayah Pelbagai untuk bertindak dan meyakinkan Mahkamah Tinggi melaksanakan kuasa-kuasa tambahannya seperti yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 25(2) dan perenggan 1 Jadual kepada Akta 91. Kami berpendapat oleh kerana prosedur permohonan yang digunakan oleh pemohon adalah salah maka Mahkamah Tinggi dalam memberi perintah yang dipohon oleh pemohon adalah dengan ini bertindak tanpa bidang kuasa dan perintah yang diberi adalah dianggap tidak sah." [27] Prinsip undang-undang dalam kes ini seharusnya terpakai bagi permohonan jenayah seperti dalam permohonan di hadapan Mahkamah ini. S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 19 of 20 [28] Oleh itu, kuasa tambahan di bawah seksyen 25(2) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 juga tidak terpakai, kerana prosedur permohonan yang digunakan oleh pemohon adalah salah, maka mahkamah tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa dalam permohonan ini. Pemohon telah salah menamakan Timbalan Pendakwa Raya sebagai Responden [29] Dalam isu ini, pihak Pemohon di dalam Afidavit sokongannya (Kandungan 2) telah menyebut mengenai tindakan yang berkaitan dengan dua pihak, iaitu tindakan oleh pihak Imigresen dan tindakan oleh pihak Polis (PDRM). [30] Maka pihak yang patut dinamakan sebagai Responden ialah Ketua Pengarah Imigresen Malaysia (Ketua Pengarah) jika Pemohon ingin menghalang pengusiran dilakukan ke atas Jaspreet. [31] Seperti yang telah dibincangkan di awal tadi bahawa seksyen 33 Akta Imigresen 1959/63, memberi kuasa kepada Ketua Pengarah Imigresen untuk mengusir mana-mana orang ke negara asalnya. Maka sewajarnya Pemohon memohon perintah untuk menghalang Ketua Pengarah Imigresen daripada menggunakan kuasanya di bawah seksyen 33 Akta Imigresen 1959/63. [32] Kuasa Pendakwa Raya adalah dalam perkara yang berkaitan dengan urusan di dalam prosiding Mahkamah (conduct of prosecution) sebagaimana yang diperuntukan dalam Perkara 145(3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan Seksyen 376(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Adalah kuasa prerogative Pendakwa Raya untuk menentukan siapa yang akan dipanggil sebagai saksi. S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 20 of 20 KESIMPULAN [33] Berdasarkan huraian di atas, Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa alasan permohonan dan hujahan yang dikemukakan oleh Pemohon adalah tidak bermerit, maka dengan ini Mahkamah menolak Permohonan di dalam Notis Usul (Kandungan 1) tersebut. Bertarikh: 2 November 2023 ………………………….. (FATHIYAH BINTI IDRIS) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Butterworth Pulau Pinang PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi pihak Responden: Mohd Azhar bin Hamzah Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Pulau Pinang Bagi pihak Pemohon: Hari Prassad Rao a/l Chandra Segaran Peguam Bela dan Peguam Cara Tetuan Chandra Segaran Butterworth, Pulau Pinang. S/N mgKqXTmUWPaIYlOjPIyQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	29,469	Tika 2.6.0
CB-62D-238-10/2023	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara] TERTUDUH SAUFI ZULFIKAR BIN OMAR	PROSEDUR JENAYAH : Mengaku salah – sabitan ke atas 3 pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 15(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952-sama ada sabitan teratur.RAYUAN : Rayuan atas hukuman – memasukkan dadah ke dalam badan sendiri – kesalahan berulang – sama ada hukuman setimpal dengan kesalahan. HUKUMAN : Hukuman di bawah seksyen 39C(1) Akta Dadah Berbahaya – sama ada hukuman penjara dan sebatan melampau – sama ada mitigasi tertuduh telah dipertimbangkan.	02/11/2023	Tuan Haji Jamaludin Bin Haji Mat	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=10d307b1-d850-4640-8855-fa5e4b7ce6bd&Inline=true	Alasan Penghakiman 238.pdf 02/11/2023 08:50:38 CB-62D-238-10/2023 Kand. 12 S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sQfTEFDYQEaIVfpeS3zmvQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal CB—62D—238—1D/2023 Kand. 12 12,11/2:21 :2-uy :3 DALAM MIAHKAMAH sssvsn m rememon. DALAM Macaw PAHANG rmzun. uumun, MALAVSIA KES ND: cs.s2u—2:s-1n/202: s DI ANYARA PENDAKWA nu ...PENDAKWA DAM sAuFI zumxm am own: ...YERYUDUN \~ KORUM: HAJI JAMALUDIN BIN HAJI MAT, HAKIM MAHKAMAH SESVEN 1. TEMERLOH YARIKH HUKUMAN: 4 omaaan ma :0 ALASAN vsmsuxumnu sw snrrzrnvuzawrvessznwu 5» mm Sum M... M“ be used m wow u. nvwvuﬁlv mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm PERMULAAN 1 Aiasan penghaklmsn W mssdxakan nenmm. danpadi uyuan Tertuduh yang hdak bemuas nan lerhaaap kepulusan saya yang 5 mhenxan paaa 4.10.202: at many say: \|:lah mensabﬂkan Yenuduh dw hzwan Seluyen vsmuy Am um». Eerhahnyn am dzn dlhukum penhn Ialaml 5 mum mulal danpadl laukh 253.202: dan 3 mu-an an bawah Soksyon ascmun Akla mam Eerhahay: 1252 an mpanmankan menizlam m pengawisan AADK selama : mum sevepas malualam hukuman m bawah Seksyen us An. Dnduh Bevb:hay:1B§2 2 Rayuan aaamh lerhadap hukuman sanap us 3 Peumah pemeruavaanmakdltawakmkan PERTUDUHAN o Fad: M02023, Tenumm (elah dmadapkan ke Mahkamah za Sesyen Temerlnh dengan perluduhzn sepem henkm .j. (gunman; >1W!7M,Fn/LIIVDKIHUIAI .‘.,..., mm......; W; N surrzrnvuzawvmescumvu um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhuﬂlli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm 25 say: mem1ana\|I mMIgas4 yang enkan oven Temmuh hdak bermenl sama sekaln PENGAKUAN sum 25 say: Ma rnengamrm kna parlgakuan sa\zh Terluduh yang Iebh menjlmatkan mm ﬂan kc: pmaminax mg nenmau 27 Walau bagalmanapun pengakuan saxan Yerluduh hdzk huleh m meruadv «mar mmgasv yang kuat (Mam kezdaan .1. mm Terluduh memang (mak mempunyaw apa~apa pembelaan nka ken inmlmurakan za Mahkamah ml mengzmhsl pendeluun yang szmz senagzmana Is dalam kes 17: An Lung v. Public Pruae:ulor\|2UD4] 4 cu 77 m mzna VA Mnkmal smm HMR rnenya\|akzn m mmmn m 1: an acoepled rule 04 Wm» (ml In accumd person um plead: nuﬂvy In an nllence wnn wmcn ha his ham :4» mmm . snmna be own a mswum an In: sanlnnna my wumd mnmm have been Ampwed an mm nan n. Men calwxcled ma . mal yet there ave mm-.x exuepuanx m um: g:n:la\ Ma mam ms aﬂerux: “mun. Dangerous Drugs AI:11§§2 are exclpnnns ln1husrule' :.m..,.,, . uwnzn/wruw9<nM4I ...,.,, nvzxmnnvwz mu. N smzruvuawmessxmm um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm 29. Mahkamah In: semnjuhwyi mslwuk kes PF y. Abdul Halim Ishak 4 saw Lag! [2013] 5 cu 559 di mzna YA Muhd Zawawl Salleh HMR (elah menramvkzn pzndzngannya sebagalmana benkm 5 1211 Hank dapal dxperlwkawan buhnw: knalahan yzng hurkawzn dangan dadan aaawah memplkin aam kculahan yang mm yang wen merlﬁlnclm kauiamatzn nan Ivalenlualmn ngava sen; kcsmilin umum Daﬂzh Isiah dufllmalkan ncagav nwsuh namlwrsllu naglm ahh Kmqaan m pad: umm was Juam, nu mlhkamah mnmmuhkzn hukuman yang Imgin kevudn xilu kculahzn yang dweupkan melahn Pathmen sehugiv sews Audah lenlu psmndungan sewapamya max ﬂaps! mama" mam: mug vamaw Dahm kn: Yusmann Samsmim y as (sums) mahkzmah mengaikan we The sevenly at unlanoe can omy he to IeV\|«l Parhamenls mlnnlmn Ihal mrmwon rm mm, m posueumn av a law: amuum at any law: at pvummled drugs must mmmsmuvzh will the semenue to be pissed an Imnnnmavlzns a!eachcase' pasnun YEGAR so saya wga mempemmbangkan cam bahawa szhwan kalu ml hukanlah kesalahan panama nmmun Rekad sabwan Vamplu as Temmuh (P5) yang dikemukakan m Mahkamah menunwkkan bahawa Terluduh mempunyaw 3 saman Xe: Aenayah yang belkauzn dengan daaah ssbemnl W ?jc.._,..,., ,,.a.u'y.ya_.m .m.. .,.,..., ym,..y.,.,. Pagell aw sowzrnvuia vvnesaxmvﬂ «ma am.‘ n-nhnrwm be used m mm a. mm-y mm: dun-mm y.. mum v-max 31 Rekod sarmn lampau renuuun manunjukkan bahawa Terluduh mempakzn pesalah (egav, masm balum msal dan masm hemm senkwmzupun (elah bending mu keluarmasuk peruava Semua kesalahan yang dﬂakukan wgz adalah henkausn dengan dadah 32 men yang demlhzn, sewmamya Tenuduh mkenakan lmkuman yzng berzt 33 Bemasark-In kepada nasms m ans, say: bemuas nan bahawa m hukuman peruara 5 \|ahun dzn 3 sebalan yang dvksnakan uleh Mallkamah Ini admah selau dengan kapulusan Mahkamah Aiasan aw alas yang menghendzkr Mzhkaman mengsnakan rmkuman yang mam hag! kes-kes yang mehhilkin kepenhngan avwam Hukuman penjzla 5 tamm aﬂalah mempikan hukumzn vi pemara panng rmmma yang hcleh mahkamzh kenzkan Hukumzn sebatan sebanyak 3 xan adalah mm memandzngkan on mempunyal rekod sahnan lampau mellhaxkin kesa\ahan— kesabhan yang sama In TIADA nAsA INSAF mu asxnusn 34 Dz\am mmgaumy; Yanuduh (idak langslmg menunyukxan rlsa bersalah alau ma! :5 as Sekirznya hellau hens!-benar Insaﬂ sudah \|en(u nenau max akan mengmangl kesalahan yang sama bemlang xau cIu:2 -mm: rvuwnuu-wlmrwluumxl -vmn:\| \vrw.\nIvv»' P.vgeI.4 N smzruvuawmessxmm um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm as Mahkamah WU mevumk kes PP v. ron Ah Chang [1976] 2 MLJ was an mane YA Alanna! Cidar H le\zh menyalakan sepsm mm s ‘The Ivspnndenl mm pull mmm m ms Mel n mmglnnn m. ta-:1 am he u Imphyad and iuppoﬂs .n Igld mamu znd ilenbrelheu H: mama La! aomse have Ihaughl at um. mm oamrmmw m. aﬂalvoes and MI arm. n. u m van nlsadmg harashv mmn mm m eonsazuem-2: no ms mm id: and 1 H: mm Iedevala what 1 ma umsm nvewnmw m uhgervs m analher am that an uneuder snoma nut lune!-1m nuts or humus my xymnzmy on in mm mm Dy um"; Ihal slams :7 the uupemm mm who kmeﬂ hr: nnrerm mm zn am and men welded m mmganon man he W: .n nmhan KEPEMTINGAN AWAIII TERPELIHARA 37 Say: percaya. kepenhngan awam akan mum \|evpe\|Ihara uka Tenuduh diasmgkzn danpada masyarakat da\zm suzm lempoh :0 yang panyang as Tempoh pemenﬁraan yang paruang Juga dmarapkzn dapal memnanm Tenuduh umuk melupakan naps dadah yang mungkwn sudah meruadl dzmh dzgmg Terwduh ..s....,.....m w..4m_..,..m.,. umn; mm.».w Pzgnu sw smzrnvu:=wm.sa.m «-um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm 39 Tempah pemeruaraan yang paruang mga dmarapkan davzt memumskan hubungan Terluduh dengan rakamvakzn seperuenayah yang lain dan Tenuduh dapal marualanl pmgrzrw pmgvam pemulman dengan inlet: 40 Semugz 5e\epas menglkuu pvvgrzlwpmglam yang wan msusun semasa m pennra nann dapzl mengmsauun Tenuduh dzn memben pehlang kepzda Tenuduh umuk hemluhasabah am an berubah kepzda semng mm yang Iebih hawk ﬂan dapal In menmggzxkan dadah sepenuhnya. 41 says Anya bevharap bellau mangamw pemang semasa menmam hukuman pengam mm mempeman pelhagiw kemimvan Denaedah yang buleh mgunakan nmuk mencan I5 vezekl yang max kenka dxbebaskan danpaﬂa peluara mm. FELUANG MEMBAIKI mm 42 Sunny: dengzn lempoh pemenjarzan mg mm: W member! an pemang kepaﬂa Tenuduh unluk bemhzh aan memperbmkv dm menjadl seorang wavganegalz yang bevguna ﬂan menukzv cam mﬂup kepada yang lebm hawk 43 D1 pemara mg; Termduh hevpeluzng uniuk Delmar Hmu-Hmu :5 zkzdermk dan Ilmu—1\|mu kemamvan kendm secara Ievsusun bevsama pegawzrpegawaw yang berlauhah : EAAXLLHIH/1B1) nuwsn muurnnul «myth xlxuulzvwu mus N smzruvuawmessxmm gm smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm 44 Adam dmalapkan‘ serepas dwbebaskan ﬂavvpada peruava nanln Terluduh -mu mm mm a new rear ﬂan membahaskan dm danpads ms dadah serla menyaﬂl seorang Insan ham yang Vehnh proaukm, menyayangl darn msayang: men anggola .s masyarakal numusm 45 Du mm anahsws‘ saya berpendapat hukuman yang (ehh m dualuhkan mm mengukut \mdang—undzng wapr ﬂan munasabah sen: senmpax dengzn kesalahan yang dllakukan oven renumm Eovurikh had: cmm Clktnber 2023. Mankanuh Suyen Tlmerloh. Parung mm: Makmuv. : ¢..m...,.,,, r:,wusA.rKum$-uznnnvnr umvr: \)wu w\|u) mu. N surrzrnvuzawvmescumvu mm Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm u. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm [eh ASP suvaka: .1: Munlnndy, Punt-aw: Ray: dlwak 5 um Pejabal Polis Daerlh Temevloh, Tenlarloh. m.‘ .7 N mrrzrnvuiaxvrpesazmvu mm Sum IHIVVDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm mmuum amnu «mu 1'/ma mm mu 1021 m4 LEBIH xmms n 5: mum in mum rwan mmoum smsnn muuu s Mncurlk Iuur:JAuAr vous mum; on mum u.«I:kAu mmuon on mm»: Nzcckl mums mm wxkmuk. mm DIDAPAII um.:.u~w./m mom: nmmuu uzms Mom-um: u ml AM mm/H KAMU nnvcm cm. \4r.NvAL«m nmmw V mum; mm mm nmuum mm mm vxmxuxm m srsA\|AHAr~ m saw/«II stksvm mum um mum anumwA ms: mu mum; mm scam»: muxumx MSALAHAN smxu nl AYAS mm Dis/\aInu\' nmom nm a: swim)» s xrs/mam m am./m sgksvm vwu um om mu. nF\4Ixm.‘~4. man aoLn4 umuxum uumuu msvw sum) AKT/\ mm sAw\ mm umu uumm mmzx xxsm AHA vmosmn an nuxuumz mama scum rmpou wvmx xurmr. m mum mm nmx MELUHHI m nlum mu HrNnA\<IA1I mm muwwm umcuw uuxumw sew rum Lsmu mrumm mm snwm us um PDVCAWASAN nmx xux,«~«, ummn L1) uuw mm nmk MLLLEIHI mm m mew ...,.,.,.....,. .“w.m..,..».,.... W... m.......... mu sm sowzruvuialvvn-saxmvu «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! FENGAKUAN 5 Ferluduhan .1‘ 11:: le\ah dvbacakan dengan (erzng dan ﬁlms kepada Terluduh dalam Bahasa Mauyswa yang mcanam oxen Termduh s Tenuduh dengan sukareh mengaku Dersalan ke alas penuduhan (ersebut m 7 Mahkamah selevusnya menemngkan Mal am akmax pangakuan salah (evsehm dan pemnlukan hukuman yang men dlkenakzn kc alas Terluduh. s Tanuduh memahaml penerangan Mahkamah din maslh ts mengaku sa\ah K2 was penuduhan‘ ﬂan vanam sovan uan akmm pengakuannya mu RINGKASAN FAKTA KES PEMDAKWAAN :0 5 Sztemsnya, Pegawaw Pendaxwa xerpexaw mengemukakan nngkasan lakta kes pendakwaan 1D Rmgkasan fzkta kes man mbacakan den dnevangkan kzpada Termdun melzhu wrubahasa Mahkamah ﬂan dmahkan iebagaw :5 helm ;..T,.m.,+ 7:0’-V-54-A/MYJ\ um... n1n x>«m.\ ...: W4 N sowzruvuiawvvnessxmvu um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm ‘H Rlngkaszn (aha kes kemudlzrmya dnandakan sebagaw eksmm v1 EKSHIEIT-EKSHIEIY 12 Sehzrusnyz, Pegam: Pendzkwz lemelajar mengemukakan eksmmreksmbu sepem benkm (3) Temenoh Report Na 3121/2023 sabagaw P2 In (:2) Lanchang Raven Nu 509/2023 sabanav F3. Ac) Lzpovan vzmln ' hzgat P4 — mlurqukkan darn mam (.1) Rekud Pusax Permanaran Feruenayzh sehagaw s-5 — ﬂlbacakan din mam. As) 4 kapmg Qambar halal um! uh-Iaav PEA-D - dnuruukkan 1: dan mwunu mmunun 13 Mahkamah selerusllya mendengar raynan danpada Tanuﬂuh <4 Temmuh damn: myuarmya menyalakan (mp Fahon hukuman am. ﬂan mm. (angknp (b) on berusna as «am. (:1 on sudah bevkahwi 1x (:1) on hekena szbagaw pemandu Von (e) on mennnggung seorang Ibu ad: anak .....,,...n.., .....~..‘..‘.‘.,...m...n <v1runnvm mu N smzruvuawmessxmm um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm HUJAN FEMBERATAN OLEH FERAWAI PEMDAKWA 15 Pegaml Pendakwz memohnn Sam hukuman yang se\|\mpa\ dan bemaxman wxenaxan ks axis on SABITAN 15 Se\|eIah mendengzv pengakuan smah Tenumm lanpa syarzt‘ menganausa «am kes. menem. akshubw-eksmbul yang (ehh m muemuxakan .1‘ hadapan Mahkamah Mahkamah menenma pengakuan saxan Terludull ks aizs penuduhzn din mensabvlkin Tenudtm sebagzwmana perludunan HUKUMAN 17 Selehh memmbang rzyuzrl Terludun man pemberalan nmnaxan Pendakwa Raya‘ Mahkamah menghuknm Temmuh dengan hukuman sepem benkul an on dllwkum Penjzva selama 5 am... mmzw 2s.s.2oz3 nan 3 sehaun an lzawah Saksyan aocuum Aklz Dadall Bemahaya nsz dzn dlvennlahkan men;a\am pengnwnsan AADK se\ama :1 uhun sebpas memaum hukuman a; hawah semen us Aku nmh Euvbahaya 1952 ¢..m,..m.., ...m..u.m......¢... I/VHKH nvcmmuvmx hers N surrzrnvuiawvmessxmvvl um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm ALASAN AYAS NUKUMAN sznzmmuu DIPLITUSKAN mnsnp UMDANG-UNDANG nauun MENGNUKUM 1a Frmsvw undang—undang bemubung hukuman Ielah ‘ems dan mzmap Pemmhzngan mama mengenm hukuman W sewn laklarfaklor Yam aaavan lakkor kepenhngan iwnm n. sampmg Mu‘ lakmr kepenungan awam ml perm ﬂumbangx dengan Vaklnr mmgasv Tenuduh 19 Eenepaian an sun unmk a. Imhas kemhah panduan mengnukum yang dnnyihkan ualam kes rubric Ploucutor v. Loo cnoon Fm [1975] 2 MLJ 259 my meruelaskan sepem benknl ‘On: 1:! m. mxm onnxvﬂuvzmns m m. asnnmem ac nzrnenaa m m mun: me quuuun Mpubuc Inlarul an m pumu nend my Qua : passion mm on uudgmnm M Hwlbary 4 m Rex V Ksnmm ./arm em as numm, :0 1" decudmg me awmam summon 2 mun shamd army: bd Ruined hy oerum cnnswdstauuns the hrsl ind «mm: .. In. public mines: The cnrmnm ‘aw we mm, erﬂoraed mzl emy my. me obyecl oi Dumsmng cﬂme ma aha m m. have M we-vetmng u A planed semzersce‘ 2: passed m pubhc suvei we nubhc Vnlevevsl n Iwo ways u may aw alums Mm mwgm be tempted to m, came as seem; holler uiymoney Br: the suvpusmm, um me ollenﬂel »s cauahl and bmuwm m Ausnoe‘ me Dumsmnen\| val! be nevhv-we Such a senlenm may Msn new In: L..m..‘,,.,, m.WW,.u...u... A-mu) lwxunmwn mu plmculzv cmmnal mm commmmg a cum; zgam u. wanna mm In (um cm a cnmum to an hanesx nu. ma nuhlwc mxemsx ‘s new um, and mu sauna u (M nllumav .. mduaad In Ium Vvom Minna! ways m hams! 5 my Om law does mil me/Mom, ﬁx we we-wlencs can Damcmzr crime‘ bun /has a maxdmum semenm and Veavgs n In me mm in mm: mm .s‘ mm the maxdmum‘ ma appmpna» sanhnc: let each cummai m the pankulat cucumslancas an nah use Not cmy m In regard xa each mme‘ M m mg“: (9 each cnmm, Ihe cam! has In: mm am: me duly to deem: mm: to an Vamem :1! mm’ Pnesxdenls and Mmmugs me Mien mchned mm: mm»; In he wmympaxnemc In the accusm ms .5 a nonma\ us nsvcnalvmc.-V relcwm la the smulmn m mm me [anew accused rs seen many in my mum. mm nulnunly In: mmqlaan Auhrmﬂtd by . cnrmdzd pumm WM alm m...uy me up warm... at hmwly rurdalnn nu ma mm usual pmmm at ﬁvmg In inch . :nu.I1mn ma mun: mmm ncmups 20 mm n amcuu In mm. as In mm aanlelma mum be Imvoled m on: live cunvwcleﬁ Dlrsan may nm a. mm-r num.:a mm mnmx Ivamsmp Ym: 5 myvww wsxwvmg zppmxnlv Yb: mm: appmm us an sink: 2 bahncq as ﬁav as annual: human 4». wntamns at (M Dublwc and ma .m.mm m 0.. :5 ancumd Lava Guddavd LCJ m Fax v Gronokowrla on-nu mm: quad ammx when a. rain. m wage mus! aonswder the mberesls alpmme as M11 as m. mm-:5 at we wlxonnrs VI Vs we wen M-mmayﬁ mmghl‘ or mm In be Ilwughl that \he Inxereﬁs at m ms!-as mean: my Ihe mm oi we Prisoners" ....,.,....... m....,...,.m.......a.... ..x.. 5:-cmmm-52 mun sm sowzruvuialvvn-saxmvu mm. smm ...m WW .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! sum EIEARA zn Se\zm nu, saya ]uga meng.-mm: maklum hahawa unaang~ mm mambenkan bud: btcarz sepemmnya xepaua ham moat: umuk meneniukan hukuman yang sepatmnya myaluhkan ke alas Desalzh letzpw kuzsz ml hemiaklzh dﬂzksanzkzn secava mm dun saksama sews: dengan pmmp undang-undang bemuhung hukuman In 24 Frmswp nu umyuakan denﬂan Mas dalam kes PP v. J-I: bin Daud [ween 1 ms 23. men 1 MLJ ms‘ av mana Hakim Mohamed Azmv (nae: mm M) mengganskan pnnsrp-plinsrp hukuman yang sewﬂmnya sebagavmlnl benkul .5 ‘A 'nzmem>e acmrdlna m um main: may the mnlama mm! mm only be wnlmn we mm: M uh: pumshahle mu-an, hm a mum am: he znanad and passed m anrmdanoe wwlh asubhshed ,mm prlnﬂplﬁ In ilsusmw senleme‘ one cl Ins mzln lxlms m be mrmdared .; mum me aunmcled zu person V5 3 Hm o«e..a.: u V5 for (ms pwpnsa mm belote Hissmg sentence. a Magklrate ‘s requued lo cal lot emdenoe av mlalmilmrl mummy me blckqmunﬂ anleeedenl ma characm oi Ih: muses Wheve me uumded Demon Ms prevmus recavas arm adrwls them is mm the noun mus\| uorvsxder wnethev the mm m uﬂznces wmmmad Wevmusﬂ rnnnauvlun u~V§A1F\1u>FI0RI«:hAl mans: ixvzmuzlwn mm sm sowzrnvuia vvn-scumvu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm were u! mm nmum u the one mlh man he rs Drzsenlw «men we own mm men sounder we senlemx: vrvlpoien n. 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CA-21NCvC-4-03/2019	PLAINTIF Zamri bin Omar DEFENDAN 1. ) Kerajaan Malaysia 2. ) Dr Sri Dthuruga Devi A/p Krishnamoorthy 3. ) Dr Muhammad Hafiz Bin Abdul Rasid 4. ) Nashrul Syiddik bin Mohd Salleh	Plaintif memfailkan tindakan terhadap Defendan-Defendan berasaskan dakwaan kecuaian semasa Plaintif mendapatkan rawatan di Hospital Pekan yang mana telah menyebabkan Plaintif mengalami stroke. Pihak Defendan-Defendan telah mengaku akan kecuaian di pihak mereka dan dengan itu perbicaraan di Mahkamah hanyalah tertumpu bagi tuntutan Gantirugi Khas dan Gantirugi Am. Mahkamah telah mengawadkan gantirugi sepertimana yang telah ditaksirkan oleh kerana Plaintif telahpun mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan yang credible untuk membuktikan tuntutan-tuntutan yang dikemukakan ke Mahkamah yang disokong oleh pengemukaan resit-resit dan bil-bil yang gagal disangkal oleh pihak Defendan. Bagi tuntutan Gantirugi Am pula, Mahkamah telah menimbangkan segala kerugian yang dipohon dan dengan itu telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif tersebut.	02/11/2023	YA Dato' Haji Zainal Azman Bin Ab. Aziz	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=0aa8e60e-e3af-4a77-8b89-d937ae746e5c&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - AP CA-21NCVC-4-03-2019 BP KER.MSIA V ZAMRI 25.10 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUANTAN DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR GUAMAN SIVIL NO : CA-21NCVC-4-03/2019 ANTARA ZAMRI BIN OMAR [NO. K/P : 640516-06-5047] …PLAINTIF DAN 1. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 2. DR. SRI DTHURUGA DEVI A/P KRISHNAMOORTHY 3. DR. MUHAMMAD HAFIZ BIN ABDUL RASID 4. NASHRUL SYIDDIK BIN MOHD SALLEH ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PENGENALAN 1. Plaintif memfailkan tindakan terhadap Defendan-Defendan berasaskan dakwaan kecuaian semasa Plaintif mendapatkan 02/11/2023 15:38:00 CA-21NCvC-4-03/2019 Kand. 101 S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 rawatan di Hospital Pekan yang mana telah menyebabkan Plaintif mengalami stroke. 2. Pihak Defendan-Defendan telah mengaku akan kecuaian di pihak mereka dan dengan itu perbicaraan di Mahkamah hanyalah tertumpu bagi tuntutan Gantirugi Khas dan Gantirugi Am. 3. Setelah mendengar keterangan daripada kesemua pihak, Mahkamah telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif sepertimana Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 27 Disember 2022. FAKTA KES 4. Berkaitan dengan fakta kes akan tuntutan ini, faktanya adalah seperti berikut : i. Pada 08 Mac 2016 jam 7.13 petang, Plaintif telah hadir ke Jabatan Kecemasan di Hospital Pekan dengan aduan kekebasan pada anggota badan. Plaintif telah didiagnos dengan hipertensi yang tidak terkawal dan dinasihatkan supaya pulang dan mengawasi tekanan darah secara harian. S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 ii. Pada jam 10.43 malam, Plaintif telah pergi sekali lagi ke Jabatan Kecemasan di hospital yang sama di mana Plaintif telah disuntik dengan ubat Stemetil dan dinasihatkan supaya pulang ke rumah. iii. Pada 09 Mac 2016, Plaintif telah mengalami hipertensi dan telah dimasukkan ke Kuantan Medical Centre dan didiagnos menghidap Cerebrovascular dengan Hemiparesis. 5. Hanya satu isu untuk dibicarakan di Mahkamah ini adalah sama ada Plaintif berhak terhadap tuntutan Gantirugi Khas dan Gantirugi Am sepertimana yang dituntut. 6. Gantirugi Khas adalah seperti berikut : Plaintiff Court No. Item RM RM A. Special Damages (March 2016 to March 2019 = 36 months) 1. Hospital and medical expenses. 61,000.00 61,000.00 2. The cost of physiotherapy. 2,000.00 2,000.00 3. Travel, accommodation and incidental expenses. 5,000.00 5,000.00 S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 4. The cost of obtaining pre- action discovery of medical records. 8,480.00 8,480.00 5. Fee for medical report. 500.00 500.00 6. The cost of assistive equipment. 5,000.00 5,000.00 7. The cost of a hospital bed 3,000.00 3,000.00 8. The cost of a multi-purpose vehicle. 191,000.00 170,000.00 9. The cost of modifications to Encik Zamri’s home. 15,000.00 15,000.00 10. Loss of income. 223,212.72 [9,300 x 12 months x 2 years (55-51 divided by 2)] 232,212.72 Subtotal 514,192.72 493,192.72 B. Pre-Trial Damages (April 2019 to November 2022 = 44 months) 11. Hospital and medical expenses. 30,000.00 20,000.00 12. The cost of physiotherapy. 10,000.00 10,000.00 13. Travel, accommodation and incidental expenses. 7,000.00 7,000.00 14. The cost of assistive equipment and devices. 10,000.00 10,000.00 Subtotal 57,000.00 47,000.00 C. Life Expectancy 68 65 + 3 (life expectancy + S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 favourable economics point) D. Multiplier 10 68 – 58 (life expectancy minus current age) E. Future Damages (Assistive Equipment and Devices) 15. Manual lightweight wheelchair. 50,000.00 (25,000.00 with 1 replacement) 25,000.00 16. Tilt-in-space commode shower chair. 2,400.00 2,400.00 17. Electric hospital bed 8,000.00 8,000.00 18. Powered wheelchair 36,00.00 (18,000.00 with 1 replacement) 24,000.00 (12,000.00 x 2) 19. Walking frame 400.00 (200.00 with1 replacement) 400.00 20. Portable hoist 14,000.00 (7,000.00 with 1 replacement) 14,000.00 21. Pressure relief cushion 12,000.00 (3,000.00 with 3 replacement) 8,000.00 Subtotal 122,800.00 81,800.00 S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 F. Future Damages (Medical and Hospital) 22. The cost of hospital admissions 600,000.00 (30,000.00 twice a year x 10 years) 200,000.00 (10,000 x 2 x 10) 23. The cost of consultations with a Rehabilitation medicine physician 201,600.00 (280.00 x 6 times a month x 12 months x 10 years) 33,600.00 (280.00 x 12 x 10) 24. The cost of consultation with a Clinical psychologist. 6,000.00 (250.00 x 2 times a month for 1 year) 6,000.00 25. The cost of consultations with a Nutrition Specialist 20,000.00 (2,000.00 per year x 10 years) 2,000.00 26. The cost of consultations with a Neurologist 5,600.00 (280.00 x 2 times a year x 10 years) 5,600.00 27. The cost of consultations with a Neurosurgeon / Orthopedic 4,700.00 (235.00 x 2 times a year x 10 years) 4,700.00 Subtotal 857,900.00 251,900.00 G. Future Damages (Therapies and Rehabilitation) 28. The cost of physiotherapy 76,800.00 (160.00 per month x 12 months x 10 years) 62,400.00 (130.00 x 4 x 12 x 10) 29. The cost of occupational therapy 86,400.00 62,400.00 S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 (180.00 per month x 12 months x 10 years) (130.00 x 4 x 12 x 10) 30. The cost of inpatient rehabilitation 70,000.00 (14,000.00 every 2 years for 10 years) 0 31. The cost of home physiotherapy 43,200.00 (180.00 twice a month x 12 months x 10 years) 43,200.00 32. The cost medications 84,000.00 (700.00 per month x 12 months x 10 years) 84,000.00 33. The cost of botulinum toxin injections 5,400.00 (1,600.00 x 3 injections) 5,400.00 Subtotal 365,800.00 257,400.00 H. Future Damages 34. The cost prima facie hiring carers 260,000.00 (2,000.00 per month x 12 months x 10 + 20,000.00 various fees and charges) 200,000.00 35. The cost of a multi-purpose vehicle 200,000.00 0 36. Petrol, insurance, road tax, accommodation & incidental expenses 36,000.00 (300.00 per month x 12 months x 10) 36,000.00 Subtotal 496,000.00 236,000.00 S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 37. General Damages for Loss of Earning Capacity (From the Plaintiff’s age of 55 to 65) 558,031.80 (9,300.53 per month x 12 months x 5 years) + (7,000.00 per month x 12 months x 5 years) 558,031.80 38. General damages for pain and suffering and the loss of amenities of life 300,000.00 200,000.00 I. General Damages for the Value of case provided by Encik Zamri’s family 39. During the Special Damages period (March 2016 to March 2019) (36 months) 43,200.00 (1,200.00 Perayu month x 36 months) 43,200.00 40. During the Pre-Trial Damages period (April 2019 to November 2020) (19 months) 22,800.00 (1,200.00 per month x 19 months) 22,800.00 41. During the Future Damages period (10 years) 144,000.00 (1,200.00 per month x 12 months x 10 years) 144,000.00 Subtotal 210,000.00 968,031.80 42. Aggravated Damages 500,000.00 300,000.00 43. Party-and-party costs 250,000.00 250,000.00 44. Out of pocket expenses 17,514.90 17,514.90 Grand Total 4,249,239.42 2,902,839.42 S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 J. Interest 45. Interest on Special Damages from date of incident, 8 March 2016 up to date of judgment. 4% 46. Interest on pre-trial damages, general damages and aggravated damages from date of service of writ, 5 March 2019 to date of judgment. 8% 47. Interest on judgment sum, including costs from of judgment to date prima facie payment. 5% PERTIMBANGAN DAN PENILAIAN MAHKAMAH 7. Bagi tuntutan gantirugi, sebagai pampasan Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Ong Ah Long v Dr S Underwood [1983] 2 MLJ 324 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa : “…It has to be borne in mind that damages for personal injuries are not punitive and still less a reward. They are simply compensation that will give the injured party reparation for the wrongful act and for all the natural and direct S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 consequences of the wrongful act, so far as money can compensate…” 8. Di dalam kes Yang Salbiah & Anor v Jamil bin Harun [1981] 1 MLJ 292 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa : “It must be remembered that the purpose of damages is to try, so far as humanly possible, to put the victim back to the position he would have been in but for the accident. The damages must be fair, adequate and not excessive…” 9. Juga, di dalam kes Bekalan Sains P&C Sdn Bhd v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd [2011] 5 MLJ 1 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan antara lain : “[185] Every day, damages are awarded by the courts to claimants in order to compensate them for loss and damage. But before damages can be recovered in an action there must firstly be a wrong committed, whether the wrong be a tort or a breach of contract. If a loss has been incurred by the claimant, no damages can be awarded unless there is a wrong… S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [189] The person who is claiming damages must prove his case. Thus, the claimant in order to justify an award of substantial damages he must satisfy the court as to the fact of damage and as to its quantum (Senate Electrical Wholesalers Ltd v Alcatel Submarine Networks Ltd (Formerly STC Submarine Systems Ltd) [1999] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 423 (CA)). If the claimant fails to satisfy the court on the fact of damage and quantum, then his action must fail or at the very least he would be awarded nominal damages where his right has been infringed. [190] Put in another way, the claimant must show actual loss and evidence must be led in that direction. It is submitted that the appellant has failed to prove damages with precise evidence (Sony Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd v Direct Interest Sdn Bhd [2007] 2 MLJ 229; [2007] 1 CLJ 611, (CA); and Ban Chuan Trading Co Sdn Bhd & Ors v Ng Bak Guan [2004] 1 MLJ 411; [2003] 4 CLJ 785, (CA)) and that the appellant has also failed to lead evidence to show actual loss.” S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 10. Berkaitan dengan tuntutan gantirugi tersebut, pampasan yang diberi adalah semoga mangsa telah kembali ke kedudukan asal sebelum kemalangan tersebut berlaku. 11. Berkaitan dengan Gantirugi Khas, Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Ong Ah Long v Dr S Underwood [1983] 2 MLJ 324 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa : “It is a well-established principle that special damages in contrast to general damages, have to be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. They are recoverable only where they can be included in the proper measure of damages and are not too remote (see Halsbury's Laws of England 4th edition, volume 11 page 218 para 386). That in our view is the cardinal principle adopted by all courts both in England and this country. The same principle was adopted by Ong Hock Thye, F.J. (as he then was) in Yee Hup Transport & Co and Anor v Wong Kong [1967] 2 MLJ 93 which was an appeal on quantum of damages. Quoting an excerpt from the judgment of Wilmer L.J. in Ilkiw v Samuels [1963] 1 WLR 991; [1963] 2 All ER 879 he held that the general damages should not be S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 awarded as though they were special damages properly pleaded and proved. Similarly Chang Min Tat, F.J.(as he then was) in Murtadza bin Mohamed Hassan v Chong Swee Pian [1980] 1 MLJ 216 applied the principle in Ilkiw v. Samuels( supra) that special damages if pleaded as in that case could be recovered. The principle was also adopted by Mohamed Azmi, J. (as he then was) in Sam Wun Hoong v Kader Ibramshah [1981] 1 MLJ 295 in the Federal Court.” 12. Juga, di dalam Yeap Cheng Hock v Kajima-Taisel Joint Venture [1973] 1 MLJ 230 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa : “The general principle is that the plaintiff must be prepared to prove his special damages unless it has been agreed. It is not enough for him to write down the particulars and leave them for the court to decide. It is for him to prove them. (See Sum Kum v Devaki Nair & Anor [1964] MLJ 74 74, and Khoo See Moi v Tay Teik Chang [1970] 2 MLJ 249 250). No doubt, the plaintiff gave evidence that he had purchased the extra nourishing food when he was in the hospital, but in the absence of medical S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 evidence that they were necessary in the light of hospital food and nourishment prescribed, I am not prepared in the circumstances to allow the claim on the three items.” 13. Oleh itu, dengan menggunapakai nas-nas di atas, Mahkamah telah mengawadkan gantirugi sepertimana yang telah ditaksirkan oleh kerana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa Plaintif telahpun mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan yang credible untuk membuktikan tuntutan-tuntutan yang dikemukakan ke Mahkamah. 14. Mahkamah juga mendapati Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan jumlah kerugian bagi Gantirugi Khas dengan pengemukaan resit- resit dan bil-bil yang telah dikemukakan ke Mahkamah semasa perbicaraan dan tuntutan-tuntutan tersebut telah gagal disangkal oleh pihak Defendan. 15. Bagi tuntutan Gantirugi Am pula, Mahkamah telah menimbangkan segala kerugian yang dipohon dan dengan itu telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif tersebut. S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 KEPUTUSAN 16. Di atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah dengan ini mendapati dan memutuskan bahawa Plaintif telah berjaya mengasaskan tuntutan mereka bagi Gantirugi Khas dan Gantirugi Am sepertimana yang dipohon. 17. Dengan itu, Tuntutan Plaintif bagi kerugian yang dialami akibat kecuaian Defendan-Defendan telah diasaskan dan dibenarkan sepertimana jumlah Gantirugi Khas dan Gantirugi Am yang telah diawadkan oleh Mahkamah beserta faedah dan kos. t.t. ZAINAL AZMAN BIN AB AZIZ HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA KUANTAN PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR BERTARIKH : 16 OKTOBER 2023 S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 Peguam Plaintif : Encik Desmond Mun Ching Yong Tetuan P S Ranjan & Co. Tingkat 17, Wisma Lee Rubber No. 1 Jalan Melaka, 50100 Kuala Lumpur Ruj. : 3444/ZO/MMS/DM/iza Emel : admin@psranco.com Peguam Defendan-Defendan : Tuan Vesvanathan a/l Jeevaji (Peguam Persekutuan) Pejabat Penasihat UndangUndang Negeri Pahang Tingkat 3, Wisma Sri Pahang 25000 Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur Ruj. : PN/PG/SFC/21/1/2019 Emel : S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	16,621	Tika 2.6.0
BA-24NCvC-56-01/2023	PEMOHON SELVI A/P M.RAMAN RESPONDEN SKF SOLUTION SDN BHD	Pembatalan Kaveat Persendirian perlu rujuk kepada 4 persoalan iaitu sama ada Pengkaveat mempunyai kepentingan, Pengkaveat mendedahkan isu-isu serius untuk dibicarakan, imbangan keselesaan memihak bahawa Kaveat tersebut dikekalkan dan terdapat keadaan istimewa dipihak Pemohon yang melayakkan status quo diubah.	02/11/2023	YA Puan Zaharah Binti Hussain	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=333ee223-e925-4f7d-813a-d15e37e69161&Inline=true	02/11/2023 15:34:46 BA-24NCvC-56-01/2023 Kand. 42 S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N IIMyXpfUBOtFeNaRYQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal an-2mcvc—5s—u1/2023 Kand. 42 :2, mm: 15»3a:ae NIANKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA on sun ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL ENSAN, MALAYSIA SAIIIAN PEMLILA N amzaucvcse-0112023 Dalam perxara seksymsaxsyan 32111) man 12)‘ 329 (1; dan 417 Kanun Tanah Negarn, 1955 Dan Dalam Devkara Hananah yang mpegang dv aawan GRN 309392‘ Lm 2555, Pekzn Pucnung Pamana, Duran Pa! mg. Negerl Sallngnv dengzn kemasan sebanyak 2D4meIev pelsegw dan dengan alamal paa ua 45‘ Jalan PU 9/5. Pucmnn Ulzma‘ «ma Pucnang. serangm Daml Ehsan Dan Dalam perkara Kaveal Pevsevahzn No 275:3/2023 yang mdaﬂavkan paaa 25 Jun2023padn jam 09 24 34 via- Dan Dalam nevka-a Amvan 7 dan Aluran 92 Kaedah 4 K.aeaan—><aauan Mahkzmah 2012 H1/.7.nuv:ae.vA,1uu m nwxuruamrzmakvu «ma. sm.‘ runblrwwﬂ .. man a my ». am.m -mm; ﬂwumunl via IVMNG wn-1 ANTARA SELVI up M. swam (uo.KP: svnm-uxnswu) (nbapai Pnntzdb Han: Punk: Lmnummn nu Pnriasamy, Simzli (Nn.KP: woos-1nsn11) MFLAINTIF DAN SKF soumou sun sun (No. SYARIKAT: 4654324) ...DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGNAKIMAN Pengenalan [11 Padz 9 0305 2112:, Mahkamah ml Ie\ah memhenarknn pevmohnnan P\am\|i1da\am saman Pemula im unmk pennlah sepem benkuc (a) Bahzwz Kaveal Persendman yang dnmzsukkan u\eh ue4-enaan kc am Hananah yang dlpaging m am» can 309592, Lot 2655, Fekan Puclmng Pemana. Daevah Pelzlmg, Negevi Selangur dengan kemasan sehanyak 2114 meter persegw dan dengan alamal pas No As, .la\an PU 9/5‘ Puchong uvama, mm Puchang Semvgov om: Ehnn (“Hansnah levsebuf) memm Kiveal Fersendman No 1\nA‘Am_\'4:s 5, m2; /N n x.mo.s.N.m m.,.,."é.n.m.“..mm.,.w.»,mm.mm.mm.,..“.m..nL.NaW [25] Mahkamah Rayuzn an dalam kes Luggage Dinribulars (M) san Ehd V4 1... Mar Tcny [M195] .1 cu szn; mm 1 m..: m lelah mengganskzn uuanmjlan yang hams digunauakzl a. dalam menemukan sesualu pevmuhonan unluk membatalkan kav , Mshkamah Rayuan lelah menymakan bank-n. -m coruldorlrrﬂ In lﬁnlicnklnn fur the rumovll or - "Vat, an pnmaun to D: ndopmt should be . Iimplo ma rmnmaly am. A: on: Itzyl, me court wm axsmiru rm ground: cxpnssod in m. lppﬁcatron for me caven ra sn wiutmr my Shaw 3 cmmnp. inmur, cm the court I: san'sn..1 ma: me cmamrs cum. nmaunts in law ha a canamble lmlrul. it must men ya on to canlldnr wnun-rem claim uucmua-unou: quullon mulling: m I Am: mm two mm »m can emund, ml cowl mm mm. mm on: nmm alcunvinllnca" An: Mahkamah [251 Deiendan mendakwa man membeukan plmaman kapnda s. Man lelapw Ianpa pengecanuan Islen s. Man Iamu Plamm (yang ktm walah Pemaamr Hana Pusaka S! Man) [211 Pla\rmI menyalakan bahawa mernandangkan lunlulan Delend adalan dalam henlnk Kewangan, men nu Delendan hdak mempunyll apa— apa keven\|\|ngan benensm ﬂalam Hananah «ersenm yang membenkan hak kepzda Delendan untuk memawkkan salu Kaveal Persenmnan kc a\|as (anal: \|evs:hu\| lI\aA21N,'/( 52 u1r1uz3 5/N umxaruao.rm.xvu «mm. sm.‘ ,..u..mu .. mad w my ». mmm -mm; ﬂuumlnl n. IHLING Wm! gm mmm-n vnlah menahu sama ad: Penman Pmjirnan wu\|ud anlara Delendan dan 5. Man mm unluk jnmlah sebanyak Rmzomxm no. Eerdasarkan Penanj n l.elsebu1lah.Dsfendan1e\ah memulakan lmdakan Guaman \|emadap S! Man an memnya temadap wamm ubauai Fenladbn Hana Fusak: SA Man [29] Mahkamah mm menerm kepada perscalan panama. sarvn ada Pengkavem mampunyiv keuermngan Kavaawarhadap hananah nmenm Deiandin telah mamasukkan Kaveal alas pmiaman sehanyak RM2oo,Duo no. Sebenzmya Defenﬂan amen menunm iumlan pimaman (ems dan hukarmya memasukkan mam alas harlanzh tevsehm [so] Farsoalan kedun saml ma kepanhngzn berkaveal lersebul menimhmkan alau mendedahkan Isu»Isu senus unmk dwbxcatakan Mahkamah berpendapal hzham uaak (Imbul ISIHSU yang senus unluk diblcarakan kevzni Deiendan mnya manunhll jumlah pmjaman uhila [:11 Persoalan Kenga sama ada Imbangan Keselesaan memmak bahawa Kavea\| Aevsebul dlkekakan Mahkanah nerpemtapac bahawa a\|as mange" keselesaan bahawa iapalulnya Plalnm yang man helm memhayar plnllman daupada RHB dapa\| menehus hank gadalan dzn mu 1-mzv: as ax/201: SM n xaruamfemwvn w.,.,."§.n.‘...“..mu.,.u...m.~..mm.m.a.,..“.m..rmW RHB Bank Kaveal persendlnan uleh Delendan Ie\ah menggagnlkan Flalrmldanpndz belbual demlknan [22] Persoalan xeempan sama adz temapal keadaan mmewa dx pmak Pemohon yang mmayakkzn slams qua drgangau/dlubah Mahkamah hupennapnx xememangny: levdapal kezdnn mnmmu dlpmak mmmw yang meuiyakkan Kaveat pevsemman ml dwbalalkan my Sepeni yang dmyalaksn nu a\|as bahawa ma m yznu ielah mehngsawkan pllulman pemmaharmya danqan ma Bank Eemad perlu menemskan unluk menebus bank gadalan dan RI-ca Bank Eevhaﬂ Kegagalan Plalnw berhual demkian kevana Ierdapamya Kaveac pelsendman nersew. mamhuakan mam lavpaksa menangﬁung «Va penalh din bsyarsn Vain yang lebm hanyak Penulup [341 Berdnarkan vakmakva dan undang-undang yang dmyitikin di am Mahkaman berpandapal bahawa Delendan parlu membualiunlmzn alas pvuaman 5. Man sepemminl dalam mnmlannya as Mamcanuan Sesyen sekarang. um 2<>«(v/( as nnrznu 5/N nwxurUaL7:feNnwvn “Nun: sum ....n.mn .. mad n my n. unvmuhlv -mm: ﬂuuununl n. IVMNG wrm [55] Mahkamah membenalkan dan mtmberikan Penman mam yang diwhan dalzm Saman Femula WI! Ianu Kavenl Parsendlllan yang dwmasukkan blah Delendan dIhala\kan nan ﬂlpolong seuamunnya Penlanblv Hakmlllk man mernhalal dan memalcmg Kaveel Ielsebul Delendan am: wakilnya nnak lrdak mi memasukkan Kaveal Persendinan m mm akan dalang Dangan um Iebnnyik mama nu lenakluk Kepadi u zkzkamr aenarim 25 Oklober 2023 RAH sum NUSSAIM) Pssurumaya Kehakunan Mahkaman ‘ﬁnggl NCVC 2 Shah Alam um J-1V(\/L 7b u; mu SM n xaruamfemkvu w.,.,."§.n.‘...“..mu.,.w..m.~..mm.mm.,..“.m..rmW KAUNSE Peguamcara Plalnﬂl/Runonden Teluan Szlvmder K &AssocIa(es Na 3, Jalan Hujan Ema: m Overseas Union Gzvden sazuu Kuana Lumpur No rm awesome Email saMndevkna@gma\l com, kzsnnnzaﬂgmawl cam Ru]. smznaromzuzz Fleuuncaru Fulvulbckmln : Tmuzn Amrr 5 Rajpal Ghsi sum 2:212. Plaza Pengkamn wan raw. on Jalan sum Allan Shah smm Kuala Lumpur Na Tel'D3-271341311 Emu nfﬁce@zvg~\zw com Ru: ARG/SEUU336/2022/R: man mu“ ,5 uniu/4 5/N IM/XuIUaL7:reN.Rvu “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my .. mmm -mm; ﬂwulnlnl n. IVMNG Wm! RUJ My 5; Km: Ah Soon v Dumaga sun and (199512 on 215, [1996] 2 ML! 121 Luggage Dnsmbulurs (My Sun arm V Yan HorTeng 1199513 cu 520; [1995]1MLJ 719 mu Hum: as muuzx /N n xaruamfemkvu w.,.,."§.n.‘...“..mu.,.w..m.~..mm.mm.,..“.m..rmW zvsaarzozs yang dtdallarkan pada 26 Jun 2023 pada [am us 29:34 pig! mbalalkan dun dlpmong‘ (n) Bahawa Pzmaablr Hakmllxk danlalau Fenladmv ram dan Gahan Selangar di Shah Alam ﬂlperlnlahkan unmk membavtalkan dan mernmung xmsc Pelsenﬂwian No 2153:/2023 yang dmanarkan paﬂa 25 Jun 202: pldl pm as 25 :4 pay! dvdalzm uanaman memaklumkan an dalamnya a\asan unluk pembalahn lersebm den lanklvlya dalam Iempoh Dua 12) nan darn masa dlserzhkan dengzn pennlah ml. (cu Banawa Delendan‘ samada seazva sendln nan/alau ejen‘ pekena, penganih dan/a\|au seharang pmak Yam yang berkavlan dengan Delendan ﬂﬂarang din cﬂhalang ﬂan mamasukkan mu rnandallnlkan apa-ipi Kaveul lervrlaiuk Kaveal Pevsendman ke anas Haﬂanah pada bxlrblla mas: Dengan kos sehanyak RM3,uou.ou terlakmk kepada Fx Alukamv Lalarbelakang Kc: [21 Suam\|PIamAi1\|axm Leldmrnanan all Penasamy(No KP 65100610 sum zdzlzh Psnullk namanar tebxdlnn hinanah an hawah Germ Hakmnlk No ansaaz, Lo! Nozaaa Fekan Puchang Pemana, Daevan nu zmuu :. A van 5/N uwxurUaL7:feN.Rvu “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my .. mmm -mm; ﬂwulnlnl n. IVMNG Wm! Peialma‘ Negen Selangnr dengzn kemasan sebanyak 204 male! pevsegl dengan Ihmal pus Nu 4e‘ Jam PU 9/5, Fucmmg mama, mm Puchmg Selangav Darul Ehsan (“Hannah leIsebul’7 [21 lelchuminan an Perfaianvylelah meninggal dunla pad: me 2015. pm 28122021 wamm um dulanuk sabugm Punm1h\rHanu Fuuka Snmall mehlul Ge(an Surat Kuasa Menladmv yang dlkeluarksn oxen Mankaman TmggA Kuala Lumpur melalul Saman Pemula No wA—24— 31Ncvc—1s9s—1 mm: [4] Paris zaazma, Deiendan wan memlallkan Wm Saman dan Pernyataan Tumulan (evhadap sy Man an Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam melahm wm Samar: No5AA5zN<:c4sa—as/zowa (Gunman No 353) Malalm Gunman Mam lmsehul‘ Dafenuan amar: mm mendakwi bahawa s. Man telsn menqmgkan sua\|u Peqanuan Plmaman beclankh 2272ms dan bemmang kepaﬂa Defender! ssbanyak RM245,000 no selakai 25 6 2013 bersama laadah xebanyak ms ssxahun [5] Pada :1 1 2019, De4endanle\ah memasukkan Pengnamman Ingkar kenaauan Kemadap 31 Man Pada 2 mzms, Pkamlﬂ lelah memrauxan pelmohonan umuk mengenepikzn penghalw-nan mgur luuebm. namun permohonzn unluk mengeneplkan penghaknman \|ngkar1evsebu\|(elah Mu 2+m<v< se cxunzh m IM/xaIUaL7:feN.wvn “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my .. mmm -mm: ﬂwulnlnl n. IVMNG wrm dnolak men Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Nam pad: 27 11 2019 [5] Fan: 5122019, wamm 121:» memlallkan Nuns Rayuan ke Mahkaman Tmggl Shah Nam unluk merayu Iemadap kepulusan Mahkamih Sewer: benankh 2711 ms (ersebm Rayuan leuebm «em. amanaukan mag-1 Mahkamah Tlnqgl Shah Alam Rayum sun Na sa- IZANCC-I7-12/2021 1-Ray-nan N017‘) Pada 11320211 Mshkamah Tmggn 1eIan membenalkan vayuan Plamul dan oleh 111. penghaklman mgkav berlavikh :11 112019 man mkelepikan denuan kus sebanwk Ru12,o1m no a1nay.1am1 note:-can xepsdu Plalrlm m Delenﬂan 1-aak mengambvl ﬁndakan semi-nnya wen Mu, Mank.-man sesyen lelah memhatalkan wm Srnan Delendan dihm Gunman No 363 \|aIubII1 pad: a 4 m1 [131 Paris 1752021. wenuan \|elah memfailkzn nnaakan barn (emadap nan: Pusaka :1 Mali .1. Mahkamah Sesyen Pelawlu ma nan zmumn \:r:ebu\| man dldaﬂafxan sebagm wm No BB»B52NCD»37- 11321721 1-euaman No 37-1. Pada 25.3 2022, Defendan tahh memlaﬂkan suaw Dermohonan m ham»: Aluran 15 Kaedah an Kaedan-kaedah Mihkamah 2012 unluk melanuk Plamm sebagal wak1l «am: hana puiika 51 Man Pads 15 sznzz, Delendun leluh mampelmeh penmah s1n1m1:1< 55 M mu m I1wxaruaL71feNnwvn “um 5.1.1 ....1..m11 .. mad 1: mm .. 11111.11-1 mm. ﬂwulnlnl n. -r1u>1G wrm umux menamakan Wavnlxf sebagav wakll kenadi Hana Pusaka S1 Mali am him menemskzn dangan mmam :1. Dawn?! Guaman No.37 lenabul [91 Guzman No 37 letsebut wga Deveman mendakwz hahawa sx Man lelah memlluim wang dan Demman Gan bemulang kepaﬂi meraka sehanynk Rwnzunoooo mum 2572021 Pan: 2 11 mm, mm (elah memiawtan Pembelaan dan Tun\|u\|an Bales (emadap mnnman Delenﬂan dslam Guaman Na 37 lersebm dan menaﬂkan apaapa kebemulangan yang maakwa wumd amira s. Man din Deiundan [1471 5. Man lelah mengambll plnnman ﬂan RHE Bank Bemad umuk membwzyaw harlanah Iersebut Plsmm bsvsama anak sulongnya \|elah menyelesilkan hakl Dmlaman German pmak RHB Bank Berhad Dengin pengesahln nan nus Bank Bemad banzwa mmaman \|ersehu\| Ielah salesal dlbayav. Plamuhelah mengavahkan peguamcavanya Tamar: Am» 5. Raina! Ghai umuk mengamnn lmdakan menebus balik Haﬂanah tersebm am gaaa-an dengan RHE Bank Eemad [14] Pada 20 non yam n2-20-14 peung, Peguamcala mzmm «max dapaf melakukan prvses penebusan balik Hananah Ievsebm den melepiskan gaaamn cleh RHE Bank Eemad meiklpun buyarsn pmnman ielah diselesalkan dangan penuh um adalah kevsna Delendan man Mu zaN:vL 5s m mu 5/N uwxurUaL7:feN-Rvu “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my .. mmm -mm; ﬂwulnlnl n. IVMNG Wm! memasukkan suauu Kzveal Persendinan ke mas nananan oenehm Dada 20 7 2022mm 02.20.14 umzng [121 Pada 1511 2022 Peguamcara F'Ii\nt\Hze\ah memben Nuns Berluhs kepadz Delendan unluk msmmong dan mengeluarkan Kaveal Periandmin \|evsehu( di\am H. am lanehul sens memben nkujnnjl berlulls mink a<an memasuklcan ipa—apa kavez! pevsendman ke alas Harlanah an masa hidapan [131 Namun navenuan enggan memmuhl uumuvan lartebul dun menegiskan bahawa max zkan memhual apa-apa dan (slap dengan Kepumsan un\|uk Aidak memalong dan memnnamn K.avea\| Peisendlnan Iersehut [14] Nasal: Delendan bahawa rnereka rnempImya1kepen\|mgan kaveal din/anau beneﬁsnal ke alas Hananah Deﬁemiin yang memmzkan Guzman No 363 an lam Guaman No 37 mambua\| lunnnan hsrbenluk kewanuan 'monu(Iry cxamr din bukan Iemzrlap Hananah (ersebul [151 Plainm menyalakan hahawa Defendan lanqsung hdzk mempunyal apa—apa keoanlmgin yang ba\eh dikavumkan alas Tznah msenux, mans knvem pewandlvian Delendan hrsebm pamIdIhn1a\kan 7\|nA znmvn Sb «mm 5/N uwxaruao.re~.wvn “Nun: sm.‘ ...u..mm .. mad w my .. mmm -mm: ﬂwulnlnl n. IVMNG wrm [151 Ymdakzn Gunman No :7 mm Dulendin manunlm RM32o,ooo oo selzagal plnjaman yang dvbenkan uleh Delenﬂan kepada 5: Man. [111 uerenaan menyztilkzn hahawa Plimm sebauai Penladbw Hana Punk: s. Mah sememanqnyu max mempunyav pengahnuzn Vzngsung mange:-an plnjaman \|er:ebul [131 Delendan sememangnya zdalzh Pemeginu Laser: Mm usmumnzoazap . bawah Akla Penman Puuamnn Wang 1951 dun memberi kemuﬂahan pxnjaman kepada pewanggan jugs Iermasuk 5: Man [111 seeaga. ballnn bag: Fenarman mums" lanebut. Sw Mzh \|elnh menyelihkan kepzda Defender: salu cagann yang dikenali sehagal Hakmi\|i< Gavan 309592, Lot No. zesa‘ Pekan Fuchong Femana, Daerah Pelahng, Negevi Selangov yang mempunyaw :\ama\| penyampaiannya ax No 45, man PU 2/5‘ Puchmg mama. 47170 Puchung, Samngavﬂalul Ehsan (-Hamanan (ersebul“\|. [av] sv Mali mu: Ma?! metnlzekillan uesllinan Penanjian Jual Bell benankh zsmmom bag: Hunanlh Iersebul yang dilaksanaknn an anlara mm xuum so amnzx 5/N u xuvuamfemwvn w.,.,."§.n.‘...“..mu.,.u...W.~..mm.m.a.,..“.m..nmW su Mali dan Fzvid hm Abdullah (No KP 7oo4m1a.55m unluk Mum cigaran rm Se\an]u(nya Dedendan yang dahulunya dlkenah sehagal Alcadna emu sun Bhd (ND Syalikal 455432-x) Ievah mzmalukkan salu Kaveal Persendlmn alas nnan kn ah: Hannah wsrsebul pad: 25/7/zme melalul Nombov Pelsevznan 36344/zms (“Kaveal Pemnauian ms“; [221 Memandangkan Kaveat Periendinan zma (ersebul akin Lamal pads 24/m/2022, oevenaan Isiah mernasukkan KavenIPeuendir\.In bavu pzaa 20/n7/2022 memm Nombor Persevahan aaassizozz (“Kaveal Fersendman Z022”) Umiang-nndanu Mung. .\| Ponnahmun Fambnlnlnn Knvanl Pnrnndlmn m] Pnnup undang-undang berkailan pevmahonan unmk membalalkan kaveauaaalan jelai Dw uzram sesualu purmohonan untuk membzlalkan men, Mahkamuh Mndakrah menevnlu dan rnampemmbangkan pals/aa\an»pelsoa!an benkul . tama ada pengkaveal mempuny-ax kepenlmgan helkaveat mhzdap mun-n ceuenux gm “mu ,5 H1021 SM n xaruamfemkvu w.,.,."§.n.‘...“..mu.,.w..m.~..mm.mm.,..“.m..rmW u eama ada kepenlmgan berkaveal «enema me ‘ mendedzhkan Asu-Isu mus unluk dmlcavzkan m sama ada wmbangan xeaeweaaaan memmak hahawa kaveal levsebm dvkekarkan Iv sama aua lzrdapal keadzan wslwmewa an pmak pemuhun yang mulayakkan slams qua mganggu/dlub-h m1 D1 dalam kes Kilo An Soon v. Dunlngn Sdn Bhd[199£] 2 cm 219,- mm] 2 MLJ m, Mahkaman Persekuman lelah sekah lam manekankan berkznaan pmuip nndangrurvdanq dl dalam pembalalan kaveal di mana Pen Swee Chin. HMP (e\ah menyananan m muka max «ea seven: benkm -n Is mum Inn in . mzmr vl mnom on man as bulniln . cavearor and cavnatce, M in ma instant appeal, mega an my meamm sansvy Me Coun am hi: evidence does rats: a serious qulstron to be Med 15 nglrds me claim to an mrelesiln me nana rn auesaan, -nu Invlng don: so ne mun snnw me; on a hllancn or canvnnlnnct :1 would a. honor to nulnnln lln mm. 41:40 until ma mun: ma nation by puvonling tin cnvnlu Irnrn dispa-ingofnlx/und, m.maownoyLama;pIecx:ns_ng_n1g_mu ; [1379] 3 "U 772' "W by lnllngy indnecrry to Amencan cy-nnmiu on v. Emicon [ms] AC 399 as indicated by Lara Dlplock, ma urious question for ma! nlurrud on above could mean a quulion rm! being vexatious or hi»/n)ou.l'. mm 11mm 5h 11 '01.‘ am nnnxaruao.rm.xvu «em. sun runblrwwﬂ n. mad w my n. unvmuhlv mm; ﬂwulnlnl n. muno wrm	2,069	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
BA-24NCvC-1898-11/2022	PEMOHON CHONG BOON HENG RESPONDEN HANSON BUILDING MATERIALS MALAYSIA SDN BHD	Civil procedure – action for order to send original document for forensic examination – document is used or being used in a pending court case in the Sessions Court – whether applicant can leapfrog to the High Court for such order of forensic examination of document – whether applicant who is dissatisfied with the Sessions Court’s refusal to order forensic examination can file a separate suit in the High Court for such examination order – whether multiplicity of proceedings – whether attempt to re-litigate the same issue – whether applicant’s proper remedy is to raise the issue in an appeal against the Sessions Court’s final decision.	02/11/2023	YA Tuan Tee Geok Hock	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ebb7e6ea-b8fd-48d5-98bf-36b108468e66&Inline=true	02/11/2023 11:25:27 BA-24NCvC-1898-11/2022 Kand. 17 S/N 6ua36/241UiYvzaxCEaOZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 6ua36/241UiYvzaxCEaOZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 6ua36/241UiYvzaxCEaOZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 6ua36/241UiYvzaxCEaOZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 6ua36/241UiYvzaxCEaOZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 6ua36/241UiYvzaxCEaOZg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal EA-ZINCVC-1593-11/2022 Kand, 17 ‘ :2/11/2023 11:25-2* ‘ nu me man coum or MALAYA IN SHAH ALAM IN ms sun: or ssumeon DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA ORIGINAHNG summons No.: an-zmcvc-155:-11/znzz DALAM PERKARA BERKENAAN SURAT JAMINAN DAN Innzumm EERYARIKH 29.oa.2nn5 DAN DALAM PERKARA ATLIRAN 92 KAEDAH 4 KAEDAH-KAEDAH MAHKAMAHZIHZ BETWEEN CHONG BOON HENG [IDENTITV cum M0,: s2n1z4—1n—s1ss] PLAINTIFF AND HANSON BUILDING MATERIALS muvsm sun sun xcaupmv no. : 327637-K] nzrzunnms GROUNDS or JUDGMENY IN suaamnuwvuxczaazw ‘NEVA sum ...m., M“ be mad p. vecly M nH§\nnH\|Y M W. mm. VII mun: NM‘ gnouuos or JUDGMENT (0.5. for lemme Iumlnnlon) lmroductlon The P\amIwl/EH Chang's apphcauon in «ms ow Summons seals an 07:12! In mm the DalendamlHansDn m Dmduce me unginal 01 may av suarame and lndemmly dated 29 s 2005. pan of me sutuecl maltev m anamer Sesswons Conn sum, far Imensm Exammahan by me Chermslry Depanmenla1Ma\ays\a regarding me uulhenlnuly nf me mgnalure Ihevein sad to he aw Chong'5 swgnamve 2 TN: us not 3 Iresh npplicalmn befove the cnmmenoemen\| av a mun suil am a oollalem ar cllculluus way av cvcumvsmmg me remanx Sessions Conn m appwmg for an umer wmch us ancmuy to me Sussmns Conn sun and which is well within the junsdivinon oi the relevam Sessvons Cnun 3 On 29 sapnemner 2023 nus Court aisnussea me P m ms ongluanng Summons with most: 4 Dxssmisﬁed, Ihe Plamuw has apaealed so me Conn o1Appea\ Lcgal prin an 5 n In barbie and alemenlavy pnnclple M procedural law mm when a hhganl m 3 noun case mlends m make an zp on «m Inspection or examlnalvun at an mginzx aocumemwmcu m used or baing used as ewdenoe in a pending own case, me mlganl applies cm the 2 sm nu-zmnuuwuxciaazg -W. sum rumhzv MU ... M In M, m. .mw., MW: nnumgnl VI mung W.‘ necessary urdar tar Inspuclton ur exannnatton tn the same cmm case Where he neeessny tor such apphcahun anm tn n suhomlnme mun case, such apphcahnn I310 be made to tne same sundrdtnate cowl wmen Is hearing the case. as n is wet wtlhin me powers and nmsdtettdn aitne sumrdtnata court to make suen mder Tne law dees nnl eountenanee a teeptmggtng process of clmumvenltng the aubamtnale cowl by pavachuttng te tne High Cowl en eppttcettdn my mdav 01 Inspectton e« examlnzlmn at docuntenu used 0! to be used tn tne pendtng subardmam court case. As this pmceduval maltev ts ED paste and etententnry, thus Cmm does not prepdse ta one any case precedent except to say mat must the Plainlﬂf has done here etsp censtnutee mu¥lp\|\I:Ify ol pmceedings wnten ts intended tn be prevented by paragraph 11 at the senedute In tne Owns at Judtcalule Am 1964 wnten pnwmes tor “Power to drsmtss . . proceedings . mump/my ol proceedings tn any court or court: the ploaasdmgs ought not In be eon:rnued- . whats by nmon 41/ Analysis and Findings s In me snan Atem Sessions com Sm! No BA—B52<;37-11/2021 (‘the Slutons Cowl SuI\| No art, Hanson sued an Chang and CP Se! is euetenm for me unpaid value 01 guode edtd by Hansen In Syzlikal eenetest Ntlwana Sdn and a company In Much an cncng and op Serwere Dtrsclurs. EH Chang and or Serwas sued In tne Sesstons cddn Sutl Ne 37 as me guarznlurs :17 syanxat Generast 3 sm ad-zmnutvvuxciaozg -we Sum nuvthzv wm ... U544 no my me .nnn.n., MW: mm... VI ertuus pom! Nirwanz Sdn Bhd pulsuanl to the Guaraniee and Iridemnﬂy da\|ad 29 e 2005 9. The issue on ugnaiuie in me Guaraniae and Indemnity dated 29 a.2ua5 was me oi ms issue: In the Sessions Cnuil sun No.37 whereby sessm. Com has reyeaea an Chung‘: argumeni on signature and than pvnceeded In glam summary iudgemen\| in favour oi Hanson une rviaimwi in ma smions Cum Sun Na :7). see paragraphs 1502) and Ac) 01 me wenuanrs Aﬂidavil in Reply (Enclosure 5) These paragraphs I5(hj and \|::)a1\|he Deiena-nrs Aniaavii In Reply are um denied by in: Piainim. see parigmph in urine Piamiim Ania n Reply (Ericlnsure an 10 wiiaieyu dissaiisiaciion that a parry has isgaidmg me Sessions cuurrs due’ on ineiuamg pvocadural DY eymenuui rulings, cum in be vaised In an uppeai against me Sessions Dnun‘s ducision and mi by ﬁling a fresh and npsiaie sun in respeci olane nuns Iuues mere 11 huh and sepziaie sun Ilka [ms we-Ad resin: in munipiiciiy M pvuceedlngs, at 2 miismeni anempn In rehuﬁzln the same issue if! a neparatelarum 12 In the premises, the Onginahng Summens have is iiivoious and an abuse ui process in terms M pmceduru audio! mode at commencemunt IN nu-zmnuivvuxciaazg Wale sum runny M“ be us« In May i... migiruuly mm. mm... VI griuns poﬂli Conclusion 12 In noncmsxan, ms Crawl on 29 September 2023 msmlssed me Onglnaﬁng Summons mm costs 14 Aﬂer me msmissal al the Ongmalmg Summons on the ground 0! aupncuy of proceeding and abuse a! process, K \s unnecessary to look at me rnems at me appllcalmn 15. As the merits anne spphcaxion lawns pan cf anumer mun sun and It has become unnecessary var «ms Court (0 decxde on m, mus coun wm reﬂaxn from making any comment an the mencs Dazed «ms 26"’ Oanber 202:5 czmmnmmoow Signld VA... " ma Ts:ﬁJ:DoGKEHocK mm ""“"“ ' men coum or MALAVA AT sum ALAM (NCVC 10) m M-uaawuuvmxciaazg Wale sum runhnv Mu e. um law may he .ngn.ny mm dnutmnl «. muus mm To me pames' snhciluls. 1 For me Flamlm Ahmad Zayd Ahmad Zuber Messrs Fmsal A Zayd (Pevalm Jays) 2 For me Respmdanl . Fanmr selvam :10 Narawnasamy Messrs N Selvam. Jay ma Company (Kuz\a Lumpur) m M-uaawuuvmxciaazg Wale sum rumhnv wm ». um law may m. .m.u-y mm dnunvmnl «. muus mm	855	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-22NCvC-445-08/2022	PLAINTIF JOHAN SHAH BIN AMIN SHAH DEFENDAN 1. ) STEMEY (MALAYSIA) SDN. BHD. 2. ) EDMUND CHUAH CHOONG ENG HUAT	The grounds for both applications are basically the same.(a) no reasonable cause of action against the 2nd Defendant who was not a party to the Membership Form (case of Abu Bakar Rajudin (from Abu Bakar Rajudin & Co acting as receiver and manager for Sykt Usahasama Km-Ldah Sdn Bhd) v Sykt Perumahan Negara Bhd [2017] 1 MLJ 115).(b) The 1st Defendant is a duly registered company and has a legal personality separate from that of its members including the 2nd Defendant (Section 20 (a) of the Companies Act 2016, Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1896] UKHL 1, [1897] AC 22) The 2nd Defendant acted in his capacity as the director of the 1st Defendant which does not make the 2nd Defendant a party to the Membership Form signed between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant.(c) The allegation of fraud in the Statement of Claim was not sufficiently pleaded. The Statement of Claim discloses no facts or evidence showing any special circumstances which justifies the lifting of the corporate veil of the 1st Defendant (the cases of Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 39, Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1991]1 ALL ER 929, Gurbachan Singh s/o Bagawan Singh & Ors v Vellasamy s/o Ponnusamy & Ors [2015] 1 MLJ 773).(d) In addition, under Enclosure 18, the 3rd Party relied on the High Court case of Lim Sze Way v Allianz General Insurance Company (M) Bhd (Supreme Power Auto Sdn Bhd & Ors, third parties) [2020] MLJU 2089, whereby Ong Chee Kwan JC held that in a claim for indemnity, there must first exist a legal relationship between parties. This Court agrees that there was non-existence of a legal relationship between the Plaintiff (Defendant in the counterclaim) and the 2nd Defendant (3rd party).In short, the above findings warrant for striking out under Order 18 Rule 19 of ROC.CONCLUSIONEnclosures 11 and 18 are allowed with cost.	02/11/2023	YA Dr Suzana binti Muhamad Said	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1e0bb9e1-b8e5-4e0c-aa4a-2bdf3d1de057&Inline=true	IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF FEDERAL TERRITORY OF MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO.: WA-22NCVC-445-08/2022 BETWEEN JOHAN SHAH BIN AMIN SHAH (I/C NO.: 870716-89-5019) …PLAINTIFF AND 1. STEMEY (MALAYSIA) SDN. BHD. (Previously known as Aphrozone (Malaysia Sdn. Bhd.) (Company Registration No.: 201601035195) 2. EDMUND CHUAH CHOONG ENG HUAT (I/C NO.: 620214-10-6271) … DEFENDANTS 02/11/2023 11:16:06 WA-22NCvC-445-08/2022 Kand. 59 S/N 4bkLHuW4DE6qSivfPR3gVw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (ENCLOSURES 11 AND 18) INTRODUCTION [1] This is a decision in relation to two applications, namely Enclosures 11 and 18. Enclosure 11 was filed by the 2nd Defendant to strike out the Plaintiff’s claims under Order 18 rule 19(1)(a), (b), (c) or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC) (Enclosure 11). Subsequently, the 1st Defendant filed a counterclaim against the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff named the 2nd Defendant as a 3rd party in the counterclaim. Thus, the 2nd Defendant (as a 3rd party in the counterclaim) filed Enclosure 18 to strike out the 3rd party claim against him under Order 18 rule 19(1)(a), (b), (c) or (d) of the ROC (Enclosure 18). [2] Consequently, this Court allowed both applications to strike out in Enclosure 11 and 18 with cost. The reasons for the decision as set out below. BRIEF FACTS [3] The 1st Defendant runs a multi-level network marketing business and deals with skincare products, cosmetics and toiletries. The 2nd S/N 4bkLHuW4DE6qSivfPR3gVw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Defendant is the director and shareholder of the 1st Defendant. A company, Wealthexcel Holdings Sdn. Bhd. (Wealthexcel) is also a shareholder of the 1st Defendant where the 2nd Defendant is a director and shareholder of Wealthexcel. [4] The Plaintiff applied to join the 1st Defendant as its member and executed a Membership Application Form (Membership Form) which the plaintiff agreed to, inter alia, promote and sell the 1st Defendant's products, either by himself or through his "downliners". [5] On 20.06.2022, the 1st Defendant issued a show-cause letter to the Plaintiff and suspended his membership. [6] On 10.08.2022, the Plaintiff commenced an action against the 1st Defendant for damages following the suspension of the Plaintiff’s membership by the 1st Defendant. The 1st Defendant then counter-claimed for RM 1,099,880.00, being the outstanding amount for the pre-registration of sales. [7] The Plaintiff contended that the 2nd Defendant is the controlling mind S/N 4bkLHuW4DE6qSivfPR3gVw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal of the 1st Defendant and the acts of the 1st Defendant are the acts of the 2nd Defendant and/or vice versa. [8] The 2nd Defendant contended that prior to the filing of this Suit, the Plaintiff had not pledged any wrongdoing or fraud of the 2nd Defendant. Further, the contracting parties to the Membership Form were the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant, not the 2nd Defendant. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Striking Out [9] The law on Order 18 Rule 19 of ROC is trite (Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36). Thus, this Court took note of the followings- Enclosure 11 & Enclosure 18 [10] The grounds for both applications are basically the same. (a) no reasonable cause of action against the 2nd Defendant who was not a party to the Membership Form (case of Abu Bakar Rajudin (from Abu Bakar Rajudin & Co acting as receiver and manager for Sykt S/N 4bkLHuW4DE6qSivfPR3gVw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Usahasama Km-Ldah Sdn Bhd) v Sykt Perumahan Negara Bhd [2017] 1 MLJ 115). (b) The 1st Defendant is a duly registered company and has a legal personality separate from that of its members including the 2nd Defendant (Section 20 (a) of the Companies Act 2016, Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1896] UKHL 1, [1897] AC 22) The 2nd Defendant acted in his capacity as the director of the 1st Defendant which does not make the 2 nd Defendant a party to the Membership Form signed between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant. (c) The allegation of fraud in the Statement of Claim was not sufficiently pleaded. The Statement of Claim discloses no facts or evidence showing any special circumstances which justifies the lifting of the corporate veil of the 1st Defendant (the cases of Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 39, Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1991] 1 ALL ER 929, Gurbachan Singh s/o Bagawan Singh & Ors v Vellasamy s/o Ponnusamy & Ors [2015] 1 MLJ 773). (d) In addition, under Enclosure 18, the 3rd Party relied on the High Court case of Lim Sze Way v Allianz General Insurance Company S/N 4bkLHuW4DE6qSivfPR3gVw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (M) Bhd (Supreme Power Auto Sdn Bhd & Ors, third parties) [2020] MLJU 2089, whereby Ong Chee Kwan JC held that in a claim for indemnity, there must first exist a legal relationship between parties. This Court agrees that there was non-existence of a legal relationship between the Plaintiff (Defendant in the counterclaim) and the 2nd Defendant (3rd party). [11] In short, the above findings warrant for striking out under Order 18 Rule 19 of ROC. CONCLUSION [12] Enclosures 11 and 18 are allowed with cost. (SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Kuala Lumpur Date 31 October 2023 S/N 4bkLHuW4DE6qSivfPR3gVw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal COUNSELS For the Plaintiff Messrs Goh Wong Pereira Advocates & Solicitors 8 Chancery No. 8, Jalan Tualang Taman Bukit Bandaraya Bangsar, 59100 Kuala Lumpur For the Defendants Messrs Vin Cheng & Co Advocates & Solicitors 20-1 dan 20-2, Oval Damansara Taman Tun Dr Ismail, 60000 Kuala Lumpur S/N 4bkLHuW4DE6qSivfPR3gVw *Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal wA—22ucvc—u5—na/2u22 IN THE HIGH COUHY OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMFUR IN THE STAYE or FEDERAL TERRITORY or MALAYSIA w cw sun N NCVC-445-GE/2022 BETWEEN JOHAN sum am AMIN smm we NO.:87D716-B9-5019) ...FLAlNTlFF AND I. STEMEY (MALAVSIA) sun. arm. (Pvevlously known as Aphroznne (Malaysla sun. arm.) (Company ﬁeglslratlon No.: 2915»: 035195) 2 EDMUND CHUAH cuooms ENG HUAT (I/C NO.: 620214-1a-6271) DEFENDANTS sw 4nkLMuw4DEansw=RJqvw -mm Sum -nvhgvwm nausea mmm-.wm.mmmmm.m..m4c varw GROUNDS or JUDGMENY (ENCLOSURES 11 AND 13) mmonucnou [I] ms Is a uemsm m re\aman m we apphcaunns, name\y Enclosmes 11 am 15 Encmsure 11 was mad by \he 2"“ Delendant m smke nu! ma Plammrs dams undev0rder1Bvule19{1)(a).(b)‘ (c) or (:1) cl me Rmes ac com 2012 mac) (Enclosure I1) sunsequenuy, me 15‘ Delendant men a cnunterdaxm agamst \|he P\a\|nMl and me F\amIM named \he 2"“ Delendam as a 3'“ parly m me caun\erc\axm Thus‘ we 2~= Deiendanl (as a 3'4 pany m we coun\|evc\a\|m) men Encmsure 15 m smke aux me 3“ pany mam aga\|ns\| mm under 0n1er15 me «away. (h), m or my ac me HOG (Enclosure I8) [2] Cansequemly, ms cam allowed mm apphcahans \|a smke mu m Encmsuve 11 am 18 mm cost. The reasons rm me aemsmn as se\| am bemw EHIEF FACTS [:1 The W Deiendanl runs a mu\u—\|eve\ network marketmg busmess and deals wuh skmcare pmaucus, cosmehcs and umemes. The 2"‘ N 4nkLMuw4DEanswwRJqvw we Sam M... M“ be used m mm we nvwvuﬁlv mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm Delendant Is \|he director and shavehnlder m the Is\| Deiendam A cempany.Wea\\|hexce\ Hmdmgs sun Bhd ¢wea\mexceh ws alsna sharehmder 0! \he 1“ Devehuam where we 2"“ Devehuahn \s a chrecmr aha sharehmder av weauhexcel. [4] The Plamml apphed m jam the 1-‘ Derehuahn as us membev aha execmed a Membersmp Apphcalmn Farm (Membershlp Form) wmch lhe plamhn agreed to, Inter aha, pmmole aha sen \he 1“ Devenaahrs products‘ euher by hxmseﬂ or mmugh ms "c1awhhhers". [5] On 20 us.2o22, me I“Delent1anI\ssued a show-cause letiev \|o the Plalnhll and Suspended his memhevshu [s] On m as 2u22, the Plalnhll commenced an acllnn against (he 15 Delendant lav damages folmwmg the suspensmn av the mamhrrs membevshup by me 1:‘ Deiendanl The 1:‘ Deiendanl (hen coumev-claimed lav HM huasgaaa nu. being the outstanding amounnnr me pre-regwstvalwon av sales. [7] The F\amIM cnhnenaeu uhauhe 2"“ Delendam ws me canlrcmmg mmd N anxmuwwzanswwﬁﬂqvw mm Sum M... M“ be used m mm u. nﬂmruﬂlv mm; “Mm. VII mum pm nu ma 1“ Deiendam aha \he ans 0! me 1:‘ Delendam ave me am: cl me 2"“ Deiendanl and/or wee versa [5] The 2"“ DeiendamcanlendedU1a\|pr\|ovInIhelH\|ng of ms sum. the Plalnhll had ha: pledged any wmhgueuhg or hand 0! the 2"" Delendanl. Furlhen the cnmractmg names In me Memnersmp Form were the P\am(W and me 15‘ Derendam nanhe 2nd Derendam ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Smkmg om [9] The law an omey 18 we we nVF\|OCTs\n(e(BanI1ar Builder Sdn Em‘! 5 Dr: v United Malayan sankmg carparauan 51:11 119911 .1 ML! 35) Thus. ms cam took nme or me rauawmgs Enclosure 1: Ac Enclosure 1!? [m] The gvcmnds tor bcnh appheahohs are basically \|he same. (a) no reasahame cause ac achon agamst the 2'" Deiendanl who was not a party m the Memhersmp Farm (case 0! Abu Baku R:]udln (Imm Abu aakar Rajudln 5 Co acllng as receiver and manager Ia: Sykt usanasama Km-Ldan sun Ehd) v Sykl Perumahan Negar: sn:1[2a171 1 ML] 115). (b) pevsonahly separate Item that of us members Inchmmg \he 2"“ Devenaam The 1“ Delendanl 15 a duly vegwsleved company and has a Vega! (secunn 20 (a; of [he Companies Ac! 2015, Salomon v Salomon .1 Co LId[1E96] LIKHL 1, (1a9nAc2a The 2“ Devenaam acled m ms capacny as me dvecmr av \he 1s\ Devenaam wmcn does nm make me 2"“ Devenaam a pany m we Membersmp Farm sxgned between lhe Wamtm and me 15‘ Delendant (C) meaded The Slatemem av mam dxscmses no iacls or ewuence shawmg The aHegamn omaua m we Slatemem av mam was not summemly any spews! cncumsxances wmcn MSNIES lhe Mung av the corporate van nu ma <s\| Devenaam (me cases ac Ong Leang Chlou 5 Anal v Keller (M) Sun and A on 121121) MLJU :19, Adams 1/ cape Induslrles Plc [12191] 1 ALL ER gas, Gurbacnan Slngn s/n aagawan Slngh a on v Vellasamy 5/a Fannusamy a am [21115] 1 ML] 77.1). (6) own case al Llnl Sze way 1/ Amanz General Insurance Campany In aaamon. undev Enclosure 15. me am Fany rehed on me Hugh syn 4m<LMuw4nEm1swwRJqvw warn sum 1\|-nhnv WW he .15.. m mm 1.. nvVﬂ\ruU\|y mm; m.n.n VII .mm mm (M) sun (Supreme Power Auto San Ehd 3. am, Ihlrdpalﬂes) (202471 MLJU 2039. whereby Ong Ghee Kwan JG new mm m a mam var mdemnuy, Iheve must wan exxst a Vega! relamnsmp belween pames ms Com! agrees mat there was nonexxslence at a Vega! relauonsmp belween me P\amull (Delendam m the caunlermaxm) and me 2"“ Deiendanl (cw pany) [11] In sham me above nmmgs wanam lav sinkmg out under Ordev IE Rme 19 of Roc. CONCLUSION [12] Enclosures 11 and 18 are allowed Mm cost. (suumx mn MUHAMAD sun) .mdu:\a\ Commissioner Hugh Coun oi Malaya Kuala Lumpm Date :1 ocmber 202: am 4nxLMuw4DE6nswwRJqvw -ma Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm ua nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm COUNSELS Far lhe Flnlnlllf Messrs Gnh Wang Pevexra Advocates a scmcnms 5 Chancery No. 5, Ja\an Tua\ang Taman Eukll Bandaraya Eangsav, 59100 Kuala Lumpur Far lhe Devan-ants Messrs Vm Cheng a. Ca Advocates a scmcnms 204 dan 2ur2. ouax Damansava Taman Tun Dr Vsmanl eoouu Kua\a Lumpur	6,623	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
CA-22NCvC-58-10/2018	PLAINTIF GAS MALAYSIA VIRTUAL PIPELINE SDN BHD DEFENDAN INTERGATE STEEL MILL SDN BHD	Plaintif memfailkan tindakan terhadap Defendan di atas kegagalan Defendan mengambil bekalan gas mampat (CNG) daripada Plaintif setelah kedua-dua pihak memasuki suatu perjanjian yang dipanggil sebagai Pre-Supply Agreement (PSA) bertarikh 23 Oktober 2014 di mana tarikh pengambilan gas tersebut bermula pada Jun 2015. Melalui keterangan SP2, jelas bahawa tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan telahpun diasaskan di mana pihak Plaintif telahpun mengambil langkah-langkah mitigasi untuk mengurangkan kerugian dan seterusnya mengurangkan tuntutan asal Plaintif terhadap Defendan. Keterangan saksi-saksi Defendan di Mahkamah gagal untuk mencabar pengiraan Plaintif tersebut dan apa yang dinyatakan hanyalah mereka perlu perlanjutan masa untuk mengambil bekalan CNG daripada Plaintif. Mahkamah mendapati dan memutuskan bahawa pihak Plaintif telah berjaya mengasaskan tuntutan mereka dan dengan itu tuntutan Plaintif telah dibenarkan dengan kos	02/11/2023	YA Dato' Haji Zainal Azman Bin Ab. Aziz	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d21aa00e-a245-47e0-9b05-462e93c64300&Inline=true	02/11/2023 16:06:12 CA-22NCvC-58-10/2018 Kand. 102 S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N DqAa0kWi4EebBUYuk8ZDAA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal c.\—22ncvc—5eA1n/2013 Kand. 102 az/mm: 16:06-12 DALAM MAHKAIAN TINGGI MALAVA DI KUANTAN DALAM NEGERI PMAMG DARUL IIAKIMJR GAS MALAYSIA VIRTUAL PIPELINE sou am: ...PLA\|NT\|F (No svanuoxr mama) DAN INYERGAYE swan mu sou am: ...DEFENDAN (No. SVARIKAT: 421465-K) ALASAN PENGHAKMAN PENGENALAN 1 Plain“! memtanxan undakan Kemadap Derenaan dx alas kegzgalan Defendan menqambll bakalan gas mampat qcmsp danpadl Flmmﬂ nlnlah kedua-ﬂu: mm melnaslm sumu peqirulan yang mpanggn sebngau Pu;-Supmy Agreemenl 1;-sa) m DuA:mwmE-nauvukaznu mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! bellankh 23 Okmber mu m man: Iankh pengambﬂan gu larsebul bumula pad: Jun am 2 same» msudangar ksterangan danpada keduadua mhak dan setelih memmbangxan penghuphin‘ Mahkamuh mendauim dan rnamululkln mm. mh-k mum mm bculya mengaumn nmlutan meveka din dengnn mu lunlman Plamm Ielnh moemmn uenuan kos nxn KE§ 3 Menuvul peqanpan psx benankh 23 Oklober 2014, keduadua k telah mencapal salu peusemuan bag! Pblmwmenbekalkan cm; kenada Delandan dl warms Daisndan m Kuaman 4 m amava Iermadermn yang relevan an dulum PSA Ievsebm aaaxan u Bnclun I warm 0 rnanyalnkan bnhnwu Ialu -.y.’ \| pembuknl mug-' (anelgy suFP’F company) mam. aunmuman clan Gas Mﬂaysna Bamad ﬂan IEV Energy Sdn Bbd saleuu PSA luuaouh unluk mnyumam bekalan cm; m uuaamwmmaumaznu mm. Snr1I\nmhnrw\HI>e HIQG w may he mmuny mum: ﬂmumnl VI mum Wm! amour wen diﬁhsl an mukasulsl 1 hmggﬂ 30 Uurnn Dukuman Bcrumn Tnmbnnnrv (man Selaras nengan Psrjanﬂan JV, syankal usaha same mg drlubuhkan dtnamakan sebaga: Gas Malaysaa IEV Sdn aw Gas Mnlnysra rev Sdn Bhd dvperbodnnkln pm 21 mzzm, upom ylng dabuﬁmkan oleh Perakuan Pememadanan Syarika! sonaman .1; mukasural 12 Ikaran comm Bcrsama (ms! “ 19 semusnya, sm rnenyatakan sepeni benknl -su ISM dr‘ dnmn nvnyalnn pemnotunnya cam. memmbulkan rsu bshawa GMVP buknnluh Illhuk ow an/am PSA Apuawapun anda temadap tsu M J /m adalah sam ml my lumen an Ildnk berusas Adnlnlv mm was «mad: dokumon-ookumsn yang Isl.-an say. kamukakarl bamwa EMVP mm. mam yang dllmnall sebapa: may 0 m dalam Kllusu IPSA oemmn Ptnaloplllak semomewrvya m uuaamwmmaumamu mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIQG w my .. mmuny mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum Wm! n Isiah mangsu-hm bahaws GMVP akan men/ad: max kspada PSA Iurxomll sebatk mun uny- ﬂwarbadnnkon says mga pmaya bahawa ISM max pemah mxmu um mongolahm bahnwa GMVP semamangnya pmak yang Ielan rncngnmmlamu dun dtseralmak men ems dun IEV Enelgy Tambnhan lag! momm rmdnkan gu-mm oamulnkln obi: GMVF, rsu man borulus sum! aengnn GMVP tsnoa spnpa pmles alau banllhan rm dapanﬁllhuldr rmlkasurul s ningga 10 an 44 me man flu, In [In ndal-Iv Hanyn m. yang dmmbulkan unluk melengalman mm dan msncnn .541 untuk Irdak mange/akkan dm ﬂan menalvgglmg lmrupmn mm: kamungkmsn rsu ssndm ~ 20 Swemmanl yang dmyalakan men sm, Delenﬂan mm belkumumkasl dengan F\a\|nlWdan Defendzn sememanunyalahu bahawn Plalnm away. Plny c .1. a m PSA tenohul Mnhhun m uuaamwmmaumaznu mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIQG w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum Wm! 11 kahenngln suz Mu mewlkm bahnwa P Idllih P-ny C ynna unumuk-n mnbul n samemananyl snz ma bummu bnmwa mun bommnn cural demon Flilntﬂ an mum Flamm adalah Party C da\am PSA neusazun an mana snz mwyeﬁakan 199671! beri(u\| ? nVuEskepada SHAIKH Plafrmf mm (353 MBEYSFG VMIIBI Pfpiﬂne ‘ sun Blvd, seIu,u7 /Wino;-rum. 142 ‘snow s'sam,u aruu Ink setwu, aulam aural rm ‘ sHAu<H mukasursl 5 can 9, Em om ad. was ‘ an Ma/mu Vrmnl Pvnolme Sdn BM? as “ SD2 J‘; San lulu kcpaaa dm m 3 ENCVK s‘ Laps: nu mmsura: 44 pan daﬂﬂadu Gas ‘SHA/KH Ma/Iys»a V/III/H! PIPGIV/'5 SUI! B01 X51171 ‘ \ Sltujcﬂ ‘ 145 Vsuz J‘ sitwu ' ’ W‘ 145. ism:/K ‘s Faniesdah Iullskepsde P(amln7 ‘ ismlxu \ l 5 Y: ‘ x _, , u us ‘ENC/K s Says cadungkan luspadu Enoak ongx l SHA/KN ‘ sobe/mm:/I rsm em up: 6.: my-ysm Vmual Fmlrm San am, map. uluu rum 149. ism J soosmm nu. 15a ENCIK ,5 om, sum/u mu ﬁduksetujvﬁuhaja 1 srmxn ‘ 151 'sn'2 m sutuju ’ "’ ” W’ 1 152. sucm s Dan ssbenamya Gas Malaym \/mush srwxn Baolmo sun any mm Parry c dolam P’!-suwiy aalumnnlnu, ulrlll/" '15: “S02 J"seoanParryc— 7% ’s-Tnqu slau blink zak .393 mm.’ M Wong wsrwm nlun tcnyl balik unmk you axploin om ] 1 Dcnvon sayn, selwu mu um ‘ 155 sm ‘.1 Tuk seluill 156 ‘ENC/K 5 Dan Eaya bmangxan mum /SM srmxn slbanamyu am pemlh rnambanruh mu‘ Dual vanyu MM Gas Mataysm vmuu Fmenne L15/Am semua sum menyural dunqun Plafrrliﬂ 157. 5132 J scnqu m Ink mm Ipa-op: bnnlomn - 21. Danpaaa memngan SD2 a. anas, Mas nanm plhak Demaun wuarmngnya mangatzhul Plalnhl aauxan sebennmya Plny c .1... dmgln Nu Plamm puny: «om mm unluk mengambﬂ llndikln w Ksmadip Demaan oengan memuruskan kepaaa Karma-turn! Yang menumukkin nal sepem benku\| a n=mak—pmax some mwum buhawn kin Ids Flny c selepas PSA dvlandmangunl. a mmmw mampnun Pnny c a« sum PSA lenebul dun Pmnul ndaluh syankal usahuurnn anuna Gas Malayna Bemad tr-any 3.1) an IEV Energy Sdn em: (Party 32; d1 datam PSA \|em:bul. dan c necemnn lelah berulus sum man man pernah memmmn mahumm memnrme: yamasa masa mainnal bahawa Plaumﬂ memvikan plhzk yang sapahllnyz menjadl pmlk a. damn undalun ml 22 semusnya menulul Innna—terma di dzlam PSA, behan unluk menaﬁkan lunmian kefuwnn yang ax alarm clan P\|aInm mam m DuAamwmE-nauvukaznu mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. U... a may he mm-y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! is kepada Delandan lm zdalah berdztarkan kenadz Klaus: em» ynng rnenyzmkan upeni benknﬂ “(b) me aezaus aims Reimbursable Casts may be mmpaled by Ptﬁy 5 and lwwnldod to Parry A m Rem-nwsaale Costs so mmpufnd by Fury 5 sm save lormlminslerrm, as concmwa, mm and mnamg an Parry A and Party a “ Z3 Adalah ‘alas hahzwa Defendan perm unluk manuruukkan koi man .1. mm samulu tnmnpal kamlapan an mum penglvaarmya Jwka Delendln Qiﬂhl unluk menumukkan saarzng kesllapanalau mamlssl mm pengmn Phmm adahn dmnggap sebagaw mukhmad din menglkzl Delendarl 2o. Muhkamah mevuwk kapada kes cum: Bank EM] (pnviuully km-um u aumipmn-oommcm Bank arm) v Ziml vropmiu sun am I 01: {ms} 1 um 14 m min: Mahkamah Riyuan memuluskun bonus 1151 wm raspecz rm subm/ss/on onsamed wullsellollhe rupoﬂdcnls Wu: bars]! ol mm It in lxiomnﬁc mu 1 m DuAamwmE-nauvuxaznu mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! comnc-on or xmamont luuod pursuant to n conclusive lvrdonzc cllwn II, in ma «cum. 1:! n-um or nunirm umar an an an 0! en. mun:-c-, dlronnlncﬂvo oi tbs -mount du nBecho&Co(LondnI'I)LtdvBir\|<7ua Vames av cammercw De Psn's[1973I 2 Lloyd’: Rap 437 (Sachs) Lord Dummy MR sun: My 440 I won»: only Add ms ws commomlll primed to! innmng 'concIuIin widoncf mum; is only nmpmn Mann en. banku: at bmkon who mm mm m known wbtnonosrundmlllblamnn or nusrnm who m moat nnmmty to mm a mist): Thu» standing rs so hrwh mu: man ward .5 In o. Inmod S1: much so Inn! .5 name omavnnn given by a bank or 5 molar mus! be honoured 1: ranks as equumiem to .1 not Iugher man. me osmﬁcats of an nmrrrurororengrnosrm 5 building canlracl As we mm mpsnlod/y held, such 5 certiﬁcate must be hormulad /aavmy any crussclarms to be settled later by an ammazar Sa :1 a banker or mom was a Home al aornun m pursuance of n bone/uxmy uvvdsnca’ clause m DuA:m.wmE-nauvukaznu mm. sm-w ...m.mm .. U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! me guaranmr mus! humour :1, leaving any cmsstlalnu by me cuuomr to ca Adjusted In uplrnfo procsedmg: 1151 ‘Die abovo arﬁcullﬁon arm raﬁonile undulylnq an Inga! accuﬁunct or cnnclusivv widvncn cliuus wu npmnam mo Fldorulcoun um olclﬂbonk mu v oomoon Loony A on man 1 ML] 231 Ind cm-gm Financa and v Nu Lai Yiny (trading as KN Trading) A Anorrzoosl 2 ML! £15.-12005): Cu 544. no arms: cowl of me mm mm dmaou mar - camfc-to av mdeblsdlless operates m the held or udpclnml law, and :1 excuses me Dank (mm adducmg Me pmaro/new 1: .s Imlhe bonownr lo dvspmve me amount clarmnd * 25 Juga an damn kes ocsc Bank (M) v Omogu noumn sun and 3 On [ms] 1 Mu 15: an mans Mahkamah Tmgg. memmuskan bahawi ‘23 m me cucumszances Dims mslsnl case, me uevammus are cuslamers ol Ine P/amt!!! wmch pmwded [hem with an avwdrull‘ Iacmty subjscl to mo (arms and sandman: uz m DuA:mwmE-nauvukaznu mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! conlmnedtn (ho fur/rty leﬂsrnndlscrmy ngmemenl Swslyﬂ the ﬂufundanlx um In/yfng on IM Inc: ma! my wnnr-«Ia Dlymunts because my man my my Ictsd on ms mm pmlmsss ind assurances or ma p/amnll wuuld :1 no: be reasonable Io: me delelvdanrs as Prudent businessmen Io mm». m slatsmolvl olaaoounls wnnn In this case they and not In my apmlon m the mnlaxtafa aarlkmg rmnucnon an In ma mslanl case‘ me esmﬁcala or wmebtsdnsss dauw meal: the naqmnnnenr ofthe rvqwous last or a dear and unnnumgnm pmnmn as alluded m by Ms Fnw Cauncu m Ta: Hmg canon Mm ua mu rt is to on bomo rn mind mm mm Is 2 cormlcnt or Indtboodnou cllun In It»: ncinr, ngmmun and on gnmnm (ell 13 and 11 ruapicllvulyhvhlch wouldnndonhv lrmwnl cunlﬂrdby tin Nalmlﬂ u concmuv. um-nu unlcss mm 1: nlanilnl tmar. my conduct ol mo asrsnusnes speak volumes lor (MW nmdmnny m the ngm an on canlompnmnoous documents produced by m. p/nnmn ' Z6 Adalah ‘alas hahavm behan Ienetak a. was mun Deaenaan nnmk menunlukhn ma-pow: kunapm an a-um oﬂnwlrun Fhmm m uwmwnmaumaznu ‘Nan: sm-w llmhnrwm .. HIQG n my .. mmun mum: ﬂnunmnl VI .HuNa Wm! Melalul sum pegu-m cars Plalnm benankn 14 September 2n1a‘ Fhnlﬂ Inllhpun mlumpmn pmyau knrnn kamguln ylng dillamn nlah P1-nm mm nahnnynk RM2,sea,4se 24 an Im um dlnahlvolah Ddlendan. 27 Wllulngltmlnlpun‘ perbiuruln kel ml «emu dilnnpumgknn mmpiu lahun selapas dun um. nualbevsehm dun PI Mleluh mulgihml kelwiin Nlnlun begun, Plalnlﬂ oelnh menglmbﬂ larvgkaluangkah Immk memmgnnkan keruglannyz 25 Pl um and"! mom. kawrangun SP2 man manhunt penmmn lervermcl menoana. mumun Plalnm seven: benkul Engmavmg »..;.=m...: xwmnmmmmu 1». molar-9-ma 1 'mm.a.m.m.w..mm..,.:um.sym. manna: [Er-m»-any Pvummmm aamao v IIEJGSIJO ,"......,"...cm.m.. [ M. Pm-an Mm Mn». Mum {Hull ham: mA :14 nuiknsau 59 Hwy: (2 /DB} m nu.mwmz.nauv..mznu ‘Mm: sm-1 nmmrmu .. U...» v-viymu nr1n\nIV\|Y mm. u....m m .HuNa WM kepoau Dulendan uan syankat vembexal (snag: tersebm hendnklah dlsnrzhlukkan kn dalam PSA narunm Dawn hal IN, sylnkm Delennun lalah mlubuhkan menglkul pammukan PSA (eaehul, b Eocnn xv Ikocmr /V) mnymakan bahawu mg. Mulrl membakalkan one kevid: Delendan‘ Plawmn lelah rnenlillnkan Deﬂblnaan din pemasangan kemuﬂahan slzsan mu tmunm smmn Iscvmres) wen: xemua ken: lawn yang periu Ilnu umnlng-n unluk pambeklhn cm: nlah F\z\|n\|ﬂ kepada Daiandan (Knmudahan cue), c Klausa 1(z){x) menyzhkzn hahawz mum pembekzlan cue lellh am-pk-n um: Jun 2015‘ :1. Kllusa Stallu) menyavakan bahawa Iankh pembekalan one mum duannmn aungun poueuunan bersamu semua pmuk kapadl vsa Dalnm mu ml‘ unkh Dembeknlnn m um» PSA ken-ua-annya dwluuulkan dengan perselujuan belsama pahak keuaua Julaw zma mnkn Lanmin Bekalan) (Extended supply Dali). din m uuaamwmmaumaznu mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIQG w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum Wm! Em-«ma. pmmmm Carurumnrumtcamnusawrlw n. m-um... ~.m« cm saw cm Pm.-a u s . ;=.m..u.m.4.y.. Nu: naumsuan vcunaoovuuma H0011 smxraw 1 mmm n m an m :2-1+9 7» s an uzma rm-wk bunk ammmmmm mmmu-tummnsr Pruﬁtrwwnl rmm‘ scary I ammo:-w av ms ‘ Cormmsw Ina Yum Ad Post (CmnuI0ra7 Smfnd Er-Imumv tuuzvoo «mm: >. H van» urns Juneau W-mnomaa-»m»mJm a mum: Ovhnlzvl 57 me: Comm: Ia Lame Samoa Pvw-wvlwnnnmvdlhnolli ms mmuuamuvm Iwm won 2:71: we mm... mm 4:7 mm tom» Tmhv nmmuo x 2 ms ~«,zsv.mm cm was (Fvuunrnn/Rand my puszwow ~ rn-420 . 2 mil — um,mm.m on-n nmiunnnm mm 2: mm 2:: w4umpmamn.m:mmmm..m9m-w-s4r / mm. mum: sm nu.mwmz.nauv..mmu “Nut: sun-1 ...m.mu .. H...» mm. nﬂi\nIV\|YI>OINn u....m m .r\uNa WM! 11 ca¢4i:Kowu-v-'nWu m-an dnrwduwuvmm 25553757‘ jJ..uy.»x..-.;a.nn»..y..s...... ' mu.n4.AuIt zs Wlllubuglvmlnapun. spa man manuvunknu jumlnh levsebm keoada RM1,675.595 37 saasian Plamm mermlak wmlah RM1‘1l8,87D93 wm adalih Kenna mm Tuba Skrd talah dlnunikan aleh mammumuk pram mg Inm so mamcn ‘uga lelah bersemju unluk mengurangkun lagv hag: PRU500 an maul Mum. amlnyo RM498.9vJ no yang man dibeli khan oleh wnmmaan kemudmmy: mum mm. mungurlngkln lunluten (enebm nun-In pnralanan udak dapal mgunzkan antam hulan Julau zms semngga Januan 2021 Kelanngnn ml menuruukkln mm Plmnw mun menuamzm Imdakan unm mnngurlngkan mnumn hqw PRUSOD mm bernamaln RM249.4se so (RMa,:s1e as x 30 bulanl 3: Mia‘ bum Mother sum am one comwmor, Pianm mun mangenaknn peviluun 5 am. ﬂavlpada mmluh basal kos punhlnaan dan pembexaxanyang an exam uleh Plalnm yang mm Ianya mm. selarus um.» PSA «man: m uuaamwmmaumamu ‘Nan: sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIQG w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum Wm! 22 32 Akhnrsekai. bag has bgisnk yang le\ah dnznggung duh Pleinm Iklhnlklﬂlﬁihn Manama. man my: cum hevdnsurxun ma :7 bulan mm aemnggn Dumber zms m mm: lrariavleruabul lelah dapa(d>gunzkan kemha jak D\|serrbev2ﬂ19 sepemmaru kevgranqan SP2 3: Smalulny mg. (unlmzn ubanyak RM2G5‘537.51 mu. bagl D4- ca; kmranuan yang dw alarm obeh Plamm unluk penguaan mm yang dlkanikun oleh maunm, keﬁerinuan SP2 mum sepam bankul sa4 Bagalmalvakall ,umIan RM2ss,5a7 51 bay: mm, x-wangnn Im dodapafﬂ ./ C31-ca; kewangan ml muruplku pamocymn mm aleh GMVP bagr pmpman-pm/nmln yang mbsnksn c/eh HSEC Bank Malaysia [HSBC] dan kqmudlsnnyn RHB Esmad /FHE] melalm Gus Mnlaysrl Enmu1[GMB] keplda aw» Dam mluln pembmaan nan pemasangan Kalnudahan GAM menu: m uuaamwmmaumaznu mm. Snr1I\nmhnrw\HI>e HIQG w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum Wm! m uuaumwmmaumamu Bag] prmanmn danu-ads nssc, GMVP fa/ah msmmjam prmwpul ssbanyuk RM11,960 we an an zwmnn man: my term dxbaynr an amp den Janunn am Imgga Dssemcar 2015 -as/nn RM969,320 73 Purnle mash Md: 3 10% Bnytptlvamnn an-pada RNA melalm GME, GM!/P lalah momm/am plllmpal sebnnylk RM9.000,00000 dun jam/ah Iaedah yang lelalv dvblylr den umn-our my mama Jam 2020 adaiah RM1,2:m2oo1v Punt: ludalv pede- 13.60% D-ma-auunuan pnmpalyang dlpmpm Alon GMVP mm RMZINSIZUOIJ 00 (RM11,980,l)oo on . RM9,DDO am 00; :1-In ,um/m moan RMZ200 520 .94 (RM969 320 73 . RM1,2.'H zoo 11; yang am away.’ alsh GMVP, nahagrsn yang ma mg-rm mgr men ISM udalnh Wiuru fuedah name 10 50% alau RM2ﬂ5‘557 57 1. mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIQG w my me mmuny mum: ﬂnunmnl y. .HuNa Wm! uann-saalun-Ian pelaoumn yang mom cam GMVP our Kamumn-n GAM wmm RM2.52l,92U 2:1 s w 1: as n: so 34 Obit ﬂu. sellru ding!!! DIno\|ak:n llullulln bum Tllﬂnl Tube sx-1 din FWU500 yang ielah aapal dsgunakan semula. mnnmn Plainnl udahh sebanyak RMI,380.6€5 22 Iapemmana um-nu-n swz mm benkul -sm Apmn ;uml.3n Iumman Isrpmda wen GMVP at man’ .1 mm.» GMVP my kon yang mpnkn dubs/Amaknn mm ponyeauan selaras dengan PSA lnlsh dirumuskan sewn berikur Fasamu Roaucnon um: - RM249,m so Momarsrzuon - RM332,477 43 cm; can-pressw — RM307,l83 44 Log/soc sqmcn Pmwanr - RM255,570 2: m nu.mwmz.nauv..mnu 1 ‘Mm: sm-1 nmwmu .. “mm vary .. mwny mm. ﬂmanmnl vs muua WM ﬂu bequmhn RM1,115‘127 55 samnya drcampur amgnn us ﬁne/Icmg sehnnyzk mass, 517 51 /um/an mmum moruad: RM1,Jc0,M522." 35 cu.» nu. mmm kalnrungInSP2 Am mu blhawl mrmnan M-mm Iemadap Delendnn lelahpun masunn an mana pihak mzmm felahnun mengambtl Iangxan-xangkan mmgasl untuk manguringkan kerugian dan saerusnya mengurannkun mmman um Pumm xamaao Defendin 36 Seballknyu kebarangan saksu-caksr Defendan an Mahkamah gagal -mm rnencabir pengmn Piallml larsebul um spa yang dmyauknn mnyun mevaka mu pemnmn m-H unmk mcngambll neman cue dmpada Plannul :7 om nu, lunhnan kzrplndz Plalnm sebanyak RMn3w.ss5 22 mun mm-m. nun Deiendnn gm: umuk mencabuv plmlnh lelscbm m uunamwmz-nauvukamu mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIQG w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum Wm! 16 XEPUTQAN 3a Dnnpooa k urangon my ad: dv ruazpan Mahkam Mlhkumnh dengin ml menaapam can mamu\|un(an nanm plhnk Plamlﬂ Ielah benavya mengemukikan kemangan yang mm: darn dengan I\|u an alas wrnbangan kebaraugkalxan‘ PVIMIW telah ban-ya mug--man ummun mun (umadip Deicnnnn bequmlah nm,:au,aa5 22 39 Eng» meruiwab wsu-wsu yang Ialah dlharvgkhkan di perenagan tau) mnggl 11:), Jlwlpirmyi mun ya bug: hang:-(I93 pueII¢§an 15 (3) hmgg: 1:) lersebul 4o Dengan nu (umuun Plalrml mun dlbenarkzn banana dengnn indah am km Munnkaln mum. gum: mgl am am unakman AZIIAN am AB AZIZ MAKIIA IIAHKAIAN TINGGI IMLAYA KUANTAN vmma mam. MAKIIIJR BERYARIKN : no OKYOBER znza m DuAamwmE-nauvuxaznu mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e HIQG w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! 17 Poglum can Fulu Enck Shzvkh Abd Snbem hetslml Enclk Mlh D-ck San mum snnnm Dame .5 co AI-9~§ Noon: Mom Knara, No 10 Jalan mm 50450 Kuala Lumpul Emel «momma-moo mm my Nu R-qukan SDC/SAS/PS/15001705 Pcuuam cm Dmnaan : Encvk Wang Funk Vang bnruml Fuln Am: - mun Mahlmld sn-a Taluzn Wang Law 5 n Nn A—23. Tlngkil 1. 2 a. 3. Larong Sen Kuaman 2 Sn Kua-nan sq-ma, Jam Teluk snuu 25500 Kn-man. Pu lug Emel wmaw_a@yanoo cam No. Rlllukan WFV/Em/I8/S:/Fa m nunamwmznnauvukaznu mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! e Khusa s menyilakan bchawa Deleudan hevxdaklah member: Dlmnuan keoaau .>na...m umuk am... n. has dun Demewuun mg nnlngguna um. Phlmwunwk umun km: yang dualankan barman nengzn pembmaan dan penyapzn Kemuaarm. CNG (Km Eolen Dmayar sa.....m (Reimbursable Goals’) ukirnnyn Deiandnn 9.9.. .......x menglmbn cm; pudl Iankh pumbelman don/sun Yankh Lannmn aekaun. 5 saw... PSI mmlwku I>I....m lalnh mnmulnk-n ken:-ken] unluk mnnyedukm .n:v.unrukmr mg. memulnknn pemhekllan one kepada Devanaa... 5 Pin: 2a Mo: 2013. Dofamnn lalnh marnnhm kanlﬂa .>.....m supuyi 1a..xn Lamulnn aeman dwhnlmkan wag. kepaﬂa Januan 2019 Malangnya, Detenuan seiepas memahon umuk oanema perlzruulan muss Inluh gagzl .......k mangimbﬂ hekalan cm; danpaﬂu Plamm 7 >\m...n..1ak bersenqu denuan pennomnan larssbul dan belan momaklumknn up-as Dafandln mulllui -nu. benankh 12 4.... m DuA:rl.w.nE-nauvukaznu 1.... 5.... ......m... .. ...... w my .. .n........ mm: .m...... VI mum pm... 201: yang man: kelemnan Ielah benevusan selana new salzhun sstangzh nan mum pcnylupin kemudahin one an pmlk Dom-an umuk monalmhnl manna cm: mrnbul 3 Defennan lelah um: um: msnglmbwi one tenebul mengm n-nkn beknlln Inrwlnn dun dnngln nu nan.» mulnmm FSA larsehm meng1kulK\|ausn sm yang menylukln sepem benkul '5 (e) In one mm mm=.nyA mu lailtn lake cm; by - (U 1». Supply D {H} such axtanded Supply am me Supply oars rs exronoed pursuant In Clause 5{.!I(u), or (in) 2». new ol Iurmmulinn of (ms Aglvslmnf ns lurmmaled pursuant In cm. 515;") Pxrw A shall compensate Pam B for all less, 00:1: and -xpanm manned by Party a for all ma won: curled out /mm m mmnon with me commmmn and completion ollna cm; Fucnlmex 9; authorized by Pay A m Clause 2 (Mrsmansr Iafenpd to as 'Rormnumz:/- Costs’! pmvidud that :1 the cm; m uuaamwmmaumamu mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIQG w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum Wm! resumes ale not and or menace to be um for me so): purpou of mummy the suppoy ul cm (0 ma Prumtsos‘ ma Rwmbursabh Costs vhurgud my be such pomon or the ram: lees, wsls and expenses as Parry is man defermvrre ' 2 Aklbal dnnunda Dlﬂlnggllun PSA mar. Defandan, Planmﬂ hendaklah amen pampaszn uleh Delendan urmk Kns amen Dwbuynr Semula belkiilan dengan punbinann din penyiapan kemudnmn CNGInnsbu1 ID Melahn sura\| peguam ra Plzmm benankh 14 Ssmember 2n1a. Pmnuv «elm manggluukan sural Iunlmnn unluk Km Belch Dvbaylr s-mum unmk amcy-r own Pumm Nohs ml amanm dangan knun xelam dengan Klausa am) FSA neruhul yang merw9ukan- 1») no dtfmls onno Retmburseblo con: man be compulod by Pmys and rammed to Party A. rm Rambursnble Cost: so compared by Party 5 shaﬂ save /up mamflzsl am)! he eoncmsm. ﬁnululld omdmg on Part;/A and Fairy 9 " m uuaamwmmaumaznu mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIQG w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum Wm! 11 Dnlam nan ,Kus amen nmayaraanx lemulang nan peril: dxhayal olah Delanﬂan beljumlzh RM2 596.493 24 Wlluupun Pumm am/um pogunmcivanyl mun memmu pambayunn KM Boleh nmayar Semula. Delendan danlalau zgermyz lelah gagax, aba1 am. ea-ggan umux menyelasaikan zumlan lavsebul mg." PIn\|n\|i1 12 Kos amen Dlbcyar Blhk tersebul pana nan pemncaraan IEVII1 d\‘(\|lfﬂfIﬂk1H dengan iukllell oleh P\amIﬂ kspada rm1.s75,595 n7 Selim: amgm kalanngln wan spa lumuun Am man unurunkan sekall lag: kepaﬂa m1‘aeo.ss5 22 Igygy guy; 9 alguwuu 13 D: dallm m m Isu—Isu unluk dlbuzvllun Idallh wpam bankm a Sam: ad: Plamm id: lows unmk mengambl Imdakan 1m larhaaap Dakndan ow. kanna naaa pnvm amm Dalanﬂln In Sama ada Defendln lalah memungkm nnnannau PSA bennnkh 2: omw 2014 m DuA:rl.wmEnnauvukazDAA mm. s.n.1...m.m11... HIQG w my 1... mmnuuly mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum v-max c Sama aaa Plamof bemak mendapal pampasan danpada Plalnm unluk kesemua oi, hos din perbelaruun yang dwkeluavkln ohh Flalnul berkman amm. pemhmnn am pengunan kamudanan msngvkul lama-Isms PSA Izamabul 14 Deienuan aw dnlam pamehsanya rnenyzlzkan hahawa Pumlﬂ mm Gas Malaysia Vmual Pmelune sun arm bukanlnn pmak yang mun berkunllzk m dalam PSA dan dengan nu ma: mus szmm unluk mongunbll unum im larhadlo Defandan 15 Menunn Pmmn. PSA nemnm lellh mas menyihkan bahawa wzmm mu dlpelbadankzn selapai PSA lenabul dnlaknnakan Kuemua pm‘ mm uk Delandnn mangclnhm umw. mum aauan pmlk yung akan meugamhn hmiakan lersebm 15 Pmak asal as Hakim PSA (ersabm mam. Gas Mahyln somua an ax dalun vs: dun IEV Energy Sun and lcvmlluk pvhlk a. damn PSA xlauu pendihuluan ax vs: menynum sepem berlkul m uuaamwmmaumamu mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIQG w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum Wm! "1 lmarpals SIsaIMﬂlSdn.Bnd.1CcmpanyNumber 421455- K] a private limnud Ixanmy company fmzorpamled m Malaysm mm rm rugrsremd ulﬁcl at Lot 147, Kuwusun Pcnndusman Semambu‘ Ma/-ysoa tr-emmunar to 3: ‘Party /17 ohm Wm pan. 2 Gus Ma/uysu Bemnd (Company Number 240409) 2 private ltmvred company Jmzorparxlad rn Malaysia mm as rngrsturad am at No 5. Jalan Sersndah 26/17. Ssksyelv 26. 40732 Shah Alum‘ Se/Inger, Mmysm (htmnaller Ialenud to as Party an aim: soczmdparl, and 3 IEV Energy Sdn sh-1 (Company Numbol 7l)BDG2—K), a pm/an limited company mcotpotlfsd in Malnyma war: II: Icglxnsrud olﬁcs .1 my mac, 4- Floor, I/Wsma comm/, man Ampm. 50450 Kuala Lumpur {hsrsmancr rllanad to as P-ny B—2)o1lne ofhslpun Parlyﬂ-1 ma Party 52 shall collectively Ialenad to as Ferry 5. m uuaamwmmaumaznu ‘Nan: sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIQG w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum Wm! 17 Sehrusnya. Plalntﬂ yang ﬂmamakan -1. alas adalah Pany c an dalam PEA larslbul dun umynuan sepom boriut 1 PattyAandPsvtyBIIaveagmadmpnncq1/aunmsmamal us sellarm below rslalmg to me future me by Purl A ofme Eomprlsxas Natural Gas (hnrufnnlfur Ivlonvd to as c/vs; mm mu bu prov-aw by on energy supwy company due to be ssnb/Med by Party 5 at a me: ﬂan: lltammallermlerred In as Party c whldv snanmmy established as Party $113- 2; and comqmuy Pnny c mu usrgn We (ms Pu-suupcy Agmmam. " I8 Kelaranqnn svu menqesahkan hahawa Phmm auulah many 0 a mom PSA teaobul a nun. kohunuun sm mum upom benkul “sva Apmn psnghbalan GM\/Pdangun PSA Iurxabuﬂ .1 amp sabunnmya mam: syanknl uuna xnmn antara we din /EV E/Ievgy yang mmxmk-n selaras dengan salu Psryanjtun llsaha Same bulunkh 24 2 arm (Pmcrman JV) Paqanpnn .lV m m uuA=mwmz.naumam.A mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIQG w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnunmnl VI mum Wm!	3,668	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
AA-A52NCvC-41-04/2023	PLAINTIF PRISTAR HOUSING DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD DEFENDAN SUCCESS INPUT SDN BHD	Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 KKM 2012 - prinsip res judicata dan kausa tindakan di luar had masa di bawah seksyen 6(1) Akta Had Masa 1953	02/11/2023	Puan Nor Hasniah binti Ab Razak	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=c05d46e0-bb52-4bf9-aef2-5d75249133df&Inline=true	02/11/2023 12:03:07 AA-A52NCvC-41-04/2023 Kand. 22 S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 4EZdwFK7Uuu8l11JJEz3w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AA—1A52NCvC—d1—0l/2023 Kand. 22 u2,n,2n2s was 07 mum MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI IPON DALAM NEGERI FERAK DARUL RIDZUAM, MALAVSIA GUAMAN SIBIL NO: AA-Aszucvc-41-n4/1023 ANTARA PRISTAR NOUSING DEVELOPMENT sun‘ arm. PLAINTIF (ND. SVARIKAT: sen22:«.n DAN succsss INPUT son, sun. DEFENDAN (NO. SVARIKAT: 1033509-T) ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN [LANIFIRAN 5) LATAR aELAKAu§ 525 m Dslandan Ielah menrauxan Nuns Permahunan dx bawah Aluran 1s Kaedah 19 (1) (a). (la) ﬂan (-1) Kaedah-Kaedah Mshksmah 2012 (‘KKM 2012') Ilamplran 5] unluk perlntah-pennlah berikut 1 Sam Penman bannwa wm ﬂan Pamyalaan Tunlman yang m an Ierhadap naienaan mnacarxan: 2 K05 Dsrmohunan dw swnl dibayar olen P\ainIW kepada Deiendan dan 3. Lam-lam oenman yang dmkirkan sesuan dsn palulnleh Mankaman Vang Mulla mi [2] Fada 1 September 2023. Mahkamah im am Imbangan kebarangkahan lelih msmben kepulusan ﬂengsn msmbenarkan permononan Dsfendan di Lampvran a. mak berpuas nan dengan kepulusan Mzhkamah nu, P\amli1 \|e\|ah menfauxan rayuan me Mums Rayuan bensnkh 7 September 202: ke Mshkamzh Twnggi [31 Bag: pannohanan Im, Manknmah Im telsh nuenexin kerKas—kenas kausa yang hevikm. (a) Wri\| Saman [Lampvran 1] dan Pemyataan ‘runmxan bsnarikh 7 4.2023 [Lampiran 2]; (by Memmandum Kehaduran Defender: benankh I7 4 2u23 [Lamwran 5], m 4EzmFK7uuus41 mma «mm. saw ...n.mn .. U... a may he anmn.u-y -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum v-max PERMDHOMAN DEFEﬂQAﬂ [35] Lampirsn e dimasukkan Defendan un\|uk penn\|ah—perinfah sebagavnana dx peranggan 1 ca. a\|as [39] Nasanalasan permahonsn sda\ah sspem henkur 15] wm dan Femyalaan Tun(u\|an F\a\|nM max mendedahkan kausa lvndakan yang munasabah, my Wm dan Pernyataan Tunlulan Flam adalah bersﬂal mengamkan. msnyusahkan dan remzh, den 14:) Wm! dan Pemya\|aan Tunnman Plalnui msnyabahkan pmswding bevulang-ulang Imumpllcmy ol pmceedmgs); my Tumman Plairml lerhadap Delendan dlfallkan m mar had masa yang dweupxan an bawah seksysn s Akla Had Masa 1953‘ dan (e) la smalnnya adalah Sam penyawangunaan prosas Mahkamsh dan hams dibatalkan. DAFATAM MAHKAMAM [40] Sahagaw mwkan, Aluran 13 Kaedsh 19 KKM 2012 mempemnlukkan bahawa — ‘Slrikinl ourpreaamgs and endorsam-ms la. 19. r. 1:1; 19 (1; The Cam may 3! any 51399 of ms pmwsmngs we: to ba struck out or amandsd any Neadmg ar me endorsement‘ afnrly mu m ms m m 4zz.wxvu.mm mmw «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! man, or anymmg rn any praaamg at m ma enrlorsemsnl, on the ground than {3} 1: dingy; Hg gagging cause aramm or defense 1; ma case may De’ (la) n is scandalous mmmua or mam g/ (c; A‘ may wmnae embarrass or gm! 5; M mg pl me %‘ or (.1) 1: .g g mg. an sbusa suns mcaaa aims Cam and may order ma nclforv to D: stayud ml msmrssed M /urlgmenl In as smsrud acmldrngﬂ/, as the case may be (2; No ewdenos man be admrsslbis on an agp/matron under subparagraph may ¢3) rm nus man, as far as Eﬂbhcable, apply to an oagmslmg summons as yr :1 were a Dlearlmg - [penekanan awamnah] my Tzrdapat hanyak ownu yang te\ah memhincangkan den memmuskan pnnwprunsup pemzkaian kuasa mm. blnara mahkamah da\am permohunan pembzualan umnman .1. bawah Aluvan I8 Kaedah 19 KKM 2012 Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Vwaganlh Sanmavasilan v Pubhc Bank am: [2019] 1 cm 505 hahawa — “Striking Oul Proust Under 0. nr. 15 or rm no; 24711 [91 umrg La 5 19 at me was 2912 me caun‘ has the pews! la arms out ma wnara or part may plindirvy wmm drsdoses no reasonable cause or a¢11on. at which rs scandalous, invo/nus or vsxatfons, or wmch may pzsmma, embarrass or dalay ma (arr lnal or the aclmrl, ar winch rs 11 am Azzmrxvuuusn mwa «mm. sm-w ...m.mm .. U... a may he mam-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! otherwise an abuse am» places: aims man. The process ofsrvrkrng out praamngs under nns nu/s rs summary m nature [‘1l7]The Mqmng gnncms um wmcn the mud act: m exerdxlng E summgq gawer: oismkmg g mgggg; an Wq// settled and maansnea rn the an-mu tension onne men Supreme Court In Banner Eullder $11!! and (supra) m The mm-rs paws! olstnkmg oarp/sadrngs rs sxemsamn only In pham and obvious cases and wnere no reasonable amendment would cum ma defect. my The court In Ixamismg M: yoswrs should not mnducl a rmnute exammalran onne dacwmenls andlects aims cuss m ovderm ascsrtsm whethar ms party nss a cam olaclrom (m; If ma pomlrlqmns sunstanlrz! algumenl and barely! consmeralmn, rtmay be more apwapﬂare to sat a down for ma! wow 0, as r. 2 DHIIH noc zmz (iv) nu court must bv samea that there 1: no reasonable cause of man M Mal ms c/arms an invoinus cl vexanous In the sense ma! ms plar'n7y svfdsnl‘ that the statement my alarm as .1 stands 1; Inwfﬁciulvf. even Wpmved, m entfllu ms plamn/Ha wnarns am; and M So long as m. p/ssdfngs disc/9.59 some cause 9/ aclmn or miss sums qusstnm /mo be mvasa by Ma/udgs, the mm «ac: Marthe ms 1: weak and nor may to suuvad at the ma! IS no ground for me plsadfrvgs to be sum out “ lpenskanan dnambsh] [421 Plainlii \|e\ah mengrmzankan hahawa numunannya mdak d\ha\ang di bavrm res mmcsoa ksmna kausa ﬁndakan unluk keria reukulasx pembenlungan dalam kes im adalah bsrbeza dsngan \|un\|u\|an balss P\a\|m\l di da\am ke: Guzman Nu. AAVAEZNCVCVZMJZ/2019 Tunknan Pmmw adalah hurkenaan mnunan LAD manakam mmman balas Puamm dw da\am 1] sm Azzmrxvuu-an mm. «mm. Snr1I\nanhnrw\HI>e U... n my n. nrW\n\|H\|Y mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! kes Guaman No AA-A52NCvCr24rD2/2019 adalah berdasarkan kegagalan Dslandan untuk me!-akukan pemenksaan cow sehelum dan selepas kenakeqa remikasx serta menyemakan 1apman cow unluk prmek lersebui yang menyebabkan 1=1a1nn1 Ierpaksa ms1an111< puhak keliga 1aiIu syarikal Ker1lL1k Sdn Bhd umux melaksanskannya [431 Hlqahan kedua Plalnm adalah mmuvannya bukan di mar mase menurm muse 13 Perjannan Iersehut Pengxraan unluk LAD aaaxan dxkira dan Oklnber 2015 iawu lankh Xena reklmkasx dmapkan sehmgga Iarikh keua-kena nsmbetungan msahkan slap apabﬂa 1w1< mslepaskan Jannnan Bank senem di dalam sural benankh 25.10.2019 Olen 111.‘ kausa Imdakan Plamtif ada\ah (erakm pads 25102019 Had mas: enam lahun unluk Plelnm menlailkan luntuvannya man sebelum 2e.1u 2n25 mainm nnenoairkan mmucan IN pada 7 42m Oleh nu, nunmun P\a1r1m1m masm dalam had mass yang duecapkan as bawah sexsyen e (1)Ak1a Had Mass 1953 [Akta 254 [441 1:-evenuan pula mengnujahkan bahawa Flainm adalah meswp clan pnnnp /as jutncals unluk rnenIm\|IM LAD kerana lakls ks: mshupun 1su—isu dalam kes 1111 ada\ah sama dsngin kas yang telah dipumskan m Mahkamah sesyen Taming 1anu aa1am Guzman AA-ASZNCVC-24-D2/2019 dan Guaman AA—A52NCvC-153-D9/2019 Sscara nngkas lak\|a kes dalam Guaman AA-A52NCvC-24—n2/2019 dan Gunman AA-ASZNCVC-I53» os/2019, selam Penanjian Iersebul. Flamm dsn Defendan ‘uga \|elah memasukl salu penannan Vain 1aw.u perianjian pembmaan henarikh :1 5.2015 tsalspss dsripada ‘ isebm sebagal ‘Ferjanﬂan Fembmaan“) yang mana 1: m 4EzmFK7uuum mww «mm. Sm\|\nav1hnrwH\I>e 1.... 1: may 1... nrW\ruH\|y -mm: dnuamnl VI .r1uNa v-max Devan-aan Ielah anannx oxen P\amlW sebagar konlxakmr unluk rnewaksanakan pembmasn 205 mil rumah bag: Frujek lersebul Alas kegagalan Delendan maﬂepaskan 5% Wang Iahanan dw bawah Perjanpsn Pemhinaan \ersebu(. necenaan telah menfailkan 2 mnmnan m Mahkamah sesyen sehagaimsna yang mnyaxakan dalam perenggan 22 den 23 an axaa yang mana Guaman AA-A52NCvC-24—U2/2019 den suaman AA-Aszncvc-155—ue/2019 «swan dnsalukan unluk dimcaraxan secara bersama. D1 dalam Guaman AA- A52Ncvc-24-oz/2a1a, F lelah menfaﬂkan mmman bales sebsgavmana yang dinyalakan dalam pevenggan 24 m acas. P\ainIW lurul mempﬁdkan mu berkenaan dengan Langgungiawab Delendan melaksanakan pemenksaan ccw. [45] Ham Mahkamah Sesyen yang mendengar Guaman AA-A52Ncyc— 2442/2019 dan Guaman AA—A52NC\/C-153-09/2019 telah membuat kepulusan unluk menolak Tuntulan Bales Plainlil Nasarl Denghakvman belusu ada\ah yang benkul (a) kesemrunan kena pembehmgan lelah swap pada Julaw 2017, (n) sun Perakuan Swap dan Pemaluhsn (-ccc') umuk kesehlruhan prujek Iermasuk perumahan Ie\ah dnkemarkan Dada 14 1 2u17; 1:) Delandan man menuumi ssga\a kawajipannya an bawah Peqaniian larssbul den hanyalah seklranya levdapat keqa devem dalam Iempoh new Lxabvmy Feriud, maka Defendan hamsmembaxkmyay my mengxkul Fananilan Ievsebul. Ddendan hanya mbayav unmk malaksanakan laporan ccw sebanyak 2 kan sahajs unmk ,- m Azzmwxvuuum mum «mm. saw ...n.mn .. U... a may he nrwhuﬂly -mm: dnuamnl y. nF\uNa Wm! mendapal sum sukongan dari VWK Terﬂapat kenarangan Saks» saksv hahawa Delendan (e\ahpun mdaksanzkan lapman CCTV sekurang-kursngnya 2 kaw, ta) (erdapat wga kelerangan bahawa Delaksanaan Iapuran CCTV unluk menaapaman bihk wang Jamxnan Bank aan VWK aaaxan syaral mxenakan kepada P\aIrmi sahaje sehagau pamaw dam is uada kailan dengan Deleman sshagai kunlrakmr: den (0 Flam gagax msngemukakan sebarang kelerangan bebas dam VWK un\|uk mernbukllkan lsrdapal kerja pembelungan yang deiekm nleh Defendan [45] Devenuan mengmuahxan lagi bahawa Plainui max memheri sebarang Juslifwkasi mengapa lunlulan LAD seJak Dklober 2u1e dalam kes im Iidak dimmuc dalam Guaman AA»A52NCvCr2A—02/2019 dan Guaman AA-A52NCvC»153»n9/2019 an Sekivanya Lamplran e tmalak, ia selﬁsh- mah msmben peluang kepada P\aIn1\f unluk Cuba re Agate wsu-xsu yang Ielah dipuluskan oleh Ham Mahkamah Sesyen lersehul. Va ;uga msrupakan salu penyamhgunaan prose: Mahkamah [471 Hwshsn Delendan selerusnya adalah Undakan mainur dalam kes ml adalah di mar had masa menumt seksyen s Akla 254 Memandangkan P\aInuf mendakwa Delendan (e\ah gags! msnywapkan keua—kena pada OkIuber2D16, kiusahndakan Plamlii da\am kesini lemhpunlamalnada is m 4EzmFK7uuum mmw «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! Oklnber 2022. selsyen s Akla 254 memperumukkan naham — -s Lumeanan ofnrnans uleonnam and lot! and oeﬂnm other acne»: (1) Save as hsrsma/I9! prowaed me In//gwfgg gctrorvs snarl nu! be may. aner ms aqmrm g(§r'x ﬁgs (mm me dale on which m g Lg olaclran amygg. mm m Ear ts) icmms hzunded an a mung ar an ran. my actions In sniorce a recognrsancs, (:1 achons m enforce an award,‘ (L1)a:Imns to rsoaver any sum Iscovslabls by vrrma or any written law amar than . pmI/ly or rorrenm or of: sum by way ofpsnally or /manure [nenekanan dnambah] [48] Selelah menalm Pens . n \|ersehuI yang diekslmtkan dalam GVL-1 dan Alasan Fsngha dalam GVL6 di Lumpm 7, «aka kes mahupun xsu-mu ds\am kes mi admah sama dengan kes yang celan dvpumsksn di Mahkamah Sesyen nu yang mana penglraan mmuxan LAD meh Plainlil hendaklsh bermma davi lankh kemungklran knmtrak uleh Delendan karsns (idak menyiapkan karm- kena pada Oktober 2016 dan bukannya pada 2a to 2019 aekelah Jamman Bank lsrssbut dlkanma man IWK seperli dakwaan Plsmlil an Hakim Mahkamah Sssyen yang dweksibwkan [49] Selaruulnys dalam membua\| kepumsan, Mshksmah W Ielah merwuk kepsda kes panama wallu kes Mankaman Agung Asxa Commermal Finance is am Azzmwxvuuum mwa «mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. U... a may he mm-y -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! (M) Bemad v Kawal Te sebagsxmsna nerikuc san Bhd [1995] 3 Cu 153 yang menyalakan ‘Them .5 ans school ollhaughr that mm Bafoppel app/ms only to Issue: acfuaﬂy ammo: ny ms Cour! m me prewaus proceeding: and not :9 Issue: which nugm have been and which were not bmugm fnrward, either dv/rbsrataly or due to mg/rgme or mamnme, while n I school of mm: M; mg mum g’ K ma! such 1&5; wﬁ'g[1 mght hag mn n yon were /1 m rum described mm. n aclu deems Court am an ersdb e is arms u my g_q;mg' o/emggg/mum udrcslum ollhe vn mallhe elm 1: w wr‘ lei-rad n replesents lul one wag, n corrsct even though broads! auprnach m the snaps cums eslopae/. n rs warranted by the weagm L7! sulhonlrss to on rrluslrslad lalsl. I: IS mnmtemy m amen: or resonant wan (he rsltorwss bshrml ms clacbina ofrss judlnars, m olher words. wrrll lhe donlllne afsafoppsl per mm mimrum. 2: rs panmwany imporlan! to bear in mm the quesnan ml the pub/rc nolrcy Ma! mm smwld be ﬁrm/lfy rn /mgalmn m conjunclrbrv wan me explcdmg pupmauan, Ms mm-aasmg aaphislrcanbrv or me popurm with ma law and mm N1: ixpanmng resource: arms Calms aerng Iound arwm one step Dsnmd ms ms-u/tmg /Ivuuase m /flrgation 2: rs lunher nammy gr lnrs stage to urmerslarld ma Impoﬂ .21 ms wants m the semi /smm statement .5 2 . every now warm pmperry belonged Io ms swam or lnlgatfan. - wmm Somsrvsﬂ u explained m Gresrmalgh V. M5/7an.1I1947]2 All ER 255, 257 as follows‘ . rujudrcam lat mi: purpose rs no! confined to the Ltsue! wmcn me cm .5 adual/y aaked In dacids but 11 mag §' §uss or ram mm clear ssu cum 7 ms/msllann an muld been 7.31: mwoum be H seoune rose common anew 99' obeavanr Ia! them” [penekanan dﬂambsh] 1: sm Azzmrxvuuuan mm. «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! [501 K85 kadua ada\ah kes Mahxamah Tinggw shah Nam Top Fresh Foods (M) Sdn Bhd v Parbadanan Fengurusan Palm Spring @ Damansara A Anor [2020] s MLJ :05 yang memuluskan bahawa — wrhough mere may bu smrar »5§ues that may as mnsrdsred amamm and Ihg gig; :/I had m me gram: gag mma fur a dﬂlererlt ranergmms azmarawma ' ' sofms udmala has anth / srtstood me ‘n and mm /rca h would srals m ma hr scsnano m ma wrdgg sunse som suns shared 3 §gml set of racg SM ' same we llawmalnave been/fl adudrcated o m whose declsmn h affirmed n the ear. Hence Ins nmﬁll nanaurmm n ' Ia/nlgahng ms /swam; ma menhanme same “ [penekanan anamnah] [51] Berdasarkan kepada has-nil: undang di alas‘ memandangkan pm [as judrcata aaaxah (erpakav dan Iuntulan LAD Pramm dl luar had masa menurul seksyen 6 w (3) Am 254 dalam kss an hadapan Mahkamah Im, Mahkamah ml berpanﬂangan bshawa cuhmm Plaxhhf gagax mendedahkan sualu kausa Knndakan yang munasabah dan merupakan sualu penyalahgunaan pruses Mahkamah yang mewajarkan permuhunan Delendan dv Lampwan s dibenarkan KES M2; LAN [52] Eerdasarkan kepada alasan-sﬂasan yang d\u\|arakarv dx alas, Mahksmah elah mengambnl kira kesemua kenas kausa narkaman, am Azzmwxvuuuan mwa «mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. U... a may he mm-y -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! mqahan berluhs clan mqahan bales plhak-plhak umuk msmbenken pennlah yang dmyaxakan an perenggan 2 di alas » A/.[{/V NOR mswum awn AB max Ham Mahkamah Sesyen Ipah Eenankh 1 Nnvembev2D23 EagipvhakF\|am\|i1 En Skanda a/1 Vagassna dan En Rnbm Lim Feguambeli den Peguamcara Teluan char. 5 Msocuﬂes Eagi pmak Delendan Pn sun Axshsn nmn Mohamed Azahan Peguambela dan Peguamcava Teluan BH Koh‘ soong, Zarin & Fanners I9 m 4zz.wxvu.mm mmw «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! (c) Lammran 6‘ (.1) Aﬁdavil Sokongan Goh Yong Leng yang dmuaman pads 23 4.2023 (Lampnran 7); (e) Psmyataan Pemnexaan Delendan benankh 25 A 2023 [Lampvan 3]; (0 Jawapan kepada Pamnevaan berlarikh 3 5.2023 [Lanman 9}‘ (g) Aﬂdavll Ealasan Chew Hui Gwap yang dukrarkan Dada a 52023 [Lampiran 1 my Amawc Balasan can Yong Lang yang dnkrarkan pada 22.6 2o23[Lampvan11} RINGKASAN FAKTA KES Fakca kes sebagaxmana Larnplran 2 adalah seperll benkul. [4] F\a<nM admah syankal pamaju perumahan yang dﬂubuhkan an Malaysia dv bawah Akla Syankal 1955 den beralamal di Na 27‘ Ja\zn Medan Sauiana 2. Medan Saujana Kamuming. 34600 Kamummg‘ Perak [5] Defendan adalah syankal kanttaklor pambinaan yang anummkan an Malayswa an bawah Am syarikaz 1565 ﬂan beralamal an Lot 3035, .IaIan aam Kurau, Ulu Sepelang‘ 34010 Taipmg. Ferak. [5] Memu. penaruian bznarikh 2332015 (smepas danpada im msebun sabagax “Peqan]Ian"), P\aInIW telah me\an\|xk Defendan sebagai konlraklur 2 m azzamqumn mwa «mm. s.nn nmhnrwm .. med a M, .. nﬂmnuﬂly -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! umuk Keqa Relikmasl Paip Pembetungan (sewerage Relwculalion Works) an alias lanah Keraman. Mukim swam, Daerah aaxang Padang‘ Perak (smepas danpada IN msenzm senagai “Frmek”\|. [7] Menunﬂ pelenggan E Penanpan \|arsebu\|, Delendan perm memmakin Prmsk lsrsebul pada bulan April zone dan menyempunlakan Prujak Iersebul pada bu\an Oklober 2015. Jumlah halga Projek Iersebm adexan RM‘/50 mm. [5] Msnuml klausa 13 Perja ]an levsebm. sskwanya Defendan gage! unluk menyempumakan Prwsk \|srsebuA da\am masa yang duexapkan. Pkunlxi bemak unluk menumm Sam: Rugi remu (1L\qu\duleﬂ Aacanaineu Damages) se\epas daripada im dlsebul sabagax ‘LAD“\| daripada Defendan [9] Mengm Peqannan Ievsebu\|. Deiendan bananggunmawah untuk membekalkan Ienaga kena, memmesm dan peralauin-peralatan pembmaan unluk kena—k2na pemmnaan unmk Pmyek tsrsebul. [10] Hausa 5.2 Perjanjian \|ersebu( dengan iewasnya menyalakan hahawa Delendan mempurmi «anggungewab un\|uk kevja—kenz pembinaan, mambual pemenksaan ccw darn kena-kena penlaulnahan \|emIasuk pemenksaan JPP a(au lndah Walsr Konsumum (selepas daripada Im dlsabul sabagsw 'IWK“). m Azzmwxvuuum mww «mm. saw ...m.mm .. H... a may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! [11] Plamm menvauuan mnman mi berdasarkan Klauss 13 Penanuan (ersebul yang menyalakan hahawa — -1: LAD calcmalsd mm day to day a\| me me oi 10% per annum 0! «ha canuau Pnce «mm the expxry ov me r:0mp\e\|\cn date until receipt .11 wvilten mnﬁrmauon on work compleled Falﬁng which, ws shall deduct ameurn lmm retenunn sum‘ [12] Pvmek «ersenu: sapamnnya dilengkapkan pada [man Okluber 2016 Im lsrmasuk pemenksaan ccrv dan laporan ccrv yang menyalskan bahawa keqa-kena pembmaan \|evsebu\| ada\ah sempuma (samceable conamom den bebas danpada sebarang xacacaxan Urea (mm deled) [13] Laporan ccrv mempakan satu keperluan yang dﬂelapkan oleh ‘WK ﬂan Ielah mnyanakan aalam klausa e 2 Perjanzian lersebu\| umuk memas\|Ikan kena-kena pemblnaan «ersebm berada dalam keadaan yang ham (semcaame cundmonl [141 Wa\au bagawmanapun‘ xena-xena psmbmaan Ievsebm hanya mm sempuma apazma IWK mengembalikan ;am\nan bank (bank guarantee) (selepas danpsda ml uisebm sebagax ‘Jsmman Bank“) kepada Flamld wavlu pada 25102019 Pangsmbalian Jamman Bank (ersabul memmjukkan bahawa VWK berpuas nan dengan kena-kaus psmbmaan tevsehm. [151 Eerdasarkan suran danpada IWK benankh 23102019. Pmax IaIsEbu\| hanya dlanggap sempuma disrapkan pada bulan Okmber 2019 P\aIrmf menyacakan hahawa Devendan max menyelesaikan kena-Kerja m azzamquwm mmw "Nair saw ...m.mm .. 0.... a may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! reukuvssx umuk Fmjek \|ersebu( damn: masa yang drlemukan dalsm Feqanjian lsrsebul [15] Delendzm (s\ah gagal unmk mengemukskan lapuramlaparsn CCTV urnuk membukmkan banawa kana—keq‘a pembmaan \|ersebu( adalah bebas ﬂanpada apn-apa kecacalan [171 Delendan le\ah gaga\ ngkar den/zlau enggan umuk melaksanakan ublwgasx-obllgasmya sepem yang uinyacakan dalam Perianjlan lersebm ma] Plainhl melalul peguamcayanya, cnan a. Assaciakes benarikh 17.5 2013 man menunca Delendan unluk me\akukan pem ' aan cow unluk mernawxan naaa apa-apa kecacatan beﬂaku pada Xena-Kena pembmasn Ievsebu\| [19] selam nu, .-uunera Plalnnf \|e\ah membenkan penngalan beherapa kah unluk melakukan ksna pemenksaan cow Iersebul levapx Defendan masih enggan, mgkav, gagax dan/acau cuai un\|uk nemuan aeaernman [20] Oleh ssbsb nevenaan gagal umuk memsnulv Feqamian lersebm‘ Pram Ielah melanluk pmak kemga yam; syavikal Kent LAk Sdn and untuk melakukan pemenksaan ccw sebelum dan selepas kena-Xena reliﬂkasw sena manyemakan Vaporan ccrv unluk prmek Cevsehul. [211 Psmeriksaan ccrv yang zmakuxan o\eh syankal Kent Lik sdn aha man mengesankan kecacatan da\am kerja pawp pembenlungan yang 5 m azzamquwm mmw «mm. saw ...m.mm .. U... a may he nVW‘Hl‘W -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! uuaxukan oleh oavanuan Flamlil (erpaksa mensnggung kas yang Vebih banyak unluk melakukan Kane rsuﬁkasi dan selerusnya pemeriksaan ccw aan selsmsnya Dsmenksaan ccrv mervgikul keperluan IWK. [22] Delendan lelsh mamailkan sa\|u Hndakan an Mahkamah semen Taming di bawah nombor Guamsn AA-A52NCvCv2A—D2/2019 dan AA- A52Ncvc-15:H)9/201e unluk menunlm wang Iahanan 1re1ermon sum) uannsaa Pvamm [23] Tmdakan m Ixawah Guaman No. AA-ASZNCVC-24-O2/Z019 telah difaﬂkan nleh Delendin untuk menunIu\| 25% Wang Iahanzn berjumlah RM270.7D1 cs dan (indakan dw bawah Guarnan No. ASZNCVC-I53—09.’2l)1 9 difaﬂkan unluk menunIu\| man 25% Wang lahanan berjumlah RM270.‘/D1 19 [2A] Piamlﬂ jugs (e\ah menlanlkan Tun\|uvan Balas di dalam unaakan AA- lk52NCvC»24—02/2019 kerane Deiendun «swan gsgah cuau. enggan dan/a\|au mgker unluk mewangkapxan keua—kena reukmasi paw: pembenlungan umuk Frajek Isrmbut. [251 Gann rugx yang dilunnn di bawah Guamsn Nu AA4x52Ncyc»24— oz/2019 adalah yumlan yang panu dlbayav kepada pmak keﬂga, syankat Kent Lxk Sdn Ehd unluk membuzt kerja-kena reukmasl pawp psmbenlungan unluk Fmyak Iersebm an bawah Ferjanjuan ksvsehut dan kos-kus pemerlksaan ccrv yang dﬂakukan m Azzmwxvuuum mwa «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... a may he mm-y -mm: dnuamnl y. mum v-ma! [25] Pada 5.11.2022, Mahkamah sesyen Vvoh lelsh menalak mmman Delendan (Success lnpu\| Sdn Bhd) an bawah Guaman No AA-ASZNCVC» 24-02/2019 dan Guamsn No. A52Ncvc—1 5109/2019 [27] Pada Iarikh yang aama, Mahkamah Sesyen lpnh \|eKeh menulak nmxman baraa Mam (pnaxar Housing Developmenl Sdn Bhd) di bawah Guaman Nu AA-A52NCvC—24-D2/2019. [25] Kedua—dua pmnk lelah menlaﬂkan rayuan 4» Mahkamah ﬁnggl lpah yang maanarxan di bawah number Gunman — (a) AA-12BNCvC-B—11/2022 (rayuan Pmnm lemadap penmakan Iun\|u\|an balas dx bawah Guaman Nu. AA—A52Mcvo24~n2/20(9). (ta) AA-12BNCvC-9-11/2022 (rayuan Delendan Iamsdap psnmakan tunlulan 2 5°/. wang (ahanan an hawah Guaman Nn AA- ASZNCVC-24-D2/2019), den (op AA»12ENCvC—10—1Il20221rayuarI Dsfendan 1emauap penolakarl mmuuan 25'/n bakx Wang vahanan an bawah Guaman No Mr A52Ncvc—153—n9/2019) [291 Oleh nu, Plsmm manegaskan bahawa Imdakan im bukanlah res mmcala dan mak lenkal dx bawah Iindakan Guaman No AA-ASZNCVC-24» 0712019 znaunun Unﬂskan Guaman No. AA- A52NCvC-153-U9/2019 m Azzmrxvuuusn mwa «mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. U... a may he mmuny mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! [30] lm mempaksn hndakan hem unluk menunlul LAD alas kegagalan Delendan unluk melakukan alau menyempumakan obhgasmya m hawah Penaniian Iersebul. [31] Plainul juga manegaskan bahawa Plamnl berhak unluk rnambzwa mmakan bsrdasarkan ldausa berbeu yang Ierdapil (imam Perjarulan levsehul. oven Nu, wn\| saman ml max buleh terikal m‘ bawah res pmmaca alas sebab \|erdspaI klausa Hndakan yang barbeza (321 Pada 2.12.2022. Puamm melalm peguamcaranya Teluan Chan 3. Assoclsles (e?ah menghamarsam nuns Iunmlan bsnankh 2.12 2022 unluk menumm LAD (erssbul yang bsnuman RM195,DuU.0D [33] Pengiraan RM1§5,D00 so adaiah sebagalmsna benkur K Perkava Perams ‘ Marge (RM) Jumlah (RM) ‘ Harga Konlrak 150,000 00 \ LAD 10% tdlkim dan danpada 7s,aoo.uo 7s,ouo no x 3 Dktober 2n1s — Jumlah selahun tahun = 23 Oklobsr Harga 234‘ooo.oa 2u19\| Kunhak ‘ 5% aanpada Wang Tahanan Jumah 39.000 on 234,000 no 7 (Rslemmn Sumb Harga 39,000 on = Konlrak dnolak danpada W3.''‘9 \ m Azzmrxvuuuan mm. «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... w may he mmuny mum: ﬂnuamnl VI mum Wm! Tahanan Jurmah bayaran 1 195000 00 [34] Pads 1312 2022‘ Delsndan melaml peguamcaranya Teluan EH mm Snong‘ Zann .1. 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WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019	PLAINTIF 1. ) Ryan Koh Yue Loong @ Koh Teck Loong 2. ) Tan Guat Lian DEFENDAN 1. ) Koh Shing Yee 2. ) Cheong Ali SinPIHAK KETIGAKOH CHING KEW	1. The suits before this Court, pertains to competing claims by the parties (alleged survivors from three families) over the estate of the Kor Seng Kar @ Koh Hai Sew (the Deceased) who died intestate on 23.03.2019.2. After full trial, I find that the Plaintiffs and the intervener have failed to prove their case and it was dismissed with costs. 3 The Defendants counterclaim is allowed with costs and for damages to be assessed.	02/11/2023	YA Puan Hayatul Akmal binti Abdul Aziz	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a6b14f53-9e6c-415e-93c6-2af378611f53&Inline=true	WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: WA-22NCVC-649-09/2019 ANTARA 5 1. RYAN KOH YUE LOONG @ KOH TECK LOONG (NO. PASPORT SINGAPURA: K0979473N) 2. TAN GUAT LIAN (NO. PASPORT SINGAPURA: E6390244D) … PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF 10 DAN 1. KOH SHING YEE (NO. PASPORT SINGAPURA: E6275648K) 2. CHEONG LAI SIN 15 (NO. PASPORT SINGAPURA: E6274983L) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN DAN KOH CHING KEW (No. K/P: 640306-10-6365) … PENCELAH 20 Digabungkan dan dibicarakan dengan SAMAN PEMULA No.: WA-31NCVC-702-04/2019 Dalam perkara harta pusaka Koh 25 Seng Kar @ Koh Hai Sew (No. K/P: 430719-10-5509) (“Si Mati”) Dan Di dalam perkara Akta Probet dan Pentadbiran 1959 30 Dan Di dalam perkara Aturan 71 Kaedah 5 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 35 KOH SHING YEE (NO. PASPORT SINGAPURA: E6275648K) PEMOHON RYAN KOH YUE LOONG @ KOH TECK LOONG (NO. PASPORT SINGAPURA: K0979473N) PENGKAVEAT 40 02/11/2023 16:23:54 WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 Kand. 258 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 2 JUDGMENT PREFACE The suits before this Court, pertains to competing claims by the parties (alleged survivors from three families) over the estate of the Kor Seng Kar @ Koh Hai Sew (the Deceased) who died intestate on 23.03.2019. 45 INTRODUCTION [1] There are two suits to be heard and determined together, i.e.: (a) Civil Suit No: WA-22NCVC-649-09/2019 (Suit 649); and (b) Ex-parte Originating Summons No: WA-31NCVC-702-04/2019 (OS 50 702). Parties are as follows: 1.1 The First Plaintiff (P1) and Second Plaintiff (P2), [referred as the Ps, collectively] claim to be the biological son and the lawful widow from the Deceased’s 2nd marriage (customary) on 19.02.1988 that was 55 never registered in the Republic of Singapore. 1.2 The First Defendant (D1) and Second Defendant (D2) [referred as the Ds, collectively] claim to be the lawful biological daughter and the lawful widow from the Deceased's monogamous marriage registered under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952 on 04.05.1979 in Malaysia. 60 1.3 The Intervener claims to be the biological son from the Deceased's 1st purported customary marriage to Ho Ah Nya @ Ho Cheng Bak (Ho Ah Nya) in 1962-1963. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 3 [2] The parties filed two (2) separate suits, as follows: 65 2.1 Civil Suit No: WA-22NCVC-649-09/2019 (Suit 649) filed by the Ps on 03.09.2019, seeking a declaration that P1 is the issue of the Deceased and P2 as the lawful wife of the said Deceased and other prayers. 2.2 Ex-Parte Originating Summons No: WA-31NCVC-702-04/2019 (OS 702) filed by D1 on 16.04.2019 for a Letter of Administration (LA) of 70 the Deceased estate and P1 as the caveator. 2.3 Under a Consent Order dated 24.07.2020, OS 702 was consolidated and to be heard together with Suit 649. 2.4 Under the Court Order dated 28.04.2021, the Intervener was granted leave to intervene in the combined Suit of Writ 649 and OS 702. 75 2.5 For completeness, it is to be noted that the Defendants had in their counter claim referred to another suit Originating Summons No: WA- 31NCVC-901-05/2019 (OS 901) filed by the Ps seeking a Letter of Administration for the estate of the Deceased. However, this OS was later withdrawn by them on 06.09.2019 with costs of RM2,120.88 paid 80 to the Ds. Suit 649: 22NCVC-649-09/2019 [3] The Ps case: 3.1 Is anchored on the claim by P2 that she and the Deceased had allegedly 85 conducted a customary marriage ceremony on 19.02.1988 in the Republic of Singapore. However, it is to be noted that the evidence at the trial could not definitively evince the supposed marriage. That said, the purported S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 4 customary marriage was never registered under the Women’s Charter 90 of Singapore as legally required, rendering it invalid. 3.2 Since that purported customary marriage, it is claimed that they allegedly lived together in Singapore as husband and wife for over 30 years until the Deceased’s demise. Again, evidence at the trial places substantial doubt on this claim. 95 3.3 P1 claimed to be the child/biological son of the Deceased from that supposed customary marital union, though his birth certificate named the Deceased’s adopted brother (Koh Seng Lee/PW1) who worked for the Deceased, as his father. Evidence at the trial is merely speculative, with no definitive evidence 100 that P1 is the biological offspring of the Deceased. 3.4 In defending the position he’s taken and to facilitate his case in insisting that the Deceased was his biological father, one (1) month before he filed Suit 649, P1 took out a suit in the High Court of Kuala Lumpur (No. WA-22NCVC-543-08/2019 (Suit 543) against Koh Seng Lee (his uncle). 105 P1 secured an Order of the High Court on 10.12.2019 that: (a) Declared Koh Seng Lee was not his father, and P1 is not the child of Koh Seng Lee. (b) Koh Seng Lee is to deliver within fourteen days from the order a statutory declaration that he is not the father of P1. 110 (c) A mandatory injunction was granted to compel Koh Seng Lee to remove his name from the birth certificate of P1 within fourteen days of the Order, complying with all requirements of the Immigration & Checkpoints Authority of Singapore and (d) Koh Seng Lee is to take a DNA test. 115 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 5 3.5 The Court records show that Koh Seng Lee (PW1) did not appeal the findings of the High Court of Kuala Lumpur to the Court of Appeal as an aggrieved party: (i) I do take cognisance that throughout the course of the present trial, no replacement/rectified Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births 120 from the relevant Singaporean Authority was adduced by P1 since the Kuala Lumpur High Court Order was granted three years ago. The Original Birth Certificate with Koh Seng Lee as the father remains on official record in Singapore and herein in this proceeding. It has not been proven otherwise with persuasive evidence. 125 (ii) This is a matter within the domain of the Singaporean Government. The Order of the High Court of Kuala Lumpur on 10.12.2019 cannot be taken to alter that position since P1’s Certificate of Extract from Register of Births is an official document of the Government of the Republic of Singapore. This legal issue must necessarily involve the reciprocal 130 enforcement of foreign judgments (Kuala Lumpur High Court Order) in Singapore. (iii) There is no evidence that it was done. It cannot be that the High Court Order was merely taken for the purpose of the present proceeding and was never intended to be ultimately taken up with the Singaporean 135 Authority for whatever reason. If so, that can amount to an abuse of process, as it reflects poorly on the intent of P1 and Koh Seng Lee. If the findings in Suit 543 are to stand legal scrutiny. It must be ultimately addressed and determined by the relevant Singaporean Authority on the matter leading to the rectification of the Register of Births concerning 140 P1. (iv) There is no convincing evidence before me during the trial. (v) It begs the question: Why was this legal issue that is serious in nature in attempting to vary an official document issued by the Government of Singapore, not raised 145 in the High Court in the Republic of Singapore? (vi) Notwithstanding the said High Court of Kuala Lumpur Order dated 10.12.2019, as it stands, on the official record, Koh Seng Lee remains the father as named in the Certificate of Extract from Register of Births (No: S8908403B, Enclosure 95, p.440) of P1 issued by the Registrar of 150 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 6 Birth unless a new rectified Certificate of Extract from Register of Births by the relevant Singaporean Authority is produced to state expressly otherwise. (vii) Consequently, it is my considered view that even the self-serving Statutory Declaration by P1 on 18.04.2019 (enclosure 92, p.31) that the 155 Deceased was his biological father cannot alter the Certificate of Extract from Register of Births No: S8908403B by the Singaporean Government. To take a legal position that it has would be a grave error in judgment. In the circumstances, it has no probative value for the purpose. 160 3.6 In OS 702, P1, as the caveator in opposing D1’s application for the LA, he alleged that the Ds had acted oppressively and unfairly against the Ps by depriving their rights to be the administrators of the Deceased’s estate. 3.7 P1 and the Deceased had allegedly lived together as father and son for 165 more than 30 years (unproven at trial) since P1 was born until the Deceased’s demise on 23.03.2019. [4] Briefly, the Ps in Suit 649 claims in the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim as follows: 170 “a) Perintah deklarasi bahawa Seksyen 5 Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang (Perkahwinan dan Perceraian) 1976 yang melanjutkan bidang kuasanya di luar Malaysia adalah diluar bidang kuasanya dan adalah salah dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan ke atas Plaintif Kedua yang pada setiap masa material adalah diluar bidang kuasa; 175 b) Perintah deklarasi bahawa undang-undang yang menyekat, menghalang dan/atau melucutkan hak waris seseorang anak luar nikah atas alasan beliau adalah anak di luar nikah adalah menindas ("oppressive"), tidak adil ("injustice"), diskriminasi, salah, bercanggahan dan bertentangan dengan Artikel 8 Perlembagaan Malaysia, adalah undang-undang buruk ("bad law') dan 180 bertentangan dengan keadilan asasi ("against natural justice")·dan adalah terbatal dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan ("null and void''); c) Perintah deklarasi bahawa Akta Pembahagian 1958, terutamanya Seksyen 3 dan 6, tidak boleh ditafsirkan bagi maksud menyekat, menghalang dan/atau S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 7 melucutkan hak waris seseorang anak berdasarkan status undang-undang atau 185 klasifikasi/golongan anak tersebut dan tafsiran tersebut adalah menindas .("oppressive"), tidak adil ("injustice"), diskriminasi, salah, bercanggahan dan bertentangan dengan Artikel 8 Perlembagaan Malaysia, adalah undang-undang buruk ("bad law') dan bertentangan dengan keadilan asasi ("against natural justice") dan adalah terbatal dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan ("null and void''); 190 d) Perintah deklarasi bahawa perkahwinan antara Si Mati dan Defendan Ke.2 telahpun dibubarkan apabila Si Mati meninggal dunia pada 23.03.2019; e) Perintah deklarasi bahawa setelah perkahwinan antara Si Mati dan Defendan Ke-2 dibubarkan apabila Si Mati meninggal dunia pada 23.03.2019, Defendan- Defendan tiada hak untuk mewaris atau memohon surat kuasa wakil bagi harta 195 pusaka Si Mati; f) Perintah deklarasi bahawa perkahwinan di antara Si Mati, dan Plaintif Ke-2 adalah sah mengikut kepercayaan, adat istiadat dan/atau budaya mereka yang terpakai pada masa itu· g) Perintah deklarasi bahawa Plaintif Ke-2 adalah isteri sah kepada Si Mati; 200 h) Perintah Deklarasi bahawa Plaintif Pertama adalah anak (kandung lelaki dan/atau zuriat dan/atau keturunan dan/atau baka dan/atau "issue" kepada kepada Si Mati; i) Surat Kuasa Mentadbir bagi harta pusaka Koh Seng Kar @ Koh Hai Sew (No. K/P: 430719-10-5509) yang tersebut diberikan kepada Plaintif-Plaintif secara 205 bersama-sama; j) Plaintif-Plaintif diiktirafkan sebagai benefisiari dan waris kadim bagi harta pusaka Koh Seng Kar @ Koh·Hai Sew (No. KIP: 430719-10-5509), Si Mati yang dinamakan di atas, dan nama Plaintif-Plaintif dimasukkan dan dinyatakan sebagai benefisiari dalam senarai benefisiari bagi harta pusaka Koh Seng Kar @ 210 Koh Hai Sew (No. KIP: 430719- 10-5509), Si Mati; k) kos; dan. l) apa-apa relif dan perintah lain yang dianggap sesuai dan patut oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini.” 215 4.1 The witnesses for the plaintiffs are as follows: PW1 - Koh Seng Lee; PW2 - Tan Beng Kiow; PW3 - Cheng Chin Yong; PW4 - Tan Guat Lian (P2); and 220 PW5 - Ryan Koh Yue Loong @ Koh Teck Loong (P1). 4.2 The witnesses for the defendants are as follows: DW1 - Cheong Lai Sin (D2); DW2 - Koh Shing Yee (D1); DW3 - Teo Siok Khoong; and 225 DW4 - Poonam Lachman Michandani. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 8 4.3 The witnesses for the Intervener are as follows: IW1 - Ho Hock Keong; IW2 - Koh Ching Kew; IW3 - Koh Sing Puck; and 230 IW4 - Koi Ah Long. [5] After perusing and considering all the evidence, relevant cause papers and the respective written submissions/replies by the learned counsels on 07.09.2023, I find that: 235 5.1 The Ps and the intervener failed to discharge their burden to establish their case with compelling evidence. 5.2 Their claims were dismissed with costs: (i) as against P1-P2: global costs of RM100,000.00 to be paid to D1- D2 within 30 days; and 240 (ii) against the intervener RM15,000.00 to be paid to D1-D2 within 30 days. 5.3 The Ds counterclaim is allowed with costs and for damages to be assessed. Prayer (c) interest at 5%. However, prayers d, e, and f are disallowed (no appeal was filed by the Defendants). 245 5.4 D1’s application for the Grant of LA in OS 702 is allowed with costs. [6] Dissatisfied with the above decisions, the plaintiffs and the intervener are appealing against the said decisions. Since both suits were jointly tried and to avoid duplicity, I will only prepare a single judgment and my reasons 250 are as follows: BRIEF FACTS [7] The brief facts are as follows: 7.1 From the parties' cause papers, it has been discerned that: 255 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 9 (a) The Deceased, born in Pulau Ketam in 1943, was a Malaysian citizen and domiciled in Malaysia. The Intervener claims that sometime in 1962-1963, the Deceased and one Ho Ah Nya underwent a customary marriage in Pulau Ketam (1st Marriage). 260 This purported union resulted in the alleged birth of the Intervener on 06.03.1964 (Intervener’s Birth Certificate at PDF 5, pg.2, Enclosure 179). Sometime in 1968, the Deceased left Ho Ah Nya and Pulau Ketam and never returned. 265 (b) The Deceased married D2 in 1973 in a customary Chinese tea ceremony in Singapore (PDF 48-49, pp 459-460, Enclosure 95). Six years later, on 04.05.1979, this 2nd marriage was registered in Malaysia under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952 (The Marriage Certificate: PDF6, pg.417, Enclosure 95). D1 was later born on 270 27.07.1980 from this marital union (Birth certificate: PDF7, pg.418, Enclosure 95), with the Deceased confirmed as the father. (c) The Ps took the position that sometimes on 19.02.1988, the Deceased allegedly took a 3rd marriage when he and P2 275 underwent a purported customary tea ceremony in Singapore (Ps Statutory Declaration: PDF43-86, pp.34-78, Enclosure 92). On 08.05.1989, P1 was born, but his Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births indicates that Koh Seng Lee (the uncle) is his father (Certificate of Extract from Register of Births No: 280 S8908403B: PDF29, pg.440, Enclosure 95). S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 10 I take cognisance, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the Ds, that: (i) The deponents of the Statutory Declarations (witnesses listed by the Ps) to support the alleged 3rd customary marriage 285 between the Deceased and P2 were not called by the Ps. (ii) I also take cognisance that the witness who claimed to be the photographer who allegedly took photos of the purported 3rd marriage was also not called. (iii) The witnesses listed by the Ps, supposedly the interpreters 290 who prepared the translation and transcripts of the recordings in the CDs marked as IDP1-6, were also not called. In the circumstances, those issues above in this trial remained unproven for the Ps case. (d) The crux of the suit before the Court, therefore, pertains to 295 competing claims by these three families over the estate of the Deceased: (i) 1st purported customary marriage in Pulau Ketam Malaysia, 1962-1963, being pursued by the Intervener. (ii) 2nd customary marriage in Singapore in 1973, but registered 300 on 04.05.1979 under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952 in Malaysia being pursued by Ds, and (iii) 3rd purported customary marriage in Singapore, 19.02.1988, that was not registered under the Women's Charter of Singapore being pursued by the Ps. 305 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 11 7.2 During the course of the proceeding, the Federal Court ruled in Tan Kah Fatt & Anor on the position of an illegitimate issue in the estate of the deceased’s father. I had then instructed parties to examine how the Federal Court ruling in Tan Kah Fatt & Anor v Tan Ying [2023] 2 MLJ 583, FC could impact the outcome of the present proceeding. In 310 that case, the FC observed: (i) That an illegitimate issue is entitled to inherit from the deceased parent’s estate under sections 3 and 6 of the Distribution Act 1958. (ii) It further observed that accepting the testimonies of the illegitimate issue’s mother and paternal grandparents that the mother had a reasonable belief 315 (at the time of the solemnisation of the marriage) that the marriage was valid, the issue was a legitimate child who was entitled to inherit under her deceased father’s estate. Applying s.75 LRA 1976. (iii) The FC overruled the HC and CA’s determination that the Child was illegitimate because her parents’ Chinese customary marriage was not a 320 valid marriage under the LRA 1976 and, as such, was not entitled to inherit under sections 3 and 6 of the Distribution Act 1958. (iv) The FC opined that the “issue” concerning the deceased did not depend on the legitimacy of the issue or the descendant of the deceased. The Court adopted the purposive approach to interpretation over a literal interpretation 325 of the Distribution Act 1958. (v) It reasoned that the word ‘includes’ in the definition of ‘issue’ suggests an enlarging or non-exhaustive definition and is intended to “expand or enlarge the category of persons who may succeed or inherit, consonant with the purpose” of the DA 1958. In contrast, the more definitive or comprehensive 330 word ‘means’ is used in the definition of ‘child’. The Court concluded from its survey of the respective dictionary definitions of ‘issue’ in relation to the deceased that the term ‘issue’ “suggests descendants by blood lineage, not dependent on the matter of legitimacy of the descendant”. The DA 1958 does not, whether expressly or by implication, state that only legitimate children 335 may inherit in the case of intestacy. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 12 7.3 The position taken by the learned counsels of the parties herein on Tan Kah Fatt & Anor, FC, on the outcome of this present proceeding are as follows: 340 (a) The Ps: (i) The learned counsel argued that the FC had clarified the inheritance rights of children born in void marriages. It will benefit many children of void marriages. It would protect children’s rights and not be discriminated against simply because their parents were not legally 345 married. (ii) It is a positive development for the law of succession in Malaysia. (iii) The FC ruling in Tan Kah Fatt & Anor is binding on this Court since the Ps case is closely like it. Stare decisis applies. 350 (b) The Intervener: (i) As with the position the Ps took, the learned counsel for the Intervener submitted that stare decisis applies to this Court. (c) The Ds: 355 (i) The learned counsel for the Ds took the legal position and strongly argued that Tan Kah Fatt & Anor does not apply to the facts of the present case, whose views provided some valuable food for thought and interesting insights from the legal perspective of a senior legal practitioner in family matters, and its continuing development 360 notwithstanding the binding effect of the FC ruling. (ii) The learned counsel, in distinguishing facts, in a nutshell, respectfully argued that: (a) The per-incuriam decision by the FC goes against legislation precisely placed to deal with the issue of succession rights of 365 illegitimate children. (b) There is no ambiguity in Sections 3 and 6 of the Distribution Act 1958. The word "issue" in Section 6 must be read together with Section 3 of the Distribution Act provides: S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 13 "child" means a legitimate child, and where the deceased is 370 permitted by his personal law, a plurality of wives includes a child by any of such wives but does not include an adopted child other than a child adopted under the provisions of the Adoption Act 1952 [Act 257]. "Issue" includes children and the descendants of deceased 375 children. She cited Re Tan Cheng Siong Deed; Charles Clement Dunman v Tan Seng Hwee; Tan Chin Tuan [1937] 1 MLJ 87, per McElwain CJ said that there is no doubt that the ordinary 380 meaning of "child" is a person born by a woman to her lawful husband. A bastard, annulus filius, is not a son….as said by Arden M.R. in Godfrey v Davis 6 Ves Jun 43 noted that "Such persons only could be intended, who could entitle themselves as children by the strict rule of law; and no illegitimate child can claim 385 under such a description unless particularly pointed out by the testator." (c) The term “issue”, as it is, already had a more comprehensive application than “children”. It includes all lineal descendants of the legitimate child(ren), i.e., children, grandchildren, and great-390 grandchildren. Because it does not include illegitimate children, it would not be rendered ‘otiose and redundant’. (d) The Distribution Act 1958 contemplates a situation where the deceased and the person they leave behind were married. The references to "child," "children", and "issue" must necessarily refer 395 to the legitimate daughter or son of that marriage and their descendants. The context would militate against reading the word "issue" to include an illegitimate child of the deceased with another woman or man to whom the deceased was never married. Under common law, reference in a statute to "child" or "children" would 400 prima facie mean a legitimate child or legitimate children: see Galloway v Galloway [1956] AC 299 at 316 (per Lord Oaksey), at 318 (per Lord Radcliffe and at 323 (per Lord Tucker). (e) The learned counsel argued further that the position taken by the FC in Tan Kah Fatt on the interpretation of “issue” and/or “children” 405 would render redundant other legislation in the country. When a child is illegitimate, its mother would be the sole guardian to the exclusion of the father. Section 11 of the Legitimacy Act 1961 allowed an illegitimate child to inherit from the mother's estate, but S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 14 only if the mother did not have other legitimate children. Section 6 410 of the Legitimacy Act 1961 was to legitimise a person so that they may inherit under their parents’ estate. In this premise, if an illegitimate child is permitted to inherit without being legitimised, section 6 would be redundant. (f) Section 13 of the Births and Death Registration Act 1957 only 415 permits a father to be named on an illegitimate child’s certificate if it is at the joint request of the mother. (g) Section 1 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 distinguished between guardians of legitimate and illegitimate children. In this case, the former is the father, and the latter is the mother. 420 (h) To date, illegitimate children cannot be conferred citizenship by their father because of this: CTEB & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 4 MLJ 237, FC. (i) The learned counsel also argued that in the context of the inter vivo transfer of immovable properties from a parent to a child, the 425 exemption of stamp duty under the Stamp Duty (Exemption)(No.3) order 2023 might only benefit legitimate children, stepchildren, or legally adopted children. Notably, illegitimate children are excluded from such exemption of stamp duty. (j) It was further argued that Article 8 of the Federal Constitution of 430 Malaysia deals with equality, which was amended to prohibit discrimination. It has no application concerning personal law. Article 8(5)(a) clarifies that the Article does not invalidate or prohibit any provision regulating personal law. (k) By Article 8(5)(a), any provisions regulating personal law, including 435 questions of marriage, divorce, and succession, even if discriminatory, are not invalidated or prohibited. As the issues of marriage and succession fall within areas of personal law, Article 8 has no part to play in the matter. Article 8(2) of the Federal Constitution further permits discrimination against non-440 citizens. Thus, there is no breach of any of the Ps' constitutional rights as alleged. (l) In children born out of wedlock, the father is under a limited legal duty to an illegitimate child. He must only provide maintenance by Section 3 of the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950. 445 (m) The learned counsel made her argument that applications by illegitimate children competing with the claims of legitimate children, whether under a will or intestacy, unnecessarily burdens the courts and causes profound injustice to the legal expectations of the legal wife and legitimate offspring by rendering the 450 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 15 succession law uncertain, particularly if they may not know any other illegitimate dependants who might still make succession claims. (n) In Singapore, the default position is still that illegitimate children are not entitled to inherit in respect of their parent's estate. 455 However, the High Court and Court of Appeal have called upon Parliament to consider changes to be made to the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children: AAG v Estate of AAH [201O] 1 SLR 769 at [41]-[43]. (o) The learned counsel went further to point out that in other 460 jurisdictions, the entitlement of illegitimate children to inherit has explicitly been legislated for, like in the United Kingdom (UK) via the Family Law Reform Act 1987, Hong Kong via the Intestates' Estates Ordinance (IEO). It was also noted that the UK and Hong Kong laws especially provide that the rights 465 under the intestacy of a person dying before the relevant sections come into force remain unaffected. (p) It was also argued that some of our laws have already been amended. Section 75 of the LRA 1976 recognises an otherwise illegitimate child to be legitimate if the parents were under a 470 reasonable belief that their marriage was valid. Its wording is like Section 1 of the UK's Legitimacy Act 1976. (q) Tan Kah Fatt & Anor, in paragraphs [97] to [100], considered and applied Section 75(2) to find the second appellant to be a legitimate child and entitled to inherit. This was not the case in 475 the present proceeding. (r) Section 18 (2A) UK Family Law Reform Act 1987 even makes special provisions for children born of surrogacy and artificial insemination, who would otherwise be entitled to inherit from their biological parents' estates. However, this was not considered in 480 Tan Kah Fatt (supra). As it stands now, even a child born from a surrogacy arrangement or sperm/egg donors will have a right to inherit from their unknowing / unsuspecting parents. (s) In her closing arguments, the learned counsel emphasised that the separation of powers should be fortified. The Court's powers are 485 confined to interpreting legislative and constitutional provisions. It ought not to encroach into legislative powers within the strict purview of Parliament. Though Tan Kah Fatt & Anor is a Federal Court decision, it may be revisited in future cases with similar facts as the plethora of authorities had shown: PP v Kok Wah Kuan 490 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 16 [2008] 1 MLJ 1, FC; Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd v. Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance (Malaysia) Bhd [2008] 6 CLJ 1, FC. (t) The learned counsel asks that the Ps and the Intervener’s claim of inheritance under the deceased’s estate in Suit 649 ought to be dismissed, and D1’s application for the LA in OS 702 is allowed. 495 THE PLAINTIFFS (Ps) CASE [8] I observed the Ps' arguments in canvassing and ventilating for their position in Suit 649 and OS 702 as follows: 8.1 It is the position of P1 that the Deceased and P2 married customarily 500 on 19.02.1998 and have cohabited as husband and wife for more than thirty years since then in the Republic of Singapore. P1 was born a year after the marriage on 05.03.1989 (Certificate of Extract from Register of Births: L95, pg.440). P1 claims that the Ds has denied his right to be the administrator of the Deceased's estate. The Ps seek an 505 order from the Court to place and cement their position in the Deceased's estate. However, as I have observed and addressed in paragraph 3.4 hereof: (a) The Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births stated that Koh Seng Lee (PW1) is the father of P1. Notwithstanding the 510 10.12.2019 High Court of Kuala Lumpur Order finding that Koh Seng Lee is not the father, nothing has been done by either P1 or Koh Seng Lee to rectify the Singaporean Certificate of Extract from Register of Births or to bring up this matter with the relevant Singaporean Authority. There is no evidence from either party that 515 it had been done. (b) For all intent and purpose, Koh Seng Lee remains on Singapore's official record as the father of P1. It is my view that fact cannot be S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 17 ignored. That the said Koh Seng Lee has been complicit in the Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births of P1 debacle for 520 the past thirty-plus years, and necessarily with the knowledge of P2 as the mother of P1, gives me grounds for concern about the veracity of their evidence. (c) The High Court Order of 10.12.2019 was explicit in ordering (mandatory injunction) that Koh Seng Lee (PW1) must remove his 525 name from the Register of Births in Singapore within fourteen days from the date of that Order, and P1 has done nothing about it since more than three years ago. (d) In his evidence, P1 said that he did not know of the contents of his Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births, that he doesn’t 530 know Kho Seng Lee was named as his father. I find the evidence too far-fetched to be believed. The Certificate of Birth is an essential, primary document you must use as you grow up in Singapore or Malaysia for education, work, etc. (e) Claiming complete ignorance of Koh Seng Lee being the named 535 father for over thirty years in the birth certificate, premised on the facts before me, is just so improbable. This outright denial does not assist, nor does it augur well for the credibility of P1. (f) This does not augur well for their credibility, nor does it instil confidence in the truth of their evidence before me. In the 540 circumstances, I read the facts against P1 and Koh Seng Lee (PW1), who appear to be acting in concert. I will regard the official document of the Government of Singapore (the Certificate of Extract from Register of Births No: S8908403B, in Enclosure 95, p.440) as still valid and subsisting unless official evidence from the 545 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 18 Singaporean Authority to the contrary is produced. (g) It is my considered judgment that the Kuala Lumpur High Court order of 10.12.2019, though valid and enforceable in Malaysia, unless it is set aside, varied, or stayed, it cannot, however, invalidate an official governmental document of a foreign 550 sovereign nation. (h) Save for the Intervener; all other parties (the Ps and the Ds) are Singaporean nationals in this proceeding. (i) As for the customary marriage of P2 to the Deceased, it is irrefutable at the trial that the said union was never registered 555 under the Singaporean Women’s Charter as required by the law in the Republic of Singapore. DW4: Ms Poonam Mirchandani (an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore), an expert from Singapore, gave evidence that the purported customary union of P2 and the Deceased is void since it was never 560 registered under the Women’s Charter. I find this evidence to be relevant to this proceeding and admit the evidence of the said expert. I see no basis for the objection by the Ps to exclude it. In the circumstances, irrespective of the duration (alleged over thirty years) that the Deceased cohabited with P2 in the customary 565 union, it was still not sanctioned by the law in Singapore for failure to register. (j) With the unregistered status of the purported customary marriage of P2 to the Deceased confirmed, any child born from such a marriage in the circumstances would not be legitimate in 570 Singapore, just as it is in Malaysia under section 22(4) LRA where it says expressly that every marriage purported to be solemnised S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 19 in Malaysia shall be void unless a certificate for marriage or a license has been issued by the Registrar or Chief Minister or a statutory declaration under sub-section (3) has been delivered to 575 the Registrar or Assistant registrar, as the case may be. (k) However, it must be pointed out that, illegitimate or not, when there is doubt about the child's lineage, it would be required to be satisfactorily proven that the child is the biological offspring of the Deceased. This doubt is created by the official Singaporean 580 Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births, which clearly says that Koh Seng Lee (PW1) is the father of P1. To date, there is no other official document from the Singaporean Authorities to state otherwise as it involves their national. The Kuala Lumpur High Court order of 10.12.2019 cannot officially or unofficially alter that 585 official Singaporean position. If that biological connection (the illegitimate biological offspring of the Deceased) cannot be conclusively established, Tan Kah Fatt, FC (supra) would not apply. (l) As I have addressed the position of the Intervener in this 590 proceeding, there is no other definitive evidence to establish P1 as a lineal descendant (biological offspring) of the Deceased than a relationship DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) report that would constitute compelling evidence for genetic or hereditary information (paternity/ancestry testing): 595 (i) But there is none in this proceeding. (ii) Talking about or being willing to do is not sufficient. (iii) It is the Ps suit, and P1 must manage how best to do it. The Court will not conduct his case for him. (iv) As the cumulative evidence stands in this proceeding, I am in doubt 600 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 20 as to the lineage of P1 to the Deceased. Irrespective of how much time the Deceased spends with P1 (that remains unproven), as alleged, it is inconsequential if the biological link cannot be established for succession purposes. (v) What the Ps have offered thus far is fundamentally speculative 605 evidence at best in the hope that it is sufficient to tilt the scale of evidence. Well, legally, it doesn’t for this proceeding. (vi) I agree with the learned counsel for the Ds that the burden lies on the Ps to prove their assertion that P1 is the biological offspring of the Deceased (s.101 Evidence Act 1950). 610 (vii) The Ps could have applied for a Court Order to compel the DNA test by the parties, but that was not done. (viii) Adverse inference against the Ds is unjustified in the circumstances. (ix) The burden of proof lies on the Ps throughout the proceedings. 615 (m) That said, there is also no evidence that the Deceased had lawfully adopted P1 to protect the interest of P1 considering the status of an unregistered customary marriage in Singapore, there is no conclusive evidence save for bare assertions of any purported gifts of property (movable or immovable) before death to P1 by the 620 Deceased, and there is no convincing evidence to show that the Deceased expressly brought P1 into his life and his work, as the Deceased did with D1 and D2. It is sad to say, but those are the facts which cannot be denied. 625 8.2 During the trial, I directed the parties to submit on the admissibility of the audio-video recording (IDP1-IDP6) tendered by P1 to support his case. P1 argued: (i) Cited s.3 Evidence Act 1950 that the audio-video recording constitutes a document under the EA 1950. Therefore, s.90A EA 630 applies to IDP1-IDP6, where a certificate under s.90A had been S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 21 submitted as Exhibit P8, enclosure 202. Tan Guat Lian (P2) was called to testify as she did the recording using her mobile phone. (ii) The phone was produced in Court for inspection but could not be powered on. The original contents have been lost for examination. 635 The Ps argued that IDP1-IDP6 should nevertheless be admitted as secondary evidence under s.65(1)(c) EA 1950. (iii) Therefore, the objections the Ds raised should be denied. (iv) The transcripts for the video recordings in IDP1-IDP6 were agreed to be placed in Part B Documents, which would still require its 640 contents to be proven. IDP1-IDP6 are recordings purportedly of P1 and the Deceased. (v) Though the video recordings were referred to during the trial, it has not been admitted as exhibits for this proceeding. The Ps pray that IDP1-IDP6 be admitted. 645 I observed: (a) The video recordings were edited into IDP1-6 segments when it was evident that it was a continuous recording. The Ds learned counsel pointed out that the recording was for a continuous recording on the same day, while IDP5 appears to have been 650 taken on a different day. The Ps have yet to offer a plausible explanation for why the recordings were edited into five segments. The Ds’ counsel further pointed out that IDP1-6 were placed in Part C Documents in 2020, which require proof of both source and content. But on 09.03.2023, on the 7th day of the trial, the Ps 655 informed the Court that the device could no longer be powered on. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 22 (b) The learned counsel for the Ds argued that notwithstanding the s.90A certificate by P2, the edited recordings should not be admitted because they do not provide complete, accurate or reliable evidence. She cited: Dato Kanalingam a/l Vellupillai v 660 Majlis Peguam Malaysia [2022] 3 MLJ 699, CA said that it is authentic as in a precise reproduction of the event and the relevant contents have not been tampered with unless the appellant is saying that the part not produced would exonerate him. In Mohd Ali Jaafar v PP [1998] 4 CLJ SUPP 208, HC, it 665 was noted that the tapes' integrity, accuracy, and continuity were relevant and admissible. There must be no tampering. In Lim Peng Hock & Anor v Chuah Peng San & Anor [2021] 1 LNS 119, CA, it was ruled that the Court cannot take it lightly as to digital evidence. It is very fragile and could be easily altered. 670 Therefore, the issue of authenticity and reliability are essential for digital evidence. The plaintiffs had not proved the issue of non- tempering. (c) The learned counsel of the Ds further drew the Court’s attention to the fact that there is no proof adduced to confirm the identity of 675 the voice recorded in IDP1-6 was that of the Deceased. Citing Lim Peng Hock & Anor (supra), the law requires the voice of the speaker to be duly identified, and since the 1st defendant disputes, strict proof is necessary to determine the identity of the speaker (PP v Zul Hassan & Anor [2013] 7 CLJ 141). It was said in Mohd 680 Ali Jaafar (supra) that proof of identity of the conversation is the most crucial element to be established when introducing evidence S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 23 of a tape recording. Therefore, it was argued that IDP1-IDP6 should not be admitted as exhibits. (d) Considering the arguments and respective positions taken by the 685 parties, I believe the integrity of the IDP1-IDP6 is suspect. Without the original continuous recording, it would be impossible to compare and ascertain its authenticity and degree of tempering, if any. When the continuous recording has been cut/edited into six parts, it would have involved some element of editing, no matter 690 how you argue it. Without editing works, it cannot be segmented into six pieces. As the Court of Appeal in Lim Peng Hock (supra) said, the Court must exercise caution when dealing with digital evidence as it is susceptible and prone to digital alteration. I observed that with today's sophisticated equipment and 695 technology, once the audio-video recordings are digitised, they can be edited and altered to angle support to any proposed issue or purpose. (e) Therefore, it is my considered judgment that IDP1-IDP6 documents in Part C should not be admitted as exhibits in this 700 proceeding. Their integrity is suspect without the original recording to confirm their contents and the part that had been excluded, if at all. The duty to preserve the integrity of the said evidence falls squarely on the Ps. In the circumstances, the Ps failed to observe that duty if IDP1-6 is fundamental to their case. 705 There is no one to be faulted but the Ps themselves. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 24 8.3 P2 submitted laboriously on the customary wedding of P2 and the Deceased, as shown in the various pictures in enclosure 93, and many repetitive pages in their arguments. (a) I find no evidence to definitively support the alleged customary 710 marriage of P2 and the Deceased. What has been produced is highly speculative evidence suggesting an alleged customary wedding. (b) Even if the alleged customary wedding took place, it does not change the fact that it was not registered under the Women’s 715 Charter 1961 as required by the law in Singapore, rendering it void. Since it had been rendered invalid, P2 would not derive any rights under it, and there is no arguing out of it. That is the law as it stands. Legislation supersedes customs and practises save where it is excepted. 720 (c) The legal consequences of that incompliance have been stated in the preceding paragraph. It is my observation that Ps submission places so much emphasis and time on the peripherals and unsupported suppositions rather than on the fundamental root issue that would ultimately determine the entitlement of the Ps in 725 this suit. (d) From the facts before me, it is irrefutable that: (i) The Deceased took a 2nd customary marriage to D2 in 1973 in Singapore. Six years later, in 1979, they registered the marriage in Malaysia under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952 (CMO). 730 (ii) Section 4(1) CMO disallows a subsequent marriage to be contracted while the subsisting marriage subsists. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 25 (iii) A subsequent marriage in default of that prohibition, the women and any issue from that prohibited union shall not have any succession rights of the man if he dies intestate. 735 (iv) LRA 1976, which superseded the CMO under section 5(1), which also extended such prohibition as in s.4 of CMO. Section 6 (1) and (2) void such marriages in contravention of the prohibition in s.5, and no rights of succession or inheritance shall be granted to the women or any issue from such a prohibited union. 740 (v) In 1978, the Deceased purportedly took a 3rd customary marriage with P2 in Singapore but did not register the said marriage under the Women’s Charter in Singapore. SEDW4: Ms Poonam Mirchandani, an expert from Singapore, gave evidence that the purported customary union of P2 and the Deceased is void since it was never registered 745 under the Women’s Charter. Evidently, P2 cannot claim any inheritance right in the Deceased's estate by law. 8.4 The P1 claimed to have: (i) The original title deed of the property held under HS(D) No. 13953, PT No. 750 MLO 8301, Mukim Plentong, Daerah Johor Baru, Negeri Johor; (pg 371 – 375 of Enclosure 94). (ii) The property held under Geran Hakmilik No. 92354, Lot No. Lot 1544, Mukim Tebrau, Daerah Johor Bahru, Negeri Johor (pg 356-359 of Enclosure 94) (under WSI). 755 (iii) The property held under Title No. 6994, Presentation No. 168055, Lot No.1545, Mukim Tebrau, Daerah Johor Bahru, Negeri Johor (pg 385-387 of Enclosure 94) (under WSI). (iv) The property held under Title No. 6995, Presentation No. 168056, Lot No. 1546, Mukim Tebrau, Daerah Johor Bahru, Negeri Johor (pg 388-390 of 760 Enclosure 94) (under WSI. (v) The original Share Certificates of the 500,001 unit of shares in the company named WSI Sdn Bhd; (pg 392, 394 of Enclosure 94), and (vi) The original Share Certificates of the 10,000 units of shares in the company named Herald Heights Sdn Bhd (pg 395 of Enclosure 94). 765 He claimed that the Deceased handed them over to him during his lifetime. Other than that, and bare assertions, no cogent evidence is S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 26 adduced that it was intended as a gift (inter vivos) to him. The Ps referred to the video recordings with the transcripts that had been 770 disallowed. It was also argued that the Ds never challenged his evidence on the properties being gifted to him, and therefore, they ought to be taken out or excluded from the list of the Deceased assets. My attention has been drawn to the fact: (a) The assets in paragraphs (ii), (iii), (iv) and (vi) above were never 775 pleaded by the Ps (O.18. r.12.RC 2012). (b) In the circumstances, I believe these four assets are to be excluded from the Ps claim on gifts inter-vivos. (c) Save for self-serving unsupported statements by the Ps, I find no compelling or persuasive evidence to support the Ps' claim that the 780 Deceased had intended the assets pleaded by the Ps as gifts inter- vivos. 8.5 The Ps cited section 34 LRA 1976, that says nothing in the Act, or the rules made thereunder shall be construed to render valid or invalid any 785 marriage which otherwise is invalid or invalid merely because it has been or is not registered. I observed: (a) This argument is wholly misplaced and unnecessary since LRA is applicable in Malaysia. The purported customary marriage that is the subject matter of this proceeding is in the Republic of 790 Singapore, where the Singapore Women’s Charter applies for marriages solemnised and registered there. Evidence has been produced that if at all it took place (the 3rd customary wedding), it is void for failure to register. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 27 (b) It would be too farfetched for the Ps to suggest or imply that the 795 provisions of the LRA apply in the Republic of Singapore. If it is rendered invalid for legal incompliance in Singapore, it could not be validated by the LRA provision in Malaysia under the LRA. (c) There is no evidence that this 3rd customary marriage by the Deceased with P2 was intended to be registered in Malaysia as 800 the Deceased did with the customary marriage with D2. (d) Because of the registration of the 2nd marriage to D2 under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952 on 04.05.1979 (L.95, pg.417), the Deceased would not be able to lawfully take a 3rd marriage as he did with P2 as the CMO 1952 expressly prohibits it. 805 (e) The purported 3rd marriage would not receive any legal recognition while the 2nd marriage subsists to ensure monogamy in civil marriages. 8.6 On the issue of OS 901 that had been withdrawn, an issue in the counterclaim by the Ds, the Ps argued that it is no longer a relevant 810 issue to be considered since it is no longer before the parties after it was withdrawn by the Ps with cost already paid to the Ds. Therefore, it should no longer be an issue with the Ds. OS 901 and Suit 649 were not taken for any collateral purpose as alleged by the Ds to constitute an abuse of process. Any purported technical incompliance should not 815 be taken to impair the proceedings. The Ps had no choice but to file OS 901 after the Defendants had excluded the Ps from claiming their right to administer and inherit the Deceased’s estate by filing the ex-parte OS 702. The sole purpose of S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 28 filing OS 901 was to include both the Ps and the Defendants (without 820 having the Intervener, whose existence at the material time was not within the knowledge of the Plaintiffs) to ensure that all relevant parties would be heard. The Plaintiffs also filed applications to consolidate and transfer OS 702 and OS 901 to expedite the process. These applications were later withdrawn with OS 901 by the Plaintiffs 825 on 06.09.2019 due to the filing of the current suit 649 on 03.09.2019. The Ds have failed to prove what damage they have suffered because of it to justify their claim for damages as a result thereof. 8.7 On the issue of the Intervener, the Ps took the position that it is incumbent on the Intervener to prove that he was the legitimate son of 830 the Deceased. Shanmugam v Pappah [1994] 1MLJ 144, HC held that the plaintiff had the burden of establishing that he was the legitimate son of the deceased to establish his right to succeed to the estate of the deceased who died intestate, the plaintiff must not only prove that he was the son of the deceased but must, because of the 835 Distribution Act 1958, also prove that he was the legitimate son of the deceased. However, this issue is now rendered academic due to the ruling in Tan Kah Fatt, FC (supra). 8.8 The Ps asks: (i) A declaration that s.5 LRA (Disability to contract marriages 840 otherwise than under the Act) does not apply to P2, a Singaporean and has never been within the local jurisdiction of this Court. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 29 (ii) An Order declaring any law restricting and preventing an illegitimate child from claiming contradicts Article 8 of the Federal Constitution. 845 (iii) An Order declaring s.3 and 6 of the Distribution Act cannot be construed to deprive a child of their entitlement based on their legal status. (iv) An Order declaring the marriage by the Deceased to D2 is null and void. The Ds has no right to claim over the estate of the 850 Deceased. D1 is not the lawful child of the Deceased. (v) The customary marriage between P2 and the Deceased is valid, and P1 is the lawful heir of the Deceased. The Ps will be granted the Letter of Administration to administer the Deceased's estate. (vi) An Order declaring that the Deceased had given all his shares, 855 interest, and title in WSI Sdn Bhd, Isotank Container Services Sdn Bhd, and the property held under the deed title H.S.(D) No. 13953, PT No. MLO 8301, Mukim Plentong, Daerah Johor Baru, Negeri Johor, to the Plaintiffs as gifts inter vivos, and an Order giving effect for the ownership in those assets to vest in the Ps. 860 In the premise, the Ps pray for order in terms of their prayers and cost. THE DEFENDANT (Ds) CASE [9] I observed the Ds' arguments in canvassing and ventilating for their position in Suit 649 and OS 702 as follows: 865 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 30 9.1 It was submitted that: (a) It is the Ds contentions that: (i) the Deceased had lived with them at all material times. Sometime in 1987, they resided at No.52 Bayshore Road, 870 Ruby Tower# 06-01, Bayshore Park, Singapore 469978. (ii) But from 2009 until his passing, they lived at No. 53, Jalan Awan Cina, Taman Yarl, 58200 Kuala Lumpur, while D1 continued to reside at the Bayshore Residence in Singapore. 875 (iii) On 23.03.2019, the Deceased passed away at the Taman Yarl Residence in Kuala Lumpur (Death Certificate: PDF4, pg.1, Enclosure 91). (b) During his lifetime, the Deceased: (i) Named D2 as his wife in his tax returns/statements (Tax 880 Statement: PDF12-23, pp.423-43, Enclosure 95). (ii) His official documents were sent to the Bayshore residence in Singapore or the Taman Yarl residence in Kuala Lumpur. (iii) D2 was named his sole beneficiary in his Great Eastern Insurance Policy (PDF40-41, pp.451-452, Enclosure 95). 885 9.2 In opposing Suit 649 by the Ps, the Ds argued that: (a) The inheritance rights are governed under s.6 of the Distribution Act 1958. (b) The late Ho Ah Nya of the purported 1st customary marriage 890 (1968) in Malaysia to the deceased would be disentitled to make any claim on his estate by predeceasing the Deceased. In the S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 31 circumstances, she would not be entitled to claim even if her purported customary marriage was valid at the time. (c) As for D2, the lawfully registered spouse in the Deceased’s 2nd 895 customary marriage (1973 in the Republic of Singapore) but subsequently, six years later, registered it under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952 (CMO) in Malaysia on 04.05.1979 (L.95, pg.417). (d) Under section 4(1) CMO, the Deceased could not take a subsequent marriage lawfully for so long as the 2nd marriage 900 subsists. S.4(1) says that a male person married by the provisions of this Ordinance shall be incapable of contracting a valid marriage with any third person, whether as a principal or secondary marriage. (e) The learned counsel also drew my attention to s.5(1) CMO, which 905 makes clear the inheritance position of the Ps in this suit: "(1) If any male person lawfully married under this Ordinance shall thereafter during the continuance of such marriage contract a union with a woman which but for such marriage would confer rights of succession or inheritance upon such woman or upon the issue of such union, no 910 issue of such union shall be legitimate or have any right of inheritance in or succession to the estate of such male person, and no such woman shall have any right by reason of the death intestate of such male person". (f) Subsequently, the LRA 1976 came into force on 01.03.1982. 915 (g) The 3rd customary marriage to P2 was on 18.02.1988 in Singapore, six years after the LRA came into force, which would have certainly rendered it void (s.5(1) LRA 1976). Section 5(1) says: 920 "(1) Every person who on the appointed date is lawfully married under any law, religion, custom or usage to one or more spouses shall be S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 32 incapable, during the continuance of such marriage or marriages, of contracting a valid marriage under any law, religion, custom or usage with any other person. Whether the first-mentioned marriage or the 925 second-mentioned marriage is contracted within Malaysia or outside Malaysia. Section 6(1) and (2) LRA says: (1) Every marriage contracted in contravention of section 5 shall be void. (2) If any male person lawfully married under any law, religion, custom, or 930 usage shall during the continuance of such marriage contract another union with any woman, such woman shall have no right of succession or inheritance on the death intestate of such male person. (h) Evidently, P2 cannot claim any inheritance right in the Deceased's estate by law. 935 9.3 Of the three, P1, the Intervener and D1, only D1, the legitimate child of the Deceased from a lawfully registered 2nd customary marriage, is entitled to a claim in the Deceased's estate. The Deceased is named the father in her Birth Certificate (PDF7, pg.418, L.95). 940 9.4 At this juncture, I agree with the arguments of the Ds that the Birth Certificate of the Intervener is indeterminable, as I had addressed in my observation in the Intervener’s submissions. For P1, as I observed, Koh Seng Lee is named the father in the official Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births in Singapore. Till now, no rectified certificate 945 has been produced from the relevant Singaporean authority to say otherwise. 9.5 During the trial, P2 agreed that because the Deceased was married to D2, he refused to put his name on P1’s birth certificate. 9.6 Tan Kah Fatt was distinguished in that, even though the 1st customary 950 marriage, in that case, could not be proven with photographs, evidence S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 33 from the relevant family members shows that the 2nd appellant was accepted into the Deceased’s family as a grandchild. Therefore, it was argued that even if Tan Kah Fatt, FC (supra) did not determine the issue of an illegitimate child, s.75 LRA would have stepped in and 955 saved the 2nd appellant as a legitimate child and eligible for inheritance. Section 75 (2) says: "(2) Subject to the provisions of this section, the child of a void marriage shall be treated as the legitimate child of his parent if, at the time of the solemnisation of the marriage, both or either of the parties reasonably 960 believed that the marriage was valid." 9.7 There is no compelling evidence produced by either P1 or the Intervener that they had at any time been accepted into the family of the Deceased, nor were they treated as part of the Deceased’s family. 965 During the trial: (a) P2 admitted she had never met the Deceased’s mother. (b) P1 admitted he had never met the Deceased’s family or Koh Seng Lee before the Deceased's passing. (c) P1 agreed that the Deceased did not live with him and P2 seven 970 days a week. (d) P2 admitted that she and P1 did not participate in the Deceased’s funeral rite ceremony on 26.03.2019. (e) P2 admitted that she only told Koh Seng Lee at the Deceased’s funeral that P1 was the Deceased’s son. 975 (f) P2 agree that she was not introduced as Mrs Koh at the Deceased’s funeral, (g) P2 agreed that the Ps never celebrated Chinese New Year with the Deceased’s family in Malaysia. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 34 (h) P1 admitted that the Deceased never spent Chinese New Year’s 980 Eve with the Ps. (i) P2 admitted that she did not attend the Deceased’s mother’s funeral on 08.11.2004. (j) The Ps were not named as family members in the Deceased’s late mother’s obituaries. 985 (k) P1 admitted that he never went to pay any respects to the Deceased’s ancestors in Malaysia. (l) The intervener also admitted that he was never accepted as part of the Deceased’s family. (m) The intervener admitted that he did not attend the Deceased’s 990 funeral, and he and his mother, Ho Ah Nya, were not named in the obituaries. (n) The Intervener admitted that he had never met the Ds or the Ps before this proceeding. (o) The Intervener admitted he never celebrated Chinese New Year 995 with the Deceased’s family. (p) The Intervener did not attend the Deceased’s mother’s funeral. (q) The Intervener could not produce any supporting document on the claim that the Deceased had given to the late mother, Ho Ah Nya, RM100,000.00 to rebuild their house after it burnt down. 1000 9.8 The Intervener could not produce compelling evidence of the purported 1st customary marriage between his mother, Ho Ah Nya, and the Deceased. He merely relied on the unsupported evidence of: S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 35 (i) Ho Hock Keong (IW1) was not even familiar with the name of the 1005 Deceased, nor has he ever met the deceased’s family, and nor has he attended his funeral. (ii) Koh Sing Puck (IW3) could not prove his relationship with the Deceased and had not met him for over twenty years. (iii) Koi Ai Long (IW4) provided untrue evidence of his alleged 1010 relationship with the late Ho Ah Nya or the Deceased 9.9 The purported 1st customary marriage either did not exist or was not consensual. The Deceased had left Pulau Ketam and never returned. He never took the late Ho Ah Nya as part of his family. 1015 9.10 Regarding the purported 3rd customary marriage, the Ps rely primarily on the Statutory Declarations from P2’s brother, sister, and in-laws. None were affirmed by the Deceased’s family (SD at PDF 42-86, pp.34-78, enclosure 92). None of the deponents of the Statutory 1020 Declarations were called to own up to their SDs during the trial. P2 admitted that none of the Deceased’s family members attended the purported 3rd customary marriage. The photographic evidence could not prove definitively that there was a customary marriage. P2 admitted in evidence that she did not serve tea to the Deceased’s 1025 mother or D2. 9.11 The Ps family knew that the Deceased could not marry P2, and such a union was invalid. The evidence Ps witnesses: (i) P2’s bother, Tan Beng Kiow (PW2): 1030 (a) admitted he knew the 3rd customary marriage was not registered. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 36 (b) He knew that the Deceased was not named as the father of P1 in the birth certificate. (c) He also agreed that the Deceased did not live or stay with the 1035 Ps. (d) He also knew that the Deceased and P2 could not register the purported customary union as required under Singaporean law. (e) The Deceased did not spend Chinese New Year's Eve with 1040 the plaintiff or their family: (ii) Koh Seng Lee (PW1) is a witness with a vested interest in the outcome of this proceeding: (a) He is a director and shareholder of K Seng Seng Corporation 1045 Berhad, founded by the Deceased. (b) His evidence is contrary to other evidence adduced in Court: (i) He pleaded ignorance of his name on the birth certificate of P1, which I find improbable. (ii) The Intervener informed the Court on 20.4.2021 that he 1050 was told about this proceeding by Koh Seng Lee, though Koh Seng Lee denied that he did. (iii) He claimed that he could not remember when the Deceased left Pulau Ketam but could remember that the late adoptive mother allegedly told him that the Intervener 1055 was the deceased’s son. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 37 (iv) In preparing the obituaries of the Deceased and the deceased’s mother, he did not name Ho Ah Nya or the Ps. 9.12 It is highly improbable, given the circumstances, that P1 did not know 1060 throughout his growing up years that Koh Seng Lee was the named father in his birth certificate until this proceeding began, as he is an educated person (Degree in Accountancy and a Degree in Business). He only sought a declaratory order from the Kuala Lumpur High Court that Koh Seng Lee was not his father on 10.12.2019, nine months after 1065 the Deceased’s passing. 9.13 The evidence of P2 that she did not know that the Deceased was a married man when she was working as his administrative assistant in Singapore (1983-2012) is also highly improbable in the circumstances. 1070 9.14 While there is clear evidence that the Deceased did not include the Ps and the Intervener in his life and businesses when he did not make them directors or shareholders in his companies, he made the Ds directors and shareholders of KSK Realty Sdn Bhd (PDF 62, pg.575, 1075 enclosure 101) as the Deceased intended to transfer all immovable assets under KSK Realty Sdn Bhd where D2 would be a shareholder. 9.15 Regarding the inter-vivos claim by the Ps. The Ds argued that: (a) The Ps relied fundamentally on IDP1-IDP6 to support their 1080 arguments on the purported gifts inter-vivos by the Deceased. Since I have disallowed the said recordings, it would not be necessary to address these recordings as their evidence. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 38 (b) The Deceased did not take steps to realise and/or perfect the alleged inter-vivo gifts. Therefore, it is incomplete and ineffective: 1085 Tan Chong Kiat v Kwan Ah Soh & Anor [1998] 3 MLJ 884, HC. In this regard: (i) WSI Sdn Bhd: The Ps were not made directors or shareholders of the company. There is no evidence that he 1090 had taken any steps to do so (PDF 66-71, pp.579-584, enclosure 101). (ii) Isotank Container Services Sdn Bhd: The Ps were not made directors and shareholders of the company, and neither is there any evidence that the Deceased has taken steps to do 1095 so (PDF 4-9, pp.639-644, enclosure 105). (iii) Property H.S.(D) No.13953, PT No. MLO 8301, Mukim Plentong, Daerah Johor Bharu (GRN 485717, Lot 9625, Mukim Plentong, Daerah Johor Bharu). This property was not gifted to the Ps but was transferred to D1 (PDF 78-79, 1100 pp.591-592, enclosure 101). It is trite that the Court will not perfect an imperfect gift: Milroy v Lord (1862) 45 ER 1185; Re Rose (deceased) Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Co Ltd v Rose and Others [1948] 2 All ER 971; Kwan 1105 Teck Meng & Ors v Liew Sam Lee [1963] 1 MLJ 333; Kumarappa Chettiar Son of Raman Chettiar of Klang v the Federated Malay States [1938] 1 MU 9. 9.16 On the Ds counterclaim against the Ps, it was argued by the Ds that: 1110 (a) At the time the Ps filed their several suits against the Ds, it was before the Federal Court decided Tan Kah Fatt, FC (supra). It was S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 39 a time when the Ps had no right to interfere and intervene in the Ds' succession rights in the Deceased’s estate. (b) Those action taken by the Ps was an abuse of process designed 1115 to extort or oppress the Ds to secure an outcome for which they had not but for Tan Kah Fatt (supra). Provided the conditions can be proven; otherwise, the P1 would not be entitled. Malaysian Building Society Berhad v Tan Sri Ungku Nazruddin Bin Ungku Mohamed [1998] 2 MLJ 425, CA cited 1120 Lord Denning in Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd & Ors [1977] 1 WLR that it is abused when it is diverted from its true course to serve extortion or oppression: or to exert pressure to achieve an improper end. When it is so abused, it is a tort, a wrong known to the law. The judges can and will intervene to stop it. They will stay 1125 the legal process they can before any harm is done. If they cannot stop it in time, and harm is done, they will give damages against the wrongdoer. Neither malice nor the termination of the proceedings in the plaintiff’s favour are necessary elements of this tortuous wrong. It is only upon proof of the elements that make up 1130 the tort of collateral abuse of process that a plaintiff is entitled to an award of damage: (i) The process complained of must have been initiated. (ii) The dominant purpose for initiating that process must be for some other purpose than to obtain genuine redress, and 1135 (iii) The plaintiff has suffered damage or injury in consequence. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 40 (c) I have examined the chronology of events (OS 901 and Suit 649) meant to suppress the Ds in claiming their rights of succession to the Deceased’s estate initiated by the Ps as set out in the Ds 1140 arguments, from April 2019 – 01.08.2022. (d) The Ps has no right or legitimate interest in the Deceased’s estate to protect. To date, P2 still has no such right. As a result of the Ps action, the Ds have (1) suffered mental stress and a waste of time 1145 and energy, (2) cost and expenses incurred of approximately RM86,183.26 (breakdown given) as at the date of their defence and Counterclaim in Suit 649 on 10.10.2019. (e) Therefore, the Ds in their counterclaim asks for: 1150 (a) Damages to be assessed. (b) General Damages. (c) Interest at the rate of 8% from the date of defence and counterclaim to the date of full realisation. (d) An injunction against the Ps from dealing with any media and 1155 K Seng Seng until the final disposal of OS 702 and Suit 649. (e) The Ps are declared vexatious litigants under clause 17 of the Schedule to Section 25(2) of the Court of Judicature Act 1964. (f) The Ps are prohibited from filing and proceedings in any 1160 Court without the Court’s permission against the Ps and the Ps solicitors, and such an Order must be gazetted before such proceedings can be filed. (g) The Ps is subject to committal in default thereof. (h) Costs for the Counterclaim. 1165 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 41 9.17 In the circumstances, the Ds pray that: (a) Suit 649 be dismissed with costs. (b) The Grant of Letters of Administration in Enclosure 1 of OS 702 1170 is allowed with costs and (c) The Ds counterclaim is allowed with costs. THE INTERVENER’S CASE [10] I observed the Intervener canvassing his position as follows: 1175 10.1 To support the alleged purported customary marriage of his mother (Ho Ah Nya) with the Deceased, he argued that section 4 LRA Act 1976 stipulating that the Act shall not affect the validity of any marriage solemnised under any law, religion, custom or usage before the 1180 appointed date. That such marriage, if valid under the law, religion, custom or usage under which it was solemnised, shall be deemed to be registered under the act. In his Counterclaim, the Intervener is asking for the following: 1185 “(i) Perintah deklarasi bahawa perkahwinan antara Si Mati dan ibu Pencelah iaitu Ho Ah Nya@ Ho Cheng Bak adalah sah mengikut kepercayaan, adat istiadat dan/atau budaya Cina; (ii) Perintah Deklarasi bahawa Pencelah iaitu Koh Ching Kew NO. K/P:640306-10-6365) adalah anak kandungan lelaki dan /atau zuriat 1190 kepada Si Mati; (iii) Pencelah, Koh Ching Kew (NO. K/P:640306-10-6365) diiktirafkan sebagai benefisiari dan waris kadim harta pusaka Koh Seng Kar @ Koh Hai Sew (NO. K/P: 430719-10-5509), Si Mati yang dinamakan di atas dan nama Pencelah, Koh Ching Kew (NO.K/P:640306-10-6365) 1195 dimasukkan dan dinyatakan sebagai benefisiari dalam senarai benefisiari bagi harta pusaka Koh Seng Kar @ Koh Hai Sew (NO.K/P: 430719-10-5509); S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 42 (iv) Kos; dan (v) Apa-apa relif lain yang dianggap sesuai dan patut oleh Mahkamah Yang 1200 Mulia ini.” (a) I observe that s.4 LRA would not validate an invalid or void marriage. The reading of the said section is obvious. It only applies to valid marriages. In a legal article by Mr Balwant Singh 1205 Sidhu: Married or Not married? -That is the Question [2002] 3 MLJ xxix, the learned author pointed out that by s.4 LRA, subsisting valid marriages are deemed to be registered under the Act. However, these marriages are still open to challenge as to their validity according to the law, religion, custom or usage under 1210 which they were solemnised. In addition, in the absence of actual registration, subsisting customary marriages would still have to be proven. Parties to any marriage solemnised prior to the appointed date of the LRA may apply to the Registrar for the registration of the marriage. 1215 (b) To demonstrate the workings of s.4, in Sabrina Loo Cheng Suan v Eugene Khoo Oon Jin [1995] 1 CLJ 875, the High Court in Penang had to determine the legality of a second marriage under Chinese custom while the man was still married to his first wife. The Chinese customary marriage was in 1973, before the 1220 enforcement of the Act. The Court held that in 1973, there was no legal impediment against the plaintiff and the defendant entering a Chinese customary marriage between themselves while the defendant was married to one Dorothy Khoo, thus making the latter the principal wife and the plaintiff the second wife. Although 1225 polygamous, Chinese customary marriages entered before March S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 43 1, 1982, were valid. Therefore, the plaintiff’s marriage to the defendant was valid under sections 4(1) and (2) of the Act. (c) After the Act comes into force, a second marriage contracted while a first marriage is still in subsistence is invalid under s.5(1). 1230 Section 34 of the LRA says that nothing in the Act or the rules made thereunder shall be construed to render valid or invalid any marriage which otherwise is invalid or invalid merely because it has been or is not registered. The decision by the Court of Appeal in Chai Siew Yin v Leong Wee Shing [2004] 1 CLJ 752 was 1235 reversed in the Federal Court Appeal No: 02-10-2003(W) when the FC ruled that s.34 must not be read in isolation but must be construed in harmony with other provisions of the Act which encapsulates the overall intention of the legislature. To do otherwise would defeat the intent and purpose of the Act, which is 1240 to provide for monogamous marriages and the solemnisation and registration of such marriages. (d) Therefore, s.4 cannot be read in isolation but must be in tandem/harmoniously with other relevant provisions of the Act. One must do more than angled it to support an 1245 unsustainable/unproven position. That would not be tenable and most certainly be a misplaced effort. (e) In the present case, it must be pointed out that the alleged customary marriage between the Deceased and Ho Ah Nya had yet to be proven or established by the Intervener to the satisfaction 1250 of the Court. There is no compelling evidence save for unsupported and sweeping hearsay oral evidence that is vague S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 44 on the existence of the alleged marriage. It is neither here nor there with no definitive value. 1255 10.2 The Intervener had exhibited his Birth Certificate (Enclosure 179, part B, pg.5 PDF) to prove that he is the biological son of the Deceased. However, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the Ds, I observed that the details of the Deceased had not been correctly stated. It says the Deceased is not a Malaysian, the Deceased is a permanent 1260 resident, and the Deceased has been identified as Hokkien, which does not accord with the present information in the Deceased’s death certificate adduced by the Intervener in Enclosure 179, pg.4 PDF. that he was just Chinese. No evidence was found at the trial to prove the information on the Birth Certificate. This is a ground for concern on 1265 the integrity of the information stated that can only be resolved by the Registration Department. But unfortunately, no officer from the said department was called to clarify the discrepancies in the details concerning the alleged Deceased. (a) It is my legitimate concern that if it can happen in the Certificate 1270 of Extract from Register of Births for P1, it can also occur with the Intervener. A common person in these two issues is Koh Seng Lee (PW1), who appears to have played a covert role in both instances. (b) The Intervener’s Birth Certificate is a Part B Document that 1275 requires the contents to be proven, though the authenticity is not disputed. As it stands, I am not persuaded by the contents, which require clarification from the appropriate party/authority on the discrepancies. To reiterate, no officer from the Registration S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 45 Department was called to clarify those discrepancies. It is not for 1280 the Court to conduct the Intervener’s case, but it is entirely up to him to manage it and do what is necessary to persuade the Court with cogent evidence. (c) Any attempt at evidence by implication would not be sufficient in the premise. Other than the said Birth Certificate with 1285 discrepancies in the details that have not been clarified, there is no other evidence to establish the Intervener as a lineal descendant (blood relation) with the Deceased, such as a relationship DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) report that would constitute a definitive prove for genetic or hereditary information 1290 (paternity/ancestry testing). What was produced before the Court was merely unsupported postulation or evidence by implication and uncorroborated oral hearsay evidence. What matters most is that a definitive piece of evidence (DNA Report) that would have tilted the scale of evidence in his favour was never produced. 1295 Therefore, even before the Court can consider the issue of legitimacy or otherwise, a blood relation with the Deceased must be satisfactorily established before the Court. (d) DNA test by the Department of Chemistry Malaysia: Paternity testing simply means establishing fatherhood. Paternity is done to 1300 confirm or exclude the biological father of a child. The DNA test is accurate, rapid, and affordable, with a power of discrimination (accuracy) as high as 99.9999%. DNA paternity tests can be performed on individuals of any age. It has become the most accepted method to determine identity within the legal scientific communities. 1305 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 46 (e) As it is, there is no convincing evidence of the purported customary marriage between the Deceased and the mother of the Intervener, rendering the claim by the Intervener highly speculative. The legal position is trite that the Court does not act 1310 on mere speculation or supposition. 10.3 The Intervener relied fundamentally on the oral hearsay evidence of his witnesses, saying the Deceased and the late Ho Ah Nya were purportedly married in 1968 and cohabited as husband and wife. Other 1315 than that, no definitive or persuasive evidence was adduced to corroborate that contention. The intervener claimed that there was no photograph to evince the tea ceremony to indicate the wedding as a fire in Pulau Ketam had destroyed a shophouse owned by Ho Ah Nya that the Intervener currently occupies. He cited Seow Beng Hay v 1320 Seow Soon Quee [1933] 11 MLJ, which held that such customary marriage could be established by oral or circumstantial evidence. (a) It is my observation that it cannot be any oral or circumstantial evidence but must be cogent or persuasive oral evidence for the 1325 Court to make a favourable finding. At this point of the proceeding, I find no compelling evidence to favour the Intervener. Oral hearsay evidence is never good evidence to establish a fact. (b) Ho Hock Keong (IW1), the younger brother to Ho Ah Nya, gave evidence that Ho Ah Nya told him that she and the Deceased were 1330 married. No corroboration was provided. (c) Koi Ah Long (IW4) gave a sweeping statement that the Deceased and Ho Ah Nya were married to each other. All seniors in Pulau S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 47 Ketam know they were married. But no relevant seniors were called to corroborate that statement. 1335 (d) Koh Seng Lee (PW1) said that the Deceased had never mentioned to him that the deceased was married in Pulau Ketam. Only that their mother and father allegedly informed him. No tangible evidence was adduced to corroborate the position taken. 1340 To reiterate, I am unpersuaded with the foregoing unsupported evidence. 10.4 The Intervener further claimed that the Deceased had presented a payment of RM100,000.00 to the late mother, but he could not prove 1345 it since the mother had passed away long ago. Maybank does not want to disclose any financial information, though requested by his solicitor due to secrecy provisions under the Financial Services Act 2013. 10.5 He relied fundamentally on the testimony of Koh Seng Lee (PW1), the 1350 adopted brother of the Deceased, who was complicit in the Certificate of Extract from Register of Births of P1 debacle addressed in the foregoing paragraph 3.4 herein. It was claimed that Koh Seng Lee had notified the Intervener for whatever reason that the Deceased was married in Pulau Ketam. There was no cogent evidence to corroborate 1355 that statement. (a) I observed that Koh Seng Lee (PW1) seems to have played a role everywhere in this proceeding. The fact that the said Koh Seng Lee (PW1) has been complicit in the Certificate of Extract from the 1360 Register of Births of P1 debacle for the past thirty-plus years, and S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 48 necessarily with the knowledge of P2 as the mother of P1, gives me grounds for concern about the veracity of his unsupported oral evidence. (b) The very debacle that has yet to be addressed and resolved by 1365 the relevant Singaporean Authorities and what action is to be taken, if any, on the Kuala Lumpur High Court Order that had made some findings on the details of the P1 Certificate of Extract from Register of Births. (c) The deafening silence by both P1 and Koh Seng Lee (PW1) on 1370 the matter can only mean that the issue had not been raised with the relevant Singaporean Authority since the day the Order was granted (more than three years ago) for whatever reason that only they know and do not wish to be forthcoming about it. (d) The High Court Order of 10.12.2019 was explicit in ordering 1375 (mandatory injunction) that Koh Seng Lee (PW1) must remove his name from the Register of Births in Singapore within fourteen days from the date of that Order. This does not augur well for their credibility in this Court. In those foregoing circumstances, the Intervener prays for order in terms of 1380 his counterclaim. THE LAW [11] It is trite in law that all cases are decided on the legal burden of proof being discharged: 1385 11.1 It is the acid test applied in any particular case. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 49 (a) Lord Brandon in Rhesa Shipping Co.SA v Edmunds [1985] 1 WLR 948 at 955 said: 1390 “No judge likes to decide cases on the burden of proof if he can legitimately avoid having to do so. There are cases, however, in which, owing to the unsatisfactory state of the evidence or otherwise, deciding on the burden of proof is the only just course to take.” 1395 (b) In Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 it was said that: “The Court’s decision in every case will depend on whether the party concerned has satisfied the particular burden and standard of proof imposed on him. Since the terms ‘proved’, ‘disproved’, and ‘not proved’ are statutory 1400 definitions contained in the Evidence Act (Cap 9), 1997 Rev Ed), the term ‘proof’. Wherever it appears in the Evidence Act and unless the context otherwise suggests, means the burden to satisfy the Court of the existence or non-existence of some fact, that is, the legal burden of proof”. 1405 (c) The burden of proof in establishing its case is on the plaintiff. It is not the Ds' duty to disprove it. The evidentiary burden is trite that those who allege a fact are duty-bound to prove it (see s.101, 102, and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950). 1410 (d) In Selvaduray v Chinniah [1939] 1 MLJ 253, 254 (CA) held: "The burden of proof under section 102 of the Evidence Enactment is upon the person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side, and accordingly, the plaintiff must establish his case. If he fails to do so, it will not avail him to turn around and say that the defendant has not established his. 1415 The defendant can say it is wholly immaterial whether I prove my case or not. You have not proved yours". S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 50 (e) In Johara Bi bt. Abdul Kadir Marican v. Lawrence Lam Kwok Fou & Anor [1981] 1 MLJ 139, held: 1420 "It was all a matter of proof and that until and unless the plaintiff has discharged the onus on her to prove her case on a balance of probabilities, the burden did not shift to the defendant, and no matter if the defendant's case was completely unbelievable, the claim against him must in these circumstances be dismissed. With respect, we agree with this judicial 1425 approach." 11.2 Distribution Act 1958 (Act 300): Section 3. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires— 1430 "child" means a legitimate child and where the deceased is permitted by his personal law a plurality of wives includes a child by any of such wives but does not include an adopted child other than a child adopted under the provisions of the Adoption Act 1952 [Act 257]. 1435 "issue" includes children and the descendants of deceased children; "parent" means the natural mother or father of a child, or the lawful mother or father of a child under the Adoption Act 1952; "Peninsular Malaysia" has the meaning assigned thereto in section 3 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 [Act 388] and includes the Federal 1440 Territory. Section 4 (1) The distribution of the movable property of a person deceased shall be regulated by the law of the country in which he was 1445 domiciled at the time of his death. (2) The distribution of the immovable property of a person deceased intestate shall be regulated by this Act wherever he may have been domiciled at the time of his death. Persons held to be similarly related to deceased. 1450 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 51 Section 6 (1) After the commencement of this Act, if any person shall die intestate as to any property to which he is beneficially entitled to an interest which does not cease on his death, such property Distribution 7 or the proceeds thereof after payment thereout of the expenses of due 1455 administration shall, subject to the provisions of section 4, be distributed in the manner or be held on the trusts mentioned in this section, namely-- (a) if an intestate die leaving a spouse and no issue and no parent or parents, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to the whole 1460 of the estate; (b) if an intestate die leaving no issue but a spouse and a parent or parents, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-half of the estate and the parent or parents shall be entitled to the remaining one-half; 1465 (c) if an intestate die leaving issue but no spouse and no parent or parents, the surviving issue shall be entitled to the whole of the estate; (d) if an intestate die leaving no spouse and no issue but a parent or parents, the surviving parent or parents shall be entitled to 1470 the whole of the estate; (e) if an intestate die leaving a spouse and issue but no parent or parents, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-third of the estate and the issue the remaining two-thirds; (f) if an intestate die leaving no spouse but issue and a parent or 1475 parents, the surviving issue shall be entitled to two-thirds of the estate and the parent or parents the remaining one-third; (g) if an intestate die leaving a spouse, issue and parent or parents, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-quarter of the estate, the issue shall be entitled to one-half of the estate and 1480 the parent or parents the remaining one-quarter; (h) subject to the rights of a surviving spouse or a parent or parents, as the case may be, the estate of an intestate who S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 52 leaves issue shall be held on the trusts set out in section 7 for the issue; 1485 (i) if an intestate die leaving no spouse, issue, parent or parents, the whole of the estate of the intestate shall be held on trusts for the following persons living at the death of the intestate and in the following order and manner, namely: Firstly, on the trusts set out in section 7 for the brothers and 1490 sisters of the intestate in equal shares; but if no person takes an absolutely vested interest under such trusts, then Secondly, for the grandparents of the intestate, and if more than one survives the intestate in equal shares absolutely; but if there are no grandparents surviving, then 1495 Thirdly, on the trusts set out in section 7 for the uncles and aunts of the intestate in equal shares; but if no person takes an absolutely vested interest under such trusts, then Fourthly, for the great grandparents of the intestate and if more than one survives the intestate in equal shares absolutely; but if there are 1500 no such great grandparents surviving, then Fifthly, on the trusts set out in section 7 for the great grand uncles and great grand aunts of the intestate in equal shares. (j) In default of any person taking an absolute interest under the foregoing provisions the Government shall be entitled to the 1505 whole of the estate except insofar as the same consists of land. (2) If any person so dying intestate be permitted by his personal law a plurality of wives and shall leave surviving him more wives than one, such wives shall share among them equally the share which the wife of the intestate would have been entitled to, had such intestate left 1510 one wife only surviving him. (3) When the intestate and the intestate's husband or wife have died in circumstances rendering it uncertain which of them survived the other, this section shall, notwithstanding any rule of law to the contrary, have effect as regards the intestate as if the husband or 1515 wife had not survived the intestate. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 53 11.3 Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952: Section 4: (1) A male person married in accordance with the provisions of this 1520 Ordinance, shall be incapable during the continuance of such marriage, of contracting a valid marriage with any third person. whether as principal or secondary wife. Section 5: 1525 (1) If any male person lawfully married under this Ordinance shall thereafter during the continuance of such marriage contract a union with a woman which but for such marriage would confer rights of succession or inheritance upon such woman or upon the issue of such union, no issue of such union shall be 1530 legitimate or have any right of inheritance in or succession to the estate of such male person, and no such woman shall have any right by reason of the death intestate of such male person. 11.4 The Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA) 1535 Section 4: (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect the validity of any marriage solemnized under any law, religion, custom or usage prior to the appointed date. (2) Such marriage, if valid under the law, religion, custom or usage 1540 under which it was solemnized, shall be deemed to be registered under this Act. (3) Every such marriage, unless void under the law, religion, custom or usage under which it was solemnized, shall continue until dissolved— 1545 (a) by the death of one of the parties; (b) by order of a court of competent jurisdiction; or (c) by a decree of nullity made by a court of competent jurisdiction. 1550 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 54 Section 5: (1) Every person who on the appointed date is lawfully married under any law, religion, custom or usage to one or more spouses shall be incapable, during the continuance of such marriage or marriages, of contracting a valid marriage under any law, religion, 1555 custom or usage with any other person, whether the first mentioned marriage or the purported second mentioned marriage is contracted within Malaysia or outside Malaysia. (2) Every person who on the appointed date is lawfully married under any law, religion, custom or usage to one or more spouses and 1560 who subsequently ceases to be married to such spouse or all such spouses, shall, if he thereafter marries again, be incapable during the continuance of that marriage of contracting a valid marriage with any other person under any law, religion, custom or usage, whether the second mentioned marriage or purported third 1565 mentioned marriage is contracted within Malaysia or outside Malaysia. (3) Every person who on the appointed date is unmarried and who after that date marries under any law, religion, custom or usage shall be incapable during the continuance of such marriage of 1570 contracting a valid marriage with any other person under any law, religion, custom or usage, whether the first mentioned marriage or the purported second mentioned marriage is contracted within Malaysia or outside Malaysia. (4) After the appointed date, no marriage under any law, religion, 1575 custom or usage may be solemnized except as provided in Part III. Section 6: (1) Every marriage contracted in contravention of section 5 shall be 1580 void. (2) If any male person lawfully married under any law, religion, custom or usage shall during the continuance of such marriage contract another union with any woman, such woman shall have S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 55 no right of succession or inheritance on the death intestate of such 1585 male person. (3) Nothing in this section shall affect the liability of any person to pay such maintenance as may be directed to be paid by him under this Act or any other written law. 1590 Section 22: (1) Every marriage under this Act shall be solemnized— (a) in the office of a Registrar with open doors within the hours of six in the morning and seven in the evening; (b) in such place other than in the office of a Registrar at such 1595 time as may be authorized by a valid licence issued under subsection 21(3); or (c) in a church or temple or at any place of marriage in accordance with section 24 at any such time as may be permitted by the religion, custom or usage which the 1600 parties to the marriage or either of them profess or practise. (2) A valid marriage may be solemnized under paragraph (1)(a) or (b) by a Registrar if a certificate for the marriage issued by the Registrar or Registrar concerned or a licence authorizing the 1605 marriage is delivered to him. (3) A valid marriage may be solemnized under paragraph (1)(c) by an Assistant Registrar if he is satisfied by statutory declaration that— (a) either— (i) each of the parties is twenty-one years of age or over, 1610 or, if not, is a widower or widow, as the case may be, or (ii) if either party is a minor who has not been previously married and the female party not under the age of sixteen years that the consent of the appropriate 1615 person mentioned in section 12 has been given in writing, or has been dispensed with, or has been given by a court in accordance with section 12; (b) there is no lawful impediment to the marriage; S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 56 (c) neither of the parties to the intended marriage is married 1620 under any law, religion, custom or usage to any person other than the person with whom such marriage is proposed to be contracted; and (d) in so far as the intended marriage is a Christian marriage and is to be solemnized in accordance with the rites, 1625 ceremonies or usages of a Christian religious denomination, the provisions of the canons of such religious denomination relating to the publication of banns or the giving notice of the intended marriage have been complied with or lawfully dispensed with in 1630 accordance with such canons. (4) Every marriage purported to be solemnized in Malaysia shall be void unless a certificate for marriage or a licence has been issued by the Registrar or Chief Minister or a statutory declaration under subsection (3) has been delivered to the Registrar or Assistant 1635 Registrar, as the case may be. (5) Every marriage shall be solemnized in the presence of at least two credible witnesses besides the Registrar. (6) No marriage shall be solemnized unless the Registrar is satisfied that both the parties to the marriage freely consent to the 1640 marriage. Section 75: (2) Subject to the provisions of this section, the child of a void marriage shall be treated as the legitimate child of his parent if, 1645 at the time of the solemnisation of the marriage, both or either of the parties reasonably believed that the marriage was valid. FINDINGS OF THIS COURT [12] I have examined all-cause papers, the evidence and/or the lack thereof 1650 at the trial, and the parties' respective submissions in canvassing for their position in the present suit. Considering my observation in paragraph [3] 3.4 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 57 and my observations in the parties' respective arguments in paragraphs [8] 8.1-8.8, [9] 9.1-9.18, and [10] 10.1-10.5 hereof, and in addition to, it is my considered determination that: 1655 12.1 The Ps and the Intervener have failed to discharge their burden of proof to establish their respective claim of entitlement to the estate of the Deceased under ss 101-103 Evidence Act 1950: Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855. 1660 12.2 Evidently, the Ps and the Intervener failed to adduce the required compelling evidence to tilt the scale of evidence in their favour. The arguments and assertions by the Ps and the Intervener are simply speculative at best, and the Court will not act on speculation. As 1665 observed by the Federal Court in Guan Soon Tin Mining Co v Wong Fook Kum [1969] 1 MLJ 99, FC, that there was no positive proof, but only a possibility. In the circumstances, it is not good enough. 12.3 It is trite in law that the burden of proof in establishing its case is on 1670 the Ps and the Intervener. It is not the Ds' duty to disprove it. The evidentiary burden is that those who allege a fact are duty-bound to prove it (see s.101, 102, and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950). [13] It is an established foundation that in Malaysia, marriage under the 1675 Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (Act 164) (LRA) anchors on registration for legal recognition of marital union. A similar position would apply under the Women’s Charter 1961 in the Republic of Singapore. It is trite; a customary wedding does not constitute, nor does it satisfy, the legal requirement of a valid registration under the LRA. In our present case, the 1680 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 58 Deceased elected to register his customary marriage to D2 in Malaysia under the Civil Marriage Ordinance 1954 on 4.5.1979 (L.95, pg.417) before the LRA superseded it. It is trite that registration is to facilitate monogamy in civil unions and that is the basic principle behind it. It is my considered judgment that the 2nd customary marriage by the Deceased to D2 is a lawful 1685 marriage under the CMO. Consequently, the birth of D1 (PDF7, pg.418, L95) under this lawful marriage cements her succession rights to the Deceased's estate with her mother (D2). The Ds are, undoubtedly, the lawful heirs (lawful daughter and widow) from the duly registered marriage of the Deceased: 13.1 I find the Intervener’s claim to be entitled as the supposed son of the 1690 purported 1st customary marriage of the Deceased in the 1960s fundamentally flawed with no compelling evidence to establish his claim save for hearsay evidence and utter speculation as I had observed in paragraph [10] hereof. 13.2 The Ps claim to be the lawful son and widow of the Deceased arising 1695 from an unproven customary marriage (19.02.1988) that was not registered under the Women’s Charter 1961, as legally required in Singapore, is unsustainable. I have addressed this in paragraph [9] hereof. 13.3 Among others, the plaintiffs alleged that the Deceased had gifted 1700 specific properties inter-vivo (gifts before death) to them, but no evidence was adduced that the said gifts had been duly completed or perfected during the Deceased's life. No evidence of the Deceased’s intention was produced save for self-serving assertions by the Ps. I observed that this claim by the Ps had been entirely negated by the Ds 1705 arguments in paragraph [9] 9.6 hereof. S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 59 13.4 From the entirety of the evidence before, it is evident that: (a) No rectified Certificate of Extract from the Register of Births for P1 from the relevant Singaporean Authority exists. Koh Seng Lee remains the named father on the official record. There are no 1710 definitive materials other than suggestive/speculative materials that the Deceased is the biological father of P1. In failing to establish factually that P1 is the natural offspring of the Deceased (legitimate or illegitimate), P1 has no claim on the Deceased's estate. Tan Kah Fatt, FC (supra), is distinguished and is of no 1715 assistance in the circumstances. (b) Grounding her claim on the Deceased’s estate on an invalid customary marriage (non-registration under the Women’s Charter 1961) provides P2 with no right to succession. Otherwise, an Order from the Singaporean High Court would have been sought 1720 for reciprocal enforcement in Malaysia. The Ps objection to the expert evidence from Singapore on the legal status of the purported customary marriage of D2 to the Deceased is dismissed. The Ps did not offer an expert of their own to say otherwise. This invalid marriage cannot be used to premise a 1725 claim for succession in Malaysia as well. This invalidity caused by the non-registration of the customary marriage would sever her claim for succession to the estate of the Deceased. Even if the Deceased and P2 elect to register this 3rd customary marriage, they could not do so. At the same time, there is evidence of an 1730 existing 2nd customary marriage to D2 that had been registered under the CMO in Malaysia at the time. The said 2nd customary S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 60 marriage is still subsisting. A will or perfected gifts inter-vivos would have assisted her, but there is none to be proven in this case. 1735 (c) The Civil Marriage Ordinance 1952, the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 in Malaysia, and the Women’s Charter 1961 in Singapore are predicated on promoting and maintaining monogamy in civil marriages and the protection of women’s rights and interests as well as their valid offsprings. Customary rites 1740 personal to the parties cannot be used to override legislative requirements for validity. (d) The owners of the self-serving Statutory Declaration (SDs’ at PDF 42-86, pp.34-78, enclosure 92) were not called to verify the contents of their respective SD to support the Ps position on the 1745 existence of the alleged 3rd customary marriage. It renders the contents unproven. Though the SDs’ are Part B documents, their contents must still be proven. However, it cannot alter nor exculpate the 3rd customary marriage for invalidity due to non- registration. 1750 (e) IDP1-IDP6 (the video recording) is disallowed. It cannot be referred to or used to support the claim and arguments of the Ps in this proceeding. As a Part C Document, its authenticity and contents need to be satisfactorily proven, and it wasn’t. Editing the recording into six segments is an indication to it being edited in 1755 one way or another. The Ps are to be blamed for not ensuring the integrity of the evidence as required by law since it is fundamental to their case. The interpreter who carried out the transcript was S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 61 not called to verify the proposed evidence and its contents. The transcript may have been placed in Part B Documents, but the 1760 contents still need to be proven to the satisfaction of the Court. Without IDP1-IDP6 and the transcript, the Ps have lost a fundamental part of their supposed evidence to support their claim. Without fundamental supporting evidence, their claim must naturally fail. 1765 (f) Concerning the Ds counterclaim on the tort of collateral abuse of process against the Ps. It is my considered judgment that after considering the facts and the relevant law, the Ds has proven the requirements for the alleged tortious wrong by the Ps: (i) The process complained of must have been initiated: 1770 OS 901 and Suit 649 were started much before the FC’s decision in Tan Kah Fatt was delivered. (ii) The dominant purpose for initiating that process must be for some other purpose than to obtain genuine redress: At the time the action was taken, the Ps had no succession rights over 1775 the estate of the Deceased, and from the facts of proceedings herein, still, today has none that can be proven in this proceeding. (i) The plaintiff has suffered damage or injury in consequence: (ii) Tabulated by the Ds in paragraph 139, enclosure 233 from April 2019 – 01.08.2022, with expenses incurred as tabulated in enclosure 233, 1780 pp.58-59. Malaysian Building Society Berhad v Tan Sri Ungku Nazruddin Bin Ungku Mohamed [1998] 2 MLJ 425, CA cited Lord Denning in Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd & Ors [1977] 1 WLR, made it clear that neither malice nor the termination of the 1785 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 62 proceedings (OS 901) in the plaintiff’s favour (with costs ordered to be paid to the Ds) are necessary elements of this tortuous wrong. Only upon proof of the elements that make up the tort of collateral abuse of process is a plaintiff entitled to an award of damage. 1790 (g) Concerning the Intervener claiming to be the lawful natural offspring of the Deceased by his purported 1st customary marriage to Ho Ah Nya, no compelling evidence was adduced to establish the marriage or that the Deceased was his biological father. The Birth Certificate he produced in Court at trial is indeterminable due 1795 to discrepancies in its information. The Intervener failed to call the officer from the Registration Department to clarify the ambiguity and doubt. In such circumstances, no DNA Report was produced to establish that he is the biological offspring of the Deceased for Tan Kah Fatt, FC (supra) to apply. Just like P1, he did not pursue 1800 for an Order from the Court to compel a DNA test to be carried out. For want of convincing evidence, the Intervener’s claim must be dismissed with costs. The Court will not act on speculative evidence. (h) It is a cardinal rule in litigation that parties cannot conduct nor 1805 pursue their respective cases by instalments. [14] It is my considered judgment that the Ps and the Intervener have failed to establish their claim. To cite Lord Brandon in Rhesa Shipping Co.SA v Edmunds [1985] 1 WLR 948 at 955, that no judge likes to decide cases on 1810 the burden of proof if he can legitimately avoid having to do so. There are S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 63 cases, however, in which, owing to the unsatisfactory state of the evidence or otherwise, deciding on the burden of proof is the only just course to take. Accordingly, the respective claims by the Ps and the Intervener are dismissed with costs. 1815 CONCLUSION [15] In light of the foregoing and after closely scrutinising and examining all evidence adduced before me, it is my considered judgment that: 15.1 On the balance of probability, I find that the scale of evidence had tilted 1820 in the Ds' Favor. 15.2 I hold that the Ps and the Intervener failed to discharge their burden and prove their case. 15.3 Their claims (Ps and the Intervener) were dismissed with cost: (a) Against P1-P2: Global costs of RM100,000.00 to be paid to 1825 D1-D2 within 30 days, and (b) Against the Intervener: RM15,000.00 to be paid to D1-D2 within 30 days. 15.4 After considering the parties’ arguments for the tort of collateral abuse of process, I find for the Ds. The Ds’ counterclaim: 1830 (a) Prayer (a) and (b) are allowed with costs and for damages to be assessed. (b) Prayer (c) interest at 5%. (c) Prayers (d), (e), and (f) are disallowed. 1835 S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-22NCvC-649-09/2019 & WA-31NCvC-702-04/2019 64 15.5 Grounded on the facts in present Suit 649 and its appropriate dismissal thereof, there is no more impediment to OS 702 for the Grant of the letter of Administration to the Deceased’s estate. Consequently, it is granted to D1 as prayed with costs. 1840 Dated 02.11.2023. 1845 (HAYATUL AKMAL ABDUL AZIZ) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA 1850 KUALA LUMPUR Parties: 1855 Mr. Trevor George De Silva, together with Mr. Beh Chee Wei and Ms. Peyton Yap Messrs. Beh & Co. Counsels for the plaintiffs 1860 Ms. Goh Siu Lin, together with Ms. Denise Lim Hsui Yen Messrs. Kee Sern, Siu & Huey. Counsels for the defendants Mr. Wong Kok Yih 1865 Messrs. Gary Wong & Co. Counsel for the intervener S/N U0xpmyeXkGTxirzeGEfUw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	120,165	Tika 2.6.0
