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DebateCards-SFT-phase2-v2

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[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Section 5 rulemaking with Chevron deference can reach extraterritorially.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The FTC’s regulations\nprovide a good example of an agency using general rulemaking authority to define the geographic scope of a statute\nThe aim is to give\nagencies the chance to review\nin order to determine whether they would violate\nClayton\nor the FTC A\nprohibiting\nu\nm\nc\ntext does not define\ngeographic scope\ngives the FTC\nrulemaking authority to implement the Act\nSuch delegations are rare in antitrust\nalthough\ngreater deference to\nagencies in\nantitrust\nthe Supreme Court is moving towards\nauthority includes the power to “define\nterms used in this section;”\nBeyond\nauthority\nin these grants, there is no express delegation to the FTC of authority to define\ngeographic scope\nFrom the start it used its rulemaking authority to define the Act’s geographic scope\nIt seems doubtful that a court asked to determine the geographic scope of HSR without the benefit of the FTC’s guidance would have landed in exactly the same place. But it also seems doubtful that a court would cast aside the FTC’s guidance and seek to determine\ngeographic scope\nfor itself, whether by applying the presumption against extraterritoriality or otherwise\nAs a general matter, FTC regulations\nare evaluated for reasonableness at Chevron step two\nHSR gives the FTC “great discretion to define statutory terms and to promulgate rules to facilitate Government identification of mergers and acquisitions likely to violate federal antitrust laws\nIn determining the geographic scope\nthe FTC did not apply the presumption against extraterritoriality\nBut\ndid consider both the “impact on United States commerce” and “considerations of comity” when it decided to exempt “some acquisitions\nthe FTC’s regulations implementing HSR reflect the same values\nthat lie behind the presumption against extraterritoriality\nthe fact that the agency took into account the normative values underlying the presumption should be sufficient to find its regulations reasonable at Chevron step two.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "FTC’s reg\ns\nusing general rulemaking authority to define\ngeographic scope of a statute\nto give\nagencies\nchance to review\nwhether they\nviolate\nthe FTC A\nprohibiting\nu\nm\nc\ngreat\ndeference to\nagencies in\nantitrust\nincludes\npower to “define\nterms\nin this section\nno express delegation\ndefine\ngeographic scope\nit\nseems doubtful\na court would cast aside\nFTC’s guidance and\ndetermine\ngeographic scope\nfor itself, whether by\nthe presumption against extraterritoriality or otherwise\nFTC reg\ns\nare evaluated\nat Chevron step two\ngives\ngreat discretion\nFTC did not apply\npresumption against extraterritoriality\nBut\ndid consider\ncommerce\nand\ncomity\nthat\nshould be sufficient to find\nreg\ns reasonable at Chevron", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Regulations don’t ‘increase prohibitions by… law.’", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Government argues that this whistleblower statute does not protect MacLean because his disclosure regarding the canceled missions was “specifically prohibited by law” in two ways. First, the Government argues that the disclosure was specifically prohibited by the TSA's regulations on sensitive security information: 49 CFR §§ 1520.5(a)-(b), 1520.7(j) (2003). Second, the Government argues that the disclosure was specifically prohibited by 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1), which authorized the TSA to promulgate those regulations. We address each argument in turn.\n*390 A\n1\n*391 In 2003, the TSA's regulations prohibited the disclosure of “ [s]pecific details of aviation security measures ... [such as] information concerning specific numbers of Federal Air Marshals, deployments or missions, and the methods involved in such operations.” 49 CFR § 1520.7(j). MacLean does not dispute before this Court that the TSA's regulations prohibited his disclosure regarding the canceled missions. Thus, the question here is whether a disclosure that is specifically prohibited by regulation is also “ specifically prohibited by law ” under Section 2302(b)(8)(A). (Emphasis added.)\nThe answer is no. Throughout Section 2302, Congress repeatedly used the phrase “law, rule, or regulation.” For example, Section 2302(b)(1)(E) prohibits a federal agency from discriminating against an employee “on the basis of marital status or political affiliation, as prohibited under any law, rule, or regulation.” For another example, Section 2302(b)(6) prohibits an agency from “grant[ing] any preference or advantage not authorized by law, rule, or regulation.” And for a third example, Section 2302(b)(9)(A) prohibits an agency from retaliating against an employee for “the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation.”\n1In contrast, Congress did not use the phrase “law, rule, or regulation” in the statutory language at issue here; it used the word “law” standing alone. That is significant because Congress generally acts intentionally when it uses particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983). Thus, Congress's choice to say “specifically prohibited by law” rather than “specifically prohibited by law, rule, or regulation” suggests that Congress meant to exclude rules and regulations.\n*392 The interpretive canon that Congress acts intentionally when it omits language included elsewhere applies with particular force here for two reasons. First, Congress used “law” and “law, rule, or regulation” in close proximity—indeed, in the same sentence. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (protecting the disclosure of “any violation of any law, rule, or regulation ... if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law”). Second, Congress used the broader phrase “law, rule, or regulation” repeatedly—nine times in Section 2302 alone. See §§ 2302(a)(2)(D)(i), (b)(1)(E), (b)(6), (b)(8)(A) (i), (b)(8)(B)(i), (b)(9)(A), (b)(12), (b)(13), (d)(5). Those two aspects of the whistleblower statute make Congress's choice to use the narrower word “law” seem quite deliberate.\n**920 We drew the same inference in Department of Treasury, IRS v. FLRA, 494 U.S. 922, 110 S.Ct. 1623, 108 L.Ed.2d 914 (1990). There, the Government argued that the word “laws” in one section of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 meant the same thing as the phrase “law, rule, or regulation” in another section of the Act. Id., at 931, 110 S.Ct. 1623. We rejected that argument as “simply contrary to any reasonable interpretation of the text.” Id., at 932, 110 S.Ct. 1623. Indeed, we held that a statute that referred to “laws” in one section and “law, rule, or regulation” in another “cannot, unless we abandon all pretense at precise communication, be deemed to mean the same thing in both places.” Ibid. That inference is even more compelling here, because the statute refers to “law” and “law, rule, or regulation” in the same sentence, rather than several sections apart.\nAnother part of the statutory text points the same way. After creating an exception for disclosures “specifically prohibited by law,” Section 2302(b)(8)(A) goes on to create a second exception for information “specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.” This exception is limited to action taken directly by the President. That suggests that the word “law” in the only other exception is limited to actions by Congress—after all, it would be unusual *393 for the first exception to include action taken by executive agencies, when the second exception requires action by the President himself.\nIn addition, a broad interpretation of the word “law” could defeat the purpose of the whistleblower statute. If “law” included agency rules and regulations, then an agency could insulate itself from the scope of Section 2302(b)(8)(A) merely by promulgating a regulation that “specifically prohibited” whistleblowing. But Congress passed the whistleblower statute precisely because it did not trust agencies to regulate whistleblowers within their ranks. Thus, it is unlikely that Congress meant to include rules and regulations within the word “law.”\n2\n2The Government admits that some regulations fall outside the word “law” as used in Section 2302(b)(8)(A). But, the Government says, that does not mean that all regulations are excluded. The Government suggests two interpretations that would distinguish “law” from “law, rule, or regulation,” but would still allow the word “law” to subsume the TSA's regulations on sensitive security information.\nFirst, the Government argues that the word “law” includes all regulations that have the “force and effect of law” (i.e., legislative regulations), while excluding those that do not (e.g., interpretive rules). Brief for Petitioner 19–22. The Government bases this argument on our decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979). There, we held that legislative regulations generally fall within the meaning of the word “law,” and that it would take a “clear showing of contrary legislative intent” before we concluded otherwise. Id., at 295–296, 99 S.Ct. 1705. Thus, because the TSA's regulations have the force and effect of law, the Government says that they should qualify as “law” under the statute.\nThe Government's description of Chrysler is accurate enough. But Congress's use of the word “law,” in close connection with the phrase “law, rule, or regulation,” provides *394 the necessary “clear showing” that “law” does not include regulations. Indeed, using “law” and “law, rule, or regulation” in the same sentence would be a very obscure way of drawing the Government's nuanced distinction between different **921 types of regulations. Had Congress wanted to draw that distinction, there were far easier and clearer ways to do so. For example, at the time Congress passed Section 2302(b)(8)(A), another federal statute defined the words “regulatory order” to include a “rule or regulation, if it has the force and effect of law.” 7 U.S.C. § 450c(a) (1976 ed.). Likewise, another federal statute defined the words “State law” to include “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1976 ed.). As those examples show, Congress knew how to distinguish between regulations that had the force and effect of law and those that did not, but chose not to do so in Section 2302(b)(8)(A).\nSecond, the Government argues that the word “law” includes at least those regulations that were “promulgated pursuant to an express congressional directive.” Brief for Petitioner 21. Outside of this case, however, the Government was unable to find a single example of the word “law” being used in that way. Not a single dictionary definition, not a single statute, not a single case. The Government's interpretation happens to fit this case precisely, but it needs more than that to recommend it.\nAlthough the Government argues here that the word “law” includes rules and regulations, it definitively rejected that argument in the Court of Appeals. For example, the Government's brief accepted that the word “law” meant “legislative enactment,” and said that the “only dispute” was whether 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1) “serve[d] as that legislative enactment.” Brief for Respondent in No. 11–3231 (CA Fed.), pp. 46–47. Then, at oral argument, a judge asked the Government's attorney the following question: “I thought I understood your brief to concede that [the word “law”] can't *395 be a rule or regulation, it means statute. Am I wrong?” The Government's attorney responded: “You're not wrong your honor. I'll be as clear as I can. ‘Specifically prohibited by law’ here means statute.” Oral Arg. Audio in No. 11–3231, at 22:42–23:03; see also id., at 29:57–30:03 (“Now, as we've been discussing here, we're not saying here that [the word “law”] needs to encompass regulations. We're saying statute.”). Those concessions reinforce our conclusion that the Government's proposed interpretations are unpersuasive.\nIn sum, when Congress used the phrase “specifically prohibited by law” instead of “specifically prohibited by law, rule, or regulation,” it meant to exclude rules and regulations. We therefore hold that the TSA's regulations do not qualify as “law” for purposes of Section 2302(b)(8)(A).\nB\n3We next consider whether MacLean's disclosure regarding the canceled missions was “specifically prohibited” by 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1) itself. As relevant here, that statute provides that the TSA “shall prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information obtained or developed in carrying out security ... if the Under Secretary decides that *396 disclosing the information would ... be detrimental to the security of transportation.” § 114(r)(1)(C).\nThis statute does not prohibit anything. On the contrary, it authorizes something—it authorizes the Under Secretary to “prescribe regulations.” Thus, by its terms Section 114(r)(1) did not prohibit the disclosure at issue here.\nThe Government responds that Section 114(r)(1) did prohibit MacLean's disclosure by imposing a “legislative mandate” on the TSA to promulgate regulations to that effect. See Brief for Petitioner 28, 33; see also post, at 2–3 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). **922 But the Government pushes the statute too far. Section 114(r)(1) says that the TSA shall prohibit disclosures only “if the Under Secretary decides that disclosing the information would ... be detrimental to the security of transportation.” § 114(r)(1)(C) (emphasis added). That language affords substantial discretion to the TSA in deciding whether to prohibit any particular disclosure.\nThe dissent tries to downplay the scope of that discretion, viewing it as the almost ministerial task of “identifying whether a particular piece of information falls within the scope of Congress' command.” Post, at 3. But determining which documents meet the statutory standard of “detrimental to the security of transportation” requires the exercise of considerable judgment. For example, the Government says that Section 114(r)(1) requires the Under Secretary to prohibit disclosures like MacLean's. The Government also says, however, that the statute does not require the Under Secretary to prohibit an employee from disclosing that “federal air marshals will be absent from important flights, but declining to specify which flights.” Reply Brief 23. That fine-grained distinction comes not from Section 114(r)(1) itself, but from the Under Secretary's exercise of discretion. It is the TSA's regulations—not the statute—that prohibited MacLean's disclosure. And as the dissent agrees, a regulation does not count as “law” under the whistleblower statute. See post, at 1.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The Government argues\ndisclosure\nwas\nprohibited by law\nMacLean does not dispute\nthat\nregulations prohibited\ndisclosure\nThus, the question here is whether a disclosure that is specifically prohibited by regulation is also\nprohibited by law\nThe answer is no\nCongress did not use the phrase “law, rule, or regulation” in the statutory language\nit used the word “law” standing alone. That is significant because Congress\nacts intentionally when it uses particular language\nCongress's choice to say\nprohibited by law\nrather than\nprohibited by law, rule, or regulation\nsuggests\nCongress meant to exclude rules and regulations.\nlaws\nand\nlaw, rule, or regulation\ncannot, unless we abandon all pretense at precise communication, be deemed to mean the same thing\nthe Government argues\nthe word “law” includes at least those regulations that were “promulgated pursuant to an express congressional directive.”\nhowever\nwas unable to find a single example of the word “law” being used in that way. Not a single dictionary definition, not a single statute, not a single case. The Government's interpretation happens to fit this case\nbut\nneeds more than that to recommend it\n“law” meant “legislative enactment,”\nthe word\nlaw\ncan't\nbe a rule or regulation, it means statute\nprohibited by law\nmeans statute\nfine-grained distinction comes not from Section 114(r)(1) itself\nbut from the Under Secretary's\ndiscretion\nIt is the\nregulations—not the statute—that prohibited\nAnd\na regulation does not count as “law”", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Regulations don’t ‘increase prohibitions by… law.’", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Government argues\ndisclosure\nwas\nprohibited by law\nMacLean does not dispute\nthat\nregulations prohibited\ndisclosure\nThus, the question here is whether a disclosure that is specifically prohibited by regulation is also\nprohibited by law\nThe answer is no\nCongress did not use the phrase “law, rule, or regulation” in the statutory language\nit used the word “law” standing alone. That is significant because Congress\nacts intentionally when it uses particular language\nCongress's choice to say\nprohibited by law\nrather than\nprohibited by law, rule, or regulation\nsuggests\nCongress meant to exclude rules and regulations.\nlaws\nand\nlaw, rule, or regulation\ncannot, unless we abandon all pretense at precise communication, be deemed to mean the same thing\nthe Government argues\nthe word “law” includes at least those regulations that were “promulgated pursuant to an express congressional directive.”\nhowever\nwas unable to find a single example of the word “law” being used in that way. Not a single dictionary definition, not a single statute, not a single case. The Government's interpretation happens to fit this case\nbut\nneeds more than that to recommend it\n“law” meant “legislative enactment,”\nthe word\nlaw\ncan't\nbe a rule or regulation, it means statute\nprohibited by law\nmeans statute\nfine-grained distinction comes not from Section 114(r)(1) itself\nbut from the Under Secretary's\ndiscretion\nIt is the\nregulations—not the statute—that prohibited\nAnd\na regulation does not count as “law”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "prohibited by law\nnot\nregulations\nreg\nalso\nlaw\nno\nnot\nrule, or regulation\n“law” standing alone\nacts intentionally\nuses particular language\nsay\nprohibited by law\nrather than\nrule, or reg\nexclude rules and reg\ns\nlaws\nlaw, rule, or regulation\ncannot\nabandon all pretense at precise communication\nmean the same thing\nGov\nincludes\nleast\nreg\ns\npursuant to an express congressional directive\nunable\nsingle example of the word “law” being used in that way\nsingle dictionary definition\nsingle statute\nsingle case\nhappens to fit this case\nneeds more than that to recommend it\nlegislative enactment\ncan't\nrule or reg\nstatute\nprohibited by law\nstatute\ndistinction\nnot\nSection 114(r)(1) itself\nUnder Secretary's\ndiscretion\nregulations—not the statute\nprohibited\nregulation\nnot count as “law”", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Regulations don’t ‘increase prohibitions by… law.’\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Government argues\ndisclosure\nwas\nprohibited by law\nMacLean does not dispute\nthat\nregulations prohibited\ndisclosure\nThus, the question here is whether a disclosure that is specifically prohibited by regulation is also\nprohibited by law\nThe answer is no\nCongress did not use the phrase “law, rule, or regulation” in the statutory language\nit used the word “law” standing alone. That is significant because Congress\nacts intentionally when it uses particular language\nCongress's choice to say\nprohibited by law\nrather than\nprohibited by law, rule, or regulation\nsuggests\nCongress meant to exclude rules and regulations.\nlaws\nand\nlaw, rule, or regulation\ncannot, unless we abandon all pretense at precise communication, be deemed to mean the same thing\nthe Government argues\nthe word “law” includes at least those regulations that were “promulgated pursuant to an express congressional directive.”\nhowever\nwas unable to find a single example of the word “law” being used in that way. Not a single dictionary definition, not a single statute, not a single case. The Government's interpretation happens to fit this case\nbut\nneeds more than that to recommend it\n“law” meant “legislative enactment,”\nthe word\nlaw\ncan't\nbe a rule or regulation, it means statute\nprohibited by law\nmeans statute\nfine-grained distinction comes not from Section 114(r)(1) itself\nbut from the Under Secretary's\ndiscretion\nIt is the\nregulations—not the statute—that prohibited\nAnd\na regulation does not count as “law”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "is\na disclosure\nprohibited by reg\nalso\nprohibited by law\nno\nCongress\nused\n“law” standing alone\nacts intentionally when it uses particular language\nchoice to say\nprohibited by law\nrather than\nby law, rule, or reg\nsuggests\nto exclude rules and reg\ns\nlaws\nand\nrule, or regulation\ncannot, unless we abandon all pretense at precise communication\nmean the same thing\nthe Gov\nargues\n“law” includes at least\nreg\ns\npromulgated pursuant to\ncongressional directive\nhowever\nwas unable to find a single example of the word\nbeing used\nthat way. Not a single dictionary\nnot a\nstatute\nnot a\ncase\nlaw\ncan't\nbe a rule or reg", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: That means specifying a class of activity covered by Section 5 does NOT expand the scope.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "b. Examples 7-9 – New Media \nSeveral commenters raised questions about, or suggested revisions to, proposed new Examples 7-9 in Section 255.5, in which the obligation to disclose material connections is applied to endorsements made through certain new media.91 Two commenters argued that application of the principles of the Guides to new media would be inconsistent with the Commission’s prior commitment to address word of mouth marketing issues on a case-by-case basis.92 Others urged that they be deleted in their entirety from the final Guides, either because it is premature for the Commission to add them, or because of the potential adverse effect on the growth of these (and other) new media.93 Two commenters said that industry self-regulation is sufficient.94\nThe Commission’s inclusion of examples using these new media is not inconsistent with the staff’s 2006 statement that it would determine on a case-by-case basis whether law enforcement investigations of ‘‘buzz marketing’’ were appropriate.95 All Commission law enforcement decisions are, and will continue to be, made on a case-by-case basis, evaluating the specific facts at hand. Moreover, as noted above, the Guides do not expand the scope of liability under Section 5; they simply provide guidance as to how the Commission intends to apply governing law to various facts. In other words, the Commission could challenge the dissemination of deceptive representations made via these media regardless of whether the Guides contain these examples; thus, not including the new examples would simply deprive advertisers of guidance they otherwise could use in planning their marketing activities.96", "role": "user" }, { "content": "All Commission law enforcement decisions are\nmade on a case-by-case basis, evaluating the specific facts\nGuides do not expand the scope of\nSection 5; they simply provide guidance as to how the Commission intends to apply governing law to various facts\nthus, not including the\nexamples would simply deprive advertisers of guidance they otherwise could use in planning their\nactivities", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: That means specifying a class of activity covered by Section 5 does NOT expand the scope.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "All Commission law enforcement decisions are\nmade on a case-by-case basis, evaluating the specific facts\nGuides do not expand the scope of\nSection 5; they simply provide guidance as to how the Commission intends to apply governing law to various facts\nthus, not including the\nexamples would simply deprive advertisers of guidance they otherwise could use in planning their\nactivities", "role": "user" }, { "content": "law enforcement\ncase-by-case\nspecific facts\nGuides\nnot expand the scope of\nSection 5\nguidance\nhow the Commission intends to apply governing law to various facts\nnot including\nexamples\nsimply\nguidance\notherwise\nplanning\nactivities", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: That means specifying a class of activity covered by Section 5 does NOT expand the scope.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "All Commission law enforcement decisions are\nmade on a case-by-case basis, evaluating the specific facts\nGuides do not expand the scope of\nSection 5; they simply provide guidance as to how the Commission intends to apply governing law to various facts\nthus, not including the\nexamples would simply deprive advertisers of guidance they otherwise could use in planning their\nactivities", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Commission\nenforcement decisions are\nmade\nevaluating\nspecific facts\nGuides do not expand the scope of\nSection 5; they simply provide guidance as to how the Commission intends to apply\nlaw to various facts", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Only the CP alone solves the case---the plan is a joint offer to both Russia and China, necessitating trilateral negotiations---that collapses agreement due to increased complexity, cultural disparities, and differences in approach---the CP offers the same content but structured it as dual parallel bilateral agreements to each---that’s key", "role": "system" }, { "content": "“The Incidents in Space Agreement”\nThe principles and goals of the Incidents on the High Seas Agreement are applicable to the emerging issue of space weaponry, albeit there are differences given the nature of space and the rules of present international space law. There are currently three nations with the demonstrated capacity for manned space flight and the demonstrated capacity to affect or interfere with the space capability of each other: the United States, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China.\nApplying the principles and goals of freedom from interference and the prevention of incidents involving spacecraft would begin with separate formal invitations by the United States to the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China to enter into bilateral discussions concerning space operations. Because of the sensitivity and complexity of the topic, opening trilateral agreements would be more cumbersome and have less probability of producing an effective agreement given the multiplicity of varying national interests, cultural disparities, and differences in space operations. Such bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China would not prohibit—and in fact might encourage—the two nations to adopt a similar measure.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "There are currently three nations with the demonstrated capacity for manned space flight and the demonstrated capacity to affect or interfere with the space capability of each other: the United States, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China\nApplying the principles and goals of freedom from interference\nwould begin with separate formal invitations by the U\nS\nto the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China to enter into bilateral discussions concerning space operations. Because of the sensitivity and complexity of the topic, opening trilateral agreements would be more cumbersome and have less probability of producing an effective agreement given the multiplicity of varying national interests, cultural disparities, and differences in space operations. Such bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China would not prohibit\nand in fact might encourage—the two nations to adopt a similar measure", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Only the CP alone solves the case---the plan is a joint offer to both Russia and China, necessitating trilateral negotiations---that collapses agreement due to increased complexity, cultural disparities, and differences in approach---the CP offers the same content but structured it as dual parallel bilateral agreements to each---that’s key", "role": "system" }, { "content": "There are currently three nations with the demonstrated capacity for manned space flight and the demonstrated capacity to affect or interfere with the space capability of each other: the United States, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China\nApplying the principles and goals of freedom from interference\nwould begin with separate formal invitations by the U\nS\nto the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China to enter into bilateral discussions concerning space operations. Because of the sensitivity and complexity of the topic, opening trilateral agreements would be more cumbersome and have less probability of producing an effective agreement given the multiplicity of varying national interests, cultural disparities, and differences in space operations. Such bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China would not prohibit\nand in fact might encourage—the two nations to adopt a similar measure", "role": "user" }, { "content": "three\nU\nS\nRussia\nformal invitations\nU\nS\nRussia\nChina\nbilateral discussions\nsensitivity\ncomplexity\ncumbersome\nless probability\nagreement\nvarying national interests\ncultural disparities\ndifferences\nbilateral agreements\nprohibit\nencourage", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Only the CP alone solves the case---the plan is a joint offer to both Russia and China, necessitating trilateral negotiations---that collapses agreement due to increased complexity, cultural disparities, and differences in approach---the CP offers the same content but structured it as dual parallel bilateral agreements to each---that’s key\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "There are currently three nations with the demonstrated capacity for manned space flight and the demonstrated capacity to affect or interfere with the space capability of each other: the United States, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China\nApplying the principles and goals of freedom from interference\nwould begin with separate formal invitations by the U\nS\nto the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China to enter into bilateral discussions concerning space operations. Because of the sensitivity and complexity of the topic, opening trilateral agreements would be more cumbersome and have less probability of producing an effective agreement given the multiplicity of varying national interests, cultural disparities, and differences in space operations. Such bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China would not prohibit\nand in fact might encourage—the two nations to adopt a similar measure", "role": "user" }, { "content": "There are\nthree nations with\ndemonstrated capacity for\nspace flight\nU\nS\nRussia\nand\nChina\nApplying\ngoals\nwould begin with separate\ninvitations by the U\nS\nto\nRussia\nand\nChina to enter into bilateral discussions concerning\noperations. Because of\nsensitivity and complexity\nopening trilateral agreements would be\ncumbersome and have less probability of\neffective agreement given\nmultiplicity of varying\ninterests, cultural disparities, and differences in space operations\nbilateral agreements\nwould\nencourage—the two nations to adopt a similar measure", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2. Trilateral agreements structurally increase the risk of deal failure due to lowest-common-denominator effects", "role": "system" }, { "content": "2. Theorizing the payoffs of trilateralism\nMinilateralism has emerged as a widely discussed phenomenon in international politics. Due to the relatively small number of total cooperative partners, minilateralism is widely known for its efficiency, given that complications and transaction costs are expected to be proportional to the number of actors involved in any multilateral arrangement. Trilateralism is the most minimized format of multilateralism, marking a point of juncture between bilateralism and multilateralism. It refers to ‘the building of cooperative institutions among three states or strategic polities to promote specific values and orders’ (Tow, Thomson, & Yamamoto, 2007). Admittedly, trilateralism functions effectively in helping to reduce transaction costs and enhancing the efficiency of collective undertakings. Nonetheless, this study argues that trilateralism has been constantly confronted with structural uncertainties. Two factors – bilateral constraints and dilution effects – help characterize the trilateralism–bilateralism nexus and the institutional vulnerability of trilateral groupings.\nFirst, the operability of trilateralism is overwhelmingly subject to fluctuations of its\nembedded bilateral relationships. The weakest bilateral tie among three pairs of embedded\nbilateral relationships is most likely to be the Achilles heel of a trilateral arrangement.\nThe creation of trilateral groupings is highly prevalent in East Asia, including the\nUS–Japan–India Strategic Dialogue, the US–Japan–Australia Security Dialogue, and the\nUS–Japan–Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group. In all these trilateral groupings, the role of the United States as a hegemonic power is deemed vital (Green, 2014, p. 761). For instance, the relatively weak Japan–Korea bilateral tie creates uncertainty for US–Japan–Korea trilateralism. In this case, the United States has mobilized substantial diplomatic resources in mediating and encouraging conflict avoidance between Japan and Korea (Tow et al., 2007, p. 24). In contrast, trilateralism among China, Japan and Korea follows the pattern of two great powers plus one relatively small power in the middle and lacks a dominant great power to lead this form of trilateral cooperation, a role which the United States has played for other triangles in the region. The fragility of China–Japan relations, as well as the rising competition for regional hegemony between the two, creates uncertainty and challenges for the solidarity of the trilateral regime (Zhang, 2016).\nIn the meantime, the dilution effect caused by bilateral approaches poses another threat to the operability of trilateralism. Multilateralism generally has the advantage of reducing transaction costs and creating economies of scale. It allows a set of negotiations or agreements to be conducted in a way that incorporates the views of all relevant stakeholders. In contrast, the bilateral approach multiplies transaction costs because ‘a new contract has to be negotiated, drafted, and safeguarded for each participant’ (Thompson & Verdier, 2010). However, with only three member nations, the benefits of reducing transaction costs are relatively insignificant within a trilateral regime. For a member country in a trilateral setting, the cooperation will for constructing such a trilateral arrangement is likely to drop and be diluted by bilateral approaches. Jo and Mo (2010) posited that the payoffs of a trilateral grouping must amount to more than the sum of the bilateral relations between countries that are willing to cooperate. In other word, a trilateral agreement or institution is likely to be established only on the condition that each of three actors realizes that the payoffs of trilateralism are higher than they would be when cooperating with the other two actors in bilateral approaches respectively.\nHence, the payoffs associated with a trilateral grouping are likely to be offset by the negative impacts of ‘bilateral constraints’ and ‘dilution effects.’ Trilateral cooperation is, therefore, more likely to emerge under special circumstances, such as those arising from common exogenous crises, in which the demand for trilateral cooperation and the payoffs of trilateralism rise accordingly. Scholars refer to such pivotal turning points as ‘critical junctures.’ The effects of these events may spread from the financial and economic sectors in such a way as to affect functional dimensions, such as environmental protection and disaster relief. Critical junctures have significant influences on institutional development. A crisis or other emergency event calls the legitimacy of existing institutional arrangements into serious question, and creates windows of opportunity for change, which then generates a demand for establishing new institutional forms, powers and precedents (Yoshimatsu, 2016). In addition to being widely used in understanding East Asian regionalism under the APT, the critical juncture approach has more recently been applied in studies of regionalism and multilateralism in northeast Asia (Calder & Ye, 2010). In the face of contingent exogenous crises, a timely trilateral joint response is more efficient and cost-saving than separate bilateral talks.\nOn the other hand, it is also important to examine the sustainability of trilateralism in post-crisis processes; that is, whether and to what extent the three countries have committed to developing their trilateral cooperation after the crucial exogenous shock has ended. The main finding of this study is that institutional innovations based in trilateralism have seemingly revealed greater solidarity and stability at the functional level. However, in areas of middle and high politics, once these common problems and crises have dissipated, trilateralism remains not capable of overcoming bilateral constraints and dilution effects. The payoffs of a trilateral setting seemingly yielded to the aggregate payoffs of separate bilateral diplomatic bargains.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Trilateralism\nrefers to\nbuilding of cooperative institutions among three states\nNonetheless\ntrilateralism has been constantly confronted with structural uncertainties. Two factors – bilateral constraints and dilution effects – help characterize the trilateralism–bilateralism nexus and the institutional vulnerability of trilateral groupings\nFirst, the operability of trilateralism is overwhelmingly subject to fluctuations of its\nembedded bilateral relationships. The weakest bilateral tie among three pairs\nis most likely to be the Achilles heel of a trilateral arrangement\nthe relatively weak\nbilateral tie creates uncertainty for\ntrilateralism\nthe dilution effect\napproaches poses another threat to the operability of trilateralism. Multilateralism generally has the advantage of reducing transaction costs and creating economies of scale. It allows a set of negotiations\nto be conducted in a way that incorporates\nviews of all relevant stakeholders. In contrast, the bilateral\nmultiplies transaction costs because ‘a new contract has to be negotiated\nfor each participant’\nHowever, with only three member nations, the benefits of reducing transaction costs are relatively insignificant within a trilateral regime. For a member country in a trilateral setting, the cooperation will for constructing\na trilateral arrangement is likely to drop and be diluted by bilateral approaches\nthe payoffs of a trilateral grouping must amount to more than the sum of the bilateral relations between countries that are willing to cooperate. In other word, a trilateral agreement\nis likely to be established only on the condition that each of three actors realizes that the payoffs of trilateralism are higher than they would be when cooperating with the other two actors in bilateral approaches respectively\nHence, the payoffs\nwith a trilateral grouping are\noffset by\nnegative impacts of ‘bilateral constraints’ and ‘dilution effects.’ Trilateral cooperation is\nlikely to emerge under special circumstances, such as\nexogenous crises\nOn the other hand, it is\nimportant to examine the sustainability\npost-crisis\nwhether and to what extent the three countries have committed to developing\ncooperation after the\nshock has ended\nin areas of\nhigh politics, once\ncommon problems\nhave dissipated, trilateralism remains not capable of overcoming bilateral constraints and dilution effects. The payoffs of a trilateral setting seemingly yielded to the aggregate payoffs of separate bilateral diplomatic bargains", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2. Trilateral agreements structurally increase the risk of deal failure due to lowest-common-denominator effects", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Trilateralism\nrefers to\nbuilding of cooperative institutions among three states\nNonetheless\ntrilateralism has been constantly confronted with structural uncertainties. Two factors – bilateral constraints and dilution effects – help characterize the trilateralism–bilateralism nexus and the institutional vulnerability of trilateral groupings\nFirst, the operability of trilateralism is overwhelmingly subject to fluctuations of its\nembedded bilateral relationships. The weakest bilateral tie among three pairs\nis most likely to be the Achilles heel of a trilateral arrangement\nthe relatively weak\nbilateral tie creates uncertainty for\ntrilateralism\nthe dilution effect\napproaches poses another threat to the operability of trilateralism. Multilateralism generally has the advantage of reducing transaction costs and creating economies of scale. It allows a set of negotiations\nto be conducted in a way that incorporates\nviews of all relevant stakeholders. In contrast, the bilateral\nmultiplies transaction costs because ‘a new contract has to be negotiated\nfor each participant’\nHowever, with only three member nations, the benefits of reducing transaction costs are relatively insignificant within a trilateral regime. For a member country in a trilateral setting, the cooperation will for constructing\na trilateral arrangement is likely to drop and be diluted by bilateral approaches\nthe payoffs of a trilateral grouping must amount to more than the sum of the bilateral relations between countries that are willing to cooperate. In other word, a trilateral agreement\nis likely to be established only on the condition that each of three actors realizes that the payoffs of trilateralism are higher than they would be when cooperating with the other two actors in bilateral approaches respectively\nHence, the payoffs\nwith a trilateral grouping are\noffset by\nnegative impacts of ‘bilateral constraints’ and ‘dilution effects.’ Trilateral cooperation is\nlikely to emerge under special circumstances, such as\nexogenous crises\nOn the other hand, it is\nimportant to examine the sustainability\npost-crisis\nwhether and to what extent the three countries have committed to developing\ncooperation after the\nshock has ended\nin areas of\nhigh politics, once\ncommon problems\nhave dissipated, trilateralism remains not capable of overcoming bilateral constraints and dilution effects. The payoffs of a trilateral setting seemingly yielded to the aggregate payoffs of separate bilateral diplomatic bargains", "role": "user" }, { "content": "confront\nstructural uncertainties\nconstraints\ndilution effects\ncharacterize\ntrilateral\nbilateral\ninstitutional vulnerability\ntrilat\noverwhelmingly subject to fluctuations\nweakest\nAchilles heel\nuncertainty\ndilution effect\na\nMultilat\ngenerally\nreduc\ntransaction costs\ncreat\neconomies of scale\nonly three\nbenefits\nrelatively insignificant\ncooperation will\ndrop\ndiluted\namount to more than the sum of the bilateral relations\nonly\ncondition\nrealizes\npayoffs\nhigher\ncooperating with the other two actors in bilateral approaches\noffset\nnegative impacts\nspecial circumstances\nsustainability\npost-crisis\nhigh politics\nnot capable\nThe payoffs of a trilateral setting seemingly yielded to the aggregate payoffs of separate bilateral diplomatic bargains", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 2. Trilateral agreements structurally increase the risk of deal failure due to lowest-common-denominator effects\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Trilateralism\nrefers to\nbuilding of cooperative institutions among three states\nNonetheless\ntrilateralism has been constantly confronted with structural uncertainties. Two factors – bilateral constraints and dilution effects – help characterize the trilateralism–bilateralism nexus and the institutional vulnerability of trilateral groupings\nFirst, the operability of trilateralism is overwhelmingly subject to fluctuations of its\nembedded bilateral relationships. The weakest bilateral tie among three pairs\nis most likely to be the Achilles heel of a trilateral arrangement\nthe relatively weak\nbilateral tie creates uncertainty for\ntrilateralism\nthe dilution effect\napproaches poses another threat to the operability of trilateralism. Multilateralism generally has the advantage of reducing transaction costs and creating economies of scale. It allows a set of negotiations\nto be conducted in a way that incorporates\nviews of all relevant stakeholders. In contrast, the bilateral\nmultiplies transaction costs because ‘a new contract has to be negotiated\nfor each participant’\nHowever, with only three member nations, the benefits of reducing transaction costs are relatively insignificant within a trilateral regime. For a member country in a trilateral setting, the cooperation will for constructing\na trilateral arrangement is likely to drop and be diluted by bilateral approaches\nthe payoffs of a trilateral grouping must amount to more than the sum of the bilateral relations between countries that are willing to cooperate. In other word, a trilateral agreement\nis likely to be established only on the condition that each of three actors realizes that the payoffs of trilateralism are higher than they would be when cooperating with the other two actors in bilateral approaches respectively\nHence, the payoffs\nwith a trilateral grouping are\noffset by\nnegative impacts of ‘bilateral constraints’ and ‘dilution effects.’ Trilateral cooperation is\nlikely to emerge under special circumstances, such as\nexogenous crises\nOn the other hand, it is\nimportant to examine the sustainability\npost-crisis\nwhether and to what extent the three countries have committed to developing\ncooperation after the\nshock has ended\nin areas of\nhigh politics, once\ncommon problems\nhave dissipated, trilateralism remains not capable of overcoming bilateral constraints and dilution effects. The payoffs of a trilateral setting seemingly yielded to the aggregate payoffs of separate bilateral diplomatic bargains", "role": "user" }, { "content": "trilateralism\nconfront\nstructural uncertainties\nconstraints\ncharacterize the trilateral\nbilateral\nnexus and\ninstitutional vulnerability of trilateral groupings\nFirst\ntrilat\nis overwhelmingly subject to fluctuations\nThe weakest\ntie\nis\nthe Achilles heel\nMultilat\ngenerally\nreduc\ntransaction costs and creat\neconomies of scale\nHowever, with only three\nbenefits\nare\ninsignificant\nin a trilateral setting\ncooperation will\ndrop and be diluted\npayoffs\nmust amount to more than\nsum of\nrelations\na\nagreement\nis\nestablished only on the condition\neach\nrealizes\npayoffs\nare higher than\ncoop\nwith the other two\nbilateral\npayoffs\nare\noffset by\nnegative impacts\npayoffs of a trilateral\nyielded to\naggregate payoffs of separate bilateral\nbargains", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 3. Game theory proves. Either each of the U.S., Russia, and China will have a veto which blocks a deal by incentivizing hold outs, or they don’t, which creates coalitional side deals that undermine optimal efficiency and overall effectiveness. Bilateral structures are better.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "3 Multiparty Negotiations\nMy analysis of bilateral negotiations explains why a negotiator’s pursuit of distributive gain can often lead to negotiation failures; even though there are possible agreements that would better serve the parties, agreement may not be reached at all, or even if resolution is achieved, may not satisfy the economist’s Pareto-criterion of efficiency. These same strategic problems - and the underlying tension between creating and claiming value - exist in multiparty negotiations as well. But in this section, I would like to explore several additional strategic complications that may act as barriers in the multiparty context alone.\nThe first problem concerns the meaning of creating value and efficiency in the multiparty context. Like other negotiation analysts, in bilateral negotiations I define creating value in terms of Pareto-efficiency. This measure does not require inter- personal utility comparisons. It simply suggests that efficiency is improved whenever there is an alternative resolution that either makes both parties better off, and at least makes one party better off, when the other party is no worse off. An important feature of bilateral negotiation is that whenever the parties have agreed to an outcome, that outcome can be presumed to better serve the interests of each party than the status quo - otherwise there would have been no agreement.\nThings are much less straightforward in a multiparty context. Indeed, the requirement of Pareto-efficiency may paradoxically be very inefficient. The Pareto-criterion requires that every party to a negotiation have veto power over the deal. If there are ten parties to a negotiation, the only way we can know that a negotiated agreement is Pareto-superior to the status quo is if all ten parties agree to make the deal. In other words, Pareto-efficiency in a multiparty negotiation requires unanimity.\nUnfortunately, a unanimity rule creates the strategic risk of holdout problems. Assume, for the moment, that the ZOPA in a multiparty context includes many possible deals - with different distributive implications - all of which make all 10 negotiators better off than the status quo. With a unanimity rule, the distributive aspects of multiparty bargaining can become extremely difficult and time consuming to manage. Whenever 9 out of 10 negotiators have agreed to a particular deal, the 10th person may credibly threaten to veto that deal because he wants a deal that gives him a larger share of the pie. Obviously, more than one negotiator can play this game, and as a consequence, the transaction costs of attempting to achieve unanimous agreement may be very high, and indeed negotiations may break down.\nA few years back I saw an example of this. A Cambridge, Massachusetts’s neighborhood was given the opportunity to have its electrical wires put underground. The city would provide a partial subsidy, but the 10 neighbors all had to consent to an allocation of the remaining costs for installing the new main wire. Whatever the allocation, each neighbor would also need to pay his own hook-up costs for bringing the power from the new underground wire to his house. Most neighbors quickly agreed to allocate the cost of the main wire based on frontage feet of each lot. But one neighbor, “Mr. Jones,” whose house was set farther back from the street, objected. He argued that since his connection cost to a new underground wire would be higher, he should pay a smaller share of the joint costs. Two other neighbors saw Jones’ suggestion as strategic - as holding out to get more of the surplus - and as a consequence no deal could be made at all: the electrical wires were not placed underground, and the subsidy was lost.\nMy own intuition is that the probability of a bargaining failure - even though there is a ZOPA - will increase as the number of the parties to a negotiation goes up, if each has a veto. And even if a deal is made, I would also predict that the transaction costs of reaching agreement are likely to be much higher than with a less strict decision rule.\nPutting the holdout issue to one side, there is an even more fundamental issue. As parties are added, if each has a veto, it would stand to reason that the risk of there being no ZOPA increases. This is not a problem if one believes a negotiated deal should not be possible if it has even slightly unfavorable distributional consequences for even one party. But in multiparty context, there may often be situations where the gains for the winners from a social perspective are thought to substantially outweigh the losses of the losers. What if a possible agreement benefits nearly all of the parties a great deal, but imposes slight losses on a few. Because the Pareto- criterion imposes a distribution requirement that privileges the status quo, the losers might be expected to exercise their veto. And yet in many contexts, especially if side-payments are not possible, one might conclude that at least in terms of wealth maximization and ordinary notions of efficiency, the community would be better off with the deal even though it does not meet the requirements of Pareto-efficiency.\nInterestingly, using the Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion as a way of defining\neconomic efficiency avoids the constraints of the classical Pareto-criterion. Kaldor-\nHicks asks whether it is possible for the winners to make side payments to the losers so that the losers would be indifferent between the new arrangement and the status quo. No such side payment is actually required to be paid, however. If as a theoretical proposition the gains were sufficient to permit such payments, that was enough to conclude that the proposed arrangement was more efficient than the status quo. In Kaldor’s words, whether the losers “should in fact be given compensation ... is a political question on which an economist, qua economist, could hardly pronounce an opinion” (Kaldor [1939, p. 550]).\nBecause the Kaldor-Hicks test asks whether it might be possible to make a com- pensatory payment, not whether in fact one is going to be made, it mitigates the holdout problem. Some parties might be made worse off but the new arrangement would nonetheless be viewed as more efficient than the old status quo. But Kaldor-Hicks is hardly a complete solution to determining economic efficiency in a multiparty negotiation. As a matter of economic theory, the criterion is not without its problems, whether because of potential changes in relative prices or income effects.6 While applied economists and policy makers may use cost-benefit analysis or “wealth maximization” principles to evaluate economic efficiency, they are implicitly making “a leap of faith,” and “weigh[ing] together Eve’s losses and Adam’s gains” (Friedman [1998, p. 421]). More fundamentally, in a negotiation no social planner is trying to weigh overall costs and benefits to assess whether a sufficient side-payment is theoretically possible. If less than all can impose costs on a minority without the need to make side-payments, how can we be confident that the new arrangement improves social welfare in comparison with the status quo?\nNotwithstanding these conceptual difficulties, in many contexts unanimity requirements are simply by-passed because subgroups can form coalitions and make their own agreements, unconstrained by a veto of those who might be disadvantaged. “Once three or more conflicting parties are involved, coalitions may form and act in concert against the other disputants” (Raiffa [1982, p. 11]). Those left out of a coalition may often be worse off than they were before negotiations began. Unlike bilateral negotiations, where typically one party cannot affect the other party’s BATNA, in multiparty negotiations, those left out of deal may often find themselves worse off if no deal were made. Consider, for example, merger negotiations in an industry with three competing companies. Although a “grand coalition” involving a merger of all three parties may be possible, so too would be mergers between any two of the firms. Moreover, a merger between any two firms may make the company left out worse off than if no deal were made (Raiffa [1982, pp. 257-262]).\nWhenever coordinated actions or decisions by less than all the parties can change the status quo, the potential for coalitional dynamics becomes part and parcel of multiparty negotiation. Without attempting to plumb fully the conceptual complexities of coalitions, it is safe to assert that a variety of strategic barriers may arise that do not exist in bilateral negotiations. n-person game theory demonstrates, for example, that with respect to games that have no “core,” the problem is not too many equilibria - but none. “If a game has no core, it is unstable in the sense that whatever the payoff, some coalition has the power and motivation to break up the imputation and go off on its own” (DAVIS [1983, p. 184]). Coalitional instability may lead to an obvious strategic barrier in such instances.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "additional strategic complications\nact as barriers in the multiparty context alone\nfirst\nconcerns the meaning of\nvalue and efficiency\nI define\nvalue in terms of Pareto-efficiency\nwhenever there is a\nresolution that\nmakes both parties better off\nAn important feature of bilateral negotiation is\nwhenever\nparties\nagreed\nthat outcome can be presumed to better serve\ninterests\nthan the status quo\nThings are much less straightforward in a multiparty context. Indeed, the requirement of Pareto-efficiency may paradoxically be very inefficient. The\ncriterion requires\nevery party to a negotiation have veto power over the deal\nPareto-efficiency in a multiparty negotiation requires unanimity\nUnfortunately, a unanimity rule creates the strategic risk of holdout problems. Assume\nthat\na multiparty context includes many possible deals - with different distributive implications - all of which make all\nnegotiators better off\nWith a unanimity rule\ndistributive aspects\ncan become extremely difficult and time consuming to manage. Whenever 9 out of 10 negotiators\nagree\nthe 10th\nmay credibly threaten to veto\nbecause\nwants\na larger share of the pie\nmore than one negotiator can play this game, and as a consequence, the transaction costs of attempting to achieve unanimous agreement may be very high, and indeed negotiations may break down\nthe probability of a bargaining failure\nincrease as the number of the parties to a negotiation goes up, if each has a veto\neven if a deal is made\nthe transaction costs of reaching agreement are likely\nmuch higher\nin multiparty context, there may\nbe situations where\ngains for\nwinners\nsubstantially outweigh\nlosses of\nlosers. What if a possible agreement benefits nearly all\nparties\nbut imposes slight losses\nBecause the Pareto- criterion imposes a distribution requirement that privileges the status quo, the losers\nveto. And yet\nin terms of\nordinary notions of efficiency, the community would be better off with the deal\nin many contexts unanimity requirements are\nby-passed\ncoalitions may form and act in concert\nThose left out\nmay\nbe worse off than\nbefore negotiations began. Unlike bilateral negotiations, where\none party cannot affect the other party\nin multiparty negotiations, those left out\nfind themselves worse off\nWhenever\nactions\nby less than all\nparties can change the status quo, the potential for coalitional dynamics becomes part and parcel of multiparty negotiation. Without attempting to plumb fully the conceptual complexities of coalitions, it is safe to assert that a variety of strategic barriers may arise that do not exist in bilateral negotiations\ngame theory demonstrates\nthat\nthe problem is not too many equilibria - but none. “If a game has no core, it is unstable in the sense that whatever the payoff, some coalition has the power and motivation to break up the imputation and go off on its own”\nCoalitional instability may lead to an obvious strategic barrier in such instances", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 3. Game theory proves. Either each of the U.S., Russia, and China will have a veto which blocks a deal by incentivizing hold outs, or they don’t, which creates coalitional side deals that undermine optimal efficiency and overall effectiveness. Bilateral structures are better.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "additional strategic complications\nact as barriers in the multiparty context alone\nfirst\nconcerns the meaning of\nvalue and efficiency\nI define\nvalue in terms of Pareto-efficiency\nwhenever there is a\nresolution that\nmakes both parties better off\nAn important feature of bilateral negotiation is\nwhenever\nparties\nagreed\nthat outcome can be presumed to better serve\ninterests\nthan the status quo\nThings are much less straightforward in a multiparty context. Indeed, the requirement of Pareto-efficiency may paradoxically be very inefficient. The\ncriterion requires\nevery party to a negotiation have veto power over the deal\nPareto-efficiency in a multiparty negotiation requires unanimity\nUnfortunately, a unanimity rule creates the strategic risk of holdout problems. Assume\nthat\na multiparty context includes many possible deals - with different distributive implications - all of which make all\nnegotiators better off\nWith a unanimity rule\ndistributive aspects\ncan become extremely difficult and time consuming to manage. Whenever 9 out of 10 negotiators\nagree\nthe 10th\nmay credibly threaten to veto\nbecause\nwants\na larger share of the pie\nmore than one negotiator can play this game, and as a consequence, the transaction costs of attempting to achieve unanimous agreement may be very high, and indeed negotiations may break down\nthe probability of a bargaining failure\nincrease as the number of the parties to a negotiation goes up, if each has a veto\neven if a deal is made\nthe transaction costs of reaching agreement are likely\nmuch higher\nin multiparty context, there may\nbe situations where\ngains for\nwinners\nsubstantially outweigh\nlosses of\nlosers. What if a possible agreement benefits nearly all\nparties\nbut imposes slight losses\nBecause the Pareto- criterion imposes a distribution requirement that privileges the status quo, the losers\nveto. And yet\nin terms of\nordinary notions of efficiency, the community would be better off with the deal\nin many contexts unanimity requirements are\nby-passed\ncoalitions may form and act in concert\nThose left out\nmay\nbe worse off than\nbefore negotiations began. Unlike bilateral negotiations, where\none party cannot affect the other party\nin multiparty negotiations, those left out\nfind themselves worse off\nWhenever\nactions\nby less than all\nparties can change the status quo, the potential for coalitional dynamics becomes part and parcel of multiparty negotiation. Without attempting to plumb fully the conceptual complexities of coalitions, it is safe to assert that a variety of strategic barriers may arise that do not exist in bilateral negotiations\ngame theory demonstrates\nthat\nthe problem is not too many equilibria - but none. “If a game has no core, it is unstable in the sense that whatever the payoff, some coalition has the power and motivation to break up the imputation and go off on its own”\nCoalitional instability may lead to an obvious strategic barrier in such instances", "role": "user" }, { "content": "barriers\nalone\nPareto-efficiency\na\nA\nbilat\nmuch less straightforward\nvery inefficient\nveto power\nunanimity\nstrategic risk\nholdout problems\nmany possible deals\nextremely difficult\ntime consuming\nagree\nveto\nlarger share\ntransaction costs\nvery high\nnegotiations may break down\nprobability\nbargaining failure\nincrease\nnumber of the parties\ngoes up\neven if a deal is made\nmuch higher\nveto\nbetter off with the deal\nby-passed\nleft out\nworse off\nparty\nworse off\ncoalitional dynamics\npart and parcel\nconceptual complexities\nvariety of strategic barriers\ndo not exist in bilateral negotiations\ngame theory\nnot too many equilibria\nnone\nunstable\nwhatever the payoff\nsome coalition\npower\nmotivation\nbreak up\ngo off on its own\nCoalitional instability\na\nobvious strategic barrier", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 3. Game theory proves. Either each of the U.S., Russia, and China will have a veto which blocks a deal by incentivizing hold outs, or they don’t, which creates coalitional side deals that undermine optimal efficiency and overall effectiveness. Bilateral structures are better.