instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _rpc_ping(slurm_msg_t *msg)
{
int rc = SLURM_SUCCESS;
uid_t req_uid = g_slurm_auth_get_uid(msg->auth_cred,
conf->auth_info);
static bool first_msg = true;
if (!_slurm_authorized_user(req_uid)) {
error("Security violation, ping RPC from uid %d",
req_uid);
if (first_msg) {
error("Do you have SlurmUser configured as uid %d?",
req_uid);
}
rc = ESLURM_USER_ID_MISSING; /* or bad in this case */
}
first_msg = false;
if (rc != SLURM_SUCCESS) {
/* Return result. If the reply can't be sent this indicates
* 1. The network is broken OR
* 2. slurmctld has died OR
* 3. slurmd was paged out due to full memory
* If the reply request fails, we send an registration message
* to slurmctld in hopes of avoiding having the node set DOWN
* due to slurmd paging and not being able to respond in a
* timely fashion. */
if (slurm_send_rc_msg(msg, rc) < 0) {
error("Error responding to ping: %m");
send_registration_msg(SLURM_SUCCESS, false);
}
} else {
slurm_msg_t resp_msg;
ping_slurmd_resp_msg_t ping_resp;
get_cpu_load(&ping_resp.cpu_load);
get_free_mem(&ping_resp.free_mem);
slurm_msg_t_copy(&resp_msg, msg);
resp_msg.msg_type = RESPONSE_PING_SLURMD;
resp_msg.data = &ping_resp;
slurm_send_node_msg(msg->conn_fd, &resp_msg);
}
/* Take this opportunity to enforce any job memory limits */
_enforce_job_mem_limit();
/* Clear up any stalled file transfers as well */
_file_bcast_cleanup();
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 25,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ucma_get_event(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct ucma_context *ctx;
struct rdma_ucm_get_event cmd;
struct ucma_event *uevent;
int ret = 0;
/*
* Old 32 bit user space does not send the 4 byte padding in the
* reserved field. We don't care, allow it to keep working.
*/
if (out_len < sizeof(uevent->resp) - sizeof(uevent->resp.reserved))
return -ENOSPC;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
mutex_lock(&file->mut);
while (list_empty(&file->event_list)) {
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
if (file->filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
return -EAGAIN;
if (wait_event_interruptible(file->poll_wait,
!list_empty(&file->event_list)))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
mutex_lock(&file->mut);
}
uevent = list_entry(file->event_list.next, struct ucma_event, list);
if (uevent->resp.event == RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST) {
ctx = ucma_alloc_ctx(file);
if (!ctx) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto done;
}
uevent->ctx->backlog++;
ctx->cm_id = uevent->cm_id;
ctx->cm_id->context = ctx;
uevent->resp.id = ctx->id;
}
if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd.response),
&uevent->resp,
min_t(size_t, out_len, sizeof(uevent->resp)))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto done;
}
list_del(&uevent->list);
uevent->ctx->events_reported++;
if (uevent->mc)
uevent->mc->events_reported++;
kfree(uevent);
done:
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@beyondsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
unsigned char *rk = NULL;
int rklen;
rklen = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &rk);
if (rklen <= 0) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), 0,
V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, rk, rklen)) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse> HandleSetHeaderRequest(
const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
if (!base::StartsWith(request.relative_url, "/set-header?",
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE))
return nullptr;
size_t query_string_pos = request.relative_url.find('?');
std::string escaped_header =
request.relative_url.substr(query_string_pos + 1);
std::string header = net::UnescapeURLComponent(
escaped_header,
net::UnescapeRule::NORMAL | net::UnescapeRule::SPACES |
net::UnescapeRule::PATH_SEPARATORS |
net::UnescapeRule::URL_SPECIAL_CHARS_EXCEPT_PATH_SEPARATORS);
size_t colon_pos = header.find(':');
if (colon_pos == std::string::npos)
return std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse>();
std::string header_name = header.substr(0, colon_pos);
std::string header_value = header.substr(colon_pos + 2);
std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse> http_response(
new net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse);
http_response->set_code(net::HTTP_OK);
http_response->AddCustomHeader(header_name, header_value);
return std::move(http_response);
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseAudioContext::RejectPendingDecodeAudioDataResolvers() {
for (auto& resolver : decode_audio_resolvers_)
resolver->Reject(DOMException::Create(kInvalidStateError,
"Audio context is going away"));
decode_audio_resolvers_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeBlockOrStatement() {
if (lex->tk=='{') {
jspeBlock();
return 0;
} else {
JsVar *v = jspeStatement();
if (lex->tk==';') JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(';');
return v;
}
}
/** Parse using current lexer until we hit the end of
* input or there was some problem. */
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspParse() {
JsVar *v = 0;
while (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE && lex->tk != LEX_EOF) {
jsvUnLock(v);
v = jspeBlockOrStatement();
}
return v;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeStatementVar() {
JsVar *lastDefined = 0;
/* variable creation. TODO - we need a better way of parsing the left
* hand side. Maybe just have a flag called can_create_var that we
* set and then we parse as if we're doing a normal equals.*/
assert(lex->tk==LEX_R_VAR || lex->tk==LEX_R_LET || lex->tk==LEX_R_CONST);
jslGetNextToken();
bool hasComma = true; // for first time in loop
while (hasComma && lex->tk == LEX_ID && !jspIsInterrupted()) {
JsVar *a = 0;
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
a = jspeiFindOnTop(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex), true);
if (!a) { // out of memory
jspSetError(false);
return lastDefined;
}
}
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN(LEX_ID, jsvUnLock(a), lastDefined);
if (lex->tk == '=') {
JsVar *var;
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN('=', jsvUnLock(a), lastDefined);
var = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE)
jsvReplaceWith(a, var);
jsvUnLock(var);
}
jsvUnLock(lastDefined);
lastDefined = a;
hasComma = lex->tk == ',';
if (hasComma) JSP_MATCH_WITH_RETURN(',', lastDefined);
}
return lastDefined;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeStatementIf() {
bool cond;
JsVar *var, *result = 0;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_IF);
JSP_MATCH('(');
var = jspeExpression();
if (JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE) return var;
JSP_MATCH(')');
cond = JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE && jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvSkipName(var));
jsvUnLock(var);
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
if (!cond) jspSetNoExecute();
JsVar *a = jspeBlockOrStatement();
if (!cond) {
jsvUnLock(a);
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
} else {
result = a;
}
if (lex->tk==LEX_R_ELSE) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_ELSE);
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
if (cond) jspSetNoExecute();
JsVar *a = jspeBlockOrStatement();
if (cond) {
jsvUnLock(a);
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
} else {
result = a;
}
}
return result;
}
NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeStatementSwitch() {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_SWITCH);
JSP_MATCH('(');
JsVar *switchOn = jspeExpression();
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
bool execute = JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE;
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN(')', jsvUnLock(switchOn), 0);
if (!execute) { jsvUnLock(switchOn); jspeBlock(); return 0; }
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN('{', jsvUnLock(switchOn), 0);
bool executeDefault = true;
if (execute) execInfo.execute=EXEC_NO|EXEC_IN_SWITCH;
while (lex->tk==LEX_R_CASE) {
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN(LEX_R_CASE, jsvUnLock(switchOn), 0);
JsExecFlags oldFlags = execInfo.execute;
if (execute) execInfo.execute=EXEC_YES|EXEC_IN_SWITCH;
JsVar *test = jspeAssignmentExpression();
execInfo.execute = oldFlags|EXEC_IN_SWITCH;;
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN(':', jsvUnLock2(switchOn, test), 0);
bool cond = false;
if (execute)
cond = jsvGetBoolAndUnLock(jsvMathsOpSkipNames(switchOn, test, LEX_TYPEEQUAL));
if (cond) executeDefault = false;
jsvUnLock(test);
if (cond && (execInfo.execute&EXEC_RUN_MASK)==EXEC_NO)
execInfo.execute=EXEC_YES|EXEC_IN_SWITCH;
while (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE && lex->tk!=LEX_EOF && lex->tk!=LEX_R_CASE && lex->tk!=LEX_R_DEFAULT && lex->tk!='}')
jsvUnLock(jspeBlockOrStatement());
oldExecute |= execInfo.execute & (EXEC_ERROR_MASK|EXEC_RETURN); // copy across any errors/exceptions/returns
}
jsvUnLock(switchOn);
if (execute && (execInfo.execute&EXEC_RUN_MASK)==EXEC_BREAK) {
execInfo.execute=EXEC_YES|EXEC_IN_SWITCH;
} else {
executeDefault = true;
}
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
if (lex->tk==LEX_R_DEFAULT) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_DEFAULT);
JSP_MATCH(':');
JSP_SAVE_EXECUTE();
if (!executeDefault) jspSetNoExecute();
else execInfo.execute |= EXEC_IN_SWITCH;
while (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE && lex->tk!=LEX_EOF && lex->tk!='}')
jsvUnLock(jspeBlockOrStatement());
oldExecute |= execInfo.execute & (EXEC_ERROR_MASK|EXEC_RETURN); // copy across any errors/exceptions/returns
execInfo.execute = execInfo.execute & (JsExecFlags)~EXEC_BREAK;
JSP_RESTORE_EXECUTE();
}
JSP_MATCH('}');
Commit Message: Fix stack overflow if interpreting a file full of '{' (fix #1448)
CWE ID: CWE-674 | 0 | 23,753 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnDidStartLoading() {
delegate_->DidStartLoading(this);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int register_atmdevice_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
return atomic_notifier_chain_register(&atm_dev_notify_chain, nb);
}
Commit Message: atm: update msg_namelen in vcc_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about vcc_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLenum GLES2DecoderImpl::AdjustGetPname(GLenum pname) {
if (GL_MAX_SAMPLES == pname &&
features().use_img_for_multisampled_render_to_texture) {
return GL_MAX_SAMPLES_IMG;
}
if (GL_ALIASED_POINT_SIZE_RANGE == pname &&
gl_version_info().is_desktop_core_profile) {
return GL_POINT_SIZE_RANGE;
}
return pname;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 29,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::RemoveRenderPassResource(
std::vector<RenderPassId> ids) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(!ids.empty());
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<ImageContextImpl>> image_contexts;
image_contexts.reserve(ids.size());
for (const auto id : ids) {
auto it = render_pass_image_cache_.find(id);
if (it != render_pass_image_cache_.end()) {
it->second->clear_image();
image_contexts.push_back(std::move(it->second));
render_pass_image_cache_.erase(it);
}
}
if (!image_contexts.empty()) {
auto callback = base::BindOnce(
&SkiaOutputSurfaceImplOnGpu::RemoveRenderPassResource,
base::Unretained(impl_on_gpu_.get()), std::move(image_contexts));
ScheduleGpuTask(std::move(callback), std::vector<gpu::SyncToken>());
}
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 15,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_split_extent(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path **ppath,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
int split_flag,
int flags)
{
struct ext4_ext_path *path = *ppath;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
struct ext4_extent *ex;
unsigned int ee_len, depth;
int err = 0;
int unwritten;
int split_flag1, flags1;
int allocated = map->m_len;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
unwritten = ext4_ext_is_unwritten(ex);
if (map->m_lblk + map->m_len < ee_block + ee_len) {
split_flag1 = split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT;
flags1 = flags | EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO;
if (unwritten)
split_flag1 |= EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT1 |
EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2;
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2)
split_flag1 |= EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1;
err = ext4_split_extent_at(handle, inode, ppath,
map->m_lblk + map->m_len, split_flag1, flags1);
if (err)
goto out;
} else {
allocated = ee_len - (map->m_lblk - ee_block);
}
/*
* Update path is required because previous ext4_split_extent_at() may
* result in split of original leaf or extent zeroout.
*/
path = ext4_find_extent(inode, map->m_lblk, ppath, 0);
if (IS_ERR(path))
return PTR_ERR(path);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
if (!ex) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "unexpected hole at %lu",
(unsigned long) map->m_lblk);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
unwritten = ext4_ext_is_unwritten(ex);
split_flag1 = 0;
if (map->m_lblk >= ee_block) {
split_flag1 = split_flag & EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2;
if (unwritten) {
split_flag1 |= EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT1;
split_flag1 |= split_flag & (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT |
EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2);
}
err = ext4_split_extent_at(handle, inode, ppath,
map->m_lblk, split_flag1, flags);
if (err)
goto out;
}
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
out:
return err ? err : allocated;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 28,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decl_die(int status, const char *phase, request_rec *r)
{
if (status == DECLINED) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, 0, r, APLOGNO(00025)
"configuration error: couldn't %s: %s", phase, r->uri);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
else {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, r,
"auth phase '%s' gave status %d: %s", phase,
status, r->uri);
return status;
}
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2015-3183 (cve.mitre.org)
Replacement of ap_some_auth_required (unusable in Apache httpd 2.4)
with new ap_some_authn_required and ap_force_authn hook.
