filename
stringclasses 1
value | title
stringlengths 3
66
| text
stringlengths 41
12.8k
⌀ |
|---|---|---|
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Armoured fighting vehicle | Self-propelled artillery: Self-propelled artillery vehicles give mobility to artillery. Within the term are covered self-propelled guns (or howitzers) and rocket artillery. They are highly mobile, usually based on tracked chassis carrying either a large howitzer or other field gun or alternatively a mortar or some form of rocket or missile launcher. They are usually used for long-range indirect bombardment support on the battlefield.
In the past, self-propelled artillery has included direct-fire "Gun Motor Carriage" vehicles, such as assault guns and tank destroyers (also known as self-propelled anti-tank guns). These have been heavily armoured vehicles, the former providing danger-close fire-support for infantry and the latter acting as specialized anti-tank vehicles.
Modern self-propelled artillery vehicles may superficially resemble tanks, but they are generally lightly armoured, too lightly to survive in direct-fire combat. However, they protect their crews against shrapnel and small arms and are therefore usually included as armoured fighting vehicles. Many are equipped with machine guns for defence against enemy infantry.
The key advantage of self-propelled over towed artillery is that it can be brought into action much faster. Before towed artillery can be used, it has to stop, unlimber and the guns set up. To move position, the guns must be limbered up again and brought – usually towed – to the new location. By comparison, self-propelled artillery in combination with modern communications, can stop at a chosen location and begin firing almost immediately, then quickly move on to a new position. This ability is very useful in a mobile conflict and particularly on the advance.
Conversely, towed artillery was and remains cheaper to build and maintain. It is also lighter and can be taken to places that self-propelled guns cannot reach, so despite the advantages of the self-propelled artillery, towed guns remain in the arsenals of many modern armies.
Assault gun: An assault gun is a gun or howitzer mounted on a motor vehicle or armoured chassis, designed for use in the direct fire role in support of infantry when attacking other infantry or fortified positions.
Historically, the custom-built fully armoured assault guns usually mounted the gun or howitzer in a fully enclosed casemate on a tank chassis. The use of a casemate instead of a gun turret limited these weapons' field of fire, but allowed a larger gun to be fitted relative to the chassis, more armour to be fitted for the same weight, and provided a cheaper construction. In most cases, these turretless vehicles also presented a lower profile as a target for the enemy.
Self-propelled siege mortar: A siege mortar is a form of self-propelled gun that holds a siege mortar. The only siege mortar ever built was the Karl-Gerät. It could be argued that these could be classified as a Mortar carrier.
Mortar carrier: A mortar carrier is a self-propelled artillery vehicle carrying a mortar as its primary weapon. Mortar carriers cannot be fired while on the move and some must be dismounted to fire. In U.S. Army doctrine, mortar carriers provide close and immediate indirect fire support for maneuver units while allowing for rapid displacement and quick reaction to the tactical situation. The ability to relocate not only allows fire support to be provided where it is needed faster, but also allows these units to avoid counter-battery fire. Mortar carriers have traditionally avoided direct contact with the enemy. Many units report never using secondary weapons in combat.
Prior to the Iraq War, American 120 mm mortar platoons reorganized from six M1064 mortar carriers and two M577 fire direction centres (FDC) to four M1064 and one FDC. The urban environment of Iraq made it difficult to utilize mortars. New technologies such as mortar ballistic computers and communication equipment and are being integrated. Modern era combat is becoming more reliant on direct fire support from mortar carrier machine guns.
Multiple rocket launcher: A multiple rocket launcher is a type of unguided rocket artillery system. Like other rocket artillery, multiple rocket launchers are less accurate and have a much lower (sustained) rate of fire than batteries of traditional artillery guns. However, they have the capability of simultaneously dropping many hundreds of kilograms of explosive, with devastating effect.
The Korean Hwacha is an example of an early weapon system with a resemblance to the modern-day multiple rocket launcher. The first self-propelled multiple rocket launchers – and arguably the most famous – were the Soviet BM-13 Katyushas, first used during World War II and exported to Soviet allies afterwards. They were simple systems in which a rack of launch rails was mounted on the back of a truck. This set the template for modern multiple rocket launchers. The first modern multiple rocket launcher was the German 15 cm Nebelwerfer 41 of the 1930s, a small towed artillery piece. Only later in World War II did the British deploy similar weapons in the form of the Land Mattress.The Americans mounted tubular launchers atop M4 Sherman tanks to create the T34 Calliope rocket launching tank, only used in small numbers, as their closest equivalent to the Katyusha.
Missile vehicle: Missile vehicles are trucks or tractor units designed to carry rockets or missiles. The missile vehicle may be a self-propelled unit, or the missile holder/launcher may be on a trailer towed by a prime mover. They are used in the military forces of a number of countries in the world. Long missiles are commonly transported parallel to the ground on these vehicles, but elevated into an inclined or vertical position for launching.
A Transporter erector launcher (TEL) is a missile vehicle with an integrated prime mover (tractor unit) that can carry, elevate to firing position and launch one or more missiles. Such vehicles exist for both surface-to-air missiles and surface-to-surface missiles.
Tank destroyer: Tank destroyers and tank hunters are armed with an anti-tank gun or anti-tank missile launcher, and are designed specifically to engage enemy armoured vehicles. Many have been based on a tracked tank chassis, while others are wheeled. Since World War II, main battle tanks have largely replaced gun-armed tank destroyers; although lightly armoured anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) carriers are commonly used for supplementary long-range anti-tank engagements.
In post-Cold War conflict, the resurgence of expeditionary warfare has seen the emergence of gun-armed wheeled vehicles, sometimes called "protected gun systems", which may bear a superficial resemblance to tank destroyers, but are employed as direct fire support units typically providing support in low intensity operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. These have the advantage of easier deployment, as only the largest air transports can carry a main battle tank, and their smaller size makes them more effective in urban combat.
Many forces' IFVs carry anti-tank missiles in every infantry platoon, and attack helicopters have also added anti-tank capability to the modern battlefield. But there are still dedicated anti-tank vehicles with very heavy long-range missiles, or intended for airborne use. There have also been dedicated anti-tank vehicles built on ordinary armoured personnel carrier or armoured car chassis. Examples include the U.S. M901 ITV (Improved TOW Vehicle) and the Norwegian NM142, both on an M113 chassis, several Soviet ATGM launchers based on the BRDM scout car, the British FV438 Swingfire and FV102 Striker and the German Raketenjagdpanzer series built on the chassis of the HS 30 and Mardar IFVs.
Armoured train: An armoured train is a railway train protected with armour. They are usually equipped with rail cars armed with artillery, autocannons, machine guns, tank turrets and anti-aircraft guns. They were mostly used during the late 19th to mid-20th century, when they offered an innovative way to quickly move large amounts of firepower. Their use was discontinued in most countries when road vehicles became much more powerful and offered more flexibility, and because armoured trains were too vulnerable to track sabotage and attacks from the air. However, the Russian Federation used improvised armoured trains in the Second Chechen War in the late 1990s and 2000s. Armoured trains carrying ballistic missiles have also been used.
The rail cars on an armoured train were designed for many tasks, such as carrying artillery and machine guns, infantry units, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. During World War II, the Germans would sometimes put a Fremdgerät (captured AFVs such as the French Somua S-35 or Czech PzKpfw 38(t)), or obsolescent Panzer II light tanks on a flatbed rail car, which could quickly be offloaded by means of a ramp and used away from the railway line to chase down enemy partisans.
Different types of armour were used to protect armoured trains from attack. In addition to various metal plates, concrete and sandbags were used in some cases on armoured trains.
Armoured trains were sometimes escorted by a kind of rail-tank called a draisine. One such example was the Italian 'Littorina' armoured trolley, which had a cab in the front and rear, each with a control set so it could be driven down the tracks in either direction. Littorina mounted two dual 7.92mm MG13 machine gun turrets from Panzer I light tanks.
See also:
References:
Sources: Gougaud, Alain (1987). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Armoured fighting vehicle | Different types of armour were used to protect armoured trains from attack. In addition to various metal plates, concrete and sandbags were used in some cases on armoured trains.
Armoured trains were sometimes escorted by a kind of rail-tank called a draisine. One such example was the Italian 'Littorina' armoured trolley, which had a cab in the front and rear, each with a control set so it could be driven down the tracks in either direction. Littorina mounted two dual 7.92mm MG13 machine gun turrets from Panzer I light tanks.
See also:
References:
Sources: Gougaud, Alain (1987). L'aube de la gloire: les autos mitrailleuses et les chars français pendant la Grande Guerre, histoire technique et militaire, arme blindée, cavalerie, chars, Musée des blindés (in French). Issy-les-Moulineaux: Société OCEBUR. ISBN 978-2-904255-02-1.
Macksey, Kenneth (1980). The Guinness Book of Tank Facts and Feats. Guinness Superlatives Limited. ISBN 0-85112-204-3.
Margiotta, Franklin D., ed. (1996). Brassey's encyclopedia of land forces and warfare. Brassey's. ISBN 1-57488-087-X. Retrieved 19 February 2011.
External links:
US Wheeled armoured fighting vehicles |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Armoured spearhead | See also: Flying wedge
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Armoured warfare | World War I: Modern armored warfare began during the First World War of 1914–1918. Strategists wanted to break the tactical, operational and strategic stalemates forced on commanders on the Western Front by the effectiveness of entrenched defensive infantry armed with machine guns – known as trench warfare. Under these conditions, attacks usually advanced very slowly and incurred massive casualties. The developers of tanks aimed to return manoeuvre to warfare, and found a practical way to do so: providing caterpillar traction to machine guns allowing them to overcome trenches, while at the same time offering them armour protection against small arms as they were moving.
Britain and France first developed tanks in 1915 as a way of navigating the barbed wire and other obstacles of no-man's land while remaining protected from machine-gun fire. British Mark I tanks first went into action at the Somme on 15 September 1916, but did not manage to break the deadlock of trench warfare. The first French employment of tanks, on 16 April 1917, using the Schneider CA, also failed to live up to expectations. In the Battle of Cambrai (November to December 1917) British tanks were more successful, and broke a German trenchline system, the Hindenburg Line.
Despite the generally unpromising beginnings, the military and political leadership in both Britain and France during 1917 backed large investment into armoured-vehicle production. This led to a sharp increase in the number of available tanks for 1918. The German Empire, on the contrary, produced only a few tanks, late in the war. Twenty German A7V tanks were produced during the entire conflict, compared to over 4,400 French and over 2,500 British tanks of various kinds. Nonetheless, World War I saw the first tank-versus-tank battle, during the Second Battle of Villers-Bretonneux in April 1918, when a group of three German A7V tanks engaged a group of three British Mark IV tanks which they met accidentally.
After the final German spring offensives of 21 March to 18 July 1918, the Entente deployed tanks en masse at the Battle of Soissons (18 to 22 July 1918) and Battle of Amiens (August 1918), which ended the stalemate imposed by trench warfare on the Western Front, and thus effectively ended the war.
Tactically, deployment plans for armour during the war typically placed a strong emphasis on direct support for infantry. The tank's main tasks were seen as crushing barbed-wire and destroying machine-gun nests, facilitating the advance of foot soldiers. Theoretical debate largely focused on the question of whether to use a "swarm" of light tanks for this, or a limited number of potent heavy vehicles. Though in the Battle of Cambrai a large concentration of British heavy tanks effected a breakthrough, it was not exploited by armour. The manoeuvrability of the tank should at least in theory regain armies the ability to flank enemy lines. In practice, tank warfare during most of World War I was hampered by the technical immaturity of the new weapon system, limiting speed, operational range, and reliability, and a lack of effective armoured tactics.
Strategic use of tanks developed only slowly during and immediately after World War I, partly due to these technical limits but also due to the prestige role traditionally accorded to horse-mounted cavalry. An exception, on paper, was the Plan 1919 of the British Army's Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, who envisaged using the expected vast increase in armour production during 1919 to execute deep strategic penetrations by mechanised forces consisting of tanks and infantry carried by trucks, supported by aeroplanes, to paralyse the enemy command-structure.
Following the First World War, the technical and doctrinal aspects of armoured warfare became more sophisticated and diverged into multiple schools of doctrinal thought.
Interwar period:
1920s: During the 1920s, a very limited number of tanks were produced. There were however, important theoretical and technical developments. Various British and French commanders who had contributed to the origin of the tank, such as Jean Baptiste Eugène Estienne, B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller, theorised about a possible future use of independent armoured forces, containing a large concentration of tanks, to execute deep strategic penetrations. Especially Liddell Hart wrote many books about the subject, partly propagating Fuller's theories. Such doctrines were faced with the reality that during the 1920s the armoured vehicles, as early road transport in general, were extremely unreliable, and could not be used in sustained operations. Mainstream thought on the subject was more conservative and tried to integrate armoured vehicles into the existing infantry and cavalry organisation and tactics.
Technical development initially focussed on the improvement of the suspension system, transmission and engine, to create vehicles that were faster, more reliable and had a better range than their WW I predecessors. To save weight, such designs had thin armour plating and this inspired fitting small-calibre high-velocity guns in turrets, giving tanks a good antitank capacity. Both France and Britain eventually built specialised infantry tanks, more heavily armoured to provide infantry support, and cavalry tanks that were faster and could exploit a breakthrough, seeking to bring about defeat of the enemy by severing his lines of communication and supply, as cavalry had done during the previous century.
The British were the first to create a larger fully mechanised unit when the War Office sanctioned the creation of the Experimental Mechanized Force, which was formed on 1 May 1927, under infantry Colonel R. J. Collins, after Fuller (was) refused the function. Its sub-units were entirely mobile and consisted of reconnaissance tankettes and armoured cars, a battalion of forty-eight Vickers Medium Mark I tanks, a motorised machine-gun battalion, a mechanised artillery regiment, which had one battery of fully tracked self-propelled Birch guns capable of acting as conventional or anti-aircraft artillery, and a motorised company of field engineers. The unit carried out operations on Salisbury Plain and was observed by the other major nations, the United States, Germany, and the Soviet Union. Although its performance was recognised, it was disbanded in 1928.
In 2022, Kendrick Kuo, assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College, argued that the British army, under budget and over-stretched during the interwar period, pursued innovation recklessly by betting on the combat effectiveness of armoured units operating with little infantry or artillery support. Doing so led to its initial setbacks in North Africa during the Second World War.
All major European states (with the exception of Germany that was forbidden to possess armoured vehicles under the Treaty of Versailles), the US, and Japan, would create their own experimental mechanised forces during the late 1920s, many using either French or British vehicle designs or even directly purchased vehicles, but largely borrowing from both to develop their own doctrines.
1930s: During the 1930s, political tensions between the world powers quickly increased. The Soviet Union and France began to rearm in the early thirties. In the Soviet Union, the mechanisation of the armed forces was part of a massive general industrialisation programme, the successive Five Years Plans, and the country soon had more tanks than the rest of the world combined, thousands of them being produced per year. In this period, before the rise to power of the Nazi Party in Germany, German officers were sent to observe and participate in development of armoured doctrine in the USSR. Red Army and German experts collaborated in developing the use of tanks based on second generation vehicles with turreted main weapons, and experimenting to design different chassis configurations and drive trains. One important acquisition for the Red Army turned out to be the purchase of a T3 chassis, using the Christie suspension, from US designer John Walter Christie, which served as the basis of the Soviet BT series of fast tanks. The Red Army tactics were influenced by the theoretical works of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky who advocated "large scale tank warfare" as part of the deep battle doctrine.
In France, the second largest tank producer, mechanisation was motivated by a need to compensate for severe manpower shortages due to a collapsed birth rate during World War I. This led to the development of a vast range of specialised armoured vehicles, not just tanks but also armoured cars, self-propelled guns, mechanised artillery, armoured tractors, armoured supply vehicles, armoured artillery observation vehicles, armoured command vehicles, half-tracks, and fully tracked armoured personnel carriers. As the mechanisation progressed, slowly the French armour doctrine began to reflect the increased capacity, evolving from direct infantry support, to independent breakthrough and eventually envelopment with the Infantry, and to deep strategic exploitation with the Cavalry.
Despite the increase in tank numbers, in all countries financial constraints prohibited a full mechanisation of the entire armed ground forces. Necessarily, most of the divisions still consisted of infantry that was not even motorised. As a result, tanks tended to be allotted to special armoured units, where the limited and expensive expert maintenance and training capacity could be concentrated. Only the Soviet Union had enough tanks to equip an organic tank battalion in each infantry division. Nevertheless, France was the first to create large armoured units: in 1934 two Mechanised Corps were formed of 430 tanks each. In July 1935, in France the 4th Cavalry Division was transformed into the 1e Division Légère Mécanique, the first French armoured division of the Cavalry. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Armoured warfare | Despite the increase in tank numbers, in all countries financial constraints prohibited a full mechanisation of the entire armed ground forces. Necessarily, most of the divisions still consisted of infantry that was not even motorised. As a result, tanks tended to be allotted to special armoured units, where the limited and expensive expert maintenance and training capacity could be concentrated. Only the Soviet Union had enough tanks to equip an organic tank battalion in each infantry division. Nevertheless, France was the first to create large armoured units: in 1934 two Mechanised Corps were formed of 430 tanks each. In July 1935, in France the 4th Cavalry Division was transformed into the 1e Division Légère Mécanique, the first French armoured division of the Cavalry. In Germany, after the Nazi Regime started open rearmament in March 1935, on 15 October 1935 three Panzerdivisionen were formed. Though some tank brigades were part of the Cavalry or Infantry arm, most German tanks were concentrated into a special branch, from 1936 called the Panzerwaffe. The precise interpretation of this phenomenon has proven controversial among military historians. Traditionally, it has been seen as part of a "Blitzkrieg strategy" of swift world conquest by means of armoured forces. Later it has been argued, among others by Karl-Heinz Frieser, that the German army in the 1930s did not even possess an explicit Blitzkrieg tactical doctrine, let alone strategy. This would have been reflected by the relatively unimpressive rate of tank production and development. During the 1930s the United Kingdom gave priority to the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy. The British Army began the conversion of its cavalry from horse to tanks and all but a few regiments were fully converted by 1939. The British 1st Armoured Division was formed, as the "Mobile Division", in November 1937.
Before the Second World War actual use of armoured fighting vehicles was limited. Both sides used Italian, German and Soviet tanks during the Spanish Civil War but these proved to be vulnerable to antitank guns due to their thin armour. Traditionalist elements within the Red Army used this to diminish the influence of proponents of mechanisation. Tukhachevsky himself was executed in 1937. Nevertheless, during the Soviet-Japanese Border Wars of 1938 and 1939, the Soviet forces tested modern armoured warfare tactics. General Georgy Zhukov in the summer of 1939 combined mass tank manoeuvres with artillery and air attacks, to defeat the Japanese Imperial Army at the Battles of Khalkhin Gol at Nomonhan in Mongolia. Partly as a result of the experiences in Spain, the Soviet Union began the development of a new generation of medium and heavy tanks, sporting much stronger armour and armament.
World War II:
Poland: In their Invasion of Poland during September 1939, German forces applied a narrow cooperation between large armoured units – of the Panzerwaffe and the Cavalry – and "active" infantry divisions to break the Polish defensive lines and pursue the defeated enemy forces. The more limited and dispersed Polish armoured units were quickly destroyed. The Red Army, invading the east of Poland, also deployed armoured divisions. At the time, the swift collapse of the Polish army was seen as the result of an armoured Blitzkrieg. However, later it has been argued that the campaign was largely an instance of the classical nineteenth century German concept of the "Annihilation Battle", in which the role of deep strategic armoured penetrations was limited.
France: In the wake of the Polish campaign, during the Phoney War French, British and German tank production sharply increased, with both western allies out-producing Germany. However, the Anglo-French coalition proved unable to match the Germans in the number of armoured divisions, as it was impossible to quickly raise such large units. Though the French possessed a superior number of tanks, often better armoured and armed, half of these were allotted at army-level to independent Bataillons de Chars de Combat ("battle tank battalions") for infantry support. In early 1940, the German command had concluded that it could not win a war of attrition and embarked on a high-risk strategy. They approved the Manstein Plan, envisaging an advance through the Ardennes by the main mass of German infantry divisions, spearheaded by seven armoured divisions, while the main mobile French reserve consisting of three Cavalry armoured divisions (Divisions Légères Mécaniques or Mechanised Light Divisions) – the only armoured units organised on the lines of the German armoured divisions – would be lured into the Low Countries by a feint attack with a lesser force, including three armoured divisions. In May 1940, during the Battle of France, the German feint resulted in a number of undecided armour engagements, among them the Battle of Hannut, the largest tank battle fought until that date. At the same time, German motorised infantry west of the Ardennes forced the crossings over the river Meuse, assisted by massive carpet bombing of the crossing points. In the original plan, the armoured divisions were again supposed to closely cooperate with the infantry divisions. In reality, armour commanders like Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian immediately broke out of the bridgeheads, initiating a drive towards the English Channel, which was reached within a week. The French reserve of four Infantry armoured divisions, the Divisions cuirassées, lacked sufficient strategic mobility to prevent this. The strategic envelopment surrounded the Belgian army, the British Expeditionary Force and the best French troops. It led to the Evacuation of Dunkirk and the ultimate fall of France in operation Fall Rot.
The spectacular and unexpected success not only caused a sudden change in the global geostrategic situation, gaining Germany a position of hegemony on the European continent, but also seemed to vindicate the theories of Fuller and Liddell-Hart. Confronted with the undeniable potential of armoured manoeuvre warfare, from the summer of 1940 onwards the armed forces of all surviving major powers adapted their tactical doctrine, unit organisation, strategic planning and tank production plans. According to Frieser, this was even true for Germany itself, that only now officially adopted Blitzkrieg tactics.
North African theatre: In the deserts of North Africa, the British developed the alternative approach of combining the armoured, infantry and artillery together to form a 'balanced, combined arms team'. The 10th Italian Army of Maresciallo (Marshal) Rodolfo Graziani, being ill-armed and inadequately led, soon gave way to this approach by the Commonwealth troops of the British Western Desert Force.
The arrival of the German Afrika Korps under command of General der Panzertruppe Erwin Rommel highlighted the weaknesses of the British approach: the small number of infantry and artillery in each armoured division was sufficient when attacking the immobile and uncoordinated Italian troops, but against the highly mobile, well-coordinated German units, the undermanned Commonwealth formations were proving inadequate.
Between 1941 and 1942, the Allies struggled in armoured battles in the North African desert due to improper tactics; in particular, running armoured formations into opposing anti-tank positions; however, they achieved some notable successes at Crusader, 1st Alamein and under Montgomery finally achieved decisive victories, in particular at the Second Battle of El Alamein.
In 2022, Kendrick Kuo, assistant professor at the U.S. Naval War College, wrote that due to factors emanating from the interwar period, the British army in North Africa initially operated their armoured units with little infantry or artillery support. Meanwhile, the Germans had integrated their armour with mechanised infantry and artillery. Only after undoing their misplaced emphasis on armour were the British able to restore their combat effectiveness.
Soviet Union:
Pre-war: Much of the Red Army development in tank use was based on the theoretical work carried out by such officers as Tukhachevsky and Triandafillov in the mid to late 1930s. This was as part of the two-directioned concepts, one being infantry-centred "broad front" and the other being a "shock army".
While the infantry based part of the doctrine demanded "powerful tanks" (heavy tanks armed with infantry guns and machineguns) and "tankettes" (light, often amphibious tanks with machineguns), the shock army demanded "manoeuvre tanks" (fast tanks with medium guns) used in conjunction with motorised forces and "mechanised cavalry" that would operate in depth as "strategic cavalry" combined with nascent airborne troops.
These ideas culminated in the "PU-36" or the 1936 Field Service Regulations.
Wartime: At the start of the Second World War much of the Red Army, including its armoured forces, was in transition and recovering from the 1937 repression of the officer corps. The Red Army ignored the lessons from Nomonhan, which had been successfully conducted by General Zhukov, and relied instead on lessons from politically selected officers who were veterans of the Spanish Civil War. The result was a poor showing during the Winter War. The Red Army tank fleet was extremely large, consisting of some 24,000 vehicles, but many were obsolete or unfit for service due to difficulties with supplying spare parts and lack of qualified support staff. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Armoured warfare | These ideas culminated in the "PU-36" or the 1936 Field Service Regulations.
Wartime: At the start of the Second World War much of the Red Army, including its armoured forces, was in transition and recovering from the 1937 repression of the officer corps. The Red Army ignored the lessons from Nomonhan, which had been successfully conducted by General Zhukov, and relied instead on lessons from politically selected officers who were veterans of the Spanish Civil War. The result was a poor showing during the Winter War. The Red Army tank fleet was extremely large, consisting of some 24,000 vehicles, but many were obsolete or unfit for service due to difficulties with supplying spare parts and lack of qualified support staff.
One important development took place shortly before the war, which influenced Soviet armoured doctrine and tank design for a decade: the creation of the T-34. Developed on the Christie suspension chassis and using sloped armour for the first time, the T-34 proved a shock to the German forces in the first German encounter of Soviet T-34 and KV tanks. The T-34 had an excellent combination of mobility, protection and firepower. Using wide tracks, the T-34 was also able to negotiate terrain in difficult weather conditions, something that persistently dogged the German designs.
Assessing the success of the German Blitzkrieg strategy, operational methods and tactics, the Red Army concluded that it should return to the use of operational methods developed before the war, so the Tank Armies were eventually created. To complement the T-34, heavy tanks, self-propelled artillery, and tank destroyers were also designed. The Red Army's armoured forces were used in concentrations during all strategic operations of the Red Army in World War II, initiated under strict secrecy and using the Principle of Surprise.
Germany: In Germany, in-depth research through theoretical approaches, wargaming and exercises developed a confidence within the Panzertruppe itself (and political support by Hitler) in the armoured formation as the key battlefield formation – although this view was before 1940 not shared by the other Arms of Service. A key part of this doctrine was improved communications by having radios in all tanks, although this ideal suffered from technical limits as most tanks had receiver sets only.
At the outbreak of World War II, the German armoured forces benefited from a much more profound and more flexible training than that of the Allies on the tactical and operational level. German tanks operated while directed by radio communication, which allowed tank commanders to take greater advantage of the manoeuvrability of their vehicles.
Even after the conquest of Poland, "Blitzkrieg" was not defined on the strategic level. Guderian and von Manstein devised a strategy that entailed what later would be seen as the essence of Blitzkrieg: concentrated panzer divisions performing swift deep penetrations. This strategy was not initially accepted by German High Command. Nevertheless, the final plans for the invasion of France in 1940 hinged on the element of a Schwerpunkt at Sedan, and was assigned to such forces. The great success of this operation led to Blitzkrieg being integrated with strategic planning for the rest of the war.
German tanks could carry with them enough fuel and supplies to go almost two hundred kilometers, and enough food to last three to nine days. This relative independence from supply lines proved effective, and allowed them to advance on critical targets much faster and without hesitation. Another factor was the ability of commanders to make strategic decisions in the field and without much consultation with their headquarters, the orders of which were often simply ignored. A prime example is Erwin Rommel's lead-from-the-front approach while commanding 7.Panzer-Division which allowed him a flexible response to the battlefield situation, an instance of the Auftragstaktik (reliance on subordinates to make their own decisions).
The effect of German Panzer's speed, mobility, and communication shocked the French, and ultimately were the deciding factors in the battle. It overcame their inferiority in armour and armament relative to the main French materiel such as the Char B1 bis. The superior tactical and operational praxis, combined with an appropriate strategic implementation, enabled the Germans to defeat forces superior in armour (both quantitatively and qualitatively) in the battles of 1940, but just as Blitzkrieg became a deliberate military doctrine, in 1941, it ultimately failed on the eastern front, though initially attaining spectacular successes.
Before the war, Heinz Guderian had in his Achtung–Panzer! propounded a thorough mechanisation of the German forces. By 1942, increased AFV-production allowed a fuller implementation of this ideal. Now extensive armoured combined arms team could be formed, distinct from a purely infantry or cavalry formation. The panzer divisions integrated tanks with mechanised infantry (riding in halftracks to be protected from small-arms fire while being transported) and self-propelled artillery (howitzers fitted on a tank chassis). This allowed the panzer division to become an independent combat force, in principle able to overcome the problems of attaining a breakthrough against entrenched enemy infantry, equipped with large numbers of antitank-guns, with the potential to completely halt tank assaults inflicting devastating losses to armoured units without infantry support. However, much of the AFV production was increasingly diverted away from the Panzertruppe. The Artillery formed its own Sturmgeschütz units and infantry divisions were given their own Panzerjäger companies. Despite lowering their formal organic strength, from the summer of 1943 onwards, the armoured divisions were structurally short of tanks.
United States: Though the U.S. had established the Tank Corps in World War I using French Renault FT light tanks and British Mark V and Mark V* heavy tanks, and some officers like Dwight D. Eisenhower and George S. Patton, Jr. emerged from that war initially as avid proponents of continuing and developing an American armoured force, the rapid reduction of the forces and apathy and even antipathy towards funding and maintaining armed forces in the inter-war years led to relative stagnation of armoured doctrine in the United States. Adna R. Chaffee, Jr., virtually alone, advocated for the future of armoured warfare and the development of appropriate training, equipment and doctrine during the late 1920s through the 1930s.
The United States Army regarded the French Army as the best army in Europe, and consequently the U.S. Army frequently copied French uniforms (the American Civil War) and aeroplanes. Only when France was rapidly overrun in 1940 did the U.S. Army become "shocked" into re-thinking the influences by the perceived actions of German tanks in the 1939 Polish Campaign. Its Armored Combat Arm was not created until 1940 when the Armored Force was born on 10 July 1940, with the Headquarters, Armor Force and the Headquarters, I Armored Corps established at Fort Knox. On July 15, 1940, the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanised) became the 1st Armored Division; the 7th Provisional Tank Brigade, an infantry tank unit at Fort Benning, became the 2nd Armored Division". The Tank Battalion was established at Fort Meade, Md., and a small Armored Force School was also established.
Under this doctrine, U.S. tank crews of both armoured divisions and GHQ tank battalions were taught to fight tanks in tank on tank engagements. Armoured force personnel during and after the war criticised the infantry for using the GHQ tank battalions assigned to infantry divisions strictly as infantry support.
Tank destroyers: The U.S. combined arms team included air support, artillery, engineers, and a tank component supplemented by tank destroyers formed into independent tank destroyer battalions. The latter is most closely identified with the Chief of Army Ground Forces, Lesley J. McNair. Having studied the early German successes McNair came under the belief that U.S. forces would be faced with fast moving enemy forces who would seek to bypass, isolate and reduce U.S. forces in a replay of the Fall of France. To stem the flood of marauding panzers, fast moving powerfully armed tank destroyer battalions were created to be held back and used in the counter-attack.
It was also calculated that U.S. interests would be better served by large numbers of reliable (battle-worthiness) medium tanks rather than a smaller number of unreliable heavy tanks. It was decided therefore to slow the production of the U.S. heavy tank designs such as the M26 Pershing and concentrate resources on mass-producing the M4 Sherman and tank destroyers such as the M18 Hellcat.
To be able get into position to counter-attack, the tank destroyers had to be fast. To achieve the desired mobility and agility from the engines available the armour protection was sacrificed, a measure of protection coming from being nimble and hopefully from being able to knock out the enemy before they could get a shot in. Although they usually had guns of either 75 mm or 76 mm calibre (the M36 used a 90mm calibre gun), the tank destroyer units were issued with the ancestor of the modern armour-piercing discarding sabot, rounds which made their guns much more powerful than a simple comparison of calibres would suggest.
Japan: The Japanese doctrine was mainly French in concept but with some purely Japanese elements. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Armoured warfare | It was decided therefore to slow the production of the U.S. heavy tank designs such as the M26 Pershing and concentrate resources on mass-producing the M4 Sherman and tank destroyers such as the M18 Hellcat.
To be able get into position to counter-attack, the tank destroyers had to be fast. To achieve the desired mobility and agility from the engines available the armour protection was sacrificed, a measure of protection coming from being nimble and hopefully from being able to knock out the enemy before they could get a shot in. Although they usually had guns of either 75 mm or 76 mm calibre (the M36 used a 90mm calibre gun), the tank destroyer units were issued with the ancestor of the modern armour-piercing discarding sabot, rounds which made their guns much more powerful than a simple comparison of calibres would suggest.
Japan: The Japanese doctrine was mainly French in concept but with some purely Japanese elements. Due to Japan's naval priorities in warship construction and inter-service feuds (the marine branch of the IJN favoured all-around protective armour) IJA tanks were lightly armoured. As with most armour during the 1930s, the main guns were small in calibre: 37 mm for their Type 95 light tanks and 47 mm for the Type 97 medium tank, but this was sometimes compensated by a high muzzle velocity. The IJA's use of tanks in China exemplifies its doctrine: light tanks were used for scouting or acted as mobile infantry support, while medium tanks supported the infantry and assaulted deeper objectives, but did not fight en masse.
In 1939, the Japanese Army engaged Soviet armour at Nomonhan. During the three-month-long war, Japanese armour had shown their weakness against Soviet tanks; and the resulting Japanese defeat prompted a series of complaints by the Imperial Army to incorporate improvements in future Japanese armour. This is the primary reason IJA tanks were not as successful while being used with IJA tactics. The tank forces of the U.S. Army consisted of the M2A4 and M3 Stuart light tanks up until 1941, although these vehicles were five years newer than the 1935 built Type 95's, the IJA and U.S. light tanks were comparable to each other, and seemingly performed well for their respective forces during jungle combat operations; during their phase of World War II.
As with all armour, maintenance was a continuous challenge; especially in tropical environments. When IJA and SNLF (Imperial marines) tanks did clash with the enemy they were quickly destroyed by concealed anti-tank guns or overwhelming numbers of hostile tanks. Japan was a naval power, and concentrated its production on warships, thus placing a low priority on armoured vehicle development, its tanks becoming quickly obsolete during the later years of the war. A number of designs that were equal to heavier foreign types were on the drawing board at the beginning of the war, but would only be built in small numbers towards the end, being placed in reserve, to be deployed for the defence of Japan itself.
China: The Republic of China's National Revolutionary Army's 200th Division was the country's only mechanised division during the war. The 200th used pre-war tanks acquired from Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union.
After 1945:
Indo-Pakistani wars:
Arab–Israeli wars: The conflict between Arab nations in the East Mediterranean region and Israel in particular would serve to become a testing ground for development in armoured warfare during the decades of the Cold War. Both sides in the Arab–Israeli series of conflicts made heavy use of tanks and other armoured vehicles due to the practicality of tanks in the desert environment these conflicts largely took place in.
During the 1956 Suez War and Six-Day War (1967), Israeli armoured units typically had the advantage, mainly due to good tactics and unit cohesion.
Conversely, the Yom Kippur War (1973) illustrated the problems that can arise if armoured and infantry units do not work closely together. Israeli tanks, operating independently in large numbers, were decimated by Egyptian anti-tank teams, well-distributed amongst regular infantry, and often equipped with new, first-generation portable anti-tank guided missiles. This is an extreme example but exemplifies what has been fairly thoroughly documented since the Second World War: tanks and infantry work best by taking advantage of each other's strengths and combining to minimise the weaknesses.
In many conflicts, it was usual to see infantry riding on the back of tanks, ready to jump off and provide support when necessary. Unfortunately, the design of many modern tanks makes this a dangerous practice. The turboshaft-powered M1 Abrams, for example, has such hot exhaust gas that nearby infantry have to be careful where they stand. Tanks can also be very vulnerable to well aimed artillery; well-coordinated air support and counter-battery artillery units can help overcome this.
Emergence of guided missiles: While attempts to defeat the tank were made before and during the Second World War, through the use of conventional high velocity anti-tank artillery, this proved increasingly difficult in the post-war period due to increased armour protection and mobility of tanks.
In response, the Soviet Union, the country with the largest armoured fleet in the world, strove to incorporate some anti-tank capability into almost every infantry weapon. By the 1960s, Soviet defense scientists were designing portable anti-tank guided missiles. These new weapons were to be either carried by infantry, or fired from the newly developed BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle. They were in use with Soviet forces before the end of the decade.
In 1973, the Israeli Army failed to anticipate the importance of these new weapon systems. Hundreds of AT-3 Sagger man-portable anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), supplied to Egypt by the Soviet Union and could be operated by infantry without having extensive training, inflicted heavy losses on the Israeli armoured formations. Since then, ATGMs have played an important role within the Israeli Army, having developed advanced domestic-made versions (see Spike/Gil missile), which have been widely exported throughout the world.
In the recent 2006 conflict with Hezbollah, while Israeli infantry were able to easily defeat opposing ATGM teams, tanks operating on their own suffered several hits from the latest advanced Russian tandem-warhead types (such as the Kornet). This highlighted that tanks operating solely, in the era of ATGMs, are extremely vulnerable.
Responding to the serious tank losses suffered against Hezbollah, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems in cooperation with Israel Aircraft Industries developed a missile defence system for tanks, called Trophy, to intercept and destroy anti tank missiles. The system was successfully deployed in combat on March 1, 2011, when it intercepted an anti tank missile during an engagement on the Gaza border.
NATO: During the Cold War, NATO assumed armoured warfare to be a dominant aspect of conventional ground warfare in Europe. Although the use of light tanks was largely discontinued, and heavy tanks were also mostly abandoned, the medium tank design evolved into heavier models due to increase in armour and larger sized main weapon resulting in the main battle tank (MBT) which came into existence, combining most of the different types of tanks during World War II.
For the most part the NATO armoured doctrine remained defensive, and dominated by use of nuclear weapons as deterrence. Although most NATO nations began the Cold War period with a large number of U.S.-designed tanks in their fleets, there was a considerable degree of disagreement on the design of future MBTs among the NATO major nations. Both the U.S. and Germany experimented with, but abandoned the missile-armed MBT-70. The M26 Pershing basic design of the United States would evolve until the M60 main battle tank was replaced with the gas-turbine powered M1 Abrams in the 1980s. The British Army also retained a World War II tank design, the Centurion, which proved to be highly successful and was not fully replaced until the 1970s.
The West German Bundeswehr decided to develop their own tank in the 1960s, and in the 1970s produced the Leopard I, which was a somewhat lighter design, conforming to German doctrine that emphasised speed over protection. From the same initial collaborative project as the Leopard I, the French series of AMX tanks also emphasised manoeuvre over protection. By the 21st century, most advanced western main battle tanks were built around powerful engines, large 120 mm guns and composite armour.
Warsaw Pact: The Warsaw Pact armoured doctrine was substantially influenced by the developments in the Soviet Army which sought to adopt its existing doctrine evolved during World War II to the nuclear battlefield. In the early 1960s this led to a number of important developments in the armoured forces and their supporting Arms. One important development was the transition of the Second World War use of Cavalry-Mechanised Group (CMG) into the Cold War Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG) that was designed to exploit breakthroughs to penetrate NATO's defences in depth. This was a culmination of the Deep Battle theory dating to the 1930s.
In 1964 a significant breakthrough in tank design was achieved in the Soviet Union when the T-64 was produced which for the first time used an automatic loader, reducing the crew of the tank to three crewmen. Subsequently, this model, and the later T-72 and T-80 tanks introduced further innovations that influenced armoured warfare by introducing guided missiles into the tank ammunition mix, allowing ATGW fire from standard tank guns. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Armoured warfare | In the early 1960s this led to a number of important developments in the armoured forces and their supporting Arms. One important development was the transition of the Second World War use of Cavalry-Mechanised Group (CMG) into the Cold War Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG) that was designed to exploit breakthroughs to penetrate NATO's defences in depth. This was a culmination of the Deep Battle theory dating to the 1930s.
In 1964 a significant breakthrough in tank design was achieved in the Soviet Union when the T-64 was produced which for the first time used an automatic loader, reducing the crew of the tank to three crewmen. Subsequently, this model, and the later T-72 and T-80 tanks introduced further innovations that influenced armoured warfare by introducing guided missiles into the tank ammunition mix, allowing ATGW fire from standard tank guns. The Soviet Union was also one of the countries that used two Main Battle Tanks: The high-quality T-80s and lower quality T-72s. Modern Soviet tanks, like the ones mentioned, are typically armed with 125 mm (5 in) smooth bore guns. Advancements in Soviet tanks include improved Fire Control Systems, strong armour protected by ERA, and defensive countermeasures (such as Shtora-1 and Arena). The most advanced Soviet tank, up until the end of the Cold War, was the T-80U, which shared similar characteristics with the M1A1(Turbine engine, advanced Fire Control Systems, strong armour, and firepower)
Infantry fighting vehicles were first developed in the 1960s with the Soviet Union's BMP-1, for the first time allowing supporting infantry to accompany tanks on a battlefield when nuclear weapon use was expected.
The T-64s and BMP-1s were also joined by the self-propelled guns and more importantly Mi-24 Rotary-wing aircraft capable of firing anti-tank missiles entering production in 1970 which were built and theorised as "flying tanks".
The Soviet tank troops, as they were known in the USSR, included armoured units, armoured training regiments and other formations and units.
Vietnam War: M113 armoured personnel carriers proved effective in the terrain of Vietnam against enemy forces which, until 1968, rarely deployed their armour. Though they were soon countered with mines and RPGs, M-113's continued service during the war, primarily evolving into infantry fighting vehicles, known as the ACAV (Armoured Cavalry Assault Vehicle); and functioning as a "light tank."
More heavily armed infantry fighting vehicles such as the M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle would be based on experience with the M113. Gun trucks were also introduced as M35 trucks fitted with armour and guns to protect convoys. In 1968, Communist forces primarily deployed the Soviet built PT-76 light tank.
By 1971, the larger T-54 medium tanks were fielded, proving themselves susceptible to the M-72 LAW rocket, ARVN M41 Walker Bulldog light tanks, as well as the larger M48A3 Pattons. In January 1969, U.S. armoured cavalry units began exchanging their M48A3 Patton tanks for the M551 Sheridan Armoured Airborne Reconnaissance Assault Vehicles; by 1970 over 200 Sheridan tanks were operating in Vietnam.
21st century: Tanks rarely work alone; the usual minimum unit size is a platoon (a platoon is the smallest U.S. Army/Marine unit led by an officer, and a component of a company or troop) of three to five tanks. The tanks of the platoon work together providing mutual support: two might advance while covered by the others then stop and provide cover for the remainder to move ahead.
Normally, multiple platoons coordinate with mechanised infantry and use their mobility and firepower to penetrate weak points in enemy lines. This is where the powerful engines, tracks and turrets come into play. The ability to rotate the turret by a full 360° allows coordinated movement within and between platoons, while defending against attacks from multiple directions and engaging troops and vehicles without stopping or slowing down.
When on the defensive, they wait in prepared positions or use any natural terrain elements (such as small hills) for cover. A tank sitting just behind a hill crest ("hull-down") exposes only the top of its turret, with the gun and sensors, to the enemy, leaving the smallest possible target while allowing it to engage the enemy on the other side of the hill. Tanks are usually able to depress the main gun below the horizontal since modern kinetic energy (KE) rounds have nearly flat trajectories. Without this they would be unable to exploit such positions. However, upon cresting a hill, the tank may expose its thinly armoured underside to enemy weapons.
The disposition of armour around a tank is not uniform; the front is typically better armoured than the sides or rear. Accordingly, normal practice is to keep the front towards the enemy at all times; the tank retreats by reversing instead of turning around. Driving backwards away from an enemy is even safer than driving forwards towards them since driving forwards over a bump can throw the front of the tank up in the air, exposing the thin armour of the underside and taking the gun off the target due to its limited angle of depression.
The tracks, wheels and suspension of a tank are outside the armoured hull and are some of the most vulnerable spots. The easiest way to disable a tank (other than a direct hit in a vulnerable area with a full-power anti-tank weapon) is to target the tracks for a "mobility kill" (m-kill), or target all external visual aids with rubbery cohesive substances such as melted rubber or blackened high viscosity epoxy resins. Once a tank is disabled it is easier to destroy. This is why side-skirts are an important feature; they can deflect heavy machine-gun bullets and trigger the detonation of high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds before they strike the running gear. Other vulnerable parts of a typical tank include the engine deck (with air intakes, radiators, etc.) and the turret ring, where the turret joins the hull.
When used defensively, tanks are often sunk into trenches or placed behind earth berms for increased protection. The tanks can fire off a few shots from their defensive position, then retreat (reversing) to another prepared position further back and drive behind the berms or into the trenches there. These positions can be constructed by the tank crews, but preparations are better and quicker if carried out by combat engineers with bulldozers. Overhead protection, even if it is fairly thin, can also be very useful since it can help pre-detonate artillery shells and avoid direct hits from above which can be deadly to tanks, by striking them at their thinnest armour. In short, tank crews find as many ways as possible to augment the armour on their vehicles.
Tanks usually go into battle with a round in the gun, ready to fire, to minimise reaction time when encountering an enemy. The US doctrine calls for this round to be a kinetic energy (KE) round, as the reaction time is most important when meeting enemy tanks, to get the first shot (and possibly the first kill). If troops or light vehicles are encountered, the usual response is to fire this round at them, despite it not being ideal—it is difficult and time-consuming to remove a round which is already in the breech. In this case, after the KE round is fired, a HEAT round would normally be loaded next to continue the engagement.
Tanks can be decisive in city fighting, with the ability to demolish walls and fire medium and heavy machine guns in several directions simultaneously. However, tanks are especially vulnerable in urban combat. It is much easier for enemy infantry to sneak up behind a tank or fire at its sides, where it is most vulnerable. In addition, firing down from multi-story buildings allows shots at the thin upper turret armour and even basic weapons like Molotov cocktails, if aimed at the engine air intakes, can disable a tank. Because of these limits, tanks are difficult to use in city conflicts where civilians or friendly forces might be nearby, since their firepower can't be used effectively.
Some analysts argue that recent conflicts, like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, highlight the growing vulnerability of tanks. Estimates from early 2024 indicate that Russia has lost around 3,000 tanks in the first two years of the conflict, with the actual number likely being higher. In contrast, during the Israel-Hamas war, Israeli tanks equipped with active protection systems (APS) showed improved survivability against anti-tank missiles. Additionally, using tanks in pairs with overlapping APS provided extra defense and enhanced their overall effectiveness.
Airborne threats: Tanks and other armoured vehicles are vulnerable to attack from the air for several reasons. One is that they are easily detectable—the metal they are made of shows up well on radar, and is especially obvious if they are moving in formation. A moving tank also produces a lot of heat, noise and dust. The heat makes seeing them on a forward-looking infra-red system easy and the dust is a good visual cue during the day.
The other major reason is that most armoured vehicles have thinner armour on the roof of the turret and on the engine deck, so an anti-tank guided missile or bomb (from an attack helicopter, unmanned combat aerial vehicle, ground-attack jet or small drone) hitting them from the top can be deadly even if it has a small warhead. Even a small automatic cannon is powerful enough to penetrate the rear and top sections of the engine compartment of a tank. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Armoured warfare | Airborne threats: Tanks and other armoured vehicles are vulnerable to attack from the air for several reasons. One is that they are easily detectable—the metal they are made of shows up well on radar, and is especially obvious if they are moving in formation. A moving tank also produces a lot of heat, noise and dust. The heat makes seeing them on a forward-looking infra-red system easy and the dust is a good visual cue during the day.
The other major reason is that most armoured vehicles have thinner armour on the roof of the turret and on the engine deck, so an anti-tank guided missile or bomb (from an attack helicopter, unmanned combat aerial vehicle, ground-attack jet or small drone) hitting them from the top can be deadly even if it has a small warhead. Even a small automatic cannon is powerful enough to penetrate the rear and top sections of the engine compartment of a tank. Loitering munition (suicide drone) is also used to attack tanks in modern warfare.
Certain aircraft have been developed to attack armoured vehicles. Most notable is the purpose-built Fairchild-Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II, also known as the "Warthog". Although able to carry a number of different missiles and bombs (including anti-tank ordnance such as the AGM-65 Maverick), the A-10's main weapon is a 30 mm GAU-8/A Avenger Gatling gun which is capable of firing 3,900 depleted uranium armour-piercing rounds per minute. The Russian equivalent is the SU-25.
Similarly, a number of helicopter gunships have been designed mainly to engage enemy armoured vehicles. The AH-1Z Viper, AH-64 Apache, HAL Light Combat Helicopter, Denel Rooivalk, Eurocopter Tiger, Ka-50 Black Shark, Mi-28 Havoc, A129 Mangusta and Westland Lynx are examples. Helicopters are very effective against armoured vehicles for many reasons. The AH-64D Longbow Apache, for example, is equipped with an improved sensor suite and weapon systems and the AN/APG-78 Longbow Fire Control Radar dome installed over the main rotor.
Airborne threats can be countered in several ways. One is air supremacy. This is what the United States relies on most, which is demonstrated by their distinct lack of effective short-range, mobile air defence vehicles to accompany armoured units. Most other countries accompany their armoured forces with highly mobile self-propelled anti-aircraft guns such as the German Gepard or the Soviet 9K22 Tunguska, short and medium-range surface-to-air missile systems such as the SA-6, SA-8 and SA-11, or combine both on the same vehicle (the Tunguska for example can also host SA-19 SAM missiles). The usage of anti-aircraft rounds fired from the main gun of a tank has been increasing over the years. An example is the HE-FRAG round from the T-90 which can be detonated at a set distance as determined by its laser range finder.
Engineering support: Armoured warfare is mechanically and logistically intensive and requires extensive support mechanisms. Armoured fighting vehicles require armoured vehicles capable of working in the same terrain to support them. These are operated by the appropriate branches of the army, e.g. recovery and maintenance vehicles by the REME and combat engineering vehicles by the RE in the British Army. These include:
Armoured recovery vehicles (ARV)—many of these are based on the chassis for the vehicle they support. E.g. the ARV for the UK Challenger tank is a Challenger hull onto which a winch is added.
Armoured supply vehicles
Combat engineering vehicles (CEV), e.g. bulldozers
For transporting tracked AFVs over highways, heavy transporters are used, since AFVs are prone to malfunction and their tracks also ruin the highways.
Light tanks and tank destroyers: While tanks are integral to armoured warfare, when power projection is required, the inability to perform rapid deployment has always been a limit of heavy main battle tanks.
It takes a few weeks to transfer tanks and their supporting equipment by air or sea. Some tanks and armoured vehicles can be dropped by parachute, or carried by cargo airplanes or helicopters. The largest transports can only carry one or two main battle tanks. Smaller transports can only carry or air drop light tanks and APCs such as the M113.
The desire to create air-portable armoured vehicles that can still take on conventional MBTs has usually resulted in ATGM-armed light vehicles or in self-propelled gun style vehicles. The lack of armour protection is offset by the provision of a first-look/first-hit/first-kill capability through the mating of a powerful gun to superior targeting electronics, a concept similar to that of the US tank destroyers of World War II.
Vehicles which have put such considerations into practice include the Stingray light tank, AMX 10 RC and B1 Centauro. Most such US projects to create such vehicles have been abortive, e.g. the M8 Armored Gun System. The most common was the flawed M551 Sheridan light tank. This was an air-portable tank capable of destroying heavier tanks using the revolutionary (for the time) 152 mm CLGP launcher. The combat effectiveness of this tank was limited by the unreliable MGM-51 missile. The latest iteration of the mobile anti-tank gun platform in American service is the M1134 anti-tank guided missile vehicle, a Stryker variant equipped with TOW missiles; most modern militaries operate comparable vehicles.
Though limited conflicts (such as the insurgency in Iraq) rarely involve direct combat between armoured vehicles, the need to defend against insurgent attacks and IEDs has resulted in the application of armour to light vehicles and the continued use of armoured transports, fighting vehicles and tanks.
See also:
Theorists and practitioners:
Notes:
References:
External links: Tanks Encyclopedia
Japanese Tanks and Tank Tactics Chapter II: Tactics
Historic films showing tank warfare during the First World War at europeanfilmgateway.eu
Educational video of how armored vehicles are used on the battlefield. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Arms control | Enactment: Arms control treaties and agreements are often seen as a way to avoid costly arms races which could prove counter-productive to national aims and future peace. Some are used as ways to stop the spread of certain military technologies (such as nuclear weaponry or missile technology) in return for assurances to potential developers that they will not be victims of those technologies. Additionally, some arms control agreements are entered to limit the damage done by warfare, especially to civilians and the environment, which is seen as bad for all participants regardless of who wins a war.
While arms control treaties are seen by many peace proponents as a key tool against war, by the participants, they are often seen simply as ways to limit the high costs of the development and building of weapons, and even reduce the costs associated with war itself. Arms control can even be a way of maintaining the viability of military action by limiting those weapons that would make war so costly and destructive as to make it no longer a viable tool for national policy.
Enforcement: Enforcement of arms control agreements has proven difficult over time. Most agreements rely on the continued desire of the participants to abide by the terms to remain effective. Usually, when a nation no longer desires to abide by the terms, they usually will seek to either covertly circumvent the terms or to end their participation in the treaty. This was seen with the Washington Naval Treaty (and the subsequent London Naval Treaty), where most participants sought to work around the limitations, some more legitimately than others. The United States developed better technology to get better performance from their ships while still working within the weight limits, the United Kingdom exploited a loop-hole in the terms, the Italians misrepresented the weight of their vessels, and when up against the limits, Japan left the treaty. The nations which violated the terms of the treaty did not suffer great consequences for their actions. Within little more than a decade, the treaty was abandoned. The Geneva Protocol has lasted longer and been more successful at being respected, but still nations have violated it at will when they have felt the need. Enforcement has been haphazard, with measures more a matter of politics than adherence to the terms. This meant sanctions and other measures tended to be advocated against violators primarily by their natural political enemies, while violations have been ignored or given only token measures by their political allies.
More recent arms control treaties have included more stringent terms on enforcement of violations as well as verification. This last has been a major obstacle to effective enforcement, as violators often attempt to covertly circumvent the terms of the agreements. Verification is the process of determining whether or not a nation is complying with the terms of an agreement, and involves a combination of release of such information by participants as well as some way to allow participants to examine each other to verify that information. This often involves as much negotiation as the limits themselves, and in some cases questions of verification have led to the breakdown of treaty negotiations (for example, verification was cited as a major concern by opponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, ultimately not ratified by the United States).
States may remain in a treaty while seeking to break the limits of that treaty as opposed to withdrawing from it. This is for two major reasons. To openly defy an agreement, even if one withdraws from it, often is seen in a bad light politically and can carry diplomatic repercussions. Additionally, if one remains in an agreement, competitors who are also participatory may be held to the limitations of the terms, while withdrawal releases your opponents to make the same developments you are making, limiting the advantage of that development.
Theory of arms control: Scholars and practitioners such as John D. Steinbruner, Thomas Schelling, Morton Halperin, Jonathan Dean or Stuart Croft worked extensively on the theoretical backing of arms control. Arms control is meant to break the security dilemma. It aims at mutual security between partners and overall stability (be it in a crisis situation, a grand strategy, or stability to put an end to an arms race). Other than stability, arms control comes with cost reduction and damage limitation. It is different from disarmament since the maintenance of stability might allow for mutually controlled armament and does not take a peace-without-weapons-stance. Nevertheless, arms control is a defensive strategy in principle, since transparency, equality, and stability do not fit into an offensive strategy.
According to a 2020 study in the American Political Science Review, arms control is rare because successful arms control agreements involve a difficult trade-off between transparency and security. For arms control agreements to be effective, there needs to be a way to thoroughly verify that a state is following the agreement, such as through intrusive inspections. However, states are often reluctant to submit to such inspections when they have reasons to fear that the inspectors will use the inspections to gather information about the capabilities of the state, which could be used in a future conflict.
History:
Pre-19th century: One of the first recorded attempts in arms control was a set of rules laid down in ancient Greece by the Amphictyonic Leagues. Rulings specified how war could be waged, and breaches of this could be punished by fines or by war.
In the 8th and 9th centuries AD, swords and chain mail armor manufactured in the Frankish empire were highly sought after for their quality, and Charlemagne (r. 768–814), made their sale or export to foreigners illegal, punishable by forfeiture of property or even death. This was an attempt to limit the possession and use of this equipment by the Franks' enemies, including the Moors, the Vikings and the Slavs.
The church used its position as a trans-national organization to limit the means of warfare. The 989 Peace of God (extended in 1033) ruling protected noncombatants, agrarian and economic facilities, and the property of the church from war. The 1027 Truce of God also tried to prevent violence between Christians. The Second Lateran Council in 1139 prohibited the use of crossbows against other Christians, although it did not prevent its use against non-Christians.
The development of firearms led to an increase in the devastation of war. The brutality of wars during this period led to efforts to formalize the rules of war, with humane treatment for prisoners of war or wounded, as well as rules to protect non-combatants and the pillaging of their property. However, during the period until the beginning of the 19th century few formal arms control agreements were recorded, except theoretical proposals and those imposed on defeated armies.
One treaty which was concluded was the Strasbourg Agreement of 1675. This is the first international agreement limiting the use of chemical weapons, in this case, poison bullets. The treaty was signed between France and The Holy Roman Empire
19th century: The 1817 Rush–Bagot Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom was the first arms control treaty of what can be considered the modern industrial era, leading to the demilitarization of the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain region of North America. This was followed by the 1871 Treaty of Washington which led to total demilitarization.
The industrial revolution led to the increasing mechanization of warfare, as well as rapid advances in the development of firearms; the increased potential of devastation (which was later seen in the battlefields of World War I) led to Tsar Nicholas II of Russia calling together the leaders of 26 nations for the First Hague Conference in 1899. The Conference led to the signing of the Hague Convention of 1899 that led to rules of declaring and conducting warfare as well as the use of modern weaponry, and also led to the setting up of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
1900 to 1945: A Second Hague Conference was called in 1907 leading to additions and amendments to the original 1899 agreement. A Third Hague Conference was called for 1915, but this was abandoned due to the First World War.
After the World War I, the League of Nations was set up which attempted to limit and reduce arms. However the enforcement of this policy was not effective. Various naval conferences, such as the Washington Naval Conference, were held during the period between the First and Second World Wars to limit the number and size of major warships of the five great naval powers.
The 1925 Geneva Conference led to the banning of chemical weapons being deployed against enemy nationals in international armed conflict as part of the Geneva Protocol. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, whilst ineffective, attempted for "providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy".
Since 1945: After World War II, the United Nations was set up as a body to promote and to maintain international peace and security. The United States proposed the Baruch Plan in 1946 as a way to impose stringent international control over the nuclear fuel cycle and thereby avert a global nuclear arms race, but the Soviet Union rejected the proposal and negotiations failed. Following President Eisenhower's 1953 Atoms for Peace speech to the UN General Assembly, the International Atomic Energy Agency was set up in 1957 to promote peaceful uses of nuclear technology and apply safeguards against the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.
Under the auspices of the United Nations, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which aimed to end nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer-space, was established in 1963. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons technology to countries outside the five that already possessed them: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Arms control | The United States proposed the Baruch Plan in 1946 as a way to impose stringent international control over the nuclear fuel cycle and thereby avert a global nuclear arms race, but the Soviet Union rejected the proposal and negotiations failed. Following President Eisenhower's 1953 Atoms for Peace speech to the UN General Assembly, the International Atomic Energy Agency was set up in 1957 to promote peaceful uses of nuclear technology and apply safeguards against the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.
Under the auspices of the United Nations, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which aimed to end nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer-space, was established in 1963. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons technology to countries outside the five that already possessed them: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. With the three main goals of establishing nonproliferation with inspections, nuclear arms reduction, and the right to use nuclear energy peacefully, this treaty initially met some reluctance from countries developing their own nuclear programs such as Brazil, Argentina and South Africa. Still, all countries with the exception of India, Israel, Pakistan and South Sudan decided to sign or ratify the document.
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and Soviet Union in the late 1960s/early 1970s led to further weapons control agreements. The SALT I talks led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an Interim Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (see SALT I), both in 1972. The SALT II talks started in 1972 leading to agreement in 1979. Due to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan the United States never ratified the treaty, but the agreement was honoured by both sides.
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed between the United States and Soviet Union in 1987 and ratified in 1988, leading to an agreement to destroy all missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers. This came in the context of a revitalised peace movement during the previous decade which included huge demonstrations around the world for nuclear disarmament.
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention was signed banning the manufacture and use of chemical weapons.
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties were signed, as START I and START II, by the US and Soviet Union, further restricting weapons. This was further moved on by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which was in turn superseded by the New START Treaty.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1996 banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes, but it has not entered into force due to the non-ratification of eight specific states.
In 1998 the United Nations founded the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Its goal is to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the strengthening of the disarmament regimes in respect to other weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons. It also promotes disarmament efforts in the area of conventional weapons, especially landmines and small arms, which are often the weapons of choice in contemporary conflicts.
In addition to treaties focused primarily on stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, there has been a recent movement to regulate the sale and trading of conventional weapons. As of December 2014, the United Nations is preparing for entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty, which has been ratified by 89 nations. However, it is currently missing ratification by key arms producers such as Russia and China, and while the United States has signed the treaty it has not yet ratified it. The Treaty regulates the international trade in almost all categories of conventional weapons – from small arms to battle tanks, combat aircraft and warships. Ammunition, as well as parts and components, are also covered.
More recently, the United Nations announced the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2020, following the 50th ratification or accession by member states.
List of treaties and conventions related to arms control: Some of the more important international arms control agreements follow:
Treaty of Versailles, 1919 – limited the size of the Germany's military after World War I
Washington Naval Treaty, 1922–1939 (as part of the naval conferences) – set limitations on construction of battleships, battlecruisers, and aircraft carriers as well as tonnage quotas on cruisers, destroyers, and submarines between the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, and Italy
Geneva Protocol, 1925 – prohibited the use of biological and chemical weapons against enemy nationals in international armed conflict
Antarctic Treaty, signed 1959, entered into force 1961 – prohibited military conflict in Antarctica
Partial Test Ban Treaty, signed and entered into force 1963 – prohibited nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere
Outer Space Treaty, signed and entered into force 1967 – prohibited deployment of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, in space
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed 1968, entered into force 1970 – prohibited countries without nuclear weapons from acquiring them while committing nuclear-armed states to eventual disarmament
Seabed Arms Control Treaty, signed 1971, entered into force 1972 – prohibited underwater nuclear tests
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), signed and ratified 1972, in force 1972–1977 – limited introduction of new intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed and entered into force 1972, terminated following U.S. withdrawal 2002 – restricted anti-ballistic missiles
Biological Weapons Convention, signed 1972, entered into force 1975 – prohibited production of biological weapons
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, signed 1974, entered into force 1990 – limited nuclear weapons tests to 150 kilotons
SALT II signed 1979, never entered into force – limited production of long-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles
Environmental Modification Convention, signed 1977, entered into force 1978 – prohibited military use of environmental modification techniques
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, signed 1980, entered into force 1983 – restricted certain conventional weapons such as landmines, incendiary weapons, and laser weapons as well as requiring clearance of unexploded ordnances.
Moon Treaty, signed 1979, entered into force 1984 – prohibits militarization of the Moon
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), signed 1987, entered into force 1988, United States and Russia announced withdrawal 2019 – limited short-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, (CFE Treaty) signed 1990, entered into force 1992 – established limits on deployment of conventional military forces in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
Vienna Document, adopted 1990, updated 1992, 1994, 1999, 2011 – European agreement on confidence- and security-building measures such as prior notification of military force activities and inspections of military activities
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), signed 1991, entered into force 1994, expired 2009 (START I was a successor to the expired SALT agreements.) – provided limitations on strategic offensive arms
Chemical Weapons Convention, signed 1993, entered into force 1997 – prohibited production and stockpiling of chemical weapons
START II, signed 1993, ratified 1996 (United States) and 2000 (Russia), terminated following Russian withdrawal 2002 – prohibited intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
Open Skies Treaty, signed 1992, entered into force 2002 – allowed unarmed reconnaissance flights between NATO and Russia
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, signed 1996, has not entered into force. – prohibited nuclear weapons testing
Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel landmines, signed 1997, entered into force 1999
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), signed 2002, entered into force 2003, expires 2012 – limited nuclear warheads
International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, signed 2002 – limited proliferation of ballistic missiles
Convention on Cluster Munitions, signed 2008, entered into force 2010 – prohibits deployment, production, and stockpiling of cluster bombs
New START Treaty, signed by Russia and the United States April 2010, entered into force February 2011 – reduced strategic nuclear missiles by half
Arms Trade Treaty, concluded 2013, entered into force 24 December 2014 – regulates trade of conventional weapons
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, signed 2017, entered into force January 2021 – prohibits nuclear weapons
Nuclear weapon-free zone treaties: Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean), signed 1967, entered into force 1972
Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific), signed 1985, entered into force 1986
Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia), signed 1995, entered into force 1997
Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa), signed 1996, entered into force 2009
Treaty of Semipalatinsk (Central Asia), signed 2006, entered into force 2008
Other treaties also envision the creation of NWFZ, among other objectives. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Arms control | These are the following:
Antarctic Treaty, signed 1959, entered into force 1961
Outer Space Treaty, signed and entered into force 1967
Seabed Arms Control Treaty, signed 1971, entered into force 1972
Treaties not entered into force: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, signed 1996 – prohibits nuclear weapons testing
Proposed treaties: Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty – would prohibit all further production of fissile material
Nuclear weapons convention – would prohibit nuclear weapons
Export control regimes: Zangger Committee since 1971
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) since 1974
Australia Group since 1985
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), since 1987
Wassenaar Arrangement, since 1996
Nonbinding declarations: Ayacucho Declaration 1974
Arms control organizations: The intergovernmental organizations for arms control are the following:
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which has other functions besides arms control
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom)
Conference on Disarmament (CD)
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
the now disbanded United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the successor to United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
failed proposal for Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons
There are also numerous non-governmental organizations that promote a global reduction in nuclear arms and offer research and analysis about U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Pre-eminent among these organizations is the Arms Control Association, founded in 1971 to promote public understanding of and support for arms control. Others include:
Federation of American Scientists (FAS)—founded in 1945 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists by veterans of the Manhattan Project.
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament—a leading disarmament organization in the United Kingdom, founded in 1957.
Peace Action—formerly SANE (the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy), founded in 1957
Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR)—founded by Bernard Lown in 1961.
Council for a Livable World—founded in 1962 by physicist Leó Szilárd and other scientists who believed that nuclear weapons should be controlled and eventually eliminated.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)—founded in 1966.
Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)—founded in 1969 by faculty and students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Arms Control Association—founded in 1971.
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation—founded in 1980 as a sister organization to the Council for a Livable World.
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)—founded in 1981.
Alliance for Nuclear Accountability—a national network of organizations working to address issues of nuclear weapons production and waste cleanup, founded in 1987 as the Military Production Network.
Global Zero—founded in 2008.
T.M.C. Asser Instituut—founded in 1965.
See also:
References:
Further reading: Adelman, Kenneth L. (1986). "Arms control and human rights". World Affairs. 149 (3): 157–162. JSTOR 20672104.
Amnesty International (2014). "Arms control and human rights". amnesty.org. Amnesty International.
Bailes, Alyson J. K. "The changing role of arms control in historical perspective." in Arms Control in the 21st Century (2013): 15-38.
Coe, Andrew J. and Jane Waynman. 2019. "Why Arms Control Is So Rare." American Political Science Review. doi:10.1017/S000305541900073X|
Croft, Stuart. Strategies of arms control: a history and typology (Manchester University Press, 1996).
Foradori, Paolo, et al. eds. Arms Control and Disarmament: 50 Years of Experience in Nuclear Education (2017) excerpt
Forsberg, Randall, ed., Arms Control Reporter 1995–2005. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995–2004.
Gillespie, Alexander. A History of the Laws of War: Volume 3: The Customs and Laws of War with Regards to Arms Control (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011).
Glynn, Patrick. Closing Pandora's Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War (1992) online
Graham Jr, Thomas. Disarmament sketches: Three decades of arms control and international law (University of Washington Press, 2012).
Kaufman, Robert Gordon. Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era (Columbia University Press, 1990).
Larsen, Jeffrey A. Historical dictionary of arms control and disarmament (2005) online
Mutschlerm, Max M. Arms Control in Space: Exploring Conditions for Preventive Arms Control (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
Reinhold, Thomas, and Christian Reuter. "Arms control and its applicability to cyberspace." in Information Technology for Peace and Security: IT Applications and Infrastructures in Conflicts, Crises, War, and Peace (2019): 207-231.
Smith, James M. and Gwendolyn Hall, eds. Milestones in strategic arms control, 1945–2000: United States Air Force roles and outcomes (2002) online
Thompson, Kenneth W., ed. Presidents and Arms Control: Process, Procedures, and Problems (University Press of America, 1997).
Williams Jr, Robert E., and Paul R. Viotti. Arms Control: History, Theory, and Policy (2 vol. ABC-CLIO, 2012).
Young, Nigel J. ed. The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace (4 vol. 2010) 1:89–122.
Primary sources: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations (1996) ISBN 9780160486890
External links: online books on arms control (on Internet Archive)
Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements Congressional Research Service, May 8, 2018.
"The Arms Trade Treaty at a Glance". armscontrol.org. Arms Control Association. July 2013.
National Counterproliferation Center – Office of the Director of National Intelligence (archived 28 April 2015)
UN – Disarmament Affairs
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Council for a Livable World (archived 11 July 2007)
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Research on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (archived 17 February 2011)
Lecture by Masahiko Asada entitled Nuclear Weapons and International Law in the Lecture Series of the United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law
Disarmament insight website |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Arms industry | History: During the early modern period, England, France, Sweden and the Netherlands became self-sufficient in arms production, with diffusion and migration of skilled workers to more peripheral countries such as Portugal and Russia.
The modern arms industry emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century as a product of the creation and expansion of the first large military–industrial companies. As smaller countries (and even newly industrializing countries like Russia and Japan) could no longer produce cutting-edge military equipment with their indigenous resources and capacity, they increasingly began to contract the manufacture of military equipment, such as battleships, artillery pieces and rifles to foreign firms.
In 1854, the British government awarded a contract to the Elswick Ordnance Company to supply the latest breech loading rifled artillery pieces. This galvanized the private sector into weapons production, with the surplus increasingly exported to foreign countries. William Armstrong became one of the first international arms dealers, selling his systems to governments across the world from Brazil to Japan. In 1884, he opened a shipyard at Elswick to specialize in warship production – at the time, it was the only factory in the world that could build a battleship and arm it completely. The factory produced warships for many navies, including the Imperial Japanese Navy. Several Armstrong cruisers played an important role in defeating the Russian fleet at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905.
In the American Civil War in 1861 the North had about ten times the manufacturing capacity of the economy of the Confederate States of America. This advantage over the South included the ability to produce (in relatively small numbers) breech-loading rifles for use against the muzzle-loading rifled muskets of the South. This began the transition to industrially produced mechanized weapons such as the Gatling gun.
This industrial innovation in the defense industry was adopted by Prussia in its 1864, 1866 and 1870–71 defeats of Denmark, Austria and France respectively. By this time the machine gun had begun entering arsenals. The first examples of its effectiveness were in 1899 during the Boer War and in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War. However, Germany led the innovation of weapons and this advantage in the weapons of World War I nearly defeated the allies. In 1885, France decided to capitalize on this increasingly lucrative trade and repealed its ban on weapon exports. The regulatory framework for the period up to the First World War was characterized by a laissez-faire policy that placed little obstruction in the way of weapons exports. Due to the carnage of World War I, arms traders began to be regarded with odium as "merchants of death" and were accused of having instigated and perpetuated the war in order to maximize their profits from arms sales. An inquiry into these allegations in Britain failed to find evidence to support them. However, the sea change in attitude about war more generally meant that governments began to control and regulate the trade themselves.
The volume of the arms trade greatly increased during the 20th century, and it began to be used as a political tool, especially during the Cold War where the United States and the USSR supplied weapons to their proxies across the world, particularly third world countries (see Nixon Doctrine).
Sectors:
Land-based weapon: This category includes everything from light arms to heavy artillery, and the majority of producers are small. Many are located in third world countries. International trade in handguns, machine guns, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other relatively inexpensive weapons is substantial. There is relatively little regulation at the international level, and as a result, many weapons fall into the hands of organized crime, rebel forces, terrorists, or regimes under sanctions.
Small arms: The Control Arms Campaign, founded by Amnesty International, Oxfam, and the International Action Network on Small Arms, estimated in 2003 that there are over 639 million small arms in circulation, and that over 1,135 companies based in more than 98 countries manufacture small arms as well as their various components and ammunition.
Aerospace systems: Encompassing military aircraft (both land-based and naval aviation), conventional missiles, and military satellites, this is the most technologically advanced sector of the market. It is also the least competitive from an economic standpoint, with a handful of companies dominating the entire market. The top clients and major producers are virtually all located in the western world and Russia, with the United States easily in the first place. Prominent aerospace firms include Rolls-Royce, BAE Systems, Saab AB, Dassault Aviation, Sukhoi, Mikoyan, EADS, Leonardo, Thales Group, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, RTX Corporation, and Boeing. There are also several multinational consortia mostly involved in the manufacturing of fighter jets, such as the Eurofighter. The largest military contract in history, signed in October 2001, involved the development of the Joint Strike Fighter.
Naval systems: Several of the world's great powers maintain substantial naval forces to provide a global presence, with the largest nations possessing aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and advanced anti-air defense systems. The vast majority of military ships are conventionally powered, but some are nuclear-powered. There is also a large global market in second-hand naval vessels, generally purchased by developing countries from Western governments.
Cybersecurity: The cybersecurity industry is expected to be of increasing importance to defense, intelligence and homeland security agencies.
International arms transfers:
Over time:
2010–2014: According to research institute SIPRI, the volume of international transfers of major weapons in 2010–14 was 16 percent higher than in 2005–2009. The five biggest exporters in 2010–2014 were the United States, Russia, China, Germany and France, and the five biggest importers were India, Saudi Arabia, China, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan. The flow of arms to the Middle East increased by 87 percent between 2009–13 and 2014–18, while there was a decrease in flows to all other regions: Africa, the Americas, Asia and Oceania, and Europe.
2014–2018: SIPRI has identified 67 countries as exporters of major weapons in 2014–18. The top 5 exporters during the period were responsible for 75 percent of all arms exports. The composition of the five largest exporters of arms changed between 2014 and 2018 remained unchanged compared to 2009–13, although their combined total exports of major arms were 10 percent higher. In 2014–18, significant increases in arms exports from the US, France and Germany were seen, while Chinese exports rose marginally and Russian exports decreased.
In 2014–18, 155 countries (about three-quarters of all countries) imported major weapons. The top 5 recipients accounted for 33 percent of the total arms imports during the period. The top five arms importers – Saudi Arabia, India, Egypt, Australia and Algeria – accounted for 35 percent of total arms imports in 2014–18. Of these, Saudi Arabia and India were among the top five importers in both 2009–13 and 2014–18.
In 2014–18, the volume of major arms international transfers was 7.8 percent higher than in 2009–13 and 23 percent than that in 2004–08. The largest arms importer was Saudi Arabia, importing arms primarily from the United States, United Kingdom and France. Between 2009–13 and 2014–18, the flow of arms to the Middle East increased by 87 percent. Also including India, Egypt, Australia and Algeria, the top five importers received 35 percent of the total arms imports, during 2014–18. The five largest exporters were the United States, Russia, France, Germany and China.
Post-2018: The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine changed the National Shooting Sports Foundation members ability to obtain an export license from taking a month to taking just four days. This was due to the United States Department of Commerce and agencies associated with ITAR expediting weapons shipments to Ukraine. In addition, the time it took to obtain a permit to buy a firearm in Ukraine also decreased from a few months to a few days.
World's largest arms exporters: Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in millions. These numbers may not represent real financial flows as prices for the underlying arms can be as low as zero in the case of military aid. The following are estimates from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Overall global arms exports rose of about 6 per-cent in the last 5 years compared to the period 2010–2014 and increased by 20 per-cent since 2005–2009.
Rankings for exporters below a billion dollars are less meaningful, as they can be swayed by single contracts. A much more accurate picture of export volume, free from yearly fluctuations, is presented by 5-year moving averages.
Next to SIPRI, there are several other sources that provide data on international transfers of arms. These include national reports by national governments about arms exports, the UN register on conventional arms, and an annual publication by the U.S. Congressional Research Service that includes data on arms exports to developing countries as compiled by U.S. intelligence agencies. Due to the different methodologies and definitions used different sources often provide significantly different data.
World's largest arms exporters since 1950: SIPRI uses the "trend-indicator values" (TIV). These are based on the known unit production costs of weapons and represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Arms industry | Rankings for exporters below a billion dollars are less meaningful, as they can be swayed by single contracts. A much more accurate picture of export volume, free from yearly fluctuations, is presented by 5-year moving averages.
Next to SIPRI, there are several other sources that provide data on international transfers of arms. These include national reports by national governments about arms exports, the UN register on conventional arms, and an annual publication by the U.S. Congressional Research Service that includes data on arms exports to developing countries as compiled by U.S. intelligence agencies. Due to the different methodologies and definitions used different sources often provide significantly different data.
World's largest arms exporters since 1950: SIPRI uses the "trend-indicator values" (TIV). These are based on the known unit production costs of weapons and represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.
World's largest arms importers: Units are in Trend Indicator Values expressed as millions of U.S. dollars at 1990s prices. These numbers may not represent real financial flows as prices for the underlying arms can be as low as zero in the case of military aid.
Arms import rankings fluctuate heavily as countries enter and exit wars. Export data tend to be less volatile as exporters tend to be more technologically advanced and have stable production flows. 5-year moving averages present a much more accurate picture of import volume, free from yearly fluctuations.
List of major weapon manufacturers: This is a list of the world's largest arms manufacturers and other military service companies who profit the most from the war economy, their origin is shown as well. The information is based on a list published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for 2022.
Arms control: Arms control refers to international restrictions upon the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation and usage of small arms, conventional weapons, and weapons of mass destruction. It is typically exercised through the use of diplomacy, which seeks to persuade governments to accept such limitations through agreements and treaties, although it may also be forced upon non-consenting governments.
Notable international arms control treaties: Geneva Protocol on chemical and biological weapons, 1925
Outer Space Treaty, signed and entered into force 1967
Biological Weapons Convention, signed 1972, entered into force 1975
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 1987
Chemical Weapons Convention, signed 1993, entered into force 1997
Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel land mines, signed 1997, entered into force 1999
New START Treaty, signed by Russia and the United States in April 2010, entered into force in February 2011
Arms Trade Treaty, concluded in 2013, entered into force on 24 December 2014.
See also:
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Army | Structure: Armies are always divided into various specialties, according to the mission, role, and training of individual units, and sometimes individual soldiers within a unit.
Some of the groupings common to all armies include the following:
Infantry
Armoured corps
Artillery corps
Signal corps
Special forces
Military police
Medical corps
History:
India: The Battle of the Ten Kings, a Hindu Aryan king named Sudas defeated an alliance of ten kings and their supportive chieftains. During the Iron Age, the Maurya and Nanda Empires had one of the largest armies in the world, the peak being approximately over 600,000 Infantry, 30,000 Cavalry, 8,000 War-Chariots and 9,000 War Elephants not including tributary state allies. In the Gupta age, large armies of longbowmen were recruited to fight off invading horse archer armies. Elephants, pikemen and cavalry were other featured troops.
China: The states of China raised armies for at least 1000 years before the Spring and Autumn Annals. By the Warring States period, the crossbow had been perfected enough to become a military secret, with bronze bolts that could pierce any armor. Thus any political power of a state rested on the armies and their organization. China underwent political consolidation of the states of Han (韓), Wei (魏), Chu (楚), Yan (燕), Zhao (趙) and Qi (齊), until by 221 BCE, Qin Shi Huang (秦始皇帝), the first emperor of the Qin dynasty, attained absolute power. This first emperor of China could command the creation of a Terracotta Army to guard his tomb in the city of Xi'an (西安), as well as a realignment of the Great Wall of China to strengthen his empire against insurrection, invasion and incursion.
