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Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: __rds_conn_error(struct rds_connection *conn, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); vprintk(fmt, ap); va_end(ap); rds_conn_drop(conn); } Commit Message: RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on unbound socket Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create(). Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if you're interested. I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer with this patch, whereas I could without. Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937: 74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection") Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-362
0
27,727
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::OnGpuVSync(base::TimeTicks timebase, base::TimeDelta interval) { DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_); if (gpu_vsync_callback_) gpu_vsync_callback_.Run(timebase, interval); } Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed. Bug: 1009452 Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811 Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946} CWE ID: CWE-704
0
12,137
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: fetch_last_req_info(krb5_db_entry *dbentry, krb5_last_req_entry ***lrentry) { *lrentry = nolrarray; return 0; } Commit Message: Fix S4U2Self KDC crash when anon is restricted In validate_as_request(), when enforcing restrict_anonymous_to_tgt, use client.princ instead of request->client; the latter is NULL when validating S4U2Self requests. CVE-2016-3120: In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause krb5kdc to dereference a null pointer if the restrict_anonymous_to_tgt option is set to true, by making an S4U2Self request. CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C ticket: 8458 (new) target_version: 1.14-next target_version: 1.13-next CWE ID: CWE-476
0
16,438
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: _zip_cdir_grow(struct zip_cdir *cd, int nentry, struct zip_error *error) { struct zip_dirent *entry; if (nentry < cd->nentry) { _zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INTERNAL, 0); return -1; } if ((entry=((struct zip_dirent *) realloc(cd->entry, sizeof(*(cd->entry))*nentry))) == NULL) { _zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MEMORY, 0); return -1; } cd->nentry = nentry; cd->entry = entry; return 0; } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-189
0
21,301
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static struct mr6_table *ip6mr_get_table(struct net *net, u32 id) { struct mr6_table *mrt; ip6mr_for_each_table(mrt, net) { if (mrt->id == id) return mrt; } return NULL; } Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed the issue for ipv4 ipmr: ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well. This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket by ip_mroute_setsockopt(). Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-20
0
7,504
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static int qcow2_write_snapshots(BlockDriverState *bs) { BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque; QCowSnapshot *sn; QCowSnapshotHeader h; QCowSnapshotExtraData extra; int i, name_size, id_str_size, snapshots_size; struct { uint32_t nb_snapshots; uint64_t snapshots_offset; } QEMU_PACKED header_data; int64_t offset, snapshots_offset; int ret; /* compute the size of the snapshots */ offset = 0; for(i = 0; i < s->nb_snapshots; i++) { sn = s->snapshots + i; offset = align_offset(offset, 8); offset += sizeof(h); offset += sizeof(extra); offset += strlen(sn->id_str); offset += strlen(sn->name); } snapshots_size = offset; /* Allocate space for the new snapshot list */ snapshots_offset = qcow2_alloc_clusters(bs, snapshots_size); offset = snapshots_offset; if (offset < 0) { ret = offset; goto fail; } ret = bdrv_flush(bs); if (ret < 0) { goto fail; } /* The snapshot list position has not yet been updated, so these clusters * must indeed be completely free */ ret = qcow2_pre_write_overlap_check(bs, 0, offset, snapshots_size); if (ret < 0) { goto fail; } /* Write all snapshots to the new list */ for(i = 0; i < s->nb_snapshots; i++) { sn = s->snapshots + i; memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); h.l1_table_offset = cpu_to_be64(sn->l1_table_offset); h.l1_size = cpu_to_be32(sn->l1_size); /* If it doesn't fit in 32 bit, older implementations should treat it * as a disk-only snapshot rather than truncate the VM state */ if (sn->vm_state_size <= 0xffffffff) { h.vm_state_size = cpu_to_be32(sn->vm_state_size); } h.date_sec = cpu_to_be32(sn->date_sec); h.date_nsec = cpu_to_be32(sn->date_nsec); h.vm_clock_nsec = cpu_to_be64(sn->vm_clock_nsec); h.extra_data_size = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(extra)); memset(&extra, 0, sizeof(extra)); extra.vm_state_size_large = cpu_to_be64(sn->vm_state_size); extra.disk_size = cpu_to_be64(sn->disk_size); id_str_size = strlen(sn->id_str); name_size = strlen(sn->name); assert(id_str_size <= UINT16_MAX && name_size <= UINT16_MAX); h.id_str_size = cpu_to_be16(id_str_size); h.name_size = cpu_to_be16(name_size); offset = align_offset(offset, 8); ret = bdrv_pwrite(bs->file, offset, &h, sizeof(h)); if (ret < 0) { goto fail; } offset += sizeof(h); ret = bdrv_pwrite(bs->file, offset, &extra, sizeof(extra)); if (ret < 0) { goto fail; } offset += sizeof(extra); ret = bdrv_pwrite(bs->file, offset, sn->id_str, id_str_size); if (ret < 0) { goto fail; } offset += id_str_size; ret = bdrv_pwrite(bs->file, offset, sn->name, name_size); if (ret < 0) { goto fail; } offset += name_size; } /* * Update the header to point to the new snapshot table. This requires the * new table and its refcounts to be stable on disk. */ ret = bdrv_flush(bs); if (ret < 0) { goto fail; } QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(QCowHeader, snapshots_offset) != offsetof(QCowHeader, nb_snapshots) + sizeof(header_data.nb_snapshots)); header_data.nb_snapshots = cpu_to_be32(s->nb_snapshots); header_data.snapshots_offset = cpu_to_be64(snapshots_offset); ret = bdrv_pwrite_sync(bs->file, offsetof(QCowHeader, nb_snapshots), &header_data, sizeof(header_data)); if (ret < 0) { goto fail; } /* free the old snapshot table */ qcow2_free_clusters(bs, s->snapshots_offset, s->snapshots_size, QCOW2_DISCARD_SNAPSHOT); s->snapshots_offset = snapshots_offset; s->snapshots_size = snapshots_size; return 0; fail: if (snapshots_offset > 0) { qcow2_free_clusters(bs, snapshots_offset, snapshots_size, QCOW2_DISCARD_ALWAYS); } return ret; } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-119
0
25,646
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: NavigationNotificationObserver::NavigationNotificationObserver( NavigationController* controller, AutomationProvider* automation, IPC::Message* reply_message, int number_of_navigations, bool include_current_navigation, bool use_json_interface) : automation_(automation->AsWeakPtr()), reply_message_(reply_message), controller_(controller), navigations_remaining_(number_of_navigations), navigation_started_(false), use_json_interface_(use_json_interface) { if (number_of_navigations == 0) { ConditionMet(AUTOMATION_MSG_NAVIGATION_SUCCESS); return; } DCHECK_LT(0, navigations_remaining_); content::Source<NavigationController> source(controller_); registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_NAV_ENTRY_COMMITTED, source); registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_START, source); registrar_.Add(this, content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_STOP, source); registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_AUTH_NEEDED, source); registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_AUTH_SUPPLIED, source); registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_AUTH_CANCELLED, source); registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_APP_MODAL_DIALOG_SHOWN, content::NotificationService::AllSources()); if (include_current_navigation && controller->GetWebContents()->IsLoading()) navigation_started_ = true; } Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt. BUG=107201 TEST=no visible change Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-20
0
22,345
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: bool doReadHmacKey(blink::WebCryptoKeyAlgorithm& algorithm, blink::WebCryptoKeyType& type) { uint32_t lengthBytes; if (!doReadUint32(&lengthBytes)) return false; blink::WebCryptoAlgorithmId hash; if (!doReadAlgorithmId(hash)) return false; algorithm = blink::WebCryptoKeyAlgorithm::createHmac(hash, lengthBytes * 8); type = blink::WebCryptoKeyTypeSecret; return !algorithm.isNull(); } Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings BUG=390928 R=dcarney@chromium.org Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 CWE ID:
0
27,588
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void FrameFetchContext::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) { visitor->Trace(document_loader_); visitor->Trace(document_); visitor->Trace(frozen_state_); visitor->Trace(fetch_client_settings_object_); BaseFetchContext::Trace(visitor); } Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all. Bug: 876822 Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215 Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736} CWE ID: CWE-200
0
9
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: GahpClient::cream_job_purge(const char *service, const char *job_id) { static const char* command = "CREAM_JOB_PURGE"; if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) { return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED; } if (!service) service=NULLSTRING; if (!job_id) job_id=NULLSTRING; std::string reqline; char *esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(service) ); char *esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(job_id) ); int job_number = 1; // Just query 1 job for now int x = sprintf(reqline, "%s %d %s", esc1, job_number, esc2); free( esc1 ); free( esc2 ); ASSERT( x > 0 ); const char *buf = reqline.c_str(); if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) { if ( m_mode == results_only ) { return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED; } now_pending(command,buf,normal_proxy,medium_prio); } Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf); if ( result ) { if (result->argc != 2) { EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command); } int rc; if (strcmp(result->argv[1], NULLSTRING) == 0) { rc = 0; } else { rc = 1; error_string = result->argv[1]; } delete result; return rc; } if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) { sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command ); return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT; } return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING; } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-134
0
10,867
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: AddListItem(list_item_t **pfirst, LPVOID data) { list_item_t *new_item = malloc(sizeof(list_item_t)); if (new_item == NULL) { return ERROR_OUTOFMEMORY; } new_item->next = *pfirst; new_item->data = data; *pfirst = new_item; return NO_ERROR; } Commit Message: Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336) Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code. This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time, CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk. Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData() for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()). Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit. Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <jbaines@tenable.com>. CVE: 2018-9336 Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de> Acked-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com> Message-Id: <20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de> URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de> CWE ID: CWE-415
0
13,677
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static int inotify_fasync(int fd, struct file *file, int on) { struct fsnotify_group *group = file->private_data; return fasync_helper(fd, file, on, &group->inotify_data.fa) >= 0 ? 0 : -EIO; } Commit Message: inotify: fix double free/corruption of stuct user On an error path in inotify_init1 a normal user can trigger a double free of struct user. This is a regression introduced by a2ae4cc9a16e ("inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure"). We fix this by making sure that if a group exists the user reference is dropped when the group is cleaned up. We should not explictly drop the reference on error and also drop the reference when the group is cleaned up. The new lifetime rules are that an inotify group lives from inotify_new_group to the last fsnotify_put_group. Since the struct user and inotify_devs are directly tied to this lifetime they are only changed/updated in those two locations. We get rid of all special casing of struct user or user->inotify_devs. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.37 and up) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> CWE ID: CWE-399
0
28,598
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static int inet6_fill_ifmcaddr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ifmcaddr6 *ifmca, u32 portid, u32 seq, int event, u16 flags) { struct nlmsghdr *nlh; u8 scope = RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE; int ifindex = ifmca->idev->dev->ifindex; if (ipv6_addr_scope(&ifmca->mca_addr) & IFA_SITE) scope = RT_SCOPE_SITE; nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, sizeof(struct ifaddrmsg), flags); if (nlh == NULL) return -EMSGSIZE; put_ifaddrmsg(nlh, 128, IFA_F_PERMANENT, scope, ifindex); if (nla_put(skb, IFA_MULTICAST, 16, &ifmca->mca_addr) < 0 || put_cacheinfo(skb, ifmca->mca_cstamp, ifmca->mca_tstamp, INFINITY_LIFE_TIME, INFINITY_LIFE_TIME) < 0) { nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh); return -EMSGSIZE; } nlmsg_end(skb, nlh); return 0; } Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet drops. If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values too small, but not for too big ones.) The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU. Note that similar check is already performed at ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA. Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-20
0
18,486
