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58 In that connection, in certain cases the very circumstances in which the aid has been granted show that it is liable to affect trade between Member States and to distort or threaten to distort competition. In such cases, the Commission must set out those circumstances in the statement of reasons for its decision (see Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission, cited above, paragraph 24; Germany and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 52; and Joined Cases C-15/98 and C-105/99 Italy and Sardegna Lines v Commission [2000] ECR I-8855, paragraph 66). Contrary to what the Spanish Government claims, the statement of reasons in the contested decision, as set out in the first sentence of paragraph 56 above, is sufficient to explain the effect of the Plan on competition and trade between Member States since the Plan applies to an indeterminate number of beneficiaries above the de minimis threshold, it relates to services the supply of which is liberalised between the Member States and those services are by nature liable to be the subject of inter-State supplies. The fact that only a small number of professional transport companies from other Member States actually engage in cabotage in Spain is irrelevant precisely because the Plan could have the effect of hampering growth in the supply of such services.
66 As regards more particularly a decision concerning State aid, the Court has held that although in certain cases the very circumstances in which the aid has been granted may show that it is liable to affect trade between Member States and to distort or threaten to distort competition, the Commission must at least set out those circumstances in the statement of reasons for its decision (Joined Cases 296/82 and 318/82 Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v Commission [1985] ECR 809, at paragraph 24; and Joined Cases C-329/93, C-62/95 and C-63/95 Germany and Others v Commission [1996] ECR I-5151, at paragraph 52).
98. It follows that the answer to Question 1(b) must be that, where an abusive practice has been found to exist, the transactions involved must be redefined so as to re-establish the situation that would have prevailed in the absence of the transactions constituting that abusive practice. Costs
56. As Community law stands, it is still possible that differences will continue to exist between Member States in the classification of products as medicinal products or as foodstuffs. Thus, the fact that a product is classified as a foodstuff in another Member State cannot prevent it from being classified as a medicinal product in the Member State of importation, if it displays the characteristics of such a product (see Case C-387/99 Commission v Germany [2004] ECR I-3773, paragraphs 52 and 53, and Commission v Austria , paragraphs 59 and 60).
53. The fact therefore that a product is classified as a foodstuff in another Member State cannot prevent its being classified as a medicinal product in the Member State of importation if it displays the characteristics of such a product (see, inter alia, Delattre , paragraph 27; LTM , paragraph 24; and Laboratoires Sarget , paragraph 23, all cited above).
11 ALTHOUGH , IN THE CONTEXT OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY , IT IS NOT FOR THE COURT TO RULE ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF A NATIONAL LAW WITH THE TREATY , IT DOES , ON THE OTHER HAND , HAVE JURISDICTION TO PROVIDE THE NATIONAL COURT WITH ALL THE CRITERIA OF INTERPRETATION RELATING TO COMMUNITY LAW WHICH MAY ENABLE IT TO JUDGE SUCH COMPATIBILITY .
41 The parties concerned, within the meaning of Article 93(2) of the Treaty, who, as persons directly and individually concerned, are thus entitled under the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty to institute proceedings for annulment are those persons, undertakings or associations whose interests might be affected by the grant of the aid, in particular competing undertakings and trade associations (see, in particular, Case 323/82 Intermills v Commission [1984] ECR 3809, paragraph 16).
16 ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 93 ( 2 ), THE COMMISSION IS TO TAKE A DECISION IN RELATION TO AID GRANTED ' ' AFTER GIVING NOTICE TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO SUBMIT THEIR COMMENTS ' ' . IT MUST BE NOTED THAT THE ' ' PARTIES CONCERNED ' ' REFERRED TO IN THAT PROVISION ARE NOT ONLY THE UNDERTAKING OR UNDERTAKINGS RECEIVING AID BUT EQUALLY THE PERSONS , UNDERTAKINGS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE INTERESTS MIGHT BE AFFECTED BY THE GRANT OF THE AID , IN PARTICULAR COMPETING UNDERTAKINGS AND TRADE ASSOCIATIONS . IN OTHER WORDS , THERE IS AN INDETERMINATE GROUP OF PERSONS TO WHOM NOTICE MUST BE GIVEN .
39 The fact that the appellant could not have been unaware during that period that Feldmühle and CBC were participating in the cartel, because it had itself been participating in it since January 1987 through its subsidiary Kopparfors, cannot, as the Advocate General correctly observes at point 80 of his Opinion, suffice to impute to it responsibility for the infringements committed by those companies prior to their acquisition.
44. However, it is also clear from the case-law of the Court that, in certain situations, goods, materials or raw materials resulting from an extraction or manufacturing process the primary aim of which is not their production may be regarded not as a residue, but as by-products, which their holder does not seek to ‘discard’, within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 1(a) of Directive 75/442, but which he intends to exploit or market on terms advantageous to himself in a subsequent process – including, as the case may be, in order to meet the needs of economic operators other than the producer of those substances – provided that such reuse is not a mere possibility but a certainty, without any further processing prior to reuse and as part of the continuing process of production (see, inter alia, Case C‑121/03 Commission v Spain , paragraph 58; Case C‑194/05 Commission v Italy , paragraph 38; and Commune de Mesquer , paragraph 42).
58. In certain situations, goods, materials or raw materials resulting from an extraction or manufacturing process, the primary aim of which is not the production of that item, may be regarded not as a residue but as a by-product which the undertaking does not seek to ‘discard’, within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 1(a) of Directive 75/442, but intends to exploit or market on terms which are advantageous to it, in a subsequent process, without any further processing prior to reuse. There is, in such a case, no reason to hold that the provisions of that directive, which are intended to regulate the disposal or recovery of waste, apply to goods, materials or raw materials which have an economic value as products regardless of any form of processing and which, as such, are subject to the legislation applicable to those products, provided that such reuse is not a mere possibility but a certainty, without any further processing prior to reuse, and as part of the continuing process of production (see Case C‑9/00 Palin Granit and Vehmassalon kansanterveystyön kuntayhtymän hallitus [2002] ECR I‑3533, paragraphs 34 to 36).
19. Mrs van Pommeren-Bourgondiën, who has Netherlands nationality, resides in Belgium but worked in the Netherlands for her entire working life. Since 1997 she has received invalidity benefit under the WAO at the highest rate under the invalidity benefit scheme.
80. With regard to judicial review of the conditions referred to in the previous paragraph, the Community legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in those fields can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (see, to this effect, Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council [1996] ECR I-5755, paragraph 58; Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-2405, paragraphs 55 and 56; Case C-157/96 National Farmers’ Union and Others [1998] ECR I-2211, paragraph 61; and British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco , paragraph 123). That is so, in particular, in the field of the common transport policy (see, to this effect, in particular, Joined Cases C-248/95 and C-249/95 SAM Schiffahrt and Stapf [1997] ECR I-4475, paragraph 23, and Joined Cases C‑27/00 and C-122/00 Omega Air and Others [2002] ECR I-2569, paragraph 63).
55 In assessing the need for the measure in question, it should be emphasized that the Community legislature was seeking to regulate an economically complex situation. Before the adoption of the Directive, deposit-guarantee schemes did not exist in all the Member States; moreover, most of them did not cover depositors with branches set up by credit institutions authorized in other Member States. The Community legislature therefore needed to assess the future, uncertain effects of its action. In so doing, it could choose between the general prevention of a risk and the establishment of a system of specific protection.
54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.
38. Il s’ensuit que le principe d’égalité de traitement serait méconnu si l’application de l’article 65 de la directive TVA était tributaire de la forme que revêt la contrepartie perçue par l’assujetti. Ledit principe commande donc d’interpréter cet article 65 en ce sens qu’il s’applique également lorsque l’acompte est versé en nature, dès lors que les conditions rappelées au point 32 du présent arrêt sont remplies. Il est cependant nécessaire que la valeur de cet acompte puisse être exprimée en argent. En effet, si, selon une jurisprudence constante, la contrepartie d’une prestation de services peut consister en une livraison de biens et en constituer la base d’imposition au sens de l’article 73 de la directive TVA lorsqu’il existe un lien direct entre la prestation de services et la livraison de biens, c’est à condition que la valeur de cette dernière puisse être exprimée en argent (arrêt Orfey Balgaria, précité, point 36, ainsi que, en ce sens, arrêt du 3 juillet 2001, Bertelsmann, C‑380/99, Rec. p. I‑5163, point 17 et jurisprudence citée).
17 In order to interpret, for that purpose, the term .consideration. in Article 11A(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the consideration for a supply of goods may consist of a supply of services, and so constitute the taxable amount within the meaning of that provision, if there is a direct link between the supply of goods and the supply of services and if the value of those services can be expressed in monetary terms (see, in particular, Naturally Yours Cosmetics, paragraphs 11, 12 and 16, and Empire Stores, paragraph 12).
54. It is therefore for the national court to determine whether A has in fact proved that B has exhausted all the possibilities of taking account of the losses which exist in Sweden.
75. In that regard, it must be noted that, as the Court has consistently held, while a prohibition such as that under the Italian legislation, which entails the obligation to use a sales name other than that used in the Member State of production, does not absolutely preclude the importation into the Member State concerned of products originating in other Member States, it is nevertheless likely to make their marketing more difficult and thus impede trade between Member States (see, to that effect, inter alia , Case 182/84 Miro [1985] ECR 3731, paragraph 22; Case 298/87 Smanor [1988] ECR 4489, paragraph 12; Case 286/86 Deserbais [1988] ECR 4907, paragraph 12; and Guimont , cited above, paragraph 26).
12 However, it would be incompatible with Article 30 of the Treaty and the objectives of a common market to apply such rules to imported cheeses of the same type where those cheeses have been lawfully produced and marketed in another Member State under the same generic name but with a different minimum fat content . The Member State into which they are imported cannot prevent the importation and marketing of such cheeses where adequate information for the consumer is ensured .
29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26).
17 It must first of all be borne in mind that due consultation of the Parliament in the cases provided for by the Treaty constitutes an essential formal requirement breach of which renders the measure concerned void (see, for example, the judgment in Case 417/93 Parliament v Council [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 9). The effective participation of the Parliament in the legislative process of the Community, in accordance with the procedures laid down by the Treaty, represents an essential factor in the institutional balance intended by the Treaty. Such power reflects the fundamental democratic principle that the people should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly (see, for example, the judgment in Case C-65/93 Parliament v Council [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraph 21).
9 The Court has consistently held that due consultation of the Parliament in the cases provided for by the Treaty constitutes an essential formal requirement disregard of which means that the measure concerned is void (Case 138/79 Roquette Frères v Council [1980] ECR 3333, paragraph 33). I10 In the context of the consultation procedure, however, nothing in Community law requires the Council to abstain from any consideration of a Commission proposal or from any search for a general approach or even for a common position within the Council before the Parliament' s opinion is delivered provided that it does not adopt its final position before being apprised of the opinion. Furthermore, such a prohibition is not called for by any institutional or procedural objective.
40. Thus, to begin with, Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision expressly states that the decision is not to have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 EU, an obligation which moreover concerns all the Member States, in particular both the issuing and the executing Member States.
21. The fact that the marketability of the product in ‘normal conditions’ is an aspect inherent in the concept of ‘sound and fair marketable quality’ is indeed clearly apparent from the rules relating to export refunds for agricultural products inasmuch as, from Regulation No 1041/67 onwards, all the relevant regulations have adopted the concept of ‘sound and fair marketable quality’ as well as the criterion of the product’s marketability ‘in normal conditions’. As regards Regulation No 3665/87, it is the ninth recital which refers to that requirement (see, to that effect, SEPA , paragraphs 23 and 26).
26. The fact that the marketability of the product ‘in normal conditions’ is an inherent aspect of ‘sound and fair marketable quality’ is however clearly apparent from the rules relating to export refunds for agricultural products inasmuch as, from Regulation No 1041/67 onwards, all the relevant regulations have adopted the concept of ‘sound and fair marketable quality’ as well as the criterion of the product’s marketability ‘on normal terms’ and subsequently ‘in normal conditions’ as requirements for a product’s eligibility for an export refund.
54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.
37. To exclude automatically application of the framework agreement in situations such as those in the cases before the referring court would, in disregard of the objective attributed to clause 4, effectively reduce the scope of the protection against discrimination for the workers concerned and would give rise to an unduly restrictive interpretation of that clause, contrary to the case-law of the Court ( Rosado Santana , paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
44. To exclude automatically application of the framework agreement in a situation such as that in the case before the referring court – as the Spanish Government and the Commission suggest – would, in disregard of the objective attributed to clause 4, effectively reduce the scope of the protection against discrimination for the workers concerned and would give rise to an unduly restrictive interpretation of that clause, contrary to the case-law of the Court (see, to that effect, Del Cerro Alonso , paragraphs 37 and 38, and Case C‑268/06 Impact [2008] ECR I‑2483, paragraphs 114 and 115).
64. It is therefore apparent from the very wording of Regulation No 805/2004 that a judgment by default issued in circumstances where it is impossible to ascertain the domicile of the defendant cannot be certified as a European Enforcement Order. That conclusion also follows from an analysis of the objectives and scheme of that regulation. The regulation institutes a derogation from the common system of recognition of judgments, the conditions of which are, as a matter of principle, to be interpreted strictly.
39. It is indisputable that the conditions to be satisfied under Paragraph 18(12) to (16) of the AuslBG by a service provider intending to post in Austria workers who are nationals of non-Member States, by reason of the administrative burdens that they represent, and in particular the six‑week period required in order for the EU Posting Confirmation to be issued, impede the planned posting and, consequently, the provision of services by that undertaking (see, to that effect, Case C‑445/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2004] ECR I-10191, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
23. It is indisputable that the conditions to be satisfied under the Grand Ducal Regulation of 12 May 1972 by a service-providing undertaking intending to deploy in Luxembourg workers who are nationals of non-member countries are liable, by reason of the administrative and financial burdens that they represent, to impede the planned deployment and, consequently, the provision of services by that undertaking (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C‑54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 Finalarte and Others [2001] ECR I‑7831, paragraph 30).
110 THE SUBMISSION MUST THEREFORE BE REJECTED . ( B ) THE ALLEGED ABSENCE OF INTENTION ON THE PART OF PIONEER
22. The Commission, when it is faced with an aid scheme, is generally not in a position to identify exactly the amount of aid received by individual recipients. Accordingly, the specific circumstances of one of the recipients of an aid scheme can be assessed only at the stage of recovery of the aid (see, to that effect, Case C‑310/99 Italy v Commission [2002] ECR I-2289, paragraphs 89 to 91).
91 There was no need for the contested decision to include an analysis of the aid granted in individual cases on the basis of the scheme. It is only at the stage of recovery of the aid that it is necessary to look at the individual situation of each undertaking concerned.
54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.
49. Accordingly, the Court has held that Article 152(5) EC does not exclude the possibility that the Member States may be required under other Treaty provisions, such as Article 49 EC, to make adjustments to their national systems of social security, but that it does not follow that this undermines their sovereign powers in the field (see Watts , paragraph 147, and Commission v Luxembourg , paragraph 45).