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "additional strategic complications\nact as barriers in the multiparty context alone\nfirst\nconcerns the meaning of\nvalue and efficiency\nI define\nvalue in terms of Pareto-efficiency\nwhenever there is a\nresolution that\nmakes both parties better off\nAn important feature of bilateral negotiation is\nwhenever\nparties\nagreed\nthat outcome can be presumed to better serve\ninterests\nthan the status quo\nThings are much less straightforward in a multiparty context. Indeed, the requirement of Pareto-efficiency may paradoxically be very inefficient. The\ncriterion requires\nevery party to a negotiation have veto power over the deal\nPareto-efficiency in a multiparty negotiation requires unanimity\nUnfortunately, a unanimity rule creates the strategic risk of holdout problems. Assume\nthat\na multiparty context includes many possible deals - with different distributive implications - all of which make all\nnegotiators better off\nWith a unanimity rule\ndistributive aspects\ncan become extremely difficult and time consuming to manage. Whenever 9 out of 10 negotiators\nagree\nthe 10th\nmay credibly threaten to veto\nbecause\nwants\na larger share of the pie\nmore than one negotiator can play this game, and as a consequence, the transaction costs of attempting to achieve unanimous agreement may be very high, and indeed negotiations may break down\nthe probability of a bargaining failure\nincrease as the number of the parties to a negotiation goes up, if each has a veto\neven if a deal is made\nthe transaction costs of reaching agreement are likely\nmuch higher\nin multiparty context, there may\nbe situations where\ngains for\nwinners\nsubstantially outweigh\nlosses of\nlosers. What if a possible agreement benefits nearly all\nparties\nbut imposes slight losses\nBecause the Pareto- criterion imposes a distribution requirement that privileges the status quo, the losers\nveto. And yet\nin terms of\nordinary notions of efficiency, the community would be better off with the deal\nin many contexts unanimity requirements are\nby-passed\ncoalitions may form and act in concert\nThose left out\nmay\nbe worse off than\nbefore negotiations began. Unlike bilateral negotiations, where\none party cannot affect the other party\nin multiparty negotiations, those left out\nfind themselves worse off\nWhenever\nactions\nby less than all\nparties can change the status quo, the potential for coalitional dynamics becomes part and parcel of multiparty negotiation. Without attempting to plumb fully the conceptual complexities of coalitions, it is safe to assert that a variety of strategic barriers may arise that do not exist in bilateral negotiations\ngame theory demonstrates\nthat\nthe problem is not too many equilibria - but none. “If a game has no core, it is unstable in the sense that whatever the payoff, some coalition has the power and motivation to break up the imputation and go off on its own”\nCoalitional instability may lead to an obvious strategic barrier in such instances", "role": "user" }, { "content": "additional\ncomplications\nact as barriers\nfirst\nvalue in\nPareto-efficiency\nA\nfeature of bilat\nis\nwhenever\nparties\nagreed\ncan be presumed\nbetter\nthan the status quo\nless straightforward in\nmultiparty\nefficiency may\nbe very inefficient\ncriterion requires\nevery party\nhave veto power\nunanimity\ncreates\nholdout problems\naspects\nbecome extremely difficult and time consuming\nWhenever 9 out of 10\nagree\nthe 10th\nmay\nthreaten to veto\nbecause\nwants\na larger share\nmore than one\nplay this game, and\nnegotiations\nbreak down\nprobability of\nbargaining failure\nincrease as\nnumber of\nparties\ngoes up\neven if a deal is made\ncosts\nare\nmuch higher\nin\ncontexts unanimity requirements are\nby-passed\nThose left out\nmay\nbe worse off than\nbefore\ncoalitional dynamics becomes part and parcel of\nnegotiation. Without attempting to plumb fully\nconceptual complexities\na variety of strategic barriers\narise that do not exist in bilat\ngame theory demonstrates\nthe problem is not too many equilibria - but none\na game\nis unstable\nwhatever the payoff, some coalition has\npower and motivation to break up\nand go off on its own\nCoalitional instability\nlead to a\nstrategic barrier", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The only part of this card that’s actually about possession is about when hostages were sent to other states as collateral to prove commitments were genuine in ancient Mesopotamia, with commitment breaches deterred by curses. That’s clearly not a predictable foundation for the topic.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Because betrayal by one’s ally is costly, management of opportunistic behavior is a central part of alliance politics. Oliver Williamson, a leading scholar of transaction cost economics, has written on the use of hostages as a mechanism for commitment—which we know was common among military allies. The following example he refers to also reveals the importance of commitment to military alliances:\nA still earlier example of an effort to craft a credible commitment was recently unearthed in Mesopotamia. Tablets dated around 1750 B.C. show that curses were used to deter the breach of treaties. One of these reads as follows: When you ask us for troops, we will not withhold our best forces, we will not answer you with evasions, we shall brandish our maces and strike down your enemy . . . As wasted seeds do not sprout, may my seed never rise, may someone else marry my wife under my very eyes, and may someone else rule my country. (Williamson 1996, 91)", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Williamson, a leading scholar of transaction cost economics, has written on the use of hostages as a mechanism for commitment\nunearthed in Mesopotamia. Tablets\nshow\ncurses were used to deter the breach of treaties", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The only part of this card that’s actually about possession is about when hostages were sent to other states as collateral to prove commitments were genuine in ancient Mesopotamia, with commitment breaches deterred by curses. That’s clearly not a predictable foundation for the topic.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Williamson, a leading scholar of transaction cost economics, has written on the use of hostages as a mechanism for commitment\nunearthed in Mesopotamia. Tablets\nshow\ncurses were used to deter the breach of treaties", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Williamson\nhas written on\nhostages as\nmechanism for commitment\nMesopotamia\nTablets\nshow\ncurses were used to deter\nbreach of treaties", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Unmanned maritime systems (UMS) are rapidly being developed and will revolutionize naval warfare.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "This chapter explores unmanned systems (UxS), their projected missions and tasks during naval warfare, and the rules that apply to them during such conflicts. Numerous states are developing and experimenting with UxS, which are sometimes called “drones” and include unmanned surface vessels (USVs), various submersible unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and unmanned aerial systems or vehicles (UAS/UAVs).1 UAVs may be launched from land, ships, submarines, or even from containers on the seabed. These systems enhance survivable, persistent presence in high threat environments near an adversary’s coast at lower cost and with decreased risk to human life, so they are becoming the preferred alternative to manned platforms for certain dull, dirty, or dangerous missions. Unmanned systems free the warfighter for more critical operations while increasing resilience, connectivity, and real-time awareness through distributed network nodes.2 In future conflicts, robotic combat systems will be everywhere—on the land, in the air, at sea, and in outer space. A Chinese White Paper, for example, envisions a “multi-dimensional, multi-domain unmanned combat ‘system of systems’ on the battlefield.”3\nThe United States, China, and Russia are developing larger and more sophisticated unmanned maritime systems (UMSs) that displace the role of traditional platforms—warships and submarines—for tedious or dangerous maritime security and naval warfare missions. This trend means that traditional platforms may play the role of a “mother ship” and exercise command and control of a vast network of UMS.\nFor more than two decades, observers have predicted that unmanned systems would transform maritime operations.4 In the United States, institutional resistance to unmanned systems has stymied their advancement.5 The traditional U.S. fleet force architecture is constructed around small numbers of large, gold-plated, and technologically exquisite platforms that are too valuable to risk in combat. China, however, has built a multiplying menagerie of inexpensive but lethal missiles to target and destroy the small number of American trophy warships. In East Asia, for example, the U.S. Seventh Fleet operates a single aircraft carrier and 10 to 14 destroyers and cruisers at any one time, all vulnerable to Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles. To overmatch this force (and without putting a single warship to sea), China fields 200 intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers and more than 200 missiles linked to a battle network of reconnaissance satellites that can conduct precision strikes against U.S. warships.6 The only way out of this “numbers game” is to multiply assets, and unmanned platforms are the only feasible route for doing so.7 The United States has to move from a platform-centric approach to a capability-centric approach.8 Yet the United States has moved slowly toward that conclusion, although the unsustainable costs of manned platforms and the comparative advantages of autonomous systems are too evident to ignore. The MQ-9 Reaper (Predator B), for example, costs about $14.5 million, compared to $94.6 million for a manned F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, without considering the costs of training and maintaining the aircraft. China has cut costs even further by copying U.S. systems. China’s CH-4B, for example, is a virtual clone of the U.S. drone, just as its J-20 fifth-generation fighter looks strikingly like the F-35.9\nAdvances in marine and information technologies raise expectations that a distributed force with some elements capable of operating with a level of autonomy will become commonplace. UxS are being integrated into the naval force structure with manned warships to form a hybrid fleet. The pervasive use of unmanned systems will accelerate in all domains as new technologies make them stealthier, more mobile, and more versatile. A naval force built around unmanned systems operating independently or tethered to warships offers greater survivability and distributed lethality.\nShifting to a more distributed force promises key advantages for the navies that make the transition. First, spreading sensors and weapons among greater numbers of platforms complicates an adversary’s targeting by multiplying the number of enemy units to detect, identify, track, and engage. The distributed force increases the complexity that confronts an adversary in prioritizing targets, given the fixed number of weapons. Second, widely distributing the force reduces the aggregate loss from the destruction of a single platform. Third, the large number of deployed UAVs, USVs, and UUVs in armed conflict facilitates missions that are tactically advantageous but too risky for manned ships. Commanders are emboldened to press advantage. Fourth, a widely distributed force can help to increase the modularity and configurability of the fleet, accelerating adaptive change.10 Fifth, the cost curve favors unmanned systems, which are orders of magnitude less expensive than exquisitely outfitted manned warships and submarines. Sixth, unmanned systems are smaller and easier to hide and therefore usually more difficult to find and target.\nThe deployment of unmanned systems requires development of new operational concepts, raises issues about their legal status and sovereign immunity, and requires consideration of the rights and duties that inure to such craft for navigation at sea, and belligerent rights under the law of naval warfare.11 The legal status of UMSs is governed by the law of the flag state, customary international law, and is reflected in the instruments of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The navigational rights and duties these systems enjoy in the ocean and airspace during peacetime are also reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).12 UxS that conduct belligerent operations are subject to the laws of naval warfare, especially as the systems acquire greater levels of autonomy. Lethal autonomous weapons systems or LAWS, which are the focus of Chapter 4, have generated international discussions under the auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on how (or whether) their operations can be consistent with the law of armed conflict (LOAC).", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Numerous states are developing\nunmanned surface vessels\nUSVs\nunmanned underwater vehicles\nUUVs\nThese systems enhance survivable, persistent presence in high threat environments near an adversary’s coast at lower cost and with decreased risk to human life, so they are becoming the preferred alternative to manned platforms for\ndangerous missions\nUnmanned systems free the warfighter for more critical operations while increasing resilience\nconnectivity, and\nawareness through distributed network nodes\nIn future conflicts, robotic combat systems will be everywhere\nUMSs\nthat displace the\ntraditional platforms\nwarships and submarines\nfor\ndangerous maritime security and naval warfare missions\nChina\nhas built\nlethal missiles to target\nAmerican trophy warships\nthe U.S. Seventh Fleet operates a single aircraft carrier and\n14 destroyers and cruisers\nall vulnerable to Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles\nTo overmatch this force\nChina fields 200 intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers and more than 200 missiles linked to a battle network of reconnaissance satellites that can conduct precision strikes against U.S. warships\nThe only way out of this “numbers game” is to multiply assets\nand unmanned platforms are the only feasible route for doing so\nThe U\nS\nhas to move from a platform-centric approach to a capability-centric approach\nthe unsustainable costs of manned platforms and the comparative advantages of autonomous systems are too evident to ignore\nChina has cut costs even further by copying U.S. systems\nAdvances in marine\ninformation technologies raise expectations\nof\nautonomy\nUxS are being integrated into the naval force structure with manned warships to form a hybrid fleet\nThe pervasive use of unmanned systems will accelerate\nas new technologies make them stealthier\nmore mobile, and more versatile\nA naval force built around unmanned systems operating independently\noffers greater survivability and distributed lethality\na\ndistributed force promises key advantages\nFirst\nspreading\nweapons among greater\nplatforms complicates an adversary’s targeting\nSecond\ndistributing\nforce reduces the aggregate loss from the destruction of a single platform\nThird, the large number of deployed\nUSVs\nand UUVs in armed conflict facilitates missions that are tactically advantageous but too risky for manned ships\nFourth, a widely distributed force can\nincrease\nmodularity\nof the fleet\nFifth\nthe cost curve favors unmanned systems, which are orders of magnitude less expensive\nSixth, unmanned systems are smaller and easier to hide\ndeployment of unmanned systems\nraises issues about their legal status\nand requires\nrights and duties that inure to such craft for navigation at sea, and belligerent rights under the law of naval warfare\nThe legal status of UMSs is governed by\ncustomary international law\nThe navigational rights and duties these systems enjoy in the ocean\nare\nreflected in\nUNCLOS\nUxS that conduct belligerent operations are subject to the laws of naval warfare\nespecially as\nsystems acquire greater\nautonomy", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Unmanned maritime systems (UMS) are rapidly being developed and will revolutionize naval warfare.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Numerous states are developing\nunmanned surface vessels\nUSVs\nunmanned underwater vehicles\nUUVs\nThese systems enhance survivable, persistent presence in high threat environments near an adversary’s coast at lower cost and with decreased risk to human life, so they are becoming the preferred alternative to manned platforms for\ndangerous missions\nUnmanned systems free the warfighter for more critical operations while increasing resilience\nconnectivity, and\nawareness through distributed network nodes\nIn future conflicts, robotic combat systems will be everywhere\nUMSs\nthat displace the\ntraditional platforms\nwarships and submarines\nfor\ndangerous maritime security and naval warfare missions\nChina\nhas built\nlethal missiles to target\nAmerican trophy warships\nthe U.S. Seventh Fleet operates a single aircraft carrier and\n14 destroyers and cruisers\nall vulnerable to Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles\nTo overmatch this force\nChina fields 200 intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers and more than 200 missiles linked to a battle network of reconnaissance satellites that can conduct precision strikes against U.S. warships\nThe only way out of this “numbers game” is to multiply assets\nand unmanned platforms are the only feasible route for doing so\nThe U\nS\nhas to move from a platform-centric approach to a capability-centric approach\nthe unsustainable costs of manned platforms and the comparative advantages of autonomous systems are too evident to ignore\nChina has cut costs even further by copying U.S. systems\nAdvances in marine\ninformation technologies raise expectations\nof\nautonomy\nUxS are being integrated into the naval force structure with manned warships to form a hybrid fleet\nThe pervasive use of unmanned systems will accelerate\nas new technologies make them stealthier\nmore mobile, and more versatile\nA naval force built around unmanned systems operating independently\noffers greater survivability and distributed lethality\na\ndistributed force promises key advantages\nFirst\nspreading\nweapons among greater\nplatforms complicates an adversary’s targeting\nSecond\ndistributing\nforce reduces the aggregate loss from the destruction of a single platform\nThird, the large number of deployed\nUSVs\nand UUVs in armed conflict facilitates missions that are tactically advantageous but too risky for manned ships\nFourth, a widely distributed force can\nincrease\nmodularity\nof the fleet\nFifth\nthe cost curve favors unmanned systems, which are orders of magnitude less expensive\nSixth, unmanned systems are smaller and easier to hide\ndeployment of unmanned systems\nraises issues about their legal status\nand requires\nrights and duties that inure to such craft for navigation at sea, and belligerent rights under the law of naval warfare\nThe legal status of UMSs is governed by\ncustomary international law\nThe navigational rights and duties these systems enjoy in the ocean\nare\nreflected in\nUNCLOS\nUxS that conduct belligerent operations are subject to the laws of naval warfare\nespecially as\nsystems acquire greater\nautonomy", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Numerous states\nUSVs\nUUVs\nenhance\nhigh threat\nadversary’s coast\nlower cost\ndecreased risk\npreferred alternative\ndangerous missions\ncritical operations\nresilience\nconnectivity\nawareness\nfuture conflicts\neverywhere\nUMSs\nwarships\nsubmarines\nChina\nlethal missiles\naircraft carrier\n14 destroyers\ncruisers\nanti-ship ballistic missiles\nreconnaissance satellites\nprecision strikes\nmultiply assets\nonly feasible route\nU\nS\nplatform-centric\ncapability-centric\nunsustainable costs\ncomparative advantages\ncut costs\nmarine\ninformation technologies\nautonomy\nintegrated\nnaval force structure\nhybrid fleet\naccelerate\nstealthier\nmobile\nversatile\nunmanned systems\nindependently\ngreater survivability\ndistributed lethality\nweapons\ntargeting\nreduces\nsingle platform\nUSVs\nUUVs\ntactically advantageous\ntoo risky\nwidely distributed\nmodularity\ncost curve\norders of magnitude\nsmaller\neasier to hide\ndeployment\nlegal status\nrights\nduties\nnavigation\nbelligerent rights\nlaw\nlegal status\ncustomary international law\nUNCLOS\nnaval warfare\ngreater\nautonomy", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Unmanned maritime systems (UMS) are rapidly being developed and will revolutionize naval warfare.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Numerous states are developing\nunmanned surface vessels\nUSVs\nunmanned underwater vehicles\nUUVs\nThese systems enhance survivable, persistent presence in high threat environments near an adversary’s coast at lower cost and with decreased risk to human life, so they are becoming the preferred alternative to manned platforms for\ndangerous missions\nUnmanned systems free the warfighter for more critical operations while increasing resilience\nconnectivity, and\nawareness through distributed network nodes\nIn future conflicts, robotic combat systems will be everywhere\nUMSs\nthat displace the\ntraditional platforms\nwarships and submarines\nfor\ndangerous maritime security and naval warfare missions\nChina\nhas built\nlethal missiles to target\nAmerican trophy warships\nthe U.S. Seventh Fleet operates a single aircraft carrier and\n14 destroyers and cruisers\nall vulnerable to Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles\nTo overmatch this force\nChina fields 200 intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers and more than 200 missiles linked to a battle network of reconnaissance satellites that can conduct precision strikes against U.S. warships\nThe only way out of this “numbers game” is to multiply assets\nand unmanned platforms are the only feasible route for doing so\nThe U\nS\nhas to move from a platform-centric approach to a capability-centric approach\nthe unsustainable costs of manned platforms and the comparative advantages of autonomous systems are too evident to ignore\nChina has cut costs even further by copying U.S. systems\nAdvances in marine\ninformation technologies raise expectations\nof\nautonomy\nUxS are being integrated into the naval force structure with manned warships to form a hybrid fleet\nThe pervasive use of unmanned systems will accelerate\nas new technologies make them stealthier\nmore mobile, and more versatile\nA naval force built around unmanned systems operating independently\noffers greater survivability and distributed lethality\na\ndistributed force promises key advantages\nFirst\nspreading\nweapons among greater\nplatforms complicates an adversary’s targeting\nSecond\ndistributing\nforce reduces the aggregate loss from the destruction of a single platform\nThird, the large number of deployed\nUSVs\nand UUVs in armed conflict facilitates missions that are tactically advantageous but too risky for manned ships\nFourth, a widely distributed force can\nincrease\nmodularity\nof the fleet\nFifth\nthe cost curve favors unmanned systems, which are orders of magnitude less expensive\nSixth, unmanned systems are smaller and easier to hide\ndeployment of unmanned systems\nraises issues about their legal status\nand requires\nrights and duties that inure to such craft for navigation at sea, and belligerent rights under the law of naval warfare\nThe legal status of UMSs is governed by\ncustomary international law\nThe navigational rights and duties these systems enjoy in the ocean\nare\nreflected in\nUNCLOS\nUxS that conduct belligerent operations are subject to the laws of naval warfare\nespecially as\nsystems acquire greater\nautonomy", "role": "user" }, { "content": "states are developing\nunmanned\nvessels\nThese systems enhance\npresence in high threat environments\nUnmanned systems free the warfighter for\ncritical operations while increasing\nawareness through distributed\nnodes\nUMSs\ndisplace\ntraditional\nwarships\nfor\ndangerous\nmissions\nChina\nhas built\nlethal missiles to target\nAmerican\ncarrier\ndestroyers\nThe only way out\nis to multiply assets\nunmanned platforms are the only\nroute\nAdvances\nexpect\nautonomy\nUxS are being integrated\nto form a hybrid fleet\nnew tech\nmake them stealthier\nmobile\nspreading\nweapons\ncomplicates\nadversary’s targeting\ndistributing\nforce reduces\naggregate loss\nlarge number\nfacilitates missions\nrisky for manned ships\nthe cost curve favors unmanned systems\nunmanned\nare\neasier to hide\ndeployment\nrequires\nrights and duties\nand belligerent rights under\nlaw of\nwarfare\nstatus\nis governed by\nc\ni\nl\nreflected in\nUNCLOS", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: UMS are key to the next generation of freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). Only unmanned systems can ensure cost savings to outpace adversarial shipbuilding and complete dangerous tasks that humans cannot.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "As this vignette suggests, the time has come for the U.S. Navy to pass the freedom of navigation mission set to unmanned systems. This shift would provide significant benefits, including substantial cost savings, a reduced risk to human life, increased flexibility in escalation dynamics, and an asymmetric answer to geographically advantaged peer competitors in distant oceans.\nMoreover, using unmanned systems for FONOPs could help to establish the desired U.S. government precedent regarding these platforms and the law of the sea. The U.S. Navy’s proactive demonstration of unmanned system operation across the globe could clearly communicate expected norms regarding their usage under existing conventions and customary law. \nA FONOPs Primer \nIn order to understand the future of FONOPs within the context of unmanned systems, one should first examine the genesis of the U.S. Navy’s freedom of navigation program, as well as the successes and challenges attributed to it by observers throughout its forty years of existence. \nThe U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea codifies customary international legal concepts pertinent to maritime claims. As President Ronald Reagan outlined in his 1983 speech on oceans policy, the United States “will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the convention.”\nDespite substantial commercial and government support for the convention, the U.S. Senate has not joined over 160 other countries in ratifying the 1982 law of the sea agreement. Initially, American opponents of ratification feared that the convention’s provisions for the governance of deep-seabed mining would run counter to domestic interests. More recently, concerns including sovereignty issues and environmental restrictions have prevented the necessary Senate ratification vote from occurring. Both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama pushed aggressively for ratification, yet failed due to political opposition. And while the current administration has largely remained quiet on any renewed efforts, in 2007 then-Senator Joe Biden led an unsuccessful attempt to move forward with ratification as the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.\nEven without congressional ratification of the convention, legal experts cite enduring maritime law traditions that can create widely accepted customary rules without a specific requirement for binding international agreements. Based on this fundamental concept of customary international law, over the last four decades the U.S. freedom of navigation program has combined diplomatic efforts with at-sea operations across the globe, sailing or flying through excessive maritime claims to reinforce the American interpretation of customary maritime claims.\nThrough these operations, the U.S. government contests claims — against allies and antagonists alike — with a military presence in the disputed zone. Each year, a number of these excessive claims are contested. In Fiscal Year 2020, for instance, the Department of Defense challenged 28 separate excessive claims made by 19 different countries. Each challenge can represent a larger tempo of operations, as one listed maritime challenge may include multiple passages by U.S. assets throughout the year.\nProponents of FONOPs assert that the program deserves credit for the freedom of the global commons enjoyed by maritime shipping today, the continued expansion of global sea trade over the last forty years, and a normalization of maritime claims in line with convention standards. The 2016 Chinese refusal to recognize the arbitral tribunal’s decision regarding disputes in the South China Sea bolsters the case for U.S. FONOPs, highlighting the difficulty in enforcing the convention through purely diplomatic efforts at the international level.\nFONOPs detractors, meanwhile, perceive the program as unnecessarily offensive in nature, emphasize the persistent threat of collision at sea with resulting escalation concerns, and question whether any behavioral changes can actually be attributed to military contestations.\nActivity under the freedom of navigation program, which is approved and directed at the presidential level, has largely remained steady during recent administrations. This trend implies that American leadership values the program and supports the conclusion that FONOPs will remain a vital and visible part of U.S. national security policy going forward.\nThe Advantages of Unmanned Systems During FONOPs\nWhile forty years have elapsed since FONOPs’ inception, the tools used to execute the mission in 2021 still resemble those used in 1981. Twenty-first century unmanned systems technology offers opportunities to mitigate past weaknesses and amplify current strengths. By saving money and reducing risk while providing a response to rapidly expanding adversarial fleets, the U.S. Navy can leverage unmanned FONOPs to breathe new life into the program during a vital period in its existence.\nAn Efficient Use of Assets\nThe Department of Defense can realize significant and much-needed cost savings by using unmanned platforms for the freedom of navigation mission set. The state-of-the-art Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyer, a likely candidate for completing FONOPs in the twenty-first century, has an estimated unit cost of $1.8 billion versus approximately $35 million for a medium-sized unmanned system prototype. Beyond the reduced initial investment, experts estimate daily operating costs for the manned destroyer at $700,000 versus a $20,000 daily price tag for unmanned surface systems, such as the Sea Hunter. In a time of flat-line Department of Defense budgets and a stated Department of the Navy desire to focus further on unmanned systems, employing drone technology for these operations provides clear cost advantages while aligning with modernization efforts.\nBesides monetary savings, the use of unmanned systems for these missions allows more-capable manned platforms to focus on those tasks that require different competences or a human touch. FONOPs fall neatly into the category of “dull, dirty, and dangerous” operations that best fit unmanned systems. An unmanned system can easily refute a challenged nation’s excessive maritime claim that requires prior permission for innocent transit by conducting an unannounced straight-line passage through disputed waters, freeing a manned vessel and its crew to conduct more in-depth operations elsewhere.\nRobots Can Reduce Risk While Providing Flexibility\nIn the event of a miscalculation on either side during an unplanned encounter at sea involving unmanned assets, metal and electronics may incur damage, but no human life will be lost. As recent non-FONOP ship collisions have shown, when two large-tonnage vessels collide at sea, a tragic loss of life may result. By removing the potential for this loss of life from a collision in contested waters, the use of unmanned systems during FONOPs allows technology to accomplish a potentially dangerous mission with no requirement for physical human presence.\nBeyond the inherent heartbreak involved, the loss of human life also has implications for escalation. A recent study examined the different emotions generated from the loss of an unmanned system versus a manned system, and its findings demonstrate de-escalation advantages from an unmanned loss. In simple terms, the destruction of an unmanned system does not generate the same visceral and escalatory response as the loss of a human life. This vital difference adds flexibility following a collision at sea or a hostile act during FONOPs. While unmanned systems do not negate the potential for an escalation spiral, their use provides de-escalation options to decision-makers that do not exist with manned platforms. As geopolitical tensions continue to grow, opportunities to decrease potential escalation spirals stemming from collisions during FONOPs should not be ignored.\nAn Asymmetric Response to Being Outnumbered\nMuch attention in recent years has focused on the impressive scope of Chinese shipbuilding capabilities. In the waters of the South China Sea, the U.S. Navy already finds itself outnumbered — even more significantly so when one includes the tremendous size and coercive capabilities of the Chinese maritime militia. According to the 2020 annual Department of Defense report to Congress, China has built the largest navy in the world, comprising 350 ships compared to the U.S. Navy’s 293 ships. This disparity exists primarily in smaller hull classes, and further emphasizes the benefit of using lower-cost unmanned systems to even the numerical playing field. The maxim that “quantity has a quality all its own” will likely hold true in a dynamic twenty-first century battlespace. As recent budget submissions demonstrate, the U.S. Navy simply does not have the necessary capital to match adversary numbers at traditional major surface combatant shipbuilding costs.\nLow-cost unmanned systems will facilitate the dispersion of the naval assets necessary to ensure the successful conduct of peacetime FONOPs, while also enabling the execution of the distributed maritime operations wartime concept. The deployment of unmanned systems to counter current asymmetry creates an achievable and efficient option to execute assigned missions, such as FONOPs, while countering increasing naval proliferation across the globe.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the time has come for the U.S. Navy to pass the freedom of navigation mission\nto unmanned systems\nThis\nwould provide\ncost savings\nreduced risk to human life\nincreased flexibility in escalation dynamics\nand an asymmetric answer to geographically advantaged peer competitors in distant oceans\nusing unmanned systems for FONOPs could\nestablish\nU.S. government precedent regarding these platforms and the law of the sea\nThe U.S. Navy’s proactive demonstration of unmanned system operation across the globe could clearly communicate expected norms regarding their usage under\ncustomary law\nthe Law of the Sea codifies customary international legal concepts pertinent to maritime claims\nEven without congressional ratification of the convention, legal experts cite enduring maritime law traditions that\ncreate\ncustomary rules without\ninternational agreements\nBased on\ncustomary international law\nthe U.S. freedom of navigation program has combined diplomatic efforts with at-sea operations across the globe\nto reinforce\nAmerican interpretation of customary maritime claims\nThrough these operations\nthe U.S. government contests claims\nwith a military presence in the disputed zone\nFONOPs\ndeserves credit for the freedom of the global commons enjoyed by maritime shipping today\nthe\nexpansion of global sea trade\nand\nnormalization of maritime claims in line with convention standards\nChinese refusal to recognize the\ntribunal’s decision regarding disputes in the South China Sea bolsters the case for U.S. FONOPs\nunmanned systems technology offers opportunities to mitigate past weaknesses and amplify\nstrengths\nBy saving money and reducing risk while providing a response to rapidly expanding adversarial fleets, the U.S. Navy can leverage unmanned FONOPs to breathe new life into the program during a vital period\nThe D\no\nD\ncan realize\ncost savings by using unmanned platforms for\nfreedom of navigation\ndestroyer\nhas\ncost of $1.8 billion versus\n$35 million for a\nunmanned system\nIn a time of flat-line\nbudgets\nemploying drone technology for these operations provides clear cost advantages while aligning with modernization efforts\nuse of unmanned systems\nallows more-capable manned platforms to focus on\ntasks that require different competences or a human touch\nFONOPs fall neatly into the category of\ndangerous\nthat\nfit unmanned systems. An unmanned system can easily refute a challenged nation’s excessive maritime claim that requires prior permission for innocent transit by conducting\nstraight-line passage through disputed waters\nfreeing a manned vessel and its crew to conduct\nin-depth operations elsewhere\nattention\nfocused on\nChinese\ncapabilities\nIn the\nS\nC\nS\nthe\nNavy\nfinds itself outnumbered\nChina has built the largest navy in the world, comprising 350 ships compared to the U.S. Navy’s 293 ships\nThis disparity\nemphasizes the benefit of using lower-cost unmanned systems to even the numerical playing field\nquantity has a quality all its own\nAs recent budget submissions demonstrate, the\nNavy\ndoes not have the\ncapital to match adversary numbers at traditional\nshipbuilding costs\nLow-cost unmanned systems will facilitate the dispersion of the naval assets necessary to ensure\nsuccessful\nFONOPs, while also enabling\nthe distributed maritime operations wartime concept.\nunmanned systems to counter\nasymmetry creates an achievable\noption to execute\nFONOPs\nwhile countering\nnaval proliferation across the globe", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: UMS are key to the next generation of freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). Only unmanned systems can ensure cost savings to outpace adversarial shipbuilding and complete dangerous tasks that humans cannot.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the time has come for the U.S. Navy to pass the freedom of navigation mission\nto unmanned systems\nThis\nwould provide\ncost savings\nreduced risk to human life\nincreased flexibility in escalation dynamics\nand an asymmetric answer to geographically advantaged peer competitors in distant oceans\nusing unmanned systems for FONOPs could\nestablish\nU.S. government precedent regarding these platforms and the law of the sea\nThe U.S. Navy’s proactive demonstration of unmanned system operation across the globe could clearly communicate expected norms regarding their usage under\ncustomary law\nthe Law of the Sea codifies customary international legal concepts pertinent to maritime claims\nEven without congressional ratification of the convention, legal experts cite enduring maritime law traditions that\ncreate\ncustomary rules without\ninternational agreements\nBased on\ncustomary international law\nthe U.S. freedom of navigation program has combined diplomatic efforts with at-sea operations across the globe\nto reinforce\nAmerican interpretation of customary maritime claims\nThrough these operations\nthe U.S. government contests claims\nwith a military presence in the disputed zone\nFONOPs\ndeserves credit for the freedom of the global commons enjoyed by maritime shipping today\nthe\nexpansion of global sea trade\nand\nnormalization of maritime claims in line with convention standards\nChinese refusal to recognize the\ntribunal’s decision regarding disputes in the South China Sea bolsters the case for U.S. FONOPs\nunmanned systems technology offers opportunities to mitigate past weaknesses and amplify\nstrengths\nBy saving money and reducing risk while providing a response to rapidly expanding adversarial fleets, the U.S. Navy can leverage unmanned FONOPs to breathe new life into the program during a vital period\nThe D\no\nD\ncan realize\ncost savings by using unmanned platforms for\nfreedom of navigation\ndestroyer\nhas\ncost of $1.8 billion versus\n$35 million for a\nunmanned system\nIn a time of flat-line\nbudgets\nemploying drone technology for these operations provides clear cost advantages while aligning with modernization efforts\nuse of unmanned systems\nallows more-capable manned platforms to focus on\ntasks that require different competences or a human touch\nFONOPs fall neatly into the category of\ndangerous\nthat\nfit unmanned systems. An unmanned system can easily refute a challenged nation’s excessive maritime claim that requires prior permission for innocent transit by conducting\nstraight-line passage through disputed waters\nfreeing a manned vessel and its crew to conduct\nin-depth operations elsewhere\nattention\nfocused on\nChinese\ncapabilities\nIn the\nS\nC\nS\nthe\nNavy\nfinds itself outnumbered\nChina has built the largest navy in the world, comprising 350 ships compared to the U.S. Navy’s 293 ships\nThis disparity\nemphasizes the benefit of using lower-cost unmanned systems to even the numerical playing field\nquantity has a quality all its own\nAs recent budget submissions demonstrate, the\nNavy\ndoes not have the\ncapital to match adversary numbers at traditional\nshipbuilding costs\nLow-cost unmanned systems will facilitate the dispersion of the naval assets necessary to ensure\nsuccessful\nFONOPs, while also enabling\nthe distributed maritime operations wartime concept.\nunmanned systems to counter\nasymmetry creates an achievable\noption to execute\nFONOPs\nwhile countering\nnaval proliferation across the globe", "role": "user" }, { "content": "time has come\nfreedom of navigation\nunmanned systems\ncost savings\nflexibility\nescalation dynamics\nasymmetric answer\ngeographically advantaged\nFONOPs\nU.S. government precedent\nlaw of the sea\nproactive demonstration\nunmanned system operation\nclearly communicate\ncustomary law\nLaw of the Sea\ncustomary international legal concepts\ncongressional ratification\nmaritime law traditions\ncustomary rules\ninternational agreements\ncustomary international law\ndiplomatic efforts\nreinforce\nmilitary presence\nFONOPs\nglobal commons\nexpansion\ntrade\nnormalization\nChinese refusal\nSouth China Sea\nU.S. FONOPs\nunmanned systems technology\nmitigate past weaknesses\namplify\nstrengths\nrapidly expanding\nleverage\nnew life\nvital period\ncost savings\ndestroyer\n$1.8 billion\n$35 million\nunmanned system\nflat-line\ndrone technology\naligning\nmodernization efforts\nmore-capable\ndifferent competences\nhuman touch\nFONOPs\ndangerous\neasily refute\nmaritime claim\nprior permission\ndisputed waters\nin-depth operations\nChinese\nS\nC\nS\noutnumbered\nlargest navy\n350 ships\n293 ships\nlower-cost\nrecent budget submissions\ndoes not have\nadversary numbers\ndispersion\nnaval assets\nFONOPs\nwartime concept.\nasymmetry\nFONOPs\nnaval proliferation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: UMS are key to the next generation of freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). Only unmanned systems can ensure cost savings to outpace adversarial shipbuilding and complete dangerous tasks that humans cannot.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the time has come for the U.S. Navy to pass the freedom of navigation mission\nto unmanned systems\nThis\nwould provide\ncost savings\nreduced risk to human life\nincreased flexibility in escalation dynamics\nand an asymmetric answer to geographically advantaged peer competitors in distant oceans\nusing unmanned systems for FONOPs could\nestablish\nU.S. government precedent regarding these platforms and the law of the sea\nThe U.S. Navy’s proactive demonstration of unmanned system operation across the globe could clearly communicate expected norms regarding their usage under\ncustomary law\nthe Law of the Sea codifies customary international legal concepts pertinent to maritime claims\nEven without congressional ratification of the convention, legal experts cite enduring maritime law traditions that\ncreate\ncustomary rules without\ninternational agreements\nBased on\ncustomary international law\nthe U.S. freedom of navigation program has combined diplomatic efforts with at-sea operations across the globe\nto reinforce\nAmerican interpretation of customary maritime claims\nThrough these operations\nthe U.S. government contests claims\nwith a military presence in the disputed zone\nFONOPs\ndeserves credit for the freedom of the global commons enjoyed by maritime shipping today\nthe\nexpansion of global sea trade\nand\nnormalization of maritime claims in line with convention standards\nChinese refusal to recognize the\ntribunal’s decision regarding disputes in the South China Sea bolsters the case for U.S. FONOPs\nunmanned systems technology offers opportunities to mitigate past weaknesses and amplify\nstrengths\nBy saving money and reducing risk while providing a response to rapidly expanding adversarial fleets, the U.S. Navy can leverage unmanned FONOPs to breathe new life into the program during a vital period\nThe D\no\nD\ncan realize\ncost savings by using unmanned platforms for\nfreedom of navigation\ndestroyer\nhas\ncost of $1.8 billion versus\n$35 million for a\nunmanned system\nIn a time of flat-line\nbudgets\nemploying drone technology for these operations provides clear cost advantages while aligning with modernization efforts\nuse of unmanned systems\nallows more-capable manned platforms to focus on\ntasks that require different competences or a human touch\nFONOPs fall neatly into the category of\ndangerous\nthat\nfit unmanned systems. An unmanned system can easily refute a challenged nation’s excessive maritime claim that requires prior permission for innocent transit by conducting\nstraight-line passage through disputed waters\nfreeing a manned vessel and its crew to conduct\nin-depth operations elsewhere\nattention\nfocused on\nChinese\ncapabilities\nIn the\nS\nC\nS\nthe\nNavy\nfinds itself outnumbered\nChina has built the largest navy in the world, comprising 350 ships compared to the U.S. Navy’s 293 ships\nThis disparity\nemphasizes the benefit of using lower-cost unmanned systems to even the numerical playing field\nquantity has a quality all its own\nAs recent budget submissions demonstrate, the\nNavy\ndoes not have the\ncapital to match adversary numbers at traditional\nshipbuilding costs\nLow-cost unmanned systems will facilitate the dispersion of the naval assets necessary to ensure\nsuccessful\nFONOPs, while also enabling\nthe distributed maritime operations wartime concept.\nunmanned systems to counter\nasymmetry creates an achievable\noption to execute\nFONOPs\nwhile countering\nnaval proliferation across the globe", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the\nNavy to pass\nfreedom of navigation\nto unmanned systems\nwould provide\nan asymmetric answer to\ncompetitors\nFONOPs\nestablish\nprecedent regarding\nlaw of the sea\ndemonstration of unmanned\noperation\ncould\ncommunicate\nnorms\nunder\ncustomary law\nEven without\nratification\nexperts cite\nlaw traditions that\ncreate\ncustomary rules\nfreedom of navigation\ncontests claims\nwith\npresence\nFONOPs\ndeserves credit for\nfreedom of\ncommons\nexpansion of\ntrade\nunmanned systems\nmitigate\nweaknesses\nBy saving money\nproviding a response to\nexpanding adversarial fleets, the\nNavy can\nbreathe\nlife into the program\ndestroyer\ncost\n$1.8 billion versus\n$35 million for a\nunmanned system\nunmanned systems\nallows\nmanned platforms to focus on\ntasks that requ\nhuman touch\nFONOPs fall\ninto\ncategory of\ndangerous\nAn unmanned system can\nrefute a challenged\nclaim\nby conducting\npassage through disputed waters\nIn the\nS\nC\nS\nthe\nNavy\nfinds itself outnumbered\nChina has\n350\ncompared to\n293\nThis\nemphasizes\nbenefit of\nlower-cost\nsystems\nthe\nNavy\ndoes not have the\ncapital to match adversary numbers\nunmanned systems\nfacilitate\ndispersion of\nassets\nto ensure\nFONOPs\nunmanned systems\ncounter\nasymmetry\ncounter\nproliferation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Classification of UMS as warships is key. Exercise of belligerent rights is necessary to conduct offensive operations.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Assuming a UMS qualifies as a “ship” or “vessel,” the next question is whether such a craft employed in the naval service can be characterized as a “warship” as that term is defined in international law. This is a very important issue given that warships are the only vessels that can exercise belligerent rights— offensive attacks or the belligerent right of visit and search of neutral ships— under the law of naval warfare.99\nUNCLOS defines “warship” as “a ship belonging to the armed forces of a state bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the state and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.”100 Although article 29 is qualified by the phrase “for the purposes of this Convention,” the rule emerged from the 1907 Hague VII negotiations concerning the conversion of merchant ships into warships.101 This rule is accepted as customary international law.102 The U.S. Navy and DoD doctrine recognize this definition as authoritative—warships need not be armed but must be under the command of a duly commissioned officer and manned by a qualified crew subject to armed forces discipline.103\nCertainly, a UMS can belong to the armed forces of a state and can bear external markings regarding its nationality. Is a UMS, however, capable of being “under the command” of a commissioned officer and “manned” by a crew subject to armed forces discipline? Since DoD classifies UAS as military aircraft, it must adopt a similar position regarding the status of UMS as warships if it expects them to enjoy belligerent rights. At the time of publication in early-2022, however, U.S. Navy doctrine regards military UMS engaged exclusively in government, noncommercial service as “sovereign immune craft,” rather than “warships.”104\nThe definition of “warship” originated in 1907, at the dawn of the era of all-big-gun dreadnought battleships. Since then, the submarine and aircraft carrier have transformed naval warfare, and unmanned systems and autonomous ships are profoundly shaping contemporary conflict at sea. Hague VII, which governs the conversion of merchant ships to warships, requires that the converted merchant ship (1) be “placed under the direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the Power whose flag it flies”; (2) “bear the external marks which distinguish the warships of their nationality”; (3) be under the command of a duly commissioned officer in the service of the state whose “name must figure on the list of the officers of the fighting fleet”; and (4) be manned by a crew “subject to military discipline.”105 The drafters of Hague VII did not envision unmanned systems, and the definition should be re-examined and reinterpreted in light of current and emerging technologies. That said, there is nothing in UNCLOS or any other instrument that requires the commander and crew to be physically on board a warship. UAVs are remotely piloted and still qualify as a military aircraft; we take a similar position with UMS. UMS can be remotely manned by a crew and under the command of a commissioned officer that is not physically present on the platform. Given that UMS have similar characteristics of manned combatants, they can be considered “warships” in international law.\nAll UMS are not warships, however. As UMS mission sets expand to include offensive operations, states should adjust their policy concerning the status of UMS. Under current U.S. Navy doctrine, naval auxiliaries, merchant vessels, and presumably UMS are not warships and therefore may only defend themselves from enemy attacks—they may not engage in offensive combat operations in an international armed conflict.106 Yet, one of the nine priority mission areas for UMS is TCS, which calls for the delivery of ordnance on a target from an UMS or UMS-delivered weapon cache.107 Thus, state practice and doctrine have moved in advance of the law; the lawyers should catch up.\nA UUV’s stealth, long-standoff distance and endurance features allow for clandestine weapon delivery and remote launch, making the unmanned underwater vehicles the weapon platform of choice for many TCS missions.108 Underwater weapons caches or buoyant missile launch capsules delivered by an UUV can “loiter in place awaiting launch instructions, or the UUV itself could carry the weapons and loiter.”109 Legal purists might suggest that in order to lawfully execute this capability, the UUV must be designated as a warship. Instead, we conclude that UUVs, like torpedoes, may serve as weapons or launch weapons, but the designation of a “warship” provides greater clarity on its status as a sovereign immune vessel and reinforces belligerent rights.\nIn the United States, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has authority to register, classify, and designate naval water-borne craft as warships.110 Warship classification applies to any ship built or armed for naval combat that the service maintains on the Naval Vessel Register. In this regard, the CNO is responsible for entering vessels into the battle force ship inventory and the Naval Vessel Register. Battle force ships are commissioned as United States Ship (USS) warships capable of contributing to combat operations, which could include some UMS currently under development.111 Neither U.S. Navy Regulations nor Secretary of the Navy Instructions distinguish between manned and unmanned vessels. Consequently, there is nothing that prohibits the CNO from designating a UMS as a warship so long as he or she complies with applicable fiscal law requirements,112 and determines that the manning and command requirements can be satisfied remotely and that the UMS can be operated safely.\nWith the abolition of privateers, only warships that fulfill the elements of the definition in article 29 of UNCLOS are entitled to belligerent rights, which include enforcement of a blockade, capture of vessels in prize law, and attacks against the enemy. Among all vessels, only warships may exercise belligerent rights during an international armed conflict under the law of naval warfare. This limitation on the authority to exercise belligerent rights was reaffirmed in the 1907 Hague VII Convention, which governs the conversion of merchant ships to warships.113 If a belligerent converts a merchant ship into a warship, it must place the vessel “under the direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility” of the flag state.114 Additionally, the converted merchant vessel shall bear “external marks” that distinguish nationality.115 The converted vessel shall be placed “under the command of a duly commissioned officer in the service of the state whose name must figure on the list of the officers of the fighting fleet” and shall be “manned by a crew subject to military discipline.”116 If a merchant vessel is converted, the belligerent state must also publicly announce the conversion in the list of warships as soon as possible.117\nAlthough the United States is not a party to either the Paris Declaration or the 1907 Hague VII Convention, U.S. practice confirms that only warships and military aircraft can exercise belligerent rights at sea.118 The Department of Defense Law of War Manual and Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations reiterate that during international armed conflict at sea, warships are the only vessels that may exercise belligerent rights, which include the right to conduct offensive attacks.119 Thus, naval auxiliaries and merchant vessels, as well as UMS that are otherwise considered vessels but have not been designated as “warships,” may not conduct attacks during an international armed conflict. Such vessels may only defend themselves.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the next question is whether such\nemployed in the naval service can be characterized as a “warship\nas that term is defined in international law\nThis is a very important issue given\nwarships are the only vessels that can exercise belligerent rights\noffensive attacks or\nright of visit and search of neutral ships\nunder the law of naval warfare\nUNCLOS defines “warship” as “a ship belonging to the armed forces of a state\nand manned by a crew\nThis rule is accepted as customary international law\nThe U.S. Navy and DoD doctrine recognize this definition as authoritative\nwarships need not be armed but must be under the command of a duly commissioned officer and manned by a qualified crew\na UMS can belong to the armed forces of a state and can bear external markings regarding its nationality. Is a UMS, however\nmanned\nby a crew subject to armed forces discipline\nU.S. Navy doctrine regards military UMS engaged exclusively in government, noncommercial service as “sovereign immune craft,” rather than “warships\nThe definition of “warship” originated in 1907\nautonomous ships are\nshaping contemporary conflict at sea\ndrafters\ndid not envision unmanned systems, and the definition should be re-examined and reinterpreted in light of current and emerging technologies\nUMS\ncan be considered “warships” in international law\nAll UMS are not warships\nAs UMS mission sets expand to include offensive operations, states should adjust their policy concerning the status of UMS. Under current U.S. Navy doctrine\nnaval auxiliaries, merchant vessels, and presumably UMS are not warships and therefore may only defend themselves from enemy attacks\nthey may not engage in offensive combat operations in an international armed conflic\nYet, one of the nine priority mission areas for UMS is TCS, which calls for the delivery of ordnance on a target from an UMS or UMS-delivered weapon cache\ndoctrine have moved in advance of the law;\nlawyers should catch up\nA UUV’s stealth\nlong-standoff distance and endurance features allow for clandestine weapon delivery and remote launch, making the unmanned underwater vehicles the weapon platform of choice for many TCS missions\nUUVs\nlike torpedoes, may serve as weapons\nbut the designation of a “warship” provides greater clarity on its status as a sovereign immune vessel and reinforces belligerent rights\nIn the U\nS\nthe Chief of Naval Operations\nhas authority to register, classify, and designate naval water-borne craft as warships\nWarship classification applies to any ship built or armed for naval combat that the service maintains on the Naval Vessel Registe\nthe CNO is responsible for entering vessels into the battle force ship inventory and the Naval Vessel Register\nBattle force ships are commissioned as\nUSS\nwarships capable of contributing to combat operations, which could include\nUMS\nunder development\nthere is nothing that prohibits the CNO from designating a UMS as a warship so long as he or she complies with applicable fiscal law requirements\nand determines that\ncommand requirements can be satisfied remotely and that the UMS can be operated safely\nonly warships that fulfill the elements of the definition in article 29 of UNCLOS are entitled to belligerent rights, which include enforcement of a blockade\ncapture of vessels in prize law, and attacks against the enemy\nonly warships may exercise belligerent rights during an international armed conflict under the law of naval warfare\nIf a\nvessel is converted, the belligerent state must\npublicly announce the conversion in the list of warships as soon as possible\nAlthough the U\nS\nis not a party to\nthe Paris Declaration or\n1907 Hague VII Convention\nU.S. practice confirms that only warships\ncan exercise belligerent rights at sea\nThe Department of Defense Law of War Manual and Commander’s Handbook\nreiterate\nduring international armed conflict at sea\nwarships are the only vessels that may exercise belligerent rights\nwhich include the right to conduct offensive attacks\nnaval auxiliaries and merchant vessels, as well as UMS that are otherwise considered vessels but have not been designated as “warships,” may not conduct attacks\nSuch\nmay only defend themselves", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Classification of UMS as warships is key. Exercise of belligerent rights is necessary to conduct offensive operations.