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DebateCards-SFT-phase2-v2

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[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Russia knows NATO’s force posture is defensive and unthreatening. NATO does not cause the security dilemma.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "my answer to\nwhether NATO enlargement\ncontributed to a security dilemma for Russia is\nno: NATO’s inclusion of the Visegrád states (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) did not\nexacerbate a security dilemma for Russia.\nNATO (and the U.S.) were revisionist in the sense that they took advantage of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact\nand of the Soviet Union\nto expand their\npolitical influence\nBut they did not cause either of those collapses\nenlargement happened years afterwards because states\npressured NATO to let them in—not because the U.S. or NATO pressured them\nEnlargement\ndid not signal aggression\na review of the military capabilities\nnew NATO members brought\nshows their inclusion weakened NATO, rather than strengthening it\nIn the years after Poland joined NATO it was mired in civil-military struggles and\nfights over budgeting and force planning\nPoland\ndefined its military missions primarily in terms of\nout-of-area peace enforcement and anti-terrorism operations\nnot only have force deployments in the Baltic states never been anywhere close to\nan offensive threat to Russia, but a\n2016 RAND study found\nNATO would have difficulty reinforcing their defenses\nin the event of a Russian attack\nthe U.S. force presence in Europe declined precipitously\nif NATO ever changed its military goals to the offense\nRussia would have plenty of advanced warning\nthere could be no real uncertainty: NATO’s\ncapabilities\nwere not malign, but only minimally\ndefensive, and could not have been used offensively. Russia knew this.\nthe number of troops and equipment\nthat Russia deployed in its Western and Southern Military Districts\ndropped steeply, and continued to decline\nuntil a sharp uptick\nin 2014\nthe “critical force correlation” for Russian military planners is NATO’s ability to carry out an aerospace attack,\nThe vast majority of those strikes would not be launched from\nnew NATO member states, but\nNorth America, the UK, and the open ocean", "role": "user" }, { "content": "NATO enlargement\nno\ndid not\nexacerbate a security dilemma\ndid not cause\nenlargement happened years afterwards\npressured NATO\ndid not signal aggression\nweakened NATO\nPoland\ndifficulty reinforcing their defenses\ndeclined precipitously\nplenty of advanced warning\nRussia knew this.\ncontinued to decline\ncritical force correlation\naerospace attack\nNorth America\nthe UK", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Russia knows NATO’s force posture is defensive and unthreatening. NATO does not cause the security dilemma.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "my answer to\nwhether NATO enlargement\ncontributed to a security dilemma for Russia is\nno: NATO’s inclusion of the Visegrád states (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) did not\nexacerbate a security dilemma for Russia.\nNATO (and the U.S.) were revisionist in the sense that they took advantage of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact\nand of the Soviet Union\nto expand their\npolitical influence\nBut they did not cause either of those collapses\nenlargement happened years afterwards because states\npressured NATO to let them in—not because the U.S. or NATO pressured them\nEnlargement\ndid not signal aggression\na review of the military capabilities\nnew NATO members brought\nshows their inclusion weakened NATO, rather than strengthening it\nIn the years after Poland joined NATO it was mired in civil-military struggles and\nfights over budgeting and force planning\nPoland\ndefined its military missions primarily in terms of\nout-of-area peace enforcement and anti-terrorism operations\nnot only have force deployments in the Baltic states never been anywhere close to\nan offensive threat to Russia, but a\n2016 RAND study found\nNATO would have difficulty reinforcing their defenses\nin the event of a Russian attack\nthe U.S. force presence in Europe declined precipitously\nif NATO ever changed its military goals to the offense\nRussia would have plenty of advanced warning\nthere could be no real uncertainty: NATO’s\ncapabilities\nwere not malign, but only minimally\ndefensive, and could not have been used offensively. Russia knew this.\nthe number of troops and equipment\nthat Russia deployed in its Western and Southern Military Districts\ndropped steeply, and continued to decline\nuntil a sharp uptick\nin 2014\nthe “critical force correlation” for Russian military planners is NATO’s ability to carry out an aerospace attack,\nThe vast majority of those strikes would not be launched from\nnew NATO member states, but\nNorth America, the UK, and the open ocean", "role": "user" }, { "content": "my answer to\nwhether NATO enlargement\ncontributed to a security dilemma\nis\nno\nNATO\ndid not cause either\ncollapse\nenlargement happened years afterwards because states\npressured NATO\nEnlargement\ndid not signal aggression\nnew NATO members\nweakened NATO\nPoland\ndefined\nmilitary missions\nin terms of\npeace enforcement\nnot only have\ndeployments in the Baltic\nnever been\nclose\nbut\nNATO would have difficulty reinforcing their defenses\nthe U.S.\npresence\ndeclined\nRussia would have plenty of advanced warning\nNATO’s\ncapabilities\nwere\nminimally\ndefensive, and could not have been\noffensive\nRussia knew this\nthe “critical\ncorrelation\nis\nan aerospace attack\nThe vast majority\nwould not be launched from\nnew\nmember states", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Clog now – judicial backlogs are systemic. Terminally denies the link.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "With jury trials still suspended, cases are being dismissed by the dozen. Defendants live with charges they can’t shake. And Dick Collier lies awake at night, wondering if he will die before the man accused of killing his daughter faces justice.\n“That’s my fear,” said Collier, 81, and in precarious health. “That I might not live long enough to see him go to trial.”\nNearly two years after the American justice system was paralyzed frozen by a pandemic, the repercussions continue to radiate through communities nationwide, from tiny towns to the largest cities.\nDistrict attorneys face some of the longest case backlogs in living memory. Defendants languish in jails that have become breeding grounds for the coronavirus. Others are set free — and, some prosecutors say, may be contributing to a spike in violent crime that is only compounding the pileup.\nAlthough the shutdown in Newport is extreme — most courthouses are back in action, even if they are not yet at their pre-pandemic capacity — legal officials from coast to coast say justice delayed by covid-19 will continue to be a feature of the American landscape for several years to come. And that’s assuming the courts don’t have to shut down again for omicron or another new variant.\n“This is a three-year project to get the number of pending cases back to what it was. And I’m an optimist,” said Dan Satterberg, prosecuting attorney in King County, Wash., which includes Seattle. “It’s a historic challenge that we’re facing right now.”\nThe backlogged system has had deadly consequences, officials say.\nIn Wisconsin, Darrell Brooks was set to stand trial this year for allegedly firing a gun at his nephew. Prosecutors were ready, as was the defense. But there was no courtroom available. With the system unable to deliver the speedy trial that Brooks had requested — and that the state was required to deliver — he was released on $500 bail.\nWhile out, court records show, the 39-year-old allegedly tried to use his car to run over the mother of his child and was arrested once more. But an overburdened junior prosecutor juggling a jury trial and two dozen other felony cases set his new bail at $1,000 — an amount the district attorney would later call “a mistake” — and Brooks was released again.\nJust days later, on Nov. 21, prosecutors say Brooks plowed his car into the Christmas parade in the Milwaukee suburb of Waukesha, hitting 60 people — and killing six. This time, his bail was set at $5 million.\nWhile critics have focused on the low bail amounts, Milwaukee District Attorney John Chisolm said the case was better understood as the tragic consequence of when courts can’t keep up.\n“This is a system issue right now, and it’s only going to get worse,” Chisholm told reporters this month. “These backlogs aren’t going to magically disappear.”\nDelays in the U.S. court system are nothing new, of course. Long before the coronavirus, America stood out among its industrialized peers for the extensive wait times from charges filed to verdict delivered.\n“It’s not that the criminal justice system was a model of efficiency prior to the pandemic,” said Christopher Slobogin, a law professor at Vanderbilt University. “But now things have gotten much worse, and ultimately that’s not good for anybody.”\nWhen the pandemic struck, the impact on the courts was immediate and far-reaching: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared a “statewide judicial emergency” and extended filing deadlines. Virginia’s Supreme Court issued an order suspending nonessential proceedings in circuit and district courts. The Iowa Supreme Court announced that it was pushing back criminal trials, while Alabama’s Supreme Court suspended in-person court proceedings.\nBecause criminal defendants have a constitutional right to face their accusers, criminal trials — unlike civil and family law cases — generally could not be conducted remotely. And amid fears of superspreader events, jury trials in cramped quarters seemed especially unwise.\nThe shutdowns reverberated nationwide, but to varying degrees. Some states reopened far more quickly than others. Now, even as certain areas report lengthy delays, others say their backlogs are gone. A survey by the Thomson Reuters Institute released in August found that the average backlog in state and local courts had increased by about a third.\nVera Institute of Justice Vice President Insha Rahman said that, on the whole, the courts were slow relative to other parts of society in getting back up and running. And the reason, Rahman said, is insidious: The courts disproportionately “process cases for people who are poor, who are Black and brown. If the courts were filled with cases of White kids from suburban, wealthy parts of our communities, there would have been more urgency to bring things back to normal.”\nAttorneys and experts say the impact of delayed criminal cases is felt across the board. They point out that defendants can be sitting in jail, losing out on employment and means to support their families. Victims of crime who were traumatized face added anguish waiting to see how the cases are resolved. And, these attorneys and experts say, there are practical reasons for trials to happen sooner rather than later.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "With jury trials\nsuspended, cases are being dismissed by the dozen. Defendants live with charges they can’t shake\nNearly two years after the American justice system was\nfrozen by a pandemic, the repercussions continue to radiate through communities nationwide\nDistrict attorneys face some of the longest case backlogs in living memory. Defendants languish in jails that have become breeding grounds for the coronavirus.\nthe shutdown in Newport is extreme\nlegal officials from coast to coast say justice delayed by covid-19 will continue to be a feature of the American landscape for several years to come.\nthat’s assuming the courts don’t have to shut down again for omicron or another new variant.\nThis is a three-year project to get the number of pending cases back to what it was. And I’m an optimist,”\nIt’s a historic challenge that we’re facing right now.”\nThe backlogged system has\ndeadly consequences\nThis is a system issue right now\nit’s only going to get worse\nbacklogs aren’t going to magically disappear.”\nDelays in the U.S. court system are nothing new\nAmerica stood out among its industrialized peers for the extensive wait times from charges filed to verdict delivered.\n“It’s not that the criminal justice system was a model of efficiency prior to the pandemic\nnow things have gotten much worse, and ultimately that’s not good for anybody.”\nWhen the pandemic struck, the impact on the courts was immediate and far-reaching: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared a “statewide judicial emergency”\nVirginia\nissued an order suspending nonessential proceedings in circuit and district courts\nshutdowns reverberated nationwide\nthe average backlog\nhad increased by about a third.\nthe impact of delayed criminal cases is felt across the board\nthere are practical reasons for trials to happen sooner rather than later.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Clog now – judicial backlogs are systemic. Terminally denies the link.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "With jury trials\nsuspended, cases are being dismissed by the dozen. Defendants live with charges they can’t shake\nNearly two years after the American justice system was\nfrozen by a pandemic, the repercussions continue to radiate through communities nationwide\nDistrict attorneys face some of the longest case backlogs in living memory. Defendants languish in jails that have become breeding grounds for the coronavirus.\nthe shutdown in Newport is extreme\nlegal officials from coast to coast say justice delayed by covid-19 will continue to be a feature of the American landscape for several years to come.\nthat’s assuming the courts don’t have to shut down again for omicron or another new variant.\nThis is a three-year project to get the number of pending cases back to what it was. And I’m an optimist,”\nIt’s a historic challenge that we’re facing right now.”\nThe backlogged system has\ndeadly consequences\nThis is a system issue right now\nit’s only going to get worse\nbacklogs aren’t going to magically disappear.”\nDelays in the U.S. court system are nothing new\nAmerica stood out among its industrialized peers for the extensive wait times from charges filed to verdict delivered.\n“It’s not that the criminal justice system was a model of efficiency prior to the pandemic\nnow things have gotten much worse, and ultimately that’s not good for anybody.”\nWhen the pandemic struck, the impact on the courts was immediate and far-reaching: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared a “statewide judicial emergency”\nVirginia\nissued an order suspending nonessential proceedings in circuit and district courts\nshutdowns reverberated nationwide\nthe average backlog\nhad increased by about a third.\nthe impact of delayed criminal cases is felt across the board\nthere are practical reasons for trials to happen sooner rather than later.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "dismissed by the dozen\nradiate through communities nationwide\nthe longest case backlogs in living memory\ncoast to coast\ndelayed by covid-19\nfeature of the American landscape\nshut down again for omicron\nthree-year project\nAnd I’m an optimist,”\nhistoric challenge\ndeadly consequences\nsystem issue\nonly going to get worse\naren’t going to magically disappear\nnothing new\nextensive wait times\nthings have gotten much worse\nstatewide judicial emergency\nincreased by about a third.\nfelt across the board", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Clog now – judicial backlogs are systemic. Terminally denies the link.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "With jury trials\nsuspended, cases are being dismissed by the dozen. Defendants live with charges they can’t shake\nNearly two years after the American justice system was\nfrozen by a pandemic, the repercussions continue to radiate through communities nationwide\nDistrict attorneys face some of the longest case backlogs in living memory. Defendants languish in jails that have become breeding grounds for the coronavirus.\nthe shutdown in Newport is extreme\nlegal officials from coast to coast say justice delayed by covid-19 will continue to be a feature of the American landscape for several years to come.\nthat’s assuming the courts don’t have to shut down again for omicron or another new variant.\nThis is a three-year project to get the number of pending cases back to what it was. And I’m an optimist,”\nIt’s a historic challenge that we’re facing right now.”\nThe backlogged system has\ndeadly consequences\nThis is a system issue right now\nit’s only going to get worse\nbacklogs aren’t going to magically disappear.”\nDelays in the U.S. court system are nothing new\nAmerica stood out among its industrialized peers for the extensive wait times from charges filed to verdict delivered.\n“It’s not that the criminal justice system was a model of efficiency prior to the pandemic\nnow things have gotten much worse, and ultimately that’s not good for anybody.”\nWhen the pandemic struck, the impact on the courts was immediate and far-reaching: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared a “statewide judicial emergency”\nVirginia\nissued an order suspending nonessential proceedings in circuit and district courts\nshutdowns reverberated nationwide\nthe average backlog\nhad increased by about a third.\nthe impact of delayed criminal cases is felt across the board\nthere are practical reasons for trials to happen sooner rather than later.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "attorneys face\nlongest\nbacklogs\nofficials\nsay justice delayed by covid\nwill\nbe a feature\nfor\nyears\nassuming\ncourts don’t\nshut down again for omicron\nit’s only going to get worse\nbacklogs aren’t going to\ndisappear\nIt’s not that the\nsystem was a model of efficiency prior to the pandemic\nimpact\nis\nacross the board", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Backlogs will take years to clear at minimum. Tech doesn’t solve.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "State courts across the country have gradually reopened for in-person proceedings, although many have yet to reach their pre-pandemic operating capacity.\nState attorneys can barely handle the mounting number of new cases, leaving a trail of extra work every day, all while trying to chip away at the massive backlogs accumulated during months of court shutdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic. Technology and remote hearings have helped to limit the backlog, but they could only go so far in a criminal justice system in which key functions, such as trials, still rely on face-to-face proceedings.\nThe backlog is especially acute at offices that oversee large urban cities, many of which are also plagued by an increasing shortage of state attorneys.\nIt’s an unprecedented crisis that won’t go away for years, according to a dozen state attorneys’ offices and state attorneys’ associations interviewed by The Epoch Times. As a result, justice is delayed. In other cases, justice is administered in expedient ways that are often more favorable to the defendants.\nAt the New York Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, the number of disposed cases dropped by half to around 4,500 in 2020, leaving a COVID-19 backlog of thousands of cases.\nIn 2021, the office cleared 6,400 felony cases by Oct. 8, all while adding more than 9,000 during the same period. Tony Jordan, president of the District Attorneys Association of New York, likened the court backlogs to water in a swimming pool.\n“You fill the pool with a hose, and now, you bail it out with a bucket. It is going to take years,” Jordan said.\nAn Epoch Times analysis of case-disposition data of other large state attorneys’ offices revealed the same pattern.\nAt the Seattle-based King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, there was an average of 3,300 pending cases at any given time prior to the pandemic. In October 2021, that number had risen to 5,386.\nThe number of cases closed in 2021 by the Philadelphia District Attorney’s office is 16,600 (more than 30 percent short of the pre-pandemic level in 2019), while adding more than 19,000 new cases during the same span.\nAt the Houston-based Harris County District Attorney’s Office, 473 jury trials were conducted in 2019, but only 69 in 2021.\nDavid LaBahn, president of the Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, called it an unprecedented nationwide caseload crisis that will take years to tackle.\nIn the past, the caseload problem was limited to certain offices, but the pandemic court shutdowns have made it a national problem, LaBahn said. To find a historical parallel, you would probably have to go back to the 1990s, when the crack epidemic caused a historic surge of crimes nationwide, he said.\nCompounding the backlog crisis is an increasing shortage of state attorneys in certain urban cities, he said. Young state attorneys are leaving caseload-heavy offices for either suburban or federal agencies, while old guards are retiring early after working at home for a year or so.\nOn top of that, new applicants are harder to find. One state attorney’s office used to have 20 applicants for a vacancy, now they only have one or two, LaBahn said.\nNelson O. Bunn Jr., executive director of the National District Attorney’s Association, said state attorneys were hard to recruit even before the pandemic. Low entry-level salaries, high caseloads, and mental pressure after being repeatedly exposed to horrific crimes all make the job less desirable for young talent. The pandemic just made the job even less desirable.\nBunn said one state is down 58 state attorneys in the past 18 months, and some state attorneys are handling 300 to 400 cases at a time.\n“It is just way too high for an individual to handle,” Bunn told The Epoch Times. “This is not a problem that’s going to be solved overnight. This is a multiyear challenge to address backlogs and to really get the workforce up to where it needs to be.”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "courts\nhave gradually reopened for in-person proceedings, although many have yet to reach their pre-pandemic operating capacity.\nattorneys can barely handle the mounting number of new cases, leaving a trail of extra work every day\nwhile trying to chip away at the massive backlogs accumulated during months of court shutdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic\nTechnology and remote hearings\nhelped to limit the backlog, but they could only go so far in a criminal justice system in which key functions, such as trials, still rely on face-to-face proceedings.\nThe backlog is especially acute at offices that oversee large urban cities, many of which are also plagued by an increasing shortage of\nattorneys\nIt’s an unprecedented crisis that won’t go away for years\njustice is delayed\nTony Jordan, president of the District Attorneys Association of New York, likened the court backlogs to water in a swimming pool.\n“You fill the pool with a hose, and now, you bail it out with a bucket. It is going to take years,” Jordan said.\nthere was an average of 3,300 pending cases at any given time prior to the pandemic. In October 2021, that number had risen to 5,386.\nDavid LaBahn, president of the Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, called it an unprecedented nationwide caseload crisis that will take years to tackle.\nthe pandemic court shutdowns have made it a national problem\nYoung state attorneys are leaving caseload-heavy offices for either suburban or federal agencies, while old guards are retiring early after working at home for a year or so.\nstate attorneys were hard to recruit even before the pandemic. Low entry-level salaries, high caseloads, and mental pressure after being repeatedly exposed to horrific crimes all make the job less desirable for young talent. The pandemic just made the job even less desirable.\nThis is not a problem that’s going to be solved overnight. This is a multiyear challenge to address backlogs and to really get the workforce up to where it needs to be.”", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Backlogs will take years to clear at minimum. Tech doesn’t solve.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "courts\nhave gradually reopened for in-person proceedings, although many have yet to reach their pre-pandemic operating capacity.\nattorneys can barely handle the mounting number of new cases, leaving a trail of extra work every day\nwhile trying to chip away at the massive backlogs accumulated during months of court shutdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic\nTechnology and remote hearings\nhelped to limit the backlog, but they could only go so far in a criminal justice system in which key functions, such as trials, still rely on face-to-face proceedings.\nThe backlog is especially acute at offices that oversee large urban cities, many of which are also plagued by an increasing shortage of\nattorneys\nIt’s an unprecedented crisis that won’t go away for years\njustice is delayed\nTony Jordan, president of the District Attorneys Association of New York, likened the court backlogs to water in a swimming pool.\n“You fill the pool with a hose, and now, you bail it out with a bucket. It is going to take years,” Jordan said.\nthere was an average of 3,300 pending cases at any given time prior to the pandemic. In October 2021, that number had risen to 5,386.\nDavid LaBahn, president of the Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, called it an unprecedented nationwide caseload crisis that will take years to tackle.\nthe pandemic court shutdowns have made it a national problem\nYoung state attorneys are leaving caseload-heavy offices for either suburban or federal agencies, while old guards are retiring early after working at home for a year or so.\nstate attorneys were hard to recruit even before the pandemic. Low entry-level salaries, high caseloads, and mental pressure after being repeatedly exposed to horrific crimes all make the job less desirable for young talent. The pandemic just made the job even less desirable.\nThis is not a problem that’s going to be solved overnight. This is a multiyear challenge to address backlogs and to really get the workforce up to where it needs to be.”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "pre-pandemic operating capacity.\nmassive backlogs\nmonths of court shutdowns\nhelped to limit\nkey functions\nrely on face-to-face proceedings.\nincreasing shortage of\nattorneys\nunprecedented crisis\nwon’t go away for years\nwater in a swimming pool.\nIt is going to take years\nrisen to 5,386.\ntake years to tackle.\nnational problem\nhard to recruit\neven less desirable.\nmultiyear challenge\naddress backlogs", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Backlogs will take years to clear at minimum. Tech doesn’t solve.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "courts\nhave gradually reopened for in-person proceedings, although many have yet to reach their pre-pandemic operating capacity.\nattorneys can barely handle the mounting number of new cases, leaving a trail of extra work every day\nwhile trying to chip away at the massive backlogs accumulated during months of court shutdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic\nTechnology and remote hearings\nhelped to limit the backlog, but they could only go so far in a criminal justice system in which key functions, such as trials, still rely on face-to-face proceedings.\nThe backlog is especially acute at offices that oversee large urban cities, many of which are also plagued by an increasing shortage of\nattorneys\nIt’s an unprecedented crisis that won’t go away for years\njustice is delayed\nTony Jordan, president of the District Attorneys Association of New York, likened the court backlogs to water in a swimming pool.\n“You fill the pool with a hose, and now, you bail it out with a bucket. It is going to take years,” Jordan said.\nthere was an average of 3,300 pending cases at any given time prior to the pandemic. In October 2021, that number had risen to 5,386.\nDavid LaBahn, president of the Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, called it an unprecedented nationwide caseload crisis that will take years to tackle.\nthe pandemic court shutdowns have made it a national problem\nYoung state attorneys are leaving caseload-heavy offices for either suburban or federal agencies, while old guards are retiring early after working at home for a year or so.\nstate attorneys were hard to recruit even before the pandemic. Low entry-level salaries, high caseloads, and mental pressure after being repeatedly exposed to horrific crimes all make the job less desirable for young talent. The pandemic just made the job even less desirable.\nThis is not a problem that’s going to be solved overnight. This is a multiyear challenge to address backlogs and to really get the workforce up to where it needs to be.”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "courts\nhave yet to reach\npre-pandemic operating capacity\nattorneys can barely handle the mounting number of\ncases,\nTechnology\nhelped\nbut\ncould only go so far in a\nsystem in which\ntrials\nrely on face-to-face proceedings\ncities\nare\nplagued by a\nshortage of\nattorneys\nIt’s\nan\nunprecedented\ncrisis\nthat\nwon’t\ngo\naway\nfor\nyears,\nYou fill the pool with a hose\nyou bail it out with a bucket. It is going to take years\nthe\nshutdowns\nmade it a national problem\nattorneys were hard to recruit\nbefore the pandemic\nThis is a multiyear challenge to address backlogs", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: “Shocks” are inevitable and have no impact.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The good news is that business confidence is hopeless as an economic indicator. The correlation with economic growth is poor and I largely ignore business confidence readings. Changes in direction can provide some insightful information – whether things are picking up or slowing down, but not the levels. \nBusinesses tend to be more upbeat regarding general confidence about the economy under a blue flag as opposed to a red one. Business confidence averaged minus 18 between 2000 and 2007. The economy (measured by real gross domestic product) grew on average by more than 3.5% per year. Yep, confidence was negative, but growth was positive. So, we ignore business confidence as an economic indicator. This is nothing new. It’s surprising headline business confidence figures receive so much attention.\nCommentators make the constant mistake of saying the ANZ survey is a business confidence survey. The same applies to the NZIER’s QSBO. They are surveys of business views across an array of key indicators including prospects for growth, hiring, whether firms are planning to invest and experiences with inflation / costs. These indicators matter. Business confidence is one question.