147. That provision does not, however, exclude the possibility that the Member States may be required under other Treaty provisions, such as Article 49 EC, or Community measures adopted on the basis of other Treaty provisions, such as Article 22 of Regulation No 1408/71, to make adjustments to their national systems of social security. It does not follow that this undermines their sovereign powers in the field (see to that effect Müller-Fauré and van Riet , paragraph 102, and, by analogy, Case C‑376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419, paragraph 78).
28 MAIS, SI LA CONSTATATION DE L' ILLEGALITE DANS LES MOTIFS DE L' ARRET D' ANNULATION OBLIGE, EN PREMIER LIEU, L' INSTITUTION AUTEUR DE L' ACTE A ELIMINER CETTE ILLEGALITE DANS L' ACTE DESTINE A SE SUBSTITUER A L' ACTE ANNULE, ELLE PEUT EGALEMENT, EN TANT QU' ELLE VISE UNE DISPOSITION D' UN CONTENU DETERMINE DANS UNE MATIERE DONNEE, ENTRAINER D' AUTRES CONSEQUENCES POUR CETTE INSTITUTION .
15. The Commission’s function is to ensure, in the general interest, that the Member States give effect to Community law and to obtain a declaration of any failure to fulfil the obligations deriving therefrom with a view to bringing it to an end (see Commission v France , cited above, paragraph 15, and Commission v Germany , cited above, paragraph 29 and the case‑law there cited).
29. It is settled case-law that in exercising its powers under Article 226 EC the Commission does not have to show that there is a specific interest in bringing an action. The provision is not intended to protect the Commission's own rights. The Commission's function, in the general interest of the Community, is to ensure that the Member States give effect to the Treaty and the provisions adopted by the institutions thereunder and to obtain a declaration of any failure to fulfil the obligations deriving therefrom with a view to bringing it to an end (Case 167/73 Commission v France [1974] ECR 359, paragraph 15; Case C-431/92 Commission v Germany [1995] ECR I-2189, paragraph 21; and Case C-476/98 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-9855, paragraph 38).
66. Accordingly, the fact that the supplier acted in good faith, that he took every reasonable measure in his power and that his participation in fraud is excluded are important points in deciding whether that supplier can be obliged to account for the VAT after the event.
36. Moreover, the fact that the applicable national rules are social security rules and, more specifically, provide, as regards sickness insurance, for benefits in kind rather than reimbursement does not mean that medical treatment falls outside the scope of that basic freedom (see, to that effect, Müller‑Fauré and van Riet , paragraph 103; Watts , paragraph 89, and Commission v Spain , paragraph 47).
89. The fact that reimbursement of the hospital treatment in question is subsequently sought from a national health service such as that in question in the main proceedings does not mean that the rules on the freedom to provide services guaranteed by the Treaty do not apply (see to that effect Smits and Peerbooms , paragraph 55, and Müller-Fauré and van Riet , paragraph 39). It has already been held that a supply of medical services does not cease to be a supply of services within the meaning of Article 49 EC on the ground that the patient, after paying the foreign supplier for the treatment received, subsequently seeks the reimbursement of that treatment from a national health service (see Müller-Fauré and van Riet , paragraph 103).
37 Moreover, the acts were not isolated occurrences. As regards the use of mopeds on the breeding beaches, this is clear from the Greek Government's assertion that nocturnal supervision of the eastern part of beach at Laganas was, at the material time, particularly difficult to ensure owing to the length of the beach, the high number of access points and the low number of supervisors. As far as the presence of small boats in the relevant sea area is concerned, it should be noted that these were observed on two visits to Zakinthos by Commission officials, as stated at paragraphs 8 and 13 of this judgment.
49 The rest of the case-law referred to by KCH is not decisive. In most of the cases referred to, the penalty is examined in the light of the principle of proportionality rather than the principle `nulla poena sine culpa' (cases cited above, Thyssen v Commission, paragraphs 18 to 22; Schumacher, paragraphs 25 to 31; Cereol Italia, paragraphs 13 to 27; National Farmers' Union and Others, paragraphs 49 to 55; and Molkereigenossenschaft Wiedergeltingen, paragraphs 33 to 45). As for the judgment in Estel v Commission, in paragraphs 38 to 43 of which the Court held that a steel company penalised by the Commission for having exceeded the production quota imposed on it had committed an error which was not excusable and that, accordingly, the Commission had not breached the principle `nulla poena sine culpa', that judgment was delivered in an area far removed from agricultural regulations and without the Court ruling explicitly on whether the penalty in question was of a criminal nature or not.
30 In the light of those considerations, it must be held that although the loss of the whole of the special premium in circumstances other than those referred to in Article 9(2), (3) and (4) is a severe penalty, that penalty is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objective of the regulation in question, which is to prevent irregularities and frauds.
18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
51. It follows that, where the Regulation does not prescribe the consequences of certain facts, it is for the national court to apply, in principle, national law while taking care to ensure the full effectiveness of Community law, a task which may lead it to refrain from applying, if need be, a national rule preventing that or to interpret a national rule which has been drawn up with only a purely domestic situation in mind in order to apply it to the cross-border situation at issue (see inter alia, to this effect, Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 16, Case C-213/89 Factortame and Others  [1990] ECR I‑2433, paragraph 19, Case C‑453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, paragraph 25, and Case C‑253/00 Muñoz and Superior Fruiticola [2002] ECR I‑7289, paragraph 28).
28 The national courts, whose task it is to apply the provisions of Community law in areas within their jurisdiction, must ensure that they take full effect (see, inter alia, Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 16, Case C-213/89 Factortame and Others [1990] ECR I-2433, paragraph 19, and Case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, paragraph 25).
26. Moreover, a system under which the amount of the penalties imposed in Article 9 of that regulation varies in accordance with the amount of undeclared cash does not seem, in principle, to be disproportionate in itself.
32. It is therefore only in exceptional circumstances that the Court is required to examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court (see, to that effect, Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I‑2099, paragraph 39). The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in preliminary ruling proceedings requires the national court for its part to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to contribute to the administration of justice in the Member States and not to give opinions on general or hypothetical questions (Case C‑112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I‑5659, paragraph 32 and the case‑law cited).
32. However, the Court has also held that, in exceptional circumstances, it can examine the conditions in which the case was referred to it by the national court (see, to that effect, PreussenElektra , cited above, paragraph 39). The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in preliminary ruling proceedings requires the national court for its part to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to contribute to the administration of justice in the Member States and not to give opinions on general or hypothetical questions (Bosman , paragraph 60; Der Weduwe , paragraph 32, and Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins , paragraph 42).
11 THAT VIEW MUST BE ACCEPTED . IT IS CLEAR FROM THE SCHEME OF DIRECTIVE NO 77/187 AND FROM THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 1 ( 1 ) THEREOF THAT THE DIRECTIVE IS INTENDED TO ENSURE THE CONTINUITY OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS EXISTING WITHIN A BUSINESS , IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP . IT FOLLOWS THAT THE DECISIVE CRITERION FOR ESTABLISHING WHETHER THERE IS A TRANSFER FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE DIRECTIVE IS WHETHER THE BUSINESS IN QUESTION RETAINS ITS IDENTITY .
38. It must also be pointed out that it is settled case-law that the mere acquisition and holding of shares in a company is not to be regarded as an economic activity within the meaning of the Sixth Directive, conferring on the holder the status of a taxable person. The mere acquisition of financial holdings in other undertakings does not amount to the exploitation of property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis because any dividend yielded by that holding is merely the result of ownership of the property and is not the product of any economic activity within the meaning of that directive (see Harnas & Helm , paragraph 15, and Case C-442/01 KapHag [2003] ECR I-6851, paragraph 38). I II f, therefore, such activities do not in themselves constitute an economic activity within the meaning of that directive, the same must be true of activities consisting in the sale of such holdings (see Wellcome Trust , paragraph 33, and KapHag , paragraph 40).
33 As the Commission appositely pointed out, if such activities do not in themselves constitute an economic activity within the meaning of the Directive, the same must be true of activities consisting in the sale of such holdings.
23. However, it should be borne in mind that, as the Court has previously held, Article 51 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 42 EC), does not prohibit the Community legislature from attaching conditions to the rights and advantages which it accords in order to ensure freedom of movement for workers or from determining the limits thereto (Joined Cases 41/79, 121/79 and 796/79 Testa and Others [1980] ECR 1979, paragraph 14, and Gray , paragraph 11).
51. Il ressort de la jurisprudence qu’une prestation peut être considérée comme accessoire à une prestation principale lorsqu’elle constitue non une fin en soi, mais le moyen de bénéficier dans les meilleures conditions du service principal (voir, en ce sens, arrêts Madgett et Baldwin, précité, point 24; du 25 février 1999, CPP, C‑349/96, Rec. p. I‑973, point 30; du 6 novembre 2003, Dornier, C‑45/01, Rec. p. I‑12911, point 34, ainsi que Horizon College, précité, point 29).
34. In this case, it is common ground that the psychotherapeutic treatment given in Dornier ' s out-patient facility by qualified psychologists generally constitutes services provided to the patients as an end in themselves and not as a means of better enjoying other types of services. In so far as that treatment is not ancillary to hospital or medical care, it is not an activity " closely related" to services exempted under Article 13A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive.
62. Il n’en va autrement que pour les situations nées et définitivement réalisées sous l’empire de la règle précédente, qui créent des droits acquis (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 14 avril 1970, Brock, 68/69, Rec. p. 171, point 7; du 5 décembre 1973, SOPAD, 143/73, Rec. p. 1433, point 8, et du 10 juillet 1986, Licata/CES, 270/84, Rec. p. 2305, point 31).
41. Consequently, even if, formally, the referring court has limited its questions to the interpretation only of the provisions of Directives 76/207 and 96/34, that does not prevent this Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of European Union law that may be of assistance in adjudicating in the case pending before it, whether or not the referring court has referred to them in the wording of its questions. It is, in this regard, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of European Union law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute (see Fuß , paragraph 40, and Worten , paragraph 31).
31. Consequently, even if, formally, the referring court has limited its questions to the interpretation of Article 17(1) of Directive 95/46, that does not prevent this Court from providing the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of European Union law that may be of assistance in adjudicating in the case pending before it, whether or not the referring court has referred to them in the wording of its questions. It is, in this regard, for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of European Union law which require interpretation in view of the subject-matter of the dispute (see Fuß , paragraph 40).
34 A legislative provision such as the one at issue in the main proceedings has the effect of dissuading nationals of a Member State residing in the Netherlands from investing their capital in companies which have their seat in another Member State. It is also clear from the legislative history of that provision that the exemption of dividends, accompanied by the limitation of that exemption to dividends on shares in companies which have their seat in the Netherlands, was intended specifically to promote investments by individuals in companies so established in the Netherlands in order to increase their equity capital.
41. The national courts must therefore ensure that all appropriate conclusions will be drawn from an infringement of the last sentence of Article 88(3) EC, in accordance with their national law, as regards both the validity of measures giving effect to the aid and the recovery of financial support granted in disregard of that provision (‘ FNCE ’, paragraph 12, and SFEI and Others , cited above, paragraph 40, as well as Joined Cases C‑261/01 and C‑262/01 van Calster and Others [2003] ECR I‑12249, paragraph 64, and Transalpine Ölleitung in Österreich and Others , cited above, paragraph 47).
64. Furthermore, it is for the national courts to uphold the rights of the persons concerned in the event of any breach by the national authorities of the prohibition on putting aid into effect, which is referred to in the last sentence of Article 93(3) of the Treaty and has direct effect. Where such a breach is invoked by individuals entitled to rely on it and is established by the national courts, the latter must take all the consequential measures under national law as regards both the validity of decisions giving effect to the aid measures concerned and the recovery of the financial support granted (see Fédération nationale du commerce extérieur des produits alimentaires et Syndicat national des négociants et transformateurs de saumon , paragraph 12, and Lornoy and Others , paragraph 30).
16. By letter of 24 October 2001, TGI submitted its observations in respect of the second formal investigation procedure and requested the Commission to give it access to a non-confidential version of the file and the opportunity to submit, subsequently, further observations. That request was rejected by the Commission by letter of 23 November 2001.
25. Not only must the authorisation laid down in Article 6(2) of Directive 2006/11 be prior to any discharge liable to contain any of the List II substances, it must also specify the emission standards, which are based on the environmental quality standards set out in a programme established by the Member State in accordance with Article 6(1) and (3). The Court has, however, held on numerous occasions that it follows from Article 7(2) of Directive 76/464, of which the wording is identical to that of Article 6(2) of Directive 2006/11, that authorisations must contain emission standards which are applicable to authorised individual discharges and which have been calculated in accordance with the quality objectives previously laid down in a programme established pursuant to Article 7(1) to protect the expanses of water and watercourses in question (see, inter alia, Case C-282/02 Commission v Ireland [2005] ECR I-4653, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited). The Court also stated, in connection with Article 7(2), that the quality objectives fixed by those programmes on the basis of analyses of the waters affected serve as the point of reference for calculating the emission standards set in the prior authorisations (see Case C-384/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-3823, paragraph 41).
68. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, as the Court has already ruled on numerous occasions, it follows inter alia from Article 7(2) of the Directive that authorisations must contain emission standards which are applicable to authorised individual discharges and which have been calculated in accordance with the quality objectives previously laid down in a programme established pursuant to Article 7(1) to protect the expanses of water and watercourses in question (Joined Cases C-232/95 and C-233/95 Commission v Greece [1998] ECR I-3343, paragraph 28). Because of the absence of a coherent and general system of quality objectives, the other elements of a programme (authorisations and emission standards based on the objectives) cannot be defined in such a way as to comply with the requirements of the Directive.
27 However, such legislation, preventing as it does operators in other Member States from taking bets, directly or indirectly, in Italian territory, constitutes an obstacle to the freedom to provide services.
70. So far as concerns the protection of the national economy, this is an objective of a purely economic nature which cannot justify a difference in treatment such as that at issue in the main proceedings (see by analogy, as regards the justification of restrictions on the fundamental freedoms, Case C‑398/95 SETTG [1997] ECR I‑3091, paragraph 23, and Case C‑20/09 Commission v Portugal [2011] ECR I‑2637, paragraph 65).
23 However, maintaining industrial peace as a means of bringing a collective labour dispute to an end and thereby preventing any adverse effects on an economic sector, and consequently on the economy of the State, must be regarded as an economic aim which cannot constitute a reason relating to the general interest that justifies a restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty (see Gouda and Others, cited above, paragraph 11).
22. In order to answer those questions, it is necessary to refer to the recitals in the preamble to Regulation No 44/2001. The second of those recitals states that certain differences between national rules governing jurisdiction and recognition of judgments hamper the sound operation of the internal market. The seventh recital in the preamble to that regulation provides that its scope must cover all the main civil and commercial matters. The 15th recital in the preamble to that regulation makes clear the need, in the interests of the harmonious administration of justice, to ensure that irreconcilable judgments will not be given in two Member States.
30. In those circumstances, that notion must be defined having regard to the wording and context of Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250, where the reference to it is to be found and in the light of both the overall objectives of that directive and international law (see, by analogy, Case C‑5/08 Infopaq International [2009] ECR I‑6569, paragraph 32).