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: UrlData::UrlData(const GURL& url, CORSMode cors_mode, UrlIndex* url_index) : url_(url), have_data_origin_(false), cors_mode_(cors_mode), url_index_(url_index), length_(kPositionNotSpecified), range_supported_(false), cacheable_(false), has_opaque_data_(false), last_used_(), multibuffer_(this, url_index_->block_shift_) {} Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates: - DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker - HasSingleSecurityOrigin - DidPassCORSAccessCheck . These are used to determine whether the response body is available for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them. This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors to match the spec. Bug: 849942, 875153 Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098 Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258} CWE ID: CWE-732
1
28,763
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::noneSupported() { BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "noneSupported(" << (void*)this << ")"; stopPeriodicTimers(); m_loadState = WaitingForSource; m_currentSourceNode = nullptr; m_error = MediaError::create(MediaError::kMediaErrSrcNotSupported); forgetResourceSpecificTracks(); setNetworkState(kNetworkNoSource); updateDisplayState(); scheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::error); scheduleRejectPlayPromises(NotSupportedError); closeMediaSource(); setShouldDelayLoadEvent(false); if (layoutObject()) layoutObject()->updateFromElement(); } Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly disable it. Intent to ship: https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ BUG=689018 Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002 Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423} CWE ID: CWE-119
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23,456
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: bool ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout( const ImeConfigValue& value) { return (value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList && value.string_list_value.size() == 1 && chromeos::input_method::IsKeyboardLayout( value.string_list_value[0])); } Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary. BUG=chromium-os:16238 TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before. Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-399
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23,855
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: rc_pdf14_maskbuf_free(gs_memory_t * mem, void *ptr_in, client_name_t cname) { /* Ending the mask buffer. */ pdf14_rcmask_t *rcmask = (pdf14_rcmask_t * ) ptr_in; /* free the pdf14 buffer. */ if ( rcmask->mask_buf != NULL ){ pdf14_buf_free(rcmask->mask_buf); } gs_free_object(mem, rcmask, "rc_pdf14_maskbuf_free"); } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-416
0
6,472
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnExtendSelectionAndDelete(int before, int after) { ImeEventGuard guard(GetRenderWidget()); frame_->ExtendSelectionAndDelete(before, after); } Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen. BUG=776418, 800056 Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378 Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790} CWE ID:
0
15,251
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static wchar_t vfat_skip_char(wchar_t w) { return (w == '.') || (w == ' '); } Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its 16-bit output. This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new capabilities. The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a different patch. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> CWE ID: CWE-119
0
13,396
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::getDescriptors( ScriptState* scriptState, ExceptionState&) { return getDescriptorsImpl( scriptState, mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity::MULTIPLE); } Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids. This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed object isn't empty. BUG=None R=juncai, dcheng Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003 Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809} CWE ID: CWE-119
0
25,709
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static ssize_t uio_write(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { struct uio_listener *listener = filep->private_data; struct uio_device *idev = listener->dev; ssize_t retval; s32 irq_on; if (!idev->info->irq) return -EIO; if (count != sizeof(s32)) return -EINVAL; if (!idev->info->irqcontrol) return -ENOSYS; if (copy_from_user(&irq_on, buf, count)) return -EFAULT; retval = idev->info->irqcontrol(idev->info, irq_on); return retval ? retval : sizeof(s32); } Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size check. Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org. CWE ID: CWE-119
0
5,460
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static int ipx_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct ipx_sock *ipxs = ipx_sk(sk); struct sockaddr_ipx *sipx = (struct sockaddr_ipx *)msg->msg_name; struct ipxhdr *ipx = NULL; struct sk_buff *skb; int copied, rc; lock_sock(sk); /* put the autobinding in */ if (!ipxs->port) { struct sockaddr_ipx uaddr; uaddr.sipx_port = 0; uaddr.sipx_network = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_IPX_INTERN rc = -ENETDOWN; if (!ipxs->intrfc) goto out; /* Someone zonked the iface */ memcpy(uaddr.sipx_node, ipxs->intrfc->if_node, IPX_NODE_LEN); #endif /* CONFIG_IPX_INTERN */ rc = __ipx_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&uaddr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_ipx)); if (rc) goto out; } rc = -ENOTCONN; if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)) goto out; skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &rc); if (!skb) goto out; ipx = ipx_hdr(skb); copied = ntohs(ipx->ipx_pktsize) - sizeof(struct ipxhdr); if (copied > size) { copied = size; msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; } rc = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct ipxhdr), msg->msg_iov, copied); if (rc) goto out_free; if (skb->tstamp.tv64) sk->sk_stamp = skb->tstamp; msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sipx); if (sipx) { sipx->sipx_family = AF_IPX; sipx->sipx_port = ipx->ipx_source.sock; memcpy(sipx->sipx_node, ipx->ipx_source.node, IPX_NODE_LEN); sipx->sipx_network = IPX_SKB_CB(skb)->ipx_source_net; sipx->sipx_type = ipx->ipx_type; sipx->sipx_zero = 0; } rc = copied; out_free: skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); out: release_sock(sk); return rc; } Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) to return msg_name to the user. This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak uninitialized memory. Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets msg_name to NULL. Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David Miller. Changes since RFC: Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of verify_iovec. With this change in place I could remove " if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0) msg->msg_name = NULL ". This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL. Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change comments to netdev style. Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-20
1
2,955
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static void t1_subset_end(void) { if (t1_synthetic) { /* copy to "dup /FontName get exch definefont pop" */ while (!strstr(t1_line_array, "definefont")) { t1_getline(); t1_putline(); } while (!t1_end_eexec()) t1_getline(); /* ignore the rest */ t1_putline(); /* write "mark currentfile closefile" */ } else while (!t1_end_eexec()) { /* copy to "mark currentfile closefile" */ t1_getline(); t1_putline(); } t1_stop_eexec(); if (fixedcontent) { /* copy 512 zeros (not needed for PDF) */ while (!t1_cleartomark()) { t1_getline(); t1_putline(); } if (!t1_synthetic) /* don't check "{restore}if" for synthetic fonts */ t1_check_end(); /* write "{restore}if" if found */ } get_length3(); } Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751 CWE ID: CWE-119
0
18,261
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static zend_object_value zend_default_exception_new_ex(zend_class_entry *class_type, int skip_top_traces TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */ { zval obj; zend_object *object; zval *trace; Z_OBJVAL(obj) = zend_objects_new(&object, class_type TSRMLS_CC); Z_OBJ_HT(obj) = &default_exception_handlers; object_properties_init(object, class_type); ALLOC_ZVAL(trace); Z_UNSET_ISREF_P(trace); Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(trace, 0); zend_fetch_debug_backtrace(trace, skip_top_traces, 0, 0 TSRMLS_CC); zend_update_property_string(default_exception_ce, &obj, "file", sizeof("file")-1, zend_get_executed_filename(TSRMLS_C) TSRMLS_CC); zend_update_property_long(default_exception_ce, &obj, "line", sizeof("line")-1, zend_get_executed_lineno(TSRMLS_C) TSRMLS_CC); zend_update_property(default_exception_ce, &obj, "trace", sizeof("trace")-1, trace TSRMLS_CC); return Z_OBJVAL(obj); } /* }}} */ Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-20
0
26,677
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static inline void perf_cgroup_sched_in(struct task_struct *task) { perf_cgroup_switch(task, PERF_CGROUP_SWIN); } Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the resulting interrupt do the wakeup. For the various event classes: - hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from the PMI-tail (ARM etc.) - tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context. - software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot perform wakeups, and hence need 0. As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented). The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a bunch of conditionals in fast paths. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com> Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> CWE ID: CWE-399
0
17,928
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static Image *ReadEMFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info, ExceptionInfo *exception) { Gdiplus::Bitmap *bitmap; Gdiplus::BitmapData bitmap_data; Gdiplus::GdiplusStartupInput startup_input; Gdiplus::Graphics *graphics; Gdiplus::Image *source; Gdiplus::Rect rect; GeometryInfo geometry_info; Image *image; MagickStatusType flags; register PixelPacket *q; register ssize_t x; ssize_t y; ULONG_PTR token; unsigned char *p; wchar_t fileName[MaxTextExtent]; assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL); assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature); if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse) (void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s", image_info->filename); assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL); image=AcquireImage(image_info); if (Gdiplus::GdiplusStartup(&token,&startup_input,NULL) != Gdiplus::Status::Ok) ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "GdiplusStartupFailed"); MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8,0,image->filename,-1,fileName,MaxTextExtent); source=Gdiplus::Image::FromFile(fileName); if (source == (Gdiplus::Image *) NULL) { Gdiplus::GdiplusShutdown(token); ThrowReaderException(FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile"); } image->x_resolution=source->GetHorizontalResolution(); image->y_resolution=source->GetVerticalResolution(); image->columns=(size_t) source->GetWidth(); image->rows=(size_t) source->GetHeight(); if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL) { flags=ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info); image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho; image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma; if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0) image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution; if ((image->x_resolution > 0.0) && (image->y_resolution > 0.0)) { image->columns=(size_t) floor((Gdiplus::REAL) source->GetWidth() / source->GetHorizontalResolution() * image->x_resolution + 0.5); image->rows=(size_t)floor((Gdiplus::REAL) source->GetHeight() / source->GetVerticalResolution() * image->y_resolution + 0.5); } } bitmap=new Gdiplus::Bitmap((INT) image->columns,(INT) image->rows, PixelFormat32bppARGB); graphics=Gdiplus::Graphics::FromImage(bitmap); graphics->SetInterpolationMode(Gdiplus::InterpolationModeHighQualityBicubic); graphics->SetSmoothingMode(Gdiplus::SmoothingModeHighQuality); graphics->SetTextRenderingHint(Gdiplus::TextRenderingHintClearTypeGridFit); graphics->Clear(Gdiplus::Color((BYTE) ScaleQuantumToChar(QuantumRange- image->background_color.opacity),(BYTE) ScaleQuantumToChar( image->background_color.red),(BYTE) ScaleQuantumToChar( image->background_color.green),(BYTE) ScaleQuantumToChar( image->background_color.blue))); graphics->DrawImage(source,0,0,(INT) image->columns,(INT) image->rows); delete graphics; delete source; rect=Gdiplus::Rect(0,0,(INT) image->columns,(INT) image->rows); if (bitmap->LockBits(&rect,Gdiplus::ImageLockModeRead,PixelFormat32bppARGB, &bitmap_data) != Gdiplus::Ok) { delete bitmap; Gdiplus::GdiplusShutdown(token); ThrowReaderException(FileOpenError,"UnableToReadImageData"); } image->matte=MagickTrue; for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++) { p=(unsigned char *) bitmap_data.Scan0+(y*abs(bitmap_data.Stride)); if (bitmap_data.Stride < 0) q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,image->rows-y-1,image->columns,1,exception); else q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception); if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) break; for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++) { SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++)); SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++)); SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++)); SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++)); q++; } if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse) break; } bitmap->UnlockBits(&bitmap_data); delete bitmap; Gdiplus::GdiplusShutdown(token); return(image); } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-119
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11,133