\nThe so-called “soft” or “perception” indicators are the hard data of tomorrow. They are estimates and view based but you can’t ignore them. They are well correlated with growth.\nIn a perfect world we’d have timely “hard” official data and statistics. We don’t. Official data comes with a lag. So, we need to rely on sentiment-based indicators if we want timely readings on the economy and a guide as to the year ahead. \nThe likes of the ANZ survey are showing a sombre mood when it comes to indicators that matter. The ANZ survey asks key questions about activity, employment, investment and profitability. When these indicators head to zero, which they have done now, growth can do the same. Those indicators were weak in 2000 during the so-called winter of discontent – and growth slowed to 0.9% year on year.\nGrowth did rebound. But back then the economy was early in the economic expansion. The economy is late in the business cycle this time around. The economy has tended to go through a ten-year cycle, so businesses are naturally looking more nervously over their shoulders at present. The economy is going through substantial economic change too and businesses are wary. There is little argument over the need to change the economy. However, there are serious questions about the actual economic plan and what the new economy looks like. That is a key issue that needs addressed.\nSome of the weakness in survey measures could be put down to the way survey questions are phrased. Firms are asked their view and given three options; will conditions improve, stay the same, or worsen. For a lot of firms’ things are damned good. It’s telling that finding skilled staff is the biggest problem firms are facing. Businesses are facing capacity constraints. So, zero readings may reflect a levelling out at a high base.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "business confidence is hopeless as an economic indicator\nThe correlation with economic growth is poor\nBusinesses tend to be more upbeat regarding general confidence\nunder a blue flag as opposed to a red one\nconfidence averaged minus 18 between 2000 and 2007\neconomy\ngrew on average by more than 3.5% per year\nconfidence was negative\nbut growth was positive\neconomy\ntended to go through a ten-year cycle\nso businesses are naturally looking\nnervously over their shoulders\neconomy is going through substantial economic change\nand businesses are wary\nweakness in survey measures\nbe put down to the way survey questions are phrased", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: “Shocks” are inevitable and have no impact.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "business confidence is hopeless as an economic indicator\nThe correlation with economic growth is poor\nBusinesses tend to be more upbeat regarding general confidence\nunder a blue flag as opposed to a red one\nconfidence averaged minus 18 between 2000 and 2007\neconomy\ngrew on average by more than 3.5% per year\nconfidence was negative\nbut growth was positive\neconomy\ntended to go through a ten-year cycle\nso businesses are naturally looking\nnervously over their shoulders\neconomy is going through substantial economic change\nand businesses are wary\nweakness in survey measures\nbe put down to the way survey questions are phrased", "role": "user" }, { "content": "hopeless as an economic indicator\ncorrelation\npoor\nmore upbeat\ngeneral\nblue flag\nred\nminus 18\n2000\n2007\nmore than 3.5% per year\nnegative\npositive\nten-year cycle\nnaturally\nsubstantial\nwary\nsurvey measures\nphrased", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: “Shocks” are inevitable and have no impact.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "business confidence is hopeless as an economic indicator\nThe correlation with economic growth is poor\nBusinesses tend to be more upbeat regarding general confidence\nunder a blue flag as opposed to a red one\nconfidence averaged minus 18 between 2000 and 2007\neconomy\ngrew on average by more than 3.5% per year\nconfidence was negative\nbut growth was positive\neconomy\ntended to go through a ten-year cycle\nso businesses are naturally looking\nnervously over their shoulders\neconomy is going through substantial economic change\nand businesses are wary\nweakness in survey measures\nbe put down to the way survey questions are phrased", "role": "user" }, { "content": "confidence is hopeless\nindicator\ncorrelation with\ngrowth is poor\naveraged minus 18\necon\ngrew\n3.5%\nconfidence\nnegative\ngrowth\npositive\ntend\nto go through a ten-year cycle\nthrough substantial\nchange\nweakness in survey\ns\nput down to the way\nquestions are phrased", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Rulemaking frees resources.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Second, establishing rules could help relieve antitrust enforcement of steep costs and prolonged trials. Identifying ex ante what types of conduct constitute “unfair method[s] of competition” would obviate the need to establish the same exclusively through ex post, case-by-case adjudication. Targeting conduct through rulemaking, rather than adjudication, would likely lessen the burden of expert fees or protracted litigation, potentially saving significant resources on a present-value basis.47", "role": "user" }, { "content": "establishing rules could help relieve antitrust enforcement of steep costs and prolonged trials\nex ante\nunfair method[s] of competition” would obviate the need to establish the same exclusively through ex post, case-by-case adjudication\nrulemaking\nwould\nlessen the burden of expert fees\nprotracted litigation\nsaving significant resources on a present-value basis", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Rulemaking frees resources.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "establishing rules could help relieve antitrust enforcement of steep costs and prolonged trials\nex ante\nunfair method[s] of competition” would obviate the need to establish the same exclusively through ex post, case-by-case adjudication\nrulemaking\nwould\nlessen the burden of expert fees\nprotracted litigation\nsaving significant resources on a present-value basis", "role": "user" }, { "content": "relieve antitrust enforcement\nsteep costs\nprolonged trials\nex post\ncase-by-case adjudication\nrulemaking\nexpert fees\nprotracted litigation\nsignificant resources", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Rulemaking frees resources.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6", "role": "system" }, { "content": "establishing rules could help relieve antitrust enforcement of steep costs and prolonged trials\nex ante\nunfair method[s] of competition” would obviate the need to establish the same exclusively through ex post, case-by-case adjudication\nrulemaking\nwould\nlessen the burden of expert fees\nprotracted litigation\nsaving significant resources on a present-value basis", "role": "user" }, { "content": "rules could help relieve\nenforcement of steep costs and prolonged trials\nex ante\nwould obviate\nex post, case-by-case adjudication\nrulemaking\nwould\nlessen the burden of\nfees\nlitigation\nsaving significant resources", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Multiple points of divergence for dominant firms. .", "role": "system" }, { "content": "4.1.3. Assumptions about Underlying Economic Conditions\nDecisions of courts and enforcement agencies in the US system to relax antitrust prohibitions may stem from assumptions about the operation of the US economic system. Important characteristics of the US system include relatively strong capital markets, comparatively few impediments to the formation of new business enterprises, and an effective mechanism for recycling the assets and personnel of failed firms back into the economy. These features give the US system a substantial degree of adaptability and flexibility.\nThese conditions may help account for the assumption, reflected in decisions by courts and enforcement agencies, to disfavor intervention in a wide range of disputes. US abuse of dominance doctrine and policy, for example, assumes a considerable capacity on the part of rivals, suppliers, and consumers to adapt, reposition, and otherwise protect themselves in the face of apparent overreaching by specific firms. The same assumptions probably help explain the trend since the 1970s to disfavor intervention concerning vertical restraints – particularly in light of the expectation that distribution channels will be highly resilient and adaptable. By contrast, it is possible that, because EU officials perceive the economy of the community and its member states to be less flexible and adaptable, there is less confidence that market processes alone will provide a sufficient antidote, in the absence of public intervention, to offset seemingly anticompetitive business practices. The many measures underway in the EU to liberalize markets – to facilitate capital formation, to promote broad acceptance of a competition culture, and to realize the Treaty’s longstanding aims for community-wide economic integration – gradually could change assumptions about the robustness and resilience of markets and induce a relaxation of restrictions on business conduct.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Decisions of courts and enforcement agencies in the US system to relax antitrust prohibitions\nstem from assumptions about the operation of the US economic system\nThese conditions may help account for the assumption\nto disfavor intervention\nUS abuse of dominance doctrine\nassumes\ncapacity on the part of rivals, suppliers, and consumers to adapt\nin the face of\noverreaching by specific firms. The same assumptions\nhelp explain the trend since the 1970s to disfavor intervention concerning vertical restraints\nBy contrast\nbecause EU officials perceive the economy of the community and its member states to be less flexible\nthere is less confidence that market processes alone will provide a sufficient antidote\nin the absence of public intervention\nto offset\nanticompetitive business practices", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Multiple points of divergence for dominant firms. .", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Decisions of courts and enforcement agencies in the US system to relax antitrust prohibitions\nstem from assumptions about the operation of the US economic system\nThese conditions may help account for the assumption\nto disfavor intervention\nUS abuse of dominance doctrine\nassumes\ncapacity on the part of rivals, suppliers, and consumers to adapt\nin the face of\noverreaching by specific firms. The same assumptions\nhelp explain the trend since the 1970s to disfavor intervention concerning vertical restraints\nBy contrast\nbecause EU officials perceive the economy of the community and its member states to be less flexible\nthere is less confidence that market processes alone will provide a sufficient antidote\nin the absence of public intervention\nto offset\nanticompetitive business practices", "role": "user" }, { "content": "relax antitrust prohibitions\nintervention\ndominance doctrine\nadapt\noverreaching\ndisfavor intervention\nvertical restraints\nBy contrast\nEU\nless flexible\nsufficient antidote\npublic intervention\nanticompetitive business practices", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Multiple points of divergence for dominant firms. .\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Decisions of courts and enforcement agencies in the US system to relax antitrust prohibitions\nstem from assumptions about the operation of the US economic system\nThese conditions may help account for the assumption\nto disfavor intervention\nUS abuse of dominance doctrine\nassumes\ncapacity on the part of rivals, suppliers, and consumers to adapt\nin the face of\noverreaching by specific firms. The same assumptions\nhelp explain the trend since the 1970s to disfavor intervention concerning vertical restraints\nBy contrast\nbecause EU officials perceive the economy of the community and its member states to be less flexible\nthere is less confidence that market processes alone will provide a sufficient antidote\nin the absence of public intervention\nto offset\nanticompetitive business practices", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Decisions\nin the US system to relax antitrust\nstem from assumptions\ndisfavor intervention\nUS abuse of dominance doctrine\nassumes\ncapacity on\nrivals\nto adapt\nin the face of\noverreaching by\nfirms. The same assumptions\nexplain\ntrend\nto disfavor intervention concerning vertical restraints\nBy contrast\nEU\nperceive\neconomy\nto be less flexible\nthere is less confidence\nmarket\nalone will provide a sufficient antidote\nin the absence of\nintervention", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: FTC rulemaking key.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "4.1.2. Dissimilar Procedures: Administrative vs. Adversarial Models\nThe EU model of policy making relies chiefly on elaboration by an administrative body whose decisions are subject to judicial review. To some degree, the operations of the FTC use the same model. For the US system as a whole (including the operations of the FTC), the bulk of key decisions, such as measures to prevent the consummation of a merger, cannot be taken without judicial approval. In other words, where decisions to intervene have relatively powerful consequences, the US system gives the courts an earlier, more significant role in determining whether the prosecutors’ preferences will be fulfilled.\nIn some respects, the US reliance on the adversarial model imbues the US public enforcement system with greater caution in deciding to intervene. DOJ and FTC investigative techniques, for example, place greater weight on investigational hearings and depositions to gather and test evidence. Judicial control in the EU is hardly absent (witness the General Court’s merger decisions in 2002 in AirTours, Tetra, and Schneider31), but it is generally less intrusive and immediate as it is in the US model. On the whole, this inclines the US agencies to demand, perhaps, a greater quantum and quality of evidence before deciding to prosecute.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The EU model of policy making relies chiefly on elaboration by an administrative body\nthe operations of the FTC use the same model\nFor the US system as a whole\nthe bulk of key decisions\ncannot be taken without judicial approval\nwhere decisions to intervene have\npowerful consequences, the US system gives the courts\nsignificant role\nthe US reliance on the adversarial model imbues the US public enforcement system with greater caution in deciding to intervene\nFTC investigative techniques\nplace greater weight on investigational hearings and depositions to gather and test evidence\nJudicial control in the EU\nis\nless intrusive and immediate as it is in the US model\nthis inclines the US agencies to demand\na greater quantum\nof evidence", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: FTC rulemaking key.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The EU model of policy making relies chiefly on elaboration by an administrative body\nthe operations of the FTC use the same model\nFor the US system as a whole\nthe bulk of key decisions\ncannot be taken without judicial approval\nwhere decisions to intervene have\npowerful consequences, the US system gives the courts\nsignificant role\nthe US reliance on the adversarial model imbues the US public enforcement system with greater caution in deciding to intervene\nFTC investigative techniques\nplace greater weight on investigational hearings and depositions to gather and test evidence\nJudicial control in the EU\nis\nless intrusive and immediate as it is in the US model\nthis inclines the US agencies to demand\na greater quantum\nof evidence", "role": "user" }, { "content": "administrative body\nFTC\nas a whole\ncannot be taken\njudicial approval\nadversarial model\ngreater caution\nFTC\ninvestigational hearings\nJudicial control\nless intrusive\nUS model", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: FTC rulemaking key.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The EU model of policy making relies chiefly on elaboration by an administrative body\nthe operations of the FTC use the same model\nFor the US system as a whole\nthe bulk of key decisions\ncannot be taken without judicial approval\nwhere decisions to intervene have\npowerful consequences, the US system gives the courts\nsignificant role\nthe US reliance on the adversarial model imbues the US public enforcement system with greater caution in deciding to intervene\nFTC investigative techniques\nplace greater weight on investigational hearings and depositions to gather and test evidence\nJudicial control in the EU\nis\nless intrusive and immediate as it is in the US model\nthis inclines the US agencies to demand\na greater quantum\nof evidence", "role": "user" }, { "content": "EU model\nrelies\non\nan administrative body\nthe\nFTC use the same\nFor the US\nas a whole\nthe bulk of key decisions\ncannot be taken without judicial approval\nthe US reliance on the adversarial model imbues\nenforcement\nwith\ncaution\nFTC\ntechniques\nplace\nweight on investigational\nJudicial control in the EU\nis\nless intrusive and immediate as it is in the US model\nthis inclines the US agencies to demand\ngreater\nevidence", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Competition law is key to trade liberalization – equal distribution of market power is necessary to the benefit of trade.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Trade, competition, and market power\nEarly IPE theories drew from neoclassical trade models, whether based on class (Rogowski, 1989) or industry coalitions (Frieden, 1991; Frieden & Rogowski, 1996) for or against free trade. These theories assumed competition to be present, absent any specific impediments that were rarely, if ever, considered. While intermediate variables like factor mobility (Hiscox, 2002) introduced some dimensions of competition—in that factor immobility implies a lessening of competition across industries—the issue was largely avoided, and trade liberalization was assumed to universally increase domestic competition, an assumption necessary for the predicted distributional outcomes of these trade theories.\nEven though more recent scholarship focuses on firm-level differences in trade politics, it has still avoided direct engagement with issues of competition and market power. Building off earlier research (Busch & Milner, 1994; Milner, 1988, 1997) and insights from new trade theory (Melitz, 2003), this line of research emphasizes that factor endowments and mobility are less important than firm-level differences in productivity, cost structure, and size. There is an increasingly strong consensus that the primary beneficiaries of trade liberalization are highly productive firms characterized by large economies of scale (Baccini, 2019). Most notably, Baccini et al. (2017) find that Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) predominantly benefit the largest and most competitive firms, with increases in concentration ratios for those firms after trade liberalization. Significant research shows that these differences in the expected benefits of trade, driven by economies of scale, and productivity, are among the primary determinants of support for trade liberalization (Chase, 2003; Kim, 2017; Osgood, 2017a, 2017b; Plouffe, 2015, 2017).\nHowever, these arguments reduce economic power to differences in productivity and efficiency, rather than see it as its own political issue, even though many points in this research strongly imply dynamics of market power. Manger (2009) argues that PTAs are primarily tools for multinationals to exclude competitors from regional or national markets, because of first-mover advantages in acquiring important infrastructure or shaping domestic regulations. Similarly, one of the less well-explored details from Baccini et al. (2017) was that the depth of a PTA (including provisions for competition rules) led to a more equal distribution of benefits across firms. While more fine-grained research is needed to isolate the effects of competition provisions,3 the intuitive implication is that the uneven distributional consequences are driven in part by practices or mechanisms that would be prohibited by competition rules. Nonetheless, the reduction of differences in economic power to questions of productivity makes existing literature and theory poorly suited to understand the relationship between trade and market power.\nAs an alternative starting point, this article looks to the sociology of markets, which does not see the efficiency of different economic arrangements, organizations, or firms as central (Fligstein, 2002, p. 9). The goal of firms and economic actors is survival and stability, not just profit or income optimization. Prices are not exogenous signals of value or scarcity, but are instead contingent on legal norms, economic practices, and social values that coordinate prices to stabilize markets against price-cutting (Fligstein, 1996). Firms look for mechanisms to stabilize prices to prevent ruinous price wars with competitors (Djelic, 1998; Dobbin & Dowd, 2000; Fligstein, 1990). Under this framework, the policies that allocate the coordination rights needed to control or limit price competition—cartels, price-fixing, collusion, mergers, market power, etc.—are the key political questions, and the economic power of lead firms, and the legal infrastructure around them, are among these mechanisms. Unlike issues of direct trade liberalization or protectionism, issues of market power are more dependent on the specific power relationships among firms and competitors, and less reducible to abstract differences like productivity. The ability of antitrust and related policies to allocate coordination rights (Paul, 2020) needed to stabilize prices and markets means that prices—and thus seemingly apolitical measures like productivity—are not simply the result of which firms produce the most efficiently.\nIn this domain of antitrust, competition, and market power, the state plays a central role in the politics around trade. In the limited existing research specifically on the relationship between antitrust and trade politics, Bradford and Buthe ( € 2015) and Buthe ( € 2015) assert that competition policy is a necessary complement to trade liberalization—to avoid transnational collusion among firms—and antitrust policies are understood on the assumption that state actors genuinely aim to promote competition. This article expands on this to show that the state’s interests and policy interventions are more complex and fundamental than just avoiding collusion, and that the state’s preferences for competition are not just a functional response to trade liberalization. In contrast to public-choice perspectives in the antitrust literature that have subsumed antitrust and competition policy as nothing but another arena for regulatory rent-seeking by private interests (Guzman, 1998; Shughart, 1995), here I focus on the public interest concerns of state actors and follow the tradition of ‘state autonomy’ (Evans et al., 1985), arguing that the state is at least partially independent from the pressures of, or capture by, private interests. State actors have a more encompassing interest (Olson, 1965) in the overall functioning of markets, and they will go to great efforts to puzzle, learn, and understand how market relationships work in the aggregate. None of this framing is to suggest that private interests are not present or important, but state actors have significant space to implement their own agenda, as existing evidence is rather conflicted about the ability of concentrated or organized interests to reliably get their policy preferences.4", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Early IPE theories drew from neoclassical trade models\nfor or against free trade\nThese theories assumed competition to be present\nthe issue was largely avoided\nand trade liberalization was assumed to universally increase\ncompetition\nrecent scholarship\nhas still avoided\nengagement with issues of competition and market power\nThere is an increasingly strong consensus that the primary beneficiaries of trade liberalization are highly productive firms characterized by large economies of scale\nPTAs\npredominantly benefit the largest\nfirms, with increases in concentration ratios for those firms after trade liberalization\ndifferences in the expected benefits of trade, driven by economies of scale\nare\nthe\ndeterminants\nfor trade liberalization\nthese arguments reduce economic power to differences\nefficiency\neven though many points in this research\nimply dynamics of market power\nPTAs are\ntools for multinationals to exclude competitors from\nmarkets\nbecause of first-mover advantages\ndepth of a PTA\nincluding provisions for competition rules\nled to\nequal distribution of benefits across\nuneven distributional consequences are driven\npart by practices\nthat would be prohibited by competition rules\nthe reduction of differences in economic power to\nivity makes existing literatur\npoorly suited to understand the relationship between trade and market power\nAs an alternative\nthis article looks to the sociology of markets\nwhich does not see the efficiency\nas central\ngoal of firms\nis survival\nnot just profit\nPrices are not exogenous signals of value\nbut\ncontingent on legal norms\nthat coordinate prices to stabilize markets\npolicies that allocate\ncoordination rights needed to control\nmarket power\nare the key political questions\nand the economic power of lead firms\nare among these mechanisms\nUnlike issues of direct trade liberalization or protectionism\nissues of market power are\ndependent on\npower relationships among firms and competitors\nand less reducible to abstract differences like productivity\nThe ability of antitrust\nto allocate coordination rights\nneeded to stabilize prices\nmeans that prices\nare not simply the result of which firms produce the most efficiently\nIn\nantitrust\nthe state plays a central role in\ntrade\ncompetition policy is\nnecessary\nto trade liberalization\nstate actors have\nspace to implement their own agenda", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Competition law is key to trade liberalization – equal distribution of market power is necessary to the benefit of trade.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Early IPE theories drew from neoclassical trade models\nfor or against free trade\nThese theories assumed competition to be present\nthe issue was largely avoided\nand trade liberalization was assumed to universally increase\ncompetition\nrecent scholarship\nhas still avoided\nengagement with issues of competition and market power\nThere is an increasingly strong consensus that the primary beneficiaries of trade liberalization are highly productive firms characterized by large economies of scale\nPTAs\npredominantly benefit the largest\nfirms, with increases in concentration ratios for those firms after trade liberalization\ndifferences in the expected benefits of trade, driven by economies of scale\nare\nthe\ndeterminants\nfor trade liberalization\nthese arguments reduce economic power to differences\nefficiency\neven though many points in this research\nimply dynamics of market power\nPTAs are\ntools for multinationals to exclude competitors from\nmarkets\nbecause of first-mover advantages\ndepth of a PTA\nincluding provisions for competition rules\nled to\nequal distribution of benefits across\nuneven distributional consequences are driven\npart by practices\nthat would be prohibited by competition rules\nthe reduction of differences in economic power to\nivity makes existing literatur\npoorly suited to understand the relationship between trade and market power\nAs an alternative\nthis article looks to the sociology of markets\nwhich does not see the efficiency\nas central\ngoal of firms\nis survival\nnot just profit\nPrices are not exogenous signals of value\nbut\ncontingent on legal norms\nthat coordinate prices to stabilize markets\npolicies that allocate\ncoordination rights needed to control\nmarket power\nare the key political questions\nand the economic power of lead firms\nare among these mechanisms\nUnlike issues of direct trade liberalization or protectionism\nissues of market power are\ndependent on\npower relationships among firms and competitors\nand less reducible to abstract differences like productivity\nThe ability of antitrust\nto allocate coordination rights\nneeded to stabilize prices\nmeans that prices\nare not simply the result of which firms produce the most efficiently\nIn\nantitrust\nthe state plays a central role in\ntrade\ncompetition policy is\nnecessary\nto trade liberalization\nstate actors have\nspace to implement their own agenda", "role": "user" }, { "content": "neoclassical trade models\nfree trade\nassumed competition\nlargely avoided\ntrade liberalization\navoided\ncompetition\nmarket power\nincreasingly strong consensus\ntrade liberalization\neconomies of scale\nPTAs\nconcentration ratios\nexpected benefits\neconomies of scale\ntrade liberalization\neconomic power\nefficiency\nmarket power\nmultinationals\nexclude competitors\nfirst-mover advantages\ncompetition rules\nequal distribution\nuneven distributional consequences\nprohibited\ncompetition rules\npoorly suited\nalternative\nsociology of markets\nefficiency\nsurvival\nprofit\nexogenous signals\nlegal norms\nstabilize markets\ncoordination rights\nmarket power\nkey political questions\nmarket power\npower relationships\nabstract differences\nantitrust\ncoordination rights\nefficiently\nantitrust\ncentral role\ntrade\ncompetition policy\nnecessary\ntrade liberalization\nstate actors", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Competition law is key to trade liberalization – equal distribution of market power is necessary to the benefit of trade.