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the next question is whether such\nemployed in the naval service can be characterized as a “warship\nas that term is defined in international law\nThis is a very important issue given\nwarships are the only vessels that can exercise belligerent rights\noffensive attacks or\nright of visit and search of neutral ships\nunder the law of naval warfare\nUNCLOS defines “warship” as “a ship belonging to the armed forces of a state\nand manned by a crew\nThis rule is accepted as customary international law\nThe U.S. Navy and DoD doctrine recognize this definition as authoritative\nwarships need not be armed but must be under the command of a duly commissioned officer and manned by a qualified crew\na UMS can belong to the armed forces of a state and can bear external markings regarding its nationality. Is a UMS, however\nmanned\nby a crew subject to armed forces discipline\nU.S. Navy doctrine regards military UMS engaged exclusively in government, noncommercial service as “sovereign immune craft,” rather than “warships\nThe definition of “warship” originated in 1907\nautonomous ships are\nshaping contemporary conflict at sea\ndrafters\ndid not envision unmanned systems, and the definition should be re-examined and reinterpreted in light of current and emerging technologies\nUMS\ncan be considered “warships” in international law\nAll UMS are not warships\nAs UMS mission sets expand to include offensive operations, states should adjust their policy concerning the status of UMS. Under current U.S. Navy doctrine\nnaval auxiliaries, merchant vessels, and presumably UMS are not warships and therefore may only defend themselves from enemy attacks\nthey may not engage in offensive combat operations in an international armed conflic\nYet, one of the nine priority mission areas for UMS is TCS, which calls for the delivery of ordnance on a target from an UMS or UMS-delivered weapon cache\ndoctrine have moved in advance of the law;\nlawyers should catch up\nA UUV’s stealth\nlong-standoff distance and endurance features allow for clandestine weapon delivery and remote launch, making the unmanned underwater vehicles the weapon platform of choice for many TCS missions\nUUVs\nlike torpedoes, may serve as weapons\nbut the designation of a “warship” provides greater clarity on its status as a sovereign immune vessel and reinforces belligerent rights\nIn the U\nS\nthe Chief of Naval Operations\nhas authority to register, classify, and designate naval water-borne craft as warships\nWarship classification applies to any ship built or armed for naval combat that the service maintains on the Naval Vessel Registe\nthe CNO is responsible for entering vessels into the battle force ship inventory and the Naval Vessel Register\nBattle force ships are commissioned as\nUSS\nwarships capable of contributing to combat operations, which could include\nUMS\nunder development\nthere is nothing that prohibits the CNO from designating a UMS as a warship so long as he or she complies with applicable fiscal law requirements\nand determines that\ncommand requirements can be satisfied remotely and that the UMS can be operated safely\nonly warships that fulfill the elements of the definition in article 29 of UNCLOS are entitled to belligerent rights, which include enforcement of a blockade\ncapture of vessels in prize law, and attacks against the enemy\nonly warships may exercise belligerent rights during an international armed conflict under the law of naval warfare\nIf a\nvessel is converted, the belligerent state must\npublicly announce the conversion in the list of warships as soon as possible\nAlthough the U\nS\nis not a party to\nthe Paris Declaration or\n1907 Hague VII Convention\nU.S. practice confirms that only warships\ncan exercise belligerent rights at sea\nThe Department of Defense Law of War Manual and Commander’s Handbook\nreiterate\nduring international armed conflict at sea\nwarships are the only vessels that may exercise belligerent rights\nwhich include the right to conduct offensive attacks\nnaval auxiliaries and merchant vessels, as well as UMS that are otherwise considered vessels but have not been designated as “warships,” may not conduct attacks\nSuch\nmay only defend themselves", "role": "user" }, { "content": "naval service\nwarship\ninternational law\nvery important issue\nbelligerent rights\noffensive attacks\nneutral ships\nUNCLOS\narmed forces\nmanned by a crew\ncustomary international law\nauthoritative\ncommand\nmanned\nbelong\nexternal markings\nhowever\nmanned\nU.S. Navy doctrine\nmilitary UMS\nsovereign immune craft\nwarships\n1907\nautonomous ships\ncontemporary conflict\ndid not envision\nshould be re-examined\nreinterpreted\nemerging technologies\nUMS\ninternational law\nnot warships\nexpand to include\nadjust their policy\nUnder current U.S. Navy doctrine\nnot warships\nenemy attacks\ninternational armed conflic\nYet\nTCS\ndoctrine\nlawyers\nUUV’s\nclandestine\nunmanned underwater vehicles\nTCS missions\nUUVs\nweapons\ndesignation of a “warship\ngreater clarity\nstatus\nreinforces belligerent rights\nU\nS\nChief of Naval Operations\nclassify\nwarships\nnaval combat\nCNO\nBattle force ships\nUSS\ncombat operations\ncould include\nUMS\nCNO\nwarship\nfiscal law requirements\ncommand requirements\nremotely\noperated safely\nwarships\nbelligerent rights\nblockade\nvessels\nattacks\nonly warships\nnaval warfare\nconverted\npublicly announce\nU\nS\nnot a party\nU.S. practice\nwarships\nLaw of War Manual\nwarships\nbelligerent rights\noffensive attacks\nnaval auxiliaries\nUMS\nhave not been\nconduct attacks", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Classification of UMS as warships is key. Exercise of belligerent rights is necessary to conduct offensive operations.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the next question is whether such\nemployed in the naval service can be characterized as a “warship\nas that term is defined in international law\nThis is a very important issue given\nwarships are the only vessels that can exercise belligerent rights\noffensive attacks or\nright of visit and search of neutral ships\nunder the law of naval warfare\nUNCLOS defines “warship” as “a ship belonging to the armed forces of a state\nand manned by a crew\nThis rule is accepted as customary international law\nThe U.S. Navy and DoD doctrine recognize this definition as authoritative\nwarships need not be armed but must be under the command of a duly commissioned officer and manned by a qualified crew\na UMS can belong to the armed forces of a state and can bear external markings regarding its nationality. Is a UMS, however\nmanned\nby a crew subject to armed forces discipline\nU.S. Navy doctrine regards military UMS engaged exclusively in government, noncommercial service as “sovereign immune craft,” rather than “warships\nThe definition of “warship” originated in 1907\nautonomous ships are\nshaping contemporary conflict at sea\ndrafters\ndid not envision unmanned systems, and the definition should be re-examined and reinterpreted in light of current and emerging technologies\nUMS\ncan be considered “warships” in international law\nAll UMS are not warships\nAs UMS mission sets expand to include offensive operations, states should adjust their policy concerning the status of UMS. Under current U.S. Navy doctrine\nnaval auxiliaries, merchant vessels, and presumably UMS are not warships and therefore may only defend themselves from enemy attacks\nthey may not engage in offensive combat operations in an international armed conflic\nYet, one of the nine priority mission areas for UMS is TCS, which calls for the delivery of ordnance on a target from an UMS or UMS-delivered weapon cache\ndoctrine have moved in advance of the law;\nlawyers should catch up\nA UUV’s stealth\nlong-standoff distance and endurance features allow for clandestine weapon delivery and remote launch, making the unmanned underwater vehicles the weapon platform of choice for many TCS missions\nUUVs\nlike torpedoes, may serve as weapons\nbut the designation of a “warship” provides greater clarity on its status as a sovereign immune vessel and reinforces belligerent rights\nIn the U\nS\nthe Chief of Naval Operations\nhas authority to register, classify, and designate naval water-borne craft as warships\nWarship classification applies to any ship built or armed for naval combat that the service maintains on the Naval Vessel Registe\nthe CNO is responsible for entering vessels into the battle force ship inventory and the Naval Vessel Register\nBattle force ships are commissioned as\nUSS\nwarships capable of contributing to combat operations, which could include\nUMS\nunder development\nthere is nothing that prohibits the CNO from designating a UMS as a warship so long as he or she complies with applicable fiscal law requirements\nand determines that\ncommand requirements can be satisfied remotely and that the UMS can be operated safely\nonly warships that fulfill the elements of the definition in article 29 of UNCLOS are entitled to belligerent rights, which include enforcement of a blockade\ncapture of vessels in prize law, and attacks against the enemy\nonly warships may exercise belligerent rights during an international armed conflict under the law of naval warfare\nIf a\nvessel is converted, the belligerent state must\npublicly announce the conversion in the list of warships as soon as possible\nAlthough the U\nS\nis not a party to\nthe Paris Declaration or\n1907 Hague VII Convention\nU.S. practice confirms that only warships\ncan exercise belligerent rights at sea\nThe Department of Defense Law of War Manual and Commander’s Handbook\nreiterate\nduring international armed conflict at sea\nwarships are the only vessels that may exercise belligerent rights\nwhich include the right to conduct offensive attacks\nnaval auxiliaries and merchant vessels, as well as UMS that are otherwise considered vessels but have not been designated as “warships,” may not conduct attacks\nSuch\nmay only defend themselves", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the\nquestion is whether such\ncan be characterized as a “warship\nin international law\nwarships\ncan exercise belligerent rights\noffensive attacks or\nright of visit and search\nUNCLOS defines\nas “a ship belonging to\narmed forces\nmanned by a crew\nThis\nis accepted as c\ni\nl\nU.S. Navy doctrine regards military UMS\nas “sovereign immune craft,” rather than “warships\ndrafters\ndid not envision unmanned systems\nthe definition should be\nreinterpreted in light of\nemerging technologies\nAs UMS mission\ninclude offensive operations, states should adjust\npolicy\nUUV’s stealth\ndistance and endurance\nallow for clandestine\ndelivery\ndesignation of\nwarship” provides\nclarity\nand reinforces belligerent rights\nthe Chief of Naval Operations\nhas authority to\nclassify\ncraft as warships\nBattle force ships are\ncapable of\ncombat\nwhich\ninclude\nUMS\nwarships\nare entitled to belligerent rights, which include\nblockade\ncapture\nand attacks\nf a\nvessel is converted, the\nstate must\nannounce the conversion\nnaval auxiliaries\nas well as UMS\nnot\ndesignated\nwarships,” may not conduct attacks", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Clear signals of US interpretation of “warships’ in CIL are needed to ensure the success of unmanned FONOPs.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The near-term extensive use of unmanned systems during FONOPs necessitates both prudent planning and measured operational execution. The U.S. government should establish a favorable precedent for the legal status of unmanned systems under existing conventions and enforce suitable repercussions for external interference with unmanned systems operating in accordance with customary international law.\nSetting a Precedent\nThere is debate in legal circles over whether unmanned systems qualify as warships — a classification advantageous to the execution of freedom of navigation missions. Unfortunately, any comprehensive solution to this complex question will likely suffer due to the frayed relationships in today’s global environment, which make consensus difficult.\nWith this obstacle in mind, the best path forward for ensuring unmanned systems’ ability to conduct operations in accordance with accepted standards is through clear communication of intent and routine usage across the globe. Just as the U.S. government has relied on its interpretation of convention provisions to dictate its actions around the world and reinforce customary international law, a transparent and publicly accessible U.S. policy on unmanned system use on the seas could combine with at-sea operations to provide the necessary foundation for global acceptance. \nSignaling Resolve During Unmanned FONOPs \nImportant questions also remain as to whether challenged nations will treat unmanned systems in accordance with the norms afforded to manned systems during FONOPs. Numerous instances already exist of nations capturing or destroying unmanned systems, including the shooting down of a U.S. Navy surveillance drone by Iran in 2019. In that case, media reporting indicated that Iranian forces specifically chose their target based on its unmanned nature in an attempt to avoid further escalation. If an adversary believes they can target unmanned systems without any retribution, effective unmanned system usage across all mission sets will suffer.\nWith that consideration in mind, clear policy guidance prior to the execution of unmanned system FONOPs can signal the resolve and set the expectations necessary to ensure successful operations. The U.S. government should credibly and consistently communicate that any actions taken to inhibit the navigation of these systems will be met with determination. Signaling could be accomplished via pre-negotiated international agreements or clear warning statements disseminated via the appropriate forum.\nBy credibly signaling resolve with respect to the execution of unmanned FONOPs, the U.S. government could provide escalation expectations and manage risk effectively. The same escalation options available for the loss of a manned asset would be available for the loss of an unmanned asset, but with additional and less-escalatory rungs to climb along the way. These additional escalation steps include using manned assets to accomplish the mission, or a proportional military response when merited. In practice, certain — and likely most — circumstances will lend themselves to unmanned systems usage while rare situations may require more traditional means of contestation.\nPreventing Technology Loss\nAnother commonly mentioned concern is the potential loss of technology resulting from the loss of unmanned systems. In this scenario, an unmanned system taken “captive” by a rival nation results in the loss of sensitive technology or information. This drama has already played out in real time, as witnessed by the capture of a U.S. Navy oceanographic survey glider in 2016 and subsequent Chinese technological advances.\nBefore condemning unmanned systems for this fault, however, one should note that this problem is not unique to them. The 2001 emergency landing of a manned U.S. Navy EP-3 in Hainan, China, resulted in the loss of sensitive materials. Going back further, the capture of the USS Pueblo and its crew in 1968 by North Korean forces also infamously compromised classified information and hardware, including ten encryption machines and thousands of pages of top secret documents.\nNotably, unmanned systems may experience a higher likelihood of attempted tampering or interference than traditional assets due to the same traits that contribute to their de-escalation advantages. Ensuring the protection of sensitive information lies not in eschewing the use of unmanned systems, but rather in ensuring fail-safe methods for destroying relevant data when in danger of exploitation. As with their manned counterparts, unmanned systems operations should be approached from a continuing perspective of potential exposure with mitigations in place to avoid technological theft.\nWhile manned systems can resort to a human and an axe in attempts to destroy equipment, unmanned systems’ hardware needs to automatically revert to a zeroized, or unusable, state in case of distress. Initiation of this process can be triggered by a command from its home station, the shock from a significant collision, or an extended loss of communication with its handler, inhibiting the loss of critically sensitive information and exploitation of the hardware itself.\nPerhaps unexpectedly, unmanned systems possess at least one advantage in this realm. Unmanned systems negate the adversary’s ability to leverage human crews for nefarious purposes, such as the creation of damaging propaganda or the receipt of additional sensitive information via interrogation.\nUnmanned Systems as the Platform of Choice for FONOPs\nBy properly executing a transition to unmanned system FONOPs, the United States can use technological advances to ensure a continuing ability to “provide a legal order that will, among other things, facilitate peaceful international uses of the oceans.” Properly leveraged, unmanned systems will execute this mission at a significant cost savings, with a reduction in risk, and at a scale needed in a twenty-first century defined by great-power competition.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The U.S. government should establish a favorable precedent for the legal status of unmanned systems under existing conventions and enforce suitable repercussions for external interference with unmanned systems\nin accordance with customary international law\nThere is debate in legal circles over whether unmanned systems qualify as warships\na classification advantageous to the execution of freedom of navigation missions\ncomprehensive solution\nwill\nsuffer\ntoday’s global environment\nmake consensus difficult\nthe best path forward for ensuring unmanned systems’ ability to conduct operations in accordance with accepted standards is through clear communication of intent and routine usage across the globe. Just as the U.S\nhas relied on its interpretation of convention provisions to dictate\nactions around the world and reinforce customary international law, a transparent\nU.S. policy on unmanned system use on the seas could combine with at-sea operations to provide the necessary foundation for global acceptance\nquestions\nremain\nwhether challenged nations will treat unmanned systems in accordance with the norms afforded to manned systems during FONOPs\nNumerous instances already exist of nations capturing or destroying unmanned systems\nIf an adversary believes they can target unmanned systems without any retribution\neffective unmanned system usage across all mission sets will suffer\nclear policy guidance prior to the execution of unmanned system FONOPs can signal the resolve and set the expectations necessary to ensure successful operations\nThe U.S. government should credibly and consistently communicate that any actions taken to inhibit the navigation of these systems will be met with determination\nBy credibly signaling resolve with respect to the execution of unmanned FONOPs, the U.S. government could provide escalation expectations and manage risk effectively. The same escalation options available for the loss of a manned asset would be available for\nan unmanned asset, but with additional\nless-escalatory rungs to climb\nBy properly executing a transition to unmanned system FONOPs, the U\nS\ncan use technological advances to ensure a continuing ability to “provide a legal order that will\nfacilitate peaceful international uses of the oceans\nunmanned systems will execute this mission\nat a scale needed in\ngreat-power competition", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Clear signals of US interpretation of “warships’ in CIL are needed to ensure the success of unmanned FONOPs.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The U.S. government should establish a favorable precedent for the legal status of unmanned systems under existing conventions and enforce suitable repercussions for external interference with unmanned systems\nin accordance with customary international law\nThere is debate in legal circles over whether unmanned systems qualify as warships\na classification advantageous to the execution of freedom of navigation missions\ncomprehensive solution\nwill\nsuffer\ntoday’s global environment\nmake consensus difficult\nthe best path forward for ensuring unmanned systems’ ability to conduct operations in accordance with accepted standards is through clear communication of intent and routine usage across the globe. Just as the U.S\nhas relied on its interpretation of convention provisions to dictate\nactions around the world and reinforce customary international law, a transparent\nU.S. policy on unmanned system use on the seas could combine with at-sea operations to provide the necessary foundation for global acceptance\nquestions\nremain\nwhether challenged nations will treat unmanned systems in accordance with the norms afforded to manned systems during FONOPs\nNumerous instances already exist of nations capturing or destroying unmanned systems\nIf an adversary believes they can target unmanned systems without any retribution\neffective unmanned system usage across all mission sets will suffer\nclear policy guidance prior to the execution of unmanned system FONOPs can signal the resolve and set the expectations necessary to ensure successful operations\nThe U.S. government should credibly and consistently communicate that any actions taken to inhibit the navigation of these systems will be met with determination\nBy credibly signaling resolve with respect to the execution of unmanned FONOPs, the U.S. government could provide escalation expectations and manage risk effectively. The same escalation options available for the loss of a manned asset would be available for\nan unmanned asset, but with additional\nless-escalatory rungs to climb\nBy properly executing a transition to unmanned system FONOPs, the U\nS\ncan use technological advances to ensure a continuing ability to “provide a legal order that will\nfacilitate peaceful international uses of the oceans\nunmanned systems will execute this mission\nat a scale needed in\ngreat-power competition", "role": "user" }, { "content": "favorable precedent\nlegal status\nunmanned systems\nexisting conventions\nsuitable repercussions\ncustomary international law\ndebate\nwarships\nadvantageous\nexecution\nfreedom of navigation missions\ncomprehensive solution\nglobal environment\nconsensus difficult\nbest path forward\naccepted standards\nclear communication\nintent\nroutine usage\ninterpretation\nconvention provisions\ncustomary international law\nU.S. policy\nnecessary foundation\nglobal acceptance\nunmanned systems\nnorms\nFONOPs\nNumerous instances\ncapturing\ndestroying\nadversary\nwithout any retribution\nall mission sets\nclear policy guidance\nunmanned system FONOPs\nsignal the resolve\nset the expectations\nsuccessful operations\ncredibly\nconsistently\ndetermination\ncredibly signaling\nunmanned FONOPs\nescalation expectations\nmanage risk\nescalation options\nless-escalatory rungs\nproperly executing\nU\nS\ncontinuing ability\nlegal order\npeaceful\nunmanned systems\ngreat-power competition", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Clear signals of US interpretation of “warships’ in CIL are needed to ensure the success of unmanned FONOPs.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The U.S. government should establish a favorable precedent for the legal status of unmanned systems under existing conventions and enforce suitable repercussions for external interference with unmanned systems\nin accordance with customary international law\nThere is debate in legal circles over whether unmanned systems qualify as warships\na classification advantageous to the execution of freedom of navigation missions\ncomprehensive solution\nwill\nsuffer\ntoday’s global environment\nmake consensus difficult\nthe best path forward for ensuring unmanned systems’ ability to conduct operations in accordance with accepted standards is through clear communication of intent and routine usage across the globe. Just as the U.S\nhas relied on its interpretation of convention provisions to dictate\nactions around the world and reinforce customary international law, a transparent\nU.S. policy on unmanned system use on the seas could combine with at-sea operations to provide the necessary foundation for global acceptance\nquestions\nremain\nwhether challenged nations will treat unmanned systems in accordance with the norms afforded to manned systems during FONOPs\nNumerous instances already exist of nations capturing or destroying unmanned systems\nIf an adversary believes they can target unmanned systems without any retribution\neffective unmanned system usage across all mission sets will suffer\nclear policy guidance prior to the execution of unmanned system FONOPs can signal the resolve and set the expectations necessary to ensure successful operations\nThe U.S. government should credibly and consistently communicate that any actions taken to inhibit the navigation of these systems will be met with determination\nBy credibly signaling resolve with respect to the execution of unmanned FONOPs, the U.S. government could provide escalation expectations and manage risk effectively. The same escalation options available for the loss of a manned asset would be available for\nan unmanned asset, but with additional\nless-escalatory rungs to climb\nBy properly executing a transition to unmanned system FONOPs, the U\nS\ncan use technological advances to ensure a continuing ability to “provide a legal order that will\nfacilitate peaceful international uses of the oceans\nunmanned systems will execute this mission\nat a scale needed in\ngreat-power competition", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The U.S.\nshould establish\nprecedent for the legal status of unmanned systems\nand enforce\nrepercussions\nwith c\ni\nl\nunmanned systems\nas warships\na classification advantageous to\nexecution of freedom of navigation\nsolution\nwill\nsuffer\ntoday’s\nenvironment\nmake consensus difficult\nthe best path forward\nis through\ncommunication of intent and\nusage\nthe U.S\nrelied on\ninterpretation of\nprovisions to dictate\nactions\nand reinforce c\ni\nl\ntransparent\npolicy on unmanned system use\ncould\nprovide\nfoundation for\nacceptance\nquestions\nremain\nwhether\nnations will treat unmanned systems in accordance with\nnorms\nduring FONOPs\nNumerous instances\nexist of nations capturing\nsystems\nIf an adversary believes they can target\nwithout\nretribution\nmission\nsuffer\nclear\nguidance prior to\nunmanned\nFONOPs can signal\nresolve\nto ensure success\nThe U.S.\nshould\nconsistently communicate that\nactions\nto inhibit\nnavigation\nwill be met with determination\nBy\nsignaling resolve with\nunmanned FONOPs, the U.S\ncould\nmanage risk\nBy properly executing\ntransition\nthe U\nS\ncan\nprovide a legal order that will\nfacilitate peaceful\noceans", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Collapse of maritime norms causes hot wars in the Persian Gulf, Arctic, and SCS. Try or die for FONOPs.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "It has been decades since international relations in the world order dictated true competition for sea control, sea lines of communication, access to world markets, and diplomatic partnerships. However, it is becoming increasingly alarming that nations such as Iran, China and Russia seek to accumulate/consolidate power and re-define international maritime norms, potentially at the peril of diplomatic, economic, and military bonds that link NATO allies and critical partners.\nIran claims control of the Strait of Hormuz and has put the threat of closure or denial at the core of its asymmetric war strategy. In a 2019 statement in response to the U.S. plan to end waivers on Iranian oil exports, Alireza Tangsiri, head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps navy force confirmed that the Straits of Hormuz was a critical arrow in Iran’s proverbial military quiver. Tangsiri remarked that “If we are prevented from using it; we (Iran) will close it. In the event of any threats, we will not have the slightest hesitation to protect and defend Iran’s waterway.” 1\nRenewed tensions between Iran and the United States, heightened further following the Trump administration’s decision to target Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani, have renewed Iranian narratives about closing the Straits of Hormuz in an effort to break another set of renewed western sanctions. Carrying one-fifth of the world’s traded sweet crude oil, a possible interruption of oil and gas exports through the strategic waterway would have a significant, negative, impact on the global economy. 2 Moreover, it is not only oil. According to the International Energy Association, huge amounts of natural gas are also transported on that route with an estimated 33 billion cubic meters of gas, including from Iran and Qatar, passing through the Strait of Hormuz each year. 3\nLikewise, China’s attempts to rationalize and assert control of 80 to 90 percent of the South China Sea, including waters allocated to neighboring sovereign states under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are equally troubling. 4 As author Bill Hayton aptly describes it in book The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, the South China Sea is “both the fulcrum of world trade and the crucible for conflict.” 5 The challenge posed by China’s refusal to abide by international law in the South China Sea may potentially re-define the practical application of the concept of maritime freedom. Beijing is bullying its way through its selective application of UNCLOS to a maritime entitlement five times larger than permitted via the convention (China ratified UNCLOS in 1996) and customary international law, carving out an illegitimate sphere of influence. 6 In effect, if Beijing gets its way, the South China Sea will become a seaward extension of Chinese territory and the ruling Chinese Communist Party will ipso facto dictate what foreign vessels and aircraft can and cannot do. 7 The cascading effects for other critical SLOCs, from the Persian Gulf to the ever increasingly more accessible Arctic routes, could be severe if other coastal states, such as Iran and Russia, decide to press their own revisionist interpretations of maritime law. 8\nMany Russia watcher and analysts support the premise that Russia, through its confrontation with the Ukrainian Navy in the Kerch Straits in November of 2018 and its subsequent restrictions on shipping, is similarly trying to rewrite the rules in the Sea of Azov, just as China has done in the South China Sea. Experts such as James Holmes, a professor of maritime strategy at the United States Naval War College, agree that the Russian actions in the Black Sea region pose a challenge to international maritime law.\n“It’s an effort to set a precedent that Russia can then apply to other seas that it would also like to dominate if not control, much as the South China Sea is an expanse that China would like to ‘own,’ ” he said. “If Russia can define the Azov Sea as Russian territorial waters, there is no reason in principle it could not do so in the wider Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, Sea of Okhotsk, et cetera. So this is an easy win for Moscow and an easy place to set that precedent.” 9\nIn all of the examples above, the international norms and UNCLOS regulated system of maritime trade, commerce and military endeavors has come under direct challenge. In all such cases, it is incumbent upon maritime nations that believe in the freedom of the sea and require international sea based trade to maintain their quality of being, help defend this centuries-old concept that the high seas are a global commons. International waters belong to everyone and no one, with few, minor and narrowly defined exceptions. No state owns it, and no state can make laws dictating what others do there. 10 Operations, such as the ones listed above, threaten the freedom of the seas, seek to intimidate neighboring states and coerce weaker nations into violation of international law.\nOn a daily basis, surface naval forces of the NATO Alliance’s nations and partners are conducting peaceful operations across the globe. These joint forces at sea protect freedom of maneuver, secure the sea-lanes for global trade and economic growth, defend and promote key national interests and prevent competitors and adversaries from leveraging the world’s oceans against us. The navies of the democratic and peaceful countries of the world and the international maritime community share concern over safeguarding strategic sea lines of communication.\nVersatile and scalable naval forces fulfill these crucial roles, which are the necessary preconditions to ensure the free movement of trade and commerce and to safeguard the interests of NATO and partner nations all the while maintaining a strictly defensive posture. The persistent forward presence and power projection of the Alliance’s naval forces backed by credible combat capability deters potential aggression and seeks to limit regional frictions from escalating to greater levels of conflict. These forces strengthen conditions that enable mutual prosperity.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Iran, China and Russia seek to accumulate\npower and re-define international maritime norms\nthe peril of\nallies\nIran claims control of the Strait of Hormuz and has put\nthreat of closure\nat the core of its asymmetric war strategy\nIranian\nnavy force confirmed\nStraits of Hormuz was a critical arrow in Iran’s proverbial military quiver\ntensions between Iran and the U\nS\nheightened\nfollowing\nSoleimani\nrenewed\nnarratives about closing the Straits\nto break\nwestern sanctions. Carrying one-fifth of the world’s\noil\ninterruption\nthrough the strategic waterway would have a\nnegative, impact on the\neconomy\nChina’s attempts to\nassert control of\nthe S\nC\nS\nincluding waters allocated to neighboring\nstates under\nUNCLOS) are\ntroubling\nthe South China Sea is\nthe fulcrum of\ntrade and\ncrucible for conflict\nThe challenge posed by China’s refusal to abide by international law\nmay\nre-define\napplication of\nmaritime freedom\nBeijing is bullying its way through\nselective application of UNCLOS\nand customary international law\ncarving out an illegitimate sphere of influence\nthe South China Sea will become\nseaward extension of Chinese territory\nThe cascading effects for\nSLOCs, from the Persian Gulf to th\nArctic\ncould be severe if\nIran and Russia\npress\nrevisionist interpretations of maritime law\nRussia\nanalysts support the premise\nRussia\nis\ntrying to rewrite\nrules in the Sea of Azov\nRussian actions in the Black Sea\npose a challenge to international maritime law\nIt’s an effort to set a precedent\nRussia can\napply to other seas\nit would\nlike to\ncontrol\nit could\ndo so in the\nBaltic Sea, Sea of Okhotsk\ninternational norms and UNCLOS regulated\nmaritime\ncommerce and military endeavors has come under\nchallenge\nit is incumbent upon maritime nations that believe in the freedom of the sea\nto maintain\nthe\nglobal commons\nforces at sea protect freedom of maneuver\nsecure the sea-lanes for\ntrade\nand prevent\nadversaries from leveraging\nworld’s oceans against us\nnavies of\ndemocratic\ncountries\nshare concern over safeguarding\nsea lines of communication\nscalable naval forces fulfill these\nroles, which are\npreconditions to ensure\nfree\ncommerce\npower projection of\nnaval forces backed by credible combat\ndeters\naggression and seeks to limit regional frictions from escalating to greater\nconflict", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Collapse of maritime norms causes hot wars in the Persian Gulf, Arctic, and SCS. Try or die for FONOPs.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Iran, China and Russia seek to accumulate\npower and re-define international maritime norms\nthe peril of\nallies\nIran claims control of the Strait of Hormuz and has put\nthreat of closure\nat the core of its asymmetric war strategy\nIranian\nnavy force confirmed\nStraits of Hormuz was a critical arrow in Iran’s proverbial military quiver\ntensions between Iran and the U\nS\nheightened\nfollowing\nSoleimani\nrenewed\nnarratives about closing the Straits\nto break\nwestern sanctions. Carrying one-fifth of the world’s\noil\ninterruption\nthrough the strategic waterway would have a\nnegative, impact on the\neconomy\nChina’s attempts to\nassert control of\nthe S\nC\nS\nincluding waters allocated to neighboring\nstates under\nUNCLOS) are\ntroubling\nthe South China Sea is\nthe fulcrum of\ntrade and\ncrucible for conflict\nThe challenge posed by China’s refusal to abide by international law\nmay\nre-define\napplication of\nmaritime freedom\nBeijing is bullying its way through\nselective application of UNCLOS\nand customary international law\ncarving out an illegitimate sphere of influence\nthe South China Sea will become\nseaward extension of Chinese territory\nThe cascading effects for\nSLOCs, from the Persian Gulf to th\nArctic\ncould be severe if\nIran and Russia\npress\nrevisionist interpretations of maritime law\nRussia\nanalysts support the premise\nRussia\nis\ntrying to rewrite\nrules in the Sea of Azov\nRussian actions in the Black Sea\npose a challenge to international maritime law\nIt’s an effort to set a precedent\nRussia can\napply to other seas\nit would\nlike to\ncontrol\nit could\ndo so in the\nBaltic Sea, Sea of Okhotsk\ninternational norms and UNCLOS regulated\nmaritime\ncommerce and military endeavors has come under\nchallenge\nit is incumbent upon maritime nations that believe in the freedom of the sea\nto maintain\nthe\nglobal commons\nforces at sea protect freedom of maneuver\nsecure the sea-lanes for\ntrade\nand prevent\nadversaries from leveraging\nworld’s oceans against us\nnavies of\ndemocratic\ncountries\nshare concern over safeguarding\nsea lines of communication\nscalable naval forces fulfill these\nroles, which are\npreconditions to ensure\nfree\ncommerce\npower projection of\nnaval forces backed by credible combat\ndeters\naggression and seeks to limit regional frictions from escalating to greater\nconflict", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Iran\nChina\nRussia\nmaritime norms\nallies\nStrait of Hormuz\nclosure\nasymmetric war strategy\nIranian\nStraits of Hormuz\ncritical arrow\nmilitary quiver\nIran\nU\nS\nSoleimani\nclosing\nwestern sanctions\none-fifth\noil\ninterruption\nstrategic waterway\neconomy\nassert control\nS\nC\nS\nUNCLOS\ntroubling\nfulcrum\ntrade\ncrucible\nconflict\ninternational law\napplication\nmaritime freedom\nselective application\nUNCLOS\ncustomary international law\nsphere of influence\nseaward extension\ncascading effects\nSLOCs\nPersian Gulf\nArctic\nsevere\nIran\nRussia\nSea of Azov\nBlack Sea\nprecedent\ncontrol\nBaltic Sea\nSea of Okhotsk\ninternational norms\nUNCLOS\nchallenge\nfreedom of the sea\nglobal commons\nfreedom of maneuver\nsea-lanes\nadversaries\nnavies\nsafeguarding\nscalable\npreconditions\npower projection\ndeters\naggression\nregional frictions\nconflict", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Collapse of maritime norms causes hot wars in the Persian Gulf, Arctic, and SCS. Try or die for FONOPs.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Iran, China and Russia seek to accumulate\npower and re-define international maritime norms\nthe peril of\nallies\nIran claims control of the Strait of Hormuz and has put\nthreat of closure\nat the core of its asymmetric war strategy\nIranian\nnavy force confirmed\nStraits of Hormuz was a critical arrow in Iran’s proverbial military quiver\ntensions between Iran and the U\nS\nheightened\nfollowing\nSoleimani\nrenewed\nnarratives about closing the Straits\nto break\nwestern sanctions. Carrying one-fifth of the world’s\noil\ninterruption\nthrough the strategic waterway would have a\nnegative, impact on the\neconomy\nChina’s attempts to\nassert control of\nthe S\nC\nS\nincluding waters allocated to neighboring\nstates under\nUNCLOS) are\ntroubling\nthe South China Sea is\nthe fulcrum of\ntrade and\ncrucible for conflict\nThe challenge posed by China’s refusal to abide by international law\nmay\nre-define\napplication of\nmaritime freedom\nBeijing is bullying its way through\nselective application of UNCLOS\nand customary international law\ncarving out an illegitimate sphere of influence\nthe South China Sea will become\nseaward extension of Chinese territory\nThe cascading effects for\nSLOCs, from the Persian Gulf to th\nArctic\ncould be severe if\nIran and Russia\npress\nrevisionist interpretations of maritime law\nRussia\nanalysts support the premise\nRussia\nis\ntrying to rewrite\nrules in the Sea of Azov\nRussian actions in the Black Sea\npose a challenge to international maritime law\nIt’s an effort to set a precedent\nRussia can\napply to other seas\nit would\nlike to\ncontrol\nit could\ndo so in the\nBaltic Sea, Sea of Okhotsk\ninternational norms and UNCLOS regulated\nmaritime\ncommerce and military endeavors has come under\nchallenge\nit is incumbent upon maritime nations that believe in the freedom of the sea\nto maintain\nthe\nglobal commons\nforces at sea protect freedom of maneuver\nsecure the sea-lanes for\ntrade\nand prevent\nadversaries from leveraging\nworld’s oceans against us\nnavies of\ndemocratic\ncountries\nshare concern over safeguarding\nsea lines of communication\nscalable naval forces fulfill these\nroles, which are\npreconditions to ensure\nfree\ncommerce\npower projection of\nnaval forces backed by credible combat\ndeters\naggression and seeks to limit regional frictions from escalating to greater\nconflict", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Iran, China\nRussia seek to\nre-define\nmaritime norms\nIran\nhas put\nclosure\nat the core of its\nstrategy\nnavy\nconfirmed\nHormuz was a critical arrow\ntensions\nheightened\nfollowing\nSoleimani\nrenewed\nclosing\nto break\nsanctions\none-fifth of\noil\ninterruption\nwould\nimpact\nthe\neconomy\nChina’s\ncontrol of\nthe S\nC\nS\nunder\nUNCLOS) are\ntroubling\nthe fulcrum of\ntrade and\ncrucible for conflict\nrefusal to abide by i\nlaw\nmay\nre-define\nmaritime freedom\nselective application of\nc\ni\nl\ncarving out\nillegitimate sphere\ncascading effects for\nSLOCs, from the Persian Gulf to\nArctic\ncould be severe\nRussia\nis\ntrying to rewrite\nthe Black Sea\nit could\ndo so in the\nBaltic Sea, Sea of Okhotsk\nnorms\nregulated\ncommerce\nhas come under\nchallenge\nit is incumbent\nto maintain\nthe\ncommons\nforces at sea protect freedom\nsea-lanes\nand prevent\nadversaries\nnaval forces fulfill these\nroles\npower projection\ndeters\naggression\nfrom escalating to\nconflict", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Persian Gulf war goes nuclear.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "War could break out in a variety of ways: As a result of Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz (a choke point for the daily transfer of some 19 million barrels of oil), a preemptive strike on Iran’s military and nuclear facilities (in light of Iran’s stated intention to resume aspects of its nuclear activities, banned under the 2015 nuclear agreement), an application of the 9/11 legislation on Authorization of Military Force against al-Qaeda (accusing Iran of being in league with al-Qaeda terrorists), or in response to perceived Iranian mischief (such as the recent sabotage on board several Saudi and UAE merchant ships).\nThe United States and Iran are not the only regional players, and care must be taken to understand the context and implications of events. As pointed out by a number of US experts in the wake of the most recent attacks on oil tankers, regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia have much to gain from a breakout of war between the U.S. and Iran. The U.S. has echoed the Saudi accusations against Iran and extended them to include blaming Iran for the Yemenis Houthi rebels’ drone attack on a Saudi pipeline on May 14th.\nAccusations are one thing, but the big question is, will the Trump administration heed Saudi Arabia’s call for a “US surgical strike” on Iran? Both the Saudis and Iranians harbor hegemonic ambitions in the region. The Saudis are pushing for a limited US strike to eliminate some of Iran’s formidable naval and missile capabilities, thus weakening their regional rival. But even a limited US strike would increase the likelihood of Iranian forces inflicting serious damage on US military assets in the region, both directly and indirectly through multiple proxy forces.\nIran’s military commanders have warned that the US military fleet is within range of Iran’s short-range missiles. Iran has reportedly affixed anti-ship missiles on hundreds of its fast boats, as part of an asymmetrical “swarming” tactic. Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, has also instructed the country’s military forces to commence preparations for war.\nIt is worth recalling that Iran is ranked 14th for countries with the most military firepower. Iran has also devoted considerable attention to upgrading its asymmetrical capabilities, including shifting its formal strategy to an “offensive-defensive” posture—meaning that if the United States moves offensively against Iran, Iran will counter by moving offensively against a regional target of value for the United States. An example of an offensive-defensive move would be if the United States were to use its airbases to launch nuclear-capable B-52 strikes on Iran, Iran could counterattack the US base in Qatar, irrespective of friendly ties with the country.\nIran is in many respects a “regional superpower” with over a half a million active soldiers and another 350,000 reservists; it possesses thousands of guided missiles, over 1,600 tanks, some 500 aircraft, hundreds of military drones, and several surface warships, submarines, and mine boats, in addition to some 3,000 fast boats. These assets indicate that the now seemly imminent conflict with Iran will not be a cakewalk for the United States. This possibility of a costly conventional conflict in our minds increases the likelihood of US conflict escalation to nuclear war.\nThe risk of nuclear warfare in the Persian Gulf represents a present and clear danger to world peace, requiring the mobilization of the international community to intervene.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "War could break out\nAs a result of Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz\nThe United States and Iran are not the only regional players\neven a limited US strike would increase the likelihood of Iranian forces inflicting serious damage on US military assets\nthrough\nproxy forces\nIran is ranked 14th for countries with the most military firepower. Iran has also devoted considerable attention to upgrading its asymmetrical capabilities\nIran will counter by moving offensively against a regional target of value for the United States\nIran could counterattack the US base in Qatar\nIran is\na “regional superpower” with over a half a million active soldiers and another 350,000 reservists; it possesses thousands of guided missiles, over 1,600 tanks\n some 500 aircraft, hundreds of military drones, and several surface warships, submarines, and mine boats, in addition to some 3,000 fast boats. These assets indicate that the now seemly imminent conflict with Iran will not be a cakewalk for the United States. This possibility of a costly conventional conflict in our minds increases the likelihood of US conflict escalation to nuclear war.\nThe risk of nuclear warfare in the Persian Gulf represents a present and clear danger\n.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Persian Gulf war goes nuclear.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "War could break out\nAs a result of Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz\nThe United States and Iran are not the only regional players\neven a limited US strike would increase the likelihood of Iranian forces inflicting serious damage on US military assets\nthrough\nproxy forces\nIran is ranked 14th for countries with the most military firepower. Iran has also devoted considerable attention to upgrading its asymmetrical capabilities\nIran will counter by moving offensively against a regional target of value for the United States\nIran could counterattack the US base in Qatar\nIran is\na “regional superpower” with over a half a million active soldiers and another 350,000 reservists; it possesses thousands of guided missiles, over 1,600 tanks\n some 500 aircraft, hundreds of military drones, and several surface warships, submarines, and mine boats, in addition to some 3,000 fast boats. These assets indicate that the now seemly imminent conflict with Iran will not be a cakewalk for the United States. This possibility of a costly conventional conflict in our minds increases the likelihood of US conflict escalation to nuclear war.\nThe risk of nuclear warfare in the Persian Gulf represents a present and clear danger\n.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "break out\nIran’s closure\nStrait of Hormuz\nU\nS\nnot the only regional players\neven a limited US strike\nIranian forces\nserious damage\nmilitary assets\nproxy forces\n14th\nmilitary firepower\nconsiderable attention\nasymmetrical capabilities\nmoving offensively\nregional target\ncounterattack\nQatar\nregional superpower\nhalf a million\n350,000 reservists\nguided missiles\n1,600 tanks\n500 aircraft\nmilitary drones\nseveral surface warships\nsubmarines\nmine boats\n3,000 fast boats\nimminent conflict\ncostly conventional conflict\nincreases the likelihood of US conflict escalation to nuclear war\nnuclear warfare in the Persian Gulf\nclear danger", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Persian Gulf war goes nuclear.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "War could break out\nAs a result of Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz\nThe United States and Iran are not the only regional players\neven a limited US strike would increase the likelihood of Iranian forces inflicting serious damage on US military assets\nthrough\nproxy forces\nIran is ranked 14th for countries with the most military firepower. Iran has also devoted considerable attention to upgrading its asymmetrical capabilities\nIran will counter by moving offensively against a regional target of value for the United States\nIran could counterattack the US base in Qatar\nIran is\na “regional superpower” with over a half a million active soldiers and another 350,000 reservists; it possesses thousands of guided missiles, over 1,600 tanks\n some 500 aircraft, hundreds of military drones, and several surface warships, submarines, and mine boats, in addition to some 3,000 fast boats. These assets indicate that the now seemly imminent conflict with Iran will not be a cakewalk for the United States. This possibility of a costly conventional conflict in our minds increases the likelihood of US conflict escalation to nuclear war.\nThe risk of nuclear warfare in the Persian Gulf represents a present and clear danger\n.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "War\nAs a result of Iran’s closure of\nHormuz\nThe U\nS\nIran are not the only\nplayers\na limited\nstrike would increase\ndamage\nthrough\nproxy\nIran is\n14th\nwith\nmost\nfirepower\nIran has\nasymmetrical capabilities\nIran will\nmov\noffensively against\nregional target\nIran could\nattack\nQatar\nIran is\na “\nsuperpower” with over a half a million\nsoldiers and another 350,000\nthousands of\nmissiles\ntanks\naircraft\ndrones\nwarships, submarines\na costly\nconflict\nincreases the likelihood of\nescalation to nuclear war\nnuclear warfare in the Persian Gulf represents a\ndanger", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Chinese naval expansion causes nuclear escalation of every Asian dyad.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "China’s military related aspirations have to do with enhancing its IndoPacific regional and wider strategic profile and economic influence. Accordingly, Chinese nuclear modernization will support deterrence of nuclear attack or blackmail against China proper, but also provide for coercive military backing of China’s growing regional assertiveness in Asia. With regard to the United States, for example, this implies that China will want to deter any conventional military intervention in the region against China’s vital interests, through a combination of improving conventional and nuclear missile and air forces. According to the 2018 US Department of Defense annual report to Congress on Chinese military and security developments, The Chinese armed forces (People’s Liberation Army or PLA) are undergoing transformation to support complex war fighting capabilities:\nThe PLA is undergoing the most comprehensive restructure in its history to become a force capable of conducting complex joint operations. The PLA strives to be capable of fighting and winning “informatized local wars” – regional conflicts defined by real-time, data-networked command and control, and precision strike.7\nChina’s nuclear forces also serve as a measure of escalation control on favorable terms should conventional war in its early stages not go according to Beijing’s expectations. With respect to strategic nuclear forces, modernization should provide a canopy, atop a range of Chinese military capabilities, that will have integrity from the lowest to the highest rungs of the escalation ladder. For example: China’s nuclear modernization includes unprecedented modernization of its ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers, but also the development of next generation nuclear warheads with smaller yields and high accuracy.8\nAlong with this, China’s fleet of nuclear attack submarines supports an ambitious anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) strategy to deter US military intervention to support allied interests in Asia against Chinese wishes.9 In addition, experts warn that, as China’s military capabilities for power projection expand, so may its strategic aspirations:\nSince anti-access strategies are adopted by nations who perceive their potential opponents as strategically inferior, China is likely to shift defense resources away from A2/AD systems and toward power projection and expansion capabilities once this perception of inferiority dissipates. Indeed, China is preparing to make this shift.10\nUnder President Xi Jinping, China has also been more assertive on other military-strategic issues, including the construction of Chinese military airfields on disputed islands in the South China Sea; claiming extended “air defense identification zones” whose transit would require permission from China; and developing a larger inventory of cyberweapons to support its diplomatic and military strategy.11\nChina’s diplomacy also creates additional space for maneuver on arms control and other issues. As nuclear arms control expert Alexei Arbatov has noted, Beijing’s “cautious and multivectored” policies “have allowed it to assume the role to which Russia has traditionally aspired – that of a balancer between East and West. In fact, it is Russia, with its new policy of “Eurasianism,” that has become the East”.12 On the other hand, China’s political and military objectives in Asia and worldwide differ from those of the United States and Russia, reflecting China’s perception of its own interests and of its anticipated role in the emerging world order.13 China’s military modernization is intended to support its rising global profile and expanded portfolio of international interests: focused on “investments and infrastructure to support a range of missions beyond China’s periphery” including “power projection, sea lane security, counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), and noncombatant evacuation operations”.14\nEntering China into the US-Russian nuclear deterrence equation creates considerable analytical challenges, for a number of reasons. First, China’s military modernization is going to change the distribution of power in Asia, including the distribution of nuclear and missile forces. China’s military modernization draws not only on its indigenous military culture but also on careful analysis of Western and other experiences. As David Lai has noted:\nThe Chinese way of war places a strong emphasis on the use of strategy, strategems and deception. However, the Chinese understand that their approach will not be effective without the backing of hard military power. China’s grand strategy is to take the next 30 years to complete China’s modernization mission, which is expected to turn China into a true great power by that time.15\nChina’s ballistic missile force—the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF)—is among the beneficiaries of its military modernization. The PLARF, established in 2016, is responsible for maintaining conventional and nuclear weapons and for the “ability to deter and strike across the entire defense area”. It is also tasked to “enhance nuclear deterrence and counter-strike capacity” with the ability for long and medium-range precision strike.16\nChinese military publications have identified a number of missions that might be undertaken by nuclear or conventional missile-rocket forces in peacetime or under conditions of crisis or war, including war prevention, escalation control, using nuclear deterrence to “backstop” conventional operations, and strategic compellence of enemies by means of deterrent actions.17 Chinese military modernization and defense guidance for the use of nuclear and other missile forces hold some important implications for US policy. First, Chinese thinking is apparently quite nuanced about the deterrent and defense uses for nuclear weapons. Despite the accomplishments of modernization thus far, Chinese leaders are aware that they are far from nuclear-strategic parity with the United States or Russia. On the other hand, China may not aspire to this model of nuclear-strategic parity, as between major nuclear powers, as the key to war avoidance by deterrence or other means. China may prefer to see nuclear weapons as one option among a spectrum of choices available in deterring or fighting wars under exigent conditions, as well as means of supporting assertive diplomacy and conventional operations when necessary. Nuclear-strategic parity as measured by quantitative indicators of relative strength may be less important to China than the qualitative use of nuclear and other means as part of broader diplomatic-military strategies.18 As the United States Defense Intelligence Agency has noted:\nIn 2015, Beijing directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be able to win “informatized local wars” with an emphasis on “maritime military struggle.” Chinese military strategy documents also emphasize the growing importance of offensive air, long-distance mobility, and space and cyberspace operations. The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the information sphere, and denying adversaries the same as key components of conducting modern “informatized” wars.\nSecond, China is expanding its portfolio of military preparedness not only in platforms and weapons, but also in the realm of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and information technology, including for cyber war and space deterrence.20 Having observed the US success in Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991, Chinese military strategists concluded that the informatization of warfare under all conditions would be a predicate to future deterrence and defense operations.21 China’s growing portfolio of smart capabilities and modernized platforms includes, in addition to items previously noted, stealth aircraft, antisatellite warfare, quiet submarines, “brilliant” torpedo mines, improved cruise missiles, and the potential for disrupting financial markets. As Paul Bracken has noted, the composite effect of China’s developments is to make its military more agile:\nBy agility I mean the ability to identify and seize opportunities and to move more quickly than rivals. This nimbleness is reflected in China’s mobile missiles, a reactive air and sea response against the U.S. Navy, and information warfare. What all of these have in common is quick action.22\nThe emphasis on agility instead of brute force reinforces the traditional emphasis in Chinese military thinking since Sun Tzu on the acme of skill as winning without fighting, but, if war is unavoidable, getting in the first and decisive blows. It also follows that one should attack the enemy’s strategy and his alliances making maximum use of deception, based on superior intelligence and estimation. The combination of improved platforms, command-control and information warfare should provide options for the selective use of precision fire strikes and cyberattacks against priority targets, avoiding mass killing and fruitless attacks on enemy strongholds.23 As former defense official Robert O. Work has explained, an important component of China’s military strategy is the concept of “system destructive warfare” that focuses on “disabling the sensor, command and control, and effects grids common to all battle networks”.24 More broadly, China is determined to dominate future AI and cyberspace research and development and its application for military purposes. According to US Naval War College cyber expert Chris C. Demchak: \nWith the real revolution in AI found in the emerging applications of so-called deep neural learning that require massive computational resources, Chinese command of AI and eventually quantum computing will massively increase the speed at which its actors can compute likely outcomes across societal-scale problems and threats. They’ll then be able to coordinate rapid actions to enhance, dampen, disrupt, or destroy the essential elements of targeted processes in any opposing nation.25\nA third aspect of the Chinese military modernization that is important for nuclear deterrence and arms control in Asia is the problem of escalation control. Two examples or aspects of this problem might be cited here. First, improving Chinese capabilities for nuclear deterrence, and for conventional warfighting, increase Chinese leaders’ confidence in their ability to carry out an A2/AD strategy against the United States, or against another power seeking to block Chinese expansion in Asia. This confidence might be misplaced in the case of the United States. The United States is engaged in a “pivot” in its military-strategic planning and deployment to Asia, and toward that end, is developing its doctrine and supporting force structure for “AirSea Battle” countermeasures against Chinese anti-access strategy.26\nA second aspect of the problem of escalation control is the question of nuclear crisis management as between a more muscular China and its Asian neighbors or others. Asia in the Cold War was a comparative nuclear weapons backwater, since the attention of US and allied NATO policy makers and military strategists was focused on the US-Soviet arms race. The world of the twenty-first century is very different. Europe, notwithstanding recent contretemps in Ukraine, is a relatively pacified security zone compared to the Middle East or to South and East Asia, and post Cold War Asia is marked by five nuclear weapons states: Russia, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea. The possibility of nuclear first use, growing out of a conventional war between, say, India and Pakistan, or China and India, is nontrivial, and North Korea poses a continuing uncertainty of two sorts. It might start a conventional war on the Korean peninsula, or the Kim III regime might implode, leaving uncertain the command and control over its armed forces, including nuclear weapons and infrastructure.27 Further to this issue, the uncertain implications for China of United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty have yet to be worked out, including the possible US deployment of conventional land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with INF-range capabilities in the West Pacific.28\nThe problem of keeping nuclear armed states below the threshold of first use, or containing escalation afterward, was difficult enough to explain within the more simplified Cold War context. Uncertainties are even more abundant with respect to escalation control in the aftermath of a regional Asian war. Then, too, there is the possibility of a US-Chinese nuclear incident at sea or a clash over Taiwan escalating into conventional conflict, accompanied by political misunderstanding and the readying of nuclear forces as a measure of deterrence. The point is that US and Chinese forces would not actually have to fire nuclear weapons to use them. Nuclear weapons would be involved in the conflict from the outset, as offstage reminders that the two states could stumble into a process of escalation that neither had intended.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China’s military\naspirations have to do with enhancing its IndoPacific\nprofile\nprovide for coercive military backing of China’s growing regional assertiveness in Asia\nChina’s fleet of nuclear attack submarines support\nA2/AD) strategy to deter US military intervention to support allied interests in Asia against Chinese wishes\nas China’s military capabilities for power projection expand, so may its strategic aspirations\n, China is likely to shift defense resources away from A2/AD systems and toward power projection and expansion capabilities\nChina is preparing to make this shift\nChina has\nbeen more assertive on other military-strategic issues, including the construction of Chinese military airfields on disputed islands in the South China Sea\nand developing\ncyberweapons\nChina’s military modernization is going to change the distribution of power\nChinese military strategy documents also emphasize the growing importance of offensive air, long-distance mobility, and space and cyberspace operations\nChina is expanding its portfolio of military preparedness not only in platforms and weapons, but also in the realm of C4ISR\nand information technology, including for cyber war and space deterrence\ninformatization of warfare under all conditions would be a predicate to future deterrence\nportfolio of smart capabilities\nincludes\nantisatellite warfare\nquiet submarines\ncruise missiles\nan important component of China’s military strategy is the concept of “system destructive warfare” that focuses on “disabling the sensor, command and control, and effects grids common to all battle networks\nChina is determined to dominate future AI and cyberspace research and development and its application for military purposes\n Chinese command of AI and eventually quantum computing will massively increase the speed at which its actors can compute\nA third aspect\nis the problem of escalation control\nFirst, improving Chinese capabilities for nuclear deterrence, and for conventional warfighting, increase Chinese leaders’ confidence in their ability to carry out an A2/AD strategy against the United States, or against another power seeking to block Chinese expansion in Asia.