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23 Moreover, under the second subparagraph of Article 27(2) of that directive, the issue of any expulsion measure is conditional on the requirement that such conduct must represent a genuine, present threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society or of the host Member State, which implies, in general, the existence in the individual concerned of a propensity to act in the same way in the future (judgment of 22 May 2012, I, C‑348/09, EU:C:2012:300, paragraph 30).

30. Under the second subparagraph of Article 27(2) of Directive 2004/38, the issue of any expulsion measure is conditional on the requirement that the personal conduct of the individual concerned must represent a genuine, present threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society or of the host Member State, which implies, in general, the existence in the individual concerned of a propensity to act in the same way in the future.

26. According to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of Community law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑222/05 to C‑225/05 van der Weerd and Others [2007] ECR I-4233, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

25 In view of the foregoing considerations, by virtue of which the parafiscal charge at issue is governed either by Article 12 et seq. or by Article 95 of the Treaty, depending on matters of fact to be examined by the national court, Article 30 cannot apply to the present case (judgment in Compagnie Commerciale de l' Ouest, cited above, paragraph 29).

29 In view of the foregoing considerations, by virtue of which the parafiscal charge at issue is governed either by Article 12 et seq. or by Article 95 of the Treaty, depending on matters of fact to be examined by the national court, Article 30 cannot apply to the present case.

36 Accordingly, it is necessary to determine, first of all, whether VLRD was established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, the activity of which meets such needs before, if necessary, examining whether or not those needs have an industrial or commercial character (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 May 2003, Korhonen and Others, C‑18/01, EU:C:2003:300, paragraph 40).

24 It follows that, as the Court held in its judgments in Corsica Ferries France, cited above, paragraph 11, and in Joined Cases 209 to 213/84 Ministère Public v Asjes [1986] ECR 1425, paragraph 37, in the transport sector the objective laid down in Article 59 of the Treaty of abolishing during the transitional period restrictions on freedom to provide services should have been attained in the framework of the common policy provided for in Articles 74 and 75 of the Treaty.

11 It follows, as the Court pointed out in the judgment of 30 April 1986 ( cited above, paragraph 37 ), that in the transport sector the objective laid down in Article 59 of the Treaty of abolishing during the transitional period restrictions on freedom to provide services should have been attained in the framework of the common policy provided for in Articles 74 and 75 .

12 FURTHERMORE , IT MUST BE NOTED THAT WHILST MEASURES OF A PURELY PREPARATORY CHARACTER MAY NOT THEMSELVES BE THE SUBJECT OF AN APPLICATION FOR A DECLARATION THAT THEY ARE VOID , ANY LEGAL DEFECTS THEREIN MAY BE RELIED UPON IN AN ACTION DIRECTED AGAINST THE DEFINITIVE ACT FOR WHICH THEY REPRESENT A PREPARATORY STEP .

40. Consequently, that latter procedure must be regarded as a special judicial procedure for the enforcement of judgments and, in other words, as a method of enforcement (Case C‑304/02 Commission v France , paragraph 92). Therefore, only a failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations under the FEU Treaty which the Court has held, on the basis of Article 258 TFEU, to be well founded may be dealt with under that procedure (Case C‑457/07 Commission v Portugal [2009] ECR I‑8091, paragraph 47).

47. Since the procedure laid down in Article 228(2) EC must be regarded as a special judicial procedure for the enforcement of judgments, in other words as a method of enforcement (Case C-304/02 Commission v France [2005] ECR I-6263, paragraph 92) only a failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty which the Court has declared, on the basis of Article 226 EC, to be well founded may be dealt with under that procedure.

119 It is sufficient to recall that the conduct at issue here is that of a conference having a share of over 90% of the market in question and only one competitor. The appellants have, moreover, never seriously disputed, and indeed admitted at the hearing, that the purpose of the conduct complained of was to eliminate G & C from the market.

14 In those circumstances, a given level of practical experience cannot confer on the person possessing it a right to be appointed to the higher grade of the career bracket concerned (see Klinke, paragraph 30; Alexopoulou I, paragraph 20; and Case T-12/97 Barnett v Commission [1997] ECR-SC I-A-313 and II-863, paragraph 50).

30 The applicant' s line of argument is tantamount to saying that the appointing authority could not in the circumstances exercise its discretion otherwise than by appointing him to the higher grade of the career bracket concerned, as if a given level of practical experience could confer on the person possessing it a right to be appointed at that grade.

Or, il résulte d’une jurisprudence bien établie que l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé (voir, notamment, arrêts du 4 septembre 2014, Commission/Grèce, C-351/13, non publié, EU:C:2014:2150, point 20, et du 5 février 2015, Commission/Belgique, C-317/14, EU:C:2015:63, point 34).

86. It is to be remembered that derogations from a general principle are to be interpreted strictly. As regards, in particular, the principle of exemption from withholding tax laid down in Article 5(1) of the Directive, the Court thus held at paragraph 27 of its judgment in Denkavit and Others , cited above, in relation to Article 3(2) of the Directive that since Article 3(2) constitutes a derogation from that principle it is to be interpreted strictly and that the option which it allows the Member States cannot be given an interpretation going beyond its actual words.

27 Likewise, the Member States' option to lay down a minimum period during which the parent company must maintain a holding in the subsidiary is to be interpreted strictly, since it constitutes a derogation from the principle of exemption from withholding tax provided for in Article 5(1) of the Directive. That option cannot, therefore, be given an interpretation going beyond the actual words of Article 3(2), to the detriment of beneficiary undertakings.

39. Certes, afin de respecter le principe d’effectivité, l’organisation des voies de recours internes et le nombre de degrés de juridiction ne doivent pas rendre impossible ou excessivement difficile l’exercice des droits que les justiciables tirent du droit de l’Union.

34. In addition, it is settled case-law that, when adopting measures to implement Community legislation, national authorities must exercise their discretion in compliance with the general principles of Community law, which include the principle of proportionality (see, inter alia, Case C‑313/99 Mulligan and Others [2002] ECR I‑5719, paragraphs 35 and 36; Joined Cases C‑231/00, C‑303/00 and C‑451/00 Cooperativa Lattepiú and Others [2004] ECR I‑2869, paragraph 57; and Case C‑496/04 Slob [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 41).

36 Consequently, a clawback measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings must be established and applied in compliance with the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-63/93 Duff and Others [1996] ECR I-569, paragraph 34). Moreover, it must be proportionate to the aim pursued (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-22/94 Irish Farmers Association and Others [1997] ECR I-1809, paragraphs 30 and 31) and applied without discrimination (see, to that effect, in particular Klensch and Others, paragraph 8). Similarly, such a measure must respect fundamental rights, such as the right to property (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-2/92 Bostock [1994] ECR I-955, paragraphs 16 and 20) and the freedom to pursue a trade or profession (see, to that effect, in particular Joined Cases C-90/90 and C-91/90 Neu and Others [1991] ECR I-3617, paragraph 13).

42. It follows from the foregoing that the fact that the marketing authorisation issued under a simplified procedure is personal is justified.

26. With regard to the first of those conditions, the settled case-law of the Court shows that only advantages granted directly or indirectly through State resources are to be considered aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The distinction made in that provision between aid granted by a Member State and aid granted through State resources does not signify that all advantages granted by a State, whether financed through State resources or not, constitute aid but is intended merely to bring within that definition both advantages which are granted directly by the State and those granted by a public or private body designated or established by the State (Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I‑2099, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). Thus, the prohibition in Article 107(1) TFEU may also cover, in principle, aid granted by public or private bodies established or appointed by the State to administer aid (see, to that effect, Pearle and Others , paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

34. With regard to the first condition, it is clear from established case-law that there is no need to draw any distinction according to whether the aid is granted directly by the State or by public or private bodies established or appointed by that State (Case 57/86 Greece v Commission [1988] ECR 2855, paragraph 12, PreussenElektra , paragraph 58, and Case C-126/91 GEMO [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 23).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

45 Unless it is objectively justified and proportionate to its aim, a provision of national law must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it is intrinsically liable to affect migrant workers more than national workers and if there is a consequent risk that it will place the former at a particular disadvantage (O'Flynn, cited above, paragraph 20).

20 It follows from all the foregoing case-law that, unless objectively justified and proportionate to its aim, a provision of national law must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it is intrinsically liable to affect migrant workers more than national workers and if there is a consequent risk that it will place the former at a particular disadvantage.

31. As the Court has already noted, in circumstances in which one only of several supposed perp etrators of alleged damage is sued in a court within whose jurisdiction he has not acted, it cannot be considered that the causal event occurred within the jurisdiction of that court for the purposes of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 (see Melzer EU:C:2013:305, paragraph 40).

74. The aim of Regulation No 2081/92 is to ensure uniform protection within the Community of the geographical designations which it covers; it introduced a requirement of Community registration in respect of those designations so that they could enjoy protection in every Member State, whereas the national protection which a Member State accords to geographical designations that do not meet the conditions for registration under Regulation No 2081/92 is governed by the national law of that Member State and is confined to its territory (see Warsteiner Brauerei , paragraph 50).

50 Second, Regulation No 2081/92 is intended to ensure uniform protection within the Community of the geographical designations which it covers and it introduced a requirement of Community registration so that they could enjoy protection in every Member State (see, to that effect, the judgment in Joined Cases C-129/97 and C-130/97 Chiciak and Fol [1998] ECR I-3315, paragraphs 25 and 26), whereas the national protection which a Member State confers on geographical designations which do not meet the conditions for registration under Regulation No 2081/92 is governed by the national law of that Member State and is confined to the territory of that Member State.

34 In view of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question submitted must be that Article 11(A)(1)(a) and Article 11(C)(1) of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted as meaning that where (a) a manufacturer issues a money-off coupon, which is redeemable at the amount stated on the coupon by or at the expense of the manufacturer in favour of the retailer, (b) the coupon, which is distributed to a potential customer in the course of a sales promotion campaign, may be accepted by the retailer in payment for a specified item of goods, (c) the manufacturer has sold the specified item at the "original supplier' s price" direct to the retailer and (d) the retailer takes the coupon from the customer on sale of the item, presents it to the manufacturer and is paid the stated amount, the taxable amount is equal to the selling price charged by the manufacturer, less the amount indicated on the voucher and refunded. The same applies if the original supply is made by the manufacturer to a wholesaler rather than directly to a retailer.

29. Therefore, individuals are entitled to rely before national courts, against the Member State concerned, on the provisions of a directive which appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise whenever the full application of the directive is not in fact secured, that is to say, not only where the directive has not been implemented or has been implemented incorrectly, but also where the national measures correctly implementing the directive are not being applied in such a way as to achieve the result sought by it (Case C‑62/00 Marks & Spencer [2002] ECR I‑6325, paragraph 27).

27 Consequently, the adoption of national measures correctly implementing a directive does not exhaust the effects of the directive. Member States remain bound actually to ensure full application of the directive even after the adoption of those measures. Individuals are therefore entitled to rely before national courts, against the State, on the provisions of a directive which appear, so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise whenever the full application of the directive is not in fact secured, that is to say, not only where the directive has not been implemented or has been implemented incorrectly, but also where the national measures correctly implementing the directive are not being applied in such a way as to achieve the result sought by it.

28 As the Council and the Commission were right to point out, the aim of binding tariff information is to enable the trader to proceed with certainty where there are doubts as to the classification of goods in the existing customs nomenclature, thereby protecting him against any subsequent change in the position adopted by the customs authorities with regard to the classification of the goods. However, such information is not aimed at, nor can it have the effect of, guaranteeing that the tariff heading to which the trader refers will not subsequently be amended by a measure adopted by the Community legislature. That interpretation is confirmed clearly and precisely by the wording of the first indent of the first paragraph of Article 13 of Regulation No 1715/90.

29. It follows, first, as noted by the Advocate General in point 57 of her Opinion, that an anti-su it injunction, such as that in the main proceedings, is contrary to the general principle which emerges from the case-law of the Court on the Brussels Convention, that every court seised itself determines, under the rules applicable to it, whether it has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute before it (see, to that effect, Gasser , paragraphs 48 and 49). It should be borne in mind in that regard that Regulation No 44/2001, apart from a few limited exceptions which are not relevant to the main proceedings, does not authorise the jurisdiction of a court of a Member State to be reviewed by a court in another Member State (Case C‑351/89 Overseas Union Insurance and Others [1991] ECR I-3317, paragraph 24, and Turner , paragraph 26). That jurisdiction is determined directly by the rules laid down by that regulation, including those relating to its scope of application. Thus in no case is a court of one Member State in a better position to determine whether the court of another Member State has jurisdiction ( Overseas Union Insurance and Others , paragraph 23, and Gasser , paragraph 48).

49. Thus, where there is an agreement conferring jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention, not only, as observed by the Commission, do the parties always have the option of declining to invoke it and, in particular, the defendant has the option of entering an appearance before the court first seised without alleging that it lacks jurisdiction on the basis of a choice-of-court clause, in accordance with Article 18 of the Convention, but, moreover, in circumstances other than those just described, it is incumbent on the court first seised to verify the existence of the agreement and to decline jurisdiction if it is established, in accordance with Article 17, that the parties actually agreed to designate the court second seised as having exclusive jurisdiction.

27. In the context of Directive 76/207, the term ‘dismissal’ must be widely construed so as to include termination of the employment relationship between an employee and his employer, even as part of a voluntary redundancy scheme (see, to that effect, Case 19/81 Burton [1982] ECR 555, paragraph 9).

That interpretation is expressly confirmed by the title of that notice and also by point 31 which states that the fact that immunity or reduction in respect of fines is granted cannot protect an undertaking from the civil law consequences of its participation in an infringement of Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 14 March 2017, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P, EU:C:2017:205, paragraph 92).

92 Such an interpretation is expressly confirmed by the title of that notice and also by point 31 which states that the fact that immunity or reduction in respect of fines is granted cannot protect an undertaking from the civil law consequences of its participation in an infringement of Article 101 TFEU.

98. The patients of a dentist visit a dental practice with the sole objective of receiving treatment, as the broadcasting of phonograms is in no way a part of dental treatment. They have access to certain phonograms by chance and without any active choice on their part, according to the time of their arrival at the practice and the length of time they wait and the nature of the treatment they undergo. Accordingly, it cannot be presumed that the usual customers of a dentist are receptive as regards the broadcast in question.

41 It is settled case-law that medical activities fall within the scope of Article 60 of the Treaty, there being no need to distinguish in that regard between care provided in a hospital environment and care provided outside such an environment (see Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377, paragraph 16, Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland [1991] ECR I-4685, paragraph 18, and Kohll, paragraphs 29 and 51).

16 IT FOLLOWS THAT THE FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES INCLUDES THE FREEDOM , FOR THE RECIPIENTS OF SERVICES , TO GO TO ANOTHER MEMBER STATE IN ORDER TO RECEIVE A SERVICE THERE , WITHOUT BEING OBSTRUCTED BY RESTRICTIONS , EVEN IN RELATION TO PAYMENTS AND THAT TOURISTS , PERSONS RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT AND PERSONS TRAVELLING FOR THE PURPOSE OF EDUCATION OR BUSINESS ARE TO BE REGARDED AS RECIPIENTS OF SERVICES .

19 Since the national court states that the tax on companies' net assets is unanimously classified as a direct tax, it must be observed first of all that, according to settled case-law, the nature of a tax, duty or charge must be determined by the Court, under Community law, according to the objective characteristics by which it is levied, irrespective of its classification under national law (Joined Cases C-197/94 and C-252/94 Bautiaa and Société Française Maritime [1996] ECR I-505, paragraph 39, and the case-law there cited).