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthUsing(LogicalWidthType widthType, LayoutUnit availableLogicalWidth) { LayoutUnit logicalWidthResult = logicalWidth(); Length logicalWidth; if (widthType == LogicalWidth) logicalWidth = style()->logicalWidth(); else if (widthType == MinLogicalWidth) logicalWidth = style()->logicalMinWidth(); else logicalWidth = style()->logicalMaxWidth(); if (logicalWidth.isIntrinsicOrAuto()) { LayoutUnit marginStart = style()->marginStart().calcMinValue(availableLogicalWidth); LayoutUnit marginEnd = style()->marginEnd().calcMinValue(availableLogicalWidth); if (availableLogicalWidth) logicalWidthResult = availableLogicalWidth - marginStart - marginEnd; if (sizesToIntrinsicLogicalWidth(widthType)) { logicalWidthResult = max(logicalWidthResult, minPreferredLogicalWidth()); logicalWidthResult = min(logicalWidthResult, maxPreferredLogicalWidth()); } } else // FIXME: If the containing block flow is perpendicular to our direction we need to use the available logical height instead. logicalWidthResult = computeBorderBoxLogicalWidth(logicalWidth.calcValue(availableLogicalWidth)); return logicalWidthResult; } Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding. https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046 Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21 Reviewed by David Hyatt. Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html * rendering/RenderBox.cpp: (WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing): LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding. https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046 Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21 Reviewed by David Hyatt. * fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added. * fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added. git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 CWE ID: CWE-20
0
6,355
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void php_snmp_write_property(zval *object, zval *member, zval *value, const zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC) { zval tmp_member; php_snmp_object *obj; php_snmp_prop_handler *hnd; int ret; if (Z_TYPE_P(member) != IS_STRING) { tmp_member = *member; zval_copy_ctor(&tmp_member); convert_to_string(&tmp_member); member = &tmp_member; } ret = FAILURE; obj = (php_snmp_object *)zend_objects_get_address(object TSRMLS_CC); ret = zend_hash_find(&php_snmp_properties, Z_STRVAL_P(member), Z_STRLEN_P(member) + 1, (void **) &hnd); if (ret == SUCCESS && hnd->write_func) { hnd->write_func(obj, value TSRMLS_CC); if (! PZVAL_IS_REF(value) && Z_REFCOUNT_P(value) == 0) { Z_ADDREF_P(value); zval_ptr_dtor(&value); } } else { zend_object_handlers * std_hnd = zend_get_std_object_handlers(); std_hnd->write_property(object, member, value, key TSRMLS_CC); } if (member == &tmp_member) { zval_dtor(member); } } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-416
0
327
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: virDomainGetMemoryParameters(virDomainPtr domain, virTypedParameterPtr params, int *nparams, unsigned int flags) { virConnectPtr conn; VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "params=%p, nparams=%d, flags=%x", params, (nparams) ? *nparams : -1, flags); virResetLastError(); virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1); virCheckNonNullArgGoto(nparams, error); virCheckNonNegativeArgGoto(*nparams, error); if (*nparams != 0) virCheckNonNullArgGoto(params, error); if (VIR_DRV_SUPPORTS_FEATURE(domain->conn->driver, domain->conn, VIR_DRV_FEATURE_TYPED_PARAM_STRING)) flags |= VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING_OKAY; VIR_EXCLUSIVE_FLAGS_GOTO(VIR_DOMAIN_AFFECT_LIVE, VIR_DOMAIN_AFFECT_CONFIG, error); conn = domain->conn; if (conn->driver->domainGetMemoryParameters) { int ret; ret = conn->driver->domainGetMemoryParameters(domain, params, nparams, flags); if (ret < 0) goto error; return ret; } virReportUnsupportedError(); error: virDispatchError(domain->conn); return -1; } Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in virDomainGetTime(). Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com> CWE ID: CWE-254
0
29,782
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void RecordDownloadCompleted(int64_t download_len, bool is_parallelizable, DownloadSource download_source) { RecordDownloadCountWithSource(COMPLETED_COUNT, download_source); int64_t max = 1024 * 1024 * 1024; // One Terabyte. download_len /= 1024; // In Kilobytes UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS("Download.DownloadSize", download_len, 1, max, 256); if (is_parallelizable) { UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS("Download.DownloadSize.Parallelizable", download_len, 1, max, 256); } } Commit Message: Add .desktop file to download_file_types.asciipb .desktop files act as shortcuts on Linux, allowing arbitrary code execution. We should send pings for these files. Bug: 904182 Change-Id: Ibc26141fb180e843e1ffaf3f78717a9109d2fa9a Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1344552 Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#611272} CWE ID: CWE-20
0
27,141
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: ApiTestEnvironment::~ApiTestEnvironment() { } Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden BUG=546677 Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003 Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654} CWE ID: CWE-264
0
19,848
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static int handle_invvpid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); u32 vmx_instruction_info; unsigned long type, types; gva_t gva; struct x86_exception e; struct { u64 vpid; u64 gla; } operand; if (!(vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID) || !(vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vpid_caps & VMX_VPID_INVVPID_BIT)) { kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); return 1; } if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu)) return 1; vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO); type = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, (vmx_instruction_info >> 28) & 0xf); types = (vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vpid_caps & VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SUPPORTED_MASK) >> 8; if (type >= 32 || !(types & (1 << type))) { nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID); return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); } /* according to the intel vmx instruction reference, the memory * operand is read even if it isn't needed (e.g., for type==global) */ if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION), vmx_instruction_info, false, &gva)) return 1; if (kvm_read_guest_virt(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, gva, &operand, sizeof(operand), &e)) { kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e); return 1; } if (operand.vpid >> 16) { nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID); return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); } switch (type) { case VMX_VPID_EXTENT_INDIVIDUAL_ADDR: if (is_noncanonical_address(operand.gla, vcpu)) { nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID); return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); } /* fall through */ case VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_CONTEXT: case VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_NON_GLOBAL: if (!operand.vpid) { nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID); return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); } break; case VMX_VPID_EXTENT_ALL_CONTEXT: break; default: WARN_ON_ONCE(1); return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); } __vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, vmx->nested.vpid02); nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu); return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); } Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8 If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8. This fixes CVE-2017-12154. Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> CWE ID:
0
29,091
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static CCPrepare gen_prepare_cc(DisasContext *s, int b, TCGv reg) { int inv, jcc_op, cond; TCGMemOp size; CCPrepare cc; TCGv t0; inv = b & 1; jcc_op = (b >> 1) & 7; switch (s->cc_op) { case CC_OP_SUBB ... CC_OP_SUBQ: /* We optimize relational operators for the cmp/jcc case. */ size = s->cc_op - CC_OP_SUBB; switch (jcc_op) { case JCC_BE: tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_tmp4, cpu_cc_srcT); gen_extu(size, cpu_tmp4); t0 = gen_ext_tl(cpu_tmp0, cpu_cc_src, size, false); cc = (CCPrepare) { .cond = TCG_COND_LEU, .reg = cpu_tmp4, .reg2 = t0, .mask = -1, .use_reg2 = true }; break; case JCC_L: cond = TCG_COND_LT; goto fast_jcc_l; case JCC_LE: cond = TCG_COND_LE; fast_jcc_l: tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_tmp4, cpu_cc_srcT); gen_exts(size, cpu_tmp4); t0 = gen_ext_tl(cpu_tmp0, cpu_cc_src, size, true); cc = (CCPrepare) { .cond = cond, .reg = cpu_tmp4, .reg2 = t0, .mask = -1, .use_reg2 = true }; break; default: goto slow_jcc; } break; default: slow_jcc: /* This actually generates good code for JC, JZ and JS. */ switch (jcc_op) { case JCC_O: cc = gen_prepare_eflags_o(s, reg); break; case JCC_B: cc = gen_prepare_eflags_c(s, reg); break; case JCC_Z: cc = gen_prepare_eflags_z(s, reg); break; case JCC_BE: gen_compute_eflags(s); cc = (CCPrepare) { .cond = TCG_COND_NE, .reg = cpu_cc_src, .mask = CC_Z | CC_C }; break; case JCC_S: cc = gen_prepare_eflags_s(s, reg); break; case JCC_P: cc = gen_prepare_eflags_p(s, reg); break; case JCC_L: gen_compute_eflags(s); if (TCGV_EQUAL(reg, cpu_cc_src)) { reg = cpu_tmp0; } tcg_gen_shri_tl(reg, cpu_cc_src, 4); /* CC_O -> CC_S */ tcg_gen_xor_tl(reg, reg, cpu_cc_src); cc = (CCPrepare) { .cond = TCG_COND_NE, .reg = reg, .mask = CC_S }; break; default: case JCC_LE: gen_compute_eflags(s); if (TCGV_EQUAL(reg, cpu_cc_src)) { reg = cpu_tmp0; } tcg_gen_shri_tl(reg, cpu_cc_src, 4); /* CC_O -> CC_S */ tcg_gen_xor_tl(reg, reg, cpu_cc_src); cc = (CCPrepare) { .cond = TCG_COND_NE, .reg = reg, .mask = CC_S | CC_Z }; break; } break; } if (inv) { cc.cond = tcg_invert_cond(cc.cond); } return cc; } Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation caching' reported by Jann Horn here: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122 Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com> Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> CWE ID: CWE-94
0
2,809
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps) { mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock); memcpy(ps->channels, &kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels, sizeof(ps->channels)); ps->flags = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags; mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock); memset(&ps->reserved, 0, sizeof(ps->reserved)); return 0; } Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0 on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec. This is CVE-2015-7513. Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> CWE ID:
0
1,393
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static struct mempolicy *shmem_get_sbmpol(struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo) { struct mempolicy *mpol = NULL; if (sbinfo->mpol) { spin_lock(&sbinfo->stat_lock); /* prevent replace/use races */ mpol = sbinfo->mpol; mpol_get(mpol); spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock); } return mpol; } Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be specified if mpol=M is given. Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object. To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run: # mkdir /tmp/x # mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x # grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0 # mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x # grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0 # note ? garbage in mpol=... output above # dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1 # panic here Panic: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [< (null)>] (null) [...] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Call Trace: mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160 shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270 shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0 shmem_create+0x18/0x20 vfs_create+0xb5/0x130 do_last+0x9a1/0xea0 path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0 do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0 do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0 compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20 cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable behavior. The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol: config = *sbinfo shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true) mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol) sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */ This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol. How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did not look back further. Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> CWE ID: CWE-399
0
11,981
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static void labelto(JF, int inst, int addr) { if (addr != (js_Instruction)addr) js_syntaxerror(J, "jump address integer overflow"); F->code[inst] = addr; } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-476
0
12,355
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: sc_pkcs15emu_add_cert(sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card, int type, int authority, const sc_path_t *path, const sc_pkcs15_id_t *id, const char *label, int obj_flags) { sc_pkcs15_cert_info_t *info; info = calloc(1, sizeof(*info)); if (!info) { LOG_FUNC_RETURN(p15card->card->ctx, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY); } info->id = *id; info->authority = authority; if (path) info->path = *path; return sc_pkcs15emu_add_object(p15card, type, label, info, NULL, obj_flags); } Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH for reporting the problems. CWE ID: CWE-415
0
18,269
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: int TabStripGtk::GetAvailableWidthForTabs(TabGtk* last_tab) const { if (!base::i18n::IsRTL()) return last_tab->x() - bounds_.x() + last_tab->width(); else return bounds_.width() - last_tab->x(); } Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt. BUG=107201 TEST=no visible change Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-20
0
12,810
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: explicit RenderFrameCreatedObserver(Shell* shell) : WebContentsObserver(shell->web_contents()), last_rfh_(nullptr) {} Commit Message: Security drop fullscreen for any nested WebContents level. This relands 3dcaec6e30feebefc11e with a fix to the test. BUG=873080 TEST=as in bug Change-Id: Ie68b197fc6b92447e9633f233354a68fefcf20c7 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1175925 Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#583335} CWE ID: CWE-20