\nAsia is marked by five nuclear weapons states: Russia\nChina, India, Pakistan and North Korea\nThe possibility of nuclear first use\n India and Pakistan, or China and India, is nontrivial, and North Korea poses a continuing uncertainty of two sorts. It might start\nwar on the Korean peninsula,\n Uncertainties are even more abundant with respect to escalation control in the aftermath of a regional Asian war.\nthere is the possibility of a US-Chinese nuclear incident at sea or a clash over Taiwan escalating into conventional conflict\nNuclear weapons would be involved\ntwo states could stumble into a process of escalation that neither had intended", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Chinese naval expansion causes nuclear escalation of every Asian dyad.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "China’s military\naspirations have to do with enhancing its IndoPacific\nprofile\nprovide for coercive military backing of China’s growing regional assertiveness in Asia\nChina’s fleet of nuclear attack submarines support\nA2/AD) strategy to deter US military intervention to support allied interests in Asia against Chinese wishes\nas China’s military capabilities for power projection expand, so may its strategic aspirations\n, China is likely to shift defense resources away from A2/AD systems and toward power projection and expansion capabilities\nChina is preparing to make this shift\nChina has\nbeen more assertive on other military-strategic issues, including the construction of Chinese military airfields on disputed islands in the South China Sea\nand developing\ncyberweapons\nChina’s military modernization is going to change the distribution of power\nChinese military strategy documents also emphasize the growing importance of offensive air, long-distance mobility, and space and cyberspace operations\nChina is expanding its portfolio of military preparedness not only in platforms and weapons, but also in the realm of C4ISR\nand information technology, including for cyber war and space deterrence\ninformatization of warfare under all conditions would be a predicate to future deterrence\nportfolio of smart capabilities\nincludes\nantisatellite warfare\nquiet submarines\ncruise missiles\nan important component of China’s military strategy is the concept of “system destructive warfare” that focuses on “disabling the sensor, command and control, and effects grids common to all battle networks\nChina is determined to dominate future AI and cyberspace research and development and its application for military purposes\n Chinese command of AI and eventually quantum computing will massively increase the speed at which its actors can compute\nA third aspect\nis the problem of escalation control\nFirst, improving Chinese capabilities for nuclear deterrence, and for conventional warfighting, increase Chinese leaders’ confidence in their ability to carry out an A2/AD strategy against the United States, or against another power seeking to block Chinese expansion in Asia.\nAsia is marked by five nuclear weapons states: Russia\nChina, India, Pakistan and North Korea\nThe possibility of nuclear first use\n India and Pakistan, or China and India, is nontrivial, and North Korea poses a continuing uncertainty of two sorts. It might start\nwar on the Korean peninsula,\n Uncertainties are even more abundant with respect to escalation control in the aftermath of a regional Asian war.\nthere is the possibility of a US-Chinese nuclear incident at sea or a clash over Taiwan escalating into conventional conflict\nNuclear weapons would be involved\ntwo states could stumble into a process of escalation that neither had intended", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China’s\nIndoPacific\ncoercive military backing\nassertiveness\nnuclear attack submarines\nA2/AD\ndeter\nallied interests\npower projection\nstrategic aspirations\npower projection\npreparing to make this shift\nmore assertive\nChinese military airfields\nS\nC\nS\ncyberweapons\nmilitary modernization\ndistribution\npower\nmilitary strategy\noffensive air\nlong-distance mobility\nspace\ncyberspace\nmilitary preparedness\nC4ISR\ninformation technology\ncyber war\nspace deterrence\ninformatization\nfuture deterrence\nsmart capabilities\nantisatellite warfare\nquiet submarines\ncruise missiles\nimportant component\nsystem destructive warfare\ncommand and control\nAI\ncyberspace\nAI\nquantum computing\nspeed\ncompute\nescalation control\nconfidence\nA2/AD\nU\nS\nChinese expansion\nfive nuclear weapons\nRussia\nNorth Korea\nnuclear first use\nIndia\nPakistan\nChina\nIndia\nnontrivial\nNorth Korea\nwar\nKorean peninsula\nUncertainties\nabundant\nescalation control\nAsian war\nUS-Chinese nuclear incident\nclash over Taiwan\nstumble\nescalation\nintended", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Chinese naval expansion causes nuclear escalation of every Asian dyad.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "China’s military\naspirations have to do with enhancing its IndoPacific\nprofile\nprovide for coercive military backing of China’s growing regional assertiveness in Asia\nChina’s fleet of nuclear attack submarines support\nA2/AD) strategy to deter US military intervention to support allied interests in Asia against Chinese wishes\nas China’s military capabilities for power projection expand, so may its strategic aspirations\n, China is likely to shift defense resources away from A2/AD systems and toward power projection and expansion capabilities\nChina is preparing to make this shift\nChina has\nbeen more assertive on other military-strategic issues, including the construction of Chinese military airfields on disputed islands in the South China Sea\nand developing\ncyberweapons\nChina’s military modernization is going to change the distribution of power\nChinese military strategy documents also emphasize the growing importance of offensive air, long-distance mobility, and space and cyberspace operations\nChina is expanding its portfolio of military preparedness not only in platforms and weapons, but also in the realm of C4ISR\nand information technology, including for cyber war and space deterrence\ninformatization of warfare under all conditions would be a predicate to future deterrence\nportfolio of smart capabilities\nincludes\nantisatellite warfare\nquiet submarines\ncruise missiles\nan important component of China’s military strategy is the concept of “system destructive warfare” that focuses on “disabling the sensor, command and control, and effects grids common to all battle networks\nChina is determined to dominate future AI and cyberspace research and development and its application for military purposes\n Chinese command of AI and eventually quantum computing will massively increase the speed at which its actors can compute\nA third aspect\nis the problem of escalation control\nFirst, improving Chinese capabilities for nuclear deterrence, and for conventional warfighting, increase Chinese leaders’ confidence in their ability to carry out an A2/AD strategy against the United States, or against another power seeking to block Chinese expansion in Asia.\nAsia is marked by five nuclear weapons states: Russia\nChina, India, Pakistan and North Korea\nThe possibility of nuclear first use\n India and Pakistan, or China and India, is nontrivial, and North Korea poses a continuing uncertainty of two sorts. It might start\nwar on the Korean peninsula,\n Uncertainties are even more abundant with respect to escalation control in the aftermath of a regional Asian war.\nthere is the possibility of a US-Chinese nuclear incident at sea or a clash over Taiwan escalating into conventional conflict\nNuclear weapons would be involved\ntwo states could stumble into a process of escalation that neither had intended", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China’s military\naspirations\nenhanc\nIndoPacific\nprofile\nprovide for\nbacking of\nassertiveness in Asia\nattack sub\ns support\nA2/AD\nto deter US\nintervention to support allied interests in Asia\nas\npower projection expand, so may\naspirations\nChina has\nbeen\nassertive on\nS\nC\nS\nand\ncyberweapons\nmodernization\nchange\ndistribution of power\nmilitary strategy\nemphasize\nair\nlong-distance\nand space\noperations\nChina is expanding\nC4ISR\nportfolio of smart capabilities\nincludes\nantisatellite warfare\nquiet submarines\ncruise missiles\nsystem destructive warfare” that focuses on “disabling\ncommand and control\nChinese command of AI\nquantum computing will\nincrease\nspeed\nimproving\ncapabilities\nincrease\nconfidence in\nA2/AD\nagainst\nU\nS\nseeking to block Chinese expansion\nAsia is marked by five nuclear weapons states: Russia\npossibility of nuclear first use\nIndia and Pakistan\nChina and India\nis nontrivial\nNorth Korea\nmight start\nwar on the Korean peninsula\nUncertainties are\nabundant with\nescalation control in\nAsian war\nthere is the possibility of\nnuclear incident\nover Taiwan", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Distributed maritime operations enable an unmanned-manned division of labor that preserves Indian Ocean security.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "To counter the threat of a rising and expansionist China, Indo-Pacific nations are pushing to improve their ability to identify vessels in the maritime domain. Their current capabilities tend to feature land-based radars and limited satellite capabilities. A possible solution already is being tested in the Middle East, where U.S. Fifth Fleet has established an unmanned task force that is enhancing regional maritime domain awareness.1\nTask Force 59 has taken commercially available unmanned platforms, paired with artificial intelligence, and quickly integrated them into Fifth Fleet operations in novel ways. Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, Fifth Fleet Commander, says the intent is twofold: “One, enhance our maritime domain awareness, and two, increase deterrence.”2 As the Navy looks ahead to the next region where an unmanned task force could affect adversaries’ calculus, the Indo-Pacific region’s growing importance as the center of rising global competition and hub of worldwide maritime trade is a powerful argument for assigning the next unmanned task force to this theater. This would make the Indo-Pacific more transparent and could serve as the command-and-control backbone for other unmanned missions.\nPlan to Expand\nThe Navy must consider some basic questions as it stands up the next unmanned task force. Where should this organization be situated to best capture lessons from Task Force 59 and other organizations that operate unmanned vehicles? What missions are most compatible with unmanned platforms and their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)? What is the Navy’s role in the unmanned mission and where can it have the most impact given the state of competition and rising maritime security concerns in the Indo-Pacific? How might it integrate unmanned platforms from the air, sea, and undersea domains?\nThe Navy also must determine in which regions a task force can be successful and develop the proper command-and-control structures to ensure the unmanned platforms meet their full operational capabilities and relieve pressure on crewed resources.\nIn addition, as the operating areas for unmanned vehicles expand, it will be critical to standardize operating principles and procedures. Surface Development Squadron 1 (SurfDevRon 1)—established to man, train, and equip the three Zumwalt-class destroyers, the Navy’s two large unmanned surface vessels, and the Ghost Fleet ships—is the ideal organization to standardize the TTPs, oversee manning, training, and equipping, and act as the force provider for all unmanned surface vehicles as the Navy expands beyond the vital work of Task Force 59.3 As fleets desire to implement unmanned surface vehicles, SurfDevRon 1 should deploy the assets as part of a task group. Together with SurfDevRon 1, the fleet’s regional experts and partner nations should further develop regional concepts of employment.\nTask Force 759\nEighty percent of the world’s maritime trade in oil passes through Indian Ocean region (IOR) choke points.4 Understanding what is floating on and under these waters is of vital interest to India and the many countries that border this vast expanse of the maritime domain.5 By knowing the pattern of life of “white” shipping, it becomes easier to classify the potential bad actors, military vessels, or vessels otherwise not reporting their information.\nA new Task Force 759 based in Seventh Fleet should be the next instantiation of the Navy’s unmanned operations. Using current unmanned assets available to the fleet and supplied by SurfDevRon 1, the task force could help identify and deter malign actors in the region. A network of unmanned vessels could serve as additional sensors in critical areas.\nUsing patterns of life as a starting point, these unmanned vessels could relay precise information to manned platforms and shore facilities to aid in vessel classification beyond what is available from space or over the horizon. The task force could include both Navy operators employing currently fielded technology solutions from multiple warfare communities and civilian contractors using new systems.\nUnmanned platforms will enable distributed maritime operations and expeditionary advanced base operations. By putting the command-and-control structures in place under Task Force 759 as the supported commander, with task group assets provided by SurfDevRon 1, the lessons can start to be gathered now to develop and refine future concepts of operation and employment. In turn, SurfDevRon 1 could act as a centralized learning hub for all unmanned surface operations.\nTask Force 759 could partner with Japan, Australia, India, and other nations in the Indo-Pacific. Formal alliances should not be required to participate in this information sharing, but the United States might need to formalize information-sharing procedures to control who has access to certain types of data. The Information Fusion Center–Indian Ocean Region, hosted by India and staffed by liaison officers from many countries including the United States, continues to improve its vessel tracking capabilities and pattern of life tracking.6", "role": "user" }, { "content": "To counter\nexpansionist China\ncurrent capabilities\nfeature land-based radars and limited satellite capabilities. A\nsolution\nis\nunmanned task force\nenhancing\nmaritime domain awareness\nunmanned platforms, paired with a\ni\nenhance our maritime domain awareness, and\nincrease deterrence\nthe Indo-Pacific region’s growing importance as the center of rising global competition and hub of worldwide maritime trade is a powerful argument for assigning the next unmanned task force to this theater\nThis\ncould serve as the command-and-control backbone for other unmanned missions\nEighty percent of the world’s maritime trade in oil passes through Indian Ocean region\nIOR\nchoke points\nUnderstanding what is floating on\nthese waters is of vital interest to India and\ncountries that border this vast expanse of the maritime domain\nBy knowing the pattern of life of “white” shipping, it becomes easier to classify\npotential bad actors\nmilitary vessels\nor vessels\nnot reporting\ninformation\nA new Task Force 759 based in Seventh Fleet should be the next instantiation of the Navy’s unmanned operations\nUsing current unmanned assets available to the fleet\nthe task force could help identify and deter malign actors in the region. A network of unmanned vessels could serve as additional sensors in critical areas\nunmanned vessels could relay precise information to manned platforms and shore facilities to aid in vessel classification\nUnmanned platforms will enable distributed maritime operations and expeditionary advanced base operations. By putting\ncommand-and-control\nin place\nwith\nassets provided by SurfDevRon\nlessons can\nrefine future\nemployment\nTask Force\ncould partner with Japan\nAustralia\nIndia\nand\nnations in the Indo-Pacific\nin\ninformation sharing\nThe Information Fusion Center–Indian Ocean Region\nhosted by India\nto improve\nvessel tracking capabilities", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Distributed maritime operations enable an unmanned-manned division of labor that preserves Indian Ocean security.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "To counter\nexpansionist China\ncurrent capabilities\nfeature land-based radars and limited satellite capabilities. A\nsolution\nis\nunmanned task force\nenhancing\nmaritime domain awareness\nunmanned platforms, paired with a\ni\nenhance our maritime domain awareness, and\nincrease deterrence\nthe Indo-Pacific region’s growing importance as the center of rising global competition and hub of worldwide maritime trade is a powerful argument for assigning the next unmanned task force to this theater\nThis\ncould serve as the command-and-control backbone for other unmanned missions\nEighty percent of the world’s maritime trade in oil passes through Indian Ocean region\nIOR\nchoke points\nUnderstanding what is floating on\nthese waters is of vital interest to India and\ncountries that border this vast expanse of the maritime domain\nBy knowing the pattern of life of “white” shipping, it becomes easier to classify\npotential bad actors\nmilitary vessels\nor vessels\nnot reporting\ninformation\nA new Task Force 759 based in Seventh Fleet should be the next instantiation of the Navy’s unmanned operations\nUsing current unmanned assets available to the fleet\nthe task force could help identify and deter malign actors in the region. A network of unmanned vessels could serve as additional sensors in critical areas\nunmanned vessels could relay precise information to manned platforms and shore facilities to aid in vessel classification\nUnmanned platforms will enable distributed maritime operations and expeditionary advanced base operations. By putting\ncommand-and-control\nin place\nwith\nassets provided by SurfDevRon\nlessons can\nrefine future\nemployment\nTask Force\ncould partner with Japan\nAustralia\nIndia\nand\nnations in the Indo-Pacific\nin\ninformation sharing\nThe Information Fusion Center–Indian Ocean Region\nhosted by India\nto improve\nvessel tracking capabilities", "role": "user" }, { "content": "expansionist China\ncurrent capabilities\nlimited\nsolution\nunmanned\nmaritime domain awareness\nunmanned platforms\na\ni\ndeterrence\ngrowing importance\nglobal competition\nmaritime trade\ntheater\ncommand-and-control\nEighty percent\nIndian Ocean region\nIOR\nfloating on\nvital interest\nIndia\nvast expanse\nwhite\nclassify\nbad actors\nmilitary vessels\nvessels\nTask Force 759\nSeventh Fleet\nnext instantiation\nunmanned operations\nidentify\ndeter\nunmanned vessels\nprecise information\nmanned platforms\nvessel classification\ndistributed maritime operations\nexpeditionary\ncommand-and-control\nSurfDevRon\nJapan\nAustralia\nIndia\nIndo-Pacific\nIndia\nvessel tracking", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Distributed maritime operations enable an unmanned-manned division of labor that preserves Indian Ocean security.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "To counter\nexpansionist China\ncurrent capabilities\nfeature land-based radars and limited satellite capabilities. A\nsolution\nis\nunmanned task force\nenhancing\nmaritime domain awareness\nunmanned platforms, paired with a\ni\nenhance our maritime domain awareness, and\nincrease deterrence\nthe Indo-Pacific region’s growing importance as the center of rising global competition and hub of worldwide maritime trade is a powerful argument for assigning the next unmanned task force to this theater\nThis\ncould serve as the command-and-control backbone for other unmanned missions\nEighty percent of the world’s maritime trade in oil passes through Indian Ocean region\nIOR\nchoke points\nUnderstanding what is floating on\nthese waters is of vital interest to India and\ncountries that border this vast expanse of the maritime domain\nBy knowing the pattern of life of “white” shipping, it becomes easier to classify\npotential bad actors\nmilitary vessels\nor vessels\nnot reporting\ninformation\nA new Task Force 759 based in Seventh Fleet should be the next instantiation of the Navy’s unmanned operations\nUsing current unmanned assets available to the fleet\nthe task force could help identify and deter malign actors in the region. A network of unmanned vessels could serve as additional sensors in critical areas\nunmanned vessels could relay precise information to manned platforms and shore facilities to aid in vessel classification\nUnmanned platforms will enable distributed maritime operations and expeditionary advanced base operations. By putting\ncommand-and-control\nin place\nwith\nassets provided by SurfDevRon\nlessons can\nrefine future\nemployment\nTask Force\ncould partner with Japan\nAustralia\nIndia\nand\nnations in the Indo-Pacific\nin\ninformation sharing\nThe Information Fusion Center–Indian Ocean Region\nhosted by India\nto improve\nvessel tracking capabilities", "role": "user" }, { "content": "To counter\nChina\nA\nsolution\nis\nunmanned task force\nenhancing\nmaritime\nawareness\nunmanned platforms, paired with a\ni\nincrease deterrence\nIndo-Pacific\n’s\nimportance as the center\ncompetition\ncould serve as\ncommand-and-control backbone\nEighty percent of\ntrade\npasses through Indian Ocean\nchoke points\nUnderstanding what is\non\nwaters is of\ninterest to India\nthat border this\ndomain\nit becomes easier to classify\nbad actors\nunmanned operations\nhelp identify and deter\nactors\nunmanned vessels\nrelay\ninformation to manned platforms\nto aid in\nclassification\nUnmanned platforms\nenable distributed maritime operations\nTask Force\ncould partner with\nIndia\nto improve\nvessel tracking", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Indian Ocean Region (IOR) instability goes nuclear.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "With strategic competition in South Asia shifting to the maritime space and nuclear weapon states increasingly relying on sea power, the Indian Ocean region (IOR) has become a theatre for trilateral security competition between India, Pakistan, and China. Developments over the past several years showcase the complicated nature of the situation in the IOR, and lead to a number of difficult questions about strategic stability. What are the drivers of nuclear escalation in the Indian Ocean region (IOR), as well as the implications for peace and stability in the region? Will changing threat perceptions in the IOR, especially as China’s People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) demonstrates increased capabilities, lead New Delhi to forge stronger naval ties with the United States? As states in the IOR contest for naval nuclear supremacy and project newly developed capabilities, this article examines the risk of friction and misperceptions that challenges the stability of the Indian Ocean.\nIn 2015, China carried out a flight test of its long-range sea-based nuclear deterrent: the JL-2. With an estimated range of up to 7,200km, the JL-2 can target assets in continental India from Chinese waters. Moreover, Chinese nuclear submarines continue to patrol the Indian Ocean, exemplifying Beijing’s willingness to project power in the IOR. China uses advanced military assets, such as attack submarines (SSNs), for ‘piracy operations’ in the IOR. However, the presence of SSNs, which are not appropriate for anti-pirate missions, intensify regional misperceptions. Beijing’s support to Pakistan’s nuclear and ballistic missile program (M-11 missile technology transfers), and its recent announcement to provide Pakistan with eight diesel-electric attack submarines have alarmed India’s strategic community, which fears that these sales will bolster Pakistan’s sea-denial strategy.\nFurthermore, Beijing’s naval assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) has raised concerns with Indian officials, who see a correlation between aggressive Chinese patrolling in the SCS and increasing deployments in the IOR. Some believe China might use its bases in the SCS to project power in the Indian Ocean. The prospect of active patrols by nuclear-armed Chinese submarines has intensified India’s surveillance. The challenge to New Delhi’s domination in the Indian Ocean has led New Delhi to bolster its maritime partnership with the United States. The US-India Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean serves as a roadmap for bilateral cooperation on safeguarding maritime security and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\nOn India’s other border, Pakistan tested the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) in early 2017. Babur-3 is reportedly capable of carrying a nuclear payload and designed for integration with the Agosta 90B diesel electric submarine. These developments augment the shifts in Pakistan’s military and nuclear force structure, which was traditionally dominated by the army. As Pakistan’s navy develops a submarine-based nuclear deterrent, there are clear indications of accommodating the navy within Pakistan’s command and control (C2). However, questions arise regarding Islamabad’s ability to safely and reliably manage a submarine-based nuclear force given the doubts raised over the robustness of Pakistan’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C412SR) systems. Analysts have suggested that a balanced and effective nuclear C2 system faces challenges in Pakistan. When Pakistan’s military leadership took the reins of presidential power in 1999, the country’s civilian institutions and other services came under the army’s political control. This meant that the air force and navy chiefs could no longer contribute their views on an equal footing with the army chief. Therefore, the lack of an effective C2 has highlighted discernible doubts regarding Pakistan’s ability to communicate with the Agosta submarines to put negative controls on weapons. Pakistan’s stated policy of “first-use” of nuclear weapons against India coupled with a weak C2 has exacerbated India’s security concerns. India views Islamabad’s attempt to acquire second-strike capabilities as attempts to gain strategic technological and capabilities parity with India, giving impetus to the action-reaction cycle.\nGiven security threat perceptions in IOR, Indian naval planners and strategists are convinced that nuclear submarines will provide the most reliable deterrent. India’s pursuit of a sea-based nuclear force is thus a logical step in its desire to achieve assured retaliatory capabilities. Few analysts argue that India’s new K-4 nuclear-capable SLBM, coupled with India’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine program could lead to further destabilization and conflict in the region. There is little merit in such an argument. India’s ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force will not only improve the operational capabilities of India’s sea-based leg of its triad but also enable New Delhi to maintain balance of power in the IOR. To maintain a credible minimum deterrent vis-à-vis China and Pakistan and to ensure its arsenal’s survivability against a preemptive first strike, New Delhi must focus on developing submarine launched ballistic missiles (SSBM) technology and SSBN capabilities. The primary objective of India’s Arihant-class SSBNs is to deter conflict and coercion against India by its adversaries. India’s 2015 maritime security strategy document re-prioritized & reformulated deterrence as India’s first priority and war fighting as the second. Therefore, India’s SSBN force should be seen as a critical enabler of its no-first use policy.\nAs China, India, and Pakistan employ nuclear weapons at sea, the India Ocean is slipping from a ‘Zone of Peace’ to a hotbed of nuclear politics. To help reduce tensions, India and the United States have engaged in cooperative discussions about India opening up its military bases to the United States in exchange for access to weapons technology to help it narrow the gap with China. The two sides will also hold talks on anti-submarine warfare (ASW), an area of sensitive military technology and tactics. The process of India-US security-burden sharing in the IOR should serve as a building block for an enduring navy-to-navy relationship that should grow into a shared ASW capability. At a time of a qualitative reordering of the Asia-Pacific, stability in the Indian Ocean region hinges on collaborative efforts by India and the United States to keep the seas open and peaceful.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "strategic competition in South Asia shifting to the maritime space and nuclear weapon states\nrelying on sea power\nthe\nIOR) has become a theatre for trilateral security competition between India, Pakistan, and China\nDevelopments\nlead to\nquestions about strategic stability\ndrivers of nuclear escalation in the\nIOR\nPLA-N) demonstrates increased capabilities\nNew Delhi\nforge stronger\nties with the U\nS\nstates\ncontest for naval nuclear supremacy\nrisk\nmisperceptions that challenges the stability of the Indian Ocean\nChinese nuclear submarines\npatrol the Indian Ocean, exemplifying Beijing’s willingness to project power in the IOR. China uses advanced\nSSNs\nwhich\nintensify regional misperceptions\nBeijing’s support to Pakistan’s\nnuclear\nprogram\nhave alarmed India’s strategic community, which\nbolster\nPakistan’s sea-denial strategy\nofficials\nsee a correlation between aggressive Chinese patrolling in the SCS and increasing deployments in the IOR\nChina might use\nbases in the SCS to project power in the Indian Ocean\nThe\nUS-India\nVision\nthe Indian Ocean serves as a roadmap\non safeguarding maritime security and preventing\nproliferation of w\nm\nd\nPakistan tested\nSLCM\ncapable of carrying a nuclear payload\nAs Pakistan’s navy develops a submarine-based nuclear deterrent, there are clear indications of accommodating the navy within Pakistan’s\nC2\nPakistan’s\nstated policy of “first-use\nof nuclear weapons against India\nC2 has exacerbated India’s security concerns\nIslamabad’s attempt to acquire second-strike\nto gain\nparity with India, giving impetus to the action-reaction cycle\nthe India Ocean is slipping from a ‘Zone of Peace’\nto a hotbed of nuclear politics\nThe process of India-US security-burden sharing in the IOR should serve as a building block\nstability in the Indian Ocean region hinges on\nIndia and the U\nS\nto keep the seas open and peaceful", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Indian Ocean Region (IOR) instability goes nuclear.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "strategic competition in South Asia shifting to the maritime space and nuclear weapon states\nrelying on sea power\nthe\nIOR) has become a theatre for trilateral security competition between India, Pakistan, and China\nDevelopments\nlead to\nquestions about strategic stability\ndrivers of nuclear escalation in the\nIOR\nPLA-N) demonstrates increased capabilities\nNew Delhi\nforge stronger\nties with the U\nS\nstates\ncontest for naval nuclear supremacy\nrisk\nmisperceptions that challenges the stability of the Indian Ocean\nChinese nuclear submarines\npatrol the Indian Ocean, exemplifying Beijing’s willingness to project power in the IOR. China uses advanced\nSSNs\nwhich\nintensify regional misperceptions\nBeijing’s support to Pakistan’s\nnuclear\nprogram\nhave alarmed India’s strategic community, which\nbolster\nPakistan’s sea-denial strategy\nofficials\nsee a correlation between aggressive Chinese patrolling in the SCS and increasing deployments in the IOR\nChina might use\nbases in the SCS to project power in the Indian Ocean\nThe\nUS-India\nVision\nthe Indian Ocean serves as a roadmap\non safeguarding maritime security and preventing\nproliferation of w\nm\nd\nPakistan tested\nSLCM\ncapable of carrying a nuclear payload\nAs Pakistan’s navy develops a submarine-based nuclear deterrent, there are clear indications of accommodating the navy within Pakistan’s\nC2\nPakistan’s\nstated policy of “first-use\nof nuclear weapons against India\nC2 has exacerbated India’s security concerns\nIslamabad’s attempt to acquire second-strike\nto gain\nparity with India, giving impetus to the action-reaction cycle\nthe India Ocean is slipping from a ‘Zone of Peace’\nto a hotbed of nuclear politics\nThe process of India-US security-burden sharing in the IOR should serve as a building block\nstability in the Indian Ocean region hinges on\nIndia and the U\nS\nto keep the seas open and peaceful", "role": "user" }, { "content": "strategic competition\nmaritime space\nnuclear weapon states\nsea power\nIOR\ntrilateral security competition\nstrategic stability\nnuclear escalation\nIOR\nPLA-N\nincreased capabilities\nstronger\nties\nU\nS\nnaval nuclear supremacy\nmisperceptions\nIndian Ocean\nnuclear submarines\npatrol\nproject power\nIOR\nSSNs\nPakistan’s\nbolster\ncorrelation\nSCS\nIOR\nproject power\nUS-India\nroadmap\nmaritime security\nproliferation\nw\nm\nd\nSLCM\nnuclear payload\nsubmarine-based\nclear indications\nPakistan’s\nfirst-use\nexacerbated\nIslamabad’s\nsecond-strike\nparity\nimpetus\naction-reaction cycle\nIndia Ocean\nZone of Peace’\nhotbed\nIndia-US\nbuilding block\nIndian Ocean\nIndia\nU\nS\nopen\npeaceful", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Indian Ocean Region (IOR) instability goes nuclear.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "strategic competition in South Asia shifting to the maritime space and nuclear weapon states\nrelying on sea power\nthe\nIOR) has become a theatre for trilateral security competition between India, Pakistan, and China\nDevelopments\nlead to\nquestions about strategic stability\ndrivers of nuclear escalation in the\nIOR\nPLA-N) demonstrates increased capabilities\nNew Delhi\nforge stronger\nties with the U\nS\nstates\ncontest for naval nuclear supremacy\nrisk\nmisperceptions that challenges the stability of the Indian Ocean\nChinese nuclear submarines\npatrol the Indian Ocean, exemplifying Beijing’s willingness to project power in the IOR. China uses advanced\nSSNs\nwhich\nintensify regional misperceptions\nBeijing’s support to Pakistan’s\nnuclear\nprogram\nhave alarmed India’s strategic community, which\nbolster\nPakistan’s sea-denial strategy\nofficials\nsee a correlation between aggressive Chinese patrolling in the SCS and increasing deployments in the IOR\nChina might use\nbases in the SCS to project power in the Indian Ocean\nThe\nUS-India\nVision\nthe Indian Ocean serves as a roadmap\non safeguarding maritime security and preventing\nproliferation of w\nm\nd\nPakistan tested\nSLCM\ncapable of carrying a nuclear payload\nAs Pakistan’s navy develops a submarine-based nuclear deterrent, there are clear indications of accommodating the navy within Pakistan’s\nC2\nPakistan’s\nstated policy of “first-use\nof nuclear weapons against India\nC2 has exacerbated India’s security concerns\nIslamabad’s attempt to acquire second-strike\nto gain\nparity with India, giving impetus to the action-reaction cycle\nthe India Ocean is slipping from a ‘Zone of Peace’\nto a hotbed of nuclear politics\nThe process of India-US security-burden sharing in the IOR should serve as a building block\nstability in the Indian Ocean region hinges on\nIndia and the U\nS\nto keep the seas open and peaceful", "role": "user" }, { "content": "IOR) has become a theatre for trilateral\ncompetition\ndrive\nnuclear escalation\nPLA-N) demonstrates\ncapabilities\ncontest for\nsupremacy\nrisk\nmisperceptions\nChinese\nsubmarines\npatrol the\nIOR\nsupport to Pakistan’\nalarmed India\nofficials\nsee\ncorrelation\nin\nSCS and\nIOR\nUS-India\nVision\nsafeguardi\nsecurity\nPakistan tested\nSLCM\nsubmarine\nnuclear deterrent\nIslamabad’s attempt to acquire second-strike\ngiving impetus to\naction-reaction\nstability\nhinges on\nIndia and the U\nS\nto keep\nseas open", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Independently, unmanned operations prevent escalation from accidents in the event of miscalculation.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Robots Can Reduce Risk While Providing Flexibility\nIn the event of a miscalculation on either side during an unplanned encounter at sea involving unmanned assets, metal and electronics may incur damage, but no human life will be lost. As recent non-FONOP ship collisions have shown, when two large-tonnage vessels collide at sea, a tragic loss of life may result. By removing the potential for this loss of life from a collision in contested waters, the use of unmanned systems during FONOPs allows technology to accomplish a potentially dangerous mission with no requirement for physical human presence.\nBeyond the inherent heartbreak involved, the loss of human life also has implications for escalation. A recent study examined the different emotions generated from the loss of an unmanned system versus a manned system, and its findings demonstrate de-escalation advantages from an unmanned loss. In simple terms, the destruction of an unmanned system does not generate the same visceral and escalatory response as the loss of a human life. This vital difference adds flexibility following a collision at sea or a hostile act during FONOPs. While unmanned systems do not negate the potential for an escalation spiral, their use provides de-escalation options to decision-makers that do not exist with manned platforms. As geopolitical tensions continue to grow, opportunities to decrease potential escalation spirals stemming from collisions during FONOPs should not be ignored.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "In the event of\nmiscalculation\nduring an unplanned encounter\ninvolving unmanned assets\nelectronics may incur damage, but no human life will be lost\nuse of unmanned systems during FONOPs allows technology to accomplish a\ndangerous mission\nthe loss of\nlife also has implications for escalation\nA\nstudy examined\nemotions generated from the loss of an unmanned system versus a manned system\nits findings demonstrate de-escalation advantages from\nunmanned loss\nthe destruction of an unmanned system does not generate\nescalatory response\nThis vital difference adds flexibility following a collision at sea or a hostile act during FONOPs\nunmanned systems\nprovides de-escalation options to decision-makers that do not exist with manned platforms. As geopolitical tensions\ngrow, opportunities to decrease\nescalation spirals\nfrom collisions during FONOPs should not be ignored", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Independently, unmanned operations prevent escalation from accidents in the event of miscalculation.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In the event of\nmiscalculation\nduring an unplanned encounter\ninvolving unmanned assets\nelectronics may incur damage, but no human life will be lost\nuse of unmanned systems during FONOPs allows technology to accomplish a\ndangerous mission\nthe loss of\nlife also has implications for escalation\nA\nstudy examined\nemotions generated from the loss of an unmanned system versus a manned system\nits findings demonstrate de-escalation advantages from\nunmanned loss\nthe destruction of an unmanned system does not generate\nescalatory response\nThis vital difference adds flexibility following a collision at sea or a hostile act during FONOPs\nunmanned systems\nprovides de-escalation options to decision-makers that do not exist with manned platforms. As geopolitical tensions\ngrow, opportunities to decrease\nescalation spirals\nfrom collisions during FONOPs should not be ignored", "role": "user" }, { "content": "miscalculation\nunplanned encounter\nunmanned assets\nno human life\n FONOPs\ndangerous mission\nescalation\nstudy\nunmanned system\nmanned system\nde-escalation\nunmanned loss\ndoes not generate\nflexibility\nhostile act\nFONOPs\nde-escalation\ndo not exist\nmanned platforms\ngeopolitical tensions\ndecrease\nescalation spirals\nnot be ignored", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Independently, unmanned operations prevent escalation from accidents in the event of miscalculation.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In the event of\nmiscalculation\nduring an unplanned encounter\ninvolving unmanned assets\nelectronics may incur damage, but no human life will be lost\nuse of unmanned systems during FONOPs allows technology to accomplish a\ndangerous mission\nthe loss of\nlife also has implications for escalation\nA\nstudy examined\nemotions generated from the loss of an unmanned system versus a manned system\nits findings demonstrate de-escalation advantages from\nunmanned loss\nthe destruction of an unmanned system does not generate\nescalatory response\nThis vital difference adds flexibility following a collision at sea or a hostile act during FONOPs\nunmanned systems\nprovides de-escalation options to decision-makers that do not exist with manned platforms. As geopolitical tensions\ngrow, opportunities to decrease\nescalation spirals\nfrom collisions during FONOPs should not be ignored", "role": "user" }, { "content": "In the event of\nmiscalc\nduring an unplanned encounter\nno human life will be lost\nloss of\nlife\nhas implications for escalation\nstudy\nfindings demonstrate de-escalation\nfrom\nunmanned loss\nThis\nadds flexibility following\na hostile act during FONOPs\nde-escalation options\ndo not exist with manned platforms. As\ntensions\nopportunities to decrease\nescalation spirals\nshould not be ignored", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: US-China accidents are likely and go nuclear.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "China and the United States today are on a collision course. No less an authority than Henry Kissinger said just over a year ago that the U.S. and China are in the “foot hills of a Cold War.” Our assessment is that both nations are rapidly ascending the slope of that metaphorical mountain, and will likely find themselves in a full-blown, Cold War-like status in the near future. By 2034, the year in which we set our new novel, could this lead the two nations to a hot war? Even a nuclear exchange? Unfortunately, the answer is yes.\nThe two nations are significantly at odds over the status of the South China Sea, which China claims as territorial waters, potentially giving them control over rich oil and gas deposits and dominance over the 40% of the world’s trade that passes through these strategic seas. The U.S., and most of the rest of the world, believes these waters to be high seas, free for any nation to sail. China is expanding its Navy rapidly (they already have more warships than the U.S.) and building artificial islands throughout the South China Sea to operate as strategic military nodes.\nChina and the U.S. are also in disagreement over a wide variety of trade and tariff rules attendant to an unbalanced trading relationship; significant intellectual property theft accusations by the U.S. against China; offensive cyber activities undertaken by both sides; widespread human rights violations against the Muslim Uighur population within China; and the status of Hong Kong, where the U.S. believes China to be in violation of the treaty which returned the former British colony to a “special status” within China.\nThere are profound differences over control of the emerging 5G networks and the status of Chinese company Huawei as a provider; retaliation against American companies in China who refuse to toe the line on Chinese policy issues (such as the status of Taiwan and the treatment of Uighurs); the devastating results of COVID-19 in the U.S. originating from a virus that first started to spread in Wuhan; and the freedom of Taiwan to decide whether or not to eventually unify politically with China.\nHistory is replete with examples of the so-called “Thucydides trap” articulated by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison. Whenever a rising power (in this case China) confronts an established power (the U.S.) over the past two thousand years, the outcome very often leads to a global conflict. This occurs despite the fact that in most cases there is no advantage to either side in launching into a war.\nMost recently, of course, this occurred in 1914 when the major European powers – who were deeply intertwined both by royal family relationships and economic networks – stumbled into the devastating First World War. More recently, the world dodged a serious bullet in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, narrowly missing a nuclear exchange that would have destroyed much of the planet.\nWhat feels different now is the size of the growing basket of disagreements coupled with domestic political pressures on both sides of the Pacific. President Xi is seeking to consolidate power and President Biden is governing with a narrow majority. For both, it is easy to point to the other as the aggressor, militarily and economically. Add the pandemic as an additional pressure point and it is clear the relationship is fraught.\nAnd the likely flashpoint is at sea – over the disputed waters of the vast South China Sea. The U.S. is conducting frequent “freedom of navigation” patrols, sailing its warships throughout the disputed waters, often very close to China’s coast. China views this the way most of us would feel if a neighbor started to drive “donut holes” in our lawn. The Chinese Navy and Air Force frequently respond aggressively. The U.S will continue these patrols, and will pressure allies to come and participate – we are deeply and rightfully invested geopolitically in the values of high seas freedom.\nAnd the patrols are conducted on both sides by relatively young military leaders – men and women in their 20s and 30s. We both personally know the mettle, pride, and attitude of these young warriors, and they will not back down. Either side could easily miscalculate, the other side would respond more aggressively, and the ladder of escalation could easily begin. A Chinese jet shot down or an American destroyer hit by a Chinese missile could cause deaths and ramp up feelings of national pride both in Beijing and Washington, especially in the wake of U.S. elections in which both Democrats and Republicans used China as a rhetorical punching bag.\nIf such an incident occurred, perhaps in the Taiwan Straits adding in the additional factor of extreme Chinese pride and nationalism over their view of Taiwan as a sovereign part of China, it could easily spark a far larger military exchange than the warning shots and close approaches we have seen thus far.\nWe say in the military, “when you release ordnance and people die, everything changes.” It is like kicking a door open into a very dark room. Outcomes become much harder to predict. Larger strikes from either side could follow, as could a far broader cyberattack, perhaps against critical infrastructure. Carrier strike groups on both sides could deploy head-to-head. With even more significant losses, the temptation to employ a tactical nuclear weapons – perhaps at sea, thinking it could never then escalate to a strategic exchange – might rise.\nAll of this seems unimaginable. Yet so often our challenges in responding to the greatest threats are not failures of intelligence, but rather failures of imagination. We never imagined Pearl Harbor; or a devastating attack on the U.S. that destroyed the World Trade Towers; or a twenty year war in Afghanistan; or a global pandemic. Collectively we have to imagine the disaster of a possible war between the U.S. and China, so we can reverse engineer and prevent it.\nThe chances of the U.S. and China stumbling into a war are real and increasing. It will require not only imagination, but the hard work of creating a national strategy that can employ all our considerable tools of state – diplomacy, economics, military deterrence, culture, communications – if we are to avoid sleepwalking into a 21st century war.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China and the U\nS\nare on a collision course\nthe U.S. and China are in the “foot hills of a Cold War\nnations are rapidly ascending the slope\ncould this lead the two nations to a hot war\nEven a nuclear exchange\nthe answer is yes\nThe two nations are significantly at odds over the status of the South China Sea\nThe U.S\nbelieves these waters to be high seas\nthis occurred in 1914 when the major European powers\nwho were deeply intertwined\nby\neconomic networks\nstumbled into the devastating First World War\nthe world dodged a serious bullet in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, narrowly missing a nuclear exchange t\n, it is easy to point to the other as the aggressor, militarily and economically\nAdd the pandemic\nthe likely flashpoint is at sea\nover the disputed waters of the vast South China Sea\nso often our challenges in responding to the greatest threats are not failures of intelligence, but rather failures of imagination.\nwe have to imagine the disaster of a possible war between the U.S. and China\nso we can reverse engineer and prevent it.\nchances of the U.S. and China stumbling into a war are real and increasing", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: US-China accidents are likely and go nuclear.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "China and the U\nS\nare on a collision course\nthe U.S. and China are in the “foot hills of a Cold War\nnations are rapidly ascending the slope\ncould this lead the two nations to a hot war\nEven a nuclear exchange\nthe answer is yes\nThe two nations are significantly at odds over the status of the South China Sea\nThe U.S\nbelieves these waters to be high seas\nthis occurred in 1914 when the major European powers\nwho were deeply intertwined\nby\neconomic networks\nstumbled into the devastating First World War\nthe world dodged a serious bullet in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, narrowly missing a nuclear exchange t\n, it is easy to point to the other as the aggressor, militarily and economically\nAdd the pandemic\nthe likely flashpoint is at sea\nover the disputed waters of the vast South China Sea\nso often our challenges in responding to the greatest threats are not failures of intelligence, but rather failures of imagination.\nwe have to imagine the disaster of a possible war between the U.S. and China\nso we can reverse engineer and prevent it.\nchances of the U.S. and China stumbling into a war are real and increasing", "role": "user" }, { "content": "on a collision course\nfoot hills of a Cold War\nrapidly ascending the slope\ntwo nations to a hot war\nEven a nuclear exchange\nthe answer is yes\nodds over the status of the South China Sea\ndeeply intertwined\neconomic networks\nstumbled into the devastating First World War\nnarrowly missing a nuclear exchange\nit is easy to point to the other as the aggressor,\npandemic\nthe likely flashpoint is at sea\nSouth China Sea\nchallenges in responding to the greatest threats\nfailures of imagination.\nwe have to imagine the disaster of a possible war between the U.S. and China\nreal and increasing", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: US-China accidents are likely and go nuclear.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "China and the U\nS\nare on a collision course\nthe U.S. and China are in the “foot hills of a Cold War\nnations are rapidly ascending the slope\ncould this lead the two nations to a hot war\nEven a nuclear exchange\nthe answer is yes\nThe two nations are significantly at odds over the status of the South China Sea\nThe U.S\nbelieves these waters to be high seas\nthis occurred in 1914 when the major European powers\nwho were deeply intertwined\nby\neconomic networks\nstumbled into the devastating First World War\nthe world dodged a serious bullet in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, narrowly missing a nuclear exchange t\n, it is easy to point to the other as the aggressor, militarily and economically\nAdd the pandemic\nthe likely flashpoint is at sea\nover the disputed waters of the vast South China Sea\nso often our challenges in responding to the greatest threats are not failures of intelligence, but rather failures of imagination.\nwe have to imagine the disaster of a possible war between the U.S. and China\nso we can reverse engineer and prevent it.\nchances of the U.S. and China stumbling into a war are real and increasing", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China and the U\nS\nare on a collision course\nin the “foot hills of a Cold War\ncould this lead\nto\nnuclear exchange\nyes\nThe two\nare significantly at odds over the\nS\nC\nS\nin 1914\nEuropean powers\ndeeply intertwined\nby\neconomic networks\nstumbled into the devastating First World War\nthe world dodged a\nbullet in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, narrowly missing\nnuclear exchange\nit is easy to point to the other as the aggressor\nthe likely flashpoint is\nthe\nS\nC\nS\nchances o\nstumbling into a war are real and increasing", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Autonomous vessels are inevitable and will make shipping more cost-effective and respond to oil spills.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "With rapidly evolving autonomous technology spanning everything from advanced sensors to navigation systems, the maritime industry is embracing emerging technology for its cost effectiveness, safety, and fuel efficiency.\nWith recent advances in autonomous technology ranging from communication technologies to zero-emission autonomous ships, autonomy is affecting how the maritime and offshore industry operate.\nCOSTS\nCrew-related expenses can account for up to 30% of a voyage’s cost. Without designated space and weight for crew quarters, provisions, and other amenities, autonomous ships are lighter, utilize a more efficient use of space and are less expensive to operate while having the ability to carry more cargo. While vessels may not be entirely unmanned, many autonomous systems are designed to be controlled from shore, which can still lead to significant savings on crew supplies and fuel. One study estimated one autonomous vessel could save over $7 million in costs over 25 years.\nRolls-Royce is developing autonomous systems that allow crews to remotely operate ships in international waters by 2025, with plans for autonomous oceangoing vessels by 2030.\nSAFETY\nWith human error causing up to 96% of maritime accidents—most commonly due to fatigue—and 90% of the global trade handled by oceangoing vessels, autonomous systems have a significant potential to reduce shipping-related accidents. With emerging technologies in ship sensors, piloting assistance, and anti-collision alert systems, autonomy has the potential to reduce risk and protect crews.\nCloser to shore, unmanned surface vehicles, already being tested by the U.S. Coast Guard, will allow operators to respond to spill events despite conditions or crew availability, reducing exposure to any potential toxins or hazards. The vessels would permit more widespread protection for marine resources and faster responses to any illegal or illicit activities as well.\nSea Machine Robotics is developing autonomous software that can be installed on existing vessels, allowing ships to read the environment around them, leading to safer and more predictable marine operations.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "With rapidly evolving autonomous technology\nthe maritime industry is embracing emerging technology\nautonomous technology\nfrom\nCrew-related expenses can account for\n30% of a voyage’s cost\nWithout designated space and weight for crew quarters\nprovisions\nand other amenities\nautonomous ships are lighter, utilize\nmore efficient use of space and are less expensive to operate while having\nmore cargo\nautonomous systems are designed to be controlled from shore\nwhich can still lead to significant savings on crew supplies and fuel\nOne study estimated one autonomous vessel could save over $7 million in costs\nRolls-Royce is developing autonomous systems that allow crews to remotely operate ships in international waters by 2025\nwith plans for autonomous oceangoing vessels by 2030\nWith human error causing up to 96% of maritime accidents\ndue to fatigue\nand 90% of the global trade handled by oceangoing vessels, autonomous systems have\npotential to reduce\naccidents. With emerging technologies in ship sensors\npiloting assistance, and anti-collision alert systems, autonomy has the potential to reduce risk\nunmanned surface vehicles, already being tested by the\nCoast Guard, will allow operators to respond to spill events\nreducing exposure to\nhazards\nvessels would permit\nwidespread protection for marine resources and faster responses to\nor illicit activities\nSea Machine Robotics is developing autonomous software\nallowing ships to read the environment around them, leading to safer\nmarine operations", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Autonomous vessels are inevitable and will make shipping more cost-effective and respond to oil spills.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "With rapidly evolving autonomous technology\nthe maritime industry is embracing emerging technology\nautonomous technology\nfrom\nCrew-related expenses can account for\n30% of a voyage’s cost\nWithout designated space and weight for crew quarters\nprovisions\nand other amenities\nautonomous ships are lighter, utilize\nmore efficient use of space and are less expensive to operate while having\nmore cargo\nautonomous systems are designed to be controlled from shore\nwhich can still lead to significant savings on crew supplies and fuel\nOne study estimated one autonomous vessel could save over $7 million in costs\nRolls-Royce is developing autonomous systems that allow crews to remotely operate ships in international waters by 2025\nwith plans for autonomous oceangoing vessels by 2030\nWith human error causing up to 96% of maritime accidents\ndue to fatigue\nand 90% of the global trade handled by oceangoing vessels, autonomous systems have\npotential to reduce\naccidents. With emerging technologies in ship sensors\npiloting assistance, and anti-collision alert systems, autonomy has the potential to reduce risk\nunmanned surface vehicles, already being tested by the\nCoast Guard, will allow operators to respond to spill events\nreducing exposure to\nhazards\nvessels would permit\nwidespread protection for marine resources and faster responses to\nor illicit activities\nSea Machine Robotics is developing autonomous software\nallowing ships to read the environment around them, leading to safer\nmarine operations", "role": "user" }, { "content": "rapidly evolving\nmaritime industry\nembracing\nautonomous technology\n30%\nWithout\ncrew quarters\nprovisions\nautonomous ships\nlighter\nspace\nless expensive\nmore cargo\ncontrolled from shore\nsavings\nOne study\n$7 million\ncosts\nRolls-Royce\nautonomous systems\n2025\n2030\nhuman error\n96%\nfatigue\n90%\nglobal trade\noceangoing vessels\nreduce\nship sensors\npiloting assistance\nanti-collision\nreduce risk\nalready\nCoast Guard\nrespond\nspill events\nexposure\nwidespread protection\nfaster responses\nillicit\nautonomous software\nread the environment", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Autonomous vessels are inevitable and will make shipping more cost-effective and respond to oil spills.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "With rapidly evolving autonomous technology\nthe maritime industry is embracing emerging technology\nautonomous technology\nfrom\nCrew-related expenses can account for\n30% of a voyage’s cost\nWithout designated space and weight for crew quarters\nprovisions\nand other amenities\nautonomous ships are lighter, utilize\nmore efficient use of space and are less expensive to operate while having\nmore cargo\nautonomous systems are designed to be controlled from shore\nwhich can still lead to significant savings on crew supplies and fuel\nOne study estimated one autonomous vessel could save over $7 million in costs\nRolls-Royce is developing autonomous systems that allow crews to remotely operate ships in international waters by 2025\nwith plans for autonomous oceangoing vessels by 2030\nWith human error causing up to 96% of maritime accidents\ndue to fatigue\nand 90% of the global trade handled by oceangoing vessels, autonomous systems have\npotential to reduce\naccidents. With emerging technologies in ship sensors\npiloting assistance, and anti-collision alert systems, autonomy has the potential to reduce risk\nunmanned surface vehicles, already being tested by the\nCoast Guard, will allow operators to respond to spill events\nreducing exposure to\nhazards\nvessels would permit\nwidespread protection for marine resources and faster responses to\nor illicit activities\nSea Machine Robotics is developing autonomous software\nallowing ships to read the environment around them, leading to safer\nmarine operations", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the\nindustry is embracing\nautonomous technology\nCrew\nexpenses\naccount for\n30% of a voyage\nWithout\ncrew quarters\nautonomous ships are lighter\nand\nless expensive\nwhile having\nmore cargo\nOne study estimated\n$7 million in costs\nRolls-Royce is developing\nby 2030\nWith\n90% of\ntrade\nby\nvessels, autonomous systems\nreduce\naccidents. With\nsensors\npiloting assistance, and anti-collision\nsystems\nunmanned\nvehicles\nwill\nrespond to spill events\nwould permit\nprotection for\nresources and\nresponses to\nillicit activities", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Sustaining global trade hinges on unmanned vessels. The costs of maintaining human crews are unsustainable.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "It would not be an understatement to say that economic globalization and modern society would not be possible without commercial maritime shipping. As of 2015, maritime shipping was responsible for carrying approximately 90% of global trade. 1 All sorts of goods and cargo are transported via sea, ranging from crude oil, gas, and petroleum products to foodstuffs and all sorts of consumer goods. The international shipping industry has been steadily growing for the past 30 years, with a record 9.8 billion metric tons of goods shipped via seaborne trade in 2014. 2 In order to facilitate this trade, the global shipping industry utilizes over 50,000 merchant ships and employs over one million seafarers to crew those ships. 3\nDespite the growth of international trade, the shipping industry has long struggled to find sufficient seafarers to staff the global merchant fleet. Demand for qualified seafarers currently exceeds the available supply. 