KLHC WA-22NCC-159-04/2021	PLAINTIF GAN KOK HWA [ IDENTITY CARD NO.: 750124055445 ] [ MESSRS EWE CHONG & KHOO (KUALA LUMPUR) ] DEFENDAN LOO CHOOI TING [ IDENTITY CARD NO.: 610620015480 ] [ MESSRS AMAR SYIIMIR IZZAT & SHAM (KUALA LUMPUR) ]	Companies — Sale of shares — Whether there is oral understanding that shareholders fund the expenses of the Company — Defendant failed to testify to support her Counterclaim — Whether adverse inference should be drawn — Whether breakdown of Company expenses contained in 2 sheets of paper is admissible as evidence — Whether Defendant has satisfied court as to fact of the oral understanding and quantum of Company expenses — Whether Defendant on balance of probabilities proved her Counterclaim	02/11/2023	YA Puan Liza Chan Sow Keng	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=215e24fc-07bb-4c8b-9b16-89b5d2d2f52e&Inline=true	IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR COMMERCIAL DIVISION CIVIL SUIT NO.: WA-22NCC-159-04/2021 BETWEEN GAN KOK HWA (NRIC No.: 750124-05-5445) … PLAINTIFF AND LOO CHOOI TING (NRIC No.: 610620-01-5480) … DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (3) Introduction [1] In this action, the Plaintiff sought to recover from the Defendant a balance sum of RM1,700,000 in respect of shares sold to the Defendant in a company known as Builtamont Development Sdn Bhd (“the Company”). [2] The trial however only concerns the Defendant’s counterclaim for a sum of RM643,494.65 being allegedly the Plaintiff’s 25% share of debts/expenses of RM2,573,978.58 incurred by the Company for the years 2015 to 2020. According to the Defendant, there was an oral understanding between the parties that both were to bear the expenses of the Company during their tenure as shareholders. [3] The Plaintiff denied there was such an oral understanding and pleaded further that when the 25% block was sold to the Defendant, it was a term of sale that the Plaintiff shall cease to be responsible for all outstanding payments or debts of the Company. 2 [4] During trial of the counterclaim, the Plaintiff testified in person whilst the Defendant called 2 witnesses to adduce evidence i.e. DW1 (Chan Moi Fong, instructed by Defendant to work on the Company’s accounts) and DW2 (Noraini binti Rashid) in support of the counterclaim. [5] I had on 14.8.2023 dismissed the Defendant’s counterclaim and given broad grounds as to why. This judgment contains the full reasons for my decision. Background [6] The Plaintiff and Pembinaan Makmur Teguh Sdn Bhd (“PMTSB”) together held 25% or 250,000 units of the ordinary shares in the Company whilst the other 75% was held by the Defendant. [7] On 25.8.2020, the Defendant wrote to the Plaintiff and PMTSB expressing her interest to purchase the 25% shares for a sum of RM2.2 million and proposed that upon receipt of duly executed blank and undated Transfer Forms for the shares and the Plaintiff’s resignation as a director of the Company, the Defendant shall deliver 2 postdated cheques as follows: (i) a cheque for the sum of RM500,000.00 dated 3 weeks after the date of receipt of the Transfer Forms and Resignation Letter; and (ii) a cheque for the balance sum of RM1,700,000.00 dated 6 months after the date of the first cheque. 3 [8] On 28.08.2020, Messrs. Tee, Ooi & Partners wrote to the Defendant: (a) confirming that they represent the Plaintiff and PMTSB; (b) that they were preparing the Transfer Forms and Resignation Letter; (c) counter proposed the following terms: (i) a simultaneous exchange of the blank and undated Transfer Forms and Resignation Letter and the post- dated cheques in favour of the Plaintiff only; and (ii) that the Plaintiff shall cease to be responsible for all outstanding payments or debts of the Company (if any). [9] On 02.09.2020, Messrs. Y.C. Wong (“Messrs. YC Wong”) acting for the Defendant wrote, inter-alia, to expressly confirm the Defendant’s agreement to the terms including that the Plaintiff shall cease to be responsible for all outstanding payments or debts of the Company. [10] Pursuant to the terms of sale as agreed, Plaintiff did handover the blank and undated Transfer Forms and Resignation Letter as well as the relevant board and shareholders’ resolutions of PMTSB for the purposes of effecting the transfer of the cumulative 250,000 ordinary shares to the Defendant and the Defendant did issue 2 Hong Leong Bank cheques to the Plaintiff as follows: 4 (i) Cheque No. 469176 dated 26.9.2020 for a sum of RM500,000; and (ii) Cheque No. 469178 postdated to 27.3.2021 for a sum of RM1,700,000.00. [11] The 1st cheque was good for payment. [12] On 9.3.2021, about 2 weeks before the 2nd cheque was due for payment, the Defendant’s new solicitors, namely Messrs Amar Syiimir Izzat & Sham wrote to the Plaintiff as follows: (a) informed that an alleged recent audit on the accounts of the Company for the period of 2015 and 2020, reveal that there were various expenses incurred by the Company amounting to RM2,573,978.58; (b) the Plaintiff is to be responsible for 25% of the expenses incurred by the Company: (i) stating that the Defendant “has agreed to set off the amount of RM643,494.65” from the “amount of RM1,700,000.00 being the second tranche of the purchase price of the shares. As such the remaining amount to be paid by our client after the setting off is RM1,056,505.35”; and (ii) sought the Plaintiff’s return of the post-dated cheque of RM1,700,000 within seven (7) days. 5 [13] The Plaintiff’s solicitors responded to the said letter, reminding that the Defendant had agreed that the Plaintiff will not be liable for all outstanding payments or debts of the Company. [14] The 2nd cheque for RM1,700,000 when presented for payment was countermanded; hence this suit and the counterclaim. [15] On 15.9.2021, summary judgment was entered against the Defendant. The reasons for allowing the summary judgment application has been set out in my first grounds of judgment – see Gan Kok Hwa v Loo Chooi Ting [2021] MLJU 2336; [2021] 1 LNS 1922. The Defendant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal against the entry of summary judgment was not successful. Issues [16] The issues to be tried in my view boil down to 3 as follows: 16.1 Whether there is an oral understanding or agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant to jointly bear the expenses of the Company, Builtamont Development Sdn. Bhd. from 2015 to 2020? 16.2 Whether the Company, Builtamont Development Sdn. Bhd. incurred expenses of RM2,573,978.58 from 2015 to 2020? 16.3 If so, whether the Plaintiff owes the Defendant the sum of RM643,494.65 being his 25% share of the expenses? 6 Burden of proof [17] The Defendant in the counterclaim bears the legal and evidential burden to prove on a balance of probabilities of establishing a case against the Plaintiff throughout the trial. In the case of Dr Shanmuganathan v Periasamy s/o Sithambaram Pillai [1997] 3 MLJ 61, the Federal Court held: “Sections 101, 102, 103 and 106 of the Evidence Act 1950 deal with the burden of proof. Under s 101, it is provided that whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. Under s 102 the burden of proof lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Under s 103, the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. Under s 106, when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” [18] In Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan @ L Allagappan (as executor to SL Alameloo Achi alias Sona Lena Alamelo Acho, deceased) & Anor v Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLJ 697, Jeffrey Tan FCJ elucidated as follows: “[56] Thus, a plaintiff has both the burden of proof as well as the initial onus of proof. In Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 855, the Singapore Court of Appeal per VK Rajah JCA, delivering the judgment of the court, explained that at the start of the plaintiff’s case the burden of proof and the onus of proof coincide: … at the start of the plaintiff’s case, the legal burden of proving the existence of any relevant fact that the plaintiff must prove and the 7 evidential burden of some (not inherently incredible) evidence of the existence of such fact coincide. Upon adduction of that evidence, the evidential burden shifts to the defendant, as the case may be, to adduce some evidence in rebuttal. If no evidence in rebuttal is adduced, the court may conclude from the evidence of the defendant. If, on the other hand, evidence in rebuttal is adduced, the evidential burden shifts back to the plaintiff. If, ultimately, the evidential burden comes to rest on the defendant, the legal burden of proof of the relevant fact would have been discharged by the plaintiff. The legal burden of proof — a permanent and enduring burden — does not shift. A party who has the legal burden of proof on any issue must discharge it throughout. Sometimes, the legal burden is spoken of, inaccurately, as ‘shifting’; but what is truly meant is that another issue has been engaged, on which the opposite party hears the legal burden of proof. [57] The rule is that ‘the onus of proof of any particular fact lies on the party who alleges it, not on him who denies it; et incumbit probation qui decit, non qui negat, Actori incibit probation … The plaintiff is bound in the first instance, to show a prima facie case, and if he leaves it imperfect, the court will not assist him. Hence the maxim Potior est condition defendantis. A plaintiff cannot obviously advantage himself by the weakness of the defence. A plaintiff’s case must stand or fall upon the evidence adduced by him. When, however, the defendant, or either litigant party, instead of denying what is alleged against him, relies on some new matter which, if true, is an answer to it, the burden of proof changes sides; and he, in his turn, is bound to show a prima facie case at least and, if he leaves it imperfect, the court will not assist him. Reus excipendo fit actor’ (Woodroffe and Amir Ali, Vol 3 at pp 3190-3191). (Emphasis added) [19] I would thus remind myself that if the Defendant does not discharge her burden, the counterclaim would be dismissed notwithstanding whether the defence is or is not established. I now deal with the issues. 8 Evaluations and Findings Whether there is an oral understanding or agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant to jointly bear the expenses of the Company from 2015 to 2020? [20] Having heard the evidence of the 2 witnesses called for the Defendant and the Plaintiff who testified in person, examined and read the relevant documents and submission of the parties, I am of the respectful view that the Defendant has not proven her counterclaim on a balance of probability. [21] Firstly, there were no contemporaneous documents at all between Plaintiff and the Defendant from 2015 – 2020 to support the alleged understanding pertaining to the Plaintiff being responsible to pay 25% of the Company’s expenses. Both DW-1 and DW-2 have no personal knowledge of the relevant fact in dispute namely that of oral agreement/understanding. Their evidence is pure hearsay and is worthless as evidence and no court can be expected to pay the slightest attention to it. [22] The date of the oral understanding or agreement in the instant case is unknown. In Tan Poh Yee v Tan Boon Thien & Other Appeals [2017] 3 CLJ 569 at 571, the Court of Appeal held that where an oral agreement is pleaded, it is incumbent on the person asserting on the existence of said oral agreement to pleaded the precise date upon which the oral agreement was entered into: “It was the respondent’s obligation to ensure that all the material particulars and facts necessary to establish his case had been acquired before the filing of the claim. The respondent had failed to establish the existence of 9 such purported 2004 agreement when the respondent could not provide or specify the precise date upon which it was entered into. The date for the conclusion of a valid contract, especially an oral one in the instant appeal, was pertinent and must be specific to achieve certainty. A party intending to rely on the oral agreement could not make an assumption of any date and failure to provide the precise date necessarily meant that the plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of the same. The respondent therefore had failed to plead and provide the material particulars to the exact date of the purported 2004 agreement at this preliminary stage which was highly prejudicial to the appellants and fatal to the respondent’s case.” [23] Second, the evidence when properly analysed will lead to a finding that the fate of the counterclaim was sealed by the Defendant’s failure to testify. In the face of denial by the Plaintiff that the understanding was ever made, there is as such a controversy of fact pertaining to the truth of the allegation of fact of the alleged understanding and breach which can only be resolved by viva voce evidence. It would be critical to ascertain the true state of affairs by resort to cross-examination. The Defendant however undermined her position by not testifying. I can be forgiven for concluding that she was trying to avoid cross examination. Her not testifying is significant as here is a case where she alleged there was an oral agreement /understanding for the Plaintiff to bear 25% of the Company’s s expenses. It behoves her to give evidence to prove her case. [24] In Takako Sakao (f) v Ng Pek Yuen (f) Anor (2009) 6 MLJ 751, the Federal Court speaking through Gopal Sri Ram FCJ, provided a useful guide when there is no evidence put forth by a party in a civil case: “[4] In our judgment, two consequences inevitably followed when the first respondent who was fully conversant with the facts studiously refrained from 10 giving evidence. In the first place, the evidence given by the appellant ought to have been presumed to be true. As Elphinstone CJ said inWasakah Singh v Bachan Singh (1931) 1 MC 125 at p 128: If the party on whom the burden of proof lies gives or calls evidence which, if it is believed, is sufficient to prove his case, then the judge is bound to call upon the other party, and has no power to hold that the first party has failed to prove his case merely because the judge does not believe his evidence. At this stage, the truth or falsity of the evidence is immaterial. For the purpose of testing whether there is a case to answer, all the evidence given must be presumed to be true. Now, what the trial judge did in the present case is precisely what he ought not to have done. He expressed dissatisfaction with the appellant's evidence without asking himself that most vital question: does the first defendant/respondent have a case to answer? This failure on the part of the trial judge is a serious non-direction amounting to a misdirection which occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The trial judge was at that stage not concerned with his belief of the appellant's evidence. She had given her explanation as to the discrepancies in the figures. And her evidence does not appear to be either inherently incredible or inherently improbable. In these circumstances it was the duty of the judge to have accepted her evidence as true in the absence of any evidence from the first respondent going the other way. He however failed to direct himself in this fashion thereby occasioning a serious miscarriage of justice. [5] The second consequence is that the court ought to have drawn an adverse inference against the first respondent on the amount of the appellant's contribution to the purchase price as well as the existence and the terms of the mutual understanding or agreement that she had with the first respondent. Where, as here, the first respondent being a party to the action provides no reasons as to why she did not care to give evidence the court will normally draw an adverse inference. SeeGuthrie Sdn Bhd v Trans-Malaysian Leasing Corp Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 33. See alsoJaafar 11 bin Shaari & Anor (suing as Administrators of the Estate of Shofiah bte Ahmad, deceased) v Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693 where Peh Swee Chin FCJ said: 'The respondents had chosen to close the case at the end of the appellants' case. Although they were entitled to do so, they would be in peril of not having the evidence of their most important witness and of having an adverse inference drawn against them for failing to call such evidence should the circumstances demand it.' ….. The other case isCrawford v Financial Institutions Services Ltd (Jamaica) [2005] UKPC 40, where Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe when delivering the advice of the Privy Council said: It is well settled that in civil proceedings the court may draw adverse inferences from a defendant's decision not to give or call evidence as to matters within the knowledge of himself or his employees. [5] Sarkar on Evidence (16th Ed) at p 1837 states: It is the bounden duty of a party personally knowing the whole circumstances to give evidence and to submit to cross-examination. Non-appearance as a witness would be the strongest possible circumstance to discredit the truth of his case Gurbakhsh v Gurdial AIR 1927 PC 230. [6] In the present instance, there is no doubt that the first respondent had intimate knowledge of the material facts relevant to the dispute and that she was privy to the several steps through which the transaction had proceeded. Based on the authorities already cited, it is patently clear that the trial judge in the present case ought to have held that the failure of the first respondent to give evidence apart from discrediting her case strengthened the appellant's case on those vital points that lay at the axis of the dispute between the parties. This, the trial judge clearly omitted to do. Instead, he treated the first respondent's failure to appear and give evidence as a matter of no apparent consequence. His non-direction upon such a crucial point as this certainly amounts to a misdirection which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. To conclude the first issue, it is our 12 judgment that there was no judicial appreciation of the appellant's evidence. A reasonable tribunal correctly directing itself on the facts and the relevant law would have held that the appellant had indeed contributed RM194,610 towards the purchase price of the building; that there was a mutual understanding between the appellant and the first respondent that they shall be beneficial co owners of the property in question in equal shares; and that the first respondent had acted in breach of that understanding.” [25] As such, this court is entitled to draw an adverse inference against the Defendant where, as here, she provided no reasons as to why she did not care to give evidence. This court is entitled to have the best evidence before it, bearing in mind that the burden to prove the counterclaim rests, all along, with the Defendant. Her evidence is highly relevant and pivotal as her cause of action is based on her oral understanding with the Plaintiff. [26] Without proving the oral agreement or understanding, the counterclaim imploded and I need not go into other issues which I will for completeness' sake, address. Whether the company incurred expenses of RM2,573,978.58 from 2015 to 2020? [27] There are no supporting documents to prove the Company had incurred expenses of RM2,573,978.58 from 2015 to 2020 to show that the Defendant had made shareholder advances of like amount to the Company. The fact that the Defendant pleaded she funded the expenses for the Company does not equate that the sum of RM2,573,978.58 was expended or incurred. In this case, it was just writing down the figures or items which will simply not do. The breakdown of RM2,573,978.58 prepared by DW-1 is on 2 sheets of paper at pp. 22-23 of CBD-1. This in 13 my view has no probative value - it does not prove anything without supporting documents such as invoices, payment vouchers, receipts. As stated in the Court of Appeal case of Sampo Materials (M) Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2016] 1 MLJ 375, the mere fact that the summary of the particulars were made could never be taken as proving that the contents were correct. [28] Another Court of Appeal case of Sony Electronics (M) SdnBhd v Direct Interest Sdn Bhd [2007] 2 MLJ 229 is instructive. The Defendant must produce all necessary supporting documents. In Sony’s case the plaintiff failed to produce the documents to support the audited statements of account. This proved to be fatal. Sony’s case also held that a summary of particulars or sheet of calculations or summary of accounts do not prove the contents. They are nothing more than conclusions. They must be proven by calling the maker to explain the facts and basis of calculation. In addition, the books to support the calculation must be in evidence. The failure of the respondent to produce or tender the account books or the necessary support documents upon which the audited statements of account were based was fatal to his claim for damages. Thus, the audited statements of account and the respondent's oral evidence in connection therewith were inadmissible (see para 55 of the judgment). [29] The Defendant’s counsel nevertheless submitted that each particular or item in the table of expenses was not challenged in detail by the Plaintiff’s counsel. He argued that none of the Defendant’s witnesses were referred to each of the particulars to the summary of the expenses incurred by the Defendant for the Company for the year 2015 - 2020 in detail during trial to scrutinize its content and validity. As the table of 14 summary remains unchallenged, it was submitted that the counterclaim of RM643,494.65 remains valid. [30] The Defendant’s counsel’s arguments with respect, are absolutely misconceived and wide off the mark. There is no duty to challenge the evidence when the evidence is inadmissible: see Sony supra: “[35] According to the appellant the respondent made much of the appellant's failure to object to the audited statements of account. [36] It is the appellant's case that the fact that the appellant's counsel did not object to the audited statements of account does not render the said document admissible or relevant per Edger Joseph Jr J in Popular Industries Limited v Eastern Garment Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [1989] 3 MLJ 360. …. [66] Edger Joseph Jr J in Popular Industries Ltd v Eastern Garment Manufacturing [1989] 3 MLJ 360 cited Sarkar on Laws of Evidenceas follows: … An erroneous omission to object to evidence not admissible or relevant under the Act does not make it admissible. It is the duty of the court to exclude all irrelevant or inadmissible evidence even if no objection is taken to its admissibility by the parties …. [68] By the same token we find that the appellant was not obliged to cross-examine Ramlan on his oral evidence thereon, when it is clear that the said audited statements of account and oral evidence were irrelevant and insufficient to establish the respondent's claim to damages. [69] We might add that the mere fact that the audited statements were marked as exhibits in no way formalize their existence in the absence of 15 correct and proper tendering thereof. This is especially true when the respondent had failed to discharge their duty to properly tender or prove the said audited statements”. [31] Just as in this case, the fact that the Plaintiff’s counsel did not object to the 2 sheets of paper setting out the amounts incurred does not render the said document admissible or relevant per Edger Joseph Jr J in Popular Industries Limited v Eastern Garment Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [1989] 3 MLJ 360. Paragraphs 68 and 69 of Sony’s case alluded in the preceding paragraph nail the point. [32] How the Court of Appeal in Sony’s case dealt with such evidence offers guidance here to me on the breakdown as contained in the 2 sheets of paper produced in this case: "[55] The respondent's failure to produce or tender the account books or the necessary support documents upon which the audited statements of account were based is fatal to his claim for damages. Thus, we find that the audited statements of account and Ramlan's oral evidence in connection therewith are inadmissible. [56] The case of Johnson v Kershaw 63 ER 1059 which was followed in Popular Industries Limited v Eastern Garment Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [1989] 3 MLJ 360 illustrates the above position. The Vice-Chancellor in Johnson v Kershaw had observed: If the account books had been in evidence, the accountant's statement of the results of his examination of those books, as the evidence of a person of skill might be receivable; but, inasmuch as the books were not in evidence, I must decline to receive the deposition of Mr Seet as to their contents. ...... [59] Even if Ramlan had in fact been the maker of the audited statements of account, it is still incumbent upon him to produce the books of account upon 16 which the audited statements were based (see KPM Khidmat Sdn Bhd v Tey Kim Suie [1994] 2 MLJ 627 and Popular Industries Ltd v Eastern Garment [1989] 3 MLJ 360).” [33] The former Suprreme Court in KPM Khidmat Sdn Bhd v Tev Kim Suie [1994] 2 MLJ 627 observed thus (at p 631): … when documentary evidence is tendered, primary evidence of the said document must be adduced except in the cases under s 65 of the Evidence Act 1950. ' … The mere fact that the summary of the particulars were made could never be taken as proving that the contents were correct. It has to be proved by calling the maker to explain the facts and the basis of the calculation of the amount claimed. Moreover the record book upon which the maker based her summary must be in evidence… ' [34] The instant case is even weaker as audited statements were not even produced. The fact that the Defendant pleaded that she funded the expenses does not ipso facto dispense with proof by acceptable and precise evidence of the amounts expended. Although DW1 testified that because the Company was sold to a new purchaser, so she does not have the documents to show because all the documents had handed over to the new company is unacceptable as there is no effort shown to retrieve the documents; neither was a subpoena issued for such documents to be produced. Sans supporting documents, the Defendant has not proven quantum on a balance of probability. [35] In any case, I also find that it is a term of sale of shares by the Plaintiff to the Defendant that the Plaintiff shall cease to be responsible for all outstanding payments or debts of the Company. It had also crossed my mind when deciding this case that as the expenses were allegedly 17 incurred by the Company, it called into question whether the Defendant is the proper person to make such a claim and caught by the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189 but this does not concern the court as it was not raised in the Plaintiff’s defence, and I shall say no more. [36] Both the 2nd and 3rd issues are answered in the negative. [37] On the facts and circumstances, the Defendant failed to satisfy the court on the fact of the oral understanding and the quantum of expenses. I find that the Defendant has not on a balance of probability proven her counterclaim. The counterclaim is thus dismissed with costs to the Plaintiff subject to allocator. Dated 2nd November 2023 - signed - ……………………….. Liza Chan Sow Keng Judge High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff : Nickson Yew Ka Hui Messrs Ewe Chong & Khoo For the Defendant : Ahmad Syiimir Suffian (together with Mohd Shahrysham and Muhammad Danish) Messrs Amar Syiimir Izzat & Sham CASES REFERRED: Tan Poh Yee v Tan Boon Thien & Other Appeals [2017] 3 CLJ 569 Takako Sakao (f) v Ng Pek Yuen (f) Anor (2009) 6 MLJ 751 18 Sampo Materials (M) Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2016] 1 MLJ 375 Sony Electronics (M) SdnBhd v Direct Interest Sdn Bhd [2007] 2 MLJ 229 KPM Khidmat Sdn Bhd v Tev Kim Suie [1994] 2 MLJ 627 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189	28,930	Tika 2.6.0
CA-21NCvC-4-03/2019	PLAINTIF Zamri bin Omar DEFENDAN 1. ) Kerajaan Malaysia 2. ) Dr Sri Dthuruga Devi A/p Krishnamoorthy 3. ) Dr Muhammad Hafiz Bin Abdul Rasid 4. ) Nashrul Syiddik bin Mohd Salleh	Plaintif memfailkan tindakan terhadap Defendan-Defendan berasaskan dakwaan kecuaian semasa Plaintif mendapatkan rawatan di Hospital Pekan yang mana telah menyebabkan Plaintif mengalami stroke. Pihak Defendan-Defendan telah mengaku akan kecuaian di pihak mereka dan dengan itu perbicaraan di Mahkamah hanyalah tertumpu bagi tuntutan Gantirugi Khas dan Gantirugi Am. Mahkamah telah mengawadkan gantirugi sepertimana yang telah ditaksirkan oleh kerana Plaintif telahpun mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan yang credible untuk membuktikan tuntutan-tuntutan yang dikemukakan ke Mahkamah yang disokong oleh pengemukaan resit-resit dan bil-bil yang gagal disangkal oleh pihak Defendan. Bagi tuntutan Gantirugi Am pula, Mahkamah telah menimbangkan segala kerugian yang dipohon dan dengan itu telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif tersebut.	02/11/2023	YA Dato' Haji Zainal Azman Bin Ab. Aziz	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=0aa8e60e-e3af-4a77-8b89-d937ae746e5c&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - AP CA-21NCVC-4-03-2019 BP KER.MSIA V ZAMRI 25.10 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUANTAN DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR GUAMAN SIVIL NO : CA-21NCVC-4-03/2019 ANTARA ZAMRI BIN OMAR [NO. K/P : 640516-06-5047] …PLAINTIF DAN 1. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 2. DR. SRI DTHURUGA DEVI A/P KRISHNAMOORTHY 3. DR. MUHAMMAD HAFIZ BIN ABDUL RASID 4. NASHRUL SYIDDIK BIN MOHD SALLEH ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PENGENALAN 1. Plaintif memfailkan tindakan terhadap Defendan-Defendan berasaskan dakwaan kecuaian semasa Plaintif mendapatkan 02/11/2023 15:38:00 CA-21NCvC-4-03/2019 Kand. 101 S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 rawatan di Hospital Pekan yang mana telah menyebabkan Plaintif mengalami stroke. 2. Pihak Defendan-Defendan telah mengaku akan kecuaian di pihak mereka dan dengan itu perbicaraan di Mahkamah hanyalah tertumpu bagi tuntutan Gantirugi Khas dan Gantirugi Am. 3. Setelah mendengar keterangan daripada kesemua pihak, Mahkamah telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif sepertimana Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 27 Disember 2022. FAKTA KES 4. Berkaitan dengan fakta kes akan tuntutan ini, faktanya adalah seperti berikut : i. Pada 08 Mac 2016 jam 7.13 petang, Plaintif telah hadir ke Jabatan Kecemasan di Hospital Pekan dengan aduan kekebasan pada anggota badan. Plaintif telah didiagnos dengan hipertensi yang tidak terkawal dan dinasihatkan supaya pulang dan mengawasi tekanan darah secara harian. S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 ii. Pada jam 10.43 malam, Plaintif telah pergi sekali lagi ke Jabatan Kecemasan di hospital yang sama di mana Plaintif telah disuntik dengan ubat Stemetil dan dinasihatkan supaya pulang ke rumah. iii. Pada 09 Mac 2016, Plaintif telah mengalami hipertensi dan telah dimasukkan ke Kuantan Medical Centre dan didiagnos menghidap Cerebrovascular dengan Hemiparesis. 5. Hanya satu isu untuk dibicarakan di Mahkamah ini adalah sama ada Plaintif berhak terhadap tuntutan Gantirugi Khas dan Gantirugi Am sepertimana yang dituntut. 6. Gantirugi Khas adalah seperti berikut : Plaintiff Court No. Item RM RM A. Special Damages (March 2016 to March 2019 = 36 months) 1. Hospital and medical expenses. 61,000.00 61,000.00 2. The cost of physiotherapy. 2,000.00 2,000.00 3. Travel, accommodation and incidental expenses. 5,000.00 5,000.00 S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 4. The cost of obtaining pre- action discovery of medical records. 8,480.00 8,480.00 5. Fee for medical report. 500.00 500.00 6. The cost of assistive equipment. 5,000.00 5,000.00 7. The cost of a hospital bed 3,000.00 3,000.00 8. The cost of a multi-purpose vehicle. 191,000.00 170,000.00 9. The cost of modifications to Encik Zamri’s home. 15,000.00 15,000.00 10. Loss of income. 223,212.72 [9,300 x 12 months x 2 years (55-51 divided by 2)] 232,212.72 Subtotal 514,192.72 493,192.72 B. Pre-Trial Damages (April 2019 to November 2022 = 44 months) 11. Hospital and medical expenses. 30,000.00 20,000.00 12. The cost of physiotherapy. 10,000.00 10,000.00 13. Travel, accommodation and incidental expenses. 7,000.00 7,000.00 14. The cost of assistive equipment and devices. 10,000.00 10,000.00 Subtotal 57,000.00 47,000.00 C. Life Expectancy 68 65 + 3 (life expectancy + S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 favourable economics point) D. Multiplier 10 68 – 58 (life expectancy minus current age) E. Future Damages (Assistive Equipment and Devices) 15. Manual lightweight wheelchair. 50,000.00 (25,000.00 with 1 replacement) 25,000.00 16. Tilt-in-space commode shower chair. 2,400.00 2,400.00 17. Electric hospital bed 8,000.00 8,000.00 18. Powered wheelchair 36,00.00 (18,000.00 with 1 replacement) 24,000.00 (12,000.00 x 2) 19. Walking frame 400.00 (200.00 with1 replacement) 400.00 20. Portable hoist 14,000.00 (7,000.00 with 1 replacement) 14,000.00 21. Pressure relief cushion 12,000.00 (3,000.00 with 3 replacement) 8,000.00 Subtotal 122,800.00 81,800.00 S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 F. Future Damages (Medical and Hospital) 22. The cost of hospital admissions 600,000.00 (30,000.00 twice a year x 10 years) 200,000.00 (10,000 x 2 x 10) 23. The cost of consultations with a Rehabilitation medicine physician 201,600.00 (280.00 x 6 times a month x 12 months x 10 years) 33,600.00 (280.00 x 12 x 10) 24. The cost of consultation with a Clinical psychologist. 6,000.00 (250.00 x 2 times a month for 1 year) 6,000.00 25. The cost of consultations with a Nutrition Specialist 20,000.00 (2,000.00 per year x 10 years) 2,000.00 26. The cost of consultations with a Neurologist 5,600.00 (280.00 x 2 times a year x 10 years) 5,600.00 27. The cost of consultations with a Neurosurgeon / Orthopedic 4,700.00 (235.00 x 2 times a year x 10 years) 4,700.00 Subtotal 857,900.00 251,900.00 G. Future Damages (Therapies and Rehabilitation) 28. The cost of physiotherapy 76,800.00 (160.00 per month x 12 months x 10 years) 62,400.00 (130.00 x 4 x 12 x 10) 29. The cost of occupational therapy 86,400.00 62,400.00 S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 (180.00 per month x 12 months x 10 years) (130.00 x 4 x 12 x 10) 30. The cost of inpatient rehabilitation 70,000.00 (14,000.00 every 2 years for 10 years) 0 31. The cost of home physiotherapy 43,200.00 (180.00 twice a month x 12 months x 10 years) 43,200.00 32. The cost medications 84,000.00 (700.00 per month x 12 months x 10 years) 84,000.00 33. The cost of botulinum toxin injections 5,400.00 (1,600.00 x 3 injections) 5,400.00 Subtotal 365,800.00 257,400.00 H. Future Damages 34. The cost prima facie hiring carers 260,000.00 (2,000.00 per month x 12 months x 10 + 20,000.00 various fees and charges) 200,000.00 35. The cost of a multi-purpose vehicle 200,000.00 0 36. Petrol, insurance, road tax, accommodation & incidental expenses 36,000.00 (300.00 per month x 12 months x 10) 36,000.00 Subtotal 496,000.00 236,000.00 S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 37. General Damages for Loss of Earning Capacity (From the Plaintiff’s age of 55 to 65) 558,031.80 (9,300.53 per month x 12 months x 5 years) + (7,000.00 per month x 12 months x 5 years) 558,031.80 38. General damages for pain and suffering and the loss of amenities of life 300,000.00 200,000.00 I. General Damages for the Value of case provided by Encik Zamri’s family 39. During the Special Damages period (March 2016 to March 2019) (36 months) 43,200.00 (1,200.00 Perayu month x 36 months) 43,200.00 40. During the Pre-Trial Damages period (April 2019 to November 2020) (19 months) 22,800.00 (1,200.00 per month x 19 months) 22,800.00 41. During the Future Damages period (10 years) 144,000.00 (1,200.00 per month x 12 months x 10 years) 144,000.00 Subtotal 210,000.00 968,031.80 42. Aggravated Damages 500,000.00 300,000.00 43. Party-and-party costs 250,000.00 250,000.00 44. Out of pocket expenses 17,514.90 17,514.90 Grand Total 4,249,239.42 2,902,839.42 S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 J. Interest 45. Interest on Special Damages from date of incident, 8 March 2016 up to date of judgment. 4% 46. Interest on pre-trial damages, general damages and aggravated damages from date of service of writ, 5 March 2019 to date of judgment. 8% 47. Interest on judgment sum, including costs from of judgment to date prima facie payment. 5% PERTIMBANGAN DAN PENILAIAN MAHKAMAH 7. Bagi tuntutan gantirugi, sebagai pampasan Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Ong Ah Long v Dr S Underwood [1983] 2 MLJ 324 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa : “…It has to be borne in mind that damages for personal injuries are not punitive and still less a reward. They are simply compensation that will give the injured party reparation for the wrongful act and for all the natural and direct S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 consequences of the wrongful act, so far as money can compensate…” 8. Di dalam kes Yang Salbiah & Anor v Jamil bin Harun [1981] 1 MLJ 292 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa : “It must be remembered that the purpose of damages is to try, so far as humanly possible, to put the victim back to the position he would have been in but for the accident. The damages must be fair, adequate and not excessive…” 9. Juga, di dalam kes Bekalan Sains P&C Sdn Bhd v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd [2011] 5 MLJ 1 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan antara lain : “[185] Every day, damages are awarded by the courts to claimants in order to compensate them for loss and damage. But before damages can be recovered in an action there must firstly be a wrong committed, whether the wrong be a tort or a breach of contract. If a loss has been incurred by the claimant, no damages can be awarded unless there is a wrong… S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [189] The person who is claiming damages must prove his case. Thus, the claimant in order to justify an award of substantial damages he must satisfy the court as to the fact of damage and as to its quantum (Senate Electrical Wholesalers Ltd v Alcatel Submarine Networks Ltd (Formerly STC Submarine Systems Ltd) [1999] 2 Lloyd's Law Reports 423 (CA)). If the claimant fails to satisfy the court on the fact of damage and quantum, then his action must fail or at the very least he would be awarded nominal damages where his right has been infringed. [190] Put in another way, the claimant must show actual loss and evidence must be led in that direction. It is submitted that the appellant has failed to prove damages with precise evidence (Sony Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd v Direct Interest Sdn Bhd [2007] 2 MLJ 229; [2007] 1 CLJ 611, (CA); and Ban Chuan Trading Co Sdn Bhd & Ors v Ng Bak Guan [2004] 1 MLJ 411; [2003] 4 CLJ 785, (CA)) and that the appellant has also failed to lead evidence to show actual loss.” S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 10. Berkaitan dengan tuntutan gantirugi tersebut, pampasan yang diberi adalah semoga mangsa telah kembali ke kedudukan asal sebelum kemalangan tersebut berlaku. 11. Berkaitan dengan Gantirugi Khas, Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Ong Ah Long v Dr S Underwood [1983] 2 MLJ 324 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa : “It is a well-established principle that special damages in contrast to general damages, have to be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. They are recoverable only where they can be included in the proper measure of damages and are not too remote (see Halsbury's Laws of England 4th edition, volume 11 page 218 para 386). That in our view is the cardinal principle adopted by all courts both in England and this country. The same principle was adopted by Ong Hock Thye, F.J. (as he then was) in Yee Hup Transport & Co and Anor v Wong Kong [1967] 2 MLJ 93 which was an appeal on quantum of damages. Quoting an excerpt from the judgment of Wilmer L.J. in Ilkiw v Samuels [1963] 1 WLR 991; [1963] 2 All ER 879 he held that the general damages should not be S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 awarded as though they were special damages properly pleaded and proved. Similarly Chang Min Tat, F.J.(as he then was) in Murtadza bin Mohamed Hassan v Chong Swee Pian [1980] 1 MLJ 216 applied the principle in Ilkiw v. Samuels( supra) that special damages if pleaded as in that case could be recovered. The principle was also adopted by Mohamed Azmi, J. (as he then was) in Sam Wun Hoong v Kader Ibramshah [1981] 1 MLJ 295 in the Federal Court.” 12. Juga, di dalam Yeap Cheng Hock v Kajima-Taisel Joint Venture [1973] 1 MLJ 230 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa : “The general principle is that the plaintiff must be prepared to prove his special damages unless it has been agreed. It is not enough for him to write down the particulars and leave them for the court to decide. It is for him to prove them. (See Sum Kum v Devaki Nair & Anor [1964] MLJ 74 74, and Khoo See Moi v Tay Teik Chang [1970] 2 MLJ 249 250). No doubt, the plaintiff gave evidence that he had purchased the extra nourishing food when he was in the hospital, but in the absence of medical S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 evidence that they were necessary in the light of hospital food and nourishment prescribed, I am not prepared in the circumstances to allow the claim on the three items.” 13. Oleh itu, dengan menggunapakai nas-nas di atas, Mahkamah telah mengawadkan gantirugi sepertimana yang telah ditaksirkan oleh kerana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa Plaintif telahpun mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan yang credible untuk membuktikan tuntutan-tuntutan yang dikemukakan ke Mahkamah. 14. Mahkamah juga mendapati Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan jumlah kerugian bagi Gantirugi Khas dengan pengemukaan resit- resit dan bil-bil yang telah dikemukakan ke Mahkamah semasa perbicaraan dan tuntutan-tuntutan tersebut telah gagal disangkal oleh pihak Defendan. 15. Bagi tuntutan Gantirugi Am pula, Mahkamah telah menimbangkan segala kerugian yang dipohon dan dengan itu telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif tersebut. S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 KEPUTUSAN 16. Di atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah dengan ini mendapati dan memutuskan bahawa Plaintif telah berjaya mengasaskan tuntutan mereka bagi Gantirugi Khas dan Gantirugi Am sepertimana yang dipohon. 17. Dengan itu, Tuntutan Plaintif bagi kerugian yang dialami akibat kecuaian Defendan-Defendan telah diasaskan dan dibenarkan sepertimana jumlah Gantirugi Khas dan Gantirugi Am yang telah diawadkan oleh Mahkamah beserta faedah dan kos. t.t. ZAINAL AZMAN BIN AB AZIZ HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA KUANTAN PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR BERTARIKH : 16 OKTOBER 2023 S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 Peguam Plaintif : Encik Desmond Mun Ching Yong Tetuan P S Ranjan & Co. Tingkat 17, Wisma Lee Rubber No. 1 Jalan Melaka, 50100 Kuala Lumpur Ruj. : 3444/ZO/MMS/DM/iza Emel : admin@psranco.com Peguam Defendan-Defendan : Tuan Vesvanathan a/l Jeevaji (Peguam Persekutuan) Pejabat Penasihat UndangUndang Negeri Pahang Tingkat 3, Wisma Sri Pahang 25000 Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur Ruj. : PN/PG/SFC/21/1/2019 Emel : S/N DuaoCq/jd0qLidk3rnRuXA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	16,621	Tika 2.6.0
CG-83-152-10/2023	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara] TERTUDUH CHEAH BOON KAI	Rayuan terhadap hukuman- Pertuduhan di bawah Seksyen 43 Akta Pengangkutan Jalan Raya-rayuan terhadap hukuman penjara-Majistret menjatuhkan hukuman penjara dan denda atas kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 43 Akta Pengangkutan Jalan Raya 1987-[11] Walau bagaimanapun, pengurangan hukuman atau diskaun tersebut bukanlah suatu yang automatik memandangkan hukuman bagi sesuatu kesalahan tersebut adalah masih di bawah budibicara Majistret yang mendengar pertuduhannya setelah menilai keseriusan kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan serta faktor-faktor lain yang menjadi aras pertimbangannya-	02/11/2023	Puan Nadhratun Naiem binti Zainan	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=9d057dcf-ab34-4381-bdfe-5ff6cdb1c4d1&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI CAMERON HIGHLANDS DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR KES JENAYAH NO. CG-83-152-10/2023 PENDAKWA RAYA LAWAN CHEAH BOON KAI Latar belakang [1] Cheah Boon Kai (Tertuduh) dalam kes ini telah dituduh di bawah seksyen 41(1) yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen yang sama atau di bawah pertuduhan pilihan Seksyen 43(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen yang sama. Tertuduh yang berada dalam jaminan Mahkamah telah hadir ke Mahkamah ini pada 12 Oktober 2023 dan telah membuat pengakuan bersalah bagi pertuduhan pilihan setelah pertuduhan asal dan pertuduhan pilihan dibacakan kali pertama di hadapan beliau. Tertuduh telah dijatuhkan hukuman 4 bulan penjara dari tarikh tangkap iaitu 12 Oktober 2023 dan denda RM6,000.00 gagal bayar 3 bulan penjara.Dalam kes ini, Tertuduh telah melunaskan pembayaran denda sebanyak RM6,000.00. Pertuduhan [2] Pertuduhan asal dan pertuduhan pilihan terhadap Tertuduh adalah seperti berikut; Pertuduhan asal “Bahawa kamu pada 18/07/2022 jam lebih kurang 09.00 pagi, bertempat, di KM66 Jalan Besar Brinchang, di dalam daerah Cameron Highlands, di negeri 02/11/2023 13:28:26 CG-83-152-10/2023 Kand. 15 S/N z30FnTSrgUO9/l/2zbHE0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Pahang, sebagai pemandu pacuan 4 roda no. VIP 9368 jenis Toyota Hilux telah didapati memandu kenderaan tersebut di atas jalan raya dengan cara melulu kepada orang awam, setelah mengambil perhatian tentang segala hal keadaan (termasuk jenis, keadaan, saiz jalan dan kesesakan lalu lintas yang dijangka yang ada atau mungkin ada dijalan tersebut) sehingga menyebabkan kematian kepada Md Shomes (lelaki) no. passport EJ0249859, oleh yang demikian itu kamu telah melakuan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen 41 (1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 (Akta 333)” Pertuduhan pilihan “Bahawa kamu pada 18/07/2022 jam lebih kurang 09.00 pagi, bertempat, di KM66 Jalan Besar Brinchang, di dalam daerah Cameron Highlands, di negeri Pahang, sebagai pemandu pacuan 4 roda no. VIP9368 jenis toyota hilux telah didapati semasa memandu kenderaan tersebut di atas jalan raya tanpa kecermatan dan perhatian yang sepatutnya terhadap orang lain yang menggunakan jalan tersebut, oleh yang demikian itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen 43(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 (Akta 333).” Fakta kes [3] Pada 18.07.2022, jam lebih kurang 9.00 pagi, Tertuduh sedang memandu M/4X4 jenis Toyota Hilux nombor pendaftaran VIP 9368 dari Jalan Besar Kea Farm menuju ke SG. Menson. Semasa sampai di KM66 jalan besar, Tertuduh telah memotong sebuah motosikal no. Pendaftaran ACC3014 yang ada di hadapannya. [4] Semasa memotong motosikal tersebut, Tertuduh telah terdengar bunyi motosikal tersebut terjatuh dari arah kiri kenderaan Tertuduh. S/N z30FnTSrgUO9/l/2zbHE0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [5] Berdasarkan Laporan Bedah Siasat terhadap mangsa, punca kematian mangsa iaitu penunggang motosikal tersebut adalah kecederaan otak akibat daripada kemalangan jalan raya. Mitigasi tertuduh [6] Tertuduh memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa Tertuduh berumur 27 tahun, mempunyai ladang sendiri, mempunyai anggaran pendapatan tidak tetap bergantung kepada jualan sayur iaitu lingkungan RM1,800.00 sehingga RM2,300.00, mempunyai tanggungan ibu bapa dan 4 orang adik beradik.Tertuduh memohon untuk diberikan hukuman denda sahaja. Hujahan pemberatan pihak pendakwaan [7] Pihak pendakwaan memohon hukuman setimpal dan sewajarnya dikenakan ke atas Tertuduh sebagai pengajaran kepada mereka dan juga masyarakat di luar sana. Timbalan Pendakwa Raya terpelajar juga memohon Mahkamah mengambil kira fakta kes yang diperakui Tertuduh dan kekerapan berlakunya kes-kes seumpama ini. Dapatan Mahkamah [8] Seksyen 43 (1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 memperuntukkan bahawa; Memandu dengan tidak cermat dan tidak bertimbang rasa 43. (1) Seseorang yang memandu suatu kenderaan motor di jalan tanpa kecermatan dan perhatian yang sepatutnya atau tanpa pertimbangan yang munasabah terhadap orang lain yang menggunakan jalan itu melakukan suatu kesalahan dan apabila disabitkan hendaklah dihukum denda tidak kurang daripada empat ribu ringgit dan tidak lebih daripada sepuluh ribu ringgit dan boleh juga dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak melebihi dua belas bulan. [9] Dari segi perundangan, hukuman yang diperuntukkan bagi kesalahan di bawah S/N z30FnTSrgUO9/l/2zbHE0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 S.43(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 adalah denda tidak kurang daripada empat ribu ringgit dan tidak lebih daripada sepuluh ribu ringgit dan boleh juga dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak melebihi dua belas bulan. Pengakuan salah [10] Tertuduh mengaku salah terhadap pertuduhan pilihan dan mengetahui sebab dan akibat daripada pengakuan tersebut. Secara asasnya, jika Tertuduh mengaku bersalah, Mahkamah wajar untuk mengambil kira pengakuan tersebut dan memberikan pengurangan atau diskaun atas hukuman yang bakal dijatuhkan kerana pengakuan salah Tertuduh tersebut bukan sahaja menjimatkan masa pihak Mahkamah malah juga masa pihak pendakwaan. [11] Walau bagaimanapun, pengurangan hukuman atau diskaun tersebut bukanlah suatu yang automatik memandangkan hukuman bagi sesuatu kesalahan tersebut adalah masih di bawah budibicara Majistret yang mendengar pertuduhannya setelah menilai keseriusan kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan serta faktor-faktor lain yang menjadi aras pertimbangannya. [12] Augustine Paul, Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan dalam Bachik Bin Abdul Rahman V. Pendakwa Raya [2004] 2 MLJ 534, [2004] 2 CLJ 572, seperti berikut: “One of the principles in sentencing is that a convicted person should be given a discount for pleading guilty. A reduction of about one third of the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed is normally given. This, however, is not a strict rule and the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, refuse to grant any discount. The severity of the offence or the existence of a previous conviction may outweigh the mitigating effect of the guilty plea; so, may the demands of public interest for a deterrent sentence as well as the absence of a good defence or of other mitigating factors. The guilty plea does not automatically entitle the convict to a lesser punishment.” S/N z30FnTSrgUO9/l/2zbHE0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [13] Selanjutnya Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada prinsip yang digariskan dalam kes Public Prosecutor V Kamaruzaman Bin Mahmud &Anor [2007] 1 MLJ 750 di mana mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut: "[68] Ordinarily a plea of guilty has been treated as a mitigating factor since it saves judicial time in conducting a lengthy trial but it also saves time and inconvenience of many, particularly the witnesses (see Melvani v Public Prosecutor [1971] 1 MLJ 137, Sau Soo Kim v Public Prosecutor [1975] 2 MLJ 134, Loh Hock Seng & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1980] 2 MLJ 13, Public Prosecutor v Leo Say & 2 Ors [1985] 2 CLJ 155, Mohamed Abdullah Ang Swee Kang v Public Prosecutor [1988] 1 MLJ 167, Public Prosecutor v Ravindran a/l N Rethinam & 5 Ors [1992] 4 CLJ 2043, Tan Lay Chen v Public Prosecutor [2001] 1 MLJ 135). The court has recognized that a plea of guilty is ordinarily a consideration to be taken into account in mitigation of punishment but it must be made clear that it is not the law that a sentencing judge must exercise a discretion to provide a non-custodial sentence in every case of plea of guilty as each case is dealt with on its own individual merits and should not be assumed mechanically that it will be spared the custodial sentence. A plea advanced on counsel's advice late in the day because a conviction is almost inevitable, will be given less weight than one advanced from arrest or committal, on the first day he is charged in court to save witnesses from the trauma of a trial or to reduce court delays, (see R Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122,) Laurentiu [1992] 63 A Crim R 402)." [14] Mahkamah ini dalam melaksanakan budi bicara ketika menjatuhkan hukuman telah mengambil kira pelbagai faktor sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam kes PP v. Morah Chekwube Chukwudi [2017] 1 LNS 864 yang memutuskan seperti berikut: - “Jurisprudence relating to sentence (5)It is well established that there are a number of factors that courts take into consideration before sentencing. Some of them are as follows: (a) the gravity or severity of the facts constituting the offence; (b) the circumstances in which it was committed; (c) the rampancy of such offence in the area; (d) the offender's previous record; (e) the offender's contribution and support to his family members; (f) the offenders means; (g) the effect of conviction and sentence on his job opportunities; (h) the age and health of the accused; (i) whether it is his first offence; (j) whether the S/N z30FnTSrgUO9/l/2zbHE0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 accused had cooperated with the police after the commission of the offence; (k) whether the accused had pleaded guilty; (i) status of the accused; (m) whether there was violence during the crime; (n) public interest, etc. (6)All these factors where applicable need to be addressed by the defence to secure a just sentence. It is equally important for the prosecution to rebut the facts adduced by the accused if they are not bona fide, as ultimately the power to sentence is placed on the trial judge and the judge had to rely on the facts adduced in court...” [15] Oleh yang demikian, walaupun Tertuduh mengaku bersalah, Mahkamah juga mengambil kira-kira faktor-faktor berikut; (i) Keadaan di mana kejadian tersebut berlaku [16] Berdasarkan fakta kes yang diakui oleh Tertuduh, kejadian tersebut berlaku akibat daripada Tertuduh memotong motosikal yang dipandu mangsa di laluan Cameron Highlands yang umumnya diketahui oleh orang ramai sebagai jalan yang berbahaya dan sering berlaku kemalangan. [17] Oleh yang demikian, dengan mengambil kira keadaan jalan di kawasan kejadian, tindakan Tertuduh yang memandu dalam keadaan yang berbahaya walaupun mengetahui bahawa jalan tersebut adalah berbahaya serta mengambil kira fakta bahawa Tertuduh adalah warga tempatan di Cameron Highlands, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa satu hukuman yang setimpal harus diberikan kepada Tertuduh agar menjadi pengajaran bukan sahaja buat Tertuduh tetapi juga kepada pemandu- pemandu lain untuk mengambil langkah yang lebih berjaga-jaga dan lebih cermat semasa memandu di kawasan tersebut. (ii) Kekerapan berlaku kesalahan tersebut di kawasan Cameron Highlands [18] Melihat kepada kekerapan berlakunya kesalahan Seksyen 41 dan Seksyen 43 Akta Pengangkutan Jalan Raya 1987 yang mana disebabkan kesalahan tersebut, ada nyawa yang melayang, maka, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa hukuman yang S/N z30FnTSrgUO9/l/2zbHE0Q Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 diberikan oleh Mahkamah dalam kes ini adalah berpatutan untuk dijadikan pengajaran kepada kesemua pengguna jalan raya di kawasan tersebut dan juga memastikan pengguna-pengguna jalan raya lebih peka semasa memandu di kawasan tersebut. (iii) Kemampuan Tertuduh [19] Semasa mitigasi, Tertuduh memaklumkan bahawa Tertuduh bekerja sendiri dan mempunyai ladang sendiri. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah merasakan bahawa hukuman denda tidak mencukupi untuk menjadi pengajaran kepada Tertuduh. Oleh itu, Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara disamping hukuman denda terhadap Tertuduh dengan harapan agar hukuman tersebut menjadi satu pengajaran agar Tertuduh lebih berwaspada di kemudian hari. Kesimpulan [20] Berdasarkan kepada alasan-alasan yang diberikan di atas, Mahkamah ini yakin bahawa hukuman yang telah diberikan terhadap Tertuduh adalah setimpal dengan mengambil kira fakta kes, rayuan Tertuduh dan juga faktor pemberat yang diberikan oleh Timbalan Pendakwa Raya terpelajar. Bertarikh: 2 November 2023 Nadhratun Naiem binti Zainan Majisret Mahkamah Cameron Highlands S/N z30FnTSrgUO9/l/2zbHE0Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Latar belakang	13,023	Tika 2.6.0
CA-24NCvC-128-07/2022	PEMOHON SITI NUR AIN BINTI SULAIMAN RESPONDEN 1. ) Majlis Ugama Islam dan Adat Resam Melayu Pahang 2. ) Kerajaan Malaysia	Plaintiff telah memfailkan Saman Pemula untuk satu deklarasi bahawa Plaintif bukan seorang yang menganut agama Islam,satu deklarasi bahawa perkataan ‘ibu bapa’ dalam perenggan (b) dalam tafsiran ‘orang Islam’ di Seksyen 2 Enakmen Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam 1991 (Pahang) (Enakmen 3 Tahun 1991) hanya merujuk kepada ibu bapa kepada seorang anak yang sah taraf, satu deklarasi bahawa Plaintif mempunyai hak untuk mengamalkan dan menganut adat dan kepercayaan beliau sendiri sebagai seorang orang asli dari suku kaum Jakun tanpa sebarang campur tangan dari Defendan-Defendan. Permohonan Plaintif adalah di luar bidang kuasa Mahkamah Tinggi memandangkan Plaintif adalah beragam Islam dan oleh kerana permohonan Plaintif menjurus kepada keluar daripada agama Islam, maka ianya terletak di bawah bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah. Plaintif selaku anak tidak sah taraf adalah terletak di bawah jagaan ibunya dan apabila ibunya memeluk agama Islam ketika Plaintif berumur 2 tahun, maka dengan itu Plaintif adalah menurut agama ibunya sebagaimana yang diperuntukan di bawah Seksyen 103 Enakmen Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam 1991 (Pahang). Oleh kerana kes ini menjurus kepada renunciation, maka Mahkamah Sivil ini tidak mempunyai apa-apa bidang kuasa untuk menentukan isu tersebut kerana ianya terletak khusus di dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah. Mahkamah menolak permohonan Plaintif dengan kos.	02/11/2023	YA Dato' Haji Zainal Azman Bin Ab. Aziz	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2e8a31af-1f40-455d-803b-cb4f7bdaf57f&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - AP CA-24NCVC-128-07-2022 SITINUR AIN V MUIP 1 nDALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUANTAN DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR SAMAN PEMULA NO. CA-24NCVC-128-07/2022 Dalam perkara Perkara 5, 8, 10, 11, 12 dan/atau 121 Perlembagaan Persekutuan Dan Dalam perkara seksyen 5 dan 11 Akta Penjagaan Kanak-Kanak 1961 Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 5 Kaedah 4, Aturan 7, Aturan 15 Kaedah 16, Kaedah 16 dan/atau bidang kuasa sedia ada Mahkamah Dan Dalam perkara Seksyen 41, Akta Relief Spesifik 1950 (Disemak 1974) Dan Dalam perkara Enakmen Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam 1991 (Pahang) 02/11/2023 14:56:06 CA-24NCvC-128-07/2022 Kand. 41 S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ANTARA SITI NUR AIN BINTI SULAIMAN [NO. K/P : 930127-06-5938] ...PLAINTIF DAN 1. MAJLIS UGAMA ISLAM DAN ADAT RESAM MELAYU PAHANG 2. KERAJAAN NEGERI PAHANG ...DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PENGENALAN 1. Plaintif memfailkan satu permohonan melalui Saman Pemula untuk mendapatkan perintah atau relif seperti berikut : a. Satu deklarasi bahawa Plaintif bukan seorang yang menganut agama Islam; S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 b. Satu deklarasi bahawa perkataan ‘ibu bapa’ dalam perenggan (b) dalam tafsiran ‘orang Islam’ di Seksyen 2 Enakmen Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam 1991 (Pahang) (Enakmen 3 Tahun 1991) hanya merujuk kepada ibu bapa kepada seorang anak yang sah taraf; c. Satu deklarasi bahawa Plaintif mempunyai hak untuk mengamalkan dan menganut adat dan kepercayaan beliau sendiri sebagai seorang orang asli dari suku kaum Jakun tanpa sebarang campur tangan dari Defendan-Defendan; dan/atau d. Kos ditanggung oleh Defendan-Defendan; dan/atau e. Sebarang perintah selanjutnya dan/atau lain-lain yang difikirkan sesuai dan/atau sebaliknya wajar oleh Mahkamah. 2. Setelah menelitikan kertas-kertas kausa yang difailkan dan setelah menimbangkan penghujahan kedua-dua pihak, Mahkamah telah menolak permohonan Plaintif tersebut. S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 FAKTA KES 3. Plaintif merupakan seorang orang asli dari suku kaum Jakun yang lahir di luar nikah kepada Sofiah a/p Denting dan Sulaiman pada 27 November 1993. 4. Pada 14 November 1995, ibu Plaintif telah memeluk agama Islam dan diberikan satu kad memeluk Islam oleh Defendan Pertama dan nama baru ibu Plaintif adalah Sofiah binti Denting. 5. Ibu dan bapa Plaintif tidak pernah pada bila-bila masa memberi persetujuan untuk Plaintif memeluk agama Islam. 6. Namun begitu, status Plaintif dalam kad pengenalan adalah Islam dan diberi nama Islam walaupun nama panggilannya adalah Anne. Defendan Pertama dengan itu mengambil kedudukan bahawa Plaintif telahpun memeluk agama Islam pada 14 November 1995. 7. Plaintif memohon kepada Mahkamah agar deklarasi kepadanya oleh kerana : S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 i. Plaintif tidak pernah memeluk agama Islam pada 14 November 1995 oleh kerana pada masa Plaintif berumur 2 tahun dan tidak pernah mengucap Kalimah Syahadah; ii. Kebenaran atau persetujuan ibu dan bapa Plaintif tidak pernah diperolehi; dan iii. Plaintif lahir sebagai seorang orang asli dan pada setiap masa material mengamalkan adat dan kepercayaan orang asli suku kaum Jakun. 8. Defendan Pertama melalui surat bertarikh 16 Julai 2018 telah mengesahkan bahawa Plaintif telah memeluk agama Islam pada 14 November 1995 menurut Daftar Rekod Mualaf Negeri Pahang Tahun 1996/1999. 9. Defendan Pertama dengan itu berpendapat bahawa Plaintif adalah seorang Islam atas sebab seperti berikut : i. Peruntukan Seksyen 2(d) Enakmen Pentadbiran Undang- Undang Islam 1991 (Pahang) menakrifkan orang Islam S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 ertinya seseorang yang telah memeluk agama Islam menurut peruntukan Seksyen 101 atau Seksyen 102 dan Seksyen 103; ii. Peruntukan Seksyen 103 Enakmen tersebut memperuntukan mengenai status agama anak mualaf yang berumur di bawah 18 tahun adalah mengikut agama penjaganya; iii. Seksyen 86 Enakmen Keluarga Islam 2005 telah menggariskan penjagaan bagi kanak-kanak tidak sah taraf dan mengiktirafkan hak penjagaan adalah terletak kepada ibunya; dan iv. Melalui Fatwa Negeri Pahang bagi status agama anak bawah umur 18 tahun selepas salah seorang pasangan memeluk Islam yang diwartakan pada September 2013 menyatakan bahawa anak bawah umur akan mengikut agama ibu atau bapa yang memeluk agama Islam. S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 10. Oleh itu, permohonan Plaintif adalah di luar bidang kuasa Mahkamah ini memandangkan Plaintif adalah beragam Islam dan oleh kerana permohonan Plaintif menjurus kepada keluar daripada agama Islam, maka ianya terletak di bawah bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah. 11. Defendan Kedua juga telah berhujah dan menggunapakai penyataan-penyataan sepertimana yang telah dikemukakan oleh pihak Defendan Pertama. ISU-ISU UNTUK DIBICARAKAN 12. Berdasarkan kepada permohonan Plaintif tersebut dan jawapan- jawapan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua, maka isu-isu yang berbangkit adalah seperti berikut : i. Sama ada Plaintif adalah seorang yang beragama Islam di bawah peruntukan undang-undang yang terpakai; ii. Sama ada kebenaran daripada ibu dan bapa Plaintif adalah diperlukan; dan S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 iii. Sama ada Mahkamah ini mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk memberikan deklarasi yang dipohon oleh Plaintif. PERTIMBANGAN DAN PENILAIAN MAHKAMAH 13. Berkaitan dengan isu pertama iaitu sama ada Plaintif seorang yang beragam Islam atau tidak, Defendan-Defendan telah merujuk kepada peruntukan Seksyen 2 Enakmen Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam 1991 (Pahang) yang memperuntukan seperti berikut: “2.(1) Dalam Enakmen ini, melainkan konteksnya menghendaki makna yang lain- “orang Islam” ertinya- (a) seseorang yang menganut agama Islam; (b) seseorang yang sama ada kedua-dua ibu bapa atau salah seorang daripadanya pada masa kelahiran orang itu adalah seorang Islam; (c) seseorang yang sejak lahir dididik atau telah dididik oleh orang Islam atau dengan cara yang diterima oleh Islam; S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 (d) seseorang yang telah memeluk agama Islam menurut seksyen 101 atau menurut kuasa Seksyen 102 dan 103; (e) seseorang yang lazimnya dikenali sebagai seorang Islam; atau (f) seseorang yang menyebut, dalam keadaan di mana ia terikat dengan undang-undang berkata benar, bahawa dia adalah seorang Islam, sama ada kenyataan itu dibuat secara lisan atau bertulis;” 14. Dengan menggunapakai peruntukan di atas, Defendan Kedua menyatakan bahawa Plaintif seorang yang beragama Islam sebagaimana yang ditakrifkan di bawah Seksyen 2(1)(d) Enakmen tersebut iaitu Plaintif telah memeluk agama Islam menurut kuasa Seksyen 103 yang memperuntukan seperti berikut: “103. Jika pada saat dia memeluk agama Islam, seseorang muallaf sama ada lelaki atau perempuan, ada mempunyai anak yang belum mencapai umur lapan belas tahun, dan anak itu telah diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah, selain S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 daripada Mahkamah Syariah, supaya diletakkan di bawah penjagaan muallaf itu, dan muallaf itu menetapkan supaya anak itu memeluk agama Islam, maka anak tersebut adalah memeluk agama Islam pada masa penjagaan diberi.” 15. Plaintif adalah anak tidak sah taraf yang dilahirkan pada 27 November 1993 dan ibu Plaintif adalah seorang yang bukan beragama Islam semasa Plaintif dilahirkan. Manakala bapa Plaintif (Sulaiman) adalah seorang Muslim. 16. Ibu Plaintif telah memeluk agama Islam pada 14 November 1995 ketika Plaintif berumur 2 tahun dan telah diberikan kad penukaran agama. Kad tersebut telah diberikan sebagai gentian yang mana kad lama telah hilang. Permohonan ibu Plaintif pada 05 Julai 1998 telah didaftarkan di dalam Daftar Rekod Mualaf Negeri Pahang 1996/1999 sebagaimana yang terdapat di ekshibit MUIP-2. Menurut ekshibit tersebut, Daftar Rekod Mualaf telah mencatitkan bahawa Siti Nur Ain binti Sulaiman dan ini menunjukkan bahawa nama Islam Plaintif telah diberikan sejak Plaintif masih kecil lagi. Oleh itu, keterangan Plaintif bahawa ibunya telah memberikan nama Siti Nur Ain yang dibuat di bawah tekanan semasa ingin S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 mendaftarkan kad pengenalan beliau semasa berumur 13 tahun tersebut adalah tidak selari dan bercanggah sepertimana di kandungan ekshibit MUIP-2 tersebut. 17. Oleh kerana Plaintif telah mengesahkan bahawa beliau telah dijaga oleh ibunya sejak beliau dilahirkan, maka hak penjagaan Plaintif adalah terletak sepenuhnya di bawah ibunya dan hak penjagaan ini adalah tidak dipertikaikan berdasarkan kepada keterangan-keterangan yang telah dikemukakan ke Mahkamah. 18. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada peruntukan Seksyen 86 Enakmen Undang-undang Keluarga Islam 2005 yang menggariskan bahawa penjagaan bagi kanak-kanak tidak sah taraf adalah terletak kepada ibunya. Peruntukan tersebut adalah seperti berikut : “Penjagaan anak-anak tak sahtaraf 86. Penjagaan anak-anak tak sahtaraf adalah semata-mata pada ibu dan ibu saudara mara ibu.” S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 19. Kerajaan Negeri Pahang juga telah mengeluarkan Fatwa Negeri Pahang bagi status agama anak di bawah umur 18 tahun selepas salah seorang pasangan memeluk agama Islam yang telah diwartakan pada 12 September 2013 yang mana menyatakan bahawa anak bawah umur akan mengikut agama ibu atau bapa yang telah memeluk agama Islam. 20. Oleh itu, fatwa tersebut boleh digunakan oleh Mahkamah ini bagi menentukan deklarasi yang dipohon oleh kerana ianya adalah relevan dan fatwa tersebut juga telah diwartakan di dalam Warta Kerajaan Negeri Pahang. 21. Mahkamah dengan itu merujuk kepada kes Rosliza bt Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 2 MLJ 181 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyatakan bahawa : “[131] … I respectfully consider that before granting the relevant remedies the appellant sought, we should first request for the opinion of the Fatwa Committee of the State of Selangor… S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [151] The question pertaining to the religious status of the appellant at the time of birth transgresses into the realm of Islamic law, which needs serious consideration, proper scrutiny and proper interpretation of such law. Unquestionably, when the legal question of religious status is concerned, it bears spiritual and theological undertones. In my opinion, the civil court on its own is not qualified to determine this issue. It bears emphasizing that Islamic law is derived from the primary sources ie the Holy Quran and the Hadith. In addition, there are other secondary sources of Islamic law, for example the consensus of the religious scholars (ijma) and the authoritative rulings (fatwa)… [156] …The point I want to make is this: while we are competent to adjudicate the matter and to rule on this foundational issue, it must not be without the assistance of Islamic jurists after consideration of Islamic law. With this in perspective, in my opinion, the expert opinion given by a Fatwa Committee is relevant evidence to be considered in deciding with certainty the issue before us… S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [162] … It is with all the above principles in mind that before granting prayers (b) and (c) sought by the appellant, the opinion of the Fatwa Committee should first be obtained. …” 22. Juga, di dalam kes Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara & Ors v A Child & Ors (Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Johor, Intervener) [2020] 2 MLJ 277 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti berikut : “[73] Typically under the state legislation on the administration of Islamic laws, there is always a provision that allows a fatwa to be made or deliberated on an unsettled or controversial issue. Such a ruling or opinion, generally speaking, becomes law and binding, upon it been gazetted (see as an example s 34 of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993). [75] The opinion of the National Fatwa Committee or a fatwa becomes law in the State of Johore and would be legally binding only if it is gazetted in the State Gazette under S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 s 49 of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Johor) Enactment 2003 (Enactment No 16 of 2003). …” 23. Berpandukan kepada nas-nas di atas, adalah diputuskan bahawa fatwa tersebut adalah mengikat (binding) bagi setiap orang Islam yang menetap di Negeri Pahang apabila ianya diwartakan di dalam Warta Negeri menurut peruntukan Seksyen 36(3) Enakmen Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam 1991 (Pahang) yang memperuntukan seperti berikut : “36.(3) Sebaik sahaja dibuat oleh Mufti, sesuatu fatwa hendaklah mengikat setiap orang Islam yang tinggal di Negeri Pahang sebagai ajaran agamanya dan hendaklah menjadi kewajipannya mengikuti dan berpegang kepada fatwa itu, kecuali dia dibenarkan oleh Hukum Syarak menyimpang daripada fatwa itu dalam hal kewajipan peribadi, kepercayaan atau pendapat.” 24. Oleh itu, hak penjagaan Plaintif selaku anak tidak sah taraf adalah terletak di bawah jagaan ibunya dan apabila ibunya memeluk agama Islam ketika Plaintif berumur 2 tahun, maka dengan itu S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 Plaintif adalah menurut agama ibunya sebagaimana yang diperuntukan di bawah Seksyen 103 enakmen tersebut. 25. Oleh itu, bagi menjawab isu pertama, Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa Plaintif adalah seorang yang beragama Islam sebagaimana yang ditakrifkan menurut peruntukan Seksyen 2(1)(d) Enakmen Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam 1991 (Pahang) yang dibaca bersama-sama Seksyen 103 enakmen yang sama dan juga Seksyen 86 Enakmen Undang-Undang Keluarga Islam 2005. 26. Berkaitan dengan isu kedua pual iaitu sama ada Plaintif memerlukan kebenaran ibu bapa dengan merujuk kepada peruntukan Perkara 12(4) Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang memperuntukan seperti berikut : “12. Hak-hak berkenaan dengan pelajaran. (4) Bagi maksud Fasal (3), ugama bagi seseorang yang berumur kurang daripada lapan belas tahun adalah ditetapkan oleh ibu bapa atau penjaganya.” S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 27. Defendan Pertama menyatakan bahawa bapa Plaintif adalah seorang Islam manakala ibu Plaintif telah memeluk agama Islam ketika Plaintif berumur 2 tahun. Menurut catatan di ekshibit MUIP- 2, Plaintif telah dicatatkan sebagai memeluk agama Islam bersama ibunya dan telah dicatatkan sebagai seorang Islam oleh Pegawai Daftar Mualad di dalam Daftar Rekod Mualaf di atas maklumat yang diberikan oleh ibu Plaintif sendiri. 28. Nama Siti Nur Ain binti Sulaiman yang dicatatkan di ekshibit MUIP- 2 tersebut adalah sama dengan nama Plaintif sewaktu kad pengenalan beliau didaftarkan yang mana juga adalah sama dengan nama Plaintif di dalam tindakan ini. 29. Ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa nama Siti Nur Ain binti Sulaiman telah diberikan oleh ibu Plaintif sendiri dan bukannya ketika Plaintif berumur 13 tahun semasa ibunya ingin mendaftarkan kad pengenalan di Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara. Tiada apa-apa keterangan lain yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif bahawa nama sebenarnya adalah Anne sepertimana yang didakwa. S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 30. Oleh itu, berdasarkan kepada rekod ekshibit MUIPS-2, ibu Plaintiflah yang telah memberikan persetujuan untuk Plaintif memeluk agama Islam bersama-samanya dan ibu Plaintif jugalah yang telah memberi persetujuan untuk memeluk agama Islam pada ketika itu. 31. Oleh itu, dakwaan ibu Plaintif bahawa beliau tidak pernah memberikan apa-apa persetujuan untuk Plaintif memeluk agama Islam tidak disokong oleh apa-apa keterangan bebas yang lain tanpa maklumat daripada ibu Plaintif sendiri. Adalah mustahil bagi Pegawai Daftar Mualaf untuk memberikan nama Siti Nur Ain binti Sulaiman sepertimana yang tercatat di dalam Daftar Rekod Mualaf tersebut. 32. Oleh itu, isu persetujuan daripada ibu bapa Plaintif adalah tidak relevan oleh kerana bapa Plaintif adalah seorang muslim manakala Plaintif juga adalah di bawah jagaan ibu Plaintif dan juga seorang yang beragama Islam. 33. Mahkamah dengan ini merujuk kepada kes Indira Ghandi a/p Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors and S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 Other Appeals [2018] 1 MLJ 545 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa persetujuan kedua-dua ibu dan bapa adalah diperlukan bagi penukaran status agama anak kepada agama Islam menurut Perkara 12(4) Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang dibaca bersama-sama dengan Seksyen 5 dan Seksyen 11 Akta Penjagaan Budak 1991. 34. Fakta kes di atas adalah berbeza di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini di mana kedua-dua pasangan suami isteri adalah beragam Hindu dan telah mendaftarkan perkahwinan mereka di bawah Akta Undang-Undang Pembaharuan (Perkahwinan dan Perceraian) 1976. Selepas itu si suami telah memeluk agama Islam dan telah menukarkan agama anak-anak mereka kepada agama Islam tanpa persetujuan si isteri. Oleh itu, isu berkenaan persetujuan kedua-dua ibu bapa adalah relevan di dalam kes tersebut memandangkan salah seorang daripada penjaga adalah bukan beragama Islam. 35. Berbeza dengan kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Plaintif telah dilahirkan sebagai anak tidak sah taraf dan bapa Plaintif adalah seorang muslim pada ketika kelahirannya, manakala ibu Plaintif S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 telah memeluk agama Islam ketika Plaintif berumur 2 tahun iaitu semasa Plaintif di bawah umur 18 tahun. Oleh itu, keputusan kes Indira Ghandi a/p Mutho tersebut adalah tidak relevan dan tidak terpakai bagi kes Plaintif ini. 36. Oleh itu, persetujuan ibu atau bapa adalah tidak terpakai di sini. 37. Berkaitan dengan isu ketiga iaitu sama ada Mahkamah ini punya bidang kuasa untuk membuat perintah deklarasi sebagaimana yang dipohon oleh Plaintif. Defendan-Defendan menyatakan bahawa Plaintif sebenarnya adalah seorang yang beragama Islam sepertimana yang telah diputuskan melalui isu pertama. 38. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Rosliza bt Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor (supra) di mana di dalam penghakimanya, Tengku Maimun, Ketua Hakim Negara menyatakan seperti berikut: “[108] ... At the risk of repetition, if a matter concerns an ab initio case, that is, the question whether a person is in the first place a ‘person professing the religion of Islam’ it S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 necessarily concerns a question regarding one’s identity under the FC which in turn necessitates constitutional interpretation. This is because the phrase ‘persons professing the religion of Islam’ is a constitutional term. Accordingly, the civil courts are empowered, indeed, duty- bound to adjudicate the matter. It is only in renunciation cases where one already professes or proclaims to profess the religion of Islam (irrespective of whether they actually practise the faith) with the subsequent decision to change what they profess, that the matter is removed to the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. The distinction drawn from the cases of Lina Joy and Azmi illustrates the difference. Whether it is an ab initio case or a renunciation case will require a careful examination of the factual matrix of the case. [112] The respondents and the amicus curiae, the attorney general, argued that this is a renunciation case and accordingly, this court has no jurisdiction to determine the religion of the plaintiff under art 121(1A) of the FC. It is thus necessary to now examine the factual matrix of the case to S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 determine whether the plaintiff is, on the evidence, a Muslim to begin with. If she is not, then in accordance with the principles established earlier, this court can grant her the declaration she seeks. If she is a Muslim by original faith, then the matter will be for the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court and this court would not have the jurisdiction to grant her the reliefs sought to the extent that they relate to renunciation.” 39. Mahkamah Persekutuan juga telah membuat analisis fakta seperti berikut : “[121] Again, determining whether the plaintiff is constitutionally a person ‘professing the religion of Islam’ requires proof. The force of the evidence on record suggests to the contrary. To assume that Ibrahim may have raised the plaintiff as a Muslim without proof, with respect, is merely a conjecture. The logical conclusion ought to have been that taking the evidence as it stands, s 2(c) of the ARIE 2003 does not apply to the plaintiff. S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [122] In the circumstances, as none of the provisions of s 2 of the ARIE 2003 apply to the plaintiff’s case, the natural conclusion one is compelled to draw is that the plaintiff is not, as a matter of fact, a person ‘professing the religion of Islam’ as per Item 1 of the State List. This is because there is no proof that she is a Muslim by original faith. [123] Accordingly, the concurrent decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal cannot stand as they were made on the erroneous premise that the plaintiff was originally a Muslim seeking to renounce her faith. This is an ab initio case and not a renunciation case.” 40. Berdasarkan kepada keputusan kes di atas, permohonan deklarasi yang dipohon oleh Plaintif di sini adalah an initio dan bukannya kes penolakan (renunciation) memandangkan tidak ada bukti bahawa beliau beragama Islam pada asalnya. 41. Kes Rosliza bt Ibrahim adalah berbeza dengan kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini kerana ibu Rosliza adalah beragama Buddha dan beliau telah dibesarkan di dalam kepercayaan Buddha. S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 Permohonan kad pengenalan Rosliza telah dibuat oleh bapanya yang menyatakan Rosliza adalah beragama Islam. 42. Berbeza dengan kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, ibu Plaintif telah memeluk agama Islam ketika Plaintif berusia 2 tahun dan ibu Plaintif jugalah yang telah memberikan nama Islam kepada Plaintif menurut Daftar Rekod Mualaf dan nama itu jugalah yang telah digunakan oleh ibunya ketika membuat permohonan kad pengenalan Plaintif. 43. Juga, Plaintif sejak lahir telah dijaga oleh ibunya yang merupakan seorang Muslim dan Plaintif hanya berkahwin ketika berumur 19 tahun pada 2012. Plaintif juga mempunyai 2 orang adik beradik yang beragama Islam sebagaimana Sijil Kelahiran di ekshibit MUIP-1. 44. Plaintif telah gagal memberikan apa-apa keterangan bahawa Plaintif telah dibesarkan mengikut adat dan kepercayaan orang asli. Oleh itu, beban pembuktian bagi sesuatu fakta adalah terletak kepada pihak yang menuntut hak tersebut menurut Seksyen 41 Akta Relif Spesifik 1950. S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 45. Daripada keterangan-keterangan yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah, adalah jelas bahawa Plaintif adalah seorang yang beragama Islam sejak asal dan ia dibesarkan menurut agama tersebut oleh ibunya apabila ibunya memeluk agama Islam. Oleh itu, permohonan Plaintif yang menjurus kepada permohonan Plaintif untuk keluar daripada agama Islam adalah terletak di bawah bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah sepertimana yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Rosliza bt Ibrahim tersebut. 46. Di dalam kes Rosliza bt Ibrahim, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah membuat observation seperti berikut : “[87] Administratively, once one becomes a Muslim, and becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts, the procedure to ‘leave’ the religion also becomes subject to Islamic law. In this context, almost all States in Malaysia have a presumption provision and in Selangor it is s 74(2) of the ARIE 2003 which provides: S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that a Muslim shall at all times be acknowledged and treated as a Muslim unless a declaration has been made by a Syariah Court that he is no longer a Muslim. [88] Summarising the above, one cannot unilaterally on his own accord renounce the religion of Islam. Doing so would amount to an offence against the precepts of Islam. In such an instance, the Syariah Court would have both jurisdictions ratione personae and ratione materiae. This has long been canvassed and explained by the Federal Court in Kamariah bte Ali dan lain-lain lwn Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan dan satu lagi [2005] 1 MLJ 197.” 47. Seterusnya, oleh kerana kes ini menjurus kepada renunciation, maka Mahkamah Sivil ini tidak mempunyai apa-apa bidang kuasa untuk menentukan isu tersebut kerana ianya terletak khusus di dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah. 48. Juga, merujuk kepada Enakmen A82 iaitu Enakmen Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam (Pindaan) (No. 2) 2020 yang telah S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 disiarkan dalam Warta Kerajaan pada 11 Februari 2021 dan berkuatkuasa pada 12 Februari 2021 selaras dengan kehendak subseksyen 19(1) Akta Tafsiran 1948 dan 1967 (Akta 388). 49. Dalam undang-undang yang terkini dan berkuatkuasa sekarang, Ketua Pendaftar Mualaf juga merupakan Ketua Pendaftar Penentuan Status Muslim sebagaimana yang diperuntukan dalam seksyen baharu Seksyen 111E Enakmen N0.3/1991. Tambahan pula, diperuntukan juga di bawah Seksyen 111H misalan-misalan yang menjelaskan hal situasi di mana Ketua Pendaftar mempunyai kuasa untuk memperakukan bahawa seseorang Pemohon itu bukan Islam sebagaimana dalam Subseksyen 111H(3). DIperhatikan bahawa terdapat misalan yang hampir serupa faktanya tetapi tidak sama dengan kes Plaintif ini seperti berikut : “MISALAN (a) … (b) (c) C adalah anak tak sah taraf yang salah seorang ibu atau bapanya adalah seorang Islam. C meragui sama ada S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 dia seorang Islam atau bukan kerana dia tinggal bersama ibu, bapa atau penjaga yang bukan beragama Islam. C dibesarkan sebagai bukan Islam dan mengamalkan cara hidup bukan Islam. C merujuk kepada Ketua Pendaftar untuk diperakukan bahawa dia bukan seorang Islam. Ketua Pendaftar itu hendaklah memperakukan bahawa C pada setiap masa yang material bukan seorang Islam selepas Jawatankuasa Penasihat Akidah membuat penentuan bahawa C bukan seorang Islam.” 50. Oleh itu, Mahkamah Syariah mempunyai bidang kuasa sepenuhnya di dalam kes-kes berkaitan dengan renunciation dan dengan itu Mahkamah Sivil tidak punya apa-apa bidang kuasa bagi memutuskan relif-relif yang dipohon oleh Plaintif tersebut. KEPUTUSAN 51. Dengan mengambilkira hujahan-hujahan di atas, Mahkamah dengan ini mendapati dan memutuskan bahawa permohonan Plaintif adalah tidak bermerit dan dengan itu permohonan Plaintif adalah ditolak dengan kos. S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 t.t ZAINAL AZMAN BIN AB AZIZ HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA KUANTAN PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR BERTARIKH : 05 OKTOBER 2023 Peguam Plaintif : Encik Surendra Ananth bersama Cik New Sin Yew dan Nur Izni Syazwani binti Ahmad (Pelatih Dalam Kamar) Tetuan AmerBon D3-5-1 Solaris Dutamas No.1 Jalan Dutamas 1, 50480 Kuala Lumpur No. Rujukan : 2022000713 NSY/NIS/nj [CALR] Emel : court@amerbon.com / nizni@amerbon.com Peguam Defendan Pertama: Dato’ Haji Mohd Najid bin Hussain bersama Encik Mohd Rosli bin Yusoff dan Puan Nornajihah binti Ahmad Nadjemudin Tetuan Mohd Najid & Partners B-30, Tingkat Bawah & Tingkat 1 Jalan Bukit Sekilau, PO BOX 400 S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 25200 Kuantan, Pahang No. Rujukan : MNP/L/CV/IND/719/08/2022/MNH/NAN/noor Emel : mnplaw@yahoo.com Peguam Defendan Kedua: Puan Dorah binti Abd Kadir (Penolong Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Pahang) Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Pahang Tingkat 3, Blok B, Wisma Sri Pahang 25000 Kuantan, Pahang No. Rujukan : PUH/PHG.F/100/38/1/44/2022 (MT) Emel : dorah@agc.gov.my S/N rzGKLkAfXUWAO8tPe9r1fw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	31,561	Tika 2.6.0
22NCC-362-09/2014	PLAINTIF PROTASCO BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) PT ANGLO SLAVIC UTAMA 2. ) TEY POR YEE 3. ) OOI KOCK AUN	Company Law — Companies — Directors — Claim by company against ex-directors — Breach of statutory duties – Breach of fiduciary duties —Whether ex-directors acted in breach of fiduciary and statutory duties — Whether there was a conspiracy to injure the company by the ex-directors — Whether company suffered loss	02/11/2023	YA Puan Liza Chan Sow Keng	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=154860cf-9db6-49ed-81ed-1cf06961533f&Inline=true	IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) SUIT NO. WA-22NCC-362-09/2014 BETWEEN PROTASCO BHD [ Company No.: 548078-H] …. PLAINTIFF AND 1. PT ANGLO SLAVIC UTAMA [Company Registration No.: 09.03.1.46.80564) 2. TEY POR YEE [ NRIC No.: 760202-14-5147] 3. OOI KOCK AUN [ NRIC No.: 670307-07-5561] …. DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT “Harap pagar, pagar makan padi.” INTRODUCTION [1] In this action, the Plaintiff claims against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants (respectively, “Larry” and “Adrian”) as former directors of the Plaintiff, among others, to recover the sum of USD27million paid to the 1st Defendant (“PT ASU”) and PT Anglo Slavic Indonesia (“PT ASI”). The Plaintiff alleged that Larry and Adrian had fraudulently caused the Plaintiff to enter into a transaction to acquire shares in PT ASI, a company that purportedly owned oil exploration rights in Indonesia from PT ASU, the 1st Defendant. The Plaintiff further alleged that Larry and Adrian had personal interests in (among others) PT ASU, which they failed to disclose to the Plaintiff in breach of their statutory and fiduciary duties as directors. 02/11/2023 10:44:19 22NCC-362-09/2014 Kand. 743 S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Plaintiff’s case [2] The Plaintiff’s case in summary is that Larry and Adrian: 2.1 acted in breach of their fiduciary and statutory duties owed to Protasco as Directors, in particular breach of Section 132 and 131 of the CA 1965; 2.2 deception, fraud, conspiracy to defraud, utilising PT ASU as a vehicle to defraud Protasco, and PT ASU is the signatory to SPA 1 and SPA 2. [3] The Plaintiff claimed that Larry on or about November 2012 had introduced an investment opportunity in the oil and gas industry in Indonesia to Protasco. The proposed investment involved the purchase of 76% of the total issued share capital of PT ASI from PT ASU. PT ASI at that material time owned and controlled 49% of a company PT Firman Andalan Sakti (“PT FAS”) which in turn owned and controlled 70% of PT Hase Bumou Aceh (“PT Haseba”). PT Haseba had entered into a production management partnerhip agreement (“PMPA”) with PT Pertamina (Persero) (“Pertamina”) wherein PT Haseba was granted rights by Pertamina to develop and produce oil and gas in the Kuala Simpang Timur (“KST”) oil field located in Aceh, Indonesia. [4] The proposed investment was done through 2 agreements executed between Protasco and PT ASU. The 1st agreement (“SPA 1”) was executed on 28.12.2012 for a purchase consideration of USD55million. Due to subsequent material discoveries which were discovered through a due diligence, Protasco and PT ASU executed an S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 amended sale and purchase agreement on 29.01.2014 (“SPA 2”). SPA 2 reduced the purchase consideration to USD22million with a further payment of USD5million made as a shareholders’ advance to PT ASI (“Shareholder’s Advance”). [5] In total, a sum of USD27million was paid by Protasco to PT ASU and PT ASI. This payment of USD27million was secured by shares in a company known as PT Inovisi Infracom TBK (“PT Inovisi”) given by a 3rd party, namely Acclaim Investments Limited (“Acclaim”), a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (“Blocked Inovisi Shares”). [6] According to Protasco, the securities in the form of Blocked Innovisi shares provided was part of the inducement for Protasco to make the aforesaid payments. [7] It is also Protasco’s case that it was deceived into paying: (a) the differential sum of USD5,659,437.00 to PT ASU pursuant to SPA 2 on the representation of Adrian that the Conditions Subsequent contained in SPA 2 was attainable; (b) the Shareholder’s Advance of USD5million to PT ASI pursuant to SPA 2 on the representation of Adrian that the USD5million was needed for inter-alia wells re-activation in order to facilitate the process of securing a 10-year extension to the PMPA with Pertamina. [8] Protasco contends that: (a) it had discovered that it has become a victim of deception and fraud as Larry and Adrian are in fact the effective S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 beneficial owners of PT ASU, PT ASI, Acclaim, PT Inovisi and PT Green Pine (single largest shareholder of PT Inovisi); (b) Larry and Adrian breached their fiduciary and statutory duties to Protasco including but not limited to the following: - (i) that Larry and Adrian failed to disclose their interest in PT ASU, PT ASI, Acclaim and PT Inovisi to Protasco; (ii) that Larry and Adrian had induced Protasco to make payment of a sum of USD22million without Protasco’s knowledge of their personal interest in PT ASU; (iii) that Larry and Adrian had induced Protasco to make the Shareholder’s Advance of USD5million to PT ASI for works that was supposed to be undertaken to assist in the application to Pertamina in order to secure an extension of the PMPA; (iv) that Larry and Adrian had appropriated a total sum of USD27million for the benefit of themselves using various corporate vehicles, fronts and nominees; (v) that Larry and Adrian had induced Protasco to accept as security provided by Acclaim for payment of the consideration sum for SPA 1 and SPA 2 and the Shareholder’s Advance in which Protasco was S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 purportedly able to dispose of and recover the purchase price and the Shareholder’s Advance. Protasco was unable to recover the purchase consideration and the Shareholder’s Advance through the security provided; (vi) that Larry and Adrian either by themselves or through their agents, servants and/or nominees have with fraudulent design and through forgery caused the issuance of the PT ASU’s letters dated 21.07.2014 and 04.08.2014. (c) SPA 1 and SPA 2 were entered into in breach of Section 132E of the Companies Act 1965 due to the non-disclosure of interest by Larry and Adriani in the transaction; (d) that Larry and Adrian have wrongfully and with intent to injure Protasco and/or cause loss to Protasco by unlawful means conspired and combined together to defraud Protasco and to conceal such fraud and the proceeds of such fraud from Protasco; (e) The elements of conspiracy include: (i) causing Protasco to make payment of USD27million to PT ASU and PT ASI with full knowledge that the transaction was nothing more than a scam to defraud Protasco and/or unjustly enriched Larry and Adrian with the payments made by Protasco; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (ii) the receipt by Larry and Adrian of the USD27million via PT ASU and PT ASI is in breach of their fiduciary, equitable and statutory duties; and (iii) causing and/or authoring the issuance of letters by PT ASU in an attempt to deprive Protasco of its rights to unilaterally terminate SPA 2 and deprive Protasco a refund of the purchase consideration and the Shareholder’s Advance. [9] Premised on facts and events narrated above, the Plaintiff asserts it has suffered loss and damage. The reliefs claimed against Larry and Adrian as particularized in paragraph 76 of the SOC is for payment of the sum of USD27million to Protasco and a declaration that Larry and Adrian had acted in breach of their duties set out in paragraphs 60 to 62 of the SOC. [10] As against PT ASU, Protasco’s claim is grounded on conspiracy to injure/defraud and the relief claimed is: (a) a declaration that all monies received by it through the defrauding of Protasco are held by it as a constructive trustee; (b) damages for breach of contract; (c) damages for conspiracy and fraud; (d) declaration that SPA1 and SPA2 are null and void for breach of s. 132 of the CA or breach of public policy; (e) a payment of USD22 million. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [11] The claim against PT ASU was stayed pending arbitration pursuant to section 10(1), Arbitration Act 2005 (“AA 2005”). Protasco subsequently obtained an order to stay the arbitration pending the determination of the action herein. Larry and Adrian’s defence [12] Larry and Adrian ‘s defence in gist is that: 12.1 It was Dato’ Sri Chong Ket Pen (“DSC or “CKP”) who was the executive vice chairman of the Plaintiff that had approached Global Capital Limited (“Global Cap” or “GCL”) to procure a purchaser for a controlling stake in Protasco; 12.2 It was promised to Global Cap that in return, the purchaser would be given equal board representation in Protasco and Protasco would jointly develop the oil and gas project in KST Aceh, Indonesia with purchaser; 12.3 DSC and Global Cap entered into the Investment Agreement (“IA”) intending to jointly develop the oil and gas project and a master agreement was supposed to be entered into. SPA1 was entered into by Protasco and PT ASU in furtherance of the IA, namely to enable Protasco to diversify its business into oil and gas in Indonesia vide related companies; 12.4 That Adrian was not involved in the negotiations and execution of the IA, and that he only became aware of the S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 said agreement after this suit was filed by Protasco; 12.5 That due to time constraints, Global Cap was unable to secure sufficient investors and Larry opted to participate in the deal to purchase the 27.11% of total share capital in Protasco via his corporate vehicle, Kingdom Seekers; 12.6 That both Larry and Adrian were not involved in the discussions and negotiations between Protasco and PT ASU leading up to the execution of the SPA 1 and SPA 2; 12.7 that there was no misrepresentation nor inducement by Adrian and Larry towards Protasco vis-à- vis SPA 1 and SPA 2 and the payments made thereunder; 12.8 That at all material times: (i) the board of directors of Protasco was under the control of DSC; DSC did not disclose the IA of 3 November 2012 to the Board of Protasco. As such it is contended by Larry and Adrian that it was DSC who was in breach of his fiduciary duties in failing to disclose the terms of the IA; (ii) Dedi Francis was the commissioner and owner of PT ASU; (iii) the director of PT ASU was one Tjoe Yudhis, who is answerable to the said Dedi Francis. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 12.10 Protasco had appointed several professional parties to conduct due diligence; that in light of the exhaustive due diligence conducted by DSC and his son Kenny Chong, the principal officers acting for and on behalf of Protasco, who actively conducted negotiations with PT ASU and entry into SPA1 and SPA2, they had full knowledge and had participated in the preparation of SPA2 as made evident from correspondence and emails. The entire transaction between Protasco and PT ASU has been undertaken at the behest of, and with the full knowledge and consent of DSC and Kenny Chong. Therefore there could be no inducement, misrepresentation, deception and/or cheating by Larry and Adrian which caused the payment of the said USD27million or any part thereof to PT ASU and PT ASI; 12.11 Protasco was represented by a lawyer while PT ASU was not. Protasco knew that the concession was only until 14.12. 2014. SPA2 reduced the purchase price to USD22 million but sought to extend the tenure by ten years while knowing full well that Pertamina’s policy is to grant a contract for only two or three years. 12.12 That Protasco had failed to perform its obligations to reactivate the oilfields or provide a business duration and drilling program for the oil field to facilitate any extension sought, thus prevented PT ASU from carrying out its obligations to secure the 10-year extension from S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Pertamina; 12.13 That at all material times, Larry and Adrian are not the beneficial owners of PT ASU, PT Inovisi, Acclaim, or PT Green Pine; 12.14 The investigations by the Investigation Committee (“IC”) was a sham, no investigation report was produced, no report of its findings were made to the board of directors, nor any queries put to Larry and Adrian at all; 12.15 Contend the claim was filed at the behest of DSC after a board meeting convened to ratify his unilateral action; 12.16 That DSC, Kenny Chong and the senior management of Protasco and its subsidiaries have financially benefited through illegal financial gains of RM10million via an entity named RS Maha Niaga Sdn Bhd. [13] As gleaned from the parties’ cases, the substantive issues before the court are whether Larry and Adrian: 13.1 breached their fiduciary or statutory duties as directors; 13.2 conspired to defraud the Plaintiff; 13.3 if found liable to have acted in breach of their fiduciary or statutory duties as directors, and/or for conspiracy to defraud the Plaintiff, is the Plaintiff entitled to the relief sought? S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 The Trial [14] During a protracted trial which first opened before Azizul J (now JCA) pre-pandemic in 2019, and then conducted virtually online by me commencing 2021, using the Zoom video conferencing platform lasting 42 non-consecutive days, the Plaintiff called 14 witnesses whilst Larry and Adrian called a total of 4 witnesses including themselves to give evidence. 14.1 The Plaintiff’s witnesses were: (i) Ho Chun Fuat [PW-1] (ii) Mea Fak Sin [PW-2] (iii) Dato’ Sri Chong Ket Pen [PW-3] (iv) Lim Yok Chaw [PW-4] (v) Tjoe Yudhis Gathrie [PW-5] (vi) Manpreet Kaur [PW-6] (vii) Hendra Setiawan [PW-7] (viii) Heriyanto [PW-8] (ix) Johnny Situwanda [PW-9] (x) Aida Zurina binti Mat Yassin @ Adnan [PW-10] (xi) Tan Yee Boon [PW-11] (xii) Mohammad Zahir Talib [PW-12] (xiii) Norliza Harun [PW-13] (xiv) Rachel a/p Dason [PW-14] 14.2 Larry and Adrian’s witnesses: (i) Andy Yong Siew Vui [DW-1] (ii) Dedi Francis [DW-2] (iii) Larry Tey [DW-3] (iv) Adrian Ooi [DW-4] S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [15] Having looked the matter entirely, considered the numerous documents and notes of evidence, and having carefully considered the submissions of the parties, I find on a balance of probabilities, that the claim by the Plaintiff has been proven and had on 30.8.2023 allowed the Plaintiff’s claim with costs, and gave broad grounds as to why. This judgment contains the reasons for my decision. At the outset, I ought to say that on the facts of the present case, I am in accord with the arguments canvassed by the Plaintiff’s counsel and adopt his submissions in these grounds. Preliminary Issues [16] It is observed that in post trial submissions, Larry and Adrian contended that as the claim centres on alleged deception by the Defendants, and thus fraud, the pleading lacks specificity, is fatally deficient and thus have caused prejudice to Larry and Adrian in understanding the case they have to meet. [17] In addition, during the course of trial, various objections were taken by Larry and Adrian on evidence led as being outside the pleaded case and on the inadmissibility of documents which are: 17.1 In respect of DSC’s witness statement, Q&A 52A, 60, second paragraph of the answer to 78, the amendments to the third paragraph of Q&A129, 129A (premised on Order 18 rule 12 of ROC 2012) , Q&A 199, 200, 201 and 205 (which mentioned PT NRR, Fast Global and Telecity being entities that were connected or related to Larry and Adrian S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 whereas the pleaded case of Protasco had cited only the companies of PT ASU, PT ASI, Acclaim and PT Green Pine); 17.2 Q&A 39 to 51, 59 to 71, 94 to 122 of Tjoe Yudhis’s witness statement for contravening Order 18 rule 7(2) of ROC 2012 in that these were material facts which ought to have been pleaded; 17.3 Audio Recordings i.e. IDP82-A and IDP 82-B are not admissible for not having satisfied the law for admission; 17.4 Transcripts by Scribe – Exhibit P83 and P84 are inadmissible as there were conversations in Bahasa Indonesia that were not transcribed, and that some parts were inaudible; 17.5 forgery of Tjoe Yudhis’s signatures in the PT ASU Letters dated 09.05.2013, 25.09.2013, 10.01.2014, 21.07.2014, 04.08.2014, 05.08.2014 and signature in the supplemental SPA dated 28.06.2013 cannot be raised as these documents had been included in the bundles marked as Part B; 17.6 Q&A14 to 19 of the witness statement of Johnny Situwanda (PW9) and the entirety of Enclosure 649, which was a report titled ‘Report of Duties to Protasco Bhd’ dated 22.12.2021 prepared by Johnny Situwanda being a belated attempt to address deficiencies in the Plaintiff’s case that S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 came to light during the cross-examination of DSC and further, constitute hearsay evidence; 17.7 Exhibits P45, P46, P47, P48, P104 - no certificate under Section 90A (2) of EA 1950 was tendered by Protasco and Exhibit P105 bank statements, objection was on the weight of the said document as it was not available earlier for the cross-examination of DSC; IDP12, IDP13, IDP103 and IDP112 as the originals were not available; and 17.8 Printout from PT Inovisi website. [18] These preliminary issue ought to be disposed of before I turn to the substantive issues before me. Pleading is fatally deficient and caused prejudice to Larry and Adrian? [19] The basis for this complaint is that as the Protasco’s claim ultimately centres on deception and thus, broadly put, fraud, (i) the failure to plead particulars essential to informing the Defendants the specific basis of the claim against each of them is fatal; (ii) that such deficiencies have caused prejudice to Larry and Adrian in understanding the case that they would need to respond to; and (iii) that the evidence led at trial is an expansion of the pleaded case. [20] I do not agree. At the outset of the trial, I had conveyed my preliminary view that the pleading as it stands was sufficient but nevertheless, informed parties that it would be open to them to ventilate S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 the point at the close of trial so that I could consider the matter in a more detailed manner. Having done so, I confirm my preliminary view. [21] To begin with, the trite principles on pleadings are: 21.1 ‘The function of pleading is to give fair notice of the case which has to be met: Rosita bte Baharom (an infant) v Sabedin bin Salleh [1993] 1 MLJ 393, Perniagaan Kinabalu (S) Sdn Bhd v Sua Ah Yoke & Ham Jon See [2002] MLJU 601. This is to prevent the opposing party from being taken by surprise by evidence which departs from pleaded material facts, for such evidence if allowed, will prejudice and embarrass or mislead the opposing party: see Superintendent of Lands and Surveys (4th Div) & Anor v Hamit bin Matusin & Ors [1994] 3 MLJ 185; [1994] 3 CLJ 567; Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah bin Raja Shahruzzaman v Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 308. A good pleading should contain a statement of: (1) facts, not law, (2) material facts only, (3) facts, not evidence, and (4) facts stated in a summary form: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Ed, Reissue), para 13’ - Iftikar Ahmed Khan (as the executor of the estate for Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan, deceased) v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (previously known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd) [2018] 2 MLJ 292 FC at [22]; 21.2 A party should not be put to surprise. 'Under our adversary system of procedure, for a judge to disregard the rule by which counsel are bound, has the effect of depriving the S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 parties to the action of the benefit of one of the most fundamental rules of natural justice, the right of each to be informed of any point adverse to him that is going to be relied upon by the judge, and to be given the opportunity of stating what his answer to it is …' - Hadmor Productions Ltd v Hamilton [1983] 1 AC 191 per Lord Diplock, cited with approval by the former Supreme Court in Lee Ah Chor v Southern Bank Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 428; 21.3 ‘It is settled law that parties are bound by their pleadings and are not allowed to adduce facts and issues which they have not pleaded: Samuel Naik Siang Ting v Public Bank Bhd [2015] 6 MLJ 1, State Government of Perak v Muniandy [1986] 1 MLJ 490, Veronica Lee Ha Ling & Ors v Maxisegar Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 141; [2009] 6 CLJ 232. In Lee Ah Chor v Southern Bank Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 428; [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 239 it was held that where a vital issue was not raised in the pleadings, it could not be allowed to be argued and to succeed on appeal. A decision based on an issue which was not raised by the parties in their pleadings is liable to be set aside: Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok Chye [1990] 2 MLJ 152. In The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157 the Federal Court set aside the judgment of the trial judge as it was decided on an issue not raised on the pleadings. In that case the trial judge erred in concluding that the pleadings included a claim for breach of contract as well as a claim for libel.’ - Iftikar Ahmed Khan (supra) at [27]; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 21.4 ‘In a case where the matter or material facts are not pleaded but evidence is led without objections at trial, the court is duty bound to consider such evidence although it may be a departure from the pleading. It has the effect of curing defect in the pleading. In such a case the opposite party is not taken by surprise, prejudiced, embarrassed or misled. The exception is where the evidence represents a radical departure from the pleading and is not just a variation, modification or development of what has been alleged in the pleading. Dato’ Hamzah bin Abdul Majid v Omega Securities Sdn Bhd [2015] 6 MLJ 725; [2015] 9 CLJ 677 is an illustration of a case where there was a radical departure from the pleading. In that case, loan, which was not a pleaded defence but evidence of it was adduced without objection was rejected as a defence as it was a radical departure from pleading, not just a variation, modification or development of what had been alleged in the pleading.’ - Iftikar Ahmed Khan (supra) at [36]; 21.5 ‘The primary function of the statement of claim is to plead reasonable cause of action against the defendant. Therefore, it must contain all material facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim. It must also disclose the legal liability of the defendant. By this, it is essential to establish a linkage between material facts pleaded in the statement of claim and the substantive right which the plaintiff claims or seeks to enforce against the defendant. Thus, in a case where breach of duty is alleged, the facts upon which the alleged duty is founded must be pleaded, and where there S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 is an allegation of negligence, facts must set out showing the existence of a duty to take reasonable care owed to the particular person or class of person and that the duty was disregarded.' (Metroplex Development Sdn Bhd v Mohd Mastana bin Makaddas & anor [1995] 2 MLJ 276, at p 284 per James Foong J, as he then was). 21.6 Pursuant to Order 18 rule 7 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”) only material facts, and not evidence, must be pleaded in summary form: “7. (1) Subject to the provisions of this rule and rules 10, 11 and 12, every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies on for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved, and the statement shall be as brief as the nature of the case allows.” [22] The former Supreme Court in Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 MLJ 12, explained what constitutes ‘a cause of action’, as follows: “What then is the meaning of "a cause of action"? "A cause of action" is a statement of facts alleging that a plaintiff's right, either at law or by statute, has, in some way or another, been adversely affected or prejudiced by the act of a defendant in an action. Lord Diplock in Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 at P 242 defined "a cause of action" to mean "a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person". In my view the factual situation spoken of by Lord Diplock must consist of a statement alleging that, first, the respondent/plaintiff has a right either at law or by statute and that, secondly, S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 such right has been affected or prejudicated by the appellant/defendant's act.” [23] The UK Court of Appeal in Bruce v Odhams Press Limited [1936] 1 All ER 287 at p.294-295 defined ‘material facts’ as follows: “The cardinal provision in rule 4 is that the statement of claim must state the material facts. The word “material” means necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action; and if any one “material” statement is omitted, the statement of claim is bad; it is “demurrable” in the old phraseology, and in the new is liable to be “struck out” under RSC Ord XXV, r 4 (see Philipps v Philipps); or “a further and better statement of claim” may be ordered under rule 7.” (Emphasis added) [24] Bearing the above principles in mind, I find that Protasco has pleaded distinct causes of action for breach of fiduciary duties, breach of Section 132E of the Companies Act 1965, fraud and conspiracy to defraud on the part of Larry Tey and Adrian Ooi. The claim for deception, for fraud and conspiracy to defraud, has been set out in paragraphs 45 to 59, and 66 to 67 of the SOC. The claim for breach of fiduciary duties being a separate claim is set out in paragraphs 60 to 62 of the SOC with loss and damage of USD27million arising from such breach of fiduciary duties set out at paragraph 63. As regards breach of Section 132E of Companies Act 1965, this was set out in paragraph 65 of the SOC that Protasco’s shareholders’ approval at a general meeting was never obtained; and at any material time, there was no disclosure by Larry Tey and Adrian Ooi of their interest in PT ASU to the shareholders of Protasco. [25] For the reasons and apt authorities cited by Prostasco’s counsel, I agree with him that the above paragraphs in the SOC setting out the S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 various causes of action do not stand alone as the SOC should be read as a whole, even if the ingredients that form each cause of action are not set out in consecutive paragraphs in the SOC. As for the pleading on fraud, in Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan @ L Allagappan (as executor to SL Alameloo Achi alias Sona Lena Alamelo Acho, deceased) & Anor v Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLJ 697, Jeffrey Tan delivering judgment of the Federal Court after an extensive survey of cases on the subject of how fraud is to be pleaded, held that ‘whether the word ‘fraud’ was specifically pleaded was a semantic detail of no significance whatsoever from the standpoint of pleadings, as the correct test for a valid plea of fraud is whether or not the facts which make the conduct fraudulent were pleaded.’ [26] ‘It is an elementary rule in pleading that, when a state of facts is relied on, it is enough to allege it simply without setting out the subordinate facts which are the means of producing it or the evidence sustaining the allegation.’ - Williams v Wilcox and another [1835] All ER Rep 25 at p.27- 28 per Lord Denman CJ cited with approval by Suffian J (later Lord President) in Jusoh v Ng Ah Sooi & Anor [1963] 1 MLJ 92. [27] Larry and Adrian have both failed to persuade me as to how they can now honestly argue that Protasco’s claim being “broadly put, for fraud” is fatally deficient and that prejudice was caused to them as contended. I therefore dismissed this argument premised on the preceding paragraphs and also due to the fact that: 27.1 Protasco has pleaded: 27.1.1 it was deceived into: S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 (a) paying the deposit of RM50million pursuant to SPA 1, and the differential sum pursuant to SPA 2, as it was led to believe by Adrian that the conditions precedent in SPA 1 and conditions subsequent in SPA 2 were attainable; (b) making payment of the Shareholders’ Advance on Larry and/or Adrian’s misrepresentation that the said USD5million was needed for the oil wells reactivation, and/or construction of wells to facilitate the process of securing the 10-years extension to the PMPA; 27.1.2 that Larry and Adrian : (a) induced Protasco to accept as security of the PT Inovisi shares for payment of the purchase consideration and Shareholders’ Advance, on the premise that Protasco would be able to dispose of the said PT Inovisi shares and recover the purchase consideration and Shareholders’ Advance, and that the same was good security; (b) had knowledge that both the SPA 1 and SPA 2 were nothing more than a scam to defraud Protasco; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 (c) had induced Protasco into paying the purchase consideration without disclosing their personal interest in PT ASU; (d) are the beneficial owners and control PT ASU, PT ASI, PT Inovisi and PT Green Pine; (e) have appropriated the total sum of USD27million using various corporate vehicles, fronts, and nominees; and they have received the purchase consideration and Shareholders’ Advance in breach of their fiduciary, equitable and statutory duties; 27.1.3 that Tjoe Yudhis acted as a nominee of Larry and Adrian at all material times, (ii) that Tjoe Yudhis takes instructions from both Larry and Adrian (iii) Tjoe Yudhis did not issue nor signed any of the PT ASU Letters and other letters attributed to him, (iv) that his purported signatures on the said letters are forgeries; (noting too that ‘Forgery’ is a specific method of fraud - Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan supra at [31]). 27.2 it was demonstrably obvious to me that Larry and Adrian were able to at the outset respond to the SOC and HAD FILED THEIR DEFENCE contending amongst others, that the entire oil & gas acquisition was an arms-length transaction, SPA 1 and SPA 2 were negotiated without their S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 involvement; there was no misrepresentation or inducement by them towards Protasco, all payments, including the Shareholders’ Advance made by Protasco pursuant to SPA 1 and SPA 2 were made pursuant to decisions of the board of directors or management of Protasco after negotiations, discussions and/or consultations with PT ASU; they merely acted as an introducer. Larry Tey’s position is that apart from the IA with DSC and introducing PT ASU to Protasco, he was not involved in any manner whatsoever in relation to the transaction and as for Adrian, he avers that he merely was requested by Protasco to follow up with the status of negotiation of SPA 2 for purposes of expediting the matter, he was not privy to discussions between DSC and Augustone who represented PT ASU; 27.3 Both Larry and Adrian DID NOT make any application at all to seek further and/or better particulars in respect of any of the matters in the SOC; Objections to Q&A 52A, 60, second paragraph of the answer to 78, the amendments to the third paragraph of Q&A129, 129A of DSC’s witness statement [28] The objections to these questions were premised on Order 18 rule 12 of ROC 2012 on insufficient particulars. These questions and answers relate to the representations made by Larry and Adrian pertaining to the fulfilment of the conditions precedent in SPA 1, the fulfilment of conditions subsequent in SPA 2, the involvement of Larry and Adrian in the negotiation process, the inducement by the provision of securities to S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 guarantee the payments made towards the transaction which led Protasco to believe that it would be able to dispose of the securities and recover the purchase consideration and Shareholders’ Advance. I find no merits to the objection as the material facts necessary for the purpose of formulating Protasco’s cause of action in relation to these questions have been pleaded in the Statement of Claim at paragraphs 45, 46, 47, 57, 62(a), and (e), 67(c) and (e). There is no reason why evidence on facts relied upon to support the material facts should not be allowed. Objections to Q&A 199, 200, 201 and 205 of DSC’s witness statement [29] These questions and answers allude to PT NRR, Fast Global and Telecity as entities that were connected or related to Larry and Adrian whereas the pleaded case of Protasco refer only PT ASU, PT ASI, Acclaim and PT Green Pine as the entities under control of and/or related to and/or being the alter ego of Larry Tey and Adrian Ooi. [30] The objection is untenable as I find the evidence sought to be adduced in these questions and answers are relevant and will throw light on where the money which emanated from Protasco’s payments to PT ASU flowed to - facts to support the material facts already pleaded in paragraphs 51(e), 59, 62(b) and (f), and 67(g) that: (i) the money went to various other entities; (ii) were utilized for the benefit of Larry Tey and Adrian Ooi, (iii) that they are in fact the beneficial owners of, amongst others, PT ASU and PT ASI, PT Inovisi and PT Green Pine; and (iv) they have misappropriated the USD27million in breach of their of their fiduciary, equitable and statutory duties. [31] It ought to be mentioned that in Protasco Bhd v PT Anglo Slavic S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 Utama & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 417, at [45], [46], [49] and [50], Azizul J (now JCA) held that the BBEA documents to the pleaded case of Protasco are relevant as it shows the money trail to Larry and Adrian’s account and this decision was upheld by the Federal Court in Protasco Bhd v Tey Por Yee & Anor and other appeals [2021] 6 MLJ 1 as follows: “Of course, as rightly found by the learned High Court judge, the general rule of evidence, that is relevancy, is the cornerstone of s 7 and all other discovery applications. His Lordship was equally right when he considered that from the pleaded claim of the plaintiff, the money trail is relevant to prove or disprove its allegation of the flow of funds to the respondents.” [32] I accept Protasco’s argument that it does not lie in Larry and Adrian’s mouths to posit that the matters covered by the Q&As objected to are not pleaded and thus they were caught by surprise when: (i) Larry himself at a press conference on 28.10.2014 had revealed the purported money flow through, amongst others, Fast Global, PT NRR and Telecity; (ii) Larry and Adrian’s own witness statement in enc 691 and 688 in evidence in chief sought to attempt to explain some of the very transactions in the money trail that was disclosed pursuant to the BBEA Order. Objections to Q&A 39 to 51, 59 to 71, 94 to 122 of Tjoe Yudhis’s witness statement [33] The objections to Q&A39 to 51, and 59 to 71 were premised on Order 18 7(2) of ROC 2012 in that these were material facts which ought to have been pleaded. I do not agree. The SOC at paragraphs 50 and 51 had already pleaded that: (i) Tjoe Yudhis had acted as a nominee of Larry S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 and Adrian at all material times, (ii) that Tjoe takes instructions from both Larry and Adrian, (iii) Tjoe neither issued nor signed any of the PT ASU Letters and other letters attributed to him, (iv) that his purported signatures on the said letters are forgeries, and (v) that Larry and Adrian are, at all material times, the beneficial owners and/or controllers of PT ASU, PT Inovisi, Acclaim, and PT Green Pine. IC had attained the said information are further subordinate facts to be proven at trial. How the IC obtained the statutory declarations from Tjoe Yudhis, the meetings in Jakarta after this suit was filed are subordinate facts and/or are evidence to establish the material facts already pleaded. [34] Besides, it is my respectful view that Order 18 rule 7(2) ROC 2012 is not a stand alone rule. It reads: “(2) Without prejudice to paragraph (1), the effect of any document or the purport of any conversation referred to in the pleading shall, if material, be briefly stated, and the precise words of the document or conversation shall not be stated, except in so far as those words are themselves material.” [35] Read together with Order 18 rule 7(1), it means if one pleads the existence of a document or conversation, the material effect of the document, or purport of the conversation should also be pleaded briefly. The precise words of the document or conversation shall not be pleaded unless those words are themselves material. Objections to Q&A 94 to 122 of Tjoe Yudhis’s witness statement Audio Recordings i.e. IDP82-A and IDP 82-B not admissible? Transcripts by Scribe – Exhibit P83 and P84 inadmissible? [36] Q&A 94 to 122 concern the audio recordings and the transcripts by Scribe of the audio recordings which Larry and Adrian assert are not S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 admissible. [37] The recordings being documents within the definition set out in s. 3 Evidence Act, are governed by ss 61 to 66 of the same Act pursuant to which the recordings must be proved by being produced for the inspection/viewing of the court. I have heard the audio recordings which were played in the course of trial on 02.03.2022 and 03.03.2022. Tjoe Yudhis who made the recordings testified in Q&A 94 to 123 that: 37.1 he utilized his iPhone 5 to make the recordings; 37.2 he was satisfied that his iPhone 5 was in proper working order at all material times when the recordings were made; 37.3 after making the recordings, he played the recordings again after synchronizing the same to his MacBook Pro Apple Laptop; 37.4 He was satisfied that his laptop was in good working order when he synchronized the recordings; 37.5 That he had unfortunately traded in his iPhone 5 several years ago; 37.6 that at the end of each evening when he recorded the conversation, he then saved the recordings in his external hard disk from his MacBook Pro Apple laptop; 37.7 the recordings in his laptop were then burned into a DVD- R; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 37.8 before burning the recordings into the DVD-R from his laptop, Tjoe Yudhis listened to the recordings from his laptop to ensure that the contents are completed and the voices in the recordings are clear; 37.9 that after the recordings were moved into his hard disk at the end of the night, he would then delete the recordings from his said laptop to conserve storage space; 37.10 he had not tampered with the recordings in any manner; 37.11 he is still in possession of his original MacBook Pro Apple laptop and the external hard disk originally used to store the recordings; 37.12 that he had replayed the two recordings and read through the two transcripts of the recordings by Scribe Synergy Sdn Bhd (“Scribe”) and confirmed that the two transcripts are an accurate reflection of the two recordings. [38] I find from Tjoe Yudhis’s evidence that the criterias as set out by Augustine Paul J (as he then was) in Mohd Ali Jaafar v Public Prosecutor [1998] 4 MLJ 210 have been satisfied: “It is perhaps appropriate at this stage to consider the matters that must be established when introducing evidence of a tape recording. They are as follows: (a) the tape was run through and found to be clean before the recording was made; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 (b) the machine was in proper working order; (c) the tape was not tampered with or altered in any way — it should be established in whose possession the tape was at all times; (d) the officers (or other witnesses) played the tape over after making the recording and heard voices which they can identify; (e) a transcript was prepared of the voices; if it was just taken down in shorthand and the typed transcript prepared from the shorthand notes then the notes should be saved; (f) the officers (or other witnesses) played over the recording and checked it with the transcript as to the identity of the voices and as to the conversation. (See Canadian Criminal Evidence (3rd Ed) by PK McWilliams QC at pp 7-10). In addition, the following precautionary steps taken by PW5 ought to be followed: (1) uttering of the introductory and closing words; (2) breaking of the safety tabs after the recording; and (3) placing identification marks on the tapes. Proof of identity of the conversation which comes within the ambit of item (f) above is the most important element to be established when introducing evidence of a tape recording. In ZB Bulkhari v BR Mehra AIR 1973 SC 1788, it was held that the accuracy of what was actually recorded had to be proved by the maker of the record (see also Maqsud Ali). It is desirable that a witness who participated in a conversation that has been recorded gives an oral account of it. He may refer to the taped conversation to refresh his memory (see R v Mills [1962] 3 All ER 298). Alternatively, he must at least confirm that the tape recording is of a conversation which occurred if for some reason or other he is unable to give an oral account of the conversation. If there is no evidence to show that it is an accurate account of a conversation that occurred, then it is not S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 admissible. In my opinion, the absence of such proof means that the tape recording sought to be admitted in evidence is in the same position as a document being tendered in evidence without proper proof of execution. In R v Chen, the Supreme Court of Victoria considered the evidence that must be led in introducing a tape recording and said that it depends on the circumstances of each case. Marks, Southwell and Harper JJ in delivering the judgment of the court added at p 150: The test is whether there is sufficient material before the court to allow the tribunal of fact acting reasonably to conclude that the recorded sounds reproduce those originally made by the persons identified by the evidence. In other words, there must be evidence, which the tribunal of fact is entitled to accept, that the recording is of a conversation which occurred and which would be admissible if proved by oral testimony. In our opinion, admissibility does not depend on the party tendering the tapes having removed absolutely any chance that they are inaccurate. (Emphasis added.) I agree with this view as evidence to show that the recording tendered is an accurate reproduction of a conversation which occurred would remove any doubt that the recording is inaccurate due to failure to fully establish the other matters that are required to be proved.” [39] The English case of R v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688 was referred to in Mohd Ali Jaafar. In Maqsud Ali, the accused was convicted of murder. What was sought to be admitted was a tape-recorded conversation of two suspects talking to each other about the murder in a bugged office before they were charged. The conversation of such words as could be made make out, for not all that was said was clearly audible was first made in Urdu, and then a translation of it into English and transcripts of it were made. The tape had a number of imperfections: first, the microphone did not always clearly pick up all that was being said; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 secondly, from time to time the recording was overlaid by street noises from the open window, in particular those resulting from the bus stop just under the window. Further, the recording had to be translated into English to be of any use. Some inaudible portions of the recording were not translated. Some translations were not even made directly from the tape. The Court of Appeal agreed with the court below that much of the recording was transcribed and admissible. Marshall J delivering judgment of the Court of Appeal said: “For many years now photographs have been admissible in evidence on proof that they are relevant to the issues involved in the case and that the prints are taken from negatives that are untouched. The prints as seen represent situations that have been reproduced by means of mechanical and chemical devices. Evidence of things seen through telescopes or binoculars which otherwise could not be picked up by the naked eye have been admitted, and now there are devices for picking up, transmitting, and recording, conversations. We can see no difference in principle between a tape recording and a photograph. In saying this we must not be taken as saying that such recordings are admissible whatever the circumstances, but it does appear to this court wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved and the voices recorded properly identified; provided also that the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible, we are satisfied that a tape recording is admissible in evidence. Such evidence should always be regarded with some caution and assessed in the light of all the circumstances of each case. There can be no question of laying down any exhaustive set of rules by which the admissibility of such evidence should be judged.” On the admissibility of the tape recording, the court held: S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 “It is next said that the recording was a bad one, overlaid in places by street and other noises. This obviously was so and as a result much of the conversation was inaudible or undecipherable. In so far as that was so, much of the conversation was never transcribed but there still remained much that was transcribed, and the judge after full argument ruled that what was deciphered should be left for the jury to assess. We think that he was right. Lastly, it was said that the difficulties of language were such as to make any transcription unreliable and misleading. This argument the judge treated with great care and circumspection. [His Lordship then referred to the warning given by the trial judge in his summing-up and set out the facts above in respect of those passages common to the translations and continued:] The court does not feel it necessary to go in detail into the common passages. Suffice it to say that if they are accurate, there are phrases on the tape recording in which words said by both of these appellants on their face value amount to, or come very near to, a confession of guilt. In the matter of the transcripts the court desires only to say this. Having a transcript of a tape recording is, on any view, a most obvious convenience and a great aid to the jury, otherwise a recording would have to be played over and over again. Provided that a jury is guided by what they hear themselves and upon that they base their ultimate decision, we see no objection to a copy of a transcript, properly proved, being put before them. Here all the translations were submitted to detailed and searching cross- examination, and it is to be stated also that one of the translators called on behalf of the defence in the final part of his evidence came very close, if not completely, to agreeing with Rahmet Khan's translation and Changuz's translation, particularly on the one sentence that involved the appellant Maqsud in respect of this matter.” [40] Being satisfied that there is sufficient material before the court to warrant a conclusion that the recorded sounds reproduce those originally made by the persons identified by the evidence, that it was not suggested that the recordings had been interfered with in any way, that the defence S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 has also not put to Tjoe Yudhis or the transcriber from Scribe, Manpreet Kaur, in cross examination that the recordings have been tampered with; and there being no independent expert called by Larry and Adrian to challenge the accuracy and authenticity of the recordings, that the recordings are relevant to the pleaded case, I thus reject the attempt made Larry and Adrian’s counsel to persuade this court to exclude the audio recordings and the transcript. I have no hesitation to state that I cannot see any reason why the recordings IDP82-A and IDP 82-B are not admissible. They are thus marked as exhibits P82-A and P 82-B. To be clear, there is also no question here that Larry and Adrian had disavowed their presence in the recordings. [41] As for the trnscripts of the recordings, the complaints by Larry and Adrian were that there were conversations in Bahasa Indonesia in the recordings that were not transcribed, and that some parts were inaudible. However, much of the recordings made by Tjoe Yudhis were in fact audible and spoken in the English language. Only some parts in the Indonesian language were not transcribed. Bearing in mind that the transcript was not tampered with and is only a means of assisting the court in the appreciation and understanding of the evidence tendered by playing over of the recording, just as in Maqsud Ali, I fail to see any reason why the transcript is inadmissible once the recordings themselves have been made admissible. Forgery of Tjoe Yudhis’s signatures in the PT ASU Letters and supplemental SPA [42] The PT ASU Letters dated 09.05.2013, 25.09.2013, 10.01.2014, 21.07.2014, 04.08.2014, 05.08.2014 and the supplemental SPA dated S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 28.06.2013 were included in the bundles marked as Part B. Larry and Adrian contend that as these documents having been included in Part B, pursuant to Order 34 rule 2(2)(e)(i), ROC 2012, they ought not to be relied on as evidence of facts to prove alleged forgery. [43] Order 34 rule 2 (2) (e) ROC 2012 reads: “(e) if the parties are unable to agree on certain documents, those documents on which agreement cannot be reached shall be included in separate bundles and each such bundle shall be filed by the plaintiff and marked as follows: (i) Part B – documents where the authenticity is not disputed but the contents are disputed; (ii) Part C – documents where the authenticity and contents are disputed.” [44] In Jaafar Bin Shaari & Anor (suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah Bte Ahmad, deceased) v Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693, the former Supreme Court in a judgment by Peh Swee Chin FCJ explained: “First and foremost, the agreed bundle of documents means that the documents therein are authentic and they do exist, therefore they require no proof of their authenticity by calling, e.g. their makers. Secondly, the truth of contents of any of the documents in the agreed bundle of documents is always not admitted unless the contrary is indicated directly or indirectly and such truth of such contents is liable to be challenged in court at the instance of either of the parties. Thirdly, such documents therein do not form automatically a part of the evidence of the case in question ipso facto, but any of such documents does become part of such evidence if it is read or referred to by either of the S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 parties, wholly or partly, at length or in a briefest of mention, either in examination of any witness, in submission at any stage or even on any unilateral drawing of court's attention to it by either of the parties at any time before the conclusion of the case. Fourthly, at the end of the whole case, the truth of the contents of any of the document is up to the court to determine, regard being had, inter alia, to any absence of challenge by either of the parties on any part of the document and similarly, the question of weight, e.g. either great or no weight to be given to any part of any document is also a matter for the trial court, which considers the documents including any 'written hearsay' contained therein. The court may refuse to give any weight at all to any document, but then it is accountable like in other matters, to the parties and to the appellate court for reasons for such refusal.” [45] It is manifestly clear to me that, when these impugned documents are placed in Part B, irrefragably, it means that there is no dispute to the existence and authenticity of the documents but only the contents may be disputed. They are not fake or fictitious, in which case they would have been placed in part C where the originals have to be produced, maker called and to have them marked as exhibits. If they remain in Part C, the evidence is not admissible – see Damansara Realty (Pahang) Sdn Bhd v Om Cahaya Mineral Asia Bhd [2021] 5 MLJ 1 CA. Here, Protasco is not disputing that the documents do not exist or are not authentic;l but Protasco is disputing that the signature of Tjoe Yudhis in the documents are forged. As was the case in Beh Sui Loon & anor v Murugesu Kuppusamy & Ors [2022] 1 LNS 774, it is my view that these documents are correctly placed in Part B of the common bundles. And having been placed in Part B, there is no room to reclassify them as Part C fake documents. Protasco is entitled to dispute Tjoe Yudhis’s signature in these documents. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 Admissibility of Q&A14 to 19 of Johnny Situwanda (PW9)’s witness statement and the report in Enclosure 649 [46] Johnny Situwanda is an Indonesian solicitor engaged by Protasco in September 2014 to attend the office of PT Brent. His testimony relates to: 46.1 his efforts to procure Ricky Chaniadi or an officer of PT Brent to provide evidence in the trial before the court; 46.2 that he was informed by the said Ricky Chaniadi that: 46.2.1 he was not willing to be a witness in this trial nor would he provide a written testimonial for Protasco in respect of the events which took place in September 2014; 46.2.2 Lim Sue Fern had informed him (Ricky) that she did not sign the blocking letter, and therefore PT Brent was not going to act on the said instruction letter; 46.3 his attempts to enforce the letter of instruction and the unblocking letter on PT Brent to cause the sale of the blocked PT Inovisi shares; and 46.4 that the financial services authority of Indonesia had, on 13.02.2018, revoked the business license of PT Brent and that PT Brent securities was declared bankrupt on S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 22.03.2021 pursuant to a decision of the central Jakarta Commercial Court. [47] The objection taken was that PT Brent’s status was not relevant in the sense that Protasco chose not to take action against PT Brent to compel the liquidation of the blocked PT Inovisi shares at the material time. DSC was cross-examined on this aspect of the case; that Johnny Situwanda’s evidence was hearsay evidence and it was also contended that the report by Johnny Situwanda besides being late, was intended to address deficiencies in Protasco’s case arising from the cross examination of DSC. [48] I reject these arguments. I instead agree with Protasco’s counsel that Johnny Situwanda‘s evidence is admissible and relevant to show Protasco did try and has taken reasonable steps to secure the attendance of Ricky Chaniadi to testify and his attendance could not be procured without an unreasonable amount of delay or expense. Johnny Situwanda’s oral evidence of having seen and read the email exchange between Mr Ricky Chaniadi and Ms Lim Sue Fern is thus admissible under Section 63(e) of the EA 1950 read together with Section 65(1)(c) as secondary evidence of the contents of the email received by Ricky Chaniadi. At any rate, learned counsel for Larry and Adrian had utilized Enclosure 649 in their attempt to discredit Tan Yee Boon (PW11). This amounts to a waiver of the original objection to the report. No s. 90A certificate for Exhibits P45, P46, P47, P48, P104 and P105 [49] The objections to Exhibits P45, P46, P47, P48, and P104 being documents obtained pursuant to the BBEA order are made on grounds S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 that there was no certificate under s. 90A(2) of EA 1950 tendered by Protasco and to Exhibit P105 bank statements on the weight of the said documents as they were not available earlier for the cross-examination of DSC. These objections were withdrawn during clarification/decision on 30.8.23. In any event, I find the objections have no merit as PW2 and/or PW14, both subpoenaed witnesses have testified that these documents were produced by computers in good working order and operating properly at the material time when they were printed. As such the s. 90A certificate is not necessary. Printout from PT Inovisi website [50] The objection taken was that there was there was no s. 90A EA 1950 certificate. Tjoe Yudhis however gave evidence that the said document was produced by a computer in the course of its ordinary use and that the said device was in good working order at the material time when the document was printed. I therefore see no reason why the print out is not admissible. Burden of proof [51] In Dato’ Pardip Kumar Kukreja & Anor v Vell Paari a/l Samy Vellu [2016] 4 MLJ 649; [2015] 1 LNS 1482 CA, Vernon Ong JCA (later FCJ) succinctly explained: [24] It is settled law that the party who desires the court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability bears the burden of proof (s 101(1) of the Evidence Act 1950). The burden of proof is on that party is twofold: (a) the burden of establishing a case; and (b) the burden of introducing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party throughout the trial. The standard of proof required of the plaintiff is on the balance of probabilities. The evidential burden of proof is only shifted to the other party once that party has S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 discharged its burden of proof. If that party fails to discharge the original burden of proof, then the other party need not adduce any evidence. In this respect it is the plaintiff who must establish his case. If he fails to do so, it will not do for the plaintiffs to say that the defendants have not established their defence (Selvaduray v Chinniah [1939] 1 MLJ 253 (CA); s 102 of the Evidence Act 1950). On the effect of the burden of proof not being discharged, Terrell Ag CJ in Selvaduray v Chinniah, adopting the position stated by the Court of Appeal in Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co [1883] 11 QBD 440 said: In such a case as the present the position has been clearly stated in the judgment of Brett MR in Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co [1883] 11 QBD 440 at p 452: But then it is contended (I think fallaciously), that if the plaintiff has given prima facie evidence, which, unless it be answered, will entitle him to have the question decided in his favour, the burden of proof is shifted on to the defendant as the decision of the question itself. This contention seems to be the real ground of the decision in the Queen’s Bench Division. I cannot assent to this. It seems to me that the propositions ought to be stated thus: the plaintiff may give prima facie evidence which, unless it be answered either by contradictory evidence or by the evidence of additional facts, ought to lead the jury to find the question in his favour: the defendant may give evidence either by contradicting the plaintiff’s evidence or by proving other facts: the jury have to consider upon the evidence given upon both sides, whether they are satisfied in favour of the plaintiff with respect to the question which he calls them to answer; if they are, they must find for the plaintiff; but if upon consideration of the facts they come clearly to the opinion that the question ought to be answered against the plaintiff; they must find for the defendant. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 Then comes this difficulty — suppose that the jury, after considering the evidence, are left in real doubt as to which way they are to answer the question put to them on behalf of the plaintiff: in that case also the burden of proof lies upon the plaintiff, and if the defendant has been able by the additional facts which he has adduced to bring the minds of the whole jury to a real state of doubt, the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the burden of proof which lies upon him. [52] The Federal Court in Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan @ L Allagappan (as executor to SL Alameloo Achi alias Sona Lena Alamelo Acho, deceased) & Anor v Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLJ 697; [2017] 5 CLJ 418 FC speaking through Jeffrey Tan FCJ at [48] to [63] offers valuable guidance on this subject. See also [17] of Yeohata Machineries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Coil Master Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 6 MLJ 810 CA, also a judgment of Vernon Ong JCA (later FCJ) that “… there must be some preponderance in the plaintiffs’ favour at the conclusion of the whole case. Even if the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case, but if at the conclusion of the trial the court finds that the position was exactly even, then any preponderance in favour of the plaintiffs has ceased to exist. If that happens, then the plaintiffs have failed to discharge the burden of proof which is upon it, and the plaintiffs must necessarily fail (Abrath v The North Eastern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 440, at p 452).” The Facts and Evidence Background [53] The Plaintiff, Protasco is a public limited company whose shares are traded on the main board of Bursa Malaysia with its core business in road and/or infrastructure related works, education, and property development, road maintenance and other related business. It is an S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 investment holding company with its various s businesses run through its subsidiaries which together with Protasco generally known as the Protasco Group. [54] The 1st Defendant, PT ASU is a company incorporated in the Republic of Indonesia on 06.09.2012. [55] The 2nd Defendant, Larry is a Malaysian citizen. Larry on or about 26.11.2012, became a substantial shareholder of Protasco through his acquisition of 27.11% shares in Protasco using his corporate vehicle, Kingdom Seekers Ventures Sdn Bhd (“Kingdom Seeker”). Larry was a director of Protasco from 10.03.2014 to 27.11.2014. The 3rd Defendant, Adrian is a Malaysian citizen. Adrian was a director of Protasco from 10.12.2012 to 27.11.2014. Adrian Ooi was also a shareholder of Protasco. Events leading to SPA1 and SPA2 [56] To determine whether Larry and Adrian’s nature of relationship with Protasco was one which fell within the settled categories giving rise to fiduciary obligations, it is necessary to unravel the roles they played in the entire episode. Counsel for Protasco, Mr. Peter Skelchy deftly took the court through the copious documents and evidence which reveal the following. [57] On 19.09.2012 as reflected in Vincent Tan’s email to Andy Yong, there was a search for a passive investor to purchase 80,429,515 of the ordinary shares in Protasco, representing 27.11% of its issued share capital (“27.11% block”), from two of its then existing shareholders, Dream Cruiser Sdn Bhd and FNQ Advanced Materials Sdn Bhd which will cost S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 approximately RM100million. [58] In September 2012, DSC was informed by Andy Yong that Larry was interested to purchase Protasco’s shares from the previous substantial shareholders. In late September 2012, Larry proposed oil and gas project injection into Protasco in meetings with Andy Yong and DSC as a condition for his purchase of 27.11% block. [59] Following discussions on the terms of the Investment Agreement via email exchanges involving NS Cheng of Fairfield, Andy Yong, Larry, Adrian and DSC, on 03.11.2012, an Investment Agreement (“IA”) was executed between Global Capital Limited and DSC. Larry executed the IA on behalf of Global Cap in his capacity as ‘co-founder’. The recitals stated that Global Cap, through its ‘affiliates/nominees’, had been granted rights to develop and produce oil and gas in Kuala Simpang Timur, Aceh, Indonesia. The recitals of the IA disclosed that the parties had intended to develop the oil and gas project in Indonesia via Protasco and that Protasco would, in turn, enter into a master agreement with Global Cap towards that end. It was expressed to be in furtherance of that intention that DSC had entered into the IA in consideration for Global Cap’s offer to purchase the 27.11% block. [60] On 26.11.2012, Larry via his corporate vehicle, Kingdom Seekers became a substantial shareholder of Protasco through his acquisition of the 27.11% block. As a consequence, Larry wanted and obtained representation on the board. His nominee for this purpose was Adrian Ooi who 2 weeks after the acquisition, became a director of Protasco on 10.12.2012. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 [61] Larry introduced Augustone Cheong (‘Augustone’) to Protasco. Augustone held a power of attorney (“PA”) for PT ASU dated 15.10.2012. Vide this PA executed by PT ASU’s then President Director, Tjoe Yudhis, Augustone was authorised to deal with all negotiations on behalf of PT ASU for the purchase of the PT ASI shares. [62] On 14.12.2012, Acclaim wrote to PT Brent Securities (“PT Brent”) to block 25,200,000 shares of PT Inovisi on behalf of Acclaim. On 24.12.2012, Messrs Risman Hutabarat & Rekan issued a legal opinion on the blocked shares of PT Inovisi and securities for RM50million deposit. On 25.12.2012, Adrian Ooi emailed Lim Yew Ting of Protasco enclosing the legal opinion from the Indonesia lawyer on the blocking of PT Inovisi shares. On 27.12.2012, Acclaim issued a letter to PT Brent in respect of its application for shares blocking in PT Inovisi [“Blocked Letter”]. [63] On 28.12.2012, Protasco’s Board of Directors (“Protasco’s Board) by a circular resolution (“DCR”) approved the entry into SPA 1 with PT ASU. On the same day: 63.1 SPA 1 was entered between Protasco and PT ASU to acquire 76% share capital of PT ASI for a purchase consideration USD55million; and 63.2 a deposit of RM50million was paid by Protasco to PT ASU via cheque. [64] Having considered the evidence and submissions before me, I find that Larry had made the oil and gas project in KST Aceh injection into Protasco as a pre-condition for his purchase of 27.11% shares as made evident from the various exchanges of email flowing between the S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 parties between September 2011 and November 2011 starting from Vincent Tan’s email to Andy Yong on 19.09.2012 informing Andy Yong of DSC’s intention to find a purchaser to purchase the 27.11% block of Protasco shares, belonging to the previous substantial shareholders culminating in: 64.1 the signing of the IA; 64.2 Larry via his corporate vehicle, Kingdom Seekers becoming a substantial shareholder of Protasco through his acquisition of the 27.11% block on 26.11.2012; and 64.3 the signing of SPA1 on 28.12.2012 with a simultaneous payment of a deposit of RM50million by Protasco to PT ASU on the same day. [65] Protasco asserts that when Larry introduced the potential investment opportunity to DSC he represented himself as the principal of Global Cap, a private equity management firm with expertise in identifying growth and start up companies with regional reach in the Asia Pacific region. Larry disputes this vehemently. He postulates that Global Cap was to procure an investor to acquire the 27.11% block of Protasco. Global Cap was unable to secure sufficient investors due to time constraints and so he via his corporate vehicle, Kingdom Seekers then acquired the 27.11% block. [66] That there is no shadow of a doubt that Larry is the principal of Global Cap is evident from (i) his own corporate profile provided to Protasco at the material time, where it is expressly stated that in the year S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 2008, he founded the private equity firm Global Capital Limited to focus on emerging markets; (ii) the engagement letter dated 02.11.2012 by Fairfield to Global Cap where Fairfield as an advisor was engaged by Global Cap to assist Kingdom Seekers (Larry ’s corporate vehicle) to sell the oil and gas asset and business to Protasco and in this letter, Larry had confirmed the engagement terms in the capacity as ‘Co- Founder’ of Global Cap; (iii) Global Cap’s company profile produced by Larry and Adrian at trial made no mention of one Kan Ding Yau who was alleged by Larry to be the only shareholder and director of Global Cap; (iv) the position taken by Larry in Global Cap Suit 465 that Global Cap through its representative had acquired the 27.11% block in Protasco; effectively meaning, Larry, Kingdom Seekers and Global Cap are one and the same. [67] Despite Adrian’s stand that DSC offered him the position of Non- Executive Director in Protasco in view of his business and corporate experience and expertise in Indonesia, I find that it was Larry that caused Adrian to be appointed to Protasco’s Board on 10.12.2012 which was 2 weeks before SPA1 was signed. This is borne out by Larry’s witness statement filed in Suit 465, where Larry states “Pursuant to the Investment Guarantee Agreement, the Plaintiff nominated Ooi Kock Aun (“Dato’ Ooi”) as a director of Protasco. Dato’ Ooi was appointed to the Board of Protasco on 10.12.2012.” [68] Adrian pleaded that he was not involved in the negotiations and execution of the IA and that he only became aware of the IA after this suit was filed by Protasco. I find however he was being economical with the truth as the email exchanges between Adrian and Dr Cheng on 01.11.2012 show unequivocally that he was in the loop in the email S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 exchanges concerning the terms of the IA, and he provided his comments on the terms to be included therein. [69] Both Larry and Adrian deny Protasco’s contentions that they were involved in the negotiations involving the terms of the purchase of PT ASI’s shares and have made representations that inter- alia the deal would satisfy the due diligence to be conducted and the conditions set in the agreement and that adequate security would be provided by PT ASU towards the deposit paid by Protasco. Larry contends that he was not involved at all in the negotiations and signing/execution of SPA 1 whilst Adrian’s evidence that he was apparently informed that Protasco had entered into negotiation with PT ASU in relation to SPA 1 after he was appointed as a director of Protasco (which was 10.12.2012). These contentions by Larry and Adrian are easily debunked by the fact that SPA1 was only signed some 18 days after Adrian Ooi became a director and by the contents of contemporaneous email exchanges involving YY Chin of Global Cap (who acts under the advice of Adrian ), Lim Yew Ting, Hooi Ling, Dr Cheng, Augustone Cheong, Jason Minos, Larry and Adrian from 08.11.2012 to late November 2012 which explicitly show both Larry and Adrian were actively involved in the discussions on the terms for SPA 1. This excerpt when Adrian Ooi was under cross-examination is telling: NOP Pg. 65 enc 700 “PJS Thank you. And by this email, would you agree Larry is asking you to insert these terms into the draft SPA? OOI Yes.” [70] Tjoe Yudhis testified that he was instructed to sign SPA 1 by Adrian Ooi, as well as SPA 2 and the PA . He was also instructed by one S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 Lim Chye Guan, an employee of Larry and Adrian, to sign documents in relation to the opening of the bank account on behalf PT ASU with CIMB Bank Berhad’s Plaza Damansara branch. From the email found in En.555/p7-17, Adrian had given instructions to staff of PT Inovisi and Global Cap to arrange for Tjoe Yudhis’s trip to Kuala Lumpur for him to sign SPA 1, including to give him cash allowance for the trip and arranged for Tjoe Yudhis’s flight and hotel accommodation. [71] Although the diligence process was being conducted by Protasco’s professional advisors appointed by Protasco, the evidence show backstage, Adrian and Larry instructed PT ASU on the due diligence requirements requested by Protasco despite Larry’s protestation that he was not a director and therefore not involved; Adrian although a director protested he was not involved. Adrian’s protestations are imploded by his own email for e.g. on 23.04.2013, in response to Protasco’s solicitors Messrs Makarim & Taira requesting for office lease agreement of PT ASU for due diligence, Adrian had instructed Deny of PT Inovisi that “PT ASU’s office lease agreement is not relevant for their DD process. Inform them that PT ASU is now waiting for the new office to be ready in Patra Jasa sometime in June 2013 and by then we will get the new office lease agreement with the landlord. For now, PT ASU is only temporarily using Anugrah office, which we had already informed them last week.” Then on 30.07.2013, in response to Protasco’s solicitors Messrs Makarim & Taira’s request for power of attorney to be executed for Protasco to conduct court searches, Adrian had instructed Tjoe Yudhis to proceed with the signing of the power of attorney forwarded to him by Deny via email dated 29.07.2013. It is observed that the day before, Tjoe Yudhis had via email sent on 29.07.2013 requested for Larry and Adrian’s instructions. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 [72] Protasco’s position is that the Blocked Shares forming the security were part of the inducement for Protasco to make the payments to PT ASU pursuant to SPA 1 and the Shareholder’s Advance to PT ASI pursuant to SPA 2. The evidence lead at trial show that: 72.1 Adrian under cross- examination admitted that the securities and the legal opinion on enforceability and validity of the security is needed in order for Protasco to make payment of the deposit and was critical to Protasco making payment as payment was made even prior to the conduct of the due diligence; 72.2 It was Adrian who: 72.2.1 instructed the Indonesian legal firm Messrs Risman Hutabarat & Rekan to provide the legal opinion to Protasco that the enforceability and dealing in the Blocked shares comply with the laws of Indonesia. The legal opinion expressly provides that the Instruction Letter would be good instructions to PT Brent for Protasco to deal with the shares provided it is signed by Acclaim; 72.2.2 3 days prior the signing of SPA1 and prior to the payment of RM50million deposit on SPA1, on 25.12.2012 provided to the board of Protasco and solicitors of Protasco, the aforesaid legal opinions obtained from Indonesian solicitors; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 72.3 admitted under cross-examination, that both he and Larry had procured Acclaim to provide the securities. [73] It is most puzzling that Dedi Francis, the purported owner of Acclaim when asked if he had heard of a company called Acclaim said “I think I’ve heard of it.” The answer was not a but of course, I am the owner! Yet more puzzling still, he testified under cross-examination, that he was informed by Larry and Adrian that Acclaim provided the securities in the form of PT Inovisi shares for the transaction. Probed further, an admission was squeezed out from him that he was not the owner of Acclaim. I find that the evidence lead by Protasco has established, or at the very least, it is inherently probable that it only executed SPA 1 and SPA 2 as it was armed with the legal opinion that it would be able to call upon the securities if the payments made towards SPA 1 and SPA 2 were not returned pursuant to termination by Protasco. I have not overlooked that the securities were not mentioned in SPA 1 but only in SPA 2, but by even Adrian’s own evidence, the procurement of the securities was fundamental towards the payment of the RM50million deposit made by Protasco to PT ASU. This is underscored by: (i) Clause 1.4 of SPA 2, where PT ASU confirmed that the Blocking Letter shall continue to serve as the security and PT ASU agrees, undertook to cause the Security Provider Acclaim to sign, seal and deliver further documentation in the form of a share charge to protect Protasco’s interest under the agreement; the same clause provide that the Secured Shares in the form of PT Inovisi were to be set aside as security for the repayment back of the purchase price by PT ASU to Protasco in the event of termination of SPA 2 pending the fulfillment of Conditions Subsequent as set out in Clause 3.1; (ii) the repayment back of the Shareholder’s Advance of USD5million made by Protasco to PT ASI as set out in Clause 4.3(b); and (iii) the S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 fulfilment of the Profit Guarantee as set out in Clause 8. There is more - by Clause 4.3(b) of SPA 2, it was agreed that a Shareholder’s Advance of USD5million provided by Protasco to PT ASI for the reactivation of the wells is secured by securities of such number of additional shares provided by Acclaim equivalent to 130% of the value of the advance made by Protasco. [74] Pursuant to SPA1, the conditions precedent therein were to be fulfilled by 28.06.2013. Protasco by letter to PT ASU on 08.05.2013 informed that it would be unlikely that all the Conditions Precedent in Clause 3 of the SPA 1 would be met by 28.06.2013 and requested from PT ASU a revised timetable on when the Conditions Precedent could be fulfilled. PT ASU by letter the very next day on 09.05.2013 acknowledged the delay and requested for Protasco’s indulgence and consent to extend the due diligence period to 31.07.2013 and the fulfillment of the Conditions Precedent to 30.09.2013. Protasco and PT ASU then entered into the Supplemental Sale and Purchase Agreement on 28.06.2013 (“Supplemental Agreement”) extending the time for compliance of the Conditions Precedent to 30.09.2013 and the due diligence period to 31.07.2013 (“1st Extension”). Later, PT ASU by letter dated 25.09.2013 sought another extension from 30.09.2013 to 31.03.2014 for all condition precedents and due diligence to be fulfilled (“2nd Extension”). [75] Tjoe Yudhis testified that he did not execute PT ASU’s letter dated 09.05.2013, the Supplemental Agreement dated 28.06.2013 and PT ASU’s letter dated 25.09.2013. He testified that the signatures on these documents (“disputed signatures”) were not his. The Forensic Document Examiner, Lim Yok Chaw [“PW-4”] who had prepared an expert report after his examination and comparison of the disputed signatures in S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 these documents with the specimen signatures of Tjoe Yudhis, had opined that the disputed signatures and the specimen signatures of Tjoe Yudhis are of different authorship. PW-4’s opinion are relevant facts pursuant to Section 45 of the Evidence Act 1950. Larry and Adrian did not adduce any expert opinion to rebut PW-4’s opinion . Despite being cross- examined extensively by learned counsel for Larry and Adrian, PW-4 had maintained and stood by his opinion. I do not find his opinion ‘obviously lacking in defensibility’ and accept PW-4 ‘s opinion. [76] In regard to the extensions of time sought by PT ASU, Dedi Francis’s evidence was most curious. In respect of PT ASU’s letter dated 09.05.2013 relating to the 1st extension, in Q&A 41 of his witness statement, he testified that he had instructed Augustone to prepare the letter and Tjoe to sign the letter but in cross-examination, testified that he was informed about this letter by Larry and Adrian and that he instructed Tjoe Yudhis to execute PT ASU’s letter through Larry and Adrian. When questioned on whether he has any evidence instructing Larry and Adrian, his answer was they met frequently in Jakarta at that time. Adding to the mystery, his testimony under cross examination show he did not have a clue why the 2 extensions were needed, nor why the Supplemental Agreement was signed. His testimony under cross-examination is that the delay was caused by the revision in the purchase consideration and the number of shares to be purchased! His understanding of the Supplement Agreement was based on what was presented to him by Larry apparently via Larry’s laptop. Dedi Francis testified under cross- examination, that he instructed Global Cap to instruct Tjoe Yudhis to execute the Supplemental Agreement. This evidence is in conflict with his evidence given in chief in Q&A 44 where he says he instructed Tjoe Yudhis to sign the Supplemental Agreement on behalf of PT ASU. These are only 2 S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 examples of his testimony showing that he does not even have a passing familiarity with the contents of his own witness statement. On the 2nd extension sought by PT ASU’s letter dated 25.09.2013, Dedi Francis gave the same answer that all the information he obtained in relation to extension was obtained from Global Cap and the instructions to execute the PT ASU letter was given through Global Cap. Dedi Francis further testified that all discussions and instructions to Global Cap were all done verbally without any written correspondences. Learned Counsel for Protasco was quick to point out that it betrays common sense for Dedi Francis who is based in Jakarta to be giving instructions to Tjoe Yudhis who is also based in Jakarta verbally via Larry and Adrian who are both based in Kuala Lumpur. There is also an appreciable absence of any written instructions at all from Dedi Francis whether to Tjoe Yudhis or for that matter Larry and Adrian from the inception of the transaction till it ended. Watching Dedi Francis give evidence throughout the trial, he appeared to me to be making up stories as he goes along. As manifested under cross-examination, his evidence through out the trial which follow which way the wind blows is to be taken with a pinch of salt. Juxtaposing Dedi Francis’s evidence with (i) Larry’s denial of any knowledge of the events in relation to the transaction prior to him being made a director on 10.03.2014 and (ii) Adrian’s position that sometime in or around June 2013, he was ‘belatedly informed by the Plaintiff that the 1st Defendant had sought for an extension of the Due Diligence’ and for an extension to fulfil the Conditions Precedent, all 3 persons’ evidence stretches credulity. [77] Whilst on the subject of the Supplemental Agreement, prior its signing, DSC at a board of directors meeting on 27.05.2013, updated the board on the progress of the deal and had informed the board of the following: - S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 77.1 that the deal would be called off if the extension of the oil and gas concession which expires on 14.12.2014 could not be procured by PT ASU; 77.2 that the Indonesian authority would normally grant an extension of up to a further 10 years for the concession; 77.3 that the application for an extension of the concession was in progress; 77.4 that there were about 30 wells at the site at that time and it would require 1 to 1 ½ months to reactive the wells for oil extraction. [78] DSC testified under cross-examination that he had informed the board of the matters in the preceding paragraph as he had been advised by Larry and Adrian that the extension would be granted normally for 10 years. [79] At this juncture it is to be noted that the PMPA provided for a duration of 10 years from 14.12.2004 to 14.12.2014. When SPA 1 was executed, the PMPA had only 2 years more to go, and the due diligence was undertaken after the execution of SPA 1. The Supplemental Agreement signed on 28.6.2013 provides that the extension is granted for the compliance of the due diligence to be completed by 30.09.2013 and PT ASU shall use its best endeavours to secure an extension of the PMPA on the best terms possible. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 [80] Before SPA2 was signed on 29.01.2014, the following events are noteworthy: 80.1 Adrian Ooi had by 2 email to Kenny Chong, dated 03.09.2013 and 11.12.2013 respectively enclosed PT Haseba’s application to Pertamina for an extension of 10 years, thus conveying the application for a 10-year extension was being made and the later mail enclosing Pertamina’s field report where Pertamina states that they would extend the time period beyond 2014 as long as there is compliance with Pertamina’s work requirements. Whilst he did not expressly in his emails say so, he appeared to give the impression that the 10-year extension will be obtained provided the wells are being reworked in accordance with Pertamina’s work requirements; 80.2 RISC in its report prepared in December 2013 was of the opinion that on the assumption of the purchase of the oil field could be completed by the end of 2013, then first production from the redeveloped KST field can be expected only in early 2016. This entire process could only take place after the redevelopment of the oil wells; 80.3 At the board of directors’ meeting on 18.12.2013, KPMG informed the board that the KST oil field might generate revenue in 3 to 5 years but the recovery of the investment cost might take a longer period; and S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55 80.4 Adrian admitted under cross-examination that at the material time of December 2013, the extension of 10 years was critical to proceed with the acquisition. [81] Hence, Clause 3.1(a) of SPA 2 signed the next month on 29.2.2014 expressly provides that the agreement was conditional upon the extension of the PMPA beyond its expiry on 14.12.2014 for a further 10 years to 14.12.2024. [82] Dedi Francis, held out to be owner of PT ASU, states in his evidence in chief that he was informed by Augustone Cheong that the insertion of Clause 3.1(a) in SPA 2 was insisted upon by DSC even though this clause was not included in the original SPA. [83] Adrian’s evidence in chief stated that he has no knowledge of any specific reasoning for the insertion of Clause 3.1(a) into SPA 2 as he was not privy to the negotiations between PT ASU and Protasco is confounding when viewed against the matters stated in paragraphs 80.1 and 80.4. I agree with the Plaintiff that such evidence was designed to downplay his having made representations in relation to 10-year extension for the PMPA. [84] Larry and Adrian took the position that the terms of SPA 1 and SPA 2 were negotiated between Kenny Chong and Augustone Cheong without their involvement. Adrian contends that he was merely instructed by Protasco after he became director to facilitate the deal in terms of communication with PT ASU based in Indonesia and that since the beginning of 2014, Protasco apparently gave less instructions for him to facilitate communication with PT ASU. He apparently had the impression S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 that Protasco had meetings with PT ASU without his assistance. The evidence however says otherwise and points ot his active involvement: 84.1 Besides the email between Adrain and Kenny alluded in paragraph 80.1, on 23.12.2013 by letter to PT ASU, Protasco requested for rectification on material issues, informed of instances of non-compliance and due diligence queries raised by the consultants. 84.2 On 10.01.2014, Adrian emailed DSC enclosing PT ASU’s letter dated 10.01.2014 responding to Protasco’s letter dated 23.12.2013. The email speaks of the letter of PT ASU setting out the revised structure of the entire deal, including the new purchase price, the loan to PT ASI for USD5million and the revised profit guarantee. Adrian ends the email by stating that he would like to call for a board of directors’ meeting for ‘the approval of this new deal structure and bring to the closure of this long protracted transaction’; 84.3 On 14.01.2014, Adrian writes to DSC and enclosed a Protasco board paper for the revised deal for his review and circulation. Adrian then informed DSC of the need to have a Protasco ‘BOD meeting early next week to approve’ the revised deal before the CNY holidays; 84.4 On 16.01.2014, Kenny Chong emailed Adrian and Larry with a summary of the outstanding matters in relation to the revised deal. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 84.5 On 21.01.2014, Adrian emailed Kenny Chong informing that as agreed, Protasco is to circulate the board resolution for all the members to approve it by the coming Thursday. Adrian encloses Protasco’s draft board resolution. Adrian ends the email by informing Kenny Chong, ‘Let’s close this chapter before the CNY…’. 