Sun Tzu's The Art of War remains one of China's Seven Military Classics, even though it is two thousand years old. Since no political figure could exist without an army, measures were taken to ensure only the most capable leaders could control the armies. Civil bureaucracies (士大夫) arose to control the productive power of the states, and their military power.
Sparta: The Spartan Army was one of the earliest known professional armies. Boys were sent to a barracks at the age of seven or eight to train for becoming a soldier. At the age of thirty, they were released from the barracks and allowed to marry and have a family. After that, men devoted their lives to war until their retirement at the age of 60. The Spartan Army was largely composed of hoplites, equipped with arms and armor nearly identical to each other. Each hoplite bore the Spartan emblem and a scarlet uniform. The main pieces of this armor were a round shield, a spear and a helmet.
Ancient Rome: The Roman Army had its origins in the citizen army of the Republic, which was staffed by citizens serving mandatory duty for Rome. Conscription remained the main method through which Rome mustered forces until the end of the Republic. The army eventually became a professional organization largely of citizens, who would served continuously for 25 years before being discharged.
The Romans were also noted for making use of auxiliary troops, non-Romans who served with the legions and filled roles that the traditional Roman military could not fill effectively, such as light skirmish troops and heavy cavalry. After their service in the army they were made citizens of Rome and then their children were citizens also. They were also given land and money to settle in Rome. In the Late Roman Empire, these auxiliary troops, along with foreign mercenaries, became the core of the Roman Army; moreover, by the time of the Late Roman Empire tribes such as the Visigoths were paid to serve as mercenaries.
Medieval Europe: In the earliest Middle Ages it was the obligation of every aristocrat to respond to the call to battle with his own equipment, archers, and infantry. This decentralized system was necessary due to the social order of the time, but could lead to motley forces with variable training, equipment and abilities. The more resources the noble had access to, the better his troops would be.
Initially, the words "knight" and "noble" were used interchangeably as there was not generally a distinction between them. While the nobility did fight upon horseback, they were also supported by lower class citizens – and mercenaries and criminals – whose only purpose was participating in warfare because, most often than not, they held brief employment during their lord's engagement. As the Middle Ages progressed and feudalism developed in a legitimate social and economic system, knights started to develop into their own class with a minor caveat: they were still in debt to their lord. No longer primarily driven by economic need, the newly established vassal class were, instead, driven by fealty and chivalry.
As central governments grew in power, a return to the citizen armies of the classical period also began, as central levies of the peasantry began to be the central recruiting tool. England was one of the most centralized states in the Middle Ages, and the armies that fought in the Hundred Years' War were, predominantly, composed of paid professionals.
In theory, every Englishman had an obligation to serve for forty days. Forty days was not long enough for a campaign, especially one on the continent.
Thus the scutage was introduced, whereby most Englishmen paid to escape their service and this money was used to create a permanent army. However, almost all high medieval armies in Europe were composed of a great deal of paid core troops, and there was a large mercenary market in Europe from at least the early 12th century.
As the Middle Ages progressed in Italy, Italian cities began to rely mostly on mercenaries to do their fighting rather than the militias that had dominated the early and high medieval period in this region. These would be groups of career soldiers who would be paid a set rate. Mercenaries tended to be effective soldiers, especially in combination with standing forces, but in Italy they came to dominate the armies of the city states. This made them considerably less reliable than a standing army. Mercenary-on-mercenary warfare in Italy also led to relatively bloodless campaigns which relied as much on maneuver as on battles.
In 1439 the French legislature, known as the Estates General (French: états généraux), passed laws that restricted military recruitment and training to the king alone. There was a new tax to be raised known as the taille that was to provide funding for a new Royal army. The mercenary companies were given a choice of either joining the Royal army as compagnies d'ordonnance on a permanent basis, or being hunted down and destroyed if they refused. France gained a total standing army of around 6,000 men, which was sent out to gradually eliminate the remaining mercenaries who insisted on operating on their own. The new standing army had a more disciplined and professional approach to warfare than its predecessors. The reforms of the 1440s, eventually led to the French victory at Castillon in 1453, and the conclusion of the Hundred Years' War. By 1450 the companies were divided into the field army, known as the grande ordonnance and the garrison force known as the petite ordonnance.
Early modern: First nation states lacked the funds needed to maintain standing forces, so they tended to hire mercenaries to serve in their armies during wartime. Such mercenaries typically formed at the ends of periods of conflict, when men-at-arms were no longer needed by their respective governments.
The veteran soldiers thus looked for other forms of employment, often becoming mercenaries. Free Companies would often specialize in forms of combat that required longer periods of training that was not available in the form of a mobilized militia.
As late as the 1650s, most troops were mercenaries. However, after the 17th century, most states invested in better disciplined and more politically reliable permanent troops. For a time mercenaries became important as trainers and administrators, but soon these tasks were also taken by the state. The massive size of these armies required a large supporting force of administrators.
The newly centralized states were forced to set up vast organized bureaucracies to manage these armies, which some historians argue is the basis of the modern bureaucratic state. The combination of increased taxes and increased centralization of government functions caused a series of revolts across Europe such as the Fronde in France and the English Civil War.
In many countries, the resolution of this conflict was the rise of absolute monarchy. Only in England and the Netherlands did representative government evolve as an alternative. From the late 17th century, states learned how to finance wars through long term low interest loans from national banking institutions. The first state to master this process was the Dutch Republic. This transformation in the armies of Europe had great social impact. The defense of the state now rested on the commoners, not on the aristocrats. However, aristocrats continued to monopolize the officer corps of almost all early modern armies, including their high command. Moreover, popular revolts almost always failed unless they had the support and patronage of the noble or gentry classes. The new armies, because of their vast expense, were also dependent on taxation and the commercial classes who also began to demand a greater role in society. The great commercial powers of the Dutch and English matched much larger states in military might.
As any man could be quickly trained in the use of a musket, it became far easier to form massive armies. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Army | From the late 17th century, states learned how to finance wars through long term low interest loans from national banking institutions. The first state to master this process was the Dutch Republic. This transformation in the armies of Europe had great social impact. The defense of the state now rested on the commoners, not on the aristocrats. However, aristocrats continued to monopolize the officer corps of almost all early modern armies, including their high command. Moreover, popular revolts almost always failed unless they had the support and patronage of the noble or gentry classes. The new armies, because of their vast expense, were also dependent on taxation and the commercial classes who also began to demand a greater role in society. The great commercial powers of the Dutch and English matched much larger states in military might.
As any man could be quickly trained in the use of a musket, it became far easier to form massive armies. The inaccuracy of the weapons necessitated large groups of massed soldiers. This led to a rapid swelling of the size of armies. For the first time huge masses of the population could enter combat, rather than just the highly skilled professionals.
It has been argued that the drawing of men from across the nation into an organized corps helped breed national unity and patriotism, and during this period the modern notion of the nation state was born. However, this would only become apparent after the French Revolutionary Wars. At this time, the levée en masse and conscription would become the defining paradigm of modern warfare.
Before then, however, most national armies were in fact composed of many nationalities. In Spain armies were recruited from all the Spanish European territories including Spain, Italy, Wallonia (Walloon Guards) and Germany. The French recruited some soldiers from Germany, Switzerland as well as from Piedmont. Britain recruited Hessian and Hanovrian troops until the late 18th century. Irish Catholics made careers for themselves in the armies of many Catholic European states.
Prior to the English Civil War in England, the monarch maintained a personal bodyguard of Yeomen of the Guard and the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen at Arms, or "gentlemen pensioners", and a few locally raised companies to garrison important places such as Berwick on Tweed or Portsmouth (or Calais before it was recaptured by France in 1558).
Troops for foreign expeditions were raised upon an ad hoc basis. Noblemen and professional regular soldiers were commissioned by the monarch to supply troops, raising their quotas by indenture from a variety of sources. On January 26, 1661 Charles II issued the Royal Warrant that created the genesis of what would become the British Army, although the Scottish and English Armies would remain two separate organizations until the unification of England and Scotland in 1707. The small force was represented by only a few regiments.
After the American Revolutionary War the Continental Army was quickly disbanded as part of the Americans' distrust of standing armies, and irregular state militias became the sole ground army of the United States, with the exception of one battery of artillery guarding West Point's arsenal. Then First American Regiment was established in 1784. However, because of continuing conflict with Native Americans, it was soon realized that it was necessary to field a trained standing army. The first of these, the Legion of the United States, was established in 1791.
Until 1733 the common soldiers of Prussian Army consisted largely of peasantry recruited or impressed from Brandenburg–Prussia, leading many to flee to neighboring countries. To halt this trend, Frederick William I divided Prussia into regimental cantons. Every youth was required to serve as a soldier in these recruitment districts for three months each year; this met agrarian needs and added extra troops to bolster the regular ranks.
Russian tsars before Peter I of Russia maintained professional hereditary musketeer corps (streltsy in Russian) that were highly unreliable and undisciplined. In times of war the armed forces were augmented by peasants. Peter I introduced a modern regular army built on German model, but with a new aspect: officers not necessarily from nobility, as talented commoners were given promotions that eventually included a noble title at the attainment of an officer's rank. Conscription of peasants and townspeople was based on quota system, per settlement. Initially it was based on the number of households, later it was based on the population numbers. The term of service in the 18th century was for life. In 1793 it was reduced to 25 years. In 1834 it was reduced to 20 years plus 5 years in reserve and in 1855 to 12 years plus 3 years of reserve.
The first Ottoman standing army were Janissaries. They replaced forces that mostly comprised tribal warriors (ghazis) whose loyalty and morale could not always be trusted. The first Janissary units were formed from prisoners of war and slaves, probably as a result of the sultan taking his traditional one-fifth share of his army's treasure they looted in kind rather than cash.
From the 1380s onwards, their ranks were filled under the devşirme system, where feudal dues were paid by service to the sultan. The "recruits" were mostly Christian youths, reminiscent of mamluks.
China organized the Manchu people into the Eight Banner system in the early 17th century. Defected Ming armies formed the Green Standard Army. These troops enlisted voluntarily and for long terms of service.
Late modern: Conscription allowed the French Republic to form the Grande Armée, what Napoleon Bonaparte called "the nation in arms", which successfully battled European professional armies.
Conscription, particularly when the conscripts are being sent to foreign wars that do not directly affect the security of the nation, has historically been highly politically contentious in democracies.
In developed nations, the increasing emphasis on technological firepower and better-trained fighting forces, make mass conscription unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Russia, as well as many other nations, retains mainly a conscript army. There is also a very rare citizen army as used in Switzerland (see Military of Switzerland).
Field army: A particular army can be named or numbered to distinguish it from military land forces in general. For example, the First United States Army and the Army of Northern Virginia. In the British Army it is normal to spell out the ordinal number of an army (e.g. First Army), whereas lower formations use figures (e.g. 1st Division).
Armies (as well as army groups and theaters) are large formations which vary significantly between armed forces in size, composition, and scope of responsibility.
In the Soviet Red Army and the Soviet Air Force, "Armies" could vary in size, but were subordinate to an Army Group-sized "front" in wartime. In peacetime, a Soviet army was usually subordinate to a military district. Viktor Suvorov's Inside the Soviet Army describes how Cold War era Soviet military districts were actually composed of a front headquarters and a military district headquarters co-located for administration and deception ('maskirovika') reasons.
Formations: In many countries, especially in Europe or North America, armies are often subdivided as follows:
See also: Lists of armies
List of armies by country
List of army units called Guards
List of numbered armies
List of countries by number of military and paramilitary personnel
Military organization
Paramilitary
References:
External links: Media related to army at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Artillery | Artillery piece: Although not called by that name, siege engines performing the role recognizable as artillery have been employed in warfare since antiquity. The first known catapult was developed in Syracuse in 399 BC. Until the introduction of gunpowder into western warfare, artillery was dependent upon mechanical energy which not only severely limited the kinetic energy of the projectiles, it also required the construction of very large engines to accumulate sufficient energy. A 1st-century BC Roman catapult launching 6.55 kg (14.4 lb) stones achieved a kinetic energy of 16 kilojoules, compared to a mid-19th-century 12-pounder gun, which fired a 4.1 kg (9.0 lb) round, with a kinetic energy of 240 kilojoules, or a 20th-century US battleship that fired a 1,225 kg (2,701 lb) projectile from its main battery with an energy level surpassing 350 megajoules.
From the Middle Ages through most of the modern era, artillery pieces on land were moved by horse-drawn gun carriages. In the contemporary era, artillery pieces and their crew relied on wheeled or tracked vehicles as transportation. These land versions of artillery were dwarfed by railway guns; the largest of these large-calibre guns ever conceived – Project Babylon of the Supergun affair – was theoretically capable of putting a satellite into orbit. Artillery used by naval forces has also changed significantly, with missiles generally replacing guns in surface warfare.
Over the course of military history, projectiles were manufactured from a wide variety of materials, into a wide variety of shapes, using many different methods in which to target structural/defensive works and inflict enemy casualties. The engineering applications for ordnance delivery have likewise changed significantly over time, encompassing some of the most complex and advanced technologies in use today.
In some armies, the weapon of artillery is the projectile, not the equipment that fires it. The process of delivering fire onto the target is called gunnery. The actions involved in operating an artillery piece are collectively called "serving the gun" by the "detachment" or gun crew, constituting either direct or indirect artillery fire. The manner in which gunnery crews (or formations) are employed is called artillery support. At different periods in history, this may refer to weapons designed to be fired from ground-, sea-, and even air-based weapons platforms.
Crew: Some armed forces use the term "gunners" for the soldiers and sailors with the primary function of using artillery.
The gunners and their guns are usually grouped in teams called either "crews" or "detachments". Several such crews and teams with other functions are combined into a unit of artillery, usually called a battery, although sometimes called a company. In gun detachments, each role is numbered, starting with "1" the Detachment Commander, and the highest number being the Coverer, the second-in-command. "Gunner" is also the lowest rank, and junior non-commissioned officers are "Bombardiers" in some artillery arms.
Batteries are roughly equivalent to a company in the infantry, and are combined into larger military organizations for administrative and operational purposes, either battalions or regiments, depending on the army. These may be grouped into brigades; the Russian army also groups some brigades into artillery divisions, and the People's Liberation Army has artillery corps.
The term "artillery" also designates a combat arm of most military services when used organizationally to describe units and formations of the national armed forces that operate the weapons.
Tactics: During military operations, field artillery has the role of providing support to other arms in combat or of attacking targets, particularly in-depth. Broadly, these effects fall into two categories, aiming either to suppress or neutralize the enemy, or to cause casualties, damage, and destruction. This is mostly achieved by delivering high-explosive munitions to suppress, or inflict casualties on the enemy from casing fragments and other debris and from blast, or by destroying enemy positions, equipment, and vehicles. Non-lethal munitions, notably smoke, can also suppress or neutralize the enemy by obscuring their view.
Fire may be directed by an artillery observer or another observer, including crewed and uncrewed aircraft, or called onto map coordinates.
Military doctrine has had a significant influence on the core engineering design considerations of artillery ordnance through its history, in seeking to achieve a balance between the delivered volume of fire with ordnance mobility. However, during the modern period, the consideration of protecting the gunners also arose due to the late-19th-century introduction of the new generation of infantry weapons using conoidal bullet, better known as the Minié ball, with a range almost as long as that of field artillery.
The gunners' increasing proximity to and participation in direct combat against other combat arms and attacks by aircraft made the introduction of a gun shield necessary. The problems of how to employ a fixed or horse-towed gun in mobile warfare necessitated the development of new methods of transporting the artillery into combat. Two distinct forms of artillery were developed: the towed gun, used primarily to attack or defend a fixed-line; and the self-propelled gun, intended to accompany a mobile force and to provide continuous fire support and/or suppression. These influences have guided the development of artillery ordnance, systems, organizations, and operations until the present, with artillery systems capable of providing support at ranges from as little as 100 m to the intercontinental ranges of ballistic missiles. The only combat in which artillery is unable to take part is close-quarters combat, with the possible exception of artillery reconnaissance teams.
Etymology: The word as used in the current context originated in the Middle Ages. One suggestion is that it comes from French atelier, meaning the place where manual work is done.
Another suggestion is that it originates from the 13th century and the Old French artillier, designating craftsmen and manufacturers of all materials and warfare equipments (spears, swords, armor, war machines); and, for the next 250 years, the sense of the word "artillery" covered all forms of military weapons. Hence, the naming of the Honourable Artillery Company, which was essentially an infantry unit until the 19th century.
Another suggestion is that it comes from the Italian arte de tirare (art of shooting), coined by one of the first theorists on the use of artillery, Niccolò Tartaglia.
History: Mechanical systems used for throwing ammunition in ancient warfare, also known as "engines of war", like the catapult, onager, trebuchet, and ballista, are also referred to by military historians as artillery.
Medieval: During medieval times, more types of artillery were developed, most notably the counterweight trebuchet. Traction trebuchets, using manpower to launch projectiles, have been used in ancient China since the 4th century as anti-personnel weapons. The much more powerful counterweight trebuchet was invented in the eastern Mediterranean region in the 12th century, with the earliest definite attestation in 1187.
Invention of gunpowder: Early Chinese artillery had vase-like shapes. This includes the "long range awe inspiring" cannon dated from 1350 and found in the 14th century Ming dynasty treatise Huolongjing. With the development of better metallurgy techniques, later cannons abandoned the vase shape of early Chinese artillery. This change can be seen in the bronze "thousand ball thunder cannon", an early example of field artillery. These small, crude weapons diffused into the Middle East (the madfaa) and reached Europe in the 13th century, in a very limited manner.
In Asia, Mongols adopted the Chinese artillery and used it effectively in the great conquest. By the late 14th century, Chinese rebels used organized artillery and cavalry to push Mongols out.
As small smooth-bore barrels, these were initially cast in iron or bronze around a core, with the first drilled bore ordnance recorded in operation near Seville in 1247. They fired lead, iron, or stone balls, sometimes large arrows and on occasions simply handfuls of whatever scrap came to hand. During the Hundred Years' War, these weapons became more common, initially as the bombard and later the cannon. Cannon were always muzzle-loaders. While there were many early attempts at breech-loading designs, a lack of engineering knowledge rendered these even more dangerous to use than muzzle-loaders.
Expansion of use: In 1415, the Portuguese invaded the Mediterranean port town of Ceuta. While it is difficult to confirm the use of firearms in the siege of the city, it is known the Portuguese defended it thereafter with firearms, namely bombardas, colebratas, and falconetes. In 1419, Sultan Abu Sa'id led an army to reconquer the fallen city, and Marinids brought cannons and used them in the assault on Ceuta. Finally, hand-held firearms and riflemen appear in Morocco, in 1437, in an expedition against the people of Tangiers. It is clear these weapons had developed into several different forms, from small guns to large artillery pieces.
The artillery revolution in Europe caught on during the Hundred Years' War and changed the way that battles were fought. In the preceding decades, the English had even used a gunpowder-like weapon in military campaigns against the Scottish. However, at this time, the cannons used in battle were very small and not particularly powerful. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Artillery | While it is difficult to confirm the use of firearms in the siege of the city, it is known the Portuguese defended it thereafter with firearms, namely bombardas, colebratas, and falconetes. In 1419, Sultan Abu Sa'id led an army to reconquer the fallen city, and Marinids brought cannons and used them in the assault on Ceuta. Finally, hand-held firearms and riflemen appear in Morocco, in 1437, in an expedition against the people of Tangiers. It is clear these weapons had developed into several different forms, from small guns to large artillery pieces.
The artillery revolution in Europe caught on during the Hundred Years' War and changed the way that battles were fought. In the preceding decades, the English had even used a gunpowder-like weapon in military campaigns against the Scottish. However, at this time, the cannons used in battle were very small and not particularly powerful. Cannons were only useful for the defense of a castle, as demonstrated at Breteuil in 1356, when the besieged English used a cannon to destroy an attacking French assault tower. By the end of the 14th century, cannon were only powerful enough to knock in roofs, and could not penetrate castle walls.
However, a major change occurred between 1420 and 1430, when artillery became much more powerful and could now batter strongholds and fortresses quite efficiently. The English, French, and Burgundians all advanced in military technology, and as a result the traditional advantage that went to the defense in a siege was lost. The cannon during this period were elongated, and the recipe for gunpowder was improved to make it three times as powerful as before. These changes led to the increased power in the artillery weapons of the time.
Joan of Arc encountered gunpowder weaponry several times. When she led the French against the English at the Battle of Tourelles, in 1430, she faced heavy gunpowder fortifications, and yet her troops prevailed in that battle. In addition, she led assaults against the English-held towns of Jargeau, Meung, and Beaugency, all with the support of large artillery units. When she led the assault on Paris, Joan faced stiff artillery fire, especially from the suburb of St. Denis, which ultimately led to her defeat in this battle. In April 1430, she went to battle against the Burgundians, whose support was purchased by the English. At this time, the Burgundians had the strongest and largest gunpowder arsenal among the European powers, and yet the French, under Joan of Arc's leadership, were able to beat back the Burgundians and defend themselves. As a result, most of the battles of the Hundred Years' War that Joan of Arc participated in were fought with gunpowder artillery.
The army of Mehmet the Conqueror, which conquered Constantinople in 1453, included both artillery and foot soldiers armed with gunpowder weapons. The Ottomans brought to the siege sixty-nine guns in fifteen separate batteries and trained them at the walls of the city. The barrage of Ottoman cannon fire lasted forty days, and they are estimated to have fired 19,320 times. Artillery also played a decisive role in the Battle of St. Jakob an der Birs of 1444. Early cannon were not always reliable; King James II of Scotland was killed by the accidental explosion of one of his own cannon, imported from Flanders, at the siege of Roxburgh Castle in 1460.
The able use of artillery supported to a large measure the expansion and defense of the Portuguese Empire, as it was a necessary tool that allowed the Portuguese to face overwhelming odds both on land and sea from Morocco to Asia. In great sieges and in sea battles, the Portuguese demonstrated a level of proficiency in the use of artillery after the beginning of the 16th century unequalled by contemporary European neighbours, in part due to the experience gained in intense fighting in Morocco, which served as a proving ground for artillery and its practical application, and made Portugal a forerunner in gunnery for decades. During the reign of King Manuel (1495–1521) at least 2017 cannon were sent to Morocco for garrison defense, with more than 3000 cannon estimated to have been required during that 26-year period. An especially noticeable division between siege guns and anti-personnel guns enhanced the use and effectiveness of Portuguese firearms above contemporary powers, making cannon the most essential element in the Portuguese arsenal.
The three major classes of Portuguese artillery were anti-personnel guns with a high borelength (including: rebrodequim, berço, falconete, falcão, sacre, áspide, cão, serpentina and passavolante); bastion guns which could batter fortifications (camelete, leão, pelicano, basilisco, águia, camelo, roqueira, urso); and howitzers that fired large stone cannonballs in an elevated arch, weighted up to 4000 pounds and could fire incendiary devices, such as a hollow iron ball filled with pitch and fuse, designed to be fired at close range and burst on contact. The most popular in Portuguese arsenals was the berço, a 5 cm, one pounder bronze breech-loading cannon that weighted 150 kg with an effective range of 600 meters.
A tactical innovation the Portuguese introduced in fort defense was the use of combinations of projectiles against massed assaults. Although canister shot had been developed in the early 15th century, the Portuguese were the first to employ it extensively, and Portuguese engineers invented a canister round which consisted of a thin lead case filled with iron pellets, that broke up at the muzzle and scattered its contents in a narrow pattern. An innovation which Portugal adopted in advance of other European powers was fuse-delayed action shells, and were commonly used in 1505. Although dangerous, their effectiveness meant a sixth of all rounds used by the Portuguese in Morocco were of the fused-shell variety.
The new Ming Dynasty established the "Divine Engine Battalion" (神机营), which specialized in various types of artillery. Light cannons and cannons with multiple volleys were developed. In a campaign to suppress a local minority rebellion near today's Burmese border, "the Ming army used a 3-line method of arquebuses/muskets to destroy an elephant formation".
When the Portuguese and Spanish arrived at Southeast Asia, they found that the local kingdoms were already using cannons. Portuguese and Spanish invaders were unpleasantly surprised and even outgunned on occasion. Duarte Barbosa ca. 1514 said that the inhabitants of Java were great masters in casting artillery and very good artillerymen. They made many one-pounder cannons (cetbang or rentaka), long muskets, spingarde (arquebus), schioppi (hand cannon), Greek fire, guns (cannons), and other fire-works. In all aspects the Javanese were considered excellent in casting artillery, and in the knowledge of using it.: 254 : 198 : 224 In 1513, the Javanese fleet led by Pati Unus sailed to attack Portuguese Malacca "with much artillery made in Java, for the Javanese are skilled in founding and casting, and in all works in iron, over and above what they have in India".: 162 : 23 By the early 16th century, the Javanese already locally-producing large guns, some of them still survived until the present day and dubbed as "sacred cannon" or "holy cannon". These cannons varied between 180 and 260 pounders, weighing anywhere between 3–8 tons, measuring between 3–6 m.
Between 1593 and 1597, about 200,000 Korean and Chinese troops which fought against Japan in Korea actively used heavy artillery in both siege and field combat. Korean forces mounted artillery in ships as naval guns, providing an advantage against Japanese navy which used Kunikuzushi (国崩し – Japanese breech-loading swivel gun) and Ōzutsu (大筒 – large size Tanegashima) as their largest firearms.
Smoothbores: Bombards were of value mainly in sieges. A famous Turkish example used at the siege of Constantinople in 1453 weighed 19 tons, took 200 men and sixty oxen to emplace, and could fire just seven times a day. The Fall of Constantinople was perhaps "the first event of supreme importance whose result was determined by the use of artillery" when the huge bronze cannons of Mehmed II breached the city's walls, ending the Byzantine Empire, according to Sir Charles Oman.
Bombards developed in Europe were massive smoothbore weapons distinguished by their lack of a field carriage, immobility once emplaced, highly individual design, and noted unreliability (in 1460 James II, King of Scots, was killed when one exploded at the siege of Roxburgh). Their large size precluded the barrels being cast and they were constructed out of metal staves or rods bound together with hoops like a barrel, giving their name to the gun barrel.
The use of the word "cannon" marks the introduction in the 15th century of a dedicated field carriage with axle, trail and animal-drawn limber—this produced mobile field pieces that could move and support an army in action, rather than being found only in the siege and static defenses. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Artillery | Bombards developed in Europe were massive smoothbore weapons distinguished by their lack of a field carriage, immobility once emplaced, highly individual design, and noted unreliability (in 1460 James II, King of Scots, was killed when one exploded at the siege of Roxburgh). Their large size precluded the barrels being cast and they were constructed out of metal staves or rods bound together with hoops like a barrel, giving their name to the gun barrel.
The use of the word "cannon" marks the introduction in the 15th century of a dedicated field carriage with axle, trail and animal-drawn limber—this produced mobile field pieces that could move and support an army in action, rather than being found only in the siege and static defenses. The reduction in the size of the barrel was due to improvements in both iron technology and gunpowder manufacture, while the development of trunnions—projections at the side of the cannon as an integral part of the cast—allowed the barrel to be fixed to a more movable base, and also made raising or lowering the barrel much easier.
The first land-based mobile weapon is usually credited to Jan Žižka, who deployed his oxen-hauled cannon during the Hussite Wars of Bohemia (1418–1424). However, cannons were still large and cumbersome. With the rise of musketry in the 16th century, cannon were largely (though not entirely) displaced from the battlefield—the cannon were too slow and cumbersome to be used and too easily lost to a rapid enemy advance.
The combining of shot and powder into a single unit, a cartridge, occurred in the 1620s with a simple fabric bag, and was quickly adopted by all nations. It speeded loading and made it safer, but unexpelled bag fragments were an additional fouling in the gun barrel and a new tool—a worm—was introduced to remove them. Gustavus Adolphus is identified as the general who made cannon an effective force on the battlefield—pushing the development of much lighter and smaller weapons and deploying them in far greater numbers than previously. The outcome of battles was still determined by the clash of infantry.
Shells, explosive-filled fused projectiles, were in use by the 15th century. The development of specialized pieces—shipboard artillery, howitzers and mortars—was also begun in this period. More esoteric designs, like the multi-barrel ribauldequin (known as "organ guns"), were also produced.
The 1650 book by Kazimierz Siemienowicz Artis Magnae Artilleriae pars prima was one of the most important contemporary publications on the subject of artillery. For over two centuries this work was used in Europe as a basic artillery manual.
One of the most significant effects of artillery during this period was however somewhat more indirect—by easily reducing to rubble any medieval-type fortification or city wall (some which had stood since Roman times), it abolished millennia of siege-warfare strategies and styles of fortification building. This led, among other things, to a frenzy of new bastion-style fortifications to be built all over Europe and in its colonies, but also had a strong integrating effect on emerging nation-states, as kings were able to use their newfound artillery superiority to force any local dukes or lords to submit to their will, setting the stage for the absolutist kingdoms to come.
Modern rocket artillery can trace its heritage back to the Mysorean rockets of Mysore. Their first recorded use was in 1780 during the battles of the Second, Third and Fourth Mysore Wars. The wars fought between the British East India Company and the Kingdom of Mysore in India made use of the rockets as a weapon. In the Battle of Pollilur, the Siege of Seringapatam (1792) and in Battle of Seringapatam in 1799, these rockets were used with considerable effect against the British. After the wars, several Mysore rockets were sent to England, but experiments with heavier payloads were unsuccessful. In 1804 William Congreve, considering the Mysorian rockets to have too short a range (less than 1,000 yards) developed rockets in numerous sizes with ranges up to 3,000 yards and eventually utilizing iron casing as the Congreve rocket which were used effectively during the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812.
Napoleonic: With the Napoleonic Wars, artillery experienced changes in both physical design and operation. Rather than being overseen by "mechanics", artillery was viewed as its own service branch with the capability of dominating the battlefield. The success of the French artillery companies was at least in part due to the presence of specially trained artillery officers leading and coordinating during the chaos of battle. Napoleon, himself a former artillery officer, perfected the tactic of massed artillery batteries unleashed upon a critical point in his enemies' line as a prelude to a decisive infantry and cavalry assault.
Physically, cannons continued to become smaller and lighter. During the Seven Years War, King Frederick II of Prussia used these advances to deploy horse artillery that could move throughout the battlefield. Frederick also introduced the reversible iron ramrod, which was much more resistant to breakage than older wooden designs. The reversibility aspect also helped increase the rate of fire, since a soldier would no longer have to worry about what end of the ramrod they were using.
Jean-Baptiste de Gribeauval, a French artillery engineer, introduced the standardization of cannon design in the mid-18th century. He developed a 6-inch (150 mm) field howitzer whose gun barrel, carriage assembly and ammunition specifications were made uniform for all French cannons. The standardized interchangeable parts of these cannons down to the nuts, bolts and screws made their mass production and repair much easier. While the Gribeauval system made for more efficient production and assembly, the carriages used were heavy and the gunners were forced to march on foot (instead of riding on the limber and gun as in the British system). Each cannon was named for the weight of its projectiles, giving us variants such as 4, 8, and 12, indicating the weight in pounds. The projectiles themselves included solid balls or canister containing lead bullets or other material. These canister shots acted as massive shotguns, peppering the target with hundreds of projectiles at close range. The solid balls, known as round shot, was most effective when fired at shoulder-height across a flat, open area. The ball would tear through the ranks of the enemy or bounce along the ground breaking legs and ankles.
Modern: The development of modern artillery occurred in the mid to late 19th century as a result of the convergence of various improvements in the underlying technology. Advances in metallurgy allowed for the construction of breech-loading rifled guns that could fire at a much greater muzzle velocity.
After the British artillery was shown up in the Crimean War as having barely changed since the Napoleonic Wars, the industrialist William Armstrong was awarded a contract by the government to design a new piece of artillery. Production started in 1855 at the Elswick Ordnance Company and the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich, and the outcome was the revolutionary Armstrong Gun, which marked the birth of modern artillery. Three of its features particularly stand out.
First, the piece was rifled, which allowed for a much more accurate and powerful action. Although rifling had been tried on small arms since the 15th century, the necessary machinery to accurately rifle artillery was not available until the mid-19th century. Martin von Wahrendorff, and Joseph Whitworth independently produced rifled cannon in the 1840s, but it was Armstrong's gun that was first to see widespread use during the Crimean War. The cast iron shell of the Armstrong gun was similar in shape to a Minié ball and had a thin lead coating which made it fractionally larger than the gun's bore and which engaged with the gun's rifling grooves to impart spin to the shell. This spin, together with the elimination of windage as a result of the tight fit, enabled the gun to achieve greater range and accuracy than existing smooth-bore muzzle-loaders with a smaller powder charge.
His gun was also a breech-loader. Although attempts at breech-loading mechanisms had been made since medieval times, the essential engineering problem was that the mechanism could not withstand the explosive charge. It was only with the advances in metallurgy and precision engineering capabilities during the Industrial Revolution that Armstrong was able to construct a viable solution. The gun combined all the properties that make up an effective artillery piece. The gun was mounted on a carriage in such a way as to return the gun to firing position after the recoil.
What made the gun really revolutionary lay in the technique of the construction of the gun barrel that allowed it to withstand much more powerful explosive forces. The "built-up" method involved assembling the barrel with wrought-iron (later mild steel was used) tubes of successively smaller diameter. The tube would then be heated to allow it to expand and fit over the previous tube. When it cooled the gun would contract although not back to its original size, which allowed an even pressure along the walls of the gun which was directed inward against the outward forces that the gun's firing exerted on the barrel. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Artillery | It was only with the advances in metallurgy and precision engineering capabilities during the Industrial Revolution that Armstrong was able to construct a viable solution. The gun combined all the properties that make up an effective artillery piece. The gun was mounted on a carriage in such a way as to return the gun to firing position after the recoil.
What made the gun really revolutionary lay in the technique of the construction of the gun barrel that allowed it to withstand much more powerful explosive forces. The "built-up" method involved assembling the barrel with wrought-iron (later mild steel was used) tubes of successively smaller diameter. The tube would then be heated to allow it to expand and fit over the previous tube. When it cooled the gun would contract although not back to its original size, which allowed an even pressure along the walls of the gun which was directed inward against the outward forces that the gun's firing exerted on the barrel.
Another innovative feature, more usually associated with 20th-century guns, was what Armstrong called its "grip", which was essentially a squeeze bore; the 6 inches of the bore at the muzzle end was of slightly smaller diameter, which centered the shell before it left the barrel and at the same time slightly swaged down its lead coating, reducing its diameter and slightly improving its ballistic qualities.
Armstrong's system was adopted in 1858, initially for "special service in the field" and initially he produced only smaller artillery pieces, 6-pounder (2.5 in/64 mm) mountain or light field guns, 9-pounder (3 in/76 mm) guns for horse artillery, and 12-pounder (3 inches /76 mm) field guns.
The first cannon to contain all 'modern' features is generally considered to be the French 75 of 1897. The gun used cased ammunition, was breech-loading, had modern sights, and a self-contained firing mechanism. It was the first field gun to include a hydro-pneumatic recoil mechanism, which kept the gun's trail and wheels perfectly still during the firing sequence. Since it did not need to be re-aimed after each shot, the crew could fire as soon as the barrel returned to its resting position. In typical use, the French 75 could deliver fifteen rounds per minute on its target, either shrapnel or melinite high-explosive, up to about 5 miles (8,500 m) away. Its firing rate could even reach close to 30 rounds per minute, albeit only for a very short time and with a highly experienced crew. These were rates that contemporary bolt action rifles could not match.
Indirect fire: Indirect fire, the firing of a projectile without relying on direct line of sight between the gun and the target, possibly dates back to the 16th century. Early battlefield use of indirect fire may have occurred at Paltzig in July 1759, when the Russian artillery fired over the tops of trees, and at the Battle of Waterloo, where a battery of the Royal Horse Artillery fired shrapnel indirectly against advancing French troops.
In 1882, Russian Lieutenant Colonel KG Guk published Indirect Fire for Field Artillery, which provided a practical method of using aiming points for indirect fire by describing, "all the essentials of aiming points, crest clearance, and corrections to fire by an observer".
A few years later, the Richtfläche (lining-plane) sight was invented in Germany and provided a means of indirect laying in azimuth, complementing the clinometers for indirect laying in elevation which already existed. Despite conservative opposition within the German army, indirect fire was adopted as doctrine by the 1890s. In the early 1900s, Goertz in Germany developed an optical sight for azimuth laying. It quickly replaced the lining-plane; in English, it became the 'Dial Sight' (UK) or 'Panoramic Telescope' (US).
The British halfheartedly experimented with indirect fire techniques since the 1890s, but with the onset of the Boer War, they were the first to apply the theory in practice in 1899, although they had to improvise without a lining-plane sight.
In the next 15 years leading up to World War I, the techniques of indirect fire became available for all types of artillery. Indirect fire was the defining characteristic of 20th-century artillery and led to undreamt of changes in the amount of artillery, its tactics, organisation, and techniques, most of which occurred during World War I.
An implication of indirect fire and improving guns was increasing range between gun and target, this increased the time of flight and the vertex of the trajectory. The result was decreasing accuracy (the increasing distance between the target and the mean point of impact of the shells aimed at it) caused by the increasing effects of non-standard conditions. Indirect firing data was based on standard conditions including a specific muzzle velocity, zero wind, air temperature and density, and propellant temperature. In practice, this standard combination of conditions almost never existed, they varied throughout the day and day to day, and the greater the time of flight, the greater the inaccuracy. An added complication was the need for survey to accurately fix the coordinates of the gun position and provide accurate orientation for the guns. Of course, targets had to be accurately located, but by 1916, air photo interpretation techniques enabled this, and ground survey techniques could sometimes be used.
In 1914, the methods of correcting firing data for the actual conditions were often convoluted, and the availability of data about actual conditions was rudimentary or non-existent, the assumption was that fire would always be ranged (adjusted). British heavy artillery worked energetically to progressively solve all these problems from late 1914 onwards, and by early 1918, had effective processes in place for both field and heavy artillery. These processes enabled 'map-shooting', later called 'predicted fire'; it meant that effective fire could be delivered against an accurately located target without ranging. Nevertheless, the mean point of impact was still some tens of yards from the target-centre aiming point. It was not precision fire, but it was good enough for concentrations and barrages. These processes remain in use into the 21st century with refinements to calculations enabled by computers and improved data capture about non-standard conditions.
The British Major General Henry Hugh Tudor pioneered armour and artillery cooperation at the breakthrough Battle of Cambrai. The improvements in providing and using data for non-standard conditions (propellant temperature, muzzle velocity, wind, air temperature, and barometric pressure) were developed by the major combatants throughout the war and enabled effective predicted fire. The effectiveness of this was demonstrated by the British in 1917 (at Cambrai) and by Germany the following year (Operation Michael).
Major General J.B.A. Bailey, British Army (retired) wrote:
From the middle of the eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth, artillery is judged to have accounted for perhaps 50% of battlefield casualties. In the sixty years preceding 1914, this figure was probably as low as 10 percent. The remaining 90 percent fell to small arms, whose range and accuracy had come to rival those of artillery. ... [By WWI] The British Royal Artillery, at over one million men, grew to be larger than the Royal Navy. Bellamy (1986), pp. 1–7, cites the percentage of casualties caused by artillery in various theaters since 1914: in the First World War, 45 percent of Russian casualties and 58 percent of British casualties on the Western Front; in the Second World War, 75 percent of British casualties in North Africa and 51 percent of Soviet casualties (61 percent in 1945) and 70 percent of German casualties on the Eastern Front; and in the Korean War, 60 percent of US casualties, including those inflicted by mortars.
An estimated 75,000 French soldiers were casualties of friendly artillery fire in the four years of World War I.
Precision-guidance: Modern artillery is most obviously distinguished by its long range, firing an explosive shell or rocket and a mobile carriage for firing and transport. However, its most important characteristic is the use of indirect fire, whereby the firing equipment is aimed without seeing the target through its sights. Indirect fire emerged at the beginning of the 20th century and was greatly enhanced by the development of predicted fire methods in World War I. However, indirect fire was area fire; it was and is not suitable for destroying point targets; its primary purpose is area suppression. Nevertheless, by the late 1970s precision-guided munitions started to appear, notably the US 155 mm Copperhead and its Soviet 152 mm Krasnopol equivalent that had success in Indian service. These relied on laser designation to 'illuminate' the target that the shell homed onto. However, in the early 21st century, the Global Positioning System (GPS) enabled relatively cheap and accurate guidance for shells and missiles, notably the US 155 mm Excalibur and the 227 mm GMLRS rocket. The introduction of these led to a new issue, the need for very accurate three dimensional target coordinates—the mensuration process.
Weapons covered by the term 'modern artillery' include "cannon" artillery (such as howitzer, mortar, and field gun) and rocket artillery. Certain smaller-caliber mortars are more properly designated small arms rather than artillery, albeit indirect-fire small arms. This term also came to include coastal artillery which traditionally defended coastal areas against seaborne attack and controlled the passage of ships. With the advent of powered flight at the start of the 20th century, artillery also included ground-based anti-aircraft batteries. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Artillery | However, in the early 21st century, the Global Positioning System (GPS) enabled relatively cheap and accurate guidance for shells and missiles, notably the US 155 mm Excalibur and the 227 mm GMLRS rocket. The introduction of these led to a new issue, the need for very accurate three dimensional target coordinates—the mensuration process.
Weapons covered by the term 'modern artillery' include "cannon" artillery (such as howitzer, mortar, and field gun) and rocket artillery. Certain smaller-caliber mortars are more properly designated small arms rather than artillery, albeit indirect-fire small arms. This term also came to include coastal artillery which traditionally defended coastal areas against seaborne attack and controlled the passage of ships. With the advent of powered flight at the start of the 20th century, artillery also included ground-based anti-aircraft batteries.
The term "artillery" has traditionally not been used for projectiles with internal guidance systems, preferring the term "missilery", though some modern artillery units employ surface-to-surface missiles. Advances in terminal guidance systems for small munitions has allowed large-caliber guided projectiles to be developed, blurring this distinction. See Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF), Joint terminal attack controller
Ammunition: One of the most important roles of logistics is the supply of munitions as a primary type of artillery consumable, their storage (ammunition dump, arsenal, magazine
) and the provision of fuzes, detonators and warheads at the point where artillery troops will assemble the charge, projectile, bomb or shell.
A round of artillery ammunition comprises four components:
Fuze
Projectile
Propellant
Primer
Fuzes: Fuzes are the devices that initiate an artillery projectile, either to detonate its High Explosive (HE) filling or eject its cargo (illuminating flare or smoke canisters being examples). The official military spelling is "fuze". Broadly there are four main types:
impact (including graze and delay)
mechanical time including airburst
proximity sensor including airburst
programmable electronic detonation including airburst
Most artillery fuzes are nose fuzes. However, base fuzes have been used with armor-piercing shells and for squash head (High-Explosive Squash Head (HESH) or High Explosive, Plastic (HEP) anti-tank shells). At least one nuclear shell and its non-nuclear spotting version also used a multi-deck mechanical time fuze fitted into its base.
Impact fuzes were, and in some armies remain, the standard fuze for HE projectiles. Their default action is normally 'superquick', some have had a 'graze' action which allows them to penetrate light cover and others have 'delay'. Delay fuzes allow the shell to penetrate the ground before exploding. Armor or Concrete-Piercing (AP or CP) fuzes are specially hardened. During World War I and later, ricochet fire with delay or graze fuzed HE shells, fired with a flat angle of descent, was used to achieve airburst.
HE shells can be fitted with other fuzes. Airburst fuzes usually have a combined airburst and impact function. However, until the introduction of proximity fuzes, the airburst function was mostly used with cargo munitions—for example, shrapnel, illumination, and smoke. The larger calibers of anti-aircraft artillery are almost always used airburst. Airburst fuzes have to have the fuze length (running time) set on them. This is done just before firing using either a wrench or a fuze setter pre-set to the required fuze length.
Early airburst fuzes used igniferous timers which lasted into the second half of the 20th century. Mechanical time fuzes appeared in the early part of the century. These required a means of powering them. The Thiel mechanism used a spring and escapement (i.e. 'clockwork'), Junghans used centrifugal force and gears, and Dixi used centrifugal force and balls. From about 1980, electronic time fuzes started replacing mechanical ones for use with cargo munitions.
Proximity fuzes have been of two types: photo-electric or radar. The former was not very successful and seems only to have been used with British anti-aircraft artillery 'unrotated projectiles' (rockets) in World War II. Radar proximity fuzes were a big improvement over the mechanical (time) fuzes which they replaced. Mechanical time fuzes required an accurate calculation of their running time, which was affected by non-standard conditions. With HE (requiring a burst 20 to 30 feet (9.1 m) above the ground), if this was very slightly wrong the rounds would either hit the ground or burst too high. Accurate running time was less important with cargo munitions that burst much higher.
The first radar proximity fuzes (perhaps originally codenamed 'VT' and later called Variable Time (VT)) were invented by the British and developed by the US and initially used against aircraft in World War II. Their ground use was delayed for fear of the enemy recovering 'blinds' (artillery shells which failed to detonate) and copying the fuze. The first proximity fuzes were designed to detonate about 30 feet (9.1 m) above the ground. These air-bursts are much more lethal against personnel than ground bursts because they deliver a greater proportion of useful fragments and deliver them into terrain where a prone soldier would be protected from ground bursts.
However, proximity fuzes can suffer premature detonation because of the moisture in heavy rain clouds. This led to 'Controlled Variable Time' (CVT) after World War II. These fuzes have a mechanical timer that switched on the radar about 5 seconds before expected impact, they also detonated on impact.
The proximity fuze emerged on the battlefields of Europe in late December 1944. They have become known as the U.S. Artillery's "Christmas present", and were much appreciated when they arrived during the Battle of the Bulge. They were also used to great effect in anti-aircraft projectiles in the Pacific against kamikaze as well as in Britain against V-1 flying bombs.
Electronic multi-function fuzes started to appear around 1980. Using solid-state electronics they were relatively cheap and reliable, and became the standard fitted fuze in operational ammunition stocks in some western armies. The early versions were often limited to proximity airburst, albeit with height of burst options, and impact. Some offered a go/no-go functional test through the fuze setter.
Later versions introduced induction fuze setting and testing instead of physically placing a fuze setter on the fuze. The latest, such as Junghan's DM84U provide options giving, superquick, delay, a choice of proximity heights of burst, time and a choice of foliage penetration depths.
Projectiles: The projectile is the munition or "bullet" fired downrange. This may be an explosive device. Projectiles have traditionally been classified as "shot" or "shell", the former being solid and the latter having some form of "payload".
Shells can be divided into three configurations: bursting, base ejection or nose ejection. The latter is sometimes called the shrapnel configuration. The most modern is base ejection, which was introduced in World War I. Base and nose ejection are almost always used with airburst fuzes. Bursting shells use various types of fuze depending on the nature of the payload and the tactical need at the time.
Payloads have included:
Bursting: high-explosive, white phosphorus, coloured marker, chemical, nuclear devices; high-explosive anti-tank and canister may be considered special types of bursting shell.
Nose ejection: shrapnel, star, incendiary and flechette (a more modern version of shrapnel).
Base ejection: Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition bomblets, which arm themselves and function after a set number of rotations after having been ejected from the projectile (this produces unexploded sub-munitions, or "duds", which remain dangerous), scatterable mines, illuminating, coloured flare, smoke, incendiary, propaganda, chaff (foil to jam radars) and modern exotics such as electronic payloads and sensor-fuzed munitions.
Stabilization: Rifled: Artillery projectiles have traditionally been spin-stabilised, meaning that they spin in flight so that gyroscopic forces prevent them from tumbling. Spin is induced by gun barrels having rifling, which engages a soft metal band around the projectile, called a "driving band" (UK) or "rotating band" (U.S.). The driving band is usually made of copper, but synthetic materials have been used.
Smoothbore/fin-stabilized: In modern artillery, smoothbore barrels have been used mostly by mortars. These projectiles use fins in the airflow at their rear to maintain correct orientation. The primary benefits over rifled barrels is reduced barrel wear, longer ranges that can be achieved (due to the reduced loss of energy to friction and gas escaping around the projectile via the rifling) and larger explosive cores for a given caliber artillery due to less metal needing to be used to form the case of the projectile because of less force applied to the shell from the non-rifled sides of the barrel of smooth bore guns. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Artillery | Spin is induced by gun barrels having rifling, which engages a soft metal band around the projectile, called a "driving band" (UK) or "rotating band" (U.S.). The driving band is usually made of copper, but synthetic materials have been used.
Smoothbore/fin-stabilized: In modern artillery, smoothbore barrels have been used mostly by mortars. These projectiles use fins in the airflow at their rear to maintain correct orientation. The primary benefits over rifled barrels is reduced barrel wear, longer ranges that can be achieved (due to the reduced loss of energy to friction and gas escaping around the projectile via the rifling) and larger explosive cores for a given caliber artillery due to less metal needing to be used to form the case of the projectile because of less force applied to the shell from the non-rifled sides of the barrel of smooth bore guns.
Rifled/fin-stabilized: A combination of the above can be used, where the barrel is rifled, but the projectile also has deployable fins for stabilization, guidance or gliding.
Propellant: Most forms of artillery require a propellant to propel the projectile to the target. Propellant is always a low explosive, which means it deflagrates, rather than detonating like high explosives. The shell is accelerated to a high velocity in a very short time by the rapid generation of gas from the burning propellant. This high pressure is achieved by burning the propellant in a contained area, either the chamber of a gun barrel or the combustion chamber of a rocket motor.
Until the late 19th century, the only available propellant was black powder. It had many disadvantages as a propellant; it has relatively low power, requiring large amounts of powder to fire projectiles, and created thick clouds of white smoke that would obscure the targets, betray the positions of guns, and make aiming impossible. In 1846, nitrocellulose (also known as guncotton) was discovered, and the high explosive nitroglycerin was discovered at nearly the same time. Nitrocellulose was significantly more powerful than black powder, and was smokeless. Early guncotton was unstable, however, and burned very fast and hot, leading to greatly increased barrel wear. Widespread introduction of smokeless powder would wait until the advent of the double-base powders, which combine nitrocellulose and nitroglycerin to produce powerful, smokeless, stable propellant.
Many other formulations were developed in the following decades, generally trying to find the optimum characteristics of a good artillery propellant – low temperature, high energy, non-corrosive, highly stable, cheap, and easy to manufacture in large quantities. Modern gun propellants are broadly divided into three classes: single-base propellants that are mainly or entirely nitrocellulose based, double-base propellants consisting of a combination of nitrocellulose and nitroglycerin, and triple base composed of a combination of nitrocellulose and nitroglycerin and nitroguanidine.
Artillery shells fired from a barrel can be assisted to greater range in three ways:
Rocket-assisted projectiles enhance and sustain the projectile's velocity by providing additional 'push' from a small rocket motor that is part of the projectile's base.
Base bleed uses a small pyrotechnic charge at the base of the projectile to introduce sufficient combustion products into the low-pressure region behind the base of the projectile responsible for a large proportion of the drag.
Ramjet-assisted, similar to rocket-assisted, but using a ramjet instead of a rocket motor; it is anticipated that a ramjet-assisted 120-mm mortar shell could reach a range of 22 mi (35 km).
Propelling charges for barrel artillery can be provided either as cartridge bags or in metal cartridge cases. Generally, anti-aircraft artillery and smaller-caliber (up to 3" or 76.2 mm) guns use metal cartridge cases that include the round and propellant, similar to a modern rifle cartridge. This simplifies loading and is necessary for very high rates of fire. Bagged propellant allows the amount of powder to be raised or lowered, depending on the range to the target. It also makes handling of larger shells easier. Cases and bags require totally different types of breech. A metal case holds an integral primer to initiate the propellant and provides the gas seal to prevent the gases leaking out of the breech; this is called obturation. With bagged charges, the breech itself provides obturation and holds the primer. In either case, the primer is usually percussion, but electrical is also used, and laser ignition is emerging. Modern 155 mm guns have a primer magazine fitted to their breech.
Artillery ammunition has four classifications according to use:
Service: ammunition used in live fire training or for wartime use in a combat zone. Also known as "warshot" ammunition.
Practice: Ammunition with a non- or minimally-explosive projectile that mimics the characteristics (range, accuracy) of live rounds for use under training conditions. Practice artillery ammunition often utilizes a colored-smoke-generating bursting charge for marking purposes in place of the normal high-explosive charge.
Dummy: Ammunition with an inert warhead, inert primer, and no propellant; used for training or display.
Blank: Ammunition with live primer, greatly reduced propellant charge (typically black powder), and no projectile; used for training, demonstration or ceremonial use.
Field artillery system: Because modern field artillery mostly uses indirect fire, the guns have to be part of a system that enables them to attack targets invisible to them, in accordance with the combined arms plan.
The main functions in the field artillery system are:
Communications
Command: authority to allocate resources;
Target acquisition: detect, identify and deduce the location of targets;
Control: authority to decide which targets to attack and allot fire units to the attack;
Computation of firing data – to deliver fire from a fire unit onto its target;
Fire units: guns, launchers or mortars grouped together;
Specialist services: produce data to support the production of accurate firing data;
Logistic services: to provide combat supplies, particularly ammunition, and equipment support.
All these calculations to produce a quadrant elevation (or range) and azimuth were done manually using instruments, tabulated, data of the moment, and approximations until battlefield computers started appearing in the 1960s and 1970s. While some early calculators copied the manual method (typically substituting polynomials for tabulated data), computers use a different approach. They simulate a shell's trajectory by 'flying' it in short steps and applying data about the conditions affecting the trajectory at each step. This simulation is repeated until it produces a quadrant elevation and azimuth that lands the shell within the required 'closing' distance of the target coordinates.
NATO has a standard ballistic model for computer calculations and has expanded the scope of this into the NATO Armaments Ballistic Kernel (NABK) within the SG2 Shareable (Fire Control) Software Suite (S4).
Logistics: Supply of artillery ammunition has always been a major component of military logistics. Up until World War I some armies made artillery responsible for all forward ammunition supply because the load of small arms ammunition was trivial compared to artillery. Different armies use different approaches to ammunition supply, which can vary with the nature of operations. Differences include where the logistic service transfers artillery ammunition to artillery, the amount of ammunition carried in units and extent to which stocks are held at unit or battery level. A key difference is whether supply is 'push' or 'pull'. In the former the 'pipeline' keeps pushing ammunition into formations or units at a defined rate. In the latter units fire as tactically necessary and replenish to maintain or reach their authorised holding (which can vary), so the logistic system has to be able to cope with surge and slack.
Classification: Artillery types can be categorised in several ways, for example by type or size of weapon or ordnance, by role or by organizational arrangements.
Types of ordnance: The types of cannon artillery are generally distinguished by the velocity at which they fire projectiles.
Types of artillery:
Cannon: The oldest type of artillery with direct firing trajectory.
Bombard: A type of a large calibre, muzzle-loading artillery piece, a cannon or mortar used during sieges to shoot round stone projectiles at the walls of enemy fortifications.
Falconet was a type of light cannon developed in the late 15th century that fired a smaller shot than the similar falcon.
Swivel gun is a type of small cannon mounted on a swiveling stand or fork which allows a very wide arc of movement. Camel mounted swivel guns called zamburak were used by the Gunpowder Empires as self-propelled artillery.
Volley gun is a gun with multiple single-shot barrels that volley fired simultaneously or sequentially in quick succession. Although capable of unleashing intense firepower, volley guns differ from modern machine guns in that they lack autoloading and automatic fire mechanisms
Siege artillery: Large-caliber artillery that have limited mobility with indirect firing trajectory, which was used to bombard targets at long distances.
Large-calibre artillery.
Field artillery: Mobile weapons used to support armies in the field. Subcategories include:
Infantry support guns: Directly support infantry units.
Mountain guns: Lightweight guns that can be disassembled and transported through difficult terrain.
Field guns: Capable of long-range direct fires.
Howitzers: Capable of high-angle fire, they are most often employed for indirect-fire.
Gun-howitzers: Capable of high or low-angle fire with a longer barrel. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Artillery | Volley gun is a gun with multiple single-shot barrels that volley fired simultaneously or sequentially in quick succession. Although capable of unleashing intense firepower, volley guns differ from modern machine guns in that they lack autoloading and automatic fire mechanisms
Siege artillery: Large-caliber artillery that have limited mobility with indirect firing trajectory, which was used to bombard targets at long distances.
Large-calibre artillery.
Field artillery: Mobile weapons used to support armies in the field. Subcategories include:
Infantry support guns: Directly support infantry units.
Mountain guns: Lightweight guns that can be disassembled and transported through difficult terrain.
Field guns: Capable of long-range direct fires.
Howitzers: Capable of high-angle fire, they are most often employed for indirect-fire.
Gun-howitzers: Capable of high or low-angle fire with a longer barrel.
Mortars: Typically muzzle-loaded, short-barreled, high-trajectory weapons designed primarily for an indirect-fire role.
Gun-mortars: Typically breech-loaded, capable of high or low-angle fire with a longer barrel.
Tank guns: Large-caliber guns mounted on tanks to provide mobile direct fire.
Anti-tank artillery: Guns, usually mobile, designed primarily for direct fire to destroy armored fighting vehicles with heavy armor.
Anti-tank gun: Guns designed for direct fire to destroy tanks and other armored fighting vehicles.
Anti-aircraft artillery: Guns, usually mobile, designed for attacking aircraft by land and/or at sea. Some guns were suitable for the dual roles of anti-aircraft and anti-tank warfare.
Rocket artillery: Launches rockets or missiles, instead of shot or shell.
Railway gun: Large-caliber weapons that are mounted on, transported by and fired from specially-designed railway wagons.
Naval artillery: Guns mounted on warships to be used either against other naval vessels or to bombard coastal targets in support of ground forces. The crowning achievement of naval artillery was the battleship, but the advent of air power and missiles have rendered this type of artillery largely obsolete. They are typically longer-barreled, low-trajectory, high-velocity weapons designed primarily for a direct-fire role.
Coastal artillery: Fixed-position weapons dedicated to defense of a particular location, usually a coast (for example, the Atlantic Wall in World War II) or harbor. Not needing to be mobile, coastal artillery used to be much larger than equivalent field artillery pieces, giving them longer range and more destructive power. Modern coastal artillery (for example, Russia's "Bereg" system) is often self-propelled, (allowing it to avoid counter-battery fire) and fully integrated, meaning that each battery has all of the support systems that it requires (maintenance, targeting radar, etc.) organic to its unit.
Aircraft artillery: Large-caliber guns mounted on attack aircraft, this is typically found on slow-flying gunships.
Nuclear artillery: Artillery which fires nuclear shells.
Modern field artillery can also be split into two other subcategories: towed and self-propelled. As the name suggests, towed artillery has a prime mover, usually an artillery tractor or truck, to move the piece, crew, and ammunition around. Towed artillery is in some cases equipped with an APU for small displacements. Self-propelled artillery is permanently mounted on a carriage or vehicle with room for the crew and ammunition and is thus capable of moving quickly from one firing position to another, both to support the fluid nature of modern combat and to avoid counter-battery fire. It includes mortar carrier vehicles, many of which allow the mortar to be removed from the vehicle and be used dismounted, potentially in terrain in which the vehicle cannot navigate, or in order to avoid detection.
Organizational types: At the beginning of the modern artillery period, the late 19th century, many armies had three main types of artillery, in some case they were sub-branches within the artillery branch in others they were separate branches or corps. There were also other types excluding the armament fitted to warships:
Horse artillery, first formed as regular units in the late 18th century, with the role of supporting cavalry, they were distinguished by the entire crew being mounted.
Field or "foot" artillery, the main artillery arm of the field army, using either guns, howitzers, or mortars. In World War II this branch again started using rockets and later surface to surface missiles.
Fortress or garrison artillery, operated a nation's fixed defences using guns, howitzers or mortars, either on land or coastal frontiers. Some had deployable elements to provide heavy artillery to the field army. In some nations coast defence artillery was a naval responsibility.
Mountain artillery, a few nations treated mountain artillery as a separate branch, in others it was a speciality in another artillery branch. They used light guns or howitzers, usually designed for pack animal transport and easily broken down into small easily handled loads
Naval artillery, some nations carried pack artillery on some warships, these were used and manhandled by naval (or marine) landing parties. At times, part of a ship's armament would be unshipped and mated to makeshift carriages and limbers for actions ashore, for example during the Second Boer War, during the First World War the guns from the stricken SMS Königsberg formed the main artillery strength of the German forces in East Africa.
After World War I many nations merged these different artillery branches, in some cases keeping some as sub-branches. Naval artillery disappeared apart from that belonging to marines. However, two new branches of artillery emerged during that war and its aftermath, both used specialised guns (and a few rockets) and used direct not indirect fire, in the 1950s and 1960s both started to make extensive use of missiles:
Anti-tank artillery, also under various organisational arrangements but typically either field artillery or a specialist branch and additional elements integral to infantry, etc., units. However, in most armies field and anti-aircraft artillery also had at least a secondary anti-tank role. After World War II anti-tank in Western armies became mostly the responsibility of infantry and armoured branches and ceased to be an artillery matter, with some exceptions.
Anti-aircraft artillery, under various organisational arrangements including being part of artillery, a separate corps, even a separate service or being split between army for the field and air force for home defence. In some cases infantry and the new armoured corps also operated their own integral light anti-aircraft artillery. Home defence anti-aircraft artillery often used fixed as well as mobile mountings. Some anti-aircraft guns could also be used as field or anti-tank artillery, providing they had suitable sights.
However, the general switch by artillery to indirect fire before and during World War I led to a reaction in some armies. The result was accompanying or infantry guns. These were usually small, short range guns, that could be easily man-handled and used mostly for direct fire but some could use indirect fire. Some were operated by the artillery branch but under command of the supported unit. In World War II they were joined by self-propelled assault guns, although other armies adopted infantry or close support tanks in armoured branch units for the same purpose, subsequently tanks generally took on the accompanying role.
Equipment types: The three main types of artillery "gun" are field guns, howitzers, and mortars. During the 20th century, guns and howitzers have steadily merged in artillery use, making a distinction between the terms somewhat meaningless. By the end of the 20th century, true guns with calibers larger than about 60 mm have become very rare in artillery use, the main users being tanks, ships, and a few residual anti-aircraft and coastal guns. The term "cannon" is a United States generic term that includes guns, howitzers, and mortars; it is not used in other English speaking armies.
The traditional definitions differentiated between guns and howitzers in terms of maximum elevation (well less than 45° as opposed to close to or greater than 45°), number of charges (one or more than one charge), and having higher or lower muzzle velocity, sometimes indicated by barrel length. These three criteria give eight possible combinations, of which guns and howitzers are but two. However, modern "howitzers" have higher velocities and longer barrels than the equivalent "guns" of the first half of the 20th century.
True guns are characterized by long range, having a maximum elevation significantly less than 45°, a high muzzle velocity and hence a relatively long barrel, smooth bore (no rifling) and a single charge. The latter often led to fixed ammunition where the projectile is locked to the cartridge case. There is no generally accepted minimum muzzle velocity or barrel length associated with a gun.
Howitzers can fire at maximum elevations at least close to 45°; elevations up to about 70° are normal for modern howitzers. Howitzers also have a choice of charges, meaning that the same elevation angle of fire will achieve a different range depending on the charge used. They have rifled bores, lower muzzle velocities and shorter barrels than equivalent guns. All this means they can deliver fire with a steep angle of descent. Because of their multi-charge capability, their ammunition is mostly separate loading (the projectile and propellant are loaded separately).
That leaves six combinations of the three criteria, some of which have been termed gun howitzers. A term first used in the 1930s when howitzers with a relatively high maximum muzzle velocities were introduced, it never became widely accepted, most armies electing to widen the definition of "gun" or "howitzer". |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Artillery | Howitzers can fire at maximum elevations at least close to 45°; elevations up to about 70° are normal for modern howitzers. Howitzers also have a choice of charges, meaning that the same elevation angle of fire will achieve a different range depending on the charge used. They have rifled bores, lower muzzle velocities and shorter barrels than equivalent guns. All this means they can deliver fire with a steep angle of descent. Because of their multi-charge capability, their ammunition is mostly separate loading (the projectile and propellant are loaded separately).
That leaves six combinations of the three criteria, some of which have been termed gun howitzers. A term first used in the 1930s when howitzers with a relatively high maximum muzzle velocities were introduced, it never became widely accepted, most armies electing to widen the definition of "gun" or "howitzer". By the 1960s, most equipment had maximum elevations up to about 70°, were multi-charge, had quite high maximum muzzle velocities and relatively long barrels.
Mortars are simpler. The modern mortar originated in World War I and there were several patterns. After that war, most mortars settled on the Stokes pattern, characterized by a short barrel, smooth bore, low muzzle velocity, elevation angle of firing generally greater than 45°, and a very simple and light mounting using a "baseplate" on the ground. The projectile with its integral propelling charge was dropped down the barrel from the muzzle to hit a fixed firing pin. Since that time, a few mortars have become rifled and adopted breech loading.
There are other recognized typifying characteristics for artillery. One such characteristic is the type of obturation used to seal the chamber and prevent gases escaping through the breech. This may use a metal cartridge case that also holds the propelling charge, a configuration called "QF" or "quickfiring" by some nations. The alternative does not use a metal cartridge case, the propellant being merely bagged or in combustible cases with the breech itself providing all the sealing. This is called "BL" or "breech loading" by some nations.
A second characteristic is the form of propulsion. Modern equipment can either be towed or self-propelled (SP). A towed gun fires from the ground and any inherent protection is limited to a gun shield. Towing by horse teams lasted throughout World War II in some armies, but others were fully mechanized with wheeled or tracked gun towing vehicles by the outbreak of that war. The size of a towing vehicle depends on the weight of the equipment and the amount of ammunition it has to carry.
A variation of towed is portee, where the vehicle carries the gun which is dismounted for firing. Mortars are often carried this way. A mortar is sometimes carried in an armored vehicle and can either fire from it or be dismounted to fire from the ground. Since the early 1960s it has been possible to carry lighter towed guns and most mortars by helicopter. Even before that, they were parachuted or landed by glider from the time of the first airborne trials in the USSR in the 1930s.
In SP equipment, the gun is an integral part of the vehicle that carries it. SPs first appeared during World War I, but did not really develop until World War II. They are mostly tracked vehicles, but wheeled SPs started to appear in the 1970s. Some SPs have no armor and carry few or no other weapons and ammunition. Armored SPs usually carry a useful ammunition load. Early armored SPs were mostly a "casemate" configuration, in essence an open top armored box offering only limited traverse. However, most modern armored SPs have a full enclosed armored turret, usually giving full traverse for the gun. Many SPs cannot fire without deploying stabilizers or spades, sometimes hydraulic. A few SPs are designed so that the recoil forces of the gun are transferred directly onto the ground through a baseplate. A few towed guns have been given limited self-propulsion by means of an auxiliary engine.
Two other forms of tactical propulsion were used in the first half of the 20th century: Railways or transporting the equipment by road, as two or three separate loads, with disassembly and re-assembly at the beginning and end of the journey. Railway artillery took two forms, railway mountings for heavy and super-heavy guns and howitzers and armored trains as "fighting vehicles" armed with light artillery in a direct fire role. Disassembled transport was also used with heavy and super heavy weapons and lasted into the 1950s.
Caliber categories: A third form of artillery typing is to classify it as "light", "medium", "heavy" and various other terms. It appears to have been introduced in World War I, which spawned a very wide array of artillery in all sorts of sizes so a simple categorical system was needed. Some armies defined these categories by bands of calibers. Different bands were used for different types of weapons—field guns, mortars, anti-aircraft guns and coastal guns.
Modern operations: List of countries in order of amount of artillery (only conventional barrel ordnance is given, in use with land forces):
Artillery is used in a variety of roles depending on its type and caliber. The general role of artillery is to provide fire support—"the application of fire, coordinated with the manoeuvre of forces to destroy, neutralize or suppress the enemy". This NATO definition makes artillery a supporting arm although not all NATO armies agree with this logic. The italicised terms are NATO's.
Unlike rockets, guns (or howitzers as some armies still call them) and mortars are suitable for delivering close supporting fire. However, they are all suitable for providing deep supporting fire although the limited range of many mortars tends to exclude them from the role. Their control arrangements and limited range also mean that mortars are most suited to direct supporting fire. Guns are used either for this or general supporting fire while rockets are mostly used for the latter. However, lighter rockets may be used for direct fire support. These rules of thumb apply to NATO armies.
Modern mortars, because of their lighter weight and simpler, more transportable design, are usually an integral part of infantry and, in some armies, armour units. This means they generally do not have to concentrate their fire so their shorter range is not a disadvantage. Some armies also consider infantry operated mortars to be more responsive than artillery, but this is a function of the control arrangements and not the case in all armies. However, mortars have always been used by artillery units and remain with them in many armies, including a few in NATO.
In NATO armies artillery is usually assigned a tactical mission that establishes its relationship and responsibilities to the formation or units it is assigned to. It seems that not all NATO nations use the terms and outside NATO others are probably used. The standard terms are: direct support, general support, general support reinforcing and reinforcing. These tactical missions are in the context of the command authority: operational command, operational control, tactical command or tactical control.
In NATO direct support generally means that the directly supporting artillery unit provides observers and liaison to the manoeuvre troops being supported, typically an artillery battalion or equivalent is assigned to a brigade and its batteries to the brigade's battalions. However, some armies achieve this by placing the assigned artillery units under command of the directly supported formation. Nevertheless, the batteries' fire can be concentrated onto a single target, as can the fire of units in range and with the other tactical missions.
Application of fire: There are several dimensions to this subject. The first is the notion that fire may be against an opportunity target or may be arranged. If it is the latter it may be either on-call or scheduled. Arranged targets may be part of a fire plan. Fire may be either observed or unobserved, if the former it may be adjusted, if the latter then it has to be predicted. Observation of adjusted fire may be directly by a forward observer or indirectly via some other target acquisition system.
NATO also recognises several different types of fire support for tactical purposes:
Counterbattery fire: delivered for the purpose of destroying or neutralizing the enemy's fire support system.
Counterpreparation fire: intensive prearranged fire delivered when the imminence of the enemy attack is discovered.
Covering fire: used to protect troops when they are within range of enemy small arms.
Defensive fire: delivered by supporting units to assist and protect a unit engaged in a defensive action.
Final Protective Fire: an immediately available prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede enemy movement across defensive lines or areas.
Harassing fire: a random number of shells are fired at random intervals, without any pattern to it that the enemy can predict. This process is designed to hinder enemy forces' movement, and, by the constantly imposed stress, threat of losses and inability of enemy forces to relax or sleep, lowers their morale.
Interdiction fire: placed on an area or point to prevent the enemy from using the area or point.
Preparation fire: delivered before an attack to weaken the enemy position.
These purposes have existed for most of the 20th century, although their definitions have evolved and will continue to do so, lack of suppression in counterbattery is an omission. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Artillery | Covering fire: used to protect troops when they are within range of enemy small arms.
Defensive fire: delivered by supporting units to assist and protect a unit engaged in a defensive action.
Final Protective Fire: an immediately available prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede enemy movement across defensive lines or areas.
Harassing fire: a random number of shells are fired at random intervals, without any pattern to it that the enemy can predict. This process is designed to hinder enemy forces' movement, and, by the constantly imposed stress, threat of losses and inability of enemy forces to relax or sleep, lowers their morale.
Interdiction fire: placed on an area or point to prevent the enemy from using the area or point.
Preparation fire: delivered before an attack to weaken the enemy position.
These purposes have existed for most of the 20th century, although their definitions have evolved and will continue to do so, lack of suppression in counterbattery is an omission. Broadly they can be defined as either:
Deep supporting fire: directed at objectives not in the immediate vicinity of own force, for neutralizing or destroying enemy reserves and weapons, and interfering with enemy command, supply, communications and observation; or
Close supporting fire: placed on enemy troops, weapons or positions which, because of their proximity present the most immediate and serious threat to the supported unit.
Two other NATO terms also need definition:
Neutralization fire: delivered to render a target temporarily ineffective or unusable; and
Suppression fire: that degrades the performance of a target below the level needed to fulfill its mission. Suppression is usually only effective for the duration of the fire.
The tactical purposes also include various "mission verbs", a rapidly expanding subject with the modern concept of "effects based operations".
Targeting is the process of selecting target and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. It requires consideration of the type of fire support required and the extent of coordination with the supported arm. It involves decisions about:
what effects are required, for example, neutralization or suppression;
the proximity of and risks to own troops or non-combatants;
what types of munitions, including their fuzing, are to be used and in what quantities;
when the targets should be attacked and possibly for how long;
what methods should be used, for example, converged or distributed, whether adjustment is permissible or surprise essential, the need for special procedures such as precision or danger close
how many fire units are needed and which ones they should be from those that are available (in range, with the required munitions type and quantity, not allotted to another target, have the most suitable line of fire if there is a risk to own troops or non-combatants);
The targeting process is the key aspect of tactical fire control. Depending on the circumstances and national procedures it may all be undertaken in one place or may be distributed. In armies practicing control from the front, most of the process may be undertaken by a forward observer or other target acquirer. This is particularly the case for a smaller target requiring only a few fire units. The extent to which the process is formal or informal and makes use of computer based systems, documented norms or experience and judgement also varies widely armies and other circumstances.
Surprise may be essential or irrelevant. It depends on what effects are required and whether or not the target is likely to move or quickly improve its protective posture. During World War II UK researchers concluded that for impact fuzed munitions the relative risk were as follows:
men standing – 1
men lying – 1/3
men firing from trenches – 1/15–1/50
men crouching in trenches – 1/25–1/100
Airburst munitions significantly increase the relative risk for lying men, etc. Historically most casualties occur in the first 10–15 seconds of fire, i.e. the time needed to react and improve protective posture, however, this is less relevant if airburst is used.
There are several ways of making best use of this brief window of maximum vulnerability:
ordering the guns to fire together, either by executive order or by a "fire at" time. The disadvantage is that if the fire is concentrated from many dispersed fire units then there will be different times of flight and the first rounds will be spread in time. To some extent a large concentration offsets the problem because it may mean that only one round is required from each gun and most of these could arrive in the 15 second window.
burst fire, a rate of fire to deliver three rounds from each gun within 10 or 15 seconds, this reduces the number of guns and hence fire units needed, which means they may be less dispersed and have less variation in their times of flight. Smaller caliber guns, such as 105 mm, have always been able to deliver three rounds in 15 seconds, larger calibers firing fixed rounds could also do it but it was not until the 1970s that a multi-charge 155 mm howitzer, FH-70 first gained the capability.
multiple round simultaneous impact (MRSI), where a single weapon or multiple individual weapons fire multiple rounds at differing trajectories so that all rounds arrive on target at the same time.
time on target, fire units fire at the time less their time of flight, this works well with prearranged scheduled fire but is less satisfactory for opportunity targets because it means delaying the delivery of fire by selecting a 'safe' time that all or most fire units can achieve. It can be used with both the previous two methods.
Counter-battery fire: Modern counter-battery fire developed in World War I, with the objective of defeating the enemy's artillery. Typically such fire was used to suppress enemy batteries when they were or were about to interfere with the activities of friendly forces (such as to prevent enemy defensive artillery fire against an impending attack) or to systematically destroy enemy guns. In World War I the latter required air observation. The first indirect counter-battery fire was in May 1900 by an observer in a balloon.
Enemy artillery can be detected in two ways, either by direct observation of the guns from the air or by ground observers (including specialist reconnaissance), or from their firing signatures. This includes radars tracking the shells in flight to determine their place of origin, sound ranging detecting guns firing and resecting their position from pairs of microphones or cross-observation of gun flashes using observation by human observers or opto-electronic devices, although the widespread adoption of 'flashless' propellant limited the effectiveness of the latter.
Once hostile batteries have been detected they may be engaged immediately by friendly artillery or later at an optimum time, depending on the tactical situation and the counter-battery policy. Air strike is another option. In some situations the task is to locate all active enemy batteries for attack using a counter-battery fire at the appropriate moment in accordance with a plan developed by artillery intelligence staff. In other situations counter-battery fire may occur whenever a battery is located with sufficient accuracy.
Modern counter-battery target acquisition uses unmanned aircraft, counter-battery radar, ground reconnaissance and sound-ranging. Counter-battery fire may be adjusted by some of the systems, for example the operator of an unmanned aircraft can 'follow' a battery if it moves. Defensive measures by batteries include frequently changing position or constructing defensive earthworks, the tunnels used by North Korea being an extreme example. Counter-measures include air defence against aircraft and attacking counter-battery radars physically and electronically.
Field artillery team: 'Field Artillery Team' is a US term and the following description and terminology applies to the US, other armies are broadly similar but differ in significant details. Modern field artillery (post–World War I) has three distinct parts: the Forward Observer (FO), the Fire Direction Center (FDC) and the actual guns themselves. The forward observer observes the target using tools such as binoculars, laser rangefinders, designators and call back fire missions on his radio, or relays the data through a portable computer via an encrypted digital radio connection protected from jamming by computerized frequency hopping. A lesser known part of the team is the FAS or Field Artillery Survey team which sets up the "Gun Line" for the cannons. Today most artillery battalions use an "Aiming Circle" which allows for faster setup and more mobility. FAS teams are still used for checks and balances purposes and if a gun battery has issues with the "Aiming Circle" a FAS team will do it for them.
The FO can communicate directly with the battery FDC, of which there is one per each battery of 4–8 guns. Otherwise the several FOs communicate with a higher FDC such as at a Battalion level, and the higher FDC prioritizes the targets and allocates fires to individual batteries as needed to engage the targets that are spotted by the FOs or to perform preplanned fires.
The Battery FDC computes firing data—ammunition to be used, powder charge, fuse settings, the direction to the target, and the quadrant elevation to be fired at to reach the target, what gun will fire any rounds needed for adjusting on the target, and the number of rounds to be fired on the target by each gun once the target has been accurately located—to the guns. Traditionally this data is relayed via radio or wire communications as a warning order to the guns, followed by orders specifying the type of ammunition and fuse setting, direction, and the elevation needed to reach the target, and the method of adjustment or orders for fire for effect (FFE). However, in more advanced artillery units, this data is relayed through a digital radio link. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Artillery | The Battery FDC computes firing data—ammunition to be used, powder charge, fuse settings, the direction to the target, and the quadrant elevation to be fired at to reach the target, what gun will fire any rounds needed for adjusting on the target, and the number of rounds to be fired on the target by each gun once the target has been accurately located—to the guns. Traditionally this data is relayed via radio or wire communications as a warning order to the guns, followed by orders specifying the type of ammunition and fuse setting, direction, and the elevation needed to reach the target, and the method of adjustment or orders for fire for effect (FFE). However, in more advanced artillery units, this data is relayed through a digital radio link.
Other parts of the field artillery team include meteorological analysis to determine the temperature, humidity and pressure of the air and wind direction and speed at different altitudes. Also radar is used both for determining the location of enemy artillery and mortar batteries and to determine the precise actual strike points of rounds fired by battery and comparing that location with what was expected to compute a registration allowing future rounds to be fired with much greater accuracy.
Time on target: A technique called time on target (TOT) was developed by the British Army in North Africa at the end of 1941 and early 1942 particularly for counter-battery fire and other concentrations, it proved very popular. It relied on BBC time signals to enable officers to synchronize their watches to the second because this avoided the need to use military radio networks and the possibility of losing surprise, and the need for field telephone networks in the desert. With this technique the time of flight from each fire unit (battery or troop) to the target is taken from the range or firing tables, or the computer and each engaging fire unit subtracts its time of flight from the TOT to determine the time to fire. An executive order to fire is given to all guns in the fire unit at the correct moment to fire. When each fire unit fires their rounds at their individual firing time all the opening rounds will reach the target area almost simultaneously. This is especially effective when combined with techniques that allow fires for effect to be made without preliminary adjusting fires.