4 Seafarers require highly specialized training and spend long periods at sea. Conditions on board vessels are far from luxurious and there are significant risks inherent in the occupation, such as dangerous storms and rough seas, piracy, and other dangerous working conditions stemming from the vessel itself. 5 Even with the risks and demands of the occupation, the payoff is not enticing; the annual salary of an average seafarer in the United States is around $39,000. 6 For the shipping companies themselves, crew expenses are the second largest expense in running a ship, just behind fuel costs. 7 Crew quarters take up a significant portion on cargo ships and must provide adequate shelter and recreation for the crew, not to mention the need to stock provisions such as drinking water and food. To fully crew an average cargo ship at sea can cost anywhere from $3,000 to $4,000 a day. 8\nIn stark contrast to the growth of international trade, the size of the United States merchant fleet has steadily decreased over the last 70 years. U.S. carriers controlled 45% of global shipping trade at the end of World War II, but that number has dwindled to a mere 4% by 1997. 9 As of 2010, there were only 393 flagged vessels in the U.S. Merchant Marine fleet. 10 Many companies, domestic and foreign, look to \"flags of convenience\" for their ships, choosing to register them in countries such as Panama and Liberia (which boast 6,413 11 and 2,771 12 registered ships respectively), where regulations are lax, taxes are low, and few questions are asked. 13 U.S. seafarers today make up only a fraction of the global percentage of seafarers; in an estimated market of 721,000 seafarers, there are only 27,640 seafarers hailing from the U.S. 14\nUnmanned commercial vessels can solve the impending seafarer shortage, cut costs for shipping companies, and improve efficiency and safety in general. 15 The concept of unmanned vessels is a relatively recent development, but estimates indicate that such ships may set sail sooner than expected. 16 Current developments in the shipping industry are focusing on automated systems where the crew can supervise the operation of these systems from shore. In 2014, Rolls-Royce's Blue Water development division unveiled plans for remote-controlled vessels which could be entirely controlled by a small operating crew from a shore-based bridge. 17 This shore-based crew would cost significantly less to maintain than a traditional crew on board a vessel. Working conditions for the operators would be far safer and allow them to balance work and family in a more traditional fashion. 18 The vessel itself would be safer and prone to fewer accidents, as these vessels would utilize state-of-the-art sensors and navigation aids to reduce accidents. 19 Most marine accidents can be attributed to human error, which has led the industry to take a great interest in the increasing automation of vessels. 20 The vessels and crew as a whole could be more efficient, allowing a small number of operators to remotely control an entire fleet of unmanned vessels. 21 Unmanned vessels would no longer require systems on board such as water storage, heating, AC, and sewage, which would therefore require less power from the engines. 22 Cutting out unnecessary systems would allow for a greater volume of cargo to be loaded than onto a manned vessel of comparable size. 23", "role": "user" }, { "content": "globalization\nwould not be possible without\nmaritime\nshipping\nshipping was responsible for carrying\n90% of global trade\ngoods and cargo are transported via sea\nfrom\noil, gas, and petroleum\nto foodstuffs and all\nconsumer goods\nto facilitate this trade, the\nshipping industry utilizes\n50,000 merchant ships and employs\none million seafarers to crew\nthe shipping industry has\nstruggled to find sufficient seafarers to staff the\nfleet. Demand\nexceeds the available supply\nSeafarers require highly specialized training and spend long periods at sea\nConditions\nare far from luxurious\nthere are significant risks inherent in the occupation, such as\nstorms\nrough seas\npiracy\npayoff is not enticing\nthe annual salar\nis\n$39,000\ncrew expenses are the second largest expense\nbehind fuel costs\nCrew quarters take up a significant portion on cargo ships and must provide\nshelter\nrecreation\nwater and food\nUnmanned commercial\nvessels\nsolve the impending seafarer shortage, cut costs\nand improve efficiency\nships may set sail sooner\nshore-based crew would cost significantly less to maintain than a traditional crew\nWorking conditions\nwould be\nsafer\nThe vessel itself would be safer and prone to fewer accidents\nas these vessels would utilize state-of-the-art sensors and navigation aids to reduce accidents\nvessels\ncould be more efficient\nallowing a small number\nto remotely control an entire fleet of unmanned vessels\nUnmanned vessels\nwould no longer require systems on board such as water storage, heating, AC, and sewage, which would\nrequire less power\nCutting out unnecessary systems would allow for a greater volume of cargo to be loaded than onto a manned vessel", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Sustaining global trade hinges on unmanned vessels. The costs of maintaining human crews are unsustainable.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "globalization\nwould not be possible without\nmaritime\nshipping\nshipping was responsible for carrying\n90% of global trade\ngoods and cargo are transported via sea\nfrom\noil, gas, and petroleum\nto foodstuffs and all\nconsumer goods\nto facilitate this trade, the\nshipping industry utilizes\n50,000 merchant ships and employs\none million seafarers to crew\nthe shipping industry has\nstruggled to find sufficient seafarers to staff the\nfleet. Demand\nexceeds the available supply\nSeafarers require highly specialized training and spend long periods at sea\nConditions\nare far from luxurious\nthere are significant risks inherent in the occupation, such as\nstorms\nrough seas\npiracy\npayoff is not enticing\nthe annual salar\nis\n$39,000\ncrew expenses are the second largest expense\nbehind fuel costs\nCrew quarters take up a significant portion on cargo ships and must provide\nshelter\nrecreation\nwater and food\nUnmanned commercial\nvessels\nsolve the impending seafarer shortage, cut costs\nand improve efficiency\nships may set sail sooner\nshore-based crew would cost significantly less to maintain than a traditional crew\nWorking conditions\nwould be\nsafer\nThe vessel itself would be safer and prone to fewer accidents\nas these vessels would utilize state-of-the-art sensors and navigation aids to reduce accidents\nvessels\ncould be more efficient\nallowing a small number\nto remotely control an entire fleet of unmanned vessels\nUnmanned vessels\nwould no longer require systems on board such as water storage, heating, AC, and sewage, which would\nrequire less power\nCutting out unnecessary systems would allow for a greater volume of cargo to be loaded than onto a manned vessel", "role": "user" }, { "content": "globalization\nmaritime\nshipping\n90%\nglobal trade\nsea\nconsumer goods\nshipping industry\none million\nstruggled\nstaff\nexceeds\nhighly specialized\nlong periods\nsignificant risks\nstorms\npiracy\nnot enticing\n$39,000\nsecond largest\nCrew quarters\nsignificant portion\nUnmanned\nsolve\nseafarer shortage\ncut costs\nefficiency\nsooner\nshore-based\nsignificantly less\ntraditional crew\nsafer\nsafer\nfewer accidents\nnavigation\nmore efficient\nsmall number\nUnmanned vessels\nless power\ngreater volume of cargo", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Sustaining global trade hinges on unmanned vessels. The costs of maintaining human crews are unsustainable.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "globalization\nwould not be possible without\nmaritime\nshipping\nshipping was responsible for carrying\n90% of global trade\ngoods and cargo are transported via sea\nfrom\noil, gas, and petroleum\nto foodstuffs and all\nconsumer goods\nto facilitate this trade, the\nshipping industry utilizes\n50,000 merchant ships and employs\none million seafarers to crew\nthe shipping industry has\nstruggled to find sufficient seafarers to staff the\nfleet. Demand\nexceeds the available supply\nSeafarers require highly specialized training and spend long periods at sea\nConditions\nare far from luxurious\nthere are significant risks inherent in the occupation, such as\nstorms\nrough seas\npiracy\npayoff is not enticing\nthe annual salar\nis\n$39,000\ncrew expenses are the second largest expense\nbehind fuel costs\nCrew quarters take up a significant portion on cargo ships and must provide\nshelter\nrecreation\nwater and food\nUnmanned commercial\nvessels\nsolve the impending seafarer shortage, cut costs\nand improve efficiency\nships may set sail sooner\nshore-based crew would cost significantly less to maintain than a traditional crew\nWorking conditions\nwould be\nsafer\nThe vessel itself would be safer and prone to fewer accidents\nas these vessels would utilize state-of-the-art sensors and navigation aids to reduce accidents\nvessels\ncould be more efficient\nallowing a small number\nto remotely control an entire fleet of unmanned vessels\nUnmanned vessels\nwould no longer require systems on board such as water storage, heating, AC, and sewage, which would\nrequire less power\nCutting out unnecessary systems would allow for a greater volume of cargo to be loaded than onto a manned vessel", "role": "user" }, { "content": "globalization\nwould not be\nwithout\nshipping\ncarrying\n90% of\ntrade\nto facilitate\ntrade\nindustry utilizes\none million seafarers\nshipping\nhas\nstruggled to find\nstaff\nDemand\nexceeds\nsupply\nSeafarers require\nspecialized training\nthere are\nrisks\nsuch as\nstorms\npiracy\npayoff is not enticing\ncrew expenses are\nsecond largest\nbehind fuel\nquarters take up\nships\nUnmanned\nvessels\nsolve the\nshortage\nand improve efficiency\nshore-based crew\ncost\nless\nUnmanned vessels\nwould no longer require\nwater\nheating\nsewage\nCutting out\nsystems\nallow for\ngreater\ncargo", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Unmanned ships pave the way for emissions reductions.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "ENERGY\nApproximately 1.68 billion tons of cargo are transported every year spanning 998 billion ton-miles. The autonomous ship market was estimated to be valued at $85 billion in 2020, and is projected to reach $165 billion within 10 years. With maritime shipping currently accounting for 3% of global emissions, autonomous ships have the ability to reduce emissions with lighter ships and less fuel, lessening their impact worldwide as the demand for the industry grows. The Yara Birkeland, the first fully-electric and zero-emission vessel, may also pave the way for a reduction in emissions that are currently inevitable on long voyages. Embracing autonomy in the maritime industry, something already being developed in other vessels like harbor tugs and submarines, may lead to minimal emissions, increased safety, and reduced costs as vessels traverse waters across the world in the near future.\nIndustries across the globe are adopting new autonomous innovations. Exploring these technologies will allow individual users, workflows, and entire organizations to maximize the opportunities that can lead to redefining industries.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "1.68 billion tons of cargo are transported\nspanning 998 billion ton-miles\nWith maritime shipping\naccounting for 3% of global emissions\nautonomous ships have the ability to reduce emissions with lighter ships and less fuel\nlessening their impact worldwide as the demand for the industry grows\nThe Yara Birkeland, the first fully-electric and zero-emission vessel, may\npave the way for a reduction in emissions that are currently inevitable on long voyages\nEmbracing autonomy in the maritime industry\nmay lead to minimal emissions\nas vessels traverse waters\nIndustries\nare adopting new autonomous innovations", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Unmanned ships pave the way for emissions reductions.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "1.68 billion tons of cargo are transported\nspanning 998 billion ton-miles\nWith maritime shipping\naccounting for 3% of global emissions\nautonomous ships have the ability to reduce emissions with lighter ships and less fuel\nlessening their impact worldwide as the demand for the industry grows\nThe Yara Birkeland, the first fully-electric and zero-emission vessel, may\npave the way for a reduction in emissions that are currently inevitable on long voyages\nEmbracing autonomy in the maritime industry\nmay lead to minimal emissions\nas vessels traverse waters\nIndustries\nare adopting new autonomous innovations", "role": "user" }, { "content": "1.68 billion tons\n998 billion ton-miles\n3%\nautonomous ships\nlighter ships and less fuel\nlessening\nYara Birkeland\nfully-electric\nzero-emission\npave the way\nemissions\ncurrently inevitable\nlong voyages\nautonomy\nminimal emissions\nautonomous innovations", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Unmanned ships pave the way for emissions reductions.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "1.68 billion tons of cargo are transported\nspanning 998 billion ton-miles\nWith maritime shipping\naccounting for 3% of global emissions\nautonomous ships have the ability to reduce emissions with lighter ships and less fuel\nlessening their impact worldwide as the demand for the industry grows\nThe Yara Birkeland, the first fully-electric and zero-emission vessel, may\npave the way for a reduction in emissions that are currently inevitable on long voyages\nEmbracing autonomy in the maritime industry\nmay lead to minimal emissions\nas vessels traverse waters\nIndustries\nare adopting new autonomous innovations", "role": "user" }, { "content": "autonomous ships\nreduce emissions with lighter ships and less fuel\nThe Yara Birkeland, the first\nzero-emission vessel, may\npave\nway\nreduction in emissions\ninevitable on long voyages\nIndustries\nare adopting\ninnovations", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Shipping emissions are existential.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "There is a serious threat lurking in the Arctic that has largely escaped attention from the public and the media. Ships just started traveling through the icy Arctic even in the depths of winter. New shipping routes and increasing ship traffic due to ice melt bring greater environmental hazards. One of the most critical risks facing the Arctic, aside from climate change, is the use of heavy fuel oil which is basically heated tar. Heavy fuel oil, also known as residual fuel or bunker oil, is the tar-like sludge that is left over from the crude oil refining process. It’s essentially the bottom of the barrel and is so viscous it has to be heated to allow it to flow before it can be used by ships. The only denser oils are those used in asphalt and roof sealing. It is the fuel of choice for ships in the Arctic because it is the cheapest fuel. The International Maritime Organization, an agency of the United Nations, has already banned heavy fuel oil in Antarctic waters, yet it is still the most commonly used fuel in the Arctic. More than 1,300 ships sail through the Arctic every year, and 75% of the total mass of fuel on board is heavy fuel oil.\nShips using HFO emit sulfur, nitrogen oxides and black carbon. Also known as soot, black carbon is deposited by passing ships onto ice and snow, causing the affected area to absorb more radiation from the sun instead of reflecting it away back into space. It covers the land in soot. This leads to more warming and more melting, creating a vicious cycle. Black carbon emissions are expected to increase, possibly as much as 46%, as Arctic shipping traffic continues to increase every year. Heavy fuel oil can cause asthma, lung cancer and birth defects. Black carbon is also a major threat to human health. Its fine particles are small enough to be inhaled into our lungs and cause respiratory disease, cardiovascular disease, cancer, and birth defects. This puts four million people from eight Arctic nations at risk of severe medical conditions.\nHeavy fuel oil is virtually impossible to clean up after a spill. It is cheaper than other crude oil, but is several times more expensive to clean up after a spill. The chilly Arctic waters prevent this oil from dispersing or degrading naturally, and it tends to sink rather than float on the surface. During warmer months, sunken heavy fuel oil can rise back to the surface and pollute shores that were already considered to be clean. A heavy fuel oil spill would devastate Arctic wildlife like whales, seals, walrus and seabirds.\nHeavy fuel oil could destroy Arctic ecosystems. Heavy fuel oil is toxic to fish; seabirds and marine mammals that are covered by the oil are at risk of hypothermia or death. This isn’t speculation: In 2003, a tanker ship collided with another vessel in Russia’s White Sea, spilling 54 tons of heavy fuel oil into prime beluga whale calving habitat. Only 16 percent of the oil was ever recovered, and the area is still 22 times the permissible contamination level set by the Russian government. Multiple beluga carcasses were found in the area, and the whales have been forced to seek other areas in which to give birth.\nHeavy fuel oil could devastate Arctic communities. A spill would be disastrous for hundreds of indigenous communities that depend on ocean life for subsistence, as well as commercial fisheries that in many areas serve as economic foundations. In 2004, a cargo vessel lost power and ran aground outside of Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands of Alaska, spilling 338,000 gallons of fuel. This forced a portion of the tanner crab season to be canceled. Fishermen operating out of the harbor lost an estimated $500,000 in revenue.\nGlobal Community wants U.N.’s International Maritime Organization and country delegations to get heavy fuel oil out of the Arctic and make sure that ships navigating in the Arctic use clean energy.\nIn coming decades, because of global warming, the Arctic tundra permafrost and Arctic Ocean sea bed will release Methane CH4, a much more deadly GHG than CO2.\nThe global warming trajectory gets even worse still if one considers the Methane Bomb of the Arctic tundra and Arctic Ocean sea bed. The Global Warming Potential (GWP) of CH4 is 21 times that of CO2 on a 100 year time frame but is 105 times greater than that of CO2 on a 20 year time frame and taking atmospheric aerosol impacts into account. Huge stores of CH4 as water-methane (H2O-CH4) clathrates in the Arctic tundra permafrost and on the Arctic Ocean sea bed may be released in coming decades due to global warming, with this release involving a disastrous positive feedback loop in which global warming causes CH4 release, thence more global warming and consequently even more CH4 release. Atmospheric CH4 increased in 1983-1998 by up to 13 ppb (parts per billion) per year, increased much more slowly in the period 1999-2006 (up to 3 ppb per year, the 2001-2005 average being 0.5 ppb/year), and has increased more rapidly from 2007 onwards, reaching 12.5 ppb per year in 2014. Atmospheric CH4 increased to 1,843 ppb CH4 in December 2015 as compared to a pre-Industrial Revolution level of 700 ppb CH4.\nAs the amount of Arctic sea ice declines at an unprecedented rate, the thawing of offshore permafrost releases methane. A 50-gigatonne (Gt) reservoir of methane, stored in the form of hydrates, exists on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf. It is likely to be emitted as the seabed warms, either steadily over 50 years or suddenly. However the Global Warming Potential (GWP) of CH4 on a 20 year time frame and with aerosol impacts considered is 105 times that of CO2. No more than a terminal carbon pollution budget of 600 billion tonnes of CO2 can be emitted between 2010 and zero emissions in 2050 if the world is to have a 75% chance of avoiding a catastrophic 2C temperature rise. That Terminal Carbon Pollution Budget has now effectively been exceeded. Indeed climate criminal Australia’s commitment to fossil fuel exploitation means that Australia is set to exceed the world’s 2009 Terminal Carbon Pollution Budget by a factor of 3. However the 50 Gt (billion tonnes) CH4 in the East Siberian Arctic Shelf is thus equivalent to 50 billion tonnes CH4 x 105 tonnes CO2-equivalent/tonne CH4 = 5,250 billion tonnes CO2-e or about nine (9) times more than the world’s remaining Terminal Carbon Pollution Budget in 2009. We are doomed unless we can stop this Arctic CH4 release.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "There is a serious threat lurking in the Arctic that has largely escaped attention\nShips\nstarted traveling through the icy Arctic\nin the\nwinter\ndue to ice melt bring greater environmental hazards\nthe use of heavy fuel oil\nin the Arctic\nemit sulfur\nn\nox\nand black carbon\nAlso known as soot\ndeposited by passing ships onto ice and snow, causing the affected area to absorb more radiation from the sun instead of reflecting it\nThis leads to more warming and more melting, creating a vicious cycle\nBlack carbon emissions are expected to increase\n46%\nas Arctic shipping traffic continues to increase every year\na major threat to human health\nHeavy fuel oil is virtually impossible to clean\nafter a spill\nchilly Arctic waters prevent this oil from dispersing or degrading naturally, and it tends to sink rather than float\nwould devastate Arctic wildlife\nHeavy fuel oil could destroy Arctic ecosystems\nis toxic to fish; seabirds and marine mammals that are covered by the oil are at risk of hypothermia or death\nThe\ntrajectory gets even worse\nif one considers the Methane Bomb\nwith this release involving a disastrous positive feedback loop\nAs\nArctic sea ice declines\nthe thawing\nreleases methane\nWe are doomed unless we can stop this Arctic CH4 release", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Shipping emissions are existential.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "There is a serious threat lurking in the Arctic that has largely escaped attention\nShips\nstarted traveling through the icy Arctic\nin the\nwinter\ndue to ice melt bring greater environmental hazards\nthe use of heavy fuel oil\nin the Arctic\nemit sulfur\nn\nox\nand black carbon\nAlso known as soot\ndeposited by passing ships onto ice and snow, causing the affected area to absorb more radiation from the sun instead of reflecting it\nThis leads to more warming and more melting, creating a vicious cycle\nBlack carbon emissions are expected to increase\n46%\nas Arctic shipping traffic continues to increase every year\na major threat to human health\nHeavy fuel oil is virtually impossible to clean\nafter a spill\nchilly Arctic waters prevent this oil from dispersing or degrading naturally, and it tends to sink rather than float\nwould devastate Arctic wildlife\nHeavy fuel oil could destroy Arctic ecosystems\nis toxic to fish; seabirds and marine mammals that are covered by the oil are at risk of hypothermia or death\nThe\ntrajectory gets even worse\nif one considers the Methane Bomb\nwith this release involving a disastrous positive feedback loop\nAs\nArctic sea ice declines\nthe thawing\nreleases methane\nWe are doomed unless we can stop this Arctic CH4 release", "role": "user" }, { "content": "lurking\nShips\nwinter\nenvironmental hazards\nheavy fuel oil\nsulfur\nn\nox\nblack carbon\nsoot\nice\nsnow\nmore warming and more melting\nvicious cycle\nincrease\n46%\nmajor threat\noil\nimpossible to clean\nspill\ndevastate\nwildlife\ndestroy Arctic ecosystems\ntoxic\nworse\nMethane Bomb\ndisastrous positive feedback loop\nArctic sea ice declines\nthawing\nmethane\nWe are doomed\nstop this Arctic CH4 release", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Shipping emissions are existential.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "There is a serious threat lurking in the Arctic that has largely escaped attention\nShips\nstarted traveling through the icy Arctic\nin the\nwinter\ndue to ice melt bring greater environmental hazards\nthe use of heavy fuel oil\nin the Arctic\nemit sulfur\nn\nox\nand black carbon\nAlso known as soot\ndeposited by passing ships onto ice and snow, causing the affected area to absorb more radiation from the sun instead of reflecting it\nThis leads to more warming and more melting, creating a vicious cycle\nBlack carbon emissions are expected to increase\n46%\nas Arctic shipping traffic continues to increase every year\na major threat to human health\nHeavy fuel oil is virtually impossible to clean\nafter a spill\nchilly Arctic waters prevent this oil from dispersing or degrading naturally, and it tends to sink rather than float\nwould devastate Arctic wildlife\nHeavy fuel oil could destroy Arctic ecosystems\nis toxic to fish; seabirds and marine mammals that are covered by the oil are at risk of hypothermia or death\nThe\ntrajectory gets even worse\nif one considers the Methane Bomb\nwith this release involving a disastrous positive feedback loop\nAs\nArctic sea ice declines\nthe thawing\nreleases methane\nWe are doomed unless we can stop this Arctic CH4 release", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Ships\nstarted\nthrough the\nArctic\nbring\nenvironmental hazards\nh\nf\no\nemit\nblack carbon\nonto\nsnow\nleads to more warming and\nmelting\na vicious cycle\nemissions\nexpected to increase\n46%\noil is\nimpossible to clean\nafter a spill\nwould devastate\nwildlife\ndestroy\necosystems\neven worse\nthe Methane Bomb\nrelease\na disastrous positive feedback\nAs\nsea ice declines\nthawing\nreleases methane\nWe are doomed unless we can stop this\nrelease", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Only navigational rights enable unmanned vessels to traverse international waters. The Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not permit other ocean-going devices to navigate the seas.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The missions that UMVs can be tasked with will be in part determined by where they can lawfully travel in the ocean. The key navigational rights that allow maritime vehicles to move through the territorial sea of other states are set out in UNCLOS and only available to ships, not to other ocean-going devices. A UMV being categorised as a ship means it has access to established rights of navigation and will be subject to widely accepted international standards.34 Access to these rights will substantially increase UMV utility to militaries.35\nPut simply, categorisation as a ship or a vessel allows for a much more straightforward assessment of what the device can do, where it can go, and how other States can respond to it.36 The navigational rights provided by UNCLOS are one of the central mechanisms of the regulation of maritime spaces and they allow ships to travel through the territorial waters of other states. UNCLOS provides multiple navigational rights that differ depending on the jurisdictional zone of the ocean: innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea lane passage, and in the high seas, freedom of navigation. 37 UNCLOS, representing a compromise between the interests of maritime powers and coastal states, sets the conditions under which ships and vessels can exercise those rights.38 Understanding the operation of those rights, and the limitations that are placed on how they are exercised, allows for a full appreciation of the clarity that follows from classifying a UMV as a ship under UNCLOS.\nInnocent passage, which became established in the mid-nineteenth century,39 allows ships to navigate within the territorial sea 40 of a foreign coastal state 41, reconciling the territorial sovereignty of the coastal state with other states.42 Innocent passage must be continuous and expeditious, and must be for the purpose of entering or leaving internal waters, or passing through without entering internal waters.43 To qualify as ‘innocent’, the passage must not be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state.44 Article 19 of UNCLOS sets out a list of activities that are considered prejudicial, most of which relate to military purposes. These include activities that might be undertaken by UMVs, including any threat or use of force, any exercise or practice with weapons, the collection of information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal state, or carrying out research or survey activities.45 Innocent passage requires submarines and underwater vehicles to travel on the surface and to show their flag.46 There is no support in UNCLOS or customary international law that a non-vessel ‘object’ or ‘device’ is permitted to access the right of innocent passage, and no other legal mechanism that would allow such a device to enter the territorial sea of another state.47\nCoastal states are permitted to regulate how the right of innocent passage is exercised in their territorial waters to ensure navigational and maritime safety. This regulation is not, however, permitted to extend to the design, construction and crewing of foreign vessels unless it is giving effect to generally accepted international standards.48 It means that all ships – including any UMVs that fall into this category – will be required to comply with these generally accepted standards. It appears the it would be possible for UMVs to meet the requirements of the main sources of these standards (the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea49 (SOLAS) regime and the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea50 (COLREGS)).51 If this is correct, it means that coastal states will not be permitted to unilaterally put in place a requirement that all vessels carry a commander and crew and in effect prohibit the passage of any UMVs. 52 More will be said on this below.\nTransit passage and archipelagic sea lane passage are variations to the innocent passage regime that were negotiated during the drafting of UNCLOS. Transit passage allows ships to navigate in straits ‘used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.’53 A compromise was necessary because UNCLOS permitted the territorial sea claim coastal states could make to expand from 3 nautical miles from their baseline (generally the low-water mark) to 12 nautical miles, leaving no open ocean available for navigation in some critical international straits.54 This outcome was detrimental to maritime powers as ships engaging in innocent passage are seriously limited in the activities they can carry out, leaving naval vessels unable to sufficiently protect themselves, and requiring submarines to surface.55 The compromise between these two interests reached at UNCLOS was transit passage, a non-suspendable right that allows for ships and aircraft to travel without delay through or over the straight in normal navigational mode. Normal navigational mode is generally understood to mean that submarines can continue travelling underwater, and surface ships can undertake activities necessary for their security that would not be permissible in innocent passage.56 Archipelagic sea lanes passage is analogous to transit passage, and allows an archipelagic state to set aside sea lanes and air routes through its archipelagic waters 57 and the adjoining territorial sea.58 As with transit passage, ships and vessels have the right to navigate through these sea lanes in normal mode.59 Both navigational rights are only available to ships and vessels.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "missions that UMVs can be tasked with will be\ndetermined by where they can lawfully travel in the ocean\nThe key navigational rights that allow maritime vehicles to move through\nterritorial sea of other states are set out in UNCLOS and only available to ships, not to other ocean-going devices\nA UMV being categorised as a ship means it has access to\nrights of navigation and will be subject to widely accepted international standards\ncategorisation as a ship\nallows for a much more straightforward assessment of what the device can do\nwhere it can go, and how other States can respond to\nnavigational rights provided by UNCLOS are one of the central mechanisms of the regulation of maritime spaces and they allow ships to travel through the territorial waters of other states\nUNCLOS provides multiple navigational rights\ninnocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea lane passage\nand\nfreedom of navigation\nUNCLOS\nsets the conditions under which ships\ncan exercise those rights\nUnderstanding\nthose rights\nlimitations\nplaced on how they are exercised\nallows for a full appreciation of the clarity that follows from classifying a UMV as a ship\nInnocent passage\nallows ships to navigate within the territorial sea\nof a foreign coastal state\nTo qualify as ‘innocent’\npassage must not be prejudicial to the peace\nof the coastal state\nThese include activities that might be undertaken by UMVs\nincluding\nthreat\nof for\nexercise\nwith weapons\nInnocent passage requires submarines\nto travel on the surface\nThere is no support in UNCLOS or customary international law that a non-vessel ‘object’\nis permitted to access the right of innocent passage, and no other legal mechanism that would allow such a device to enter the territorial sea of another state\nCoastal states are permitted to regulate\ninnocent passage\nThis regulation is not\npermitted to extend to the design\nand crewing of foreign vessels\nmeans that all ships\nincluding\nUMVs\nwill be required to comply with these\nstandards\nit would be possible for UMVs to meet the requirements of the main sources of these standards\nIf this is correct, it means\ncoastal states will not be permitted to unilaterally put in place a requirement that all vessels carry a commander and crew and in effect prohibit the passage of any UMVs\nTransit passage allows ships to navigate in straits ‘used for international navigation between one part of the high seas\nor an exclusive economic zone\ntransit passage\nallows for ships\nto travel without delay through or over the straight in normal navigational mode\nunderstood to mean that submarines can continue travelling underwater\nand surface ships can undertake activities necessary for their security that would not be permissible in innocent passage\nArchipelagic sea lanes passage\nallows an archipelagic state to set aside sea lanes\nthrough its archipelagic waters\nand the adjoining territorial sea\nships\nhave the right to navigate through these sea lanes in normal mode\nBoth navigational rights are only available to ships", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Only navigational rights enable unmanned vessels to traverse international waters. The Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not permit other ocean-going devices to navigate the seas.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "missions that UMVs can be tasked with will be\ndetermined by where they can lawfully travel in the ocean\nThe key navigational rights that allow maritime vehicles to move through\nterritorial sea of other states are set out in UNCLOS and only available to ships, not to other ocean-going devices\nA UMV being categorised as a ship means it has access to\nrights of navigation and will be subject to widely accepted international standards\ncategorisation as a ship\nallows for a much more straightforward assessment of what the device can do\nwhere it can go, and how other States can respond to\nnavigational rights provided by UNCLOS are one of the central mechanisms of the regulation of maritime spaces and they allow ships to travel through the territorial waters of other states\nUNCLOS provides multiple navigational rights\ninnocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea lane passage\nand\nfreedom of navigation\nUNCLOS\nsets the conditions under which ships\ncan exercise those rights\nUnderstanding\nthose rights\nlimitations\nplaced on how they are exercised\nallows for a full appreciation of the clarity that follows from classifying a UMV as a ship\nInnocent passage\nallows ships to navigate within the territorial sea\nof a foreign coastal state\nTo qualify as ‘innocent’\npassage must not be prejudicial to the peace\nof the coastal state\nThese include activities that might be undertaken by UMVs\nincluding\nthreat\nof for\nexercise\nwith weapons\nInnocent passage requires submarines\nto travel on the surface\nThere is no support in UNCLOS or customary international law that a non-vessel ‘object’\nis permitted to access the right of innocent passage, and no other legal mechanism that would allow such a device to enter the territorial sea of another state\nCoastal states are permitted to regulate\ninnocent passage\nThis regulation is not\npermitted to extend to the design\nand crewing of foreign vessels\nmeans that all ships\nincluding\nUMVs\nwill be required to comply with these\nstandards\nit would be possible for UMVs to meet the requirements of the main sources of these standards\nIf this is correct, it means\ncoastal states will not be permitted to unilaterally put in place a requirement that all vessels carry a commander and crew and in effect prohibit the passage of any UMVs\nTransit passage allows ships to navigate in straits ‘used for international navigation between one part of the high seas\nor an exclusive economic zone\ntransit passage\nallows for ships\nto travel without delay through or over the straight in normal navigational mode\nunderstood to mean that submarines can continue travelling underwater\nand surface ships can undertake activities necessary for their security that would not be permissible in innocent passage\nArchipelagic sea lanes passage\nallows an archipelagic state to set aside sea lanes\nthrough its archipelagic waters\nand the adjoining territorial sea\nships\nhave the right to navigate through these sea lanes in normal mode\nBoth navigational rights are only available to ships", "role": "user" }, { "content": "UMVs\ndetermined\nlawfully travel\nnavigational rights\nterritorial sea\nUNCLOS\nnot to other ocean-going devices\nrights of navigation\nwidely accepted\nship\nmuch more\nother States\nnavigational rights\nUNCLOS\ncentral mechanisms\nterritorial waters\nUNCLOS\nfreedom of navigation\nconditions\nrights\nfull appreciation\nclarity\nUMV\nship\nnavigate\nterritorial sea\ninnocent’\nUMVs\nsubmarines\nno support\ncustomary international law\nnon-vessel ‘object’\ninnocent passage\nno other legal mechanism\npermitted\ninnocent passage\ndesign\ncrewing\nUMVs\nUMVs\ncoastal states\nunilaterally\ncommander\ncrew\nprohibit\nTransit passage\ninternational navigation\nhigh seas\nexclusive economic zone\nwithout delay\ntravelling underwater\nsecurity\nArchipelagic sea lanes passage\nsea lanes\nships\nsea lanes\nonly available", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Only navigational rights enable unmanned vessels to traverse international waters. The Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not permit other ocean-going devices to navigate the seas.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "missions that UMVs can be tasked with will be\ndetermined by where they can lawfully travel in the ocean\nThe key navigational rights that allow maritime vehicles to move through\nterritorial sea of other states are set out in UNCLOS and only available to ships, not to other ocean-going devices\nA UMV being categorised as a ship means it has access to\nrights of navigation and will be subject to widely accepted international standards\ncategorisation as a ship\nallows for a much more straightforward assessment of what the device can do\nwhere it can go, and how other States can respond to\nnavigational rights provided by UNCLOS are one of the central mechanisms of the regulation of maritime spaces and they allow ships to travel through the territorial waters of other states\nUNCLOS provides multiple navigational rights\ninnocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea lane passage\nand\nfreedom of navigation\nUNCLOS\nsets the conditions under which ships\ncan exercise those rights\nUnderstanding\nthose rights\nlimitations\nplaced on how they are exercised\nallows for a full appreciation of the clarity that follows from classifying a UMV as a ship\nInnocent passage\nallows ships to navigate within the territorial sea\nof a foreign coastal state\nTo qualify as ‘innocent’\npassage must not be prejudicial to the peace\nof the coastal state\nThese include activities that might be undertaken by UMVs\nincluding\nthreat\nof for\nexercise\nwith weapons\nInnocent passage requires submarines\nto travel on the surface\nThere is no support in UNCLOS or customary international law that a non-vessel ‘object’\nis permitted to access the right of innocent passage, and no other legal mechanism that would allow such a device to enter the territorial sea of another state\nCoastal states are permitted to regulate\ninnocent passage\nThis regulation is not\npermitted to extend to the design\nand crewing of foreign vessels\nmeans that all ships\nincluding\nUMVs\nwill be required to comply with these\nstandards\nit would be possible for UMVs to meet the requirements of the main sources of these standards\nIf this is correct, it means\ncoastal states will not be permitted to unilaterally put in place a requirement that all vessels carry a commander and crew and in effect prohibit the passage of any UMVs\nTransit passage allows ships to navigate in straits ‘used for international navigation between one part of the high seas\nor an exclusive economic zone\ntransit passage\nallows for ships\nto travel without delay through or over the straight in normal navigational mode\nunderstood to mean that submarines can continue travelling underwater\nand surface ships can undertake activities necessary for their security that would not be permissible in innocent passage\nArchipelagic sea lanes passage\nallows an archipelagic state to set aside sea lanes\nthrough its archipelagic waters\nand the adjoining territorial sea\nships\nhave the right to navigate through these sea lanes in normal mode\nBoth navigational rights are only available to ships", "role": "user" }, { "content": "missions\nUMVs can be tasked\nwill be\ndetermined by where they can\ntravel\nnavigational rights\nare\nin UNCLOS and only available to ships, not\nother\ndevices\ncategorisation as a ship\nallows for\nstraightforward assessment of\nhow\nStates\nrespond\nrights\nallow ships to travel through\nterritorial waters\nUNCLOS provides\ninnocent\ntransit\narchipelagic\nand\nfreedom of navigation\nInnocent passage\nallows ships to navigate within\nterritorial sea\nThere is no support in\nc\ni\nl\nthat a non-vessel\nis permitted to access\ninnocent passage\ncoastal states will not\nunilaterally\nrequire\nvessels carry\ncrew\nTransit passage allows ships to navigate in straits\nfor international navigation between\nhigh seas\nor an e\ne\nz\nArchipelagic sea lanes passage\nallows\nstate to set aside sea lanes\nthrough\nwaters", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The international community will accept a broader interpretation of “ship” to include unmanned systems.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "There is no uniform legal definition of ‘ship’ in UNCLOS, in other treaties or in customary international law, making it difficult to determine whether UMVs will fall into this category.65 This is particularly as one of the assumptions made about the operation of ships– mainly due to technical limitations – is that they will have people on board.66 If this assumption means that having a crew or commander on board the device is a critical component of being a ship, UMVs will not satisfy the definition and will be more difficult to fit into the UNCLOS regime. 67 The scholarly debate about this question is testament to this uncertainty,68 and the ambiguity increases the risk that the categorisation of a device could differ between states and result in conflict.69\nThis dispute is partly about whether an expansive and evolutionary interpretation of ship in UNCLOS is permissible in the face of the new technology of UMVs. As noted above, ship is not defined in UNCLOS and is used interchangeably with vessel. It is clear that ship and vessel refer to the same concept: the authentic treaty texts in French and Spanish only use one word – navire and buque respectively. 70 UNCLOS does recognise that there may be other objects using the ocean by establishing rules for devices and equipment, particularly for use in marine scientific research, but does not provide a clear way of distinguishing them from ships.71 We are left with the word ‘ship’, the contexts in which it is used in UNCLOS, and the method of treaty interpretation provided by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) - looking at the text of the treaty, its object and purpose, and interpreting it in good faith.\n1 An evolutionary approach to UNCLOS is justified\nInterpreting the term ship in UNCLOS to encompass the new(ish) technology of UMVs is an example of an evolutionary interpretation. An evolutionary interpretation recognises that in some contexts the terms of a treaty are not fixed once and for all, but can change through time. 72 Of course, it is not appropriate to take an evolutionary approach to all terms in every treaty; it depends on the terms used, the subject matter of the treaty, and most importantly, on whether it would be consistent with the intention of the parties. The ‘intention’ of the parties understood by the treaty interpretation process is not necessarily the subjective intention of the parties; rather, the process of interpretation aims to discover the ‘objective’ intention of the parties. The legally recognised way of determining the objective intention of the parties is by applying the VCLT, looking at the text, the object and purpose, and interpreting in good faith.73\nThe International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Navigational Rights sets out when the Court would apply a presumption in favour of an evolutionary interpretation:\n… where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily having been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the treaty has been entered into for a very long period or is ‘of continuing duration’, the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to have an evolving meaning.74\nThe ICJ also adopted an evolutionary understanding of treaty terms in Namibia,75 Aegean Sea, 76 Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros, 77 and Pulp Mills,78 all on the basis of the intention of the parties.\nThere are strong indications that the parties to UNCLOS intended that its terms be interpreted in this way.79 The preamble to UNCLOS reveal the high hopes of the parties: it was prompted by a ‘desire to settle … all issues relating to the law of the sea.’80 It recognises that the ‘problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole,’81 and that ‘the codification and progressive development of the law of the sea’ in UNCLOS will strengthen peace and security.82 The broad scope of UNCLOS also suggests that the very significant threshold question of what amounts to a ship should be read widely. UNCLOS has been described as a ‘constitution for the ocean’83 and has ‘innate constitutional attributes’ such as not allowing reservations (article 309) and making amendment difficult (article 312).84 These features suggest an expansive and evolving definition of the word ‘ship’ should be preferred as this approach would be most likely to fulfil this vision.\nThe word ‘ship’ is also conducive to a broad interpretation. It is a generic word and can refer to a wide range of devices, from large commercial container ships to much smaller sailing vessels. 85 In addition, a cursory glance at the history of maritime technology shows the drafters must have been aware that technological change would occur in shipbuilding, navigation, and means of propulsion and would have intended that UNCLOS be able to accommodate these changes. Any definition of ship in UNCLOS would have to encompass the range of possible vessels, with significant variation in construction methods, purposes and sizes. 86 Modern militaries are no exception, and have a wide variety of ships, including high-speed patrol craft, troop transporters, submarines and aircraft carriers. Evidently, the more specific the requirements of the definition the more problematic it will be to incorporate the definition into existing international law.\nMost scholars who considered the status of UMVs accept that at least some will be ships.87 Kraska, emphasising the importance of the freedom of the seas in the law of the sea, argues that we should take a flexible approach that is inclusive of UMVs.88 Similarly, McLaughlin argues that the flexibility of the general principles of the law of the sea mitigate the need to develop new, more comprehensive, regulation of UMVs at this stage. He says the general law of the sea is adequate until we can better assess whether more detailed regulation is necessary once have more information about the practical legal issues.89\nThere are indications that the international community accepts that the UNCLOS framework applies to some UMVs. The Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO has issued interim guidelines on the trial of ‘maritime autonomous surface ships’ 90 as part of the development of a Regulatory Scoping Exercise to figure out how to address the operation of UMVs in IMO instruments.91 In a survey of states completed by Comité Maritime International that addressed the navigational rights of un-crewed vessels no concerns were expressed about treating uncrewed devices as ‘vessels’ or ‘ships’ under the law of the sea.92\nThere is also some state practice, mainly relating to the United States.93 The 2017 US Navy’s Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations refers to ‘unmanned vessels’ and says that these devices have ‘sovereign immunity’ as ships engaging in government non-commercial service.94 Further, it says the United States ‘recognizes reciprocal full sovereign immunity privileges for the equivalent vessels of other States.’95 This appears to be in line with the approach taken to un-crewed aerial vehicles which are treated by US doctrine as military aircraft, despite not having personnel on board.96 Examining the customary law implications of US Naval Doctrine, Allen did not find any objections from other states to this assertion and noted that it appears the US maritime services have acted consistently with that position without protest for many years.97\nOther military manuals are more ambiguous. The German Manual of Armed Conflict states that UMVs ‘can enjoy the sovereign immunity of government ships (including warships) provided they cannot be classified as such themselves.’98 While it is unclear, it could be read as meaning that UMVs can share the status of another government ship (presumably one they are deployed from) in the event a UMV cannot be classified as a government ship in their own right. The Danish Military Manual refers to ‘unmanned underwater and surface vessels’ when discussing what sort of devices can be used to maintain and enforce a naval blockade,99 also perhaps suggesting they can be ships. The New Zealand manual addresses the status, rights and obligations of unmanned aerial systems (accepting they can be military aircraft)100 but does not address similar systems operating on the ocean.\nGiven the above, it seems safe to conclude that the term ‘ship’ is broad enough to refer to some UMVs. 101 In fact, it would be strange if the state parties to UNCLOS only intended the treaty to apply to maritime devices already in existence; if they did, you would expect to see some effort to define ship more narrowly. 102 Instead, by declining to define this term (or ‘vessel’), the drafting of the treaty combined with its constitutional nature are evidence that an evolutionary approach is appropriate, allowing us to incorporate UMVs into the UNCLOS framework.103 However, article 94(4) of UNCLOS might be an impediment to this conclusion.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "There is no uniform legal definition of ‘ship’ in UNCLOS\nor in customary international law\nmaking it difficult to determine whether UMVs will fall into this category\nparticularly as one of the assumptions\nabout\nships\nis\nthey will have people on board\nIf this assumption means\nhaving a crew\nis a critical component of being a ship, UMVs will not satisfy the definition and will be more difficult to fit into the UNCLOS regime\nThe scholarly debate about this question is testament to this uncertainty\nambiguity increases the risk that the categorisation of a device could differ between states and result in conflict.\nship is not defined in UNCLOS\nUNCLOS does recognise that there may be other objects using the ocean by establishing rules for devices\nbut does not provide a clear way of distinguishing them from ships\nWe are left with the word ‘ship’\nand\ntreaty interpretation\nInterpreting\nship\nto encompass\nUMVs is\nevolutionary interpretation\nThe ICJ\nadopted an evolutionary understanding of treaty terms in Namibia\nAegean Se\nGabčíkovo–Nagymaros\nand Pulp Mills\nall on the basis of the intention of the parties\nThere are strong indications\nparties to UNCLOS intended that its terms be interpreted in this way\nThe preamble\nreveal\na ‘desire to settle\nissues relating to the law of the sea\nThe broad scope of UNCLOS also suggests that the very significant threshold question of what amounts to a ship should be read widely. UNCLOS has been described as a ‘constitution for the ocean\nThese features suggest an expansive and evolving definition of the word ‘ship’ should be preferred as this approach would be most likely to fulfil this vision\nship’ is also conducive to a broad interpretation. It is a generic word and can refer to a wide range of devices\nglance at the history of maritime technology shows\ndrafters must have been aware that technological change would occur in shipbuilding\nand would have intended that UNCLOS\naccommodate these changes\nAny definition of ship in UNCLOS would have to encompass the range of possible vessels\nmilitaries are no exception, and have a wide variety of ships\nMost scholars\nconsidered the status of UMVs accept that at least some will be ships\nKraska\nemphasising\nimportance of the freedom of the seas\nargues\nwe should take a flexible approach that is inclusive of UMVs\nThere are indications\nthe international community accepts\nthe UNCLOS framework applies to\nUMVs\nThe Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO\nissued interim guidelines on\nautonomous\nships\nIn a survey of states completed by Comité Maritime International that addressed\nnavigational rights of un-crewed vessels no concerns were expressed about treating uncrewed devices as\nships’\nThere is also\nstate practice\nrelating to the U\nS\nThe 2017 US Navy’s Commander’s Handbook\nrefers to ‘unmanned vessels\nand says\nthese devices have ‘sovereign immunity’\nit says the U\nS\nrecognizes reciprocal full sovereign immunity privileges for the equivalent vessels of other States\nThis appears to be in line with the approach taken to un-crewed aerial vehicles which are treated by US doctrine as military aircraft\ndespite not having personnel on board\nExamining the customary law implications of US Naval Doctrine\nAllen did not find any objections from other states to this assertion and noted that it appears the US maritime services have acted consistently with that position without protest for many years\nit seems safe to conclude\nthe term ‘ship’ is broad enough to refer to\nUMVs\nit would be strange if the state parties to UNCLOS only intended the treaty to apply to maritime devices already in existence\nif they did, you would expect to see some effort to define ship more narrowly\nby declining to define this term\nthe drafting of the treaty combined with its constitutional nature are evidence that an evolutionary approach is appropriate", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The international community will accept a broader interpretation of “ship” to include unmanned systems.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "There is no uniform legal definition of ‘ship’ in UNCLOS\nor in customary international law\nmaking it difficult to determine whether UMVs will fall into this category\nparticularly as one of the assumptions\nabout\nships\nis\nthey will have people on board\nIf this assumption means\nhaving a crew\nis a critical component of being a ship, UMVs will not satisfy the definition and will be more difficult to fit into the UNCLOS regime\nThe scholarly debate about this question is testament to this uncertainty\nambiguity increases the risk that the categorisation of a device could differ between states and result in conflict.\nship is not defined in UNCLOS\nUNCLOS does recognise that there may be other objects using the ocean by establishing rules for devices\nbut does not provide a clear way of distinguishing them from ships\nWe are left with the word ‘ship’\nand\ntreaty interpretation\nInterpreting\nship\nto encompass\nUMVs is\nevolutionary interpretation\nThe ICJ\nadopted an evolutionary understanding of treaty terms in Namibia\nAegean Se\nGabčíkovo–Nagymaros\nand Pulp Mills\nall on the basis of the intention of the parties\nThere are strong indications\nparties to UNCLOS intended that its terms be interpreted in this way\nThe preamble\nreveal\na ‘desire to settle\nissues relating to the law of the sea\nThe broad scope of UNCLOS also suggests that the very significant threshold question of what amounts to a ship should be read widely. UNCLOS has been described as a ‘constitution for the ocean\nThese features suggest an expansive and evolving definition of the word ‘ship’ should be preferred as this approach would be most likely to fulfil this vision\nship’ is also conducive to a broad interpretation. It is a generic word and can refer to a wide range of devices\nglance at the history of maritime technology shows\ndrafters must have been aware that technological change would occur in shipbuilding\nand would have intended that UNCLOS\naccommodate these changes\nAny definition of ship in UNCLOS would have to encompass the range of possible vessels\nmilitaries are no exception, and have a wide variety of ships\nMost scholars\nconsidered the status of UMVs accept that at least some will be ships\nKraska\nemphasising\nimportance of the freedom of the seas\nargues\nwe should take a flexible approach that is inclusive of UMVs\nThere are indications\nthe international community accepts\nthe UNCLOS framework applies to\nUMVs\nThe Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO\nissued interim guidelines on\nautonomous\nships\nIn a survey of states completed by Comité Maritime International that addressed\nnavigational rights of un-crewed vessels no concerns were expressed about treating uncrewed devices as\nships’\nThere is also\nstate practice\nrelating to the U\nS\nThe 2017 US Navy’s Commander’s Handbook\nrefers to ‘unmanned vessels\nand says\nthese devices have ‘sovereign immunity’\nit says the U\nS\nrecognizes reciprocal full sovereign immunity privileges for the equivalent vessels of other States\nThis appears to be in line with the approach taken to un-crewed aerial vehicles which are treated by US doctrine as military aircraft\ndespite not having personnel on board\nExamining the customary law implications of US Naval Doctrine\nAllen did not find any objections from other states to this assertion and noted that it appears the US maritime services have acted consistently with that position without protest for many years\nit seems safe to conclude\nthe term ‘ship’ is broad enough to refer to\nUMVs\nit would be strange if the state parties to UNCLOS only intended the treaty to apply to maritime devices already in existence\nif they did, you would expect to see some effort to define ship more narrowly\nby declining to define this term\nthe drafting of the treaty combined with its constitutional nature are evidence that an evolutionary approach is appropriate", "role": "user" }, { "content": "no uniform legal definition\ncustomary international law\nUMVs\nfall into this category\nassumptions\npeople\ncrew\nUMVs\nnot satisfy\nUNCLOS regime\nscholarly debate\nuncertainty\nambiguity\ndiffer between states\nconflict\nUNCLOS\nUNCLOS\nother objects\ndoes not\nship’\ntreaty interpretation\nship\nUMVs\nevolutionary interpretation\nICJ\nintention\nstrong indications\nintended\npreamble\nlaw of the sea\nbroad scope\nthreshold question\nread widely\nconstitution\nexpansive\nevolving\npreferred\nfulfil this vision\nship’\ngeneric word\nhistory\ntechnological change\nUNCLOS\nAny definition\nencompass\nmilitaries\nMost scholars\nKraska\nfreedom of the seas\nflexible approach\nUMVs\nindications\ninternational community\nUNCLOS framework\nUMVs\nIMO\ninterim guidelines\nsurvey of states\nnavigational rights\nno concerns\nships’\nstate practice\nU\nS\nunmanned vessels\nsovereign immunity’\nU\nS\nsovereign immunity\nequivalent vessels\nin line\nun-crewed aerial vehicles\nmilitary aircraft\ncustomary law implications\ndid not find\nUS maritime services\nconsistently\nmany years\nsafe to conclude\nship’\nUMVs\nstate parties\nUNCLOS\nalready in existence\nsome effort\nmore narrowly\ncombined\nevolutionary approach", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The international community will accept a broader interpretation of “ship” to include unmanned systems.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "There is no uniform legal definition of ‘ship’ in UNCLOS\nor in customary international law\nmaking it difficult to determine whether UMVs will fall into this category\nparticularly as one of the assumptions\nabout\nships\nis\nthey will have people on board\nIf this assumption means\nhaving a crew\nis a critical component of being a ship, UMVs will not satisfy the definition and will be more difficult to fit into the UNCLOS regime\nThe scholarly debate about this question is testament to this uncertainty\nambiguity increases the risk that the categorisation of a device could differ between states and result in conflict.