29 However, the Court has also previously held that the principle of equal treatment does not preclude the correction or amplification of details of a tender, where it is clear that they require clarification or where it is a question of the correction of obvious clerical errors, subject, however, to the fulfilment of certain requirements (see, to that effect, in the context of tendering procedures under Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114), judgments of 29 March 2012, SAG ELV Slovensko and Others, C‑599/10, EU:C:2012:191, paragraphs 35 to 45, concerning the evaluation of offers stage, and of 10 October 2013, Manova, C‑336/12, EU:C:2013:647, paragraphs 30 to 39, concerning the stage of pre-selection of tenderers).

38. That guidance in relation to tenders can also be applied to applications filed at the screening stage for candidates in a restricted procedure.

11 THE FIRST IMPORTANT POINT TO NOTE IS THAT WHEN THE CONTRACT WAS ENTERED INTO IN 1973 THE PARTIES WERE FREE TO LEAVE THEIR DISPUTES TO BE RESOLVED BY THE ORDINARY COURTS OR TO OPT FOR ARBITRATION BY INSERTING A CLAUSE TO THAT EFFECT IN THE CONTRACT . FROM THE FACTS OF THE CASE IT APPEARS THAT THE PARTIES WERE UNDER NO OBLIGATION , WHETHER IN LAW OR IN FACT , TO REFER THEIR DISPUTES TO ARBITRATION .

51. By contrast, the Court has already held that compliance with the limitation period may not be raised by a European Union Court of its own motion but must be raised by the party affected (see, to that effect, Case 20/88 Roquette frères v Commission [1989] ECR 1553, paragraph 12).

12 Actions to establish non-contractual liability are governed, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 215 of the EEC Treaty, by the general principles common to the laws of the Member States . A comparison of the legal systems of the Member States shows that as a general rule, subject to very few exceptions, a court may not of its own motion raise the issue of time limitation .

107. En ce qui concerne, ensuite, les conditions de rémunération, ainsi qu’il ressort des points 93 à 97 du présent arrêt, il n’y a pas de lien de subordination dès lors que les registradores-liquidadores supportent le risque économique de leur activité, dans la mesure où le profit qu’ils en tirent dépend du montant des impôts recouvrés, des dépenses liées à l’organisation des moyens en personnel et en matériel de leur activité (voir, en ce sens, arrêts précités Commission/Pays-Bas, point 14, et Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, point 13), de l’efficacité des registradores-liquidadores et même, dans certains cas, du pourcentage des sanctions et amendes imposées et recouvrées dans l’exercice de l’activité du registrador-liquidador. Le fait que les frais généraux et les dépenses en matériel et en personnel de chaque bureau de liquidation sont à la charge des registradores-liquidadores titulaires desdits bureaux ressort clairement des informations fournies par le Royaume d’Espagne ainsi que de certaines conventions de collaboration conclues entre certaines Communautés autonomes et les collèges des «registradores» desdites Communautés.

27 The Court has repeatedly held that the right of establishment enshrined in Article 52 of the Treaty entails the right to set up and maintain, subject to observance of the rules of professional practice, more than one place of work within the Community (see, to that effect, Case 107/83 Klopp [1984] ECR 2971, paragraph 19, Case C-106/91 Ramrath [1992] ECR I-3351, paragraphs 20 to 22 and 28, and Case C-162/99 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-541, paragraph 20).

20 In order to rule on the merits of this complaint, it must be pointed out, first, that it is not disputed that where a Member State makes registration with the dental association, and therefore the practice by dentists of their profession, subject to the requirement that the persons concerned reside in the district of the professional association with which they seek registration, that constitutes a restriction on freedom of establishment and freedom of movement for workers in that such a requirement prevents dentists established or resident in another Member State from setting up a second dental surgery in the first State or practising as employees there (see, to that effect, in particular, Case C-106/91 Ramrath v Ministre de la Justice [1992] ECR I-3351, paragraphs 20 to 22 and 28).

29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26).

33. However, it is not appropriate for an action for annulment before the Community Court to be available to an individual who contests the validity of a measure of general application, such as a regulation, which does not distinguish him individually in the same way as an addressee, even if it could be shown, following an examination by that Court of the particular national procedural rules, that those rules do not allow the individual to bring proceedings to contest the validity of the Community measure at issue. Such an interpretation would require the Community Court, in each individual case, to examine and interpret national procedural law. That would go beyond its jurisdiction when reviewing the legality of Community measures (see Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council , paragraphs 37 and 43).

37 If that condition is not fulfilled, a natural or legal person does not, under any circumstances, have standing to bring an action for annulment of a regulation (see, in that regard, the order in CNPAAP v Council, cited above, paragraph 38).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

28. Article 3(2) of Directive 1999/44 lists the rights on which the consumer may rely against the seller in cases where there is a lack of conformity in the goods delivered. In the first place, under Article 3(3) of Directive 1999/44, the consumer has the right to require that the goods be brought into conformity. If that is not possible, he may subsequently, in accordance with Article 3(5) thereof, seek a reduction in the price or rescission of the contract (see Quelle , paragraph 27, and Gebr. Weber and Putz , paragraph 44). However, as is apparent from Article 3(6) of the directive, where the lack of conformity in the goods delivered is minor, the consumer is not entitled to have the contract rescinded and, in such a case, may request only an appropriate reduction in the price of the goods at issue.

27. Article 3(2) of the Directive lists the rights which the consumer may rely on against the seller in cases where the goods delivered are not in conformity. Initially, the consumer has the right to require the goods to be brought into conformity. If that is not possible, he may subsequently require a reduction in the price or rescission of the contract.

16 It follows that each time the question of classifying a specific item arises, it is first necessary to examine whether the item falls within one of the categories referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 and it is only when the answer to that question is in the negative that reference must be made to the general concept in paragraph 1(a ).

89. The Court points out that concerning, in this instance, decisions with important budgetary implications, it is in the interests both of the Member State concerned and of the Commission that the length of the procedure for financial corrections be predictable, which implies the setting of a predetermined time-limit for adopting the final decision. It should also be stated that failing to comply with the time-limit laid down for adopting a decision on financial corrections is not compatible with the general principle of sound administration (judgments in Spain v Commission , C‑192/13 P, EU:C:2014:2156, paragraph 88, and Spain v Commission , C‑197/13 P, EU:C:2014:2157, paragraph 88).

88. Concerning, in this case, decisions with important budgetary implications, it is in the interests both of the Member State concerned and of the Commission that the length of the procedure for financial corrections be predictable, which implies the setting of a predetermined time-limit for adopting the final decision. It should also be stated that failing to comply with the time-limit laid down for adopting a decision on financial corrections is not compatible with the general principle of sound administration.

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

35. National legislation which places certain Community nationals at a disadvantage simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State is a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 18(1) EC on every citizen of the Union (see, to that effect, Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] ECR I-6947, paragraph 39; Tas-Hagen and Tas , paragraph 31; and Nerkowska , paragraph 32).

32. National legislation which places certain of the nationals of the Member State concerned at a disadvantage simply because they have exercised their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State is a restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 18(1) EC on every citizen of the Union (Case C‑406/04 De Cuyper [2006] ECR I‑6947, paragraph 39, and Tas-Hagen and Tas , paragraph 31).

10 In replying to Question 1, it must first be borne in mind that the Court has consistently held that, since the concept of force majeure does not have the same scope in the various spheres of application of Community law, its meaning must be determined by reference to the legal context in which it is to operate.

64. As is apparent from Case 81/72 Commission v Council , paragraphs 3 and 4; Case 70/74 Commission v Council [1975] ECR 795, paragraph 7; and Case 59/81 Commission v Council , paragraph 8, the Council decided, first of all, in 1972, to apply, as an experiment and for a period of three years, a system of adjustment of remuneration involving recourse to two specific indices, while rejecting the automatic application of an arithmetical mean between the two indices which were adopted. In the light of that approach, the Court held that, by its decision, the Council, acting within the framework of the powers relating to the remunerations of the staff conferred on it by Article 65 of the Staff Regulations, assumed obligations which it has bound itself to observe for the period it has defined (see Case 81/72 Commission v Council , paragraphs 8 and 9; Case 70/74 Commission v Council , paragraphs 20 to 22; and Case 59/81 Commission v Council , paragraph 8).

21 THIS SYSTEM WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 5 JUNE 1973 IN CASE 81/72 COMMISSION V COUNCIL ( 1973 ) ECR 575 AS CONSTITUTING A LEGAL METHOD OF THE EXERCISE BY THE COUNCIL OF THE DISCRETION WHICH ARTICLE 65 GIVES IT AND AS COMMITTING THE INSTITUTION FOR THE PERIOD WHICH IT HAS LAID DOWN .

35. However, as soon as a Member State, either unilaterally or by way of a convention, imposes a charge to tax on the income, not only of resident shareholders, but also of non-resident shareholders, from dividends which they receive from a resident company, the situation of those non‑resident shareholders becomes comparable to that of resident shareholders ( Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation , paragraph 68).

42. Legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, according to its wording, applies without distinction to operators established in the Italian Republic and to operators established in other Member States, is generally likely to fall within the scope of the provisions on the fundamental freedoms established by the FEU Treaty only to the extent to which it applies to situations related to intra‑Community trade (see, to that effect, inter alia, Joined Cases C‑321/94 to C‑324/94 Pistre and Others [1997] ECR I‑2343, paragraph 45; Case C‑448/98 Guimont [2000] ECR I‑10663, paragraph 21; and Duomo Gpa and Others , paragraph 26 and the case‑law cited).

45 In such a situation, the application of the national measure may also have effects on the free movement of goods between Member States, in particular when the measure in question facilitates the marketing of goods of domestic origin to the detriment of imported goods. In such circumstances, the application of the measure, even if restricted to domestic producers, in itself creates and maintains a difference of treatment between those two categories of goods, hindering, at least potentially, intra-Community trade.

60 IN THIS REGARD, IT IS SUFFICIENT TO POINT OUT THAT THE COURT HAS ALREADY STATED ( SEE THE JUDGMENT OF 27 JANUARY 1981 IN CASE 1251/79 ITALIAN REPUBLIC V COMMISSION (( 1981 )) ECR 205 ) THAT DECISIONS CONCERNING THE CLEARANCE OF ACCOUNTS DO NOT REQUIRE DETAILED REASONS IF THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNED WAS CLOSELY INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS BY WHICH THE DECISION CAME ABOUT AND IS THEREFORE AWARE OF THE REASON FOR WHICH THE COMMISSION CONSIDERS THAT IT MUST NOT CHARGE THE SUMS IN DISPUTE TO THE EAGGF .

42. Finally, as regards the argument of that Member State that it is impossible to determine with certainty the amount of aid to be recovered, it must be recalled that, in situations involving the recovery of amounts of aid from a large number of undertakings in conjunction with numerous individual calculation parameters, the Court has held that such difficulties in implementing the relevant decisions did not constitute an absolute impossibility, within the meaning of the case-law cited (see, in particular, Case C-280/95 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-259, paragraphs 18 and 23, and Commission v Belgium , paragraphs 41 and 42). The documents before the Court do not show that the problems arising, in the present case, in calculating the amount of aid to be recovered are greater than those encountered in the situations that gave rise to the judgments cited above.

41 In this case, as the Advocate General noted in point 25 of his Opinion, the Belgian authorities in practice confined themselves to raising the difficulties of a technical and administrative nature which such recovery presented; those difficulties resulted essentially from the large number of undertakings concerned and from the need to determine the amount of aid - for each quarter - on the basis of the number of workers actually employed in those undertakings.

58 On the other hand, as communication of that form constitutes an essential formality, intended to safeguard the rights of defence of the addressee of the act, its omission must be corrected by the receiving agency in accordance with the provisions laid down by Regulation No 1393/2007. The receiving agency must therefore immediately inform the addressee of the document of his right to refuse to accept it, by submitting to him, pursuant to Article 8(1) of that regulation, that standard form (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 September 2015, Alpha Bank Cyprus, C‑519/13, EU:C:2015:603, paragraphs 67, 70, 72 and 74, and order of 28 April 2016, Alta Realitat, C‑384/14, EU:C:2016:316, paragraph 71).

37. More specifically, the Court has taken that step only in quite specific circumstances, where there was a risk of serious economic repercussions owing in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in good faith on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force and where it appeared that individuals and national authorities had been led to adopt practices which did not comply with Union legislation by reason of objective, significant uncertainty regarding the implications of Union provisions, to which the conduct of other Member States or the Commission may even have contributed (see, inter alia, Case C‑423/04 Richards [2006] ECR I‑3585, paragraph 42, and Brzeziński , paragraph 57).

42. The Court has taken that step only in quite specific circumstances, where there was a risk of serious economic repercussions owing in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in good faith on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force and where it appeared that individuals and national authorities had been led to adopt practices which did not comply with Community legislation by reason of objective, significant uncertainty regarding the implications of Community provisions, to which the conduct of other Member States or the Commission of the European Communities may even have contributed ( Bidar , paragraph 69).

26. Moreover, a system under which the amount of the penalties imposed in Article 9 of that regulation varies in accordance with the amount of undeclared cash does not seem, in principle, to be disproportionate in itself.

28. In such circumstances Directive 93/42 must reconcile the free movement of medical devices with the protection of patients’ health (see, to that effect, Case C‑6/05 Medipac-Kazantzidis [2007] ECR I‑4557, paragraph 52).

52. In that context, the need to reconcile the free movement of those devices with the protection of patients’ health implies that, in the event of the emergence of a risk linked to devices which have been certified as being in compliance with Directive 93/42, the Member State concerned must implement the safeguard procedure provided for in Article 8 of that directive; bodies which are not empowered to do so may not themselves decide unilaterally on the action to be taken in such circumstances.

102. As regards the fourth and final allegation, it is common ground that it was not raised by the Kingdom of Belgium until the reply stage. However, the lack or inadequacy of a statement of reasons such as to impede judicial review by the Community judicature constitutes a matter of public interest which may, and even must, be raised by that judicature of its own motion (Case C-166/95 P Commission v Daffix [1997] ECR I-983, paragraph 24). It is therefore also appropriate to examine that last allegation.

43 Thus, if a Member State refuses tax benefits linked to the taking into account of personal and family circumstances to a taxpayer who works but does not reside in its territory whilst granting them to resident taxpayers, the Court has held that there is discrimination where the non-resident receives all or almost all of his worldwide income in that State since the income received in the State in which he resides is insufficient to allow his personal and family circumstances to be taken into account. The situations of the two categories of taxpayer are in that case comparable with regard to the taking into account of their personal and family circumstances (Schumacker, paragraphs 36, 37 and 38).

37 There is no objective difference between the situations of such a non-resident and a resident engaged in comparable employment, such as to justify different treatment as regards the taking into account for taxation purposes of the taxpayer' s personal and family circumstances.

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

40 So far as concerns State aid specifically, in addition to the undertaking in receipt of aid, competing undertakings have been recognised as being individually concerned by a Commission decision terminating a procedure initiated under Article 93(2) of the Treaty with regard to individual aid, where those undertakings have played an significant role in that procedure, provided that their position on the market is significantly affected by the aid which is the subject of the decision at issue (see the judgment in Cofaz and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 25).