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.1", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Early IPE theories drew from neoclassical trade models\nfor or against free trade\nThese theories assumed competition to be present\nthe issue was largely avoided\nand trade liberalization was assumed to universally increase\ncompetition\nrecent scholarship\nhas still avoided\nengagement with issues of competition and market power\nThere is an increasingly strong consensus that the primary beneficiaries of trade liberalization are highly productive firms characterized by large economies of scale\nPTAs\npredominantly benefit the largest\nfirms, with increases in concentration ratios for those firms after trade liberalization\ndifferences in the expected benefits of trade, driven by economies of scale\nare\nthe\ndeterminants\nfor trade liberalization\nthese arguments reduce economic power to differences\nefficiency\neven though many points in this research\nimply dynamics of market power\nPTAs are\ntools for multinationals to exclude competitors from\nmarkets\nbecause of first-mover advantages\ndepth of a PTA\nincluding provisions for competition rules\nled to\nequal distribution of benefits across\nuneven distributional consequences are driven\npart by practices\nthat would be prohibited by competition rules\nthe reduction of differences in economic power to\nivity makes existing literatur\npoorly suited to understand the relationship between trade and market power\nAs an alternative\nthis article looks to the sociology of markets\nwhich does not see the efficiency\nas central\ngoal of firms\nis survival\nnot just profit\nPrices are not exogenous signals of value\nbut\ncontingent on legal norms\nthat coordinate prices to stabilize markets\npolicies that allocate\ncoordination rights needed to control\nmarket power\nare the key political questions\nand the economic power of lead firms\nare among these mechanisms\nUnlike issues of direct trade liberalization or protectionism\nissues of market power are\ndependent on\npower relationships among firms and competitors\nand less reducible to abstract differences like productivity\nThe ability of antitrust\nto allocate coordination rights\nneeded to stabilize prices\nmeans that prices\nare not simply the result of which firms produce the most efficiently\nIn\nantitrust\nthe state plays a central role in\ntrade\ncompetition policy is\nnecessary\nto trade liberalization\nstate actors have\nspace to implement their own agenda", "role": "user" }, { "content": "beneficiaries of trade\nare\nfirms characterized by\neconomies of scale\nPTAs\nincrease\nconcentration\ndifferences in\nexpected benefits\nare\ndeterminants\nfor trade\nPTAs\nexclude competitors\ncompetition\nled to\nequal distribution of benefits\nissues of market power are\ndependent on\nrelationships\nantitrust\nallocate coordination rights\nnecessary\nto trade liberalization", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: MHHI is empirically validated and even without using the metric, studies show it increases prices.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Others critique the MHHI measure of horizontal shareholding because it assumes that shareholder influence turns on relative shareholdings, aggregates shareholdings at the fund family level, or fails to assume that the financial incentives of institutional investors equal only 1% of owned stock value. These critiques are mistaken on theoretical grounds, but more generally miss the point that whether MHHI levels affect prices is a hypothesis that the studies empirically tested and validated. To the extent that alternative measures fail to predict price effects as well as MHHI levels do, it suggests that those alternative measure are failing to include an important feature of horizontal shareholding that MHHI picks up. In any event, even if one uses a measure of horizontal shareholding that does not assume relative influence or aggregate shareholding, the studies continue to show adverse price effects.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Others critique the MHHI measure\nThese critiques are mistaken on theoretical grounds\nbut more generally miss the point that whether MHHI levels affect prices is a hypothesis that the studies empirically tested and validated\nalternative measure are failing to include an important feature of horizontal shareholding that MHHI picks up\neven if one uses a measure of horizontal shareholding that does not assume relative influence or aggregate shareholding\nstudies\nshow adverse price effects", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: MHHI is empirically validated and even without using the metric, studies show it increases prices.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Others critique the MHHI measure\nThese critiques are mistaken on theoretical grounds\nbut more generally miss the point that whether MHHI levels affect prices is a hypothesis that the studies empirically tested and validated\nalternative measure are failing to include an important feature of horizontal shareholding that MHHI picks up\neven if one uses a measure of horizontal shareholding that does not assume relative influence or aggregate shareholding\nstudies\nshow adverse price effects", "role": "user" }, { "content": "MHHI measure\nmistaken\ntheoretical grounds\npoint\nMHHI levels\nhypothesis\nempirically tested\nvalidated\nimportant feature\nhorizontal shareholding\nMHHI picks\ndoes not assume\nadverse price effects", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: MHHI is empirically validated and even without using the metric, studies show it increases prices.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.8", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Others critique the MHHI measure\nThese critiques are mistaken on theoretical grounds\nbut more generally miss the point that whether MHHI levels affect prices is a hypothesis that the studies empirically tested and validated\nalternative measure are failing to include an important feature of horizontal shareholding that MHHI picks up\neven if one uses a measure of horizontal shareholding that does not assume relative influence or aggregate shareholding\nstudies\nshow adverse price effects", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Others critique\nMHHI measure\nThese\nare mistaken on theoretical grounds\nbut\nmiss the point that whether MHHI levels affect prices is\nhypothesis that\nstudies empirically tested and validated\nalternative measure are failing to include an important feature of horizontal shareholding that MHHI picks up\neven if one uses a measure\nthat does not assume\nshareholding\nstudies\nshow adverse price effects", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Case-by-case adjudication creates slow, ambiguous enforcement and deprives legal participation – regulatory uncertainty substantially disadvantages entrants.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Antitrust law today is developed exclusively through adjudication. In theory, this case-by-case approach facilitates nuanced and fact-specific analysis of liability and well-tailored remedies. But in practice, the reliance on case-by-case adjudication yields a system of enforcement that generates ambiguity, unduly drains resources from enforcers, and deprives individuals and firms of any real opportunity to democratically participate in the process. \nOne reason that antitrust adjudication suffers from these shortcomings is that courts analyze most forms of conduct under the “rule of reason” standard. The “rule of reason” involves a broad and open-ended inquiry into the overall competitive effects of particular conduct and asks judges to weigh the circumstances to decide whether the practice at issue violates the antitrust laws. Balancing short-term losses against future predicted gains calls for “speculative, possibly labyrinthine, and unnecessary” analysis and appears to exceed the abilities of even the most capable institutional actors.1 Generalist judges struggle to identify anticompetitive behavior2 and to apply complex economic criteria in consistent ways.3 Indeed, judges themselves have criticized antitrust standards for being highly difficult to administer.4 And if a standard isn’t administrable, it won’t yield predictable results. The dearth of clear standards and rules in antitrust means that market actors face uncertainty and cannot internalize legal norms into their business decisions.5 Moreover, ambiguity deprives market participants and the public of notice about what the law is, thereby undermining due process—a fundamental principle in our legal system.6\nDecades ago, former Commissioner Philip Elman observed that case-by-case adjudication “may simply be too slow and cumbersome to produce specific and clear standards adequate to the needs of businessmen[people], the private bar, and the government agencies.”7 Relying solely on case-by-case adjudication means that businesses and the public must attempt to extract legal rules from a patchwork of individual court opinions. Because antitrust plaintiffs bring cases in dozens of different courts with hundreds of different generalist judges and juries, simply understanding what the law is can involve piecing together disparate rulings founded on unique sets of facts. All too often, the resulting picture is unclear. This ambiguity is compounded when the Supreme Court assigns to lower courts the task of fleshing out how to structure and apply a standard, potentially delaying clarity and certainty for years or even decades.8\nThe current approach to antitrust also makes enforcement highly costly and protracted. In 2012, the American Bar Association (ABA) published the report of a task force that sought to “study ways to control the costs of antitrust litigation and enforcement.”9 The task force, the authors explained, was “a response to concerns” about both “the costs imposed on businesses by the American system of antitrust enforcement” and “the length of time required to resolve antitrust issues both in litigation and in enforcement proceedings.”10 Out-of-control costs undermine effective antitrust enforcement by agencies and private litigants, but may advantage actors who profit from anticompetitive practices and can treat litigation as a routine cost of business. \nProfessor Michael Baye and Former Commissioner Joshua Wright have noted that generalist judges may be ill-equipped to independently analyze and assess evidence presented by economic experts.11 Because determining the legality of most conduct now involves complex economic analysis, courts have effectively “delegate[d] both factfinding and rulemaking to courtroom economists,” making courtroom economics “not just inevitable but often dispositive.”12 In fact, paid expert testimony now is often “the ‘whole game’ in an antitrust dispute.”13\nPaid experts are a major expense. Some experts charge over $1,300 an hour, earning more than senior partners at major law firms.14 Over the last decade, expenditures on expert costs by public enforcers have ballooned.15 In a system that incentivizes firms to spend top dollar on economists who can use ever-increasing complexity to spin a favorable tale, the eye-popping costs for economic experts can put the government and new market entrants at a significant disadvantage.16 \nAnother component of the burden is that antitrust trials are extremely slow and prolonged.17 The Supreme Court has criticized antitrust cases for involving “interminable litigation”18 and the “inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase,”19 yielding an antitrust system that is “hopelessly beyond effective judicial supervision.”20 That it can easily take a decade to bring an antitrust case to full judgment means that by the time a judge orders a remedy, market circumstances are likely to have outpaced it.21 The same 2012 ABA report suggested that lengthy, costly litigation may be contributing to reduced government-enforcement efforts over time relative to the expansion of the US economy.22\nLastly, the current approach deprives both the public and market participants of any real opportunity to participate in the creation of substantive antitrust rules.23 The exclusive reliance on case-by-case adjudication leaves broad swaths of market participants watching from the sidelines, lacking an opportunity to contribute their perspective, their analysis, or their expertise, except through one-off amicus briefs.24 Nascent firms and startups are especially likely to be left out—despite the vital role they play in the competition ecosystem—given that they do not comprise a significant portion of the parties represented in litigated matters, and they usually lack the resources to engage in amicus activity. Furthermore future entrants, whose interests should be carefully considered in all aspects of competition law and policy, have no voice.\nFirms, entrepreneurs, workers, and consumers across our economy vary wildly in their experiences and perspectives on market conduct. Enforcement and regulation of business conduct can more successfully promote competition when it incorporates more voices and evidence from across the marketplace. \nThe ambiguity of the laws, the administrative and resource burdens of enforcing them, and the exclusivity of the current process tend to advantage incumbents and suppress market entry. For example, when courts disagree with one another on the legality of particular conduct, new entrants are likely to eschew the practice, since the threat of litigation could prove fatal at an early stage. Incumbents, by contrast, will be more likely to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of engaging in a potentially unlawful practice, since they are likely to have higher tolerance for protracted litigation and deeper pockets to fund it. Continued ambiguity and complexity also create business opportunities for lawyers, economists, and lobbyists, who effectively profit from the lack of clarity", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Antitrust law\nis developed\nthrough adjudication\nin practice\ncase-by-case adjudication yields\nenforcement that generates ambiguity\ndrains resources from enforcers\nand deprives\nfirms of\nopportunity to\nparticipate\ncourts analyze\nconduct under the “rule of reason\nrule of reason” involves a broad and open-ended inquiry\nand asks judges to weigh\ncircumstances to decide whether the practice\nviolates the antitrust laws\nBalancing\ncalls for “speculative\nlabyrinthine\nand unnecessary\nanalysis\nGeneralist judges struggle to\nand\napply complex economic criteria\njudges themselves\ncriticized antitrust\nfor being\ndifficult to administer\nif a standard isn’t administrable, it won’t yield predictable results\ndearth of clear standards\nin antitrust means\nmarket actors face uncertainty and cannot internalize legal norms into their business decisions\nambiguity deprives market participants and the public of notice about what the law is\ncase-by-case adjudication “may\nbe too slow and cumbersome to produce\nstandards adequate to the needs of business\n[people]\nand\ngovernment agencies\nRelying\non case-by-case adjudication means\nbusinesses\nmust\nextract legal rules from a patchwork of individual court opinions\nBecause antitrust plaintiffs bring cases in dozens of different courts with hundreds of different generalist judges\nsimply understanding\nthe law\ncan involve piecing together disparate rulings\nresulting picture is unclear\nambiguity is compounded when the\nCourt assigns to lower courts the task of fleshing out how to\napply a standard\ndelaying clarity and certainty for\ndecades\nthe\napproach deprives\nmarket participants\nopportunity to participate in\ncreation of\nantitrust rules\nreliance on case-by-case adjudication leaves broad swaths of market participants watching from the sidelines, lacking an opportunity to contribute their perspective, their analysis, or their expertise\nNascent firms and startups are especially likely to be left out\ngiven that they do not comprise a significant portion of the parties represented in litigated matters\nEnforcement\nof business conduct can\nsuccessfully promote competition when it incorporates\nvoices\nfrom across the marketplace\nThe ambiguity of the laws, the administrative and resource burdens of enforcing them, and the exclusivity of the current process tend to advantage incumbents and suppress market entry\nnew entrants are likely to eschew the practice, since the threat of litigation could prove fatal at an early stage. Incumbents\nbe more likely to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of engaging in a potentially unlawful practice, since they are likely to have higher tolerance for protracted litigation and deeper pockets to fund it.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Case-by-case adjudication creates slow, ambiguous enforcement and deprives legal participation – regulatory uncertainty substantially disadvantages entrants.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Antitrust law\nis developed\nthrough adjudication\nin practice\ncase-by-case adjudication yields\nenforcement that generates ambiguity\ndrains resources from enforcers\nand deprives\nfirms of\nopportunity to\nparticipate\ncourts analyze\nconduct under the “rule of reason\nrule of reason” involves a broad and open-ended inquiry\nand asks judges to weigh\ncircumstances to decide whether the practice\nviolates the antitrust laws\nBalancing\ncalls for “speculative\nlabyrinthine\nand unnecessary\nanalysis\nGeneralist judges struggle to\nand\napply complex economic criteria\njudges themselves\ncriticized antitrust\nfor being\ndifficult to administer\nif a standard isn’t administrable, it won’t yield predictable results\ndearth of clear standards\nin antitrust means\nmarket actors face uncertainty and cannot internalize legal norms into their business decisions\nambiguity deprives market participants and the public of notice about what the law is\ncase-by-case adjudication “may\nbe too slow and cumbersome to produce\nstandards adequate to the needs of business\n[people]\nand\ngovernment agencies\nRelying\non case-by-case adjudication means\nbusinesses\nmust\nextract legal rules from a patchwork of individual court opinions\nBecause antitrust plaintiffs bring cases in dozens of different courts with hundreds of different generalist judges\nsimply understanding\nthe law\ncan involve piecing together disparate rulings\nresulting picture is unclear\nambiguity is compounded when the\nCourt assigns to lower courts the task of fleshing out how to\napply a standard\ndelaying clarity and certainty for\ndecades\nthe\napproach deprives\nmarket participants\nopportunity to participate in\ncreation of\nantitrust rules\nreliance on case-by-case adjudication leaves broad swaths of market participants watching from the sidelines, lacking an opportunity to contribute their perspective, their analysis, or their expertise\nNascent firms and startups are especially likely to be left out\ngiven that they do not comprise a significant portion of the parties represented in litigated matters\nEnforcement\nof business conduct can\nsuccessfully promote competition when it incorporates\nvoices\nfrom across the marketplace\nThe ambiguity of the laws, the administrative and resource burdens of enforcing them, and the exclusivity of the current process tend to advantage incumbents and suppress market entry\nnew entrants are likely to eschew the practice, since the threat of litigation could prove fatal at an early stage. Incumbents\nbe more likely to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of engaging in a potentially unlawful practice, since they are likely to have higher tolerance for protracted litigation and deeper pockets to fund it.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Antitrust law\npractice\ncase-by-case adjudication\nambiguity\nresources\nenforcers\nfirms\nrule of reason\nbroad\nopen-ended\nviolates\nspeculative\nlabyrinthine\nunnecessary\nGeneralist judges\ncomplex economic criteria\ndifficult\npredictable results\nmarket actors\nuncertainty\nbusiness decisions\nnotice\ntoo slow\ncumbersome\nbusiness\n[people]\ngovernment agencies\ncase-by-case adjudication\nlegal rules\npatchwork\nindividual court opinions\ndozens\nhundreds\ngeneralist judges\ndisparate rulings\nunclear\ncompounded\ndelaying clarity\ncertainty\ndecades\ndeprives\nmarket participants\nparticipate\nantitrust rules\ncase-by-case adjudication\nmarket participants watching from the sidelines\nNascent firms and startups\nleft out\nbusiness conduct\nsuccessfully\nincorporates\nvoices\nacross the marketplace\nambiguity\nadministrative\nresource burdens\nexclusivity\nadvantage incumbents\nsuppress\nentry\nnew entrants\nthe threat of litigation could prove fatal\ncost-benefit analysis\nprotracted litigation\ndeeper pockets", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Case-by-case adjudication creates slow, ambiguous enforcement and deprives legal participation – regulatory uncertainty substantially disadvantages entrants.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Antitrust law\nis developed\nthrough adjudication\nin practice\ncase-by-case adjudication yields\nenforcement that generates ambiguity\ndrains resources from enforcers\nand deprives\nfirms of\nopportunity to\nparticipate\ncourts analyze\nconduct under the “rule of reason\nrule of reason” involves a broad and open-ended inquiry\nand asks judges to weigh\ncircumstances to decide whether the practice\nviolates the antitrust laws\nBalancing\ncalls for “speculative\nlabyrinthine\nand unnecessary\nanalysis\nGeneralist judges struggle to\nand\napply complex economic criteria\njudges themselves\ncriticized antitrust\nfor being\ndifficult to administer\nif a standard isn’t administrable, it won’t yield predictable results\ndearth of clear standards\nin antitrust means\nmarket actors face uncertainty and cannot internalize legal norms into their business decisions\nambiguity deprives market participants and the public of notice about what the law is\ncase-by-case adjudication “may\nbe too slow and cumbersome to produce\nstandards adequate to the needs of business\n[people]\nand\ngovernment agencies\nRelying\non case-by-case adjudication means\nbusinesses\nmust\nextract legal rules from a patchwork of individual court opinions\nBecause antitrust plaintiffs bring cases in dozens of different courts with hundreds of different generalist judges\nsimply understanding\nthe law\ncan involve piecing together disparate rulings\nresulting picture is unclear\nambiguity is compounded when the\nCourt assigns to lower courts the task of fleshing out how to\napply a standard\ndelaying clarity and certainty for\ndecades\nthe\napproach deprives\nmarket participants\nopportunity to participate in\ncreation of\nantitrust rules\nreliance on case-by-case adjudication leaves broad swaths of market participants watching from the sidelines, lacking an opportunity to contribute their perspective, their analysis, or their expertise\nNascent firms and startups are especially likely to be left out\ngiven that they do not comprise a significant portion of the parties represented in litigated matters\nEnforcement\nof business conduct can\nsuccessfully promote competition when it incorporates\nvoices\nfrom across the marketplace\nThe ambiguity of the laws, the administrative and resource burdens of enforcing them, and the exclusivity of the current process tend to advantage incumbents and suppress market entry\nnew entrants are likely to eschew the practice, since the threat of litigation could prove fatal at an early stage. Incumbents\nbe more likely to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of engaging in a potentially unlawful practice, since they are likely to have higher tolerance for protracted litigation and deeper pockets to fund it.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "case-by-case adjudication yields\nambiguity\nand deprives\nfirms\nopportunity to\nparticipate\nrule of reason” involves a broad\ninquiry\ncalls for\nlabyrinthine\nanalysis\nand\ncomplex\ncriteria\nactors face uncertainty and cannot internalize legal norms into\ndecisions\nadjudication “may\nbe too slow\nbusinesses\nextract\nrules from a patchwork of\nopinions\nresult\nis unclear\ndelaying\ncertainty for\ndecades\nadjudication leaves\nparticipants watching from the sidelines\nNascent\nstartups are\nleft out\nEnforcement\npromote competition when it incorporates\nvoices\nambiguity\nand\nexclusivity\nsuppress\nentry\nnew entrants\neschew\npractice, since\nthreat of litigation could prove fatal\nIncumbents\nhave\ntolerance for\nlitigation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Rate hikes cause European debt crisis.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "A rate hike before companies benefit from such a shock would risk igniting another crisis in Europe. The ECB may fear that, if it were to increase interest rates, banks would lose capital because bond prices would fall. Zombified companies would start defaulting, bringing banks’ capital down even further. Some European countries might even struggle to remain solvent, as some countries’ sovereign debt is larger than after the Second World War (debt is also at the highest level it has ever been in the United States). Throughout the last ten years, the ECB has demonstrated multiple times that it considers fiscal tensions when deciding monetary policy. Thus, we should expect the ECB to continue UMP.\nThe Fed has more room for maneuver than the ECB, as UMP-related problems are less pronounced in the United States than in Europe. Hence, the way in which the Fed will react is more uncertain. There are three possible paths for the Fed going forward.\nFirst, the Fed might keep rates at the zero lower bound and accept temporarily higher inflation. It may calculate that unloading some of the excess liquidity will help to handle the debt overhang and justify current high shares valuations. This would make the normalization of monetary policy easier in the future. However, with rates close to zero, money creation by banks will most likely remain impaired. Thus, excess liquidity accumulated post-GFC will not be transformed into loans by the banking sector.\nSecond, the Fed might apply the textbook reaction to inflation.4 That is, tempted by faster output growth and elevated inflation, it may decide to hike rates in 2023 or even as early as 2022. However, if this happens, inflation might very well accelerate instead of falling. Higher rates and a steep yield curve will reduce demand for cash and push money from short-term deposits to longer ones. As banks benefit from the level and steepness of the yield curve, they will be incentivized to lend more. Longer-term financing coming from the increasing tenure of deposits will facilitate this move. As the loan-to-deposit ratio is at its all-time low, there is an ample amount of liquidity to lend once the system gets unclogged with higher rates. 5 Policymakers may interpret this reaction as an effect of insufficient rate hikes and continue increasing them.6 Higher interest costs will eventually limit companies’ willingness to invest and consumers’ propensity to spend, thus weakening the financial standing of both. Worsened growth prospects will likely lead to a crash on financial markets and end the currently blooming wealth effect. The resulting unemployment and depressed sentiment will negatively impact consumption and investments, further lowering money velocity and demand for credit. Rate hikes will stop inflation but not in a way anybody would desire, especially shortly after recovering from the pandemic. Then the Fed would presumably reintroduce UMP, and the economy would return where it has been trapped since the GFC–to a state of low inflation, subdued growth, and suffering productivity.\nThe third path is the only way out of that trap. It requires hiking interest rates very gradually. The interest rate increases must be slow enough to avoid causing deflationary shocks and entering into the scenario described above. Done right, slow rate increases can unlock banks’ money creation and restore velocity, although at the expense of a higher price level (which may in turn help the economy recover from zombification). The implementation will be extremely challenging, as the Fed will have to balance between controlling inflation and avoiding crisis–a task almost impossible, as most certainly there will be shocks tipping this fragile balance.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "rate hike\nwould risk igniting\ncrisis in Europe\nZombified companies would start defaulting, bringing banks’ capital down\ncountries might even struggle to remain solvent\ncountries’ sovereign debt is larger than after the Second World W\nhas demonstrated multiple times that it considers fiscal tensions when deciding monetary policy.\nthe Fed might keep rates at the zero lower bound\nHowever, with rates close to zero, money creation by banks will most likely remain impaired.\nexcess liquidity accumulated post-GFC will not be transformed into loans by the banking sector.\nthe Fed might apply the textbook reaction to inflation\nit may decide to hike rates in 2023 or even as early as 2022\nRate hikes will stop inflation but not in a way anybody would desire\nespecially shortly after recovering from the pandemic\nthe only way out of that trap\nrequires hiking interest rates very gradually\nrate increases must be slow enough to avoid causing deflationary shocks\nslow rate increases can unlock banks’ money creation and restore velocity, although at the expense of a higher price level\nas the Fed will have to balance between controlling inflation and avoiding crisis–a task almost impossible\nwill be shocks tipping this fragile balance", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Rate hikes cause European debt crisis.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "rate hike\nwould risk igniting\ncrisis in Europe\nZombified companies would start defaulting, bringing banks’ capital down\ncountries might even struggle to remain solvent\ncountries’ sovereign debt is larger than after the Second World W\nhas demonstrated multiple times that it considers fiscal tensions when deciding monetary policy.\nthe Fed might keep rates at the zero lower bound\nHowever, with rates close to zero, money creation by banks will most likely remain impaired.\nexcess liquidity accumulated post-GFC will not be transformed into loans by the banking sector.\nthe Fed might apply the textbook reaction to inflation\nit may decide to hike rates in 2023 or even as early as 2022\nRate hikes will stop inflation but not in a way anybody would desire\nespecially shortly after recovering from the pandemic\nthe only way out of that trap\nrequires hiking interest rates very gradually\nrate increases must be slow enough to avoid causing deflationary shocks\nslow rate increases can unlock banks’ money creation and restore velocity, although at the expense of a higher price level\nas the Fed will have to balance between controlling inflation and avoiding crisis–a task almost impossible\nwill be shocks tipping this fragile balance", "role": "user" }, { "content": "rate hike\ncrisis in Europe\nZombified companies would start defaulting,\ncountries might even struggle to remain solvent\ncountries’ sovereign debt is larger than after the Second World W\nstop inflation\nnot in a way anybody would desire\nrecovering from the pandemic\nthe only way out of that trap\nrequires hiking interest rates very gradually\nrestore velocity\nwill be shocks tipping this fragile balance", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Rate hikes cause European debt crisis.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "rate hike\nwould risk igniting\ncrisis in Europe\nZombified companies would start defaulting, bringing banks’ capital down\ncountries might even struggle to remain solvent\ncountries’ sovereign debt is larger than after the Second World W\nhas demonstrated multiple times that it considers fiscal tensions when deciding monetary policy.