32. In those circumstances, those concepts must be defined having regard to the wording and context of Article 2 of Directive 2001/29, where the reference to them is to be found and in the light of both the overall objectives of that directive and international law (see, to that effect, SGAE , paragraphs 34 and 35 and case-law cited).
211. It follows that this part of the fifth plea must be declared inadmissible in so far as it seeks a general re-examination of the amount of the fines imposed by the Commission (see Baustahlgewebe v Commission , paragraph 129).
56. The Court has already held in similar circumstances that if the pre‑litigation procedure has attained its objective of protecting the rights of the Member State in question, that Member State, which did not inform the Commission during the pre-litigation procedure that the directive should be regarded as having already been implemented in its domestic law, cannot complain that the Commission has extended or altered the subject-matter of the action as defined by the pre-litigation procedure. According to the Court, the Commission may, after alleging that a Member State has failed to transpose a directive at all, specify in its reply that the implementation pleaded for the first time by the Member State concerned in its defence is in any event incorrect or incomplete so far as certain provisions of the directive are concerned, as such a complaint is necessarily included in the complaint alleging a complete failure to transpose and is subsidiary to that complaint (Case C‑456/03 Commission v Italy [2005] ECR I‑5335, paragraphs 23 to 42, and, in particular, paragraph 40).
24. The application lodged by the Commission, according to which it essentially alleges that the Italian Republic has not adopted any measure necessary for transposing the Directive, contains a clear statement of this complaint and of the legal and factual particulars on which it is based.
33. It follows that, the TRIPs Agreement having been concluded by the Community and its Member States by virtue of joint competence, the Court, hearing a case brought before it in accordance with the provisions of the EC Treaty, in particular Article 234 EC, has jurisdiction to define the obligations which the Community has thereby assumed and, for that purpose, to interpret the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement (see, to that effect, Dior and Others , paragraph 33).
64. However, as the referring court itself pointed out, the application of that qualification is subject to judicial control (for an example of such control in relation to the concept of objective reasons in the context of Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement, see Case C‑212/04 Adeneler and Others [2006] ECR I‑6057, paragraphs 58 to 75), although the possibility of relying on it does not preclude the view that the provision at issue confers on individuals rights which they may enforce in the national courts and which the latter must protect (see, by analogy, van Duyn , paragraph 7; Case C‑156/91 Hansa Fleisch Ernst Mundt [1992] ECR I‑5567, paragraph 15; Case C‑374/97 Feyrer [1999] ECR I‑5153, paragraph 24; and also Case C‑413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I‑7091, paragraphs 85 and 86).
61. The Framework Agreement proceeds on the premiss that employment contracts of indefinite duration are the general form of employment relationship, while recognising that fixed-term employment contracts are a feature of employment in certain sectors or in respect of certain occupations and activities (see paragraphs 6 and 8 of the general considerations in the Framework Agreement).
54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.
27. However, in accordance with settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of EU law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, which must take into account the context of that provision and the purpose of the legislation in question (see, inter alia, judgments in Fish Legal and Shirley , C‑279/12, EU:C:2013:853, paragraph 42, and Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds , C‑201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, paragraph 14).
42. Selon une jurisprudence constante, il découle tant des exigences de l’application uniforme du droit de l’Union que du principe d’égalité que les termes d’une disposition du droit de l’Union qui ne comporte aucun renvoi exprès au droit des États membres pour déterminer son sens et sa portée doivent normalement trouver, dans toute l’Union, une interprétation autonome et uniforme qui doit être recherchée en tenant compte du contexte de cette disposition et de l’objectif poursuivi par la réglementation en cause (voir, notamment, arrêt Flachglas Torgau, précité, point 37).
54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.
35. Thus, an effect on intra-Community trade is normally the result of a combination of several factors which, taken separately, are not necessarily decisive (Joined Cases C‑215/96 and C‑216/96 Bagnasco and Others [1999] ECR I‑135, paragraph 47, and Case C‑359/01 P British Sugar v Commission [2004] ECR I‑4933, paragraph 27). In order to assess whether an arrangement has an appreciable effect on trade between Member States, it is necessary to examine it in its economic and legal context (see, to that effect, Case C‑393/92 Almelo [1994] ECR I‑1477, paragraph 37).
47 In that regard, the Court has consistently held that, in order that an agreement between undertakings may affect trade between Member States, it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact that it may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States, such as might prejudice the realisation of the aim of a single market in all the Member States (Case 42/84 Remia and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, paragraph 22). Accordingly, the effect on intra-Community trade is normally the result of a combination of several factors which, taken separately, are not necessarily decisive (Case C-250/92 Gottrup-Klim v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab [1994] ECR I-5641, paragraph 54).
7 According to the third and fourth recitals in the preamble to the regulation, the period of effective protection under a patent prior to adoption of the regulation was insufficient to cover the investment put into the pharmaceutical research. The regulation is specifically designed to remedy that insufficiency by the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products in respect of which marketing authorization has been granted.
16. According to settled case-law, the exemptions provided for in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive have their own independent meaning in Community law and must therefore be given a Community definition (see Case C‑358/97 Commission v Ireland [2000] ECR I‑6301, paragraph 51; Case C‑315/00 Maierhofer [2003] ECR I‑563, paragraph 25; Case C‑275/01 Sinclair Collis [2003] ECR I‑5965, paragraph 22; Case C‑284/03 Temco Europe [2004] ECR I‑11237, paragraph 16; Case C‑428/02 Fonden Marselisborg Lystbådehavn [2005] ECR I‑1527, paragraph 27; and Case C‑455/05 Velvet & Steel Immobilien [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 15).
51 It should be observed at the outset that according to settled case-law the exemptions provided for in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive have their own independent meaning in Community law (see Case 348/87 Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1989] ECR 1737, paragraph 11, Case C-453/93 Bulthuis-Griffioen v Inspecteur der Omzetbelasting [1995] ECR I-2341, paragraph 18, and Case C-2/95 SDC v Skatteministeriet [1997] ECR I-3017, paragraph 21). They must therefore be given a Community definition.
29 IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT THE PREFERENTIAL TARIFF WAS APPLICABLE ONLY TO UNDERTAKINGS ENGAGED IN HOTHOUSE HORTICULTURE . IN THAT SECTOR, HEATING COSTS ACCOUNT FOR A LARGE PART OF PRODUCTION COSTS . IF, IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE TARIFF APPLIED TO THOSE UNDERTAKINGS DISPLAYS A DOWNWARD TREND WHICH IS NOT REFLECTED BY THE TARIFFS APPLICABLE TO UNDERTAKINGS IN OTHER SECTORS, THAT IS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE FOR THE CONCLUSION THAT THE PREFERENTIAL TARIFF CONSTITUTES AID .
26. It is apparent from the Court’s case-law that the fact that the Commission did not take further action on a reasoned opinion immediately or shortly after its issue cannot create, on the part of the Member State concerned, a legitimate expectation that the procedure has been closed (see, inter alia, Case C‑317/92 Commission v Germany , paragraph 4). That is a fortiori the position where, as in the present case, it is not in dispute that efforts were made during the alleged period of inactivity, inter alia in the context of the Europe Agreement referred to in paragraph 10 of this judgment, to find a solution which would put an end to the alleged infringement.
4 Secondly, it is for the Commission to judge at what time it will bring an action for failure to fulfil obligations; the considerations which determine its choice of time cannot affect the admissibility of the action (see judgment in Case 7/68 Commission v Italy [1968] ECR 423). That being so, the fact, on the one hand, that no action was taken further to the reasoned opinion, either immediately or shortly afterwards, and, on the other hand, that the subject of the failure to fulfil obligations was not formally raised at a bilateral meeting, could not confer on the Member State concerned a legitimate expectation that the procedure was at an end.
18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
33. In this respect, it should, as a preliminary point, be noted that, as derogations from the rules relating to procedures for the award of public procurement contracts, the provisions of Article 20(2)(c) and (d) of Directive 93/38 must be interpreted strictly. Also, the burden of proof lies on the party seeking to rely on them (see, to that effect, in the context of Directives 71/305 and 93/37, Case 199/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 1039, paragraph 14; Case C-57/94 Commission v Italy [1995] ECR I-1249, paragraph 23; and Case C-385/02 Commission v Italy [2004] ECR I‑8121, paragraph 19).
14 THOSE PROVISIONS, WHICH AUTHORIZE DEROGATIONS FROM THE RULES INTENDED TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY THE TREATY IN THE FIELD OF PUBLIC WORKS CONTRACTS, MUST BE INTERPRETED STRICTLY AND THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE ACTUAL EXISTENCE OF EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING A DEROGATION LIES ON THE PERSON SEEKING TO RELY ON THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES .
26 In any event, an infringement of EU law is sufficiently serious where it was made in manifest breach of the case-law of the Court in the matter (see judgments of 30 September 2003 in Köbler, C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paragraph 56; of 12 December 2006 in Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, C‑446/04, EU:C:2006:774, paragraph 214, and of 25 November 2010 in Fuß, C‑429/09, EU:C:2010:717, paragraph 52).
26. The first questions in Cases C‑446/12, C‑448/12 and C‑449/12 and the second question in Case C‑447/12 concerned the validity of Article 1(2) of Regulation No 2252/2004. They corresponded to the question referred for a preliminary ruling which gave rise to the judgment in Schwarz (C‑291/12, EU:C:2013:670).
61. The regulation not providing for any other form or method of storing those fingerprints, it cannot in and of itself, as is pointed out by recital 5 of Regulation No 444/2009, be interpreted as providing a legal basis for the centralised storage of data collected thereunder or for the use of such data for purposes other than that of preventing illegal entry into the European Union.
54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.
15 The Court did indeed hold, in Case C-107/94 Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1996] ECR I-3089, paragraph 26, that the director of a company of which he is the sole shareholder is not carrying out his activity in the context of a relationship of subordination, and so he is not to be regarded as a `worker' within the meaning of Article 48 of the Treaty. However, that result cannot be automatically transposed to his spouse. The personal and property relations between spouses which result from marriage do not rule out the existence, in the context of the organisation of an undertaking, of a relationship of subordination characteristic of an employment relationship.
26 In the Netherlands, Mr Asscher is the director of a company of which he is the sole shareholder; his activity is thus not carried out in the context of a relationship of subordination, and so he is to be treated not as a "worker" within the meaning of Article 48 of the Treaty but as pursuing an activity as a self-employed person within the meaning of Article 52.
39. Since the argument concerning such a difference in treatment must be regarded as new, it cannot be examined at the stage of the appeal. In an appeal the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is in principle confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued at first instance ( FLSmidth v Commission EU:C:2014:284, paragraph 42). Accordingly, both limbs of the second plea must be rejected.
22 SECONDLY , AS REGARDS THE SUBMISSION ALLEGING DISCRIMINATION IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT DIFFERENT TREATMENT MAY NOT , AS POINTED OUT IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 13 JUNE 1978 ( CASE 139/77 DENKAVIT ( 1978 ) ECR 1317 ), BE REGARDED AS DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED BY ARTICLE 40 ( 3 ) OF THE TREATY UNLESS IT APPEARS TO BE ARBITRARY , OR IN OTHER WORDS , AS STATED IN OTHER JUDGMENTS , DEVOID OF ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION AND NOT BASED ON OBJECTIVE CRITERIA .
15IN PROVIDING IN PARAGRAPH 1 THAT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY SHALL BE INTER ALIA TO ENSURE A FAIR STANDARD OF LIVING FOR THE AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITY , IN PARTICULAR BY INCREASING THE INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS OF PERSONS ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE , ARTICLE 39 DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF DIFFERENCES OF TREATMENT BETWEEN THE VARIOUS SECTORS OF AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY , ALWAYS PROVIDED THAT SUCH DIFFERENCES OF TREATMENT ARE NOT ARBITRARY AND ARE BASED ON OBJECTIVE CRITERIA . THE NEED FOR DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF VARIOUS CLASSES OF THE AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITY , IN APPROPRIATE CASES , IS ACKNOWLEDGED IN ARTICLE 39 ( 2 ), WHICH PROVIDES THAT ' ' IN WORKING OUT THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY . . . ACCOUNT SHALL BE TAKEN OF : ( A ) THE PARTICULAR NATURE OF AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY , WHICH RESULTS FROM THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF AGRICULTURE AND FROM STRUCTURAL AND NATURAL DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE VARIOUS AGRICULTURAL REGIONS ' ' . ALTHOUGH ARTICLE 40 ( 3 ) OF THE TREATY PROHIBITS ANY DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN PRODUCERS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY , AND EVEN WITHIN A SINGLE COUNTRY OF THE COMMUNITY , DIFFERENT TREATMENT COULD BE REGARDED AS CONSTITUTING PROHIBITED DISCRIMINATION ONLY IF IT APPEARS TO BE ARBITRARY .
111. However, it is clear from the analysis of the first part of the third plea in law invoked before the General Court that that premiss is incorrect, since the Commission was fully entitled to classify the agreements on commissions and cover quotes as agreements on prices and customer‑sharing and such agreements, like agreements on prices, clearly form part of the category of the most serious restrictions of competition. Accordingly, that argument must be rejected as must, on the same ground, Portielje’s claim that the fine imposed on Gosselin should be reduced by the Court in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction.
62. Although a public administration following a general practice may be bound by that practice (see, to that effect, Case 268/84 Ferriera Valsabbia v Commission [1987] ECR 353, paragraphs 14 and 15, and Joined Cases C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I‑5425, paragraph 211), the fact remains that the principle of equal treatment must be reconciled with the principle of legality, according to which a person may not rely, in support of his claim, on an unlawful act committed in favour of a third party (see, to that effect, Case 188/83 Witte v Parliament [1984] ECR 3465, paragraph 15; Case 134/84 Williams v Court of Auditors [1985] ECR 2225, paragraph 14, and Case C‑51/10 P Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 75 and 76).
211. In adopting such rules of conduct and announcing by publishing them that they will henceforth apply to the cases to which they relate, the institution in question imposes a limit on the exercise of its discretion and cannot depart from those rules under pain of being found, where appropriate, to be in breach of the general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations. It cannot therefore be precluded that, on certain conditions and depending on their content, such rules of conduct, which are of general application, may produce legal effects.
87. Lastly, the Luxembourg Government contends that the Commission has not established that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg disregarded its obligations of verification of the compliance of the cost accounting system and the publication of statements of compliance, as provided for by Directive 97/33 and Directive 98/10. In fact, the ILT and the ILR have approved the EPT’s reference interconnection offers for each year since 1998. That approval comprises, inter alia, verification by the ILR and the ILT of the EPT’s compliance with its obligation of cost orientation for tariffs. Accordingly, it follows that since the EPT’s reference interconnection offers have always been the subject of regular approvals and publications, including in 1998 and 1999, the Commission cannot criticise the Luxembourg authorities for having failed to fulfil their obligations under Article 7(5) of Directive 97/33 and Article 18(1) and (2) of Directive 98/10.
92. In those circumstances, it is possible that in a procedure for the award of public contracts SIEPSA should allow itself to be guided by other than purely economic considerations. It is precisely in order to guard against such a possibility that it is essential to apply the Community directives on public contracts (see, to this effect, inter alia, Adolf Truley , paragraph 42, and Korhonen , paragraphs 51 and 52).