Multiple round simultaneous impact: Multiple round simultaneous impact (MRSI) is a modern version of the earlier time on target concept. MRSI is when a single gun fires multiple shells so all arrive at the same target simultaneously. This is possible because there is more than one trajectory for a round to fly to any given target. Typically one is below 45 degrees from horizontal and the other is above it, and by using different sized propellant charges with each shell, it is possible to utilize more than two trajectories. Because the higher trajectories cause the shells to arc higher into the air, they take longer to reach the target. If shells are fired on higher trajectories for initial volleys (starting with the shell with the most propellant and working down) and later volleys are fired on the lower trajectories, with the correct timing the shells will all arrive at the same target simultaneously. This is useful because many more shells can land on the target with no warning. With traditional methods of firing, the target area may have time (however long it takes to reload and re-fire the guns) to take cover between volleys. However, guns capable of burst fire can deliver multiple rounds in a few seconds if they use the same firing data for each, and if guns in more than one location are firing on one target they can use Time on Target procedures so that all their shells arrive at the same time and target.
MRSI has a few prerequisites. The first is guns with a high rate of fire. The second is the ability to use different sized propellant charges. Third is a fire control computer that has the ability to compute MRSI volleys and the capability to produce firing data, sent to each gun, and then presented to the gun commander in the correct order. The number of rounds that can be delivered in MRSI depends primarily on the range to the target and the rate of fire. To allow the most shells to reach the target, the target has to be in range of the lowest propellant charge.
Examples of guns with a rate of fire that makes them suitable for MRSI includes UK's AS-90, South Africa's Denel G6-52 (which can land six rounds simultaneously at targets at least 25 km (16 mi) away), Germany's Panzerhaubitze 2000 (which can land five rounds simultaneously at targets at least 17 km (11 mi) away), Slovakia's 155 mm SpGH ZUZANA model 2000, and K9 Thunder.
The Archer project (developed by BAE-Systems Bofors in Sweden) is a 155 mm howitzer on a wheeled chassis which is claimed to be able to deliver up to six shells on target simultaneously from the same gun. The 120 mm twin barrel AMOS mortar system, joint developed by Hägglunds (Sweden) and Patria (Finland), is capable of 7 + 7 shells MRSI. The United States Crusader program (now cancelled) was slated to have MRSI capability. It is unclear how many fire control computers have the necessary capabilities.
Two-round MRSI firings were a popular artillery demonstration in the 1960s, where well trained detachments could show off their skills for spectators.
Air burst: The destructiveness of artillery bombardments can be enhanced when some or all of the shells are set for airburst, meaning that they explode in the air above the target instead of upon impact. This can be accomplished either through time fuzes or proximity fuzes. Time fuzes use a precise timer to detonate the shell after a preset delay. This technique is tricky and slight variations in the functioning of the fuze can cause it to explode too high and be ineffective, or to strike the ground instead of exploding above it. Since December 1944 (Battle of the Bulge), proximity fuzed artillery shells have been available that take the guesswork out of this process. These employ a miniature, low powered radar transmitter in the fuze to detect the ground and explode them at a predetermined height above it. The return of the weak radar signal completes an electrical circuit in the fuze which explodes the shell. The proximity fuze itself was developed by the British to increase the effectiveness of anti-aircraft warfare.
This is a very effective tactic against infantry and light vehicles, because it scatters the fragmentation of the shell over a larger area and prevents it from being blocked by terrain or entrenchments that do not include some form of robust overhead cover. Combined with TOT or MRSI tactics that give no warning of the incoming rounds, these rounds are especially devastating because many enemy soldiers are likely to be caught in the open; even more so if the attack is launched against an assembly area or troops moving in the open rather than a unit in an entrenched tactical position.
Use in monuments: Numerous war memorials around the world incorporate an artillery piece that was used in the war or battle commemorated.
See also:
References:
Notes:
Bibliography: Browne, J.P.R.; Thurbon, M T (1998). Electronic Warfare. Brassey's air power, v. 4. London: Brassey's. ISBN 978-1-85753-133-6. OCLC 38292289.
Hackett, James, ed. (2010), The Military Balance, The International Institute for Strategic Studies
Holmes, Richard (1988). The World Atlas of Warfare: Military Innovations that Changed the Course of History. New York: Viking Studio Books. ISBN 978-0-670-81967-6. OCLC 17840438.
McCamley, N.J. (2004). Disasters Underground. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military. ISBN 978-1-84415-022-9. OCLC 53241739.
McNaughton, Andrew (January 1929). "The Development of Artillery in the Great War". Canadian Defence Quarterly. 6 (2).
Ordway, Frederick I (July 1970). "History of Astronautics Symposium: Mar Del Plata, Argentina, October 1969". Technology and Culture. 11 (3): 407–416. doi:10.2307/3102202. ISSN 0040-165X. JSTOR 3102202. S2CID 113141625.
Schmidtchen, Volker (1977). "Riesengeschütze des 15. Jahrhunderts. Technische Höchstleistungen ihrer Zeit" [Giant cannon of the 15th century: technical masterpieces of their era]. Technikgeschichte (in German). 44 (2): 153–73 (162–64). OCLC 85351643.
Interavia. 32. International Aeronautic Federation: 262. January–June 1977. ISSN 0020-5168. {{cite journal}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
Further reading: Hogg, Oliver Frederick Gillilan (1970). Artillery: Its Origin, Heyday and Decline. London: C. Hurst. ISBN 978-0-900966-43-9. OCLC 99454.
Bailey, J.B.A. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Artillery | "Riesengeschütze des 15. Jahrhunderts. Technische Höchstleistungen ihrer Zeit" [Giant cannon of the 15th century: technical masterpieces of their era]. Technikgeschichte (in German). 44 (2): 153–73 (162–64). OCLC 85351643.
Interavia. 32. International Aeronautic Federation: 262. January–June 1977. ISSN 0020-5168. {{cite journal}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
Further reading: Hogg, Oliver Frederick Gillilan (1970). Artillery: Its Origin, Heyday and Decline. London: C. Hurst. ISBN 978-0-900966-43-9. OCLC 99454.
Bailey, J.B.A. (2004). Field Artillery and Firepower. AUSA Institute of Land Warfare book. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-029-0. OCLC 51931033.
External links:
Naval Weapons of the World
Cannon Artillery – The Voice of Freedom's Thunder
Modern Artillery Archived May 4, 2006, at the Wayback Machine
What sort of forensic information can be derived from the analysis of shell fragments Archived August 9, 2021, at the Wayback Machine
Evans, Nigel F. (2001–2007) "British Artillery in World War 2"
Artillery Tactics and Combat during the Napoleonic Wars
Artillery of Napoleon's Imperial Guard
French artillery and its ammunition. 14th to the end of the 19th century
Historic films showing artillery in World War I at europeanfilmgateway.eu
Video: Inside shrieking shrapnel. Hear the great sound of shrapnel's – Finnish field artillery fire video year 2013
Video: Forensic and archaeological interpretation of artillery shell fragments and shrapnel
"Ordnance" . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 20 (11th ed.). 1911. pp. 189–235. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Asymmetric warfare | Definition and differences: The popularity of the term dates from Andrew J. R. Mack's 1975 article "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars" in World Politics, in which "asymmetric" referred simply to a significant disparity in power between opposing actors in a conflict. "Power," in this sense, is broadly understood to mean material power, such as a large army, sophisticated weapons, an advanced economy, and so on. Mack's analysis was largely ignored in its day, but the end of the Cold War sparked renewed interest among academics. By the late 1990s, new research building off Mack's works was beginning to mature; after 9/11, the U.S. military began once again to grapple with asymmetric warfare strategy.
Since 2004, the discussion of asymmetric warfare has been complicated by the tendency of academic and military officials to use the term in different ways, as well as by its close association with guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism.
Academic authors tend to focus on explaining two puzzles in asymmetric conflict. First, if "power" determines victory, there must be reasons why weaker actors decide to fight more powerful actors. Key explanations include:
Weaker actors may have secret weapons.
Weaker actors may have powerful allies.
Stronger actors are unable to make threats credible.
The demands of a stronger actor are extreme.
The weaker actor must consider its regional rivals when responding to threats from powerful actors.
Second, if "power," as generally understood, leads to victory in war, then there must be an explanation for why the "weak" can defeat the "strong." Key explanations include:
Strategic interaction.
Willingness of the weak to suffer more or bear higher costs.
External support of weak actors.
Reluctance to escalating violence on the part of strong actors.
Internal group dynamics.
Inflated strong actor war aims.
Evolution of asymmetric rivals' attitudes towards time.
Asymmetric conflicts include interstate and civil wars, and over the past two hundred years, have generally been won by strong actors. Since 1950, however, weak actors have won the majority of asymmetric conflicts. In asymmetric conflicts conflict escalation can be rational for one side.
Strategic basis: In most conventional warfare, the belligerents deploy forces of a similar type, and the outcome can be predicted by the quantity or quality of the opposing forces, for example, better command and control of theirs (c2). There are times when this is the case, and conventional forces are not easily compared, making it difficult for opposing sides to engage. An example of this is the standoff between the continental land forces of the French Army and the maritime forces of the United Kingdom's Royal Navy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In the words of Admiral Jervis during the campaigns of 1801, "I do not say, my Lords, that the French will not come. I say only they will not come by sea", and a confrontation that Napoleon Bonaparte described as that between the elephant and the whale.
Tactical basis: The tactical success of asymmetric warfare is dependent on at least some of the following assumptions:
One side can have a technological advantage that outweighs the numerical advantage of the enemy; the English longbow at the Battle of Crécy is an example.
Technological superiority usually is cancelled by the more vulnerable infrastructure, which can be targeted with devastating results. Destruction of multiple electric lines, roads, or water supply systems in highly populated areas could devastate the economy and morale. In contrast, the weaker side may not have these structures at all.
Training, tactics, and technology can prove decisive and allow a smaller force to overcome a much larger one. For example, for several centuries, the Greek hoplite's (heavy infantry) use of phalanx made them far superior to their enemies. The Battle of Thermopylae, which also involved good use of terrain, is a well-known example.
If the inferior power is in a position of self-defense, i.e., under attack or occupation, it may be possible to use unconventional tactics, such as hit-and-run and selective battles in which the superior power is weaker, as an effective means of harassment without violating the laws of war. Perhaps the classic historical examples of this doctrine may be found in the American Revolutionary War, movements in World War II, such as the French Resistance and Soviet and Yugoslav partisans. Against democratic aggressor nations, this strategy can be used to play on the electorate's patience with the conflict (as in the Vietnam War, and others since), provoking protests, and consequent disputes among elected legislators.
However, if the weaker power is in an aggressive position or turns to tactics prohibited by the laws of war (jus in bello), its success depends on the superior power's refraining from like tactics. For example, the law of land warfare prohibits the use of a flag of truce or marked medical vehicles as cover for an attack or ambush. Still, an asymmetric combatant using this prohibited tactic to its advantage depends on the superior power's obedience to the corresponding law. Similarly, warfare laws prohibit combatants from using civilian settlements, populations or facilities as military bases, but when an inferior force uses this tactic, it depends on the premise that the superior one will respect the law that the other is violating, and will not attack that civilian target, or if they do the propaganda advantage will outweigh the material loss.
Terrorism: There are two opposing viewpoints on the relationship between asymmetric warfare and terrorism. In the modern context, asymmetric warfare is increasingly considered a component of fourth generation warfare. When practiced outside the laws of war, it is often defined as terrorism, though rarely by its practitioners or their supporters. The other view is that asymmetric warfare does not coincide with terrorism.
Use of terrain: Terrain that limits mobility, such as forests and mountains, can be used as a force multiplier by the smaller force and as a force inhibitor against the larger one, especially one operating far from its logistical base. Such terrain is called difficult terrain. Urban areas, though generally having good transport access, provide innumerable ready-made defensible positions with simple escape routes and can also become rough terrain if prolonged combat fills the streets with rubble:
The contour of the land is an aid to the army, sizing up opponents to determine victory and assessing dangers and distance. "Those who do battle without knowing these will lose."
The guerrillas must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.
In the 12th century, irregulars known as the Assassins were successful in the Nizari Ismaili state. The "state" consisted of fortresses (such as the Alamut Castle) built on strategic mountaintops and highlands with difficult access, surrounded by hostile lands. The Assassins developed tactics to eliminate high-value targets, threatening their security, including the Crusaders.
In the American Revolutionary War, Patriot Lieutenant Colonel Francis Marion, known as the "Swamp Fox," took advantage of irregular tactics, interior lines, and the wilderness of colonial South Carolina to hinder larger British regular forces.
Yugoslav Partisans, starting as small detachments around mountain villages in 1941, fought the German and other Axis occupation forces, successfully taking advantage of the rough terrain to survive despite their small numbers. Over the next four years, they slowly forced their enemies back, recovering population centers and resources, eventually growing into the regular Yugoslav Army.
Role of civilians: Civilians can play a vital role in determining the outcome of an asymmetric war. In such conflicts, when it is easy for insurgents to assimilate into the population quickly after an attack, tips on the timing or location of insurgent activity can severely undermine the resistance. An information-central framework, in which civilians are seen primarily as sources of strategic information rather than resources, provides a paradigm to understand better the dynamics of such conflicts where civilian information-sharing is vital. The framework assumes that:
The consequential action of non-combatants (civilians) is information sharing rather than supplying resources, recruits, or shelter to combatants.
Information can be shared anonymously without endangering the civilian who relays it.
Given the additional assumption that the larger or dominant force is the government, the framework suggests the following implications:
Civilians receive services from government and rebel forces as an incentive to share valuable information.
Rebel violence can be reduced if the government provides services.
Provision of security and services are complementary in reducing violence.
Civilian casualties reduce civilian support to the perpetrating group.
Provision of information is strongly correlated with the level of anonymity that can be ensured.
A survey of the empirical literature on conflict, does not provide conclusive evidence on the claims. But the framework gives a starting point to explore the role of civilian information sharing in asymmetric warfare.
War by proxy: Where asymmetric warfare is carried out (generally covertly) by allegedly non-governmental actors who are connected to or sympathetic to a particular nation's (the "state actor's") interest, it may be deemed war by proxy. This is typically done to give the state actor deniability. The deniability can be crucial to keep the state actor from being tainted by the actions, to allow the state actor to negotiate in apparent good faith by claiming they are not responsible for the actions of parties who are merely sympathizers, or to avoid being accused of belligerent actions or war crimes. If proof emerges of the true extent of the state actor's involvement, this strategy can backfire; for example, see Iran-contra and Philip Agee.
Examples:
American Indian Wars: Benjamin Church designed his force primarily to emulate Native American patterns of war. Toward this end, Church endeavored to learn to fight like Native Americans from Native Americans. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Asymmetric warfare | War by proxy: Where asymmetric warfare is carried out (generally covertly) by allegedly non-governmental actors who are connected to or sympathetic to a particular nation's (the "state actor's") interest, it may be deemed war by proxy. This is typically done to give the state actor deniability. The deniability can be crucial to keep the state actor from being tainted by the actions, to allow the state actor to negotiate in apparent good faith by claiming they are not responsible for the actions of parties who are merely sympathizers, or to avoid being accused of belligerent actions or war crimes. If proof emerges of the true extent of the state actor's involvement, this strategy can backfire; for example, see Iran-contra and Philip Agee.
Examples:
American Indian Wars: Benjamin Church designed his force primarily to emulate Native American patterns of war. Toward this end, Church endeavored to learn to fight like Native Americans from Native Americans. Americans became rangers exclusively under the tutelage of the Native American allies. (Until the end of the colonial period, rangers depended on Native Americans as both allies and teachers.)
Church developed a special full-time unit mixing white colonists selected for frontier skills with friendly Native Americans to carry out offensive strikes against hostile Native Americans in terrain where normal militia units were ineffective. Church paid special care to outfitting, supplying and instructing his troops in ways inspired by indigenous methods of warfare and ways of living. He emphasized the adoption of indigenous techniques, which prioritized small, mobile and flexible units which used the countryside for cover, in lieu of massed frontal assaults by large formations. Benjamin Church is sometimes referred to as the father of Unconventional warfare.
American Revolutionary War: From its initiation, the American Revolutionary War was, necessarily, a showcase for asymmetric techniques. In the 1920s, Harold Murdock of Boston attempted to solve the puzzle of the first shots fired on Lexington Green and came to the suspicion that the few score militiamen who gathered before sunrise to await the arrival of hundreds of well-prepared British soldiers were sent to provoke an incident which could be used for Patriot propaganda purposes. The return of the British force to Boston following the search operations at Concord was subject to constant skirmishing by Patriot forces gathered from communities all along the route, making maximum use of the terrain (particularly, trees and stone field walls) to overcome the limitations of their weapons – muskets with an effective range of only about 50–70 meters. Throughout the war, skirmishing tactics against British troops on the move continued to be a key factor in the Patriots' success; particularly in the Western theater of the American Revolutionary War.
Another feature of the long march from Concord was the urban warfare technique of using buildings along the route as additional cover for snipers. When revolutionary forces forced their way into Norfolk, Virginia and used waterfront buildings as cover for shots at British vessels out in the river, the response of destruction of those buildings was ingeniously used to the advantage of the rebels, who encouraged the spread of fire throughout the largely Loyalist town and spread propaganda blaming it on the British. Shortly afterwards, they destroyed the remaining houses because they might provide cover for British soldiers.
The rebels also adopted a form of asymmetric sea warfare by using small, fast vessels to avoid the Royal Navy and capturing or sinking large numbers of merchant ships; however the Crown responded by issuing letters of marque permitting private armed vessels to undertake similar attacks on Patriot shipping. John Paul Jones became notorious in Britain for his expedition from France in the sloop of war Ranger in April 1778, during which, in addition to his attacks on merchant shipping, he made two landings on British soil. The effect of these raids, particularly when coupled with his capture of the Royal Navy's HMS Drake – the first such success in British waters, but not Jones' last – was to force the British government to increase resources for coastal defense, and to create a climate of fear among the British public which was subsequently fed by press reports of his preparations for the 1779 Bonhomme Richard mission.
From 1776, the conflict turned increasingly into a proxy war on behalf of France, following a strategy proposed in the 1760s but initially resisted by the idealistic young King Louis XVI, who came to the throne at the age of 19 a few months before Lexington. France ultimately drove Great Britain to the brink of defeat by entering the war(s) directly on several fronts throughout the world.
American Civil War: The American Civil War saw the rise of asymmetric warfare in the Border States, and in particular on the US Western Territorial Border after the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 opened the territories to vote on the expansion of slavery beyond the Missouri Compromise lines. Political implications of this broken 1820's compromise were nothing less than the potential expansion of slavery all across the North American continent, including the northern reaches of the annexed Mexican territories to California and Oregon. So the stakes were high, and it caused a flood of immigration to the border: some to grab land and expand slavery west, others to grab land and vote down the expansion of slavery. The pro-slavery land grabbers began asymmetric, violent attacks against the more pacifist abolitionists who had settled Lawrence and other territorial towns to suppress slavery. John Brown, the abolitionist, travelled to Osawatomie in the Kansas Territory expressly to foment retaliatory attacks back against the pro-slavery guerrillas who, by 1858, had twice ransacked both Lawrence and Osawatomie (where one of Brown's sons was shot dead).
The abolitionists would not return the attacks and Brown theorized that a violent spark set off on "the Border" would be a way to finally ignite his long hoped-for slave rebellion. Brown had broad-sworded slave owners at Potawatomi Creek, so the bloody civilian violence was initially symmetrical; however, once the American Civil War ignited in 1861, and when the state of Missouri voted overwhelmingly not to secede from the Union, the pro-slavers on the MO-KS border were driven either south to Arkansas and Texas, or underground—where they became guerrilla fighters and "Bushwhackers" living in the bushy ravines throughout northwest Missouri across the (now) state line from Kansas. The bloody "Border War" lasted all during the Civil War (and long after with guerrilla partisans like the James brothers cynically robbing and murdering, aided and abetted by lingering lost causers). Tragically the Western Border War was an asymmetric war: pro-slavery guerrillas and paramilitary partisans on the pro-Confederate side attacked pro-Union townspeople and commissioned Union military units, with the Union army trying to keep both in check: blocking Kansans and pro-Union Missourians from organizing militarily against the marauding Bushwhackers.
The worst act of domestic terror in U.S. history came in August 1863 when paramilitary guerrillas amassed 350 strong and rode all night 50 miles across eastern Kansas to the abolitionist stronghold of Lawrence (a political target) and destroyed the town, gunning down 150 civilians. The Confederate officer whose company had joined Quantrill's Raiders that day witnessed the civilian slaughter and forbade his soldiers from participating in the carnage. The commissioned officer refused to participate in Quantrill's asymmetric warfare on civilians.
Philippine–American War: The Philippine–American War (1899–1902) was an armed conflict between the United States and Filipino revolutionaries. Estimates of the Filipino forces vary between 100,000 and 1,000,000, with tens of thousands of auxiliaries. Lack of weapons and ammunition was a significant impediment to the Filipinos, so most of the forces were only armed with bolo knives, bows and arrows, spears and other primitive weapons that, in practice, proved vastly inferior to U.S. firepower.
The goal, or end-state, sought by the First Philippine Republic was a sovereign, independent, socially stable Philippines led by the ilustrado (intellectual) oligarchy. Local chieftains, landowners, and businessmen were the principales who controlled local politics. The war was strongest when illustrados, principales, and peasants were unified in opposition to annexation. The peasants, who provided the bulk of guerrilla forces, had interests different from their illustrado leaders and the principales of their villages. Coupled with the ethnic and geographic fragmentation, unity was a daunting task. The challenge for Aguinaldo and his generals was to sustain unified Filipino public opposition; this was the revolutionaries' strategic centre of gravity. The Filipino operational center of gravity was the ability to sustain its force of 100,000 irregulars in the field. The Filipino General Francisco Macabulos described the Filipinos' war aim as "not to vanquish the U.S. Army but to inflict on them constant losses." They initially sought to use conventional tactics and an increasing toll of U.S. casualties to contribute to McKinley's defeat in the 1900 presidential election. Their hope was that as president the avowedly anti-imperialist future Secretary of state William Jennings Bryan would withdraw from the Philippines. They pursued this short-term goal with guerrilla tactics better suited to a protracted struggle. While targeting McKinley motivated the revolutionaries in the short term, his victory demoralized them and convinced many undecided Filipinos that the United States would not depart precipitously. For most of 1899, the revolutionary leadership had viewed guerrilla warfare strategically only as a tactical option of final recourse, not as a means of operation which better suited their disadvantaged situation. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Asymmetric warfare | The Filipino General Francisco Macabulos described the Filipinos' war aim as "not to vanquish the U.S. Army but to inflict on them constant losses." They initially sought to use conventional tactics and an increasing toll of U.S. casualties to contribute to McKinley's defeat in the 1900 presidential election. Their hope was that as president the avowedly anti-imperialist future Secretary of state William Jennings Bryan would withdraw from the Philippines. They pursued this short-term goal with guerrilla tactics better suited to a protracted struggle. While targeting McKinley motivated the revolutionaries in the short term, his victory demoralized them and convinced many undecided Filipinos that the United States would not depart precipitously. For most of 1899, the revolutionary leadership had viewed guerrilla warfare strategically only as a tactical option of final recourse, not as a means of operation which better suited their disadvantaged situation. On 13 November 1899, Emilio Aguinaldo decreed that guerrilla war would henceforth be the strategy. This made the American occupation of the Philippine archipelago more difficult over the next few years. In fact, during just the first four months of the guerrilla war, the Americans had nearly 500 casualties. The Philippine Revolutionary Army began staging bloody ambushes and raids, such as the guerrilla victories at Paye, Catubig, Makahambus, Pulang Lupa, Balangiga and Mabitac. At first, it seemed like the Filipinos would fight the Americans to a stalemate and force them to withdraw. President McKinley even considered this at the beginning of the phase. The shift to guerrilla warfare drove the U.S. Army to adopt counterinsurgency tactics.
20th century:
Second Boer War: Asymmetric warfare featured prominently during the Second Boer War. After an initial phase, which was fought by both sides as a conventional war, the British captured Johannesburg, the Boers' largest city, and captured the capitals of the two Boer Republics. The British then expected the Boers to accept peace as dictated in the traditional European manner. However, the Boers fought a protracted guerrilla war instead of capitulating. 20,000-30,000 Boer guerrillas were only defeated after the British brought to bear 450,000 imperial troops, about ten times as many as were used in the conventional phase of the war. The British began constructing blockhouses built within machine gun range of one another and flanked by barbed wire to slow the Boers' movement across the countryside and block paths to valuable targets. Such tactics eventually evolved into today's counterinsurgency tactics.
The Boer commando raids deep into the Cape Colony, which were organized and commanded by Jan Smuts, resonated throughout the century as the British adopted and adapted the tactics first used against them by the Boers.
World War I: T.E. Lawrence and British support for the Arab uprising against the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans were the stronger power, and the Arab coalition were the weaker.
Austria-Hungary's invasion of Serbia, August 1914. Austria-Hungary was the stronger power, and Serbia was the weaker.
Germany's invasion of Belgium, August 1914. Germany was the stronger power, Belgium the weaker.
Between the World Wars: Abd el-Krim led resistance in Morocco from 1920 to 1924 against French and Spanish colonial armies ten times as strong as the guerrilla force, led by General Philippe Pétain.
TIGR, the first anti-fascist national-defensive organization in Europe, fought against Benito Mussolini's regime in Northeast Italy.
Anglo-Irish War (Irish War of Independence) fought between the Irish Republican Army and the Black and Tans/Auxiliaries. Though Lloyd George (Prime Minister at the time) attempted to persuade other nations that it was not a war by refusing to use the army and using the Black and Tans instead, the conflict was conducted as an asymmetric guerrilla war and was registered as a war with the League of Nations by the Irish Free State.
World War II: Philippine resistance against Japan – During the Japanese occupation in World War II, there was an extensive Philippine resistance movement, which opposed the Japanese with an active underground and guerrilla activity that increased over the years.
Winter War – Finland was invaded by the much larger mechanized military units of the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets captured 8% of Finland, they suffered enormous casualties versus much lower losses for the Finns. Soviet vehicles were confined to narrow forest roads by terrain and snow, while the Finns used ski tactics around them unseen through the trees. They cut the advancing Soviet column into what they called motti (a cubic metre of firewood) and then destroyed the cut-off sections one by one. Many Soviets were shot, had their throats cut from behind, or froze to death due to inadequate clothing and lack of camouflage and shelter. The Finns also devised a petrol bomb they called the Molotov cocktail to destroy Soviet tanks.
Soviet partisans – resistance movement which fought in the German occupied parts of the Soviet Union.
Warsaw Uprising – Poland (Home Army, Armia Krajowa) rose up against the German occupation.
Germany's occupation of Yugoslavia, 1941–45 (Germany vs. Tito's Partisans and Mihailović's Chetniks).
Britain: British Commandos and European coastal raids. German countermeasures and the notorious Commando Order.
Long Range Desert Group and the Special Air Service in Africa and later in Europe.
South East Asian Theater: Wingate, Chindits, Force 136, V Force
Special Operations Executive (SOE)
Provisional Irish Republican Army against British security forces in the Northern Campaign.
United States: Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
China Burma India Theater: Merrill's Marauders and OSS Detachment 101.
After World War II: First Indochina War (1946-1954) and Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962); both against France
The Cuban Revolution of 1953-1958 became a template of asymmetric warfare.
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 (or "Russo-Hungarian" war) saw makeshift forces improvising lopsided tactics against Soviet tanks.
Libyan support to the Provisional Irish Republican Army during the Troubles (1960s to 1998) and collusion between British security forces and Ulster loyalist paramilitaries.
United States Military Assistance Command Studies and Observations Group (US MAC-V SOG) (1964-1972) and Viet Cong in Vietnam.
The South African Border War, otherwise known as the Namibian War of Independence (1966-1990) between the South African Defense Force and People's Liberation Army of Namibia.
United States support of the Nicaraguan Contras (1979-1990).
Cold War (1945–1992): The end of World War II established the two strongest victors, the United States of America (the United States, or just the U.S.) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or just the Soviet Union) as the two dominant global superpowers.
Cold War examples of proxy wars: In Southeast Asia, specifically Vietnam, the Viet Minh, NLF and other insurgencies engaged in asymmetrical guerrilla warfare with France. The war between the Mujahideen and the Soviet Armed Forces during the Soviet–Afghan War of 1979 to 1989, though claimed as a source of the term "asymmetric warfare," occurred years after Mack wrote of "asymmetric conflict." (Note that the term "asymmetric warfare" became well-known in the West only in the 1990s.) The aid given by the U.S. to the Mujahideen during the war was only covert at the tactical level; the Reagan Administration told the world that it was helping the "freedom-loving people of Afghanistan." Many countries, including the U.S., participated in this proxy war against the USSR during the Cold War.
Post-Cold War: The Kosovo War, which pitted Yugoslav security forces (Serbian police and Yugoslav army) against Albanian separatists of the guerrilla Kosovo Liberation Army, is an example of asymmetric warfare, due to Yugoslav forces' superior firepower and manpower, and due to the nature of insurgency/counter-insurgency operations. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (1999), which pitted NATO air power against the Yugoslav armed forces during the Kosovo war, can also be classified as asymmetric, exemplifying international conflict with asymmetry in weapons and strategy/tactics.
21st century:
Israel/Palestine: The ongoing conflict between Israel and some Palestinian organizations (such as Hamas and PIJ) is a classic case of asymmetric warfare. Israel has a powerful army, air force and navy, while the Palestinian organizations have no access to large-scale military equipment with which to conduct operations; instead, they utilize asymmetric tactics, such as paragliding, small gunfights, cross-border sniping, mortar/rocket attacks, and others.
Sri Lanka: The Sri Lankan Civil War, which raged on and off from 1983 to 2009, between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) saw large-scale asymmetric warfare. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Asymmetric warfare | The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (1999), which pitted NATO air power against the Yugoslav armed forces during the Kosovo war, can also be classified as asymmetric, exemplifying international conflict with asymmetry in weapons and strategy/tactics.
21st century:
Israel/Palestine: The ongoing conflict between Israel and some Palestinian organizations (such as Hamas and PIJ) is a classic case of asymmetric warfare. Israel has a powerful army, air force and navy, while the Palestinian organizations have no access to large-scale military equipment with which to conduct operations; instead, they utilize asymmetric tactics, such as paragliding, small gunfights, cross-border sniping, mortar/rocket attacks, and others.
Sri Lanka: The Sri Lankan Civil War, which raged on and off from 1983 to 2009, between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) saw large-scale asymmetric warfare. The war started as an insurgency and progressed to a large-scale conflict with the mixture of guerrilla and conventional warfare, seeing the LTTE use suicide bombing (male/female suicide bombers) both on and off the battlefield use of explosive-filled boats for suicide attacks on military shipping; and use of light aircraft targeting military installations.
Iraq: The victory by the US-led coalition forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq demonstrated that training, tactics and technology could provide overwhelming victories in the field of battle during modern conventional warfare. After Saddam Hussein's regime was removed from power, the Iraq campaign moved into a different type of asymmetric warfare where the coalition's use of superior conventional warfare training, tactics and technology was of much less use against continued opposition from the various partisan groups operating inside Iraq.
Syria: Much of the 2012–present Syrian Civil War has been asymmetrical. The Syrian National Coalition, Mujahideen, and Kurdish Democratic Union Party have been engaging with the forces of the Syrian government through asymmetric means. The conflict has seen large-scale asymmetric warfare across the country, with the forces opposed to the government unable to engage symmetrically with the Syrian government and resorting instead to other asymmetric tactics such as suicide bombings and targeted assassinations.
Ukraine: The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a classical asymmetrical warfare scenario. Russia's superior military might, including its vast nuclear arsenal, larger economy and population, and seemingly superior armored forces have not helped Russia surmount fierce opposition from the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which has inflicted severe blows against the Russian Armed Forces by relying on technologically advanced weaponry supplied by the outside Ukraine supporting parties. The use of MAGURA V5 unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) to attack Russian Black Sea Fleet ships such as the Tsezar Kunikov has been cited as example of asymmetrical warfare by analysts.
Semi-symmetric warfare: A new understanding of warfare has emerged amidst the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although this type of warfare does not oppose an insurgency to a counter-insurgency force, it does involve two actors with substantially asymmetrical means of waging war. Notably, as technology has improved war-fighting capabilities, it has also made them more complex, thus requiring greater expertise, training, flexibility and decentralization. The nominally weaker military can exploit those complexities and seek to eliminate the asymmetry. This has been observed in Ukraine, as defending forces used a rich arsenal of anti-tank and anti-air missiles to negate the invading forces' apparent mechanized and aerial superiority, thus denying their ability to conduct combined arms operations. The success of this strategy will be compounded by access to real-time intelligence and the adversary's inability to utilize its forces to the maximum of their potential due to factors such as the inability to plan, brief and execute complex, full-spectrum operations.
See also:
References:
Further reading:
Bibliographies: Compiled by Joan T. Phillips Bibliographer at Air University Library: A Bibliography of Asymmetric Warfare, August 2005.
Asymmetric Warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Debate sponsored by the Project on Defense Alternatives
Books: Arreguin-Toft, Ivan (2005). How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. New York & Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-54869-4.
Beckett, I. F. W. (15 September 2009). Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare (Hardcover). Santa Barbara, California: Abc-Clio Inc. ISBN 978-0-874-36929-8.
Barnett, Roger W. (2003). Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's. ISBN 978-1-574-88562-0.
Friedman, George (2004). America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle between the United States and Its Enemies. London: Little, Brown. ISBN 978-0-316-72862-1.
Paul, T. V. (1994). Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-45117-8.
Schröfl, Josef (2007). Political Asymmetries in the Era of Globalization. Lang. ISBN 978-3-631-56820-0.
Kaplan, Robert D. (2003). Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos. New York: Vintage. ISBN 978-0-375-72627-9.
Levy, Bert "Yank"; Wintringham, Tom (Foreword) (1964). Guerrilla Warfare (PDF). Paladin Press. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-04-12. Retrieved 2014-04-15.
Merom, Gil (2003). How Democracies Lose Small Wars. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-80403-5.
Metz, Steven; Johnson II, Douglas V. (2001). Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts (PDF). Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute/U.S. Army War College. ISBN 978-1-58487-041-8.
Schröfl, Josef; Cox, Sean M.; Pankratz, Thomas (2009). Winning the Asymmetric War: Political, Social and Military Responses. Peter Lang. ISBN 978-3-631-57249-8.
Record, Jeffrey (2007). Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books. ISBN 978-1-59797-090-7.
Giuseppe, Gagliano (2007). Introduzione alla conflittualita' non convenzionale. Edizioni New Press. ISBN 978-8-895-38302-6.
Resnick, Uri (July 12, 2013). Dynamics of Asymmetric Territorial Conflict: the evolution of patience. Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave-Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-137-30398-1.
Sobelman, Daniel (2004). New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbollah after the Withdrawal from Lebanon (PDF). Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel-Aviv University. ISBN 978-9-654-59057-0. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2012-11-02.
Sobelman, Daniel (2009). "Hizbollah – from Terror to Resistance: Towards a National Defence Strategy". In Jones, Clive; Catignani, Sergio (eds.). Israel and Hizbollah An Asymmetric Conflict in Historical and Comparative Perspective. Routledge. pp. 49–66. ISBN 9781135229207.
Sobelman, Daniel (Winter 2017). "Learning to Deter: Deterrence Failure and Success in the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, 2006–2016". International Security. 41 (3): 151–196. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00259. JSTOR 26777793. S2CID 57571128.
Articles and papers: Bryant, G. J. (2004). "Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India". Journal of Military History. 68 (2): 431–469. doi:10.1353/jmh.2004.0019. S2CID 144222473 – via Project Muse(subscription required).
Arreguin-Toft, Ivan (Summer 2001). "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict". International Security. 26 (1): 93–128. doi:10.1162/016228801753212868. S2CID 51776546.
Dunne, J. Paul; García-Alonso, María D.C.; Levine, Paul; Smith, Ron P. (April 2006). "Managing Asymmetric Conflict". Oxford Economic Papers. 58 (2): 183–208. doi:10.1093/oep/gpi056. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Asymmetric warfare | "Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India". Journal of Military History. 68 (2): 431–469. doi:10.1353/jmh.2004.0019. S2CID 144222473 – via Project Muse(subscription required).
Arreguin-Toft, Ivan (Summer 2001). "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict". International Security. 26 (1): 93–128. doi:10.1162/016228801753212868. S2CID 51776546.
Dunne, J. Paul; García-Alonso, María D.C.; Levine, Paul; Smith, Ron P. (April 2006). "Managing Asymmetric Conflict". Oxford Economic Papers. 58 (2): 183–208. doi:10.1093/oep/gpi056. hdl:10419/68097. JSTOR 3876996.
Fowler, C. A. "Bert" (March 2006). "Asymmetric Warfare: A Primer". IEEE Spectrum. Archived from the original on 2008-01-04. Retrieved 2006-03-05. A mathematical approach to the concept.
Corbin, Marcus (October 5, 2001). "Reshaping the Military for Asymmetric Warfare". CDI. Archived from the original on 2012-04-10.
Deady, Timothy K. (2005). "Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899–1902" (PDF). Parameters. 35 (1): 53–68. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-12-10. Retrieved 2018-01-13.
Goulding Jr., Vincent J. "Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare". Parameters. 30 (4) 7: 21–30. Archived from the original on 2004-02-10. Retrieved 2006-06-12.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
Mack, Andrew (January 1975). "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict". World Politics. 27 (2): 175–200. doi:10.2307/2009880. JSTOR 2009880. S2CID 154410180.
Meigs, Montgomery C. "Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2003-10-02.
Norton-Taylor, Richard (October 3, 2001). "Asymmetric Warfare: Military Planners Are Only Beginning to Grasp the Implications of September 11 for Future Deterrence Strategy". The Guardian.
Novak, Michael (February 10, 2003). ""Asymmetrical Warfare" & Just War: A Moral Obligation". NRO.
Pfanner, Toni (March 2005). "Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Action". International Review of the Red Cross. 87 (857): 149–174. doi:10.1017/S1816383100181238. S2CID 145126086.
Sullivan, Patricia (2007). "War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 51 (3): 496–524. doi:10.1177/0022002707300187. S2CID 37158560.
Tucker, Jonathan B. (Summer 1999). "Asymmetric Warfare". Archived from the original on 2006-05-15.
"Asymmetry and other fables". Jane's Defence Weekly. 18 August 2006. Archived from the original on 26 January 2013. Retrieved 6 May 2021.
Buffaloe, David (September 2006). "Defining Asymmetric Warfare" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-03-22.
White, Josh; Branigin, William (April 22, 2008). "Gates Assails Pentagon on Resources for Battlefields". The Washington Post.
Mandel, Robert (July 2007). "Reassessing Victory in Warfare". Armed Forces & Society. 33 (4). Sage Publications: 461–495. doi:10.1177/0095327X06295515. S2CID 145246391.
Mandel, Robert (January 2004). "The Wartime Utility of Precision Versus Brute Force in Weaponry". Armed Forces & Society. 30 (2). Sage Publications: 171–201. doi:10.1177/0095327X0403000203. S2CID 110384704. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Attrition warfare | Strategic considerations: Attrition warfare represents an attempt to grind down an opponent's ability to make war by destroying their military resources by any means including guerrilla warfare, people's war, scorched earth and all types of battles apart from a decisive battle. Attrition warfare does not include Blitzkrieg or using concentration of force and a decisive battle to win. The side that reinforces their army at a higher speed will normally win the war. Clausewitz called it the exhaustion of the adversary.
A side that perceives itself to be at a marked disadvantage may deliberately seek out attrition warfare to neutralize its opponent's advantages over time. Sun Tzu has stated that there is no country that has benefitted from prolonged warfare, but Russia in 1812 won the war with attrition warfare against Napoleon. When attritional methods have worn down the enemy sufficiently to make other methods feasible, attritional methods are often complemented or even abandoned by other strategies. World War I military commanders on both sides ineffectively relied on attrition warfare, which resulted in casualties without a strategic result.
The difference between war of attrition and other forms of war is somewhat artificial since even a single battle normally contains an element of attrition. A strategy of attrition is pursba9ucnolncosr;bn; an attempt to cause the enemy great losses in a single stroke (such as by encirclement and capture). Attrition warfare also tries to increase the friction in a war for the opponent.
While attrition warfare might appear to be a strategic option for combatants possessing greater resources or asymmetric advantages over their adversaries, it also carries considerable drawbacks. Perhaps the most common reason for failure of attrition warfare is related to the time required to fulfill one's war goals. The geopolitical and strategic situation may shift dramatically over long periods of time, potentially giving the opponent an edge if victory is not achieved soon enough. Additionally, the attrition strategies gives opponents time to adjust tactics and strategy. Although the strategy is typically victorious for the more well-resourced nation, it may eventually fail due to operational and geopolitical mishaps, such as Athens during the Peloponnesian War, or due to strategic miscalculations, such as Germany during the Battle of Britain.
Examples in history:
Most typical: The French invasion of Russia is a textbook example of attrition warfare, where Russia interfered with Napoleon's military logistics and won the war without a decisive battle. One of the best visual representations of the Russian attrition warfare strategies was created by Charles Joseph Minard. It shows the steady decrease of the number of soldiers of the French Grande Armée during the course of the war.
Best known: One commonly known example of attrition warfare might be on the Western Front during World War I. Both military forces found themselves in static defensive positions in trenches running from Switzerland to the English Channel. For years, without any opportunity for maneuvers, the only way the commanders thought that they could defeat the enemy was to repeatedly attack head on and grind the other down.
One of the most enduring examples of attrition warfare on the Western Front is the Battle of Verdun, which took place throughout most of 1916. Erich von Falkenhayn later claimed that his tactics at Verdun were designed not to take the city but rather to destroy the French Army in its defense. Falkenhayn is described as wanting to "bleed France white" and thus the attrition tactics were employed in the battle.
Soldiers on the Italian Front fought a series of battles of attrition along the Isonzo River between June 1915 and November 1917.
Attritional warfare in World War I has been shown by historians such as Hew Strachan to have been used as a post hoc ergo propter hoc excuse for failed offensives. Contemporary sources disagree with Strachan's view on this. While the Christmas Memorandum is a post-war invention, the strategy of attritional warfare was the original strategy for the battle.
List of wars: Scythian tactics during the European Scythian campaign of Darius I of 513 BC, which was in deep steppes retreat, avoiding a direct confrontation with Darius I's army, while spoiling the wells and pastures.
The Athenians, who were weaker in land warfare during the Peloponnesian War, employed attrition warfare using their navy.
The "delaying" tactics of Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (surnamed "Cunctator", the delayer) against Hannibal during the Second Punic War.
Muhammad Tapar's campaign against the Nizaris of Alamut in 1109–1118
Second Mongol invasion of Hungary in 1285 and 1286
Fall of Tenochtitlan by Hernán Cortés in 1521
Swedish invasion of Russia in 1708
The American strategy during the American Revolutionary War
The latter portion of the American Civil War, notably the siege of Vicksburg, the overland campaign, and the siege of Petersburg
The Attrition warfare against Napoleon in the French invasion of Russia by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1812
The later battles of the Philippine–American War
The latter stages of the Spanish Civil War (1938–1939)
The Chinese strategy during the Second Sino-Japanese War
Tonnage war in the Atlantic and Pacific during World War II
The Air battle for Great Britain in World War II after the bombing of London
Static battles in World War II, including Soviet urban defense during the Battle of Stalingrad
Battle of Tabu-dong, and the final two years of the Korean War
The Vietnam War
The "Long War" during the Provisional IRA's armed campaign against the British Army during the Troubles.
The Israeli–Egyptian War of Attrition from 1967 to 1970.
The Soviet–Afghan War and later the Afghan Civil War (1989–1992)
The later phases of the Iran–Iraq War
The Yugoslav Wars (1991–2001): especially the Bosnian War (1992–1995), the Croatian War (1991–1992 and 1995), and the Kosovo War (1998–1999).
The War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)
The Sri Lankan Civil War after 2005
The 2011 Libyan civil war
Kurdish–Turkish conflict (1978–present)
The Syrian civil war (2011–present), in particular the Battle of Aleppo (2012–2016).
The fight of the Polisario Front in Western Sahara against the Moroccan Army (2020–present).
The Tigray War between the Ethiopian government and Tigray rebels (2020–2022).
During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Russian military adopted a strategy of attrition.
The Israel–Hamas war (2023–present)
See also: Asymmetric warfare
Demoralization (warfare)
Guerrilla warfare
Human wave attack
Mexican standoff
No-win situation
Pyrrhic victory
Winner's curse
Win-win game
Military theory: Fabian strategy
Flypaper theory (strategy)
Ivan Bloch
Lanchester's laws
Loss Exchange Ratio
Maneuver warfare
New generation warfare
Notes:
References: Clausewitz, Carl von (1873). On War. Retrieved 3 April 2021.
DiGiovanni, Janine (2012). "Bleary-Eyed Troops Fight a Building at a Time in Syria". New York Times. Retrieved 4 April 2021.
firstworldwar (1916). "Erich von Falkenhayn on the Battle of Verdun". Retrieved 3 April 2021.
Foley, Robert (1916). "A New Form of Warfare? Erich von Falkenhayn's Plan for Victory, 1916". Retrieved 16 March 2018.
Handel, Michael I. (2003). Strategic Logic and Political Rationality: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel. Psychology Press. p. 80. ISBN 9780714654843. Retrieved 4 April 2018.
idlocgov (2022). "Attrition (Military science)". Retrieved 27 August 2022.
Kaye, C.A. (1957). "Military Geology in the United States Sector of the European Theater of Operations during World War II". Geological Society of America Bulletin. 68 (1): 47. Bibcode:1957GSAB...68...47K. doi:10.1130/0016-7606(1957)68[47:MGITUS]2.0.CO;2. Retrieved 3 April 2021.
McPherson, James (1988). Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press. p. 734. ISBN 1442097515. Retrieved 20 June 2022.
Merriam Webster Dictionary (2021). "attrition". Retrieved 3 April 2021.
Murray, Nicholas (2021). "Attrition Warfare". Retrieved 3 April 2021.
nctimes (2012). "Airstrikes turn Libya conflict into battle of attrition". Archived from the original on 4 September 2012. Retrieved 3 April 2021.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
Sun Tzu (2004). The Art of War. Retrieved 3 April 2021. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Auxiliary ship | Roles:
Replenishment: One of the most direct ways that auxiliary ships support the fleet is by providing underway replenishment (also known as "replenishment at sea") to major fleet units. This allows the fleet to remain in the same location, with the replenishment vessels bringing up fuel, ammunition, food, and supplies from shore to the fleet wherever it is operating.
Oilers ("replenishment tankers") are vessels specifically designed to bring fuel oil to the fleet, while the earlier Colliers supplied coal-burning steamships. Specific role replenishment vessels include combat stores ships, depot ships, general stores issue ships, and ammunition ships.
Tenders are specifically designed to support a type of smaller naval unit, like submarines, destroyers, and seaplanes, providing a mobile base of operations for these units: specifically destroyer tenders, submarine tenders, seaplane tenders, torpedo boat tenders.
Transport: Supporting front-line operating bases requires immense transportation capacity. Transport ships are often converted merchant ships simply commissioned (APA, APD, APH, APV) into naval service. Tankers are transports specifically designed to ship fuel to forward locations. Transport ships are often employed not only carrying cargo for naval support but are in support of all forces of a nation's military (AK, AKA, AKN, AKR, AKS). In particular, troopships and attack transports are used to carry a large number of soldiers to operational theatres. Some transport ships are highly specialized, like the ammunition ships employed by the US Navy. Large ocean tugs (AT, ATO, ATF, ATA, ATR) are used to tow large auxiliary ships, like barges, floating repair docks, and floating cranes in the open sea, also disabled ships.
Repair: Repairing ships at sea or in conflict areas is important as it allows these vessels to return to service more quickly, while also increasing the chance of survival for ships critically damaged in battle. Repair vessels (US Navy: AR, ARB, ARC, ARG, ARH, ARL, ARV) range from small equipment ships known as Auxiliary repair docks, to the larger Auxiliary floating drydocks, there are also Aircraft repair ships that specialize in repair of naval aircraft.
Harbor: Harbor support is a critical support role, with various types of vessels including tugboats, barges, lighter barges, derrick-crane vessels, and others used to move ships and equipment around the port facilities, and depot ships and tends to service ships currently in the harbor. These vessels also help maintain the harbor by dredging channels, maintaining jetties and buoys, and even providing floating platforms for port defenses.
In US Navy, tugboats are type YT, YTB, YTM, YTL or a Type V ship. and barges are classified as a Type B ship or YF, YFN, YFR, or YFRN.
Support: Radar picket to increase the radar detection range around a force. Communications Relay Ships (AGMR) are floating communications stations. Tracking ships or Range Instrumentation Ships (AGM) are equipped with antennas and electronics to support the launching and tracking of missiles and rockets. Command ship (AGF) are flagships of the commander of a fleet. Wind-class icebreaker (AGB WAGB) are support ships. Rescue and salvage ship and Submarine rescue ship (ASR) for surface support ship for ship and submarine rescue. Barracks ships or Auxiliary Personal Living ships, (APL) are vessels-barges for service men to live on.
Research: A wide variety of vessels are employed as Technical Research Ships(AGTR), Tracking Ships(AGM), Environmental Research Ships (AGER), Hydrofoil Research Ships (AGEH), and Survey Vessels, primarily to provide a navy with a better understanding of its operating environment or to assist in testing new technologies for employment in other vessels.
Hospital: Hospital ships are able to provide medical care in remote locations to personnel.
Unclassified auxiliary ship: The US Navy also used an unclassified miscellaneous auxiliary ship classification in which the unclassified miscellaneous auxiliary ship classification is IX. An unclassified miscellaneous auxiliary ship can be a new ship without a classified role or a ship that does not fit into a standard category or a ship that had been removed from its classification.
See also: List of auxiliaries of the United States Navy
List of auxiliary ship classes in service
Service Squadron
US Naval Advance Bases
References:
Notes:
Bibliography: Cutler, Deborah W.; Cutler, Thomas J. (2005). Dictionary of Naval Terms (6 ed.). Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1591141501.
Morris, Christopher G. (1992). Academic Press Dictionary of Science and Technology (1 ed.). Academic Press. p. 192. ISBN 978-0127356327. role of auxiliary vessels.
External links: Media related to Auxiliary ships at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Barbed wire | Design: Materials
Zinc-coated steel wire. Galvanized steel wire is the most widely used steel wire during barbed wire production. It has commercial type, Class 1 type and Class 3 type. Or it is also well known as electric galvanized steel wire and hot dipped galvanized steel wire.
Zinc-aluminum alloy coated steel wire. Barbed wire is available with zinc, 5% or 10% aluminum alloy and mischmetal steel wire, which is also known as Galfan wire.
Polymer-coated steel wire. Zinc steel wire or zinc-aluminum steel wire with PVC, PE or other organic polymer coating.
Stainless steel wire. It is available with SAE 304, 316 and other materials.
Strand structure
Single strand. Simple and light duty structure with single line wire (also known as strand wire) and barbs.
Double strand. Conventional structure with double strand wire (line wire) and barbs.
Barb structure
Single barb. Also known as 2-point barbed wire. It uses single barb wire twisted on the line wire (strand wire).
Double barb. Also known as 4-point barbed wire. Two barb wires twisted on the line wire (strand wire).
Twist type
Conventional twist. The strand wire (line wire) are twisted in single direction, which is also known as traditional twist. Besides, the barb wires are twisted between the two strand wire (line wire).
Reverse twist. The strand wire (line wire) are twisted in opposite direction. Besides, the barb wires are twisted outside of the two line wire.
Nominal diameter:
History:
Before 1865: Fencing consisting of flat and thin wire was first proposed in France, by Leonce Eugene Grassin-Baledans in 1860. His design consisted of bristling points, creating a fence that was painful to cross. In April 1865 Louis François Janin proposed a double wire with diamond-shaped metal barbs; Francois was granted a patent. Michael Kelly from New York had a similar idea, and proposed that the fencing should be used specifically for deterring animals.
More patents followed, and in 1867 alone there were six patents issued for barbed wire. Only two of them addressed livestock deterrence, one of which was from American Lucien B. Smith of Ohio. Before 1870, westward movement in the United States was largely across the plains with little or no settlement occurring. After the American Civil War the plains were extensively settled, consolidating America's dominance over them.
Ranchers moved out on the plains, and needed to fence their land in against encroaching farmers and other ranchers. The railroads throughout the growing West needed to keep livestock off their tracks, and farmers needed to keep stray cattle from trampling their crops. Traditional fence materials used in the Eastern U.S., like wood and stone, were expensive to use in the large open spaces of the plains, and hedging was not reliable in the rocky, clay-based and rain-starved dusty soils. A cost-effective alternative was needed to make cattle operations profitable.
1873 meeting and initial development: The "Big Four" in barbed wire were Joseph Glidden, Jacob Haish, Charles Francis Washburn, and Isaac L. Ellwood. Glidden, a farmer in 1873 and the first of the "Big Four," is often credited for designing a successful sturdy barbed wire product, but he let others popularize it for him. Glidden's idea came from a display at a fair in DeKalb, Illinois in 1873, by Henry B. Rose. Rose had patented "The Wooden Strip with Metallic Points" in May 1873.
This was simply a wooden block with wire protrusions designed to keep cows from breaching the fence. That day, Glidden was accompanied by two other men, Isaac L. Ellwood, a hardware dealer and Jacob Haish, a lumber merchant. Like Glidden, they both wanted to create a more durable wire fence with fixed barbs. Glidden experimented with a grindstone to twist two wires together to hold the barbs on the wire in place. The barbs were created from experiments with a coffee mill from his home.
Later Glidden was joined by Ellwood who knew his design could not compete with Glidden's for which he applied for a patent in October 1873. Meanwhile, Haish, who had already secured several patents for barbed wire design, applied for a patent on his third type of wire, the S barb, and accused Glidden of interference, deferring Glidden's approval for his patented wire, nicknamed "The Winner," until November 24, 1874.
Barbed wire production greatly increased with Glidden and Ellwood's establishment of the Barb Fence Company in DeKalb following the success of "The Winner". The company's success attracted the attention of Charles Francis Washburn, Vice President of Washburn & Moen Manufacturing Company, an important producer of plain wire in the Eastern U.S. Washburn visited DeKalb and convinced Glidden to sell his stake in the Barb Wire Fence Company, while Ellwood stayed in DeKalb and renamed the company I.L Ellwood & Company of DeKalb.
Promotion and consolidation: In the late 1870s, John Warne Gates of Illinois began to promote barbed wire, now a proven product, in the lucrative markets of Texas. At first, Texans were hesitant, as they feared that cattle might be harmed, or that the North was somehow trying to make profits from the South. There was also conflict between the farmers who wanted fencing and the ranchers who were losing the open range.
Demonstrations by Gates in San Antonio in 1876 showed that the wire could keep cattle contained, and sales then increased dramatically. Gates eventually parted company with Ellwood and became a barbed wire baron in his own right. Throughout the height of barbed wire sales in the late 19th century, Washburn, Ellwood, Gates, and Haish competed with one another. Ellwood and Gates eventually joined forces again to create the American Steel and Wire Company, later acquired by The U.S. Steel Corporation.
Between 1873 and 1899 there were as many as 150 companies manufacturing barbed wire. Investors knew that the business required minimal capital, and almost anyone with determination could profit by manufacturing a new wire design. There was then a sharp decline in the number of manufacturers, and many were consolidated into larger companies, notably the American Steel and Wire Company, formed by the merging of Gates's and Washburn's and Ellwood's industries.
Smaller companies were decimated because of economies of scale and the smaller pool of consumers available to them, compared to the larger corporations. The American Steel and Wire Company established in 1899 employed vertical integration: it controlled all aspects of production, from producing the steel rods to making many different wire and nail products from that steel. It later became part of U.S. Steel, and barbed wire remained a major source of revenue.
In the American West: Barbed wire was important in protecting range rights in the Western U.S. Although some ranchers put notices in newspapers claiming land areas, and joined stockgrowers associations to help enforce their claims, livestock continued to cross range boundaries. Fences of smooth wire did not hold stock well, and hedges were difficult to grow and maintain. Barbed wire's introduction in the West in the 1870s dramatically reduced the cost of enclosing land.
One fan wrote the inventor Joseph Glidden:
it takes no room, exhausts no soil, shades no vegetation, is proof against high winds, makes no snowdrifts, and is both durable and cheap.
Barbed wire emerged as a major source of conflict with the so-called "Big Die Up" incident in the 1880s. This occurred because of the instinctual migrations of cattle away from the blizzard conditions of the Northern Plains to the warmer and plentiful Southern Plains, but by the early 1880s this area was already divided and claimed by ranchers. The ranchers in place, especially in the Texas Panhandle, knew that their holdings could not support the grazing of additional cattle, so the only alternative was to block the migrations with barb wire fencing.
Many of the herds were decimated in the winter of 1885, with some losing as many as three-quarters of all animals when they could not find a way around the fence. Later other smaller scale cattlemen, especially in central Texas, opposed the closing of the open range, and began cutting fences to allow cattle to pass through to find grazing land. In this transition zone between the agricultural regions to the south and the rangeland to the north, conflict erupted, with vigilantes joining the scene causing chaos and even death. The Fence Cutting Wars ended with the passage of a Texas law in 1884 that made fence cutting a felony. Other states followed, although conflicts occurred through the early years of the 20th century. An 1885 federal law forbade placing such fences across the public domain.
Barbed wire is cited by historians as the invention that tamed the West. Herding large numbers of cattle on open range required significant manpower to catch strays. Barbed wire provided an inexpensive method to control the movement of cattle. By the beginning of the 20th century, large numbers of cowboys were unnecessary.
In the Southwest United States: John Warne Gates demonstrated barbed wire for Washburn and Moen in Military Plaza, San Antonio, Texas in 1876. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Barbed wire | In this transition zone between the agricultural regions to the south and the rangeland to the north, conflict erupted, with vigilantes joining the scene causing chaos and even death. The Fence Cutting Wars ended with the passage of a Texas law in 1884 that made fence cutting a felony. Other states followed, although conflicts occurred through the early years of the 20th century. An 1885 federal law forbade placing such fences across the public domain.
Barbed wire is cited by historians as the invention that tamed the West. Herding large numbers of cattle on open range required significant manpower to catch strays. Barbed wire provided an inexpensive method to control the movement of cattle. By the beginning of the 20th century, large numbers of cowboys were unnecessary.
In the Southwest United States: John Warne Gates demonstrated barbed wire for Washburn and Moen in Military Plaza, San Antonio, Texas in 1876. The demonstration showing cattle restrained by the new kind of fencing was followed immediately by invitations to the Menger Hotel to place orders. Gates subsequently had a falling out with Washburn and Moen and Isaac Ellwood. He moved to St. Louis and founded the Southern Wire Company, which became the largest manufacturer of unlicensed or "bootleg" barbed wire.
An 1880 US District Court decision upheld the validity of the Glidden patent, effectively establishing a monopoly. This decision was affirmed by the US Supreme Court in 1892. In 1898 Gates took control of Washburn and Moen, and created the American Steel and Wire monopoly, which became a part of the United States Steel Corporation.
This led to disputes known as the range wars between open range ranchers and farmers in the late 19th century. These were similar to the disputes which resulted from enclosure laws in England in the early 18th century. These disputes were decisively settled in favor of the farmers, and heavy penalties were instituted for cutting a barbed wire fence. Within 2 years, nearly all of the open range had been fenced in under private ownership. For this reason, some historians have dated the end of the Old West era of American history to the invention and subsequent proliferation of barbed wire.
Installation: The most important and most time-consuming part of a barbed wire fence is constructing the corner post and the bracing assembly. A barbed wire fence is under tremendous tension, often up to half a ton, and so the corner post's sole function is to resist the tension of the fence spans connected to it. The bracing keeps the corner post vertical and prevents slack from developing in the fence.
Brace posts are placed in-line about 2.5 metres (8 ft) from the corner post. A horizontal compression brace connects the top of the two posts, and a diagonal wire connects the top of the brace post to the bottom of the corner post. This diagonal wire prevents the brace post from leaning, which in turn allows the horizontal brace to prevent the corner post from leaning into the brace post. A second set of brace posts (forming a double brace) is used whenever the barbed wire span exceeds 60 metres (200 ft).
When the barbed wire span exceeds 200 m (650 ft), a braced line assembly is added in-line. This has the function of a corner post and brace assembly but handles tension from opposite sides. It uses diagonal brace wire that connects the tops to the bottoms of all adjacent posts.
Line posts are installed along the span of the fence at intervals of 2.5 to 15 m (8 to 50 ft). An interval of 5 m (16 ft) is most common. Heavy livestock and crowded pasture demands the smaller spacing. The sole function of a line post is not to take up slack but to keep the barbed wire strands spaced equally and off the ground.
Once these posts and bracing have been erected, the wire is wrapped around one corner post, held with a hitch (a timber hitch works well for this) often using a staple to hold the height and then reeled out along the span of the fence replacing the roll every 400 m. It is then wrapped around the opposite corner post, pulled tightly with wire stretchers, and sometimes nailed with more fence staples, although this may make readjustment of tension or replacement of the wire more difficult. Then it is attached to all of the line posts with fencing staples driven in partially to allow stretching of the wire.
There are several ways to anchor the wire to a corner post:
Hand-knotting. The wire is wrapped around the corner post and knotted by hand. This is the most common method of attaching wire to a corner post. A timber hitch works well as it stays better with wire than with rope.
Crimp sleeves. The wire is wrapped around the corner post and bound to the incoming wire using metal sleeves which are crimped using lock cutters. This method should be avoided because while sleeves can work well on repairs in the middle of the fence where there is not enough wire for hand knotting, they tend to slip when under tension.
Wire vise. The wire is passed through a hole drilled into the corner post and is anchored on the far side.
Wire wrap. The wire is wrapped around the corner post and wrapped onto a special, gritted helical wire which also wraps around the incoming wire, with friction holding it in place.
Barbed wire for agriculture use is typically double-strand 12+1⁄2-gauge, zinc-coated (galvanized) steel and comes in rolls of 400 m (1,320 ft) length. Barbed wire is usually placed on the inner (pasture) side of the posts. Where a fence runs between two pastures livestock could be with the wire on the outside or on both sides of the fence.
Galvanized wire is classified into three categories; Classes I, II, and III. Class I has the thinnest coating and the shortest life expectancy. A wire with Class I coating will start showing general rusting in 8 to 10 years, while the same wire with Class III coating will show rust in 15 to 20 years. Aluminum-coated wire is occasionally used, and yields a longer life.
Corner posts are 15 to 20 centimetres (6 to 8 in) in diameter or larger, and a minimum 2.5 metres (8 ft) in length may consist of treated wood or from durable on-site trees such as osage orange, black locust, red cedar, or red mulberry, also railroad ties, telephone, and power poles are salvaged to be used as corner posts (poles and railroad ties were often treated with chemicals determined to be an environmental hazard and cannot be reused in some jurisdictions). In Canada spruce posts are sold for this purpose. Posts are 10 centimetres (4 in) in diameter driven at least 1.2 metres (4 ft) and may be anchored in a concrete base 51 centimetres (20 in) square and 110 centimetres (42 in) deep. Iron posts, if used, are a minimum 64 millimetres (2.5 in) in diameter. Bracing wire is typically smooth 9-gauge. Line posts are set to a depth of about 76 centimetres (30 in). Conversely, steel posts are not as stiff as wood, and wires are fastened with slips along fixed teeth, which means variations in driving height affect wire spacing.
During the First World War, screw pickets were used for the installation of wire obstacles; these were metal rods with eyelets for holding strands of wire, and a corkscrew-like end that could literally be screwed into the ground rather than hammered, so that wiring parties could work at night near enemy soldiers and not reveal their position by the sound of hammers.
Gates: As with any fence, barbed wire fences require gates to allow the passage of persons, vehicles and farm implements. Gates vary in width from 3.5 metres (12 ft) to allow the passage of vehicles and tractors, to 12 metres (40 ft) on farm land to pass combines and swathers.
One style of gate is called the Hampshire gate in the UK, a New Zealand gate in some areas, and often simply a "gate" elsewhere. Made of wire with posts attached at both ends and in the middle, it is permanently wired on one side and attaches to a gate post with wire loops on the other. Most designs can be opened by hand, though some gates that are frequently opened and closed may have a lever attached to assist in bringing the upper wire loop over the gate post.
Gates for cattle tend to have four wires when along a three wire fence, as cattle tend to put more stress on gates, particularly on corner gates. The fence on each side of the gate ends with two corner posts braced or unbraced depending on the size of the post. An unpounded post (often an old broken post) is held to one corner post with wire rings which act as hinges. On the other end a full-length post, the tractor post, is placed with the pointed end upwards with a ring on the bottom stapled to the other corner post, the latch post, and on top a ring is stapled to the tractor post, tied with a Stockgrower's Lash or one of numerous other opening bindings. Wires are then tied around the post at one end then run to the other end where they are stretched by hand or with a stretcher, before posts are stapled on every 1.2 metres (4 ft). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Barbed wire | The fence on each side of the gate ends with two corner posts braced or unbraced depending on the size of the post. An unpounded post (often an old broken post) is held to one corner post with wire rings which act as hinges. On the other end a full-length post, the tractor post, is placed with the pointed end upwards with a ring on the bottom stapled to the other corner post, the latch post, and on top a ring is stapled to the tractor post, tied with a Stockgrower's Lash or one of numerous other opening bindings. Wires are then tied around the post at one end then run to the other end where they are stretched by hand or with a stretcher, before posts are stapled on every 1.2 metres (4 ft). Often this type of gate is called a portagee fence or a portagee gate in various ranching communities of coastal Central California.
Most gates can be opened by push post. The chain is then wrapped around the tractor post and pulled onto the nail, stronger people can pull the gate tighter but anyone can jar off the chain to open the gate.
Uses:
Agriculture: Barbed wire fences remain the standard fencing technology for enclosing cattle in most regions of the United States, but not all countries. The wire is aligned under tension between heavy, braced, fence posts (strainer posts) and then held at the correct height by being attached to wooden or steel fence posts, and/or with battens in between.
The gaps between posts vary depending on type and terrain. On short fences in hilly country, steel posts may be placed every 3 metres (3 yd), while in flat terrain with long spans and relatively few stock they may be spaced up to 30 to 50 metres (33 to 55 yd) apart. Wooden posts are normally spaced at 10 metres (11 yd) on all terrain, with 4 or 5 battens in between. However, many farmers place posts 2 metres (2 yd) apart as battens can bend, causing wires to close in on one another.
Barbed wire for agricultural fencing is typically available in two varieties: soft or mild-steel wire and high-tensile. Both types are galvanized for longevity. High-tensile wire is made with thinner but higher-strength steel. Its greater strength makes fences longer lasting because it resists stretching and loosening better, coping with expansion and contraction caused by heat and animal pressure by stretching and relaxing within wider elastic limits. It also supports longer spans, but because of its elastic (springy) nature, it is harder to handle and somewhat dangerous for inexperienced fencers. Soft wire is much easier to work but is less durable and only suitable for short spans such as repairs and gates, where it is less likely to tangle.
In high soil-fertility areas where dairy cattle are used in great numbers, 5- or 7-wire fences are common as the main boundary and internal dividing fences. On sheep farms 7-wire fences are common with the second (from bottom) to fifth wire being plain wire. In New Zealand wire fences must provide passage for dogs since they are the main means of controlling and driving animals on farms.
Warfare and law enforcement: Barbed wire was used for the first time by Portuguese troops defending from African tribes during the Combat of Magul in 1895. Less well known is its extensive usage in the Russo-Japanese War.
In 1899 barbed wire was also extensively used in the Boer War, where it played a strategic role bringing spaces under control, at military outposts as well as to hold the captured Boer population in concentration camps.
The government of the United States built its first international border fence from 1909 to 1911 along the California-Mexico border. It included barbed wire and was intended to keep cattle from moving between the two countries. In 1924, the United States created its border patrol, which built more barbed wire fences on the Mexican border; this time to prevent people from crossing.
More significantly, barbed wire was used extensively by all participating combatants in World War I to prevent movement, with deadly consequences. Barbed wire entanglements were placed in front of trenches to prevent direct charges on men below, increasingly leading to greater use of more advanced weapons such as high-powered machine guns and grenades. A feature of these entanglements was that the barbs were much closer together, often forming a continuous sequence.
Barbed wire could be exposed to heavy bombardments because it could be easily replaced, and its structure included so much open space that machine guns rarely destroyed enough of it to defeat its purpose. However, barbed wire was defeated by the tank in 1916, as shown by the Allied breakthrough at Amiens through German lines on August 8, 1918.
One British writer described how the Germans used barbed wire as follows: The enemy wire was always deep, thick, and securely staked with iron supports, which were either crossed like the letter X, or upright, with loops to take the wire and shaped at one end like corkscrews so as to screw into the ground. The wire stood on these supports on a thick web, about four feet high and from thirty to forty feet across. The wire used was generally as thick as sailor's marline stuff, or two twisted rope yarns. It contained, as a rule, some sixteen barbs to the foot. The wire used in front of our lines was generally galvanized, and remained grey after months of exposure. The (German) wire, not being galvanized, rusted to a black color, and shows up black at a great distance.
During the Great Depression, migratory work camps in the United States used barbed wire.
In the 1930s and 1940s Europe the Nazis used barbed wire in concentration camp and extermination camp architecture, where it usually surrounded the camp and was electrified to prevent escape. Barbed wire served the purpose of keeping prisoners contained.
Infirmaries in extermination camps like Auschwitz where prisoners were gassed or experimented on were often separated from other areas by electrified wire and were often braided with branches to prevent outsiders from knowing what was concealed behind their walls.
During the United States' World War II Internment of Japanese Americans, barbed wire was used to enclose the concentration camps, such as Manzanar.
During the 1968 Chicago riots, barbed wire was attached to the fronts of police and National Guard vehicles. The vehicles were used to drive into protesters and rioters and were nicknamed "Daly dozers" after then-Chicago mayor Richard J. Daley.
Safety and injuries: Most barbed wire fences, while sufficient to discourage cattle, are passable by humans who can simply climb over or through the fence by stretching the gaps between the wires using non-barbed sections of the wire as handholds. To prevent humans crossing, many prisons, and other high-security installations construct fences with razor wire, a variant which replaces the barbs with near-continuous cutting surfaces sufficient to injure unprotected persons who climb on it. Both razor wire and barbed wire can be bypassed with protection, such as a thick carpet, or with the use of wire cutters.
A commonly seen alternative is the placement of a few strands of barbed wire at the top of a chain link fence. The limited mobility of someone climbing a fence makes passing conventional barbed wire more difficult. On some chain link fences, these strands are attached to a bracket tilted 45 degrees towards the intruder, further increasing the difficulty.
Barbed wire began to be widely used as an implement of war during World War I. Wire was placed either to impede or halt the passage of soldiers, or to channel them into narrow defiles in which small arms, particularly machine guns, and indirect fire could be used with greater effect as they attempted to pass. Artillery bombardments on the Western Front became increasingly aimed at cutting the barbed wire that was a major component of trench warfare, particularly once new "wire-cutting" fuzes were introduced midway through the war.
As the war progressed, the wire was used in shorter lengths that were easier to transport and more difficult to cut with artillery. Other inventions were also a result of the war, such as the screw picket, which enabled construction of wire obstacles to be done at night in No Man's Land without the necessity of hammering stakes into the ground and drawing attention from the enemy.
During the Soviet–Afghan War, the accommodation of Afghan refugees into Pakistan was controlled in Pakistan's largest province, Balochistan, under General Rahimuddin Khan, by making the refugees stay for controlled durations in barbed wire camps (see Controlling Soviet–Afghan war refugees).
The frequent use of barbed wire on prison walls, around concentration camps, and the like, has made it symbolic of oppression and denial of freedom in general. For example, in Germany, the totality of East Germany's border regime is commonly referred to with the short phrase "Mauer und Stacheldraht" (that is, "wall and barbed wire"), and Amnesty International has a barbed wire in their symbol.
Movement against barbed wire can result in moderate to severe injuries to the skin and, depending on body area and barbed wire configuration, possibly to the underlying tissue. Humans can manage not to injure themselves excessively when dealing with barbed wire as long as they are cautious. Restriction of movement, appropriate clothing, and slow movement when close to barbed wire aid in reducing injury.
Infantrymen are often trained and inured to the injuries caused by barbed wire. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Barbed wire | The frequent use of barbed wire on prison walls, around concentration camps, and the like, has made it symbolic of oppression and denial of freedom in general. For example, in Germany, the totality of East Germany's border regime is commonly referred to with the short phrase "Mauer und Stacheldraht" (that is, "wall and barbed wire"), and Amnesty International has a barbed wire in their symbol.
Movement against barbed wire can result in moderate to severe injuries to the skin and, depending on body area and barbed wire configuration, possibly to the underlying tissue. Humans can manage not to injure themselves excessively when dealing with barbed wire as long as they are cautious. Restriction of movement, appropriate clothing, and slow movement when close to barbed wire aid in reducing injury.
Infantrymen are often trained and inured to the injuries caused by barbed wire. Several soldiers can lie across the wire to form a bridge for the rest of the formation to pass over; often any injury thus incurred is due to the tread of those passing over and not to the wire itself.
Injuries caused by barbed wire are typically seen in horses, bats, or birds. Horses panic easily, and once caught in barbed wire, large patches of skin may be torn off. At best, such injuries may heal, but they may cause disability or death (particularly due to infection). Birds or bats may not be able to perceive thin strands of barbed wire and suffer injuries.
For this reason, horse fences may have rubber bands nailed parallel to the wires.
More than 60 different species of wildlife have been reported in Australia as victims of entanglement on barbed wire fences, and the wildlife friendly fencing project is beginning to address this problem.
Grazing animals with slow movements that will back off at the first notion of pain (e.g., sheep and cows) will not generally suffer the severe injuries often seen in other animals.
Barbed wire has been reported as a tool for human torture. It is also frequently used as a weapon in hardcore professional wrestling matches, often as a covering for another type of weapon—Mick Foley was infamous for using a baseball bat wrapped in barbed wire—and infrequently as a covering of or substitute for the ring ropes.
Because of the risk of injuries, in 2010 Norway prohibited making new fences with barbed wire for limiting migration of animals. Electric fences are used instead. Consequently, automotive brands such as Bentley and Rolls-Royce Motor Cars is using Norwegian (and other Northern European region) hides for producing leather interior in their cars, since the hides from Norwegian cattle have fewer scratches than hides from countries where barbed wire is used.
See also: Bangalore torpedo
Barbed Wire Act 1893
Concertina wire
Isaac L. Ellwood
Jacob Haish
Kansas Barbed Wire Museum
Razor wire
Wire obstacle
Notes:
References and further reading:
External links:
Website of the Devils Rope Museum Archived February 22, 2011, at the Wayback Machine in McLean, Texas
The Kansas Barbed Wire Museum in La Crosse, Kansas is the only museum in the world dedicated solely to barbed wire and the history of fencing."History of the invention of barbed wire". Archived from the original on July 21, 2010. Retrieved July 21, 2010.
Krell, Alan: Barbed Wire, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
Wire Fence and the Dіffеrent Styles They Come In
Development and Rise of Barbed Wire at University of Virginia accessed March 29, 2006
Barbed Wire Fencing - Its Rise and Influence also at UVA, from Agricultural History, Volume 13, October 1939, accessed September 20, 2006
Glidden's patent for barbed wire accessed March 29, 2006
Antique Barbed Wire Society accessed September 21, 2006
Barbed Wire in Texas
Barbed wire changes life on the American Great Plains
The History of Barbed Wire About.com
The Wildlife Friendly Fencing project
Papers, 1878-1938, of Texas rancher and co-inventor Isaac L. Ellwood in Southwest Collection/Special Collections Library at Texas Tech University
"Patent history". Archived from the original on December 7, 2008. Retrieved September 21, 2006. accessed September 21, 2006
U.S. patent 66,182 – Lucien Smith, Kent, Ohio, Wire fence – "rotary spools with projecting spurs" (June 1867)
U.S. patent 67,117 – William Hunt, Scott, New York, Improvement in Fences – "sharpened spur wheels" (July 1867)
U.S. patent 74,379 – Michael Kelly, New York City (!), Improvement in Fences – "thorny fence" (1868)
U.S. patent 116,755 – Joshua Rappleye, Seneca County, New York, Improvement in Constructing Wire fence – tensioner for fence with palings (pickets) (1871)
U.S. patent 138,763 – Henry Rose, DeKalb County, Illinois, Improvement in Wire-fences – "strips provided with metal points" (1873)
U.S. patent 147,756 – Isaac Ellwood, DeKalb, Illinois Improvement in Barbed Fences – "single piece of metal with four points, attached to a flat rail" (February, 1874)
U.S. patent 157,124 – Joseph Glidden, DeKalb, Illinois, Improvement in Wire-fences – twisted fence wires with short spur coiled around one of the strands (November, 1874) This became the most popular patent.
U.S. patent 167,240 – Jacob Haish, DeKalb, Illinois, Improvement in Wire-fence Barbs – "single piece of wire bent into the form of the letter S" so that both strands are clasped (1875)
U.S. patent 185,346 – John Nelson, Creston, Illinois, Improvement in Wire-fence Barbs – barb installable on existing fence wire, (1876) |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Barrage (artillery) | Development: The moving barrage was developed during the Boer War, one of several tactical innovations instituted under command of General Redvers Buller. It was a response to Boer defensive positions, notably at Tugela Heights and effective long range rifle fire.
Artillery usually fired over open sights at visible targets, until the Second Boer War when indirect fire started to be used. The largest unit accustomed to firing at a single target was the brigade (i.e. an artillery battalion), normally 18 guns. Trench warfare led to the necessity for indirect firing through the use of observers, more sophisticated artillery fire plans and an increasingly scientific approach to gunnery. Gunners had to use increasingly complicated calculations to lay the guns. Individual guns were aimed so that their fall of shot was co-ordinated with others to form a pattern; in the case of a barrage, the pattern was a line. The term “barrage” was first used in World War I in English in the orders for the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in 1915.
A lifting barrage was a development in which the barrage lifted periodically to a target further back, such as a second line of trenches. This was countered by the defenders infiltrating troops and machine guns into no-man's land or the areas between their own trench lines, so it was found necessary to comb the entire area of the advance with artillery fire.
Creeping barrage: A creeping barrage (also called a moving barrage) was a barrage that lifted in small increments, usually 50 to 100 yards every few minutes, moving forward slowly, keeping pace with the infantry. British practice evolved to fire at two lines simultaneously. Eventually, three patterns of advancing the barrage developed. In a creeping barrage, the shell-fire moved from one line to the next. In a block barrage two or more lines were fired on simultaneously and then the fire moved as block to the next lines to be engaged. In a rolling barrage, the fire on the line nearest to their own troops moved to the first unengaged line behind then after a set interval the fire on the second line would move in turn to the next one behind that.
By late 1917, the technique of a creeping barrage had been perfected and could be made to move in complex ways, the barrage wheeling or even combing back and forth, to catch the defenders re-emerging after the barrage had passed but it was still governed by a timetable. A creeping barrage that was too slow would risk friendly fire on one's advancing troops; too quickly could mean that the enemy would have too much time to emerge from cover to resume defensive positions and attack the exposed advancing troops. After World War I the British developed the "quick barrage", a standard barrage pattern that could be ordered by radio without advance plotting of the fire plan on a map.
Standing and box barrages: A standing barrage was static, and might be defensive, to inhibit the movement of enemy troops and break up attacks. A creeping barrage could be made to stand on a line for a time before it moved on, perhaps waiting for the infantry to form up behind it, or to catch up, or perhaps it would stand on the line of known enemy defences, to do more damage and sap enemy morale. The fireplan for the Battle of Messines on 7 June 1917 called for most of the British 18-pounder field guns to fire a creeping barrage of shrapnel immediately ahead of the advance, while the other field guns and 4.5-inch (110 mm) howitzers fired a standing barrage some 700 yards (640 m) ahead.