Submitted by: breser
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684524 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GetStatsOnSignalingThread(
const scoped_refptr<webrtc::PeerConnectionInterface>& pc,
webrtc::PeerConnectionInterface::StatsOutputLevel level,
const scoped_refptr<webrtc::StatsObserver>& observer,
rtc::scoped_refptr<webrtc::MediaStreamTrackInterface> selector) {
TRACE_EVENT0("webrtc", "GetStatsOnSignalingThread");
if (selector) {
bool belongs_to_pc = false;
for (const auto& sender : pc->GetSenders()) {
if (sender->track() == selector) {
belongs_to_pc = true;
break;
}
}
if (!belongs_to_pc) {
for (const auto& receiver : pc->GetReceivers()) {
if (receiver->track() == selector) {
belongs_to_pc = true;
break;
}
}
}
if (!belongs_to_pc) {
DVLOG(1) << "GetStats: Track not found.";
observer->OnComplete(StatsReports());
return;
}
}
if (!pc->GetStats(observer.get(), selector.get(), level)) {
DVLOG(1) << "GetStats failed.";
observer->OnComplete(StatsReports());
}
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 11,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void efx_init_tx_queue(struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue)
{
netif_dbg(tx_queue->efx, drv, tx_queue->efx->net_dev,
"initialising TX queue %d\n", tx_queue->queue);
tx_queue->insert_count = 0;
tx_queue->write_count = 0;
tx_queue->old_write_count = 0;
tx_queue->read_count = 0;
tx_queue->old_read_count = 0;
tx_queue->empty_read_count = 0 | EFX_EMPTY_COUNT_VALID;
/* Set up TX descriptor ring */
efx_nic_init_tx(tx_queue);
tx_queue->initialised = true;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 16,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void strcpy_gmt(char *ubuf, time_t *when) /* {{{ */
{
char buf[MAX_STR];
struct tm tm, *res;
int n;
res = php_gmtime_r(when, &tm);
if (!res) {
ubuf[0] = '\0';
return;
}
n = slprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s, %02d %s %d %02d:%02d:%02d GMT", /* SAFE */
week_days[tm.tm_wday], tm.tm_mday,
month_names[tm.tm_mon], tm.tm_year + 1900,
tm.tm_hour, tm.tm_min,
tm.tm_sec);
memcpy(ubuf, buf, n);
ubuf[n] = '\0';
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 25,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __releases(bitlock)
__acquires(bitlock)
{
struct va_format vaf;
va_list args;
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es;
es->s_last_error_ino = cpu_to_le32(ino);
es->s_last_error_block = cpu_to_le64(block);
__save_error_info(sb, function, line);
va_start(args, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &args;
printk(KERN_CRIT "EXT4-fs error (device %s): %s:%d: group %u, ",
sb->s_id, function, line, grp);
if (ino)
printk(KERN_CONT "inode %lu: ", ino);
if (block)
printk(KERN_CONT "block %llu:", (unsigned long long) block);
printk(KERN_CONT "%pV\n", &vaf);
va_end(args);
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT)) {
ext4_commit_super(sb, 0);
return;
}
ext4_unlock_group(sb, grp);
ext4_handle_error(sb);
/*
* We only get here in the ERRORS_RO case; relocking the group
* may be dangerous, but nothing bad will happen since the
* filesystem will have already been marked read/only and the
* journal has been aborted. We return 1 as a hint to callers
* who might what to use the return value from
* ext4_grp_locked_error() to distinguish beween the
* ERRORS_CONT and ERRORS_RO case, and perhaps return more
* aggressively from the ext4 function in question, with a
* more appropriate error code.
*/
ext4_lock_group(sb, grp);
return;
}
Commit Message: ext4: init timer earlier to avoid a kernel panic in __save_error_info
During mount, when we fail to open journal inode or root inode, the
__save_error_info will mod_timer. But actually s_err_report isn't
initialized yet and the kernel oops. The detailed information can
be found https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32082.
The best way is to check whether the timer s_err_report is initialized
or not. But it seems that in include/linux/timer.h, we can't find a
good function to check the status of this timer, so this patch just
move the initializtion of s_err_report earlier so that we can avoid
the kernel panic. The corresponding del_timer is also added in the
error path.
Reported-by: Sami Liedes <sliedes@cc.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <boyu.mt@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,819 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL update_send_cache_brush(rdpContext* context,
const CACHE_BRUSH_ORDER* cache_brush)
{
wStream* s;
UINT16 flags;
size_t bm, em, inf;
int headerLength;
INT16 orderLength;
rdpUpdate* update = context->update;
flags = 0;
headerLength = 6;
inf = update_approximate_cache_brush_order(cache_brush, &flags);
update_check_flush(context, headerLength + inf);
s = update->us;
if (!s)
return FALSE;
bm = Stream_GetPosition(s);
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(s, headerLength))
return FALSE;
Stream_Seek(s, headerLength);
if (!update_write_cache_brush_order(s, cache_brush, &flags))
return FALSE;
em = Stream_GetPosition(s);
orderLength = (em - bm) - 13;
Stream_SetPosition(s, bm);
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, ORDER_STANDARD |
ORDER_SECONDARY); /* controlFlags (1 byte) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, orderLength); /* orderLength (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, flags); /* extraFlags (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, ORDER_TYPE_CACHE_BRUSH); /* orderType (1 byte) */
Stream_SetPosition(s, em);
update->numberOrders++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 79 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pgoff_t get_next_page_offset(struct dnode_of_data *dn, pgoff_t pgofs)
{
const long direct_index = ADDRS_PER_INODE(dn->inode);
const long direct_blks = ADDRS_PER_BLOCK;
const long indirect_blks = ADDRS_PER_BLOCK * NIDS_PER_BLOCK;
unsigned int skipped_unit = ADDRS_PER_BLOCK;
int cur_level = dn->cur_level;
int max_level = dn->max_level;
pgoff_t base = 0;
if (!dn->max_level)
return pgofs + 1;
while (max_level-- > cur_level)
skipped_unit *= NIDS_PER_BLOCK;
switch (dn->max_level) {
case 3:
base += 2 * indirect_blks;
case 2:
base += 2 * direct_blks;
case 1:
base += direct_index;
break;
default:
f2fs_bug_on(F2FS_I_SB(dn->inode), 1);
}
return ((pgofs - base) / skipped_unit + 1) * skipped_unit + base;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 28,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int ib_ucm_new_cm_id(int event)
{
return event == IB_CM_REQ_RECEIVED || event == IB_CM_SIDR_REQ_RECEIVED;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_fd_exec (fd_set *read_fds, fd_set *write_fds, fd_set *exception_fds)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook, *next_hook;
hook_exec_start ();
ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_FD];
while (ptr_hook)
{
next_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook;
if (!ptr_hook->deleted
&& !ptr_hook->running
&& (((HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_READ)
&& (FD_ISSET(HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), read_fds)))
|| ((HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_WRITE)
&& (FD_ISSET(HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), write_fds)))
|| ((HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_EXCEPTION)
&& (FD_ISSET(HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), exception_fds)))))
{
ptr_hook->running = 1;
(void) (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, callback)) (ptr_hook->callback_data,
HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd));
ptr_hook->running = 0;
}
ptr_hook = next_hook;
}
hook_exec_end ();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
pte_t *pte, unsigned int flags)
{
/* No page to get reference */
if (flags & FOLL_GET)
return -EFAULT;
if (flags & FOLL_TOUCH) {
pte_t entry = *pte;
if (flags & FOLL_WRITE)
entry = pte_mkdirty(entry);
entry = pte_mkyoung(entry);
if (!pte_same(*pte, entry)) {
set_pte_at(vma->vm_mm, address, pte, entry);
update_mmu_cache(vma, address, pte);
}
}
/* Proper page table entry exists, but no corresponding struct page */
return -EEXIST;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Effect_Init(preproc_effect_t *effect, uint32_t procId)
{
if (HasReverseStream(procId)) {
effect->itfe = &sEffectInterfaceReverse;
} else {
effect->itfe = &sEffectInterface;
}
effect->ops = sPreProcOps[procId];
effect->procId = procId;
effect->state = PREPROC_EFFECT_STATE_INIT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoadingPredictorTest::SetPreference() {
profile_->GetPrefs()->SetInteger(
prefs::kNetworkPredictionOptions,
chrome_browser_net::NETWORK_PREDICTION_NEVER);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 22,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BrowserContextIOData::~BrowserContextIOData() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::IO);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect BrowserView::GetClientAreaBoundsInScreen() const {
return GetWidget()->GetClientAreaBoundsInScreen();
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::setLayerFlushSchedulingEnabled(bool layerFlushingEnabled)
{
if (m_layerFlushSchedulingEnabled == layerFlushingEnabled)
return;
m_layerFlushSchedulingEnabled = layerFlushingEnabled;
if (m_layerFlushSchedulingEnabled) {
scheduleLayerFlush();
return;
}
cancelPendingLayerFlush();
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct crypto_instance *crypto_rfc4106_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
struct crypto_instance *inst;
struct crypto_aead_spawn *spawn;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
const char *ccm_name;
int err;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return ERR_CAST(algt);
if ((algt->type ^ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD) & algt->mask)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
ccm_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
if (IS_ERR(ccm_name))
return ERR_CAST(ccm_name);
inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*spawn), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!inst)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
spawn = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
crypto_set_aead_spawn(spawn, inst);
err = crypto_grab_aead(spawn, ccm_name, 0,
crypto_requires_sync(algt->type, algt->mask));
if (err)
goto out_free_inst;
alg = crypto_aead_spawn_alg(spawn);
err = -EINVAL;
/* We only support 16-byte blocks. */
if (alg->cra_aead.ivsize != 16)
goto out_drop_alg;
/* Not a stream cipher? */
if (alg->cra_blocksize != 1)
goto out_drop_alg;
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"rfc4106(%s)", alg->cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ||
snprintf(inst->alg.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"rfc4106(%s)", alg->cra_driver_name) >=
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto out_drop_alg;
inst->alg.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD;
inst->alg.cra_flags |= alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
inst->alg.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
inst->alg.cra_blocksize = 1;
inst->alg.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
inst->alg.cra_type = &crypto_nivaead_type;
inst->alg.cra_aead.ivsize = 8;
inst->alg.cra_aead.maxauthsize = 16;
inst->alg.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_rfc4106_ctx);
inst->alg.cra_init = crypto_rfc4106_init_tfm;
inst->alg.cra_exit = crypto_rfc4106_exit_tfm;
inst->alg.cra_aead.setkey = crypto_rfc4106_setkey;
inst->alg.cra_aead.setauthsize = crypto_rfc4106_setauthsize;
inst->alg.cra_aead.encrypt = crypto_rfc4106_encrypt;
inst->alg.cra_aead.decrypt = crypto_rfc4106_decrypt;
inst->alg.cra_aead.geniv = "seqiv";
out:
return inst;
out_drop_alg:
crypto_drop_aead(spawn);
out_free_inst:
kfree(inst);
inst = ERR_PTR(err);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::SimulateAttrib0(
GLuint max_vertex_accessed, bool* simulated) {
DCHECK(simulated);
*simulated = false;
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2)
return true;
const VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_->GetVertexAttribInfo(0);
bool attrib_0_used = current_program_->GetAttribInfoByLocation(0) != NULL;
if (info->enabled() && attrib_0_used) {
return true;
}
typedef VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo::Vec4 Vec4;
GLuint num_vertices = max_vertex_accessed + 1;
GLuint size_needed = 0;
if (num_vertices == 0 ||
!SafeMultiply(num_vertices, static_cast<GLuint>(sizeof(Vec4)),
&size_needed) ||
size_needed > 0x7FFFFFFFU) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glDrawXXX: Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
CopyRealGLErrorsToWrapper();
glBindBuffer(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, attrib_0_buffer_id_);
if (static_cast<GLsizei>(size_needed) > attrib_0_size_) {
glBufferData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, size_needed, NULL, GL_DYNAMIC_DRAW);
GLenum error = glGetError();
if (error != GL_NO_ERROR) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glDrawXXX: Simulating attrib 0");
return false;
}
attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ = false;
}
if (attrib_0_used &&
(!attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ ||
(info->value().v[0] != attrib_0_value_.v[0] ||
info->value().v[1] != attrib_0_value_.v[1] ||
info->value().v[2] != attrib_0_value_.v[2] ||