\nship is not defined in UNCLOS\nUNCLOS does recognise that there may be other objects using the ocean by establishing rules for devices\nbut does not provide a clear way of distinguishing them from ships\nWe are left with the word ‘ship’\nand\ntreaty interpretation\nInterpreting\nship\nto encompass\nUMVs is\nevolutionary interpretation\nThe ICJ\nadopted an evolutionary understanding of treaty terms in Namibia\nAegean Se\nGabčíkovo–Nagymaros\nand Pulp Mills\nall on the basis of the intention of the parties\nThere are strong indications\nparties to UNCLOS intended that its terms be interpreted in this way\nThe preamble\nreveal\na ‘desire to settle\nissues relating to the law of the sea\nThe broad scope of UNCLOS also suggests that the very significant threshold question of what amounts to a ship should be read widely. UNCLOS has been described as a ‘constitution for the ocean\nThese features suggest an expansive and evolving definition of the word ‘ship’ should be preferred as this approach would be most likely to fulfil this vision\nship’ is also conducive to a broad interpretation. It is a generic word and can refer to a wide range of devices\nglance at the history of maritime technology shows\ndrafters must have been aware that technological change would occur in shipbuilding\nand would have intended that UNCLOS\naccommodate these changes\nAny definition of ship in UNCLOS would have to encompass the range of possible vessels\nmilitaries are no exception, and have a wide variety of ships\nMost scholars\nconsidered the status of UMVs accept that at least some will be ships\nKraska\nemphasising\nimportance of the freedom of the seas\nargues\nwe should take a flexible approach that is inclusive of UMVs\nThere are indications\nthe international community accepts\nthe UNCLOS framework applies to\nUMVs\nThe Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO\nissued interim guidelines on\nautonomous\nships\nIn a survey of states completed by Comité Maritime International that addressed\nnavigational rights of un-crewed vessels no concerns were expressed about treating uncrewed devices as\nships’\nThere is also\nstate practice\nrelating to the U\nS\nThe 2017 US Navy’s Commander’s Handbook\nrefers to ‘unmanned vessels\nand says\nthese devices have ‘sovereign immunity’\nit says the U\nS\nrecognizes reciprocal full sovereign immunity privileges for the equivalent vessels of other States\nThis appears to be in line with the approach taken to un-crewed aerial vehicles which are treated by US doctrine as military aircraft\ndespite not having personnel on board\nExamining the customary law implications of US Naval Doctrine\nAllen did not find any objections from other states to this assertion and noted that it appears the US maritime services have acted consistently with that position without protest for many years\nit seems safe to conclude\nthe term ‘ship’ is broad enough to refer to\nUMVs\nit would be strange if the state parties to UNCLOS only intended the treaty to apply to maritime devices already in existence\nif they did, you would expect to see some effort to define ship more narrowly\nby declining to define this term\nthe drafting of the treaty combined with its constitutional nature are evidence that an evolutionary approach is appropriate", "role": "user" }, { "content": "There is no\ndefinition of ‘ship’\nmaking it difficult to determine\nUMVs\none\nassumption\nis\nthey\nhave people\nUMVs will not satisfy the definition\ndebate about this\nis testament to\nuncertainty\nambiguity increases\nrisk\ncategorisation\ncould differ\nand result in conflict\nUNCLOS\ndoes not\ndistinguish\nships\nInterpreting\nship\nto encompass\nUMVs is\nevolutionary\nbroad scope of UNCLOS\nsuggests\nthe\nquestion of what amounts to\nship should be read widely\nhistory\nwould\nintend\nUNCLOS\naccommodate\nchanges\nThere are indications\nthe international community accepts\nthe\nframework applies to\nUMVs\nIMO\nissued\nguidelines\nIn a survey\nno concerns were expressed\nit would be strange if\nparties to UNCLOS\nintended the treaty to apply to\ndevices already in existence", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Uncertainty about the status of unmanned vessels undermines navigational safety and encourages adversarial exploitation. Certain US signals that UMS are ships ensure compliance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS).", "role": "system" }, { "content": "On December 15, 2016, China seized a United States Navy unmanned maritime system (UMS) in the South China Sea. 1 The UMS, known as an \"ocean glider,\" was used by the Navy to gather oceanographic data in the region. 2 Chinese naval personnel seized the UMS within sight of Navy research vessel, USNS Bowditch, and despite protests by the United States, the Chinese did not return the UMS for several days. 3 A little over a year later, Houthi rebels reportedly seized another United States Navy UMS off the coast of Yemen, although circumstances behind this second incident remain unclear. 4 These high profile incidents highlight important questions about the rights and obligations of unmanned systems vis-à-vis the international maritime agreements, notably the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 5 and the various International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions, including the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW convention), the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), and the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS). 6 Because these agreements pre-date UMSs, at least in the modern sense of the term, 7 the extent that these and other maritime agreements govern UMSs is unclear. This paper focuses primarily on challenges that UMSs present under the COLREGS, the technical rules on maritime navigation, from a perspective recommended for the United States military.\nIn order to enhance safety of navigation, to limit the ability of adversaries to exploit uncertainty against United States UMS operations, and to a lesser extent, to incentivize the development of UMS technology, this paper asserts that the United States should work towards definitive recognition that most UMSs are subject to the COLREGS, in conjunction with the regulatory scoping effort underway at the IMO. 8 To this end, this paper seeks to frame the major issues anticipated for United States Navy and Department of Defense (DoD), other United States government entities, and international decision-makers working to address this problem. Following the introduction in Part I, Part II provides an overview of the characteristics and missions for DoD UMSs, their status as vessels or non-vessels under current law and regulations, and a description of the efforts by the IMO and other maritime organizations to address these issues. Part III addresses the challenges of COLREGS compliance for UMSs, including rule-based and technological challenges; COLREGS special categories that may provide leeway for UMSs to operate under the Rules, including restricted-in-ability-to-maneuver status; and best practices and amendments to the COLREGS for UMSs proposed by various maritime organizations. Part IV examines COLREGS uncertainty for UMSs in admiralty law, including the possibility that applying the Rules to unmanned systems will incentivize technological development. Part V evaluates alternatives to COLREGS application, including considering UMSs as a novel category subject to a separate set of navigation rules, 9 treating UMSs as components of a launching platform, 10 classifying military UMSs that qualify as warships, 11 and retaining the status quo in which the UMS regulatory environment remains uncertain. Finally, Part VI discusses the likely phases towards definitive COLREGS governance and provides recommendations for the IMO's regulatory scoping exercise. The paper concludes that a strong United States position for COLREGS governance over most UMSs will persuade other states, maritime organizations, and the IMO to act on this increasingly relevant issue. 12\nIn general, the COLREGS, also known as the \"Rules of the Road,\" consist of two sets of rules: (1) the Inland Rules that govern in United States inland waters such as lakes and rivers and (2) the International Rules that govern in all water surfaces beyond the inland waters, including on the high seas and in connected navigable waters. 13 This paper focuses on the International Rules, although the International and Inland rules match each other in most important respects. Rule 1(a) of the COLREGS (International Rules) states, \"These Rules shall apply to all vessels upon the high seas and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.\" 14 While the COLREGS govern the conduct of vessels (a term that is interchangeable with ships), 15 the Rules do not directly regulate non-vessels, such as buoys or fixed objects like piers. Similarly, aside from minor provisions on the lighting of unmanned barges, the COLREGS do not address \"unmanned\" ships, systems, craft, or other objects, including autonomous or semi-autonomous craft, as vessels or nonvessels. 16 It is therefore an open question whether the COLREGS apply to UMSs, creating an uncertain regulatory environment for unmanned systems and manned vessels that encounter them.\nThe December 2016 Chinese seizure of the United States Navy UMS raises a host of legal issues, but as it relates to the COLREGS, the incident highlights uncertainty for UMSs in the following way: if the UMS seized by China was considered a vessel for COLREGS purposes, the COLREGS would govern the conduct of both the Chinese vessel and the UMS vessel in this incident, as the Rules impose definite obligations on how vessels interact with one another. For example, COLREGS Rules 13, 14, and 15 that prescribe actions for vessels to take when overtaking one another, in crossing situations, and in head-on situations, apply to the \"[c]onduct of vessels in Sight of One Another,\" 17 which presumably was the case in this incident. If the UMS was a vessel for COLREGS purposes, then the Chinese vessel certainly violated the COLREGS when it failed to take action to avoid the UMS. 18 If the UMS was not a vessel, it is unclear which navigational rules, if any, govern the interaction, although by intentionally seizing the UMS, the Chinese vessel violated several international norms in any case, including its obligation to exercise due regard. 19\nThe UMS seizure by China in the South China Sea was a high profile intentional incident that has not been repeated, with the possible exception of the incident off the coast of Yemen, mentioned in Part I above. 20 Nonetheless, uncertainty about COLREGS application to UMSs is much more likely to result in lower profile maritime accidents, as UMSs become more numerous and manned vessels encounter them more frequently. For example, the uncertain application of the COLREGS to UMSs could result in the following mishaps: (1) a manned vessel closes on a UMS but hesitates to act in time to prevent a collision because its crew is uncertain whether to treat the UMS as a vessel for COLREGS purposes; (2) a manned vessel closes on a UMS that looks like another manned vessel, and absent any markings to indicate it is unmanned, the manned vessel unsuccessfully tries to get the attention of the UMS using bridge-to-bridge radio before colliding, and (3) a remote UMS operator assumes that a UMS is not obligated to follow the COLREGS, therefore fails to give way to a manned vessel when it would be required to under the Rules, resulting in a collision in which a crew member is killed, potentially exposing the UMS operator to significant liability.\nFortunately, the problem of UMS-COLREGS uncertainty demonstrated by these and similar situations has not gone unnoticed. Several governmental entities, non-governmental maritime organizations, and trade groups including the IMO, the United States Coast Guard, Maritime U.K., the Comité Maritime International (CMI), among others are studying these issues and developing recommendations to address the problem. 21 The recent work by CMI is particularly helpful. CMI's International Working Group (IWG) produced an informational paper on UMSs and solicited input from its national maritime law association (MLA) members via questionnaire on application of the maritime regulatory framework to UMSs, including ship and vessel status, ship registration rules, and considerations in UNCLOS, SOLAS, the STCW convention, and the COLREGS. 22 To date, twenty-two national MLAs, including MLAs from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, have submitted responses to CMI's questionnaire, providing insight on these issues from diverse national legal perspectives that will aid the IMO. 23 However, with unmanned systems increasing in number and capability, as well as the likelihood of full-sized commercial UMSs within a few years, 24 dangers to navigation safety caused by regulatory uncertainty will become more pervasive until definitive guidance is provided. 25\nIn addition to the perspectives of governmental and non-governmental maritime organizations and industry groups, a military perspective is also vital to any comprehensive effort to address the UMS-COLREGS issue. The military has distinct concerns related to the application of the COLREGS to UMSs that go beyond the interests of groups like private industry that are primarily concerned with navigation safety. First, according to available information, UMSs owned or operated by the military, particularly the United States military, 26 are more developed and operate in greater numbers than other UMSs, so they are exposed to proportionally greater risks from regulatory uncertainty based on numbers and autonomous development alone. 27 Second, military UMSs have certain operational requirements that may be uniquely impacted by future regulatory action or amendments to the COLREGS, especially those that would unduly constrain freedom of operation. 28 Therefore the military should be involved in shaping regulatory policy in a way that increases navigational certainty, while preserving its operational flexibility to the maximum extent possible. 29 Third, military UMSs face additional considerations in the UNCLOS context, recognized in relevant part by the United States (a non-party) as customary international law, such as recent challenges to UMS activities like military marine data collection. 30 While not directly related to the issue of COLREGS uncertainty, UNCLOS considerations are informative to the UMS-COLREGS discussion, as the COLREGS and UNCLOS both govern maritime navigation, with UNCLOS applying on a jurisdictional level and the COLREGS on a vessel-specific level. 31 As an important caveat, although they are related, the COLREGS and UNCLOS are distinct agreements with different purposes and effects, so the recommendation to recognize most UMSs as COLREGS vessels does not necessarily mean that interested states should take a similar position on UMSs in the UNCLOS (and customary international law of the sea) context. 32\nFinally, the recommendation in this paper for the United States to work towards definitive recognition of UMSs as COLREGS vessels is subject to two additional clarifications. First, the recommendation is limited to those UMSs that reasonably meet the definition of a COLREGS vessel. As discussed in Part II, Section B, infra, not every UMS meets or should meet the vessel definition, although this paper recommends an inclusive interpretation to strengthen regulatory certainty for as many UMSs as possible and to incentivize the development of COLREGS-compliant devices. 33 Second, while this paper primarily concerns UMSs operated by the military, the COLREGS should govern all UMSs that meet the definition of a vessel including those operated by the military, those in other governmental service, and privately-owned UMSs. UMSs that are privately-owned or that otherwise engage in commercial service face certain regulatory considerations that do not necessarily apply to UMSs in non-commercial service. 34 Nonetheless, there is no overriding policy rationale for treating military and non-military UMSs vessel status differently under the COLREGS, and navigation safety would be furthered by maximum recognition of UMSs as vessels, to the extent supported by law. Subject to caveats discussed in Part III, infra; this paper will demonstrate that most UMSs can and should operate as vessels under the COLREGS, while additional regulatory guidance and amendments to better account for UMSs should be pursued. 35", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China seized a\nUMS\nin the South China Sea\nHouthi rebels\nseized another\nUMS off the coast of Yemen\nThese\nincidents highlight\nquestions about\nrights and obligations of unmanned systems vis-à-vis the international maritime agreements\nnotably\nUNCLOS\nand\nCOLREGS\nBecause these agreements pre-date UMSs\nthe extent\nthese\nagreements govern UMSs is unclear\nto enhance safety of navigation\nto limit the ability of adversaries to exploit uncertainty against U\nS\nUMS operations\nthe U\nS\nshould work towards definitive recognition that most UMSs are subject to the COLREGS\na strong U\nS\nposition for COLREGS governance over\nUMSs will persuade other states\nto act on this\nissue\nCOLREGS\nconsist of\nInland Rules that govern\ninland waters such as lakes and rivers and\nInternational Rules that govern\nall water surfaces beyond the inland waters, including\nthe high seas and\nnavigable waters\nWhile the COLREGS govern the conduct of vessels\nthe Rules do not directly regulate non-vessels\nthe COLREGS do not address \"unmanned\" ships\nIt is\nan open question whether\nCOLREGS apply to UMSs\ncreating an uncertain regulatory environment for unmanned systems\nvessels that encounter them\nChinese seizure of the\nUMS\nhighlights uncertainty for UMSs in the following way: if the UMS seized by China was considered a vessel for COLREGS purposes, the COLREGS would govern the conduct of both the Chinese vessel and the UMS vessel\nthe Rules impose definite obligations on how vessels interact with one another\nIf the UMS was a vessel for COLREGS purposes, then the Chinese vessel certainly violated\nCOLREGS when it failed to take action to avoid the UMS\nIf the UMS was not a vessel, it is unclear which navigational rules\ngovern the interaction\nuncertainty about COLREGS application to UMSs is\nlikely to result in\nmaritime accidents, as UMSs become more numerous and\nvessels encounter them more frequently\nthe uncertain application of the COLREGS to UMSs could result in\ncollision\nwith unmanned systems increasing in number and capability\ndangers to navigation safety caused by regulatory uncertainty will become\npervasive until definitive guidance is provided\nThe military has distinct concerns related to the application of the COLREGS to UMSs\nUMSs\noperated by the military\nare more developed and operate in greater numbers than other UMSs\nthey are exposed to proportionally greater risks from regulatory uncertainty based on numbers and autonomous development alone\nmilitary UMSs have certain operational requirements that may be uniquely impacted by future regulatory action\nto the COLREGS\nespecially those that\nconstrain freedom of operation\nthe military should be involved in shaping regulatory policy in a way that increases navigational certainty\nwhile preserving\noperational flexibility\nmilitary UMSs face additional considerations in the UNCLOS context, recognized in relevant part by the U\nS\nas customary international law\nsuch as recent challenges to UMS activities like military marine data collection\nthe recommendation is limited to those UMSs that reasonably meet the definition of a COLREGS vessel\nnot every UMS meets\nthe vessel definition, although this paper recommends an inclusive interpretation to strengthen regulatory certainty for as many UMSs as possible and to incentivize the development of COLREGS-compliant devices\nCOLREGS should govern all UMSs that meet the definition of a vessel including those operated by the military\nthose in other governmental service, and privately-owned UMSs", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Uncertainty about the status of unmanned vessels undermines navigational safety and encourages adversarial exploitation. Certain US signals that UMS are ships ensure compliance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS).", "role": "system" }, { "content": "China seized a\nUMS\nin the South China Sea\nHouthi rebels\nseized another\nUMS off the coast of Yemen\nThese\nincidents highlight\nquestions about\nrights and obligations of unmanned systems vis-à-vis the international maritime agreements\nnotably\nUNCLOS\nand\nCOLREGS\nBecause these agreements pre-date UMSs\nthe extent\nthese\nagreements govern UMSs is unclear\nto enhance safety of navigation\nto limit the ability of adversaries to exploit uncertainty against U\nS\nUMS operations\nthe U\nS\nshould work towards definitive recognition that most UMSs are subject to the COLREGS\na strong U\nS\nposition for COLREGS governance over\nUMSs will persuade other states\nto act on this\nissue\nCOLREGS\nconsist of\nInland Rules that govern\ninland waters such as lakes and rivers and\nInternational Rules that govern\nall water surfaces beyond the inland waters, including\nthe high seas and\nnavigable waters\nWhile the COLREGS govern the conduct of vessels\nthe Rules do not directly regulate non-vessels\nthe COLREGS do not address \"unmanned\" ships\nIt is\nan open question whether\nCOLREGS apply to UMSs\ncreating an uncertain regulatory environment for unmanned systems\nvessels that encounter them\nChinese seizure of the\nUMS\nhighlights uncertainty for UMSs in the following way: if the UMS seized by China was considered a vessel for COLREGS purposes, the COLREGS would govern the conduct of both the Chinese vessel and the UMS vessel\nthe Rules impose definite obligations on how vessels interact with one another\nIf the UMS was a vessel for COLREGS purposes, then the Chinese vessel certainly violated\nCOLREGS when it failed to take action to avoid the UMS\nIf the UMS was not a vessel, it is unclear which navigational rules\ngovern the interaction\nuncertainty about COLREGS application to UMSs is\nlikely to result in\nmaritime accidents, as UMSs become more numerous and\nvessels encounter them more frequently\nthe uncertain application of the COLREGS to UMSs could result in\ncollision\nwith unmanned systems increasing in number and capability\ndangers to navigation safety caused by regulatory uncertainty will become\npervasive until definitive guidance is provided\nThe military has distinct concerns related to the application of the COLREGS to UMSs\nUMSs\noperated by the military\nare more developed and operate in greater numbers than other UMSs\nthey are exposed to proportionally greater risks from regulatory uncertainty based on numbers and autonomous development alone\nmilitary UMSs have certain operational requirements that may be uniquely impacted by future regulatory action\nto the COLREGS\nespecially those that\nconstrain freedom of operation\nthe military should be involved in shaping regulatory policy in a way that increases navigational certainty\nwhile preserving\noperational flexibility\nmilitary UMSs face additional considerations in the UNCLOS context, recognized in relevant part by the U\nS\nas customary international law\nsuch as recent challenges to UMS activities like military marine data collection\nthe recommendation is limited to those UMSs that reasonably meet the definition of a COLREGS vessel\nnot every UMS meets\nthe vessel definition, although this paper recommends an inclusive interpretation to strengthen regulatory certainty for as many UMSs as possible and to incentivize the development of COLREGS-compliant devices\nCOLREGS should govern all UMSs that meet the definition of a vessel including those operated by the military\nthose in other governmental service, and privately-owned UMSs", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China\nUMS\nHouthi rebels\nUMS\nrights and obligations\ninternational maritime agreements\nUNCLOS\nCOLREGS\npre-date UMSs\nUMSs\nunclear\nsafety of navigation\nadversaries\nexploit uncertainty\nU\nS\nU\nS\ndefinitive recognition\nCOLREGS\nstrong\nCOLREGS governance\nUMSs\nother states\nCOLREGS\ninland waters\nall water surfaces\nhigh seas\nvessels\nnon-vessels\nunmanned\" ships\nopen question\nUMSs\nuncertain regulatory environment\nunmanned systems\nChinese seizure\nUMS\nuncertainty\nvessel\ngovern\ndefinite obligations\nvessel\ncertainly violated\navoid the UMS\nunclear\nnavigational rules\nuncertainty\nUMSs\nmaritime accidents\nnumerous\nmore frequently\nuncertain application\ncollision\nunmanned systems\nnavigation safety\nregulatory uncertainty\npervasive\ndefinitive guidance\nmilitary\nUMSs\nmore developed\ngreater numbers\nproportionally greater risks\nregulatory uncertainty\nmilitary UMSs\noperational requirements\nuniquely impacted\nfreedom of operation\nregulatory policy\nnavigational certainty\noperational flexibility\nadditional considerations\nU\nS\ncustomary international law\nUMSs\nCOLREGS vessel\nevery UMS\ninclusive interpretation\nregulatory certainty\nCOLREGS-compliant\nall UMSs\nmilitary", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Uncertainty about the status of unmanned vessels undermines navigational safety and encourages adversarial exploitation. Certain US signals that UMS are ships ensure compliance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS).\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "China seized a\nUMS\nin the South China Sea\nHouthi rebels\nseized another\nUMS off the coast of Yemen\nThese\nincidents highlight\nquestions about\nrights and obligations of unmanned systems vis-à-vis the international maritime agreements\nnotably\nUNCLOS\nand\nCOLREGS\nBecause these agreements pre-date UMSs\nthe extent\nthese\nagreements govern UMSs is unclear\nto enhance safety of navigation\nto limit the ability of adversaries to exploit uncertainty against U\nS\nUMS operations\nthe U\nS\nshould work towards definitive recognition that most UMSs are subject to the COLREGS\na strong U\nS\nposition for COLREGS governance over\nUMSs will persuade other states\nto act on this\nissue\nCOLREGS\nconsist of\nInland Rules that govern\ninland waters such as lakes and rivers and\nInternational Rules that govern\nall water surfaces beyond the inland waters, including\nthe high seas and\nnavigable waters\nWhile the COLREGS govern the conduct of vessels\nthe Rules do not directly regulate non-vessels\nthe COLREGS do not address \"unmanned\" ships\nIt is\nan open question whether\nCOLREGS apply to UMSs\ncreating an uncertain regulatory environment for unmanned systems\nvessels that encounter them\nChinese seizure of the\nUMS\nhighlights uncertainty for UMSs in the following way: if the UMS seized by China was considered a vessel for COLREGS purposes, the COLREGS would govern the conduct of both the Chinese vessel and the UMS vessel\nthe Rules impose definite obligations on how vessels interact with one another\nIf the UMS was a vessel for COLREGS purposes, then the Chinese vessel certainly violated\nCOLREGS when it failed to take action to avoid the UMS\nIf the UMS was not a vessel, it is unclear which navigational rules\ngovern the interaction\nuncertainty about COLREGS application to UMSs is\nlikely to result in\nmaritime accidents, as UMSs become more numerous and\nvessels encounter them more frequently\nthe uncertain application of the COLREGS to UMSs could result in\ncollision\nwith unmanned systems increasing in number and capability\ndangers to navigation safety caused by regulatory uncertainty will become\npervasive until definitive guidance is provided\nThe military has distinct concerns related to the application of the COLREGS to UMSs\nUMSs\noperated by the military\nare more developed and operate in greater numbers than other UMSs\nthey are exposed to proportionally greater risks from regulatory uncertainty based on numbers and autonomous development alone\nmilitary UMSs have certain operational requirements that may be uniquely impacted by future regulatory action\nto the COLREGS\nespecially those that\nconstrain freedom of operation\nthe military should be involved in shaping regulatory policy in a way that increases navigational certainty\nwhile preserving\noperational flexibility\nmilitary UMSs face additional considerations in the UNCLOS context, recognized in relevant part by the U\nS\nas customary international law\nsuch as recent challenges to UMS activities like military marine data collection\nthe recommendation is limited to those UMSs that reasonably meet the definition of a COLREGS vessel\nnot every UMS meets\nthe vessel definition, although this paper recommends an inclusive interpretation to strengthen regulatory certainty for as many UMSs as possible and to incentivize the development of COLREGS-compliant devices\nCOLREGS should govern all UMSs that meet the definition of a vessel including those operated by the military\nthose in other governmental service, and privately-owned UMSs", "role": "user" }, { "content": "incidents highlight\nquestions about\nrights\nof unmanned systems vis-à-vis\nmaritime agreements\nthe extent\nthese\nagreements govern UMSs is unclear\nto enhance safety\nlimit\nadversaries to exploit uncertainty against U\nS\nthe U\nS\nshould work towards\nrecognition\nUMSs are subject to\nCOLREGS\na strong U\nS\nposition\nwill persuade other states\nto act\nCOLREGS\ngovern\nthe high seas\nCOLREGS do not address \"unmanned\" ships\ncreating an uncertain\nenvironment\nChinese seizure\nhighlights uncertainty\nif the UMS\nwas\na vessel\nCOLREGS would govern\nconduct\nIf the UMS was a vessel\nthen the Chinese\nviolated\nCOLREGS\nIf the UMS was not\nit is unclear\nrules\ngovern\ninteraction\nuncertainty\nis\nlikely to result in\nmaritime accidents, as UMSs become\nnumerous\nuncertain application\ncould result in\ncollision\ndangers to\nsafety caused by\nuncertainty will become\npervasive\nUMSs\nby the military\nare exposed to\ngreater risks from\nuncertainty based on\ndevelopment\nnot every UMS meets\nthe vessel definition\nthis paper recommends a\ninclusive interpretation to strengthen\ncertainty\nand\nincentivize\nCOLREGS-compliant devices", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Failing to align interpretations of unmanned vessels as “ships” cause conflict. US practice encourages adoption of UMS as ships under customary international law.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Armed forces around the world are rapidly developing un-crewed maritime vehicles (UMVs) for use in military operations. Key to the strategic value of UMVs is that they will have no people on board, and instead be remotely controlled or, in the future, will be able to carry out some or all of their mission autonomously. But will they fit into the existing categories of the law of the sea? This paper will consider whether two of the basic classifications of this body of law – being categorised as a ‘ship’ or ‘vessel’ and being a ‘warship’ under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea2 (UNCLOS) – require people to be on board the vehicle and thus exclude UMVs.\nThe category of ‘ship’/’vessel’ is critical for the distribution of rights and obligations in UNCLOS, the most important treaty in the law of the sea and recognised as being broadly reflective of customary international law. 3 Many of the provisions of UNCLOS, including the navigational rights, only apply to either ships or vessels. As these terms are used interchangeably in the treaty and refer to the same concept,4 this paper will use the word ‘ship’ to refer to both. Failing to qualify as a ship would significantly limit the strategic value of UMVs, restricting their navigational rights under UNCLOS and possibly preventing states claiming sovereign immunity. Moreover, finding that UMVs did not amount to a ‘ship’ under UNCLOS would be strong evidence that the same would be true in any residual category of ‘ship’ in customary international law. After setting out some background information about the military use of UMVs, it will be shown that the better interpretation of ship in UNCLOS is capacious enough to include both remotely controlled and autonomous UMVs. This does not mean that all UMVs will necessarily be ships; it would depend on whether they were classified as a ship by a State through registration, a decision that would be made according to national law and the planned use of the device.\nIf UMVs do qualify as a ship, a secondary question is whether they can be categorised as a ‘warship’ and consequently have access to the belligerent rights. UNCLOS specifically defines warship in article 29, setting requirements that could be difficult for a UMV to meet. The provision explicitly states that a warship must have a crew under regular armed forces discipline and be commanded by a military officer. However, the history of the definition of warship demonstrates that the object and purpose of the provision supports a more flexible interpretation, particularly in light of the regulatory challenge the definition was seeking to solve.\nThese definitional challenges serve as an example of when an evolutionary interpretation of international treaty law should be preferred. The analysis shows that taking an expansive approach and including UMVs in the category of ship in UNCLOS is consistent with the principles of treaty interpretation and the principles of the law of the sea. However, inclusion in the definition of warship is more of a stretch.\nThe focus on the category of ship and warship in UNCLOS is necessary given that outside this treaty there is insufficient state practice and opinio juris to provide a basis for recognising rights of UMVs in customary international law. The limited (public) use by state armed forces of UMVs in contested areas means that their rights and obligations have not been clarified through the response of other states to their use.5 Even if we limit the analysis to the provisions of UNCLOS, there is no settled view amongst states and international lawyers about where these devices can go and what they can do when they are there. While some states would be in favour of including UMVs in these categories, others may prefer to limit the navigational rights and belligerent rights UMVs hold.6 This creates a real risk for conflict where states have different views about the categorisation of a UMV. This has already happened, most prominently after the Chinese capture of an American UMV in the South China Sea in December 2016. 7\nInstead of waiting for the formation of new customary international law (or treaty) outside of the UNCLOS regime to clarify the situation recognising UMVs can fit within existing regulation is the best way to ensure their safe and predictable operation in the ocean. The increased use of these devices and the ambiguous legal situation make it more important for states to be public with their interpretations of UNCLOS. The best way to reduce the risk of future conflict, or at least understand when it is likely to occur, is for states to follow the lead of the US and make their view of the legal position clear.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Armed forces around the world are rapidly developing\nUMVs) for use in military operations\nUMVs\nwill have no people on board\nThe category of ‘ship’\nis critical for\nrights and obligations in UNCLOS\nrecognised as being broadly reflective of customary international law\nnavigational rights, only apply to\nships\nFailing to qualify as a ship would significantly limit the strategic value of UMVs, restricting their navigational rights under UNCLOS and possibly preventing states claiming sovereign immunity\nfinding that UMVs did not amount to a ‘ship’ under UNCLOS would be strong evidence\nthe same would be true in any residual category of ‘ship’ in customary international law\nthe better interpretation of ship in UNCLOS is capacious enough to include\nremotely controlled and autonomous UMVs\nThis does not mean that all UMVs will necessarily be ships; it would depend on whether they were classified as a ship by a State through\nnational law\nThese definitional challenges serve as an example of when an evolutionary interpretation of international treaty law should be preferred\ntaking an expansive approach and including UMVs in the category of ship in UNCLOS is consistent with\ntreaty interpretation and\nlaw of the sea\nThe focus on the category of ship and warship in UNCLOS is necessary given\noutside this treaty there is insufficient state practice and opinio juris to provide a basis for recognising rights of UMVs in customary international law\nThe limited\nuse by state armed forces of UMVs\ncontested areas means that their rights and obligations have not been clarified through the response of other states to their use\nthere is no settled view amongst states\nabout where these devices can go and what they can do when they are there\nThis creates a real risk for conflict where states have different views about the categorisation of a UMV\nThis has already happened\nafter the Chinese capture of an American UMV in the South China Sea\nInstead of waiting for\nformation of new\ntreaty\noutside of the UNCLOS regime to clarify the situation recognising UMVs can fit within existing regulation is the best way to ensure their safe and predictable operation in the ocean\nThe increased use of these devices and the ambiguous legal situation make it\nimportant for states to be public with their interpretations of UNCLOS\nThe best way to reduce\nrisk of future conflict\nis for states to follow the lead of the US", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Failing to align interpretations of unmanned vessels as “ships” cause conflict. US practice encourages adoption of UMS as ships under customary international law.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Armed forces around the world are rapidly developing\nUMVs) for use in military operations\nUMVs\nwill have no people on board\nThe category of ‘ship’\nis critical for\nrights and obligations in UNCLOS\nrecognised as being broadly reflective of customary international law\nnavigational rights, only apply to\nships\nFailing to qualify as a ship would significantly limit the strategic value of UMVs, restricting their navigational rights under UNCLOS and possibly preventing states claiming sovereign immunity\nfinding that UMVs did not amount to a ‘ship’ under UNCLOS would be strong evidence\nthe same would be true in any residual category of ‘ship’ in customary international law\nthe better interpretation of ship in UNCLOS is capacious enough to include\nremotely controlled and autonomous UMVs\nThis does not mean that all UMVs will necessarily be ships; it would depend on whether they were classified as a ship by a State through\nnational law\nThese definitional challenges serve as an example of when an evolutionary interpretation of international treaty law should be preferred\ntaking an expansive approach and including UMVs in the category of ship in UNCLOS is consistent with\ntreaty interpretation and\nlaw of the sea\nThe focus on the category of ship and warship in UNCLOS is necessary given\noutside this treaty there is insufficient state practice and opinio juris to provide a basis for recognising rights of UMVs in customary international law\nThe limited\nuse by state armed forces of UMVs\ncontested areas means that their rights and obligations have not been clarified through the response of other states to their use\nthere is no settled view amongst states\nabout where these devices can go and what they can do when they are there\nThis creates a real risk for conflict where states have different views about the categorisation of a UMV\nThis has already happened\nafter the Chinese capture of an American UMV in the South China Sea\nInstead of waiting for\nformation of new\ntreaty\noutside of the UNCLOS regime to clarify the situation recognising UMVs can fit within existing regulation is the best way to ensure their safe and predictable operation in the ocean\nThe increased use of these devices and the ambiguous legal situation make it\nimportant for states to be public with their interpretations of UNCLOS\nThe best way to reduce\nrisk of future conflict\nis for states to follow the lead of the US", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Armed forces\nUMVs\nmilitary operations\nUMVs\nship’\nrights\nobligations\nUNCLOS\ncustomary international law\nnavigational rights\nship\nsignificantly limit\nstrategic value\nnavigational rights\npossibly preventing states\nsovereign immunity\nstrong evidence\ncustomary international law\nbetter interpretation\nremotely controlled\nautonomous UMVs\ndoes not mean\nState\nnational law\ndefinitional challenges\nevolutionary interpretation\nUMVs\nship\ntreaty interpretation\nlaw of the sea\ncategory\nship\ninsufficient state practice\nopinio juris\nrecognising rights\ncustomary international law\nUMVs\nnot been clarified\nother states\nno settled view\nreal risk\nconflict\nUMV\nChinese capture\nSouth China Sea\nnew\ntreaty\nwithin existing regulation\nsafe\npredictable\nambiguous legal situation\nimportant\npublic\nUNCLOS\nreduce\nfuture conflict\nfollow the lead", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Failing to align interpretations of unmanned vessels as “ships” cause conflict. US practice encourages adoption of UMS as ships under customary international law.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Armed forces around the world are rapidly developing\nUMVs) for use in military operations\nUMVs\nwill have no people on board\nThe category of ‘ship’\nis critical for\nrights and obligations in UNCLOS\nrecognised as being broadly reflective of customary international law\nnavigational rights, only apply to\nships\nFailing to qualify as a ship would significantly limit the strategic value of UMVs, restricting their navigational rights under UNCLOS and possibly preventing states claiming sovereign immunity\nfinding that UMVs did not amount to a ‘ship’ under UNCLOS would be strong evidence\nthe same would be true in any residual category of ‘ship’ in customary international law\nthe better interpretation of ship in UNCLOS is capacious enough to include\nremotely controlled and autonomous UMVs\nThis does not mean that all UMVs will necessarily be ships; it would depend on whether they were classified as a ship by a State through\nnational law\nThese definitional challenges serve as an example of when an evolutionary interpretation of international treaty law should be preferred\ntaking an expansive approach and including UMVs in the category of ship in UNCLOS is consistent with\ntreaty interpretation and\nlaw of the sea\nThe focus on the category of ship and warship in UNCLOS is necessary given\noutside this treaty there is insufficient state practice and opinio juris to provide a basis for recognising rights of UMVs in customary international law\nThe limited\nuse by state armed forces of UMVs\ncontested areas means that their rights and obligations have not been clarified through the response of other states to their use\nthere is no settled view amongst states\nabout where these devices can go and what they can do when they are there\nThis creates a real risk for conflict where states have different views about the categorisation of a UMV\nThis has already happened\nafter the Chinese capture of an American UMV in the South China Sea\nInstead of waiting for\nformation of new\ntreaty\noutside of the UNCLOS regime to clarify the situation recognising UMVs can fit within existing regulation is the best way to ensure their safe and predictable operation in the ocean\nThe increased use of these devices and the ambiguous legal situation make it\nimportant for states to be public with their interpretations of UNCLOS\nThe best way to reduce\nrisk of future conflict\nis for states to follow the lead of the US", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Armed forces\nare\ndeveloping\nUMVs\ncategory of ‘ship’\nis critical for\nrights\nin UNCLOS\nreflective of c\ni\nl\nFailing to qualify as a ship would\nlimit\nvalue\nUMVs, restricting\nnavigational rights\nand\npreventing\nsovereign immunity\nbetter interpretation\ninclude\nUMVs\nincluding UMVs in\nship\nis consistent with\ninterpretation\nfocus on\nship\nis necessary given\nthere is insufficient state practice\nfor recognising rights\nin customary international law\nrights\nhave not been clarified through\nresponse of other states\nThis creates\nrisk for conflict where states have different views\nThis\nhappened\nafter\nChinese capture\nin the S\nC\nS\nclarify\nUMVs can fit within existing regulation is\nbest\nto ensure\npredictable operation\nincreased use\nmake it\nimportant for states to be public with\ninterpretations of UNCLOS\nbest way to reduce\nrisk of\nconflict\nis\nto follow\nthe US", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Clarifying UMSs can be ships incentivizes safe development that avoids collisions.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "On one level, definitive application of the COLREGS over most UMSs as vessels would provide greater clarity to how courts would analyze a mishap involving a UMS. For example, assume a manned vessel and a UMS collide. In a normal scenario, involving two manned vessels, the admiralty presumptions related to COLREGS compliance would apply to both vessels. As vessels, both the manned vessel and the UMS vessel would be subject to the COLREGS, and the vessel at fault would be found liable under normal negligence principles. However, given uncertainty about COLREGS' application to a UMS, it is possible that a court would find the UMS to be a vessel for COLREGS' purposes. As a vessel, courts may place a high burden on the UMS for any procedural non-compliance with the COLREGS that could result in its operator being found liable. 155 It is equally possible for a court to find that a UMS is not a vessel, and therefore not subject to the COLREGS, removing any burden against the UMS and resulting in the opposite conclusion.\nAs demonstrated by this scenario, COLREGS violations are important to the issue of causation and apportionment of liability in admiralty law. 156 The Pennsylvania Rule is the controlling precedent on this issue in the United States. 157 This rule derived from The Pennsylvania case in which the Supreme Court found two vessels colliding in dense fog to be equally at fault when each violated a statutory rule, one for exceeding safe speed and the other for using a bell instead of a foghorn as required. 158 Under the Pennsylvania Rule, a vessel that is involved in an accident and is found to be in violation of a safety statute or regulation (e.g. a COLREGS Rule) is presumed to be at fault unless it meets the high burden to prove that the violation could not have caused the accident. 159 For example, a vessel that alters course to port in a meeting situation instead of altering to starboard as required by the COLREGS Rule 14, 160 and then collides with another vessel, would have the burden to show that its non-compliance with the Rule did not and could not have caused the collision. 161 Uncertainty about whether the COLREGS govern UMSs confuses this presumption for UMS mishaps, resulting in uncertainty about liability for UMS operators, including the United States military.\nA clearer regulatory environment in which the COLREGS definitively apply to a broad range of UMSs would not only remove this uncertainty but could also incentivize technological development. If a broad range of UMSs, including lower technology devices that meet vessel requirements discussed in Part II, Section B, 162 are recognized as vessels subject to the COLREGS, owners and operators of less-than-fully-compliant UMSs would face a more certain risk of liability under the Pennsylvania Rule for any mishap involving a UMS if the UMS violates one or more of the COLREGS. 163 This risk of liability would impact the least COLREGS-compliant, lowest technology, UMSs the most 164 and would therefore incentivize development of better, more compliant technology. In the long-term, these incentives may result in advances to unmanned technology benefitting private industry and the military alike.\nTo date, few UMSs' collisions with other vessels have resulted in lawsuits, perhaps, because UMSs have not yet become prevalent in the maritime environment. 165 With the anticipated increase in UMSs in future years, however, this will undoubtedly change. Accordingly, definitive action by the IMO on COLREGS application to UMSs will help lessen uncertainty about liability for UMSs, while potentially spurring technological development. In the meantime, operating UMSs in a cautious manner, perhaps in close-proximity to launching platforms and outside busy shipping lanes, taking advantage of mitigation measures such as RAM status, 166 and following best practices (when available) that are appropriate for DoD UMSs, would help to mitigate these risks.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "definitive application of\nCOLREGS\nwould provide greater clarity to\nanalyze a mishap involving a UMS\nUncertainty about whether the COLREGS govern UMSs confuses this presumption for UMS mishaps, resulting in uncertainty about liability for UMS operators\nA clearer regulatory environment in which the COLREGS definitively apply to a broad range of UMSs would\nremove this uncertainty but could also incentivize technological development\nIf a broad range of UMSs\nare recognized as vessels subject to the COLREGS, owners and operators of less-than-fully-compliant UMSs would face\ncertain risk of liability\nfor any mishap involving a UMS if the UMS violates\nCOLREGS\nThis risk of liability would impact the least COLREGS-compliant, lowest technology, UMSs the most\nand would therefore incentivize development of better\ntechnology\nthese incentives may result in advances to unmanned technology benefitting private industry and the military\nfew UMSs' collisions with other vessels\nresulted in lawsuits\nbecause UMSs have not yet become prevalent in the maritime environment\nWith the anticipated increase in UMSs in future years\nthis will\nchange\ndefinitive action\non COLREGS application to UMSs will help lessen uncertainty about liability for UMSs, while\nspurring technological development", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Clarifying UMSs can be ships incentivizes safe development that avoids collisions.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "definitive application of\nCOLREGS\nwould provide greater clarity to\nanalyze a mishap involving a UMS\nUncertainty about whether the COLREGS govern UMSs confuses this presumption for UMS mishaps, resulting in uncertainty about liability for UMS operators\nA clearer regulatory environment in which the COLREGS definitively apply to a broad range of UMSs would\nremove this uncertainty but could also incentivize technological development\nIf a broad range of UMSs\nare recognized as vessels subject to the COLREGS, owners and operators of less-than-fully-compliant UMSs would face\ncertain risk of liability\nfor any mishap involving a UMS if the UMS violates\nCOLREGS\nThis risk of liability would impact the least COLREGS-compliant, lowest technology, UMSs the most\nand would therefore incentivize development of better\ntechnology\nthese incentives may result in advances to unmanned technology benefitting private industry and the military\nfew UMSs' collisions with other vessels\nresulted in lawsuits\nbecause UMSs have not yet become prevalent in the maritime environment\nWith the anticipated increase in UMSs in future years\nthis will\nchange\ndefinitive action\non COLREGS application to UMSs will help lessen uncertainty about liability for UMSs, while\nspurring technological development", "role": "user" }, { "content": "definitive application\nCOLREGS\ngreater clarity\nmishap\nUncertainty\nconfuses this presumption\nUMS mishaps\nuncertainty\nliability\nclearer regulatory environment\nCOLREGS\nremove this uncertainty\ntechnological development\nUMSs\nvessels\nCOLREGS\ncertain risk of liability\nviolates\nrisk of liability\nbetter\ntechnology\nincentives\nunmanned technology\nfew UMSs' collisions\nlawsuits\nnot yet\nmaritime environment\nanticipated increase\nchange\ndefinitive action\nlessen uncertainty\nspurring", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Clarifying UMSs can be ships incentivizes safe development that avoids collisions.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "definitive application of\nCOLREGS\nwould provide greater clarity to\nanalyze a mishap involving a UMS\nUncertainty about whether the COLREGS govern UMSs confuses this presumption for UMS mishaps, resulting in uncertainty about liability for UMS operators\nA clearer regulatory environment in which the COLREGS definitively apply to a broad range of UMSs would\nremove this uncertainty but could also incentivize technological development\nIf a broad range of UMSs\nare recognized as vessels subject to the COLREGS, owners and operators of less-than-fully-compliant UMSs would face\ncertain risk of liability\nfor any mishap involving a UMS if the UMS violates\nCOLREGS\nThis risk of liability would impact the least COLREGS-compliant, lowest technology, UMSs the most\nand would therefore incentivize development of better\ntechnology\nthese incentives may result in advances to unmanned technology benefitting private industry and the military\nfew UMSs' collisions with other vessels\nresulted in lawsuits\nbecause UMSs have not yet become prevalent in the maritime environment\nWith the anticipated increase in UMSs in future years\nthis will\nchange\ndefinitive action\non COLREGS application to UMSs will help lessen uncertainty about liability for UMSs, while\nspurring technological development", "role": "user" }, { "content": "application of\nCOLREGS\nwould provide\nclarity to\nanalyze a mishap\nUncertainty about whether\nCOLREGS govern UMSs confuses\nUMS mishaps, resulting in uncertainty about liability\nA clearer regulatory environment in which\nCOLREGS\napply\nwould\nremove\nuncertainty but\nincentivize\ndevelopment\nIf\nUMSs\nare\nvessels subject to\nCOLREGS\noperators\nwould face\ncertain risk of liability\nThis risk\nwould\nincentivize development of better\ntechnology\nfew\ncollisions\nresulted in lawsuits\nbecause UMSs have not\nbecome prevalent\nWith\nincrease in UMSs\nthis will\nchange\ndefinitive action", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Liability issues are delegated ex-ante to classification of a ship. Satisfying human duties is a requirement for ships to access rights.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Even if the generic concept of ship includes UMVs, article 94(4) of UNCLOS might be a basis for arguing an on-board master and crew is necessary. This provision sits within article 94, which sets out the duties of flag states to ‘effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters.’104 Article 94(3) provides that every flag state must take measures ‘necessary to ensure safety at sea’, including in relation to the ‘manning of ships’ and the ‘training of crews’. The requirements in subparagraph (4) further articulate the requirements of subparagraph (3) and are examples of measures deemed necessary to ensure safety at sea. Most importantly for our purposes, in the event that the device is recognised as a ship, subparagraph 94(4)(b) requires that the flag state ensures that it is ‘in the charge of a master and officers who possess appropriate qualifications, in particular seamanship, navigation, communications and marine engineering, and that the crew is appropriate in qualification and numbers for the type, size, machinery and equipment of the ship’. 105 Finally, article 94(5) provides that in establishing these measures, the flag state is required to ‘conform to generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices and to take any steps which might be necessary to secure their observance.’ In doing so, UNCLOS does not establish precise obligations for flag states but refers to an ‘abstract, and continuously changing, set of international rules’ thus allowing for technological change to be incorporated into the UNCLOS regime.106\nSeveral scholars have suggested that article 94 is a significant impediment to categorising UMVs as ships under UNCLOS, arguing that it requires flag states to ensure there is a commander and crew on board every ship. 107 While the most obvious rationale for this requirement is to ensure the navigational safety of the ship, the designation of someone as a master is also important for the system of maritime liability,108 and that it serves an ‘important security function’ as coastal States have someone on who to enforce criminal liability.109\nThere is no question that article 94 was drafted with conventional ships, operated by a master, officers and crew, in mind.110 However, the better view is that this provision does not define what can be a ship under UNCLOS, but rather obliges States to only register ships where they are satisfied that they will meet certain safety criteria. The question of whether the UMVs have access to the rights of ships under UNCLOS should be separated from the question of whether an specific device is able to comply with all of the safety requirements of UNCLOS set out in provisions like article 94.111 It is up to the flag state to ensure the UMV it was registering as a ship was compliant with UNCLOS obligations relating to safety, collision avoidance, and protection of the environment.112 If the flag state failed, it would be in breach of UNCLOS but it would not change the status of the device as a ‘ship’. 113 This might seem like a unnecessary distinction, but it is important as it constrains the remedies available to a state that discovered a flagged UMV in their territorial waters.\nBesides, it is not clear a flag state that registered a UMV as a ship would breach article 94. Article 94(4) is focused on the effective exercise of jurisdiction by the flag state and in ensuring the safety of ships. It should be enough to meet article 94 if the flag state is satisfied that the UMV has been designed and programmed to ensure ‘safety at sea’ and that there is a master and crew responsible for the safe navigation and communication of the device, regardless of whether they are physically on board the vessel and making every decision. This would be consistent with the system of regulation established by UNCLOS.\nThe most challenging requirement for a UMV will be satisfying the flag State that it is ‘in the charge of’ a master and crew. This requirement is not insurmountable as the phrase ‘in the charge of’ does not necessarily connote physical presence. This is most easily seen where the ship is remotely controlled: while the person controlling the ship might not be on board, they are clearly commanding the vessel and could be designated as the ship’s master.114 The situation is more difficult in moments when a UMV is operating autonomously. References to being in ‘command’ of a vessel could suggest contemporaneous influence. 115 While a person could be nominated as the master responsible for the vessel, and even if they could step in and remotely control the device at certain critical moments, it does seem distinct from the oversight an on-board master or a remote controller would have over the activities of the vessel when they were at the helm. 116 Nevertheless, as long as there was a person who was responsible, and the flag state was satisfied that person had the requisite knowledge and access to the device to operate it safely (in the context of its capabilities and its purpose) and who will be liable as master if there are any incidents, this should be enough to satisfy the requirement. Existing regulations do not require a master to be on the bridge navigating at all times even though they have responsibility for the entire time.117 Besides, some have questioned the credibility of these requirements given the number of ships operating under ‘less-than-strict flags of convenience’ who are still permitted access to the UNCLOS navigational regime. 118\nOther requirements of article 94 are much easier to satisfy. The coastal State may be satisfied that the ‘appropriate’ number of crew on board the vessel is zero. 119 Further, the operator of the device will be subject to the same rules as the operators and commanders of other military devices as long as there is a traceable path of control over and responsibility for its deployment, and recognition of the scope for error or mistake.120 This chain of reasoning is not unprecedented; it is effectively how US doctrine developed in relation to un-crewed aerial vehicles.121\nThe same is true of other provisions of UNCLOS that will, in effect, require UMVs to have certain capabilities to access certain rights. For example, to access innocent passage an underwater UMV would have to be able to surface and turn off some of its surveying and information collection. None of the conditions imposed on innocent passage, or the exercise of navigational rights, are dependent on people being on board the vessel, and may be fulfilled by other technological solutions. Part of the reason that this is possible is because person to person interaction is not a required part of navigation; what is important is where and how the device is travelling through the ocean.\nEvidently, some of the requirements of UNCLOS will be harder to comply if there are no people on board, such as ensuring the registration papers of the vessel are able to be inspected and enabling the UMV to communicate properly with other vessels. However, the purpose of these requirements could be presumably satisfied by ensuring the documents are available online in an appropriate electronic form122 and providing information on how to communicate with the ‘master’ responsible for the ship. Some rights are likely to be impossible for UMVs to access in the short term, such as a UMV boarding another vessel as part of an inspection. 123 Nevertheless, providing that there is a satisfactory technical solution if found (which is no small thing) the presence of personnel on the vessel is not necessarily critical for the safety of other ships. These technical solutions may require additional regulations to clarify how the requirements of UNCLOS will be met for UMVs,124 or at least require States to explain how they intend to satisfy them.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Even if the generic concept of ship includes UMVs\narticle 94(4\nmight be a basis for arguing an on-board master and crew is necessary\nscholars have suggested\narticle 94\na significant impediment to categorising UMVs as ships under UNCLOS\narticle 94 was drafted with conventional ships\nin mind\nHowever\nthis provision does not define what can be a ship under UNCLOS\nbut rather obliges States to only register ships where they are satisfied that they will meet certain safety criteria\nThe question of whether the UMVs have access to the rights of ships under UNCLOS should be separated from the question of whether an specific device is able to comply with all of the safety requirements of UNCLOS\nIt is up to the flag state to ensure the UMV it was registering as a ship was compliant with UNCLOS obligations relating to safety, collision avoidance\nand protection of the environment.\nIf the flag state failed, it would be in breach\nbut it would not change the status of the device as a ‘ship’\nArticle 94(4) is focused on the effective exercise of jurisdiction by the flag state and in ensuring the safety of ships\nIt should be enough to meet article 94 if the flag state is satisfied that the UMV has been designed and programmed to ensure ‘safety at sea’\nthat there is a master and crew responsible for\nsafe navigation\nregardless of whether they are physically on board the vessel\nsatisfying the flag State that it is ‘in the charge of’ a master and crew\nrequirement is not insurmountable as the phrase ‘in the charge of’ does not\nconnote physical presence\nThis is\nseen where the ship is remotely controlled\nThe situation is\ndifficult\nwhen\nautonomously\nNevertheless, as long as there was a person who was responsible, and the flag state was satisfied that person had the requisite knowledge and access to the device to operate it safely\nand who will be liable as master if there are any incidents, this should be enough to satisfy the requirement\nOther requirements\nare\neasier to satisfy\nThe coastal State may be satisfied that the ‘appropriate’ number of crew on board the vessel is zero\nthe operator of the device will be subject to the same rules as the operators\nas long as there is a traceable path of control over\nits deployment\nThis chain of reasoning is not unprecedented\nit is\nhow US doctrine developed in relation to un-crewed aerial vehicles\nThe same is true of other provisions of UNCLOS that will\nrequire UMVs to have certain capabilities to access\nrights\nto access innocent passage an underwater UMV would have to be able to surface and turn off\nits surveying and information collection\nNone of the conditions imposed on\nnavigational rights, are dependent on people being on board the vessel\nregistration papers\nrequirements could be\nsatisfied by ensuring the documents are\nonline\npresence of personnel on the vessel is not\ncritical for the safety of other ships", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Liability issues are delegated ex-ante to classification of a ship. Satisfying human duties is a requirement for ships to access rights.