The standing barrage was aligned with known German positions, and lifted to the next target when the advance reached within 400 yards (370 m) of it. As each objective was taken by the infantry, the creeping barrage would pause at 150 to 300 yards (140 to 270 m) ahead of them and become a standing barrage, protecting the newly gained positions from counter-attack while the infantry consolidated. During this time the pace of fire slackened to one round per gun a minute, enabling the guns and the crews a respite before resuming full intensity as the barrage moved on. The heavy and super-heavy artillery fired on German rear areas. Over 700 machine guns participated in the barrage, using indirect fire over the heads of their own troops.
In a box barrage three or four barrages formed a box – or more often three sides of a box – around a position to isolate it. Standing or box barrages were often used for defensive fire tasks, in which the barrage was registered beforehand on a position – agreed with the defending infantry commander – to be called down in the event of an enemy attack on his positions. A box barrage could also be used to prevent the enemy from reinforcing a position to be attacked. In a trench raid of March 1917, the 1st Battalion the Buffs were supported first by a creeping barrage, then by a box barrage once they were in the enemy trenches, to prevent German reinforcement or counter-attack. It was aided with dummy bombardments on other sections of the line to confuse the enemy.
Advantages and drawbacks: It was soon appreciated how important it was for the attacking troops to follow the barrage closely ("leaning on the barrage"), without allowing time for the defenders to recover from the shock of bombardment and emerge from their dug-outs; the French reckoned they should be suffering 10% of their casualties from their own artillery if they were close enough to the barrage. Ideally the attackers should be into the enemy positions before the defenders had time to recover their composure after the terror of an intense bombardment, emerge from shelters and man their firing positions. On the First day of the Somme, and in the later French Nivelle Offensive on the Chemin des Dames, the barrage outpaced the infantry, allowing the defenders to recover and emerge from their dug-outs, with disastrous results for the attackers. By the end of World War I it was realised that the important effect of the barrage was to demoralise and suppress the enemy, rather than physical destruction; a short, intense bombardment immediately followed by infantry assault was more effective than the weeks of grinding bombardment used in 1916.
A creeping barrage could maintain the element of surprise, with the guns opening fire only shortly before the assault troops moved off. It was useful when enemy positions had not been thoroughly reconnoitred, as it did not depend on identifying individual targets in advance. On the other hand, it was wasteful of ammunition and guns, as much of the fire would inevitably fall on ground containing no enemy.
The World War I barrage with programmed lifts had the effect of confining the infantry advance to the artillery schedule, and of requiring the use of linear tactics, restricting infantry manoeuvre. Infiltration tactics later proved more effective than advancing in rigid lines, and the infiltration phase of German stormtrooper attacks could not use a creeping barrage; but the opening phase of the German spring offensive (Operation Michael) was still supported by a massive creeping barrage, containing a heavy mix of gas shells. The importance of the barrage was such that traditional infantry tactics, such as reliance on the infantry's own firepower to support its movement, were sometimes forgotten.
In the featureless Western Desert in World War II, one benefit of the barrage was that it enabled the infantry to conform their line to the barrage, ensuring that their line of advance was correct. By 1943 the barrage was considered to dissipate firepower and to constrain the infantry into advancing in rigid lines.
A barrage could severely churn up the ground, especially in soft going, and impede the progress of the attacking troops.
Use in World War I: It is sometimes claimed that creeping barrage was first used during World War I in the battle of Gorlice in May 1915 (part of the Gorlice–Tarnów offensive) by General Tadeusz Rozwadowski, but in fact infantry assault was simply preceded by a four-hour shelling of the Russian defences. The first day of the battle of the Somme saw another attempt at a large-scale creeping barrage which had been planned in anticipation of the infantry's anticipated ability to advance relatively unhampered across the battlefield due to a heavy, week-long preparatory bombardment. For example, on XV Corps front, the barrage was programmed to lift 50 yards (46 m) every minute. Complications arose however in British protocols to prevent friendly-fire casualties which at the time dictated that shellfire was to be kept over one hundred yards away from their own uncovered infantry. In many cases no man's land was narrower than the allowable 'safe' distance and as such the barrage did not protect the men as they went 'over the top' and advanced towards the German trenches.
Further, as the British infantry was slowed far beyond the expected pace of advance across no-man's land, all along the Somme front it proved impossible for the infantry to keep up with the pace of the barrage. However, the tactic was further refined as the Battle of the Somme wore on and by September 1916 the creeping barrage became a standard tactic for infantry attacks, and soon spread to the French Army, enabling the French recapture of Fort Vaux at the Battle of Verdun in November 1916. By the later stages of the Battle of the Somme, the British had improved the accuracy of and confidence in their artillery fire and had learned the lessons of keeping infantry close to the barrage: the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) circulated an aerial observer's report commending a "most perfect wall of fire" followed up within 50 yards (46 m) by the infantry of 50th (Northumbrian) Division, enabling them to take a village with little opposition. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Barrage (artillery) | However, the tactic was further refined as the Battle of the Somme wore on and by September 1916 the creeping barrage became a standard tactic for infantry attacks, and soon spread to the French Army, enabling the French recapture of Fort Vaux at the Battle of Verdun in November 1916. By the later stages of the Battle of the Somme, the British had improved the accuracy of and confidence in their artillery fire and had learned the lessons of keeping infantry close to the barrage: the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) circulated an aerial observer's report commending a "most perfect wall of fire" followed up within 50 yards (46 m) by the infantry of 50th (Northumbrian) Division, enabling them to take a village with little opposition. A report said "Experience has shown that it is far better to risk a few casualties from an occasional short round from our own artillery than to suffer the many casualties which occur when the bombardment is not closely followed up". A creeping barrage was essential to the success of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in the capture of Vimy Ridge in April, 1917. The creeping barrage was used during the action of Tell 'Asur on 12 March 1918 in the Sinai and Palestine Campaign. Six months later, it was used with devastating effect during the Battle of Megiddo (1918) when 18-pdr and Royal Horse Artillery formed a creeping barrage which fired in front of the advancing infantry up to their extreme range while 4.5-inch howitzers fired beyond the barrage, while heavy artillery were employed in counter battery work. The creeping barrage moved at a rate of between 50 yards (46 m), 75 yards (69 m) and 100 yards (91 m) per minute.
At first, British creeping barrages consisted only of shrapnel shells but an equal mix of HE was soon added, in some cases later supplemented by smoke shells. The creeping barrage would advance at a rate of 100 yards every one to six minutes, depending on terrain and conditions; although six minutes was found to be too slow. By the Battle of Arras in 1917, the creeping barrage was huge and complex, with five or six lines of fire covering a depth of 2,000 yards (1,800 m) ahead of the infantry.
Back barrages were fired, in which rearmost lines of the barrage reversed direction, and machine gun barrages were introduced. False barrages attempted to deceive the enemy about Allied intentions or to force him to reveal his positions. The creeping barrage was used to great effect in the Canadian success at the Battle of Vimy Ridge where the men had been extensively trained to move forward in the 'Vimy Glide' - a 100-yard per three minute pace which kept the infantry directly behind the barrage. The opening attack of the Battle of Passchendaele was covered by a barrage of shrapnel and HE on a colossal scale, fired by over 3,000 British guns and howitzers: one 18-pounder for every 15 yards (14 m) of front, and a heavy howitzer for every 50 yards (46 m), with yet more guns in the French sector. The British barrage advanced 100 yards (91 m) every four minutes, with the infantry following as close as 50 yards (46 m) from the bursting shells. One battery's programme required 45 lifts. As each objective was reached, the barrage settled 500 yards (460 m) beyond the new position, combing back and forth to disrupt expected German counter-attacks, while some of the artillery moved forward to support the next phase of the advance.
On the Eastern Front, German Colonel Georg Bruchmüller developed a form of double creeping barrage, with the first line of the barrage consisting of gas shells. His ideas were applied on the Western Front in the German spring offensive of 1918.
The day of the lengthy large-scale preliminary barrage had largely passed by the end of World War I, at least in Western nations, with the realisation that best results were achieved by neutralising the enemy rather than attempting his physical destruction, and that short, concentrated bombardments, including creeping barrages, were more effective in neutralising the enemy than extended bombardment. Once open warfare returned after the breaking of the Hindenburg Line in September 1918 the British fired far fewer creeping barrages, using more lifts and concentrations instead.
Attacks by tanks do not need the same form of artillery support, and the single barrage along the entire front of the advance had even been abandoned by the battle of Cambrai in 1917. More sophisticated fire control enabled infantry to call down artillery fire in direct support, or targeting of identified enemy positions. Nevertheless, barrages remained in use. On 31 August 1918 the attack of the U.S. 32nd Division was preceded by a walking barrage. After first passing over the German line, the barrage returned twice more, attempting to catch the defenders returning to their firing positions from their dugouts, or to keep them underground when the real assault went in.
Use in World War II: The barrage remained in use in World War II, but was no longer the dominant artillery plan. In the absence of the huge set-piece infantry assaults of World War I, barrages were on a smaller scale. For the opening of the second Battle of El Alamein, for example, a barrage was considered by British Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery's planners, but rejected in favour of fierce concentrations on known or suspected targets in turn. Along a 12,000-yard (11,000 m) front, 456 guns were considered insufficient for a true creeping barrage (at Neuve Chapelle there had been one gun for every four yards of front). But creeping and rolling barrages were used in some divisional sectors and in later phases of the Alamein battle. For Operation Supercharge on 1–2 November 1942, the attack in the 2nd New Zealand Division sector was preceded by a creeping barrage of 192 guns along a 4,000-yard (3,700 m) front, firing on three lines. There was almost one 25-pounder for every 20 yards of front, plus two medium regiments thickening the barrage.
By the fighting in Tunisia, more guns were available and the defenders were more concentrated than in the Western Desert. The artillery plan for the British attack at Wadi Akarit in April 1943 involved eight barrages in three phases ahead of the advances of 50th (Northumbrian) and 51st (Highland) Infantry Divisions. They included a standing barrage to mark the start line in the dark and enable the infantry to form up in the right alignment; a barrage that wheeled left during the advance; and an on-call creeping barrage. Nevertheless, attacks rarely relied solely on a barrage for artillery support: at Wadi Akarit pre-arranged concentrations on likely targets were called down by observers in the course of the assault.
Nevertheless, it remained in use in the Italian Campaign. In the assault on the Hitler Line during the Battle of Monte Cassino on 23 May 1944, 810 guns were amassed for the attack of I Canadian Corps. Three hundred of them fired on the first line of a 3,200-yard (2,900 m) wide barrage, beginning three minutes before the infantry moved off and lifting at a rate of 100 yards in five minutes. It was due to pause for an hour at the first objective, then lift at 100 yards per three minutes to the further objectives, but the timing was disrupted by heavy resistance and defensive artillery fire. The operation was later criticised for concentrating on too narrow a front, constrained by the need for enough guns to produce a dense barrage.
In the assault crossing of the Senio during the final offensive in Italy in 1945, dummy barrages were used to confuse the enemy, either misleading them as to the line of attack or drawing them out of shelters as the barrage passed, expecting an infantry assault, only to catch them with a renewed barrage or air attacks. On Monte Sole, U.S. artillery fired probably its heaviest barrage of the war, 75,000 shells in a half-hour to clear the advance of the South Africans.
During the Battle of Normandy, a creeping barrage fired from 344 guns preceded the opening attacks of 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division in Operation Epsom on 26 June 1944.
For the opening of Operation Veritable, the push to the Rhine, the fire of 1,050 field and heavy guns was supplemented by 850 barrels of pepper-pot barrage: other weapons – mortars, machine guns, tanks, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns and rockets – supplementing the field guns. The true barrage of the British XXX Corps began at 09:20, building in intensity over the next hour, 500 guns shooting at a line 500 yards deep. The barrage included smoke shells to screen the attackers forming up behind the barrage. From 10.30 the barrage was pure high explosive and began to roll forward. A 300-yard lift was made every 12 minutes, the lifts being signalled to the infantry by yellow smoke shells, and the barrage paused for ½ hour at each defensive line. 2,500 shells were fired per square kilometre per hour until the barrage stopped at 16:30.
The barrage remained in Soviet doctrine in World War II, where the creeping barrage by massed guns was the standard accompaniment to an infantry assault. The Soviet artillery had plenty of guns. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Barrage (artillery) | The true barrage of the British XXX Corps began at 09:20, building in intensity over the next hour, 500 guns shooting at a line 500 yards deep. The barrage included smoke shells to screen the attackers forming up behind the barrage. From 10.30 the barrage was pure high explosive and began to roll forward. A 300-yard lift was made every 12 minutes, the lifts being signalled to the infantry by yellow smoke shells, and the barrage paused for ½ hour at each defensive line. 2,500 shells were fired per square kilometre per hour until the barrage stopped at 16:30.
The barrage remained in Soviet doctrine in World War II, where the creeping barrage by massed guns was the standard accompaniment to an infantry assault. The Soviet artillery had plenty of guns. Some 7,000 guns and mortars were massed for the counter-attack at the battle of Stalingrad, and huge bombardments remained standard for the rest of the war. During the Soviet advances in 1944–45, the tactic was used extensively throughout the Eastern Front such as the Vyborg–Petrozavodsk Offensive, the Battle of the Seelow Heights, and the Battle of Berlin.
Korean War and after: The barrage continued in use into the Korean War. At the Battle of Pork Chop Hill, UN forces employed on-call, pre-registered defensive fires called flash fire to defend its outposts, in which artillery laid down a box barrage in a horseshoe-shaped pattern around the outpost. It was still in use in the Vietnam War.
In the 1982 Falklands War, the assault of 42 Commando Royal Marines on Mount Harriet was preceded by a moving concentration from supporting artillery, firing some 100 yards ahead of the advancing Marines. Later phases of the attack used a pepperpot fire, including Milan anti-tank missiles. However, neither of these were true barrages with fire aimed at successive lines to a strict timetable. The term Barrage as a method of fire control was not included in the 1965 ABCA artillery agreement nor its successor NATO STANAG.
General use of the word: The word barrage, imported from the French for "barrier" around 1915, means a coordinated bombardment as a static or moving barrier, as described in this article. The word has also entered general language, where it has come to mean any intense sequence of words or missiles – such as a barrage of questions. Nowadays, any form of artillery fire of more than one round may be described as a barrage in general language. Even military historians use it in a non-technical sense, referring to any intense artillery fire.
See also: Broadside
Salvo
Fusillade
Saturation fire
Time On Target
Barrage balloon
Notes:
References: Bidwell, Shelford, Artillery Tactics 1939-45, Almark, 1976
Blackburn, George G., The Guns of Normandy, The Guns of Victory, and Where the Hell are the Guns McClellandStewart, 1995–97.
Griffith, Paddy (1996). Battle Tactics of the Western Front: British Army's Art of Attack, 1916-18. Yale.
Hogg, Ian V (1971). Barrage: the Guns in Action. Macdonald.
Pakenham, Thomas, The Boer War, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1979, ISBN 0-297-77395-X
"Artillery in World War II—The field artillery organisation, tactics, gunnery methods and regiments of the Royal Artillery and the artilleries of British Commonwealth". Retrieved 2 January 2010. A large and detailed site on Royal Artillery methods in World War II
US Launches Barrage in Southern Baghdad Reuters, 29 April 2007. Example of misuse of term barrage. Retrieved on 24 October 2007.
Falls, Cyril (1930). Military Operations Egypt & Palestine from June 1917 to the End of the War. Official History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. 2 Part II. A. F. Becke (maps). London: HM Stationery Office. OCLC 256950972.
External links: British Artillery in WWII Fire Planning detailed account of barrage techniques on a site devoted to technicalities of British artillery. Retrieved on 19 November 2007.
Historical Artillery and Mortar Tactics an excellent summary of artillery tactics, mainly World War II, including details of the fire pattern sizes used by different guns and units making up the barrage
Artillery Terms and Tactics glossary of Vietnam era US artillery terminology
2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery: Planning Supercharge detailed account of a barrage plan
New York Times extracts 19 July 1918 reporting Pershing's communique including references to several tactical uses of barrages by US and German forces Retrieved on 6 November 2007 |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Basic training | Major characteristics: Initial military training is an intensive residential programme commonly lasting several weeks or months, which aims to induct newly recruited military personnel into the social norms and essential tasks of the armed forces. Common features include foot drill, inspections, physical training, weapons training, and a graduation parade.
The training process resocializes recruits to the demands made of them by military life. Psychological conditioning techniques are used to shape attitudes and behaviours, so that recruits will obey all orders, face mortal danger, and kill their opponents in battle. According to an expert in United States military training methods, Dave Grossman, recruit training makes extensive use of four types of conditioning techniques: role modeling, classical conditioning, operant conditioning, and brutalization.
Inductees are required to partially submerge their individuality for the sake of their military unit, which enhances obedience to orders to perform actions normally absent from civilian life, including killing and prolonged exposure to danger.
The resocialization of recruit training operates in several ways, as follows:
Confinement and suppression: Once their training has begun, the right of recruits to leave the military estate (or to quit the armed forces) is denied or tightly restricted. By shaving the head, issuing uniforms, denying privacy, and prohibiting the use of first names, individuality is suppressed.
Control and conformity: Recruits' daily routine is highly controlled, in the manner of the 'total institution' described by the Canadian-American sociologist Erving Goffman. For example, the training regime determines how recruits must make their beds, polish boots, and stack their clothes; mistakes are punished.
Throughout their training, recruits are conditioned to conform to military norms and to work as a team. In particular, recruits are repeatedly instructed to stand, march, and respond to orders in a ritual known as foot drill, which is derived from 18th-century military practices and trains recruits to obey orders without hesitation or question. According to Finnish Army regulations, for example, foot drill is essential for the esprit de corps and cohesion, accustoms recruits to instinctive obedience, enables large units to be marched and moved in an orderly manner, and creates the basis for action in the battlefield.
Stress and punishment: The training process applies stressors continuously. Instructors may deprive recruits of sleep, food, or shelter; shout personal insults; use physical aggression; or give orders intended to humiliate. According to specialists in U.S. recruit training, the conditions of continuous stress deplete recruits' resistance to the demands made of them.
The intense workload and sleep restriction experienced by military recruits leaves them little attention capacity for processing the messages they receive about new norms… Therefore, recruits should be less likely to devote their remaining cognitive effort to judging the quality of persuasive messages and will be more likely to be persuaded by the messages…
Evidence from Canada, the UK, the U.S. and elsewhere shows that punishments are used routinely to condition group conformity and discourage poor performance. The role of group punishment in Canadian Army training, for example, has been described as follows:
Coming from civilian society that elevates the individual, recruits are now in a world where the institutional value of the group is supreme. One has to be a team player or risk ostracism. The military does things quite deliberately to intensify the power of group pressure within its ranks. The group is made responsible for each member... even though it may seem manifestly unfair to make the group suffer for the individual.
Bonding and the hierarchy of esteem: As a buffer against the stressful conditions of their training, the trainee group normally forms a strong bond of mutual loyalty. Researchers in the U.S. have described it as an intense "we-feeling", which can feel more powerful than the civilian bonds that recruits are familiar with. In 2006, an official report on Australian Defence Force training explained the importance of the group bond:
Willingness to apply lethal force requires… sufficient bonding within the team to override each individual’s natural human resistance to kill. The toughness and bonding required increases the closer the contact with the enemy.
Recruits are taught to be proud of their identity as professional military personnel, and of their unit in particular. Heroic regimental stories and symbols are used to ennoble the recruits' own unit above others, and above other branches of the armed forces (an aspect of Interservice rivalry), thereby establishing a hierarchy of esteem (also known as a hierarchy of respect); the same stories are used to draw a contrast with the purported inferior norms associated with civilian life. (Cf. Unit cohesion)
Aggression and objectification: Evidence from Australia, the UK and the U.S. shows that recruit training systematically stimulates aggression, particularly in those enlisted for ground close combat roles. Bayonet practice is an example, as the strong language of this instruction from a British army corporal illustrates:
I wanna see it in your eyes that you wanna kill these fuckers. Imagine these dummies are the fucking Taliban and they’ve just killed some of your mates. You wanna fuckin’ kill them. Show me your war face! [Recruits yell] You need some fucking more aggression, show me your war face.
Another example is milling, an exercise used for infantry training in which pairs of recruits wearing boxing gloves punch each other in the head as aggressively as possible.
To further enable recruits to kill on demand, they are taught to objectify (dehumanize) their opponent in battle as an ‘enemy target’ to ‘be engaged’, which will ‘fall when hit’.
Fieldcraft and fitness: Recruits are taught the basic skills of their profession, such as military tactics, first aid, managing their affairs in the field, and the use of weaponry and other equipment.
Throughout, the physical fitness of recruits is tested and developed, although evidence from Israel, Norway, South Africa, the UK and the U.S. has found that the heavy strain on the body also leads to a high rate of injury.
Graduation and drop-out: Recruits who complete their initial training normally take part in a graduation parade (also called passing-out or marching-out). The parade is observed by their family and friends, and senior military personnel. Recruits then pass to the next stage of their training, if applicable.
A large percentage of recruits drop out of training. For example, attrition among British infantry recruits has been found to be above 30% during the first 12 weeks. Reasons for this include dismissal for behavioural problems, poor performance, or injury, and furthermore, recruits who choose to leave if and when they have a legal right to do so. In the UK and U.S., recruits under the age of 20 are most likely to drop out in these ways.
Variations in recruit training: Recruit training varies by nation according to the national requirement and can be voluntary (volunteer military) or mandatory (conscription). Some nations operate both volunteer and conscription systems simultaneously.
Recruit training differs according to military branch:
Army and Marine Corps recruits are normally trained in basic marksmanship with individually assigned weapons, field maintenance of weapons, physical fitness training, first aid, and basic survival and infantry techniques.
Navy and Coast Guard training usually focuses on water survival training, physical fitness, basic seamanship, and such skills as shipboard firefighting, basic engineering, and signals.
Air Force and Space Force training usually includes physical fitness training, military and classroom instructions, basic airmanship/guardianship and field training in basic marksmanship and first aid.
Australia: Most of the recruit training in the Australian Army is currently held at Army Recruit Training Centre (ARTC) at Kapooka, near Wagga Wagga in New South Wales. Recruit training lasts 80 days for members of the Australian Regular Army and 35 days for members of the Australian Army Reserve. In basic training recruits are taught drill, weapons and workplace safety, basic equipment maintenance, marksmanship, fieldcraft, radio use and defensive/offensive operations.
Regional Force Surveillance Units: Training for recruits in the Regional Force Surveillance Units usually differs greatly from training in the rest of the Army. For instance, NORFORCE recruits attend a 2-week course at the Kangaroo Flats. Recruits from areas covered by the RFSUs often come from indigenous cultures radically different from that of the general Australian population, and as such many regular standards and methods of training are not as applicable in their case.
Royal Military College Duntroon: Recruit Training for officers in the Australian Army (known as ICT—Initial Cadet Training) takes place at Royal Military College, Duntroon (RMC). The ICT is conducted for approximately seven weeks after which staff cadets continue military instruction in skills such as weapons training, military history, leadership, strategic studies and other such skills at section, platoon and company levels. Trainees at RMC hold the rank of Staff Cadet and, if successful in completing the course are commissioned as Lieutenants (pronounced Left-tenant). The overall full-time officer training course at RMC is 18 months long.
Canada: Centralized recruit training in the Canadian Army did not exist until 1940, and until the creation of Basic Training Centres across Canada, recruit training had been done by individual units or depots.
In 1968 the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force were unified into one service, the Canadian Forces. The Canadian Forces Training System, a unified system for all the services, was devised and remains in place today.
Most non-commissioned CF recruits in the Regular Force (full-time) participate in the 8-week Basic Military Qualification (BMQ) at Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School at Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Basic training | Trainees at RMC hold the rank of Staff Cadet and, if successful in completing the course are commissioned as Lieutenants (pronounced Left-tenant). The overall full-time officer training course at RMC is 18 months long.
Canada: Centralized recruit training in the Canadian Army did not exist until 1940, and until the creation of Basic Training Centres across Canada, recruit training had been done by individual units or depots.
In 1968 the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force were unified into one service, the Canadian Forces. The Canadian Forces Training System, a unified system for all the services, was devised and remains in place today.
Most non-commissioned CF recruits in the Regular Force (full-time) participate in the 8-week Basic Military Qualification (BMQ) at Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School at Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. Regular Force officers complete their 12-week Basic Military Officer Qualification (BMOQ) at CFLRS as well, before moving on to Second Language Training or their occupational training.
After basic training, personnel are trained in the specialty of their "environment". Members of the Royal Canadian Navy undergo a five-week sea environment training course; with members of the Canadian Army undergo a 20-day Soldier Qualification course, while officers go through a 12-week Common Army Phase (now renamed to Basic Military Officer Qualification-Army); while members from the Royal Canadian Air Force move on directly to their trade training, with the exception of Construction Engineer Officers, who also do BMOQ-A
Reservists, particularly the Army Reserve, may conduct basic and trades training part-time, generally alternating weekends with their own units. Due to increased integration of the Regular and Reserve Force, many reservists attend courses hosted by the Regular Force. Members of the Army Reserves complete an 8-week BMQ/SQ combined course (Basic Military Qualification and Soldier Qualification) during the summer. Formerly the Naval and Air Reserve jointly conduct BMQ for its recruits at the Naval Reserve Training Division Borden, Ontario equivalent to Regular Force BMQ, at Canadian Forces Base Borden. Now the Naval Reserve conducts the Basic Military Naval Qualification in CFB Valcartier by the Canadian Forces Fleet School Québec (a combination of recruit training and naval environmental training which leads to savings in the training). The Navy trains its personnel in seamanship, firefighting, damage control and other skills after BMQ, in the Naval Environmental Training Program (NETP) in either Esquimalt, British Columbia or Halifax, Nova Scotia.
The Royal Military College of Canada is the military academy of the Canadian Forces, and is a degree-granting university. The Royal Military College Saint-Jean is a Canadian military academy located on the site of Fort Saint-Jean (Quebec),
China:
Denmark: The Danish Army conducts the HBU (Hærens Basisuddannelse, Army Basic Training course) at 8 bases around the country. The course lasts four months, and has its focus on training skills used in connection with the Danish total defence, and on recruiting for the army's international missions, and for the NCO-schools. The recruits are technically conscripts, but during recession years, many young men and woman have volunteered for HBU.
Finland: Training lasts 5.5 to 11.5 months total, depending on an individual specialization. All Finnish conscripts undergo six weeks of basic training (peruskoulutuskausi), which is essentially the same for all servicemen. It includes assault rifle (RK-62/RK-95) marksman training, few other basic weapon training, battle training, short field medic training and camping skills. At the end of this training, all men are promoted to their first military rank. After this, specialized training is given depending on the person (5,5–11,5 months). The NCO trainees go to AUK (NCO school) and become corporals or sergeants, from which some are selected to RUK (Reserve officer school) and become second lieutenants. Leadership training (officer candidates and NCOs) always lasts 11.5 months.
France: In the French army, the "Formation Générale Initiale" (FGI) is a 12 weeks course which occurs in a Centre de Formation Initiale des Militaires du Rang (CFIM). There are 10 CFIM in the country. Prior to this course, new recruits are joining the regiment they are going to serve during 3 to 5 years for reception week where they get issued gear, complete administrative documents and a final medical exam before starting training => in France any enlisted soldier signs not only for a MOS but also a unit to serve.
After completing the 12 week FGI course, recruits are receiving the AFFIM certificate (say BCT graduation) and are considered as private 2nd class. After one week of leave, they go back to their regiment for the Formation de Spécialité Initiale (FSI) => MOS training.
After FGI+FSI, they can start training with their platoon for external deployment. Usually, Private 1st class rank is earned after 6 to 12 month of time in service.
For some units (mountain troops - airborne), there is also during first year a Formation d'Adaptation (FA) for basic mountain training (2 × 2 weeks) or parachute school (3 weeks)
Content of FGI is the following one:
Drills,
First aid and chemical warfare,
PT and obstacle course,
First weapon qualification (FAMAS, pistol and grenade),
Signals,
Basic field and infantry training (even if not MOS11B later on),
Presentation of French army, soldiers duties and reports.
Germany: The Allgemeine Grundausbildung (AGA) (i.e. general basic training) of the Bundeswehr covers the first three months of military service.
The contents of the "Allgemeine Grundausbildung" includes
Formal training (ranks, flags, orders and other fundamentals)
Weapon Drill and Basic Combat training for all soldiers (Rifle, Pistol and machine gun drills are mandatory for every soldier)
Theoretical Courses about Democracy and legal regulations
Sports: the Basic Fitness Test (BFT) and the German Sports Badge (DSA)
Guard duty training (ATB SichSdt)
First Aid
A notable peculiarity of German basic training is rooted in German military tradition that prefers initiative to obedience. Rather than "breaking" the personality of new recruits through intimidation and aggression, German basic training generally tries to "mold" a recruits personality in the hope of producing soldiers with stronger personalities and more own initiative.
Greece: While until 2000 the Greek Army was mainly conscript based, since then a large Professional Enlisted institution has been adopted, which combined with the reduction of conscript service will produce an approximate 1:1 ratio between conscript and professional enlisted. While initially training of the two institutions was shared, it has since then diverged, and conscript training has been reduced in length while professional enlisted training has been increased.
India: The Indian military services have established numerous and distinguished academies and staff colleges across India for the purpose of training professional soldiers in new generation military sciences, warfare command and strategy, and associated technologies.
Israel: The recruit training of the Israel Defense Forces (called tironut in Hebrew) varies depending on the unit: virtually every unusual unit completes a different training course. Recruits are certified as riflemen after the completion of the training, while most non-combat units train in all-army bases for the certification of Rifleman 02. Individuals who want to become officers must apply to be trained at a facility in the Negev desert called "Bahad One" (abbreviation of "Bsis Hadracha", Instruction Base).
Pakistan: The Pakistan Military Academy (or PMA) is a Military Academy of the Pakistan Army. It is located at Kakul in Abbottabad in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Pakistan Military Academy is analogous to Sandhurst, West Point or Tironut and undertakes training of the prospective officers of Pakistan Army. The academy has four training battalions and sixteen companies. A Cadet is trained and passed out as an officer of the Pakistan Army in 2 years.
Enlisted Men undertake training at the Regimental Center of their chosen regiment.
Russia:
Singapore: National Service (NS) in Singapore is obligatory for all able-bodied male citizens and second generation permanent residents who have reached the age of 18. Conscripts enlisted into the Singapore Armed Forces are required to attend Basic Military Training (BMT) at the beginning of their NS. They are known as Full-Time National Servicemen (NSFs).
Based on their Physical Employment Status (PES) grade determined by a pre-enlistment medical examination, NSFs may undergo either a standard, enhanced, modified, or obese BMT programme at the Basic Military Training Centre on the offshore island of Pulau Tekong or at the various military units that directly accept mono-intake PES A and B recruits. A similar 4-week BMT is conducted at Kranji School 5 for enlistees deemed unfit for combat roles.
Throughout their BMT, NSFs will acquire the basic soldiering skills by learning how to execute drills, undergoing physical training activities aimed at developing physical fitness and preparing them for the Individual Physical Proficiency Test (IPPT), learning how to handle the SAR 21 assault rifle and SFG 87 hand grenade, completing a Standard Obstacle Course and Battle Inoculation Course, and completing a five-day field camp, among other activities. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Basic training | They are known as Full-Time National Servicemen (NSFs).
Based on their Physical Employment Status (PES) grade determined by a pre-enlistment medical examination, NSFs may undergo either a standard, enhanced, modified, or obese BMT programme at the Basic Military Training Centre on the offshore island of Pulau Tekong or at the various military units that directly accept mono-intake PES A and B recruits. A similar 4-week BMT is conducted at Kranji School 5 for enlistees deemed unfit for combat roles.
Throughout their BMT, NSFs will acquire the basic soldiering skills by learning how to execute drills, undergoing physical training activities aimed at developing physical fitness and preparing them for the Individual Physical Proficiency Test (IPPT), learning how to handle the SAR 21 assault rifle and SFG 87 hand grenade, completing a Standard Obstacle Course and Battle Inoculation Course, and completing a five-day field camp, among other activities.
Before passing out from BMT, NSFs have to complete a 24 km (14.91 mi) route march in Full Battle Order and attend the Passing Out Parade, which may be held at the Marina Bay Floating Platform.
After completing BMT, NSFs will receive their posting orders to their respective vocations, which are determined by their PES status, suitability for deployment, and manpower requirements, among other conditions. Some NSFs will be directly posted to a military unit while others may undergo vocational training at certain institutes before being posted to units.
NSFs who perform well during BMT may progress to either the Specialist Cadet School or Officer Cadet School for further training to become Specialists (non-commissioned officers) or Officers.
NSFs will serve the remaining part of their NS in their respective units until their Operationally-Ready Date (ORD), whereupon they will be known as Operationally-Ready National Serviceman (NSmen) or reservists. NSmen may still be required to take the IPPT every year and attend In-Camp Training of up to 40 days per year over a period of ten years, or until they are statutorily discharged from NS at the age of 40 (for Warrant Officers, Specialists and Enlistees) or 50 (for Officers).
Sri Lanka: In Sri Lanka, officer training is carried out at the General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University and at the respective Military Academies of each respective service.
Recruit training for enlisted personnel of the Sri Lanka Army is organised by the Army Training School and carried out at its premises and at several other locations. Following basic training specialized training would be carried out at Regimental Training Centres.
Basic training for new recruits of the Sri Lanka Navy which is approximately six months are conducted at Advanced Naval Training Center, SLNS 'Nipuna'; Naval Artificer Training Institute, SLNS 'Thakshila', Welisara; and at Naval Recruit Training Centres at several shore establishments . This basic training will be followed by on-the-job training on-board fleet units and at shore establishments. Combat Training School at SLNS 'Pandukabaya' conducts combat training for Naval Patrolmen.
Basic training for airmen of the Sri Lanka Air Force is handled by the Training Wing of the SLAF Diyatalawa. This is followed by secularized training at Advanced & Specialized Trade Training School.
Sweden: Since conscription ended in Sweden in 2010 (reintroduced in 2017), all recruits who seek employment within the Swedish Armed Forces have to go through Grundläggande Militär Utbildning (GMU) (Basic Military Training) for three months.
Since conscription was reintroduced in 2017, all recruits who seek employment in the Swedish Armed Forces have to go through Grundutbildning (GU) (Basic Training), which consists of two parts; Grundläggande Militär Utbildning (GMU) (Basic Military Training) that lasts for 3 months and aims to provide every recruit with the same foundation for continued military service, and Befattningsutbildning (Specialization Education) for between 1–11 months depending on specialization.
There is also a shorter volunteer training program for people who seek service within the Home Guard called GU-F. GU-F training takes only 14 days, but following a completed GU-F, a guardsman may go through additional training in order to specialize within the Home Guard.
Basic training as part of GU as well as GU-F usually takes place at any of the Swedish Army training units.
Switzerland: Switzerland has mandatory military service (German: Militärdienst; French: service militaire; Italian: servizio militare) in the Swiss Army for all able-bodied male citizens, who are conscripted when they reach the age of majority, though women may volunteer for any position. Conscripts make up the majority of the manpower in the Swiss Armed Forces.
At the age of 19, all male Swiss nationals must attend the two-day recruitment process in one of the six recruitment centres spread across Switzerland (Aarau, Payerne, Sumiswald, Monte Ceneri, Rüti, Mels). At the end of those two-days, if fit for service, recruits are assigned to a position in the Swiss Armed Forces.
A few months later, recruits start an 18-week (23-week for special forces) boot camp (German: Rekrutenschulen; French: école de recrues; Italian: scuola reclute) during which they are allowed to go home on week-ends. There are two boot camp start per year : January (Winter) and June (Summer). During the recruitment process, recruits can choose whether they would like to serve during summer or winter.
In the first seven weeks of boot camp, recruits receive "General Basic Instruction" (German: Allgemeine Grundausbildung; French: Instruction de base générale; Italian: Istruzione di base generale). During this period, recruits are instructed by their sergeants to military tactics, the use of weaponry (including SIG SG 550) and other equipment, marksmanship, self-defense skills, buddy- and self- aid, CBRN defense, basic survival skills, etc. Recruits are also educated to military life, including how to speak to their superiors, how to clean their weapons and combat shoes, how to clean the barracks, etc. During this period, recruits practice sport on a daily basis, including foot drill, running, team sports, push-ups, etc., and a few kilometers' march (up to 50 km) for some weeks.
The second phase of six weeks is devoted to function-specific basic instructions (German: Funktionsgrundausbildung; French: Instruction de base spécifique à la fonction; Italian: Istruzione di base alla funzione), where recruits learn skills specific to their job.
In the third phase, called "instruction in formation" (German: Verbandsausbildung; French: Instruction en formation; Italian: Istruzione di reparto), battlegroups and battalions are formed.
United Kingdom: British armed forces recruits train in two phases. The length of Phase 1 recruit training varies according to service and trade. The British Army Phase 1 training, for all enlisted units other than infantry, lasts 14 weeks. Infantry units of the British Army undergo a combined 28 weeks basic training, with the exception of the Parachute Regiment (30 weeks), Guards Regiments (30 weeks) and the Royal Gurkha Rifles (36 weeks).
The Royal Air Force provides 10 weeks of basic training for all enlisted recruits, regardless of trade, and is delivered at RAF Halton.
The Royal Navy provides 10 weeks of basic recruit training for all enlisted recruits, with the exception of the Royal Marines, delivered at HMS Raleigh. The Royal Marines (excluding the Royal Marines band), undertake 32 weeks of basic training, delivered at Commando Training Centre Royal Marines.
Phase One is initial recruit training designed to bring all recruits to a similar standard of basic military ability. Upon completion of Phase 1 training, recruits (with the exception of Army infantry roles, and the Royal Marine Commandos) will progress to their trade specific Phase Two training, which consists of courses of varying duration to prepare recruits for their assigned role.
Officer recruits into the UK Armed Forces undergo the following Basic training:
British Army - 44 weeks, delivered at Royal Military Academy (RMA) in Sandhurst.
Royal Air Force - 24 weeks, delivered at RAF College Cranwell (MIOTC).
Royal Navy - 30 weeks (split into two equal phases of 15 weeks each), delivered at Britannia Royal Naval College (BRNC) in Dartmouth.
Royal Marines - 15 months, delivered at Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, with 3 weeks towards the end of the course in the United States.
Upon completion of their Officer recruit training, cadets will then progress to their trade specific training of varying length.
The British Army, Royal Navy, Royal Marines and Royal Air Force manage their own Phase One and Phase Two training establishments.
United States: In the United States, recruit training in the U.S. Army is called Basic Combat Training (BCT); U.S. Army Combat Arms MOS (11 Series, 19 series, 13 series, 12 series) and Military Police MOS (31 series) undergo One Station Unit Training (OSUT) which involves BCT, Advanced Individual Training (AIT) and Specialized Training (such as Bradley, or Mortar School, or Gunnery) all in one. In the U.S. Air and Space Forces it is called Basic Military Training (BMT). In the U.S. Navy, U.S. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Basic training | Upon completion of their Officer recruit training, cadets will then progress to their trade specific training of varying length.
The British Army, Royal Navy, Royal Marines and Royal Air Force manage their own Phase One and Phase Two training establishments.
United States: In the United States, recruit training in the U.S. Army is called Basic Combat Training (BCT); U.S. Army Combat Arms MOS (11 Series, 19 series, 13 series, 12 series) and Military Police MOS (31 series) undergo One Station Unit Training (OSUT) which involves BCT, Advanced Individual Training (AIT) and Specialized Training (such as Bradley, or Mortar School, or Gunnery) all in one. In the U.S. Air and Space Forces it is called Basic Military Training (BMT). In the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard it is called "Recruit Training" (commonly known as Boot Camp).
Some services present a badge or other award to denote completion of recruit training. The Army typically issues the Army Service Ribbon (issued after completion of Advanced Individual Training), and the Air Force presents the Air Force Training Ribbon and the Airman's Coin. The Marine Corps issue the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor once initial training is complete to signify that the recruits are now Marines. The Navy replaces the "RECRUIT" ball cap the recruits have worn throughout training with the "NAVY" ball cap upon successful completion of "Battle Stations". The United States Coast Guard's recruit training graduates place a Coast Guard Medallion on their ball cap.
For honor graduates of basic training, the Air Force, Coast Guard, and Navy present a Basic Training Honor Graduate Ribbon. The Navy and Marine Corps often meritoriously advance the top graduates of each division one pay-grade (up to a maximum of E-3).
U.S. Army: In the United States Army, recruits are sent to Basic Combat Training in a location designated according to the military Military Occupational Specialty, or MOS, which is selected upon enlistment.
Initial Entry Training (IET) is divided into two parts, which commonly take place at two different locations, depending on the chosen MOS:
Basic Combat Training, or BCT, is a ten-week training cycle. This period does not include "Reception Week" during which recruits are being slotted to their training companies (troops for cavalry). During reception, trainees get Sexual Harassment/Assault Response & Prevention training during IET, as of 30 July 2021.
Advanced Individual Training, or AIT, is where new soldiers receive specific training in their chosen MOS. The length of AIT training varies depending on the MOS and can last anywhere from four weeks to nearly one year.
Several MOSs (mainly combat arms) combine both basic training and AIT in a single combined course called One Station Unit Training (OSUT), which can last up to 22 weeks. The attitude and environment remain the same throughout the entire training cycle, including drill instructors. Essentially, OSUT is an extended version of Basic Training, especially for Infantry OSUT, which remains on the same basic soldiering tasks for the entire cycle, although in greater detail. Infantry OSUT is conducted at the United States Army Infantry School at Fort Moore, and is 22 weeks long.
The U.S. Army has four sites for BCT:
Fort Moore at Columbus, Georgia
Fort Jackson at Columbia, South Carolina
Fort Leonard Wood at St. Robert, Missouri
Fort Sill at Lawton, Oklahoma
During Basic Combat Training, Army recruits learn a variety of basic combat skills including: Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM), land navigation, patrolling, securing and defending a position, drill and ceremony, fireteam formations and assaults, communications and use of AN/PRC-119 radio, combat lifesaving skills, 9-line medevac, reporting intelligence, hand grenades, Claymore mines, M203/M320 grenade launcher, M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), M240B machine gun, M2 .50 caliber machine gun, MK-19, and AT-4 anti-tank weapon. Training also includes combat conditioning by running an obstacle course, the Confidence Course, conducting marches of varying distances up to 12 miles, physical training, and Modern Army Combatives Program (MACP), a martial arts program based on the combination of Brazilian jiu-jitsu, wrestling, judo, Muay Thai, boxing, and a number of others. Recruits are trained to adopt the Army "Warrior Ethos", and to memorize and live by the Soldier's Creed.
BCT is divided into three phases. During Phase I, (also known as "Red Phase") recruits are subject to "Total Control," meaning their every action is monitored and constantly corrected by drill sergeants. The first week of training is commonly referred to as "Hell Week," due to the intense period of adjustment required on the part of the new recruits. Marches are common throughout basic training. Recruits are sent to the "gas chamber" during Phase I, as part of training for defensive chemical warfare. They are also introduced to their standard-issue weapon, the M16A2 rifle, the M16A4 rifle, or M4 carbine.
In Phase II (also known as "White Phase") soldiers begin actually firing weapons, starting with the rifle or carbine (M4A1). Other weapons the recruit becomes familiarized with include various grenades (such as the M67 fragmentation grenade) and grenade launchers (such as the M203). Recruits are then familiarized with the bayonet, anti-tank/armor weaponry and other heavy weapons. The course also includes an obstacle course which the soldiers are expected to negotiate in a certain amount of time. Additionally, Phase II includes continual, intense PT, along with drill and ceremony training. At the conclusion of Phase II, Soldiers are to demonstrate proficiency with the various weaponry with which they trained.
Phase III or "Blue Phase," is the culmination and the most challenging of all the training phases. A final PT test is administered during the first week. Recruits who fail are frequently retested, often up until the morning of their cycle's graduation. If they do not pass, then they are recycled to another platoon that is in an earlier phase of the training cycle until they meet the fitness standards. The final PT Test is the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT). Usually, a soldier needs to score at least 60 points in each APFT category (pushups, planks, and 2 mile run) to pass, but in Basic Combat Training, only 50 points are required; the soldier will nevertheless take another APFT with a 60-point requirement at AIT. During Blue Phase, the recruits move on to such longer and more intensive "bivouac" and FTX (Field Training Exercises) as nighttime combat operations. Drill sergeants will make much of this an adversarial process by working against the recruits in many of the night operations and trying to foil plans, etc.
Upon completion of Basic Combat Training, a recruit is now a soldier, and has developed skills to operate in a combat environment, as a basic rifleman and to perform his or her MOS-specific duties under fire.
U.S. Marine Corps: The United States Marine Corps Recruit Depots are located at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina, and Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, California. Men and women go to either, depending on whether they were recruited east or west of the Mississippi River. Until 2021, women only trained at Parris Island. Marine Corps boot camp is the longest basic training, excluding Army One Station Unit Training (OSUT), in-processing & out-processing is included unlike the other branches as the other branches do not contain this in their Basic Training duration length. Formerly, recruits were referred to as either "(the) private(s)" or "(the) recruit(s)" from day one of Recruit Training. Since the 1990s, they are referred to as "(the) recruit(s)" alone until they earn the title of Marine.
Marine Corps Recruit Training (MCRT) is a 13-week program that is divided up into three four-week phases and further broken down into individual training days. While there are 69 individual training days, recruits also go through pre- and post-training processing where recruits are afforded relatively little freedom. Phase one mainly consists of learning recruit life protocol, physical training, MCMAP training, academic classes, initial drill, a series inspection, and the confidence course. West coast recruits also do swim qualification during this phase. Phase two is completely in the field at Camp Pendleton for west coast recruits, with the first two weeks being spent on marksmanship training and qualification with the M16A4 service rifle, and the last week in the field learning skills such as fireteam formations, land navigation, and hikes. For east coast recruits, phase two is swim qualification, rifle qualification, and Team Week, a week of maintenance duties for the island as a show of how to perform base support tasks while still keeping military bearing and attention to detail. Phase three brings the San Diego recruits back to the recruit depot where they finish up with final drill, final inspection, more PT and confidence courses, and graduation. During third phase, west coast recruits also go back into the field one last time to do the Crucible event. Parris Island recruits finish with field training, final drill and inspection, the Crucible, and graduation. Note that recruits going to either depot receive exactly the same training, if in a different order. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Basic training | For east coast recruits, phase two is swim qualification, rifle qualification, and Team Week, a week of maintenance duties for the island as a show of how to perform base support tasks while still keeping military bearing and attention to detail. Phase three brings the San Diego recruits back to the recruit depot where they finish up with final drill, final inspection, more PT and confidence courses, and graduation. During third phase, west coast recruits also go back into the field one last time to do the Crucible event. Parris Island recruits finish with field training, final drill and inspection, the Crucible, and graduation. Note that recruits going to either depot receive exactly the same training, if in a different order. An important part of this process is training recruits to adopt and live by the motto, "Every Marine a rifleman".
Upon completion, recruits proceed to receive further training at the School of Infantry (SOI). All non-infantry MOS Marines are trained at the Marine Combat Training Battalion (MCT), while infantry MOS Marines are trained at the Infantry Training Battalion (ITB).
MCT and ITB training is conducted at one of two locations, SOI-East at Camp Lejeune in Jacksonville, North Carolina (for Parris Island graduates) and SOI-West at Camp Pendleton in San Diego, California (for San Diego graduates).
Marine Combat Training Battalion (MCT) is a 29-day course. Marines learn the basics of combat marksmanship, counter-improvised explosive device techniques, how to conduct the defense of a position, convoy operations, combat formations, fireteam assaults, patrolling, urban warfare, use of the AN/PRC-119 radio, reporting military intelligence, land navigation, and the use of hand grenades, the M203 grenade launcher, M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, and M240 machine gun. Training also includes combat conditioning by running an obstacle course, conducting marches, physical training, and Marine Corps Martial Arts Program. Upon completion of Marine Combat Training, the Marine is to have gained the knowledge and ability to operate in a combat environment as a basic rifleman and to perform his or her primary duties under fire. (The main contrast with Army recruit training is that nearly identical training is integrated into Basic Combat Training, so there is no follow-on school.) Upon completion, Marines proceed to their MOS-specific school.
In Infantry Training Battalion (ITB), infantry MOS (03XX) Marines receive 59 days of training in infantry skills, including advanced marksmanship, combat patrolling, land navigation, and a wide array of other infantry skills. Upon completion of ITB, newly qualified Marine infantrymen proceed to their assigned units.
U.S. Navy: The United States Navy currently operates boot camp at Recruit Training Command Great Lakes, located at Naval Station Great Lakes, near North Chicago, Illinois. Instead of having Drill Sergeants or Drill Instructors like other branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, the U.S. Navy has RDCs (Recruit Division Commanders) that are assigned to each division. Training lasts approximately eight weeks (although some recruits will spend as many as nine weeks in training due to the somewhat complicated processing cycle). Days are counted by a system that lists the week and day that they are on, for example, 7-3 for week 7 day 3. The first approximate week is counted P-1, P-2, etc. which denotes that it is a processing day and does not count as part of their 8-week training period. Recruits are instructed on military drill, watchstanding, basic seamanship, water survival skills, first aid, basic shipboard damage control, firefighting, shipboard communication, familiarization with the M9 pistol and Mossberg 500 shotgun (the Navy no longer gives instruction on the M16 in boot camp), pass the confidence chamber (tear-gas-filled chamber), PT, and the basic essentials on Navy life. Recruits also attend many classes throughout boot camp on subjects such as Equal Opportunity, Sexual Assault Victim Intervention, Uniform Code of Military Justice, recognition of naval aircraft and vessels, U.S. naval history, and more. In order for recruits to pass boot camp, they are physically and mentally tested on a 12-hour exercise called Battle Stations which consists of 12 different scenarios involving firefighting, navigating smoke filled compartments, first-aid knowledge, survival at sea, mass casualties, shipboard flood control, bomb detection, and many other skills that they have been learning in the previous 7 weeks. After completion of boot camp, freshly minted sailors are sent either to various "A" Schools located across the United States—where they begin training to receive their ratings (jobs)—or to apprenticeship training, where they then enter the fleet without a designation.
The Navy formerly operated Recruit Training Centers in San Diego, California; Orlando, Florida; Meridian, Mississippi; and Port Deposit (Bainbridge), Maryland. From 1942 to 1946—during and immediately following World War II—the Navy had two additional training sites: Naval Training Station (USNTS) Sampson (renamed Sampson Air Force Base in 1950), near Seneca Lake, New York, where over 400,000 recruits were trained, and Farragut Naval Training Station in Bayview, Idaho.
U.S. Air and Space Forces: The U.S. Air and Space Forces' Basic Military Training (BMT) is seven and a half weeks long, as they do not count the first week ("Week 0"). BMT is 63 calendar days long. It is conducted at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. Formerly, trainees were referred to as "airman" from day one of BMT. This has been changed; now, personnel are referred to as trainees until the Airman's Coin Ceremony in the eighth week of training, when they receive their Airman's Coin. Trainees receive military instruction (including the Air Force core values, flight and individual drill, and living area inspections), academic classes (covering topics such as Air Force history, dress and appearance, military customs and courtesies, ethics, security, and alcohol/drug abuse prevention and treatment), and field training (including protection against biological and chemical attack, basic marksmanship on the M4 carbine as well as self-aid buddy care). Following BMT, airmen/guardians go to a technical school (or 'tech school') where they learn the specifics of their Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC), which is equivalent to the MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) in the Army and Marines, the Navy's NEC (Naval Enlisted Classification) code, or the Coast Guard's ratings.
All non-prior-service enlistees are required to complete BMT, including those enlisting in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command. Reserve component enlistees receive the same training as their active-duty counterparts. Credit can be given on a case-by-case basis for enlistees with college credit. Eagle Scouts and service in the Civil Air Patrol qualify for promotion to E-2 (airman) or E-3 (airman first class) upon graduation from BMT. The stripes are not worn until graduation, though trainees are paid at the higher pay grade.
Lackland AFB has been associated with BMT for almost the Air Force's entire history. From 1950 to 1956, 300,000 airmen received BMT at Sampson Air Force Base in New York. In 1951, Parks Air Force Base in Dublin, California, became a BMT center, with training beginning in March 1952. BMT at Parks AFB ceased later in the decade and the installation was transferred to the U.S. Army in 1959. For a brief time between 1966 and 1968, the Air Force operated a second BMT at Amarillo Air Force Base in Amarillo, Texas.
Unlike the Army and Navy, but like the Marine Corps (throughout boot camp) and Coast Guard (during the first section of boot camp), trainees are required to refer to all airmen and guardians of all ranks as "sir" or "ma'am". Trainees are required to preface speaking to military training instructors with their reporting statement: "Sir/Ma'am, Trainee (the recruit's surname) reports as ordered".
An additional two weeks of BMT was added to the program on November 1, 2008, extending the duration of BMT from six and a half weeks to eight and a half weeks. BMT has been tailored to incorporate some of the additional warfighting skills to coincide with increased Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) rotations and more frequent support of its sister services during those rotations. In 2015, BMT was shortened once again to seven and a half weeks. Trainees still stay at Lackland for eight and half weeks, however, the eighth week following graduation they are moved to a more relaxed environment under a program called Airman's Week, which is designed to transition trainees to technical training.
U.S. Coast Guard: Recruit training for the U.S. Coast Guard is held at Coast Guard Training Center Cape May in Cape May, New Jersey. The Coast Guard base on Government Island (now known as Coast Guard Island) Alameda, California was also used as a second major recruit training center until it was closed in 1982. The official standard recruit training cycle lasts eight weeks. A limited number of recruits may face reversion to earlier weeks of training should they exhibit egregious deficiencies in attitude and/or aptitude. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Basic training | In 2015, BMT was shortened once again to seven and a half weeks. Trainees still stay at Lackland for eight and half weeks, however, the eighth week following graduation they are moved to a more relaxed environment under a program called Airman's Week, which is designed to transition trainees to technical training.
U.S. Coast Guard: Recruit training for the U.S. Coast Guard is held at Coast Guard Training Center Cape May in Cape May, New Jersey. The Coast Guard base on Government Island (now known as Coast Guard Island) Alameda, California was also used as a second major recruit training center until it was closed in 1982. The official standard recruit training cycle lasts eight weeks. A limited number of recruits may face reversion to earlier weeks of training should they exhibit egregious deficiencies in attitude and/or aptitude.
As an alternate for those recruits possessing prior military service or civilian job skills, Coast Guard recruit basic training offers an abbreviated route to completion of basic training with the Direct Entry Petty Officer Training program (DEPOT) "The goal of the Direct Entry Petty Officer Training Course is to produce petty officers who on the basis of their civilian professions, prior military experience, or a combination of both" are otherwise duly qualified.
Coast Guard boot camp covers basic seamanship, drill, military bearing, and firefighting. The U.S. Coast Guard is unique among the armed services in that it fires the SIG Sauer P229R pistol as well as the M16 rifle during the training.
Although the Coast Guard is a part of the Department of Homeland Security, rather than the Department of Defense, it is by law and tradition a branch of the United States Armed Forces. As with all military personnel, coast guardsmen are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Due to the Coast Guard's unique mission set – including CONUS and OCONUS defense operations, search and rescue and maritime law enforcement – there are added requirements to maintain high physical fitness standards and military bearing. Due to its unusual, diverse and difficult mission, the U.S. Coast Guard is the most selective in recruiting and training standards. As an example, the Coast Guard Academy is the only service academy that uses competitive admissions for prospective officer candidates rather than congressional appointment.
During their time at Cape May, recruits are subjected to the usual "boot camp" atmosphere of direct instruction and intense motivation. Recruits must adhere to strict rules such as hygiene and uniform regulations and obey all lawful orders. The recruits are designated as seaman recruits (SR; E-1). Unique to the Coast Guard among the armed services, recruits successfully completing basic recruit training are advanced to the rank of seaman apprentice/fireman apprentice (SA/FA; E-2) or seaman/fireman (SN/FN; E-3) upon graduation—the difference generally based on the level of higher education the graduate possesses. Coast Guard drill instructors are called "company commanders" and hold a rank ranging from petty officer 2nd class (E-5) up to senior chief petty officer (E-8). Coast Guard companies have approximately two or three company commanders and anywhere from 20 to over 100 recruits.
After completing boot camp, recruits can select their rating and then attend an "A" school. Few graduates go straight to "A" school; most spend up to a year in the fleet as "non-rates". "A" school is a long-term technical school providing specific instruction about a rating. The "A" schools last two to six months and usually occur at TRACEN Yorktown, Yorktown, Virginia or TRACEN Petaluma, Petaluma, California. Aviation related ratings train at the Aviation Technical Training Center at Coast Guard Air Station Elizabeth City, North Carolina. Some ratings have an available on-the-job apprenticeship training option known as "striking" instead of attending an "A" school.
See also: Military education and training
Milling - military training exercise
Military Academy
Officer Candidate School
Resocialization
Psychological conditioning
Military recruitment
Military service
References:
External links: USAREC (2003). U.S. Army DEP Guide: Army Terminology Archived 2003-12-27 at the Wayback Machine. United States Army Recruiting Command. Fort Knox, KY (USA).
USMC Recruit Depot San Diego. Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego Archived 2007-04-13 at the Wayback Machine Headquarters Western Recruiting Region. MCRD San Diego, CA (USA)
Media:The Ultimate Basic Training Guidebook: Tips, Tricks, and Tactics for Surviving Boot Camp, by Sgt. Michael Volkin. Savas Beatie, 2005. ISBN 1-932714-11-1 |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle | Etymology: Battle is a loanword from the Old French bataille, first attested in 1297, from Late Latin battualia, meaning "exercise of soldiers and gladiators in fighting and fencing", from Late Latin (taken from Germanic) battuere "beat", from which the English word battery is also derived via Middle English batri.
Characteristics: The defining characteristic of the fight as a concept in military science has changed with the variations in the organisation, employment and technology of military forces. The English military historian John Keegan suggested an ideal definition of battle as "something which happens between two armies leading to the moral then physical disintegration of one or the other of them" but the origins and outcomes of battles can rarely be summarized so neatly. Battle in the 20th and 21st centuries is defined as the combat between large components of the forces in a military campaign, used to achieve military objectives. Where the duration of the battle is longer than a week, it is often for reasons of planning called an operation. Battles can be planned, encountered or forced by one side when the other is unable to withdraw from combat.
A battle always has as its purpose the reaching of a mission goal by use of military force. A victory in the battle is achieved when one of the opposing sides forces the other to abandon its mission and surrender its forces, routs the other (i.e., forces it to retreat or renders it militarily ineffective for further combat operations) or annihilates the latter, resulting in their deaths or capture. A battle may end in a Pyrrhic victory, which ultimately favors the defeated party. If no resolution is reached in a battle, it can result in a stalemate. A conflict in which one side is unwilling to reach a decision by a direct battle using conventional warfare often becomes an insurgency.
Until the 19th century the majority of battles were of short duration, many lasting a part of a day. (The Battle of Preston (1648), the Battle of Nations (1813) and the Battle of Gettysburg (1863) were exceptional in lasting three days.) This was mainly due to the difficulty of supplying armies in the field or conducting night operations. The means of prolonging a battle was typically with siege warfare. Improvements in transport and the sudden evolving of trench warfare, with its siege-like nature during the First World War in the 20th century, lengthened the duration of battles to days and weeks. This created the requirement for unit rotation to prevent combat fatigue, with troops preferably not remaining in a combat area of operations for more than a month.
The use of the term "battle" in military history has led to its misuse when referring to almost any scale of combat, notably by strategic forces involving hundreds of thousands of troops that may be engaged in either one battle at a time (Battle of Leipzig) or operations (Battle of Wuhan). The space a battle occupies depends on the range of the weapons of the combatants. A "battle" in this broader sense may be of long duration and take place over a large area, as in the case of the Battle of Britain or the Battle of the Atlantic. Until the advent of artillery and aircraft, battles were fought with the two sides within sight, if not reach, of each other. The depth of the battlefield has also increased in modern warfare with inclusion of the supporting units in the rear areas; supply, artillery, medical personnel etc. often outnumber the front-line combat troops.
Battles are made up of a multitude of individual combats, skirmishes and small engagements and the combatants will usually only experience a small part of the battle. To the infantryman, there may be little to distinguish between combat as part of a minor raid or a big offensive, nor is it likely that he anticipates the future course of the battle; few of the British infantry who went over the top on the first day on the Somme, 1 July 1916, would have anticipated that the battle would last five months. Some of the Allied infantry who had just dealt a crushing defeat to the French at the Battle of Waterloo fully expected to have to fight again the next day (at the Battle of Wavre).
Battlespace: Battlespace is a unified strategic concept to integrate and combine armed forces for the military theatre of operations, including air, information, land, sea and space. It includes the environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to apply combat power, protect the force or complete the mission, comprising enemy and friendly armed forces; facilities; weather; terrain; and the electromagnetic spectrum.
Factors: Battles are decided by various factors, the number and quality of combatants and equipment, the skill of commanders and terrain are among the most prominent. Weapons and armour can be decisive; on many occasions armies have achieved victory through more advanced weapons than those of their opponents. An extreme example was in the Battle of Omdurman, in which a large army of Sudanese Mahdists armed in a traditional manner were destroyed by an Anglo-Egyptian force equipped with Maxim machine guns and artillery.
On some occasions, simple weapons employed in an unorthodox fashion have proven advantageous; Swiss pikemen gained many victories through their ability to transform a traditionally defensive weapon into an offensive one. Zulus in the early 19th century were victorious in battles against their rivals in part because they adopted a new kind of spear, the iklwa. Forces with inferior weapons have still emerged victorious at times, for example in the Wars of Scottish Independence. Disciplined troops are often of greater importance; at the Battle of Alesia, the Romans were greatly outnumbered but won because of superior training.
Battles can also be determined by terrain. Capturing high ground has been the main tactic in innumerable battles. An army that holds the high ground forces the enemy to climb and thus wear themselves down. Areas of jungle and forest, with dense vegetation act as force-multipliers, of benefit to inferior armies. Terrain may have lost importance in modern warfare, due to the advent of aircraft, though the terrain is still vital for camouflage, especially for guerrilla warfare.
Generals and commanders also play an important role, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Khalid ibn Walid, Subutai and Napoleon Bonaparte were all skilled generals and their armies were extremely successful at times. An army that can trust the commands of their leaders with conviction in its success invariably has a higher morale than an army that doubts its every move. The British in the naval Battle of Trafalgar owed its success to the reputation of Admiral Lord Nelson.
Types: Battles can be fought on land, at sea, and in the air. Naval battles have occurred since before the 5th century BC. Air battles have been far less common, due to their late conception, the most prominent being the Battle of Britain in 1940. Since the Second World War, land or sea battles have come to rely on air support. During the Battle of Midway, five aircraft carriers were sunk without either fleet coming into direct contact.
A pitched battle is an encounter where opposing sides agree on the time and place of combat.
A battle of encounter (or encounter battle) is a meeting engagement where the opposing sides collide in the field without either having prepared their attack or defence.
A battle of attrition aims to inflict losses on an enemy that are less sustainable compared to one's own losses. These need not be greater numerical losses – if one side is much more numerous than the other then pursuing a strategy based on attrition can work even if casualties on both sides are about equal. Many battles of the Western Front in the First World War were intentionally (Verdun) or unintentionally (Somme) attrition battles.
A battle of breakthrough aims to pierce the enemy's defences, thereby exposing the vulnerable flanks which can be turned.
A battle of encirclement—the Kesselschlacht of the German battle of manoeuvre (bewegungskrieg)—surrounds the enemy in a pocket.
A battle of envelopment involves an attack on one or both flanks; the classic example being the double envelopment of the Battle of Cannae.
A battle of annihilation is one in which the defeated party is destroyed in the field, such as the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile.
Battles are usually hybrids of different types listed above.
A decisive battle is one with political effects, determining the course of the war such as the Battle of Smolensk or bringing hostilities to an end, such as the Battle of Hastings or the Battle of Hattin. A decisive battle can change the balance of power or boundaries between countries. The concept of the decisive battle became popular with the publication in 1851 of Edward Creasy's The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World. British military historians J.F.C. Fuller (The Decisive Battles of the Western World) and B.H. Liddell Hart (Decisive Wars of History), among many others, have written books in the style of Creasy's work.
Land: There is an obvious difference in the way battles have been fought. Early battles were probably fought between rival hunting bands as unorganized crowds. During the Battle of Megiddo, the first reliably documented battle in the fifteenth century BC, both armies were organised and disciplined; during the many wars of the Roman Empire, barbarians continued to use mob tactics.
As the Age of Enlightenment dawned, armies began to fight in highly disciplined lines. Each would follow the orders from their officers and fight as a unit instead of individuals. Armies were divided into regiments, battalions, companies and platoons. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle | British military historians J.F.C. Fuller (The Decisive Battles of the Western World) and B.H. Liddell Hart (Decisive Wars of History), among many others, have written books in the style of Creasy's work.
Land: There is an obvious difference in the way battles have been fought. Early battles were probably fought between rival hunting bands as unorganized crowds. During the Battle of Megiddo, the first reliably documented battle in the fifteenth century BC, both armies were organised and disciplined; during the many wars of the Roman Empire, barbarians continued to use mob tactics.
As the Age of Enlightenment dawned, armies began to fight in highly disciplined lines. Each would follow the orders from their officers and fight as a unit instead of individuals. Armies were divided into regiments, battalions, companies and platoons. These armies would march, line up and fire in divisions.
Native Americans, on the other hand, did not fight in lines, using guerrilla tactics. American colonists and European forces continued using disciplined lines into the American Civil War.
A new style arose from the 1850s to the First World War, known as trench warfare, which also led to tactical radio. Chemical warfare also began in 1915.
By the Second World War, the use of the smaller divisions, platoons and companies became much more important as precise operations became vital. Instead of the trench stalemate of 1915–1917, in the Second World War, battles developed where small groups encountered other platoons. As a result, elite squads became much more recognized and distinguishable. Maneuver warfare also returned with an astonishing pace with the advent of the tank, replacing the cannon of the Enlightenment Age. Artillery has since gradually replaced the use of frontal troops. Modern battles resemble those of the Second World War, along with indirect combat through the use of aircraft and missiles which has come to constitute a large portion of wars in place of battles, where battles are now mostly reserved for capturing cities.
Naval: One significant difference of modern naval battles, as opposed to earlier forms of combat is the use of marines, which introduced amphibious warfare. Today, a marine is actually an infantry regiment that sometimes fights solely on land and is no longer tied to the navy. A good example of an ancient naval battle is the Battle of Salamis. Most ancient naval battles were fought by fast ships using the battering ram to sink opposing fleets or steer close enough for boarding in hand-to-hand combat. Troops were often used to storm enemy ships as used by Romans and pirates. This tactic was usually used by civilizations that could not beat the enemy with ranged weaponry. Another invention in the late Middle Ages was the use of Greek fire by the Byzantines, which was used to set enemy fleets on fire. Empty demolition ships utilized the tactic to crash into opposing ships and set it afire with an explosion. After the invention of cannons, naval warfare became useful as support units for land warfare. During the 19th century, the development of mines led to a new type of naval warfare. The ironclad, first used in the American Civil War, resistant to cannons, soon made the wooden ship obsolete. The invention of military submarines, during World War I, brought naval warfare to both above and below the surface. With the development of military aircraft during World War II, battles were fought in the sky as well as below the ocean. Aircraft carriers have since become the central unit in naval warfare, acting as a mobile base for lethal aircraft.
Aerial: Although the use of aircraft has for the most part always been used as a supplement to land or naval engagements, since their first major military use in World War I aircraft have increasingly taken on larger roles in warfare. During World War I, the primary use was for reconnaissance, and small-scale bombardment. Aircraft began becoming much more prominent in the Spanish Civil War and especially World War II. Aircraft design began specializing, primarily into two types: bombers, which carried explosive payloads to bomb land targets or ships; and fighter-interceptors, which were used to either intercept incoming aircraft or to escort and protect bombers (engagements between fighter aircraft were known as dog fights). Some of the more notable aerial battles in this period include the Battle of Britain and the Battle of Midway. Another important use of aircraft came with the development of the helicopter, which first became heavily used during the Vietnam War, and still continues to be widely used today to transport and augment ground forces. Today, direct engagements between aircraft are rare – the most modern fighter-interceptors carry much more extensive bombing payloads, and are used to bomb precision land targets, rather than to fight other aircraft. Anti-aircraft batteries are used much more extensively to defend against incoming aircraft than interceptors. Despite this, aircraft today are much more extensively used as the primary tools for both army and navy, as evidenced by the prominent use of helicopters to transport and support troops, the use of aerial bombardment as the "first strike" in many engagements, and the replacement of the battleship with the aircraft carrier as the center of most modern navies.
Naming: Battles are usually named after some feature of the battlefield geography, such as a town, forest or river, commonly prefixed "Battle of...". Occasionally battles are named after the date on which they took place, such as The Glorious First of June. In the Middle Ages it was considered important to settle on a suitable name for a battle which could be used by the chroniclers. After Henry V of England defeated a French army on October 25, 1415, he met with the senior French herald and they agreed to name the battle after the nearby castle and so it was called the Battle of Agincourt. In other cases, the sides adopted different names for the same battle, such as the Battle of Gallipoli which is known in Turkey as the Battle of Çanakkale. During the American Civil War, the Union tended to name the battles after the nearest watercourse, such as the Battle of Wilsons Creek and the Battle of Stones River, whereas the Confederates favoured the nearby towns, as in the Battles of Chancellorsville and Murfreesboro. Occasionally both names for the same battle entered the popular culture, such as the First Battle of Bull Run and the Second Battle of Bull Run, which are also referred to as the First and Second Battles of Manassas.
Sometimes in desert warfare, there is no nearby town name to use; map coordinates gave the name to the Battle of 73 Easting in the First Gulf War. Some place names have become synonymous with battles, such as the Passchendaele, Pearl Harbor, the Alamo, Thermopylae and Waterloo. Military operations, many of which result in battle, are given codenames, which are not necessarily meaningful or indicative of the type or the location of the battle. Operation Market Garden and Operation Rolling Thunder are examples of battles known by their military codenames. When a battleground is the site of more than one battle in the same conflict, the instances are distinguished by ordinal number, such as the First and Second Battles of Bull Run. An extreme case are the twelve Battles of the Isonzo—First to Twelfth—between Italy and Austria-Hungary during the First World War.
Some battles are named for the convenience of military historians so that periods of combat can be neatly distinguished from one another. Following the First World War, the British Battles Nomenclature Committee was formed to decide on standard names for all battles and subsidiary actions. To the soldiers who did the fighting, the distinction was usually academic; a soldier fighting at Beaumont Hamel on November 13, 1916, was probably unaware he was taking part in what the committee named the Battle of the Ancre. Many combats are too small to be battles; terms such as "action", "affair", "skirmish", "firefight", "raid", or "offensive patrol" are used to describe small military encounters. These combats often take place within the time and space of a battle and while they may have an objective, they are not necessarily "decisive". Sometimes the soldiers are unable to immediately gauge the significance of the combat; in the aftermath of the Battle of Waterloo, some British officers were in doubt as to whether the day's events merited the title of "battle" or would be called an "action".
Effects: Battles affect the individuals who take part, as well as the political actors. Personal effects of battle range from mild psychological issues to permanent and crippling injuries. Some battle-survivors have nightmares about the conditions they encountered or abnormal reactions to certain sights or sounds and some experience flashbacks. Physical effects of battle can include scars, amputations, lesions, loss of bodily functions, blindness, paralysis and death. Battles affect politics; a decisive battle can cause the losing side to surrender, while a Pyrrhic victory such as the Battle of Asculum can cause the winning side to reconsider its goals. Battles in civil wars have often decided the fate of monarchs or political factions. Famous examples include the Wars of the Roses, as well as the Jacobite risings. Battles affect the commitment of one side or the other to the continuance of a war, for example the Battle of Inchon and the Battle of Huế during the Tet Offensive.
See also: List of battles
Military strategy
Military tactics
Naval battle
Pitched battle
Skirmisher
War
Further reading: Interstate War Battle dataset (1823–2003)
References:
Sources
== External links == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle cry | History:
Antiquity: The war cry is an aspect of epic battle in Homer: in the Iliad, Diomedes is conventionally called "Diomedes of the loud war cry." Hellenes and Akkadians alike uttered the onomatopoeic cry "alala" in battle.
The troops of ancient Athens, during the Medic Wars and the Peloponnesian War were noted for going into battle shouting "Alala!" or "Alale!", which was supposed to emulate the cry of the owl, the bird of their patron goddess Athena.
The Western Huns attacked with terrifying battle cries.
One of the common Hindu war cry was "Hara Hara Mahadeva" meaning, "Hail to Mahadeva!" (Shiva).
Another common war cry in India was "Jai Bhavani" meaning, "Hail goddess Bhavani!”
A common war cry used in ancient Tamilakam was "Vetrivel, Veeravel", meaning, "Victorious vel, courageous vel." Vel is the spear of Murugan, the regional form of Kartikeya, the Hindu war deity. In the contemporary period, the battle cry "Vetrivel, Veeravel" is being used in the 191 Field Regiment of the Indian Army based in Madukkarai, Coimbatore.
Middle Ages: During the Scottish wars of independence, Scottish soldiers used Alba gu bràth as a battle-cry, a phrase that means 'Scotland for ever' (literally, 'Scotland until judgement'.) This was depicted in the film Braveheart during which Mel Gibson, playing William Wallace, shouts the phrase to rally his soldiers just before a battle commenced.
Each Turkic tribe and tribal union had its distinct tamga (seal), totemic ongon bird, and distinct uran (battle cry) (hence the Slavic urah "battle cry"). While tamgas and ongons could be distinct down to individuals, the hue of horses and uran battle cries belonged to each tribe, were passed down from generation to generation, and some modern battle cries were recorded in antiquity. On split of the tribe, their unique distinction passed to a new political entity, endowing different modern states with the same uran battle cries of the split tribes, for example Kipchak battle cry among Kazakhs, Kirgizes, Turkmens, and Uzbeks. Some larger tribes' uran battle cries:
Kipchak – "ay-bas" ("lunar head").
Kangly (Kangars) – "bai-terek" ("sacred tree").
Oguzes – "teke" ("mount")
Desperta ferro! ("Awake iron!" in Catalan) was the most characteristic cry of the Almogavar warriors during the Crown of Aragon military campaigns across the Mediterranean from the 12th through to the 14th centuries.
Deus vult! ("God wills it!" in Latin) was the battle cry of the Crusaders.
Montjoie Saint Denis!: battle cry of the Kings of France since the 12th century.
Santiago y cierra, España! was a war cry of Spanish troops during the Reconquista, and of the Spanish Empire.
On 14 August 1431, the whole Army of the Holy Roman Empire (of the 4th anti-Hussite crusade) was defeated by the Hussites in the Battle of Domažlice. Attacking imperial units started to retreat after hearing Ktož jsú boží bojovníci ("Ye Who Are Warriors of God") choral and were annihilated shortly after.
Allāhu Akbar (الله أكبر, "God is [the] Greatest") and Allāhu Allāh (الله الله, "God! God!") were used by Muslim armies throughout history. Al-naṣr aw al-shahāda (النصر أو الشهادة, "Victory or martyrdom") was also a common battle cry; the At-Tawbah 9:52 says that God has promised to the righteous Muslim warrior one of these two glorious ideals.
Óðinn á yðr alla (Odin owns you all) – A reference to Odin's self sacrifice at Yggdrasil. Attributed to Eric the Victorious.
Pre-modern: When suppressing peasants' rebellions in Germany and Scandinavia around 1500, such as in the Battle of Hemmingstedt, the Dutch mercenaries of the Black Guard yelled Wahr di buer, die garde kumt ("Beware, peasants, the guards are coming"). When the peasants counterattacked, they responded with Wahr di, Garr, de Buer de kumt ("Beware, Guard, of the peasant, [who is] coming").
The Spanish cried Santiago ("Saint James") both when reconquering Spain from the Moors and during conquest in early colonial America.
Polish "Winged Hussars" used to shout Jezus Maria ("Jesus, Mary") or Matka Boska ("Mother of God") during their charges.
King Henry IV of France (1553–1610), a pleasure-loving and cynical military leader, was famed for wearing a striking white plume in his helmet and for his war cry: Ralliez-vous à mon panache blanc! ("Follow my white plume!").
Burmese soldiers of the Konbaung Dynasty under Alaungpaya were recorded to shout Shwebo-Thar (Sons of Shwebo) during the Konbaung-Hanthawady War.
Most of the Jaikaras were popularized by Guru Gobind Singh. The Sikhs have a number of battle cries or jaikara: the most popular ones are as follows:
Bolnaji (Respectfully Utter) – Waheguru (Wondrous Enlightener)
Deg Teg Fateh (Victory to Charity and Arms) – Birdh ki Paij Panth ki jit (Rout of the Enemy Victory of the Sikh Path)
Bole So Nihal...Sat Sri Akaal ("Shout Aloud in Ecstasy... True is the Great Timeless One"),
Nanak naam charhdi kalaa (May Thy name be exalted O Nanak) – Tere bhaanae sarbatt daa bhalaa (and all people prosper by Thy grace)
Waheguru ji ka Khalsa (the Community of the Pure belongs to the Wondrous Enlightener) – Waheguru ji ki Fateh (Victory belongs to the Wondrous Enlightener)
Raj Karega Khalsa – (The Khalsa will rule) Aaakki Rahe Na Koye (And no opponent will remain)
Gaj ke jaikara gajaave fateh paave nihaal ho jaavae, Sat Sri Akaal gurbaar akaal hee akaal|| (excerpt from ardas of Buddha Dal prayerbook (gutka) praising the blessing of uttering jaikara proclaiming supreme truth).
The Pashtun soldiers' war cry against the Mughals was Hu, Hu.
The Gurkha (Gorkha) soldiers' battle cry was, and still is, "Jai Mahakali, Ayo Gorkhali!" ("Victory to Goddess Mahakali, the Gurkhas are coming!")
The "rebel yell" was a battle cry used by Confederate soldiers during the American Civil War.
Finnish light cavalry troops in the Swedish Army in the 17th and 18th centuries would use the battle cry "Hakkaa päälle!" ("Cut them down!" in Finnish), lending them the name Hackapell.
Irish regiments of various armies used and continue to use Gaelic War cries, "Faugh a Ballagh" ("Clear the way!") or "Erin go Bragh" ("Ireland Forever")
The Swedish army in the 18th and 19th centuries would be issued with the command to attack with "För Fäderneslandet, gå på, Hurra!" ("For the Fatherland, onwards, Hurrah!")
Argentine general José de San Martín is known in South America for his war cry: "Seamos libres, que lo demás no importa nada!" ("Let's be free, nothing else matters!").
In the Texas Revolution, following the Battle of Goliad and the Battle of the Alamo, Texan soldiers would use the battle cry "Remember Goliad! Remember the Alamo!"
In the Battle of Dybbøl in 1864, both Danish and German forces used "Hurrah" as a war cry.
During World War I in the Italian Front of 1915. Before battle, Italian soldiers would yell "Savoia" or "Avanti Savoia", which is "Come on Savoy!" or "Onwards Savoy!" in Italian (compare "For the king!" among British soldiers of the same era).
Modern: During World War II, Tennōheika Banzai (天皇陛下万歳, May the Emperor live for ten thousand years) served as a battle cry of sorts for Japanese soldiers, particularly in a "banzai charge". The most popular battle cry is "Ei ei oh" (エイエイオー), which is usually used at the start of battle.
"Avanti Savoia!" (English: Go Savoy!) |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle cry | In the Battle of Dybbøl in 1864, both Danish and German forces used "Hurrah" as a war cry.
During World War I in the Italian Front of 1915. Before battle, Italian soldiers would yell "Savoia" or "Avanti Savoia", which is "Come on Savoy!" or "Onwards Savoy!" in Italian (compare "For the king!" among British soldiers of the same era).
Modern: During World War II, Tennōheika Banzai (天皇陛下万歳, May the Emperor live for ten thousand years) served as a battle cry of sorts for Japanese soldiers, particularly in a "banzai charge". The most popular battle cry is "Ei ei oh" (エイエイオー), which is usually used at the start of battle.