84.6 On 22.01.2014, Kenny Chong emailed Adrian and Larry informing that DSC had gotten the green light on the value of the deal from the members of the board. Kenny Chong then requests Larry and Adrian to grant them some time to get the paperwork in order. [85] From the various mail, it is demonstrably clear that DSC and Kenny Chong treated Adrian as if he was representing Protasco in dealing with PT ASU and he was not merely facilitating communication between Protasco’s personnel and PT ASU as claimed by him. The revised structure of the oil and gas acquisition leading to the execution of SPA 2 was clearly the result of Adrian’s dealing with PT ASU and he admits under cross-examination at the very least, that as far as the board of Protasco is concerned, he was the one dealing with the vendor, PT ASU. [86] Dedi Francis’s evidence in chief which attempts to prop Adrian’s position by positing that PT ASU contacted the late Ho Chun Fuat and Kenny Chong in relation to settling the terms of SPA 2 went up in smoke when evaluated: (i) the late Ho Chun Fuat only joined Protasco on 07.01.2014 and SPA 2 was signed on 26.1.2014, 3 weeks later; (ii) there was zilch correspondence between PT ASU and Ho Chun Fuat; (iii) the S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 58 email show it was Adrian who was dealing with PT ASU in settling the terms in SPA 2; (iv) Dedi Francis was not involved personally at all in the negotiations leading up to the execution of SPA 2.He testified that it was Tjoe Yudhis and Global Cap who was dealing with the late Ho Chun Fuat and Kenny Chong leading up to the execution of SPA 2 and that Tjoe Yudhis had reported the product of the negotiations to Larry and Adrian who then report to him. According to Dedi Francis, his instructions were given to Global Cap (which is Larry and Adrian) and then it was Global Cap who instructed Tjoe Yudhis. [87] Larry’s position in his evidence in chief is essentially that: - 87.1 only after he was made a director of Protasco (10.03.2014), he discovered the manner of approval of SPA 1; 87.2 he became aware that the transaction was discussed at previous meeting; 87.3 he was left out of the discussions with regard to SPA 2 and hence not privy; 87.4 he only found out subsequently after joining the board about SPA 2 and its peculiar terms regarding the condition subsequent; 87.5 apparently, after he was appointed as a director, he ‘observed the interactions of the directors present at the various board meetings and concluded that the negotiations were solely handled by CKP on behalf of the S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 59 Plaintiff’s board’. [88] Larry’s postulations however were shot to smithereens as the emails on SPA2 were copied to him, and all he could then muster under cross-examination was a feeble answer that he did not read the emails that were copied to him which I find does not beggar belief. Was Protasco hoodwinked into making a Shareholder’s Advance of USD5million to PT ASI? [89] Prior signing of SPA2, the following events transpired : 89.1 the representative of RISC Operations Pty Ltd (“RISC”) had briefed the board at a board of directors’ meeting on 18.12.2013, that based on the information gathered the oil wells had been abandoned for over 20 years since the last production in 1990/1991. RISC noted that about USD3million would be required in order to reactive the existing well whereas a new well would cost approximately USD4million. 89.2 On 10.01.2014, Adrian forwarded PT ASU’s letter dated 10.01.2014 setting out the proposed revised structure to the entire deal. In the said letter, PT ASU had structured the revised total purchase consideration to USD27million paid by Protasco to PT ASU from which PT ASU would extend the shareholder loan to PT ASI for USD5million. This was then revised in SPA 2 for the purchase consideration to be USD22million with Protasco advancing USD5million to PT ASI to be utilized for the S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 60 purpose of wells reactivation and construction of new wells (if necessary) for the purpose of extending the PMPA agreement. 89.3 Adrian represented that PT ASI requires USD5million for the reactivation of the wells. As shown in paragraph 84 above, Adrian highlighted the urgency of the matter by informing in his email that he would like to call for a BOD meeting the following week for the approval of a new structured deal. [90] Adrian under cross-examination was vehement that the USD5million did not emanate from him but was based on the proposal from RISC. That is not true as RISC estimated approximately USD3million for reactivation of the existing wells whereas new wells would cost approximately USD4million. In the letter by PT ASU dated 10.01.2014 forwarded by Adrian, it was stated expressly that USD5million advance was needed for well reactivation and constructions of new wells for the sole purpose of extending the PMPA Agreement. [91] There is more. Dedi Francis the supposed owner of PT ASU under cross- examination did not even know what the USD5million was for. When questioned on PT ASU’s letter dated 10.1.2014 which was forwarded by Adrian to Protasco, he curiously testifies that ‘As far as I remember, that USD5million sum was required or was needed by Protasco to purchase or to arrange the majority sales, shares. That’s what I remember.’ S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 61 [92] Protasco’s Board had acted upon PT ASU’s purported request as represented by Adrian. At Protasco’s board of directors’ meeting on 23.01.2014, the board agreed to the revised proposed acquisition which included the granting of the advance of USD5million to PT ASI. which is to be utilized by PT ASI solely for the purpose of exploration, wells reactivation and/or construction of wells. But this was not to be. [93] The Shareholder’s Advance of USD5million was paid by Protasco to PT ASI’s CIMB Bank account on 04.02.2014. Unbeknownst to Protasco, Adrian made himself a sole cheque signatory of PT ASI’s CIMB Bank account on 27.01.2014, 2 days prior to the execution of SPA 2 on 29.01.2014. [94] On 10.02.2014, 6 days after USD5million was paid to PT ASI by Protasco on 04.02.2014, Adrian transferred the exact sum of USD5million (equivalent to RM16,250,000.00) from PT ASI’s CIMB Bank account to PT ASI’s Permata Bank Account in Indonesia. He signed the remittance form himself. Adrian in his evidence in chief attempted to explain away his appointment as cheque signatory as follows: 94.1 As he was absent from the board meeting on 23.01.2014, he later learned from Mohd Farid (another director nominated by Larry) that Protasco’s board had agreed to authorize him to manage, monitor and supervise the oil and gas business in Indonesia; 94.2 He was later told verbally by the late Ho Chun Fuat that he would be handling PT ASI’s financial portfolio when the time came; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 62 94.3 Hence in anticipation of the same, he was instructed by Protasco’s board to make a request to PT ASI through PT ASU to allow him to be the authorized signatory of PT ASI’s CIMB Bank account. [95] Protasco’s learned counsel pointed out that Adrian had instructed his solicitors to amend his draft witness statement from “I was later told by the Plaintiff that I would be handling PT ASI’s financial portfolio when the time comes” to “I was later told verbally by the late Ho Chun Fuat from the Plaintiff that I would be handling PT ASI’s financial portfolio when the time comes.” Protasco’s counsel thus submitted that the amended witness statement was filed after the passing of the late Ho Chun Fuat and was clearly designed to ensure that the late Ho Chun Fuat was not able to challenge his assertion in Court. I tend to agree as Adrian’s evidence could not be reconciled with the total body of evidence including as follows. [96] Firstly, the minutes of Protasco’s board meeting on 23.01.2014 do not reflect that the Adrian was to be appointed as a signatory of PT ASI’s bank account to receive the USD5million. When questioned on this, Adrian Ooi was evasive. “OOI: I am not aware. PJS: And you would agree that these minutes do not reflect that you were authorised to be a signatory of PT ASI’s bank account to receive this USD5 million? OOI: I was authorised at PT ASI’s board resolution. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 63 PJS: But not, but the money came from Protasco, Dato'. You were not authorised by Protasco, agree or disagree? OOI: Disagree. PJS: And you just told this Court, that’s why I asked you and I took it down very carefully, that you were not able to take this role because you were not appointed as an officer in PT ASI – OOI: I was appointed – PJS: You were not able to take this role. OOI: I saw my appointment at PT ASI to be the signatory, that one I saw. PJS: Dato', did you disclose PT ASI’s resolution authorising you to be a signatory to Protasco? OOI: No, to the bank account. PJS: Dato', you need to answer my questions. Did you disclose PT ASI’s resolution appointing you to be a signatory of their own bank account to Protasco? OOI: I didn’t get the question. I don’t get your question. PJS: Did you disclose– OOI: To who? PJS: To Protasco that you were appointed as a signatory to PT ASI’s bank account? OOI: It was Ho Chun Fuat, who is a management of Protasco, who asked me to be the signatory. It came from Protasco because Ho Chun Fuat represented Protasco. PJS: Dato', what you are saying, agree or disagree, is not reflected in the minutes of meetings, is not reflected in any documents before this Court? S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 64 OOI: I told you I disagree. I told you that. PJS: Now, this whole thing about Ho Chun Fuat telling you, can I suggest to you is an afterthought? OOI: No. PJS: And you are only bringing Mr Ho Chun Fuat in this after his death, am I right? OOI: No.” [97] Secondly, Adrian did not produce any evidence to back his claim that the instructions for him to be the cheque signatory came from Protasco’s board of directors. Conversely, Tan Yee Boon a member of the board, gave evidence that Adrian was never authorized to be a cheque signatory of PT ASI’s bank account. [98] Thirdly, in Adrian’s s.112 statement to the police made in January 2015, Adrian undertook to provide the police the minutes of meeting where the board had authorized him to become a cheque signatory of PT ASI’s bank account. No such minutes in existence were produced. [99] When confronted as such, Adrian vacillated by stating that as informed by the late Ho Chun Fuat at the board of directors’ meeting on 24.02.2014, he had assumed that PT ASI had already been controlled by the management of Protasco. He testified: “So I assumed that PT ASI had already been controlled by him and the management of this Protasco. So when the change of the, for the cheque signatory comes from PT ASI’s management, which I assumed S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 65 at that time is already under the control of Protasco. That’s why I went on.” [100] I find Adrian’s explanation to be eye-brow raising, self-serving and a disingenuous opportunistic posturing for when he made himself a cheque signatory on 27.01.2014, he could not have gazed into the crystal ball or consulted an astrologer on what the late Ho Chun Fuat will inform him at Protasco’s board meeting a month later on 24.02.2014 that Protasco has taken control of PT ASI. Thus, Adrian’s allegation on what the late Ho Chun Fuat informed him remained just that – an allegation, and a bare one at that. [101] What in fact transpired was, at the Board meeting on 24.02.2014, the late Ho Chun Fuat had informed the board the following: - 101.1 that the advance of USD5million from Protasco to PT ASI for wells reactivation was to show commitment to Pertamina in granting the extension of the PMPA; 101.2 that Dato’ Hanif and DSC would be appointed as members of the Board of Commissioners of PT ASI overseeing the function of the Board of Directors of PT ASI; 101.3 that the proposed PT ASI’s Board would comprise of Adrian, Kenny Chong and a representative of PT ASU; 101.4 that the authorized signatories for PT ASI would also be changed accordingly in due course. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 66 [102] Adrian was present at this Board meeting. He kept quiet and did not disclose he had made himself a cheque signatory 2 days before SPA2 was signed and that he had on 10.2.2014 already transferred away the USD5million. In any case, common sense dictates that there was no need for a change of authorized signatory as what was informed to the board by the late Ho Chun Fuat if it was within the board’s knowledge that Adrian was already the cheque signatory of PT ASI’s account. [103] Adrian’s testimony that he was never made a signatory to PT ASI’s bank account in Indonesia and therefore according to him he had no control over the USD5million and that Protasco was in control of PT ASI pursuant to SPA 2 is not credible at all for firstly his testimony raised the burning question why would he transfer the USD5million of Protasco’s fund to another account outside Malaysia which he has no control over? Second, his testimony blithely ignored the fact Protasco was not in control of PT ASI pursuant to SPA 2 as the transfer of shares from PT ASI to Protasco only took place on 24.03.2014 by which time, the USD5M had long disappeared through Adrian’s very own action. [104] That to the knowledge of the board of Protasco, the signatories to PT ASI’s account were never changed was also made clear at the board of directors’ meeting on 25.07.2014 where Adrian was present as well as the late Ho Chun Fuat (by invitation). In respect of the USD5million, the following statements were made by board members: 104.1 2 board members, Dato’ Mohd Bin Ibrahim bin Mohd Noor and Dato’ Hanif had expressed deep concern over the USD5million Shareholder’s Advance granted to PT ASI; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 67 104.2 DSC informed the board that due to KITAS (Indonesian working visa) problem, Protasco was not able to effect the change of bank signatories for PT ASI and thus not able to manage the USD5million advance. DSC had demanded for a detailed report on the utilization of the USD5million advance. [105] Adrian kept up the pretense and did not see it fit to rebut DSC and remind him of his alleged appointment as signatory since it was his stand that he was instructed by the board to become a bank signatory of PT ASI. Neither did Adrian see it fit to remind the late Ho Chun Fuat that he had instructed Adrian to handle PT ASI’s financial portfolio. [106] The weight and effect of the sum total of the evidence points to only one obvious conclusion - that Protasco was deceived into making the USD5million Shareholder’s Advance . Larry and Adrian’s actions from the time Protasco sought to terminate SPA1 and SPA2 and to seek a refund of the Purchase Consideration and refund [107] A revisit of the salient terms of SPA 2 include the following: - 107.1 Clause 1.1 – instead of the initial acquisition of 76% of PT ASI, Protasco now acquire 63% of PT ASI from PT ASU for a reduced consideration of USD22million instead of USD55million; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 68 107.2 Clause 2.1 – the revised purchase consideration will be satisfied by setting off the deposit of RM50million paid by Protasco pursuant to SPA 1 as part payment towards the purchase consideration under SPA 2. Pursuant to Clause 2.1(ii), a sum of USD5,659,437.00 (equivalent to RM18,393,170.00) was paid to PT ASU on 29.01.2014 and 30.01.2014 being the difference between the purchase price of USD22million and RM50million deposit paid 107.3 Clause 4.3(b) – a Shareholder’s Advance of USD5million (equivalent to RM16,250,000.00) was paid to PT ASI on 04.02.2014 to be utilized solely for purposes of exploration works, well-reactivation and/or construction of wells; 107.4 Clauses 1.4, 1.5, 4.3(b) and Recital F – payments made by Protasco to PT ASU and PT ASI are to be securitized. PT ASU to procure Acclaim, the security provider to provide security in the form of blocked shares in PT Inovisi. PT ASU agrees, undertakes and covenants to sign, seal and deliver and cause the security provider, Acclaim to sign, seal and deliver the share charge in order to give rise to protection of Protasco’s interest; 107.5 Clause 3.1 (a), Clause 3 – the agreement was conditional upon the extension of the PMPA beyond its expiry on 14.12.2014 for a further 10 years to 14.12.2024; the conditions subsequent are to be fulfilled within 6 months of its execution i.e. by 28.07.2014; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 69 107.6 Clause 3.6 - Protasco was entitled to terminate SPA 2 by delivery of notice of termination to PT ASU whereupon PT ASU was obliged to refund the full purchase price to Protasco within 14 days from the date of the issuance of the notice of termination in default of which Protasco is entitled to deal with the Blocked Inovisi Shares at its absolute discretion by requesting the escrow agent/broker to dispose of the secured shares and the sale proceeds therefore be released and paid to Protasco as refund to the purchase price. [108] It is common ground that the conditions subsequent were not fulfilled by 28.07.2014. That Protasco was thus entitled to terminate the agreement and to recover the purchase consideration of USD22million was agreed by Adrian during cross-examination. [109] On 04.08.2014: 109.1 at Protasco’s board of directors’ meeting, the board deliberated PT ASU’s numerous requests for extension of time and instructed Management to issue a letter informing PT ASU that Protasco agrees to extend provided PT ASU and Acclaim fulfilled 2 key conditions and requested PT ASU to revert by 4.00pm on the same day. The board meeting adjourned at 10.00am to resume at 4.00pm to discuss on PT ASU’s reply letter; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 70 109.2 Larry (at 3.01pm) emailed Augustone and Lim Chye Guan and copied Adrian and instructed on the contents of PT ASU’s letter in reply to Protasco’s letter dated 04.08.2014; 109.3 At Protasco’s resumed board meeting at 4.25pm to discuss the contents of PT ASU’s reply letter dated 04.08.2014 proposing 2 options i.e. (i) Option 1 was further extension of time to expire on 30.11.2014 subject to the PT ASU’s agreement to perfecting the charge document on the PT Inovisi’s blocked shares; (ii) Option 2 was the immediate termination of SPA 2 with PT ASU having a call option to buy back the Blocked Shares at a fixed value of USD 27 million within 24 months from the date of termination. The Board deliberated, found that the proposals from PT ASU were not acceptable and, resolved to terminate the deal and instructed Management to issue a termination letter to PT ASU; 109.4 Protasco exercised its right to terminate SPA 2 via Notice of Termination and demanded for a full refund of USD22million; with a copy emailed to Tjoe Yudhis by Chow Siew Meng (Protasco’s Corporate Affairs Director) at 7.38pm; 109.5 Larry (at 11.15pm) emailed Adrian instructing on the contents of PT ASU’s letter in reply to Protasco’s Notice of Termination dated 04.08.2014; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 71 109.6 Adrian (at 11.25pm) emailed Augustone and Larry, copied to Lim Chye Guan to instruct Augustone to prepare a reply to Protasco. [110] On 05.08.2014: 110.1 Protasco emailed Tjoe Yudhis (at his real email address) all the previous correspondences between Protasco and PT ASU; 110.2 PT ASU wrote to Protasco rejecting unilateral termination from Protasco and will only accept mutual termination based on Option 2 as proposed by PT ASU via letter dated 04.08.2014. [111] On 07.08.2014, Tjoe Yudhis visited Protasco’s office. Tjoe Yudhis signed a statutory declaration in Kuala Lumpur. [112] On 11.08.2014 at Protasco’s IC meeting an Investigation Report No.IR 1/110814 dated 11.08.2014 prepared by the Management was circulated and deliberated by the IC. [113] On 14.08.2014, Protasco issued a revised termination letter to PT ASU attentioned to Tjoe Yudhis’s real email address and the same was acknowledged by Tjoe Yudhis on 19.08.2014 (“Revised Termination Letter”). [114] Prior the termination events of 4.8.2014 and 14.8.2014, on 16.07.2014, Protasco wrote to PT ASU for the attention of Tjoe Yudhis S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 72 reminding PT ASU on the expiry date of the fulfilment of the conditions subsequent and enquired on the status of the extension of the PMPA. Chow Siew Meng as Protasco’s Corporate Affairs Director at that material time emailed the letter of 16.7.2014 to Augustone Cheong, with the message that ‘We seek a written reply from PT ASU on matters raised in the attached letter’. [115] As the evidence unfolded: 115.1 Augustone the same day emailed Larry and Adrian for instructions on how to respond to the said letter. On the same day, Larry emailed Adrian and Augustone giving his instructions for PT ASU to reply to Protasco’s letter dated 16.07.2014 and to state that it was Protasco’s own fault for the delay: “You may add and tune the dates etc, the tone has to be clear - it’s Protasco’s own fault for their own delay, and ASI shall stay strong to take legal action if new contract is not obtained. …Reply and slap on the company face as we wish. If want paper, this is paper. Else we do as we plan on corporate: Get my ass into listco Exec Directorship… Key points in the reply. 1st …It is the delay of Protasco in honoring the contract transaction process, and delay of funding to implement Pertamina approved work plan, that all the plan has been delayed until precedence condition are met, and upon met, have to be resubmitted… 2nd. In oil & gas industry, oil contracts are awarded, traded, and financed, usually within days or weeks without much Due Diligence to be made, as most oil field are pre Due Diligence done S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 73 by Pertamina before awarded. Haseba and Pertamina despite Protasco lack of experience in this industry, have tolerated repeatedly delayed such industry practice, and questioned Pertamina’s integrity in awarding oil contract. Such distrust to Pertamina’s contract practice is rare and Pertamina has no obligation in giving priority to fasten the new work plan approval. 5th. In Pertamina perspective, the contract is valid until 31 Dec 2014. It is Protasco’s own stupidity/self-proclaimed- commercial- call in setting own deal line in hope of Pertamina or vendor/ASI to fit Protasco’s own perceived time line. Legally Pertamina and nor the vendor/ASI, would need to entertain Protasco own deadline..” 115.2 On 17.07.2014, Adrian emailed Augustone Cheong (Enc 555 p 198) as follows: ‘Bro, Reply as per his points mentioned below, but in a lighter tone and business like. We will run through it together when your draft is out.” 115.3 PT ASU then issued a letter dated 21.07.2014 to Protasco adopting all the key points given by Larry as set out above. The letter asserted it is Protasco’s fault for the delay/failure in the fulfilment of the Conditions Subsequent, in particular the extension of the PMPA. In the said letter, PT ASU according to Protasco for the first time informed Protasco that Pertamina will only grant a maximum of 3 years’ extension. PT ASU also requested for a further extension of time until 14.12.2014 to comply with the Conditions Subsequent. PT ASU further stated that they were confident that the Conditions Subsequent can be met S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 74 before 14.12.2014 particularly with the impending conclusion of the Indonesian Presidential election. [116] It is pivotal to note: 116.1 Tjoe Yudhis testified he did not sign the letter and has testified that the signature on the said letter is not his; 116.2 Dedi Francis as purported owner of PT ASU was not party to all the email exchanges; he testified that he has delegated Augustone Cheong to take care of PT ASU’s letter dated 21.07.2014 and that he has no personal knowledge of what is set out in the said letter; 116.3 Larry during cross-examination on Protasco’s letter dated 16.07.2014, at the outset completely denied knowledge of the letter and that the letter was not sent over to him. When confronted with his email on the same day Protasco’s letter was received giving instructions on how to reply to the said letter, Larry gave 2 inconsistent answers. First, Larry said that he asked the owner, then the owner asked him to reply, so he gave his comments. He said he was angry when he replied to the letter because according to him he was cheated by DSC. He then said Augustone told him that there was a letter from Protasco and they wanted to terminate. Clearly, Larry was economical with the truth as the letter did not mention anything about termination but rather asked about the status of the compliance of the Conditions Subsequent. Larry then incredulously said that S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 75 he did not read the letter but only gave his advice to Augustone, and then Augustone and “his boss” responded to the letter. 116.4 Adrian when cross-examined on his email giving instructions to Augustone Cheong on how to reply to Protasco’s letter, distanced himself, that he was not the author of the letter. He also testified: “Until today, I just want to clarify, whatever, I don’t know why Dato’ Larry sent an email to me which I am not privy of. Whatever that he said to me, until today, I couldn’t fully comprehend what he is saying – “ [117] Inescapably, the evidence adduced show that Larry and Adrian either through themselves or through their agents, servants and/or nominees were in fact the real authors of PT ASU’s letter dated 21.07.2014. [118] The charade continued. Adrian then attended the AC meeting on 25.07.2014 as a member of the AC. At this meeting, the AC was informed that the SC and Bursa had made numerous enquiries to the management with regard to the proposed acquisition, in particular whether there was in existence a related party transaction between the directors and the proposed acquisition. Bursa had requested information on the vendor PT ASU and the details of the security provider for the block securities and its relationship with PT ASU. Bursa further demanded information on when the proposed acquisition was to be completed, the status of the conditions for completion, and whether it was Larry who brought the deal to Protasco. SC had advised that in order to ensure compliance with good corporate S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 76 governance, Protasco should secure statutory declarations from all directors declaring that they were not connected with the proposed acquisition. To this, Adrian had suggested that Larry and Dato’ Mohd Ibrahim bin Mohd Nor should be exempted from executing the statutory declaration since both of them were only appointed after the proposed acquisition was brought into Protasco. [119] The AC meeting discussed PT ASU’s letter dated 21.07.2014. Tan Sri Hadenan and Dato’ Hanif had requested that the meeting record their dissatisfaction over the contents of the said letter which was deemed to be untrue and issued in bad faith and demanded that PT ASU retract the said letter. Adrian informed the meeting that the vendor had been actively looking for the extension of the PMPA from Pertamina since the execution of SPA 2. Adrian further informed the meeting that it was very common for Indonesian to put the blame on others and shared the view of the meeting over the contents of the letter. The AC including Adrian as reflected by the minutes resolved to recommend to Protasco’s board of directors inter-alia the following: - • to form an IC to conduct the investigation on the parties/companies related to the proposed acquisition and submit the audit report to SC and Bursa; • that all board members execute a statutory declaration declaring their interest, if any, in the proposed oil and gas acquisition; • that management shall provide no further extensions to the proposed acquisition; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 77 • to insist that the vendor retract the letter dated 21.07.2014 which the AC was of the view that the said letter was untrue and issued in bad faith. [120] On account of Larry and Adrian’s involvement in the very issuance of PT ASU’s letter of 21.07.2014, no clearer picture of deceit or at the very least, dishonesty can be described of Larry and Adrian’s conduct behind the scenes and Adrian’s conduct at the said AC meeting. The contemporaneous documentary evidence points conclusively that both Larry and Adrian’s conduct is completely at odds with the duties expected of them as directors of Protasco. More of this same conduct as concerns PT ASU’s letter dated 04.08.2014 to Protasco later. [121] I should say a few words about dishonesty and on the tort of deceit. [122] The essence of a tort of deceit was set out in the landmark House of Lords case William Derry, J. C. Wakefield, M. M. Moore, J. Pethick, And S. J. Wilde Appellants; And Sir Henry William Peek, Baronet Respondent. (1889) 14 App.Cas. 337: “In an action of deceit the plaintiff must prove actual fraud. Fraud is proved when it is shewn that a false representation has been made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, without caring whether it be true or false.” [123] LP Thean JCA in Panatron Pte Ltd & Anor v Lee Cheow Lee & Anor [2001] 3 SLR 405, at [14] explained the tort requires the Plaintiff to prove: S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 78 (i) there must be a representation of fact made by words or conduct; (ii) the representation must be made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the Plaintiff; (iii) the Plaintiff had acted upon the false statement; (iv) the Plaintiff suffered damage by so doing; and (v) the representation must be made with knowledge that it is false; it must be wilfully false, or at least made in the absence of any genuine belief that it is true. [124] The Court of Appeal in Victor Cham & Anor v Loh Bee Tuan [2006] 5 MLJ 359 cited Panatron with approval: “[13] Fraudulent misrepresentation comes under the tort of deceit. To succeed in his claim, the respondent in this case need to establish that he had acted in reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentation and that the representation was false. He further needs to establish that the first appellant had made those statements knowingly or recklessly without caring whether it was true or false. And that as a result of reliance on such representation, the respondent had suffered damage. For the elements of the tort of deceit, see Panatron Pte Ltd v Lee Cheow Lee [2001] 3 SLR 405.” [125] As for what constitutes dishonesty, this is set out in the judgment of Lord Nicholls in the decision of the Privy Council in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378; [1995] 3 All ER 97; [1995] 3 WLR 64 where he said: S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 79 “…Honesty, indeed, does have a strong subjective element in that it is a description of a type of conduct assessed in the light of what a person actually knew at the time, as distinct from what a reasonable person would have known or appreciated. Further, honesty and its counterpart dishonesty are mostly concerned with advertent conduct, not inadvertent conduct. Carelessness is not dishonesty. Thus for the most part dishonesty is to be equated with conscious impropriety. However, these subjective characteristics of honesty do not mean that individuals are free to set their own standards of honesty in particular circumstances. The standard of what constitutes honest conduct is not subjective. Honesty is not an optional scale, with higher or lower values according to the moral standards of each individual. … “All investment involves risk. Imprudence is not dishonesty, although imprudence may be carried recklessly to lengths which call into question the honesty of the person making the decision. This is especially so if the transaction serves another purpose in which that person has an interest of his own.” “…Ultimately, in most cases, an honest person should have little difficulty in knowing whether a proposed transaction, or his participation in it, would offend the normally accepted standards of honest conduct.” [126] It is also useful to refer to s. 17 of the Contracts Act 1950 (“the Act”) where it defines ‘fraud’ as follows: “Fraud’ includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contracts: (a) the suggestion, as to a fact, of that which is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 80 (b) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (c) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (d) any other act fitted to deceive; and (e) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.” [127] Case laws suggest that the evidence required to prove an allegation of dishonesty, stands on the same footing as an allegation of fraud, which in most cases, would depend on circumstantial evidence to prove the allegation. In Ng Pak Cheong v Global Insurance Co Sdn Bhd [1995] 1 CLJ 223; [1995] 1 MLJ 60; [1994] 3 AMR 2663 (HC), Mohamed Dzaiddin J (as he then was) dealt with the reception of circumstantial evidence in proving fraud. The learned judge said, “...it is not the law of evidence that every step in the allegation of fraud had to be proved by calling live and admissible evidence nor is it the law that fraud cannot be inferred in the appropriate case. The inference, however, should not be made lightly; the circumstantial evidence must be so compelling and convincing that bearing in mind the high standard of proof the inference is nevertheless justified...”. [128] In CGU Insurance Berhad v Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd [2006] 3 MLJ 1; [2006] 2 CLJ 409 (CA) Gopal Sri Ram JCA said, “…While mere suspicion is insufficient, it is not the law that a litigant who alleges fraud must unravel each and every act of the person accused of fraud. Like any other fact, fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence with the added proviso that there must be a foundation of evidence and not mere suspicion.” (Emphasis added) S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 81 [129] Larry and Adrian’s conduct throughout the entire saga will give good clues as to whether they are acting honestly and transparently or in a dishonest fashion. Lord Blackburn in Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Company (1876–77) LR 2 App Cas 666 HL(E) had occasion to say: “…is trite law that the thought of man is not triable, for even the devil does not know what the thought of man is... Board of Directors’ Meetings on 25.07.2014 and 04.08.2014 [130] At the board of directors’ meeting on 25.07.2014 following the AC meeting, the board (including Larry and Adrian) had accepted the recommendation from the AC set out in paragraph 119 above with no objection. Consequently, all the directors had executed statutory declarations affirming that inter-alia: 130.1 PT ASU is not a party related (as defined under the Main Market Listing Requirement) to them or any person connected to them (as defined under CA); 130.2 None of the director of PT ASU or its shareholders (including ultimate shareholders) is a party related (as defined under the Main Market Listing Requirement) to them or any person connected to them (as defined under CA); 130.3 that they are not aware of any matter which require the transaction to be approved by the shareholders of Protasco. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 82 [131] The minutes of the board of directors’ meeting on 25.07.2014 reflect that: 131.1 the board had deliberated on PT ASU’s letter dated 21.07.2014 and had without exception ‘expressed its dissatisfaction over the content of the letter which was deemed to be untrue and issued in bad faith and demanded the Vendor to retract the letter’; 131.2 Larry had made the following statements to the board: - 131.2.1 that he was disappointed on the delay in completing the proposed acquisition and the manner the deal was managed; 131.2.2 that had he joined the board earlier, the deal would have been already completed; 131.2.3 that issues relating to oil and gas are national issues in the Republic of Indonesia; 131.2.4 that if it was Pertamina’s practice and / or policy to grant a 2 to 3 years contract, and that was good and acceptable to him; that Protasco should notwithstanding the terms of the SPA 2, not make demands that was outside the norm of Pertamina; 131.2.5 that the proposed acquisition was a good deal for Protasco; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 83 131.2.6 that Protasco should be putting in a concerted effort to salvage the acquisition rather than attempting to call it off; 131.2.7 that from Pertamina’s perspective, the proposed acquisition was considered completed; and 131.2.8 that Protasco should not be insisting on the completion of the Conditions Subsequent as set out in SPA 2. [132] Protasco’s counsel submitted that Larry’s vigorous defence of PT ASU’s position was clearly not in good faith and in the best interest of Protasco as Protasco was entitled to terminate SPA 2 for the reasons aforementioned. I agree. [133] Protasco’s counsel further argued that whilst it is the pleaded case of Larry and Adrian that Pertamina could not have granted the extension sought as Protasco had failed to perform its obligations and prevented PT ASU from carrying out its obligation to secure the extension, no evidence was led by Larry and Adrian during the trial to establish their pleaded defence. This point he asserted, was not put to Protasco’s directors who gave evidence at the trial. Protasco’s counsel suggested not without basis that the reason for this is quite simple: 133.1 Pursuant to SPA 2, Protasco had paid USD5million to PT ASI for the reactivation of the oil wells. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 84 133.2 Adrian unknown to Protasco, had made himself a sole cheque signatory to PT ASI’s bank account which received the said USD5million as testified by himself. 133.3 Surely Adrian would be in the best position to inform this Court as to what happened to the USD5million. [134] Larry when he was questioned during cross-examination that he was aware prior to the 25.7.2014 Board meeting that PT ASU had failed to comply with the terms of SPA 2, he simply responded “I do not know”. When Protasco’s counsel challenged him that he had however expressed his disappointment in the delay in completing the proposed acquisition and the manner in which the deal was managed, he answered “I totally cannot remember. I was very disappointed at that time…I was very shocked. How can they mismanage this project in such a way…”. [135] Viewed against what he and Adrian did behind the scene as alluded earlier, both Larry and Adrian’s testimony are not honest. [136] The minutes of meeting minuted that DSC expressed that he and the board had been advised and relied on Adrian who possessed local knowledge in Indonesia in dealing with matters relating to the deal. Adrian did not at the Board meeting rebut this statement. Adrian testified during cross-examination that he did not interject as there was an argument going on between DSC and Larry at the meeting. When challenged that Adrian had in fact the opportunity during the meeting to rebut DSC’s statement, his evidence was as follows: S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 85 “JUDGE: You have opportunity then to rebut, right. And what’s the answer? OOI: It was not necessary for me to rebut to that statement, My Lady.” [137] The Board minutes reflect that at the end of the meeting, DSC proposed that PT ASU and Acclaim to perfect the charge documents and return the USD5million advance with Adrian being instructed to communicate the same to PT ASU and revert to the board accordingly. In this regard, Adrian testified that he allegedly had a teleconference with Dedi Francis and was told that they were unable to issue any official response to Protasco’s request for the perfection of the charge documents and the refund of the Shareholder’s Advance due to the festive season in Indonesia. However, Dedi Francis under cross- examination testified that he did not have any conversation with Adrian in respect of Protasco’s demand for a refund of USD5million. Dedi Francis testified that he has no knowledge of the USD5million. [138] At Protasco’s board of directors’ meeting on 04.08.2014, Adrian informed the board that he was told by PT ASU that they were still pursuing the application for the extension and therefore PT ASU had requested for extension of time for getting the concession extended. He also informed the board that in view of the festive season in Indonesia, the board of PT ASU was not able to meet and to issue any official letter in response to Protasco’s request on the refund of USD5million and the perfection of charge document. [139] In this regard, Prostaco’s counsel was not wrong to argue that Adrian had simply lied to Protasco’s board and continued his deception as the evidence adduced at trial revealed that there was never any S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 86 previous need for a board meeting by PT ASU to deliberate on issues pertaining to the transaction since the board of PT ASU consisted of Dedi Francis as Commissioner (Komisaris) and Tjoe Yudhis as the President Director. As adverted earlier, Dedi Francis did not receive any call from Adrian, and Tjoe Yudhis was not in the loop. [140] Larry at this board said meeting stated that he has no objection to the termination of the deal but advised the board not to make any rush decision before PT ASU had responded to the company. Larry proposed for a mutual termination to be done amicably. [141] The board meeting was then adjourned for Protasco to issue a letter to PT ASU. [142] Protasco then by letter dated 04.08.2014 issued to PT ASU informed that Protasco is willing to consider an extension of time for PT ASU to fulfil the Conditions Subsequent conditional upon PT ASU agreeing and undertaking to sign, seal and deliver and cause Acclaim to sign, seal and deliver the charge on the secured shares and to procure PT ASI to refund the USD5million advance. [143] Pausing here, it is to be noted that the charge on the secured shares was in fact a term of SPA 2 which PT ASU had yet to comply as at the date of the letter, i.e. 04.08.2014. [144] After the board had adjourned and Protasco had issued the letter of 4.8.2014, unbeknownst to the board, Larry emails Augustone Cheong and Lim Chye Guan and copied Adrian Ooi at 3.01pm with instructions on S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 87 how to respond to Protasco’s letter. PT ASU then by way of letter dated 04.08.2014 on the instructions of Larry responded as follows: - 144.1 PT ASU proposed the following 2 options. (a) The first option is that PT ASU be granted an extension of time till 30.11.2014 in order to meet Clause 3.1(a) of SPA 2 in consideration of PT ASU causing Acclaim to sign, seal and deliver the third- party charge on the PT Invoisi secured shares; OR (b) The second option is immediate termination of SPA 2. PT ASI’s 67% shares to be transferred back to PT ASU or its assignee. PT ASU shall have a call option to buy back the secured PT Inovisi shares at a fixed value of USD27million within 24 months of the termination date. In return, PT ASU shall provide and/or procure Acclaim to charge the secured PT Inovisi shares as third party security for Protasco’s benefit. In the event the call option expired without it being exercised, the secured PT Inovisi shares shall be automatically transferred to Protasco; (c) Protasco shall be provided with a call option exercisable within 24 months of the termination of SPA 2 to buy back PT ASI shares at USD27million in the event PT ASU is unable to obtain a new contract with Pertamina for a further period of 10 years. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 88 144.2 If Option 2 is accepted, PT ASU undertakes to forgo any claims to recover the opportunity losses due to the delay. [145] Protasco’s counsel postulated that PT ASU’s letter dated 04.08.2014 issued on the instructions of Larry reveals the breadth of the fraud committed on Protasco by Larry and Adrian. Learned counsel correctly pointed out: 145.1 Under Option 1, Protasco was to grant an extension of time to PT ASU and in return PT ASU is to perform what it was already obligated to do under SPA 2 without any refund of the USD5million advance; 145.2 Under Option 2(a) and (b), Protasco had already paid USD27million towards the transaction but USD22million was for the purchase consideration for PT ASI’s shares and USD5million was paid as Shareholder’s Advance for the reactivation of the wells. If the Advance has not been spent to reactivate the wells, then the USD5million should be returned to Protasco in any event. It should not have been lumped in with the purchase consideration for PT ASI’s shares; 145.3 This letter also debunks Adrian’s entire evidence that he did not know what happened to the USD5million because Protasco had control over PT ASI. If indeed Protasco had control of PT ASI and had control over the USD5million, then the burning question is why is PT ASU agreeing to refund the USD5million together with the purchase S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 89 consideration of USD22million? Clearly Larry and Adrian had control over the USD5million and the same was never spent on any reactivation of the wells as represented; 145.4 Under Option 2, it sets out should Protasco terminate SPA 2 and Protasco transfer back the shares of PT ASI to PT ASU, PT ASU will have a call option to buy back the secured PT Inovisi shares for USD27million within 24 months from the date of termination. Which means, Protasco transfers the PT ASI’s shares back to PT ASU, Protasco in the meantime cannot deal with the secured PT Inovisi shares and PT ASU is given a call option which it may or may not exercise to buy back the secured shares within 24 months. And in return, PT ASU will cause Acclaim to charge the secured PT Inovisi shares (which in any event it was obligated to do under SPA 2). In the event the call option expires without exercise, apparently the secured PT Inovisi shares will be automatically transferred to Protasco (which is after 24 months); 145.5 Finally, Protasco upon termination is given a call option exercisable within 24 months to buy back PT ASI’s shares at USD27million in the event PT ASU is able to secure the extension to the PMPA with Pertamina. The purchase consideration which Protasco paid was USD22million. The USD5million was paid as an advance for wells reactivation. Under this option, should Protasco exercise the call option, Protasco will be paying a USD5million premium for the purchase PT ASI’s shares! S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 90 [146] Learned Counsel for Protasco drew this Court’s attention to Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Edition) which defined a call option as “an option to buy something (esp. securities) at a fixed price even if the market rises; the right to require another to sell.” A call option operates as an ‘option’ but not an obligation. Meaning PT ASU under option 2, has the option if it chooses to exercise it, to buy back the secured PT Inovisi shares for USD27million. [147] Weighed objectively, these terms could not be said to be in Protasco’s interest at all. [148] Tjoe Yudhis has testified that he did not sign PT ASU’s letter dated 04.08.2014 and the signature on the said letter was not his. He has no knowledge of the same. [149] Larry when cross-examined on his email instructing on the contents of PT ASU’s letter dated 04.08.2014, answered inter alia as follows: - 149.1 that “Of course, I have to think on behalf of my friend’s company. One side is my friend’s oil and gas company and another side is my company”; 149.2 that “I was acting on good intention to protect my company Protasco”; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 91 149.3 that “This is the responsibility as the investor and also director of Protasco. Also for the responsibility as introducer of the oil and gas company”; 149.4 that “I’m the advisor for Chong Ket Pen and also advisor for the oil and gas company”. [150] Protasco’s counsel’s argument was not unattractive when he postulated that: 150.1 Larry in his own words has admitted that he was acting in breach of his fiduciary duties inter-alia in acting in bad faith and not in the best interest of Protasco and had permitted his personal interest to conflict with his duties to Protasco. No disclosure was made by Larry to Protasco that he was instructing PT ASU’s response to Protasco’s letters. In any event his evidence is at variance with his own testimony: - (i) Q&A32 where he testifies that “In any event, CKP cut me off from advising both himself and the 1st Defendant in relation to the PT ASI share deal right after I bought over the Stake in the Plaintiff. Hence I limited my advisory role to purely secretarial and non- deal matters”; and (ii) Q&A53 where he testifies that “No, because after I bought over the Stake in the Plaintiff, CKP instructed me not to advice both himself and the 1st Defendant in relation to the Plaintiff’s proposed share acquisition S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 92 in PT ASI…I did not advise the 1st Defendant on both SPA 1 and SPA 2.” 150.2 Consel therefore submits that Larry was clearly willing to tailor his answers to suit any given situation. [151] As for Adrian, under cross-examination he distanced himself by saying he was not the author of the letter, but he was unsure as he may or may not have contributed to the contents of the letter. [152] Dedi Francis confirmed under cross-examination that there were no discussions with him on the contents prior to the issuance of the said letter dated 04.08.2014. [153] Protasco’s board found that the proposal by PT ASU was not acceptable. The minutes reflect that Adrian attempted to stall the termination by advising Management to seek advice from an external auditor on the financial impact to Protasco following termination. [154] Protasco’s board at the said meeting resolved to terminate the deal with PT ASU and management was instructed to send the termination letter to PT ASU accordingly. It bears mention that Larry and Adrian were party to the decision of the board to terminate the deal with PT ASU. [155] Protasco by letter dated 04.08.2014 informed PT ASU that the proposal provided in PT ASU’s letter dated 04.08.2014 was not acceptable. Pursuant to the terms of SPA 2, Protasco terminated SPA 2 with immediate effect and demanded a refund of the purchase S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 93 consideration of USD22million within 14 days from the date of issuance of the said notice of termination. Protasco’s letter dated 04.08.2014 was emailed by Chow Siew Meng to Tjoe Yudhis’s email address on the same day at 7.38pm. [156] On the same day at 11.15pm, unbeknownst to Protasco, Larry emailed Adrian setting out his instructions on PT ASU’s response to the said notice of termination. Adrian, 10 minutes later at 11.25pm emailed Augustone Cheong and instructs him to prepare a response to Protasco stating that the termination between the two parties can only be based on the exact conditions stipulated under Option 2 of PT ASU’s letter dated 04.08.2014. Adrian instructed that PT ASU is not acceptable to unilateral termination as set out in Protasco’s letter. [157] Premised on Larry and Adrian’s instructions, PT ASU by letter dated 05.08.2014 to Protasco rejected any unilateral termination by Protasco and informed that they were only able to accept a mutual termination based on the exact terms as proposed under Option 2 of PT ASU’s letter dated 04.08.2014. [158] It must be mentioned that Dedi Francis in his evidence in chief states that he had instructed Augustone Cheong to prepare the letter dated 05.08.2014 but the email exchange as alluded above show that it was Larry and Adrian who instructed Augustone Cheong. Dedi Francis was not even in the email loop. When queried about these email exchange, Larry simply avoided answering the question whilst Adrian maintained that he was merely communicating the decision of PT ASU to Augustone Cheong which plainly conflicted with Dedi Francis’s evidence S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 94 that he was the one who instructed Augustone Cheong to issue the said letter. [159] Tjoe Yudhis testified that he did not sign PT ASU’s letter dated 05.08.2014 and the signature on the said letter was not his. He has no knowledge of the same. [160] Protasco posits that the actions of Larry and Adrian as detailed above had denied and deprived Protasco of its rights to recover the purchase consideration and the Shareholder’s Advance paid pursuant to SPA 1 and SPA 2; and that these acts alone committed by Larry and Adrian are sufficient by themselves to make both of them liable in respect of the USD27million paid by Protasco towards the transaction. [161] Protasco had by letter dated 14.08.2014 issued a revised notice of termination to PT ASU demanding for a return of a total sum of USD27million and setting out the Conditions Subsequent that were not fulfilled by PT ASU. [162] PT ASU did not respond to Protasco’s revised termination letter dated 14.08.2014. In this regard, 162.1 Despite Dedi Francis’s testimony in relation to PT ASU’s earlier letters dated 09.05.2013, 25.09.2013, 10.01.2014, 21.07.2014, 04.08.2014 and 05.08.2014, he did not seem to be able to remember Protasco’s said letter dated 14.08.2014 when shown the same under cross- examination as he said it was addressed to Tjoe Yudhis and not him. But Protasco’s previous letters 08.05.2013, S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 95 31.07.2013, 30.09.2013, 23.12.2013, 16.07.2014, 24.07.2014, 04.08.2014, 05.08.2014, 14.08.2014, to PT ASU were also addressed to Tjoe Yudhis! 162.2 Dedi Francis also appeared at sea on the sum demanded by Protasco. He testified to his knowledge, only the purchase consideration of USD22mililion was demanded by Protasco and not the USD5million Shareholder’s Advance. He was not able to shed any light on the utilization and the whereabouts of the USD5million apart from insisting that it was Protasco’s duty to reactive the oil wells. Larry and Adrian’s Further Actions that were not in the interest of Protasco [163] Clause 3.6 of SPA 2 provides that should PT ASU fail to refund the purchase consideration within 14 days from the date of issuance of the notice of termination, Protasco is entitled to deal with the secured PT Inovisi shares at its absolute discretion by requesting the broker to dispose the secured shares and the sales proceed to be released and paid to Protasco as refund of the purchase price. [164] Protasco by letter dated 29.08.2014 to PT Brent effected the Instruction Letter on 29.08.2014 which was purportedly signed by Lim Sue Fern of Acclaim to cancel the Blocked Inovisi Shares and to sell the said shares and to remit the proceeds to Protasco. This was exercised in accordance with Protasco’s right pursuant to Clause 3.6(ii) of SPA 2. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 96 [165] Protaso’s management led by the late Ho Chun Fuat had visited PT Brent’s office on 29.08.2014 to attempt to effect the sale of the Blocked Inovisi Shares pursuant to the duly executed Instruction Letter which was signed by Acclaim and Protasco. However, Protasco’s management was unable to reach one Mr Riky Chainadi of PT Brent despite numerous attempts. The management could only leave a photocopy of the Instruction Letter at PT Brent’s office on 29.08.2014. Protasco did not receive any response from PT Brent on the Instruction Letter dated 29.08.2014. [166] Protaso also attempted to notify Acclaim on its intention to exercise its rights to deal with the blocked PT Inovisi secured shares (“Notice to Acclaim”). However, the Notice to Acclaim was returned by the courier service company as the location of Acclaim was unknown. [167] Protasco then appointed solicitors in Jakarta, Messrs Johnny Situwanda & Partners to serve the original copy of the Instruction Letter to PT Brent and to follow up with PT Brent with regard to the dealing of the blocked securities in the form of PT Inovisi shares. [168] Mr Johnny Situwanda, Protasco’s appointed solicitors in Jakarta, testified at the trial [PW-9] that he had on 22.09.2014 attended to the office of PT Brent and met with the director of PT Brent, one Mr Riky Chaniadi. 168.1 Mr Johnny Situwanda handed over a copy of the Instruction Letter to Mr Riky Chaniadi and requested him to sign and acknowledge the receipt of the said letter from Protasco to PT Brent for the sale of the 297,142,900 shares in PT Inovisi dated 29.08.2014 and the Instruction S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 97 Letter for Cancellation of Blocking of Shares in PT Inovisi dated 29.08.2014. 168.2 Mr Riky Chaniadi was willing to accept the letter from Protasco dated 29.08.2014 and acknowledged receipt of the same by signing on the said letter. However, Mr Riky Chaniadi refused to sign the Instruction Letter for Cancellation of Blocking of Shares in PT Inovisi dated 29.08.2014. 168.3 Mr Riky Chaniadi revealed his email communications on 09.09.2014 with Lim Sue Fern who purportedly had requested PT Brent not to effect the sale on the Blocked Inovisi Shares as Lim Sue Fern had purportedly claimed that she did not sign any Instruction Letter and that the signature on the said Instruction Letter was not hers. [169] Protasco’s unsuccessful attempt through Johnny Situwanda to get Mr Riky Chaniadi to testify at this trial, that the Financial Services Authority (OJK) had on 13.02.2018 revoked the business license of PT Brent; that PT Brent was declared bankrupt on 22.03.2021 pursuant to a decision of the Central Jakarta Commercial Court; and PT Brent is no longer listed as a member of the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) has been adverted to earlier. [170] Counsel for Larry and Adrian had suggested during the cross- examination of Mr Johnny Situwanda that the duly executed Instruction Letter provides that once the said letter is signed by Acclaim (Lim Sue Fern) and counter-signed by Protasco (DSC) constitutes good instruction S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 98 to PT Brent to cancel the blocking and effect the sale of the Blocked Inovisi Shares without further reference to Acclaim. This contention as was pointed out by Protasco’s counsel ignores: (i) the fact that according to Mr Riky Chaniadi, Lim Sue Fern had expressly denied executing the Instruction Letter in the first place; and (ii) Messrs Risman Hutubarat & Rekan who provided the legal opinion on the validity of the Instruction Letter had opined that the Instruction Letter would be good instructions to PT Brent for Protasco to deal with the shares provided it is signed by Acclaim. The dispute by Acclaim of not having executed the Instruction Letter in the first place drew the spotlight on the validity and enforceability of the said Instruction Letter that was procured by Larry and Adrian. [171] Lim Sue Fern was at all material times a sole director of Acclaim who was the 3rd party that provided the securities in the form of PT Inovisi shares for the transaction between Protasco and PT ASU. Lim Sue Fern is the wife of one, See Poh Yee (also known as “Andrew See”) who is a long time partner and associate of Larry. Protasco’s attempt to serve the subpoena and secure the attendance of Lim Sue Fern of Acclaim to testify at this trial were unsuccessful. [172] The evidence adduced show that again behind the scenes, Larry and Adrian acted to prevent Protasco from selling the secured PT Inovisi shares: 172.1 Augustone Cheong on 19.09.2014 at 10.37am emailed Larry and copied Adrian, Lim Chye Guan, On Yong Chieh and Aida. In the said email, Augustone Cheong attached a draft PT ASU’s response letter dated 19.09.2014 that S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 99 was requested by Larry. The said letter drafted on Larry’s instructions expressly states as follows: “We are writing to reiterate that we reject any unilateral termination from Protasco and reserve our rights to take further action, including legal redress to protect our interest.” “We noted that you have made attempts to sell the Blocked Shares provided by the Security Provider, Acclaim Investments Ltd. You have no right to sell the Blocked Shares and we shall continue to take steps to prevent such sale and/or to procure the Security Provider to do so, in order to protect our interest.” [173] When cross-examined on the draft letter that was prepared based on Larry’s instructions as suggested in Augustone Cheong’s email dated 19.09.2014, Larry claimed that the email was apparently sent to him for his comments after Augustone Cheong had purportedly discussed with his boss presumably the said Dedi Francis. According to Larry, he was not able to give his comments to him. Larry evaded answering by simply stating that “I cannot answer the question because I do not know about the details.” [174] Plainly, Larry was not truthful as Larry did in fact respond in his email to Augustone Cheong sent on the same day, 19.09.2014 at 5pm which was copied to Adrian Ooi, Lim Chye Guan and Aida. Larry expressly instructed Augustone Cheong as follows: “Hi Augus, As per my points given, I need this letter to be “peaceful”, seeking proper departure options, while due to force major which DIRECT RELATES to ASU being all the while fulfilled all agreement terms”. Means indirectly hinted S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 100 P is the one that break agreement putting up public information defame ASU of “not fulfilling precedence/terms”. …. ASU is not going to “transfer to P’s name the 3rd party charged asset, means stays is it in 3rd party charges. Else DSC will do like he’s doing now – on his own decision, bang the wall selling shares. Alternatively if no answer from P in a peaceful discharge, ASU shall not seek 3rd party charges to provide such security. Highlight that “P already OWNED the ASI shares (which is “legally owned the asset”), there is no need for 3rd party charge. Which means this is only ASU’s generous courtesy to offer P good discharge. And, word it as ASI shares which “belongs to P already”, if wanted to find new investor, ASU shall provide assistance. … Meaning: Either option 1 above, or option 2 above, shows that ASU is being “KIND AND GENEROUS” to help P flip and contain/retain as much customers as possible, and highlight P actually “owned ASI shares already, dealcompleted, accounting wise has no problem to record as intrinsic/goodwill value/asset”. … Tune again and standby the weapon – wait for either ME or Adrian’s instruction to strike. We do not send to P, just wait until P’s BOD meeting is done next week. Anytime next week onward we will send this. … Conclusion: Looking at P’s self-closed actions, it’s rude and reckless without even negotiate. We need these weapons ready ASAP by coming Monday, before P’s BOD meeting next week. Anytime, if needed, may need to use. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 101 Send both drafts to me & Adrian these 2 days. TQ. Lry” [175] In the same email, Larry attached a draft press release to Augustone Cheong for the issuance by PT ASU. Larry in his email explained that the press release is meant to inter-alia explain that: “3. And stress that ASU being an experience industry player, ALREADY SPENT all their money to 2 new projects, and in the midth of raising new funding of just US$5mil likely from Australia stock exchange (above will slap on P’s face of seeking cash-back from ASU, and ASU being an exploration company, buy/sell oil block is “industry norm”)” [176] Protasco’s counsel pointed out that the draft press release that was attached by Larry to Augustone Cheong contained several false statements in relation to the oil and gas transaction between PT ASU and Protasco. They include inter-alia the following: 176.1 “PT ASU being new to market is ran by reputable and experience retirees in the industry”; 176.2 “We are unaware of sudden request by Malaysia group to ask for early issuance of new contract”; 176.3 “we could not remember who introduce us to Malaysia group”; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 102 176.4 “During Aldilfiltri, we were told the Malaysia group has some complication in giving such letter”; 176.5 “We do not want to take opportunity to simply terminate our agreement, we try to hold on our guarantor and awaits malaysia group reply”; 176.6 “At least we fulfill as per agreement by giving Malaysia group time to slowly digest.”; 176.7 “we were advised to terminate the SPA as Pertamina latest changes may alter SPA terms even though deem force majeure due to policy changes risk, we still awaits amicable reply from Malaysia group”. [177] Confronted with such clear evidence of his instructions to Augustone Cheong in relation to the letter to be issued by PT ASU and the press release, Larry evaded providing any explanation to the court on the contents of his email and press release and maintained his unconvincing position that he was merely providing general comments. [178] It is not difficult to conclude from PT ASU’s letter which was drafted upon Larry’s instructions and Larry’s own email on 19.09.2014, that Larry and Adrian were aware that Protasco was attempting at the material time to unblock the secured PT Inovisi shares and to sell off the same. The PT ASU’s draft letter and email further reveal that Larry and Adrian were actively at the material time preventing Protasco from doing the same. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 103 Board of Directors’ Meeting on 22.09.2014 [179] The IC that was set up by Protasco to investigate the transaction presented its findings of the investigation and its investigation reports to Protasco’s board of director meeting on 22.09.2014. The board at this meeting resolved to proceed with legal action against PT ASU, Larry and Adrian to recover the purchase price of USD22million and the Shareholder’s Advance of USD5million. [180] Larry’s own email on 19.09.2014 shows that he was anticipating Protasco’s directors meeting on 22.09.2014, and both he and Adrian had expected that Protasco were going to take legal action against the both of them in relation to the total sum of USD27milion paid towards the oil and gas acquisition and instructed Augustone Cheong to prepare PT ASU’s letter and press release to be used as a response to outcome of the Board meeting. Their contending at trial that the board meeting was conducted despite their absence as they were away on a family vacation and that they were belatedly informed of the outcome of the Board meeting do not add to their defence at all. The IC Investigation [181] As alluded earlier at paragraph 115 and 125, the IC was formed by the board on 25.07.2014 after the board accepted the recommendation of the AC to form an investigation committee to investigate the parties related to the proposed acquisition. It bears repetition that Adrian was a party to the decision of the AC and both Larry and Adrian were members of the board that agreed to form the IC. As shown above, the premise of the IC investigation was to address the queries made by the Securities S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 104 Commission and Bursa which are listed out in the AC minutes itself which include inter-alia: 181.1 Whether the proposed acquisition has been completed. If not, when will it be expected to complete as it was coming to two years; 181.2 What are the status of the conditions that had yet to be met for completion? What will happen if the Proposed Acquisition would be called off? 181.3 Who is Acclaim Investments Ltd that provided the security to Protasco for the Acquisition and why? 181.4 Will the oil concession be extended? 181.5 Did Tey Por Yee bring in the deal to Protasco? 181.6 What is Tey Por Yee’s position/role in Protasco? 181.7 Why was the revised purchase consideration being reduced from the original USD55million? [182] The IC found inter alia the following: (i) Larry had brought the proposal for this transaction to Protasco through his vehicle Global Capital Limited; (ii) The President Director of PT ASU, Tjoe Yudhis , had acted at all times as a nominee of Larry and Adrian ; he had taken instructions from them in respect of all matters pertaining to PT ASU; Tjoe Yudhis had only signed SPA 1 and SPA S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 105 2 in relation to the proposed acquisition. The other correspondences to Protasco by PT ASU purportedly signed by Tjoe Yudhis did not in actual fact bear his signature (iii) TjoeYudhis had not received any of Protasco’s letters during the negotiations leading up to the execution of SPA1 and SPA2; the purported email address of the Tjoe Yudhis which was used by management to correspond with him was not his real email address and hence never reached him; (iv) Larry and Adrian were and remain the effective beneficial owners of PT ASU, PT Inovisi, Acclaim Investment Limited etc. Notwithstanding this, they had not disclosed their personal interests in PT ASI to Protasco as required by law; (v) Tjoe Yudhis had not received the letters issued or transmitted to him vide email because the email address given was the same as the address for another company known as Nextnation Communication Berhad where Larry and Adrian are the substantial shareholders; (vi) Larry and Adrian or through their agents had authored and forged the signatures of Tjoe Yudhis on the PT ASU letters issued in reply to Protasco’s letters; (vii) Lim Sue Fern the director of Acclaim, as the third party that had provided security for the repayment of the deposit of S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 106 RM50 million who signed the Letter of Instruction is the spouse of Andrew See Poh Yee. See is a director and shareholder in 24 companies linked to Larry; (viii) See, Larry and Adrian are the partners of Global Capital Limited that had first introduced the transaction to Protasco; (ix) PT ASU, PT ASI, Acclaim, PT Green Pine and PT Goldchild and PT Inovisi are owned, related or the alter- ego of Larry and Adrian. [183] Larry and Adrian’s position is that the entire IC investigation was a sham, with no proper investigation, no minutes of meetings nor inquiry being conducted by the IC. Larry and Adrian’s web of companies [184] I next deal with the companies PT ASU, PT ASI, Acclaim, PT Inovisi, and PT Green Pine said to be controlled or beneficially owned by Larry and Adrian. [185] Pursuant to s .122A of Companies Act 1965 (s. 197 CA 2016), a body corporate is deemed to be connected with a director if it, or its directors, are accustomed to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of that director or that director and persons connected with him, are entitled to exercise, or control the exercise of, not less than fifteen percent of the votes attached to voting shares in the body corporate. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 107 PT ASU and PT ASI Tjoe Yudhis acted at all material times as a nominee of Larry Tey and Adrian Ooi [186] Tjoe Yudhis testified that: 186.1 he was appointed as the President Director of PT ASU by Larry; 186.2 Larry and Adrian were his bosses in respect of PT ASU and other entities known as PT Goldchild Indonesia Sukes (“PT Goldchild”); 186.3 Larry and Adrian were to his knowledge, owners of PT ASU, PT ASI, PT Goldchild, PT Inovisi, PT Green Pine and PT Nusantara Rising Rich (“PT NRR”); 186.4 he takes instructions from Larry and/or Adrian on all matters concerning PT ASU and PT Goldchild; 186.5 he was instructed by Larry and/or Adrian to sign SPA 1, SPA 2 and the Power of Attorney; 186.6 he was also instructed by one Lim Chye Guan, an employee of Larry and Adrian to sign documents in relation to the opening of the bank account on behalf of PT ASU with CIMB Bank Berhad’s Plaza Damansara branch; 186.7 he was not involved in any negotiations leading to the signing of SPA 1 and SPA 2; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 108 186.8 he was not kept informed or briefed on matters related to SPA 1 and SPA 2; 186.9 he did not sign the letters dated 09.05.2013, 25.09.2013 and 10.01.2014 issued by PT ASU. He did not issue these letters and the signatures contained therein are not his; 186.10 he did not sign the Supplement Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 28.06.2013; 186.11 he did not open any bank account on behalf of PT ASI. [187] Tjoe Yudhis had affirmed statutory declarations on 07.08.2014, 18.08.2014, 29.08.2014 and 26.09.2014 in Kuala Lumpur alluding to the matters set out in the preceding paragraph. As proof that Tjoe Yudhis had at all times taken instructions from Larry and Adrian with regards to PT ASU, he exhibited email exchanges in his statutory declaration dated 26.09.2014 (Exhibit P75). [188] Tjoe Yudhis’s testimony as set out above is consistent with and is corroborated by the other evidence adduced at trial. Tjoe Yudhis’s role in PT ASU [189] Tjoe Yudhis was appointed as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of PT Fantasi Artis Media Entertainment (“FAME”) by Larry. Tjoe Yudhis was requested to sign a Confidentiality Agreement in respect of his appointment as CEO of FAME. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 109 [190] Sometime in the year 2012, Tjoe Yudhis was approached by Larry and offered a position to source for business opportunity and project in the oil and gas industry for Larry. This was due to Tjoe Yudhis’s purported contacts within the Indonesian administration. [191] On the instructions of Larry, Tjoe Yudhis was instructed to sign a Consultancy & Service Agreement which purportedly appointed him as a consultant to help secure business in Indonesia. The said agreement was emailed to Tjoe Yudhis with Larry’s instructions for him to execute the same. The said Consultancy & Service Agreement was executed on 27.06.2012 between Tjoe Yudhis as the Consultant and PT Goldchild represented by its Managing Partner, Tey Por Yee (Larry) and Partner, Ooi Kock Aun (Adrian). [192] The said Consultancy & Service Agreement expressly provides that Tjoe Yudhis (Consultant) ‘shall report directly to the Client’s top management including Managing Partner (Advisor) Larry Tey, followed by Partner (Group CEO) Adrian Ooi, or any Client’s assigned reporting person subject to project needs, on a regular basis. Day to day project progress reporting, Buyer or Seller or Suppliers or Consultant contacts shall be directly to Adrian Ooi on timely basis, project filtering and selecting process shall be discussed with Larry OR Adrian Ooi directly’. [193] In the email exchange between Tjoe Yudhis, Jason Minos who has a Global Cap email domain, Suriany who also has a Global Cap email domain and Larry using a risingrich email domain on 06.09.2012, which is the same day PT ASU was incorporated, reveals that Tjoe Yudhis was instructed to execute several documents in relation to incorporation of an entity called Whisperdusk Finance Corporation which was purportedly S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 110 incorporated for purposes of being involved in the oil and gas industry. The documents Tjoe Yudhis was asked to sign included his consent to act as director and resolution approving the change of name and authorized capital. [194] Tjoe Yudhis had expressed hesitancy in executing the documents as he was unaware of what the documents were related to until being instructed to do so by Larry in his email sent on 06.09.2012 at 5.59pm. Larry explains to him that the company in question was for an oil and gas project and once the project was secured, it was to be transferred to a listed company and Tjoe Yudhis will be discharged. Larry further informed him that he will forward his data to Dedi Francis to process. Prior to Larry’s instructions, Tjoe Yudhis had expressed thanks to Larry and referred to him as ‘THE CEO of the group’. [195] PT ASU was incorporated under the laws of Indonesia on 06.09.2012. As of 06.09.2012, Dedi Francis was the Commissioner (Komisaris) and Tjoe Yudhis was the President Director of PT ASU. Dedi Francis holds 1,249,999,999 shares of Rupiah 100 each in paid up capital of PT ASU whereas Tjoe Yudhis holds 1 share. As of 28.12.2012, PT ASU holds 99.99% of the equity interest in PT ASI. As of 24.03.2014, the Director of PT ASI is one, Edward Farolan. [196] On 07.09.2012, Larry writes to Dedi Francis and instructs him that Tjoe Yudhis’s salary will be paid from PT NRR. Dedi Francis was instructed to transfer Rupiah 10million monthly to Tjoe Yudhis. Larry further instructed Dedi Francis that Tjoe Yudhis will be handling ‘2 project nominee now, 1 in batu 1 in oil field bidding’. Larry had also instructed S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 111 Dedi Francis to let Tjoe Yudhis use the office at Bellagio Jakarta (CBD32/En.555/p170). [197] The abovementioned email conversation does not suggest as contended by Larry in his evidence in chief that the email was sent in relation to the advisory services that he was providing to PT ASU. The drift of the email were clearly in the form of instructions. Larry’s assertion that this email sent in September 2012 were advisory services he provided to PT ASU is in conflict with his s. 112 statement given to the police dated 27.01.2015 where Larry said he only knew about PT ASU after the agreement between PT ASU and Protasco was executed. Larry made no mention at all in his s. 112 statement to the police about his purported advisory role as a consultant to Dedi Francis and his prior relationship with PT ASU and PT ASI which were raised at the trial. [198] In a later email on 25.10.2012, Larry informed Tjoe Yudhis that his KTP (Indonesian Identity Card) had expired. Tjoe Yudhis was instructed to email an updated copy to Larry. Tjoe Yudhis was reminded by Larry Tey that “We are holding new migas company shares under 2 persons name – you and Dedi. Focus.” [199] On 26.10.2012, Tjoe Yudhis was also instructed by Larry Tey to provide information requested for the oil and gas project (migas) as the project needed the profile of “real person” and not anyone “on the street”. In response to Tjoe Yudhis’s email, Larry Tey had on 27.10.2012 informed Tjoe Yudhis “No dangerous”, Tjoe Yudhis is “holding my $” in the companies just like how corporate did in which Larry named Adrian and Dedi Francis. According to Larry, he had only appointed 10 people as nominees in corporate. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 112 [200] It can irresistibly inferred that Larry’s emails to Tjoe Yudhis and Dedi Francis were in the form of instructions and not advice and that they treat Larry as a superior in the organization. [201] Tjoe Yudhis testified that he was instructed by Larry and Adrian to execute SPA 1, that he flew down to Kuala Lumpur to execute SPA 1 at the end of November 2012 and he subsequently flew down to Kuala Lumpur again to open a bank account on behalf of PT ASU. [202] Although SPA 1 is dated 28.12.2012, DSC testified that in order to show good faith to Larry Tey as per his request, DSC had signed SPA 1 in advance before 28.12.2012. This is corroborated by the email sent by Messrs Teh & Lee on 29.11.2012 where the solicitors of Protasco states that DSC intends to sign the SPA 1 the next day at 11am. [203] The email exchange from 17.04.2013 to 23.04.2013 and 10.06.2013 between Adrian, Deny, Augustone Cheong, Larry and Tjoe Yudhis, reveals that Tjoe Yudhis and Dedi Francis were not involved in giving instructions on the due diligence involving PT ASU undertaken under SPA 1. The instructions emanated from Adrian. [204] Tjoe Yudhis’s position as a nominee is manifestly evident in the email exchange between Deny, Larry, Lauren Gunawan and Tjoe Yudhis on 04.04.2013: 204.1 Tjoe Yudhis informed Deny that Larry told him that before he signs any documents, those documents should be copied to Larry. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 113 204.2 Deny responded to Tjoe Yudhis on the same day informing him that the group never intends to harm nominees (‘grup tidak pernah bermaksud membahayakan nominee’). 204.3 Deny further informs Tjoe Yudhis that there are 2 principles, firstly, group need nominees and nominees need group (‘grup butuh nominee dan nominee butuh grup’) and secondly, group trust nominees and nominees trust the group (‘grup percaya nominee dan nominee percaya grup’). 204.4 It is manifestly obvious from this email exchange that Tjoe Yudhis is a nominee for Larry and Adrian and not Dedi Francis as Dedi Francis was not even in the email loop. [205] The email exchanges between 29.07.2013 and 30.07.2013 between Adrian, Larry, Deny and Tjoe Yudhis, shows that Tjoe Yudhis had emailed Larry and Adrian to request their consent for him to execute a power of attorney to Messrs Makarim & Taira granting them authority to check on court cases involving PT ASU. As is obvious in the email exchange, Adrian on 30.07.2013 at 4.32am instructed Tjoe Yudhis that it was “Ok to proceed”. [206] Tjoe Yudhis’s testimony that he did not sign the letters dated 09.05.2013, 25.09.2013, 10.01.2014, 21.07.2014, 04.08.2014 and 05.08.2014 issued by PT ASU and did not sign the Supplement Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 28.06.2013 is corroborated by the evidence S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 114 given by the Forensic Document Examiner, Lim Yok Chaw [PW-4] who had opined that the signature in the aforesaid documents is of different authorship from the specimen signatures of Tjoe Yudhis. [207] On 30.10.2013, Larry instructed Tjoe Yudhis via email sent at 11.34am to “Come office before 12 noon, finish up this part today. Project is waiting.” [208] On 23.04.2013, Deny (PT Inovisi’s staff) had emailed Tjoe Yudhis, copied to Larry and Adrian, to inform Tjoe Yudhis that his signature was needed for the execution of office lease agreement of PT ASI and PT PIL. The email exchange between Qimie (also known as Faizatul Ikmi binti Abdul Razak) of Global Cap and other personnel of Global Cap on 18.12.2013 reveals that flight arrangements were made for Tjoe Yudhis to fly down to Kuala Lumpur on Adrian’s instructions in relation to the opening of PT ASU’s bank account in Kuala Lumpur. Qimie is an employee within the Nexgram group of companies. According to Aida (PW10) who works as a legal officer in the Nexgram group together with Qimie, Qimie reports to Larry. [209] Tjoe Yudhis apart from being instructed to execute the power of attorney, SPA 1 and SPA 2, was not involved at all at any stage of the transaction between Protasco and PT ASU. He was not involved in the correspondence between PT ASU and Protasco leading up to termination of SPA 2 and thereafter. Tjoe Yudhis just like Dedi Francis was not in the email loop between Larry Tey, Adrian Ooi and Augustone Cheong in drafting PT ASU’s response letters dated 21.07.2014, 04.08.2014 and 05.08.2014. Tjoe Yudhis testified he only became aware of the said PT ASU’s letters dated 21.07.2014, 04.08.2014 and 05.08.2014 when he S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 115 came down to Kuala Lumpur to meet with Protasco’s personnel on 07.08.2014. [210] After Tjoe Yudhis’s visit to Kuala Lumpur and having received the revised termination letter dated 14.08.2014 from Protasco, Tjoe Yudhis had called Larry to inform him that he had in his possession Protasco’s termination letter. Larry had instructed Tjoe Yudhis to give the said letter to Adrian for Adrian to handle the rest of the matter. Tjoe Yudhis then emailed the letter to Adrian via email on 24.08.2014. In the said email, Tjoe Yudhis stated clearly that he has no idea and no information of what has happened between PT ASU and Protasco. As pointed out by Protasco’s counsel, Adrian’s response is telling when he states, “We are expecting this letter already”. [211] At a meeting on 09.10.2014 held at Ritz Carlton Hotel Jakarta, Indonesia between Larry, Adrian, Dedi Francis, Tjoe Yudhis, Hendra Setiawan (Tjoe Yudhis’s brother-in-law) and 2 of Hendra’s friends who were also lawyers. The following transpired. 211.1 Adrian told Tjoe Yudhis: (i) that he is only a nominee director and no way they (means Protasco) can touch him personally. Adrian further told Tjoe Yudhis that both he and Larry were friends with Tjoe Yudhis for so long and will not put Tjoe Yudhis in a position that will jeopardise him. (ii) that he is supposed to be a side player but has become a main player by signing all the statutory declarations in Kuala Lumpur. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 116 211.2 Adrian and Larry wanted Tjoe Yudhis to unwind what he had declared and then he can come down as a director. Larry also said that they will put a very strong man as a director to replace Tjoe Yudhis. 211.3 Larry when asked by Hendra Setiawan as to who he was, he replied that he is Tjoe Yudhis’s “boss”. 211.4 Hendra Setiawan had raised the issue, whether Tjoe Yudhis’s signature had been forged in company documentation. Larry’s response was that it did not matter as Tjoe Yudhis was just a nominee in the company, like an actor who signed up who should just follow the scripts. 211.5 Larry informed Tjoe Yudhis that if he wanted to resign as a nominee, he could go ahead and Larry will get somebody much smarter . 211.6 Larry further told Tjoe Yudhis that Tjoe Yudhis had a script to follow, and he had already agreed to everything and because Tjoe Yudhis was not a “good actor”, Larry will find another “actor” to replace Tjoe Yudhis. Adrian also said that they do not simply put someone from the street. The reason why they put Tjoe Yudhis is because they trust him. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 117 211.7 When Hendra Setiawan raised the issue as to whether Tjoe Yudhis’s signature had been forged, Larry said that all the bosses in Indonesia use nominees. 211.8 Tjoe Yudhis told Larry and Adrian that he just wanted to resign from all the companies including Anglo Slavic Petrogas, PT ASU and Green Pine. Tjoe Yudhis reminded Larry and Adrian that they still owe him Rupiah 200million or 250million as reimbursement for his expenses incurred for work done by Tjoe Yudhis as director of Anglo Slavic Petrogas. [212] It is pertinent to observe that although Dedi Francis was present at the meeting, Tjoe Yudhis was requesting for reimbursement for expenses incurred as a director of Anglo Slavic Petrogas from Larry and Adrian, but not from Dedi Francis. [213] After the meeting on 09.10.2014, Larry informed Tjoe Yudhis that he would like to meet Tjoe Yudhis personally. Both Larry and Tjoe Yudhis then met on 15.10.2014 at the JW Marriott Hotel Jakarta, Indonesia. The following transpired: 213.1 At the said meeting, Larry explained to Tjoe Yudhis for the first time his version of events leading up to the transaction between PT ASU and Protasco. Larry’s version of events to Tjoe Yudhis shows that Larry was desirous to get this deal completed as quickly as possible and he felt cheated by DSC for stalling the deal. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 118 213.2 Larry informed Tjoe Yudhis that he put Tjoe Yudhis’s name as a director and nominee for his companies. Larry also referred to his email to Dedi Francis on 07.09.2012 which was copied to Tjoe Yudhis where Dedi Francis was instructed by Larry to pay Tjoe Yudhis a consultancy fee of Rupiah 10million for handling 2 projects as a nominee. 213.3 Larry further informed Tjoe Yudhis that Tjoe Yudhis is just a nominee and as a nominee, the company can always get even a driver (supir) to sign documents for Tjoe Yudhis. 213.4 Larry also informed Tjoe Yudhis that once Tjoe Yudhis became a nominee, he already surrendered his rights and being a nominee is ok for other people to sign on his behalf as even an office boy and driver (supir) can sign for Tjoe Yudhis. 213.5 To Tjoe Yudhis’s question on why Larry gave orders to fake his signature, Larry did not deny the same but instead tried to explain to Tjoe Yudhis why his signature was forged. Larry informed Tjoe Yudhis that he was always not contactable and “because no time”. 213.6 When Larry was asked by Tjoe Yudhis as to why Larry did not tell Tjoe Yudhis anything about the transaction between Protasco and PT ASU, Larry said because Tjoe Yudhis never read what he signed. Larry further said that because Tjoe Yudhis is just a nominee, Tjoe Yudhis is not S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 119 supposed to know every detail as it is secret. When asked by Tjoe Yudhis as to why he forged his signature, Larry tried to justify that he can do that because Tjoe Yudhis is just a nominee. 213.7 Larry said that he was the one who asked Tjoe Yudhis to run FAME. 213.8 Larry also said he will instruct Dedi Francis to be present at the time when Tjoe Yudhis will revoke the statutory declaration the following day. Counsel for Protasco was quick to point out that by this statement made by Larry Tey, it is clear that Dedi Francis act under Larry’s direction and/or instruction. [214] The audio recordings are consonant with the fact that Tjoe Yudhis is a mere nominee of Laryy and Adrian. When cross-examined on the transcript of the meetings on 09.10.2014 and 15.10.2014, Larry was mainly evasive. When asked a simple question whether Larry would agree that in the conversation with Tjoe Yudhis, he was asking Tjoe Yudhis to revoke his statutory declaration, he answered: “TEY: I shall reiterate, at that point of time, I do not even know what is this legal SD is. So, suddenly Yudhis went and make up a fake SD. For the corporate knowledge that I know, this is company’s matter. He doesn’t want to suffer then there’s no need for him to suffer all these lame things. Because when I talked to Dedi, Dedi can also appoint a professional to just replace him. Like TikTok US also engaged a very clever CEO to go and fight US Government. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 120 How did I know Chong Ket Pen can only catch this only Tjoe Yudhis to use his mouth only to create all these things, and then can use this legal case to drag on until now?... PJS: Dato’ Tey, you are not answering my questions. You’re going here, there and everywhere, and that is why we’re taking up so much time with this. If you carry on like this, I cannot finish today. And there is no email in the bundle of documents before this Court where Tjoe Yudhis emails Dedi Francis. All the conversations are with you, you understand? TEY: Stop twisting the facts. I’m saying in email, he knows that he reports to Dedi Francis. I didn,t say he, don’t twist the fact and say that he wrote the letter to Dedi Francis. I shall reiterate again, Teh Hong Piow will never reply your email, even though he’s the owner of Public Bank. The question you asked me just now was a twist of fact, therefore, I don’t know how to answer you. PJS: …He is your employee. He is your nominee. That’s why you say, “I’m his boss”. Correct? TEY: Totally wrong. Company engaged me as advisor, the people down there of course I say they are the boss. Public Bank engaged me as consultant, so it is very common for me to say the people down there are my bosses.” PJS: …Now, Dato’ Tey, basically, you were complaining to Tjoe Yudhis that Dato’ Sri had stalled the injection of the oil and gas project into Protasco, that is your complaint. That was your complaint to Tjoe Yudhis. TEY: I disagree. PJS: Why you disagree, Dato’? S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 121 TEY: Firstly, I cannot remember whether I said all this to Tjoe Yudhis. Secondly, Chong doesn’t even allow me to go inside Protasco, how do I know how does the deal work? So, if I’m in Protasco, then maybe he doesn’t need to hurt me, hurt Protasco or hurt Indonesian anymore. Chong Ket Pen only thinks of himself, therefore he had drag me in, drag Indonesian and also drag the Protasco in. The contents of this transcript is a fact. But however, whether I mentioned all this to Tjoe Yudhis or not, I cannot remember. PJS: Again this shows, what I’ve just highlighted to you here, this shows that you were the one pushing this deal through. That’s why you said, “Then come January 2014, I was very angry.” And, “I said, come on, you promise us to finish up. Why you take so long? Ok?” You were pushing this deal through. You were insisting that this deal be completed and you were very well aware of the progress of this deal. TEY Totally disagree. I pushed him is because I was wondering why he doesn’t want to make me the director. PJS: …But this shows, and whatever I’ve shown you, this meeting shows that you are Tjoe Yudhis’ boss. You are the one that instructs him in PT ASU. TEY Luckily, I have read the entire transcript. When did I instructed him? I’m just merely telling him the things which I know, if I know. And you conveniently said that I gave instruction, so which paragraph shows the instruction? I’m not even having the power and authority. If I can give instruction, would have given him instruction not to meet Chong Ket Pen in August. [215] Adrian under cross-examination on the transcript of the meetings merely disagreed and repeatedly answered, “I cannot confirm”. When S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 122 asked about Tjoe Yudhis’s statutory declaration which set out the events that took place at the said meetings, Adrian merely responded that he was not very sure, and he disagreed. When asked if he had gone through the statutory declarations affirmed by Tjoe Yudhis in 2014 which Adrian had knowledge of since November 2014 as committal proceedings were commenced against Gideon Tan, Larry Tey and Adrian Ooi, Adrian merely replied “I wouldn’t say I’ve gone through it”. [216] Whilst in the main, Adrian and Larry’s responses under cross- examination were that they disagreed or could not confirm the statements attributed to them at the meetings, Larry under re-examination attempted to provide an explanation of his own of what was said in the recordings but did not attempt to clarify the answers given by him under cross- examination. [217] As alluded earlier in this judgment, it bears repetition that the accuracy of the transcripts that were transcribed by the transcriber, Ms Manpreet Kaur [PW-6], was never challenged by Larry and Adrian and there is no issue of tampering of the audio recordings being raised by Larry and Adrian. [218] Tjoe Yudhis had contemporaneously signed a statutory declaration in relation to the events that transpired at the meetings on 09.10.2014 and 15.10.2014 in Jakarta. His statutory declaration also set out in summary: 218.1 Larry and Adrian requested Tjoe Yudhis to reverse his earlier statements signed in Kuala Lumpur by signing a new statutory declaration which was given to him through Pak Jan Adam Tangkilisan at the Sushi Tei Restaurant S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 123 on 16.10.2014; 218.2 Larry and Adrian assured Tjoe Yudhis that they will get him out from this problem provided Tjoe Yudhis revoke the statutory declarations he made in Kuala Lumpur; 218.3 Larry informed Tjoe Yudhis that if Tjoe Yudhis were to sign a statutory declaration that Larry was comfortable with, then Larry will let Tjoe Yudhis resign from PT ASU, Anglo Slavic Petrogas and PT Green Pine; 218.4 At the meeting on 17.10.2014, Larry disagreed with the draft prepared by Tjoe Yudhis together with Hendra Setiawan and Heriyanto. Larry asked Tjoe Yudhis to just sign the draft statutory declaration that was given to him at the Sushi Tei Restaurant. Larry informed Tjoe Yudhis that if he did not execute the statutory declaration Larry wanted, Larry will come after Tjoe Yudhis and sue him. [219] Tjoe Yudhis’s testimony of events that took place at the meetings on 16.10.2014 and 17.10.2014 were corroborated by Hendra Setiawan (PW7) and Heriyanto (PW8), both are lawyers practicing in Indonesia. Hendra Setiawan is the brother in law of Tjoe Yudhis and Heriyanto was at the material time a partner of Hendra Setiawan. PT ASU and PT ASI’s Addresses [220] Protasco adduced evidence at the trial to show PT ASU and PT ASI shared a common address with, Global Cap, PT NRR, PT Inovisi, PT Green Pine, PT Goldchild, Telecity Investments Limited (“Telecity”), S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 124 Nutox Limited (“Nutox”) and Fast Global Investments Limited (“Fast Global”) as follows: 220.1 Global Cap and PT NRR have the same address as PT ASU and PT ASI at Menara Anugrah, 19th Floor, Kantor Taman E3.3, Lot 8.6-8.7, Kawasan Mega Kuningan, Jakarta; 220.2 PT Inovisi, PT Green Pine and PT Goldchild have the same address as PT ASU at Patrajasa Office Tower, 21st Floor, Kuningan Timur Setiabudi, Jl Gatot Subroto, Kav 32-34 Jakarta; 220.3 PT NRR, Telecity, Fast Global and Nutox have the same address as PT ASU at 18, Jalan Bayu Segar 4, Bayu Segar, Cheras 56100 Kuala Lumpur. Ownership of PT Inovisi / PT Green Pine / Acclaim [221] The corporate and shareholding structure of PT Inovisi at the material time in 2012 and 2013 were as follows: - 221.1 PT Green Pine owns 60.25% shares in PT Inovisi; 221.2 Acclaim owns 8.3% shares in PT Inovisi; 221.3 PT Inovisi owns 60.0% shares in PT Goldchild; 221.4 PT Inovisi owns 100% shares in Code Wireless Pte Ltd. Code Wireless Pte Ltd owns 100% shares in Abamon Technology Sdn Bhd; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 125 221.5 PT Inovisi owns 100% shares in PT Cakra Daya Energy. [222] When Adrian became a director of Protasco on 10.12.2012, it was announced by Protasco that Adrian was the Finance Director/Chief Finance Officer of PT Inovisi. Adrian’s wife, one Adeline Teoh Geok Poh was at all material times the Commissioner of PT Inovisi. [223] The pleaded defence of Larry and Adrian was that they are not the beneficial owners of PT Inovisi, PT Green Pine and Acclaim. They pleaded that “It is ludicrous” for Protasco to allege that Larry and Adrian are owners of PT Inovisi which is a public listed company in the Indonesian stock exchange with a market cap close to USD1billion. [224] Under cross-examination, Adrian testified that Dedi Francis and his friend, one, Anton partly own PT Inovisi. Larry under cross- examination testified that PT Inovisi is a public listed company and it was absurd to say that Adrian and himself were in control of PT Inovisi. Dedi Francis however disputed he had control over PT Inovisi. He said “I purchased this share but it’s a public listed company in Jakarta” and he does not have control over PT Inovisi. [225] As for Acclaim, Adrian testified in his evidence in chief that he was told by Dedi Francis that Acclaim was controlled by him and his local Indonesian business associates. Larry in his evidence in chief testified that Acclaim is owned by Dedi and Dedi’s associate. Under cross-examination Larry and Adrian maintained that they do not own, and control Acclaim and Acclaim was Dedi Francis’s company. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 126 [226] Both Larry and Adrian had repeatedly maintained under cross- examination that there was no need at all material times during the pendency of the transaction for them to declare any interest in PT ASU, PT ASI and Acclaim as the said entities were not related parties to them. But the evidence adduced at trial however revealed that Larry and Adrian were in fact the controlling shareholders of Acclaim, PT Inovisi and PT Green Pine. [227] On 04.11.2013 at 11.49am, Qimie emailed Grace Chin, the Assistant Manager of Vistra Corporate Services (SEA) Pte Ltd (“Vistra”) (‘Subject: Transfer of shares – Green Pine Holdings Ltd and Acclaim Investments Limited’) instructing for the transfer of the shares of Acclaim and Green Pine Holdings Limited to Larry and Adrian. When questioned under cross- examination, Adrian admitted that the transfer of shares in S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 127 Acclaim and Green Pine Holdings were for himself and Larry in November 2013. In the said email, Grace Chin was requested to: 227.1 transfer the current shareholding of Green Pine Holdings Limited to:- (i) Existing shareholder will hold 45% (ii) Mr Tey Por Yee – 30% (iii) Mr Ooi Kock Aun – 25% 227.2 Transfer the current shareholding of Acclaim Investments Limited to: (i) Mr Tey Por Yee 85% (transfer from Lim Sue Fern) (ii) Mr Ooi Kock Aun – 15% [228] On 08.11.2013 at 4.40pm, Grace Chin wrote to Qimie informing her that they have updated the Register and proceeded with the request (by Qimie) to procure the Certificate of Incumbency (COI) and Certificate of Good Standing (COGS). [229] On 12.11.2013 at 2.04pm, Qimie wrote to Grace Chin requesting for a copy of the COI and COGS to be provided urgently as she has been chased for the same by the Management. [230] On 12.11.2013 at 2.50pm, Qimie wrote to Adrian informing him that she has yet to receive the COI and COGS from the registered agent. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 128 [231] On 12.11.2013 at 3.09pm, Adrian Ooi in reply to the same email thread with the title ‘Subject: Transfer of shares – Green Pine Holdings Ltd and Acclaim Investments Limited’ instructed Qimie to get the COI and COGS out by tomorrow as the documents were needed “very urgently for submission to our bank”. Adrian admitted that he was instructing Qimie to get the transfer of shares documents of Acclaim and Green Pine Holdings urgently for the purpose of submission to the bank. [232] On 13.11.2013 at 2.37pm, Lim Hui Ting from Vistra emailed Qimie and copied Adrian Ooi and Grace Chin, enclosing a certified copy of COI, COGS, Register of Directors and Register of Members of Acclaim Investments Limited. A perusal of the COI enclosed in the said email shows that Acclaim is 100% owned by Larry Tey and Adrian Ooi holding 85% and 15% respectively. A perusal of the Register of Director attached in the email showed that Lim Sue Fern is a director of Acclaim. The Registers of Member attached showed that Larry Tey and Adrian Ooi are shareholders of Acclaim holding 85% and 15% respectively in November 2013 as transferred from Lim Sue Fern. [233] Aida [PW-10] was an ex-employee of the Nexgram Group of companies handling legal matters for Larry and Adrian and she reported to Larry and Adrian whom she referred to as her “bosses”. [234] On 28.01.2014 at 10.37pm, Adrian Ooi instructs Aida to immediately remove himself and Larry Tey as shareholders of Acclaim. Adrian Ooi instructed Aida that all 100% shares are to be transferred to Lim Sue Fern and the said share transfer is to be backdated to 13.01.2014. Clearly this instruction was issued because SPA 2 was to be executed the very next day (29.01.2014). Adrian Ooi plainly was aware of S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 129 the prohibition of related party transactions because in the said email he informed Aida that “As Acclaim is providing the collateral INVS shares to Protasco, we do not want it to be an RPT transaction”. [235] Protasco’s counsel pointed out that Dedi Francis the purported owner of Acclaim was not involved in the instructions given to change the shareholdings of Acclaim. Neither was the purported nominee of Dedi Francis, the said Lim Sue Fern’s consent sought for the transfer of shares. Lim Sue Fern was not involved in the email loop for the change of shareholdings in Acclaim. [236] Whilst Larry and Adrian had attempted to explain away the instruction for the change of shareholding from Lim Sue Fern to them on 12.11.2013 and then back to Lim Sue Fern on 28.01.2014 (backdated to 13.01.2014) by claiming that there was a request by Dedi Francis for a fund raising exercise, there was no explanation proffered for the change in Green Pine Holdings’ shareholdings which appeared in the same email thread from 04.11.2013 to 13.11.2013 (which Adrian Ooi was copied). There was no explanation as to why the emails record that Green Pine Holdings is 55% owned by Larry (controlling 30%) and Adrian (controlling 25%). [237] Adrian when confronted with these emails under cross- examination merely responded that “I was not privy to this email”. However, Adrian Ooi forgot that his email sent to Qimie on 12.11.2013 at 3.09pm (which is in relation to transfer of shares in Green Pine Holdings Ltd and Acclaim Investments Limited) is in response to the email thread starting from 04.11.2013 bearing the same title “Re: transfer of shares – Green Pine Holdings Ltd and Acclaim Investments Limited”. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 130 [238] Adrian testified in his evidence in chief that on or about the beginning of 2013, Dedi Francis had apparently informed him that the sole shareholder and director of Acclaim at the time was Lim Sue Fern, who held the share on trust for Dedi Francis. Adrian knew Lim Sue Fern as the wife of his colleague in Global Cap, Andrew See Poh Yee. Adrian did not disclose the fact of this relationship to Protasco as he purportedly was informed that Dedi Francis is the beneficial owner of Acclaim. [239] SPA 1 was dated 28.12.2012. Adrian testified he had procured the securities and the blocking letters in December 2012 itself. Protasco’s counsel posed a striking question: If Dedi Francis had only informed Adrian in the beginning of 2013 that he in fact is the owner of Acclaim, it does beg the question who did Adrian think own Acclaim when he procured the securities and the blocking letters in December 2012? [240] Adrian and Larry in an attempt to explain away themselves as registered shareholders of Acclaim as evident from the above email exchange, testified that the reason for them appearing as registered shareholders of Acclaim is that they were apparently requested to be nominee shareholders of Acclaim for the sole reason of raising funds from an International Financial Institution using PT Inovisi’s shares that were owned by Acclaim at the material time. According to Adrian due to his professional qualification and regional financial experience, “it would be more effective for him (rather than Dedi Francis who was a businessman without much corporate and banking exposure) to approach the regional financial institutions and private equity firms to raise funds for Acclaim using PT Inovisi shares. According to Adrian, these funds were raised in both Singapore and Hong Kong”. Larry and Adrian further testified that S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 131 after the fund-raising exercise for Acclaim completed, their names were removed as shareholders of Acclaim. But there are material inconsistencies in the evidence led by Adrian and Larry in respect of the purported fund-raising exercise for Acclaim: 240.1 Under examination in chief, Adrian testified that his name was removed as the shareholder of Acclaim after the fundraising exercise was successful. 240.2 Under examination in chief, Larry testified that he had declined to provide his services to Dedi Francis for the fundraising to avoid the potential conflict of interest with his other client, DSC. 240.3 However, under cross-examination Larry Tey testified that he became a shareholder to raise financing but the fundraising was not successful. [241] Dedi Francis in his evidence in chief in his witness statements said that he is the beneficial owner of the shares in Acclaim and Lim Sue Fern was holding the shares on his behalf but testified under cross- examination that he was in actual fact not the owner of Acclaim. Dedi Francis further stated under cross-examination that he would not be able to testify on the business dealings of Acclaim from 2012 to 2014. In re- examination, he was not asked to explain the inconsistencies between his evidence in chief and the answer he gave in his cross-examination when he unequivocally stated that he is not the owner of Acclaim. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 132 [242] An email exchange between one Jan Adam Tangkilisan (also known as Pak Jan, a Non-Affiliated Director in PT Inovisi), Jerry, Adrian and Larry from 23.05.2014 to 26.05.2014 relate to a legal case involving PT Green Pine, which is PT Inovisi’s largest shareholder. The email shows Adrian instructing PT Inovisi’s personnel on the conduct of the legal suit and Adrian setting the amount of fees payable to the expert witnesses. Adrian by email on 04.06.2014 sent at 5.30pm by him to Lim Chye Guan and On Yong Chieh, Adrian records the advance of Rupiah 200million personally made by him to PT Green Pine for the legal fees to be incurred by PT Green Pine for the legal case. Adrian was also entrusted with pre- signed blank cheques in relation to PT Green Pine’s funds as made evident by an email exchange on 20.06.2014 between Adrian and Jerry. Another email exchange between Adrian, Jerry, Pak Jan Adam Tangkilisan, Lim Chye Guan and Tyty on 02.06.2014 and 03.06.2014 further revealed that Adrian was in control of the finances of PT Green Pine. These evidence suggest Larry and Adrian had control over PT Green Pine and PT Inovisi. PT Goldchild [243] Besides the Consultancy & Service Agreement which provides that Tjoe Yudhis is to report directly to Managing Partner (Advisor) Larry, followed by Partner (Group CEO) Adrian, Adrian being a cheque signatory of PT Goldchild, there are also email showing Larry and Adrian giving instructions on PT Goldchild’s coal project and Larry instructing of what the commission would be for a successful project involving PT Goldchild that suggest plainly both Larry and Adrian had control over PT Goldchild. PT Goldchild also shares the same address as Global Cap, PT Inovisi and PT Green Pine. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 133 Evidence of Dedi Francis (DW-2) [244] Larry and Adrian’s pleaded case contend that they do not have any interest in PT ASU, PT ASI and/or Acclaim. Larry and Adrian plead that Dedi Francis is the owner of PT ASU and at all material times, Tjoe Yudhis is answerable to Dedi Francis as the Commissioner (Komisaris) of PT ASU. Tjoe Yudhi’s evidene has debunked this. [245] Larry and Adrian contend that Dedi Francis is the owner of Acclaim. Lim Sue Fern is Dedi Francis’s nominee in Acclaim. Acclaim owns 8.3% in PT Inovisi; that PT Green Pine is controlled by Dedi Francis and his local Indonesian associates. PT Green Pine owns 60.25% in PT Inovisi; Dedi Francis as such owns approximately 68.55% of PT Inovisi; and Fast Global is one of Dedi Francis’s investment companies. [246] Dedi Francis however testified under cross-examination that he does not own Acclaim. He also testified that PT Green Pine is not one of his companies and he does not control PT Inovisi which conflict with Larry and Adrian’s evidence. [247] Pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Lim Guan Eng v Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 MLJ 14 at p 47; [1998] 3 CLJ 769 at p 788, it is well established that a party is bound by the evidence of witnesses whom he calls in proof of his case and this rule is enforced with full rigour in civil cases. [248] In Kheam Huat Holdings Sdn Bhd v The Indian Association, Penang [2000] 7 MLJ 74; [2000] 1 LNS 355, Abdull Hamid Embong J (as S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 134 His Lordship then was) applied the principle in Lim Guan Eng’s case and held that the plaintiff was bound by the evidence of its witness, even if it is damning in some parts. [249] In my opinion, the evidence of Dedi Francis when analysed and weighed up show he does not seem to have much of a clue about SPA1, SPA2, why the Supplemental Agreement dated 28.06.2013 was entered into, why the purchase price for PT ASI shares was reduced, why the USD5million advance was needed from Protasco, what happened to this advance, he does not even know PT ASU and PT ASI had a bank account in Kuala Lumpur, does not know sum of USD5million was transferred from PT ASI’s CIMB Bank account in Kuala Lumpur to PT ASI’s account with Permata Bank in Jakarta; does not remember whether PT ASI had a bank account at Permata Bank in Jakarta; does not know why the transaction was terminated and how much Protasco was demanding as refund. He had a proclavity to contradict himself and for the most part, his answers were either liberally peppered with “I left it to Global Cap”, “I was advised by Global Cap”, “I left it to Augustone Cheong”, “I left it to Larry Tey and Adrian Ooi”, “I don’t remember” or was unintelligible. His evidence I find in fact does not assist Larry and Adrian one whit. Far from it. The money flow on the USD27million paid by Protasco [250] Protasco has proven that it has paid USD27million to PT ASU and PT ASI as follows: 250.1 deposit amount of RM50million to PT ASU ASU’s Account No. 14610001187109 with CIMB Bank Berhad S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 135 on 28.12.2012 via Protasco’s RHB Bank Berhad cheque no. 884012 (“1st Tranche”); 250.2 the balance purchase consideration of USD5,659,437 (equivalent to RM18,393,170.00) into PT ASU’s account with CIMB Bank Berhad (Account No. 14610001363109- i) on 29.01.2014 and 30.01.2014 (“2nd Tranche”); and 250.3 the amount of USD5,000,000.00 (equivalent to RM16,250,000.00) into PT ASI’s account with CIMB Bank Berhad (Account No. 8600288860) on 04.02.2014 (“3rd Tranche”). [251] On 27.10.2014, Larry via his corporate vehicle, Kingdom Seekers commenced an action in Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No.22NCC-407- 10/2014 against DSC, Kenny Chong, RS Maha Niaga and its directors and Protasco [“Derivative Action or “Suit 407”]. Protasco was the 7th Defendant in the suit. In paragraph 27 of the said Amended Statement of Claim, Larry pleaded inter alia that PT ASU, PT NRR, Fast Global and Telecity are all related and associate companies accustomed to dealing with each other. [252] Larry was hoisted by his own petard when at a press conference on 28.10.2014, in a press statement annexed with a chart showing the money trail of RM50million paid by Protasco to PT ASU and from PT ASU to PT NRR, Fast Global and onwards to Telecity, ultimately with RM10million paid to RS Maha Niaga. The chart exhibited by Larry Tey further details that a sum of RM16million paid by Protasco’s subsidiary to PT Goldchild thereafter flowed to PT NRR, Fast Global and ultimately to Telecity. Larry revealed and provided some supporting documentation of S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 136 the following: - 252.1 Protasco’s RM50million paid via Protasco’s RHB Bank Berhad cheque no. 884012 was deposited into PT ASU’s CIMB Bank’s account; 252.2 from the RM50million deposited with PT ASU, a sum of RM9,868,000.00 was paid out to an entity called Fast Global; 252.3 from the RM50million deposited with PT ASU, a sum of RM5,642,000.00 was paid out to an entity called PT NRR; and 252.4 that from Protasco’s monies of RM5,642,000.00 that was received by PT NRR from PT ASU, a sum of RM4,980,000.00 was paid out to an entity called Telecity. [253] As regards the money trail chart, Adrian despite having made a police report on 27.10.2014 stating that he was informed by PT ASU of the payments made as detailed in the chart changed his position under cross-examination to say that he got the information from his previous counsel, Gideon Tan and Larry who obtained the same from PT ASU. [254] Larry testified that it was Dedi Francis that provided the chart showing the money trail to him for his use in the press statement. According to Larry, the chart was created by Augustone Cheong who was Dedi Francis’s advisor. Larry later back tracked to say he did not know who created the chart but it was Dedi Francis who have given him the S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 137 money trail chart. Dedi Francis when cross-examined on the chart attached to Larry’s press statement testified that he did not make the chart and did not supply all the information contained in the chart to Larry and Adrian. According to Dedi Francis, he only supplied information in relation to PT ASU and PT NRR. Dedi Francis had no clue as to why PT ASU, Fast Global, PT NRR and Telecity are related and associated companies and the purpose of the various payments made between entities that are supposedly owned by him. In any case, the money trail in the chart is completely at odds with Dedi Francis’s statement to the police that the USD22million was used to pay off suppliers and investors and he left the payments of monies out of PT ASU totaling USD22million to Tjoe Yudhis. This exceprt when he was under cross-examination is revealing: “JUDGE: If you don’t mind, I just want to clarify something. PJS: Sorry. JUDGE: Is it usual in Indonesia that they give instructions, multi- million dollar instructions orally? Biasanya? PJS: Pak Dedi, Judge is asking you a question. DEDI: My Lady let me answer you, since we already have a contract with Global Cap, wherein I believe in Global Cap, I fully believe in Global Cap to run a proper transaction, to run a proper company. Usually, I don’t like have a discussion using emails. I prefer to meet in person because all have been based on contract. That’s why I did that orally, verbally My Lady. PJS: So if the instructions to the consultants are verbal, how does he keep a record? S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 138 DEDI: I have a small note myself wherein I have my own staff who can get me help. PJS: So- DEDI: I was questioned by Your Lady just now whether it is normal to do transaction verbally, I am not saying, in fact in Indonesia it is not normal but here my case, because I have trusted my consultant, any communication, verbal communication I gave I made a small note for own self. Here to answer the question raised by Pak Peter, how can I can trace, record or keep I have a small note and assisted by my staff. PJS: So he says he makes his own notes, is it? JUDGE: Mr Peter, he said at least two times, he makes a small note and he’s got a staff to assist him. PJS: Alright. I heard that. JUDGE: Dua kali, he said. PJS: He makes a small note and he’s got a staff to assist him. Is he able to produce any of those notes for us? Very important, Pak Dedi. DEDI: My staff held the small note and it had been long time, and I don’t know where my staff is now. This business has been done. I don’t have any records with me because share has been paid, has been transferred so I don’t have any record with me anymore.” Payments by PT ASU to PT NRR S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 139 [255] Based on the documents given by Larry during press conference, it was revealed that PT NRR received a sum of RM5,642,000.00 from PT ASU after Protasco made the payment of RM50million on 28.12.2012. The breakdown is as follows: 255.1 On 02.01.2013, PT ASU paid RM1,300,000.00 to PT NRR [En.554/p324]. The exact sum of RM1,300,000.00 was paid out by PT NRR to Larry ’s margin account with JF Apex Securities [En.554/p323]. Dedi Francis does not remember the purpose of making such payment to JF Apex but testified that he was involving in giving instructions for such payment as he signed it. 255.2 On 29.01.2013, PT ASU paid RM792,000.00 to PT NRR [En.554/p742]. The exact sum was paid out by PT NRR to CIMB Investment Bank Berhad. Dedi Francis does not remember the purpose of such payment to CIMB Investment Bank . Larry denied that this payment was made to CIMB Investment Bank under the instructions and for the benefit of himself and Adrian. 255.3 On 04.02.2013, PT ASU paid RM2,050,000.00 to PT NRR [En.554/p329]. The exact sum was paid out by PT NRR to CIMB Investment Bank Berhad [En.554/p14]. Dedi Francis testifies that this payment was made for share investment but he does not remember which shares were bought at that time . The said sum was made to CIMB Investment Bank Berhad to purchase Hytex Integrated Berhad’s (“Hytex”) shares by Dedi Francis/PT S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 140 NRR wherein Larry Tey was a substantial shareholder of Hytex at the material time. 255.4 On 06.02.2013, PT ASU paid RM1,500,000.00 to PT NRR. 255.5 When questioned on the purpose of each payment paid out by PT NRR, Dedi Francis brandished the same banal answers ‘I don’t remember’, ‘I really forgot, it’s been along time’, ‘I forgot, I don’t remember’. [256] Based on the documents given by Larry during the press conference, PT NRR received a sum of RM4,980,000.00 from PT Goldchild on 06.02.2013. This payment made by PT Goldchild originated from the payment made by Protasco’s subsidiary on 05.02.2013. The exact sum received by PT NRR was paid out to Telecity on 07.02.2013. 256.1 When questioned as to why PT Goldchild (a company not owned by Dedi Francis) transferred RM4,980,000.00 to PT NRR, Dedi Francis answered, ‘I forgot this. I don’t know’. Dedi Francis agreed that he does not remember because he was not involved in giving instructions for this payment. 256.2 When questioned on the said payment by PT NRR to Telecity, Dedi Francis at first said ‘It’s a form of the yield of my investment to other company’ then he said he ‘may not remember’. When pressed further as to why PT NRR paid Telecity to make investment and why can’t PT NRR S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 141 make the investment itself, Dedi Francis said ‘I may not remember the detail of Telecity Investment for instance, to Dato’ Chong, I may not remember the details’. When questioned by me on what he meant, Dedi Francis said ‘Dato’ Chong investment is a pinjaman’. He further said ‘That is one of the examples if you ask me the form of the investment. Because the money I lent to Dato’ Chong was not from this money’. This is but one of the many instances of Dedi Francis being incoherent in answering relatively simple questions in the face of objective evidence placed before the court and casts considerable doubt in my mind as to the veracity of his evidence. [257] PT ASU after receiving RM50million paid by Protasco on 28.12.2012, on 30.01.2014, transferred a sum of RM3million and RM5million to PT NRR . 257.1 Dedi Francis under cross-examination testifies that he ‘may agree’ that this sum of RM8million originated from Protasco’s monies. 257.2 The same exact sum of RM3million and RM5million was then transferred by PT NRR to Telecity on 30.01.2014. When questioned as to why PT NRR make such transfer of RM8million in total to Telecity (which Dedi Francis said is also his company), Dedi Francis said there is no certain reason as to why can’t PT ASU pay directly to Telecity, nothing wrong to transfer from one company to his another company. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 142 Payment by PT ASU to Abamon [258] On 28.12.2012 and 31.12.2012, PT ASU transferred a sum of RM4.3million and RM4.6million respectively to Abamon [En.554/p498- 497]. This total sum of RM8.9million paid out by PT ASU to Abamon was after PT ASU received the RM50million from Protasco on 28.12.2012. 258.1 Dedi Francis cannot remember and had no idea about Abamon. When questioned as to why PT ASU transferred RM8.9million to Abamon a company which he cannot remember and has no idea about, Dedi Francis answered ‘I handed over PT ASU to my consultant, Augustone. Augustone could collaborate with Yudhis. The signature there was Yudhis, so whatever Augustone recommended it was done by Yudhis. My purpose to invest was I put my money, I trust it to the consultants, and I want to earn a profit. Regarding the flow, all are provide for by my consultants.’ 258.2 When questioned would he agree that he has no involvement in giving instructions for the payment of funds from PT ASU to Abamon, Dedi Francis said ‘I was informed by my consultant, and I would respond, I would tell my consultant do the best as to how I could earn profit’. 258.3 When further questioned if the consultant informed him the purpose of PT ASU making such payment to Abamon, S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 143 Dedi Francis said ‘I cannot remember what the purpose of the payment was, but I instructed them what to be paid have to be paid.’ 258.4 As to why Abamon paid RM8.9million to Telecity (which he claims is his company), he admits that he was not involved in the payment because Abamon is not his company. 258.5 Under cross-examination, Larry agreed that he heard of Code Wireless Pte Ltd which was a subsidiary of Nexgram before being sold to PT Inovisi. Code Wireless Pte Ltd is the sole shareholder of Abamon. 258.6 However, when shown to Larry that Mohd Zamzuri bin Zakaria (“Mohd Zamzuri”) is the husband of Qimie (who reported to Larry according to Aida) was one of the directors in Abamon as of July 2014, Larry replied ‘I am not her wife. I don’t know, at which point of time which people they want to use. I don’t know. Why ask me?’. 258.7 Mohd Zamzuri informed the police in his s.112 Statement that he is not aware of Abamon’s bank account, not aware of being appointed as the cheque signatory of Abamon, never signed any cheque for Abamon except being appointed as director of Abamon. Mohd Zamzuri further informed the police in his s. 112 statement that he only heard of the name Larry Tey Por Yee and Adrian Ooi Kock Aun but has never dealt with them before. Mohd S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 144 Zamzuri only dealt with Qimie on matters relating to Abamon. 258.8 When shown to Larry the s.112 statement made by Mohd Zamzuri to the police, Larry despite being the boss of Qimie (according to Aida), denied strenuously that Qimie is his subordinate who reported to him and that Abamon is another entity owned and controlled by him through Qimie. [NOP/En.699/p313] [259] On 07.01.2013, Abamon transferred the exact sum of RM8.9million to Telecity [En.554/p146,499,494]. 259.1 Dedi Francis claims he is the owner of Telecity despite he was never appointed as a director or cheque signatory for Telecity. Dedi Francis have not met the 2 registered account holders of Telecity namely, Mohd Ablynisyam bin Abdullah (“Mohd Ablynisyam”) and Teh Yee Peng. However, Dedi was kept informed of the movement of funds of Telecity by his consultants, Larry and Adrian. 259.2 Dedi Francis do not have knowledge as to why Telecity received RM8.9million from Abamon after Abamon received the exact sum from PT ASU. 259.3 When asked as to how Dedi Francis give instruction to Mohd Ablyhisham (whom he said he did not meet and deal directly), he answered he received suggestions from his consultants, Larry and Adrian. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 145 259.4 Protasco argued that Larry and Adrian have control over the bank account of Telecity for reason as follows: - (a) Dedi Francis does not seem to know the details of the transactions and left it all to Larry and Adrian. (b) Mohd Ablynisham in his s.112 statement [En.584/648-649] informed the police that he works in Nextnation Communication Berhad (now known as Nexgram Holdings Berhad) and his boss is Larry. (c) Mohd Ablynisham further informed the police that he does not know about the bank account, transactions of the account and the cheque signatory of Telecity’s bank account. 259.5 There was a change of cheque signatory of Telecity to On Yong Chieh in 2012 [En.554/p142-145]. On Yong Chieh in his s.112 statement informed the police that he agreed to be the cheque signatory of Telecity without getting paid by Telecity however he received payment from Larry in cash as his fees [En.583/p660- 661]. (a) When questioned on On Yong Chieh’s statement to the police that he was paid by Larry as he does freelance work to handle banking matters of Larry, Larry agreed in part as he claimed that On Yong Chieh also does provide some advisory services to Dedi Francis. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 146 (b) When questioned that Larry was the one who paid On Yong Chieh for being cheque signatory of Telecity, Larry replied ‘I wish to reiterate here there are two separate issues here. I indeed engaged him, asked him to do some works to pay him. Pertaining to the transaction of this company, he reported to Pak Dedi. So, how Dedi pays his salary has got nothing to do with me. This 112 statement was created by you, a trap to trap him. You created this for the police.’ (c) I tend to agree with Protasco that Larry’s contention cannot be true as Dedi Francis had only heard of On Yong Chieh (as On but not the full name). Dedi Francis does not even remember instructing on the change of cheque signatory of Telecity to On Yong Chieh. [260] The evidence adduced at trial revealed that after Telecity received the sum of RM8.9million from Abamon on 07.01.2013, a sum of RM191,715.00 was paid out by Telecity to Larry and Adrian respectively on 15.01.2013. It is clear that the said sum of RM8.9million received by Abamon was transferred by PT ASU on 28.12.2012 and 31.12.2012 which originated from the RM50million paid by Protasco on 28.12.2012. [261] The evidence adduced also revealed that Telecity acquired shares in Asdion Berhad where Larry was a major shareholder and Adrian was holding a minority stake of 1.5million shares. Dedi Francis does not know why Telecity purchased shares in Asdion Berhad. He does not know S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 147 why PT NRR invested in Asdion Bhd. He does not remember details about Asdion Bhd and did not know that Larry was a shareholder of Asdion Berhad. Payments from PT ASU to Telecity [262] After Protasco made the payments of RM50million on 28.12.2012 and USD5,659,437.00 on 28.01.2014 and 30.01.2014 to PT ASU, PT ASU then made the following payments to Telecity: - 262.1 the sum of RM8million on 30.01.2014 [En.554/p157-158] 262.2 the sum of RM2.3million on 30.01.2014 [En.554/p159- 160] 262.3 the sum of RM90,000.00 on 05.06.2014 [En.554/p191- 192] [263] Dedi Francis had no clue of the aforementioned payments and he said ‘it should be asked to my consultant’ which is Augustone. Dedi Francis said Augustone will report the inflow of funds to him regularly. He contradicted himself when he first testified on 31.05.2022 that all instructions to Augustone was done through Larry and Adrian and he never instructed Augustone directly. He changed his position to say that ‘for some cases I first informed or consulted Larry but for other cases, I sometimes directly instruct Augustone.’ [264] According to Dedi Francis, “it is ok for me to transfer funds from one company to my other own company.” S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 148 “DEDI: I have no purpose because the flow of the 1 money should be like that. I think it is something correct. PJS: No, why should the flow of the money be like that? DEDI: There was no certain reason. PJS: Alright. JUDGE: What was the last few words? No certain reason? PJS: Certain reason, yes. TRANSL: There was no – JUDGE: No certain reason.” Payments made by Telecity to other entities [265] After receiving monies from PT ASU, Telecity then made the following payments: - 265.1 The sum of RM4.6million to Nutox on 27.01.2014 [En.554/p152-153]; 265.2 The sum of RM1million to Nutox on 12.02.2014 [En.554/p166-167]; 265.3 The sum of RM4.05million to Kellminster Group Inc on 27.01.2014 [En.554/p150-151]; 265.4 The sum of RM2.46million to Zoomic Technology (M) Sdn Bhd on 27.01.2014 [En.554/p154]; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 149 265.5 The sum of RM4.05million to Fast Global on 28.01.2014 [En.554/p155-156]; 265.6 The sum of RM7.3million to Active Run Securities Limited on 30.01.2014 [En.554/p161-162]; 265.7 The sum of RM11million to Active Run Securities Limited on 30.01.2014 [En.554/p63-164]; 265.8 The sum of RM509,430.00 to PT Green Pine on 05.02.2014 [En.554/p165]; 265.9 The sum of RM4million to its own CIMB Bank Berhad’s account on 17.02.2014. Telecity subsequently made a payment of the same sum of RM4million to RHB Investment Bank Bhd on 17.02.2014. [En.554/p168- 169] 265.10 The sum of RM2,650,000.00 to Goodunited Limited on 24.02.2014. Goodunited Limited is a substantial shareholder in Asdion holding 17.74% shares as at August 2014 where Larry was also a major shareholder in Asdion. [CBD36/En.677/p285] 265.11 cash in a sum of RM3.5million to Telecity’s own CIMB Bank Berhad’s account on 24.02.2014 [En.554/p174- 175]. Telecity subsequently made a payment of the same sum of RM3.5million to TA Securities Holdings Bhd on 24.02.2014. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 150 265.12 cash in a sum of RM3million to Telecity’s own CIMB Bank Berhad’s account on 14.03.2014. [En.554/p178- 179]. Telecity subsequently made a payment of the same sum of RM3million to KAF Investment Bank Bhd on 14.03.2014. 265.13 Telecity made a payment of RM2,300,000.00 to Fast Global on 24.03.2014 [En.554/p183-184] 265.14 Telecity made a payment of RM3,680,000.00 to Fast Global on 25.03.2014 [En.554/p185-186]. [266] Protaso submitted that the aforementioned payments from Telecity to other entities were made under the instructions and for the benefit of Larry and Adrian for reasons as follow: - 266.1 When asked why is PT NRR his investment holding company incorporated in Indonesia but Telecity is incorporated in BVI, Dedi Francis answered “I don’t know why, because it did exist there.” He said he was advised by Larry and Adrian to incorporate Telecity in BVI. 266.2 Telecity had made payments to Goodunited Limited for purchase of shares in Asdion in which Larry was a major shareholder. Goodunited Limited was also a shareholder in Wintoni Group Berhad in which Larry was a shareholder since May 2013. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 151 266.3 Telecity had made payments to KAF Investment Bank Berhad, RHB Investment Bank Berhad and TA Securities Holdings Berhad for the benefit of Larry and Adrian. 266.4 When questioned as to why Dedi Francis transferred a total sum of RM18.3million to Active Run Securities Limited which he agreed to be a considerable sum of money, Dedi Francis said he cannot remember and that he left it to his consultant in Telecity, Adrian and Larry. 266.5 Dedi Francis testified that he has never heard of Nutox 266.6 Dedi Francis when asked as to why Telecity made payments to Nutox (a company he never heard of), he does not seem to remember the details and merely disagreed that he was not involved in giving instructions for these payments. When asked as to what is the relationship between Telecity and Nutox, Dedi Francis replied ‘I don’t remember, I really do not remember’. 266.7 Faizatul Ikmi (Qimie) has informed the police in her s.112 that she takes all instructions regarding the transaction, the appointment of director and other matters relating to Nutox from Dedi Francis. This statement cannot be true as Dedi Francis testified that he does not remember Faizatul Ikmi and there is also evidence of him giving instructions to Faizatul Ikmi. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 152 266.8 The only conclusion that can be made is clearly Faizatul Ikmi (Qimie) who reports to Larry has been handling matters in relation to Nutox on the instructions and for the benefit of Larry and Adrian. [267] The evidence at trial revealed Larry was a substantial shareholder in Asdion, Fast Global, Telecity, Nutox, PT NRR, Telecity, Goodunited Limited, and Qimie was also a shareholder in Asdion. Payments by Telecity to JF Apex Securities Berhad [268] After receiving monies from PT ASU which originated from Protasco’s monies paid to PT ASU, Telecity had since March 2014 till June 2014 make the following payments in the sum of RM3,821,730.02 to JF Apex: - 268.1 The sum of RM190,352.20 was made by Telecity to JF Apex for the purposes of Larry share trading [En.554/p180]. This sum is reflected in Larry’s JF Apex Statement of Accounts as at 31.03.2014 wherein the sum of RM190,352.20 was paid on 25.03.2014 [En.584/p314]. Larry did not deny receiving the said sum but insisted that he does not know the source of the money; 268.2 Telecity made a payment of RM2,650,000.00 to JF Apex. This payment is made by Telecity to JF Apex for the purposes of Larry’s share trading [En.554/p189- 190]. This sum is reflected in Larry’s JF Apex Statement of S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 153 Accounts as at 31.05.2014 wherein the sum of RM2,650,000.00 was paid on 28.05.2014 [En.584/p307]. 268.3 Further payments were also made by Telecity to JF Apex: (a) a sum of RM240,623.49 [En.554/p181] (b) a sum of RM95,754.33 [En.554/p182] (c) a sum of RM20,000.00 [En.554/p193] (d) a sum of RM440,000.00 [En.554/p194] (e) a sum of RM185,000.00 [En.554/p195] [269] The aforementioned payments were made by Telecity to JF Apex were clearly for the purposes of Larry’s share trading. Dedi Francis was not involved in giving instructions for these payments to be made. Payments by PTR ASU to Fast Global [270] Larry’s own documents given during the press conference revealed that Fast Global received a sum of RM9,868,000.00 from PT ASU after Protasco made the payment of RM50million on 28.12.2012 as follows: - 270.1 04.01.2013 – RM1.6million [En.554/p435] 270.2 09.01.2013 – RM2million [En.554/p436] 270.3 25.01.2013 – RM1.3million [En.554/p444-445] 270.4 29.01.2013 – RM2.04million [En.554/p446] S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 154 270.5 06.02.2013 – RM2,928,000.00 [En.554/p448-449] [271] The evidence adduced at trial reveals that: 271.1 The registered account holder of Fast Global is Faizatul Ikmi (Qimie) She is the sole director and cheque signatory of Fast Global ; 271.2 Faizatul Ikmi (Qimie) reports to Larry; 271.3 Whilst Dedi Francis claimed that Fast Global is his company, the evidence clearly shows that he was not involved in giving instructions on the payments relating to Fast Global and he does not even remember Faizatul Ikmi; 271.4 When questioned on the said payment, Dedi Francis first said that the payments were for three things, for supplier, for purchase of shares and for return of investment. Dedi Francis testified that Fast Global is not a supplier to PT ASU, Fast Global did purchase some shares in Malaysia and Fast Global is just one of the companies that do the return of investment. 271.5 Clearly, Dedi Francis has very little to no knowledge of the payments and was not seen to be involved in giving instructions for these payments. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 155 271.6 Dedi Francis’s testimony that he has authorized his consultant, Augustone to make payments and Augustone was to collaborate with Tjoe Yudhis is obviously untrue as the evidence led at trial revealed that Tjoe Yudhis was never involved in PT ASU’s banking transactions. Payments made by Fast Global to other entities [272] After Fast Global received the sum of RM9,868,000.00 from PT ASU, Fast Global paid: 272.1 RM6.08million to Nutox on 06.02.2013 [En.554/p450- 451]; 272.2 RM5.02million to Telecity on 07.02.2013 [En.554/p452]; 272.3 RM3.5million to Telecity on 18.02.2013 [En.554/p453- 454]; 272.4 RM1.5million to PT ASU on 27.02.2013 [En.554/p456- 457] [273] The aforesaid payments were clearly made under the instructions and for the benefit of Larry and Adrian as made evident by Dedi Francis’s testimony that he instructed his consultants, Larry and Adrian on transactions in relation to Fast Global to Nutox or Fast Global to Telecity. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 156 Payments made by Fast Global to CIMB Investment Bank [274] After receiving monies from PT ASU, Fast Global had since January 2013 till March 2013 make the following payments in the sum of RM6,820,000.00 to CIMB Investment Bank: - 274.1 The sum of RM1,680,000.00 on 25.01.2013 for the purposes of Larry’s share trading [En.554/p443] borne out by the fact that Fast Global had on 25.01.2013 acquired 14million shares of Hytex Integrated Berhad in which Larry was a substantial shareholder [CBD36/En.677/p9-10]. 274.2 a payment of RM1million on 09.01.2013 [En.554/p437]; 274.3 a payment of RM1.5million on 11.01.2013 En.554/p441]; 274.4 a payment of RM1,680,000.00 on 25.01.2013 [En.554/p443]; 274.5 a payment of RM2,040,000.00 on 29.01.2013 En.554/p447]; 274.6 a payment of RM200,000.00 on 20.02.2013 [En.554/p455]; 274.7 a payment of RM400,000.00 on 28.03.2013 [En.554/p458] [275] Dedi Francis when questioned on the aforesaid payments simply does not remember the purpose of such payments and stated that he S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 157 instructed Larry and Adrian to make these payments but produced no evidence showing his instructions to Larry and Adrian on these payments.. Other payments made by Fast Global [276] From monies received from PT ASU, Fast Global also made the following payments: - 276.1 a sum of RM13,440.00 to Adrian on 11.01.2013 [En.554/p440]. Adrian admits receiving the said sum; 276.2 a sum of RM22,720.00 to Jason Minos Anak Peter on 10.01.2013 [En.554/p438]. Dedi Francis testified that he does not remember who is Jason Minos and does not remember the purpose of the payment made to Jason Minos; 276.3 a sum of RM47,040.00 to Lim Chye Guan on 10.01.2013 [En.554/p439]. Dedi Francis testified that he does not remember whether he has dealt with Lim Chye Guan and does not remember the purpose of making such payment to Lim Chye Guan; 276.4 a sum of RM500,000.00 to Faizatul Ikmi binti Abdul Razak on 21.01.2013 [En.554/p442]. Dedi Francis testified that he never dealt directly with Faizatul Ikmi. When questioned why Fast Global paid RM500,000.00 to Faizatul Ikmi, he answered ‘All the communication from Fast Global to any person whomsoever, all I have S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 158 left it to Global Cap as my consultant…In reality Global Cap suggested me it is I who made the decision whether its ok or not’. [277] Dedi’s evidence when analysed entirely reveal he hardly has any knowledge or understanding of the transactions nor has control over the companies involved in these transactions. His evidence appears to be calculated to support Larry and Adrian’s case rather than provide this court with frank disclosure. It is demonstrably clear that the central figures were the bosses of Global Cap - Larry and Adrian. The payments were obviously made for the benefit of Larry and Adrian. Dedi Francis‘s own evidence in court nailed the lie in his s.112 statement that the USD22milliion was used to pay off suppliers. [278] Besides the above sums, evidence adduced further show of the monies originating from Protasco, a total sum of RM9,931,715.00 was paid directly into Larry’s personal margin and bank accounts and a sum of RM205,155.00 was paid directly into Adrian’s personal bank account. [279] Larry in his s.112 statement and under cross-examination admits that he personally received a total sum of RM9,931,715.00 through various entities namely, PT NRR, Nutox, Telecity, Fast Global, Firstlogix, Evodus Mobility, Mikhail Euro and Abamon Technology with breakdown as follows: - S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 159 279.1 On 02.01.2013, PT ASU paid RM1,300,000.00 to PT NRR. The exact sum was paid into Larry’s margin account with JF Apex Securities [NOP/En.701/p283- 287]: Larry in his s. 112 statement when questioned, admits receiving the sum of RM1,300,000.00 but he informed the police that he did not know the source of money. However, under cross- examination after being shown his own statement of account with JF Apex Securities which Larry admits is his, he attempted to explain that apparently, he borrowed the fund from one of Dedi Francis’s investors in order to invest in the property market in Indonesia. According to Larry, he is not aware as to where Dedi Francis’s investors have taken the fund from. Larry testified that the monies used by him to purchase the 27.11% block in Protasco was apparently borrowed from Dedi Francis’s investors. “PJS: Alright. Now, you will see you were questioned about, the same cheque, 28.01.2012 for the sum of RM1.3 million. And you told, your statement to the police was you admitted that the sum of RM1.3 million was banked into your JF Apex trading accounts. But you said you did not know the source of the money. TEY: Who said I did not know the source of money? Drop from... because I got property in Indonesia invest to him, so I asked Dedi’s investor, Dedi’s boss to borrow, to lend me money. Of course, I know the origin of money. As a businessman the funder gave me money, of course, I receive, how do I know from where, how do I know they contra in business. And in accounting we call it net off and how do I know they net off in accounting. This is S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 160 the daily doing of investment trading every day. And he took it to create stories. PJS: Dato’ Tey, what you just told us is not what you told the police in your 112 statement, am I correct? TEY: It’s entirely the same. It’s stated here I used the money for investment, right? So, from where you obtained this 112 statement? PJS: Dato' Tey, it’s in the affidavit which you have filed in Court. You have filed in Court. “Saya tidak ingat sumber wang yang masuk ke dalam akaun ini.” So, you are saying you do not know the source of the funds for the RM1.3 million which was paid into your account. You admit receiving it, but you don’t know the source of the funds. TEY: Absolutely disagree. You misinterpreted. I said, of course, I know the origin of money my source. So, as far as that cheque is concerned, that TT from which account was it, I do not know. Full stop. This is exactly what I meant.” 279.2 On 29.01.2013, PT ASU paid RM2,040,000.00 toNutox Limited. The exact sum was paid into Larry’s margin account with JF Apex Securities [NOP/En.701/p369 – 373]: Larry in his s.112 statement when questioned, admits receiving the sum of RM2,040,000.00 and he informed the police that he used it for shares investment. When shown his statement of account with JF Apex Securities, he replied “How could I still remember, where, from where did the investors pay me, how is it possible for me to ask them?”. Larry repeats the same story that he had borrowed money from investors, but he S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 161 does not know from where the investors paid him. Under cross-examination, Larry agreed that he utilized the money for the purchase of shares but disagree the said money was utilized for his own / personal investment: “TEY: I have said it many times already and you keep on asking the same question. I borrow money from Indonesian, from whichever account they pay me as long as it is the legitimate account, I just accept. PJS: Mr Leong, we can’t hear you, Mr Leong, sorry. TEY: I have my Rupiah money to pay them, lend off money, accounting, do you understand? I have my Indonesian, I have my Rupiah Indonesian account to net off the funder in Ringgit. So where did the funders came from, I never ask. No matter it is money changer, international trading, they are all using net off. Do you understand? When I deal with my funders, they use whichever account, we will never ask one. The foreign investor in Bursa Malaysia, they entirely come like that. Again, out of context you are getting the facts wrong to fulfil your theory of conspiracy. Your salary also Protasco paid, Indonesian money. …. PJS: So, now would you agree that you utilised the money, the RM2,040,000 for your own investment, for your personal investment. TEY: I disagree entirely. PJS: No, why do you disagree? S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 162 TEY: If you are saying like that then I am also Chong Ket Pen’s nominee, purchased Protasco’s shares. As investor I can help people invest. Ok. Before I even know Chong Ket Pen, I have already started trading shares. At that time I invested a lot of shares. Some of them I purchased myself, some of them are not. That time it was boom market, at that point of time. Investor Indonesian asked me to purchase some lot of shares on their behalf, you know? In share transaction statement, there are so many transactions statements, you are pulling out a little bit, you are pulling out just one row in order to just fulfil your conspiracy theory. Where is your duty of conduct?” 279.3 PT ASU paid RM2,600,000.000 to Mikhail Euro. The exact sum was transferred to Larry’s Maybank Bank account [NOP/En.701/p379-380]: Larry in his s.112 statement when questioned, admits receiving the said sum from Mikhail Euro who might be one of his suppliers. When asked during cross-examination as to what business dealings he had with Mikhail Euro in 2013, Larry simply answered he does not remember. 279.4 PT ASU paid RM2,200,000.00 to Evodus Mobility. The exact sum was transferred to Larry’s Maybank Bank account [NOP/En.701/p381]: Larry in his s. 112 statement when questioned, admits receiving the said sum from Evodus Mobility but does not know the source of the money. When asked during cross- examination as to what business dealings he had with Evodus Mobility, Larry said he dealt with Dedi and he does not know S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 163 which associate Dedi Francis used to bank in the money to him. Larry emphasized that he has clearly stated to the police in his statement on his borrowing arrangement with Dedi Francis. Dedi Francis testified that he has never heard of Evodus Mobility. 279.5 PT ASU paid RM1,600,000.00 to Firstlogix. The exact sum was transferred to Larry ’s Alliance Investment Bank Bhd [NOP/En.701/p388]. Larry testified that he heard of Firstlogix. Larry Tey when questioned by the police, admitted receiving the said sum paid into his margin account with Alliance Investment Bank which he used to purchase shares. Larry does not remember what business dealing he had with Firstlogix and the purpose of the payment into his margin account. Dedi Francis testified he does not know of Firstlogix. 279.6 Telecity paid RM191,715.00 to Larry. He attempted to justify this payment of RM191,715.00 as part of his fees for advisory work done. Larry produced a document purportedly from Telecity dated 05.07.2012 purportedly appointing him as a broker and advisor, purportedly signed by one, Mohd Ablynisyam bin Abdullah for and behalf of Telecity. Mohd Ablynisyam is listed as the “nominee director” and Dedi Francis as “company secretary”. Mohd Ablynisyam bin Abdullah however informed the police in his s . 112 statement that he is not familiar with Telecity. Dedi Francis (who claims that Telecity is his company) under cross-examination S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 164 testified that he has not met nor dealt directly with Mohd Ablynisyam, that he did not instruct Mohd Ablynisyam to sign the purported agreement and further denied that he is the company secretary for Telecity; and he does not remember what Larry has done for Telecity. [280] From the evidence, for all these payments made into his personal margin and bank accounts through PT NRR, Nutox, Telecity, Fast Global, Firstlogix, Evodus Mobility, Mikhail Euro and Abamon Technology, Larry repeats the story that all these funds were borrowed from Dedi Francis’s investors who apparently originally funded his purchase of the 27.11% block in Protasco. Dedi Francis however said he has never heard of these companies. [281] When Larry was asked that if indeed the monies was from Dedi Francis and his investors, the monies could come straight from PT ASU instead of going through several companies, he was evasive and simply replied “Very good question. You need to go and ask Dedi.” [282] Adrian in his evidence in chief admits receiving a total sum of RM205,155.00 through various payments by Telecity and Fast Global, allegedly as payment made by Dedi Francis for his consultancy services and reimbursement. 282.1 Under cross-examination, Adrian claims that RM191,715.00 was paid by Dedi Francis through Telecity for the financial consultancy services rendered by him to Telecity through A&A Associates. When questioned as to why there is a need for Telecity since S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 165 Adrian as advisor for Global Cap has been providing advice to Dedi Francis, he simply replied “Global Cap is not a legal entity that we use for billings, alright. So, all the billings are done through Telecity or Fast Global…Global Cap, I do not have a legal and official, I told you from day one, I don’t derive any income or any fees at all ever from Global Capital Limited”. 282.2 When shown his own s.112 statement given to the police in which he informed the police that the payment of RM191,715.00 was issued by Telecity to him as a loan and there was no loan agreement was a different story from what he testify now in Court, Adrian Ooi replied “I made a mistake then”. 282.3 When questioned that he did not provide this loan agreement with Telecity dated 01.06.2013 to the police on 15.09.2015 and had told the police a different story that it was a loan, Adrian Ooi again replied “I made a mistake then”. 282.4 When questioned whether he knows On Yong Chieh who was instructing on the banking transactions for Telecity, Adrian replied he met On Yong Chieh and On Yong Chieh takes advice from him. However, Adrian denied instructing On Yong Chieh throughout all the material time. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 166 282.5 Under cross-examination, Adrian claims that RM13,440.00 was paid by Dedi Francis through Fast Global for reimbursement of hotel, food and beverages. 282.6 When shown that Faizatul Ikmi binti Abd Razak (who Adrian know as Qimie) is the sole director and cheque signatory of Fast Global, Adrian testified that he was not too sure at the time when he received the payment. He is not sure of Qimie’s payroll but he know Qimie does services for Larry . Adrian further testified that Qimie do not take instructions but advice from him and Larry . [283] On 16.04.2013, On Yong Chieh sent an email to Lim Chye Guan, Adrian Ooi and Augustone Cheong. The email reads: “[Private & Confidential] Hi All, Attached is the list of fund movement in ASU and GIA CIMB Bank.” [284] On Yong Chieh in his s.112 statement to the police, states that he takes instructions from Larry regarding Telecity, Fast Global, Nutox, PT ASU and PT NRR. [285] Aida [PW-10] testified that On Yong Chieh works closely with Lim Chye Guan and was always seen working in the same office as her in the Nexgram group. Aida further testified that Lim Chye Guan is the Chief Financial Controller of Nexgram. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 167 [286] Larry himself under cross-examination admitted that Lim Chye Guan is his colleague and an employee within the Nexgram Group looking after the accounts, who also reported and take instructions from himself. [287] On Yong Chieh’s email details the flow of funds into and from PT ASU which includes the sum of RM50million paid by Protasco as at 16.04.2013. The outflow of funds include the following sum: - 287.1 FLXT is Firstlogix Technology Sdn Bhd – RM1.6million 287.2 MEA is Mikhail Euro Associates Sdn Bhd – RM 2.6million 287.3 Evodus SB is Evodus Mobility Sdn Bhd – RM2.2million 287.4 Abamon SB is Abamon Technology Sdn Bhd – RM8.9million 287.5 PT NRR is PT Nusantara Rising Rich – RM5,642,000.00 287.6 TIL is Telecity Investments Limited – RM9,245,909.00 287.7 FGIL is Fast Global Investments Limited – RM13,691,000.00 287.8 NL is Nutox Limited – RM2,985,000.00 287.9 Kenanga Invest (For Heah) – RM5million S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 168 287.10 Heah – Blank Cheque – RM1,537,500.00 287.11 PT CDE-Mandiri (USD1.5m) – RM4,679,250.00 287.12 Xu Yan, TM. Selvan, Lee Kong Toh – RM206,955.00 287.13 PT GP-Permata, ICBC (USD4.442m) – RM12,881,566.00 287.14 Vision Eagle-CIMB – RM3.2mil. [288] Larry under cross-examination when shown this email dated 16.04.2013 in particular on the exact same payments of RM1.6million by Firstlogix, RM2.6million by Mikhail Euro and RM2.2million by Evodus Mobility which he admitted receiving but Larry repeated the same banal “I don’t know”, “How can I agree”. [289] On Yong Chieh’s email also detailed the RM16million that was paid to PT Goldchild by Protasco’s subsidiaries. The email further details the payments out of PT Goldchild to Fast Global and PT NRR. [290] Significantly, Dedi Francis as the purported owner of PT ASU was not in this email loop in respect of the inflow and outflow of the funds. The email revealed that the RM50million refundable deposit paid by Protasco pursuant to SPA 1 in December 2012 was already paid out by PT ASU to various entities as of date of the email in April 2013. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 169 [291] Adrian who at the material time was a director of Protasco, admitted that he was aware that as of April 2013, the RM50million paid by Protasco to PT ASU was already paid out to third parties but he however explained that there was no need for him to disclose this fact to Protasco as in his words “this money belongs to Dedi”. Unsurprisingly, Larry feigns ignorance and testified that he had no idea about On Yong Chieh’s email dated 16.04.2013. Larry simply states that Augustone Cheong is engaged by Dedi Francis. [292] On 17.05.2014, On Yong Chieh sent another email to Larry, Adrian, Augustone Cheong and Lim Chye Guan. The email reads: - “[Private & Confidential] Hi all, Enclosed the Cash Flow for Share A/C & Summary of fund usage @ 16-May-14.” [293] This May 2014 email sets out the outflow of fund from PT ASU as at 16.05.2014 after SPA 2 was executed on 29.01.2014. The email details the inflow of fund into PT ASU which includes the differential sum of USD5,659,437.00 that was received by PT ASU from Protasco on 30.01.2014 pursuant to SPA 2. The email also set out that on 04.02.2014, PT ASI received a sum of USD5million paid by Protasco pursuant to SPA 2 for the reactivation of the oil wells. The email show that on 10.02.2014, PT ASI had transferred the USD5million to its own account with Permata Bank in Jakarta. The email also set out the summary of the cash flow paid out from 01.02.2014 to 15.05.2014 and revealed that PT ASU had paid out the monies received from Protasco for the benefit of various third parties including Larry and Adrian. Both Larry and Adrian at the material S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 170 time were directors of Protasco but they did not reveal to Protasco that these sums were already paid out to other parties including for their own benefit. [294] Adrian as a recipient of the email attempted to distance himself by testifying that: - “PJS: So, why is Mr On sending this to you? OOI: I don’t know. You got to ask him. PJS: Dato’, you are saying you didn’t read this? OOI: I didn’t analyse the details of the attachment, because it’s not in my business to look at other people finances. … OOI: I did open up the email but I didn’t go through the analysis. It was very detailed. PJS: So, what exactly did you do then? When you opened up the email, what exactly did you do? OOI: I just disregard it. PJS: So, you opened up the email and didn’t read the contents? OOI: I didn’t read, I didn’t analyse the movement of funds. PJS: How would you describe your perusal of the email then? OOI: I just looked at the headings and also I glanced through the attachment. PJS: So, you looked at the heading and then the attachment you glanced through? OOI: Yes, that’s why there was no action from me.” S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 171 [295] Larry when shown the email in which he was copied, was completely evasive and merely responded that he did not know the details stated in the email. “PJS: And the email sets out the flow of funds from PT ASU as at 16/05/2014, would you agree? TEY: How do I know? I cannot involve also. Chong Ket Pen’s son, Kenny Chong sent us the pre-signed agreement. He cc’ed to me. The presigned agreement for this Protasco deal, pre-signed. It’s – PJS: Dato’, that’s a different issue lah. I am talking about this particular email, let me finish. This particular email that shows the flow of funds out of PT ASU as at 16/05/2014 which he is a recipient 1 of. So, can we just discuss about this? TEY: Correct, they have cc’ed to me. Protasco cc’ed to me. Dedi Francis cc’ed to me but as I said, whatever issues touching on Protasco, I will not go and read. That’s all. Period. PJS: Dedi Francis is not involved in this email lah, Dato’ Tey, isn’t it? TEY: Augustone Cheong work for him. Boss need to work meh? Is it necessary for Chong Ket Pen himself to torture me? No need. So he engaged Peter Skelchy to do it.” [296] On Yong Chieh’s email of 17.5.2104 sets out amongst others: 296.1 Monies were paid to Adrian directly through A&A Associates and through his margin account. When payments were made to Adrian, they are listed as “AO”. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 172 296.2 Payments were also made for credit card expenditure of Lim Sue Fern and for PT Green Pine; 296.3 Payments were also made to Kong Chin Lam who works within Nexgram group/Global Cap and take instructions from Larry; 296.4 Payments made to Larry’s margin account with JF Apex Securities and to Nutox Limited’s margin account with RHB/OSK for the purchase of Nexgram’s shares. Where the payments were made to Larry, it is listed as “LT”; 296.5 Payments made to Larry’s margin account with Public Investment Bank for the purchase of Nexgram’s shares. The payment is listed as “LT-PIBB Top-up for N shares”; 296.6 Payments made to Andy Yong c/o Fairfield in relation to the work done by Fairfield leading up to the execution of Investment Agreement alluded to earlier were paid out from the tranche of fund which included the monies originated from Protasco; 296.7 Payments made to Larry ’s margin account with Alliance Investment Bank Berhad for the purchase of Protasco’s shares. The payment is listed as “LT AIBB Margin a/c- cross P share”; 296.8 Payments made to Alliance Investment Bank Berhad to serve interest on Larry ’s margin account with Alliance S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 173 Investment Bank Berhad. The payment is listed as “LT AIBB Margin Interest”; 296.9 Payments made to TA Securities Holdings Berhad for Goodunited Limitied for private placement of Winsun shares (now known as Wintoni); 296.10 Payments made to KAF Investment Bank Berhad for private placement of R&A Telecommunication Berhad’s shares in which Larry was a substantial shareholder; 296.11 Payments made to Asdion Berhad for increase of authorised share capital where Larry was a substantial shareholder; 296.12 Payments made to JF Apex Securities for Telecity, Nutox and Fast Global’s purchase of MQ Technology Berhad’s shares where Larry was a shareholder; 296.13 Payments made to JF Apex Securities for Telecity, Nutox and Fast Global’s purchase of Nexgram’s shares where Larry was a substantial shareholder; 296.14 Payments made to JF Apex Securities where Telecity was servicing the interest payment of Larry ’s margin account. The payment is listed as “LT-Margin Int Feb’14”; S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 174 296.15 Payments made to Larry ’s margin account with SJ Securities for rollover fees payment. The payment is listed as “LT SJ-1% rollover fees”; 297.16 Payments made to JF Apex Securities for Fast Global’s purchase of Nexgram’s shares where Larry was a substantial shareholder; 296.17 Payments were made to JF Apex Securities where Larry used Telecity to serve interest and rollover fees due to JF Apex Securities pursuant to RM10milllion loan by DSC.The payment is listed as “DC JF margin interest Jan 2014”; 296.18 Payments made to PT FAME for factoring interest and for Dedi; 296.19 Payments made to PT Cakra Daya Energy (which is subsidiary of PT Inovisi) for PT Cakra Daya Energy’s March 2014 salary payment; 296.20 Payments made to Bidang Lagenda Sdn Bhd, a substantial shareholder of Negxram while Larry was still CEO and MD of Nexgram; 296.21 Payments made to PT Green Pine for factoring interest, salary and others. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 175 [297] Adrian when cross-examined on 08.11.2022 agreed that payments listed in the email that was paid to A&A Associates would relate to him. During continued cross-examination the next day on 09.11.2022, he recanted knowledge and repeated “I cannot confirm”. [298] Larry was evasive in cross-examination on the details of payments listed the email and repeatedly answered “don’t know”, “I don’t know”, “how do I know”, interspersed sometimes with “I don’t know and I also I disagree” and “don’t know, also cannot remember”. [299] Apart from Larry’s own press statement, the evidence adduced at trial laid bare that Larry and Adrian had personally benefited from the money received by PT ASU and PT ASI from Protasco. Did Larry and Adrian breach their fiduciary and statutory duties? [300] The Federal Court in Board of Trustees of the Sabah Foundation & Ors v Datuk Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamed & Anor [2008] 5 MLJ 469 at [30] has adopted Millet LJ ‘s definition of a fiduciary in Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew (t/a Stapley & Co) [1998] Ch 1 at p 11 as follows: A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 176 is sufficient to indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations. They are the defining characteristics of the fiduciary. [301] The law is clear that a director of a company is in fiduciary relationship with his company and as such he is precluded from acting in a manner which will bring his personal interest into conflict with that of his company - per Saleh Abas LP in Avel Consultants Sdn Bhd & Anor v Mohamed Zain Yusof & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 209 SC. [302] In Ford's Principles of Corporations Law in Chapter 8 at para [8.050] at p 312, a director is subject to the fiduciary's duty of loyalty and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest. Walter Woon on Company Law states that: Firstly, a director must act in what he honestly considers to be the company’s interests and not in the interests of some other person or body. This is a director’s main and overriding duty at common law; Secondly, a director must employ the powers and assets that he is entrusted with for proper purposes and not for any collateral purpose; Thirdly, a director must not place himself in a position whereby his duty to the company and his personal interests may conflict. [303] Sections 132(1) and 132(1A) of the Companies Act 1965 set out the statutory duties owed by a director to a company. Section 132(1) provides: … A director of a company shall at all times exercise his powers for a proper purpose and in good faith in the best interest of the company; Section 132(1 A) provides: S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 177 A director of a company shall exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence with: (a) The knowledge, skill and experience which may reasonably be expected of a director having the same responsibilities; and (b) Any additional knowledge, skill and experience which the director in fact has. [304] In Pioneer Haven Sdn Bhd v Ho Hup Construction Co Bhd & Anor and other appeals [2012] 3 MLJ 616 at p 654 the Court of Appeal held that ss 132(1) and 132(1A) do not alter the law in this area but enhance the common law duty of care and equitable fidicuary duties. The Court of Appeal said at para 233: … The prior provision of s 132(1) requires a director to act honestly. The current s 132(1) of the Act, requires a director to act in good faith in the best interests of the company. It is accepted that for all intents and purposes, the scope of the directors’ duties to act honestly under the old s 132(1) and the new s 132(1) are the same. Thus the old case law relating to the duty to act honestly continues to be relevant (see Cheam Tat Pang v Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 SLR 541).It is also recognised that the duty to act in the best interests of the company means different things, depending on the factual circumstances. [305] Section 131 of the CA 1965 mandates disclosure where a director is in any way whether directly or indirectly interested in a transaction with the company. The learned author Dato’ Loh Siew Cheang in ‘Corporate Powers Accountability’ explained the no-conflict and underlying fiduciary principle as follows: “14-4 The no-conflict principle embodies two fundamental themes. First, directors cannot engage in 'self-dealings' or enter into transactions S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 178 with a company in which they are directly or indirectly interested. Second, directors cannot make improper use of their office, company's property or information to make profits for themselves directly or indirectly. This is commonly known as the no-profit rule. There are many ways in which directors may misuse their office to benefit themselves-from usurpation of corporate opportunities, receiving bribes or commission and misapplying company's property. The rule prohibiting undisclosed self-dealings and secret profits is a positive rule. 14-5 The underlying fiduciary principle against the abuse of office is well established. In Gurbachan Singh s/o Bagawan Singh & Ors v Vellasamy s/o Pennusamy & Ors (on their behalf and for the 213 sub-purchasers of plots of land known as PN35553, Lot 9108, Mukim Hutan Melintang, Hilir Perak) and other appeals, the Federal Court said: [69] It is trite law that a person in a fiduciary position is not entitled to make a profit and he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty are in conflict. In Boardman v Phipps [1966] 3 WLR 1009 Lord Hodson explained the rule as follows: Whether this aspect is properly to be regarded as part of the trust assets is, in my judgment, immaterial. The appellants obtained knowledge by reason of their fiduciary position and they cannot escape liability by saying that they were acting for themselves and not as agents of the trustees. Whether or not the trust or the beneficiaries in their stead could have taken advantage of the information is immaterial, as the authorities clearly show. No doubt it was but a remote possibility that Mr Boardman would ever be asked by the trustees to advice on the desirability of an application to the Court in order that the trustees might avail themselves of the information obtained. Nevertheless, even if the possibility of conflict is present between personal interest and the fiduciary position the rule of equity must be applied. This appears from the observations of S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 179 Lord Cranworth LC in Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie 1 Macq 461, 471. In the later case of Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44 Lord Herschell ... said: It is an inflexible rule of a Court of Equity that a person in a fiduciary position, such as the respondent's is not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict. It does not appear to me that this rule is, as has been said, founded upon principles of morality. I regard it rather as based on the consideration that human nature being what it is, there is danger, in such circumstances, of the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather than by duty, and thus prejudicing those whom he was bound to protect. It has, therefore, been deemed expedient to lay down this positive rule. But I am satisfied that it might be departed from in many cases, without any breach of morality, without any wrong being inflicted, and without any consciousness of wrong-doing. Indeed, it is obvious that it might sometimes be to the advantage of the beneficiaries that their trustee should act for them professionally rather than a stranger, even though the trustee were paid for his services. [Emphasis added] 14-6 In Furs Ltd v Tomkies, the High Court of Australia explained the rationale as follows: No director shall obtain for himself a profit by means of a transaction in which he is concerned on behalf of the company unless all the material facts are disclosed to the shareholders and by resolution in a general meeting approves of his doing so, or all the shareholders acquiesce. An undisclosed profit which a director so derives from the execution of his fiduciary duties belongs in equity to the company. It is no answer to the application of the rule that the profit is of a kind which the company could not itself have obtained, or that no loss is caused to the company by the gain of the director. It is a principle S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 180 resting upon the impossibility of allowing the conflict of duty and interest which is involved in the pursuit of private advantage in the course of dealing in a fiduciary capacity with the affairs of the company. If, when it is his duty to safeguard and further the interests of the company, he uses the occasion as a means of profit to himself, he raises an opposition between the duty he has undertaken and his own self interest, beyond which it is neither wise nor practicable for the law to look for a criterion of liability. The consequences of such a conflict are not discoverable. Both justice and policy are against their investigation. [Emphasis added]” [306] On related or connected party transactions, Section 132E of the CA 1965 provides: “132E. Substantial property transaction by director or substantial shareholder (1) Subject to subsection (2) and section 132F, a company shall not carry into effect any arrangement or transaction where a director or a substantial shareholder of the company or its holding company, or a person connected with such a director or substantial shareholders— (a) acquires or is to acquire shares or non-cash assets of the requisite value, from the company; or (b) disposes of or is to dispose of shares or non-cash assets of the requisite value, to the company. (2) An arrangement or transaction which is carried into effect in contravention of subsection (1) shall be void, unless there is prior approval of the arrangement or transactions— (a) by a resolution of the company at a general meeting; or (b) by a resolution of the holding company at a general meeting, if the arrangement or transaction is in favour of a director or substantial S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 181 shareholder of its holding company or person connected with such director or substantial shareholder. (3) The resolution of the company or its holding company at the general meeting of the company or its holding company to consider the arrangement or transaction shall be subject to the director, substantial shareholder or person connected with such director or substantial shareholder, as the case may be, abstaining from voting on the resolution whether or not to approve the arrangement or transaction. (4) Where an arrangement or transaction is carried into effect by a company in contravention of subsections (1) and (2) that director, substantial shareholder or person connected with such director or substantial shareholder and any director who knowingly authorized the arrangement or transaction shall, in addition to any other liability, be liable— (a) to account to the company for any gain which he had made directly or indirectly by the arrangement or transaction; and (b) jointly and severally with any person liable under this subsection, to indemnify the company for any loss or damage resulting from the arrangement or transaction... …… (7) For the purposes of subsection (1) – "person connected with a substantial shareholder" shall have the same meaning as that assigned to a "person connected with a director" in section 122A save that all references therein to a director shall be read as a reference to a substantial shareholder;..” [307] Pursuant to s.122A of the CA 1965, a “person connected” in relation to a director or major shareholder of a company means an associate or partner of that person. Pursuant to s. 122A(3)(a), a body corporate is associated with a director if inter alia the body corporate is S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 182 accustomed or is under an obligation, whether formal or informal, or its directors are accustomed, to act in accordance with the directions, instructions or wishes of that director. [308] In the instant case, Adrian served as a director of Protasco from 10.12.2012 to 27.11.2014. His statutory and fiduciary duties as a director including his duties of disclosure under Section 131 of the CA 1965 existed throughout his tenure as a director. Larry on 26.11.2012 became a substantial shareholder of Protasco by purchasing the 27.11% block and he became a director of Protasco on 10.03.2014. [309] Adrian’s duty to disclose his interest in the oil and gas transaction is mandated by ss. 131, 132 and 132E as he was a director of Protasco at the material times and further was a person connected with PT ASU. The evidence adduced at trial suggest he and Larry are partners within the definition of Section 122A of Companies Act 1965. Both Larry and Adrian are persons connected. At all material times they were common shareholders Nexgram, Asdion, Ire-Tex and Protasco. [310] Larry’s duty to disclose his interest in the oil and gas transaction is mandated by Sections 131 and 132E as he was at all material times a substantial shareholder of Protasco, a person connected with PT ASU and a director of Protasco from 10.03.2014. [311] On the evidence adduced, PT ASU, PT ASI and Acclaim are body corporates accustomed or under and obligation, formal or informal, or its directors are accustomed to act in accordance with the directions, wishes or instructions of Larry and Adrian. Larry and Adrian were also effectively shadow directors of PT ASU, PT ASI and Acclaim within the definition of S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 183 Section 132E read together with Section 4 of CA 1965. In this regard, Tjoe Yudhis as the President Director of PT ASU acts under the instructions of Larry and Adrian in relation to all corporate matters of PT ASU; he has testified to his knowledge , Larry and Adrian were the owners of PT ASU, PT ASI, PT Inovisi and PT Green Pine; email correspondences show Larry and Adrian Ooi were the decision makers and superiors in PT ASU, PT ASI, Acclaim, PT Green Pine and PT Inovisi ; Adrian , without the knowledge of Dedi Francis was able to cause himself to be made a cheque signatory of PT ASI and to cause a transfer of USD5million from PT ASI’s CIMB Bank account in Malaysia to another PT ASI’s bank account with Permata Bank in Jakarta; Adrian had the authority to instruct for a change of shareholdings and Acclaim and PT Green Pine (Green Pine Holdings) and his instructions were acted upon and carried out by the relevant company’s personnel; Larry and Adrian were the ones dictating the contents of PT ASU’s letters of response to Protasco; these behind the scene conduct and machinations put together, are not conduct loyal to Protasco when both of them were placed in a position of confidence and trust. An intelligent and honest man in the positions of either Larry and Adrian could not , in the whole of the existing circumstances, have reasonably believed that what they did was acting primarily in good faith, bona fide and would be in the best interest of the company, Protasco. As fiduciaries, the foremost consequence is that both would owe a duty of undivided loyalty to Protasco. There is sufficient evidence and justification to support the conclusion or inference that Larry and Adrian (either themselves or through their staff ) had caused the transfer of the RM50million deposit, the differential sum and the Shareholder’s Advance and they had direct knowledge of the transfer of funds from PT ASU to a web of companies and had personally profited from the transaction when some of the funds originating from Protasco S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 184 ended up in their own accounts or were utilized to purchase shares on their behalf in Malaysian public listed entities in which they had an interest in. There was no credibility at all to their case that Dedi Francis is the owner of inter-alia PT ASU, Acclaim, Telecity, Fast Global and PT Green Pine. Dedi Francis being owner of these companies simply could not be reconciled with the total body of evidence adduced. [312] I have not overlooked Larry and Adrian’s case that DSC knew and by extension Protasco had knowledge of the IA and of the correspondence between DSC/Kenny Chong and Larry and Adrian that Larry was linked to the oil and gas injection from the very outset up to the point where SPA 2 being signed and as such. there could not have been non-disclosure of interest in the oil and gas transaction. I find this contention untenable as Larry himself under cross-examination had consistently asserted that he had informed DSC that there was no need for any declaration because he had no pecuniary interest in the oil and gas project. Under cross-examination, Larry agreed that shareholders’ approval is needed if the oil and gas project is a related party transaction but Larry had stated in cross-examination that “I’m not a related party, so what should I be declaring for?” Larry is not “a babe in the woods” nor a ‘country yokel’, a term used in Abdol Mulok Awang Damit v Perdana Industri Holdings Bhd [2003] 3 CLJ 497 at page 502 as Larry had experience as a director in a few public listed companies such as Nexgram and Wintoni and was aware of the requirements of disclosure. The statutory declarations signed by both Larry and Adrian at the 25.7.2014 Board meeting are express representations to Protasco of their non interest in the oil and gas transaction. In any case, Suit 446 against Protasco was struck out by the High Court on 03.06.2015. There was no appeal by Global Cap and Kingdom Seekers against the striking out S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 185 decision. Thus the issue of Protasco having knowledge of the IA is caught by the principles of res judicata and or issue estoppel as exposited in Asia Commercial Finance (F) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189. [313] Larry and Adrian in breach of their statutory duties and fiduciary duties failed to disclose to Protasco that they were persons connected to PT ASU, PT ASI and the security provider, Acclaim. They brazenly affirmed statutory declarations declaring to Protasco that PT ASU is not a party related or any person connected to them as defined under the Companies Act. There was also ample evidence to show that whilst breaching such duties, they had profited from their breach. Both of them having acted in breach of Section 132E of the CA 1965 are liable under the provisions of: 313.1 Section 132E(4)(a) to account to Protasco for any gain which they had made directly or indirectly; and 313.2 Section 132E(4)(b) to indemnify Protasco for its damages suffered resulting from the transaction entered into with PT ASU. [314] In Acumen Scientific Sdn Bhd v Yeow Liang Ming [2020] 3 MLJ 82, the Court of Appeal said: “[38] A company director holds a fiduciary relationship with his company and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest and must at all times exercise his powers bona fide and in the best interests of the company as a whole. The essence of the fiduciary duty is a duty to act bona fide at all times in the interests of the company and not for a collateral purpose. This the defendant failed to exercise and his failure to do so is a blatant breach of his fiduciary duties. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 186 [39] The law requires the defendant as a director of the plaintiff to do, act and behave as follows: (a) exercise the powers vested as a director in the interests of the company; (b) must not exercise those powers as a director against the interests of the company; and (c) in exercising those powers by virtue of his position as a director he must always do so for the general interests of the company and nothing else. [40] In the Privy Council case of Brickenden v London Loan & Savings Co [1934] 3 DLR 465 a solicitor acting for the loan company had a personal interest in certain loans made to a customer of the company which, in breach of his fiduciary duty, he failed to disclose to the company. The trial judge entered judgment for the company. The Court of Appeal of Ontario set aside the judgment on the ground that no breach of duty had been proved, and that in any event the company had suffered no loss. The Supreme Court of Canada restored the judgment of the trial judge, and its decision was affirmed by the [2020] 3 MLJ 82 at 100Privy Council. Giving the judgment of the Privy Council, Lord Thankerton said this (at p 469): When a party, holding a fiduciary relationship, commits a breach of his duty by non-disclosure of material facts, which his constituent is entitled to know in connection with the transaction, he cannot be heard to maintain that disclosure would not have altered his decision to proceed with the transaction, because the constituent’s action would be solely determined by some other factor, such as the valuation by another party of the property proposed to be mortgaged. Once the Court has determined that the non-disclosed facts were material, speculation as to what course the constituent, on disclosure, would have taken is not relevant. [41] The defendant had breached not only both the agreements but his fiduciary duties as a director of the plaintiff by failing to disclose and S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 187 making use of the plaintiff’s confidential information. He had used the company’s asset, the Dell laptop from 23 December 2014 until 12 January 2015 to communicate and receive emails with regards to Amcen’s business operations through his personal email. The defendant had conducted evaluation monitoring of Dynacraft Industries Sdn Bhd on 3 July 2014 and 4 July 2014 in his capacity as associate consultant of Amcen. There was also evidence that whilst still under the employment of the plaintiff, the defendant had registered the website of Amcen and that he was also the administrator.” [315] I find Larry and Adrian’s allegation that the board of directors had greenlighted SPA 1 and the payment of the deposit even prior to due diligence, the board of directors had granted extensions to PT ASU to comply with its obligations under SPA 1, and that despite what their learned counsel referred to as ‘red flags’ arising from the due diligence, the board still proceeded to enter into SPA 2 with the payment of further monies to PT ASU and PT ASI do not exonerate them from breach of statutory and common law fiduciary duties. They had behind the scenes in breach of their duty of good faith, worked against the very interest of Protasco as alluded earlier in the judgment and the evidence is borne out by the email exchanges. [316] I am inclined to agree with Protasco’s counsel that the lack of disclosure by Larry and Adrian as being related persons with PT ASU and being in control of Acclaim and therefore correspondingly being in a position of conflict, had a direct consequence on Protasco proceeding with the transaction and making the necessary payments pursuant thereto. The lack of disclosure had a direct consequence on the integrity of announcement made by Protasco to Bursa and on the audit conducted by Protasco’s auditors on the transaction. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 188 [317] Larry and Adrian had procured the securities from Acclaim including the necessary Blocking Letters allegedly signed by Lim Sue Fern which were relied upon by Protasco to justify the terms of the acquisition as announced to Bursa and these securities were in fact an inducement for Protasco to enter into the transactions with PT ASU and make the payments thereunder. The terms of SPA 2 clearly sets out that in the event of non-compliance of the Conditions Subsequent, Protasco has a right to terminate and cause the sale of the blocked securities. As reflected further in SPA 2, the securities were also central in causing Protasco to provide the Shareholder’s Advance to PT ASI and the terms of SPA 2 provides that a charge be created over the securities. After Protasco terminated SPA 2 with PT ASU as it was entitled, behind the scenes and without the knowledge of the board, both Larry and Adrian acted to deprive Protasco of its right to a refund of the purchase consideration and the Shareholder’s Advance. Acclaim, a company under their control through their nominee director Lim Sue Fern denied executing the Blocking Letters thereby preventing Protasco from effecting the sale through PT Brent. [318] I find from the emails sent by On Yong Chieh, it has been clearly established that both Larry and Adrian had knowledge of the transfer of funds, part of which ended up in their personal share margin and bank accounts and they had appropriated the sum of USD27million for the benefit of themselves using various corporate vehicles, fronts and nominees. [319] From the evidence adduced, there is no escaping that Larry and Adrian have indubitably breached their duty to act in good faith and in the S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 189 best interest of Protasco, breached their duty of permitting their interest to conflict with that of Protasco and breached their duty not to make a secret profit. In my respectful view, there is ample evidence that Protasco’s losses are causally connected to their failure of duties to Protasco. [320] It is trite that the remedy imposed on the wrongdoers for breach of fiduciary duties would be compensation in equity. The measure of compensation is to put the Plaintiff in the position he would have been had the breach not been committed, see Newacres Sdn Bhd v Sri Alam Sdn Bhd [2000] 2 MLJ 353 (FC) at p 378. Fraud and Conspiracy to defraud [321] On the facts and evidence adduced, given the probabilities, the reasonable result is my finding that fraud has also been proven against Larry and Adrian. In respect of the securities they both caused to be provided to Protasco, Protasco was in fact induced to enter into SPA 1 and SPA 2 by Larry and Adrian on their representation that the securities could be sold should there be a breach by PT ASU of SPA 2. Both of them knew that Protasco will rely on their representation and towards this end, Adrian instructed the Indonesian legal firm Messrs Risman Hutabarat & Rekan to provide the legal opinion to Protasco that the enforceability and dealing in the Blocked shares comply with the laws of Indonesia. Protasco had also made payment of the differential sum and the shareholders’ advance pursuant to SPA 2 premised on Adrian’s representations that the conditions subsequent contained in SPA 2, including the extension to the PMPA, was attainable provided the wells were reactivated. Protasco had made the payment of shareholders advance on Adrian’s representations that the said advance was needed S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 190 as working capital for wells reactivation. Both Larry and Adrian had concealed from Protasco their control of PT ASU, PT ASI, Acclaim, their involvement in the issuance of the letters on behalf of PT ASU denying Protasco’s request for a return of USD27million, their knowledge of the fact that the total USD27million was already paid out to various third parties including themselves on their instructions and their secret profit and benefit from the entire transaction. Yet at the Board meetings of 25.07.2014 and 04.08.2014, they continued their dishonest conduct. The entire transaction in fact turned out to be a scam to defraud Protasco of its money. [322] The concatenation of circumstances and events, the acts and conduct of Larry and Adrian, the totality of their dealings and the oral evidence pieced together and weighed, I find that there is credible, cogent, convincing, and compelling tangible evidence that Larry and Adrian have combined together with a common purpose or intention to defraud and injure and/or cause loss to Protasco by unlawful means. In this regard, there is sufficient evidence from which a conspiracy could be properly inferred, and their acts done in execution of that agreement had resulted in damage to Protasco to the tune of USD 27million. Evaluation and assessment of the credibility of the witnesses [323] As “evidence” is not confined to documents and the Court is enjoined by s. 3 of the Evidence Act to consider oral statements by witnesses, the evaluation and assessment of the credibility (or otherwise), of the witnesses were crucial to the present case. In assessing credibility of the witnesses, I have taken note that credibility of a witness embraces not only the concept of his truthfulness ie whether the evidence of the witness is to be believed but also the objective reliability of the witness ie S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 191 his ability to observe or remember facts and events about which the witness is giving evidence and this court must pay attention to a number of factors which, inter alia, include the following as exposited by Gillen J in Sean Thornton (a minor by his mother and next friend) v Northern Ireland Housing Executive [2010] NIQB 4: (i) The inherent probability or improbability of representations of fact; (ii) The presence of independent evidence tending to corroborate or undermine any given statement of fact; (iii) The presence of contemporaneous records; (iv) The demeanour of witnesses e.g., does he equivocate in cross examination; (v) The frailty of the population at large in accurately recollecting and describing events in the distant past; (vi) Does the witness take refuge in wild speculation or uncorroborated allegations of fabrication; (vii) Does the witness have a motive for misleading the court; and (viii) Weigh up one witness against another [324] Sir George Farwell in the Privy Council case of Bombay Cotton Manufacturing Company v Motilal Shivlal ILR 1915 39 Bom 386, PC, in addressing the credit of a witness upon cross-examination, said that ‘it is most relevant in a case where everything depends on the judge’s belief or disbelief in the witness’ story.’ S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 192 [325] In deciding the matter, I have preferred the evidence of the Plaintiff’s witnesses whom I viewed as ‘more credible’ in support of the Plaintiff’s contentions, as compared to the Defendants’ witnesses whom I found ‘evasive’ when troubling questions were put to them, and were not credible at all. The Defendants’ witnesses’ evidence were riddled with contradictions and simply do not add up. Even if there were discrepancies in the Plaintiff’s witnesses' evidence, if at all, were minor and not relevant, and on the whole, their evidence was comprehensive, quite compelling, convincing and consistent with the documents and the overall probabilities. In the context of the entirety of the evidence before the court, any lingering doubts that I have, I would resolve in favour of the Plaintiff. I also find nothing sinister in the fact that Kenny Chong was not called to give evidence by the Plaintiff or that any adverse inference should be drawn against the Plaintiff for not calling him. There is no property in a witness. If the Defendants deem him a material witness, they could have called him instead. Other matters - RM10million Loan Gratification [326] Larry and Adrian as part of their pleaded case allege that DSC, his son Kenny Chong and senior management of Protasco and/or its subsidiaries have financially benefited through gratification, breach of fiduciary duties and illegal financial gain from the agreements between Protasco and PT ASU. Larry and Adrian contend that the financial gain of RM10million was received via an entity named RS Maha Niaga. I find this complaint is caught by the proper plaintiff rule in Foss v Harbottle and does not concern this court. There is also no relief sought By Larry and Adrain in the present proceedings against DSC personally. S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 193 [327] In sum, based on the sum total of all the evidence adduced herein, I am satisfied that Protasco has discharged its burden in establishing its claim for breach of fiduciary duties, breach of Section 131 and 132E of the Companies Act, fraud, and conspiracy to defraud on the part of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on a balance of probabilities. In the present case, I am of the ciew that it would not be inequitable or contrary to conscience to grant the relief as sought by Protasco . So that there is no overlap or double recovery, the claims in para 76 (a), (b), (k) & (l) are allowed with costs of RM650,000 subject to allocator. In determining cost, this court took into account the criterias in O59 r16 interalia, the trial took 42 days, documents involved are voluminous and this is not a run of the mill case. In allowing pre judgment interest at 5% per annum from the date of the writ, this court exercised its discretion under s.11 Civil Law Act. 1956. The USD27 million is coverted to its Ringgit equivalent as at date of judgment. [328] It remains for me to record my appreciation to learned counsel for the respective parties for their efforts and industry expended in their submissions. I do not propose to burden this judgment by citing at length each of the arguments and authorities relied upon by learned counsel. Dated: 29th October 2023 - sgd - ………………………. Liza Chan Sow Keng Judge High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 194 COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff : Peter Skelchy (together with him, Joycelyn Teoh and Tan ZhiXin) Messrs Cheah Teh & Su For the 2nd & 3rd Defendants : Datuk Malik Imtiaz Sarwar (together with him, Jayasingam, Lim Yvonne, Khoo Suk Chyi, Ng Keng Yang, Chuo Chung Cheng and Mahendran (Pdk)) Messrs B H Lawrence & Co. CASES CITED: Iftikar Ahmed Khan (as the executor of the estate for Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan, deceased) v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (previously known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd) [2018] 2 MLJ 292 Hadmor Productions Ltd v Hamilton [1983] 1 AC 191 Metroplex Development Sdn Bhd v Mohd Mastana bin Makaddas & anor [1995] 2 MLJ 276 Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 MLJ 12 Bruce v Odhams Press Limited [1936] 1 All ER 287 Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan @ L Allagappan (as executor to SL Alameloo Achi alias Sona Lena Alamelo Acho, deceased) & Anor v Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLJ 697; [2017] 5 CLJ 418 Jusoh v Ng Ah Sooi & Anor [1963] 1 MLJ 92 Protasco Bhd v PT Anglo Slavic Utama & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 417 Protasco Bhd v Tey Por Yee & Anor and other appeals [2021] 6 MLJ 1 Mohd Ali Jaafar v Public Prosecutor [1998] 4 MLJ 210 R v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688 S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 195 Jaafar Bin Shaari & Anor (suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah Bte Ahmad, deceased) v Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693 Dato’ Pardip Kumar Kukreja & Anor v Vell Paari a/l Samy Vellu [2016] 4 MLJ 649; [2015] 1 LNS 1482 Yeohata Machineries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Coil Master Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 6 MLJ 810 William Derry, J. C. Wakefield, M. M. Moore, J. Pethick, And S. J. Wilde Appellants; And Sir Henry William Peek, Baronet Respondent. (1889) 14 App.Cas. 337 Panatron Pte Ltd & Anor v Lee Cheow Lee & Anor [2001] 3 SLR 405 Victor Cham & Anor v Loh Bee Tuan [2006] 5 MLJ 359 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378; [1995] 3 All ER 97; [1995] 3 WLR 64 Ng Pak Cheong v Global Insurance Co Sdn Bhd [1995] 1 CLJ 223; [1995] 1 MLJ 60; [1994] 3 AMR 2663 CGU Insurance Berhad v Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd [2006] 3 MLJ 1; [2006] 2 CLJ 409 Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Company (1876–77) LR 2 App Cas 666 HL(E) Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew (t/a Stapley & Co) [1998] Ch 1 The Board of Trustees of the Sabah Foundation & Ors v Datuk Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamed & Anor [2008] 5 MLJ 469 Avel Consultants Sdn Bhd & Anor v Mohamed Zain Yusof & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 209 Abdol Mulok Awang Damit v Perdana Industri Holdings Bhd [2003] 3 CLJ 497 Asia Commercial Finance (F) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 196 Acumen Scientific Sdn Bhd v Yeow Liang Ming [2020] 3 MLJ 82 Newacres Sdn Bhd v Sri Alam Sdn Bhd [2000] 2 MLJ 353 Sean Thornton (a minor by his mother and next friend) v Northern Ireland Housing Executive [2010] NIQB 4 STATUTE/LEGISLATION REFERRED: Order 18 rule 7, Order 34 rule 2 (2) (e) of the Rules of Court 2012 Section 45 of the Evidence Act 1950 Section 17 of the Contracts Act 1950 Sections 132(1), 132(1A), 122A and 132E of the Companies Act 1965 Section 197 of Companies Act 2016 S/N z2BIFbad7UmB7RzwaWFTPw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	320,910	Tika 2.6.0