0
25,746
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void LocalFrame::ForceSynchronousDocumentInstall( const AtomicString& mime_type, scoped_refptr<SharedBuffer> data) { CHECK(loader_.StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument()); DCHECK(!Client()->IsLocalFrameClientImpl()); GetDocument()->Shutdown(); DomWindow()->InstallNewDocument( mime_type, DocumentInit::Create().WithFrame(this), false); loader_.StateMachine()->AdvanceTo( FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedFirstRealLoad); GetDocument()->OpenForNavigation(kForceSynchronousParsing, mime_type, AtomicString("UTF-8")); data->ForEachSegment( [this](const char* segment, size_t segment_size, size_t segment_offset) { GetDocument()->Parser()->AppendBytes(segment, segment_size); return true; }); GetDocument()->Parser()->Finish(); if (GetPage() && GetDocument()->IsSVGDocument()) GetPage()->GetUseCounter().DidCommitLoad(this); } Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window Bug: 377995 Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558 Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663} CWE ID: CWE-285
0
21,879
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::EnsureRenderbufferBound() { if (!state_.bound_renderbuffer_valid) { state_.bound_renderbuffer_valid = true; api()->glBindRenderbufferEXTFn(GL_RENDERBUFFER, state_.bound_renderbuffer.get() ? state_.bound_renderbuffer->service_id() : 0); } } Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread. Bug: 881152, 957001 Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630 Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568} CWE ID: CWE-416
0
27,203
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: GLuint GetClientId(const MANAGER_TYPE* manager, const OBJECT_TYPE* object) { DCHECK(manager); GLuint client_id = 0; if (object) { manager->GetClientId(object->service_id(), &client_id); } return client_id; } Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread. Bug: 881152, 957001 Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630 Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568} CWE ID: CWE-416
0
21,674
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static void read_exception(struct pstore *ps, uint32_t index, struct core_exception *result) { struct disk_exception *de = get_exception(ps, index); /* copy it */ result->old_chunk = le64_to_cpu(de->old_chunk); result->new_chunk = le64_to_cpu(de->new_chunk); } Commit Message: dm snapshot: fix data corruption This patch fixes a particular type of data corruption that has been encountered when loading a snapshot's metadata from disk. When we allocate a new chunk in persistent_prepare, we increment ps->next_free and we make sure that it doesn't point to a metadata area by further incrementing it if necessary. When we load metadata from disk on device activation, ps->next_free is positioned after the last used data chunk. However, if this last used data chunk is followed by a metadata area, ps->next_free is positioned erroneously to the metadata area. A newly-allocated chunk is placed at the same location as the metadata area, resulting in data or metadata corruption. This patch changes the code so that ps->next_free skips the metadata area when metadata are loaded in function read_exceptions. The patch also moves a piece of code from persistent_prepare_exception to a separate function skip_metadata to avoid code duplication. CVE-2013-4299 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com> CWE ID: CWE-264
0
11,484
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: int test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e; int i, j, s = 0, t, ret = 0; int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 }; int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 }; a = BN_new(); b[0] = BN_new(); b[1] = BN_new(); c = BN_new(); d = BN_new(); e = BN_new(); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]); BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0); for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { t = BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(c, a, b[j], ctx); if (t) { s++; BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(d, c, b[j], ctx); BN_GF2m_add(d, c, d); BN_GF2m_mod(e, a, b[j]); # if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */ if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp, c); BIO_puts(bp, " is root of z^2 + z = "); BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " % "); BN_print(bp, b[j]); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } } # endif BN_GF2m_add(e, e, d); /* * Test that solution of quadratic c satisfies c^2 + c = a. */ if (!BN_is_zero(e)) { fprintf(stderr, "GF(2^m) modular solve quadratic test failed!\n"); goto err; } } else { # if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't * handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */ if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BIO_puts(bp, "There are no roots of z^2 + z = "); BN_print(bp, a); BIO_puts(bp, " % "); BN_print(bp, b[j]); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } } # endif } } } if (s == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "All %i tests of GF(2^m) modular solve quadratic resulted in no roots;\n", num0); fprintf(stderr, "this is very unlikely and probably indicates an error.\n"); goto err; } ret = 1; err: BN_free(a); BN_free(b[0]); BN_free(b[1]); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); return ret; } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-200
0
5,297
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: nvmet_fc_delete_target_assoc(struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc) { struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport = assoc->tgtport; struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *queue; unsigned long flags; int i; spin_lock_irqsave(&tgtport->lock, flags); for (i = NVMET_NR_QUEUES; i >= 0; i--) { queue = assoc->queues[i]; if (queue) { if (!nvmet_fc_tgt_q_get(queue)) continue; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags); nvmet_fc_delete_target_queue(queue); nvmet_fc_tgt_q_put(queue); spin_lock_irqsave(&tgtport->lock, flags); } } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tgtport->lock, flags); nvmet_fc_tgt_a_put(assoc); } Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range. When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range. Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> CWE ID: CWE-119
0
18,090
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: virtual ~TestWebFrameClient() { } Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..." Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ. > This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and > PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all > the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the > PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new > MHTMLTest file. > > Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the > 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus > have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better. > > Detailed list of changes: > > - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test > - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test > - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code > - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test > - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test > - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test > - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test > - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file > - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test > - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test > - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test > - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test > - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test > - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test > - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages > - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links > - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator > - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src > - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags > - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS > - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter > > BUG= > R=abarth@chromium.org > > Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003 TBR=tiger@opera.com Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 CWE ID: CWE-119
0
15,910
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void Document::addConsoleMessage(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ConsoleMessage> consoleMessage) { if (!isContextThread()) { m_taskRunner->postTask(FROM_HERE, AddConsoleMessageTask::create(consoleMessage->source(), consoleMessage->level(), consoleMessage->message())); return; } if (!m_frame) return; if (!consoleMessage->scriptState() && consoleMessage->url().isNull() && !consoleMessage->lineNumber()) { consoleMessage->setURL(url().string()); if (!isInDocumentWrite() && scriptableDocumentParser()) { ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = scriptableDocumentParser(); if (parser->isParsingAtLineNumber()) consoleMessage->setLineNumber(parser->lineNumber().oneBasedInt()); } } m_frame->console().addMessage(consoleMessage); } Commit Message: Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events. This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs. BUG=536652 Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002 Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419} CWE ID: CWE-20
0
12,212
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: QuotaTaskObserver::~QuotaTaskObserver() { std::for_each(running_quota_tasks_.begin(), running_quota_tasks_.end(), std::mem_fun(&QuotaTask::Abort)); } Commit Message: Quota double-delete fix BUG=142310 Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10832407 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152532 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-399
0
14,866
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: Element* Editor::FindEventTargetFrom(const VisibleSelection& selection) const { Element* target = AssociatedElementOf(selection.Start()); if (!target) target = GetFrame().GetDocument()->body(); return target; } Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate| since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|. Bug: 742093 Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389 Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660} CWE ID: CWE-119
0
736
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static void currentTimeFunc( sqlite3_context *context, int argc, sqlite3_value **argv ){ time_t t; char *zFormat = (char *)sqlite3_user_data(context); sqlite3_int64 iT; struct tm *pTm; struct tm sNow; char zBuf[20]; UNUSED_PARAMETER(argc); UNUSED_PARAMETER(argv); iT = sqlite3StmtCurrentTime(context); if( iT<=0 ) return; t = iT/1000 - 10000*(sqlite3_int64)21086676; #if HAVE_GMTIME_R pTm = gmtime_r(&t, &sNow); #else sqlite3_mutex_enter(sqlite3MutexAlloc(SQLITE_MUTEX_STATIC_MASTER)); pTm = gmtime(&t); if( pTm ) memcpy(&sNow, pTm, sizeof(sNow)); sqlite3_mutex_leave(sqlite3MutexAlloc(SQLITE_MUTEX_STATIC_MASTER)); #endif if( pTm ){ strftime(zBuf, 20, zFormat, &sNow); sqlite3_result_text(context, zBuf, -1, SQLITE_TRANSIENT); } } Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL. This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in third_party/sqlite/src/ and third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh. The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended. BUG=742407 Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976 Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275} CWE ID: CWE-119
0
18,612
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: ofputil_count_queue_stats(const struct ofp_header *oh) { struct ofpbuf b = ofpbuf_const_initializer(oh, ntohs(oh->length)); ofpraw_pull_assert(&b); for (size_t n = 0; ; n++) { struct ofputil_queue_stats qs; if (ofputil_decode_queue_stats(&qs, &b)) { return n; } } } Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command. When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder, however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This commit fixes the problem. ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default. Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249 Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org> Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com> CWE ID: CWE-617
0
16,984