"Avanti Savoia!" (English: Go Savoy!) was the patriotic battle cry of the Italian Royal Army during World War I and to a lesser extent, World War II. Infantrymen would scream this motto when launching an offensive attack, namely against the Austro-Hungarians.
During the Greco-Italian War (in WWII), the Greeks would shout "Αέρα!" (wind) as their battle cry.
During the Korean War, the Korean People's Army used the phrase "김일성 수령님 만세" (transliterated gim-ilseong sulyeongnim manse, translated as "Long live the Great Leader Kim Il Sung").
"Hooah" is the war cry of the United States Army, the United States Air Force, and the United States Space Force. "Oorah" is the war cry used by United States Marine Corps. "Hooyah" is the war cry of the United States Navy and the United States Coast Guard.
The Slavic version, "Ura!" (not to be mistaken with the "Hooah", noting in common) has been used by the Imperial Russian Army, the Red Army, Russian Ground Forces, alongside many more Eastern European armed forces. It was also used by Yugoslav Partisans as Juriš/Јуриш.
"Merdeka atau mati!" (English: Freedom or death!) Used by Indonesian national army and freedom fighters (Indonesian: Pedjoeang/pejuang) during the Indonesian National Revolution.
In Afghanistan, Norwegian troops of the Telemark Battalion would sometimes use the battle cry "Til Valhall!" (To Valhalla!) followed by Oorah.
Mujahideen and jihadists in the Middle East and North Africa shout "Allahu Akbar" (God is the Greatest).
During the Bangladesh Liberation War the Mukti Bahini would shout "Joy Bangla" ("Victory to Bengal" / "Long live Bengal") during their battles against the Pakistani military.
During the Indochina War in Vietnam, the Viet Minh soldiers usually used "Xung phong" (English: Charge) whenever attacking the enemy. The same battle cry would be used later by PAVN and NLF forces during the Vietnam War.
Each individual regiment of the Indian Army has a unique war cry. These chants are sonorous with the beliefs of individual castes and religions from which the troops belong to.
Croatian armed forces during the Croatian War of Independence would use "Za dom spremni". One would start by saying "Za dom!" and the rest would follow with "Spremni!". It translates loosely to "For home – ready!" or "For homeland – ready!".
Leeroy [sic] Jenkins is an internet meme, which has often served the purpose of an ironic or fatalistic parody of a battle cry, originating from a famous video of a World of Warcraft clan creating an intricate battle plan, before being party-wiped as a result of Leeroy Jenkins, who had been AFK at the time, charging in head-first. This gave rise to the phrase in first-person shooter games, where players will shout "LEEROOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOY JEEEEEENKIIIIIIIIIINS!" as they charge at the enemy. The phrase has gained notoriety, making appearances in various non-World of Warcraft media.
Sangh Parivar and other Hindu nationalist organizations use the Hindu religious slogan Jai Shri Ram (Victory to Lord Rama) as a war cry during communal violence.
Various Kurdish groups such as PKK, YPG and Peshmerga use the following phrases "Bijî Kurdistan!" short for "Her Bijî Kurdistan" (English: Long Live Kurdistan), which is usually accompanied with "Her Bijî!" (English : Long live) "Yan Kurdistan Yan Neman" (English: Either Kurdistan or Extinction!)
During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, "Slava Ukraini" (Слава Україні! English: Glory to Ukraine!), often accompanied by a reply of "Heroiam Slava" (Героям слава! English: Glory to the heroes!), became an internationally-known battle cry not only among domestic forces, but also among Western, mostly NATO allies.
See also:
References: Guilhem Pepin, ‘Les cris de guerre " Guyenne ! " et " Saint George ! ". L’expression d’une identité politique du duché d’Aquitaine anglo-gascon’, Le Moyen Age, cxii (2006) pp 263–281
External links: Philip Rance, 'War Cry' in The Encyclopedia of the Roman Army – Roman battle cries
Ross Cowan, The Clashing of Weapons and Silent Advances in Roman Battles – battle cries and the drumming of weapons in Roman warfare |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Cannae | Strategic background: Shortly after the start of the Second Punic War, Hannibal crossed into Italy by traversing the Pyrenees and the Alps during the summer and early autumn of 218 BC. He quickly won major victories over the Romans at Trebia and at Lake Trasimene. After these losses, the Romans appointed Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus as dictator to deal with the threat.
Fabius used attrition warfare against Hannibal, cutting off his supply lines and avoiding pitched battles. These tactics proved unpopular with the Romans who, as they recovered from the shock of Hannibal's victories, began to question the wisdom of the Fabian strategy, which had given the Carthaginian army a chance to regroup. The majority of Romans were eager to see a quick conclusion to the war. It was feared that, if Hannibal continued plundering Italy unopposed, Rome's allies might defect to the Carthaginian side for self-preservation.
Therefore, when Fabius came to the end of his term, the Senate did not renew his dictatorial powers and command was given to consuls Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Atilius Regulus. In 216 BC, when elections resumed, Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus were elected as consuls, placed in command of a newly raised army of unprecedented size and directed to engage Hannibal. Polybius wrote:
The Senate determined to bring eight legions into the field, which had never been done at Rome before, each legion consisting of five thousand men besides allies. ...Most of their wars are decided by one consul and two legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely employ all four at one time and on one service. But on this occasion, so great was the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved to bring not only four but eight legions into the field.
Estimates of Roman troop numbers: Rome typically employed four legions each year, each consisting of 4,000 foot soldiers and 200 cavalry. Per contemporary Roman sources, for the first time ever the Senate introduced eight legions, each consisting of 5,000 foot soldiers and 300 cavalry, with allied troops numbering the same number of foot soldiers but 900 cavalry per legion—more than triple the legion numbers. Eight legions—some 40,000 Roman soldiers and an estimated 2,400 cavalry—formed the core of this massive new army. Livy quotes one source stating the Romans added only 10,000 men to their usual army.
Roman command: The two consuls were each assigned two of the four legions to command, unusually employing all four legions at once on the same assignment. However, the Senate feared a real threat, and deployed not just four legions to the field but all eight, including allies. Ordinarily, each of the two consuls would command his own portion of the army, but since the two armies were combined into one, Roman law required them to alternate their command on a daily basis.
The traditional account puts Varro in command on the day of the battle, and much of the blame for the defeat has been laid on his shoulders. His low origins seem to be exaggerated in the sources, and Varro may have been made a scapegoat by the aristocratic establishment. He lacked the powerful descendants that Paullus had, descendants who were willing and able to protect his reputation—most notably his grandson Scipio Aemilianus, the patron of Polybius, one of the main sources of this history.
Prelude: In the spring of 216 BC Hannibal took the initiative and seized the large supply depot at Cannae, in the Apulian plain, placing himself between the Romans and their crucial source of supply. As Polybius noted, the capture of Cannae "caused great commotion in the Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but the fact that it commanded the surrounding district". The consuls, resolving to confront Hannibal, marched southward in search of him. After two days' march, they found him on the left bank of the river Aufidus, and encamped 8 km (5 miles) away.
Varro, in command on the first day, is presented by contemporary sources as a man of reckless nature and hubris, who was determined to defeat Hannibal. As the Romans approached Cannae, some of Hannibal's light infantry and cavalry ambushed them. Varro repelled the attack and continued slowly on his way to Cannae. This victory, though essentially a mere skirmish with no lasting strategic value, greatly bolstered the confidence of the Roman army, perhaps leading to overconfidence on Varro's part.
Paullus was opposed to the engagement as it was taking shape. Unlike Varro, he was prudent and cautious, and he believed it was foolish to fight on open ground, despite the Romans' numerical strength. This was especially true since Hannibal held the advantage in cavalry, in both quality and quantity. Despite these misgivings, Paullus thought it unwise to withdraw the army after the initial success, and camped two-thirds of the army east of the river Aufidus, sending the remainder to fortify a position on the opposite side, 2 km (1.2 mi) away from the main camp. The purpose of this second camp was to cover the foraging parties from the main camp and harass those of the enemy.
The two armies stayed in their respective locations for two days. During the second day (August 1) Hannibal, aware that Varro would be in command the following day, left his camp and offered battle, but Paullus refused. When his request was rejected, Hannibal, recognizing the importance of water from the Aufidus to the Roman troops, sent his cavalry to the smaller Roman camp to harass water-bearing soldiers that were found outside the camp fortifications. According to Polybius, Hannibal's cavalry boldly rode up to the edge of the Roman encampment, causing havoc and thoroughly disrupting the supply of water to the Roman camp.
On the morning of the battle, as the forces drew up, a Carthaginian officer named Gisgo reportedly remarked to Hannibal that the size of the Roman army was astonishing. "There is one thing, Gisgo, yet more astonishing", Hannibal coolly replied, "which you take no notice of." He then explained, "In all those great numbers before us, there is not one man called Gisgo", provoking laughter that spread through the Carthaginian ranks.
Appian and Livy say Hannibal sent a small contingent of 500–600 mercenaries to pretend to desert to the Roman side. Those men, Celtiberians according to Appian and Numidians according to Livy, handed their weapons to the Romans as a sign of good will while retaining hidden short swords in their clothes. Once the battle started, following Hannibal's plans, the mercenaries attacked, stealing weapons and shields from their victims and causing chaos and confusion in the Roman camp. However, the veracity of this part is disputed.
Date: Ancient historians rarely provide the precise dates for the events they describe. For example, Livy provides no explicit dates for any of the battles of the Second Punic War. Macrobius, citing the Roman annalist Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius, states the battle was fought ante diem iiii nones Sextilis, or 2 August.
The months of the pre-Julian Roman calendar are known not to correspond to its namesake Julian day. For example, Livy records a lunar eclipse in 168 BC as occurring on 4 September, when astronomical calculations show it happened on Julian day 21 June of that year. This discrepancy arose from the failure of the pontifices to properly perform intercalations, either by accident or for political advantage. A review of the evidence led P.S. Derow to identify the equivalent Julian date as 1 July 216 BC. Other authorities have suggested other Julian dates.
Armies: Figures for troops involved in ancient battles are often unreliable, and Cannae is no exception. They should be treated with caution, especially those for the Carthaginian side. The Carthaginian army was a combination of warriors from numerous regions, and may have numbered between 40,000 and 50,000. Their infantry comprised an estimated 8,000 Libyans, 5,500 Gaetulian, 16,000 Gauls, mainly Boii and Insubres (8,000 were left at camp the day of battle) and 8,000 of several tribes of Hispania, including Iberians, Celtiberians and Lusitanians.
Hannibal's cavalry also came from diverse backgrounds. He commanded 4,000 Numidian, 2,000 Iberian peninsular, 4,000 Gallic and 450 Libyan-Phoenician cavalry. Hannibal had an auxiliary skirmisher contingent consisting of 1,000–2,000 Balearic slingers and 6,000 mixed-nationality javelinmen, possibly including Lusitanians among them. The uniting factor for the Carthaginian army was the personal tie each group had with Hannibal.
Equipment: Rome's forces used typical Roman equipment including pila (heavy javelins) and hastae (thrusting spears) as weapons as well as traditional bronze helmets, bodyshields and body armor. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Cannae | Hannibal's cavalry also came from diverse backgrounds. He commanded 4,000 Numidian, 2,000 Iberian peninsular, 4,000 Gallic and 450 Libyan-Phoenician cavalry. Hannibal had an auxiliary skirmisher contingent consisting of 1,000–2,000 Balearic slingers and 6,000 mixed-nationality javelinmen, possibly including Lusitanians among them. The uniting factor for the Carthaginian army was the personal tie each group had with Hannibal.
Equipment: Rome's forces used typical Roman equipment including pila (heavy javelins) and hastae (thrusting spears) as weapons as well as traditional bronze helmets, bodyshields and body armor. In contrast, the Carthaginian army used a variety of equipment. The Iberians fought with falcatas, while Celtiberians and Lusitanians used straight gladii, as well as javelins and various types of spears. For defense, warriors from Hispania carried large oval shields and often wore a crested helmet made of animal sinews. Most Gallic foot warriors likely had no protection other than large shields, and the typical Gallic weapon was a long slashing sword.
The Numidian cavalry were very lightly equipped, lacking saddles and bridles for their horses, and wearing no armor but carrying small shields, javelins and possibly a knife or a longer blade. In contrast, the heavier Iberian peninsular cavalry carried round shields, swords, javelins and thrusting spears. The similarly heavy Gallic cavalry added the four-horned saddle, with the wealthier ones being clad in mail, a Gallic invention.
Skirmishers acting as light infantry carried either slings or javelins. The Balearic slingers, who were famous for their accuracy, carried short, medium and long slings used to cast stones or bullets. They may have carried a small shield or simple leather pelt on their arms, but this is uncertain. Hannibal himself, like many Roman officers on the opposing side, might have been wearing a bronze musculata and carrying a falcata as his personal sidearm.
The equipment of the Libyan line infantry has been much debated. Duncan Head has argued in favor of short stabbing spears. Polybius states that the Libyans fought with equipment taken from previously defeated Romans. It is unclear whether he meant only shields and armor or offensive weapons as well, though a general reading suggests he meant the whole panoply of arms and armor, and even tactical organization. Apart from his description of the battle itself, when later discussing the subject of the Roman legion versus the Greek phalanx, Polybius says that "...against Hannibal, the defeats they suffered had nothing to do with weapons or formations" because "Hannibal himself... discarded the equipment with which he had started out [and] armed his troops with Roman weapons".
Gregory Daly is inclined to the view that Libyan infantry would have copied the Iberian use of the sword during their fighting there and so were armed similarly to the Romans. Peter Connolly has argued that they were armed as a pike phalanx. This has been disputed by Head, because Plutarch states they carried spears shorter than the Roman triarii and by Daly because they could not have carried an unwieldy pike at the same time as a heavy Roman-style shield.
Tactical deployment: The conventional deployment for armies of the time was placement of infantry in the center, with the cavalry in two flanking wings. The Romans followed this convention fairly closely, but chose extra depth rather than breadth for the infantry in hopes of breaking quickly through the center of Hannibal's line. Varro knew how the Roman infantry had managed to penetrate Hannibal's center at Trebia, and he planned to recreate this on an even greater scale. The principes were stationed immediately behind the hastati, ready to push forward at first contact to ensure the Romans presented a unified front. As Polybius wrote, "the maniples were nearer each other, or the intervals were decreased... and the maniples showed more depth than front".
Even though they outnumbered the Carthaginians, this depth-oriented deployment meant that the Roman lines had a front of roughly equal size to their numerically inferior opponents. The typical style of ancient warfare was to continuously pour infantry into the center and attempt to overpower the enemy. Hannibal understood that the Romans fought their battles like this, and he took his outnumbered army and strategically placed them around the enemy to win a tactical victory.
Hannibal had deployed his forces based on the particular fighting qualities of each unit, taking into consideration both their strengths and weaknesses. This aspect of Hannibal's leadership was highlighted in the use of a Spanish unit, the Balearic slingers, whom he placed behind the infantry to hurl their ranged missiles into the masses of Roman troops. He placed his Iberians, Celtiberians and Gauls in the middle, alternating the ethnic composition between Hispanics and Gauls across the front line, with himself at the front and center alongside his brother Mago.
Roman sources claim their placement was chosen for being the most expendable and unreliable troops, but modern reflections believe those forces were actually selected for their battle-hardening to carry the weight of the Punic side, as they would be tasked with the controlled retreat that ultimately made possible Hannibal's pincer movement. Meanwhile, infantry from Punic Africa was on the wings at the very edge of his infantry line. This infantry would remain cohesive and attack the Roman flanks.
Hasdrubal led the Hispanic and Gallic cavalry on the left (south near the river Aufidus) of the Carthaginian army. By placing the flank of his army on the Aufidus, Hannibal prevented this flank from being overlapped by the more numerous Romans. Hasdrubal was given 6,000–7,000 cavalry, and Hanno had 3,000–4,000 Numidians on the right.
Hannibal intended that his cavalry, comprising mainly medium Hispanic cavalry and Numidian light horse, and positioned on the flanks, would defeat the weaker Roman cavalry and swing around to attack the Roman infantry from the rear as it pressed upon Hannibal's weakened center. His veteran African troops would then press in from the flanks at the crucial moment, and encircle the overextended Romans.
The Romans were in front of the hill leading to Cannae and hemmed in on their right flank by the river Aufidus, so that their left flank was the only viable means of retreat. In addition, the Carthaginian forces had maneuvered so that the Romans would face east. Not only would the morning sun shine low into the Romans' eyes, but the southeasterly winds would blow sand and dust into their faces as they approached the battlefield. Hannibal's deployment of his army, based on his perception of the terrain and understanding of the capabilities of his troops, proved decisive.
Battle: As the armies advanced on one another, Hannibal gradually extended the center of his line, as Polybius described: "After thus drawing up his whole army in a straight line, he took the central companies of Hispanics and Celts and advanced with them, keeping the rest of them in contact with these companies, but gradually falling off, so as to produce a crescent-shaped formation, the line of the flanking companies growing thinner as it was prolonged, his object being to employ the Africans as a reserve force and to begin the action with the Hispanics and Celts." Polybius described the weak Carthaginian center as deployed in a crescent, curving out toward the Romans in the middle with the African troops on their flanks in echelon formation.
It is believed that the purpose of this formation was to break the forward momentum of the Roman infantry, and delay its advance before other developments allowed Hannibal to deploy his African infantry most effectively. While the majority of historians feel that Hannibal's action was deliberate, some have called this account fanciful, and claim that the actions of the day represent either the natural curvature that occurs when a broad front of infantry marches forward, or the bending back of the Carthaginian center from the shock action of meeting the heavily massed Roman center.
The battle began with a fierce cavalry engagement on the flanks. Polybius described many of the Hispanic and Celtic horsemen facing the Romans dismounting due to the lack of space to fight on horseback, and called the struggle "barbaric" in the sense of its utter brutality. When the Carthaginian cavalry got the upper hand, they cut down their Roman opponents without giving quarter. On the other flank the Numidians engaged in a way that merely kept the Roman allied cavalry occupied. Hasdrubal kept his victorious Hispanic and Gallic cavalry under control and did not chase the retreating Roman right wing. Instead, he led them to the other side of the field to attack the socii cavalry still fighting the Numidians. Assailed from both sides, the allied cavalry broke before Hasdrubal could charge into contact and the Numidians pursued them off the field.
While the Carthaginian cavalry were in the process of defeating the Roman horsemen, the masses of infantry on both sides advanced towards each other in the center of the field. The wind from the east blew dust in the Romans' faces and obscured their vision. While the wind was not a major factor, the dust that both armies created would have been potentially debilitating to sight. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Cannae | On the other flank the Numidians engaged in a way that merely kept the Roman allied cavalry occupied. Hasdrubal kept his victorious Hispanic and Gallic cavalry under control and did not chase the retreating Roman right wing. Instead, he led them to the other side of the field to attack the socii cavalry still fighting the Numidians. Assailed from both sides, the allied cavalry broke before Hasdrubal could charge into contact and the Numidians pursued them off the field.
While the Carthaginian cavalry were in the process of defeating the Roman horsemen, the masses of infantry on both sides advanced towards each other in the center of the field. The wind from the east blew dust in the Romans' faces and obscured their vision. While the wind was not a major factor, the dust that both armies created would have been potentially debilitating to sight. Although it made seeing difficult, troops would still have been able to see others in the vicinity.
The dust was not the only psychological factor involved in battle. Because of the somewhat distant battle location, both sides were forced to fight on little sleep. Another Roman disadvantage was thirst caused by Hannibal's attack on the Roman encampment during the previous day. Furthermore, the massive number of troops would have led to an overwhelming amount of background noise. All of these psychological factors made battle especially difficult for the infantrymen.
The light infantry on both sides engaged in indecisive skirmishing, inflicting few casualties and quickly withdrawing through the ranks of their heavy infantry. As the Roman heavy infantry attacked, Hannibal stood with his men in the weak center and held them together in a controlled retreat. The crescent of Hispanic and Gallic troops buckled inwards as they gradually withdrew step by step. Knowing the superiority of the Roman infantry, Hannibal had instructed his infantry to withdraw deliberately, creating an even tighter semicircle around the attacking Roman forces. By doing so, he had turned the strength of the Roman infantry into a weakness. While the front ranks were gradually advancing, the bulk of the Roman troops began to lose their cohesion, as troops from the reserve lines advanced into the growing gaps.
Soon they were compacted together so closely that they had little space to wield their weapons. In pressing so far forward in their desire to destroy the retreating and seemingly collapsing line of Hispanic and Gallic troops, the Romans had ignored (possibly due to the dust) the African troops that stood uncommitted on the projecting ends of this now-reversed crescent.
This also gave the Carthaginian cavalry time to drive the Roman cavalry off on both flanks and attack the Roman center in the rear. The Roman infantry, now stripped of protection on both its flanks, formed a wedge that drove deeper and deeper into the Carthaginian semicircle, driving itself into an alley formed by the African infantry on the wings. At this decisive point, Hannibal ordered his African infantry to turn inwards and advance against the Roman flanks, creating an encirclement in one of the earliest known examples of a pincer movement.
When the Carthaginian cavalry attacked the Romans in the rear and the African flanking echelons assailed them on their right and left, the advance of the Roman infantry was brought to an abrupt halt. The Romans were henceforth enclosed in a pocket with no means of escape. The Carthaginians created a wall and began to systematically massacre them. Polybius wrote: "as their outer ranks were continually cut down, and the survivors forced to pull back and huddle together, they were finally all killed where they stood."
As Livy described, "So many thousands of Romans were dying... Some, whom their wounds, pinched by the morning cold, had roused, as they were rising up, covered with blood, from the midst of the heaps of slain, were overpowered by the enemy. Some were found with their heads plunged into the earth, which they had excavated; having thus, as it appeared, made pits for themselves, and having suffocated themselves." Victor Davis Hanson claims that nearly six hundred legionaries were slaughtered each minute until darkness brought an end to the bloodletting. Only 14,000 Roman troops managed to escape, including Scipio Africanus, who managed to escape the encirclement with 500 men, most of whom had cut their way through to the nearby town of Canusium.
Casualties:
Roman: Polybius writes that of the Roman and allied infantry, 70,000 were killed, 10,000 captured, and "perhaps" 3,000 survived. He also reports that of the 6,000 Roman and allied cavalry, only 370 survived.
Livy wrote, "Forty-five thousand and five hundred foot, two thousand seven hundred horse, there being an equal number of citizens and allies, are said to have been slain." He also reports that 3,000 Roman and allied infantry and 1,500 Roman and allied cavalry were taken prisoner by the Carthaginians. Another 2,000 Roman fugitives were rounded up at the unfortified village of Cannae by Carthaginian cavalry commanded by Carthalo, 7,000 fell prisoner in the smaller Roman camp and 5,800 in the larger. Although Livy does not cite his source by name, it is likely to have been Quintus Fabius Pictor, a Roman historian who fought in and wrote about the Second Punic War. It is Pictor whom Livy names when reporting the casualties at the Battle of Trebia.
In addition to the consul Paullus, Livy recorded that among the dead were 2 quaestors, 29 of the 48 military tribunes, some of consular rank, including the consul of the previous year, Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, and the former Magister equitum, Marcus Minucius Rufus, and 80 "senators or men who had held offices which would have given them the right to be elected to the Senate".
Later Roman and Greco-Roman historians largely follow Livy's figures. Appian gave 50,000 killed and "a great many" taken prisoner. Plutarch agreed, "50,000 Romans fell in that battle... 4,000 were taken alive in the field and 10,000 in the camps of both consuls". Quintilian: "60,000 men were slain by Hannibal at Cannae". Eutropius: "20 officers of consular and praetorian rank, 30 senators, and 300 others of noble descent, were taken or slain, as well as 40,000-foot-soldiers, and 3,500 horse".
Some modern historians, while rejecting Polybius's figure as flawed, are willing to accept Livy's figure. Other historians have come up with far lower estimates. In 1891, Cantalupi proposed Roman losses of 10,500 to 16,000. Samuels in 1990 also regarded Livy's figure as far too high, on the grounds that the cavalry would have been inadequate to prevent the Roman infantry escaping to the rear. He doubts that Hannibal even wanted a high death toll, as much of the army consisted of Italians whom Hannibal hoped to win as allies. Micheal Clodfelter also doubts the casualties of the Romans, citing the scarcity and unreliability of ancient sources, with him expressing that "are we really supposed to believe that Hannibal’s 50,000 Carthaginians slaughtered 48,000–70,000 Romans on a single afternoon on the field of Cannae, even if the battle did degenerate into a massacre in its final stages?".
Carthaginian: Livy recorded Hannibal's losses at "about 8,000 of his bravest men." Polybius reports 5,700 dead: 4,000 Gauls, 1,500 Hispanics and Africans, and 200 cavalry.
Aftermath: Never when the city was in safety was there so great a panic and confusion within the walls of Rome. I shall therefore shrink from the task, and not attempt to relate what in describing I must make less than the reality. The consul and his army having been lost at the Trasimenus the year before, it was not one wound upon another which was announced, but a multiplied disaster, the loss of two consular armies, together with the two consuls: and that now there was neither any Roman camp, nor general nor soldiery: that Apulia and Samnium, and now almost the whole of Italy, were in the possession of Hannibal. No other nation surely would not have been overwhelmed by such an accumulation of misfortune.
For a brief period, the Romans were in complete disarray. Their best armies in the peninsula had been destroyed, the few remnants severely demoralized, and the only remaining consul (Varro) completely discredited. As the story goes, Rome declared a national day of mourning as there was not a single person who was not either related to or acquainted with a person who had died. The Romans became so desperate that they resorted to human sacrifice, twice burying people alive at the Forum of Rome and abandoning an oversized baby in the Adriatic Sea (perhaps one of the last instances of human sacrifices by the Romans, apart from public executions of defeated enemies dedicated to Mars).
Within just three campaign seasons (20 months), Rome had lost one-fifth (150,000) of the entire population of male citizens over 17 years of age. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Cannae | No other nation surely would not have been overwhelmed by such an accumulation of misfortune.
For a brief period, the Romans were in complete disarray. Their best armies in the peninsula had been destroyed, the few remnants severely demoralized, and the only remaining consul (Varro) completely discredited. As the story goes, Rome declared a national day of mourning as there was not a single person who was not either related to or acquainted with a person who had died. The Romans became so desperate that they resorted to human sacrifice, twice burying people alive at the Forum of Rome and abandoning an oversized baby in the Adriatic Sea (perhaps one of the last instances of human sacrifices by the Romans, apart from public executions of defeated enemies dedicated to Mars).
Within just three campaign seasons (20 months), Rome had lost one-fifth (150,000) of the entire population of male citizens over 17 years of age. The morale effect of this victory was such that most of southern Italy joined Hannibal's cause. After Cannae, the Hellenistic southern provinces of Arpi, Salapia, and Uzentum, including the cities of Capua and Tarentum, two of the largest city-states in Italy, and other settlements of non-Latin origin such as Herdonia, revoked their allegiance to Rome and pledged their loyalty to Hannibal.
As Livy noted, "How much more serious was the defeat of Cannae than those which preceded it, can be seen by the behavior of Rome's allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshaken, now it began to waver for the simple reason that they despaired of Roman power." Following the battle, Sicily's Greek cities rose in revolt against Roman political control. The Macedonian king, Philip V, pledged his support to Hannibal, initiating the First Macedonian War against Rome. Hannibal also secured an alliance with the new king Hieronymus of Syracuse, the only independent king left in Sicily.
Livy illustrates the state of Roman morale with two vivid anecdotes. The first concerns Hannibal's brother Mago, who had returned to Carthage with news of the victory. He reported to their senate that in several engagements with the Romans Hannibal had killed over 200,000 soldiers and taken 50,000 prisoner; of six commanders, two consuls and a Master of horse had been slain; and a number of Roman allies had gone over to the Carthaginians. Then Mago concluded his report by having a collection of golden rings poured upon the council floor in front of the assembled senators. He explained that each ring belonged to one eques who had been slain in battle and had earned the ring through exceptional bravery. Livy notes that one unnamed authority stated the volume of jewelry amounted to three and one-half measures (Congius?), only to add "it is generally and more credibly held that there was not more than one measure of them".
The second concerns Lucius Caecilius Metellus and three other military tribunes, who had taken refuge at Canusium with other Roman refugees. Demoralized at the defeat, they discussed the possibility of setting sail overseas and finding employment as mercenaries for some foreign prince. Word of this meeting reached the young Publius Cornelius Scipio who, with only a few followers, burst into the room where the discussion was underway. Holding his naked sword over the heads of the wavering men, Scipio is reported to have cried:
I swear with all the passion in my heart that I will never desert our homeland, or permit any other citizen of Rome to leave her in the lurch. If I willfully break my oath may Jupiter, Greatest and Best, bring me to a shameful death, with my house, my family, and all I possess! Swear the same oath, Caecilius! And the rest of you, swear it too. If anyone refuses, against him this sword is drawn.
After the battle, the commander of the Numidian cavalry, Maharbal, urged Hannibal to seize the opportunity and march immediately on Rome. It is told that the latter's refusal caused Maharbal's exclamation: "Assuredly, no one man has been blessed with all God's gifts. You, Hannibal, know how to gain a victory; you do not know how to use it."
Instead, Hannibal sent a delegation led by Carthalo to negotiate a peace treaty with the Senate on moderate terms. Despite the multiple catastrophes Rome had suffered, the Senate refused to parley. Instead, they redoubled their efforts, declaring full mobilization of the male Roman population, and raised new legions, enlisting landless peasants and even slaves. So firm were these measures that the word "peace" was prohibited, mourning was limited to only 30 days, and public tears were prohibited even to women.: 386
Hannibal had good reasons to judge the strategic situation after the battle differently from Maharbal. As the historian Hans Delbrück pointed out, due to the high numbers of killed and wounded among its ranks, the Punic army was not in a condition to mount a direct assault on Rome. It would have been a fruitless demonstration that would have nullified the psychological effect of Cannae on the Roman allies. Even if his army were at full strength, a successful siege of Rome would have required Hannibal to subdue a considerable part of the hinterland to cut the enemy's supplies and secure his own.
Even after the tremendous losses suffered at Cannae and the defection of a number of her allies, Rome still had abundant manpower to prevent this and maintain considerable forces in Iberia, Sicily, Sardinia and elsewhere, despite Hannibal's presence in Italy. Hannibal's conduct after the victories at Trasimene (217 BC) and Cannae, and the fact that he first attacked Rome only five years later in 211 BC, suggests that his strategic aim was not the destruction of his foe but to dishearten the Romans by carnage on the battlefield and to wear them down to a moderate peace agreement by stripping them of their allies.
"In fact there were many good reasons for not marching on Rome," military expert Robert O'Connell writes, "and only one good reason for going." While the scholars provide reasons not to march, a soldier, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, believed Maharbal was right; when a more powerful adversary is down, he must be dispatched. "Hannibal's single chance of winning the larger war was to begin marching his army towards Rome," O'Connell adds. "In the end it still would have been a long shot. But it was his only shot. Instead, Hannibal chose another route, and the war became only a matter of time."
For the remainder of the war in Italy, the Romans did not amass large forces under one command against Hannibal; they used several independent armies, still outnumbering the Punic forces in numbers of soldiers. The war in Italy still had occasional battles, but was focused on taking strongpoints and constant fighting according to the Fabian strategy. This finally forced Hannibal with his shortage of manpower to retreat to Croton from where he was called to Africa for the final battle of Zama, where the Roman victory ended the war.
Historical significance:
Effects on Roman military doctrine: Cannae played a major role in shaping the military structure and tactical organization of the Roman Republican army. At Cannae, the Roman infantry assumed a formation similar to the Greek phalanx. This left them vulnerable to Hannibal's tactic of double envelopment since their inability to maneuver independently from the mass of the army made it impossible for them to counter the strategic encirclement used by the Carthaginian cavalry. The laws of the Roman state requiring command to alternate between the two consuls restricted strategic consistency.
In the years following Cannae, striking reforms were introduced to address these deficiencies. First, the Romans "articulated the phalanx, then divided it into columns, and finally split it up into a great number of small tactical bodies that were capable, now of closing together in a compact impenetrable union, now of changing the pattern with consummate flexibility, of separating one from the other and turning in this or that direction." For instance, at Ilipa and Zama, the principes were formed up well to the rear of the hastati—a deployment that allowed a greater degree of mobility and maneuverability. The culminating result of this change marked the transition from the traditional manipular system to the cohort under Gaius Marius, as the basic infantry unit of the Roman army.
In addition, a unified command came to be seen as a necessity. After various political experiments, Scipio Africanus was made general-in-chief of the Roman armies in Africa, and was assured this role for the duration of the war. This appointment may have violated the constitutional laws of the Roman Republic but, as Delbrück wrote, it "effected an internal transformation that increased her military potentiality enormously" while foreshadowing the decline of the Republic's political institutions. Furthermore, the battle exposed the limits of a citizen-militia army. Following Cannae, the Roman army gradually developed into a professional force.
Status in military history: Cannae is as famous for Hannibal's tactics as it is for the role it played in Roman history. Not only did Hannibal inflict a defeat on the Roman Republic in a manner unrepeated for over a century until the lesser-known Battle of Arausio, but the battle also has acquired a significant reputation in military history. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Cannae | After various political experiments, Scipio Africanus was made general-in-chief of the Roman armies in Africa, and was assured this role for the duration of the war. This appointment may have violated the constitutional laws of the Roman Republic but, as Delbrück wrote, it "effected an internal transformation that increased her military potentiality enormously" while foreshadowing the decline of the Republic's political institutions. Furthermore, the battle exposed the limits of a citizen-militia army. Following Cannae, the Roman army gradually developed into a professional force.
Status in military history: Cannae is as famous for Hannibal's tactics as it is for the role it played in Roman history. Not only did Hannibal inflict a defeat on the Roman Republic in a manner unrepeated for over a century until the lesser-known Battle of Arausio, but the battle also has acquired a significant reputation in military history. As military historian Theodore Ayrault Dodge wrote:
Few battles of ancient times are more marked by ability... than the battle of Cannae. The position was such as to place every advantage on Hannibal's side. The manner in which the far from perfect Hispanic and Gallic foot was advanced in a wedge in echelon... was first held there and then withdrawn step by step, until it had reached the converse position... is a simple masterpiece of battle tactics. The advance at the proper moment of the African infantry, and its wheel right and left upon the flanks of the disordered and crowded Roman legionaries, is far beyond praise. The whole battle, from the Carthaginian standpoint, is a consummate piece of art, having no superior, few equal, examples in the history of war.
Will Durant wrote, "It was a supreme example of generalship, never bettered in history... and it set the lines of military tactics for 2,000 years".
Hannibal's double envelopment at Cannae is often viewed as one of the greatest battlefield maneuvers in history, and is cited as the first successful use of the pincer movement within the Western world to be recorded in detail.
"Cannae model": Apart from being one of the greatest defeats inflicted on Roman arms, Cannae represents the archetypal battle of annihilation, a strategy that has rarely succeeded since. As Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in World War II, wrote, "Every ground commander seeks the battle of annihilation; so far as conditions permit, he tries to duplicate in modern war the classic example of Cannae". "Cannae" has become a byword for military success, and the battle is studied in military academies around the world. The notion that an entire army could be encircled and annihilated within a single stroke led to a fascination among Western generals for centuries, including Frederick the Great and Helmuth von Moltke, who attempted to create their own "Cannae".
Delbrück's seminal study of the battle influenced German military theorists, particularly the Chief of the German General Staff, Alfred von Schlieffen, whose "Schlieffen Plan" was inspired by Hannibal's double envelopment maneuver. Schlieffen believed that the "Cannae model" would continue to be applicable in maneuver warfare throughout the 20th century:
A battle of annihilation can be carried out today according to the same plan devised by Hannibal in long forgotten times. The enemy front is not the goal of the principal attack. The mass of the troops and the reserves should not be concentrated against the enemy front; the essential is that the flanks be crushed. The wings should not be sought at the advanced points of the front but rather along the entire depth and extension of the enemy formation. The annihilation is completed through an attack against the enemy's rear... To bring about a decisive and annihilating victory requires an attack against the front and against one or both flanks...
Schlieffen later developed his own operational doctrine in a series of articles, many of which were translated and published in a work entitled Cannae.
In 1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf Jr., commander of coalition forces in the Gulf War, cited Hannibal's triumph at Cannae as inspiration for the rapid and successful coalition operations during the conflict.
Historical sources: There are three main accounts of the battle, none of them contemporary. The closest is Polybius, who wrote his account 50 years after the battle. Livy wrote in the time of Augustus, and Appian later still. Appian's account describes events that have no relation with those of Livy and Polybius. Polybius portrays the battle as the nadir of Roman fortunes, perhaps to emphasise the subsequent Roman recovery—some historians contend that his casualty figures are exaggerated—"more symbolic than factual".
Livy portrays the Senate in heroic terms and assigns blame for the Roman defeat to the low-born Varro. This lifts blame from the Roman soldiers, whom Livy idealizes. Scholars tend to discount Appian's account. The verdict of Philip Sabin—"a worthless farrago"—is typical.
Although he has no connected narrative of the battle, Plutarch provides a number of details about Cannae in his Parallel Lives, specifically the essays "Fabius" and "Aemilius Paulus".
Historian Martin Samuels has questioned whether it was in fact Varro in command on the day on the grounds that Paullus may have been in command on the right. The warm reception that Varro received after the battle from the Senate was in striking contrast to the savage criticism meted out to other commanders. Samuels doubts whether Varro would have been received with such warmth had he been in command. Gregory Daly notes that, in the Roman military, the right was always the place of command. He suggests that at the Battle of Zama Hannibal claimed to have fought Paullus at Cannae and concludes that it is impossible to be sure who was in command on the day.
Notes:
References:
Bibliography:
Ancient sources:
Modern sources:
External links:
Cannae – a treatise by General Fieldmarshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen
Archaeological site believed to be where the battle took place
Battle At Cannae Mommsen History of Rome. Book 03 From the Union of Italy to the Subjugation of Carthage and the Greek States, p. 50 |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Chaeronea (338 BC) | Background: In the decade following his accession in 359 BC, the Macedonian king, Philip II, had rapidly strengthened and expanded his kingdom into Thrace and Chalkidiki on the northern coast of the Aegean Sea. He was aided in this process by the distraction of Athens and Thebes, the two most powerful city-states in Greece at that point, by events elsewhere. In particular, these events included the Social War between Athens and her erstwhile allies (357–355 BC), and the Third Sacred War which erupted in central Greece in 356 BC between the Phocians and the other members of the Delphic Amphictyonic League. Much of Philip's expansion during this period was at the nominal expense of the Athenians, who considered the north Aegean coast as their sphere of influence, and Philip was at war with Athens from 356–346 BC.
Philip was not originally a belligerent in the Sacred War, but became involved at the request of the Thessalians. Seeing an opportunity to expand his influence, Philip obliged, and in 353 or 352 BC won a decisive victory over the Phocians at the Battle of Crocus Field in Thessaly. In the aftermath, Philip was made archon of Thessaly, which gave him control of the levies and revenues of the Thessalian Confederation, thereby greatly increasing his power. However, Philip did not intervene further in the Sacred War until 346 BC.
Early in 346 BC, the Thebans, who had borne the brunt of the Sacred War, together with the Thessalians, asked Philip to assume the "leadership of Greece" and join them in fighting the Phocians. Philip's power was by now so great that ultimately the Phocians did not even attempt to resist, and instead surrendered to him. Philip was thus able to end a particularly bloody war without any further fighting. Philip allowed the Amphictyonic council the formal responsibility of punishing the Phocians, but ensured that the terms were not overly harsh; nevertheless, the Phocians were expelled from the Amphictyonic League, all their cities were destroyed, and they were resettled in villages of no more than fifty houses.
By 346 BC, the Athenians were war-weary, unable to match Philip's strength, and had begun to contemplate the necessity of making peace. Nevertheless, when it became apparent that Philip would march south that year, the Athenians originally planned to help the Phocians (whom they were allied to) keep Philip out of central Greece, by occupying the pass of Thermopylae, where Philip's superior numbers would be of little benefit. The Athenians had successfully used this tactic to prevent Philip attacking Phocis itself after his victory at Crocus Field.
The occupation of Thermopylae was not only for the benefit of Phocis; excluding Philip from central Greece also prevented him from marching on Athens itself. However, by the end of February, the general Phalaikos was restored to power in Phocis, and he refused to allow the Athenians access to Thermopylae. Suddenly unable to guarantee their own security, the Athenians were forced instead into making peace with Philip. Their peace treaty, known as the Peace of Philocrates, made Athens a reluctant ally of Macedon.
For the Athenians, the treaty had been expedient, but it was never popular. Philip's actions in 346 BC had expanded his influence over all Greece, and although he had brought peace, he had come to be seen as the enemy of the traditional liberty of the city-states. The orator and politician Demosthenes had been a principal architect of the Peace of Philocrates, but almost as soon as it was agreed, he wished to be rid of it. Over the next few years, Demosthenes became leader of the "war-party" in Athens, and at every opportunity he sought to undermine the peace. From 343 BC onwards, in order to try to disrupt the peace, Demosthenes and his followers used every expedition and action of Philip to argue that he was breaking the peace.
Conversely, there was at first a substantial body of feeling in Athens, led by Aeschines, that the peace, unpopular though it was, should be maintained and developed. Towards the end of the decade however, the "war party" gained the ascendancy, and began to openly goad Philip; in 341 BC for instance, the Athenian general Diopeithes ravaged the territory of Philip's ally Cardia, even though Philip demanded that they desist. Philip's patience finally ran out when the Athenians formed an alliance with Byzantium, which Philip was at that time besieging, and he wrote the Athenians declaring war. Shortly afterward Philip broke off the siege of Byzantium; Cawkwell suggests that Philip had decided to deal with Athens once and for all. Philip went on campaign against the Scythians, and then began to prepare for war in southern Greece.
Prelude: Philip's forthcoming campaign in southern Greece became linked with a new, fourth, Sacred War. The citizens of Amphissa in Ozolian Locris had begun cultivating land sacred to Apollo on the Crisaean Plain south of Delphi; after some internal bickering the Amphictyonic council decided to declare a sacred war against Amphissa. A Thessalian delegate proposed that Philip should be made leader of the Amphictyonic effort, which therefore gave Philip a pretext to campaign in southern Greece; it is, however, probable that Philip would have gone ahead with his campaign anyway.
At the start of 339 BC, the Thebans had seized the town of Nicaea near Thermopylae, which Philip had garrisoned in 346 BC. Philip does not appear to have treated this as a declaration of war, but it nevertheless presented him with a significant problem, blocking the main route. However, a second route into central Greece was available, leading over the shoulder of Mount Callidromos and descending into Phocis. However, the Athenians and Thebans had either forgotten the existence of this road, or believed that Philip would not use it; the subsequent failure to guard this road allowed Philip to slip into central Greece unhindered.
Philip's relatively lenient treatment of the Phocians at the end of the Third Sacred War in 346 BC now bore fruit. Reaching Elatea, he ordered the city to be re-populated, and during the next few months the whole Phocian Confederation was restored to its former state. This provided Philip with a base in Greece, and new, grateful allies in the Phocians. Philip probably arrived in Phocis in November 339 BC, but the Battle of Chaeronea did not occur until August 338 BC.
During this period Philip discharged his responsibility to the Amphicytonic council by settling the situation in Amphissa. He tricked a force of 10,000 mercenaries who were guarding the road from Phocis to Amphissa into abandoning their posts, then took Amphissa and expelled its citizens, turning it over to Delphi. He probably also engaged in diplomatic attempts to avoid further conflict in Greece, although if so, he was unsuccessful.
When news first arrived that Philip was in Elatea, just three days march away, there was panic in Athens. In what Cawkwell describes as his proudest moment, Demosthenes alone counseled against despair, and proposed that the Athenians should seek an alliance with the Thebans; his decree was passed, and he was sent as ambassador. Philip had also sent an embassy to Thebes, requesting that the Thebans join him, or at least allow him to pass through Boeotia unhindered. Since the Thebans were still not formally at war with Philip, they could have avoided the conflict altogether. However, in spite of Philip's proximity, and their traditional enmity with Athens, they chose to ally with the Athenians, in the cause of liberty for Greece. The Athenian army had already pre-emptively been sent in the direction of Boeotia, and was therefore able to join the Thebans within days of the alliance being agreed.
The details of the campaign leading up to Chaeronea are almost completely unknown. Philip was presumably prevented from entering Boeotia by way of Mount Helicon, as the Spartans had done in the run-up to the Battle of Leuctra; or by any of the other mountain passes that led into Boeotia from Phocis. There were certainly some preliminary skirmishes; Demosthenes alludes to a "winter battle" and "battle on the river" in his speeches, but no other details are preserved. Finally, in August 338 BC, Philip's army marched straight down the main road from Phocis to Boeotia, to assault the main allied army defending the road at Chaeronea.
Opposing forces: According to Diodorus, the Macedonian army numbered roughly 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, a figure generally accepted by modern historians. Philip took command of the right wing of the Macedonian army and placed his 18-year-old son Alexander (the future conqueror of the Persian Empire) in command of the left wing, accompanied by a group of Philip's experienced generals.
The allied army included contingents from Achaea, Corinth, Chalcis, Epidaurus, Megara, and Troezen, with the majority of troops being supplied by Athens and Thebes. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Chaeronea (338 BC) | Finally, in August 338 BC, Philip's army marched straight down the main road from Phocis to Boeotia, to assault the main allied army defending the road at Chaeronea.
Opposing forces: According to Diodorus, the Macedonian army numbered roughly 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, a figure generally accepted by modern historians. Philip took command of the right wing of the Macedonian army and placed his 18-year-old son Alexander (the future conqueror of the Persian Empire) in command of the left wing, accompanied by a group of Philip's experienced generals.
The allied army included contingents from Achaea, Corinth, Chalcis, Epidaurus, Megara, and Troezen, with the majority of troops being supplied by Athens and Thebes. The Athenian contingent was led by the generals Chares and Lysicles, and the Thebans by Theagenes. No source provides exact numbers for the allied army, although Justin suggests that the southern Greeks were "far superior in number of soldiers". The modern view is that the numbers of the city states that fought were approximately equal to those of the Macedonians.
The Athenians took up positions on the left wing, the Thebans on the right, and the other allies in the centre. Athenian aristocrat Philippides of Paiania, campaigned for Philip's cause with his associates during the battle in Thebes, Eleuthera and Tanagra. Philippides was later prosecuted by Hypereides for his pro-Macedonian actions after the defeat.
Strategic and tactical considerations: The allied army of Athens and Thebes had taken up a position near Chaeronea, astride the main road. On the left flank, the allied line lay across the foothills of Mount Thurion, blocking the side-road that led to Lebedea, while on the right, the line rested against the Kephisos River, near a projecting spur of Mount Aktion. The allied line, which was about 2.5 miles in length, was thus secure on both flanks. Moreover, the allied line seems to have slanted north-eastwards across the plain in between, so that it did not face the direction of Macedonian advance full-square.
This prevented Philip from attempting to concentrate his force on the allied right wing, since the advanced position of the left wing would then threaten Philip's right. Although Philip could attempt to concentrate his force against the southern Greek left, the troops there occupied high ground, and any attack would be difficult. Since the southern Greeks could remain on the defensive, having only to prevent Philip's advance, their position was therefore strategically and tactically very strong.
Battle: Details of the battle itself are scarce, with Diodorus providing the only formal account. He says that "once joined, the battle was hotly contested for a long time and many fell on both sides, so that for a while the struggle permitted hopes of victory to both." He then recounts that the young Alexander, "his heart set on showing his father his prowess" succeeded in rupturing the allied line aided by his companions, and eventually put the right wing to flight; meanwhile, Philip advanced in person against the left wing and also put it to flight.
This brief account can be filled out, if Polyaenus's account of the battle is to be believed. Polyaenus collected many snippets of information on warfare in his Strategems; some are known from other sources to be reliable, while others are demonstrably false. In the absence of other evidence, it is unclear whether his passage regarding Chaeronea is to be accepted or rejected. Polyaenus suggests that Philip engaged the allied left, but then withdrew his troops; the Athenians on the left followed and, when Philip held the high ground, he stopped retreating and attacked the Athenians, eventually routing them.
In another 'stratagem', Polyaenus suggests that Philip deliberately prolonged the battle, to take advantage of the rawness of the Athenian troops (his own veterans being more used to fatigue) and delayed his main attack until the Athenians were exhausted. This latter anecdote also appears in the earlier Stratagems of Frontinus.
Polyaenus's accounts have led some modern historians to tentatively propose the following synthesis of the battle. After the general engagement had been in progress for some time, Philip had his army perform a wheeling manoeuver, with the right wing withdrawing, and the whole line pivoting around its centre. At the same time, wheeling forward, the Macedonian left wing attacked the Thebans on their right and punched a hole in the allied line. On the allied left, the Athenians followed Philip, their line becoming stretched and disordered; the Macedonians then turned, attacked and routed the tired and inexperienced Athenians. The southern Greek right wing, under the assault of the Macedonian troops under Alexander's command, then attacked, ending the battle.
Many historians, including Hammond and Cawkwell, place Alexander in charge of the Companion Cavalry during the battle, perhaps because of Diodorus's use of the word "companions". However, there is no mention of cavalry in any ancient account of the battle, nor does there seem to have been space for it to operate against the flank of the southern Greek army. However, some Macedonian cavalry squadrons in wedged formation, a tactical deployment Philip designed for his cavalry for just such a purpose, could have penetrated the gaps which opened amid the Greek lines, gaps which are mentioned by Diodorus in his brief account. Plutarch says that Alexander was the "first to break the ranks of the Sacred Band of the Thebans", the elite of the Theban infantry, who were stationed on the extreme right of the battle line. However, he also says that the Sacred Band had "met the spears of [the Macedonian] phalanx face to face". This, together with the improbability that a head-on cavalry charge against the spear-armed Thebans could have succeeded, has led Gaebel and others to suggest that Alexander must have been commanding a portion of the Macedonian phalanx at Chaeronea.
Diodorus says that more than 1,000 Athenians died in the battle, with another 2,000 taken prisoner, and that the Thebans fared similarly. Plutarch suggests that all 300 of the Sacred Band were killed at the battle, having previously been seen as invincible. In the Roman period, the 'Lion of Chaeronea', an enigmatic monument on the site of the battle, was believed to mark the resting place of the Sacred Band. Modern excavations found the remains of 254 soldiers underneath the monument; it is therefore generally accepted that this was indeed the grave of the Sacred Band, since it is unlikely that every member was killed.
Aftermath: Cawkwell suggests that this was one of the most decisive battles in ancient history. Since there was now no army which could prevent Philip's advance, the war effectively ended. In Athens and Corinth, records show desperate attempts to re-build the city walls, as they prepared for siege. However, Philip had no intention of besieging any city, nor indeed of conquering it. He wanted the southern Greeks as his allies for his planned campaign against the Persians, and he wanted to leave a stable Greece in his rear when he went on campaign; further fighting was therefore contrary to his aims. Philip marched first to Thebes, which surrendered to him; he expelled the Theban leaders who had opposed him, recalled those pro-Macedonian Thebans who had previously been exiled, and installed a Macedonian garrison. He also ordered that the Boeotian cities of Plataea and Thespiae, which Thebes had destroyed in previous conflicts, be re-founded. Generally, Philip treated the Thebans severely, making them pay for the return of their prisoners, and even to bury their dead; he did not, however, dissolve the Boeotian Confederacy.
By contrast, Philip treated Athens very leniently. Although the Second Athenian League was dissolved, the Athenians were allowed to keep their colony on Samos, and their prisoners were freed without ransom. Philip's motives are not entirely clear, but one likely explanation is that he hoped to use the Athenian navy in his campaign against Persia, since Macedon did not possess a substantial fleet; he therefore needed to remain on good terms with the Athenians.
Philip also made peace with the other combatants, Corinth and Chalcis, which controlled important strategic locations both received Macedonian garrisons. He then turned to deal with Sparta, which had not taken part in the conflict, but was likely to take advantage of the weakened state of the other Greek cities to try to attack its neighbours in the Peloponnese. The Spartans refused Philip's invitation to engage in discussions, so Philip ravaged Lacedaemonia, but did not attack Sparta itself.
Philip seems to have moved around in the months after the battle, making peace with the states that opposed him, dealing with the Spartans, and installing garrisons. His movements also probably served as a demonstration of force to the other cities, that they should not try to oppose him. In mid 337 BC, he seems to have camped near Corinth, and began the work to establish a league of the city-states, which would guarantee peace in Greece, and provide Philip with military assistance against Persia. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Chaeronea (338 BC) | He then turned to deal with Sparta, which had not taken part in the conflict, but was likely to take advantage of the weakened state of the other Greek cities to try to attack its neighbours in the Peloponnese. The Spartans refused Philip's invitation to engage in discussions, so Philip ravaged Lacedaemonia, but did not attack Sparta itself.
Philip seems to have moved around in the months after the battle, making peace with the states that opposed him, dealing with the Spartans, and installing garrisons. His movements also probably served as a demonstration of force to the other cities, that they should not try to oppose him. In mid 337 BC, he seems to have camped near Corinth, and began the work to establish a league of the city-states, which would guarantee peace in Greece, and provide Philip with military assistance against Persia. The result, the League of Corinth, was formed in the latter half of 337 BC at a congress organised by Philip. All states signed up to the league, with the exception of Sparta.
The principal terms of the concord were that all members became allied to each other, and to Macedon, and that all members were guaranteed freedom from attack, freedom of navigation, and freedom from interference in internal affairs. Philip, and the Macedonian garrisons installed, would act as the 'keepers of the peace'. At Philip's behest, the synod of the league then declared war on Persia, and voted Philip as Strategos for the forthcoming campaign.
An advance Macedonian force was sent to Persia in early 336 BC, with Philip due to follow later in the year. However, before he could depart, Philip was assassinated by one of his bodyguards. Alexander therefore became King of Macedon, and in a series of campaigns lasting from 334 to 323 BC, he conquered the whole Persian Empire.
References:
Citations:
=== Sources === |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Chancellorsville | Background:
Military situation:
Union attempts against Richmond: In the Eastern Theater of the American Civil War, the objective of the Union had been to advance and seize the Confederate capital, Richmond, Virginia. In the first two years of the war, four major attempts had failed: the first foundered just miles away from Washington, D.C., at the First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) in July 1861. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Peninsula Campaign took an amphibious approach, landing his Army of the Potomac on the Virginia Peninsula in the spring of 1862 and coming within 6 miles (9.7 km) of Richmond before being turned back by Gen. Robert E. Lee in the Seven Days Battles.
That summer, Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Virginia was defeated at the Second Battle of Bull Run. Finally, in December 1862, Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside's Army of the Potomac attempted to reach Richmond by way of Fredericksburg, Virginia, but was defeated at the Battle of Fredericksburg.
Shakeup in the Army of the Potomac: In January 1863, the Army of the Potomac, following the Battle of Fredericksburg and the humiliating Mud March, suffered from rising desertions and plunging morale. Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside decided to conduct a mass purge of the Army of the Potomac's leadership, eliminating a number of generals who he felt were responsible for the disaster at Fredericksburg. In reality, he had no power to dismiss anyone without the approval of Congress.
Predictably, Burnside's purge went nowhere, and he offered President Abraham Lincoln his resignation from command of the Army of the Potomac. He even offered to resign entirely from the Army, but the president persuaded him to stay, transferring him to the Western Theater, where he became commander of the Department of the Ohio. Burnside's former command, the IX Corps, was transferred to the Virginia Peninsula, a movement that prompted the Confederates to detach troops from Lee's army under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, a decision that would be consequential in the upcoming campaign.
Abraham Lincoln had become convinced that the appropriate objective for his Eastern army was the army of Robert E. Lee, not any geographic features such as a capital city, but he and his generals knew that the most reliable way to bring Lee to a decisive battle was to threaten his capital. Lincoln tried a fifth time with a new general on January 25, 1863—Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, a man with a pugnacious reputation who had performed well in previous subordinate commands.
With Burnside's departure, Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin left as well. Franklin had been a staunch supporter of George B. McClellan and refused to serve under Hooker, because he disliked him personally and also because he was senior to Hooker in rank. Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner stepped down due to old age (he was 65) and poor health. He was reassigned to a command in Missouri, but died before he could assume it. Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield was reassigned from command of the V Corps to be Hooker's chief of staff.
Hooker embarked on a much-needed reorganization of the army, doing away with Burnside's grand division system, which had proved unwieldy; he also no longer had sufficient senior officers on hand that he could trust to command multi-corps operations. He organized the cavalry into a separate corps under the command of Brig. Gen. George Stoneman (who had commanded the III Corps at Fredericksburg). But while he concentrated the cavalry into a single organization, he dispersed his artillery battalions to the control of the infantry division commanders, removing the coordinating influence of the army's artillery chief, Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt.
Hooker established a reputation as an outstanding administrator and restored the morale of his soldiers, which had plummeted to a new low under Burnside. Among his changes were fixes to the daily diet of the troops, camp sanitary changes, improvements and accountability of the quartermaster system, addition of and monitoring of company cooks, several hospital reforms, an improved furlough system, orders to stem rising desertion, improved drills, and stronger officer training.
Intelligence and plans: Hooker took advantage of improved military intelligence about the positioning and capabilities of the opposing army, superior to that available to his predecessors in army command. His chief of staff, Butterfield, commissioned Col. George H. Sharpe from the 120th New York Infantry to organize a new Bureau of Military Information in the Army of the Potomac, part of the provost marshal function under Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick. Previously, intelligence gatherers, such as Allan Pinkerton and his detective agency, gathered information only by interrogating prisoners, deserters, "contrabands" (slaves), and refugees.
The new BMI added other sources including infantry and cavalry reconnaissance, spies, scouts, signal stations, and an aerial balloon corps. As he received the more complete information correlated from these additional sources, Hooker realized that if he were to avoid the bloodbath of direct frontal attacks, which were features of the battles of Antietam and, more recently, Fredericksburg, he could not succeed in his crossing of the Rappahannock "except by stratagem."
Hooker's army faced Lee across the Rappahannock from its winter quarters in Falmouth and around Fredericksburg. Hooker developed a strategy that was, on paper, superior to those of his predecessors. He planned to send his 10,000 cavalrymen under Maj. Gen. George Stoneman to cross the Rappahannock far upstream and raid deep into the Confederate rear areas, destroying crucial supply depots along the railroad from the Confederate capital in Richmond to Fredericksburg, which would cut Lee's lines of communication and supply.
Hooker reasoned that Lee would react to this threat by abandoning his fortified positions on the Rappahannock and withdrawing toward his capital. At that time, Hooker's infantry would cross the Rappahannock in pursuit, attacking Lee when he was moving and vulnerable. Stoneman attempted to execute this turning movement on April 13, but heavy rains made the river crossing site at Sulphur Spring impassable. President Lincoln lamented, "I greatly fear it is another failure already." Hooker was forced to create a new plan for a meeting with Lincoln, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, and general in chief Henry W. Halleck in Aquia on April 19.
Hooker's second plan was to launch both his cavalry and infantry simultaneously in a bold double envelopment of Lee's army. Stoneman's cavalry would make a second attempt at its deep strategic raid, but at the same time, 42,000 men in three corps (V, XI, XII Corps) would stealthily march to cross the Rappahannock upriver at Kelly's Ford. They would then proceed south and cross the Rapidan at Germanna and Ely's Ford, concentrate at the Chancellorsville crossroads, and attack Lee's army from the west.
While they were under way, 10,000 men in two divisions from the II Corps would cross at the U.S. Ford and join with the V Corps in pushing the Confederates away from the river. The second half of the double envelopment was to come from the east: 40,000 men in two corps (I and VI Corps, under the overall command of John Sedgwick) would cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg and threaten to attack Stonewall Jackson's position on the Confederate right flank.
The remaining 25,000 men (III Corps and one division of the II Corps) would remain visible in their camps at Falmouth to divert Confederate attention from the turning movement. Hooker anticipated that Lee would either be forced to retreat, in which case he would be vigorously pursued, or he would be forced to attack the Union Army on unfavorable terrain.
One of the defining characteristics of the battlefield was a dense woodland south of the Rapidan known locally as the "Wilderness of Spotsylvania". The area had once been an open broadleaf forest, but during colonial times the trees were gradually cut down to make charcoal for local pig iron furnaces. When the supply of wood was exhausted, the furnaces were abandoned and secondary forest growth developed, creating a dense mass of brambles, thickets, vines, and low-lying vegetation.
Catharine Furnace, abandoned in the 1840s, had recently been reactivated to produce iron for the Confederate war effort. This area was largely unsuitable for the deployment of artillery and the control of large infantry formations, which would nullify some of the Union advantage in military power. It was important for Hooker's plan that his men move quickly out of this area and attack Lee in the open ground to the east. There were three primary roads available for this west-to-east movement: the Orange Plank Road, the Orange Turnpike, and the River Road.
The Confederate dispositions were as follows: the Rappahannock line at Fredericksburg was occupied by Longstreet's First Corps division of Lafayette McLaws on Marye's Heights, with Jackson's entire Second Corps to their right. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Chancellorsville | Catharine Furnace, abandoned in the 1840s, had recently been reactivated to produce iron for the Confederate war effort. This area was largely unsuitable for the deployment of artillery and the control of large infantry formations, which would nullify some of the Union advantage in military power. It was important for Hooker's plan that his men move quickly out of this area and attack Lee in the open ground to the east. There were three primary roads available for this west-to-east movement: the Orange Plank Road, the Orange Turnpike, and the River Road.
The Confederate dispositions were as follows: the Rappahannock line at Fredericksburg was occupied by Longstreet's First Corps division of Lafayette McLaws on Marye's Heights, with Jackson's entire Second Corps to their right. Early's division was at Prospect Hill and the divisions of Rodes, Hill, and Colston extended the Confederate right flank along the river almost to Skinker's Neck. The other division present from Longstreet's Corps, Anderson's, guarded the river crossings on the left flank. Stuart's cavalry was largely in Culpeper County near Kelly's Ford, beyond the infantry's left flank.
Initial movements:
April 27–30: Movement to battle: On April 27–28, the initial three corps of the Army of the Potomac began their march under the leadership of Slocum. They crossed the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers as planned and began to concentrate on April 30 around the hamlet of Chancellorsville, which was little more than a single large, brick mansion at the junction of the Orange Turnpike and Orange Plank Road. Built in the early 19th century, it had been used as an inn on the turnpike for many years, but now served as a home for the Frances Chancellor family. Some of the family remained in the house during the battle.
Hooker arrived late in the afternoon on April 30 and made the mansion his headquarters. Stoneman's cavalry began on April 30 its second attempt to reach Lee's rear areas. Two divisions of II Corps crossed at U.S. Ford on April 30 without opposition. By dawn on April 29, pontoon bridges spanned the Rappahannock south of Fredericksburg and Sedgwick's force began to cross.
Pleased with the success of the operation so far, and realizing that the Confederates were not vigorously opposing the river crossings, Hooker ordered Sickles to begin the movement of the III Corps from Falmouth the night of April 30 – May 1. By May 1, Hooker had approximately 70,000 men concentrated in and around Chancellorsville.
In his Fredericksburg headquarters, Lee was initially in the dark about the Union intentions and he suspected that the main column under Slocum was heading towards Gordonsville. Jeb Stuart's cavalry was cut off at first by Stoneman's departure on April 30, but they were soon able to move freely around the army's flanks on their reconnaissance missions after almost all their Union counterparts had left the area.
As Stuart's intelligence information about the Union river crossings began to arrive, Lee did not react as Hooker had anticipated. He decided to violate one of the generally accepted principles of war and divide his force in the face of a superior enemy, hoping that aggressive action would allow him to attack and defeat a portion of Hooker's army before it could be fully concentrated against him. He became convinced that Sedgwick's force would demonstrate against him, but not become a serious threat, so he ordered about 4/5 of his army to meet the challenge from Chancellorsville. He left behind a brigade under Brig. Gen. William Barksdale on heavily fortified Marye's Heights behind Fredericksburg and one division under Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, on Prospect Hill south of the town.
These roughly 11,000 men and 56 guns would attempt to resist any advance by Sedgwick's 40,000. He ordered Stonewall Jackson to march west and link up with Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson's division, which had pulled back from the river crossings they were guarding and began digging earthworks on a north–south line between the Zoan and Tabernacle churches. McLaws's division was ordered from Fredericksburg to join Anderson. This would amass 40,000 men to confront Hooker's movement east from Chancellorsville. Heavy fog along the Rappahannock masked some of these westward movements and Sedgwick chose to wait until he could determine the enemy's intentions.
Opposing forces:
Union: The Army of the Potomac, commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, had 133,868 men and 413 guns organized as follows:
I Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. James S. Wadsworth, John C. Robinson, and Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday.
II Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch, with the divisions of Maj. Gens. Winfield Scott Hancock, William H. French, and Brig. Gen. John Gibbon.
III Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, with the divisions of Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, and Maj. Gens. Hiram G. Berry and Amiel W. Whipple.
V Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. Charles Griffin, Andrew A. Humphreys, and Maj. Gen. George Sykes.
VI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. William T. H. Brooks, Albion P. Howe, Maj. Gen. John Newton, and Col. Hiram Burnham.
XI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. Charles Devens, Jr., Adolph von Steinwehr, and Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz.
XII Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. Alpheus S. Williams and John W. Geary.
Cavalry Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. George Stoneman, with the divisions of Brig. Gens. Alfred Pleasonton, William W. Averell, and David M. Gregg.
Confederate: Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia fielded 60,298 men and 220 guns, organized as follows:
First Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet. Longstreet and the majority of his corps (the divisions of Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood and Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett, and two artillery battalions) were detached for duty in southeastern Virginia. The divisions present at Chancellorsville were those of Maj. Gens. Lafayette McLaws and Richard H. Anderson.
Second Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. Stonewall Jackson, with the divisions of Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill, Brig. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early, and Brig. Gen. Raleigh E. Colston.
Cavalry Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart. (Stuart's corps had only two brigades at Chancellorsville, those of Brig. Gens. Fitzhugh Lee and W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee. The brigades of Brig. Gens. Wade Hampton and William E. "Grumble" Jones were detached.)
The Chancellorsville campaign was one of the most lopsided clashes of the war, with the Union's effective fighting force more than twice the Confederates', the greatest imbalance during the war in Virginia. Hooker's army was much better supplied and was well-rested after several months of inactivity. Lee's forces, on the other hand, were poorly provisioned and were scattered all over the state of Virginia. Some 15,000 men of Longstreet's Corps had previously been detached and stationed near Norfolk in order to block a potential threat to Richmond from Federal troops stationed at Fort Monroe and Newport News on the Peninsula, as well as at Norfolk and Suffolk.
In light of the continued Federal inactivity, by late March Longstreet's primary assignment became that of requisitioning provisions for Lee's forces from the farmers and planters of North Carolina and Virginia. As a result of this the two divisions of Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood and Maj. Gen. George Pickett were 130 miles (210 km) away from Lee's army and would take a week or more of marching to reach it in an emergency. After nearly a year of campaigning, allowing these troops to slip away from his immediate control was Lee's gravest miscalculation. Although he hoped to be able to call on them, these men would not arrive in time to aid his outnumbered forces. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Chancellorsville | In light of the continued Federal inactivity, by late March Longstreet's primary assignment became that of requisitioning provisions for Lee's forces from the farmers and planters of North Carolina and Virginia. As a result of this the two divisions of Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood and Maj. Gen. George Pickett were 130 miles (210 km) away from Lee's army and would take a week or more of marching to reach it in an emergency. After nearly a year of campaigning, allowing these troops to slip away from his immediate control was Lee's gravest miscalculation. Although he hoped to be able to call on them, these men would not arrive in time to aid his outnumbered forces.
Battle:
May 1: Hooker passes on opportunity: Jackson's men began marching west to join with Anderson before dawn on May 1. Jackson himself met with Anderson near Zoan Church at 8 a.m., finding that McLaws's division had already arrived to join the defensive position. But Stonewall Jackson was not in a defensive mood. He ordered an advance at 11 a.m. along two roads toward Chancellorsville: McLaws's division and the brigade of Brig. Gen. William Mahone on the Turnpike, and Anderson's other brigades and Jackson's arriving units on the Plank Road.
At about the same time, Hooker ordered his men to advance on three roads to the east: two divisions of Meade's V Corps (Griffin and Humphreys) on the River Road to uncover Banks's Ford, and the remaining division (Sykes) on the Turnpike; and Slocum's XII Corps on the Plank Road, with Howard's XI Corps in close support. Couch's II Corps was placed in reserve, where it would be soon joined by Sickles's III Corps.
The first shots of the Battle of Chancellorsville were fired at 11:20 a.m. as the armies collided. McLaws's initial attack pushed back Sykes's division. The Union general organized a counterattack that recovered the lost ground. Anderson then sent a brigade under Brig. Gen. Ambrose Wright up an unfinished railroad south of the Plank Road, around the right flank of Slocum's corps. This would normally be a serious problem, but Howard's XI Corps was advancing from the rear and could deal with Wright.
Sykes's division had proceeded farther forward than Slocum on his right, leaving him in an exposed position. This forced him to conduct an orderly withdrawal at 2 p.m. to take up a position behind Hancock's division of the II Corps, which was ordered by Hooker to advance and help repulse the Confederate attack. Meade's other two divisions made good progress on the River Road and were approaching their objective, Banks's Ford.
Despite being in a potentially favorable situation, Hooker halted his brief offensive. His actions may have demonstrated his lack of confidence in handling the complex actions of such a large organization for the first time (he had been an effective and aggressive division and corps commander in previous battles), but he had also decided before beginning the campaign that he would fight the battle defensively, forcing Lee, with his small army, to attack his own, larger one. At the [First] Battle of Fredericksburg (December 13, 1862), the Union army had done the attacking and met with a bloody defeat.
Hooker knew Lee could not sustain such a defeat and keep an effective army in the field, so he ordered his men to withdraw back into the Wilderness and take a defensive position around Chancellorsville, daring Lee to attack him or retreat with superior forces at his back. He confused matters by issuing a second order to his subordinates to hold their positions until 5 p.m., but by the time it was received, most of the Union units had begun their rearward movements. That evening, Hooker sent a message to his corps commanders, "The major general commanding trusts that a suspension in the attack to-day will embolden the enemy to attack him."
Hooker's subordinates were surprised and outraged by the change in plans. They saw that the position they were fighting for near the Zoan Church was relatively high ground and offered an opportunity for the infantry and artillery to deploy outside the constraints of the Wilderness. Meade exclaimed, "My God, if we can't hold the top of the hill, we certainly can't hold the bottom of it!" Viewing through the lens of hindsight, some of the participants and many modern historians judged that Hooker effectively lost the campaign on May 1. Stephen W. Sears observed, however, that Hooker's concern was based on more than personal timidity.
The ground being disputed was little more than a clearing in the Wilderness, to which access was available by only two narrow roads. The Confederate response had swiftly concentrated the aggressive Stonewall Jackson's corps against his advancing columns such that the Federal army was outnumbered in that area, about 48,000 to 30,000, and would have difficulty maneuvering into effective lines of battle. Meade's two divisions on the River Road were too far separated to support Slocum and Sykes, and reinforcements from the rest of the II Corps and the III Corps would be too slow in arriving.
As the Union troops dug in around Chancellorsville that night, creating log breastworks, faced with abatis, Lee and Stonewall Jackson met at the intersection of the Plank Road and the Furnace Road to plan their next move. Jackson believed that Hooker would retreat across the Rappahannock, but Lee assumed that the Union general had invested too much in the campaign to withdraw so precipitously. If the Federal troops were still in position on May 2, Lee would attack them. As they discussed their options, cavalry commander J.E.B. Stuart arrived with an intelligence report from his subordinate, Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee.
Although Hooker's left flank was firmly anchored by Meade's V Corps on the Rappahannock, and his center was strongly fortified, his right flank was "in the air." Howard's XI Corps was camped on the Orange Turnpike, extending past Wilderness Church, and was vulnerable to a flanking attack. Investigations of a route to be used to reach the flank identified the proprietor of Catharine Furnace, Charles C. Wellford, who showed Jackson's cartographer, Jedediah Hotchkiss, a recently constructed road through the forest that would shield marchers from the observation of Union pickets. Lee directed Jackson to make the flanking march, a maneuver similar to the one that had been so successful prior to the Second Battle of Bull Run (Second Manassas). An account by Hotchkiss recalls that Lee asked Jackson how many men he would take on the flanking march and Jackson replied, "my whole command."
May 2: Jackson's flank attack: Early on the morning of May 2, Hooker began to realize that Lee's actions on May 1 had not been constrained by the threat of Sedgwick's force at Fredericksburg, so no further deception was needed on that front. He decided to summon the I Corps of Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds to reinforce his lines at Chancellorsville. His intent was that Reynolds would form up to the right of the XI Corps and anchor the Union right flank on the Rapidan River.
Given the communications chaos of May 1, Hooker was under the mistaken impression that Sedgwick had withdrawn back across the Rappahannock and, based on this, that the VI Corps should remain on the north bank of the river across from the town, where it could protect the army's supplies and supply line. In fact, both Reynolds and Sedgwick were still west of the Rappahannock, south of the town.
Hooker sent his orders at 1:55 a.m., expecting that Reynolds would be able to start marching before daylight, but problems with his telegraph communications delayed the order to Fredericksburg until just before sunrise. Reynolds was forced to make a risky daylight march. By the afternoon of May 2, when Hooker expected him to be digging in on the Union right at Chancellorsville, Reynolds was still marching to the Rappahannock.
Meanwhile, for the second time, Lee was dividing his army. Jackson would lead his Second Corps of 28,000 men around to attack the Union right flank while Lee exercised personal command of the remaining two divisions, about 13,000 men and 24 guns facing the 70,000 Union troops at Chancellorsville. For the plan to work, several things had to happen. First, Jackson had to make a 12-mile (19 km) march via roundabout roads to reach the Union right, and he had to do it undetected. Second, Hooker had to stay tamely on the defensive. Third, Early would have to keep Sedgwick bottled up at Fredericksburg, despite the four-to-one Union advantage there. And when Jackson launched his attack, he had to hope that the Union forces were unprepared.
Confederate cavalry under Stuart kept most Union forces from spotting Jackson on his long flank march, which started between 7 and 8 a.m. and lasted until midafternoon. Several Confederate soldiers saw the Union observation balloon Eagle soaring overhead and assumed that they could likewise be seen, but no such report was sent to headquarters. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Chancellorsville | For the plan to work, several things had to happen. First, Jackson had to make a 12-mile (19 km) march via roundabout roads to reach the Union right, and he had to do it undetected. Second, Hooker had to stay tamely on the defensive. Third, Early would have to keep Sedgwick bottled up at Fredericksburg, despite the four-to-one Union advantage there. And when Jackson launched his attack, he had to hope that the Union forces were unprepared.
Confederate cavalry under Stuart kept most Union forces from spotting Jackson on his long flank march, which started between 7 and 8 a.m. and lasted until midafternoon. Several Confederate soldiers saw the Union observation balloon Eagle soaring overhead and assumed that they could likewise be seen, but no such report was sent to headquarters. When men of the III Corps spotted a Confederate column moving through the woods, their division commander, Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, ordered his artillery to open fire, but this proved little more than harassment. The corps commander, Sickles, rode to Hazel Grove to see for himself and he reported after the battle that his men observed the Confederates passing for over three hours.
When Hooker received the report about the Confederate movement, he thought that Lee might be starting a retreat, but he also realized that a flanking march might be in progress. He took two actions. First, he sent a message at 9:30 a.m. to the commander of the XI Corps, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard on his right flank: "We have good reason to suppose the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be safe in order to obtain timely information of their approach."
At 10:50 a.m., Howard replied that he was "taking measures to resist an attack from the west." Hooker's second action was to send orders to Sedgwick – "attack the enemy in his front" at Fredericksburg if "an opportunity presents itself with a reasonable expectation of success" – and Sickles – "advance cautiously toward the road followed by the enemy, and harass the movement as much as possible". Sedgwick did not take action from the discretionary orders. Sickles, however, was enthusiastic when he received the order at noon. He sent Birney's division, flanked by two battalions of Col. Hiram Berdan's U.S. sharpshooters, south from Hazel Grove with orders to pierce the column and gain possession of the road.
But the action came too late. Jackson had ordered the 23rd Georgia Infantry to guard the rear of the column and they resisted the advance of Birney and Berdan at Catherine Furnace. The Georgians were driven south and made a stand at the same unfinished railroad bed used by Wright's Brigade the day before. They were overwhelmed by 5 p.m. and most were captured. Two brigades from A.P. Hill's division turned back from the flanking march and prevented any further damage to Jackson's column, which by now had left the area.
Most of Jackson's men were unaware of the small action at the rear of their column. As they marched north on Brock Road, Jackson was prepared to turn right on the Orange Plank Road, from which his men would attack the Union lines at around Wilderness Church. However, it became apparent that this direction would lead to essentially a frontal assault against Howard's line. Fitzhugh Lee met Jackson and they ascended a hill with a sweeping view of the Union position. Jackson was delighted to see that Howard's men were resting, unaware of the impending Confederate threat.
Although by now it was 3 p.m., Jackson decided to march his men two miles farther and turn right on the Turnpike instead, allowing him to strike the unprotected flank directly. The attack formation consisted of two lines—the divisions of Brig. Gens. Robert E. Rodes and Raleigh E. Colston—stretching almost a mile on either side of the turnpike, separated by 200 yards, followed by a partial line with the arriving division of A.P. Hill.
Significant contributions to the impending Union disaster were the nature of the Union XI Corps and the incompetent performance of its commander, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard. Howard failed to make any provision for defending against a surprise attack, even though Hooker had ordered him to do so. The Union right flank was not anchored on any natural obstacle, and the only defenses against a flank attack consisted of two cannons pointing out into the Wilderness.
Also, the XI Corps was not well respected – an outfit with poor morale and no history of battlefield success. Many of its officers and enlisted men were immigrants from Germany and other parts of Central Europe, including a number of political refugees from the 1848 revolutions. The corps had been formed in the spring of 1862 by merging Brig. Gen Louis Blenker's division with Maj. Gen John C. Frémont's Mountain Department in West Virginia. After a miserable trek across Virginia in which Blenker's troops were provisioned inadequately and suffered from widespread hunger, disease, and desertion, they joined with Fremont in a campaign that resulted in them being soundly defeated by Stonewall Jackson.
Fremont's army became part of Maj. Gen John Pope's Army of Virginia in the summer. Fremont had refused to serve under Pope and was replaced by Maj. Gen Franz Sigel, an inept political general who, however, was much beloved by his German troops. Louis Blenker fell from a horse during the Northern Virginia campaign and suffered injuries that would claim his life later in 1863. The corps suffered heavy casualties at Second Bull Run and was left behind in Washington D.C. during the Maryland campaign. During the Fredericksburg campaign, it did not join the rest of the army until after the battle was over.
After Hooker took command, Sigel was the ranking general behind him. The XI Corps was the smallest in the army and Sigel's requests to general-in-chief Henry Halleck to have it enlarged were refused, so he resigned his command in March 1863 and was replaced by Maj. Gen Oliver O. Howard, who was widely unpopular with the enlisted men and brought in several new generals, such as Brig. Gen Francis Barlow, who had a reputation of being aggressive martinets. Eight of the 27 regiments in the corps had never been in battle before, while the remaining 21 had never been on the winning side of a battle. The German soldiers suffered from widespread ethnic friction with the rest of the army although a number of the regiments in the XI Corps consisted of native-born Americans.
Hooker had no major plans for the corps except for mopping up after the main battle was over, and it was placed out on the army's right flank where it was not expected to be involved in any fighting, and the woods to the west were assumed to be so thick that enemy troops could not possibly move through them and form a line of battle. As far as Hooker knew, the only possible route for a Confederate attack was along the turnpike, which would cause them to run right into the II and XII Corps, both elite outfits and well-entrenched. Further north, the Union line was held by the V Corps, also first-rate troops occupying an almost impregnable position.