BA-22NCvC-301-08/2020	PLAINTIF IMEC JAYA SDN. BHD. DEFENDAN GREATEARTH APG SDN. BHD.	Permohonan kebenaran meminda penyata tuntutan - Perbicaraan penuh tamat - Sama ada "bona fide" - Pendirian defendan tiada kes untuk dijawab - Isu kelewatan - Isu prejudis terhadap defendan - Isu pendeposan afidavit jawapan oleh peguam defendan.	02/11/2023	YA Puan Indra Nehru Savandiah	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ebe96803-34c0-4eee-8d70-0a88e966883c&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN NO. GUAMAN: BA-22NCVC-301-08/2020 ANTARA IMEC JAYA SDN BHD … PLAINTIF [NO. PENDAFTARAN: 200101002680] (538436-A)] DAN GREATEARTH APG SDN BHD … DEFENDAN [DAHULUNYA DIKENALI SEBAGAI APG GEO-SYSTEMS SDN BHD] [NO. PENDAFTARAN: 199301005180 (259917-W)] _______________________________________________________ ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Rayuan 1. Notis rayuan difailkan oleh pihak plaintif terhadap keputusan Mahkamah menolak permohonan plaintif untuk meminda penyata tuntutan selepas tamat perbicaraan penuh. 2. Pihak plaintif memfailkan permohonan untuk meminda penyata tuntutan di bawah Aturan 20 Kaedah 5 dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. 02/11/2023 15:34:55 BA-22NCvC-301-08/2020 Kand. 113 S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Ringkasan Kes 3. Satu tuntutan terhadap defendan difailkan oleh plaintif bagi jumlah sebanyak RM2,001,302.81. 4. Tuntutan plaintif berasaskan dakwaan pelanggaran kontrak oleh defendan untuk perkhidmatan dan/atau barangan yang dibekalkan oleh plaintif kepada defendan. 5. Adalah dakwaan plaintif bahawa pembekalan perkhidmatan dan/atau barangan dibuat kepada defendan dari tahun 2002 hingga tahun 2017. 6. Kes telah habis dibicarakan dan ditetapkan untuk pemfailan hujahan. 7. Pihak plaintif memfailkan permohonan meminda penyata tuntutan atas alasan untuk membatalkan sejumlah besar invois- invois sama yang difailkan berulangan. 8. Pemfailan invois-invois sama yang berulangan ini telah menjadikan jumlah tuntutan plaintif sebanyak RM2,001,302.81. Jumlah tuntutan yang betul adalah sebanyak RM1,690,232.41. S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 9. Plaintif menyatakan permohonan ini dibuat secara “bona fide”, tidak menukar fakta kes plaintif dan tidak memprejudiskan defendan. 10. Pihak defendan tidak setuju terhadap permohonan meminda penyata tuntutan oleh plaintif atas sebab-sebab di antaranya, pihak defendan telah mengemukakan keterangan kewujudan invois-invois sama yang berulangan dalam perbicaraan penuh melalui keterangan saksi plaintif sendiri. 11. Pengemukakan keterangan tersebut oleh defendan membuktikan tuntutan plaintif tidak betul. 12. Pihak defendan berpendirian tidak ada kes untuk dijawab. 13. Pihak defendan tegas dengan pendirian sekiranya permohonan plaintif dibenarkan, ianya akan memprejudiskan defendan memandangkan defendan telah pun mengambil pendirian tiada kes untuk dijawab. S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Prinsip Undang-Undang Berhubung Dengan Permohonan Untuk Meminda Penyata Tuntutan 14. Prinsip undang-undang berkenaan permohonan untuk meminda penyata tuntutan telah diputuskan di dalam kes Mahkamah Persekutuan Yamaha Motor Co Ltd v Yamaha (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1983] CLJ REP 428 seperti berikut: “Under O. 20 of the Rules of the High Court 1980, which is equivalent to O. 28 Rules of Supreme Court, a judge has a discretion to allow leave to amend pleadings. Like any other discretion, it must of course be exercised judicially [see Kam Hoy Trading v Kam Fatt Tin Mine [1963] MLJ 248]. The general principle is that the Court will allow such amendments as will cause no injustice to other parties. Three basic questions should be considered to determine whether injustice would or would not result, (1) whether the application is bona fide; (2) whether prejudice caused to the other side can be compensated by costs and (3) whether the amendments would not in effect turn S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 the suit from one character into a suit of another and inconsistent character.” 15. Sehubungan dengan ini, seterusnya kes Mahkamah Persekutuan, Hong Leong Finance Bhd v Low Thiam Hoe & Another Appeal [2016] 1 MLJ 301 memutuskan seperti berikut: “[18] It is pertinent to note that Yamaha Motor was decided under the old RHC 1980. The civil procedure has since then changed with the introduction of the pre-trial case management in the year 2000 under O.34 of the RHC 1980 (w.e.f. 22 September 2000) and now under O.34 of the RC 2012 (w.e.f. 1 August 2012). Nowadays the Court recognises especially under the new case management regime that a different approach needs to be taken to prevent delay in the progress of a case to trial and for its completion. The progress of the case is no longer left in the hands of the litigants but with the court in the driver’s seat. (See the case of Syed Omar Syed Mohamed v Perbadanan Nasional Bhd [2012] 9 S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 CLJ 557). In particular when an application to amend the pleading is made at a very late stage as was done in the present case, the principles in Yamaha Motor ought not to be the sole consideration. This is because an order for compensation by payment of costs in such a case may not be adequate remedy and it would also disrupt the administration of justice which affects the courts, the parties and the other users of the judicial process. (See the case of Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd v Perembun (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 9 CLJ 828, [2014] 1 MLJ 80).” [33] Having considered the facts and the circumstances of the present case, our views are as follows: (a) When dealing with an application to amend the pleadings, which introduce a new case in the claim or defence, or on the eve of the trial, the principles in S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Yamaha Motor are not the sole considerations. (b) The principles in Yamaha Motor applies to cases where the application to amend the pleadings is made at an early stage of the proceedings. (c) That there has to be a cogent and reasonable explanation in the applicant’s affidavit as to why the application was filed late. (d) That the application to amend the pleadings is not a tactical manoeuvre. (e) That the proposed amendment must disclose full particulars for the court to ascertain if there is a real prospect of success in proving the same. S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 (f) That lateness in the application to amend the pleadings cannot necessarily be compensated by payment of costs.” Keputusan Mahkamah 16. Setelah meneliti dan mengkaji segala keterangan afidavit- afidavit dan hujahan-hujahan peguam-peguam terpelajar, adalah diputuskan permohonan kebenaran untuk meminda penyata tuntutan ditolak berdasarkan alasan-alasan seperti berikut: (a) Kes ini telah habis dijalankan selama 4 hari, bermula 19.6.2023 hingga 22.6.2023. Pada 22.6.2023, arahan telah diberikan kepada pihak- pihak berhubung dengan pemfailan hujahan. Hujahan seharusnya difailkan pada atau sebelum 27.7.2023. (b) Walau bagaimanapun, pada 21.7.2023 pihak plaintif memfailkan permohonan kebenaran untuk meminda penyata tuntutan. S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 (c) Dalam mengambil kira prinsip kes Hong Leong Finance Bhd v Low Thiam Hoe and Another Appeal [2016] 1 MLJ 301, Mahkamah mendapati permohonan plaintif dibuat lewat tanpa alasan- alasan kukuh untuk menjustifikasikan tindakan sedemikian. (d) Mahkamah ini mendapati ketika perbicaraan penuh dijalankan, pihak defendan yang bertungkus lumus mengemukakan bahan bukti kes berkait invois- invois sama yang berulangan digunakan untuk membuat tuntutan. (e) Alasan plaintif ianya adalah tidak disengajakan menunjukkan ketidaksungguhan plaintif dalam mengendalikan kes yang dibicarakan. (f) Jikalau fakta ini tidak dibawa kepada perhatian Mahkamah oleh defendan, ianya tidak akan diketahui pada bila-bila masa dan meninggalkan kesan serius kerana melibatkan hak pihak-pihak dalam kes. S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (g) Mahkamah mendapati kecacatan kes plaintif di mana tuntutan dari jumlah sebanyak RM2,001,302.81 dikurangkan kepada RM1,690,232.41 bukanlah perkara remeh-temeh. (h) Pada ketika perbicaraan kes dijalankan, pihak defendan telah membuktikan pengemukaan invois- invois sama yang berulangan mengakibatkan jumlah tuntutan plaintif berbeza dengan jumlah yang sewajarnya dituntut. (i) Permohonan kebenaran untuk meminda penyata tuntutan hanya difailkan pada 21.7.2023 iaitu lebih kurang 29 hari dari tarikh tamat perbicaraan penuh. (j) Plaintif gagal memberi penjelasan akan kelewatan dalam memfailkan permohonan tersebut. (k) Sehubungan dengan ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada keputusan kes Mah Sing Properties Sdn Bhd v UTS Management Service Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJ 2259 yang telah memutuskan penjelasan S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 wajib diberikan apabila permohonan meminda pliding tidak dibuat secepat mungkin. (l) Plaintif bergantung kepada alasan “bona fide”. Mahkamah tidak menerima alasan ini. Ini adalah kerana kecacatan kes plaintif telah dikemukakan oleh pihak defendan dan hanya disedari oleh pihak plaintif ketika perbicaraan sedang berlangsung. (m) Mahkamah juga memutuskan jikalau permohonan kebenaran meminda penyata tuntutan ini dibenarkan, ianya akan memprejudiskan defendan. (n) Ini adalah kerana pihak defendan telah mengambil pendirian bahawa tiada kes untuk dijawab yang berakibat daripada kecacatan serius kes plaintif sendiri. 17. Laungan plaintif yang bertemakan isu “bona fide” ditolak oleh Mahkamah ini sebab plaintif seharusnya cakna terhadap isi kandungan dokumen-dokumen yang bakal dijadikan bahan bukti tuntutan kes plaintif. S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 18. Sebaliknya, di dalam kes ini, pihak defendan yang telah membuktikan akan kewujudan invois-invois sama yang berulangan dijadikan bahan bukti dalam kes tuntutan plaintif. 19. Di dalam konteks ini rujukan dibuat kepada kes Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Ice Man Sdn Bhd [2020] 11 MLJ 584 yang memutuskan seperti berikut: “The defendant’s application did not promote the speedy disposal of the case and was more tactical than anything else. The matters sought to be included in the amendments were matters known to the defendant all along and could have been pleaded when the statement of defence was drafted or even before the pleadings had closed. Making the amendments at this late stage raised doubts about the bona fide of the application. A bona fide application would have explained the reason for the delayed amendments and whether the proposed amendments had any prospect of success.” S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 20. Seterusnya pihak plaintif telah membantah terhadap afidavit jawapan yang dideposkan oleh peguamcara defendan di dalam permohonan meminda penyata tuntutan di hadapan Mahkamah ini. 21. Mahkamah ini sehaluan dengan hujahan pihak defendan bahawa peguamcara defendan boleh mengikrarkan afidavit berkenaan. 22. Rujukan dibuat kepada kes Tirumeniyar Singara Veloo v Malaysia Motor Insurance Insurance Pool [2017] 8 CLJ 682 yang memutuskan seperti berikut: “[11] We do not think the learned judge had stated the correct principles of law on affidavits. (See Janab’s Key to Civil Procedure, 5th edn, pp 329 to 336). It is well settled that a supporting affidavit in an originating summons must be filed by the plaintiff or his power of attorney or any person who is entitled by law to do so. Order 28 r. 3C by itself does not impose the same restriction in respect of affidavit in reply by the defendant. However, the S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 affidavit in reply if filed by any other authorised person of the defendant who does not have personal knowledge may not have probative force as per O. 41 r. 5 (See Awaludin Sham Bokhari v Public Prosecutor [2016] 1 LNS 2; [2016] 2 AMR 20). In Malayan Banking Berhad v Chaterefield Corporation Sdn Bhd [2001] 6 CLJ 407; [2001] 3 AMR 3686, the point of debate of a litigant. Ramly Ali JC (as he then was) took the view that: In Malayan Banking Berhad v Chaterefield Corportion Sdn Bhd [2001] 6 CLJ 407; [2001] 3 AMR 3686, the point of debate was whether a solicitor may depose an affidavit on behalf of a litigant, Ramly Ali JC (as he then was) took the view that: (a) There are no express provisions of law relating to this matter, nor is there any provision of law which specifically states that an affidavit such as that in the instant case cannot be accepted by the court: S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 (b) On the authorities, a solicitor may depose an affidavit on behalf of the litigant provided the following conditions are fulfilled, ie: (i) the facts to be deposed must not be contentious or disputed questions of fact; (ii) the facts to be deposed must be from his knowledge; and (iii) the solicitors must have been authorised by the litigant, to depose the affidavit on his behalf.” 23. Apabila dikaji fakta kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, peguam defendan yang telah membuktikan akan kewujudan invois-invois sama secara berulangan ketika saksi plaintif diperiksa balas. S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 24. Oleh itu, fakta-fakta yang dideposkan adalah dalam pengetahuan peribadi peguam defendan sendiri. Walhal beliau adalah orang yang membuktikan fakta material ini di hadapan Mahkamah. 25. Justeru, Mahkamah memutuskan syarat-syarat kes Tirumeniyar Singara Veloo v Malaysia Motor Insurance Insurance Pool [2017] 8 CLJ 682 telah dipenuhi. 26. Berhubung dengan isu pemberian kuasa oleh anak guam kepada pihak lain, rujukan dibuat kepada kes Nazlan bin Hashim & Anor V Mohamad Akmal bin Mohd Rashid (a patient and is suing through his father and guardian Mohd Rashid bin Hamzah) [2015] MLJU 1805 yang memutuskan seperti berikut: “[15] I must firstly state that there is no requirement under O. 41 of the Rules of Court 2012, for a deponent of an affidavit to state that he was duly authorised by the litigant to affirm an affidavit on its behalf. I am also aware that S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 there are precedents, where the courts have either allowed the affidavit, or disregarded the affidavit, where this phrase was not stated; see Sabah Bank v Pemborong Keningau Sdn Bhd [1991] 3 CLJ 2590, and Twenty First Century Oils Sdn Bhd v Bank of Commerce (M) Sdn Bhd [1993] 2 AMR 1963; cf Syarikat Ying Mui Sdn Bhd v Muthusamy a/l Sellapan [1999] 6 MLJ 622 and Molop Corp Sdn Bhd v Uniperkasa (M) Sdn Bhd [2003] 6 MLJ 311.” “[17] In respect of authorisation, I would like to think, that solicitors are impliedly authorised by their client to affirm affidavits on its behalf. The client after all instructs the solicitors. This presumption is of course rebuttable, but it is for the client to raise that objection, and not their opponents, unless the latter has clear evidence to base their objections on.” S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 27. Prinsip kes tersebut diguna pakai dan dakwaan pihak plaintif bahawa peguam defendan tidak boleh membuat afidavit jawapan bagi pihak anak guam tidak diterima oleh Mahkamah ini sebab tidak ada keterangan bahawa anak guam defendan tidak mengizinkan peguam defendan mengikrar dan memfailkan afidavit berkenaan. Kesimpulan 28. Mahkamah ini memutuskan adalah adil dan wajar permohonan plaintif untuk kebenaran meminda penyata tuntutan ditolak dengan kos RM7,000.00 tertakluk fi alokatur berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang telah dihuraikan. Tarikh: 2 November 2023 (INDRA NEHRU SAVANDIAH) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Shah Alam Tarikh keputusan: 22 September 2023 S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 Peguam-Peguam: Bagi pihak plaintif: Gomathy Balasupramaniam [Tetuan Ganeson Gomathy Fadzlin M. Nava & Co.] Bagi pihak defendan: Habizan Rahman & Thevini Nayagam, [Tetuan Rahman Rohaida] S/N A2jp68A07k6NcAqI6WaIPA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	18,042	Tika 2.6.0
CB-62D-233-10/2023	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara] TERTUDUH AERYZUAN BIN RAHMAT	PROSEDUR JENAYAH : Mengaku salah – sabitan ke atas 3 pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 15(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952-sama ada sabitan teratur.RAYUAN : Rayuan atas hukuman – memasukkan dadah ke dalam badan sendiri – kesalahan berulang – sama ada hukuman setimpal dengan kesalahan. HUKUMAN : Hukuman di bawah seksyen 39C(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya – sama ada hukuman penjara dan sebatan melampau – sama ada mitigasi tertuduh telah	01/11/2023	Tuan Haji Jamaludin Bin Haji Mat	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ece98946-5de6-4bef-abd8-4d144f4e20f4&Inline=true	01/11/2023 16:30:38 CB-62D-233-10/2023 Kand. 8 S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Ronp7OZd70ur2E0UT04g9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ca—s2D—233—1o/2023 Kand. 8 :,,11/22:: ,b' «:2 DALANI MAHKAMAH sEsv£N DI TEMERLOH, DALAM NEGERI FAHANG DARUL MAKMLIR. MALAYSIA KES Nu: ca—s2n-2::-1n/zaz: DI ANYARA PENDAKWA RAVA ...PENDAKWA DAN AERVZUAN am RAHMAT ...TERTUDUH us KORUM: HAJI JAMALUDIN BIN HAJI MAT, HAKIM MAHKAMAH SESVEN1, TEMERLOH TARIKH HUKUMAN: A OKYOBER znza ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN AHJVNIAHM/\V unza) xntnmnn sw wonp7oz.s7amzEnum4yvA -ms Sum M... M“ be used m wow u. nvwvuﬁlv mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm PERMULAAN 1 Nasan pengmmman W dnsedmkan benkman danpida rayuan Terluauh yang udak herpuas nan Ierhadap kepulusan say: yang dmenkzn pada 4.1a.2oz3 a mans says telah mensamlkan Tenuaun an bawah Seksytn I5(I)(a) Akla Dadall Bcrbahayu 1952 dan dihukum pmjm uuma 5 mum mulax danpada (ankh 25.3.2023 ﬂan 2 sebalan dw bawah Seksyen ascmm) Am Dldah Berharuya I952 ﬂan dlpennlahkan memalam m pengawasan AADK se\ama 3 lahun seﬂepas men;a\am hukuman dv bzwah Sekxyen 335 Am mam Hem-my: 1:52 2 Rayuan ada\ah Iemaﬂap hukuman sahaja 15 3 Penman pemenjavaanlwdakdwlawakulkan PERTUDHHAN 4 Dada 4102023 Tenuduh \|e\aI1 dihadapkan ke Mahkamah 2» Sesyen Yemerloh dengan perluduhan sepem benkul IN wonp7oza7uu2Enum4yIA -ms Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm u. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm 25 Saya menaapan mmgas: yang dlbenkan men ‘renunun udak bsnnem same sekall PENGAKUAN SALAH 26 Saya pnga mengamml ma pengakuan saxan Temmuh yang le\ah rnenpmaikan masa ﬂan kn: pvhalvplhak yang (evhba( 27. Walau uagannanapun, pengakuan saxan Tenudun uuak men In memadl faktor mmgasx yang kuat da\am keadaan u. mana Tenuduh memzng hdak mempunym apa»apa pembelaan jika kes Im dubucarakzn 23 Mahkamah um mengambul pendekalan yang sama sebagamlana 15 da\am kss Tia Ah Long v. Public Prosecutor mom} 4 cu 77 an mana VA Mukhlar smm HMR manyacakan- ‘[1]A\\|huughIl\s nn awemed Me cl pvacnce mm in accusad persun 7 mm plaza: gmlly m .n oﬂencs with which ne nas Dean 20 shamed 7 would be gwen a m.ca..n\| on me semen»: ma! wnmd alvtefwxse have bean lmpmad on him run he been convicted Mm a ma!‘ yet mere ave nnpunmn zxcemmns In Ims gmem rm: Indeed we anems under ma Dzhgavmn Dmg: Am 1952 are exeeplmns mans my unn)m-nu ......m.‘....nm.... nmn uvmmnwsz Pu: N Ronp7ozn7uu1Enum4yiA um smm n-nhnrwm be used m van; .. mn.u.y mm: mmn VIZ mum puns! 29 Mahkamih ml selaruulnya menuuk kes PF’ v. Abdul Halim lshak A San: Lagi [2013] 9 cm 559 m mana YA Mahd Zawam Saﬂeh HMR lelih menzamrkan pandangannya sebagalmana benkul s 12‘! hank ﬂapnl mpemkankin mm kzsaman ma bevk-W-H Herman man mm. mempakin saw kesalahan yang Iellus yang hotel! mengancam kzsahnulnn am. kelenlevaman negava serla kumavan urnum om» «emu dhsimharkan sebum muiuh nombol salu negava uleh s<sr.,.... m Md: ram «sea Jusleru. uh mahkamah manlihmkan hukumsn yang rlnain kepada sam kesalahan yang mmapm m:\a\m Fnmmeu xebaglw serum‘ sudnh mam nevhndunuan sewapmya max dznal amnm kavadz nvzng Iamaw Dnlnm kes Yusmarm Samsuam v PP1supvaj mankamah menaumkan Is The seveﬂly or sememe can my be m mm Fanmmenrs mlenmn max wnvumcn car bema m Wssssslun 07 a Warga :mmm\| m any mm M pmmbned drugs mus\| cnmmelvsullle mm the semeooe m be name on me Pecuuarvzcts mum I211‘ PESALAH TEGAR so Szya .uga mempemmhangkan faktor bahawa samtan kall ml bukinlah Kesalahan panama Terluduh Rekod saman lampau Termduh (P5) yang dwkemukakan dw Mahkamah msnuruukkan blhawa Tenuduh mempunya: 5 sabman ka$JenaYah yang mana 4 danpadanya ada\ah helkanan dengan dzdzh ssbemm w r>4z:u.\m)-11) ..v,...m.,.n....._... AVCVIO4) m;m...s: men N wonp7ozn7nu2Enum4yiA um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm zu :11 Rem samlan Vampau Tenugun menuruukkan bahawa Tenuduh merupakan pssalah \|egar masm helum unsaman masxh bemm senk walaupurv le\ah bemlans; kah kemav masuk pemara 32, D\eh yang aennxuan, sewmamya Tenuduh dlkenakan hukuman yang beral 3: Berdasavkan kzpada nas—nas an alas, aaya herpuas nan hahawa nukuman veruari 5 (ahun dan 3 sehalan yang mkenakan meh Mahkamah mu adalah se\ari dengan kepuiusan Mahkamah Alasan <11 eras yang menghendakl Mahkamah mengenakan hukuman yang beral bagx kes»kes yang mehbalkan kepennngan awam Hukuman pemara 5 nanun adalan merupakan nukuman pemava paling mwmma yang boleh mahkamah kenzkan Hukuman sebalan sebanyak 3 kah ada\ah wmar memanaangxan on mempunyal rekoﬂ samlan Vampau memaaxkan kesa\ahan— kesakahan yang sama TIADA RASA INSAF DAN BERYAUEAT 34 Dalam mmgasmya. Terluduh hdak langsung menuruukkan rasa bsrsalah alau xnsav 35 Sekrranya bshau benar-benar unsaa sudah (emu bellau Iwdak akan mengwangw kesalahan yang sarna berulang kah .;.,.,.;....,....1 wxmqnszvlxuuluawwv ......,,, u.m.;.n.: mu: N wonp7oza7uu2Em1m4yIA ma s.n.‘ n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. nrW\ruU\|:I mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm as Mzhkamah ml meru]uk kes PP V. m: Ah Bhsng [1975] 2 Mm 155 m man: VA Ahdoa! Cadet H newsn menyalakan sepam benkul “rne resnandent am am: «mm m ms me. .n nnugumn the (ad «run run 11 amwwyad and supports an agad mmhnv and swnbvolhlrs He should or some have maugm ov mm more aommnmnq me oilenaes and mi altev. he Vs vn lac! meadnni namsn-p mm Imm une cunsequences oi ms mm acts and x m wvuld mtedate whal u had accaslm Dvevmusly In nmerve m anmhev case um an allendel shuuld nu\|2lne:1 m exnle nr n..nm any lympamy an an Ipsa mm hy Vzkmg mat stance av me nnpauous yuulh wno men ms palenls wnn an axe and men Headed m mmyaluzn that he was an -wnan “ ws KEPENTINGAN AWAM TERPELIHARA 31 Saya percaya‘ kepennngan awam akan lebm \|erpelihara jlka Tertuduh dlasmgkan danpada masyarakat dalam sualu Ismpoh In yang panjang as Tempoh pemenjaraan yang pamang mg: dlharapkan dapal membanlu Tenuduh unluk melupakan naps dadah yang mungkln sudah menjzdw darah daglng Tenuduh. c..m,,W. ...,...m.....nn.....y umﬂvzt sV'rnAIwv‘>~x mm N wonp7oZa7nu1Enum4yDA Nuns smm n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. nﬂmnnﬂly mm: dun-mm VI] .nuNG pm 39 Tempch pemenjaraan yang panjang Jugs ﬂmarapkan dapal memumskan hubungan rammun dengan raxanaakan sepemenayah yang Vain aan Tenuduh dapal menmanl pmgrarn- pmgram pemulnhan dengan aman 40 Semoga se\epas mangumu progrzrmpragram yang (e\ah msusun semasa an pwuara nanh dapal mangmsavxan Tsrluduh dan member: peluang kepada Terluduh unluk bevmuhasabah dm dan beruban kepaua seovang msan yang Vabrh bank ﬂan decal m memnggaxxan dadah sepenulvuya 41 saya jug: bemarzp behau mengambll peluang semasa manyaram hukuman pemara unmx mempe\|a.an pemaga. Kemzmran beﬂaedah yang man mgunakan unluk mencarl ws rezekx yang haIa\ kenxa amebaskan danpada pemava nann PELUANG MEMEAIKI mm 42 Semcga dengan (empuh pememaraan yang Vama ml memben zo peluang kepada Terluduh unzuk oemban ﬂan mampenaam dun memam searing warganegara yang berguna dan menukar cave mdup kepada yang Iemh balk 43 Du penjam jugay Tanuaun berpeluang unluk beIa]ar Ilmwlmu akadenuk dan I\|mu—I\mu kemahuan kendm secava (ersusun bersama Degawax-pegawan yang berlaulnah 44 Adam! dmarapkan, selspas dxbsbasxan danpada pemara narm. Terluduh "mu turn we a new leaf‘ dan memhebzskzn dun darvvada naps dadah sena meruam seorang Insan barn yang 5 xenm pmaum menyayangl dan dlsayangl aleh anggala masyavakal numusnu H1 45. D1 akhlr anahsws‘ says bevpendapal hukuman yang te\ah dijatuhkan ada\ah menglkm undang-undang‘ wayav ﬂan munasabah sen; selimpal dengzn kesa\ahan yang dﬂakukan aleh Terluduh VJ Bumlkh pldn 31\|1b.OktabI1 2023. LUDIN am HAJI MAT Hlldm Mahkamah Sesyan Temevloh, Falung Darul Mzkmuv. mm , ..Mm..w M...” “W, m Anna gas IN wonp7oza7uu2Enum4yIA -ms Sum In-nhnv WW he used m mm u. nvwhuﬂly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm Plhzk-Flhak: Ponnukwa Raya diwzkill oleh ASP suukar all Inuniznuy, mu Fejabal Poll: Duran Temevlnh. Temenon. Terluﬂnn mewa u : Allvlmukuwat; . mun :mmA\|vaM.»x pm 17 sw wunp7oz.s7um2Enum4yIA -ms Sum IHIWDIY WW be .15.. m van; M m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VII mum puns! vzavununau» mmwn xmu PADA 25/«M2 mm 1 mm mum cu m mu m mum mm In) rwrmou. mum nAr.kAH nwmon. s mum NIGER! m-mm. man mmmu MENGGUNAKAN Damn acnmmva mms ‘\AOKPlIINE' om: ‘(AVG nzmvkuw mm mm MELAKUMN s/nu K2:/\L,\H/«N um/mm sen usmm AKTA mum-« m».kn/MAVA mi. mm wl an/mm KFNAIAHAN Mun mu >41». mm m mm mm m.~/mITK/m mwm-W4 KAMU no no: m mHuKuM nl mwm szksvm mm Axn vaaosama nuxuwu: mu msammw x:saun,«~ urn-naxm: nuunuwm pmmu I5 scum rwrou nmx xukmo my mm mm mm Lmun m mm mm nn<FNAKA\ saamw mm Leam mm m s:sA\|AN mm omnmnm Pr:NuA\»/xx/w 5H./\MA mayo» ru».K mama ommn amx»-um I)/w nnax mm (3) mm :o PENGAKUAN 5 Perluduhan as alas Celin dlbacakin aaugan (evang din Jelis kepada Tenuduh davam Eahasa Ma\aysia yang dﬂahami man Tanuduh 5 Tenuduh dengan auxarela mengaku nevsaxah ke ans perluduhan Iersehm ...,m.., ..,wa.m.a...‘...a...y mam’: S!VI:l7AI:Iw3) ma; am Ronp7ozn7nm1Enum4yIA «ma am nmhnrwm a. med w my a. nrW\nnH\|:I mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 7 Mahkamah selemsnya menerangkan swat ﬂan akxbat pengakuzn szlah lelsebm dzn pemrnukan hukuman yang wen dlkervakan Ke alas Tenuduh an Temmuh memahamx penerangan Mahkamah den masnh mengaku sa\ah ke alas penuu-man, dan vanam swfil can a\|<vba\| penqakuannya nu RINGKASAN FAKTA KES PENDAKWAAN m 9 Selerusnya‘ Fegawan Pendakwa Ierpelqar mengemukakzn rmgkasan «ma Kes penaaxwaan 10 Rlngkasan fakla kss «swan amacakan dan mterangkan kepaaa I5 Terluduh me\aluI Jumbahasa Mahkamah dan disahkan sebagal bexur H. Rmgkasan Vakla kes kemudnannya zmandakan sebzgzw eksmbn P1 2:: EKSHIEIT-EKSHIBIY 12. Selemsnya‘ Pegawal Fendakwa werpemar mengemuxakan eksmbwt-ekshxbn sepem benkul =..,m..m.. I-wauiavxmu-\u><wr uunxx )AOL‘)ADn\|i§) ra,-,u IN wonp7oz.s7uu1Enum4yIA -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm ta) Temenoh Report No 3677/2023 sehagav P2 (:2) K Klan Repan Nu 432/2023 sebagal F3 (c) Laparan pamog. sebagav P4 — dnumukkan din mam my Rekod Pusal Penaanavan Pamenayah sebagaw P5 — dmacakan dan duakm (e) 4 kepmg gambav bmol unn sebagax P6A—D — dwuruukkan ﬂan mam RAVUAN vsmuuuu 13 Mahkamah selerusnya mendengar rayuan dznpada Tenuduh 14 Terluduh da\am rayuannya menyafakan Ia) Ponon hukuman dnknra dan tankh tangkap. Is my on hemsla 45 tahun 1:) on man berkahwm, memnunyal 5 orang anak my on bekena sebaga! bumh ladang ke\apa sewn (e) on menanggung 5 erang nak‘ searang rsten uan ssnrang mu HUJAH PEMSERATAN OLEH PEGAWAI PENDAKWA 15, Pegawax Pendakwa memohon saw nuxuman yang senmpal can berpalman mxenaxan ke alas on IN wonp7oz.s7uu1Enum4yIA -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm SAEITAN 15 Selelah mzndengar pengakuan salah Tenuﬂuh (anpa syavan menganahsa vakca kes menemv eksmhneksmbn yang Ie\ah dikemukakan dl hadapan Mahkamah. Mahkamah msnenma pengakuan sa\ah Terluduh ke a\|as perluduhan dan mansamxan Terluduh sebagawmana penuaunan HUKMMAN 17. 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Tenuduh 2: Walau baganmanapun, saya hdak nampak sebarang alasan yang munasabah mkemuxaxan bag: membenarkan mmmm lerus mengulangl kesdahan yang sama bevmang xan uunznwnn ruw><A£rvAuI<uw<»«Av Arvuzum xylcm-\IzuM.»z Vagzm N Runpvozmm-1Enum4yiA Nuns Snr1n\nnnhnrwH\I>e used m van; me nngwnauuy mums aaa.n.n. VIZ mum Wm!	2,258	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
BA-16-35-08/2022	PERAYU MAKAN-LAH (M) SENDIRIAN BERHAD RESPONDEN KAVITHA A/P SHANMUGAM	Rayuan yang difailkan oleh perayu, terhadap keputusan Pejabat Tenaga Kerja Bangi - Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan yang diarahkan oleh Kerajaan Malaysia - Akta Kerja 1955 - Peraturan-Peraturan Kerja (Faedah-faedah Penamataan dan Pemberhentian Kerja Sementara) 1980.	01/11/2023	YA Dr Shahnaz Binti Sulaiman	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=13036db8-d83e-4eb6-a9cd-986d49e133ff&Inline=true	1 BA-16-35-08/2022 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: BA-16-35-08/2022 ANTARA MAKAN-LAH (M) SENDIRIAN BERHAD (No. Syarikat: 647526-D) …PERAYU DAN KAVITA A/P SHANMUGAM (No. K/P: 791026-10-5630) …RESPONDEN [Dalam Pejabat Tenaga Kerja Bangi Kes Saman Ketua Pengarah Buruh No.: KBR/11004/2022/0456 ANTARA KAVITA A/P SHANMUGAM (No. K/P: 791026-10-5630) …PENGADU DAN MAKAN-LAH (M) SENDIRIAN BERHAD (No. Syarikat: 647526-D) …DEFENDAN] 01/11/2023 15:07:49 BA-16-35-08/2022 Kand. 12 S/N uG0DEz7Ytk6pzZhtSeEz/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 BA-16-35-08/2022 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN [1] Ini adalah rayuan yang difailkan oleh perayu, Makan Lah Sdn Bhd terhadap keputusan Pejabat Tenaga Kerja Bangi di dalam Negeri Selangor bertarikh 18.08.2022. Fakta Kes [2] Fakta kes berdasarkan hujahan pihak perayu adalah seperti berikut. Responden telah berkhidmat sebagai seorang juruwang (cashier) dengan perayu sejak 02.08.2004. [3] Sejak 18.03.2020 berdasarkan kepada Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan yang diarahkan oleh Kerajaan Malaysia, responden tidak hadir bekerja dengan perayu. [4] Perayu telah membayar gaji responden sehingga bulan Mei 2020. Bermula bulan Jun 2020, responden ada menerima bantuan kerajaan atas inisiatif perayu sebanyak RM600.00 (Penjana Perkeso) selama 10 bulan sehingga Mac 2021. [5] Pada 11.04.2022, perayu telah memberikan notis kepada responden memaklumkan responden bahawa responden telah ditukarkan ke syarikat baru di Resource Department, Lim Kok Wing University of Creative Technology International Sendirian Berhad yang dikenali sebagai Lim Kok Wing University of Creative Technology bermula 18.04.2022. Jawatan di Lim Kok Wing University of Creative Technology adalah sebagai ‘general worker’. S/N uG0DEz7Ytk6pzZhtSeEz/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 BA-16-35-08/2022 [6] Menurut perayu, arahan penempatan baru ini adalah disebabkan kafe yang dioperasikan oleh ‘Makanlah (M) Sendirian Berhad di mana responden telah berkhidmat masih belum boleh beroperasi. [7] Menurut perayu lagi, penempatan baru ini merupakan syarikat yang mempunyai kerjasama dengan syarikat Makanlah (M) Sendirian Berhad yang mana kedua-duanya merupakan syarikat dibawah Lim Kok Wing Group of Companies. [8] Walau bagaimanapun, responden enggan menerima arahan pertukaran/penempatan yang dilakukan oleh perayu dan tidak menghadirkan diri untuk bekerja. Responden menganggap dirinya telah ditamatkan pekerjaannya. Perkara ini dinafikan oleh perayu. [9] Penolong Pengarah Tenaga Kerja, Pejabat Tenaga Kerja Bangi yang mendengar kes responden telah membuat keputusan memihak kepada responden. Alasan Penolong Pengarah Tenaga Kerja adalah bahawa perayu telah menamatkan perkhidmatan responden. [10] Tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan tersebut, perayu telah memfailkan rayuan di mahkamah ini. Analisa dan Dapatan Mahkamah [11] Hujahan perayu adalah bahawa Penolong Pengarah Tenaga Kerja, Pejabat Tenaga Kerja Bangi telah membuat dapatan bahawa tiada terma secara nyata dan tersirat bagi melaksanakan perpindahan/penempatan di dalam kontrak perkhidmatan di antara pihak-pihak. S/N uG0DEz7Ytk6pzZhtSeEz/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 BA-16-35-08/2022 [12] Menurut perayu, sebagai majikan kepada responden, perayu mempunyai hak untuk mengarahkan perpindahan dan/atau pertukaran dan/atau penempatan perkhidmatan responden walaupun perkara tersebut tidak wujud di dalam kontrak perkhidmatan. [13] Rujukan telah dibuat kepada kes Ladang Holyrood V. Ayasamy Manikam & Ors [2004] 2 CLJ 697 di mana mahkamah telah menyatakan seperti berikut: “[2a] Nevertheless, an employer always has the implied right to transfer its employees. As the right is one that is 'implied', no express term in the contract of service is necessary. The right to transfer exists even in the absence of a contract of service unless there is a contract to the contrary. The transfer, however, must not be actuated by mala fide or any improper or indirect motive and must not involve a change in the terms of employment to the detriment of the employee.” [14] Menurut perayu, pada sepanjang masa yang material perayu telah bertindak secara ‘bona fide’ untuk memastikan responden terus diberikan kerja. [15] Berhubung perkara ini, perayu merujuk kepada kes Ngeow Voon Yean v. Sungei Wang Plaza Sdn Bhd/Landmarks Holding Bhd [2006] 3 ILR 1717 yang mana telah memutuskan bahawa: “[34] The duty of an employee at common law is also similar in that he is to comply with all lawful and reasonable orders given by his employer with respect to the performance of S/N uG0DEz7Ytk6pzZhtSeEz/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 BA-16-35-08/2022 such functions within the scope of his employment. That duty is one of the fundamental obligations which is deemed to be impliedly undertaken in every contract of hiring. The duty of obedience at common law is subject to two qualifications, firstly that the employer may not order his employee to do something illegal or secondly order his employee to do anything dangerous.” [16] Berdasarkan kes di atas perayu berhujah bahawa apabila responden menulis tidak bersetuju untuk arahan perpindahan ini maka responden enggan mematuhi arahan majikan dan telah melakukan perlanggaran pada terma-terma perkhidmatan. [17] Fakta kes yang tidak dipertikaikan adalah bahawa responden bekerja dengan perayu. Fakta lain yang tidak dipertikai adalah bahawa notis bertarikh 18.04.2022 dari perayu mengarahkan responden untuk bertugas sebagai ‘general worker’ di Resources Department bermula 18.04.2022. Akta Kerja 1955 adalah terpakai kepada responden. [18] Berhubung rayuan ini, mahkamah ini merujuk kepada perenggan 12(3)(e) Akta Kerja 1955 memperuntukkan: “(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (2), where the termination of service of the employee is attributable wholly or mainly to the fact that— … (e) the employee has refused to accept his transfer to any other place of employment, unless his contract of service requires him to accept such transfer; or S/N uG0DEz7Ytk6pzZhtSeEz/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 BA-16-35-08/2022 … the employee shall be entitled to, and the employer shall give to the employee, notice of termination of service, and the length of such notice shall be not less than that provided under paragraph (2)(a), (b) or (c), as the case may be, regardless of anything to the contrary contained in the contract of service.” [19] Sementara itu, perenggan 12(2)(a), (b) dan (c) Akta Kerja 1955 pula memperuntukkan: “(2) The length of such notice shall be the same for both employer and employee and shall be determined by a provision made in writing for such notice in the terms of the contract of service, or, in the absence of such provision in writing, shall not be less than— (a) four weeks’ notice if the employee has been so employed for less than two years on the date on which the notice is given; (b) six weeks’ notice if he has been so employed for two years or more but less than five years on such date; (c) eight weeks’ notice if he has been so employed for five years or more on such date: Provided that this section shall not be taken to prevent either party from waiving his right to a notice under this subsection.” S/N uG0DEz7Ytk6pzZhtSeEz/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 BA-16-35-08/2022 [20] Responden tidak bersetuju dengan perpindahan oleh perayu dan enggan dipindahkan. Pada padangan mahkamah ini, perkara ini diperuntukkan oleh perenggan 12(3)(e) Akta Kerja 1955. Menurut perenggan 12(3)(e) Akta Kerja 1955, pekerja yang telah enggan menerima pindahannya ke mana-mana tempat pekerjaan lain, melainkan jika kontrak perkhidmatannya mengkehendaki beliau menerima pindahan tersebut, berhak untuk, dan majikan hendaklah memberikan kepada pekerja, notis penamatan perkhidmatan, dan tempoh notis tersebut hendaklah tidak kurang daripada yang disediakan di bawah perenggan (2)(a), (b), atau (c), seperti mana yang berkenaan, tanpa mengira apa-apa yang bertentangan yang terkandung dalam kontrak perkhidmatan. [21] Tempoh notis pula diperuntukkan oleh perenggan 12(2)(a), (b) atau (c) Akta Kerja 1955. [22] Responden telah dengan jelas dan dari mula menyatakan ketidak setujuan responden untuk dipindahkan. Dalam surat perpindahan bertarikh 18.04.2022, responden telah menambah perkataan “not” bagi menyatakan ketidak setujuan responden terhadap arahan pertukaran. [Lihat: Metaldek Industries Sdn Bhd v. Kamaruddin bin Tokiman [1998] 7 MLJ 342] [23] Responden telah enggan untuk ditukarkan atau dipindahkan dan mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan Penolong Pegawai Tenaga Kerja bahawa kes responden ini terjumlah kepada penamatan di bawah perenggan 12(3)(e) Akta Kerja 1955. [24] Tiada bukti bahawa kontrak di antara perayu dan responden memperuntukkan pertukaran atau perpindahan sebagai terma kontrak. Oleh itu, responden mempunyai hak untuk menolak S/N uG0DEz7Ytk6pzZhtSeEz/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 BA-16-35-08/2022 arahan pertukaran. Responden ditukarkan kepada pekerjaan baru sebagai ‘general worker’ yang melibatkan skop kerja yang berbeza, ini memerlukan persetujuan kedua pihak. Dalam rayuan ini, tiada persetujuan oleh responden terhadap pertukaran. [25] Memandangkan mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa responden telah ditamatkan perkhidmatannya, maka mahkamah mendapati bahawa responden berhak mendapat faedah penamatan sebagaimana Perkara 4(1) Peraturan-Peraturan Kerja (Faedah-Faedah Penamatan dan Pemberhentian Kerja Sementara) 1980. [26] Responden bekerja dengan perayu sehingga 18.03.2020. Gaji responden dibayar oleh perayu sehingga Mei 2020. Responden juga mendapat sabsidi PERKESO sebanyak RM600.00 sebulan untuk 10 bulan. [27] Penamatan pekerjaan responden berlaku apabila perayu mengarahkan responden bertukar tempat kerja yang mana tidak dipersetujui oleh responden. Berdasarkan peraturan 6(1)(c) Peraturan-Peraturan Kerja (Faedah-faedah Penamataan dan Pemberhentian Kerja Sementara) 1980, responden berhak mendapat upah untuk dua puluh hari bagi setiap tiap penggajian di bawah kontrak perkhidmatan yang berterusan dengan majikan jika ia diambil kerja untuk tempoh lima tahun atau lebih. [28] Responden telah mula bekerja dengan perayu pada 2.08.2004 dan tarikh akhir bekerja adalah 18.04.2022. Ini bererti tempoh pekerjaan responden adalah 17 tahun 8 bulan. Gaji terakhir repsonden adalah RM2,000.00 sebulan. S/N uG0DEz7Ytk6pzZhtSeEz/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 BA-16-35-08/2022 [29] Berdasarakan perkiraan, responden berhak mendapat pampasan sebanyak RM23,237.26 dari perayu. Kesimpulan [30] Berdasarakan sebab-sebab yang telah dinyatakan, mahkamah ini menolak rayuan perayu. Keputusan Penolong Pengarah Tenaga Kerja adalah disahkan dan dikekalkan. Kos sebanyak RM1,000.00 dibayar kepada responden, tertakluk kepada alokatur. Tarikh: 1 November 2023 (SHAHNAZ BINTI SULAIMAN) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya, Shah Alam S/N uG0DEz7Ytk6pzZhtSeEz/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 BA-16-35-08/2022 Peguamcara Pihak Pemohon: Mohamad Fauzi bin Abdul Samad, Rajinder Singh a/l Uttam Singh Tetuan The Law Chambers of Fauzi & Nasser Advocates & Solicitors No. 25-1, Jalan PUJ 3/5, Taman Puncak Jalil, Bandar Putra Permai, 43000 Seri Kembangan, Selangor danaurium@gmail.com +6 03 8999 2062 Pihak Responden: Kavitha a/p Shanmugam No. 25 Jalan 6, Taman Gemilang, 43800 Dengkil, Selangor. kavithayasshwin@gmail.com S/N uG0DEz7Ytk6pzZhtSeEz/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	12,770	Tika 2.6.0
A-02(W)-1555-08/2022	PERAYU ANNATHURAI A/L VENKIDASALM RESPONDEN Vani A/p Welluven	Section 76 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 - Distribution of matrimonial property – Division of the matrimonial house – the division is not an exercise of strict financial accounting but a fair and equitable distribution of the matrimonial property and assets - proceeds of the sale of the matrimonial house be distributed on 50%-50% basis - Section 92, 93 and 95 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 - Maintenance and tertiary education expenses of the Children.	01/11/2023	YA Dato' Lim Chong FongKorumYA Datuk Seri Kamaludin Bin Md. SaidYA Dato' Hashim Bin HamzahYA Dato' Lim Chong Fong	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=fdc176ce-260d-41d1-8812-9e6d442d6fb7&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - Alasan Penghakiman Muktamad Annathurai v Vani 1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA IN PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF PUTRAJAYA CIVIL APPEAL NO: A-02(W)-1555-08/2022 BETWEEN ANNATHURAI A/L VENKIDASALAM … APPELLANT (NRIC NO.: 720711-08-6257) AND VANI A/P WELLUVEN … RESPONDENT (NRIC NO.: 770208-08-6968) In the High Court of Malaya at Taiping In the State of Perak Darul Ridzuan,Malaysia Divorce Petition No.: AB-33-29-07/2021 Between Annathurai a/l Venkidasalam …Petitioner Husband (NRIC NO.: 720711-08-6257) And Vani a/p Welluven …Respondent Wife (NRIC NO.: 770208-08-6968) 01/11/2023 13:33:51 A-02(W)-1555-08/2022 Kand. 27 S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 CORAM: KAMALUDIN BIN MD. SAID, JCA. HASHIM BIN HAMZAH, JCA. LIM CHONG FONG, JCA. GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against the distribution of matrimonial property as well as children maintenance consequential to divorce. [2] The appeal came before us on 21st August 2023 and we unanimously allowed the appeal in part by only setting aside the High Court’s order relating to the lump sum payment of RM37,500.00 for the 2nd child’s maintenance for her tertiary education. The rest of the High Court order is maintained. No order as to costs. [3] We now provide below the grounds of our decision. S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 BACKGROUND [4] The parties were married in 1992. The Appellant husband is presently 51 years old and the Respondent wife is 46 years old. [5] They have 3 children viz, 1st daughter (now 25 years), 2nd daughter (now 21 years) and 3rd daughter (19 years in October 2023) (collectively “Children”). [6] The Appellant runs a scrap metal business whilst the Respondent was a full-time housewife. They used to live together in the matrimonial home (“House”) purchased by the Appellant after the marriage and registered in his sole name. [7] The parties were not compatible and the marriage got into serious problems because of the Appellant’s extra-marital affairs as well as harassment and abuse of the Respondent. [8] As the result, the Respondent in 2009 left the House and lived separately with the 3 children. She worked as a cashier in the supermarket without maintenance of her and the Children by the Appellant. In times of financial hardship, the Respondent’s brothers-in-law helped her out in the maintenance. S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [9] By reason that the marriage has irretrievably broken down, the Appellant commenced divorce proceedings in the High Court in July 2021. IN THE HIGH COURT [10] After trial that was not contested on the divorce (because the parties have no wish to stay married to each other) but only contested on the distribution of matrimonial property and children maintenance, the learned High Court Judicial Commissioner on 2nd August 2022 ordered as follows (“Decision”): …MAKA ADALAH DIPUTUSKAN DAN DIPERINTAHKAN seperti berikut: - (a) Bahawa perkahwinan antara Pempetisyen Suami dan Responden Isteri dibubarkan; (b) Bahawa dekri pembubaran perkahwinan dijadikan mutlak dengan serta merta; (c) Bahawa Pempetisyen Suami dikehendaki melantik penilai yang dipersetujui oleh kedua-dua pihak untuk membuat penilaian rumah yang beralamat No. 5, Lorong Mewah 11, Taman Mewah, Kamunting, 34600 Perak yang didirikan atas Lot 17034, Mukim Asam Kumbang, Daerah Larut & Matang, Negeri Perak dan dipegang dibawah Pajakan Negeri No. Hakmilik 210291 (seterusnya dirujuk sebagai “rumah perkahwinan”) untuk memperolehi harga pasaran rumah perkahwinan dalam tempoh 2 bulan dari tarikh ini; (d) Bahawa Pempetisyen Suami dikehendaki menjual rumah perkahwinan pada harga yang tidak kurang dari nilai pasaran dalam tempoh 4 bulan dari S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 tarikh laporan penilaian rumah perkahwinan diterima kecuali sekiranya lanjutan masa dipersetujui oleh kedua-dua pihak; (e) Bahawa Pempetisyen Suami dikehendaki membayar Responden Isteri ½ bahagian harga jualan rumah perkahwinan dalam tempoh 3 minggu dari tarikh harga jualan rumah perkahwinan diterima olehnya; (f) Bahawa Responden Isteri dikehendaki menarikbalik Kaveat Persendiriannya atas rumah perkahwinan supaya tiada halangan untuk penjualan rumah perkahwinan; (g) Bahawa ½ bahagian jumlah wang simpanan dalam akaun KWSP Pempetisyen Suami setakat tarikh dekri mutlak diberi kepada Responden Isteri; (h) Bahawa Lembaga KWSP mengambil langkah-langkah yang sewajarnya untuk memindahkan ½ bahagian jumlah caruman KWSP tersebut dari akaun KWSP Pempetisyen Suami ke akaun KWSP Responden Isteri untuk memberi kesan kepada penghakiman Mahkamah ini; (i) Bahawa Pempetisyen Suami dikehendaki membayar Responden Isteri fee kursus bagi Leshani a/p Annathurai sebanyak RM 37,500.00 dalam tempoh 2 bulan dari tarikh ini; (j) Bahawa Pempetisyen Suami hendak menanggung kos pengajian Uma Nandhinii a/p Annathurai dengan membuat bayaran sejumlah RM 12,500.00 setiap tahun disepanjang tempoh pengajian tinggi Uma Nandhinii mulai tarikh Uma Nandhinii masuk kursus pengajian tinggi sehingga selesai pengajian tingginya di peringkat ijazah sarjana muda; (k) Bahawa Pempetisyen Suami hendaklah membayar Responden Isteri RM 500.00 seorang setiap bulan sebagai nafkah Leshani a/p Annathurai dan Uma Nandhinii a/p Annathurai mulai dari tarikh ini pada/atau sebelum 10 haribulan setiap bulan sehingga selesai pengajian tinggi masing-masing; S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (l) Bahawa Pempetisyen Suami membayar Responden Isteri dengan serta merta RM 4,000.00 sebagai kos tindakan ini tertakluk kepada alocatur; [11] The Appellant is dissatisfied with the Decision and have on 16th August 2022 appealed to this Court. FINDINGS OF THIS COURT [12] Before us, the parties have narrowed the appeal into 3 broad issues, to wit: (i) Division of the House; (ii) Share of Appellant’s EPF; and (iii) Maintenance and education expenses of the Children, which we will deal with them seriatim. [13] It is apposite that we reproduce here for purposes of this appeal the relevant statutory provisions in ss. 76, 92, 93 and 95 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (“LRA”) as follows: 76. Power for court to order distribution of matrimonial asset (1) The court shall have power, when granting a decree of divorce or judicial separation, to order the division between the parties of any assets acquired by S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 them during the marriage or the sale of any such assets and the division between the parties of the proceeds of sale. (2) In exercising the power conferred by subsection (1) the court shall have regard to- (a) the extent of the contributions made by each party in money, property or work towards the acquiring of the assets or payment of expenses for the benefit of the family; (aa) the extent of the contributions made by the other party who did not acquire the assets to the welfare of the family by looking after the home or caring for the family; (b) any debts owing by either party which were contracted for their joint benefit; (c) the needs of the minor children, if any, of the marriage; (d) the duration of the marriage, and subject to those considerations, the court shall incline towards equality of division. (3) (Deleted by Act A1546:s.6) (4) (Deleted by Act A1546:s.6) (5) For the purposes of this section, references to assets acquired during a marriage include assets owned before the marriage by one party which have been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party or by their joint efforts. 92. Duty to maintain children Except where an agreement or order of court otherwise provides, it shall be the duty of a parent to maintain or contribute to the maintenance of his or her children, whether they are in his or her custody or the custody of any other person, either by providing them with such accommodation, clothing, food and education as may be reasonable having regard to his or her means and station in life or by paying the cost thereof. S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 93. Power of court to order maintenance for children (1) The court may at any time order a man to pay maintenance for the benefit of his child- (a) if he has refused or neglected reasonably to provide for the child; (b) if he has deserted his wife and the child is in her charge; (c) during the pendency of any matrimonial proceedings; or (d) when making or subsequent to the making of an order placing the child in the custody of any other person. (2) The court shall have the corresponding power to order a woman to pay or contribute towards the maintenance of her child where it is satisfied that having regard to her means it is reasonable so to order. (3) An order under subsection (1) or (2) may direct payment to the person having custody or care and control of the child or trustees for the child. 95. Duration for orders of custody and maintenance Except where an order for custody or maintenance of a child is expressed to be for any shorter period or where any such order has been rescinded, it shall expire on the attainment by the child of the age of eighteen years or where the child is under physical or mental disability, or is pursuing further or higher education or training, on the ceasing of such disability or completion of such further or higher education or training, whichever is the later. Division of the House [14] It is not in dispute that the House is the sole matrimonial property or asset in issue between the parties. S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [15] This is governed by ss. 76(1) and (2) of the LRA which is now the combined provision between the merger of ss. 76(1) and (2) LRA with the repealed ss. 76(3) and (4) LRA via Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Amendment Act 2017 that came into force on 15th December 2018. Prior to the amendment, ss. 76(1) and (2) LRA dealt with matrimonial assets by joint efforts and ss. 76(3) and (4) LRA via sole effort of the parties. [16] Prior to the amendment, Abdul Hamid Mohamad JCA (later CJ) generally held as follows in Sivanes Rajaratnam v. Usha Rani Subramaniam [2002] 3 CLJ 300 CA with emphasis added by us: “From the authorities referred to us by both learned counsel and from my research, as far as I can ascertain, I am unable to find any decided case in Malaysia and Singapore to support an accounting of all the assets acquired or improved during the marriage and the income thereof and the determination of who had benefitted more or less and awarding a shortfall to the party who is found to have benefitted less. All the cases simply talk about the "division" of the matrimonial assets, which necessarily means the existing assets at the time of the divorce. Of course the question of the size and nature of each spouse's contribution and who has enjoyed the property to the exclusion of the other (for example, as in this case, where only one party lived at the Crescent Court Apartment) and the reasons why, are relevant in determining the portion that each spouse should get, but not, in my view, for the purpose of calculating either spouse's share of past income. This view, in my opinion, is consistent with the wording and spirit of s. 76. That section talks of "division" of assets acquired during the marriage and provides the factors that should be taken into account when making the division. Besides (I am speaking generally here) in a marriage, both spouses share everything, both contribute towards the home and family in one way or another, to a bigger or smaller extent. Where both spouses work and earn income, each of them inevitably spends his or her own income for the family. Similarly, where there is income from an asset purchased during the subsistence of the marriage, say rent, even though it may be paid into the account of one spouse, S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 eventually it will go to the family, may be all and may be part of it. No one keeps an account, indeed no one should, as a marriage is not a business venture. So, if and when the marriage breaks up, it is unreasonable that the court should undertake an accounting of their income and expenditure during the period the marriage subsists. The function of the court is to make a fair and equitable division of the matrimonial assets that exist at the time of the divorce, taking into account the factors provided by s. 76.” [17] After the amendment of the LRA, Aliza Sulaiman JC (now J) elegantly held as follows in Poonageswari a/p P. Krishnan v. Bailand a/l Govindham [2019] MLJU 448 with emphasis added by us: “[58] A perusal of the Bill (D.R. 33/2017) for Act A1546 and the Hansard when the said Bill was debated in Parliament shows that a major part of the amendments was necessitated in order to address the rights of a converted spouse to initiate a divorce proceeding in the civil court and the issue of whether the converted spouse can unilaterally convert the child of the marriage to Islam. In so far as section 76 LRA 1976 is concerned, the objective of the amendments was to provide better security to the position of wives and to give due recognition to their contribution in kind by taking care of the home and its members, some who may even had to give up their salaried employment and whatever career advancements or opportunities they had in order to take care of the family. In other words, the sacrifices made by the fairer sex for the well- being of the family, especially the nuclear family unit, are not in vain. [59] With the new section 76 LRA 1976, the Court is empowered to have regard to the payment of expenses for the benefit of the family; the extent of the contributions made by the other party who did not acquire the assets to the welfare of the family by looking after the home or caring for the family; and the duration of the marriage, for the purposes of equality of division of matrimonial assets. Wives and mothers who are home makers from the inception of the marriage or who intentionally choose to become full time home managers but were deprived of any division of the assets acquired for the welfare of the family, due to the inability to prove "joint effort " under the previous wordings of section 76 LRA 1976, are thus better protected. All assets acquired during the subsistence of marriage are now considered as matrimonial property. S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [60] At a glance, the new section 76 LRA 1976 would lean more favorably towards the Petitioner in the present case since her contribution by looking after the home and the daily needs of the family are taken into account even though the Petitioner was not able to contribute monetarily to the acquisition of the Sentul property. … [65] In this context, one is reminded of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of Sivanes a/l Rajaratnam v. Usha Rani A/P Subramanian [2002] 3 CLJ 300 that the function of the Court is to make fair and equitable division of the matrimonial assets that exist at the time of the divorce taking into consideration the factors laid down in section 76 LRA 1976 and it is not an assessment of damages. Although Sivanes was decided before the amendments to section 76 LRA 1976 came into operation, I would think that the general principle as laid down by the Court of Appeal is still applicable whenever the said provision is being invoked. [66] Before I conclude my analysis of the issue concerning the Sentul property, for the sake of completeness I should mention my opinion on the applicability of the decision in Yap Yen Piow v. Hee Wee Eng [2016] 1 LNS 1060; [2017] 1 MLJ 17 as cited by Ms. Sheela Devi. In that case, the Court of Appeal had considered the pre-amended section 76 LRA 1976 and the general jurisprudence relating to matrimonial assets. Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JCA, in delivering the judgment of the Court, held as follows: " Jurisprudence relating to matrimonial property and non-matrimonial assets and provision for maintenance Division of Assets [11]Section 76 of LRA 1976 is the key statutory provision to deal with the division of the property. In principle, it differentiates assets acquired during the subsistence of marriage into three types. They are as follows: (i) Any assets acquired by joint efforts which we have classified as matrimonial property. In this category, the court has an obligation to divide the assets. [See section 76(1) LRA 1976 ]; S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (ii) Any assets acquired by one party by sole effort which we classify as non-matrimonial property. In this category, the court is not obliged to divide but may do so. [See section 76(3) LRA 1976 ]; and (iii) Assets which were acquired before the marriage, but has been substantially improved by the other party or by their joint efforts. In this category, if there is no substantial improvement, the property is not subjected to division at all. In addition, if the property has been acquired before the marriage and subjected to a loan, the said property may not fall in that category. [See section 76(5) LRA 1976 ]. ... [19] Division of assets for which one spouse has no immediate right under the law to the asset such as the spouse, EPF or insurance or pension will not fall within the definition of matrimonial property. The assets which section 76(1) refers to are movable and/or immovable property which can immediately be divided among the spouses.... ... [23] Whether the matrimonial assets fall under section 76(1) or (3) a spouse who asserts his/her claim during the divorce petition over division of the matrimonial property alleged to have been acquired by the other spouse, must adduce evidence to prove that the same were acquired during the subsistence of marriage and for purposes of continuing resources of the spouses or their children or the family as a whole....". [67] Following from the deletion of subsections 76(3) and 76(4) LRA 1976, I am of the opinion that the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Yap Yen Piow v. Hee Wee Eng [2016] 1 LNS 1060; [2017] 1 MLJ 17 is still good law where subsection 76(1) (with the exception of any references to the phrase "by their joint efforts " under the provision before the amendment vide Act A1546) and subsection 76(5) LRA 1976, and division of assets for which one spouse has no immediate right under the law to the asset such as EPF monies, are concerned…” S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [18] In re-visiting s. 76 LRA, and we make the following observations: (i) Albeit it is stated in s.76(2) LRA that the court shall incline towards equality, it is however not mandatorily 50%-50% in dividing the matrimonial property and assets; (ii) The division is at the discretion of the court but the court must take into account the factors listed in s. 76(2)(a) to (e) LRA; (iii) There is no prohibition on the court to also take into account other relevant or appropriate circumstances because the aforesaid factors have not been expressly specified in s. 76(1) and (2) LRA as exclusive and/or exhaustive, see Dean v. Wiesengrund [1955] 2. Q.B. 120 and S (a minor) v. Special Education Needs Tribunal [1996] 1 All ER 171; and (iv) The division is not an exercise of strict financial accounting but a fair and equitable distribution of the matrimonial property and assets as determined by the court. S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [19] Therefore, there is no strait-jacket solution. Each and every case has to be determined on its peculiar facts and circumstances. [20] Before us, the Appellant contended that the Respondent is entitled to only 30% of the House. On the other hand, the Respondent contended that her entitlement is 50% of the House instead. [21] The learned High Court Judicial Commissioner determined that the House should be divided equally. She held as follows in her grounds of judgment (“Judgment”): “[31] The Court finds that the RW is in the same situation as the respondent in the Koay Cheng Eng Case whereby the RW had been contributing to the family by caregiving and making her own financial contributions after she had to leave the matrimonial home in 2009. She became a single mother even before they had divorced and she obtained a job to support her daughters. Despite not contributing to the renovation costs after the house burned down, the Court finds that RW was still taking care of the children as there is no other evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the RW is entitled to half share of the value of the matrimonial home. Pursuant to sections 76(2)(a), (aa) and (d) of the 1976 Act, the Court orders 50% of the proceeds of the matrimonial home at the current market price to be given to the RW after sale. A valuation will have to be carried out accordingly no later than 2 months from the date of the decision. In respect of the period to sell off the matrimonial home, it is to be within 4 months from the date of receipt of the valuation report, unless agreed upon by both parties and the proceeds of 50% to be given to RW within 21 days from the date payment is received from the purchaser or financier (bank). The RW is to withdraw the caveat before the matrimonial home is sold and ensure there will be no encumbrances on her part in regard to the property. S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [32] From the facts, the Court finds that for 25 years of marriage the RW has not benefitted personally from the PH, but any contribution from him was mainly for the first daughter. The Court agrees that she has discharged her responsibilities as a mother admirably, with 2 children attaining diploma level education despite the irresponsible attitude of the PH. The contributions PH made after they were separated were mainly for the first daughter and the Court is puzzled why this was so and it has not been sufficiently explained in the pleadings. The Court can only draw an inference that the PH did not want to pay more because he considered that the pressing need at that stage was the education of the first daughter. But the 2 younger girls also had gone to school and the second daughter is now in college. The Court finds that at the present time, the RW needs the EPF savings more than the PH as she is saddled with more responsibilities on her hands in respect of the growing children. There is no good reason to deny the RW this half share of the PH's EPF contributions as the only issue to be decided is whether or not the RW is entitled to a share and not merely what are the needs of the PH. The case laws cited earlier also decided that the EPF savings of the husband is a matrimonial asset which could be shared between them. Having said that and in view of the circumstances of the case, the Court orders that the RW is entitled to 50% of the PH's EPF savings and the statutory body is to give effect to the Court's order accordingly. By this, the RW is to be given the amount of 50% from the PH's EPF account to be transferred to the RW's EPF account by the EPF in accordance with its procedures. [33] Before she left him, she was a housewife. But she was not being maintained and for more than 13 years she had been supporting herself and her children (refer to Ikatan Pilding at paragraph 10). RW received maintenance of RM500 per month from 2014-2018 and it was stopped after 7 years…” [22] The Appellant did not seriously challenge the facts as found by the learned in High Court Judicial Commissioner particularly that in paragraph [31] of the Judgment. However, the Appellant contended that the House was during the course of their marriage burnt down and the Appellant re- built the House on his own without any financial assistance from the Respondent. S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [23] Moreover, the Appellant added that the Respondent is the one who walked out from the House and it was the Appellant that provided maintenance for the family ever since. [24] It is trite that we do not generally disturb the findings and exercise of discretion of the learned High Court Judicial Commissioner in the making of her Decision unless it is plainly wrong; see Iskandar Coast Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2019] 7 CLJ 143. [25] Upon our review of the Decision, we do not find that the learned High Court Judicial Commissioner was wrong in any way either in her findings of fact or exercise of discretion. [26] In respect of the Appellant’s contention that he financed the re- construction of the burnt down House and maintenance of the family, it might have been different if the Appellant had maintained both the Respondent as well as the Children. But as found by the learned High Court Judicial Commissioner, the Appellant only mainly maintained his 1st daughter’s education only. The other two daughters were maintained by the Respondent. [27] As to the Respondent having moved out from the House that triggered the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, we are satisfied that the fault was on the part of the Appellant due to his extra-marital affairs as well as harassment and abuse of the Respondent. It might again have been different otherwise. S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [28] In the premises, we are convinced that learned High Court Judicial Commissioner rightly ordered that the proceeds of the sale of the House be distributed on 50%-50% basis. There is no error here to warrant our appellate intervention. Share of Appellant’s EPF [29] Before us, the Appellant has conceded to give 50% of his Employees Provident Fund (EPF) savings to the Respondent. This aspect of the appeal is hence deem withdrawn. Maintenance and education expenses of the Children [30] The Appellant is cognizant that he has the duty to maintain his children pursuant to s. 95 LRA but primarily contended the lump sum of RM37,500.00 and RM12,500.00/year for the 2nd daughter’s and 3rd daughter’s tertiary educational expenses respectively as well as their monthly subsistence expenses of RM500.00/month each ordered by the learned High Court Judicial Commissioner are excessive. [31] Furthermore, the Appellant contended that the amount ordered for the 2nd daughter’s education expenses is premature and remote by reason that she has neither decided nor been admitted into any tertiary education institution to-date following UAP v UAQ [2018] 3 SLR 319. S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [32] The Respondent counter-contended that the aforementioned sums ordered by the learned High Court Judicial Commissioner is fair and reasonable. [33] We have again reviewed the findings of fact and exercise of discretion of the learned High Court Judicial Commissioner based on the evidence adduced as well as judicial notice on the costs of living generally and we find that the learned High Court Judicial Commissioner was not in error save for the order of payment of RM37,500.00 for the 2nd daughter’s tertiary educational expenses. This is because it is not in dispute that the 2nd daughter has received the Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Tinggi Nasional (PTPTN) loan to finance her entire course. As for the 3rd daughter’s education expenses, we are mindful that she is due to pursue her tertiary education soon, probably next year and the Appellant is always at liberty to vary the order if there is a material change in circumstance thereafter. [34] In the premises, we find that that the only justification is for us to set aside the order of payment of RM37,500.00 in respect of the 2nd daughter’s tertiary educational expenses made by the learned Judicial Commissioner. S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 CONCLUSION [35] It is for the foregoing reasons that we allowed the appeal in part as so ordered. Dated this 23rd October 2023 -Sgd- LIM CHONG FONG JUDGE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 LIST OF COUNSELS: Counsels for Appellant 1. Ramachandran A.L Nala Pulle; and 2. Vithya Letchemy A/P Diagarajam Solicitors for Appellant Messrs. Evelyn Shoba & Partners. Advocates & Solicitors. No.22,1st Floor, Jalan Sultan Abdullah, 34000 Taiping, Perak Perak Darul Ridzuan. Counsels for Respondent Lalitha Menon Solicitors for Respondent Messrs Lalitha Menon & Associates. Advocates & Solicitors. No. 90, 1st Floor, Church Street, 10200 Penang. STATUTE/LEGISLATION REFERRED TO: s. 76,92,93 and 95 of the Law Reform Marriage Act 1976. CASES REFERRED TO: Sivanes Rajaratnam v. Usha Rani Subramaniam [2002] 3 CLJ; Poonageswari a/p P. Krishnan v. Bailand a/l Govindham [2019] MLJU 448; Dean v. Wiesengrund [1955] 2. Q.B. 129; S (a minor) v. Special Education Needs Tribunal [1996] 1 All ER 171; Iskandar Coast Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2019] 7 CLJ 143; and UAP v. UAQ [2018] 3 SLR 319. S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 S/N znbB/Q0m0UGIEp5tRC1vtw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	32,158	Tika 2.6.0
KB-45-5-03/2021	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH MUHAMAD MUSHI FAIRUZ BIN ISKANAROS	Undang-undang Jenayah— Dadah Berbahaya— Tertuduh dituduh dengan dua pertuduhan di bawah sek 39B(1)(a) dan 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 — Sama suatu pendakwaan telah membuktikan suatu kes prima facie — Sama ada pembelaan Tertuduh menimbulkan keraguan munasabah ke atas kes pendakwaan — Hukuman setimpal bagi kesalahan pemilikan dadah — Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan Akta Pemansuhan Hukuman Mati Mandatori 2023	01/11/2023	YA Puan Narkunavathy Sundareson	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=3ddccefb-925d-40e5-859f-caf6d96e6e58&Inline=true	01/11/2023 08:03:36 KB-45-5-03/2021 Kand. 21 S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 87cPV2S5UCFn8r22W5uWA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal n3—I5—5—D3/2021 Kand, 21 :1/11/2023 08:23-3: DALAM MAMKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA m SUNGAI FETANI DALAM NEGERI KEDAH DARUL AMAN, MALAVSIA PENDAKWA RAVA LAWAN MUHAMMAD MusHI FAIRUZ BIN ISKANDAROS ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalzn 1 Terluduh. Muhammad Mush! Falmz bin Iskandavus rrenuduh] le\ah dmadapkan dv Mahkamah avas pemAduhan»pemAduhan bsrIkul- (1) Ke§ Nu Ka45A—m—u2/2021 “Bahawa Kamu, pada 31 1 2020, pm lebm kuvang 5 45 pslang. ax fem ja\an, susur keluar Herman Rama: dan Rawal Gurun Arah mam, Lebuhvaya Lnayaseuaran, an dalam daerah Kuala Muda‘ an dalam Negen Kedah Dam Aman, \|e\ah dldapaﬁ mengedardadah berbahaya saw Herom seberat 52.2 gram Oleh yang devmkwan‘ kamu bersama-same dengan niat hersama, IeVah me\akukan salu kesalahan cm bawah seksysn 39E(I)(a) Akla Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan bmeh dnhukum m IN a7cPv2s5ucFm!r22w5uwA 1 ‘NEVA sum ...m., W1“ be mad p. vecly M mm.“-V M W. mm. VII mun: NM‘ (H) bawah seksyen 393(2) Akla yang sama“ [Pertuduhan Femmll [Eksihﬂ 511. dan K25 Nu Ka45—5—o3/2021 “Bahavm xamu, pm 31.12020, ‘am Veblh Kurang sA5 petang, a. lap! Jakan, susur ksmar Harman Rahal dun Rawat Gurun Nah Ulara, Lebuhraya Utara—SeIatan‘ d1 dakam daarah Kua\a Muda‘ di dalam Negen Kedah Daml Aman, le\ah ada dalam mmkan kamu dadah bevbahaya Iawlu Monoaceﬂyhuorphlnss saberal 13.2 gram O\eh yang UEIYHKWEVI‘ kamu le\ah melakukan salu kesarahan dl bawah seksyen 12(2) Akla Dadah Eerbahaya 1952 ﬂan boleh dihukum an bawih seksyen 39A(2) Akla yang sama" [Fenuduhnn Kednn][Eks an Kes Dwudakwazn 2 Fendakwaan «emu mengemukakan kelerangan melamv 9 Saks: dan bolsh diringkaskan sepem bariknn 3 Pada 31 1 2020, Inspeklur G/Z2788 Theodore anak Peter Dlen, pengadu 1SP5HeIiIh rnenenma maklumal bahawa lerdapal aktvvm psngadaran hemln oleh seorang \e\aki Melayu menggunakan matnsnkal Yamaha V15RZ E1 Herman Rahal ﬂan Rekveasi GLIYWI mengI1a\a ke arah Mara (RNR Gurun) SP5 telah mengalur suslu pasukan serbuan yang mangguca. uleh 14 anggoca pahs termasuk DISubinpeklov Raja an Govindasamy (SP6) SP5 telah member: lakllmat dan mgasan umuk serbuan Iersebul IN a7cPv2s5ucFm!rzzw5uwA 2 W. sum runny WW ... M » «My n.. nH§\mH\|V MW; mm. Vﬂ muws NM! 29 Mahkamah ini berpuas hali bahawa EKsm\|l—Eks\|h\I P6‘ P7‘ P3 den F'I5(Aj — (F) yang dxrsmpas dw Iempat kejadran dawn kehadiran Tenuduh adalah barang kes yang same yang dikemukakan an Mahkamah 30. Berdasarkan akasan-alasan . , Mahkamah . mendapao pendakwaan le¥ah membukllkan dadah merbahaya yang menjam halpelkara Perluduhan Perlami man neram seberat 52.2 gram dan halperkava Permdunan Kedua man monnacetylmarphmes seberal 13 2 gram Elemen kedua — milikan mm pangotalmln dndlh 31. Unluk e\amen W, Mahkamah my berpandukan amalan Thumscml dakam kss cnan Pean Lean v PP 1956 1 MLJ 231 d! 239. Penghakman telsebut telah mmjuk dan dxendus Nah Mahksman Persekuruan dalam kes~kes PF‘ v Abdul Rahman bin Am 2007 5 0, PP v nemsn Madhavan 2009 2 MLJ194 2009 2 cu 209 2003] MLJU 771, Snsw Yoke Keang v PP 2013 3 MLJ 830 2012 MLJUZSS 2013 ACLJ MS 2013 23AMR 202‘ Ghasem Huzuun Hassan v PF 2019 6 MLJ 231 8. Chan Wen Leon v PP and another aggeal 2021 4 MLJ 560 2021 MLJU 770 32. Damn kss Panen Dadeh v PP 2009 1 CLJ 717, Auguslme Pam FCJ memmuskan m7A1— ‘The Vaw is dear and wen settled P700101 knowledge us very urcen a mailer u! mlerenee The matenal mm which the mference ol xnowxsage can be drawn vanes (ram case In case 0 would be IN a7cPv2s5ucFnar2zw5uwA 1 W. sum ...m.., wm .. 0544 n mm m. nngmuly MW; mm. VI muus rmm sumciemforme prosecuuon to woo! fscls (mm wmch il wuld be pmpeny moaned max «he accused had the necessary knumedge ' Mod laba Hoaaemzaaan Ma m v PP and another a al 2015 2 ‘ ML] 254 at gm & Ggnalgn gm Ramachandran & Ors v PF 2004 ‘ 4 MLJ 489 at 506 2006 1CLJ 357 (eunaxanb) as Eerdasarkan mamka cam kes um, sws dan sws memnen 1 keterangan yang kunsIs1en dan sahng sokcngmenyukong bahawa ‘ kah penama mereka mehhal Tenuduh, Tenuduh duduk berssmang an alas Molasxkm (ersebut dan ssdang merokok. Apabnla spa mengenaxxan am sebagal pegawal polns, Tenuduh berlmdak agresur dan ma melankan dm Termduh beuaya dilahan Eks1bi\| P6 duumpal dalam raga Mmosikal (evsebul Tsnuduh boleh meIIha(Eks1bIl P6 dalam raga Molasxkal levsebul Vanya huxan dmam keadaan lersellndung auau tersembunyl 34 Tenuduh bukan permhk Motusvkax Ievsebul Molosxkal i\|u mllik spa Mahkamah menenma sebahagian keterangan SP9 bahawa hanya ma den Tenuduh menggunakin Muloslkal Iersebm. Paaa \|ankh kqsman, SP9 msnggunakan Motos\ka\ (erssbul ssmngga pukul 5 no pelang spa lwdak swmpan apa—apa pada Molus\|ka\ mu Kemudian Mulusxkal ilu mgunaxan o\eh Tenuuun. 35 Keterangan spa rm dlsakung oleh keterangan SP5 dan spa bahawa Mctasxkm [Ekslbll F7] telah dlrampas m (empat xqaman dari Terluduh IN BRPVZSSUCFHEVZZWSAAWA 12 W. sum ...m.., wm .. wed Ix: my me nngmuly MW; mm. VI muus rmm as Danpada keterangan pendakwaan berhubung kedudukan dekat ream-m kepada Ekslbll P6 yang mengandungl uaaan, Mahkimah im membual danatan nasmv bavang kes dadah adalah dalam kawalan dan Jagaan Tenuduh. 37 Pengetahuan berkenaan dadah Iersebut haven dvbual inlerens berdasarkan unsur kedekatan tbroxwmityj Terluduh kepada dadah lersebul dan (mdakan Tenuduh cubs ms\arIkan am semasa SP5 mengenalkan am sebagax pegawav pohs 33 Dengan kelerangan yang ada, Mahkamah berpuas mm Tenuduh mempunyal mmkan dan pengenahuan berkenaan dadah lersebut Elemen keriga Ferluduharv Pertama — nengedaran dadah 39 Seksyan 3‘/(dab ADE mempevunmkkan — “any persnn whu Is lmmd m possessiun av — u) 15 grammas or more m wewghl of harm, uthelwwse «mu m accardanoe wnh me aumomy or «ms Au or any other wvillen law, shall be presumed, unlll me contrary is proved, to be mamckmg in the sam dmﬂ‘ .. 40 Memandangkan uerac hsmm sebanyak 52 2 gram yang dwpermehl darn Eksuhxl P15(A)— (F) melebmn had staluton mmuum tanggapan pengedaran dw bawah seksyen 37(da) ADE \|erpaka\ IN BRPVZSSAJCFHEVZZWSMWA 3 W. sum ...m.., M“ .. wed » mm m. nngmuly MW; mm. VI muus NM! Kobnlehpercayaan saksrlsaksi pendukwman 41 Dakam kes Anwar Ibramm Na 3 (supra), Augustine Paul H (kem ‘ mu), telah menyalakan an 293 - \ “The Pvivy councu has s1.a\edlI1atII1e lea! tests Var erlher accemmg or rejenmng Ihe evwdence at a wmness are how conswslem the slnry Is mm Nself, how u stands the test at cross-exammamn, and how var it ms in mm me rest :1! me evidence and the circumstances at me case (see Elmira] v sitaram AIR [1935] PC 60) M musn, huwevev, be observed that being unshaken m crass-examinauon Is um per 52 an an-summem and test or crembuny The mherent pruhab\|'ly of a «an m wssue must be me pnme ccmsmeranon (see Mun/'andy& Drs v PP[1965]1LNS110‘[1966]1MLJ 257) It has been held that vi a wimess demonslvably tells hes, ms evmenee must be Vooked upon wwth suspwcwun and xreaxea with camm buﬂn say that wt should he evmrely repeated would be to go too lar (see Khamv Chye Hm v PP[1961] 1 LNS 41‘ [1961] MLJ 105)‘ A2 Berpandukan saranan um, Mahkamah ml lelah mempemmbangkan keterangan kes pendakwaan secara keselumhan ﬂan kebirangkalian kes unluk menﬂaw kebolehpercayaan saksxsavsx Dendakwaan IN BRPVZSSAJCFHEVZZWSMWA '4 W. sum ...m.., M“ .. wed Ix: my me nngmuly MW; mm. VI muus NM! 43 44 45 46 Mahkamah im berpeluang mama: dan mendangar Saks!-Saks! psndakwaan member: Keterangan Secara keseluruhannya Saks!- saksx pendakwaan khasnya SP5 lelah memben ke\|erangan yang konsIs\|en dan Iwdak Iergugal semasa pemsnksaan bzlas Kelerangan mereka jugs swan dengan barang kes clan dokumen yang dikemukakan. untuk Mahkamah Inl Tlada sebarang alasan yang munasabah Iwdak mempercayav mu menenma kelerangan rneveki. Kelsrangan SP9 berkenaan pemmkan Mnloswkm dan penukarin wama kansIs1en dengan kelerangan penaakwaan yang lam. Bahagian kelerangan vu wajar dnerima da\am pemmhangan Mahkamah Walau baganmanapun, kecarangan spa dmam kandang saksi yang uskanaams, menunggang Mulos\k.a\ nu pads mass kmadlan lslah dimdas Men keleringan spa. Keterangan nu ;e\as suatu kelerangan yang lldak disokrmg men aparapa kelerangan ‘am dan Muslim‘ (Inherslmy Improbable) Ks.-(erangan ﬂu wajar dilmak dan pemmbangan Mahkamah Lebm-lebih lagi memandangkan Kalerangan rebuttal SP5 ada1ah bahawa sspanjang temper: 19 H 2019 semngga bman Novembev 2021‘ lskandams berada dalam tahanan Olen nu, uada kemungklnan dwa terhbat damn kejadlan pads 31.1 2020 IN a7cPv2s5ucFm!r2zw5uwA 5 -Na. sum ...m.., M“ .. wed » mm m. nngmuly MW; nnumeul VI arwuus NM! 47 46 49 50 Mahkamah ml mendapau lak\|a~lakIa malerm yang dlsandarkan bag! Iwuan membukukan seliap e\emen permduhanrpemmlman Iemndap Tenuduh sena ism-vaxxa samplngan Vam yang retevan menunjukksn xqaman yang herlaku. sepem yang dwrungkalkan melalm saksxsaksl penaakwaan, adnlah semar dengan kebarangkahan kes Mahkamah Inl (elah membual pemlawan makslma ke alas keterangan pendakwaan darn berpuas hali pendakwaaan lelah beuaya membukxikan sualu kss pnma lame Ierhadap Tenuduh bagl kedua-dua pertuduhan lersehut sakspsam Benkman dengan kepulusan Mahkamah mu. Tenuduh dlpanggil membela dm untuk keduwua penuduhan Iersebm Mahkamah melalul mubahasa eelah menerangkan plhhawpllman mamhuat pembe\aan kepada Teﬂuduh dan Tenuduh memmh unmk member! kelerangan bzrsumpah dan kandang saksi Punlullln Turmduh 51 IN a7cPv2s5ucFm!rzzw5uwA Terluduh bempa saksl tunggal pembexaan. Tenuduh «emu mengemukakan pemyalaan berluhs dl bawah seksyen 4023 KTJ berwikh 5 5.2023 [Psu-1} 1s ‘Nate sum runny WW ... M » «My n.. nH§\mH\|V MW; mm. Vﬂ muws NM! 52 Kewrarlgannya buleh dinngkaskam sepeni berikut — u) pads lankh xejaman pukul 2 cu penang, ma lelah ﬂmubnngl aleh Venom seurang yang Iwdak dnkenahnya, untuk membanhmya menghanlar nauang ke Pendang unluk upah RM 200 00. (n) venm berkata ma kenalan bapa Terluduh dan (e\ah mm Terluduh membanlu menghamav barang kepaaa Kawannya di fol Pendang: Teﬂuduh le\ah bequmpa Venut pzda pukul sno pelang a. kedaw vwo, di hadapan Pacmc, Pulau Plnang dan lelah diberikan beg ga\as [Eksibil P6] umuk mserarman kepada kawannya :1! Col Pendang, (xv) Terluduh nemenm dx henhan RNR Gumn unluk memkuk dan Ie\ah drlahan. (V) Termduh bergelm kenka dilahan kerana manyangka amnya dwsamun‘ (wt Tenuduh ndak pemah mehha! banana kes dadah dahm Eksnbm P6 sehingga dwtunjukkan oleh penis, aan (vnjdxa sanggup memnanm menghantar barang mu Keranz memenukan dwl IN BRPVZSSAJCFHEVZZWSMWA 17 W. sum ...u.., M“ .. wed In mm m. nngmuly MW; mm. VI muus NM! 53. Semasa perneviksaan balas, Tenuduh menyalakan ma ida cerilakan pembemannyi kepada pegawaw pens letapx udak dapal mengenalpasu maps pagawax berkenaan Tenuduh juga le\ah makmmkan peguambela cemanulunya, lelapl peguam mak menyoa\ SF4 atau SF5 berkenann wsu-Isu yang umangkukannya dmam Pembekiinnyi Hu[ahan di akhir kes Ringkasan Imiahan Pendakwaan 54 55 56 IN a7cPv2s5ucFm!rzzw5uwA Pendakwaan menghujahkan mereka xeran benaya membukhkan sualu kes melampam keraguan munasabah Mereka menqux Mahkamah semula kepada inn-pan kedua-Hus Derluduhan din menyowl kelevangan saksisaksx pendakwaan khasny: sps‘ swe‘ SP7‘ SP8 Gan SP4 Pendakwaan bemujah pembelaan Terluduh max mempen-kaman wmpani Jems dan beral dadah manupun langgapan seamen di bamh seksyen 37(da) ADE. Pembelaan Tanuduh (enumpu Kepada mnpan mlllkan dan pengecahuan dadah Tertuduh Ivdak membangkmn 15»; im di penngkal kes nendakwaan dengan memenksa was SP5, SP6, SP7 atau SP8 Noanlara Ambrass Anthony v PP 1596 1 cu 705 :11 hsadnole 1 — 4’ 1996 1 MLJ zus, PPV Hemna Pumama San 2016 1 LNS1855d\|Era 42 2017 1 MLRA499) 18 W. sum ...m.., M“ .. wed » mm m. mwgmuly MW; mm. VI muus wvm 57 Pendakwaan bemumu pembelaan Teduduh im bahawa dis adiﬂah pembawa udak bersa\ah (mnocem carrier) was suam yang dnﬁknrkan kemudran (anenhaugmy dan mreka hanya smapas ma aupanggulmemnexaaun An A nz v P n n r 2019 5CLJ 730 d\ 800 30:1 2019 4 Mu 1) Rmgmn. nujalun points .1. 53. Pembelaam zelan bemulah berkenaan Ianggungjawab Mahkamah unluk menﬂax kesemruhan kelerangan yang man mxemuxakan uleh kedua pmak man menquk Mahkamah kepaﬂa psnghamman dalam kes Ma V PP (supra) 59 Pemhewaan wga menuuk kepada kes PP v saw-in 1. Drs 1971 2 MLJ 15 d1 mans Sharmi J memumxan di17— -rnuunumm urmcmru am not my iound hulweH rewurused an puma — 41; we arms at plm/mg everything msmx «a me eluhhlhvtem :71 me chama agmnsl ma Etllllssd has on ma pvasemman, (21 The emdence mus\| be such as (0 exchme «o a mans! cenamly every reasonable douhl ml the gum ov me accused, 13; In mailer: uldnubl n u safer In acqunthan m cammn A Mme» mnnm be suslamed even w (he now! vs sansﬂed Ihm me Dvosecunon story “maYbel1ue" umess and mm n wslolmdmalma Pmsecunon story “must b. nus" the human av pmav mam on me pmlewllun ihmughum Ihe mnl n he ‘earned mngmmue Wm! um sihshed mm me cu: m we msemmon Ilwas ms my la mum and msmarse me wmsm ac me dnse av me Dvoeacnmon case The many oime delence does not veheve me pmuculmn «mm wanting nu pmsaculmn case bcynnd varliunabh mum m burden ulpmvmg gum ln . cnmmal charge wsmwnyx an we plmecnman sm a7cPv2s5ucFm!rzzw5uwA 9 -W. sum ...u.., M“ .. wed In mm m. nngmuly MW; m.m. VI muus wvm (Nor Azman hm Ammn v PP 12013 MLJU 703 m gara 12, sucmma Okayev PP 1995 MA 5;§ gumgp Pm: mu dun d-pmn Mlhlumlh an nkhlr kn so 51 Seksyen 182 KTJ mempemnlukkan — ‘Pmueduva .1 Iha rmnnlusmn Mme (ml 11) At my conclusmn oa me man «m cm man came: an we emanoe xddurad he1me4\|-Ind am. Wnrlhsr nu pmlsumnn has pvuvad .1; use beymld miwmbla am: 12> 11 the calm «nu; ms: the Drosecmmn has proved as case be‘/and Iuscnime mm, the Com! mu am we accused gum and he may he mmllcind an n 12; um Caullfnds vmme pmseanlmn 11.. um plmed its use heyund reasnname mm the cm shaﬂ vsenm an order MaNumal' Diﬂam kes Mohamnd Radhi bin Yaakob v. PP 1991 1 CLJ Reg 311du315 1991 3 CL! 2073* 1991 3MLJ1S9,MohdAzm1HMA menerangkan- -1: Is a we\leslabI1sIved Dummle oa Malaysian cummal ‘aw man we general human 0! wow I165 mruughuul his man on me pmewnan lo Pmve beynnd reasnnahle mm»: m gui\\|aHl1e accused cm the mm W101 wmch be u mama mm 1: no 317111151 burden waned an (he acmsed Ia vmve ms mnaaence He Is nvesumed mnooem mum woven qmuy To earn an a<>«:-my ms duly u meve\Y to out a Icasuruble mum m In: pmmumm case 1n me some of me pmleculmn case, «.2 pm.cmim. may M sauna new on mums smmary nvesumnlmns \|a mm nne ev more 01 Ihe exsenlml Ingredients Mme shame When man oecurs. me Damcmar burden alvmolas UPPUIMI In my gen-m1 burden. mm: to ma aeveuca w rebut such sm a7cPv2s5ucFm!r2zw5uwA 20 mm. S:H\|Hh:v1h:vw\Hb¢ uud In mm m. mV§\nIH\|Y MW; anumgnl VI muus wvm 4 Pasukan serbuan telah tuba RNR Gumn pada seknar ;am 545 palang RNR Gurun ada medan makan den 2 slesen mmyak‘ Petmn and Shell Pads kehka nu, keadaan pencahayaan an \|empa\| Iersehul masm lerang‘ cuaca balk Gan Valuhmaa agak smuk 5 Kelikl kenderaan Toyota Avanza yang ainam SP5 berhampwan Slesen Mmyak Shell, behau telah mehhal semang \e\ak\ Me\ayu sedang duduk alas sualu mmosmax Vamaha WSRZ wama mru dengan no pendaﬂaran PNVB364(Mn\|us\kaI)[EksIbIlF7] Jarak m ancara merexa pads mesa nu lebm kurang 150 me\|er dan beluau mellhal Velakl Ma\ayu nu sedang memkok 5 Apsbna sps menghampm le\ak\ Me\ayu yang dlcsm ssbagal Terluduh dan mengenaxkan dlnnya sebagav sebagaw pegawax pom. Tertuduh ﬂu benindak aglesxi Lian cubs melankan dm DlKp\| Zulkmee um Kamarudln benaya menaharmya SP5 kemuwannya memaxankan pemerlksaan ks atas Tertudun lelapx nada apa-apa baring yang menya\ahi undangmndang dqumpax 7 xemuman, dalam kehadivan Terluduh dan D/Kpl Zmkmee‘ SP5 memenksa Eksnbxl P7 5:25 menjumpai satu beg gaxas berzip berwama mm Mam [Eksihil re] an mga Malosika\ xersebm Da\arn beg galas tersebul. SP5 melwmpaw s hungkusan plaslnk Msmar yang mengandungi bahan yang dwsyakl dadah hemln sps merampas Moluslkal, anak Kunci Malnsiksﬂ [Eksibil Pa] dan beg galas sena kandungsnnya IN a7cPv2s5ucFm!r2zw5uwA 3 W. sum runny WW ... U544 u. «my n.. nH§\mH\|V mm mm. Vﬂ mun: NM‘ presumnlmvus an the ha\am>e M vmbahmlues whnzh harm the deﬁance pew m vtewws mzwannanma burden Mcainna a masonams doubt bum wsoenamly Immu man the burden oﬂha vvwewvion in mm beyond raawnable dam Ya earn an mum: ax me dose of me use my me prcxeculmn unde¢s mm or ; 180 al (he cnmmax Fmneduve Carley me Own must be silbﬂed lhal no case agaIns\| (he accused has been made cm which wt unrehuﬂed would wmm hrs oonwc1.un(Munusamy y FF’ man] 1 ms :2 n an-nee vs caﬂsd, um duo, £71015 unused us cmly m cat a reasonable auum m an pmleculmn case He 3 ml requwed m mm: mm mnmeme beymld reasnname doubt Tn earn an acqmnm. the am my not be convmued -11 lbs mm. ol Ihe defer»: story or vumun Rmsmg a vaaionabll doubt m we quI\\| av me ‘ accused wwll sulhaa n y. M haweunv, wvmlg {m n.. Com m 5. myma mm the deience velsmn 5 (me m whmh cue me count mus\| emer nn anqulual m avhmnnate cases :1 .5 also um Wm m we own to emmude ‘ manna dalenoesluly mans: arm! convmolrw. mu m Ina! Instance‘ me Coull ‘ mushuol wnvwtl mm! m uk: . lmlhlv quulmn man -van am. cum dun nn\| n::::ep\| ur helueve me delenue exolnnamm, does u nevenhebss, rune . reasonable mm as -.7 ms mull? n \s by (ms rensan mm m dealmi mm the ‘ deﬂence my av exwananun, live mapoﬂly av mm numry mm m mm ‘ ymm away he Iagwy -smamsmu “maxmuhla mar um, rather m... lu dew: m me -mmme and mrwmc\ng" my before appwmg Ihe "yensmunble mm (est “ Iﬁamchandran1suPFI)§ﬂ_,Guna\arI(suI-Va)dxB6S 2204 mu m & Md zaurumn bin Run an y. PF 2013 3 MLJ 77:. di 79: 2017.]ML.JU 314 gm: Acu 21 2013 aAMR4au). 52. Mahkamah um telah menlmbang dan menganalisa kesemua ketevangan yang dikemukakan dalam new-caraan temadap Terluduh umuk memmuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan Isiah membukukan Kes meteka ms\ampam keraguan munasabah sm B7:7V2S5\|JCFn!r2ZW5uWA 2‘ -my. sum I-mxhnv wm y. um In my m .m.u-y mm; uaammnl «. muws mum 53. 55 sm a7:7v2s5ucFnar2zw5uwA -W. sum runhnv Mu e. um In my me .ngn.u-y mm; e...n.n «. muns bum! unzuk mlipan m kan dan pengelahuan bevkenaan dadah. keterangan pendakwaan menunjukkan dadih duumpal dmarn beg galae yang dlsimpan (mam raga mn(osIka\ yang dnunggang aleh Tenuduh Apatma Terluduh dwahan‘ dla bemndak agrasxl dan Cuba mewikan dxri Pembelaan Tenuduh bahawa ma adalah pembawa lldak bersalah barang kes dadah Keterangan Tsrtuduh ada\ah Venot rnemberikarvlya Eksnbm P6 unluk dlhantar kepada kawannya dw mu Pendang Tenuduh mbayarupan RM 200.00. Teduduh menaﬁkan pengecahuan berkenaan kandungan Exem P6 Dxa jugs mambsri pemelesan hahawa ma mha melankan dm Karena sangka me msamun Pembe\aan pembawa Iidak bersa\ah im Ie\ah dlbincangkan dalam Kes Munusamy Sundar Ra v. PF [guts e MLJ 214 an mans sunyam FCJ memmuskan .1 219 — “The delencs m Innocent camav us emu d¢1vwema\|wu\d bl aﬂuded to by an auwm Ptrmn. and m lhu csxa «n. applﬂanl A plalhnla at can: spnnkbl lhe legs! gnumms .n Mnlaysla and sumee m we merely veler la . chosen ve-mo danfy «ms aevenoe wwhom me new «or wmvrehenswelumrzual actmsm rne com -:1 Appaax m Venkatssan Cmrmasamt v Pvblrr: Pm:sculorIZ011]1 ms 1735 pill n Ipﬂy n me 6uHawing terms A den.-nee ohnnnoem narr\ene4evs m 3 slate ov nﬁahs wheve an accused Person acknwnedges narfvlnsl. lo! example 3 use on hnx‘ as -n lhe case below: 0:, wmammq me dangewui drugs but ampules nanng knuwxeagu unne drug: Whelhzu mu mum av no: menu vary much depend on the «am 0! each case 22 M uld shave n n nnvmny. mat the success at me deﬁance Mmnooem unier depends very mum on lhe fnclsufeach cane, : mmrnnannauns wnmn the ream: of the unax wage Ignorance simphuher n na\| sulﬁuenl In let an accused nevwn on «n. hook as olherwnse every omev aowsed pecsnn w\lI aﬂuda to ma daianoe n needs more than mal wumm any reason 70! sulpwcnn, ur were .. no ngm av awanunny olexam\na1wn,mno::noe may in a gm defence A hypoxhelnm scan-Inn mm ha men an awuled vmxon veoewes a package which comams smut drugs «nnn My. Englnnd when ml n smed oi menu could esxannsn nnn having heen awave M the cwwmnanuascﬂha drugs being mum: nnn ovhavmg any naxustomm Pnov to me paveel ippstnng it ms door she}: na would nut have had any mason my suspnﬂon or me npnmmmy In Inspect the puma! heaving in mud (ml the package was beyand ms reach Imm n reached hrs mag The n-1er:s1h.:\| avemmnu uepefldsou lha mm- as Dalam konleks kes ml, dapalan iakta adamu bahawa » 0) kmerangan berkenaan \leno( ndak umangxmn semasa pemenksaan ha\as saksrsaksx pendakwaan, (u) keterangam SP5 tldak mcabar dengan pevscalan sums ada wang upah RM 200.00 yang konnnnya mbenkan olsh Vsnol atsu lemon blmbn Terluduh yang dugunakan Imtuk bemuhung dengan Venm dvampas semasa serbuan pads 31 1 2020‘ (In) walaupun Tenuduh memberi kelerangan ma telah makmmkan pegawan polns yang merakam percakapannya naralﬂ pembemannya‘ Tenudun mdak dapal mengenalpasu Degawaw Pens sm B7:7\IZS5UCFn!r2ZW5uWA 23 -wn. sum ruvmnv Mu n. um n may m. nnnnnn Wm dnanmnl y. muus mm 67 (M percakapan beramaran Terlumm «max mxamuxakan dl Mahkamah. (V) liada cadangan olen Tenuduh Dahawa ma «emu membual perlanyaan kepada venm, searang yang udak dwkenahnya‘ berkenaan Kandungan Eksmn P6, (vx) bavang kes dadah [EkIIbIt P15[A} — (F)] yang mpaw dalam Eksmm P6 dalam keadaan [max tersehndung‘ uan (w) Temmuh mempunyai peluang yang uenm dan mencukupw untuk memhuka Ekslbwl we den memenksa kandungannya se\epas ianya dwserahkan kepadanya sehlnggalah dia mcanan men pmak polls an kawasan RNR Gurun map. Termduh sengma lvdak berbuat uemman Kesernua fakla mu memmhmkan syak wasangka (emadap kesanman ketevangan Tertudnm dan Mahkamah udak msmpsmayamya Fade hemal Mahkamah um, pembelaan Tenumm bahawa dna adaxah pembawa tidak hersalah ]e\as suatu penaﬁan semala-mats dan sualu yang a klrkan kemudlan Kqahﬂan srmphcltsryang dnbangkllkan a\eh Tenuduh udak mampu menyokong pembelaan pembawa mak bersakahnya, memalahkan dapaian iakla permhkan dan pengelahuan alas Imhangan kebarangkahan man merwmudkan sualu keraguan munasabah dalam kss pendakwaan m a7:7v2s5ucFm!r2zw5uwA 24 W. sum rumhnv Mu be us« w vetny m. nugmuly mm anuumnl m nrwuus W.‘ Kesimpulzn as Selelih membual penilalan maksirna dan memmbang keseluruhan kelerangan pmak pandakwaan ﬂan psnubawaan Tenuduh, dengan mengambulkura kredlhllm ssksrsaksl kedua pmak‘ Mahkamah W mendapau — (I) (iii (xv) IV) (W) m a7:7v2s5ucFnar2zw5uwA Wale sum rumhnv Mu ». um n may m. .ngn.ny mm dnunvmnl «. muus mm kes pendakwaan lerhadap Tenuduh adalah kukuh dnn msokung nleh xeqerangan sakswaksx pendakwaan‘ pembeman Terluduh 9a§a\ memalahkan aavman lakla permllkan ﬂan psngeunuan alas wmbangan kebarangknlian, pembelaan Terluduh gage! memalahkan tanggapan sialutun pengedavan dadah bawah seksyen a7(da) ADE atas wmbangan kebamngkallan, Mahkamah max mempercayax pembe\aan Tenuduh yang benma Flembelaan yang dnf rkan semula, pembelian Terluduh uagal menwmbmkan sebarang keraguan rmmasabah Ierhadap kes pendakwaan mengikul pnnsxp yang amyacakan dalam kes Mat y PP (supra); dan pendakwaan Ie\ah benaya membukllkan kes temadap Tenuduh unluk penuduhan di bawah seksyen 39511 Kat ADB dan psrtuduhan dx bawah seksyen ¢2(2; ADE mewampaui keraguan munasabah 25 70. Dengan nu, Terluduh amapau bersalah unluk kedua—dua penuduhan lemadapnya. Mmgasi Tertuduh 71 Tenuduh mengemukakan laklar—lak\|ar mlllgasw benkul unluk pemmbangan Mahkamah Dla uemmur 22 lahun dan bekerja sehagav seuvang wlreman dengan gain bulanan RM wane no pada masa kemdian ma lelihpun kahvwm dan ada seorang anak berumur 3 lahun Tenuduh Ielah member! kenasama kepida plhak palm ﬂan berkelakuan hawk da\am (ananan. Terluduh Imah msaf clan pohun dlben peluang untuk menyumbang Kepada Negara 72 Alas dasar nu, Tsnudun memnhun ma hanya mxenaxan hukuman pemara ﬂan sebalan Dwa wga puhun agar hukuman peruara umuk keduadua penuduhan bevymn seremak rakmr pombmun 73 Pendakwaan berhuiah kepenlmgan awam perlu dmlamakan dalam menmuhkan hukuman umuk kes dadah yang bempa musuh No.1 Negara. 74 Eerdasarkan kelerangan dalam kes mu, Tenuduh (erhbal (imam akum pengedaran dan hukuman yang mxenakan hams mencermmkan pohsv dan usaha Negara menbanlers gema dadah m a7cPv2s5ucFm!r2zw5uwA 23 Wale sum lhlhhﬂ wm be um In new m. mwgmuly mm 3..."... VI muus wvm 75. Pendakwaan memohon agar Mihkamah mengamml pengwklwrafan kehakiman (\|ud\c\a\ notice) bahawa kes dadah kvan berleluas wakaupun kesaklhan tevsebut membawa hukuman man mandalon sebelum Ana Pemansuhan Hukuman Man Mandalnn 2023 (Akla S46) berkualkuasa 76 Pendakwaan Ie\ah memjuk Mahkamah kepada nas undangr undang unluk menumukkan (rend hukuman unmk kesalahan m bawah seksyen asnqzy ADE 77 Psndakwaan memohnn hukuman mam dlksnakan ke alas Temmuh Hukuman 79, Dengan berkualkuasanya Akla B46 mulax 4 72a2a, Mahkamah kvm mempunyal budmlcara sepenuhnya unluk sama ada mengenakan nukuman gamung sampaw man atau hukuman penjara seumuv mdup dan sebacan «max kurang aan 12 sebatan untuk Penuduhan Panama 79 Damn kes PP V Llma am: Ganesan oz: 9 cm 525 Mnhd Radzx Abdul Harmd J Ielah membmcangkan pindaan lersebul dengan memenk sebahagwan ucapan Tlmbalan Menlen unaang- Undang semasa bacaan kedua darn ketiga Rang Undang—Undang Iersehut pada n42u23 Beﬁau juga Ie\ah menuuk kepada pengnamman mmarm Namm Pammanalhan HMP dawn kes Ly m a7:7v2s5ucFm!r2zw5uwA 27 Wale sum rumhnv wm ». M w vemy m. nﬂgvuuly mm dnuuvmnl 7. mm W.‘ Eosman v PP & Olhgr Aggeaws zgza 3 CLJ 147 a 235 E020 5 MLJ 277 dsn memumskan di 635 — -raxmg mm mm mm cansuauauon, um mb at a cnnmcled accused m the ipewum nﬂrﬂfsckwvg nc1M\|\es mum mmqnhnq reawnslotlhem mus\|now be ucmxldzved by me mun In ememumnu wmm: me passm at a aun- nemenee Vs eommensurala with ma M1: at an of «mrnckuvu =5 d-aimed umlers 2 :11 me um That mm:-an um: new be «am as .u. enmmaassmg and on: um in nu In addman to man, we wewghl nr vnmme of Ihe dangeraus dnms mum m ma pulseulm at me wnvmted accused wm be anvlher Key wnswderalian A dnsimcuon shnula now be made hemeen am whave the ammmls L11 dangerous mug: mvolved uamy nun: ma rmnlmum threshold cm . preiumvllm m namckmg undirs 37(di] ul me ovum muse mac are gm xym exuss Mum mwmum An amaun\|ma(bam\ymes1s me rrummum «mama armereabnms should no(. mme ahsencemany heavy aggravming Vncton Dnma time msmu ma duh untsncl mu. navmg umudsmd an lhe pmmxe nggmvaﬂng Ind mmnaung factors and kupmg m mm we saw“ me mien! m me an 345. m (ms mm mm, we deem sentenne shumd only be vesarved lur ampuenany unuus canes where me comm mum up sawed a mapr mb m me an M uammnu (see Lem Bcasmln (supmj, Mahnmad Faun Rmwan 5. Mar v PP Runs! 1 cu us, [2006] 2 MU15)‘ my \|ramr:ked m lame amount: av quanmy Lrfdangerom dmgl ur gmmly m excess 0! the m an ﬂveshnh fur me nvesummmn al lmmdung undau ma.) Mme DDAAsee on N: Chum v PP Mean] « ms 131419511 1 mm 64; Muhammad Lukman Munamad V pp mm! 7 cu szuznzu MLJU «:15, PP V Sawfmnlnlum Mat um V vs: \|2u21]1 ms «nu, [2n21)5 MLJ 255), (M) was uugm m the m M pmcessmg or manuiacmnng dangevous drugs (:92 cm We< Loan v F'P& AnomerAppea\ R021] :3 cu 523. [2021] ¢ MLJ sen). sm I7:7\IZS5UCFnSr2ZW5uWA 15 -mu. sum ...u..v wm ». M In «My m. .uw.y cum; “M... w. IFVLING Wu‘ (M trafficked dangemusdmgs lhamere Ioum1mdmduaHy padmd wn lame amounts‘ [7131 miss: the Inferanbe Hwy were meant Var Isl]!!! Of dwslrlbunon (I¢!.VP V Mohd Valelan Md Khuzeh [2015] 9 CL! 224. name} a MLJ sax), M was caught in the ml 07 sewing Inge amoums oi dangemus dnlisy my mu m ms nnsassmn lame uuarmfy of Pavabhamalna (51 me Dlwessman manulacnmnu or admlmsltatlurv of dannlvuus drugs (see Sawlmnlzam Mal Naur1wPri\|. (yup wucaughlswin nstmctmminmheu, ynpanyaynymynm mmeacl vi P'“CBIII\q‘mnnMax.1urIruyse\lmg nrd\s\|rIbu(mg dangaroui drugs‘ (ynu used swhnsmzled mmlmr to wnmu, man or \|ranspoII dung-snnys own: (See w/my gnmn. y up zune 3 cu 124 [znns] 5 Mu Ms, Eehuu Am Ecurmmn Vwn as ygom 1 ms 511 mm MLJU H1), my «mu.-m In large quammar ul crmvucally pvuansd dangumus drugs av deilarm «runs an Khuinl Anwal Aw n.n.n (.yp..y, ouggm Emmgng Chukwunanu V vs we 1 ms was [mm] MLRHU 349;, (X) mm m ms vnssessmn mega: arms mweawns man he was caught «yo \|ook I\le«mveataenmg msasuluto .-my Inuit may had nnmvne Pnuv<:mwu:1mns,nnd/at my; idea m cahanswnh mrmnlmembets cl any enluoemem aaenvl Those iamu: are merew Examvles :17 axoevnanay aaarayanng (a:1or:\|hl\| mny.In(h1s mrrsvmn nmny lha mm Immune Hwnuhi ha upmlhe cmnl lo deubevile an am! wagh (hem tug: sl an mmgaung harms gmded by arhbhshad um unsenymnyg [see Bhandummndalayamakev PF 1931 1LMs139 [1952] « MLJ 53) up y Ramakusnnin Suhvimamam son 3912 9 cm 443 [mm]? MU 549. 25 y M Mm um ygms 1 ms 1555 W .4 Lou gym an as 1 LNS1D2 (197511 MLA‘ and w y Shnhmmzuuan Adguju g my m1: 2 cu 636 (201313 MLJ my and (a rum :1 any one 0! them W a mnymnnnan 0! any number av lmwe mum \|us\|\VY ma cam exerdse M ayweunn no Has: the mm sentence - sm l7:7\I2S5lJCFn!r2ZW5uWA 29 "nun: sum I-mam wm ne um n my like .ngn.ny MIN: nnammnl «. mums Wm no Penna-man Kadua membawa hukuman peruara saumur hldup acau lempoh max Kurang darl 5 (ahun ﬂan sebatan max kurang davi 1a saua«an 51 Bsrdasarkan kelerangan yang dikemukakan dalam kes mi, Tenuduh udak memamkan peranan yang hesav da\am pengsdaran dadah atau dldapall memual atau mempmses dadah da\am kuanlm yang bessr Sernasa dnangkap, ma max bemndak secara ganas alau menggunakan senjsna dan membahayakan atau mencederakan mana—mana anggma pahs Da\am Keadaan ml, Mahkamah herpendapa\| llada iakcmakcar pemberatan yang mewajarkan Terluduh dikenakan hukuman ganlung sampaw man. 32 Walau hagamanapun, Mahkamah ml berpendapat apa-apa hukuman yang mkanaxan ke alas Tertuduh hams mencermmkan kesenusan Denuduhan/pertuduhan yang dlkenakan ke alasnya dan mamberi keulamain kepida kepermngan awam. 53 lm kerana berdasarkan rnakmman yang mbankan oleh Tnmbalan Kelua Pengarah (OperasI)Agens1AnI\ Dadah Kehangsaan, Datuk Dr Muhamad Sade Monamaa Amm di program sammnan Panngaoan Han Ann Dadah Tahun 2023 pada 192 2023. Nagen Kati\maekndkan;um1ah ksspmryalahgunaan uaaamsmggm Nsgala mas «anun 2021 an MahkamahImmengambnlmak\|Jmkepemngar\awamt£:\|a9ai\kaTe9mduh yang mesh muda. when pemang mermmhkan am agar menpdl anak bangsa yarg Ink m B7:7\IZS5\|JCFn!r2ZW5uWA 30 Wane sum IHIHDIV Mu a. um a may m. mtgmuly ma anuumnl y. AFVLING puvm 10 IN a7cPvzs5ucFnarzzw5uwA ‘Nate sum rumhzr wm ... M n «My Due anwn mm mm. Vﬂ mung NM! Tenudun dan bavang kes yang dvampas telah dmawa ks um Pejabal Puhs Daevah Kuala Muda av maria SP5 Ie\ah menlmbang s bungkusan plasux Iulsmar (ersebuf [Ek:ibiI P15(A) — (F)] dan mendapan beral xasamya aualan 271500 gram SP5 lelah membual tandaan pada kesemua barang kes dadah sena tandacangannya dan lankh Pada jam xanm kurang em ma\am yang sama, SP5 lelah menyevzhkan Tertuduh‘ Kesemua harang kes dan dokumen berkanan kepada Vnspeklur G/25542 Nur Vzzan mm. Abdul Rahman, pegawai penywasal (SP7) SP1 memben kelerangan \|xahawa— my behau Ie\ah menylmpan Eksvlm P6 darn Eksibil P15(A) — (F) ds\am a\min berkuncw behau sehingga 122020 mm 330 pelang dv mana barang Kes (e\ah mkeluarkan unluk diambil gamhar sebelum dan sebpas unsung, my liada sebanang kesan camari mnnul pada barang kes; (nu) Emma mam — (F) dlmasukkan dalam suim kulak yang d\sea\ dengan meleral PDRM 579 benanda 'E' [ambit F10] dun an mpan semula da\am ahuan berkuncn belnau bersama Ekslbn F6. (xv) pada 1 2 2020 jam lehlh kurang 5 45 pelang. belwau bersama SP1 Ie\ah pergl Ke lempat kepdlan dan mengarnbu gambar sena semakan man kasar clan kuncl, as Setelah memmbang segala fakla kes ml lermasuk mmgasl Teﬂuduh dan laktor psmberalan hukuman psndskwaan dan bemandukan nas undangundang dahuman‘ Mahkamall Im msmuluskan Tenumm disabnkan kesalanan umuk kedua—dua pertudlman dan mkenakan hukuman - (1) pemara seumur mdup dan senacan 15 sebalan unluk Fertuduhan Panama‘ dam (H) Imkuman pemara 7 Iahun dan lankh tangkap aan hukuman sebalan 12 sebacan unmk Pertuduhan Kedua as Hukuman pememaraan akan bena\an eersmak Bertankh 2s Oktuber 2023 Narkun Sun snn Pesurumaya Kenamman Mahkamah Tlnggx Mama dx Sungai Pelanl TFR Nabila Huda bum Muhammad Nazxm aagx pmak Pendakwaan Pelabal Penasmal Undang-Undang Negen Kedah m a7:7v2s5ucFm!r2zw5uwA Wale sum rumhnv wm ». um law may m. .m.u-y mm dnunvmnl «. muus mm Encik Rana: hm Mahamad Peguam hagx puhak Pembelaan Teluan Shamsudln Bahavi 5 Ram: No 44-A, Tingkal 1, Jalan Todak 4, Bandar Seberang Jaya 13700 Peril Pmau Plnang m a7:7v2s5ucFm!r2zw5uwA Wale sum rumhnv wm ». um law may m. .m.u-y mm dnunvmnl «. muus mm :2 (V) pane 222020 [am wenm Kurang E‘A5 pagx, bellau telah mengarahkan SP1 unluk menganmu gambar Muluswkal tersebul. my pada nan yang sama,1am Vehlh kurang H 30 pagl behau Isiah keluarkan Eksmn P10 den a\man berkuncx hehau unmk dlhawa ke Jab:-nan Kirma Malayswa Cawangan Alur senar, (vu) Eksmn P10 telsh dlsershkan Kepada SP4 yang mengeluarkan resxt rasmv Janacan Kmua Malayswa dengan nu makmal 2o— FR~K~0G751 [Eksibil P11], (vun pads 12 2.2020‘ benau celah seran Eksmn-Ekslbn P6, P7 dan P8 kepada SP2 unluk ﬂvslmpan da\am star hamng kes an VPD Kua\a Mud:-1 an bawah nu pendaﬂaran E11176/20, (xx) wads 13.10.2020 Jam mm pagx, behau lekah menerima laporan Kmua dan Eksibﬂ P10 dengan sea! Jabatan Knma Mmaysla an no makmal 2l)FR—K—0D751l2U danpada SP4; (x) Exsnaix Pm kemudiarmya dlsxmpan dalam almavi berk-ma bsuau semngga mmzuzu dx mans Eksibwl Pm Isiah dwssrahkan kepada spa Lmtuk msmxpan bsrsama barang Kes Vain dw bawah nu pendaﬂaran ER176/20, dan (xi) behau menaapaxkan pengesahin danpada Jabalan Pengangxman Jalan Rays bahawa P7 adalah mllxk spa IN a7cPv2s5ucFm!rzzw5uwA ‘Nate sum runny WW ... M » «My n.. nH§\mH\|V MW; mm. Vﬂ muws NM! M 12 13 14 15 Inspekmr G/24569 Snmta mm. Annual‘ pegawaw penyxasal ganh‘ (SP9! \|e\|ah mengambﬂ ahh kes im selepas SP7 dttukarkan Eeliau memberi keterangan bahawa berdisarksn Eksxbll P23(B), malaslkal Yamaha VISRZ dengan no psrmaﬂaran FNV 5:54 berwama merah dldaﬂarkan alas nama spa SP9 cenan mengecam Emu F7 sebagal mmusmal mlliknya Hashnda mm: Vsrnaﬂ, arm xmua Kermaan (ss-4) telah memnen Keterangan bahawa behau Qelah menenma Eks\|b\tF-'10 danpada SP7 dan Ie\ah kemarkan resll dalam Ekswbn P13 Pada mesa menenma Eksxbn F10, sea! PDRM 579 damm keadaan bank Eksmu P10 msngandungx Eksubn F15(A) — (F) den behau lelah menandakan semma kesemua harang kes lersebut dengan nu makmar 20—FR—K—DO751/20 SP4 memben kelerangan bahawa pads semasa barang kes dadah da\am sunpanan benau, Ianya telah dmmpan da\am xamneq besl berkuncw Semasa proses analwsa‘ harang kes dalam kawalan dan pememaman sepemmnya nenau SP4 ts\ah memmbang kesemua Exsmu F15(A) hmgga (F) nan nasu anallsa belnau menunyukkan barang kes dadah Iersebm mengandungw 522 hemin dan 132 gvam gvam m0nL:aCE\|y\mnrph\|nes Hasu anahsa SF4 dmyalakan dakam Vaporan kmua behau benankh 7 7 2020 [Ekslbll F14] den telah mserahkan kepada SP7 pada 13 1a 2020]am1D0 pe\|ang IN a7cPv2s5ucFm!rzzw5uwA 5 ‘Nate sum runny WW ... M » «My n.. nH§\mH\|V MW; mm. Vﬂ muws NM! we Nansrah bmlr Saad, ibu Tertuduh (SP9) telah dlpanggn unmk member: kelsrangan bsrkenaan Motos\ka\ Iersebul Berdasarkan dakumenlasx pendaﬂaran‘ SP9 adalah pemlhk mu\|os\ka\ Yamaha ‘ V15RZ belwama mevah dengan no Dendaharin PNV 3354 Molusxka! yang mrampas semasa serbuan pads 31 1 mm jam 545 petang [Eks\|b\|t FY] ada\a7I molosnkal Yamaha V15RZ berwama mm dengan no pendaﬂaran PNV 21364 599 member; keterangan wama Eksvmt F7 \|eIah dilukav oxen suammya rskanaaros bin Ismau tlskanaams) sws ts\ah mengenalpasli Exsmn P7 ssbagax molcsxkal yang dldaftarkan avas namanya 17 ualam kelerangannya dan kandang saksi, SP9 menyalakan bahawa Dada Iarikh kejamannya, Vskandaras menggunakan Matosika\ (ersebul den (Idak pulsng semngga lewal maxam Keterangan Im bercanggah dengan rakaman percakapannya kepada plhak polls pada Iahun 2020 15. Dalam percakapan Iersehul, $99 menyatakan hanya dia uan Tenuduh menggunakan Mo(os\|ka\ lersebut Pads tankh keyaman, ma nampak Terluduh menggunakan mulosxkm tersebul pada sebe\a7I Dehang 19 Fendakwaan lalah memanggu semma SP5 untuk memben kelerangan Iamut berkenaan Mutosnkal tersebut Eelxau mengesahkan uada swasalan dualankan he alas panama Vskandaws kerana namanya ndak peman disebul separuang penynasacan IN a7cPv2s5ucFm!rzzw5uwA A W. sum ...m.., M“ .. wed » mm m. nngmuly MW; mm. VI muus NM! 20 Larwtan danpada Kelerangan SP9‘ spa (elah membuat semakan dan mendapall maklumat panawa szpanyang lempcm 19 11 2019 semngga bman Npvernber 2021, Vskandarcs berada dzlam lahanan Peru Ian dan dapacan Mzhkamah dl akhir urea pend-kwaan Prinsip kos prima fatio 21 Tugas Mahkamah 0. akmr kes pendakwaan Ialah unmk mmakukan pennaran mamrnra ke alas keseluruhan ketevangan pendakwaan dan nremumskan sama ada pendakwaan (elah berjaya membuknkan sualu kas prima vacre terhadap Termduh sepem arpanmmkkan :1. bawah seksyen 160(1) Kanun Talacara Janayah (Kn) 22 Damn kes PP v. Mchd Radzr bin Abu Baker 2006 1 CLJ A57 an 407 2005 s MLJ 393 an 400» 2004 2 MLRA 547 zoos 1 AMR gr Mahkamah Persekutuan menyarankan Vangkamangkah yang perlu aranmn men nakrm bmara ar akhvr kes pendakwaan — '0; me dose arms praseculIon‘s case‘ subject me evidence wed by me prosecution m rts cmamy la a maximum evaluatmn caramuy scrullmse Ina credlbmly ol eacn ov me pmsecuuan's wwnesses Take Into accmml aH reasnnable Inlerences that may be drawn irom Ihal evrdence If the evraenae admils oi M0 or more mferences‘ men draw me rnierence that is most vavourame In zne amused: (I1) ask yuursemhequeslnon IH now call upon the amused to make ms delence and he ekects «o remam suent am I prepared cp convict IN BRPVZSSUCFHEVZZWSAAWA 3 ‘Nate sum runny wm be mad r. «My Due nﬂgmnﬂlv MW; nnuungnl Vﬂ mun: pmm 2: him on me swdenoe now before me? rune answenc mm quesucn is "Ves", men apnma laofe case has been made um and me delence should be caHed If the answer Is "No" then, apm-rm lame case has not been made out and me accused shuuld be acquined1 (Hi) aner me «Manse :2. called, ma aewsed elems la remam snem, than convict. (my aﬂer defence Is called, the accused eleas to gwe ewdence. men go mrcugn me steps set an! In Mal v PP 1953 1 LNS 52. 195: MLJ 25: ' PP V Data‘ SSH Anwar hm Ibrahim No 3 1999 2 ML! I til 53 (Anwarlbramm No 3). L001 KowCI1a1 &Anurv PP 200; 1g;L.I 734 m 752 2003 2 MLJ as 2003 2 AM}? as, Balachandran v PP 2005 2 MLJ 3431 ex 315- 2005 «cu as 2005 1AMR 321 [ﬁalachandrany a. Magsrmran an Mnhan v PP 2011 1 cu aos dl B24 2011 6 MLJ1) E\emen-e\emen Perluduhan Panama adalah — 11) Jems den herat dadah yang memsm hal perkara psnuduhan adalah dadah berhahaya seperll dllaknf a1 bawah ADE dan dmyalakan damn penud-man tersebul. 111) Tarluduh memilm dadah berbahaya dan mempunyal pengelahuarl mengenal mllnkan mu‘ den (:11) Terluduh mengedardadah bevbahaya 1m IN BRPVZSSAJCFHEVZZWSMWA 9 W. sum ...u..1 MU .. wed In mm m. .1m1-y MW; mm. VI muus rum 24. Elemen perllml 25 26 27. 25 Suatu kaa pnma faoie unluk Permduhan Kedua tememuk apabna pendakwaan membukukan 2 elemen panama yang msenamkan dw alas ma dadnn dun hem! dadnn spa telah menganalnsa kandungan Eksvbn P15[A) — qn dan mendanan ianya mengandungx 52.2 gram helm" yang memadi ha! perkara Penuduhan Panama dan 132 gmm monuaceb/lmarphmes yang meruam ha! perkara Femmuhan Kedua Kedua-dua neram nan mannacelyhnarphlnes dlsenaraxkan sehagal dadah hsmahaya dalam Jadua\ Panama ADE Berpandukan Penghakwman Augusvne Paul HMR (kehka nu) dalam kes Balachandran 1su;2ra)\ Mahkamah my rnenenma kelsfangan SP4 paaa Max zammya sebagax kelerangan yang boleh mpemayau Munusamy Vengadasalam v PP 1987 1 Mu A92 1957 1 on 250 1937 CLJ Reg) 221, PP v Lam san 1991 3 MLJ 425 3. Khan Hlchxang v. PP 1994 IMLJ 265 1994 2 CLJ151) Saksvsaksv pendakwaan le\ah mengemukakan keterangan bevkenaarl Denemuan den pergeraxan baring kes dadzh dengan Je1aS (anpa sebavang pemnggaxan mengenaxpasn baring kes khasnya barang kes dadah berdasarkan Iandaan mas\ng»masmg Kesemua sakss Ie\ah IN BRPVZSSUCFHEVZZWSMWA 10 ‘Nate sum rumhzr wm ... M a «My Due nH§\mH\|V «ma anumgul Vﬂ muws rum	4,144	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
PA-22NCvC-100-07/2022	PLAINTIF ACS SUN ENGINEERING SDN BHD DEFENDAN JFA JAYA SDN BHD	Full Trial – Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant for damages for breach of subcontract due to delay in completing works and abandonment of the project site. Part performance of the obligation under the subcontract.The Defendant mounted a counterclaim for the costs of materials/equipment supplied to the Plaintiff arising from an alleged new contract.Whether the Defendant breached the subcontract when it failed to complete the agreed subcontract works?Whether there was a substitution or variation of the subcontract when parties performed different obligations under the subcontract?Acceleration costs: whether the Plaintiff suffered a loss due to the Defendant’s breach by having to take over and complete the works thereby incurring additional costs and expenses including loss of profit?Whether the damages sought by the Plaintiff is too remote?The Court finds that there is a breach of the subcontract when the Defendant failed to complete the work within the stipulated key milestones date and the request for an increase of 50% from the original contract price unreasonable.The Court finds that there is ample evidence that the Defendant breached the subcontract when it abandoned the project site. There is no variation nor substitution of the subcontract and parties are still bound by the terms of the original subcontract.The Court is of the view that the Plaintiff’s claim ought to be allowed against the Defendant for breach of the subcontract. However, the Plaintiff is not entitled to all claims sought being losses allegedly suffered by the Plaintiff arising from the Defendant’s breach of the subcontract. Plaintiff awarded a total of RM1,698,503.55. The Defendant’s counterclaim is dismissed.	01/11/2023	YA Dato' Anand Ponnudurai	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7a0a08a4-4d12-4589-acb3-48dbc3dff191&Inline=true	01/11/2023 14:45:44 PA-22NCvC-100-07/2022 Kand. 77 S/N pAgKehJNiUWss0jbw9/xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N pAgKehJNiUWss0jbw9/xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N pAgKehJNiUWss0jbw9/xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N pAgKehJNiUWss0jbw9/xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N pAgKehJNiUWss0jbw9/xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N pAgKehJNiUWss0jbw9/xkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 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WA-44-189-12/2022	PEMOHON YUSRAZIF BIN WAN YUSOH RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	section 165 of the Penal Code - section 4(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities 2001 (AMLATFPUAA)	01/11/2023	YA Datuk Noorin binti Badaruddin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5c0444cf-5693-41b2-8254-709e13791617&Inline=true	01/11/2023 15:29:27 WA-44-189-12/2022 Kand. 20 S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N z0QEXJNWskGCVHCeE3kWFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Kand. 20 £1/Juznu 15:29-27 DALAM MAHKAMAH mes: MALAVA on KUALA LUMFUR DALAM WILAVAH PERSEKUTUAN. MALAYSIA 2 w.\—u—1a9—12/2n22 Dahm Pelkara Burkanaan Dengan Mahkamah Sesyen a. Kuala Lumpur. Kes Jenzyah No WA61R—H)1l102l Dan Dawn Pemum ammnn Dengan Mnnkamnh Sesyen m mm. Lumpur, Kn: mum Na WAAHR-2-0172021 Dan Dawn Ferkara Blrkanaavv nengan semm. 31 Akla Mahkamah Kehak\|men1964 Dan uamm Perxam Eerkenain Dengan seksya»~Seksyen173 mm :25 can :21 Knnun Tatacara Jon-yin Dan Dahm Pemam sum Kuasa Seam Ma Mahkamah mum VUSRAIIF BIN WAN vuson ...PEMOHON DAN PENDAKWA RAVA ...RESPDNDEN Juncugm [1] The apulucant was charged mm M: (5) charges under secnon 165 ov me Pena! Code and one (1) charge under sacmon m) at me Anu- Money Laundenng. Anu—Termnsm Flnanung and Proceeds cl Unlawm x sm xnuzxtnwnacwc-Ezxwrw «mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Achvmes 2001 (AMLATFPUAA) All the cnarges were reqvslerad as Cnmmal Case Numbers wA4s1R—1 —u1r2u21 and WA«61F(—2-OI/2011 I2] undev seamen 135 01 me Penal Code The anplrcam was acumen and sentenced mm a ﬁne ol RMw,ooo (or each charge under semen 165 at the Penal code The change under sacnnn 4(1) oi AMLATFPUAA was taken mm oonslderauon me) by me Veamed Sessmns Court Judge (“sch pursuant In sec1Ion171A ov me Cnmmal Procedure Code (“crew on 5 9 2021, me appncam meaded guilty to aH me we (5) charges [3] amongst others tor ms common and sennenee bequashed and se\| as-de on 27 12.2022, ms Apbheann mad the Present apphcamon seeking and lor nus mum to order a rs«\|na\ on me grounds was he was canviued undera ‘quesxraname gmlly plea beiom me 5:34 1»: Amzlicunrs story [4] avers that araund September 2021 he was ssauoned as a team leader at the unnngvauon davanmenl m KLIA Term-nal 2 Al the malaria! lime he Vn ms amdavil m supparl o1 ms apphcalmn harem, cne applxmnl was howlng the post as 'Trmba/an Pena/ong Pengarah Kanan /I-mgresen (TPF'K)“ or 'Psno/ong Penguesa Kanan“. [5] that ne was approached by one ‘Pegawar Imigresen nnggr Monamad Kamis bm Pakv Mawdm (‘PIT Kamis“) who was a senvur drﬁoer altached lo me ann-human n-ammng dw Ian (AT\|PSOM) wimm me Imrmgrallorl depamnem through me wnavsApp Iext message aﬂenng mm a pasmon as an agam pmvocaleur (“AP”) tor ATIPSOM Both PLT Kanus and ma appﬁcanl is said to have men me! m Negen Sembilan Ia dvscuss me offer to won me applicam men agreed due to me trusl ne had m PH Kamws Fnor la ms anacnment a1 me KLIA Temw\a\ 2. the applnmnl dawns 2 sm .nuzxmw;sscwc.s:swrw «mm. sans! ...n.mn s. d... m my me nnmnmy mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum we gurlly. ll ls very unlikely lhac lhe applicanl had misunderstood lne charges and me consequences ol pleading guilty. The applicani do noi asserl as such or Ihal he failed lo ocnrorehand any rnallera ounoemlllg lhe proceedings oelore lhe sessions corrrl whlcll led lo his guilly plea. ln lacl, lrorn lhe submlsslan on his behalf, in ls so clear \|haI he underslood whal he was charged wish rhe charges, and the consequences oi hrrn pleadlng gurlly in me Sessions courl. Ncl only he had pleaded purlry to me charges, lrrere rs nc denral llral lhe ap ' ni had admltlad lo lha slaIamenloHac1s.Thls rs where lhe learned sca have ensured lhal lhe aoeused lrrlerrds lo adrnli wlihour qualiﬂcalion [35] lmpcrtalllly, ihe appllcanl was represenied by iwo murlsels ol senlorseandlnps and he had pleaded gurlly lo (he allemallve charge under seclrorr les olihe Penal code. Mlhgallan was conduelad on hrs oehan py ihe counsel represenirng hrnr [36] The brlnglng olclalnrs orallegallons after a ﬁrlallly ola mailer oelore lhe eoun wllhoul rnore arnounr lo an abuse ollhe ouul1‘5 process more so when «he elarrns er allegallorrs should have oeen ralsed in lhe eanrer proeeedlngs. The quesuorr ls, rnusl lhe oourl be lashed or burdened Wllh whal rransplred or agreed upon oerween lhe applloanl and any olrrer parlies milslde the calm’ ls lhe ccurl lo be olanred lor nor ensurlng saleguards in accordance wrlrr law when lhere rs rrolhrrrg belara lhe court to show lhal me amused/appllcanl was coeroed or ihrealened lo make a plea oi gul\|\|y in calm? The applioanrs subrrlisslcrl rhal lhe “slgnal‘ gryen lo hlrrr lo plead gumy by hls counsel oanncl be aard lo be an lndloallorr lo the dorm lhel he gave hls plea oondilllanally The lad rernalns rhal rhe applleanl was peldre rhe oourt or law He had pleaded gullry and had lmered the plea. He had all me lloerly lo deny the charges prollered rn .naaxrnwoaeyne.asswrw “None s.n.l luvlhnrwlll rs. med a my r... pﬂnlrullly MVMI dnuavlnrll VI .rlune vtmxl against ruin il Indeed he never Inlerlded Io Dleid guilty rnene was no one to slap hint lrern doing W‘ not even his counsels nmwnrielanuing any "signer was given to him (if there was any such signal lot that matter). This oaurl ueelined to call let me recording of lhe proceeding tietere the sessions court because It is at the considered View and at the risk 0! repetition‘ (here was naming and no one D2401! the com in slop the applicant lrein claiming trial. [37] Any promises or oonaitiens made ie the applicant that lee him to plead guilly are rnetleis trial transpired belweerl him and Ihe ether venies pnor In him pleading guilty. The cenailiens or assumrlce or promises wrieieuer Ihey may be are matters which are el no concealed oi the court unless they are being raisea at the ﬁrs! inslanoe, reponed and tried. [as] The applicant had pleaded guilty aritl whal could be gleaned liern ms present application is that he is now unhappy lhai lha eonaiiians given [0 him il he pleads gurliy were not lulhllea and with me condillnns nol lullillea, his plea ol gullly is said \|o be a mneilienal plea er unsala to be accepted To qiioia wnal Muhd Nazlan Mnhd Ghazall J (as His Lordship inen was) saia in Wong cnun Khuln v Pendakwa Ray: [2020] 1 ms 2151: 741} Fourthly, the critical pom! is Ihls. if then won the rusans (never mind not PNVOGJ that had led the applicant to pluid aullry. is It lht law than we court is /uetmul on than rmana to ﬁnd the guilty pm A: ui-ism and new it an aside? Auaalinely not. otherwise, mesa awailing lrlal would take me chance and plead guilty in be released but much later seek toreirisll the corlvfcllcn by way olreyrsian apnlrcauen and queslion his 11 sru xmExlNWxAECVHC-E3iWFw “Nair s.n.i nuvlhnrwm be u... ie my i... nﬂmnnllly enii. dnuuvlml Vﬂ .nuue vtmxl own olee by rslymg an some unsubstantiated anegerions ofmsrtsrs that have nothing to do mm the me/ proceedings especra//y when one sentence rs not as no expects " [Ernphasws added] [39] n woutd ha a mockery to or en abuse oa me oeuns pmoess In order (or a men on the ground tha\| the oondiuons offered to the aophcam uutsude me noun or unono mm nleadmg gullly nas net been Mﬂllad resumng in ms ores oi gmhly being oundmonaL Bemg e person of ms slandmg, an enlomemenl afﬁoer m the anal serwce no less, me apphcant ougnn nal to have pleaded gullly In the ﬁrs\ place and whatever aneganons ne now make agamsl the MACC oﬂioers can only be proven ii ne claims trial to wfuch he dld not. He oughl to know that V1 VS "'18 couns H15! convml and nass sencence and no one else can or oomd oﬂer when me senlenne shown he or ought to be. So how could anyone else assured nr affered the apphcam 3 (arm of semencs \|haI could be meted out agamsl mm? What was the reason for the MACC Io vnplnmle me eooncenrs sxsleﬂ Was she Involved m being an unregwslered AP mo’: Au the euegauons rehed an by me apphcanl are unsubs\|am\a\|ed before «ms coon Mono Nazlan .I (as His Lordship then was) m Wong Cllun Knuen v Pendakwa Raye (supra) has stated 142] ms rs /57 from p/omolmg me due admrmslralion o/zne cllmmal 1:./slrcs syslam m we country In my view them must be creu no direct evidence or oppress/ve and megmmaro pnssuus applied to an accused to plud gu/Iry ms: can mm In nﬂlrmnllu response m an sppncsuon to revise nd set aside . convlcllon mseo on me pm a! gumy Dy nn accused rms IS not me case 1; sm .nusunw;.ecwc.zsswrw “None ssnsw nmhnrwm e. LAIQ4 m mm s. nrW\nnU\|Y mm: m.n.n VII munc Wm! In niis applicarion before me 1'». alllgations am torlou: and lacking in substantiation The plea is nor Qualiﬁed " [Emphasis added] [40] Tiiia noun agiaas wiln the iaspoiiaenrs oonieiilioii iiial this applimlian is sameriow a lomi Ma back door‘ appeal, an attempt in invite me coun lo allow a “re\ria\" before aiioiriei oourl Thls Kind Ofappllcallnrl would only open a ﬂood-gale wneie parlles can sli apply for inauais ﬁnally determined to be re-heard 0! lelned. There musl be is ﬁnahly reached in cniiiinal cases alnaiwisa qiialing mat Zawawl Salleh JCA (as he then was) had slated in Public Prosecutor V Mollalmd sliariariuaain Mohamed All a ois mlsl 1 ML: szn ./I would cause a ‘tsunami’ O/GDDGEIS and (I19 Court :3! Appeal would be swamped ' Conclusion [41] This mun is saiisnea Iha( liieia is nc ualacl in llie aanlicaiirs cuilly plaa The plea was uiicaiiuixional and or unequivocal and U15 applicant understood in: nature and aorlsaquerloes or his plea M giiilly There is no men: in me iiislanl app\|lca\|il)n For me veasuns sal out in ma loregolngi me appli::anl‘s annlicaliori was dismissed Dal a lube! 2023 [N olim Judga High calm cl Malaya Kuala Lurrlpuv NTI aAT>ARunDlNl 14 SN xmExINWsAEc\/NC-E:kWFw “Nana Smll nuvlhnrwlll be UIQG w my i... nﬂﬂlrinﬂly MVMI dnuuvlnril Vﬂ nFluNG Wm! Caunsnl my on Applicant Van H:nmba\ Llang bm Danval Lvang Messrs Damn Chan, Hannibal a. N9 Chambers Snnior Fodtr Cmm I (ssc) Mahamad Fadhly hm Menu zamry Shahmm um um 15 am xnuEx1NwsLGcvHc-Euwrw «ma Snr1n\nmhnrwH\I>e LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum v-max WT Kamis is nverred lo hive iepieeenieo Io ihe sppiicaril lhal he wduid be registered as an AP oonimeneing iioin Auousi 202a and lhat ihe applicant would be given immllmly and oioieeiion iioni any iegai pioceeainge pursuant to the w ieioleweis Pmleclian Acl2D1U [5] According to ihe aooiicani, his job scope invoiued handing over iiiegai money or black money to PVT Kamis which would men he chenneieo lo the Fedeiai Temlary Al the KLIA Temiinai 2 the applicant had to ga undermver and had no aitemalive but to channel the iiiegal money he received «uni the foreign agenis or the syndicate lo oihei iinniigraiion omoeis in avoid Suspicion and blowing up his undercover. The apoiicam adds iunhenhaiaii ihe whine. FIT Kamls aha anolherofﬁner by [I18 name M P! Rizal were aware that he was an AP PIT Kamis IS aiso saio to have been awaie ihauhe applimni was in possession oi the iiiegai money [7] oensisienuy pmuided inlurmalmn ioahd eoooeiaieo wiih FLT Kainis, being his handiing erridei Thmughuu\| the ooereiion, the apeiieaiii believed Ihal he was a oroiecieo AP but, in his diwlliyi as at oaooei 2020, he has yet In be iegisieieo as an AP oi Arii=soM amcieiiy and neiiheidid he iecewe any omeiai docunienia eiaiing the same the applicanl siaies ihai ihmughoui being an AP, he had [5] on 16 11.2020. ihe apnlieaiii iogeihei wi\|h a law eihei iinhiigieiion omceis were arrested by the Malaysian Anii-coinioiion commission (umcci [91 The apiziicani believes «he: the said anesi made by MACC was conducled relying un the inioinieiion he heo piovided as an AP and wniisi in cusiody he had iepeaieoiy iniomieo ihe MACC emoeis, in oanieuiai x SIN .oozxiuweaeunc.mwm “None s.n.i nuvihnrwm a. met! a may i... nﬂﬂiruﬂly mi. dnuuviml Vﬂ .nuua Wm! one Tiian Syukn. the Head el lnvestigatien Depariineiii c that he was an AF «or ATIFSOM of the imrnigiation department. [10] The Applicant ﬂﬂlher avers that sueseqiiently, one Tuan Lnkmari, the assistant inmtigaiing olﬁoar at ihe MACC inlenned him lhal there was an application stlbmrlled to register the applicant as an AP lor ATIPSOM rain the application was dismissed by the iininigraimn denerirneni. [11] Despite all the above events, the applicant was charged taelere the Sessions coiiri and the applicant avers that he had tmended Io claim trial against the charges pieteired against him In pieve that he was indeed an AP alA1li=soM in the immigration department. [12] According to the applicant, he was faced with nurneieusttireats and pmmlsas train the MACC dmeeis Yhe applicant claims that one of the MACC investigation olﬁcer by the name at Tiian shaleh had owered him an imprisonment terms at I4 days and e rine i11RM1U.0DDlor each charge if he pleads guilty to which he stated he had declined and remained adamant Io cieiiri trial. The MACC is said to have also introduced the applicant lie a solicitor to repieseni him to which he agreed as he was without a lawyer er the malenal time. [13] The applicant liirther stlbmlls that atter eennding to the sol Im at his intention to claim trial, the said solicitor pmvlded a quote pl his retainer fees tor hill trial In which the applwarit said he could not attend [14] Then‘ the said Tuan shaieh was replaced by a new iniieatigaiing omcerene Ptian siihaidah Towards the end willy 2o21,l=ti.-in suhaidaii called the applicant to the MACE’: dance ae man Syukn is said In have 4 SN xmE)uNwxAEcvHc-E:kWPw “Nate s.n.i mnlhnrwlu a. HIQG a vuny i... nﬂglnlllly MVMI dnuuvlml VI .niine pmul intended to meet him The applicant adhered to the request whereby the said Titan shulrn had then ehered theapplieant a new offer The aﬂerwas that in the event the applicant pleads guilty he would only be imposed with a ﬁns without any imprisonment term Tuan Shukri is also alleged to have threatened the applicant that in the event he dees net elead guilty to the charges the Mlxcc would I proseeute the applwanfs sister who was an immigration oﬁoer based in Johor at the material time despite the rtort-Involvement et his sister in his attairs; and ii. add more charges against the applicant [15] According lo the applicant, in light at the grave threats, he was pushed to the wall as he did not wish to implicate his innoeent sister and as such he agreed to plead guilty [16] ruan Shukrl is also said le have assured the applicant that he would not be dismissed ner discharged hem the department upon his conviction on the eondition that he pleads guilty as seen as pdssiple. [17] The applicant sutmiits that at the time the charges were reread to him the sollcilor representing him had given him a signal to plead gumy Fearing the weH—being ot his sister and his livelihood. the applicant pleaded guilty albeit under duress and threats [16] Yheappllcanl paid the line imposed upon him by the sessions court and despite the promises and conditions agreed upen belween him and the MACC, the wrtdltlorts were not met and the applicant now avevs that N xnuExlNwn5cvHc-Ezhwrw «mu. s.n.i navlhnrwm r. u... a may i... eﬂmhnllly MIMI dnuavlnrtl VI hFlt.tNa Wm! he was looled by the MACC and trial his plea ol uullly was noi une<:uivoi:aI [19] Trle applicanl runner slates lnal rle was unable to lake lmmedlale legal recourse lo really mailers as nis bank ecoaurlls were lrozerl helwsen November 2o21ani1 early 2022 and was unable Iaappolnla new solicllcl lo represenl rllrn. [20] In oramurld Fennieiy 2u22, once he could saws: his oarlxaccaunl. me applicarli appointed Messis. Kevin A Go who rlea ealrisaia rllni vs ﬁle a iudiciel reuiew In reinslaie nis pusllmn in ine lmmlgl'a\|i0H aepennlenl. Hnwavel‘ lrie High ceun had dismissed \|he appllcan\|'s iimieiel review alwllcallon. [211 lrlareaiier, llla aaallcanl appolmed me present solieller and hence the Present avullcatlan wal ﬁled In December 2022 summary ollhe AppI\|canl's Comemlons [22] II is me epplicenla Donlenunn men since all ms eiremlenls In his elﬁaevil in support ol me piesenl appllilaii are not rammed by lrle respondent, liis ellegeuens slleuld illerelere be admmed and me lnslanl eppllcaiion ougrii to be allowed [23] Secondlyi me appllcanl oonlenas «rial riis plea was cundltlunal because lie was all lne wrllle isliiclanl lo plead gullly and me soliuller repieeenilng lilnl lien in signal \|a rlim la plead It IS oonlended illal me learned SCJ uuglll In nave exercised caullun belere eeeepiirlg rlls plea wlilcri was no! done as ine acl ol me sollcllol signaling lrle apallnarll lo plead gulliy ougnl (0 walranl lunner inquiry and lrerlncaliorl liem ine learned SCJ. e srn .nezxinw;aecuae.zaawnw “Nair a.il.l nmlhnrwm a. med a my l... aililn.ll-y MIMI dnuuvlml Vﬂ nFluNﬂ Wm! [24] The applicanl irnplaras upon lnis counlo call up ma recording in the sessions coun lo assess the physical acl of ihe splipilor and that me sellcllor was never his choice in «he lirst place [25] The applicani uonlends that his plea ol gumy can never be unequivocal because he was pushed is me wall by me ihreais andlor blackmail by me MACC. [251 Arising lrom me above, me apphcanlennlends lhai il was unsale lor the learned SCJ lo accepl his gulliy plea and that ihere was a imscamage cl yusuce and me eerwicilori oughl lo be quashed and we own oughl lo alder tor a lnal oelore a dillareni Sessions ooun Evaluaiion znd Fin has [271 ll is lrile law lhal there are saleguards which rnusi be oomplled wilh aelore a calm can accept a plea ol guilty as valid and unequivocal, Fnremnsl, lhe court rnusl ensure ihal ii is lhe accused hlmulfwha wishes In plead gullly and me accused muel plead guiliy by his own rnoulh and nol lhiough his counsel. saearidly. me eaurl rnual ascerlam me accused undersiands lhe naiure and consequences olhia plea. Thirdlyl lne couri musl ensure ihai lhe accused amends la adniil mhoui qualmcauan the alrence alleged against him This is done by me disclosure oi lhe laols via lhe slaleineni ol facts lenderad by the araseculian disclosing all the necessary eleinanls pl inc aﬂsrloa (see L wang Tuck d. Anor v FF (198912 MLJ 14:) [26] It is appasile lo nole lne provision in secllon 305 ollhe CFC which prevents an accused person lrorn appealing againsi his corwlcllan if he had plead guiny lelhe charge. A oonvlcled person may however appeal in me exienl ar legalily of ihe semenpe By pleading guilty lo the charge, ru .aazxmw;.acync.aaawru «nu. a.n.i navlhnrwm be UIQG a may i... aﬂmnallly MVMI dnuavlml VI .nuna Wm! the accused is deemed lo have wawed ms rich! to quesudn me Iegahty ol the conwcuon. Section 305 cnhe CPC smes: when plea oi gumy Irm/led me ngh! olappeal 305. wnen an accused person has pleaded gumy and been canwcled by e Magtsrrals on mar plea, mere shall be no appeal except as (a the extent at /ega/My 0/ me semenee " [291 There n. e fmahly in me maner by me (act me: me app:-cam nas meaded gumy, cemnmed and semenoed So in mhev wordeu ‘i there Is anyming Ien ws rm lhe appIir:an\| In zppelﬂ agams\| me senxenee imposed on rum [:0] However‘ more me count. mslead 0! sppeahng agamsl me sentence oessed by me Sessnns caun. me applncanl by way 0! mduon var rewsion, ws seeking larlms ooun to exercise us rewsuonery power under sectvons 323 end 325 of me cvc wtnen read. ‘Paws: la call In: records ofsubonimate cduds 323 (1) A Judge may call In! and examme [he record of any proceeding befule any subacdfrrale cnmnel coun [or me purpose or saﬁsfymg nunsen as re me corvedness. )egaIIry or pmpnery at any lmdmg, sentence or order rsoon1sn1 or passed, and es to live rsgulsmy cl any pmceedmgs dune: subordinate Com (2) Orders made under sections 97 and 95' are not prooeedmgs wirmn me meaning oi th/s seeoon Powers of Judge on rm/rsrorl 325 (1) A Judge may, m any case me record ol ms pvaceedmgs al wnrcn has been ceued rd, by hunself DI 3 sm .neexmw;.ecwc.mwpn «mu. sum nmhnrwm .. med e may he mmnnﬂly em. m.n.n Vﬂ mum v-ms! w/nan olhsrwrse comes to no knowledge, rn his drscmtmn‘ exercise any ofme powers canfelred by sections 311 315 315 and 317 ohms Code (2) No order under Ihrs sec!/‘on shall be made In ma pre/mm ol the accused unless he has had an opponunny ofbemg Ilssnt arthsv psvsana!/y or by advocate, m ms own defense (3! ’\Iarhmv In this secnon sI1a// be deemed lo aulhonza a Judge lo convert a ﬁndmg of acqwtts! rate one of convtclvon." [311 n .s clear that may seamen 325 or me cpc, the vevisxunary power of a Judge Vs hmwed within the penme\|ers or the runes av pmceedings recorded by1heIHa\ cour(,Tms Is amplmea by me pronsion under section 35 (2) or me couns oﬂudlcalure Ad 1954 whrch 5121125: 35 (2; Upon on High coun calling [or any rtcord as aloresam all pmceeamgs In the subonzimals noun m ms matter or pwceedmg In quesuon shall as slsyed pendmg lunhsr 011131 or me Hrgh Court.’ [32] The com 01 Appem -n Publlc wmuomor v Audroy Koonu u-I cnln mm 3 MLJ 411 had made «ms Dimcmar oosewsnen as (c In: usage of amaavu announce m a roman. Tna Com of Appaav obsarved. ‘Before leaving the subject. we would «me la make one other observation. owing ma pmcudlngs bclon rm mgh com, a number of amd-ms were ﬁled both by me prosecution as well as by the respondent for me consideration of the learned judge. In uremising his 9 sm .msunw;.acwc.znwpw «mm. smm ...n.mn .. U... w my me mmnnuly mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ muNa Wm! powers under s 125 al in: cue, the ieamedﬂidgo In: to satisfy ninmir as 21.7 the sommnoss, legality or pmplinry (.1! any ﬁnding, slnturicl or until recorded or passod, and as to the rwulariry of any Pmcudfnvs of in. interior com: in order to do inis, In has In examin- cm raconi ofiht meanings of which has bun cnllnd my by niinsoir or, .s in this sass, which aincmin corms to his knowlodn-. in gums‘ "M ms" d'§i:rnlian ma Iumud [ugqe ougm to conﬁne ninmrf mix lg mg ncord or ﬂu swings and naming -In Ag aggimian rm mision twig nsscnlilliz - crimlnnl I I u i 1 vidcrica nssno iﬁ ‘(Emphasis added] [33] in the presem mane! it is me applicanfs contention mal Since an his avermenls in ms afﬁdavit W7 suwon or me Dresenl application EVE not rebuiled by ins respondeni, his allegations should therefore be admilled and me inslanl apphcation ougni to be anawea. Prernised on the authority oi Public Prosecutor v Audrly Kcong uni Chin (supra) «ms Court \|$ oi the considered view that ail the unrehlmed avermenls on the Dafl of lhe respondent via alﬁdaviis are nai deinmeniai and do noi ermlied \|h5 allegations made by the applicant admissible in warrant hIS insiani apphcaiion to be allowed as me court‘: xask In revision is oniy mnﬁned to me record 01 me proceedings and nothing else. This coun formal malter has never instructed for any alﬁdavits in be filed. [:4] There is naming on record or In his submission for max matter to show ihal the apphcanl ma rini undeisland ihe charges pruierved agamsi mm and that he an: noi know me naiure and consequences ni pleading ID SIN xnuExiNwskGcvHc-Ezkwrw “Nair s.n.i n-nhnrwm be LAIQ4 m may he nﬂninnﬂly mm: m.n.n n. nrium WM!	2,004	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
KB-45A-10-02/2021	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya] TERTUDUH MUHAMAD MUSHI FAIRUZ BIN ISKANAROS	Undang-undang Jenayah— Dadah Berbahaya— Tertuduh dituduh dengan dua pertuduhan di bawah sek 39B(1)(a) dan 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 — Sama suatu pendakwaan telah membuktikan suatu kes prima facie — Sama ada pembelaan Tertuduh menimbulkan keraguan munasabah ke atas kes pendakwaan — Hukuman setimpal bagi kesalahan pemilikan dadah — Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan Akta Pemansuhan Hukuman Mati Mandatori 2023	01/11/2023	YA Puan Narkunavathy Sundareson	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=8ae60811-c44f-42e7-9ce2-18528ff65205&Inline=true	01/11/2023 08:05:19 KB-45A-10-02/2021 Kand. 144 S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N EQjmik/E50Kc4hhSj/ZSBQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ma-45n—1o-02/2021 Kand. 1A4 :1/11/2023 92:25-19 DALAM MAMKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA m SUNGAI FETANI DALAM NEGERI KEDAH DARUL AMAN, MALAVSIA PENDAKWA RAVA LAWAN MUHAMMAD MusHI FAIRUZ BIN ISKANDAROS ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalzn 1 Terluduh. Muhammad Mush! Falmz bin Iskandavus rrenuduh] le\ah dmadapkan dv Mahkamah avas pemAduhan»pemAduhan bsrIkul- (1) Ke§ Nu Ka45A—m—u2/2021 “Bahawa Kamu, pada 31 1 2020, pm lebm kuvang 5 45 pslang. ax fem ja\an, susur keluar Herman Rama: dan Rawal Gurun Arah mam, Lebuhvaya Lnayaseuaran, an dalam daerah Kuala Muda‘ an dalam Negen Kedah Dam Aman, \|e\ah dldapaﬁ mengedardadah berbahaya saw Herom seberat 52.2 gram Oleh yang devmkwan‘ kamu bersama-same dengan niat hersama, IeVah me\akukan salu kesalahan cm bawah seksysn 39E(I)(a) Akla Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan bmeh dnhukum m IN Eupwna£snK:Amsuzsau 1 ‘NEVA sum ...m., W1“ be mad p. vecly M mm.“-V M W. mm. VII mun: NM‘ (H) bawah seksyen 393(2) Akla yang sama“ [Pertuduhan Femmll [Eksihﬂ 511. dan K25 Nu Ka45—5—o3/2021 “Bahavm xamu, pm 31.12020, ‘am Veblh Kurang sA5 petang, a. lap! Jakan, susur ksmar Harman Rahal dun Rawat Gurun Nah Ulara, Lebuhraya Utara—SeIatan‘ d1 dakam daarah Kua\a Muda‘ di dalam Negen Kedah Daml Aman, le\ah ada dalam mmkan kamu dadah bevbahaya Iawlu Monoaceﬂyhuorphlnss saberal 13.2 gram O\eh yang UEIYHKWEVI‘ kamu le\ah melakukan salu kesarahan dl bawah seksyen 12(2) Akla Dadah Eerbahaya 1952 ﬂan boleh dihukum an bawih seksyen 39A(2) Akla yang sama" [Fenuduhnn Kednn][Eks an Kes Dwudakwazn 2 Fendakwaan «emu mengemukakan kelerangan melamv 9 Saks: dan bolsh diringkaskan sepem bariknn 3 Pada 31 1 2020, Inspeklur G/Z2788 Theodore anak Peter Dlen, pengadu 1SP5HeIiIh rnenenma maklumal bahawa lerdapal aktvvm psngadaran hemln oleh seorang \e\aki Melayu menggunakan matnsnkal Yamaha V15RZ E1 Herman Rahal ﬂan Rekveasi GLIYWI mengI1a\a ke arah Mara (RNR Gurun) SP5 telah mengalur suslu pasukan serbuan yang mangguca. uleh 14 anggoca pahs termasuk DISubinpeklov Raja an Govindasamy (SP6) SP5 telah member: lakllmat dan mgasan umuk serbuan Iersebul IN Eupmkiisnxumsuzsau 2 W. sum runny WW ... M » «My n.. nH§\mH\|V MW; mm. Vﬂ muws NM! 29 Mahkamah ini berpuas hali bahawa EKsm\|l—Eks\|h\I P6‘ P7‘ P3 den F'I5(Aj — (F) yang dxrsmpas dw Iempat kejadran dawn kehadiran Tenuduh adalah barang kes yang same yang dikemukakan an Mahkamah 30. Berdasarkan akasan-alasan . , Mahkamah . mendapao pendakwaan le¥ah membukllkan dadah merbahaya yang menjam halpelkara Perluduhan Perlami man neram seberat 52.2 gram dan halperkava Permdunan Kedua man monnacetylmarphmes seberal 13 2 gram Elemen kedua — milikan mm pangotalmln dndlh 31. Unluk e\amen W, Mahkamah my berpandukan amalan Thumscml dakam kss cnan Pean Lean v PP 1956 1 MLJ 231 d! 239. Penghakman telsebut telah mmjuk dan dxendus Nah Mahksman Persekuruan dalam kes~kes PF‘ v Abdul Rahman bin Am 2007 5 0, PP v nemsn Madhavan 2009 2 MLJ194 2009 2 cu 209 2003] MLJU 771, Snsw Yoke Keang v PP 2013 3 MLJ 830 2012 MLJUZSS 2013 ACLJ MS 2013 23AMR 202‘ Ghasem Huzuun Hassan v PF 2019 6 MLJ 231 8. Chan Wen Leon v PP and another aggeal 2021 4 MLJ 560 2021 MLJU 770 32. Damn kss Panen Dadeh v PP 2009 1 CLJ 717, Auguslme Pam FCJ memmuskan m7A1— ‘The Vaw is dear and wen settled P700101 knowledge us very urcen a mailer u! mlerenee The matenal mm which the mference ol xnowxsage can be drawn vanes (ram case In case 0 would be IN Euyvmuzsnxumsuzsau “ W. sum ...m.., wm .. 0544 n mm m. nngmuly MW; mm. VI muus rmm sumciemforme prosecuuon to woo! fscls (mm wmch il wuld be pmpeny moaned max «he accused had the necessary knumedge ' Mod laba Hoaaemzaaan Ma m v PP and another a al 2015 2 ‘ ML] 254 at gm & Ggnalgn gm Ramachandran & Ors v PF 2004 ‘ 4 MLJ 489 at 506 2006 1CLJ 357 (eunaxanb) as Eerdasarkan mamka cam kes um, sws dan sws memnen 1 keterangan yang kunsIs1en dan sahng sokcngmenyukong bahawa ‘ kah penama mereka mehhal Tenuduh, Tenuduh duduk berssmang an alas Molasxkm (ersebut dan ssdang merokok. Apabnla spa mengenaxxan am sebagal pegawal polns, Tenuduh berlmdak agresur dan ma melankan dm Termduh beuaya dilahan Eks1bi\| P6 duumpal dalam raga Mmosikal (evsebul Tsnuduh boleh meIIha(Eks1bIl P6 dalam raga Molasxkal levsebul Vanya huxan dmam keadaan lersellndung auau tersembunyl 34 Tenuduh bukan permhk Motusvkax Ievsebul Molosxkal i\|u mllik spa Mahkamah menenma sebahagian keterangan SP9 bahawa hanya ma den Tenuduh menggunakin Muloslkal Iersebm. Paaa \|ankh kqsman, SP9 msnggunakan Motos\ka\ (erssbul ssmngga pukul 5 no pelang spa lwdak swmpan apa—apa pada Molus\|ka\ mu Kemudian Mulusxkal ilu mgunaxan o\eh Tenuuun. 35 Keterangan spa rm dlsakung oleh keterangan SP5 dan spa bahawa Mctasxkm [Ekslbll F7] telah dlrampas m (empat xqaman dari Terluduh IN Eumwzsnxumsuzsau 12 W. sum ...m.., wm .. wed Ix: my me nngmuly MW; mm. VI muus rmm as Danpada keterangan pendakwaan berhubung kedudukan dekat ream-m kepada Ekslbll P6 yang mengandungl uaaan, Mahkimah im membual danatan nasmv bavang kes dadah adalah dalam kawalan dan Jagaan Tenuduh. 37 Pengetahuan berkenaan dadah Iersebut haven dvbual inlerens berdasarkan unsur kedekatan tbroxwmityj Terluduh kepada dadah lersebul dan (mdakan Tenuduh cubs ms\arIkan am semasa SP5 mengenalkan am sebagax pegawav pohs 33 Dengan kelerangan yang ada, Mahkamah berpuas mm Tenuduh mempunyal mmkan dan pengenahuan berkenaan dadah lersebut Elemen keriga Ferluduharv Pertama — nengedaran dadah 39 Seksyan 3‘/(dab ADE mempevunmkkan — “any persnn whu Is lmmd m possessiun av — u) 15 grammas or more m wewghl of harm, uthelwwse «mu m accardanoe wnh me aumomy or «ms Au or any other wvillen law, shall be presumed, unlll me contrary is proved, to be mamckmg in the sam dmﬂ‘ .. 40 Memandangkan uerac hsmm sebanyak 52 2 gram yang dwpermehl darn Eksuhxl P15(A)— (F) melebmn had staluton mmuum tanggapan pengedaran dw bawah seksyen 37(da) ADE \|erpaka\ IN Eumwzsnxumsuzsau '3 W. sum ...m.., M“ .. wed » mm m. nngmuly MW; mm. VI muus NM! Kobnlehpercayaan saksrlsaksi pendukwman 41 Dakam kes Anwar Ibramm Na 3 (supra), Augustine Paul H (kem ‘ mu), telah menyalakan an 293 - \ “The Pvivy councu has s1.a\edlI1atII1e lea! tests Var erlher accemmg or rejenmng Ihe evwdence at a wmness are how conswslem the slnry Is mm Nself, how u stands the test at cross-exammamn, and how var it ms in mm me rest :1! me evidence and the circumstances at me case (see Elmira] v sitaram AIR [1935] PC 60) M musn, huwevev, be observed that being unshaken m crass-examinauon Is um per 52 an an-summem and test or crembuny The mherent pruhab\|'ly of a «an m wssue must be me pnme ccmsmeranon (see Mun/'andy& Drs v PP[1965]1LNS110‘[1966]1MLJ 257) It has been held that vi a wimess demonslvably tells hes, ms evmenee must be Vooked upon wwth suspwcwun and xreaxea with camm buﬂn say that wt should he evmrely repeated would be to go too lar (see Khamv Chye Hm v PP[1961] 1 LNS 41‘ [1961] MLJ 105)‘ A2 Berpandukan saranan um, Mahkamah ml lelah mempemmbangkan keterangan kes pendakwaan secara keselumhan ﬂan kebirangkalian kes unluk menﬂaw kebolehpercayaan saksxsavsx Dendakwaan IN Eumwzsnxumsuzsau " W. sum ...m.., M“ .. wed Ix: my me nngmuly MW; mm. VI muus NM! 43 44 45 46 Mahkamah im berpeluang mama: dan mendangar Saks!-Saks! psndakwaan member: Keterangan Secara keseluruhannya Saks!- saksx pendakwaan khasnya SP5 lelah memben ke\|erangan yang konsIs\|en dan Iwdak Iergugal semasa pemsnksaan bzlas Kelerangan mereka jugs swan dengan barang kes clan dokumen yang dikemukakan. untuk Mahkamah Inl Tlada sebarang alasan yang munasabah Iwdak mempercayav mu menenma kelerangan rneveki. Kelsrangan SP9 berkenaan pemmkan Mnloswkm dan penukarin wama kansIs1en dengan kelerangan penaakwaan yang lam. Bahagian kelerangan vu wajar dnerima da\am pemmhangan Mahkamah Walau baganmanapun, kecarangan spa dmam kandang saksi yang uskanaams, menunggang Mulos\k.a\ nu pads mass kmadlan lslah dimdas Men keleringan spa. Keterangan nu ;e\as suatu kelerangan yang lldak disokrmg men aparapa kelerangan ‘am dan Muslim‘ (Inherslmy Improbable) Ks.-(erangan ﬂu wajar dilmak dan pemmbangan Mahkamah Lebm-lebih lagi memandangkan Kalerangan rebuttal SP5 ada1ah bahawa sspanjang temper: 19 H 2019 semngga bman Novembev 2021‘ lskandams berada dalam tahanan Olen nu, uada kemungklnan dwa terhbat damn kejadlan pads 31.1 2020 IN Euyvmuzsnxumsuzsau ‘5 -Na. sum ...m.., M“ .. wed » mm m. nngmuly MW; nnumeul VI arwuus NM! 47 46 49 50 Mahkamah ml mendapau lak\|a~lakIa malerm yang dlsandarkan bag! Iwuan membukukan seliap e\emen permduhanrpemmlman Iemndap Tenuduh sena ism-vaxxa samplngan Vam yang retevan menunjukksn xqaman yang herlaku. sepem yang dwrungkalkan melalm saksxsaksl penaakwaan, adnlah semar dengan kebarangkahan kes Mahkamah Inl (elah membual pemlawan makslma ke alas keterangan pendakwaan darn berpuas hali pendakwaaan lelah beuaya membukxikan sualu kss pnma lame Ierhadap Tenuduh bagl kedua-dua pertuduhan lersehut sakspsam Benkman dengan kepulusan Mahkamah mu. Tenuduh dlpanggil membela dm untuk keduwua penuduhan Iersebm Mahkamah melalul mubahasa eelah menerangkan plhhawpllman mamhuat pembe\aan kepada Teﬂuduh dan Tenuduh memmh unmk member! kelerangan bzrsumpah dan kandang saksi Punlullln Turmduh 51 IN Euyvmuzsnxumsuzsau ‘Nate sum runny WW ... M » «My n.. nH§\mH\|V MW; mm. Vﬂ muws NM! Terluduh bempa saksl tunggal pembexaan. Tenuduh «emu mengemukakan pemyalaan berluhs dl bawah seksyen 4023 KTJ berwikh 5 5.2023 [Psu-1} 1s 52 Kewrarlgannya buleh dinngkaskam sepeni berikut — u) pads lankh xejaman pukul 2 cu penang, ma lelah ﬂmubnngl aleh Venom seurang yang Iwdak dnkenahnya, untuk membanhmya menghanlar nauang ke Pendang unluk upah RM 200 00. (n) venm berkata ma kenalan bapa Terluduh dan (e\ah mm Terluduh membanlu menghamav barang kepaaa Kawannya di fol Pendang: Teﬂuduh le\ah bequmpa Venut pzda pukul sno pelang a. kedaw vwo, di hadapan Pacmc, Pulau Plnang dan lelah diberikan beg ga\as [Eksibil P6] umuk mserarman kepada kawannya :1! Col Pendang, (xv) Terluduh nemenm dx henhan RNR Gumn unluk memkuk dan Ie\ah drlahan. (V) Termduh bergelm kenka dilahan kerana manyangka amnya dwsamun‘ (wt Tenuduh ndak pemah mehha! banana kes dadah dahm Eksnbm P6 sehingga dwtunjukkan oleh penis, aan (vnjdxa sanggup memnanm menghantar barang mu Keranz memenukan dwl IN Eumwzsnxumsuzsau '7 W. sum ...u.., M“ .. wed In mm m. nngmuly MW; mm. VI muus NM! 53. Semasa perneviksaan balas, Tenuduh menyalakan ma ida cerilakan pembemannyi kepada pegawaw pens letapx udak dapal mengenalpasu maps pagawax berkenaan Tenuduh juga le\ah makmmkan peguambela cemanulunya, lelapl peguam mak menyoa\ SF4 atau SF5 berkenann wsu-Isu yang umangkukannya dmam Pembekiinnyi Hu[ahan di akhir kes Ringkasan Imiahan Pendakwaan 54 55 56 IN Eumwzsnxumsuzsau W. sum ...m.., M“ .. wed » mm m. mwgmuly MW; mm. VI muus wvm Pendakwaan menghujahkan mereka xeran benaya membukhkan sualu kes melampam keraguan munasabah Mereka menqux Mahkamah semula kepada inn-pan kedua-Hus Derluduhan din menyowl kelevangan saksisaksx pendakwaan khasny: sps‘ swe‘ SP7‘ SP8 Gan SP4 Pendakwaan bemujah pembelaan Terluduh max mempen-kaman wmpani Jems dan beral dadah manupun langgapan seamen di bamh seksyen 37(da) ADE. Pembelaan Tanuduh (enumpu Kepada mnpan mlllkan dan pengecahuan dadah Tertuduh Ivdak membangkmn 15»; im di penngkal kes nendakwaan dengan memenksa was SP5, SP6, SP7 atau SP8 Noanlara Ambrass Anthony v PP 1596 1 cu 705 :11 hsadnole 1 — 4’ 1996 1 MLJ zus, PPV Hemna Pumama San 2016 1 LNS1855d\|Era 42 2017 1 MLRA499) 18 57 Pendakwaan bemumu pembelaan Teduduh im bahawa dis adiﬂah pembawa udak bersa\ah (mnocem carrier) was suam yang dnﬁknrkan kemudran (anenhaugmy dan mreka hanya smapas ma aupanggulmemnexaaun An A nz v P n n r 2019 5CLJ 730 d\ 800 30:1 2019 4 Mu 1) Rmgmn. nujalun points .1. 53. Pembelaam zelan bemulah berkenaan Ianggungjawab Mahkamah unluk menﬂax kesemruhan kelerangan yang man mxemuxakan uleh kedua pmak man menquk Mahkamah kepaﬂa psnghamman dalam kes Ma V PP (supra) 59 Pemhewaan wga menuuk kepada kes PP v saw-in 1. Drs 1971 2 MLJ 15 d1 mans Sharmi J memumxan di17— -rnuunumm urmcmru am not my iound hulweH rewurused an puma — 41; we arms at plm/mg everything msmx «a me eluhhlhvtem :71 me chama agmnsl ma Etllllssd has on ma pvasemman, (21 The emdence mus\| be such as (0 exchme «o a mans! cenamly every reasonable douhl ml the gum ov me accused, 13; In mailer: uldnubl n u safer In acqunthan m cammn A Mme» mnnm be suslamed even w (he now! vs sansﬂed Ihm me Dvosecunon story “maYbel1ue" umess and mm n wslolmdmalma Pmsecunon story “must b. nus" the human av pmav mam on me pmlewllun ihmughum Ihe mnl n he ‘earned mngmmue Wm! um sihshed mm me cu: m we msemmon Ilwas ms my la mum and msmarse me wmsm ac me dnse av me Dvoeacnmon case The many oime delence does not veheve me pmuculmn «mm wanting nu pmsaculmn case bcynnd varliunabh mum m burden ulpmvmg gum ln . cnmmal charge wsmwnyx an we plmecnman sm Euymklisnxumsuzsau ‘9 -W. sum ...u.., M“ .. wed In mm m. nngmuly MW; m.m. VI muus wvm (Nor Azman hm Ammn v PP gma MLJU 703 m gara 12, sucmma Okayev PP 1995 1M 5;§ gumgp Pnm mm mm d-pmn M-mum-n an nkhlr kn so Seksyen 182 KTJ mempemnlukkan — ‘Pmueduva .1 Iha rmnnlusmn Mme (ml H) At my wnclusmn oa ms mat «m cm man came: an we emanoe xddurad he1me4\|-Ind am. Wnrlhsr nu pmlsumnn has pvuvad .1; use beymld miwmbla am: 12> w the calm «nu; ms: the Drosecmmn has proved as case be‘/and -usoname mm, the Com! mu am we accused gum and he may he mrwlcind an n 12; um Caullfnds vmme pmseanlmn has um plmed its use heyund reasnname mm the cm shaﬂ vsenm an order MaNumaI' 51 Diﬂam kes Mohamnd Radhi bin Yaakob v. PP 1991 1 CLJ Reg 311d\|315 1991 3CL.l2073* 1991 3MLJ1S9,MohdAzm\HMA menerangkan- -u Is a wen eslablwshed pmcme oa Malaysian cummal xaw man we general human 0! wow has mruughuul his man on me pmewnan lo Pmve beynnd reasnnahle mm»: m gum no the accused cm the mm wwm wmch be u mama mm x: no swmuhal burden waned an (he acmsed Ia vmve ms mmmence He Is nvesumed mnooem mum woven gum To earn an a<>\1umaI« ms duly u -mew to out a Icasuruble mum m In: pmmumm case m me some of me pmleculmn case, «.2 pm.cmim. may M sauna new on avmlnble smmary nvesumnlmns \|a mm nne ev more 01 Ihe exsenlml Ingredients Mme shame When man oecurs. me Damcmar burden alvmolas UPPUIMI In my gen-raw burden. mm: to ma aeveuca w rebut such sm Euymklisnxumsuzsau 20 mm. sum lhlhhﬂ wm be uud In mm m. mwgmuly MW; anumgnl VI muus wvm Pasukan semuan telah hba RNR Gumn pada seknar ;am 545 palang RNR Gurun ada medan makan den 2 slesen mmyak‘ Petmn and Shell Pads kehka nu, keadaan pencahayaan an \|empa\| Iersehul masm lerang‘ cuaca balk Gan Valuhmaa agak smuk Kelikl kenderaan Tayo\|a Avanza yang ainam SP5 berhampvan Slesen Mmyak Shell, behau telah mehhal semang \e\ak\ Me\ayu sedang duduk alas sualu mmosmax Vamaha WSRZ wama mru dengan no pendaﬂaran PNVB364(Mn\|us\kaI)[EksIbIlF7] Jarak m ancara merexa pads mesa nu lebm kurang 150 me\|er dan beluau mellhal Velakl Ma\ayu nu sedang memkok Apsnna sps menghampm le\ak\ Me\ayu yang dlcsm ssbagal Terluduh dan mengenaxkan dlnnya sebagav sebagaw pegawax pom. Tertuduh ﬂu benindak aglesxi Lian cubs melankan dm DlKp\| Zulkmee um Kamarudln benaya menaharmya SP5 kemuwannya memaxankan pemerlksaan ks atas Tertudun lelapx nada apa-apa baring yang menya\ahi undangmndang dqumpax xemuman, dalam kehadivan Terluduh dan D/Kpl Zmklﬂee‘ SP5 memenksa Eksnbxl P7 5:25 menjumpai satu beg gaxas berzip berwama mm Mam [Eksihil re] an mga Malosika\ xersebm Da\arn beg galas tersebul. SP5 melwmpaw s hungkusan plaslnk Msmar yang mengandungi bahan yang dwsyakl dadah hemln sps merampas Moluslkal, anak Kunci Malnsiksﬂ [Eksibil Pa] dan beg galas sena kandungsnnya presumnlmvus an the ha\am>e M vmbahmlues whnzh harm the deﬁance pew m vtewws mzwannanma burden Mcainna a masonams doubt bum wsoenamly Immu man the burden oﬂha vvwewvion in mm beyond raawnable dam Ya earn an mum: ax me dose of me use my me prcxeculmn unde¢s mm or ; 180 al (he cnmmax Fmneduve Carley me Own must be silbﬂed lhal no case agaIns\| (he accused has been made cm which wt unrehuﬂed would wmm hrs oonwc1.un(Munusamy y FF’ man] 1 ms :2 n an-nee vs caﬂsd, um duo, £71015 unused us cmly m cat a reasonable auum m an pmleculmn case He 3 ml requwed m mm: mm mnmeme beymld reasnname doubt Tn earn an acqmnm. the am my not be convmued -11 lbs mm. ol Ihe defer»: story or vumun Rmsmg a vaaionabll doubt m we quI\\| av me ‘ accused wwll sulhaa n y. M haweunv, wvmlg {m n.. Com m 5. myma mm the deience velsmn 5 (me m whmh cue me count mus\| emer nn anqulual m avhmnnate cases :1 .5 also um Wm m we own to emmude ‘ manna dalenoesluly mans: arm! convmolrw. mu m Ina! Instance‘ me Coull ‘ mushuol wnvwtl mm! m uk: . lmlhlv quulmn man -van am. cum dun nn\| n::::ep\| ur helueve me delenue exolnnamm, does u nevenhebss, rune . reasonable mm as -.7 ms mull? n \s by (ms rensan mm m dealmi mm the ‘ deﬂence my av exwananun, live mapoﬂly av mm numry mm m mm ‘ ymm away he Iagwy -smamsmu “maxmuhla mar um, rather m... lu dew: m me -mmme and mrwmc\ng" my before appwmg Ihe "yensmunble mm (est “ Iﬁamchandran1suPFI)§ﬂ_,Guna\arI(suI-Va)dxB6S 2204 mu m & Md zaurumn bin Run an y. PF 2013 3 MLJ 77:. di 79: 2017.]ML.JU 314 gm: Acu 21 2013 aAMR4au). 52. Mahkamah um telah menlmbang dan menganalisa kesemua ketevangan yang dikemukakan dalam new-caraan temadap Terluduh umuk memmuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan Isiah membukukan Kes meteka ms\ampam keraguan munasabah sm Euywuisnxumsuzsau 2' -my. sum I-mxhnv wm y. um In my m .m.u-y mm; uaammnl «. muws mum 53. 55 sm Euywuisnxumsuzsau -W. sum runhnv Mu e. um In my me .ngn.u-y mm; e...n.n «. muns bum! unzuk mlipan m kan dan pengelahuan bevkenaan dadah. keterangan pendakwaan menunjukkan dadih duumpal dmarn beg galae yang dlsimpan (mam raga mn(osIka\ yang dnunggang aleh Tenuduh Apatma Terluduh dwahan‘ dla bemndak agrasxl dan Cuba mewikan dxri Pembelaan Tenuduh bahawa ma adalah pembawa lldak bersalah barang kes dadah Keterangan Tsrtuduh ada\ah Venot rnemberikarvlya Eksnbm P6 unluk dlhantar kepada kawannya dw mu Pendang Tenuduh mbayarupan RM 200.00. Teduduh menaﬁkan pengecahuan berkenaan kandungan Exem P6 Dxa jugs mambsri pemelesan hahawa ma mha melankan dm Karena sangka me msamun Pembe\aan pembawa Iidak bersa\ah im Ie\ah dlbincangkan dalam Kes Munusamy Sundar Ra v. PF [guts e MLJ 214 an mans sunyam FCJ memmuskan .1 219 — “The delencs m Innocent camav us emu d¢1vwema\|wu\d bl aﬂuded to by an auwm Ptrmn. and m lhu csxa «n. applﬂanl A plalhnla at can: spnnkbl lhe legs! gnumms .n Mnlaysla and sumee m we merely veler la . chosen ve-mo danfy «ms aevenoe wwhom me new «or wmvrehenswelumrzual actmsm rne com -:1 Appaax m Venkatssan Cmrmasamt v Pvblrr: Pm:sculorIZ011]1 ms 1735 pill n Ipﬂy n me 6uHawing terms A den.-nee ohnnnoem narr\ene4evs m 3 slate ov nﬁahs wheve an accused Person acknwnedges narfvlnsl. lo! example 3 use on hnx‘ as -n lhe case below: 0:, wmammq me dangewui drugs but ampules nanng knuwxeagu unne drug: Whelhzu mu mum av no: menu vary much depend on the «am 0! each case 22 M uld shave n n nnvmny. mat the success at me deﬁance Mmnooem unier depends very mum on lhe fnclsufeach cane, : mmrnnannauns wnmn the ream: of the unax wage Ignorance simphuher n na\| sulﬁuenl In let an accused nevwn on «n. hook as olherwnse every omev aowsed pecsnn w\lI aﬂuda to ma daianoe n needs more than mal wumm any reason 70! sulpwcnn, ur were .. no ngm av awanunny olexam\na1wn,mno::noe may in a gm defence A hypoxhelnm scan-Inn mm ha men an awuled vmxon veoewes a package which comams smut drugs «nnn My. Englnnd when ml n smed oi menu could esxannsn nnn having heen awave M the cwwmnanuascﬂha drugs being mum: nnn ovhavmg any naxustomm Pnov to me paveel ippstnng it ms door she}: na would nut have had any mason my suspnﬂon or me npnmmmy In Inspect the puma! heaving in mud (ml the package was beyand ms reach Imm n reached hrs mag The n-1er:s1h.:\| avemmnu uepefldsou lha mm- as Dalam konleks kes ml, dapalan iakta adamu bahawa » 0) kmerangan berkenaan \leno( ndak umangxmn semasa pemenksaan ha\as saksrsaksx pendakwaan, (u) keterangam SP5 tldak mcabar dengan pevscalan sums ada wang upah RM 200.00 yang konnnnya mbenkan olsh Vsnol atsu lemon blmbn Terluduh yang dugunakan Imtuk bemuhung dengan Venm dvampas semasa serbuan pads 31 1 2020‘ (In) walaupun Tenuduh memberi kelerangan ma telah makmmkan pegawan polns yang merakam percakapannya naralﬂ pembemannya‘ Tenudun mdak dapal mengenalpasu Degawaw Pens sm Euywuisnxumsuzsau 23 -wn. sum ruvmnv Mu n. um n may m. nnnnnn Wm dnanmnl y. muus mm 67 (M percakapan beramaran Terlumm «max mxamuxakan dl Mahkamah. (V) liada cadangan olen Tenuduh Dahawa ma «emu membual perlanyaan kepada venm, searang yang udak dwkenahnya‘ berkenaan Kandungan Eksmn P6, (vx) bavang kes dadah [EkIIbIt P15[A} — (F)] yang mpaw dalam Eksmm P6 dalam keadaan [max tersehndung‘ uan (w) Temmuh mempunyai peluang yang uenm dan mencukupw untuk memhuka Ekslbwl we den memenksa kandungannya se\epas ianya dwserahkan kepadanya sehlnggalah dia mcanan men pmak polls an kawasan RNR Gurun map. Termduh sengma lvdak berbuat uemman Kesernua fakla mu memmhmkan syak wasangka (emadap kesanman ketevangan Tertudnm dan Mahkamah udak msmpsmayamya Fade hemal Mahkamah um, pembelaan Tenumm bahawa dna adaxah pembawa tidak hersalah ]e\as suatu penaﬁan semala-mats dan sualu yang a klrkan kemudlan Kqahﬂan srmphcltsryang dnbangkllkan a\eh Tenuduh udak mampu menyokong pembelaan pembawa mak bersakahnya, memalahkan dapaian iakla permhkan dan pengelahuan alas Imhangan kebarangkahan man merwmudkan sualu keraguan munasabah dalam kss pendakwaan m Eupmuzsnxumsuzsau 24 W. sum rumhnv Mu be us« w vetny m. nugmuly mm anuumnl m nrwuus W.‘ Kesimpulzn as Selelih membual penilalan maksirna dan memmbang keseluruhan kelerangan pmak pandakwaan ﬂan psnubawaan Tenuduh, dengan mengambulkura kredlhllm ssksrsaksl kedua pmak‘ Mahkamah W mendapau — (I) (iii (xv) IV) (W) m Euvmuzsnxumsuzsau Wale sum rumhnv Mu ». um n may m. .ngn.ny mm dnunvmnl «. muus mm kes pendakwaan lerhadap Tenuduh adalah kukuh dnn msokung nleh xeqerangan sakswaksx pendakwaan‘ pembeman Terluduh 9a§a\ memalahkan aavman lakla permllkan ﬂan psngeunuan alas wmbangan kebarangknlian, pembelaan Terluduh gage! memalahkan tanggapan sialutun pengedavan dadah bawah seksyen a7(da) ADE atas wmbangan kebamngkallan, Mahkamah max mempercayax pembe\aan Tenuduh yang benma Flembelaan yang dnf rkan semula, pembelian Terluduh uagal menwmbmkan sebarang keraguan rmmasabah Ierhadap kes pendakwaan mengikul pnnsxp yang amyacakan dalam kes Mat y PP (supra); dan pendakwaan Ie\ah benaya membukllkan kes temadap Tenuduh unluk penuduhan di bawah seksyen 39511 Kat ADB dan psrtuduhan dx bawah seksyen ¢2(2; ADE mewampaui keraguan munasabah 25 70. Dengan nu, Terluduh amapau bersalah unluk kedua—dua penuduhan lemadapnya. Mmgasi Tertuduh 71 Tenuduh mengemukakan laklar—lak\|ar mlllgasw benkul unluk pemmbangan Mahkamah Dla uemmur 22 lahun dan bekerja sehagav seuvang wlreman dengan gain bulanan RM wane no pada masa kemdian ma lelihpun kahvwm dan ada seorang anak berumur 3 lahun Tenuduh Ielah member! kenasama kepida plhak palm ﬂan berkelakuan hawk da\am (ananan. Terluduh Imah msaf clan pohun dlben peluang untuk menyumbang Kepada Negara 72 Alas dasar nu, Tsnudun memnhun ma hanya mxenaxan hukuman pemara ﬂan sebalan Dwa wga puhun agar hukuman peruara umuk keduadua penuduhan bevymn seremak rakmr pombmun 73 Pendakwaan berhuiah kepenlmgan awam perlu dmlamakan dalam menmuhkan hukuman umuk kes dadah yang bempa musuh No.1 Negara. 74 Eerdasarkan kelerangan dalam kes mu, Tenuduh (erhbal (imam akum pengedaran dan hukuman yang mxenakan hams mencermmkan pohsv dan usaha Negara menbanlers gema dadah m Eupmuisnxumsuzsau 25 Wale sum lhlhhﬂ wm be um In new m. mwgmuly mm 3..."... VI muus wvm 75. Pendakwaan memohon agar Mihkamah mengamml pengwklwrafan kehakiman (\|ud\c\a\ notice) bahawa kes dadah kvan berleluas wakaupun kesaklhan tevsebut membawa hukuman man mandalon sebelum Ana Pemansuhan Hukuman Man Mandalnn 2023 (Akla S46) berkualkuasa 76 Pendakwaan Ie\ah memjuk Mahkamah kepada nas undangr undang unluk menumukkan (rend hukuman unmk kesalahan m bawah seksyen asnqzy ADE 77 Psndakwaan memohnn hukuman mam dlksnakan ke alas Temmuh Hukuman 79, Dengan berkualkuasanya Akla B46 mulax 4 72a2a, Mahkamah kvm mempunyal budmlcara sepenuhnya unluk sama ada mengenakan hukuman gamung sampaw man atau hukuman penjara seumuv mdup dan sebacan «max kurang aan 12 sebatan untuk Penuduhan Panama 79 Damn kes PP v Llma am: Ganesan 023 9 cm 525 Mnhd Radzx Abdul Harmd J Ielah membmcangkan pindaan lersebul dengan memenk sebahagwan ucapan Tlmbalan Menlen unaang- Undang semasa bacaan kedua dan ketiga Rang Undangrundang Iersehut pada 1142023 Beﬁau juga Ie\ah menuuk kepada pengnamman mmurm Namm Pammanalhan HMP dawn kes Ly m Eupmuzsnxumsuzsau 27 W. sum rumhnv Mu be us« w vetny m. .mw., mm anuumnl 7. nrwuus W.‘ Eosman v PP & Olhgr Aggeaws zgza 3 CLJ 147 a 235 E020 5 MLJ 277 dsn memumskan di 635 — -raxmg mm mm mm cansuauauon, um mb at a cnnmcled accused m the ipewum nﬂrﬂfsckwvg nc1M\|\es mum mmqnhnq reawnslotlhem mus\|now be ucmxldzved by me mun In ememumnu wmm: me passm at a aun- nemenee Vs eommensurala with ma M1: at an of «mrnckuvu =5 d-aimed umlers 2 :11 me um That mm:-an um: new be «am as .u. enmmaassmg and on: um in nu In addman to man, we wewghl nr vnmme of Ihe dangeraus dnms mum m ma pulseulm at me wnvmted accused wm be anvlher Key wnswderalian A dnsimcuon shnula now be made hemeen am whave the ammmls L11 dangerous mug: mvolved uamy nun: ma rmnlmum threshold cm . preiumvllm m namckmg undirs 37(di] ul me ovum muse mac are gm xym exuss Mum mwmum An amaun\|ma(bam\ymes1s me rrummum «mama armereabnms should no(. mme ahsencemany heavy aggravming Vncton Dnma time msmu ma duh untsncl mu. navmg umudsmd an lhe pmmxe nggmvaﬂng Ind mmnaung factors and kupmg m mm we saw“ me mien! m me an 345. m (ms mm mm, we deem sentenne shumd only be vesarved lur ampuenany unuus canes where me comm mum up sawed a mapr mb m me an M uammnu (see Lem Bcasmln (supmj, Mahnmad Faun Rmwan 5. Mar v PP Runs! 1 cu us, [2006] 2 MU15)‘ my \|ramr:ked m lame amount: av quanmy Lrfdangerom dmgl ur gmmly m excess 0! the m an ﬂveshnh fur me nvesummmn al lmmdung undau ma.) Mme DDAAsee on N: Chum v PP Mean] « ms 131419511 1 mm 64; Muhammad Lukman Munamad V pp mm! 7 cu szuznzu MLJU «:15, PP V Sawfmnlnlum Mat um V vs: \|2u21]1 ms «nu, [2n21)5 MLJ 255), (M) was uugm m the m M pmcessmg or manuiacmnng dangevous drugs (:92 cm We< Loan v F'P& AnomerAppea\ R021] :3 cu 523. [2021] ¢ MLJ sen). sm EDpw\|lE5ﬂKa4M1Su1SED 15 -mu. sum ...u..v wm ». M In «My m. .uw.y cum; “M... w. IFVLING Wu‘ (M trafficked dangemusdmgs lhamere Ioum1mdmduaHy padmd wn lame amounts‘ [7131 miss: the Inferanbe Hwy were meant Var Isl]!!! Of dwslrlbunon (I¢!.VP V Mohd Valelan Md Khuzeh [2015] 9 CL! 224. name} a MLJ sax), M was caught in the ml 07 sewing Inge amoums oi dangemus dnlisy my mu m ms nnsassmn lame uuarmfy of Pavabhamalna (51 me Dlwessman manulacnmnu or admlmsltatlurv of dannlvuus drugs (see Sawlmnlzam Mal Naur1wPri\|. (yup wucaughlswin nstmctmminmheu, ynpanyaynymynm mmeacl vi P'“CBIII\q‘mnnMax.1urIruyse\lmg nrd\s\|rIbu(mg dangaroui drugs‘ (ynu used swhnsmzled mmlmr to wnmu, man or \|ranspoII dung-snnys own: (See w/my gnmn. y up zune 3 cu 124 [znns] 5 Mu Ms, Eehuu Am Ecurmmn Vwn as ygom 1 ms 511 mm MLJU H1), my «mu.-m In large quammar ul crmvucally pvuansd dangumus drugs av deilarm «runs an Khuinl Anwal Aw n.n.n (.yp..y, ouggm Emmgng Chukwunanu V vs we 1 ms was [mm] MLRHU 349;, (X) mm m ms vnssessmn mega: arms mweawns man he was caught «yo \|ook I\le«mveataenmg msasuluto .-my Inuit may had nnmvne Pnuv<:mwu:1mns,nnd/at my; idea m cahanswnh mrmnlmembets cl any enluoemem aaenvl Those iamu: are merew Examvles :17 axoevnanay aaarayanng (a:1or:\|hl\| mny.In(h1s mrrsvmn nmny lha mm Immune Hwnuhi ha upmlhe cmnl lo deubevile an am! wagh (hem tug: sl an mmgaung harms gmded by arhbhshad um unsenymnyg [see Bhandummndalayamakev PF 1931 1LMs139 [1952] « MLJ 53) up y Ramakusnnin Suhvimamam son 3912 9 cm 443 [mm]? MU 549. 25 y M Mm um ygms 1 ms 1555 W .4 Lou gym an as 1 LNS1D2 (197511 MLA‘ and w y Shnhmmzuuan Adguju g my m1: 2 cu 636 (201313 MLJ my and (a rum :1 any one 0! them W a mnymnnnan 0! any number av lmwe mum \|us\|\VY ma cam exerdse M ayweunn no Has: the mm sentence - sm Euymuzsnxumsy/zsau 29 "nun: sum I-mam wm ne um n my like .ngn.ny MIN: nnammnl «. mums Wm no Penna-man Kadua membawa hukuman peruara saumur hldup acau lempoh max Kurang darl 5 (ahun ﬂan sebatan max kurang davi 1a saua«an 51 Bsrdasarkan kelerangan yang dikemukakan dalam kes mi, Tenuduh udak memamkan peranan yang hesav da\am pengsdaran dadah atau dldapall memual atau mempmses dadah da\am kuanlm yang bessr Sernasa dnangkap, ma max bemndak secara ganas alau menggunakan senjsna dan membahayakan atau mencederakan mana—mana anggma pahs Da\am Keadaan ml, Mahkamah herpendapa\| llada iakcmakcar pemberatan yang mewajarkan Terluduh dikenakan hukuman ganlung sampaw man. 32 Walau hagamanapun, Mahkamah ml berpendapat apa-apa hukuman yang mkanaxan ke alas Tertuduh hams mencermmkan kesenusan Denuduhan/pertuduhan yang dlkenakan ke alasnya dan mamberi keulamain kepida kepermngan awam. 53 lm kerana berdasarkan rnakmman yang mbankan oleh Tnmbalan Kelua Pengarah (OperasI)Agens1AnI\ Dadah Kehangsaan, Datuk Dr Muhamad Sade Monamaa Amm di program sammnan Panngaoan Han Ann Dadah Tahun 2023 pada 192 2023. Nagen Kati\maekndkan;um1ah ksspmryalahgunaan uaaamsmggm Nsgala mas «anun 2021 an MahkamahImmengambnlmak\|Jmkepemngar\awamt£:\|a9ai\kaTe9mduh yang mesh muda. when pemang mermmhkan am agar menpdl anak bangsa yarg Ink m Eupmuisnxumsuzsau 30 Wane sum IHIHDIV Mu a. um a may m. mtgmuly ma anuumnl y. AFVLING puvm 10 IN Eumuisnxumsuzsau ‘Nate sum rumhzr wm ... M n «My Due anwn mm mm. Vﬂ mung NM! Tenudun dan bavang kes yang dvampas telah dmawa ks um Pejabal Puhs Daevah Kuala Muda av maria SP5 Ie\ah menlmbang s bungkusan plasux Iulsmar (ersebuf [Ek:ibiI P15(A) — (F)] dan mendapan beral xasamya aualan 271500 gram SP5 lelah membual tandaan pada kesemua barang kes dadah sena tandacangannya dan lankh Pada jam xanm kurang em ma\am yang sama, SP5 lelah menyevzhkan Tertuduh‘ Kesemua harang kes dan dokumen berkanan kepada Vnspeklur G/25542 Nur Vzzan mm. Abdul Rahman, pegawai penywasal (SP7) SP1 memben kelerangan \|xahawa— my behau Ie\ah menylmpan Eksvlm P6 darn Eksibil P15(A) — (F) ds\am a\min berkuncw behau sehingga 122020 mm 330 pelang dv mana barang Kes (e\ah mkeluarkan unluk diambil gamhar sebelum dan sebpas unsung, my liada sebanang kesan camari mnnul pada barang kes; (nu) Emma mam — (F) dlmasukkan dalam suim kulak yang d\sea\ dengan meleral PDRM 579 benanda 'E' [ambit F10] dun an mpan semula da\am ahuan berkuncn belnau bersama Ekslbn F6. (xv) pada 1 2 2020 jam lehlh kurang 5 45 pelang. belwau bersama SP1 Ie\ah pergl Ke lempat kepdlan dan mengarnbu gambar sena semakan man kasar clan kuncl, as Setelah memmbang segala fakla kes ml lermasuk mmgasl Teﬂuduh dan laktor psmberalan hukuman psndskwaan dan bemandukan nas undangundang dahuman‘ Mahkamall Im msmuluskan Tenumm disabnkan kesalanan umuk kedua—dua pertudlman dan mkenakan hukuman - (1) pemara seumur mdup dan senacan 15 sebalan unluk Fertuduhan Panama‘ dam (H) Imkuman pemara 7 Iahun dan lankh tangkap aan hukuman sebalan 12 sebacan unmk Pertuduhan Kedua as Hukuman pememaraan akan bena\an eersmak Bertankh 2s Oktuber 2023 Narkun Sun snn Pesurumaya Kenamman Mahkamah Tlnggx Mama dx Sungai Pelanl TFR Nabila Huda bum Muhammad Nazxm aagx pmak Pendakwaan Pelabal Penasmal Undang-Undang Negen Kedah m Eupmuzsnxumsuzsau Wale sum rumhnv wm ». um law may m. .m.u-y mm dnunvmnl «. muus mm Encik Rana: hm Mahamad Peguam hagx puhak Pembelaan Teluan Shamsudln Bahavi 5 Ram: No 44-A, Tingkal 1, Jalan Todak 4, Bandar Seberang Jaya 13700 Peril Pmau Plnang m Eupmuisnxumsuzsau Wale sum rumhnv wm ». um law may m. .m.u-y mm dnunvmnl «. muus mm :2 (V) pane 222020 [am wenm Kurang E‘A5 pagx, bellau telah mengarahkan SP1 unluk menganmu gambar Muluswkal tersebul. my pada nan yang sama,1am Vehlh kurang H 30 pagl behau Isiah keluarkan Eksmn P10 den a\man berkuncx hehau unmk dlhawa ke Jab:-nan Kirma Malayswa Cawangan Alur senar, (vu) Eksmn P10 telsh dlsershkan Kepada SP4 yang mengeluarkan resxt rasmv Janacan Kmua Malayswa dengan nu makmal 2o— FR~K~0G751 [Eksibil P11], (vun pads 12 2.2020‘ benau celah seran Eksmn-Ekslbn P6, P7 dan P8 kepada SP2 unluk ﬂvslmpan da\am star hamng kes an VPD Kua\a Mud:-1 an bawah nu pendaﬂaran E11176/20, (xx) wads 13.10.2020 Jam mm pagx, behau lekah menerima laporan Kmua dan Eksibﬂ P10 dengan sea! Jabatan Knma Mmaysla an no makmal 2l)FR—K—0D751l2U danpada SP4; (x) Exsnaix Pm kemudiarmya dlsxmpan dalam almavi berk-ma bsuau semngga mmzuzu dx mans Eksibwl Pm Isiah dwssrahkan kepada spa Lmtuk msmxpan bsrsama barang Kes Vain dw bawah nu pendaﬂaran ER176/20, dan (xi) behau menaapaxkan pengesahin danpada Jabalan Pengangxman Jalan Rays bahawa P7 adalah mllxk spa M 12 13 14 15 Inspekmr G/24569 Snmta mm. Annual‘ pegawaw penyxasal ganh‘ (SP9! \|e\|ah mengambﬂ ahh kes im selepas SP7 dttukarkan Eeliau memberi keterangan bahawa berdisarksn Eksxbll P23(B), malaslkal Yamaha VISRZ dengan no psrmaﬂaran FNV 5:54 berwama merah dldaﬂarkan alas nama spa SP9 cenan mengecam Emu F7 sebagal mmusmal mlliknya Hashnda mm: Vsrnaﬂ, arm xmua Kermaan (ss-4) telah memnen Keterangan bahawa behau Qelah menenma Eks\|b\tF-'10 danpada SP7 dan Ie\ah kemarkan resll dalam Ekswbn P13 Pada mesa menenma Eksxbn F10, sea! PDRM 579 damm keadaan bank Eksmu P10 msngandungx Eksubn F15(A) — (F) den behau lelah menandakan semma kesemua harang kes lersebut dengan nu makmar 20—FR—K—DO751/20 SP4 memben kelerangan bahawa pads semasa barang kes dadah da\am sunpanan benau, Ianya telah dmmpan da\am xamneq besl berkuncw Semasa proses analwsa‘ harang kes dalam kawalan dan pememaman sepemmnya nenau SP4 ts\ah memmbang kesemua Exsmu F15(A) hmgga (F) nan nasu anallsa belnau menunyukkan barang kes dadah Iersebm mengandungw 522 hemin dan 132 gvam gvam m0nL:aCE\|y\mnrph\|nes Hasu anahsa SF4 dmyalakan dakam Vaporan kmua behau benankh 7 7 2020 [Ekslbll F14] den telah mserahkan kepada SP7 pada 13 1a 2020]am1D0 pe\|ang IN Eumuisnxumsuzsau 5 ‘Nate sum runny WW ... M » «My n.. nH§\mH\|V MW; mm. Vﬂ muws NM! we Nansrah bmlr Saad, ibu Tertuduh (SP9) telah dlpanggn unmk member: kelsrangan bsrkenaan Motos\ka\ Iersebul Berdasarkan dakumenlasx pendaﬂaran‘ SP9 adalah pemlhk mu\|os\ka\ Yamaha ‘ V15RZ belwama mevah dengan no Dendaharin PNV 3354 Molusxka! yang mrampas semasa serbuan pads 31 1 mm jam 545 petang [Eks\|b\|t FY] ada\a7I molosnkal Yamaha V15RZ berwama mm dengan no pendaﬂaran PNV 21364 599 member; keterangan wama Eksvmt F7 \|eIah dilukav oxen suammya rskanaaros bin Ismau tlskanaams) sws ts\ah mengenalpasli Exsmn P7 ssbagax molcsxkal yang dldaftarkan avas namanya 17 ualam kelerangannya dan kandang saksi, SP9 menyalakan bahawa Dada Iarikh kejamannya, Vskandaras menggunakan Matosika\ (ersebul den (Idak pulsng semngga lewal maxam Keterangan Im bercanggah dengan rakaman percakapannya kepada plhak polls pada Iahun 2020 15. Dalam percakapan Iersehul, $99 menyatakan hanya dia uan Tenuduh menggunakan Mo(os\|ka\ lersebut Pads tankh keyaman, ma nampak Terluduh menggunakan mulosxkm tersebul pada sebe\a7I Dehang 19 Fendakwaan lalah memanggu semma SP5 untuk memben kelerangan Iamut berkenaan Mutosnkal tersebut Eelxau mengesahkan uada swasalan dualankan he alas panama Vskandaws kerana namanya ndak peman disebul separuang penynasacan IN Eumwisnxumsuzsau A W. sum ...m.., M“ .. wed » mm m. nngmuly MW; mm. VI muus NM! 20 Larwtan danpada Kelerangan SP9‘ spa (elah membuat semakan dan mendapall maklumat panawa szpanyang lempcm 19 11 2019 semngga bman Npvernber 2021, Vskandarcs berada dzlam lahanan Peru Ian dan dapacan Mzhkamah dl akhir urea pend-kwaan Prinsip kos prima fatio 21 Tugas Mahkamah 0. akmr kes pendakwaan Ialah unmk mmakukan pennaran mamrnra ke alas keseluruhan ketevangan pendakwaan dan nremumskan sama ada pendakwaan (elah berjaya membuknkan sualu kas prima vacre terhadap Termduh sepem arpanmmkkan :1. bawah seksyen 160(1) Kanun Talacara Janayah (Kn) 22 Damn kes PP v. Mchd Radzr bin Abu Baker 2006 1 CLJ A57 an 407 2005 s MLJ 393 an 400» 2004 2 MLRA 547 zoos 1 AMR gr Mahkamah Persekutuan menyarankan Vangkamangkah yang perlu aranmn men nakrm bmara ar akhvr kes pendakwaan — '0; me dose arms praseculIon‘s case‘ subject me evidence wed by me prosecution m rts cmamy la a maximum evaluatmn caramuy scrullmse Ina credlbmly ol eacn ov me pmsecuuan's wwnesses Take Into accmml aH reasnnable Inlerences that may be drawn irom Ihal evrdence If the evraenae admils oi M0 or more mferences‘ men draw me rnierence that is most vavourame In zne amused: (I1) ask yuursemhequeslnon IH now call upon the amused to make ms delence and he ekects «o remam suent am I prepared cp convict rn zumuzspmmsuzsau 5 ‘Nate sum runny wm be mad r. «My Due nﬂgmnﬂlv MW; nnuungnl Vﬂ mun: pmm 2: him on me swdenoe now before me? rune answenc mm quesucn is "Ves", men apnma laofe case has been made um and me delence should be caHed If the answer Is "No" then, apm-rm lame case has not been made out and me accused shuuld be acquined1 (Hi) aner me «Manse :2. called, ma aewsed elems la remam snem, than convict. (my aﬂer defence Is called, the accused eleas to gwe ewdence. men go mrcugn me steps set an! In Mal v PP 1953 1 LNS 52. 195: MLJ 25: ' PP V Data‘ SSH Anwar hm Ibrahim No 3 1999 2 ML! I til 53 (Anwarlbramm No 3). L001 KowCI1a1 &Anurv PP 200; 1g;L.I 734 m 752 2003 2 MLJ as 2003 2 AM}? as, Balachandran v PP 2005 2 MLJ 3431 ex 315- 2005 «cu as 2005 1AMR 321 [ﬁalachandrany a. Magsrmran an Mnhan v PP 2011 1 cu aos dl B24 2011 6 MLJ1) E\emen-e\emen Perluduhan Panama adalah — 11) Jems den herat dadah yang memsm hal perkara psnuduhan adalah dadah berhahaya seperll dllaknf a1 bawah ADE dan dmyalakan damn penud-man tersebul. 111) Tarluduh memilm dadah berbahaya dan mempunyal pengelahuarl mengenal mllnkan mu‘ den (:11) Terluduh mengedardadah bevbahaya 1m IN Eumklzsnxumsuzsau 9 W. sum ...u..1 MU .. wed In mm m. .1m1-y MW; mm. VI muus rum 24. Elemen perllml 25 26 27. 25 IN Eumuzsnxumsuzsau ‘Nate sum rumhzr wm ... M a «My Due nH§\mH\|V «ma anumgul Vﬂ muws rum Suatu kaa pnma faoie unluk Permduhan Kedua tememuk apabna pendakwaan membukukan 2 elemen panama yang msenamkan dw alas ma dadnn dun hem! dadnn spa telah menganalnsa kandungan Eksvbn P15[A) — qn dan mendanan ianya mengandungx 52.2 gram helm" yang memadi ha! perkara Penuduhan Panama dan 132 gmm monuaceb/lmarphmes yang meruam ha! perkara Femmuhan Kedua Kedua-dua neram nan mannacelyhnarphlnes dlsenaraxkan sehagal dadah hsmahaya dalam Jadua\ Panama ADE Berpandukan Penghakwman Augusvne Paul HMR (kehka nu) dalam kes Balachandran 1su;2ra)\ Mahkamah my rnenenma kelsfangan SP4 paaa Max zammya sebagax kelerangan yang boleh mpemayau Munusamy Vengadasalam v PP 1987 1 Mu A92 1957 1 on 250 1937 CLJ Reg) 221, PP v Lam san 1991 3 MLJ 425 3. Khan Hlchxang v. PP 1994 IMLJ 265 1994 2 CLJ151) Saksvsaksv pendakwaan le\ah mengemukakan keterangan bevkenaarl Denemuan den pergeraxan baring kes dadzh dengan Je1aS (anpa sebavang pemnggaxan mengenaxpasn baring kes khasnya barang kes dadah berdasarkan Iandaan mas\ng»masmg Kesemua sakss Ie\ah m	4,179	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
CA-A72NCC-138-04/2023	PLAINTIF ARTINI BINTI AB RASHID DEFENDAN ENRICH GARDEN CITY SDN BHD	PENGHAKIMAN TERUS - Samada melebihi had batas masa waktu - Seksyen 26 dan 27 Akta Had Masa 1953 - Samada surat lanjutan masa untuk membayar telah memperbaharui kausa tindakan Plaintif - Samada ianya satu isu yang patut dibicarakan.	31/10/2023	Puan Nor Izzati binti Zakaria	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b2f15223-80c4-432d-8866-1d508244bc7a&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN 1 DI DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUANTAN DALAM NEGERI PAHANG GUAMAN SIVIL: CA-A72NCC-138-04/2023 ANTARA ARTINI BINTI AB RASHID [NO. KAD PENGENALAN: 740707-03-5666] ... PLAINTIF DAN ENRICH GARDEN CITY SDN. BHD. [NO. SYARIKAT: 200601-03-0514] ...DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (KANDUNGAN 5) Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah permohonan (“KM5”) pihak Plaintif untuk memasukkan Penghakiman Terus menurut Aturan 14 Kaedah-Kedah Mahkamah 2012 terhadap Defendan. Di dalam kes ini, Mahkamah membenarkan KM5 dengan kos sebanyak RM1500 dibayar kepada Plaintif. Alasan ringkas adalah seperti berikut. 31/10/2023 16:18:37 CA-A72NCC-138-04/2023 Kand. 26 S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Latar Belakang Kes [2] Plaintif adalah seorang individu dengan alamat penyampaian di No. 8, Lorong Promenade Villa 3, 26060 Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur. [3] Defendan adalah sebuah syarikat yang diperbadankan di Malaysia bawah Akta Syarikat 1965 dengan alamat berdaftar di B-38, Tingkat 1 Lorong Seri Teruntum 139, Jalan Bukit Ubi, 25100 Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur. [4] Defendan merupakan sebuah syarikat pemaju yang membangunkan satu projek yang dikenali sebagai Promenade Villa di atas sebidang tanah yang diterangkan dibawah HS(D) 854 PT 6509, Mukim Kuala Kuantan, Daerah Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur seluas 14.2753 hektar. [5] Melalui Perjanjian Jual Beli bertarikh 26.06.2013 (“Perjanjian Tersebut”), Plaintif telah bersetuju untuk membeli dan Defendan telah bersetuju untuk menjual hartanah yang dikenali sebagai Sub-Lot 107 di Promenade Villa berserta sebuah rumah 2 tingkat berteres yang akan didirikan diatasnya pada harga RM350,000-00. [6] Defendan telah mengingkari syarat-syarat Perjanjian dimana Defendan telah gagal menyerahkan milikan kosong bangunan dan hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif pada atau sebelum 26.06.2015. Malahan, milikan kosong tersebut hanya diserahkan melalui Sijil Perakuan Siap dan Pematuhan (Borang F) yang dikeluarkan pada S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 11.08.2016 dan oleh itu jumlah yang perlu dibayar menurut Fasal 22(2) perjanjian tersebut adalah sebanyak RM27,125-48. Isu Yang Dipertikaikan [7] Mahkamah telah meneliti hujahan bertulis yang disediakan oleh pihak-pihak dan mendapati hanya terdapat satu isu yang dipertikaikan secara bersama oleh kedua-dua pihak. Maka, adalah lebih mudah sekiranya Mahkamah ini menyatukan hujahan kedua-dua pihak untuk mencerminkan isu yang diperdebatkan. [8] Mahkamah mendapati satu-satunya isu yang menjadi pertikaian bagi kedua-dua pihak adalah berkenaan dengan isu masa. Kausa tindakan yang terakru adalah pada 11.08.2016 dimana pada tarikh penyerahan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut diberikan kepada Plaintif. Berdasarkan undang-undang, tuntutan Plaintif hendaklah dibuat dalam tempoh masa 6 tahun daripada tarikh kausa tindakan terakru tamat iaitu pada 11.08.2022. [9] Defendan di dalam hujahnya berpendapat bahawa tuntutan Plaintif bertarikh 06.04.2023 adalah telah tamat tempoh kerana ianya telah melepasi had batasan waktu pemfailan yang telah berakhir pada 11.08.2022. Manakala, Plaintif berhujah bahawa Defendan melalui suratnya bertarikh 26.04.2017 yang dialamatkan kepada Plaintif telah mengakui liabiltinya tetapi memohon 70% diskaun atas jumlah terhutang merupakan satu pengakuan liabiliti yang boleh memperbaharui kausa tindakan tuntutan Plaintif. S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Dapatan Mahkamah [10] Mahkamah telah meneliti hujahan kedua-dua pihak dan Mahkamah ini berpendapat kes ini merupakan satu kes yang “straightforward”. Adalah menjadi fakta yang dipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak bahawa terdapat satu surat daripada Defendan bertarikh 26.04.2017 yang mana kandungan surat tersebut adalah berkenaan dengan permohonan 70% diskaun atas jumlah terhutang. [11] Yang menjadi pertikaikan di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah samada surat daripada Defendan bertarikh 26.04.2017 memperbaharui kausa tindakan di hadapan Mahkamah ini. Untuk menjawab persoalan ini, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada niat asal Defendan menghantar surat permohonan diskaun tersebut kepada Plaintif. Mengapakah surat tersebut dihantar? Pada hemat Mahkamah, sekiranya Defendan tidak terhutang kepada jumlah yang dituntut oleh Plaintif tersebut, Defendan tidak perlu untuk menghantar apa-apa surat permohonan diskaun kepada Plaintif. [12] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada Seksyen 26 Akta Had Masa 1953 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “Fresh accrual of action on acknowledgment 26. (1)... S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (2) Where any right of action has accrued to recover any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim, or any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest therein, and the person liable or accountable therefor acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect thereof, the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or the last payment: Provided that a payment of a part of the rent or interest due at any time shall not extend the period for claiming the remainder of the rent or interest then due, but any payment of interest shall have effect, for the purposes of this subsection only, as if it were a payment in respect of the principal debt.” [13] Mahkamah ini seterusnya merujuk kepada syarat-syarat yang perlu dipatuhi di bawah Section 27 Akta Had Masa 1953 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “Formal provisions as to acknowledgments and part payments (1) Every such acknowledgment as is referred to in section 26 or in the proviso to section 16 of this Act shall be in writing and signed by the person making the acknowledgment. (2) Any such acknowledgment or payment as is referred to in section 26 or the proviso to section 16 of this Act may be made by S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 the agent of the person by whom it is required to be made under that section, and shall be made to the person, or to an agent of the person, whose title or claim is being acknowledged or, as the case may be, in respect of whose claim the payment is being made.” [14] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes WEE TIANG TENG V. ONG CHONG HOOI & ANOR [1978] 1 LNS 234; [1978] 2 MLJ 54, 56 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: "There are three kinds of acknowledgments: (1) an acknowledgment by the debtor that a debt subsisted in the past but not at the time of the acknowledgment; (2) an acknowledgment that it subsists at the time of the acknowledgment; and (3) an acknowledgment that it may subsist in the future but not at the time of the acknowledgment". …. [89] The Federal Court referred to and relied on the English Court of Appeal decision in Good v. Parry [1963] 2 All ER 59. Lord Denning M.R. speaking for the Court of Appeal said: S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 "A person may acknowledge that a claim has been made against him without acknowledging any indebtedness. It is clear that what the Limitation Act, 1939, means is 'acknowledges the debt or other liquidated amount',... there must be an admission that there is a debt or other liquidated amount outstanding and unpaid. Even though the debtor says in the same writing that he will never pay it, nevertheless it is a good acknowledgment. In order to be an acknowledgment, however, the debt must be quantified in figures, or, at all events, it must be liquidated in this sense that it is capable of ascertainment by calculation, or by extrinsic evidence, without further agreement of the parties... No doubt a promise in writing by a debtor to pay whatever sum is found due on taking an account is a good acknowledgment today... provided always that the amount is a mere calculation from vouchers, or can be ascertained by extrinsic evidence, and is not dependent on the further agreement of the debtor". [15] Manakala di dalam kes Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur iaitu SSANGYONG ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO LTD V. TRIDANT ENGINEERING (M) SDN BHD AND ANOTHER CASE [2015] 1 LNS 1237; [2015] MLJU 1124, di mana Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Mary Lim, pada ketika itu menyatakan bahawa: S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 “[57] Therefore, for an acknowledgment to be valid, sections 26 and 27 require the acknowledgment of the right of action or the right to claim upon the debt must be: i. in writing; ii. signed by the person making the acknowledgment; and iii. made to the person whose "title or claim is being acknowledged.” [58] This means that the acknowledgment of the debt which is a promise to pay the debt due must be in a written form and it must be by the person who owes the obligation in the first place. That acknowledgment must then be made to the person who has the right of action or to whom the debt is owed. This exchange is usually kept within the immediate parties. But there may be instances where third parties are involved. In such a situation, can there still be a valid acknowledgment if it is made by a third person to a third person.” [16] Bagi mencerminkan prinsip yang diketengahkan di dalam kes tersebut, Mahkamah ini menyelusuri semula kepada surat Defendan bertarikh 26.04.2017 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [17] Melihat kepada surat ini, ianya tidak dapat disangkal lagi bahawa: i) Pengakuan pengakuan liabilti tersebut telah dibuat secara bertulis iaitu surat bertarikh 26.04.2017 di KM6 (Eksibit C); ii) Surat tersebut telah ditandatangani oleh Defendan sendiri iaitu Pengurus Projek yang bernama Mr. KS Wong daripada Enrich Garden City Sdn Bhd; dan iii) Surat tersebut dihantar dan ditujukan kepada Plaintif iaitu Artini binti Ab Rashid. [18] Menggunapakai prinsip di dalam kes tersebut di atas, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan Plaintif bahawa surat Defendan bertarikh 26.04.2017 merupakan satu pengakuan liabiliti yang telah memperbaharui kausa tindakan tuntutan Plaintif di sini. Maka, tuntutan Plaintif di dalam kes ini adalah di dalam tempoh had batas masa yang dibenarkan. Mahkamah ini mendapati Defendan telah melemahkan pembelaannya sendiri dengan mengemukakan hujah ini sebagai satu- satunya alasan untuk kes ini tidak diberikan penghakiman terus. [19] Adalah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap di Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes CEMPAKA FINANCE BHD V HO LAI YING (TRADING AS KH TRADING) [2006] 2 MLJ 685 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 “Quite clearly, the Court of Appeal has put the burden on the plaintiff to prove his case in an O. 14 application. With respect, that cannot be the correct proposition of law. In an application under O. 14, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish the following conditions: that the defendant must have entered appearance; that the statement of claim must have been served on the defendant; that the affidavit in support must comply with r. 2 of O. 14 in that it must verify the facts on which the claim is based and must state the deponent's belief that there is no defence to the claim. (See SUPREME LEASING SDN BHD V. DIOR ENTERPRISES & ORS [1989] 1 LNS 144; [1990] 2 MLJ 36.) Once those conditions are fulfilled, the burden then shifts to the defendant to raise triable issues. The law on this is trite.” [20] Pada hemat saya, Plaintif telah mematuhi semua syarat-syarat yang terkandung di dalam kes tersebut di atas, dan kes ini merupakan satu kes yang biasa dan yang jelas yang menjadikan ianya satu kes yang wajar dan sesuai untuk diperintahkan penghakiman terus. Tambahan pula, Defendan tidak sesekali mempertikaikan keberhutangannya terhadap Plaintif. [21] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes SOUTH EAST ASIA INSURANCE BHD V. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA [1998] 1 CLJ 1045 SHAIK DAUD ISMAIL JCA di m/s 1048 menyatakan: "It is well settled that if a defendant in an O. 14 application succeeds in raising even a single triable issue, it will not be a fit case and S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 proper case to order summary judgment. It is only in plain and obvious cases where there are no issues to be tried should recourse be had to O. 14." Kesimpulan [22] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa tidak terdapat isu-isu yang perlu dibicarakan dan Mahkamah ini percaya Defendan telah gagal menunjukkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa terdapatnya sebab lain untuk kes ini dibicarakan. Justeru atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah membenarkan KM5 dengan kos sebanyak RM1500 dibayar kepada Plaintif. BERTARIKH: 31HB OKTOBER 2023 (NOR IZZATI BINTI ZAKARIA) Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Kuantan, Pahang Peguam: Plaintif: Gainneos Jacob Goldie daripada Tetuan Jacob Goldie S.S. Chew Defendan: Aiman As' Ad Bin Mohd Ghani daripada Tetuan Irfan Aiman S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Akta: Seksyen 26 dan 27 Akta Had Masa 1953 Kes yang dirujuk: 1) Wee Tiang Teng v. Ong Chong Hooi & Anor [1978] 1 LNS 234; [1978] 2 Mlj 54, 56; 2) Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co Ltd v. Tridant Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd And Another Case [2015] 1 Lns 1237; [2015] MLJU 1124; 3) Cempaka Finance Bhd v. Ho Lai Ying (Trading As Kh Trading) [2006] 2 MLJ 685; Dan 4) South East Asia Insurance Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia [1998] 1 CLJ 1045 S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	15,286	Tika 2.6.0
CA-A72NCC-55-02/2023	PLAINTIF CHIN HAN SIONG DEFENDAN ENRICH GARDEN CITY SDN. BHD.	PENGHAKIMAN TERUS - Samada melebihi had batas masa waktu - Seksyen 26 dan 27 Akta Had Masa 1953 - Samada surat lanjutan masa untuk membayar telah memperbaharui kausa tindakan Plaintif - Samada ianya satu isu yang patut dibicarakan.	31/10/2023	Puan Nor Izzati binti Zakaria	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f559cf8d-5cf3-4dc4-8884-372622516e14&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN 1 DI DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUANTAN DALAM NEGERI PAHANG GUAMAN SIVIL: CA-A72NCC-55-02/2023 ANTARA CHIN HAN SIONG [NO. KAD PENGENALAN: 700930-06-5335] ... PLAINTIF DAN ENRICH GARDEN CITY SDN. BHD. [NO. SYARIKAT: 200601-03-0514] ...DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (KANDUNGAN 7) Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah permohonan (“KM7”) pihak Plaintif untuk memasukkan Penghakiman Terus menurut Aturan 14 Kaedah-Kedah Mahkamah 2012 terhadap Defendan. Di dalam kes ini, Mahkamah membenarkan KM7 dengan kos sebanyak RM1500 dibayar kepada Plaintif. Alasan ringkas adalah seperti berikut. 31/10/2023 15:20:58 CA-A72NCC-55-02/2023 Kand. 42 S/N jc9Z9fNcxE2IhDcmIlFuFA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Latar Belakang Kes [2] Plaintif adalah wakil kepada Chin Han Siong (“si mati”) yang merupakan individu dengan alamat penyampaian di No. 22, Lorong IM 11/3, Taman Mahkota Height, 25200 Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur. [3] Defendan adalah sebuah syarikat yang diperbadankan di Malaysia bawah Akta Syarikat 1965 dengan alamat berdaftar di B-38, Tingkat 1 Lorong Seri Teruntum 139, Jalan Bukit Ubi, 25100 Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur. [4] Defendan merupakan sebuah syarikat pemaju yang membangunkan satu projek yang dikenali sebagai Promenade Villa di atas sebidang tanah yang diterangkan dibawah HS(D) 854 PT 6509, Mukim Kuala Kuantan, Daerah Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur seluas 14.2753 hektar. [5] Melalui Perjanjian Jual Beli bertarikh 05.02.2013 (“Perjanjian Tersebut”), si mati telah bersetuju untuk membeli dan Defendan telah bersetuju untuk menjual hartanah yang dikenali sebagai Sub-Lot 419 di Promenade Villa berserta sebuah rumah 2 tingkat berteres yang akan didirikan diatasnya pada harga RM280,000-00. [6] Defendan telah mengingkari syarat-syarat Perjanjian dimana Defendan telah gagal menyerahkan milikan kosong bangunan dan hartanah tersebut kepada simati pada atau sebelum 05.02.2015. Malahan, milikan kosong tersebut hanya diserahkan melalui Sijil S/N jc9Z9fNcxE2IhDcmIlFuFA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Perakuan Siap dan Pematuhan (Borang F) yang dikeluarkan pada 04.11.2015 dan oleh itu jumlah yang perlu dibayar menurut Fasal 22(2) perjanjian tersebut adalah sebanyak RM27,125-48. Isu Yang Dipertikaikan [7] Mahkamah telah meneliti hujahan bertulis yang disediakan oleh pihak-pihak dan mendapati hanya terdapat satu isu yang dipertikaikan secara bersama oleh kedua-dua pihak. Maka, adalah lebih mudah sekiranya Mahkamah ini menyatukan hujahan kedua-dua pihak untuk mencerminkan isu yang diperdebatkan. [8] Mahkamah mendapati satu-satunya isu yang menjadi pertikaian bagi kedua-dua pihak adalah berkenaan dengan isu masa. Kausa tindakan yang terakru adalah pada 04.11.2015 dimana pada tarikh penyerahan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut diberikan kepada Plaintif. Berdasarkan undang-undang, tuntutan Plaintif hendaklah dibuat dalam tempoh masa 6 tahun daripada tarikh kausa tindakan terakru tamat iaitu pada 04.11.2021. [9] Defendan di dalam hujahnya berpendapat bahawa tuntutan Plaintif bertarikh 11.02.2023 adalah telah tamat tempoh kerana ianya telah melepasi had batasan waktu pemfailan yang telah berakhir pada 04.11.2021. Manakala, Plaintif berhujah bahawa Defendan melalui suratnya bertarikh 13.02.2017 yang dialamatkan kepada Plaintif telah mengakui liabiltinya tetapi memohon sedikit masa untuk menyelesaikan perkara tersebut dan surat Defendan bertarikh 13.02.2017 tersebut S/N jc9Z9fNcxE2IhDcmIlFuFA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 merupakan satu pengakuan liabiliti yang boleh memperbaharui kausa tindakan tuntutan Plaintif. Dapatan Mahkamah [10] Mahkamah telah meneliti hujahan kedua-dua pihak dan Mahkamah ini berpendapat kes ini merupakan satu kes yang “straightforward”. Adalah menjadi fakta yang dipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak bahawa terdapat satu surat daripada Defendan bertarikh 13.02.2017 yang mana kandungan surat tersebut adalah berkenaan dengan permohonan lanjutan masa Defendan untuk membuat bayaran yang terhutang kepada Plaintif. [11] Yang menjadi pertikaikan di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah samada surat daripada Defendan bertarikh 13.02.2017 memperbaharui kausa tindakan di hadapan Mahkamah ini. Untuk menjawab persoalan ini, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada niat asal Defendan menghantar surat perlanjutan tempoh masa tersebut kepada Plaintif. Mengapakah surat tersebut dihantar? Pada hemat Mahkamah, sekiranya Defendan tidak terhutang kepada jumlah yang dituntut oleh Plaintif tersebut, Defendan tidak perlu untuk menghantar apa-apa surat permohonan lanjutan masa tersebut kepada Plaintif. [12] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada Seksyen 26 Akta Had Masa 1953 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “Fresh accrual of action on acknowledgment S/N jc9Z9fNcxE2IhDcmIlFuFA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 26. (1)... (2) Where any right of action has accrued to recover any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim, or any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest therein, and the person liable or accountable therefor acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect thereof, the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or the last payment: Provided that a payment of a part of the rent or interest due at any time shall not extend the period for claiming the remainder of the rent or interest then due, but any payment of interest shall have effect, for the purposes of this subsection only, as if it were a payment in respect of the principal debt.” [13] Mahkamah ini seterusnya merujuk kepada syarat-syarat yang perlu dipatuhi di bawah Section 27 Akta Had Masa 1953 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “Formal provisions as to acknowledgments and part payments (1) Every such acknowledgment as is referred to in section 26 or in the proviso to section 16 of this Act shall be in writing and signed by the person making the acknowledgment. S/N jc9Z9fNcxE2IhDcmIlFuFA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (2) Any such acknowledgment or payment as is referred to in section 26 or the proviso to section 16 of this Act may be made by the agent of the person by whom it is required to be made under that section, and shall be made to the person, or to an agent of the person, whose title or claim is being acknowledged or, as the case may be, in respect of whose claim the payment is being made.” [14] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes WEE TIANG TENG V. ONG CHONG HOOI & ANOR [1978] 1 LNS 234; [1978] 2 MLJ 54, 56 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: "There are three kinds of acknowledgments: (1) an acknowledgment by the debtor that a debt subsisted in the past but not at the time of the acknowledgment; (2) an acknowledgment that it subsists at the time of the acknowledgment; and (3) an acknowledgment that it may subsist in the future but not at the time of the acknowledgment". …. S/N jc9Z9fNcxE2IhDcmIlFuFA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [89] The Federal Court referred to and relied on the English Court of Appeal decision in Good v. Parry [1963] 2 All ER 59. Lord Denning M.R. speaking for the Court of Appeal said: "A person may acknowledge that a claim has been made against him without acknowledging any indebtedness. It is clear that what the Limitation Act, 1939, means is 'acknowledges the debt or other liquidated amount',... there must be an admission that there is a debt or other liquidated amount outstanding and unpaid. Even though the debtor says in the same writing that he will never pay it, nevertheless it is a good acknowledgment. In order to be an acknowledgment, however, the debt must be quantified in figures, or, at all events, it must be liquidated in this sense that it is capable of ascertainment by calculation, or by extrinsic evidence, without further agreement of the parties... No doubt a promise in writing by a debtor to pay whatever sum is found due on taking an account is a good acknowledgment today... provided always that the amount is a mere calculation from vouchers, or can be ascertained by extrinsic evidence, and is not dependent on the further agreement of the debtor". [15] Manakala di dalam kes Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur iaitu SSANGYONG ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO LTD V. TRIDANT ENGINEERING (M) SDN BHD AND ANOTHER CASE [2015] S/N jc9Z9fNcxE2IhDcmIlFuFA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 1 LNS 1237; [2015] MLJU 1124, di mana Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Mary Lim, pada ketika itu menyatakan bahawa: “[57] Therefore, for an acknowledgment to be valid, sections 26 and 27 require the acknowledgment of the right of action or the right to claim upon the debt must be: i. in writing; ii. signed by the person making the acknowledgment; and iii. made to the person whose "title or claim is being acknowledged.” [58] This means that the acknowledgment of the debt which is a promise to pay the debt due must be in a written form and it must be by the person who owes the obligation in the first place. That acknowledgment must then be made to the person who has the right of action or to whom the debt is owed. This exchange is usually kept within the immediate parties. But there may be instances where third parties are involved. In such a situation, can there still be a valid acknowledgment if it is made by a third person to a third person.” [16] Bagi mencerminkan prinsip yang diketengahkan di dalam kes tersebut, Mahkamah ini menyelusuri semula kepada surat Defendan bertarikh 13.02.2017 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: S/N jc9Z9fNcxE2IhDcmIlFuFA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [17] Melihat kepada surat ini, ianya tidak dapat disangkal lagi bahawa: S/N jc9Z9fNcxE2IhDcmIlFuFA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 i) Pengakuan pengakuan liabilti tersebut telah dibuat secara bertulis iaitu surat bertarikh 13.02.2017 di KM8 (Eksibit D); ii) Surat tersebut telah ditandatangani oleh Defendan sendiri iaitu Pengurus Projek yang bernama Mr. KS Wong daripada Enrich Garden City Sdn Bhd; dan iii) Surat tersebut dihantar dan ditujukan kepada Plaintif iaitu Encik Chin Han Siong. [18] Menggunapakai prinsip di dalam kes tersebut di atas, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan Plaintif bahawa surat Defendan bertarikh 13.02.2017 merupakan satu pengakuan liabiliti yang telah memperbaharui kausa tindakan tuntutan Plaintif di sini. Maka, tuntutan Plaintif di dalam kes ini adalah di dalam tempoh had batas masa yang dibenarkan. Mahkamah ini mendapati Defendan telah melemahkan pembelaannya sendiri dengan mengemukakan hujah ini sebagai satu- satunya alasan untuk kes ini tidak diberikan penghakiman terus. [19] Adalah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap di Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes CEMPAKA FINANCE BHD V HO LAI YING (TRADING AS KH TRADING) [2006] 2 MLJ 685 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “Quite clearly, the Court of Appeal has put the burden on the plaintiff to prove his case in an O. 14 application. With respect, that cannot be the correct proposition of law. In an application under O. 14, the S/N jc9Z9fNcxE2IhDcmIlFuFA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 burden is on the plaintiff to establish the following conditions: that the defendant must have entered appearance; that the statement of claim must have been served on the defendant; that the affidavit in support must comply with r. 2 of O. 14 in that it must verify the facts on which the claim is based and must state the deponent's belief that there is no defence to the claim. (See SUPREME LEASING SDN BHD V. DIOR ENTERPRISES & ORS [1989] 1 LNS 144; [1990] 2 MLJ 36.) Once those conditions are fulfilled, the burden then shifts to the defendant to raise triable issues. The law on this is trite.” [20] Pada hemat saya, Plaintif telah mematuhi semua syarat-syarat yang terkandung di dalam kes tersebut di atas, dan kes ini merupakan satu kes yang biasa dan yang jelas yang menjadikan ianya satu kes yang wajar dan sesuai untuk diperintahkan penghakiman terus. Tambahan pula, Defendan tidak sesekali mempertikaikan keberhutangannya terhadap Plaintif. [21] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes SOUTH EAST ASIA INSURANCE BHD V. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA [1998] 1 CLJ 1045 SHAIK DAUD ISMAIL JCA di m/s 1048 menyatakan: "It is well settled that if a defendant in an O. 14 application succeeds in raising even a single triable issue, it will not be a fit case and proper case to order summary judgment. It is only in plain and obvious cases where there are no issues to be tried should recourse be had to O. 14." S/N jc9Z9fNcxE2IhDcmIlFuFA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Kesimpulan [22] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa tidak terdapat isu-isu yang perlu dibicarakan dan Mahkamah ini percaya Defendan telah gagal menunjukkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa terdapatnya sebab lain untuk kes ini dibicarakan. Justeru atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah membenarkan KM7 dengan kos sebanyak RM1500 dibayar kepada Plaintif. BERTARIKH: 31HB OKTOBER 2023 (NOR IZZATI BINTI ZAKARIA) Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Kuantan, Pahang Peguam: Plaintif: Gainneos Jacob Goldie daripada Tetuan Jacob Goldie S.S. Chew Defendan: Aiman As' Ad Bin Mohd Ghani daripada Tetuan Irfan Aiman Akta: Seksyen 26 dan 27 Akta Had Masa 1953 S/N jc9Z9fNcxE2IhDcmIlFuFA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Kes yang dirujuk: 1) Wee Tiang Teng v. Ong Chong Hooi & Anor [1978] 1 LNS 234; [1978] 2 Mlj 54, 56; 2) Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co Ltd v. Tridant Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd And Another Case [2015] 1 Lns 1237; [2015] MLJU 1124; 3) Cempaka Finance Bhd v. Ho Lai Ying (Trading As Kh Trading) [2006] 2 MLJ 685; Dan 4) South East Asia Insurance Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia [1998] 1 CLJ 1045 S/N jc9Z9fNcxE2IhDcmIlFuFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	15,451	Tika 2.6.0