25 THE SAME CONCLUSIONS APPLY TO UNDERTAKINGS WHICH HAVE PLAYED A COMPARABLE ROLE IN THE PROCEDURE REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 93 OF THE EEC TREATY PROVIDED , HOWEVER , THAT THEIR POSITION ON THE MARKET IS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED BY THE AID WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THE CONTESTED DECISION . ARTICLE 93 ( 2 ) RECOGNIZES IN GENERAL TERMS THAT THE UNDERTAKINGS CONCERNED ARE ENTITLED TO SUBMIT THEIR COMMENTS TO THE COMMISSION BUT DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY FURTHER DETAILS .

57. In those circumstances, it is precisely in order to ensure that that symmetry is actually observed that the rule identified by the case-law of the Court — that it is the substantive legal basis of a measure that determines the procedures to be followed in adopting that measure (see Parliament v Council EU:C:2012:472, paragraph 80) — applies not only to the procedures laid down for adopting an internal act but also to those applicable to the conclusion of international agreements.

25 It is therefore important that the national court should set out, in particular, the precise reasons which led it to question the validity of certain provisions of EU law and set out the grounds of invalidity which, consequently, appear to it capable of being upheld (see to that effect, inter alia, judgment in Greenpeace France and Others, C‑6/99, EU:C:2000:148, paragraph 55, and order in Adiamix, C‑368/12, EU:C:2013:257, paragraph 22). Such a requirement also arises under Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court.

55 It follows that, where the national court finds that, owing to irregularities in the conduct of the examination of the notification by the competent national authority provided for in Article 12(1) of Directive 90/220, it was not proper for that authority to forward the dossier with a favourable opinion to the Commission as provided for in paragraph 2 of that provision, that court must refer the matter to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling if it considers that those irregularities are such as to affect the validity of the Commission's favourable decision, setting out the reasons for which it believes that the decision must be held to be invalid and, if necessary, ordering suspension of application of the measures for implementing that decision until the Court of Justice has ruled on the question of validity (see, to this effect, the judgment in Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest [1991] ECR I-415, paragraph 24).

68. That intention is not, on the other hand, always present in the case of advertising by means of the internet. Since this method of communication inherently has a worldwide reach, advertising on a website by a trader is in principle accessible in all States, and, therefore, throughout the European Union, without any need to incur additional expenditure and irrespective of the intention or otherwise of the trader to target consumers outside the territory of the State in which it is established.

42. The aim of obliging the State concerned to abolish aid found by the Commission to be incompatible with the common market is to restore the previous situation, and that objective is attained once the aid in question, increased where appropriate by default interest, has been repaid by the recipient. By repaying the aid, the recipient forfeits the advantage which it had enjoyed over its competitors on the market, and the situation prior to payment of the aid is restored (see, in particular, Case C-350/93 Commission v Italy [1995] ECR I-699, paragraphs 21 and 22, and Case C-310/99 Italy v Commission , paragraphs 98 and 99).

99 By repaying the aid, the recipient forfeits the advantage which it had enjoyed over its competitors on the market, and the situation prior to payment of the aid is restored (Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 22). It also follows from that function of repayment of aid that, as a general rule, the Commission will not, save in exceptional circumstances, exceed the bounds of its discretion, recognised by the case-law of the Court, if it asks the Member State to recover the sums granted by way of unlawful aid, since it is only restoring the previous situation (Belgium v Commission, cited above, paragraph 66).

15 THIS RESTRICTION ON THE SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONS IN QUESTION MUST HOWEVER REMAIN LIMITED TO ITS PROPER OBJECTIVE .

30 The Court has consistently held that every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule (Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 21).

21IT FOLLOWS FROM THE FOREGOING THAT EVERY NATIONAL COURT MUST , IN A CASE WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION , APPLY COMMUNITY LAW IN ITS ENTIRETY AND PROTECT RIGHTS WHICH THE LATTER CONFERS ON INDIVIDUALS AND MUST ACCORDINGLY SET ASIDE ANY PROVISION OF NATIONAL LAW WHICH MAY CONFLICT WITH IT , WHETHER PRIOR OR SUBSEQUENT TO THE COMMUNITY RULE .

38. Ainsi que la Cour l’a itérativement jugé, même si la juridiction de renvoi a limité sa demande de décision préjudicielle à l’interprétation de la libre circulation des travailleurs, une telle circonstance ne fait pas obstacle à ce que la Cour fournisse à la juridiction nationale tous les éléments d’interprétation du droit de l’Union pouvant être utiles au jugement de l’affaire dont elle est saisie, que cette juridiction y ait fait ou non référence dans l’énoncé de sa question (voir en ce sens, notamment, arrêts du 21 février 2006, Ritter-Coulais, C‑152/03, Rec. p. I‑1711, point 29, et du 23 avril 2009, Rüffler, C‑544/07, Rec. p. I‑3389, point 57).

154. As regards, second, the purported infringement of the fundamental right to fair legal process and the principle of good administration, it should be noted that, while the Commission may not be classified as a ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Landewyck and Others v Commission [1980] ECR I‑3125, paragraph 81, and Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission , paragraph 7), it is nevertheless required during the administrative procedure to respect the fundamental rights of the European Union, which include the right to good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter. In particular, it is that provision, not Article 47 of the Charter, which governs the administrative procedure relating to restrictive practices before the Commission (see, to that effect, Case C‑109/10 P Solvay v Commission [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 53, and Case C‑110/10 P Solvay v Commission [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 48).

48. By the first part of the fifth ground of appeal, Solvay claims that the General Court did not address Solvay’s argument that it should have been heard before the contested decision was adopted, notwithstanding Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission , since the administrative proceeding had been affected by irregularities, stemming from the lack of access to the file at a stage prior to the decision’s adoption, which affected the validity of the preparatory measures for the decision, and since those irregularities had been established by the General Court before the contested decision was adopted, in Case T‑30/91 Solvay v Commission .

20. Taking into account, firstly, that it follows from Article 2(1) of the Sixth Directive that every transaction must normally be regarded as distinct and independent and, secondly, that a transaction which comprises a single supply from an economic point of view should not be artificially split, so as not to distort the functioning of the VAT system, the essential features of the transaction must in the first place be ascertained in order to determine whether the taxable person is making to the customer, being a typical consumer, several distinct principal supplies or a single supply (see, by analogy, CPP , paragraph 29).

25 In Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretais van Justitie [1990] ECR I-3461, paragraphs 14 and 15, the Court held that the same criteria apply in determining whether the provisions of a decision of the EEC-Turkey Association Council can have direct effect.

14 In order to be recognized as having direct effect, the provisions of a decision of the Council of Association must satisfy the same conditions as those applicable to the provisions of the Agreement itself .

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

33. The Court has consistently held that the need for a uniform application of European Union law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of European Union law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the objective of the relevant legislation (see, inter alia, Case 327/82 Ekro [1984] ECR 107, paragraph 11; Case C-287/98 Linster [2000] ECR I-6917, paragraph 43; and judgment of 22 March 2012 in Case C-190/10 Génesis , paragraph 40).

11 THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY LAW AND THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY REQUIRE THAT THE TERMS OF A PROVISION OF COMMUNITY LAW WHICH MAKES NO EXPRESS REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF THE MEMBER STATES FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING ITS MEANING AND SCOPE MUST NORMALLY BE GIVEN AN INDEPENDENT AND UNIFORM INTERPRETATION THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY ; THAT INTERPRETATION MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONTEXT OF THE PROVISION AND THE PURPOSE OF THE RELEVANT REGULATIONS .

31. As an exception to the prohibition on imposing specific obligations on operators individually, the obligations which may be imposed under the Universal Service Directive on undertakings designated in accordance with Article 8(1) thereof to provide universal service are to be interpreted strictly.

31. With regard to consumer protection, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court on the special rules introduced by the provisions of the Brussels Convention, transposable to the equivalent provisions of Regulation No 44/2001, that those rules serve to ensure adequate protection for the consumer, as the party deemed to be economically weaker and less experienced in legal matters than the other, professional, party to the contract (see, to that effect, judgments in Česká spořitelna, C‑419/11, EU:C:2013:165, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited, and in Kolassa , C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

21. At the outset, it should be recalled, first, that in so far as Regulation No 44/2001 now replaces the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36) as amended by the successive conventions relating to the accession of new Member States to that convention, the interpretation provided by the Court in respect of the provisions of the Brussels Convention is valid also for those of the regulation whenever the provisions of those instruments may be regarded as equivalent (see judgment in Maletic , C‑478/12, EU:C:2013:735, paragraph 27 and case-law cited).

35. As regards the argument that the French rules on television advertising have the result that television advertising for alcoholic beverages is authorised where the French audience is overall very high (multinational events), but prohibited where the French audience is not so high (bi-national events), it is sufficient to observe that by limiting the prohibition to indirect advertising broadcast during the retransmission of sporting events which specifically target a French audience and when the advertising is therefore capable of specifically targeting that audience alone, the rules can only make the measure less prejudicial to the freedom to provide services and, therefore, more proportionate to the objective pursued.

22. As regards the question whether national legislation falls within the scope of one or other of the freedoms of movement, it is clear from what is now well established case-law that the purpose of the legislation concerned must be taken into consideration (see, to that effect, Case C‑196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas [2006] ECR I‑7995, paragraphs 31 to 33; Case C‑452/04 Fidium Finanz [2006] ECR I‑9521, paragraphs 34 and 44 to 49; Case C‑374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 37 and 38; Case C‑446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 36; and Case C‑524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation [2007 ] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 26 to 34).

30. In the second place, in the case of the amendments made in 1998, the legislation at issue applies only where the two companies in question are subject to common control in the sense that one of them participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital or the other company concerned or a third party participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of both the other companies concerned.

31 With regard to the first paragraph of Article 17 of that convention, which was replaced by Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, the Court held that a jurisdiction clause, which serves a procedural purpose, is governed by the provisions of that convention, whose aim is to establish uniform rules of international jurisdiction (judgment of 3 July 1997 in Benincasa, C‑269/95, EU:C:1997:337, paragraph 25).

40. It should be noted at the outset that the principle of mutual trust between the Member States, which is of fundamental importance in EU law, requires, particularly with regard to the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law (see, to that effect, Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 191 and the case-law cited). As is stated in recital 16 in the preamble to Regulation No 44/2001, the rules of recognition and enforcement laid down by that regulation are based, precisely, on mutual trust in the administration of justice in the European Union. Such trust requires, inter alia, that judicial decisions delivered in one Member State should be recognised automatically in another Member State (see judgment in flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines , C‑302/13, EU:C:2014:2319, paragraph 45).

45. First of all, it must be noted, as is stated in recitals 16 and 17 in the preamble to Regulation No 44/2001, that the rules on recognition and enforcement laid down by that regulation are based on mutual trust in the administration of justice in the European Union. Such trust requires that judicial decisions delivered in one Member State are not only recognised automatically in another Member State, but also that the procedure for making those decisions enforceable in that Member State is efficient and rapid. Such a procedure, according to the terms of recital 17 in the preamble to that regulation, must involve only a purely formal check of the documents required for enforceability in the Member State in which enforcement is sought (see, to that effect, judgment in Prism Investments , C‑139/10, EU:C:2011:653, paragraphs 27 and 28).

42. Toutefois, cette répartition de la compétence fiscale ne permet pas aux États membres d’appliquer des mesures contraires aux libertés de circulation garanties par le traité FUE. En effet, en ce qui concerne l’exercice du pouvoir d’imposition ainsi réparti dans le cadre de conventions bilatérales préventives de la double imposition, les États membres sont tenus de se conformer aux règles de l’Union (arrêts précités de Groot, point 94; Renneberg, points 50 et 51, ainsi que Beker, points 33 et 34).

55. The general principle of equal treatment, of which the principle of fiscal neutrality is the reflection in matters relating to VAT (see Case C-309/06 Marks & Spencer [2008] ECR I-2283, paragraph 49; Case C-174/08 NCC Construction Danmark [2009] ECR I-10567, paragraphs 41 and 44; and Joined Cases C-259/10 and C-260/10 The Rank Group [2011] I-10947, paragraph 61), requires similar situations not to be treated differently unless differentiation is objectively justified (see Marks & Spencer , paragraph 51; NCC Construction Danmark , paragraph 44; and Case C-285/10 Campsa Estaciones de Servicio [2011] ECR I-5059, paragraph 29).

51. In this connection, the general principle of equal treatment requires that similar situations are not treated differently unless differentiation is objectively justified (Joined Cases 201/85 and 202/85 Klensch and Others [1986] ECR 3477, paragraph 9, and Idéal tourisme , paragraph 35).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

36. However, the Court has held that the additional levy is not to be regarded as a penalty analogous to those provided for under Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation No 536/93 of 9 March 1993 laying down detailed rules on the application of the additional levy on milk and milk products (OJ 1993 L 57, p. 12) (see Joined Cases C-231/00, C‑303/00 and C-451/00 Cooperativa Lattepiù and Others [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 74, and Joined Cases C-480/00 to C-482/00, C-484/00, C‑489/00 to C‑491/00 and C-497/00 to C-499/00 Azienda Agricola Ettore Ribaldi and Others [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 58).

74. It follows that, contrary to the arguments of the applicants in the main proceedings, the additional levy is not to be regarded as a penalty analogous to those provided for under Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation No 536/93. The additional levy on milk amounts to a restriction arising from market policy rules or structural policy (see, to that effect, Case C-177/90 Kühn [1992] ECR I-35, paragraph 13).

Par conséquent, si la lettre de mise en demeure a pour but de circonscrire l’objet du litige, lequel ne peut plus être étendu par la suite, l’avis motivé et la requête devant reposer sur les mêmes griefs, la Commission est toutefois libre de se fonder par la suite sur des mesures ultérieures qui s’apparentent, pour l’essentiel, aux mesures contestées dans la mise en demeure (voir, en ce sens, arrêts et du 18 mai 2006, Commission/Espagne, C‑221/04, non publié, EU:C:2006:329, point 37, du 6 septembre 2012, Commission/Portugal, C‑38/10, non publié, EU:C:2012:521, point 15, du 25 février 2016, Commission/Espagne, C‑454/14, non publié, EU:C:2016:117, point 25).

26. According to established case-law, the taxation of leasing and letting transactions is a power which the Community legislature has conferred on the Member States in derogation from the general rule established in Article 13(B)(b) of the Sixth Directive, according to which leasing and letting transactions are exempt from VAT. The right to deduct attached to that taxation does not therefore operate automatically in that context, but only if the Member States have made use of the power under Article 13(C) of the Sixth Directive and subject to the taxable persons exercising the right of option allowed to them (see Case C‑269/03 Vermietungsgesellschaft Objekt Kirchberg [2004] ECR I‑8067, paragraph 20).

20. It is clear from those provisions that the taxation of leasing and letting transactions is a power which the legislature has conferred on the Member States in derogation from the general rule established in Article 13(B)(b) of the Sixth Directive, according to which leasing and letting transactions are, as a rule, exempt. The right to deduct does not therefore operate automatically in that context but only if the Member States have made use of the power under Article 13(C) of the Sixth Directive and subject to the taxpayers exercising the right of option allowed to them.

72. It is also settled case-law that the restoration of the previous situation and the elimination of the distortion of competition resulting from the unlawfully paid aid may in principle be achieved through registration of the liability relating to the repayment of the aid in question in the schedule of liabilities (see, to that effect, Case 52/84 Commission v Belgium [1986] ECR 89, paragraph 14; Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission , [1990] ECR I-959, ‘ Tubemeuse ’, paragraphs 60 to 62; Case C-277/00 Germany v Commission [2004] ECR I-3925, paragraph 85; and Case C-331/09 Commission v Poland [2011] ECR I-2933, paragraph 60).