info->value().v[3] != attrib_0_value_.v[3]))) {
std::vector<Vec4> temp(num_vertices, info->value());
glBufferSubData(GL_ARRAY_BUFFER, 0, size_needed, &temp[0].v[0]);
attrib_0_buffer_matches_value_ = true;
attrib_0_value_ = info->value();
attrib_0_size_ = size_needed;
}
glVertexAttribPointer(0, 4, GL_FLOAT, GL_FALSE, 0, NULL);
if (info->divisor())
glVertexAttribDivisorANGLE(0, 0);
*simulated = true;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 28,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AirPDcapCleanSecAssoc(
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx)
{
PAIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION psa;
int i;
for (psa = ctx->sa, i = 0; i < AIRPDCAP_MAX_SEC_ASSOCIATIONS_NR; i++, psa++) {
/* To iterate is human, to recurse, divine */
AirPDcapRecurseCleanSA(psa);
}
}
Commit Message: Sanity check eapol_len in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey
Bug: 12175
Change-Id: Iaf977ba48f8668bf8095800a115ff9a3472dd893
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15326
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Tested-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 27,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::UpdateTitle(WebFrame* frame,
const string16& title,
WebTextDirection title_direction) {
if (frame->parent())
return;
string16 shortened_title = title.substr(0, kMaxTitleChars);
Send(new ViewHostMsg_UpdateTitle(routing_id_, page_id_, shortened_title,
title_direction));
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 16,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NTSTATUS TCDispatchQueueIRP (PDEVICE_OBJECT DeviceObject, PIRP Irp)
{
PEXTENSION Extension = (PEXTENSION) DeviceObject->DeviceExtension;
PIO_STACK_LOCATION irpSp = IoGetCurrentIrpStackLocation (Irp);
NTSTATUS ntStatus;
#if defined(_DEBUG) || defined (_DEBUG_TRACE)
if (irpSp->MajorFunction == IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL && (Extension->bRootDevice || Extension->IsVolumeDevice))
{
switch (irpSp->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.IoControlCode)
{
case TC_IOCTL_GET_MOUNTED_VOLUMES:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_PASSWORD_CACHE_STATUS:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_PORTABLE_MODE_STATUS:
case TC_IOCTL_SET_PORTABLE_MODE_STATUS:
case TC_IOCTL_OPEN_TEST:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_RESOLVED_SYMLINK:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_DEVICE_REFCOUNT:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_PARTITION_INFO:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_BOOT_DRIVE_VOLUME_PROPERTIES:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_BOOT_ENCRYPTION_STATUS:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_DECOY_SYSTEM_WIPE_STATUS:
case TC_IOCTL_GET_WARNING_FLAGS:
case TC_IOCTL_IS_HIDDEN_SYSTEM_RUNNING:
case IOCTL_DISK_CHECK_VERIFY:
break;
default:
Dump ("%ls (0x%x %d)\n",
TCTranslateCode (irpSp->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.IoControlCode),
(int) (irpSp->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.IoControlCode >> 16),
(int) ((irpSp->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.IoControlCode & 0x1FFF) >> 2));
}
}
#endif
if (!Extension->bRootDevice)
{
if (Extension->IsDriveFilterDevice)
return DriveFilterDispatchIrp (DeviceObject, Irp);
if (Extension->IsVolumeFilterDevice)
return VolumeFilterDispatchIrp (DeviceObject, Irp);
}
switch (irpSp->MajorFunction)
{
case IRP_MJ_CLOSE:
case IRP_MJ_CREATE:
case IRP_MJ_CLEANUP:
return COMPLETE_IRP (DeviceObject, Irp, STATUS_SUCCESS, 0);
case IRP_MJ_SHUTDOWN:
if (Extension->bRootDevice)
{
Dump ("Driver shutting down\n");
DriverShuttingDown = TRUE;
if (EncryptionSetupThread)
while (SendDeviceIoControlRequest (RootDeviceObject, TC_IOCTL_ABORT_BOOT_ENCRYPTION_SETUP, NULL, 0, NULL, 0) == STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES);
if (DecoySystemWipeThread)
while (SendDeviceIoControlRequest (RootDeviceObject, TC_IOCTL_ABORT_DECOY_SYSTEM_WIPE, NULL, 0, NULL, 0) == STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES);
OnShutdownPending();
}
return COMPLETE_IRP (DeviceObject, Irp, STATUS_SUCCESS, 0);
case IRP_MJ_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
case IRP_MJ_READ:
case IRP_MJ_WRITE:
case IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL:
if (Extension->bRootDevice)
{
if (irpSp->MajorFunction == IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL)
{
NTSTATUS status = KeWaitForMutexObject (&RootDeviceControlMutex, Executive, KernelMode, FALSE, NULL);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
return status;
status = ProcessMainDeviceControlIrp (DeviceObject, Extension, Irp);
KeReleaseMutex (&RootDeviceControlMutex, FALSE);
return status;
}
break;
}
if (Extension->bShuttingDown)
{
Dump ("Device %d shutting down: STATUS_DELETE_PENDING\n", Extension->nDosDriveNo);
return TCCompleteDiskIrp (Irp, STATUS_DELETE_PENDING, 0);
}
if (Extension->bRemovable
&& (DeviceObject->Flags & DO_VERIFY_VOLUME)
&& !(irpSp->Flags & SL_OVERRIDE_VERIFY_VOLUME)
&& irpSp->MajorFunction != IRP_MJ_FLUSH_BUFFERS)
{
Dump ("Removable device %d has DO_VERIFY_VOLUME flag: STATUS_DEVICE_NOT_READY\n", Extension->nDosDriveNo);
return TCCompleteDiskIrp (Irp, STATUS_DEVICE_NOT_READY, 0);
}
switch (irpSp->MajorFunction)
{
case IRP_MJ_READ:
case IRP_MJ_WRITE:
ntStatus = EncryptedIoQueueAddIrp (&Extension->Queue, Irp);
if (ntStatus != STATUS_PENDING)
TCCompleteDiskIrp (Irp, ntStatus, 0);
return ntStatus;
case IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL:
ntStatus = IoAcquireRemoveLock (&Extension->Queue.RemoveLock, Irp);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (ntStatus))
return TCCompleteIrp (Irp, ntStatus, 0);
IoMarkIrpPending (Irp);
ExInterlockedInsertTailList (&Extension->ListEntry, &Irp->Tail.Overlay.ListEntry, &Extension->ListSpinLock);
KeReleaseSemaphore (&Extension->RequestSemaphore, IO_DISK_INCREMENT, 1, FALSE);
return STATUS_PENDING;
case IRP_MJ_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
return TCCompleteDiskIrp (Irp, STATUS_SUCCESS, 0);
}
break;
case IRP_MJ_PNP:
if (!Extension->bRootDevice
&& Extension->IsVolumeDevice
&& irpSp->MinorFunction == IRP_MN_DEVICE_USAGE_NOTIFICATION
&& irpSp->Parameters.UsageNotification.Type == DeviceUsageTypePaging
&& irpSp->Parameters.UsageNotification.InPath)
{
PagingFileCreationPrevented = TRUE;
return TCCompleteIrp (Irp, STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL, 0);
}
break;
}
return TCCompleteIrp (Irp, STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST, 0);
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnOpenURL(
const ViewHostMsg_OpenURL_Params& params) {
GURL validated_url(params.url);
FilterURL(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance(),
GetProcess(), false, &validated_url);
delegate_->RequestOpenURL(
this, validated_url, params.referrer, params.disposition, params.frame_id,
params.is_cross_site_redirect);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 15,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool already_entry(RList *entries, ut64 vaddr) {
RBinAddr *e;
RListIter *iter;
r_list_foreach (entries, iter, e) {
if (e->vaddr == vaddr) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: fix #6857
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 16,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pipe_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *wait)
{
unsigned int mask;
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = filp->private_data;
int nrbufs;
poll_wait(filp, &pipe->wait, wait);
/* Reading only -- no need for acquiring the semaphore. */
nrbufs = pipe->nrbufs;
mask = 0;
if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
mask = (nrbufs > 0) ? POLLIN | POLLRDNORM : 0;
if (!pipe->writers && filp->f_version != pipe->w_counter)
mask |= POLLHUP;
}
if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
mask |= (nrbufs < pipe->buffers) ? POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM : 0;
/*
* Most Unices do not set POLLERR for FIFOs but on Linux they
* behave exactly like pipes for poll().
*/
if (!pipe->readers)
mask |= POLLERR;
}
return mask;
}
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 14,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::~SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost() {
SharedWorkerDevToolsManager::GetInstance()->AgentHostDestroyed(this);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FoFiType1::parse() {
char *line, *line1, *p, *p2;
char buf[256];
char c;
int n, code, i, j;
char *tokptr;
for (i = 1, line = (char *)file;
i <= 100 && line && (!name || !encoding);
++i) {
if (!name && !strncmp(line, "/FontName", 9)) {
strncpy(buf, line, 255);
buf[255] = '\0';
if ((p = strchr(buf+9, '/')) &&
(p = strtok_r(p+1, " \t\n\r", &tokptr))) {
name = copyString(p);
}
line = getNextLine(line);
} else if (!encoding &&
!strncmp(line, "/Encoding StandardEncoding def", 30)) {
encoding = fofiType1StandardEncoding;
} else if (!encoding &&
!strncmp(line, "/Encoding 256 array", 19)) {
encoding = (char **)gmallocn(256, sizeof(char *));
for (j = 0; j < 256; ++j) {
encoding[j] = NULL;
}
for (j = 0, line = getNextLine(line);
j < 300 && line && (line1 = getNextLine(line));
++j, line = line1) {
if ((n = line1 - line) > 255) {
error(-1, "FoFiType1::parse a line has more than 255 characters, we don't support this");
n = 255;
}
strncpy(buf, line, n);
buf[n] = '\0';
for (p = buf; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
if (!strncmp(p, "dup", 3)) {
for (p += 3; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
for (p2 = p; *p2 >= '0' && *p2 <= '9'; ++p2) ;
if (*p2) {
c = *p2; // store it so we can recover it after atoi
*p2 = '\0'; // terminate p so atoi works
code = atoi(p);
*p2 = c;
if (code == 8 && *p2 == '#') {
code = 0;
for (++p2; *p2 >= '0' && *p2 <= '7'; ++p2) {
code = code * 8 + (*p2 - '0');
code = code * 8 + (*p2 - '0');
}
}
if (code < 256) {
for (p = p2; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
if (*p == '/') {
++p;
c = *p2; // store it so we can recover it after copyString
*p2 = '\0'; // terminate p so copyString works
encoding[code] = copyString(p);
*p2 = c;
p = p2;
for (; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p); // eat spaces between string and put
if (!strncmp(p, "put", 3)) {
for (p += 3; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t' || *p == '\n' || *p == '\r'; ++p);
if (*p)
{
line1 = &line[p - buf];
}
} else {
error(-1, "FoFiType1::parse no put after dup");
}
}
}
}
} else {
if (strtok_r(buf, " \t", &tokptr) &&
(p = strtok_r(NULL, " \t\n\r", &tokptr)) && !strcmp(p, "def")) {
break;
}
}
}
} else {
line = getNextLine(line);
}
}
parsed = gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 4,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int br_mdb_rehash(struct net_bridge_mdb_htable __rcu **mdbp, int max,
int elasticity)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *old = rcu_dereference_protected(*mdbp, 1);
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
int err;
mdb = kmalloc(sizeof(*mdb), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!mdb)
return -ENOMEM;
mdb->max = max;
mdb->old = old;
mdb->mhash = kzalloc(max * sizeof(*mdb->mhash), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!mdb->mhash) {
kfree(mdb);
return -ENOMEM;
}
mdb->size = old ? old->size : 0;
mdb->ver = old ? old->ver ^ 1 : 0;
if (!old || elasticity)
get_random_bytes(&mdb->secret, sizeof(mdb->secret));
else
mdb->secret = old->secret;
if (!old)
goto out;
err = br_mdb_copy(mdb, old, elasticity);
if (err) {
kfree(mdb->mhash);
kfree(mdb);
return err;
}
call_rcu_bh(&mdb->rcu, br_mdb_free);
out:
rcu_assign_pointer(*mdbp, mdb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void virtio_del_queue(VirtIODevice *vdev, int n)
{
if (n < 0 || n >= VIRTIO_QUEUE_MAX) {
abort();
}
vdev->vq[n].vring.num = 0;
vdev->vq[n].vring.num_default = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsTestObjImmutablePoint(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
UNUSED_PARAM(exec);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
JSValue result = toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(SVGPropertyTearOff<FloatPoint>::create(impl->immutablePoint())));
return result;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int android_net_wifi_getInterfaces(JNIEnv *env, jclass cls) {
int n = 0;
JNIHelper helper(env);
wifi_handle halHandle = getWifiHandle(helper, cls);
wifi_interface_handle *ifaceHandles = NULL;
int result = hal_fn.wifi_get_ifaces(halHandle, &n, &ifaceHandles);
if (result < 0) {
return result;
}
if (n < 0) {
THROW(helper,"android_net_wifi_getInterfaces no interfaces");
return 0;
}
if (ifaceHandles == NULL) {
THROW(helper,"android_net_wifi_getInterfaces null interface array");
return 0;
}
if (n > 8) {
THROW(helper,"Too many interfaces");
return 0;
}
jlongArray array = (env)->NewLongArray(n);
if (array == NULL) {
THROW(helper,"Error in accessing array");
return 0;
}
jlong elems[8];
for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
elems[i] = reinterpret_cast<jlong>(ifaceHandles[i]);
}
helper.setLongArrayRegion(array, 0, n, elems);
helper.setStaticLongArrayField(cls, WifiIfaceHandleVarName, array);
return (result < 0) ? result : n;
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: load_chalresp_state(FILE *f, CR_STATE *state, bool verbose, FILE *debug_file)
{
/*
* Load the current challenge and expected response information from a file handle.