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Even if the generic concept of ship includes UMVs\narticle 94(4\nmight be a basis for arguing an on-board master and crew is necessary\nscholars have suggested\narticle 94\na significant impediment to categorising UMVs as ships under UNCLOS\narticle 94 was drafted with conventional ships\nin mind\nHowever\nthis provision does not define what can be a ship under UNCLOS\nbut rather obliges States to only register ships where they are satisfied that they will meet certain safety criteria\nThe question of whether the UMVs have access to the rights of ships under UNCLOS should be separated from the question of whether an specific device is able to comply with all of the safety requirements of UNCLOS\nIt is up to the flag state to ensure the UMV it was registering as a ship was compliant with UNCLOS obligations relating to safety, collision avoidance\nand protection of the environment.\nIf the flag state failed, it would be in breach\nbut it would not change the status of the device as a ‘ship’\nArticle 94(4) is focused on the effective exercise of jurisdiction by the flag state and in ensuring the safety of ships\nIt should be enough to meet article 94 if the flag state is satisfied that the UMV has been designed and programmed to ensure ‘safety at sea’\nthat there is a master and crew responsible for\nsafe navigation\nregardless of whether they are physically on board the vessel\nsatisfying the flag State that it is ‘in the charge of’ a master and crew\nrequirement is not insurmountable as the phrase ‘in the charge of’ does not\nconnote physical presence\nThis is\nseen where the ship is remotely controlled\nThe situation is\ndifficult\nwhen\nautonomously\nNevertheless, as long as there was a person who was responsible, and the flag state was satisfied that person had the requisite knowledge and access to the device to operate it safely\nand who will be liable as master if there are any incidents, this should be enough to satisfy the requirement\nOther requirements\nare\neasier to satisfy\nThe coastal State may be satisfied that the ‘appropriate’ number of crew on board the vessel is zero\nthe operator of the device will be subject to the same rules as the operators\nas long as there is a traceable path of control over\nits deployment\nThis chain of reasoning is not unprecedented\nit is\nhow US doctrine developed in relation to un-crewed aerial vehicles\nThe same is true of other provisions of UNCLOS that will\nrequire UMVs to have certain capabilities to access\nrights\nto access innocent passage an underwater UMV would have to be able to surface and turn off\nits surveying and information collection\nNone of the conditions imposed on\nnavigational rights, are dependent on people being on board the vessel\nregistration papers\nrequirements could be\nsatisfied by ensuring the documents are\nonline\npresence of personnel on the vessel is not\ncritical for the safety of other ships", "role": "user" }, { "content": "generic concept\narticle 94(4\non-board master\ncrew\narticle 94\nships\nconventional ships\nHowever\nwhat can be a ship\nobliges States\nregister ships\nquestion\nrights of ships\nseparated\ncomply\nUNCLOS\nflag state\nUMV\ncompliant\nsafety\ncollision avoidance\nprotection\nin breach\nchange the status\neffective exercise\nbe enough\narticle 94\nsatisfied\ndesigned\nprogrammed\n‘safety at sea’\nmaster\ncrew\nsafe navigation\nregardless\nphysically\ninsurmountable\ndoes not\nphysical presence\nremotely controlled\nautonomously\nNevertheless\nresponsible\nflag state\nsatisfied\nrequisite knowledge\naccess\nliable\nbe enough\neasier to satisfy\nappropriate’\nzero\nsame rules\ntraceable path\ndeployment\nnot unprecedented\nUS doctrine\naerial vehicles\nprovisions\nUNCLOS\nUMVs\nrights\ninnocent passage\nunderwater UMV\nsurface\nturn off\nnavigational rights\non board\nregistration papers\nnot\ncritical", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Liability issues are delegated ex-ante to classification of a ship. Satisfying human duties is a requirement for ships to access rights.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Even if the generic concept of ship includes UMVs\narticle 94(4\nmight be a basis for arguing an on-board master and crew is necessary\nscholars have suggested\narticle 94\na significant impediment to categorising UMVs as ships under UNCLOS\narticle 94 was drafted with conventional ships\nin mind\nHowever\nthis provision does not define what can be a ship under UNCLOS\nbut rather obliges States to only register ships where they are satisfied that they will meet certain safety criteria\nThe question of whether the UMVs have access to the rights of ships under UNCLOS should be separated from the question of whether an specific device is able to comply with all of the safety requirements of UNCLOS\nIt is up to the flag state to ensure the UMV it was registering as a ship was compliant with UNCLOS obligations relating to safety, collision avoidance\nand protection of the environment.\nIf the flag state failed, it would be in breach\nbut it would not change the status of the device as a ‘ship’\nArticle 94(4) is focused on the effective exercise of jurisdiction by the flag state and in ensuring the safety of ships\nIt should be enough to meet article 94 if the flag state is satisfied that the UMV has been designed and programmed to ensure ‘safety at sea’\nthat there is a master and crew responsible for\nsafe navigation\nregardless of whether they are physically on board the vessel\nsatisfying the flag State that it is ‘in the charge of’ a master and crew\nrequirement is not insurmountable as the phrase ‘in the charge of’ does not\nconnote physical presence\nThis is\nseen where the ship is remotely controlled\nThe situation is\ndifficult\nwhen\nautonomously\nNevertheless, as long as there was a person who was responsible, and the flag state was satisfied that person had the requisite knowledge and access to the device to operate it safely\nand who will be liable as master if there are any incidents, this should be enough to satisfy the requirement\nOther requirements\nare\neasier to satisfy\nThe coastal State may be satisfied that the ‘appropriate’ number of crew on board the vessel is zero\nthe operator of the device will be subject to the same rules as the operators\nas long as there is a traceable path of control over\nits deployment\nThis chain of reasoning is not unprecedented\nit is\nhow US doctrine developed in relation to un-crewed aerial vehicles\nThe same is true of other provisions of UNCLOS that will\nrequire UMVs to have certain capabilities to access\nrights\nto access innocent passage an underwater UMV would have to be able to surface and turn off\nits surveying and information collection\nNone of the conditions imposed on\nnavigational rights, are dependent on people being on board the vessel\nregistration papers\nrequirements could be\nsatisfied by ensuring the documents are\nonline\npresence of personnel on the vessel is not\ncritical for the safety of other ships", "role": "user" }, { "content": "article 94\nmight be\nbasis for\nan on-board\ncrew is necessary\nthis provision does not define what can be a ship\nbut\nobliges States to\nregister ships\nquestion of whether\nUMVs have\nrights\nshould be separated\nIt is up to the flag state to ensure the UMV\nwas compliant\nrelating to\ncollision avoidance\nIt should be enough to meet article 94 if the\nstate is satisfied\nthe UMV has been\nprogrammed to ensure ‘safety\nthat there is\nmaster and crew\nregardless of whether they are physically on board\nsatisfying the\nrequirement is not insurmountable\nseen where the ship is remotely controlled\nsituation is\ndifficult\nwhen\nautonomous\nNevertheless, as long as\na person\nwas responsible, and\nhad\nknowledge and access\nand who will be liable\nthis should be enough\nOther requirements\nare\neasier\nthe ‘appropriate’\ncrew\nis zero\noperator\nwill be subject to the same rules\nas long as there\na traceable path of control over\ndeployment\nsame is true of other provisions of UNCLOS that\nrequire UMVs\nto access\nrights\nto access innocent passage an underwater UMV would have to be able to surface\nregistration papers\ncould be\nsatisfied\nonline", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Flexible, tailored responses and joint strategic planning curtails moral hazard and solves escalation.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The evolution of terrorist tactics and strategies requires NATO to deploy a fluid mixture of instruments to form a tailor-made response. On the doctrinal level, the alliance adopted a military concept in 2002, policy guidelines in 2012, and an action plan in 2014. In 2017, NATO created a terrorism intelligence cell in the Joint Intelligence and Security Division in Brussels.4\nYet the alliance must go further. If the allies are to have a fighting chance of preventing the emergence of a new caliphate, they need to improve their situational awareness. The 2014 events in Iraq and Syria grew out of specific political, economic, and social circumstances. NATO must enhance its ability to read these early warning signs to avoid new surprises. The creation of a NATO Strategic Direction South Hub in the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy, will help. Given that the Islamic State’s military strength is diminishing, NATO faces the risk of reducing the priority it once gave to the fight against terrorism. This could be a mistake, and any change in the emphasis on counterterrorism should be based on strong intelligence assessments from the hub for the South and other relevant sources.\nNATO interacts with the security personnel of countries affected by terrorism more intensively outside those countries than within. This generates a gap between the reality on the ground and the perception of that reality in NATO’s headquarters. The alliance should realize that because of its intermittent presence on the ground, any potential intervention to combat terrorism in MENA would require extra time and coordination with local actors to acquire the necessary situational awareness.\nTo further increase its ability to fight terrorism, NATO must help its members enhance their military capabilities to conduct direct military actions against training camps or other infrastructure of terrorist groups. NATO planners must adapt new instruments of warfare—information, cyber, and hybrid—to the fight against terrorism. In the East, the alliance must combine its advanced presence with reinforced capabilities, while in the South, it must complement its permanent monitoring and surveillance of terrorist groups with the capability for collective direct action if necessary. That need could arise at some point if NATO members decide unanimously that populations in the South of the alliance are at risk.\nBecause NATO lacks the proper instruments to deal with drivers of instability, it must choose between developing its own nonmilitary instruments and cooperating with other international, regional, or subregional organizations in MENA and beyond.\nThe alliance also needs to learn the lessons of recent counterterrorism campaigns, in which the allies failed to bridge the gap between their low level of ambition and the high level of effort required to deliver stability. In Iraq, the U.S.-led military campaign to overthrow the regime of former president Saddam Hussein was marred by a lack of postconflict planning. In Afghanistan, NATO’s military planning included civil-military cooperation programs to provide aid and relief to the local population. But the gains of the alliance’s local reconstruction teams could not compensate for the failure of international bodies and external states to promote governance and development at the national level.\nNATO should avoid becoming involved in military actions without sound planning for the day after the intervention ends. That is an error the alliance made in Libya, where the mixed outcome of the NATO-led military operation affected allies’ regional reputation and ability to carry out cooperative security missions in the MENA region.\nAs for NATO’s future roles in Iraq, Syria, and the global coalition, alliance planners must consider allies’ differing strategic cultures and national interests. Divergences matter, and not all allies see their vital interests threatened in Syria. Even if the civil war in that country comes to an end, NATO’s military planners should continue to monitor the situation to minimize its impact on allied security and regional stability. In its postconflict role, NATO’s secretariat should keep up political dialogue with actors to help prevent new conflicts. The alliance should support international reconstruction missions and exchange intelligence on subjects such as the return of foreign terrorist fighters, arms trafficking, or maritime security in the Mediterranean.\nGiven the accelerated evolution and complexity of terrorist methods and the wide range of nonmilitary actors and factors involved, NATO should not aspire to play a leading role in the fight against terrorism. Instead, the alliance should adopt a supportive function. It should focus its counterterrorist efforts on enhancing strategic intelligence, improving situational awareness, and continuing to build local capabilities to cope with terrorist threats at the national or regional level.\nThe intelligence gathered and the analysis conducted by the hub for the South in Naples must be comprehensive and include structural sources of terrorism and early warning to give NATO and its members as much time as possible to respond. In the context of such a supportive role, NATO must reinforce its capacity for surveillance or intervention to prevent strategic surprises and deter potential threats on the alliance’s Southern flank.\nNATO should avoid placing the military in crisis management roles traditionally performed by civilians. Whatever the complexities of building and managing coalitions, the alliance should strive to harness partners’ capabilities, as it has been doing in the context of improving cooperation with the European Union. This will have the added benefit of reducing the high costs and risks of NATO-only or NATO-led operations. Even when no allies or partners can be found to join alliance crisis management operations, NATO should avoid the temptation to lead complex crisis management missions in the MENA region and look instead for ad hoc networks and responses.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The evolution of terrorist tactics and strategies requires NATO to deploy a fluid mixture of instruments to form a tailor-made response.\nthe alliance must go further\nallies\nneed to improve their situational awareness\nNATO must enhance its ability to read these early warning signs to avoid new surprises\nNATO faces the risk of reducing the priority it once gave to the fight against terrorism. This could be a mistake\nany change in the emphasis on counterterrorism should be based on strong intelligence assessments\nNATO must help its members enhance\nmilitary capabilities to conduct direct military actions\nNATO planners must adapt new instruments of warfare—information, cyber, and hybrid—to the fight against terrorism.\nThe alliance also needs to learn the lessons of recent counterterrorism campaigns, in which the allies failed to bridge the gap between their low\nambition and the high level of effort required to deliver stability\nIn Afghanistan, NATO’s military planning included civil-military cooperation programs to provide aid and relief to the local population. But the gains of the alliance’s local reconstruction teams could not compensate for the failure of international bodies\nto promote governance\nNATO should avoid becoming involved in military actions without sound planning for the day after the intervention ends\nNATO’s secretariat should keep up political dialogue with actors to help prevent new conflicts. The alliance should support international reconstruction missions and exchange intelligence on subjects such as the return of foreign terrorist fighters, arms trafficking, or maritime security in the Mediterranean\nNATO should not aspire to play a leading role in the fight against terrorism\nthe alliance should adopt a supportive function\nIt should focus its counterterrorist efforts on\nintelligence\nsituational awareness, and\nlocal capabilities\nthe alliance should strive to harness partners’ capabilities, as it has been doing in the context of improving cooperation with the European Union. This will have the added benefit of reducing the high costs and risks of NATO-only or NATO-led operations\nNATO should avoid the temptation to lead complex crisis management missions in the MENA region and look instead for ad hoc networks and responses.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Flexible, tailored responses and joint strategic planning curtails moral hazard and solves escalation.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The evolution of terrorist tactics and strategies requires NATO to deploy a fluid mixture of instruments to form a tailor-made response.\nthe alliance must go further\nallies\nneed to improve their situational awareness\nNATO must enhance its ability to read these early warning signs to avoid new surprises\nNATO faces the risk of reducing the priority it once gave to the fight against terrorism. This could be a mistake\nany change in the emphasis on counterterrorism should be based on strong intelligence assessments\nNATO must help its members enhance\nmilitary capabilities to conduct direct military actions\nNATO planners must adapt new instruments of warfare—information, cyber, and hybrid—to the fight against terrorism.\nThe alliance also needs to learn the lessons of recent counterterrorism campaigns, in which the allies failed to bridge the gap between their low\nambition and the high level of effort required to deliver stability\nIn Afghanistan, NATO’s military planning included civil-military cooperation programs to provide aid and relief to the local population. But the gains of the alliance’s local reconstruction teams could not compensate for the failure of international bodies\nto promote governance\nNATO should avoid becoming involved in military actions without sound planning for the day after the intervention ends\nNATO’s secretariat should keep up political dialogue with actors to help prevent new conflicts. The alliance should support international reconstruction missions and exchange intelligence on subjects such as the return of foreign terrorist fighters, arms trafficking, or maritime security in the Mediterranean\nNATO should not aspire to play a leading role in the fight against terrorism\nthe alliance should adopt a supportive function\nIt should focus its counterterrorist efforts on\nintelligence\nsituational awareness, and\nlocal capabilities\nthe alliance should strive to harness partners’ capabilities, as it has been doing in the context of improving cooperation with the European Union. This will have the added benefit of reducing the high costs and risks of NATO-only or NATO-led operations\nNATO should avoid the temptation to lead complex crisis management missions in the MENA region and look instead for ad hoc networks and responses.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "fluid mixture of instruments\ntailor-made response.\nsituational awareness\nearly warning signs\nreducing the priority\nmistake\ndirect military actions\nnew instruments of warfare\nlow\nambition\nhigh level of effort\nAfghanistan\nfailure of international bodies\nsound planning for the day after\nkeep up political dialogue\ninternational reconstruction missions\nplay a leading role\nsupportive function\nreducing the high costs\nrisks\navoid the temptation\ncomplex crisis management missions\nad hoc networks\nresponses", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Flexible, tailored responses and joint strategic planning curtails moral hazard and solves escalation.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The evolution of terrorist tactics and strategies requires NATO to deploy a fluid mixture of instruments to form a tailor-made response.\nthe alliance must go further\nallies\nneed to improve their situational awareness\nNATO must enhance its ability to read these early warning signs to avoid new surprises\nNATO faces the risk of reducing the priority it once gave to the fight against terrorism. This could be a mistake\nany change in the emphasis on counterterrorism should be based on strong intelligence assessments\nNATO must help its members enhance\nmilitary capabilities to conduct direct military actions\nNATO planners must adapt new instruments of warfare—information, cyber, and hybrid—to the fight against terrorism.\nThe alliance also needs to learn the lessons of recent counterterrorism campaigns, in which the allies failed to bridge the gap between their low\nambition and the high level of effort required to deliver stability\nIn Afghanistan, NATO’s military planning included civil-military cooperation programs to provide aid and relief to the local population. But the gains of the alliance’s local reconstruction teams could not compensate for the failure of international bodies\nto promote governance\nNATO should avoid becoming involved in military actions without sound planning for the day after the intervention ends\nNATO’s secretariat should keep up political dialogue with actors to help prevent new conflicts. The alliance should support international reconstruction missions and exchange intelligence on subjects such as the return of foreign terrorist fighters, arms trafficking, or maritime security in the Mediterranean\nNATO should not aspire to play a leading role in the fight against terrorism\nthe alliance should adopt a supportive function\nIt should focus its counterterrorist efforts on\nintelligence\nsituational awareness, and\nlocal capabilities\nthe alliance should strive to harness partners’ capabilities, as it has been doing in the context of improving cooperation with the European Union. This will have the added benefit of reducing the high costs and risks of NATO-only or NATO-led operations\nNATO should avoid the temptation to lead complex crisis management missions in the MENA region and look instead for ad hoc networks and responses.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The evolution of terrorist\nstrategies requires\na fluid mixture of instruments to form a tailor-made response\nallies\nneed\nsituational awareness\ncapabilities to conduct direct military actions\nplanners must adapt new instruments of warfare—information\nand hybrid—to\nterrorism\nNATO should avoid becoming involved\nwithout\nplanning for the day after\nNATO should not\nplay a leading role\nagainst terrorism\nthe alliance should adopt a supportive function\nNATO should avoid\ncomplex\nmissions in\nMENA\nand look instead for ad hoc\nresponses", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Unilateral defense pact restrictions undermine cohesion – only the counterplan preserves consensus and assurance.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law constitute the very foundation of the Alliance. Whenever internal disputes have arisen among NATO members – such as the Suez Crisis in 1956, the French withdrawal from the military command structure in 1966, the intermediate-range nuclear missile debate in the early 1980s and the Iraq War in 2003 – a unifying purpose based on shared values and strategic interests ensured that the member states eventually managed to overcome these disagreements and stand together when it mattered. Even with the accession of 18 new members, NATO has never needed to modify the original 14 articles of the North Atlantic Treaty. The treaty does not mention any specific threat or adversary; instead, it establishes the operating principles for a defensive alliance of democratic states defending one another, protecting liberal values and promoting a rules-based international order.\nNATO’s political decision-making relies on an inclusive process of security and defence consultations, continual engagement with all members and ultimately the attainment of consensus. It follows a democratic norm that gives the Alliance political legitimacy and military credibility. The consensus rule ensures that every member is a party to, and assumes responsibility for, every decision. A failure to reach consensus is therefore a collective failure as much as an expression of individual dissent.17 According to the US diplomat Rose Gottemoeller, former deputy secretary general of NATO:\nAs an alliance of democracies, unity does not mean uniformity. Governments change, and balancing different interests and priorities has never been easy. NATO membership has always come with obligations as well as benefits, and the tendency to prefer the latter to the former is true of countries as well as individuals. But the key is to work through differences and find a common way forward. NATO’s unique quality is that it has always managed to forge this common path.18\nFinding common ground when national interests challenge the collective good is in line with the North Atlantic Council’s working principles and procedures. Timely and substantial consultation among NATO ambassadors and senior military representatives, whether those of all members or a subset affected by a particular issue, is at the heart of the Alliance’s modus operandi. This institutional inclusiveness, combined with informal diplomacy, gives smaller states influence in formulating policies.\nAny member country can formally invoke Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty: ‘The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened’.19 As soon as it is invoked, the Allies discuss the issue, which can potentially lead to some form of joint decision or action on behalf of the Alliance. Whatever the scenario, fellow members sitting around the North Atlantic Council table are encouraged to react to a situation brought to their attention by a member country. Since the Alliance’s creation in 1949, Article 4 has been invoked six times – five times by Turkey and once by Poland. Most recently, on 28 February 2020, Turkey requested that NATO hold consultations on the latest developments in Syria.20\nAlliance cohesion derives from NATO’s raison d’être, captured in the ‘Three Musketeers’ principle’ of ‘all for one, one for all’. Thus, the primary task to ensure the Alliance’s future relevance is to maintain political unity based on the common values that underpin the commitment to Article 5. Ultimately, this is NATO’s core strength, but these values are under constant pressure from autocratic, populist and nationalist movements in several member states. Consequently, NATO must seek to ensure that its own members do not fall short of the treaty’s democratic standards. If a member drifts away from liberal democratic norms, as some have done, the rest must encourage a return to the central values while exhibiting strategic patience and offering constructive advice rather than undertake rash and possibly irreversible action. Maintaining Alliance cohesion, ‘for better or worse … in sickness and in health’, is NATO’s collective vow.21\nRevitalise US Leadership and Transatlantic Unity\nStrong US leadership remains crucial in almost all aspects of NATO decision-making. US commitment to the Alliance, including its military presence in Europe, is critical for credible collective deterrence and defence. NATO was and is designed for US leadership. In the words of Ambassadors Douglas Lute and Nicholas Burns, ‘with American leadership, anything is possible within the Alliance; absent American leadership, progress will be slow at best’.22 Although Alliance-wide consultation and consensus are all-important principles, the US must remain primus inter pares politically as well as militarily. Simply put, without the US there is no NATO.\nOver the decades, the US commitment to European security has been admirably strong, but it cannot be taken for granted, especially given the emergence of China as a global power and the resultant shift in US priorities. European members must convince and reassure US policymakers that no member is stronger without the Alliance, that NATO offers the best way of influencing developments in Europe and that there is no substitute for the transatlantic bond. The European states remain the US’s most consistent allies: they contribute more willingly than other countries to international military missions and give political legitimacy to operations that are overwhelmingly American in composition and scope. US access to European air and naval bases brings US forces a continent closer to the Middle East, Africa and parts of Asia. The US has bilateral as well as multinational agreements with most NATO members. Europe and the US are each other’s largest trading partners and each other’s largest sources of foreign direct investment.23 NATO’s military power protects and buttresses these political and economic ties. NATO is the best foreign policy investment the US has ever made; the US is substantially stronger as part of NATO than it would be on its own.24 In short, the transatlantic partnership continues to be the basis for the leading US position in global affairs.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Whenever internal disputes have arisen among NATO members\na unifying purpose based on shared values and strategic interests ensured that the member states\nmanaged to overcome these disagreements and stand together when it mattered. Even with\n18 new members, NATO has never needed to modify the original 14 articles of the North Atlantic Treaty. The treaty\nestablishes the operating principles for a defensive alliance\npromoting a rules-based international order\nNATO’s\ndecision-making relies on\nsecurity and defence consultations, continual engagement\nand\nattainment of consensus. It follows a democratic norm that gives the Alliance political legitimacy and military credibility. The consensus rule ensures that every member is a party to, and assumes responsibility for, every decision\nthe key is to work through differences and find a common way forward. NATO\nhas always managed to forge this common path\nTimely and substantial consultation among NATO ambassadors and senior military representatives\nis at the heart of the Alliance’s modus operandi. This institutional inclusiveness, combined with informal diplomacy, gives smaller states influence in formulating policies.\nAny member country can formally invoke Article 4\nAs soon as it is invoked, the Allies discuss the issue, which can\nlead to some\njoint decision or action on behalf of the Alliance\nfellow members sitting around the North Atlantic Council table are encouraged to react to a situation brought to their attention by a member country\nArticle 4 has been invoked six times – five times by Turkey and once by Poland\nAlliance cohesion derives from NATO’s\nall for one, one for all’\nthe primary task\nis to maintain political unity based on the common values that underpin the commitment to Article 5.\nthis is NATO’s core strength\nthese values are under constant pressure from autocratic, populist and nationalist movements\nNATO must seek to ensure that its own members do not fall short of the treaty’s\nstandards\nMaintaining Alliance cohesion, ‘for better or worse … in sickness and in health’, is NATO’s collective vow\nUS commitment to the Alliance, including its military presence in Europe, is critical for credible collective deterrence and defence.\nwithout the US there is no NATO.\nthe US commitment to European security has been admirably strong, but it cannot be taken for granted, especially given the emergence of China as a global power\nEuropean members must convince and reassure US policymakers that no member is stronger without the Alliance, that NATO offers the best way of influencing developments in Europe and that there is no substitute for the transatlantic bond\nEuropean states remain the US’s most consistent allies: they contribute more willingly than other countries to international\nmissions and give political legitimacy to operations that are overwhelmingly American in composition and scope\nthe transatlantic partnership continues to be the basis for the leading US position in global affairs.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Unilateral defense pact restrictions undermine cohesion – only the counterplan preserves consensus and assurance.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Whenever internal disputes have arisen among NATO members\na unifying purpose based on shared values and strategic interests ensured that the member states\nmanaged to overcome these disagreements and stand together when it mattered. Even with\n18 new members, NATO has never needed to modify the original 14 articles of the North Atlantic Treaty. The treaty\nestablishes the operating principles for a defensive alliance\npromoting a rules-based international order\nNATO’s\ndecision-making relies on\nsecurity and defence consultations, continual engagement\nand\nattainment of consensus. It follows a democratic norm that gives the Alliance political legitimacy and military credibility. The consensus rule ensures that every member is a party to, and assumes responsibility for, every decision\nthe key is to work through differences and find a common way forward. NATO\nhas always managed to forge this common path\nTimely and substantial consultation among NATO ambassadors and senior military representatives\nis at the heart of the Alliance’s modus operandi. This institutional inclusiveness, combined with informal diplomacy, gives smaller states influence in formulating policies.\nAny member country can formally invoke Article 4\nAs soon as it is invoked, the Allies discuss the issue, which can\nlead to some\njoint decision or action on behalf of the Alliance\nfellow members sitting around the North Atlantic Council table are encouraged to react to a situation brought to their attention by a member country\nArticle 4 has been invoked six times – five times by Turkey and once by Poland\nAlliance cohesion derives from NATO’s\nall for one, one for all’\nthe primary task\nis to maintain political unity based on the common values that underpin the commitment to Article 5.\nthis is NATO’s core strength\nthese values are under constant pressure from autocratic, populist and nationalist movements\nNATO must seek to ensure that its own members do not fall short of the treaty’s\nstandards\nMaintaining Alliance cohesion, ‘for better or worse … in sickness and in health’, is NATO’s collective vow\nUS commitment to the Alliance, including its military presence in Europe, is critical for credible collective deterrence and defence.\nwithout the US there is no NATO.\nthe US commitment to European security has been admirably strong, but it cannot be taken for granted, especially given the emergence of China as a global power\nEuropean members must convince and reassure US policymakers that no member is stronger without the Alliance, that NATO offers the best way of influencing developments in Europe and that there is no substitute for the transatlantic bond\nEuropean states remain the US’s most consistent allies: they contribute more willingly than other countries to international\nmissions and give political legitimacy to operations that are overwhelmingly American in composition and scope\nthe transatlantic partnership continues to be the basis for the leading US position in global affairs.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "internal disputes\nshared values\nstrategic interests\novercome these disagreements\noperating principles\nrules-based international order\nattainment of consensus\ndemocratic norm\nlegitimacy\nmilitary credibility\nwork through differences\ncommon way forward\nforge this common path\nTimely\nsubstantial consultation\nmodus operandi\ninformal diplomacy\nformally invoke Article 4\ndiscuss the issue\njoint decision\ninvoked six times\nall for one\none for all’\ncommitment to Article 5\nconstant pressure\ndo not fall short\nMaintaining Alliance cohesion\nUS commitmen\nthere is no NATO.\ncannot be taken for granted\nno member is stronger\nmost consistent allies\npolitical legitimacy\nleading US position", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Unilateral defense pact restrictions undermine cohesion – only the counterplan preserves consensus and assurance.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Whenever internal disputes have arisen among NATO members\na unifying purpose based on shared values and strategic interests ensured that the member states\nmanaged to overcome these disagreements and stand together when it mattered. Even with\n18 new members, NATO has never needed to modify the original 14 articles of the North Atlantic Treaty. The treaty\nestablishes the operating principles for a defensive alliance\npromoting a rules-based international order\nNATO’s\ndecision-making relies on\nsecurity and defence consultations, continual engagement\nand\nattainment of consensus. It follows a democratic norm that gives the Alliance political legitimacy and military credibility. The consensus rule ensures that every member is a party to, and assumes responsibility for, every decision\nthe key is to work through differences and find a common way forward. NATO\nhas always managed to forge this common path\nTimely and substantial consultation among NATO ambassadors and senior military representatives\nis at the heart of the Alliance’s modus operandi. This institutional inclusiveness, combined with informal diplomacy, gives smaller states influence in formulating policies.\nAny member country can formally invoke Article 4\nAs soon as it is invoked, the Allies discuss the issue, which can\nlead to some\njoint decision or action on behalf of the Alliance\nfellow members sitting around the North Atlantic Council table are encouraged to react to a situation brought to their attention by a member country\nArticle 4 has been invoked six times – five times by Turkey and once by Poland\nAlliance cohesion derives from NATO’s\nall for one, one for all’\nthe primary task\nis to maintain political unity based on the common values that underpin the commitment to Article 5.\nthis is NATO’s core strength\nthese values are under constant pressure from autocratic, populist and nationalist movements\nNATO must seek to ensure that its own members do not fall short of the treaty’s\nstandards\nMaintaining Alliance cohesion, ‘for better or worse … in sickness and in health’, is NATO’s collective vow\nUS commitment to the Alliance, including its military presence in Europe, is critical for credible collective deterrence and defence.\nwithout the US there is no NATO.\nthe US commitment to European security has been admirably strong, but it cannot be taken for granted, especially given the emergence of China as a global power\nEuropean members must convince and reassure US policymakers that no member is stronger without the Alliance, that NATO offers the best way of influencing developments in Europe and that there is no substitute for the transatlantic bond\nEuropean states remain the US’s most consistent allies: they contribute more willingly than other countries to international\nmissions and give political legitimacy to operations that are overwhelmingly American in composition and scope\nthe transatlantic partnership continues to be the basis for the leading US position in global affairs.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Whenever internal disputes have arisen\nNATO\nmanaged to overcome\ndisagreements\nThe treaty\nestablishes the operating principles for\nattainment of consensus\nthe key is to work through differences\nsubstantial consultation\nis at the heart of the Alliance’s modus operandi\nAny\ncountry can\ninvoke Article 4\ncohesion derives from\nall for one, one for all’\nthe primary task\nis to maintain\nunity based on\nthe commitment to Article 5\nthe US commitment\ncannot be taken for granted\nEuropean states remain the US’s most consistent allies", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The plan bypasses institutional mechanisms and fractures the alliance.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The findings of this research suggest that there is a strong positive association between the institutionalization of CT within NATO and the intra-alliance CTC in general. More precisely, the findings suggest that there exists a positive relationship between the main IV (the institutionalization of CT within the domains of CD + IS + MOps) and the six of the related DVs the defense expenditures of the key Allies, counterterrorism-related military exercises, activities under STO, activities conducted by the NATO COE DAT, deployed troops in ISAF & RSM and the financial contributions to ANATF. Hence, we may argue that as the Alliance creates more institutionalized commitments and substructures and links different issue-areas, the Allies become eager to cooperate in the realm of CT within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance.\nIn addition to that, a strong association between the institutionalization of CT within NATO, in general, does exist, this trend is also given regarding the institutionalization of CT within the specific set of domains; CD, IS and MOps separately. In other words, the results obtained from the examination of effects of the institutionalization of CT separately in each domain upon each of the DVs may also be meaningful in exploring the relationship between each domain and each of the DVs separately. In fact, there can be multiple theoretical and methodological implications of the institutionalization of CT within each domain separately.\nThe criteria of institutionalization of CT would likely yield additional themes. More refined or additional questions, for example, might clarify the criteria of the process of the institutionalization of specific issue-areas. Additionally, measurement of the institutionalization of CT and the operationalization of the criteria of the institutionalization of CT may as well be applied to the studies on the institutionalization of specific issue-areas in future works from a micro-level perspective. In sum, this research analyzed the effects of the institutionalization of CT on intra-alliance CTC within NATO in the post-9/11 era and explored the variations in the levels of the institutionalization of CT within the specific set of domains; CD, IS and MOPs. Future work may also include analyses to explain the variations among these domains. In other words, possible reasons behind variations in the levels of the institutionalization of CT as a specific issue area within these specific domains remain inconclusive. So, future work may include the “why” type of questions.\nTo conclude, the policy implications from this study indicate that, intra-alliance CTC is specifically important for the overall Alliance cohesion. More precisely, the Alliance should allow its’ member states, through a set of institutional re-arrangements, to solve the points of disagreements. Thus, to solve these points of disagreements, what necessary is to enhance the institutionalized patterns of the CTC within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance. Otherwise the Allies are likely to be more polarized.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "there is a strong positive association between the institutionalization of CT within NATO and the intra-alliance CTC in general\nthere exists a positive relationship between\nthe institutionalization of CT\nand\ncounterterrorism-related military exercises\nactivities conducted by the NATO COE DAT\nas the Alliance creates more institutionalized commitments and substructures and links different issue-areas, the Allies become eager to cooperate in the realm of CT within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance.\nthis research analyzed the effects of the institutionalization of CT on intra-alliance CTC within NATO in the post-9/11 era and explored the variations in the levels of the institutionalization of CT within the specific set of domains;\nthe policy implications\nindicate that, intra-alliance CTC is specifically important for the overall Alliance cohesion\nthe Alliance should allow its’ member states, through a set of institutional re-arrangements, to solve the points of disagreements\nto solve these points of disagreements, what necessary is to enhance the institutionalized patterns of the CTC within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance. Otherwise the Allies are likely to be more polarized.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The plan bypasses institutional mechanisms and fractures the alliance.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "there is a strong positive association between the institutionalization of CT within NATO and the intra-alliance CTC in general\nthere exists a positive relationship between\nthe institutionalization of CT\nand\ncounterterrorism-related military exercises\nactivities conducted by the NATO COE DAT\nas the Alliance creates more institutionalized commitments and substructures and links different issue-areas, the Allies become eager to cooperate in the realm of CT within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance.\nthis research analyzed the effects of the institutionalization of CT on intra-alliance CTC within NATO in the post-9/11 era and explored the variations in the levels of the institutionalization of CT within the specific set of domains;\nthe policy implications\nindicate that, intra-alliance CTC is specifically important for the overall Alliance cohesion\nthe Alliance should allow its’ member states, through a set of institutional re-arrangements, to solve the points of disagreements\nto solve these points of disagreements, what necessary is to enhance the institutionalized patterns of the CTC within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance. Otherwise the Allies are likely to be more polarized.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "strong positive association\ninstitutionalization of CT\neager to cooperate\noverarching institutional framework\neffects of the institutionalization of CT\nintra-alliance CTC\noverall Alliance cohesion\nsolve the points of disagreements\nwithin the overarching institutional framework\nbe more polarized.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The plan bypasses institutional mechanisms and fractures the alliance.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "there is a strong positive association between the institutionalization of CT within NATO and the intra-alliance CTC in general\nthere exists a positive relationship between\nthe institutionalization of CT\nand\ncounterterrorism-related military exercises\nactivities conducted by the NATO COE DAT\nas the Alliance creates more institutionalized commitments and substructures and links different issue-areas, the Allies become eager to cooperate in the realm of CT within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance.\nthis research analyzed the effects of the institutionalization of CT on intra-alliance CTC within NATO in the post-9/11 era and explored the variations in the levels of the institutionalization of CT within the specific set of domains;\nthe policy implications\nindicate that, intra-alliance CTC is specifically important for the overall Alliance cohesion\nthe Alliance should allow its’ member states, through a set of institutional re-arrangements, to solve the points of disagreements\nto solve these points of disagreements, what necessary is to enhance the institutionalized patterns of the CTC within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance. Otherwise the Allies are likely to be more polarized.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "there is a strong positive association\nas the Alliance creates\ninstitutionalized commitments\nthe Allies become eager to cooperate in\nCT within the overarching institutional framework\nthe policy implications\nindicate\nintra-alliance CTC is\nimportant for\noverall Alliance cohesion\nthe Alliance should allow its’ member states\nto solve\ndisagreements\nwhat necessary is to enhance\ninstitutionalized patterns\nwithin the overarching institutional framework\nOtherwise the Allies are likely to be more polarized.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Congressional input works.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Information. The lifeblood of oversight, members of Congress require information to form judgments, understand the requirements for new legislative proposals, evaluate performance, understand alternative assessments and proposals, and educate and empower both the broader public and specific stakeholders. The executive branch—with its size, on-the-ground access, classification authority, and communications platforms—has a natural advantage in information gathering and narrative setting. Numerous studies, however, have demonstrated that Congress can play a vital role in encouraging, convening, and organizing public and alternative sources of information, and can even exhibit informational advantages over the stovepiped executive branch. Shifts in policy have, for example, resulted from Congress asserting narratives different from those offered by a president—as in Somalia, where members helped change perceptions that the humanitarian crisis was intractable; or in Iraq in 2006, when members rebuffed the Bush administration’s metrics and reports of success; or in Yemen more recently, where members spotlighted rampant human rights abuse by U.S. partner forces.\nCONGRESS IS well placed to obtain and share information about a pending or ongoing conflict. Traditional oversight tools, such as hearings and formal written queries, work best when augmented by the suite of formal and informal processes and procedures members and their staffs can use to educate themselves, the public, and the administration. A spectrum of such tools includes:\nHearings. Committee hearings offer members the opportunity to receive formal testimony and briefings, and to question witnesses on the record, including follow-up “questions for the record.” As a rule, the number of hearings on a given issue is not by itself a metric of effective oversight. Instead, high quality, well-attended hearings pursuing a line of inquiry over time tend to produce the most meaningful insights. Hearings can draw the public eye and deepen understanding of military interventions by featuring strong expert witnesses, coordinated questioning, and a sense that the area of study is more than a one-off set of members’ statements aimed at the cameras. And as artificial as congressional theatrics may appear to those in the room, they can produce effects: as experts William Howell and Jon Pevehouse describe it,\n“The public posturing, turns of praise and condemnation, rapid-fire questioning, long-winded exhortations, pithy Shakespearean references, graphs, timelines, and pie charts that fill these highly scripted affairs are intended to focus media attention and thereby sway the national conversation surrounding questions of war and peace.”\nBriefings. Requesting and participating in regular intelligence, military, and policy briefings from a variety of executive branch officials, in both classified and unclassified formats, allow members and staff to get the “official” story of military operations in a less formal setting than televised hearings. Briefings also serve to encourage level-setting in understanding authorities, risk, threats, and complex vocabulary, both across member offices and between legislative and executive branch counterparts. Bipartisan briefings, or sequential majority/minority briefings, can prove especially effective for generating transparency and responsiveness.\nCongressional delegations (CODELs). CODELs to war zones and other relevant locations create invaluable opportunities to assess ground truth. CODELs and staff delegation trips often provide members and staffers with a wider and sometimes more accurate perspective than that of their executive branch counterparts, who can both be more constrained in their travel and receive different treatment when overseas. That said, CODELs can also tend toward dog-and-pony shows that offer visitors a carefully curated version of reality. Key to such trips is seeking deviations from any scripted agenda in order to get candid or unofficial assessments, whether this involves setting aside a prepared briefing for informal questions, requesting last-minute meetings with local experts and stakeholders, or challenging assumptions with validated facts and analysis. Also key is making repeated trips to particular locations over time, rather than attempting to fly in once, take the measure of a situation in a day or two, and return to Washington replete with firmly held convictions.\nExpert consultations. Convening outside experts in particular issue areas, including those critical of existing policy, provides members and staffs with alternatives to prevailing narratives, assessments, and facts on the ground. Such sessions are all the more important given trends in hearings toward one-sided expert witnesses and limited participation in question periods. After 9/11, Capitol Hill’s trust in the Department of Defense (DoD) to manage information, operations, and evaluations soared—thereby aligning with the military’s standing as most the most trusted institution in America. But particularly as the U.S. military presence diminished in major theaters and smaller “by-with-and-through” deployments became the norm, the Pentagon’s more limited presence visibly constrained its information advantage. Likewise, formal assessments such as the Iraq Study Group and the Afghanistan Papers challenged DoD’s credibility in measuring its operational success and understanding local conditions. Think tanks, advocacy groups, grassroots organizations, academics, and other third-party stakeholders’ experience, historical expertise, and on-the-ground connections offer insights unavailable even to the most widely traveled members of Congress and their staffs. Members have recently challenged dod briefings on Saudi and Emirati operations in Yemen with facts acquired through such external consultations; thirty years ago, their colleagues did the same on the security dynamics of Somalia; and three decades before that did so with Vietnam.\nInvestigations. Congressional committees may launch investigations of specific aspects of a conflict, its costs and impacts, or operational decisions. The most well-known investigations in national security circles have become deeply polarized, but, performed effectively, they serve as crucial mechanisms to level-set congressional and public understanding of complex policy challenges. Scholarship suggests three effective measures to strive for: as former Senator Carl Levin and Elise Bean put it, quality bipartisanship (“whether it addressed issues of importance to the public, made use of appropriate investigative techniques, uncovered useful information, and was able to produce a consensus on the facts”); credibility in the eyes of experts, policymakers, and the public; and the “extent to which it led to changes in policy or practice.”\nReports and notifications required by law. Congress can mandate new executive branch reporting on key aspects of a military effort, and it can also use existing reporting as a source of authoritative information. A wide range of reporting requirements governs matters on the spectrum of military intervention. From arms sales to advisory missions to combat-equipped deployments to drone strikes, committees receive notifications, updates, metrics, and spending reports. Close attention to these can highlight areas meriting further investigation and generate a comprehensive picture of executive branch activities. Such reports are not, however, always distributed across all national security committees, and, due to classification or administration preference, they are not always made public. One staffer noted in an interview with the authors that while notifications serve as information, they are also “relationship enablers”—if the notifications go only to limited audiences, the relationships will be similarly limited.\nA frequent criticism of mandatory congressional reporting is that members and staffs simply do not read what the executive branch produces. This is often true, but ignores its other potential functions. Reports allow interest groups and the media to highlight notable concerns, such as in arms sales proceedings. They also often demand policy, legal, and evaluative rationales from the executive branch that should, in theory, cause officials to think harder about their decisions and take ownership of them—as in the Legal and Policy Justification of Use of Force report. And reports can spur interagency awareness and consultation that might not otherwise occur in a fractured national security policy system. In the case of the Global Security Contingency Fund, for instance, Congress required both State-DoD “dual key” authorization and reporting to multiple committees.\nOther powerful information-gathering tools include:\nLetters to agencies and requests for information. It has been said that one letter from one member of Congress can tie up a federal agency for six weeks. Though sending such a letter may not be a good idea, the axiom underscores the potential power of such a seemingly pedestrian missive. Letters constitute useful opportunities to flag congressional interest and concern, particularly when the concern crosses party lines and ideologies. Responses may reap some of the same benefits as reports but may also garner higher-level attention and be less subject to bureaucratic censoring.\nMeetings with foreign officials. Representing themselves rather than the U.S. government, members of Congress often have access to the highest levels of foreign governments and can both obtain information and convey messages.\nRegular intelligence. The members and staff of national security committees, including the House and Senate Intelligence, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations Committees, have access to regular intelligence reporting as well as the opportunity to receive additional information about areas of particular interest.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The lifeblood of oversight\nCongress require information to form judgments, understand\nlegislative proposals, evaluate performance\nand\nempower\nspecific stakeholders\nNumerous studies\nhave demonstrated that Congress can play a vital role in encouraging, convening, and organizing public and alternative sources of information, and can even exhibit informational advantages over the stovepiped executive branch. Shifts in policy\nresulted from Congress asserting narratives different from those offered by a president—as in Somalia,\nor in Iraq\nwhen members rebuffed the Bush administration’s\nreports of success; or in Yemen\nwhere members spotlighted rampant human rights abuse\nCONGRESS IS well placed to obtain and share information about a\nconflict. Traditional oversight tools\n, work best when augmented by\nand informal processes a\nCommittee hearings offer\nthe opportunity to receive formal testimony\nhigh quality, well-attended hearings\nproduce the most meaningful insights. Hearings can draw the public eye and deepen understanding of military interventions\n“The public posturing\nrapid-fire questioning, long-winded exhortations\nand pie charts\nare intended to focus media attention and thereby sway the national conversation\nRequesting and participating in regular\nbriefings from a variety of executive\nofficials\nallow members and staff to get the “official” story of military operations in a less formal setting\nCongressional delegations (CODELs). CODELs to war zones and other relevant locations create invaluable opportunities to assess ground truth. CODELs\nprovide members and staffers with a wider and sometimes more accurate perspective than\ntheir executive branch counterparts, who can\nbe\nconstrained in their travel and receive different treatment when overseas. That\nExpert consultations. Convening outside experts in\nissue areas\nprovides members and staffs with alternatives to prevailing narratives, assessments, and facts on the ground\nAfter 9/11, Capitol Hill’s trust in the\nDoD\nto manage information, operations, and evaluations soared\nBut particularly as the U.S. military presence diminished in major theaters and smaller “by-with-and-through” deployments became the norm, the Pentagon’s more limited presence visibly constrained its information advantage\nThink tanks, advocacy groups, grassroots organizations, academics, and other third-party stakeholders’ experience, historical expertise, and on-the-ground connections offer insights unavailable even to the most widely traveled members of Congress and their staffs\nInvestigations. Congressional committees may launch investigations of specific aspects of a conflict, its costs and impacts, or operational decisions\nperformed effectively, they serve as crucial mechanisms to level-set congressional and public understanding of complex policy challenges.\nquality bipartisanship\nuncovered useful information, and was able to produce a consensus on the facts\nReports\nnotifications required by law\nCongress can mandate\nexecutive branch reporting on key aspects of a military effort, and it can also use existing reporting as a source of authoritative information. A wide range of reporting requirements governs matters on the spectrum of military intervention. From arms sales to advisory missions to combat-equipped deployments to drone strikes, committees receive notifications, updates, metrics, and spending reports\nReports allow interest groups and the media to highlight notable concerns, such as in arms sales proceedings. They also often demand policy, legal, and evaluative rationales from the executive branch that should\ncause officials to think harder about their decisions\nreports can spur interagency awareness and consultation that might not\noccur in a fractured national security policy system\nMeetings with foreign officials\nmembers of Congress often have access to the highest levels of foreign governments and can\nobtain information and convey messages\negular intelligence. The members and staff of national security committees\nhave access to regular intelligence reporting as well as the opportunity to receive additional information about areas of\ninterest", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Congressional input works.