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: snap_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *p, u_int length, u_int caplen, const struct lladdr_info *src, const struct lladdr_info *dst, u_int bridge_pad) { uint32_t orgcode; register u_short et; register int ret; ND_TCHECK2(*p, 5); if (caplen < 5 || length < 5) goto trunc; orgcode = EXTRACT_24BITS(p); et = EXTRACT_16BITS(p + 3); if (ndo->ndo_eflag) { /* * Somebody's already printed the MAC addresses, if there * are any, so just print the SNAP header, not the MAC * addresses. */ ND_PRINT((ndo, "oui %s (0x%06x), %s %s (0x%04x), length %u: ", tok2str(oui_values, "Unknown", orgcode), orgcode, (orgcode == 0x000000 ? "ethertype" : "pid"), tok2str(oui_to_struct_tok(orgcode), "Unknown", et), et, length - 5)); } p += 5; length -= 5; caplen -= 5; switch (orgcode) { case OUI_ENCAP_ETHER: case OUI_CISCO_90: /* * This is an encapsulated Ethernet packet, * or a packet bridged by some piece of * Cisco hardware; the protocol ID is * an Ethernet protocol type. */ ret = ethertype_print(ndo, et, p, length, caplen, src, dst); if (ret) return (ret); break; case OUI_APPLETALK: if (et == ETHERTYPE_ATALK) { /* * No, I have no idea why Apple used one * of their own OUIs, rather than * 0x000000, and an Ethernet packet * type, for Appletalk data packets, * but used 0x000000 and an Ethernet * packet type for AARP packets. */ ret = ethertype_print(ndo, et, p, length, caplen, src, dst); if (ret) return (ret); } break; case OUI_CISCO: switch (et) { case PID_CISCO_CDP: cdp_print(ndo, p, length, caplen); return (1); case PID_CISCO_DTP: dtp_print(ndo, p, length); return (1); case PID_CISCO_UDLD: udld_print(ndo, p, length); return (1); case PID_CISCO_VTP: vtp_print(ndo, p, length); return (1); case PID_CISCO_PVST: case PID_CISCO_VLANBRIDGE: stp_print(ndo, p, length); return (1); default: break; } break; case OUI_RFC2684: switch (et) { case PID_RFC2684_ETH_FCS: case PID_RFC2684_ETH_NOFCS: /* * XXX - remove the last two bytes for * PID_RFC2684_ETH_FCS? */ /* * Skip the padding. */ ND_TCHECK2(*p, bridge_pad); caplen -= bridge_pad; length -= bridge_pad; p += bridge_pad; /* * What remains is an Ethernet packet. */ ether_print(ndo, p, length, caplen, NULL, NULL); return (1); case PID_RFC2684_802_5_FCS: case PID_RFC2684_802_5_NOFCS: /* * XXX - remove the last two bytes for * PID_RFC2684_ETH_FCS? */ /* * Skip the padding, but not the Access * Control field. */ ND_TCHECK2(*p, bridge_pad); caplen -= bridge_pad; length -= bridge_pad; p += bridge_pad; /* * What remains is an 802.5 Token Ring * packet. */ token_print(ndo, p, length, caplen); return (1); case PID_RFC2684_FDDI_FCS: case PID_RFC2684_FDDI_NOFCS: /* * XXX - remove the last two bytes for * PID_RFC2684_ETH_FCS? */ /* * Skip the padding. */ ND_TCHECK2(*p, bridge_pad + 1); caplen -= bridge_pad + 1; length -= bridge_pad + 1; p += bridge_pad + 1; /* * What remains is an FDDI packet. */ fddi_print(ndo, p, length, caplen); return (1); case PID_RFC2684_BPDU: stp_print(ndo, p, length); return (1); } } if (!ndo->ndo_eflag) { /* * Nobody printed the link-layer addresses, so print them, if * we have any. */ if (src != NULL && dst != NULL) { ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s ", (src->addr_string)(ndo, src->addr), (dst->addr_string)(ndo, dst->addr))); } /* * Print the SNAP header, but if the OUI is 000000, don't * bother printing it, and report the PID as being an * ethertype. */ if (orgcode == 0x000000) { ND_PRINT((ndo, "SNAP, ethertype %s (0x%04x), length %u: ", tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown", et), et, length)); } else { ND_PRINT((ndo, "SNAP, oui %s (0x%06x), pid %s (0x%04x), length %u: ", tok2str(oui_values, "Unknown", orgcode), orgcode, tok2str(oui_to_struct_tok(orgcode), "Unknown", et), et, length)); } } return (0); trunc: ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|snap]")); return (1); } Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print(). This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz. Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST(). Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). CWE ID: CWE-125
0
14,545
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item) { DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); s->packet = rdata->packet; s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */ memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6); return(1); } Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue. Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected. Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch, eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion. Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team. CVE-2015-0206 Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> CWE ID: CWE-119
0
28,064
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void WebContentsImpl::RequestTransferURL( const GURL& url, const Referrer& referrer, WindowOpenDisposition disposition, int64 source_frame_id, const GlobalRequestID& old_request_id, bool should_replace_current_entry, bool user_gesture) { WebContents* new_contents = NULL; PageTransition transition_type = PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK; if (render_manager_.web_ui()) { OpenURLParams params(url, Referrer(), source_frame_id, disposition, render_manager_.web_ui()->GetLinkTransitionType(), false /* is_renderer_initiated */); params.transferred_global_request_id = old_request_id; new_contents = OpenURL(params); transition_type = render_manager_.web_ui()->GetLinkTransitionType(); } else { OpenURLParams params(url, referrer, source_frame_id, disposition, PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, true /* is_renderer_initiated */); params.transferred_global_request_id = old_request_id; params.should_replace_current_entry = should_replace_current_entry; params.user_gesture = user_gesture; new_contents = OpenURL(params); } if (new_contents) { FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_, DidOpenRequestedURL(new_contents, url, referrer, disposition, transition_type, source_frame_id)); } } Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof. BUG=280512 BUG=278899 TEST=See bug for repro steps. Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID:
0
16,362
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static void tcp_cong_avoid(struct sock *sk, u32 ack, u32 in_flight) { const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); icsk->icsk_ca_ops->cong_avoid(sk, ack, in_flight); tcp_sk(sk)->snd_cwnd_stamp = tcp_time_stamp; } Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his linux machines to their limits. Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-399
0
14,814
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: bool BrowserWindowGtk::IsMinimized() const { return (state_ & GDK_WINDOW_STATE_ICONIFIED); } Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt. BUG=107201 TEST=no visible change Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-20
0
12,852
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::CreateResourceHandlerForDownload( net::URLRequest* request, bool is_content_initiated, bool must_download, DownloadId id, scoped_ptr<DownloadSaveInfo> save_info, const DownloadResourceHandler::OnStartedCallback& started_cb) { scoped_ptr<ResourceHandler> handler( new DownloadResourceHandler(id, request, started_cb, save_info.Pass())); if (delegate_) { const ResourceRequestInfo* request_info( ResourceRequestInfo::ForRequest(request)); ScopedVector<ResourceThrottle> throttles; delegate_->DownloadStarting( request, request_info->GetContext(), request_info->GetChildID(), request_info->GetRouteID(), request_info->GetRequestID(), is_content_initiated, must_download, &throttles); if (!throttles.empty()) { handler.reset( new ThrottlingResourceHandler( handler.Pass(), request_info->GetChildID(), request_info->GetRequestID(), throttles.Pass())); } } return handler.Pass(); } Commit Message: Revert cross-origin auth prompt blocking. BUG=174129 Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12183030 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181113 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-264
0
2,306
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: struct tty_struct *tty_pair_get_pty(struct tty_struct *tty) { if (tty->driver->type == TTY_DRIVER_TYPE_PTY && tty->driver->subtype == PTY_TYPE_MASTER) return tty; return tty->link; } Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move tty lookup/reopen to caller). Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path. I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to stable. Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2 Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> CWE ID:
0
12,062
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static MagickBooleanType SyncAuthenticPixelsCache(Image *image, ExceptionInfo *exception) { CacheInfo *magick_restrict cache_info; const int id = GetOpenMPThreadId(); MagickBooleanType status; assert(image != (Image *) NULL); assert(image->signature == MagickSignature); assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL); cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache; assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature); assert(id < (int) cache_info->number_threads); status=SyncAuthenticPixelCacheNexus(image,cache_info->nexus_info[id], exception); return(status); } Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946 CWE ID: CWE-399
0
19,244
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static int netlink_insert(struct sock *sk, struct net *net, u32 pid) { struct nl_pid_hash *hash = &nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].hash; struct hlist_head *head; int err = -EADDRINUSE; struct sock *osk; struct hlist_node *node; int len; netlink_table_grab(); head = nl_pid_hashfn(hash, pid); len = 0; sk_for_each(osk, node, head) { if (net_eq(sock_net(osk), net) && (nlk_sk(osk)->pid == pid)) break; len++; } if (node) goto err; err = -EBUSY; if (nlk_sk(sk)->pid) goto err; err = -ENOMEM; if (BITS_PER_LONG > 32 && unlikely(hash->entries >= UINT_MAX)) goto err; if (len && nl_pid_hash_dilute(hash, len)) head = nl_pid_hashfn(hash, pid); hash->entries++; nlk_sk(sk)->pid = pid; sk_add_node(sk, head); err = 0; err: netlink_table_ungrab(); return err; } Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520] Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not including any such data at all or including the correct data from the peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX). This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961 (af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default) This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as before the regression. Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it might break some programs. With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-287
0
10,443
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static void PartiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod2Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) { TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder()); TestInterfaceImplementation* test_interface_arg; test_interface_arg = V8TestInterface::ToImplWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[0]); if (!test_interface_arg) { V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("partiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::ArgumentNotOfType(0, "TestInterface"))); return; } impl->partiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod(test_interface_arg); } Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?" Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?". Bug: 1028047 Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866 Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676} CWE ID:
0
28,622
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static void cmd_parse_search(struct ImapData *idata, const char *s) { unsigned int uid; struct Header *h = NULL; mutt_debug(2, "Handling SEARCH\n"); while ((s = imap_next_word((char *) s)) && *s != '\0') { if (mutt_str_atoui(s, &uid) < 0) continue; h = (struct Header *) mutt_hash_int_find(idata->uid_hash, uid); if (h) h->matched = true; } } Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us> CWE ID: CWE-77
0
29,512
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdClearErrorMethod(void) { gd_error_method = gd_stderr_error; } Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor(). CVE-2016-9317 CWE ID: CWE-20
0
19,379
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: set_directory_record_rr(unsigned char *bp, int dr_len, struct isoent *isoent, struct iso9660 *iso9660, enum dir_rec_type t) { /* Flags(BP 5) of the Rockridge "RR" System Use Field */ unsigned char rr_flag; #define RR_USE_PX 0x01 #define RR_USE_PN 0x02 #define RR_USE_SL 0x04 #define RR_USE_NM 0x08 #define RR_USE_CL 0x10 #define RR_USE_PL 0x20 #define RR_USE_RE 0x40 #define RR_USE_TF 0x80 int length; struct ctl_extr_rec ctl; struct isoent *rr_parent, *pxent; struct isofile *file; bp = extra_open_record(bp, dr_len, isoent, &ctl); if (t == DIR_REC_PARENT) { rr_parent = isoent->rr_parent; pxent = isoent->parent; if (rr_parent != NULL) isoent = rr_parent; else isoent = isoent->parent; } else { rr_parent = NULL; pxent = isoent; } file = isoent->file; if (t != DIR_REC_NORMAL) { rr_flag = RR_USE_PX | RR_USE_TF; if (rr_parent != NULL) rr_flag |= RR_USE_PL; } else { rr_flag = RR_USE_PX | RR_USE_NM | RR_USE_TF; if (archive_entry_filetype(file->entry) == AE_IFLNK) rr_flag |= RR_USE_SL; if (isoent->rr_parent != NULL) rr_flag |= RR_USE_RE; if (isoent->rr_child != NULL) rr_flag |= RR_USE_CL; if (archive_entry_filetype(file->entry) == AE_IFCHR || archive_entry_filetype(file->entry) == AE_IFBLK) rr_flag |= RR_USE_PN; #ifdef COMPAT_MKISOFS /* * mkisofs 2.01.01a63 records "RE" extension to * the entry of "rr_moved" directory. * I don't understand this behavior. */ if (isoent->virtual && isoent->parent == iso9660->primary.rootent && strcmp(isoent->file->basename.s, "rr_moved") == 0) rr_flag |= RR_USE_RE; #endif } /* Write "SP" System Use Entry. */ if (t == DIR_REC_SELF && isoent == isoent->parent) { length = 7; if (bp != NULL) { bp[1] = 'S'; bp[2] = 'P'; bp[3] = length; bp[4] = 1; /* version */ bp[5] = 0xBE; /* Check Byte */ bp[6] = 0xEF; /* Check Byte */ bp[7] = 0; bp += length; } extra_tell_used_size(&ctl, length); } /* Write "RR" System Use Entry. */ length = 5; if (extra_space(&ctl) < length) bp = extra_next_record(&ctl, length); if (bp != NULL) { bp[1] = 'R'; bp[2] = 'R'; bp[3] = length; bp[4] = 1; /* version */ bp[5] = rr_flag; bp += length; } extra_tell_used_size(&ctl, length); /* Write "NM" System Use Entry. */ if (rr_flag & RR_USE_NM) { /* * "NM" Format: * e.g. a basename is 'foo' * len ver flg * +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ * | 'N'| 'M'| 08 | 01 | 00 | 'f'| 'o'| 'o'| * +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ * <----------------- len -----------------> */ size_t nmlen = file->basename.length; const char *nm = file->basename.s; size_t nmmax; if (extra_space(&ctl) < 6) bp = extra_next_record(&ctl, 6); if (bp != NULL) { bp[1] = 'N'; bp[2] = 'M'; bp[4] = 1; /* version */ } nmmax = extra_space(&ctl); if (nmmax > 0xff) nmmax = 0xff; while (nmlen + 5 > nmmax) { length = (int)nmmax; if (bp != NULL) { bp[3] = length; bp[5] = 0x01;/* Alternate Name continues * in next "NM" field */ memcpy(bp+6, nm, length - 5); bp += length; } nmlen -= length - 5; nm += length - 5; extra_tell_used_size(&ctl, length); if (extra_space(&ctl) < 6) { bp = extra_next_record(&ctl, 6); nmmax = extra_space(&ctl); if (nmmax > 0xff) nmmax = 0xff; } if (bp != NULL) { bp[1] = 'N'; bp[2] = 'M'; bp[4] = 1; /* version */ } } length = 5 + (int)nmlen; if (bp != NULL) { bp[3] = length; bp[5] = 0; memcpy(bp+6, nm, nmlen); bp += length; } extra_tell_used_size(&ctl, length); } /* Write "PX" System Use Entry. */ if (rr_flag & RR_USE_PX) { /* * "PX" Format: * len ver * +----+----+----+----+-----------+-----------+ * | 'P'| 'X'| 2C | 01 | FILE MODE | LINKS | * +----+----+----+----+-----------+-----------+ * 0 1 2 3 4 12 20 * +-----------+-----------+------------------+ * | USER ID | GROUP ID |FILE SERIAL NUMBER| * +-----------+-----------+------------------+ * 20 28 36 44 */ length = 44; if (extra_space(&ctl) < length) bp = extra_next_record(&ctl, length); if (bp != NULL) { mode_t mode; int64_t uid; int64_t gid; mode = archive_entry_mode(file->entry); uid = archive_entry_uid(file->entry); gid = archive_entry_gid(file->entry); if (iso9660->opt.rr == OPT_RR_USEFUL) { /* * This action is simular mkisofs -r option * but our rockridge=useful option does not * set a zero to uid and gid. */ /* set all read bit ON */ mode |= 0444; #if !