*
* Format is hex(challenge):hex(response):slot num
*/
char challenge_hex[CR_CHALLENGE_SIZE * 2 + 1], response_hex[CR_RESPONSE_SIZE * 2 + 1];
char salt_hex[CR_SALT_SIZE * 2 + 1];
unsigned int iterations;
int slot;
int r;
if (! f)
goto out;
/* XXX not ideal with hard coded lengths in this scan string.
* 126 corresponds to twice the size of CR_CHALLENGE_SIZE,
* 40 is twice the size of CR_RESPONSE_SIZE
* (twice because we hex encode the challenge and response)
*/
r = fscanf(f, "v2:%126[0-9a-z]:%40[0-9a-z]:%64[0-9a-z]:%d:%d", challenge_hex, response_hex, salt_hex, &iterations, &slot);
if(r == 5) {
if (! yubikey_hex_p(salt_hex)) {
D(debug_file, "Invalid salt hex input : %s", salt_hex);
goto out;
}
if(verbose) {
D(debug_file, "Challenge: %s, hashed response: %s, salt: %s, iterations: %d, slot: %d",
challenge_hex, response_hex, salt_hex, iterations, slot);
}
yubikey_hex_decode(state->salt, salt_hex, sizeof(state->salt));
state->salt_len = strlen(salt_hex) / 2;
} else {
rewind(f);
r = fscanf(f, "v1:%126[0-9a-z]:%40[0-9a-z]:%d", challenge_hex, response_hex, &slot);
if (r != 3) {
D(debug_file, "Could not parse contents of chalresp_state file (%i)", r);
goto out;
}
if (verbose) {
D(debug_file, "Challenge: %s, expected response: %s, slot: %d", challenge_hex, response_hex, slot);
}
iterations = CR_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS;
}
state->iterations = iterations;
if (! yubikey_hex_p(challenge_hex)) {
D(debug_file, "Invalid challenge hex input : %s", challenge_hex);
goto out;
}
if (! yubikey_hex_p(response_hex)) {
D(debug_file, "Invalid expected response hex input : %s", response_hex);
goto out;
}
if (slot != 1 && slot != 2) {
D(debug_file, "Invalid slot input : %i", slot);
goto out;
}
yubikey_hex_decode(state->challenge, challenge_hex, sizeof(state->challenge));
state->challenge_len = strlen(challenge_hex) / 2;
yubikey_hex_decode(state->response, response_hex, sizeof(state->response));
state->response_len = strlen(response_hex) / 2;
state->slot = slot;
return 1;
out:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: util: make sure to close the authfile before returning success
fixes #136
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::AudioSourceProviderImpl::ProvideInput(
AudioBus* bus,
size_t frames_to_process) {
DCHECK(bus);
MutexTryLocker try_locker(provide_input_lock);
if (!try_locker.Locked() || !web_audio_source_provider_ || !client_.Get()) {
bus->Zero();
return;
}
unsigned n = bus->NumberOfChannels();
WebVector<float*> web_audio_data(n);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < n; ++i)
web_audio_data[i] = bus->Channel(i)->MutableData();
web_audio_source_provider_->ProvideInput(web_audio_data, frames_to_process);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 6,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage void do_sun4c_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, int text_fault, int write,
unsigned long address)
{
extern void sun4c_update_mmu_cache(struct vm_area_struct *,
unsigned long,pte_t *);
extern pte_t *sun4c_pte_offset_kernel(pmd_t *,unsigned long);
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
pgd_t *pgdp;
pte_t *ptep;
if (text_fault) {
address = regs->pc;
} else if (!write &&
!(regs->psr & PSR_PS)) {
unsigned int insn, __user *ip;
ip = (unsigned int __user *)regs->pc;
if (!get_user(insn, ip)) {
if ((insn & 0xc1680000) == 0xc0680000)
write = 1;
}
}
if (!mm) {
/* We are oopsing. */
do_sparc_fault(regs, text_fault, write, address);
BUG(); /* P3 Oops already, you bitch */
}
pgdp = pgd_offset(mm, address);
ptep = sun4c_pte_offset_kernel((pmd_t *) pgdp, address);
if (pgd_val(*pgdp)) {
if (write) {
if ((pte_val(*ptep) & (_SUN4C_PAGE_WRITE|_SUN4C_PAGE_PRESENT))
== (_SUN4C_PAGE_WRITE|_SUN4C_PAGE_PRESENT)) {
unsigned long flags;
*ptep = __pte(pte_val(*ptep) | _SUN4C_PAGE_ACCESSED |
_SUN4C_PAGE_MODIFIED |
_SUN4C_PAGE_VALID |
_SUN4C_PAGE_DIRTY);
local_irq_save(flags);
if (sun4c_get_segmap(address) != invalid_segment) {
sun4c_put_pte(address, pte_val(*ptep));
local_irq_restore(flags);
return;
}
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
} else {
if ((pte_val(*ptep) & (_SUN4C_PAGE_READ|_SUN4C_PAGE_PRESENT))
== (_SUN4C_PAGE_READ|_SUN4C_PAGE_PRESENT)) {
unsigned long flags;
*ptep = __pte(pte_val(*ptep) | _SUN4C_PAGE_ACCESSED |
_SUN4C_PAGE_VALID);
local_irq_save(flags);
if (sun4c_get_segmap(address) != invalid_segment) {
sun4c_put_pte(address, pte_val(*ptep));
local_irq_restore(flags);
return;
}
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
}
}
/* This conditional is 'interesting'. */
if (pgd_val(*pgdp) && !(write && !(pte_val(*ptep) & _SUN4C_PAGE_WRITE))
&& (pte_val(*ptep) & _SUN4C_PAGE_VALID))
/* Note: It is safe to not grab the MMAP semaphore here because
* we know that update_mmu_cache() will not sleep for
* any reason (at least not in the current implementation)
* and therefore there is no danger of another thread getting
* on the CPU and doing a shrink_mmap() on this vma.
*/
sun4c_update_mmu_cache (find_vma(current->mm, address), address,
ptep);
else
do_sparc_fault(regs, text_fault, write, address);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void smb1cli_req_cancel_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
{
/* we do not care about the result */
TALLOC_FREE(subreq);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tea_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
u32 y, z, n, sum;
u32 k0, k1, k2, k3;
struct tea_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
const __le32 *in = (const __le32 *)src;
__le32 *out = (__le32 *)dst;
y = le32_to_cpu(in[0]);
z = le32_to_cpu(in[1]);
k0 = ctx->KEY[0];
k1 = ctx->KEY[1];
k2 = ctx->KEY[2];
k3 = ctx->KEY[3];
sum = TEA_DELTA << 5;
n = TEA_ROUNDS;
while (n-- > 0) {
z -= ((y << 4) + k2) ^ (y + sum) ^ ((y >> 5) + k3);
y -= ((z << 4) + k0) ^ (z + sum) ^ ((z >> 5) + k1);
sum -= TEA_DELTA;
}
out[0] = cpu_to_le32(y);
out[1] = cpu_to_le32(z);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 12,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_get_lpcm_flags(enum AVCodecID codec_id)
{
switch (codec_id) {
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_F32BE:
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_F64BE:
return 11;
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_F32LE:
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_F64LE:
return 9;
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_U8:
return 10;
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S16BE:
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S24BE:
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S32BE:
return 14;
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S8:
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S16LE:
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S24LE:
case AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S32LE:
return 12;
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 6,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IndexedDBDispatcher::RequestIDBObjectStoreGet(
const IndexedDBKey& key,
WebIDBCallbacks* callbacks_ptr,
int32 idb_object_store_id,
const WebIDBTransaction& transaction,
WebExceptionCode* ec) {
ResetCursorPrefetchCaches();
scoped_ptr<WebIDBCallbacks> callbacks(callbacks_ptr);
int32 response_id = pending_callbacks_.Add(callbacks.release());
Send(new IndexedDBHostMsg_ObjectStoreGet(
idb_object_store_id, CurrentWorkerId(), response_id,
key, TransactionId(transaction), ec));
if (*ec)
pending_callbacks_.Remove(response_id);
}
Commit Message: Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcCreatePixmap(ClientPtr client)
{
PixmapPtr pMap;
DrawablePtr pDraw;
REQUEST(xCreatePixmapReq);
DepthPtr pDepth;
int i, rc;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xCreatePixmapReq);
client->errorValue = stuff->pid;
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->pid, client);
rc = dixLookupDrawable(&pDraw, stuff->drawable, client, M_ANY,
DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
if (!stuff->width || !stuff->height) {
client->errorValue = 0;
return BadValue;
}
if (stuff->width > 32767 || stuff->height > 32767) {
/* It is allowed to try and allocate a pixmap which is larger than
* 32767 in either dimension. However, all of the framebuffer code
* is buggy and does not reliably draw to such big pixmaps, basically
* because the Region data structure operates with signed shorts
* for the rectangles in it.
*
* Furthermore, several places in the X server computes the
* size in bytes of the pixmap and tries to store it in an
* integer. This integer can overflow and cause the allocated size
* to be much smaller.