20 Having regard to the foregoing considerations, it is necessary to establish whether public placement offices such as those referred to in Article 11(1) of Law No 264 may be regarded as undertakings within the meaning of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty (see Höfner and Elser, cited above, paragraph 20).

33 A potential effect of that kind on trade between Member States arises in particular where executive recruitment by private companies may extend to the nationals or to the territory of other Member States.

71. En particulier, un acte faisant grief est suffisamment motivé dès lors qu’il est intervenu dans un contexte connu de l’intéressé, qui lui permet de comprendre la portée de la mesure prise à son égard (arrêt Conseil/Bamba, précité, point 54).

73 As stated in paragraph 61 above, customs authorities enjoy broad discretion in conducting subsequent checks and in regularising the situation appropriately (see, inter alia, judgment of 10 December 2015, Veloserviss, C‑427/14, EU:C:2015:803, paragraphs 27 and 28).

28. It follows that Article 78(3) of the Customs Code must be interpreted as meaning that, within the framework of the obligations it imposes on the customs authorities, as a rule it allows those authorities to revise or conduct a post-clearance examination of a customs declaration and to regularise the situation by fixing a new customs debt.

35. Furthermore, the Court has held previously that barter contracts, under which the consideration is by definition in kind, and transactions for which the consideration is in money are, economically and commercially speaking, two identical situations (see, to that effect, Case C-330/95 Goldsmiths [1997] ECR I-3801, paragraphs 23 and 25).

41. The framework agreement, in particular clause 4 thereof, aims to apply the principle of non-discrimination to fixed-term workers in order to prevent an employer using such an employment relationship to deny those workers rights which are recognised for permanent workers (judgments in Del Cerro Alonso , C‑307/05, EU:C:2007:509, paragraph 37; Gavieiro Gavieiro and Iglesias Torres , C‑444/09 and C‑456/09, EU:C:2010:819, paragraph 48; and Nierodzik , C‑38/13, EU:C:2014:152, paragraph 23; and orders in Montoya Medina , C‑273/10, EU:C:2011:167, paragraph 30, and Lorenzo Martínez , C‑556/11, EU:C:2012:67, paragraph 35).

48. The framework agreement, in particular clause 4, aims to apply that principle to fixed-term workers in order to prevent an employer using such an employment relationship to deny those workers rights which are recognised for permanent workers ( Del Cerro Alonso , paragraph 37).

20 ACCORDINGLY IT IS NOT ONLY THE FAMILY SITUATION OF THE WORKER THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT , BUT ALSO THE REASONS WHICH HAVE LED HIM TO MOVE , AND THE NATURE OF THE WORK .

35. Indeed, it is apparent from the Court’s well established case-law that the text of Article 81(1) EC refers generally to all agreements and concerted practices which, in either horizontal or vertical relationships, distort competition on the common market, irrespective of the market on which the parties operate, and that only the commercial conduct of one of the parties need be affected by the terms of the arrangements in question (see, to that effect, judgments in LTM , 56/65, EU:C:1966:38, p. 358; Consten and Grundig v Commission , 56/64 and 58/64, EU:C:1966:41, p.p. 492 and 493; Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission , 100/80 to 103/80, EU:C:1983:158, paragraphs 72 to 80; Binon , 243/83, EU:C:1985:284, paragraphs 39 to 47; and Javico , C‑306/96, EU:C:1998:173, paragraphs 10 to 14).

41 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY , WHICH TOOK PART IN THE PROCEEDINGS SOLELY IN ORDER TO SUBMIT OBSERVATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE THIRD QUESTION , CONSIDERS THAT THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS , AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE MEMBER STATES AND BY THE COURT ' S CASE-LAW , ENTAILS THE FREEDOM TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORMATION OF PUBLIC OPINION . FOR THAT REASON NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS AS WELL AS THEIR DISTRIBUTION HAVE SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS . THE NATURE OF NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS REQUIRES AN EXTREMELY RAPID SYSTEM FOR THEIR DISTRIBUTION IN VIEW OF THE VERY LIMITED PERIOD DURING WHICH THEY CAN BE SOLD BEFORE THEY ARE OUT OF DATE ; AT THE END OF THAT PERIOD , THE LENGTH OF WHICH VARIES ACCORDING TO THE SPECIFIC PUBLICATION IN QUESTION , NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS HAVE PRACTICALLY NO VALUE . TO THOSE FACTORS MUST BE ADDED THE HETEROGENEITY OF NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS AND THE LACK OF ELASTICITY IN DEMAND SINCE EACH NEWSPAPER OR PERIODICAL HAS MORE OR LESS ITS OWN BODY OF CUSTOMERS .

43. It follows that Article 6(2) of Directive 2000/78 applies only to occupational social security schemes covering the risks of old age and invalidity.

40 That is the case since the decision of a Turkish national to establish himself in a Member State in order there to exercise a stable economic activity could be negatively affected where the legislation of that Member State makes family reunification difficult or impossible, so that that national could, as the case may be, find himself obliged to choose between his activity in the Member State concerned and his family life in Turkey (see, to that effect, judgment in Dogan, C‑138/13, EU:C:2014:2066, paragraph 35).

35. The decision of a Turkish national to establish himself in a Member State in order to exercise there a stable economic activity could be negatively affected where the legislation of that Member State makes family reunification difficult or impossible, so that that national could, as the case may be, find himself obliged to choose between his activity in the Member State concerned and his family life in Turkey.

29. Il convient de constater que, dans un tel contexte, l’intervention du Roi dans la détermination d’éléments importants pour la fixation des tarifs, tels que la marge bénéficiaire, soustrait à la CREG les compétences de réglementation qui, en vertu de l’article 23, paragraphe 2, sous a), de la directive, devraient lui revenir.

49. Finally, with regard to determining the object of the agreements at issue in the main proceedings with respect to the car repair service market, it is necessary to take account of the fact that those agreements appear to have been concluded on the basis of ‘recommended prices’ established in the three decisions taken by GÉMOSZ from 2003 to 2005. In that context, it is for the referring court to determine the exact nature and scope of those decisions (see, to that effect, Case C‑260/07 Pedro IV Servicios [2009] ECR I‑2437, paragraphs 78 and 79).

79. In the light of the division of jurisdiction between the national courts and the Court of Justice in the context of the cooperation established by Article 234 EC, it is for the referring court, which alone has direct knowledge of the dispute before it, to assess the manner in which the retail price was fixed in the case in the main proceedings. It is for it, in particular, to ascertain, account being taken of all the contractual obligations in their commercial and legal context, and if the conduct of the parties to the main proceedings, whether the retail price recommended by the supplier constitutes, in reality, a fixed or minimum sale price (see, to that effect, CEPSA , paragraphs 67 and 70).

81. Pour soutenir sa proposition de cumul des sanctions, la Commission se serait bornée à citer l’arrêt Commission/Italie (C-496/09, EU:C:2011:740) qui, cependant, présentait des caractéristiques tout à fait différentes. En particulier, la décision de la Commission en cause dans ledit arrêt aurait été très claire dans la détermination des aides qui devaient être récupérées, de telle sorte que le temps écoulé avant de parvenir à des résultats significatifs de récupération pouvait, en tant que tel, être considéré comme une forme de manquement.

74. It is settled case-law that it is irrelevant that the failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations is the result of technical difficulties it encounters (see, in particular, Case C-152/98 Commission vNetherlands , cited above, paragraph 41, and Case C-364/00 Commission vNetherlands [2002] ECR I-4177, paragraph 10).

41 The Netherlands Government does not deny that it had not set quality objectives for titanium, boron, uranium, tellurium, silver and the substances falling within the fourth category at the date on which the period laid down in the reasoned opinion expired. As the Court has held, it is irrelevant whether the failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations is the result of technical difficulties encountered by it (see, in particular, Case C-71/97 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-5991, paragraph 15, and Case C-333/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-1025, paragraph 36).

31 It follows that reinforced protection of a trade mark's distinctive character or reputation against certain uses of a sign other than for the purpose of distinguishing goods or services is not covered by Community harmonisation.

60. It should be noted in this connection that, even if — in order to ensure full compliance with the Court’s judgment — the penalty payment should be payable in its entirety until such time as the Member State has taken all the measures necessary to bring to an end the failure to fulfil obligations established, nevertheless, in certain specific cases, a penalty which takes account of the progress that the Member State may have made in complying with its obligations may be envisaged (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission v Spain , EU:C:2003:635, paragraphs 43 to 51; in Commission v Italy , EU:C:2011:740, paragraphs 47 to 55; and in Commission v Belgium , EU:C:2013:659, paragraphs 73 and 74).

48. As regards the invariable nature of the amount of the penalty payment proposed by the Commission, it appears that it will be particularly difficult for the Italian Republic in the short term to reach full compliance with Decision 2000/128, and hence with the judgment in Case C‑99/02 Commission v Italy , in view of the fact that the operations involved relate to a large number of undertakings.

29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26).

26. At the outset, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the terms used to specify the exemptions in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly. However, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives underlying those exemptions and must comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. Accordingly, that requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 13 must be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effects (see, inter alia, judgment in Zimmermann , C‑174/11, EU:C:2012:716, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

22. As is clear from settled case‑law, the terms used to specify the exemptions in Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly. Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives underlying the exemptions and must comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. Accordingly, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 13 must be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effects (see inter alia, to that effect, Case C‑445/05 Haderer [2007] ECR I‑4841, paragraph 18 and the case‑law cited; Case C‑461/08 Don Bosco Onroerend Goed [2009] ECR I‑11079, paragraph 25 and the case‑law cited; and Case C‑262/08 CopyGene ECR [2010] ECR I‑5053, paragraph 26).

119 By his eleventh ground of appeal, the appellant disputes paragraphs 172 to 175 of the contested judgment on the ground that the Court of First Instance failed to answer various arguments capable of establishing that the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated by a misuse of powers. The arguments relied on concerned parallel proceedings, the failure to reply to the question concerning the exact scope of the disciplinary proceedings in relation to Articles 11, 12 and 17 of the Staff Regulations, the absence of a logical connection between the premisses and the conclusions drawn in relation to the disciplinary proceedings, the fact that the Commission maintained in its pleadings that the Disciplinary Board was not even obliged to read the contested book and the deliberate and provocative appointment of the Secretary-General as Chairman of the Disciplinary Board.

30. It is clear from the case-law of the Court that those institutions are obliged, under Decisions 93/731 and 94/90 respectively, and in accordance with the principle of proportionality, to examine whether partial access should be granted to the information not covered by the exceptions, in the absence of which a decision refusing access to a document must be annulled as being vitiated by an error of law (in connection with Decision 93/731, see Council v Hautala , paragraphs 21 to 31).

23 It is therefore apparent even from the context in which Decision 93/731 was adopted that the Council and the Spanish Government are wrong in submitting that that decision concerns only access to documents as such rather than to the information contained in them.

16. National legislation which does not take into account, for the calculation of the amount of parental benefit, periods of employment completed under the Joint Sickness Insurance Scheme of the European Communities is likely to dissuade citizens of a Member State from working within an institution of the European Union situated in another Member State since by accepting employment with such an institution they lose the right to benefit under the national sickness insurance scheme from family benefits to which they would have been entitled had they not accepted that employment (see to that effect, My , paragraph 47).

22. With regard, more specifically, to the admissibility of the fourth question, it must be noted that, admittedly, the possibility for a litigant to plead before the court hearing its action the invalidity of provisions in European Union acts presupposes that the party in question had no right of direct action under Article 263 TFEU by which it could challenge provisions the consequences of which it is suffering without having been able to seek their annulment (see TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf , paragraph 23, and Case C‑550/09 E and F [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 45 and 46).

45. It follows that, in proceedings before the national courts, every party has the right to plead before the court hearing the case the illegality of the provisions contained in legislative acts of the European Union which serve as the basis for a decision or act of national law relied upon against him and to prompt that court, which does not have jurisdiction itself to make a finding of such illegality, to put that question to the Court by means of a reference for a preliminary ruling (see, to that effect, Cases C‑239/99 Nachi Europe [2001] ECR I‑1197, paragraph 35, and Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council , paragraph 40).

31. Since the parent company is at liberty to decide to form a tax entity with its subsidiary and, with equal liberty, to dissolve such an entity from one year to the next, the possibility of including a non-resident subsidiary in the single tax entity would be tantamount to granting the parent company the freedom to choose the tax scheme applicable to the losses of that subsidiary and the place where those losses are taken into account.

49. According to equally well-established case-law, whilst EU law does not detract from the power of the Member States to organise their social security systems and whilst, in the absence of harmonisation at EU level, it is for the legislation of each Member State to determine the conditions for the grant of social security benefits, the fact nevertheless remains that, when exercising that power, Member States must comply with EU law and, in particular, with the provisions on the freedom to provide services (see, to that effect, in particular, Kohll , paragraphs 17 to 21; Case C-208/07 von Chamier-Glisczinski [2009] ECR I-6095, paragraph 63; and Case C-490/09 Commission v Luxembourg [2011] ECR I-247, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

19 As the Advocate General observes in points 17 to 25 of his Opinion, the Member States must nevertheless comply with Community law when exercising those powers.

54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.

25 By virtue of Article 29 of the Customs Code, the customs value of imported goods is the transaction value, that is to say, the price actually paid or payable for the goods when they are sold for export to the customs territory of the European Union, adjusted, where necessary, in accordance with Articles 32 and 33 thereof (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 December 2013, Christodoulou and Others, C‑116/12, EU:C:2013:825, paragraph 38, and of 16 June 2016, EURO 2004. Hungary, C‑291/15, EU:C:2016:455, paragraph 24).

24 In particular, as is apparent from paragraph 38 of the judgment of 12 December 2013 in Christodoulou and Others (C‑116/12, EU:C:2013:825), by virtue of Article 29 of the Customs Code, the customs value of imported goods is the transaction value, that is to say, the price actually paid or payable for the goods when they are sold for export to the customs territory of the European Union, adjusted, where necessary, in accordance with Articles 32 and 33 of that code.

16 In those circumstances, loss of entitlement to the aid, which flows from non-compliance with that obligation, is not disproportionate in relation to the objective which the Community legislature has sought to attain .

66. La Commission propose l’imposition tant d’une astreinte que d’une somme forfaitaire pour les mêmes raisons que celles exposées dans l’arrêt Commission/Italie (C‑496/09, EU:C:2011:740, points 42 à 45 et 82 à 92).

32. Moreover, while it is true that the Italian Republic needed a longer period of time for identifying the recipients and the amount of the aid granted under a scheme that had been declared incompatible with the common market than if only an individual grant of aid had been concerned, that being a factor which may be taken into account in determining the basic amount of the penalty payment, it does not appear from the explanations provided by the Italian Republic that, as required for compliance with a judgment finding a failure to fulfil obligations in such a case, all the measures taken with a view to recovering the aid in question were the subject of permanent and effective monitoring.

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

60. In so far as concerns the first and second parts of the first ground of appeal, the Court notes that the question whether the grounds of a judgment of the General Court are incoherent is indeed a question of law which may be raised on appeal, since the statement of the reasons on which a judgment is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose the General Court’s reasoning (see, to that effect, the order of 29 November 2011 in Case C‑235/11 P Evropäiki Dynamiki v Commission [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 29 and 30, and the judgment of 19 December 2012 in Case C‑314/11 P Commission v Planet [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 63 and 64).