\nthe Fed might keep rates at the zero lower bound\nHowever, with rates close to zero, money creation by banks will most likely remain impaired.\nexcess liquidity accumulated post-GFC will not be transformed into loans by the banking sector.\nthe Fed might apply the textbook reaction to inflation\nit may decide to hike rates in 2023 or even as early as 2022\nRate hikes will stop inflation but not in a way anybody would desire\nespecially shortly after recovering from the pandemic\nthe only way out of that trap\nrequires hiking interest rates very gradually\nrate increases must be slow enough to avoid causing deflationary shocks\nslow rate increases can unlock banks’ money creation and restore velocity, although at the expense of a higher price level\nas the Fed will have to balance between controlling inflation and avoiding crisis–a task almost impossible\nwill be shocks tipping this fragile balance", "role": "user" }, { "content": "rate hike\nwould risk igniting\ncrisis in Europe\ncompanies would start defaulting, bringing banks’ capital down\ncountries might even struggle to remain solvent\nRate hikes will stop inflation but not in a way anybody would desire\nafter recovering from the pandemic\nthe only way out\nrequires hiking\nrates very gradually\nslow rate increases can\nrestore velocity\nthe Fed will have to balance\ninflation and avoiding crisi", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Newest data confirms labor’s declining share and historically high earnings for the top 1%.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Newly available wage data from the Social Security Administration allow us to analyze wage trends for the top 1.0% and other very high earners as well as for the bottom 90% during 2020. The upward distribution of wages from the bottom 90% to the top 1.0% that was evident over the period from 1979 to 2019 was especially strong in the 2020 pandemic year, yielding historically high wage levels and shares of all wages for the top 1.0% and 0.1%. Correspondingly, the share of wages earned by the bottom 95% fell in 2020.\nTwo features of the pandemic economy distorted wage patterns in 2020 and led to faster wage growth, especially at the top. One feature was that inflation grew at a subdued 1.2% rate, boosting the average real wage (but not affecting distribution). A second feature was that, as employment fell (the number of earners fell by 1.7 million, or 1.6%) and unemployment rose (to 8.1%), the composition of the workforce changed. Specifically, job losses were heaviest for lower wage workers so the mix of jobs shifted toward higher paying ones, artificially boosting average wages (see Gould) and generating faster measured wage growth especially in the bottom half.\nFor last year, the data (Table 1) show annual wages rising fastest for those in the top 1.0% (up 7.3%) and top 0.1% (up 9.9%) while those in the bottom 90% saw wages grow by just 1.7%.\nThis continuous growth of wage inequality undercuts wage growth for the bottom 90% and reaffirms the need to place generating robust wage growth for the vast majority and rebuilding worker power at the center of economic policymaking. See Mishel and Bivens (2021) for the evidence that an erosion of worker power due to excessive unemployment, eroded collective bargaining, corporate-driven globalization, weaker labor standards, new employer-mandated agreements (such as noncompetes), and supply-chain dominance explains wage suppression and wage inequality growth.\nAs Figure A shows, the top 1.0% and 0.1% were the clear winners over the 1979–2020 period:\nThe top 1.0% saw their wages grow by 179.3%.\nWages for the top 0.1% grew more than twice as fast, up a spectacular 389.1%.\nThe other segments of the top 10% also had faster-than-average wage growth since 1979, up 53.9% and 83.1%, but nowhere near as fast as the wage growth at the top.\nIn contrast, those in the bottom 90% had annual wages grow by 28.2% from 1979 to 2020.\nThis disparity in wage growth reflects a sharp long-term rise in the share of total wages earned by those at the very top: the top 1.0% earned 13.8% of all wages in 2020, up from 7.3% in 1979. That marks the second highest share of earnings for the top 1.0% since the earliest year, 1937, when data became available (matching the tech bubble share of 13.8% in 2000 and below the share of 14.1% in 2007). The share of wages for the bottom 90% fell from 69.8% in 1979 to just 60.2% in 2020.\nThese are the results of EPI’s updated series on wages by earning group, which is developed from published Social Security Administration (SSA) data and updates the wage series from 1947–2004 originally published by Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010). This data, unlike the usual source of our other wage analyses (the Current Population Survey), allow us to estimate wage trends for the top 1.0% and top 0.1% of earners, as well as those for the bottom 90% and other categories among the top 10% of earners. This wage data is not top-coded, meaning the underlying earnings reported are actual earnings and not “capped” or “top-coded” for confidentiality. These SSA wage data are W-2 earnings which include realized stock options and vested stock awards.\nOne constant wage dynamic in every period since 1979 has been that the wages for the bottom 90% are continuously redistributed upwards.\nIt is worth noting that our series on the wage growth of the bottom 90% corresponds closely to the Social Security Administration’s series on median annual earnings: Between 1991 and 2020, the real median annual wage grew 23.5%, not far below the 28.2% growth for the bottom 90%.\nIt is also noteworthy that the wage growth for the bottom 90% over the 1979–2019 period (ending at the end of the last recovery rather than the bottom of a new recession) was almost entirely concentrated in the two periods of sustained low unemployment representing 11 of the 40 years: the bottom 90%’s wage growth in the 1995–2000 and 2013–2019 periods represented 90% of all the wage growth ($7,320 of $8,144) over the entire 1979–2019 period. The $676, or 1.7%, wage growth for the bottom 90% over 2019–2020 probably represents the special circumstances of the pandemic recession and low inflation. The shift of wages away from the bottom 90% meant that their wages rose 26.0% rather than the 44.6% increase obtained on average over the 1979–2019 period, some 18.6 percentage points faster growth. Thus, growing inequality of wages zapped wage growth for the bottom 90% by about 0.5% each year.\nThese disparities in long-term wage growth reflect a major redistribution upwards of wages since 1979, as noted earlier. The bottom 90% earned 69.8% of all earnings in 1979 but only 60.2% in 2020 (Table 2). In contrast, the top 1.0% nearly doubled its share of earnings from 7.3% in 1979 to 13.8% in 2020. The growth of wages for the top 0.1% is the major dynamic driving the top 1.0% earnings as the top 0.1% more than tripled its earnings share from 1.6% in 1979 to 5.4% in 2020, accounting for 58% of the increased wage share of the top 1.0%.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Newly available\nwage data\nfrom the\nS\nS\nA\nallow us to analyze wage trends for the top 1.0% and other\nhigh earners as well as for the bottom 90\nThe upward distribution of wages from the bottom 90% to the top 1.0% that was evident over the period from 1979 to 2019 was especially strong in the 2020 pandemic year\nyielding historically high\nshares\nfor the top 1.0%\n0.1%.\nthe share of wages earned by the bottom 95% fell\nTwo features\nled to faster wage growth\nat the\ninflation grew\nboosting the average real wage (but not affecting distribution\njob losses were heaviest for lower wage workers so the mix of jobs shifted toward higher paying ones\nthe data\nshow annual wages rising fastest for those in the top 1.0%\nup 7.3%\nand top 0.1%\nup 9.9%) while those in the bottom 90% saw wages grow by just 1.7%\nThis continuous growth of wage inequality undercuts wage growth for the bottom 90% and reaffirms the need to\nrebuilding worker power at the center of economic policymaking\nthe top 1.0% and 0.1% were the clear winners over\n1979–2020\nThe top 1.0% saw their wages grow by 179.3%\nWages for the top 0.1% grew more than twice as fast\nup a spectacular 389.1%.\nThe other segments of the top 10% also had faster-than-average wage growth since 1979, up 53.9% and 83.1%,\nIn contrast\nthose in the bottom 90% had annual wages grow by 28.2% from 1979 to 2020\nThis disparity in wage growth reflects a sharp long-term rise in the share of total wages earned by those at the very top\nThat marks the second highest share of earnings for the top 1.0% since the earliest year\n1937\nwhen data became available\nThe share of wages for the bottom 90% fell from 69.8% in 1979 to just 60.2% in 2020\nThese are the results of EPI’s\nupdated series on wages by earning group, which is developed from published\nSSA) data\nand updates the wage series from 1947–2004 originally published\nThis data\nunlike the usual source of\nother wage analyses\nallow us to estimate wage trends for the top 1.0% and top 0.1% of earners, as well as those for the bottom 90%\nThese SSA wage data are W-2 earnings which include realized stock options and vested stock awards\nconstant wage dynamic in every period since 1979 has been\nwages for the bottom 90% are continuously redistributed upwards\nwage growth of the bottom 90% corresponds closely to\nmedian annual earnings\nBetween 1991 and 2020, the real median annual wage grew 23.5%, not far below the 28.2% growth for the bottom 90%.\nwage growth for the bottom 90%\nwas almost entirely concentrated in the two periods of sustained low unemployment representing 11 of the 40 years\nThe shift of wages away from the bottom 90% meant\ntheir wages rose 26.0% rather than the 44.6% increase obtained on average over the 1979–2019 period\nsome 18.6 percentage points faster growth\ngrowing inequality of wages zapped wage growth for the bottom 90% by about 0.5% each year\nThese disparities\nreflect a major redistribution upwards\nthe top 1.0% nearly doubled its share of earnings\nThe growth of wages for the top 0.1% is the major dynamic driving the top 1.0% earnings as the top 0.1% more than tripled its earnings share", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Newest data confirms labor’s declining share and historically high earnings for the top 1%.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Newly available\nwage data\nfrom the\nS\nS\nA\nallow us to analyze wage trends for the top 1.0% and other\nhigh earners as well as for the bottom 90\nThe upward distribution of wages from the bottom 90% to the top 1.0% that was evident over the period from 1979 to 2019 was especially strong in the 2020 pandemic year\nyielding historically high\nshares\nfor the top 1.0%\n0.1%.\nthe share of wages earned by the bottom 95% fell\nTwo features\nled to faster wage growth\nat the\ninflation grew\nboosting the average real wage (but not affecting distribution\njob losses were heaviest for lower wage workers so the mix of jobs shifted toward higher paying ones\nthe data\nshow annual wages rising fastest for those in the top 1.0%\nup 7.3%\nand top 0.1%\nup 9.9%) while those in the bottom 90% saw wages grow by just 1.7%\nThis continuous growth of wage inequality undercuts wage growth for the bottom 90% and reaffirms the need to\nrebuilding worker power at the center of economic policymaking\nthe top 1.0% and 0.1% were the clear winners over\n1979–2020\nThe top 1.0% saw their wages grow by 179.3%\nWages for the top 0.1% grew more than twice as fast\nup a spectacular 389.1%.\nThe other segments of the top 10% also had faster-than-average wage growth since 1979, up 53.9% and 83.1%,\nIn contrast\nthose in the bottom 90% had annual wages grow by 28.2% from 1979 to 2020\nThis disparity in wage growth reflects a sharp long-term rise in the share of total wages earned by those at the very top\nThat marks the second highest share of earnings for the top 1.0% since the earliest year\n1937\nwhen data became available\nThe share of wages for the bottom 90% fell from 69.8% in 1979 to just 60.2% in 2020\nThese are the results of EPI’s\nupdated series on wages by earning group, which is developed from published\nSSA) data\nand updates the wage series from 1947–2004 originally published\nThis data\nunlike the usual source of\nother wage analyses\nallow us to estimate wage trends for the top 1.0% and top 0.1% of earners, as well as those for the bottom 90%\nThese SSA wage data are W-2 earnings which include realized stock options and vested stock awards\nconstant wage dynamic in every period since 1979 has been\nwages for the bottom 90% are continuously redistributed upwards\nwage growth of the bottom 90% corresponds closely to\nmedian annual earnings\nBetween 1991 and 2020, the real median annual wage grew 23.5%, not far below the 28.2% growth for the bottom 90%.\nwage growth for the bottom 90%\nwas almost entirely concentrated in the two periods of sustained low unemployment representing 11 of the 40 years\nThe shift of wages away from the bottom 90% meant\ntheir wages rose 26.0% rather than the 44.6% increase obtained on average over the 1979–2019 period\nsome 18.6 percentage points faster growth\ngrowing inequality of wages zapped wage growth for the bottom 90% by about 0.5% each year\nThese disparities\nreflect a major redistribution upwards\nthe top 1.0% nearly doubled its share of earnings\nThe growth of wages for the top 0.1% is the major dynamic driving the top 1.0% earnings as the top 0.1% more than tripled its earnings share", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Newly available\nS\nS\nA\nwage trends\nhigh earners\nbottom 90\nupward distribution\n1979 to 2019\nespecially strong\n2020\nhistorically high\ntop 1.0%\nfell\ninflation grew\nnot affecting\njob losses\ndata\nannual wages\nup 7.3%\ntop 0.1%\n1.7%\ncontinuous growth\nwage inequality\nbottom 90%\neconomic policymaking\nclear winners\n1979–2020\n179.3%\n0.1%\ntwice as fast\n389.1%.\nfaster-than-average\nIn contrast\ndisparity\nsharp long-term rise\nsecond highest share\n1937\n69.8%\njust 60.2%\nupdated series\nSSA) data\nwage series\noriginally published\ndata\nwage trends\nrealized stock options\nvested stock awards\nconstant wage dynamic\nevery period\ncontinuously redistributed\nclosely\nmedian annual earnings\nentirely concentrated\nlow unemployment\n18.6 percentage\ngrowing inequality\nwage growth\n0.5%\nmajor redistribution upwards\nnearly doubled\ndriving\nmore than tripled", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Newest data confirms labor’s declining share and historically high earnings for the top 1%.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Newly available\nwage data\nfrom the\nS\nS\nA\nallow us to analyze wage trends for the top 1.0% and other\nhigh earners as well as for the bottom 90\nThe upward distribution of wages from the bottom 90% to the top 1.0% that was evident over the period from 1979 to 2019 was especially strong in the 2020 pandemic year\nyielding historically high\nshares\nfor the top 1.0%\n0.1%.\nthe share of wages earned by the bottom 95% fell\nTwo features\nled to faster wage growth\nat the\ninflation grew\nboosting the average real wage (but not affecting distribution\njob losses were heaviest for lower wage workers so the mix of jobs shifted toward higher paying ones\nthe data\nshow annual wages rising fastest for those in the top 1.0%\nup 7.3%\nand top 0.1%\nup 9.9%) while those in the bottom 90% saw wages grow by just 1.7%\nThis continuous growth of wage inequality undercuts wage growth for the bottom 90% and reaffirms the need to\nrebuilding worker power at the center of economic policymaking\nthe top 1.0% and 0.1% were the clear winners over\n1979–2020\nThe top 1.0% saw their wages grow by 179.3%\nWages for the top 0.1% grew more than twice as fast\nup a spectacular 389.1%.\nThe other segments of the top 10% also had faster-than-average wage growth since 1979, up 53.9% and 83.1%,\nIn contrast\nthose in the bottom 90% had annual wages grow by 28.2% from 1979 to 2020\nThis disparity in wage growth reflects a sharp long-term rise in the share of total wages earned by those at the very top\nThat marks the second highest share of earnings for the top 1.0% since the earliest year\n1937\nwhen data became available\nThe share of wages for the bottom 90% fell from 69.8% in 1979 to just 60.2% in 2020\nThese are the results of EPI’s\nupdated series on wages by earning group, which is developed from published\nSSA) data\nand updates the wage series from 1947–2004 originally published\nThis data\nunlike the usual source of\nother wage analyses\nallow us to estimate wage trends for the top 1.0% and top 0.1% of earners, as well as those for the bottom 90%\nThese SSA wage data are W-2 earnings which include realized stock options and vested stock awards\nconstant wage dynamic in every period since 1979 has been\nwages for the bottom 90% are continuously redistributed upwards\nwage growth of the bottom 90% corresponds closely to\nmedian annual earnings\nBetween 1991 and 2020, the real median annual wage grew 23.5%, not far below the 28.2% growth for the bottom 90%.\nwage growth for the bottom 90%\nwas almost entirely concentrated in the two periods of sustained low unemployment representing 11 of the 40 years\nThe shift of wages away from the bottom 90% meant\ntheir wages rose 26.0% rather than the 44.6% increase obtained on average over the 1979–2019 period\nsome 18.6 percentage points faster growth\ngrowing inequality of wages zapped wage growth for the bottom 90% by about 0.5% each year\nThese disparities\nreflect a major redistribution upwards\nthe top 1.0% nearly doubled its share of earnings\nThe growth of wages for the top 0.1% is the major dynamic driving the top 1.0% earnings as the top 0.1% more than tripled its earnings share", "role": "user" }, { "content": "New\ndata\nallow us to analyze\ntrends\nupward distribution\nwas\nstrong in\n2020\nyielding historically high\nshares\nfor the\n1.0%\njob losses were heaviest for low\nwage workers\ngrowth of\ninequality undercuts\ngrowth for the bottom 90%\nover\n1979–2020\ntop 1.0% saw\nwages grow\n179.3\ntop 0.1%\nup\n389.1\ntop 10%\nhad faster-than-average\ngrowth\nThat marks\nsecond highest share of earnings for the top\nsince\n1937\nshare of wages for the bottom\nfell from 69.8\nin\nto\n60\nThese\nresults\nupdate\nwage series\ndata\nunlike the usual source\nallow us to estimate\ntrends\nThese\ninclude\nstock options and\nawards\nconstant wage dynamic in every period\nhas been\nwages\nredistributed upwards\nwage growth\ncorresponds closely to\nmedian\nearnings\ninequality\nzapped wage growth\n0.5% each year\ndisparities\nreflect\nmajor redistribution upwards", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Applying antitrust against common ownership remedies employer market power.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Where this article takes the argument further, however, is in pointing out that it is not simply that shareholders want to squeeze as much out of the firms they own as they can, at the expense of workers, but, firstly, that they seek to do so at the portfolio or industry level, not simply at the level of the firm, and secondly, the increased size and concentration of shareholders enables them to wield greater influence at the industry or market level than they have been able to since the era of the Great Merger Movement and the Morganization discussed in the previous section, exacerbating the unequal bargaining power between any one employer and his or her workers. That is part of what makes the case for an antitrust response, in contrast with the skeptical stance toward antitrust as a remedy adopted by Stansbury and Summers, as well as similar work.\nAntitrust as a Remedy to Common Ownership and Labor Market Power\nSo far, this article has done two things: explicate the corporate governance channel to the proliferation of anticompetitive conduct and structures across firms and industries and characterize employer power in labor markets as a field in which that anticompetitive conduct and structure is manifest. But what about the linkage between those two things? And Is antitrust a potential remedy?\nA simple answer to the first question, identifying the linkage between common ownership and poor labor market outcomes for workers, is that we would not necessarily expect to see it in a way that’s distinct from what we observe from shareholder-first corporate governance. Managers responsible to shareholders would not invest, expand capacity, post job vacancies, or pay higher wages for fear of a hostile takeover bid from activist investors seeking to sway institutional shareholders with decisive voting power. If worker productivity increases, managers who are answerable to shareholders will hand over the marginal profit rather than increase wages or hiring if they can possibly get away with it, which the evidence of labor market monopsony shows that they can. What looks like good corporate governance, then, simply entails worker-unfriendly corporate policy.64 That is why even though the linkage between common ownership and monopsony power in labor markets is unexplored in the literature relative to the effects of common ownership on consumer-facing outcomes, in some ways it is the more plausible channel for explaining the overall macroeconomic increase in market power. Exploiting an imbalance of bargaining power favoring employers is exactly what managers beholden to shareholders are hired to do under entirely orthodox corporate governance principles.\nThe reason we might look to antitrust in a broad sense for a remedy is that the employer power fact pattern operates in many instances across and not solely within firms, through the corporate governance channel, because institutional investors are larger and with more overlapping portfolios than had previously been the case. Research in management science shows that shareholders can and do wield that influence, specifically over executives, in such a way that cannot be understood other than as a portfolio-value-maximization strategy.65\nConsider the bank-holding company Softbank, a major shareholder in many companies around the world but specifically in the technology sector. In the last decade, Softbank has typically operated something like a venture capital firm, taking large if not majority positions in private, unprofitable companies and seeking its return when they go public, whether they have achieved profitability by that stage or not. The companies it has funded have used the resulting financial resources to cut prices and expand operations to achieve dominant market shares in particular segments (e.g., ridesharing or short-term office space rentals), at the same time cutting wages and terms of work for a largely contingent workforce and implementing the type of surveillance and algorithmic management techniques that have come to typify the gig economy.66\nIn fact, regulators report that founders of startup firms in the technology space are told they have no chance of getting funded unless they control their workforce in this way without legally employing their workers.67 Gig economy platforms could themselves be understood as inherently anticompetitive, since they control and coordinate markets and allocate customers to workers unilaterally, displacing competition among providers and setting the terms of these transactions to which the platform is putatively a neutral third party.68 Because the nature of the gig economy is to make use of the independent contractor classification in labor law, it inherently implicates antitrust as the instrument we have to regulate the exercise of power across firm boundaries.69\nBut even aside from the gig economy platform business model itself, which might be understood as suppressing intra-brand competition in an antitrust sense, Softbank has acted to suppress interplatform competition among its portfolio firms as well. Softbank portfolio firms have engaged in stock swaps that allocated entire national or multinational ridesharing markets to one company, where there previously had been competition: Uber and Didi Chuxing in China70; Uber and Grab across Southeast Asia.71 Under circumstances in which each of these platforms is separately unprofitable, the move to consolidate monopolies and suppress competition between them to stabilize creditors’ stakes is quite reminiscent of the Great Merger Movement. It is also undertaken repeatedly in different market segments by private equity firms implementing “rollups,” in which all the firms in a given segment are merged into the same private-equity-controlled entity. That strategy has proven especially successful where, prior to consolidation, portfolio firms exhibited variation in labor share and working conditions, private equity achieves standardization through a race to the bottom.72\nAnother example of common ownership’s threat to competition implicating labor markets is the recent acquisition by Liberty Media of IHeartMedia. Liberty Media is a holding company that already held controlling interests in many content properties, particularly related to noninteractive music streaming (e.g., Pandora and SiriusXM satellite radio) as well as live performance (Live Nation/ Ticketmaster, itself the product of a controversial vertical merger in 2010, after which performing artists were induced to also use Ticketmaster’s ticketing services for concerts at Live Nation venues.)73 IHeartMedia owns hundreds of radio stations, as well as its own concert and music festival promotion companies and podcast network. By controlling all of these entities, Liberty Media is now able to reduce royalty rates for streaming music and leverage its control of live performance to extract favorable terms from artists who seek to be promoted on its streaming platforms.74 If any one of these properties were seeking to maximize profits independently of the others, they might seek an exclusive contract with a performer by paying him or her more, to withhold that performer from the others. That’s what firm-level profit maximization would entail, even if entirely shareholder-responsive. Portfolio-level profit maximization, on the other hand, means that any one of these outlets can secure an artist’s services without paying for an exclusive contract but rather withholding access to the others to enforce one. As in other segments like ridesharing, the “rollup” of outlets by which musicians and other creators used to reach their audiences by one dominant holding company threatens to shut down this formerly vibrant ecosystem by channeling all revenue to its dominant shareholder.\nAntitrust is not the only policy tool available to remedy employer power, but it is the one that has historically been successful at regulating the exercise of power across the boundaries of the firm.75 Institutional investors like Softbank and Liberty Media, which are self-acknowledged active managers, could simply be barred from owning more than one firm in an industry by extending the logic of the existing Clayton Act ban on interlocking directorates. For investors that seek a market portfolio through a rollup, the appropriate remedy is probably an enforceable restriction on the exercise of voting power or the dilution of voting rights as a function of the extent to which a given shareholder also holds competing firms.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "shareholders want to squeeze as much out of the firms they own as they can\nat the portfolio\nlevel\nnot simply at the level of the firm\nthe increased size and concentration of shareholders enables them to wield greater influence at the industry or market level than they have been able to since the era of the Great Merger Movement\nexacerbating\nunequal bargaining power\nThat is\nwhat makes the case for an antitrust response\nManagers responsible to shareholders would not invest\npost job vacancies, or pay higher wages for fear of a hostile takeover bid from activist investors seeking to sway institutional shareholders with decisive voting power\nIf worker productivity increases, managers\nanswerable to shareholders will hand over the marginal profit rather than increase wages or hiring\nthey can possibly get away with it, which the evidence of labor market monopsony shows that they can\nWhat looks like good corporate governance\nentails worker-unfriendly corporate policy\nit is the more plausible channel for explaining the overall macroeconomic increase in market power\nExploiting an imbalance of bargaining power favoring employers is exactly what managers beholden to shareholders are hired to do under entirely orthodox corporate governance principles\nThe reason we\nlook to antitrust\nfor a remedy is that the employer power fact pattern operates\nacross and not\nwithin firms\nbecause institutional investors are larger and with more overlapping portfolios\nResearch in management science shows\nshareholders\nwield that influence\nSoftbank\na major shareholder\nThe companies it has funded have used\nfinancial resources to\ncut\nwages and terms of work for a largely contingent workforce and implementing\nsurveillance and algorithmic management techniques\nstartup firms\nare told they have no chance of getting funded unless they control their workforce in this way without legally employing their workers\nBecause the nature of the gig economy is to make use of the independent contractor classification in labor law, it\nimplicates antitrust as the instrument we have to regulate the exercise of power across firm boundarie\nSoftbank has acted to suppress interplatform competition among its portfolio firms as well\nportfolio firms have engaged in stock swaps that allocated entire\nridesharing markets to one company\nwhere there previously had been competition\nAnother example of common ownership’s threat to competition implicating labor markets is the\nacquisition by Liberty Media of IHeartMedia\nPortfolio-level profit maximization\nmeans\noutlets can secure an artist’s services without paying for an exclusive contract but rather withholding access to the others to enforce one\nthe “rollup\nof outlets by which musicians\nused to reach their audiences by one dominant holding company threatens to shut down this\nvibrant ecosystem by channeling all revenue to its dominant shareholder\nAntitrust\nhas historically been successful at regulating the exercise of power across the boundaries of the firm\nInstitutional investors\ncould\nbe barred from owning more than one firm in an industry by extending the logic of the existing Clayton Act", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Applying antitrust against common ownership remedies employer market power.