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__) if (mode & 0111) #endif /* set all exec bit ON */ mode |= 0111; /* clear all write bits. */ mode &= ~0222; /* clear setuid,setgid,sticky bits. */ mode &= ~07000; } bp[1] = 'P'; bp[2] = 'X'; bp[3] = length; bp[4] = 1; /* version */ /* file mode */ set_num_733(bp+5, mode); /* file links (stat.st_nlink) */ set_num_733(bp+13, archive_entry_nlink(file->entry)); set_num_733(bp+21, (uint32_t)uid); set_num_733(bp+29, (uint32_t)gid); /* File Serial Number */ if (pxent->dir) set_num_733(bp+37, pxent->dir_location); else if (file->hardlink_target != NULL) set_num_733(bp+37, file->hardlink_target->cur_content->location); else set_num_733(bp+37, file->cur_content->location); bp += length; } extra_tell_used_size(&ctl, length); } /* Write "SL" System Use Entry. */ if (rr_flag & RR_USE_SL) { /* * "SL" Format: * e.g. a symbolic name is 'foo/bar' * len ver flg * +----+----+----+----+----+------------+ * | 'S'| 'L'| 0F | 01 | 00 | components | * +----+----+----+----+----+-----+------+ * 0 1 2 3 4 5 ...|... 15 * <----------------- len --------+------> * components : | * cflg clen | * +----+----+----+----+----+ | * | 00 | 03 | 'f'| 'o'| 'o'| <---+ * +----+----+----+----+----+ | * 5 6 7 8 9 10 | * cflg clen | * +----+----+----+----+----+ | * | 00 | 03 | 'b'| 'a'| 'r'| <---+ * +----+----+----+----+----+ * 10 11 12 13 14 15 * * - cflg : flag of componet * - clen : length of componet */ const char *sl; char sl_last; if (extra_space(&ctl) < 7) bp = extra_next_record(&ctl, 7); sl = file->symlink.s; sl_last = '\0'; if (bp != NULL) { bp[1] = 'S'; bp[2] = 'L'; bp[4] = 1; /* version */ } for (;;) { unsigned char *nc, *cf, *cl, cldmy = 0; int sllen, slmax; slmax = extra_space(&ctl); if (slmax > 0xff) slmax = 0xff; if (bp != NULL) nc = &bp[6]; else nc = NULL; cf = cl = NULL; sllen = 0; while (*sl && sllen + 11 < slmax) { if (sl_last == '\0' && sl[0] == '/') { /* * flg len * +----+----+ * | 08 | 00 | ROOT component. * +----+----+ ("/") * * Root component has to appear * at the first component only. */ if (nc != NULL) { cf = nc++; *cf = 0x08; /* ROOT */ *nc++ = 0; } sllen += 2; sl++; sl_last = '/'; cl = NULL; continue; } if (((sl_last == '\0' || sl_last == '/') && sl[0] == '.' && sl[1] == '.' && (sl[2] == '/' || sl[2] == '\0')) || (sl[0] == '/' && sl[1] == '.' && sl[2] == '.' && (sl[3] == '/' || sl[3] == '\0'))) { /* * flg len * +----+----+ * | 04 | 00 | PARENT component. * +----+----+ ("..") */ if (nc != NULL) { cf = nc++; *cf = 0x04; /* PARENT */ *nc++ = 0; } sllen += 2; if (sl[0] == '/') sl += 3;/* skip "/.." */ else sl += 2;/* skip ".." */ sl_last = '.'; cl = NULL; continue; } if (((sl_last == '\0' || sl_last == '/') && sl[0] == '.' && (sl[1] == '/' || sl[1] == '\0')) || (sl[0] == '/' && sl[1] == '.' && (sl[2] == '/' || sl[2] == '\0'))) { /* * flg len * +----+----+ * | 02 | 00 | CURREENT component. * +----+----+ (".") */ if (nc != NULL) { cf = nc++; *cf = 0x02; /* CURRENT */ *nc++ = 0; } sllen += 2; if (sl[0] == '/') sl += 2;/* skip "/." */ else sl ++; /* skip "." */ sl_last = '.'; cl = NULL; continue; } if (sl[0] == '/' || cl == NULL) { if (nc != NULL) { cf = nc++; *cf = 0; cl = nc++; *cl = 0; } else cl = &cldmy; sllen += 2; if (sl[0] == '/') { sl_last = *sl++; continue; } } sl_last = *sl++; if (nc != NULL) { *nc++ = sl_last; (*cl) ++; } sllen++; } if (*sl) { length = 5 + sllen; if (bp != NULL) { /* * Mark flg as CONTINUE component. */ *cf |= 0x01; /* * len ver flg * +----+----+----+----+----+- * | 'S'| 'L'| XX | 01 | 01 | * +----+----+----+----+----+- * ^ * continues in next "SL" */ bp[3] = length; bp[5] = 0x01;/* This Symbolic Link * continues in next * "SL" field */ bp += length; } extra_tell_used_size(&ctl, length); if (extra_space(&ctl) < 11) bp = extra_next_record(&ctl, 11); if (bp != NULL) { /* Next 'SL' */ bp[1] = 'S'; bp[2] = 'L'; bp[4] = 1; /* version */ } } else { length = 5 + sllen; if (bp != NULL) { bp[3] = length; bp[5] = 0; bp += length; } extra_tell_used_size(&ctl, length); break; } } } /* Write "TF" System Use Entry. */ if (rr_flag & RR_USE_TF) { /* * "TF" Format: * len ver * +----+----+----+----+-----+-------------+ * | 'T'| 'F'| XX | 01 |FLAGS| TIME STAMPS | * +----+----+----+----+-----+-------------+ * 0 1 2 3 4 5 XX * TIME STAMPS : ISO 9660 Standard 9.1.5. * If TF_LONG_FORM FLAGS is set, * use ISO9660 Standard 8.4.26.1. */ #define TF_CREATION 0x01 /* Creation time recorded */ #define TF_MODIFY 0x02 /* Modification time recorded */ #define TF_ACCESS 0x04 /* Last Access time recorded */ #define TF_ATTRIBUTES 0x08 /* Last Attribute Change time recorded */ #define TF_BACKUP 0x10 /* Last Backup time recorded */ #define TF_EXPIRATION 0x20 /* Expiration time recorded */ #define TF_EFFECTIVE 0x40 /* Effective time recorded */ #define TF_LONG_FORM 0x80 /* ISO 9660 17-byte time format used */ unsigned char tf_flags; length = 5; tf_flags = 0; #ifndef COMPAT_MKISOFS if (archive_entry_birthtime_is_set(file->entry) && archive_entry_birthtime(file->entry) <= archive_entry_mtime(file->entry)) { length += 7; tf_flags |= TF_CREATION; } #endif if (archive_entry_mtime_is_set(file->entry)) { length += 7; tf_flags |= TF_MODIFY; } if (archive_entry_atime_is_set(file->entry)) { length += 7; tf_flags |= TF_ACCESS; } if (archive_entry_ctime_is_set(file->entry)) { length += 7; tf_flags |= TF_ATTRIBUTES; } if (extra_space(&ctl) < length) bp = extra_next_record(&ctl, length); if (bp != NULL) { bp[1] = 'T'; bp[2] = 'F'; bp[3] = length; bp[4] = 1; /* version */ bp[5] = tf_flags; bp += 5; /* Creation time */ if (tf_flags & TF_CREATION) { set_time_915(bp+1, archive_entry_birthtime(file->entry)); bp += 7; } /* Modification time */ if (tf_flags & TF_MODIFY) { set_time_915(bp+1, archive_entry_mtime(file->entry)); bp += 7; } /* Last Access time */ if (tf_flags & TF_ACCESS) { set_time_915(bp+1, archive_entry_atime(file->entry)); bp += 7; } /* Last Attribute Change time */ if (tf_flags & TF_ATTRIBUTES) { set_time_915(bp+1, archive_entry_ctime(file->entry)); bp += 7; } } extra_tell_used_size(&ctl, length); } /* Write "RE" System Use Entry. */ if (rr_flag & RR_USE_RE) { /* * "RE" Format: * len ver * +----+----+----+----+ * | 'R'| 'E'| 04 | 01 | * +----+----+----+----+ * 0 1 2 3 4 */ length = 4; if (extra_space(&ctl) < length) bp = extra_next_record(&ctl, length); if (bp != NULL) { bp[1] = 'R'; bp[2] = 'E'; bp[3] = length; bp[4] = 1; /* version */ bp += length; } extra_tell_used_size(&ctl, length); } /* Write "PL" System Use Entry. */ if (rr_flag & RR_USE_PL) { /* * "PL" Format: * len ver * +----+----+----+----+------------+ * | 'P'| 'L'| 0C | 01 | *LOCATION | * +----+----+----+----+------------+ * 0 1 2 3 4 12 * *LOCATION: location of parent directory */ length = 12; if (extra_space(&ctl) < length) bp = extra_next_record(&ctl, length); if (bp != NULL) { bp[1] = 'P'; bp[2] = 'L'; bp[3] = length; bp[4] = 1; /* version */ set_num_733(bp + 5, rr_parent->dir_location); bp += length; } extra_tell_used_size(&ctl, length); } /* Write "CL" System Use Entry. */ if (rr_flag & RR_USE_CL) { /* * "CL" Format: * len ver * +----+----+----+----+------------+ * | 'C'| 'L'| 0C | 01 | *LOCATION | * +----+----+----+----+------------+ * 0 1 2 3 4 12 * *LOCATION: location of child directory */ length = 12; if (extra_space(&ctl) < length) bp = extra_next_record(&ctl, length); if (bp != NULL) { bp[1] = 'C'; bp[2] = 'L'; bp[3] = length; bp[4] = 1; /* version */ set_num_733(bp + 5, isoent->rr_child->dir_location); bp += length; } extra_tell_used_size(&ctl, length); } /* Write "PN" System Use Entry. */ if (rr_flag & RR_USE_PN) { /* * "PN" Format: * len ver * +----+----+----+----+------------+------------+ * | 'P'| 'N'| 14 | 01 | dev_t high | dev_t low | * +----+----+----+----+------------+------------+ * 0 1 2 3 4 12 20 */ length = 20; if (extra_space(&ctl) < length) bp = extra_next_record(&ctl, length); if (bp != NULL) { uint64_t dev; bp[1] = 'P'; bp[2] = 'N'; bp[3] = length; bp[4] = 1; /* version */ dev = (uint64_t)archive_entry_rdev(file->entry); set_num_733(bp + 5, (uint32_t)(dev >> 32)); set_num_733(bp + 13, (uint32_t)(dev & 0xFFFFFFFF)); bp += length; } extra_tell_used_size(&ctl, length); } /* Write "ZF" System Use Entry. */ if (file->zisofs.header_size) { /* * "ZF" Format: * len ver * +----+----+----+----+----+----+-------------+ * | 'Z'| 'F'| 10 | 01 | 'p'| 'z'| Header Size | * +----+----+----+----+----+----+-------------+ * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 * +--------------------+-------------------+ * | Log2 of block Size | Uncompressed Size | * +--------------------+-------------------+ * 7 8 16 */ length = 16; if (extra_space(&ctl) < length) bp = extra_next_record(&ctl, length); if (bp != NULL) { bp[1] = 'Z'; bp[2] = 'F'; bp[3] = length; bp[4] = 1; /* version */ bp[5] = 'p'; bp[6] = 'z'; bp[7] = file->zisofs.header_size; bp[8] = file->zisofs.log2_bs; set_num_733(bp + 9, file->zisofs.uncompressed_size); bp += length; } extra_tell_used_size(&ctl, length); } /* Write "CE" System Use Entry. */ if (t == DIR_REC_SELF && isoent == isoent->parent) { length = RR_CE_SIZE; if (bp != NULL) set_SUSP_CE(bp+1, iso9660->location_rrip_er, 0, RRIP_ER_SIZE); extra_tell_used_size(&ctl, length); } extra_close_record(&ctl, 0); return (ctl.dr_len); } Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives * Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t) * Check a + b > limit by writing it as a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit to avoid problems when a + b wraps around. CWE ID: CWE-190
0
5,622
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: status_t BnMemoryHeap::onTransact( uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags) { switch(code) { case HEAP_ID: { CHECK_INTERFACE(IMemoryHeap, data, reply); reply->writeFileDescriptor(getHeapID()); reply->writeInt32(getSize()); reply->writeInt32(getFlags()); reply->writeInt32(getOffset()); return NO_ERROR; } break; default: return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags); } } Commit Message: Sanity check IMemory access versus underlying mmap Bug 26877992 Change-Id: Ibbf4b1061e4675e4e96bc944a865b53eaf6984fe CWE ID: CWE-264
0
426
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void ServiceWorkerHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host, RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) { process_ = process_host; if (!process_host) { ClearForceUpdate(); context_ = nullptr; return; } StoragePartition* partition = process_host->GetStoragePartition(); DCHECK(partition); context_ = static_cast<ServiceWorkerContextWrapper*>( partition->GetServiceWorkerContext()); } Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost upon closure of DevTools front-end. Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694 Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657 Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} CWE ID: CWE-20
1
1,804
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: bool ID3::isValid() const { return mIsValid; } Commit Message: better validation lengths of strings in ID3 tags Validate lengths on strings in ID3 tags, particularly around 0. Also added code to handle cases when we can't get memory for copies of strings we want to extract from these tags. Affects L/M/N/master, same patch for all of them. Bug: 30744884 Change-Id: I2675a817a39f0927ec1f7e9f9c09f2e61020311e Test: play mp3 file which caused a <0 length. (cherry picked from commit d23c01546c4f82840a01a380def76ab6cae5d43f) CWE ID: CWE-20
0
13,287
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static void nlmclnt_cancel_callback(struct rpc_task *task, void *data) { struct nlm_rqst *req = data; u32 status = ntohl(req->a_res.status); if (RPC_ASSASSINATED(task)) goto die; if (task->tk_status < 0) { dprintk("lockd: CANCEL call error %d, retrying.\n", task->tk_status); goto retry_cancel; } dprintk("lockd: cancel status %u (task %u)\n", status, task->tk_pid); switch (status) { case NLM_LCK_GRANTED: case NLM_LCK_DENIED_GRACE_PERIOD: case NLM_LCK_DENIED: /* Everything's good */ break; case NLM_LCK_DENIED_NOLOCKS: dprintk("lockd: CANCEL failed (server has no locks)\n"); goto retry_cancel; default: printk(KERN_NOTICE "lockd: weird return %d for CANCEL call\n", status); } die: return; retry_cancel: /* Don't ever retry more than 3 times */ if (req->a_retries++ >= NLMCLNT_MAX_RETRIES) goto die; nlm_rebind_host(req->a_host); rpc_restart_call(task); rpc_delay(task, 30 * HZ); } Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically, if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we really want to quit instead of retrying. Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org CWE ID: CWE-399
0
27,512
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static void pdf_run_Do_image(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, const char *name, fz_image *image) { pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc; pdf_show_image(ctx, pr, image); } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-416
0
19,958
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: override_value(option, priority, source) const char *option; int priority; const char *source; { option_t *opt; opt = find_option(option); if (opt == NULL) return 0; while (opt->flags & OPT_PRIOSUB) --opt; if ((opt->flags & OPT_PRIO) && priority < opt->priority) return 0; opt->priority = priority; opt->source = source; opt->winner = -1; return 1; } Commit Message: pppd: Eliminate potential integer overflow in option parsing When we are reading in a word from an options file, we maintain a count of the length we have seen so far in 'len', which is an int. When len exceeds MAXWORDLEN - 1 (i.e. 1023) we cease storing characters in the buffer but we continue to increment len. Since len is an int, it will wrap around to -2147483648 after it reaches 2147483647. At that point our test of (len < MAXWORDLEN-1) will succeed and we will start writing characters to memory again. This may enable an attacker to overwrite the heap and thereby corrupt security-relevant variables. For this reason it has been assigned a CVE identifier, CVE-2014-3158. This fixes the bug by ceasing to increment len once it reaches MAXWORDLEN. Reported-by: Lee Campbell <leecam@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> CWE ID: CWE-119
0
25,298