64. According to settled case-law, the statement of the reasons on which a judgment is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose the General Court’s thinking, so that the persons concerned can be apprised of the justification for the decision taken and the Court of Justice can exercise its power of review (see Case C-259/96 P Council v de Nil and Impens [1998] I-2915, paragraphs 32 and 33, and Case C-449/98 P IECC v Commission [2001] ECR I-3875, paragraph 70).

16 That interpretation is justified by the purpose of the rules in question, which is to facilitate the transport of goods within the Community by simplifying and standardizing the formalities to be carried out when internal frontiers are crossed . The question referred for a preliminary ruling

25. As regards the purpose of those provisions, it must be recalled that, in establishing Annex III to the VAT Directive, the EU legislature intended that essential commodities and goods and services having social or cultural objectives may be subject to a reduced rate of VAT, provided that those goods or services pose little or no risk of distortion to competition (see, to that effect, the judgment in Commission v Netherlands , C‑41/09, EU:C:2011:108, paragraph 52).

52. With regard to the purpose of point 1 of Annex III, it should be noted that, in response to a written question asked by the Court, the Commission stated, without being contradicted on that point by the other parties, that the EU legislature, by drawing up Annex H to the Sixth Directive, intended that essential commodities and goods and services having social or cultural objectives may be subject to a reduced rate of VAT, provided that those goods or services pose no or little risk of distortion to competition.

50 Consequently, the third plea must be rejected, it being unnecessary to examine the other charges made by the French Government in support of it.

62. In paragraphs 24 and 25 of Case C-300/03 Honeywell Aerospace [2005] ECR I‑0000, the Court held that it follows from the very wording of Articles 378(1) and 379(2) of the implementing regulation that notification by the office of departure to the principal of the time-limit by which the proof requested must be furnished is mandatory and must precede recovery of the customs debt. The time-limit is intended to protect the interests of the principal by allowing him three months in which to furnish, where appropriate, proof of the regularity of the transit operation or the place where the offence or irregularity was actually committed. In those circumstances, the Member State to which the office of departure belongs may recover import duties only if, in particular, it has indicated to the princ ipal that he has three months in which to furnish the proof requested and such proof has not been provided within that period.

25. In those circumstances, the Member State to which the office of departure belongs may recover import duties only if, in particular, it has indicated to the principal that he has three months in which to furnish the proof requested and such proof has not been provided within that period (see, by analogy, Case C-233/98 Lensing & Brockhausen [1999] ECR I-7349, paragraph 31). Under Article 221(3) of the Customs Code, the amount of the customs debt must, in any event, have been notified within the limitation period of three years from when the debt was incurred.

13 FINALLY, IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE APPLICATION OF PROTOCOL I.7 FROM THE POINT OF VIEW BOTH OF THE COMMON ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AND OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT AS TO THE LEGAL INTEREST IN THE ACTION BROUGHT BY THE COMMISSION . II - THE SUBSTANCE

44. Even though the Court, in paragraph 40 of van Pommeren‑Bourgondiën , did not rule out that the residence requirement — as a condition for continuing to qualify for compulsory insurance in respect of some branches of social security — might be compatible with Article 39 EC, the option of taking out voluntary insurance open to Mr Salemink cannot invalidate the finding in paragraph 43 above. The steps which non-resident workers wishing to take out voluntary insurance must take on their own initiative, and the constraints associated with such insurance, such as complying with time-limits for applying for insurance, are factors which place non-resident workers — who have the option only of voluntary insurance — in a less favourable position than resident workers, who are covered by compulsory insurance.

40. The residence requirement set by the Netherlands legislature as a condition for continuing to qualify for compulsory insurance in respect of some branches of social security is therefore compatible with Article 39 EC only if the conditions relating to voluntary insurance for non-residents are not less favourable than the conditions relating to compulsory insurance, for the same branches of social security, which residents obtain.

103. As was stated, inter alia by the United Kingdom Government and the Commission at the hearing and by the Advocate General at points 119 and 120 of his Opinion, it follows that the use of signs identical with or similar to trade marks in offers for sale displayed on an online marketplace is made by the sellers who are customers of the operator of that marketplace and not by that operator itself.

55. First of all, it should be stated that point 1(e) of the annex to that directive mentions, among the terms which may be declared unfair within the meaning of Article 3(3) of that directive, terms which have the object or effect of requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation. The Court has held in that regard that, while the content of that annex does not suffice in itself to establish automatically the unfair nature of a contested term, it is nevertheless an essential element on which the competent court may base its assessment as to the unfair nature of that term (Case C‑472/10 Invitel [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 26).

26. If the content of the annex does not suffice in itself to establish automatically the unfair nature of a contested term, it is nevertheless an essential element on which the competent court may base its assessment as to the unfair nature of that term. In the present case, it is clear from a reading of the provisions of the annex to the Directive, referred to in paragraph 24 of the present judgement, that, in assessing the unfair nature of a term such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the question whether the reasons for, or the method of, the variation of the fees connected with the service provided were specified and whether the consumer had the right to terminate the contract is particularly relevant.

35. L’article 1 er du règlement n° 2847/93, qui constitue, dans le domaine de la pêche, une expression particulière des obligations imposées aux États membres par l’article 10 CE, prévoit que ces derniers arrêtent les mesures appropriées pour assurer l’efficacité du régime communautaire de conservation et de gestion des ressources en matière de pêche (arrêt du 12 juillet 2005, Commission/France, C‑304/02, Rec. p. I‑6263, point 32).

35. That subsequent application is itself subject to VAT and the amount of the VAT for which the Gemeente is liable as a result of that application must be calculated, in accordance with Article 11A(1)(b) of the Sixth Directive, on the basis of the overall value of each of those elements, the land and the building, it being understood that VAT must not have been previously charged on those elements (see, to that effect, judgment in Gemeente Vlaardingen , EU:C:2012:698, paragraphs 28 to 33).

31. That being so, a taxation mechanism of that design cannot give rise to breach of the principles laid down in relation to VAT, which must at all times – including, therefore, when use is made of the treatment option referred to above – be respected by the Member State concerned.

64. Par ailleurs, ainsi que le reconnaît le Royaume de Belgique, nonobstant le fait que les seuils fixés dans le cadre de l’autorisation écologique sont très bas et visent uniquement à exempter les installations générant des effets insignifiants sur l’environnement, il ne saurait être exclu que certains projets relevant des catégories visées à l’annexe II de cette directive soient susceptibles d’être exemptés de toute autorisation préalable, ce qui fait obstacle en principe à ce que, en ce qui les concerne, la procédure de demande d’autorisation et d’évaluation de leurs incidences sur l’environnement instaurée par l’article 2, paragraphe 1, de la directive 85/337 soit toujours respectée.

57. According to the Court ' s case-law, the concept of public service within the meaning of Article 39(4) EC must be given uniform interpretation and application throughout the Community and cannot therefore be left entirely to the discretion of the Member States (see, in particular, Case 152/73 Sotgiu [1974] ECR 153, paragraph 5, and Commission v Belgium , paragraphs 12 and 18).

18 IT IS CORRECT THAT ARTICLE 48 ( 4 ) IS INDEED INTENDED TO OPERATE , IN THE SCHEME OF THE PROVISIONS ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS , TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE OF PROVISIONS OF THE KIND MENTIONED . BUT AT THE SAME TIME , AS IS ADMITTED IN THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT , THE DEMARCATION OF THE CONCEPT OF ' ' PUBLIC SERVICE ' ' WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 48 ( 4 ) CANNOT BE LEFT TO THE TOTAL DISCRETION OF THE MEMBER STATES .

32. Par ailleurs, il convient de rappeler qu’un État membre ne saurait exciper de dispositions, de pratiques ou de situations de son ordre juridique interne pour justifier l’inobservation des obligations et des délais prescrits par une directive (voir, notamment, arrêts Commission/Espagne, C‑295/09, EU:C:2010:99, point 10; Commission/Grèce, C‑407/09, EU:C:2011:196, point 36, et Commission/Irlande, C‑279/11, EU:C:2012:834, point 71).

17 In its judgment in Marshall, cited above, the Court held that women are entitled to go on working beyond the qualifying age for an old-age pension, that is to say at least until the age at which a man is supposed to retire.

36 HOWEVER , IN VIEW OF THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY OF TREATMENT , WHICH THE COURT HAS REAFFIRMED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS , ARTICLE 1 ( 2 ) OF DIRECTIVE NO 76/207 , WHICH EXCLUDES SOCIAL SECURITY MATTERS FROM THE SCOPE OF THAT DIRECTIVE , MUST BE INTERPRETED STRICTLY . CONSEQUENTLY , THE EXCEPTION TO THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF SEX PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 7 ( 1 ) ( A ) OF DIRECTIVE NO 79/7 APPLIES ONLY TO THE DETERMINATION OF PENSIONABLE AGE FOR THE PURPOSES OF GRANTING OLD-AGE AND RETIREMENT PENSIONS AND THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES THEREOF FOR OTHER BENEFITS .

22 ACCORDINGLY, THE QUESTIONS REFERRED SHOULD BE ANSWERED TO THE EFFECT THAT THE MEMBER STATES MAY NOT, SUBSEQUENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF, INTRODUCE, IN A UNILATERAL MANNER, NEW CHARGES ON GOODS IMPORTED DIRECTLY FROM THIRD COUNTRIES OR RAISE THE LEVEL OF THOSE IN EXISTENCE AT THAT TIME .

46. It is thus clear from case-law that, whatever the mechanism adopted for preventing or mitigating the imposition of a series of charges to tax or economic double taxation, the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty preclude a Member State from treating foreign-sourced dividends less favourably than nationally-sourced dividends, unless such a difference in treatment concerns situations which are not objectively comparable or is justified by overriding reasons in the general interest (see, to that effect, Case C‑315/02 Lenz [2004] ECR I‑7063, paragraphs 20 to 49, and Case C‑319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477, paragraphs 20 to 55). Likewise, as regards the decisions which Directive 90/435 leaves in the hands of the Member States, the Court has pointed out that these may be exercised only in compliance with the fundamental provisions of the Treaty, in particular those relating to freedom of establishment ( Keller Holding , paragraph 45).

30. The Finnish, French and United Kingdom Governments begin by arguing that the dividends paid are fundamentally different in character according to whether they come from Finnish or non-Finnish companies. Unlike profits distributed by non-Finnish companies, those paid in the form of d ividends by companies established in Finland are subject to corporation tax in that Member State, conferring entitlement on the part of a shareholder who is fully taxable in Finland to the tax credit. The difference in treatment between dividends paid by companies established in that State and those paid by companies which do not satisfy that condition is therefore justified, they argue, in the light of Article 58(1)(a) EC.

20. It should be noted in that regard that, in the interests of legal certainty and ease of verification, the decisive criterion for the classification of goods for customs purposes is in general to be sought in their objective characteristics and properties as defined in the wording of the relevant heading of the CN and in the section or chapter notes (see, inter alia, judgment in Digitalnet and Others , C‑320/11, C‑330/11, C‑382/11 and C‑383/11, EU:C:2012:745, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

50. That being the case, the EU legislature made clear in that provision that the abnormally low character of a tender must be assessed ‘in relation to the service to be provided’. Thus, the contracting authority may, in the course of its examination of the abnormally low character of a tender, take into consideration, for the purpose of ensuring healthy competition, not only the situations set out in the second paragraph of Article 37 of Directive 92/50 but also all the factors that are relevant in the light of the service at issue (see, to that effect, the judgment in SAG ELV Slovensko and Others , EU:C:2012:191, paragraphs 29 and 30).

30. In that regard, it must be borne in mind, firstly, that although the list in the second subparagraph of Article 55(1) of Directive 2004/18 is not exhaustive, it is also not purely indicative, and therefore does not leave contracting authorities free to determine which are the relevant factors to be taken into consideration before rejecting a tender which appears to be abnormally low (judgment of 23 April 2009 in Case C‑292/07 Commission v Belgium , paragraph 159).

26ACCORDINGLY MEMBER STATES MUST NOT ADOPT OR ALLOW NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITH A LEGISLATIVE POWER TO ADOPT A MEASURE BY WHICH THE COMMUNITY NATURE OF A LEGAL RULE AND THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH ARISE FROM IT ARE CONCEALED FROM THE PERSONS CONCERNED .

27 In that regard, it should be observed that Article 52 of the Treaty confers on nationals of one Member State who wish to pursue activities as self-employed persons in another Member State the benefit of the same treatment as the host State's own nationals and prohibits any discrimination based on nationality which hinders the taking up or pursuit of such activities. As the Court held in Case C-111/91 Commission v Luxembourg [1993] ECR I-817, paragraph 17, that prohibition covers not only specific rules on the pursuit of occupational activities, but also, as emerges from the General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on the freedom of establishment (OJ, English Special Edition, Second Series (IX), p. 7), any measure which, pursuant to any provision laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in a Member State, or as the result of the application of such a provision, or of administrative practices, hinders nationals of other Member States in their pursuit of activities as self-employed persons by treating nationals of other Member States differently from nationals of the country concerned.

17 Article 52 confers on nationals of one Member State who wish to pursue activities as self-employed persons in another Member State the benefit of the same treatment as the host State' s own nationals and prohibits any discrimination based on nationality which hinders the taking up or pursuit of such activities. That prohibition covers not only specific rules on the pursuit of occupational activities, but also, as emerges from the General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on the freedom of establishment (OJ, English Special Edition, Second Series (IX), p. 7), any measure which, pursuant to any provision laid down by law, Regulation or administrative action in a Member State, or as the result of the application of such a provision, or of administrative practices, hinders nationals of other Member States in their pursuit of an activity as a self-employed person by treating nationals of other Member States differently from nationals of the country concerned.

20. The Explanatory Notes to the CN and those to the HS are an important aid for interpreting the scope of the various tariff headings but do not have legally binding force. The wording of those Notes must therefore be consistent with the provisions of the CN and cannot alter their scope ( Intermodal Transports, cited above, paragraph 48) .

47. Likewise, where the Commission has adduced sufficient evidence to show that a Member State’s authorities have developed a repeated and persistent practice which is contrary to the provisions of a directive, it is incumbent on that Member State to challenge in substance and in detail the information produced and the consequences flowing therefrom (see, by analogy, Case 272/86 Commission v Greece , cited above, paragraph 21, and San Rocco , paragraphs 84 and 86). The facts relating to the complaints examined by the Commission

21 It must therefore be held that the Commission has produced sufficient evidence to show that the Greek Government applied restrictions on exports and imports of olive oil . Since the administrative procedures were applied without distinction to the Hellenic Republic' s dealings with Member States and non-member countries, restrictions affecting the latter must be presumed . In those circumstances it was incumbent on the Hellenic Republic to contest substantively and in detail the information produced and the consequences thereof . The Greek Government has not submitted any information to the Court in that respect and therefore the Commission' s allegations must be regarded as substantiated . Infringement of Articles 30 and 34 of the Treaty

58. That objective of accelerating judicial cooperation is present in various aspects of the Framework Decision, inter alia in the treatment of the time-limits for adopting decisions relating to a European arrest warrant.

62. According to the Court’s settled case-law, where national legislation falling within an area which has not been harmonised at EU level is applicable without distinction to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the Member State concerned, it may, notwithstanding its restrictive effect on the freedom to provide services, be justified where it meets an overriding requirement relating to the public interest and that interest is not already safeguarded by the rules to which the service provider is subject in the Member State in which he is established, and in so far as it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (judgments in Arblade and Others , C‑369/96 and C‑376/96, EU:C:1999:575, paragraphs 34 and 35; in dos Santos Palhota and Others , EU:C:2010:589, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited; and in Commission v Belgium , EU:C:2012:814, paragraph 44).