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "shareholders want to squeeze as much out of the firms they own as they can\nat the portfolio\nlevel\nnot simply at the level of the firm\nthe increased size and concentration of shareholders enables them to wield greater influence at the industry or market level than they have been able to since the era of the Great Merger Movement\nexacerbating\nunequal bargaining power\nThat is\nwhat makes the case for an antitrust response\nManagers responsible to shareholders would not invest\npost job vacancies, or pay higher wages for fear of a hostile takeover bid from activist investors seeking to sway institutional shareholders with decisive voting power\nIf worker productivity increases, managers\nanswerable to shareholders will hand over the marginal profit rather than increase wages or hiring\nthey can possibly get away with it, which the evidence of labor market monopsony shows that they can\nWhat looks like good corporate governance\nentails worker-unfriendly corporate policy\nit is the more plausible channel for explaining the overall macroeconomic increase in market power\nExploiting an imbalance of bargaining power favoring employers is exactly what managers beholden to shareholders are hired to do under entirely orthodox corporate governance principles\nThe reason we\nlook to antitrust\nfor a remedy is that the employer power fact pattern operates\nacross and not\nwithin firms\nbecause institutional investors are larger and with more overlapping portfolios\nResearch in management science shows\nshareholders\nwield that influence\nSoftbank\na major shareholder\nThe companies it has funded have used\nfinancial resources to\ncut\nwages and terms of work for a largely contingent workforce and implementing\nsurveillance and algorithmic management techniques\nstartup firms\nare told they have no chance of getting funded unless they control their workforce in this way without legally employing their workers\nBecause the nature of the gig economy is to make use of the independent contractor classification in labor law, it\nimplicates antitrust as the instrument we have to regulate the exercise of power across firm boundarie\nSoftbank has acted to suppress interplatform competition among its portfolio firms as well\nportfolio firms have engaged in stock swaps that allocated entire\nridesharing markets to one company\nwhere there previously had been competition\nAnother example of common ownership’s threat to competition implicating labor markets is the\nacquisition by Liberty Media of IHeartMedia\nPortfolio-level profit maximization\nmeans\noutlets can secure an artist’s services without paying for an exclusive contract but rather withholding access to the others to enforce one\nthe “rollup\nof outlets by which musicians\nused to reach their audiences by one dominant holding company threatens to shut down this\nvibrant ecosystem by channeling all revenue to its dominant shareholder\nAntitrust\nhas historically been successful at regulating the exercise of power across the boundaries of the firm\nInstitutional investors\ncould\nbe barred from owning more than one firm in an industry by extending the logic of the existing Clayton Act", "role": "user" }, { "content": "shareholders\nportfolio\nlevel\nsize\nconcentration\ngreater influence\nexacerbating\nantitrust response\nshareholders\ninvest\nhigher wages\nhostile takeover bid\ninstitutional shareholders\nworker productivity\nmarginal profit\nincrease wages\nhiring\nlabor market monopsony\ncorporate governance\nworker-unfriendly\nmore plausible\noverall macroeconomic increase\nmarket power\nexactly\nentirely orthodox\nantitrust\nemployer power\nacross\nnot\nwithin firms\ninstitutional investors\noverlapping portfolios\nResearch\nmanagement science\nSoftbank\nfinancial resources\ncut\ncontingent workforce\nstartup firms\nno chance\nlegally employing\ngig economy\nindependent contractor\nlabor law\nimplicates antitrust\ninterplatform competition\nstock swaps\none company\ncompetition\ncommon ownership’s\nlabor markets\nwithout paying\nrollup\nshut down\ndominant shareholder\nAntitrust\nhistorically\nInstitutional investors\nbarred\nextending the logic\nClayton Act", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Applying antitrust against common ownership remedies employer market power.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "shareholders want to squeeze as much out of the firms they own as they can\nat the portfolio\nlevel\nnot simply at the level of the firm\nthe increased size and concentration of shareholders enables them to wield greater influence at the industry or market level than they have been able to since the era of the Great Merger Movement\nexacerbating\nunequal bargaining power\nThat is\nwhat makes the case for an antitrust response\nManagers responsible to shareholders would not invest\npost job vacancies, or pay higher wages for fear of a hostile takeover bid from activist investors seeking to sway institutional shareholders with decisive voting power\nIf worker productivity increases, managers\nanswerable to shareholders will hand over the marginal profit rather than increase wages or hiring\nthey can possibly get away with it, which the evidence of labor market monopsony shows that they can\nWhat looks like good corporate governance\nentails worker-unfriendly corporate policy\nit is the more plausible channel for explaining the overall macroeconomic increase in market power\nExploiting an imbalance of bargaining power favoring employers is exactly what managers beholden to shareholders are hired to do under entirely orthodox corporate governance principles\nThe reason we\nlook to antitrust\nfor a remedy is that the employer power fact pattern operates\nacross and not\nwithin firms\nbecause institutional investors are larger and with more overlapping portfolios\nResearch in management science shows\nshareholders\nwield that influence\nSoftbank\na major shareholder\nThe companies it has funded have used\nfinancial resources to\ncut\nwages and terms of work for a largely contingent workforce and implementing\nsurveillance and algorithmic management techniques\nstartup firms\nare told they have no chance of getting funded unless they control their workforce in this way without legally employing their workers\nBecause the nature of the gig economy is to make use of the independent contractor classification in labor law, it\nimplicates antitrust as the instrument we have to regulate the exercise of power across firm boundarie\nSoftbank has acted to suppress interplatform competition among its portfolio firms as well\nportfolio firms have engaged in stock swaps that allocated entire\nridesharing markets to one company\nwhere there previously had been competition\nAnother example of common ownership’s threat to competition implicating labor markets is the\nacquisition by Liberty Media of IHeartMedia\nPortfolio-level profit maximization\nmeans\noutlets can secure an artist’s services without paying for an exclusive contract but rather withholding access to the others to enforce one\nthe “rollup\nof outlets by which musicians\nused to reach their audiences by one dominant holding company threatens to shut down this\nvibrant ecosystem by channeling all revenue to its dominant shareholder\nAntitrust\nhas historically been successful at regulating the exercise of power across the boundaries of the firm\nInstitutional investors\ncould\nbe barred from owning more than one firm in an industry by extending the logic of the existing Clayton Act", "role": "user" }, { "content": "shareholders want to squeeze as much out of\nfirms\nat the portfolio\nlevel\nincreased size\nenables them to wield\ninfluence\nexacerbating\nunequal bargaining power\nManagers responsible to shareholders would not\npay higher wages for fear of\ninvestors\nIf\nproductivity increases, managers\nwill hand over\nprofit rather than increase wages\ncorporate governance\nentails worker-unfriendly\npolicy\nThe reason we\nlook to antitrust\nfor a remedy is that\nemployer power\noperates\nacross\nnot\nwithin firms\nbecause\ninvestors are larger\nwith\noverlapping portfolios\nBecause\nthe gig economy\nmake use of the independent contractor classification in labor law, it\nimplicates antitrust\nAntitrust\nhas\nbeen successful at regulating\npower across\nfirm\nInstitutional investors\ncould\nbe barred from owning more than one firm in an industry", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Inequality hollows out economic resilience.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Mounting evidence, which I will review today, demonstrates how the rising concentration of corporate power has increased economic inequality and made the U.S. economy less efficient. Reversing the trends that have led to a “second gilded age” is critical to encouraging a resilient economic recovery following the pandemic-induced economic crisis of 2020 and encouraging a healthy, competitive economy for the future. \nIntroduction\nThe United States boasts one of the wealthiest economies in the world, but decades of increasing income inequality, job polarization, and stagnant wages for most Americans has plagued our labor market and demonstrated that a rising tide does not lift all boats. Furthermore, economic evidence demonstrates how inequality results in an inefficient allocation of talent and resources while increasing corporate concentration that enriches the few while holding back the entire economy from its potential. Understanding the causes and consequences of the concentration of corporate power will guide policymaking in order to ensure that the economic recovery in the next phase of the pandemic will be broadly shared and ensure a more resilient economy.\n“Monopsony” is a key economic concept to understand in this discussion. Monopsony is the labor market equivalent of the better-known phenomenon of “monopoly,” but instead of having only one producer of a good or service, there is effectively only one buyer of a good or service, such as only one employer hiring people’s labor in a company town. Like in monopoly, this phenomenon is not limited to when a firm is strictly the only buyer of labor. Today I will explain the circumstances and effects of employers having significant monopsony power over the market and over workers.\nWhen employers have outsized power in employment relationships, they are able to set wages for their workers, rather than wages being determined by competitive market forces. Given this monopsony power, employers undercut workers. This means paying them less than the value they contribute to production. One recent survey of all the economic research on monopsony finds that, on average across studies, employers have the power to keep wages over one-third less than they would be in a perfectly competitive market. Put another way, in a theoretical competitive market, if an employer cut wages then all workers would quit. But in reality, these estimates are the equivalent of a firm cutting wages by 5 percent yet only losing 10 percent to 20 percent of their workers, thus growing their profits without significantly impacting their business.\nIt is not only important for workers to earn a fair share so they can support themselves and their families, but also critical to ensure that our economy rebuilds to be stronger and more resilient. Prior to the current public health crisis and resulting recession, earnings inequality had been growing since at least the 1980s while the labor share of national income has been declining in same period. This is cause for concern as recent evidence suggests that the labor share of income has a positive impact on GDP growth in the long-run.\nThe unprecedented economic shock caused by the coronavirus pandemic revealed how economic inequality leads to a fragile economy, where those with the least are hit the hardest, amplifying recessions since lower-income workers typically spend more of their income in the economy. But the crisis also demonstrated how economic policy targeted toward workers and families can provide a foundation for growth. This is because workers are the economy, and pushing back against the concentration corporate power by providing resources to workers is the foundation for strong, stable and broadly shared growth.\nThe Causes of Monopsony\nThe concept of monopsony was initially developed by the early 20th century economist Joan Robinson, who examined how lack of competition led to unfair and inefficient economic outcomes. The prototypical example of monopsony is a company town, where there is one very dominant employer and workers have no choice but to accept low wages since they have no outside options. This is the most extreme case, but it is important to note that firms have monopsony power in any circumstance where workers aren’t moving between jobs seamlessly in search of the highest wages they can get.\nFirms can use monopsony power to lower workers’ wages any time workers:\nHave few potential employers\nFace job mobility constraints\nCan only gather imperfect information about employers and jobs \nHave divergent preferences for job attributes\nLack the ability to bargain over those offers\nI will go through each of these factors in turn and demonstrate how labor markets are unique compared to other markets in dealing with competitive forces.\nWhile concentrated labor markets are not the norm, they are pervasive across the United States, especially within certain sectors or locations. When markets are very concentrated, employers can give workers smaller yearly raises or make working conditions worse, knowing that their workers have nowhere to go to find a better job with better pay. (See Figure 1.)\nA study published in the journal Labour Economics by economists Jose Azar, Ioana Marinescu, and Marshall Steinbaum finds that 60 percent of U.S. local labor markets are highly concentrated as defined by U.S. antitrust authorities’ 2010 horizontal merger guidelines. This accounts for 20 percent of employment in the United States. Research by economists Gregor Schubert, Anna Stansbury, and Bledi Tsaka goes further by estimating workers’ outside options, or the likelihood a worker is able to change into a different occupation or industry. This study finds that even with a more expansive definition of job opportunities more than 10 percent of the U.S. workforce is in local labor markets where pay is being suppressed by employer concentration by at least 2 percent, and a significant proportion of these workers facing few outside options are facing pay suppression of 5 percent or more. As study co-author Anna Stansbury noted, “for a typical full-time workers making $50,000 a year, a 2 percent pay reduction is equivalent to losing $1,000 per year and a 5 percent pay reduction is equivalent to losing $2,500 per year.”\nCertain sectors are now very concentrated, such as the healthcare industry. In a paper by the economists Elena Prager and Matt Schmitt, they find that hospital mergers led to negative wage growth among skilled workers such as nurses or pharmacy workers. Consolidation and outsized employer power, alongside other phenomenon such as the fissuring of the workplace, may have broader impacts on the structure of the U.S. labor market when it affects the overall structure of the labor market, including the hollowing out of middle class jobs that have historically been a pathway for upward mobility.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the rising concentration of corporate power has increased economic inequality and made the U.S. economy less efficient\nReversing the\nsecond gilded age\nis critical to encouraging a resilient economic recovery\nand encouraging a healthy, competitive economy for the future\nincreasing income inequality\njob polarization, and stagnant wages\nhas plagued our labor market\ninequality results in an inefficient allocation of talent and resources\nincreasing corporate concentration\nholding back the entire economy from its potential\nUnderstanding\nconcentration\nwill guide policymaking in order to ensure that the economic recovery\nwill be broadly shared and ensure a more resilient economy.\nWhen employers have outsized power\nthey are able to set wages for their workers, rather than wages being determined by competitive market forces\nemployers undercut workers\nThis means paying them less\nthese estimates are the equivalent of a firm cutting wages by 5 percent yet only losing 10 percent to 20 percent of their workers, thus growing their profits without significantly impacting their business.\nIt is\ncritical to ensure that our economy rebuilds to be stronger and more resilient\nearnings inequality had been growing since at least the 1980s\nThis is cause for concern as recent evidence suggests that the labor share of income has a positive impact on GDP growth in the long-run.\neconomic shock\nrevealed how economic inequality leads to a fragile economy\nwhere those with the least are hit the hardest, amplifying recessions since lower-income workers\nspend more of their income in the economy\neconomic policy targeted toward workers\nprovide a foundation for growth\nworkers are the economy\npushing back against the concentration corporate power by providing resources to workers is the foundation for strong, stable and broadly shared growth.\nlack of competition led to unfair and inefficient economic outcomes\nfirms have monopsony power in any circumstance where workers aren’t moving between jobs seamlessly\nFirms can use monopsony power to lower workers’ wages\nconcentrated labor markets are\npervasive across the United States\nWhen markets are\nconcentrated, employers can give workers smaller yearly raises or make working conditions worse\nknowing that their workers have nowhere to go to find a better job with better pay\nA study\nby\nAzar\nMarinescu, and\nSteinbaum finds that 60 percent of U.S. local labor markets are highly concentrated\nThis accounts for 20 percent of employment\nResearch\ngoes further by estimating workers’ outside options\neven with a more expansive definition of job opportunities more than 10 percent of the U.S. workforce is in local labor markets where pay is being suppressed by\nconcentration by at least 2 percent\nCertain sectors are now very concentrated\nConsolidation and outsized employer power\nmay have broader impacts on the structure of the U.S. labor market when it affects the overall structure of the labor market, including the hollowing out of middle class jobs that have\nbeen a pathway for upward mobility", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Inequality hollows out economic resilience.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the rising concentration of corporate power has increased economic inequality and made the U.S. economy less efficient\nReversing the\nsecond gilded age\nis critical to encouraging a resilient economic recovery\nand encouraging a healthy, competitive economy for the future\nincreasing income inequality\njob polarization, and stagnant wages\nhas plagued our labor market\ninequality results in an inefficient allocation of talent and resources\nincreasing corporate concentration\nholding back the entire economy from its potential\nUnderstanding\nconcentration\nwill guide policymaking in order to ensure that the economic recovery\nwill be broadly shared and ensure a more resilient economy.\nWhen employers have outsized power\nthey are able to set wages for their workers, rather than wages being determined by competitive market forces\nemployers undercut workers\nThis means paying them less\nthese estimates are the equivalent of a firm cutting wages by 5 percent yet only losing 10 percent to 20 percent of their workers, thus growing their profits without significantly impacting their business.\nIt is\ncritical to ensure that our economy rebuilds to be stronger and more resilient\nearnings inequality had been growing since at least the 1980s\nThis is cause for concern as recent evidence suggests that the labor share of income has a positive impact on GDP growth in the long-run.\neconomic shock\nrevealed how economic inequality leads to a fragile economy\nwhere those with the least are hit the hardest, amplifying recessions since lower-income workers\nspend more of their income in the economy\neconomic policy targeted toward workers\nprovide a foundation for growth\nworkers are the economy\npushing back against the concentration corporate power by providing resources to workers is the foundation for strong, stable and broadly shared growth.\nlack of competition led to unfair and inefficient economic outcomes\nfirms have monopsony power in any circumstance where workers aren’t moving between jobs seamlessly\nFirms can use monopsony power to lower workers’ wages\nconcentrated labor markets are\npervasive across the United States\nWhen markets are\nconcentrated, employers can give workers smaller yearly raises or make working conditions worse\nknowing that their workers have nowhere to go to find a better job with better pay\nA study\nby\nAzar\nMarinescu, and\nSteinbaum finds that 60 percent of U.S. local labor markets are highly concentrated\nThis accounts for 20 percent of employment\nResearch\ngoes further by estimating workers’ outside options\neven with a more expansive definition of job opportunities more than 10 percent of the U.S. workforce is in local labor markets where pay is being suppressed by\nconcentration by at least 2 percent\nCertain sectors are now very concentrated\nConsolidation and outsized employer power\nmay have broader impacts on the structure of the U.S. labor market when it affects the overall structure of the labor market, including the hollowing out of middle class jobs that have\nbeen a pathway for upward mobility", "role": "user" }, { "content": "corporate power\nincreased economic inequality\nU.S. economy less efficient\nresilient economic recovery\nhealthy, competitive economy\nincreasing income inequality\nplagued our labor market\ninefficient\nentire economy from its potential\neconomic recovery\nbroadly shared\nresilient economy\nemployers undercut workers\ngrowing their profits without significantly impacting their business\nrebuilds to be stronger and more resilient\nconcern\nlabor share of income has a positive impact on GDP growth in the long-run\neconomic shock\nfragile economy\namplifying recessions\nmore of their income in the economy\nworkers\nfoundation for growth\nworkers are the economy\nworkers\nstrong, stable and broadly shared growth\nlower workers’ wages\npervasive\nsmaller yearly raises\nworking conditions worse\nnowhere to go\n60 percent of U.S. local labor markets are highly concentrated\nsuppressed by\nconcentration by at least 2 percent\nvery concentrated\nhollowing out of middle class jobs\nupward mobility", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Inequality hollows out economic resilience.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the rising concentration of corporate power has increased economic inequality and made the U.S. economy less efficient\nReversing the\nsecond gilded age\nis critical to encouraging a resilient economic recovery\nand encouraging a healthy, competitive economy for the future\nincreasing income inequality\njob polarization, and stagnant wages\nhas plagued our labor market\ninequality results in an inefficient allocation of talent and resources\nincreasing corporate concentration\nholding back the entire economy from its potential\nUnderstanding\nconcentration\nwill guide policymaking in order to ensure that the economic recovery\nwill be broadly shared and ensure a more resilient economy.\nWhen employers have outsized power\nthey are able to set wages for their workers, rather than wages being determined by competitive market forces\nemployers undercut workers\nThis means paying them less\nthese estimates are the equivalent of a firm cutting wages by 5 percent yet only losing 10 percent to 20 percent of their workers, thus growing their profits without significantly impacting their business.\nIt is\ncritical to ensure that our economy rebuilds to be stronger and more resilient\nearnings inequality had been growing since at least the 1980s\nThis is cause for concern as recent evidence suggests that the labor share of income has a positive impact on GDP growth in the long-run.\neconomic shock\nrevealed how economic inequality leads to a fragile economy\nwhere those with the least are hit the hardest, amplifying recessions since lower-income workers\nspend more of their income in the economy\neconomic policy targeted toward workers\nprovide a foundation for growth\nworkers are the economy\npushing back against the concentration corporate power by providing resources to workers is the foundation for strong, stable and broadly shared growth.\nlack of competition led to unfair and inefficient economic outcomes\nfirms have monopsony power in any circumstance where workers aren’t moving between jobs seamlessly\nFirms can use monopsony power to lower workers’ wages\nconcentrated labor markets are\npervasive across the United States\nWhen markets are\nconcentrated, employers can give workers smaller yearly raises or make working conditions worse\nknowing that their workers have nowhere to go to find a better job with better pay\nA study\nby\nAzar\nMarinescu, and\nSteinbaum finds that 60 percent of U.S. local labor markets are highly concentrated\nThis accounts for 20 percent of employment\nResearch\ngoes further by estimating workers’ outside options\neven with a more expansive definition of job opportunities more than 10 percent of the U.S. workforce is in local labor markets where pay is being suppressed by\nconcentration by at least 2 percent\nCertain sectors are now very concentrated\nConsolidation and outsized employer power\nmay have broader impacts on the structure of the U.S. labor market when it affects the overall structure of the labor market, including the hollowing out of middle class jobs that have\nbeen a pathway for upward mobility", "role": "user" }, { "content": "corporate power\nincreased\ninequality and made the\neconomy less efficient\nReversing\ncritical to\nresilient\nrecovery\nWhen employers have outsized power\nthey\nset wages\nrather than\ncompetitive market forces\ncritical to ensure\neconomy rebuilds to be\nresilient\ninequality\ngrowing since\n80s\nlabor share\nhas a positive impact on GDP growth\nshock\nrevealed how\ninequality leads to a fragile economy\namplifying recessions\nlower-income workers\nspend\nincome in the economy\npolicy targeted toward workers\nprovide\nfoundation for growth\nworkers are the economy\nFirms\nuse monopsony\nto lower\nwages\nconcentrated labor markets are\npervasive\nworkers have nowhere to go\n60 percent of\nlabor markets are\nconcentrated\naccounts for 20 percent of employment\npay is being suppressed by\nconcentration by at least 2 percent\nCertain sectors are\nconcentrated\nConsolidation\nhollow\nout\nmiddle class jobs that have\nbeen a pathway for\nmobility", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It sparks global instability that goes nuclear.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Challenge: Multiple Existential Threats\nThe relationship between pandemics and war is as long as human history. Past pandemics have set the scene for wars by weakening societies, undermining resilience, and exacerbating civil and inter-state conflict. Other disease outbreaks have erupted during wars, in part due to the appalling public health and battlefield conditions resulting from war, in turn sowing the seeds for new conflicts. In the post-Cold War era, pandemics have spread with unprecedented speed due to increased mobility created by globalization, especially between urbanized areas. Although there are positive signs that scientific advances and rapid innovation can help us manage pandemics, it is likely that deadly infectious viruses will be a challenge for years to come.\nThe COVID-19 is the most demonic pandemic threat in modern history. It has erupted at a juncture of other existential global threats, most importantly, accelerating climate change and resurgent nuclear threat-making. The most important issue, therefore, is how the coronavirus (and future pandemics) will increase or decrease the risks associated with these twin threats, climate change effects, and the next use of nuclear weapons in war.5\nToday, the nine nuclear weapons arsenals not only can annihilate hundreds of cities, but also cause nuclear winter and mass starvation of a billion or more people, if not the entire human species. Concurrently, climate change is enveloping the planet with more frequent and intense storms, accelerating sea level rise, and advancing rapid ecological change, expressed in unprecedented forest fires across the world. Already stretched to a breaking point in many countries, the current pandemic may overcome resilience to the point of near or actual collapse of social, economic, and political order.\nIn this extraordinary moment, it is timely to reflect on the existence and possible uses of weapons of mass destruction under pandemic conditions – most importantly, nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological weapons. Moments of extreme crisis and vulnerability can prompt aggressive and counterintuitive actions that in turn may destabilize already precariously balanced threat systems, underpinned by conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as the threat of weaponized chemical and biological technologies. Consequently, the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, increases at such times, possibly sharply.\nThe COVID-19 pandemic is clearly driving massive, rapid, and unpredictable changes that will redefine every aspect of the human condition, including WMD – just as the world wars of the first half of the 20th century led to a revolution in international affairs and entirely new ways of organizing societies, economies, and international relations, in part based on nuclear weapons and their threatened use. In a world reshaped by pandemics, nuclear weapons – as well as correlated non-nuclear WMD, nuclear alliances, “deterrence” doctrines, operational and declaratory policies, nuclear extended deterrence, organizational practices, and the existential risks posed by retaining these capabilities – are all up for redefinition.\nA pandemic has potential to destabilize a nuclear-prone conflict by incapacitating the supreme nuclear commander or commanders who have to issue nuclear strike orders, creating uncertainty as to who is in charge, how to handle nuclear mistakes (such as errors, accidents, technological failures, and entanglement with conventional operations gone awry), and opening a brief opportunity for a first strike at a time when the COVID-infected state may not be able to retaliate efficiently – or at all – due to leadership confusion. In some nuclear-laden conflicts, a state might use a pandemic as a cover for political or military provocations in the belief that the adversary is distracted and partly disabled by the pandemic, increasing the risk of war in a nuclear-prone conflict. At the same time, a pandemic may lead nuclear armed states to increase the isolation and sanctions against a nuclear adversary, making it even harder to stop the spread of the disease, in turn creating a pandemic reservoir and transmission risk back to the nuclear armed state or its allies.