As the day wore on, the men of the XI Corps became increasingly aware that something was going on in the woods to the west of them, but were unable to get any higher-ups to pay attention. Col. John C. Lee of the 55th Ohio received numerous reports of a Confederate presence out there, and Col. William Richardson of the 25th Ohio reported that huge numbers of Confederates were massing to the west. Col. Leopold von Gilsa, who commanded one of two brigades in Brig. Gen Charles Devens' division, went to Howard's headquarters warning him that an all-out enemy assault was imminent, but Howard insisted that it was impossible for the Confederates to get through the dense woods.
Maj. Gen Carl Schurz, who commanded the 3rd Division of the corps, began rearranging his troops into a line of battle. Captain Hubert Dilger, who commanded Battery I of the 1st Ohio Artillery, rode out on a reconnaissance mission, narrowly missed being captured by the Confederates, and rode far north, almost to the banks of the Rapidan, and back south to Hooker's headquarters, but a haughty cavalry officer dismissed his concerns and would not let him in to see the general. Dilger next went to Howard's headquarters, but was merely told that the Confederate army was retreating and that it was not acceptable to make scouting expeditions without permission of higher-ups. As the sun started to go down, all remained quiet on the XI Corps's front, the noises of the III and XII Corps engaging Lee's rear guard coming from off in the distance.
Around 5:30 p.m., Jackson turned to Robert Rodes and asked him "General, are you ready?" When Rodes nodded, Jackson replied, "You may go forward then." Most of the men of the XI Corps were encamped and sitting down for supper and had their rifles unloaded and stacked. Their first clue to the impending onslaught was the observation of numerous animals, such as rabbits and foxes, fleeing in their direction out of the western woods. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Chancellorsville | Dilger next went to Howard's headquarters, but was merely told that the Confederate army was retreating and that it was not acceptable to make scouting expeditions without permission of higher-ups. As the sun started to go down, all remained quiet on the XI Corps's front, the noises of the III and XII Corps engaging Lee's rear guard coming from off in the distance.
Around 5:30 p.m., Jackson turned to Robert Rodes and asked him "General, are you ready?" When Rodes nodded, Jackson replied, "You may go forward then." Most of the men of the XI Corps were encamped and sitting down for supper and had their rifles unloaded and stacked. Their first clue to the impending onslaught was the observation of numerous animals, such as rabbits and foxes, fleeing in their direction out of the western woods. This was followed by the crackle of musket fire, and then the unmistakable scream of the "Rebel Yell".
Two of von Gilsa's regiments, the 153rd Pennsylvania and 54th New York, had been placed up as a heavy skirmish line and the massive Confederate assault rolled completely over them. A few men managed to get off a shot or two before fleeing. The pair of artillery pieces at the very end of the XI Corps line were captured by the Confederates and promptly turned on their former owners. Devens's division collapsed in a matter of minutes, slammed on three sides by almost 30,000 Confederates. Col. Robert Reily and his 75th Ohio managed to resist for about ten minutes before the regiment disintegrated with 150 casualties, including Reily himself, and joined the rest of the fleeing mob.
Col. Lee would later write sarcastically, "A rifle pit is useless when the enemy is on the same side and in rear of your line." Some men tried to stand and resist, but they were knocked over by their fleeing comrades and a hail of Confederate bullets. Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz ordered his division to shift from an east–west alignment to north–south, which they did with amazing precision and speed. They resisted for about 20 minutes and "Leatherbreeches" Dilger managed to drive the Confederates off the turnpike for a bit with his guns, but the sheer weight of Jackson's assault overwhelmed them, too, and they soon had to flee.
Dilger for a time stood alone with a gun firing double-shotted canister at the attackers, then limbered up to flee as the Confederates closed in on him. Three of his artillery horses were shot dead, and when he realized that the gun could not be moved, he had to abandon it. General Howard partially redeemed his inadequate performance prior to the battle by his personal bravery in attempting to rally the troops. He stood shouting and waving a flag held under the stump of his amputated arm lost at the Battle of Seven Pines in 1862, ignoring the danger of the heavy rifle fire, but he could only gather small pockets of soldiers to resist before his corps disintegrated. Col. Adolf Buschbeck's brigade put up a last-ditch stand along with Dilger's guns. They too had to retreat, but maintained good order as they went.
The chaos unfurling on the Union right had gone unnoticed at Hooker's headquarters until at last the sound of gunfire could be heard in the distance, followed by a panic-stricken mob of men and horses pouring into the Chancellorsville clearing. A staff officer yelled "My God, here they come!" as the mob ran to and past the Chancellor mansion. Hooker jumped onto his horse and frantically tried to take action. He ordered Maj. Gen Hiram Berry's division of the III Corps, once his own division, forward, yelling "Receive them on your bayonets!" Artillerymen around the clearing began moving guns into position around Fairview Cemetery.
Meanwhile, down at Hazel Grove, the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry were relaxing and awaiting orders to chase after Confederate wagon trains, also oblivious to the collapse of the XI Corps. The regiment's commander, Maj. Pennock Huey, received a notice that General Howard was requesting some cavalry. Huey saddled up his men and headed west along the turnpike, where they ran straight into Robert Rodes's division. After a confused fight, the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry retreated to the safety of the Chancellorsville clearing with the loss of 30 men and three officers.
By nightfall, the Confederate Second Corps had advanced more than 1.25 miles, to within sight of Chancellorsville, but darkness and confusion were taking their toll. The attackers were almost as disorganized as the routed defenders. Although the XI Corps had been defeated, it had retained some coherence as a unit. The corps suffered nearly 2,500 casualties (259 killed, 1,173 wounded, and 994 missing or captured), about one quarter of its strength, including 12 of 23 regimental commanders, which suggests that they fought fiercely during their retreat.
Jackson's force was now separated from Lee's men only by Sickles's corps, which had been separated from the main body of the army after its foray attacking Jackson's column earlier in the afternoon. Like everyone else in the Union army, the III Corps had been unaware of Jackson's attack. When he first heard the news, Sickles was skeptical, but finally believed it and decided to pull back to Hazel Grove.
Sickles became increasingly nervous, knowing that his troops were facing an unknown number of Confederates to the west. A patrol of Jackson's troops was driven back by Union gunners, a minor incident that would come to be exaggerated into a heroic repulse of Jackson's entire command. Between 11 p.m. and midnight, Sickles organized an assault north from Hazel Grove toward the Plank Road, but called it off when his men began suffering artillery and rifle friendly fire from the Union XII Corps.
Stonewall Jackson wanted to press his advantage before Hooker and his army could regain their bearings and plan a counterattack, which might still succeed because of the sheer disparity in numbers. He rode out onto the Plank Road that night to determine the feasibility of a night attack by the light of the full moon, traveling beyond the farthest advance of his men. When one of his staff officers warned him about the dangerous position, Jackson replied, "The danger is all over. The enemy is routed. Go back and tell A.P. Hill to press right on."
As he and his staff started to return, they were incorrectly identified as Union cavalry by men of the 18th North Carolina Infantry, who hit Jackson with friendly fire. Jackson's three bullet wounds were not in themselves life-threatening, but his left arm was broken and had to be amputated. While recovering, he contracted pneumonia and died on May 10. His death was a devastating loss for the Confederacy. Some historians and participants—particularly those of the postbellum Lost Cause movement—attribute the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg two months later to Jackson's absence.
The Union gunners at Fairview Cemetery were alert and nervous; they were a few hundred yards behind Berry's division and still-intact elements of the XI Corps and they found it quite impossible to fire their guns without the shells going over the heads of the infantrymen in front of them. A few friendly-fire casualties resulted from this as the gunners were quick to shoot at anything that looked like enemy soldiers; when they got sight of a large body of Confederates drawing near, they let loose a huge cannonade that landed on and around the party that was carrying the wounded Jackson to the rear and did end up wounding A.P. Hill.
May 3: Chancellorsville: Despite the fame of Stonewall Jackson's victory on May 2, it did not result in a significant military advantage for the Army of Northern Virginia. Howard's XI Corps had been defeated, but the Army of the Potomac remained a potent force and Reynolds's I Corps had arrived overnight, which replaced Howard's losses. About 76,000 Union men faced 43,000 Confederate at the Chancellorsville front. The two halves of Lee's army at Chancellorsville were separated by Sickles's III Corps, which occupied a strong position on high ground at Hazel Grove.
Unless Lee could devise a plan to eject Sickles from Hazel Grove and combine the two halves of his army, he would have little chance of success in assaulting the formidable Union earthworks around Chancellorsville. Fortunately for Lee, Joseph Hooker inadvertently cooperated. Early on May 3, Hooker ordered Sickles to move from Hazel Grove to a new position on the Plank Road. As they were withdrawing, the trailing elements of Sickles's corps were attacked by the Confederate brigade of Brig. Gen. James J. Archer, which captured about 100 prisoners and four cannons. Hazel Grove was soon turned into a powerful artillery platform with 30 guns under Col. Porter Alexander.
After Jackson was wounded on May 2, command of the Second Corps fell to his senior division commander, Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill. Hill was soon wounded himself. He consulted with Brig. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, the next most senior general in the corps, and Rodes acquiesced in Hill's decision to summon Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart to take command, notifying Lee after the fact. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Chancellorsville | Early on May 3, Hooker ordered Sickles to move from Hazel Grove to a new position on the Plank Road. As they were withdrawing, the trailing elements of Sickles's corps were attacked by the Confederate brigade of Brig. Gen. James J. Archer, which captured about 100 prisoners and four cannons. Hazel Grove was soon turned into a powerful artillery platform with 30 guns under Col. Porter Alexander.
After Jackson was wounded on May 2, command of the Second Corps fell to his senior division commander, Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill. Hill was soon wounded himself. He consulted with Brig. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, the next most senior general in the corps, and Rodes acquiesced in Hill's decision to summon Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart to take command, notifying Lee after the fact. Brig. Gen. Henry Heth replaced Hill in division command.
Although Stuart was a cavalryman who had never commanded infantry before, he was to deliver a creditable performance at Chancellorsville. By the morning of May 3, the Union line resembled a horseshoe. The center was held by the III, XII, and II Corps. On the left were the remnants of the XI Corps, and the right was held by the V and I Corps. On the western side of the Chancellorsville salient, Stuart organized his three divisions to straddle the Plank Road: Heth's in the advance, Colston's 300–500 yards behind, and Rodes's, whose men had done the hardest fighting on May 2, near the Wilderness Church.
The attack began about 5:30 a.m. supported by the newly installed artillery at Hazel Grove, and by simultaneous attacks by the divisions of Anderson and McLaws from the south and southeast. The Confederates were resisted fiercely by the Union troops behind strong earthworks, and the fighting on May 3 was the heaviest of the campaign. The initial waves of assaults by Heth and Colston gained a little ground, but were beaten back by Union counterattacks.
Rodes sent his men in last and this final push, along with the excellent performance of the Confederate artillery, carried the morning battle. Chancellorsville was the only occasion in the war in Virginia in which Confederate gunners held a decided advantage over their Federal counterparts. Confederate guns on Hazel Grove were joined by 20 more on the Plank Road to duel effectively with the Union guns on neighboring Fairview Hill, causing the Federals to withdraw as ammunition ran low and Confederate infantrymen picked off the gun crews.
Fairview was evacuated at 9:30 a.m., briefly recaptured in a counterattack, but by 10 a.m. Hooker ordered it abandoned for good. The loss of this artillery platform doomed the Union position at the Chancellorsville crossroads as well, and the Army of the Potomac began a fighting retreat to positions circling United States Ford. The soldiers of the two halves of Lee's army reunited shortly after 10 a.m. before the Chancellor mansion, wildly triumphant as Lee arrived on Traveller to survey the scene of his victory.
Lee's presence was the signal for one of those uncontrollable bursts of enthusiasm which none can appreciate who has not witnessed them. The fierce soldiers, with their faces blackened with the smoke of battle, the wounded crawling with feeble limbs from the fury of the devouring flames, all seemed possessed with a common impulse. One long unbroken cheer, in which the feeble cry of those who lay helpless on the earth blended with the strong voices of those who still fought, rose high above the roar of battle and hailed the presence of a victorious chief. He sat in the full realization of all that soldiers dream of—triumph; and as I looked at him in the complete fruition of the success which his genius, courage, and confidence in his army had won, I thought that it must have been from some such scene that men in ancient days ascended to the dignity of gods.
At the height of the fighting on May 3, Hooker suffered an injury when at 9:15 a.m. a Confederate cannonball hit a wooden pillar he was leaning against at his headquarters. He later wrote that half of the pillar "violently [struck me] ... in an erect position from my head to my feet." He likely received a concussion, which was sufficiently severe to render him unconscious for over an hour. Although clearly incapacitated after he arose, Hooker refused to turn over command temporarily to his second-in-command, Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch, and, with Hooker's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, and Sedgwick out of communication (again due to the failure of the telegraph lines), there was no one at headquarters with sufficient rank or stature to convince Hooker otherwise. This failure may have affected Union performance over the next day and may have directly contributed to Hooker's seeming lack of nerve and timid performance throughout the rest of the battle.
Meanwhile, at about 7:30 a.m., near Chancellorsville, III Corps, Second Division commander Maj. Gen. Hiram Berry was killed by Confederate musket fire. Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott, next in seniority, was also severely wounded at about that time. Believing himself to be next in command, Brig. Gen. Joseph Warren Revere (grandson of Paul Revere) assumed command of the division. Finding himself in among stragglers from the battle and unable to contact Sickles, Revere commanded a group of 500 or 600 soldiers to reform at a point about three miles to the north of Chancellorsville. This three-mile march away from the battlefield, described by Revere as a "regrouping effort" and not a retreat, led to his being court-martialed in August by Maj. Gen. Hooker. This coincided with Revere's friendly 1852 conversation with Stonewall Jackson, in which Jackson used horoscopes and astrology to predict Revere's "culmination of the malign aspect" in the first days of May 1863.
May 3: Fredericksburg and Salem Church: As Lee was savoring his victory at the Chancellorsville crossroads, he received disturbing news: Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick's force had broken through the Confederate lines at Fredericksburg and was headed toward Chancellorsville. On the night of May 2, in the aftermath of Jackson's flank attack, Hooker had ordered Sedgwick to "cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg on the receipt of this order, and at once take up your line of march on the Chancellorsville road until you connect with him. You will attack and destroy any force you may fall in with on the road."
Lee had left a relatively small force at Fredericksburg, ordering Brig. Gen. Jubal Early to "watch the enemy and try to hold him." If he was attacked in "overwhelming numbers," Early was to retreat to Richmond, but if Sedgwick withdrew from his front, he was to join with Lee at Chancellorsville. On the morning of May 2, Early received a garbled message from Lee's staff that caused him to start marching most of his men toward Chancellorsville, but he quickly returned after a warning from Brig. Gen. William Barksdale of a Union advance against Fredericksburg.
At 7 a.m. on May 3, Early was confronted with four Union divisions: Brig. Gen. John Gibbon of the II Corps had crossed the Rappahannock north of town, and three divisions of Sedgwick's VI Corps—Maj. Gen. John Newton and Brig. Gens. Albion P. Howe and William T. H. Brooks—were arrayed in line from the front of the town to Deep Run. Most of Early's combat strength was deployed to the south of town, where Federal troops had achieved their most significant successes during the December battle. Marye's Heights was defended by Barksdale's Mississippi brigade and Early ordered the Louisiana brigade of Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays from the far right to Barksdale's left.
By midmorning, two Union attacks against the infamous stone wall on Marye's Heights were repulsed with numerous casualties. A Union party under flag of truce was allowed to approach ostensibly to collect the wounded, but while close to the stone wall, they were able to observe how sparsely the Confederate line was manned. A third Union attack was successful in overrunning the Confederate position. Early was able to organize an effective fighting retreat.
John Sedgwick's road to Chancellorsville was open, but he wasted time in gathering his troops and forming a marching column. His men, led by Brooks's division, followed by Newton and Howe, were delayed for several hours by successive actions against the Alabama brigade of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox. His final delaying line was a ridge at Salem church, where he was joined by three brigades from McLaws's division and one from Anderson's, bringing the total Confederate strength to about 10,000 men. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Chancellorsville | A Union party under flag of truce was allowed to approach ostensibly to collect the wounded, but while close to the stone wall, they were able to observe how sparsely the Confederate line was manned. A third Union attack was successful in overrunning the Confederate position. Early was able to organize an effective fighting retreat.
John Sedgwick's road to Chancellorsville was open, but he wasted time in gathering his troops and forming a marching column. His men, led by Brooks's division, followed by Newton and Howe, were delayed for several hours by successive actions against the Alabama brigade of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox. His final delaying line was a ridge at Salem church, where he was joined by three brigades from McLaws's division and one from Anderson's, bringing the total Confederate strength to about 10,000 men.
Artillery fire was exchanged by both sides in the afternoon and at 5:30 p.m., two brigades of Brooks's division attacked on both sides of the Plank Road. The advance south of the road reached as far as the churchyard, but was driven back. The attack north of the road could not break the Confederate line. Wilcox described the action as "a bloody repulse to the enemy, rendering entirely useless to him his little success of the morning at Fredericksburg." Hooker expressed his disappointment in Sedgwick: "my object in ordering General Sedgwick forward ... Was to relieve me from the position in which I found myself at Chancellorsville. ... In my judgment General Sedgwick did not obey the spirit of my order, and made no sufficient effort to obey it. ... When he did move it was not with sufficient confidence or ability on his part to manoeuvre his troops."
The fighting on May 3, 1863, was some of the most furious anywhere in the civil war. The loss of 21,357 men that day in the three battles, divided equally between the two armies, ranks the fighting only behind the Battle of Antietam as the bloodiest day of war in American history.
May 4–6: Union withdrawals: On the evening of May 3 and all day May 4, Hooker remained in his defenses north of Chancellorsville. Lee observed that Hooker was threatening no offensive action, so felt comfortable ordering Anderson's division to join the battle against Sedgwick. He sent orders to Early and McLaws to cooperate in a joint attack, but the orders reached his subordinates after dark, so the attack was planned for May 4.
By this time Sedgwick had placed his divisions into a strong defensive position with its flanks anchored on the Rappahannock, three sides of a rectangle extending south of the Plank Road. Early's plan was to drive the Union troops off Marye's Heights and the other high ground west of Fredericksburg. Lee ordered McLaws to engage from the west "to prevent [the enemy] concentrating on General Early."
Early reoccupied Marye's Heights on the morning of May 4, cutting Sedgwick off from the town. However, McLaws was reluctant to take any action. Before noon, Lee arrived with Anderson's division, giving him a total of 21,000 men, slightly outnumbering Sedgwick. Despite Lee's presence, McLaws continued his passive role and Anderson's men took a few hours to get into position, a situation that frustrated and angered both Early and Lee, who had been planning on a concentrated assault from three directions.
The attack finally began around 6 p.m. Two of Early's brigades (under Brig. Gens. Harry T. Hays and Robert F. Hoke) pushed back Sedgwick's left-center across the Plank Road, but Anderson's effort was a slight one and McLaws once again contributed nothing. Throughout the day on May 4, Hooker provided no assistance or useful guidance to Sedgwick, and Sedgwick thought about little else than protecting his line of retreat.
Sedgwick withdrew across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford during the pre-dawn hours of May 5. When he learned that Sedgwick had retreated back over the river, Hooker felt he was out of options to save the campaign. He called a council of war and asked his corps commanders to vote about whether to stay and fight or to withdraw. Although a majority voted to fight, Hooker had had enough, and on the night of May 5–6, he withdrew back across the river at U.S. Ford.
It was a difficult operation. Hooker and the artillery crossed first, followed by the infantry beginning at 6 a.m. on May 6. Meade's V Corps served as the rear guard. Rains caused the river to rise and threatened to break the pontoon bridges.
Couch was in command on the south bank after Hooker departed, but he was left with explicit orders not to continue the battle, which he had been tempted to do. The surprise withdrawal frustrated Lee's plan for one final attack against Chancellorsville. He had issued orders for his artillery to bombard the Union line in preparation for another assault, but by the time they were ready Hooker and his men were gone.
The Union cavalry under Brig. Gen. George Stoneman, after a week of ineffectual raiding in central and southern Virginia in which they failed to attack any of the objectives Hooker established, withdrew into Union lines east of Richmond—the peninsula north of the York River, across from Yorktown—on May 7, ending the campaign.
Aftermath: My God! It is horrible—horrible; and to think of it, 130,000 magnificent soldiers so cut to pieces by less than 60,000 half-starved ragamuffins!
Casualties: Lee, despite being outnumbered by a ratio of over two to one, won arguably his greatest victory of the war, sometimes described as his "perfect battle." But he paid a terrible price for it, taking more casualties than he had lost in any previous battle, including the stalemate at the Battle of Antietam. With only 60,000 men engaged, he suffered 13,303 casualties (1,665 killed, 9,081 wounded, 2,018 missing), losing some 22% of his force in the campaign—men that the Confederacy, with its limited manpower, could not replace. Just as seriously, he lost his most aggressive field commander, Stonewall Jackson. Brig. Gen. Elisha F. Paxton was the other Confederate general killed during the battle. After Longstreet rejoined the main army, he was highly critical of Lee's strategy, saying that battles like Chancellorsville cost the Confederacy more men than it could afford to lose.
Of the 133,000 Union men engaged, 17,197 were casualties (1,606 killed, 9,672 wounded, 5,919 missing), a percentage much lower than Lee's, particularly considering that it includes 4,000 men of the XI Corps who were captured on May 2. When comparing only the killed and wounded, there were almost no differences between the Confederate and Federal losses at Chancellorsville. The Union lost three generals in the campaign: Maj. Gens. Hiram G. Berry and Amiel W. Whipple and Brig. Gen. Edmund Kirby.
Assessment of Hooker: Hooker, who began the campaign believing he had "80 chances in 100 to be successful", lost the battle through miscommunication, the incompetence of some of his leading generals (most notably Howard and Stoneman, but also Sedgwick), but mostly through the collapse of his own confidence. Hooker's errors included abandoning his offensive push on May 1 and ordering Sickles to give up Hazel Grove and pull back on May 2. He also erred in his disposition of forces; despite Abraham Lincoln's exhortation, "this time put in all your men," some 40,000 men of the Army of the Potomac scarcely fired a shot. When later asked why he had ordered a halt to his advance on May 1, Hooker is reputed to have responded, "For the first time, I lost faith in Hooker." However, Stephen W. Sears has categorized this as a myth:
Nothing has been more damaging to General Joseph Hooker's military reputation than this, from John Bigelow's The Campaign of Chancellorsville (1910): "A couple of months later, when Hooker crossed the Rappahannock [actually, the Potomac] with the Army of the Potomac in the Campaign of Gettysburg he was asked by General Doubleday: 'Hooker, what was the matter with you at Chancellorsville? ... Hooker answered frankly ... 'Doubleday ... For once I lost confidence in Hooker'."
Sears's research has shown that Bigelow was quoting from a letter written in 1903 by an E. P. Halstead, who was on the staff of Doubleday's I Corps division. There is no evidence that Hooker and Doubleday ever met during the Gettysburg campaign, and they could not have done so since they were dozens of miles apart. Finally, Doubleday made no mention of such a confession from Hooker in his history of the Chancellorsville campaign, published in 1882. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Chancellorsville | ... Hooker answered frankly ... 'Doubleday ... For once I lost confidence in Hooker'."
Sears's research has shown that Bigelow was quoting from a letter written in 1903 by an E. P. Halstead, who was on the staff of Doubleday's I Corps division. There is no evidence that Hooker and Doubleday ever met during the Gettysburg campaign, and they could not have done so since they were dozens of miles apart. Finally, Doubleday made no mention of such a confession from Hooker in his history of the Chancellorsville campaign, published in 1882. Sears concludes:
It can only be concluded that forty years after the event, elderly ex-staff officer Halstead was at best retailing some vaguely remembered campfire tale, and at worst manufacturing a role for himself in histories of the campaign.... Whatever Joe Hooker's failings at Chancellorsville, he did not publicly confess them.
Lincoln later told Connecticut Representative Deming that he believed the war could have been terminated at Chancellorsville had Hooker managed the battle better: specifically, "when Hooker failed to reinforce Sedgwick, after hearing his cannon...." However, he added, "I do not know that I could have given any different orders had I been with them myself. I have not fully made up my mind how I should behave when minie-balls were whistling, and those great oblong shells shrieking in my ear. I might run away."
Union reaction: The Union was shocked by the defeat. President Abraham Lincoln was quoted as saying, "My God! My God, what will the country say!?" A few generals were career casualties. Hooker relieved Stoneman for incompetence and for years waged a vituperative campaign against Howard, whom he blamed for his loss. He wrote in 1876 that Howard was "a hypocrite ... totally incompetent ... a perfect old woman ... a bad man." He labeled Sedgwick as "dilatory." Couch was so disgusted by Hooker's conduct of the battle (and his incessant political maneuvering) that he resigned and was placed in charge of the Department of the Susquehanna, commanding only Pennsylvania militia.
President Lincoln chose to retain Hooker in command of the army, but the friction between Lincoln, general in chief Henry W. Halleck, and Hooker became intolerable in the early days of what would become known as the Gettysburg campaign and Lincoln relieved Hooker of command on June 28, just before the Battle of Gettysburg. One of the consequences of Chancellorsville at Gettysburg was the conduct of Daniel Sickles, who undoubtedly recalled the terrible consequences of withdrawing from Hazel Grove when he decided to ignore the commands of his general and moved his lines on the second day of battle to ensure that a minor piece of high ground, the Peach Orchard, was not available to the enemy's artillery.
Confederate reaction: The Confederate public had mixed feelings about the result, joy at Lee's tactical victory tempered by the loss of their most beloved general, Stonewall Jackson. The death of Jackson caused Lee to make the long-needed reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia from two large corps into three, under James Longstreet, Richard S. Ewell, and A.P. Hill. The new assignments for the latter two generals caused some command difficulties in the upcoming Gettysburg campaign, which began in June. Of more consequence for Gettysburg, however, was the supreme confidence that Lee gained from his great victory at Chancellorsville, that his army was virtually invincible and would succeed at anything he asked it to do.
Lee later wrote "At Chancellorsville we gained another victory; our people were wild with delight—I, on the contrary, was more depressed than after Fredericksburg; our loss was severe, and again we gained not an inch of ground and the enemy could not be pursued.”
Additional battle maps:
Gallery: Chancellorsville campaign tactical maps:
Battlefield preservation: The battlefield was a scene of widespread destruction, covered with dead men and animals. The Chancellor family, whose house was destroyed during the battle, placed the entire 854-acre property for sale four months after the battle. A smaller version of the house was rebuilt using some of the original materials, which served as a landmark for many of the veteran reunions of the late 19th century. In 1927, the rebuilt house was destroyed by fire. That same year, the United States Congress authorized the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park, which preserves some of the land that saw fighting in the 1862 Battle of Fredericksburg, the Chancellorsville campaign, the Battle of the Wilderness, and the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House (the latter two being key battles in the 1864 Overland Campaign).
In May 2002, a regional developer announced a plan to build 2,300 houses and 2,000,000 square feet of commercial space on the 790-acre Mullins Farm, site of the first day of fighting at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Soon thereafter, the American Battlefield Trust, then known as The Civil War Trust, formed the Coalition to Save Chancellorsville, a network of national and local preservation groups that waged a vocal campaign against the development.
For nearly a year, the Coalition mobilized local citizens, held candlelight vigils and hearings, and encouraged residents to become more involved in preservation. Public opinion polling conducted by the Coalition found that more than two-thirds of local residents opposed the development. The survey also found that 90 percent of local residents believed their county has a responsibility to protect Chancellorsville and other historic resources.
As a result of these efforts, in March 2003 the Spotsylvania County Board of Supervisors denied the rezoning application that would have allowed for the development of the site. Immediately following the vote, the Civil War Trust and other Coalition members began working to acquire the battlefield. By working with county officials and developers, the Trust acquired 140 acres in 2004 and another 74 acres in 2006. The American Battlefield Trust and its federal, state and local partners have acquired and preserved 1,365 acres (5.52 km2) of the battlefield in more than 15 different transactions from 2002 through mid-2023.
In popular media: The battle formed the basis for Stephen Crane's 1895 novel The Red Badge of Courage.
The battle serves as the background for one of F. Scott Fitzgerald's short stories, published in the February 1935 Esquire Magazine, entitled "The Night at Chancellorsville."
The Battle of Chancellorsville was depicted in the 2003 film Gods and Generals, based on the novel of the same name. The treatment of the battle in both the novel and the movie focuses on Jackson's assault on the Union right flank, his wounding, and his subsequent death.
See also:
Notes:
References: Alexander, Edward P. Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989. ISBN 0-8078-4722-4.
Catton, Bruce. Glory Road. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1952. ISBN 0-385-04167-5.
Cullen, Joseph P. "Battle of Chancellorsville." In Battle Chronicles of the Civil War: 1863, edited by James M. McPherson. Connecticut: Grey Castle Press, 1989. ISBN 1-55905-027-6. First published in 1989 by McMillan.
Dupuy, R. Ernest, Trevor N. Dupuy, and Paul F. Braim. Military Heritage of America. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956. ISBN 0-8403-8225-1.
Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5.
Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC 5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website.
Fishel, Edwin C. The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War. Boston: Mariner Books (Houghton Mifflin Co.), 1996. ISBN 0-395-90136-7.
Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative. Vol. 2, Fredericksburg to Meridian. New York: Random House, 1958. ISBN 0-394-49517-9.
Freeman, Douglas S. Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command. 3 vols. New York: Scribner, 1946. ISBN 0-684-85979-3.
Furgurson, Ernest B. Chancellorsville 1863: The Souls of the Brave. New York: Knopf, 1992. ISBN 0-394-58301-9.
Gallagher, Gary W. The Battle of Chancellorsville. National Park Service Civil War series. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Chancellorsville | Boston: Mariner Books (Houghton Mifflin Co.), 1996. ISBN 0-395-90136-7.
Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative. Vol. 2, Fredericksburg to Meridian. New York: Random House, 1958. ISBN 0-394-49517-9.
Freeman, Douglas S. Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command. 3 vols. New York: Scribner, 1946. ISBN 0-684-85979-3.
Furgurson, Ernest B. Chancellorsville 1863: The Souls of the Brave. New York: Knopf, 1992. ISBN 0-394-58301-9.
Gallagher, Gary W. The Battle of Chancellorsville. National Park Service Civil War series. Conshohocken, PA: U.S. National Park Service and Eastern National, 1995. ISBN 0-915992-87-6.
Goolrick, William K., and the Editors of Time-Life Books. Rebels Resurgent: Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1985. ISBN 0-8094-4748-7.
Hebert, Walter H. Fighting Joe Hooker. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999. ISBN 0-8032-7323-1.
Krick, Robert K. Chancellorsville – Lee's Greatest Victory. New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1990. OCLC 671280483.
Livermore, Thomas L. Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America 1861–65. Reprinted with errata, Dayton, OH: Morninside House, 1986. ISBN 0-527-57600-X. First published in 1901 by Houghton Mifflin.
McGowen, Stanley S. "Battle of Chancellorsville." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X.
McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-19-503863-0.
Salmon, John S. The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001. ISBN 0-8117-2868-4.
Sears, Stephen W. Chancellorsville. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996. ISBN 0-395-87744-X.
Smith, Derek. The Gallant Dead: Union & Confederate Generals Killed in the Civil War. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2005. ISBN 0-8117-0132-8.
Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. ISBN 0-8071-0822-7.
Wineman, Bradford Alexander. The Chancellorsville Campaign, January–May 1863 Archived June 11, 2016, at the Wayback Machine. Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2013. OCLC 847739804.
National Park Service battle description
CWSAC Report Update
Memoirs and primary sources: Bigelow, John. The Campaign of Chancellorsville, a Strategic and Tactical Study. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1910. OCLC 1348825.
Crane, Stephen. The Red Badge of Courage. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1895. ISBN 978-0-13-435466-8.
Dodge, Theodore A. The Campaign of Chancellorsville. Boston: J. R. Osgood & Co., 1881. OCLC 4226311.
Evans, Clement A., ed. Confederate Military History: A Library of Confederate States History. 12 vols. Atlanta: Confederate Publishing Company, 1899. OCLC 833588.
Tidball, John C. The Artillery Service in the War of the Rebellion, 1861–1865. Westholme Publishing, 2011. ISBN 978-1594161490.
U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880–1901.
Further reading: Ballard, Ted, and Billy Arthur. Chancellorsville Staff Ride: Briefing Book. Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2002. OCLC 50210531.
Mackowski, Chris, and Kristopher D. White. Chancellorsville's Forgotten Front: The Battles of Second Fredericksburg and Salem Church, May 3, 1863. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2013. ISBN 978-1-61121-136-8.
Mackowski, Chris, and Kristopher D. White. The Last Days of Stonewall Jackson: The Mortal Wounding of the Confederacy's Greatest Icon. Emerging Civil War Series. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2013. ISBN 978-1-61121-150-4.
Mackowski, Chris, and Kristopher D. White. That Furious Struggle: Chancellorsville and the High Tide of the Confederacy, May 1–4, 1863. Emerging Civil War Series. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2014. ISBN 978-1-61121-219-8.
Parsons, Philip W. The Union Sixth Army Corps in the Chancellorsville Campaign: A Study of the Engagements of Second Fredericksburg, Salem Church, and Banks's Ford. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2006. ISBN 978-0-7864-2521-1.
Pula, James S. Under the Crescent Moon with the XI Corps in the Civil War. Vol. 1, From the Defenses of Washington to Chancellorsville, 1862–1863. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2017. ISBN 978-1-61121-337-9.
External links:
The Battle of Chancellorsville: Battle Maps Archived October 12, 2012, at the Wayback Machine, histories, photos, and preservation news (Civil War Trust)
Battle of Chancellorsville Virtual Tour
Chancellorsville Campaign in Encyclopedia Virginia
Second Battle of Fredericksburg in Encyclopedia Virginia
The Brothers War: The Battle of Chancellorsville
Animated Powerpoint slide presentation of campaign
Animated history of the Battle of Chancellorsville
C-SPAN American History TV Tour of Jackson's Flank Attack at Chancellorsville
Texts on Wikisource:
Guernsey, Alfred H. (1879). "Chancellorsville, Battle of" . The American Cyclopædia. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Grunwald | Names and sources:
Names: Traditionally, the battle's location was thought to be in the territory of the monastic state of the Teutonic Order, on the plains between three villages: Grünfelde (Grunwald) to the west, Tannenberg (Stębark) to the northeast and Ludwigsdorf (Łodwigowo, Ludwikowice) to the south. However, research by Swedish historian Sven Ekdahl and archaeological excavations in 2014–2017 proved that the actual site was south of Grünfelde (Grunwald). Władysław II Jagiełło referred to the site in Latin as in loco conflictus nostri, quem cum Cruciferis de Prusia habuimus, dicto Grunenvelt. Later, Polish chroniclers interpreted the word Grunenvelt ("green field" in Low German) as Grünwald, meaning "green forest" in German. The Lithuanians followed suit and translated the name as Žalgiris. The name Žalgiris was first used by Maironis in 1891. The Germans named the battle after Tannenberg ("fir hill" or "pine hill" in German). Thus, there are three commonly used names for the battle: German: Schlacht bei Tannenberg, Polish: bitwa pod Grunwaldem, Lithuanian: Žalgirio mūšis. Its names in the languages of other involved peoples include Belarusian: Бітва пад Грунвальдам, Ukrainian: Грюнвальдська битва, Russian: Грюнвальдская битва, Czech: Bitva u Grunvaldu, Romanian: Bătălia de la Grünwald.
Sources: There are few contemporary, reliable sources about the battle, and most were produced by the Polish. The most important and trustworthy source is Cronica conflictus Wladislai regis Poloniae cum Cruciferis anno Christi 1410, which was written within a year of the battle by an eyewitness. Its authorship is uncertain, but several candidates have been proposed: Polish deputy chancellor Mikołaj Trąba and Władysław II Jagiełło's secretary Zbigniew Oleśnicki. While the original Cronica conflictus did not survive, a short summary from the 16th century has been preserved. Historiae Polonicae by Polish historian Jan Długosz (1415–1480). is a comprehensive and detailed account written several decades after the battle. The reliability of this source suffers not only from the long gap since the events, but also from Długosz's alleged biases against Lithuanians. Banderia Prutenorum is a mid-15th-century manuscript with images and Latin descriptions of the Teutonic battle flags captured during the battle and displayed in Wawel and Vilnius Cathedrals. Other Polish sources include two letters written by Władysław II Jagiełło to his wife Anne of Cilli and Bishop of Poznań Wojciech Jastrzębiec and letters sent by Jastrzębiec to Poles in the Holy See. German sources include a concise account in the chronicle of Johann von Posilge. An anonymous letter, discovered in 1963 and written between 1411 and 1413, provided important details on Lithuanian maneuvers.
Historical background:
Lithuanian Crusade and Polish–Lithuanian union: In 1230, the Teutonic Order, a crusading military order, moved to Chełmno Land (Kulmerland) and launched the Prussian Crusade against the pagan Prussian clans. With support from the pope and Holy Roman Emperor, the Teutons conquered and converted the Prussians by the 1280s and shifted their attention to the pagan Grand Duchy of Lithuania. For about 100 years, the order raided Lithuanian lands, particularly Samogitia, as it separated the order in Prussia from their branch in Livonia. While the border regions became an uninhabited wilderness, the order gained very little territory. The Lithuanians first gave up Samogitia during the Lithuanian Civil War (1381–84) in the Treaty of Dubysa.
In 1385, Grand Duke Jogaila of Lithuania agreed to marry Queen Jadwiga of Poland in the Union of Kreva. Jogaila converted to Christianity and was crowned King of Poland and became known as Władysław II Jagiełło, thus creating a personal union between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The official Lithuanian conversion to Christianity removed the religious rationale for the order's activities in the area. Its grand master, Conrad Zöllner von Rothenstein, supported by Hungarian King Sigismund of Luxemburg, responded by publicly contesting the sincerity of Jogaila's conversion, bringing the charge to a papal court. The territorial disputes continued over Samogitia, which had been in Teutonic hands since the Peace of Raciąż in 1404. Poland also had territorial claims against the order in Dobrzyń Land and Gdańsk (Danzig), but the two states had been largely at peace since the Treaty of Kalisz (1343). The conflict was also motivated by trade considerations: the order controlled the lower reaches of the three largest rivers (the Neman, Vistula and Daugava) in Poland and Lithuania.
War, truce and preparations: In May 1409, an uprising in Teutonic-held Samogitia started. Lithuania supported it and the order threatened to invade. Poland announced its support for the Lithuanian cause and threatened to invade Prussia in return. As Prussian troops evacuated Samogitia, Teutonic Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen declared war on the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania on 6 August 1409. The order hoped to defeat Poland and Lithuania separately, and began by invading Greater Poland and Kuyavia, catching the Poles by surprise. The order burned the castle at Dobrin (Dobrzyń nad Wisłą), captured Bobrowniki after a 14-day siege, conquered Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) and sacked several towns. The Poles organized counterattacks and recaptured Bydgoszcz. The Samogitians attacked Memel (Klaipėda). However, neither side was ready for a full-scale war.
Wenceslaus, King of the Romans, agreed to mediate the dispute. A truce was signed on 8 October 1409 and was set to expire on 24 June 1410. Both sides used this time to prepare for war, gathering troops and engaging in diplomatic maneuvering. Both sides sent letters and envoys accusing each other of various wrongdoings and threats to the Christendom. Wenceslaus, who received a gift of 60,000 florins from the order, declared that Samogitia rightfully belonged to the order and only Dobrzyń Land should be returned to Poland. The order also paid 300,000 ducats to Sigismund of Hungary, who had ambitions regarding the Principality of Moldavia, for mutual military assistance. Sigismund attempted to break the Polish–Lithuanian alliance by offering Vytautas a king's crown; Vytautas' acceptance would have violated the terms of the Ostrów Agreement and created Polish-Lithuanian discord. At the same time, Vytautas managed to obtain a truce from the Livonian Order.
By December 1409, Władysław II Jagiełło and Vytautas had agreed on a common strategy: their armies would unite into a single massive force and march together towards Marienburg (Malbork), capital of the Teutonic Order. The order, who took a defensive position, did not expect a joint attack and were preparing for a dual invasion—by the Poles along the Vistula River towards Danzig (Gdańsk) and the Lithuanians along the Neman River towards Ragnit (Neman). To counter this perceived threat, Ulrich von Jungingen concentrated his forces in Schwetz (Świecie), a central location from where troops could respond to an invasion from any direction rather quickly. Sizable garrisons were left in the eastern castles of Ragnit, Rhein (Ryn) near Lötzen (Giżycko) and Memel (Klaipėda). To keep their plans secret and mislead the order, Władysław II Jagiełło and Vytautas organized several raids into border territories, thus forcing the order to keep their troops in place.
Opposing forces: The precise number of soldiers involved has proven difficult to establish. None of the contemporary sources provided reliable troop counts. Jan Długosz provided the number of banners, the principal unit of each cavalry: 51 for the Teutons, 50 for the Poles and 40 for the Lithuanians. However, it is unclear how many men were under each banner. The structure and number of infantry units (pikemen, archers, crossbowmen) and artillery units is unknown. Estimates, often biased by political and nationalistic considerations, were produced by various historians. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Grunwald | To keep their plans secret and mislead the order, Władysław II Jagiełło and Vytautas organized several raids into border territories, thus forcing the order to keep their troops in place.
Opposing forces: The precise number of soldiers involved has proven difficult to establish. None of the contemporary sources provided reliable troop counts. Jan Długosz provided the number of banners, the principal unit of each cavalry: 51 for the Teutons, 50 for the Poles and 40 for the Lithuanians. However, it is unclear how many men were under each banner. The structure and number of infantry units (pikemen, archers, crossbowmen) and artillery units is unknown. Estimates, often biased by political and nationalistic considerations, were produced by various historians. German historians tend to present lower numbers, while Polish historians tend to use higher estimates. The high-end estimates by Polish historian Stefan Kuczyński of 39,000 Polish–Lithuanian and 27,000 Teutonic men have been cited in Western literature as "commonly accepted".
While outnumbered, the Teutonic army had advantages in discipline, military training and equipment. They were particularly noted for their heavy cavalry, although only a small percentage of the Order's army at Grunwald were heavily armoured knights. The Teutonic army was also equipped with bombards that could shoot lead and stone projectiles.
Both armies were composed of troops from several states and lands, including numerous mercenaries, primarily from Silesia and Bohemia. Bohemian mercenaries fought on both sides. The Silesian mercenaries were led in battle by Duke Konrad VII the White, of Oels, who was supported by knights from the Silesian nobility including Dietrich von Kottulin and Hans von Motschelnitz.
Soldiers from twenty-two different states and regions, mostly Germanic, joined the Order's army. Teutonic recruits known as guest crusaders included soldiers from Westphalia, Frisia, Austria, Swabia, Bavaria, and Stettin (Szczecin). Two Hungarian nobles, Nicholas II Garai and Stibor of Stiboricz, brought 200 men for the Order, but support from Sigismund of Hungary was disappointing.
Poland brought mercenaries from Moravia and Bohemia. The Czechs produced two full banners, under the command of John Sokol of Lamberg. Serving among the Czechs was possibly Jan Žižka, future commander of the Hussites. Alexander I of Moldavia commanded an expeditionary corps and the Moldavian king was so brave that the Polish troops and their king honoured him with a royal sword, the Szczerbiec. Vytautas gathered troops from Lithuanian and Ruthenian lands (present-day Belarus and Ukraine). Among them were three banners from Smolensk led by Władysław II Jagiełło's brother Lengvenis, the Tatar contingent of the Golden Horde under the command of the future Khan Jalal al-Din, and Armenian cavalry troops from Podolia. The overall commander of the joint Polish–Lithuanian force was King Władysław II Jagiełło; however, he did not directly participate in the battle. The Lithuanian units were commanded directly by Grand Duke Vytautas, who was second in command, and helped design the grand strategy of the campaign. Vytautas actively participated in the battle, managing both Lithuanian and Polish units. Jan Długosz stated that the low-ranking swordbearer of the Crown, Zyndram of Maszkowice, commanded the Polish army, but that is highly doubtful. More likely, marshal of the Crown Zbigniew of Brzezia commanded the Polish troops in the field.
Course of the battle:
March into Prussia: The first stage of the Grunwald campaign was the gathering of all Polish–Lithuanian troops at Czerwińsk, a designated meeting point about 80 km (50 mi) from the Prussian border, where the joint army crossed the Vistula over a pontoon bridge. This maneuver, which required precision and intense coordination among multi-ethnic forces, was accomplished in about a week, from 24 to 30 June. Polish soldiers from Greater Poland gathered in Poznań, and those from Lesser Poland, in Wolbórz. On 24 June, Władysław II Jagiełło and Czech mercenaries arrived in Wolbórz. Three days later the Polish army was already at the meeting place. The Lithuanian army marched out from Vilnius on 3 June and joined the Ruthenian regiments in Hrodna. They arrived in Czerwińsk on the same day the Poles crossed the river. After the crossing, Masovian troops under Siemowit IV and Janusz I joined the Polish–Lithuanian army. The massive force began its march north towards Marienburg (Malbork), capital of Prussia, on 3 July. The Prussian border was crossed on 9 July.
The river crossing remained secret until Hungarian envoys, who were attempting to negotiate a peace, informed the Grand Master. As soon as Ulrich von Jungingen grasped the Polish–Lithuanian intentions, he left 3,000 men at Schwetz (Świecie) under Heinrich von Plauen and marched the main force to organize a line of defense on the Drewenz River (Drwęca) near Kauernik (Kurzętnik). The river crossing was fortified with stockades. On 11 July, after meeting with his eight-member war council, Władysław II Jagiełło decided against crossing the river at such a strong, defensible position. The army would instead bypass the river crossing by turning east, towards its sources, where no other major rivers separated his army from Marienburg. The march continued east towards Soldau (Działdowo), although no attempt was made to capture the town. The Teutonic army followed the Drewenz River north, crossed it near Löbau (Lubawa) and then moved east in parallel with the Polish–Lithuanian army. According to the Order's propaganda, the latter ravaged the village of Gilgenburg (Dąbrówno). Later, in the self-serving testimonies of the survivors before the Pope, the order claimed that Von Jungingen was so enraged by the alleged atrocities that he swore to defeat the invaders in battle.
Battle preparations: In the early morning of 15 July, both armies met in an area covering approximately 4 km2 (1.5 sq mi) between the villages of Grunwald, Tannenberg (Stębark) and Ludwigsdorf (Łodwigowo). The armies formed opposing lines along a northeast–southwest axis. The Polish–Lithuanian army was positioned in front and east of Ludwigsdorf and Tannenberg. Polish heavy cavalry formed the left flank, Lithuanian light cavalry the right flank and various mercenary troops made up the center. Their men were organized in three lines of wedge-shaped formations about 20 men deep. The Teutonic forces concentrated their elite heavy cavalry, commanded by Grand Marshal Frederic von Wallenrode, against the Lithuanians. The order, which was the first to organize their army for the battle, hoped to provoke the Poles or Lithuanians into attacking first. Their troops, wearing heavy armor, had to stand in the scorching sun for several hours waiting for an attack. One chronicle suggested that they had dug pits that an attacking army would fall into. They also attempted to use field artillery, but a light rain dampened their powder and only two cannon shots were fired. As Władysław II Jagiełło delayed, the Grand Master sent messengers with two swords to "assist Władysław II Jagiełło and Vytautas in battle". The swords were meant as an insult and a provocation. Known as the "Grunwald Swords", they became one of the national symbols of Poland.
Battle begins: Lithuanian attack and retreat maneuver: Vytautas, supported by the Polish banners, started an assault on the left flank of the Teutonic forces. After more than an hour of heavy fighting, the Lithuanian light cavalry began a full retreat. Jan Długosz described this development as a complete annihilation of the entire Lithuanian army. According to Długosz, the Order assumed that victory was theirs, broke their formation for a disorganized pursuit of the retreating Lithuanians, and gathered much loot before returning to the battlefield to face the Polish troops. He made no mention of the Lithuanians, who later returned to the battlefield. Thus Długosz portrayed the battle as a single-handed Polish victory. This view contradicted Cronica conflictus and has been challenged by modern historians.
Starting with an article by Vaclaw Lastowski in 1909, they proposed that the retreat had been a planned maneuver borrowed from the Golden Horde. A feigned retreat had been used in the Battle of the Vorskla River (1399), when the Lithuanian army had been dealt a crushing defeat and Vytautas himself had barely escaped alive. This theory gained wider acceptance after the discovery and publication, in 1963 by Swedish historian Sven Ekdahl, of a German letter. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Grunwald | He made no mention of the Lithuanians, who later returned to the battlefield. Thus Długosz portrayed the battle as a single-handed Polish victory. This view contradicted Cronica conflictus and has been challenged by modern historians.
Starting with an article by Vaclaw Lastowski in 1909, they proposed that the retreat had been a planned maneuver borrowed from the Golden Horde. A feigned retreat had been used in the Battle of the Vorskla River (1399), when the Lithuanian army had been dealt a crushing defeat and Vytautas himself had barely escaped alive. This theory gained wider acceptance after the discovery and publication, in 1963 by Swedish historian Sven Ekdahl, of a German letter. Written a few years after the battle, it cautioned the new Grand Master to look out for feigned retreats of the kind that had been used in the Great Battle. Stephen Turnbull asserts that the Lithuanian tactical retreat did not quite fit the formula of a feigned retreat; such a retreat was usually staged by one or two units (as opposed to almost an entire army) and was swiftly followed by a counterattack (whereas the Lithuanians had returned late in the battle).
Battle continues: Polish–Teutonic fight: While the Lithuanians were retreating, heavy fighting broke out between Polish and Teutonic forces. Commanded by Grand Komtur Kuno von Lichtenstein, the Teutonic forces concentrated on the Polish right flank. Six of von Walenrode's banners did not pursue the retreating Lithuanians, instead joining the attack on the right flank. A particularly valuable target was the royal banner of Kraków. It seemed that the order were gaining the upper hand, and at one point the royal standard-bearer, Marcin of Wrocimowice, lost the Kraków banner. However, it was soon recaptured and fighting continued. Władysław II Jagiełło deployed his reserves—the second line of his army. Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen then personally led 16 banners, almost a third of the original Teutonic strength, to the right Polish flank, and Władysław II Jagiełło deployed his last reserves, the third line of his army. The melee reached the Polish command and one knight, identified as Lupold or Diepold of Kökeritz, charged directly against King Władysław II Jagiełło. Władysław's secretary, Zbigniew Oleśnicki, saved the king's life, gaining royal favor and becoming one of the most influential people in Poland.
Battle ends: Teutonic Order defeated: At that time the reorganized Lithuanians returned to the battle, attacking von Jungingen from the rear. The Teutonic forces were by then becoming outnumbered by the mass of Polish knights and advancing Lithuanian cavalry. As von Jungingen attempted to break through the Lithuanian lines, he was killed. According to Cronica conflictus, Dobiesław of Oleśnica thrust a lance through the Grand Master's neck, while Długosz presented Mszczuj of Skrzynno as the killer. Surrounded and leaderless, the Teutonic Order began to retreat. Part of the routed units retreated towards their camp. This move backfired when the camp followers turned against their masters and joined the manhunt. The knights attempted to build a wagon fort: the camp was surrounded by wagons serving as an improvised fortification. However, the defense was soon broken and the camp was ravaged. According to Cronica conflictus, more knights died there than on the battlefield. The battle lasted for about ten hours.
The Teutonic Order attributed the defeat to treason on the part of Nicholas von Renys (Mikołaj of Ryńsk), commander of the Culm (Chełmno) banner, and he was beheaded without a trial. He was the founder and leader of the Lizard Union, a group of knights sympathetic to Poland. According to the order, von Renys lowered his banner, which was taken as a signal of surrender and led to the panicked retreat. The legend that the order was "stabbed in the back" was echoed in the post-World War I stab-in-the-back myth and preoccupied German historiography of the battle until 1945.
Aftermath:
Casualties and captives: A note sent in August by envoys of King Sigismund of Hungary, Nicholas II Garai and Stibor of Stiboricz, put total casualties at 8,000 dead "on both sides". However, the wording is vague and it is unclear whether it meant a total of 8,000 or 16,000 dead. A papal bull from 1412 mentioned 18,000 dead Christians. In two letters written immediately after the battle, Władysław II Jagiełło mentioned that Polish casualties were small (paucis valde and modico) and Jan Długosz listed only 12 Polish knights who had been killed. A letter by a Teutonic official from Tapiau (Gvardeysk) mentioned that only half of the Lithuanians returned, but it is unclear how many of those casualties are attributable to the battle and how many to the later siege of Marienburg.
The defeat of the Teutonic Order was resounding. According to Teutonic payroll records, only 1,427 men reported back to Marienburg to claim their pay. Of 1,200 men sent from Danzig, only 300 returned. Between 203 and 211 brothers of the Order were killed, out of 270 that participated in battle, including much of the Teutonic leadership—Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen, Grand Marshal Friedrich von Wallenrode, Grand Komtur Kuno von Lichtenstein, Grand Treasurer Thomas von Merheim, Marshal of Supply Forces Albrecht von Schwartzburg, and ten of the komturs. Marquard von Salzbach, Komtur of Brandenburg (Ushakovo) and Heinrich Schaumburg, voigt of Sambia, were executed by order of Vytautas after the battle. The bodies of von Jungingen and other high-ranking officials were transported to Marienburg Castle for burial on 19 July. The bodies of lower-ranking Teutonic officials and 12 Polish knights were buried at the church in Tannenberg. The rest of the dead were buried in several mass graves. The highest-ranking Teutonic official to escape the battle was Werner von Tettinger, Komtur of Elbing (Elbląg).
Polish and Lithuanian forces took several thousand captives. Among these were Dukes Konrad VII of Oels (Oleśnica) and Casimir V of Pomerania. Most of the commoners and mercenaries were released shortly after the battle on condition that they report to Kraków on 11 November 1410. Only those who were expected to pay ransom were kept. Considerable ransoms were recorded; for example, the mercenary Holbracht von Loym had to pay 150 kopas of Prague groschen, amounting to more than 30 kg (66 lb) of silver.
Further campaign and peace: After the battle, the Polish and Lithuanian forces delayed their attack on the Teutonic capital in Marienburg (Malbork), remaining on the battlefield for three days and then marching an average of only about 15 km (9.3 mi) per day. The main forces did not reach heavily fortified Marienburg until 26 July. This delay gave Heinrich von Plauen enough time to organize a defense. Władysław II Jagiełło also sent his troops to other Teutonic fortresses, which often surrendered without resistance, including the major cities of Danzig (Gdańsk), Thorn (Toruń), and Elbing (Elbląg). Only eight castles remained in Teutonic hands. The besiegers of Marienburg expected a speedy capitulation and were not prepared for a long siege, suffering from lack of ammunition, low morale, and an epidemic of dysentery. The order appealed to their allies for help, and Sigismund of Hungary, Wenceslaus, King of the Romans, and the Livonian Order promised financial aid and reinforcements.
The siege of Marienburg was lifted on 19 September. The Polish–Lithuanian forces left garrisons in the fortresses they had taken and returned home. However, the order quickly recaptured most of the castles. By the end of October only four Teutonic castles along the border remained in Polish hands. Władysław II Jagiełło raised a fresh army and dealt another defeat to the order in the Battle of Koronowo on 10 October 1410. Following other brief engagements, both sides agreed to negotiate.
The Peace of Thorn was signed in February 1411. Under its terms, the order ceded the Dobrin Land (Dobrzyń Land) to Poland and agreed to resign their claims to Samogitia during the lifetimes of Władysław II Jagiełło and Vytautas, although another two wars—the Hunger War of 1414 and the Gollub War of 1422—would be waged before the Treaty of Melno permanently resolved the territorial disputes. The Poles and Lithuanians were unable to translate the military victory into territorial or diplomatic gains. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Grunwald | By the end of October only four Teutonic castles along the border remained in Polish hands. Władysław II Jagiełło raised a fresh army and dealt another defeat to the order in the Battle of Koronowo on 10 October 1410. Following other brief engagements, both sides agreed to negotiate.
The Peace of Thorn was signed in February 1411. Under its terms, the order ceded the Dobrin Land (Dobrzyń Land) to Poland and agreed to resign their claims to Samogitia during the lifetimes of Władysław II Jagiełło and Vytautas, although another two wars—the Hunger War of 1414 and the Gollub War of 1422—would be waged before the Treaty of Melno permanently resolved the territorial disputes. The Poles and Lithuanians were unable to translate the military victory into territorial or diplomatic gains. However, the Peace of Thorn imposed a heavy financial burden on the order from which they never recovered. They had to pay an indemnity in silver in four annual installments. To meet these payments, the order borrowed heavily, confiscated gold and silver from churches, and increased taxes. Two major Prussian cities, Danzig (Gdańsk) and Thorn (Toruń), revolted against the tax increases. The defeat at Grunwald left the Teutonic Order with few forces to defend their remaining territories. Since Samogitia became officially christened, as both Poland and Lithuania were for a long time, the order had difficulties recruiting new volunteer crusaders. The Grand Masters then needed to rely on mercenary troops, which proved an expensive drain on their already depleted budget. The internal conflicts, economic decline, and tax increases led to unrest and the foundation of the Prussian Confederation, or Alliance against Lordship, in 1441. This in turn led to a series of conflicts that culminated in the Thirteen Years' War (1454).
Battlefield memorials: Ideas about commemorating the battle rose right after the event. Władysław II Jagiełło wanted to build a monastery dedicated to Saint Bridget of Sweden, who had prophesied the downfall of the Teutonic Order, at the location of the battle. When the order regained the territory of the battlefield, the new grand master Heinrich von Plauen built a chapel dedicated to Saint Mary and it was consecrated in March 1413. It was destroyed by the Poles when they invaded during the Hunger War of 1414, but it was quickly rebuilt. The chapel fell to ruins during the Protestant Reformation and was demolished in 1720. Over time, the location of the chapel became associated with the location where Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen was killed. In 1901, a large memorial stone was erected for the fallen Grand Master in the midst of the chapel ruins for the 200th anniversary of the coronation of King Frederick I of Prussia. The inscription was chiseled in 1960 and the stone was removed from the chapel ruins and placed inscription facing down in 1984.
In 1960, for the 550th anniversary, a museum and monuments were constructed a little northeast of the chapel ruins. The grounds were designed by sculptor Jerzy Bandura and architect Witold Cęckiewicz. The monuments included an obelisk of Silesian granite depicting two faces of knights, a bundle of eleven 30-metre (98 ft)-high flagpoles with emblems of the Polish–Lithuanian army, and a sculptural map depicting the supposed positions of the armies before the battle. Presumed locations where Władysław II Jagiełło and Vytautas had their main camps were marked with artificial mounds and flagpoles. The battle site is one of Poland's national Historical Monuments, as designated on 4 October 2010, and tracked by the National Institute of Cultural Heritage. The museum, which is open during summers, has an exhibition space of 275 square metres (2,960 sq ft) in which it displays archaeological finds from the battlefield, original and reproduced medieval weapons, reconstructed flags from the battle, as well as various maps, drawings, and documents related to the battle. In 2018, the museum was visited by about 140,000 people. Construction of a larger year-round museum at an estimated cost of 30 million Polish złoty (6.5 million euros) started in April 2019.
In July 2020, a large stone with engraved Vytis was erected by the Lithuanians near the monument site to commemorate the 610th anniversary of the battle. The monument was unveiled by Lithuanian and Polish presidents Gitanas Nausėda and Andrzej Duda.
Archaeological excavations: Several artifacts from the battlefield are known from historical record, for example stone balls in the church of Stębark (Tannenberg) and a metal helmet with holes in the church of Mielno which was gifted to Frederick William IV of Prussia when he visited the battlefield in 1842, but they have not survived to the present day. The first amateur archeological research was carried out in 1911 in hopes of finding the mass graves mentioned by Jan Długosz at the church of Stębark. The church was surveyed with ground-penetrating radar in 2013 but little evidence of the mass graves was found.
The first more thorough archaeological excavations of the battlefield were carried out in 1958–1960 in the run-up to the 550th anniversary, connected to the construction of the memorial site and museum. The government showed great interest in the excavations and sent helicopters and 160 soldiers to help. Research continued in later decades, but yielded very little results with the exception of the area around the ruined chapel. Several mass graves were found at the chapel: remains of six people in the vestibule, 30 people next to the southern wall, more than 130 people in three pits adjacent to the chapel, and about 90 people in the sacristy. Many remains showed signs of traumatic injuries. Some skeletons showed signs of being burned and moved. Mass burials, including of women and children, were also found in the villages of Gilgenburg (Dąbrówno) and Faulen (Ulnowo). The massacre in Gilgenburg was known from written sources, but the burial in Faulen was unexpected. In the fields, very few items of militaria were found. In 1958–1990, only 28 artefacts were found connected to the battle: ten crossbow bolts, five arrowheads, a javelin head, two sword pieces, two gun bullets, six pieces of gauntlets, and two small arms bullets.
In 2009 Swedish historian Sven Ekdahl published his long-held hypothesis that the traditionally accepted location of the battlefield was incorrect. He believed that the surveys near the chapel ruins were actually around the site of the Teutonic Order's camp. According to Ekdahl's theory, the main battlefield was located northeast of the road between Grunwald and Łodwigowo, about 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) southwest of the memorial site. Between 2014 and 2019, archaeologists from Scandinavia and Poland investigated an area of approximately 450 hectares (1,100 acres) with metal detectors and located the main battle site according to Ekdahl's predictions. In 2017, the team found approximately 65 crossbow bolts and 20 arrowheads, as well as parts of spurs, stirrups, gauntlets, etc. As of 2020, archaeologists had discovered about 1,500 artifacts of which about 150 are linked to the battle. Among them are a Teutonic clasp to fasten coat with the Gothic inscription ‘Ave Maria’, a seal with the image of a pelican feeding its young with blood, two well preserved axes, and Teutonic coins.
The 2014-2019 surveys have been criticsed due to inconsistent publications and not following scientific techniques established by battlefield archeology. These include preservation of findings, lack of survey maps and inconsistent recording of GPS data. There has also been a lack of funding from the Polish government for reliable research of the entire battlefield.
Legacy: In William Urban's summary, almost all accounts of the battle made before the 1960s were more influenced by romantic legends and nationalistic propaganda than by fact. Historians have since made progress towards dispassionate scholarship and reconciliation of the various national accounts of the battle.
Poland and Lithuania: The Battle of Grunwald is regarded as one of the most important in the histories of Poland and Lithuania. In Lithuania, the victory is synonymous with the Grand Duchy's political and military peak. It was a source of national pride during the age of Romantic nationalism and inspired resistance to the Germanization and Russification policies of the German and Russian Empires. The Teutonic Order was portrayed as bloodthirsty invaders and Grunwald as a just victory achieved by a small, oppressed nation.
In 1910, to mark the 500th anniversary of the battle, a monument by Antoni Wiwulski was unveiled in Kraków during a three-day celebration attended by some 150,000 people. About 60 other towns and villages in Galicia also erected Grunwald monuments for the anniversary. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Grunwald | Historians have since made progress towards dispassionate scholarship and reconciliation of the various national accounts of the battle.
Poland and Lithuania: The Battle of Grunwald is regarded as one of the most important in the histories of Poland and Lithuania. In Lithuania, the victory is synonymous with the Grand Duchy's political and military peak. It was a source of national pride during the age of Romantic nationalism and inspired resistance to the Germanization and Russification policies of the German and Russian Empires. The Teutonic Order was portrayed as bloodthirsty invaders and Grunwald as a just victory achieved by a small, oppressed nation.
In 1910, to mark the 500th anniversary of the battle, a monument by Antoni Wiwulski was unveiled in Kraków during a three-day celebration attended by some 150,000 people. About 60 other towns and villages in Galicia also erected Grunwald monuments for the anniversary. About the same time, Nobel Prize-winner Henryk Sienkiewicz wrote the novel The Knights of the Cross (Polish: Krzyżacy), prominently featuring the battle in one of the chapters. In 1960, Polish filmmaker Aleksander Ford used the book as the basis for his film, Knights of the Teutonic Order. At the 1939 New York World's Fair, Poland exhibited the King Jagiello Monument which commemorated the battle and was later installed in the Central Park, New York City. The battle has lent its name to military decorations (Order of the Cross of Grunwald), sports teams (BC Žalgiris, FK Žalgiris), and various organizations. 72 streets in Lithuania are named after the battle.
Under Communist rule over Poland, memory to the battle was monopolized by the state. Memory to the battle was instrumentalized for justifying the new borders, under which Poland annexed a quarter of pre-war Germany, while losing the Kresy. Under the new government in the 1970s, anti-German propaganda was reduced, but the symbol of Grunwald did not disappear. Until end of the 1980s, July 15 was an important official memorial day.
An annual battle re-enactment takes place on 15 July. In 2010, a pageant reenacting the event and commemorating the battle's 600th anniversary was held. It attracted 200,000 spectators who watched 2,200 participants playing the role of knights in a re-enactment of the battle. An additional 3,800 participants played peasants and camp followers. The pageant's organisers believe that the event has become the largest re-enactment of medieval combat in Europe. The reenactment attracts about 60,000 to 80,000 visitors annually.
The battle is also commemorated in Ukraine and Belarus. In 2010, the National Bank of Ukraine released a jubilee coin of 20 hryvnia commemorated to the 600 anniversary of the battle. At least three cities in Ukraine (Lviv, Drohobych, and Ivano-Frankivsk) have a street named after the battle. In Belarus, interest in the battle began to grow in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 2010, Belarus issued postage stamps for the 600th anniversary. Since 2008, Our Grunwald Festival is hosted by a private museum of medieval culture near Minsk and includes battle reenactment.
Germany and Russia: Germans generally saw the Teutonic knights as heroic and noble men who brought Christianity and civilization to the east, although many came to the region with more material motives. In August 1914, during World War I, Germany won a battle against Russia near the site. When the Germans realized its propaganda potential, they named the battle the Battle of Tannenberg, despite it having actually taken place much closer to Allenstein (Olsztyn), and framed it as revenge for the Polish–Lithuanian victory 504 years earlier. To cement this symbolism, Germany built the Tannenberg Memorial, which became the tomb of the national hero Paul von Hindenburg.
Nazi Germany later exploited the sentiment by portraying their Lebensraum policies as a continuation of the order's historical mission. For example, SS Chief Heinrich Himmler told Nazi Germany's leader Adolf Hitler on the first day of the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944: "After five, six weeks we shall leave. But by then Warsaw, the capital, the head, the intelligence of this former 16–17 million Polish people will be extinguished, this Volk that has blocked our way to the east for 700 years and has stood in our way ever since the First Battle of Tannenberg."
Due to the participation of the three Smolensk banners, Russians saw the battle as a victory of a Polish–Lithuanian–Russian coalition against invading Germans. However, the ethnic composition of the men under these banners cannot be determined as Smolensk had rebelled against Vytautas in 1404 and 1408. Chronicler Jan Długosz praised the Smolensk banners, who fought bravely and, according to him, were the only banners from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania not to retreat. In Soviet historiography, the Battle of Grunwald was styled as an ethnic struggle between Slavs and Germanics. The Teutonic Order was portrayed as the medieval forerunners of Hitler's armies, while the battle itself was seen as the medieval counterpart to the Battle of Stalingrad.
In 2014, the Russian Military Historical Society stated that Russian troops and their allies defeated the German knights in the Battle of Grunwald. In July 2017, billboards appeared on the streets of Russian cities with statements that seemed to attribute the victory in the battle of Grunwald to Russia.
References:
Bibliography:
External links:
Cronica conflictus Wladislai regis Poloniae cum cruciferi sanno Christi 1410 (Chronicle of the battle, written in 1410–1411, just after the battle) Archived 10 November 2021 at the Wayback Machine
(in Latin) Photos of Banderia Prutenorum, a catalog of captured Teutonic banners
Account by Jan Dlugosz, written sixty years after the battle
Museum of the Battle of Grunwald
Battle of Grunwald re-enactment (every year on 15 July)
600th anniversary celebrations in 2010 |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Hastings | Background: In 911, the Carolingian ruler Charles the Simple allowed a group of Vikings to settle in Normandy under their leader Rollo. Their settlement proved successful, and they quickly adapted to the indigenous culture, renouncing paganism, converting to Christianity, and intermarrying with the local population. Over time, the frontiers of the duchy expanded to the west. In 1002, King Æthelred II married Emma, the sister of Richard II, Duke of Normandy. Their son Edward the Confessor spent many years in exile in Normandy, and succeeded to the English throne in 1042. This led to the establishment of a powerful Norman interest in English politics, as Edward drew heavily on his former hosts for support, bringing in Norman courtiers, soldiers, and clerics and appointing them to positions of power, particularly in the Church. Edward was childless and embroiled in conflict with the formidable Godwin, Earl of Wessex, and his sons, and he may also have encouraged Duke William of Normandy's ambitions for the English throne.
Succession crisis in England: King Edward's death on 5 January 1066 left no clear heir, and several contenders laid claim to the throne of England. Edward's immediate successor was the Earl of Wessex, Harold Godwinson, the richest and most powerful of the English aristocrats and son of Godwin, Edward's earlier opponent. Harold was elected king by the Witenagemot of England and crowned by Ealdred, the Archbishop of York, although Norman propaganda claimed that the ceremony was performed by Stigand, the uncanonically elected Archbishop of Canterbury. Harold was at once challenged by two powerful neighbouring rulers. Duke William claimed that he had been promised the throne by King Edward and that Harold had sworn agreement to this. Harald Hardrada of Norway also contested the succession. His claim to the throne was based on an agreement between his predecessor Magnus the Good and the earlier King of England Harthacnut, whereby, if either died without heir, the other would inherit both England and Norway. William and Harald Hardrada immediately set about assembling troops and ships for separate invasions.
Tostig and Hardrada's invasions: In early 1066, Harold's exiled brother Tostig Godwinson raided southeastern England with a fleet he had recruited in Flanders, later joined by other ships from Orkney. Threatened by Harold's fleet, Tostig moved north and raided in East Anglia and Lincolnshire. He was driven back to his ships by the brothers Edwin, Earl of Mercia and Morcar, Earl of Northumbria. Deserted by most of his followers, he withdrew to Scotland, where he spent the middle of the year recruiting fresh forces. Hardrada invaded northern England in early September, leading a fleet of more than 300 ships carrying perhaps 15,000 men. Hardrada's army was further augmented by the forces of Tostig, who supported the Norwegian king's bid for the throne. Advancing on York, the Norwegians occupied the city after defeating a northern English army under Edwin and Morcar on 20 September at the Battle of Fulford.
English army and Harold's preparations: The English army was organised along regional lines, with the fyrd, or local levy, serving under a local magnate – whether an earl, bishop, or sheriff. The fyrd was composed of men who owned their own land, and were equipped by their community to fulfil the king's demands for military forces. For every five hides, or units of land nominally capable of supporting one household, one man was supposed to serve. It appears that the hundred was the main organising unit for the fyrd. As a whole, England could furnish about 14,000 men for the fyrd, when it was called out. The fyrd usually served for two months, except in emergencies. It was rare for the whole national fyrd to be called out; between 1046 and 1065 it was only done three times, in 1051, 1052, and 1065. The king also had a group of personal armsmen, known as housecarls, who formed the backbone of the royal forces. Some earls also had their own forces of housecarls. Thegns, the local landowning elites, either fought with the royal housecarls or attached themselves to the forces of an earl or other magnate. The fyrd and the housecarls both fought on foot, with the major difference between them being the housecarls' superior armour. The English army does not appear to have had a significant number of archers.
Harold had spent mid-1066 on the south coast with a large army and fleet waiting for William to invade. The bulk of his forces were militia who needed to harvest their crops, so on 8 September Harold dismissed the militia and the fleet. Learning of the Norwegian invasion he rushed north, gathering forces as he went, and took the Norwegians by surprise, defeating them at the Battle of Stamford Bridge on 25 September. Harald Hardrada and Tostig were killed, and the Norwegians suffered such great losses that only 24 of the original 300 ships were required to carry away the survivors. The English victory came at great cost, as Harold's army was left in a battered and weakened state, and far from the south.
William's preparations and landing: William assembled a large invasion fleet and an army gathered from Normandy and the rest of France, including large contingents from Brittany and Flanders. He spent almost nine months on his preparations, as he had to construct a fleet from nothing. According to some Norman chronicles, he also secured diplomatic support, although the accuracy of the reports has been a matter of historical debate. The most famous claim is that Pope Alexander II gave a papal banner as a token of support, which only appears in William of Poitiers's account, and not in more contemporary narratives. In April 1066 Halley's Comet appeared in the sky, and was widely reported throughout Europe. Contemporary accounts connected the comet's appearance with the succession crisis in England.
William mustered his forces at Saint-Valery-sur-Somme, and was ready to cross the English Channel by about 12 August. But the crossing was delayed, either because of unfavourable weather or to avoid being intercepted by the powerful English fleet. The Normans crossed to England a few days after Harold's victory over the Norwegians, following the dispersal of Harold's naval force, and landed at Pevensey in Sussex on 28 September. A few ships were blown off course and landed at Romney, where the Normans fought the local fyrd. After landing, William's forces built a wooden castle at Hastings, from which they raided the surrounding area. More fortifications were erected at Pevensey.
Norman forces at Hastings: The exact numbers and composition of William's force are unknown. A contemporary document claims that William had 776 ships, but this may be an inflated figure. Figures given by contemporary writers for the size of the army are highly exaggerated, varying from 14,000 to 150,000. Modern historians have offered a range of estimates for the size of William's forces: 7,000–8,000 men including 1,000–2,000 cavalry; 10,000–12,000 men; 10,000 men including 3,000 cavalry; or 7,500 men. The army consisted of about one half infantry, one quarter cavalry, and one quarter archers or crossbowmen. Later lists of companions of William the Conqueror are extant, but most are padded with extra names; only about 35 named individuals can be reliably identified as having been with William at Hastings.
The main armour was chainmail hauberks, usually knee-length, with slits to allow riding, some with sleeves to the elbows. Some hauberks may have been made of scales attached to a tunic, with the scales made of metal, horn or hardened leather. Headgear was usually a conical metal helmet with a vertical band guarding the bridge of the nose. Horsemen and infantry carried shields. The infantryman's shield was usually round and made of wood with metal reinforcement. Horsemen changed to a kite-shaped shield and were usually armed with a lance. The couched lance, carried tucked against the body under the right arm, was relatively new and probably not used at Hastings, as the terrain was unfavourable for long cavalry charges. Both infantry and cavalry usually fought with a straight sword, long and double-edged. The infantry could also use javelins and long spears. Some of the cavalry may have used a mace instead of a sword. Archers would have used a self bow or a crossbow, and most would not have had armour.
Harold moves south: After defeating his brother Tostig and Harald Hardrada in the north, Harold left much of his forces in the north, including Morcar and Edwin, and marched the rest of his army south to deal with the threatened Norman invasion. It is unclear when Harold learned of William's landing, but it was probably during the march. Harold stopped in London for about a week before Hastings, so it is likely that he spent about a week on his march south, averaging about 27 mi (43 km) per day, for the approximately 200 mi (320 km). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Hastings | Both infantry and cavalry usually fought with a straight sword, long and double-edged. The infantry could also use javelins and long spears. Some of the cavalry may have used a mace instead of a sword. Archers would have used a self bow or a crossbow, and most would not have had armour.
Harold moves south: After defeating his brother Tostig and Harald Hardrada in the north, Harold left much of his forces in the north, including Morcar and Edwin, and marched the rest of his army south to deal with the threatened Norman invasion. It is unclear when Harold learned of William's landing, but it was probably during the march. Harold stopped in London for about a week before Hastings, so it is likely that he spent about a week on his march south, averaging about 27 mi (43 km) per day, for the approximately 200 mi (320 km). Harold camped at Caldbec Hill on the night of 13 October, near a "hoar-apple tree", about 8 mi (13 km) from William's castle at Hastings. Some of the early contemporary French accounts mention an emissary or emissaries sent by Harold to William, which is likely, though nothing came of it.
Although Harold attempted to surprise the Normans, William's scouts reported the English arrival to the duke. The exact events preceding the battle are obscure, with contradictory accounts in the sources, but all agree that William's army advanced from his castle towards the enemy. Harold had taken a defensive position at the top of Senlac Hill (present-day Battle, East Sussex), about 6 mi (9.7 km) from William's castle at Hastings.
English forces at Hastings: The exact number of soldiers in Harold's army at Hastings is unknown, as contemporary records do not give reliable figures. Some Norman sources give 400,000 to 1,200,000 on Harold's side, while English sources seem to underestimate Harold's army, perhaps to make the English defeat seem less devastating. Recent historians have suggested figures of between 5,000 and 13,000, while most argue for a figure of 7,000–8,000 English troops. These men would have been a mix of the fyrd and housecarls. Few individual Englishmen are known to have been present; about 20 named individuals can reasonably be assumed to have fought with Harold at Hastings, including Harold's brothers Gyrth and Leofwine and two other relatives.
The English army consisted entirely of infantry. It is possible that some of the higher-class members of the army rode to battle, but then dismounted when battle was joined to fight on foot. The core of the army was made up of housecarls, full-time professional soldiers. Their armour consisted of a conical helmet, a mail hauberk, and a shield, which might be either kite-shaped or round. Most housecarls fought with the two-handed Danish battleaxe, but they could also carry a sword. The rest of the army was made up of levies from the fyrd, also infantry but more lightly armoured and not professionals. Most of the infantry would have formed part of the shield wall, in which the front ranks locked their shields together. Behind them would have been axemen and javelins as well as archers.
Battle:
Background and location: Because many of the primary accounts contradict each other at times, it is impossible to provide an authoritative description of the battle. The only undisputed facts are that fighting began at 9 am Saturday 14 October 1066 and that the battle lasted until dusk. Sunset on the day of the battle was at 4:54 pm, with the battlefield mostly dark by 5:54 pm and in full darkness by 6:24 pm. Moonrise that night was not until 11:12 pm, so once the sun set, there was little light on the battlefield. William of Jumièges reports that Duke William kept his army armed and ready against a surprise attack for the entire night before. The battle took place 7 mi (11 km) north of Hastings at the present-day town of Battle, between two hills – Caldbec Hill to the north and Telham Hill to the south. The area was heavily wooded, with a marsh nearby. The name traditionally given to the battle is unusual – there were several settlements much closer to the battlefield than Hastings. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle called it the battle "at the hoary apple tree". Within 40 years, the battle was described by the Anglo-Norman chronicler Orderic Vitalis as "Senlac", a Norman-French adaptation of the Old English word "Sandlacu", which means "sandy water". This may have been the name of the stream that crosses the battlefield. The battle was already being referred to as "bellum Haestingas" or "Battle of Hastings" by 1086, in the Domesday Book.
The sun rose at 6:48 am that morning, with the day unusually bright. The weather conditions are not recorded. The precise route of the English army southward to the battlefield is not known. Several roads are possible: one, an old Roman road that ran from Rochester to Hastings has long been favoured because of a large coin hoard found nearby in 1876. Another possibility is the Roman road between London and Lewes and then over local tracks to the battlefield. Some accounts of the battle indicate that the Normans advanced from Hastings to the battlefield, but the contemporary account of William of Jumièges places the Normans at the site of the battle the night before. Most historians incline towards the former view, but M. K. Lawson argues that William of Jumièges's account is correct.
Dispositions of forces and tactics: Harold's forces deployed in a small, dense formation at the top of a steep slope, with their flanks protected by woods and marshy ground in front of them. The line may have extended far enough to be anchored on a nearby stream. The English formed a shield wall, with the front ranks holding their shields close together or even overlapping to provide protection from attack. Sources differ on the exact site that the English fought on: some sources state the site of the abbey, but some newer sources suggest it was Caldbec Hill.