44. Where national legislation falling within an area which has not been harmonised at European Union level is applicable without distinction to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the Member State concerned, it may, notwithstanding its restrictive effect on the freedom to provide services, be justified where it meets an overriding requirement in the public interest and that interest is not already safeguarded by the rules to which the service provider is subject in the Member State in which he is established and in so far as it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it ( Arblade and Others , paragraphs 34 and 35; Case C-224/04 Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I-885, paragraph 31; and Case C-219/08 Commission v Belgium [2009] ECR I-9213, paragraph 14).

12 It must be inferred from all those factors that the survivor' s pension in question falls within the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty.

53. In addition, while it is true that the requirement of legal certainty prevents the exercise of individual rights arising from Community law from being subject to conditions and limits set by national administrative rules (see, to that effect, Case C-306/91 Commission v Italy [1993] ECR I-2133, paragraph 14 and Case C-354/98 Commission v France [1999] ECR I-4927, paragraph 11), the fact remains that, in the context of transnational posting of workers, the difficulties likely to arise when comparing national paid-leave schemes cannot be resolved – in the absence of harmonisation in that area – without effective cooperation between the authorities of those Member States (see, to this effect, the Commission Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions of 25 July 2003). The conclusion of administrative agreements aimed at ensuring the mutual recognition of such schemes is part of that cooperation, and more generally, part of the need for cooperation in good faith between Member States in the areas covered by Community law.

11 It is enough to observe in this regard that the Court has consistently held that the incompatibility of national legislation with Community provisions, even provisions which are directly applicable, can be finally remedied only by means of national provisions of a binding nature which have the same legal force as those which must be amended, and that the provisions of a directive must be implemented with unquestionable binding force and with the specificity, precision and clarity required in order to satisfy the requirement of legal certainty, under which, in the case of a directive intended to confer rights on individuals, persons concerned must be enabled to ascertain the full extent of their rights (Case C-197/96 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-1489, paragraphs 14 and 15).

107. Il en découle que, à supposer même que, contrairement aux constatations du Tribunal dans l’arrêt attaqué, une violation du droit d’être entendu dans un délai raisonnable puisse être établie en raison de la longueur de la procédure administrative et juridictionnelle à laquelle Bolloré a été soumise, une telle violation ne saurait, à elle seule, amener le Tribunal, ou la Cour dans le cadre d’un pourvoi, à réduire le montant de l’amende qui a été infligée à cette société au titre de l’infraction en cause.

31 Moreover, it is evident from well-established case-law of the Court that national measures which are liable to restrict or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the FEU Treaty may nonetheless be permitted, provided that they serve overriding reasons in the public interest, are appropriate for attaining their objective and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 December 2006, Cipolla and Others, C‑94/04 and C‑202/04, EU:C:2006:758, paragraph 61, and of 11 December 2014, Commission v Spain, C‑678/11, EU:C:2014:2434, paragraph 42), on the understanding that national legislation will be appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective relied upon only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain that objective in a consistent and systematic manner (see judgment of 13 February 2014, Sokoll-Seebacher, C‑367/12, EU:C:2014:68, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited).

39. Third, it should be noted that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, national legislation is appropriate for securing attainment of the objective sought only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain that objective in a consistent and systematic manner (see, to that effect, Hartlauer , paragraph 55; Joined Cases C-171/07 and C-172/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others [2009] ECR I-4171, paragraph 42; Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez , paragraph 94; and Case C-539/11 Ottica New Line di Accardi Vincenzo [2013] ECR, paragraph 47).

28 However, such a prohibition deprives the operators concerned of a rapid and direct technique for marketing and for contacting potential clients in other Member States. It can therefore constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide cross-border services.

55. Therefore, the General Court cannot reasonably be criticised as having erred in law on the ground that it assessed the overall impression produced by the earlier mark and the contested design without starting from the premiss that an informed user would in all likelihood make a direct comparison of them (see, to that effect, PepsiCo v Grupo Promer Mon Graphic , paragraph 56).

56. Therefore, the General Court cannot reasonably be criticised as having erred in law on the ground that it assessed the overall impression produced by the designs in conflict without starting from the premiss that an informed user would in all likelihood make a direct comparison of those designs.

65. In any event, in view of the mandatory nature of the supervision of State aid by the Commission under Article 88 EC, undertakings to which aid has been granted cannot, in principle, entertain a legitimate expectation that the aid is lawful unless it has been granted in compliance with the procedure laid down in that article (see Case C-169/95 Spain v Commission [1997] ECR I-135, paragraph 51).

102. On the contrary, it is precisely the existence of those Rules of Procedure, by which matters concerning the pleadings in question remain governed, and the fact that not only do they make no provision for a third-party right of access to the case-file but, in accordance with Article 31 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, they actually do provide that a hearing may be heard in camera or that certain information, such as the names of parties, may be kept confidential, which lend authority to the presumption that disclosure of those pleadings would undermine court proceedings (see, by analogy, Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau , paragraphs 56 to 58).

58. It follows from the above that the interested parties, except for the Member State responsible for granting the aid, do not have a right under the procedure for reviewing State aid to consult the documents on the Commission’s administrative file. Account must be taken of that fact for the purposes of interpreting the exception laid down by Article 4(2), third indent, of Regulation No 1049/2001. If those interested parties were able to obtain access, on the basis of Regulation No 1049/2001, to the documents in the Commission’s administrative file, the system for the review of State aid would be called into question.

10. However the ministre délégué asserts that, on the one hand, the judgment in Vander Zwalmen and Massart (C‑229/98, EU:C:1999:501) indicates that those provisions do not preclude the refusal of a tax advantage, which applies indiscriminately to households whose income fall below a certain amount, to households in which one spouse is an official or other servant of the Union and where the salary of that spouse exceeds that amount.

15. To assess the scope of application of the Treaty within the meaning of Article 12 EC, that article must be read in conjunction with the provisions of the Treaty on citizenship of the Union. Citizenship of the Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to receive the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for (Case C‑184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I‑6193, paragraphs 30 and 31, Case C‑148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I‑11613, paragraphs 22 and 23, and Case C‑209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 31).

31 Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for.

89. First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge, and the obligations must be clearly defined. In the main proceedings, the national court will therefore have to examine whether the public service obligations which were imposed on Altmark Trans are clear from the national legislation and/or the licences at issue in the main proceedings.

32 However, it is settled case-law of the Court that EU law may not be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends. The application of EU legislation may not be extended to cover abusive practices by economic operators, that is to say, transactions carried out not in the context of normal commercial operations, but solely for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining advantages under EU law (see, inter alia, judgments in Halifax and Others, C‑255/02, EU:C:2006:121, paragraphs 68 and 69 and the case-law cited, and SICES and Others, C‑155/13, EU:C:2014:145, paragraphs 29 and 30).

68. Notwithstanding that finding, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, Community law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends (see, in particular Case C-367/96 Kefalas and Others [1998] ECR I-2843, paragraph 20; Case C-373/97 Diamantis [2000] ECR I-1705, paragraph 33; and Case C-32/03 Fini H [2005] ECR I-1599, paragraph 32).

50. It is clear from the above considerations that the ground of appeal alleging failure to observe the rules on the imputability to the parent company of the practices of its subsidiary in that the General Court applied an irrebuttable version of the presumption based on ownership by the parent company of the total share capital of its subsidiary is unfounded, since it is based on a misreading of the judgment under appeal.

57 The question to be determined, therefore, is whether the restriction of competition is necessary to enable the holder of an exclusive right to perform its task of general interest in economically acceptable conditions. The Court has held that the starting point in making that determination must be the premiss that the obligation, on the part of the undertaking entrusted with such a task, to perform its services in conditions of economic equilibrium presupposes that it will be possible to offset less profitable sectors against the profitable sectors and hence justifies a restriction of competition from individual undertakings in economically profitable sectors (Corbeau, paragraphs 16 and 17).

17 The starting point of such an examination must be the premise that the obligation on the part of the undertaking entrusted with that task to perform its services in conditions of economic equilibrium presupposes that it will be possible to offset less profitable sectors against the profitable sectors and hence justifies a restriction of competition from individual undertakings where the economically profitable sectors are concerned.

48 In Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior v Evora [1997] ECR I-6013, the Court first held, at paragraph 38, that on a proper interpretation of Articles 5 and 7 of the directive, when trade-marked goods have been put on the Community market by the proprietor of the trade mark or with his consent, a reseller, besides being free to resell those goods, is also free to make use of the trade mark in order to bring to the public's attention the further commercialisation of those goods.

44 The Court accordingly concluded, in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the judgment in Crispoltoni I, that Regulations Nos 1114/88 and 2268/88 could not be regarded as having retroactive effect in so far as the purpose to be achieved by those regulations did not so demand. The Court also held that those regulations had infringed the legitimate expectations of the traders concerned. Although those traders must have seen as foreseeable measures to limit any increase in production of varieties which were difficult to dispose of, they were entitled to expect that they would be notified in good time of any measures having effects on their investments. That, however, had not been the case.

20 In the absence of any other reason indicated in the preambles to Regulations No 1114/88 and No 2268/88, it must therefore be held that the first condition for the retroactivity of those regulations to be permitted, namely that the purpose to be achieved so demands, is not fulfilled and, consequently, those regulations are invalid in so far as they lay down a maximum guaranteed quantity for tobacco of the "Bright" variety harvested in 1988.

54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.

32. It should be recalled in that regard that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and national courts under Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court, before which the dispute has been brought and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C‑415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I‑4921, paragraph 59, and Case C‑45/09 Rosenbladt [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 32).

59 As to those submissions, it is to be remembered that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts provided for by Article 177 of the Treaty, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C-125/94 Aprile v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 16 and 17).

54. En ce qui concerne les justifications invoquées par la République d’Autriche, il ressort d’une jurisprudence constante qu’une réglementation ou une pratique nationale qui constitue une mesure d’effet équivalent à des restrictions quantitatives ne peut être justifiée que par l’une des raisons d’intérêt général énumérées à l’article 30 CE ou par des exigences impératives (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 5 février 2004, Commission/Italie, C‑270/02, Rec. p. I‑1559, point 21, et du 20 septembre 2007, Commission/Pays-Bas, C‑297/05, Rec. p. I‑7467, point 75). Dans l’un et l’autre cas, la mesure nationale doit être propre à garantir la réalisation de l’objectif poursuivi et ne pas aller au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour qu’il soit atteint (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 8 mai 2003, ATRAL, C‑14/02, Rec. p. I‑4431, point 64; du 15 mars 2007, Commission/Finlande, C‑54/05, Rec. p. I‑2473, point 38, et du 24 avril 2008, Commission/Luxembourg, C‑286/07, point 36).

42. Accordingly, it cannot be inferred from the foregoing paragraphs that the commercial component of the Convention is purely incidental. A reading of the provisions of the Convention and, more particularly, of its articles concerning the PIC procedure, prompts the conclusion that the Convention also contains rules governing trade in hazardous chemicals and having direct and immediate effects on such trade (see, to that effect, Opinion 2/00, cited above, paragraph 37, and Case C-281/01 Commission v Council , cited above, paragraphs 40 and 41).

41. It is true that in the long term, depending on how manufacturers and consumers in fact behave, the programme should have a positive environmental effect as a result of the reduction in energy consumption which it should achieve. However, that is merely an indirect and distant effect, in contrast to the effect on trade in office equipment which is direct and immediate.

17 Lastly, it should be recalled that the Court has consistently held, most recently in its judgment in Cornée ( paragraph 14 ) that the Member States are under a duty, when implementing a common organization of agricultural markets, to observe the prohibition of discrimination between Community producers, laid down in Article 40(3 ) of the EEC Treaty . Consequently, where a Member State allocates special reference quantities under the Community rules at issue, the allocations must be made in such a way that they do not give rise to discrimination between Community producers .

41 In that connection, the Court has consistently held that Article 43 of the Treaty is the proper legal basis for any legislation concerning the production and marketing of agricultural products listed in Annex II to the Treaty which contributes to the attainment of one or more of the objectives of the common agricultural policy set out in Article 39 of the Treaty (now Article 33 EC). Consequently, even where that legislation is directed both to objectives of agricultural policy and to other objectives pursued on the basis of other Treaty provisions, the existence of those provisions cannot be relied on as a ground for restricting the field of application of Article 43 of the Treaty (see the judgments in Case 68/86 United Kingdom v Council [1988] ECR 855, paragraphs 14 and 16; Case C-131/87 Commission v Council [1989] ECR 3743, paragraphs 10 and 11; and Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR 1-4973, paragraph 54).

11In the same judgments the Court pointed out that Article 38(2 ) of the Treaty gives precedence to specific provisions in the agricultural field over general provisions relating to the establishment of the common market and that consequently, even where the legislation in question is directed both to objectives of agricultural policy and to other objectives which, in the absence of specific provisions, are pursued on the basis of Article 100 of the Treaty, that article, a general one under which directives may be adopted for the approximation of the laws of the Member States, cannot be relied on as a ground for restricting the field of application of Article 43 of the Treaty .

104. In order to reply to these questions, it should be noted that, as stated in recital 9 to Directive 2006/123, that directive does not apply to, inter alia, ‘requirements, such as … rules concerning the development or use of land, town and country planning, building standards…’.

26. It is apparent from settled case-law that, in order to determine whether national legislation falls within the scope of one or other of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, the purpose of the legislation concerned must be taken into consideration (see, to that effect, Case C‑157/05 Holböck [2007] ECR I-4051, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

22. As regards the question whether national legislation falls within the scope of one or other of the freedoms of movement, it is clear from what is now well established case-law that the purpose of the legislation concerned must be taken into consideration (see, to that effect, Case C‑196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas [2006] ECR I‑7995, paragraphs 31 to 33; Case C‑452/04 Fidium Finanz [2006] ECR I‑9521, paragraphs 34 and 44 to 49; Case C‑374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 37 and 38; Case C‑446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation [2006] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 36; and Case C‑524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation [2007 ] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 26 to 34).

23 It follows that the conditions laid down for the registration of vessels must not form an obstacle to freedom of establishment within the meaning of Article 52 et seq. of the Treaty.

68. In that regard, it is relevant to point out, by way of preliminary, that, according to settled case-law, while direct taxation falls within their competence, the Member States must none the less exercise that competence consistently with Community law (see, inter alia, Case C‑319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477, paragraph 19; Case C‑292/04 Meilicke and Others [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 19; and Case C‑157/05 Holböck [2007] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 21).

21. As a preliminary point, it should be observed that, according to settled case-law, although direct taxation falls within their competence, the Member States must none the less exercise that competence consistently with Community law (Case C‑35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I‑4071, paragraph 32; Lenz , paragraph 19; and Case C‑319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477, paragraph 19).

42 The Commission' s amendments to its proposal thus did not affect the very essence of the Regulation taken as a whole, and therefore did not make it necessary for the Parliament to be consulted anew.

49. Thus, where an appeal merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance, including those based on facts expressly rejected by that Court, it fails to satisfy the requirements regarding the statement of grounds under those provisions (see, in particular, the order in Case C-174/97 P FFSA and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-1303, paragraph 24, and the judgment in Interporc v Commission , paragraph 16).