42. Furthermore, settled case-law also shows that the purpose of the Community directives coordinating procedures for the award of public contracts is to avoid both the risk of preference being given to national tenderers or applicants whenever a contract is awarded by the contracting authorities and the possibility that a body financed or controlled by the State, regional or local authorities or other bodies governed by public law may choose to be guided by considerations other than economic ones (see, in particular, University of Cambridge , cited above, paragraph 17, Commission v France , cited above, paragraph 42, and Universale-Bau , cited above, paragraph 52).
41 The distinction between taxes prohibited by Article 10 of the Directive and duties paid by way of fees or dues implies that the latter cover only payments collected on registration or annually, the amount of which is calculated on the basis of the cost of the service rendered.
24. A Member State which, pursuant to a decision of the Commission, is obliged to recover illegal aid is thus free to choose the means of fulfilling that obligation, provided that the measures chosen do not adversely affect the scope and effectiveness of Community law (see Case C-209/00 Commission v Germany , paragraph 34).
34. A Member State which, pursuant to a decision of the Commission, is obliged to recover illegal aid is thus free to choose the means of fulfilling that obligation, provided that the measures chosen do not adversely affect the scope and effectiveness of Community law.
162 In that respect it must be observed that the infringement committed by AKZO is particularly serious, since the behaviour complained of was intended to prevent a competitor from extending its activity into a market in which AKZO held a dominant position.
17 IT SHOULD BE ADDED THAT THE QUESTION OF THE LIMITS AND CONSEQUENCES OF A DECLARATION THAT , AS A RESULT OF THE JUDGMENT OF 15 OCTOBER 1980 , REGULATIONS ALTERING MONETARY COMPENSATORY AMOUNTS ARE INVALID WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE COURT ' S JUDGMENT OF 27 FEBRUARY 1985 IN CASE 112/83 ( SOCIETE DES PRODUITS DE MAIS V DIRECTEUR GENERAL DES DOUANES ET DROITS INDIRECTS ( 1985 ) ECR 732 ). IN PARAGRAPH 17 OF THAT JUDGMENT THE COURT EMPHASIZED THAT ITS ' POWER TO IMPOSE TEMPORAL LIMITS ON THE EFFECTS OF A DECLARATION THAT A LEGISLATIVE ACT IS INVALID , IN THE CONTEXT OF PRELIMINARY RULINGS UNDER INDENT ( B ) OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 , IS JUSTIFIED BY THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 174 OF THE TREATY HAVING REGARD TO THE NECESSARY CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE PRELIMINARY RULING PROCEDURE AND THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLES 173 , 174 AND 176 OF THE TREATY , WHICH ARE TWO MECHANISMS PROVIDED BY THE TREATY FOR REVIEWING THE LEGALITY OF ACTS OF THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS . THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPOSING TEMPORAL LIMITS ON THE EFFECTS OF THE INVALIDITY OF A COMMUNITY REGULATION , WHETHER UNDER ARTICLE 173 OR ARTICLE 177 , IS A POWER CONFERRED ON THE COURT BY THE TREATY IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY LAW THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY . IN THE PARTICULAR CASE OF THE JUDGMENT OF 15 OCTOBER 1980 , REFERRED TO BY THE TRIBUNAL , THE USE OF THE POSSIBILITY PROVIDED FOR IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 174 WAS BASED ON REASONS OF LEGAL CERTAINTY . . . ' .
18 IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT WHERE IT IS JUSTIFIED BY OVERRIDING CONSIDERATIONS THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 174 GIVES THE COURT DISCRETION TO DECIDE , IN EACH PARTICULAR CASE , WHICH SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF A REGULATION WHICH HAS BEEN DECLARED VOID MUST BE MAINTAINED . IT IS THEREFORE FOR THE COURT , WHERE IT MAKES USE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF LIMITING THE EFFECT ON PAST EVENTS OF A DECLARATION IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 177 THAT A MEASURE IS VOID , TO DECIDE WHETHER AN EXCEPTION TO THAT TEMPORAL LIMITATION OF THE EFFECT OF ITS JUDGMENT MAY BE MADE IN FAVOUR OF THE PARTY WHICH BROUGHT THE ACTION BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURT OR OF ANY OTHER TRADER WHICH TOOK SIMILAR STEPS BEFORE THE DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY OR WHETHER , CONVERSELY , A DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE FUTURE CONSTITUTES AN ADEQUATE REMEDY EVEN FOR TRADERS WHO TOOK ACTION AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME WITH A VIEW TO PROTECTING THEIR RIGHTS .
43. À cet égard, il y a lieu de rappeler qu’il résulte de l’article 38, paragraphe 1, sous c), du règlement de procédure de la Cour et de la jurisprudence y relative que toute requête introductive d’instance doit indiquer l’objet du litige ainsi que l’exposé sommaire des moyens et que cette indication doit être suffisamment claire et précise pour permettre à la partie défenderesse de préparer sa défense et à la Cour d’exercer son contrôle. Il en découle que les éléments essentiels de fait et de droit sur lesquels un recours est fondé doivent ressortir d’une façon cohérente et compréhensible du texte de la requête elle-même et que les conclusions de cette dernière doivent être formulées de manière non équivoque afin d’éviter que la Cour ne statue ultra petita ou bien n’omette de statuer sur un grief (voir, notamment, arrêts du 26 avril 2007, Commission/Finlande, C‑195/04, Rec. p. I‑3351, point 22; du 21 février 2008, Commission/Italie, C‑412/04, Rec. p. I‑619, point 103, et du 20 novembre 2008, Commission/Irlande, C‑66/06, point 30).
46. It should be recalled in that regard that, according to the case-law, the principle of legal certainty, the corollary of which is the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, requires, on the one hand, that rules of law must be clear and precise and, on the other, that their application must be foreseeable by those subject to them (see, inter alia, Case C‑63/93 Duff and Others [1996] ECR I‑569, paragraph 20; Case C‑107/97 Rombi and Arkopharma [2000] ECR I‑3367, paragraph 66; and Case C‑17/03 VEMW and Others [2005] ECR I‑4983, paragraph 80). That requirement must be observed all the more strictly in the case of rules liable to entail financial consequences, in order that those concerned may know precisely the extent of the obligations which those rules impose on them (Case C‑17/01 Sudholz [2004] ECR I‑4243, paragraph 34).
66 It is true that, as Arkopharma has observed, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is the corollary of the principle of legal certainty which requires that legal rules be clear and precise, and aims to ensure that situations and legal relationships governed by Community law remain foreseeable (see Case C-63/93 Duff and Others v Minister for Agriculture and Food, Ireland, and the Attorney General [1996] ECR I-569, paragraph 20).
58. Or, un tel abus ne saurait exister lorsque le produit en question a subi une transformation substantielle et non réversible, entraînant sa disparition en tant que tel et la création d’un nouveau produit relevant d’une autre position tarifaire (arrêts Roquette Frères, précité, point 19, et du 21 juillet 2005, Eichsfelder Schlachtbetrieb, C‑515/03, Rec. p. I‑7355, point 31).
47. According to the case-law of the Court, where aid is granted in the form of a guarantee it is essential that the national courts identify the beneficiaries of the aid, those beneficiaries being either the borrower or the lender or, in certain cases, both of them together (see, to that effect, judgment in Residex Capital IV , C‑275/10, EU:C:2011:814, paragraph 37).
37. In order to carry out this repayment, it is essential that the national courts identify the beneficiary or, as the case may be, the beneficiaries of the aid. In the case where aid is granted in the form of a guarantee, the beneficiaries of that aid may be either the borrower or the lender or, in certain cases, both of them together.
75. Like the practices referred to in paragraph 49 of the judgment in Marks & Spencer , which involved arranging transfers of losses incurred within a group of companies to companies established in the Member States which applied the highest rates of taxation and in which the tax value of those losses was therefore the greatest, the type of conduct described in the preceding paragraph is such as to undermine the right of the Member States to exercise their tax jurisdiction in relation to the activities carried out in their territory and thus to jeopardise a balanced allocation between Member States of the power to impose taxes ( Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas , paragraph 56).
64. Second, as the finding of a failure by a Member State to fulfil its obligations is not bound up with a finding as to the damage flowing therefrom (Case C‑263//96 Commission v Belgium [1997] ECR I‑7453, paragraph 30), Ireland cannot rely on the fact that no tenderer suffered damage, arguing that, even if the initial weighting of the award criteria had been used, the contract at issue would not have been awarded to a contractor other than the one who was chosen at the conclusion of the procedure.
30 Finally, where the finding of a failure by a Member State to fulfil its obligations is not bound up with a finding as to the damage flowing therefrom, a Member State may not rely on the argument that the failure to adopt measures to transpose a directive has had no adverse consequences for the functioning of the internal market or of that directive.
18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
20. In the context of the cooperation established by Article 267 TFEU, it is for the national courts to determine whether the taxable person makes a single supply in a particular case and to make all definitive findings of fact in that regard (see, to that effect, CPP , paragraph 32; Part Service , paragraph 54; Bog and Others , paragraph 55; and order in Case C-117/11 Purple Parking and Airparks Services [2012] ECR, paragraph 32). However, it is for the Court to provide the national courts with all the guidance as to the interpretation of European Union law which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before them ( Levob Verzekeringen and OV Bank , paragraph 23).
54. It is for the national court to assess if, the contractual structure of the transaction notwithstanding, the evidence put before the court discloses the characteristics of a single transaction.
47. Cependant, la caducité des décisions attaquées, survenue après l’introduction du recours, n’entraînait pas, à elle seule, l’obligation pour le Tribunal de prononcer un non-lieu à statuer pour défaut d’objet ou pour défaut d’intérêt à agir à la date du prononcé de l’arrêt.
27 In the second place, it should be pointed out that an error by the General Court in the assessment of the severability of a provision of an act of EU law is an error of law which is subject to review by the Court of Justice (for such a review, see, inter alia, judgment of 29 March 2012, Commission v Estonia, C‑505/09 P, EU:C:2012:179, paragraphs 110 to 122).
111. As the General Court noted in paragraph 28 of the judgment under appeal, partial annulment of a European Union act is possible only if the elements the annulment of which is sought may be severed from the remainder of the act (see, inter alia, Case C-29/99 Commission v Council [2002] ECR I-11221, paragraphs 45 and 46; Case C-378/00 Commission v Parliament and Council [2003] ECR I-937, paragraph 30; and Case C‑244/03 France v Parliament and Council [2005] ECR I‑4021, paragraph 12; see, to that effect, Case C-378/00 Commission v Parliament and Council [2003] ECR I‑937, paragraph 30). The Court has also repeatedly held that the requirement of severability is not satisfied in the case where the partial annulment of an act would have the effect of altering its substance (Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-1375, paragraph 257; Case C-29/99 Commission v Council cited above, paragraph 46; and Case C‑244/03 France v Parliament and Council , cited above, point 13).
18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
40 However, it must be observed that, as the Court has previously held, the fact that either the registered office or real head office of a company was established in accordance with the legislation of a Member State for the purpose of enjoying the benefit of more favourable legislation does not, in itself, constitute abuse (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 March 1999, Centros, C‑212/97, EU:C:1999:126, paragraph 27, and of 30 September 2003, Inspire Art, C‑167/01, EU:C:2003:512, paragraph 96).
96. The Court has also held that the fact that the company was formed in a particular Member State for the sole purpose of enjoying the benefit of more favourable legislation does not constitute abuse even if that company conducts its activities entirely or mainly in that second State ( Segers , paragraph 16, and Centros , paragraph 18).
24. Therefore, the claims for dismissal of the substance of the action and the underlying pleas advanced for the first time in the rejoinder must be considered as late and, therefore, inadmissible (see Case C‑471/98 Commission v Belgium [2002] ECR I-9681, paragraphs 41 to 43, and Case C‑526/08 Commission v Luxembourg [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 48 to 50).
30. In this respect, it should be recalled that, while a mere finding of disparities between national rules is not sufficient to justify having recourse to Article 95 EC (see, to that effect, Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419, paragraph 84), it is otherwise where there are differences between the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States which are such as to obstruct the fundamental freedoms and thus have a direct effect on the functioning of the internal market (see, to that effect, Germany v Parliament and Council , paragraph 95, and Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453, paragraph 60).
95 It therefore necessary to verify whether the Directive actually contributes to eliminating obstacles to the free movement of goods and to the freedom to provide services, and to removing distortions of competition. Elimination of obstacles to the free movement of goods and the freedom to provide services
61. Similarly, it is not relevant that the tax measure at issue in the main proceedings was adopted by the Member State of origin of the person concerned (see, to that effect, Case 115/78 Knoors [1979] ECR 399, paragraph 24; Case C-61/89 Bouchoucha [1990] ECR I-3551, paragraph 13; Case C-19/92 Kraus [1993] ECR I-1663, paragraph 15; Case C-419/92 Scholz [1994] ECR I-505, paragraphs 8 and 9; and Case C-107/94 Asscher [1996] ECR I-3089, paragraph 32).
32. La Cour a également relevé, en ce qui concerne le lieu d’exécution des obligations découlant de contrats de vente de marchandises, que le règlement définit, à son article 5, point 1, sous b), premier tiret, de manière autonome ce critère de rattachement, afin de renforcer les objectifs d’unification des règles de compétence judiciaire et de prévisibilité (arrêt Wood Floor Solutions Andreas Domberger, précité, point 23 et jurisprudence citée). Ces objectifs sont également ceux de l’article 5, point 1, sous b), second tiret, du règlement, dès lors que les règles de compétence spéciale prévues par ce dernier en matière de contrats de vente de marchandises et de fourniture de services ont la même genèse, poursuivent la même finalité et occupent la même place dans le système établi par ce règlement (arrêt précité Wood Floor Solutions Andreas Domberger, point 26 et jurisprudence citée).
26. The rules of special jurisdiction provided for by the regulation for contracts for the sale of goods and the provision of services have the same origin, pursue the same objectives and occupy the same place in the scheme established by that regulation ( Rehder , paragraph 36).
77. En effet, la réglementation litigieuse considère, en principe, les héritiers ou les donataires tant résidents que non-résidents comme assujettis aux fins de la perception de droits de succession ou de mutation sur des biens immeubles situés en Espagne. Partant, il n’existe entre un résident et un non-résident aucune différence de situation objective de nature à fonder une différence de traitement (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Schumacker, EU:C:1995:31, point 37).
33. It follows, moreover, from the Court’s case‑law that Articles 3(1) and 4(1) of the Directive, taken as a whole, define the general criteria permitting an assessment as to whether the contract terms subject to the provisions of the Directive are unfair (see, to that effect, Case C‑478/99 Commission v Sweden [2002] ECR I‑4147, paragraphs 11 and 17, and Case C‑237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten [2004] ECR I‑3403, paragraphs 18, 19 and 21).
21. As to the question whether a particular term in a contract is, or is not, unfair, Article 4 of the Directive provides that the answer should be reached taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract. It should be pointed out in that respect that the consequences of the term under the law applicable to the contract must also be taken into account. This requires that consideration be given to the national law.