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: HostPortAllocatorSession::~HostPortAllocatorSession() { STLDeleteElements(&url_fetchers_); } Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead. BUG=133790 TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work. Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-399
0
25,781
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: ar6000_aggr_rcv_addba_req_evt(struct ar6_softc *ar, WMI_ADDBA_REQ_EVENT *evt) { if(evt->status == 0) { aggr_recv_addba_req_evt(ar->aggr_cntxt, evt->tid, evt->st_seq_no, evt->win_sz); } } Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com> CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net> CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl> CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com> CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-264
0
14,877
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void RenderBox::addLayerHitTestRects(LayerHitTestRects& layerRects, const RenderLayer* currentLayer, const LayoutPoint& layerOffset, const LayoutRect& containerRect) const { LayoutPoint adjustedLayerOffset = layerOffset + locationOffset(); RenderBoxModelObject::addLayerHitTestRects(layerRects, currentLayer, adjustedLayerOffset, containerRect); } Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1) Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases on layout change. Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent flags. This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further repaint optimizations possible. Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during the conversion. Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the following conversion rules: - diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange() - diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly() - diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() - diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() - diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout() - diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout() - diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout() - diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly() - diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout() BUG=358460 TEST=All existing layout tests. R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983 Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 CWE ID: CWE-119
0
13,163
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void InspectorClientImpl::flush() { if (WebDevToolsAgentImpl* agent = devToolsAgent()) agent->flush(); } Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser. BUG=366585 Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 CWE ID:
0
3,423
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void TaskManagerView::ExecuteCommand(int id) { tab_table_->SetColumnVisibility(id, !tab_table_->IsColumnVisible(id)); } Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans. BUG=128242 R=ben@chromium.org Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-399
0
11,012
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static int skcipher_next_copy(struct skcipher_walk *walk) { struct skcipher_walk_buffer *p; u8 *tmp = walk->page; skcipher_map_src(walk); memcpy(tmp, walk->src.virt.addr, walk->nbytes); skcipher_unmap_src(walk); walk->src.virt.addr = tmp; walk->dst.virt.addr = tmp; if (!(walk->flags & SKCIPHER_WALK_PHYS)) return 0; p = kmalloc(sizeof(*p), skcipher_walk_gfp(walk)); if (!p) return -ENOMEM; p->data = walk->page; p->len = walk->nbytes; skcipher_queue_write(walk, p); if (offset_in_page(walk->page) + walk->nbytes + walk->stride > PAGE_SIZE) walk->page = NULL; else walk->page += walk->nbytes; return 0; } Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the skcipher conversion. This patch restores them. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...") Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> CWE ID: CWE-476
0
15,389
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: BrowserClosedNotificationObserver::BrowserClosedNotificationObserver( Browser* browser, AutomationProvider* automation, IPC::Message* reply_message, bool use_json_interface) : automation_(automation->AsWeakPtr()), reply_message_(reply_message), use_json_interface_(use_json_interface), for_browser_command_(false) { registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_CLOSED, content::Source<Browser>(browser)); } Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt. BUG=107201 TEST=no visible change Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID: CWE-20
0
21,536
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidAddMessageToConsole( const blink::WebConsoleMessage& message, const blink::WebString& source_name, unsigned source_line, const blink::WebString& stack_trace) { logging::LogSeverity log_severity = logging::LOG_VERBOSE; switch (message.level) { case blink::WebConsoleMessage::kLevelVerbose: log_severity = logging::LOG_VERBOSE; break; case blink::WebConsoleMessage::kLevelInfo: log_severity = logging::LOG_INFO; break; case blink::WebConsoleMessage::kLevelWarning: log_severity = logging::LOG_WARNING; break; case blink::WebConsoleMessage::kLevelError: log_severity = logging::LOG_ERROR; break; default: log_severity = logging::LOG_VERBOSE; } if (ShouldReportDetailedMessageForSource(source_name)) { for (auto& observer : observers_) { observer.DetailedConsoleMessageAdded( message.text.Utf16(), source_name.Utf16(), stack_trace.Utf16(), source_line, static_cast<uint32_t>(log_severity)); } } Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole( routing_id_, static_cast<int32_t>(log_severity), message.text.Utf16(), static_cast<int32_t>(source_line), source_name.Utf16())); } Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen. BUG=776418, 800056 Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378 Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790} CWE ID:
0
1,612
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static bool caller_is_in_ancestor(pid_t pid, const char *contrl, const char *cg, char **nextcg) { char fnam[PROCLEN]; FILE *f; bool answer = false; char *line = NULL; size_t len = 0; int ret; ret = snprintf(fnam, PROCLEN, "/proc/%d/cgroup", pid); if (ret < 0 || ret >= PROCLEN) return false; if (!(f = fopen(fnam, "r"))) return false; while (getline(&line, &len, f) != -1) { char *c1, *c2, *linecmp; if (!line[0]) continue; c1 = strchr(line, ':'); if (!c1) goto out; c1++; c2 = strchr(c1, ':'); if (!c2) goto out; *c2 = '\0'; if (strcmp(c1, contrl) != 0) continue; c2++; stripnewline(c2); prune_init_slice(c2); /* * callers pass in '/' for root cgroup, otherwise they pass * in a cgroup without leading '/' */ linecmp = *cg == '/' ? c2 : c2+1; if (strncmp(linecmp, cg, strlen(linecmp)) != 0) { if (nextcg) *nextcg = get_next_cgroup_dir(linecmp, cg); goto out; } answer = true; goto out; } out: fclose(f); free(line); return answer; } Commit Message: Fix checking of parent directories Taken from the justification in the launchpad bug: To a task in freezer cgroup /a/b/c/d, it should appear that there are no cgroups other than its descendents. Since this is a filesystem, we must have the parent directories, but each parent cgroup should only contain the child which the task can see. So, when this task looks at /a/b, it should see only directory 'c' and no files. Attempt to create /a/b/x should result in -EPERM, whether /a/b/x already exists or not. Attempts to query /a/b/x should result in -ENOENT whether /a/b/x exists or not. Opening /a/b/tasks should result in -ENOENT. The caller_may_see_dir checks specifically whether a task may see a cgroup directory - i.e. /a/b/x if opening /a/b/x/tasks, and /a/b/c/d if doing opendir('/a/b/c/d'). caller_is_in_ancestor() will return true if the caller in /a/b/c/d looks at /a/b/c/d/e. If the caller is in a child cgroup of the queried one - i.e. if the task in /a/b/c/d queries /a/b, then *nextcg will container the next (the only) directory which he can see in the path - 'c'. Beyond this, regular DAC permissions should apply, with the root-in-user-namespace privilege over its mapped uids being respected. The fc_may_access check does this check for both directories and files. This is CVE-2015-1342 (LP: #1508481) Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> CWE ID: CWE-264
1
1,930
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: cpu_cgroup_css_alloc(struct cgroup_subsys_state *parent_css) { struct task_group *parent = css_tg(parent_css); struct task_group *tg; if (!parent) { /* This is early initialization for the top cgroup */ return &root_task_group.css; } tg = sched_create_group(parent); if (IS_ERR(tg)) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); sched_online_group(tg, parent); return &tg->css; } Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann) Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn. * emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>: sched: panic on corrupted stack end ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top CWE ID: CWE-119
0
17,379
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: bool GpuProcessHost::HostIsValid(GpuProcessHost* host) { if (!host) return false; if (host->process_->disconnect_was_alive()) return false; if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kSingleProcess) || CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessGPU) || host->software_rendering() || !GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->ShouldUseSoftwareRendering()) { return true; } host->ForceShutdown(); return false; } Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer). This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash. The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line. BUG=117062 TEST=Manual runs of test streams. Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699 Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001 This is causing crbug.com/129103 TBR=posciak@chromium.org Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066 git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 CWE ID:
0
25,405
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static long vma_add_reservation(struct hstate *h, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr) { return __vma_reservation_common(h, vma, addr, VMA_ADD_RESV); } Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size This oops: kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484! RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410 Call Trace: hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130 notify_change+0x292/0x410 do_truncate+0x65/0xa0 do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180 SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10 tracesys+0xd9/0xde was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte. mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that includes UFFDIO_COPY. We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just -EFAULT. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> CWE ID: CWE-119
0
3,281
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void usbnet_unlink_rx_urbs(struct usbnet *dev) { if (netif_running(dev->net)) { (void) unlink_urbs (dev, &dev->rxq); tasklet_schedule(&dev->bh); } } Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe() In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled. They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to the double free reported in http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm. Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID:
0
4,407
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_connect) { php_pgsql_do_connect(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU,0); } Commit Message: CWE ID:
0
20,849
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: INT_PTR MyDialogBox(HINSTANCE hInstance, int Dialog_ID, HWND hWndParent, DLGPROC lpDialogFunc) { INT_PTR ret; LPCDLGTEMPLATE rcTemplate = GetDialogTemplate(Dialog_ID); ShowWindow(hMainDialog, SW_NORMAL); ret = DialogBoxIndirect(hMainInstance, rcTemplate, hWndParent, lpDialogFunc); safe_free(rcTemplate); return ret; } Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 * This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit, by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to bypass the intended signature verification checks. * It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it, is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP. * It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately, before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability. * Closes #1009 * Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately. CWE ID: CWE-494
0
6,312
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: isdn_net_hangup(struct net_device *d) { isdn_net_local *lp = netdev_priv(d); isdn_ctrl cmd; #ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25 struct concap_proto *cprot = lp->netdev->cprot; struct concap_proto_ops *pops = cprot ? cprot->pops : NULL; #endif if (lp->flags & ISDN_NET_CONNECTED) { if (lp->slave != NULL) { isdn_net_local *slp = ISDN_SLAVE_PRIV(lp); if (slp->flags & ISDN_NET_CONNECTED) { printk(KERN_INFO "isdn_net: hang up slave %s before %s\n", lp->slave->name, d->name); isdn_net_hangup(lp->slave); } } printk(KERN_INFO "isdn_net: local hangup %s\n", d->name); #ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_PPP if (lp->p_encap == ISDN_NET_ENCAP_SYNCPPP) isdn_ppp_free(lp); #endif isdn_net_lp_disconnected(lp); #ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25 /* try if there are generic encap protocol receiver routines and signal the closure of the link */ if( pops && pops -> disconn_ind ) pops -> disconn_ind(cprot); #endif /* CONFIG_ISDN_X25 */ cmd.driver = lp->isdn_device; cmd.command = ISDN_CMD_HANGUP; cmd.arg = lp->isdn_channel; isdn_command(&cmd); printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Chargesum is %d\n", d->name, lp->charge); isdn_all_eaz(lp->isdn_device, lp->isdn_channel); } isdn_net_unbind_channel(lp); } Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com> CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net> CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl> CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com> CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CWE ID: CWE-264
0
21,567
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: HRESULT CGaiaCredentialBase::Initialize(IGaiaCredentialProvider* provider) { LOGFN(INFO); DCHECK(provider); provider_ = provider; return S_OK; } Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled. Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled. Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or googlemail.com domain. Bug: 944049 Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903 Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278} CWE ID: CWE-284