\nIn principle, the common threat of the pandemic might induce nuclear-armed states to reduce the tension in a nuclear-prone conflict and thereby the risk of nuclear war. It may cause nuclear adversaries or their umbrella states to seek to resolve conflicts in a cooperative and collaborative manner by creating habits of communication, engagement, and mutual learning that come into play in the nuclear-military sphere. For example, militaries may cooperate to control pandemic transmission, including by working together against criminal-terrorist non-state actors that are trafficking people or by joining forces to ensure that a new pathogen is not developed as a bioweapon.\nTo date, however, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the isolation of some nuclear-armed states and provided a textbook case of the failure of states to cooperate to overcome the pandemic. Borders have slammed shut, trade shut down, and budgets blown out, creating enormous pressure to focus on immediate domestic priorities. Foreign policies have become markedly more nationalistic. Dependence on nuclear weapons may increase as states seek to buttress a global re-spatialization6 of all dimensions of human interaction at all levels to manage pandemics. The effect of nuclear threats on leaders may make it less likely – or even impossible – to achieve the kind of concert at a global level needed to respond to and administer an effective vaccine, making it harder and even impossible to revert to pre-pandemic international relations. The result is that some states may proliferate their own nuclear weapons, further reinforcing the spiral of conflicts contained by nuclear threat, with cascading effects on the risk of nuclear war.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Past pandemics have set the scene for wars by weakening societies, undermining resilience, and exacerbating civil and inter-state conflict\npandemics\nspread with unprecedented speed due to increased mobility created by globalization\nit is likely that deadly infectious viruses will be a challenge for years to come\nnuclear weapons\ncan\ncause nuclear winter and mass starvation of\nthe entire human species\nMoments of extreme crisis\ncan prompt aggressive\nactions that in turn may destabilize already precariously balanced threat systems, underpinned by conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as the threat of weaponized chemical and biological technologies. Consequently, the risk of the use of\n(WMD),\nincreases\nsharply\nA pandemic has potential to destabilize a nuclear-prone conflict by incapacitating\ncommanders who have to issue nuclear strike orders, creating uncertainty as to who is in charge, how to handle nuclear mistakes (such a\naccidents\nand opening a\nopportunity for a first strike\na state might use a pandemic as a cover for\nmilitary provocations\na pandemic may lead nuclear armed states to increase\nisolation and sanctions against a\nadversary\nIn principle, the common threat\nmight induce nuclear\nstates to reduce\ntension\nTo date, however, the\npandemic has increased\nisolation\nand provided a textbook case of the failure\nto cooperate\nBorders\nslammed shut, trade shut down\nand budgets blown out\nForeign policies have become markedly more nationalistic. Dependence on nuclear weapons may increase as states seek to buttress a global re-spatialization\nof all dimensions of human interaction at all levels to manage pandemics.\nThe result is that\nstates may proliferate\nnuclear weapons\nreinforcing the spiral of conflicts\nwith cascading effects on the risk of nuclear war", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It sparks global instability that goes nuclear.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Past pandemics have set the scene for wars by weakening societies, undermining resilience, and exacerbating civil and inter-state conflict\npandemics\nspread with unprecedented speed due to increased mobility created by globalization\nit is likely that deadly infectious viruses will be a challenge for years to come\nnuclear weapons\ncan\ncause nuclear winter and mass starvation of\nthe entire human species\nMoments of extreme crisis\ncan prompt aggressive\nactions that in turn may destabilize already precariously balanced threat systems, underpinned by conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as the threat of weaponized chemical and biological technologies. Consequently, the risk of the use of\n(WMD),\nincreases\nsharply\nA pandemic has potential to destabilize a nuclear-prone conflict by incapacitating\ncommanders who have to issue nuclear strike orders, creating uncertainty as to who is in charge, how to handle nuclear mistakes (such a\naccidents\nand opening a\nopportunity for a first strike\na state might use a pandemic as a cover for\nmilitary provocations\na pandemic may lead nuclear armed states to increase\nisolation and sanctions against a\nadversary\nIn principle, the common threat\nmight induce nuclear\nstates to reduce\ntension\nTo date, however, the\npandemic has increased\nisolation\nand provided a textbook case of the failure\nto cooperate\nBorders\nslammed shut, trade shut down\nand budgets blown out\nForeign policies have become markedly more nationalistic. Dependence on nuclear weapons may increase as states seek to buttress a global re-spatialization\nof all dimensions of human interaction at all levels to manage pandemics.\nThe result is that\nstates may proliferate\nnuclear weapons\nreinforcing the spiral of conflicts\nwith cascading effects on the risk of nuclear war", "role": "user" }, { "content": "set the scene\nweaken\nexacerbat\nunprecedented speed\nincreased mobility\nlikely\nyears to come\nnuclear winter\nmass starvation\nentire human species\nextreme crisis\naggressive\nactions\ndestabilize\nprecarious\nconventional\nnuclear\nweaponized chemical\nbiological\nincreases\nsharply\nnuclear-prone conflict\naccidents\nopportunity\nfirst strike\ncover\nBorders\nslammed shut\ntrade shut down\nbudgets blown out\nnationalistic\ncascading effects\nnuclear war", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: It sparks global instability that goes nuclear.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Past pandemics have set the scene for wars by weakening societies, undermining resilience, and exacerbating civil and inter-state conflict\npandemics\nspread with unprecedented speed due to increased mobility created by globalization\nit is likely that deadly infectious viruses will be a challenge for years to come\nnuclear weapons\ncan\ncause nuclear winter and mass starvation of\nthe entire human species\nMoments of extreme crisis\ncan prompt aggressive\nactions that in turn may destabilize already precariously balanced threat systems, underpinned by conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as the threat of weaponized chemical and biological technologies. Consequently, the risk of the use of\n(WMD),\nincreases\nsharply\nA pandemic has potential to destabilize a nuclear-prone conflict by incapacitating\ncommanders who have to issue nuclear strike orders, creating uncertainty as to who is in charge, how to handle nuclear mistakes (such a\naccidents\nand opening a\nopportunity for a first strike\na state might use a pandemic as a cover for\nmilitary provocations\na pandemic may lead nuclear armed states to increase\nisolation and sanctions against a\nadversary\nIn principle, the common threat\nmight induce nuclear\nstates to reduce\ntension\nTo date, however, the\npandemic has increased\nisolation\nand provided a textbook case of the failure\nto cooperate\nBorders\nslammed shut, trade shut down\nand budgets blown out\nForeign policies have become markedly more nationalistic. Dependence on nuclear weapons may increase as states seek to buttress a global re-spatialization\nof all dimensions of human interaction at all levels to manage pandemics.\nThe result is that\nstates may proliferate\nnuclear weapons\nreinforcing the spiral of conflicts\nwith cascading effects on the risk of nuclear war", "role": "user" }, { "content": "pandemics\nweaken\nsocieties\nand exacerbat\ninter-state conflict\nspread with unprecedented speed due to\nmobility\nby globalization\nit is likely\nviruses will be a challenge for years to come\nMoments of\ncrisis\nprompt\nactions that\ndestabilize\nprecarious\nsystems\nrisk of\nuse of\n(WMD)\nincreases\nsharply\nA pandemic\ndestabilize a nuclear\nconflict\nincapacitating\ncommanders\nand opening\nopportunity for\nfirst strike\nBorders\nslam\ntrade shut down\npolicies\nbecome\nnationalistic\nresult is\nstates\nproliferate\nreinforcing\nspiral of conflicts\nwith cascading effects on\nnuclear war", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Not all innovation is created equal – changing the direction of innovation is key to breakthroughs.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The context also urges us to be circumspect and intentional when it comes to comes to innovation. Within antitrust, innovation is efficiency on steroids. According to Tad Lipsky, there is a common understanding “shared across the entire spectrum of expert economic opinion” that “the predominant determinant of overall increases in our economic well-being is innovation”. 4 That is quite a statement. When it comes to climate change, green tech innovations could certainly help us live in a zero-carbon world, but we already have the technologies we need to decarbonise. It is the structure of the economy, and politics, that must catch up. When it comes to inequality, the theory is that innovations increase productivity, raising earnings and increasing the size of the economic pie. That will only solve inequality if the gains are distributed (and redistributed) fairly, not just through the tax and benefits systems, but also at the point of production. Otherwise rising capital productivity can be accompanied by unemployment or, as we also see today, underemployment and the degradation of employment terms. \nOpioids were an innovation. Fracking is an innovation. Naked Credit Default Swaps were innovations. 5 Not all innovations are good. The direction of innovation matters, and while this may be influenced along paths that are profitable, paths of innovation should not be captured, unprofitable but world-saving innovations should not be side-lined, and democratic institutions should have a say in what is acceptable. At this moment, we cannot afford anything else.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The context also urges us to be circumspect and intentional when it comes to comes to innovation. Within antitrust, innovation is efficiency on steroid\ngreen tech innovations could certainly help us live in a zero-carbon world, but we already have the technologies we need to decarbonise\nstructure of the economy, and politics, that must catch up\nthe theory is that innovations increase productivity, raising earnings and increasing the size of the economic pie\nThat will only solve\nif\ngains are distributed (and redistributed) fairly, not just through the tax and benefits systems, but also at the point of production\nOtherwise rising capital productivity can be accompanied by unemployment or, as we also see today, underemployment and the degradation of employment terms.\nOpioids were an innovation\nFracking is an innovation\nCredit\nSwaps were innovations\nNot all innovations are good\ndirection of innovation matters\nAt this moment, we cannot afford anything else.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Not all innovation is created equal – changing the direction of innovation is key to breakthroughs.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The context also urges us to be circumspect and intentional when it comes to comes to innovation. Within antitrust, innovation is efficiency on steroid\ngreen tech innovations could certainly help us live in a zero-carbon world, but we already have the technologies we need to decarbonise\nstructure of the economy, and politics, that must catch up\nthe theory is that innovations increase productivity, raising earnings and increasing the size of the economic pie\nThat will only solve\nif\ngains are distributed (and redistributed) fairly, not just through the tax and benefits systems, but also at the point of production\nOtherwise rising capital productivity can be accompanied by unemployment or, as we also see today, underemployment and the degradation of employment terms.\nOpioids were an innovation\nFracking is an innovation\nCredit\nSwaps were innovations\nNot all innovations are good\ndirection of innovation matters\nAt this moment, we cannot afford anything else.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "circumspect\nintentional\ninnovation\nWithin antitrust, innovation\nefficiency\ngreen tech\ntech\ndecarbonise\nstructure of the economy, and politics, that must catch up\ninnovations\nproductivity\nearnings\nonly solve\ndistributed\nfairly\npoint of production\ncapital productivity\nunemployment\nunderemployment\nemployment terms\nOpioids\nFracking\nCredit\nSwaps\nNot all innovations are good\ndirection of innovation matters\nanything else", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Not all innovation is created equal – changing the direction of innovation is key to breakthroughs.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The context also urges us to be circumspect and intentional when it comes to comes to innovation. Within antitrust, innovation is efficiency on steroid\ngreen tech innovations could certainly help us live in a zero-carbon world, but we already have the technologies we need to decarbonise\nstructure of the economy, and politics, that must catch up\nthe theory is that innovations increase productivity, raising earnings and increasing the size of the economic pie\nThat will only solve\nif\ngains are distributed (and redistributed) fairly, not just through the tax and benefits systems, but also at the point of production\nOtherwise rising capital productivity can be accompanied by unemployment or, as we also see today, underemployment and the degradation of employment terms.\nOpioids were an innovation\nFracking is an innovation\nCredit\nSwaps were innovations\nNot all innovations are good\ndirection of innovation matters\nAt this moment, we cannot afford anything else.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "context\nurges us to be\nintentional when it comes to\ninnovation\nWithin antitrust, innovation is efficiency\nwe already have\ntech\nto decarbonise\nstructure of the economy\ncatch up\ninnovations increase productivity\nThat will only solve\nif\ngains are distributed\nfairly\nOtherwise\nproductivity can be accompanied by unemployment\nOpioids\nFracking\nCredit\nSwaps were innovations\nNot all innovations are good\ndirection of innovation matters", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Inflation destabilizes exchange rates and triggers Asian debt dumping – causes global financial meltdown.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Investors in U.S. Treasuries are racking up some of the biggest losses since Paul Volcker’s day four decades ago. Yet they now have a bigger worry: how Asia responds. \nThe cornerstone holders of Washington’s debt are in Asia, especially Japan and China. The top 10 holders in this region are sitting on around $3.5 trillion of Uncle Sam’s IOUs just as inflation surges the most in 40 years.\nThat was back when then-Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker was hiking rates so aggressively that he got death threats. The resulting late 1970s-early 1980s bond rout isn’t one that most of today’s Wall Street traders remember. \nIn some cases, the same is true of 1994, when Volcker’s successor Alan Greenspan engineered his own tightening shock. The Greenspan Fed doubled short-term rates in just 12 months, slamming global debt markets. The turmoil helped push Mexico into crisis, Orange County, California into bankruptcy and bond dealer Kidder Peabody into extinction. \nAsia recalls the dollar’s resulting rally all too well. Surging U.S. exchange rates made dollar pegs impossible to maintain, paving the way for Asia’s 1997 crisis. \nThe last thing today’s Fed chief Jerome Powell wants as part of his legacy is precipitating another Asia reckoning. But then, Asia could return the favor by selling huge blocks of Treasury securities to front-run a bigger yield surge. It’s not like the inflation surge is likely to moderate in short order. \nIt’s a Catch 22, of course. If traders got wind that the Bank of Japan or People’s Bank of China were reducing the $1.1 trillion or more each holds, markets might collapse. This gives somewhat smaller U.S. debt holders a chance at a first-mover selling opportunity. \nIn theory, Hong Kong could perhaps draw down its $230 billion of U.S. exposure without panicking markets. The same with India and its $218 billion and South Korea with its $130 billion. At some point, though, bond dealers in New York and London will catch on and U.S. yields will skyrocket. \nThis risk dramatizes the tough position in which Tokyo, Beijing and Taipei, Washington’s top-three Asian bankers, are in. Pundits often assume holding a mountain of dollars gives Asian central banks huge geopolitical leverage over U.S. policy. When President Joe Biden’s predecessor launched a trade war with China, a $1.3 trillion arsenal of Treasuries seemed Beijing’s trump card. \nWell, yes and no. Is Beijing able to call the shots or is President Xi Jinping’s economy trapped? Dumping tens of billions of dollars of U.S. debt, or more, would boomerang on China as surging global yields savage export demand. \nNot surprisingly, foreign holdings of U.S. debt have become the stuff of Hollywood thrillers. The plot of 2014’s “Jack Ryan: Shadow Recruit,” based on the Tom Clancy hero, had Russia trying to crash the dollar in a bid to destabilize the globe. \nIt’s not as far-fetched as it seems. U.S. Treasuries are, for better or worse, the linchpin asset of world trade and finance. Efforts from Beijing to Moscow to Riyadh to crypto exchanges everywhere to de-throne the dollar amounted to little.\nNor did the chaos of the Covid-19 era imperil dollar hegemony. It’s worth noting, too, that the rise in U.S. yields has been surprisingly mild considering the 6.8% surge in consumer prices in November year-on-year. Also, neither gold nor cryptocurrencies are acting as obvious inflation hedges. \nStill, the specter of Powell’s team hiking rates in the months ahead has markets on edge. So do fears the Fed might fall behind the inflation curve, given that monetary policy changes can operate with a months-long lag. \nAlready, inflation-adjusted returns are the worst since Volcker’s day in the early 80s. Back then, Volcker’s team was fighting a so-called wage-price spiral. Powell may confront something similar. The wages and conditions that workers were willing to accept pre-pandemic in 2019 are what many are accepting in 2021. \nOne vital constituency the Fed needs to serve is Washington’s Asian bankers. The U.S. can’t take its reserve-currency status for granted. Few developments would undermine credibility faster than U.S. debt losing the trust of central bankers everywhere. \nIt’s not Russia’s military the world fears in 2021. It’s Moscow’s credit rating. Take Xi, who added his name to the pantheon of top Chinese leaders. Fine, but the default drama at China Evergrande Group means the foundations of that power are shaky. Reserve currency status is indeed an “exorbitant privilege,” as one-time French finance minister Valery Giscard d’Estaing famously said. With it, though, comes immense responsibility. Now that inflation is perking up, the Fed needs to ensure it’s getting ahead of things. Or at least explain in detail why Asia shouldn’t call its U.S. loans.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "holders of Washington’s debt are in Asia\nespecially Japan and China\nThe top 10 holders in this region are sitting on around $3.5 trillion of Uncle Sam’s IOUs just as inflation surges the most in 40 years.\nwhen\nGreenspan engineered\ntightening shock\nThe Greenspan Fed doubled short-term rates in just 12 months\nslamming global debt markets. The turmoil helped push Mexico into crisis\nCalifornia into bankruptcy and\nPeabody into extinction\nAsia recalls the dollar’s resulting rally all too well\nSurging U.S. exchange rates made dollar pegs impossible to maintain, paving the way for Asia’s 1997 crisis.\nAsia could return the favor by selling huge blocks of Treasury securities to front-run a bigger yield surge.\nIt’s a Catch 22\nIf traders got wind that the Bank of Japan or People’s Bank of China were reducing the $1.1 trillion or\nmarkets might collapse\nHong Kong could perhaps draw down\nThe same with India and its $218 billion and South Korea\nNew York and London will catch on\nThis risk dramatizes the tough position\nTokyo\nBeijing and Taipei\nWashington’s top-three Asian bankers, are in. Pundits often assume holding a mountain of dollars gives Asian central banks huge geopolitical leverage over U.S. policy.\nDumping tens of billions of dollars of U.S. debt\nwould boomerang on China as surging global yields savage export demand.\ntrying to crash the dollar in a bid to destabilize the globe.\nIt’s not as far-fetched as it seems\nTreasuries are\nlinchpin asset of world trade and finance\nEfforts from Beijing to Moscow to Riyadh to crypto exchanges everywhere to de-throne the dollar amounted to little.\nthe specter of Powell’s team hiking rates in the months ahead has markets on edge.\nthe Fed might fall behind the inflation curve, given that monetary policy changes can operate with a months-long lag.\ninflation-adjusted returns are the worst since Volcker’s day in the early 80s\nPowell may confront something similar.\nOne vital constituency the Fed needs to serve is Washington’s Asian bankers\nThe U.S. can’t take its reserve-currency status for granted. Few developments would undermine credibility faster than U.S. debt losing the trust of central bankers everywhere.\nIt’s not Russia’s military the world fears in 2021. It’s Moscow’s credit rating.\nReserve currency status is indeed an “exorbitant privilege,”\nWith it,\nimmense responsibility.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Inflation destabilizes exchange rates and triggers Asian debt dumping – causes global financial meltdown.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "holders of Washington’s debt are in Asia\nespecially Japan and China\nThe top 10 holders in this region are sitting on around $3.5 trillion of Uncle Sam’s IOUs just as inflation surges the most in 40 years.\nwhen\nGreenspan engineered\ntightening shock\nThe Greenspan Fed doubled short-term rates in just 12 months\nslamming global debt markets. The turmoil helped push Mexico into crisis\nCalifornia into bankruptcy and\nPeabody into extinction\nAsia recalls the dollar’s resulting rally all too well\nSurging U.S. exchange rates made dollar pegs impossible to maintain, paving the way for Asia’s 1997 crisis.\nAsia could return the favor by selling huge blocks of Treasury securities to front-run a bigger yield surge.\nIt’s a Catch 22\nIf traders got wind that the Bank of Japan or People’s Bank of China were reducing the $1.1 trillion or\nmarkets might collapse\nHong Kong could perhaps draw down\nThe same with India and its $218 billion and South Korea\nNew York and London will catch on\nThis risk dramatizes the tough position\nTokyo\nBeijing and Taipei\nWashington’s top-three Asian bankers, are in. Pundits often assume holding a mountain of dollars gives Asian central banks huge geopolitical leverage over U.S. policy.\nDumping tens of billions of dollars of U.S. debt\nwould boomerang on China as surging global yields savage export demand.\ntrying to crash the dollar in a bid to destabilize the globe.\nIt’s not as far-fetched as it seems\nTreasuries are\nlinchpin asset of world trade and finance\nEfforts from Beijing to Moscow to Riyadh to crypto exchanges everywhere to de-throne the dollar amounted to little.\nthe specter of Powell’s team hiking rates in the months ahead has markets on edge.\nthe Fed might fall behind the inflation curve, given that monetary policy changes can operate with a months-long lag.\ninflation-adjusted returns are the worst since Volcker’s day in the early 80s\nPowell may confront something similar.\nOne vital constituency the Fed needs to serve is Washington’s Asian bankers\nThe U.S. can’t take its reserve-currency status for granted. Few developments would undermine credibility faster than U.S. debt losing the trust of central bankers everywhere.\nIt’s not Russia’s military the world fears in 2021. It’s Moscow’s credit rating.\nReserve currency status is indeed an “exorbitant privilege,”\nWith it,\nimmense responsibility.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Asia\nJapan\nChina\n$3.5 trillion of Uncle Sam’s IOUs\nthe most in 40 years\nGreenspan\n12 months\nMexico into crisis\nCalifornia into bankruptcy\nextinction\ndollar pegs impossible to maintain\nAsia’s 1997 crisis.\nselling huge blocks of Treasury securities\nbigger yield surge.\nIt’s a Catch 22\nBank of Japan\nPeople’s Bank of China\n$1.1 trillion\nmarkets might collapse\nHong Kong\nIndia\nSouth Korea\nNew York\nLondon\nTokyo\nBeijing\nTaipei\nPundits often assume holding a mountain of dollars gives Asian central banks huge geopolitical leverage over U.S. policy.\ndollars\nboomerang on\ncrash the dollar\ndestabilize the globe.\nIt’s not as far-fetched as it seems\nlinchpin asset of world trade and finance\nBeijing\nMoscow\nRiyadh\ncrypto exchanges\nthe specter of Powell’s team hiking rates in the months ahead has markets on edge.\ninflation-adjusted\nthe worst since Volcker’s day\nvital constituency\nAsian bankers\nThe U.S. can’t take its reserve-currency status for granted.\nU.S. debt losing the trust of central bankers everywhere\nIt’s not Russia’s military the world fears in 2021. It’s Moscow’s credit rating.\nimmense responsibility.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Inflation destabilizes exchange rates and triggers Asian debt dumping – causes global financial meltdown.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "holders of Washington’s debt are in Asia\nespecially Japan and China\nThe top 10 holders in this region are sitting on around $3.5 trillion of Uncle Sam’s IOUs just as inflation surges the most in 40 years.\nwhen\nGreenspan engineered\ntightening shock\nThe Greenspan Fed doubled short-term rates in just 12 months\nslamming global debt markets. The turmoil helped push Mexico into crisis\nCalifornia into bankruptcy and\nPeabody into extinction\nAsia recalls the dollar’s resulting rally all too well\nSurging U.S. exchange rates made dollar pegs impossible to maintain, paving the way for Asia’s 1997 crisis.\nAsia could return the favor by selling huge blocks of Treasury securities to front-run a bigger yield surge.\nIt’s a Catch 22\nIf traders got wind that the Bank of Japan or People’s Bank of China were reducing the $1.1 trillion or\nmarkets might collapse\nHong Kong could perhaps draw down\nThe same with India and its $218 billion and South Korea\nNew York and London will catch on\nThis risk dramatizes the tough position\nTokyo\nBeijing and Taipei\nWashington’s top-three Asian bankers, are in. Pundits often assume holding a mountain of dollars gives Asian central banks huge geopolitical leverage over U.S. policy.\nDumping tens of billions of dollars of U.S. debt\nwould boomerang on China as surging global yields savage export demand.\ntrying to crash the dollar in a bid to destabilize the globe.\nIt’s not as far-fetched as it seems\nTreasuries are\nlinchpin asset of world trade and finance\nEfforts from Beijing to Moscow to Riyadh to crypto exchanges everywhere to de-throne the dollar amounted to little.\nthe specter of Powell’s team hiking rates in the months ahead has markets on edge.\nthe Fed might fall behind the inflation curve, given that monetary policy changes can operate with a months-long lag.\ninflation-adjusted returns are the worst since Volcker’s day in the early 80s\nPowell may confront something similar.\nOne vital constituency the Fed needs to serve is Washington’s Asian bankers\nThe U.S. can’t take its reserve-currency status for granted. Few developments would undermine credibility faster than U.S. debt losing the trust of central bankers everywhere.\nIt’s not Russia’s military the world fears in 2021. It’s Moscow’s credit rating.\nReserve currency status is indeed an “exorbitant privilege,”\nWith it,\nimmense responsibility.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "holders of\ndebt are in Asia\nsitting on\n3.5 trillion\nas inflation surges the most in 40 years\nSurging\nexchange rates made dollar pegs impossible\npaving the way for Asia’s 1997 crisis\nAsia could\nsell\nhuge blocks of Treasury securities to front-run a\nsurge\nIf traders got wind\nmarkets might collapse\nHong Kong\nIndia\nand\nKorea\nDumping\nbillions of\nof\ndebt\nwould boomerang\ntrying to crash the dollar\nto destabilize the globe.\nTreasuries are\nlinchpin asset of\nfinance\ninflation-adjusted returns are the\nsince Volcker\nThe U.S. can’t take its reserve-currency\nfor granted. Few developments would undermine credibility faster than\ndebt losing\ntrust of central bankers", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Scope of FTC Section 5 is determined by the FTC.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The vague and ambiguous nature of Section 5 is well known. Proposed definitions for what constitutes an “unfair method of competition” have varied substantially over time and belief that the modern FTC has now somehow moved beyond this inherent product of its institutional design are no more than wishful thinking. Indeed, for at least the past twenty years, commissioners from both parties have acknowledged that a principled standard for the application of Section 5 would be a welcome improvement. The lack of institutional commitment to a stable definition of what constitutes an “unfair method of competition” leads to two sources of problematic variation in the agency’s interpretation of Section 5. One is that the agency’s interpretation of the statute in different cases need not be consistent even when the individual Commissioners remain constant. Another is that as the members of the Commission change over time, so does the agency’s Section 5 enforcement policy, leading to wide variations in how the Commission prosecutes “unfair methods of competition” over time. In short, the scope of the Commission’s Section 5 authority today is as broad or as narrow as a majority of commissioners believes it is.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The\nambiguous nature of Section 5 is well known\ndefinitions for\nunfair method of competition\nvaried substantially over time\nbelief that the modern FTC has\nmoved beyond this inherent product of its institutional design are no more than wishful thinking\nthe scope of the Commission’s Section 5 authority today is as broad or as narrow as a majority of commissioners believes it is.