WA-24F-154-05/2023	PEMOHON TAN YING SHI RESPONDEN 1. ) KUMPULAN WANG SIMPANAN PEKERJA 2. ) LIM TSOO SIN	Application to withdraw EPF monies pertaining to Court Order - Whether order to withdraw EPF monies fell within section 53A of the EPF Act - Whether nomination made by Deceased subsequent to Court Order prevails	31/10/2023	YA Puan Evrol Mariette Peters	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=4e47803c-556d-41ed-9e5c-aeefb0f370a1&Inline=true	WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 Di Dalam Perkara Aturan 7, 15, 28, 29 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Dan Di Dalam Perkara Seksyen 53A Akta KWSP 1991 Dan Di Dalam Perkara Seksyen 50, 51 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950 Dan Di Dalam perkara mengenai, TAN TZE PEI (Si Mati) Nombor Kad Pengenalan *********** BETWEEN TAN YING SHI …PLAINTIFF AND 1) LEMBAGA KUMPULAN WANG SIMPANAN PEKERJA 2) LIM TSOO SIN …DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 31/10/2023 14:25:35 WA-24F-154-05/2023 Kand. 39 S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 2 Introduction [1] This was an application (“this Application”) by the Plaintiff for a declaration, pursuant to a Court Order dated 22 October 2021, that she was entitled to receive a certain amount of monies from the Employees Provident Fund (“EPF”) Account (“the EPF Monies”) of one Tan Tze Pei (“the Deceased”), and that, consequently, the First Defendant is prohibited from releasing the EPF Monies to the Second Defendant, who is the mother of the Deceased. The factual background [2] The Plaintiff is the former wife of the Deceased, whose mother is now the Second Defendant. The Plaintiff and the Deceased finalised their divorce in December 2017, and obtained a Court Order dated 15 December 2017 (“the December 2017 Order”), which includes pertinent clauses that read: … 7. Responden Suami hendaklah membayar jumlah wang sebanyak MYR1,500 (Ringgit Malaysia Seribu Lima Ratus Sahaja) sebulan sebagai nafkah (“maintenance”) kepada Pemptisyen isteri untuk tiga (3) tahun berturut-turut, bermula daripada Januari 2018. … 10. Pempetisyen isteri di beri tiga puluh peratus (30%) daripada jumlah simpanan Responden Suami di Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja (KWSP) setakat tarikh perintah dekri nisi ini di mana jumlah tersebut akan dibayar kepada Pempetisyen Isteri apabila Responden Suami berumur lima puluh lima (55) tahun dan pembayaran wang simpanan S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 sebanyak 30% tersebut adalah termasuk faedah ke atas 30% yang diperuntukkan oleh KWSP untuk tahun-tahun berkenaan. [3] The Deceased had failed to meet the payment obligations outlined in the December 2017 Order. Consequently, the Plaintiff initiated committal proceedings, leading to the Court granting an order on 22 October 2021 (“the October 2021 Order”), with the pertinent portion stating: … (c) Responden Suami telah bersetuju dan diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia untuk mengeluarkan jumlah wang sebanyak MYR 75,000 (Ringgit Malaysia Tujuh Puluh Lima Ribu Sahaja) daripada Akaun 1, KWSP dalam tempoh empat belas (14) hari dari Tarikh Perintah ini dan harus dibayar kepada Pemohon Isteri dalam tempoh empat belas (14) hari sebagai penyelesaian sebahagian daripada tunggakan nafkah berjumlah MYR84,099.95 (Ringgit Malaysia Lapan Puluh Empat Ribu Sembilan Puluh Sembilan dan Sembilan Puluh Lima Sen) seperti di lampiran 67, Dekri Nisi bertarikh 15 Disember 2017. [Emphasis added.] [4] The Deceased had failed to adhere to the provisions of paragraph (c) in the October 2021 Order. Instead, in September 2022, he designated his mother, the Second Defendant, as his nominee. In November 2022, the Deceased passed away. [5] The Plaintiff subsequently visited the EPF office to claim the funds purportedly owed to her in accordance with the October 2021 Order. S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 However, she was informed that the funds could not be disbursed to her because the Deceased had named his mother as the nominee. [6] Consequently, in May 2023, the Plaintiff filed this Application, which was dismissed for the following reasons. Issues [7] The issues for consideration were (a) whether delay on the part of the Plaintiff in filing this Application was satisfactorily explained; and (b) the interpretation of section 53A of the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 (“EPF Act”), particularly, whether the Plaintiff’s claim for the EPF monies fell within ‘matrimonial asset’ in section 53A of the EPF Act. Contentions, evaluation, and findings Whether delay was satisfactorily explained [8] The Plaintiff’s filing of this Application 18 months after the Deceased’s non-compliance with the October 2021 Order raised the issue of delay, a matter that necessitated the Court’s attention. [9] It was imperative, at this juncture, to emphasise to the Plaintiff that the element of delay holds significant importance in considering any application filed by a litigant. In Khor Cheng Wah v. Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 396; [1996] 1 MLJ 223, the following remarks by Gopal Sri Ram JCA bear relevance: S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 It is a cardinal principle of law, that when a litigant seeks the intervention of the court in a matter that affects his rights, he must do so timeously. The maxim vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, though having its origins in the Court of Chancery, is of universal application. Even in cases where a right is exercisable ex debito justitiae, a court may refuse relief to an indolent litigant. In all cases in which delay in approaching the court is in issue, the burden is upon the litigant who has delayed to render a satisfactory explanation for it. [Emphasis added.] [10] In the present case, the Plaintiff sought to attribute the lack of prompt action following the Deceased’s non-compliance with the October 2021 Order to her former solicitors. I found her explanation to be unsustainable, considering that her previous solicitors were not present in Court to provide their account, and furthermore, any interactions between the Plaintiff and her previous solicitors were not within the purview of this Court’s consideration. [11] As such, this Application should not be entertained by this Court. Nevertheless, in the pursuit of comprehensive consideration, I proceeded to examine the merits of this Application and provided the reasons for dismissing it. Whether the Plaintiff’s claim for the EPF Monies fell within ‘matrimonial asset’ [12] Given that this Application was based on section 53A of the EPF Act, it was essential to commence by scrutinising the said provision, as follows: S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 6 Section 53A – Transfer of credit of a member of the Fund in accordance with the division of matrimonial assets order (1) Notwithstanding section 51, when an order is issued by a court that part of the sums of money standing to the credit of a member of the Fund is matrimonial asset, the Board may, after being served with the sealed order, transfer the sum of money as ordered by the court from the account of a member of the Fund into the account of the receiver named in the order subject to any terms and conditions as prescribed by the Board. [Emphasis added.] [13] It is a well-established principle, as evidenced by a multitude of cases, including Koay Cheng Eng v Linda Herawati Santoso [2008] 4 CLJ 105, that funds held in EPF accounts are considered part of matrimonial assets. This concept is further reinforced by the provisions outlined in section 53A of the EPF Act. [14] However, section 53A of the EPF Act introduces a noteworthy aspect with the use of the term ‘may’, granting the EPF Board discretion to transfer funds, as per an order of the court, from the account of a member of the EPF Fund into the account of the receiver named in the order. [15] Additionally, this provision specifies that such a transfer is subject to the terms and conditions outlined by the EPF Board. It is important to note that this section does not compel the EPF Board to execute the transfer. S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 [16] In fact, the EPF Board had highlighted the challenges associated with these transfers, as documented in Circular No 113/2021, titled Matrimonial Assets Claims Pursuant to Section 53A of the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 dated 26 March 2021. In this circular, the Legal Division of the EPF Board had communicated to members of the Malaysian Bar, the difficulties encountered in specific circumstances when implementing transfers stipulated by court orders, pursuant to section 53A of the EPF Act. [17] The further observation to make regarding this Application is that the October 2021 Order expressly states that the responsibility for withdrawing the funds rested with the Deceased, within a timeframe of 14 days after the date of the Order. There was no condition contingent upon the Deceased’s failure to comply, and it would be untenable for this Court to imply any such condition. [18] The October 2021 Order, dated 22 October 2021, placed the Deceased in breach of such order as of 5 November 2021. Given that the responsibility for withdrawal of the EPF funds rested with the Deceased, his failure to act necessitated action by the Plaintiff, which she had not undertaken. [19] Regrettably, not only did the Deceased fail to comply with the October 2021 Order, but he also proceeded to designate his mother as nominee, thereby further obstructing the implementation of the October 2021 Order. S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 [20] Furthermore, it was essential to acknowledge that the October 2021 Order expressly stated that the EPF funds were to be withdrawn as arrears for maintenance, rather than as matrimonial asset. Consequently, section 53A of the EPF Act could not be applicable as it pertains to matrimonial asset. [21] The Plaintiff cited the case of Leow Kooi Wah v Philip Ng Kok Seng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 133 to argue that the nomination of the Deceased’s mother should not be used to undermine her legal rights. The Plaintiff referred to the following passage by Mahadev Shankar J (as he then was): Regulation 16(2) of the EPF Regulations 1991 recognizes that upon the death of a Muslim member of the Fund, a nominee does not receive the money as a beneficiary but only as an executor in accordance with Islamic law. No parallel provisions have been made in the EPF legislation for non- Muslims, but the philosophy of the EPF legislation is clear. The nomination cannot be utilized to defeat the legal rights of the next of kin to the extent that the member's testamentary capacity has been restricted by law. [Emphasis added.] [22] It was, however, important to emphasise that Leow Kooi Wah v Philip Ng Kok Seng & Anor was decided in 1997, whilst the EPF Act was amended vide EPF (Amendment) Act 2007 to include section 53A with effect from 1 July 2008. Therefore, Leow Kooi Wah v Philip Ng Kok Seng & Anor was not a relevant precedent for the application of section 53A of the EPF Act. S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 [23] This would mean that the Plaintiff’s claim was contrary to section 51 of the EPF Act, which reads: Section 51 – Contributions and deposits not to be assigned or attached (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other written law- (a) no sum deducted from the wages of a member of the Fund under section 48; (b) no amount payable by the employer as his contribution; and (c) no amount standing to the credit of a member of the Fund, shall be assignable, transferable, liable to be attached, sequestered, levied upon, for, or in respect of, any debt or claim whatsoever, nor shall the Official Assignee be entitled to or have any claim on any such sum or amount. (2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), the amount standing to the credit of a member of the Fund under paragraph (1)(c) may be forfeited if the amount standing to the credit of such member is subject to an order of forfeiture by a court under the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001. [Emphasis added.] Conclusion [24] In the upshot, based on the aforesaid reasons, and after careful scrutiny of all the evidence before this Court, both oral and documentary, and submissions of all parties, this Application was dismissed. S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 Dated: 31 October 2023 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Plaintiff – S Sakhty Vell and Premalosani Arivananthan; Messrs Chambers of Ari For the First Defendant – Nur Zahirah Badarudin and Nor Asfalla Mohamed Arsad; Jabatan Undang-Undang, Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja For the Second Defendant – Poon Choong Yiew; Messrs James Liew & Kong Cases referred to: ➢ Khor Cheng Wah v. Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 396; [1996] 1 MLJ 223 ➢ Koay Cheng Eng v Linda Herawati Santoso [2008] 4 CLJ 105 ➢ Leow Kooi Wah v Philip Ng Kok Seng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 133 S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 Legislation referred to: ➢ Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 – sections 51, 53A ➢ Employees Provident Fund (Amendment) Act 2007 S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	15,993	Tika 2.6.0
JA-A53KJ-334-05/2022	PLAINTIF 1. ) CALVIN THOMAS A/L RAYAPPAN 2. ) NAGENTHERAN A/L VELU DEFENDAN 1. ) LOH KA LIN 2. ) CHAN WAN ZHEN	Ini adalah rayuan Perayu/Plaintif-Plaintif melalui Notis Rayuan di Lampiran 22 terhadap sebahagian keputusan Mahkamah ini yang diberikan pada 12/9/2023 iaitu atas isu kuantum sahaja.	31/10/2023	Puan Sazlina binti Safie	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=049f8a55-9b35-4318-98d9-f9f9cf01b70c&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM WRIT SAMAN NO – JA-A53KJ-334-05/2022 ANTARA 1. CALVIN THOMAS A/L RAYAPPAN [Identity Card No.: 010409011733] 2. NAGENTHERAN A/L VELU [Identity Card No.: 981120088889] [SYARIZAD ZAMAN & SEAH] …PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN 1. LOH KA LIN [Identity Card No.: 960822235078] 2. CHAN WAN ZHEN [Identity Card No.: 910723016173] [V.M. KUMARAN & CO.] …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (SELEPAS BICARA PENUH DENGAN SAKSI) 31/10/2023 07:59:36 JA-A53KJ-334-05/2022 Kand. 26 S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 LATAR BELAKANG KES [1] Ini adalah rayuan Perayu/Plaintif-Plaintif melalui Notis Rayuan di Lampiran 22 terhadap sebahagian keputusan Mahkamah ini yang diberikan pada 12/9/2023 iaitu atas isu kuantum sahaja. [2] Tiada rayuan balas oleh Responden/Defendan-Defendan dalam tindakan ini. A - LIABILITI Pihak-pihak telah merekodkan persetujuan atas isu liability pada 12/4/2023 di mana Defendan bertanggungan cuai 50% manakala Plaintif sumbangcuai 50%. B - KUANTUM Atas dasar 100%, Defendan-Defendan hendaklah membayar kepada Plaintif-Plaintif kuantum bagi gantirugi seperti berikut: Pihak-pihak telah merekodkan persetujuan bagi gantirugi seperti berikut: S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 BIL PERKARA JUMLAH DIBENARKAN/ DITOLAK GANTIRUGI KHAS - KOS a Laporan polis RM20.00 b Laporan JPJ RM30.00 c Gambar-gambar kemalangan RM24.00 d Laporan perubatan Hospital Kulai RM40.00 e Laporan perubatan Hospital Columbia Asia Hospital Iskandar Puteri RM311.00 f Laporan perubatan Pakar Hospital Columbia Asia Hospital Iskandar Puteri RM885.75 GANTIRUGI KHAS YANG DIPERSETUJUI PLAINTIF PERTAMA i Tambang bagi keluarga melawat Plaintif di Hospital Kulai RM50.00 pergi balik untuk 1 kali RM50.00 J Tambang bagi keluarga melawat Plaintif di Hospital Columbia Asia Hospital Iskandar Puteri RM300.00 K Tambang bagi keluarga melawat Plaintif di Hospital Columbia Asia Hospital Iskandar Puteri RM400.00 S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 bagi rawatan pesakit luar t Kehilangan pendapatan basic selama 7 bulan MC RM7,586.00 u Kehilangan pendapatan allowance/overtime selama 9 bulan MC GANTIRUGI KHAS YANG DIPERSETUJUI PLAINTIF KEDUA a Bil repair motorsikal RM1,000.00 JUMLAH GANTIRUGI KHAS YANG DIHUJAHKAN l Bil hospital sewaktu hospitalization = RM24,472.09 m Bil hospital outpatient = RM867.72 Bagi item l dan m – Mahkamah benarkan 1/3 x RM25,294.81 = RM8,431.60 Bagi kedua-dua item ini, Plaintif berhujah satu RM8,431.60 S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 jumlah penuh diberikan. Defendan berhujah hanya 1/3 dibenarkan dari jumlah keseluruhan iaitu RM8,431.60. Mahkamah membenarkan jumlah RM8,431.60. Alasan Mahkamah: 1) Dalam tindakan ini, jika dilihat sejarah perubatan Plaintif, beliau pada awalnya menerima rawatan pertama di Hospital Temenggong Seri Marahaja Tun Ibrahim Kulai, Johor. 2) Kemalangan berlaku pada 24/3/2021. Plaintif telah dimasukkan ke hospital berkenaan dan keluar (discharged) pada tarikh yang sama. 3) Dalam laporan perubatan di nyatakan “Patient took at own risk discharge to go to private hospital for further management.” 4) Dalam keterangan Plaintif, beliau sedia menerima rawatan di Hospital Kulai tetapi semasa di bahagian Kecemasan, beliau menyatakan tiada apa-apa rawatan yang S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 telah diberikan kepada beliau dan setelah lama menunggu, beliau mengambil keputusan untuk ke Columbia Asia. 5) Defendan berhujah Plaintif tidak berhak menuntut bayaran penuh bagi bil perubatan yang telah dibayar oleh insurans melalui “medical card.” 6) Defendan merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan iaitu kes MUHAMMAD YASSEIN ZULISKANDAR V KERAJAAN MALAYSIA & ANOR [2018] 1 MLJU 2185 yang mengambilkira keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes DR. KOK CHOONG SENG. 7) Plaintif bergantung kepada kes YA Pn Evrol Marriette Peters dalam kes KIM LIN CHAN V LEE HUA SING [2019] MLJU 1229 di mana diputuskan tiada peraturan yang memaksa Plaintif hanya untuk mendapat rawatan di hospital kerajaan. 8) Mahkamah setuju dengan hujahan Plaintif S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 dan apa yang dinyatakan oleh YA Pn Evrol. Walaupun begitu, terdapat 2 keadaan dalam menentukan isu ini. 9) Satu adalah kes Mahkamah Persekutuan iaitu DR KOK CHOONG SENG & ANOR v. SOO CHENG LIN & ANOTHER APPEAL, FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA [2017] 10 CLJ 529 yang mana ini adalah melibatkan satu kes kecuaian professional seorang doktor terhadap pesakit yang mana diputuskan: (11) Kaedah am untuk mengawardkan ganti rugi, adalah, plaintif hanya boleh mendapatkan semula apa yang hilang, dan apa-apa jumlah yang diterima dalam mitigasi kerugiannya perlu diambil kira dalam pengurangan ganti rugi. Kaedah am ini mempunyai pengecualian yang matan, di mana ganti rugi diawardkan walaupun plaintif secara teknikalnya tidak mengalami kerugian dari segi kewangan. Faedah S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 insurans yang diterima menurut polisi insurans, yang baginya plaintif telah membayar premium, adalah pengecualian tetap bagi kaedah am tersebut. Tiada perbezaan dari segi prinsip sama ada pihak yang tercedera menerima haknya bawah polisi insurans daripada syarikat insurans dalam bentuk wang, atau menerima faedah daripadanya melalui syarikat insurans membuat bayaran bagi pihaknya. Dengan itu, hak tindakan plaintif terhadap defendan bagi jumlah kerugian keseluruhan tidak berkurangan atau lenyap di mana kerugian tersebut dibayar oleh syarikat insurans, sama ada atau tidak syarikat insurans memilih untuk melaksanakan hak untuk subrogasi.” 10) Dalam keadaan kes kemalangan seperti ini, terdapat kes di peringkat Mahkamah Rayuan yang memutuskan seperti berikut: CHAI YEE CHONG v. LEW THAI, COURT OF S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 APPEAL, KUALA LUMPUR [2004] 2 CLJ 321 Diputuskan: [4] Setiap orang berhak untuk mendapatkan rawatan perubatan di hospital pilihannya, sama ada di hospital kerajaan mahu pun swasta. Berkaitan pemberian award bagi rawatan sedemikian, sekiranya rawatan yang dibuat adalah di hospital kerajaan, jumlah yang ditanggung dan dibayar oleh orang berkenaan harus berikan award sepenuhnya. Jika orang tersebut mendapatkan rawatan di hospital swasta, ia harus membuktikan, pertama, bahawa ia mempunyai justifikasi untuk mendapatkan rawatan di situ, dan kedua, bahawa jumlah yang ditanggungnya adalah munasabah. Berhubung dengan halangan pertama, ia harus membuktikan: (a) bahawa rawatan yang beliau perlukan itu tidak terdapat di hospital kerajaan disebabkan ketiadaan peralatan-peralatan perlu atau doktor-doktor yang berkelayakan ataupun sebab-sebab lain yang memadai; (b) bahawa S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 walaupun rawatan itu terdapat di hospital kerajaan, ia tidak dapat diperoleh dalam waktu yang munasabah mengambilkira kecemasan yang wujud bagi mendapatkan rawatan. Ini mungkin disebabkan oleh kesesakan di hospital kerajaan atau pun lain-lain sebab yang memadai; atau (c) bahawa rawatan di hospital kerajaan, walaupun ada, adalah sangat-sangat tidak mencukupi. [5] Sekiranya mahkamah tidak berpuas hati bahawa seorang plaintif mempunyai justifikasi untuk mendapatkan rawatan di hospital swasta, maka, bergantung kepada fakta kes dan butiran- butiran perbelanjaan, mahkamah harus sama ada menolak tuntutan atau mengawardkan satu jumlah yang tidak melebihi sepertiga perbelanjaan. Prinsip sepertiga tidak ditetapkan oleh undang-undang. Ia sebaliknya adalah satu perkara amalan. Jika sepertiga juga terlampau banyak maka jumlah yang kurang dari itu boleh diawardkan. S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 11) Kes diatas adalah melibatkan kemalangan di tempat kerja. Ia harus dibezakan dengan kes di Mahkamah Persekutuan di atas yang mana itu adalah kes kecuaian professional seorang doctor di hospital swasta. 12) Dalam kes kita sekarang, ia melibatkan satu kes kemalangan jalanraya. Secara normalnya, apabila kemalangan berlaku, ambulans akan datang dan membawa mangsa ke hospital kerajaan terdekat. 13) Rawatan awal dan seterusnya diberikan kepada mangsa. Jika seterusnya mangsa memilih untuk keluar hospital (discharge), ia adalah atas risiko sendiri. 14) Walaupun begitu, jika tindakan pesakit (Plaintif di sini) untuk “discharged” mempunyai asas atau bersebab sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam kes CHAI YEE CHONG di atas, Mahkamah perlu berpuashati dan boleh samada menolak atau hanya membenarkan 1/3 daripada kos yang dibayar tersebut. S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 15) Plaintif dalam hujahan mereka menyatakan bahawa dalam kes ini, Plaintif risaukan akan kesihatan dan keadaan beliau dan telah mendapatkan rawatan segera di hospital di mana beliau telah mendapat rawatan pembedahan dan telah keluar hospital (discharged) pada 29/3/2021 iaitu dalam tempoh masa 5 hari selepas kemalangan. 16) Dalam kes ini, Mahkamah ingin nyatakan bahawa sebenarnya Plaintif tidak pernah memberi keterangan di Mahkamah. Ini adalah bicara taksiran gantirugi dan hujahan berdasarkan dokumen sahaja. 17) Oleh itu tidak ada keterangan kenapa Plaintif memilih untuk “discharged” dari Hospital Kulai dan tidak ada bukti sebagaimana dihujahkan bahawa tiada apa-apa rawatan diberikan kepada Plaintif. 18) Walaupun begitu, Plaintif telah pergi mendapatkan rawatan di Hospital Columbia Asia dan mendapatkan pembedahan. Pada tahap ini, S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa adalah wajar hanya 1/3 dibenarkan dari kos rawatan yang telah dikeluarkan bagi tujuan perubatan Plaintif di sini dan bukan satu jumlah penuh diberikan. n Kos Scar Reducing Steroid Injection - RM2,500.00 Mahkamah menolak tuntutan ini. Plaintif berhujah jumlah RM2,500.00. Defendan berhujah ia ditolak. Mahkamah menolak tuntutan ini. Alasan Mahkamah: 1) Dalam laporan perubatan hanya dinyatakan satu “scar” iaitu “2cm, 2cm, 1cm, 1cm dan 5cm scar on the right leg”. 2) Plaintif bersandarkan kepada laporan perubatan dari Hospital Columbia Asia yang menyatakan “Scars: The operative scars contracted as a result of the accident and the surgery. These will remain DITOLAK S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 permanent. The scars may be reduced with steroid injection and laser therapy. This may cost RM2,500.00.” 3) Dalam laporan doktor pakar Defendan pula menyatakan seperti berikut “There is no keloid scar on right leg. There is no requirement for steroid injection or laser therapy. The procedure will lead to skin thinning and ulceration.” 4) Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa memandangkan Plaintif sendiri tidak memberi keterangan bagaimana kesan parut kepada dirinya dan dengan 2 pandangan pakar yang berbeza, Mahkamah mengambilkira keadaan terkini Plaintif iaitu daripada hasil pemeriksaan pakar Defendan. 5) Tambahan pula doctor pakar defendan sendiri nyatakan tiada “Keloid scar” dan rawatan yang dicadangkan akan lebih membawa kemudaratan daripada S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 kebaikan. 6) Oleh demikian, tuntutan bagi item ini ditolak. o Kos physiotherapy RM100.00 x 20 RM2,000.00 Mahkamah menolak tuntutan ini. Plaintif berhujah jumlah jumlah RM100 x 20 sesi = RM2,000.00. Defendan berhujah ia ditolak. Mahkamah menolak tuntutan ini. Alasan Mahkamah: 1) Plaintif bersandarkan kepada laporan pakar Plaintif dari Columbia Asia yang menyatakan seperti berikut “A short course of physiotherapy will help improve the muscle bulk, muscle power and possibility the range of motion of a joint. Currently this will cost RM2,000.00 (Twenty 1 hour visits costing RM100.00 per visit).” 2) Pakar Defendan pula membuat penelitian dan mendapati bahawa “Physiotherapy is DITOLAK S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 not necessary now as the injury is already more than one and a half years. Physiotherapy if ever required should be done early during the recovery period. There is no muscle wasting of right lower limb and no muscle weakness of right lower limb. The joint movements of the right lower limbs are within normal range. In general, a person will require about 10 sessions of physiotherapy. He will be taught self- exercise regime which he will practice at home. Physiotherapy will involve all region of body that needs attention and all perform at the same time during a session. Physiotherapy is available in the government hospital at a cost of RM5 per session”. 3) Dalam kes ini, Mahkamah menolak tuntutan Plaintif untuk kos physiotherapy memandangkan tiadka keperluan bagi kos ini memandangkan keadaan terkini Plaintif S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 sudah sembuh dari kecederaan muscle. 4) Plaintif mungkin berhujah bahawa Mahkamah telah benarkan gantirugi bagi “muscle wasting” tetapi kenapa tidak benarkan physiotherapy? 5) Mahkamah benarkan gantirugi bagi “muscle wasting” kerana akibat kemalangan, Plaintif mengalaminya tetapi setakat keadaan terkini Plaintif, keilatan terebut sudah sembuh dan tiada lagi. 6) Mahkamah juga setuju dan telah mendengar keterangan umum doctor- doktor perubatan bahawa physiotherapy adalah penting dijalankan diawal kecederaan dan apabila telah lebih satu tahun, ia tidak membawa significant atau perubahan besar. 7) Tambahan pula, tidak ada keterangan bahawa Plaintif sejak awal telah menjalani physiotherapy kerana jika ini dibuat sejak awal dahulu, sesi-sesi seterusnya boleh S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 dibuat hanya melalui latihan sendiri di rumah sahaja. 8) Oleh demikian, kos tuntutan ini ditolak. s Kos pembedahan Removal of Metallic Implant = RM10,000.00 Mahkamah benarkan 1/3 x RM10,000.00 = RM3,333,00 – tanpa faedah . Plaintif berhujah jumlah RM10,000.00. Defendan berhujah RM500.00. Mahkamah benarkan RM3,333.00. Alasan Mahkamah: 1) Doktor pakar ada mencadangkan “Right tibia implant need not be removed if there is no complication.” 2) Mahkamah setuju bahawa ini adalah bagi keperluan pada masa akan datang. Jika terdapat komplikasi, Plaintif perlulah menjalani pembedahan mengeluarkan implant ini. 3) Oleh demikian, ia akan melibatkan kos. RM3,333.00 S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 4) Dalam laporan pakar Plaintif, kos pembedahan ini dinyatakan sebanyak RM10,000.00. 5) Pakar Defendan pula menyatakan “Removal of implant operation is available at the government hospital at a minimal cost. The cost of removal in the private medical centre will be RM7,000.00. 6) Untuk kos pembedahan ini, pihak Defendan berhujah jumlah RM500.00 dibenarkan. 7) Mahkamah dalam mempertimbangkan tuntutan ini dengan mengambilkira prinsip 1/3 dari kos rawatan swasta dan membuat dapatan bahawa ia adalah kos yang wajar dan berpatutan memandangkan jika ingin dapatkan rawatan di hospital kerajaan, mungkin mengambil masa dan Defendan sendiri setuju jika ia di buat di hospital swasta kos mungkin mencapai RM7,000.00. 8) Mahkamah mengambil prinsip 1/3 dan S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 bukan memberikan satu award penuh memandangkan ini adalah satu pembedahan yang dicadangkan pada masa akan datang hanya sekiranya perlu dan Plaintif ada plihan samada akan menjalankan pembedahan di hospital swasta atau dengan memitigasikan kerugiannya dengan pergi mendapatkan rawatan/pembedahan di hospital kerajaan. 9) Oleh demikian, Mahkamah dapati jumlah ini adil dan berpatutan. GANTIRUGI AM PLAINTIF PERTAMA BIL PERKARA JUMLAH DIBENARKAN /DITOLAK 1 Multiple abrasion wounds over both upper and RM5,000.00 S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 lower limbs Plaintif berhujah RM10,000.00. Defendan berhujah RM3,000.00. Mahkamah benarkan RM5,000.00. Alasan Mahkamah: 1) Dalam Laporan perubatan Plaintif dari Hospital Sultanah Kulai dan Hospital Columbia Asia Iskandar Puteri, doctor ada menyatakan bahawa Plaintif mengalami kecederaan “multiple abrasion wounds over both upper and lower limbs.” 2) Dalam Revised Compedium of Personal Injury Awards 2018, award yang disyorkan adalah antara RM1,300.00 – RM5,000.00. 3) Mahkamah dapati kecederaan Plaintif ini adalah tidak serius dan hanya di 2 bahagian. 4) Jumlah yang diberikan Mahkamah juga adalah jumlah maksima dalam garispanduan di bawah Revised Compedium of Personal Injury Awards 2018. 5) Walaupun ada kes-kes yang dirujuk pihak S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 Plaintif award boleh capai sehingga RM12,000.00, ia harus dibezakan dengan keadaan Plaintif di sini. 6) Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa jumlah yang diberikana dalah adil dan wajar dan sekiranya satu jumlah yang tinggi ditetapkan bagi jenis kecederaan ini dan Mahkamah perlu lari dari garis panduan yang ada, jumlah award bagi kecederaan lain yang lebih serius seharusnya dikaji semula dan diberikan satu garis panduan lain bagi mengimbangi keseriusan sesuatu kecederaan dan berdasarkan sesautu fakta kes itu sendiri. 2 Distal 1/3 right tibial and fibula fracture Plaintif berhujah RM35,000.00. Defendan berhujah RM25,000.00. Mahkamah benarkan RM30,000.00. Alasan Mahkamah: 1) Terdapat kecederaan pada “Distal 3rd right tibia dan fibula fracture” yang dinyatakan RM30,000.00 S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 oleh doktor dalam laporan perubatan. 2) Plaintif berhujah mengikut Revised Compedium of Personal Injury Awards 2018, jumlah yang dibenarkan adalah antara RM21,500.00 – RM42,000.00. 3) Plaintif berhujah mengikut 2 kes yang telah diputuskan, jumlah award yang dibenarkan adalah RM40,000.00 iaitu kes SUNIL SUNAR V BALOO A/L MURUGIAH [2016] 1 PIR [57] dan RATNAM AL/ N SAMUNATHAN V DANIAL ASYRAF BIN DESNAWI [2018] 1 PIR [40]. 4) Defendan pula merujuk kepada 1 kes yang membenarkan award RM25,000.00 dan 1 kes lagi membenarkan award RM30,000.00. 5) Mahkamah dalam menentukan award, bukan sekadar memilih kes-kes terdahulu untuk diikuti tetapi perlu berdasarkan laporan perubatan dan kesannya kepada Plaintif dalam sesuatu kes. 6) Mahkamah merujuk semula kepada laporan S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 perubatan terkini Plaintif dari Hospital Columbia Asia bertarikh 22/2/2022 di mana doctor ada menyatakan bahawa Plaintif telah kembali bekerja (dalam bidang kerja lain), “healed fracture of the right tibia and fibula”, “he will have residual pain on the right leg.” 7) Oleh demikian, mengambil kira keadaan Plaintif dalam kes ini, Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa jumlah RM30,000.00 adalah munasabah dan adil dan masih dalam lingkungan yang dibenarkan. 3 Scarring Plaintif berhujah RM10,000.00. Defendan berhujah RM3,000.00. Mahkamah benarkan RM5,000.00. Alasan Mahkamah: 1) Plaintif mengalami kecederaan dan meninggalkan parut hanya disatu bahagian iaitu “2cm, 2cm, 1cm, 1cm dan 5cm scar on the right leg” seperti dinyatakan dalam RM5,000.00 S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 laporan perubatan Hospital Columbia Asia. 2) Plaintif merujuk Revised Compedium of Personal Injury Awards 2018 antara jumlah RM9,500.00 – RM18,000.00. 3) Plaintif sebenarnya mengambil julat award bagi “extensive scarring to leg”. 4) Defendan memberikan cadangan Award bagi “Operation scars antara RM2,750.00 – RM12,000.00,” 5) Dalam kes ini, Mahkamah dapati parut hanya di satu bahagian iaitu kaki, ia tidak serius, tiada gambar dikemukakan menunjukkan keseriusan parut tersebut, doktor pakar Defendan tidak ada mencadangkan apa-apa krim atau ubat untuk parut ini dan tidak ada doktor membuat komen berhubung parut ini samada dari kesan pembedahan dan menjadi serius atau nampak jelas/mencacatkan atau ia cuma “minor scarring to the leg”. S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 6) Doktor pakar Defendan juga ada membuat komen bahawa “There is no keloid scar on right leg. There is no requirement for steroid injection or laser therapy. The procedure will lead to skin thinning and ulceration.” 7) Mahkamah juga tidak membenarkan kos untuk “Scar Reducing Steroid Injection” sebagaimana di mohon oleh Plaintif di atas. Ini adalah selari dengan keadaan kecederaan parut yang dialami oleh Plaintif dan hasil dari pemeriksaan doktor/doktor pakar, ia bukanlah satu keilatan serius dan perlukan rawatan susulan. 8) Oleh demikian, Mahkamah membuat dapatan jumlah RM3,000.00 adalah munasabah dan wajar bagi keilatan ini dan jumlah yang dicadangkan oleh pihak Plaintif adalah terlalu tinggi bagi keadaan ini. 4 Muscle wasting Plaintif berhujah RM10,000.00. Defendan berhujah ditolak dan tidak dibenarkan. RM5,000.00 S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Mahkamah membenarkan jumlah RM5,000.00. 1) Defendan berhujah ia ditolak kerana dalam laporan perubatan orthopedic Defendan iaitu laporan terkini, pada bahagian diagnosis jelas menyatakan “No muscle wasting of right thigh and and right calf” sedangkan Plaintif menyatakan bahawa dalam laporan perubatan Hospital Columbia Asia terdapat “Lower limbs muscle bulk – there is muscle wasting of the right thigh and the right calf.” 2) Dalam keadaan ini, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa dari peringkat awal, kecederaan yang dialami Plaintif telah memberi kesan dan wujud keadaan “muscle wasting”. 3) Walaupun dalam laporan terkini, keadaan ini sudah tidak wujud, Mahkamah berpandangan satu jumlah minima boleh diberikan kepada Plaintif berdasarkan keadaan dan kesakitan beliau kesan daripada kemalangan dan sepanjang proses untuk sembuh. S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 4) Tambahan pula pihak Defendan tidak memfailkan hujahan balas atas perkara ini dan Mahkamah berpendapat award yang diberikan Mahkamah adalah wajar dan keilatan ini telah Mahkamah pertimbangkan. 5 Pain and suffering for future surgery Plaintif berhujah RM5,000.00. Defendan berhujah ia ditolak. Mahkamah benarkan jumlah RM5,000.00. Dalam tindakan ini, pihak Defendan tidak memfailkan Rayuan Balas. Oleh itu, Mahkamah berpendapat, item ini bukanlah satu isu dalam rayuan di sini. RM5,000.00 JUMLAH RM50,000.00 C – faedah 1. faedah atas gantirugi khas ialah 2.5% setahun dari tarikh kemalangan ke tarikh penghakiman 2. faedah ke atas gantirugi am ialah 5% setahun dari tarikh penyampaian writ saman hingga penghakiman S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 3. faedah ke atas jumlah penghakiman ialah 5% setahun dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga pembayaran jumlah penuh penghakiman. D – kos seperti dalam skala Jumlah penghakiman dimasukkan ke dalam akaun klien peguamcara Plaintif sebagai pemegang amanah untuk di bayar kepada Plaintif. Disediakan oleh: SAZLINA SAFIE ……………………………………………….. SAZLINA BINTI SAFIE KETUA PUSAT MEDIASI @ HAKIM MAHKAMAH SESYEN 4 JOHOR BAHRU TARIKH: 26/10/2023. Peguamcara Plaintif: DATO’ KHUTUBUL ZAMAN BUKHARI [ TETUAN SYARIZAD ZAMAN & SEAH (JOHOR BAHRU) ] S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 Peguamcara Defendan: MOHD TAHRIL BIN JAMIA’AN [ TETUAN V.M. KUMARAN & CO. (BATU PAHAT) ] S/N VYqfBDWbGEOY2fn5zwG3DA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	26,598	Tika 2.6.0
WA-41S-7-05/2023	PERAYU AW YU HUI RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	Criminal Justice - appeal by accused against sentence - plea of guilty - offences under section 420 Penal Code and 468 Penal Code - application of section 172G Criminal Procedure Code - stands independent of section 172D (2) and (3) Criminal Procedure Code - penal provisions to be interpreted strictly in favour of the accused - reduction of sentence allowed.	31/10/2023	YA Tuan Muniandy a/l Kannyappan	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e36a7540-3819-4d3e-93a4-c39a7467aef6&Inline=true	1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR (CRIMINAL DIVISION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: WA-41S-6-05/2023 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: WA-41S-7-05/2023 BETWEEN PERAYU AW YU HUI (NO K/P: 820409-06-5381) AND RESPONDENT PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 31/10/2023 06:19:44 WA-41S-7-05/2023 Kand. 16 S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 NOTES ON SUBMISSION 3.8.2023 Untuk Pengurusan Kes Perayu adalah OKT Akan mengendalikan rayuan secara sendiri Perayu: 1. Sentence passed is 20 months imprisonment - for two cases. 2. One charge - section 468 PC - 8 months imprisonment and fine RM2000, in default of payment of fine, 3 months’ imprisonment 3. Another charge - section 420 PC - 12 months and 1 stroke of the whip and fine RM3000, in default of payment of fine, 5 months’ imprisonment. 4. Learnt lesson well. 5. Want to be beneficial to the society. 6. Family needs me very much. 7. Parents are unwell. 8. Pray for a concurrent sentence. S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 DPP: Prays for another date to submit. To - 7.8.2023 for Hearing of Appeal. 7.8.2023 For Hearing of Appeal Appellant present. DPP: 1. Hukuman serentak tidak wajar. 2. Dua kesalahan yang berbeza - Kesalahan pertama - 420 KK - setahun penjara dan denda RM3000 (denda telah dibayar dan hukuman sebatan satu kali. 2. Kesalahan kedua - pertuduhan dibawah seksyen 468 KK - 8 bulan penjara dan denda RM2000 (denda telah dibayar). 3. Pengakuan salah terhadap kedua-dua kesalahan. Telah berada di dalam penjara selama 3 bulan. 4. Kepentingan awam perlu dipelihara. 5. Hukuman seharusnya berasingan. S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Appellant: 1. I have learned my lesson. 2. Pray for a concurrent sentence. Decision After having considered the case in its entirety, and the fact that the accused had paid the fines for both cases, this court decides to reduce the sentence of imprisonment imposed. For the first charge - 3 months imprisonment. For the second charge - 3 months imprisonment. Sentence to run from the date of arrest - 6.5.2023. Sentence of imprisonment to run consecutively for case no. WA-41S-6- 05/2023 and WA-41S-7-05/2023. Sentence of whipping of one stroke remains - section 288 (4) applies. No effect on the sentence of fine, as it has been paid. S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 JUDGMENT [1] An appeal was lodged by the Public Prosecutor against the above sentence meted out by this court on appeal by the accused person. [2] Accused, who is the appellant to this appeal has to endure two different sentences for two different criminal cases of arrest against him, namely, case no. WA-41S-6-05/2023 and WA-41S-7-05/2023. The sentences are to take effect consecutively from the date of arrest on 6.5.2023. [3] Case no. 6 – 05/2023 pertains an offence of cheating pursuant to section 420 of the Penal Code (PC/Act 574), while case no. 7 – 05/2023 relates to an offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating pursuant to section 468 PC. [4] Both the charges against the accused are: Charge of forgery “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 06/05/2023 di 18-09 DMajestic Jalan Pudu, Pudu 55100 di dalam Daerah Dang Wangi, Wilayah Persekutuan, Kuala Lumpur di dapati dengan curangnya telah memalsukan Kad Pengenalan Malaysia yang mana telah diubah suai bagi tujuan penipuan pinjaman secara atas talian, dengan niat supaya dokumen palsu tersebut digunakan bagi tujuan hendak menipu. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 468 Kanun S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Keseksaan dan boleh dihukum di bawah peruntukan yang sama dan dibacakan bersama Seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Hukuman: Jika disabit kesalahan hendaklah dihukum dengan pemenjaraan selama tempoh yang boleh sampai tujuh tahun, dan hendaklah juga dikenakan denda.” Charge of cheating “Bahawa kamu bersama seorang lagi yang masih bebas, pada 19/05/2018 jam 1.20 petang di Mc’ Donalds Suria KLCC, Jalan Ampang, Dalam Daerah Dang Wangi, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, dalam mencapai niat bersama telah menipu Muhammad Syafiq Bin Sidin (930503-14-6185) dengan memperdayakan beliau dalam urusan jual beli telefon bimbit dan dengan itu kamu dengan curangnya telah mendorong beliau untuk menyerahkan (2) unit telefon bimbit berjenama Samsung Galaxy S9 dengan harga berjumlah keseluruhan RM 6,000 yang mana beliau tidak akan serahkan telefon bimbit tersebut sekiranya tidak diperdayakan sedemikian dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan dan dibacakan bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Hukuman: Penjara tidak kurang dari satu tahun dan tidak lebih dari sepuluh tahun dan dengan sebat dan bolehlah juga dikenakan denda.” [5] As for the offence under section 468 PC, he has to endure a period of eight (8) months’ imprisonment and to pay a fine of RM2000, and if he does not pay the fine imposed, he has to suffer a further three (3) months’ period of imprisonment. For the charge for an offence under section 420 PC, he has to suffer a period of twelve (12) months’ imprisonment and 1 stroke of the whip (see section 288 (4) S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC/Act 593) and fine of RM3000, in default of payment of fine, 5 months’ imprisonment. [6] On the date of appeal, this court was informed that the accused had paid the fines imposed, thus left is only for him to suffer the period of incarceration, adding up to 20 months’ and one stroke of the whip. [7] After having heard the plea by accused on his appeal and the responding submission by the deputy public prosecutor (DPP), I have decided to allow his appeal on the sentence meted out by the magistrate. With that, the sentence of imprisonment for both offences of cheating and forgery for the purpose of cheating was reduced to a period of three (3) months’ imprisonment respectively. It has to take effect consecutively from the date of arrest on 6.5.2023. Since the sentence of whipping passed is legal in accordance with section 420 PC, it stays. [8] The Public Prosecutor (PP) vide notice of appeal dated 18.8.2023 had appealed against the reduction of sentence for both offences of cheating as well as forgery for the purpose of cheating, which reads as the following: “… Pendakwa Raya Malaysia merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap keputusan … yang mana Yang Arif Hakim telah membenarkan rayuan Responden dan mengurangkan hukuman penjara 1 tahun bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 420 S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Kanun Keseksaan kepada 3 bulan penjara bermula dari tarikh tangkap (06.05.2023). Rayuan ini adalah terhadap hukuman tersebut.” “… Pendakwa Raya Malaysia merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap keputusan … yang mana Yang Arif Hakim telah membenarkan rayuan Responden dan mengurangkan hukuman penjara 8 bulan bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 468 Kanun Keseksaan kepada 3 bulan penjara bermula dari tarikh tangkap (06.05.2023). Rayuan ini adalah terhadap hukuman tersebut.” [9] Hence, the appeal by PP is only on reduction of the sentence of imprisonment to a period of 3 months’ by this court, for both offences committed by the accused. The cheating charge [10] Essentially, the basis for reduction of sentence of imprisonment from a period of 12 months to 3 months is because the sentence meted out by the magistrate is found to be manifestly excessive. Viewing the circumstance of the case whereby the accused had pleaded guilty to the charge for an offence of cheating pursuant to section 420 PC, it ought to be considered as a strong mitigating factor as he has the legitimate expectation under the law to have his sentence reduced accordingly. The plea of guilty came about immediately when the case was called up at the magistrate’s court. [11] Presumably (as it is not stipulated in the Notice of Appeal), the PP is dissatisfied with the reduction of sentence as section 420 PC S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 provides for a minimum period of one year or 12 months imprisonment on conviction of the accused. Therefore, both the court of first instance and this court on appeal are left without an alternative but to impose a period of 12 months imprisonment. The sole question, would that be so? [12] Reading the penal provision, it renders the following: Whoever cheats …, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year and not more than ten years and with whipping and shall also be liable to fine. (emphasis is mine) [13] Thus, it provides for a minimum term of 12 months imprisonment, and the court of first instance had imposed such term of imprisonment on the accused. However, this court on appeal had reduced it to a period of only 3 months imprisonment, since the 12 months’ imprisonment is found to be manifestly excessive, considering the salient fact the accused had pleaded guilty at once when the case was called up for determination by the magistrate. Is that reduction of sentence illegal? [14] This court opines the reduction of sentence from a period of 12 months imprisonment to 3 months imprisonment is not illegal but legal and proper as it is sanctioned by section 172G of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC/Act 593), which renders the following: S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Where an accused pleads guilty at any time before the commencement of his trial, the Court shall sentence the accused in accordance with subparagraph 172D(1)(c)(ii). Section 172D (1) (c) (ii) reads as: (ii) subject to subsection (2) and (3), sentence the accused to not more than half of the maximum punishment of imprisonment provided under the law for the offence for which the accused has been convicted. (emphasis is mine) Reading both the provisions, it is apparent the accused who had pleaded guilty to a charge for an offence under section 420 PC, is entitled in law to be treated leniently. He has only to be sentenced to a period of imprisonment not more than half of the maximum punishment of imprisonment provided under the law for the offence of cheating for which he has been convicted. Section 420 PC caters for a maximum period of 10 years imprisonment. Therefore, pursuant to section 172G CPC, the maximum period of imprisonment allowed under the law against the accused is only 5 years imprisonment and not anything more than that. As such, the accused in the present case has to suffer a period of only 5 years imprisonment, and anything more than that period of imprisonment would be illegal. But, in the present case, this court had reduced the sentence of imprisonment to a period of 3 months, which of course falls squarely within the 5 years period of imprisonment. S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [15] However, an argument could be advanced, that section 172D (1) (c) (ii) has to be read subject to subsections (2) and (3) of section 172D CPC. That would mean, pursuant to subsection (2) of section 172D CPC, where there is a minimum term of imprisonment provided under the law for the offence, no accused shall be sentenced to a lesser term of imprisonment than that of the minimum term. That means, in the present case, the accused has to suffer a period of 12 months imprisonment, as it is the minimum period of imprisonment provided for under section 420 PC. Needless to refer and discuss subsection 172D (3), as it is inapplicable to the present case. [16] This court opines subsection 172D (2) is inapplicable vis a vis section 172G CPC, as the scheme of section 172D pertains a plea bargaining process, which means, where a satisfactory disposition of the case has been agreed upon by the accused and the PP under section 172C CPC, the court shall, in accordance with law, dispose of the case in the manner provided for in section 172D (1) (a), (b) and (c) CPC and if that situation arises, section 172D (1) (c) (ii) CPC is subject to subsection 172D (2) and (3) CPC. In the present case, there has been no plea bargaining, thus there is no satisfactory disposition of the case between the accused and PP in order for section 172D CPC to be operable. It is salutary to note, the accused S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 had pleaded guilty at the court of first instance, voluntarily at once without having to go through a trial. There has been no plea bargaining process as envisaged under section 172C CPC and therefore needless to proceed with section 172C (7) CPC, which provides that where a satisfactory disposition of the case has been agreed upon by the accused and the PP, the satisfactory disposition shall be put into writing and signed by the accused, his advocate if the accused is represented, and the PP, and the court shall give effect to the satisfactory disposition as agreed upon by the accused and the PP. [17] In the premise, section 172G CPC operates independently of section 172D CPC and has to be read as it stands so as give its fullest effect. Therefore, when the accused pleads guilty, like in the present case, he is entitled in law to be sentenced to half of the maximum term of imprisonment provided for by section 420 PC. It is also needless for this court to be strayed by the other part of section 172D (c) (ii) CPC, as the precursor to 172D (c) CPC provides “where the satisfactory disposition is in relation to a plea bargaining of the sentence, find the accused guilty on the charge and …”. (emphasis is mine) S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [18] It is axiomatic, if there is a doubt in the reading and interpretation of section 172G CPC, which is a penal provision, benefit of it has to go to the accused. He cannot be denied of his right and legitimate expectation to be sentenced only to half of the maximum term of imprisonment as stipulated in section 420 PC. To reiterate, he has only to suffer a period of 5 years imprisonment or less after taking into consideration all factors, plea in mitigation included. Ensuing from that, the sentence of 3 months imprisonment meted out by this court on appeal against the accused is legal and not disproportionate to his case, wherein he has also to suffer another 3 months period of imprisonment for the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating pursuant to section 468 PC. As support, reliance is on the dictum of Lord Esher MR in Tuck & Sons v Priester (1887) 19 QBD 629 at page 638: If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case, we must adopt that construction. If there are two reasonable constructions we must give the more lenient one. That is the settled rule for the construction of penal sections. Further, reference is also made to persuasive case authorities from the Supreme Court of India in Tolaram Relumal and another v The State of Bombay (1954 SC) and State of West Bengal v Swapan Kumar Guha (1982 SC) which had in effect decided the following: S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 When there are two possible construction, the court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty, rather than one which imposes penalty. Where an ambiguity exists and it has not been possible for the legislature to express itself clearly, the court exhibits a preference for the liberty of the subject and resolves the doubt in favour of a subject. The court is not competent to stretch the meaning of an expression and include the situation which would not have come under the reasonable interpretation of the provision. [19] Aside the above, it is also appropriate to comment on the submission by DPP responding to the plea by accused as appellant to this appeal. She did not raise any submission on the legality of sentence pursuant to section 420 PC, if there is a reduction, but merely implored this court not to disturb the consecutive effect of the sentence meted out by the magistrate, and nothing more. She did not contend with support, to state any form of reduction of sentence for the offence of cheating under section 420 PC, cannot be anything less than 12 months imprisonment. In that respect, this appeal by the PP on reduction of the sentence to a period of 3 months’ imprisonment is an afterthought. Be that as it is, this court opines the reduction of sentence for the offence under section 420 PC is legal and justifiable under the law. The charge of forgery for the purpose of cheating [20] As for the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating, this court had also reduced the sentence meted out from a period of 8 months S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 imprisonment to 3 months imprisonment. It is also anchored on the basis, the sentence meted out by the magistrate was manifestly excessive as it was disproportionate to the commission of the offence by accused. He has to be sentenced to what he deserves and nothing more, so as to be in conformity with the principle of justice and fairness. Sentences passed or meted out should express abhorrence to the conduct of accused, which has to be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence. Rehabilitation, as an aim of sentencing should be pursued only within the confines of proportionate sentences. In the present case, viewing the sentence meted out which is a composite sentence as it embodies both imprisonment and fine, it sufficiently punishes the accused. On that score, the 8 months period of imprisonment is disproportionate to the commission of offence by the accused as a fine of RM2000 had been imposed. [21] Perusing the record of proceeding at the subordinate court (as below) it is apparent that the prosecution did not tender facts of the case to support its case against the accused, when he pleaded guilty. What has evolved, is that the facts tendered is as per the charge. If commission of the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating by the accused is viewed seriously by the prosecution, it S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 would have advanced facts of the case to support the charge in order to demonstrate to the court, his conduct when committing the said offence as well as his degree of involvement and deliberation. Likewise, is for the offence of cheating. With the brief facts the court may form an opinion on his conduct when assessing to mete out an appropriate sentence. (See: Abdul Kadir bin Abdul Rahman v PP (1984) 1 MLJ 80). Sadly, in the present case, for both the charges, there was none, other than the prosecution merely informing the court, facts of the case are as per the charges against the accused. Charge of cheating: “… TPR: DENGAN IZIN PUAN, MOHON PERTUDUHAN DIBACAKAN PUAN. PERTUDUHAN DIBACAKAN, TERTUDUH FAHAM, MENGAKU SALAH. FAHAM AKIBAT SIFAT PENGAKUAN, MASIH MENGAKU SALAH. TPR: DENGAN IZIN PUAN POHON FAKTA KES SEPERTI MANA PERTUDUHAN, LAPORAN PENGADU DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P1, LAPORAN TANGKAPAN DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P2, LAPORAN TANGKAPAN SEMULA DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P3, PERBUALAN WHATSAPP DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P4, RESIT BAYARAN DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P5. S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 POHON DIKEMUKAKAN P4 DAN P5 DITUNJUKKAN KEPADA OKT UNTUK PENGECAMAN, PUAN. PENGECAMAN DIBUAT DAN DIAKUI BENAR OLEH OKT. MAH: BOLEH BUAT RAYUAN. OKT: PUAN, TOLONG BAGI HUKUMAN SERINGAN-RINGANNYA. SAYA TELAH INSAF. MAH: PENDAKWAAN? TPR: PUAN, POHON HUKUMAN SETIMPAL SEBAGAI PENGAJARAN PUAN. MAH: OKT DIDAPATI SALAH DAN DISABITKAN SALAH SEPERTI PERTUDUHAN, HUKUMAN 1 TAHUN PENJARA DARI TARIKH TANGKAP DAN DENDA RM 3000.00 GAGAL BAYAR 5 BULAN PENJARA DAN 1 KALI SEBATAN. ITU SAHAJA.” (Emphasis is mine) Charge of Forgery for the purpose of cheating: ‘ … TPR: DENGAN IZIN PUAN, POHON PERTUDUHAN DIBACAKAN, PUAN. PERTUDUHAN DIBACAKAN, TERTUDUH FAHAM, MENGAKU SALAH. FAHAM AKIBAT SIFAT PENGAKUAN, MASIH MENGAKU SALAH. TPR: DENGAN IZIN PUAN POHON FAKTA KES SEPERTI MANA PERTUDUHAN, LAPORAN TANGKAPAN DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P1, GAMBAR BARANG KES DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P2, PENGESAHAN JABATAN PENDAFTARAN NEGARA DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P3. ITU SAHAJA PUAN, POHON DIKEMUKAKAN GAMBAR KEPADA OKT UNTUK PENGECAMAN, PUAN. S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 PENGECAMAN DIBUAT DAN DIAKUI BENAR OLEH OKT. MAH: RAYUAN. B1: SAYA MEMOHON HUKUMAN SAYA DIRINGANKAN. MAH: B2 BUAT RAYUAN. B2: PUAN, KAMI BERBUAT DEMIKIAN SUPAYA KAWAN-KAWAN TIDAK BERBUAT KESALAHAN LAIN. SAYA BERBUAT DEMIKIAN UNTUK PERBELANJAAN SAHAJA. BUKAN SENGAJA BERBUAT DEMIKIAN UNTUK BUAT JENAYAH PUAN, UNTUK PERBELANJAAN HARIAN SAHAJA PUAN. MINTA PUAN RINGANKAN HUKUMAN SEBAB SAYA PUN ADA ANAK UNTUK DISARA. MAH: B3 BUAT RAYUAN. B3: PUAN, SAYA MOHON HUKUMAN SAYA DIRINGANKAN SEBAB SAYA ADA AYAH DAN EMAK YANG SUDAH TUA HENDAK DIJAGA. MAH: PENDAKWAAN? TPR: DENGAN IZIN PUAN, POHON HUKUMAN SETIMPAL SEBAGAI PENGAJARAN, PUAN. MAH: KETIGA-TIGA OKT DIDAPATI SALAH DAN DISABITKAN SALAH SEPERTI PERTUDUHAN, HUKUMAN 8 BULAN PENJARA DARI TARIKH TANGKAP DAN DENDA RM2000.00 GAGAL BAYAR 3 BULAN PENJARA. ITU SAHAJA. …” (Emphasis is mine – B2 is the accused/appellant in the present case). [22] Except in a case where the facts are straight forward without any complexity involved and the offence is embodied in the charge itself, then it would be easier for the accused to say yes or no to a plea of guilty. But when the law applicable to those facts, beyond doubt seems impossible to expect an accused person unversed in the law and undefended to be able to say, whether he is or not guilty of the S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 offence charged, then facts of the case is pivotal. (See the case of Low Hiong Boon v PP (1948-49) MLJ Supp. 135). In the present case, it is apparent in the charge against the accused for the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating is “dengan curangnya telah memalsukan Kad Pengenalan Malaysia yang mana telah diubah suai bagi tujuan penipuan pinjaman secara atas talian, dengan niat supaya dokumen palsu tersebut digunakan bagi tujuan hendak menipu.” Since the charge does not disclose if the said loan was in fact approved and disbursed to the accused, it could be deduced that the loan and disbursement did not eventually go through. Therefore, the actus reus involved is only falsification of the identity card, used to apply for a loan online, but thwarted as it was discovered. Therefore, the sentence of 3 months imprisonment and the fine imposed, which was not altered by this court, commensurate with the offence committed by him. [23] Likewise for the offence of cheating, the accused had pleaded guilty to the charge which contains his actus reus “dalam mencapai niat bersama telah menipu Muhammad Syafiq Bin Sidin (930503-14- 6185) dengan memperdayakan beliau dalam urusan jual beli telefon bimbit dan dengan itu kamu dengan curangnya telah mendorong beliau untuk menyerahkan (2) unit telefon bimbit berjenama S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Samsung Galaxy S9 dengan harga berjumlah keseluruhan RM 6,000 yang mana beliau tidak akan serahkan telefon bimbit tersebut sekiranya tidak diperdayakan sedemikian”. It is a fact, he was not alone in the said commission of the offence of cheating, but with others, thus the use of common intention as mode of his participation in the commission of crime. In the absence of the facts disclosing his degree of involvement and premised on the charge itself, a punishment of 3 months imprisonment with the imposition of fine is sufficient punishment for the accused to suffer. What more, he has also to suffer a stroke of the whip, adding on to the severity of punishment against him. [24] After having considered all factors against accused, cumulatively and being mindful of the settled principle of sentencing in the administration of criminal justice, that punishment in proportion to the seriousness of the crime is one of many objectives in sentencing and also the principal focus for a sentence, and the accused has not committed a violent crime but crimes against property, where on the face of the charge, it is inferred was actuated by greed for money, the punishment imposed of 3 months imprisonment for each of the offences he has committed with the imposition of fine and also a stroke of the whip for the offence of cheating, is appropriate, S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 proportional and sufficient punishment he has to suffer. Adding on, imposition of the fines has also served as deterrence for the offences committed. (See cases like Rex v Teo Woo Tin (1932) MLJ 124; Zakariya bin Musa v PP (1985) 2 MLJ 221) Moreover, it is also a fact to be mindful of, that the offence of cheating was committed in the year 2018, as opposed to the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating which took place in the year 2023, thus raising an argument for it tantamount to a stale offence which was only brought against the accused when he was charged for the offence of forgery. The accused has also repented by pleading guilty to both the charges. In the premise the plea of guilty by accused is a predominant and pivotal factor considered by this court when reducing the sentence meted out by the magistrate. (See: Melvani v PP (1971) 1 MLJ 137; Sau Soo Kim v PP (1975) 2 MLJ 134; Ravindran & Ors v PP (1992) 4 CLJ 2043). In the upshot, appeal by the accused is allowed and sentences of imprisonment meted out against him is reduced accordingly. Appeal allowed. Sentence reduced to three months imprisonment. S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 Dated 30 October 2023 SGD. Muniandy Kannyappan Judge, High Court 2 (Criminal) Kuala Lumpur. Accused in person. DPP Aqilah Ishak for the respondent. S/N QHVq4xk4Pk2TpMOadGeu9g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	28,562	Tika 2.6.0
AB-12BNCvC-6-03/2022	PERAYU 1. ) Abdul Majid Bin Othman 2. ) Jamilah Binti Hashim RESPONDEN Ong Jia Hao	Civil procedure - Appeal from Sessions Court - Liability and quantum - Plaintiff 80% and Defendants 20% - Whether the SCJ was plainly wrong in arriving at the decision - Whether Plaintiff contributorily negligent - Hemipelvectomy as a result of crush injury to right lower limb - Whether damages proved - Whether the Plaintiff qualifies for a "microprocessor leg" - Appeal of Plaintiff partly allowed - Appeal of Defendants dismissed	31/10/2023	YA Puan Noor Ruwena binti Md Nurdin	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=da45c5c1-8537-4537-a969-e5d798f5e2ea&Inline=true	31/10/2023 15:24:23 AB-12BNCvC-6-03/2022 Kand. 57 S/N wcVF2jeFN0WpaeXXmPXi6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wcVF2jeFN0WpaeXXmPXi6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 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wcVF2jeFN0WpaeXXmPXi6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wcVF2jeFN0WpaeXXmPXi6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wcVF2jeFN0WpaeXXmPXi6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N wcVF2jeFN0WpaeXXmPXi6g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 1us—12ancvc—s—n3/2022 Kand. 57 smmnzs Jsvzu-A DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI TAIPING DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZWAN MALAYSIA RAVUAN slvn. N 1 ABDUL MAJ\|D aw OTHMAN [NO. K/F’: 49u92o»u7-52591 1a 2 JAMILAH EVNTIHASHIM [NO. K/P 47013108-5347] .. FERAYU-FERAVU DAN xs ONG JIA HAO [No K/P. 010331-as-05191 RESFONDEN [DI DALAM PERKARA MAHKAMAH SESVEN DI TAIPIN6 m GUAMAN NO.: AB«A53KJ-IE6-II/2019) ANTARA ONG JIA HAD [NO. K/P: moaaw-on-0519] ..PLA\NT\|F 15 DAN 3. ABDUL MAJID BIN OTHMAN [NO K/P'49l792D—07-5239] an 4 JAMILAH awn HASHIM [No. KIP: 470131-oe-5347] "DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 1 5w wcvFZuFmWna:xxmPxmv mm Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used m mm u. mm.“-y mm; mm. VII nF\uNG pm 15 :0 ts Gag; ND§ or JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] Some say that a mp to Kuala sepetang, about 20 mtrtules‘ drtve fmm Talptng, wouta not he r:ontple\|a wtlhaut lrytng rte tanrous local tare oi Mes Udsng. others say the prawn noodles are yusl overrated. expertstve and net worth eernrng back «or. A5 rt happened an that tatetut nrght of 19 3 2013, this was exaatty what Ahrtrrt Majid Btn othrnan (‘the 15‘ Delendanf as he was at the sessiens Cowl) and hrs tarnrty had tn mind. They came an the way trorn Eukit Mertaranr to try the famuus prawn nooates, Little dtd they krtuw what was going In happen on the way there and that they rnrght not even gel to taste the supposedly oetieious rare. [2] The nrghtweatherhne put the mad was wet and Itnsred wttn tanen teayee ane nrtaereh. The streteh of road at KM 2 «mm Kuala sepetang to Tarprng which was near a river, was net hr at an and rt was very dark. The 69 yearsetrt 1" De1endanI and his wrte tthe 2"‘ nerenuant Mm was the owner of the car], and 1hetr gvandchtldran were tn the ear. They were travettrng to Keats Sepelang to have lhetr dtlvtev at about Baﬂpm when suooenty out at nowhere. \|he‘/ heard a “hoorn' and they felt therr car being htt by something on the rtght srde. Allegedlyr a rnotoreyetist hart hit the car and the rtdsr was ﬂung rnto a erarn on the oopestte see of the road due te the trnpaet at the oolltstort. [3] Plairtltlf‘ as he was at the sessiens court) As fate woutd have tl, the The nder ot the rnotercycte was 17—yaars ald Ong Jta Han ("the Ptaintrttwas ontha way to Tatptnglo meet hrs girﬂrtend atterttnrshrng work at Koala seperang. A ‘date' that merauy changed s we fovevev [no pun 2 srn wevF2uFwWn::xxrnP>uav ‘Nuns s.n.r In-vthnrwm re used m mm ms nﬂmnaﬂly sun. dun-mm vta aﬂt.ING wnxt 15 15 never be able lo walk and hewill nave tn learn in wrlle and eat with lhs leu hand [19] As ean be seen lrl me medlcal reports. the injurles sullered were nonllyrng and rnoelly pennananr ln nalure, Some or lne lnlurles on me ngnl upper llmb could sllll be lrealeo wrln surgery and Improve nre ngnl hand lunctlon lo at laael enable the Plalnm to nolo a walking lrerne properly wrrn both hands, oe able to walk and dn personal eneres eucn as c1eaning.ea\|Irlg and preparing loudlorhimsel\|(aslI1lswas larer explained by rene lallon exrnens). Hence, the claims were very imDurlan\| to enable me Plainliﬂto be able to rerurn 10 ms normal Me VI some aspects 2:! least rl nor all. It was ellclled (l'la\| llre Plairluff rm nor have a valid lrcenee lo ride a rnlolreyele. He em nor have money lo ablalrl a lleenee. He lolrl rne ooun man he slapped selroolrng early eno worked er me age 01 14 so mar he would have an lnoorne. He had been worklng as a general worker ln Kuala Sepelang only for a week and earned Rmalmo per day prmr lo llra amtldenl. According In rne Plainlllf, his grnlnene nee sinee lelr him ellar the eeeidenr Tne rnelercyele was burmwed rrern nis menu and ll are not nave a valid roadlax and insurenee, The Plalntlﬂ was basically ner covered lo rlde lhe motorcycle lzal cornrng back re rne aoclderll, rne Plalnnfi was eaarnenl that me «- Deleneenra had encmachsd lnlo ms lawlul earn [hereby eausrng lhe accldenl N Ihal pol!!! M llme, bath vehicle dlslanoe (0 each other were already (am dose to avuid the aocldent desplle NS efforts \|o swerve to me lell slde ol the reed, The motorcycle grazed the rigln from side ul me rnorurcer and me Plalmlff lesr ocnlml unne rnororeycle Tne motorcycle Iulched larwaru ln ns lewml pscn marked as Azuu WI rne sketch plan (Exhlblt P1). He had rnen pressed en rne brakes which len 21 long scrawh n slN wevF2uFwWn:axxrnP>uall -use s.n.l In-vlhnrwlll es used e mm ms nﬂnlrrallly mm: dun-mm Va mane we 15 10 15 mark en me read irem D in D1 as marked in Pi. The meiorcycie ended ai ihe point marked as N en ihe side ei ihe road. [21] The 1“ Deiendani stand his gmund in orussexa ihe Pieiniiii who had suddenly encroached inm his righiiui pain marked as AAAS in F1 when iis iarrip no\| iii an all, ‘i unexpected aeiion caused the 1" Deiendani io iurn his sieering io ihe right side 0! his pam in an eiion to avoid ihe nieioreyeie However, he ieo ieiied and ihe mmercyeie crashed inie ihe rightlmnl deer in his mi. anon ihai iiwae [22] The evidence eiihe lnvesligalion oiiieer, sin. RF 100957 Easksran A/L Francis (SP1) was ihai ihe acoideni was caused by his meiercar encroaching into the pain oi ihe Pieiniiii when the 1" izeienearii overlook eneiher moiorcycle in ironi oi his 1'2! at ihai lime The 1=~ Defendant was summoned under Ruie 10 oi ihe Road Trafﬁc Rules 1959 (LN iseisiz) which provides “Na driver oia vehicle moving aiong zi load shiiii sieep dr eiherwise negieei in exercise due eoninoi over the mavemenis oi ihe vehicle". The 1-‘ Deiendani did no: edmii iieoiiiiy by paying ihe ﬁne bui evenhiaiiy he paid in en 24.9 2019 oniy because he was asked by ins police In dd so This became a mini oi eemeniidn hyihe panies and lwlll eiaboreie on ihis issue iaier [23] si=i gave evidence on is 5.2020 and 24 5 202m where his wiinese ciaiemenis were med on ihe day oi iriai (PSSP1) some bundles ul dommeriis were siiii being ﬁled on ihai day Dy ihe Piainiiirs soiieiiors. in paragraphs 19 and 20 er me SCJ's greunds oi iudgnieni, she made speoiai nieniion ol ihe iaie iiiing cil wiiness siaisnienis and mmdies er dcoimiene io he reierred in during inai. Hawever, ihe Piairififf iried id iusiiiy the deiay Hm was due \|o ine inipienieniauen oi ihe Meveiiieni 1) sin wcVF2uFWWn::XxniP>u£v -use s.n.i iuvihnrwm es used is vaiw me nﬂnihnﬁly MVMS dun-vinril wa .riiwe WM! 15 25 Comm! Order zozc SP1 went lp the spens at me accident al 9 25 pm with police photographer Kpl RF 1704431 Mazwan am Arman (SP2) who look me photographs in Email l>2(a) — ll) al pages 59 pl Eundle A [24] SP1 confirmed lnal mere was no street Hghnng all me stretch olraad al KM2 which was an the smaollne mad heading towards Taiplng. There was a JKR milestone about 100-200 metres (mm the accident site The Slgnhnald usnpung the speed linm of Bﬂkm/hour was located on the side 0\| the mad heading \|clrWards Kuala Sepe\|ang He had mavked an the sketch DIEVI which he drew‘ the dlvemiuns cﬂ both veﬁlclej T impcrlanl because Ihe 1“ Defendarlfs counsel in cmssvexa suggeslea man (he sergeant had wrongly marked me uiramipns 0! me vehicles, which SP1 denied vehemently. This pain: was also argued during the appeal oaiora rne. SP1 oanﬁrmed (here were glass lragmenls on the lane A3/-X4. Na glaas lragmenls or make marks were found on the lane A4A§. The man was ws\| because a! the occurrence a! rising (Ade along me said mad. SP1 further uanﬂmlsd that this caused rubbish in uverﬂlvw un\|n both sides of the mad although he did nm indicate the presence of lubhlsh in his skelcll plan but could be seen in F2(e) Must imponanlly, both me Plaintiﬁ and 9* Defendant admitted In sm Ihal their vshlcle was lravellirlg closer lo the while dividing line (0 avoid ms mppisn on the mad was aliun 125] The damage: to bath vehicles can be seen In pholographs marked as P2(g)—\|i) and \|aHc)respec1lvely.Thefrnnlpart of ma molarcycle was complelely damaged I galhered lnal ll ouuld no: he sent in PUSPAKOM for lnspeulion in delermine ll ms neadlignl was working at all The molcrcar was also damaged rnpslly ﬁn melrcrn right Side and the driver‘: door and glass screen were cracked. Tnerelare. based on ms 13 SN wcvF2uFM0WnnxxmP>uav Nuns s.n.i In-vlhnrwm be used m mm r.. mn.u-y sum. dun-mm wa aFluNG pm Invssligahon and swam ewdsnca wmch were more conswstent with ms F\zvmlf‘s panes report. SP1 concluded that the aocxdenl was caused by and mumrcar encroaching mm the Mawnnffs law1u\ pam 5 EVALUATION Ago rmnmss or ms couwr A. on lhe i§§5ge 91 Izabm [251 There were numerous grounds dv aDDea\ pleaded m ms Memorandum of Appea\ (pages 15-30 of RRJ1) hut durmg me hearing of ma appeal ma names subrnmed on\y on a law xssues wmcn ac\|uaHy ID mvered me Ispuls over ma uammy appomonsd and quanmrn dc damages sd we have 2 conlhcimg vsrsxans or new the acumen! happened. me markings on ma sketch pvan was my contested by bum pames. that me SCJ was uunfused mm ma markings un me sketch plan and (here was a comment Ihal me sca dud not aﬂaw an unpaaanman: :5 procsedmg against me 1“ Defendant and awsowbemer ma summuns paid byme 1-‘ De!endan\| indwcaled ms Viabmfy at an All mesa weresummarissd mm 3 Issues (or me cum to deems as vaucws: i dlrecllnns ol bavsx of the parties, n. whe\|hsrthe1“De1em1anlancmanhed mo pam onne Flam! m and whemer there was ountnbulury neghgsnce dn ma part at ma Plalrmll [211 u 15 «me Vaw that me burden 0! met in an acuun for negligence was 15 with me plalnmf: Mg Chnl 5\|: v. Mnlman B: All [1933] 1 MLJ 11a. The may at me sour! us m deterrmne wmch versmn Is mnrs innerenuy pmbable based on avaﬂahle evmanoa: Noorlaml blﬂ Zzlnol Abldln & on v Tang L ' 92 [1990] 2 MLI 212. u syn wcVF2uFWWn::XXmP>u£v . -ma sand n-nhnrwm be used m mm s. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG wrm [231 1 naya perused me SC.\|‘s as pages olgrmmds of judgment mm, Encl (3) to see whether me oompkamls raised were subslanhated. V1 is necessary at mus palm m reproduce parts cl me SCJ‘s grounds 0! judgment m paragraph: 118 — 126 (pages 61 — 69 of RRT, Encl 13) as 5 she had made ﬁndings aHaL1 based on the evidence avaﬂable as Inﬂows: ‘ma! mtpak neruesaran mmnuka\ weum omen mangasankan Flamlﬂ yang nnarrg kawalan psngandahan mo1us4ka\nya yang Dalksmunuklnantsﬂapak kl n-aapan akmar mmnggang m um had lam alau am yang mask 1» sebnhigian gngal membememnun nrmamu dw landaan 'x‘ mahuvun an lmldnzm rrr walaunun bmk mnlnslkal amaxwa dilekan an ranaaan D‘ an renuan laman ASAA. Brek mnmsxkal yang gagal hemmasl msmbememlkan mahoslkalnya memnngalkan wasan rarserar Nngsa memim ks Izndaan ‘nr sebelum laluh \|emenn a. Iandaan ‘N‘ m kawasan narumpm Aw. my] Apt yang Ma: mlah kunn implhan ham .1: mm. ABAA am.» kelnn pecihan kaca ram.» hadnpan melaknr mzaav, heokzmungbdnan sebpas beﬂaku Detlemhungen an Iandaan x Kelensnian genysv rnx June herkeharangkallan nranunmxkan mulukar P.l\|.2DD7 yawn arranrpun olan 2n nrmasrxar an x msnlnﬂg-3\kan kesan seruman ‘cw waves Iandaan n Ksmna mswfv wanaan Panama y-nu rnamurar sunny kn kanan nrananasr ka Muan AJA6 salspas plnunhungan dx Xdln kamudllnnya kamhill masuk ke Hum» AME Imluk marnbamannm mmakamya m Landaan V [AM7l 1; may aamaaaman nerunmnan marangarnrararangan spa, kredxmlm sm (amahar o\eh Dequam Delandan-deiendan mamandanwkan percanggahan keleramlan sm ada\ah marllurui kspida asvsk rnananal kaa dv naaapan Mahkamah wanu burksnaan bigalmana kamalangan nu berkemungkmnn ranmr Dahm [MI W, Mahkimnn mlluwk kspada kars G\|malunRamu:IIam1ran :0 4 Or: y PPIZMHI 2 ML.) 191: [ms] t on 551, panel 2 Ann 465 ﬂw rnana Mahkamnh Pelsekuluan memuluskan hahaw . -wnar new to be considered Is wnamar ms drsaapindes mlatn lo rnazanar a-SW61: er the saw or omuwtso. Ax sfatsd m Samavan Evrdenns 15m min. a as 142 Mmur dfsulnandns an Dmnvizln lwn m the version 1:! truthful mmaaaaa and am. mmor disuepencies on/y add .-.2 ma mmriu/ness al then evidence (Srdhan y sma a{K2Iala [1956] on u 410, 475 rxar». am mmpanuar In ena araramarru av wrmassar an matenal pomts on snama not be may passer: over, as may ssnoll-W alfnt rm yarua or 15 any wcvF2uFwWna:xxnrP>uav «ma a.n.r n-nhnrwm .. LAIQ4 m mm r... nrwhrnﬂly mm: dun-mm y.. mum may m :5 aa Ins)! zaanmanyqsm Lal V. Kurvwar, as A 157.18 cwrv 549 A 1914 PC 35) In. mlm thing In a. aaam 1: wnllhovlnn mcansvslnncus gm nu ma max anna matter DI pmam la umgmnaam: 5512201: mere av - 1121) Damn keadnan im, aekah lam pevkum um Hdak aapan menen\|uk\|n denyan mmlak maamama kemalangan vm harlaku, mm sama aaa Flalrm mewru masuk Gan mananugar mukzkar navanaan-aaranaan tsrubm xecara «manna alan umeman Panama yam; msnwonon masuk kn Iaman sah mo<wkaxwsum yang ﬂnunggang ulsh Pimmnf as laman AJAA 1122; Selemsnya, Mahkamzh aknn menllal kelerungan Delendarmeﬂendnn dalam kes m. Delendan Pen.amaASD2)memher1 kmerangan aaaawa hellau memamu mamkar P.n.2m77 semasa kemalanuan pads 19.092015 ax KM2 .la\zn Kua\z Ssoelanwtzvpm Menunn snz, Flawnnlsecava l1ba—l1I:a marvanah maiuk ks Vaiuan ms dan mmamav lwdak memasang Vampu haﬂzpannya lam mammmm Dada bahigxan hndipan um karun mumkzr amnm ﬂu Ishtar! ms [lzrvdmm x ma. :1 dwbunmleh mama [1221 Menuml kmeraman Deﬂendandeﬂsndanm aaaa haﬂ kejzman, mereka aaauan penaaana Lalan yama Dam aanama ka\I manngunakan Valuan menum be Kuala Savelarlv Imluk makan maa udavm Anemia tuba m mz, kaadaan lilan naax dnanngw Vamnu ‘awn danhha-1i>a xahuah mwmmkal datxwg ml Iqlh aam amh aamamamgam dw hadapan mnmknr mum yang a.aa»aa eleh namaam mama Deﬂenﬂan Panama Husk sempat menekan latex ﬂan hsnya sampax memmar sieving ke kanan bay mengelakkan penemhungan cenaax dank herjaya Mutokar mznm dmenukan aau dlperklrm bahu Jalau dw Kmudukan «r d\ km Ialuanrvya lm A5A7J [my Sa\|a\ah asks: a. pmak Flavmﬂ aam n.4amaam.a.4amaam mam mamaam uamamgam, Mamman uaau aarauaa ham bahawa kemamnaan m1 aaaxan aem-ma aaupana kzcuman mhak Deﬂendan Panama semalaanzlam berdasarkan vemavn aanm — an Wmpakdankesan ksrusakan aaaa smuamam kaduaduakundsnan hdak menyoktwu Dumlatazn oven Flamm mm P: my [alas membukmkan plmmbmvgnn Imxk haﬂaku slum blmidapln ktvinn mnlnkzr dihnggir aaa. bahanian az mas kanan maaaam mnmkar munm yang mask xemk aan aaa keaan damh aauam ekmbu P2 my. 12) Kelevanuan «om Pam adabh kstaranaau pnma Vania nanawa max hemamzn oven mnloswkal wanm zdmah tenumpu an bahaglan ssbahn swsl Kanan muwkaryina mpandu clan naoamuan Panama 15 am wcvF2uFwWna:xxmP>u£v «ma. ama n-nhnrwm a. a... a my a. nrW\nnU\|:I mm: ﬂan-mm VII .mm mm m 2; n: (3) Nlolakar FJLZDLW yaw masuk ks hluan aagalan kanan yang nananrangan arnh wavas bemsmbuns manaaan x max mangnanang Iihlin mmasAka\ yang man Inllamun semula a. Iahnan ABM Ian. \|eﬂa]ak kc hadnpan ann k: may P1 bemasarkun mam sw yang memkiskan kasan max um adnmh ke man mas P1 Anaxa ks manna). m Dalam kn: Im vamapax ksnn u\arYi'!§ dnandakan sabagal ‘n ‘nleh sr-1 dawn PI aanagax canaaan pannulaan kasan bnk mubuslkﬂ yang ununggang man P\a\’nM yang mungsku mngaxak ks km aan band: .1. \euglII hluln mu sm mtnqmakan xaann nu iﬂ2\|LIh kasnn mlar hrek semasn mmas\kn\ wsmva (emh hsnambunu aengan motokar mzmxv Ielavl beldasnlknn akuan Pwnul lamn malnslkm benamhunu aenann malokzv an landasn x. Smaln dadpaﬂa kesan brek yanamnuanunan moIos\kzIFlam1ﬂyenﬂ d1larx1akan‘D‘dHnn§Iah Iahun nu, ma-nua s-rpman kaci yang dﬂamakan ‘CK’ am F1 ma bend: av Ialuan Flamlﬂylna rnanghala ks avih rannng (5; Wnlaupun aw melukuskan kexnn brak men mmnsnkxl ynng cﬂlunggang meh Pmlnlﬂ amnan bammm an xangah uavnan AC-IAA caaaa. molosman wEL7a7a uaak dlbemennkan my oananan u zlau x1 sehahknw mnlaslkai wEL7373 Isiah Iznatskl leranlak ks hudapan al nnnnn ASM aangan malskmn Ilemabas ks km ssbelum \|emenndv(andaan m alas MA2 Kaaan bmk n ksD1Ia\ah aan. mm. ssrwip nanawa husk mokwkal wELn73 naau nannngaa demgzm mix (man. kosllumhnn / nbnhagmn) nun perwnggang mah memmggnnq ﬂengan kamiunn yang Mag! aan gagal memhual kamman yang can akiba\| (emedem pads ama-a sebelah kannn semase menempuh hahsulan kanzn molokar ax laluan ms (5; snbanknya sm melvdnkwl punt: kemahngnn adnlah herpumm aanpaoa kowailn mmokir mzom yang Ierblbn memnmng salu mamsikm lam Nngga mamasuki hluan berlznvaangan wnlaupm pengamn P\aml\l adalah \|1dak dlsaknng clan mana—/nana ketemngan spa Man memkam pangacaan bahawe semasa kemzlanwany Vzmpu moloslkeﬂ mak dlnyalakan a1au 9-isle! aannngsx aan mmrmkzl yam sebenamyi masuk dahum ka laman lzsruntanairl yam manuvxa ram kaadzan yang msnuemaskln anma msmlu yam ma-ampun pads bahasiln kamn mm.ukzrPJL2Dn7 41) Justnlu Snman yang dﬁsu olsh pemlong negawm peny1nsa1\|PD mm mung nu man sama sﬂan dlkanakan Iemadav Deiendan Panama Wmauvun seman menurm Kaedah m Pemuran Lanmnnas Tvaﬂk 1959 was/59 nu wan mangaap aanaga: asai umnk dwsrsaxanxan ates lull keL:Ia\ar\ yaw msncann kapada nanarnnungan kadua-dua kendenaan dalam kamalznaan. Hablmr yang akzn dnaglhkzn man. mam holah mslebwm 50% ma-unbxan, anvana lam, kaouahn yang mannmnngxan .11 pihuk wainnv yang gagnl memasuknn kendecaan yang ﬂnunggangnya her-ads dnlam keadaan :7 any wcvF2uFwWnaaxxnuP>u£v «ma snnnw n-nhnrwm a. med m yaw n. nrW\nnU\|:I mm: dun-mm y.. mum Wm! m as AU yang Vayak bend: Stu pr... riyn [mad wunhmess], my kememnn dwlelvggirnkzm gay. men mgun. dawn kandmn kecemasan. Flamlﬂ jugs mm memulikan kecmeruan am man man ﬂan amnam nous! Vnsnvans yana sun sebelum ma memmlam mocosmau an run an ssnmn aaanan sscrinn Yansl bemamwtsn sen‘: ad: Imn yam: sen unmk menu-vagana kandsrzan was ‘an... my wan. kn an., Imgkah mm M nn: yang mammggang kememan belmulnrlinpl Imn yang .an .1... udnk . mum meh pnusiimmanssemasa beﬂaku kemalanaan ilu, mm" sanap umam yang menymam nMarW' undanulelam salu nernumeuaxan yam] avsmnnangkanoxan Pnanxn. sw udak Vsu iamzn kevada Fralnmyinﬂlelar msnumang muiuilkzlianpa lawn yang iah my Llmnunn dilams zamnm Pengnngkman Jamn 19:31 [Akin 331!]memperunlukk£lI bahnwn lidak ads yang ﬂwhznalkan mavmndu kender-nan hermotnr an lahan rayﬂ kscuau ma memmmyel Vegan yam san. Seswana yang may rnempunm men Hdak wen mamandu kamaraan bermmov Da\am kas -n-. Plammsama ueI<a\I(Idak mampunyav men nmnanuu yang san unluk mamandu my manunggang .1 ahn ray; (Ia) Pemnmkln . 90 Am 333. semnang mm mamvunm mm Vnsurans yaw ssh unmk mallnduml dla semasa ma mnmandu alau manungaang ksmuraan belmolor dv man aye Clan kamna saiaurana yang membanawkan mrmya atau omng nan. kalina kmadaan men mamandu yang rah umuk memandu alau manunaoang ax man rays, ﬂdik uharusnya dwa man; ax plan my. :. mawan palm Mn nnsm yang carvmnkan mn maksu-1 Pnmmsn mn. :23 .1... 590 Am 333. Hngkah um memmmanﬁ mam... bermmorianvalasan yang snhllu semm merunakanundakan yang meﬂyalam undaw-umani I ma: vemmaan 3 dzlam K35 Muhammad /‘loo! Rsdzuan hm Mwun vMunammaL1AImvuIH-sﬁzbm Knattulazum [max in MU 23¢: (11) Unmk mambsusrkln Flamnf malavskknn babnn kemahn 100% dnzmggmlg alsh nmnagmmenaan mun barsnmnan mannnan penghamsan mm Plamul kerana max memamhl unaanmmang. alau lebm humklaai unluk mannen ianlamn Ksnadaﬂya alas panama-an umaw mam: wzlaunun P\a\nl\l manlmbulkan sua\|u keadaan yang banaya ham dmrwi wndm din Vamh venom‘ ktavada pa-manna 1a\an ray: lam yaw mamamm undang-ulvdann Undallz-undamz Vldlkdlpatmehrldunglolang yang ndak msngarnbn kn; ullilng-undamg dun pnhsv swim ying barusnha mengilurpengendihln lam hnu: dun paugarvgkmml dw man mya 1; sm wcvF2uFwWna:xxmP>u£v mm. smm n-nhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w may he nrmnnﬂly mm: dun-mm VII mum pm 15 m 15 In (12) Damn kes ml, pemunya betvawar mowsnax wzum Ia-vgsu-9 «mu avpanmu man sm unluk manguahkln mmnmksl wEL73'r3 dunmlw dnmm ksadaan yang membenalkan mnya hemda Mn: mm mm wodhmess], emu dun am: an SP1 gagnl nmnanggn permmya beraamr nwlnslkm umuk hamr mammn katamngnn, sums nan mams\\|<a\nya yang xldak Eda cukal man yang san, adahh sam muluslkal yann msak mu mmsakkan‘ Sam: ad: ssbanasllan man kssnmmhzn alau Vayak umuk dlaunakan alarman llrl forms vuvvnul (13) D. dalam kaadaarl kamllangan ying mum ﬁx wlklu mzﬂam, penLm9!!in9 Mowslal mm. hemnggungan dan ugx mun: kerane mnunggang malusiksl dewgnn membahayakan am sens penggunajalzn yang Yam, Llnpﬁ menyavmn Vumpu hadapan mu membawa motoslkm dsnuan Lamvn haamn yang msak alau max yam: ﬂdak bemmasl denuan hawk Anya ndak mambenarkan ve¢\uawa\arI/venwsndahan aengan bavk ada\am saiu luau kasmahan mx yang Vam yang mangundang (angquﬂgan mum (M) lRuJuk ks; um snannv urn Amm Rahman V Ahmad Zuflendl Mn Am.»a'[2D2l] 12 ML! an bedmit keg mm: yang memmguanu Vanna Vesen ma uh! (<5) Kaswvulan nman benuhs pewuam Dufendaruieiaman banam manna a-man ssndm man n..n:an- puma kamahngnn pad: mazma memmpa dmnya devlgan Lllvggungan sumhang cuan an-z. mnnaknla Delendarmelendan lehh cum “mm znwanam menyehabkan kzmmangzn dslam kes mu Karslmpulannye hm Kemrangan senyav yam: rmmakm bulah mumbamu unruk mambuil 3.-nu uapavan. yang unggaw adahh bsrdasarkan kumlakzn kzyida kaduadun kenderaan‘ FN; bslkab-Ilarngkahan mlnyukcmg um dihm mwmn pmil aver. Daiamnn mum. herlnnkh was mm, mm kegs» kzrmakan nmuomn wznzn yang Ienumpu ax hahaghan haﬂapan sﬂmzh se\ar1 dengan Vmpak henlnman men mmnsmax aw slsl nanan nmmm PJLZDOY [1261 Panelmzn (emadap man kasar bersama-iima dangan man-vgan nemeauan lawn sepem nambiv-gambar din kamiakzn-Memsakxn kapadn ksrvﬂlvaan-kalvdamxn yang lamhal dllim kivulangin wlu‘ Mahkamah mummuskan vem mg new. bememungkman Man veni damn Vapman pohs men Daﬂendan Permmzn ymvg mbual beberspn jam selepas kemzlungan padz maazmsiam u m ma\am[\lhaID7J [1271 on nlhzk umenaan Fedama sebagal vemandu an man ray! yang mempunyax kawanpan Im\|uk se-mas: osnagaaasa pan: kmwumnan mas: kavanalahn mm nwam maxan mnpnnunmm mnnmxmmng mm mm hdak hemnh-h ’ hanyn kemm: um bah-mwa is adamn man yang sunyi emu :9 sm wcvF2uFwWna:xxnuP>unv mm. smm n-nhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w may he nﬂmnnﬂly mm: dun-mm VII munc pm an as pads mua Vnln nnua adauan .andan Dalam kt: Khmmn Nfzmi bm Daud a Armr v.IupIV‘n Fau![2D18] a um 32 -1\| m s.38‘Pe1uruhJaya Kemammnn (pads maaa M memuluskan bahawa — ‘([321 ram In admemsn: Mal mam rs away: a am an road users 10 remam Wgrlam at all time: as public roads am arways a vcnua ror dlrvgor, wmdvavv (rm. n/ma ﬂay nnamndn, wnm on. an rvlvirb nnnm in (ski n any and be UN-guard because :1 IS a qmet snawn olmads or a me a( me day where kslﬁc vamme .s law [33] Then rs sdmsmnas 3/50 a smbbam amlmie (:1 some dnvsvs rd aonsrdal that wnen they nawa rvghl o/way‘ ms roams mans wnsm any I/me mtsnuplmn ormtemranca mm their ‘right 01 way‘ would be sumac! Io arvnoyanov, Imlahon and a randancy In mud man ground‘ and natgn/1 way us n rs man ‘lnga7'ngM away They ml/Ivsv: sulﬁuenl presence afmind and Lune Ia aannd bheirllom, gasmrsur afhmwise indnxle m ms Human A7/Ibuding sgamst man nahl al way, but not to new dmm or ylerd — wh/an rn ms maﬁer old ssmnd at Ma, would have been surﬂmsnt to muss ms incident to mine to pass. - [12!l$ala\ah menelm segaua kalarangamkmnriugan yang dukemukakzn danam kg: ml, Mzhkamlh memperumbzmgkan, maxi blngan kebnmngknhan, bahawa Flamlil gagnx memhukliun kzcuaian adaxan semalamala di phwak oavandanaarandan sacadax pdnaa yang mellyehzbkan venemhunuan kedua— ﬂua kandavaan danam kemakangan my nadaxu paaa «ms zms Mahkamah mandapam Deiemiarvdslsndan naman-nu 20°/. cual sebauaw panyanan kamavangan Iru dan mun. yam: Vamh uvaumkan kspida Flalrmf adahh so-n panyumlnng cuil sahlgaw pancams klmllangan yang mannnpanya pad: 19 as 2013 and - [29] Having gone through the grounds aljudgmenl and aompanng n with the News of Emdancs, I did rml ﬁnd that the SCJ was confused by Ike malkmgs on ma sketch plan as alleged by me Plammv The durecnons drawn by SP1 on the skecth plan were afsu curred. I am mostly tn agreemem wmn me $CJ's nndings and reasunings in vegard In the hamlwty oi the Puaimm and ma: ne was wnmbmomy negngem. n was the appomonmenl ovnabumy whwch I did not agree. The SCJ Iound tl1aI(he1sI Defendanfs velsmn was more Dmhame and he had wedged a police report sham 2 hours after the aoddenl. The 1:! Difemllm admmad (III! duo lslon, his car had gone [Mn mo lam AJA4 In 2n to ma impm :11 mo c syn wcVF2uFWWna:XxmP>u£v "Nuns saw n-nhnrwm be used m mm ms nrW\nnU\|Y mm: dun-mm vu mum v-max m )5 25 lhlendeal. Ha loal lhe whole ol hla nghl leg and suﬂered other homfylng injuries \|\| was very llagle lndeed BACKGROUND [4] The Sessluns calm eh 9.3.2022 lound lhe Plalnlmle be 210% le fur the accldenl and hence. this appeal al me Hlgh calm was against llab‘l\|l(‘I and euanlum The names are relenea la as they were al me Sssslorls calm as mm have apuesleu egainsl my aeasloh uelwerea on 23 5.2023. The learned sesslons com Judge (SCJ) had wrlllen a very long and qul\|e cnmprehenslve grounds al ludgmenl Nevertheless, wnlle I agreed wl\|h some al her ﬁndlngs. I hurld (ha\| lmm lhe lame eslabllshed ln me ease lmln Ewes were alnmsl egually llanle for the aocldenl and emaned liablli at 40°. and so"/. Qgfzndams resgslztlvely. I had ihlenelad wllh lne laalual ﬁndings 01 me lrlal judge because it was 'plalhly wrong'ln me sense lhel II could run raasanahly be explained or lusﬂﬂsd and Due whlch nu reasonable luaga could have reached: rengku nets Ibrahim Pena Tnnqku Indra Falra v Pena Perdzna aemad 1. Ann! Appeal pm} 2 l:L.l 541 a alhsl lhe Plalhllw and [5] It is Irlte law me: an appellale mun would he slaw Ia disturb me nhdlngs of the lrlal eoun unless it ls convinced lhal there have been subslarlllal mlsalreelmn ol fads and law whlah nleriled anpellale lntervsntlcn The appellale mun wlll delermlns whelher or not me lnal calm arrlveti at he aaelelen orﬂmilng correctly on the basis ollhe relevant law andlur the established e enee ll will examlhe the pmcess el evaluallnn ollne evldence by the mal court. A aeelslon arrived al by a lnal emm wllnem or lhsumelehl ludlelal appreclallorl el lhe evldenea may be set aslae on appeal The IS ennslslenl wlth ma eslabllshed 'plalnly wrung‘ 2 SN wevF2uF»W’n::xxmP>uall -we Smnl In-vlhnrwlll be ﬂied a yaw me nﬂnlnnllly ml. glam. wa nFluNG Wﬂxl .5 1.: A5 ms ouons lo nvoid mo meaorcyele She also round that sP1's evidence oomd not supporl me F\ainuN‘s version 0! everus. She cued a case law max mere were bound in be minor discrepancies and than she said the minor duscrepancxes nu ma F\amulTs case cuuld na\| dslenmne who ancroached man whose path am (see pa.-egrpan 121). [30] The SCJ had alsu shied that she did not consider SP1 to be a wmness who had lied in ocurl and she had aocepled r.is ewuenoe in so car as it was consis\|en1w\Ih me silem ewoenoe. In paragranhs ms — 109. I lound ma. lhe sea r.aa oonsiderea why .1 was unneooesary to unoeaa. sun and I agreed mm her ﬁndmgs as loHaws: [‘1UE)Da1gan mwgimbil kw: kelelangan SP1 dam SP2 yang memhsn kelernngnn belsumpah ax... lekah diuenksa hulls a\=h pegunm Deceme... delendan. says msnemua kelerenuen sm den svz selakal mane kelersngsn mereka ada\ah se\an denuan keteranwarr serryan mewena. kemsakan kepadz Ksduadua Kendavaan. kaian brek am Klan darn Iaporarr vans roamoua pmak, big: .......:...ksr. sagala kalnrangan p.r.ax.p.n..k bqlkau nap: yang msnyabnhkan bermkunyn kemalangan pm wakm .....xa... jam 9 .1. ma 1.1.... Kuaxa Sena1ar19~YaVDlrW was 19.na1ma ilu dun mamuluxkan vars‘ nihak mm yam wemr. hsmabarawkaﬂan mm m adalah kerina 5-wan: ksmawan mu dlkemukakan man sm yam «oak selan man how seblhh am. am om. sskall pun, hdak mewatavkan knalumhsn katsnngan sm dnmak lazuli da\am ....o..sp. kaadsan u... ulu cnnlall ndalah cahanan kepada kamoswa... kzsnkxian ( paachmam) Iemndav s». Ar... cahsran Unlnaachmsml in‘ herjaya, kaelumhan kalavanwan sm Iazlmnya mhusng alau dlkelsplkau om. Mahkamah [mam keadzan nu \|)urI.\|\ka ads keteranwan kesan orek. semman kaca atasialarr nan kaian karoiikan kevada keduadua ksnderaan dalam kss ...r yang oonsn a..sr....s bagl msnvmukan namlm pmak-pm: Mzhkzmlh akan mangammlkwa kvhrangan knan bvak, se.pr...... me ans 1...... .4... kaszn kamaakzn kapadi k.a....u... kenderxnn dllam ke: .... yang borer. mpsrseys. nu [ma] Prtnsrv Denaﬂmaa/I keleaam-an lam dawn keadaan sesemanﬁ saks\ hevhahonu (saya max Dmuskan sedemudan dalam kes mu arqansxer. onen kei rwoarv cw: HW v PUBLIC PROSECUTORIw61l\| ML! ms, or «or 2. srr. wcvF2uFw\MmxxmP>uav «u... so... nnnhnrwm .. ..... .. my .. .n....u-y mm: dun-mm vu murm pm... In ‘Na witness rlemanalrabfy ierh /re. en one or two now: than ill: ciesr me: he 15 nor a Mlhab/9 witness and as a rnaner o/prudence me new or his swdsnzw rrnm D9 Rwlmninzd mm grea: earn and indand wnn xvipiworv Ta ery. howmn Ihalbaalusa e witness has new prawns her an out 0! Mo painls men we whale er his ewaenee ‘must in Mw be IE/:c.‘:d'::tuga ton Island]: wrung < has} Dalam kas ini, save davan ape yang mkavakan Dembohungan iaiah kesvepian mernanenn soaien den memhen rawapan kepadz seaien yang «eiah urreiah lalsirkan oieh yam: aerrunan, ray: nerpanaengan new-awe sm tidak bubommg new rwavennya (Idak «eeax kapada eeaien ylng dillnyi ~ [31] However, I «mine that despite aeeephng «he evidence 01 SP1, me SCJ stated his evidence did not suppori the Plainlﬂfs version or euerus, i e. how ihe accident happened I\ was eiear men me: she awegled mat the is: Deieneani had encroached inio «he Fla mrs Iewiul galh but due to his “nghgeneer ior wanl of a hener word In riding wiihnui e iieence and uninsured to ride etc. «hereiere she eenciuaed thsl me Plarmm was 30% Mable At the same me she had slated thal lhs Deiendanie should have been mare eeremi driving In those eonunien that nighi and cummenled mat they were uniemmerwirh the piece Th is where Hound mallhe SCJ had uomradided hereeii and was 'g\|am\y wrung“ n naming to the conciusion 0:; she gig In my view, the 1s\ Defendant made a wrong judgment call when he swerved ngm im the path unhe Fiernnirr when he should have swerved to the leﬂ and avoided the rnomrcycle enogeiher. He nrosi hkely hea been eaughi on guard when he sudaeniy saw the P1amm‘l‘s motorcycle In the dark 0! the night. Meenwhiie, Ihe Pieinm was eise wrong \|o have been riding his nreiorcyeie almcst near me whne divider line where he shouiri have anticipated his eaiene may endanger me driver at any vehieie err the uppusile side enhe while hue [32] in paragraph 124(1)-I15}. \|hescJ sieved why shecould nolﬁnd the Deiendanis In be 100% Iiebie and she almbuled 30% Iiabuiixy to the 21 n mvrmrwwmnxxnmr nae s.n.i n-vihnrwm re used m mm ms nﬂmnnﬂly MVMS dun-mm VI] .nune wnxi in 10 15 an Flamhﬂ because he moauy contributed towards me accident when he was not ncenoau to me a mnlarcyda, the mexomyae was not covered by insurance and mm: not have a madlax. he endangered hrmaexfanu others when me rode the mumrcycls wilhaut me headlight an and he was neghgem «or nnl ensuring ils me madwanhinass. The owner n! ma motorcycle was alsu not called In Iesnfy an rs madwarlhmsss The SCJ [33] 1 have rererrea to me case Vaws cued by Iha SCJ wmch aH were at me High com level and ms appanaxs noun found against me unmsured rider For msxanca, In Muhammad Noar R-dlunn am Mlmm v Muhammad Amlrul Ham Bin Khalruluuln 12020} 1n MLI 2:5, the inuesugamg aﬂicer found that ma appauam was wmmm a yam dnvmg hoence or road tax ur covering msurance when he rude me molnrcyde. ma High Calm dwsmlssed the appeal [34] However, this Conn‘ ' dined to foﬂuw and agrees 0! me Vearned Hugh Caurl Judge m sm Rohnul an new Shah a. Ors v Ha]! Z.IlnI\| am Snlﬂu 4. On [2001] 5 MLJ 5 where n was new mac- me decismn -9) n I: wry Izloanhal mung or aﬂvlniwnhom avalld llmncnpdlsu Is Ml nlnlhannlu Ramur, n I. ma mlnnlv M m rldlng or drum; ind/or conduct on or ln wanna to flu mad mu conmhuu to 1». cluu of: mum! nccldnnl av cnllixinn.Tha¢ac11hnl\ha!\rs\|nvDE\|I£M wnx mg ma mnvmcylﬂe mhumaualhd um carmawr-nam. saVa\yha\melzmd even Mm .1 piuian «den cnuld ml and am not enter into me cause oi the eomsrer. The lack ouna matmvwas Ina! anlhe ha\am>e own-omnuma.»-., ms rm zppeuamua nu\| cause or wnmbms to me cause nuns acmiem N50. me am app-auam am not canlnhms «a mu Innmas ax she and not xuslaln any need Injunas. and cm welrwvg ah: safely he\me1wou\d ml have reduced her wmmies - [Emphasis added] n N wcvF2uFwWn::xxmP>u£v we saw n-nhnrwm be used m mm has mrmu-y mm: dun-mm VI] anum Wm 15 25 In [35] The com alae applled lne Drlrlclple rn lne case cl Goh Bong Song v Dol bin Dolan [1970] 2 MLJ 95 where snarrna J slaled ‘More can in ne (emmni! nr geenleuaeel divlslnrl el lne reed The cemm llne rern rlsa gulda and e rarnlnderenly one-s duly V3 in ensure selelylerenesell nnd for mhal: ‘Hm am-lde el mlnd lhal bacansc me drive: cominu mm. me HPDOEKI dlncllon ls enmaenlnu av-w lnchu Milly me ohm road. I can nut Mm as a umpmusna wound on my nalretlru mad as i c was my excluilvo domain and ma: l am tvully Immunn mm. Illb Iy I drive wnhlu mu xx-.1I\|m\|ls of man -man mu Ihnugll I know mu en Iccldull nllylhnnhy h-Ippln on my sldn mm. n1:d,ls1hn milude Man mpenelele and In ln-mm: bcmg. I ew duty in mere on me read just.“ mm: em a duty In rne. [Emphasls added] [as] ln decldmg whether the 1" Deiendarll had encroached lnla pm at me Plalnlm and liablllly lo he appomoned. lne coun lound ll to be ln lne afflrma\|ive as ne adrnlned ll mo and based on me glass lragrnenle an lne road ln A3A4l Ifme1“Delendant's clalrn that me Plalnufr enereaened lnle r-is paln llrsl was true, men x would nave mare likely been lower lnarl where he rnamed lion lne sketch plan They would have mm been very near to me middle of me Ioad,1Ile Plalnlllv ml lrre car and ms rnulurcycle was dragged lo X which lne Plalnllrl rnarked ie where rnosl 0! me glass rragrnenls were and Iherl me momrcycle was pushed/skidded from D lo D1. The 1“ Delandanl submmed me car was eemlng from lap to bcdorn (el lne 5ke(m plan] but me Plalnllu eneuld be dragged lo lne bollnrvl and net le lne (up an N. But mls calm ldund ll was probable, due Ia (he glass lragrnenls belng rrlasvlyz-1lX,\|Ile pan: of irnpam was mere on me Plainmrs side ol the road The 2"“ Delerldanl dld not see me lrnpael when ll happened‘ so her evidence was not reliable In me Prlvy Cuu vahaya aln Mahmud v cmn Tum Murn [1915] 2 MLJ 111, i\| was neld thalwhsn mere IS derllllenng evldsnce‘ lnerl lne coun wlll have lo rely on case at lne ulnar evidence r.e sllenl evlderlee 1; SW wevF2uFM0WnnxxrnP>u£v -we Sum ...ne.r nu be used m mm ea nllmruﬂly MIN; dun-mm wa aFluNG we to ID 10 [37] On the lssue cl‘ eahtrtbutary negllgenoe dtthe Ptatntm, he adnntted he had been rldlrlg near the nttddte et the mad te avetd the rubbteh. Judging trbrn the tntpaet at the eetltetbn on both vehicles‘ as seen in the phbtogrephs, thts court obtned that beth at them mus\| have been getng tnsterthen the so km/hour speed ltrntz. The Ptairttttt claimed he was ndlng at so km/hnurand the 1" Detendent between ewe lrrnthour. Despite the ﬁnding by the SCJ that the ntotmycte dld nol have its headltghl on, t was of the new thte was unltkely because the area was very dark They should have eent the ntetereyele te FUSFAKDM as the tnepectten eeutd have gleaned some tnterrnatton te help the Platntttre ease. The ewnerwes also net called te Iesllfy 7 ' erably weakened the Pl 'nliﬁ‘s case to obtatn 100°/. compehsattort. Moreover, being about 17 years old and not having a licence. he was not tested tquatmed to rlde a motorcycle although he clatrned that he knew the road rules very well. He may have been careless tn that sense the way he chose to ride almost In the middle at the read to avetd the rubbtsh rather than riding elewty at the nsarstde at the road to keep hlrneeltaway tram eneontlng Ualllc. But as elated by the teamed Hlgh court Judge in Sm Ramnl ate Mohd snatrs Cue. in cm. K\|m stng a. Anew Abdul Rank bln Amin [1 we] a MLJ 43: the nder succeeded tn his clalm, even thuugh he was wtthbut a valtd ltbenee. The High court Judge t:ulIIlnued' had een ' ‘Now In aruwer Mlse tat, the law etmun-.e deee rtnlsanclbon a nelson wttheut a valld Hcanoe to be ndlw ordrlvtrla a vemde on the man. But that Darsnh re net, as wnuld seam to have been suggested by Mtu Lat tetr same. wtth nu rtgms Kn ls ntttt unlllluﬂ to ma urn. duty at can ptchd at In bu Iccnrdnd tn all an and Id‘ ennt in ms man sbr an In umhriying pnne bln ollhn Ilw rmhn htwly thnutt mtnllhnw mulull nsplclnnd furbenrnncn tm seen. v VI/:lIhnnk[1D47l AC :41 II putt. Yhe only mnedy, or nenalty ttyou tttre, ts that presenbed tn the an the remedy Is not an actionable wrend [Enrpheete added] 2; n wcvF7uFWWn::xxmP>u£v nee s.n.t n-vlhnrwlll be used m mm the nﬂﬂlhhllly MIME dun-mm n. mum Wml ID 20 15 [35] Thereforei while I agree with uiescwe decision lriellrie Pleirilrfi was alse liable, I wauld revise are Fl rims llabﬂlty to Mr/.. aria me Delendanls' lo snss. Trie sllenl eviderioe were clear llial llie gleee iragrrienrs were on «re Plainlllrs side el me mad and lrie 1" Delenrlaril had negligently encroached inro riis Iawtul pami E. on llie issue oi guanluln [39] Trie mriesees were me Plamliﬂi SP1, SP4. SP3 lrrie Plainlilrs graridlalrier wrio cared lor liiiri), SP5 (medical evidence), sws (lne Plairilnrs employer)‘ spa lreliapilrlalleri sxpel1)and SF9(prcstl1ells(and orrliorier speeialiel). On rlie Delendarile elder me wilrieeeee were sm (reriaailiraliori expert). SD2 (pmslhellst arid orlriorisl speelalisl), sna (nurse) l had also revised some ol me quanlum awarded by lrie sou based ori acceptable arineiples when I luund iriere were eiriissiorins) nr mislake(s). [ml Trie crux oi llie Pleinlilrs eerrinlairil ageiriel \|\|’le quanlurri was Dscauss me SCJ did rial award llie Gsnium proellierie leg ooslirig aaeul RMA riiilrieri and «or zmlure surgeries trial were rieoeeeary lerlrie F\a'ln\|lH lo undergo From my underelaridirig cf me rriedieal evidence in mi: case, a crusri injury on rrie lower rigrir lirrie pl lrie l=lairirir1 reedllerl iri il hsmg unable to be saved and ir had in be arripuiared Therefnre‘ me impad or me collision rriusl riave been very loreelul and we would likely id have been due to me riigri sneer: of orie or borri vehicles prior lo rlie accldenl. Luﬂklng a\| me exleril oldsmages oi bolri veriiclee in prielograpris P2, riie silerilevideriee was compelling iri llial both ollnerii riiusl have been doing riiere marl so km/hour at lriar lime. The wlairiarr was “cNShed' by me car arrrie lrorir riglir panarid liie mood eeirld be seen an lrie ear in prielogrepri 15 SN wevF2um0WnnxxriiP>uail ‘Nuns s.r.i In-vlhnrwm i. used m mm i.. nﬂninaﬂly MIME m.i.ii wa aFiuNG WM! 15 :0 15 P2(c). The exterrawe rmpaet was seen tn photograph Pztat If both were not gaing cast, the impact wrtrr the cafs rrghthorrt etde weuttt have thruwn the Ptarrrtrﬂ an the mad but the In]un9s might nn\| have been as severe [41] m the case or Laksamarra Reatty sdn Bhd [mas] 4 cu an, the court there reterred 1073!! Kuan van v SulIint1rirvIarIiAlIensarI\)/[I955] 1 cm 429 where the Feaerat Ccurl held ‘The nrmetme that mutt guide (Ms noun tr. deterrrrrrurra wnetrrer rr should mterrere wrtrr trre quarrturrr urdarrtades vi crystar clear What rs area cleans trrat mum depsnds ar. the umumxlancas at aaur :25: n pzmculzrme ammml at the award \|n . palllculnv can Ihnnfmu II I: tar th. lppl tmm no cmtsmurwmlmrln ﬂu Ilnhloﬂhn nlmumsnncn anhat can at rs ta an ermmous estlmaln onm iIlIB1ﬂIlOfI'\|I damage In malcllmr tum was an omiislon an IM run mm Judi: lo culnldnrsomv nluvanl matnrtars err tn ma ldmillud tar purpou nl ..a.urrr.r.t soul: I nnl comitiernliam. tr the cam rs saustred arearmraeu lhal lhe Judge has aetau uparr wrung Mnctnles er rm men tr lsluslmsd trr reverstrra: trrueeu n ts rts duty to reverse the nrrurrrq ortrre trra: Judge- [Emphasts added] [42] The SCJ in her gmunds at judgmen ' paragraphs 129 drrwards discussed the rssue ul quantum where she stated that she agreed with ' ‘err in Exm\|>t\| D41 ovsm, Dr. Mchd lzmt am Ahmad @ Iammm, who was me rehabilitalion expert trom Hdsprtat Renabrmasr Cheras. wt was submilled that the quantum 0! damages awarded to the Plamltlf was on the lower sute. Upon perusat at her grounds at Judgment, I luund that me scu had taken the correct approach hr dealing wrth me issue of quantum and edmpehsatran as wen as appnett the rrght ease laws and arse gurued by the zma Revised Cumpen m at Persanal hrruries. The SCJ had also iducmea cuvrenl trends as decided by omev courts ul doardrrrate turisdrdtmrr and trre supenor courts. To say that she had not given adequate reasons var the awards rrr respect at the miunes would be wrong. Based on her assessment onhe evidence, thrs court agreed wrth most at the ﬁndmgs of the SCJ on the rssue ai quantum Htmeuer, 1 had the medrcal a 17 N wcvF2uFMW’nnxxmP>uav Nuns Sam In-vthnrwm re used m mm has aﬂmrraﬂly arm. dun-mm Va .rruua wrut 1:1 1:1 levlsed some or me awards where I round lha quanlum were not gweh due la same emlaslen er mlslake [43] For mslance, me SCJ am not allclw lor casls nfsluma bag: which spa stated in heroral emuence as belhg necessary lunhe Plalhllll (pages 170472 of lhe Nales of Evlaence). Coming back Io P17. me medical reporl stated that “me rlghl lower limb had been amputated at the pelvis. The nghl hemwelvls and sacral ala have been ampulaled. Tognal-rwllh ml: ampumloh, (hl rlgm ucul IIIWII wauld llso have b In oxclsol1.ThuI. he wauld not be Iblo In haw normal control of lhe anal sphlncter Ind mo collmomy lor the dlverslon of laeces wlll be penhanemr The sc.l may nal have prupevly appreclaled lhls fact The plalhllrl alsu had given evidence an «ms and «he estlmale (or a supply av 41 years was RM5:l1,:sso on He nestled a halter quality stoma bag lo avold leakages Therefore, although me Defendants submllled that lhls had not been pleaded‘ nevenheless. lnis llem l5 a lnelong neeesslzy lor me Plalnllll as he would no: be able lo amply hls bowels like more. [44] ll la not unreasonable far me calms la aeeepl anal laallmeny la support such expenses clalmea: Numl Husnl Muhammad H:ﬁz&Anor v. Karajazn Malaysia 5. Drs [2nl5] l cu n25. lh the E52 of Nur syararma nl Sz'ari v xerajaan Malaysia A or: 11019] 12 MLJ 741. me Hlgh Courl allowed some speca damages where the plalhlllr dld hm '(1) ll was lmlsallslm m experx a clalmahl \|o uollecl arlﬂ ﬁle all hllls and lecelvls wllh a wewla nnhglng a slam As long as here was oval leallmohylo supwl lhe expense aha me sxpa-us eeula he rsasorlablv axpsnsd In as -helm ans lo we eheumslaheas em-e case‘ «he wall: have allowed me dalm cm spsclal damages (sea pm 2»- 2: sh wevF2uFM0WnnxxmP>u£ll -we Sum ...h.. MU be used m mm me nllnlrullly MIN; dnunvlnnl VI] nFluNG we 15 JD [45] Muving err in eirier issues, regarding iiie decision nmie SCJ iri rim greriiirig me award for future surgeries, me cairn was guided by irie principles in me case A)! Chui vee ciiarig V. Lew Yhai izniui 2 cu m wriere iria Federai Calm rieid: ‘Ta siiriiriieriee my view all lhe issun. every perseri hii e riurii m seek medi1z\|lIea(n\sri\|a(a msvlmlolhs crime be ii an a iiaveirirrierii huspnai av si e Drlvale riespnai siii wneri ii carries in awarding u-riieees fur sirai irearirierir. ii mu hiatmam is emigrii er . gnvemmem riiaspiiai, rrie riiii amounl expended mid paid by iiie pelsmi srimiia be ewereeu ELAL ii rie seeks lreﬁlﬂielil 1\| a prime mspilai, he riss In pieve, llm rriei rie is iiisrinea la seek ireerriierii si 3 nrivsre iwsnital em, seeamiy. me i7!IK)UlI\|iHI1\|lFVM is reasmabie. Renard/W i.-ie mi mar. irier rie rise to cross: (ei He rriuei vruve iriei max pallicuiarinatmvit is riui aviliabie ei me eiweirimrii hmpnal allhsr GUI In me iirimrieiriirry cl irie rieeessnry equiniiierir er eiusiiiiea dnclms er eirier eiiriieieiii reesoru: er (bi He riiiisi prove iiisirmugri me ireemieriz is evziiaue at: aerierai riaepiiei. ii is riei avaiiahls wrrriiri a raawnabla perm eorisiaeririg me urgency mine ireeiiri-rii. rriis may in dun in iri. Dnngalﬂun ei iri. govemmavﬂ riosiiiiei uriuruI1Ierxn11iueri\| lenlmus, or re; Ha rriiisi pmvl mnl M5101: rruirrierii ei irie gnvemmenl Ilnspilni mew» sveiisnie, is gmssly irisaeci-iere. rriis may be due io lack er lrulned aemors iri iriei DHI1iCIAYaY ﬁeld av inr SDNVB eirier uuei: reesoris. At peiriien am by RK Neirian JD iii crierw miss my (supra) wiiri wrierii I agree we are wrieerriea wiiri traztmami rial eewirirrieiieiiori.“ [46] From me eviaeriee available, irie couri iouria irisii irie 2 surgeries would be avai abie ei goverrimerii riespneie eriu lherelare, die riei award iiie RM4D.DO0 no and RMA,(}0D.Dﬂ prayed iar iiiie were or irie surgeries iii priveie riuspnais as esiirrieieii by Dr. Mosesi [41] i have drswri up a table In sricw me awards made by the SCJ End «his couri's awri decision and iriereiare do rivi wish in corrirrierii uri each at me ewards. siimee e law examples here \|o derricrisiraie me exierii ci 1! SN wevF2uFwWna:xxriiP>u£v “Nate Smni In-vihnrwiii re vied m mm re nrwiriniily MIME mm. VII nFiuNG Wﬂxi an 15 n An oonsideraﬁcn given by the scJy sum as In paragraph 135wI1ere sne had stated: 35] Vsu nemunakn bawH\|em1M)~kus memparmah anmma (man: (1; saumn. msmbankan kepmuszm yang nan, perlimhlngan yangwajaruna pinilixan yang belul nanaanan am. herdnsarkan pnwdnngan vakm mm mama-mun bnhawa Dsrsaalin Ialah Ierjawah dengnn sepatmnya bagi memnermeh Eanﬁan anagmn uman ma pm my mngsx dan swat [channel] adulah hsvsasualan danaan nan ksadzan Plamul Menurul aanaangan vakzr. Dv Izml Deluandangan hahzva kakx nanu wanu ‘ullobock C-lay 4 Mvcrupmcuwr wntruﬂad Dmnhnu: knun‘ yang dtcadanqkan man cpo Sanlash Kumar Fraud adalih ﬂdik dllimnlwn umuk dlguna pakm nlsh pnnnn yang d\ni\n\|sehagaiK1~K1 Maxnnny xayax Mammn Dr lzmn, Immk membenkan kesebsaan ﬂan keslabﬂan yang .nkh\myE mamnmmumkan vmnns\ mahllm wavnm, we term sesual dlpe\|<a\kan aanann ‘madam pmsmanc mp mint’ Yang dvrska bemuk umuk dlpaszng secan harmurn uangan komvonan Ollnb-ask yang a-reka sum padan dalvsan Pangguna kﬂegon ‘hEmIpe\|v:4:1umy‘ dengzm grad naznny m «2 uwu manm. (1\|Bngi mnksud nu N93, msmluk Kavada slasan sabag ans Yinﬂ mvuluskan dalam kes Lmmnanmsagar s Karupp/an v Dr Thomas Yau Fak cn.nksAno«\|zuue1acLJ; [ms] '\|AMR ass yam menyabmnanawa 'M5mIlI9 man diva! dmaﬁkan nan.» xesenlarlg nu bemnk un\|uk -n-naapamn assuam yang mu uahvya wnan dwnlkmlhnyi, lam slﬂlsang kakn yaw semvwna dz-n Pllmg kumm; adzﬂah yang lzrdekai kepuda keadaan nsal. nnnu dengan mendapalkan gallkian kakx pa\su‘ Namun Dada mass yam same: man Isu kas yam new dhadlkan Demandrnuan Ape yam: smmzmya admah lungs! dzn swat/charactet kakw nanu my hendak mbenalkzn ada\ah belsasualan den paaan ua-san nan kaadaan Plawmf. my Dahm ken \| , say: bcryamu dnngan spa yang duthskan nigh Dr lzmx bnhawl yang mrbaik mm. pnnmr yang muauagonuan ‘hem\ne\veanm)/ danaan grsa «mum K1, selaln membeﬂkan keselesaan, walah xesnaxnnan mu akmmya msmakslmumkzn punenn molmm Plamm 1:) Sahubungan u-ngan nu, sayi msndlpatv bstdasaﬂun ktwangan pakar- pakan kldua-Gus kam aaran dangsn um: hangs yang yaun bemazn nan leg! nﬂawnyi nu ssbarmmyn bsmpnyn berpemnan msmbzmm mama ﬂalam melakukan verwanakan yang sewajamya Teiaph yang lahlh saints! aenuan an sm wcvF2uFwWna:xxmP>u£v «ma s.nn n-uhnrwm be mad m mm he annnnuy mm: dun-mm y.. mum WM In In (es! Gan Vuok Chlrl 5 Or: v Lee in; clrin a. Ors [mu] CLI am; (Fcj Hence, regardless pi any number pl grounds raised in me Memorandum of Appeal, me duly pl me eppeliale cuurl in a appeal is to determine whelhsr me appellanl nae pmved ins case on a balarlae ol propeblllues. [5] advantage oi seeing and hearing me wllnessee and me epportunﬂy to assess liieir demeanoun Rnsldln Elli Pannki v lrrsaarialr Kill [1915] 2 MLJ 214. He or she would have had ﬁrshhand pppprlwrilylp evaluate and appraise lire evidence pl me wllrresses However, in the lrrslanl case. In varying me apporllonrrrenl ni llebillry made by the SCJ. I iourld there was judicial rrrrsapprscrallpn at are fans‘ parlicuiarly in regard up we porn: or irnpapl pr me pplllalen and that me l=lalnlr« and nor have a valid licence to ride a mnlurcycle, which led the sm up conclude mar me Plelnlrn was aw. liable (or me accident This Grounds M Jupgrnerrl panlain my I am rrwlului mac me mar 01 «am would have had ins berlelli and reasoning: lur aepamng lmm me eslabllshea principle m There were 2 appeals in mis case al are High Cuurl i e Appeal No: AB-12BNC\/C-4-D3/2022 and AB-12ENCVC—6-D3/2022 ﬁled by me l=lalnlrii aria nelenaenls. reslﬁvtlvelyr againsl me whole declslon of lhe sessipna Cuurl in Talplng I have prepared me Grounds onluugnrenl \|o encompass mm appeals which were heard lpgemer on 2.5.2023 By a ouun urder da\|ed 7.2.2023, both appeals were ordered la be heard together and heanng was vixen on 27 4.2023 Howsvsr, me Flalnlllre eellcller filed a lecler «also 21 2023 WI respeel of Appeal Nu AB’ l2aNcw:—6-oz/2022 giving notice pl a Preliminary Otljscliun (Po) re me Defendants‘ spllcilar pursuanno Rule 11 04 ollhe Bar Council Rulings lpr [ls lailure lo adhere lo 0.55 r.4(4)o1ﬂ1e Rules oi coun 2012 (R00) when rl am rmlservs a pppy more wall index of me Record in! Appeal upon the I SIN wcvF2uFMW’nnxxmP>u£v Nuns s.n.l nnvlhnrwm be used m mm ms nﬂnlnallly MIN: dun-mm VI] nF\uNG wrui m 15 15 keadaan Flawmi walah 'mudu\ar mp punt: aengan kumponan Vunn yang barsewaxzn eengan keupayaan mam ying dlkalsganknn namIDslv\|1:mmy‘d:ng.In glad muhlhh m.»<2 Sayn was hevseluiu hahawa mhap kagmm enema. yam eenam belakannkan camp nend\ﬂ\kan Darjah s an kmaw Demahaman modul dawn aenase Vnwens, bail menguasa. kawalan ﬂan penlacaan vemnn uenan anwma «man mu dan den sea. mmmen Demakzlan my palsu pugs penu dlamml we bagl mamawkun nah nausu yam: havvdak dvbanarkan mu memausnnumkan wtavvsv mobﬂm I=lam\|ll' [43] I nae read me Notes of Ewdenee and nexee in page 152 (End. 15) almuugn counse\ for me Plaimm wnsisted that me F\am\|iW wamd he smtxble for the bmnic Veg as he nad a K15 mommy. that ne was qune aclive and could hop up me smirs,SD1d\d not agree and gave his reasens sm ‘csughf nnenn when caunse\ stated me P\ain\if1 womd need a portable mamneea wneslchav because he womd not be abie Io wa\k long mevance even with me Gemum \eg.SD1 slated me P\am(\fi would none be needing it i! ma c\aIm {or Ihe eenmm leg was auwea. Moreover, in order In be awe m use a motarlsad whss\chair. Ms abode must be In a mania «or the mnvemenl af the whae\chair as emenmse mere was no point gemng il. The survuundmg enwunmanl uncmmng umdnnr) where me memw womd be spending must nf ms unne would also he a lamnrto eensnser. [491 overeu, HoundIha1SD1‘s evidence and SP8 complemenled each mher, «meat in regard to mamcauon needed and me enouce of same memcan and neueenem equnpment wmch soc expxamee why those were unnaaxasry. Thsrehre. 1 agree: wnn the SCJ’s ﬁndmgs Ihal SDI's evidence was the mast rename and usenn guidance for the cam In delermimng whiuh snmtiun would he Mable lur the P\am\|if1 wnen compared with SP5 and SP9 :1 syn wevF2uFwWnnxxmP>u£v "Mme em.‘ nnnhnrwm be used m mm ms enmnmy mm: dun-mm vu .nuNG v-mm 15 m [50] On me correctness of the SCJ’s decision not \|o aﬂow an award fur [he Gemum prosthetic leg, «ms Cnurl agreed wilh hev mionane and me lauowmg cam of Appea\ case av cm-a Kay Hook 5 Armor v La. Hnan Pol [2022] 6 MLJ 38 where I! was stated: [40] In uurcnnlldllld viaw, ilwu nolermmous nrhaseleu venue LII: In mudm - . him‘ nrusmesxs wuem be anwen nomnemuu. loss 01 fulun mm-gs, llwnuld umeawnahly sot a mceuem In! an vlammva m slmllav nlrcumslanns In claim M a mum: pronh lnshad M a "mum, ma-onaulrnrxeae nyauaunc Pvoilhuvs line uwoula he lair cm us In nbnrvl man In: much morn -auonanry Pvimd muchxmc-ll man... had any ulnsvl an: hzzn -vtnrdzd a. uumpzns on [or Impuhllnn cm: .A: hlgh nghud mm. nsnondenun us anamen mu: lctmml by ma uc, (ht hydrl leg I5 used widely In me puhlllz nmeelnwemmmsmor and known to be popular m Manama worlln yours. um lmvunanlly. ma snphllllcilnd mu nlmu an blank la. a. not wisely um In Inn country and known In lack fa nu luv auananu urviu or npalv M n max. duwn. Admnnnzlbq n a (ma pnnmple ma: 3 p\|am\|il1 xeekmg mmpensntnly dnmuges a required in mmgale ma ma and 5 enhlisd my (a mssaname compensation and not exnmMan\| awards save on gmund: av nemssily wn exoenlionm cimumswnnes when 2 masoname aﬂemallve vs wmw unavaﬂahls or mannvapnaxe. mam mun be smmaam lus\|mr.awn shown by me mm For ms awam olwmvsnsalmn furwnﬂ abnvi me Irena or wmamporavv awavds {as} Prermsed an we lmeaomg gmun-1:‘ we womd mnchme man we aweﬂanl had «am In demmslnale In us me: the us had «awed lo nuumauy avhrmaaua the Ialalwly ov Ihe evidence m cmredly saw me Drindnlss apnncame m mm In damages m neqnaencs amuzns vm personal mwnss and mam lnues. In ow cansldered View and mgmem, me we had no! amvsd at a dsusmn men was ervorvmus m pnnclpll ur rm m wanxm appnﬂmn Inlellevence m lhis Insiance as velevam mnsidemlmns and «mm rm been Inked! mla am:mm\| Vn amvmg alike sawd decismn I411 we, mererme, mm mm was 29063! Is deaﬂy devmd a¢ mums, and hasmess m law and vac: Accomxnanyv we dismiss lms apveal and slim the aemsmn cl ms us As we appenam was an awaam m:1Im who had slﬂnrad semus Imunas, wt mm-sea our mmeuan m nmer me Danie! m bear mar vwn wsu dssvwe me apneum havwvg \n:\| mu appen\|' [Emphass added] :2 sw wevF2um0Wn:axxmP>uav we saw ...m.mm be used m mm me mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] .mm mm In 10 15 [51] slill an lne issue of me pmslhsliu leg, n was subrrlllled by me Plainlm Ihal snz was nul presenl ld exarrllne nirn and lake ms measurements‘ and lherefove lhelr quolallon was false. I have considered (he evidence orsm and so: and round lhsllnls allegallon was baseless. olner lssues rslsed an qusnlurn were lhsl lne SCJ did no: provlde any reason my she gave an award ol RMeu,uoc.nl) ler nurslng care 5 years‘ la lmm zma — 2023. The Dalendanls submlrled lnal lne Plainmrs grandlamer agreed lnere was no less ler Iwn lcl dare lnr mm In my view. RM5D.ﬂ00 on lur 5 years «or nursing care ls an apprdprlsle snrounl lo oornpensale the caregivers (includlng ms sisler and uncle) lcr lnelr full- Ilmz dare dl lne Plalnms needs. [52] The olher Issue was lnal lne award ldr loss cl samlng capaclty was nol pleadsd There was awdence fmm spa lnal lhe P\|aln\|lﬂ nad worked lar nrrn cnly leoenlly pnarlo lne accldenl and mat ne would ml be able ld corlllnus lha emplaymenl dus la ma Flainllffs physical dlsablllly Again. we sc.l nad covered ms In me grounds ol judgnnenn as follows ‘um lsu bemarlgkll mlrlﬂsrlal new ml helkall ‘lass aleamlng mnacnll ul Perllmbangml alen Mnhkamnh Agung damn kl: Vang Yap Fang 5 Anal v. Leona Psk Noon &Anar [1987] 1 cm 311‘ nsancu(l2ep):1s, bar\<al\|l>€msmz1lall YA Syed Aarl Barzkhah scl hahawa ‘TM lwunar lesl ru es applea ls wnelllsr some ma ln me mum, due in me [that aim: lmullls suvslntdby mm. ma plamrlﬂwlfl lice a waslarllla/Ilsk ole/mar mslngnrspa nlgsmrlg s lusspald anrplayrnanl lraou notmamv worm... ln. pl-linﬁlf wl: in lmpluymank lzr nut n m. nm at mu trill so long I: Own L1 snrlsllerl nnnr evident: that thin I: . ml or subslznrlnlrlsk rn-nus earning unlolly wlll he unmu in MI rurur. - [Empnasrs added} N wevfzurluwmnxxmmuav was Smnl luvlhnrwlll as used m mm me nﬂnlnnllly mm: dun-mm wa nFluNG wnxl [53] Here Is the comparison table anhe awards man have oomplied for ease of rsference: GAMTI RUGI AM TL au'nrw< Kscsnsum AWAIDDMNKAMM1 Kinuvusm szsva: umumm mean u Br:\nI::ummc\IIluv:/Klmlnfhialhumnvil-lat Rmsamm nuzmnnn man med) 2 Lwamim mm m-rnnanﬂ um mm. Ruimnun kununuu 5 Avumunir-11nuM¢vlu\nr.r:nuntI¢Ivrn mzamom nu:<.sa-mu Dmxmm ulnl mu .. Ian M ham: ...1 Ian nan-unhn wm.m..mn-vwm....»gn. ¢»msoo.au —Imbw\ rdwus wal dkluabtd mm mu .n..,..mn kn kn-aaazan mm .4." unwk new an n 1:) mm“ ms pmmm. ukﬂu m awn". ya-1. Denlnmun A man man mu ma Am ...a an Hmz um In rzmzmnn nu mmam Mm mummu -16 mm mm an m mm“ .. ml 5 cm mm... Dmxnxd mm»-< mm lwﬂax um Hmsmm In Ruumnn on mlddb mm s Lmm1wwmMA7vevIVhnrIVu\m\=aurn1\Ivl Rmmunaoa Rulmnomoa m n-«mum ma mm. 1 am mm r-QM sunenuv Ind mlsmv pm Numuno no n%uw.wo M mm! a Cuuunwrvwfnwlv-mwnn-n(wdvd»-awn n».mu.nauan Rulmumaon rum mmwv-mm) ~.: Slzrltr-yMIm lwa Icm snuvumxvmvmn mmw no Rulzapuwn an yrs‘ mm vuraum Vrln erlgml rm. um um sun mu mm mam -puumm. tum Ind M unallv mm. Aw «mm m (alarm v mp» Ia mu ..m um mnlnumg .9 luv: -16 Sun, mu lmunn mm-cum an 1cm Mn um ncar. nun: ya. at W. smmn Imam mnmm vmm: aim ulnar m min gar, wan mm an-zscm um um Mwul mar 11: Skn M ammo ac num.oom n ma. mm mama nu RuIs‘uno.w (in: mm. m an A no ‘as ca-4. <2 Famnnd mﬂmw mmnm nu kmunpnuun mm nuuo4nou.ou x>ms.soouu 3: sm wcwziurwwnnxxmvxdn «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vﬂ mum Wm! mum «um Kmns dnlun mm 31 uh bemmnm Rum 5n on .1 KB! ummn we amumm nndn mu nmssu nu ymnaunnnum unaoz mun drum mm ea an new-um am_mn on my. kin DIIV I-um —mv-pom umma nium mun «saw. nu mm mm wumvvvwlwli ﬂcrvnm am mm-y Kw: omtncx mm mm ma dun mumnkﬂmak-w Dmlr-4 ....mmy mum .yrmI kn uh-D koamm mum: avnrun Awum mmm Ksvurus-:4 sasvzu wwxnlm-1 imam . Dckmuecv M1: was an Rmzma a.....n pIn4'"N\|n n uparan m vlmwlhax : L-mu mu.» N-pm mm .1 m........ Pamanmnnm man no Iumnoau . Mlkinm Bum mm M: mum 1 P.-mm Ullrlalhk an Kul 5»-um Rusnun x :u: am,m.oo K: umom T-MW mm.» mm «man u Lms-Mummy handy nhvns Ruaunam mm» an kunilrwln ......n my. hi-uman mu." xsm mm um nmmu mm." mg .n ma mImn1uV.vv tnmr ﬂan 5-vmum nus! ylnv u.- ,¢m umau has 1 Mun «mm: mm n Lapovan mm mm an mu-rluw ‘ x.sv.mn.:.m M... nun». RMs‘uov.no Ruwoom 1 Km my-am seam sum: Pmmnnk, am: am no nu:‘nm.an >....u-mm Twin Emu!‘ Sen and x Puku Guru max I Caumelk smvw Nmmm no auu.m.un ¢ ms mmmn 'uBr mm mm —Yumawk umm . n-mvwvonwvw 112:! mu m-mm wwm m Dembeduhln mun nadapin m Kn: munwum m. mm mm ‘sac no bum rzumsuuu Imumruhln um mm. H Kn: wlurn mid: mwmm um: um —v-mmrnrvzm cum (xummzoo . mm nu my-mam. uh-uzumm >.m...m mm: nu:-.smm as sm wcvﬂiurrmwnnxxmvxdn «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! [54] cempensauon must be lav, reasonable and adequale but not 5 exeesawe. Vang salblan a. Anor v Jumll Bln Hnnm [19:11 1 MLJ 292; Ina: Faiqan Mahd Halml (1 child aulng Ihrough n-rmnor Ind noxl friund: uond mlnu Abdul Aux v Kmlaan Malaysia .1. Dr: [znls] 2 cm :55‘ Wang Li Fan wn am (an hlI()v Haidawull a sulnen 5 Anar[1en41 2 MLJ Am. The Court nas Ozken lntn cunslderztlun bl bath m penis‘ submissions and uerused lne grounds uliudgmenlanne sc.I and concluded lhatlheloval amounl below was lalr, reasonable and adeduale lo compensate me Plalrmmor ma Injurles, losses and mmre expenses: 1 General damages awarded RM4os,5oo.un 15 la speclal damages awarded RMn13,1w5 no in ma: damages awarded RM1,:l1a,das.nn. as sw wcvF2uFwW\|mxxmP>uav «me s.n.l ...m.mm be used m mm ms mm-y mm. dun-mm VII nFluNG Wm! l -mm unlub. dlmzsukkan HI V Amunnh nay- Knﬁlﬁnadn ma kadad Ruzsvnnnumlan lommn ms dmw,um.an Ruwlow no a m dmmr pad. mm M mauwkm . ma mvw mg am... an d.m..m. :..m.l.«w. mww on X12 man: hm: momhi = ammo an Mulllnly by an yum ‘ IM§:l.1¢n.rw Kewsl Foul mmsoo an ml.son.w ram mm-u an nMs1:.las.w LAN-LNN PERKARA BUYIRAN amen mum»: KEPIIWHN sssvzu umxmm YINGGI . me mm mm Yldzk amam Gmummorll hvlpw In wwly b Gullvwl km: dluluvknrl met-M amlruh Dlbzrurkzn xehahlwlln Ya m. Plnnlws an hem-ﬂ kanzdsvlllnlﬂ/Puvzyu my iunanyik mhwlui dl-nl nnzmanz 4n nwmml [551 During a diannaaiidn session on 310.2023, the ioudwing was ordered (a) mtereston general damages amie me of 5% Dsrannum iron. the date aiming do me Wm on mm: me daie of iudgmani an 5 23 5.202 (D) interest on special damages at me raia at 2 5% per anﬂum from me dale at me incident unm ma dale di iudgmem loday 23 3.2023‘ and (c) mtalest an ma judgmam sum at me race a! 5% per annum mm In da\e or iudgmenl until lull sememeni, CONCLUSION [55] Premlsed upon me above cdnsideiaiidn, me cdun iodnd that IS appauaia misrvaniidn was jusliﬁed and acddrdingiy varied ma dec an and quanium awarded by me iaamed SCJ The appsai VI Case Na. 4 against iiauimy and quanmm was allowed padiy wim ms1s cf RM1u,DGD.DD (in saver the ws\|s here and beiowu The apnea! in Case ND 3 againsi quanmm and iiammy was dismissed win no order as io 2n ddsis Dated 31 ember 202: /4...} NDOR RIJWENA sum MD NURDIN Judlclal commisslnnu High court M Maluyai Tuning 37 sw wcVF7IIFWWn3IXXmP>uEv Nuns Sum Illﬂhlv M“ be .5... M mm as nvVmruH\|y MW; dnunmnl VI] muNG ma For mu Agullnm: Ms. Shumma Guha Tnakum with Mr. Mak Xhlr Vin Mum. Munllt 5 Co‘, Bum Marlajam 5 For the Resgundem: Ms. Ron-Iu D-vl smllnqam with ML Mend. Amin Bin segu Alavudin Messrs. Arnold Andrew .1. co.. upon :5 5w mvm.mwp..xxmmy -ms Sum M... M“ be used m mm u. nvVWuH\|Y mm; “Mm. VII mum pm as :5 Plainolrs solicitor. There was no application idrexlensiori ol time to serve lne Dvafl Index. Meanwhile. tne Delendanls’ solieiter med a letler dated 3 4.2023 cl nlenﬁun to raise a F0 on me ldlldwlng issues: lailure In adhere to 0, 55 r.4 ol the R00. Aiﬁdavﬂs and exriipits in relation to interlocutory application snpuld not be included as pan ol lhe records ol appeal; appeal on me dsclslnn ol tne interlocutory application med al sessions ceun under Enclosures AB and 115 were out ol time under order 55 r. 5 onne R00; and iresri evldence is inadmissible on appeal under 0 55 r 7 ortne R00. Evidence not marked as Exnipitcan rieitner be included lll the Record cl Appeal nor tendered in coun. [3] At lne healing of the PC on 21.4 2023. among lne complaints were trial we nelendanls ed to include a Hospital Talplng A&E repon and an OKU card ol lne Plaintirt (maﬂxed as an exnioitl, out nad included a witness statement or a person who was not called lo testiiy in eoun In response to ttie Plaimilrs P0, tne lnelendants solicilersuomitled lnallney merely overlooked to serve the Draﬂ lrldex bul nad served me Records or Appeal wiinin lime and trial tnere was no iriiustiee caused II was also submllted trial the PO did not menlion anylhlrlg about documents belng included or exeluded in tne Record of Appeal our only on teennioality oi ndneomplianoe with 0.55 r.4(4). Tne Delsndanls’ solicitor stated that it tney were inlormed abnul lne Reoord el Appeal earlier, triey would have witndrawn me ﬁled reoords and reclined the lssue(s) immediately. 5 SW wcVF2lIFWWn3IXXmP>u£v -we s.n.i In-nhnrwlll re used m mm a. nﬂnlriallly mi. dun-vlnril wa nFluNG Wﬂxl 15 [9] On 25.5 2023, line Cmm delivered ils decision on me 2 P05 nled where in regard to me lzlainiitrs PO,1lle Calm dismissed ii and lnvuked 0 1A ollrie ROC, having regard to me overriding nol only lo lire leonnical non-compliance wiiln lire Rules. However, ine oosls aflhe Polo be oome by lne Delerldams lo compensaie iorlne Dmﬂ index rial nled in accordance wilri 0.55 r.4. The Court applied 0.2 r.3 in resolving inis PO raised py lne Plamlili. in regard lo lire Deiendanls‘ PD, lne courr siaied Ihzl inal doiarmems and wioiessas musi oe managed at eresi of luslica and me PTCMS properly so as nol In surprise me opponent and also ilia courl. lilne Plainiiii really believed lnal lne documenis would alieci ine de or «no ouwcms oi ine trial. they should nave proceeded wiin ine appeal wnion iney med earlier. «ms is one oi ine suoleol-mailers oi the preseni appeal helore lne coun of Appeal i.e. on Eneis. 4a and 115 iriai were dismissed by the SCJ. Tney would have argued «rial inere was ﬁnality in ma inierlorariory decisions. url [in] Brieﬂy. Encl. 45 was an applioaiion at lne sessions couri lo amend the sielemenl of claim In include medical cosis, inerapy oasis and medical equipnienl recommended oy a doclor. Encl. 115 was an apnlicalion by the Plainiiii io include in me bundle oi documenis a CD wliicn snowed lrie Plainmfs condition aiier lne aocidenl as well as ine alildavlis and submissions med in respect oi ine ippllcallon. The l)e1eridanis'suldmliiedinailiie Flainiiii mad a Noiioa oi Appeal pursuanl is lira de on or me sessions coon lo dismiss Enol. as and men wiiridrewine nolloe, but in oils appeal may did nai indisale may would be appealing on lnal decision They also submined ine iniraduciion or a CD and a wilness al a laie siege of trial, wnicri lney would nol nave an oooorlunny lo cross—exarnine me wilness. would be a miscarriage oi iueiioe ii ine ooun allowed ii 5 SN wcVF2lIFWWn3IXXmP>u£v None s.r.i In-vlhnrwm as used a mm s. snni.ii-i Mimi dun-mm w. nFiuNG WM! 15 15 [11] The lzlarhmrs sallellerargueu may um nel appeal because ll was an rnlehm deersrph. Hence, they havs rheluderl lhe CD and doeumenl rn lhe Reunrd :11 Appeal The Delehdahls suhmllteﬂ lhal the CD was nol lresh evidence as ll was hroughl ln lhe sesslens Cuurfs lrlal hul was run allowed. on the issue cl lhe Plalnhlrs apneal helhg hnreparrea, rhey submilled lhal lhe prwenl Nplloe ol Appeal sleled he was appeallrrg agalhsl lhe whale ol lhe Sessions Conn deelslon and lhe hence have oaversd lhe appeal agarnsl lhe rrrlennr declslnns also. Please reler (0 lhe GOJ ln Enel. 13 al page lu, paragraphs 23.2 and 2: 3 and al page la in paragraph 24.3 larlhe rallonale aflhe SCJ ln rlrsmlsslhg lhe appllcauons. [12] order as w eosts. The Ccurl proceeded lu glue dlreehuhs ln preparallurl larlhe hearlng ol lhe appeals and urged panles la move farwardln ensure The courl generally eooepled lhe PC at the uelendanle wllh nu ma! lhe appeals could be dlspcsed orexpedlhcusly, hearing In mlnd lhe aeelsenl happened on l9.a.2o1e. The Grounds or Judgment pllhis Caurl rh respeel of lhe Pos ls as per Encl 55 el Appeal No. ABel2BNCV-4- D3/2022 daled 31.7.2023 bscause lhe Plalnllfi had Ned a Nnllce of Appeal agalnsl the d an on lhe F05 an 7.6 2023 Thls Caun oplnes that the declslon In dismiss Ends. 18 and 115 Is more ln the nature cf a rullrlg which dos npmhally dlspuse rhe rlghls pnhe parlles and ls therelore nnl appealable. on the lssue of lhe yrdep being 'lresh evidence“ as clalmed by lhe Plalnlill. lhe cdurl lpund than il dld not sallsfy the 3 oandnimls lrl Lndd v Mmhall [1954] 3 AER 745. [13] There was also an applreellon for a slay of pmeeedlngs penalng appeal (cl lhe cpurl uf Appeal agalnsl lhe ueelsron an lhe Poe whleh was drsppsed plan 2 8.2023[u5I pelore lhe appeals were heard. I did holallew the eppllcalldh for slay of proceedlngs as I did no: see ll ﬁt re ppslpehe 7 SW wevF2uFM0Wn:axxmP>u£v -use s.n.l In-vlhnrwlll as used a yaw has pﬂnlhhllly sun. dun-vlnhl Va maue wnxl 15 2o 15 the appeais. stnce there were nu specrat drcumstanoes to grant the stay, more so when more than a year had passed aher the appeats were regtetered tn March 2022. THE APPEAL A. on the tseue at liahtltly [141 On the tssue of tiabttty. the witnases were the Flatntm htrnsett (SP7), SP1, SP2 and the Ftathtttrs uncte Ortg Ah Eng (SPA) who arrived at the scene at 9.10 pm The wrthesses tor the Detenaante were the 1‘ Detendent (sue; the 2“ De1ertdan\|\|SD5) whd was seated rtex\| to mm In the car and Melvtn an Swamtvajau (sm) and tnsuranoe adhtster. [15] The Detendants‘ version dnhe accident was as setbut in paragraph 2 above The 1“ Detendant tn hrs paltce repdn tadged apprdxtmatety 2 hours aﬁsttl happened stated that the mutomychst (the Ptatntiif) suddenty encmachsd rnte hts terre and htt the from part 01 ms car beartng registrattdn number FJL 2007 The motomyctes headlight was not err The1"De1ertt1antbraKed and trred to svotd the molomycle but failed. The damages to his car was tasted In Exhtbtt D7, and they were mostly an the tront right e enhe Atza [151 Meanwhtle, the t>taintm'verston dtthe acctdent was as par ms police report tn Exhtbll P6. The pohce report was todged an 27 2 2019‘ abmn 5 months aﬂsr the aectdent trr F6, me Ptatnrrtt stated that he was rtdtng a mbtdrcycte beartng regrstraherr number WFL 7373 awards Tatutng when are carouming trdrh the ebpoatte dtrectidn dvenoox another motorcycle tn from of II and hit hrs mdtoreydte The carwas driven tast and erroroeched tnto hts tame and he cdutd rret remember the number at the mher rnotorcycte The Pterntm sus\|atned severe injunes td ms head and nght a SIN wevrzuruowpnxxmmutty ‘Nuns s.n.r In-vthnrwm re used m van; me mrmrrry sun. dun-mm VIZ mum: Mr in 1D 15 limbs and ne tainted eiteiwards. He was taken to Talplrlg Haspnal His right middle ﬁngerwas ampulalsd due to the accident. E ii . [171 The civil suit was In claim tor the iniunes that he surtered as slated in the the medical report at tne Emergenuy a. Surgery Department or ‘leaping Hospital marked as P10, the Tai ng Hospital medical report dated ts ti zuta marked as P11. the clariﬁcation report at the Taiplrlg l-ldspilal dated 21.11 2019 marked as P12, the medical report of Dale‘ Dr R eunasagian lmm Guna Plastic a. cosmetic Surgery, Guna Laser centre marked as P15 and the medical report at Dr T Moses lrom orthopaedic specialist Sdn. End. marked as F17. The maidr iniuries I have summarised lrdm the medical reports were u ntum i a crush injury dver ngm ldwar limb which resulted in a right tiemipelvectorny (am:-ulation). avulsion fracture right olecmndn (elbow) which resulted in it becoming wobbly and halzilly unstable: right wrist doreillexlen and pslmarllexien losing its llexlbilliytn 12- au degrees (normal is 0-90 degrees); eldse lracture right hand 4'” and 5'" melaeanaals, open lraeture pruximal phalanx right index and middle ﬁngers which resulted in 1) the right middle iinger being amputated, 2; the ngtiit lndalt, ring and little ﬁngers becoming ﬁxed in a slawed position with no movement at all; shortening ol the right ulna by 1 cm, multiple sears over the right limbs which were extensive and permanent, and deglaving iniury over right elbow. 9 sin vrevF2uFwWnnxxmP>uall -use s.ii.i In-vlhnrwﬂl as used M mm ms sitiimii-v eiiii. dnunvlnrrl vta nFluNG WM! IS [18] The medical repon P17 oonoluded lhar— Vl vlll lhe rlghl lower limb had been ampulaled al the pelvis The rlghl herhrbelvis and sacral ala have been arnbulaled. Togelher wllh lhis ernuulallon lhe righl saeral nerves would also have been excised Thus, he would nol be able id have normal carllml ol lhe anal sphincter and the ooloelomy lor (he diversion ollaecee will be permrlent; an uloer al lhe anipulaled slump due lo relalned sulure malerlall This should be explored and removed so lhal lhe ulcer can heal surgery in we private sector will cosl RMADOO 0 uroslhesls lor me rlghl lower limb would have lo be assessed and mled by a preslhellsl/orlhollsl: the pallenl was nghl hand dolnlnanl and me nghl hand had no lunehdh al all: me ngnl ulna had hserl shenened by mm and me nghl radius ncalad nut onhe nghl eloow ioinl; was the nghl index, ring and llhle lingers had beemne ﬁxed in a clawed poslhon with no movernenl an all. he should undergo surgery In luse the rlghl elbow loin: in extension lo slabllise lhe rlghl elbow jolnl and allow lhe rlghl lhumb lo punch me rlghl index ﬁnger. ‘Mlh lhls, he would be able lo eland an lhe leﬂ loot and hop wllh lhe and al a walking lrame being held wilh bolh hands Surgery In me prlvale SBC1DfWl" cosl RMw,noo.ao: and in his bresenl slate, he ls dependern on anolher person to Flush his wheelchair. lllhe righl elbow lsfused ln uexiun he will never be able lo asslsl in holding a walking lrorne and he will In sin wcVF2IIFWWn3:XXmP>u£v None s.n.l nnvlhnrwlll be used m mm r.. nﬂnlnnllly MIME dun-vlnrll VI] nFluNG Wﬂxl	4,949	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
AA-42LB-5-11/2022	PERAYU Pendakwa Raya RESPONDEN P.MANIVANNAN A/L PANJIAH	RAYUAN JENAYAH: Kesalahan dibawah 307 Kanun Keseksaan – Percubaan Membunuh- Rayuan TPR terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen melepaskan dan membebaskan Responden- Sama ada pertuduhan cacat di bawah seksyen 422 KAJ memandangkan pertuduhan tidak dinyatakan OKT telah melanggar pengadu dengan menggunakan kereta – Sama ada HMS terkhilaf apabila memutuskan bahawa elemen kedua pertuduhan iaitu niat untuk membunuh (mens rea) gagal dibuktikan.	31/10/2023	YA Dato' Abdul Wahab Bin Mohamed	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2aa3ea63-7c6c-4c19-a672-755a115968a7&Inline=true	31/10/2023 09:18:50 AA-42LB-5-11/2022 Kand. 31 S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N YqjKmx8GUymcnVaEVlopw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal AA—l2LB—5—11/2022 Kand. 31 =, 10/22:: DALAM uunmuumra meal MALAVA an IPGH ngum NEGERI mun mam RIDZUAN MALAVSIA KES mvunu JENAVAN no ; uu2La.§11/znzz 13 :0 [Da\|arn perkara Mahkamah sesyen (3) lpoh‘ Pecak Kas Jenayah No AA-€268-OB/2022] PENDAKWA RAVA . PERAVU LAWAN P MANIVANNAN A/L FANJIAH RESPONDEN (700909-oe-53:1; ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pug; n [1] P Manwannan all Pinush yang msmpakan Responden (selepas mi dlkenall sebagal “ow; aalam vayuan ml telah dnuduh dengan panuduhan dv biwah dw bawah seksyan 307 Kanun Keseksaan lselepas ml mkenah sebagax “KK“) Dy aklur kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah Sesyen (3) Ipoh Ie\ah me\epaskan din membebaskan on lanpa mpanggn umuk membe\a dlri dan perluduhan lesebm Terknan dengan kepmusan m pmak Psndakwa Raya Iselepas ml dnkenall sebagav “Pemyif Ielah memfallkan rayuan xe Mahkamah Im [21 Fenuduhan yang mkenakan ks acas OKT adalah sepem benkm 'sanawa kalrm pads 24 ./u/ar 2020, [am Iebm Kurang 1 an pefalrg berfsmpaf m lap!/s/an bemampfran oengan kuhur Mslayu, Jalsn Eendalvara, 31550 Ipoh m dalam daerah Kmla, m ds/am Negen Perak, drdapalt tslah melanggar dan dengan psngelahuan kamu‘ bahawa dsngsn perbuatan nu msyebabkan kecsderaan kepada Rsguphali a/1 Jayamm, KPT. 550516.05-5m, adalah ms/akukan mencuba msmbunuh olang olen yang demrklan, ks/ml rem melakukan kssalshan yang Doe/Iv dihukum dl bwah ssksysn 301 Kanun Kesrksssn ' n Tnar sucn death was attempted to be caused by‘ or /n conssquenca of. the so! 0/ me accuse in That such M‘! was done mm me mtenriulv oi causing death, or [hat rt was dune wnn ma mtsrman of causmg such bodrly Injury as (a; deal)! or, (DJ sucn many nuury 8515 /rke/y (0 cause death, ms accused having no excuse for Incumng me rrsk al causing sucn death or rmury That the accused arzennusa to cause such daam by dnmg an EL‘! known In mm to be SO imminemly dangerous ma! :1 mus! in all probability cause (5) dcazn, or (D) such bod:/y rruury as IS likely to cause death, the accused having Ivg excuse for mcurrmg me nsk of causing such death or Iruury ~ [19] Daham membual kepuzusan, Tuan Hakim Mallkamah Sesyen berucap sepem benkul. Pu! srmply ma abava preposmons onne /aw pronounced by Zamam A Ram!" J can be understood as to denote mun me element: 0/ scrus mus and mans res must be sufdent/y and clearly Indicated ll! mo charge 11 If snhar one Is absent or not sufﬁroient/,v indicated, the charge is [hen rendered asrscms The defect is not curable under S 422 of the Cnmlnal Pmcedule Coda (cpc). Now, lstusvisit the charge In me mslanrcase - H says c/eany 'denyan penyszanuan Kamu, bahawa dsngsn psmuatalv rru menyebabkan kecederaan kepada Ragupalm s/I Jsyaramsn, KPT 550515 - as - 5157 « ﬁnd M5! the mens res slemanl ;s sulFc1srmy Indicated We should men sxamrns whether the charge has sI11TcrenfIy Indicated the anus runs In (hrs case, ms prosecution sought to Pnzvs me accussd aﬂsmptsd Io mumer me comp/imam‘ by mmrvg me camplamam Ilsmg ms car. Hrmng by car is the slelm-ml of Horus lens in ms case nus mus! II-version; be mmcalsd clssrry and summenrly m Ihs marge Alter dose/y scrutinizing one charge. I luund out that me charge slapped mu 5! mt wrmom mdicatmg further we manner me complainant was In: For olanty, ms rs/svan! Portion oune charye rs Iewoducsd bslaw » -. .1: mam nsgsn‘ Psmk, drdapen‘ man me/anygnr den dengan pengatshusn ksmu I! the charge rs In be mad s/one wtrhour Ioakmg at me ewdervce, a qusslmn wm any /7! ma follawrng fashion . The accused was hr: by whaﬁ wnarn mrs kmd alquesnorr arrsss, :1 can man be sard that the accused was not given snmiclsnt and specrnc notice as to what kind a! cnmmal ac! he has been a/(aged to have commuted mat consmule me oﬁence. secmm 152 1)! the CPC makes rr marrdarury mat the charge mus! oleariy indicate the oircrrcs The sccussd must he told deany, suifmsnlly arm pracrse», ma crrma wmcn he rs alleged n: have comrmlted mar colvsmule me av-reuse Imus is rm! dune, than the charge cannot stand agamst the accused Cnmmg back to this case, the charge Iailsd I0 indicate summarmy ma cnrmnal ed wmr wrrrcr: me accused was charged The manner me complainsnr was being rm had not been indicated m ma charge The accused was [nus not told sulfrmsnﬂy cl lh: Enme he was a//eged to have committed The charge was marsrora defective and no! curable under 5 422 of me cs-c ms charge rs tainted with r/regariry [20] Mahkamah ml bersexuju dengan dapavan Tuan Hakml Mahkamah Sesyen dv alas d1 mans perlakuan rnemrlggar yang dmyalakan dl dalam kenas penuduhan max dapat menurwkkan keadaan yang memungklnkan akan menyebabkan kemauan ke alas mangsa kerana 13 Ianya bu\eh unarsmn on hanya melinggar dengan anggma hadanrwa sahaja lanpa mengunakan spa-apa omsk aknbat danpada kenadaan pennuan lemadnp penakuan mskanggar eevsebun [211 seram nu, peneln-an Ierhadap P17 wailu Laporan Pembalan yang dlsedlakan oleh Dr N9 Kom Hilng (yang max mpanggu untuk member! kelerangan) menuruukkan bahsw: Fengadu memaklumkan beluau hanya terlnhat dengan kemawangan plan raya Me\a\m Vapulan perubacan lersebul Juga menurwkkan Pengadu telah bemndak nulang ﬂan hospna\ manna menenma apa-apa rawalan yang sepalulnya bag: xeeeaeraan yang dlalaml Ma\ahsn‘ Pegawaw Fembaaan yang mpanggul memben kelerangan (semasa pemeriksaan mama oleh pmak Perayu) jug: merlyalakan bnhavm kecederaan mangsa mak baleh menyebahkan kemanan [22] Mahkamah merujuk kepeda kes Pundakwa Rnyu Mn onm Slujll Awoyll Shukh mm uuu ass‘ yang mempermukan elemen dlbawah Seksyen 307 Kanun Keseksaarv» [251 Bagr pambukltan an canap kes puma [acre bagr kesalahan dr bawah Seksyen 307 Kamm Ksseksea/1, prhsk pendakwaan penu membuktrkan kesemua s/amsn benkul (5) SP2 mengs/am: ‘bodily paw’ atau nun sepemmana dsﬁnasr diperuntukkalv df bahawa Seksyen 319 Ksmm Keseksaan. (b) aaduy pam Ierselm! naleh membawa kemanan .4 (c) Bodily pam (srsshut ls/ah allskukan dsngan mat untuk cube menyebsbkan kamahsn kspada 55-2 (.1) Bod!/y pain telsebul Ielah dllskukan dslvgna niat urvtuk cubs menysbsbkan ksmalisn kspads SP2 [231 Sehubungan dengan nu, Mahkamah nn berpendapal bahawa Tuan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (elah menepatv kehendak undam- undang berkzllan danger! penuduhan yang dthadapkan ke alas OKT eaewen canal aan Ivdak dapal uupemaun m bawah Semyen 422 KTJ [24] Pmak Perayu setemsnya nemuyen banawa befdasarkan kaerangan saksi-saksl pendakwaan dw Mahkamah, wanya dengan yexes membukukan bahswa wujud pemuauan Cuban" unluk rnenmunun SP3 dalam kes Inn Fakla kes pendakwaan yang kukuh menyalakan bahawa OKT \|e\|ah PI-In memnggar ssa menggunakan kenderaan yang mpandu sendm olehnya sexelan pelanggaran kall penama, on cenen membual puemgan u dan kemball memuu ke avan SP3 unluk mmanggamya bual kalu yang Kedua Psrbuatan on Ini lelah pun menyebabkarl kecederaan retak pace mang xam kanan SP3 yang lurul msenxen men Dakar perubman wawtu SP1 [25] Plhak Perayu saterusnya bemujen bahawa walaupun kecederaan yang d\a\am\ glen SP3 bukamah sualu keesderaan yang membawa rnem, namun psrbualan melanggav atau merempuh spa sebanyak 2 Kah adalah mancukupl unmk menumukkan nial on un\|uk membunuh spay atau sekurangrkurangnya menkamen be\eh membull Merens baharwa on sudah \|en(u mengevahul bahawa pemualannya nu bmeh menyebahkan keoederaan yang amen menyebabkan kemalian oxen yang aemuuan, Tuan Hakwm Mahkamah Sesyen tetan terktmav apabua memuluskan bahawa elemen kedua tam; mans Isa (elah gagal dlbukukan oxen pmak psndakwaan walaupun keterangan kes pendakwaan aaanan was ﬂan kukuh dawn membuknkan mat on [25] Dalam menangkls mtzanan pmak Perzyu, peguambeka DKT barman binawa perrakuan on boner: menuruukkan mfarens bahawa bellau mak mempunyaw mat alau pengelahun untuk menyehabkzn xemaman ke alas mangs Ssbagatmana mpumskan an dalam kes Abd. Khalid Ahd Hamid [1:95] 1 cm 49. mat seseorang perm dunuxuxan malalui Derbuatan atau amaakannya dan iuga mekaluu xeterangan Ikul keadaan D-gum: Mnhlumlh [271 Dalam menenlukan on man dtsabttkan dengan kesaxatuan pernubaan membunuh, elemen-e\emen yang perm wujua adalah sebagiirnana yang dvpumskan da\am kes sauwu: Plnmee (20211 MLJU upon! benku\| a That the death al a human being was attempted, b That such death was attempted to as caused by, or m consequence of, the act ol the accused c That such act was cane wvln me Infsnllon or causmg death, or that tt was done wrth the Intention of csusmg such bamly /n/my as (a) ma accucca knew to be likely la cause deem, or an was sulfate!!! In [he ordinary course oi nature rc cause me: on that me accused anempvca to cause death by doing an as! Known to mm to be sa rmmmenf/y dangemus Mal (hat rt must In all pmbnmliry cause (a) doam or, (1)) such bod:/y In/my as Is nxsly (0 cause death, ms accused nawng no excuse my mcumng me n's»< of oausmg sucn oenrn or mjuzy. me: me accused attempted to Dause sucn asam by aomg an act known to mm to be cc rmmmenlly dangsmus that u musr In all pmbab:/ny cause (5) cream, or (n) such ccuuy /Iv/my as is liksfy to cause mean, one accused nawng no excuse Iar mcumng the risk uf csusmg such death armjmy " [251 Pmak Ferayu pedu bukukan Bolus reus Iallu on (elm: Cuba membunuh pengadu dengan cara me\anggar pengadu dengan manggunakan Karena dan mans ma wzllu pcmuatan nnelanggar pengadu dengan menggunakan kerela dllakukan dengan ma! unluk mendalangkan keeedevaan pad: Iubuh badan pengadu yang mane on warm ianyi akan mengaxmaxkan kemauan pg] Mankaman memjuk kepada Ralamal 5 nmranal, The Inman Pena! Code [34Ih Edmun] dx muka 725 yang mengatxkan sepem benkuz 1: The secrran makes a drsrinctron Delween me so! ol ma accused and ms rssun, yr any. The com has m sea whether [he scl, mmspecllvs af IFS result, was done with [he mlenhon or krlawledge and under crrcumstances menltonsd m we section Tlverslars, an accused charysd under sec!/on 307 /PC cannot be acquitted merely because the iryunes mmclsd an ma mam were m name afa srmpls mm The mjuly caused is an the vrta/pan and dangerous ro Me as slated by PW5 doctor, as such the ma! court has nghlly held accused Dsrban Smgh gm/ty ol charge or affsnce punishable under s 307 IPC (lrhal Darban slngn v, sun, 2013 cru em (um. [:01 E\emen panama yang perm duhuknkan aleh pmak Perayu adalah dalzm percubaannya untuk memhunuh Ie\ah meiarvggar pengadu dengan nvensxiunakan kevefa Mahkamah berpendanat bahawa elemen panama benaya dvbuktikan aleh pihak Penayu [31] Bag: e\emen kedua, dan kelerangan yang mkamukakan, adamh jelas pengadu hanya dllanggav olsh on dsngan kevela sekali sahma. Mahkamah merwuk kepada kelerangan sun seperli benkut s Eerdssarkan ksoederaan mu patah mnang «ma tersebm. bole?! tak Dv cerangkan apakah lahap kasenusan keeederaan Dada mangsa/peaam Iersebun J’ Kaxau kna bercakap tentang kesenusan kecederaan tzrsebul, ka\au lidak mrawac boleh menyebabkan xecacacan. Kalau kna befcakap lentang senus u samada boleh menyebabkan kernltian mu lrdak‘ max sehab ma hanya cadeva pads bahaglan kaku [321 Sehubungan dengan Wu‘ Mahkamah ml berselwu dsngan dapatan Tuin HMS yang mengatakan bahawa sekiranya wujud mat on untuk cubs membunuh pengaau, maka on berkeupayaan untuk melanggar pengadu beberapa kah Sekxrsnya pengadu (erlanlar an aeas ranah atau man, om akan ambnl peluang . unzuk Ierus me\anggar pengadu Walau begalmanapun, perbualan ini Ildak dllakukan alah on Mahkamah Im memenk dapacan Tuan HMS sepem henkul Intarmon ns anen infermd from me surrnumirng circumstances It is drmcu/1, 1 not rmpasslme, In pmcure direct ewdence to pmvs me lnmman afar! mdlwdual, in most cases :1 has to be mlaned lvom ms act or conduct ar other rslsvant crrcumstanoes or the case [per Zslshs Zahan JC (as she then was) In ABD. KHALID ABD. HAMID [1995] 1 CL] 49]. The camp/amen! was rm ance I! ma accused really Intended to mum ms comp/amam, he wowd mt me comp/ainanr several muss The moment we comp/swam was brought In the ground he/p/essvys me mused would take ems chance to run over mm mercilessly The accused, :1 ms mlsnhan to murder the cammarnanr existed on ms part, wuuld make sum the complainant um ﬂatly under me Iiles 0! ms car me moment me comp/amanl was nmugm down m me gluund 19 Bu!/nsleadoldomg man, he let /case ms camp/email! Ha mt ms mmpnnnanr only once He and no! can!/Hue Ntlmg ms comp/amanl Tnamrme, me surmundmg mmnmszanoes are msnmcxenx to tempt ms to draw an mlersnoe agamsr me accused that he has an nnsnnon to commit murder on the complainant [33] Dan keterangan yang ads, pengadu senam mengalakan bahawa benau nanya auanggar sekah sahaja Iallu selepas helnau benmdak mrun dan kerela Perbualan nn menuruukkan bahawa OKT naak bemlal unluk melsnggar pengadu mu secava Iidak sengaji xenanggar pengadu kerana sexnanya on msmpunyai mat unluk membunuh pengadu‘ sudan past: on akan (ems melanggarnya berka\H<al: bag: mencapaw malnya nu Namun‘ keﬁzrangan Ikul keadaan Mas menuruukkan bahawa se\eu\|s nu om’ lerus mernnggaxkan pengadu dx (empat ke]adIan [34] Melalui kelerangan-kelerinsan yang Ielah dwkemukakarh kssnnpnxan dapal dihual bahawa eleman-elemen venuduhan naak benaya an buktxkan uleh plhak Ferayu ssmasa penngkat Kes pendakwaan Kepunnsan Tuan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang melepaskan den membebaskan OKT dari perluduhan Ianpa dxcanggll untuk membela am «max pam dlubah atau mcabar F kl: Rlngkas Koe [31 Pm 24 Jma: 2020, Jan! lehm kuring 1 30pm. semasa pengadu lam: Ragupnan a/I Jsyaram memandu kereta ]ems Toyota was dengan ksrawan 30km-40km sewn, pengadu mensyakl bahawa pengadu dwkqzr o\eh on yang pads keuka Itu memandu kerela Jams Vulvu wama kelabu Setelah mengelahm banawa pengadu dxkejar men on pangadu telah belhenlukan kerela dx bahu ;aIan dan kemsr ﬂan kerela [4] Pengadu mernbemerm kereta den Keluar dan kareca kevana pengadu hendak bersemuka dan benanya kapada OKT avas sebab apa on mengeﬁr ksnata pengadu [51 Pada kelika nu, on \|e\an mamolung kerevta pengadu. Kemudnannya, OKT te\ah membuat puslngan U dan memandu (ems Xe zrah pengadu yang pada kellki nu sedang Denim mseneuan kerela pengadu on setevuskan melanggar bahaglan kakw pengadu Pengadu mun dan mengalarm keoederaan an bahaguan kakl melan Kanan [5] Pengadu dan on mengenau dv anlara sam same lain dan mak bevmusuhan Pekeuaan on adalah mekanlk kerata Pengadu pernah menghanlar kerela pengadu untuk mpenksa dan d-pemam aleh OKT sabevum .n. Setelah menialankan upan “x-ray“, pegawal pembalan (SP1) mendapau ma" kanan pengadu telah paoah dan mendapal vawa\|an pakar ortncpedu: [35] Sehuhungan dengan nu‘ rayuan Perayu Ke alas keculusan Tuan Hakxm Mahkamah Sesyen yang lelah mebpaskan aan membebaskan om’ an akmr pendakwaan adalah udak bermem dan dwtolak Tankh 24 10.2023 H (ABDUL WAHAE am MOHAMED) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA IFOH, PERAK Pggunmc Ponxu Pendakwa Ray: Kamar Peguin Magirl Am 5‘ Lat am‘ No 45 Persunran Fenian: szma wumaya u &ju Ian-n T-ngku $na1uan 5 Do Peguamcnn din Paguambeh P1777 Lm name Tmgkat 4‘ Seksyen 21 Jllun Kabun Sultan «seen Km: snam Kzlmlan Tel ua 7:952:32 Fan on 7455252 Emal mgmgamneaggman mm sw Vmknuasuymmvaivlww um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm 21 [7] Terdapat 2 wsu yang dibangknkan aleh plhak Perayu mm a) Sauna ada pertuduhan cam m bawah seksyen A22 Kamm Tatscara Jenayah 1‘KT.I‘\| memandangkan penuduhan «max dlnyahkan on Ielah mewanggar pengadu dgﬂggn msnggunakan Ingmar M Sama ada Tuan Hakvm Mahkamah Sesyen (sekepas Inn dlkenali sebagal “HMS“) terkhﬂaf dam segi undang— undang dan lakla apabula msmuluskan bahawa elemen kedua penuﬂuhan Iillu mat untuk membunuh (mens tea) gagal dlbuknkan [a] Bag: «em (a) Pevayu berhujah xnmawa dv dalam Kenas penuduhan dw muka sural 5 Rakcd Rayuan June 1, Ianya menyatakan “te\ah melanggar ﬂan dengan pengemanuan kamu ' D\eh yang demwkwan‘ peﬂuduhan yang mxenaxan (emidap on aﬂalah naak weak dan Ianya aaalan ‘cuIab(e'di bawah seksyen 422 KTJ [9] Pihak Perayu selanjulnya benlwah bahawa dl dalam kes W, ubyektil pemmunan yang dxkenakan lemadav oxr adalah untuk member: amamn lenlang penuduhan yang perlu duawab oxen ow ianu perbuatan on yang melanggar pengadu dengan kerela man man danpada perbuatan om tersebut bnleh menyebabkan kamallan kepada spa. Sehubungan dengan am, Tuan HMS (en<m\a( apibﬂa memhuat dapatan bahavm penuduhan Ks ates on adalah case! an aetmw kevann H1 dalam peduduhan udak dwnyatnkan pengadu dtlanggar dengan ave no] Perayu selerusnya msnegaskan bahawa kennggaxan untuk rnenyalakan an da\am perluduhan bahawa SP3 (elah dlllnggiv dengan ape udik Vangsung menunjukkan kemakamlan berlaku \|emadap on [11] IN ada\aI1 kerana plhak peguambma yang mewakm OKT di dalam patbicaraan Vnl mempunyal peluang unmk menyoal halas saks\»saks\| lermasukhan pengadu semasa dv penngkat pendakwaan [12] Manakaxa Peguambela on berhugah hahawa kerlas psnudunan yang unangka (erhadap on menyalakan on Ielah ‘dldapah me\angga\|’ pengadu Wa\au bagaimanapun pevnyazaan ‘melanggaf lidak dlpermukan menyebebkan seslapa saha1a yang membaca kanas penuuunan Iersabul Iidak mendapal gambaran bagannana perbualan “melanggaf lersebut mlakuxan sehmgga bcleh menyehabkan kecedetaan Pmak on seterusnya bemuyah banawa HMS Iidak knuav dan segl undangrundang dan «ma apabﬂa memmuskan penuduhan yang cacal Ivdak bolen dwsembuhkan dlbarwan Seksyen 422 KTJ Karina Kesan kecacalan um lelah manyebabkan xmakamlan kepada on Dagalnn an [131 Pnnswp asas dalam memnen pemmbangan ke atas sesuam riayuan adalah Mahkamah yang mendengardan member! pemmbangan ke mas sesualu rayuan perm hem-.m—r-an darn sukar membual penmanan ke alas kapulusan berdasarkan «axes yang amuac o\eh mahkamah yang s melualankan pelolcavaan penuh. Mahkamah an peringkal rayuan plga ndak sepalnlnyi mengganggu dapalan fakia Hakim olcala melalnkan wuludnya kesllapan yang keqara lelan dvlakukan oxen Hakim ocala Prinsip VII telah dllekankan dalam kes Ping Hun sun v. Data’ Yip V00 Foo [ma] 1 \|.NS :20. apamla Mankaman Rayuan menyalakan "When ma ﬁndmg onlla lnalludge IS lactual, however, was lad Iindefs VJECASVDIV calmer be alarmed on appeal unless ma aeclslon ol me locl ﬁnder VS plalnly wrong (see cmna Almne Llu v Mallmrl All colp son and A Anolnsl Appeal [1996] 2 cu 163), Zallarah or A Kadlr v Rarmlrla same Pro Lid 5 Anal [2011] 1 ms 1015, Kyms lnlemallonal sun and v. Kslus Pangaran Hasll Dalam Negen 120131 1 LNS 1;. The ﬁndlngs nf fact ol me me! [udgs can only be reversed when ll ls posmvely demonslraled to the appellate court rnnl - (a) by lesson of same non-dlrecrlbrl or mlx-dlnacllon or mnalwlaa ma [udge ensd ln accepllng ms awaenca which he or she an: accept. or la) in sssessmg and evaluanng ms svldence msludgs has lakan lnlo accounl some male: which na or she ougnr nor (0 have taken mm accaurlt, or raved [0 like mm account some manor W/lid! he Lu sne ought to have taken mlo account, or (o) rt ummsraxenly appears imm me evidence nselt a, from me unsansracmry reasons given by me /udge /or aocsplmg rt, ma: he or she cannot have taken proper advantage 0/ ms or her havmg seen and heard me witness-.es‘or (d) in so far awe judge has mnsa on manner and dsmsanour, men; are other crmumsfances which mdrcale mar me evrdenca of ms wrtnssses wmch he or she acceprsd /s not cream/9, as an Inslanca, where moss wtlnsssss have on some wllatsral matter delrbemre/y grven an untrue answer “ (141 Dalam kss Duo‘ suri Anwar Ibrahim v. PF 5 Annlhnr Appm [znm] 3 CLJ 131‘ Mshkamah Persekuman \|e\ah menyavakan sepem benknt "clemy, an appewam cowl dues nut and should no! pm 3 mm and mat gorng any /urmer me moment n sees that me ma: /udgs says that rs ms /mding 01 lacs It should go further and sxamms the evidence and ms circumstances under winch that Imdmg rs made (a see wnemsr, la barmw me words or Hr my (0.1 Malaya) m Hamhun Smgh‘s case (supra) “mm are substantial and compel/mg Ieasans for drsagreemg mm the nmxmg. “ ornsrwrss, no /udgmelvt would ever be reversed an quesmm alias: and ms pmwsmn cls 57 cm 1964 that an appeal may he no! only an 5 question al/aw out also on a quastlolv cl lacl or on a qusstlon nf mixed lac: and law would be mea/vmg/ass. ' [15] nalam slmasl (enenltu, Manuaman yang melmengar rayuim beleh campur langan atau mengubah kepulussn yang dlbuak ulen Mankaman yang melualankan pevbicaraan seklranya kepulusan yang dlbual herdasarkan anggapan alau andalan yang rnana Tan Cmarw Tnung J lelan membenkan panduan yang bower: dnkuu aalarn kes PP v Mung Abdul Rahman[I9B1]1 LNS 169 sepem henkul "rne learned Mal maglstrate ln ms /udgmsrll gave no lnmcallon that he dlsbe/ievsd PW5 and PW6, and he made no ﬁnding cl Isl)! on ma malanal dlsputed matters rslened (0 above canalnly, he compared lne lsspecln/9 learlmonlaa all PW5 and PI/I/6‘ and me Isspalldarll and. because ‘FW6 unaer cross-examlnaaan admlfted Mal anymmg in English ls dss/t mm by ms employees“ na found that ' ms court can see no way 77! whlch PW5 can accepl me chequs as settlement ol me sccusetfs debt" The lean-lad Mal maglstrale did not say ln hls judgment rnal he dlsbellsved PW5 and PW6 As seams to be the casa me DBSIS ol lms mmlng was the drswlng af In/Erelwes from the raleuanl evldsnce m me lnal However, for ma masons a/ready given, (hrs nasls is not legally sauna, and an appellate mun can ce/lam/y lnlsrfers with (NS imdlrlg based on lnlbrenoes. Evan af matters or last, an appellale court can interfere WI appmpnala cases, but such cases ala not common and an appellale mum belora rsschlng us cone/uslon upon malts/s a/Iact, shuuld and will always give pmpsr wmgm and mnsrdembbn to such mailers as (1) ma wew a ol the Ina! [udge as to be credrb//ily or me wunassas, (2) ma presumption or Innocence m Iavuur :1! me accused, a presumption certainly naz weakened by ma fact (ha! ne nas been aoqumed at his mat, (3) ma ngnl ofme accused to ma nenenr of any doubt, and (4) ma slowness or an apps//aza cam m dlsfurhmg a nnmng orlacz arrived at by a wage who had me am/anrsgs olsssmg ma wunasses " [16] Bevasaskan kepada pnnswp undang-undang yang dlnyatakan dalam kes—kes yang dxrujuk dw ans, maka aaalah peming unluk Mahkamah memberl perllmbangan semula ke acas alasan-alasan kepulusan yang (elah mhuat aleh Tuan HMS ke alas Isu-rsu yang dlbangknkan meh pmak Perayu dalam rayuan ini saxuanya wuyud kemlapan kelara yang Ie\ah mlakuxan ouen Tuan HMS semngga boVeh menyebabkan suilu xewakaauan yang senus herlaku da\am kepulusan carsenux, maka Mahkamah um adalah berkewaupan unmk msngganggu kepulusan yang mbuat aleh Tuan HMS nu [17] Ada\ah wajav umuk Mahkamsh mememk bemuk pemndunan di bawah seksyen 152 KTJ wauu (1; Tlagrnaptuduhan dibawah Kanun Im hendalda menevangkan kesalahan lenuduh (2) Juakau undang—undang yang menevlapkzn kesaVahIn Ilu ads mernnen nama yang speswlwk make keseﬂahan nu amen dlsebmkan dalam Iuduhan dangan nama nu sahaja ¢3) Jxkalau unuangamuang yang menetapkan keseﬂahan mu ridak member! nama yang spasm make seberiva nengeniun kesmahan nu hendaklah mnyalakan hmgga dapai member: kenyartaan keepaua Ierluduh berkenaan dengan perkara yang diperluduhkan 14) umangamuang dan seksyennya lerhadap kesalahan dnakukan nu nendakran msebutkan Juga da\am (uduhan mu (5; Fakta bahawa perluduhan ﬂu mhuat adalah bersamaan aengan Dem‘/ataan bahawa uapaaap syar-at perundangan yang dvkehendakl oleh unam- undang meruamkan kssalahin nu lelah mpsnum dalam kes yang «enamu ma] Bagx memenuhl beban pernw dw bawah Ssksyen 307 Kanun Keseksaan pmak Perayu mat! mememml heberapa e\emen an da\am penuduhan. Mahkamah merujuk kepsda naoanlal a. on Ial's. um of crimes, 2;». Edlllnn Volume 2, an muka suval 2221 sepem benkul ' n Pnma Fame unluk perwduhan “The pmsacunan must prove‘ :1 The! ma aaam or a human Dsmg was atremnred‘ w	2,876	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
CA-A72NCC-138-04/2023	PLAINTIF ARTINI BINTI AB RASHID DEFENDAN ENRICH GARDEN CITY SDN BHD	PENGHAKIMAN TERUS - Samada melebihi had batas masa waktu - Seksyen 26 dan 27 Akta Had Masa 1953 - Samada surat lanjutan masa untuk membayar telah memperbaharui kausa tindakan Plaintif - Samada ianya satu isu yang patut dibicarakan.	31/10/2023	Puan Nor Izzati binti Zakaria	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b2f15223-80c4-432d-8866-1d508244bc7a&Inline=true	Microsoft Word - ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN 1 DI DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUANTAN DALAM NEGERI PAHANG GUAMAN SIVIL: CA-A72NCC-138-04/2023 ANTARA ARTINI BINTI AB RASHID [NO. KAD PENGENALAN: 740707-03-5666] ... PLAINTIF DAN ENRICH GARDEN CITY SDN. BHD. [NO. SYARIKAT: 200601-03-0514] ...DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (KANDUNGAN 5) Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah permohonan (“KM5”) pihak Plaintif untuk memasukkan Penghakiman Terus menurut Aturan 14 Kaedah-Kedah Mahkamah 2012 terhadap Defendan. Di dalam kes ini, Mahkamah membenarkan KM5 dengan kos sebanyak RM1500 dibayar kepada Plaintif. Alasan ringkas adalah seperti berikut. 31/10/2023 16:18:37 CA-A72NCC-138-04/2023 Kand. 26 S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Latar Belakang Kes [2] Plaintif adalah seorang individu dengan alamat penyampaian di No. 8, Lorong Promenade Villa 3, 26060 Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur. [3] Defendan adalah sebuah syarikat yang diperbadankan di Malaysia bawah Akta Syarikat 1965 dengan alamat berdaftar di B-38, Tingkat 1 Lorong Seri Teruntum 139, Jalan Bukit Ubi, 25100 Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur. [4] Defendan merupakan sebuah syarikat pemaju yang membangunkan satu projek yang dikenali sebagai Promenade Villa di atas sebidang tanah yang diterangkan dibawah HS(D) 854 PT 6509, Mukim Kuala Kuantan, Daerah Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur seluas 14.2753 hektar. [5] Melalui Perjanjian Jual Beli bertarikh 26.06.2013 (“Perjanjian Tersebut”), Plaintif telah bersetuju untuk membeli dan Defendan telah bersetuju untuk menjual hartanah yang dikenali sebagai Sub-Lot 107 di Promenade Villa berserta sebuah rumah 2 tingkat berteres yang akan didirikan diatasnya pada harga RM350,000-00. [6] Defendan telah mengingkari syarat-syarat Perjanjian dimana Defendan telah gagal menyerahkan milikan kosong bangunan dan hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif pada atau sebelum 26.06.2015. Malahan, milikan kosong tersebut hanya diserahkan melalui Sijil Perakuan Siap dan Pematuhan (Borang F) yang dikeluarkan pada S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 11.08.2016 dan oleh itu jumlah yang perlu dibayar menurut Fasal 22(2) perjanjian tersebut adalah sebanyak RM27,125-48. Isu Yang Dipertikaikan [7] Mahkamah telah meneliti hujahan bertulis yang disediakan oleh pihak-pihak dan mendapati hanya terdapat satu isu yang dipertikaikan secara bersama oleh kedua-dua pihak. Maka, adalah lebih mudah sekiranya Mahkamah ini menyatukan hujahan kedua-dua pihak untuk mencerminkan isu yang diperdebatkan. [8] Mahkamah mendapati satu-satunya isu yang menjadi pertikaian bagi kedua-dua pihak adalah berkenaan dengan isu masa. Kausa tindakan yang terakru adalah pada 11.08.2016 dimana pada tarikh penyerahan milikan kosong hartanah tersebut diberikan kepada Plaintif. Berdasarkan undang-undang, tuntutan Plaintif hendaklah dibuat dalam tempoh masa 6 tahun daripada tarikh kausa tindakan terakru tamat iaitu pada 11.08.2022. [9] Defendan di dalam hujahnya berpendapat bahawa tuntutan Plaintif bertarikh 06.04.2023 adalah telah tamat tempoh kerana ianya telah melepasi had batasan waktu pemfailan yang telah berakhir pada 11.08.2022. Manakala, Plaintif berhujah bahawa Defendan melalui suratnya bertarikh 26.04.2017 yang dialamatkan kepada Plaintif telah mengakui liabiltinya tetapi memohon 70% diskaun atas jumlah terhutang merupakan satu pengakuan liabiliti yang boleh memperbaharui kausa tindakan tuntutan Plaintif. S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Dapatan Mahkamah [10] Mahkamah telah meneliti hujahan kedua-dua pihak dan Mahkamah ini berpendapat kes ini merupakan satu kes yang “straightforward”. Adalah menjadi fakta yang dipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak bahawa terdapat satu surat daripada Defendan bertarikh 26.04.2017 yang mana kandungan surat tersebut adalah berkenaan dengan permohonan 70% diskaun atas jumlah terhutang. [11] Yang menjadi pertikaikan di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah samada surat daripada Defendan bertarikh 26.04.2017 memperbaharui kausa tindakan di hadapan Mahkamah ini. Untuk menjawab persoalan ini, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada niat asal Defendan menghantar surat permohonan diskaun tersebut kepada Plaintif. Mengapakah surat tersebut dihantar? Pada hemat Mahkamah, sekiranya Defendan tidak terhutang kepada jumlah yang dituntut oleh Plaintif tersebut, Defendan tidak perlu untuk menghantar apa-apa surat permohonan diskaun kepada Plaintif. [12] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada Seksyen 26 Akta Had Masa 1953 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “Fresh accrual of action on acknowledgment 26. (1)... S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (2) Where any right of action has accrued to recover any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim, or any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest therein, and the person liable or accountable therefor acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect thereof, the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or the last payment: Provided that a payment of a part of the rent or interest due at any time shall not extend the period for claiming the remainder of the rent or interest then due, but any payment of interest shall have effect, for the purposes of this subsection only, as if it were a payment in respect of the principal debt.” [13] Mahkamah ini seterusnya merujuk kepada syarat-syarat yang perlu dipatuhi di bawah Section 27 Akta Had Masa 1953 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “Formal provisions as to acknowledgments and part payments (1) Every such acknowledgment as is referred to in section 26 or in the proviso to section 16 of this Act shall be in writing and signed by the person making the acknowledgment. (2) Any such acknowledgment or payment as is referred to in section 26 or the proviso to section 16 of this Act may be made by S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 the agent of the person by whom it is required to be made under that section, and shall be made to the person, or to an agent of the person, whose title or claim is being acknowledged or, as the case may be, in respect of whose claim the payment is being made.” [14] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes WEE TIANG TENG V. ONG CHONG HOOI & ANOR [1978] 1 LNS 234; [1978] 2 MLJ 54, 56 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: "There are three kinds of acknowledgments: (1) an acknowledgment by the debtor that a debt subsisted in the past but not at the time of the acknowledgment; (2) an acknowledgment that it subsists at the time of the acknowledgment; and (3) an acknowledgment that it may subsist in the future but not at the time of the acknowledgment". …. [89] The Federal Court referred to and relied on the English Court of Appeal decision in Good v. Parry [1963] 2 All ER 59. Lord Denning M.R. speaking for the Court of Appeal said: S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 "A person may acknowledge that a claim has been made against him without acknowledging any indebtedness. It is clear that what the Limitation Act, 1939, means is 'acknowledges the debt or other liquidated amount',... there must be an admission that there is a debt or other liquidated amount outstanding and unpaid. Even though the debtor says in the same writing that he will never pay it, nevertheless it is a good acknowledgment. In order to be an acknowledgment, however, the debt must be quantified in figures, or, at all events, it must be liquidated in this sense that it is capable of ascertainment by calculation, or by extrinsic evidence, without further agreement of the parties... No doubt a promise in writing by a debtor to pay whatever sum is found due on taking an account is a good acknowledgment today... provided always that the amount is a mere calculation from vouchers, or can be ascertained by extrinsic evidence, and is not dependent on the further agreement of the debtor". [15] Manakala di dalam kes Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur iaitu SSANGYONG ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO LTD V. TRIDANT ENGINEERING (M) SDN BHD AND ANOTHER CASE [2015] 1 LNS 1237; [2015] MLJU 1124, di mana Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Mary Lim, pada ketika itu menyatakan bahawa: S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 “[57] Therefore, for an acknowledgment to be valid, sections 26 and 27 require the acknowledgment of the right of action or the right to claim upon the debt must be: i. in writing; ii. signed by the person making the acknowledgment; and iii. made to the person whose "title or claim is being acknowledged.” [58] This means that the acknowledgment of the debt which is a promise to pay the debt due must be in a written form and it must be by the person who owes the obligation in the first place. That acknowledgment must then be made to the person who has the right of action or to whom the debt is owed. This exchange is usually kept within the immediate parties. But there may be instances where third parties are involved. In such a situation, can there still be a valid acknowledgment if it is made by a third person to a third person.” [16] Bagi mencerminkan prinsip yang diketengahkan di dalam kes tersebut, Mahkamah ini menyelusuri semula kepada surat Defendan bertarikh 26.04.2017 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [17] Melihat kepada surat ini, ianya tidak dapat disangkal lagi bahawa: i) Pengakuan pengakuan liabilti tersebut telah dibuat secara bertulis iaitu surat bertarikh 26.04.2017 di KM6 (Eksibit C); ii) Surat tersebut telah ditandatangani oleh Defendan sendiri iaitu Pengurus Projek yang bernama Mr. KS Wong daripada Enrich Garden City Sdn Bhd; dan iii) Surat tersebut dihantar dan ditujukan kepada Plaintif iaitu Artini binti Ab Rashid. [18] Menggunapakai prinsip di dalam kes tersebut di atas, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan Plaintif bahawa surat Defendan bertarikh 26.04.2017 merupakan satu pengakuan liabiliti yang telah memperbaharui kausa tindakan tuntutan Plaintif di sini. Maka, tuntutan Plaintif di dalam kes ini adalah di dalam tempoh had batas masa yang dibenarkan. Mahkamah ini mendapati Defendan telah melemahkan pembelaannya sendiri dengan mengemukakan hujah ini sebagai satu- satunya alasan untuk kes ini tidak diberikan penghakiman terus. [19] Adalah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap di Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes CEMPAKA FINANCE BHD V HO LAI YING (TRADING AS KH TRADING) [2006] 2 MLJ 685 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 “Quite clearly, the Court of Appeal has put the burden on the plaintiff to prove his case in an O. 14 application. With respect, that cannot be the correct proposition of law. In an application under O. 14, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish the following conditions: that the defendant must have entered appearance; that the statement of claim must have been served on the defendant; that the affidavit in support must comply with r. 2 of O. 14 in that it must verify the facts on which the claim is based and must state the deponent's belief that there is no defence to the claim. (See SUPREME LEASING SDN BHD V. DIOR ENTERPRISES & ORS [1989] 1 LNS 144; [1990] 2 MLJ 36.) Once those conditions are fulfilled, the burden then shifts to the defendant to raise triable issues. The law on this is trite.” [20] Pada hemat saya, Plaintif telah mematuhi semua syarat-syarat yang terkandung di dalam kes tersebut di atas, dan kes ini merupakan satu kes yang biasa dan yang jelas yang menjadikan ianya satu kes yang wajar dan sesuai untuk diperintahkan penghakiman terus. Tambahan pula, Defendan tidak sesekali mempertikaikan keberhutangannya terhadap Plaintif. [21] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes SOUTH EAST ASIA INSURANCE BHD V. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA [1998] 1 CLJ 1045 SHAIK DAUD ISMAIL JCA di m/s 1048 menyatakan: "It is well settled that if a defendant in an O. 14 application succeeds in raising even a single triable issue, it will not be a fit case and S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 proper case to order summary judgment. It is only in plain and obvious cases where there are no issues to be tried should recourse be had to O. 14." Kesimpulan [22] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa tidak terdapat isu-isu yang perlu dibicarakan dan Mahkamah ini percaya Defendan telah gagal menunjukkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa terdapatnya sebab lain untuk kes ini dibicarakan. Justeru atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Mahkamah membenarkan KM5 dengan kos sebanyak RM1500 dibayar kepada Plaintif. BERTARIKH: 31HB OKTOBER 2023 (NOR IZZATI BINTI ZAKARIA) Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Kuantan, Pahang Peguam: Plaintif: Gainneos Jacob Goldie daripada Tetuan Jacob Goldie S.S. Chew Defendan: Aiman As' Ad Bin Mohd Ghani daripada Tetuan Irfan Aiman S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Akta: Seksyen 26 dan 27 Akta Had Masa 1953 Kes yang dirujuk: 1) Wee Tiang Teng v. Ong Chong Hooi & Anor [1978] 1 LNS 234; [1978] 2 Mlj 54, 56; 2) Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co Ltd v. Tridant Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd And Another Case [2015] 1 Lns 1237; [2015] MLJU 1124; 3) Cempaka Finance Bhd v. Ho Lai Ying (Trading As Kh Trading) [2006] 2 MLJ 685; Dan 4) South East Asia Insurance Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia [1998] 1 CLJ 1045 S/N I1LxssSALUOIZh1QgkS8eg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	15,286	Tika 2.6.0
BA-25-63-09/2022	PEMOHON SUN HAOTIAN RESPONDEN JABATAN IMIGRESEN MALAYSIA	Permohonan semakan kehakiman oleh pemohon terhadap keputusan responden-responden untuk menahan pemohon dengan tujuan pengusiran dari Malaysia - memohon dan telah mendapatkan kelulusan daripada Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia bagi Social Visit Pass (“PLS”) menerusi program Malaysia My Second Home (“MM2H”) - Akta Imigresen 1959/63 (“Akta 155”)	31/10/2023	YA Dr Shahnaz Binti Sulaiman	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=33ee1bba-6be3-49dd-9c42-1bdcb85c4fd6&Inline=true	1 BA-25-63-09/2022 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA PERMOHONAN SEMAKAN KEHAKIMAN NO.: BA-25-63-09/2022 Dalam perkara mengenai suatu permohonan untuk kebenaran/Perintah- Perintah mandamus berkenaan satu tangkapan pada 23.8.2022 di KLIA di bawah Seksyen 6(1)(c) Akta Imigresen 1959/63 Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 53, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam perkara Jadual 1 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 Dan Dalam perkara Seksyen 6(1)(c) Akta Imigresen 1959/63 Dan Dalam perkara Seksyen 12, 13, 15 dan 19 Akta Ekstradisi 1992. ANTARA SUN HAOTIAN (No. Passport: EB 3535664) …PEMOHON 31/10/2023 09:34:47 BA-25-63-09/2022 Kand. 36 S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 BA-25-63-09/2022 DAN 1. SUPERINTENDAN SARAVANAN KANNIAPPAN PENOLONG PENGARAH INTERPOL POLIS DIRAJA MALAYSIA, BUKIT AMAN 2. KETUA POLIS NEGARA MALAYSIA 3. PEGAWAI PENYIASAT SARJEN 194974 WAN HAFIZZUDDIN BIN WAN AHMAD 4. JABATAN IMMIGRESEN MALAYSIA 5. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN [1] Ini adalah satu permohonan semakan kehakiman oleh pemohon, Sun Haotian terhadap keputusan responden-responden untuk menahan pemohon dengan tujuan pengusiran dari Malaysia. Relif yang dipohon [2] Dalam permohonan semakan kehakiman ini, pemohon telah memohon relif seperti berikut: “(a) Perintah mandamus terhadap responden kedua dan ketiga untuk membebaskan pemohon daripada tahanan. S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 BA-25-63-09/2022 (b) Perintah mandamus terhadap responden kedua dan ketiga untuk membebaskan pemohon dan tidak menyerahkan pemohon kepada pihak imigresen ataupun penguatkuasa negara asing dengan tujuan pengusiran. (c) Satu perintah penggantungan segala prosiding pengusiran terhadap responden 1, 2, 3, 4 dan 5 sehingga permohonan pihak pemohon di bawah Aturan 53 Kaedah 3(2) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 didengar dan dilupuskan oleh mahkamah yang Mulia ini. (d) Kos permohonan ini. (e) Perintah lain dan relif selanjutnya yang difikirkan sesuai dan adil oleh mahkamah yang Mulia ini diberi atau dibuat.” [3] Berhubung perintah penggantungan yang dipohon di perenggan (c) tersebut, mahkamah ini telah pada 5.9.2022 membenarkan perintah penggantungan sementara sehingga permohonan pemohon untuk semakan kehakiman di bawah Aturan 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 didengar dan dilupuskan. Fakta Kes [4] Fakta kes diperolehi daripada affidavit dan hujahan bertulis yang telah difailkan oleh pihak-pihak. [5] Pemohon merupakan seorang warganegara People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) yang, telah memohon dan telah mendapatkan kelulusan daripada Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia bagi Social Visit Pass (“PLS”) menerusi program Malaysia My Second Home S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 BA-25-63-09/2022 (“MM2H”) pada 26.6.2019. Pemohon telah menetap di Malaysia sejak tahun 2019 dan telah membayar wang deposit sebanyak RM 300,000.00 sebagaimana yang telah disyaratkan oleh Kerajaan Malaysia untuk Visa Malaysia My Second Home. [6] Responden pertama telah menerima maklumat daripada Exit-Entry Administration Bureau of Weihai Municipal Public Security Bureau, bahawa Passport People’s Republic of China pemohon bernombor EB3535664 telah pun dibatalkan oleh Kedutaan China melalui surat bertarikh 2.3.2023. [7] Bertindak di atas maklumat yang diterima tersebut, responden pertama telah mengarahkan Pegawai Penyiasat Kanan Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah KL International Airport untuk menahan pemohon di hadapan pintu pelepasan KLIA 2. [8] Pada 23.8.2022, pemohon telah ditangkap di bawah seksyen 6(1)(c) Akta Imigresen 1959/63 (“Akta 155”) dan ditahan selama 14 hari mulai 23.8.2022 di Lokap Balai Polis Aeropolis menurut peruntukan seksyen 35 Akta 155. [9] Selanjutnya pada 1.9.2022, pemohon telah diserahkan kepada Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia untuk tindakan lanjut. [10] Satu Notice of Cancellation of Pass menurut seksyen 9(3) Akta 155 telah dikeluarkan pada 8.9.2022 kepada pemohon yang memegang PLS MM2H dan pasport nombor EB3535664. Notis ini telah diakui terima oleh pemohon pada 20.9.2022. [11] Pada 20.9.2022, satu Order of Removal menurut seksyen 56(2) Akta 155 telah dikemukakan dan diserahkan kepada pemohon. S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 BA-25-63-09/2022 [12] Pada 20.9.2022 juga satu Order of Detention menurut seksyen 34(1) Akta 155 dan peraturan 32 Peraturan-peraturan Imigresen 1963 telah dikemukakan dan diserahkan kepada pemohon. [13] Perintah-perintah penahanan di bawah seksyen 51(5)(b) Akta 155 telah diperolehi sehingga 20.1.2023. [14] Tidak berpuashati dengan penahanan yang dibuat tersebut, pemohon telah memfailkan prosiding semakan kehakiman ini. Alasan untuk Semakan Kehakiman [15] Pemohon dalam permohonan semakan kehakiman ini telah membangkitkan alasan-alasan berikut untuk menyokong permohonan semakan kehakiman pemohon: “(a) Pemohon seorang warganegara People's Republic of China (PRC) telah memohon untuk mendapatkan kelulusan daripada Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia di mana pemohon diberikan Pas Lawatan Sosial menerusi program Malaysia My Second Home (MM2H). Pemohon telah tinggal di Malaysia sejak tahun 2019 dan telah membayar wang deposit sebanyak RM300,000.00 sebagaimana yang disyaratkan oleh Kerajaan Malaysia untuk MM2H; (b) Tangkapan pemohon di bawah perenggan 6(1)(c) Akta 155 adalah tidak sah kerana pemohon pada semua masa yang material memegang visa dan paspot yang sah; (c) Responden 1, 2 dan 3 telah gagal/enggan dan/atau cuai mengikut prosedur yang ditetapkan menurut Seksyen 12(1) hingga (3) Akta Ekstradisi 1992 memandangkan Kerajaan China telah gagal membuat sebarang S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 BA-25-63-09/2022 permohonan diplomatik dan cuma mengeluarkan satu Red Notice kepada pihak Interpol; (d) Responden 1, 2, dan 3 telah gagal/enggan dan/atau cuai untuk mengikuti Seksyen 15 Akta Ekstradisi 1992 dan ini telah mengakibatkan satu ketidakwajaran prosedur memandangkan pemohon dinafikan satu prosedur penting di mana Mahkamah Majistret akan memberikan perintah untuk memindahkan kes ke Mahkamah Sesyen. (f) Responden 1, 2 dan 3 telah menafikan hak pihak pemohon untuk mendapatkan satu perbicaraan yang adil di hadapan seorang Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang diperuntukan dengan jelas menurut seksyen 19(1), (4) dan (5) Akta Ekstradisi 1992. (g) Tindakan responden 1, 2 dan 3 menahan pemohon menerusi seksyen 6(1)(c) Akta Imigresen 1959 dengan tujuan untuk menyerahkan pemohon kepada pihak polis People's Republic of China tanpa mengikut undang- undang Malaysia adalah satu tindakan yang tidak sah.” Prinsip Undang-Undang Berhubung Semakan Kehakiman [16] Prinsip undang-undang berhubung semakan kehakiman telah dinyatakan oleh Lord Diplock dalam kes Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister of Civil Service [1985] AC 374 yang mana telah diguna pakai oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 seperti berikut: S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 BA-25-63-09/2022 “In this context, it is useful to note how Lord Diplock (at pp 410– 411) defined the three grounds of review, to wit, (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, and (iii) procedural impropriety. This is how he put it: By 'illegality' as a ground for Judicial Review I mean that the decision maker must understand directly the law that regulates his decision making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of a dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exerciseable. By 'irrationality' I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the courts' exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe's ingenious explanation in Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14, of irrationality as a ground for a court's reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though undefinable mistake of law by the decision maker. 'Irrationality' by now can stand on its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by Judicial Review. I have described the third head as 'procedural impropriety' rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failing to act with procedural fairness towards the person S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 BA-25-63-09/2022 who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to Judicial Review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. Lord Diplock also mentioned 'proportionality' as a possible fourth ground of review which called for development.” [17] Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Ranjit Kaur a/p S Gopal Singh v. Hotel Excelsior (M) Sdn Bhd [2010] 6 MLJ 1 menyatakan seperti berikut: “[16] The Rama Chandran decision has been regarded or interpreted as giving the reviewing court a license to review without restrain decisions for substance even when the said decision is based on finding of facts. However, post Rama Chandran cases have applied some brakes to the courts’ liberal approach in Rama Chandran. The Federal Court in the case of Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v Zaid Noh [1997] 1 MLJ 789; [1997] 2 CLJ 11 after affirming the Rama Chandran decision held that there may be cases in which for reason of public policy, national interest, public safety or national security the principle in Rama Chandran may be wholly inappropriate. [17] The Federal Court, in Petroliam National Bhd v Nik Ramli Nik Hassan [2004] 2 MLJ 288; [2003] 4 CLJ 625, again held that the reviewing court may scrutinise a decision on its merits but only in the most appropriate of cases and not every case is amenable to the Rama Chandran approach. Further, it was held that a reviewing judge ought not to S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 BA-25-63-09/2022 disturb findings of the Industrial Court unless they were grounded on illegality or plain irrationality, even where the reviewing judge might not have come to the same conclusion.” Analisa dan Dapatan [18] Berlandaskan prinsip undang-undang berhubung semakan kehakiman, mahkamah ini akan meneliti isu-isu yang telah dibangkitkan oleh pemohon dalam kes ini. (i) Pemohon diberikan Pas Lawatan Sosial menerusi program Malaysia My Second Home (MM2H) oleh Imigresen Malaysia dan pemohon telah tinggal di Malaysia sejak tahun 2019 [19] Menurut pemohon, beliau tidak boleh ditahan menurut perenggan 6(1)(c) Akta 155 oleh kerana pemohon telah pun mendapat kelulusan bagi Pas Lawatan Sosial melalui program MM2H. [20] Bagi kelulusan MM2H, kelulusan yang telah diberikan adalah tertakluk kepada beberapa perkara sepertimana surat kelulusan PLS MM2H bertarikh 31.10.2019 di bawah ini: “2. Please be inform that your application for Malaysia My Second Home (MM2H) Social Visit Pas has been APPROVED by the YB Minister of Home Affairs No. 08/2019 dated 26.06.2019, subjected to the following terms and conditions; 2.1 … S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 BA-25-63-09/2022 2.2 The duration of 10 years of MM2H Social Visit Pass is granted as per below: 2.2.1 Subject to the validity period of the applicant’s passport.” [21] Berdasarkan syarat yang telah dinyatakan, pemohon dikehendaki mempunyai pasport yang sah. Menurut fakta kes ini, pasport pemohon telah pun dibatalkan oleh negara PRC. Oleh kerana tindakan negara PRC tersebut, pemohon tidak lagi mempunyai pasport yang sah. Memandangkan pemohon tidak lagi mempunyai pasport yang sah, maka ini bererti pemohon tidak lagi memenuhi syarat yang telah ditetapkan bagi PLS MM2H. (ii) Tangkapan pemohon di bawah perenggan 6(1)(c) Akta 155 adalah tidak sah kerana pemohon pada semua masa yang material memegang visa dan pasport yang sah [22] Bagi hujahan ini, pemohon berhujah bahawa tangkapan pemohon di bawah perenggan 6(1)(c) Akta 155 adalah tidak sah kerana pemohon pada semua masa yang material memegang visa dan pasport yang sah. [23] Mahkamah telah pun dapati bahawa pasport pemohon telah dibatalkan oleh negara PRC dan oleh itu, pemohon tidak lagi mempunyai satu pasport yang sah. Bagi pemilikan visa yang sah pula, Peraturan 11 Peraturan-Peraturan Imigresen 1963 memperuntukkan seperti berikut: S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 BA-25-63-09/2022 “Regulation 11. Visit Pass (1) – (2) … (3) A Visit Pass shall no be issued otherwise than prior to his embarkation to an unberthed passenger traveling to Malaya unless he is – (a) – (b) (c) in possession of a valid passport which permits his return to his place of embarkation.” [Penekanan ditambah] [24] Berdasarkan peruntukkan peraturan 11 Peraturan-Peraturan Imigresen 1963, bagi mengeluarkan pas lawatan, seseorang hendaklah mempunyai pasport yang sah. Dalam kes ini, mahkamah ini telah pun mendapati pemohon tidak mempunyai pasport yang sah apabila negara PRC telah membatalkan pasport pemohon. Sekiranya pemohon tidak lagi mempunyai pasport yang sah, maka dengan demikian pemohon tidak boleh mempunyai pas lawatan yang sah tanpa adanya pasport yang sah. [25] Memandangkan pemohon tidak lagi mempunyai pas lawatan yang sah, maka pemohon telah pun ditangkap. Berhubung perkara ini, seksyen 35 Akta 155 memperuntukkan: “35. Any person reasonably believed to be a person liable to removal from Malaysia under this Act may be arrested without warrant by any immigration officer generally or specially authorized by the Director General in that behalf or by a senior police officer, and may be detained in any prison, police station or S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 BA-25-63-09/2022 immigration depot for a period not exceeding thirty days pending a decision as to whether an order for his removal should be made.” [26] Oleh yang demikian, berdasarkan fakta kes dan peruntukkan seksyen 35 Akta 155, semasa pemohon ditangkap, pemohon tidak mempunyai pasport atau PLS yang sah. (iii) Responden 1, 2 dan 3 telah gagal/enggan dan/atau cuai mengikut prosedur yang ditetapkan menurut seksyen 12(1) hingga (3) Akta Ekstradisi 1992 memandangkan Kerajaan China telah gagal membuat sebarang permohonan diplomatik dan cuma mengeluarkan satu Red Notice kepada pihak Interpol; (iv) Responden 1, 2, dan 3 telah gagal/enggan dan/atau cuai untuk mengikuti seksyen 15 Akta Ekstradisi 1992 dan ini telah mengakibatkan satu ketidakwajaran prosedur memandangkan pemohon dinafikan satu prosedur penting di mana Mahkamah Majistret akan memberikan perintah untuk memindahkan kes ke Mahkamah Sesyen. (v) Responden 1, 2 dan 3 telah menafikan hak pihak pemohon untuk mendapatkan satu perbicaraan yang adil di hadapan seorang Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang diperuntukan dengan jelas menurut seksyen 19(1), (4) dan (5) Akta Ekstradisi 1992. S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 BA-25-63-09/2022 [27] Mahkamah ini akan meneliti ketiga-tiga isu ini bersekali memandangkan ianya melibatkan peruntukan Akta Ekstradisi 1992. [28] Menurut subseksyen 1(2) Akta Ekstradisi 1992, Akta Ekstradisi 1992 adalah terpakai bagi negara-negara berikut: (a) negara yang berkenaan dengannya suatu perintah telah dikeluarkan oleh Menteri di bawah seksyen 2; (b) negara yang berkenaan dengannya suatu arahan khas telah dikeluarkan oleh Menteri di bawah seksyen 3; dan (c) Brunei Darussalam dan Republik Singapura. [29] Seksysen 12 Akta Ekstradisi juga memperuntukkan: “12. (1) Sesuatu permintaan oleh mana-mana negara bagi pemulangan seseorang penjenayah buruan yang berada di Malaysia hendaklah dibuat kepada Menteri melalui wakil diplomatic negara itu.” [30] Berdasarkan peruntukan-peruntukan yang dirujuk di atas, mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa Akta Ekstradisi 1992 tidak terpakai dalam kes di sini kerana: (a) tiada perintah yang dikeluarkan oleh Menteri di bawah seksyen 2 Akta Ekstradisi 1992 oleh itu peruntukan subseksyen 1(2) perenggan (a) Akta Ekstradisi 1992 adalah tidak terpakai; S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 BA-25-63-09/2022 (b) tiada permintaan ekstradisi telah dibuat oleh negara PRC menurut peruntukan seksyen 3 Akta Ekstradisi 1992 dan tiada arahan khas telah dikeluarkan oleh Menteri di bawah seksyen 3 Akta Ekstradisi 1992. Oleh itu, peruntukan subseksyen 1(2) perenggan (b) Akta Ekstradisi 1992 adalah tidak terpakai; dan (c) tiada sebarang permintaan (requisition) dibuat oleh negara PRC menurut peruntukan seksyen 12 Akta Ekstradisi 1992. (vi) Tindakan responden 1, 2 dan 3 menahan pemohon menerusi seksyen 6(1)(c) Akta Imigresen 1959 dengan tujuan untuk menyerahkan pemohon kepada pihak polis People's Republic of China tanpa mengikut undang-undang Malaysia adalah satu tindakan yang tidak sah. [31] Menurut peruntukan seksyen 35 Akta 155, seseorang yang dipercayai dengan munasabah boleh dikenakan pengusiran dari Malaysia, boleh ditahan oleh seorang pegawai polis kanan antara lain di balai polis bagi tempoh tidak melebihi 30 hari sementara menunggu keputusan sama ada perintah pengusiran perlu dibuat. Dalam hal ini, pemohon telah ditahan di lokap balai polis Aeropolis daripada 23.8.2022 sehingga 1.9.2022. Pemohon kemudiannya telah diserahkan kepada Jabatan Imigresen untuk tahanan pada 1.9.2022 sementara menunggu keputusan berkenaan pengusiran pemohon. Mahkamah ini mendapati penahanan pemohon di antara 23.8.2022 sehingga 1.9.2022 di lokap Aeropolis ini adalah tidak melebihi tempoh 30 hari yang diperuntukkan menurut seksyen 35 Akta 155. S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 BA-25-63-09/2022 [32] Berhubung tempoh penahanan pemohon oleh Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia yang bermula pada 1.9.2022: (a) Notis Pembatalan Pas telah dikeluarkan pada 8.9.2022 menurut seksyen 9(1)(b) Akta 155; (b) Perintah Pengusiran telah dikeluarkan pada 20.9.2022 menurut seksyen 56(2) Akta 155; dan (c) Perintah Penahanan telah dikeluarkan pada 20.9.2022 menurut seksyen 34(1) Akta 155. [33] Fakta kes adalah bahawa pemohon telah diwakili peguam seawal 20.9.2022. Pemohon berhujah mendakwa bahawa tiada peluang diberikan kepada pemohon untuk membuat rayuan selepas Notis Pembatalan Pas bertarikh 8.9.2022 diserahkan kepada pemohon pada 20.9.2022. Pemohon juga menyatakan bahawa pemohon tidak dimaklumkan mengenai proses rayuan tersebut. [34] Fakta kes juga menunjukkan bahawa tujuan penanahan pemohon adalah bagi menyerahkan pemohon kepada pihak negara PRC. [35] Mahkamah juga telah merujuk kepada perenggan 9(1)(b) Akta 155 yang memperuntukkan bahawa Ketua Pengarah Imigresen mempunyai budi bicara untuk membatalkan pas lawatan pada bila- bila masa. Bagi maksud ini, perenggan 9(1)(b) Akta 155 menyebut: “9. (1)(b) in his absolute discretion cancel any Pass at any time by writing under his hand.” S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 BA-25-63-09/2022 [36] Oleh yang demikian, pembatalan pas bertarikh 8.9.2022, pada pandangan mahkamah ini adalah teratur dan dilaksanakan mengikut undang-undang. [37] Berhubung perintah pengusiran pula, subseksyen 56(2) Akta 155 memperuntukkan: “56. (2) Any person who is not a citizen unlawfully entering or re- entering or attempting unlawfully to enter or re-enter Malaysia or unlawfully remaining in Malaysia shall whether or not any proceedings are taken against him in respect of the offence be liable to be removed from Malaysia by order of the Director General.” [38] Oleh itu, mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa walaupun pemohon bukan merupakan prohibited immigrant di bawah subseksyen 8(3) perenggan (d) Akta 155 tetapi pemohon masih merupakan prohibited immigrant di bawah subseksyen 8(3) perenggan (h) Akta 155. Dalam hal ini, beban pembuktian bahawa pemohon bukanlah prohibited immigrant adalah terletak kepada pemohon. [39] Bagi maksud ini, subseksyen 8(4) Akta 155 memperentukkan seperti berikut: “(4) The burden of proof that any person seeking to enter Malaysia is not a prohibited immigrant shall lie upon that person.” [40] Selanjutnya adalah dihujahkan sekiranya sekalipun Perintah Pengusiran tersebut tidak wajar dikeluarkan menurut subseksyen 56(2) Akta 155, dalam keadaan pemohon tidak boleh lagi memasuki Malaysia kerana tiada dokumen yang sah, tiada peruntukan S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 BA-25-63-09/2022 undang-undang khususnya di bawah Akta 155 yang membolehkan pemohon dibenarkan bebas untuk pergi ke mana sahaja di dalam Malaysia tanpa diserahkan kepada pihak imigresen ataupun diusir keluar dari Malaysia. [41] Dalam keadaan ini, tindakan di bawah undang-undang hanyalah mengeluarkan Perintah Pengusiran. Tambahan pula, PLS MM2H pemohon telah dibatalkan menurut seksyen 9(1)(b) Akta 155. [42] Berhubung perintah penahanan, sementara menunggu pengusiran keluar dari Malaysia, pemohon telah ditahan di bawah peruntukkan subseksyen 34(1) Akta 155. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah ini mendapati penahanan pemohon adalah berlandaskan peruntukkan undang-undang yang sedia ada. Kesimpulan [43] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang telah dinyatakan, mahkamah ini mendapati tiada illegality, irrationality atau procedural impropriety yang membolehkan mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan semakan kehakiman ini. Sehubungan itu, permohonan semakan kehakiman ini ditolak tanpa perintah terhadap kos. Tarikh: 30 Oktober 2023 (SHAHNAZ BINTI SULAIMAN) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya, Shah Alam S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 BA-25-63-09/2022 Peguam: Bagi Pihak Pemohon: Edwin Navis, Muniandy Tetuan Edwin Navis & Associates Advocates & Solicitors A-3-9, Avenue 8, Jalan 8/1, Seksyen 8, 46050 Petaling Jaya, Selangor. johnson32@yahoo.com +6 03 7962 7052 Bagi Pihak Responden: Noerazlim binti Saidil Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang, Bahagian Guaman, Tingkat 4, Podium Utara, Bangunan Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah, 40512 Shah Alam, Selangor. noerazlim@agc.gov.my S/N uhvuMNr3UmcQhvcuFxP1g Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	24,955	Tika 2.6.0
CC-62D-107-09/2023	PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara] TERTUDUH KHAIRUL NIZAM BIN ARIF	Rayuan di atas hukuman di bawah Seksyen 39(2) ADB 1952, Hukuman panjara 8 tahun, sebatan rotan 3 kali dan pengawasan polis 2 tahun, OKT telah mengaku salah, mempunyai 10 sabitan lampau.	31/10/2023	Puan Noor Aisah binti Mohamed	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=8cda34a1-46ce-4fdf-be5e-babd3d155e17&Inline=true	31/10/2023 09:55:05 CC-62D-107-09/2023 Kand. 11 S/N oTTajM5G30Xrq9PRVeFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oTTajM5G30Xrq9PRVeFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oTTajM5G30Xrq9PRVeFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oTTajM5G30Xrq9PRVeFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oTTajM5G30Xrq9PRVeFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oTTajM5G30Xrq9PRVeFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oTTajM5G30Xrq9PRVeFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oTTajM5G30Xrq9PRVeFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oTTajM5G30Xrq9PRVeFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oTTajM5G30Xrq9PRVeFw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal cc—s2D—1u7—u9/2023 Kand. 11 :,,m/22:; 29-35 as DALAM MAHKAMAN sssvgu R5 1; DALAM NE§ERI FAHANG KES JENAVAH Mg cc—a2D-1n7-on/202: ANTAFIA PENDAKWA RAVA LAWAN KHAIRUL NIZAM BIN ARIF [NO.KP: 130901.05-M47] ALA GHAKIMAN vsuunnuwau 1 Orang Kena Tuduh mm Khairul Ninm Bin Mil, Mn. KP: 7uauu1—nn—u47, Ialah an-mun dan mengaku balsshh m bawah sualu penuduhan m bawah Seksyan 15mm ma Dzdah Earhzhaya sebagamllna benkul ‘Bahawa ksmu pads 24/05202: my mun kurang 515 pagi, m P9/aha! Rtsikarl, Opens! am Tahanan Nsrkunk /PD Raul: Fansng, dslam Dns/sh Raub, da/am Nsgen Pahang, term drdapstr membsﬁkan kepada dm ksmu ssndfn dadah berbahaya mus Amphetamine Han Methamphetamine dun Kamu msmyunysr (1; szbilan Ierdalvulu ctr bswah seksysn 390(1) Akfa Dada]! Eelbahaya 1952 Iulru pads 12/12/2018 Iii Mahkamih Sasysrl Raul: Oleh rlu kamu Is/an mslakuksn kesalahan dl Dawalv Seksyen 15(1[(a) Akts Dadah Bertwlvaya 1952 1137! bolsh dlhukum dr bawah Seksyen seem Aklu nmn berbahays 1952 dart drbacn bsrsama saksyen 365 AH: Dadah Bamshaya 1352 “ Huluman : Pamela selsma Ivmpoh Iiduk kurang 7 Iamm (slap! mm ms/Harm‘ 1: (shun, dsrv Ivsndak/ah [uga aucenaxan dengnn hukuman Saba? mink kursrlg daripada 3 mam um mm mm dalvpads 6 sebaian dim dikshsndakr msnjulam per-gawmn Irdak kurang 2 tahun, tidsk /sbm .7 tanun munum! Seksyen 355 Am Dadan Esllzahayu 1952 on lelah mengzku hersahah temidap punuduhan mu‘ ranam man dzn akibat perlummin salami dileringkan olah Mahknmuh Mahkamah selelan semevan barnuas had 1:) on memahurm axan sllal din ak-net pengakuan salalmya Ievsebuf sena (in) on msngasahkan benar akan lakta kes sen: kasemuz eksim (puny yang mkemukakan men pmak pendakwaan, mensrima pengakuan salah OKT 3 Semah mandengiv rayuan mmgaa. dan pemberalan yang mkemukakan, Mahkamahlelah mensanmn on den meapuunkan Hukuman pemala selamu a lahun um! am. as 2023, iubalan rotan sahanyzk liga an 13 kah) sena membenkan pennlah pengawasan pom selama 2 \|ah\m selelah «amac mecualam hukuman penjava sebagalmana pewnnukan uy bawsh Seksyen ass ADE 1952 4 Temvan dangan hukuman caysem on melalm pmak Pennva la¥ah mamvailkan Naais Rnyuan oenamkn 26.10 202: agav hukuman tevsebul dapst dmngankan. RAVUAN gnu QKI 5 on m da\am layman penngannnnya (ehh memonon mahkamah unluk mengenakan hukuman umnganxan kelana on bemm-"45 (ahun, memvakan searing duua, dan mananggung seurzng amk OKT yang bekeua sebagal hmuh raaang, mempunym gap manyax RM Lsou hinggn RM2.nuu sebulan om memakvumkan kepida mahkamsh hlhlwa on mempunyai masa\ah samv ma\|a yang memenuxan rawalan pakar komea dan mas». dz\am tampon rawalan RAYUAN PEMEERAVAN OLEN PINAK PENDAKWAA\|g 5 Pnhak pendakwlan lrlsrrmhon agav hukurnan yang I7era\| uan senmpal mkenakan ke was on mangambll kvra keszwanan lampau on as maﬁa samrsn lampau menmuukkan OKTMAK mu! Pmak Psndakwian se\anMnya mamuhnn hukuman sewnpal yang dipavt membenkan psngafavan kepada om’. FAKYOR PERYIIIIBANGAN MANKAMAH 7 Terdapii banyak nas undang undarlg berkaulan pnnswp unusua- undang yang mamap daham msrualtmkan hukuman sens lzkIur— cam pennqanan dzn pemoeram Mlsalannya R v. Ball 119511 .15 Dr App R. 154, pp Iwn. Abdul Hnllm ls-hak a. mu Lagi[?l713] 9 cu 559. R v. Ipul [zen] 1 SCR us, PPIwrl. Ynganaman Bay Kuppu @ umim-n (201511 ms 1485, Pendakwz Ray: mm Mohd F-uzr /mb-I/J bln Ahdullall mm] 1 LNS 107,- mas} s ML] 23:: Nukuman yang urpcrumumm clan undangdlndang. 3 Di dalam kes W hukuman yang lmlsh mkenikan ke alas on an bawah pemnlukan Seksyen 390(2) ADE 1952, adi\ah pamara salami lempoh mak kurang 7 Iahun Ierapi tidzk melebmi 1: mum, dan hendzklah yuga mksnakan dengan hukuman sebm Milk kurnng davlpada 3 saoaoan dan hdak lehm davlpuda s sebalan dan dikehendakl merua¥am pengawasan mak kumng 2 (shun, man Islam 3 tahun menurm Seksyen 385 me Dldah Earbahaya 1552 Maka hukuman yang duuluhkan oleh mahkamah Im adaxzn dalam mang lmgkup yang dvbenarkan men Imdang—undang Fvnylkuln nlah on 9 Elarpun on «em. mengaku man‘ namun im hdak belmaksud swam dlskaun aces hukuman secara aummalik waiar dwbenkan kepada on atas pengzkuan berszhahnya Lenmenm Yagx sekwanya kepenﬁngan awam menunm hukuman yang delaren (Raj: Inudaln Shah V. Public Pmsocmol mm 4 ms 155; (19791 1 Mu zm, hidon mn Shnrlfrv. Public Frc.:ocutor[1.V§6l 4cL./u1,- (1996) mm 159, lsmni/bin Ruidv. Pummm Ray: (1599) 4 cu A02; mm MLIU us (mo) I cu 402, Public Froncutor y. Md Rashid Harun mm} :4 cu u2;(zm1 J MLJ 503,- Kesavzn ./I Bzskzmn -/. wane Prosecutor 1209:) 5 cu 290,- pm] 5 ML] Ju; [zany] 1 AW? rm Dengan pallgakuan salah hehau, on Ielah menlmbulkan sualu laklnr mmgasw yang bole?! mengumngkan hukuman ks alas behau (Iujuk m snu soo Klm v, Pub/lc Prunculor 119151 1 ms 15:, {ms} 2 ML./ 114) wavau baqzwmanapun‘ uengurangzn hukuman kepada pesalah 10. yang lelah mlngaku salah bukan sesumu yang aulomauk. la nerganuung kapadz fak\|a ﬂan keadian my map kes Pasummaya makiman Augusuns Paul (kanka nu) dalzrn kzs up v. Gnvlnﬂnan Chinden M\|lr[195I1Z ML! 131 ada menyalaknn "1: Is generally accepted max an Iccused pmon mum be given crew: or dlIcmm\| [or pneamng gudty (see PF v Rawnman A on [1593] 1 MLJ 45) However, as 1 had me occaslan xa abserve m Zaldon Sham! u PP[19SB) 4 cu on at p 445 Be mac as u may, this rule u nm a ﬂncl rule as me cowl may‘ m me exercue of ma cﬂscreliun. ruins: In gram any ducoum Vn appropnala cases (see PP v Lee Say A Ors[198§]2 cm 155). In my apmiun, a guncy pba nugm m be considered wn lzwnur 5! ma accused anly when aH ulharlamols and clmumslanoes surmundlng ma commission av me Mlence .usuvy men a consmeuauon. us applmauou m vavour or me accused depends un ma cvcumsfanoes 01 each case an (mam km a. hadapan mzhkamah mu mahkzmah manaapau bahawa pengakuan salah on ma»: lergulong di dalam kalegon yang palm mpenunnangkan hukuman yang nngan secara amomallk mengamw ma lakm kes secira kusaluruhan yang mbemangkan dx hadinan Mahkaman pad: oankn pengakuan saran lersehm umuan rum: klplmirvyan lwlm 11 12 Mahkarnah Im mengunznl ma bahawa kesakahnn yang menbaxkan uaaan auaxau mpanuang sews ale?! Parhmen Mahkamah nnnujuk kepida Public Frulanutor v. Abdul mum [link 5 Sam Lagi (supra) yang menyenluh lenlang an dadah dvisylmarkzn sebagai musuh nambor saw negara wkah Karayaan pads (shun 1933, Rulukan .uga dibual aleh Muhkamah kepada Sekxyen sec ADE 4952 yang telah dimasukkan ks dalam Akla levsebul benkuian ma Dadah aemanayn (Pmdian) 2on2 [Akla A1157] yang mamperunmkkan nukmnan yang wemn bum mkanakan (emadap seswspa yang drluduh dv hawah seksyen 15(1) ADE 1952 sekimnya «emgax 2 saman reknd m hzwuh kesilahan yung same we mahkamah udak men}a\|uhkan hukuman yang semngau gangan xesavanan yang uuaxuxan ranya max dznal maruzga dan meﬂndungw kagennngan awam yang memmlul supeyi nukun-an yang mkenaknn wen mahklmah adalan sekarl ﬂengan hasrat kemjaan ma\alui perlggubalan undang-undang yang Iablh heval da\am lnembanteras penyakahgunaan uauan S-Ibihn Iimpau nxr 12 14 P7 mm Rekod saman Lampau he\ah dlluvuukkin kspada on dan salarusnya mam henar oleh cxr. Rekod samun lampau on menunjukkan on mempunyaw m vekod samlan yung memnamucan xeuxanan di hawah Ak\|a naaan aamanaya dan kal- \|eraKmrsab1lIn nu bswan Seksyerl zacm ADE paaa (ahun we yang mana nalan diialuhkzn hukuman 5 lahun permits. 1 my sabarzn mtan dan 2 mun pangawaaan. Im menuruukkan on melupzkan seomng pesauan bsmlang yang max pamzh znsavakan kasaxanan yang dnakukan Kemar masuk peruara hampw den separuh umur on msaoankan kesalahan mehbnlkan panyalangunaan dadah memhukﬁkan hahawa on adslah pesalah \|agar yang lidzk pernah senk menguung: kesﬂahsn yang iama. oxen yang demlklany hukuman penjara n tahun, 1 kah sebalan mlan adalah wajzr dzn saampal dengan kesmahnn yang dllakukan sebagal hukuman bersnfal pencsgahan kepada many awam den on aenmn Ianya wga bagw msmenuhi hasral panggubaw mang- undang dzn mg; demi kepentmgan awam 15 navan. menjaluhkan hukumun. says Ie\sh menlmblnﬂkan semua raxnor d4 alas dan kapemingan on \|erma:uK Iaktvv mmgam yang wujud bag: max on oan ma fakmv kepemmgan awzm Saya ;uga Ielah meruluk xenada ape yang dinyalikan men Hakim Abdul Wahab dalam kes Public Pm-cucor v. Soh Son Vang A Anor mac] 1 LNS 196; mm] 5 MLJ :55 di muk: rural :51 mo "fhe puono Weiss! 1: served by balancing mo ilvksrsxl olme ncousso unzn (he mlelusf 0/ mo public In see not only Mu! serious offences are punished upplupliunsly and mm 5 wsw lo deterrence not only o/me gm/Aypsnon not also cmsrs rnwn commmmg a 5-rm//M offence. but also that me Dumshmsrvl ﬁn fawundmst ncconnng In the cnme U/limalely, the ilvfsmsls til we accused person is om ssrvsd if submissions on than amt; am not only with me personal cancems af mo accused, bu! a/su show me: it rs balanced mm me lagtlfnmta concerns ol pub/rc mtslssh mch./dmg me rsoognmon mar 1:/shoe rs dons, not snnp/y mom 2 vaguo Isfsrslvca In pom intsrssl, am also by brmgrng n mlu «om by den/mg with ms nu: mncsms al 5 wcllm and ms dependants II mo pubbc, mc/udmg ms wchms and lhsrrdspandsnls do no! res//um. rs dam: accarniflrg Io Me aims, Isspect lb: and reliance upon me law wt‘/Ibe eroded " [ESIMFIJLAN 15. Berdasavkan kapsda ismua cam: yang dmyalalcan dv am dan setebn suya mempemmnanguum semua pmmp dan gzris panduan penghukuman maka pad: hemal saya hukuman penjari selama 5 tahun, 3 kall sebalan rolan dzn 2 tahun pengawasan poﬂs auavah suaw hukuman yang waiar. advl dan san an as‘ undangmndang Eanankh pada an OkIober2D23 Disedlaknn oleh NoorArsaWE'_'M'mI\ ohamed Haium Mahkamah Sesyen Mahkamah Sesyen Rania‘ Pahing Pmak—Fihzk : Psndnkwa Riya Fuan Fumma AIP Slnnapan Orarlg Ksna Tudull max drwaklli to	1,343	Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10