More is known about the Norman deployment. Duke William appears to have arranged his forces in three groups, or "battles", which roughly corresponded to their origins. The left units were the Bretons, along with those from Anjou, Poitou and Maine. This division was led by Alan the Red, a relative of the Breton count. The centre was held by the Normans, under the direct command of the duke and with many of his relatives and kinsmen grouped around the ducal party. The final division, on the right, consisted of the Frenchmen, along with some men from Picardy, Boulogne, and Flanders. The right was commanded by William fitzOsbern and Count Eustace II of Boulogne. The front lines were made up of archers, with a line of foot soldiers armed with spears behind. There were probably a few crossbowmen and slingers in with the archers. The cavalry was held in reserve, and a small group of clergymen and servants situated at the base of Telham Hill was not expected to take part in the fighting.
William's disposition of his forces implies that he planned to open the battle with archers in the front rank weakening the enemy with arrows, followed by infantry who would engage in close combat. The infantry would create openings in the English lines that could be exploited by a cavalry charge to break through the English forces and pursue the fleeing soldiers.
Beginning of the battle: The battle opened with the Norman archers shooting uphill at the English shield wall, to little effect. The uphill angle meant that the arrows either bounced off the shields of the English or overshot their targets and flew over the top of the hill. The lack of English archers hampered the Norman archers, as there were few English arrows to be gathered up and reused. After the attack from the archers, William sent the spearmen forward to attack the English. They were met with a barrage of missiles, not arrows but spears, axes and stones. The infantry was unable to force openings in the shield wall, and the cavalry advanced in support. The cavalry also failed to make headway, and a general retreat began, blamed on the Breton division on William's left. A rumour started that the duke had been killed, which added to the confusion. The English forces began to pursue the fleeing invaders, but William rode through his forces, showing his face and yelling that he was still alive. The duke then led a counter-attack against the pursuing English forces; some of the English rallied on a hillock before being overwhelmed.
It is not known whether the English pursuit was ordered by Harold or if it was spontaneous. Wace relates that Harold ordered his men to stay in their formations but no other account gives this detail. The Bayeux Tapestry depicts the death of Harold's brothers Gyrth and Leofwine occurring just before the fight around the hillock. This may mean that the two brothers led the pursuit. The Carmen de Hastingae Proelio relates a different story for the death of Gyrth, stating that the duke slew Harold's brother in combat, perhaps thinking that Gyrth was Harold. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Hastings | A rumour started that the duke had been killed, which added to the confusion. The English forces began to pursue the fleeing invaders, but William rode through his forces, showing his face and yelling that he was still alive. The duke then led a counter-attack against the pursuing English forces; some of the English rallied on a hillock before being overwhelmed.
It is not known whether the English pursuit was ordered by Harold or if it was spontaneous. Wace relates that Harold ordered his men to stay in their formations but no other account gives this detail. The Bayeux Tapestry depicts the death of Harold's brothers Gyrth and Leofwine occurring just before the fight around the hillock. This may mean that the two brothers led the pursuit. The Carmen de Hastingae Proelio relates a different story for the death of Gyrth, stating that the duke slew Harold's brother in combat, perhaps thinking that Gyrth was Harold. William of Poitiers states that the bodies of Gyrth and Leofwine were found near Harold's, implying that they died late in the battle. It is possible that if the two brothers died early in the fighting their bodies were taken to Harold, thus accounting for their being found near his body after the battle. The military historian Peter Marren speculates that if Gyrth and Leofwine died early in the battle, that may have influenced Harold to stand and fight to the end.
Feigned flights: A lull probably occurred early in the afternoon, and a break for rest and food would probably have been needed. William may have also needed time to implement a new strategy, which may have been inspired by the English pursuit and subsequent rout by the Normans. If the Normans could send their cavalry against the shield wall and then draw the English into more pursuits, breaks in the English line might form. William of Poitiers says the tactic was used twice. Although arguments have been made that the chroniclers' accounts of this tactic were meant to excuse the flight of the Norman troops from battle, this is unlikely as the earlier flight was not glossed over. It was a tactic used by other Norman armies during the period. Some historians have argued that the story of the use of feigned flight as a deliberate tactic was invented after the battle; however most historians agree that it was used by the Normans at Hastings.
Although the feigned flights did not break the lines, they probably thinned out the housecarls in the English shield wall. The housecarls were replaced with members of the fyrd, and the shield wall held. Archers appear to have been used again before and during an assault by the cavalry and infantry led by the duke. Although 12th-century sources state that the archers were ordered to shoot at a high angle to shoot over the front of the shield wall, there is no trace of such an action in the more contemporary accounts. It is not known how many assaults were launched against the English lines, but some sources record various actions by both Normans and Englishmen that took place during the afternoon's fighting. The Carmen claims that Duke William had two horses killed under him during the fighting, but William of Poitiers's account states that it was three.
Death of Harold: Harold appears to have died late in the battle, although accounts in the various sources are contradictory. William of Poitiers only mentions his death, without giving any details on how it occurred. The Tapestry is not helpful, as it shows a figure holding an arrow sticking out of his eye next to a falling fighter being hit with a sword. Over both figures is a statement "Here King Harold has been killed". It is not clear which figure is meant to be Harold, or if both are meant. The earliest written mention of the traditional account of Harold dying from an arrow to the eye dates to the 1080s from a history of the Normans written by an Italian monk, Amatus of Montecassino. William of Malmesbury stated that Harold died from an arrow to the eye that went into the brain, and that a knight wounded Harold at the same time. Wace repeats the arrow-to-the-eye account. The Carmen states that Duke William killed Harold, but this is unlikely, as such a feat would have been recorded elsewhere. The account of William of Jumièges is even more unlikely, as it has Harold dying in the morning, during the first fighting. The Chronicle of Battle Abbey states that no one knew who killed Harold, as it happened in the press of battle. A modern biographer of Harold, Ian Walker, states that Harold probably died from an arrow in the eye, although he also says it is possible that Harold was struck down by a Norman knight while mortally wounded in the eye. Another biographer of Harold, Peter Rex, after discussing the various accounts, concludes that it is not possible to declare how Harold died.
Harold's death left the English forces leaderless, and they began to collapse. Many of them fled, but the soldiers of the royal household gathered around Harold's body and fought to the end. The Normans began to pursue the fleeing troops, and except for a rearguard action at a site known as the "Malfosse", the battle was over. Exactly what happened at the Malfosse, or "Evil Ditch", and where it took place, is unclear. It occurred at a small fortification or set of trenches where some Englishmen rallied and seriously wounded Eustace of Boulogne before being defeated by the Normans.
Reasons for the outcome: Harold's defeat was probably due to several circumstances. One was the need to defend against two almost simultaneous invasions. The fact that Harold had dismissed his forces in southern England on 8 September also contributed to the defeat. Many historians fault Harold for hurrying south and not gathering more forces before confronting William at Hastings, although it is not clear that the English forces were insufficient to deal with William's forces. Against these arguments for an exhausted English army, the length of the battle, which lasted an entire day, shows that the English forces were not tired by their long march. Tied in with the speed of Harold's advance to Hastings is the possibility Harold may not have trusted Earls Edwin of Mercia and Morcar of Northumbria once their enemy Tostig had been defeated, and declined to bring them and their forces south. Modern historians have pointed out that one reason for Harold's rush to battle was to contain William's depredations and keep him from breaking free of his beachhead.
Most of the blame for the defeat probably lies in the events of the battle. William was the more experienced military leader, and in addition the lack of cavalry on the English side allowed Harold fewer tactical options. Some writers have criticised Harold for not exploiting the opportunity offered by the rumoured death of William early in the battle. The English appear to have erred in not staying strictly on the defensive, for when they pursued the retreating Normans they exposed their flanks to attack. Whether this was due to the inexperience of the English commanders or the indiscipline of the English soldiers is unclear. In the end, Harold's death appears to have been decisive, as it signalled the break-up of the English forces in disarray. The historian David Nicolle said of the battle that William's army "demonstrated – not without difficulty – the superiority of Norman-French mixed cavalry and infantry tactics over the Germanic-Scandinavian infantry traditions of the Anglo-Saxons."
Aftermath: The day after the battle, Harold's body was identified, either by his armour or by marks on his body. His personal standard was presented to William, and later sent to the papacy. The bodies of the English dead, including some of Harold's brothers and housecarls, were left on the battlefield, although some were removed by relatives later. The Norman dead were buried in a large communal grave, which has not been found. Exact casualty figures are unknown. Of the Englishmen known to be at the battle, the number of dead implies that the death rate was about 50 per cent of those engaged, although this may be too high. Of the named Normans who fought at Hastings, one in seven is stated to have died, but these were all noblemen, and it is probable that the death rate among the common soldiers was higher. Although Orderic Vitalis's figures are highly exaggerated, his ratio of one in four casualties may be accurate. Marren speculates that perhaps 2,000 Normans and 4,000 Englishmen were killed at Hastings. Reports stated that some of the English dead were still being found on the hillside years later. Although scholars thought for a long time that remains would not be recoverable, due to the acidic soil, recent finds have changed this view. One skeleton that was found in a medieval cemetery, and originally was thought to be associated with the 13th century Battle of Lewes, now is thought to be associated with Hastings instead.
One story relates that Gytha, Harold's mother, offered the victorious duke the weight of her son's body in gold for its custody, but was refused. William ordered that Harold's body be thrown into the sea, but whether that took place is unclear. Another story relates that Harold was buried at the top of a cliff. Waltham Abbey, which had been founded by Harold, later claimed that his body had been secretly buried there. Other legends claimed that Harold did not die at Hastings, but escaped and became a hermit at Chester. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Hastings | Although scholars thought for a long time that remains would not be recoverable, due to the acidic soil, recent finds have changed this view. One skeleton that was found in a medieval cemetery, and originally was thought to be associated with the 13th century Battle of Lewes, now is thought to be associated with Hastings instead.
One story relates that Gytha, Harold's mother, offered the victorious duke the weight of her son's body in gold for its custody, but was refused. William ordered that Harold's body be thrown into the sea, but whether that took place is unclear. Another story relates that Harold was buried at the top of a cliff. Waltham Abbey, which had been founded by Harold, later claimed that his body had been secretly buried there. Other legends claimed that Harold did not die at Hastings, but escaped and became a hermit at Chester.
William expected to receive the submission of the surviving English leaders after his victory, but instead Edgar the Ætheling was proclaimed king by the Witenagemot, with the support of Earls Edwin and Morcar, Stigand, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and Ealdred, the Archbishop of York. William therefore advanced on London, marching around the coast of Kent. He defeated an English force that attacked him at Southwark but was unable to storm London Bridge, forcing him to reach the capital by a more circuitous route.
William moved up the Thames valley to cross the river at Wallingford, where he received the submission of Stigand. He then travelled north-east along the Chilterns, before advancing towards London from the north-west, fighting further engagements against forces from the city. The English leaders surrendered to William at Berkhamsted, Hertfordshire. William was acclaimed King of England and crowned by Ealdred on 25 December 1066, in Westminster Abbey.
Despite the submission of the English nobles, resistance continued for several years. There were rebellions in Exeter in late 1067, an invasion by Harold's sons in mid-1068, and an uprising in Northumbria in 1068. In 1069 William faced more troubles from Northumbrian rebels, an invading Danish fleet, and rebellions in the south and west of England. He ruthlessly put down the various risings, culminating in the Harrying of the North in late 1069 and early 1070 that devastated parts of northern England. A further rebellion in 1070 by Hereward the Wake was also defeated by the king, at Ely.
Battle Abbey was founded by William at the site of the battle. According to 12th-century sources, William made a vow to found the abbey, and the high altar of the church was placed at the site where Harold had died. More likely, the foundation was imposed on William by papal legates in 1070. The topography of the battlefield has been altered by subsequent construction work for the abbey, and the slope defended by the English is now much less steep than it was at the time of the battle; the top of the ridge has also been built up and levelled. After the Dissolution of the Monasteries, the abbey's lands passed to secular landowners, who used it as a residence or country house. In 1976 the estate was put up for sale and purchased by the government with the aid of some American donors who wished to honour the 200th anniversary of American independence. The battlefield and abbey grounds are currently owned and administered by English Heritage and are open to the public.
The Bayeux Tapestry is an embroidered narrative of the events leading up to Hastings probably commissioned by Odo of Bayeux soon after the battle, perhaps to hang at the bishop's palace at Bayeux. In modern times annual reenactments of the Battle of Hastings have drawn thousands of participants and spectators to the site of the original battle.
Some English veterans of the battle left England and joined the Varangian Guard in Constantinople. They fought the Normans again at the Battle of Dyrrhachium in 1081, and were defeated again in similar circumstances.
See also: Ermenfrid Penitential
Notes:
Citations:
References:
External links:
Official English Heritage site
Origins of the conflict, the battle itself and its aftermath, BBC History website |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Issus | Location: The battle took place south of the ancient town Issus, which is close to the present-day Turkish town of Iskenderun (the Turkish equivalent of "Alexandria", founded by Alexander to commemorate his victory), on either side of a small river called Pinarus. At that location, the distance from the Gulf of Issus to the surrounding mountains is only 2.6 km (2 mi), a place where Darius could not take advantage of his superiority in numbers. Speculation on the location of the Pinarus has taken place for over 80 years. Older historians believed it to be the Deli Tchai river, but historians N.G.L. Hammond and A. M. Devine claim that the Pinarus is actually the Payas River, the latter using his own examination of the course of the river, which he considered would not have drastically changed since antiquity. Their evidence is based on Callisthenes' accounts of the measurements of the battlefield and distances marched by both sides' armies in the prelude to the battle and distance given by Diodorus after the battle.
Background: Alexander set out into Asia in 334 BC and defeated the local Persian satraps at the Battle of the Granicus. He then proceeded to occupy most of Asia Minor, with the idea of capturing all coastal settlements so as to negate the power of the vastly superior Persian fleet. He captured several important settlements such as Miletus in 334 BC and Halicarnassus, a siege lasting four months, starting in late December the same year. While Alexander was in Tarsus, he heard of Darius massing a great army in Babylon. If Darius were to reach the Gulf of Issus, he could use the support from the Persian fleet under Pharnabazus still operating in the Mediterranean Sea, thus easing his supply and possibly landing troops behind the enemy. Alexander kept his main army at Tarsus but sent Parmenion ahead to occupy the coast around Issus. In November, Alexander received reports that the great Persian army had advanced into Syria to a town named Sochoi. Alexander decided to mass his scattered army and advance south from Issus through the Pass of Jonah.
Darius knew that Parmenion held the Pass of Jonah and thus chose a northern route of advance. The Persians captured Issus without opposition and cut off the hands of all the sick and wounded that Alexander had left behind. Now Darius found out he had placed his army behind the Hellenic League and had cut their supply lines. He then advanced to the south and got no further than the river Pinarus before his scouts spotted Alexander marching north. Darius had to set up camp on this narrow coastal plain.
Motives: There is much debate as to the motives of Alexander and Darius preceding Issus. One modern perspective, based on Curtius, is that Darius was forced to move camp to terrain that favored Alexander because Alexander was fighting defensively due to a recommendation by his war council and Parmenion. Darius' large army could not be supported in the field during winter and his cities in Phoenicia were already in unrest at the arrival of Alexander. Darius was forced to move his large army to a small battlefield, greatly to the advantage of Alexander's smaller force.
Alexander was waiting for Darius to come south around the Amanus Mountain range because the pass Darius would have used, the Belen Pass, was much closer to Sochi and offered the quickest access to the area Alexander defended. Alexander was waiting 15 km (9.3 mi) to the west of the Belen Pass at Myriandus to spring a trap on Darius as he crossed through the Belen Pass or through the Pillar of Jonah if he moved north, where Darius' army would be disorganized and disjointed in the narrow crossing. Darius instead moved north from Sochi and around the mountains, through the Amanic Gate or another nearby pass, emerging behind Alexander's position and on his supply and communication lines. Thus Alexander was forced to march to Darius, who had caught him off guard in a large flanking maneuver. This gives the illusion that Darius was the one acting defensively, since Alexander was forced to march to him.
Combatants:
Persian army: Some ancient sources (Arrian and Plutarch), who based their accounts on earlier Greek sources, estimated 600,000 Persian soldiers in total, while Diodorus and Justin estimated 400,000, and Curtius Rufus estimated 250,000.
Modern historians find Arrian's count of 600,000 men highly unlikely. They argue that the logistics of fielding more than 100,000 soldiers in battle was extremely difficult at the time. Hans Delbrück gives an estimate as small as 25,000, although most (including Engels and Green) estimate the total size of Darius' army to be no larger than 100,000 at Issus, including 11,000 cavalry, 10,000 Persian Immortals, and 10,000 Greek mercenaries. Warry estimates 108,000 in total.
Hellenic army: The size of the Hellenic army may not have exceeded 40,000 men, including their other allies, led by Alexander. Alexander's army may have consisted of about 24,000 heavy infantry (9,000 phalangites, 3,000 hypaspists and 7,000 allied and 5,000 mercenary Greek hoplites), 13,000 light infantry (peltasts, archers, slingers) and 5,850 cavalry.
Battle: The Greeks advanced through the Pillar of Jonah. Alexander led his Companion cavalry on the right flank and he set his Thessalian allied cavalry on the left of the phalanx with Parmenion in command.
Darius formed his line with his heavy cavalry concentrated next to the coast on his right, followed by the Greek mercenary phalanx (historian A. M. Devine places them at a strength of 12,000, comparable to Alexander's Greek phalanx). Next to the Greek phalanx Darius spread his Persian infantry, the Cardaces, along the river and into the foothills, where they wrapped around to the other bank and threatened Alexander's right flank (the formation resembled gamma, Γ). Arrian gives an inflated figure of 20,000 to these troops. Darius positioned himself in the centre with the Greek mercenaries, his royal cavalry guard, and his best infantry. According to some historians, like P. Stratikis, he was trying to replicate the Hellenic battle formation of the Battle of the Granicus.
The Persian cavalry first charged Parmenion and the allied cavalry, crossing the river to open battle. Alexander's right wing became the crux of the battle, as at Gaugamela two years later, where Parmenion held the left wing long enough against superior Persian numbers for Alexander to make his calculated cavalry strike against Darius and break the Persian army. The infantry of the Greek left flank was commanded by the general Craterus, in a promotion from his position commanding a single brigade of pezhetairoi infantry at the Granicus.
Things did not go well for the Macedonians in the beginning. Their center phalanx, having to advance across a river and up a fortified bank, suffered severely against the Greek mercenaries waiting for them on the other side. Arrian noted that a hundred and twenty Macedonians "of note" (probably meaning officers) were slain here, and the Macedonians were forced to retreat across the river. In the left flank, the Thessalian struggled against the outnumbering mass of Persian heavy horse that faced them, delivering charges and retreating again to buy time.
Then the Hypaspists led by Alexander on foot delivered an assault on the Cardaces, and managed to punch a hole through the Persian line. The Agrianians too drove back a mass of Persian skirmishers menacing Alexander's far right, securing the flank of the Companions. Alexander then mounted a horse at the head of his Companions and led a direct assault against Darius and his bodyguards, causing them to flee from the battlefield. Alexander then saw his left flank and center in trouble, and allowing Darius to flee, he crashed into the rear of the Greek mercenaries. The Greek mercenaries broke up and started retreating from the battlefield as well. The Persians saw that their Great King had gone and that the battle was being lost, and they abandoned their positions and fled in full rout. The Hellenic cavalry pursued the fleeing Persians for as long as there was light. As with most ancient battles, significant carnage occurred after the battle as the pursuing Greeks slaughtered their crowded, disorganized foe. Arrian notes Ptolemy mentioning that while pursuing Darius, Alexander and his bodyguards came upon a ravine which they easily crossed on the piled up bodies of dead Persians. It was a decisive victory for Alexander.
Aftermath: The Battle of Issus was a decisive Hellenic victory and it marked the beginning of the end of Persian power. It was the first time the Persian army had been defeated with the King (Darius III at the time) present. After the battle, the Hellenes captured Darius' wife, Stateira I, his daughters, Stateira II and Drypetis, and his mother, Sisygambis, all of whom had accompanied Darius on his campaign. Alexander, who later married Stateira II, treated the captured women with great respect. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Issus | As with most ancient battles, significant carnage occurred after the battle as the pursuing Greeks slaughtered their crowded, disorganized foe. Arrian notes Ptolemy mentioning that while pursuing Darius, Alexander and his bodyguards came upon a ravine which they easily crossed on the piled up bodies of dead Persians. It was a decisive victory for Alexander.
Aftermath: The Battle of Issus was a decisive Hellenic victory and it marked the beginning of the end of Persian power. It was the first time the Persian army had been defeated with the King (Darius III at the time) present. After the battle, the Hellenes captured Darius' wife, Stateira I, his daughters, Stateira II and Drypetis, and his mother, Sisygambis, all of whom had accompanied Darius on his campaign. Alexander, who later married Stateira II, treated the captured women with great respect.
Later, the Spartan king Agis III recruited the Greek mercenary survivors of the Battle of Issus who had served in the Persian army, a force of 8,000 veterans, and used them in his fight against the Macedonians. In the summer of 331 BC, Agis defeated Coragus, the Macedonian general in command of the Peloponnese and the garrison of Corinth, but was finally defeated at the Battle of Megalopolis.
Depictions of the battle: German Renaissance painter and printmaker Albrecht Altdorfer (c. 1480–1538): The Battle of Alexander at Issus (1529).
The Battle of Issus (c. 1599–1600) by Jan Brueghel the Elder (1568–1625) hangs in the Louvre.
Notes:
References:
Sources:
Ancient: Diodorus Siculus (90–30 BC). Bibliotheca Historica. (Reference 6)
Quintus Curtius Rufus (AD 60–70). Historiae Alexandri Magni.
Plutarch (AD 75). The Life of Alexander the Great, Parallel Lives.
Arrian (AD 86–146). Anabasis Alexandri.
Junianus Justinus (3rd century). Historiarum Philippicarum libri XLIV.
Modern: Delbrück, Hans (1920). History of the Art of War. University of Nebraska Press. Reprint edition, 1990. Translated by Walter, J. Renfroe. 4 Volumes.
Engels, Donald W. (1978). Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London.
Fuller, John F. C. (1960). The Generalship of Alexander the Great. New Jersey: Da Capo Press.
Green, Peter (1974). Alexander of Macedon: A Historical Biography.
Moerbeek, Martijn (1997). The battle of Issus, 333 BC. Universiteit Twente.
Rogers, Guy (2004). Alexander: The Ambiguity of Greatness. New York: Random House.
Warry, J. (1998), Warfare in the Classical World. ISBN 1-84065-004-4.
Welman, Nick. Army. Fontys University.
External links:
Livius.org: Issus (333 BCE) |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Leuthen | Background: Although the Seven Years' War was a global conflict, it acquired a specific intensity in the European theater as a result of the competition between Frederick II of Prussia, known as Frederick the Great, and Maria Theresa of Austria. Their rivalry dated from 1740, when upon Maria Theresa's ascension, Frederick had attacked and annexed the prosperous province of Silesia. The 1748 Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which concluded War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) between Prussia and Maria Theresa's allies, awarded Silesia to Prussia. Maria Theresa had signed the treaty to gain time to rebuild her military forces and forge new alliances and intended to regain her ascendancy in the Holy Roman Empire and to reacquire Silesia. Similarly, France sought to break the British dominance of the Atlantic trade.
In 1754, escalating tensions between Britain and France in North America offered the Empress the opportunity to regain her lost territories and to limit Prussia's ever-growing power. France and Austria put aside their old rivalry to form a coalition of their own; Maria Theresa agreed that one of her daughters, Maria Antonia, would marry the Dauphin of France, and her chief ministers negotiated a military and political pact advantageous to both parties. That drove Britain to align herself with George II's nephew, Frederick II. Their alliance also involved the Electorate of Hanover, which was held in personal union by George, along with George's and Frederick's relatives, who ruled the Principality of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel and the Landgraviate of Hesse-Kassel. That series of political manoeuvers became known as the Diplomatic Revolution.
When war broke out in 1756, Frederick overran Saxony and campaigned in Bohemia, where he defeated the Austrians on 6 May 1757 at the Battle of Prague. Learning that the French forces had invaded his ally's territory of Hanover, Frederick moved west. On 5 November 1757, an infantry regiment of about 1,000 men and 1,500 of his cavalry defeated the combined French and Austrian force of 30,000 at the Battle of Rossbach in a 90-minute battle. In his absence, however, the Austrians had managed to retake Silesia: the Empress's brother-in-law, Prince Charles, took the city of Schweidnitz and moved on Breslau in lower Silesia.
Heading back to Silesia, Frederick learned of the fall of Breslau in late November. He and his 22,000 men covered 274 km (170 mi) in 12 days and, at Liegnitz, joined up with the Prussian troops who had survived the fighting at Breslau. The augmented army of about 33,000 troops, with approximately 167 cannons, arrived near Leuthen to find 66,000 Austrians in possession.
Terrain and troop strengths: Most of Lower Silesia is a rolling plain of fertile land. It includes black and alluvial soils near Breslau (Wrocław) and in river valleys, mixed with more sandy soils. Between the Oder river and the foot of the Sudeten Mountains, it has mild climate, fertile soils and extensive water network, which made it a coveted agricultural resource.
In the area northwest of Breslau, the absence of steep hills makes the observation of an approaching enemy easy, and the relative flatness limited hiding manoeuvers. The presence of alluvial soil guaranteed relatively-soft ground, less than what Frederick would face at Kunersdorf in 1758 but enough to provide the occasional natural bogs to bar the passage of troops in some locations or to muffle the sound of marching and horses' hooves. The area around Leuthen included several hamlets and villages: principally, Nypern, about 5.6 km (3 mi) north; Frobelwitz, also to the north, about halfway between Leuthen and Nypern; Gohlau, 3 km (2 mi) to the southeast; and Lissa (now a district of Wrocław), 6.1 km (4 mi) to the east. A road connected the villages of Borne, Leuthen, and Lissa with Breslau, across the Oder River and its tributaries.
Habsburgs: Aware of Frederick's approach, Charles and his second-in-command, Count Leopold Joseph von Daun, positioned the army facing west on a 8 km (5 mi) front in country of undulating plains. The Prince deployed his troops in two lines, the right wing at his northernmost point, anchored at Nypern. Leuthen served as the Austrian centre. Charles established his command post there by using a church tower as his observation post and stationing seven battalions in the village itself. The majority of Charles' forces stood on his right wing. A small advanced post stood at Borne, but with Frederick's arrival in force, it withdrew immediately to the east. The Austrian position intersected at right angles with the principal road between Borne and Breslau and passed through Frobelwitz and Lissa. He secured Nypern with eight grenadier companies and placed his cavalry at Guckerwitz (now Kokorzyce, part of the village Krępice). The Austrian line extended as far south as Sagschütz (now Zakrzyce), where his cavalry stood at right angles to the infantry and created a line between Sagschütz and Gohlau. The positions were secured with additional grenadiers and pickets. Troops filled villages and woods, and hastily made abatis and redoubts. Pickets guarded all communication points as well as road and path crossings. The left wing was his shortest, with cavalry placed at the far end, near a stream by the village of Gohlau. Charles had an amalgamated force of Habsburg troops, including several contingents from the Military Frontier and imperial troops from the Duchies of Württemberg and Bavaria.
Prussia: Frederick had learned the countryside by heart on previous maneuvers. On 4 December 1757, from his position on the Schönberg, a knoll about 1.5 km (1 mi) west of Borne, he surveyed the familiar landscape with his generals, and a plan emerged. In front of him, a cluster of low hills dotted the landscape along an axis approximately parallel to the Austrian line. He knew the names of the hills: Schleierberg, Sophienberg, Wachberg and Butterberg. They were hardly hills, more like hillocks, but were high enough to provide a screen for his troops. Facing an army twice his size, he had to rely on his own army's tactical training and to use the terrain to maneuver his men into an optimal position. Frederick had one of the finest armies in Europe: any company of his troops fired at least four volleys a minute, and some of them could fire a phenomenal five, which was twice the rate of fire of most other European armies. Only the Russians could come close to achieving that rate. The Prussians could maneuver better than any of the armies in Europe and could march faster, and they had just come from a resounding success at Rossbach. His artillery could quickly deploy and redeploy to support his infantry. His cavalry, superbly trained, could maneuver and charge with horses flank to flank and riders knee to knee and move at a full gallop.
Battle:
Prussian feint: The foggy weather made it difficult to see positions from either side, but Frederick and his commanders used the fog to their advantage. Leaving a cavalry unit and a cluster of infantry in front of the northernmost end of the Austrian line (the Austrian right), Frederick deployed the remainder, the bulk of his forces toward Leuthen itself. Charles saw them start their redeployment and may have interpreted the maneuver as withdrawal at least for a while.
At 4:00 a.m. on Sunday, Frederick moved toward the Austrian right wing in four columns, with infantry in the inner two and cavalry in the outer two. Using the knolls to block the Austrians' view of his movements, Frederick shifted the two columns of infantry and one of cavalry obliquely to his own right. The leftmost column of cavalry remained behind to convince the Austrians that it was still approaching directly at the latter end of the Austrian line, near Frobelwitz. The visible distraction screened Frederick's intent of executing an oblique maneuver like the one that he had used successfully only weeks earlier at the Battle of Rossbach. Prince Charles, watching from his vantage point, moved his entire reserve to his right flank. That not only weakened the left flank but also stretched his front from Leuthen past Frobelwitz and on to Nypern and extended it well beyond its original 4 km (2 mi).
While a single column of cavalry mesmerised Charles at his rightmost flank, the rest of the Prussians continued undetected, behind those hills across the Austrian front and overreached the Austrian left wing.
Oblique maneuver: The Prussian infantry marched southward and remained behind a line of low hills, out of the Austrians' sight. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Leuthen | The leftmost column of cavalry remained behind to convince the Austrians that it was still approaching directly at the latter end of the Austrian line, near Frobelwitz. The visible distraction screened Frederick's intent of executing an oblique maneuver like the one that he had used successfully only weeks earlier at the Battle of Rossbach. Prince Charles, watching from his vantage point, moved his entire reserve to his right flank. That not only weakened the left flank but also stretched his front from Leuthen past Frobelwitz and on to Nypern and extended it well beyond its original 4 km (2 mi).
While a single column of cavalry mesmerised Charles at his rightmost flank, the rest of the Prussians continued undetected, behind those hills across the Austrian front and overreached the Austrian left wing.
Oblique maneuver: The Prussian infantry marched southward and remained behind a line of low hills, out of the Austrians' sight. When the heads of both superbly-drilled Prussian columns, the distances between the marching platoons remaining exactly the width of each platoon's front, had passed the Austrian left flank, the columns veered left toward the enemy and continued their march until they had passed beyond the left Austrian flank. On command, the platoons of the columns then faced left at Lobetinz, and the whole Prussian army stood in line of battle, two to three men deep, at a nearly-right angle to the weakest point of the Austrian left. Similarly, Hans Joachim von Zieten's cavalry had traversed the entire Austrian front and positioned itself at a 45-degree angle to the Austrian flank.
The Prussian artillery perched on the reverse slopes of the Butterberg and was hidden from the Austrians' view while it prepared to move to the crest to time their bombardment with the infantry's attack. The bulk of the repositioned Prussian army now faced the smallest component of the Austrian line. The only column of Prussian cavalry and the small reserve of infantry remaining at the Austrian far right continued to demonstrate in front of the Austrians and even moved further north, as if an attack would occur there.
Attack: The Austrians were astonished at the Prussian appearance on their left flank, but the objective was soon clear. The Prussian infantry, now arrayed in the conventional two lines of battle, advanced on the weakest part of the Austrian line with the intention of rolling up the flank. The Austrian colonels on the scene did their best by turning their own lines 90 degrees and trying to take advantage of a shallow ditch, which faced the Prussian line. Franz Leopold von Nádasdy, who commanded the flank, asked Charles for support, a request that was ignored. Even in the late morning, with most of the Prussian army on his left flank, he still believed that any attack would come at the northern flank. Most of the men in the first Austrian line were Württembergers, Protestant troops whose willingness to fight the Lutheran Prussians had been called into question by the Austrian command. The Württembergers held out and maintained steady musket fire until the mass of Prussians emerged through the haze of gunpowder. They then ran for their lives, sweeping the Bavarians deployed by Nádasdy to support his flank with them.
The first wave of Prussian infantry, supported by Frederick's artillery, which now pounded away from the crest of one of the hillocks, pushed steadily toward Leuthen. Commanded by Moritz of Anhalt-Dessau, the seasoned infantry and grenadiers went into battle with 60 rounds per man, according to Prussian regulation. When they overwhelmed the first Austrian line, they had already run out of ammunition. Nádasdy sent his own small cavalry against the Prussian grenadier column and its infantry support but to no avail. Nádasdy withdrew his men in chaos with his troops disarrayed. Prince Charles and Daun finally realised they had been tricked and rushed troops from the right to the left, but they had extended the front, which was originally about 4 km (2 mi) long, to almost 10 km (6 mi), when they had repositioned forces earlier that day to meet Frederick's diversion. As the Austrians withdrew, the Prussian artillery raked them with enfilade fire.
The Prussian infantry and grenadiers reached Leuthen in 40 minutes and pushed the Austrian troops into the village. Prussian grenadiers breached the wall first and stormed the church, where many of the defenders were killed. Hand-to-hand fighting raged throughout the village. Charles-Joseph Lamoral, eventually Prince de Ligne, was then a captain in an Austrian regiment of foot:
Our Lieutenant-Colonel fell[,] killed almost at the first; beyond this we lost our Major, and indeed all the Officers but three.... We had crossed two successive ditches, which lay in an orchard to the left of the first houses in Leuthen; and were beginning to form in front of the village. But there was no standing of it. Besides a general cannonade such as can hardly be imagined, there was a rain of case-shot upon this Battalion, of which I, as there was no Colonel left, had to take command.
Leuthen was not a big village, troops were so closely packed they stood 30 to 100 ranks deep and the killing was terrible. Lamoral commented later that his battalion, usually some 1,000 strong, as well as some Hungarians and some grenadiers who had been separated from their own companies, gave him fewer than 200 men. He drew them back to the height at the edge of the village, where there was a windmill around which they could take shelter. Eventually, the Prussian Life Guards, commanded by Captain Wichard Joachim Heinrich von Möllendorf broke through the village cemetery and forced them to abandon their post.
The Austrians briefly took the advantage when they moved a battery from the ridge north of the village to cover their infantry, and the fire from the battery allowed the infantry to deploy at right angles to their original front. Frederick responded by ordering the last of his reserved left wing to advance, but the Austrian battery drove it back. Finally, Frederick's heavy cannons on the Butterberg, a small knoll to the west of town, laid down a barrage. Some participants said that barrage, more than the Prussian infantry, won the battle.
The assault on the wall briefly exposed General Wolf Frederick von Retzow's infantry line. More than two hours had elapsed since the Prince had ordered his cavalry back to Leuthen, but it arrived opportunely. Commanded by Joseph Count Lucchesi d’ Averna the cavalry hurried to take them in the flank; a successful cavalry charge at that critical moment could have turned the tide of battle. Unfortunately for the Austrians, 40 squadrons of Zieten's cavalry awaited them at Radaxdorf and charged their flank, and another 30 squadrons commanded by Georg Wilhelm von Driesen charged their front. The Bayreuth Dragoons hit the other flank; and the Puttkamer Hussars charged the rear. Lucchessi was killed by being decapitated by a cannonball, and his troopers were scattered. The cavalry mêlée soon swirled into the Austrian infantry line behind Leuthen, which caused more confusion. Overrun by the Prussian horse, the Austrian infantry broke. The infantry and then the cavalry retreated toward Breslau, where they crossed the Schweidnitzer Weistritz river, then called the "Black Water".
Maps: Solid red lines indicate Habsburg positions. Solid blue lines indicate Prussian positions. Dotted lines show movement. Rectangles with a diagonal line indicate cavalry.
The Battle in Four Maps
Aftermath: As the smoke cleared, the Prussian infantry reformed its lines and prepared to pursue the fleeing Austrians. Snow began to fall, and Frederick halted the pursuit. A few soldiers, perhaps only one of them, started to sing the well-known chorale Nun danket alle Gott (Now Thank We All Our God). Eventually the entire army may have joined in the song, but that story is likely apocryphal.
Frederick pushed toward Lissa. Refugees from the battle had filled the town, and he found the courtyard of the local castle crowded with startled Austrian officers. Reportedly, after the King dismounted, he addressed them politely, "Good evening, Gentlemen, I dare say you did not expect me here. Can one get a night's lodging along with you?"
After a day of rest, on 7 December, Frederick sent half his cavalry with Zieten, chasing Charles's retreating army, now heading toward Königgrätz by Schweidnitz and captured another 2,000 men and their baggage. With the rest of his army, Frederick marched on Breslau. By chasing Charles's army into Bohemia, the Prussians guaranteed the isolation of the Allied garrison holding Breslau. The Austrian general left in command of the city, Lieutenant Field Marshal Salman Sprecher von Bernegg, had a combined force of French and Austrian of 17,000 men. Breslau was a well-fortified city of walls and moats. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Leuthen | Reportedly, after the King dismounted, he addressed them politely, "Good evening, Gentlemen, I dare say you did not expect me here. Can one get a night's lodging along with you?"
After a day of rest, on 7 December, Frederick sent half his cavalry with Zieten, chasing Charles's retreating army, now heading toward Königgrätz by Schweidnitz and captured another 2,000 men and their baggage. With the rest of his army, Frederick marched on Breslau. By chasing Charles's army into Bohemia, the Prussians guaranteed the isolation of the Allied garrison holding Breslau. The Austrian general left in command of the city, Lieutenant Field Marshal Salman Sprecher von Bernegg, had a combined force of French and Austrian of 17,000 men. Breslau was a well-fortified city of walls and moats. The Austrians were determined to hold Breslau not only because losing it would cost them control of Silesia and considerable diminution of prestige but also because of the immense quantities of stores that the city held. The Austrian commander, recognizing his grim plight, posted placards on gallows and poles throughout the city and warned that anyone who spoke of surrender would be hanged immediately. On 7 December, Frederick laid siege to the city, and the future of Austrian control of Breslau and the region looked grim. Indeed, Breslau surrendered on 19–20 December.
Casualties: Out of an army of approximately 66,000 men, the Austrians lost 22,000, including 3,000 dead, 7,000 wounded and an astonishing 12,000 captured. Of the dead and wounded, the Austrian demographer and historian Gaston Bodart estimated that almost 5% were officers. He also placed such other losses as capture and desertion at 17,000, almost 26%. Charles lost entire regiments, which scattered in the first attacks or overrun at the end; they simply dissolved in the waves of Prussian blue coats. The Prussians also captured 51 standards and 116 of the 250 Austrian cannons. Of the Prussian army of 36,000, Frederick lost 6,344, including 1,141 dead, 5,118 wounded and 85 captured. He lost none of his artillery.
Despite the victory, its cost was high: Frederick lost one fifth of the men he had taken into battle, including two of his major generals.
The battle presented a severe blow to Austrian morale. The army had been soundly beaten by another half its size with fewer guns and tired after a long march over twelve days. Charles and his second-in-command, Count Leopold Joseph von Daun, sank "in the depths of despondency", and the prince could not fathom what had happened. Charles had a mixed-to-poor record against Frederick in past encounters, but he had never fared so badly as at Leuthen. After the crushing defeat, Maria Theresa replaced him with Daun. Charles retired from military service and later served as the governor of the Habsburg Netherlands.
The Austrians also learned some lessons, such as not to fight the Prussians in open fields and to choose their own ground for battle. They later used those lessons.
Assessments: Frederick had benefited from an obliging enemy. Firstly, Charles saw what he wanted to see regarding the principal attack, instead of using his efficient light cavalry to scout the Prussian movements. Frederick commented later that a lone patrol could have uncovered his plan. The cavalry that Frederick had left demonstrating in front of the northernmost position of the Austrian line was simply a diversion to hide his real movements. Secondly, the Austrians obliged him by their failure to post pickets on their unprotected flank south of Leuthen. Nádasdy's omission of outposts on his open flank south of Leuthen was a surprising oversight for an officer with his long years of experience against the Prussians. He should have considered the possibility of an attack from an unexpected place because that was Frederick's modus operandi. Thirdly, even when confronted with the attack on his left, the diversion on the right flank near Frobelwitz continued to mesmerize Charles. When he ordered cavalry to move from the north to support the faltering troops in and around Leuthen in the south, they had too far to travel in too little time.
The battle was Frederick's greatest victory so far, perhaps the greatest use of tactics in his career, and showed the superiority of Prussian infantry. In one day, Frederick had regained every advantage the Austrians had won earlier that year at Breslau and Schweidnitz and ended the Austrian attempt to reclaim Silesia. The battle became an exemplar on the use of 18th-century linear tactics. Frederick had learned valuable lessons at Battles of Prague and Kolin in which his infantry had run out of ammunition and lost the initiative. At Leuthen, ammunition wagons moved with the advancing lines of grenadiers and infantry battalions, which allowed the troops to be resupplied quickly without losing momentum. Although some infantrymen fired as many as 180 rounds, the advance never halted for lack of ammunition. The Prussian cavalry successfully protected the infantry's flanks, most notably during Nádasdy's assault on the Prussian grenadiers at Leuthen's church. The cavalry also provided tactically important charges, disrupting Austrian attempts to reform, which eventually turned the defeat into a rout. Frederick's horse artillery, which was sometimes called the flying artillery for its ability to move rapidly, maintained its fire and kept pace with the army and deployed and redeployed its guns as needed. In addition to the physical damage they wrought, the distinctive sound of the horse artillery's 12-pounder cannon, sometimes called Brummers, heightened Prussian morale and reduced that of the Austrians.
The victory changed the attitude of Frederick's enemies. Before the battle, he was often referred to in an unflattering, even demeaning, manner, but after Leuthen, he was widely called the King of Prussia in both polite and popular conversation. The victories at Leuthen and Rossbach earned Frederick respect and fear, which even his bitter enemies held for the rest of the war and the subsequent peace. Both battles probably saved Prussia from conquest by Austria. Half-a-century later, Napoleon called Leuthen "a masterpiece of movements, maneuvers and resolution".
Memorials: A memorial erected in 1854 honoured the Prussian army at Leuthen. Frederick's great-great nephew, King Frederick William IV, ordered a victory column with a gilded goddess of victory at Heidau 5 km (3 mi) north-west of Leuthen. The Berlin architect Friedrich August Stüler provided the design for the monument, and Christian Daniel Rauch created the goddess of victory. The sculptor Heinrich Menzel from Neisse constructed the column in his workshop, in local white-gray stone. Moritz Geiss executed the plinth and the goddess in zinc casting and gilded the statue Victoria for a better effect. Befitting its importance in the establishment of the Prussian state and the mythos of Frederick the Great, the monument reached 20 meters (66 ft). During or after the Second World War, soldiers or partisans dynamited the monument, and only ruins of its pedestal remain, renovated in 2011.
Sources:
Notes:
Footnotes:
Bibliography:
Asprey, Robert. Frederick the Great: A Magnificent Enigma, Ticknor & Fields, 1986, ISBN 978-0-89919-352-6
Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2007, ISBN 978-0-3074-2539-3
Black, Jeremy. "Essay and Reflection: On the 'Old System' and the Diplomatic Revolution' of the Eighteenth Century", International History Review (1990) 12:2 pp. 301–323.
Bodart, Gaston. Losses of Life in Modern Wars, Clarendon Press, 1916, OCLC 875334380
Blanning, Tim. Frederick the Great, Random House, 2016, ISBN 978-1-4000-6812-8
Carlyle, Thomas. History of Frederick Second, Harper, 1901. OCLC 832817892
Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Leuthen" . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 16 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 504.
Citino, Robert M., The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years War to the Third Reich. University Press of Kansas. Lawrence, KS, 2005, ISBN 978-0-7006-1410-3
Clodfelter, M. (2017). Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015 (4th ed.). Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland. ISBN 978-0-7864-7470-7. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Leuthen | History of Frederick Second, Harper, 1901. OCLC 832817892
Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Leuthen" . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 16 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 504.
Citino, Robert M., The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years War to the Third Reich. University Press of Kansas. Lawrence, KS, 2005, ISBN 978-0-7006-1410-3
Clodfelter, M. (2017). Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015 (4th ed.). Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland. ISBN 978-0-7864-7470-7.
David, Saul. War: The Definitive Visual History, Penguin, 2009. ISBN 978-0-7566-6817-4
Duffy, Christopher, The Army of Maria Theresa, Terence Wise, 1990, ISBN 978-0-7153-7387-3
Duffy, Christopher, The Army of Frederick the Great, Emperor Press, 1996, ISBN 978-1-883476-02-1
Duffy, Christopher, Prussia's Glory: Rossbach and Leuthen 1757, Emperor's Press, 2003. ISBN 978-1-883476-29-8
Fuller, J.F.C., A Military History of the Western World, Da Capo Press, 1987, ISBN 978-0-306-80305-5
Hofer, Achim. "Joseph Goldes (1802–1886) Fest-Reveille (1858) über den Choral 'Nun danket alle Gott' für Militärmusik" in Peter Moormann, Albrecht Riethmüller, Rebecca Wolf eds., Paradestück Militärmusik: Beiträge zum Wandel staatlicher Repräsentation durch Musik (in German), Transcript Verlag (2012), pp. 217–238. ISBN 978-3-8376-1655-2
Horn, D.B. "The Diplomatic Revolution" in J.O. Lindsay, ed., The New Cambridge Modern History vol. 7, The Old Regime: 1713–63 (1957), pp. 449–464. ISBN 978-0-521-04545-2
Keeney, L. Douglas. The Pointblank Directive: Three Generals and the Untold Story of the Daring Plan that Saved D-Day, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012, ISBN 978-1-7820-0895-8
König, Anton Balthasar. Lorenz Ernst von Münchow, Biographisches Lexikon aller Helden und Militairpersonen, welche sich in Preußischen Diensten berühmt gemacht haben. (in German) Band 3. Arnold Wever, Berlin 1790, S. 75.
Kroener, Bernhard R."'Nun danket alle Gott.' der Choral von Leuthen und Friedrich der Große als protestantischer Held; die Produktion politischer Mythen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert" in Hartmut Lehmann & Gerd Krumeich eds. "Gott mit uns": Religion, Nation und Gewalt im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert (in German), Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (2000), pp. 105–134, ISBN 978-3525354780.
Kosmala, Gerard. Geographical Characteristics of Silesia, Academy of Physical Education in Katowice, 2015
Latimer, Jon, Deception in War, London: John Murray, 2001. ISBN 978-0-7195-5605-0
Leipziger Illustrirte Zeitung. (in German) No. 593. 11 November 1854.
Moorhouse, Roger. "The Historian at Large: The Forgotten Battlefield at Leuthen". 5 December 2014 version. Accessed 7 February 2017.
Neue genealogisch-historische Nachrichten von den vornehmsten Begebenheiten, welche sich an den europäischen Höfen zugetragen (in German), vol. 54, Heinsius, 1759, pp. 608–609
The New York Times. "Silesia; Geography". 23 December 1981.
O'Brien, Cormac, Outnumbered: Incredible Stories of History's Most Surprising Battlefield Upsets, Fair Winds Press, 2010, ISBN 978-1-61673-843-3
Overy, Richard. A History of War in 100 Battles, Oxford University Press, 2014, ISBN 978-0-19-939071-7
Redman, Herbert J. Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War, 1756–1763, McFarland, 2014, ISBN 978-0-7864-7669-5
Showalter, Dennis E. (2007). The Early Modern World: Soldiers' Lives. Greenwood Publishing. ISBN 978-0-313-33312-5.
Sprecher, Daniel. "Sprecher", Neue Deutsche Biographie (in German) 24 (2010), S. 745–746.
Sprecher, Salomon, von Bernegg. Diarium der Belagerung von Breslau; und Capitulations-Puncte von der Übergabe an Se. Königl. Majestät in Prüssen: Nebst einem Verzeichniß mit Nahmen, derer Generals, Staabs-Officiers und andern Officiers, dann vom Feldwebel an summariter derer Kayserl. Königl. Truppen, so den 21ten December 1757. (in German) Berlin, 1758, OCLC 634835920
Tucker, Spencer. Battles that Changed History: An Encyclopedia of World Conflict. ABC-CLIO, 2010, ISBN 978-1-59884-429-0
Wilson, Peter H. The Heart of Europe: A History of the Holy Roman Empire. Penguin Publishing, 2016, ISBN 978-0-6740-5809-5 |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Maling | Sources: Records of the Grand Historian Sima Qian
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Rocroi | Context: Since 1618, the Thirty Years' War had raged in Germany, with the Catholic Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs fighting the Protestant states. In 1635, fearing a peace too favorable to the House of Habsburg after a string of Protestant defeats, France decided to intervene directly and declared war on the Habsburgs and Spain, despite France being a Catholic power that had suppressed its own Protestant rebellions. An initial invasion of the Spanish Netherlands ended in failure, and the French retreated to their borders.
December 1642 brought the death of Cardinal Richelieu, the chief minister to Louis XIII of France, followed by the King's own death on 14 May 1643, when his four-year-old son Louis XIV inherited the throne. Despite receiving overtures of peace amid the precarious domestic situation, the new French chief minister, Mazarin, did not wish to end the war and exerted French military pressure on Franche-Comté, Catalonia, and the Spanish Netherlands.
The Battle of Honnecourt in May 1642 had opened the way towards Paris, and the renowned Spanish Army of Flanders advanced through the Ardennes into northern France with 27,000 men in the hope of relieving pressure on Catalonia and in Franche-Comté.
Prelude: En route, the Spanish troops, under Francisco de Melo, laid siege to the fortified town of Rocroi. The Duc d'Enghien, the commander of a French army in Amiens, was appointed to stop the Spanish incursion. He was 21 but had already proven himself a bold and cunning commander, and he had the support of worthy subordinates, such as Marshal Jean de Gassion. French forces in the area numbered 23,000. Enghien advanced to meet de Melo's numerically superior army along the Meuse River. On 17 May, he learned the king had died but kept the news secret from his army.
Word reached Enghien that 6,000 Spanish reinforcements were on their way to Rocroi, and he hurried there on 18 May. He decided on an attack before de Melo's forces could be reinforced against the advice of his older subordinate commanders. He ordered his army forward through the only available approach, a defile between woods and marshes that the Spanish had failed to block. That afternoon, the French took up position on a ridge overlooking Rocroi.
Learning of the French advance, de Melo decided to engage the oncoming forces, rather than invest in the siege, as he deemed his army stronger. Accordingly, the Spanish army formed up between the French and Rocroi, and both sides prepared for battle the next day. The Spanish expected a decisive victory, which would compel the French to negotiate peace.
The French army was arranged in two lines of infantry in the center, squadrons of cavalry on each wing, and a thin line of artillery at the front. The Spanish army was similarly positioned but with the center infantry in their traditional "tercio" squares, with some 8,000 highly trained Spanish in front and mercenary infantry behind them. The two armies exchanged fire in the afternoon of 18 May, but the full battle did not occur until the following day.
Battle: The battle began early in the morning of 19 May on open farmland in front of Rocroi with a French cavalry attack on the Spanish left. The French horsemen on the right under Jean de Gassion pushed back the Spanish cavalry opposite, and Enghien followed up by swiftly charging the exposed Spanish left flank. The Spanish horsemen were routed, and Enghien moved against the elite Spanish infantrymen, which had engaged their French counterparts and were besting them. At the same time, the French cavalry on the left, against Enghien's orders, attacked the Spanish right and were repulsed. The Spanish mounted a counter-attack, initially very successful, but their advance was eventually halted by French reserves. At this point, the French left and center were in distress.
The battle was still inconclusive, with both armies succeeding on their right but bloodied on their left.
Enghien's illumination: Enghien, aware that his left and center were bending under pressure, decided not to pull them back, but to exploit his momentum on the right flank. He ordered a cavalry encirclement, which was achieved via a sweeping strike and got behind the Spanish lines. He then smashed through the back of the Spanish infantry in the center and went on to crash into the rear of the Spanish right-flank cavalry that had engaged his reserves. The move was a complete success, and when the Spanish cavalry scattered, it left the infantry isolated, prompting the Spanish artillery crew to flee the battlefield. Regarded as the finest in Europe for over a century, the Spanish infantry, now enveloped on all sides, held its formations and repulsed two French cavalry attacks. Enghien massed his artillery alongside the captured Spanish guns, and relentlessly hammered the Spanish squares. The Germans and Walloons deserted, overwhelmed and broken, but the veteran Spanish Tercios remained on the field with their commander.
Concluding battle: Despite heavy artillery fire and the death of their commander de Fontaines, the Spanish absorbed additional French cavalry attacks without breaking formation. Impressed with their gallantry in combat, Enghien offered surrender terms similar to those obtained by a besieged garrison in a fortress, and the Spanish accepted. When Enghien personally rode forward to take their surrender, however, some of the Spanish apparently believed that this was the beginning of a French cavalry charge and opened fire on him. Angered by this seeming treachery, the French attacked again, this time without quarter and with devastating result. The Spanish army was virtually destroyed. Some Spanish sources state that only three of the five Spanish infantry battalions were destroyed by the French, while the remaining two were allowed to leave the field with deployed flags and weapons.
French losses were about 4,000. The Spanish commander Melo reported his losses at 6,000 casualties and 4,000 captured in his report to Madrid two days after the battle. The estimates for the Spanish army's dead range from 4,000 to 8,000. Of the 7,000 Spanish infantry, only 390 officers and 1,386 enlisted men were able to escape back to the Spanish Netherlands. Guthrie lists 3,400 killed and 2,000 captured for the five Spanish infantry battalions alone, while 1,600 escaped. Most of the casualties were suffered by the Spanish infantry, while the cavalry and artillerymen were able to withdraw, albeit with the loss of all the cannons.
Aftermath and significance: The French lifted the Siege of Rocroi but were not strong enough to move the fight into Spanish Flanders. The Spanish regrouped rapidly and stabilized their positions. The year 1643 ended in a stalemate, which was enough of a success for France.
However, the battle was of great symbolic importance because of the high reputation of the Army of Flanders. Melo in his report to the King called it "the most considerable defeat there has ever been in these provinces".
The proof of strength was important for France. At home, it was seen as a good omen for the new king's reign, and it secured the power of Anne of Austria as queen regent for the four-year-old Louis XIV, and of the newly appointed Prime Minister Mazarin. Both Richelieu and Louis XIII had distrusted Anne (a sister of Philip IV of Spain), but as regent, she confirmed Mazarin, Richelieu's protégé and political heir, and the French war policy maintained its direction.
The battle established the reputation of the 21-year-old Enghien, whose numerous victories would win him the name "the Great Condé".
Abroad, it showed that France remained strong despite its four-year-old king. The following decades would see hegemony in Europe move slowly from Habsburg Spain to Bourbon France, as the absolute monarchy in France overpowered the Spanish imperial power. Mazarin had maneuvered to have space to cope with the Fronde and to turn the tide slowly against the Spanish in France and in the Low Countries. Turning to alliance with England, he defeated the Spanish at the Battle of the Dunes and took Dunkirk in 1658, leading to the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659. Although Spain looked to be all-powerful as late as 1652, the peace settlement reflected the demise of Spain's mastery of Europe in the late 1650s.
In media: A 2006 Spanish movie, Alatriste, directed by Agustín Díaz Yanes, portrays this battle in its final scene. The soundtrack features in the scene a funeral march, La Madrugá, composed by Colonel Abel Moreno for the Holy Week of Seville, played by the band of the Infantry Regiment "Soria" No. 9, the successor of the "bloody Tercio", which participated in the battle, the oldest unit in the Spanish Army.
Museum: The elderly Spanish infantry general Paul-Bernard de Fontaines, from the Spanish Netherlands and known to the Spanish as de Fuentes, suffered from gout and was carried into battle and killed. His sedan chair was taken as a trophy by the French and may be seen in the museum of Les Invalides in Paris. Enghien is reported to have said, "Had I not won the day, I wish I had died like him".
References:
Citations:
=== Bibliography === |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Trafalgar | Background: In 1805, the First French Empire, under Napoleon Bonaparte, was the dominant military land power on the European continent, while the British Royal Navy controlled the seas. During the course of the war, the British imposed a naval blockade on France, which affected trade and kept the French from fully mobilising their naval resources. Despite several successful evasions of the blockade by the French navy, it failed to inflict a major defeat upon the British, who were able to attack French interests at home and abroad with relative ease.
When the Third Coalition declared war on France, after the short-lived Peace of Amiens, Napoleon renewed his determination to invade Britain. To allow his invasion flotilla to reach England, he needed to wrest control of the English Channel from the Royal Navy.
The main French fleets were at Brest in Brittany and at Toulon on the Mediterranean coast. Other ports on the French Atlantic coast harboured smaller squadrons. France and Spain were allied, so the Spanish fleet based in Cádiz and Ferrol was also available.
The British possessed an experienced and well-trained corps of naval officers. By contrast, some of the best officers in the French navy had been executed or had left the service during the early part of the French Revolution.
Vice-Admiral Pierre-Charles Villeneuve had taken command of the French Mediterranean fleet following the death of Latouche Treville. There had been more competent officers, but they had either been employed elsewhere or had fallen from Napoleon's favour. Villeneuve had shown a distinct reluctance for facing Nelson and the Royal Navy after the French defeat at the Battle of the Nile in 1798.
Napoleon's naval plan in 1805 was for the French and Spanish fleets in the Mediterranean and Cádiz to break through the blockade and join forces in the Caribbean. They would then return, assist the fleet in Brest to emerge from the blockade, and together clear the English Channel of Royal Navy ships, ensuring a safe passage for the invasion barges.
The admirals of the campaign
Pursuit of Villeneuve: Early in 1805, Vice Admiral Lord Nelson commanded the British fleet blockading the Mediterranean port of Toulon. Unlike William Cornwallis, who maintained a close blockade off Brest with the Channel Fleet, Nelson adopted a loose blockade in hope of luring the French out to battle, saying, "to be able to get at the enemy you must let them come out to you, if you cannot get at them." However, Villeneuve's fleet successfully evaded Nelson's when the British were blown off station by storms. Nelson commenced a search of the Mediterranean, supposing that the French intended to make for Egypt, but Villeneuve instead took his fleet through the Strait of Gibraltar, rendezvoused with the Spanish fleet in Cádiz, and sailed as planned for the Caribbean. Once Nelson realised that the French were crossing the Atlantic, he set off in pursuit. He missed them by just days in the West Indies as a result of false information.
Cádiz: Having lured the British to the West Indies, Villeneuve returned from the Caribbean to Europe, intending to break the blockade at Brest. Nelson, still in fear for Egypt, made to return to the Mediterranean. The fast sailing corvette taking word of his plans back to the admiralty spotted the French heading further north. On receiving this intelligence Lord Barham was alive to the enemy strategy and immediately ordered Admiral Cornwallis to combine his squadron with that of Vice Admiral Calder off Ferrol and to stretch out thirty to forty leagues into the Atlantic to block the French from entering the Channel.
Calder intercepted the French resulting in an inconclusive engagement during the Battle of Cape Finisterre in which two of the Spanish ships were captured. Villeneuve abandoned his plan and sailed back to Ferrol in northern Spain. There he received orders from Napoleon to return to Brest according to the main plan.
Napoleon's invasion plans for Britain depended on having a sufficiently large number of ships of the line protecting his port of Boulogne on the English Channel. This would require Villeneuve's force of 33 ships to join Vice-Admiral Ganteaume's force of 21 ships at Brest, along with a squadron of five ships under Captain Allemand, which would have given him a combined force of 59 ships of the line.
When Villeneuve set sail from Ferrol on 10 August, he was under orders from Napoleon to sail northward toward Brest. Instead, he worried that the British were observing his manoeuvres, so on 11 August, he sailed southward towards Cádiz on the southwestern coast of Spain. With no sign of Villeneuve's fleet, on 25 August, the three French army corps' invasion force near Boulogne broke camp and marched into Germany, where it was later engaged. This ended the immediate threat of invasion.
The same month, Admiral Lord Nelson returned home to Britain after two years of duty at sea. He remained ashore for 25 days and was warmly received by his countrymen. Word reached Britain on 2 September about the combined French and Spanish fleet in Cádiz harbour. Nelson had to wait until 15 September before his ship, HMS Victory, was ready to sail.
On 15 August, Cornwallis decided to detach 20 ships of the line from the fleet guarding the English Channel to sail southward to engage the enemy forces in Spain, leaving the Channel with only 11 ships of the line. The detached force formed the nucleus of the British fleet at Trafalgar. This fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral Calder, reached Cádiz on 15 September. Nelson joined the fleet on 28 September to take command.
Hoping to lure the combined Franco-Spanish force out from Cadiz harbor and engage it in a decisive battle, Nelson kept his main force out of sight approximately 50 miles (80 km) offshore and sent a squadron of frigates (faster, but too small for the line of battle) to keep watch on the harbour This was led by Captain Blackwood aboard HMS Euryalus, with five frigates, a schooner, and a brig.
Supply situation: Nelson's fleet badly needed provisioning. On 2 October, 5 ships of the line, HMS Queen, Canopus, Spencer, Zealous, Tigre, and the frigate HMS Endymion were dispatched to Gibraltar under Rear-Admiral Sir Thomas Louis for supplies.
These ships were later diverted for convoy duty in the Mediterranean, although Nelson had expected them to return. Similarly, HMS Superb under Captain Richard Goodwin Keats had been sent to the dockyard for a re-fit after four years at sea including the chase of Villeneuve and was expected to return to the fleet where Keats was to be Nelson's second, but the ship was not released in time. Other British ships continued to arrive, and by 15 October the fleet was up to full strength for the battle. Nelson also lost Calder's flagship, the 98 gun Prince of Wales, which he sent home as Calder had been recalled by the Admiralty to face a court-martial for his apparent lack of aggression during the engagement off Cape Finisterre on 22 July.
Meanwhile, Villeneuve's fleet in Cádiz was also suffering from a serious supply shortage that could not be easily rectified by the cash-poor French. The blockade maintained by the British fleet had made it difficult for the Franco-Spanish allies to obtain stores, and their ships were ill-equipped. Villeneuve's ships were also more than two thousand men short of the force needed to sail. These were not the only problems faced by the Franco-Spanish fleet. The main French ships of the line had been kept in harbour for years by the British blockade with only brief sorties. The French crews included few experienced sailors, and, as most of the crew had to be taught the elements of seamanship on the few occasions when they got to sea, gunnery was neglected. The hasty voyage across the Atlantic and back used up vital supplies. Villeneuve's supply situation began to improve in October, but news of Nelson's arrival made Villeneuve reluctant to leave port. His captains had held a vote on the matter and decided to stay in harbour.
On 16 September, Napoleon gave orders for the French and Spanish ships at Cádiz to put to sea at the first favourable opportunity, join with 7 Spanish ships of the line then at Cartagena, go to Naples and land the soldiers they carried to reinforce his troops there, then fight decisively if they met a numerically inferior British fleet.
Fleets:
British: On 21 October, Admiral Nelson had 27 ships of the line with 2148 cannons, and a total of 17000 crewmen and marines under his command. Nelson's flagship, HMS Victory, captained by Thomas Masterman Hardy, was one of three 100 gun first-rates in his fleet. He also had four 98 gun second-rates and 20 third-rates. One of the third-rates was an 80 gun vessel, and 16 were 74 gun vessels. The remaining three were 64 gun ships, which were being phased out of the Royal Navy at the time of the battle. Nelson also had four frigates of 38 or 36 guns, a 12 gun schooner and a 10 gun cutter. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Trafalgar | Fleets:
British: On 21 October, Admiral Nelson had 27 ships of the line with 2148 cannons, and a total of 17000 crewmen and marines under his command. Nelson's flagship, HMS Victory, captained by Thomas Masterman Hardy, was one of three 100 gun first-rates in his fleet. He also had four 98 gun second-rates and 20 third-rates. One of the third-rates was an 80 gun vessel, and 16 were 74 gun vessels. The remaining three were 64 gun ships, which were being phased out of the Royal Navy at the time of the battle. Nelson also had four frigates of 38 or 36 guns, a 12 gun schooner and a 10 gun cutter.
Franco-Spanish: Against Nelson, Vice-Admiral Villeneuve, sailing on his flagship Bucentaure, fielded 33 ships of the line, including some of the largest in the world at the time. The Spanish contributed four first-rates to the fleet – three of these ships, one at 130 guns (Santísima Trinidad) and two at 112 guns (Príncipe de Asturias, Santa Ana), were much larger than anything under Nelson's command. The fourth first-rate carried 100 guns. The fleet had six 80 gun third-rates, (four French and two Spanish), and one Spanish 64 gun third-rate. The remaining 22 third-rates were 74 gun vessels, of which 14 were French and eight Spanish. In total, the Spanish contributed 15 ships of the line and the French 18 along with some 30000 men and marines manning 2632 cannons. The fleet also included five 40 gun frigates and two 18 gun brigs, all French.
Battle:
Nelson's plan: The prevailing tactical orthodoxy at the time involved manoeuvring to approach the enemy fleet in a single line of battle and then engaging broadside in parallel lines. In previous times, fleets had usually engaged in a mixed mêlée of chaotic one-on-one battles. One reason for the development of the line of battle formation was to facilitate control of the fleet: if all the ships were in line, signalling during battle became possible. The line also allowed either side to disengage by breaking away in formation; if the opponent chose to continue, their line would be broken as well. This often led to inconclusive battles, or allowed the losing side to minimise its losses. Facing a numerically superior Franco-Spanish line, Nelson wanted to break it into a chaotic mêlée which would force the enemy to fight his well-trained crews ship to ship.
Nelson's solution was to cut the opposing line in three. Approaching in two columns sailing perpendicular to the enemy's line, one towards the centre of the opposing line and one towards the trailing end, his ships would surround the middle third, and force them to fight to the end. Nelson hoped specifically to cut the line just in front of the French flagship, Bucentaure; the isolated ships in front of the break would not be able to see the flagship's signals, which he hoped would take them out of combat while they re-formed. This echoed the tactics used by Admiral Duncan at the Battle of Camperdown and Admiral Jervis at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, both in 1797.
The plan had three principal advantages:
First, the British fleet would close with the Franco-Spanish as quickly as possible, preventing their escape.
Second, it would quickly bring on a mêlée and frantic battle by breaking the Franco-Spanish line and inducing a series of individual ship-to-ship actions, in which the British knew they were likely to prevail. Nelson knew that the superior seamanship, faster gunnery and better morale of his crews were great advantages.
Third, it would bring a decisive concentration on the rear of the Franco-Spanish fleet. The ships in the van of the enemy fleet would have to turn back to support the rear, which would take a long time. Additionally, once the Franco-Spanish line had been broken, their ships would be relatively defenceless against powerful broadsides from the British fleet, and it would take them a long time to reposition to return fire.
The main drawback of attacking head-on was that as the leading British ships approached, the Franco-Spanish Combined Fleet would be able to direct raking broadside fire at their bows, to which they would be unable to reply. To lessen the time the fleet was exposed to this danger, Nelson had his ships make all available sail (including stunsails), yet another departure from the norm. He was also well aware that French and Spanish gunners were ill-trained and would have difficulty firing accurately from a moving gun platform. The Combined Fleet was sailing across a heavy swell, causing the ships to roll heavily and exacerbate the problem. Nelson's plan was a carefully calculated gamble.
During the blockade off the coast of Spain in October, Nelson instructed his captains, over two dinners aboard Victory, on his plan for the approaching battle. In an animated conversation with his favourite captain, Richard Goodwin Keats, who was expected to be his second in the forthcoming battle, Nelson explained a refined battle plan whilst the two were walking in the garden of Merton in August 1805. The order of sailing, in which the fleet was arranged when the enemy was first sighted, was to be the order of the ensuing action so that no time would be wasted in forming two lines. The first, led by his second-in-command Vice-Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood, was to sail into the rear of the enemy line, while the other, led by Nelson, was to sail into the centre and vanguard. In preparation for the battle, Nelson ordered the ships of his fleet to be painted in a distinctive yellow and black pattern (later known as the Nelson Chequer) that would make them easy to distinguish from their opponents.
Nelson was careful to point out that something had to be left to chance. Nothing is sure in a sea battle, so he left his captains free from all hampering rules by telling them that "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy." In short, circumstances would dictate the execution, subject to the guiding rule that the enemy's rear was to be cut off and superior force concentrated on that part of the enemy's line.
Admiral Villeneuve himself expressed his belief that Nelson would use some sort of unorthodox attack, presciently speculating that Nelson would drive right at his line. But his long game of cat and mouse with Nelson had worn him down, and he was suffering from a loss of nerve. Fearing that his inexperienced officers would be unable to maintain formation in more than one group, he chose to keep the single line that became Nelson's target.
Departure: The Combined Fleet of French and Spanish warships anchored in Cádiz under the leadership of Admiral Villeneuve was in disarray. On 16 September 1805 Villeneuve received orders from Napoleon to sail the Combined Fleet from Cádiz to Naples. At first, Villeneuve was optimistic about returning to the Mediterranean, but soon had second thoughts. A war council was held aboard his flagship, Bucentaure, on 8 October. While some of the French captains wished to obey Napoleon's orders, the Spanish captains and other French officers, including Villeneuve, thought it best to remain in Cádiz. Villeneuve changed his mind yet again on 18 October 1805, ordering the Combined Fleet to sail immediately even though there were only very light winds.
The sudden change was prompted by a letter Villeneuve had received on 18 October, informing him that Vice-Admiral François Rosily had arrived in Madrid with orders to take command of the Combined Fleet. Stung by the prospect of being disgraced before the fleet, Villeneuve resolved to go to sea before his successor could reach Cádiz. At the same time, he received intelligence that a detachment of six British ships (Admiral Louis' squadron), had docked at Gibraltar, thus weakening the British fleet. This was used as the pretext for sudden change.
The weather, however, suddenly turned calm following a week of gales. This slowed the progress of the fleet leaving the harbour, giving the British plenty of warning. Villeneuve had drawn up plans to form a force of four squadrons, each containing both French and Spanish ships. Following their earlier vote on 8 October to stay put, some captains were reluctant to leave Cádiz, and as a result they failed to follow Villeneuve's orders closely and the fleet straggled out of the harbour in no particular formation.
It took most of 20 October for Villeneuve to get his fleet organised; it eventually set sail in three columns for the Straits of Gibraltar to the southeast. That same evening, Achille spotted a force of 18 British ships of the line in pursuit. The fleet began to prepare for battle and during the night, they were ordered into a single line. The following day, Nelson's fleet of 27 ships of the line and four frigates was spotted in pursuit from the northwest with the wind behind it. Villeneuve again ordered his fleet into three columns, but soon changed his mind and restored a single line. The result was a sprawling, uneven formation. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Trafalgar | Following their earlier vote on 8 October to stay put, some captains were reluctant to leave Cádiz, and as a result they failed to follow Villeneuve's orders closely and the fleet straggled out of the harbour in no particular formation.
It took most of 20 October for Villeneuve to get his fleet organised; it eventually set sail in three columns for the Straits of Gibraltar to the southeast. That same evening, Achille spotted a force of 18 British ships of the line in pursuit. The fleet began to prepare for battle and during the night, they were ordered into a single line. The following day, Nelson's fleet of 27 ships of the line and four frigates was spotted in pursuit from the northwest with the wind behind it. Villeneuve again ordered his fleet into three columns, but soon changed his mind and restored a single line. The result was a sprawling, uneven formation.
At 5:40 a.m. on 21 October, the British were about 21 miles (34 km) to the northwest of Cape Trafalgar, with the Franco-Spanish fleet between the British and the Cape. About 6 a.m., Nelson gave the order to prepare for battle. At 8 a.m., the British frigate Euryalus, which had been keeping watch on the Combined Fleet overnight, observed the British fleet still "forming the lines" in which it would attack.
At 8 a.m., Villeneuve ordered the fleet to wear together (turn about) and return to Cádiz. This reversed the order of the allied line, placing the rear division under Rear-Admiral Pierre Dumanoir le Pelley in the vanguard. The wind became contrary at this point, often shifting direction. The very light wind rendered manoeuvring virtually impossible for all but the most expert seamen. The inexperienced crews had difficulty with the changing conditions, and it took nearly an hour and a half for Villeneuve's order to be completed. The French and Spanish fleet now formed an uneven, angular crescent, with the slower ships generally to leeward and closer to the shore.
By 11 a.m., Nelson's entire fleet was visible to Villeneuve, drawn up in two parallel columns. The two fleets would be within range of each other within an hour. Villeneuve was concerned at this point about forming up a line, as his ships were unevenly spaced in an irregular formation drawn out nearly 5 miles (8 km) long as Nelson's fleet approached.
As the British drew closer, they could see that the enemy was not sailing in a tight order, but in irregular groups. Nelson could not immediately make out the French flagship as the French and Spanish were not flying command pennants.
Nelson was outnumbered and outgunned, the enemy totalling nearly 30000 men and 2568 guns to Nelson's 17000 men and 2148 guns. The Franco-Spanish fleet also had six more ships of the line, and so could more readily combine their fire. There was no way for some of Nelson's ships to avoid being "doubled on" or even "trebled on".
As the two fleets drew closer, anxiety began to build among officers and sailors; one British sailor described the approach thus:
During this momentous preparation, the human mind had ample time for meditation, for it was evident that the fate of England rested on this battle.
Combat: The battle progressed largely according to Nelson's plan. At 11:45, Nelson sent the flag signal, "England expects that every man will do his duty".
His Lordship came to me on the poop, and after ordering certain signals to be made, about a quarter to noon, he said, "Mr. Pasco, I wish to say to the fleet, 'England confides that every man will do his duty'" and he added "You must be quick, for I have one more to make which is for close action." I replied, "If your Lordship will permit me to substitute 'expects' for 'confides' the signal will soon be completed, because the word 'expects' is in the vocabulary, and 'confides' must be spelt," His Lordship replied, in haste, and with seeming satisfaction, "That will do, Pasco, make it directly."
The term "England" was widely used at the time to refer to the United Kingdom; the British fleet included significant contingents from Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. Unlike the photographic depiction above, this signal would have been shown on the mizzen mast only and would have required 12 lifts.
As the battle opened, the French and Spanish were in a ragged curved line headed north. As planned, the British fleet was approaching the Franco-Spanish line in two columns. Leading the northern, windward column in Victory was Nelson, while Collingwood in the 100-gun Royal Sovereign led the second, leeward, column. The two British columns approached from the west at nearly a right angle to the allied line. Nelson led his column into a feint toward the van of the Franco-Spanish fleet and then abruptly turned toward the actual point of attack. Collingwood altered the course of his column slightly so that the two lines converged at this line of attack.
Just before his column engaged the allied forces, Collingwood said to his officers, "Now, gentlemen, let us do something today which the world may talk of hereafter." Because the winds were very light during the battle, all the ships were moving extremely slowly, and the foremost British ships were under heavy fire from several of the allied ships for almost an hour before their own guns could bear.
At noon, Villeneuve sent the signal "engage the enemy", and Fougueux fired her first trial shot at Royal Sovereign. Royal Sovereign had all sails out and, having recently had her bottom cleaned, outran the rest of the British fleet. As she approached the allied line, she came under fire from Fougueux, Indomptable, San Justo, and San Leandro, before breaking the line just astern of Admiral Alava's flagship Spanish ship Santa Ana, into which she fired a devastating double-shotted raking broadside. On board Victory, Nelson pointed to Royal Sovereign and said, "See how that noble fellow Collingwood carries his ship into action!" At approximately the same moment, Collingwood remarked to his captain, Edward Rotheram, "What would Nelson give to be here?"
The second ship in the British lee column, Belleisle, was engaged by Aigle, Achille, Neptune, and Fougueux; she was soon completely dismasted, unable to manoeuvre and largely unable to fight, as her sails blinded her batteries, but kept flying her flag for 45 minutes until the following British ships came to her rescue.
For 40 minutes, Victory was under fire from Héros, Santísima Trinidad, Redoutable, and Neptune; although many shots went astray, others killed and wounded a number of her crew and shot her wheel away, so that she had to be steered from her tiller belowdecks, all before she could respond. At 12:45, Victory cut the enemy line between Villeneuve's flagship Bucentaure and Redoutable; she came close to Bucentaure with her guns loaded with double or treble shots each, and her 68-pounder carronades loaded with 500 musketballs, she unleashed a devastating treble-shotted raking broadside through Bucentaure's stern which killed and wounded some 200–400 men of the ship's 800-man complement and dismasted the ship. This volley of gunfire from the Victory immediately knocked the French Flagship out of action. Villeneuve thought that boarding would take place, and with the Eagle of his ship in hand, told his men, "I will throw it onto the enemy ship and we will take it back there!" However, Victory engaged the 74-gun Redoutable; Bucentaure was left to the next three ships of the British windward column: Temeraire, Conqueror, and HMS Neptune.
A general mêlée ensued. Victory locked masts with the French Redoutable, whose crew, including a strong infantry corps (with three captains and four lieutenants), gathered for an attempt to board and seize Victory. A musket bullet fired from the mizzentop of Redoutable struck Nelson in the left shoulder, passed through his spine at the sixth and seventh thoracic vertebrae, and lodged two inches below his right scapula in the muscles of his back. Nelson exclaimed, "They finally succeeded, I am dead." He was carried below decks.
Victory's gunners were called on deck to fight boarders, and she ceased firing. The gunners were forced back below decks by French grenades. As the French were preparing to board Victory, Temeraire, the second ship in the British windward column, approached from the starboard bow of Redoutable and fired on the exposed French crew with a carronade, causing many casualties.
At 13:55, the French Captain Lucas of Redoutable, with 99 fit men out of 643 and severely wounded himself, surrendered. The French Bucentaure was isolated by Victory and Temeraire, and then engaged by HMS Neptune, HMS Leviathan, and Conqueror; similarly, Santísima Trinidad was isolated and overwhelmed, surrendering after three hours. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Trafalgar | Nelson exclaimed, "They finally succeeded, I am dead." He was carried below decks.
Victory's gunners were called on deck to fight boarders, and she ceased firing. The gunners were forced back below decks by French grenades. As the French were preparing to board Victory, Temeraire, the second ship in the British windward column, approached from the starboard bow of Redoutable and fired on the exposed French crew with a carronade, causing many casualties.
At 13:55, the French Captain Lucas of Redoutable, with 99 fit men out of 643 and severely wounded himself, surrendered. The French Bucentaure was isolated by Victory and Temeraire, and then engaged by HMS Neptune, HMS Leviathan, and Conqueror; similarly, Santísima Trinidad was isolated and overwhelmed, surrendering after three hours.
As more and more British ships entered the battle, the ships of the allied centre and rear were gradually overwhelmed. The allied van, after long remaining quiescent, made a futile demonstration and then sailed away. During the combat, Gravina was wounded, while Dionisio Alcalá-Galiano and Cosme Damián Churruca – commanders of the Bahama and San Juan Nepomuceno, respectively – were killed after ordering their ships not to surrender. Gravina died from his wounds months later. The British took 20 vessels of the Franco-Spanish fleet and lost none. Among the captured French ships were Aigle, Algésiras, Berwick, Bucentaure, Fougueux, Intrépide, Redoutable, and Swiftsure. The Spanish ships taken were Argonauta, Bahama, Monarca, Neptuno, San Agustín, San Ildefonso, San Juan Nepomuceno, Santísima Trinidad, and Santa Ana. Of these, Redoutable sank, and Santísima Trinidad and Argonauta were scuttled by the British. Achille exploded, Intrépide and San Augustín burned, and Aigle, Berwick, Fougueux, and Monarca were wrecked in a gale following the battle.
As Nelson lay dying, he ordered the fleet to anchor, as a storm was predicted. However, when the storm blew up, many of the severely damaged ships sank or ran aground on the shoals. A few of them were recaptured, some by the French and Spanish prisoners overcoming the small prize crews, others by ships sallying from Cádiz. Surgeon William Beatty heard Nelson murmur, "Thank God I have done my duty"; when he returned, Nelson's voice had faded, and his pulse was very weak. He looked up as Beatty took his pulse, then closed his eyes. Nelson's chaplain, Alexander Scott, who remained by Nelson as he died, recorded his last words as "God and my country." It has been suggested by Nelson historian Craig Cabell that Nelson was actually reciting his own prayer as he fell into his death coma, as the words 'God' and 'my country' are closely linked therein. Nelson died at half-past four, three hours after being hit.