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Scope of FTC Section 5 is determined by the FTC.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The\nambiguous nature of Section 5 is well known\ndefinitions for\nunfair method of competition\nvaried substantially over time\nbelief that the modern FTC has\nmoved beyond this inherent product of its institutional design are no more than wishful thinking\nthe scope of the Commission’s Section 5 authority today is as broad or as narrow as a majority of commissioners believes it is.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "ambiguous\nwell known\ninherent product of its institutional design\nscope\nSection 5 authority\nbroad or as narrow", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Scope of FTC Section 5 is determined by the FTC.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The\nambiguous nature of Section 5 is well known\ndefinitions for\nunfair method of competition\nvaried substantially over time\nbelief that the modern FTC has\nmoved beyond this inherent product of its institutional design are no more than wishful thinking\nthe scope of the Commission’s Section 5 authority today is as broad or as narrow as a majority of commissioners believes it is.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "ambiguous nature\nis well known\ndefinitions for\nunfair method of competition\nvaried\nbelief\nthe\nFTC\nmoved beyond\ninherent product of its institutional design are no more than wishful thinking\nscope\nis as broad or as narrow as\ncommissioners believe", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Credit Suisse precludes state antitrust laws.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "On June 18, 2007, in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, the U. S. Supreme Court issued an important decision about the relationship between the federal antitrust laws and the federal securities laws. The issue before the Court arose from the fact that the securities regulatory framework authorizes—and in some cases even encourages—certain underwriting activities that nominally conflict with the competitive principles of antitrust law. To bolster capital formation, the SEC allows competing IPO underwriters to join together in underwriting syndicates and, within certain limits, to discuss prices and allocation both among themselves and with prospective customers in order to determine a fair initial offering price. Such activities would be clear violations of the antitrust laws if undertaken by competitors in unregulated industries. The question before the Court was whether the antitrust laws should apply at all in certain areas regulated by the SEC. In an opinion that will be important in other regulated industries, the Court held that the extensive regulation in this area of securities law precluded the application of the antitrust laws, at least for the conduct challenged in this case.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\nThe consolidated plaintiff class represents thousands of direct IPO purchasers and aftermarket purchasers of technology stocks issued during the late 1990s. Defendants include some of the country’s largest underwriters and institutional investors. Plaintiffs accused the defendants of conspiring to manipulate the aftermarket prices of the stocks in violation of the Sherman Act, the Robinson-Patman Act, and state antitrust laws. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants’ conspiratorial abuse of the syndicate underwriting system precluded direct purchasers from obtaining stocks in initial public offerings (IPOs) unless the purchasers agreed to aftermarket “tying” and “laddering” arrangements or to pay excessively high commissions.1 Plaintiffs contend this conduct artificially inflated the aftermarket price of the securities at the expense of the purchasing public. Significantly, the plaintiffs did not allege that all concerted conduct of the underwriting syndicates necessarily violated the antitrust laws. Rather, plaintiffs contended that the defendants had exceeded the bounds of permissible conduct under both the securities laws and the antitrust laws. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaints under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the SEC’s comprehensive regulation of IPOs impliedly precluded the federal antitrust laws and preempted state antitrust laws. ", "role": "user" }, { "content": "in Credit Suisse\nthe\nSupreme Court issued an important decision about the relationship between the federal antitrust laws and the federal securities laws\nThe question before the Court was whether\nantitrust laws should apply at all in certain areas regulated by the SEC\nIn an opinion\nimportant in other regulated industries\nthe Court held that\nextensive regulation in this area of securities law precluded\napplication of the antitrust laws\nPlaintiffs accused\ndefendants of conspiring to manipulate\naftermarket prices of the stocks in violation of the Sherman Act\nand state antitrust laws\nDefendants moved to dismiss the complaints under Rule 12\narguing that the SEC’s comprehensive regulation\nimpliedly precluded the federal antitrust laws and preempted state antitrust laws", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Credit Suisse precludes state antitrust laws.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "in Credit Suisse\nthe\nSupreme Court issued an important decision about the relationship between the federal antitrust laws and the federal securities laws\nThe question before the Court was whether\nantitrust laws should apply at all in certain areas regulated by the SEC\nIn an opinion\nimportant in other regulated industries\nthe Court held that\nextensive regulation in this area of securities law precluded\napplication of the antitrust laws\nPlaintiffs accused\ndefendants of conspiring to manipulate\naftermarket prices of the stocks in violation of the Sherman Act\nand state antitrust laws\nDefendants moved to dismiss the complaints under Rule 12\narguing that the SEC’s comprehensive regulation\nimpliedly precluded the federal antitrust laws and preempted state antitrust laws", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Credit Suisse\nSupreme Court\nregulated\nSEC\nimportant\nother regulated industries\nextensive regulation\nprecluded\nantitrust laws\nprices of the stocks\nSherman Act\nstate antitrust laws\ncomprehensive regulation\nfederal antitrust laws\npreempted state antitrust laws", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Credit Suisse precludes state antitrust laws.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "in Credit Suisse\nthe\nSupreme Court issued an important decision about the relationship between the federal antitrust laws and the federal securities laws\nThe question before the Court was whether\nantitrust laws should apply at all in certain areas regulated by the SEC\nIn an opinion\nimportant in other regulated industries\nthe Court held that\nextensive regulation in this area of securities law precluded\napplication of the antitrust laws\nPlaintiffs accused\ndefendants of conspiring to manipulate\naftermarket prices of the stocks in violation of the Sherman Act\nand state antitrust laws\nDefendants moved to dismiss the complaints under Rule 12\narguing that the SEC’s comprehensive regulation\nimpliedly precluded the federal antitrust laws and preempted state antitrust laws", "role": "user" }, { "content": "in Credit Suisse\nquestion\nwas whether\nantitrust\nshould apply\nin\nareas regulated by the SEC\nCourt held\nregulation\nprecluded\nantitrust laws\nPlaintiffs accused\ndefendants of\nmanipulate\naftermarket prices of\nstocks in violation of\nstate antitrust laws\nDefendants moved to dismiss\narguing\nSEC’s\nregulation\nprecluded\nfederal\nlaws and preempted state\nlaws", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: State enforcement lacks clarity – prevents competition.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Consolidated enforcement and regulatory schemes would provide clarity to businesses through more uniform regulations and decreased litigation concerns. This consolidation, in turn, would reduce costs for the government and the competitors while encouraging competition and unnecessary compliance costs. 2 37 Clear regulations serving a common goal, without the inherent biases of individual state interests, can provide clarity to businesses and preserve the balancing of consumer welfare with the aggregate social welfare. Individual states make decisions based on their individual needs, as seen in the T-Mobile-Sprint merger. 238 When federal law conflicts with state law, federal law controls. 239 Despite this standard, multistate task forces continue to come forward as the interpreters of federal law. 240 This approach poses problems because of the inherent state biases that underlie the enforcement actions. Preemption could decrease the effects of individual state biases on the guidance given to competitors.\nAntitrust analysis considers geographic differences in determining the concentration of a market, meaning a one-size-fits-all approach does not work for aggregating individual state markets. 241 This restructuring would reduce the effects of an individual state's interests on collective action. 242 While any individual state may be best served by one plan, the economy as a whole might suffer for that decision. 243 \"Divergent approaches to the exercise of enforcement discretion are not just possible, they are likely.\" 244 States likely face pressure from several groups that can influence their enforcement decisions, as well as the selfish motivation to protect their consumers regardless of the cost to national welfare. 245 Uniform, clear guidance at the federal level, without state interference, will reduce opportunities for the individual motivations of states to negatively impact a clear enforcement scheme. Adding states as parties to a telecommunications antitrust lawsuit complicates the suit by increasing the number of parties that must agree to a settlement. 246 The effects of the preemption and resulting enforcement system will create efficiencies for federal and state enforcers, as well as for businesses. For telecommunications antitrust enforcement actions, this will limit costs to the federal agencies, prevent the duplication of effort (in reviewing transactions), and eliminate the costs of coordination that NAAG multistate enforcement teams face. 247 Extending even beyond telecommunications, this results in a net positive for the antitrust sections of state attorneys general offices to redeploy resources to monitor and combat anticompetitive behavior in the state-specific areas that these sections were designed to handle. 248\nThe reduced litigation could represent a net positive for both state governments and competitors. Even responding to discovery requests from one state can cost two to nine million dollars. 249 Dealing with multiple suits, as in the T-Mobile-Sprint merger, causes a compounding of these costs resulting from duplication of effort. For T-Mobile, the firm has now faced multiple reviews concerning the same issues that it believed it had resolved. The FCC review alone took 317 days.25 0 In total, from the initial merger review submission on April 28, 2018, until April 1, 2020, it took two years to close the transaction. 25 1 The T-Mobile-Sprint merger exemplifies how further delays can slow the competitor's ability to continue with business, as it must divert attention to compliance and litigation efforts. 252\nNo link – the plan’s presumption of illegality allows investors to provide research-sharing justifications.\nPosner ’21 [Eric; Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor @ University of Chicago Law School; “Policy Implications of the Common Ownership Debate,” The Antitrust Bulletin, 66(1), p. 140-149; AS]\nThe Indirect Costs of Intervention\nSeveral articles written after AST identify a possible benefit of common ownership aside from its facilitation of diversification: common owners may compel portfolio firms to cooperate in socially beneficial ways. We can identify two versions of this argument. First, imagine that Firm A and Firm B are independently developing COVID-19 vaccines. Each firm has proprietary information that it refuses to share with its competitor. A common owner is indifferent as to whether Firm A or B wins the race and so directs the two firms to share or disclose their trade secrets. Here, the common owner enables each firm to capture positive externalities from the behavior of other firms.29 Second, imagine now that Firm A and Firm B belong to different sectors. Firm A emits greenhouse gases or some other pollutant, and those emissions harm Firm B. A common owner of Firm A and Firm B will direct Firm A to mitigate its greenhouse gas emissions. Of course, the common owner will not direct socially optimal emissions but it will still benefit society.30 If either of these hypotheses is true, then restrictions on common ownership may be socially harmful.\nFrom both an antitrust and regulatory perspective, however, there is less to these arguments than meet the eye. In antitrust cases, defendants can often argue that a business efficiency justifies behavior that would otherwise seem anticompetitive. Indeed, the research-sharing justification is not much different from the argument that common owners benefit their clients by giving them access to easy diversification. If research efficiencies arise, then in suitable cases, defendants may argue that common ownership (as well as mergers and other forms of cooperation) may be lawful.\nThe same point can be made about regulation. Simple regulations designed to limit common ownership or control by common owners of portfolio forms may (as so often happens) be required to yield to a more complex approach that creates safe harbors for socially beneficial cooperation across firms. Antitrust law and related regulations that encourage competition are already full of such exceptions.\nFinally, regulators should be careful to distinguish diversification that involves common ownership within industries and diversification that involves common ownership (only) across industries. In the second example, a regulation that limits common ownership within sectors will still preserve at least a portion of the socially beneficial behavior: the common owner will restrict greenhouse gases in order to benefit the firms it owns outside the sector of the polluter, while it will have no incentive to reduce competition because it owns only one firm per sector. The first example is more difficult. A regulation that limits the common owner’s ability to own multiple firms in one sector will also prevent it from capturing the externality.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Consolidated enforcement and regulatory schemes would provide clarity to businesses through more uniform regulations and decreased litigation concerns\nThis\nwould reduce costs\nwhile encouraging competition\nClear regulations\nwithout\nbiases of individual state interests, can provide clarity to businesses and preserve\nbalancing of consumer welfare with\naggregate social welfare\nIndividual states make decisions based on their individual needs\nas seen in the T-Mobile-Sprint merger\nPreemption could decrease\neffects of individual state biases on the guidance given to competitors\nWhile any individual state may be best served by one plan, the economy as a whole might suffer for that decision\nDivergent approaches to\nenforcement\nare not just possible\nthey are likely\nStates\nface pressure from\ngroups that can influence their enforcement decisions, as well as the selfish motivation to protect\nconsumers regardless of\ncost to national welfare\nUniform\nguidance at the federal level\nwithout state interference\nwill reduce opportunities for\nindividual motivations of states to negatively impact\nenforcement\nAdding states\ncomplicates\nsuit by increasing\nparties that must agree to a settlement\neffects of\npreemption\nenforcement system will create efficiencies for federal and state enforcers, as well as for businesses\nthis will limit costs to\nfederal agencies, prevent\nduplication\nand eliminate\ncosts of coordination that NAAG multistate enforcement teams face\nreduced litigation could represent\nnet positive for both state\ns and competitors\nresponding to discovery requests from one state can cost two to nine million dollars\nDealing with multiple suits\ncauses\ncompounding of\ncosts resulting from duplication\nT-Mobile\nhas\nfaced\nreviews concerning the same issues\nit believed it had resolved\nFCC review alone took 317 days\nIn total\nit took two years to close the transaction\ndelays\nslow the competitor's ability to continue with business\nas it must divert attention to compliance and litigation efforts\nresearch-sharing\ncommon owners may compel portfolio firms to cooperate in socially beneficial ways\nthere is less to these arguments than meet the eye\nIn antitrust cases\ndefendants can\nargue\na business efficiency justifies behavior that would\nseem anticompetitive\nresearch-sharing justification is not much different from the argument that common owners benefit their clients by giving them access to easy diversification\nIf research efficiencies arise\ndefendants may argue\ncommon ownership\nmay be lawful\nSimple regulations designed to limit common ownership\nmay\nbe required to yield to a more complex approach that creates safe harbors for socially beneficial cooperation across firms\nAntitrust law\nencourage competition are already full of such exceptions\nregulators\ndistinguish diversification that involves common ownership within industries and diversification that involves common ownership\nacross industries\nIn the second example, a regulation that limits common ownership within sectors will still preserve\nsocially beneficial behavior\nthe common owner will restrict g\nh\ng\ns\nto benefit the firms it owns outside the sector of the polluter, while it will have no incentive to reduce competition because it owns only one firm per sector", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: State enforcement lacks clarity – prevents competition.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Consolidated enforcement and regulatory schemes would provide clarity to businesses through more uniform regulations and decreased litigation concerns\nThis\nwould reduce costs\nwhile encouraging competition\nClear regulations\nwithout\nbiases of individual state interests, can provide clarity to businesses and preserve\nbalancing of consumer welfare with\naggregate social welfare\nIndividual states make decisions based on their individual needs\nas seen in the T-Mobile-Sprint merger\nPreemption could decrease\neffects of individual state biases on the guidance given to competitors\nWhile any individual state may be best served by one plan, the economy as a whole might suffer for that decision\nDivergent approaches to\nenforcement\nare not just possible\nthey are likely\nStates\nface pressure from\ngroups that can influence their enforcement decisions, as well as the selfish motivation to protect\nconsumers regardless of\ncost to national welfare\nUniform\nguidance at the federal level\nwithout state interference\nwill reduce opportunities for\nindividual motivations of states to negatively impact\nenforcement\nAdding states\ncomplicates\nsuit by increasing\nparties that must agree to a settlement\neffects of\npreemption\nenforcement system will create efficiencies for federal and state enforcers, as well as for businesses\nthis will limit costs to\nfederal agencies, prevent\nduplication\nand eliminate\ncosts of coordination that NAAG multistate enforcement teams face\nreduced litigation could represent\nnet positive for both state\ns and competitors\nresponding to discovery requests from one state can cost two to nine million dollars\nDealing with multiple suits\ncauses\ncompounding of\ncosts resulting from duplication\nT-Mobile\nhas\nfaced\nreviews concerning the same issues\nit believed it had resolved\nFCC review alone took 317 days\nIn total\nit took two years to close the transaction\ndelays\nslow the competitor's ability to continue with business\nas it must divert attention to compliance and litigation efforts\nresearch-sharing\ncommon owners may compel portfolio firms to cooperate in socially beneficial ways\nthere is less to these arguments than meet the eye\nIn antitrust cases\ndefendants can\nargue\na business efficiency justifies behavior that would\nseem anticompetitive\nresearch-sharing justification is not much different from the argument that common owners benefit their clients by giving them access to easy diversification\nIf research efficiencies arise\ndefendants may argue\ncommon ownership\nmay be lawful\nSimple regulations designed to limit common ownership\nmay\nbe required to yield to a more complex approach that creates safe harbors for socially beneficial cooperation across firms\nAntitrust law\nencourage competition are already full of such exceptions\nregulators\ndistinguish diversification that involves common ownership within industries and diversification that involves common ownership\nacross industries\nIn the second example, a regulation that limits common ownership within sectors will still preserve\nsocially beneficial behavior\nthe common owner will restrict g\nh\ng\ns\nto benefit the firms it owns outside the sector of the polluter, while it will have no incentive to reduce competition because it owns only one firm per sector", "role": "user" }, { "content": "clarity\nmore uniform regulations\ndecreased litigation concerns\nreduce costs\ncompetition\nClear regulations\nstate interests\nprovide clarity\nbalancing\nconsumer welfare\naggregate social welfare\nindividual needs\nT-Mobile-Sprint merger\nPreemption\nindividual state biases\ncompetitors\neconomy as a whole\nsuffer\nenforcement\nnot just possible\nlikely\npressure\ninfluence\nselfish motivation\nnational welfare\nUniform\nfederal level\nwithout state interference\nindividual motivations\nnegatively impact\nincreasing\npreemption\nefficiencies\nbusinesses\nlimit costs\nduplication\ncosts of coordination\nNAAG multistate enforcement\nnet positive\ndiscovery requests\ntwo to nine million dollars\ncompounding\nduplication\nsame issues\n317 days\ntwo years\nslow\ncontinue with business\ndivert attention\ncooperate\nsocially beneficial ways\nless\nmeet the eye\nantitrust cases\nbusiness efficiency\nanticompetitive\nresearch-sharing\nbenefit their clients\ndiversification\nlawful\nSimple regulations\nlimit common ownership\ncomplex approach\nsafe harbors\nAntitrust law\nencourage competition\nsuch exceptions\ndiversification\nacross industries\nsocially beneficial behavior\ng\nh\ng\ns\nno incentive\none firm", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: State enforcement lacks clarity – prevents competition.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Consolidated enforcement and regulatory schemes would provide clarity to businesses through more uniform regulations and decreased litigation concerns\nThis\nwould reduce costs\nwhile encouraging competition\nClear regulations\nwithout\nbiases of individual state interests, can provide clarity to businesses and preserve\nbalancing of consumer welfare with\naggregate social welfare\nIndividual states make decisions based on their individual needs\nas seen in the T-Mobile-Sprint merger\nPreemption could decrease\neffects of individual state biases on the guidance given to competitors\nWhile any individual state may be best served by one plan, the economy as a whole might suffer for that decision\nDivergent approaches to\nenforcement\nare not just possible\nthey are likely\nStates\nface pressure from\ngroups that can influence their enforcement decisions, as well as the selfish motivation to protect\nconsumers regardless of\ncost to national welfare\nUniform\nguidance at the federal level\nwithout state interference\nwill reduce opportunities for\nindividual motivations of states to negatively impact\nenforcement\nAdding states\ncomplicates\nsuit by increasing\nparties that must agree to a settlement\neffects of\npreemption\nenforcement system will create efficiencies for federal and state enforcers, as well as for businesses\nthis will limit costs to\nfederal agencies, prevent\nduplication\nand eliminate\ncosts of coordination that NAAG multistate enforcement teams face\nreduced litigation could represent\nnet positive for both state\ns and competitors\nresponding to discovery requests from one state can cost two to nine million dollars\nDealing with multiple suits\ncauses\ncompounding of\ncosts resulting from duplication\nT-Mobile\nhas\nfaced\nreviews concerning the same issues\nit believed it had resolved\nFCC review alone took 317 days\nIn total\nit took two years to close the transaction\ndelays\nslow the competitor's ability to continue with business\nas it must divert attention to compliance and litigation efforts\nresearch-sharing\ncommon owners may compel portfolio firms to cooperate in socially beneficial ways\nthere is less to these arguments than meet the eye\nIn antitrust cases\ndefendants can\nargue\na business efficiency justifies behavior that would\nseem anticompetitive\nresearch-sharing justification is not much different from the argument that common owners benefit their clients by giving them access to easy diversification\nIf research efficiencies arise\ndefendants may argue\ncommon ownership\nmay be lawful\nSimple regulations designed to limit common ownership\nmay\nbe required to yield to a more complex approach that creates safe harbors for socially beneficial cooperation across firms\nAntitrust law\nencourage competition are already full of such exceptions\nregulators\ndistinguish diversification that involves common ownership within industries and diversification that involves common ownership\nacross industries\nIn the second example, a regulation that limits common ownership within sectors will still preserve\nsocially beneficial behavior\nthe common owner will restrict g\nh\ng\ns\nto benefit the firms it owns outside the sector of the polluter, while it will have no incentive to reduce competition because it owns only one firm per sector", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Consolidated\nregulatory schemes\nprovide clarity\nthrough\nuniform regulations and decreased litigation\nreduce costs\nencouraging competition\nwithout\nbiases of\nstate\ns\nWhile\nindividual state may be\nserved\neconomy as a whole might suffer\nDivergent approaches\nare likely\nStates\nface pressure\nthat can influence\nenforcement\nas well as\nselfish motivation to protect\nconsumers regardless of\nnational welfare\nfed\nwill reduce\nindividual motivations\nto negatively impact\nenforcement\nAdding states\ncomplicates\nsuit by increasing\nparties that must agree\nenforcement system\ncreate efficiencies\nfor businesses\nlimit costs to\nfederal agencies, prevent\nduplication\neliminate\ncosts of coordination that\nmultistate enforcement\nface\nreduced litigation\nnet positive\nresponding to\none state can cost\nmillion\ns\nmultiple suits\ncauses\ncompounding\ncosts\ndelays\nslow\nability to continue\nbusiness\nIn antitrust\ndefendants\nargue\nefficiency justifies behavior\nresearch-sharing justification\nmay be lawful\nregulations\nto limit common ownership\ncreates safe harbors\ndistinguish diversification\nwithin\nand\nacross industries\nregulation\nwithin sectors will\npreserve\nbeneficial behavior\nrestrict g\nh\ng\ns\nto benefit\nfirms\noutside the sector\nwhile\nno incentive to reduce competition", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Permutation do both – democratic biopolitics good.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Moreover, it is obvious that simply treating measures of public health, such as quarantines or ‘social distancing’, as biopolitics somehow misses their potential usefulness. In the absence of a vaccine or successful anti-viral treatments, these measures, coming from the repertoire of 19th century public health manuals, can reduce the burden, especially for vulnerable groups.\nThis is especially urgent if we recognize that even in advanced capitalist economies public health infrastructure has deteriorated and cannot actually stand the peak of the pandemic, unless measures to reduce the rate of its expansion are taken. \nOne might say that contra Agamben, the concept of ‘naked life’ can better describe the pensioner on a waiting list for a respirator or an ICU bed, because of a collapsed public health system, than the attempt to adjust to the practical exigencies of social distancing or quarantine measures. In light of the above I would like to suggest a different return to Foucault. I think that sometimes we forget that Foucault had a highly relational conception of power practices.4 In this sense, it is legitimate to ask whether a democratic or even communist biopolitics is possible.\nTo put this question in a different way: Is it possible to have collective practices that actually help the health of populations, including large-scale behaviour modifications, without a parallel expansion of forms of coercion and surveillance? \nFoucault himself, in his late work, points towards such a direction, around the notions of truth, parrhesia and care of the self.5 In this highly original dialogue with ancient philosophy, in particular Hellenistic and Roman, he suggested an alternative politics of bios that combines individual and collective care, based on a certain obligation and courage to tell the truth, in non-coercive ways.\nIn such a perspective, the decisions for the reduction of movement and for social distancing in times of epidemics, or for not smoking in closed public spaces, or for avoiding individual and collective practices that harm the environment, would be the result of democratically discussed collective decisions based on the knowledge available and as part of a collective effort to care for others and ourselves. This means that from simple discipline we move to responsibility, in regards to others and then ourselves, and from suspending sociality to consciously transforming it. In such a condition, instead of a permanent individualized fear, which can break down any sense of social cohesion, we move towards the idea of collective effort, coordination and solidarity within a common struggle, elements that in such health emergencies can be equally important to medical interventions. \nThis offers the possibility of a democratic biopolitics. This can also be based on the democratization of knowledge. The increased access to knowledge, along with the need for popularization campaigns makes possible collective decision processes that are based on knowledge and understanding and not just the authority of experts.\nBiopolitics from below\nThe battle against HIV, the fight of stigma, the attempt to make people understand that it is not the disease of ‘high risk groups’, the demand for education on safe sex practices, the funding of the development of therapeutic measures and the access to public health services, would not have been possible without the struggle of movements such as ACT UP. One might say that this was indeed an example of a biopolitics from below.