0
17,162
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE int spice_server_set_listen_socket_fd(SpiceServer *s, int listen_fd) { spice_assert(reds == s); spice_listen_socket_fd = listen_fd; return 0; } Commit Message: CWE ID: CWE-119
0
11,189
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: bit_send(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS) { /* Exactly the same as varbit_send, so share code */ return varbit_send(fcinfo); } Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns. Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter. Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow in related functions. Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0. Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane. Security: CVE-2014-0064 CWE ID: CWE-189
0
517
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: int imap_msg_commit(struct Context *ctx, struct Message *msg) { int r = mutt_file_fclose(&msg->fp); if (r != 0) return r; return imap_append_message(ctx, msg); } Commit Message: Don't overflow stack buffer in msg_parse_fetch CWE ID: CWE-119
0
20,947
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: int av_get_bits_per_sample(enum AVCodecID codec_id) { switch (codec_id) { case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_SBPRO_2: return 2; case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_SBPRO_3: return 3; case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_SBPRO_4: case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_IMA_WAV: case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_IMA_QT: case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_SWF: case AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_MS: return 4; default: return av_get_exact_bits_per_sample(codec_id); } } Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay Fixes out of array access Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc> CWE ID: CWE-787
0
23,977
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void update_group_capacity(struct sched_domain *sd, int cpu) { struct sched_domain *child = sd->child; struct sched_group *group, *sdg = sd->groups; unsigned long capacity, min_capacity, max_capacity; unsigned long interval; interval = msecs_to_jiffies(sd->balance_interval); interval = clamp(interval, 1UL, max_load_balance_interval); sdg->sgc->next_update = jiffies + interval; if (!child) { update_cpu_capacity(sd, cpu); return; } capacity = 0; min_capacity = ULONG_MAX; max_capacity = 0; if (child->flags & SD_OVERLAP) { /* * SD_OVERLAP domains cannot assume that child groups * span the current group. */ for_each_cpu(cpu, sched_group_span(sdg)) { struct sched_group_capacity *sgc; struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu); /* * build_sched_domains() -> init_sched_groups_capacity() * gets here before we've attached the domains to the * runqueues. * * Use capacity_of(), which is set irrespective of domains * in update_cpu_capacity(). * * This avoids capacity from being 0 and * causing divide-by-zero issues on boot. */ if (unlikely(!rq->sd)) { capacity += capacity_of(cpu); } else { sgc = rq->sd->groups->sgc; capacity += sgc->capacity; } min_capacity = min(capacity, min_capacity); max_capacity = max(capacity, max_capacity); } } else { /* * !SD_OVERLAP domains can assume that child groups * span the current group. */ group = child->groups; do { struct sched_group_capacity *sgc = group->sgc; capacity += sgc->capacity; min_capacity = min(sgc->min_capacity, min_capacity); max_capacity = max(sgc->max_capacity, max_capacity); group = group->next; } while (group != child->groups); } sdg->sgc->capacity = capacity; sdg->sgc->min_capacity = min_capacity; sdg->sgc->max_capacity = max_capacity; } Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame, and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list manipulation. Do a (manual) revert of: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path") It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits such as: 9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list") As Vincent Guittot explains: "I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and cfs_rq throttling: Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root: 1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1 cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end. 2) Then TG1 is throttled 3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1. 4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1 cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list. With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list. So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1 cfs_rq is removed from the list. Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released. tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should. So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added, will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad. In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and propagate the update from leaf down to root." Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly not thought through completely. This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-) [ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ] Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org> Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com> Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+ Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> CWE ID: CWE-400
0
4,898
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnEnterFullscreen( const blink::WebFullscreenOptions& options) { std::set<SiteInstance*> notified_instances; notified_instances.insert(GetSiteInstance()); for (FrameTreeNode* node = frame_tree_node_; node->parent(); node = node->parent()) { SiteInstance* parent_site_instance = node->parent()->current_frame_host()->GetSiteInstance(); if (ContainsKey(notified_instances, parent_site_instance)) continue; RenderFrameProxyHost* child_proxy = node->render_manager()->GetRenderFrameProxyHost(parent_site_instance); child_proxy->Send( new FrameMsg_WillEnterFullscreen(child_proxy->GetRoutingID())); notified_instances.insert(parent_site_instance); } delegate_->EnterFullscreenMode(GetLastCommittedURL().GetOrigin()); render_view_host_->GetWidget()->SynchronizeVisualProperties(); } Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames. BUG=836858 Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511 Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867} CWE ID: CWE-20
0
20,878
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: sp<IMemory> SoundTriggerHwService::prepareRecognitionEvent_l( struct sound_trigger_recognition_event *event) { sp<IMemory> eventMemory; switch (event->type) { case SOUND_MODEL_TYPE_KEYPHRASE: ALOGW_IF(event->data_size != 0 && event->data_offset != sizeof(struct sound_trigger_phrase_recognition_event), "prepareRecognitionEvent_l(): invalid data offset %u for keyphrase event type", event->data_offset); event->data_offset = sizeof(struct sound_trigger_phrase_recognition_event); break; case SOUND_MODEL_TYPE_GENERIC: ALOGW_IF(event->data_size != 0 && event->data_offset != sizeof(struct sound_trigger_generic_recognition_event), "prepareRecognitionEvent_l(): invalid data offset %u for generic event type", event->data_offset); event->data_offset = sizeof(struct sound_trigger_generic_recognition_event); break; case SOUND_MODEL_TYPE_UNKNOWN: ALOGW_IF(event->data_size != 0 && event->data_offset != sizeof(struct sound_trigger_recognition_event), "prepareRecognitionEvent_l(): invalid data offset %u for unknown event type", event->data_offset); event->data_offset = sizeof(struct sound_trigger_recognition_event); break; default: return eventMemory; } size_t size = event->data_offset + event->data_size; eventMemory = mMemoryDealer->allocate(size); if (eventMemory == 0 || eventMemory->pointer() == NULL) { eventMemory.clear(); return eventMemory; } memcpy(eventMemory->pointer(), event, size); return eventMemory; } Commit Message: soundtrigger: add size check on sound model and recogntion data Bug: 30148546 Change-Id: I082f535a853c96571887eeea37c6d41ecee7d8c0 (cherry picked from commit bb00d8f139ff51336ab3c810d35685003949bcf8) (cherry picked from commit ef0c91518446e65533ca8bab6726a845f27c73fd) CWE ID: CWE-264
0
4,842
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void hugetlb_unreserve_pages(struct inode *inode, long offset, long freed) { struct hstate *h = hstate_inode(inode); long chg = region_truncate(&inode->i_mapping->private_list, offset); struct hugepage_subpool *spool = subpool_inode(inode); spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); inode->i_blocks -= (blocks_per_huge_page(h) * freed); spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool, (chg - freed)); hugetlb_acct_memory(h, -(chg - freed)); } Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages() does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's vm_ops->close() to release that allocation. However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close(). This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say, after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway. Christoph's test case: http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735 This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie> Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> CWE ID: CWE-399
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20,141
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void ecryptfs_destroy_kthread(void) { struct ecryptfs_open_req *req, *tmp; mutex_lock(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.mux); ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.flags |= ECRYPTFS_KTHREAD_ZOMBIE; list_for_each_entry_safe(req, tmp, &ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.req_list, kthread_ctl_list) { list_del(&req->kthread_ctl_list); *req->lower_file = ERR_PTR(-EIO); complete(&req->done); } mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.mux); kthread_stop(ecryptfs_kthread); wake_up(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.wait); } Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann) Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn. * emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>: sched: panic on corrupted stack end ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top CWE ID: CWE-119
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29,167
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void AXTree::SetEnableExtraMacNodes(bool enabled) { DCHECK(enable_extra_mac_nodes_ != enabled); DCHECK_EQ(0U, table_info_map_.size()); enable_extra_mac_nodes_ = enabled; } Commit Message: Position info (item n of m) incorrect if hidden focusable items in list Bug: 836997 Change-Id: I971fa7076f72d51829b36af8e379260d48ca25ec Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450235 Commit-Queue: Aaron Leventhal <aleventhal@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nektarios Paisios <nektar@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628890} CWE ID: CWE-190
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27,659
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: void comps_objrtree_unset(COMPS_ObjRTree * rt, const char * key) { COMPS_HSList * subnodes; COMPS_HSListItem * it; COMPS_ObjRTreeData * rtdata; unsigned int offset, len, x; char found, ended; COMPS_HSList * path; struct Relation { COMPS_HSList * parent_nodes; COMPS_HSListItem * child_it; } *relation; path = comps_hslist_create(); comps_hslist_init(path, NULL, NULL, &free); len = strlen(key); offset = 0; subnodes = rt->subnodes; while (offset != len) { found = 0; for (it = subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) { if (((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key[0] == key[offset]) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { comps_hslist_destroy(&path); return; } rtdata = (COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data; for (x=1; ;x++) { ended=0; if (rtdata->key[x] == 0) ended += 1; if (x == len - offset) ended += 2; if (ended != 0) break; if (key[offset+x] != rtdata->key[x]) break; } if (ended == 3) { /* remove node from tree only if there's no descendant*/ if (rtdata->subnodes->last == NULL) { comps_hslist_remove(subnodes, it); comps_objrtree_data_destroy(rtdata); free(it); } else { comps_object_destroy(rtdata->data); rtdata->is_leaf = 0; rtdata->data = NULL; } if (path->last == NULL) { comps_hslist_destroy(&path); return; } rtdata = (COMPS_ObjRTreeData*) ((struct Relation*)path->last->data)->child_it->data; /*remove all predecessor of deleted node (recursive) with no childs*/ while (rtdata->subnodes->last == NULL) { comps_objrtree_data_destroy(rtdata); comps_hslist_remove( ((struct Relation*)path->last->data)->parent_nodes, ((struct Relation*)path->last->data)->child_it); free(((struct Relation*)path->last->data)->child_it); it = path->last; comps_hslist_remove(path, path->last); free(it); rtdata = (COMPS_ObjRTreeData*) ((struct Relation*)path->last->data)->child_it->data; } comps_hslist_destroy(&path); return; } else if (ended == 1) offset+=x; else { comps_hslist_destroy(&path); return; } if ((relation = malloc(sizeof(struct Relation))) == NULL) { comps_hslist_destroy(&path); return; } subnodes = ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes; relation->parent_nodes = subnodes; relation->child_it = it; comps_hslist_append(path, (void*)relation, 0); } comps_hslist_destroy(&path); return; } Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the left-over of some copy-paste. CWE ID: CWE-416
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21,081
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: xsltFreeExtModule(xsltExtModulePtr ext) { if (ext == NULL) return; xmlFree(ext); } Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7 BUG=583156,583171 Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002 Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} CWE ID: CWE-119
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28,646
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
Code: static int getArg(char ch, int def) { switch (ch) { case '&': case '-': return ch; } return def; } Commit Message: Fix #7727 - undefined pointers and out of band string access fixes CWE ID: CWE-119
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23,905
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