WA-41S-6-05/2023	PERAYU AW YU HUI RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	Criminal Justice - appeal by accused against sentence - plea of guilty - offences under section 420 Penal Code and 468 Penal Code - application of section 172G Criminal Procedure Code - stands independent of section 172D (2) and (3) Criminal Procedure Code - penal provisions to be interpreted strictly in favour of the accused - reduction of sentence allowed.	31/10/2023	YA Tuan Muniandy a/l Kannyappan	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=3c6476d4-0907-485b-b212-a162289f3abd&Inline=true	1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR (CRIMINAL DIVISION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: WA-41S-6-05/2023 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: WA-41S-7-05/2023 BETWEEN PERAYU AW YU HUI (NO K/P: 820409-06-5381) AND RESPONDENT PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 31/10/2023 06:17:37 WA-41S-6-05/2023 Kand. 23 S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 NOTES ON SUBMISSION 3.8.2023 Untuk Pengurusan Kes Perayu adalah OKT Akan mengendalikan rayuan secara sendiri Perayu: 1. Sentence passed is 20 months imprisonment - for two cases. 2. One charge - section 468 PC - 8 months imprisonment and fine RM2000, in default of payment of fine, 3 months’ imprisonment 3. Another charge - section 420 PC - 12 months and 1 stroke of the whip and fine RM3000, in default of payment of fine, 5 months’ imprisonment. 4. Learnt lesson well. 5. Want to be beneficial to the society. 6. Family needs me very much. 7. Parents are unwell. 8. Pray for a concurrent sentence. S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 DPP: Prays for another date to submit. To - 7.8.2023 for Hearing of Appeal. 7.8.2023 For Hearing of Appeal Appellant present. DPP: 1. Hukuman serentak tidak wajar. 2. Dua kesalahan yang berbeza - Kesalahan pertama - 420 KK - setahun penjara dan denda RM3000 (denda telah dibayar dan hukuman sebatan satu kali. 2. Kesalahan kedua - pertuduhan dibawah seksyen 468 KK - 8 bulan penjara dan denda RM2000 (denda telah dibayar). 3. Pengakuan salah terhadap kedua-dua kesalahan. Telah berada di dalam penjara selama 3 bulan. 4. Kepentingan awam perlu dipelihara. 5. Hukuman seharusnya berasingan. S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Appellant: 1. I have learned my lesson. 2. Pray for a concurrent sentence. Decision After having considered the case in its entirety, and the fact that the accused had paid the fines for both cases, this court decides to reduce the sentence of imprisonment imposed. For the first charge - 3 months imprisonment. For the second charge - 3 months imprisonment. Sentence to run from the date of arrest - 6.5.2023. Sentence of imprisonment to run consecutively for case no. WA-41S-6- 05/2023 and WA-41S-7-05/2023. Sentence of whipping of one stroke remains - section 288 (4) applies. No effect on the sentence of fine, as it has been paid. S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 JUDGMENT [1] An appeal was lodged by the Public Prosecutor against the above sentence meted out by this court on appeal by the accused person. [2] Accused, who is the appellant to this appeal has to endure two different sentences for two different criminal cases of arrest against him, namely, case no. WA-41S-6-05/2023 and WA-41S-7-05/2023. The sentences are to take effect consecutively from the date of arrest on 6.5.2023. [3] Case no. 6 – 05/2023 pertains an offence of cheating pursuant to section 420 of the Penal Code (PC/Act 574), while case no. 7 – 05/2023 relates to an offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating pursuant to section 468 PC. [4] Both the charges against the accused are: Charge of forgery “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 06/05/2023 di 18-09 DMajestic Jalan Pudu, Pudu 55100 di dalam Daerah Dang Wangi, Wilayah Persekutuan, Kuala Lumpur di dapati dengan curangnya telah memalsukan Kad Pengenalan Malaysia yang mana telah diubah suai bagi tujuan penipuan pinjaman secara atas talian, dengan niat supaya dokumen palsu tersebut digunakan bagi tujuan hendak menipu. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 468 Kanun S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Keseksaan dan boleh dihukum di bawah peruntukan yang sama dan dibacakan bersama Seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Hukuman: Jika disabit kesalahan hendaklah dihukum dengan pemenjaraan selama tempoh yang boleh sampai tujuh tahun, dan hendaklah juga dikenakan denda.” Charge of cheating “Bahawa kamu bersama seorang lagi yang masih bebas, pada 19/05/2018 jam 1.20 petang di Mc’ Donalds Suria KLCC, Jalan Ampang, Dalam Daerah Dang Wangi, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, dalam mencapai niat bersama telah menipu Muhammad Syafiq Bin Sidin (930503-14-6185) dengan memperdayakan beliau dalam urusan jual beli telefon bimbit dan dengan itu kamu dengan curangnya telah mendorong beliau untuk menyerahkan (2) unit telefon bimbit berjenama Samsung Galaxy S9 dengan harga berjumlah keseluruhan RM 6,000 yang mana beliau tidak akan serahkan telefon bimbit tersebut sekiranya tidak diperdayakan sedemikian dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen 420 Kanun Keseksaan dan dibacakan bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Hukuman: Penjara tidak kurang dari satu tahun dan tidak lebih dari sepuluh tahun dan dengan sebat dan bolehlah juga dikenakan denda.” [5] As for the offence under section 468 PC, he has to endure a period of eight (8) months’ imprisonment and to pay a fine of RM2000, and if he does not pay the fine imposed, he has to suffer a further three (3) months’ period of imprisonment. For the charge for an offence under section 420 PC, he has to suffer a period of twelve (12) months’ imprisonment and 1 stroke of the whip (see section 288 (4) S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC/Act 593) and fine of RM3000, in default of payment of fine, 5 months’ imprisonment. [6] On the date of appeal, this court was informed that the accused had paid the fines imposed, thus left is only for him to suffer the period of incarceration, adding up to 20 months’ and one stroke of the whip. [7] After having heard the plea by accused on his appeal and the responding submission by the deputy public prosecutor (DPP), I have decided to allow his appeal on the sentence meted out by the magistrate. With that, the sentence of imprisonment for both offences of cheating and forgery for the purpose of cheating was reduced to a period of three (3) months’ imprisonment respectively. It has to take effect consecutively from the date of arrest on 6.5.2023. Since the sentence of whipping passed is legal in accordance with section 420 PC, it stays. [8] The Public Prosecutor (PP) vide notice of appeal dated 18.8.2023 had appealed against the reduction of sentence for both offences of cheating as well as forgery for the purpose of cheating, which reads as the following: “… Pendakwa Raya Malaysia merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap keputusan … yang mana Yang Arif Hakim telah membenarkan rayuan Responden dan mengurangkan hukuman penjara 1 tahun bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 420 S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Kanun Keseksaan kepada 3 bulan penjara bermula dari tarikh tangkap (06.05.2023). Rayuan ini adalah terhadap hukuman tersebut.” “… Pendakwa Raya Malaysia merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap keputusan … yang mana Yang Arif Hakim telah membenarkan rayuan Responden dan mengurangkan hukuman penjara 8 bulan bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 468 Kanun Keseksaan kepada 3 bulan penjara bermula dari tarikh tangkap (06.05.2023). Rayuan ini adalah terhadap hukuman tersebut.” [9] Hence, the appeal by PP is only on reduction of the sentence of imprisonment to a period of 3 months’ by this court, for both offences committed by the accused. The cheating charge [10] Essentially, the basis for reduction of sentence of imprisonment from a period of 12 months to 3 months is because the sentence meted out by the magistrate is found to be manifestly excessive. Viewing the circumstance of the case whereby the accused had pleaded guilty to the charge for an offence of cheating pursuant to section 420 PC, it ought to be considered as a strong mitigating factor as he has the legitimate expectation under the law to have his sentence reduced accordingly. The plea of guilty came about immediately when the case was called up at the magistrate’s court. [11] Presumably (as it is not stipulated in the Notice of Appeal), the PP is dissatisfied with the reduction of sentence as section 420 PC S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 provides for a minimum period of one year or 12 months imprisonment on conviction of the accused. Therefore, both the court of first instance and this court on appeal are left without an alternative but to impose a period of 12 months imprisonment. The sole question, would that be so? [12] Reading the penal provision, it renders the following: Whoever cheats …, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year and not more than ten years and with whipping and shall also be liable to fine. (emphasis is mine) [13] Thus, it provides for a minimum term of 12 months imprisonment, and the court of first instance had imposed such term of imprisonment on the accused. However, this court on appeal had reduced it to a period of only 3 months imprisonment, since the 12 months’ imprisonment is found to be manifestly excessive, considering the salient fact the accused had pleaded guilty at once when the case was called up for determination by the magistrate. Is that reduction of sentence illegal? [14] This court opines the reduction of sentence from a period of 12 months imprisonment to 3 months imprisonment is not illegal but legal and proper as it is sanctioned by section 172G of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC/Act 593), which renders the following: S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Where an accused pleads guilty at any time before the commencement of his trial, the Court shall sentence the accused in accordance with subparagraph 172D(1)(c)(ii). Section 172D (1) (c) (ii) reads as: (ii) subject to subsection (2) and (3), sentence the accused to not more than half of the maximum punishment of imprisonment provided under the law for the offence for which the accused has been convicted. (emphasis is mine) Reading both the provisions, it is apparent the accused who had pleaded guilty to a charge for an offence under section 420 PC, is entitled in law to be treated leniently. He has only to be sentenced to a period of imprisonment not more than half of the maximum punishment of imprisonment provided under the law for the offence of cheating for which he has been convicted. Section 420 PC caters for a maximum period of 10 years imprisonment. Therefore, pursuant to section 172G CPC, the maximum period of imprisonment allowed under the law against the accused is only 5 years imprisonment and not anything more than that. As such, the accused in the present case has to suffer a period of only 5 years imprisonment, and anything more than that period of imprisonment would be illegal. But, in the present case, this court had reduced the sentence of imprisonment to a period of 3 months, which of course falls squarely within the 5 years period of imprisonment. S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [15] However, an argument could be advanced, that section 172D (1) (c) (ii) has to be read subject to subsections (2) and (3) of section 172D CPC. That would mean, pursuant to subsection (2) of section 172D CPC, where there is a minimum term of imprisonment provided under the law for the offence, no accused shall be sentenced to a lesser term of imprisonment than that of the minimum term. That means, in the present case, the accused has to suffer a period of 12 months imprisonment, as it is the minimum period of imprisonment provided for under section 420 PC. Needless to refer and discuss subsection 172D (3), as it is inapplicable to the present case. [16] This court opines subsection 172D (2) is inapplicable vis a vis section 172G CPC, as the scheme of section 172D pertains a plea bargaining process, which means, where a satisfactory disposition of the case has been agreed upon by the accused and the PP under section 172C CPC, the court shall, in accordance with law, dispose of the case in the manner provided for in section 172D (1) (a), (b) and (c) CPC and if that situation arises, section 172D (1) (c) (ii) CPC is subject to subsection 172D (2) and (3) CPC. In the present case, there has been no plea bargaining, thus there is no satisfactory disposition of the case between the accused and PP in order for section 172D CPC to be operable. It is salutary to note, the accused S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 had pleaded guilty at the court of first instance, voluntarily at once without having to go through a trial. There has been no plea bargaining process as envisaged under section 172C CPC and therefore needless to proceed with section 172C (7) CPC, which provides that where a satisfactory disposition of the case has been agreed upon by the accused and the PP, the satisfactory disposition shall be put into writing and signed by the accused, his advocate if the accused is represented, and the PP, and the court shall give effect to the satisfactory disposition as agreed upon by the accused and the PP. [17] In the premise, section 172G CPC operates independently of section 172D CPC and has to be read as it stands so as give its fullest effect. Therefore, when the accused pleads guilty, like in the present case, he is entitled in law to be sentenced to half of the maximum term of imprisonment provided for by section 420 PC. It is also needless for this court to be strayed by the other part of section 172D (c) (ii) CPC, as the precursor to 172D (c) CPC provides “where the satisfactory disposition is in relation to a plea bargaining of the sentence, find the accused guilty on the charge and …”. (emphasis is mine) S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [18] It is axiomatic, if there is a doubt in the reading and interpretation of section 172G CPC, which is a penal provision, benefit of it has to go to the accused. He cannot be denied of his right and legitimate expectation to be sentenced only to half of the maximum term of imprisonment as stipulated in section 420 PC. To reiterate, he has only to suffer a period of 5 years imprisonment or less after taking into consideration all factors, plea in mitigation included. Ensuing from that, the sentence of 3 months imprisonment meted out by this court on appeal against the accused is legal and not disproportionate to his case, wherein he has also to suffer another 3 months period of imprisonment for the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating pursuant to section 468 PC. As support, reliance is on the dictum of Lord Esher MR in Tuck & Sons v Priester (1887) 19 QBD 629 at page 638: If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case, we must adopt that construction. If there are two reasonable constructions we must give the more lenient one. That is the settled rule for the construction of penal sections. Further, reference is also made to persuasive case authorities from the Supreme Court of India in Tolaram Relumal and another v The State of Bombay (1954 SC) and State of West Bengal v Swapan Kumar Guha (1982 SC) which had in effect decided the following: S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 When there are two possible construction, the court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty, rather than one which imposes penalty. Where an ambiguity exists and it has not been possible for the legislature to express itself clearly, the court exhibits a preference for the liberty of the subject and resolves the doubt in favour of a subject. The court is not competent to stretch the meaning of an expression and include the situation which would not have come under the reasonable interpretation of the provision. [19] Aside the above, it is also appropriate to comment on the submission by DPP responding to the plea by accused as appellant to this appeal. She did not raise any submission on the legality of sentence pursuant to section 420 PC, if there is a reduction, but merely implored this court not to disturb the consecutive effect of the sentence meted out by the magistrate, and nothing more. She did not contend with support, to state any form of reduction of sentence for the offence of cheating under section 420 PC, cannot be anything less than 12 months imprisonment. In that respect, this appeal by the PP on reduction of the sentence to a period of 3 months’ imprisonment is an afterthought. Be that as it is, this court opines the reduction of sentence for the offence under section 420 PC is legal and justifiable under the law. The charge of forgery for the purpose of cheating [20] As for the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating, this court had also reduced the sentence meted out from a period of 8 months S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 imprisonment to 3 months imprisonment. It is also anchored on the basis, the sentence meted out by the magistrate was manifestly excessive as it was disproportionate to the commission of the offence by accused. He has to be sentenced to what he deserves and nothing more, so as to be in conformity with the principle of justice and fairness. Sentences passed or meted out should express abhorrence to the conduct of accused, which has to be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence. Rehabilitation, as an aim of sentencing should be pursued only within the confines of proportionate sentences. In the present case, viewing the sentence meted out which is a composite sentence as it embodies both imprisonment and fine, it sufficiently punishes the accused. On that score, the 8 months period of imprisonment is disproportionate to the commission of offence by the accused as a fine of RM2000 had been imposed. [21] Perusing the record of proceeding at the subordinate court (as below) it is apparent that the prosecution did not tender facts of the case to support its case against the accused, when he pleaded guilty. What has evolved, is that the facts tendered is as per the charge. If commission of the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating by the accused is viewed seriously by the prosecution, it S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 would have advanced facts of the case to support the charge in order to demonstrate to the court, his conduct when committing the said offence as well as his degree of involvement and deliberation. Likewise, is for the offence of cheating. With the brief facts the court may form an opinion on his conduct when assessing to mete out an appropriate sentence. (See: Abdul Kadir bin Abdul Rahman v PP (1984) 1 MLJ 80). Sadly, in the present case, for both the charges, there was none, other than the prosecution merely informing the court, facts of the case are as per the charges against the accused. Charge of cheating: “… TPR: DENGAN IZIN PUAN, MOHON PERTUDUHAN DIBACAKAN PUAN. PERTUDUHAN DIBACAKAN, TERTUDUH FAHAM, MENGAKU SALAH. FAHAM AKIBAT SIFAT PENGAKUAN, MASIH MENGAKU SALAH. TPR: DENGAN IZIN PUAN POHON FAKTA KES SEPERTI MANA PERTUDUHAN, LAPORAN PENGADU DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P1, LAPORAN TANGKAPAN DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P2, LAPORAN TANGKAPAN SEMULA DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P3, PERBUALAN WHATSAPP DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P4, RESIT BAYARAN DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P5. S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 POHON DIKEMUKAKAN P4 DAN P5 DITUNJUKKAN KEPADA OKT UNTUK PENGECAMAN, PUAN. PENGECAMAN DIBUAT DAN DIAKUI BENAR OLEH OKT. MAH: BOLEH BUAT RAYUAN. OKT: PUAN, TOLONG BAGI HUKUMAN SERINGAN-RINGANNYA. SAYA TELAH INSAF. MAH: PENDAKWAAN? TPR: PUAN, POHON HUKUMAN SETIMPAL SEBAGAI PENGAJARAN PUAN. MAH: OKT DIDAPATI SALAH DAN DISABITKAN SALAH SEPERTI PERTUDUHAN, HUKUMAN 1 TAHUN PENJARA DARI TARIKH TANGKAP DAN DENDA RM 3000.00 GAGAL BAYAR 5 BULAN PENJARA DAN 1 KALI SEBATAN. ITU SAHAJA.” (Emphasis is mine) Charge of Forgery for the purpose of cheating: ‘ … TPR: DENGAN IZIN PUAN, POHON PERTUDUHAN DIBACAKAN, PUAN. PERTUDUHAN DIBACAKAN, TERTUDUH FAHAM, MENGAKU SALAH. FAHAM AKIBAT SIFAT PENGAKUAN, MASIH MENGAKU SALAH. TPR: DENGAN IZIN PUAN POHON FAKTA KES SEPERTI MANA PERTUDUHAN, LAPORAN TANGKAPAN DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P1, GAMBAR BARANG KES DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P2, PENGESAHAN JABATAN PENDAFTARAN NEGARA DITANDAKAN SEBAGAI P3. ITU SAHAJA PUAN, POHON DIKEMUKAKAN GAMBAR KEPADA OKT UNTUK PENGECAMAN, PUAN. S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 PENGECAMAN DIBUAT DAN DIAKUI BENAR OLEH OKT. MAH: RAYUAN. B1: SAYA MEMOHON HUKUMAN SAYA DIRINGANKAN. MAH: B2 BUAT RAYUAN. B2: PUAN, KAMI BERBUAT DEMIKIAN SUPAYA KAWAN-KAWAN TIDAK BERBUAT KESALAHAN LAIN. SAYA BERBUAT DEMIKIAN UNTUK PERBELANJAAN SAHAJA. BUKAN SENGAJA BERBUAT DEMIKIAN UNTUK BUAT JENAYAH PUAN, UNTUK PERBELANJAAN HARIAN SAHAJA PUAN. MINTA PUAN RINGANKAN HUKUMAN SEBAB SAYA PUN ADA ANAK UNTUK DISARA. MAH: B3 BUAT RAYUAN. B3: PUAN, SAYA MOHON HUKUMAN SAYA DIRINGANKAN SEBAB SAYA ADA AYAH DAN EMAK YANG SUDAH TUA HENDAK DIJAGA. MAH: PENDAKWAAN? TPR: DENGAN IZIN PUAN, POHON HUKUMAN SETIMPAL SEBAGAI PENGAJARAN, PUAN. MAH: KETIGA-TIGA OKT DIDAPATI SALAH DAN DISABITKAN SALAH SEPERTI PERTUDUHAN, HUKUMAN 8 BULAN PENJARA DARI TARIKH TANGKAP DAN DENDA RM2000.00 GAGAL BAYAR 3 BULAN PENJARA. ITU SAHAJA. …” (Emphasis is mine – B2 is the accused/appellant in the present case). [22] Except in a case where the facts are straight forward without any complexity involved and the offence is embodied in the charge itself, then it would be easier for the accused to say yes or no to a plea of guilty. But when the law applicable to those facts, beyond doubt seems impossible to expect an accused person unversed in the law and undefended to be able to say, whether he is or not guilty of the S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 offence charged, then facts of the case is pivotal. (See the case of Low Hiong Boon v PP (1948-49) MLJ Supp. 135). In the present case, it is apparent in the charge against the accused for the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating is “dengan curangnya telah memalsukan Kad Pengenalan Malaysia yang mana telah diubah suai bagi tujuan penipuan pinjaman secara atas talian, dengan niat supaya dokumen palsu tersebut digunakan bagi tujuan hendak menipu.” Since the charge does not disclose if the said loan was in fact approved and disbursed to the accused, it could be deduced that the loan and disbursement did not eventually go through. Therefore, the actus reus involved is only falsification of the identity card, used to apply for a loan online, but thwarted as it was discovered. Therefore, the sentence of 3 months imprisonment and the fine imposed, which was not altered by this court, commensurate with the offence committed by him. [23] Likewise for the offence of cheating, the accused had pleaded guilty to the charge which contains his actus reus “dalam mencapai niat bersama telah menipu Muhammad Syafiq Bin Sidin (930503-14- 6185) dengan memperdayakan beliau dalam urusan jual beli telefon bimbit dan dengan itu kamu dengan curangnya telah mendorong beliau untuk menyerahkan (2) unit telefon bimbit berjenama S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Samsung Galaxy S9 dengan harga berjumlah keseluruhan RM 6,000 yang mana beliau tidak akan serahkan telefon bimbit tersebut sekiranya tidak diperdayakan sedemikian”. It is a fact, he was not alone in the said commission of the offence of cheating, but with others, thus the use of common intention as mode of his participation in the commission of crime. In the absence of the facts disclosing his degree of involvement and premised on the charge itself, a punishment of 3 months imprisonment with the imposition of fine is sufficient punishment for the accused to suffer. What more, he has also to suffer a stroke of the whip, adding on to the severity of punishment against him. [24] After having considered all factors against accused, cumulatively and being mindful of the settled principle of sentencing in the administration of criminal justice, that punishment in proportion to the seriousness of the crime is one of many objectives in sentencing and also the principal focus for a sentence, and the accused has not committed a violent crime but crimes against property, where on the face of the charge, it is inferred was actuated by greed for money, the punishment imposed of 3 months imprisonment for each of the offences he has committed with the imposition of fine and also a stroke of the whip for the offence of cheating, is appropriate, S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 proportional and sufficient punishment he has to suffer. Adding on, imposition of the fines has also served as deterrence for the offences committed. (See cases like Rex v Teo Woo Tin (1932) MLJ 124; Zakariya bin Musa v PP (1985) 2 MLJ 221) Moreover, it is also a fact to be mindful of, that the offence of cheating was committed in the year 2018, as opposed to the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating which took place in the year 2023, thus raising an argument for it tantamount to a stale offence which was only brought against the accused when he was charged for the offence of forgery. The accused has also repented by pleading guilty to both the charges. In the premise the plea of guilty by accused is a predominant and pivotal factor considered by this court when reducing the sentence meted out by the magistrate. (See: Melvani v PP (1971) 1 MLJ 137; Sau Soo Kim v PP (1975) 2 MLJ 134; Ravindran & Ors v PP (1992) 4 CLJ 2043). In the upshot, appeal by the accused is allowed and sentences of imprisonment meted out against him is reduced accordingly. Appeal allowed. Sentence reduced to three months imprisonment. S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 Dated 30 October 2023 SGD. Muniandy Kannyappan Judge, High Court 2 (Criminal) Kuala Lumpur. Accused in person. DPP Aqilah Ishak for the respondent. S/N 1HZkPAcJW0iyEqFiKJ86vQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	28,562	Tika 2.6.0
WA-27NCC-36-07/2023	PLAINTIF DESERT OASIS PETROCHEMICAL TRADING L.L.C DEFENDAN PEMILIK DAN/ATAU PENCARTER DEMIS KAPAL ATAU VESEL ALPINE MATHILDE (NO IMO 9740471) DARI PELABUHAN HONG KONG	Setting Aside Writ in Rem and Warrant of Arrest - Admiralty jurisdiction of Court not invoked - Effect of US Sanctions on cargo on board vessel - Sales of cargo a sham transaction - Arrest an abuse of process - Damages for wrongful arrest of vessel	31/10/2023	YA Tuan Ong Chee Kwan	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=eebf7ccd-21de-4d45-968f-447b80c12864&Inline=true	WA-27NCC-36-07-2023 Desert Oasis (Final).pdf 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ADMIRALTY IN REM NO: WA-27NCC-36-07/2023 BETWEEN DESERT OASIS PETROCHEMICAL TRADING L.L.C [Company No.: 1895567] AND PEMILIK DAN/ATAU PENCARTER DEMIS KAPAL ATAU VESEL ALPINE MATHILDE (NO IMO 9740471) DARI PELABUHAN HONG KONG [Company No.: 9740471] JUDGMENT Introduction [1] Sanctions are political trade restrictions that are imposed to maintain or restore international peace and security or to further a OFAC partment of Treasury have imposed sanctions on countries, individuals, vessels and legal entities and on various commercial activities. 31/10/2023 15:44:15 WA-27NCC-36-07/2023 Kand. 53 S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [2] The US sanctions can generally be divided into 2 categories. hich is defined as U.S citizens and permanent residents, entities incorporated under the laws of the United States and persons physically located in the United States. Primary sanctions also apply to transactions in US dollars, which transit through the U.S financial apply to non-U.S Persons. The aim is to prevent the non-U.S Persons from engaging in transactions against the U.S national security and foreign policy interest by threatening access to U.S markets. [3] Whether economic or political in nature, sanctions have a real impact and can affect the interest of those engaged in international shipping. This is one such case where one Unicious Energy Pte Ltd Unicious the voyage charterer of the vessel on route from Singapore to Japan, was designated by OFAC SDN List, making it subject to the U.S Sanctions. [4] Unicious then entered into a sales contract purporting to transfer ownership and or title in the cargo to the Plaintiff. [5] Based on the purported sales contract and asserting that it has possession of the original bills of lading (which were issued prior to the sales contract), the Plaintiff sought and demanded delivery of the cargo from the Defendant as the registered owner of the vessel. S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [6] Notwithstanding notice of the fact that the Defendant is a U.S person and with Unicious being designated as an SDN and the cargo to arrest the vessel. [7] This judgment deals with the application by the Defendant under Enclosure 18 to set aside the Writ in Rem and the Warrant of Arrest and for an order that the Plaintiff do pay the Defendant damages for wrongful arrest. [8] purported sales contract is a sham and that in any event, the Plaintiff has not suffered any damages to justify invoking the admiralty jurisdiction of this Court. Background Facts [9] Heroic the Vessel [10] The Plaintiff, Desert Oasis purports to be the owner of the cargo of approximately 36 MT Naphtha the Cargo [11] The Plaintiff asserted that it had acquired the aforesaid rights pursuant to an unsigned sales contract dated 6.4.2023 with Unicious and is in possession of the original Bills of Lading dated 9.2.2023 issued by the Defendant in respect of the Cargo. S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [12] The events leading to the Plaintiff becoming t Cargo from Unicious are relevant and it is necessary to allude to the history on the sale of the Cargo submissions. History of the Cargo [13] On 25.1.2023, Unicious as Sellers entered into a sales contract with one Idemitsu sale of the Cargo. [14] For carriage of the Cargo to Idemitsu from Singapore to Japan, Unicious entered into a voyage charterparty with the Defendant on the Voyage Charter Party [15] Significantly, the Voyage Charter Party contained the following clauses with the provisions thereunder: (a) BIMCO Sanctions Clause for Voyage Charter Parties 2020; and (b) Compliance with Laws and Sanctions Clause. the Sanctions Clause [16] The Sanctions Clause is intended to address 2 scenarios, namely (1) where the owners or charterers (or the third parties they are responsible for under the clause) are listed by a sanctioning authority or government and become subject to sanctions S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 restrictions, the innocent party has the right to terminate the charter party and claim damages and (2) where the trade or activity itself is or become subject to sanctions restrictions, the owners have the right to refuse to perform. [17] is defined in the Sanctions Clause to include United States of America or any other applicable competent [18] It is not in dispute that the relevant authority or government in the present case is the United States of America acting through its FAC which is the agency charged with administering the United States economic sanctions programs implemented through Executive Orders issued by the President of the United States. [19] OFAC has authority under the Executive Orders to impose Blocking Sanctions on individuals and entities who have engaged in certain sanctionable conduct (e.g., contributions to terrorism, narcotics trafficking, nuclear weapons proliferation, and other security threats) by designating them on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List SDN List [20] The Blocking Sanctions that accompany designation on the SDN List have the following three principal consequences: (a) First, the party designated on the SDN List, as well as any entity that owned 50% or more by the party designated on the SDN List are considered Blocked Parties which means that S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 all of their property and property interests within U.S. jurisdiction or in the custody or control of a U.S. person ( is defined below), are considered Blocked Property FAQ (available at https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/9), that when property is blocked/frozen, title to the Blocked Property remains with the Blocked Property owner, however, the owner loses the powers and privileges normally associated with ownership of the property, unless authorization from OFAC is obtained (i.e., the Blocked Property cannot be sold, purchased, transferred, or otherwise dealt with unless OFAC grants a license to do so); (b) Second, U.S. Persons are strictly prohibited from all dealings with Blocked Parties and their Blocked Property. Violations of this prohibition are subject to civil and criminal penalties. (c) Third, non-U.S. persons can be targeted with Blocking Sanctions for engaging in certain transactions with parties on the SDN List. [21] Put it in another way, the Sanctions Clause gives rise to a mutual warranty that Unicious, as well as the Defendant, would not become a sanctioned party during the pendency of that Voyage Charter Party. In the event either party i.e Unicious or the Defendant, were to become a sanctioned party (including, but not limited to, becoming an SDN under the U.S. OFAC Sanctions) (i) the party designated would be in breach of the Voyage Charter Party, (ii) the S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 non-breaching party would have the right to terminate the Charter Party and (iii) the non-breaching party would have the right and legal obligation to comply with any and all laws and sanctions requirements (including U.S. laws and sanctions regulations). Unicious designated SDN [22] Coming back to the carriage of the Cargo under the Voyage Charter Party, sometime on 9.2.2023 the Cargo was loaded on board the Vessel and the original Bill of Lading No. E 11109 in 3 sets were the Bills of Lading [23] However, about 6 hours after the Vessel departed Singapore on 9.2.2023 and began her voyage towards Japan to deliver the Cargo to Idemitsu, Unicious was designated by OFAC as an SDN. As a result, Voyage Charter Parties 2020 and Compliance with Laws and Sanctions Clause were invoked. [24] Idemitsu decided to cancel their 25.1.2023 sales contract and Norden [25] and Regulations, the designation of Unicious as an SDN caused the Cargo to automatically become Blocked Property and owing to the Blocking Sanctions imposed on Unicious, all property in which S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 U.S Persons Unicious, its property, or its property interests. [26] On 14.2.2023, the Defendant received a letter via Norden, from law firm Messrs. Oon & Bazul, LLP Singapore, in association with TS Oon & Partners, Malaysia , advising that it was acting for Unicious and claiming Unicious as the owners of the Cargo. Oon Law further stated that Unicious had provided clear instructions to discharge the Cargo back to Horizon Terminal in Singapore and claiming potential damages if the Cargo was not discharged by noon Singapore time 15.2.2023. Oon Law also threatened to arrest the [27] instructions and instead treated Unicious to be in breach of the Voyage Charter Party. The Defendant (who was left with no choice but to comply with any and all sanctions laws) terminated the Notice of Termination Unicious on notice for any and all damages the Defendant would suffer. [28] On 19.4.2023, Oon Law, again on behalf of Unicious demanded that the Defendant discharge the Cargo at Horizon Terminal in Singapore, with a deadline for discharge to be completed by close of business on 21.4.2023, otherwise Oon Law would commence legal proceedings against the Defendant to compel discharge, including the arrest of the Vessel or associated vessels. S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [29] de no reference to or stated in any way that Unicious had already, allegedly, entered into the sales contract for the Cargo with Desert Oasis on 6.4.2023, which is dated some 13 days earlier than the 19.4.2023 letter and some 15 days prior to the purported deadline of 21.4.2023 for the Defendant to discharge the Cargo at Horizon Terminal to Unicious. [30] LLP reminded Oon Law that under the Voyage Charter Party with Unicious, Unicious was in breach of the warranty not to become an SDN and that the Voyage Charter Party required the Defendant to comply with U.S. laws and regulations, including, and particularly, Sanctions Laws and Regulations. As such, the Defendant could not violate U.S. law by delivering the Cargo to Unicious (an SDN), as demanded. [31] managers, Norden, received an inquiry from Idemitsu regarding the original Bills of Lading. In this communication, Idemitsu confirmed that the original Bills of Lading remained with Unicious and that Unicious had asked Idemitsu to endorse the Bills of Lading to a third party. It is common ground that Idemitsu never endorsed the original Bills of Lading. Appearance of Plaintiff [32] Despite the Plaintiff purportedly entering into the sales contract with Unicious on 6.4.2023 the Sales Contract , the Plaintiff only surfaced in this matter more than a month after the date. This was S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Norden, on 10.5.2023 to claim entitlement to the Cargo. [33] Vide the said email of 10.5.2023, the Plaintiff simply stated that it had purchased the Cargo, that it was demanding the Defendant to deliver the Cargo to the Plaintiff and that it was [34] In response, the Defendant, via its commercial managers, Norden, stated on 10.5.2023 [time zone difference - 09.05.2023] as follows: MATHILDE to be blocked property. Even if Unicious sold the cargo to Desert Oasis, the cargo would remain blocked until OFAC granted a petition to unblock this property. In such circumstances, OFAC will not permit Owners to transfer or sell the Cargo to a third party unless the sale proceeds are deposited into a blocked account [35] No additional or further communications were received directly from the Plaintiff until nearly two months later, on 30.6.2023, when Hong Kong counsel, acting on behalf of the Plaintiff, wrote to the the Cargo, asserting potential losses in the amount of US$25,085,476.26, demanding immediate discharge of the Cargo and threatening legal action to seek security in the total sum of US$32,404,188.12 [the potential losses noted above, plus an exorbitant amount of costs, fees and interest] if the S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [36] explanation, in detail, of the reasons why Unicious was not capable of selling the Blocked Property (two months after being designated an SDN and the property becoming blocked), as well as why the Defendant could not deliver Blocked Property to any third party without a license or permission from OFAC and also challenging the veracity of the Plai Plaintiff nor its Hong Kong counsel responded. [37] Instead, the Plaintiff proceeded with the filing of an associated vessel arrest in the High Court Durban, South Africa against the vessel M/T ALPINE MYSTERY in early July 2023. Proceeding in Africa [38] On 4.7.2023, the Plaintiff commenced an admiralty arrest action before the High Court of South Africa in Durban for the arrest order of an associated vessel of the Plaintiff, the M/T ALPINE MYSTERY, arrest procedure. [39] The Defendant immediately challenged the order issued in South ALPINE MYSTERY, by filing an application for reconsideration of the issuance of the arrest order in the first instance on 6.7.2023. [40] On 7.7.2023, the Durban High Court held an urgent hearing, which concluded with the Court setting aside the original 4.7.2023 order for the arrest of M/T ALPINE MYSTERY. The South African High S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Court at Durban issued an order vacating the security arrest of the M/V ALPINE MYSTERY, immediately releasing the vessel and ordering the Plaintiff to pay the for reconsideration, including the costs consequent upon the for the owners of the associated vessel, ALPINE MYSTERY. Action In Rem and Arrest of Vessel in this action [41] in the Durban High Court, the Plaintiff commenced this action in rem on 31.7.2023 and on the same day at the PTP anchorage, Johor. [42] im against the Defendant as endorsed in the he Plaintiff as lawful owners having title and/or persons entitled to possession of and/or having other legal or equitable interests in respect of a cargo of approximately 36,259.858 MT of Naphtha shipped onboard the Vessel for carriage from Singapore to Japan under Bill of Lading No. E11109, claim against the Defendant as carriers and/or persons being in physical possession of the Cargo, damages for failure to deliver and/or unlawful detention and/or conversion of the Cargo, [43] As can be seen, the Plaintiff in effect is seeking enforcement of Vessel as security on the basis of a claim for damages against the S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Defendant for a cause of action in conversion of the Cargo on board the Vessel. [44] It is not disputed that the V by the Sheriff from the Vessel during the arrest of the Vessel on 31.7.2023 for safe keeping, pending release. [45] The Defendant entered an appearance in this action on 2.8.2023 in accordance with the Malaysian Rules of Court, 2012. The entry of appearance is strictly without or liberties to challenge the admiralty jurisdiction and the issue of validity or regularity of the Writ in Action in rem and or Warrant of Arrest. [46] Plaintiff or its solicitors to accept alternative security by way of a letter of undertaking issued by a reputable international surety subject to OFAC approval, for the release of the Vessel from arrest, the Plaintiff or its solicitors have not responded todate. [47] (i.e from the date of arrest on 31.07.2023 and continuing). Application under Enclosure 18 [48] Vide Notice of Application dated 8.8.2023 (Enclosure 18) pursuant to Order 12 Rule 10, Rules of Court 2012 and or the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, the Defendant is seeking for the following orders and or reliefs: S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (a) the Writ in rem and Warrant of Arrest both dated 31.07.2023 be set aside in this action; (b) the vessel registered at the Port of Hong Kong be immediately released from arrest in this action; (c) a declaration that in the circumstances of the case, this Court has no in rem jurisdiction over the Defendant in respect of the subject matter of this suit and/or the relief or remedy sought in this action; (d) any alternative security (if any) given by the Defendant to the Plaintiff shall be returned to the solicitors for the Defendant within 2 days from the date of the Order to be made herein; (e) Plaintiff/Sheriff from the vessel during the arrest of the vessel on 31.7.2023 for safe keeping, shall be returned to the solicitors for the Defendant within 24 hours from the date of the Order to be made herein; (f) the Plaintiff do pay to the Defendant damages for wrongful vessel together with damages for wasted expenses, such to be assessed by the High Court Deputy Registrar; (g) all other applications by the Plaintiff or hearing thereof in relation to the vessel or cargo on board the vessel shall be S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 stayed pending the hearing and final determination of this application; (h) the costs of the application and including incidental to this application be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant on an indemnity basis; and (i) further Orders and/or such other reliefs as this Honourable Court deems fit, just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. [49] The Defendant has adduced its expert evidence pertaining to the U.S. Sanctions Laws. The Plaintiff has not challenged or disputed expert opinion in this application. [50] The Plaintiff is also not disputing that Unicious is designated on the and or or that the Cargo is a Blocked Property subject to the Blocked Sanctions. [51] In the present in rem action, the Plaintiff based its right to bring the action in rem against the Vessel on the claims that: (a) the Plaintiff is the lawful owner having title and or persons entitled to possession of and or having other legal or equitable interests in respect of Cargo shipped onboard the Vessel; S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 (b) the Plaintiff has sustained damages for failure to deliver and or unlawful detention and or conversion of the Cargo. [52] In respect of the claims as lawful owner of the Cargo, the Plaintiff has abandoned its reliance as holder of the original Bills of Lading, conceding that the Bills of Ladings were never endorsed by Idemitsu [53] Instead the Plaintiff is claiming that it has acquired ownership of the Cargo from the former owner, Unicious, by virtue of the unsigned Sales Contract dated 6.4.2023 between them. [54] The Plaintiff claimed that it is entitled to the delivery of the Cargo from the Defendant because it is now the owner of the Cargo and the Defendant cannot refuse delivery even if Unicious (the seller of is contended that there is no legal basis to refuse based upon the US sanctions law. The Plaintiff further contended that the determination ssel arising from the same alleged cause of action by the Durban High Court is irrelevant in this action. Sales Contract dated 6.4.2023 [55] With respect to the Plaintiff, I find the Sales Contract to be nothing more than a sham, entered into between the Plaintiff and Unicious an as attempt to circumvent the U.S Sanctions Laws and S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 Regulations as administered by OFAC. I accept the D contention that the Sales Contract is in fact a pretext for Unicious to recover the Cargo or its value by using the Plaintiff as a proxy. [56] Unicious makes clear by its own Affidavit vide Sabil Affidavit (Encl. 10 at Paragraph 14) that Unicious had approached the Plaintiff about entering into this contract because it was not possible to procure a buyer given Unicious was subject to US OFAC Sanctions . Yet, no reasons have been proffered by the Plaintiff as to why it agreed to buy the Cargo that it knows is subject to the U.S Sanctions and is a Blocked Property. [57] The Sales Contract itself displays many features which are suspicious and unconventional. In particular: (a) the Sales Contract is unsigned; (b) under the payment provision, the Plaintiff is not required to make any payment until after receipt of the Cargo; (c) notwithstanding the aforesaid, Unicious is said to have conveyed the title to the Cargo without any payment whatsoever which is most unusual and is not in keeping with any practice of commodity sales; (d) there is no provision regulating what happens if the Cargo is delivered to the Plaintiff but the Plaintiff fails to pay Unicious; S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 (e) the Sales Contract omits to state a discharge location for the Cargo; (f) the Sales Contract makes no provisions or reference to the fact that the Cargo is subject to the U.S Sanctions, more specifically, the fact that under the Sanctions Clause, Unicious is unable to deal with the Cargo and to transfer the title in the Cargo to the Plaintiff; (g) there is no obligation on the part of Unicious to hand over to the Plaintiff the duly endorsed Bills of Lading to take delivery of the Cargo on board the Vessel. [58] Apart from the aforesaid strange and curious terms of the Sales Contract, the circumstances surrounding the same also bear mention: (a) although the Sales Contract was entered into on 6.4.2023, Unicious had on 19.4.2023 continued to assert ownership of the Cargo demanding the Defendant to discharge the same by 21.4.2023 without any mention of the Sales Contract; (b) the Plaintiff only surfaced to make a claim for the Cargo on 10.5.2023, after more than a month from the Sales Contract and after been met. Vide email of 10.5.2023, the Plaintiff simply stated that it had purchased the Cargo, that it was demanding the Defendant delivery of the Cargo to the Plaintiff and that it was S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 This was despite the fact that the Plaintiff knew that it did not have the Bills of Lading duly endorsed by Idemitsu; (c) the Plaintiff did not produce any documentary evidence of any bona fide notwithstanding what appears as unusual haste in the conclusion of the Sales Contract. Given the well-publicized relationship between Unicious and the Plaintiff that Unicious has regularly purchased oil from the Plaintiff for which Unicious is accused of petroleum-related payments for other companies within the , in circumvention of U.S. Sanctions Regulations, such documentary evidence on the negotiations become all the more pressing; (d) both Unicious and the Plaintiff are represented by the same counsel and law firm at all times. [59] Notwithstanding the many suspicious and questionable points raised on the Sales Contract, the Plaintiff conspicuously failed to respond to the same to demonstrate the bone fide of the transaction. [60] Accordingly, I accept the submission of learned counsel for the Defendant, Mr Mathew Kurien that the aforesaid can only lead to one explanation i.e., this is not a legitimate transaction and is against public policy and that the Plaintiff is conspiring with Unicious to perpetrate a deception on this Court. Thus, based on the principle S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 of ex turpi causa non oritur action, no Court should lend its aid to a party who found his cause of action upon an illegitimate act. [61] The locus classicus definition of a sham transaction is found in the speech of Diplock LJ in the case of Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786: As regards the contention of the plaintiff that the transactions between himself, Auto Finance and the defendants were a "sham," it is, I think, necessary to consider what, if any, legal concept is involved in the use of this popular and pejorative word. I apprehend that, if it has any meaning in law, it means acts done or documents executed by the parties to the "sham" which are intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create. But one thing, I think, is clear in legal principle, morality and the authorities (see Yorkshire Railway Wagon Co. v. Maclure15 and Stoneleigh Finance Ltd. v. Phillips),16 that for acts or documents to be a "sham," with whatever legal consequences follow from this, all the parties thereto must have a common intention that the acts or documents are not to create the legal rights and obligations which they give the appearance of creating. No unexpressed intentions of a "shammer" affect the rights of a party whom he deceived. [emphasis added] [62] A claim that a transaction is a sham is a serious allegation. Sham however does not mean fraud. The standard of proof for sham S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 transaction was explained by the High Court Judge in [2002] 6 MLJ 433 case as follows: The plaintiff had always maintained that the purported transfer of beneficial ownership was a sham and nowhere in plaintiff's affidavits or submission of counsel had the plaintiff alleged fraud. Contrary to the contention by both, the defendant and Pan Ocean, 'sham' did not mean 'fraud' and hence, the plaintiff had to only prove sham on a balance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt. Sham transactions in the context of the present case meant that the sale was not genuine, for example, a sale of convenience. In the instant case, the defendant's sale of the said vessel for USD3m smacked of a sham because the defendant continued to retain the mortgage debt of USD9.5m on the said vessel [emphasis added] [63] In Jemix Co Ltd & Anor v. Jemix Heat Treatment (M) Sdn Bhd [2019] the conclusion of sale and purchase agreement for shares entered between the defendants in question in finding that it was a sham agreement. Wong Kian Kheong J (as he then was) stated: I find as a fact that the SPA is a sham agreement for the following reasons - (i) the "unholy haste" in the conclusion of the SPA (17 days after the 2nd Defendant's Denial) shows a lack of bona tides on the part of the 2nd Defendant; (ii) there is no documentary evidence of any bona fide negotiation at arm's length between the 2nd and 4th Defendants prior to the conclusion of the SPA; S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 (iii) there is no written proof regarding PCS's valuation fee and its payment by the 2nd and/or 3rd Defendants; (iv) no evidence of offer and acceptance by the 2nd and 4th Defendants (which led to the SPA) has been tendered in this case; (v) the SPA had been prepared by Messr BPL and yet, no draft SPA has been exchanged and discussed between Messrs BPL (acting for the 2nd Defendant) and the 4th Defendant; (vi) after the execution of the SPA, there was no correspondence between the 2nd and 4th Defendants regarding the completion of the SPA; (vii) clause 3.1 of the SPA provided that the consideration for the 4th Defendant's purchase of the 2nd Defendant's Shares was RM2,000,000.00 (Purchase Consideration) which was "payable wholly in cash The 2nd Defendant did not tender any evidence that the 4th Defendant had paid the Purchase Consideration and yet, the 2nd Defendant's Shares had been transferred to the 4th Defendant! The SPA is clearly a sham contract because the 2nd Defendant's Shares had been transferred to the 4th Defendant despite a breach of Clauses 3.2 and 5.1 (4th Defendant's Breach). The 4th Defendant even received interim dividends amounting to RM156,800.00 [emphasis added] S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [64] Accordingly, based on the authorities and the factual circumstances of this case as enumerated above, it is my judgment that the Sales Contract is a sham and by reason thereof, the Plaintiff has not shown that it is the lawful owner having title and or is a person entitled to possession of and or having other legal or equitable interests in respect of Cargo shipped onboard the Vessel. Plaintiff sustained no loss [65] Further, quite apart from the issue of ownership and title to the Cargo under the Sales Contract, I also agree with the findings of the Honourable Justice Bedderson of the Durban High Court that the claim as the Plaintiff has not suffered any loss and or damages to justify a claim against the Defendant. [66] with Unicious allows no basis for liability because the Plaintiff currently owes no money to Unicious and any failure to perform resulting from the embargo would be excused pursuant to the Sales force majeure clause. The Plaintiff had entered into the Sales Contract with knowledge of the U.S Sanctions, which means that the Plaintiff knew that the Defendant would not be able to deliver the Cargo. This explains the reason the Plaintiff is not obliged to pay Unicious until after delivery. [67] The Durban High Court explicitly concluded that contract of sale that [Desert Oasis] only became liable for payment of the purchase price of the cargo three working days after S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 In other words, if the Cargo is never delivered, the Plaintiff simply suffers no loss or damages, period. Accordingly, the Plaintiff admits (there in Durban High Court and here), as it must, that it has not paid for the Cargo. [68] Even if liability could arise under the Sales Contract, the Plaintiff has no way to quantify its damages, where, as aptly noted by the Durban High Court, purchase price for the cargo was subject to inter alia the quality and quantity being mutually agreed upon as per the published selling rate which was still to be determined as set out in The Plaintiff cannot seek security for unquantifiable and non-existent damages, which it never is misplaced, and inconsistent with the terms of its Sales Contract with Unicious. [69] The Durban High Court agreed that cargo in question, which in turn has a direct bearing on the amount of security i Simply put, without a damages in support of its application for security and the arrest of the Vessel in this action is illusory and smacks of mala fide. [70] If the Plaintiff never takes delivery, it never has an obligation to pay for the Cargo and therefore Plaintiff has no basis upon which it can S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 suffer or claim damages for which it now wrongfully seeks security, of which it previously sought security (unsuccessfully) in the Durban High Court. Ingredients for Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Court not satisfied [71] For the Plaintiff to come within the admiralty jurisdiction of this Court and to arrest the Vessel, the Plaintiff must satisfy in the Affidavit Leading to Warrant of Arrest, five essential steps succinctly set out by the Singapore Court of Appeal in [2012] 4 SLR 546]: (a) show that it has a claim under Section 20 (2) of the UK Senior (b) show that the claim (c) identify the person who would be liable on the claim in an action in personam (ie, the in personam liability requirement) (d) show that the relevant person was, when the cause of action arose, the owner or charterer of, or in possession or in control (e) show that the relevant person was, at the time when the action was brought: (i) the beneficial owner of the offending ship in respect of all the shares in it or the charterer of that ship under S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 a demise charter or (ii) the beneficial owner of the sister ship [72] The Bunga Melati 5 tests have been cited approvingly even in the in [2015] Vol 2 175. This was also accepted and applied in the Malaysian context in the case of Vitol Asia Pte Ltd v Owners of the Ship or Vessel Malik Al Ashtar [2017] 1 CLJ 236. [73] It is not disputed that this Court is entitled by virtue of Order 12 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court 2012 and or under its own inherent jurisdiction and power, Warrant of Arrest if there is no reasonable cause of action or if the action is vexatious or an action is plainly or obviously unsustainable. [74] In the present case, the Plaintiff has not shown that it has a claim in personam against the Defendant. The admiralty jurisdiction of this Court cannot be brought or enforced where there is clear evidence that the Defendant is not liable in personam See: [1999] SGHC 274: where there is clear evidence before the court that the defendant sued is not liable in personam because he is not a party to the contract sued on, the admiralty jurisdiction of the court cannot be invoked S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 [75] As the Plaintiff does not have title or entitled to immediate use and possession or any legitimate basis to demand the Cargo, a claim of conversion is simply impossible and non-existent. [76] Further, according to the Sales Contract between Unicious and the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff has no obligation to pay for the Cargo until after the Cargo is delivered to the Plaintiff. Therefore, a failure to deliver the Cargo to the Plaintiff actually prevents any claim whatsoever by Unicious against Plaintiff for payment. The Plaintiff has not, and will not, suffer any damages whatsoever until, or unless, the Cargo is delivered to it. [77] This means that the admiralty in rem jurisdiction of the Court has been wrongly brought by the Plaintiff because the Defendant is not the relevant person action in personam under section 21 of the UK SCA 1981. It should be set aside as the Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the requirement under section 21. Damages for Wrongful Arrest [78] The Defendant has prayed for damages against the Plaintiff for the arrest of the Vessel on the ground that it is wrongful and an abuse of Court process given that the Plaintiff does not have a good faith claim against the Defendant. [79] It is trite that the Defendant is entitled to damages for a wrongful S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 this Court finds that the arrest is brought with so little color or with so little foundation, that it implies malice or gross negligence. [80] The test to be applied in deciding whether or not to order an inquiry as to damages for the wrongful arrest of a ship is succinctly encapsulated by the Privy Council in The Evangelismos [1858] 12 Moo PC 352: unwarrantedly brought, or brought with so little colour, or so little foundation, that it rather implies malice on the part of the plaintiff, [81] This was also reaffirmed in The Dong Nai [1996] 4 MLJ 454 where Abdul Malik Ishak J in the High Court found as follows: rant of arrest meant that the defendants were alleging wrongful arrest and wrongful continuance of the arrest their ship. Therefore, the appropriate test to be applied was whether there was mala fides or crassa negligentia implying malice on the part of the plaintiffs. On the evidence tendered, the court found that malice had been established against the plaintiffs. Hence, the arrest of the Dong Nai was in fact wrongful (see p 466A D; The Evangelismos (1858) 12 Moo PC 352 and The Euroexpress [1988] 3 MLJ 367 [82] In the case of [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 22, the follows: S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 "Two types of cases are thus envisaged. Firstly, there are cases of mala fides, which must be taken to mean those cases where on the primary evidence the arresting party has no honest belief in his entitlement to arrest the vessel. Secondly, there are those cases in which objectively there is so little basis for the arrest that it may be inferred that the arresting party did not believe in his entitlement to arrest the vessel. It is, as I understand the judgment, in the latter sense that such phrases "crassa negligentia" and "gross negligence" are used and are described as implying malice or being [emphasis added] [83] It should be noted that the remedy of arrest is not something that can simply be invoked without consequence. The case of the [2008] 4 SLR(R) 994 is particularly instructive in this regard: The arrest of a vessel is never a trifling matter. Arrest is a very powerful invasive remedy. An arrest of a ship can lead to tremendous inconvenience, financial distress and severe commercial embarrassment. Even the briefest of delays can sometimes cause significant losses. It can also in certain commercial fortunes of the shipowner. Maritime arrests can, when improperly executed, sometimes be as destructive as Anton PIller orders an even as potentially ruinous as Mareva injunctions, the two nuclear weapons of civil litigation. [emphasis added] [84] In the present case, the unsigned Sales Contract between the Plaintiff and Unicious was entered into well after the parties were S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 aware that Unicious was a designated SDN and the Cargo on board the Vessel was Blocked Property. It was clearly a sham transaction to circumvent the U.S Sanctions. [85] The Plaintiff was already on notice that a competent Durban High Court in exercising its admiralty jurisdiction saw through this sham and yet the Plaintiff proceeded again before this Court on the exact same facts. In fact, its specious claims are a blatant attempt to mislead this Court, after having unsuccessfully tried this very same thing in South Africa High Court at Durban. [86] The Plaintiff asserted in this Court, like in the Durban High Court, that it would be in a position to present the original Bills of Lading and went further to claim that mere possession was sufficient to establish title, because, in its circular logic, bills of lading is the party which is entitled to delivery of the cargo as it holds title by virtue of being the holder of the bills of lading [87] In this regard, the Plaintiff has intentionally provided an illegible copy of the Bills of Lading, but now admits that the Bills of Lading are not in Pla . [88] Although at the hearing of Enclosure 18, the Plaintiff has refrained from asserting the position that mere possession of a Bills of Lading alone, without being named or endorsed therein, is sufficient to entitle a party to delivery, this was stated and relied upon as a basis in the arrest of the Vessel. S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 [89] Steven Chong J (as he then was) in the Singapore High Court case of [2015] SGHC 308 observed the policy and the principles of law relating to damages for wrongful arrest of vessel, as follows: The law on wrongful arrest was developed to protect of the arresting party. 2 Proof of actual malice is often difficult to establish, especially at the interlocutory stage, where most applications for wrongful arrest are pursued. However, the malice threshold can be satisfied by inference in circumstances where the case is so hopelessly bereft of merit that it warrants a finding that the claim colour foundation 3 Ship arrest is an extremely draconian remedy. It can be very disruptive and may inflict severe economic hardship on the ction against this draconian measure to be meaningful and effective, the judicial threshold should not be set too high so as to render the right to damages practically illusory. 4 In appropriate cases, where the threshold has been crossed, the court should express its opprobrium towards the damages occasioned by its wrongful arrest. Indeed, our courts have in a number of cases held the arresting party accountable for wrongful arrest. Principles governing the law on wrongful arrest S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 27 In The Vasiliy Golovnin at [134], the Court of Appeal affirmed the long-standing test set out in The Evangelismos The Evangelismos 948): Undoubtedly there may be cases in which there is either mala fides, or that crassa negligentia, which implies malice, which would justify a Court of Admiralty giving damages, as in an action brought at The real questi or is there not, reason to say, that the action was so unwarrantably brought, or brought with so little colour, or so little foundation, that it rather implies malice on the part of the Plaintiff, or that gross negligence which is equivalent to it? [emphasis added] 28. under the two parts to The Evangelismos test, the Court of Appeal held at [137]: first part mean that the inquiry would be both an objective and a subjective one into the time of the arrest as there would be a need to establish if the plaintiff had a genuine and honest belief that the arrest was legitimate then. On the other hand, if the focus is on the second part of the passage, this would mean a more objective inquiry into the circumstances prevailing and the evidence available at the time of the arrest, so as to determine if the action and the arrest were so unwarrantably brought, or brought with so S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 little colour, or so little foundation, as to imply that they were brought with malice or gross negligence [emphasis added] 29 The court then held that the inquiry should generally be focused on the second part of The Evangelismos test, ie, brought, or brought with so little colour, or so little foundation, as to imply malic The Vasiliy Golovnin at [137]). 30 It thus appears that the test is ultimately premised on a finding of malice (see also, The Kiku Pacific at [30]). Malice may be found on the basis of direct evidence of t mind at the time of the arrest, or it can be inferred if the claim is so unmeritorious that the arresting party could not have honestly believed that he had an entitlement to arrest the vessel (or at least recklessly disregarded whether he had grounds to do so). 31 Specifically, the action or arrest may be considered to inter alia - disclosure in the affidavit in supp The Vasiliy Golovnin at [138]). Given that the defendant has, in the present case, relied on both these grounds to seek damages for wrongful arrest, it is helpful to consider them in some detail. ...... 37 Notwithstanding the high threshold of The Evangelismos test, it can be seen that our courts would not be slow to find wrongful arrest and to award damages in appropriate circumstances. Indeed, this sentiment was expressed by the Court of Appeal in The Vasiliy Golovnin at [135]. From the above S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 cases, it is clear that the court will pay particular attention to what the arresting party knew, or must have known, at the time of the arrest (see [34] and [36] above). Where facts which clearly arrest are known or must have been known to the plaintiff at the time of the arrest, the courts will be more inclined to award damages for wrongful arrest. 38 In this regard, the question as to how weak a claim must be before malice can be inferred is perhaps a question that cannot be comprehensively answered in every case by a single threshold test. While the courts have held that malice may be inferred if the claim is without colour or foundation, what that means in practice is inevitably a matter of judgment, and can only be determined by the court on the facts of each case. 39 I would add at this juncture that because the focus of the inquiry is on malice of the arresting party, special attention should be paid to what the arresting party knew or must have known at the time of the arrest. While this is not the only factor the court should consider, it is certainly an important one in evaluating the merits of the claim for wrongful arrest. If, based on the information available, the court finds that the arresting party knew or must have known that it had no reasonable or probable cause to arrest the vessel, the court may well be justified in awarding damages for wrongful arrest. By contrast, if the court only arrives at the finding that the arresting party had no reasonable or probable cause to arrest the vessel after a legal analysis of the jurisdictional basis of the claim (as in the case of The Inai Selasih), or based on documents or information which were not available to the arresting party at the time of the arrest, the judicial finding in such circumstances may not be a sufficient basis for an award of damages. S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 40 While The Kiku Pacific did reject the use of the phrase a reasonable or probable cause alone can be sufficient to give rise to an inference of malice (see The Kiku Pacific at [18]). I accept that the absence of a reasonable or probable cause alone would not normally be sufficient to give rise to a finding of malice. However, if the court finds not only that there was no reasonable or probable cause for the arrest, but also that the arresting party knew or must have known that it did not have reasonable or probable cause at the time of the arrest, malice may be inferred and damages for wrongful arrest accordingly awarded. 42 Thus, to conclude, a claim may alone be sufficient to justify a finding of malice, regardless arrest. The finding of malice would be made even more compelling in circumstances where the court determines that the arresting party knew or must have known that it had no reasonable cause of action when arresting the vessel. Malice, however, remains the centrepiece of the inquiry, and a finding of malice is ultimately a fact- [90] Based on the aforesaid governing principles on the law of wrongful arrest and based on the facts and circumstances as stated above, it is the judgment of this Court that the Plaintiff has acted with mala fides and or crassa negligentia (gross negligent) in obtaining the Warrant of Arrest and arrested and continued to arrest the S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 [91] I would add that the Plaintiff has persisted with the arrest of the the Defendant on a strictly without prejudice basis had offered to provide alternative security via an international surety. The Plaintiff was unreasonable and had acted in mala fide in reje security to secure immediate release of vessel from arrest; delay in providing information on the amount of security required for the release of the Vessel and excessive demand of quantum security by the Plaintiff for release of the Vessel, all of which had prolonged the wrongful continued arrest of the Vessel at Port of Tanjung Pelepas, Johor to the detriment of the Defendant (for nearly two months). [92] In the The Evmar [1989] 2 MLJ 460, it was held that a refusal to accept a Protection and Indemnity Club undertaking to release of vessel from arrest tantamounted to malicious negligence: agreed to gave the plaintiffs a reasonable cause not to release the vessel. It seems to me that that expression meant, in the context, no more than that the defendants were reserving their rights, which they were entitled to do. In my opinion since alternative security had been furnished to the plaintiffs in terms which the plaintiffs had asked for, the plaintiffs had no further reasons not to release the vessel. The test to be applied to determine whether there was wrongful continuance of an arrest is the same as that applicable to wrongful arrest, ie mala fides or crassa negligentia implying malice: see The Margaret Jane (1869) LR 2 A & E 345. In my the letter of undertaking amounted to at least malicious S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 negligence. The arrest was clearly continued unnecessarily. The plaintiffs are therefore liable for damages for the continued detent [emphasis added] [93] I accept that t so little foundation in fact no foundation it is a case which the Plaintiff knew or ought to have known was based on a false foundation and a second bite of the cherry after it failed in the Durban High Court. [94] In the premises, it is the judgment of this Court that the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay for the damages occasioned by the . Conclusion [95] In the light of my findings and conclusions above, I hereby grant to the Defendant the following orders: (a) the Writ in rem and Warrant of Arrest both dated 31.7.2023 be set aside in this action; (b) the vessel registered at the Port of Hong Kong be immediately released from arrest in this action; (c) a declaration that in the circumstances of the case, this Court has no in rem jurisdiction over the Defendant in respect of the S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 subject matter of this suit and or the relief or remedy sought in this action; (d) or Sheriff from the vessel during the arrest of the vessel on 31.7.2023 for safe keeping, shall be returned to the solicitors for the Defendant within 24 hours from the date of the Order to be made herein; (e) the Plaintiff do pay to the Defendant damages for wrongful arrest and or wrongful vessel together with damages for wasted expenses, such to be assessed by the High Court Deputy Registrar; (f) the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant costs fixed at RM 25,000.00 subject to payment of allocator. Dated the 27th day of October 2023 ONG CHEE KWAN Judge of the High Court of Malaya High Court of Kuala Lumpur, NCC2 S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 Counsel: 1. Mr. Oon Thian Seng together with Lionel Noel for Plaintiff Messrs. T S Oon & Partners (Kuala Lumpur) 2. Mr. Mathew Kurien for Defendant Messrs. Sativale Mathew Arun (Subang Jaya) Case Reference: 1. Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786 2. [2002] 6 MLJ 433 3. Jemix Co Ltd & Anor v. Jemix Heat Treatment (M) Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLRH 276 4. [2012] 4 SLR 546 5. [2015] Vol 2 175 6. Vitol Asia Pte Ltd v Owners of the Ship or Vessel Malik Al Ashtar [2017] 1 CLJ 236 7. [1999] SGHC 274 8. The Evangelismos [1858] 12 Moo PC 352 9. The Dong Nai [1996] 4 MLJ 454 10. [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep 22 11. [2008] 4 SLR(R) 994 12. [2015] SGHC 308 13. The Evmar [1989] 2 MLJ 460 Legislation Reference: 1. Order 12 Rule 10, Rules of Court 2012 S/N zXy/7t4hRU2Wj0R7gMEoZA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	55,481	Tika 2.6.0
WA-11BNCvC-65-11/2022	PERAYU 1. ) MOHAMAD AMIN BIN MD HASHIM 2. ) AMIN-TAN & CO. RESPONDEN 1. ) TAN BING HUA 2. ) HUA YANG BERHAD 3. ) DAYA NIAGA SDN. BHD. 4. ) AGRO-MOD INDUSTRIES SDN. BHD.	It was undisputed that the cause of action in relation to the billing or unbilled legal work occurred between the years 2000 to 2002. However, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to act with reasonable diligence to discover the fraud, if any.Thus, this Court finds that the issue on limitation raised by the Plaintiffs does not come under section 29. The delay/latches of diligent actions by the Plaintiffs did not give rise to stop time from running as there was an inordinate delay which the Court could not find any evidence of fact for a reasonable explanation in regards to the delay.In conclusion, after careful scrutiny and judicious consideration of all the evidence before this Court, including the written and oral submissions of both parties, the appeal is dismissed with costs.	31/10/2023	YA Dr Suzana binti Muhamad Said	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=4592baba-1dbb-4554-848e-f9044c8b1fff&Inline=true	1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR CIVIL APPEAL NO.: WA-11BNCvC-65-11/2022 BETWEEN 1. DATO’ MOHAMAD AMIN BIN MD HASHIM (No. K/P: 520909-02-5533) 2. TETUAN AMIN-TAN & CO (suing as a firm) … APPELLANTS AND 1. DATO’ TAN BING HUA (No. K/P: 440702-08-5241) 2. HUA YANG BERHAD (No. Syarikat: 44094-M) 3. DAYA NIAGA SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 14034-M) 4. AGRO-MOD INDUSTRIES SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1444430-W) … RESPONDENTS 31/10/2023 10:09:21 WA-11BNCvC-65-11/2022 Kand. 29 S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 In the matter of the Magistrate Court at Kuala Lumpur In The Federal Territory Of Kuala Lumpur Civil Suit No.: WA-A72NCvC-13237-12/2020 Between 1. Dato’ Mohamad Amin Bin Md Hashim (No. K/P: 520909-02-5533) 2, Tetuan Amin-Tan & Co (suing as a firm) …Plaintiffs And 1. Dato’ Tan Bing Hua (No. K/P: 440702-08-5241) 2. Hua Yang Berhad (No. Syarikat: 44094-M) 3. Daya Niaga Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 14034-M) 4. Agro-Mod Industries Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 1444430-W) …Defendants S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against the decision of the learned Magistrate that dismissed the Plaintiffs Writ and Statement of Claim with cost, after a full trial. [2] The Plaintiffs claim was for the outstanding bills amounting to RM97,302.65 with interest and damages as follows- (a) Jumlah wang keseluruhan bil tertunggak berjumlah RM97,302.65; (b) Faedah ke atas bil tertunggak berjumlah RM97,302.65 dikira dan tarikh pemfailan saman ini sehingga penyelesaian penuh; (c) Faedah dan kos atas atas dasar ganti rugi berdasarkan bil-bil yang telah diisukan; (d) Ganti Rugi Teladan berasaskan daripada:- (i) Defendan Pertama melanggar dan mengingkari kewajipan beliau sebagai Rakan Kongsi Pengurusan dan/atau Legal Asssociate yang berkhidmat untuk Plaintif Kedua pada waktu yang material; dan S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 (ii) Bahawa penipuan dan konspirasi untuk menipu yang dilakukan oleh Defendan-Defendan adalah bertujuan untuk menyebabkan kerugian kepada Plaintif Kedua pada waktu yang material. (e) Suatu Akuan bahawa semua bayaran yang telah dibuat oleh Defendan Kedua dan/atau Defendan Ketiga dan/atau Defendan Keempat kepada Defendan Pertama untuk fail-fail dibawah kendalian Defendan Pertama merupakan amanah konstruktif terhadap Plaintif Kedua pada waktu yang material; (f) Segala bayaran yang dibuat oleh Defendan Kedua dan/atau Defendan Ketiga dan/atau Defendan Keempat kepada Defendan Pertama diberikan kepada Plaintif Kedua bersama faedah; (g) Taksiran Ganti Rugi Am (akan ditaksirkan oleh Mahkamah); dan (h) Lain-lain relif yang dianggap sesuai oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini. [3] This Court dismissed the appeal with cost. [4] For ease of reference, the respective parties shall be referred to as they appear in the Magistrate’s Court. S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Brief facts of the case [5] The First Plaintiff (P1) and the First Defendant (D1) were founders and partners of the Second Plaintiff (P2). D1 had been the Managing Partner of P2 from 1997 until 2005 and thereafter as a legal assistant until 2012 while P1 became the Managing Partner of P2 in 2005. The Second Defendant (D2), Third Defendant (D3) and Fourth Defendant (D4) were clients of P2 managed by D1. D3 and D4 are subsidiaries of D2. [6] An internal audit was conducted in 2017 (audit exercise) pursuant to a ‘hostile take-over’ of P2 from 27 December 2016 - 30 December by two (2) partners namely Dato’ Yong Lay Keow and Susie Lim Chuan Tin at which time, P1 was on leave. Both the partners have resigned since then. [7] Accordingly, through the audit exercise, the Plaintiffs discovered discrepancies in the financial records of P2’s clients files where fraudulent activities occurred in the management for the files of BH-15940-00-HY- WCF, BH-15940-00-HYWCF, BH-16037-2001-SPA-SV and BH-16082- 2001-SPA-SV (Files) which were the basis of the Plaintiffs’ claim in this suit. S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [8] Subsequently, demand letters were sent to D2, D3 and D4 demanding payments for the Files which they replied that ‘all payments had been fully settled as agreed by the firm’ (referring to P2). These payments were disputed by the Plaintiffs. Details of the relevant bills of the Files are listed under paragraph 27 of the Statement of Claim as Jadual A, B, C and D. [9] During the trial, four (4) witnesses were called by the Plaintiffs and five (5) witnesses by the Defendants. Plaintiffs’ Contentions [10] It was the Plaintiff’s contention that the fraud and conspiracy to defraud were only discovered in 2017, after a hostile take-over by the 2 former partners. Hence the Plaintiffs employed section 29 of the Limitation Act 1953 (Act 254) that time does not run until they discovered the conspiracy to defraud. Defendants’ Contentions [11] The Defendants contended that the occasioned claimed by the Plaintiffs happened 20 years ago. As the Writ was filed on 31/12/2020, this action which was founded on tort was clearly time-barred by the S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 statutory 6 years limitation period under section 6(1)(a) of Act 254 which prescribed such limitation. Issues [12] There were various issues raised by both parties apart from limitation including whether P2 has locus standi, conspiracy to defraud by the Defendants and that D1 has breached his fiduciary duties. [13] Having read the cause papers and parties' written submissions and having heard and considered the oral submissions by both the learned Counsels on all the issues raised, this Court is of the view that the one issue that will determine and dispose off the appeal is whether the Plaintiffs' case was caught by the statute of limitation. [14] As such, this Court will only deliberate on the issue of limitation as this was the sole ground that this appeal was dismissed. Analysis and Findings Whether the claim was time barred? [15] Section 29 of Act 254 provides that the limitation period might be postponed if the cause of action is- S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 i) based on fraud of the defendant; ii) concealed by the defendant; or iii) an action for relief from the consequences of a mistake. [16] Section 29 of the Limitation Act provides- “29. Where, in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either: (a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant or his agent or of any person through whom he claims or his agent; or (b) the right of action is concealed by the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or (c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake, the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or the mistake, as the case may be, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.”. [17] In Thameez Nisha Hasseem v. Maybank Allied Bank Berhad [2023] 4 MLRA 492; [2023] 4 MLJ 145 (FC), it was held- S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 “[32] The LA 1953 is therefore a law of general application, regulating the limitation period for commencing a cause of action - generally at either six or twelve years. It actually was actuated by the desire of the government at that time, "to sweep aside this vast compilation of various types of action leading to interminable argument and in many cases gross injustice by substituting it with a simple and uniform system which can be understood" by all and sundry.”. [18] In the case of Credit Corp (M) Bhd v. Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLRA 293; [1991] 1 MLJ 409, the Supreme Court elaborated on section 29 of the Limitation Act and held- “[18] This provision was inserted to protect a plaintiff who was ignorant of his right of action in the special case of fraudulent concealment, and to overcome the difficulty that time would otherwise be running against him, unknown to him. As a general rule as stated in the notes in Halsbury's Statutes of England and Wales (4th Edn) Vol 24 to s 32 of the English Limitation Act 1980 (which is in pari materia with s 26 of the English Limitation Act 1939 which is in turn in pari materia with S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 s 29 of our Limitation Act 1953) it is stated that s 29(1)(c) applied "to an action at common law to recover money paid under a mistake of fact or to an analogous claim in equity for money paid under a mistake of fact or law". [20] In RB Policies at Lloyd's v. Butler [1950] 1 KBD 76 Streatfield J explained the rationale of s 26 of the English Act as follows: This section was inserted to protect a plaintiff who was ignorant of his right of action in the special case of fraudulent concealment, and to overcome the difficulty that time would otherwise have been running against him, unknown to himself. But for the section, time would have run against him from the accrual of his right of action, for it is to be noted that the section, even in the case of fraudulent concealment, does not say that the cause of action shall not accrue until the fraud is discovered, but simply that "time shall not "begin to run" until that event. [31] The doctrine of limitation is said to be based on two broad considerations. Firstly there is a presumption that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. The other consideration is that it is necessary that matters of right in S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 general should not be left too long in a state of uncertainty or doubt or suspense. [32] The limitation law is promulgated for the primary object of discouraging plaintiffs from sleeping on their actions and more importantly, to have a definite end to litigation. This is in accord with the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium that in the interest of the State there must be an end to litigation. The rationale of the limitation law should be appreciated and enforced by the Courts.” [19] In this context, the Plaintiffs must provide a sufficient explanation of the delay particularly as to why the audit was only conducted at a much later time (2017) when it could have been done earlier (2000-2002). Further, it is only logical that in order to operate, a legal firm needs to renew its licence which requires an annual audit exercise. [20] In this regard, the case of Tenaga Nasional Berhad v SM Pembinaan Sdn Bhd [2000] MLJU 600 which was cited by the Defendants counsels, held that the phrase “reasonable diligence” means “diligently do something as common people”. Reasonable diligence "bermakna membuat sesuatu dengan tekun atau rajin oleh orang biasa S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (lihat Peco Arts Inc. v. Hazlitt Gallery Ltd [1983] 3 All ER 193).”. It is the level of care and effort that a person of ordinary prudence would take in a given situation. [21] In the case of Sa'adi Ibrahim & Anor v. Liew Han Sin & Anor [2006] 2 MLRH 310 (CA) it was held- “[10] Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn, vol. 28 at p. 314, para. 694 states as follows: 694. Court's power to override time-limits. If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which (1) the provisions in respect of the time-limit for personal injury actions or actions under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 prejudice the plaintiff or any person whom he represents and (2) any decision of the court would prejudice the defendant or any person whom he represents, the court may direct that those provisions are not to apply to the action or are not to apply to any specified cause of action to which the actions relates. S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 In so acting, the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to (a) the length of and the reason for the delay on the plaintiff's part; (b) the extent to which having regard to the delay, the evidence adduced or likely to be adduced by the plaintiff or the defendant is or is likely to be less cogent than if the action had been brought within the time allowed; (c) the defendant's conduct after the cause of action arose including the extent, if any, to which he responded to requests reasonably made by the plaintiff for information or inspection for the purpose of ascertaining facts which were or might be relevant to the plaintiff's cause of action against the defendant; (d) the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising after the date of the accrual of the cause of action; (e) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the defendant's act or omission to which the injury was attributable might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages and (f) the steps, if any, taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of any such advice he may have received. In S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 applying these principles the court's discretion is unfettered.”. [22] It was undisputed that the cause of action in relation to the billing or unbilled legal work occurred between the years 2000 to 2002. However, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to act with reasonable diligence to discover the fraud, if any. [23] Thus, this Court finds that the issue on limitation raised by the Plaintiffs does not come under section 29. The delay/latches of diligent actions by the Plaintiffs did not give rise to stop time from running as there was an inordinate delay which the Court could not find any evidence of fact for a reasonable explanation in regards to the delay. [24] In conclusion, after careful scrutiny and judicious consideration of all the evidence before this Court, including the written and oral submissions of both parties, the appeal is dismissed with costs. (SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Kuala Lumpur S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Date 26 October 2023 COUNSELS Solicitors For The Appellant Tetuan Amin-Tan & Co No. 11, 11-1 & 11-2, Jalan Pantai Murni 6 Pantai Dalam 59200 Kuala Lumpur Solicitors For The Respondent Tetuan Ting Asiah & Co. C-2-1 & C-2-2, Encorp Strand Garden Office, No 12, Jalan Pju 5/1, 47810 Kota Damansara, Petaling Jaya, Selangor S/N urqSRbsdVEWEjvkETIsf/w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	16,664	Tika 2.6.0
JC-A72NCvC-101-11/2021	PLAINTIF Rong Cheng Casket & Funeral Services Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN Kong Sew Chu	Bicara Penuh- rayuan yang difailkan oleh Defendan yang tidak berpuashati dengan keputusan yang diberikan pada 24 Julai 2023 selepas Bicara Penuh di mana Mahkamah telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan dengan kos. Plaintif telah dilantik oleh Defendan untuk membekalkan perkhidmatan Pengebumian bagi suami defendanPlaintif memfailkan tuntutan terhadap Defendan berasaskan Prinsip kontrak di mana Defendan telah gagal serta enggan menjalankan tanggungjawab untuk membayar Plaintif bagi perkhimatan yang telah diberikan.	31/10/2023	Puan Nurasidah Binti A. Rahman	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=4061927c-ca82-4818-88c2-2c843194ad3e&Inline=true	1 \| P a g e DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI BATU PAHAT DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM GUAMAN SIVIL JC-A72NCVC-101-11/2021 ANTARA RONG CHENG CASKET & FUNERAL SERVICES SDN BHD [Company No 202001010342/136662-A] …PLAINTIF DAN KONG SEW CHU (NO K/P: 400914-10-5026) …DEFENDAN ********************************************************************************************* ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN ******************************************************************************************* 31/10/2023 12:57:13 JC-A72NCvC-101-11/2021 Kand. 34 S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 \| P a g e Pengenalan [1] Ini merupakan rayuan yang difailkan oleh Defendan yang tidak berpuashati dengan keputusan yang diberikan pada 24 Julai 2023 selepas Bicara Penuh di mana Mahkamah telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan dengan kos. [2] Plaintif dalam kes ini menuntut daripada Defendan seperti berikut:- (i) Pengisytiharan bahawa Defendan dalam kemungkiran dan/atau mungkir tanggungjawab kontrak dan/atau tanggungjawab kontrak dan/atau tanggungjawan bayaran terhadap Plaintiff untuk Pakej Pengebumian yang telah dibekalkan untuk Suami Mendiang Defendan; (ii) jumlah wang sebanyak RM26,800 yang perlu dibayarkan oleh Defendan terhadap Plaintif; (iii) Faedah sebanyak 5% setahun keatas jumlah tuntutan sebanyak RM26,800 dari tarikh 17.1.2023 sehingga pemfailan Pernyataan Tuntutan seperti yang dibenarkan dibawah Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956; (iv) Faedah sebanyak 5% setahun ke atas jumlah sebanyak RM26,800 atau mana jumlah penghakiman yang dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah yang perlu dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif dari tarikh pemfailan pernyataab tuntutan sehingga tarikh akhir penghakiman; (v) Faedah sebanyak 5% ke atas jumlah RM26800 atau mana jumlah penghakiman yang dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah yang perlu dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif dari tarikh akhir Penghakiman sehingga penyelesaian penuh dan terakhir; S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 \| P a g e (vi) Gantirugi termasuk gantirugi am dan/atau gantirugi tambahan dan/atau gantirugi teladan, untuk dinilai oleh pegawai yang dipilih oleh Mahkamah. (vii) kos tindakan (viii) kos berasaskan pada peguamcara-klien; dan (ix) Apa-apa relief yang difikirkan perlu. [3] Sepanjang Bicara penuh kertas-kertas kausa berikut telah dirujuk:- Kertas-kertas Kausa Penandaan (mengikut sistem CMS 2) Ikatan Pliding Lampiran 7 Kronologi kes Lampiran 8 Ringkasan Kes Lampiran 9 Fakta-fakta yang dipersetujui Lampiran 10 Isu-isu untuk dibicarakan Lampiran 11 Ikatan Dokumen bersama Lampiran 12 Pernyataan Saksi Pertama Plaintif Lampiran 13 Pernyataan Saksi kedua Plaintif Lampiran 14 Pernyataan Saksi Defendan Lampiran 15 Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan Plaintif Lampiran 17 Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan II Lampiran 20 [4] Keseluruhannya, seramai 3 orang saksi telah memberi keterangan bagi kes ini yang merangkumi 2 orang saksi Plaintif dan 1 orang saksi defendan. Saksi- Saksi tersebut adalah :- i. Encik Lau Ching Siang (SP1) Pemilik syarikat Plaintif ii. Encik Tang Hong Ngang (SP2 ) Kenalan Plaintif dan Defendan iii. Puan Kong Sew Chu (SD1) Defendan S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 \| P a g e Latar Belakang Kes [5] Pada 14.1.2021 Suami Defendan yang merupakan seorang bekas Guru Besar telah meninggal dunia. Plaintif telah dilantik oleh Defendan untuk membekalkan perkhidmatan Pengebumian bagi suami defendan. Perkhidmatan semasa upacara Pengebumian berlangsung dari 14.1.2021 sehingga 16.1.2021. Plaintif telah menjalankan perkhidmatan yang ditawarkan di dalam pakej pengebumian berjumlah RM26,800.00 termasuk keranda, memoir peringatan buat mendiang suami Defendan seperti video, foto dan slideshow. Kemudian Plaintif telah mengeluarkan invois No I- 000085 pada 17.1.2021 yang berjumlah sebanyak RM26,878.00. Namun pihak Defendan engan membayar jumlah invois yang diterima. Maka Plaintif memfailkan tuntutan terhadap Defendan berasaskam Prinsip kontrak di mana Defendan telah gagal serta enggan menjalankan tanggungjawab untuk membayar Plaintif bagi perkhimatan yang telah diberikan. Hujahan Plaintif [6] Plaintif menghujahkan berlaku tawar menawar di antara pihak-pihak dan kemudian telah dijalankan oleh Plaintif pengebumian tersebut. Oleh itu Plaintif dengan rendah diri merujuk kepada Seskyen 9 Akta Kontrak 1950 dimana ia menerangkan akan kontrak perkhidmatan seperti:- “Promises, express and implied. Seksyen 9.So far as the proposal or acceptance of any promise is made in words, the promise is said to be express. So far as the proposal or acceptance is made otherwise in words, the promise is said to be implied.” [7] Plaintif merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes Melaka Farm Resorts (M) Sdn Bhd v Hong Wei Seng [2004] 6 MU 506 ‘dimana Mahkamah telah menolak rayuan Defendan ke atas ketidakwujudan Kontrak Pekerjaan dimana S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 \| P a g e suatu kontrak perkhidmatan boleh dilaksanakan secara lisan’. Selain daripada itu, Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa berdasarkan fakta-fakta di dalam kes ini, telah terhasilnya satu perjanjian rasmi di antara Defendan dan Plaintif selaras dengan tuntutan Sesyen 10 Akta Kontrak 1950 dimana telah dijelaskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Mohd Shukri bin Mat (administrator to the estate of Wan Mek bt Wan Abdullah @ Wan Eshah bin Wan Abdullah) v Wan Rahmah bt Wan Abdullah (administrator to the estate of Wan Abdullah bin Wan Ahmad) [2018] 3 MLJ 89 dimana It is clear from s10 of the Contracts Act 1950 that a contract can be entered into orally. The three elements forming a contract namely, offer, acceptance and consideration” [8] Plaintif juga menghujahkan bahawa pada setiap masa yang material Plaintif telah menawarkan beberapa pakej pengebumian bersama harga-harga pakej kepada Defendan dan Defendan telah memilih pakej pengebumian berjumlah RM26,800.00 Selepas persetujuan diberikan, Plaintif telah membekalkan perkhidmatan menuruti pakej yang telah dipilih oleh Defendan dan Plaintif menegaskan tiada bantahan dan/atau halangan yang telah dilakukan oleh Defendan bagi menghentikan kerja-kerja pengebumian mendiang suami Defendan. Selain itu Plaintif menghujahkan dan menyatakan bahawa pada hari kematian mendiang suami Defendan, Plaintif telah dilantik oleh Defendan dalam menguruskan pengebumiannya . Pada 14.1.2021 sehingga 16.1.2021, Plaintif telah menjalankan dan membekalkan perkhidmatan yang telah dipersetujui oleh Defendan. Sepanjang proses pengebumian, Defendan tidak pernah membuat percubaan menghalang atau/ menghentikan perkhidmatan pengebumian yang dijalankan oleh Plaintif sehingga urusan pengebumian mendiang suami Defendan selesai. [9] Plaintif juga percaya bahawa dengan perlantikan yang dibuat secara perlakuan ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa keengganan dan/atau kelalaian dan/atau kegagalan S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 \| P a g e Defendan untuk membayar perkhidmatan Plaintif menjurus kepada pengingkaran kontrak dan/atau janji di mana Plaintif berhak menuntut jumlah RM26,800.00 tersebut daripada Defendan. Plaintif menghujahkan berdasarkan perenggan 3 (b) pada Jawapan Kepada Pembelaan dimana Plaintif menegaskan bahawa sepanjang waktu yang material Defendan tidak pernah menolak/dan atau menghalang serta tidak membenarkan Plaintif menguruskan urusan pengebumian Defendan. Plaintif juga menghujahkan bahawa sebarang tuduhan Defendan terhadap Plaintif ini adalah tidak berasas kerana sepanjang waktu yang material sehingga ke tarikh perbicaraan tiada satu salinan Laporan Polis yang dimasukkan bagi menyokong segala kenyataan Defendan dipaksa dan/atau paksaan seperti yang dinyatakan Defendan di dalam Penyataan Pembelaan, sebaliknya Defendan yang telah gagal membayar harga pakej pengebumian sepertimana yang telah dipersetujui oleh Plaintif dan Defendan walaupun perkhidmatan pengebumian telah selesai. [10] Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa akibat salah nyata ini Plaintif telah menanggung kerugian sebanyak RM26,800.00 atas keengganan dan/atau kegagalan Defendan untuk melangsaikan tanggungjawab pembayaran kepada Plaintif Defendan mempunyai pengetahuan tentang perkhidmatan Plaintif dan pengakuan tentang jumlah yang terhutang kepada Plaintif, Defendan masih gagal dan/atau enggan melangsaikan bayaran perkhidmatan pengebumian Plaintif berjumlah RM26,800.00 adalah disebabkan ketidakpuashatian Defendan terhadap Plaintif seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Pemeriksaan Semula Saksi Defendan :- TRANSL Puan, dia kata, "Sebab saya tak nak bergaduh." KONG Saya tak nak gaduh, Puan. AM If I may, is it keadaan huru-hara? S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 \| P a g e KONG Dalam keadaan senang Judge Baik-baik lah orang kata. KONG Ya, dalam keadaan yang senang, selesai. Duit banyak-banyak pun tak guna. Saya ada duit tetapi saya tak puas hati. [11] Justeru, Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa Defendan mengetahui kewujudan dan menerima perkhidmatan yang telah dibekalkan oleh Plaintif bagi mendiang suami Defendan. Selain itu, Defendan juga tidak pernah mengutarakan apa-apa bantahan pada setiap masa yang material sepanjang proses pengebumian dijalankan sehingga selesai. Plaintif juga menghujahkan bahawa pengakuan serta bukti salinan cek berjumlah RM28,000.00 melalui Pemeriksaan Balas Defendan dan ianya jelas menunjukkan bahawa Defendan menyetujui perkhidmatan yang dibekalkan oleh Plaintif akan tetapi wang tidak pernah diserahkan kepada Plaintif. [12] Selain itu, Defendan juga telah membuat pengakuan melalui Pemeriksaan Balas SD dimana keengganan Defendan membayar jumlah yang terhutang kepada Plaintif adalah berdasarkan ketidapuashatian justeru Defendan mempunyai tanggungjawab untuk membayar perkhidmatan pengebumian mendiang suami Defendan kepada Plaintif. Plaintif juga menghujahkan bahawa pengakuan serta bukti salinan cek berjumlah RM28,000.00 melalui Pemeriksaan Balas Defendan dan ianya jelas menunjukkan bahawa Defendan menyetujui perkhidmatan yang dibekalkan oleh Plaintif akan tetapi wang tidak pernah diserahkan kepada Plaintif [13] Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa berdasarkan syarat-syarat pada Seskyen 71 Akta Kontrak 1950 , bagi syarat pertama Plainitif yang dilantik secara perlakuan oleh Defendan telah menjalankan perkhidmatan pengebumian ke atas mendiang suami Defendan. Plaintif juga telah memenuhi syarat kedua di mana perkhidmatan itu adalah S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 \| P a g e dilakukan untuk mendiang suami Defendan dan telah dinyatakan pada Perenggan 4 dalam Pernyataan Tuntutan bahawa Plaintif telah menawarkan beberapa pakej pengebumian bersama harga dan Defendan telah memilih pakej pengebumian yang berharga RM26,800.00 justeru memenuhi syarat ketiga dan bagi syarat keempat, Defendan telah mendapatkan faedah atas perkhidmatan pengebumian yang dilakukan oleh Plaintif dan sehingga ke tarikh tindakan ini Plaintif tidak menerima apa- apa bayaran terhadap perkhidmatan pengebumian yang telah diberikan kepada Defendan . Hujahan Defendan [14] Defendan menghujahkan bahawa tiada kewujudan terma kontrak yang jelas antara Plaintif dan Defendan; serta terdapatnya salah nyata (“misrepresentation”) mengenai lantikan pihak Plaintif oleh Defendan; serta Plaintif pada setiap masa tidak pernah menyerahkan apa-apa Invois dan/atau sebut harga kepada pihak Defendan bagi pengesahan perkhidmatan; selain itu, terdapat tekanan tidak wajar pihak Plaintif terhadap Defendan (Undue Influence). Bagi hujahan pertama pihak Defendan, pihak Defendan menghujahkan bahawa pada asasnya tiada kewujudan terma kontrak yang nyata dan/atau jelas di antara pihak memandangkan pihak Plaintif juga akui tiada apa- apa yang diberikan secara bertulis mengenai perkhidmatan pihak Plaintif kepada pihak Defendan. AM Ok. So, Mdm Kong ada terima ini invois? LAU Terima. AM Then, boleh bagi tahu kenapa dekat bawah itu dia tak sain? Ok, tak apa, Mr Lau. Siapa yang bagi invois ini dekat Mdm Kong? LAU Saya. S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 \| P a g e AM You yang bagi. So, you bagi kat Mdm Kong, kat bawah itu dia tak sain, dia tak mahu sain ke atau you bagi dia pakai pos? LAU Biasa ini macam, kita cakap percaya punya lah. Kita Cina buat ini cakap percaya punya lah. Saya bagi dia ini invois dulu lah. [15] Merujuk kepada pemeriksaan balas di atas ke atas pihak Plaintif, adalah jelas tiada perjanjian bertulis yang jelas wujud di antara pihak-pihak dan Invois yang dinyatakan oleh pihak Plaintif ketika itu telah diisukan kepada pihak Defendan namun tidak ditandatangani ataupun diterima oleh pihak Defendan. Perkara ini juga disahkan oleh pihak Defendan (SD1) seperti dibawah:- CEW Pn Kong, dengan rujukan pada muka surat 9 dan 10, adakah Pn Kong pernah tengok dokumen-dokumen ini? Pn Kong, sekarang adakah Pn Kong pernah tengok dokumen ini ataupun tidak? KONG Saya tidak pernah. CEW Pn Kong, merujuk kepada muka surat 11, ini merupakan satu invois yang dikeluarkan oleh Rong Cheng Casket & Funeral Services. KONG Tak pernah, Puan. Tak pernah kasi. CEW Puan, dokumen ini tidak berada dengan saya sekarang, ia adalah bersama dengan Plaintif, Witness Pertama. Yang telah hadir pada bicara yang lepas. [16] Oleh yang demikian, Defendan menghujahkan bahawa tiada apa-apa dokumen yang dapat menunjukkan Defendan bersetuju dengan sebut harga tersebut pada awalannya dan Defendan menghujahkan bahawa Plaintif dikatakan telah mengambil S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 \| P a g e kesempatan di dalam meletakkan harga perkhidmatannya. Malahan jika dilihat pula kepada kenyataan SP2:- AM Jadi saya katakan En Tang, En Tang lah yang memperkenalkan atau perkhidmatan Plaintif kepada Defendan. Setuju? TAN Ya, Puan. [17] Ini adalah kenyataan SP2:- AM Baik, ok. Puan, I think I rephrase a bit the question. Beginilah, En Tang. Saya katakan begini. En Tang tahu ada tawar menawar dan kononnya ada perjanjian untuk perkhidmatan ini disebabkan Plaintif memberitahu En Tang, setuju? I paraphrase. En Tang, setuju atau tidak saya katakan Plaintif yang memaklumkan En Tang mengenai persetujuan Defendan dan Plaintif untuk menguruskan pengebumian mendiang? TAN Ya. JUDGE Soalannya bagaimana? AM Ya. JUDGE Soalannya bagaimana. Bagaimana tahu? TAN Puan, saya ada tanya Kong Sew Chu, Defendan. Saya ada tanya Defendan sama ada beliau ingin mengambil Rong Cheng dan beliau kata boleh. AM Tanya itu melalui panggilan ataupun perjumpaan? TAN Melalui telefon. [18] Adalah amat jelas bahawa pihak Defendan telah diambil kesempatan oleh pihak Plaintif apabila terdapat pihak ketiga yang terlibat di dalam isu perlantikan Plaintif sebagai perkhidmatan pengebumian mendiang suami Defendan pada tarikh S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 \| P a g e kematian suami Defendan. Pada masa yang material, Defendan juga menghujahkan adalah pada pertimbangan kebarangkalian terdapat kemungkinan salah komunikasi di antara pihak-pihak khususnya di dalam urusan perkhidmatan pengebumian terutamanya pakej dan/atau sebut harga bagi perkhidmatan tersebut. Defendan merujuk kepada S.30 Akta Spesifik Relief 1950 dan berikunya seperti berikut:- 30 When instrument may be rectified “When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, a contract or other instrument in writing does not truly express their intention, either party, or his representative in interest, may institute a suit to have the instrument rectified: and if the court find it clearly proved that there has been fraud or mistake in framing the instrument, and ascertain the real intention of the parties in executing the same, the court may in its discretion rectify the instrument so as to express that intention, so far as this can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons in good faith and for value.” [19] Melihat kepada tujuan asal kewujudan Invois dan perkhidmatan urusan pengebumian tersebut dan seperti diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam MENTA CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD v. LESTARI PUCHONG SDN BHD [2015] 8 CLJ 1117, dan diputuskan:- (7) There can be no rectification if the plaintiff cannot show the real intention of the parties. Evidence of what took place prior to execution of the instrument is admissible and indeed essential to prove what intention was communicated by one side to the other, and with what common intention and common agreement they made their bargain. 'Some outward expression of accord" is evidence of "continuing common intention'. Evidence of subjective intention is relevant to ascertain the real intention of the parties. But the subjective intention as well as a S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 \| P a g e subjective denial must be evaluated under the light of the intercommunication or that which had 'crossed the line' [20] Defendan juga menghujahkan bahwa Ketidakwujudan unsur Pertimbangan (Consideration) di dalam Penawaran (Offer) dan Penerimaan (Acceptance) tiada dan persoalannya adakah Kewujudan Tawaran Balas (Counter Offer); Defendan kini merujuk kepada Seksyen 7 dan Seksyen 8 masing-masing di dalam Akta Kontrak 1950 di mana seperti berikut S.7 Acceptance must be absolute-. In order to convert a proposal into a promise the acceptance must- be absolute and unqualified; be expressed in some usual and reasonable manner, unless the proposal prescribes the manner in which it is to be accepted. If the proposal prescribes a manner in which it is to be accepted, and the acceptance is not made in that manner, the proposer may, within a reasonable time after the acceptance is communicated to him, insist that his proposal shall be accepted in the prescribed manner, and not otherwise; but, if he fails to do so, he accepts the acceptance.” [21] Defendan berhujah, bahawa hanya berlandaskan kepada Invois terbabit semata-mata dan perlu dibandingkan dengan perkhidmatan yang diberikan yang jelas mempunyai percanggahan dengan apa yang Defendan niatkan adalah jelas percanggahan mengenai kewujudan kontrak antara pihak-pihak. Ini kerana merujuk kepada kenyataan Plaintif melalui SP1:- LAU Ok, Puan, Puan maaf ya, saya cerita. Biasa kalau ini invois, kita tak boleh kasi customer dulu. Tapi kita tempat kecil macam Yong Peng, tempat kecil, kita biasa kasi dia orang dulu. S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 \| P a g e [22] Daripada kenyataan ini amatlah jelas, tindakan Plaintif adalah memaksa “imposed” terhadap Defendan, dan adalah jika ada perkhidmatan yang diberikan oleh Plaintif secara paksa rela ianya adalah satu hubungan kontraktual yang tidak sah (“tainted with illegality”) dan perkara ini diakui sendiri oleh pihak Plaintif. AM Dan lepas itu, you bagi tahu Mdm Kong, tunggu ambulans. LAU Ya. AM Lepas itu, you bagi tahu jumlah total RM26,800. LAU Itu masa belum kasi dia tahu. [23] Maka dengan itu, Defendan menghujahkan tiada “consideration”/ “pertimbangan” yang masih wujud pada masa material urusan pengebumian diuruskan pada adaan yang gentir, seperti disahkan oleh SD1:- JUDGE Berkenaan dengan mayat yang diangkat daripada dewan, terangkan pasal isu itu sahaja. AM Ya. KONG Puan, saksi tadi, Puan, Rong Cheng dan Rong Cheng telah menghantar orangnya mengangkat mayat suami saya dan saya tak sempat nak menghalang. Mereka macam perompak,. [24] Malahan, kesemua masa yang material ketika itu, performing conditions atau receiving conditions (as defined in S.8 of the Contracts Act 1950) tidak berlaku dan secara mutlaknya, penerimaan tidak absolute (penerimaan pertimbangan ketika itu, pembayaran caj tunggakan tidak dilakukan oleh Plaintif). Kewujudan tawar-menawar termasuk pemilihan keranda bagi urusan pengebumian terbabit juga mencerminkan S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 \| P a g e bahawa tindakan pihak-pihak ketika itu tidak menonjolkan suatu kontrak atau perjanjian terhasil kerana Penerimaan adalah tidak mutlak sama sekali., CEW En Tang, tadi peguam Plaintif ada tanya sama ada En Tang mempunyai pengetahuan tentang tawar menawar di antara Plaintif dengan Defendan. Adakah En Tang berada di tempat tersebut apabila tawar menawar sedang dijalankan antara Plaintif dengan Defendan TRANSL Adakah dia berada di sana? EW Adakah En Tang berada di sana. TAN Semasa proses tawar menawar dijalankan saya berada di situ. [25] Plaintif telah mengesahkan sememang terdapat pembayaran yang tidak dilakukan oleh Defendan oleh yang demikian menunjukkan permasalahan terhadap perkhidmatan yang disediakan oleh pihak Plaintif.. menjawap persoalan mengenai kewujudan kontrak tersebut, Defendan merujuk kepada kes Emas Kira Sdn. Bhd. v Michael Joseph Monteiro & Ors [2017] 3 CLJ 605 (IOD1), m/s 100): -“Section 7 of the Contracts Act 1950 provides that an acceptance must be absolute and unqualified in order for a proposal to be converted into a promise. Thus, if a party purports to accept an offer but introduces a new term in so doing, he would be in reality making a counteroffer, the effect of which would be to destroy the original offer. Such a counteroffer must thereafter be accepted before an agreement could be said to have been put in place. See, for example, Hyde v. Wrench” [26] Oleh yang demikian, Defendan dengan rendah diri memohon kepada Mahkamah yang Mulia ini untuk mempertimbangkan keseluruhan surat-surat terbabit dan menitik beratkan bahawasanya kontrak yang dikatakan wujud melalui 08.10.2010 telah secara khususnya ditawar balas (counter offer) dan melalui surat-surat ini tiada S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 \| P a g e satu pun persetujuan mutlak di kecapi oleh Defendan dan Plaintif. Jika diambil semula “contentious point” oleh Defendan di atas, Defendan ingin mengatakan jika sesuatu kontrak dikatakan wujud tetapi mengambil kira tawaran balas yang juga diberikan oleh Defendan, adalah terang bahawa Plaintif sendiri gagal di dalam menunaikan tanggungjawabnya, iaitu menyerahkan apa-apa notis dan/atau invoice rasmi kepada pihak Defendan dan/atau sebut harga yang dipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak sebelum urusan pengebumian itu dijalankan terlebih dahulu. Menurut akta Kontrak sek S.66 Obligation of a person who has received advantage under void agreement, or contract that becomes void “When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under the agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it. ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A pays B RM1,000 in consideration of B's promising to marry C, A's daughter. C is dead at the time of the promise. The agreement is void, but B must repay A the RM1,000. (b) A contracts with B to deliver to him 250 gantangs of rice before the 1st of May. A delivers 130 gantangs only before that day, and none later. Bretains the 130 gantangs after the 1st of May. He is bound topay A for them. (c) A, a singer, contracts with B, the manager of a theatre, to sing at his theatre for two nights in every week during the next two months, and B engages to pay her RM100 for each night's performance. On the sixth night A wilfully absents herself from the theatre, and B, in consequence, rescinds the contract. B must pay A for the five nights on which she had sung. S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 \| P a g e (d) A contract to sing for B at a concert for RM1,000, which are paid in advance. A is too ill to sing. A is not bound to make compensation to B for the loss of the profits which B would have made if A had been able to sing, but must refund to B the RM1,000 paid in advance. [27] Mengikut konteks di atas, Defendan ingin mengulangi hujahan di atas jika Kontrak atau perjanjian di atas adalah tidak sah (taint with illegality) adalah menjadi khusus bahawasanya pihak yang telah menerima faedah daripada perjanjian itu untuk memulangkan dan/atau memulihkan dan/atau memberi pampasan kepada kesemua faedah-faedah yang telah diterima oleh Plaintif khususnya. [28] Dengan mengambil konteks di dalam kes ini, pihak Plaintif pada setiap masa yang material tidak pernah memberi gambaran tepat mengenai berapa jumlah dan harga perkhidmatan yang dipersetujui melainkan dengan jumlah Invois yang dikatakan telah diisu tiga (3) hari selepas urusan pengebumian. Walaubagaimanapun tiada apa-apa bukti penerimaan mahupun persetujuan daripada pihak Defendan pada setiap masa. AM Tak setuju. Dan Mdm Kong pun tak setuju nak lantik you sebagai, you punya servis mula-mula. Mula-mula, ya. Setuju, tak setuju? LAU Setuju AM Setuju, ya. LAU Ya. Kalau Mdm Kong tak setuju, yang ada tiga hari punya masa, dia boleh cerita kita. S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 \| P a g e [29]. Merujuk kepada kenyataan di atas, melalui keterangan SP1 jelas Plaintif menyedari bahawa pada awalnya Plaintif bukanlah wakil yang dirujuk oleh En Tang yang dipersetujui untuk mengendalikan urusan pengebumian mendiang suami Defendan, malahan jika diambil konteks keadaan yang material Plaintif tidak seharusnya berada pada masa tersebut. Defendan berhujah tempoh tiga (3) hari yang diguna pakai oleh Plaintif bagi urusan pengebumian juga mencerminkan kegagalan Plaintif untuk:- a) Mendapatkan apa-apa persetujuan secara bertulis dan/atau kata putus mengenai harga perkhidmatan pengebumian mendiang suami Defendan; b) Gagal untuk menyerahkan apa-apa Invois dan/atau sebut harga kepada pihak Defendan; c) Gagal untuk mendapatkan arahan muktamad dan/atau untuk meneruskan pengebumian terbabit AM Ok, I repeat. Saya ulang balik. Saya cadangkan yang Mdm Kong atau Defendan, sebab setelah kematian suami, tidak pasti untuk lantik you untuk uruskan pengebumian Mr Ngo Kee Huat. LAU Ok. Meninggal punya masa, betul bukan dia contact saya. Tapi, yang itu Uncle Tang Hong Ngang contact saya. Tapi, saya sampai dia punya rumah, Tang Hong Ngang uncle suruh saya tolong dia tengok sudah meninggal belum. [30] Oleh yang demikian, Defendan berhujah apabila tiada kata putus yang tepat maka tiada hubungan kontrak wujud di antara pihak-pihak walaupun kerja-kerja tersebut telah dilakukan dan di dalam keadaan ini adalah tidak adil bagi Defendan untuk membayar perkhidmatan Plaintif berlandaskan kepada arahan pihak ketiga iaitu melalui En. Tan Hong Ngang. S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 \| P a g e AM Jadi saya katakan En Tang, sejurus selepas Ngo Kee Huat meninggal dunia, En Tang telah menghubungi satu syarikat yang menyediakan perkhidmatan pengebumian. Setuju? TAN Ya, Puan. AM Jadi setuju atau tidak dengan saya, En Tang, bahawa Plaintif ini diperkenalkan oleh En Tang dan bukan dicari oleh Defendan? [31] Plaintif dikatakan telah mengambil kesempatan terhadap Defendan pada masa material yang baru kehilangan suami dan mengaut kesempatan untuk perniagaan terhadap pihak Defendan. AM Ok. Maknanya, ini semua setuju cakap mulut sajalah, ya? LAU Ya, betul. AM Tak ada agreement, betul? LAU Tak ada. [32] Walaubagaimanapun, prinsip yang diketengahkan di sini merupakan prinsip Pengkayaan secara tidak adil (unjust enrichment) dan khususnya diguna pakai oleh Penuntut namun Defendan berhujah di dalam kes ini, Defendan telah bertindak secara good faith basis apabila bertanya akan harga keranda sahaja dan tidak pernah pun bersetuju bagi perkhidmatan pengurusan pengebumian mendiang suami Defendan. [33] Tindakan Plaintif yang juga menyerahkan “angpau” kepada En. Tang Hong Ngang juga amat meprejudiskan dan ini adalah sama seperti “memaksa” systematically coerced pihak Defendan untuk menerima perkhidmatan Plaintif secara paksa. S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 \| P a g e CEW En Tang, tadi En Tang telah kata bahawa En Tang tidak berapa jelas berkenaan jumlah yang angpau yang telah diberikan oleh Plaintif. Angpau tersebut adakah En Tang telah simpan ataupun angpau tersebut telah dibelanjakan? TAN Saya masih tidak buka angpau lagi. Saya tidak tahu jumlah wang dalam angpau tersebut. Dan saya simpan angpau tersebut dalam rumah. AM Jadi En Tang, tiada apa-apa pembayaran komisen ataupun elaun diberikan. Betul? TAN Puan, dia tidak memberi saya elaun ataupun komisen tapi saya diberi satu angpau, Puan. AM Berapa itu, En Tang? TAN Saya tidak berapa jelas berapa wang yang saya terima sebagai angpau. AM Jadi saya katakan En Tang memang ada bayaran diberikanlah. Setuju atau tidak? TAN Puan, saya masih katakan ialah saya hanya terima angpau sahaja. [34] Maka bagi tujuan hujahan ini, Plaintif bersama En Tang boleh dikatakan telah “intervene” di dalam urusan pengebumian mendiang suami Defendan yang jelas telah mengambil kesempatan kepada “insecurity” Defendan pada masa yang material baru kehilangan suami. Defendan menghujahkan prinsip yang diketengahkan di dalam Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 MLJ 441 (IOD2, m/s 384), S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 \| P a g e mengenai Pengkayaan Tidak Adil, Defendan memohon kepada Mahkamah yang Mulia ini untuk mempertimbangkan isu yang dibangkitkan mengenai pengkayaan secara tidak adil terhadap Defendan apabila Plaintif secara muslihat dan/atau berniat dengan tipu daya telah mendapatkan faedah-faedah melalui “systematically coerced” pihak Defendan di dalam menguruskan pengebumian mendiang suami Defendan yang telah diberikan kepada Plaintif dan selanjutnya mengenakan jumlah perkhidmatan yang tidak munasabah. “…As stated by Goff & Jones on The Law of Unjust Enrichment (8th Ed), (para 4- 01),'the law of unjust enrichment is concerned with transfers of value between claimants and defendants, and a claim in unjust enrichment is 'not a claim for compensation for loss, but for recovery of a benefit unjustly gained by a defendant at the expense of the claimant''. In this way, the usage of the term 'restitution' should be contrasted with the term 'compensation'. The second observation is that it appears the majority of the Court of Appeal was persuaded by the dicta in Berjaya Times Squares Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Berjaya Ditan Sdn Bhd) v M Concept Sdn Bhd [2010] 1 MLJ 597 to the effect that a contract-breaker should not benefit for his wrong. However the majority of the Court of Appeal failed to take into consideration that in that case the court also observed that first, acourt interpreting a private contract was not confined to the fourcorners of the document. It was entitled to look at the factual matrix forming the background to the transaction. Secondly, the factual matrix which formed the background to the transaction included all material that was reasonably available to the parties. Thirdly, the interpreting court must disregard any part of the background that was declaratory of subjective intent only. Lastly, the court should adopt anobjective approach when interpreting a private contract…” S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 \| P a g e [35] Defendan berhujah prinsip yang diketengahkan di dalam Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 MLJ 441 (IOD2, m/s 384), mengenai Pengkayaan Tidak Adil, Defendan memohon kepada Mahkamah yang Mulia ini untuk mempertimbangkan isu yang dibangkitkan mengenai pengkayaan secara tidak adil terhadap Defendan apabila Plaintif telah menikmati faedah-faedah yang telah diberikan kepada Plaintif. [36] Adalah penting untuk Mahkamah yang mulia iniuntuk mempertimbangkan segala faktual matrik (Nexus) yang melibatkan keseluruhan dokumen yang telah di hujahkan oleh Defendan sebelum ini seperti di atas bagi pembentukan, pengesahan ataupun kewujudan suatu kontrak. Di dalam kes Yap Nyo Nyok v Bath Pharmacy Sdn. Bhd. [1993] 2 MLJ 250 Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa sesuatu terma tidak boleh tersirat kecuali kesemua pihak bersetuju membuat demikian. Di dalam kes ketika ini, adalah jelas daripada kenyataan SP1, SP2 dan SD1 tiada kata putus muktahir dicapai di dalam harga perkhidmatan pengebumian yang pernah di capai oleh pihak-pihak. Justeru, apabila pihak Plaintif tidak menunjukkan apa-apa hubungan kontrak secara bertulis melainkan hanya perkhidmatan yang diberikan, ini adalah bercanggah dengan prinsip “contractual obligation” pihak-pihak. Oleh itu, Defendan berhujah walaupun perkhidmatan diberikan nas kepada percanggahan terbabit adalah sama ada Defendan bersetuju dengan intipati dan/atau kerja-kerja yang telah dilakukan oleh pihak Plaintif. CEW Pn Kong, jika merujuk kepada muka surat 3, Ikatan Dokumen Bersama, adakah Pn Kong pernah lihat pakej pengebumian? KONG Saya pada masa tersebut, semasa suami saya meninggal, saya tidak ditunjuk muka surat 3 ini. S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 \| P a g e [37} Dengan Izin Puan, satu-satunya fakta yang nyata di dalam perbicaraan ini hanyalah apabila pihak-pihak mengesahkan terdapat perbincangan mengenai keranda yang ingin ditempah oleh pihak Defendan daripada Plaintif yang juga tidak mempunyai kata putus mengenai harga keranda terbabit. CEW Ya. Ok, Pn Kong, Pn Kong telah mengatakan dalam pembelaan bahawa Pn Kong telah dipaksa untuk mengambil pakej pengebumian oleh Plaintif. KONG Puan, saya tidak tahu tentang pakej, Puan. Saya hanya diberitahu bahawa keranda ini berapa harganya, keranda itu berapa harganya. Itu sahaja, Puan. AM Ok. So, you ada bagi tahu Mdm Kong harga keranda berapa? LAU Ada [38] Defendan merujuk kepada keterangan-keterangan saksi-saksi adalah jelas bahawa tempoh masa transaksi dan/atau apa-apa hubungan kontraktual di dalam urusan pengebumian mendiang suami Defendan dilakukan sejurus dan/atau pada hari mendiang Ng Kee Huat (suami Defendan) meninggal dunia. Jika diteliti keseluruhan kenyataan saksi-saksi adalah jelas terdapat hubungan bagi perkhidmatan diberikan namun itu tidak menghalang Plaintif dari memberi tekanan yang tidak wajar untuk menanggung pembayaran yang masih boleh dianggap tidak tepat itu dan/atau tidak dipersetujui itu. Defendan merujuk kepada S.16 Akta Kontrak 1950;- Seksyen 16 Akta Kontrak 1950 menyatakan bahawa; “16(1) A contract is said to be induced by undue influence where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 \| P a g e dominate the will of the other and uses the position to obtain and unfair advantage over the other. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing principle, a person is deemed to be in the position to dominate the will of another- (a) where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other, or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other; or (b) where he makes a contract with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason of age, illness or mental or bodily distress. (3) (a) Where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another, enters into a contract with him, and the transaction appears, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that the contract was not induced by undue influence shall lie upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other. (b) Nothing in this subsection shall affect Section 111 of the Evidence Act 1950.” [39] Pengaruh yang tidak wajar telah digunakan ke atas Defendan yang tidak mempunyai pengetahuan penuh mengenai perkara tersebut memandangkan di dalam tempoh perkhidmatan diberikan Defendan masih lagi berkabung, Plaintif tidak memaklumkan kepada Defendan mengenai Invois-Invois itu. Di dalam kes TENGKU ABDULLAH IBNI SULTAN ABU BAKAR V MOHD LATIFF BIN SHAH MOHD [1996] 2 MLJ 265 Mahkamah menyatakan bahawa; “Where a transaction is tainted with undue influence, it is not only invalid as between the parties thereto and their privies, but also as against any other person who seeks to enforce the transaction with knowledge and notice, actual or constructive, that it was procured by undue influence or any other vitiating element.” S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 \| P a g e [40] Dalam kes SOUTHERN BANK BHD V ABDUL RAOF BIN RAKINAN & ANOR [2000] 4 MLJ 719, Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa terdapat unsur ‘undue influence’ dan telah menolak permohonan penghakiman terus walaupun penjamin dalam kes ini adalah seorang isteri yang memberi jaminan bagi suaminya. Mahkamah yang mulia telah merujuk kepada analisa Lord Browne-Wilkinson yang menyatakan; “Undue influence A person ho has been induced to enter into a transaction by the undue influence of another (“the wrongdoer”) is entitled to set the transaction aside as against the wrongdoer. Such undue influence is either actual or presumed. In Bank of Credit and Commerce International S A v. Aboody [1990] 1 QB 923, 953, the Court of Appeal helpfully adopted the following classification. Class 1: Actual Undue Influence In these cases it is necessary for theclaimant to prove affirmatively that the wrongdoer exerted undue influence on the complainant to enter into the particular transaction which is impugned. Class 2: Presumed Undue Influence In these cases the complainant only has to show, in the first instance, that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between the complainant and the wrongdoer of such a nature that it is fair to presume that the wrongdoer abused that relationship in procuring the complainant to enter into the impugned transaction. In Class 2 cases therefore, there is no need to produce evidence that actual undue influence was exerted in relation to the particular transaction impugned once a confidential relationship has been proved, the burden then shifts to the wrongdoer to prove that the complainant entered into the impugned transaction freely, for example by showing that the complainant had independent advice. Such a relationship can be established in two ways, viz: Class 2(A)Certain relationship (for example solicitor client, medical advisor and patient) as a matter of law raise the presumption that undue influence has been exercised. Class 2(B) Even if there is no rlationship falling within Class 2(A), if the complainant proves S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 \| P a g e that de facto existence of a relationship under which the complainant generally reposed trust and confidence in the wrongdoer, the existence of such relationship raises the presumption of undue influence. In Class 2(B) case therefore, in the absence of evidence disproving undue influence, the complainant will succeed in setting aside the impugned transaction merely by proof that the complainant reposed trust and confidence in the wrongdoer without having to prove that the wrongdoer exerted actual undue influence or otherwise abused such trust and confidence in relation to the particular transaction impugned.” [41] Sesungguhnya, Plaintif melalui tindakan ini telah mengenakan tekanan yang tidak wajar bagi memaksa Defendan sama ada dengan muslihat atau tanpa mengambil kira faktor keadaan mental Defendan ketika itu untuk mengambil pakej yang tidak dinyatakan harga secara jelas ketika itu amat dipersoalkan mengenai ketepatannya ini termasuk isu-isu berkenaan pembayaran yang dikenakan bagi perkidhmatan yang nyata berbeza. Berdasarkan kes-kes di atas, Defendan ingin menyatakan walaupun tekanan bukanlah berpunca daripada Plaintif sepenuhnya, tuntutan Plaintif tetap akan terganggu oleh kerana mendiang telah pun dikebumikan secara selamatnya namun perkhidmatan Plaintif yang amat tidak memuaskan. akan teraniaya. [42] Defendan dengan ini menghujah secara keseluruhan bahawa tindakan Plaintif di dalam kes ini setelah mengambil kira faktor-faktor hujahan- hujahan Defendan di atas, Pliding oleh kedua-dua pihak dan otoriti-otoriti yang dipetik dan/atau dinamakan seperti di atas akan membawa kepada kesimpulan yang berikut: -Kewujudan Kontrak yang jelas adalah tidak wujud dan jika ada adalah sangat diragui mengenai kewujudan kontrak tersebut; Pihak Defendan tidak melanggar apa-apa perjanjian atau kontrak; Plaintif telah gagal di dalam menjalankan tanggungjawab dengan melaksanakan S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 \| P a g e perkhidmatan yang diberikan; Maka dengan itu adalah jelas bahawa tindakan Plaintif ini tidak membawa kausa tindakan yang kukuh.Rujukan kepada semua Ikatan-Ikatan Dokumen dan Pliding tidak menunjukkan Defendan melanggari sebarang kontrak atau bersetuju dengan jumlah perkhidmtana diberikan Plaintif dan Plaintif gagal mengemukakan persoalan kewujudan suatu kontrak yang sahih dan kukuh diwujudkan. Analisis dan Dapatan Mahkamah. [43] Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan Plaintif yang merujuk kepada prinsip undang-undang kontrak perkhidmatan adalah terpakai di dalam tindakan ini dengan merujuk kepada Seksyen 9 Akta Kontrak 1950, dimana cadangan atau penerimaan janji itu boleh dikatakan terpakai bukan sahaja melalui lisan tetapi melalui apa-apa sahaja bentuk penerimaan dan merujuk kepada kes ini, Defendan telah menerima perkhimatan Plaintif untuk terus menjalankan upacara pengebumian mendiang suami Defendan adalah terpakai. Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan Defendan bahawa pada asasnya tiada kewujudan yang jelas kontrak diantara Plaintif dan Defendan kerana terdapatnya kewujudan kontrak yang nyata dan jelas diantara pihak- pihak selaras dengan tuntutan di dalam Seskyen 10 Akta Kontrak dan sepertimana yang dijelaskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Mohd Shukri bin Mat (administrator to the estate of Wan Mek bt Wan Abdullah @ Wan Eshah bin Wan Abdullah) v Wan Rahmah bt Wan Abdullah (administrator to the estate of Wan Abdullah bin Wan Ahmad) [2018] 3 MLJ 89 dimana sesuatu kontrak itu tidak semestinya terjadi melalui perjanjian bertulis, kontrak boleh dimasuki melalui lisan. Kontrak yang sah adalah apabila terdapat tawaran, penerimaan dan pertimbangan di antara pihak pihak. S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 \| P a g e [44] Mahkamah juga bersetuju dengan Plaintif yang menyatakan bahawa ketiga- tiga elemen teras yang diperuntukkan di dalam Seksyen 10 Akta Kontrak telah dipenuhi dimana pada 14.01.2021 ketika kematian mendiang suami Defendan, telah berlaku penawaran diantara Defendan dan Plaintif seperti yang disahkan oleh saksi bernama Tang Hong Ngang dan wujudnya penerimaan melalui perlakuan Defendan dengan membenarkan Plaintif untuk menjalankan perkhidmatan pengebumian dan pada setiap masa yang material tidak pernah membantah, menghalang dan/atau memberhentikan upacara pengebumian tersebut sehingga selesai serta pertimbangan dimana setelah perkhidmatan pengebumian selesai jumlah pakej berjumlah RM26,800.00 akan dibayar kepada Plaintif. Mahkamah juga mendapati Defendan sendiri telah menyatakan bahawa dia telah meminta pertolongan bekas pekerjanya iaitu Encik Tang Hong Ngang. Oleh itu jelaslah bahawa Plaintif ini telah dihubungi oleh Encik Tang atas arahan Defendan. Selain itu, ia juga telah disahkan di dalam perbicaraan dimana En Tang menyatakan bahawa Defendan sendiri yang bersetuju untuk menggunakan perkhidmatan Plaintif. [45] Berdasarkan keseluruhan kes, Mahkamah mendapati tiada terdapat sebarang unsur penipuan dalam kes ini dan berdasarkan Invois yang diberikan oleh Plaintif ia adalah sangat jelas bahawa niat Plaintif adalah untuk membekalkan perkhidmatan pengebumian kepada Defendan di mana Defendan telah bersetuju dan menerima perkhimatan tersebut. Mahkamah juga mendapati tiada sebarang paksaan untuk Defendan menerima perkhidmatan Plaintif dan Plaintif juga menyatakan bahawa tidak terdapat percanggahan niat diantara Plaintif dan Defendan kerana semasa perbicaraan Defendan telah mengakui bahawa beliau adalah bersedia untuk membayar perkhidmatan yang diberikan oleh Plaintif dengan tindakan Defendan dalan menyediakan satu cek bertarikh 14.01.2021 seperti berikut:- S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 \| P a g e EW Pn Kong, adakah Pn Kong telah berbincang berkenaan pakej pengebumian tersebut ataupun telah tawar- menawar dengan wakil Plaintif? KONG Puan, dia kata di Rong Cheng ada banyak shareholder. Dia kata banyak shareholder, rakan kongsi. Lebih kurang 10 lebih orang dan ada seorang rakan kongsi datang dan cakap dengan saya bahawa dia adalah anak murid saya. Puan, dia datang beritahu saya ialah, Puan, pada mulanya dia minta RM24,000. Lepas itu, minta RM26,000. Lepas itu, naik sampai RM28,000. Saya telah mengeluarkan sekeping cek bernilai RM28,000, bagi kepadanya. Dia ambil balik cek tersebut, kemudian dikembalikan kepada saya. Dia kata syarikat tak terima. Dia sekarang nak RM30,000 dan beliau memberitahu saya bahawa beliau akan menang kes ini. [46] Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan Defendan yang telah berhujah bahawa kewujudan tawar-menawar ini tidak menonjolkan suatu penghasilan kontrak kerana tiada penerimaan yang mutlak dan sah. Sebaliknya Mahkamah bersetuju dengan Plaintif yang menghujahkan bahawa terdapat pengakuan yang dilakukan oleh Defendan pada Perenggan 19 Hujahan Bertulis Defendan dimana Defendan telah menyatakan bahawas sememangnya terdapat pembayaran yang tidak dilakukan oleh Defendan atas sebab permasalahan perkhidmatan yang diberikan oleh Plaintif. Perkara ini juga telah dihujahkan oleh Plaintif pada Perenggan 40 Hujahan Bertulis Plaintif dimana secara amnya Defendan masih gagal dan/atau enggan untuk membayar jumlah Pakej Perkhidmatan Plaintif bukanlah disebabkan paksaan atau terdapat sebarang salah nyata tetapi adalah disebabkan ketidakpuashatian terhadap kerja-kerja yang telah dibekalkan oleh Plaintif tidak mencapai tahap kepuasan Defendan. Ketidakpuashatian ini hanya dikemukakan oleh Defendan apabila Plaintif minta bayaran perkhidmatan daripada Defendan adalah suatu pemikiran semula (“afterthought”), dan Defendan langsung tidak pernah membantah dan/atau S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 \| P a g e menghalang Plaintif untuk menjalankan perkhidmatan sepanjang upacara pengebumian dijalankan. Plaintif juga menghujahkan bahawa ketidakpuashatian terhadap kerja-kerja yang telah dibekalkan bukanlah tiket untuk tidak membayar perkhidmatan seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam kes Dua Residency Management Corporation v Edisi Utama Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] MLJU 140 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi telah mengambil petikan-petikan di dalam kes Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1996] AC 344 HL dimana ia menerangkan bahawa :- “[167] Subsequently in the English House of Lords case of Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1996] AC 344 HL, Lord Jauncey held as follows: “I take the example suggested during argument by my noble and learned friend, Lord Bridge of Harwich. A man contracts for the building of a house and specifies that one of the lower courses of brick should be blue. The builder uses yellow brick instead. In all other respects the house conforms to the contractual specification. To replace the yellow bricks with blue would involve extensive demolition and reconstruction at a very large cost. It would clearly be unreasonable to award to the owner the cost of reconstructing because his loss was not the necessary cost of reconstruction of his house, which was entirely adequate for its design purpose, but merely the lack of aesthetic pleasure which he might have derived from the sight of blue bricks. Thus in the present appeal the respondent has acquired a perfectly serviceable swimming pool, albeit one lacking the specified depth. His loss is thus not the lack of a useable pool with consequent need to construct a new one. Indeed were he to receive the cost of building a new one and retain the existing one he would have recovered not compensation for loss but a very substantial gratuitous benefit, something which damages are not intended to provide.… S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 \| P a g e It was submitted that where the objective of a building contract involved satisfaction of a personal preference the only measure of damages available for a breach involving failure to achieve such satisfaction was the cost of reinstatement. In my view this is not the case. Personal preference may well be a factor in reasonableness and hence in determining what loss has been suffered but it cannot per se be determinative of what that loss is. My Lords, the trial judge found that it would be unreasonable to incur the cost of demolishing the existing pool and building a new and deeper one. In so doing he implicitly recognised that the respondent’s loss did not extend to the cost of reinstatement. He was, in my view, entirely justified in reaching that conclusion.” Merujuk kepada kes di atas, Mahkamah Tinggi mendapati bahawa kecenderungan peribadi bukanlah ukuran semata-mata untuk bagi menentukan kerugian suatu pihak. Ia perlulah berlandaskan sesuatu perkara yang lebih material. Justeru, Plaintif sesungguhnya percaya bahawa kenyataan ketidakpuashatian Defendan terhadap perkhidmatan yang telah diberikan hanyalah berdasarkan kehendak peribadi Defendan dan bukanlah suatu kesalahan daripada Plaintif. [47] Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan Defendan yang menyatakan bahawa Plaintif telah diperkaya secara tidak adil dimana Defendan menyatakan bahawa Plaintif telah mengaut kesempatan untuk perniagaannya. Sebaliknya Mahkamah mendapati Defendan yang telah meminta En Tang untuk menghubungi mana-mana peniaga yang membekalkan perkhidmatan pengebumian dan Encik Tang telah menghubungi Plaintif di atas arahan tersebut. Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan Plaintif yang menyatakan bahawa sesuatu pengkayaan tidak adil (Unjust Enrichment) itu berlaku apabila elemen-elemen yang diterangkan di dalam Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 MLJ 441 dipenuhi, dimana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyenaraikan empat (4) elemen pengkayaan secara S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 \| P a g e tidak adil seperti berikut:- [117] The above passages from the judgments of the House of Lords are instructive and are significant contribution to the development of law of unjust enrichment. The principle underlying the cases of Banque Financiere de la Cite v Parc (Battersea) Ltd and Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Ltd) v IRC is that, in the context of the present case, a cause of action in unjust enrichment can give rise to a right to restitution where it can be established that: (a) the plaintiff must have been enriched; (b) the enrichment must be gained at the defendant's expense; (c) that the retention of the benefit by the plaintiff was unjust; and (d) there must be no defence available to extinguish or reduce the plaintiff's liability to make restitution. [48] Berdasarkan petikan di atas, Plaintif berhujah bahawa Defendan telah diperkaya dengan pembekalan perkhidmatan pengebumian terhadap mendiang suami Defendan. Seterusnya melalui perkhidmatan yang telah diberikan Defendan sehingga ke hari ini tidak pernah membayar segala kos-kos perkhidmatan pengebumian yang telah diberikan. Selain itu, Plaintif juga menyatakan bahawa perkhidmatan yang diberikan kepada Defendan tanpa pembayaran oleh Defendan adalah tidak adil kepada Plaintif kerana Plaintif telah mengeluarkan kos bagi menyempurnakan pengebumian mendiang suami Defendan termasuk dan tidak terhad kepada keranda, perkhidmatan angpau, obituari, video dan kos-kos tenaga pekerja malah tidak ada pada masa yang material menunjukkan bahawa Plaintif mendapat apa-apa pengembalian mahupun faedah daripda perlakuan Defendan yang tidak membayar perkhidamtan yang diberikan sesudah pengebumian mendiang suami Defendan selesai. Plaintif juga menghujahkan dimana sesuatu kontrak itu tidak S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 \| P a g e semestinya sah dengan hanya melalui perjanjian bertulis seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam Seskyen 2(e) Akta Kontrak 1950 :- “Interpretation- 2. In this Act the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context:… (e) every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each other, is an agreement; Hal ini juga dinyatakan di dalam Seksyen 10 (1) Akta Kontrak dimana :- “What agreements are contracts 10. (1) All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void” Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan Plaintif menyatakan berdasarkan seksyen-seksyen di atas keperluan bagi sesuatu kontrak itu sah tidak diperlukan wajib secara bertulis dan hanya perlu memenuhi elemen penawaran, penerimaan dan pertimbangan seperti yang telah diterangkan di pada Perenggan 7 di atas. [49] Mahkamah juga mendapati Defendan gagal membuktikan penyataannya, Defendan telah menyatakan bahawa terdapat suatu pengaruh tidak wajar (undue influence) yang dikenakan ke atas Defendan bagi menerima perkhidmatan pengebumian yang dibekalkan oleh Plaintif. Kenyataan yang dinyatakan Defendan adalah kenyataan yang tidak disokong oleh fakta-fakta di dalam tindakan ini. Mahkamah bersetuju dengan Plaintif bahawa pada setiap masa yang material tiada pengaruh tidak wajar diberikan ke atas Defendan dimana terdapat beberapa fakta- fakta menyokong kenyataan defendan seperti berikut:- Pada Perenggan 6 (a) - (d) di dalam Pernyataan Pembelaan dimana Defendan sendiri telah menyatakan bahawa dia telah meminta pertolongan bekas pekerjanya iaitu Encik Tang Hong Ngang menghubungi syarikat yang membekalkan perkhidmatan pengebumian; Pada setiap masa yang material dan sepanjang upacara pengebumian yang mengambil masa tiga S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 \| P a g e (3) hari, tiada apa-apa bantahan diberikan oleh Plaintif malah upacara pengebumian telah diselesaikan dengan sempurna; Pada hari perbicaraan di mana pada Pemeriksaan Semula Defendan ada menyatakan bahawa keadaan ketika upacara pengebumian itu adalah dalam keadaan tenang :- AM If I may, is it keadaan huru-hara? KONG Dalam keadaan yang senang. JUDGE Baik-baik lah orang kata. KONG Ya, dalam keadaan yang senang, selesai. Duit banyak-banyak pun tak guna. Saya ada duit tetapi saya tak puas hati. AM Ok. [50] Plaintif juga menghujahkan bahawa pada setiap masa yang material Defendan mempunyai pengetahuan tentang harga pakej pengebumian tersebut, walaupun dikatakan bahawa tiada jumlah tepat bagi perkhidmatan tersebut (tiada pengakuan dibuat), Plaintif percaya Defendan mempunyai pengetahuan tentang julat harga pakej- pakej pengebumian yang dibekalkan oleh Plaintif. Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan Plaintif yang menyatakan bahawa bagi sesuatu dakwaan pengaruh tidak wajar (undue influence) itu berjaya dibuktikan ia perlu memenuhi kriteria-kriteria dan beban pembuktian untuk membuktikan fakta tersebut pada keseimbangan kebarangkalian terletak kepada pihak yang membangkitkannya dan di dalam tindakan ini adalah Defendan dimana ia telah dinyatakan di dalam kes Sepang International Circuit Sdn Bhd v M7 Racing Sdn Bhd [2020] 9 MLJ 577 dimana Mahkamah Tinggi menyatakan :- “(4)Untuk mewujudkan pengaruh yang tidak semestinya, unsur- unsurnya adalah: (a) salah satu pihak berada dalam posisi untuk menguasai kehendak pihak lain; (b) pihak yang berada dalam posisi untuk menguasai telah S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 \| P a g e menggunakan posisi itu untuk mempengaruhi pihak lain; dan (c) pihak yang dominan memperoleh keuntungan tidak adil akibat kesan daripada perkara tersebut, mesti terbukti. Tiada unsur-unsur tersebut dapat dibuktikan. Oleh kerana isu pengaruh yang tidak semestinya dibangkitkan oleh defendan, pihaknya memiliki beban pembuktian untuk membuktikan fakta tersebut pada keseimbangan kebarangkalian sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan dalam pasal s 103 Akta Keterangan. Defendan gagal mengemukakan bukti yang cukup untuk melepaskan beban pembuktian untuk membuktikan faktor yang menyebabkan keseimbangan kebarangkalian (lihat perenggan 46, 48, 50 & 52).” [51] Mahkamah menerima hujahan Plaintif yang menegaskan dan akan menegaskan pada setiap suratcara-suratcara tindakan ini mahupun di dalam Hujahan Bertulis Defendan tiada suatu fakta kukuh yang menyokong kewujudan pengaruh tidak wajar yang dikatakan dikenakan keatas Defendan oleh Plaintif malah telah dinyatakan sendiri didalam Perenggan 51 Hujahan Bertulis Defendan dimana ia mengatakan bahawa tekanan ataupun pengaruh tidak wajar bukanlah berpunca daripada Plaintif sepenuhnya . [51] Mahkamah bersetuju dengan Plaintif dengan merujuk kepada kes-kes dan hujahan plaintif jelaslah bahawa terdapat kewujudan kontrak diantara Plaintif dan Defendan melalui beberapa perlakuan dan tindakan oleh kedua-dua pihak dan memenuhi segala aspek suatu kontrak yang sah seperti yang dinyatakan pada Seksyen 9 dan Seksyen 10 (1) Akta Kontrak 1950; bahawa setiap masa yang material, Invois telah diberikan kepada Defendan akan tetapi enggan diterima oleh Defendan serta pengetahuan jumlah pembayaran yang perlu dibayar adalah dibuktikan dengan kewujudan satu cek bertarikh 14.01.2021 berjumlah RM28,000.00 oleh Defendan; Plaintif juga menyatakan bahawa Defendan telah diperkaya secara tidak adil kerana S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 \| P a g e sehingga ke tarikh tindakan ini Defendan masih belum membayar jumlah perkhidmatan pengebumian berjumlah RM26,800.00 kepada Plaintif walaupun pengebumian mendiang suami Defendan telah lama diselesaikan. Defendan setakat ini masih gagal untuk mengemukakan sebarang pembelaan yang bermerit dalam Hujahan Bertulis Defendan dan hanya penafian kosong (“bare denial”) yang tidak berasas serta bersifat pemikiran semula (“afterthought”). Plaintif juga percaya bahawa Defendan telah gagal membuktikan pada keseimbangan kebarangkalian ke atas isu pengaruh tidak wajar yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan justeru menjurus kepada kegagalan dakwaan tersebut. Keputusan [52] Setelah meneliti pliding, mendengar keterangan bersumpah saksi-saksi Plaintif dan saksi defendan, meneliti keterangan dokumen dan eksibit-eksibit, serta setelah membaca hujahan Plaintif serta hujahan Defendan, di atas imbangan keberangkalian Mahkamah berpuashati dan membuat keputusan bahawa Plaintif berjaya membuktikan kesnya terhadap defendan, maka tuntutan plaintif dibenarkan. Bertarikh 18 Oktober 2023 NURASIDAH BINTI A RAHMAN MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET SIVIL BATU PAHAT Peguamcara bagi pihak Plaintif : (Tetuan LOW & FONG]) Peguamcara bagi pihak Defendan: (Tetuan MUZHAFFAR RAZAK CHAMBERS) S/N fJJhQILKGEiIwiyEMZStPg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	63,314	Tika 2.6.0
PB-42JSKS(A)-1-09/2022	PERAYU AIYOB BIN CHE MEH RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya	Rayuan atas Perintah Sabitan dan Hukuman.– Pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 14(a) Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak- Kanak 2017 dan dibaca bersama seksyen 16(1) Akta yang sama – Elemen-elemen kesalahan – Sama ada Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan wajar mengganggu dapatan oleh Hakim Bicara mengenai isu kredibilliti saksi – Sama ada Tertuduh boleh bergantung kepada pembelaan alibi – Sama ada pihak pembelaan berjaya membangkitkan keraguan munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan.	31/10/2023	YA Puan Fathiyah Binti Idris	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=53160487-64ec-4359-9ec2-dbc41f99338e&Inline=true	Page 1 of 30 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI BUTTERWORTH DALAM NEGERI PULAU PINANG, MALAYSIA RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: PB-42JSKS(A)-1-09/2022 ANTARA AIYOB BIN CHE MEH ... PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA … RESPONDEN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Di dalam kes ini, Perayu telah didapati bersalah dan disabitkan kesalahannya oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Butterworth, Pulau Pinang (Hakim Bicara) di bawah Seksyen 14(a) Akta Kesalahan- Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-Kanak 2017 dan dibaca bersama Seksyen 16(1) Akta yang sama. Hukuman yang telah dijatuhi ke atas Perayu adalah 4 tahun penjara dari tarikh sabitan (9.9.2022) dan hukuman tambahan iaitu 2 tahun penjara setelah selesai menjalani hukuman utama dan 2 kali sebatan rotan. [2] Pihak Perayu yang terkilan dengan keputusan tersebut, telah merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi atas sabitan dan hukuman tersebut. 31/10/2023 13:51:18 PB-42JSKS(A)-1-09/2022 Kand. 47 S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 30 [3] Setelah meneliti Rekod Rayuan, hujahan bertulis dan hujahan lisan oleh kedua-dua pihak, Mahkamah ini mendapati perintah sabitan adalah selamat dan Mahkamah ini telah menolak rayuan Perayu dan mengekalkan sabitan dan hukuman oleh Hakim Bicara. Berikut adalah alasan Mahkamah ini yang menolak rayuan Perayu terhadap sabitan dan hukuman. Pertuduhan Pindaan [4] "Bahawa kamu di antara 04.07.2020 sehingga 26.7.2020 di antara jam 10.00 pagi sehingga 5.00 petang di dalam Bilik Kaunseling, Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Kampong Selamat, Tasek Gelugor, dalam Daerah Seberang Perai Utara, di dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang, telah melakukan amang seksual fizikal ke atas seorang kanak-kanak perempuan bernama XXXXXXXX binti XXXXXX (NO KP: XXXXXXX) berumur 17 tahun dengan cara memeluk badan, meraba buah dada, mencium bahagian leher dan memegang kemaluan mangsa. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 14(a) Akta Kesalahan- Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-Kanak 2017 dan dibaca bersama Seksyen 16 (1) Akta yang sama.” Hukuman Seksyen 14(a) [5] Dihukum dengan pemenjaraan selama tempoh tidak melebihi dua puluh tahun dan boleh juga dihukum dengan hukuman sebat. Hukuman Seksyen 16(1) [6] Sebagai tambahan kepada hukuman yang dia boleh dikenakan bagi kesalahan itu, dihukum pemenjaraan selama tempoh tidak melebihi lima tahun dan hendaklah juga dihukum dengan hukuman sebat tidak kurang daripada dua sebatan. S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 30 Tugas Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan [7] Kewajipan Mahkamah ini dalam mendengar rayuan jenayah adalah untuk memastikan bahawa sabitan terhadap Perayu adalah betul dan selamat untuk dikekalkan. (Rujuk kes Dato’ Seri Mohd Najib Hj Abd Razak v. Public Prosecutor [2022] 1 MLJ 137). [8] Pada lazimnya, Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan tidak akan mengganggu dapatan fakta Hakim Bicara, namun jika Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan mendapati Hakim Bicara telah tersalah arah atau jika terdapat alasan yang substantial dan kukuh dalam dapatan Hakim Bicara, maka sewajarnya Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan campur tangan atau mengganggu penemuan fakta oleh Hakim Bicara tersebut. [9] Selain itu, adalah juga merupakan satu prinsip yang mantap, bahawa dalam melaksanakan bidang kuasa rayuan, Mahkamah ini boleh dan hendaklah menilai semula keseluruhan keterangan yang dikemukakan di peringkat pendakwaan dan pembelaan. Fakta Kes Pendakwaan [10] Fakta kes ini adalah sepertimana yang telah dibentangkan oleh Hakim Bicara di dalam Alasan Penghakimannya. [11] Pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil seramai sepuluh (10) orang saksi seperti berikut: - (a) SP1, Koperal 160363 Mohamad Hazwan bin Mat Radzi (jurufoto); (b) SP2, Puan Rohaida binti Jamaluddin (ibu mangsa); (c) SP3, Nuranalia Balqis binti Mohd Hizam (rakan mangsa); S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 30 (d) SP4, XXXXXXX binti XXXXXXX (mangsa); (e) SP5, ASP Mohd Yusof bin Haji Ibrahim (pegawai tangkapan); (f) SP6, Nurien Aiesya binti Mohd Zaki (rakan baik mangsa); (g) SP7, Puan Wan Amirnuriha binti Haji Hasbullah (guru kelas mangsa); (h) SP8, Puan Roslina binti Hasim (Pengetua SMK Kampung Selamat); (i) SP9, Puan Norafiza binti Abdullah (Guru Bimbingan dan Kaunseling SMK Kampung Selamat); dan (j) SP10, Inspektor Norma binti Abdul Razak (pegawai penyiasat kes). [12] Mangsa (SP4) ialah seorang kanak-kanak yang berumur 17 tahun semasa tarikh kejadian. Pada masa itu beliau sedang belajar di dalam tingkatan 5 Kemanusiaan Amanah, Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Kampung Selamat, Tasek Gelugor, Pulau Pinang. Sepanjang sesi persekolahan, SP4 tinggal di asrama sekolah tersebut. Bapa SP4 telah meninggal dunia semasa beliau masih kecil dan beliau dibesarkan oleh ibunya, iaitu SP2. [13] Perayu ialah seorang guru kaunseling dan bimbingan yang bertugas di Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Kampung Selamat, Tasek Gelugor, Pulau Pinang semasa tarikh kejadian. S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 5 of 30 Keterangan SP4 [14] Pada 4.7.2020 (hari Sabtu) sekitar jam 10.00 pagi, SP4 bersama SP6 dan 3 lagi rakan yang lain telah pergi ke bilik kaunseling sekolah tersebut untuk belajar berkumpulan. Mereka belajar di bahagian ruang tamu bilik kaunseling tersebut. Perayu yang berada di bilik kaunseling telah memanggil SP4 untuk masuk ke biliknya. Apabila dipanggil, SP4 telah pergi dan masuk ke bilik Perayu. [15] Semasa SP4 berada di dalam bilik Perayu, Perayu telah bertanya kepada SP4 “Boleh tak ayah nak peluk adik?” SP4 telah mengizinkan Perayu memeluknya atas alasan dia tidak pernah merasa pelukan seorang ayah. [16] Kejadian selanjutnya berlaku pada 5.7.2020 (hari Ahad), 11.7.2020 (hari Sabtu) dan 26.7.2020 (hari Ahad). Pada tarikh-tarikh yang tersebut SP4 dan SP6 telah pergi ke bilik kaunseling untuk mengulang kaji pelajaran. Semasa mereka sedang mengulang kaji pelajaran, Perayu telah memanggil SP4 untuk masuk ke biliknya. SP4 telah pergi ke bilik Perayu dan masuk ke dalam bilik tersebut. [17] Kejadian pada 5.7.2020 (hari Ahad), semasa SP4 masuk ke bilik tersebut, Perayu terus memeluk SP4 dari arah belakang. Perayu juga telah meraba buah dada SP4 dari luar baju. [18] Kejadian pada 11.7.2020 (hari Sabtu), apabila SP4 masuk ke bilik Perayu, lantas Perayu memeluk, menyelak tudung kepala SP4 serta mencium bahagian leher kanan SP4. Perayu juga pada masa yang sama telah meraba kemaluan SP4 dari bahagian luar seluar yang dipakai oleh SP4. Menurut SP4, pada ketika itu dia berasa keliru dengan perlakuan Perayu terhadapnya dan tertanya-tanya betulkah seorang ayah sanggup meraba kemaluan anaknya. S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 6 of 30 [19] SP4 telah mengelak supaya Perayu melepaskannya dan berkata kepada Perayu bahawa dia akan memberitahu ibunya mengenai perlakuan Perayu terhadapnya. Perayu telah mengingatkan SP4 supaya tidak memberitahu hal tersebut kepada sesiapa pun. [20] Kejadian seterusnya pada 26.7.2022 (hari Ahad) sekitar jam 2.00 petang, seperti kejadian-kejadian sebelumnya, Perayu yang berada di dalam bilik kaunseling telah memanggil SP4 untuk masuk ke biliknya. Apabila SP4 masuk ke bilik Perayu, Perayu terus memeluk SP4 dari arah belakang dan menyentuh bahagian kemaluan SP4 dari luar seluar yang dipakai oleh SP4. Perayu juga telah mencium leher kanan SP4 dan meraba buah dada SP4 dari luar pakaiannya. SP4 cuba mengelak supaya Perayu melepaskannya, tetapi Perayu tidak melepaskannya. [21] Pada 29.7.2020 (hari Rabu), Perayu telah menghantar SP4 dan SP6 untuk pulang bercuti di rumah masing-masing sempena cuti Hari Raya Aidil Adha dengan menaiki kereta Perayu. Perayu telah menghantar SP6 balik ke rumahnya terlebih dahulu dan kemudiannya meneruskan perjalanan ke rumah SP4. Semasa dalam perjalanan pulang ke rumah SP4, Perayu telah bertindak memegang tangan kanan SP4 dan telah menyelak seluar serta memegang betis SP4. Keterangan SP3 [22] SP3 ialah rakan sekelas SP4. Dalam keterangannya beliau menyatakan bahawa semasa beliau dan rakan-rakan yang lain menghadiri kelas prep malam di dewan makan, SP3 melihat SP4 seakan-akan mempunyai masalah. SP3 telah bertanya kepada S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 30 SP4 dan ketika itulah SP4 menceritakan kepadanya bahawa Perayu telah mencabulnya di bilik kaunseling sekolah mereka. SP3 menasihati SP4 supaya tidak lagi pergi ke bilik kaunseling untuk mengulang kaji pelajaran. SP3 kemudiannya telah menceritakan kejadian tersebut kepada guru kelas mereka, Cikgu Wan Amirnuriha (SP7). Keterangan SP7 [23] SP7 dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa beliau mendapati SP4 kurang semangat untuk belajar. SP7 mengesahkan bahawa pada 29.7.2020 di waktu petang, SP3 telah memberitahunya mengenai perbuatan Perayu yang mencabul SP4. Pada malam itu SP7 telah menelefon SP4 untuk mengesahkan tentang apa yang diceritakan oleh SP3 kepadanya. SP4 telah mengakui tentang perkara yang diceritakan kepada SP3. Semasa SP4 menceritakan kepada SP7, dia dalam keadaan menangis. Keterangan SP2 [24] Berdasarkan keterangan SP2, pada 31.07.2020 SP4 telah memberitahu SP2 bahawa Perayu telah cabul, peluk, raba dan cium SP4. [25] SP2 berasa sangat sedih dengan apa yang telah dilakukan oleh Perayu terhadap anaknya. SP2 tidak menyangka Perayu yang merupakan seorang guru sanggup melakukan sedemikian terhadap anaknya (SP4). S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 8 of 30 [26] Pada 4.8.2020 (hari Selasa) SP2 telah membuat satu laporan polis sepertimana Tasek Gelugor Report 2305/2020 (ekshibit P6). Tangkapan ke atas Perayu [27] Pada 11.8.2020 (hari Selasa), SP5 telah membuat tangkapan ke atas Perayu sepertimana Kepala Batas Report 6056/2020 (ekshibit P7). SP5 juga turut merampas telefon bimbit jenama Samsung (exh. P9) milik Perayu. Satu laporan polis dibuat mengenai rampasan telefon bimbit sepertimana Sg Dua Report 248/2021 (eksibit P10). Hasil siasatan yang dijalankan, Perayu telah dituduh sepertimana pertuduhan di atas. Kes Pembelaan [28] Setelah Perayu dipanggil membela diri, dia telah diterangkan dengan tiga pilihan dan Perayu telah memilih untuk memberi keterangan secara bersumpah dari dalam kandang saksi. [29] Selain Perayu (SD1), dua orang saksi telah memberi keterangan dalam kes pembelaan, mereka ialah Mohamad Said bin Ibrahim, Timbalan Pengarah Pendidikan, Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri Pulau Pinang (SD2) dan Amar Zulhadi bin Zulkifli, bekas pelajar SMK Kampung Selamat (SD3). [30] Perayu telah memberikan keterangan bersumpah dan telah memberikan keterangan melalui pernyataan bertulis saksi yang telah ditandakan sebagai WSD1. Secara ringkasnya, keterangan Perayu berkisar mengenai latar belakang diri dan keluarga serta latar belakang pendidikannya. Perayu mengesahkan bahawa dia S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 30 mula bertugas di SMK Kampung Selamat mulai 1 Julai, 2019 sebagai Guru Bimbingan dan Kaunseling dan dia mendakwa mempunyai rekod perkhidmatan yang amat baik. [31] Di dalam pernyataan bertulisnya, Perayu telah menceritakan mengenai fakta-fakta lain yang tidak berkaitan dengan pertuduhan yang dihadapinya. Perayu juga telah mengemukakan perkara- perkara yang telah berlaku semasa dan selepas siasatan dijalankan terhadapnya. Perayu mendakwa bahawa dia telah dituduh kerana wujudnya konspirasi sekumpulan orang yang hendak menjatuhkan dirinya. [32] Perayu juga menafikan dia hadir ke sekolah pada tarikh 4.7.2020, 5.7.2020, 11.7.2020 dan 26.7.2020 kerana kesemua tarikh tersebut adalah hari Sabtu dan Ahad yang merupakan hari cuti persekolahan dan ketika itu negara berada dalam tempoh Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan (PKP) Fasa Pertama. [33] Perayu menyatakan bahawa sebagai seorang guru, dia terikat dengan Garis Panduan Pengurusan Pembukaan Sekolah yang dikeluarkan oleh Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia dan kehadiran guru-guru perlu direkodkan dan kehadiran ke sekolah adalah secara penggiliran. [34] Perayu menafikan semua kejadian tersebut atas alasan dia tidak berada di sekolah dan tidak dibenarkan memasuki kawasan sekolah. Menurut Perayu, jika dia hadir sudah pasti pengetua sekolah (SP8) mengemukakan bukti surat kebenaran bertulis daripada pihak sekolah untuk Perayu memasuki sekolah pada tarikh-tarikh tersebut. S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 10 of 30 [35] Perayu juga mendakwa bahawa pergerakan keluar masuk ke bilik kaunseling perlu direkodkan di dalam buku rekod pendaftaran. Murid-murid tidak dibenarkan masuk ke bilik kaunseling sepanjang tempoh tersebut dan sesi kaunseling dijalankan secara atas talian sahaja. [36] Perayu mengesahkan bahawa pada 29.7.2020, dia telah menghantar SP4 dan SP6 balik ke rumah masing-masing dengan menaiki keretanya. Perayu selanjutnya mendakwa bahawa selain SP4 dan SP6, terdapat seorang lagi murid lelaki tingkatan 4 iaitu SD3 di dalam kereta tersebut. Perayu menyatakan bahawa apabila sampai di rumah SP4, dia telah berbual-bual dengan ibu SP4 (iaitu SP2) dalam suasana yang muhibah. [37] Di akhir keterangannya, Perayu menafikan melakukan perbuatan- perbuatan seperti di dalam pertuduhan. Perayu menyatakan bahawa jika dia hendak melakukan perbuatan-perbuatan seperti itu, sudah pasti dia akan mencari perempuan yang lebih seksi dan membawa ke mana-mana hotel yang lebih selesa. Keterangan SD2 [38] SD2 dalam keterangannya mengesahkan mengenai Garis Panduan Pengurusan Pembukaan Sekolah dalam tempoh Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan (PKP). Keterangan beliau adalah mengenai Standard Operasi Prosedur (SOP) operasi pembukaan sekolah secara umum. S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 30 Keterangan SD3 [39] SD3 merupakan seorang bekas pelajar SMK Kampung Selamat dan merupakan anak angkat kepada Perayu. SD3 mula tinggal di rumah Perayu sebaik sahaja Perayu bertukar ke SMK Kampong Selamat. [40] SD3 menyatakan bahawa pada 29.7.2020, Perayu ada menghantar dua lagi pelajar lain balik ke rumah masing-masing dan SD3 turut berada bersama mereka di dalam kereta Perayu. Keputusan di akhir kes pembelaan [41] Di akhir kes pembelaan, Hakim Bicara mendapati pihak pembelaan telah gagal menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan, oleh itu Perayu didapati bersalah dan disabitkan kesalahannya sepertimana pertuduhan pindaan. Alasan Rayuan [42] Pihak Perayu telah mengemukakan petisyen rayuan dan hujahan bertulisnya yang boleh diringkaskan seperti berikut: - a. Hakim Bicara telah terkhilaf kerana tidak mengambil kira kegagalan pihak pendakwaan mengemukakan surat kebenaran pergerakan Perayu untuk hadir ke sekolah dalam tempoh berkuatkuasa Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan (PKP), khususnya pada tempoh yang dinyatakan dalam pertuduhan. b. Hakim Bicara telah terkhilaf kerana tidak mengambil kira kegagalan pihak pendakwaan untuk mengemukakan Buku S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 12 of 30 Daftar Kehadiran Guru kaunseling dan murid-murid di bilik kaunseling pada hari-hari kejadian. c. Hakim Bicara telah terkhilaf kerana tidak mengambil kira kewujudan Buku Rekod Pendaftaran Bilik Kaunseling. Ini menyebabkan tanggapan bertentangan di bawah seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 adalah terpakai. d. Hakim Bicara telah terkhilaf dalam membuat kesimpulan bahawa pembelaan Perayu sebagai rekaan dan pembelaan pemikiran terkemudian (afterthought). e. Hakim Bicara telah terkhilaf apabila tidak mengambil kira keterangan SD2 bahawa dalam tempoh PKP, semua guru adalah terikat dengan Garis Panduan Pembukaan Sekolah. f. Hakim Bicara telah terkhilaf apabila gagal mengambil kira bahawa tarikh-tarikh kejadian adalah pada hari Sabtu dan Ahad iaitu hari cuti. g. Hakim Bicara telah terkhilaf apabila memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan pertuduhan terhadap Perayu melampaui keraguan yang munasabah. Analisis dan dapatan Mahkamah ini [43] Untuk membuktikan satu kes prima facie, adalah menjadi tugas pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan semua elemen pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 14(a) Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-Kanak 2017. Seksyen 14(a) menyatakan seperti berikut: - 1 “Amang seksual fizikal atas kanak-kanak S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 13 of 30 14. Mana-mana orang yang, bagi maksud seksual – a. menyentuh mana-mana bahagian badan seseorang kanak- kanak; b. ………..; c. ………..; atau d. ………… melakukan suatu kesalahan dan hendaklah apabila disabitkan, dihukum dengan pemenjaraan selama tempoh tidak melebihi dua puluh tahun dan boleh juga dihukum dengan hukuman sebatan. Huraian 1 --Perbuatan menyentuh boleh melibatkan perbuatan menyentuh dengan menggunakan mana-mana bahagian badan atau dengan suatu objek dan boleh dilakukan melalui apa-apa sahaja termasuk apa-apa sahaja yang dipakai oleh orang yang menyentuh atau kanak-kanak yang disentuh. Huraian 2 --Dalam menentukan apakah yang menjadi maksud seksual, mahkamah boleh menimbangkan, antara lain, bahagian badan yang disentuh, sifat dan takat perbuatan menyentuh atau kontak fizikal dan semua hal keadaan lain yang berkenaan dengan perlakuan itu….” [44] Manakala Seksyen 16 pula memperuntukkan seperti berikut: - “Orang yang mempunyai hubungan amanah (1) Jika seseorang yang melakukan mana-mana kesalahan di bawah Akta ini atau mana-mana kesalahan yang dinyatakan dalam Jadual terhadap seseorang kanak-kanak, mempunyai hubungan amanah dengan kanak-kanak itu, orang itu S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 14 of 30 hendaklah sebagai tambahan kepada hukuman yang dia boleh dikenakan bagi kesalahan itu, dihukum dengan pemenjaraan selama tempoh tidak melebihi lima tahun dan hendaklah juga dihukum dengan hukuman sebat tidak kurang daripada dua sebatan. (2) Dalam seksyen ini, seseorang dikatakan mempunyai hubungan amanah dengan seseorang kanak-kanak jika kanak-kanak itu berada di bawah pemeliharaan, pengawasan atau kuasanya, termasuk tetapi tidak terhad kepada – (a) …….; (b) …….; (c) guru, pensyarah atau warden sesuatu tadika, sekolah, institusi pengajian tinggi awam atau institusi pengajian tinggi swasta; (d) …..; (e) ……; dan (f) … [45] Berdasarkan peruntukan tersebut di atas, elemen-elemen pertuduhan yang mesti dibuktikan adalah seperti berikut: - (a) Mangsa adalah seorang kanak-kanak; (b) OKT telah menyentuh mana-mana bahagian badan mangsa bagi maksud seksual; (c) kontak fizikal itu tidak melibatkan apa-apa persetubuhan. [46] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti Alasan Penghakiman oleh Hakim Bicara, bagi memastikan sama ada terdapat kekhilafan di dalam membuat keputusannya sebagaimana yang dihujahkan oleh pihak Perayu. S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 15 of 30 Kredibiliti saksi-saksi [47] Hakim Bicara dalam alasan penghakimannya, bahawa beliau telah menerima keterangan bersumpah SP4 tanpa menjalankan preliminary inquiry di bawah Seksyen 133A Akta Keterangan 1950. Ini kerana semasa SP4 memberikan keterangan di Mahkamah, SP4 telah berumur melebihi 18 tahun. Hakim Bicara mendapati SP4 merupakan seorang saksi yang kompeten untuk memberi keterangan secara bersumpah. [48] Hakim Bicara telah melihat kredibiliti SP4 semasa memberi keterangan dan mendapati SP4 ini merupakan seorang saksi yang jujur, credible dan keterangannya adalah 'unusually convincing'. Keterangan SP4 ini boleh berdiri dengan sendirinya walaupun tanpa apa-apa keterangan sokongan. [49] SP4 telah menceritakan mengenai kejadian-kejadian yang berlaku dengan jelas dan nyata walaupun dicabar oleh pihak pembelaan. Hakim Bicara juga telah meneliti keterangan SP6 dan mendapati keterangannya telah menyokong keterangan SP4. Selanjutnya Hakim Bicara juga telah menilai keterangan dan demeanour SP6 dan mendapati SP6 merupakan seorang saksi yang jujur dan boleh dipercayai. SP6 hanya menceritakan apa yang beliau dengar dan lihat pada setiap tarikh-tarikh yang dinyatakan semasa beliau dan SP4 belajar bersama-sama di bilik kaunseling tersebut. SP6 mengesahkan bahawa beliau tidak tahu apa yang berlaku ketika SP4 berada di dalam bilik Perayu. [50] Mahkamah ini berpendapat, sekiranya SP6 tidak jujur, beliau boleh untuk mereka-reka cerita bagi menyokong keterangan SP4, tetapi dalam kes ini SP6 tidak menokok tambah cerita. SP6 hanya S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 16 of 30 memberi keterangan setakat apa yang ada di dalam pemerhatian dan pengetahuannya sahaja berkaitan tarikh-tarikh kejadian tersebut. [51] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Hakim Bicara tidak terkhilaf apabila merumuskan bahawa SP6 tiada kecenderungan memberikan keterangan yang berpihak atau menyokong keterangan SP4. [52] Mahkamah ini juga mendapati Hakim Bicara adalah betul apabila memutuskan bahawa SP6 ialah saksi yang credible dan keterangannya telah menyokong fakta mengenai keberadaan mereka di bilik kaunseling pada tarikh-tarih tersebut dan mengesahkan Perayu ada memanggil SP4 masuk ke dalam biliknya. [53] Hakim Bicara telah melihat dan menilai demeanour SP4 dan SP6 semasa memberi keterangan. Hakim Bicara telah berpeluang melihat watak saksi dan meneliti kredibiliti saksi-saksi berdasarkan pengamatannya sendiri. [54] Dalam isu ini, sebagai panduan Mahkamah ini sekadar merujuk kepada dua kes yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan iaitu kes Tan Kim Ho & Anor v. PP [2009] 3 CLJ 236 yang memutuskan seperti berikut: - “[29] It is an established principle of law that when dealing with finding of facts, the trial judge is more often than not, in a better position to decide. The appellate court must be reluctant to interfere with such findings, unless the facts obviously disclose the courts below had clearly and wrongly evaluated the facts.” S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 17 of 30 [55] Selanjutnya di dalam kes Amri Ibrahim & Anor v. PP [2017] 1 CLJ 617 dinyatakan: - “[51] It is trite law that the view of the trial judge as to the credibility of a witness must be given proper weight and consideration. An appellate court should be slow in disturbing such finding of fact arrived at by the trial judge, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness, unless there were substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing (see Herchun Singh & Ors v. PP [1969] 1 LNS 52; [1969] 2 MLJ 209).” [56] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Hakim Bicara tidak terkhilaf dalam mempertimbangkan kredibiliti semua saksi-saksi pendakwaan dan Hakim Bicara telah dengan betul memutuskan bahawa semua saksi pendakwaan khususnya SP4 dan SP6 merupakan saksi yang credible dan dipercayai serta menerima keterangan mereka tanpa keraguan. [57] Selanjutnya Mahkamah ini mendapati Hakim Bicara telah mempertimbangkan setiap elemen kesalahan di bawah s. 14(a) dan beliau mendapati ketiga-tiga elemen tersebut telah dibuktikan. Elemen Pertama: SP4 ialah seorang kanak-kanak [58] Hakim Bicara telah berpuas hati bahawa SP4 ialah seorang kanak- kanak yang berumur 17 tahun semasa kejadian. Fakta ini telah dibuktikan melalui Sijil Kelahiran SP4 yang dikemukakan sebagai eksibit P5. Pihak pembelaan juga tidak mempertikaikan elemen ini. Maka, Hakim Bicara mendapati elemen pertama telah berjaya dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 18 of 30 Elemen kedua dan ketiga; Perayu telah menyentuh mana-mana bahagian badan mangsa (SP4) bagi maksud seksual tanpa melakukan persetubuhan. [59] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Hakim Bicara telah meneliti dan membuat penilaian yang maksimum terhadap keterangan saksi- saksi dan mempertimbangkan kredibiliti saksi-saksi dalam memutuskan bahawa Perayu telah menyentuh bahagian badan SP4. [60] Hakim Bicara telah menerima keterangan SP4 mengenai kejadian- kejadian yang berlaku terhadapnya pada tarikh 4.7.2020, 5.7.2020, 11.7.2020 dan 26.7.2020. Hakim Bicara mendapati keterangan SP4 adalah konsisten, tidak teragak-agak dan amat meyakinkan. SP4 dapat mengingati dengan jelas fakta-fakta berkenaan tarikh, masa dan perkara-perkara yang dilakukan oleh Perayu terhadapnya. [61] Mahkamah ini juga mendapati, berdasarkan keterangan SP4 dan SP6 bahawa pada setiap tarikh kejadian, mereka bersama-sama pergi ke bilik kaunseling untuk belajar bersama-sama. SP6 telah mengesahkan bahawa pada setiap tarikh yang dinyatakan tersebut, semasa mereka sedang belajar, SP6 telah mendengar Perayu memanggil SP4 untuk masuk ke bilik Perayu dan SP6 melihat SP4 telah pergi ke bilik Perayu dan masuk ke dalam bilik Perayu. [62] Menurut SP6, bahawa SP4 telah berada di dalam bilik Perayu selama lebih kurang 5 hingga 10 minit dan selepas SP4 keluar dari bilik tersebut, SP4 terus sambung belajar bersama SP6 seperti biasa. Keterangan SP6 bahawa beliau tidak tahu apa yang berlaku S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 19 of 30 di antara SP4 dan Perayu di dalam bilik Perayu pada setiap tarikh- tarikh tersebut. [63] Apa yang berlaku semasa di dalam bilik Perayu hanya diketahui oleh Perayu dan SP4. Menurut SP4, Perayu telah menyentuh badannya dengan cara memeluk badan, meraba buah dada, mencium leher kanan dan meraba kemaluan SP4. Semasa disoal balas, SP4 tetap dengan jawapannya bahawa Perayu telah melakukan sedemikian terhadap beliau pada tarikh-tarikh yang tersebut. [64] Di hadapan Mahkamah ini pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa terdapat percanggahan dalam keterangan SP4 mengenai majlis sambutan hari jadi SP4 pada 4.7.2020 di bilik kaunseling dan SP4 telah gagal untuk mengingati nama rakan-rakan yang lain selain SP6 yang turut belajar berkumpulan pada 4.7.2020. [65] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Hakim Bicara telah mempertimbangkan mengenai percanggahan-percanggahan tersebut dan memutuskan bahawa kegagalan SP4 untuk mengingati nama semua rakannya bukanlah percanggahan yang material dan langsung tidak menjejaskan pembuktian elemen- elemen pertuduhan. [66] Sebagai panduan dalam isu ini, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada satu kes Mahkamah Rayuan iaitu Tee Hock Keong v. Public Prosecutor [2021] MLJU 566 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: - “[53] The learned trial judge found both SP17 and SP18 to be credible witnesses. However, learned counsel for the appellant submits that there are irreconcilable and material discrepancies in the evidence given by SP17 and SP18. We note that as in most cases, there are bound to be some discrepancies in the evidence S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 20 of 30 of the several witnesses, including SP17 and SP18. However, these discrepancies are not material and do not affect the quality of the testimony of these witnesses. In this respect, it would be opportune to refer to the observation of Wan Yahya J (as he then was) in Pie Chin v. PP [1983] 1 CLJ 316; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 703; [1985] 1 MLJ 234 HC: “Discrepancies are no doubt present in this case, as they do ostensibly appear in most cases in evidence of witnesses for the prosecution as well as the defence. The transcripts of most evidence, when thoroughly tooth combed by any able lawyer, never failed to yield some form of inconsistencies, discrepancies or contradictions but these do not necessarily render the witness’s entire evidence incredible. It is only when a witness’s evidence on material and obvious matters in the case is so irreconcilable, ambivalent or negational that his whole evidence is to be disregarded. Forgetfulness and failure to recall exactly certain events, which did not seem to be important to the witness, do not necessarily shake his credibility or render other parts of his story unworthy of belief.” Having examined the discrepancies alluded to by learned counsel for the appellant, we find that they are not material to the prosecution’s case, nor do they render the evidence of SP17 and SP18 incredible. We find no reasons to disagree with the learned judge’s characterisation of both SP17 and SP18 as credible witnesses.” [67] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan dapatan Hakim Bicara bahawa percanggahan yang dibangkitkan oleh pihak Perayu adalah tidak material dan tidak menjejaskan kes Pendakwaan. Selanjutnya S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 21 of 30 Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Hakim Bicara tidak terkhilaf apabila memutuskan bahawa Perayu telah menyentuh bahagian badan SP4 dan sekaligus berjaya membuktikan elemen kedua dan ketiga pertuduhan tersebut. [68] Oleh yang demikian mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan elemen kedua iaitu Perayu telah melakukan amang seksual fizikal terhadap SP4 dengan cara memeluk badan, meraba buah dada, mencium bahagian leher dan memegang kemaluan mangsa dan perbuatan tersebut telah dilakukan dengan “maksud seksual”. [69] Bagi “maksud seksual” ini telah dijelaskan dan dinyatakan di dalam Huraian 2 kepada Seksyen 14, Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-Kanak 2017 ini. Mahkamah ini berpendapat perbuatan-perbuatan Perayu yang memeluk badan, meraba buah dada, mencium bahagian leher serta memegang kemaluan SP4 telah memenuhi maksud seksual sepertimana yang dinyatakan di dalam Huraian 2 tersebut. [70] Selanjutnya pihak pendakwaan juga hendaklah membuktikan elemen di dalam seksyen 16(2)(c) Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-Kanak 2017 iaitu Perayu semasa melakukan kesalahan tersebut merupakan seorang yang mempunyai hubungan amanah iaitu guru kepada SP4. [71] SP9, iaitu Guru Bimbingan dan Kaunseling SMK Kampong Selamat dalam keterangannya telah mengesahkan bahawa Perayu ialah Guru Bimbingan dan Kaunseling sekolah tersebut dengan skop tugas seorang guru bimbingan dan kaunseling yang perlu S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 22 of 30 membimbing pelajar dari segi kerjaya, pembangunan sahsiah, kesihatan mental dan emosi pelajar-pelajar. [72] Berdasarkan keterangan SP9 adalah jelas bahawa elemen di bawah seksyen 16(2)(c) telah dipenuhi bahawa Perayu semasa melakukan kesalahan tersebut merupakan seorang yang mempunyai hubungan amanah iaitu guru kepada SP4. Isu selanjutnya, adakah Hakim Bicara telah memberi pertimbangan terhadap keseluruhan kes pembelaan? [73] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Hakim Bicara telah mempertimbangkan keseluruhan keterangan saksi-saksi pembelaan dan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan. [74] Secara ringkasnya keterangan Perayu bahawa dia mempunyai watak yang baik, dia telah memberi sumbangan yang banyak kepada pelajar-pelajar di SMK Kampong Selamat dan masyarakat luar. Perayu juga menafikan keberadaannya di bilik kaunseling SMK Kampong Selamat pada 4.7.2020, 5.7.2020, 11.7.2020 dan 26.7.2020. [75] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Hakim Bicara tidak terkhilaf apabila memutuskan bahawa pembelaan Perayu merupakan penafian semata-mata, dan pembelaan yang dikemukakan oleh Perayu tidak konsisten. Pembelaan Perayu yang menafikan keberadaannya di bilik kaunseling SMK Kampong Selamat pada 4.7.2020, 5.7.2020, 11.7.2020 dan 26.7.2020 merupakan satu pembelaan pemikiran terkemudian (afterthought) kerana pembelaan tersebut langsung tidak dibangkitkan semasa kes pendakwaan. S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 23 of 30 [76] Hakim Bicara mendapati pihak Perayu tidak memberikan sebarang notis alibi mengenai keberadaannya pada tarikh-tarikh yang dinyatakan. Perayu juga tidak mengemukakan pembelaan ini seawal pemeriksaan balas kepada saksi-saksi pihak pendakwaan khususnya kepada SP4 dan SP6. [77] Malahan pihak pembelaan telah mencadangkan kepada SP4 dan SP6 bahawa semasa SP4 dan SP6 belajar bersama-sama di bilik kaunseling tersebut, Perayu turut berada bersama mereka di ruang tamu bilik kaunseling tersebut dan pihak pembelaan mencadangkan bahawa adalah mustahil bagi Perayu untuk melakukan perbuatan amang seksual fizikal tersebut di hadapan pelajar lain. [78] Mahkamah berpendapat cadangan Perayu tersebut menunjukkan bahawa Perayu tidak menafikan beliau berada di bilik kaunseling tersebut. Memandangkan Perayu sememangnya berada di bilik kaunseling pada tarikh-tarikh tersebut maka Perayu dengan penuh pengetahuan bahawa tidak perlu untuknya memasukkan notis alibi bagi menafikan keberadaannya di tempat tersebut pada masa yang material. [79] Keterangan SP4 dalam pemeriksaan balas yang menunjukkan cadangan Perayu kepada SP4 mengenai keberadaannya dapat dilihat di petikan di bawah sepertimana yang dirujuk oleh Hakim Bicara dalam Alasan penghakimannya: - S: Arahan saya, Cikgu Aiyob ada bersama study group kamu dan tidak mungkin dia memanggil kamu untuk masuk bilik. J: Tidak setuju. S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 24 of 30 S: Saya katakan cikgu sentiasa berada bersama kumpulan study group kamu. J: Ya. [80] Mahkamah ini mendapati Hakim Bicara tidak terkhilaf apabila memutuskan bahawa pihak pembelaan hendaklah meletakkan landasan pembelaan di dalam kes pendakwaan bahawa Perayu tidak berada di tempat kejadian, bukan semata-mata menafikan Perayu berada di tempat kejadian pada peringkat kes pembelaan. [81] Mahkamah ini ingin merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Mr Losali v. PP [2011] 4 MLJ 694 yang menyatakan: “[54] The learned trial judge rightly held that the defence of the appellant was a bare denial. It is trite law that the defence of bare denial is no defence. What this amount to is this. That the appellant did not offer any explanation to the two charges and merely denied the evidence advanced by the prosecution. That was indeed a perilous course to undertake. [55] The bare denial cannot in law raise a reasonable doubt and the appellant must be convicted for both the charges. Raja Azlan Shah CJ (Malaya) (as His Majesty then was) in DA Duncan v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 2 MLJ 195, had this to say in regard to the defence of simple denial: The defence was, in effect, a simple denial of the evidence connecting the appellant with the four boxes. We cannot see any plausible ground for saying that the four boxes were not his. In the circumstances of the prosecution evidence, the High Court came, in our view, to the correct conclusion that this denial did not cast a doubt on the prosecution case against the appellant. S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 25 of 30 [82] Mahkamah ini juga mendapati bahawa Hakim Bicara telah meneliti keterangan Perayu melalui penyata saksinya dan Hakim Bicara tidak terkhilaf apabila merumuskan bahawa di dalam penyata saksi Perayu hanya menceritakan mengenai peribadi Perayu, sumbangan dan latar belakang Perayu tanpa mengaitkan dengan pertuduhan kes ini. [83] Pihak Perayu berhujah bahawa Perayu merupakan seorang guru yang baik, popular dan disenangi di kalangan pelajar di SMK Kampong Selamat serta sering terlibat dengan aktiviti masyarakat sebagai bilal masjid dan penggali kubur di kawasannya. Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan dapatan oleh Hakim Bicara bahawa pembelaan tersebut tidak berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. [84] Mengenai sikap Perayu yang pernah membantu pelajar yang memerlukan, perkara ini turut disahkan oleh keterangan SP4 bahawa Perayu pernah membantunya dan membantu pelajar- pelajar yang lain dari segi kewangan. Mahkamah ini ingin menegaskan bahawa sikap pemurah dan suka membantu yang digambarkan oleh Perayu bukanlah satu pembelaan yang menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. [85] Walaupun Perayu merupakan seorang guru yang popular dan disenangi oleh pelajar-pelajarnya, namun perbuatan amang seksual yang dilakukannya terhadap SP4 adalah menyalahi undang-undang dan kebaikan yang pernah dilakukan kepada SP4 dan pelajar yang lain bukanlah tiket untuk Perayu melakukan perbuatan jenayah seksual terhadap pelajarnya, khususnya kepada SP4 dalam kes ini. S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 26 of 30 [86] Hakim Bicara juga telah meneliti keterangan saksi-saksi pembelaan yang lain dan mendapati keterangan mereka juga tidak berjaya untuk menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. Keterangan SD2 setakat mengesahkan bahawa wujudnya garis panduan ataupun “Standard Operating Procedure” (SOP) untuk pembukaan sekolah semasa tempoh PKP dan mengesahkan tarikh-tarikh kejadian tersebut jatuh pada hari Sabtu dan Ahad sahaja. [87] Mengenai SD3, beliau ialah saksi yang hanya diperkenalkan dalam pembelaan. Pihak Perayu tidak pernah mencadangkan kepada mana-mana saksi pendakwaan khususnya kepada SP4 dan SP6 mengenai kewujudan SD3. [88] Mahkamah ini mendapati Hakim Bicara tidak terkhilaf apabila beliau telah meneliti keterangan SD3 secara berhati-hati kerana SD3 merupakan anak angkat kepada Perayu, ada kemungkinan SD3 merupakan saksi yang berkepentingan. Maka sewajarnya keterangan SD3 diteliti dan dinilai dengan berhati-hati. Hakim Bicara telah melihat watak SD3 semasa memberi keterangan dan Hakim Bicara telah menilai demeanour SD3 dan mendapati SD3 bukanlah seorang saksi yang jujur dan boleh dipercayai. [89] Mahkamah ini mendapati Hakim Bicara mempunyai kelebihan audio-visual dan beliau adalah dalam kedudukan yang terbaik untuk menilai kredibiliti saksi-saksi khususnya SD3 semasa memberi keterangan di peringkat pembelaan. Mahkamah juga mendapati Hakim Bicara telah mengingatkan dirinya untuk berhati-hati dalam menerima keterangan SD3. S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 27 of 30 [90] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Lai Kim Hon & Ors v. PP [1980] 1 LNS 197; [1981] 1 MLJ 84, di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut: - "The principle of law governing appeals in criminal cases on questions of fact is well established, in that the Appeal Court will not interfere unless the balance of evidence is grossly against the conviction especially upon a finding of a specific fact involving the evaluation of the evidence of a witness founded on the credibility of such witness. In the instant case the learned trial judge very carefully analysed all the available evidence before him and made specific finding of fact founded upon that which he believed to be the truth. He also drew certain inferences from facts specifically found. In this respect we may form our independent view but we should only do so where the fact upon which the inference was drawn was either unwarranted or manifestly against the weight of evidence. That was not the case here." [91] Selanjutnya dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Wan Razali Kassim [1970] 1 LNS 121; [1970] 2 MLJ 79 pula diputuskan: "An appellate court should be slow to interfere with the finding of fact by a lower court as an appellate court does not have the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses and therefore of assessing their credibility. [92] Berdasarkan nas undang-undang yang dirujuk di atas, Mahkamah ini tidak akan mengganggu dapatan oleh Hakim Bicara mengenai kredibilliti SD3. S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 28 of 30 Keputusan [93] Bersandarkan analisis dan dapatan di atas, Mahkamah ini mendapati Hakim Bicara telah meneliti dan membuat penilaian yang maksimum terhadap keterangan saksi-saksi, dan tiada alasan dan hujahan yang kukuh oleh pihak Perayu di hadapan Mahkamah ini yang dapat menunjukkan bahawa keputusan Hakim Bicara yang tersebut adalah satu kekhilafan atau satu salah arah. Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa rayuan Perayu terhadap sabitan tidak bermerit, maka Mahkamah ini menolak rayuan Perayu terhadap sabitan. [94] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti hujahan kedua-dua pihak berkaitan hukuman, Mahkamah berpendapat, tiada kekhilafan oleh Hakim Bicara dalam memutuskan tempoh hukuman pemenjaraan selama 4 tahun penjara dari tarikh sabitan (9.9.2022) dan hukuman tambahan iaitu 2 tahun penjara setelah selesai menjalani hukuman utama dan 2 kali sebatan rotan. Ianya masih dalam lingkungan yang dibenarkan undang-undang, Hakim Bicara juga telah mengambil kira kepentingan awam dan kepentingan peribadi Perayu. [95] Mahkamah ini merujuk keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v. Public Prosecutor [2002] 3 MLJ 193 yang menyatakan: - “It is of the upmost importance to stress here that the appellate court will not normally alter the sentence unless it is satisfied that the sentence passed by the lower court is manifestly inadequate or excessive or illegal or otherwise not a proper sentence having regard to all the facts disclosed or that the court has clearly erred in applying correct principles in the assessment of sentence. S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 29 of 30 [96] Selanjutnya di dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 1 LNS 102; [1976] 2 MLJ 256, adalah diputuskan seperti berikut: “The principles to be applied in imposing sentence however are the same in every case. The High Court sitting in exercise of its revisionary powers will not normally alter the sentence unless it is satisfied that the sentence of the lower court is either manifestly inadequate or grossly excessive or to all the facts which the court ought to take judicial notice of, that it is to say, that the lower court clearly has erred in applying the correct principles in the assessment of the sentence. It is a firmly established practice that the court will not alter a sentence merely because it might have passed a different sentence.” [97] Mahkamah ini berpendapat hukuman yang dijatuhi ke atas tertuduh adalah berpadanan dan tidaklah berlebihan. Mahkamah ini menolak rayuan Perayu atas sabitan dan hukuman. Oleh itu hukuman yang telah dijatuhi oleh Hakim Bicara terhadap Perayu adalah dikekalkan dan sebagai tambahan Perayu diperintah untuk menjalani pengawasan sebagaimana kehendak seksyen 27 Akta Kesalahan-Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-Kanak 2017. Bertarikh: 31 Oktober 2023 …………………………… (FATHIYAH BINTI IDRIS) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Butterworth Pulau Pinang S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 30 of 30 PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi pihak Responden: Norafifah binti Mohd Shokri Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Pulau Pinang Bagi pihak Perayu: Raveentharan a/l Subramaniam Peguam Bela dan Peguam Cara Raveen Associates Pulau Pinang S/N hwQWUxkWUOewtvEH5kzjg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	45,931	Tika 2.6.0