Towards the end of the battle, and with the combined fleet being overwhelmed, the still relatively un-engaged portion of the van under Rear-Admiral Dumanoir Le Pelley tried to come to the assistance of the collapsing centre. After failing to fight his way through, he decided to break off the engagement, and led four French ships, his flagship the 80 gun Formidable, the 74 gun ships Scipion, Duguay-Trouin and Mont Blanc away from the fighting. He headed at first for the Straits of Gibraltar, intending to carry out Villeneuve's original orders and make for Toulon. On 22 October he changed his mind, remembering a powerful British squadron under Rear-Admiral Thomas Louis was patrolling the straits, and headed north, hoping to reach one of the French Atlantic ports. With a storm gathering in strength off the Spanish coast, he sailed westwards to clear Cape St. Vincent, prior to heading north-west, swinging eastwards across the Bay of Biscay, and aiming to reach the French port at Rochefort. These four ships remained at large until their encounter with and attempt to chase a British frigate brought them in range of a British squadron under Sir Richard Strachan, which captured them all on 4 November 1805 at the Battle of Cape Ortegal.
Cosmao and MacDonnell sortie: Only eleven allied ships escaped to Cádiz, and, of those, only five were considered seaworthy. The seriously wounded Admiral Gravina passed command of the remainder of the fleet over to Commodore Julien Cosmao on 23 October. From shore, the allied commanders could see an opportunity for a rescue mission. Cosmao claimed in his report that the rescue plan was entirely his idea, but Vice-Admiral Escaño recorded a meeting of Spanish and French commodores at which a planned rescue was discussed and agreed upon. Enrique MacDonell and Cosmao were of equal rank and both raised commodore's pennants before hoisting anchor. Both sets of mariners were determined to make an attempt to recapture some of the prizes. Cosmao ordered the rigging of his ship, the 74 gun Pluton, to be repaired and reinforced her crew (which had been depleted by casualties from the battle), with sailors from the French frigate Hermione. Taking advantage of a favourable northwesterly wind, Pluton, the 80 gun Neptune and Indomptable, the Spanish 100 gun Rayo and 74 gun San Francisco de Asis, together with five French frigates and two brigs, sailed out of the harbour towards the British.
The British cast off the prizes: Soon after leaving port, the wind shifted to west-southwest, raising a heavy sea with the result that most of the British prizes broke their tow ropes, and drifting far to leeward, were only partially resecured. The combined squadron came in sight at noon, causing Collingwood to summon his most battle-ready ships to meet the threat. In doing so, he ordered them to cast off towing their prizes. He had formed a defensive line of ten ships by three o'clock in the afternoon and approached the Franco-Spanish squadron, covering the remainder of their prizes which stood out to sea. The Franco-Spanish squadron, numerically inferior, chose not to approach within gunshot and then declined to attack. Collingwood also chose not to seek action, and in the confusion of the powerful storm, the French frigates managed to retake two Spanish ships of the line which had been cast off by their British captors, the 112 gun Santa Ana and 80 gun Neptuno, taking them in tow and making for Cádiz. On being taken in tow, the Spanish crews rose up against their British prize crews, putting them to work as prisoners.
Despite this initial success the Franco-Spanish force, hampered by battle damage, struggled in the heavy seas. Neptuno was eventually wrecked off Rota in the gale, while Santa Ana reached port. The French 80 gun ship Indomptable was wrecked on the 24th or 25th off the town of Rota on the northwest point of the bay of Cádiz. At the time Indomptable had 1200 men on board, but no more than 100 were saved. San Francisco de Asís was driven ashore in Cádiz Bay, near Fort Santa Catalina, although her crew was saved. Rayo, an old three-deck vessel with more than 50 years of service, anchored off Sanlúcar, a few leagues to the northwest of Rota. There, she lost her masts, already damaged in the battle. Heartened by the approach of the squadron, the French crew of the former flagship Bucentaure also rose up and retook the ship from the British prize crew but she was wrecked later on 23 October. Aigle escaped from the British ship HMS Defiance, but was wrecked off the Port of Santa María on 23 October; while the French prisoners on Berwick cut the tow cables, but caused her to founder off Sanlúcar on 22 October. The crew of Algésiras rose up and managed to sail into Cádiz.
Observing that some of the leewardmost of the prizes were escaping towards the Spanish coast, Leviathan asked for and was granted permission by Collingwood to try to retrieve the prizes and bring them to anchor. Leviathan chased Monarca, but on 24 October she came across Rayo, dismasted but still flying Spanish colours, at anchor off the shoals of Sanlúcar. At this point the 74 gun HMS Donegal, en route from Gibraltar under Captain Pulteney Malcolm, was seen approaching from the south on the larboard tack with a moderate breeze from northwest-by-north and steered directly for the Spanish three-decker. At about ten o'clock, just as Monarca had got within little more than a mile of Rayo, Leviathan fired a warning shot wide of Monarca, to oblige her to drop anchor. The shot fell between Monarca and Rayo. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Trafalgar | Observing that some of the leewardmost of the prizes were escaping towards the Spanish coast, Leviathan asked for and was granted permission by Collingwood to try to retrieve the prizes and bring them to anchor. Leviathan chased Monarca, but on 24 October she came across Rayo, dismasted but still flying Spanish colours, at anchor off the shoals of Sanlúcar. At this point the 74 gun HMS Donegal, en route from Gibraltar under Captain Pulteney Malcolm, was seen approaching from the south on the larboard tack with a moderate breeze from northwest-by-north and steered directly for the Spanish three-decker. At about ten o'clock, just as Monarca had got within little more than a mile of Rayo, Leviathan fired a warning shot wide of Monarca, to oblige her to drop anchor. The shot fell between Monarca and Rayo. The latter, conceiving that it was probably intended for her, hauled down her colours, and was taken by HMS Donegal, who anchored alongside and took off the prisoners. Leviathan resumed her pursuit of Monarca, eventually catching up and forcing her to surrender. On boarding her, her British captors found that she was in a sinking state, and so removed the British prize crew, and nearly all of her original Spanish crew members. The nearly empty Monarca parted her cable and was wrecked during the night. Despite the efforts of her British prize crew, Rayo was driven onshore on 26 October and wrecked, with the loss of 25 men. The remainder of the prize crew were made prisoners by the Spanish.
Casualties:
Aftermath: In the aftermath of the storm, Collingwood wrote:
The condition of our own ships was such that it was very doubtful what would be their fate. Many a time I would have given the whole group of our capture, to ensure our own ... I can only say that in my life I never saw such efforts as were made to save these [prize] ships, and would rather fight another battle than pass through such a week as followed it.
On balance, the allied counter-attack achieved little. In forcing the British to suspend their repairs to defend themselves, it influenced Collingwood's decision to sink or set fire to the most damaged of his remaining prizes. Cosmao retook 2 Spanish ships of the line, but it cost him 1 French and 2 Spanish vessels to do so. Fearing their loss, the British burnt or sank Santísima Trinidad, Argonauta, San Antonio, and Intrépide. Only four of the British prizes, the French Swiftsure and the Spanish Bahama, San Ildefonso and San Juan Nepomuceno survived to be taken to Britain. After the end of the battle and storm only 9 ships of the line were left in Cádiz.
Spanish military garrisons and civilians set out to rescue survivors from the numerous shipwrecks scattered along the Andalusian coast. British prize crews were captured and given good treatment. On 27 October, Collingwood offered the governor of Cádiz to put his Spanish wounded prisoners ashore and set them free. The governor and Gravina offered in exchange to release their British prisoners, who boarded the British fleet. The French later joined this humanitarian agreement.
The disparity in losses has been attributed by some historians less to Nelson's daring tactics than to the difference in fighting readiness of the two fleets. Nelson's fleet was made up of ships of the line which had spent a considerable amount of sea time during the months of blockades of French ports, whilst the French fleet had generally been at anchor in port. However, Villeneuve's fleet had just spent months at sea crossing the Atlantic twice, which supports the proposition that the main difference between the two fleets' combat effectiveness was the morale of the leaders. The daring tactics employed by Nelson were to ensure a strategically decisive result. The results vindicated his naval judgement.
Results: When Rosily arrived in Cádiz, he found only five French ships, rather than the 18 he was expecting. The surviving ships remained bottled up in Cádiz until 1808 when Napoleon invaded Spain. The French ships were then seized by the Spanish forces and put into service against France.
HMS Victory made her way to Gibraltar for repairs, carrying Nelson's body. She put into Rosia Bay, Gibraltar and after emergency repairs were carried out, returned to Britain. Many of the injured crew were taken ashore at Gibraltar and treated in the Naval Hospital. Men who subsequently died from injuries sustained at the battle are buried in or near the Trafalgar Cemetery, at the south end of Main Street, Gibraltar.
One Royal Marine officer, Captain Charles Adair, was killed on board Victory, and Royal Marine Lieutenant Lewis Buckle Reeve was seriously wounded and laid next to Nelson.
The battle took place the day after the Battle of Ulm, and Napoleon did not hear about it for weeks—the Grande Armée had left Boulogne to fight Britain's allies before they could combine their armies. He had tight control over the Paris media and kept the defeat a closely guarded secret for over a month, at which point newspapers proclaimed it to have been a tremendous victory. In a counter-propaganda move, a fabricated text declaring the battle a "spectacular victory" for the French and Spanish was published in Herald and attributed to Le Moniteur Universel.
Vice-Admiral Villeneuve was taken prisoner aboard his flagship and taken back to Britain. After his parole in 1806, he returned to France, where he was found dead in his inn room during a stop on the way to Paris, with six stab wounds in the chest from a dining knife. It was officially recorded that he had committed suicide.
Despite the British victory over the Franco-Spanish navies, Trafalgar had negligible impact on the remainder of the War of the Third Coalition. Less than two months later, Napoleon decisively defeated the Third Coalition at the Battle of Austerlitz, knocking Austria out of the war and forcing the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. Although Trafalgar meant France could no longer challenge Britain at sea, Napoleon proceeded to establish the Continental System in an attempt to deny Britain trade with the continent. Further during the War of the Third Coalition, the British Navy would experience defeats in both 1806 and 1807 against the Spanish in the British invasions of the River Plate. The Napoleonic Wars continued for another ten years after Trafalgar.
Nelson's body was preserved in a barrel of brandy for the trip home to a hero's funeral.
Consequences: Following the battle, the Royal Navy was never again seriously challenged by the French fleet in a large-scale engagement. Napoleon had already abandoned his plans of invasion before the battle and they were never revived. The battle did not mean, however, that the French naval challenge to Britain was over. First, as the French control over the continent expanded, Britain had to take active steps with the Battle of Copenhagen in 1807 and elsewhere in 1808 to prevent the ships of smaller European navies from falling into French hands. This effort was largely successful, but did not end the French threat as Napoleon instituted a large-scale shipbuilding programme that had produced a fleet of 80 ships of the line at the time of his fall from power in 1814, with more under construction. However, despite constituting a substantial fleet in being, these had no impact on Britain's naval superiority throughout the conflict. For almost 10 years after Trafalgar, the Royal Navy maintained a close blockade of French bases and observed the growth of the French fleet. In the end, Napoleon's Empire was destroyed by land before his ambitious naval build-up could be completed. The next naval battles between the British and Spanish would be the British Invasions of the River Plate in 1806 and 1807, where the British Navy would fail to capture Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata.
The Royal Navy proceeded to dominate the sea until the Second World War. Although the victory at Trafalgar was typically given as the reason at the time, modern historical analyses suggest that relative economic strength was an important underlying cause of British naval mastery.
Nelson became – and remains – Britain's greatest naval war hero, and an inspiration to the Royal Navy, yet his unorthodox tactics were seldom emulated by later generations. The first monument to be erected in Britain to commemorate Nelson may be that raised on Glasgow Green in 1806, albeit possibly preceded by a monument at Taynuilt, near Oban in Scotland dated 1805, both also commemorating the many Scots crew and captains at the battle. The 144-foot-tall (44 m) Nelson Monument on Glasgow Green was designed by David Hamilton and paid for by public subscription. Around the base are the names of his major victories: Aboukir (1798), Copenhagen (1801) and Trafalgar (1805). The Nelson Monument overlooking Portsmouth was built in 1807–08 with money subscribed by sailors and marines who served at Trafalgar. In 1808, Nelson's Pillar was erected by leading members of the Anglo-Irish aristocracy in Dublin to commemorate Nelson and his achievements (between 10% and 20% of the sailors at Trafalgar had been from Ireland), and remained until it was destroyed in a bombing by "Old IRA" members in 1966. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Trafalgar | The 144-foot-tall (44 m) Nelson Monument on Glasgow Green was designed by David Hamilton and paid for by public subscription. Around the base are the names of his major victories: Aboukir (1798), Copenhagen (1801) and Trafalgar (1805). The Nelson Monument overlooking Portsmouth was built in 1807–08 with money subscribed by sailors and marines who served at Trafalgar. In 1808, Nelson's Pillar was erected by leading members of the Anglo-Irish aristocracy in Dublin to commemorate Nelson and his achievements (between 10% and 20% of the sailors at Trafalgar had been from Ireland), and remained until it was destroyed in a bombing by "Old IRA" members in 1966. Nelson's Monument in Edinburgh was built between 1807 and 1815 in the form of an upturned telescope, and in 1853 a time ball was added which still drops at noon GMT to give a time signal to ships in Leith and the Firth of Forth. In summer this coincides with the one o'clock gun being fired. The Britannia Monument in Great Yarmouth was raised by 1819. Nelson's Column, Montreal began public subscriptions soon after news of the victory at Trafalgar arrived; the column was completed in the autumn of 1809 and still stands in Place Jacques Cartier. A statue of Lord Nelson stood in Bridgetown, Barbados, in what was also once known as Trafalgar Square, from 1813 to 2020.
London's Trafalgar Square was named in honour of Nelson's victory. At the centre of the square there is the 45.1 m (148 ft) Nelson's Column, with a 5.5 m (18 ft) statue of Nelson on top. It was finished in 1843.
100th anniversary: In 1905, there were events up and down the country to commemorate the centenary, although none were attended by any member of the Royal Family, apparently to avoid upsetting the French, with whom the United Kingdom had recently entered the Entente cordiale. King Edward VII did support the Nelson Centenary Memorial Fund of the British and Foreign Sailors Society, which sold Trafalgar centenary souvenirs marked with the Royal cypher. A gala was held on 21 October at the Royal Albert Hall in aid of the fund, which included a specially commissioned film by Alfred John West entitled Our Navy. The event ended with God Save the King and La Marseillaise. The first performance of Sir Henry Wood's Fantasia on British Sea Songs occurred on the same day at a special Promenade Concert.
200th anniversary: In 2005 a series of events around the UK, part of the Sea Britain theme, marked the bicentenary of the Battle of Trafalgar. The 200th anniversary of the battle was also commemorated on six occasions in Portsmouth during June and July, at St Paul's Cathedral (where Nelson is entombed), in Trafalgar Square in London in October (T Square 200), and across the UK.
On 28 June, Queen Elizabeth II was involved in the largest Fleet Review in modern times in the Solent, in which 167 ships from 35 nations took part. The Queen inspected the international fleet from the Antarctic patrol ship HMS Endurance. The fleet included six aircraft carriers (modern capital ships): Charles de Gaulle, Illustrious, Invincible, Ocean, Principe de Asturias and Saipan. In the evening a symbolic re-enactment of the battle was staged with fireworks and various small ships playing parts in the battle.
Lieutenant John Lapenotière's historic voyage in HMS Pickle bringing the news of the victory from the fleet to Falmouth and thence by post chaise to the Admiralty in London was commemorated by the inauguration of The Trafalgar Way and further highlighted by the New Trafalgar Dispatch celebrations from July to September in which an actor played the part of Lapenotière and re-enacted parts of the historic journey.
On the actual anniversary day, 21 October, naval manoeuvres were conducted in Trafalgar Bay near Cádiz involving a combined fleet from Britain, Spain, and France. Many descendants of people present at the battle, including members of Nelson's family, were at the ceremony.
In popular culture:
Novels: Le Chevalier de Sainte-Hermine (1869), by Alexandre Dumas, is an adventure story in which the main character is alleged to be the one who shot Nelson.
Trafalgar (1873), a Spanish novel about the battle, written by Benito Pérez Galdós and starting point of the historical cycle Episodios Nacionales. It is a fictional account of a boy aboard the ship Santísima Trinidad.
In James Clavell's 1966 novel Tai-Pan, the Scots chieftain of Hong Kong, Dirk Struan, reflects on his experiences as a powder monkey on board HMS Royal Sovereign at Trafalgar.
In the unfinished novel Hornblower and the Crisis (1967) in the Horatio Hornblower series by C. S. Forester, Hornblower was to deliver false orders to Villeneuve causing him to send his fleet out of Cádiz and hence fight the battle. In Hornblower and the Atropos (1953), Hornblower is put in charge of Admiral Nelson's funeral in London.
In Ramage at Trafalgar (1986), by Dudley Pope, Ramage commands the fictitious frigate HMS Calypso, which is attached to Nelson's fleet.
In Sharpe's Trafalgar (2000), by Bernard Cornwell, Sharpe finds himself at the battle aboard the fictitious HMS Pucelle.
In the 2006 novel His Majesty's Dragon, the first of the historical fantasy Temeraire series by Naomi Novik, in which aerial dragon-mounted combat units form major divisions of European militaries during the Napoleonic Wars, Trafalgar is actually a massive feint by Napoleon to distract British forces away from the aerial and seaborne invasion of Britain near Dover. Nelson survives, though he is burned by dragon fire.
In other media: The Battle of Trafalgar is a lost 1911 American silent short film directed by J. Searle Dawley and produced by Edison Studios in New York City. Some stills from the production survive and show actor Sydney Booth performing as Nelson on film sets simulating various decks of Victory.
Nelson (also cited as Nelson: The Story of England's Immortal Naval Hero) is a silent 1918 British historical film directed by Maurice Elvey and starring Donald Calthrop, Malvina Longfellow and Ivy Close. The screenplay, which includes recreations of the battle, is based on Robert Southey's 1813 biography The Life of Horatio, Lord Viscount Nelson.
Nelson is another silent British biographical film that depicts events in the battle. Released in 1926, it features Sir Cedric Hardwicke in the title role.
That Hamilton Woman is a 1941 film about Horatio Nelson and Emma, Lady Hamilton and also includes recreations of battle scenes.
Bequest to the Nation (released in the US as The Nelson Affair) is a 1973 British historical drama film, directed by James Cellan Jones, and starring Glenda Jackson, Peter Finch, and Michael Jayston. The majority of the film revolves around Nelson's shore leave with Lady Hamilton, followed by Nelson's recall to duty and the climactic Battle of Trafalgar.
Jonathan Willcocks composed a major choral work, A Great and Glorious Victory, to mark the bicentenary of the battle in October 2005.
The BBC marked the bicentenary with Nelson's Trafalgar, a 2005 vivid drama-documentary which took full advantage of the computer-generated effects of the time. Presented by Michael Portillo, the two-disc DVD version runs 76 minutes plus extras.
"Admiral over the Oceans" is a song composed by Swedish power metal band, Civil War, detailing the battle from the point of view of a sailor and from Nelson himself.
See also: List of Royal Navy ships
List of ships captured in the 19th century § Battle of Trafalgar
Bibliography of 18th–19th century Royal Naval history
Trafalgar Day
Notes:
References:
Sources cited:
Further reading:
External links: Media related to Battle of Trafalgar at Wikimedia Commons
Nelson's Navy
Read about French Muster Rolls from the Battle of Trafalgar on The National Archives' website.
Visit HMS Victory at Portsmouth Historic Dockyard
HMS Victory Royal Navy Web Site
Nelson's Memorandum – battle plan – in the British Library Archived 7 December 2016 at the Wayback Machine
Interactive guide:Battle of Trafalgar educational presentation by Guardian Unlimited
A. J. West's "Our Navy": Wreath laying on HMS Victory, October 1905 Archived 31 March 2012 at the Wayback Machine
BBC Battlefield Academy: Battle of Trafalgar game created by Solaris Media (now Playniac) for the bicentenary.
BBC video (42 min.) |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Trafalgar | Visit HMS Victory at Portsmouth Historic Dockyard
HMS Victory Royal Navy Web Site
Nelson's Memorandum – battle plan – in the British Library Archived 7 December 2016 at the Wayback Machine
Interactive guide:Battle of Trafalgar educational presentation by Guardian Unlimited
A. J. West's "Our Navy": Wreath laying on HMS Victory, October 1905 Archived 31 March 2012 at the Wayback Machine
BBC Battlefield Academy: Battle of Trafalgar game created by Solaris Media (now Playniac) for the bicentenary.
BBC video (42 min.) of the re-enactment of the Battle of Trafalgar off Portsmouth on 28 June 2005
Concert Overture – Trafalgar 1805 on YouTube
The London Gazette Extraordinary, 6 November 1805 original published dispatches, Naval History: Great Britain, EuroDocs: Primary Historical Documents From Western Europe, Brigham Young University Library. Retrieved 27 July 2006
English folk song about the Battle of Trafalgar on YouTube |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Waterloo | Prelude: On 13 March 1815, six days before Napoleon reached Paris, the powers at the Congress of Vienna declared him an outlaw. Four days later, the United Kingdom, Russia, Austria, and Prussia mobilised armies to defeat Napoleon. Critically outnumbered, Napoleon knew that once his attempts at dissuading one or more members of the Seventh Coalition from invading France had failed, his only chance of remaining in power was to attack before the coalition mobilised.
Had Napoleon succeeded in destroying the existing coalition forces south of Brussels before they were reinforced, he might have been able to drive the British back to the sea and knock the Prussians out of the war. Crucially, this would have bought him time to recruit and train more men before turning his armies against the Austrians and Russians.
An additional consideration for Napoleon was that a French victory might cause French-speaking sympathisers in Belgium to launch a friendly revolution. Also, coalition troops in Belgium were largely second line, as many units were of dubious quality and loyalty.
The initial dispositions of Wellington, the British commander, were intended to counter the threat of Napoleon enveloping the Coalition armies by moving through Mons to the south-west of Brussels. This would have pushed Wellington closer to the Prussian forces, led by Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, but might have cut Wellington's communications with his base at Ostend. In order to delay Wellington's deployment, Napoleon spread false intelligence which suggested that Wellington's supply chain from the channel ports would be cut.
By June, Napoleon had raised a total army strength of about 300,000 men. The force at his disposal at Waterloo was less than one third that size, but the rank and file were mostly loyal and experienced soldiers. Napoleon divided his army into a left wing commanded by Marshal Ney, a right wing commanded by Marshal Grouchy and a reserve under his command (although all three elements remained close enough to support one another). Crossing the frontier near Charleroi before dawn on 15 June, the French rapidly overran Coalition outposts, securing Napoleon's "central position" between Wellington's and Blücher's armies. He hoped this would prevent them from combining, and he would be able to destroy first the Prussian army, then Wellington's.
Only very late on the night of 15 June was Wellington certain that the Charleroi attack was the main French thrust. In the early hours of 16 June, at the Duchess of Richmond's ball in Brussels, he received a dispatch from the Prince of Orange and was shocked by the speed of Napoleon's advance. He hastily ordered his army to concentrate on Quatre Bras, where the Prince of Orange, with the brigade of Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, was holding a tenuous position against the soldiers of Ney's left wing. Prince Bernhard and General Perponcher were by all accounts better informed of the French advance than other allied officials and their later initiatives to hold the crossroads proved vital for the outcome. General Constant de Rebeque, commander of one of the Dutch divisions, disobeyed Wellington's orders to march to his previous chosen concentration area around Nivelles, and decided to hold the crossroads and send urgent messages to the prince and Perponcher. This fact shows how little Wellington believed in a fast French advance towards Brussels. He did not believe in recent intelligence given to him by General Dörnberg, one of his intelligence officials warning him of numerous French outposts south of Charleroi as well as some reports sent by the intelligence of the Prussian 1st corps. Had these two generals obeyed his orders, Quatre-Bras in all probability would have fallen to the French giving them time to support Napoleon's attack on the Prussians in the Sombreffe area via the fast, cobbled road, and the history of the campaign would have been significantly different.
Ney's orders were to secure the crossroads of Quatre Bras so that he could later swing east and reinforce Napoleon if necessary. Ney found the crossroads lightly held by the Prince of Orange, who repelled Ney's initial attacks but was gradually driven back by overwhelming numbers of French troops in the Battle of Quatre Bras. First reinforcements, and then Wellington arrived. He took command and drove Ney back, securing the crossroads by early evening, too late to send help to the Prussians, who had already been defeated.
Meanwhile, on 16 June, Napoleon attacked and defeated Blücher at the Battle of Ligny, using part of the reserve and the right wing of his army. The Prussian centre gave way under heavy French assaults, but the flanks held their ground. The Prussian retreat from Ligny went uninterrupted and seemingly unnoticed by the French. The bulk of their rearguard units held their positions until about midnight, and some elements did not move out until the following morning, ignored by the French.
Crucially, the Prussians did not retreat to the east, along their own lines of communication. Instead, they, too, fell back northwards parallel to Wellington's line of march, still within supporting distance and in communication with him throughout. The Prussians rallied on Bülow's IV Corps, which had not been engaged at Ligny and was in a strong position south of Wavre.
With the Prussian retreat from Ligny, Wellington's position at Quatre Bras was untenable. The next day he withdrew northwards, to a defensive position that he had reconnoitred the previous year—the low ridge of Mont-Saint-Jean, south of the village of Waterloo and the Sonian Forest.
Napoleon, with the reserves, made a late start on 17 June and joined Ney at Quatre Bras at 13:00 to attack Wellington's army but found the position empty. The French pursued Wellington's retreating army to Waterloo; however, due to bad weather, mud and the head start that Napoleon's tardy advance had allowed Wellington, there was no substantial engagement, apart from a cavalry action at Genappe.
Before leaving Ligny, Napoleon had ordered Grouchy, who commanded the right wing, to follow the retreating Prussians with 33,000 men. A late start, uncertainty about the direction the Prussians had taken, and the vagueness of the orders given to him meant that Grouchy was too late to prevent the Prussian army reaching Wavre, from where it could march to support Wellington. More importantly, the heavily outnumbered Prussian rearguard was able to use the River Dyle to fight a savage and prolonged action to delay Grouchy.
As 17 June drew to a close, Wellington's army had arrived at its position at Waterloo, with the main body of Napoleon's army in pursuit. Blücher's army was gathering in and around Wavre, around 8 miles (13 km) to the east of the town. Early the next morning, Wellington received an assurance from Blücher that the Prussian army would support him. He decided to hold his ground and give battle.
Armies: Three armies participated in the battle: Napoleon's Armée du Nord, a multinational army under Wellington, and a Prussian army under General Blücher.
The French army of around 74,500 consisted of 54,014 infantry, 15,830 cavalry, and 8,775 artilleries with 254 guns. Napoleon had used conscription to fill the ranks of the French army throughout his rule, but he did not conscript men for the 1815 campaign. His troops were mainly veterans with considerable experience and a fierce devotion to their Emperor. The cavalry in particular was both numerous and formidable, and included fourteen regiments of armoured heavy cavalry, and seven of highly versatile lancers who were armed with lances, sabres and firearms.
However, as the army took shape, French officers were allocated to units as they presented themselves for duty, so that many units were commanded by officers the soldiers did not know, and often did not trust. Crucially, some of these officers had little experience in working together as a unified force, so that support for other units was often not given.
The French were forced to march through rain and black coal-dust mud to reach Waterloo, and then to contend with mud and rain as they slept in the open. Little food was available, but nevertheless the veteran soldiers were fiercely loyal to Napoleon.
In December 1814, the British Army had been reduced by 47,000 men. This was largely achieved by the disbandment of the second battalion of 22 infantry regiments. Wellington later said that he had "an infamous army, very weak and ill-equipped, and a very inexperienced Staff". His troops consisted of 74,326 men: 53,607 infantry, 13,400 cavalry, and 5,596 artillery with 156 guns plus engineers and staff. Of these, 27,985 (38%) were British, with another 7,686 (10%) from the King's German Legion (KGL). All of the British Army troops were regular soldiers, and the majority of them had served in the Peninsula. Of the 23 British line infantry regiments in action, only four (the 14th, 33rd, 69th, and 73rd Foot) had not served in the Peninsula, and a similar level of experience was to be found in the British cavalry and artillery. Chandler asserts that most of the British veterans of the Peninsular War were being transported to North America to fight in the War of 1812. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Waterloo | His troops consisted of 74,326 men: 53,607 infantry, 13,400 cavalry, and 5,596 artillery with 156 guns plus engineers and staff. Of these, 27,985 (38%) were British, with another 7,686 (10%) from the King's German Legion (KGL). All of the British Army troops were regular soldiers, and the majority of them had served in the Peninsula. Of the 23 British line infantry regiments in action, only four (the 14th, 33rd, 69th, and 73rd Foot) had not served in the Peninsula, and a similar level of experience was to be found in the British cavalry and artillery. Chandler asserts that most of the British veterans of the Peninsular War were being transported to North America to fight in the War of 1812. In addition, there were 21,035 (28.3%) Dutch-Belgian and Nassauer troops, 11,496 (15.5%) from Hanover and 6,124 (8.2%) from Brunswick.
Many of the troops in the Coalition armies were inexperienced. The Dutch army had been re-established in 1815, following the earlier defeat of Napoleon. With the exception of the British and some men from Hanover and Brunswick who had fought with the British army in Spain, many of the professional soldiers in the Coalition armies had spent some of their time in the French army or in armies allied to the Napoleonic regime. The historian Alessandro Barbero states that in this heterogeneous army the difference between British and foreign troops did not prove significant under fire.
Wellington was also acutely short of heavy cavalry, having only seven British and three Dutch regiments. The Duke of York imposed many of his staff officers on Wellington, including his second-in-command, the Earl of Uxbridge. Uxbridge commanded the cavalry and had carte blanche from Wellington to commit these forces at his discretion. Wellington stationed a further 17,000 troops at Halle, 8 miles (13 km) away to the west. They were mostly composed of Dutch troops under the Prince of Orange's younger brother, Prince Frederick of the Netherlands. They were placed as a guard against a wide flanking movement and also to act as a rearguard if Wellington was forced to retreat towards Antwerp and the coast.
The Prussian army was in the throes of reorganisation. In 1815, the former Reserve regiments, Legions, and Freikorps volunteer formations from the wars of 1813–1814 were in the process of being absorbed into the line, along with many Landwehr (militia) regiments. The Landwehr were mostly untrained and unequipped when they arrived in Belgium. The Prussian cavalry were in a similar state. Its artillery was also reorganising and did not give its best performance—guns and equipment continued to arrive during and after the battle.
Offsetting these handicaps, the Prussian army had excellent and professional leadership in its general staff. These officers came from four schools developed for this purpose and thus worked to a common standard of training. This system was in marked contrast to the conflicting, vague orders issued by the French army. This staff system ensured that before Ligny, three-quarters of the Prussian army had concentrated for battle with 24 hours' notice.
After Ligny, the Prussian army, although defeated, was able to realign its supply train, reorganise itself, and intervene decisively on the Waterloo battlefield within 48 hours. Two-and-a-half Prussian army corps, or 48,000 men, were engaged at Waterloo; two brigades under Bülow, commander of IV Corps, attacked Lobau at 16:30, while Zieten's I Corps and parts of Pirch I's II Corps engaged at about 18:00.
Battlefield: The Waterloo position chosen by Wellington was a strong one. It consisted of a long ridge running east–west, perpendicular to, and bisected by, the main road to Brussels. Along the crest of the ridge ran the Ohain road, a deep sunken lane. Near the crossroads with the Brussels road was a large elm tree that was roughly in the centre of Wellington's position and served as his command post for much of the day. Wellington deployed his infantry in a line just behind the crest of the ridge following the Ohain road.
Using the reverse slope, as he had many times previously, Wellington concealed his strength from the French, with the exception of his skirmishers and artillery. The length of front of the battlefield was also relatively short at 2.5 miles (4 km). This allowed Wellington to draw up his forces in depth, which he did in the centre and on the right, all the way towards the village of Braine-l'Alleud, in the expectation that the Prussians would reinforce his left during the day.
In front of the ridge, there were three positions that could be fortified. On the extreme right were the château, garden, and orchard of Hougoumont. This was a large and well-built country house, initially hidden in trees. The house faced north along a sunken, covered lane (usually described by the British as "the hollow-way") along which it could be supplied. On the extreme left was the hamlet of Papelotte.
Both Hougoumont and Papelotte were fortified and garrisoned, and thus anchored Wellington's flanks securely. Papelotte also commanded the road to Wavre that the Prussians would use to send reinforcements to Wellington's position. On the western side of the main road, and in front of the rest of Wellington's line, was the farmhouse and orchard of La Haye Sainte, which was garrisoned with 400 light infantry of the King's German Legion. On the opposite side of the road was a disused sand quarry, where the 95th Rifles were posted as sharpshooters.
Wellington's forces positioning presented a formidable challenge to any attacking force. Any attempt to turn Wellington's right would entail taking the entrenched Hougoumont position. Any attack on his right centre would mean the attackers would have to march between enfilading fire from Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte. On the left, any attack would also be enfiladed by fire from La Haye Sainte and its adjoining sandpit, and any attempt at turning the left flank would entail fighting through the lanes and hedgerows surrounding Papelotte and the other garrisoned buildings on that flank, and some very wet ground in the Smohain defile.
The French army formed on the slopes of another ridge to the south. Napoleon could not see Wellington's positions, so he drew his forces up symmetrically about the Brussels road. On the right was I Corps under d'Erlon with 16,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, plus a cavalry reserve of 4,700. On the left was II Corps under Reille with 13,000 infantry, and 1,300 cavalry, and a cavalry reserve of 4,600. In the centre about the road south of the inn La Belle Alliance were a reserve including Lobau's VI Corps with 6,000 men, the 13,000 infantry of the Imperial Guard, and a cavalry reserve of 2,000.
In the right rear of the French position was the substantial village of Plancenoit, and at the extreme right, the Bois de Paris wood. Napoleon initially commanded the battle from Rossomme farm, where he could see the entire battlefield, but moved to a position near La Belle Alliance early in the afternoon. Command on the battlefield (which was largely hidden from his view) was delegated to Ney.
Battle:
Preparation: Wellington rose at around 02:00 or 03:00 on 18 June, and wrote letters until dawn. He had earlier written to Blücher confirming that he would give battle at Mont-Saint-Jean if Blücher could provide him with at least one corps; otherwise he would retreat towards Brussels. At a late-night council, Blücher's chief of staff, August Neidhardt von Gneisenau, had been distrustful of Wellington's strategy, but Blücher persuaded him that they should march to join Wellington's army. In the morning Wellington duly received a reply from Blücher, promising to support him with three corps.
From 06:00 Wellington was in the field supervising the deployment of his forces. At Wavre, the Prussian IV Corps under Bülow was designated to lead the march to Waterloo as it was in the best shape, not having been involved in the Battle of Ligny. Although they had not taken casualties, IV Corps had been marching for two days, covering the retreat of the three other corps of the Prussian army from the battlefield of Ligny. They had been posted farthest away from the battlefield, and progress was very slow.
The roads were in poor condition after the night's heavy rain, and Bülow's men had to pass through the congested streets of Wavre and move 88 artillery pieces. Matters were not helped when a fire broke out in Wavre, blocking several streets along Bülow's intended route. As a result, the last part of the corps left at 10:00, six hours after the leading elements had moved out towards Waterloo. Bülow's men were followed to Waterloo first by I Corps and then by II Corps. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Waterloo | Although they had not taken casualties, IV Corps had been marching for two days, covering the retreat of the three other corps of the Prussian army from the battlefield of Ligny. They had been posted farthest away from the battlefield, and progress was very slow.
The roads were in poor condition after the night's heavy rain, and Bülow's men had to pass through the congested streets of Wavre and move 88 artillery pieces. Matters were not helped when a fire broke out in Wavre, blocking several streets along Bülow's intended route. As a result, the last part of the corps left at 10:00, six hours after the leading elements had moved out towards Waterloo. Bülow's men were followed to Waterloo first by I Corps and then by II Corps.
Napoleon breakfasted off silver plate at Le Caillou, the house where he had spent the night. When Soult suggested that Grouchy should be recalled to join the main force, Napoleon said, "Just because you have all been beaten by Wellington, you think he's a good general. I tell you Wellington is a bad general, the English are bad troops, and this affair is nothing more than eating breakfast".
Napoleon's seemingly dismissive remark may have been strategic, given his maxim "in war, morale is everything". He had acted similarly in the past, and on the morning of the battle of Waterloo may have been responding to the pessimism and objections of his chief of staff and senior generals.
Later on, being told by his brother, Jerome, of some gossip overheard by a waiter between British officers at lunch at the King of Spain inn in Genappe that the Prussians were to march over from Wavre, Napoleon declared that the Prussians would need at least two days to recover and would be dealt with by Grouchy. Surprisingly, Jerome's overheard gossip aside, the French commanders present at the pre-battle conference at Le Caillou had no information about the alarming proximity of the Prussians and did not suspect that Blücher's men would start erupting onto the field of battle in great numbers just five hours later.
Napoleon had delayed the start of the battle owing to the sodden ground, which would have made manoeuvring cavalry and artillery difficult. In addition, many of his forces had bivouacked well to the south of La Belle Alliance. At 10:00, in response to a dispatch he had received from Grouchy six hours earlier, he sent a reply telling Grouchy to "head for Wavre [to Grouchy's north] in order to draw near to us [to the west of Grouchy]" and then "push before him" the Prussians to arrive at Waterloo "as soon as possible".
At 11:00, Napoleon drafted his general order: Reille's Corps on the left and d'Erlon's Corps to the right were to attack the village of Mont-Saint-Jean and keep abreast of one another. This order assumed Wellington's battle-line was in the village, rather than at the more forward position on the ridge. To enable this, Jerome's division would make an initial attack on Hougoumont, which Napoleon expected would draw in Wellington's reserves, since its loss would threaten his communications with the sea. A grande batterie of the reserve artillery of I, II, and VI Corps was to then bombard the centre of Wellington's position from about 13:00. D'Erlon's corps would then attack Wellington's left, break through, and roll up his line from east to west. In his memoirs, Napoleon wrote that his intention was to separate Wellington's army from the Prussians and drive it back towards the sea.
Hougoumont: Historian Andrew Roberts notes that "It is a curious fact about the Battle of Waterloo that no one is absolutely certain when it actually began". Wellington recorded in his dispatches that at "about ten o'clock [Napoleon] commenced a furious attack upon our post at Hougoumont". Other sources state that the attack began around 11:30. The house and its immediate environs were defended by four light companies of Guards, and the wood and park by Hanoverian Jäger and the 1/2nd Nassau.
The initial attack by Bauduin's brigade emptied the wood and park, but was driven back by heavy British artillery fire, and cost Bauduin his life. As the British guns were distracted by a duel with French artillery, a second attack by Soye's brigade and what had been Bauduin's succeeded in reaching the north gate of the house. Sous-Lieutenant Legros, a French officer, broke the gate open with an axe, and some French troops managed to enter the courtyard. The Coldstream Guards and the Scots Guards arrived to support the defence. There was a fierce melee, and the British managed to close the gate on the French troops streaming in. The Frenchmen trapped in the courtyard were all killed.
Fighting continued around Hougoumont all afternoon. Its surroundings were heavily invested by French light infantry, and coordinated attacks were made against the troops behind Hougoumont. Wellington's army defended the house and the hollow way running north from it. In the afternoon, Napoleon personally ordered the house to be shelled to set it on fire, resulting in the destruction of all but the chapel. Du Plat's brigade of the King's German Legion was brought forward to defend the hollow way, which they had to do without senior officers. Eventually they were relieved by the 71st Highlanders, a British infantry regiment. Adam's brigade was further reinforced by Hugh Halkett's 3rd Hanoverian Brigade, and successfully repulsed further infantry and cavalry attacks sent by Reille. Hougoumont held out until the end of the battle.
I had occupied that post with a detachment from General Byng's brigade of Guards, which was in position in its rear; and it was some time under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel MacDonald, and afterwards of Colonel Home; and I am happy to add that it was maintained, throughout the day, with the utmost gallantry by these brave troops, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of large bodies of the enemy to obtain possession of it.
When I reached Lloyd's abandoned guns, I stood near them for about a minute to contemplate the scene: it was grand beyond description. Hougoumont and its wood sent up a broad flame through the dark masses of smoke that overhung the field; beneath this cloud the French were indistinctly visible. Here a waving mass of long red feathers could be seen; there, gleams as from a sheet of steel showed that the cuirassiers were moving; 400 cannon were belching forth fire and death on every side; the roaring and shouting were indistinguishably commixed—together they gave me an idea of a labouring volcano. Bodies of infantry and cavalry were pouring down on us, and it was time to leave contemplation, so I moved towards our columns, which were standing up in square.
The fighting at Hougoumont has often been characterised as a diversionary attack to draw in Wellington's reserves which escalated into an all-day battle and drew in French reserves instead. In fact there is a good case to believe that both Napoleon and Wellington thought that holding Hougoumont was key to winning the battle. Hougoumont was a part of the battlefield that Napoleon could see clearly, and he continued to direct resources towards it and its surroundings all afternoon (33 battalions in all, 14,000 troops). Similarly, though the house never contained a large number of troops, Wellington devoted 21 battalions (12,000 troops) over the course of the afternoon in keeping the hollow way open to allow fresh troops and ammunition to reach the buildings. He moved several artillery batteries from his hard-pressed centre to support Hougoumont, and later stated that "the success of the battle turned upon closing the gates at Hougoumont". Much like the fight for Little Round Top during the Battle of Gettysburg in the US Civil War some fifty years later, the struggle for Hougoumont became the key battle within the battle. Hougoumont proved to be decisive terrain.
The Grand Battery starts its bombardment: The 80 guns of Napoleon's grande batterie drew up in the centre. These opened fire at 11:50, according to Lord Hill (commander of the Anglo-allied II Corps), while other sources put the time between noon and 13:30. The grande batterie was too far back to aim accurately, and the only other troops they could see were skirmishers of the regiments of Kempt and Pack, and Perponcher's 2nd Dutch division (the others were employing Wellington's characteristic "reverse slope defence").
The bombardment caused a large number of casualties. Although some projectiles buried themselves in the soft soil, most found their marks on the reverse slope of the ridge. The bombardment forced the cavalry of the Union Brigade (in third line) to move to its left, to reduce their casualty rate.
Napoleon spots the Prussians: At about 13:15, Napoleon saw the first columns of Prussians around the village of Lasne-Chapelle-Saint-Lambert, 4 to 5 miles (6.4 to 8.0 km) away from his right flank—about three hours march for an army. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Waterloo | The grande batterie was too far back to aim accurately, and the only other troops they could see were skirmishers of the regiments of Kempt and Pack, and Perponcher's 2nd Dutch division (the others were employing Wellington's characteristic "reverse slope defence").
The bombardment caused a large number of casualties. Although some projectiles buried themselves in the soft soil, most found their marks on the reverse slope of the ridge. The bombardment forced the cavalry of the Union Brigade (in third line) to move to its left, to reduce their casualty rate.
Napoleon spots the Prussians: At about 13:15, Napoleon saw the first columns of Prussians around the village of Lasne-Chapelle-Saint-Lambert, 4 to 5 miles (6.4 to 8.0 km) away from his right flank—about three hours march for an army. Napoleon's reaction was to have Marshal Soult send a message to Grouchy telling him to come towards the battlefield and attack the arriving Prussians. Grouchy, however, had been executing Napoleon's previous orders to follow the Prussians "with your sword against his back" towards Wavre, and was by then too far away to reach Waterloo.
Grouchy was advised by his subordinate, Gérard, to "march to the sound of the guns", but stuck to his orders and engaged the Prussian III Corps rearguard, under the command of Lieutenant-General Baron von Thielmann, at the Battle of Wavre. Moreover, Soult's letter ordering Grouchy to move quickly to join Napoleon and attack Bülow would not actually reach Grouchy until after 20:00.
First French infantry attack: A little after 13:00, I Corps' attack began in large columns. Bernard Cornwell writes "[column] suggests an elongated formation with its narrow end aimed like a spear at the enemy line, while in truth it was much more like a brick advancing sideways and d'Erlon's assault was made up of four such bricks, each one a division of French infantry". Each division, with one exception, was drawn up in huge masses, consisting of the eight or nine battalions of which they were formed, deployed, and placed in a column one behind the other, with only five paces interval between the battalions.
The one exception was the 1st Division (led by Quiot, the commander of the 1st Brigade). Its two brigades were formed in a similar manner, but side by side instead of behind one another. This was done because, being on the left of the four divisions, it was ordered to send one (Quiot's brigade) against the south and west of La Haye Sainte, while the other (Bourgeois') was to attack the eastern side of the same post.
The divisions were to advance in echelon from the left at a distance of 400 paces apart—the 2nd Division (Donzelot's) on the right of Bourgeois' brigade, the 3rd Division (Marcognet's) next, and the 4th Division (Durutte's) on the right. They were led by Ney to the assault, each column having a front of about a hundred and sixty to two hundred files.
The leftmost division advanced on the walled farmhouse compound La Haye Sainte. The farmhouse was defended by the King's German Legion. While one French battalion engaged the defenders from the front, the following battalions fanned out to either side and, with the support of several squadrons of cuirassiers, succeeded in isolating the farmhouse. The King's German Legion resolutely defended the farmhouse. Each time the French tried to scale the walls, the outnumbered Germans somehow held them off. The Prince of Orange saw that La Haye Sainte had been cut off and tried to reinforce it by sending forward the Hanoverian Lüneburg Battalion in line. Cuirassiers concealed in a fold in the ground caught and destroyed it in minutes and then rode on past La Haye Sainte, almost to the crest of the ridge, where they covered d'Erlon's left flank as his attack developed.
At about 13:30, d'Erlon started to advance his three other divisions, some 14,000 men over a front of about 1,000 metres (1,100 yards), against Wellington's left wing. At the point they aimed for, they faced 6,000 men: the first line consisted of the 1st brigade (Van Bylandt's brigade) of the 2nd Netherlands Division, flanked by the British brigades of Kempt and Pack on either side. The second line consisted of British and Hanoverian troops under Sir Thomas Picton, who were lying down in dead ground behind the ridge. All had suffered badly at Quatre Bras. In addition, Bylandt's brigade had been ordered to deploy its skirmishers in the hollow road and on the forward slope. The rest of the brigade was lying down just behind the road.
At the moment these skirmishers were rejoining their parent battalions, the brigade was ordered to its feet and started to return fire. On the left of the brigade, where the 7th Dutch Militia stood, a "few files were shot down and an opening in the line thus occurred". The battalion had no reserves and was unable to close the gap.
D'Erlon's men ascended the slope and advanced on the sunken road, Chemin d'Ohain, that ran from behind La Haye Sainte and continued east. It was lined on both sides by thick hedges, with Bylandt's brigade just across the road, while the British brigades had been lying down some 100 yards back from the road, Pack's to Bylandt's left and Kempt's to Bylandt's right. Kempt's 1,900 men were engaged by Bourgeois' brigade of 1,900 men of Quiot's division. In the centre, Donzelot's division had pushed back Bylandt's brigade.
On the right of the French advance was Marcognet's division, led by Grenier's brigade, consisting of the 45e Régiment de Ligne and followed by the 25e Régiment de Ligne, somewhat less than 2,000 men, and behind them, Nogue's brigade of the 21e and 45e regiments. Opposing them on the other side of the road was Pack's 9th Brigade, consisting of the 44th Foot and three Scottish regiments: the Royal Scots, the 42nd Black Watch, and the 92nd Gordons, totalling something over 2,000 men. A very even fight between British and French infantry was about to occur.
The French advance drove in the British skirmishers and reached the sunken road. As they did so, Pack's men stood up, formed into a four-deep line formation for fear of the French cavalry, advanced, and opened fire. However, a firefight had been anticipated and the French infantry had accordingly advanced in more linear formation. Now, fully deployed into line, they returned fire and successfully pressed the British troops; although the attack faltered at the centre, the line in front of d'Erlon's right started to crumble. Picton was killed shortly after ordering a counter-attack, and the British and Hanoverian troops also began to give way under the pressure of numbers.
Pack's regiments, all four ranks deep, advanced to attack the French in the road but faltered and began to fire on the French instead of charging. The 42nd Black Watch halted at the hedge and the resulting fire-fight drove back the British 92nd Foot, while the leading French 45e Ligne burst through the hedge cheering. Along the sunken road, the French were forcing the Anglo-allies back, the British line was dispersing, and at two o'clock in the afternoon Napoleon was winning the Battle of Waterloo.
Reports from Baron von Müffling, the Prussian liaison officer attached to Wellington's army, relate that, "After 3 o'clock the Duke's situation became critical, unless the succour of the Prussian army arrived soon".
Charge of the British heavy cavalry: Our officers of cavalry have acquired a trick of galloping at everything. They never consider the situation, never think of manoeuvring before an enemy, and never keep back or provide a reserve.
At this crucial juncture, Uxbridge ordered his two brigades of British heavy cavalry—formed unseen behind the ridge—to charge in support of the hard-pressed infantry. The 1st Brigade, known as the Household Brigade, commanded by Major-General Lord Edward Somerset, consisted of guards regiments: the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, the Royal Horse Guards (the Blues), and the 1st (King's) Dragoon Guards. The 2nd Brigade, also known as the Union Brigade, commanded by Major-General Sir William Ponsonby, was so called as it consisted of an English (the 1st or The Royals), a Scottish (2nd Scots Greys), and an Irish (6th or Inniskilling) regiment of heavy dragoons.
More than 20 years of warfare had eroded the numbers of suitable cavalry mounts available on the European continent; this resulted in the British heavy cavalry entering the 1815 campaign with the finest horses of any contemporary cavalry arm. British cavalry troopers also received excellent mounted swordsmanship training. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Waterloo | The 1st Brigade, known as the Household Brigade, commanded by Major-General Lord Edward Somerset, consisted of guards regiments: the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, the Royal Horse Guards (the Blues), and the 1st (King's) Dragoon Guards. The 2nd Brigade, also known as the Union Brigade, commanded by Major-General Sir William Ponsonby, was so called as it consisted of an English (the 1st or The Royals), a Scottish (2nd Scots Greys), and an Irish (6th or Inniskilling) regiment of heavy dragoons.
More than 20 years of warfare had eroded the numbers of suitable cavalry mounts available on the European continent; this resulted in the British heavy cavalry entering the 1815 campaign with the finest horses of any contemporary cavalry arm. British cavalry troopers also received excellent mounted swordsmanship training. They were, however, inferior to the French in manoeuvring in large formations, were cavalier in attitude, and, unlike the infantry, some units had scant experience of warfare.
The Scots Greys, for example, had not been in action since 1795. According to Wellington, though they were superior individual horsemen, they were inflexible and lacked tactical ability. "I considered one squadron a match for two French, I didn't like to see four British opposed to four French: and as the numbers increased and order, of course, became more necessary I was the more unwilling to risk our men without having a superiority in numbers."
The two brigades had a combined field strength of about 2,000 (2,651 official strength); they charged with the 47-year-old Uxbridge leading them and a very inadequate number of squadrons held in reserve. There is evidence that Uxbridge gave an order, the morning of the battle, to all cavalry brigade commanders to commit their commands on their own initiative, as direct orders from himself might not always be forthcoming, and to "support movements to their front". It appears that Uxbridge expected the brigades of Sir John Ormsby Vandeleur, Hussey Vivian, and the Dutch cavalry to provide support to the British heavies. Uxbridge later regretted leading the charge in person, saying "I committed a great mistake", when he should have been organising an adequate reserve to move forward in support.
The Household Brigade crossed the crest of the Anglo-allied position and charged downhill. The cuirassiers guarding d'Erlon's left flank were still dispersed, and so were swept over the deeply sunken main road and then routed.
The blows of the sabres on the cuirasses sounded like braziers at work.
Sir Walter Scott, in Paul's Letters to his Kinsfolk, described the following scene:Sir John Elley, who led the charge of the heavy brigade, was [...] at one time surrounded by several of the cuirassiers; but, being a tall and uncommonly powerful man, completely master of his sword and horse, he cut his way out, leaving several of his assailants on the ground, marked with wounds, indicating the unusual strength of the arm which inflicted them. Indeed, had not the ghastly evidence remained on the field, many of the blows dealt upon this occasion would have seemed borrowed from the annals of knight-errantry [...]Continuing their attack, the squadrons on the left of the Household Brigade then destroyed Aulard's brigade. Despite attempts to recall them, they continued past La Haye Sainte and found themselves at the bottom of the hill on blown horses facing Schmitz's brigade formed in squares.
To their left, the Union Brigade suddenly swept through the infantry lines, giving rise to the legend that some of the 92nd Gordon Highland Regiment clung onto their stirrups and accompanied them into the charge. From the centre leftwards, the Royal Dragoons destroyed Bourgeois' brigade, capturing the eagle of the 105e Ligne. The Inniskillings routed the other brigade of Quoit's division, and the Scots Greys came upon the lead French regiment, 45e Ligne, as it was still reforming after having crossed the sunken road and broken through the hedge row in pursuit of the British infantry. The Greys captured the eagle of the 45e Ligne and overwhelmed Grenier's brigade. These would be the only two French eagles captured by the British during the battle. On Wellington's extreme left, Durutte's division had time to form squares and fend off groups of Greys.
As with the Household Cavalry, the officers of the Royals and Inniskillings found it very difficult to rein back their troops, who lost all cohesion. Having taken casualties, and still trying to reorder themselves, the Scots Greys and the rest of the Union Brigade found themselves before the main French lines. Their horses were blown, and they were still in disorder without any idea of what their next collective objective was. Some attacked nearby gun batteries of the Grande Battery. Although the Greys had neither the time nor means to disable the cannon or carry them off, they put very many out of action as the gun crews were killed or fled the battlefield. Sergeant Major Dickinson of the Greys stated that his regiment was rallied before going on to attack the French artillery: Hamilton, the regimental commander, rather than holding them back cried out to his men "Charge, charge the guns!"
Napoleon promptly responded by ordering a counter-attack by the cuirassier brigades of Farine and Travers and Jaquinot's two Chevau-léger (lancer) regiments in the I Corps light cavalry division. Disorganized and milling about the bottom of the valley between Hougoumont and La Belle Alliance, the Scots Greys and the rest of the British heavy cavalry were taken by surprise by the countercharge of Milhaud's cuirassiers, joined by lancers from Baron Jaquinot's 1st Cavalry Division.
As Ponsonby tried to rally his men against the French cuirassers, he was attacked by Jaquinot's lancers and captured. A nearby party of Scots Greys saw the capture and attempted to rescue their brigade commander. The French lancer who had captured Ponsonby killed him and then used his lance to kill three of the Scots Greys who had attempted the rescue.
By the time Ponsonby died, the momentum had entirely returned in favour of the French. Milhaud's and Jaquinot's cavalrymen drove the Union Brigade from the valley. The result was very heavy losses for the British cavalry. A countercharge, by British light dragoons under Major-General Vandeleur and Dutch–Belgian light dragoons and hussars under Major-General Ghigny on the left wing, and Dutch–Belgian carabiniers under Major-General Trip in the centre, repelled the French cavalry.
All figures quoted for the losses of the cavalry brigades as a result of this charge are estimates, as casualties were only noted down after the day of the battle and were for the battle as a whole. Some historians, Barbero for example, believe the official rolls tend to overestimate the number of cavalrymen present in their squadrons on the field of battle and that the proportionate losses were, as a result, considerably higher than the numbers on paper might suggest.
The Union Brigade lost heavily in both officers and men killed (including its commander, William Ponsonby, and Colonel Hamilton of the Scots Greys) and wounded. The 2nd Life Guards and the King's Dragoon Guards of the Household Brigade also lost heavily (with Colonel Fuller, commander of the King's DG, killed). However, the 1st Life Guards, on the extreme right of the charge, and the Blues, who formed a reserve, had kept their cohesion and consequently suffered significantly fewer casualties. On the rolls the official, or paper strength, for both Brigades is given as 2,651 while Barbero and others estimate the actual strength at around 2,000 and the official recorded losses for the two heavy cavalry brigades during the battle was 1,205 troopers and 1,303 horses.
Some historians, such as Chandler, Weller, Uffindell, and Corum, assert that the British heavy cavalry were destroyed as a viable force following their first, epic charge. Barbero states that the Scots Greys were practically wiped out and that the other two regiments of the Union Brigade suffered comparable losses. Other historians, such as Clark-Kennedy and Wood, citing British eyewitness accounts, describe the continuing role of the heavy cavalry after their charge. The heavy brigades, far from being ineffective, continued to provide valuable services. They countercharged French cavalry numerous times (both brigades), halted a combined cavalry and infantry attack (Household Brigade only), were used to bolster the morale of those units in their vicinity at times of crisis, and filled gaps in the Anglo-allied line caused by high casualties in infantry formations (both brigades).
This service was rendered at a very high cost, as close combat with French cavalry, carbine fire, infantry musketry, and—more deadly than all of these—artillery fire steadily eroded the number of effectives in the two brigades. At 6 o'clock in the afternoon the whole Union Brigade could field only three squadrons, though these countercharged French cavalry, losing half their number in the process. At the end of the fighting, the two brigades, by this time combined, could muster one squadron.
Fourteen thousand French troops of d'Erlon's I Corps had been committed to this attack. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Waterloo | They countercharged French cavalry numerous times (both brigades), halted a combined cavalry and infantry attack (Household Brigade only), were used to bolster the morale of those units in their vicinity at times of crisis, and filled gaps in the Anglo-allied line caused by high casualties in infantry formations (both brigades).
This service was rendered at a very high cost, as close combat with French cavalry, carbine fire, infantry musketry, and—more deadly than all of these—artillery fire steadily eroded the number of effectives in the two brigades. At 6 o'clock in the afternoon the whole Union Brigade could field only three squadrons, though these countercharged French cavalry, losing half their number in the process. At the end of the fighting, the two brigades, by this time combined, could muster one squadron.
Fourteen thousand French troops of d'Erlon's I Corps had been committed to this attack. The I Corps had been driven in rout back across the valley, costing Napoleon 3,000 casualties including over 2,000 prisoners taken. Also some valuable time was lost, as the charge had dispersed numerous units and it would take until 16:00 for d'Erlon's shaken corps to reform. And although elements of the Prussians now began to appear on the field to his right, Napoleon had already ordered Lobau's VI corps to move to the right flank to hold them back before d'Erlon's attack began.
The French cavalry attack: A little before 16:00, Ney noted an apparent exodus from Wellington's centre. He mistook the movement of casualties to the rear for the beginnings of a retreat, and sought to exploit it. Following the defeat of d'Erlon's Corps, Ney had few infantry reserves left, as most of the infantry had been committed either to the futile Hougoumont attack or to the defence of the French right. Ney therefore tried to break Wellington's centre with cavalry alone. Initially, Milhaud's reserve cavalry corps of cuirassiers and Lefebvre-Desnoëttes' light cavalry division of the Imperial Guard, some 4,800 sabres, were committed. When these were repulsed, Kellermann's heavy cavalry corps and Guyot's heavy cavalry of the Guard were added to the massed assault, a total of around 9,000 cavalry in 67 squadrons. When Napoleon saw the charge he said it was an hour too soon.
Wellington's infantry responded by forming squares (hollow box-formations four ranks deep). Squares were much smaller than usually depicted in paintings of the battle—a 500-man battalion square would have been no more than 60 feet (18 m) in length on a side. Infantry squares that stood their ground were deadly to cavalry, as cavalry could not engage with soldiers behind a hedge of bayonets, but were themselves vulnerable to fire from the squares. Horses would not charge a square, nor could they be outflanked, but they were vulnerable to artillery or infantry. Wellington ordered his artillery crews to take shelter within the squares as the cavalry approached, and to return to their guns and resume fire as they retreated.
Witnesses in the British infantry recorded 12 assaults. However, due to the wide frontage of cavalry formations and the 950m space between Hougoumont and La Haie Sainte, any massed cavalry advance would, in reality, consist of a number of successive waves. Kellermann, recognising the futility of the attacks, tried to reserve the elite carabinier brigade from joining in, but eventually Ney spotted them and insisted on their involvement.
A British eyewitness of the first French cavalry attack, an officer in the Foot Guards, recorded his impressions very lucidly and somewhat poetically:
About four p.m., the enemy's artillery in front of us ceased firing all of a sudden, and we saw large masses of cavalry advance: not a man present who survived could have forgotten in after life the awful grandeur of that charge. You discovered at a distance what appeared to be an overwhelming, long moving line, which, ever advancing, glittered like a stormy wave of the sea when it catches the sunlight. On they came until they got near enough, whilst the very earth seemed to vibrate beneath the thundering tramp of the mounted host. One might suppose that nothing could have resisted the shock of this terrible moving mass. They were the famous cuirassiers, almost all old soldiers, who had distinguished themselves on most of the battlefields of Europe. In an almost incredibly short period they were within twenty yards of us, shouting "Vive l'Empereur!" The word of command, "Prepare to receive cavalry", had been given, every man in the front ranks knelt, and a wall bristling with steel, held together by steady hands, presented itself to the infuriated cuirassiers.
In essence this type of massed cavalry attack relied almost entirely on psychological shock for effect. Close artillery support could disrupt infantry squares and allow cavalry to penetrate; at Waterloo, however, co-operation between the French cavalry and artillery was not impressive. The French artillery did not get close enough to the Anglo-allied infantry in sufficient numbers to be decisive. Artillery fire between charges did produce mounting casualties, but most of this fire was at relatively long range and was often indirect, at targets beyond the ridge.
If infantry being attacked held firm in their square defensive formations, and were not panicked, cavalry on their own could do very little damage to them. The French cavalry attacks were repeatedly repelled by the steadfast infantry squares, the harrying fire of British artillery as the French cavalry recoiled down the slopes to regroup, and the decisive countercharges of Wellington's light cavalry regiments, the Dutch heavy cavalry brigade, and the remaining effectives of the Household Cavalry.
At least one artillery officer disobeyed Wellington's order to seek shelter in the adjacent squares during the charges. Captain Mercer, who commanded 'G' Troop, Royal Horse Artillery, thought the Brunswick troops on either side of him so shaky that he kept his battery of six nine-pounders in action against the cavalry throughout, to great effect.
I thus allowed them to advance unmolested until the head of the column might have been about fifty or sixty yards from us, and then gave the word, "Fire!" The effect was terrible. Nearly the whole leading rank fell at once; and the round shot, penetrating the column carried confusion throughout its extent ... the discharge of every gun was followed by a fall of men and horses like that of grass before the mower's scythe.
For reasons that remain unclear, no attempt was made to spike other Anglo-allied guns while they were in French possession. In line with Wellington's orders, gunners were able to return to their pieces and fire into the French cavalry as they withdrew after each attack. After numerous costly but fruitless attacks on the Mont-Saint-Jean ridge, the French cavalry was spent.
Their casualties cannot easily be estimated. Senior French cavalry officers, in particular the generals, experienced heavy losses. Four divisional commanders were wounded, nine brigadiers wounded, and one killed—testament to their courage and their habit of leading from the front. Illustratively, Houssaye reports that the Grenadiers à Cheval numbered 796 of all ranks on 15 June, but just 462 on 19 June, while the Empress Dragoons lost 416 of 816 over the same period. Overall, Guyot's Guard heavy cavalry division lost 47% of its strength.
Second French infantry attack: Eventually it became obvious, even to Ney, that cavalry alone were achieving little. Belatedly, he organised a combined-arms attack, using Bachelu's division and Tissot's regiment of Foy's division from Reille's II Corps (about 6,500 infantrymen) plus those French cavalry that remained in a fit state to fight. This assault was directed along much the same route as the previous heavy cavalry attacks (between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte). It was halted by a charge of the Household Brigade cavalry led by Uxbridge. The British cavalry were unable, however, to break the French infantry, and fell back with losses from musketry fire.
Uxbridge recorded that he tried to lead the Dutch Carabiniers, under Major-General Trip, to renew the attack and that they refused to follow him. Other members of the British cavalry staff also commented on this occurrence. However, there is no support for this incident in Dutch or Belgian sources, and Wellington wrote in his Dispatch to Secretary for War Bathurst on 19 June 1815 that General Trip had "conducted himself much to my satisfaction". Uxbridge then ordered a charge by three squadrons of the 3rd Hussars of the King's German Legion. They broke through the French cavalry, but became hemmed in, were cut off and suffered severe losses. Meanwhile, Bachelu's and Tissot's men and their cavalry supports were being hard hit by fire from artillery and from Adam's infantry brigade, and they eventually fell back.
Although the French cavalry caused few direct casualties to Wellington's centre, artillery fire onto his infantry squares caused many. Wellington's cavalry, except for Sir John Vandeleur's and Sir Hussey Vivian's brigades on the far left, had all been committed to the fight, and had taken significant losses. The situation appeared so desperate that the Cumberland Hussars, the only Hanoverian cavalry regiment present, fled the field spreading alarm all the way to Brussels. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Waterloo | Uxbridge then ordered a charge by three squadrons of the 3rd Hussars of the King's German Legion. They broke through the French cavalry, but became hemmed in, were cut off and suffered severe losses. Meanwhile, Bachelu's and Tissot's men and their cavalry supports were being hard hit by fire from artillery and from Adam's infantry brigade, and they eventually fell back.
Although the French cavalry caused few direct casualties to Wellington's centre, artillery fire onto his infantry squares caused many. Wellington's cavalry, except for Sir John Vandeleur's and Sir Hussey Vivian's brigades on the far left, had all been committed to the fight, and had taken significant losses. The situation appeared so desperate that the Cumberland Hussars, the only Hanoverian cavalry regiment present, fled the field spreading alarm all the way to Brussels.
French capture of La Haye Sainte: At approximately the same time as Ney's combined-arms assault on the centre-right of Wellington's line, rallied elements of D'Erlon's I Corps, spearheaded by the 13th Légère, renewed the attack on La Haye Sainte and this time were successful, partly because the King's German Legion's ammunition ran out. However, the Germans had held the centre of the battlefield for almost the entire day, and this had stalled the French advance.
With La Haye Sainte captured, Ney then moved skirmishers and horse artillery up towards Wellington's centre. French artillery began to pulverise the infantry squares at short range with canister. The 30th and 73rd Regiments suffered such heavy losses that they had to combine to form a viable square.
The possession of La Haye Sainte by the French was a very dangerous incident. It uncovered the very centre of the Anglo-allied army, and established the enemy within 60 yards of that centre. The French lost no time in taking advantage of this, by pushing forward infantry supported by guns, which enabled them to maintain a most destructive fire upon Alten's left and Kempt's right ...
The success Napoleon needed to continue his offensive had occurred. Ney was on the verge of breaking the Anglo-allied centre.
Along with this artillery fire a multitude of French tirailleurs occupied the dominant positions behind La Haye Sainte and poured an effective fire into the squares. The situation for the Anglo-allies was now so dire that the 33rd Regiment's colours and all of Halkett's brigade's colours were sent to the rear for safety, described by historian Alessandro Barbero as, "... a measure that was without precedent".
Wellington, noticing the slackening of fire from La Haye Sainte, with his staff rode closer to it. French skirmishers appeared around the building and fired on the British command as it struggled to get away through the hedgerow along the road. The Prince of Orange then ordered a single battalion of the KGL, the Fifth, to recapture the farm despite the obvious presence of enemy cavalry. Their Colonel, Christian Friedrich Wilhelm von Ompteda obeyed and led the battalion down the slope, chasing off some French skirmishers until French cuirassiers fell on his open flank, killed him, destroyed his battalion and took its colour.
A Dutch–Belgian cavalry regiment ordered to charge retreated from the field instead, fired on by their own infantry. Merlen's Light Cavalry Brigade charged the French artillery taking position near La Haye Sainte but were shot to pieces and the brigade fell apart. The Netherlands Cavalry Division, Wellington's last cavalry reserve behind the centre having lost half their strength was now useless and the French cavalry, despite its losses, were masters of the field, compelling the Anglo-allied infantry to remain in square. More and more French artillery was brought forward.
A French battery advanced to within 300 yards of the 1/1st Nassau square causing heavy casualties. When the Nassauers attempted to attack the battery they were ridden down by a squadron of cuirassiers. Yet another battery deployed on the flank of Mercer's battery and shot up its horses and limbers and pushed Mercer back. Mercer later recalled, The rapidity and precision of this fire was quite appalling. Every shot almost took effect, and I certainly expected we should all be annihilated. ... The saddle-bags, in many instances were torn from horses' backs ... One shell I saw explode under the two finest wheel-horses in the troop down they dropped
French tirailleurs occupied the dominant positions, especially one on a knoll overlooking the square of the 27th. Unable to break square to drive off the French infantry because of the presence of French cavalry and artillery, the 27th had to remain in that formation and endure the fire of the tirailleurs. That fire nearly annihilated the 27th Foot, the Inniskillings, who lost two thirds of their strength within that three or four hours.
The banks on the road side, the garden wall, the knoll and sandpit swarmed with skirmishers, who seemed determined to keep down our fire in front; those behind the artificial bank seemed more intent upon destroying the 27th, who at this time, it may literally be said, were lying dead in square; their loss after La Haye Sainte had fallen was awful, without the satisfaction of having scarcely fired a shot, and many of our troops in rear of the ridge were similarly situated.
During this time many of Wellington's generals and aides were killed or wounded including FitzRoy Somerset, Canning, de Lancey, Alten and Cooke. The situation was now critical and Wellington, trapped in an infantry square and ignorant of events beyond it, was desperate for the arrival of help from the Prussians. He later wrote, The time they occupied in approaching seemed interminable. Both they and my watch seemed to have stuck fast.
Arrival of the Prussian IV Corps: Plancenoit: Night or the Prussians must come.
The Prussian IV Corps (Bülow's) was the first to arrive in strength. Bülow's objective was Plancenoit, which the Prussians intended to use as a springboard into the rear of the French positions. Blücher intended to secure his right upon the Châteaux Frichermont using the Bois de Paris road. Blücher and Wellington had been exchanging communications since 10:00 and had agreed to this advance on Frichermont if Wellington's centre was under attack. General Bülow noted that the way to Plancenoit lay open and that the time was 16:30.
At about this time, the Prussian 15th Brigade (Losthin's) was sent to link up with the Nassauers of Wellington's left flank in the Frichermont-La Haie area, with the brigade's horse artillery battery and additional brigade artillery deployed to its left in support. Napoleon sent Lobau's corps to stop the rest of Bülow's IV Corps proceeding to Plancenoit. The 15th Brigade threw Lobau's troops out of Frichermont with a determined bayonet charge, then proceeded up the Frichermont heights, battering French Chasseurs with 12-pounder artillery fire, and pushed on to Plancenoit. This sent Lobau's corps into retreat to the Plancenoit area, driving Lobau past the rear of the Armee Du Nord's right flank and directly threatening its only line of retreat. Hiller's 16th Brigade also pushed forward with six battalions against Plancenoit.
Napoleon had dispatched all eight battalions of the Young Guard to reinforce Lobau, who was now seriously pressed. The Young Guard counter-attacked and, after very hard fighting, secured Plancenoit, but were themselves counter-attacked and driven out. Napoleon sent two battalions of the Middle/Old Guard into Plancenoit and after ferocious bayonet fighting—they did not deign to fire their muskets—this force recaptured the village.
Zieten's flank march: Throughout the late afternoon, the Prussian I Corps (Zieten's) had been arriving in greater strength in the area just north of La Haie. General Müffling, the Prussian liaison to Wellington, rode to meet Zieten.
Zieten had by this time brought up the Prussian 1st Brigade (Steinmetz's), but had become concerned at the sight of stragglers and casualties from the Nassau units on Wellington's left and from the Prussian 15th Brigade (Laurens'). These troops appeared to be withdrawing and Zieten, fearing that his own troops would be caught up in a general retreat, was starting to move away from Wellington's flank and towards the Prussian main body near Plancenoit. Zieten had also received a direct order from Blücher to support Bülow, which Zieten obeyed, starting to march to Bülow's aid.
Müffling saw this movement away and persuaded Zieten to support Wellington's left flank. Müffling warned Zieten that "The battle is lost if the corps does not keep on the move and immediately support the English army." Zieten resumed his march to support Wellington directly, and the arrival of his troops allowed Wellington to reinforce his crumbling centre by moving cavalry from his left. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Battle of Waterloo | These troops appeared to be withdrawing and Zieten, fearing that his own troops would be caught up in a general retreat, was starting to move away from Wellington's flank and towards the Prussian main body near Plancenoit. Zieten had also received a direct order from Blücher to support Bülow, which Zieten obeyed, starting to march to Bülow's aid.
Müffling saw this movement away and persuaded Zieten to support Wellington's left flank. Müffling warned Zieten that "The battle is lost if the corps does not keep on the move and immediately support the English army." Zieten resumed his march to support Wellington directly, and the arrival of his troops allowed Wellington to reinforce his crumbling centre by moving cavalry from his left.
The French were expecting Grouchy to march to their support from Wavre, and when Prussian I Corps (Zieten's) appeared at Waterloo instead of Grouchy, "the shock of disillusionment shattered French morale" and "the sight of Zieten's arrival caused turmoil to rage in Napoleon's army". I Corps proceeded to attack the French troops before Papelotte and by 19:30 the French position was bent into a rough horseshoe shape. The ends of the line were now based on Hougoumont on the left, Plancenoit on the right, and the centre on La Haie.
Durutte had taken the positions of La Haie and Papelotte in a series of attacks, but now retreated behind Smohain without opposing the Prussian 24th Regiment (Laurens') as it retook both. The 24th advanced against the new French position, was repulsed, and returned to the attack supported by Silesian Schützen (riflemen) and the F/1st Landwehr. The French initially fell back before the renewed assault, but now began seriously to contest ground, attempting to regain Smohain and hold on to the ridgeline and the last few houses of Papelotte.
The Prussian 24th Regiment linked up with a Highlander battalion on its far right and along with the 13th Landwehr Regiment and cavalry support threw the French out of these positions. Further attacks by the 13th Landwehr and the 15th Brigade drove the French from Frichermont. Durutte's division, finding itself about to be charged by massed squadrons of Zieten's I Corps cavalry reserve, retreated from the battlefield. The rest of d'Erlon's I Corps also broke and fled in panic, while to the west the French Middle Guard were assaulting Wellington's centre. The Prussian I Corps then advanced towards the Brussels road, the only line of retreat available to the French.
Attack of the Imperial Guard: Meanwhile, with Wellington's centre exposed by the fall of La Haye Sainte and the Plancenoit front temporarily stabilised, Napoleon committed his last reserve, the hitherto-undefeated Imperial Guard infantry. This attack, mounted at around 19:30, was intended to break through Wellington's centre and roll up his line away from the Prussians. Although it is one of the most celebrated passages of arms in military history, it had been unclear which units actually participated. It appears that it was mounted by five battalions of the Middle Guard, and not by the grenadiers or chasseurs of the Old Guard. Three Old Guard battalions did move forward and formed the attack's second line, though they remained in reserve and did not directly assault the Anglo-allied line.
... I saw four regiments of the middle guard, conducted by the Emperor, arriving. With these troops, he wished to renew the attack, and penetrate the centre of the enemy. He ordered me to lead them on; generals, officers and soldiers all displayed the greatest intrepidity; but this body of troops was too weak to resist, for a long time, the forces opposed to it by the enemy, and it was soon necessary to renounce the hope which this attack had, for a few moments, inspired.
Napoleon himself oversaw the initial deployment of the Middle and Old Guard. The Middle Guard formed in battalion squares, each about 550 men strong, with the 1st/3rd Grenadiers, led by Generals Friant and Poret de Morvan, on the right along the road, to their left and rear was General Harlet leading the square of the 4th Grenadiers, then the 1st/3rd Chasseurs under General Michel, next the 2nd/3rd Chasseurs and finally the large single square of two battalions of 800 soldiers of the 4th Chasseurs led by General Henrion. Two batteries of Imperial Guard Horse Artillery accompanied them with sections of two guns between the squares. Each square was led by a general and Marshal Ney, mounted on his 5th horse of the day, led the advance. Behind them, in reserve, were the three battalions of the Old Guard, right to left 1st/2nd Grenadiers, 2nd/2nd Chasseurs and 1st/2nd Chasseurs. Napoleon left Ney to conduct the assault; however, Ney led the Middle Guard on an oblique towards the Anglo-allied centre right instead of attacking straight up the centre. Napoleon sent Ney's senior ADC Colonel Crabbé to order Ney to adjust, but Crabbé was unable to get there in time.
Other troops rallied to support the advance of the Guard. On the left infantry from Reille's corps that was not engaged with Hougoumont and cavalry advanced. On the right all the now rallied elements of D'Érlon's corps once again ascended the ridge and engaged the Anglo-allied line. French artillery also moved forward in support; Duchand's battery, in particular, inflicting losses on Colin Halkett's brigade. Halkett's front line, consisting of the 30th Foot and 73rd, traded fire with the 1st/3rd and 4th Grenadiers but they were driven back in confusion into the 33rd and 69th regiments, Halket was shot in the face and seriously wounded and the whole brigade having been ordered to pull back, retreated in a mob. Other Anglo-allied troops began to give way as well. A counterattack by the Nassauers and the remains of Kielmansegge's brigade from the Anglo-allied second line, led by the Prince of Orange, was also thrown back and the Prince of Orange was seriously wounded. The survivors of Halkett's brigade were reformed, and engaged the French in a firefight.
I saw the Garde Impériale advancing while the English troops were leaving the plateau en masse and moving in the direction of Waterloo; the battle seemed lost...
The Dutch divisional commander Chassé, on his own initiative, decided at this critical moment to advance with his relatively fresh Dutch division. Chassé first ordered his artillery forward; led by a battery of Dutch horse-artillery commanded by Captain Krahmer de Bichin. The battery opened a destructive fire into the 1st/3rd Grenadiers' flank. This still did not stop the Guard's advance, so Chassé, who was affectionately called "Generaal Bajonet" by his soldiers, ordered his first brigade, commanded by Colonel Hendrik Detmers, to charge the outnumbered French with the bayonet. As the Guard wavered Chassé galloped among his men and found Captain De Haan with a few soldiers of the 19th Militia, whom he ordered into a flank attack. According to Chassé:
[De Haan] jumped over the hedge, reformed the line of about fifty men and the murderous fire he inflicted caused death and confusion among the enemy's lines. He took advantage of their confusion and advanced with the bayonet against them. I had the unspeakable joy to witness 300 Cuirassiers run away from 50 Dutchmen.
The French grenadiers then faltered and broke. The 4th Grenadiers, seeing their comrades retreat and having suffered heavy casualties themselves, now wheeled right about and retired.
To the left of the 4th Grenadiers were the two squares of the 1st/ and 2nd/3rd Chasseurs who angled further to the west and had suffered more from artillery fire than the grenadiers. But as their advance mounted the ridge they found it apparently abandoned and covered with dead. Suddenly 1,500 British Foot Guards under Peregrine Maitland, who had been lying down to protect themselves from the French artillery, rose and devastated them with point-blank volleys. The chasseurs deployed to answer the fire, but some 300 fell from the first volley, including Colonel Mallet and General Michel, and both battalion commanders. A bayonet charge by the Foot Guards then broke the leaderless squares, which fell back onto the following column. The 4th Chasseurs battalion, 800 strong, now came up onto the exposed battalions of British Foot Guards, who lost all cohesion and dashed back up the slope as a disorganized crowd with the chasseurs in pursuit. At the crest the chasseurs came upon the battery that had caused severe casualties on the 1st and 2nd/3rd Chasseurs. They opened fire and swept away the gunners. |