31. It should be remembered at the outset that, with regard to legislation analogous to the Spanish legislation criticised by the Commission, the Court has already held that the requirement that a private security undertaking must be constituted as a legal person in order to be able to carry out its activities constituted a restriction contrary to Articles 43 EC and 49 EC (Case C‑171/02 Commission v Portugal [2004] ECR I‑5645, paragraphs 41 to 44).
37. In order to meet that double objective, the Eighth Directive gives the taxable person a right to reimbursement of the input VAT paid in a Member State in which he has neither his business, nor a fixed establishment, nor his permanent address or usual place of residence, and where he has not supplied any goods or services (see, to that effect, Case C‑429/97 Commission v France [2001] ECR I‑637, paragraph 28), subject to the production to the tax authority of the Member State in which that reimbursement is applied for (‘the reimbursing Member State’), of a certificate provided by the tax authority of the issuing Member State concerning the capacity of the operator seeking that reimbursement as a taxable person liable to VAT.
28 The effect of Articles 1 and 2 of the Eighth Directive is that a taxable person is entitled to a refund of VAT paid in another Member State if he does not have a business or fixed establishment in that State and if he has supplied no goods or services there.
61. It is true that those objectives — the reduction of betting and gaming opportunities, and the combating of criminality by making the operators active in the sector subject to control and channelling betting and gaming into the systems thus controlled — are among those recognised by case‑law as capable of justifying restrictions on fundamental freedoms in the betting and gaming sector ( Placanica and Others , paragraphs 46 and 52).
272. Within that framework, it is for the Court of Justice to verify whether the General Court has correctly assessed the Commission’s exercise of that discretion (Case C‑308/04 P SGL Carbon v Commission [2006] ECR I‑5977, paragraph 48, and Case C‑407/04 P Dalmine v Commission [2007] ECR I‑829, paragraph 134).
134. It is none the less for the Court of Justice to verify whether the Court of First Instance has correctly assessed the Commission’s exercise of that discretion ( SGL Carbon v Commission , paragraph 48).
35. The arguments put forward by the municipality of Roanne and the French and Polish Governments cannot be accepted.
60. Since the interpretation given by the Court in respect of the provisions of that convention is also valid for those of Regulation No 44/2001 whenever the provisions of those instruments may be regarded as equivalent, it must be found that such is the case as regards the first paragraph of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention and Article 23(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, which are drafted in almost identical terms (judgment in Refcomp , C‑543/10, EU:C:2013:62, paragraphs 19 and 20).
19. That is the case as far as concerns the first paragraph of Article 17 of that convention and Article 23(1) of the Regulation, which are drafted in almost identical terms.
98. However, sporting events cannot be regarded as intellectual creations classifiable as works within the meaning of the Copyright Directive. That applies in particular to football matches, which are subject to rules of the game, leaving no room for creative freedom for the purposes of copyright.
54. It must be observed that the term which the national court is examining in the main proceedings, like a term whose purpose is to confer jurisdiction in respect of all disputes arising under the contract on the court in the territorial jurisdiction of which the seller or supplier has his principal place of business, obliges the consumer to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of a court which may be a long way from his domicile. This may make it difficult for him to enter an appearance. In the case of disputes concerning limited amounts of money, the costs relating to the consumer’s entering an appearance could be a deterrent and cause him to forgo any legal remedy or defence. Such a term thus falls within the category of terms which have the object or effect of excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action, a category referred to in subparagraph (q) of paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Directive (see Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores , paragraph 22).
1 By orders of 31 March 1998 (C-240/98 and C-241/98) and 1 April 1998 (C-242/98, C-243/98 and C244/98) received at the Court on 8 July 1998, the Juzgado de Primera Instancia (Court of First Instance) No 35, Barcelona, referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EC Treaty (now Article 234 EC) a question on the interpretation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29, the Directive).
33 Where such a comparison involves the average pay of two groups of workers paid by the piece, it must in order to be relevant encompass groups each comprising all the workers who, taking account of a set of factors such as the nature of the work, the training requirements and the working conditions, can be considered to be in a comparable situation.
49. Certes, ainsi que la République hellénique l’a fait valoir à juste titre, ce critère ne saurait avoir un caractère exclusif, puisque les pensions versées par des régimes légaux de sécurité sociale peuvent, en tout ou en partie, tenir compte de la rémunération d’activité (arrêts précités Beune, point 44; Griesmar, point 29, et Niemi, point 46).
29 The Court did, admittedly, accept that that criterion cannot be regarded as exclusive, inasmuch as pensions paid by statutory social security schemes may reflect, wholly or in part, pay in respect of work (Beune, paragraph 44).
42 As the Commission has convincingly argued, the position would be different only if objective circumstances justified the failure of the migrant worker and the member of his family to live under the same roof in the host Member State. That would be the case in particular if the distance between the worker's residence and the place of employment of the member of his family or a vocational training establishment attended by that person required him or her to live in separate accommodation.
74 As regards the first part of the present ground of appeal, by which the appellant criticises the General Court for having committed an error of law by finding that the administrative procedure had been conducted within a reasonable period, it should be noted that, although the infringement of the principle of observance of a reasonable period is capable of justifying the annulment of a decision taken following an administrative procedure based on Article 101 or 102 TFEU inasmuch as it also constitutes an infringement of the rights of defence of the undertaking concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 September 2006 in Nederlandse Vereniging voor de Groothandel Federatieve op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission, C‑105/04 P, EU:C:2006:592, paragraphs 42 and 43), the Commission’s infringement of a reasonable period for such an administrative procedure, if established, is not capable of leading to a reduction of the amount of the fine imposed (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2014 in Bolloré v Commission, C‑414/12 P, EU:C:2014:301, paragraph 109).
109. En ce qui concerne, enfin, la deuxième branche du deuxième moyen, à supposer même que le Tribunal ait jugé à tort que le respect du délai de prescription visé à l’article 25, paragraphe 5, du règlement n° 1/2003 exclut toute violation du principe du délai raisonnable lorsqu’une sanction est infligée en raison d’une infraction aux règles en matière de concurrence, la constatation d’une telle violation ne serait pas susceptible, pour les raisons énoncées aux points 105 à 107 du présent arrêt, de conduire à une réduction du montant de l’amende infligée. Il s’ensuit que la deuxième branche du deuxième moyen doit être écartée comme étant inopérante et, partant, celui-ci ne saurait prospérer.
38. Even if the legislation providing for the adjustment of deductions, that is to say, Paragraph 12(10) of the UStG 1994, in the main proceedings, is unlawful, the fact none the less remains that that legislation is liable to have an impact as long as it is not repealed or, at the very least, as long as its unlawfulness is not established. Consequently it is such as to create a charge which is normally included in the budget of a medical practitioner specialising in dentistry, such as Mr Heiser. The fact that the Republic of Austria subsequently discontinued the adjustment of deductions by a separate measure from that providing for such adjustment, therefore mitigates the charges which are normally included in the budget of such a medical practitioner and, accordingly, constitutes an advantage for him.
53. The Court has also held that, in a situation in which there is no taxable income in the Member State of residence under the tax legislation of that State (see, to that effect, Wallentin , paragraph 18), discrimination could arise if the personal and family circumstances of a person such as the complainant were taken into account neither in the Member State of residence nor in the Member State of employment (see, to that effect, Wallentin , paragraph 17).
18. That is exactly the situation in the main proceedings, whose distinguishing feature is that Mr Wallentin did not have, at the material time, any taxable income in his State of residence, since the monthly subsistence allowance from his parents and the grant paid to him by the German State did not constitute taxable income under German tax legislation.
43 In order to comply with that obligation, the national court to which an application for interim relief has been made must first examine whether the Community act in question would be deprived of all effectiveness if not immediately implemented (Zuckerfabrik, paragraph 31).
41. The term ‘economic activities’ is defined in Article 4(2) of the Sixth Directive as covering ‘all’ activities of producers, traders and persons supplying services and, according to the case-law, it comprises all stages of production, distribution and the provision of services (see, inter alia, Case C-186/89 Van Tiem [1990] ECR I-4363, paragraph 17, and MKG-Kraftfahrzeuge-Factoring , cited above, paragraph 42).
17 In that respect it should first of all be underlined that Article 4 of the Sixth Directive confers a very wide scope on value added tax, comprising all stages of production, distribution and the provision of services ( see the judgments of the Court in Case 235/85 Commission v Netherlands [1987] ECR 1487, paragraph 7, and in Case 348/87 Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1989] ECR 1737, paragraph 10 ).
97. Ainsi, au point 184 de l’arrêt attaqué, il a constaté que la circonstance que l’infraction en cause a évolué dans le temps pourrait conduire à une modulation de la proportion de la valeur des ventes à retenir au titre du point 19 des lignes directrices pour le calcul des amendes ou pourrait également justifier une réduction de l’amende en raison de circonstances atténuantes. Il a toutefois jugé, au point 185 du même arrêt, que «les comportements auxquels Gosselin a participé ne représentent pas des infractions moins graves que les accords écrits de fixation des prix ou la fixation ad hoc de prix pour des déménagements déterminés. En effet, contrairement aux affirmations de Gosselin, les [accords sur les devis de complaisance] et les commissions avaient également eu des effets sur les prix [...]. De même, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, le fait que Gosselin n’ait pas participé aux réunions à objet anticoncurrentiel, qui n’étaient plus organisées à l’époque à laquelle elle faisait partie de l’entente, n’est pas pertinent aux fins de l’appréciation de la gravité de l’infraction, puisque l’entente a fonctionné au moyen de mécanismes qui rendaient inutiles de telles réunions».
22. Secondly, under the second paragraph of Article 252 TFEU, it is the duty of the Advocate General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice, require the Advocate General’s involvement. In carrying out that task, the Advocate General may, where appropriate, analyse a request for a preliminary ruling by placing it within a context which is broader than that strictly defined by the referring court or by the parties to the main proceedings. Since the Court is not bound either by the Advocate General’s Opinion or by the reasoning on which it is based, it is not absolutely necessary to reopen the oral part of the procedure each time the Advocate General raises a point of law which was not the subject of debate between the parties (the judgment in Pohotovosť , C‑470/12, EU:C:2014:101, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
22. Secondly, under the second paragraph of Article 252 TFEU, it is the duty of the Advocate General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, require the Advocate General’s involvement. In carrying out that task, the Advocate General may, where appropriate, analyse a request for a preliminary ruling by placing it within a context which is broader than that strictly defined by the referring court or by the parties to the main proceedings. Since the Court is not bound either by the Advocate General’s Opinion or by the reasoning on which it is based, it is not absolutely necessary to reopen the oral procedure, under Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure, each time the Advocate General raises a point of law which was not the subject of debate between the parties ( Carratù , paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
17 The essential characteristic of remuneration thus lies in the fact that it constitutes consideration for the service in question, and is normally agreed upon between the provider and the recipient of the service .
96 It is clear from the Court’s case-law that, in such circumstances, the requirement of legal certainty means that the EU institutions must exercise their powers within a reasonable time (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 September 2002 in Falck and Acciaierie di Bolzano v Commission, C‑74/00 P and C‑75/00 P, EU:C:2002:524, paragraphs 139 to 141 and the case-law cited; 28 February 2013 in Review of Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:134, paragraph 28; and 13 November 2014 in Nencini v Parliament, C‑447/13 P, EU:C:2014:2372, paragraphs 47 and 48), as the General Court also stated in paragraph 81 of the judgment under appeal.
47. As the General Court pointed out in paragraph 45 of the judgment under appeal, it must nevertheless be noted that neither the Financial Regulation nor the Implementing Regulations specifies the period within which a debit note must be sent following the date of the origin of the debt in question.
31. It must be borne in mind in that regard that recital 2 in the preamble to Directive 2008/115 states that it pursues the establishment of an effective removal and repatriation policy, based on common standards, for persons to be returned in a humane manner and with full respect for their fundamental rights and also their dignity.
38 Next, it is settled case-law that it is for the Courts of the European Union to decide, in the light of the circumstances of the case and in accordance with the provisions of the rules of procedure on measures of inquiry, whether it is necessary for a document to be produced. So far as concerns the General Court, it is apparent from the provisions of Article 49 in conjunction with Article 65(b) of its Rules of Procedure, in the version applicable at the date of the judgment under appeal, that a request for production of any document relating to the case is a measure of inquiry which the Court may order at any stage of the proceedings (see, to that effect, judgments of 2 October 2003, Salzgitter v Commission, C‑182/99 P, EU:C:2003:526, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited; of 2 October 2003, Aristrain v Commission, C‑196/99 P, EU:C:2003:529, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited; of2 October 2003, Ensidesa v Commission, C‑198/99 P, EU:C:2003:530, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited; and of 2 October 2003, Corus UK v Commission, C‑199/99 P, EU:C:2003:531, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).
67. With respect to the need to request production of the original of the minutes, it is for the Community Court to decide, in the light of the circumstances of the case and in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Procedure on measures of inquiry, whether it is necessary for a document to be produced. As regards the Court of First Instance, it follows from Article 49 read in conjunction with Article 65(b) of its Rules of Procedure that a request for production of documents is a measure of inquiry which the Court may order at any stage of the proceedings (Case C-286/95 P Commission v ICI [2000] ECR I-2341, paragraphs 49 and 50).
13 WHILST THE STAFF REGULATIONS PROHIBIT THE RESERVING OF POSTS FOR NATIONALS OF ANY SPECIFIC MEMBER STATE, THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY MAY NEVERTHELESS MAKE ITS SELECTION, WHEN RECRUITING AN OFFICIAL, DEPENDENT UPON SPECIFIC LINGUISTIC ABILITIES REQUIRED IN THE INTERESTS OF THE SERVICE .
182. In so far as the question concerns successive fixed-term employment contracts, it must be pointed out that that question is the same as a question on which the Court has already given a ruling in Adeneler and Others (paragraphs 91 to 105) and that other relevant information enabling an answer to be given to that question appears in the judgments in Marrosu and Sardino (paragraphs 44 to 57) as well as Vassallo (paragraphs 33 to 42) and the order in Vassilakis and Others (paragraphs 120 to 137).
40. In that regard, it should be noted that national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings which lays down mandatory rules governing the duration and renewal of fixed-term contracts and the right to compensation for damage suffered by a worker as a result of the abusive use by public authorities of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships appears, at first sight, to satisfy the requirements set out in paragraphs 36 to 38 of the present judgment.
34 In that respect, the requirement imposed on an undertaking established in one Member State which wishes, as a provider of a service, to carry on a skilled trade activity in another Member State to be entered on the latter's trades register constitutes a restriction within the meaning of Article 59 of the Treaty.
106 However, in the case of imports from non-market economy countries, Article 2(7)(a) of Regulation No 384/96 provides that, in derogation from the basic rule referred to in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment, normal value is, as a rule, to be determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in a market economy third country. The aim of that provision is to prevent account being taken of prices and costs in non-market economy countries which are not the normal result of market forces (judgments in GLS, C‑338/10, EU:C:2012:158, paragraph 20, and Council v Zhejiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group, C‑337/09 P, EU:C:2012:471, paragraph 66).