22IP-7-07/2014	PLAINTIF Lee Jin Jong DEFENDAN 1. ) BOON WAI LEONG 2. ) BOON PIN CHOY	Appeal against the quantum of damages awarded by the Senior Assistant Registrar. Whether the learned Senior Assistant Registrar had acted on wrong principles or misapprehended the facts.	31/10/2023	YA Tuan Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=bcf3e21a-6515-42b8-a515-423ab5ad1e5e&Inline=true	ja-12b-28-07/2019 IN THE MATTER OF THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT JOHOR BAHRU IN THE STATE OF JOHOR DARUL TA’ZIM CIVIL SUIT NO.: IP-22NCC-7-07/2014 BETWEEN LEE JIN JONG [No. K/P: 640602-04-5587] [Peniaga tunggal dan berdagang sebagai Jing Mi Enterprise [No. Pendaftaran Perniagaan JM0425585-V0] … PLAINTIFF AND 1. BOON WAI LEONG [No. K/P: 910527-04-5241] [Berdagang sebagai Fire Sandwood Enterprise (No. Pendaftaran Perniagaan: JM0625109-A)] 2. BOON PIN CHOY [No. K/P: 641114-05-5019] [Berdagang sebagai Fire Sandwood Enterprise (No. Pendaftaran Perniagaan: JM0625109-A)] … DEFENDANTS 31/10/2023 13:51:47 22IP-7-07/2014 Kand. 236 S/N GuLzvBVluEKlFUI6ta0eXg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal by the Defendant against the assessment of damages by the Senior Assistant Registrar (“the Registrar”). This assessment by the Registrar was commenced following the decision of the Judicial Commissioner (“JC”) of the High Court delivered on 08.02.2018. The learned JC found in favour of the Plaintiff in his claim against the Defendants for trademark infringement and passing off and ordered damages to be assessed at a later date. [2] On 28.02.2018, the Defendants filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal (“COA”) against the decision of the High Court but withdrew the appeal on the hearing date, on 20.03.2019. Thus, the only issue to be decided in this appeal is the assessment of damages by the Registrar. [3] On 02.02.2021, the Registrar awarded the Plaintiff damages in the sum of RM1,085,180.00, interests thereon at the rate of 5% from 02.02.2021 until full settlement and costs of RM10,000.00. THE LAW [4] For appeals from a decision involving evaluation of evidence by witnesses, the guiding principle is that judge should be slow to disturb the findings of facts by the Registrar unless the Registrar’s decision was plainly wrong, since the Registrar would have had the benefit of evaluating the evidence first-hand. S/N GuLzvBVluEKlFUI6ta0eXg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [5] This principle was enunciated in the case of Aeon Co (M) Bhd v Asia Plywood Co Sdn Bhd and Another appeal [2021] 2 MLJ 102 (CA), where the COA stated as follows: “[34] It is trite law that specific finding of facts by the deputy registrar as a trier of facts should not be disturbed by the High Court unless that finding was plainly wrong in light of the facts in the assessment of damages, as the deputy registrar had the benefit of an audio-visual advantage which the High Court did not have (see Low Hop Bing JCA in Ting Sieh Chung v Hoc Peng Realty Sdn Bhd [2013] 2 MLJ 90 at pp 93-94)…” [6] The High Court in CE Resources Sdn Bhd v Owners of the Ship or Vessel “Tanga 01” (Official no: 300397) of the Port of Zanzibar, Tanzania [2019] MLJU 845 briefly sets out the function of the court in its appellate capacity as follows: “[12] In so far as appellate intervention is concerned, the Court of Appeal in the case of Sambaga Valli a/p KR Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors [2018] 1 MLJ 784 had this to say – First, the Court of Appeal may interfere with the decision of a judge in chambers (in relation to an appeal from the Registrar) but only on well- established principles of appellate intervention (see C.M. Van Stillevoldt BV v E L Carrier Inc [1983] 1 WLR 207 at 208-209). The Court of Appeal may interfere with the quantum of damages awarded by the judge only if it is shown that the latter – (a) Acted on the wrong principles; (b) Misapprehended the facts; and (c) Had for these or other reasons made a wholly erroneous estimate of [the] damages.” [7] Lim Chong Fong, J (as he then was) in the case of Hew Chai Seng (t/a Fertiland Trading Company) v Metronic Integrated System Sdn Bhd & anor [2019] MJLU 348 (HC) held as follows: S/N GuLzvBVluEKlFUI6ta0eXg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 “Nonetheles, in the earlier Court of Appeal case of Amar Singh v Chin Kiew [1960] 1 MLJ 77, Thomson CJ held as follows: ‘The latest statement of how and when a Court of Appeal will interfere in a case of this nature is contained in the following passage from the judgment of Morris L.J., in the case of Scott v Musial [1959] 3 WLR 437 441: ‘Where there is an appeal from the decision of a Judge sitting alone, the appeal is by way of rehearing. The rehearing applies to the issue of damages as well as to other issues. But it is recognised that the fixation of damages is so largely a matter of opinion or of impression that differences of calculation or assessment are to be expected. There is, to some extent, an exercise of judicial discretion. It is for this reason that, if three judges of the Court of Appeal consider that the amount of general damages that they would have awarded would have been a figure different from that decided by the trial Judge, they will not, for that reason alone, give preference to their own figure; they will only do so if satisfied that the Judge has acted on a wrong principle of law or has misapprehended the facts, or has, for those or other reasons, made a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered.” FINDINGS BY THE COURT ON PIVOTAL ISSUES [8] Applying the guiding principles enunciated by the above cases notwithstanding that this appeal is by way of rehearing, this Court may review the findings of fact and the decision by the Registrar to determine if the Registrar has acted on wrong principles, misapprehended the facts, and/or made a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages which she eventually awarded the Plaintiff. [9] The Plaintiff produced a report by an expert to prove the damages he suffered as a result of the wrongful act of passing off and infringement of trademark by the Defendants. In assessing damages due to the S/N GuLzvBVluEKlFUI6ta0eXg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Plaintiff, the Registrar applied the principle of “loss of business profits” attributable to the wrongful acts of the Defendants. [10] The Defendants on the other hand did not provide any expert report to rebut the evidence of the Plaintiff’s expert but only relied on their counsel’s cross-examination of the Plaintiff’s expert witness to challenge the correctness of the expert’s conclusion and findings. [11] This Court finds that the Registrar applied the correct principle when she applied the “loss of business profits” method to assess damages payable to the Plaintiff. In Taiping Poly (M) Sdn Bhd v Wong Fook Toh & Ors (2011) 3 CLJ 837, the Federal Court enunciated the test applicable as follows: “[19] Damages for the infringement of intellectual property rights are tortious in nature. Their objective is to restore the claimant to the position he would have been in had the defendant not infringed. Thus, where the claimant is in the business of manufacturing goods, so that they are in competition with the defendant, then the measure of damages will be lost profits.” [12] The Court also went on to state that during the assessment of damages, there are no fixed rules as to which principle is to be applied. To determine how damages are calculated is dependent on the individual facts of the case. Again, in the case of Taiping Poly above, the Federal Court went on to explain: “There is no hard and fast rule to follow which is foolproof and universally accepted (see: Spalding (AG) & Bros v A W Gamage Ltd and Benetfink & Co Ltd; Juggi Lal-Kamlapat and Juggilal-Kamlapat Mills of Cawnporev Swadeshi Co Ltd (1928) 46 RPC 74). It depends on the facts of each case. It is basically facts driven.” S/N GuLzvBVluEKlFUI6ta0eXg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [13] Although there are no fixed rules to determine what principle is applicable, the Federal Court in the Taiping Poly case held that the most appropriate principle to be applied in an assessment of damages, in relation to trade mark infringement and passing off, is loss of business profits. This is the exact principle that was used by the Plaintiff’s expert, Mr David Siew (“the Plaintiff’s expert”). Therefore, I find that the Registrar did not act on a wrong principle in applying the test of loss of business profits in her assessment of damages. MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS [14] The Plaintiff submits that since there was no opposing expert report from the Defendants, “the Plaintiffs expert’s” evidence should be given considerable weight, and should not be disregarded just based on the cross-examination by the Defendants’s counsel. [15] This principle was propounded in the case of Majuikan Sdn Bhd v Barclays Bank PLC [2015] 1 MLJ 171 (CA), where the Court of Appeal stated: “[35] We are in agreement with these principles and in our view, a judge who is not an expert himself, should defer to expert opinion unless that evidence is obviously indefensible and is not supported by the basic facts of the case. Where there are conflicting expert opinions, the judge is of course entitled to bring to bear his own judicial appreciation of the matter, and choose one over the other, but where there is only one expert opinion, he should not as a rule reject that opinion outright without judiciously considering whether it is obviously indefensible and unsupported by the basic facts of the case.” S/N GuLzvBVluEKlFUI6ta0eXg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [16] The learned Registrar correctly applied this principle, which is shown in paragraphs 22 to 25 of her Grounds of Decision. The learned Registrar demonstrated that she used the Plaintiff’s report evidence to assist her in awarding the quantum of damages that she decided on. [17] The Defendants submits that the period of assessment used by the Plaintiff’s expert to calculate damages was without basis. This submission is without merit because the Registrar used the registration date of the Defendant’s business as the commencement date and the date of judgment on liability as the ending date to calculate the period of assessment. [18] I find the Registrar was not in error in choosing the period of assessment on the above-mentioned basis as her decision on the period is both reasonable and cannot be said to be unsupported by the basic facts of the case. (See Majuikan Sdn Bhd v Barclays Bank PLC (2015) 1 MLJ 171 (CA)). WRONG COMPUTATION OF LOSS OF PROFIT [19] The Defendants submit that the Plaintiff failed to prove the calculation of the unit price of the Plaintiff’s products, which the Plaintiff’s expert used for his computation of loss of profits and additionally, the expert was in error because the Plaintiff’s business was on a “loss trend” instead of a “profit trend”. S/N GuLzvBVluEKlFUI6ta0eXg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [20] In reply, the Plaintiff submits that the decrease in profits during the period of assessment was attributed to the Defendants’ conduct in selling similar items using the Plaintiff’s trademark, thus, diluting the Plaintiff’s total sales during the period of assessment. Additionally, the learned Judge Ahmad Kamal, J, in his decision on liability had found as a fact that the Defendants had caused a diversion of the Plaintiff’s business. [21] Based on the above reasons, I find that the Registrar did not misapprehend the facts in considering the Plaintiff’s expert evidence and arriving at her award of damages. Therefore, the Registrar did not make a wholly erroneous estimate of damages, since the award was in fact based on the expert report of the Plaintiff’s witness, which in turn was based on invoices and other documents including invoices by the Plaintiff and his Profit and Loss accounts, which were in Part B of the bundle of documents. [22] The Defendant raised many other issues to discredit the findings and award of damages by the Registrar. I find those issues to be not pivotal to the decision by the Registrar but merely an attempt to “throw everything but the kitchen sink” at her decision in order to convince this Court to disturb or overturn her findings. In fact, in this case the Defendant did not even spare the proverbial “kitchen sink”. Suffice for this Court to deal with the pivotal issues for otherwise, this grounds would run into many unnecessary pages. S/N GuLzvBVluEKlFUI6ta0eXg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [23] I find the Registrar did not make any appealable error to warrant any interference with her decision in making the award for damages. For the aforesaid reasons, I dismiss the Defendants’s appeal with costs of RM5,000.00. Dated 30th October 2023 …………t.t………….. Ahmad Murad Bin Abdul Aziz Judge High Court of Malaya Kuala Lumpur COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF: NORSURYATI ABD KARIM SOLICITORS FOR THE PLAINTIFF: TETUAN CHIONG AND PARTNERS COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT: THONG KYN WYNE WITH TAN JIT KAI SOLICITORS FOR THE DEFENDANT: TETUAN KEN ST JAMES S/N GuLzvBVluEKlFUI6ta0eXg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Cases Referred to: ➢ Aeon Co (M) Bhd v Asia Plywood Co Sdn Bhd and Another appeal [2021] 2 MLJ 102 (CA) ➢ CE Resources Sdn Bhd v Owners of the Ship or Vessel “Tanga 01” (Official no: 300397) of the Port of Zanzibar, Tanzania [2019] MLJU 845 ➢ Hew Chai Seng (t/a Fertiland Trading Company) v Metroni Integrated System Sdn Bhd & anor [2019] MJLU 348 (HC) ➢ Taiping Poly (M) Sdn Bhd v Wong Fook Toh & Ors (2011) 3 CLJ 837 ➢ Majuikan Sdn Bhd v Barclays Bank PLC (2015) 1 MLJ 171 (CA) Legislation Referred to: ➢ Rules of Court 2012 Decision Date : 19.01.2023 S/N GuLzvBVluEKlFUI6ta0eXg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	14,879	Tika 2.6.0
BA-22NCvC-574-12/2019	PLAINTIF PERBADANAN PENGURUSAN 3 TWO SQUARE DEFENDAN 3 TWO SQUARE SDN BHD	Permohonan Penggantungan Prosiding - menunggu pelupusan Guaman Lain - isu keadaan khas - kependuaan isu-isu kelewatan - isu sama ada perjudis terhadap plaintif.	31/10/2023	YA Puan Indra Nehru Savandiah	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=532ecb6f-7a7b-4a2b-80e3-3bcbfc2f4b65&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN GUAMAN NO.: BA-22NCVC-574-12/2019 ANTARA PERBADANAN PENGURUSAN 3 TWO SQUARE … PLAINTIF [BRN: SEL2434/09] DAN 3 TWO SQUARE SDN BHD … DEFENDAN [NO. SYKT: 617273-X] _________________________________________________________ ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan 1. Pihak plaintif merayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah yang membenarkan permohonan pihak defendan menggantungkan segala prosiding selanjutnya di dalam guaman ini sementara menunggu pelupusan muktamad Guaman Sivil Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam dalam kes No.22NCVC-516-07/2013 dan juga sebarang rayuan ke Mahkamah Atasan, jika ada, berhubung dengan kes tersebut. 31/10/2023 11:58:31 BA-22NCvC-574-12/2019 Kand. 186 S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Latar Belakang Kes 2. “3 Two Square” di Petaling Jaya, Selangor, merupakan satu pembangunan komersial yang terdiri daripada beberapa pejabat, kedai serta merangkumi petak tempat letak kereta dalam Blok A hingga F sebanyak 1,370. 3. Pihak plaintif ialah badan statutori yang melaksanakan tugasan selaku Perbadanan Pengurusan yang mendapat punca kuasa sepertimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Akta Hakmilik Strata 1985 dan Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013. 4. Pihak defendan adalah syarikat pemaju yang telah membangunkan pusat komersial “3 Two Square”. 5. 17 Petak (Petak No. M1 – F/N3/251 hingga M1 – F/15/267) yang terletak di Blok F (Crest Tower) adalah milikan berdaftar defendan dengan jumlah unit-unit syer yang diperuntukkan sebanyak 120,582. S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 6. Petak No. 267 yang terletak di Aras 15, Blok F (Crest Tower) diaksesori dengan antara lain 1,370 tempat letak kereta petak aksesori yang terletak di Aras B2, B1, LG1 dan LG2 Blok F (Crest Tower) dengan jumlah unit-unit syer yang diperuntukkan sebanyak 71,524. 7. Pihak plaintif mengenakan dan membuat kutipan caj-caj penyelenggaraan dan kumpulan wang penjelas ke atas Petak No. 267 (termasuk 1,370 tempat letak kereta petak aksesori). 8. Adalah fakta yang tidak dipertikaikan bahawa pihak plaintif dan pihak defendan terlibat dalam Guaman Sivil Shah Alam No. 22NCVC-516-07/2013 (selepas ini dikenali “Guaman 516”). 9. “Guaman 516” adalah tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan bagi tunggakan caj-caj penyelenggaraan dan kumpulan wang penjelas tertunggak ke atas Petak defendan No. 267 dan 1,370 tempat letak kereta petak aksesori bagi tempoh bermula dari 1.8.2008 hingga 31.07.2012, berjumlah sebanyak RM1,739,712.00. S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 10. Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam telah menolak tuntutan pihak plaintif bagi “Guaman 516” pada 20.9.2017. 11. Pada 7.10.2019 Mahkamah Rayuan telah mengetepikan Penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 20.9.2017. 12. Pihak plaintif berjaya di peringkat Mahkamah Rayuan bagi jumlah tuntutan sebanyak RM1,739,712.00. 13. Seterusnya pihak defendan telah memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Persekutuan atas Perintah Mahkamah Rayuan. 14. Perintah Mahkamah Persekutuan adalah tuntutan “Guaman 516” diremit balik ke Mahkamah Tinggi untuk dibicarakan semula bagi menentukan isu sama ada terdapat pelanggaran Seksyen 4, 34 dan 69 Akta Hakmilik Strata 1985 atas pemilikan defendan terhadap tempat letak kereta petak aksesori dan pengoperasian komersial tempat letak kereta petak aksesori tersebut. S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 15. Mahkamah Persekutuan juga memerintahkan pihak-pihak dalam tuntutan “Guaman 516” meminda pliding masing-masing bagi membolehkan isu-isu yang dikenalpasti oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dibicarakan secara adil dan berkesan di hadapan Hakim asal yang mendengar kes tersebut di Mahkamah Tinggi. 16. Berhubung itu, pihak plaintif dalam tuntutan “Guaman 516” telah meminda penyata tuntutan, antara lain, seperti berikut: (i) Satu pengisytiharan bahawa pengaksesorian kesemua 1,370 ruang tempat letak kereta kepada Petak No. 267 batal dan tidak sah; (ii) Satu pengisytiharan bahawa Petak No. 267 hanya berhak mendapat 21 tempat letak kereta atau bilangan petak letak kereta mengikut skala satu (1) tempat letak kereta bagi setiap 500 kaki persegi; (iii) Satu perintah bahawa 1,370 tempat letak kereta petak aksesori di “3 Two Square” diklasifikasikan S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 semula di mana 21 petak tempat letak kereta diaksesori kepada Petak No. 267 manakala baki 1,349 tempat letak kereta adalah harta bersama di bawah kawalan plaintif; (iv) Satu perintah pentaksiran gantirugi untuk menentukan jumlah hasil keuntungan yang telah diperolehi oleh defendan daripada perniagaan tempat letak kereta yang dijalankan di 1370 tempat letak kereta di “3 Two Square” dan jumlah keuntungan yang perlu disalurkan kepada plaintif setelah mengambil kira caj-caj penyelenggaraan dan kumpulan wang penjelas yang telah dan perlu dibayar oleh defendan kepada plaintif. Tuntuan Plaintif Dalam Guaman Semasa 17. Tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan adalah untuk caj-caj penyelenggaraan dan kumpulan wang penjelas tertunggak bermula dari 16.8.2012 hingga 31.10.2019 untuk 17 petak defendan S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 termasuk Petak No. 267 dan 1,370 tempat letak kereta petak aksesori berjumlah lebih kurang RM4,252,203.37. 18. Tuntutan plaintif dalam guaman semasa berasaskan fakta bahawa defendan adalah pemilik sah dan benefisial Petak No. 267 dan 1,370 tempat letak kereta petak aksesori. 19. Pihak defendan memfailkan Permohonan Penggantungan Prosiding dalam guaman semasa atas alasan menunggu pelupusan muktamad “Guaman 516” dan sebarang rayuan selepas itu berhubung kes tersebut. Prinsip Undang-Undang Berhubung Penggantungan Prosiding 20. Kes Ambank (M) Bhd v Metal Reclamation (Industries) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] 10 CLJ 205 telah memutuskan seperti berikut: “[31] There is no previous precedent on how the applicant may persuade the court to exercise its discretion to stay a suit pending the outcome of a specified event. I am inclined to follow the “special S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 circumstances” test which is applicable to applications for stay of execution of orders and judgments pending disposal of appeals as well as stay of proceedings pending disposal of appeals (“stay pending appeal” applications). The adoption of a similar test of “special circumstances” for stay of proceedings pending the outcome of a certain event, will ensure uniformity in the exercise of judicial discretion in respect of stay applications irrespective of whether there is a pending appeal or otherwise.” 21. Prinsip kes Ambank (M) Bhd v Mutual Reclamation (Industries) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] 10 CLJ 205 menggariskan ujian “keadaan- keadaan khas” dalam menentukan sama ada penggantungan prosiding harus dibenarkan dalam keadaan selain daripada penggantungan prosiding sementara menungu keputusan rayuan. 22. Kes Board of Governors of Sekolah Menengah St Gabriel v Ranjit Singh [1970] 1 MLJ 38 telah memutuskan adalah menjadi tanggungjawab Mahkamah untuk mendekati permohonan S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 penggantungan prosiding menggunakan budi bicara secara adil dan munasabah. Isu-Isu Untuk Diputuskan 23. Sama ada wujud keadaan-keadaan khas di dalam guaman semasa bagi menggantung segala prosiding sementara menunggu pelupusan muktamad “Guaman 516” dan sebarang rayuan ke Mahkamah Atasan, jika ada. 24. Perkara berhubung kependuaan isu-isu dan kebarangkalian wujud keputusan Mahkamah-Mahkamah yang bercanggah. 25. Isu kelewatan pemfailan notis permohonan penggantungan prosiding oleh pihak defendan. 26. Isu sama ada permohonan penggantungan prosiding oleh defendan mengakibatkan prejudis terhadap plaintif. S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Keputusan Mahkamah 27. Setelah meneliti dan mengkaji kesemua keterangan afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan dan hujahan-hujahan peguam-peguam terpelajar, maka diputuskan permohonan penggantungan prosiding oleh pihak defendan dibenarkan dengan kos sebanyak RM5,000.00 tertakluk fi alokatur berdasarkan sebab-sebab seperti berikut: (i) Mahkamah ini memutuskan isu pemilikan 1,370 tempat letak kereta petak aksesori yang akan diputuskan di dalam “Guaman 516” dengan sendirinya merupakan keadaan khas untuk perintah penggantungan prosiding guaman semasa ini dibenarkan. (ii) Ini adalah kerana tiada pertikaian pada bila-bila masa bahawa tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan adalah bagi caj-caj penyelenggaraan dan kumpulan wang penjelas yang dikenakan ke atas tempat letak kereta petak aksesori S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 defendan di Aras B1, B2, LG1 dan LG2 diaksesorikan kepada Petak No. 267. (iii) Berhubung ini, status pemilikan tempat letak kereta pada Aras B1, B2, LG1 dan LG2 merupakan hal perkara yang dibicarakan semula dalam “Guaman 516”. (iv) Mahkamah mendapati maklum balas pihak plaintif kepada pihak defendan bahawa bermula bulan April 2017, hanya satu invois caj-caj penyelengaraan dan kumpulan wang penjelas diisukan kepada pihak defendan bagi kesemua 17 petak di blok F milik defendan bersama tempat letak kereta mengiktirafkan status defendan sebagai pemilik tempat letak kereta tempat oleh plaintif sendiri. S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (v) Oleh yang demikian Mahkamah ini sehaluan dengan hujahan pihak defendan bahawa apa jua keputusan kes “Guaman 516” akan membawa impak ketara terhadap pengiraan dan tuntutan plaintif bagi caj-caj penyelenggaraan tertunggak dan kumpulan wang penjelas bagi Petak No. 267 dalam guaman semasa ini. (vi) Apabila dikaji penyata tuntutan terpinda “Guaman 516”, didapati pihak plaintif mendakwa tindakan pihak defendan mengambil milik dan mengawal kesemua tempat letak kereta di “3 Two Square” adalah bertentangan dengan Akta Hakmilik Strata 1985. (vii) Di dalam “Guaman 516” pihak plaintif telah memohon pelantikan seorang akauntan untuk membuat penilaian akaun berhubung dengan S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 pengoperasian komersial defendan akan tempat letak kereta tersebut dari tarikh pemilikan kosong tempat letak kereta pada 3.8.2007. (viii) Ini dengan jelas membuktikan apa jua keputusan Mahkamah dalam “Guaman 516” akan mempunyai kesan retrospektif. (ix) Mahkamah ini mengguna pakai prinsip kes Ling Peek Hoe & Anor v Golden Star & Ors [2020] MLJU 1233 dan memutuskan bahawa keputusan “Guaman 516” adalah termaktub dalam kategori pemahaman sebagai suatu kejadian pada masa hadapan yang akan memberi kesan terhadap guaman semasa di Mahkamah ini. S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (x) Perkara berhubung kependuaan isu-isu dan kebarangkalian wujud keputusan Mahkamah- Mahkamah yang bercanggah adalah dipersetujui oleh Mahkamah ini sebagaimana yang dihujahkan oleh pihak defendan dalam mengambil kira fakta kes di Mahkamah ini. (xi) Ini adalah kerana sekiranya Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam “Guaman 516” memutuskan status pemilikan 1,370 tempat letak kereta petak aksesori adalah harta bersama, ia akan membawa kesan pada setiap masa material kepada cara pengiraan caj-caj penyelenggaraan dan wang penjelas tertunggak Petak No. 267 kerana unit syer yang diperuntukkan akan berkurangan kepada defendan. (xii) Dalam pada itu, Mahkamah ini mengguna pakai prinsip kes Suruhanjaya Sekuriti v S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Datuk Ishak Ismail & Anor [2017] 9CLJ 63 yang memutuskan kesamaan isu-isu hendaklah menjadi faktor yang perlu dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah dalam memberikan penggantungan prosiding. (xiii) Dalam penilaian isu sama ada wujud kelewatan oleh pihak defendan dalam memfailkan permohonan penggantungan prosiding, Mahkamah memutuskan tidak ada kelewatan. (xiv) Perintah Mahkamah Persekutuan bertarikh 7.11.2022. Pliding di dalam “Guaman 516” ditutup pada 15.5.2023. (xv) Pihak defendan telah bertanya kepada pihak plaintif sama ada pihak plaintif bersetuju akan cadangan pemfailan permohonan penggantungan prosiding pada 28.3.2023 dan S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 hanya menerima maklum balas pada 5.5.2023 bahawa pihak plaintif tidak bersetuju terhadap cadangan pihak defendan tersebut. (xvi) Setelah mengkaji ikatan-ikatan dokumen dan pernyataan saksi plaintif bagi “Guaman 516” yang lengkap difailkan oleh pihak plaintif pada 25.6,2023, maka pihak defendan telah memfailkan permohonan penggantungan prosiding ini pada 3.7.2023 (Lampiran 162). (xvii) Justeru aliran fakta jelas menunjukkan pihak defendan tidak lewat atau leka dalam pemfailan permohonan penggantungan prosiding ini. (xviii) Pihak plaintif berhujah penggantungan prosiding dalam guaman semasa akan mengakibatkan ketidakadilan kepada pihak S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 plaintif mengambil kira guaman ini difailkan pada tahun 2019. (xix) Adalah keputusan Mahkamah ini, hujahan pihak plaintif tidak bernas. Malahan penggantungan prosiding guaman semasa akan mengelakkan kebarangkalian wujud dua keputusan bercanggah Mahkamah yang akan memudaratkan penguatkuasaan penghakiman kes-kes berkenaan. (xx) Penggantungan prosiding guaman semasa akan meletakkan kedudukan pihak pihak jelas apabila keempunyaan hakmilik tempat letak kereta diputuskan dalam “Guaman 516”. (xxi) Dalam konteks ini rujukan dibuat kepada kes Ang Sue Khoon v Majlis Bandaraya Pulau Pinang [2016] 11 MLJ 516, yang memutuskan penggantungan prosiding mesti diberikan jika S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 ianya bercondong ke arah skala keseimbangan keadilan terhadap perintah sedemikian diberikan. (xxii) Oleh yang demikian penggantungan prosiding tidak mengakibatkan prejudis kepada pihak plaintif. Kesimpulan 28. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dihuraikan di atas, Mahkamah ini memutuskan adil dan wajar bagi perintah penggantungan prosiding dibenarkan dengan kos RM5,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur. Tarikh: 26 Oktober 2023 (INDRA NEHRU SAVANDIAH) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Shah Alam Tarikh keputusan: 28 Ogos 2023 S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 Peguam-Peguam: Bagi pihak plaintif: David Samuel & Sheena Sebastian [Tetuan Chambers of Firdaus] Bagi pihak defendan: Raymond Mah, John Chan & Daphne Rethual, [Tetuan Mah Weng Kwai & Associates] S/N b8suU3t6K0qA4zvL/C9LZQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	16,679	Tika 2.6.0
BA-25-69-10/2022	PEMOHON CHRISTINE LIM CHOY WAN RESPONDEN 1. ) Jabatan Peguam Negara 2. ) Pengarah Pendakwaan Negeri Selangor	This is an application seeking leave to commence judicial review proceedings by the applicant challenging the decisions of the respondents (“the Impugned Decisions”). - Discharge Not Amounting to Acquittal (“DNAA”) - Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution	31/10/2023	YA Dr Shahnaz Binti Sulaiman	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b84e1c22-2557-4bd0-b3df-07a08f4fe362&Inline=true	1 BA-25-69-10/2022 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA PERMOHONAN SEMAKAN KEHAKIMAN NO.: BA-25-69-10/2022 Dalam Pertuduhan bagi kes Bersabit No. Repot: Klang Selatan/8744/19; Dan Dalam perkara ketidakmunasabahan (‘unreasonableness’), ketidakwarasan (‘irrationality’) atau ketidaksahihan Keputusan Jabatan Peguam Negara dan Pengarah Pendakwaan Negeri Selangor dibuat dalam surat bertarikh 8.7.2022 dan 12.8.2022 bahawa Pertuduhan Bagi Kes Bersabit No Repot: Klang Selatan/8744/19 tersebut diarahkan untuk Discharge Not Amounting to Acquittal (DNAA); Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam Perkara Kuasa-Kuasa Tersirat Mahkamah Yang Mulia Ini Yang Sedia Ada ANTARA CHRISTINE LIM CHOY WAN (No. K/P: 731026-10-5038) …PEMOHON 28/11/2023 15:46:41 BA-25-69-10/2022 Kand. 22 S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 BA-25-69-10/2022 DAN 1. JABATAN PEGUAM NEGARA 2. PENGARAH PENDAKWAAN NEGERI SELANGOR …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an application seeking leave to commence judicial review proceedings by the applicant, Christine Lim Choy Wan challenging the decisions of the respondents dated 8.7.2022 and 12.8.2022 (“the Impugned Decisions”). Reliefs Sought [2] In this application, the applicant sought the following reliefs: (a) declaration that the respondents’ decision dated 8.7.2022 and 12.8.2022 (“the Impugned Decisions”) for Discharge Not Amounting to Acquittal (“DNAA”) of the suspect, Lim Kam Cheen Peter (“the Suspect”) in Police Report No. Klang Selatan 8744/19 (“the Police Report”) is unreasonable, unsound (tidak waras) and invalid (tidak sahih); (b) Certiorari to quash the Impugned Decisions; and S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 BA-25-69-10/2022 (c) Mandamus to compel the respondents to institute criminal proceedings against the suspect for the Police Report. Factual Background [3] The facts of this instant application are as derived from the documents filed by parties are as follows. [4] The applicant lodged a Police Report on 17.3.2019, outlining the following grievances: (i) The applicant had a dispute with her mother on the same day and claimed that her mother physically assaulted her. (ii) The suspect, who happens to be the applicant’s younger brother, then confronted the applicant and attempted to record the altercation. (iii) In response, the applicant acknowledged in her affidavit in support that she pushed the suspect’s mobile phone away when he tried to record the incident. In retaliation, the suspect allegedly lifted the applicant, threw her to the ground, and proceeded to physically assault her by punching and kicking her. (iv) Consequently, the applicant asserted that she sustained significant injuries to her ribs, eyes, legs, and head and had to seek medical treatment at Klang Hospital. She remained hospitalized until 22.3.2019. S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 BA-25-69-10/2022 [5] The applicant then obtained an Interim Protection Order against the suspect from the Klang Magistrate's Court dated 17.4.2019 (“Interim Protection Order”) in which, among other, states:- “Perintah perlindungan interim ini hendaklah terhenti berkuat kuasa – (a) apabila orang dilindungi itu dimaklumkan secara bertulis oleh Pegawai polis tentang penyiasatan yang telah selesai dan bahawa tiada tindakan selanjutnya akan diambil terhadap orang yang terhadapnya perintah ini dibuat; (b) apabila prosiding jenayah dimulakan terhadap orang yang terhadapnya perintah ini dibuat jika, apabila dimaklumkan secara bertulis oleh pegawai polis bahawa prosiding jenayah yang berhubungan dengan perlakuan suatu kesalahan yang melibatkan keganasan rumah tangga akan dimulakan terhadap orang yang terhadapnya perintah ini dibuat, tiada permohonan bagi perintah perlindungan dibuat oleh orang dilindungi itu dalam masa tujuh hari selepas dimaklumkan sedemikian; ….” [6] The applicant sent an email on 18.4.2022, to the second respondent, making reference to her prior email from 28.1.2021. In the email dated 28.1.2021, the applicant conveyed the following information: (i) On 31.7.2019, the investigation officer informed her that the suspect would be charged in Klang Session Court on 2.8.2019. (ii) However, on 25.8.2020, the Deputy Public Prosecutor informed her that the suspect was discharged not amounting S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 BA-25-69-10/2022 to an acquittal (DNAA) from the charges under section 325 or 326 of the Penal Code by the Klang Session Courts’ judge, Dato' Ahmad Zamzani bin Haji Mohd Zain, due to the non- attendance of witnesses during the criminal proceedings. [7] In response to this, through an email dated 18.4.2022, the applicant requested a reconsideration of the DNAA decision against the suspect and asked for the suspect to face charges once more. [8] In a letter dated 8.7.2022, the second respondent provided the following explanations: (i) The second respondent acknowledged that the suspect had been discharged not amounting to an acquittal by the Session Court due to the absence of a witness during the criminal proceedings. However, the suspect was subsequently recharged on 4.2.2021. (ii) The suspect then submitted a Representation Letter dated 5.4.2021, which was referred to the Attorney General’s Chambers. (iii) After considering the investigation findings and the circumstances of the case, the Attorney General’s Chambers determined that the DNAA decision was warranted. (iv) Following the applicant’s email dated 18.4.2022, the investigation papers were sent back to the Attorney General’s Chambers for a review. S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 BA-25-69-10/2022 (v) Ultimately, the Attorney General’s Chambers decided to uphold the DNAA decision against the suspect. [9] The applicant again, via her solicitors sent a letter dated 8.8.2022 requested that the prosecution against the suspect to be reinstated. [10] However, the second respondent through a letter dated 12.8.2022 once again stated that the previous DNAA against the suspect was upheld. [11] Dissatisfied with the Impugned Decisions, the applicant filed this application for leave to commence judicial review. Test for Granting Leave [12] The law of judicial review has been elucidated particularly to its purpose and extent in the Federal Court’s decision in SIS Forum (Malaysia) v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor; Majlis Agama Islam Selangor (Intervener) [2022] 3 MLRA 219 where Her Ladyship Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat CJ stated: “Judicial review is a core tenet of the rule of law which is inextricably linked to the notion of constitutional supremacy in a democratic form of Government. This was because a core feature of the rule of law is the doctrine of separation of powers, a corollary to which is the concept of check and balance. Judicial review - whether constitutional review or statutory review - is a fundamental aspect of check and balance and is the vehicle through which the judicial branch of Government can perform its constitutional function visa-vis the other branches of Government. S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 BA-25-69-10/2022 The judicial power of the Federation which includes judicial review (constitutional and statutory) is vested by constitutional design solely in the two High Courts.” [13] Pertaining to the test in granting leave for judicial review, the Federal Court in WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2012] MLRA 257 held that the test for leave to commence judicial review are as follows: “[12] …Without the need to go into depth of the abundant authorities, suffice if we state that leave may be granted if the leave application is not thought of as frivolous, and if leave is granted, an arguable case in favour of granting the relief sought at the substantive hearing may be the resultant outcome. A rider must be attached to the application though ie unless the matter for judicial review is amenable to judicial review absolutely no success may be envisaged.” [Emphasis added] [14] In Bandar Utama Development Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Lembaga Lebuhraya & Anor [1998] 1 MLJ 224 His Lordship Visu Sinnadurai J at page 225 held as follows: “... The court, in exercising its discretion that an application for leave be granted must be convinced by the applicants that prima facie the application is genuine and that there is some substance in the grounds supporting the application. The test’s threshold is very low; a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion, an arguable case must be shown, not a prima facie S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 BA-25-69-10/2022 case. Additionally, an application must fail if it is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, made by busybodies with misguided or trivial complaints of administrative errors, groundless, where there are more appropriate alternative remedies, and where the application for judicial remedies is inappropriate.” [Emphasis added] [15] In summary, although the standard for granting permission is not stringent, an applicant wishing to obtain permission must meet the following requirements: (i) demonstrate that the application is not frivolous; (ii) prove that the application is not vexatious; and (iii) establish that it warrants further consideration during the substantive stage. Objection by The Attorney General [16] This application for leave was objected to by the Attorney General. The Attorney General submitted that the application for leave should be dismissed on the grounds that the impugned decisions is not amenable for judicial review. S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 BA-25-69-10/2022 Decision [17] The applicant filed this application seeking leave to commence judicial review proceedings against the respondents based on the issue of impropriety, inadequacy, or invalidity concerning the decisions of the Attorney General's Department and the Director of Prosecution for the State of Selangor made in letters dated 8.7.2022 and 12.8.2022 that the charges for Case No. Report: Klang Selatan/8744/19 are directed to Discharge Not Amounting to Acquittal (DNAA). [18] The Attorney General submitted that the applicant does not have an arguable case and this application does not merit further arguments at the substantive stage. [19] In support of this contention, the Senior Federal Counsel cited Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution which reads: “The Attorney General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings before a Syariah court, a native court or a court martial.” [20] A consistent line of judicial decisions has thoroughly scrutinized the interpretation and impact of this constitutional provision, and the highest courts have consistently ruled that the Attorney General's authority to initiate, oversee, or terminate criminal proceedings is beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny. [See: Long Bin Samat & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1974] 2 MLJ 152, Teh Cheng Poh V Public Prosecutor [1979] 1 MLJ 50, Public Prosecutor v. Zainuddin & Anor S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 BA-25-69-10/2022 [1986] 2 MLJ 100, Karpal Singh & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1991] 2 MLJ 544] [21] In Repco Holdings Bhd v. Public Prosecutor (supra) Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as His Lordship then was) had this to say: “The importance of the propositions formulated by the learned Lord President in these two cases is that, as a matter of public law, the exercise of discretion by the Attorney General in the context of art 145(3) is put beyond judicial review. In other words, the exercise by the Attorney General of his discretion, in one way or another, under art 145(3), cannot be questioned in the courts by way of certiorari, declaration or other judicial review proceedings. I think that the proposition is not only good law but good policy. For, were it otherwise, upon each occasion that the Attorney General decides not to institute or conduct or discontinue a particular criminal proceedings, he will be called upon to a court of law the reasons for his decision. It will then be the court and not the Attorney General who will be exercising the power under art 145(3). That was surely not the intent on our founding fathers who framed our Constitution for us.” [22] More recently, the Federal Court in the case of Sundra Rajoo a/l Nadarajah v Menteri Luar Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 6 CLJ 199 then established the following guiding principles: (i) Any challenge must meet a two-step threshold, which must be satisfied during the leave stage of any judicial review application; S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 BA-25-69-10/2022 (ii) The burden of proof rests on the applicant to demonstrate a legal basis for challenging the decision of the Attorney General or Public Prosecutor. This legal basis includes grounds for judicial review such as illegality, procedural impropriety, irrationality, and mala fide; and (iii) The applicant must present compelling and prima facie evidence that the Attorney General's or Public Prosecutor's decision or omission falls within these grounds, or at least one of them. The courts should presume, in consideration of the doctrine of separation of powers, that none of the grounds were established unless the evidence unequivocally leads to the inevitable conclusion that they have indeed been established. [23] In Sundra Rajoo (supra), Tengku Maimun CJ held as follows: “[96] The AG/PP by constitutional design has access to the police, investigation papers and other core decisive material which ultimately factor into his decision to charge or not to charge a person or to otherwise discontinue proceedings. The AG/PP is the guardian of public interest and so he factors not just the law and legal principles but also matters relevant to public policy and national security. The Courts, also by constitutional design, do not have the same benefit. Such design is inherent in the mechanism of our adversarial system which is grounded or rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers. Some degree of judicial deference to Executive discretion of the AG/PP is necessary so as not to stymie our justice system.” S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 BA-25-69-10/2022 [24] In this application for leave to commence judicial review, the applicant based her case for the initiation of a criminal proceeding against the suspect on the following pieces of evidence: (i) the medical report dated 23.11.2021; (ii) the Applicant’s Police Report dated 17.3.2019; and (iii) the Interim Protection Order issued by the Klang Magistrate’s Court on 17.4.2019. [25] The medical report, in the view of this court, sets out the injury suffered by the applicant. It does not, in the view of this court, in any way, demonstrate that the Impugned Decision is unreasonable or irrational. [26] With regard to the applicant’s police report. This court is of the view it is just that. A police report. The Police Report lodged by the applicant as a matter of fact only reflect the applicant’s version of story of the alleged event, not the narrative by other witness. It is the considered view of this court that by merely lodging a police report does not render the police report to be the truth. The veracity of the contents of the said police report is required to be established. [27] Pertaining to the Interim Protection Order issued by the Klang Magistrate’s Court on 17.4.2019, it was issued after a domestic violence complaint had been lodged with the police and pending investigations by the police. Section 4(4) of the Domestic Violence Act 1994 explicitly states that the interim protection order will no longer be valid once the investigations are concluded or when a S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 BA-25-69-10/2022 criminal proceeding regarding an offense related to domestic violence is initiated against the individual for whom the order was issued. [28] The applicant is relying on the above stated documents in this application to challenge the decision of the Public Prosecutor/Attorney General to halt the criminal proceedings against the suspect. The decision to DNAA a case is the decision of the Public Prosecutor/Attorney General. [29] In this instant case, the applicant had failed to produce other evidence. It could therefore be argued that the applicant had failed to provide compelling prima facie evidence which is required to challenge the Public Prosecutor’s/Attorney General’s prosecutorial power. [30] In the considered view of this court that the medical report, the police report and the Interim Protection Order are insufficient to be considered as prima facie compelling evidence in this case. [31] It is this note, this court can do no better than to reproduce the words of Wan Ahmad Farid Wan Salleh J in Sivakumar a/l Sockalingam & Anor v. Yang Berhormat Peguam Negara, Malaysia [2022] MLJU 2946 as follows: “(f) The applicants must come to Court with more than police reports or exhibits of social media postings to overcome the strong presumption of legality. Police reports and social media postings, without more, are not compelling and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of legality.” S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 BA-25-69-10/2022 [32] Moreover, in In Fazli bin Suboh v Public Prosecutor [2023] MLJU 353 this court had stated: “[28] The Federal Court in Sundra Rajoo (supra) held that the Attorney General does not have absolute or unfettered discretion under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution and that it is appropriate, rare and exceptional cases, such discretion is amenable to judicial review. [29] The Federal Court stated that any challenge to the poser of the Attorney General/Public Prosecutor must pass a two-step threshold which must be satisfied at the leave stage of any application for judicial review. The applicant is first required to show that he has a legal basis to challenge the decision of the Attorney General/Public Prosecutor such as illegality; procedural impropriety; irrationality and mala fide. The applicant will then have to adduce compelling prima facie proof that he decision or omission of the Attorney General/Public Prosecutor falls within those grounds or any one of them. … [32] The applicant’s premise is based primarily on the Police Report filed by his wife. This, in the considered view of this court, is not a compelling prima facie evidence that could on its own prove that the applicant is innocent. The veracity of the Police Report has yet to be proven. This court is therefore satisfied that it is insufficient to meet the requirement to produce compelling prima facie evidence which is required to challenge the respondent’s prosecutorial power.” S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 BA-25-69-10/2022 Conclusion [33] For the abovementioned reasons, this court is satisfied there is insufficient evidence before this court to meet the requirement of a prima facie case which is necessary to challenge the respondent’s prosecutorial powers. Hence, this court therefore dismissed this application seeking leave to file a judicial review application with no order as to costs. Date: 31 October 2023 (SHAHNAZ BINTI SULAIMAN) Judge High Court of Malaya, Shah Alam S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 BA-25-69-10/2022 Counsel: For The Applicant: Yoges M Verasuntharam Tetuan Chambers of Yoges, Advocates & Solicitors B-11-5, 1 Sentul Condominium Jalan Sentul Ria, 51200 Kuala Lumpur. yoges.vj@gmail.com +6 014 931 0198 For the Respondent: Ahmad Hanir bin Hambaly @ Arwi, Noor Atiqah binti Zainal Abidin Jabatan Peguam Negara Malaysia, Bahagian Guaman, No. 45, Persiaran Perdana, Presint 4, 62100 Putrajaya. pro@agc.gov.my +6 03 8872 2000 S/N IhxOuFcl0Euz3wegj0/jYg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	22,169	Tika 2.6.0
WA-24NCC-410-09/2017	PEMOHON Datuk Kasi A/L K.L. Palaniappan RESPONDEN 1. ) Menara Embun Sdn Bhd 2. ) PB Trustee Services Berhad (Wasi Bagi Harta Pusaka Allahyarmah Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal Bin Haji Abu Bakar No. K/P: 490318-08-5599) 3. ) Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal 4. ) MKN Holdings Sdn Bhd 5. ) Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd	Civil procedure — Affidavits — plaintiff sought leave to (i) file further affidavit; (ii) to cross examine deponent and non deponent on their affidavits / affirmed on their behalf — Whether filing of further affidavit should be allowed — Whether oral evidence through cross-examination should be taken — Whether court could order the attendance of non deponent for cross-examination under O. 38 r. 2(3) ROC 2012 Rules of Court 2012	31/10/2023	YA Puan Liza Chan Sow Keng	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1b254ee0-467f-4c1c-98b8-f4d151234d91&Inline=true	IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 In the matter of Menara Embun Sdn. Bhd. (Company No.: 428618-M) And In the matter of Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 And In the matter of Orders 7 and 88 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN DATUK KASI A/L K L PALANIAPPAN (I/C No.: 581025-10-6855) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. MENARA EMBUN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 428618-M) 2. PB TRUSTEE SERVICES BERHAD (Company No.: 196801000374 (7968-T)) (The Executor Of The Estate Of The Late TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL BIN HAJI ABU BAKAR (I/C No.: 490318-08-5599)) 3. FELINA BINTI TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL (I/C No.: 701201-10-6138) 4. MKN HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 91625-P) 5. SETIA HARUMAN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 425145-U) … DEFENDANTS [Heard together with the following Originating Summons pursuant to the Order dated 3.12.2019] 31/10/2023 11:47:31 WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 Kand. 448 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-411-09/2017 In the matter of Modern Eden Sdn Bhd. (Company No.: 623037-H) And In the matter of Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 And In the matter of Orders 7 and 88 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN DATUK KASI A/L K L PALANIAPPAN (I/C No.: 581025-10-6855) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. MODERN EDEN SDN BHD. (Company No.: 623037-H) 2. PB TRUSTEE SERVICES BERHAD (Company No.: 196801000374 (7968-T)) (The Executor Of The Estate Of The Late TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL BIN HAJI ABU BAKAR (I/C No.: 490318-08-5599)) 3. FELINA BINTI TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL (I/C No.: 701201-10-6138) 4. MKN HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 91625-P) 5. SETIA HARUMAN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 425145-U) … DEFENDANTS S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] There are 4 applications made by the Plaintiff before the court: 1.1 Enclosure (“Enc.”) 290 in Originating Summons WA- 24NCC-410-09/2017 (“Menara Embun OS”) and Enc. 271 in Originating Summons WA-24NCC-411-09/2017 (“Modern Eden OS”) seeking for the Plaintiff’s further Affidavit affirmed on 10.09.2021 (“P afft 7”) to adduce 12 volumes of documents be admitted in evidence for Both OS (“Further Affidavit Application”); and 1.2 Enc. 286 in the Menara Embun OS and Enc. 272 in the Modern Eden OS that the Plaintiff be granted leave to cross-examine, through counsel, Farah Mahami Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal on her Affidavits and Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal on the Affidavits affirmed on her behalf (“Cross Examination Application”). [2] I had allowed the applications on 5.9.2023. These are the reasons for my decisions. As the applications were related, it is convenient to deal with all 4 applications in one judgment. Background [3] The Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS were filed by the Plaintiff, Datuk Kasi a/l Palaniappan (“DK”) pursuant to Section 346 of the Companies Act, 2016 (“CA 2016”) complaining of minority oppression in S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 respect of the affairs of Menara Embun Sdn Bhd and Modern Eden Sdn Bhd respectively. [4] DK together with one Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd also commenced another minority oppression claim in respect of Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd vide Originating Summons No. WA-24NCC-290- 07/2017 (“Setia Haruman OS”). In the Setia Haruman OS, DK was struck out as a Plaintiff on 25.4.2018 as he was not a shareholder of Setia Haruman. DK however owns 50% of the shares in Impresive Circuit. The Setia Haruman OS was heard and eventually dismissed by me on 25.06.2021. The Court of Appeal had affirmed the decision on 20.1.2023. Impresive Circuit’s leave application to appeal to the Federal Court was dismissed by the Federal Court on 15.8.2023. [5] The Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS were converted into writ actions by Wong Chee Lin J but both had reverted back to OS actions after the 2nd to 4th Defendants’ appeals to the Court of Appeal was allowed on 26.08.2021 and the Plaintiff’s applications for leave to appeal to the Federal Court were dismissed on 21.2.2022. [6] In each of the 3 OS Actions, Tan Sri Mustapha Kamal (“TSMK”) was named as the 2nd Defendant. The Plaintiff’s complaints in the 3 OS Actions are that alleged oppressive acts were carried out in breach of an alleged Understanding, New Board Understanding that DK allegedly had with TSMK and DK’s legitimate expectation to participate in the management of Setia Haruman, Menara Embun and Modern Eden. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 The Further Affidavit Applications [7] Via P Afft 7, the Plaintiff seeks to adduce 12 volumes of documents as follows: a) Volumes 1 to 3 - documents exhibited in the earlier affidavits in these proceedings; b) Volume 4 - documents related to Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd; c) Volumes 5 to 9 - documents pertaining to 15 other companies and Setia Haruman; d) Volume 10 - documents pertaining to the affairs of several companies which existed before the incorporation of the 1st Defendant; e) Volume 11 - the notes of proceedings of the cross examination of TSMK, Azmy and THP in the Setia Haruman OS from 17th to 19th March 2021(which the 2nd to 4th Defendants have no objection); f) Volume 12 - document included by the 2nd to 4th Defendants to rebut the documents filed by the Plaintiff in volumes 4 to 10 for purposes of trial. [8] The documents sought to be adduced has since been narrowed down to volumes 1 to 3, 5 to 9 (except 1 document in volume 8 being the Certified True Copy of Form 13 A of MK Land by the Companies S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Commission of Malaysia, and volume 11 which was admitted by consent as these notes of proceedings are relevant but were not available earlier. [9] 2nd to 4th Defendants objections may be summarised as follows: 9.1 That the documents sought to be introduced concern other companies/joint ventures and Setia Haruman which are irrelevant documents; 9.2 These documents are sought to be adduced after the dismissal of the Setia Haruman OS. It is a belated attempt by the Plaintiff to cure the shortfalls of the Setia Haruman OS and an attempt to have a 2nd bite at the cherry; 9.3 Prior to the conversion, the Plaintiff had filed 6 affidavits in support of the Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS (“the OSs”). These documents were available to the Plaintiff at the time of filing of the OSs in 2017 and the exchange of affidavits; There was no explanation as to relevance and why these documents were not exhibited in the earlier affidavits citing in support of their arguments L.K Insulation Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Apex Energy Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 733: “[10] At any rate the reason given is not cogent enough: that of wanting to file a further affidavit. Generally only 3 affidavits are allowed for an application: an affidavit in support, an affidavit in opposition and a further affidavit in reply to that affidavit in opposition. Unless there are cogent reasons for affirming a further affidavit as in the documents that were sought to be referred to were not available previously or that what has been referred to in the last S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 affidavit filed is a lie, courts generally would not allow further affidavits to be filed. Otherwise there would be no end to affidavits filed because, human nature being what it is, everyone wants to have the final and last word! Therefore if in an affidavit in reply there is more than a reply to the affidavit filed in opposition, I would disregard the new matters raised which should have been raised in the affidavit in support.” (counsel’s emphasis) [10] The Plaintiff argued that: 10.1 The Plaintiff had in its Affidavits (Afft 7 Para 12) and Afft 8 Para 7 explained the contents of the documents as well as shown how these documents are both relevant and necessary to the core issues in both OSs i.e. the relationship between DK and TSMK, the Understanding, the New Board Understanding as well as the breaches of these understandings; 10.2 the documents relating to DK’s and TSMK’s various joint ventures are necessary and relevant to the manner in which DK and TSMK would run their joint ventures which include Menara Embun and Menara Eden; 10.3 The documents relating to Setia Haruman are necessary and relevant because the conduct at Setia Haruman affected DK’s participation in Menara Embun and Menara Eden. In this regard, the term “affairs of the company” in Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 is to be widely construed such that it includes the affairs of various S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 companies where such affairs are all closely connected e.g. parent and subsidiary companies citing in support: (i) Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] SGCA 47: “[42] We think that the approach adopted in the above cited cases is sound and we also agree that, in the final analysis, the question that must be answered in this regard is whether the affairs of the subsidiary affect or impact the holding company: Lim Chee Twang at [97]. Legitimate claims for relief from oppression should not be defeated by technical and legalistic objections relating to the company's shareholding structure; at the same time the doctrine of separate legal personalities and the strict words of the statute ("the affairs of the company" [emphasis added]) must be respected. In our view, the balance between these competing interests would be properly drawn by a requirement that commercially unfair conduct in the management of a subsidiary would be relevant so long and to the extent that such conduct affected or impacted the holding company whose member was the party claiming relief from oppression. The purpose and policy behind s 216 of the Companies Act is, above all, to grant relief from the oppressive behaviour to shareholders who would otherwise be unable to stop that abuse: see below at [49]. If the affairs of the subsidiary do not affect or impact the holding company, shareholders and members of the latter could hardly complain that their interests were therefore prejudiced.” (ii) Tob Chee Hoong v Tob Chee Choong [2017] MLJU 1303: “[50] I would respectfully follow this observation and rule that in this country, similarly, the phrase ‘affairs of the company’ S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 found in Section 181(1) of the CA (and the new but identically worded Section 346(1) of the Companies Act 2016) should be construed widely, to encompass the affairs of entities which are not themselves the subject of the oppression action, but which affairs of those entities, affect the subject company in the nature and to the extent which is beyond the inconsequential, be it a parent or a subsidiary. … [54] This provide much support to a wide reading of ‘affairs of the company’ which is wholly in line with the design of the law to ensure that in circumstances where oppressive conduct could be proven, legal redress to those unlawfully aggrieved is available and not impeded by the artificiality or in the complexity of corporate structures. Otherwise, wrongdoers in corporate world would be encouraged to strategize and build upon more complex conglomerate-like structures and perpetuate such unlawful and oppressive conduct in a fashion orchestrated to defeat the application of Section 181 (1) (Section 346 (1) of the Companies Act 2016), and almost literally employing the section as an engine of fraud. The law will fail in its true objective and the ends of justice will be far from being served if such a grim scenario is allowed to transpire, if not already manifest and flourishing.” (iii) That this principle is applicable to Setia Haruman, Menara Embun and Menara Eden was recognised by Azizul Azmi J when he heard the striking out applications in the Setia Haruman OS where DK was struck out as a Plaintiff but Impresive Circuit was allowed to continue pursuing the claim in Datuk Kasi S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Palaniappan & Anor v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 32: “[14] …Tob’s case established the principle that the expression ‘affairs of the company’ in s 346(1)(a) is to be construed widely, and would encompass oppressive conduct that is conducted at a subsidiary or a holding company. [15] While I fully agree with the ratio of the decision of Mohd Nazlan J in Tob’s case… … [18] He (DK) would have been perfectly entitled to allege, based on the principle in Tob’s case, that he was being oppressed at Menara Embun or Modern Eden by virtue of acts conducted at Setia Haruman. This is because the acts carried out at the Setia Haruman would amount to affairs of Menara Embun and/or Modern Eden. In my judgment, it makes no difference that Setia Haruman is not a subsidiary of either Menara Embun or Modern Eden. It suffices that either company holds shares in Setia Haruman, for conduct carried out at Setia Haruman to be the subject of a complaint of oppression at either Menara Embun or Modern Eden.” 10.4 P Afft 7 seeks to produce documents comprised previously in Part B of the Common Bundle of documents to enable the Plaintiff to discharge its burden to prove the Understanding, the New Board Understanding or the breaches of these understandings which amounted to oppressive acts against the Plaintiff; Having been produced in the Common bundles for trial, there is no surprise to the Defendants, the documents are admissible S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 whether the matter is tried as a writ action or an originating summons citing in support the case of Thavanathan a/l Balasubramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 MLJ 401, that all “evidence which is sufficiently relevant to the facts in issue is admissible”; 10.5 Both OSs are oppression claims which concern various complex factual and legal issues. To limit the Affidavits in such a case to only an Affidavit in support by the Plaintiff, one Affidavit in reply by the Defendant and then an Affidavit in reply by the Plaintiff as suggested by the Defendants would not lead to a just and effectual determination of both OSs. This is more so when the Defendants themselves have filed multiple Affidavits instead of subscribing to their own contention of Defendants only filing a single Affidavit in reply; 10.6 the Affidavits in respect of both OSs were still in the midst of being exchanged prior to the Conversion and once the Conversion was ordered, documents intended to be relied on by parties had to be adduced through the CBODs instead of further Affidavits; the Plaintiff had filed the Further Affidavit in both OSs to adduce the documents within 2 weeks of the Conversion being set aside by the Court of Appeal and well in advance of any hearing date of both OSs; L K Insulation Engineering relied upon by the Defendants is distinguishable because it concerned a summary judgment application for a debt recovery claim and the party seeking to file the further Affidavit had only S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 informed the Court of their intention to do so at the hearing of the summary judgment application. Court’s finding [11] Having considered the cause papers and the parties’ submissions, I find the narrowed down documents sought to be adduced are relevant and necessary to both OSs as they relate to the central issue of the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding and the purported breaches thereof. [12] I am of the respectful view that the Plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to fully ventilate his case in both OSs. In this regard, the Plaintiff had in his affidavits for the Further Affidavit Application explained although not in great detail why these documents are both relevant and necessary to the core issues in both OSs. [13] The Defendants’ posit that the Further Affidavit Application is an abuse of process because these documents ought to have been adduced in the Plaintiff’s 6 Affidavits prior to the Conversion is untenable as I accept the Plaintiff’s assertion that the affidavits in respect of both OSs were still in the midst of being exchanged prior to the Conversion after which the said documents (except for volume 11 which was not available then) were produced in Part B in the common bundles for trial. Once the appeal against the conversion to a writ action was allowed by the Court of Appeal which ordered the matters to continue and disposed by OS, the Plaintiff still wishing to rely on the said documents had no choice but to adduce them through a further affidavit, in this case through P Afft 7. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [14] In any case, I find there is no element of surprise nor prejudice occasioned to the Defendants as they will have an opportunity to reply. [15] I find it just and equitable and thus exercised my discretion to grant leave to the Plaintiff to file P Afft 7 containing the narrowed down documents only and volume 11 which was consented to. Cross Examination Applications [16] I ought to set out some basic principles on this subject. [17] First, it is settled law that the court retains an absolute discretion whether or not to allow cross-examination of a deponent on his affidavit – see as mere examples, Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189; Balwant Singh Purba v R Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3; Regional Centre for Arbitration v Ooi Beng Choo & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 383. As such, each case is to be decided on its own particular facts as “Exercises of judicial discretion are not judicial precedent because they are only authority for the facts of the particular case.” - Structural Concrete Sdn Bhd v. Wing Tiek Holdings Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 300, at 306 CA. [18] Second, the applicant for leave to cross-examine a deponent bears the legal burden to persuade the court to exercise its discretion to grant leave - in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [19] Third, the application has to be made bona fide or in good faith. In Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189, at 190, Salleh Abas FJ said: “To allow or not to allow the respondent’s application to cross-examine the appellant’s witnesses upon their affidavits, I take it, is a matter of court’s discretion. In appropriate circumstances, there is no reason why such application should be refused merely because the deponent is a foreigner living outside the jurisdiction (Re Lucas [1952] 1 All ER 102); “otherwise foreigners would have an advantage” (Strauss v Goldschmidt 8 SLR 239). It is really a matter of common sense and an elementary legal principle that a party who swears an affidavit much be prepared to stand up to it by cross- examination unless the application to cross- examine him is without just cause vexatious or motivated by desire to delay the proceedings (Allen v Allen [1894] P 239). In view of the appellant’s application for judgment under Order 32 Rule 6, I am not, however, prepared to hold the respondent’s application to cross- examine the appellant’s witnesses as being without just cause or motivated by desire to delay the proceedings or without bona fide or sham or vexatious. (emphasis added) [20] Fourth, relevancy as to disputes of the facts has to be shown to warrant cross -examination. The Court of Appeal in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (supra) stated: “[25] You can discern from the authorities referred by the parties that three prime considerations would influence the court in the exercise of its discretion to allow or disallow cross-examination on affidavit. Firstly, the truth of the averment in the affidavit must be challenged or the issues of fact identified. Secondly, cross-examination should only be allowed if the disputed fact is relevant to the issue to be decided and must be limited to that issue only. And thirdly, cross-examination would not advance the cause of justice and should be refused if there is sufficient affidavit evidence or S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 contemporaneous documents to enable the court to properly decide without the need of cross-examination. It is important to take into account all facts when considering an application for cross-examination and if it has little relevance or little weight to the issue which the judge has to decide, then cross-examination should not be permitted.” [21] Last but not least, as stated in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (supra) cross-examination must advance the cause of justice. When a conflict in affidavit evidence may be resolved by undisputed contemporaneous document, the cause of justice is not advanced. Defendants’ objections. [22] The Defendants claim there is no basis for the cross-examination of Farah on her Affidavits and Felina on the Affidavits affirmed on her behalf. CA Order dated 26.8.2021 gave liberty to apply to cross-examine deponent [23] As for the Defendants’ 1st ground of objection that cross- examination would go against the decision of the Court of Appeal setting aside the Conversion, I find no merits in this contention for the simple reason that in fact, the Court of Appeal on 26.8.2021 allowed the Conversion Appeal with liberty to the Plaintiff to apply for cross- examination. The Order reads: "1. Rayuan ini dibenarkan dan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 26.10.2018 yang menukarkan Saman Pemula bertarikh 28 September 2017 kepada tindakan Writ diketepikan dan perkara ini dikembalikan kepada Saman Pemula dengan kebebasan S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 untuk memohon untuk memeriksa balas deponen.” This Order appears at Enc. 324 p 23-25. Viva voce evidence imperative [24] As for the next ground that the Plaintiff had not identified the disputes of material facts, I find that there is more than sufficient material in the affidavits to form a basis for cross-examination. Here, the pith of the Plaintiff’s claim lay in the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding. [25] Having considered the affidavits filed by the parties and the exhibits annexed, and the submissions of the parties both oral and written, I am of the firm view that anyhow once slices it, there are disputes of facts in the Affidavits relating to the Understanding, the New Board Understanding, the breaches of these understandings and the resolutions being passed in Menara Embun and Menara Eden purportedly without DK’s knowledge, consent and/or approval so as to facilitate the said breaches. All the Defendants have denied the existence of the said Understandings and the alleged breaches thereof. In my respectful view, the controversy of facts pertaining to the truth of the allegations of fact of the alleged Understandings and breaches can only be resolved by viva voce evidence. It would be critical to ascertain the true state of affairs by resort to cross-examination. It is insufficient merely to rely on affidavits evidence alone to make a definitive determination whether there is in fact minority oppression inflicted on DK in respect of the conduct of affairs of the 2 companies. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [26] In my judgment, it would be wrong to ascribe no importance to why cross-examination is necessary. If the Plaintiff is denied leave to cross-examine Felina and Farar, as decided in Tahansan Sdn Bhd v Tay Bok Choon [1985] 1 MLJ 58, this court has to ignore the disputed averments in affidavits and, the Plaintiffs will run the risk of not being able to prove its case. In fact in the Tay Bok Choon case, the former Supreme Court held on the facts of that case, “in the face of the denial that the agreement was ever made, the trial judge should have heard oral evidence before deciding whether the alleged agreement was ever made” and the court can hear oral evidence even if no application was made under O 38 r 2(3): “Order 38 rule 2(3) of the Rules of the High Court empowers the Court to examine the deponents regardless of the absence of such application, and we agree that in this instance it should have done so.” [27] Just as in Tay Bok Choon, the Understandings and breaches here were denied by the Defendants. This need to cross examine is further exacerbated by the fact that the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding are not in writing. I hence cannot with conviction say that a decision can be made from the contemporaneous documents in the court file in order to arrive at a decision on the matters in issue. In my utmost respectful view, cross examination in this case would advance the cause of justice. [28] I find the case of Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & Ors and another application [1994] 2 MLJ 789 cited by the Defendants is to be distinguished as the court there found the matter could be decided on the undisputed contemporaneous documents in that case. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 Similarly, the case of Nasser Ali Azayez Maktoum Al Sheraifi & Ors v Affinity Heights Sdn Bhd [2018] 5 CLJ 751 is also distinguishable as the court there took the exceptional circumstances approach when considering whether to permit cross-examination of a deponent in the context of a winding up proceeding as: (i) it is a primary rule that petitions for winding up are heard on affidavit evidence; (ii) the Companies Act 1965 and the Companies Winding-up Rules 1972 do not expressly provide for a similar right to apply for the cross-examination of the affidavits as found in the RC 2012; (iii) it is public policy that a winding up petition be heard expeditiously. Cross-examination of non deponent [29] As for cross-examination of Felina in respect of affidavits affirmed on her behalf by TSMK, the Defendants contend the Plaintiff’s application to cross - examine her as a non-deponent is irrational, vexatious, misconceived and an abuse of process. The Defendants posited that Order 38 rule 2(2) ROC 2012 applies only to the cross examination of deponents of affidavits. It was pointed out that the Court of Appeal in Kumar Jaspal Quah did not agree with Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [30] In Gomez v. Gomez, Raja Azlan Shah J (later Lord President and HRH Sultan of Perak) allowed the cross-examination of a priest who had given a letter which was annexed as an exhibit to the Wife’s custody affidavit owing to conflicting evidence concerning the capability of either parent to look after the welfare of the child based on religious ground. In allowing the application, His Lordship stated: “In the present case there is only 1 issue, that is, the issue in the pending action which is whether the order can be varied. The matter raised in the three affidavits are all matters relating to the action. The applicant complains that the respondent is no longer a fit and proper person to have custody of the child. The respondent says that she is still capable of looking after the child’s religion and moral upbringing. The Rev Father wood supports her. It is the same as if he has sworn an affidavit to that effect. It is only fair and proper that the appellant be allowed to cross-examine them on their affidavits.” [31] His Royal Highness considered: 31.1 O. 38 r. 1 of the then Rules of the Supreme Court 1957 (which is similar the present O. 38 r. 2(3) ROC 2012) stated: “The power given by O. 38 r. 1 is obviously a matter of discretion to be exercised in accordance with well known judicial principles.” 31.2 And approved the following passage from Leiserach v. Schalit [1934] 2 KB 353 where leave was granted to 2 arbitrators, who were not parties nor had they affirmed any affidavits, to be called as witnesses to assist the Court to ascertain the facts of the case: S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 “This is a case in which the Court has listened to numerous, affidavits, statements in some of which directly contradict the statements in others. It is also a case in which it is essential, in order to do justice, that the Court should be enabled to make up its mind as to the actual facts of the case. In the view of the Court this is an exceptional case, and in this exceptional case the Court has arrived at the conclusion that the only way in which it can satisfactorily deal with the matter before it is by having the assistance of the evidence of the arbitrators, who, being independent persons, can tell the Court what it is to ascertain from a perusal of the affidavits on one side and the other - namely, what are the essential facts of the case. On that ground and on that ground only the Court accedes to the application to call as witnesses both the gentlemen who acted as arbitrators in the matter”. [32] Gomez v. Gomez was cited with approval in the following cases: 32.1 In Balwant Singh Purba v. R. Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3 by Lim Beng Choon J: “In the circumstances Raja Azlan Shah J (as His Royal Highness then was) quite rightly allowed cross-examination on the respondent’s affidavit since the issue in the action before His Lordship was whether the custody of the child should be given to the applicant or the respondent in view of the conflicting evidence concerning the capability of either parent to look after the welfare of the child based on religious ground.” 32.2 In Paul Raj Samy Anthony v. Annamalar Anthonysamy [2003] 3 CLJ 166 where R K Nathan J stated: “Azlan Shah J (as his Highness then was) in a short but erudite judgment decided that O. 38 r. 2(3) of the RHC must be interpreted S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 to also include the makers of the exhibits who would be subjected to cross-examination.” [33] In Messrs Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah v Dato’ Peh Teck Quee [2003] 5 MLJ 241, Mohd Hishamudin J (later JCA) however held that under O. 38 r. 2(3) “A party to a proceeding cannot apply to cross-examine a person if in the first place such person has not given any evidence either in the form of oral evidence or in the form of affidavit evidence. For, in the absence of such prior evidence, there is no material on which to cross- examine.” [34] On a literal interpretation, Order 38 rule 2(2) ROC 2012 empowers the Court to order the attendance for cross-examination of “the person making any such affidavit.” [35] With respect, here Felina’ has given evidence – the affidavits affirmed by her now late father, were also affirmed by him also on her behalf. She can be cross-examined when one applies the overriding interest of justice concept to enable Courts to deal with cases justly. In fact, Order 1A and Order 2 Rule 1 of the ROC 2012 exhorts the court in administering the Rules particularly here when the alleged Understandings are not in writing, to have regard to the overriding interest of justice and not only to the technical noncompliance with the Rules. These 2 orders give the Court wide powers in order to do justice. [36] I have also borne in mind the terse reminder of Mohtar Abdullah FCJ in Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385, at page 426: S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 “… Rules are rules! They must be obeyed. Numerous judgments can be cited in support of this firm stand on the necessity for a strict adherence of the rules. I agree. However, a judge should not be so besotted by the rules that his sense of justice and fairness becomes impaired because of his blinkered fixation on technicalities of the law and the cold letter of the law …” (emphasis added) [37] Although the Court of Appeal in a separate case in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487 did not agree with Gomez v Gomez, with respect, I find a close reading of the case shows the Court of Appeal only disagreed with Gomez v Gomez on the aspect of the onus – which is on the respondent to show why cross-examination should not be allowed. [38] On my part, I have decided to follow the Gomez v Gomez principles on cross-examining a non deponent so that all relevant evidence available is adduced before the court and for. In the present case, it is also be noted TMSK has passed away and can no longer be cross-examined on the 2 affidavits filed but which were adopted by Felina as her evidence. No delay [39] In Indrani a/p Rajaratnam & Ors v Fairview Schools Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 56; at 62, the application for cross-examination was dismissed owing to delay. Here the Defendants argued that the present application is filed for an improper purpose – that it is merely a strategy by DK to delay the hearing of the OSs to its conclusion. Nevertheless, I find there is no S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 delay here as the application here was made on 10.9.2021 i.e. 2 weeks after the Court of Appeal allowed the Conversion appeal. Res judicata? [40] The Defendants’ final point of contention is that my findings in the Setia Haruman OS that there was no Understanding and New Board Understanding constitutes res judicata in respect of both OSs. [41] In the Setia Haruman OS, in Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 1508, I stated: “[38] I find that the said “Understanding” and/or “New Board Understanding were made between two non-members of the Company. As such DK’s complaint is not a complaint member qua member pursuant to the Shareholders’ Agreement and/or the Articles of Association… [66] Moreover, the principle in Jet-Tech (supra) was affirmed by the Federal Court in Looh Siong Chee…“Shareholder’s Agreement and breaches of the same are clearly not matters pertaining to the affairs of the company. They are private matters enforceable by the parties to the Shareholder’s Agreement. “Following these cases, DK’s complaints that he was not nominated by the 10th Defendant to be a director of the Company is best addressed in suit KLHC WA-22NCC-500-08/2018.” [42] Added to that, the Federal Court in dismissing Impressive Circuit’s application for leave to appeal against my decision in the Setia Haruman OS said, as evident from the minutes: “Finally, we do not see merit in the contention that the findings in this suit will prejudice the hearing of the remaining two suits.” S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [43] Thus, I do not feel disposed to adjudge on this point of res judicata at this juncture; issues on the Understanding and New Board Understanding which were personal to DK and TSMK are better pursued in both OSs as DK and TSMK are registered members of Menara Embun and Menara Eden. Whilst there is a common issue of the “Understanding” and “New Board Understanding” between the Plaintiff and TMSK in all 3 Actions, Impresive Circuit as the plaintiff in the Setia Haruman OS is not a party in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs, UEM Land Berhad and Virtual Path Sdn Bhd who are the shareholders of Setia Haruman and the four (4) Directors of Setia Haruman all named as defendants in the Setia Haruman OS are not parties in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs. In my utmost respectful view, the complaint of oppression in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs should be heard and decided separately on their own facts and evidence. Whether or not there was oppression in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs was for DK to prove; and any decision thereafter must be based strictly on the best evidence presented by DK and the defence if any put up by the Defendants. [44] I thus conclude that on the facts of the OSs, in the interest of doing substantive justice, it is appropriate to allow cross examination on the issue of the Understanding, the New Board Understanding, the breaches of these understandings and the resolutions being passed in Menara Embun and Menara Eden purportedly without DK’s knowledge, consent and/or approval to facilitate the said breaches. I find DK ought to be given the opportunity to fully ventilate his case and he has discharged the onus on why cross-examination should be ordered. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [45] Consequently, leave in enc. 286 (OS 410 ) and enc. 272 (OS 411) is given to DK to cross examine (1) Farah Mahami Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal (NRIC No. 820512-14-5662) on the contents of the two (2) Affidavits she had affirmed on 28.11.2017 and 25.4.2018 and filed in these proceedings; (ii) Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal (NRIC No. 701201-10-6138) on the contents of the two (2) Affidavits affirmed on her behalf on 25.4.2018 and 7.6.2018 and filed in these proceedings, with costs subject to allocator. Dated: 22nd October 2023 - sgd - ……………………….. Liza Chan Sow Keng Judge High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff : Mr Gopal Sreenevasan (together with him, Shermaljit Singh) Messrs Owee & Co For the 1st & 5th : Eric Clement Defendants Messrs Abd Halim Ushah & Assoc. For the 2nd, 3rd & 4th : Dato M. Pathmanathan (together with him, Defendants Shirin Pathmanathan and Fatin Muzfirah) Messrs M Pathmanathan & Co. CASES REFERRED: L.K Insulation Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Apex Energy Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 733 Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] SGCA 47 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Tob Chee Hoong v Tob Chee Choong [2017] MLJU 1303 Datuk Kasi Palaniappan & Anor v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 32 Thavanathan a/l Balasubramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 MLJ 401 Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189 Balwant Singh Purba v R Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3 Regional Centre for Arbitration v Ooi Beng Choo & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 383 Structural Concrete Sdn Bhd v. Wing Tiek Holdings Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 300 Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487 Tahansan Sdn Bhd v Tay Bok Choon - [1985] 1 MLJ 58 Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & Ors and another application [1994] 2 MLJ 789 Nasser Ali Azayez Maktoum Al Sheraifi & Ors v Affinity Heights Sdn Bhd [2018] 5 CLJ 751 Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228 Paul Raj Samy Anthony v. Annamalar Anthonysamy [2003] 3 CLJ 166 Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385 Messrs Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah v Dato’ Peh Teck Quee [2003] 5 MLJ 241 Indrani a/p Rajaratnam & Ors v Fairview Schools Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 56 Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 1508 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 STATUTE/LEGISLATION REFERRED: Order 1A and Order 2 Rule 1, Order 38 rule 2(2) and 2(3) Rules of Court 2012 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-411-09/2017	43,149	Tika 2.6.0
WA-24NCC-410-09/2017	PEMOHON Datuk Kasi A/L K.L. Palaniappan RESPONDEN 1. ) Menara Embun Sdn Bhd 2. ) PB Trustee Services Berhad (Wasi Bagi Harta Pusaka Allahyarmah Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal Bin Haji Abu Bakar No. K/P: 490318-08-5599) 3. ) Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal 4. ) MKN Holdings Sdn Bhd 5. ) Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd	Civil procedure — Affidavits — plaintiff sought leave to (i) file further affidavit; (ii) to cross examine deponent and non deponent on their affidavits / affirmed on their behalf — Whether filing of further affidavit should be allowed — Whether oral evidence through cross-examination should be taken — Whether court could order the attendance of non deponent for cross-examination under O. 38 r. 2(3) ROC 2012 Rules of Court 2012	31/10/2023	YA Puan Liza Chan Sow Keng	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1b254ee0-467f-4c1c-98b8-f4d151234d91&Inline=true	IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 In the matter of Menara Embun Sdn. Bhd. (Company No.: 428618-M) And In the matter of Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 And In the matter of Orders 7 and 88 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN DATUK KASI A/L K L PALANIAPPAN (I/C No.: 581025-10-6855) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. MENARA EMBUN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 428618-M) 2. PB TRUSTEE SERVICES BERHAD (Company No.: 196801000374 (7968-T)) (The Executor Of The Estate Of The Late TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL BIN HAJI ABU BAKAR (I/C No.: 490318-08-5599)) 3. FELINA BINTI TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL (I/C No.: 701201-10-6138) 4. MKN HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 91625-P) 5. SETIA HARUMAN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 425145-U) … DEFENDANTS [Heard together with the following Originating Summons pursuant to the Order dated 3.12.2019] 31/10/2023 11:47:31 WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 Kand. 448 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-411-09/2017 In the matter of Modern Eden Sdn Bhd. (Company No.: 623037-H) And In the matter of Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 And In the matter of Orders 7 and 88 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN DATUK KASI A/L K L PALANIAPPAN (I/C No.: 581025-10-6855) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. MODERN EDEN SDN BHD. (Company No.: 623037-H) 2. PB TRUSTEE SERVICES BERHAD (Company No.: 196801000374 (7968-T)) (The Executor Of The Estate Of The Late TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL BIN HAJI ABU BAKAR (I/C No.: 490318-08-5599)) 3. FELINA BINTI TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL (I/C No.: 701201-10-6138) 4. MKN HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 91625-P) 5. SETIA HARUMAN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 425145-U) … DEFENDANTS S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] There are 4 applications made by the Plaintiff before the court: 1.1 Enclosure (“Enc.”) 290 in Originating Summons WA- 24NCC-410-09/2017 (“Menara Embun OS”) and Enc. 271 in Originating Summons WA-24NCC-411-09/2017 (“Modern Eden OS”) seeking for the Plaintiff’s further Affidavit affirmed on 10.09.2021 (“P afft 7”) to adduce 12 volumes of documents be admitted in evidence for Both OS (“Further Affidavit Application”); and 1.2 Enc. 286 in the Menara Embun OS and Enc. 272 in the Modern Eden OS that the Plaintiff be granted leave to cross-examine, through counsel, Farah Mahami Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal on her Affidavits and Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal on the Affidavits affirmed on her behalf (“Cross Examination Application”). [2] I had allowed the applications on 5.9.2023. These are the reasons for my decisions. As the applications were related, it is convenient to deal with all 4 applications in one judgment. Background [3] The Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS were filed by the Plaintiff, Datuk Kasi a/l Palaniappan (“DK”) pursuant to Section 346 of the Companies Act, 2016 (“CA 2016”) complaining of minority oppression in S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 respect of the affairs of Menara Embun Sdn Bhd and Modern Eden Sdn Bhd respectively. [4] DK together with one Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd also commenced another minority oppression claim in respect of Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd vide Originating Summons No. WA-24NCC-290- 07/2017 (“Setia Haruman OS”). In the Setia Haruman OS, DK was struck out as a Plaintiff on 25.4.2018 as he was not a shareholder of Setia Haruman. DK however owns 50% of the shares in Impresive Circuit. The Setia Haruman OS was heard and eventually dismissed by me on 25.06.2021. The Court of Appeal had affirmed the decision on 20.1.2023. Impresive Circuit’s leave application to appeal to the Federal Court was dismissed by the Federal Court on 15.8.2023. [5] The Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS were converted into writ actions by Wong Chee Lin J but both had reverted back to OS actions after the 2nd to 4th Defendants’ appeals to the Court of Appeal was allowed on 26.08.2021 and the Plaintiff’s applications for leave to appeal to the Federal Court were dismissed on 21.2.2022. [6] In each of the 3 OS Actions, Tan Sri Mustapha Kamal (“TSMK”) was named as the 2nd Defendant. The Plaintiff’s complaints in the 3 OS Actions are that alleged oppressive acts were carried out in breach of an alleged Understanding, New Board Understanding that DK allegedly had with TSMK and DK’s legitimate expectation to participate in the management of Setia Haruman, Menara Embun and Modern Eden. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 The Further Affidavit Applications [7] Via P Afft 7, the Plaintiff seeks to adduce 12 volumes of documents as follows: a) Volumes 1 to 3 - documents exhibited in the earlier affidavits in these proceedings; b) Volume 4 - documents related to Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd; c) Volumes 5 to 9 - documents pertaining to 15 other companies and Setia Haruman; d) Volume 10 - documents pertaining to the affairs of several companies which existed before the incorporation of the 1st Defendant; e) Volume 11 - the notes of proceedings of the cross examination of TSMK, Azmy and THP in the Setia Haruman OS from 17th to 19th March 2021(which the 2nd to 4th Defendants have no objection); f) Volume 12 - document included by the 2nd to 4th Defendants to rebut the documents filed by the Plaintiff in volumes 4 to 10 for purposes of trial. [8] The documents sought to be adduced has since been narrowed down to volumes 1 to 3, 5 to 9 (except 1 document in volume 8 being the Certified True Copy of Form 13 A of MK Land by the Companies S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Commission of Malaysia, and volume 11 which was admitted by consent as these notes of proceedings are relevant but were not available earlier. [9] 2nd to 4th Defendants objections may be summarised as follows: 9.1 That the documents sought to be introduced concern other companies/joint ventures and Setia Haruman which are irrelevant documents; 9.2 These documents are sought to be adduced after the dismissal of the Setia Haruman OS. It is a belated attempt by the Plaintiff to cure the shortfalls of the Setia Haruman OS and an attempt to have a 2nd bite at the cherry; 9.3 Prior to the conversion, the Plaintiff had filed 6 affidavits in support of the Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS (“the OSs”). These documents were available to the Plaintiff at the time of filing of the OSs in 2017 and the exchange of affidavits; There was no explanation as to relevance and why these documents were not exhibited in the earlier affidavits citing in support of their arguments L.K Insulation Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Apex Energy Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 733: “[10] At any rate the reason given is not cogent enough: that of wanting to file a further affidavit. Generally only 3 affidavits are allowed for an application: an affidavit in support, an affidavit in opposition and a further affidavit in reply to that affidavit in opposition. Unless there are cogent reasons for affirming a further affidavit as in the documents that were sought to be referred to were not available previously or that what has been referred to in the last S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 affidavit filed is a lie, courts generally would not allow further affidavits to be filed. Otherwise there would be no end to affidavits filed because, human nature being what it is, everyone wants to have the final and last word! Therefore if in an affidavit in reply there is more than a reply to the affidavit filed in opposition, I would disregard the new matters raised which should have been raised in the affidavit in support.” (counsel’s emphasis) [10] The Plaintiff argued that: 10.1 The Plaintiff had in its Affidavits (Afft 7 Para 12) and Afft 8 Para 7 explained the contents of the documents as well as shown how these documents are both relevant and necessary to the core issues in both OSs i.e. the relationship between DK and TSMK, the Understanding, the New Board Understanding as well as the breaches of these understandings; 10.2 the documents relating to DK’s and TSMK’s various joint ventures are necessary and relevant to the manner in which DK and TSMK would run their joint ventures which include Menara Embun and Menara Eden; 10.3 The documents relating to Setia Haruman are necessary and relevant because the conduct at Setia Haruman affected DK’s participation in Menara Embun and Menara Eden. In this regard, the term “affairs of the company” in Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 is to be widely construed such that it includes the affairs of various S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 companies where such affairs are all closely connected e.g. parent and subsidiary companies citing in support: (i) Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] SGCA 47: “[42] We think that the approach adopted in the above cited cases is sound and we also agree that, in the final analysis, the question that must be answered in this regard is whether the affairs of the subsidiary affect or impact the holding company: Lim Chee Twang at [97]. Legitimate claims for relief from oppression should not be defeated by technical and legalistic objections relating to the company's shareholding structure; at the same time the doctrine of separate legal personalities and the strict words of the statute ("the affairs of the company" [emphasis added]) must be respected. In our view, the balance between these competing interests would be properly drawn by a requirement that commercially unfair conduct in the management of a subsidiary would be relevant so long and to the extent that such conduct affected or impacted the holding company whose member was the party claiming relief from oppression. The purpose and policy behind s 216 of the Companies Act is, above all, to grant relief from the oppressive behaviour to shareholders who would otherwise be unable to stop that abuse: see below at [49]. If the affairs of the subsidiary do not affect or impact the holding company, shareholders and members of the latter could hardly complain that their interests were therefore prejudiced.” (ii) Tob Chee Hoong v Tob Chee Choong [2017] MLJU 1303: “[50] I would respectfully follow this observation and rule that in this country, similarly, the phrase ‘affairs of the company’ S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 found in Section 181(1) of the CA (and the new but identically worded Section 346(1) of the Companies Act 2016) should be construed widely, to encompass the affairs of entities which are not themselves the subject of the oppression action, but which affairs of those entities, affect the subject company in the nature and to the extent which is beyond the inconsequential, be it a parent or a subsidiary. … [54] This provide much support to a wide reading of ‘affairs of the company’ which is wholly in line with the design of the law to ensure that in circumstances where oppressive conduct could be proven, legal redress to those unlawfully aggrieved is available and not impeded by the artificiality or in the complexity of corporate structures. Otherwise, wrongdoers in corporate world would be encouraged to strategize and build upon more complex conglomerate-like structures and perpetuate such unlawful and oppressive conduct in a fashion orchestrated to defeat the application of Section 181 (1) (Section 346 (1) of the Companies Act 2016), and almost literally employing the section as an engine of fraud. The law will fail in its true objective and the ends of justice will be far from being served if such a grim scenario is allowed to transpire, if not already manifest and flourishing.” (iii) That this principle is applicable to Setia Haruman, Menara Embun and Menara Eden was recognised by Azizul Azmi J when he heard the striking out applications in the Setia Haruman OS where DK was struck out as a Plaintiff but Impresive Circuit was allowed to continue pursuing the claim in Datuk Kasi S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Palaniappan & Anor v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 32: “[14] …Tob’s case established the principle that the expression ‘affairs of the company’ in s 346(1)(a) is to be construed widely, and would encompass oppressive conduct that is conducted at a subsidiary or a holding company. [15] While I fully agree with the ratio of the decision of Mohd Nazlan J in Tob’s case… … [18] He (DK) would have been perfectly entitled to allege, based on the principle in Tob’s case, that he was being oppressed at Menara Embun or Modern Eden by virtue of acts conducted at Setia Haruman. This is because the acts carried out at the Setia Haruman would amount to affairs of Menara Embun and/or Modern Eden. In my judgment, it makes no difference that Setia Haruman is not a subsidiary of either Menara Embun or Modern Eden. It suffices that either company holds shares in Setia Haruman, for conduct carried out at Setia Haruman to be the subject of a complaint of oppression at either Menara Embun or Modern Eden.” 10.4 P Afft 7 seeks to produce documents comprised previously in Part B of the Common Bundle of documents to enable the Plaintiff to discharge its burden to prove the Understanding, the New Board Understanding or the breaches of these understandings which amounted to oppressive acts against the Plaintiff; Having been produced in the Common bundles for trial, there is no surprise to the Defendants, the documents are admissible S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 whether the matter is tried as a writ action or an originating summons citing in support the case of Thavanathan a/l Balasubramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 MLJ 401, that all “evidence which is sufficiently relevant to the facts in issue is admissible”; 10.5 Both OSs are oppression claims which concern various complex factual and legal issues. To limit the Affidavits in such a case to only an Affidavit in support by the Plaintiff, one Affidavit in reply by the Defendant and then an Affidavit in reply by the Plaintiff as suggested by the Defendants would not lead to a just and effectual determination of both OSs. This is more so when the Defendants themselves have filed multiple Affidavits instead of subscribing to their own contention of Defendants only filing a single Affidavit in reply; 10.6 the Affidavits in respect of both OSs were still in the midst of being exchanged prior to the Conversion and once the Conversion was ordered, documents intended to be relied on by parties had to be adduced through the CBODs instead of further Affidavits; the Plaintiff had filed the Further Affidavit in both OSs to adduce the documents within 2 weeks of the Conversion being set aside by the Court of Appeal and well in advance of any hearing date of both OSs; L K Insulation Engineering relied upon by the Defendants is distinguishable because it concerned a summary judgment application for a debt recovery claim and the party seeking to file the further Affidavit had only S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 informed the Court of their intention to do so at the hearing of the summary judgment application. Court’s finding [11] Having considered the cause papers and the parties’ submissions, I find the narrowed down documents sought to be adduced are relevant and necessary to both OSs as they relate to the central issue of the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding and the purported breaches thereof. [12] I am of the respectful view that the Plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to fully ventilate his case in both OSs. In this regard, the Plaintiff had in his affidavits for the Further Affidavit Application explained although not in great detail why these documents are both relevant and necessary to the core issues in both OSs. [13] The Defendants’ posit that the Further Affidavit Application is an abuse of process because these documents ought to have been adduced in the Plaintiff’s 6 Affidavits prior to the Conversion is untenable as I accept the Plaintiff’s assertion that the affidavits in respect of both OSs were still in the midst of being exchanged prior to the Conversion after which the said documents (except for volume 11 which was not available then) were produced in Part B in the common bundles for trial. Once the appeal against the conversion to a writ action was allowed by the Court of Appeal which ordered the matters to continue and disposed by OS, the Plaintiff still wishing to rely on the said documents had no choice but to adduce them through a further affidavit, in this case through P Afft 7. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [14] In any case, I find there is no element of surprise nor prejudice occasioned to the Defendants as they will have an opportunity to reply. [15] I find it just and equitable and thus exercised my discretion to grant leave to the Plaintiff to file P Afft 7 containing the narrowed down documents only and volume 11 which was consented to. Cross Examination Applications [16] I ought to set out some basic principles on this subject. [17] First, it is settled law that the court retains an absolute discretion whether or not to allow cross-examination of a deponent on his affidavit – see as mere examples, Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189; Balwant Singh Purba v R Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3; Regional Centre for Arbitration v Ooi Beng Choo & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 383. As such, each case is to be decided on its own particular facts as “Exercises of judicial discretion are not judicial precedent because they are only authority for the facts of the particular case.” - Structural Concrete Sdn Bhd v. Wing Tiek Holdings Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 300, at 306 CA. [18] Second, the applicant for leave to cross-examine a deponent bears the legal burden to persuade the court to exercise its discretion to grant leave - in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [19] Third, the application has to be made bona fide or in good faith. In Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189, at 190, Salleh Abas FJ said: “To allow or not to allow the respondent’s application to cross-examine the appellant’s witnesses upon their affidavits, I take it, is a matter of court’s discretion. In appropriate circumstances, there is no reason why such application should be refused merely because the deponent is a foreigner living outside the jurisdiction (Re Lucas [1952] 1 All ER 102); “otherwise foreigners would have an advantage” (Strauss v Goldschmidt 8 SLR 239). It is really a matter of common sense and an elementary legal principle that a party who swears an affidavit much be prepared to stand up to it by cross- examination unless the application to cross- examine him is without just cause vexatious or motivated by desire to delay the proceedings (Allen v Allen [1894] P 239). In view of the appellant’s application for judgment under Order 32 Rule 6, I am not, however, prepared to hold the respondent’s application to cross- examine the appellant’s witnesses as being without just cause or motivated by desire to delay the proceedings or without bona fide or sham or vexatious. (emphasis added) [20] Fourth, relevancy as to disputes of the facts has to be shown to warrant cross -examination. The Court of Appeal in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (supra) stated: “[25] You can discern from the authorities referred by the parties that three prime considerations would influence the court in the exercise of its discretion to allow or disallow cross-examination on affidavit. Firstly, the truth of the averment in the affidavit must be challenged or the issues of fact identified. Secondly, cross-examination should only be allowed if the disputed fact is relevant to the issue to be decided and must be limited to that issue only. And thirdly, cross-examination would not advance the cause of justice and should be refused if there is sufficient affidavit evidence or S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 contemporaneous documents to enable the court to properly decide without the need of cross-examination. It is important to take into account all facts when considering an application for cross-examination and if it has little relevance or little weight to the issue which the judge has to decide, then cross-examination should not be permitted.” [21] Last but not least, as stated in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (supra) cross-examination must advance the cause of justice. When a conflict in affidavit evidence may be resolved by undisputed contemporaneous document, the cause of justice is not advanced. Defendants’ objections. [22] The Defendants claim there is no basis for the cross-examination of Farah on her Affidavits and Felina on the Affidavits affirmed on her behalf. CA Order dated 26.8.2021 gave liberty to apply to cross-examine deponent [23] As for the Defendants’ 1st ground of objection that cross- examination would go against the decision of the Court of Appeal setting aside the Conversion, I find no merits in this contention for the simple reason that in fact, the Court of Appeal on 26.8.2021 allowed the Conversion Appeal with liberty to the Plaintiff to apply for cross- examination. The Order reads: "1. Rayuan ini dibenarkan dan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 26.10.2018 yang menukarkan Saman Pemula bertarikh 28 September 2017 kepada tindakan Writ diketepikan dan perkara ini dikembalikan kepada Saman Pemula dengan kebebasan S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 untuk memohon untuk memeriksa balas deponen.” This Order appears at Enc. 324 p 23-25. Viva voce evidence imperative [24] As for the next ground that the Plaintiff had not identified the disputes of material facts, I find that there is more than sufficient material in the affidavits to form a basis for cross-examination. Here, the pith of the Plaintiff’s claim lay in the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding. [25] Having considered the affidavits filed by the parties and the exhibits annexed, and the submissions of the parties both oral and written, I am of the firm view that anyhow once slices it, there are disputes of facts in the Affidavits relating to the Understanding, the New Board Understanding, the breaches of these understandings and the resolutions being passed in Menara Embun and Menara Eden purportedly without DK’s knowledge, consent and/or approval so as to facilitate the said breaches. All the Defendants have denied the existence of the said Understandings and the alleged breaches thereof. In my respectful view, the controversy of facts pertaining to the truth of the allegations of fact of the alleged Understandings and breaches can only be resolved by viva voce evidence. It would be critical to ascertain the true state of affairs by resort to cross-examination. It is insufficient merely to rely on affidavits evidence alone to make a definitive determination whether there is in fact minority oppression inflicted on DK in respect of the conduct of affairs of the 2 companies. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [26] In my judgment, it would be wrong to ascribe no importance to why cross-examination is necessary. If the Plaintiff is denied leave to cross-examine Felina and Farar, as decided in Tahansan Sdn Bhd v Tay Bok Choon [1985] 1 MLJ 58, this court has to ignore the disputed averments in affidavits and, the Plaintiffs will run the risk of not being able to prove its case. In fact in the Tay Bok Choon case, the former Supreme Court held on the facts of that case, “in the face of the denial that the agreement was ever made, the trial judge should have heard oral evidence before deciding whether the alleged agreement was ever made” and the court can hear oral evidence even if no application was made under O 38 r 2(3): “Order 38 rule 2(3) of the Rules of the High Court empowers the Court to examine the deponents regardless of the absence of such application, and we agree that in this instance it should have done so.” [27] Just as in Tay Bok Choon, the Understandings and breaches here were denied by the Defendants. This need to cross examine is further exacerbated by the fact that the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding are not in writing. I hence cannot with conviction say that a decision can be made from the contemporaneous documents in the court file in order to arrive at a decision on the matters in issue. In my utmost respectful view, cross examination in this case would advance the cause of justice. [28] I find the case of Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & Ors and another application [1994] 2 MLJ 789 cited by the Defendants is to be distinguished as the court there found the matter could be decided on the undisputed contemporaneous documents in that case. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 Similarly, the case of Nasser Ali Azayez Maktoum Al Sheraifi & Ors v Affinity Heights Sdn Bhd [2018] 5 CLJ 751 is also distinguishable as the court there took the exceptional circumstances approach when considering whether to permit cross-examination of a deponent in the context of a winding up proceeding as: (i) it is a primary rule that petitions for winding up are heard on affidavit evidence; (ii) the Companies Act 1965 and the Companies Winding-up Rules 1972 do not expressly provide for a similar right to apply for the cross-examination of the affidavits as found in the RC 2012; (iii) it is public policy that a winding up petition be heard expeditiously. Cross-examination of non deponent [29] As for cross-examination of Felina in respect of affidavits affirmed on her behalf by TSMK, the Defendants contend the Plaintiff’s application to cross - examine her as a non-deponent is irrational, vexatious, misconceived and an abuse of process. The Defendants posited that Order 38 rule 2(2) ROC 2012 applies only to the cross examination of deponents of affidavits. It was pointed out that the Court of Appeal in Kumar Jaspal Quah did not agree with Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [30] In Gomez v. Gomez, Raja Azlan Shah J (later Lord President and HRH Sultan of Perak) allowed the cross-examination of a priest who had given a letter which was annexed as an exhibit to the Wife’s custody affidavit owing to conflicting evidence concerning the capability of either parent to look after the welfare of the child based on religious ground. In allowing the application, His Lordship stated: “In the present case there is only 1 issue, that is, the issue in the pending action which is whether the order can be varied. The matter raised in the three affidavits are all matters relating to the action. The applicant complains that the respondent is no longer a fit and proper person to have custody of the child. The respondent says that she is still capable of looking after the child’s religion and moral upbringing. The Rev Father wood supports her. It is the same as if he has sworn an affidavit to that effect. It is only fair and proper that the appellant be allowed to cross-examine them on their affidavits.” [31] His Royal Highness considered: 31.1 O. 38 r. 1 of the then Rules of the Supreme Court 1957 (which is similar the present O. 38 r. 2(3) ROC 2012) stated: “The power given by O. 38 r. 1 is obviously a matter of discretion to be exercised in accordance with well known judicial principles.” 31.2 And approved the following passage from Leiserach v. Schalit [1934] 2 KB 353 where leave was granted to 2 arbitrators, who were not parties nor had they affirmed any affidavits, to be called as witnesses to assist the Court to ascertain the facts of the case: S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 “This is a case in which the Court has listened to numerous, affidavits, statements in some of which directly contradict the statements in others. It is also a case in which it is essential, in order to do justice, that the Court should be enabled to make up its mind as to the actual facts of the case. In the view of the Court this is an exceptional case, and in this exceptional case the Court has arrived at the conclusion that the only way in which it can satisfactorily deal with the matter before it is by having the assistance of the evidence of the arbitrators, who, being independent persons, can tell the Court what it is to ascertain from a perusal of the affidavits on one side and the other - namely, what are the essential facts of the case. On that ground and on that ground only the Court accedes to the application to call as witnesses both the gentlemen who acted as arbitrators in the matter”. [32] Gomez v. Gomez was cited with approval in the following cases: 32.1 In Balwant Singh Purba v. R. Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3 by Lim Beng Choon J: “In the circumstances Raja Azlan Shah J (as His Royal Highness then was) quite rightly allowed cross-examination on the respondent’s affidavit since the issue in the action before His Lordship was whether the custody of the child should be given to the applicant or the respondent in view of the conflicting evidence concerning the capability of either parent to look after the welfare of the child based on religious ground.” 32.2 In Paul Raj Samy Anthony v. Annamalar Anthonysamy [2003] 3 CLJ 166 where R K Nathan J stated: “Azlan Shah J (as his Highness then was) in a short but erudite judgment decided that O. 38 r. 2(3) of the RHC must be interpreted S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 to also include the makers of the exhibits who would be subjected to cross-examination.” [33] In Messrs Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah v Dato’ Peh Teck Quee [2003] 5 MLJ 241, Mohd Hishamudin J (later JCA) however held that under O. 38 r. 2(3) “A party to a proceeding cannot apply to cross-examine a person if in the first place such person has not given any evidence either in the form of oral evidence or in the form of affidavit evidence. For, in the absence of such prior evidence, there is no material on which to cross- examine.” [34] On a literal interpretation, Order 38 rule 2(2) ROC 2012 empowers the Court to order the attendance for cross-examination of “the person making any such affidavit.” [35] With respect, here Felina’ has given evidence – the affidavits affirmed by her now late father, were also affirmed by him also on her behalf. She can be cross-examined when one applies the overriding interest of justice concept to enable Courts to deal with cases justly. In fact, Order 1A and Order 2 Rule 1 of the ROC 2012 exhorts the court in administering the Rules particularly here when the alleged Understandings are not in writing, to have regard to the overriding interest of justice and not only to the technical noncompliance with the Rules. These 2 orders give the Court wide powers in order to do justice. [36] I have also borne in mind the terse reminder of Mohtar Abdullah FCJ in Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385, at page 426: S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 “… Rules are rules! They must be obeyed. Numerous judgments can be cited in support of this firm stand on the necessity for a strict adherence of the rules. I agree. However, a judge should not be so besotted by the rules that his sense of justice and fairness becomes impaired because of his blinkered fixation on technicalities of the law and the cold letter of the law …” (emphasis added) [37] Although the Court of Appeal in a separate case in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487 did not agree with Gomez v Gomez, with respect, I find a close reading of the case shows the Court of Appeal only disagreed with Gomez v Gomez on the aspect of the onus – which is on the respondent to show why cross-examination should not be allowed. [38] On my part, I have decided to follow the Gomez v Gomez principles on cross-examining a non deponent so that all relevant evidence available is adduced before the court and for. In the present case, it is also be noted TMSK has passed away and can no longer be cross-examined on the 2 affidavits filed but which were adopted by Felina as her evidence. No delay [39] In Indrani a/p Rajaratnam & Ors v Fairview Schools Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 56; at 62, the application for cross-examination was dismissed owing to delay. Here the Defendants argued that the present application is filed for an improper purpose – that it is merely a strategy by DK to delay the hearing of the OSs to its conclusion. Nevertheless, I find there is no S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 delay here as the application here was made on 10.9.2021 i.e. 2 weeks after the Court of Appeal allowed the Conversion appeal. Res judicata? [40] The Defendants’ final point of contention is that my findings in the Setia Haruman OS that there was no Understanding and New Board Understanding constitutes res judicata in respect of both OSs. [41] In the Setia Haruman OS, in Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 1508, I stated: “[38] I find that the said “Understanding” and/or “New Board Understanding were made between two non-members of the Company. As such DK’s complaint is not a complaint member qua member pursuant to the Shareholders’ Agreement and/or the Articles of Association… [66] Moreover, the principle in Jet-Tech (supra) was affirmed by the Federal Court in Looh Siong Chee…“Shareholder’s Agreement and breaches of the same are clearly not matters pertaining to the affairs of the company. They are private matters enforceable by the parties to the Shareholder’s Agreement. “Following these cases, DK’s complaints that he was not nominated by the 10th Defendant to be a director of the Company is best addressed in suit KLHC WA-22NCC-500-08/2018.” [42] Added to that, the Federal Court in dismissing Impressive Circuit’s application for leave to appeal against my decision in the Setia Haruman OS said, as evident from the minutes: “Finally, we do not see merit in the contention that the findings in this suit will prejudice the hearing of the remaining two suits.” S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [43] Thus, I do not feel disposed to adjudge on this point of res judicata at this juncture; issues on the Understanding and New Board Understanding which were personal to DK and TSMK are better pursued in both OSs as DK and TSMK are registered members of Menara Embun and Menara Eden. Whilst there is a common issue of the “Understanding” and “New Board Understanding” between the Plaintiff and TMSK in all 3 Actions, Impresive Circuit as the plaintiff in the Setia Haruman OS is not a party in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs, UEM Land Berhad and Virtual Path Sdn Bhd who are the shareholders of Setia Haruman and the four (4) Directors of Setia Haruman all named as defendants in the Setia Haruman OS are not parties in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs. In my utmost respectful view, the complaint of oppression in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs should be heard and decided separately on their own facts and evidence. Whether or not there was oppression in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs was for DK to prove; and any decision thereafter must be based strictly on the best evidence presented by DK and the defence if any put up by the Defendants. [44] I thus conclude that on the facts of the OSs, in the interest of doing substantive justice, it is appropriate to allow cross examination on the issue of the Understanding, the New Board Understanding, the breaches of these understandings and the resolutions being passed in Menara Embun and Menara Eden purportedly without DK’s knowledge, consent and/or approval to facilitate the said breaches. I find DK ought to be given the opportunity to fully ventilate his case and he has discharged the onus on why cross-examination should be ordered. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [45] Consequently, leave in enc. 286 (OS 410 ) and enc. 272 (OS 411) is given to DK to cross examine (1) Farah Mahami Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal (NRIC No. 820512-14-5662) on the contents of the two (2) Affidavits she had affirmed on 28.11.2017 and 25.4.2018 and filed in these proceedings; (ii) Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal (NRIC No. 701201-10-6138) on the contents of the two (2) Affidavits affirmed on her behalf on 25.4.2018 and 7.6.2018 and filed in these proceedings, with costs subject to allocator. Dated: 22nd October 2023 - sgd - ……………………….. Liza Chan Sow Keng Judge High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff : Mr Gopal Sreenevasan (together with him, Shermaljit Singh) Messrs Owee & Co For the 1st & 5th : Eric Clement Defendants Messrs Abd Halim Ushah & Assoc. For the 2nd, 3rd & 4th : Dato M. Pathmanathan (together with him, Defendants Shirin Pathmanathan and Fatin Muzfirah) Messrs M Pathmanathan & Co. CASES REFERRED: L.K Insulation Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Apex Energy Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 733 Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] SGCA 47 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Tob Chee Hoong v Tob Chee Choong [2017] MLJU 1303 Datuk Kasi Palaniappan & Anor v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 32 Thavanathan a/l Balasubramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 MLJ 401 Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189 Balwant Singh Purba v R Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3 Regional Centre for Arbitration v Ooi Beng Choo & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 383 Structural Concrete Sdn Bhd v. Wing Tiek Holdings Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 300 Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487 Tahansan Sdn Bhd v Tay Bok Choon - [1985] 1 MLJ 58 Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & Ors and another application [1994] 2 MLJ 789 Nasser Ali Azayez Maktoum Al Sheraifi & Ors v Affinity Heights Sdn Bhd [2018] 5 CLJ 751 Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228 Paul Raj Samy Anthony v. Annamalar Anthonysamy [2003] 3 CLJ 166 Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385 Messrs Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah v Dato’ Peh Teck Quee [2003] 5 MLJ 241 Indrani a/p Rajaratnam & Ors v Fairview Schools Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 56 Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 1508 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 STATUTE/LEGISLATION REFERRED: Order 1A and Order 2 Rule 1, Order 38 rule 2(2) and 2(3) Rules of Court 2012 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-411-09/2017	43,149	Tika 2.6.0
P-02(IM)(NCvC)-2008-10/2022	PERAYU JKP SDN. BHD. RESPONDEN Anas Construction Sdn. Bhd.	Whether applying to strike out claim in Court is submitting and surrendering to jurisdiction of Court - whether a further step in the proceedings has been taken - whether stay under s 10 Arbitration Act 2005 should be dismissed.Refusal of one party to arbitration to pay further AIAC’s Deposit - whether breach of AIAC’s Arbitration Rules 2018- whether breach of arbitration agreement - whether arbitration agreement has become inoperative-whether the other party that has the option to pay is now obliged to pay- whether arbitrator may terminate arbitration-whether the other party may commence proceedings in Court.	31/10/2023	YA Dato' Lee Swee SengKorumYA Dato' Lee Swee SengYA Dato' Che Mohd Ruzima Bin GhazaliYA Dato' Azizul Azmi Bin Adnan	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=0d52f8d9-4542-4828-9229-0ce20633eb86&Inline=true	1 of 44 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA DI PUTRAJAYA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: P-02(IM)(NCVC)-2008-10/2022 ANTARA JSB … PERAYU DAN ACSB … RESPONDEN [DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI PULAU PINANG DALAM NEGERI PULAI PINANG GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: PA-22NCVC-32-02/2022 ANTARA JSB … PLAINTIF DAN ACSB … DEFENDAN] 31/10/2023 17:11:54 P-02(IM)(NCvC)-2008-10/2022 Kand. 25 S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 of 44 CORAM: LEE SWEE SENG, JCA CHE MOHD. RUZIMA GHAZALI, JCA AZIZUL AZMI ADNAN, JCA JUDGMENT OF THE COURT [1] An interesting problem has arisen in an arbitration which had proceeded at the preliminary stage of settling the pleadings and when the Asian International Arbitration Centre (“AIAC”) gave notice to the parties for a further deposit of the arbitrator’s fees and the administrative costs of AIAC (“AIAC’s Deposit”). The respondent there, who also had a counterclaim, refused to pay its portion of the fees. The arbitrator then proceeded to terminate the arbitration after consultation with the Director of AIAC as provided for in the AIAC Arbitration Rules 2018 (“AIAC Arbitration Rules”). The claimant then proceeded to file its claim in the High Court. [2] The defendant in the High Court objected on ground that the arbitration agreement is still subsisting and is not abrogated on ground of it not paying its portion of the AIAC’s Deposit. According to the defendant, the recourse would be for the claimant to pay the defendant’s equal share of the AIAC’s Deposit to continue with the arbitration and to then ask for the Arbitrator to include in the final Award, the AIAC Deposit, paid on its behalf by the claimant. [3] The defendant in the High Court by way of Enclosure 6, applied to have the writ and statement of claim struck out under O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”). Alternatively, S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 of 44 the defendant prayed for a stay of the court proceedings under s 10 Arbitration Act 2005 [Act 646] (“AA 2005”) and for the matter to be referred to arbitration. [4] The claimant, on the other hand, argued that non-payment of the AIAC Deposit as required under the rules of governing the arbitration, in this case the AIAC Arbitration Rules, would amount to breach of the arbitration agreement and as such the arbitrator is at liberty to terminate the arbitration and the claimant is entitled to then commence the proceedings in Court. Previously, the claimant had filed a suit in Court but withdrew it because of the defendant’s insistence on the arbitration agreement. At the High Court [5] The High Court found that the non-payment of the AIAC’s further deposit by the defendant did not render the arbitration agreement inoperative or incapable of being performed. [6] The plaintiff as the claimant in the arbitration could pay the defendant’s share of the AIAC’s further deposit and recover the same from the defendant in the final award of the arbitrator. [7] The High Court, having found that principally the arbitration agreement had not become inoperative, ordered a stay of the High Court proceedings under s 10 of the AA 2005. The plaintiff, being dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court, had appealed to the Court of Appeal. The parties shall be referred to as they were in the High Court i.e. as plaintiff and defendant respectively. In some instances, the defendant S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 of 44 who refused to pay its portion of the AIAC’s Deposit would be referred to as the “refusing party.” Before the Court of Appeal [8] The plaintiff as appellant, argued before us that had the High Court followed the principle of law enunciated in Kebabangan Petroleum Operating Co Sdn Bhd v Mikuni (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 1 MLJ 693 with respect to when an arbitration agreement becomes inoperative, the High Court would not have granted an unconditional stay of the Court proceedings, only to refer the matter to arbitration again. [9] The plaintiff further argued before us that had the High Court followed the relevant principles of law as propounded by the full Bench of the Singapore Court of Appeal in L Capital Jones Ltd And Another v Maniach Pte Ltd [2017] SGCA 63; [2017] 1 SLR 312, the High Court would have dismissed the defendant’s application for a stay of the court proceedings. [10] It was also submitted that the High Court had erred in not fully appreciating that under Rule 14(7) of the AIAC Arbitration Rules, “the arbitral tribunal may, after consultation with the Director, order the suspension or termination of the arbitral proceedings or any part thereof.” It was further argued that the learned High Court Judge failed to appreciate that the learned Arbitrator's first Order, whereby he ordered that the defendant could not proceed with its Counterclaim and its Third- Party Proceedings was in fact not in accordance with Rule 14(7). The relevant facts showed that he had not in fact consulted the Director when he made his first Order. S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 of 44 Whether in applying to strike out the High Court Suit brought by the plaintiff, the defendant by so doing has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court and taken fresh steps in the proceedings [11] Under s 10(1) of the AA 2005, the Court would have no discretion but to make an order staying the proceedings before it in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement unless the party making the stay application has taken other steps in the proceedings or that on the evidence before it, the Court finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. [12] Section 10(1) of the AA 2005 reads as follows: “10 Arbitration agreement and substantive claim before court (1) A court before which proceedings are brought in respect of a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, where a party makes an application before taking any other steps in the proceedings, stay those proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.” (emphasis added) [13] Thus, an application under s 10 of the AA 2005 cannot be a hybrid application in combination with other provisions under the Rules of Court 2012. This is precisely because the Court would have no business to interfere or intervene in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement unless expressly provided for under the AA 2005 as stated clearly in s 8 thereof as follows: S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 of 44 “8 Extent of court intervention No court shall intervene in matters governed by this Act, except where so provided in this Act.” [14] Here the main prayer is for a striking out of the plaintiff’s claim under O 12 r 10(1)(a) and (g), O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) ROC 2012 and under O 92 r 4 ROC 2012 and only in the alternative, a stay of the proceedings in Court under s 10 AA 2005 and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. [15] It should be stated at this juncture that O 12 r 10 is designed for setting aside the writ or service of the writ in a case where under O 12 r 9 the writ or the service of the writ is irregular or in any order giving leave to serve the writ out of jurisdiction or the extending the validity of the writ for the purpose of service. It has no application in this case whatsoever. [16] As can be seen the main prayer under paragraph 2 of the Application is for the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim dated 15.2.2022 against the defendant in the action to be struck out. It is only at paragraph 4 of the Application is there an alternative prayer for the stay of the court proceedings under s 10 AA 2005 and a reference by the plaintiff to arbitration until the arbitration is concluded and disposed of with an arbitral award. [17] Such an application to strike out the plaintiff’s action would be tantamount to “taking any other steps in the proceedings” and thus the applicant is disqualified from applying for a stay of the proceedings. It does not matter that the Court did not agree with its striking out application or that it dismisses the striking out application. Once the Court is invited S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 of 44 to consider the application to strike out the suit before it, the applicant would have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court and submitted to its jurisdiction in “taking any other steps in the proceedings” and hence, can no longer apply for a stay of the proceedings on ground that the matter before the Court is the subject of an arbitration agreement. [18] We agree with the plaintiff that the applicant in invoking O 12 r 10(1)(a) and (g) and O 18 r 19(1)(a),(b),(c) and (d) and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court O 92 r 4, in the body of its application, the defendant had invited the Court and hence invoked its jurisdiction, to consider the merits of the plaintiff’s proceedings in Court with a view to have them struck out on the grounds set out in its application. [19] One of the grounds of the prayer to strike out the plaintiff’s claim is contained in paragraph k of the application which reads as follows: “k. The Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant is outside or in excess of the Court’s jurisdiction, flawed, defective and without basis, frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the court’s process and has a serious effect on the legal rights of the Defendant under the construction contract and should be struck out in limine.” [20] The merits of the plaintiff’s claim or the lack of it, would have to be considered by the Court in hearing the application. Clearly by so doing the defendant as applicant had taken “any other steps in the proceedings” such that if the Court were to dismiss, disallow or even disregard the application, the Court’s jurisdiction would have been invoked upon the invitation being made before the Court by way of the prayers in the application. S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 of 44 [21] The applicant in the defendant cannot submit itself to the Court’s jurisdiction and surrender to it in applying to strike out the plaintiff’s claim and yet at the same time apply for a stay of the proceedings should it not succeed in the striking out. Having entered the door of the Court and inviting it to decide on the matter on its merits, the applicant cannot now exit from it and merely pray for a stay of the proceedings. [22] The two are incompatible and having failed in striking out the plaintiff’s claim, the applicant must be content to having to contest the proceedings for in applying to strike out, the applicant must be taken to have abandoned arbitration in favour of litigation in the Court. [23] Consider for a moment that should the Court have allowed the striking out, the plaintiff could no longer commence arbitration to adjudicate on the matter for estoppel and res judicata would operate against the plaintiff. [24] The only recourse left for the plaintiff would be to appeal against that decision to the Court of Appeal. By praying for both striking out and alternatively for stay of proceedings, the applicant might think it was acting on an abundance of caution or trying to have the best of both worlds. However, in reality the applicant was making an irrevocable choice or election to get the Court to decide on the merits or the lack of it of the plaintiff’s claim. Having failed in doing so, it was too late to resile from it as the Court’s jurisdiction, once invoked, cannot be revoked or resisted. [25] Having submitted and surrendered to the Court’s jurisdiction, it has succumbed to it under its spell; it can no longer escape from it but must swim or sink within its system. It is unlike a fail-safe mechanism S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 of 44 where in the event of a specific failure in striking out, there is the alternative route of little impact in a stay of the proceedings. [26] The problem is not new. As far back as 1999 under the previous s 6 of the Arbitration Act 1952 [Act 93] (Repealed by the Arbitration Act 2005) (“AA 1952”), Abdul Malik Ishak J (later JCA) had the opportunity to decide on the same issue in PP Persero Sdn Bhd v Bimacom Property Development Sdn Bhd [1999] 6 MLJ 1. In that case, the defendant had filed an application for a stay of proceedings pending a reference to arbitration under s 6 of the AA 1952 which is the precursor to the present s 10 of the AA 2005. The defendant had included in the application in prayer (1) to Enclosure 17 a prayer for striking out the plaintiff’s writ. The plaintiff raised a preliminary objection that the inclusion of the prayer in the defendant’s application constituted a step in the proceedings and thus the defendant was barred from applying for a stay of proceedings. The High Court agreed with the senior assistant registrar who had allowed the preliminary objection and struck out the defendant’s application. [27] The High Court held as follows at p 22: “(4) …By seeking to strike out the plaintiff respondent's claim, the defendant appellant was submitting to the jurisdiction of this court. This would be the only inference that can be drawn when the defendant appellant incorporated prayer (1) to encl 17. It must be emphasised that the court will not accede to an application to strike out the writ or the pleading unless the case was wholly and clearly unarguable… In my judgment, the defendant appellant must be precluded from obtaining a stay and taking advantage of the remedy of arbitration when they inserted prayer (1) in encl 17. S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 of 44 (5) The conduct of the defendant appellant in seeking prayer (1) of encl 17 clearly demonstrated a desire to abandon the application for a stay in favour of allowing the matter to proceed to trial. As I said the very act of the defendant appellant have the classical effect of invoking the jurisdiction of this court to proceed to hear the case in open court and not to refer the matter to arbitration nor to stay the matter. This was my judgment and I so hold accordingly. (6) By seeking prayer (1) of encl 17, the defendant appellant had taken the necessary steps in the proceedings thereby precluding a stay and reference to arbitration. In my judgment, the defendant appellant did not unequivocally elect to refer the matter to arbitration. In the 'technical sense', the defendant appellant took a step in the proceedings thereby barring resort to s 6 of the Arbitration Act 1952. Clearly therefore the defendant appellant had no desire to stay the proceedings nor to refer the matter to arbitration. Incidentally, there was no bar for the defendant appellant to file a stay of proceedings after entering a conditional appearance. Sadly, this was not resorted to. Instead, the defendant appellant incorporated prayer (1) to encl 17.” (emphasis added) [28] Our Court of Appeal had the occasion more recently to consider the same issue in Kebabangan Petroleum Operating Company Sdn Bhd v Mikuni (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 1 MLJ 693 where it said: “[43] The facts in our case are similar as in L Capital Jones (supra). The respondents had first prayed for the civil suit to be struck out and in the alternative, a prayer for a stay of proceedings of the court action pending arbitration in encl. 24. The respondents in praying, first, for the striking out of the civil suit on merits, and only when the striking out prayer is rejected, a stay in favour of arbitration as an alternative, had, by doing so, foreclosed any argument on their part that they had S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 of 44 reserved their rights to arbitrate the matter. Again, it must be emphasised that the respondents cannot, by their action, be equated as reserving their rights to refer the matter for arbitration. We are of the view that the respondents, (except the fourth respondent), by filing encl. 24 to strike out the appellant's writ on merits, or in the alternative, to stay the court proceedings pending the disposal of the arbitration, had by their conduct, taken steps in the court proceedings pursuant to s. 10(1) of the Arbitration Act 2005. Their conduct had evinced or had signified and affirmed their unequivocal intention and willingness to submit and participate in the court's proceedings to adjudicate the dispute in preference to arbitration. The respondents, cannot now, change their stance to go for arbitration. The learned judge thus has erred in allowing the proceedings to be stayed against the respondents pending the disposal of the arbitration between the appellant and the first respondent. [44] On perusal of encl. 7 on the stay application by the respondents (except the fourth respondent), we noticed that again, the respondents in their stay application which was premised under s. 10 of the Arbitration Act 2005, had prayed first, for the civil suit to be struck out or second the court action be stayed pending the matter to be referred for arbitration (similar prayers as in their striking out application in encl. 24). Again, we are of the view that the first prayer made by the respondents in their stay application is not in consonant with an application made under s. 10(1) of the Arbitration Act 2005 and, respondents in doing so, had by their alternative prayers foreclosed any argument on their part that they had reserved their rights to arbitrate the matter." (emphasis added) [29] The learned Judge, when deciding to stay the court proceedings, was fully conversant with the above principle enunciated in Kebabangan Petroleum’s case (supra) when he referred to it in Golden Plus Holdings Bhd & Ors v China Idea Development Limited & Ors [2021] MLJU 2532 as follows: S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 of 44 “[97] In a recent Court of Appeal judgment in Kebabangan Petroleum Operating Co Sdn Bhd v Mikuni (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 1 MLJ 693 Suraya Othman, JCA held that the filing of an application to strike out constitutes a step in the proceedings and evidences an unequivocal intention to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate on the dispute, therefore the applicant was not entitled to a stay of proceedings to arbitrate the matter: … [98] Further, it was held in Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd v. Owners Of The Ship Or Vessel 'Able Lieutenant' [2002] 6 MLJ 433, that the applicant therein was plainly wrong for: (a) on one hand challenging the jurisdiction of the court (pursuant to order 12, r 7, Rules of Court 1980); and (b) on the other hand, seeking the court's jurisdiction to investigate the merits of the plaintiff's claim as disclosed on the writ (pursuant to order 18. r 19. Rules of Court 1980) [99] The Court there held that the applicant was blowing hot and cold when it failed to make an election as to whether to challenge the jurisdiction or invoke the court's jurisdiction to hear the case on its merits. The application was dismissed by the Court, and the judge emphasized that: “If a party wishes for the Court to set aside a writ or strike out the writ, it is incumbent upon that party to place before the court in clear unambiguous terms the expectation.” (emphasis added) S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 of 44 [30] With the greatest of respect to the learned Judge we are of the considered opinion that it was not open to him to say that in the application for striking out the plaintiff’s claim was not an invitation to the Court to determine the merits of the case but to enforce the arbitration agreement unlike the facts in the case of Kebabangan Petroleum (supra). Such a distinction is one without a difference as invariably under O 18 r 19(1)(b) ROC 2012, when invoking the jurisdiction of the Court to strike out the plaintiff’s claim on ground that it is scandalous, frivolous and vexatious, “the court will certainly have to determine the merits of the appellant’s claim in order to adjudicate on the veracity of the same.” See Kebabangan Petroleum (supra) at para [39]. [31] The learned Judge was fully conscious of and conversant with the principle expounded in Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd v Owners of the Ship or Vessel ‘Able Lieutenant’ [2002] 6 MLJ 433 where the applicant there was plainly wrong to on the one hand challenge the jurisdiction of the court (pursuant to Order 12 r 7 Rules of Court 1980) and on the other hand, seeking the court’s jurisdiction to investigate the merits of the plaintiff’s claim as disclosed in the writ (pursuant to Order 18 r 19 Rules of Court 1980). [32] The learned Judge had in para [99] of his judgment in the Golden Plus Holdings’ case (supra) commented that the Court there held that the applicant was blowing hot and cold when it failed to make an election as to whether to challenge the jurisdiction or invoke the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case on its merits. All too often one cannot have the cake and eat it. One cannot have the best of both worlds. One must make a choice and live with the consequences of one’s choice. S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 of 44 [33] The initiative of the defendant in making the application to strike out the plaintiff’s claim is not innocuous but inimical to the defendant for a greater consequence is at stake as fully appreciated by the Court of Appeal in Kebabangan Petroleum’s case (supra) as follows: “[40] ...In the event that encl. 24 [striking out] is allowed in favour of the respondents, this would have created some form of estoppel or res judicata which would preclude the appellant from bringing the same claim against the respondents before the arbitral tribunal. [41] Based on these reasons, we were of the view that the filing of encl. 24 [the striking out application] had clearly evinced an unequivocal intention on the part of the respondents to submit to the court's jurisdiction and proceed with the civil suit. The respondents' act or conduct in filing encl. 24 clearly indicated to us that they were willingly taking a step to participate in the proceedings in preference to arbitration." (emphasis added) [34] Our Court of Appeal endorsed the approach taken by the full bench in the Singapore Court of Appeal in the case of L Capital Jones Ltd and another v Maniach Pte Ltd [2017] SGCA 3; [2017] 1 SLR 312 which was even more explicit in expounding the consequences that would follow an application to strike out a plaintiff’s claim by a defendant on ground that there is an arbitration clause on facts strikingly similar to the present case as follows: “78. An application to strike out proceedings on the basis that it is unmeritorious is an act that signifies a submission to the court’s jurisdiction to resolve the dispute on the merits (Carona Holdings at [93]). Far from repudiating the court proceedings, an application to strike S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 of 44 out a claim on its merits is an affirmation of the court’s jurisdiction to resolve the matter. Further, …should the court have determined the striking-out application in JtGGH’s favour, this would have created some form of estoppel or res judicata, precluding the matter from being relitigated before an arbitral tribunal. Thus, filing an application to strike out S 182/2015 on its merits certainly evinces “an unequivocal intention to participate in the court proceedings in preference to arbitration” (Carona Holdings at [55]). … 80. It can be seen that one of the two grounds for striking out relied on by JtGGH was, in essence, that the Respondent’s claim lacked merit (para 3 of the grounds of application). A stay in favour of arbitration was only prayed for in the alternative. In our judgment, this forecloses any argument that JtGGH had reserved its right to arbitrate the matter. SUM 998/2015 clearly prays first for a striking out on the merits, and, only if that was rejected, a stay in favour of arbitration as an alternative. Therefore, by filing SUM 998/2015, JtGGH had taken a step in the proceedings. 81. The Judge, however, found that because JtGGH never followed through on its intention to strike out the suit, it did not ultimately take a step in the proceedings. JtGGH did not in fact present oral arguments to the court on the merits of the suit (the GD at [109]), and the part of the application to strike out S 182/2015 under O 18 r 19 was never ultimately heard or argued (the GD at [86]). On this basis, the Judge found that even though JtGGH had filed SUM 998/2015, when viewed as a whole, it cannot be treated as having taken a step in the proceedings. 82. In our respectful view, the Judge erred in finding that a step in the proceedings had not been taken by JtGGH just because the striking out application was not pursued at the oral hearing. We note, momentarily leaving aside the issue of JtGGH’s striking out application in SUM 998/2015, that JtGGH had taken the following further steps to advance its application to strike out S 182/2015 on its merits: … S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 of 44 83. In this case, given the several steps that JtGGH took to advance its striking out application on the merits, it cannot be said that JtGGH did not take a step in the proceedings just because it decided not to pursue its striking-out application at the last moment. But even assuming that JtGGH had not yet filed any affidavits or submissions in support of its striking out application, we would have been inclined to hold that the very act of filing an application to strike out the suit on its merits would have constituted a step in the proceedings because, as we have noted at [78] above, this was an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction. Once such a step is taken, it will generally be irrevocable. Even if the application is subsequently withdrawn, or the party indicates that it no longer wishes to prosecute the application, that cannot change the fact that a step has been taken under s 6(1) of the IAA.” (emphasis added) [35] Clearly the defendant by its main prayer in applying to strike out the plaintiff’s claim was inviting and invoking the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the plaintiff’s claim on its merits. The defendant had filed an affidavit in support of its application through its director MIHN dated 6.4.2022 and a further affidavit in reply dated 19.5.2022 giving reasons why the suit should be struck out. [36] The defendant had thus submitted and surrendered to the jurisdiction of the Court and waived its right to arbitration. Having succumbed to the Court’s jurisdiction the defendant cannot now switch to arbitration to resolve the dispute between the parties. S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 of 44 Whether the arbitration agreement has become inoperative within the meaning of s 10 of the AA 2005 [37] Assuming for a moment that the defendant had not taken a further step in the Court proceedings, we shall proceed to consider if the arbitration agreement had nevertheless become inoperative by the conduct of the defendant in refusing to pay its share of the AIAC Deposit in the arbitration proceedings. [38] It is now established without a doubt that in an application under s 10(1) of the AA 2005 where no further step in the Court proceedings has been taken, the Court has no discretion but to make an order staying the proceedings once there is an arbitration agreement unless the proviso applies i.e. “unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.” See the Federal Court case of Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd v Etiqa Takaful Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 417. [39] AIAC had by its letter dated 4.9.2020 to the solicitors for both the parties to request under Rule 6 of the AIAC Arbitration Rules 2018 for further deposits from the parties which shall be payable within 21 days upon receipt of the said request. The further deposit was for RM360,234.68 and that the plaintiff as claimant and the defendant as respondent in the arbitration was each required to pay to AIAC the sum of RM180,117.34. Both parties had earlier paid to AIAC a provisional advance deposit of RM77,268.15 each. Plaintiff had paid the further deposit of RM180,117.34 on 7.5.2021. [40] The refusal of the defendant in making further deposit to the arbitrator’s fees would amount to a breach of the arbitration rules in this S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 of 44 case the AIAC Arbitration Rules. It is provided in Clause 66.3 of the PWD 203A (Rev.1/2-10) Contract dated 9.4.2015, used with relevant modifications, that the arbitration shall be by an arbitrator appointed by the Director of the AIAC (previously known as the Regional Centre for Arbitration in Kuala Lumpur as was so referred to in the PWD 203A Contract). It was further provided that the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the rules for arbitration of the AIAC using the facilities and the system available at the AIAC. The defaulting party would have to take the consequences arising under the Rules as provided for in the AIAC Arbitration Rules. [41] Compliance with an arbitration agreement would include compliance with the applicable AIAC Arbitration Rules that the parties have agreed to abide by. A breach of the Rules would result in taking the consequences that would ensue. Here the arbitrator is doing what is allowed under the Rules which in this case, includes the Arbitrator exercising his right to terminate the arbitration. [42] The defendant cannot in all honesty say and indeed it would be hollow, for it to say that it is committed to having the dispute that has arisen between the parties to be resolved through arbitration and yet not be willing to abide by the Rules governing the arbitration to pay its share of the AIAC’s Deposit which includes the arbitrator’s fees. [43] It becomes more disturbing when the argument for not paying the AIAC’s Deposit is justified on the ground that it has a choice not to and that there can be no adverse consequences that would befall it as its commitment to the arbitration proceedings has always been firm and remains unchanged. S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 of 44 [44] The party refusing to pay its share of the arbitrator fees knows fully well that there is no more effective way to tax the financial resources of the other party than by compelling it to pay the refusing party’s share of the AIAC’s Deposit if the other party is keen to have the arbitrator continue with the hearing until an award is handed down. [45] For as long as the arbitration proceedings continue under the financing of the paying party, the refusing party would just have to ride on the goodwill of the paying party. We can think of no more belligerent action on the part of the refusing party to inflict suffering and punishment on the paying party and to expose it to greater risk of inability to recover the fees paid on its behalf in the award of costs. [46] To say that such an action on the part of the refusing party is a perfectly proper strategy to adopt in an arbitration with no fear of adverse consequences would be to give applause and approval to such an unsavoury act. We can imagine a scenario where both sides to the disputes declared from the mountain top that they remain committed to arbitration to resolve their dispute one with the other and yet both refuse to contribute their share to the arbitrator’s fees. [47] Would it not be a case where the arbitration would not even get off the ground for no arbitrator would want to carve out time to arbitrate with his fees not paid? Would it then be a case where one of the parties who would not be able to endure longer without vindicating itself in proving the genuineness and righteousness of its claim before limitation sets in, be the one that have to pay both its share of the AIAC’s deposit as well as that of the refusing party? If that be the case, a party who has no defence or a bad case would be in a better position not to want to pay its S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 of 44 share of the arbitrator’s fees simply because it has an option not to want to pay and yet its action has to be interpreted as being consistent with its stand that it is committed to the arbitration! [48] We can think of no better strategy to adopt to bring the Arbitral process and proceedings into disrepute. The refusing party’s action in not wanting to pay its share of the AIAC’s Deposit simply by saying it is not keen to and that it has a choice not to, must be exposed and excoriated for what it truly is: a subtle but sly strategy to scuttle the arbitration with impunity for the other party would have no choice but to pay the refusing party’s share of the AIAC’s Deposit if it has more to lose by not continuing with the arbitration. [49] We do not have to trouble ourselves to determine if there has been a repudiatory breach of the arbitration agreement by the resolute refusal of one party to pay its share of the arbitrator’s fees. The determinative factor is whether the parties insisting on arbitration because there is an arbitration agreement has nevertheless evinced an intention to waive arbitration in favour of litigation by taking a further step in the Court proceedings and by making the arbitration agreement inoperative by its action or inaction. Thus, even when a party files a suit in Court in spite of an arbitration agreement, there is no need to determine if the other party has repudiated the arbitration agreement but whether the other party has forgone arbitration by for example taking further steps in the Court proceedings. [50] If the defendant applies for a stay before taking a further step in the proceedings in Court, all it is doing is to enforce the arbitration agreement and the Court would generally grant a stay of the court S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 of 44 proceedings. If it has taken a step in the court proceedings then it is said to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and to have waived its right to arbitrate. It would appear that the question of repudiation of an arbitration agreement does not arise but more a question of whether the party wanting to proceed with arbitration has abandoned or waived its right to so proceed. [51] It appears to us that it would be illusory to ask the question of whether there has been a repudiation of the arbitration agreement before the other party is at liberty to proceed with litigation once the arbitrator has decided to terminate the arbitration. After all, the choice of arbitration is merely a choice as to mode of resolving a dispute and Courts would generally hold parties to the bargain once there is a binding arbitration agreement and parties have not abandoned it by taking a further step in proceedings before the Court. [52] Little wonder that the expression “breach of the arbitration agreement” is not used in s 10 of the AA 2005 or for that matter anywhere in the AA 2005 but rather the arbitration agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.” It would be fair for us to surmise that the test to be applied for the arbitrator to decide on whether to stay or terminate the arbitral proceedings would be whether the arbitration agreement has become inoperative through the refusal of one party to pay its share of the arbitrator’s fees and that it has waived its right to arbitration when it refuses to comply with the applicable AIAC Arbitration Rules which has been incorporated as a term of the arbitration agreement under Clause 66.3 of the PWD 203A Contract. S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 of 44 [53] To compel the other party to pay the refusing party’s share of the arbitrator’s fees cannot be right for it would be rewarding the uncooperative and unfair party and punishing the party who would then have no choice but to have to pay the belligerent party’s share of the arbitrator’s fees and then hopefully to be able to claim it back later as part of the final award of the arbitrator. [54] There is no clearer means of rendering an arbitration agreement inoperative than a simple but stubborn refusal of a party to pay its share of the administrative body’s deposit for no other reason than it does not want to, though couched euphemistically as a commercial decision. The Court of Appeal in Kebabangan Petroleum’s case (supra) had no difficulty in holding as follows: “[35] We were of the view that the first respondent's conduct in unreasonably and deliberately delaying the payment of its portion of the provisional advance deposit or the first respondent's persistence in refusing to pay and its sheer unresponsiveness and callous disregard to the letters issued by the appellant and KLRCA, had rendered the arbitration agreement between the appellant and the first respondent inoperative. The conduct of the first respondent had indicated that it was disinterested and is abandoning its intention to proceed with the arbitration, thereby waiving its rights for arbitration under the Umbrella Agreement.” (emphasis added) [55] To refuse to pay its share of the arbitrator’s fees for no reason other than it does not want to would be evincing a clear and unequivocal intention not to abide by the arbitration process of resolving the disputes and indeed to abandon it altogether. It is akin to stultifying the arbitration, S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 of 44 if not to suffocate and even sabotage it. Its conduct, of a wilful and unexplained refusal to pay the additional deposit to the arbitrator’s fees, is found wanting and like the writing on the wall, it is a waiver of its right to arbitration written in its body language of crossed arms, resisting every encouragement that it should pay its share of the arbitrator’s fees. [56] If one has to decide the matter on whether there has been a repudiation of the arbitration agreement then we would say that we know of no clearer repudiation of an arbitration agreement than to refuse to abide by the Arbitration Rules with respect to paying its share of the arbitrator’s fees or the administrative body’s deposit. The refusing party knows full well that for it not to comply with the other Rules on filing of Defence or Counterclaim or the directions of the Arbitrator, would have dire consequences. The arbitral institution and the arbitrator appointed must be equally zealous in sending the message that the refusing party cannot avowedly affirm that it is still abiding by the arbitration agreement when it has, with aloofness and apathy, acted to delay and derail the process by its commitment not to pay its share of the arbitrator’s fees and the arbitral institution’s administrative fees. [57] The relevant AIAC Arbitration Rules read as follows: “Rule 14 Deposits … (1) After the arbitration has commenced in accordance with Rule 2, the Director shall fix a provisional advance deposit in an amount intended to cover the costs of the arbitration. Any such S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 of 44 provisional advance deposit shall be paid by the Parties in equal shares and will be considered as a partial payment by the Parties of any deposits of costs fixed by the Director under Rule 14. (2) Such provisional advance deposit shall be payable within 21 days upon receiving the request from the AIAC. (3) In the event that any of the Parties fails to pay such deposit, the Director shall give the other Party an opportunity to make the required payment within a specified period of time. The arbitral tribunal shall not proceed with the arbitral proceedings until such provisional advance deposit is paid in full. (4) Upon fixing of the fees of the arbitral tribunal and administrative costs of arbitration, the Director shall prepare an estimate of the fees and expenses of the arbitral tribunal and the administrative costs of the arbitration which the Parties shall bear in equal shares. Within 21 days of written notification by the AlAC of such estimate, each Party shall deposit its share of the estimate with the AIAC. (5) During the course of the arbitral proceedings the AlAC may request further deposits from the Parties which shall be payable within 21 days upon receiving the request from the AlAC. (6) Notwithstanding Rule 14(4), where counterclaims are submitted by the Respondent, the Director may fix separate advance deposits on costs for the claims and counterclaims. When the Director has fixed separate advance deposits on costs, each of the Parties shall pay the advance deposit corresponding to its claims. (7) If the required deposits are not paid in full, the Director shall give the other Party an opportunity to make the required payment within a specified period of time. If such payment is not made, the arbitral tribunal may, after consultation with the S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 of 44 Director, order the suspension or termination of the arbitral proceedings or any part thereof.” (emphasis added) [58] Parties cannot agree to arbitration under the AIAC Arbitration Rules and yet refuse to follow its rules on ground that it has an inherent right not to abide by it with no consequences. The AIAC Arbitration Rules have become incorporated into the arbitration agreement of the parties such that the parties must take the consequences for its non-compliance or breach. [59] The mandatory language of “shall” with respect to Rule 14(1) and (4) makes it an obligation of the parties to make payment of the deposit towards the arbitrator’s fees and the administrative costs of AIAC in equal shares to AIAC within 21 days of written notification from AIAC. [60] If the obligation to pay is not discharged by the refusing party, under Rule 14(7) of the AIAC Arbitration Rules, the Director of AIAC shall give the other Party an opportunity to make the required payment within a specified period of time. If such payment is not made, the arbitral tribunal may, after consultation with the Director, order the suspension or termination of the arbitral proceedings or any part thereof. Similar rules are found in Rule 34.6 of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre Arbitration Rules 2016, Rule 4 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration Arbitration Rules 2012, Article 43 paragraph 4 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2021. [61] Here the Arbitrator had, after such consultation with the Director of AIAC, being the administrative body for the arbitration, ordered the S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 of 44 termination of the arbitral proceedings. This comes as no surprise for there was no mitigating factor put forward by the refusing party not to pay its share of the deposit. The arbitrator wrote to the parties on 25.10.2021 as follows: “I refer to the trail of emails in relation to payment of preliminary deposits and the respective parties’ stand expressed in their email. I have accordingly consulted with the Director of AIAC pursuant to Rule 14(7) of the AIAC Rules. After consulting the Director, I hereby issue this Order to Terminate the above arbitral proceedings. Parties are to take note that the Director has determined and approved the sum of RM65,000.00 to be a reasonable sum for the remuneration of the Arbitrator’s fees for the work done and further, the Director has determined and approved the sum of RM16,559.76 to be the total Administrative Fees, is reasonable for the remuneration of the AIAC.” [62] One cannot read an obligation to pay one’s share of the deposit as now being transposed onto the other party to pay once an opportunity is given to the other party to pay. The opportunity given to the other party is an option given to the other party to pay the refusing party’s equal share of the deposit after the other party has already paid its equal share of the deposit. Such an opportunity to exercise an option does not convert the option into an obligation. [63] Here the other party in the plaintiff chose not to exercise the option for it does not make sense to incur further expenses in the AIAC’s Deposit with no certainty of being able to recover it. Indeed, the refusal to pay on the understanding that it has a right to do so would raise the S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 of 44 suspicion as to whether it would be able to recover the deposit paid should it succeed in the arbitration. [64] Being a domestic arbitration, perhaps the benefits of arbitration in terms of party autonomy and confidentiality are not prejudicially subordinated to a trial in open court which would certainly be cheaper and no less fast. A judge hearing the case is sworn by his judicial oath to uphold the law and he cannot be less qualified or less independent than an arbitrator. As for benefit of confidentiality, it may be more highly touted than what it deserves for transparency of proceedings would be an equal benefit as well. Moreover when appeals are pursued so much of what is the dispute would have to be narrated by the Court as part of its reported judgment. Granted where necessary the Court may anonymise and “acronymise” the names of the parties and the construction project. [65] As an option, it is given to the other party to decide whether or not it wants to affirm the arbitration agreement in spite of its breach by the refusing party. In the case of an international arbitration, a foreign party unfamiliar with the court proceedings in a foreign State and the language used in the Court, may elect to continue with the arbitration, in which instance it may have to advance the refusing party’s share of the AIAC’s deposit and claim back later in the final accounting in the Arbitral Award. [66] It would in all probabilities, apply to the arbitrator for security for costs under s 19(1) and under s 19(2)(e) of the AA 2005 of the arbitral tribunal may require any party to provide appropriate security in connection with such measures as may be ordered by the arbitral tribunal. In default of the order to provide the amount as may be ordered for security for costs, the arbitral tribunal may bar the refusing party from S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 of 44 proceeding with its claim or defending the claim or proceeding with its counterclaim. See also s 21(3)(d) and (i) of the AA 2005. [67] The other party in the plaintiff, in the case before us, has no compunction in proceeding to Court with the claim as it had previously commenced a suit against the defendant, only to have it withdrawn because of the defendant’s insistence to proceed with arbitration as there was an arbitration agreement. [68] The arbitration agreement had been rendered inoperative by the refusal of the defendants to comply with the requirement of the AIAC Arbitration Rules that each party shall contribute equally towards the AIAC’s deposit or further deposit to cover the Arbitrator’s fees and the AIAC’s administrative costs. It is an inconsistent and untenable position for the defendant to take, that its refusal to pay its share of the AIAC’s Deposit does not in any way affect the validity of the arbitration agreement. [69] The non-payment of the arbitrator’s fees would have the effect of scuttling the arbitration for there is no good reason not to pay equally the AIAC’s Deposit and claim back from the losing party. The reason here is simply that the defendant does not want to pay. We fail to see how that is not calculated towards derailing the arbitration. Agreeing to arbitration comes together with agreeing to comply with the Rules governing the arbitration. Breach of the Rules would attract consequences. [70] Such a breach is a material breach for the payment of the AIAC’s Deposit is to facilitate the hearing of the arbitration and its non-payment has the effect of frustrating the arbitration and depriving the other party of S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 of 44 the benefit of their bargain. Such a breach would bar the defendant from compelling arbitration when it has manifested no commitment to it and indeed worked towards delaying and derailing it. [71] In other words, the defendant is in effect saying that its breach of the AIAC Arbitration Rules under which the arbitration is to be conducted does not in any way affect the valid and binding agreement to arbitrate. We do not agree. Breach of the Rules would in the circumstances of this case result in the arbitrator having to exercise its power under the Rules which would include the power to terminate the arbitration proceedings. [72] Clearly the defendant is not entitled to take advantage of its own breach and insist on continuing with the arbitration. It would be a case of the defendant not walking its talk. The practical effect of not paying one’s share of the Arbitrator’s fees would be that the Arbitrator is not obliged to continue with the hearing and may indeed terminate the arbitration before him. Parties are then at liberty to pursue litigation in Court as the arbitration agreement has been rendered inoperative. The refusing party that has defaulted in the equally binding contractual obligation to pay its share of the AIAC’s Deposit cannot insist in wanting the benefits of arbitration without wanting to pay the costs that come with it. [73] We need to go no further than to quote the Court of Appeal in Dato' Abd Rahim Mohamad v. Abdul Farish Rashid [2009] 1 CLJ 395 where it was held as follows: [6] We find it unnecessary to quote at length from the several authorities cited to us. Suffice to say that there is a presumptive rule of construction that a party is not to be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. See S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 of 44 Cheall v. Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff [1983] 1 All ER 1130; Alghussein Establishment v. Eton College [1991] 1 All ER 267. And we consider the head note of the latter authority to represent the law as it now stands on the point. “The principle that in the absence of clear express provisions in a contract to the contrary it was not to be presumed that the parties intended that a party should be entitled to take advantage of his own breach as against the other party was not limited to cases where a party was relying on his own wrong to avoid his obligations under the contract but applied also where a party sought to obtain a benefit under a continuing contract on account of his breach.” (emphasis added) [74] We are not unaware of the case of BDMS Limited v Rafael Advanced Defence Systems [2014] EWHC 451 (Comm) where the High Court in England held that the failure of the respondent to pay its share of the advance on costs in an ICC arbitration, did not in the circumstances of the case, amount to a repudiatory breach of the arbitration agreement. The High Court held at para [57] as follows: “… (1) This is not a case in which the defendant was refusing to participate in the arbitration. It was in fact actively participating in the arbitration, as illustrated by its involvement in the settling of the TOR and in exchanges as to the scope of the preliminary issue hearing. Its refusal to ‘play by the rules’ was limited to the issue of payment of its advance share on costs, a matter which was due to be addressed at the forthcoming preliminary issue hearing. Further, the refusal was not absolute, but was a refusal to pay unless security for costs was provided.” (emphasis added) S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 of 44 [75] Eamon and Holub in their article titled “See you in court! Respondents’ failure to pay the advance in on arbitration costs” (2009) Int ALR 168 have expressed the following view resonates with this Court: “The refusal by a party respondent to pay its share of advance costs, where this places the arbitration in jeopardy of termination, should give rise to an option in the non-defaulting party claimant to proceed with a suit in the appropriate domestic court on the ground that the arbitration agreement has been rendered inoperative. claimants [sic] should not be compelled to post a defaulting party’s share of an advance deposit, unless the applicable rules or arbitration agreement clearly require it to do so. The Resin court rightly concluded that a respondent who thumbs its nose at its obligations under arbitration will not be entitled to paralyse the arbitral process, force the innocent party, who wishes to avoid that state of limbo, to pay amounts which the respondent promised to pay, or create delay and uncertainty through litigation over the effect of non-payment. The Resin remedy, if embraced, should encourage compliance with international arbitration obligations and discourage dilatory tactics, and in doing so, provide a greater measure of certainty and predictability to the issue of the forum in which to pursue dispute resolution.” (emphasis added) [76] The High Court in the case of Lion Pacific Sdn Bhd v Pestech Technology Sdn Bhd [2022] 1 LNS 135 para [42] decided that in the event the defendant refuses to pay its share of the AIAC’s deposit, the plaintiff can advance the deposit and in that way the conundrum in the risk S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 of 44 of the arbitration being stalled could be avoided and that the advance can be recouped in the Arbitral Award subsequently if the claim is eventually decided in favour of the plaintiff. The High Court did not appear to have considered that under Rule 14(7) of the AIAC Arbitration Rules the Director of AIAC would give an opportunity to the plaintiff to pay the AIAC deposit but that option given is not an obligation and it is expressly provided that if the payment is not made then the Arbitrator may, after consultation with the Director, terminate the arbitration. [77] The default position once the arbitration agreement has become inoperative through the belligerent action and breach of it is that the parties affected may continue with the court proceedings if it has been stayed before under s 10 of the AA 2005 application or that a fresh action in Court may be commenced as in this case. It must not be forgotten thatarbitration is an exception to s 29 of the Contracts Act 1950 [Act 136] (CA 1950) which provides as follows: “29 Agreements in restraint of legal proceedings void Every agreement, by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is void to that extent. Saving of contract to refer to arbitration dispute that may arise Exception 1 - This section shall not render illegal a contract by which two or more persons agree that any dispute which may arise between them in respect of any subject or class of subjects shall be referred to arbitration, and that only the amount awarded in the arbitration shall be recoverable in respect of the dispute so referred.” (emphasis added) S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 of 44 [78] The plaintiff would always be able to enforce its right under the construction contract if the mode of arbitration previously agreed by the parties has been rendered inoperative because of the defendant’s refusal to abide by the AIAC Arbitration Rules. [79] For so long as the Court has jurisdiction generally because the cause of action has arisen within the local jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would assume jurisdiction once its process is activated with the filing of a claim. See the civil jurisdiction of the High Court under s 23 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 [Act 91]. Thankfully there is no need for any party to pay the Judge hearing the dispute his salary for that is taken care of under the Judges Remuneration Act 1971 [Act 45] by the State. [80] As the other party is prepared to proceed with litigation seeing that the defendant is stalling arbitration by its stoic stand not to pay its share of the arbitrator’s fees, it has no cause for complaint if it no longer enjoys party autonomy and confidentiality of the arbitral process and finality of the arbitral award. That is a detriment which the other party is prepared to accept and so those living in glass houses must be careful not to throw stones. Whether a stay of the Court proceedings would be an exercise in futility as the defendant had resolutely resolved not to pay the arbitrator’s fees [81] The stand of the defendant has not changed at the application to strike out the plaintiff’s claim in Court or alternatively its application to stay the proceedings in Court. If at all, its defensive position has escalated S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 of 44 to become more entrenched in that it sees itself having an inalienable and basic right not to pay the deposit towards the AIAC’s Deposit. [82] What has started off as an obligation for both sides to pay their equal share of the AIAC’s Deposit under the AIAC Arbitration Rules and a further opportunity for one to make advance payment for the other with a discretionary extension of time to do so as in an option to pay, has now ossified into an obligation cast on the other party to pay if it is desirous of continuing with the arbitration now at the stage of settling the pleadings. [83] That being the case it is not too difficult to imagine what would happen after the Court has given a stay of the proceedings in Court in favour of the party referring the dispute to arbitration. The defendant would predictably refuse to pay the AIAC’s Deposit leaving the newly appointed arbitrator to terminate the arbitration. [84] The defendant has not challenged the Arbitrator’s order to terminate the arbitration. It is not open to the defendant to want to proceed with another arbitration and to take the same stand of not wanting to pay its share of the AIAC’s Deposit. The stand taken by the defendant would result in the whole arbitration regime being ridiculed for the defendant is in effect saying that if the next arbitrator still proceeds to terminate the arbitral proceedings for the unchanging stand of the defendant not to pay the AIAC’s Deposit, then the whole cycle would have to be repeated until an arbitrator is found, who is prepared not to terminate the arbitral proceedings but to make the plaintiff pay the defendant’s share of the AIAC’s Deposit inclusive of the deposit to the arbitrator’s fees. S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 of 44 [85] The plaintiff may apply to Court to reinstate the Court proceedings previously stayed if there was one or to file a fresh suit in Court as is the case here and the defendant would object to reinstating the Court proceedings or apply for yet another stay on the ground that it has always been faithful to keep his side of the bargain which is to proceed to arbitration. [86] It would be a case of the Court having acted in vain in granting a stay of the Court proceedings until the plaintiff relents and pays the defendant’s share of the AIAC’s Deposit so as to break the impasse. That would be to allow the defendant to hold the plaintiff to the ransom of having to pay the defendant’s share of the AIAC’s Deposit so that the arbitration may proceed. The Court does not and must not act in vain — a maxim attributed to Lord Wilberforce in Malloch v Aberdeen Corp [1971] 1 WLR 1578 and quoted by Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ in Said Dharmalingam bin Abdullah (formerly known as Dharmalingam a/l Ranganathan v Malayan Breweries (Malaya) Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 352 at page 360. [87] It is not unlike a case of the fox chasing its own tail until it is exhausted and decided to throw in the towel, in this case by paying the defendant’s share of the AIAC’s fees. That would be rewriting the AIAC Arbitration Rules, turning an option of the other party to pay into an obligation to pay when it has no obligation to pay the defendant’s share of the AIAC deposit. [88] The doctrine of estoppel applies with equal force to the conduct of parties before an arbitral tribunal such that the conduct of one party not to comply with the requirements of the Rules may operate against its S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 of 44 insistence that it nevertheless wants to proceed with arbitration as its non- compliance is inconsequential to the arbitral proceedings continuing till completion with the handing down of an award. [89] The Court of Appeal in Lembaga Pelabuhan Kelang v Kuala Dimensi Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2010] 9 CLJ 532 made the following observations in the context of estoppel operating to prevent abuse of the arbitral proceedings: “[31] As the parties, original intention to proceed by way of arbitration had been subsequently abandoned, as expressed in cls. 2.4 and 4.4 in DA2 and DA3 respectively, neither of them should be allowed to go back on their words. Hence, it would be unfair or unjust for KDSB to do so. In other words, the doctrine of estoppel may be invoked. This doctrine of estoppel has been succinctly stated by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment v. Texas Commerce [1981] 3 All ER 577 at 584 in the following words: When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption (either in fact or of law, and whether due to misrepresentation or mistake, makes no difference), on which they have conducted the dealings between them, neither of them will be allowed to go back on that assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so. If one of them does seek to go back on it, the courts will give the other such remedy as the equity of the case demands. [32] In Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v. Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 4 CLJ 283, [1995] 3 MLJ 331, 345F-H, the Federal Court followed this estoppel principle. I would respectfully apply the same principle here. S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 of 44 [33] In my judgment, the arbitration clause has, by virtue of the submission to the court jurisdiction clauses, been rendered null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed under s. 10(1)(a). This is one of the exceptional circumstances in which eg, estoppel may be appropriately invoked.” (emphasis added) [90] Taking the overall circumstances of the case into consideration, the wilful refusal of the defendant to pay its share of the AIAC’s Deposits of the Arbitrator’s fees and AIAC’s administrative costs would mean that whilst the plaintiff as claimant in the arbitration has to foot and furnish to AIAC all the Arbitrator’s fees and AIAC administrative costs including bearing the defendant’s share of the fees and costs, the defendant would not have to bear any expenses in defending its claim. [91] That flies in the face of what the parties had agreed in the arbitration agreement where the parties have an obligation and not an option to comply with the AIAC Arbitration Rules. It would be undeniably unconscionable of the defendant to insist on continuing with the arbitration but now changing the Rules of the Arbitration. [92] It is not a case of the plaintiff rewriting the arbitration agreement when it opted for court proceedings after the defendant had obstinately refused to pay its share of the AIAC Deposits but rather a case of the defendant rewriting the Rules of the Arbitration in its attempt to obfuscate its true intent of obstructing the arbitration by declaring that the arbitration must be kept within its orbit. S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 of 44 [93] We can see a case where the refusing party should be estopped from acting unconscionably and unreasonably by the Court refusing a stay of the proceedings. That being the case the problem which the defendant refuses to admit but which it has tried to capitalise on in its resolute refusal to pay the AIAC’s Deposits would have been solved. In as much as an arbitration agreement is a term of the contract, a refusal to abide by it would free the other party from its obligation to proceed with arbitration and instead to opt for a proceeding in Court which ordinarily cannot be restrained under s. 29 of the CA 1950. [94] Both parties are local parties with the construction contract being undertaken in Malaysia and subject to Malaysian law. The advantage of party autonomy and confidentiality of the arbitral proceedings, touted often as merits for preferring arbitration to litigation, must take a back seat when the defendant is not prepared to cooperate to make the arbitration work. We can see no serious prejudice that the defendant would suffer when it has waived its right to arbitrate, if not repudiated the arbitration agreement by its calculated refusal to pay its share of the AIAC’s Deposit without any cogent reasons being proffered other than the professional parlance of commercial reason. [95] In fact the experience of counsel and judges in the litigation before our Courts is that the disputes could be “expeditiously, efficiently and economically prosecuted via the court process”, as was commented by Justice Nantha Balan J (now JCA) in AMDAC (M) Sdn Bhd v BYD Auto Industry Co Ltd [2020] 11 MLJ 281 at para [166] in a case where the respondent had proposed that the disputes between the parties be litigated rather than arbitrated which proposal if accepted, would have S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 of 44 obviated the problem of the appellant’s impecuniosity and the inability to pay the deposit towards arbitration costs. [96] We echo the words of Lord Mustill in Government of Swaziland Central Transport Administration and Alfko Aussenhandels G.M.B.H. v Ljeila Maritime Co. Ltd An Mediterranean Shipping Co. S.A. (The “Leila”) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 172 at page 180 as follows: “... The question is not whether their standpoint is attractive, but whether it would be conscionable if it were allowed to prevail. Considering the matter in this way I have come to the conclusion that it would not in all the circumstances be conscionable to allow the defendants to insist on the arbitration clause in preference to the English jurisdiction clause. … … Leaving this aspect aside, however, I conclude for the reasons previously stated that the defendants are estopped from relying on the arbitration clause in the contract of carriage, and that their application for a stay should be dismissed.” (emphasis added) [97] We did explore if we could vary the order of unconditional stay of the Court proceedings by imposing some conditions that may be deemed fit in the circumstances of this case as the Court is allowed to when granting a stay under s 10(2) of the AA 2005. However, the dogged determination of the defendant in not wanting to pay its share of the AIAC’s Deposit even up to the hearing of the appeal before us, leaves us S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 of 44 without a doubt that the defendant has taken a calculated stand consistent with the strategy it has adopted. [98] The defendant sees it as its right not to have to pay to AIAC the deposit required under the AIAC Arbitration Rules and so gave no reason for its stand. No further opportunity to pay would be necessary nor appreciated in this case where the defendant by its action has waived its right to arbitration. [99] We were more than convinced that to stay the proceedings in Court would be an exercise in futility and tantamount to the Court having acted in vain and frustrating further the plaintiff’s attempt to have the dispute heard and resolved with all due diligence and without further delay. Decision [100] For the reasons given we find that the High Court had erred to granting a stay of the Court proceedings in favour of a reference to arbitration. The defendant had taken a further step in the proceedings in Court and have submitted and surrendered to the jurisdiction of the Court when it invited and invoked the Court’s jurisdiction in applying to strike out the plaintiff’s claim under O 18 r 19(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) ROC 2012 and under O 92 r 4 ROC 2012. [101] Moreover, the arbitration agreement had become inoperative when the defendant refused to pay its share of the AIAC’s Deposit under the AIAC Arbitration Rules. The defendant by such an action has evinced S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 of 44 an intention not to be bound by the arbitration agreement and the plaintiff was perfectly entitled to proceed to Court for the hearing of the dispute between the parties. [102] We had therefore allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court in granting a stay of the High Court proceedings. The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court set aside. We awarded costs of RM15,000,00 to the appellant/plaintiff here and below subject to allocator. [103] The matter shall proceed to trial in the High Court and a Case Management date was fixed. Dated: 27 October 2023. Sgd Lee Swee Seng Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia For the Appellant: Dato’ Seri Mahinder Singh Dulku Dato’ Abdul Fareed bin Abdul Gafoor Farah Nabilah binti Shaharuddin Messrs Ezrilaw Firm S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 of 44 For the Respondent: Ong Yu Shin Lim Wooi Ying The Chambers of Yu Shin Ong Date of Decision: 2 August 2023. S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 of 44 Legislations referred to: AIAC Arbitration Rules 2018 Arbitration Act 2005 [Act 646] Contracts Act 1950 [Act 136] Courts of Judicature Act 1964 [Act 91] Judges Remuneration Act 1971 [Act 45] Permanent Court of Arbitration Arbitration Rules 2012 Rules of Court 2012 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Cases referred to: AMDAC (M) Sdn Bhd v BYD Auto Industry Co Ltd [2020] 11 MLJ 281 BDMS Limited v Rafael Advanced Defence Systems [2014] EWHC 451 (Comm) Dato' Abd Rahim Mohamad v. Abdul Farish Rashid [2009] 1 CLJ 395 Golden Plus Holdings Bhd & Ors v China Idea Development Limited & Ors [2021] MLJU 2532 Government of Swaziland Central Transport Administration and Alfko Aussenhandels G.M.B.H. v Ljeila Maritime Co. Ltd An Mediterranean Shipping Co. S.A. (The “Leila”) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 172 Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd v Owners of the Ship or Vessel ‘Able Lieutenant’ [2002] 6 MLJ 433 S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 of 44 Kebabangan Petroleum Operating Co Sdn Bhd v Mikuni (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 1 MLJ 693 L Capital Jones Ltd and another v Maniach Pte Ltd [2017] SGCA 63; [2017] 1 SLR 312 Lembaga Pelabuhan Kelang v Kuala Dimensi Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2010] 9 CLJ 532 Lion Pacific Sdn Bhd v Pestech Technology Sdn Bhd [2022] 1 LNS 135 Malloch v Aberdeen Corp [1971] 1 WLR 1578 PP Persero Sdn Bhd v Bimacom Property Development Sdn Bhd [1999] 6 MLJ 1 Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd v Etiqa Takaful Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 417 Said Dharmalingam bin Abdullah (formerly known as Dharmalingam a/l Ranganathan v Malayan Breweries (Malaya) Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 352 S/N 2fhSDUJFKEiSKQziBjPrhg Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	77,728	Tika 2.6.0