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The lifeblood of oversight\nCongress require information to form judgments, understand\nlegislative proposals, evaluate performance\nand\nempower\nspecific stakeholders\nNumerous studies\nhave demonstrated that Congress can play a vital role in encouraging, convening, and organizing public and alternative sources of information, and can even exhibit informational advantages over the stovepiped executive branch. Shifts in policy\nresulted from Congress asserting narratives different from those offered by a president—as in Somalia,\nor in Iraq\nwhen members rebuffed the Bush administration’s\nreports of success; or in Yemen\nwhere members spotlighted rampant human rights abuse\nCONGRESS IS well placed to obtain and share information about a\nconflict. Traditional oversight tools\n, work best when augmented by\nand informal processes a\nCommittee hearings offer\nthe opportunity to receive formal testimony\nhigh quality, well-attended hearings\nproduce the most meaningful insights. Hearings can draw the public eye and deepen understanding of military interventions\n“The public posturing\nrapid-fire questioning, long-winded exhortations\nand pie charts\nare intended to focus media attention and thereby sway the national conversation\nRequesting and participating in regular\nbriefings from a variety of executive\nofficials\nallow members and staff to get the “official” story of military operations in a less formal setting\nCongressional delegations (CODELs). CODELs to war zones and other relevant locations create invaluable opportunities to assess ground truth. CODELs\nprovide members and staffers with a wider and sometimes more accurate perspective than\ntheir executive branch counterparts, who can\nbe\nconstrained in their travel and receive different treatment when overseas. That\nExpert consultations. Convening outside experts in\nissue areas\nprovides members and staffs with alternatives to prevailing narratives, assessments, and facts on the ground\nAfter 9/11, Capitol Hill’s trust in the\nDoD\nto manage information, operations, and evaluations soared\nBut particularly as the U.S. military presence diminished in major theaters and smaller “by-with-and-through” deployments became the norm, the Pentagon’s more limited presence visibly constrained its information advantage\nThink tanks, advocacy groups, grassroots organizations, academics, and other third-party stakeholders’ experience, historical expertise, and on-the-ground connections offer insights unavailable even to the most widely traveled members of Congress and their staffs\nInvestigations. Congressional committees may launch investigations of specific aspects of a conflict, its costs and impacts, or operational decisions\nperformed effectively, they serve as crucial mechanisms to level-set congressional and public understanding of complex policy challenges.\nquality bipartisanship\nuncovered useful information, and was able to produce a consensus on the facts\nReports\nnotifications required by law\nCongress can mandate\nexecutive branch reporting on key aspects of a military effort, and it can also use existing reporting as a source of authoritative information. A wide range of reporting requirements governs matters on the spectrum of military intervention. From arms sales to advisory missions to combat-equipped deployments to drone strikes, committees receive notifications, updates, metrics, and spending reports\nReports allow interest groups and the media to highlight notable concerns, such as in arms sales proceedings. They also often demand policy, legal, and evaluative rationales from the executive branch that should\ncause officials to think harder about their decisions\nreports can spur interagency awareness and consultation that might not\noccur in a fractured national security policy system\nMeetings with foreign officials\nmembers of Congress often have access to the highest levels of foreign governments and can\nobtain information and convey messages\negular intelligence. The members and staff of national security committees\nhave access to regular intelligence reporting as well as the opportunity to receive additional information about areas of\ninterest", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Congress require information\nNumerous studies\nvital role\nexhibit informational advantages\nShifts in policy\nCongress asserting narratives\nwell placed\nobtain\nshare information\nCommittee hearings\nfocus media attention\nsway the national conversation\nbriefings\nofficial” story\nCongressional delegations\nmore accurate perspective\nExpert consultations\noutside experts in\nvisibly constrained its information advantage\nThink tanks, advocacy groups\nthird-party stakeholders’\nInvestigations\ncrucial mechanisms\ncomplex policy challenges\nquality bipartisanship\nReports\nnotifications\nmandate\nexecutive branch reporting\nexisting reporting\nspectrum of military intervention\nthink harder\ninteragency awareness\nconsultation\nfractured national security policy\nMeetings\nhighest levels\negular intelligence\nregular intelligence reporting", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Congressional input works.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The lifeblood of oversight\nCongress require information to form judgments, understand\nlegislative proposals, evaluate performance\nand\nempower\nspecific stakeholders\nNumerous studies\nhave demonstrated that Congress can play a vital role in encouraging, convening, and organizing public and alternative sources of information, and can even exhibit informational advantages over the stovepiped executive branch. Shifts in policy\nresulted from Congress asserting narratives different from those offered by a president—as in Somalia,\nor in Iraq\nwhen members rebuffed the Bush administration’s\nreports of success; or in Yemen\nwhere members spotlighted rampant human rights abuse\nCONGRESS IS well placed to obtain and share information about a\nconflict. Traditional oversight tools\n, work best when augmented by\nand informal processes a\nCommittee hearings offer\nthe opportunity to receive formal testimony\nhigh quality, well-attended hearings\nproduce the most meaningful insights. Hearings can draw the public eye and deepen understanding of military interventions\n“The public posturing\nrapid-fire questioning, long-winded exhortations\nand pie charts\nare intended to focus media attention and thereby sway the national conversation\nRequesting and participating in regular\nbriefings from a variety of executive\nofficials\nallow members and staff to get the “official” story of military operations in a less formal setting\nCongressional delegations (CODELs). CODELs to war zones and other relevant locations create invaluable opportunities to assess ground truth. CODELs\nprovide members and staffers with a wider and sometimes more accurate perspective than\ntheir executive branch counterparts, who can\nbe\nconstrained in their travel and receive different treatment when overseas. That\nExpert consultations. Convening outside experts in\nissue areas\nprovides members and staffs with alternatives to prevailing narratives, assessments, and facts on the ground\nAfter 9/11, Capitol Hill’s trust in the\nDoD\nto manage information, operations, and evaluations soared\nBut particularly as the U.S. military presence diminished in major theaters and smaller “by-with-and-through” deployments became the norm, the Pentagon’s more limited presence visibly constrained its information advantage\nThink tanks, advocacy groups, grassroots organizations, academics, and other third-party stakeholders’ experience, historical expertise, and on-the-ground connections offer insights unavailable even to the most widely traveled members of Congress and their staffs\nInvestigations. Congressional committees may launch investigations of specific aspects of a conflict, its costs and impacts, or operational decisions\nperformed effectively, they serve as crucial mechanisms to level-set congressional and public understanding of complex policy challenges.\nquality bipartisanship\nuncovered useful information, and was able to produce a consensus on the facts\nReports\nnotifications required by law\nCongress can mandate\nexecutive branch reporting on key aspects of a military effort, and it can also use existing reporting as a source of authoritative information. A wide range of reporting requirements governs matters on the spectrum of military intervention. From arms sales to advisory missions to combat-equipped deployments to drone strikes, committees receive notifications, updates, metrics, and spending reports\nReports allow interest groups and the media to highlight notable concerns, such as in arms sales proceedings. They also often demand policy, legal, and evaluative rationales from the executive branch that should\ncause officials to think harder about their decisions\nreports can spur interagency awareness and consultation that might not\noccur in a fractured national security policy system\nMeetings with foreign officials\nmembers of Congress often have access to the highest levels of foreign governments and can\nobtain information and convey messages\negular intelligence. The members and staff of national security committees\nhave access to regular intelligence reporting as well as the opportunity to receive additional information about areas of\ninterest", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Numerous studies\ndemonstrated\nCongress can play a vital role in encouraging\nalternative sources of information, and\nexhibit informational advantages over the\nexecutive\nShifts in policy\nresulted from Congress asserting narratives\nas in Somalia\nor\nIraq\nCommittee hearings offer\nformal testimony\nregular\nbriefings\nallow\nstaff to get the “official” story\nCongressional delegations\nThink tanks, advocacy groups\nacademics, and\nthird-party stakeholders’ experience\noffer insights\nInvestigations\nserve as crucial mechanisms to\nset\nunderstanding of\npolicy\nCongress can mandate\nexecutive\nreporting\nmembers\nhave access to the highest levels of foreign governments", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Momentum to constrain the President’s war powers now – successful imposition of existing checks is key.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In early March 2020, the House of Representatives passed a resolution calling for an end to escalating military hostilities against Iran without congressional authorization.1 The Senate had passed the measure in February,2 but with only a handful of Republicans breaking rank in both the House and Senate to vote for the measure, the resolution amounted to no more than a “legal slap on the wrist”3 to the Trump Administration. In May, the resolution landed on President Donald Trump’s desk, where it was vetoed. The next day, Congress attempted to override the veto but lacked the necessary two-thirds majority. 4\nCongress pushed for these resolutions in response to the Trump Administration’s series of strikes against Iran in late 2019 and the January 2, 2020, strike that killed Iranian general Qassem Soleimani. House Foreign Affairs Chairman Eliot Engel argued on the House floor that legislation curtailing the President’s actions against Iran was necessary, and that “Congress’ powers are not as narrow as the administration would like us to believe.”5\nThese steps taken by Congress are significant. A provision of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (WPR) allows Congress to direct the President to remove U.S. armed forces from situations of hostilities, and the Iran resolution marks only the second time in history that measures invoking the WPR to limit the President’s authority to use force have passed both the House and Senate. The first instance occurred only a year ago in April 2019, when the House and Senate passed resolutions calling for an end to U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen’s bloody civil war. U.S. involvement at the time had included arms sales, 6 military advisers, intelligence, and mid-air refueling of Saudi aircraft. 7 The Trump Administration, maintaining that U.S. troops were not involved in “hostilities” in Yemen, argued that the WPR did not require the withdrawal of troops. 8 Ultimately, Congress was unable to muster two-thirds majority support, and the resolution died after Trump’s veto.\nCongress’s actions over both Iran and Yemen represent its attempt to reassert its constitutional authority over U.S. military action. Importantly, these steps demonstrate that Congress “is both able and willing to take on the responsibility of articulating approaches to foreign policy independent of the executive branch.”10 Despite the fact that the Obama Administration initiated U.S. involvement in Yemen without congressional authorization, Congress’s actions attempted to rebalance constitutional war powers and engage in meaningful oversight over future uses of force. 11 As Stephen Pomper notes, executive overreach “does not mean Congress has to throw in the towel on its rights and responsibilities.”12\nQuestions of when and how the President can go to war or send U.S. armed forces abroad are deeply contested. Political scientist Edward Corwin once famously observed that the Constitution is “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”13 Under the Constitution, war powers are divided between the President and Congress. The President is Commander in Chief of the armed forces,14 and Congress has the power to declare war, among other related powers.15 The Founders believed that Congress was responsible for authorizing uses of force, with a narrow exception permitting the President to repel sudden armed attacks, and over the course of U.S. history, there have been formal declarations of war across five wars, in addition to statutory authorizations for use of force. 16 However, since the time of the founding, the executive branch has steadily interpreted its war powers expansively, and with courts reluctant to adjudicate any sort of tug-of-war-powers between the President and Congress, the law in this area is heavily based on historical practice. With a history of “under-motivated Congresses and over-reaching presidents,”17 the conventional adage is that the President’s war powers have become essentially unconstrained.\nThis Article joins the ranks of scholarly work arguing that presidential unilateralism, at risk of “presidential miscalculation and aggrandizement,”18 is not normatively appealing should not remain unconstrained. It argues that Congress should seek to reassert its role in regulating war powers in order to produce better military policy and to act as a check on the President’s everexpanding powers. Generally, views on war powers have favored either pro-Congress or proexecutive stances. The pro-Congress school believes that pursuant to the Article I power to declare war (among other Article I powers), war powers should primarily reside with Congress, with the president’s unilateral ability to use force limited to narrow circumstances. 19 This school includes some members of Congress, scholars like John Hart Ely, Louis Henkin, and Michael Glennon, and, most notably, current Democratic presidential candidate Joseph Biden.20 In contrast, the proexecutive school, populated by scholars like John Yoo, believes that pursuant to the Article II Commander in Chief Clause, the Constitution places war powers squarely with the President.21\nFurther, this Article contends that the law in this area, informed by historical practice and the statutory language of the WPR, is not fully without content and can in fact constrain the executive. However, the ability of the law to constrain has been threatened by the executive branch’s existing practice, with self-imposed limits that are no meaningful limits at all.22 But based on Congress’s recent resolutions invoking the WPR, there seems to be a way forward. After four years of the Trump Administration, with the possibility of a future Biden Administration helmed by a President who has historically supported pro-Congress war powers reform,23 there may be political will within Congress to reexamine its ability to act as a check against the President. In particular, Congress may be motivated to strengthen the language of an existing check—the War Powers Resolution.\nToday, the WPR has become a focal point of any discussion of uses of force as the President’s war powers fall under renewed public scrutiny.24 Passed in 1973 over President Nixon’s veto,25 the WPR represents Congress’s attempt to reassert its authority to check the President’s engagement of U.S. forces in military operations abroad. Despite the expansion of presidential war powers since the enactment of the WPR, and despite the resolution’s subsequent erosion through executive branch interpretations limiting its reach, the WPR “remains the key statutory framework for regulating the relationship between the political branches with respect to the use of U.S. armed forces abroad.”26 For purposes of this Article, the most important provision for congressional control is Section 5(b) of the WPR, which creates a 60-day termination clock. If the President introduces armed forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities, unless Congress declares war or otherwise authorizes the military action to continue or extends the period by law, the President must withdraw the forces within 60 days. 27 But since the enactment of the WPR, the executive branch has worked to limit the 60-day clock’s applicability to presidential uses of force. Since the Ford Administration, the executive branch has narrowly interpreted the meaning of “hostilities,” while members of Congress have adopted a broader interpretation. The current executive branch standard for what constitutes “hostilities” originates from State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh’s 2011 testimony on airstrikes in Libya, in which he concluded that if a military operation is limited in mission, exposure of armed forces, risk of escalation, and military means, the operation does not engage in hostilities as envisioned by the WPR.28\nThis Article argues that the WPR still serves as the best framework through which Congress can check presidential unilateralism, but one weakness with the resolution is the elasticity of the term “hostilities,” which has allowed the executive branch to raise colorable arguments that the WPR’s withdrawal mandate does not apply to a wide range of military activities abroad. This Article proposes to clarify and reconceptualize the term “hostilities” under the WPR. By providing clearer standards of what does or does not constitute an introduction of U.S. forces into “hostilities,” Congress can raise political costs to the President of presenting weak legal justifications, as well as shape public opinion when the President acts inconsistently with the WPR, both of which can act as constraining mechanisms on presidential decisionmaking.\nThis Article makes two proposals: First, it clarifies that U.S. participation in partner missions—missions at the express invitation of another state, pursuant to UN authorization, or with a coalition like NATO—is an indicator that the mission is narrow, but such participation is not on its own sufficient to show that U.S. forces have not engaged in “hostilities.” This Article then argues that “hostilities” can still exist where the United States plays a supporting role in a partner mission, and must be reframed to encompass not only situations where U.S. forces participate in active exchanges of fire, but where they use or are subject to lethal force.\nSecond, this Article proposes considering the following criteria in determining whether U.S. armed forces have been introduced into ongoing (rather than intermittent) hostilities: 1) whether there is risk of harm to U.S. forces from an exchange of fire, taking into consideration the likelihood of sustained violence occurring over an extended period of time, as indicated by factors like internal rules of engagement; and 2) whether there is regularity of use of force by or against U.S. forces, taking into consideration additional U.S. troop deployments.\nThis definition of “hostilities” is motived by the desire to create statutory guidance that would limit implausible executive branch interpretations of when congressional oversight is triggered, and to provide clarity in order to allow Congress ways to channel political sanctions and public opinion to constrain such overreach. This Article is informed by and expands upon a rich literature—from John Hart Ely to the National War Powers Commission—proposing reforms to the WPR, including to the definition of “hostilities.”29 These past reform proposals have aimed to strike a balance between providing the President flexibility in responding to a range of combat situations and guidance on when the President can use force without prior congressional authorization. This Article differs from past scholarship and makes a novel contribution by proposing a reconceptualization of “hostilities” informed in part by past executive branch practices that have acted as some limitation on presidential decisionmaking.30 While the executive branch may continue to push the boundaries of statutory constraints, it would be more difficult to do in the face of standards that incorporate previous executive branch precedent. Moreover, building off of the balancing act in the literature, this Article aims to tip this balance towards less presidential discretion and more guidance on situations that constitute “hostilities” and trigger the 60-day withdrawal requirement. As the executive branch’s self-aggrandizing interpretations in recent years have indicated, this guidance is needed to restrain U.S. involvement in consequential military operations without congressional authorization.\nThis is hardly the first time that the balance of war powers or the War Powers Resolution have been discussed. There has always existed a tension between the intent of drafters of the WPR to give the President flexibility in responding to a range of combat situations and the erosion of the WPR framework as a meaningful constraint on unfettered presidential discretion. However, these questions are especially relevant now at a time when the division of war powers is once against at the forefront of the national conversation. In response to egregious expansion of presidential war powers by the Trump Administration, and the possibility of a Biden Administration favorable to pro-Congress reforms, Congress may be especially motivated to reassert its role in reining back the executive branch. Even if the executive branch remains resistant to a broader reconceptualization of “hostilities,” strengthening this weak point of the WPR in order to allow Congress and the public to more clearly identify instances of unlawful presidential action would still serve to limit what has become nearly-unconstrained presidential powers.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "In\nMarch 2020, the House of Representatives passed a resolution calling for an end to\nmilitary hostilities against Iran without congressional authorization\nwhere it was vetoed\nCongress attempted to override the veto but lacked the\ntwo-thirds majority\nThese steps\nare significant. A provision of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (WPR) allows Congress to direct the President to remove\nforces from\nhostilities\nthe Iran resolution marks only the second time\nmeasures invoking the WPR\nhave passed both the House and Senate\nThe Trump Administration, maintaining that U.S. troops were not involved in “hostilities” in Yemen, argued\nthe WPR did not require the withdrawal of troops\nthese steps demonstrate\nCongress “is both able and willing to take on the responsibility of articulating approaches to foreign policy independent of the executive branch\nCongress’s actions attempted to rebalance constitutional war powers and engage in meaningful oversight over future uses of force\nexecutive overreach “does not mean Congress has to throw in the towel\nthe Constitution is “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”\nwar powers are divided between the President and Congress. The President is Commander in Chief\nCongress has the power to declare war\nthe executive branch has steadily interpreted its war powers expansively, and with courts reluctant to adjudicate\ntug-of-war-powers between the President and Congress, the law\nis heavily based on historical practice\nthe President’s war powers have become essentially unconstrained\npresidential unilateralism, at risk of “presidential miscalculation and aggrandizement\nis not normatively appealing\nthe law in this area\ninformed by\nthe statutory language of the WPR, is not fully without content and can in fact constrain the executive\nthe ability of the law to constrain has been threatened by the executive branch’s existing practice, with self-imposed limits that are no meaningful limits\nbased on Congress’s\nresolutions invoking the WPR, there seems to be a way forward\nthere may be political will within Congress to reexamine its ability to act as a check against the President.\nCongress may be motivated to strengthen the language of an existing check—the War Powers Resolution\nthe WPR has become a focal point of any discussion of uses of force as the President’s war powers fall under\nscrutiny\nthe WPR represents Congress’s attempt to reassert its authority to check the President’s engagement of U.S. forces in military operations abroad\nthe WPR “remains the key statutory framework for regulating the relationship between the political branches with respect to the use of U.S. armed forces abroad\nthe most important provision\nis Section 5(b) of the WPR, which creates a 60-day termination clock\nSince the Ford Administration, the executive branch has narrowly interpreted the meaning of “hostilities,” while members of Congress have adopted a broader interpretation. The current\nstandard for what constitutes “hostilities” originates from\nKoh’s 2011 testimony on airstrikes in Libya, in which he concluded that if a military operation is limited in mission\nand military means, the operation does not engage in hostilities\nthe WPR still serves as the best framework through which Congress can check presidential unilateralism, but one weakness\nis the elasticity of the term “hostilities,” which has allowed the executive branch to raise\narguments that the WPR’s\nmandate does not apply to a wide range of\nactivities abroad. This Article proposes to clarify and reconceptualize the term “hostilities” under the WPR\nBy providing clearer standards\nCongress can raise political costs to the President of presenting weak legal justifications, as well as shape public opinion when the President acts inconsistently\nboth of which can act as constraining mechanisms on presidential decisionmaking\nit clarifies that U.S. participation in partner missions\nwith a coalition like NATO—is an indicator that the mission is narrow, but such participation is not on its own sufficient to show that U.S. forces have not engaged in “hostilities\nthis Article proposes considering the following criteria\n1) whether there is risk of harm to U.S. forces\nand 2) whether there is regularity of use of force\nThis definition of “hostilities” is motived by the desire to create statutory guidance that would limit implausible executive\ninterpretations of when congressional oversight is triggered\nThis Article is informed by and expands upon\nrich literature\nproposing reforms to the WPR, including to the definition of “hostilities.”\nThese past reform proposals\naimed to strike a balance between providing the President flexibility in responding to\ncombat situations and guidance on when the President can use force without prior congressional authorization.\nthis guidance is needed to restrain U.S. involvement in consequential military operations without congressional authorization.\nThis is hardly the first time\nthe balance of war powers or the War Powers Resolution have been discussed\nIn response to egregious expansion of presidential war powers by the Trump Administration, and the possibility of a Biden Administration favorable to pro-Congress reforms, Congress may be especially motivated to reassert its role in reining back the executive branch. Even if the executive\nremains resistant to a broader reconceptualization of “hostilities,” strengthening this weak point of the WPR\nwould\nlimit\nnearly-unconstrained presidential powers", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Momentum to constrain the President’s war powers now – successful imposition of existing checks is key.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In\nMarch 2020, the House of Representatives passed a resolution calling for an end to\nmilitary hostilities against Iran without congressional authorization\nwhere it was vetoed\nCongress attempted to override the veto but lacked the\ntwo-thirds majority\nThese steps\nare significant. A provision of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (WPR) allows Congress to direct the President to remove\nforces from\nhostilities\nthe Iran resolution marks only the second time\nmeasures invoking the WPR\nhave passed both the House and Senate\nThe Trump Administration, maintaining that U.S. troops were not involved in “hostilities” in Yemen, argued\nthe WPR did not require the withdrawal of troops\nthese steps demonstrate\nCongress “is both able and willing to take on the responsibility of articulating approaches to foreign policy independent of the executive branch\nCongress’s actions attempted to rebalance constitutional war powers and engage in meaningful oversight over future uses of force\nexecutive overreach “does not mean Congress has to throw in the towel\nthe Constitution is “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”\nwar powers are divided between the President and Congress. The President is Commander in Chief\nCongress has the power to declare war\nthe executive branch has steadily interpreted its war powers expansively, and with courts reluctant to adjudicate\ntug-of-war-powers between the President and Congress, the law\nis heavily based on historical practice\nthe President’s war powers have become essentially unconstrained\npresidential unilateralism, at risk of “presidential miscalculation and aggrandizement\nis not normatively appealing\nthe law in this area\ninformed by\nthe statutory language of the WPR, is not fully without content and can in fact constrain the executive\nthe ability of the law to constrain has been threatened by the executive branch’s existing practice, with self-imposed limits that are no meaningful limits\nbased on Congress’s\nresolutions invoking the WPR, there seems to be a way forward\nthere may be political will within Congress to reexamine its ability to act as a check against the President.\nCongress may be motivated to strengthen the language of an existing check—the War Powers Resolution\nthe WPR has become a focal point of any discussion of uses of force as the President’s war powers fall under\nscrutiny\nthe WPR represents Congress’s attempt to reassert its authority to check the President’s engagement of U.S. forces in military operations abroad\nthe WPR “remains the key statutory framework for regulating the relationship between the political branches with respect to the use of U.S. armed forces abroad\nthe most important provision\nis Section 5(b) of the WPR, which creates a 60-day termination clock\nSince the Ford Administration, the executive branch has narrowly interpreted the meaning of “hostilities,” while members of Congress have adopted a broader interpretation. The current\nstandard for what constitutes “hostilities” originates from\nKoh’s 2011 testimony on airstrikes in Libya, in which he concluded that if a military operation is limited in mission\nand military means, the operation does not engage in hostilities\nthe WPR still serves as the best framework through which Congress can check presidential unilateralism, but one weakness\nis the elasticity of the term “hostilities,” which has allowed the executive branch to raise\narguments that the WPR’s\nmandate does not apply to a wide range of\nactivities abroad. This Article proposes to clarify and reconceptualize the term “hostilities” under the WPR\nBy providing clearer standards\nCongress can raise political costs to the President of presenting weak legal justifications, as well as shape public opinion when the President acts inconsistently\nboth of which can act as constraining mechanisms on presidential decisionmaking\nit clarifies that U.S. participation in partner missions\nwith a coalition like NATO—is an indicator that the mission is narrow, but such participation is not on its own sufficient to show that U.S. forces have not engaged in “hostilities\nthis Article proposes considering the following criteria\n1) whether there is risk of harm to U.S. forces\nand 2) whether there is regularity of use of force\nThis definition of “hostilities” is motived by the desire to create statutory guidance that would limit implausible executive\ninterpretations of when congressional oversight is triggered\nThis Article is informed by and expands upon\nrich literature\nproposing reforms to the WPR, including to the definition of “hostilities.”\nThese past reform proposals\naimed to strike a balance between providing the President flexibility in responding to\ncombat situations and guidance on when the President can use force without prior congressional authorization.\nthis guidance is needed to restrain U.S. involvement in consequential military operations without congressional authorization.\nThis is hardly the first time\nthe balance of war powers or the War Powers Resolution have been discussed\nIn response to egregious expansion of presidential war powers by the Trump Administration, and the possibility of a Biden Administration favorable to pro-Congress reforms, Congress may be especially motivated to reassert its role in reining back the executive branch. Even if the executive\nremains resistant to a broader reconceptualization of “hostilities,” strengthening this weak point of the WPR\nwould\nlimit\nnearly-unconstrained presidential powers", "role": "user" }, { "content": "without congressional authorization\nlacked the\ntwo-thirds majority\nremove\nforces from\nhostilities\nwere not involved in “hostilities”\nable\nwilling\nindependent of the executive branch\nrebalance constitutional war powers\nengage in meaningful oversight\ninvitation to struggle\nsteadily interpreted\nexpansively\nheavily based on historical practice\nessentially unconstrained\npresidential miscalculation\naggrandizement\nconstrain the executive\nself-imposed limits\nno meaningful limits\ninvoking the WPR\npolitical will\nact as a check\nstrengthen the language of an existing check\nfocal point\nuses of force\nscrutiny\nreassert its authority\ncheck the President’s engagement\nkey statutory framework\n60-day termination clock\nnarrowly interpreted the meaning of “hostilities\nwhat constitutes “hostilities\nlimited\nbest framework\ncheck presidential unilateralism\nclarify\nreconceptualize the term\nraise political costs\nshape public opinion\nconstraining mechanisms\npresidential decisionmaking\ncoalition like NATO\nnot on its own sufficient\nrisk of harm\nregularity of use of force\ndefinition of “hostilities”\nstatutory guidance\nrich literature\nproposing reforms\nproviding the President flexibility\nrestrain U.S. involvement\nconsequential military operations\nBiden Administration\nespecially motivated\nreassert its role\nstrengthening this weak point\nlimit\nnearly-unconstrained presidential powers", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Momentum to constrain the President’s war powers now – successful imposition of existing checks is key.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In\nMarch 2020, the House of Representatives passed a resolution calling for an end to\nmilitary hostilities against Iran without congressional authorization\nwhere it was vetoed\nCongress attempted to override the veto but lacked the\ntwo-thirds majority\nThese steps\nare significant. A provision of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (WPR) allows Congress to direct the President to remove\nforces from\nhostilities\nthe Iran resolution marks only the second time\nmeasures invoking the WPR\nhave passed both the House and Senate\nThe Trump Administration, maintaining that U.S. troops were not involved in “hostilities” in Yemen, argued\nthe WPR did not require the withdrawal of troops\nthese steps demonstrate\nCongress “is both able and willing to take on the responsibility of articulating approaches to foreign policy independent of the executive branch\nCongress’s actions attempted to rebalance constitutional war powers and engage in meaningful oversight over future uses of force\nexecutive overreach “does not mean Congress has to throw in the towel\nthe Constitution is “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”\nwar powers are divided between the President and Congress. The President is Commander in Chief\nCongress has the power to declare war\nthe executive branch has steadily interpreted its war powers expansively, and with courts reluctant to adjudicate\ntug-of-war-powers between the President and Congress, the law\nis heavily based on historical practice\nthe President’s war powers have become essentially unconstrained\npresidential unilateralism, at risk of “presidential miscalculation and aggrandizement\nis not normatively appealing\nthe law in this area\ninformed by\nthe statutory language of the WPR, is not fully without content and can in fact constrain the executive\nthe ability of the law to constrain has been threatened by the executive branch’s existing practice, with self-imposed limits that are no meaningful limits\nbased on Congress’s\nresolutions invoking the WPR, there seems to be a way forward\nthere may be political will within Congress to reexamine its ability to act as a check against the President.\nCongress may be motivated to strengthen the language of an existing check—the War Powers Resolution\nthe WPR has become a focal point of any discussion of uses of force as the President’s war powers fall under\nscrutiny\nthe WPR represents Congress’s attempt to reassert its authority to check the President’s engagement of U.S. forces in military operations abroad\nthe WPR “remains the key statutory framework for regulating the relationship between the political branches with respect to the use of U.S. armed forces abroad\nthe most important provision\nis Section 5(b) of the WPR, which creates a 60-day termination clock\nSince the Ford Administration, the executive branch has narrowly interpreted the meaning of “hostilities,” while members of Congress have adopted a broader interpretation. The current\nstandard for what constitutes “hostilities” originates from\nKoh’s 2011 testimony on airstrikes in Libya, in which he concluded that if a military operation is limited in mission\nand military means, the operation does not engage in hostilities\nthe WPR still serves as the best framework through which Congress can check presidential unilateralism, but one weakness\nis the elasticity of the term “hostilities,” which has allowed the executive branch to raise\narguments that the WPR’s\nmandate does not apply to a wide range of\nactivities abroad. This Article proposes to clarify and reconceptualize the term “hostilities” under the WPR\nBy providing clearer standards\nCongress can raise political costs to the President of presenting weak legal justifications, as well as shape public opinion when the President acts inconsistently\nboth of which can act as constraining mechanisms on presidential decisionmaking\nit clarifies that U.S. participation in partner missions\nwith a coalition like NATO—is an indicator that the mission is narrow, but such participation is not on its own sufficient to show that U.S. forces have not engaged in “hostilities\nthis Article proposes considering the following criteria\n1) whether there is risk of harm to U.S. forces\nand 2) whether there is regularity of use of force\nThis definition of “hostilities” is motived by the desire to create statutory guidance that would limit implausible executive\ninterpretations of when congressional oversight is triggered\nThis Article is informed by and expands upon\nrich literature\nproposing reforms to the WPR, including to the definition of “hostilities.”\nThese past reform proposals\naimed to strike a balance between providing the President flexibility in responding to\ncombat situations and guidance on when the President can use force without prior congressional authorization.\nthis guidance is needed to restrain U.S. involvement in consequential military operations without congressional authorization.\nThis is hardly the first time\nthe balance of war powers or the War Powers Resolution have been discussed\nIn response to egregious expansion of presidential war powers by the Trump Administration, and the possibility of a Biden Administration favorable to pro-Congress reforms, Congress may be especially motivated to reassert its role in reining back the executive branch. Even if the executive\nremains resistant to a broader reconceptualization of “hostilities,” strengthening this weak point of the WPR\nwould\nlimit\nnearly-unconstrained presidential powers", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the House\npassed a resolution calling for an end to\nhostilities against Iran\nWPR\nallows Congress to\nremove\nforces from\nhostilities\nthese steps demonstrate\nCongress “is\nable and willing to take on\nforeign policy independent of the executive\nrebalance\nwar powers and engage in\noversight\nthe executive\nhas\ninterpreted\nwar powers expansively,\npresidential miscalculation and aggrandizement\nis not\nappealing\nthe WPR\ncan\nconstrain the executive\nthere may be political will\nto strengthen the\ncheck\nthe executive\nhas narrowly interpreted the meaning of “hostilities\nthe WPR\nserves as the best framework through which Congress can check\nunilateralism\nCongress can raise political costs\nas well as shape public opinion\nwhich can act as constraining mechanisms on\ndecisionmaking\nit clarifies\nparticipation in\nmissions\nwith\nNATO\nis not\nsufficient\nIn response to\na Biden Administration\nCongress may be especially motivated to reassert its role\nthis\nwould\nlimit\nnearly-unconstrained presidential powers", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Most major conflicts have occurred absent a formal alliance commitment.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Strategists may attempt to tabulate the political costs of alliances by considering the dilemmas of alliance entrapment and abandonment. Entrapment occurs when a state is dragged into a conflict in pursuit of an ally's interests. Lesser forms of entrapment can occur when one partner behaves recklessly or takes an especially firm position toward an adversary due to its confidence in alliance support. Abandonment occurs when an ally fails to fulfill the terms of its security pledge by, for instance, refusing to assist in wartime or, less urgently, shirking commitments in peacetime.\nThe likelihood of entrapment and abandonment is thought to vary depending on how power is distributed internationally. Allied entrapment and abandonment were probably less likely during the Cold War than other eras, such as the period preceding the First World War. With multiple centers of political power, alliances were less stable, and countries aligned and de-aligned with relative frequency. The structure of Cold War competition, by contrast, was conducive to durable alliances. Because the bipolar world was organized around two military-industrial power centers, the United States and the Soviet Union, smaller allies could not easily tip the balance of power. The loss of any one smaller partner was not catastrophic, whereas it is more likely to upset stability in a multipolar world.10 Moreover, the independent interests of Cold War allies-in both the US and Soviet columns-were too minor to compel the superpowers to act against their own wishes.11 Nonetheless, prominent scholars point to what they perceive as the serious risk of American entrapment by \"reckless drivers.' 12\nIf America's Cold War alliances involved serious entrapment costs, the historical record would include cases in which the United States had been dragged into conflicts and crises despite having no direct stake in them. There are few such cases. American allies have proven no more likely to become engaged in conflicts with adversaries than are other states, suggesting that US security guarantees have not provoked adventurism.13\nTrue, during the Cold War, the United States faced serious national security challenges in allied territory, including the Berlin Crisis and the Taiwan Straits Crises. But as we saw in Chapter 2, the strong US stand over Berlin was not a product of beneficent obligation to West Germany; US policymakers saw US national interests at stake. Alliance with Bonn helped to make the US commitment to West Germany more credible, but it did not entangle the country in an uninvited fracas. Likewise during the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, Washington had an independent interest in averting a conflict between Taipei and Beijing; it was not simply ensnared in an ally's woes.\nThe United States also entered two major wars during the Cold War, in Korea and Vietnam. But in neither case was its participation a result of alliance commitments. The United States could not have been entangled by alliance with South Korea because the two did not have an alliance during the war. The dynamic arguably was just the opposite: Washington was dragged into war because it failed to commit to Seoul in early 1950. The United States later dangled the prospect of an alliance in order to win the South's support for an armistice. Vietnam, the most flagrant American military blunder of the Cold War, also was not provoked by alliance obligations. SEATO, the US defense pact in Southeast Asia, did not include Vietnam as a partner. Indeed, most of America's allies opposed the US war in 14 Vietnam, and some worried that they would be entrapped. South Korea and Australia did enter the fray, sending large numbers of troops to assist the United States, even though their own publics op­ posed the war. The United States fought in Vietnam because of its own perceived national interests and arguably paid lower, if still considerable, costs in blood and treasure than it would have if not for allies.\nIn the first few years after the Cold War, the United States participated in two more major conflicts, in the Middle East and the Balkans. The Gulf War was precipitated by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, with which the United States did not have an alliance. The George H. W. Bush administration committed troops to repel a violation of the UN Charter-not because it was obligated by treaty to protect Kuwait. Alliances played a greater role in the decision to take part in conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, as the United States sought to keep the North Atlantic Treaty relevant after the Cold War. But the Clinton administration also identified humanitarian interests and aimed to establish the United States' newfound global primacy through leadership in the Balkan conflicts. Neither Bosnia nor Kosovo were NATO members. ", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Strategists\nattempt to tabulate the political costs of alliances by considering\nalliance entrapment\nEntrapment occurs when a state is dragged into a conflict in pursuit of an ally's interests. Lesser\nentrapment can occur when one partner behaves recklessly\ntoward an adversary due to its confidence in alliance support.\nThe likelihood of entrapment\nvary depending on how power is distributed internationally. Allied entrapment and abandonment were\nless likely during the Cold War than\nthe period preceding the First World War. With multiple centers of political power, alliances were less stable, and countries\nde-aligned with relative frequency. The structure of Cold War competition,\nwas conducive to durable alliances. Because the bipolar world was organized around two\ncenters, the United States and the Soviet Union, smaller allies could not\ntip the balance of power. The loss of any one\npartner was not catastrophic\nNonetheless, prominent scholars point to\nthe serious risk of American entrapment by \"reckless drivers.'\nIf America's Cold War alliances involved\nentrapment costs, the historical record would include cases in which the U\nS\nhad been dragged into conflicts\ndespite having no direct stake in them. There are few such cases. American allies have proven no more likely to become engaged in conflicts\nthan are other states, suggesting that US security guarantees have not provoked adventurism\nduring the Cold War, the United States faced\nnational security challenges in allied territory, including the Berlin Crisis and\nTaiwan\nBut\nthe\nUS stand over Berlin was not a product of beneficent obligation\nUS policymakers saw US national interests at stake.\nLikewise during the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, Washington had an independent interest in averting a conflict between Taipei and Beijing; it was not\nensnared in an ally's woes.\nThe U\nS\nentered two major wars during the Cold War, in Korea and Vietnam\nin neither case was its participation a result of alliance commitments. The U\nS\ncould not have been entangled by alliance with South Korea because the two did not have an alliance\nThe dynamic\nwas\nthe opposite: Washington was dragged into war because it failed to commit to Seoul\nVietnam, the\nflagrant American military blunder\nwas not provoked by alliance obligations. SEATO, the US defense pact\ndid not include Vietnam as a partner\nmost of America's allies opposed the US war in\nVietnam\nsome worried that they would be entrapped\nThe U\nS\nfought in Vietnam because of its\nnational interests and\npaid lower\ncosts in blood and treasure than it would have if not for allies.\nafter the Cold War, the U\nS\nparticipated in two more major conflicts, in the Middle East and the Balkans. The Gulf War was precipitated by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, with which the U\nS\ndid not have an alliance\nBush\ncommitted troops to repel a violation of the UN Charter-not because it was obligated by treaty to protect Kuwait. Alliances played a greater role in\nBosnia and Kosovo\nBut the Clinton administration\nidentified humanitarian interests and aimed to establish the U\nS\nglobal primacy\nNeither Bosnia nor Kosovo were NATO members.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Most major conflicts have occurred absent a formal alliance commitment.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Strategists\nattempt to tabulate the political costs of alliances by considering\nalliance entrapment\nEntrapment occurs when a state is dragged into a conflict in pursuit of an ally's interests. Lesser\nentrapment can occur when one partner behaves recklessly\ntoward an adversary due to its confidence in alliance support.\nThe likelihood of entrapment\nvary depending on how power is distributed internationally. Allied entrapment and abandonment were\nless likely during the Cold War than\nthe period preceding the First World War. With multiple centers of political power, alliances were less stable, and countries\nde-aligned with relative frequency. The structure of Cold War competition,\nwas conducive to durable alliances. Because the bipolar world was organized around two\ncenters, the United States and the Soviet Union, smaller allies could not\ntip the balance of power. The loss of any one\npartner was not catastrophic\nNonetheless, prominent scholars point to\nthe serious risk of American entrapment by \"reckless drivers.'\nIf America's Cold War alliances involved\nentrapment costs, the historical record would include cases in which the U\nS\nhad been dragged into conflicts\ndespite having no direct stake in them. There are few such cases. American allies have proven no more likely to become engaged in conflicts\nthan are other states, suggesting that US security guarantees have not provoked adventurism\nduring the Cold War, the United States faced\nnational security challenges in allied territory, including the Berlin Crisis and\nTaiwan\nBut\nthe\nUS stand over Berlin was not a product of beneficent obligation\nUS policymakers saw US national interests at stake.\nLikewise during the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, Washington had an independent interest in averting a conflict between Taipei and Beijing; it was not\nensnared in an ally's woes.\nThe U\nS\nentered two major wars during the Cold War, in Korea and Vietnam\nin neither case was its participation a result of alliance commitments. The U\nS\ncould not have been entangled by alliance with South Korea because the two did not have an alliance\nThe dynamic\nwas\nthe opposite: Washington was dragged into war because it failed to commit to Seoul\nVietnam, the\nflagrant American military blunder\nwas not provoked by alliance obligations. SEATO, the US defense pact\ndid not include Vietnam as a partner\nmost of America's allies opposed the US war in\nVietnam\nsome worried that they would be entrapped\nThe U\nS\nfought in Vietnam because of its\nnational interests and\npaid lower\ncosts in blood and treasure than it would have if not for allies.\nafter the Cold War, the U\nS\nparticipated in two more major conflicts, in the Middle East and the Balkans. The Gulf War was precipitated by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, with which the U\nS\ndid not have an alliance\nBush\ncommitted troops to repel a violation of the UN Charter-not because it was obligated by treaty to protect Kuwait. Alliances played a greater role in\nBosnia and Kosovo\nBut the Clinton administration\nidentified humanitarian interests and aimed to establish the U\nS\nglobal primacy\nNeither Bosnia nor Kosovo were NATO members.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "alliance entrapment\nEntrapment\ndragged into a conflict\nbehaves recklessly\nlikelihood of entrapment\ndistributed internationally\nless stable\nde-aligned with relative frequency.\ndurable alliances\ncould not\ntip the balance of power\nnot catastrophic\nreckless drivers\nhistorical record\ndragged into conflicts\nno direct stake\nfew such cases\nno more likely\nhave not provoked adventurism\nBerlin Crisis\nTaiwan\nbeneficent obligation\nUS national interests\nindependent interest\naverting a conflict\nnot\nensnared\nKorea\nVietnam\nin neither case\ndid not have an alliance\nthe opposite\nfailed to commit to Seoul\ndid not include Vietnam\nopposed the US war in\nVietnam\npaid lower\ncosts\nMiddle East\nBalkans\nnvasion of Kuwait\nviolation of the UN Charter\nhumanitarian interests\nNATO members.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Most major conflicts have occurred absent a formal alliance commitment.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Strategists\nattempt to tabulate the political costs of alliances by considering\nalliance entrapment\nEntrapment occurs when a state is dragged into a conflict in pursuit of an ally's interests. Lesser\nentrapment can occur when one partner behaves recklessly\ntoward an adversary due to its confidence in alliance support.\nThe likelihood of entrapment\nvary depending on how power is distributed internationally. Allied entrapment and abandonment were\nless likely during the Cold War than\nthe period preceding the First World War. With multiple centers of political power, alliances were less stable, and countries\nde-aligned with relative frequency. The structure of Cold War competition,\nwas conducive to durable alliances. Because the bipolar world was organized around two\ncenters, the United States and the Soviet Union, smaller allies could not\ntip the balance of power. The loss of any one\npartner was not catastrophic\nNonetheless, prominent scholars point to\nthe serious risk of American entrapment by \"reckless drivers.'\nIf America's Cold War alliances involved\nentrapment costs, the historical record would include cases in which the U\nS\nhad been dragged into conflicts\ndespite having no direct stake in them. There are few such cases. American allies have proven no more likely to become engaged in conflicts\nthan are other states, suggesting that US security guarantees have not provoked adventurism\nduring the Cold War, the United States faced\nnational security challenges in allied territory, including the Berlin Crisis and\nTaiwan\nBut\nthe\nUS stand over Berlin was not a product of beneficent obligation\nUS policymakers saw US national interests at stake.\nLikewise during the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, Washington had an independent interest in averting a conflict between Taipei and Beijing; it was not\nensnared in an ally's woes.\nThe U\nS\nentered two major wars during the Cold War, in Korea and Vietnam\nin neither case was its participation a result of alliance commitments. The U\nS\ncould not have been entangled by alliance with South Korea because the two did not have an alliance\nThe dynamic\nwas\nthe opposite: Washington was dragged into war because it failed to commit to Seoul\nVietnam, the\nflagrant American military blunder\nwas not provoked by alliance obligations. SEATO, the US defense pact\ndid not include Vietnam as a partner\nmost of America's allies opposed the US war in\nVietnam\nsome worried that they would be entrapped\nThe U\nS\nfought in Vietnam because of its\nnational interests and\npaid lower\ncosts in blood and treasure than it would have if not for allies.\nafter the Cold War, the U\nS\nparticipated in two more major conflicts, in the Middle East and the Balkans. The Gulf War was precipitated by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, with which the U\nS\ndid not have an alliance\nBush\ncommitted troops to repel a violation of the UN Charter-not because it was obligated by treaty to protect Kuwait. Alliances played a greater role in\nBosnia and Kosovo\nBut the Clinton administration\nidentified humanitarian interests and aimed to establish the U\nS\nglobal primacy\nNeither Bosnia nor Kosovo were NATO members.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The likelihood of entrapment\nvary depending on how power is distributed internationally\nBecause the\nworld was organized around\nthe United States\nsmaller allies could not\ntip the balance of power\nIf America's\nalliances involved\nentrapment\nthe historical record would include cases in which the U\nS\nhad been dragged into conflicts\nThere are few\ncases\nallies have proven no more likely to become engaged in conflicts\nBerlin was not a product of\nobligation\nLikewise during\nTaiwan\nWashington had an independent interest\nit was not\nensnared\nin Korea and Vietnam\nin neither case was its participation a result of alliance commitments\nmost\nallies opposed the\nwar in\nVietnam\nThe Gulf War was precipitated by\nHussein's invasion of Kuwait,\nin\nBosnia and Kosovo\nNeither\nwere NATO members", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Russia knows NATO’s force posture is defensive and unthreatening. NATO does not cause the security dilemma.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Based on these definitions and distinctions, my answer to the question about whether NATO enlargement caused or contributed to a security dilemma for Russia is mostly no: NATO’s inclusion of the Visegrád states (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) did not create or exacerbate a security dilemma for Russia. The answer switches to ‘maybe,’ though, when it comes to NATO’s inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania.\nThe key terms here are ‘uncertainty’ about ‘malign intentions.’ NATO (and the U.S.) were revisionist in the sense that they took advantage of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 and of the Soviet Union in 1991 to expand their own political influence in the region. But they did not cause either of those collapses, and enlargement happened years afterwards because states formerly under the Soviet thumb pressured NATO to let them in—not because the U.S. or NATO pressured them to join. Enlargement per se did not signal aggression.\nMost important, a review of the military capabilities that new NATO members brought to the table shows their inclusion weakened NATO, rather than strengthening it. Let me give just a few examples. In the years after Poland joined NATO it was mired in civil-military struggles and domestic political fights over budgeting and force planning, with no real plans even for territorial self-defense.[54] Just before the Russia-Georgia war broke out in 2008, Poland officially defined its military missions primarily in terms of helping NATO and the UN in out-of-area peace enforcement and anti-terrorism operations.[55] In another example, not only have force deployments in the Baltic states never been anywhere close to posing an offensive threat to Russia, but a famous 2016 RAND study found that NATO would have difficulty reinforcing their defenses either by land or sea in the event of a Russian attack.[56]\nMeanwhile the U.S. force presence in Europe declined precipitously.[57] This means that if NATO ever changed its military goals to the offense, for example by placing significant new weapons and personnel numbers in Europe, Russia would have plenty of advanced warning. Unless that occurred there could be no real uncertainty: NATO’s military capabilities and goals in the region were not malign, but only minimally (and even weakly) defensive, and could not have been used offensively. Russia knew this. According to data that Moscow released via the Vienna confidence-building agreement to other members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the number of troops and equipment (including battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery) that Russia deployed in its Western and Southern Military Districts (bordering NATO) from 2000-2010 dropped steeply, and continued to decline more gradually until a sharp uptick associated with its intervention in Ukraine in 2014.[58] Indeed a recent RAND deep dive into Russian military doctrine discovered that the “critical force correlation” for Russian military planners is NATO’s ability to carry out an aerospace attack, based on air- and sea-launched precision strikes, with ground forces used primarily to mop up afterwards.[59] The vast majority of those strikes would not be launched from the territories of new NATO member states, but from North America, the UK, and the open ocean.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "my answer to\nwhether NATO enlargement\ncontributed to a security dilemma for Russia is\nno: NATO’s inclusion of the Visegrád states (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) did not\nexacerbate a security dilemma for Russia.\nNATO (and the U.S.) were revisionist in the sense that they took advantage of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact\nand of the Soviet Union\nto expand their\npolitical influence\nBut they did not cause either of those collapses\nenlargement happened years afterwards because states\npressured NATO to let them in—not because the U.S. or NATO pressured them\nEnlargement\ndid not signal aggression\na review of the military capabilities\nnew NATO members brought\nshows their inclusion weakened NATO, rather than strengthening it\nIn the years after Poland joined NATO it was mired in civil-military struggles and\nfights over budgeting and force planning\nPoland\ndefined its military missions primarily in terms of\nout-of-area peace enforcement and anti-terrorism operations\nnot only have force deployments in the Baltic states never been anywhere close to\nan offensive threat to Russia, but a\n2016 RAND study found\nNATO would have difficulty reinforcing their defenses\nin the event of a Russian attack\nthe U.S. force presence in Europe declined precipitously\nif NATO ever changed its military goals to the offense\nRussia would have plenty of advanced warning\nthere could be no real uncertainty: NATO’s\ncapabilities\nwere not malign, but only minimally\ndefensive, and could not have been used offensively. Russia knew this.\nthe number of troops and equipment\nthat Russia deployed in its Western and Southern Military Districts\ndropped steeply, and continued to decline\nuntil a sharp uptick\nin 2014\nthe “critical force correlation” for Russian military planners is NATO’s ability to carry out an aerospace attack,\nThe vast majority of those strikes would not be launched from\nnew NATO member states, but\nNorth America, the UK, and the open ocean", "role": "assistant" } ]