*
* So, such big pixmaps are rejected here with a BadAlloc
*/
return BadAlloc;
}
if (stuff->depth != 1) {
pDepth = pDraw->pScreen->allowedDepths;
for (i = 0; i < pDraw->pScreen->numDepths; i++, pDepth++)
if (pDepth->depth == stuff->depth)
goto CreatePmap;
client->errorValue = stuff->depth;
return BadValue;
}
CreatePmap:
pMap = (PixmapPtr) (*pDraw->pScreen->CreatePixmap)
(pDraw->pScreen, stuff->width, stuff->height, stuff->depth, 0);
if (pMap) {
pMap->drawable.serialNumber = NEXT_SERIAL_NUMBER;
pMap->drawable.id = stuff->pid;
/* security creation/labeling check */
rc = XaceHook(XACE_RESOURCE_ACCESS, client, stuff->pid, RT_PIXMAP,
pMap, RT_NONE, NULL, DixCreateAccess);
if (rc != Success) {
(*pDraw->pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pMap);
return rc;
}
if (AddResource(stuff->pid, RT_PIXMAP, (void *) pMap))
return Success;
}
return BadAlloc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 6,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int free_query_string = 0;
int exit_status = SUCCESS;
int cgi = 0, c, i, len;
zend_file_handle file_handle;
char *s;
/* temporary locals */
int behavior = PHP_MODE_STANDARD;
int no_headers = 0;
int orig_optind = php_optind;
char *orig_optarg = php_optarg;
char *script_file = NULL;
int ini_entries_len = 0;
/* end of temporary locals */
#ifdef ZTS
void ***tsrm_ls;
#endif
int max_requests = 500;
int requests = 0;
int fastcgi;
char *bindpath = NULL;
int fcgi_fd = 0;
fcgi_request *request = NULL;
int repeats = 1;
int benchmark = 0;
#if HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
struct timeval start, end;
#else
time_t start, end;
#endif
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
int status = 0;
#endif
char *query_string;
char *decoded_query_string;
int skip_getopt = 0;
#if 0 && defined(PHP_DEBUG)
/* IIS is always making things more difficult. This allows
* us to stop PHP and attach a debugger before much gets started */
{
char szMessage [256];
wsprintf (szMessage, "Please attach a debugger to the process 0x%X [%d] (%s) and click OK", GetCurrentProcessId(), GetCurrentProcessId(), argv[0]);
MessageBox(NULL, szMessage, "CGI Debug Time!", MB_OK|MB_SERVICE_NOTIFICATION);
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H
#if defined(SIGPIPE) && defined(SIG_IGN)
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE in standalone mode so
that sockets created via fsockopen()
don't kill PHP if the remote site
closes it. in apache|apxs mode apache
does that for us! thies@thieso.net
20000419 */
#endif
#endif
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_startup(1, 1, 0, NULL);
tsrm_ls = ts_resource(0);
#endif
sapi_startup(&cgi_sapi_module);
fastcgi = fcgi_is_fastcgi();
cgi_sapi_module.php_ini_path_override = NULL;
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
_fmode = _O_BINARY; /* sets default for file streams to binary */
setmode(_fileno(stdin), O_BINARY); /* make the stdio mode be binary */
setmode(_fileno(stdout), O_BINARY); /* make the stdio mode be binary */
setmode(_fileno(stderr), O_BINARY); /* make the stdio mode be binary */
#endif
if (!fastcgi) {
/* Make sure we detect we are a cgi - a bit redundancy here,
* but the default case is that we have to check only the first one. */
if (getenv("SERVER_SOFTWARE") ||
getenv("SERVER_NAME") ||
getenv("GATEWAY_INTERFACE") ||
getenv("REQUEST_METHOD")
) {
cgi = 1;
}
}
if((query_string = getenv("QUERY_STRING")) != NULL && strchr(query_string, '=') == NULL) {
/* we've got query string that has no = - apache CGI will pass it to command line */
unsigned char *p;
decoded_query_string = strdup(query_string);
php_url_decode(decoded_query_string, strlen(decoded_query_string));
for (p = decoded_query_string; *p && *p <= ' '; p++) {
/* skip all leading spaces */
}
if(*p == '-') {
skip_getopt = 1;
}
free(decoded_query_string);
}
while (!skip_getopt && (c = php_getopt(argc, argv, OPTIONS, &php_optarg, &php_optind, 0, 2)) != -1) {
switch (c) {
case 'c':
if (cgi_sapi_module.php_ini_path_override) {
free(cgi_sapi_module.php_ini_path_override);
}
cgi_sapi_module.php_ini_path_override = strdup(php_optarg);
break;
case 'n':
cgi_sapi_module.php_ini_ignore = 1;
break;
case 'd': {
/* define ini entries on command line */
int len = strlen(php_optarg);
char *val;
if ((val = strchr(php_optarg, '='))) {
val++;
if (!isalnum(*val) && *val != '"' && *val != '\'' && *val != '\0') {
cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries = realloc(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries, ini_entries_len + len + sizeof("\"\"\n\0"));
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len, php_optarg, (val - php_optarg));
ini_entries_len += (val - php_optarg);
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len, "\"", 1);
ini_entries_len++;
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len, val, len - (val - php_optarg));
ini_entries_len += len - (val - php_optarg);
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len, "\"\n\0", sizeof("\"\n\0"));
ini_entries_len += sizeof("\n\0\"") - 2;
} else {
cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries = realloc(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries, ini_entries_len + len + sizeof("\n\0"));
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len, php_optarg, len);
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len + len, "\n\0", sizeof("\n\0"));
ini_entries_len += len + sizeof("\n\0") - 2;
}
} else {
cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries = realloc(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries, ini_entries_len + len + sizeof("=1\n\0"));
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len, php_optarg, len);
memcpy(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries + ini_entries_len + len, "=1\n\0", sizeof("=1\n\0"));
ini_entries_len += len + sizeof("=1\n\0") - 2;
}
break;
}
/* if we're started on command line, check to see if
* we are being started as an 'external' fastcgi
* server by accepting a bindpath parameter. */
case 'b':
if (!fastcgi) {
bindpath = strdup(php_optarg);
}
break;
case 's': /* generate highlighted HTML from source */
behavior = PHP_MODE_HIGHLIGHT;
break;
}
}
php_optind = orig_optind;
php_optarg = orig_optarg;
if (fastcgi || bindpath) {
/* Override SAPI callbacks */
cgi_sapi_module.ub_write = sapi_fcgi_ub_write;
cgi_sapi_module.flush = sapi_fcgi_flush;
cgi_sapi_module.read_post = sapi_fcgi_read_post;
cgi_sapi_module.getenv = sapi_fcgi_getenv;
cgi_sapi_module.read_cookies = sapi_fcgi_read_cookies;
}
#ifdef ZTS
SG(request_info).path_translated = NULL;
#endif
cgi_sapi_module.executable_location = argv[0];
if (!cgi && !fastcgi && !bindpath) {
cgi_sapi_module.additional_functions = additional_functions;
}
/* startup after we get the above ini override se we get things right */
if (cgi_sapi_module.startup(&cgi_sapi_module) == FAILURE) {
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_shutdown();
#endif
return FAILURE;
}
/* check force_cgi after startup, so we have proper output */
if (cgi && CGIG(force_redirect)) {
/* Apache will generate REDIRECT_STATUS,
* Netscape and redirect.so will generate HTTP_REDIRECT_STATUS.
* redirect.so and installation instructions available from
* http://www.koehntopp.de/php.
* -- kk@netuse.de
*/
if (!getenv("REDIRECT_STATUS") &&
!getenv ("HTTP_REDIRECT_STATUS") &&
/* this is to allow a different env var to be configured
* in case some server does something different than above */
(!CGIG(redirect_status_env) || !getenv(CGIG(redirect_status_env)))
) {
zend_try {
SG(sapi_headers).http_response_code = 400;
PUTS("<b>Security Alert!</b> The PHP CGI cannot be accessed directly.\n\n\
<p>This PHP CGI binary was compiled with force-cgi-redirect enabled. This\n\
means that a page will only be served up if the REDIRECT_STATUS CGI variable is\n\
set, e.g. via an Apache Action directive.</p>\n\
<p>For more information as to <i>why</i> this behaviour exists, see the <a href=\"http://php.net/security.cgi-bin\">\
manual page for CGI security</a>.</p>\n\
<p>For more information about changing this behaviour or re-enabling this webserver,\n\
consult the installation file that came with this distribution, or visit \n\
<a href=\"http://php.net/install.windows\">the manual page</a>.</p>\n");
} zend_catch {
} zend_end_try();
#if defined(ZTS) && !defined(PHP_DEBUG)
/* XXX we're crashing here in msvc6 debug builds at
* php_message_handler_for_zend:839 because
* SG(request_info).path_translated is an invalid pointer.
* It still happens even though I set it to null, so something
* weird is going on.
*/
tsrm_shutdown();
#endif
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (bindpath) {
fcgi_fd = fcgi_listen(bindpath, 128);
if (fcgi_fd < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't create FastCGI listen socket on port %s\n", bindpath);
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_shutdown();
#endif
return FAILURE;
}
fastcgi = fcgi_is_fastcgi();
}
if (fastcgi) {
/* How many times to run PHP scripts before dying */
if (getenv("PHP_FCGI_MAX_REQUESTS")) {
max_requests = atoi(getenv("PHP_FCGI_MAX_REQUESTS"));
if (max_requests < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "PHP_FCGI_MAX_REQUESTS is not valid\n");
return FAILURE;
}
}
/* make php call us to get _ENV vars */
php_php_import_environment_variables = php_import_environment_variables;
php_import_environment_variables = cgi_php_import_environment_variables;
/* library is already initialized, now init our request */
request = fcgi_init_request(fcgi_fd);
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
/* Pre-fork, if required */
if (getenv("PHP_FCGI_CHILDREN")) {
char * children_str = getenv("PHP_FCGI_CHILDREN");
children = atoi(children_str);
if (children < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "PHP_FCGI_CHILDREN is not valid\n");
return FAILURE;
}
fcgi_set_mgmt_var("FCGI_MAX_CONNS", sizeof("FCGI_MAX_CONNS")-1, children_str, strlen(children_str));
/* This is the number of concurrent requests, equals FCGI_MAX_CONNS */
fcgi_set_mgmt_var("FCGI_MAX_REQS", sizeof("FCGI_MAX_REQS")-1, children_str, strlen(children_str));
} else {
fcgi_set_mgmt_var("FCGI_MAX_CONNS", sizeof("FCGI_MAX_CONNS")-1, "1", sizeof("1")-1);
fcgi_set_mgmt_var("FCGI_MAX_REQS", sizeof("FCGI_MAX_REQS")-1, "1", sizeof("1")-1);
}
if (children) {
int running = 0;
pid_t pid;
/* Create a process group for ourself & children */
setsid();
pgroup = getpgrp();
#ifdef DEBUG_FASTCGI
fprintf(stderr, "Process group %d\n", pgroup);
#endif
/* Set up handler to kill children upon exit */
act.sa_flags = 0;
act.sa_handler = fastcgi_cleanup;
if (sigaction(SIGTERM, &act, &old_term) ||
sigaction(SIGINT, &act, &old_int) ||
sigaction(SIGQUIT, &act, &old_quit)
) {
perror("Can't set signals");
exit(1);
}
if (fcgi_in_shutdown()) {
goto parent_out;
}
while (parent) {
do {
#ifdef DEBUG_FASTCGI
fprintf(stderr, "Forking, %d running\n", running);
#endif
pid = fork();
switch (pid) {
case 0:
/* One of the children.
* Make sure we don't go round the
* fork loop any more
*/
parent = 0;
/* don't catch our signals */
sigaction(SIGTERM, &old_term, 0);
sigaction(SIGQUIT, &old_quit, 0);
sigaction(SIGINT, &old_int, 0);
break;
case -1:
perror("php (pre-forking)");
exit(1);
break;
default:
/* Fine */
running++;
break;
}
} while (parent && (running < children));
if (parent) {
#ifdef DEBUG_FASTCGI
fprintf(stderr, "Wait for kids, pid %d\n", getpid());
#endif
parent_waiting = 1;
while (1) {
if (wait(&status) >= 0) {
running--;
break;
} else if (exit_signal) {
break;
}
}
if (exit_signal) {
#if 0
while (running > 0) {
while (wait(&status) < 0) {
}
running--;
}
#endif
goto parent_out;
}
}
}
} else {
parent = 0;
}
#endif /* WIN32 */
}
zend_first_try {
while (!skip_getopt && (c = php_getopt(argc, argv, OPTIONS, &php_optarg, &php_optind, 1, 2)) != -1) {
switch (c) {
case 'T':
benchmark = 1;
repeats = atoi(php_optarg);
#ifdef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
#else
time(&start);
#endif
break;
case 'h':
case '?':
if (request) {
fcgi_destroy_request(request);
}
fcgi_shutdown();
no_headers = 1;
SG(headers_sent) = 1;
php_cgi_usage(argv[0]);
php_output_end_all(TSRMLS_C);
exit_status = 0;
goto out;
}
}
php_optind = orig_optind;
php_optarg = orig_optarg;
/* start of FAST CGI loop */
/* Initialise FastCGI request structure */
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
/* attempt to set security impersonation for fastcgi
* will only happen on NT based OS, others will ignore it. */
if (fastcgi && CGIG(impersonate)) {
fcgi_impersonate();
}
#endif
while (!fastcgi || fcgi_accept_request(request) >= 0) {
SG(server_context) = fastcgi ? (void *) request : (void *) 1;
init_request_info(request TSRMLS_CC);
CG(interactive) = 0;
if (!cgi && !fastcgi) {
while ((c = php_getopt(argc, argv, OPTIONS, &php_optarg, &php_optind, 0, 2)) != -1) {
switch (c) {
case 'a': /* interactive mode */
printf("Interactive mode enabled\n\n");
CG(interactive) = 1;
break;
case 'C': /* don't chdir to the script directory */
SG(options) |= SAPI_OPTION_NO_CHDIR;
break;
case 'e': /* enable extended info output */
CG(compiler_options) |= ZEND_COMPILE_EXTENDED_INFO;
break;
case 'f': /* parse file */
if (script_file) {
efree(script_file);
}
script_file = estrdup(php_optarg);
no_headers = 1;
break;
case 'i': /* php info & quit */
if (script_file) {
efree(script_file);
}
if (php_request_startup(TSRMLS_C) == FAILURE) {
SG(server_context) = NULL;
php_module_shutdown(TSRMLS_C);
return FAILURE;
}
if (no_headers) {
SG(headers_sent) = 1;
SG(request_info).no_headers = 1;
}
php_print_info(0xFFFFFFFF TSRMLS_CC);
php_request_shutdown((void *) 0);
fcgi_shutdown();
exit_status = 0;
goto out;
case 'l': /* syntax check mode */
no_headers = 1;
behavior = PHP_MODE_LINT;
break;
case 'm': /* list compiled in modules */
if (script_file) {
efree(script_file);
}
SG(headers_sent) = 1;
php_printf("[PHP Modules]\n");
print_modules(TSRMLS_C);
php_printf("\n[Zend Modules]\n");
print_extensions(TSRMLS_C);
php_printf("\n");
php_output_end_all(TSRMLS_C);
fcgi_shutdown();
exit_status = 0;
goto out;
#if 0 /* not yet operational, see also below ... */
case '': /* generate indented source mode*/
behavior=PHP_MODE_INDENT;
break;
#endif
case 'q': /* do not generate HTTP headers */
no_headers = 1;
break;
case 'v': /* show php version & quit */
if (script_file) {
efree(script_file);
}
no_headers = 1;
if (php_request_startup(TSRMLS_C) == FAILURE) {
SG(server_context) = NULL;
php_module_shutdown(TSRMLS_C);
return FAILURE;
}
if (no_headers) {
SG(headers_sent) = 1;
SG(request_info).no_headers = 1;
}
#if ZEND_DEBUG
php_printf("PHP %s (%s) (built: %s %s) (DEBUG)\nCopyright (c) 1997-2014 The PHP Group\n%s", PHP_VERSION, sapi_module.name, __DATE__, __TIME__, get_zend_version());
#else
php_printf("PHP %s (%s) (built: %s %s)\nCopyright (c) 1997-2014 The PHP Group\n%s", PHP_VERSION, sapi_module.name, __DATE__, __TIME__, get_zend_version());
#endif
php_request_shutdown((void *) 0);
fcgi_shutdown();
exit_status = 0;
goto out;
case 'w':
behavior = PHP_MODE_STRIP;
break;
case 'z': /* load extension file */
zend_load_extension(php_optarg);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (script_file) {
/* override path_translated if -f on command line */
STR_FREE(SG(request_info).path_translated);
SG(request_info).path_translated = script_file;
/* before registering argv to module exchange the *new* argv[0] */
/* we can achieve this without allocating more memory */
SG(request_info).argc = argc - (php_optind - 1);
SG(request_info).argv = &argv[php_optind - 1];
SG(request_info).argv[0] = script_file;
} else if (argc > php_optind) {
/* file is on command line, but not in -f opt */
STR_FREE(SG(request_info).path_translated);
SG(request_info).path_translated = estrdup(argv[php_optind]);
/* arguments after the file are considered script args */
SG(request_info).argc = argc - php_optind;
SG(request_info).argv = &argv[php_optind];
}
if (no_headers) {
SG(headers_sent) = 1;
SG(request_info).no_headers = 1;
}
/* all remaining arguments are part of the query string
* this section of code concatenates all remaining arguments
* into a single string, seperating args with a &
* this allows command lines like:
*
* test.php v1=test v2=hello+world!