WA-24NCC-411-09/2017	PEMOHON Datuk Kasi A/L K.L. Palaniappan RESPONDEN 1. ) Modern Eden Sdn Bhd 2. ) PB Trustee Services Berhad (Wasi Bagi Harta Pusaka Allahyarmah Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal Bin Haji Abu Bakar No. K/P: 490318-08-5599) 3. ) Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal 4. ) MKN Holdings Sdn Bhd 5. ) Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd	Civil procedure — Affidavits — plaintiff sought leave to (i) file further affidavit; (ii) to cross examine deponent and non deponent on their affidavits / affirmed on their behalf — Whether filing of further affidavit should be allowed — Whether oral evidence through cross-examination should be taken — Whether court could order the attendance of non deponent for cross-examination under O. 38 r. 2(3) ROC 2012 Rules of Court 2012	31/10/2023	YA Puan Liza Chan Sow Keng	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1b7578ac-7ada-429f-a8cc-b4489ee85c41&Inline=true	IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 In the matter of Menara Embun Sdn. Bhd. (Company No.: 428618-M) And In the matter of Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 And In the matter of Orders 7 and 88 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN DATUK KASI A/L K L PALANIAPPAN (I/C No.: 581025-10-6855) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. MENARA EMBUN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 428618-M) 2. PB TRUSTEE SERVICES BERHAD (Company No.: 196801000374 (7968-T)) (The Executor Of The Estate Of The Late TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL BIN HAJI ABU BAKAR (I/C No.: 490318-08-5599)) 3. FELINA BINTI TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL (I/C No.: 701201-10-6138) 4. MKN HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 91625-P) 5. SETIA HARUMAN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 425145-U) … DEFENDANTS [Heard together with the following Originating Summons pursuant to the Order dated 3.12.2019] 31/10/2023 11:57:39 WA-24NCC-411-09/2017 Kand. 421 S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-411-09/2017 In the matter of Modern Eden Sdn Bhd. (Company No.: 623037-H) And In the matter of Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 And In the matter of Orders 7 and 88 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN DATUK KASI A/L K L PALANIAPPAN (I/C No.: 581025-10-6855) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. MODERN EDEN SDN BHD. (Company No.: 623037-H) 2. PB TRUSTEE SERVICES BERHAD (Company No.: 196801000374 (7968-T)) (The Executor Of The Estate Of The Late TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL BIN HAJI ABU BAKAR (I/C No.: 490318-08-5599)) 3. FELINA BINTI TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL (I/C No.: 701201-10-6138) 4. MKN HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 91625-P) 5. SETIA HARUMAN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 425145-U) … DEFENDANTS S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] There are 4 applications made by the Plaintiff before the court: 1.1 Enclosure (“Enc.”) 290 in Originating Summons WA- 24NCC-410-09/2017 (“Menara Embun OS”) and Enc. 271 in Originating Summons WA-24NCC-411-09/2017 (“Modern Eden OS”) seeking for the Plaintiff’s further Affidavit affirmed on 10.09.2021 (“P afft 7”) to adduce 12 volumes of documents be admitted in evidence for Both OS (“Further Affidavit Application”); and 1.2 Enc. 286 in the Menara Embun OS and Enc. 272 in the Modern Eden OS that the Plaintiff be granted leave to cross-examine, through counsel, Farah Mahami Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal on her Affidavits and Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal on the Affidavits affirmed on her behalf (“Cross Examination Application”). [2] I had allowed the applications on 5.9.2023. These are the reasons for my decisions. As the applications were related, it is convenient to deal with all 4 applications in one judgment. Background [3] The Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS were filed by the Plaintiff, Datuk Kasi a/l Palaniappan (“DK”) pursuant to Section 346 of the Companies Act, 2016 (“CA 2016”) complaining of minority oppression in S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 respect of the affairs of Menara Embun Sdn Bhd and Modern Eden Sdn Bhd respectively. [4] DK together with one Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd also commenced another minority oppression claim in respect of Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd vide Originating Summons No. WA-24NCC-290- 07/2017 (“Setia Haruman OS”). In the Setia Haruman OS, DK was struck out as a Plaintiff on 25.4.2018 as he was not a shareholder of Setia Haruman. DK however owns 50% of the shares in Impresive Circuit. The Setia Haruman OS was heard and eventually dismissed by me on 25.06.2021. The Court of Appeal had affirmed the decision on 20.1.2023. Impresive Circuit’s leave application to appeal to the Federal Court was dismissed by the Federal Court on 15.8.2023. [5] The Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS were converted into writ actions by Wong Chee Lin J but both had reverted back to OS actions after the 2nd to 4th Defendants’ appeals to the Court of Appeal was allowed on 26.08.2021 and the Plaintiff’s applications for leave to appeal to the Federal Court were dismissed on 21.2.2022. [6] In each of the 3 OS Actions, Tan Sri Mustapha Kamal (“TSMK”) was named as the 2nd Defendant. The Plaintiff’s complaints in the 3 OS Actions are that alleged oppressive acts were carried out in breach of an alleged Understanding, New Board Understanding that DK allegedly had with TSMK and DK’s legitimate expectation to participate in the management of Setia Haruman, Menara Embun and Modern Eden. S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 The Further Affidavit Applications [7] Via P Afft 7, the Plaintiff seeks to adduce 12 volumes of documents as follows: a) Volumes 1 to 3 - documents exhibited in the earlier affidavits in these proceedings; b) Volume 4 - documents related to Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd; c) Volumes 5 to 9 - documents pertaining to 15 other companies and Setia Haruman; d) Volume 10 - documents pertaining to the affairs of several companies which existed before the incorporation of the 1st Defendant; e) Volume 11 - the notes of proceedings of the cross examination of TSMK, Azmy and THP in the Setia Haruman OS from 17th to 19th March 2021(which the 2nd to 4th Defendants have no objection); f) Volume 12 - document included by the 2nd to 4th Defendants to rebut the documents filed by the Plaintiff in volumes 4 to 10 for purposes of trial. [8] The documents sought to be adduced has since been narrowed down to volumes 1 to 3, 5 to 9 (except 1 document in volume 8 being the Certified True Copy of Form 13 A of MK Land by the Companies S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Commission of Malaysia, and volume 11 which was admitted by consent as these notes of proceedings are relevant but were not available earlier. [9] 2nd to 4th Defendants objections may be summarised as follows: 9.1 That the documents sought to be introduced concern other companies/joint ventures and Setia Haruman which are irrelevant documents; 9.2 These documents are sought to be adduced after the dismissal of the Setia Haruman OS. It is a belated attempt by the Plaintiff to cure the shortfalls of the Setia Haruman OS and an attempt to have a 2nd bite at the cherry; 9.3 Prior to the conversion, the Plaintiff had filed 6 affidavits in support of the Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS (“the OSs”). These documents were available to the Plaintiff at the time of filing of the OSs in 2017 and the exchange of affidavits; There was no explanation as to relevance and why these documents were not exhibited in the earlier affidavits citing in support of their arguments L.K Insulation Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Apex Energy Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 733: “[10] At any rate the reason given is not cogent enough: that of wanting to file a further affidavit. Generally only 3 affidavits are allowed for an application: an affidavit in support, an affidavit in opposition and a further affidavit in reply to that affidavit in opposition. Unless there are cogent reasons for affirming a further affidavit as in the documents that were sought to be referred to were not available previously or that what has been referred to in the last S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 affidavit filed is a lie, courts generally would not allow further affidavits to be filed. Otherwise there would be no end to affidavits filed because, human nature being what it is, everyone wants to have the final and last word! Therefore if in an affidavit in reply there is more than a reply to the affidavit filed in opposition, I would disregard the new matters raised which should have been raised in the affidavit in support.” (counsel’s emphasis) [10] The Plaintiff argued that: 10.1 The Plaintiff had in its Affidavits (Afft 7 Para 12) and Afft 8 Para 7 explained the contents of the documents as well as shown how these documents are both relevant and necessary to the core issues in both OSs i.e. the relationship between DK and TSMK, the Understanding, the New Board Understanding as well as the breaches of these understandings; 10.2 the documents relating to DK’s and TSMK’s various joint ventures are necessary and relevant to the manner in which DK and TSMK would run their joint ventures which include Menara Embun and Menara Eden; 10.3 The documents relating to Setia Haruman are necessary and relevant because the conduct at Setia Haruman affected DK’s participation in Menara Embun and Menara Eden. In this regard, the term “affairs of the company” in Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 is to be widely construed such that it includes the affairs of various S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 companies where such affairs are all closely connected e.g. parent and subsidiary companies citing in support: (i) Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] SGCA 47: “[42] We think that the approach adopted in the above cited cases is sound and we also agree that, in the final analysis, the question that must be answered in this regard is whether the affairs of the subsidiary affect or impact the holding company: Lim Chee Twang at [97]. Legitimate claims for relief from oppression should not be defeated by technical and legalistic objections relating to the company's shareholding structure; at the same time the doctrine of separate legal personalities and the strict words of the statute ("the affairs of the company" [emphasis added]) must be respected. In our view, the balance between these competing interests would be properly drawn by a requirement that commercially unfair conduct in the management of a subsidiary would be relevant so long and to the extent that such conduct affected or impacted the holding company whose member was the party claiming relief from oppression. The purpose and policy behind s 216 of the Companies Act is, above all, to grant relief from the oppressive behaviour to shareholders who would otherwise be unable to stop that abuse: see below at [49]. If the affairs of the subsidiary do not affect or impact the holding company, shareholders and members of the latter could hardly complain that their interests were therefore prejudiced.” (ii) Tob Chee Hoong v Tob Chee Choong [2017] MLJU 1303: “[50] I would respectfully follow this observation and rule that in this country, similarly, the phrase ‘affairs of the company’ S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 found in Section 181(1) of the CA (and the new but identically worded Section 346(1) of the Companies Act 2016) should be construed widely, to encompass the affairs of entities which are not themselves the subject of the oppression action, but which affairs of those entities, affect the subject company in the nature and to the extent which is beyond the inconsequential, be it a parent or a subsidiary. … [54] This provide much support to a wide reading of ‘affairs of the company’ which is wholly in line with the design of the law to ensure that in circumstances where oppressive conduct could be proven, legal redress to those unlawfully aggrieved is available and not impeded by the artificiality or in the complexity of corporate structures. Otherwise, wrongdoers in corporate world would be encouraged to strategize and build upon more complex conglomerate-like structures and perpetuate such unlawful and oppressive conduct in a fashion orchestrated to defeat the application of Section 181 (1) (Section 346 (1) of the Companies Act 2016), and almost literally employing the section as an engine of fraud. The law will fail in its true objective and the ends of justice will be far from being served if such a grim scenario is allowed to transpire, if not already manifest and flourishing.” (iii) That this principle is applicable to Setia Haruman, Menara Embun and Menara Eden was recognised by Azizul Azmi J when he heard the striking out applications in the Setia Haruman OS where DK was struck out as a Plaintiff but Impresive Circuit was allowed to continue pursuing the claim in Datuk Kasi S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Palaniappan & Anor v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 32: “[14] …Tob’s case established the principle that the expression ‘affairs of the company’ in s 346(1)(a) is to be construed widely, and would encompass oppressive conduct that is conducted at a subsidiary or a holding company. [15] While I fully agree with the ratio of the decision of Mohd Nazlan J in Tob’s case… … [18] He (DK) would have been perfectly entitled to allege, based on the principle in Tob’s case, that he was being oppressed at Menara Embun or Modern Eden by virtue of acts conducted at Setia Haruman. This is because the acts carried out at the Setia Haruman would amount to affairs of Menara Embun and/or Modern Eden. In my judgment, it makes no difference that Setia Haruman is not a subsidiary of either Menara Embun or Modern Eden. It suffices that either company holds shares in Setia Haruman, for conduct carried out at Setia Haruman to be the subject of a complaint of oppression at either Menara Embun or Modern Eden.” 10.4 P Afft 7 seeks to produce documents comprised previously in Part B of the Common Bundle of documents to enable the Plaintiff to discharge its burden to prove the Understanding, the New Board Understanding or the breaches of these understandings which amounted to oppressive acts against the Plaintiff; Having been produced in the Common bundles for trial, there is no surprise to the Defendants, the documents are admissible S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 whether the matter is tried as a writ action or an originating summons citing in support the case of Thavanathan a/l Balasubramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 MLJ 401, that all “evidence which is sufficiently relevant to the facts in issue is admissible”; 10.5 Both OSs are oppression claims which concern various complex factual and legal issues. To limit the Affidavits in such a case to only an Affidavit in support by the Plaintiff, one Affidavit in reply by the Defendant and then an Affidavit in reply by the Plaintiff as suggested by the Defendants would not lead to a just and effectual determination of both OSs. This is more so when the Defendants themselves have filed multiple Affidavits instead of subscribing to their own contention of Defendants only filing a single Affidavit in reply; 10.6 the Affidavits in respect of both OSs were still in the midst of being exchanged prior to the Conversion and once the Conversion was ordered, documents intended to be relied on by parties had to be adduced through the CBODs instead of further Affidavits; the Plaintiff had filed the Further Affidavit in both OSs to adduce the documents within 2 weeks of the Conversion being set aside by the Court of Appeal and well in advance of any hearing date of both OSs; L K Insulation Engineering relied upon by the Defendants is distinguishable because it concerned a summary judgment application for a debt recovery claim and the party seeking to file the further Affidavit had only S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 informed the Court of their intention to do so at the hearing of the summary judgment application. Court’s finding [11] Having considered the cause papers and the parties’ submissions, I find the narrowed down documents sought to be adduced are relevant and necessary to both OSs as they relate to the central issue of the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding and the purported breaches thereof. [12] I am of the respectful view that the Plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to fully ventilate his case in both OSs. In this regard, the Plaintiff had in his affidavits for the Further Affidavit Application explained although not in great detail why these documents are both relevant and necessary to the core issues in both OSs. [13] The Defendants’ posit that the Further Affidavit Application is an abuse of process because these documents ought to have been adduced in the Plaintiff’s 6 Affidavits prior to the Conversion is untenable as I accept the Plaintiff’s assertion that the affidavits in respect of both OSs were still in the midst of being exchanged prior to the Conversion after which the said documents (except for volume 11 which was not available then) were produced in Part B in the common bundles for trial. Once the appeal against the conversion to a writ action was allowed by the Court of Appeal which ordered the matters to continue and disposed by OS, the Plaintiff still wishing to rely on the said documents had no choice but to adduce them through a further affidavit, in this case through P Afft 7. S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [14] In any case, I find there is no element of surprise nor prejudice occasioned to the Defendants as they will have an opportunity to reply. [15] I find it just and equitable and thus exercised my discretion to grant leave to the Plaintiff to file P Afft 7 containing the narrowed down documents only and volume 11 which was consented to. Cross Examination Applications [16] I ought to set out some basic principles on this subject. [17] First, it is settled law that the court retains an absolute discretion whether or not to allow cross-examination of a deponent on his affidavit – see as mere examples, Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189; Balwant Singh Purba v R Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3; Regional Centre for Arbitration v Ooi Beng Choo & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 383. As such, each case is to be decided on its own particular facts as “Exercises of judicial discretion are not judicial precedent because they are only authority for the facts of the particular case.” - Structural Concrete Sdn Bhd v. Wing Tiek Holdings Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 300, at 306 CA. [18] Second, the applicant for leave to cross-examine a deponent bears the legal burden to persuade the court to exercise its discretion to grant leave - in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487. S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [19] Third, the application has to be made bona fide or in good faith. In Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189, at 190, Salleh Abas FJ said: “To allow or not to allow the respondent’s application to cross-examine the appellant’s witnesses upon their affidavits, I take it, is a matter of court’s discretion. In appropriate circumstances, there is no reason why such application should be refused merely because the deponent is a foreigner living outside the jurisdiction (Re Lucas [1952] 1 All ER 102); “otherwise foreigners would have an advantage” (Strauss v Goldschmidt 8 SLR 239). It is really a matter of common sense and an elementary legal principle that a party who swears an affidavit much be prepared to stand up to it by cross- examination unless the application to cross- examine him is without just cause vexatious or motivated by desire to delay the proceedings (Allen v Allen [1894] P 239). In view of the appellant’s application for judgment under Order 32 Rule 6, I am not, however, prepared to hold the respondent’s application to cross- examine the appellant’s witnesses as being without just cause or motivated by desire to delay the proceedings or without bona fide or sham or vexatious. (emphasis added) [20] Fourth, relevancy as to disputes of the facts has to be shown to warrant cross -examination. The Court of Appeal in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (supra) stated: “[25] You can discern from the authorities referred by the parties that three prime considerations would influence the court in the exercise of its discretion to allow or disallow cross-examination on affidavit. Firstly, the truth of the averment in the affidavit must be challenged or the issues of fact identified. Secondly, cross-examination should only be allowed if the disputed fact is relevant to the issue to be decided and must be limited to that issue only. And thirdly, cross-examination would not advance the cause of justice and should be refused if there is sufficient affidavit evidence or S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 contemporaneous documents to enable the court to properly decide without the need of cross-examination. It is important to take into account all facts when considering an application for cross-examination and if it has little relevance or little weight to the issue which the judge has to decide, then cross-examination should not be permitted.” [21] Last but not least, as stated in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (supra) cross-examination must advance the cause of justice. When a conflict in affidavit evidence may be resolved by undisputed contemporaneous document, the cause of justice is not advanced. Defendants’ objections. [22] The Defendants claim there is no basis for the cross-examination of Farah on her Affidavits and Felina on the Affidavits affirmed on her behalf. CA Order dated 26.8.2021 gave liberty to apply to cross-examine deponent [23] As for the Defendants’ 1st ground of objection that cross- examination would go against the decision of the Court of Appeal setting aside the Conversion, I find no merits in this contention for the simple reason that in fact, the Court of Appeal on 26.8.2021 allowed the Conversion Appeal with liberty to the Plaintiff to apply for cross- examination. The Order reads: "1. Rayuan ini dibenarkan dan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 26.10.2018 yang menukarkan Saman Pemula bertarikh 28 September 2017 kepada tindakan Writ diketepikan dan perkara ini dikembalikan kepada Saman Pemula dengan kebebasan S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 untuk memohon untuk memeriksa balas deponen.” This Order appears at Enc. 324 p 23-25. Viva voce evidence imperative [24] As for the next ground that the Plaintiff had not identified the disputes of material facts, I find that there is more than sufficient material in the affidavits to form a basis for cross-examination. Here, the pith of the Plaintiff’s claim lay in the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding. [25] Having considered the affidavits filed by the parties and the exhibits annexed, and the submissions of the parties both oral and written, I am of the firm view that anyhow once slices it, there are disputes of facts in the Affidavits relating to the Understanding, the New Board Understanding, the breaches of these understandings and the resolutions being passed in Menara Embun and Menara Eden purportedly without DK’s knowledge, consent and/or approval so as to facilitate the said breaches. All the Defendants have denied the existence of the said Understandings and the alleged breaches thereof. In my respectful view, the controversy of facts pertaining to the truth of the allegations of fact of the alleged Understandings and breaches can only be resolved by viva voce evidence. It would be critical to ascertain the true state of affairs by resort to cross-examination. It is insufficient merely to rely on affidavits evidence alone to make a definitive determination whether there is in fact minority oppression inflicted on DK in respect of the conduct of affairs of the 2 companies. S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [26] In my judgment, it would be wrong to ascribe no importance to why cross-examination is necessary. If the Plaintiff is denied leave to cross-examine Felina and Farar, as decided in Tahansan Sdn Bhd v Tay Bok Choon [1985] 1 MLJ 58, this court has to ignore the disputed averments in affidavits and, the Plaintiffs will run the risk of not being able to prove its case. In fact in the Tay Bok Choon case, the former Supreme Court held on the facts of that case, “in the face of the denial that the agreement was ever made, the trial judge should have heard oral evidence before deciding whether the alleged agreement was ever made” and the court can hear oral evidence even if no application was made under O 38 r 2(3): “Order 38 rule 2(3) of the Rules of the High Court empowers the Court to examine the deponents regardless of the absence of such application, and we agree that in this instance it should have done so.” [27] Just as in Tay Bok Choon, the Understandings and breaches here were denied by the Defendants. This need to cross examine is further exacerbated by the fact that the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding are not in writing. I hence cannot with conviction say that a decision can be made from the contemporaneous documents in the court file in order to arrive at a decision on the matters in issue. In my utmost respectful view, cross examination in this case would advance the cause of justice. [28] I find the case of Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & Ors and another application [1994] 2 MLJ 789 cited by the Defendants is to be distinguished as the court there found the matter could be decided on the undisputed contemporaneous documents in that case. S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 Similarly, the case of Nasser Ali Azayez Maktoum Al Sheraifi & Ors v Affinity Heights Sdn Bhd [2018] 5 CLJ 751 is also distinguishable as the court there took the exceptional circumstances approach when considering whether to permit cross-examination of a deponent in the context of a winding up proceeding as: (i) it is a primary rule that petitions for winding up are heard on affidavit evidence; (ii) the Companies Act 1965 and the Companies Winding-up Rules 1972 do not expressly provide for a similar right to apply for the cross-examination of the affidavits as found in the RC 2012; (iii) it is public policy that a winding up petition be heard expeditiously. Cross-examination of non deponent [29] As for cross-examination of Felina in respect of affidavits affirmed on her behalf by TSMK, the Defendants contend the Plaintiff’s application to cross - examine her as a non-deponent is irrational, vexatious, misconceived and an abuse of process. The Defendants posited that Order 38 rule 2(2) ROC 2012 applies only to the cross examination of deponents of affidavits. It was pointed out that the Court of Appeal in Kumar Jaspal Quah did not agree with Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228. S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [30] In Gomez v. Gomez, Raja Azlan Shah J (later Lord President and HRH Sultan of Perak) allowed the cross-examination of a priest who had given a letter which was annexed as an exhibit to the Wife’s custody affidavit owing to conflicting evidence concerning the capability of either parent to look after the welfare of the child based on religious ground. In allowing the application, His Lordship stated: “In the present case there is only 1 issue, that is, the issue in the pending action which is whether the order can be varied. The matter raised in the three affidavits are all matters relating to the action. The applicant complains that the respondent is no longer a fit and proper person to have custody of the child. The respondent says that she is still capable of looking after the child’s religion and moral upbringing. The Rev Father wood supports her. It is the same as if he has sworn an affidavit to that effect. It is only fair and proper that the appellant be allowed to cross-examine them on their affidavits.” [31] His Royal Highness considered: 31.1 O. 38 r. 1 of the then Rules of the Supreme Court 1957 (which is similar the present O. 38 r. 2(3) ROC 2012) stated: “The power given by O. 38 r. 1 is obviously a matter of discretion to be exercised in accordance with well known judicial principles.” 31.2 And approved the following passage from Leiserach v. Schalit [1934] 2 KB 353 where leave was granted to 2 arbitrators, who were not parties nor had they affirmed any affidavits, to be called as witnesses to assist the Court to ascertain the facts of the case: S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 “This is a case in which the Court has listened to numerous, affidavits, statements in some of which directly contradict the statements in others. It is also a case in which it is essential, in order to do justice, that the Court should be enabled to make up its mind as to the actual facts of the case. In the view of the Court this is an exceptional case, and in this exceptional case the Court has arrived at the conclusion that the only way in which it can satisfactorily deal with the matter before it is by having the assistance of the evidence of the arbitrators, who, being independent persons, can tell the Court what it is to ascertain from a perusal of the affidavits on one side and the other - namely, what are the essential facts of the case. On that ground and on that ground only the Court accedes to the application to call as witnesses both the gentlemen who acted as arbitrators in the matter”. [32] Gomez v. Gomez was cited with approval in the following cases: 32.1 In Balwant Singh Purba v. R. Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3 by Lim Beng Choon J: “In the circumstances Raja Azlan Shah J (as His Royal Highness then was) quite rightly allowed cross-examination on the respondent’s affidavit since the issue in the action before His Lordship was whether the custody of the child should be given to the applicant or the respondent in view of the conflicting evidence concerning the capability of either parent to look after the welfare of the child based on religious ground.” 32.2 In Paul Raj Samy Anthony v. Annamalar Anthonysamy [2003] 3 CLJ 166 where R K Nathan J stated: “Azlan Shah J (as his Highness then was) in a short but erudite judgment decided that O. 38 r. 2(3) of the RHC must be interpreted S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 to also include the makers of the exhibits who would be subjected to cross-examination.” [33] In Messrs Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah v Dato’ Peh Teck Quee [2003] 5 MLJ 241, Mohd Hishamudin J (later JCA) however held that under O. 38 r. 2(3) “A party to a proceeding cannot apply to cross-examine a person if in the first place such person has not given any evidence either in the form of oral evidence or in the form of affidavit evidence. For, in the absence of such prior evidence, there is no material on which to cross- examine.” [34] On a literal interpretation, Order 38 rule 2(2) ROC 2012 empowers the Court to order the attendance for cross-examination of “the person making any such affidavit.” [35] With respect, here Felina’ has given evidence – the affidavits affirmed by her now late father, were also affirmed by him also on her behalf. She can be cross-examined when one applies the overriding interest of justice concept to enable Courts to deal with cases justly. In fact, Order 1A and Order 2 Rule 1 of the ROC 2012 exhorts the court in administering the Rules particularly here when the alleged Understandings are not in writing, to have regard to the overriding interest of justice and not only to the technical noncompliance with the Rules. These 2 orders give the Court wide powers in order to do justice. [36] I have also borne in mind the terse reminder of Mohtar Abdullah FCJ in Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385, at page 426: S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 “… Rules are rules! They must be obeyed. Numerous judgments can be cited in support of this firm stand on the necessity for a strict adherence of the rules. I agree. However, a judge should not be so besotted by the rules that his sense of justice and fairness becomes impaired because of his blinkered fixation on technicalities of the law and the cold letter of the law …” (emphasis added) [37] Although the Court of Appeal in a separate case in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487 did not agree with Gomez v Gomez, with respect, I find a close reading of the case shows the Court of Appeal only disagreed with Gomez v Gomez on the aspect of the onus – which is on the respondent to show why cross-examination should not be allowed. [38] On my part, I have decided to follow the Gomez v Gomez principles on cross-examining a non deponent so that all relevant evidence available is adduced before the court and for. In the present case, it is also be noted TMSK has passed away and can no longer be cross-examined on the 2 affidavits filed but which were adopted by Felina as her evidence. No delay [39] In Indrani a/p Rajaratnam & Ors v Fairview Schools Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 56; at 62, the application for cross-examination was dismissed owing to delay. Here the Defendants argued that the present application is filed for an improper purpose – that it is merely a strategy by DK to delay the hearing of the OSs to its conclusion. Nevertheless, I find there is no S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 delay here as the application here was made on 10.9.2021 i.e. 2 weeks after the Court of Appeal allowed the Conversion appeal. Res judicata? [40] The Defendants’ final point of contention is that my findings in the Setia Haruman OS that there was no Understanding and New Board Understanding constitutes res judicata in respect of both OSs. [41] In the Setia Haruman OS, in Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 1508, I stated: “[38] I find that the said “Understanding” and/or “New Board Understanding were made between two non-members of the Company. As such DK’s complaint is not a complaint member qua member pursuant to the Shareholders’ Agreement and/or the Articles of Association… [66] Moreover, the principle in Jet-Tech (supra) was affirmed by the Federal Court in Looh Siong Chee…“Shareholder’s Agreement and breaches of the same are clearly not matters pertaining to the affairs of the company. They are private matters enforceable by the parties to the Shareholder’s Agreement. “Following these cases, DK’s complaints that he was not nominated by the 10th Defendant to be a director of the Company is best addressed in suit KLHC WA-22NCC-500-08/2018.” [42] Added to that, the Federal Court in dismissing Impressive Circuit’s application for leave to appeal against my decision in the Setia Haruman OS said, as evident from the minutes: “Finally, we do not see merit in the contention that the findings in this suit will prejudice the hearing of the remaining two suits.” S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [43] Thus, I do not feel disposed to adjudge on this point of res judicata at this juncture; issues on the Understanding and New Board Understanding which were personal to DK and TSMK are better pursued in both OSs as DK and TSMK are registered members of Menara Embun and Menara Eden. Whilst there is a common issue of the “Understanding” and “New Board Understanding” between the Plaintiff and TMSK in all 3 Actions, Impresive Circuit as the plaintiff in the Setia Haruman OS is not a party in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs, UEM Land Berhad and Virtual Path Sdn Bhd who are the shareholders of Setia Haruman and the four (4) Directors of Setia Haruman all named as defendants in the Setia Haruman OS are not parties in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs. In my utmost respectful view, the complaint of oppression in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs should be heard and decided separately on their own facts and evidence. Whether or not there was oppression in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs was for DK to prove; and any decision thereafter must be based strictly on the best evidence presented by DK and the defence if any put up by the Defendants. [44] I thus conclude that on the facts of the OSs, in the interest of doing substantive justice, it is appropriate to allow cross examination on the issue of the Understanding, the New Board Understanding, the breaches of these understandings and the resolutions being passed in Menara Embun and Menara Eden purportedly without DK’s knowledge, consent and/or approval to facilitate the said breaches. I find DK ought to be given the opportunity to fully ventilate his case and he has discharged the onus on why cross-examination should be ordered. S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [45] Consequently, leave in enc. 286 (OS 410 ) and enc. 272 (OS 411) is given to DK to cross examine (1) Farah Mahami Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal (NRIC No. 820512-14-5662) on the contents of the two (2) Affidavits she had affirmed on 28.11.2017 and 25.4.2018 and filed in these proceedings; (ii) Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal (NRIC No. 701201-10-6138) on the contents of the two (2) Affidavits affirmed on her behalf on 25.4.2018 and 7.6.2018 and filed in these proceedings, with costs subject to allocator. Dated: 22nd October 2023 - sgd - ……………………….. Liza Chan Sow Keng Judge High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff : Mr Gopal Sreenevasan (together with him, Shermaljit Singh) Messrs Owee & Co For the 1st & 5th : Eric Clement Defendants Messrs Abd Halim Ushah & Assoc. For the 2nd, 3rd & 4th : Dato M. Pathmanathan (together with him, Defendants Shirin Pathmanathan and Fatin Muzfirah) Messrs M Pathmanathan & Co. CASES REFERRED: L.K Insulation Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Apex Energy Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 733 Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] SGCA 47 S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Tob Chee Hoong v Tob Chee Choong [2017] MLJU 1303 Datuk Kasi Palaniappan & Anor v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 32 Thavanathan a/l Balasubramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 MLJ 401 Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189 Balwant Singh Purba v R Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3 Regional Centre for Arbitration v Ooi Beng Choo & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 383 Structural Concrete Sdn Bhd v. Wing Tiek Holdings Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 300 Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487 Tahansan Sdn Bhd v Tay Bok Choon - [1985] 1 MLJ 58 Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & Ors and another application [1994] 2 MLJ 789 Nasser Ali Azayez Maktoum Al Sheraifi & Ors v Affinity Heights Sdn Bhd [2018] 5 CLJ 751 Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228 Paul Raj Samy Anthony v. Annamalar Anthonysamy [2003] 3 CLJ 166 Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385 Messrs Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah v Dato’ Peh Teck Quee [2003] 5 MLJ 241 Indrani a/p Rajaratnam & Ors v Fairview Schools Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 56 Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 1508 S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 STATUTE/LEGISLATION REFERRED: Order 1A and Order 2 Rule 1, Order 38 rule 2(2) and 2(3) Rules of Court 2012 S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-411-09/2017	43,149	Tika 2.6.0
WA-24NCC-411-09/2017	PEMOHON Datuk Kasi A/L K.L. Palaniappan RESPONDEN 1. ) Modern Eden Sdn Bhd 2. ) PB Trustee Services Berhad (Wasi Bagi Harta Pusaka Allahyarmah Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal Bin Haji Abu Bakar No. K/P: 490318-08-5599) 3. ) Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal 4. ) MKN Holdings Sdn Bhd 5. ) Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd	Civil procedure — Affidavits — plaintiff sought leave to (i) file further affidavit; (ii) to cross examine deponent and non deponent on their affidavits / affirmed on their behalf — Whether filing of further affidavit should be allowed — Whether oral evidence through cross-examination should be taken — Whether court could order the attendance of non deponent for cross-examination under O. 38 r. 2(3) ROC 2012 Rules of Court 2012	31/10/2023	YA Puan Liza Chan Sow Keng	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1b7578ac-7ada-429f-a8cc-b4489ee85c41&Inline=true	IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 In the matter of Menara Embun Sdn. Bhd. (Company No.: 428618-M) And In the matter of Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 And In the matter of Orders 7 and 88 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN DATUK KASI A/L K L PALANIAPPAN (I/C No.: 581025-10-6855) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. MENARA EMBUN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 428618-M) 2. PB TRUSTEE SERVICES BERHAD (Company No.: 196801000374 (7968-T)) (The Executor Of The Estate Of The Late TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL BIN HAJI ABU BAKAR (I/C No.: 490318-08-5599)) 3. FELINA BINTI TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL (I/C No.: 701201-10-6138) 4. MKN HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 91625-P) 5. SETIA HARUMAN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 425145-U) … DEFENDANTS [Heard together with the following Originating Summons pursuant to the Order dated 3.12.2019] 31/10/2023 11:57:39 WA-24NCC-411-09/2017 Kand. 421 S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-411-09/2017 In the matter of Modern Eden Sdn Bhd. (Company No.: 623037-H) And In the matter of Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 And In the matter of Orders 7 and 88 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN DATUK KASI A/L K L PALANIAPPAN (I/C No.: 581025-10-6855) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. MODERN EDEN SDN BHD. (Company No.: 623037-H) 2. PB TRUSTEE SERVICES BERHAD (Company No.: 196801000374 (7968-T)) (The Executor Of The Estate Of The Late TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL BIN HAJI ABU BAKAR (I/C No.: 490318-08-5599)) 3. FELINA BINTI TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL (I/C No.: 701201-10-6138) 4. MKN HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 91625-P) 5. SETIA HARUMAN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 425145-U) … DEFENDANTS S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] There are 4 applications made by the Plaintiff before the court: 1.1 Enclosure (“Enc.”) 290 in Originating Summons WA- 24NCC-410-09/2017 (“Menara Embun OS”) and Enc. 271 in Originating Summons WA-24NCC-411-09/2017 (“Modern Eden OS”) seeking for the Plaintiff’s further Affidavit affirmed on 10.09.2021 (“P afft 7”) to adduce 12 volumes of documents be admitted in evidence for Both OS (“Further Affidavit Application”); and 1.2 Enc. 286 in the Menara Embun OS and Enc. 272 in the Modern Eden OS that the Plaintiff be granted leave to cross-examine, through counsel, Farah Mahami Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal on her Affidavits and Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal on the Affidavits affirmed on her behalf (“Cross Examination Application”). [2] I had allowed the applications on 5.9.2023. These are the reasons for my decisions. As the applications were related, it is convenient to deal with all 4 applications in one judgment. Background [3] The Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS were filed by the Plaintiff, Datuk Kasi a/l Palaniappan (“DK”) pursuant to Section 346 of the Companies Act, 2016 (“CA 2016”) complaining of minority oppression in S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 respect of the affairs of Menara Embun Sdn Bhd and Modern Eden Sdn Bhd respectively. [4] DK together with one Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd also commenced another minority oppression claim in respect of Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd vide Originating Summons No. WA-24NCC-290- 07/2017 (“Setia Haruman OS”). In the Setia Haruman OS, DK was struck out as a Plaintiff on 25.4.2018 as he was not a shareholder of Setia Haruman. DK however owns 50% of the shares in Impresive Circuit. The Setia Haruman OS was heard and eventually dismissed by me on 25.06.2021. The Court of Appeal had affirmed the decision on 20.1.2023. Impresive Circuit’s leave application to appeal to the Federal Court was dismissed by the Federal Court on 15.8.2023. [5] The Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS were converted into writ actions by Wong Chee Lin J but both had reverted back to OS actions after the 2nd to 4th Defendants’ appeals to the Court of Appeal was allowed on 26.08.2021 and the Plaintiff’s applications for leave to appeal to the Federal Court were dismissed on 21.2.2022. [6] In each of the 3 OS Actions, Tan Sri Mustapha Kamal (“TSMK”) was named as the 2nd Defendant. The Plaintiff’s complaints in the 3 OS Actions are that alleged oppressive acts were carried out in breach of an alleged Understanding, New Board Understanding that DK allegedly had with TSMK and DK’s legitimate expectation to participate in the management of Setia Haruman, Menara Embun and Modern Eden. S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 The Further Affidavit Applications [7] Via P Afft 7, the Plaintiff seeks to adduce 12 volumes of documents as follows: a) Volumes 1 to 3 - documents exhibited in the earlier affidavits in these proceedings; b) Volume 4 - documents related to Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd; c) Volumes 5 to 9 - documents pertaining to 15 other companies and Setia Haruman; d) Volume 10 - documents pertaining to the affairs of several companies which existed before the incorporation of the 1st Defendant; e) Volume 11 - the notes of proceedings of the cross examination of TSMK, Azmy and THP in the Setia Haruman OS from 17th to 19th March 2021(which the 2nd to 4th Defendants have no objection); f) Volume 12 - document included by the 2nd to 4th Defendants to rebut the documents filed by the Plaintiff in volumes 4 to 10 for purposes of trial. [8] The documents sought to be adduced has since been narrowed down to volumes 1 to 3, 5 to 9 (except 1 document in volume 8 being the Certified True Copy of Form 13 A of MK Land by the Companies S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Commission of Malaysia, and volume 11 which was admitted by consent as these notes of proceedings are relevant but were not available earlier. [9] 2nd to 4th Defendants objections may be summarised as follows: 9.1 That the documents sought to be introduced concern other companies/joint ventures and Setia Haruman which are irrelevant documents; 9.2 These documents are sought to be adduced after the dismissal of the Setia Haruman OS. It is a belated attempt by the Plaintiff to cure the shortfalls of the Setia Haruman OS and an attempt to have a 2nd bite at the cherry; 9.3 Prior to the conversion, the Plaintiff had filed 6 affidavits in support of the Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS (“the OSs”). These documents were available to the Plaintiff at the time of filing of the OSs in 2017 and the exchange of affidavits; There was no explanation as to relevance and why these documents were not exhibited in the earlier affidavits citing in support of their arguments L.K Insulation Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Apex Energy Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 733: “[10] At any rate the reason given is not cogent enough: that of wanting to file a further affidavit. Generally only 3 affidavits are allowed for an application: an affidavit in support, an affidavit in opposition and a further affidavit in reply to that affidavit in opposition. Unless there are cogent reasons for affirming a further affidavit as in the documents that were sought to be referred to were not available previously or that what has been referred to in the last S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 affidavit filed is a lie, courts generally would not allow further affidavits to be filed. Otherwise there would be no end to affidavits filed because, human nature being what it is, everyone wants to have the final and last word! Therefore if in an affidavit in reply there is more than a reply to the affidavit filed in opposition, I would disregard the new matters raised which should have been raised in the affidavit in support.” (counsel’s emphasis) [10] The Plaintiff argued that: 10.1 The Plaintiff had in its Affidavits (Afft 7 Para 12) and Afft 8 Para 7 explained the contents of the documents as well as shown how these documents are both relevant and necessary to the core issues in both OSs i.e. the relationship between DK and TSMK, the Understanding, the New Board Understanding as well as the breaches of these understandings; 10.2 the documents relating to DK’s and TSMK’s various joint ventures are necessary and relevant to the manner in which DK and TSMK would run their joint ventures which include Menara Embun and Menara Eden; 10.3 The documents relating to Setia Haruman are necessary and relevant because the conduct at Setia Haruman affected DK’s participation in Menara Embun and Menara Eden. In this regard, the term “affairs of the company” in Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 is to be widely construed such that it includes the affairs of various S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 companies where such affairs are all closely connected e.g. parent and subsidiary companies citing in support: (i) Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] SGCA 47: “[42] We think that the approach adopted in the above cited cases is sound and we also agree that, in the final analysis, the question that must be answered in this regard is whether the affairs of the subsidiary affect or impact the holding company: Lim Chee Twang at [97]. Legitimate claims for relief from oppression should not be defeated by technical and legalistic objections relating to the company's shareholding structure; at the same time the doctrine of separate legal personalities and the strict words of the statute ("the affairs of the company" [emphasis added]) must be respected. In our view, the balance between these competing interests would be properly drawn by a requirement that commercially unfair conduct in the management of a subsidiary would be relevant so long and to the extent that such conduct affected or impacted the holding company whose member was the party claiming relief from oppression. The purpose and policy behind s 216 of the Companies Act is, above all, to grant relief from the oppressive behaviour to shareholders who would otherwise be unable to stop that abuse: see below at [49]. If the affairs of the subsidiary do not affect or impact the holding company, shareholders and members of the latter could hardly complain that their interests were therefore prejudiced.” (ii) Tob Chee Hoong v Tob Chee Choong [2017] MLJU 1303: “[50] I would respectfully follow this observation and rule that in this country, similarly, the phrase ‘affairs of the company’ S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 found in Section 181(1) of the CA (and the new but identically worded Section 346(1) of the Companies Act 2016) should be construed widely, to encompass the affairs of entities which are not themselves the subject of the oppression action, but which affairs of those entities, affect the subject company in the nature and to the extent which is beyond the inconsequential, be it a parent or a subsidiary. … [54] This provide much support to a wide reading of ‘affairs of the company’ which is wholly in line with the design of the law to ensure that in circumstances where oppressive conduct could be proven, legal redress to those unlawfully aggrieved is available and not impeded by the artificiality or in the complexity of corporate structures. Otherwise, wrongdoers in corporate world would be encouraged to strategize and build upon more complex conglomerate-like structures and perpetuate such unlawful and oppressive conduct in a fashion orchestrated to defeat the application of Section 181 (1) (Section 346 (1) of the Companies Act 2016), and almost literally employing the section as an engine of fraud. The law will fail in its true objective and the ends of justice will be far from being served if such a grim scenario is allowed to transpire, if not already manifest and flourishing.” (iii) That this principle is applicable to Setia Haruman, Menara Embun and Menara Eden was recognised by Azizul Azmi J when he heard the striking out applications in the Setia Haruman OS where DK was struck out as a Plaintiff but Impresive Circuit was allowed to continue pursuing the claim in Datuk Kasi S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Palaniappan & Anor v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 32: “[14] …Tob’s case established the principle that the expression ‘affairs of the company’ in s 346(1)(a) is to be construed widely, and would encompass oppressive conduct that is conducted at a subsidiary or a holding company. [15] While I fully agree with the ratio of the decision of Mohd Nazlan J in Tob’s case… … [18] He (DK) would have been perfectly entitled to allege, based on the principle in Tob’s case, that he was being oppressed at Menara Embun or Modern Eden by virtue of acts conducted at Setia Haruman. This is because the acts carried out at the Setia Haruman would amount to affairs of Menara Embun and/or Modern Eden. In my judgment, it makes no difference that Setia Haruman is not a subsidiary of either Menara Embun or Modern Eden. It suffices that either company holds shares in Setia Haruman, for conduct carried out at Setia Haruman to be the subject of a complaint of oppression at either Menara Embun or Modern Eden.” 10.4 P Afft 7 seeks to produce documents comprised previously in Part B of the Common Bundle of documents to enable the Plaintiff to discharge its burden to prove the Understanding, the New Board Understanding or the breaches of these understandings which amounted to oppressive acts against the Plaintiff; Having been produced in the Common bundles for trial, there is no surprise to the Defendants, the documents are admissible S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 whether the matter is tried as a writ action or an originating summons citing in support the case of Thavanathan a/l Balasubramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 MLJ 401, that all “evidence which is sufficiently relevant to the facts in issue is admissible”; 10.5 Both OSs are oppression claims which concern various complex factual and legal issues. To limit the Affidavits in such a case to only an Affidavit in support by the Plaintiff, one Affidavit in reply by the Defendant and then an Affidavit in reply by the Plaintiff as suggested by the Defendants would not lead to a just and effectual determination of both OSs. This is more so when the Defendants themselves have filed multiple Affidavits instead of subscribing to their own contention of Defendants only filing a single Affidavit in reply; 10.6 the Affidavits in respect of both OSs were still in the midst of being exchanged prior to the Conversion and once the Conversion was ordered, documents intended to be relied on by parties had to be adduced through the CBODs instead of further Affidavits; the Plaintiff had filed the Further Affidavit in both OSs to adduce the documents within 2 weeks of the Conversion being set aside by the Court of Appeal and well in advance of any hearing date of both OSs; L K Insulation Engineering relied upon by the Defendants is distinguishable because it concerned a summary judgment application for a debt recovery claim and the party seeking to file the further Affidavit had only S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 informed the Court of their intention to do so at the hearing of the summary judgment application. Court’s finding [11] Having considered the cause papers and the parties’ submissions, I find the narrowed down documents sought to be adduced are relevant and necessary to both OSs as they relate to the central issue of the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding and the purported breaches thereof. [12] I am of the respectful view that the Plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to fully ventilate his case in both OSs. In this regard, the Plaintiff had in his affidavits for the Further Affidavit Application explained although not in great detail why these documents are both relevant and necessary to the core issues in both OSs. [13] The Defendants’ posit that the Further Affidavit Application is an abuse of process because these documents ought to have been adduced in the Plaintiff’s 6 Affidavits prior to the Conversion is untenable as I accept the Plaintiff’s assertion that the affidavits in respect of both OSs were still in the midst of being exchanged prior to the Conversion after which the said documents (except for volume 11 which was not available then) were produced in Part B in the common bundles for trial. Once the appeal against the conversion to a writ action was allowed by the Court of Appeal which ordered the matters to continue and disposed by OS, the Plaintiff still wishing to rely on the said documents had no choice but to adduce them through a further affidavit, in this case through P Afft 7. S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [14] In any case, I find there is no element of surprise nor prejudice occasioned to the Defendants as they will have an opportunity to reply. [15] I find it just and equitable and thus exercised my discretion to grant leave to the Plaintiff to file P Afft 7 containing the narrowed down documents only and volume 11 which was consented to. Cross Examination Applications [16] I ought to set out some basic principles on this subject. [17] First, it is settled law that the court retains an absolute discretion whether or not to allow cross-examination of a deponent on his affidavit – see as mere examples, Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189; Balwant Singh Purba v R Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3; Regional Centre for Arbitration v Ooi Beng Choo & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 383. As such, each case is to be decided on its own particular facts as “Exercises of judicial discretion are not judicial precedent because they are only authority for the facts of the particular case.” - Structural Concrete Sdn Bhd v. Wing Tiek Holdings Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 300, at 306 CA. [18] Second, the applicant for leave to cross-examine a deponent bears the legal burden to persuade the court to exercise its discretion to grant leave - in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487. S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [19] Third, the application has to be made bona fide or in good faith. In Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189, at 190, Salleh Abas FJ said: “To allow or not to allow the respondent’s application to cross-examine the appellant’s witnesses upon their affidavits, I take it, is a matter of court’s discretion. In appropriate circumstances, there is no reason why such application should be refused merely because the deponent is a foreigner living outside the jurisdiction (Re Lucas [1952] 1 All ER 102); “otherwise foreigners would have an advantage” (Strauss v Goldschmidt 8 SLR 239). It is really a matter of common sense and an elementary legal principle that a party who swears an affidavit much be prepared to stand up to it by cross- examination unless the application to cross- examine him is without just cause vexatious or motivated by desire to delay the proceedings (Allen v Allen [1894] P 239). In view of the appellant’s application for judgment under Order 32 Rule 6, I am not, however, prepared to hold the respondent’s application to cross- examine the appellant’s witnesses as being without just cause or motivated by desire to delay the proceedings or without bona fide or sham or vexatious. (emphasis added) [20] Fourth, relevancy as to disputes of the facts has to be shown to warrant cross -examination. The Court of Appeal in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (supra) stated: “[25] You can discern from the authorities referred by the parties that three prime considerations would influence the court in the exercise of its discretion to allow or disallow cross-examination on affidavit. Firstly, the truth of the averment in the affidavit must be challenged or the issues of fact identified. Secondly, cross-examination should only be allowed if the disputed fact is relevant to the issue to be decided and must be limited to that issue only. And thirdly, cross-examination would not advance the cause of justice and should be refused if there is sufficient affidavit evidence or S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 contemporaneous documents to enable the court to properly decide without the need of cross-examination. It is important to take into account all facts when considering an application for cross-examination and if it has little relevance or little weight to the issue which the judge has to decide, then cross-examination should not be permitted.” [21] Last but not least, as stated in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (supra) cross-examination must advance the cause of justice. When a conflict in affidavit evidence may be resolved by undisputed contemporaneous document, the cause of justice is not advanced. Defendants’ objections. [22] The Defendants claim there is no basis for the cross-examination of Farah on her Affidavits and Felina on the Affidavits affirmed on her behalf. CA Order dated 26.8.2021 gave liberty to apply to cross-examine deponent [23] As for the Defendants’ 1st ground of objection that cross- examination would go against the decision of the Court of Appeal setting aside the Conversion, I find no merits in this contention for the simple reason that in fact, the Court of Appeal on 26.8.2021 allowed the Conversion Appeal with liberty to the Plaintiff to apply for cross- examination. The Order reads: "1. Rayuan ini dibenarkan dan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 26.10.2018 yang menukarkan Saman Pemula bertarikh 28 September 2017 kepada tindakan Writ diketepikan dan perkara ini dikembalikan kepada Saman Pemula dengan kebebasan S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 untuk memohon untuk memeriksa balas deponen.” This Order appears at Enc. 324 p 23-25. Viva voce evidence imperative [24] As for the next ground that the Plaintiff had not identified the disputes of material facts, I find that there is more than sufficient material in the affidavits to form a basis for cross-examination. Here, the pith of the Plaintiff’s claim lay in the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding. [25] Having considered the affidavits filed by the parties and the exhibits annexed, and the submissions of the parties both oral and written, I am of the firm view that anyhow once slices it, there are disputes of facts in the Affidavits relating to the Understanding, the New Board Understanding, the breaches of these understandings and the resolutions being passed in Menara Embun and Menara Eden purportedly without DK’s knowledge, consent and/or approval so as to facilitate the said breaches. All the Defendants have denied the existence of the said Understandings and the alleged breaches thereof. In my respectful view, the controversy of facts pertaining to the truth of the allegations of fact of the alleged Understandings and breaches can only be resolved by viva voce evidence. It would be critical to ascertain the true state of affairs by resort to cross-examination. It is insufficient merely to rely on affidavits evidence alone to make a definitive determination whether there is in fact minority oppression inflicted on DK in respect of the conduct of affairs of the 2 companies. S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [26] In my judgment, it would be wrong to ascribe no importance to why cross-examination is necessary. If the Plaintiff is denied leave to cross-examine Felina and Farar, as decided in Tahansan Sdn Bhd v Tay Bok Choon [1985] 1 MLJ 58, this court has to ignore the disputed averments in affidavits and, the Plaintiffs will run the risk of not being able to prove its case. In fact in the Tay Bok Choon case, the former Supreme Court held on the facts of that case, “in the face of the denial that the agreement was ever made, the trial judge should have heard oral evidence before deciding whether the alleged agreement was ever made” and the court can hear oral evidence even if no application was made under O 38 r 2(3): “Order 38 rule 2(3) of the Rules of the High Court empowers the Court to examine the deponents regardless of the absence of such application, and we agree that in this instance it should have done so.” [27] Just as in Tay Bok Choon, the Understandings and breaches here were denied by the Defendants. This need to cross examine is further exacerbated by the fact that the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding are not in writing. I hence cannot with conviction say that a decision can be made from the contemporaneous documents in the court file in order to arrive at a decision on the matters in issue. In my utmost respectful view, cross examination in this case would advance the cause of justice. [28] I find the case of Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & Ors and another application [1994] 2 MLJ 789 cited by the Defendants is to be distinguished as the court there found the matter could be decided on the undisputed contemporaneous documents in that case. S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 Similarly, the case of Nasser Ali Azayez Maktoum Al Sheraifi & Ors v Affinity Heights Sdn Bhd [2018] 5 CLJ 751 is also distinguishable as the court there took the exceptional circumstances approach when considering whether to permit cross-examination of a deponent in the context of a winding up proceeding as: (i) it is a primary rule that petitions for winding up are heard on affidavit evidence; (ii) the Companies Act 1965 and the Companies Winding-up Rules 1972 do not expressly provide for a similar right to apply for the cross-examination of the affidavits as found in the RC 2012; (iii) it is public policy that a winding up petition be heard expeditiously. Cross-examination of non deponent [29] As for cross-examination of Felina in respect of affidavits affirmed on her behalf by TSMK, the Defendants contend the Plaintiff’s application to cross - examine her as a non-deponent is irrational, vexatious, misconceived and an abuse of process. The Defendants posited that Order 38 rule 2(2) ROC 2012 applies only to the cross examination of deponents of affidavits. It was pointed out that the Court of Appeal in Kumar Jaspal Quah did not agree with Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228. S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [30] In Gomez v. Gomez, Raja Azlan Shah J (later Lord President and HRH Sultan of Perak) allowed the cross-examination of a priest who had given a letter which was annexed as an exhibit to the Wife’s custody affidavit owing to conflicting evidence concerning the capability of either parent to look after the welfare of the child based on religious ground. In allowing the application, His Lordship stated: “In the present case there is only 1 issue, that is, the issue in the pending action which is whether the order can be varied. The matter raised in the three affidavits are all matters relating to the action. The applicant complains that the respondent is no longer a fit and proper person to have custody of the child. The respondent says that she is still capable of looking after the child’s religion and moral upbringing. The Rev Father wood supports her. It is the same as if he has sworn an affidavit to that effect. It is only fair and proper that the appellant be allowed to cross-examine them on their affidavits.” [31] His Royal Highness considered: 31.1 O. 38 r. 1 of the then Rules of the Supreme Court 1957 (which is similar the present O. 38 r. 2(3) ROC 2012) stated: “The power given by O. 38 r. 1 is obviously a matter of discretion to be exercised in accordance with well known judicial principles.” 31.2 And approved the following passage from Leiserach v. Schalit [1934] 2 KB 353 where leave was granted to 2 arbitrators, who were not parties nor had they affirmed any affidavits, to be called as witnesses to assist the Court to ascertain the facts of the case: S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 “This is a case in which the Court has listened to numerous, affidavits, statements in some of which directly contradict the statements in others. It is also a case in which it is essential, in order to do justice, that the Court should be enabled to make up its mind as to the actual facts of the case. In the view of the Court this is an exceptional case, and in this exceptional case the Court has arrived at the conclusion that the only way in which it can satisfactorily deal with the matter before it is by having the assistance of the evidence of the arbitrators, who, being independent persons, can tell the Court what it is to ascertain from a perusal of the affidavits on one side and the other - namely, what are the essential facts of the case. On that ground and on that ground only the Court accedes to the application to call as witnesses both the gentlemen who acted as arbitrators in the matter”. [32] Gomez v. Gomez was cited with approval in the following cases: 32.1 In Balwant Singh Purba v. R. Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3 by Lim Beng Choon J: “In the circumstances Raja Azlan Shah J (as His Royal Highness then was) quite rightly allowed cross-examination on the respondent’s affidavit since the issue in the action before His Lordship was whether the custody of the child should be given to the applicant or the respondent in view of the conflicting evidence concerning the capability of either parent to look after the welfare of the child based on religious ground.” 32.2 In Paul Raj Samy Anthony v. Annamalar Anthonysamy [2003] 3 CLJ 166 where R K Nathan J stated: “Azlan Shah J (as his Highness then was) in a short but erudite judgment decided that O. 38 r. 2(3) of the RHC must be interpreted S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 to also include the makers of the exhibits who would be subjected to cross-examination.” [33] In Messrs Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah v Dato’ Peh Teck Quee [2003] 5 MLJ 241, Mohd Hishamudin J (later JCA) however held that under O. 38 r. 2(3) “A party to a proceeding cannot apply to cross-examine a person if in the first place such person has not given any evidence either in the form of oral evidence or in the form of affidavit evidence. For, in the absence of such prior evidence, there is no material on which to cross- examine.” [34] On a literal interpretation, Order 38 rule 2(2) ROC 2012 empowers the Court to order the attendance for cross-examination of “the person making any such affidavit.” [35] With respect, here Felina’ has given evidence – the affidavits affirmed by her now late father, were also affirmed by him also on her behalf. She can be cross-examined when one applies the overriding interest of justice concept to enable Courts to deal with cases justly. In fact, Order 1A and Order 2 Rule 1 of the ROC 2012 exhorts the court in administering the Rules particularly here when the alleged Understandings are not in writing, to have regard to the overriding interest of justice and not only to the technical noncompliance with the Rules. These 2 orders give the Court wide powers in order to do justice. [36] I have also borne in mind the terse reminder of Mohtar Abdullah FCJ in Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385, at page 426: S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 “… Rules are rules! They must be obeyed. Numerous judgments can be cited in support of this firm stand on the necessity for a strict adherence of the rules. I agree. However, a judge should not be so besotted by the rules that his sense of justice and fairness becomes impaired because of his blinkered fixation on technicalities of the law and the cold letter of the law …” (emphasis added) [37] Although the Court of Appeal in a separate case in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487 did not agree with Gomez v Gomez, with respect, I find a close reading of the case shows the Court of Appeal only disagreed with Gomez v Gomez on the aspect of the onus – which is on the respondent to show why cross-examination should not be allowed. [38] On my part, I have decided to follow the Gomez v Gomez principles on cross-examining a non deponent so that all relevant evidence available is adduced before the court and for. In the present case, it is also be noted TMSK has passed away and can no longer be cross-examined on the 2 affidavits filed but which were adopted by Felina as her evidence. No delay [39] In Indrani a/p Rajaratnam & Ors v Fairview Schools Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 56; at 62, the application for cross-examination was dismissed owing to delay. Here the Defendants argued that the present application is filed for an improper purpose – that it is merely a strategy by DK to delay the hearing of the OSs to its conclusion. Nevertheless, I find there is no S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 delay here as the application here was made on 10.9.2021 i.e. 2 weeks after the Court of Appeal allowed the Conversion appeal. Res judicata? [40] The Defendants’ final point of contention is that my findings in the Setia Haruman OS that there was no Understanding and New Board Understanding constitutes res judicata in respect of both OSs. [41] In the Setia Haruman OS, in Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 1508, I stated: “[38] I find that the said “Understanding” and/or “New Board Understanding were made between two non-members of the Company. As such DK’s complaint is not a complaint member qua member pursuant to the Shareholders’ Agreement and/or the Articles of Association… [66] Moreover, the principle in Jet-Tech (supra) was affirmed by the Federal Court in Looh Siong Chee…“Shareholder’s Agreement and breaches of the same are clearly not matters pertaining to the affairs of the company. They are private matters enforceable by the parties to the Shareholder’s Agreement. “Following these cases, DK’s complaints that he was not nominated by the 10th Defendant to be a director of the Company is best addressed in suit KLHC WA-22NCC-500-08/2018.” [42] Added to that, the Federal Court in dismissing Impressive Circuit’s application for leave to appeal against my decision in the Setia Haruman OS said, as evident from the minutes: “Finally, we do not see merit in the contention that the findings in this suit will prejudice the hearing of the remaining two suits.” S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [43] Thus, I do not feel disposed to adjudge on this point of res judicata at this juncture; issues on the Understanding and New Board Understanding which were personal to DK and TSMK are better pursued in both OSs as DK and TSMK are registered members of Menara Embun and Menara Eden. Whilst there is a common issue of the “Understanding” and “New Board Understanding” between the Plaintiff and TMSK in all 3 Actions, Impresive Circuit as the plaintiff in the Setia Haruman OS is not a party in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs, UEM Land Berhad and Virtual Path Sdn Bhd who are the shareholders of Setia Haruman and the four (4) Directors of Setia Haruman all named as defendants in the Setia Haruman OS are not parties in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs. In my utmost respectful view, the complaint of oppression in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs should be heard and decided separately on their own facts and evidence. Whether or not there was oppression in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs was for DK to prove; and any decision thereafter must be based strictly on the best evidence presented by DK and the defence if any put up by the Defendants. [44] I thus conclude that on the facts of the OSs, in the interest of doing substantive justice, it is appropriate to allow cross examination on the issue of the Understanding, the New Board Understanding, the breaches of these understandings and the resolutions being passed in Menara Embun and Menara Eden purportedly without DK’s knowledge, consent and/or approval to facilitate the said breaches. I find DK ought to be given the opportunity to fully ventilate his case and he has discharged the onus on why cross-examination should be ordered. S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [45] Consequently, leave in enc. 286 (OS 410 ) and enc. 272 (OS 411) is given to DK to cross examine (1) Farah Mahami Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal (NRIC No. 820512-14-5662) on the contents of the two (2) Affidavits she had affirmed on 28.11.2017 and 25.4.2018 and filed in these proceedings; (ii) Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal (NRIC No. 701201-10-6138) on the contents of the two (2) Affidavits affirmed on her behalf on 25.4.2018 and 7.6.2018 and filed in these proceedings, with costs subject to allocator. Dated: 22nd October 2023 - sgd - ……………………….. Liza Chan Sow Keng Judge High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff : Mr Gopal Sreenevasan (together with him, Shermaljit Singh) Messrs Owee & Co For the 1st & 5th : Eric Clement Defendants Messrs Abd Halim Ushah & Assoc. For the 2nd, 3rd & 4th : Dato M. Pathmanathan (together with him, Defendants Shirin Pathmanathan and Fatin Muzfirah) Messrs M Pathmanathan & Co. CASES REFERRED: L.K Insulation Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Apex Energy Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 733 Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] SGCA 47 S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Tob Chee Hoong v Tob Chee Choong [2017] MLJU 1303 Datuk Kasi Palaniappan & Anor v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 32 Thavanathan a/l Balasubramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 MLJ 401 Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189 Balwant Singh Purba v R Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3 Regional Centre for Arbitration v Ooi Beng Choo & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 383 Structural Concrete Sdn Bhd v. Wing Tiek Holdings Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 300 Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487 Tahansan Sdn Bhd v Tay Bok Choon - [1985] 1 MLJ 58 Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & Ors and another application [1994] 2 MLJ 789 Nasser Ali Azayez Maktoum Al Sheraifi & Ors v Affinity Heights Sdn Bhd [2018] 5 CLJ 751 Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228 Paul Raj Samy Anthony v. Annamalar Anthonysamy [2003] 3 CLJ 166 Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385 Messrs Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah v Dato’ Peh Teck Quee [2003] 5 MLJ 241 Indrani a/p Rajaratnam & Ors v Fairview Schools Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 56 Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 1508 S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 STATUTE/LEGISLATION REFERRED: Order 1A and Order 2 Rule 1, Order 38 rule 2(2) and 2(3) Rules of Court 2012 S/N rHh1G9p6n0KozLRInuhcQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-411-09/2017	43,149	Tika 2.6.0
WA-24F-154-05/2023	PEMOHON TAN YING SHI RESPONDEN 1. ) KUMPULAN WANG SIMPANAN PEKERJA 2. ) LIM TSOO SIN	Application to withdraw EPF monies pertaining to Court Order - Whether order to withdraw EPF monies fell within section 53A of the EPF Act - Whether nomination made by Deceased subsequent to Court Order prevails	31/10/2023	YA Puan Evrol Mariette Peters	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=4e47803c-556d-41ed-9e5c-aeefb0f370a1&Inline=true	WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 Di Dalam Perkara Aturan 7, 15, 28, 29 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Dan Di Dalam Perkara Seksyen 53A Akta KWSP 1991 Dan Di Dalam Perkara Seksyen 50, 51 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950 Dan Di Dalam perkara mengenai, TAN TZE PEI (Si Mati) Nombor Kad Pengenalan *********** BETWEEN TAN YING SHI …PLAINTIFF AND 1) LEMBAGA KUMPULAN WANG SIMPANAN PEKERJA 2) LIM TSOO SIN …DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 31/10/2023 14:25:35 WA-24F-154-05/2023 Kand. 39 S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 2 Introduction [1] This was an application (“this Application”) by the Plaintiff for a declaration, pursuant to a Court Order dated 22 October 2021, that she was entitled to receive a certain amount of monies from the Employees Provident Fund (“EPF”) Account (“the EPF Monies”) of one Tan Tze Pei (“the Deceased”), and that, consequently, the First Defendant is prohibited from releasing the EPF Monies to the Second Defendant, who is the mother of the Deceased. The factual background [2] The Plaintiff is the former wife of the Deceased, whose mother is now the Second Defendant. The Plaintiff and the Deceased finalised their divorce in December 2017, and obtained a Court Order dated 15 December 2017 (“the December 2017 Order”), which includes pertinent clauses that read: … 7. Responden Suami hendaklah membayar jumlah wang sebanyak MYR1,500 (Ringgit Malaysia Seribu Lima Ratus Sahaja) sebulan sebagai nafkah (“maintenance”) kepada Pemptisyen isteri untuk tiga (3) tahun berturut-turut, bermula daripada Januari 2018. … 10. Pempetisyen isteri di beri tiga puluh peratus (30%) daripada jumlah simpanan Responden Suami di Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja (KWSP) setakat tarikh perintah dekri nisi ini di mana jumlah tersebut akan dibayar kepada Pempetisyen Isteri apabila Responden Suami berumur lima puluh lima (55) tahun dan pembayaran wang simpanan S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 sebanyak 30% tersebut adalah termasuk faedah ke atas 30% yang diperuntukkan oleh KWSP untuk tahun-tahun berkenaan. [3] The Deceased had failed to meet the payment obligations outlined in the December 2017 Order. Consequently, the Plaintiff initiated committal proceedings, leading to the Court granting an order on 22 October 2021 (“the October 2021 Order”), with the pertinent portion stating: … (c) Responden Suami telah bersetuju dan diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia untuk mengeluarkan jumlah wang sebanyak MYR 75,000 (Ringgit Malaysia Tujuh Puluh Lima Ribu Sahaja) daripada Akaun 1, KWSP dalam tempoh empat belas (14) hari dari Tarikh Perintah ini dan harus dibayar kepada Pemohon Isteri dalam tempoh empat belas (14) hari sebagai penyelesaian sebahagian daripada tunggakan nafkah berjumlah MYR84,099.95 (Ringgit Malaysia Lapan Puluh Empat Ribu Sembilan Puluh Sembilan dan Sembilan Puluh Lima Sen) seperti di lampiran 67, Dekri Nisi bertarikh 15 Disember 2017. [Emphasis added.] [4] The Deceased had failed to adhere to the provisions of paragraph (c) in the October 2021 Order. Instead, in September 2022, he designated his mother, the Second Defendant, as his nominee. In November 2022, the Deceased passed away. [5] The Plaintiff subsequently visited the EPF office to claim the funds purportedly owed to her in accordance with the October 2021 Order. S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 However, she was informed that the funds could not be disbursed to her because the Deceased had named his mother as the nominee. [6] Consequently, in May 2023, the Plaintiff filed this Application, which was dismissed for the following reasons. Issues [7] The issues for consideration were (a) whether delay on the part of the Plaintiff in filing this Application was satisfactorily explained; and (b) the interpretation of section 53A of the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 (“EPF Act”), particularly, whether the Plaintiff’s claim for the EPF monies fell within ‘matrimonial asset’ in section 53A of the EPF Act. Contentions, evaluation, and findings Whether delay was satisfactorily explained [8] The Plaintiff’s filing of this Application 18 months after the Deceased’s non-compliance with the October 2021 Order raised the issue of delay, a matter that necessitated the Court’s attention. [9] It was imperative, at this juncture, to emphasise to the Plaintiff that the element of delay holds significant importance in considering any application filed by a litigant. In Khor Cheng Wah v. Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 396; [1996] 1 MLJ 223, the following remarks by Gopal Sri Ram JCA bear relevance: S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 It is a cardinal principle of law, that when a litigant seeks the intervention of the court in a matter that affects his rights, he must do so timeously. The maxim vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, though having its origins in the Court of Chancery, is of universal application. Even in cases where a right is exercisable ex debito justitiae, a court may refuse relief to an indolent litigant. In all cases in which delay in approaching the court is in issue, the burden is upon the litigant who has delayed to render a satisfactory explanation for it. [Emphasis added.] [10] In the present case, the Plaintiff sought to attribute the lack of prompt action following the Deceased’s non-compliance with the October 2021 Order to her former solicitors. I found her explanation to be unsustainable, considering that her previous solicitors were not present in Court to provide their account, and furthermore, any interactions between the Plaintiff and her previous solicitors were not within the purview of this Court’s consideration. [11] As such, this Application should not be entertained by this Court. Nevertheless, in the pursuit of comprehensive consideration, I proceeded to examine the merits of this Application and provided the reasons for dismissing it. Whether the Plaintiff’s claim for the EPF Monies fell within ‘matrimonial asset’ [12] Given that this Application was based on section 53A of the EPF Act, it was essential to commence by scrutinising the said provision, as follows: S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 6 Section 53A – Transfer of credit of a member of the Fund in accordance with the division of matrimonial assets order (1) Notwithstanding section 51, when an order is issued by a court that part of the sums of money standing to the credit of a member of the Fund is matrimonial asset, the Board may, after being served with the sealed order, transfer the sum of money as ordered by the court from the account of a member of the Fund into the account of the receiver named in the order subject to any terms and conditions as prescribed by the Board. [Emphasis added.] [13] It is a well-established principle, as evidenced by a multitude of cases, including Koay Cheng Eng v Linda Herawati Santoso [2008] 4 CLJ 105, that funds held in EPF accounts are considered part of matrimonial assets. This concept is further reinforced by the provisions outlined in section 53A of the EPF Act. [14] However, section 53A of the EPF Act introduces a noteworthy aspect with the use of the term ‘may’, granting the EPF Board discretion to transfer funds, as per an order of the court, from the account of a member of the EPF Fund into the account of the receiver named in the order. [15] Additionally, this provision specifies that such a transfer is subject to the terms and conditions outlined by the EPF Board. It is important to note that this section does not compel the EPF Board to execute the transfer. S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 [16] In fact, the EPF Board had highlighted the challenges associated with these transfers, as documented in Circular No 113/2021, titled Matrimonial Assets Claims Pursuant to Section 53A of the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 dated 26 March 2021. In this circular, the Legal Division of the EPF Board had communicated to members of the Malaysian Bar, the difficulties encountered in specific circumstances when implementing transfers stipulated by court orders, pursuant to section 53A of the EPF Act. [17] The further observation to make regarding this Application is that the October 2021 Order expressly states that the responsibility for withdrawing the funds rested with the Deceased, within a timeframe of 14 days after the date of the Order. There was no condition contingent upon the Deceased’s failure to comply, and it would be untenable for this Court to imply any such condition. [18] The October 2021 Order, dated 22 October 2021, placed the Deceased in breach of such order as of 5 November 2021. Given that the responsibility for withdrawal of the EPF funds rested with the Deceased, his failure to act necessitated action by the Plaintiff, which she had not undertaken. [19] Regrettably, not only did the Deceased fail to comply with the October 2021 Order, but he also proceeded to designate his mother as nominee, thereby further obstructing the implementation of the October 2021 Order. S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 [20] Furthermore, it was essential to acknowledge that the October 2021 Order expressly stated that the EPF funds were to be withdrawn as arrears for maintenance, rather than as matrimonial asset. Consequently, section 53A of the EPF Act could not be applicable as it pertains to matrimonial asset. [21] The Plaintiff cited the case of Leow Kooi Wah v Philip Ng Kok Seng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 133 to argue that the nomination of the Deceased’s mother should not be used to undermine her legal rights. The Plaintiff referred to the following passage by Mahadev Shankar J (as he then was): Regulation 16(2) of the EPF Regulations 1991 recognizes that upon the death of a Muslim member of the Fund, a nominee does not receive the money as a beneficiary but only as an executor in accordance with Islamic law. No parallel provisions have been made in the EPF legislation for non- Muslims, but the philosophy of the EPF legislation is clear. The nomination cannot be utilized to defeat the legal rights of the next of kin to the extent that the member's testamentary capacity has been restricted by law. [Emphasis added.] [22] It was, however, important to emphasise that Leow Kooi Wah v Philip Ng Kok Seng & Anor was decided in 1997, whilst the EPF Act was amended vide EPF (Amendment) Act 2007 to include section 53A with effect from 1 July 2008. Therefore, Leow Kooi Wah v Philip Ng Kok Seng & Anor was not a relevant precedent for the application of section 53A of the EPF Act. S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 [23] This would mean that the Plaintiff’s claim was contrary to section 51 of the EPF Act, which reads: Section 51 – Contributions and deposits not to be assigned or attached (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other written law- (a) no sum deducted from the wages of a member of the Fund under section 48; (b) no amount payable by the employer as his contribution; and (c) no amount standing to the credit of a member of the Fund, shall be assignable, transferable, liable to be attached, sequestered, levied upon, for, or in respect of, any debt or claim whatsoever, nor shall the Official Assignee be entitled to or have any claim on any such sum or amount. (2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), the amount standing to the credit of a member of the Fund under paragraph (1)(c) may be forfeited if the amount standing to the credit of such member is subject to an order of forfeiture by a court under the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001. [Emphasis added.] Conclusion [24] In the upshot, based on the aforesaid reasons, and after careful scrutiny of all the evidence before this Court, both oral and documentary, and submissions of all parties, this Application was dismissed. S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 Dated: 31 October 2023 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Plaintiff – S Sakhty Vell and Premalosani Arivananthan; Messrs Chambers of Ari For the First Defendant – Nur Zahirah Badarudin and Nor Asfalla Mohamed Arsad; Jabatan Undang-Undang, Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja For the Second Defendant – Poon Choong Yiew; Messrs James Liew & Kong Cases referred to: ➢ Khor Cheng Wah v. Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 396; [1996] 1 MLJ 223 ➢ Koay Cheng Eng v Linda Herawati Santoso [2008] 4 CLJ 105 ➢ Leow Kooi Wah v Philip Ng Kok Seng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 133 S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24NCvC-359-02/2023 31 October 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 Legislation referred to: ➢ Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 – sections 51, 53A ➢ Employees Provident Fund (Amendment) Act 2007 S/N PIBHTm1V7UGeXK7vsPNwoQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	15,993	Tika 2.6.0
WA-24NCC-410-09/2017	PEMOHON Datuk Kasi A/L K.L. Palaniappan RESPONDEN 1. ) Menara Embun Sdn Bhd 2. ) PB Trustee Services Berhad (Wasi Bagi Harta Pusaka Allahyarmah Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal Bin Haji Abu Bakar No. K/P: 490318-08-5599) 3. ) Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal 4. ) MKN Holdings Sdn Bhd 5. ) Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd	Civil procedure — Affidavits — plaintiff sought leave to (i) file further affidavit; (ii) to cross examine deponent and non deponent on their affidavits / affirmed on their behalf — Whether filing of further affidavit should be allowed — Whether oral evidence through cross-examination should be taken — Whether court could order the attendance of non deponent for cross-examination under O. 38 r. 2(3) ROC 2012 Rules of Court 2012	31/10/2023	YA Puan Liza Chan Sow Keng	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1b254ee0-467f-4c1c-98b8-f4d151234d91&Inline=true	IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 In the matter of Menara Embun Sdn. Bhd. (Company No.: 428618-M) And In the matter of Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 And In the matter of Orders 7 and 88 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN DATUK KASI A/L K L PALANIAPPAN (I/C No.: 581025-10-6855) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. MENARA EMBUN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 428618-M) 2. PB TRUSTEE SERVICES BERHAD (Company No.: 196801000374 (7968-T)) (The Executor Of The Estate Of The Late TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL BIN HAJI ABU BAKAR (I/C No.: 490318-08-5599)) 3. FELINA BINTI TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL (I/C No.: 701201-10-6138) 4. MKN HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 91625-P) 5. SETIA HARUMAN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 425145-U) … DEFENDANTS [Heard together with the following Originating Summons pursuant to the Order dated 3.12.2019] 31/10/2023 11:47:31 WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 Kand. 448 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-411-09/2017 In the matter of Modern Eden Sdn Bhd. (Company No.: 623037-H) And In the matter of Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 And In the matter of Orders 7 and 88 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN DATUK KASI A/L K L PALANIAPPAN (I/C No.: 581025-10-6855) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. MODERN EDEN SDN BHD. (Company No.: 623037-H) 2. PB TRUSTEE SERVICES BERHAD (Company No.: 196801000374 (7968-T)) (The Executor Of The Estate Of The Late TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL BIN HAJI ABU BAKAR (I/C No.: 490318-08-5599)) 3. FELINA BINTI TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL (I/C No.: 701201-10-6138) 4. MKN HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 91625-P) 5. SETIA HARUMAN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 425145-U) … DEFENDANTS S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] There are 4 applications made by the Plaintiff before the court: 1.1 Enclosure (“Enc.”) 290 in Originating Summons WA- 24NCC-410-09/2017 (“Menara Embun OS”) and Enc. 271 in Originating Summons WA-24NCC-411-09/2017 (“Modern Eden OS”) seeking for the Plaintiff’s further Affidavit affirmed on 10.09.2021 (“P afft 7”) to adduce 12 volumes of documents be admitted in evidence for Both OS (“Further Affidavit Application”); and 1.2 Enc. 286 in the Menara Embun OS and Enc. 272 in the Modern Eden OS that the Plaintiff be granted leave to cross-examine, through counsel, Farah Mahami Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal on her Affidavits and Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal on the Affidavits affirmed on her behalf (“Cross Examination Application”). [2] I had allowed the applications on 5.9.2023. These are the reasons for my decisions. As the applications were related, it is convenient to deal with all 4 applications in one judgment. Background [3] The Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS were filed by the Plaintiff, Datuk Kasi a/l Palaniappan (“DK”) pursuant to Section 346 of the Companies Act, 2016 (“CA 2016”) complaining of minority oppression in S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 respect of the affairs of Menara Embun Sdn Bhd and Modern Eden Sdn Bhd respectively. [4] DK together with one Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd also commenced another minority oppression claim in respect of Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd vide Originating Summons No. WA-24NCC-290- 07/2017 (“Setia Haruman OS”). In the Setia Haruman OS, DK was struck out as a Plaintiff on 25.4.2018 as he was not a shareholder of Setia Haruman. DK however owns 50% of the shares in Impresive Circuit. The Setia Haruman OS was heard and eventually dismissed by me on 25.06.2021. The Court of Appeal had affirmed the decision on 20.1.2023. Impresive Circuit’s leave application to appeal to the Federal Court was dismissed by the Federal Court on 15.8.2023. [5] The Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS were converted into writ actions by Wong Chee Lin J but both had reverted back to OS actions after the 2nd to 4th Defendants’ appeals to the Court of Appeal was allowed on 26.08.2021 and the Plaintiff’s applications for leave to appeal to the Federal Court were dismissed on 21.2.2022. [6] In each of the 3 OS Actions, Tan Sri Mustapha Kamal (“TSMK”) was named as the 2nd Defendant. The Plaintiff’s complaints in the 3 OS Actions are that alleged oppressive acts were carried out in breach of an alleged Understanding, New Board Understanding that DK allegedly had with TSMK and DK’s legitimate expectation to participate in the management of Setia Haruman, Menara Embun and Modern Eden. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 The Further Affidavit Applications [7] Via P Afft 7, the Plaintiff seeks to adduce 12 volumes of documents as follows: a) Volumes 1 to 3 - documents exhibited in the earlier affidavits in these proceedings; b) Volume 4 - documents related to Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd; c) Volumes 5 to 9 - documents pertaining to 15 other companies and Setia Haruman; d) Volume 10 - documents pertaining to the affairs of several companies which existed before the incorporation of the 1st Defendant; e) Volume 11 - the notes of proceedings of the cross examination of TSMK, Azmy and THP in the Setia Haruman OS from 17th to 19th March 2021(which the 2nd to 4th Defendants have no objection); f) Volume 12 - document included by the 2nd to 4th Defendants to rebut the documents filed by the Plaintiff in volumes 4 to 10 for purposes of trial. [8] The documents sought to be adduced has since been narrowed down to volumes 1 to 3, 5 to 9 (except 1 document in volume 8 being the Certified True Copy of Form 13 A of MK Land by the Companies S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Commission of Malaysia, and volume 11 which was admitted by consent as these notes of proceedings are relevant but were not available earlier. [9] 2nd to 4th Defendants objections may be summarised as follows: 9.1 That the documents sought to be introduced concern other companies/joint ventures and Setia Haruman which are irrelevant documents; 9.2 These documents are sought to be adduced after the dismissal of the Setia Haruman OS. It is a belated attempt by the Plaintiff to cure the shortfalls of the Setia Haruman OS and an attempt to have a 2nd bite at the cherry; 9.3 Prior to the conversion, the Plaintiff had filed 6 affidavits in support of the Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS (“the OSs”). These documents were available to the Plaintiff at the time of filing of the OSs in 2017 and the exchange of affidavits; There was no explanation as to relevance and why these documents were not exhibited in the earlier affidavits citing in support of their arguments L.K Insulation Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Apex Energy Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 733: “[10] At any rate the reason given is not cogent enough: that of wanting to file a further affidavit. Generally only 3 affidavits are allowed for an application: an affidavit in support, an affidavit in opposition and a further affidavit in reply to that affidavit in opposition. Unless there are cogent reasons for affirming a further affidavit as in the documents that were sought to be referred to were not available previously or that what has been referred to in the last S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 affidavit filed is a lie, courts generally would not allow further affidavits to be filed. Otherwise there would be no end to affidavits filed because, human nature being what it is, everyone wants to have the final and last word! Therefore if in an affidavit in reply there is more than a reply to the affidavit filed in opposition, I would disregard the new matters raised which should have been raised in the affidavit in support.” (counsel’s emphasis) [10] The Plaintiff argued that: 10.1 The Plaintiff had in its Affidavits (Afft 7 Para 12) and Afft 8 Para 7 explained the contents of the documents as well as shown how these documents are both relevant and necessary to the core issues in both OSs i.e. the relationship between DK and TSMK, the Understanding, the New Board Understanding as well as the breaches of these understandings; 10.2 the documents relating to DK’s and TSMK’s various joint ventures are necessary and relevant to the manner in which DK and TSMK would run their joint ventures which include Menara Embun and Menara Eden; 10.3 The documents relating to Setia Haruman are necessary and relevant because the conduct at Setia Haruman affected DK’s participation in Menara Embun and Menara Eden. In this regard, the term “affairs of the company” in Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 is to be widely construed such that it includes the affairs of various S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 companies where such affairs are all closely connected e.g. parent and subsidiary companies citing in support: (i) Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] SGCA 47: “[42] We think that the approach adopted in the above cited cases is sound and we also agree that, in the final analysis, the question that must be answered in this regard is whether the affairs of the subsidiary affect or impact the holding company: Lim Chee Twang at [97]. Legitimate claims for relief from oppression should not be defeated by technical and legalistic objections relating to the company's shareholding structure; at the same time the doctrine of separate legal personalities and the strict words of the statute ("the affairs of the company" [emphasis added]) must be respected. In our view, the balance between these competing interests would be properly drawn by a requirement that commercially unfair conduct in the management of a subsidiary would be relevant so long and to the extent that such conduct affected or impacted the holding company whose member was the party claiming relief from oppression. The purpose and policy behind s 216 of the Companies Act is, above all, to grant relief from the oppressive behaviour to shareholders who would otherwise be unable to stop that abuse: see below at [49]. If the affairs of the subsidiary do not affect or impact the holding company, shareholders and members of the latter could hardly complain that their interests were therefore prejudiced.” (ii) Tob Chee Hoong v Tob Chee Choong [2017] MLJU 1303: “[50] I would respectfully follow this observation and rule that in this country, similarly, the phrase ‘affairs of the company’ S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 found in Section 181(1) of the CA (and the new but identically worded Section 346(1) of the Companies Act 2016) should be construed widely, to encompass the affairs of entities which are not themselves the subject of the oppression action, but which affairs of those entities, affect the subject company in the nature and to the extent which is beyond the inconsequential, be it a parent or a subsidiary. … [54] This provide much support to a wide reading of ‘affairs of the company’ which is wholly in line with the design of the law to ensure that in circumstances where oppressive conduct could be proven, legal redress to those unlawfully aggrieved is available and not impeded by the artificiality or in the complexity of corporate structures. Otherwise, wrongdoers in corporate world would be encouraged to strategize and build upon more complex conglomerate-like structures and perpetuate such unlawful and oppressive conduct in a fashion orchestrated to defeat the application of Section 181 (1) (Section 346 (1) of the Companies Act 2016), and almost literally employing the section as an engine of fraud. The law will fail in its true objective and the ends of justice will be far from being served if such a grim scenario is allowed to transpire, if not already manifest and flourishing.” (iii) That this principle is applicable to Setia Haruman, Menara Embun and Menara Eden was recognised by Azizul Azmi J when he heard the striking out applications in the Setia Haruman OS where DK was struck out as a Plaintiff but Impresive Circuit was allowed to continue pursuing the claim in Datuk Kasi S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Palaniappan & Anor v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 32: “[14] …Tob’s case established the principle that the expression ‘affairs of the company’ in s 346(1)(a) is to be construed widely, and would encompass oppressive conduct that is conducted at a subsidiary or a holding company. [15] While I fully agree with the ratio of the decision of Mohd Nazlan J in Tob’s case… … [18] He (DK) would have been perfectly entitled to allege, based on the principle in Tob’s case, that he was being oppressed at Menara Embun or Modern Eden by virtue of acts conducted at Setia Haruman. This is because the acts carried out at the Setia Haruman would amount to affairs of Menara Embun and/or Modern Eden. In my judgment, it makes no difference that Setia Haruman is not a subsidiary of either Menara Embun or Modern Eden. It suffices that either company holds shares in Setia Haruman, for conduct carried out at Setia Haruman to be the subject of a complaint of oppression at either Menara Embun or Modern Eden.” 10.4 P Afft 7 seeks to produce documents comprised previously in Part B of the Common Bundle of documents to enable the Plaintiff to discharge its burden to prove the Understanding, the New Board Understanding or the breaches of these understandings which amounted to oppressive acts against the Plaintiff; Having been produced in the Common bundles for trial, there is no surprise to the Defendants, the documents are admissible S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 whether the matter is tried as a writ action or an originating summons citing in support the case of Thavanathan a/l Balasubramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 MLJ 401, that all “evidence which is sufficiently relevant to the facts in issue is admissible”; 10.5 Both OSs are oppression claims which concern various complex factual and legal issues. To limit the Affidavits in such a case to only an Affidavit in support by the Plaintiff, one Affidavit in reply by the Defendant and then an Affidavit in reply by the Plaintiff as suggested by the Defendants would not lead to a just and effectual determination of both OSs. This is more so when the Defendants themselves have filed multiple Affidavits instead of subscribing to their own contention of Defendants only filing a single Affidavit in reply; 10.6 the Affidavits in respect of both OSs were still in the midst of being exchanged prior to the Conversion and once the Conversion was ordered, documents intended to be relied on by parties had to be adduced through the CBODs instead of further Affidavits; the Plaintiff had filed the Further Affidavit in both OSs to adduce the documents within 2 weeks of the Conversion being set aside by the Court of Appeal and well in advance of any hearing date of both OSs; L K Insulation Engineering relied upon by the Defendants is distinguishable because it concerned a summary judgment application for a debt recovery claim and the party seeking to file the further Affidavit had only S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 informed the Court of their intention to do so at the hearing of the summary judgment application. Court’s finding [11] Having considered the cause papers and the parties’ submissions, I find the narrowed down documents sought to be adduced are relevant and necessary to both OSs as they relate to the central issue of the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding and the purported breaches thereof. [12] I am of the respectful view that the Plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to fully ventilate his case in both OSs. In this regard, the Plaintiff had in his affidavits for the Further Affidavit Application explained although not in great detail why these documents are both relevant and necessary to the core issues in both OSs. [13] The Defendants’ posit that the Further Affidavit Application is an abuse of process because these documents ought to have been adduced in the Plaintiff’s 6 Affidavits prior to the Conversion is untenable as I accept the Plaintiff’s assertion that the affidavits in respect of both OSs were still in the midst of being exchanged prior to the Conversion after which the said documents (except for volume 11 which was not available then) were produced in Part B in the common bundles for trial. Once the appeal against the conversion to a writ action was allowed by the Court of Appeal which ordered the matters to continue and disposed by OS, the Plaintiff still wishing to rely on the said documents had no choice but to adduce them through a further affidavit, in this case through P Afft 7. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [14] In any case, I find there is no element of surprise nor prejudice occasioned to the Defendants as they will have an opportunity to reply. [15] I find it just and equitable and thus exercised my discretion to grant leave to the Plaintiff to file P Afft 7 containing the narrowed down documents only and volume 11 which was consented to. Cross Examination Applications [16] I ought to set out some basic principles on this subject. [17] First, it is settled law that the court retains an absolute discretion whether or not to allow cross-examination of a deponent on his affidavit – see as mere examples, Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189; Balwant Singh Purba v R Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3; Regional Centre for Arbitration v Ooi Beng Choo & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 383. As such, each case is to be decided on its own particular facts as “Exercises of judicial discretion are not judicial precedent because they are only authority for the facts of the particular case.” - Structural Concrete Sdn Bhd v. Wing Tiek Holdings Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 300, at 306 CA. [18] Second, the applicant for leave to cross-examine a deponent bears the legal burden to persuade the court to exercise its discretion to grant leave - in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [19] Third, the application has to be made bona fide or in good faith. In Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189, at 190, Salleh Abas FJ said: “To allow or not to allow the respondent’s application to cross-examine the appellant’s witnesses upon their affidavits, I take it, is a matter of court’s discretion. In appropriate circumstances, there is no reason why such application should be refused merely because the deponent is a foreigner living outside the jurisdiction (Re Lucas [1952] 1 All ER 102); “otherwise foreigners would have an advantage” (Strauss v Goldschmidt 8 SLR 239). It is really a matter of common sense and an elementary legal principle that a party who swears an affidavit much be prepared to stand up to it by cross- examination unless the application to cross- examine him is without just cause vexatious or motivated by desire to delay the proceedings (Allen v Allen [1894] P 239). In view of the appellant’s application for judgment under Order 32 Rule 6, I am not, however, prepared to hold the respondent’s application to cross- examine the appellant’s witnesses as being without just cause or motivated by desire to delay the proceedings or without bona fide or sham or vexatious. (emphasis added) [20] Fourth, relevancy as to disputes of the facts has to be shown to warrant cross -examination. The Court of Appeal in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (supra) stated: “[25] You can discern from the authorities referred by the parties that three prime considerations would influence the court in the exercise of its discretion to allow or disallow cross-examination on affidavit. Firstly, the truth of the averment in the affidavit must be challenged or the issues of fact identified. Secondly, cross-examination should only be allowed if the disputed fact is relevant to the issue to be decided and must be limited to that issue only. And thirdly, cross-examination would not advance the cause of justice and should be refused if there is sufficient affidavit evidence or S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 contemporaneous documents to enable the court to properly decide without the need of cross-examination. It is important to take into account all facts when considering an application for cross-examination and if it has little relevance or little weight to the issue which the judge has to decide, then cross-examination should not be permitted.” [21] Last but not least, as stated in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (supra) cross-examination must advance the cause of justice. When a conflict in affidavit evidence may be resolved by undisputed contemporaneous document, the cause of justice is not advanced. Defendants’ objections. [22] The Defendants claim there is no basis for the cross-examination of Farah on her Affidavits and Felina on the Affidavits affirmed on her behalf. CA Order dated 26.8.2021 gave liberty to apply to cross-examine deponent [23] As for the Defendants’ 1st ground of objection that cross- examination would go against the decision of the Court of Appeal setting aside the Conversion, I find no merits in this contention for the simple reason that in fact, the Court of Appeal on 26.8.2021 allowed the Conversion Appeal with liberty to the Plaintiff to apply for cross- examination. The Order reads: "1. Rayuan ini dibenarkan dan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 26.10.2018 yang menukarkan Saman Pemula bertarikh 28 September 2017 kepada tindakan Writ diketepikan dan perkara ini dikembalikan kepada Saman Pemula dengan kebebasan S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 untuk memohon untuk memeriksa balas deponen.” This Order appears at Enc. 324 p 23-25. Viva voce evidence imperative [24] As for the next ground that the Plaintiff had not identified the disputes of material facts, I find that there is more than sufficient material in the affidavits to form a basis for cross-examination. Here, the pith of the Plaintiff’s claim lay in the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding. [25] Having considered the affidavits filed by the parties and the exhibits annexed, and the submissions of the parties both oral and written, I am of the firm view that anyhow once slices it, there are disputes of facts in the Affidavits relating to the Understanding, the New Board Understanding, the breaches of these understandings and the resolutions being passed in Menara Embun and Menara Eden purportedly without DK’s knowledge, consent and/or approval so as to facilitate the said breaches. All the Defendants have denied the existence of the said Understandings and the alleged breaches thereof. In my respectful view, the controversy of facts pertaining to the truth of the allegations of fact of the alleged Understandings and breaches can only be resolved by viva voce evidence. It would be critical to ascertain the true state of affairs by resort to cross-examination. It is insufficient merely to rely on affidavits evidence alone to make a definitive determination whether there is in fact minority oppression inflicted on DK in respect of the conduct of affairs of the 2 companies. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [26] In my judgment, it would be wrong to ascribe no importance to why cross-examination is necessary. If the Plaintiff is denied leave to cross-examine Felina and Farar, as decided in Tahansan Sdn Bhd v Tay Bok Choon [1985] 1 MLJ 58, this court has to ignore the disputed averments in affidavits and, the Plaintiffs will run the risk of not being able to prove its case. In fact in the Tay Bok Choon case, the former Supreme Court held on the facts of that case, “in the face of the denial that the agreement was ever made, the trial judge should have heard oral evidence before deciding whether the alleged agreement was ever made” and the court can hear oral evidence even if no application was made under O 38 r 2(3): “Order 38 rule 2(3) of the Rules of the High Court empowers the Court to examine the deponents regardless of the absence of such application, and we agree that in this instance it should have done so.” [27] Just as in Tay Bok Choon, the Understandings and breaches here were denied by the Defendants. This need to cross examine is further exacerbated by the fact that the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding are not in writing. I hence cannot with conviction say that a decision can be made from the contemporaneous documents in the court file in order to arrive at a decision on the matters in issue. In my utmost respectful view, cross examination in this case would advance the cause of justice. [28] I find the case of Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & Ors and another application [1994] 2 MLJ 789 cited by the Defendants is to be distinguished as the court there found the matter could be decided on the undisputed contemporaneous documents in that case. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 Similarly, the case of Nasser Ali Azayez Maktoum Al Sheraifi & Ors v Affinity Heights Sdn Bhd [2018] 5 CLJ 751 is also distinguishable as the court there took the exceptional circumstances approach when considering whether to permit cross-examination of a deponent in the context of a winding up proceeding as: (i) it is a primary rule that petitions for winding up are heard on affidavit evidence; (ii) the Companies Act 1965 and the Companies Winding-up Rules 1972 do not expressly provide for a similar right to apply for the cross-examination of the affidavits as found in the RC 2012; (iii) it is public policy that a winding up petition be heard expeditiously. Cross-examination of non deponent [29] As for cross-examination of Felina in respect of affidavits affirmed on her behalf by TSMK, the Defendants contend the Plaintiff’s application to cross - examine her as a non-deponent is irrational, vexatious, misconceived and an abuse of process. The Defendants posited that Order 38 rule 2(2) ROC 2012 applies only to the cross examination of deponents of affidavits. It was pointed out that the Court of Appeal in Kumar Jaspal Quah did not agree with Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [30] In Gomez v. Gomez, Raja Azlan Shah J (later Lord President and HRH Sultan of Perak) allowed the cross-examination of a priest who had given a letter which was annexed as an exhibit to the Wife’s custody affidavit owing to conflicting evidence concerning the capability of either parent to look after the welfare of the child based on religious ground. In allowing the application, His Lordship stated: “In the present case there is only 1 issue, that is, the issue in the pending action which is whether the order can be varied. The matter raised in the three affidavits are all matters relating to the action. The applicant complains that the respondent is no longer a fit and proper person to have custody of the child. The respondent says that she is still capable of looking after the child’s religion and moral upbringing. The Rev Father wood supports her. It is the same as if he has sworn an affidavit to that effect. It is only fair and proper that the appellant be allowed to cross-examine them on their affidavits.” [31] His Royal Highness considered: 31.1 O. 38 r. 1 of the then Rules of the Supreme Court 1957 (which is similar the present O. 38 r. 2(3) ROC 2012) stated: “The power given by O. 38 r. 1 is obviously a matter of discretion to be exercised in accordance with well known judicial principles.” 31.2 And approved the following passage from Leiserach v. Schalit [1934] 2 KB 353 where leave was granted to 2 arbitrators, who were not parties nor had they affirmed any affidavits, to be called as witnesses to assist the Court to ascertain the facts of the case: S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 “This is a case in which the Court has listened to numerous, affidavits, statements in some of which directly contradict the statements in others. It is also a case in which it is essential, in order to do justice, that the Court should be enabled to make up its mind as to the actual facts of the case. In the view of the Court this is an exceptional case, and in this exceptional case the Court has arrived at the conclusion that the only way in which it can satisfactorily deal with the matter before it is by having the assistance of the evidence of the arbitrators, who, being independent persons, can tell the Court what it is to ascertain from a perusal of the affidavits on one side and the other - namely, what are the essential facts of the case. On that ground and on that ground only the Court accedes to the application to call as witnesses both the gentlemen who acted as arbitrators in the matter”. [32] Gomez v. Gomez was cited with approval in the following cases: 32.1 In Balwant Singh Purba v. R. Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3 by Lim Beng Choon J: “In the circumstances Raja Azlan Shah J (as His Royal Highness then was) quite rightly allowed cross-examination on the respondent’s affidavit since the issue in the action before His Lordship was whether the custody of the child should be given to the applicant or the respondent in view of the conflicting evidence concerning the capability of either parent to look after the welfare of the child based on religious ground.” 32.2 In Paul Raj Samy Anthony v. Annamalar Anthonysamy [2003] 3 CLJ 166 where R K Nathan J stated: “Azlan Shah J (as his Highness then was) in a short but erudite judgment decided that O. 38 r. 2(3) of the RHC must be interpreted S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 to also include the makers of the exhibits who would be subjected to cross-examination.” [33] In Messrs Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah v Dato’ Peh Teck Quee [2003] 5 MLJ 241, Mohd Hishamudin J (later JCA) however held that under O. 38 r. 2(3) “A party to a proceeding cannot apply to cross-examine a person if in the first place such person has not given any evidence either in the form of oral evidence or in the form of affidavit evidence. For, in the absence of such prior evidence, there is no material on which to cross- examine.” [34] On a literal interpretation, Order 38 rule 2(2) ROC 2012 empowers the Court to order the attendance for cross-examination of “the person making any such affidavit.” [35] With respect, here Felina’ has given evidence – the affidavits affirmed by her now late father, were also affirmed by him also on her behalf. She can be cross-examined when one applies the overriding interest of justice concept to enable Courts to deal with cases justly. In fact, Order 1A and Order 2 Rule 1 of the ROC 2012 exhorts the court in administering the Rules particularly here when the alleged Understandings are not in writing, to have regard to the overriding interest of justice and not only to the technical noncompliance with the Rules. These 2 orders give the Court wide powers in order to do justice. [36] I have also borne in mind the terse reminder of Mohtar Abdullah FCJ in Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385, at page 426: S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 “… Rules are rules! They must be obeyed. Numerous judgments can be cited in support of this firm stand on the necessity for a strict adherence of the rules. I agree. However, a judge should not be so besotted by the rules that his sense of justice and fairness becomes impaired because of his blinkered fixation on technicalities of the law and the cold letter of the law …” (emphasis added) [37] Although the Court of Appeal in a separate case in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487 did not agree with Gomez v Gomez, with respect, I find a close reading of the case shows the Court of Appeal only disagreed with Gomez v Gomez on the aspect of the onus – which is on the respondent to show why cross-examination should not be allowed. [38] On my part, I have decided to follow the Gomez v Gomez principles on cross-examining a non deponent so that all relevant evidence available is adduced before the court and for. In the present case, it is also be noted TMSK has passed away and can no longer be cross-examined on the 2 affidavits filed but which were adopted by Felina as her evidence. No delay [39] In Indrani a/p Rajaratnam & Ors v Fairview Schools Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 56; at 62, the application for cross-examination was dismissed owing to delay. Here the Defendants argued that the present application is filed for an improper purpose – that it is merely a strategy by DK to delay the hearing of the OSs to its conclusion. Nevertheless, I find there is no S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 delay here as the application here was made on 10.9.2021 i.e. 2 weeks after the Court of Appeal allowed the Conversion appeal. Res judicata? [40] The Defendants’ final point of contention is that my findings in the Setia Haruman OS that there was no Understanding and New Board Understanding constitutes res judicata in respect of both OSs. [41] In the Setia Haruman OS, in Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 1508, I stated: “[38] I find that the said “Understanding” and/or “New Board Understanding were made between two non-members of the Company. As such DK’s complaint is not a complaint member qua member pursuant to the Shareholders’ Agreement and/or the Articles of Association… [66] Moreover, the principle in Jet-Tech (supra) was affirmed by the Federal Court in Looh Siong Chee…“Shareholder’s Agreement and breaches of the same are clearly not matters pertaining to the affairs of the company. They are private matters enforceable by the parties to the Shareholder’s Agreement. “Following these cases, DK’s complaints that he was not nominated by the 10th Defendant to be a director of the Company is best addressed in suit KLHC WA-22NCC-500-08/2018.” [42] Added to that, the Federal Court in dismissing Impressive Circuit’s application for leave to appeal against my decision in the Setia Haruman OS said, as evident from the minutes: “Finally, we do not see merit in the contention that the findings in this suit will prejudice the hearing of the remaining two suits.” S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [43] Thus, I do not feel disposed to adjudge on this point of res judicata at this juncture; issues on the Understanding and New Board Understanding which were personal to DK and TSMK are better pursued in both OSs as DK and TSMK are registered members of Menara Embun and Menara Eden. Whilst there is a common issue of the “Understanding” and “New Board Understanding” between the Plaintiff and TMSK in all 3 Actions, Impresive Circuit as the plaintiff in the Setia Haruman OS is not a party in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs, UEM Land Berhad and Virtual Path Sdn Bhd who are the shareholders of Setia Haruman and the four (4) Directors of Setia Haruman all named as defendants in the Setia Haruman OS are not parties in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs. In my utmost respectful view, the complaint of oppression in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs should be heard and decided separately on their own facts and evidence. Whether or not there was oppression in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs was for DK to prove; and any decision thereafter must be based strictly on the best evidence presented by DK and the defence if any put up by the Defendants. [44] I thus conclude that on the facts of the OSs, in the interest of doing substantive justice, it is appropriate to allow cross examination on the issue of the Understanding, the New Board Understanding, the breaches of these understandings and the resolutions being passed in Menara Embun and Menara Eden purportedly without DK’s knowledge, consent and/or approval to facilitate the said breaches. I find DK ought to be given the opportunity to fully ventilate his case and he has discharged the onus on why cross-examination should be ordered. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [45] Consequently, leave in enc. 286 (OS 410 ) and enc. 272 (OS 411) is given to DK to cross examine (1) Farah Mahami Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal (NRIC No. 820512-14-5662) on the contents of the two (2) Affidavits she had affirmed on 28.11.2017 and 25.4.2018 and filed in these proceedings; (ii) Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal (NRIC No. 701201-10-6138) on the contents of the two (2) Affidavits affirmed on her behalf on 25.4.2018 and 7.6.2018 and filed in these proceedings, with costs subject to allocator. Dated: 22nd October 2023 - sgd - ……………………….. Liza Chan Sow Keng Judge High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff : Mr Gopal Sreenevasan (together with him, Shermaljit Singh) Messrs Owee & Co For the 1st & 5th : Eric Clement Defendants Messrs Abd Halim Ushah & Assoc. For the 2nd, 3rd & 4th : Dato M. Pathmanathan (together with him, Defendants Shirin Pathmanathan and Fatin Muzfirah) Messrs M Pathmanathan & Co. CASES REFERRED: L.K Insulation Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Apex Energy Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 733 Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] SGCA 47 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Tob Chee Hoong v Tob Chee Choong [2017] MLJU 1303 Datuk Kasi Palaniappan & Anor v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 32 Thavanathan a/l Balasubramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 MLJ 401 Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189 Balwant Singh Purba v R Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3 Regional Centre for Arbitration v Ooi Beng Choo & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 383 Structural Concrete Sdn Bhd v. Wing Tiek Holdings Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 300 Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487 Tahansan Sdn Bhd v Tay Bok Choon - [1985] 1 MLJ 58 Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & Ors and another application [1994] 2 MLJ 789 Nasser Ali Azayez Maktoum Al Sheraifi & Ors v Affinity Heights Sdn Bhd [2018] 5 CLJ 751 Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228 Paul Raj Samy Anthony v. Annamalar Anthonysamy [2003] 3 CLJ 166 Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385 Messrs Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah v Dato’ Peh Teck Quee [2003] 5 MLJ 241 Indrani a/p Rajaratnam & Ors v Fairview Schools Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 56 Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 1508 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 STATUTE/LEGISLATION REFERRED: Order 1A and Order 2 Rule 1, Order 38 rule 2(2) and 2(3) Rules of Court 2012 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-411-09/2017	43,149	Tika 2.6.0
WA-24NCC-410-09/2017	PEMOHON Datuk Kasi A/L K.L. Palaniappan RESPONDEN 1. ) Menara Embun Sdn Bhd 2. ) PB Trustee Services Berhad (Wasi Bagi Harta Pusaka Allahyarmah Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal Bin Haji Abu Bakar No. K/P: 490318-08-5599) 3. ) Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal 4. ) MKN Holdings Sdn Bhd 5. ) Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd	Civil procedure — Affidavits — plaintiff sought leave to (i) file further affidavit; (ii) to cross examine deponent and non deponent on their affidavits / affirmed on their behalf — Whether filing of further affidavit should be allowed — Whether oral evidence through cross-examination should be taken — Whether court could order the attendance of non deponent for cross-examination under O. 38 r. 2(3) ROC 2012 Rules of Court 2012	31/10/2023	YA Puan Liza Chan Sow Keng	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1b254ee0-467f-4c1c-98b8-f4d151234d91&Inline=true	IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 In the matter of Menara Embun Sdn. Bhd. (Company No.: 428618-M) And In the matter of Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 And In the matter of Orders 7 and 88 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN DATUK KASI A/L K L PALANIAPPAN (I/C No.: 581025-10-6855) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. MENARA EMBUN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 428618-M) 2. PB TRUSTEE SERVICES BERHAD (Company No.: 196801000374 (7968-T)) (The Executor Of The Estate Of The Late TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL BIN HAJI ABU BAKAR (I/C No.: 490318-08-5599)) 3. FELINA BINTI TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL (I/C No.: 701201-10-6138) 4. MKN HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 91625-P) 5. SETIA HARUMAN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 425145-U) … DEFENDANTS [Heard together with the following Originating Summons pursuant to the Order dated 3.12.2019] 31/10/2023 11:47:31 WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 Kand. 448 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-411-09/2017 In the matter of Modern Eden Sdn Bhd. (Company No.: 623037-H) And In the matter of Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 And In the matter of Orders 7 and 88 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN DATUK KASI A/L K L PALANIAPPAN (I/C No.: 581025-10-6855) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. MODERN EDEN SDN BHD. (Company No.: 623037-H) 2. PB TRUSTEE SERVICES BERHAD (Company No.: 196801000374 (7968-T)) (The Executor Of The Estate Of The Late TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL BIN HAJI ABU BAKAR (I/C No.: 490318-08-5599)) 3. FELINA BINTI TAN SRI DATUK HAJI MUSTAPHA KAMAL (I/C No.: 701201-10-6138) 4. MKN HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 91625-P) 5. SETIA HARUMAN SDN. BHD. (Company No.: 425145-U) … DEFENDANTS S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] There are 4 applications made by the Plaintiff before the court: 1.1 Enclosure (“Enc.”) 290 in Originating Summons WA- 24NCC-410-09/2017 (“Menara Embun OS”) and Enc. 271 in Originating Summons WA-24NCC-411-09/2017 (“Modern Eden OS”) seeking for the Plaintiff’s further Affidavit affirmed on 10.09.2021 (“P afft 7”) to adduce 12 volumes of documents be admitted in evidence for Both OS (“Further Affidavit Application”); and 1.2 Enc. 286 in the Menara Embun OS and Enc. 272 in the Modern Eden OS that the Plaintiff be granted leave to cross-examine, through counsel, Farah Mahami Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal on her Affidavits and Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal on the Affidavits affirmed on her behalf (“Cross Examination Application”). [2] I had allowed the applications on 5.9.2023. These are the reasons for my decisions. As the applications were related, it is convenient to deal with all 4 applications in one judgment. Background [3] The Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS were filed by the Plaintiff, Datuk Kasi a/l Palaniappan (“DK”) pursuant to Section 346 of the Companies Act, 2016 (“CA 2016”) complaining of minority oppression in S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 respect of the affairs of Menara Embun Sdn Bhd and Modern Eden Sdn Bhd respectively. [4] DK together with one Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd also commenced another minority oppression claim in respect of Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd vide Originating Summons No. WA-24NCC-290- 07/2017 (“Setia Haruman OS”). In the Setia Haruman OS, DK was struck out as a Plaintiff on 25.4.2018 as he was not a shareholder of Setia Haruman. DK however owns 50% of the shares in Impresive Circuit. The Setia Haruman OS was heard and eventually dismissed by me on 25.06.2021. The Court of Appeal had affirmed the decision on 20.1.2023. Impresive Circuit’s leave application to appeal to the Federal Court was dismissed by the Federal Court on 15.8.2023. [5] The Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS were converted into writ actions by Wong Chee Lin J but both had reverted back to OS actions after the 2nd to 4th Defendants’ appeals to the Court of Appeal was allowed on 26.08.2021 and the Plaintiff’s applications for leave to appeal to the Federal Court were dismissed on 21.2.2022. [6] In each of the 3 OS Actions, Tan Sri Mustapha Kamal (“TSMK”) was named as the 2nd Defendant. The Plaintiff’s complaints in the 3 OS Actions are that alleged oppressive acts were carried out in breach of an alleged Understanding, New Board Understanding that DK allegedly had with TSMK and DK’s legitimate expectation to participate in the management of Setia Haruman, Menara Embun and Modern Eden. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 The Further Affidavit Applications [7] Via P Afft 7, the Plaintiff seeks to adduce 12 volumes of documents as follows: a) Volumes 1 to 3 - documents exhibited in the earlier affidavits in these proceedings; b) Volume 4 - documents related to Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd; c) Volumes 5 to 9 - documents pertaining to 15 other companies and Setia Haruman; d) Volume 10 - documents pertaining to the affairs of several companies which existed before the incorporation of the 1st Defendant; e) Volume 11 - the notes of proceedings of the cross examination of TSMK, Azmy and THP in the Setia Haruman OS from 17th to 19th March 2021(which the 2nd to 4th Defendants have no objection); f) Volume 12 - document included by the 2nd to 4th Defendants to rebut the documents filed by the Plaintiff in volumes 4 to 10 for purposes of trial. [8] The documents sought to be adduced has since been narrowed down to volumes 1 to 3, 5 to 9 (except 1 document in volume 8 being the Certified True Copy of Form 13 A of MK Land by the Companies S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Commission of Malaysia, and volume 11 which was admitted by consent as these notes of proceedings are relevant but were not available earlier. [9] 2nd to 4th Defendants objections may be summarised as follows: 9.1 That the documents sought to be introduced concern other companies/joint ventures and Setia Haruman which are irrelevant documents; 9.2 These documents are sought to be adduced after the dismissal of the Setia Haruman OS. It is a belated attempt by the Plaintiff to cure the shortfalls of the Setia Haruman OS and an attempt to have a 2nd bite at the cherry; 9.3 Prior to the conversion, the Plaintiff had filed 6 affidavits in support of the Menara Embun OS and Modern Eden OS (“the OSs”). These documents were available to the Plaintiff at the time of filing of the OSs in 2017 and the exchange of affidavits; There was no explanation as to relevance and why these documents were not exhibited in the earlier affidavits citing in support of their arguments L.K Insulation Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Apex Energy Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 733: “[10] At any rate the reason given is not cogent enough: that of wanting to file a further affidavit. Generally only 3 affidavits are allowed for an application: an affidavit in support, an affidavit in opposition and a further affidavit in reply to that affidavit in opposition. Unless there are cogent reasons for affirming a further affidavit as in the documents that were sought to be referred to were not available previously or that what has been referred to in the last S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 affidavit filed is a lie, courts generally would not allow further affidavits to be filed. Otherwise there would be no end to affidavits filed because, human nature being what it is, everyone wants to have the final and last word! Therefore if in an affidavit in reply there is more than a reply to the affidavit filed in opposition, I would disregard the new matters raised which should have been raised in the affidavit in support.” (counsel’s emphasis) [10] The Plaintiff argued that: 10.1 The Plaintiff had in its Affidavits (Afft 7 Para 12) and Afft 8 Para 7 explained the contents of the documents as well as shown how these documents are both relevant and necessary to the core issues in both OSs i.e. the relationship between DK and TSMK, the Understanding, the New Board Understanding as well as the breaches of these understandings; 10.2 the documents relating to DK’s and TSMK’s various joint ventures are necessary and relevant to the manner in which DK and TSMK would run their joint ventures which include Menara Embun and Menara Eden; 10.3 The documents relating to Setia Haruman are necessary and relevant because the conduct at Setia Haruman affected DK’s participation in Menara Embun and Menara Eden. In this regard, the term “affairs of the company” in Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 is to be widely construed such that it includes the affairs of various S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 companies where such affairs are all closely connected e.g. parent and subsidiary companies citing in support: (i) Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] SGCA 47: “[42] We think that the approach adopted in the above cited cases is sound and we also agree that, in the final analysis, the question that must be answered in this regard is whether the affairs of the subsidiary affect or impact the holding company: Lim Chee Twang at [97]. Legitimate claims for relief from oppression should not be defeated by technical and legalistic objections relating to the company's shareholding structure; at the same time the doctrine of separate legal personalities and the strict words of the statute ("the affairs of the company" [emphasis added]) must be respected. In our view, the balance between these competing interests would be properly drawn by a requirement that commercially unfair conduct in the management of a subsidiary would be relevant so long and to the extent that such conduct affected or impacted the holding company whose member was the party claiming relief from oppression. The purpose and policy behind s 216 of the Companies Act is, above all, to grant relief from the oppressive behaviour to shareholders who would otherwise be unable to stop that abuse: see below at [49]. If the affairs of the subsidiary do not affect or impact the holding company, shareholders and members of the latter could hardly complain that their interests were therefore prejudiced.” (ii) Tob Chee Hoong v Tob Chee Choong [2017] MLJU 1303: “[50] I would respectfully follow this observation and rule that in this country, similarly, the phrase ‘affairs of the company’ S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 found in Section 181(1) of the CA (and the new but identically worded Section 346(1) of the Companies Act 2016) should be construed widely, to encompass the affairs of entities which are not themselves the subject of the oppression action, but which affairs of those entities, affect the subject company in the nature and to the extent which is beyond the inconsequential, be it a parent or a subsidiary. … [54] This provide much support to a wide reading of ‘affairs of the company’ which is wholly in line with the design of the law to ensure that in circumstances where oppressive conduct could be proven, legal redress to those unlawfully aggrieved is available and not impeded by the artificiality or in the complexity of corporate structures. Otherwise, wrongdoers in corporate world would be encouraged to strategize and build upon more complex conglomerate-like structures and perpetuate such unlawful and oppressive conduct in a fashion orchestrated to defeat the application of Section 181 (1) (Section 346 (1) of the Companies Act 2016), and almost literally employing the section as an engine of fraud. The law will fail in its true objective and the ends of justice will be far from being served if such a grim scenario is allowed to transpire, if not already manifest and flourishing.” (iii) That this principle is applicable to Setia Haruman, Menara Embun and Menara Eden was recognised by Azizul Azmi J when he heard the striking out applications in the Setia Haruman OS where DK was struck out as a Plaintiff but Impresive Circuit was allowed to continue pursuing the claim in Datuk Kasi S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Palaniappan & Anor v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 32: “[14] …Tob’s case established the principle that the expression ‘affairs of the company’ in s 346(1)(a) is to be construed widely, and would encompass oppressive conduct that is conducted at a subsidiary or a holding company. [15] While I fully agree with the ratio of the decision of Mohd Nazlan J in Tob’s case… … [18] He (DK) would have been perfectly entitled to allege, based on the principle in Tob’s case, that he was being oppressed at Menara Embun or Modern Eden by virtue of acts conducted at Setia Haruman. This is because the acts carried out at the Setia Haruman would amount to affairs of Menara Embun and/or Modern Eden. In my judgment, it makes no difference that Setia Haruman is not a subsidiary of either Menara Embun or Modern Eden. It suffices that either company holds shares in Setia Haruman, for conduct carried out at Setia Haruman to be the subject of a complaint of oppression at either Menara Embun or Modern Eden.” 10.4 P Afft 7 seeks to produce documents comprised previously in Part B of the Common Bundle of documents to enable the Plaintiff to discharge its burden to prove the Understanding, the New Board Understanding or the breaches of these understandings which amounted to oppressive acts against the Plaintiff; Having been produced in the Common bundles for trial, there is no surprise to the Defendants, the documents are admissible S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 whether the matter is tried as a writ action or an originating summons citing in support the case of Thavanathan a/l Balasubramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 MLJ 401, that all “evidence which is sufficiently relevant to the facts in issue is admissible”; 10.5 Both OSs are oppression claims which concern various complex factual and legal issues. To limit the Affidavits in such a case to only an Affidavit in support by the Plaintiff, one Affidavit in reply by the Defendant and then an Affidavit in reply by the Plaintiff as suggested by the Defendants would not lead to a just and effectual determination of both OSs. This is more so when the Defendants themselves have filed multiple Affidavits instead of subscribing to their own contention of Defendants only filing a single Affidavit in reply; 10.6 the Affidavits in respect of both OSs were still in the midst of being exchanged prior to the Conversion and once the Conversion was ordered, documents intended to be relied on by parties had to be adduced through the CBODs instead of further Affidavits; the Plaintiff had filed the Further Affidavit in both OSs to adduce the documents within 2 weeks of the Conversion being set aside by the Court of Appeal and well in advance of any hearing date of both OSs; L K Insulation Engineering relied upon by the Defendants is distinguishable because it concerned a summary judgment application for a debt recovery claim and the party seeking to file the further Affidavit had only S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 informed the Court of their intention to do so at the hearing of the summary judgment application. Court’s finding [11] Having considered the cause papers and the parties’ submissions, I find the narrowed down documents sought to be adduced are relevant and necessary to both OSs as they relate to the central issue of the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding and the purported breaches thereof. [12] I am of the respectful view that the Plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to fully ventilate his case in both OSs. In this regard, the Plaintiff had in his affidavits for the Further Affidavit Application explained although not in great detail why these documents are both relevant and necessary to the core issues in both OSs. [13] The Defendants’ posit that the Further Affidavit Application is an abuse of process because these documents ought to have been adduced in the Plaintiff’s 6 Affidavits prior to the Conversion is untenable as I accept the Plaintiff’s assertion that the affidavits in respect of both OSs were still in the midst of being exchanged prior to the Conversion after which the said documents (except for volume 11 which was not available then) were produced in Part B in the common bundles for trial. Once the appeal against the conversion to a writ action was allowed by the Court of Appeal which ordered the matters to continue and disposed by OS, the Plaintiff still wishing to rely on the said documents had no choice but to adduce them through a further affidavit, in this case through P Afft 7. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [14] In any case, I find there is no element of surprise nor prejudice occasioned to the Defendants as they will have an opportunity to reply. [15] I find it just and equitable and thus exercised my discretion to grant leave to the Plaintiff to file P Afft 7 containing the narrowed down documents only and volume 11 which was consented to. Cross Examination Applications [16] I ought to set out some basic principles on this subject. [17] First, it is settled law that the court retains an absolute discretion whether or not to allow cross-examination of a deponent on his affidavit – see as mere examples, Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189; Balwant Singh Purba v R Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3; Regional Centre for Arbitration v Ooi Beng Choo & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 383. As such, each case is to be decided on its own particular facts as “Exercises of judicial discretion are not judicial precedent because they are only authority for the facts of the particular case.” - Structural Concrete Sdn Bhd v. Wing Tiek Holdings Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 300, at 306 CA. [18] Second, the applicant for leave to cross-examine a deponent bears the legal burden to persuade the court to exercise its discretion to grant leave - in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [19] Third, the application has to be made bona fide or in good faith. In Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189, at 190, Salleh Abas FJ said: “To allow or not to allow the respondent’s application to cross-examine the appellant’s witnesses upon their affidavits, I take it, is a matter of court’s discretion. In appropriate circumstances, there is no reason why such application should be refused merely because the deponent is a foreigner living outside the jurisdiction (Re Lucas [1952] 1 All ER 102); “otherwise foreigners would have an advantage” (Strauss v Goldschmidt 8 SLR 239). It is really a matter of common sense and an elementary legal principle that a party who swears an affidavit much be prepared to stand up to it by cross- examination unless the application to cross- examine him is without just cause vexatious or motivated by desire to delay the proceedings (Allen v Allen [1894] P 239). In view of the appellant’s application for judgment under Order 32 Rule 6, I am not, however, prepared to hold the respondent’s application to cross- examine the appellant’s witnesses as being without just cause or motivated by desire to delay the proceedings or without bona fide or sham or vexatious. (emphasis added) [20] Fourth, relevancy as to disputes of the facts has to be shown to warrant cross -examination. The Court of Appeal in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (supra) stated: “[25] You can discern from the authorities referred by the parties that three prime considerations would influence the court in the exercise of its discretion to allow or disallow cross-examination on affidavit. Firstly, the truth of the averment in the affidavit must be challenged or the issues of fact identified. Secondly, cross-examination should only be allowed if the disputed fact is relevant to the issue to be decided and must be limited to that issue only. And thirdly, cross-examination would not advance the cause of justice and should be refused if there is sufficient affidavit evidence or S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 contemporaneous documents to enable the court to properly decide without the need of cross-examination. It is important to take into account all facts when considering an application for cross-examination and if it has little relevance or little weight to the issue which the judge has to decide, then cross-examination should not be permitted.” [21] Last but not least, as stated in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (supra) cross-examination must advance the cause of justice. When a conflict in affidavit evidence may be resolved by undisputed contemporaneous document, the cause of justice is not advanced. Defendants’ objections. [22] The Defendants claim there is no basis for the cross-examination of Farah on her Affidavits and Felina on the Affidavits affirmed on her behalf. CA Order dated 26.8.2021 gave liberty to apply to cross-examine deponent [23] As for the Defendants’ 1st ground of objection that cross- examination would go against the decision of the Court of Appeal setting aside the Conversion, I find no merits in this contention for the simple reason that in fact, the Court of Appeal on 26.8.2021 allowed the Conversion Appeal with liberty to the Plaintiff to apply for cross- examination. The Order reads: "1. Rayuan ini dibenarkan dan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 26.10.2018 yang menukarkan Saman Pemula bertarikh 28 September 2017 kepada tindakan Writ diketepikan dan perkara ini dikembalikan kepada Saman Pemula dengan kebebasan S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 untuk memohon untuk memeriksa balas deponen.” This Order appears at Enc. 324 p 23-25. Viva voce evidence imperative [24] As for the next ground that the Plaintiff had not identified the disputes of material facts, I find that there is more than sufficient material in the affidavits to form a basis for cross-examination. Here, the pith of the Plaintiff’s claim lay in the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding. [25] Having considered the affidavits filed by the parties and the exhibits annexed, and the submissions of the parties both oral and written, I am of the firm view that anyhow once slices it, there are disputes of facts in the Affidavits relating to the Understanding, the New Board Understanding, the breaches of these understandings and the resolutions being passed in Menara Embun and Menara Eden purportedly without DK’s knowledge, consent and/or approval so as to facilitate the said breaches. All the Defendants have denied the existence of the said Understandings and the alleged breaches thereof. In my respectful view, the controversy of facts pertaining to the truth of the allegations of fact of the alleged Understandings and breaches can only be resolved by viva voce evidence. It would be critical to ascertain the true state of affairs by resort to cross-examination. It is insufficient merely to rely on affidavits evidence alone to make a definitive determination whether there is in fact minority oppression inflicted on DK in respect of the conduct of affairs of the 2 companies. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [26] In my judgment, it would be wrong to ascribe no importance to why cross-examination is necessary. If the Plaintiff is denied leave to cross-examine Felina and Farar, as decided in Tahansan Sdn Bhd v Tay Bok Choon [1985] 1 MLJ 58, this court has to ignore the disputed averments in affidavits and, the Plaintiffs will run the risk of not being able to prove its case. In fact in the Tay Bok Choon case, the former Supreme Court held on the facts of that case, “in the face of the denial that the agreement was ever made, the trial judge should have heard oral evidence before deciding whether the alleged agreement was ever made” and the court can hear oral evidence even if no application was made under O 38 r 2(3): “Order 38 rule 2(3) of the Rules of the High Court empowers the Court to examine the deponents regardless of the absence of such application, and we agree that in this instance it should have done so.” [27] Just as in Tay Bok Choon, the Understandings and breaches here were denied by the Defendants. This need to cross examine is further exacerbated by the fact that the alleged Understanding, the New Board Understanding are not in writing. I hence cannot with conviction say that a decision can be made from the contemporaneous documents in the court file in order to arrive at a decision on the matters in issue. In my utmost respectful view, cross examination in this case would advance the cause of justice. [28] I find the case of Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & Ors and another application [1994] 2 MLJ 789 cited by the Defendants is to be distinguished as the court there found the matter could be decided on the undisputed contemporaneous documents in that case. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 Similarly, the case of Nasser Ali Azayez Maktoum Al Sheraifi & Ors v Affinity Heights Sdn Bhd [2018] 5 CLJ 751 is also distinguishable as the court there took the exceptional circumstances approach when considering whether to permit cross-examination of a deponent in the context of a winding up proceeding as: (i) it is a primary rule that petitions for winding up are heard on affidavit evidence; (ii) the Companies Act 1965 and the Companies Winding-up Rules 1972 do not expressly provide for a similar right to apply for the cross-examination of the affidavits as found in the RC 2012; (iii) it is public policy that a winding up petition be heard expeditiously. Cross-examination of non deponent [29] As for cross-examination of Felina in respect of affidavits affirmed on her behalf by TSMK, the Defendants contend the Plaintiff’s application to cross - examine her as a non-deponent is irrational, vexatious, misconceived and an abuse of process. The Defendants posited that Order 38 rule 2(2) ROC 2012 applies only to the cross examination of deponents of affidavits. It was pointed out that the Court of Appeal in Kumar Jaspal Quah did not agree with Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [30] In Gomez v. Gomez, Raja Azlan Shah J (later Lord President and HRH Sultan of Perak) allowed the cross-examination of a priest who had given a letter which was annexed as an exhibit to the Wife’s custody affidavit owing to conflicting evidence concerning the capability of either parent to look after the welfare of the child based on religious ground. In allowing the application, His Lordship stated: “In the present case there is only 1 issue, that is, the issue in the pending action which is whether the order can be varied. The matter raised in the three affidavits are all matters relating to the action. The applicant complains that the respondent is no longer a fit and proper person to have custody of the child. The respondent says that she is still capable of looking after the child’s religion and moral upbringing. The Rev Father wood supports her. It is the same as if he has sworn an affidavit to that effect. It is only fair and proper that the appellant be allowed to cross-examine them on their affidavits.” [31] His Royal Highness considered: 31.1 O. 38 r. 1 of the then Rules of the Supreme Court 1957 (which is similar the present O. 38 r. 2(3) ROC 2012) stated: “The power given by O. 38 r. 1 is obviously a matter of discretion to be exercised in accordance with well known judicial principles.” 31.2 And approved the following passage from Leiserach v. Schalit [1934] 2 KB 353 where leave was granted to 2 arbitrators, who were not parties nor had they affirmed any affidavits, to be called as witnesses to assist the Court to ascertain the facts of the case: S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 “This is a case in which the Court has listened to numerous, affidavits, statements in some of which directly contradict the statements in others. It is also a case in which it is essential, in order to do justice, that the Court should be enabled to make up its mind as to the actual facts of the case. In the view of the Court this is an exceptional case, and in this exceptional case the Court has arrived at the conclusion that the only way in which it can satisfactorily deal with the matter before it is by having the assistance of the evidence of the arbitrators, who, being independent persons, can tell the Court what it is to ascertain from a perusal of the affidavits on one side and the other - namely, what are the essential facts of the case. On that ground and on that ground only the Court accedes to the application to call as witnesses both the gentlemen who acted as arbitrators in the matter”. [32] Gomez v. Gomez was cited with approval in the following cases: 32.1 In Balwant Singh Purba v. R. Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3 by Lim Beng Choon J: “In the circumstances Raja Azlan Shah J (as His Royal Highness then was) quite rightly allowed cross-examination on the respondent’s affidavit since the issue in the action before His Lordship was whether the custody of the child should be given to the applicant or the respondent in view of the conflicting evidence concerning the capability of either parent to look after the welfare of the child based on religious ground.” 32.2 In Paul Raj Samy Anthony v. Annamalar Anthonysamy [2003] 3 CLJ 166 where R K Nathan J stated: “Azlan Shah J (as his Highness then was) in a short but erudite judgment decided that O. 38 r. 2(3) of the RHC must be interpreted S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 to also include the makers of the exhibits who would be subjected to cross-examination.” [33] In Messrs Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah v Dato’ Peh Teck Quee [2003] 5 MLJ 241, Mohd Hishamudin J (later JCA) however held that under O. 38 r. 2(3) “A party to a proceeding cannot apply to cross-examine a person if in the first place such person has not given any evidence either in the form of oral evidence or in the form of affidavit evidence. For, in the absence of such prior evidence, there is no material on which to cross- examine.” [34] On a literal interpretation, Order 38 rule 2(2) ROC 2012 empowers the Court to order the attendance for cross-examination of “the person making any such affidavit.” [35] With respect, here Felina’ has given evidence – the affidavits affirmed by her now late father, were also affirmed by him also on her behalf. She can be cross-examined when one applies the overriding interest of justice concept to enable Courts to deal with cases justly. In fact, Order 1A and Order 2 Rule 1 of the ROC 2012 exhorts the court in administering the Rules particularly here when the alleged Understandings are not in writing, to have regard to the overriding interest of justice and not only to the technical noncompliance with the Rules. These 2 orders give the Court wide powers in order to do justice. [36] I have also borne in mind the terse reminder of Mohtar Abdullah FCJ in Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385, at page 426: S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 “… Rules are rules! They must be obeyed. Numerous judgments can be cited in support of this firm stand on the necessity for a strict adherence of the rules. I agree. However, a judge should not be so besotted by the rules that his sense of justice and fairness becomes impaired because of his blinkered fixation on technicalities of the law and the cold letter of the law …” (emphasis added) [37] Although the Court of Appeal in a separate case in Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487 did not agree with Gomez v Gomez, with respect, I find a close reading of the case shows the Court of Appeal only disagreed with Gomez v Gomez on the aspect of the onus – which is on the respondent to show why cross-examination should not be allowed. [38] On my part, I have decided to follow the Gomez v Gomez principles on cross-examining a non deponent so that all relevant evidence available is adduced before the court and for. In the present case, it is also be noted TMSK has passed away and can no longer be cross-examined on the 2 affidavits filed but which were adopted by Felina as her evidence. No delay [39] In Indrani a/p Rajaratnam & Ors v Fairview Schools Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 56; at 62, the application for cross-examination was dismissed owing to delay. Here the Defendants argued that the present application is filed for an improper purpose – that it is merely a strategy by DK to delay the hearing of the OSs to its conclusion. Nevertheless, I find there is no S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 delay here as the application here was made on 10.9.2021 i.e. 2 weeks after the Court of Appeal allowed the Conversion appeal. Res judicata? [40] The Defendants’ final point of contention is that my findings in the Setia Haruman OS that there was no Understanding and New Board Understanding constitutes res judicata in respect of both OSs. [41] In the Setia Haruman OS, in Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 1508, I stated: “[38] I find that the said “Understanding” and/or “New Board Understanding were made between two non-members of the Company. As such DK’s complaint is not a complaint member qua member pursuant to the Shareholders’ Agreement and/or the Articles of Association… [66] Moreover, the principle in Jet-Tech (supra) was affirmed by the Federal Court in Looh Siong Chee…“Shareholder’s Agreement and breaches of the same are clearly not matters pertaining to the affairs of the company. They are private matters enforceable by the parties to the Shareholder’s Agreement. “Following these cases, DK’s complaints that he was not nominated by the 10th Defendant to be a director of the Company is best addressed in suit KLHC WA-22NCC-500-08/2018.” [42] Added to that, the Federal Court in dismissing Impressive Circuit’s application for leave to appeal against my decision in the Setia Haruman OS said, as evident from the minutes: “Finally, we do not see merit in the contention that the findings in this suit will prejudice the hearing of the remaining two suits.” S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [43] Thus, I do not feel disposed to adjudge on this point of res judicata at this juncture; issues on the Understanding and New Board Understanding which were personal to DK and TSMK are better pursued in both OSs as DK and TSMK are registered members of Menara Embun and Menara Eden. Whilst there is a common issue of the “Understanding” and “New Board Understanding” between the Plaintiff and TMSK in all 3 Actions, Impresive Circuit as the plaintiff in the Setia Haruman OS is not a party in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs, UEM Land Berhad and Virtual Path Sdn Bhd who are the shareholders of Setia Haruman and the four (4) Directors of Setia Haruman all named as defendants in the Setia Haruman OS are not parties in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs. In my utmost respectful view, the complaint of oppression in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs should be heard and decided separately on their own facts and evidence. Whether or not there was oppression in the Menara Embun and Modern Eden OSs was for DK to prove; and any decision thereafter must be based strictly on the best evidence presented by DK and the defence if any put up by the Defendants. [44] I thus conclude that on the facts of the OSs, in the interest of doing substantive justice, it is appropriate to allow cross examination on the issue of the Understanding, the New Board Understanding, the breaches of these understandings and the resolutions being passed in Menara Embun and Menara Eden purportedly without DK’s knowledge, consent and/or approval to facilitate the said breaches. I find DK ought to be given the opportunity to fully ventilate his case and he has discharged the onus on why cross-examination should be ordered. S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [45] Consequently, leave in enc. 286 (OS 410 ) and enc. 272 (OS 411) is given to DK to cross examine (1) Farah Mahami Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal (NRIC No. 820512-14-5662) on the contents of the two (2) Affidavits she had affirmed on 28.11.2017 and 25.4.2018 and filed in these proceedings; (ii) Felina Binti Tan Sri Datuk Haji Mustapha Kamal (NRIC No. 701201-10-6138) on the contents of the two (2) Affidavits affirmed on her behalf on 25.4.2018 and 7.6.2018 and filed in these proceedings, with costs subject to allocator. Dated: 22nd October 2023 - sgd - ……………………….. Liza Chan Sow Keng Judge High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff : Mr Gopal Sreenevasan (together with him, Shermaljit Singh) Messrs Owee & Co For the 1st & 5th : Eric Clement Defendants Messrs Abd Halim Ushah & Assoc. For the 2nd, 3rd & 4th : Dato M. Pathmanathan (together with him, Defendants Shirin Pathmanathan and Fatin Muzfirah) Messrs M Pathmanathan & Co. CASES REFERRED: L.K Insulation Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd v. Apex Energy Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 LNS 733 Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd [2014] SGCA 47 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Tob Chee Hoong v Tob Chee Choong [2017] MLJU 1303 Datuk Kasi Palaniappan & Anor v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 32 Thavanathan a/l Balasubramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 MLJ 401 Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189 Balwant Singh Purba v R Rajasingam [1987] CLJ Rep 468; [1987] MLJU 3 Regional Centre for Arbitration v Ooi Beng Choo & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 383 Structural Concrete Sdn Bhd v. Wing Tiek Holdings Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 300 Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638; [2007] 4 CLJ 487 Tahansan Sdn Bhd v Tay Bok Choon - [1985] 1 MLJ 58 Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & Ors and another application [1994] 2 MLJ 789 Nasser Ali Azayez Maktoum Al Sheraifi & Ors v Affinity Heights Sdn Bhd [2018] 5 CLJ 751 Gomez v Gomez [1969] 1 MLJ 228 Paul Raj Samy Anthony v. Annamalar Anthonysamy [2003] 3 CLJ 166 Megat Najmuddin bin Dato Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385 Messrs Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah v Dato’ Peh Teck Quee [2003] 5 MLJ 241 Indrani a/p Rajaratnam & Ors v Fairview Schools Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 56 Impresive Circuit Sdn Bhd v Setia Haruman Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 1508 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 STATUTE/LEGISLATION REFERRED: Order 1A and Order 2 Rule 1, Order 38 rule 2(2) and 2(3) Rules of Court 2012 S/N 4E4lG39GHEyYuPTRUSNNkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-410-09/2017 ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24NCC-411-09/2017	43,149	Tika 2.6.0
BA-11BNCvC-27-08/2022	PERAYU 1. ) Thamarai A/P Perumal 2. ) Raju A/L Dorairaju RESPONDEN SKF SOLUTION SDN. BHD. (dahulunya dikenali sebagai ARCADIA GOLD SDN. BHD.)	Moneylending transaction – Whether lender a licensed moneylender – legal effect of a moneylending agreement that was not attested in the presence of a Commissioner of Oath – Whether copy of agreement duly stamped and delivered to the borrower – Moneylenders Act 1951, ss. 5, 15, 16 and 27 – Moneylenders (Control and Licensing) Regulations 2003, reg 10(3) – Rules of Court 2012, Order 18 rule 8, Order 18 rule 11.	31/10/2023	YA Dr Choong Yeow Choy	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6df0d19c-0c0d-45ea-b02c-18acfe0dd5a5&Inline=true	1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (BAHAGIAN SIVIL) RAYUAN NO: BA-11BNCVC-27-08/2022 ANTARA 1. THAMARAI A/P PERUMAL (NO. K/P: 721116-10-5876) 2. RAJU A/L DORAIRAJU (NO. K/P: 710611-10-5749) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN ARCADIA GOLD SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT. 465432-X) … RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Majistret Di Shah Alam Dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia Writ Saman No: BA-A72NCVC-1687-09/2017 Antara Arcadia Gold Sdn Bhd (No Syarikat 465432-X) ... Plaintif Dan 1. Thamarai a/p Perumal (No. K/P: 721116-10-5876) 2. Raju a/l Dorairaju (No. K/P: 710611-10-5749) ... Defendan-Defendan (Yang diputuskan oleh Puan Fatina Amyra binti Abdul Jalil, Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Sivil Shah Alam pada 18 Julai 2022)] 07/02/2024 08:29:42 BA-11BNCvC-27-08/2022 Kand. 32 S/N nNHwbQ0M6kWwLBis/g3VpQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 JUDGMENT Introduction [1] In this case, what is not disputed is the fact that the Appellants had taken a loan from the Respondent. Unfortunately, essential questions such as the exact sum of the loan that the Appellants had applied for, the actual amount of the loan that had been approved by the Respondent and the precise sum of the loan disbursed by the Respondent to the Appellants are unclear. Both the Appellants and Respondent have provided conflicting versions of circumstances surrounding this dispute. [2] In addition to having to uncover the true factual situations leading to the filing of the original action in the Magistrates Court, both the courts at first instance and here had to grapple with a number of technical and legal issues that had arisen in this dispute. These relate to the application of a number of key provisions of the Moneylenders Act 1951. The Overriding Issues [3] There are two broad issues in this appeal. [4] The first pertains to the technical issues of law. Under this first broad issue, questions were raised as to – (a) whether the Respondent/Lender in this appeal was a licensed moneylender; S/N nNHwbQ0M6kWwLBis/g3VpQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 (b) the legal effect of a moneylending agreement that was not attested in the presence of a Commissioner of Oath; and (c) whether a copy of the moneylending agreement had been duly stamped and “delivered to the borrower by the moneylender before the money is lent”. [5] The second broad issue relates to the actual sum of the loan. The Parties [6] The First and Second Appellants, namely, Thamarai a/p Perumal and Raju a/l Dorairaju respectively, were the First and Second Defendants in the court below. They were the borrowers of the loan. The Appellants are wife and husband. [7] The Respondent, Arcadia Gold Sdn Bhd, the Plaintiff in the court of first instance, is a company that is involved in the money lending business. The Suit and Decision in the Magistrates Court [8] The endorsement on the Respondent’s Writ was for the following claim: Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan-Defendan adalah untuk pinjaman tertunggak sejumlah RM92,500.00 di bawah satu perjanjian pinjaman yang diberi oleh Plaintif yang pada masa pemberian pinjaman adalah pemberi pinjam wang berlesen di bawah Akta Pemberi Pinjam Wang 1951 berserta faedah pada kadar 12% setahun dikira atas jumlah tertunggak RM92,500.00 tersebut bermula dari 15/3/2017 sehingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh. S/N nNHwbQ0M6kWwLBis/g3VpQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Dan RM508.00 (atau sekian banyak wang sebagaimana yang dibenarkan setelah ditetapkan) untuk kos, dan juga, jika plaintif dapat perintah untuk penyampaian ganti, jumlah wang selanjutnya sebanyak RM (atau sekian banyak wang sebagaimana yang dibenarkan setelah ditetapkan)….. [9] The Respondent alleged that the Appellants had borrowed RM100,000 from it and the amounts of RM45,500 and RM54,500 were disbursed to the Appellants through a cheque and in cash respectively and the loan had not been repaid in full. [10] However, according to the Appellants, they had applied for a RM70,000 loan but the amount approved by the Respondent was only RM50,000. The amount disbursed by the Respondent to the Appellants, as evident from a cheque issued by the Respondent, was only RM45,500. The Appellants alleged that the Respondent “telah memanipulasikan dan memalsukan dokumen-dokumen bagi menunjukkan bahawa jumlah pinjaman adalah sebanyak RM100,000.00”. [11] The learned Magistrate had allowed the claims by the Respondent and concluded as follows: l23l Berdasarkan keterangan dan dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan, Mahkamah atas imbangan kebarangkalian mendapati bahawa Plaintif telah membuktikan tuntutan mereka dan Mahkamah dengan ini membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif. l24l Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Perjanjian Pinjaman tersebut merupakan suatu Perjanjian yang berkuatkuasa antara Pihak-Pihak dan sekiranya Defendan tidak bersetuju dengan terma-terma dalam Perjanjian tersebut, Defendan mempunyai hak untuk tidak menandatangani Perjanjian tersebut. Dakwaan Defendan bahawa telah S/N nNHwbQ0M6kWwLBis/g3VpQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 menandatangani perjanjian yang telah diubah adalah tidak berasas dan merupakan afterthought, Tiada bukti/keterangan di Mahkamah untuk menunjukkan Defendan telah menandatangani perjanjian yang telah diubah. [25] Oleh yang demikian, berdasarkan pertimbangan-pertimbangan yang telah diperjelaskan, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Plaintif telah membuktikan tuntutan Plaintif di atas imbangan kebarangkalian dan dengan itu Mahkamah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif dengan kos RM5,000.00. The Applicable Law and the Arguments Before This Court [12] On the issue of whether the Respondent in this appeal was a licensed moneylender, it was the Appellants’ contention that the Respondent is not a licensed moneylender and that the transaction was carried out in breach of section 5 of the Moneylenders Act 1951. At the time when the transaction was carried out, the Respondent was carrying out its business under the name of Arcadia Gold Sdn Bhd. The name of this company was later changed to SKF Solution Sdn Bhd. [13] In addition to section 5, it should also be pointed out that there is one other germane provision in the Moneylenders Act 1951 that relates to this issue, namely, section 15. [14] For purposes of expediency, these provisions are reproduced: Licence to be taken out by moneylender 5. (1) No person shall conduct business as a moneylender unless he is licensed under this Act. S/N nNHwbQ0M6kWwLBis/g3VpQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (2) Any person who carries on business as a moneylender without a valid licence, or who continues to carry on such business after his licence has expired or been suspended or revoked shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and shall be liable to a fine of not less than twenty thousand ringgit but not more than one hundred thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both, and in the case of a second or subsequent offence shall also be liable to whipping in addition to such punishment. Contract by unlicensed moneylender unenforceable 15. No moneylending agreement in respect of money lent after the coming into force of this Act by an unlicensed moneylender shall be enforceable. [15] The Respondent’s reply to the above averment was twofold. First, the Respondent referred this Court to paragraph 1 of the Appellants’ Defence (in the action at the Magistrates Court) whereby the Appellants had admitted that “Plaintif adalah sebuah Syarikat pemberi pinjaman wang berlesen yang berdaftar di bawah Akta Pemberi Pinjam Wang 1951”. Citing the Court of Appeal decision in Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Satu Lagi v Mach 8 Sdn Bhd [2022] 7 CLJ 26; [2022] MLJU 1005; [2022] 5 MLra 758, the submission of the Respondent was that the Appellants are not allowed to approbate and reprobate on the issue of whether the Respondent is a licensed moneylender. [16] Second, the Respondent raised the issue that this point was never pleaded by the Appellants. The learned Magistrate had upheld this contention at para [21] in her grounds of judgment. [17] On the legal effect of a moneylending agreement that was not attested in the presence of a Commissioner of Oath, the Appellants placed S/N nNHwbQ0M6kWwLBis/g3VpQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 reliance on section 27 of the Moneylenders Act 1951. Section 27 reads as follows: Attestation of moneylending agreement 27. (1) A moneylending agreement shall be attested by an Advocate and Solicitor of the High Court, an officer of the Judicial and Legal Service, a Commissioner for Oaths, District Officer, Justice of the Peace or such other person as may be appointed by the Minister generally for such purpose. (2) The attestor shall explain the terms of the moneylending agreement to the borrower, and shall certify on the agreement that the borrower appears to understand the meaning of the terms of the agreement. (3) Any moneylending agreement which is not attested in accordance with this section shall be void and have no effect and shall not be enforceable. [18] The reply by the Respondent to this point was simply that this was never pleaded by the Appellants. The Respondent also relied on the decision of the Federal Court in Iftikar Ahmed Khan v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd [2018] 1 CLJ 415; [2018] 2 MLJ 292; [2018] 1 MLRA 202. The learned Magistrate had also upheld this contention at para [22] in her grounds of judgment. [19] On the issue of whether a copy of the moneylending agreement had been duly stamped and “delivered to the borrower by the moneylender before the money is lent”, the Appellants argued that there was non- compliance with section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951. Section 16 provides as follows: S/N nNHwbQ0M6kWwLBis/g3VpQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Moneylending agreement to be given to the borrower 16. (1) No moneylending agreement shall be enforceable unless the agreement has been signed by all the parties to the agreement and a copy of the agreement duly stamped is delivered to the borrower by the moneylender before the money is lent. (2) A moneylender who executes a moneylending agreement which does not comply with this section shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and shall be liable to a fine not exceeding ten thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months or to both. [20] The Appellants further maintained that section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 must be read together with Regulation 10(3) of the Moneylenders (Control and Licensing) Regulations 2003 (P.U.(A) 400/2003) which provides as follows: 10. Moneylending agreement ….. (3) A borrower shall be entitled, from a moneylender, to a complete set of the moneylending agreement including all annexures, if any, for the moneylender to execute the agreement with the borrower free of charge. [21] The Appellants also urged this Court to take note of the observations made by the Court of Appeal in Powernet Industries Sdn Bhd v Golden Wheel Credit Sdn Bhd [2020] 7 AMR 657; [2020] 10 CLJ 374; [2020] 12 MLJ 412; [2020] MLRAU 250, relating to the rationale underlying the provision in section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951. [22] It was the Appellants’ contention that a copy of the said agreement was only given to the First Appellant. S/N nNHwbQ0M6kWwLBis/g3VpQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [23] The essence of the Respondent’s reply to the above submission was that there is only one agreement and thus only one copy was available. The Respondent argued that the Moneylenders Act 1951 does not require that a stamped copy of the moneylending agreement to be delivered to every borrower. As the Second Appellant had authorized the First Appellant to accept on his behalf, and the fact that both the First and the Second Appellants are the wife and husband respectively, according to the Respondent, the issue of non-compliance with section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 does not arise. [24] In relation to the second broad issue of the exact sum of the loan that the Appellants had applied for, the actual amount of the loan that had been approved by the Respondent and the precise sum of the loan disbursed by the Respondent to the Appellants, there were conflicting testimonies. The Decision of This Court [25] On the arguments advanced by the parties concerning the point that the Respondent is allegedly an unlicensed moneylender but that this point was never pleaded by the Appellants, the Appellants sought to rely on Order 18 rule 11 of the Rules of Court 2012. If I understood the Appellants correctly, they sought to convince me that “a point of law need not be pleaded”. [26] This Court is perplexed as to how Order 18 rule 11 of the Rules of Court 2012 can be of any assistance to the Appellants. Order 18 rule 11 provides as follows: S/N nNHwbQ0M6kWwLBis/g3VpQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Points of law may be pleaded (O. 18, r. 11) 11. A party may by his pleading raise any point of law. [27] This provision is permissive in nature. While it is trite that parties are only permitted to plead material facts and not the law or evidence, raising a point of law is permitted. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that reliance on Order 18 rule 11 of the Rules of Court 2012 by the Appellants is flawed. [28] In actual fact, the pertinent provision is Order 18 rule 8 of the Rules of Court 2012. Order 18 rule 8 expressly provides for matters which shall be specifically pleaded. For ease of reference, it states as follows: Matters which shall be specifically pleaded (O. 18, r. 8) 8. (1) A party shall in any pleading subsequent to a statement of claim plead specifically any matter, for example, performance, release, any relevant statute of limitation, fraud or any fact showing illegality — (a) which he alleges makes any claim or defence of the opposite party not maintainable; (b) which, if not specifically pleaded, might take the opposite party by surprise; or (c) which raises issues of fact not arising out of the preceding pleading. [29] By virtue of the provision in Order 18 rule 8 of the Rules of Court 2012, the failure by the Appellants to plead the fact showing that the Respondent was an unlicensed moneylender and thus rendering the agreement as unenforceable and illegal was fatal to the Appellants’ case. S/N nNHwbQ0M6kWwLBis/g3VpQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [30] Likewise, this Court is in agreement with the learned Magistrate who had rejected the Appellants’ defence based on a breach of section 27 of the Moneylenders Act 1951. At para [22], the learned Magistrate explained: l22l Bagi Seksyen 27 pula, Defendan-Defendan juga tidak pada bila- bila masa telah plead mengenai isu ini. Defendan-Defendan mendakwa bahawa Perjanjian Pinjaman tersebut adalah tidak sah kerana Pesuruhjaya Sumpah telah membuat pengakuansaksi di luar Pejabat berdaftar tanpa kebenaran Ketua Hakim Negara. Mahkamah berpadangan pertamanya isu ini 'tidak pernah dipleadkan, kedua sekiranya benar, ia ladalah satu kesalahan dari segi tatatertib sahaja dan tidak menyebabkan Perjanjian Pinjaman tersebut tidak sah. Defendan- Defendan juga tidak pada bila-bila masa sapina Pesufuhjaya Sumpah tersebut untuk mengambil keterangan beliau. [31] On the issue of whether there had been non-compliance with section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, the learned Magistrate had answered this question in the negative. The learned Magistrate explained as follows: [17] Berdasarkan pembacaan kepada seksyen 16 tersebut, Mahkamah berpadangan Plaintif telah pun menyerahkan Perjanjian Pinjaman tersebut kepada Defendan-Defendan, Tiada keperluan dalam seksyen 16 yang menghendaki Plaintif menyerahkan Perjanjian Peminjam tersebut kepada kesemua peminjam-peminjam. Tambahan, Pihak-Pihak dalam kes ini adalah pasangan suami isteri. Oleh itu, bagi isu (b), Mahkamah berpadangan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah diserahkan sesalinan Perjanjian Pinjaman tersebut. [32] This Court is unable to agree with the above decision of the learned Magistrate on this issue. Instead, this Court answers the question in the affirmative. S/N nNHwbQ0M6kWwLBis/g3VpQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [33] The courts in this country have repeatedly said that the Moneylenders Act 1951 is a piece of social legislation. (See for example, the observation by Lee Swee Seng JCA in Mahmood Ooyub v Li Chee Leong and Other Appeals [2020] 1 LNS 660; [2020] 6 MLJ 755; [2021] 1 MLJA 609.) Hence, the provisions in the said Act must be read in favour of borrowers. While it is true that there is only one agreement in the instant case, copies can be made for every borrower (when there is more than one borrower). On this ground alone, the agreement becomes unenforceable and the appeal is allowed. [34] In view of the Court’s finding that there was a breach of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, the said loan agreement was thus unenforceable. [35] The amount of RM84,750 allowed by learned Magistrate up to 14 December, 2020 together with interest at 5% from the date of Judgment and costs of RM5,000 are hereby set aside. [36] In the event that the Court of Appeal disagrees with the above decision of this Court, it is this Court’s finding, based on the available evidence and testimonies of the witnesses, that the actual amount of the loan received by the Appellants was indeed RM45,500. If the amount of the loan had indeed been RM100,000, it would have been prudent for an experienced moneylender like the Respondent to issue a cheque for that amount, instead of partly in the form of a cheque and partly in cash, as allegedly made at the request of the Appellants. [37] Henceforth, even if the above loan agreement were one that was valid and enforceable, the Appellants had fully settled the loan. This is S/N nNHwbQ0M6kWwLBis/g3VpQ Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 because as of 2 May, 2019, the Appellants had repaid a sum of RM69,900 to the Respondent. [38] This appeal is allowed with Costs of RM10,000 (subject to allocator) to be paid by the Respondent to the Appellants. Dated: 31 October, 2023 sgd [CHOONG YEOW CHOY] Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Counsel: B. Thinagaran for the Appellants (Messrs. Thinagaran & Associates and R.B. Murali & Associates) Kathiravan Raveenthran for the Respondent (Messrs. Che Mokhtar & Ling) S/N nNHwbQ0M6kWwLBis/g3VpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	20,390	Tika 2.6.0
WA-22NCC-633-08/2023	PLAINTIF XORIX SDN BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) SMEB ASSET MANAGEMENT SDN BHD 2. ) ANDREW HENG 3. ) KUMARAKURU A/L JAI PRAKASH KRISHNAN 4. ) AZAHARIE SIMAN	Civil Procedure — Application for Injunction against Receiver and Manager – Jurisdiction to grant ad interim orders pending inter partes hearing — Powers of the High Court under s 25 of the Court of Judicature Act 1964 and para 6 of the Schedule to the same Act — Balance of convenience	30/10/2023	YA Puan Liza Chan Sow Keng	https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=93bd88e3-ca2e-44b7-a150-7c03118aa0ab&Inline=true	IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) CIVIL SUIT NO. WA-22NCC-633-08/2023 BETWEEN XORIX SDN BHD (Company No. 200401020852 (659356-M) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. SMEB ASSET MANAGEMENT SDN BHD (Company No. 199901002270 (477170-A)) 2. ANDREW HENG (NRIC No. 750225-71-5051) 3. KUMARAKURU A/L JAI PRAKASH KRISHNAN (NRIC No. 820815-01-5371) 4. AZAHARIE SIMAN (NRIC No. 760724-04-5127) … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] In Enclosure (“Enc.”) 3, the Plaintiff sought an ex parte injunction against the Defendants as follows: (i) that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants be and is hereby restrained from exercising any power as the Receivers and Managers of the Plaintiff pending disposal of this proceeding herein; 30/10/2023 07:57:21 WA-22NCC-633-08/2023 Kand. 56 S/N 44i9ky7Kt0ShUHwDEYqgqw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 (ii) that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants do forthwith return possession and control of the assets and properties of the Plaintiff pending disposal of this proceeding herein; (iii) that the 1st to 3rd Defendant shall perform all acts, incidental to and/or necessary to give effect to paragraph 1 and 2 above. [2] I had directed that Enc. 3 to be served and fixed the same to be heard inter partes on 14.9.2023. [3] On 14.9.2023 Upon the Plaintiff’s undertaking to the court given through learned counsel, to pay damages if the court is subsequently of the view that the ad interim orders ought not to be made, I had granted the ad interim orders sought on terms as in Enc. 3 with additional conditions that the Plaintiff inform the Receivers and Managers (“R&Ms”) of the operations of the company including the acquisition of assets and raw materials, disposal of any inventory/trading stocks; with liberty to apply pending inter partes hearing of Enc. 3. [4] The Defendants have appealed against the grant of the ad interim orders. This judgment contains the reasons for my decision. Background [5] By a Facility Agreement dated 30.8.2006 between SME Bank Berhad (“Bank”) and the Plaintiff, Bank agreed to provide various facilities totalling RM7,000,000.00 to the Plaintiff on the terms and conditions stated S/N 44i9ky7Kt0ShUHwDEYqgqw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 therein. The facilities were secured by a Memorandum of Deposit dated 30.8.2006 on a fixed deposit for a sum of RM 500,000.00; a Debenture dated 30.8.2006 on a First Party Fixed and Floating Charge on all existing and future assets of the Plaintiff and a Deed of Assignment dated 30.8.2006 of a project account of the Plaintiff. The Facility Agreement was varied over the years culminating in 3 Debentures dated 30.8.2006, 29.5.2009 and 14.10.2009 (“Debentures”) being created in favour of the Bank by the Plaintiff. [6] By a Vesting Order dated 26.1.2015, Bank sold and transferred the rights and interest over the Plaintiff’s accounts to the 1st Defendant, SMEB Asset Management Sdn Bhd (“D1”). [7] On 3.11.2016 and 24.11.2016 respectively, SMEB Asset obtained a judgement in default (“JID”) against Plaintiff in two separate suits in the Sessions Court and the High Court at Kuala Lumpur in respect of amount outstanding under the facility agreement. [8] On 27.6.2023, D1 filed a separate application in the Sessions Court and at the High Court respectively seeking leave of the Court to enforce the JIDs. [9] Whilst the leave applications were pending, D1 on 23.8.2023 appointed the 2nd and 3rd Defendants as the Receivers and Managers (R&Ms) of the Plaintiff. S/N 44i9ky7Kt0ShUHwDEYqgqw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [10] In support of the injunction application, amongst others, the Plaintiff asserted that: 10.1 the appointment of R&M without any prior notice given to the Plaintiff was invalid, null and void - prior notice to the Plaintiff is a pre-requisite condition before D1 can exercise its power to appoint the R&Ms; 10.2 the debt under the facility agreement has merged into the JIDs in which case D1 ceased to have any enforcement rights upon expiry of 6 years from the date the JIDs are obtained i.e. after 2.11.2022 and 23.11.2022 respectively. 10.3 The R&Ms have stationed security guards at and trespassed the business address of the Plaintiff, frozen the Plaintiff’s bank accounts rendering it unable to: (i) pay salaries, (ii) order raw materials for the production of manufacture pharmaceutical products to be supplied to the Ministry of Health for eventual distribution to the hospitals, and (iii) causing the Plaintiff to be unable to fulfil outstanding orders. The issuance of the Ad interim Orders [11] At the inter partes hearing on 14.9.2023, the Defendants sought time to file their affidavits to respond to Enc. 3. That to me was logical and time should be given for such a purpose as any submission on disputed facts S/N 44i9ky7Kt0ShUHwDEYqgqw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 from the Bar will not be entertained by this court - Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v Public Bank Bhd [1995] 1 MLJ 281; [1995] 1 CLJ 609 (CA). [12] The Court of Appeal in RIH Services (M) Sdn Bhd v Tanjung Tuan Hotel Sdn Bhd [2002] 3 MLJ 1; [2002] 3 CLJ 83 held that the court has the jurisdiction to grant an ad interim injunction in order to preserve the status quo where the hearing and disposal of application for injunction is pending. The Court of Appeal accepted that the grant of ad interim injunction pending the disposal of an application for interlocutory injunction is consistent with the powers of the High Court under s. 25(2) of the Court of Judicature Act 1964 and the additional powers under para 6 of the Schedule to the same Act which include the power to grant an injunction in any manner whatsoever. The provisions read: “25 Powers of the High Court (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) the High Court shall have the additional powers set out in the Schedule: Provided that all such powers shall be exercised in accordance with any written law or rules of court relating to the same. Schedule Paragraph 6 Preservation of property Power to provide for the interim preservation of property the subject matter of any cause or matter by sale or by injunction or the appointment of a receiver or the registration of a caveat or a lis pendens or in any other manner whatsoever” S/N 44i9ky7Kt0ShUHwDEYqgqw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [13] Although the Defendants’ respective counsel had objected to the Plaintiff’s counsel’s oral application for ad interim orders, RIH Services made it plain that even if the Defendants do not agree to the ad interim order being made, the court has the jurisdiction to make such an order. In the circumstances of the instant case, I can, and I should exercise my discretion to allow the ad interim orders sought by the Plaintiff. [14] Firstly, in my view, the alleged steps taken by the R&Ms as asserted by the Plaintiff whose appointments were disputed by the Plaintiff, made the Plaintiff vulnerable and could cause it to suffer irreparable commercial prejudice, damage and embarrassment to the Plaintiff’s business and reputation if the ad interim orders were not granted. It is the considered opinion of this court that it is equitable and just for this court to make the ad interim orders to preserve the status quo to ensure the Plaintiff’s business is not doomed pending the hearing and disposal inter partes of Enc. 3 and so that parties can ventilate all issues, and their respective contentions fully. [15] ‘Status quo’ is defined: (i) by Lord Diplock in Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board 1984] AC 130; [1983] 3 WLR 143 at p. 148: “…The status quo is the existing state of affairs; but since states of affairs do not remain static this raises the query: existing when? In my opinion, the relevant status quo to which reference was made in American Cyanamid is the state of affairs existing during the period immediately preceding the issue of the writ claiming the permanent injunction or, if there be unreasonable delay between the issue of the writ and the motion S/N 44i9ky7Kt0ShUHwDEYqgqw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 for an interlocutory injunction, the period immediately preceding the motion. The duration of that period since the state of affairs last changed must be more than minimal, having regard to the total length of the relationship between the parties in respect of which the injunction is granted; otherwise the state of affairs before the last change would be the relevant status quo.” (ii) by Sir John Pennycuick in Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] QB 122, p 141: “By the expression ‘status quo’ I understand to be meant the position prevailing when the defendant embarked upon the activity sought to be restrained. Different considerations might apply if the Plaintiff delays unduly his application for relief.” [16] Here, the status quo in my view is the state of affairs existing during the period immediately preceding the issuance of the writ claiming the injunction bearing on the impugned appointment of the R&Ms. That is the status quo to be maintained, as provided for in the Ad Interim Injunction Order until the disposal of Enc. 3 inter partes. [17] Secondly, the Plaintiff had also given an undertaking for damages so that in the event there are losses suffered by the Defendants, such losses may be made good by the Plaintiff if determined ultimately when Enc. 3 is heard on the merits, that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the ad interim orders. [18] Thirdly, glaringly, it cannot be ignored that when the sudden concerted push to apply for leave to enforce the JIDS and to appoint R&Ms, D1 had already waited more than 6 years to enforce the JIDs, and much S/N 44i9ky7Kt0ShUHwDEYqgqw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 longer still from date of default of the facility agreement, to appoint R&Ms. Hence I do not see how they could be irreparably harmed or severely prejudiced by the grant of the ad interim orders whilst waiting for Enc. 3 to be heard inter partes on its merits. [19] For reasons given, this court exercised its discretion to allow the Plaintiff’s oral application for the ad interim orders with additional conditions as alluded to in paragraph 3 above for accountability and transparency in the Plaintiff’s dealing with its assets and to ameliorate any risk of prejudice to the Defendants. Dated this: 20th day of October 2023 - sgd - …………………………. Liza Chan Sow Keng Judge High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff : Mak Lin Kum (together with him, Sandra Tan) Messrs Syed Ibrahim & Co. For the 1st and 4th Defendants : Syafinaz Vani (together with her, Elani Mazlan and Rakkshanaa Samasundaram) Messrs Rosli Dahlan Saravana Partnership For the 2nd and 3rd Defendants : Sitti Salehah (together with her, Abu Haziq and Nik Mahyiddin (Pdk)) Messrs Amelda Fuad Abi & Aidil S/N 44i9ky7Kt0ShUHwDEYqgqw Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 CASES REFERRED: Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v Public Bank Bhd [1995] 1 MLJ 281; [1995] 1 CLJ 609 RIH Services (M) Sdn Bhd v Tanjung Tuan Hotel Sdn Bhd [2002] 3 MLJ 1; [2002] 3 CLJ 83 Garden Cottage Food Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1983] 3 WLR 143; [1984] AC 130 Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] QB 122 LEGISLATION/STATUTE REFERED: s. 25 of the Court of Judicature Act 1964 and schedule 6 S/N 44i9ky7Kt0ShUHwDEYqgqw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal	12,637	Tika 2.6.0

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