20. Second, it should be noted that Article 2(7)(a) of the basic regulation provides that in the case of imports from non-market economy countries, in derogation from the rules set out in paragraphs 1 to 6 of Article 2, normal value must, as a rule, be determined on the basis of the price or constructed value in a market economy third country. The aim of that provision is to prevent account being taken of prices and costs in non-market-economy countries which are not the normal result of market forces (see Case C‑26/96 Rotexchemie [1997] ECR I‑2817, paragraph 9).
41. In reality, the fact that Directive 2001/83 lays down a complete system of authorisation procedures for medicinal products in no way means that the Community legislature cannot amend or adapt those procedures or, if necessary, introduce new ones so as better to attain the objectives of removing barriers to intracommunity trade and the protection of public health.
17. According to the case-law of the Court, the exemptions provided for in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive constitute independent concepts of Community law whose purpose is to avoid divergences in the application of the VAT system from one Member State to another (see Case C‑349/96 CPP [1999] ECR I‑973, paragraph 15; Case C‑240/99 Skandia [2001] ECR I‑1951, paragraph 23; and Ygeia , paragraph 15).
15 It must be noted to begin with that it is settled case-law that the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive constitute independent concepts of Community law whose purpose is to avoid divergences in the application of the VAT system from one Member State to another (see Case 348/87 Stichting Uitvoering Financiële Acties v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [1989] ECR 1737, paragraph 11).
18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
86 The Court has pointed out that to accept that the EU judicature has the direct responsibility for ensuring that EU law complies with the WTO agreements would effectively deprive the European Union’s legislative or executive bodies of the discretion which the equivalent bodies of the European Union’s trading partners enjoy. It is not in dispute that some of the contracting parties, including the European Union’s most important trading partners, have concluded from the subject matter and purpose of the WTO agreements that they are not among the rules applicable by their courts when reviewing the legality of their rules of domestic law. Such lack of reciprocity, if accepted, would risk introducing an imbalance in the application of the WTO agreements (judgments in Portugal v Council, C‑149/96, EU:C:1999:574, paragraphs 43 to 46, and Commission v Rusal Armenal, C‑21/14 P, EU:C:2015:494, paragraph 39).
39. In that regard, the Court has held, in particular, that to accept that the Courts of the European Union have the direct responsibility for ensuring that EU law complies with the WTO rules would deprive the European Union’s legislative or executive bodies of the discretion which the equivalent bodies of the European Union’s commercial partners enjoy. It is not in dispute that some of the contracting parties, which are amongst the most important commercial partners of the European Union, have concluded from the subject-matter and purpose of the WTO agreements that they are not among the rules applicable by their courts when reviewing the legality of their rules of domestic law. Such lack of reciprocity, if accepted, would risk introducing an anomaly in the application of the WTO rules (see, in particular, judgments in Portugal v Council , C‑149/96, EU:C:1999:574, paragraphs 43 to 46; FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission , C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P, EU:C:2008:476, paragraph 119; and LVP , C‑306/13, EU:C:2014:2465, paragraph 46).
31. In the case in the main proceedings, the service provided by RCI Europe is certainly not immediate. However, it undertakes to supply in the future the service required at the request of one of its members.
27 If the result prescribed by the directive cannot be achieved by way of interpretation, it should also be borne in mind that, in terms of the judgment in Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357, paragraph 39, Community law requires the Member States to make good damage caused to individuals through failure to transpose a directive, provided that three conditions are fulfilled. First, the purpose of the directive must be to grant rights to individuals. Second, it must be possible to identify the content of those rights on the basis of the provisions of the directive. Finally, there must be a causal link between the breach of the State' s obligation and the damage suffered.
39 Where, as in this case, a Member State fails to fulfil its obligation under the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty to take all the measures necessary to achieve the result prescribed by a directive, the full effectiveness of that rule of Community law requires that there should be a right to reparation provided that three conditions are fulfilled.
En tout état de cause, étant donné que, eu égard aux constatations précédentes dans l’arrêt attaqué, ce constat n’a été effectué par le Tribunal qu’à titre surabondant pour établir que la Commission était fondée à rejeter la méthode de calcul proposée par le Royaume d’Espagne, cet argument doit être rejeté comme étant inopérant (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 26 janvier 2017, Masco e.a./Commission, C‑614/13 P, EU:C:2017:63, points 25 et 26 ainsi que jurisprudence citée).
34. In addition, it is settled case-law that, when adopting measures to implement Community legislation, national authorities must exercise their discretion in compliance with the general principles of Community law, which include the principle of proportionality (see, inter alia, Case C‑313/99 Mulligan and Others [2002] ECR I‑5719, paragraphs 35 and 36; Joined Cases C‑231/00, C‑303/00 and C‑451/00 Cooperativa Lattepiú and Others [2004] ECR I‑2869, paragraph 57; and Case C‑496/04 Slob [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 41).
35 Third, it is settled case-law that where Community rules leave Member States to choose between various methods of implementation, the Member States must exercise their discretion in compliance with the general principles of Community law (Joined Cases 201/85 and 202/85 Klensch and Others [1986] ECR 3477, paragraph 10).
142. Moreover, the statement of reasons notified to the appellant, together with Decision 2007/445, sets out the individual and specific reasons which led the Council to consider, in accordance with Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931 on the basis of information considered to be reliable by a national authority, that the appellant was involved in the financing of terrorism. Such elements were sufficient to enable the appellant to understand the accusations made against it.
57 An undertaking may thus have participated directly in all the forms of anticompetitive conduct comprising the single and continuous infringement, in which case the Commission is entitled to attribute liability to it in relation to that conduct as a whole and, therefore, in relation to the infringement as a whole. Equally, the undertaking may have participated directly in only some of the forms of anticompetitive conduct comprising the single and continuous infringement, but have been aware of all the other unlawful conduct planned or put into effect by the other participants in the cartel in pursuit of the same objectives, or could reasonably have foreseen that conduct and have been prepared to take the risk. In such cases, the Commission is also entitled to attribute liability to that undertaking in relation to all the forms of anticompetitive conduct comprising such an infringement and, accordingly, in relation to the infringement as a whole (see judgment of 24 June 2015, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission and Commission v Fresh Del Monte Produce, C‑293/13 P and C‑294/13 P, EU:C:2015:416, paragraph 158 and the case-law cited).
158. An undertaking may thus have participated directly in all the forms of anti-competitive conduct comprising the single and continuous infringement, in which case the Commission is entitled to attribute liability to it in relation to that conduct as a whole and, therefore, in relation to the infringement as a whole. Equally, the undertaking may have participated directly in only some of the forms of anti-competitive conduct comprising the single and continuous infringement, but have been aware of all the other unlawful conduct planned or put into effect by the other participants in the cartel in pursuit of the same objectives, or could reasonably have foreseen that conduct and have been prepared to take the risk. In such cases, the Commission is also entitled to attribute liability to that undertaking in relation to all the forms of anti-competitive conduct comprising such an infringement and, accordingly, in relation to the infringement as a whole (judgment in Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens , C‑441/11 P, EU:C:2012:778, paragraph 43).
18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
34. According to settled case-law, medical services supplied for consideration fall within the scope of the provisions on the freedom to provide services (see, in particular, Kohll , paragraph 29, and Elchinov , paragraph 36), there being no need to distinguish between care provided in a hospital environment and care provided outside such an environment (Case C‑368/98 Vanbraekel and Others [2001] ECR I‑5363, paragraph 41; Müller‑Fauré and van Riet , paragraph 38; Watts , paragraph 86, and Case C‑512/08 Commission v France [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 30).
36. In that regard, firstly, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, medical services provided for consideration fall within the scope of the provisions on the freedom to provide services, including situations where care is provided in a hospital environment (see, to that effect, Case C‑372/04 Watts [2006] ECR I‑4325, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited, and Case C‑211/08 Commission v Spain [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
89 It should be pointed out in this respect that in matters concerning the common agricultural policy the Community legislature has a broad discretion which corresponds to the political responsibilities given to it by Articles 40 and 43 of the Treaty.
47. The Council submitted, rightly, that it is important to distinguish between the concept of access to Community waters and the concept of access to resources. While, after the end of the transitional period, the Kingdom of Spain may again have access to the waters of the North and Baltic Seas, it does not follow that Spanish vessels can have access to the resources of those seas in the same proportions as the vessels of the Member States which participated in the initial or subsequent allocations (Joined Cases C‑87/03 and C‑100/03 Spain v Council , paragraph 55, and Case C‑134/04 Spain v Council , paragraph 35).
35. As regards those allocations it must be observed that the principle of relative stability, which is set out in Regulation No 3760/92, remains relevant.
26 It should be borne in mind, as the Court pointed out in its judgment in Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1990] ECR I-3461, paragraph 30, that legality of employment for the purposes of Article 6(1) presupposes a stable and secure situation as a member of the labour force of a Member State.
68. The Court has previously ruled, in the context of the Brussels convention, that the ‘object of the action’ (‘objet’) is the end the action has in view (see Case C‑406/92 Tatry [1994] ECR I‑5439, paragraph 41). To ascertain whether two actions have the same object, account must be taken of the applicants’ respective claims in each of the sets of proceedings (Case C‑111/01 Gantner Electronic [2003] ECR I‑4207, paragraph 26). Further, the Court has interpreted the concept of the ‘cause of the action’ (‘cause’) as comprising the facts and the rule of law relied on as the basis of the action (see Tatry , paragraph 39).
26. It thus appears from the wording of Article 21 of the Convention that it refers only to the applicants' respective claims in each of the sets of proceedings, and not to the defence which may be raised by a defendant.
139 It follows that it is permissible, for the purpose of determining the fine, to have regard both to the total turnover of the undertaking, which constitutes an indication, albeit approximate and imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of its economic power, and to the proportion of that turnover accounted for by the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, which gives an indication of the scale of the infringement (Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 121). Although an undertaking's market shares cannot be a decisive factor in concluding that an undertaking belongs to a powerful economic entity, they are nevertheless relevant in determining the influence which it may exert on the market.
14 The general principle of non-discrimination laid down by Article 6 can only apply, therefore, subject to the special provisions of the Treaty (see the judgment in Case 8/77 Sagulo, Brenca and Bakhouche [1977] ECR 1495, paragraph 11).
11 THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 7 OF THE EEC TREATY STATES : ' WITHIN THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THIS TREATY , AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONTAINED THEREIN , ANY DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF NATIONALITY SHALL BE PROHIBITED ' . WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION PUT BY THE COURT MAKING THE REFERENCE IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF ARTICLE 7 CAN ONLY APPLY SUBJECT TO THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY . THESE SPECIAL PROVISIONS INCLUDE THE REGULATIONS AND DIRECTIVES , INCLUDING AMONG THESE DIRECTIVE NO 68/360 , PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 49 TO BRING ABOUT , BY PROGRESSIVE STAGES , FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT . IN SO FAR AS THIS DIRECTIVE IMPOSES SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS ( SUCH AS THE POSSESSION OF A PASSPORT OR AN IDENTITY CARD ) ON THE NATIONALS OF A MEMBER STATE WHO ENTER THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE OR RESIDE THERE , THE PERSONS AFFECTED THEREBY CANNOT BE SIMPLY PUT ON THE SAME FOOTING AS NATIONALS OF THE COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE .
21. De même, la Cour a déjà jugé que ladite notion a un caractère objectif et qu’elle s’applique indépendamment des buts et des résultats des opérations concernées, sans qu’il existe une obligation pour l’administration fiscale de procéder à des enquêtes en vue de déterminer l’intention de l’assujetti en cause ou encore de tenir compte de l’intention d’un opérateur autre que cet assujetti intervenant dans la même chaîne de livraisons (voir, en ce sens, arrêts Optigen e.a., précité, points 44 à 46 ainsi que 51 et 55; Halifax e.a., précité, points 56 et 57; du 6 juillet 2006, Kittel et Recolta Recycling, C‑439/04 et C‑440/04, Rec. p. I‑6161, points 41 à 44, ainsi que Newey, précité, point 41).
26 In that connection, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, in the absence of EU rules on the matter, it is for the national legal order of each Member State to establish procedural rules for actions intended to safeguard the rights of individuals, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, on condition, however, that those rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not make it excessively difficult or impossible in practice to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (judgment of 15 March 2017, Aquino, C‑3/16, EU:C:2017:209, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
48 It should be recalled here that, according to settled case-law of the Court, in the absence of EU rules on the matter, it is for the national legal order of each Member State to establish procedural rules for actions intended to safeguard the rights of individuals, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, on condition, however, that those rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not make it excessively difficult or impossible in practice to exercise the rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (judgment of 17 March 2016, Bensada Benallal, C‑161/15, EU:C:2016:175, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).
5 WITHOUT REQUIRING THE ABOLITION OF THE SAID MONOPOLIES , THIS PROVISION PRESCRIBES IN MANDATORY TERMS THAT THEY MUST BE ADJUSTED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENSURE THAT WHEN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD HAS ENDED SUCH DISCRIMINATION SHALL CEASE TO EXIST .
30 On the other hand, it is important to bear in mind that Article 7 of Directive 2008/95 is worded in general terms and comprehensively regulates the question of the exhaustion of trade mark rights for goods traded in the European Union and that, where EU directives provide for the harmonisation of measures necessary to ensure the protection of the interests referred to in Article 36 TFEU, any national measure relating thereto must be assessed in relation to the provisions of that directive and not Articles 34 to 36 TFEU. Like any secondary EU legislation, however, that directive must be interpreted in the light of the TFEU rules on the free movement of goods and of Article 36 TFEU in particular (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 1996, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others, C‑427/93, C‑429/93 and C‑436/93, EU:C:1996:282, paragraphs 25 to 27 and the case-law cited, and of 20 March 1997, Phytheron International, C‑352/95, EU:C:1997:170, paragraphs 17 and 18).
25 Where Community directives provide for the harmonization of measures necessary to ensure the protection of the interests referred to in Article 36 of the Treaty, any national measure relating thereto must be assessed in relation to the provisions of that directive and not Articles 30 to 36 of the Treaty (see Case 5/77 Tedeschi v Denkavit [1977] ECR 1555, paragraph 35; Case 227/82 Van Bennekom [1983] ECR 3883, paragraph 35; Case C-37/92 Vanacker and Lesage [1993] ECR I-4947, paragraph 9; and Case C-323/93 Centre d' Insémination de la Crespelle v Coopérative de la Mayenne [1994] ECR I-5077, paragraph 31).
49 The same must apply, a fortiori, to a period of less than six months spent by the person concerned in his country of origin for reasons beyond his control.
18. Thus, a measure by which the public authorities grant certain undertakings favourable tax treatment which, although not involving the transfer of State resources, places the recipients in a more favourable financial position than other taxpayers amounts to State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. On the other hand, advantages resulting from a general measure applicable without distinction to all economic operators do not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU (Joined Cases C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 72 and 73 and the case-law cited).
72. Consequently, a measure by which the public authorities grant certain undertakings favourable tax treatment which, although not involving the transfer of State resources, places the recipients in a more favourable financial position than other taxpayers amounts to State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC (see Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 14, and Paint Graphos and Others , paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
17 It follows, moreover, from paragraph 20 of those two judgments that Regulation No 123/85 cannot be interpreted as prohibiting a trader who is outside the official distribution network for a given make of motor vehicle and is not an authorized intermediary within the meaning of Article 3(11) of that regulation from acquiring new vehicles of that make by way of parallel imports and independently carrying on the business of marketing such vehicles (see most recently to that effect, Case C-128/95 Fontaine and Others [1997] ECR I-0000, paragraph 17).