* test.php "v1=test&v2=hello world!"
* test.php v1=test "v2=hello world!"
*/
if (!SG(request_info).query_string && argc > php_optind) {
int slen = strlen(PG(arg_separator).input);
len = 0;
for (i = php_optind; i < argc; i++) {
if (i < (argc - 1)) {
len += strlen(argv[i]) + slen;
} else {
len += strlen(argv[i]);
}
}
len += 2;
s = malloc(len);
*s = '\0'; /* we are pretending it came from the environment */
for (i = php_optind; i < argc; i++) {
strlcat(s, argv[i], len);
if (i < (argc - 1)) {
strlcat(s, PG(arg_separator).input, len);
}
}
SG(request_info).query_string = s;
free_query_string = 1;
}
} /* end !cgi && !fastcgi */
/*
we never take stdin if we're (f)cgi, always
rely on the web server giving us the info
we need in the environment.
*/
if (SG(request_info).path_translated || cgi || fastcgi) {
file_handle.type = ZEND_HANDLE_FILENAME;
file_handle.filename = SG(request_info).path_translated;
file_handle.handle.fp = NULL;
} else {
file_handle.filename = "-";
file_handle.type = ZEND_HANDLE_FP;
file_handle.handle.fp = stdin;
}
file_handle.opened_path = NULL;
file_handle.free_filename = 0;
/* request startup only after we've done all we can to
* get path_translated */
if (php_request_startup(TSRMLS_C) == FAILURE) {
if (fastcgi) {
fcgi_finish_request(request, 1);
}
SG(server_context) = NULL;
php_module_shutdown(TSRMLS_C);
return FAILURE;
}
if (no_headers) {
SG(headers_sent) = 1;
SG(request_info).no_headers = 1;
}
/*
at this point path_translated will be set if:
1. we are running from shell and got filename was there
2. we are running as cgi or fastcgi
*/
if (cgi || fastcgi || SG(request_info).path_translated) {
if (php_fopen_primary_script(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
zend_try {
if (errno == EACCES) {
SG(sapi_headers).http_response_code = 403;
PUTS("Access denied.\n");
} else {
SG(sapi_headers).http_response_code = 404;
PUTS("No input file specified.\n");
}
} zend_catch {
} zend_end_try();
/* we want to serve more requests if this is fastcgi
* so cleanup and continue, request shutdown is
* handled later */
if (fastcgi) {
goto fastcgi_request_done;
}
STR_FREE(SG(request_info).path_translated);
if (free_query_string && SG(request_info).query_string) {
free(SG(request_info).query_string);
SG(request_info).query_string = NULL;
}
php_request_shutdown((void *) 0);
SG(server_context) = NULL;
php_module_shutdown(TSRMLS_C);
sapi_shutdown();
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_shutdown();
#endif
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (CGIG(check_shebang_line)) {
/* #!php support */
switch (file_handle.type) {
case ZEND_HANDLE_FD:
if (file_handle.handle.fd < 0) {
break;
}
file_handle.type = ZEND_HANDLE_FP;
file_handle.handle.fp = fdopen(file_handle.handle.fd, "rb");
/* break missing intentionally */
case ZEND_HANDLE_FP:
if (!file_handle.handle.fp ||
(file_handle.handle.fp == stdin)) {
break;
}
c = fgetc(file_handle.handle.fp);
if (c == '#') {
while (c != '\n' && c != '\r' && c != EOF) {
c = fgetc(file_handle.handle.fp); /* skip to end of line */
}
/* handle situations where line is terminated by \r\n */
if (c == '\r') {
if (fgetc(file_handle.handle.fp) != '\n') {
long pos = ftell(file_handle.handle.fp);
fseek(file_handle.handle.fp, pos - 1, SEEK_SET);
}
}
CG(start_lineno) = 2;
} else {
rewind(file_handle.handle.fp);
}
break;
case ZEND_HANDLE_STREAM:
c = php_stream_getc((php_stream*)file_handle.handle.stream.handle);
if (c == '#') {
while (c != '\n' && c != '\r' && c != EOF) {
c = php_stream_getc((php_stream*)file_handle.handle.stream.handle); /* skip to end of line */
}
/* handle situations where line is terminated by \r\n */
if (c == '\r') {
if (php_stream_getc((php_stream*)file_handle.handle.stream.handle) != '\n') {
long pos = php_stream_tell((php_stream*)file_handle.handle.stream.handle);
php_stream_seek((php_stream*)file_handle.handle.stream.handle, pos - 1, SEEK_SET);
}
}
CG(start_lineno) = 2;
} else {
php_stream_rewind((php_stream*)file_handle.handle.stream.handle);
}
break;
case ZEND_HANDLE_MAPPED:
if (file_handle.handle.stream.mmap.buf[0] == '#') {
int i = 1;
c = file_handle.handle.stream.mmap.buf[i++];
while (c != '\n' && c != '\r' && c != EOF) {
c = file_handle.handle.stream.mmap.buf[i++];
}
if (c == '\r') {
if (file_handle.handle.stream.mmap.buf[i] == '\n') {
i++;
}
}
file_handle.handle.stream.mmap.buf += i;
file_handle.handle.stream.mmap.len -= i;
}
}
}
switch (behavior) {
case PHP_MODE_STANDARD:
php_execute_script(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC);
break;
case PHP_MODE_LINT:
PG(during_request_startup) = 0;
exit_status = php_lint_script(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC);
if (exit_status == SUCCESS) {
zend_printf("No syntax errors detected in %s\n", file_handle.filename);
} else {
zend_printf("Errors parsing %s\n", file_handle.filename);
}
break;
case PHP_MODE_STRIP:
if (open_file_for_scanning(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
zend_strip(TSRMLS_C);
zend_file_handle_dtor(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC);
php_output_teardown();
}
return SUCCESS;
break;
case PHP_MODE_HIGHLIGHT:
{
zend_syntax_highlighter_ini syntax_highlighter_ini;
if (open_file_for_scanning(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
php_get_highlight_struct(&syntax_highlighter_ini);
zend_highlight(&syntax_highlighter_ini TSRMLS_CC);
if (fastcgi) {
goto fastcgi_request_done;
}
zend_file_handle_dtor(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC);
php_output_teardown();
}
return SUCCESS;
}
break;
#if 0
/* Zeev might want to do something with this one day */
case PHP_MODE_INDENT:
open_file_for_scanning(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC);
zend_indent();
zend_file_handle_dtor(&file_handle TSRMLS_CC);
php_output_teardown();
return SUCCESS;
break;
#endif
}
fastcgi_request_done:
{
STR_FREE(SG(request_info).path_translated);
php_request_shutdown((void *) 0);
if (exit_status == 0) {
exit_status = EG(exit_status);
}
if (free_query_string && SG(request_info).query_string) {
free(SG(request_info).query_string);
SG(request_info).query_string = NULL;
}
}
if (!fastcgi) {
if (benchmark) {
repeats--;
if (repeats > 0) {
script_file = NULL;
php_optind = orig_optind;
php_optarg = orig_optarg;
continue;
}
}
break;
}
/* only fastcgi will get here */
requests++;
if (max_requests && (requests == max_requests)) {
fcgi_finish_request(request, 1);
if (bindpath) {
free(bindpath);
}
if (max_requests != 1) {
/* no need to return exit_status of the last request */
exit_status = 0;
}
break;
}
/* end of fastcgi loop */
}
if (request) {
fcgi_destroy_request(request);
}
fcgi_shutdown();
if (cgi_sapi_module.php_ini_path_override) {
free(cgi_sapi_module.php_ini_path_override);
}
if (cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries) {
free(cgi_sapi_module.ini_entries);
}
} zend_catch {
exit_status = 255;
} zend_end_try();
out:
if (benchmark) {
int sec;
#ifdef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
int usec;
gettimeofday(&end, NULL);
sec = (int)(end.tv_sec - start.tv_sec);
if (end.tv_usec >= start.tv_usec) {
usec = (int)(end.tv_usec - start.tv_usec);
} else {
sec -= 1;
usec = (int)(end.tv_usec + 1000000 - start.tv_usec);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\nElapsed time: %d.%06d sec\n", sec, usec);
#else
time(&end);
sec = (int)(end - start);
fprintf(stderr, "\nElapsed time: %d sec\n", sec);
#endif
}
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
parent_out:
#endif
SG(server_context) = NULL;
php_module_shutdown(TSRMLS_C);
sapi_shutdown();
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_shutdown();
#endif
#if defined(PHP_WIN32) && ZEND_DEBUG && 0
_CrtDumpMemoryLeaks();
#endif
return exit_status;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 23,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::SendDelegatedFrameAck(uint32 output_surface_id) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl* host = client_->GetHost();
cc::CompositorFrameAck ack;
if (!surface_returned_resources_.empty())
ack.resources.swap(surface_returned_resources_);
if (resource_collection_)
resource_collection_->TakeUnusedResourcesForChildCompositor(&ack.resources);
RenderWidgetHostImpl::SendSwapCompositorFrameAck(host->GetRoutingID(),
output_surface_id,
host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
ack);
DCHECK_GT(pending_delegated_ack_count_, 0);
pending_delegated_ack_count_--;
}
Commit Message: repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init ipmi_init_msghandler_mod(void)
{
ipmi_init_msghandler();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 18,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _php_curl_close(zend_resource *rsrc)
{
php_curl *ch = (php_curl *) rsrc->ptr;
_php_curl_close_ex(ch);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_arch_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (vcpu->arch.time_page) {
kvm_release_page_dirty(vcpu->arch.time_page);
vcpu->arch.time_page = NULL;
}
free_cpumask_var(vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
fx_free(vcpu);
kvm_x86_ops->vcpu_free(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 2,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int imap_account_match(const struct Account *a1, const struct Account *a2)
{
struct ImapData *a1_idata = imap_conn_find(a1, MUTT_IMAP_CONN_NONEW);
struct ImapData *a2_idata = imap_conn_find(a2, MUTT_IMAP_CONN_NONEW);
const struct Account *a1_canon = a1_idata == NULL ? a1 : &a1_idata->conn->account;
const struct Account *a2_canon = a2_idata == NULL ? a2 : &a2_idata->conn->account;
return mutt_account_match(a1_canon, a2_canon);
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 24,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t generic_file_splice_read(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, size_t len,
unsigned int flags)
{
loff_t isize, left;
int ret;
isize = i_size_read(in->f_mapping->host);
if (unlikely(*ppos >= isize))
return 0;
left = isize - *ppos;
if (unlikely(left < len))
len = left;
ret = __generic_file_splice_read(in, ppos, pipe, len, flags);
if (ret > 0) {
*ppos += ret;
file_accessed(in);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CommandLatencyQuery::CommandLatencyQuery(
QueryManager* manager, GLenum target, int32 shm_id, uint32 shm_offset)
: Query(manager, target, shm_id, shm_offset) {
}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
R=jbauman@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageSerializer::retrieveResourcesForProperties(const StylePropertySet* styleDeclaration, Document& document)
{
if (!styleDeclaration)
return;
unsigned propertyCount = styleDeclaration->propertyCount();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < propertyCount; ++i) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CSSValue> cssValue = styleDeclaration->propertyAt(i).value();
retrieveResourcesForCSSValue(cssValue.get(), document);
}
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AutocompleteMatch& AutocompleteResult::match_at(size_t index) const {
DCHECK(index < matches_.size());
return matches_[index];
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ndp_get_log_priority(struct ndp *ndp)
{
return ndp->log_priority;
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 1,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeURLRequestContextGetter::CreateOriginalForExtensions(
Profile* profile, const ProfileIOData* profile_io_data) {
DCHECK(!profile->IsOffTheRecord());
return new ChromeURLRequestContextGetter(
new FactoryForExtensions(profile_io_data));
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QueryTopSites(TopSitesImpl* top_sites, bool wait) {
QueryAllTopSites(top_sites, wait, false);
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void *flow_keys_hash_start(struct flow_keys *flow)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(FLOW_KEYS_HASH_OFFSET % sizeof(u32));
return (void *)flow + FLOW_KEYS_HASH_OFFSET;
}
Commit Message: flow_dissector: Jump to exit code in __skb_flow_dissect
Instead of returning immediately (on a parsing failure for instance) we
jump to cleanup code. This always sets protocol values in key_control
(even on a failure there is still valid information in the key_tags that
was set before the problem was hit).