16. By letter of 29 May 1996, the Secretary-General of the Commission rejected the confirmatory application in the following terms: "Following an examination of your request, I regret to have to inform you that I confirm the decision of DG VI and DG XXI for the following reasons. The documents requested all concern a Commission decision of 26 January 1996 (doc. COM (C)96 180 final) which has since become the subject-matter of an application for annulment brought by your representative (Case T-50/96). Consequently, and without prejudice to other exceptions which might justify refusing access to the documents requested, the exception for protection of the public interest (court proceedings) is applicable. The Code of Conduct cannot oblige the Commission, as a party to a pending action, to provide the other party with documents relating to the dispute. " ... 18. By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 9 August 1996, the applicant brought an action for annulment of the Commission's decision of 29 May 1996 confirming its refusal to allow the applicant access to certain of its documents. By its judgment in Case T-124/96 Interporc I [1998] ECR II-231, the Court of First Instance held that the statement of reasons in the decision of 29 May 1996 was inadequate and annulled that decision. 19. Moreover, in the course of proceedings in Case T-50/96, in response to the request of the Court of First Instance of 15 December 1997, the Commission produced certain documents some of which were the same as those requested by the applicant in the course of proceedings in Interporc I . In the present case the applicant has confirmed that the confirmatory application has ceased to have any purpose in so far as it relates to the documents the Commission produced at the request of the Court of First Instance in Case T-50/96. 20. In implementation of the judgment in Interporc I , the Commission sent to the applicant's lawyer a further decision dated 23 April 1998 concerning the applicant's confirmatory application of 27 March 1996 and containing an identical conclusion to that in the annulled decision of 29 May 1996 but stating different reasons ... The contested decision reads as follows: "... As regards the documents emanating from the Member States and the Argentine authorities, I would advise you to request a copy directly from those Member States and from the authorities concerned. Whilst the Code of Conduct provides that "the public will have the widest possible access to documents held by the Commission and the Council" , the fifth paragraph provides that "where the document held by an institution was written by a natural or legal person, a Member State, another Community institution or body or any other national or international body, the application must be sent direct to the author" . The Commission can therefore in no circumstances be accused of an abuse of rights; it is merely applying its decision of 8 February 1994 governing the implementation of the Code of Conduct. All the other documents concern pending legal proceedings (Case T-50/96) and fall within the exception based on the protection of the public interest, and, in particular, of the proper conduct of court proceedings, expressly provided for by the Code of Conduct. To disclose them on the basis of provisions relating to public access to Commission documents is likely to be damaging to the interests of the parties in those proceedings, and in particular to the rights of the defence, and would be contrary to the special provisions governing the disclosure of documents in court proceedings. " " The judgment under appeal 4. In support of its action for annulment of the contested decision the applicant relied, before the Court of First Instance, ─ as regards the documents emanating from the Commission, on three pleas in law alleging that the Commission infringed, first, the Code of Conduct and Decision 94/90, second, Article 176 of the EC Treaty (now Article 233 EC) in conjunction with the judgment in Interporc I and, third, Article 190 of the EC Treaty (now Article 253 EC), and ─ as regards the documents emanating from the Member States or the Argentine authorities, on three pleas alleging, first, the unlawfulness of the contested decision in so far as it is based on the authorship rule, second, infringement of the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90 and, third, infringement of Article 190 of the Treaty. 5. The Court of First Instance upheld the plea alleging infringement of the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90 on the ground that the Commission had misapplied the exception based on the protection of the public interest (court proceedings) and it therefore annulled the contested decision in so far as it refused to authorise access to documents emanating from the Commission. 6. However, the Court of First Instance held that the contested decision should not be annulled in so far as it refused access, on the basis of the authorship rule, to the documents emanating from the Member States or the Argentine authorities. 7. The Court of First Instance gave the following reasons for its rejection of the plea alleging the unlawfulness of the contested decision in so far as it is based on the authorship rule: "55. It follows from the judgment in Interporc I , first, that the Secretary-General was required, under Article 176 of the Treaty, to take a further decision in implementation of that judgment and, second, that the decision of 29 May 1996 is deemed to have never existed. 56. Accordingly, it cannot be inferred from Article 2(2) of Decision 94/90 and the 1994 communication that the Secretary-General could not rely on grounds other than those on which he took a position in his initial decision. He was therefore entitled to undertake a full review of the applications for access and base the contested decision [not only on the exception based on the protection of the public interest (court proceedings) but also] on the authorship rule. " 8. In rejecting the plea alleging infringement of the Code of Conduct adopted by Decision 94/90, the Court of First Instance held: "66. ... it must be held that, so long as there is no rule of law of a higher order according to which the Commission was not empowered, in Decision 94/90, to exclude from the scope of the Code of Conduct documents of which it was not the author, the authorship rule can be applied. ... ... 69. It must be held, [as regards the interpretation of that rule] that the authorship rule, however it may be characterised, lays down an exception to the general principle of transparency in Decision 94/90. It follows that this rule must be construed and applied strictly, so as not to frustrate the application of the general principle of transparency (Case T-188/97 Rothmans International v Commission [1999] ECR II-2463, paragraphs 53 to 55). ... 73. It is clear, on examination of the five types of documents [referred to in the contested decision], that their authors are either the Member States or the Argentine authorities. 74. It follows that the Commission has applied the authorship rule correctly in taking the view that it was not required to grant access to those documents. It cannot, therefore, have committed an abuse of rights. ... " 9. The Court of First Instance also rejected the plea alleging infringement of Article 190 of the Treaty on the following grounds: "77. According to consistent case-law, the obligation to state reasons, laid down in Article 190 of the Treaty, means that the reasoning of the Community authority which adopted the contested measure must be shown clearly and unequivocally so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure in order to protect their rights and the Community judicature to exercise its power of review ... . 78. In the present case, in the contested decision the Commission referred to the authorship rule and informed the applicant that it should request a copy of the documents in question from the Member States concerned or the Argentine authorities. Such a statement of reasons shows clearly the reasoning of the Commission. The applicant was thus in a position to know the justification for the contested measure and the Court of First Instance is in a position to exercise its power to review the legality of that decision. Accordingly, the applicant is not justified in maintaining that a more specific statement of reasons was required (see Rothmans International v Commission , cited above, paragraph 37). " The appeal 10. By its appeal, Interporc claims that the Court should: ─ set aside the judgment under appeal in so far as, first, it rejects the claim for annulment of the contested decision in so far as it refuses access to documents emanating from the Member States or the Argentine authorities and, second, orders it to bear its own costs; ─ annul the contested decision in its entirety; ─ order the Commission to pay the costs of the appeal and the costs of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance. 11. Interporc relies on two pleas in support of its appeal. The first alleges that the Court of First Instance erred in law as regards the assessment made by the Commission of the request for access to the file (paragraphs 55 to 57 of the judgment under appeal). The second plea alleges, as its main argument, that the authorship rule is void on the ground that it infringes a rule of law of a higher order and, in the alternative, that that rule has been misinterpreted and misapplied and that the Commission has breached its obligation to state reasons laid down by Article 190 of the Treaty (paragraphs 65 to 79 of that judgment). 12. The Commission contends that the appeal should be dismissed as inadmissible and, in the alternative, as unfounded, and that the appellant should be ordered to bear the costs of the appeal. However, should the authorship rule be declared void, it requests that the effects of the Court's judgment be limited to the documents sent after delivery of that judgment. Admissibility of the appeal Arguments of the parties 13. The Commission contends that the appeal is inadmissible in its entirety. First, it is inadmissible in so far as Interporc seeks the annulment of the contested decision in its entirety. Since that decision has already been annulled in part by a judgment of the Court of First Instance which is enforceable in that respect, it cannot be annulled a second time in its entirety. Second, in support of the two pleas submitted, rather than indicating clearly the aspects of the judgment under appeal it takes issue with and the legal arguments intended specifically to support its claim for annulment, the appellant confines itself to repeating or reproducing verbatim the pleas and arguments already put before the Court of First Instance. 14. Interporc counters that, as the infringement of rules of law by the Court of First Instance is generally inseparable from the pleas in the action and the legal provisions cited in them, a fresh presentation of those pleas in the appeal is often inevitable. The Commission's position as regards the admissibility of the appeal thus tends to limit disproportionately the scope for bringing appeals. Furthermore, contrary to the Commission's submission, the pleas it relies on are supported by argument and criticise the reasoning of the Court of First Instance sufficiently clearly. Findings of the Court 15. To begin with, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it follows from Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, in particular, Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, paragraph 34, and Case C-248/99 P France v Monsanto and Commission [2002] ECR I-1, paragraph 68). 16. Thus, where an appeal merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance, including those based on facts expressly rejected by that Court, it fails to satisfy the requirements to state reasons under those provisions (see inter alia the order of 25 March 1998 in Case C-174/97 P FFSA and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-1303, paragraph 24).

38. À cet égard, il convient de rappeler que l’accord-cadre part de la prémisse selon laquelle les contrats de travail à durée indéterminée constituent la forme générale des relations de travail, tout en reconnaissant que les contrats de travail à durée déterminée sont une caractéristique de l’emploi dans certains secteurs ou pour certaines occupations et activités (voir points 6 et 8 des considérations générales de l’accord-cadre ainsi que arrêt du 4 juillet 2006, Adeneler e.a., C‑212/04, Rec. p. I‑6057, point 61).

50. Recital 5 in the preamble to Directive 2009/54 specifies that the primary purposes of any rules on natural mineral waters should be to protect the health of consumers, to prevent consumers from being misled and to ensure fair trading. Recital 9 thereto states that the inclusion of the statement of the analytical composition of a natural mineral water should be compulsory in order to ensure that consumers are informed (see judgment in Hotel Sava Rogaška , C‑207/14, EU:C:2015:414, paragraph 40).

40. In that regard, recital 5 of Directive 2009/54 specifies that the primary purposes of any rules on natural mineral waters should be to protect the health of consumers, to prevent consumers from being misled and to ensure fair trading. In support of this, recital 7 of that directive provides that care should be taken to ensure that natural mineral waters retain at the marketing stage those characteristics which enabled them to be recognised as such, and recital 9 states that the inclusion of the statement of the analytical composition of a natural mineral water should be compulsory in order to ensure that consumers are informed.

29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26).

23 The finding of the Court of First Instance that Mr Tzoanos had not provided the necessary evidence in that regard is a finding of fact which comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and cannot be called into question in the context of an appeal (see, to this effect, Case C-283/90 P Vidrányi v Commission [1991] ECR I-4339, paragraph 12, and Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, paragraph 10).

10 It should be pointed out, before considering Hilti' s pleas, that the Court of Justice has consistently held that pursuant to Article 168A of the EEC Treaty and Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EEC an appeal may rely only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts (see, in particular, the judgments in Case C-283/90 P Vidrányi v Commission [1991] ECR I-4339, paragraph 12, and in Case C-346/90 P F. v Commission [1992] ECR I-2691, paragraph 7). The first plea

54 The motor-vehicle tax, which is applied without distinction to vehicles assembled and manufactured in Portugal and to imported new and second-hand vehicles alike, is part of such a general system of internal charges imposed on categories of products in accordance with an objective criterion, namely cubic capacity.

73. It is not in dispute that, by the Exchange of Notes of 29 January and 13 March 1992, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America added to the 1957 Agreement an annex concerning the principles relating to CRSs, including those applying to CRSs offered for use or used on Netherlands territory. The Kingdom of the Netherlands maintained that annex in force despite the renegotiation of the 1957 Agreement which led to the Exchange of Notes of October 1992. By acting in that way, that Member State infringed the exclusive external competence of the Community arising from Regulation No 2299/89 (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark , paragraphs 102 to 104; Commission v Sweden , paragraphs 98 to 100; Commission v Finland , paragraphs 103 to 105; Commission v Belgium , paragraphs 115 to 117; Commission v Luxembourg , paragraphs 108 to 110; Commission v Austria , paragraphs 117 to 119, and Commission v Germany , paragraphs 128 to 130).

104 By the effect of that regulation, the Community thus acquired exclusive competence to contract with non-member countries the obligations relating to CRSs offered for use or used in its territory.

80 It follows from those various provisions that the procedures for establishing MRLs and issuing marketing authorisations are inherently linked, inasmuch as a marketing authorisation will not be issued in respect of a veterinary medicinal product for administration to food-producing animals unless an MRL has been established, and, by the same token, an MRL will not be established for a new pharmacologically active substance unless that substance is intended to be placed on the market.

122. The reasonableness of a period is to be appraised in the light of the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the applicant and of the competent authorities (Baustahlgewebe , paragraph 29, and Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij , paragraph 187).

187 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the reasonableness of a period is to be appraised in the light of the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the applicant and of the competent authorities (Baustahlgewebe, paragraph 29).

14 THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FIXING AND THE CONDITIONS OF COLLECTION OF THE FINANCIAL CHARGES WHICH THE COMMUNITY IS EMPOWERED TO LEVY AND WHICH SPECIFICALLY CONSTITUTE ITS OWN RESOURCES , SUCH AS CUSTOMS DUTIES AND AGRICULTURAL LEVIES , ARE LAID DOWN BY THE COUNCIL DECISION OF 21 APRIL 1970 ON THE REPLACEMENT OF FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM MEMBER STATES BY THE COMMUNITY ' S OWN RESOURCES ( OFFICIAL JOURNAL , ENGLISH SPECIAL EDITION 1970 ( I ), P . 224 ) AND THE REGULATIONS IN IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF . THESE PROVISIONS MUST BE CONSIDERED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS ON THE FINANCIAL PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY WHICH , LIKE THE CORRESPONDING ARRANGEMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES , ARE GOVERNED BY THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY WHICH REQUIRES THAT COMPARABLE SITUATIONS MAY NOT BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY UNLESS DIFFERENCE OF TREATMENT IS OBJECTIVELY JUSTIFIED .

56 It must be noted that, under clause 8(5) of the framework agreement, the prevention and also the settlement of disputes and grievances arising from the application of that agreement are to be dealt with in accordance with national law, collective agreements and practice (judgments of 15 April 2008, Impact, C‑268/06, EU:C:2008:223, paragraph 39, and of 23 April 2009, Angelidaki and Others, C‑378/07 to C‑380/07, EU:C:2009:250, paragraph 172, and orders of 12 June 2008, Vassilakis and Others, C‑364/07, not published, EU:C:2008:346, paragraph 140, and of 24 April 2009, Koukou, C‑519/08, not published, EU:C:2009:269, paragraph 95).

172. With regard to the procedure provided for under national law for that purpose, it must be noted that, under clause 8(5) of the Framework Agreement, the prevention and also the settlement of disputes and grievances arising from the application of that agreement are to be dealt with in accordance with national law, collective agreements and practice (order in Vassilakis and Others , paragraph 140).

9 Moreover, in proceedings under Article 177 the Court has already ruled on several occasions on the interpretation of recommendations adopted on the basis of the EEC Treaty ( see judgments of 15 June 1976 in Case 113/75 Frecassetti v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato (( 1976 )) ECR 983, and of 9 June 1977 in Case 90/76 Van Ameyde v UCI (( 1977 )) ECR 1091 ). It is therefore necessary to consider the question submitted to the Court .

30 Article 23(1) of Regulation No 1008/2008 seeks to ensure, in particular, that there is information and transparency with regard to prices for air services from an airport located in a Member State and accordingly to contribute to safeguarding protection of customers who use those services. In that respect, it lays down information and transparency obligations as regards, in particular, the conditions applicable to air fares, the final price to be paid, the air fare and the unavoidable and foreseeable items that are added to the fare, and the optional price supplements relating to services that supplement the air service itself (judgment of 18 September 2014, Vueling Airlines, C‑487/12, EU:C:2014:2232, paragraph 32).