17 The Court concluded from this that Regulation No 123/85 could not be interpreted as prohibiting a trader who is outside the official distribution network for a given make of motor vehicle and is not an authorized intermediary within the meaning of that regulation from acquiring new vehicles of that make by way of parallel imports and independently carrying on the business of marketing such vehicles (judgment in Nissan France and Others, paragraph 20).
25. Au regard de ces éléments, force est de constater, en l’espèce, que les conclusions présentées devant le Tribunal et l’ensemble des moyens soulevés à l’appui de celles-ci tendaient à obtenir l’annulation de la décision litigieuse sur le fond, au motif que le régime d’exonération fiscale des provisions en cause constituait une aide incompatible avec le marché commun. Le Tribunal ne pouvait, dès lors, requalifier, ainsi qu’il l’a fait au point 51 de l’arrêt attaqué, l’objet même du recours qui lui était soumis et estimer, à tort, que les requérantes entendaient obtenir le respect des garanties procédurales dont elles auraient dû disposer.
26. It is settled case-law that Article 267 TFEU gives national courts the widest discretion in referring matters to the Court if they consider that a case pending before them raises questions involving interpretation of provisions of European Union law, or consideration of their validity, which are necessary for the resolution of the case (see, to that effect, Case 166/73 Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf [1974] ECR 33, paragraph 3; Case C‑348/89 Mecanarte [1991] ECR I‑3277, paragraph 44; Case C‑261/95 Palmisani [1997] ECR I‑4025, paragraph 20; Case C‑210/06 Cartesio [2008] ECR I‑9641, paragraph 88; and Joined Cases C‑188/10 Melki and Abdeli [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 41). National courts are, moreover, free to exercise that discretion at whatever stage of the proceedings they consider appropriate (see, to that effect, Melki and Abdeli , paragraphs 52 and 57).
57. Accordingly, the reply to the first question referred is that Article 267 TFEU precludes Member State legislation which establishes an interlocutory procedure for the review of the constitutionality of national laws, in so far as the priority nature of that procedure prevents – both before the submission of a question on constitutionality to the national court responsible for reviewing the constitutionality of laws and, as the case may be, after the decision of that court on that question – all the other national courts or tribunals from exercising their right or fulfilling their obligation to refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. On the other hand, Article 267 TFEU does not preclude such national legislation, in so far as the other national courts or tribunals remain free: – to refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, at whatever stage of the proceedings they consider appropriate, even at the end of the interlocutory procedure for the review of constitutionality, any question which they consider necessary, – to adopt any measure necessary to ensure provisional judicial protection of the rights conferred under the European Union legal order, and – to disapply, at the end of such an interlocutory procedure, the national legislative provision at issue if they consider it to be contrary to EU law. It is for the referring court to ascertain whether the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings can be interpreted in accordance with those requirements of EU law. The second question
26 An analysis of those definitions shows that the scope of the term economic activities is very wide, and that the term is objective in character, in the sense that the activity is considered per se and without regard to its purpose or results (Commission v Netherlands, cited above, paragraph 8).
72. Or, selon une jurisprudence constante de la Cour, les griefs dirigés contre des motifs surabondants d’une décision du Tribunal ne sauraient entraîner l’annulation de cette décision et sont donc inopérants (arrêt Dansk Rørindustri e.a./Commission, C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P à C‑208/02 P et C‑213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, point 148, ainsi qu’ordonnances Piau/Commission, C‑171/05 P, EU:C:2006:149, point 86, et Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland/Commission, C‑503/07 P, EU:C:2008:207, point 62).
148. However, that is a complaint directed against a ground included in the judgment purely for the sake of completeness which cannot lead to the judgment being set aside and is therefore nugatory (see, in particular, Case C-184/01 P Hirschfeldt v EEA [2002] ECR I-10173, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
30. The notion of "genuine use" also appears in Articles 15 and 50 of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1) as a prerequisite for revocation of the rights conferred by such a trade mark.
33 As to the justification of that crystallisation of the content of the preliminary complaint, it must be remembered, first, that it is settled case-law that the pre-litigation procedure is intended to allow, as a priority, an amicable settlement of the differences arising between officials or other servants and the administration. In order for such a procedure to achieve its objective, it is necessary that the appointing authority be in a position to know with sufficient precision the criticisms formulated by the persons concerned against the contested decision (see, to that effect, Case 58/75 Sergy v Commission [1976] ECR 1139, paragraph 32). The Court also points out that the administration must not interpret complaints in a restrictive manner, but must, on the contrary, examine them with an open mind.
32 THE OBJECT OF THAT PROVISION IS TO ENABLE AND ENCOURAGE AN AMICABLE SETTLEMENT OF DIFFERENCE WHICH HAS ARISEN BETWEEN OFFICIALS OR SERVANTS AND THE ADMINISTRATION ; IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THIS REQUIREMENT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BE IN A POSITION TO KNOW THE COMPLAINTS OR REQUESTS OF THE PERSON CONCERNED .
54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.
59 In so far as Laufen Austria, by its second ground of appeal, complains that the General Court failed — both in carrying out its review of the legality of the decision at issue (in paragraphs 164 to 193 of the judgment under appeal) and in exercising its unlimited jurisdiction as regards the setting of the fine (in paragraphs 258 to 261 of that judgment) — to take account of the fact that its participation in the infringement was of lesser gravity than that of the undertakings making up the ‘hard core’ of the cartel, it should be noted that it is not for the Court of Justice, when ruling on questions of law in the context of an appeal, to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the General Court exercising its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of fines imposed on undertakings for infringements of EU law (judgments of 28 June 2005, Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission, C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, paragraph 245, and of 11 July 2013, Gosselin Group v Commission, C‑429/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:463, paragraph 87).
245. As regards the allegedly disproportionate nature of the fine, on the other hand, it must be borne in mind that it is not for the Court of Justice, when ruling on questions of law in the context of an appeal, to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the Court of First Instance exercising its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of fines imposed for infringements of Community law (see, in particular, Baustahlgewebe v Commission , paragraph 129, and British Sugar v Commission , paragraph 48).
34. The first scenario concerns cases where, in the Member State of origin and the host Member State, the degree of similarity between the two professions is such that they both may be regarded as ‘the profession in question’ within the meaning of Article 3(a) of the Directive. In such a case, any shortcomings in the applicant’s education or training in relation to that required in the host Member State may be effectively made up for through the application of the compensatory measures provided for in Article 4(1) of the Directive, thereby ensuring full integration of the party concerned into the professional system in the host Member State.
25 In addition, the criteria for qualitative selection laid down in Chapter 2 of Title VI of Directive 92/50 are designed solely to define the rules governing objective assessment of the standing of tenderers, particularly as regards financial, economic and technical matters. One of those criteria, provided for in Article 31(3), allows tenderers to prove their financial and economic standing by means of any other document which the contracting authority considers appropriate. A further provision, contained in Article 32(2)(c), expressly states that evidence of the service provider's technical capability may be furnished by an indication of the technicians or technical bodies, whether or not belonging directly to the service provider, on which it can call to perform the service (see, to the same effect, as regards Directive 71/305, Ballast Nedam Groep I, paragraph 12).
12 Finally, the sole purpose of the criteria for qualitative selection laid down in Articles 23 to 26 of Directive 71/305, to which Article 28 of that directive on official lists of recognized contractors refers, is to define the rules relating to the objective assessment of the standing and, in particular, technical knowledge and ability of contractors. Article 26(e) provides expressly that a statement of the technicians or technical divisions which the contractor can call upon for carrying out the work, whether or not they belong to the firm, may be furnished as proof of such technical knowledge or ability.
47 However, a trader may not place reliance on there being no legislative amendment whatever, but can call into question only the arrangements for the implementation of such an amendment (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 June 2015, Berlington Hungary and Others, C‑98/14, EU:C:2015:386, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
47. In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, it is permissible, for the purpose of setting the fine, to have regard both to the total turnover of the undertaking, which gives an indication, albeit approximate and imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of its economic power, and to the proportion of that turnover accounted for by the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, which gives an indication of the scale of the infringement (judgments in Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission , 100/80 to 103/80, EU:C:1983:158, paragraph 121; Guardian Industries and Guardian Europe v Commission , C‑580/12 P, EU:C:2014:2363, paragraph 54; and LG Display and LG Display Taiwan v Commission , C‑227/14 P, EU:C:2015:258, paragraph 50).
50. In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, it is permissible, for the purpose of fixing the fine, to have regard both to the total turnover of the undertaking, which gives an indication, albeit approximate and imperfect, of the size of the undertaking and of its economic power, and to the proportion of that turnover accounted for by the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, which gives an indication of the scale of the infringement (judgments in Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission , 100/80 to 103/80, EU:C:1983:158, paragraph 121; Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, paragraph 243; Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission , C‑397/03 P, EU:C:2006:328, paragraph 100; and Guardian Industries and Guardian Europe v Commission , C‑580/12 P, EU:C:2014:2363, paragraph 54).
22. In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred must be that Article 18(4), of the Sixth Directive is to be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which lays down a limitation period of three years in which to make an application for the refund of excess VAT collected by, though not due to, the tax authority of that Member State. Costs
46. In addition, in the light of the objective of the adjustment scheme at issue in the main proceedings, as stated by the referring court, which is to preserve the purchasing power of the pension in the light of consumer price developments, the view cannot be taken that the scheme at issue is one which, under certain conditions, provides persons with means below a legally defined limit with a special benefit designed to enable them to meet their needs and which the Court has held not to be covered by Article 3(1)(a) of Directive 79/7 (Joined Cases C‑63/91 and C‑64/91 Jackson and Cresswell [1992] ECR I‑4737, paragraph 17).
17 However, Article 3(1)(a) of Directive 79/7 does not refer to a statutory scheme which, on certain conditions, provides persons with means below a legally defined limit with a special benefit designed to enable them to meet their needs.
58. Inasmuch as those rules require an operator from another Member State wishing to pursue its activities in several Italian provinces not to confine itself to one single establishment in Italian territory, but on the contrary require it to have premises in each of those provinces unless authority is conferred on an authorised agent, they place that operator at a disadvantage as compared with Italian operators established in Italy which already have premises in at least one of those provinces and generally have better opportunities than foreign operators to establish contacts with authorised operators in other provinces in order to issue, where necessary, powers of agency (see, to that effect, Case C‑442/02 CaixaBank France [2004] ECR I‑8961, paragraphs 12 and 13).
122. The reasonableness of a period is to be appraised in the light of the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the applicant and of the competent authorities (Baustahlgewebe , paragraph 29, and Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij , paragraph 187).
187 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the reasonableness of a period is to be appraised in the light of the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the applicant and of the competent authorities (Baustahlgewebe, paragraph 29).
73. Consequently, the answer to the question referred is that Article 49 EC does not preclude legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prohibits operators such as Bwin, which are established in other Member States, in which they lawfully provide similar services, from offering games of chance via the internet within the territory of that Member State. Costs
41. Although prior authorisation, such as that required by Article 36 of the Law on sickness insurance, constitutes, for both patients and service providers, an obstacle to the freedom to provide services (see, to that effect, Kohll , paragraph 35; Case C‑157/99 Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, paragraph 69; Case C‑385/99 Müller-Fauré and van Riet [2003] ECR I‑4509, paragraph 44; and Watts , paragraph 98), the Court has nevertheless held that Article 49 EC does not in principle preclude the right of a patient to receive hospital treatment in another Member State at the expense of the system with which he is registered from being subject to prior authorisation ( Smits and Peerbooms , paragraph 82, and Watts , paragraph 113).
82 Although, for the considerations set out above, Community law does not in principle preclude a system of prior authorisation, the conditions attached to the grant of such authorisation must none the less be justified with regard to the overriding considerations examined and must satisfy the requirement of proportionality referred to in paragraph 75 above. The condition that the proposed treatment be normal
18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
34. Certain circumstances may constitute evidence that the holder has discarded a substance or object, or intends or is required to discard it, within the meaning of Article 1(a) of the directive ( ARCO Chemie Nederland and Others , paragraph 83). That is the case in particular where a substance is a production or consumption residue, that is to say, a product which it was not, as such, sought to produce (see, to this effect, ARCO Chemie Nederland and Others , paragraph 84, and Niselli , paragraph 43).
43. As the Court has held, the fact that a used substance is a production residue is, as a rule, evidence that it has been discarded or of an intention or requirement to discard it, within the meaning of Article 1(a) of Directive 75/442 (see ARCO Chemie Nederland , cited above, paragraph 84). The same appraisal must apply as regards consumption residues.
10 Finally, it is irrelevant that, by comparison with the previous export credit system, the repayment of interest is economically neutral in its effect on the competitiveness of Greek exports and that the Commission took no action regarding the previous system, since the present system, viewed independently from its predecessor, favours certain undertakings . It follows that the first submission must be rejected . The second submission
35. It must be borne in mind in this regard that, according to settled case‑law, the necessity for uniform application and, accordingly, for uniform interpretation of a Community measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim the latter seeks to achieve, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all languages (see, inter alia, Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 3; Joined Cases C-261/08 and C-348/08 Zurita García and Choque Cabrera [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 54; and Case C‑473/08 Eulitz [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).
54. It must be borne in mind in this regard that, according to settled case-law, the necessity for uniform application and accordingly for uniform interpretation of a Community measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim he seeks to achieve, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all languages (see, inter alia, Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 3; Case 55/87 Moksel Import und Export [1988] ECR 3845, paragraph 15; Case C‑268/99 Jany and Others [2001] ECR I‑8615, paragraph 47; and Case C‑188/03 Junk [2005] ECR I‑885, paragraph 33).
42. In addition, in so far as Article 34(6) of the Visa Code states that decisions on annulment or revocation of a visa must also be notified to the applicant by means of the standard form set out in Annex VI to that code, it is apparent that the competent authority must indicate to the applicant whose visa is annulled or revoked which condition for the issue of a visa is not or is no longer satisfied by referring to one of the reasons for refusal provided for in Article 32(1) and Article 35(6) of that code, reproduced in Annex VI thereto.
33 In the absence of Community rules on the recovery of national charges levied though not due, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, first, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and, secondly, that they do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness) (see, inter alia, Aprile, cited above, paragraph 18).
18 This diversity between national systems derives mainly from the lack of Community rules on the refunding of national charges levied though not due. In such circumstances, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, first, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and, second, that they do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness) (see, most recently, Edis, cited above, paragraphs 19 and 34, and Case C-260/96 SPAC v Ministero delle Finanze [1998] ECR I-4997, paragraph 18).
52. As regards the concept of ‘appropriate assessment’ within the meaning of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, it must be pointed out that the provision does not define any particular method for carrying out such an assessment.