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> methodWithOptionalArgCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.methodWithOptionalArg");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
if (args.Length() <= 0) {
imp->methodWithOptionalArg();
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, opt, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
imp->methodWithOptionalArg(opt);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DOMWindow* V8Proxy::retrieveWindowForCallingContext()
{
v8::Handle<v8::Context> context = v8::Context::GetCalling();
if (context.IsEmpty())
return 0;
return retrieveWindow(context);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::postTask(const WebTraceLocation& location, PassOwnPtr<ExecutionContextTask> task)
{
m_taskRunner->postTask(location, task);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void put_tty_queue(unsigned char c, struct n_tty_data *ldata)
{
*read_buf_addr(ldata, ldata->read_head) = c;
ldata->read_head++;
}
Commit Message: n_tty: fix EXTPROC vs ICANON interaction with TIOCINQ (aka FIONREAD)
We added support for EXTPROC back in 2010 in commit 26df6d13406d ("tty:
Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE") and the intent was to allow it to
override some (all?) ICANON behavior. Quoting from that original commit
message:
There is a new bit in the termios local flag word, EXTPROC.
When this bit is set, several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled. Input line editing, character echo, and mapping
of signals are all disabled. This allows the telnetd to turn
off these functions when in linemode, but still keep track of
what state the user wants the terminal to be in.
but the problem turns out that "several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled" is a bit ambiguous, and you can really confuse the n_tty
layer by setting EXTPROC and then causing some of the ICANON invariants
to no longer be maintained.
This fixes at least one such case (TIOCINQ) becoming unhappy because of
the confusion over whether ICANON really means ICANON when EXTPROC is set.
This basically makes TIOCINQ match the case of read: if EXTPROC is set,
we ignore ICANON. Also, make sure to reset the ICANON state ie EXTPROC
changes, not just if ICANON changes.
Fixes: 26df6d13406d ("tty: Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 6,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Wait() {
loop_runner_->Run();
}
Commit Message: Disable AutofillInteractiveTest.OnChangeAfterAutofill test.
Failing due to http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=revision&revision=170278.
BUG=353691
TBR=isherman@chromium.org, dbeam@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/216853002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260106 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PanoramiXRenderTriStrip(ClientPtr client)
{
PanoramiXRes *src, *dst;
int result = Success, j;
REQUEST(xRenderTriStripReq);
char *extra;
int extra_len;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderTriStripReq);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE(src, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE(dst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
extra_len = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xRenderTriStripReq);
if (extra_len && (extra = (char *) malloc(extra_len))) {
memcpy(extra, stuff + 1, extra_len);
FOR_NSCREENS_FORWARD(j) {
if (j)
memcpy(stuff + 1, extra, extra_len);
if (dst->u.pict.root) {
int x_off = screenInfo.screens[j]->x;
int y_off = screenInfo.screens[j]->y;
if (x_off || y_off) {
xPointFixed *fixed = (xPointFixed *) (stuff + 1);
int i = extra_len / sizeof(xPointFixed);
while (i--) {
fixed->x -= x_off;
fixed->y -= y_off;
fixed++;
}
}
}
stuff->src = src->info[j].id;
stuff->dst = dst->info[j].id;
result = (*PanoramiXSaveRenderVector[X_RenderTriStrip]) (client);
if (result != Success)
break;
}
free(extra);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: image_transform_png_set_gray_to_rgb_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_gray_to_rgb(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 5,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *tsk,
const char *file, unsigned line)
{
if (tsk->cred == tsk->real_cred) {
if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 2 ||
creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
goto invalid_creds;
} else {
if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->real_cred) < 1 ||
read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 1 ||
creds_are_invalid(tsk->real_cred) ||
creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
goto invalid_creds;
}
return;
invalid_creds:
printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid process credentials\n");
printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
dump_invalid_creds(tsk->real_cred, "Real", tsk);
if (tsk->cred != tsk->real_cred)
dump_invalid_creds(tsk->cred, "Effective", tsk);
else
printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Effective creds == Real creds\n");
BUG();
}
Commit Message: cred: copy_process() should clear child->replacement_session_keyring
keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets ->replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().
However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus ->replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).
change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong ->replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi) {
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
OPJ_UINT32 index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1u << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1u << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : opj_uint_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : opj_uint_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on){
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1; pi->y += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dy - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dy))) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1; pi->x += (OPJ_INT32)(pi->dx - (OPJ_UINT32)(pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)pi->dx))) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
OPJ_UINT32 levelno;
OPJ_INT32 trx0, try0;
OPJ_INT32 trx1, try1;
OPJ_UINT32 rpx, rpy;
OPJ_INT32 prci, prcj;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try0 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
trx1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno));
try1 = opj_int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno));
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) && ((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))){
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) && ((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))){
continue;
}
if ((res->pw==0)||(res->ph==0)) continue;
if ((trx0==trx1)||(try0==try1)) continue;
prci = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->x, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dx << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(trx0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdx);
prcj = opj_int_floordivpow2(opj_int_ceildiv(pi->y, (OPJ_INT32)(comp->dy << levelno)), (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy)
- opj_int_floordivpow2(try0, (OPJ_INT32)res->pdy);
pi->precno = (OPJ_UINT32)(prci + prcj * (OPJ_INT32)res->pw);
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno * pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Fix an integer overflow issue (#809)
Prevent an integer overflow issue in function opj_pi_create_decode of
pi.c.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 25,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockMediaStreamDispatcherHost(int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
MediaStreamManager* manager)
: MediaStreamDispatcherHost(render_process_id, render_frame_id, manager),
task_runner_(base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()),
binding_(this) {}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,518 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ceph_x_destroy(struct ceph_auth_client *ac)
{
struct ceph_x_info *xi = ac->private;
struct rb_node *p;
dout("ceph_x_destroy %p\n", ac);
ceph_crypto_key_destroy(&xi->secret);
while ((p = rb_first(&xi->ticket_handlers)) != NULL) {
struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th =
rb_entry(p, struct ceph_x_ticket_handler, node);
remove_ticket_handler(ac, th);
}
if (xi->auth_authorizer.buf)
ceph_buffer_put(xi->auth_authorizer.buf);
kfree(ac->private);
ac->private = NULL;
}
Commit Message: libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len
We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't
enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the
buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
the point where we know how much is going to be needed.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 15,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iperf_add_stream(struct iperf_test *test, struct iperf_stream *sp)
{
int i;
struct iperf_stream *n, *prev;
if (SLIST_EMPTY(&test->streams)) {
SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&test->streams, sp, streams);
sp->id = 1;
} else {
i = 2;
SLIST_FOREACH(n, &test->streams, streams) {
prev = n;
++i;
}
SLIST_INSERT_AFTER(prev, sp, streams);
sp->id = i;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PDFiumEngine::ContinuePaint(int progressive_index,
pp::ImageData* image_data) {
DCHECK_GE(progressive_index, 0);
DCHECK_LT(static_cast<size_t>(progressive_index), progressive_paints_.size());
DCHECK(image_data);
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
g_last_instance_id = client_->GetPluginInstance()->pp_instance();
#endif
int rv;
FPDF_BITMAP bitmap = progressive_paints_[progressive_index].bitmap;
int page_index = progressive_paints_[progressive_index].page_index;
DCHECK(PageIndexInBounds(page_index));
FPDF_PAGE page = pages_[page_index]->GetPage();
last_progressive_start_time_ = base::Time::Now();
if (bitmap) {
rv = FPDF_RenderPage_Continue(page, static_cast<IFSDK_PAUSE*>(this));
} else {
pp::Rect dirty = progressive_paints_[progressive_index].rect;
bitmap = CreateBitmap(dirty, image_data);
int start_x, start_y, size_x, size_y;
GetPDFiumRect(page_index, dirty, &start_x, &start_y, &size_x, &size_y);
FPDFBitmap_FillRect(bitmap, start_x, start_y, size_x, size_y, 0xFFFFFFFF);
rv = FPDF_RenderPageBitmap_Start(
bitmap, page, start_x, start_y, size_x, size_y, current_rotation_,
GetRenderingFlags(), static_cast<IFSDK_PAUSE*>(this));
progressive_paints_[progressive_index].bitmap = bitmap;
}
return rv != FPDF_RENDER_TOBECOUNTINUED;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 10,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
{
unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int rv;
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
if (!pkey)
return 0;
/* If not EC nothing to do */
if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
return 1;
rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
if (!rv)
return 0;
/*
* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
* curves extension.