32. In those circumstances, it must held that, in Chapter IV of Regulation No 1008/2008, which contains provisions on pricing, Article 22(1) relating to pricing freedom is complemented by Article 23(1), which seeks to ensure, in particular, that there is information and transparency with regard to prices for air services from an airport located in a Member State and which thereby contributes to safeguarding protection of customers having recourse to those services (see, to that effect, judgment in ebookers.com Deutschland , C‑112/11, EU:C:2012:487, paragraph 13). In that respect, Article 23(1) lays down information and transparency obligations as regards, in particular, the conditions applicable to air fares, the final price to be paid, the air fare and the unavoidable and foreseeable items that are added to the fare, and the optional price supplements relating to services that supplement the air service itself.

36. La Cour a précisé que, compte tenu des caractéristiques particulières du système de règlement des différends au sein de l’OMC, qui réserve une place importante à la négociation entre les parties, un opérateur économique ne saurait soutenir devant une juridiction d’un État membre qu’une réglementation de l’Union est incompatible avec certaines règles de l’OMC, alors même que l’ORD a déclaré ladite réglementation incompatible avec celles-ci et que le délai raisonnable prévu dans le cadre du système de règlement des différends mis en place par les accords OMC et accordé à l’Union en vue de se conformer à cette décision a expiré (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Van Parys, précité, point 54).

31 Finally, as regards the condition of balancing the opposing rights and interests at issue, it depends in principle on the specific circumstances of the particular case (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 November 2011, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito, C‑468/10 and C‑469/10, EU:C:2011:777, paragraph 40, and of 19 October 2016, Breyer, C‑582/14, EU:C:2016:779, paragraph 62).

40. However, account must be taken of the fact that the second of those conditions necessitates a balancing of the opposing rights and interests concerned which depends, in principle, on the individual circumstances of the particular case in question and in the context of which the person or the institution which carries out the balancing must take account of the significance of the data subject’s rights arising from Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

53 The Association Agreement is designed simply to create an appropriate framework for the Czech Republic's gradual integration into the Community, with a view to its possible accession, whereas the purpose of the Treaty is to create an internal market, establishment of which involves the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital (see Article 3(c) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 3(1)(c) EC)).

75 On the one hand, the judgments of 27 January 1988, Denmark v Commission (349/85, EU:C:1988:34, paragraph 19 ), of 6 October 1993, Italy v Commission (C‑55/91, EU:C:1993:832, paragraph 69), of 4 July 1996, Greece v Commission (C‑50/94, EU:C:1996:266, paragraph 6), and of 22 April 1999, Netherlands v Commission, C‑28/94, EU:C:1999:191, paragraph 51), referred to in that regard by the Commission, concern the EU rules relating to the EAGGF which at that time contained no provision which could be regarded as comparable to the rules of EU law which led the Court of Justice to make the finding in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment.

51 Consequently, until the accounts have been duly cleared, the Commission is obliged under Article 3 of Regulation No 729/70 to refuse to charge to the EAGGF intervention intended to stabilise the agricultural markets which has not been carried out in accordance with the Community rules. That obligation does not disappear merely because the accounts are cleared after the expiry of the period prescribed in Article 5 of that regulation (see, to that effect, concerning export refunds, Denmark v Commission, paragraph 19, and Case C-50/94 Greece v Commission [1996] ECR I-3331, paragraph 6).

48. It is established that the helicopters in question, as the Italian Republic admits, are certainly for civilian use and possibly for military use.

69 Likewise, the Court has previously held that in the interests of legal certainty it is compatible with EU law to lay down reasonable time-limits for bringing proceedings (judgment of 6 October 2009, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, C‑40/08, EU:C:2009:615, paragraph 41).

41. According to established case-law, it is compatible with Community law to lay down reasonable time-limits for bringing proceedings in the interests of legal certainty (see, to this effect, Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5; Case C‑261/95 Palmisani [1997] ECR I‑4025, paragraph 28; and Case C‑2/06 Kempter [2008] ECR I‑411, paragraph 58). Such time-limits are not liable to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by Community law (see, to that effect, Case C‑255/00 Grundig Italiana [2002] ECR I‑8003, paragraph 34).

86 That the right guaranteed by Article 4 of the Charter is absolute is confirmed by Article 3 ECHR, to which Article 4 of the Charter corresponds. As is stated in Article 15(2) ECHR, no derogation is possible from Article 3 ECHR.

41. In that case, any restriction which, without objective justification, is liable to prohibit, impede or render less attractive the provision of those services must be declared incompatible with EU law. Where it is applicable, Regulation No 4055/86 transposes, in essence, the rules of the treaty relating to the freedom to provide services and the case-law relating thereto ( Commission v France , C‑381/93, EU:C:1994:370, paragraphs 13 and 16; Commission v Italy , EU:C:2002:100, paragraphs 9 and 10; Sea-Land Service and Nedlloyd Lijnen , EU:C:2002:364, paragraphs 31 and 32; Geha Naftiliaki and Others , C‑435/00, EU:C:2002:661, paragraphs 20 and 21; and Commission v Spain , C‑18/09, EU:C:2010:58, paragraph 12). That case-law includes the judgment in Laval un Partneri (C‑341/05, EU:C:2007:809) relating to the compatibility of industrial action with the freedom to provide services.

21 Since Article 1(1) of Regulation No 4055/86 has extended the principle of the freedom to provide services as regards intra-Community traffic to traffic between a Member State and a third country, the rules established in relation to the former must be applied to the latter.

7 On the other hand, contrary to what the Commission maintained, the Court does not have to take account of the lack of communication of the laws, regulations or administrative provisions necessary in order to comply with the directive, since the Kingdom of Spain had not adopted those provisions within the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion (see the judgment in Case C-303/93 Commission v Italy [1994] ECR I-1901, at paragraph 6).

74. Besides the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, the principle of equal treatment of tenderers is also to be applied to such public service contracts even in the absence of discrimination on grounds of nationality (see, by analogy, Case C‑458/03 Parking Brixen [2005] ECR I‑8585, paragraph 48, and Case C‑410/04 ANAV [2006] ECR I‑3303, paragraph 20).

20. Besides the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, the principle of equal treatment of tenderers is also to be applied to public service concessions even in the absence of discrimination on grounds of nationality ( Parking Brixen , paragraph 48).

35. The argument to the effect that the fuel is supplied to Auto Lease, since the lessee purchases the fuel in the name and at the expense of that company, which advances the cost of that property, cannot be accepted. As the Commission rightly contends, the supplies were effected at Auto Lease's expense only ostensibly. The monthly payments made to Auto Lease constitute only an advance. The actual consumption, established at the end of the year, is the financial responsibility of the lessee who, consequently, wholly bears the costs of the supply of fuel.

40. Furthermore, even if the legislation at issue in the main proceedings were to have restrictive effects on free movement of capital, it follows from the case-law that those effects would be the unavoidable consequence of an obstacle to freedom of establishment and would not therefore justify an independent examination of that legislation from the point of view of Article 56 EC (see, by way of analogy, Case C‑196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas [2006] ECR I‑7995, paragraph 33; Case C‑231/05 Oy AA [2007] ECR I‑6373, paragraph 24; and Case C‑284/06 Burda [2008] ECR I‑4571, paragraph 74).

74. In any event, should the provisions of the KStG 1996 have restrictive effects on the free movement of capital, it follows from the case-law that those effects would be the unavoidable consequence of such an obstacle to freedom of establishment as there might be, and do not therefore justify an independent examination of that legislation from the point of view of Article 73b of the Treaty ( Oy AA , paragraph 24 and the case-law cited therein).

54. According to unchallenged statements in the documents before the Court, two of the claimants in the main proceedings will receive only 20 and 49% respectively of the benefits to which they were entitled.

215 The principle of subsidiarity is set out in Article 5(3) TEU, under which the European Union, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, is to act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at EU level. Furthermore, Article 5 of Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to the EU Treaty and to the FEU Treaty, lays down guidelines for the purpose of determining whether those conditions are met (judgment in Estonia v Parliament and Council, C‑508/13, EU:C:2015:403, paragraph 44).

44. It is appropriate to bear in mind that Article 5(3) TEU refers to the principle of subsidiarity which provides that the European Union, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, is to take action only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the European Union. Furthermore, Protocol 2, in Article 5, lays down guidelines for the purposes of determining whether those conditions are met (judgment in Luxembourg v Parliament and Council , C‑176/09, EU:C:2011:290, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).

62. En vertu de l’article 11 des règlements n os  1552/89 et 1150/2000, tout retard dans les inscriptions au compte visé à l’article 9, paragraphe 1, des mêmes règlements donne lieu au paiement par l’État membre concerné d’intérêts applicables à toute la période du retard (voir, notamment, arrêts du 14 avril 2005, Commission/Pays-Bas, C‑460/01, Rec. p. I‑2613, point 91, ainsi que Commission/Allemagne, précité, point 94 et jurisprudence citée), indépendamment de la raison du retard et d’un délai fixé par la Commission pour la mise à disposition des ressources propres (voir, notamment, arrêt Commission/Allemagne, précité, points 93 et 95).

21 Consequently, where questions submitted by national courts concern the interpretation of a provision of European Union law, the Court is, in principle, obliged to give a ruling (see, inter alia, judgments of 17 July 1997, Leur-Bloem, C‑28/95, EU:C:1997:369 paragraph 25, and of 7 July 2011, Agafiţei and Others, C‑310/10, EU:C:2011:467, paragraph 26).

25. Consequently, where questions submitted by national courts concern the interpretation of a provision of Community law, the Court is, in principle, obliged to give a ruling (see Dzodzi and Gmurzynska-Bscher , cited above, paragraphs 35 and 20 respectively). Neither the wording of Article 177 nor the aim of the procedur e established by that article indicates that the Treaty makers intended to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court requests for a preliminary ruling on a Community provision where the domestic law of a Member State refers to that Community provision in order to determine the rules applicable to a situation which is purely internal to that State (see Dzodzi and Gmurzynska-Bscher , cited above, paragraphs 36 and 25 respectively).

38. In that regard, it must none the less be stated that, taking into account the progress and the special features of the Spanish procedural system, such an eventuality must be regarded as very improbable because there is a significant risk that the consumer in question will not put forward an alternative claim which would seek, moreover, relief inferior to that sought in the principal claim, either on account of the particularly rigid requirement that the alternative claim be presented at the same time as the principal claim or because the consumer is unaware of, or does not appreciate, the extent of his rights (see, by analogy, Aziz , paragraph 58).

17. According to settled case-law, it is apparent from a consideration of the provisions of Section 3 in the light of the documents leading to their enactment that, in affording the insured a wider range of jurisdiction than that available to the insurer and in excluding any possibility of a clause conferring jurisdiction for the benefit of the insurer, they reflect an underlying concern to protect the insured, who in most cases is faced with a predetermined contract the clauses of which are no longer negotiable and is the weaker party economically (Case 201/82 Gerling and Others v Amministrazione del Tesoro dello Stato [1983] ECR 2503, paragraph 17 and Case C-412/98 Group Josi [2000] ECR I-5925, paragraph 64).

17 IT IS APPARENT FROM A CONSIDERATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THAT SECTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DOCUMENTS LEADING TO THEIR ENACTMENT THAT IN AFFORDING THE INSURED A WIDER RANGE OF JURISDICTION THAN THAT AVAILABLE TO THE INSURER AND IN EXCLUDING ANY POSSIBILITY OF A CLAUSE CONFERRING JURISDICTION FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE INSURER THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO PROTECT THE INSURED WHO IS MOST FREQUENTLY FACED WITH A PREDETERMINED CONTRACT THE CLAUSES OF WHICH ARE NO LONGER NEGOTIABLE AND WHO IS IN A WEAKER ECONOMIC POSITION .

54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.

33 That power of the court has been regarded as necessary for ensuring that the consumer enjoys effective protection, in view in particular of the real risk that he is unaware of his rights or encounters difficulties in enforcing them (Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores, paragraph 26).

26 The aim of Article 6 of the Directive, which requires Member States to lay down that unfair terms are not binding on the consumer, would not be achieved if the consumer were himself obliged to raise the unfair nature of such terms. In disputes where the amounts involved are often limited, the lawyers' fees may be higher than the amount at stake, which may deter the consumer from contesting the application of an unfair term. While it is the case that, in a number of Member States, procedural rules enable individuals to defend themselves in such proceedings, there is a real risk that the consumer, particularly because of ignorance of the law, will not challenge the term pleaded against him on the grounds that it is unfair. It follows that effective protection of the consumer may be attained only if the national court acknowledges that it has power to evaluate terms of this kind of its own motion.

36. Thus, in order for VAT to become chargeable in such circumstances, all the relevant information concerning the chargeable event, namely, the future supply of goods or services, must already be known and therefore, in particular, the goods or services must be precisely identified at the time when the payment on account is made (to that effect, BUPA Hospitals and Goldsborough Developments , paragraph 48).

44. As a rule, it is for the Member States to decide on the degree of protection which they wish to afford to such lawful interests and on the way in which that protection is to be achieved. They may do so, however, only within the limits set by the Treaty and must, in particular, observe the principle of proportionality, which requires that the measures adopted be appropriate to secure the attainment of the objective they pursue and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, in particular, Säger, paragraph 15, and Case C‑262/02 Commission v France , paragraph 24).

24. In that context, it is for the Member States to decide on the degree of protection which they wish to afford to public health and on the way in which that protection is to be achieved. They may do so, however, only within the limits set by the Treaty and must, in particular, observe the principle of proportionality (see Joined Cases C-1/90 and C-176/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior and Publivía [1991] ECR I-4151, paragraph 16), which requires that the measures adopted be appropriate to secure the attainment of the objective which they pursue and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, in particular, Säger , paragraph 15; Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-8453, paragraph 35; Corsten , paragraph 39; and Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I-607, paragraph 33).

25 In so far as the grant of the winter fuel payment to any of the categories of persons referred to is always subject to the materialisation of the risk of old age, that payment must be deemed to protect directly and effectively against that risk.

38 It should be remembered that, since the intellectual component and the formal component form an inseparable whole, reducing the act to writing is the necessary expression of the intention of the adopting authority (Commission v BASF and Others, paragraph 70).

70 Since the intellectual component and the formal component form an inseparable whole, reducing the act to writing is the necessary expression of the intention of the adopting authority.

22 As to the Commission's argument that the Communication was not notified to the Member States, suffice it to say that that fact cannot alter the binding nature of the Communication.

21. The Court has consistently held that a benefit can be regarded as a social security benefit only if, firstly, it is granted, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, to recipients on the basis of a legally defined position and, secondly, it relates to one of the risks expressly listed in Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1408/71 (see, in particular, Case C-78/91 Hughes [1992] ECR I-4839, paragraph 15; Case C-85/99 Offermanns [2001] ECR I-2261, paragraph 28; and Case C-333/00 Maaheimo [2002] ECR I-10087, paragraph 22).

22 In that regard, it must be observed that, according to settled case-law, a benefit can be regarded as a social security benefit only if it is granted, without any individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, to recipients on the basis of a legally defined position (see, in this regard, Case C-78/91 Hughes [1992] ECR I-4839, paragraph 15, and Case C-85/99 Offermanns [2001] ECR I-2261).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.