24. Thus, according to settled case-law, the entities against which reliance may be placed on the provisions of a directive that are capable of having direct effect include a body, whatever its legal form, which has been given responsibility, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public-interest service under the control of the State and which has, for that purpose, special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals ( Foster and Others , paragraph 20; Case C‑343/98 Collino and Chiappero [2000] ECR I‑6659, paragraph 23; Case C‑157/02 Rieser Internationale Transporte [2004] ECR I‑1477, paragraph 24; Case C‑356/05 Farrell [2007] ECR I‑3067, paragraph 40; and Dominguez , paragraph 39).
39. Thus the entities against which the provisions of a directive that are capable of having direct effect may be relied upon include a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals (see, inter alia, Foster and Others , paragraph 20; Collino and Chiappero , paragraph 23; and Case C‑356/05 Farrell [2007] ECR I‑3067, paragraph 40).
À cet égard, il convient de constater que, s’il est vrai que, conformément aux articles 256 TFUE et 58, premier alinéa, du statut de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, le pourvoi est limité aux questions de droit et que, dès lors, seul le Tribunal est compétent pour constater et apprécier les faits pertinents ainsi que pour apprécier les éléments de preuve (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 10 décembre 2015, El Corte Inglés/OHMI, C‑603/14 P, EU:C:2015:807, point 31), il n’en demeure pas moins que, ainsi qu’il ressort des points 25 et suivants du présent arrêt, à tout le moins le deuxième moyen et la première branche du troisième moyen soulèvent des questions de droit et sont, dès lors, recevables.
50. It follows moreover from the case-law of the Court that restrictive measures imposed by the Member States on account of the pursuit of objectives in the public interest must be applied without discrimination ( Placanica and Others , paragraph 49, and Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International , paragraph 60).
60. In the present case, it is thus necessary to examine in particular whether the restriction of the provision of games of chance via the internet, imposed by the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, is suitable for achieving the objective or objectives invoked by the Member State concerned, and whether it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. In any event, those restrictions must be applied without discrimination (see, to that effect, Placanica and Others , paragraph 49).
30. In those circumstances, it must be accepted that the decision of 31 July 2001 was taken in implementation of the judgment under appeal. Accordingly, if it is upheld, the appeal would be likely to procure an advantage for the Parliament in that it would allow it to recover the arrears of salary paid to Mr Samper in compliance with the judgment under appeal.
120. En outre, dans l’arrêt Commission/Italie (C‑496/09, EU:C:2011:740), la Cour a constaté que la République italienne avait manqué à ses obligations résultant de l’article 260, paragraphe 1, TFUE, en n’ayant pas pris toutes les mesures que comportait l’exécution de l’arrêt Commission/Italie (C-99/02, EU:C:2004:207) concernant la récupération d’aides octroyées par cet État membre dans le cadre de régimes d’aides portant mesures pour l’emploi.
84. In the present case, besides the seriousness of the infringement as established in paragraphs 60 to 63 above, it should be noted that on the date of the closure of the oral procedure, more than 7 years after the date of delivery of the judgment in Case C‑99/02 Commission v Italy and more than 12 years after the adoption of Decision 2000/128 on 11 May 1999, the Italian Republic was still unable to establish precisely the definitive total amount of the aid to be recovered, as may be seen from its rejoinder.
18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
21. It is established case-law that, in the procedure laid down by Article 234 EC providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it (see Case C-334/95 Krüger [1997] ECR I-4517, paragraph 22, and Case C-88/99 Roquette Frères [2000] ECR I-10465, paragraph 18). To that end the Court of Justice may have to reformulate the question referred to it (see Krüger , paragraph 23, and Case C-62/00 Marks & Spencer [2002] ECR I-6325, paragraph 32).
22 It is established case-law that, in the procedure laid down by Article 177 of the Treaty providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it.
19 In accordance with the principle of fiscal neutrality on which the Sixth Directive is based, that provision entails no distinction, as far as exemptions are concerned, between lawful and unlawful exports. When the latter consist of goods which fall within the scope of the Sixth Directive, they must accordingly be treated in the same manner as lawful exports of the same goods.
38 It should be borne in mind that the concept of fair compensation is not defined by reference to national law, and it must thus be regarded as an autonomous concept of EU law and interpreted uniformly throughout the territory of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 October 2010 in Padawan, C‑467/08, EU:C:2010:620, paragraphs 31 to 33 and 37, and 12 November 2015 in Hewlett-Packard Belgium, C‑572/13, EU:C:2015:750, paragraph 35).
35. With regard to the phrase ‘fair compensation’, it should be noted, as a preliminary point, that the Court has previously held that the concept of ‘fair compensation’, within the meaning of Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, is an autonomous concept of EU law which must therefore be interpreted uniformly in all the Member States that have introduced a private copying exception (judgment in Padawan , C‑467/08, EU:C:2010:620, paragraph 37).
86. Pour autant que la requérante reproche au Tribunal de ne pas avoir tiré les conséquences nécessaires qu’impliquait le non-respect par ce dernier d’un délai de jugement raisonnable, il convient de relever qu’elle ne prétend pas avoir fourni au Tribunal un quelconque indice de nature à laisser apparaître que cette irrégularité de procédure pouvait avoir une incidence sur la solution du litige dont il était saisi et, à ce titre, pourrait justifier une annulation de la décision litigieuse.
70 With regard to whether the first ground of appeal is well founded, it must be borne in mind that the Court of Justice has held on many occasions that, although the EU rules in force until the end of 1999 do not lay down a time limit for the adoption of a decision on financial corrections by the Commission, since 2000 that has, however, been subject to compliance with a time limit laid down in EU law (see judgments of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraphs 75 to 82; of 4 September 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraphs 75 to 82; of 22 October 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑429/13 P, EU:C:2014:2310, paragraph 29; of 4 December 2014, Spain v Commission, C‑513/13 P, not published, EU:C:2014:2412, paragraph 36; of 24 June 2015, Germany v Commission, C‑549/12 P and C‑54/13 P, EU:C:2015:412, paragraph 81, and of 24 June 2015, Spain v Commission, C‑263/13 P, EU:C:2015:415, paragraph 50).
36. S’agissant du point de savoir si l’article H, paragraphe 2, de l’annexe II du règlement n° 1164/94 prévoit ou non un délai au cours duquel la Commission doit adopter sa décision, la Cour a examiné cette disposition à la lumière de son contexte et de la finalité du règlement n° 1164/94 dans ses arrêts Espagne/Commission (C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156) et Espagne/Commission (C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157). Elle en a conclu, aux points 82 et 93 de ces arrêts, que l’adoption par la Commission d’une décision de correction financière est, à compter de l’année 2000, subordonnée au respect d’un délai légal (voir, également, arrêt Espagne/Commission, C‑429/13 P, EU:C:2014:2310, point 29).
18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
28 Accordingly, as stated, in essence, by the Advocate General in points 53 and 77 of her Opinion, the conditions that the organisation concerned must, respectively, be subject to the authority or control of the State, and must possess special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable to relations between individuals cannot be conjunctive (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 December 1997, Kampelmann and Others, C‑253/96 to C‑258/96, EU:C:1997:585, paragraphs 46 and 47, and of 7 September 2006, Vassallo, C‑180/04, EU:C:2006:518, paragraph 26).
47 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the second question must be that individuals may rely on Article 2(2)(c) of the Directive directly before the national courts as against the State and any organizations or bodies which are subject to the authority or control of the State or have special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable to relations between individuals, either where the State has failed to transpose the Directive into national law within the prescribed period or where it has not done so correctly. It is not open to a Member State to transpose Article 2(2)(c)(ii) of the Directive in such a way as to allow the employer, in every case, to confine the information to be notified to the employee to a mere job designation. The third question
25 According to the first, seventh and ninth recitals in the preamble to Regulation No 3887/92, the objectives of the regulation are to enable the reform of the common agricultural policy to be implemented efficiently, to monitor compliance with the provisions on Community aid effectively, and to adopt provisions to prevent and penalise irregularities and fraud effectively.
41. It is for the issuing Member State to investigate whether the minimum conditions imposed by European Union law, particularly those relating to residence and fitness to drive laid down in Article 7(1) of Directive 91/439, have been satisfied and, therefore, whether the issuing of a driving licence is justified (see Schwarz , paragraph 76, and Grasser , paragraph 20).
20. It is for the Member State of issue to investigate whether the minimum requirements imposed by European Union law, particularly those relating to residence and fitness to drive, laid down in Article 7(1) of that directive, have been satisfied and, therefore, whether the issue of a driving licence is justified ( Schwarz , paragraph 76 and case-law cited).
18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.
52 When the wording of secondary Community legislation is open to more than one interpretation, preference should be given as far as possible to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the Treaty. Likewise, an implementing regulation must, if possible, be given an interpretation consistent with the basic regulation (see Case C-90/92 Dr Tretter v Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-Ost [1993] ECR I-3569, paragraph 11). Similarly, the primacy of international agreements concluded by the Community over provisions of secondary Community legislation means that such provisions must, so far as is possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements.
11 As the Court has previously held, when the wording of secondary Community law is open to more than one interpretation, preference should be given to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the Treaty (see, inter alia, the judgment in Case 218/82 Commission v Council [1983] ECR 4063, paragraph 15). An implementing regulation must also be given, if possible, an interpretation consistent with the provisions of the basic regulation (see, in that regard, the judgment in Case 38/70 Tradax [1971] ECR 145, paragraph 10).
31. In addition, in order to find whether ‘grave misconduct’ exists, a specific and individual assessment of the conduct of the economic operator concerned must, in principle, be carried out.
24. The Commission submits that, in accordance with the Court’s established case-law relating to Commission decisions reducing the monthly advances paid to Member States as part of the expenditure financed by the EAGGF, there is a general rule according to which the Commission is not entitled, when managing the common agricultural policy, to commit funds which fail to comply with the rules governing the common organisation of the market in question (Case C-342/89 Germany v Commission [1991] ECR I-5031, paragraph 14, and Case C‑346/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-5057, paragraph 14). Consequently, before accepting the accounts of the paying agencies, it has the power to adjust them by making the corrections required on finding that certain expenditure effected did not comply with those rules.
14 It follows from the foregoing reasoning that the Commission is not entitled, when managing the common agricultural policy, to commit funds which fail to comply with the rules governing the common organization of the market in question.
39 Accordingly, it is, on the one hand, for the Member States to decide whether to grant workers additional paid annual leave in addition to the minimum annual paid leave of four weeks provided for in Article 7 of Directive 2003/88. In that case, the Member States may grant to a worker who, because of illness, could not use up all of his additional paid annual leave before the end of his employment relationship, an entitlement to an allowance in lieu of that additional period. It is, on the other hand, for the Member States to determine the conditions for granting that entitlement (see, judgment of 3 May 2012 in Neidel, C‑337/10, EU:C:2012:263, paragraph 36).
35 It is clear, however, from the judgments in Case C-57/93 Vroege [1994] ECR I-4541, paragraphs 20 to 27, Case C-128/93 Fisscher [1994] ECR I-4583, paragraphs 17 to 24, and Case C-246/96 Magorrian and Cunningham v EHSSB and DHSS [1997] ECR I-7153, paragraphs 27 to 35, that the limitation in time of the effects of Article 119 resulting from both the Barber judgment and the Protocol concerns only those kinds of discrimination which employers and pension schemes could reasonably have considered to be permissible owing to the transitional derogations for which Community law provided and which were capable of being applied to occupational pensions (see Case C-435/93 Dietz v Stichting Thuiszorg Rotterdam [1996] ECR I-5223, paragraph 19).
29 In fact, it has been clear since the judgment in Bilka that any discrimination, based on sex, in the recognition of that right infringes Article 119 (Vroege, cited above, paragraph 29, Fisscher, paragraph 26, and Dietz, paragraph 20).
39 Contrary to Emerald Meats' assertion, that finding does not conflict with the Council' s intention, as stated in the preambles to the basic regulations, to introduce a Community method for the management of the tariff quotas at issue. Such a management method does not presuppose that all the decisions should be taken by the Commission, but may equally be achieved by decentralized management, involving the Member States' authorities, since economic operators are at liberty to submit their applications in the Member State of their choice and applications are processed in accordance with uniform rules applicable throughout the Community.
30 Consequently, the legislature must have sufficient information at its disposal at the time when the project is adopted. In that regard, the minimum information to be supplied by the developer is to include a description of the project comprising information on the site, design and size of the project, a description of the measures envisaged in order to avoid, reduce and, if possible, remedy significant adverse effects, and the data required to identify and assess the main effects which the project is likely to have on the environment (see judgment of 18 October 2011, Boxus and Others, C‑128/09 to C‑131/09, C‑134/09 and C‑135/09, EU:C:2011:667, paragraph 43).
43. Consequently, the legislature must have sufficient information at its disposal at the time when the project is adopted. It is apparent from Article 5(3) of Directive 85/337 and Annex IV thereto that the minimum information to be supplied by the developer is to include a description of the project comprising information on the site, design and size of the project, a description of the measures envisaged in order to avoid, reduce and, if possible, remedy significant adverse effects, and the data required to identify and assess the main effects which the project is likely to have on the environment (see Linster , paragraph 55).
47. The Court accordingly ruled that protection against dismissal had to be accorded to women not only during maternity leave but also for the entire duration of their pregnancy, after stressing that the risk of dismissal may detrimentally affect the physical and mental state of female workers who are pregnant or have recently given birth, including the particularly serious risk that pregnant women may be prompted voluntarily to terminate their pregnancy. The Court held that dismissal of a female worker during pregnancy for absences due to incapacity for work resulting from her pregnancy is linked to the occurrence of risks inherent in pregnancy and must therefore be regarded as essentially based on the fact of pregnancy. From this the Court concluded that such a dismissal can affect only women and therefore constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex ( Brown , cited above, paragraphs 18 and 24).
74. In addition, an undertaking cannot exempt itself from its liability by relying on the fact that it has not taken part in all aspects of an anti-competitive scheme or that its role in the aspects in which it did participate was limited, as those circumstances are not capable of calling into question its liability for the infringement. Those factors must be taken into consideration only when the gravity of the infringement is assessed and if and when it comes to determining the fine ( Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission , paragraph 86).
86. Neither is the fact that an undertaking has not taken part in all aspects of an anti-competitive scheme or that it played only a minor role in the aspects in which it did participate material to the establishment of the existence of an infringement on its part. Those factors must be taken into consideration only when the gravity of the infringement is assessed and if and when it comes to determining the fine (see, to that effect, Commission v Anic , paragraph 90).
72. That assessment is a matter for the national court and must be carried out on a case-by-case basis.
69. Ac cording to well-established case-law, national measures which are liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty may nevertheless be allowed provided that they pursue an objective in the public interest, are appropriate for attaining that objective and do not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective pursued (see, in particular, Commission v Greece , paragraph 51).
51. According to well-established case-law, however, national measures which are liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty may nevertheless be allowed provided that they pursue an objective in the public interest, are appropriate for attaining that objective and do not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective pursued ( Commission v Portugal , paragraph 24; Commission v Sweden , paragraph 25, and Commission v Germany , paragraph 26).
31 To that end a simple reference to Article 13(2)(f) of Regulation No 1408/71 is not sufficient, since the fact that the legislation of a Member State ceases to be applicable constitutes a condition for the application of that provision, and that provision does not itself define the conditions in which the legislation of a Member State ceases to be applicable.