*/
rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
if (!rv)
return 0;
/*
* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
* SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
*/
if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
int check_md;
size_t i;
CERT *c = s->cert;
if (curve_id[0])
return 0;
/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
else
return 0; /* Should never happen */
for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
break;
if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
return 0;
if (set_ee_md == 2) {
if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
else
s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
}
}
return rv;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int add_property_stringl_ex(zval *arg, const char *key, uint key_len, const char *str, uint length, int duplicate TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval *tmp;
zval *z_key;
if (UNEXPECTED(length > INT_MAX)) {
zend_error_noreturn(E_ERROR, "String overflow, max size is %d", INT_MAX);
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(tmp, str, length, duplicate);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(z_key);
ZVAL_STRINGL(z_key, key, key_len-1, 1);
Z_OBJ_HANDLER_P(arg, write_property)(arg, z_key, tmp, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&tmp); /* write_property will add 1 to refcount */
zval_ptr_dtor(&z_key);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 17,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DECLAREcpFunc(cpContig2SeparateByRow)
{
tsize_t scanlinesizein = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
tsize_t scanlinesizeout = TIFFScanlineSize(out);
tdata_t inbuf;
tdata_t outbuf;
register uint8 *inp, *outp;
register uint32 n;
uint32 row;
tsample_t s;
inbuf = _TIFFmalloc(scanlinesizein);
outbuf = _TIFFmalloc(scanlinesizeout);
if (!inbuf || !outbuf)
goto bad;
_TIFFmemset(inbuf, 0, scanlinesizein);
_TIFFmemset(outbuf, 0, scanlinesizeout);
/* unpack channels */
for (s = 0; s < spp; s++) {
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row++) {
if (TIFFReadScanline(in, inbuf, row, 0) < 0
&& !ignore) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read scanline %lu",
(unsigned long) row);
goto bad;
}
inp = ((uint8*)inbuf) + s;
outp = (uint8*)outbuf;
for (n = imagewidth; n-- > 0;) {
*outp++ = *inp;
inp += spp;
}
if (TIFFWriteScanline(out, outbuf, row, s) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, can't write scanline %lu",
(unsigned long) row);
goto bad;
}
}
}
if (inbuf) _TIFFfree(inbuf);
if (outbuf) _TIFFfree(outbuf);
return 1;
bad:
if (inbuf) _TIFFfree(inbuf);
if (outbuf) _TIFFfree(outbuf);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 28,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void floatAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::floatAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rwpng_version_info(FILE *fp)
{
const char *pngver = png_get_header_ver(NULL);
#if USE_COCOA
fprintf(fp, " Color profiles are supported via Cocoa. Using libpng %s.\n", pngver);
#elif USE_LCMS
fprintf(fp, " Color profiles are supported via Little CMS. Using libpng %s.\n", pngver);
#else
fprintf(fp, " Compiled with no support for color profiles. Using libpng %s.\n", pngver);
#endif
#if PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10600
if (strcmp(pngver, "1.3.") < 0) {
fputs("\nWARNING: Your version of libpng is outdated and may produce corrupted files.\n"
"Please recompile pngquant with the current version of libpng (1.6 or later).\n", fp);
} else if (strcmp(pngver, "1.6.") < 0) {
#if defined(PNG_UNKNOWN_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED)
fputs("\nWARNING: Your version of libpng is old and has buggy support for custom chunks.\n"
"Please recompile pngquant with the current version of libpng (1.6 or later).\n", fp);
#endif
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in rwpng.h (CVE-2016-5735)
Reported by Choi Jaeseung
Found with Sparrow (http://ropas.snu.ac.kr/sparrow)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 26,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::hasValidNamespaceForAttributes(const QualifiedName& qName)
{
if (qName.prefix().isEmpty() && qName.localName() == xmlnsAtom) {
return qName.namespaceURI() == XMLNSNames::xmlnsNamespaceURI;
}
return hasValidNamespaceForElements(qName);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void blk_mq_all_tag_busy_iter(struct blk_mq_tags *tags, busy_tag_iter_fn *fn,
void *priv)
{
if (tags->nr_reserved_tags)
bt_tags_for_each(tags, &tags->breserved_tags, 0, fn, priv, true);
bt_tags_for_each(tags, &tags->bitmap_tags, tags->nr_reserved_tags, fn, priv,
false);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_opening_op(int opening_op, gs_composite_t **ppcte,
gs_compositor_closing_state return_code)
{
/* Assuming a right *BEGIN* - *END* operation balance. */
gs_composite_t *pcte = *ppcte;
for (;;) {
if (pcte->type->comp_id == GX_COMPOSITOR_PDF14_TRANS) {
gs_pdf14trans_t *pct = (gs_pdf14trans_t *)pcte;
int op = pct->params.pdf14_op;
*ppcte = pcte;
if (op == opening_op)
return return_code;
if (op != PDF14_SET_BLEND_PARAMS) {
if (opening_op == PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_MASK)
return COMP_ENQUEUE;
if (opening_op == PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_GROUP) {
if (op != PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_MASK && op != PDF14_END_TRANS_MASK)
return COMP_ENQUEUE;
}
if (opening_op == PDF14_PUSH_DEVICE) {
if (op != PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_MASK && op != PDF14_END_TRANS_MASK &&
op != PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_GROUP && op != PDF14_END_TRANS_GROUP)
return COMP_ENQUEUE;
}
}
} else
return COMP_ENQUEUE;
pcte = pcte->prev;
if (pcte == NULL)
return COMP_EXEC_QUEUE; /* Not in queue. */
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 24,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __weak arch_release_thread_stack(unsigned long *stack)
{
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gslist_free_full (GSList *list, GDestroyNotify free_func)
{
GSList *tmp;
if (list == NULL)
return;
for (tmp = list; tmp != NULL; tmp = tmp->next)
free_func(tmp->data);
g_slist_free(list);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 6,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::RequestPrintPreview(PrintPreviewRequestType type) {
const bool is_modifiable = print_preview_context_.IsModifiable();
old_print_pages_params_.reset();
switch (type) {
case PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_ENTIRE_FRAME: {
Send(new PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview(routing_id(), is_modifiable,
false));
break;
}
case PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_CONTEXT_NODE: {
Send(new PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview(routing_id(), is_modifiable,
true));
break;
}
case PRINT_PREVIEW_SCRIPTED: {
IPC::SyncMessage* msg =
new PrintHostMsg_ScriptedPrintPreview(routing_id(), is_modifiable);
msg->EnableMessagePumping();
Send(msg);
break;
}
default: {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_pident_readdir(struct file *filp,
void *dirent, filldir_t filldir,
const struct pid_entry *ents, unsigned int nents)
{
int i;
struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_path.dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
const struct pid_entry *p, *last;
ino_t ino;
int ret;
ret = -ENOENT;
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
ret = 0;
i = filp->f_pos;
switch (i) {
case 0:
ino = inode->i_ino;
if (filldir(dirent, ".", 1, i, ino, DT_DIR) < 0)
goto out;
i++;
filp->f_pos++;
/* fall through */
case 1:
ino = parent_ino(dentry);
if (filldir(dirent, "..", 2, i, ino, DT_DIR) < 0)
goto out;
i++;
filp->f_pos++;
/* fall through */
default:
i -= 2;
if (i >= nents) {
ret = 1;
goto out;
}
p = ents + i;
last = &ents[nents - 1];
while (p <= last) {
if (proc_pident_fill_cache(filp, dirent, filldir, task, p) < 0)
goto out;
filp->f_pos++;
p++;
}
}
ret = 1;
out:
put_task_struct(task);
out_no_task:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct file *ib_uverbs_alloc_event_file(struct ib_uverbs_file *uverbs_file,
struct ib_device *ib_dev,
int is_async)
{
struct ib_uverbs_event_file *ev_file;
struct file *filp;
int ret;
ev_file = kzalloc(sizeof(*ev_file), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ev_file)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
kref_init(&ev_file->ref);
spin_lock_init(&ev_file->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ev_file->event_list);
init_waitqueue_head(&ev_file->poll_wait);
ev_file->uverbs_file = uverbs_file;
kref_get(&ev_file->uverbs_file->ref);
ev_file->async_queue = NULL;
ev_file->is_closed = 0;
filp = anon_inode_getfile("[infinibandevent]", &uverbs_event_fops,
ev_file, O_RDONLY);
if (IS_ERR(filp))
goto err_put_refs;
mutex_lock(&uverbs_file->device->lists_mutex);
list_add_tail(&ev_file->list,
&uverbs_file->device->uverbs_events_file_list);
mutex_unlock(&uverbs_file->device->lists_mutex);
if (is_async) {
WARN_ON(uverbs_file->async_file);
uverbs_file->async_file = ev_file;
kref_get(&uverbs_file->async_file->ref);
INIT_IB_EVENT_HANDLER(&uverbs_file->event_handler,
ib_dev,
ib_uverbs_event_handler);
ret = ib_register_event_handler(&uverbs_file->event_handler);
if (ret)
goto err_put_file;
/* At that point async file stuff was fully set */
ev_file->is_async = 1;
}
return filp;
err_put_file:
fput(filp);
kref_put(&uverbs_file->async_file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_event_file);
uverbs_file->async_file = NULL;
return ERR_PTR(ret);
err_put_refs:
kref_put(&ev_file->uverbs_file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_file);
kref_put(&ev_file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_event_file);
return filp;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnSetSelectedColorInColorChooser(int color_chooser_id,
SkColor color) {
if (color_chooser_info_ &&
color_chooser_id == color_chooser_info_->identifier)
color_chooser_info_->chooser->SetSelectedColor(color);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fm10k_reuse_rx_page(struct fm10k_ring *rx_ring,
struct fm10k_rx_buffer *old_buff)
{
struct fm10k_rx_buffer *new_buff;
u16 nta = rx_ring->next_to_alloc;
new_buff = &rx_ring->rx_buffer[nta];
/* update, and store next to alloc */
nta++;
rx_ring->next_to_alloc = (nta < rx_ring->count) ? nta : 0;
/* transfer page from old buffer to new buffer */
*new_buff = *old_buff;
/* sync the buffer for use by the device */
dma_sync_single_range_for_device(rx_ring->dev, old_buff->dma,
old_buff->page_offset,
FM10K_RX_BUFSZ,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
}
Commit Message: fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 21,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateNewWidget(int32_t render_process_id,
int32_t route_id,
bool is_fullscreen,
mojom::WidgetPtr widget,
blink::WebPopupType popup_type) {
RenderProcessHost* process = RenderProcessHost::FromID(render_process_id);
if (!HasMatchingProcess(&frame_tree_, render_process_id)) {
ReceivedBadMessage(process, bad_message::WCI_NEW_WIDGET_PROCESS_MISMATCH);
return;
}
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host = new RenderWidgetHostImpl(
this, process, route_id, std::move(widget), IsHidden());
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* widget_view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
view_->CreateViewForPopupWidget(widget_host));
if (!widget_view)
return;
if (!is_fullscreen) {
widget_view->SetPopupType(popup_type);
}
pending_widget_views_[std::make_pair(render_process_id, route_id)] =
widget_view;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::mac::NSObjectRetain(widget_view->GetNativeView());
#endif
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillDialogViews::UpdateNotificationArea() {
DCHECK(notification_area_);
notification_area_->SetNotifications(delegate_->CurrentNotifications());
ContentsPreferredSizeChanged();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Vector2dF Layer::ScrollOffsetForAnimation() const {
return TotalScrollOffset();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *raw_get_idx(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t pos)
{
struct sock *sk = raw_get_first(seq);
if (sk)
while (pos && (sk = raw_get_next(seq, sk)) != NULL)
--pos;
return pos ? NULL : sk;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 5,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ctl_table_header *register_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table *table)
{
static const struct ctl_path null_path[] = { {} };
return register_sysctl_paths(null_path, table);
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnExtendSelectionAndDelete(int before, int after) {
if (!webview())
return;
DCHECK(!handling_ime_event_);
handling_ime_event_ = true;
webview()->extendSelectionAndDelete(before, after);
handling_ime_event_ = false;
UpdateTextInputState(DO_NOT_SHOW_IME);
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int spacePush(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int val) {
if (ctxt->spaceNr >= ctxt->spaceMax) {
int *tmp;
ctxt->spaceMax *= 2;
tmp = (int *) xmlRealloc(ctxt->spaceTab,
ctxt->spaceMax * sizeof(ctxt->spaceTab[0]));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
ctxt->spaceMax /=2;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->spaceTab = tmp;
}
ctxt->spaceTab[ctxt->spaceNr] = val;
ctxt->space = &ctxt->spaceTab[ctxt->spaceNr];
return(ctxt->spaceNr++);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int js_runeat(js_State *J, const char *s, int i)
{
Rune rune = 0;
while (i-- >= 0) {
rune = *(unsigned char*)s;
if (rune < Runeself) {
if (rune == 0)
return 0;
++s;
} else
s += chartorune(&rune, s);
}
return rune;
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 24,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, const struct path *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
struct path_cond *cond)
{
struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry };
return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
}
Commit Message: apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
struct iov_iter *from,
key_serial_t ringid)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct request_key_auth *rka;
struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
size_t plen = from ? iov_iter_count(from) : 0;
void *payload;
long ret;
kenter("%d,,%zu,%d", id, plen, ringid);
if (!plen)
from = NULL;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
goto error;
/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
* assumed before calling this */
ret = -EPERM;
instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
if (!instkey)
goto error;
rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
goto error;
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
payload = NULL;
if (from) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload) {
if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
goto error;
payload = vmalloc(plen);
if (!payload)
goto error;
}
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_iter(payload, plen, from) != plen)
goto error2;
}
/* find the destination keyring amongst those belonging to the
* requesting task */
ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error2;
/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(rka->target_key, payload, plen,
dest_keyring, instkey);
key_put(dest_keyring);
/* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
* instantiation of the key */
if (ret == 0)
keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
error2:
kvfree(payload);
error:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
semaphore instead of before.
I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <pthread.h>
void *thr0(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
keyctl_revoke(key);
return 0;
}
void *thr1(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
char buffer[16];
keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
return 0;
}
int main()
{
key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
pthread_t th[5];
pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_join(th[0], 0);
pthread_join(th[1], 0);
pthread_join(th[2], 0);
pthread_join(th[3], 0);
return 0;
}
Build as:
cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
Run as:
while keyctl-race; do :; done
as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
summarised as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
[<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
[<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 16,012 |
Subsets and Splits