\nAnd in the current conjuncture, social movements have a lot of room to act. They can ask of immediate measures to help public health systems withstand the extra burden caused by the pandemic. They can point to the need for solidarity and collective self-organization during such a crisis, in contrast to individualized “survivalist” panics. They can insist on state power (and coercion) being used to channel resources from the private sector to socially necessary directions. They can organize struggles for paid sick leave and for an end to measures such as eviction. They can put their collective ingenuity in practice to create forms of support for the elderly and those without any assistance. They can project, in all possible ways, the fact that today the struggle against the pandemic is a struggle waged by labour, not capital, by doctors and nurses in understaffed public health systems, by precarious workers in the vital supply chains, by those that keep basics infrastructure running during the lock-down. And they can demand social change as a life-saving exigency.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "it is obvious that\npublic health\nquarantines\nas biopolitics somehow misses their potential usefulness\nmeasures\ncan reduce the burden, especially for vulnerable groups\nOne might say that contra Agamben, the concept of ‘naked life’ can better describe the pensioner on a waiting list for a respirator or an ICU bed, because of a collapsed public health system, than the attempt to adjust to the practical exigencies\nFoucault had a highly relational conception of power\na democratic or even communist biopolitics is possible.\ncollective practices\nactually help the health of populations\nFoucault himself\nsuggested an alternative politics of bios that combines individual and collective care, based on a certain obligation\nto tell the truth, in non-coercive ways\nthe decisions for the reduction of movement and for social distancing in times of epidemics, or for not smoking in closed public spaces, or for avoiding individual and collective practices that harm the environment, would be the result of democratically discussed collective decisions\nThis means\nresponsibility\ninstead of a permanent individualized fear\nwe move towards the idea of collective effort, coordination and solidarity\nThe battle against HIV, the fight of stigma\nthe demand for education on safe sex practices\nwould not have been possible without the struggle of movements such as ACT UP\nOne might say that this was indeed an example of a biopolitics from below.\nThey can insist on state power (and coercion) being used to channel resources from the private sector to socially necessary directions. They can organize struggles for paid sick leave\nThey can put their collective ingenuity in practice to create forms of support for the elderly and those without any assistance\nAnd they can demand social change as a life-saving exigency.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Permutation do both – democratic biopolitics good.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "it is obvious that\npublic health\nquarantines\nas biopolitics somehow misses their potential usefulness\nmeasures\ncan reduce the burden, especially for vulnerable groups\nOne might say that contra Agamben, the concept of ‘naked life’ can better describe the pensioner on a waiting list for a respirator or an ICU bed, because of a collapsed public health system, than the attempt to adjust to the practical exigencies\nFoucault had a highly relational conception of power\na democratic or even communist biopolitics is possible.\ncollective practices\nactually help the health of populations\nFoucault himself\nsuggested an alternative politics of bios that combines individual and collective care, based on a certain obligation\nto tell the truth, in non-coercive ways\nthe decisions for the reduction of movement and for social distancing in times of epidemics, or for not smoking in closed public spaces, or for avoiding individual and collective practices that harm the environment, would be the result of democratically discussed collective decisions\nThis means\nresponsibility\ninstead of a permanent individualized fear\nwe move towards the idea of collective effort, coordination and solidarity\nThe battle against HIV, the fight of stigma\nthe demand for education on safe sex practices\nwould not have been possible without the struggle of movements such as ACT UP\nOne might say that this was indeed an example of a biopolitics from below.\nThey can insist on state power (and coercion) being used to channel resources from the private sector to socially necessary directions. They can organize struggles for paid sick leave\nThey can put their collective ingenuity in practice to create forms of support for the elderly and those without any assistance\nAnd they can demand social change as a life-saving exigency.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "vulnerable\nrelational\ndemocratic\nbiopolitics is possible\nhealth\nenvironment\ncollective\nresponsibility\nindividualized fear\nThey can insist on state power (and coercion) being used to channel resources from the private sector to socially necessary directions.\nlife-saving exigency", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Permutation do both – democratic biopolitics good.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "it is obvious that\npublic health\nquarantines\nas biopolitics somehow misses their potential usefulness\nmeasures\ncan reduce the burden, especially for vulnerable groups\nOne might say that contra Agamben, the concept of ‘naked life’ can better describe the pensioner on a waiting list for a respirator or an ICU bed, because of a collapsed public health system, than the attempt to adjust to the practical exigencies\nFoucault had a highly relational conception of power\na democratic or even communist biopolitics is possible.\ncollective practices\nactually help the health of populations\nFoucault himself\nsuggested an alternative politics of bios that combines individual and collective care, based on a certain obligation\nto tell the truth, in non-coercive ways\nthe decisions for the reduction of movement and for social distancing in times of epidemics, or for not smoking in closed public spaces, or for avoiding individual and collective practices that harm the environment, would be the result of democratically discussed collective decisions\nThis means\nresponsibility\ninstead of a permanent individualized fear\nwe move towards the idea of collective effort, coordination and solidarity\nThe battle against HIV, the fight of stigma\nthe demand for education on safe sex practices\nwould not have been possible without the struggle of movements such as ACT UP\nOne might say that this was indeed an example of a biopolitics from below.\nThey can insist on state power (and coercion) being used to channel resources from the private sector to socially necessary directions. They can organize struggles for paid sick leave\nThey can put their collective ingenuity in practice to create forms of support for the elderly and those without any assistance\nAnd they can demand social change as a life-saving exigency.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "biopolitics\ncan reduce the burden\nfor vulnerable groups\nFoucault had a\nrelational concept\nof power\ndemocratic\nbiopolitics is possible\ncollective practices\nhelp\nhealth\ncollective decisions\nThis means\nresponsibility\ninstead of\nindividualized fear\nThey can insist on state power\nto channel resources from the private sector to socially necessary directions.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The plan generates a beneficial chilling effect that prevents inaccurate ratings.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "But there is a countervailing consideration. Sometimes a chilling effect can be an excellent safeguard. Without such an effect, the marketplace of ideas will allow many people to spread damaging falsehoods about both individuals and institutions. SO If false statements create serious problems, it is important to ensure that the fear of a chilling effect does not itself have a chilling effect on public discussion or social practices. Some falsehoods can hurt or even ruin individual lives. For all these reasons, it is sensible to hope that social norms and even laws will chill them. We need, in short, to find ways to discourage the spread of statements that are at once false and damaging.5", "role": "user" }, { "content": "there is a countervailing consideration\na chilling effect can be an excellent safeguard\nWithout such an effect, the marketplace of ideas will allow many people to spread damaging falsehoods about\ninstitutions\nIf false statements create serious problems\nit is important to ensure that the fear of a chilling effect does not itself have a chilling effect on public discussion or social practices. Some falsehoods can hurt\nlives\nit is sensible to hope that\nlaws will chill them\nWe need\nto find ways to discourage the spread of statements that are\ndamaging", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The plan generates a beneficial chilling effect that prevents inaccurate ratings.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "there is a countervailing consideration\na chilling effect can be an excellent safeguard\nWithout such an effect, the marketplace of ideas will allow many people to spread damaging falsehoods about\ninstitutions\nIf false statements create serious problems\nit is important to ensure that the fear of a chilling effect does not itself have a chilling effect on public discussion or social practices. Some falsehoods can hurt\nlives\nit is sensible to hope that\nlaws will chill them\nWe need\nto find ways to discourage the spread of statements that are\ndamaging", "role": "user" }, { "content": "countervailing consideration\nchilling effect\nexcellent safeguard\nmarketplace of ideas\ndamaging falsehoods\nserious problems\nfear of a chilling effect\nitself\nchilling effect\nfalsehoods\nlaws\nchill them\ndiscourage the spread\ndamaging", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The plan generates a beneficial chilling effect that prevents inaccurate ratings.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "there is a countervailing consideration\na chilling effect can be an excellent safeguard\nWithout such an effect, the marketplace of ideas will allow many people to spread damaging falsehoods about\ninstitutions\nIf false statements create serious problems\nit is important to ensure that the fear of a chilling effect does not itself have a chilling effect on public discussion or social practices. Some falsehoods can hurt\nlives\nit is sensible to hope that\nlaws will chill them\nWe need\nto find ways to discourage the spread of statements that are\ndamaging", "role": "user" }, { "content": "a chilling effect can be a\nsafeguard\nWithout such\nthe marketplace\nwill allow\nfalsehoods\nIf false statements create\nproblems\nit is important to ensure\nthe fear of a chilling effect does not itself have a chilling effect\nSome falsehoods\nhurt\nit is sensible\nchill them\nWe need\ndiscourage\nstatements that\ndamaging", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No chilling effect – safeguards check, empirically denied, and aren’t harmful.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "A. Official Fallibility\nIf the government is allowed to punish or censor what it characterizes as false, it might actually end up punishing or censoring truth. The reason is that its own judgments may not be reliable. In defending the right to say what is false, Mill made much of this point, arguing that those who seek to suppress speech \"of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible . . . . All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility.\"5 7 Public officials might be foolish or ignorant. However confident, they might be wrong. Their judgments might be self-serving. On Mill's view, official fallibility is a sufficient reason to allow what officials deem to be falsehoods - and to allow public discussion and counterspeech to provide a corrective, if a corrective is what is needed.\nTaken by itself, Mill's argument is unconvincing. To be sure, it suggests a serious cautionary note, especially about the proposition that officials should be allowed to censor or punish whatever they claim or deem to be falsehoods. But with appropriate safeguards, a well-functioning legal system ought to be able to reduce the risk of official error without giving free rein to lies and liars, and even to sincerely held falsehoods. One safeguard is an independent tribunal; a court, and not merely the executive branch, should be the institution to resolve the question of truth or falsity. It is true and important that courts are not infallible. Their factfinding tools are hardly perfect, and they might well have biases of their own. Nonetheless, an independent tribunal can serve as an important check on the potentially self-serving judgments of others, including executive officials. 8\nAnother safeguard is the burden of proof. With what clarity must it be shown that a statement is in fact false?59 With a high burden of proof, the risk of unjustified restrictions on speech is diminished. If we are very concerned about the risk of error, we might say that falsehoods may be punished or censured only when an independent tribunal has concluded that there is no reasonable doubt about the matter - as, for example, when someone has clearly been libeled with a false claim or accusation. It should be clear that as the burden of proof grows increasingly difficult to meet, Mill's argument becomes increasingly weak. At the same time, a high burden of proof will also ensure that false and harmful statements are not chilled.\nIn direct response to Mill's claim, it is important to note that the legal system has long forbidden various kinds of falsehoods, including perjury, 0 false advertising,6 ' and fraud.62 People are not allowed to say that they are government agents unless they actually are. 63 In these cases, Mill's argument has been rightly and thoroughly rejected. It is true that in such cases, there is usually demonstrable harm, 64 and we might want to say that false statements are protected unless there actually is such harm. But the question here is whether Mill's argument about official fallibility is, by itself, a convincing reason to protect falsehoods. It is not.\nThe most plausible argument in Mill's defense would be rule-consequentialist. Perhaps the risk of official error (including judicial error) is high not always, but much of the time. Perhaps case-by-case inquiries into the question of truth or falsity would be burdensome and time-consuming. Perhaps we do best to avoid those inquiries and conclude that officials cannot punish or censor falsehoods unless they can make a powerful showing of harm. That argument is not implausible in the abstract, but it too is unconvincing, at least in well-functioning legal systems. We should be able to agree that there is no point in regulating speech unless it is harmful. But if falsehoods are a little bit harmful, should they be protected merely because officials are fallible? If people lie to the Federal Bureau of Investigation about their employment history, or falsely claim to be a government agent when trying to frighten a neighbor, or say in a job application for state employment that they competed in the Olympics, is it so clear that the First Amendment should be taken to prohibit punishment, even if the harm done by those lies is relatively modest?", "role": "user" }, { "content": "If the government is allowed to punish\nwhat it characterizes as false, it might\nend up punishing\ntruth\nwith appropriate safeguards, a well-functioning legal system\nreduce the risk of official error without giving free rein to\nliars\nOne safeguard is\na court\nthe institution to resolve the question of truth or falsity\nserve as an important check on\nself-serving judgments of others\nAnother\nis the burden of proof\nWith what clarity must it be shown that a statement is in fact false\nWith a high burden of proof, the risk of unjustified restrictions on speech is diminished\nthe legal system has long forbidden\nfalsehoods, including perjury\nfalse advertising\nand fraud\nPeople are not allowed to say that they are government agents unless they actually are\nIn these cases\nargument has been\nrejected\nWe should be able to agree that there is no point in regulating speech unless it is harmful. But if falsehoods are a little bit harmful, should they be protected merely because officials are fallible? If people lie\nin a job application\nis it so clear that the First Amendment should be taken to prohibit punishment, even if the harm done by those lies is relatively modest?", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No chilling effect – safeguards check, empirically denied, and aren’t harmful.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "If the government is allowed to punish\nwhat it characterizes as false, it might\nend up punishing\ntruth\nwith appropriate safeguards, a well-functioning legal system\nreduce the risk of official error without giving free rein to\nliars\nOne safeguard is\na court\nthe institution to resolve the question of truth or falsity\nserve as an important check on\nself-serving judgments of others\nAnother\nis the burden of proof\nWith what clarity must it be shown that a statement is in fact false\nWith a high burden of proof, the risk of unjustified restrictions on speech is diminished\nthe legal system has long forbidden\nfalsehoods, including perjury\nfalse advertising\nand fraud\nPeople are not allowed to say that they are government agents unless they actually are\nIn these cases\nargument has been\nrejected\nWe should be able to agree that there is no point in regulating speech unless it is harmful. But if falsehoods are a little bit harmful, should they be protected merely because officials are fallible? If people lie\nin a job application\nis it so clear that the First Amendment should be taken to prohibit punishment, even if the harm done by those lies is relatively modest?", "role": "user" }, { "content": "punish\nappropriate safeguards\nofficial error\nsafeguard\ncourt\nimportant check\nburden of proof\nclarity\nfalse\ndiminished\nlong forbidden\nperjury\nfalse advertising\nfraud\nrejected\nno point\nlittle bit\nlie\njob application\nFirst Amendment", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No chilling effect – safeguards check, empirically denied, and aren’t harmful.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "If the government is allowed to punish\nwhat it characterizes as false, it might\nend up punishing\ntruth\nwith appropriate safeguards, a well-functioning legal system\nreduce the risk of official error without giving free rein to\nliars\nOne safeguard is\na court\nthe institution to resolve the question of truth or falsity\nserve as an important check on\nself-serving judgments of others\nAnother\nis the burden of proof\nWith what clarity must it be shown that a statement is in fact false\nWith a high burden of proof, the risk of unjustified restrictions on speech is diminished\nthe legal system has long forbidden\nfalsehoods, including perjury\nfalse advertising\nand fraud\nPeople are not allowed to say that they are government agents unless they actually are\nIn these cases\nargument has been\nrejected\nWe should be able to agree that there is no point in regulating speech unless it is harmful. But if falsehoods are a little bit harmful, should they be protected merely because officials are fallible? If people lie\nin a job application\nis it so clear that the First Amendment should be taken to prohibit punishment, even if the harm done by those lies is relatively modest?", "role": "user" }, { "content": "legal system\nreduce the risk of\nerror\nsafeguard is\na court\nserve as\ncheck on\njudgments\nAnother\nis the burden of proof\nrisk of\nrestrictions\nis diminished\nlegal system has\nforbidden\nperjury\nfalse advertising\nand\nargument has been\nrejected\nthere is no point\nregulating speech unless\nharmful\nif falsehoods are a little bit harmful, should they be protected\nIf people lie\nin a job application\nis it so clear\nFirst Amendment should\nprohibit punishment, even if\nharm\nis\nmodest", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Democracy is dead – inequality, polarization, money in politics.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The events of January 6 made it bracingly clear that our democracy is in need of repair. An incumbent president attempted to overturn election results, a violent mob assaulted the Capitol as Congress met to formalize his defeat, and lawmakers failed to hold the outgoing leader accountable for his reckless actions, leaving him in place as the de facto chief of his party.\nBut the problems that have afflicted American institutions over the past four years did not arise suddenly from a healthy political environment. As Freedom House recently concluded, American democracy has been eroding for at least a decade—a trend that is especially remarkable when viewed from a global perspective.\nTo put the matter in quantitative terms, the United States’s score on the 100-point scale in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report has dropped from 94 to 83 over the past ten years, the largest decline of any established democracy during that period. The United States has fallen out of a cohort that included traditional peers like France and the United Kingdom, and now finds itself in the ranks of countries with much weaker democratic institutions, such as Panama or Romania.\nThere is no question that Donald Trump’s time in the White House took a toll on America’s democratic vitality. The former president’s brazen effort to subvert the election was the culmination of four years of decay, in which the administration sought to trample checks on its authority, cast aside safeguards against corruption, and gave succor to right-wing extremists. But to see our country’s democratic decline as primarily a Trump phenomenon would miss the larger picture.\nEach year since the 1970s, Freedom in the World has assessed the state of political rights and civil liberties in every country, including the United States. A close examination of data from the past decade offers much to be concerned about, but it strongly suggests that three long-term problems have played a pervasive and outsized role in undermining the health of the American democratic system: unequal treatment for people of color, partisan polarization, and the improper influence of money in politics.\nThe unequal treatment of people of color, especially black Americans and Native Americans, is one of the most enduring findings in our annual evaluation, and sadly, political equality and equal treatment under the law have deteriorated further in recent years. Although there are parallels with other long-standing democracies, the United States faces a unique challenge in upholding the promise of equality due to its history of slavery and institutionalized segregation. Decades after the Jim Crow era, the fairness and inclusivity of elections is still at issue.\nSimilarly, the United States suffers from a degree of partisan polarization that surpasses the political divides found in most other established democracies. This bifurcation of the public square prevents efficient democratic functioning and drives our civic discourse to the extremes, where it becomes divorced from the daily concerns of most Americans. Partisan gerrymandering, an inversion of democracy in which politicians effectively choose their voters, is a key driver of this polarization. Analogous but more distorted forms of the practice can be found in countries like Hungary, Jordan, and Malaysia—all rated by Freedom House as only partly free or not free.\nFinally, the United States stands out for special-interest influence in politics and policymaking as well as extraordinary levels of campaign spending. In Freedom in the World, the United States ranks lower on the indicator for improper influence on the political process—which includes private interest groups, oligarchs, patronage networks, criminal organizations, armed militants, or foreign powers—than any other large, established democracy, with the exception of Italy.\nAll of this should alarm citizens. But the U.S. political system is not producing an adequate response to the crisis at hand. Legislative efforts to address pieces of the problem are themselves hampered by partisanship and polarization.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "January 6 made it\nclear\nour democracy is in need of repair\nthe problems that\nafflict\nAmerican institutions\ndid not arise suddenly\ndemocracy has been eroding for\na decade\nthe U\nS\n’s score on the 100-point scale\ndropped from 94 to 83\n, the largest decline of any\ndemocracy\nTrump’s time\ntook a toll on America’s democratic vitality\nThe\neffort to subvert the election was the culmination of four years of decay, in which the administration\ntrample checks\n, cast aside safeguards against corruption, and gave succor to right-wing extremists\nBut to see our country’s democratic decline as\na Trump phenomenon would miss the larger picture\nA close examination of data\noffers much to be concerned about, but it\nsuggests\nthree long-term problems\nplay\na pervasive\noutsized role in undermining the health of the American democratic system: unequal treatment for people of color, partisan polarization, and\nmoney in politics\nThe unequal treatment\nblack\nand Native Americans, is one of the most enduring findings\nand\npolitical equality\nhave deteriorated further\nthe United States faces a\nchallenge in upholding the promise of equality due to\nslavery and\nsegregation\nDecades after the Jim Crow era,\nfairness and inclusivity of elections is still at issue\npartisan polarization\nsurpasses the political divides found in\nother established democracies\nbifurcation of the public square prevents\ndemocratic functioning and drives\ncivic discourse to the extremes\nPartisan gerrymandering\nis a key driver of this polarization\nthe United States stands out for special-interest influence in politics and\ncampaign spending\nthis should alarm citizens\nthe U.S. political system is not producing an adequate response to the crisis at hand\nLegislative efforts\nare\nhampered by partisanship and polarization", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Democracy is dead – inequality, polarization, money in politics.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "January 6 made it\nclear\nour democracy is in need of repair\nthe problems that\nafflict\nAmerican institutions\ndid not arise suddenly\ndemocracy has been eroding for\na decade\nthe U\nS\n’s score on the 100-point scale\ndropped from 94 to 83\n, the largest decline of any\ndemocracy\nTrump’s time\ntook a toll on America’s democratic vitality\nThe\neffort to subvert the election was the culmination of four years of decay, in which the administration\ntrample checks\n, cast aside safeguards against corruption, and gave succor to right-wing extremists\nBut to see our country’s democratic decline as\na Trump phenomenon would miss the larger picture\nA close examination of data\noffers much to be concerned about, but it\nsuggests\nthree long-term problems\nplay\na pervasive\noutsized role in undermining the health of the American democratic system: unequal treatment for people of color, partisan polarization, and\nmoney in politics\nThe unequal treatment\nblack\nand Native Americans, is one of the most enduring findings\nand\npolitical equality\nhave deteriorated further\nthe United States faces a\nchallenge in upholding the promise of equality due to\nslavery and\nsegregation\nDecades after the Jim Crow era,\nfairness and inclusivity of elections is still at issue\npartisan polarization\nsurpasses the political divides found in\nother established democracies\nbifurcation of the public square prevents\ndemocratic functioning and drives\ncivic discourse to the extremes\nPartisan gerrymandering\nis a key driver of this polarization\nthe United States stands out for special-interest influence in politics and\ncampaign spending\nthis should alarm citizens\nthe U.S. political system is not producing an adequate response to the crisis at hand\nLegislative efforts\nare\nhampered by partisanship and polarization", "role": "user" }, { "content": "decade\nthree long-term problems\na pervasive\noutsized role in undermining the health of the American democratic system\nmost enduring findings\nalarm citizens", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Democracy is dead – inequality, polarization, money in politics.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "January 6 made it\nclear\nour democracy is in need of repair\nthe problems that\nafflict\nAmerican institutions\ndid not arise suddenly\ndemocracy has been eroding for\na decade\nthe U\nS\n’s score on the 100-point scale\ndropped from 94 to 83\n, the largest decline of any\ndemocracy\nTrump’s time\ntook a toll on America’s democratic vitality\nThe\neffort to subvert the election was the culmination of four years of decay, in which the administration\ntrample checks\n, cast aside safeguards against corruption, and gave succor to right-wing extremists\nBut to see our country’s democratic decline as\na Trump phenomenon would miss the larger picture\nA close examination of data\noffers much to be concerned about, but it\nsuggests\nthree long-term problems\nplay\na pervasive\noutsized role in undermining the health of the American democratic system: unequal treatment for people of color, partisan polarization, and\nmoney in politics\nThe unequal treatment\nblack\nand Native Americans, is one of the most enduring findings\nand\npolitical equality\nhave deteriorated further\nthe United States faces a\nchallenge in upholding the promise of equality due to\nslavery and\nsegregation\nDecades after the Jim Crow era,\nfairness and inclusivity of elections is still at issue\npartisan polarization\nsurpasses the political divides found in\nother established democracies\nbifurcation of the public square prevents\ndemocratic functioning and drives\ncivic discourse to the extremes\nPartisan gerrymandering\nis a key driver of this polarization\nthe United States stands out for special-interest influence in politics and\ncampaign spending\nthis should alarm citizens\nthe U.S. political system is not producing an adequate response to the crisis at hand\nLegislative efforts\nare\nhampered by partisanship and polarization", "role": "user" }, { "content": "American\ndemocracy has been eroding for\na decade\nthe U\nS\ndropped from 94 to 83\n, the largest decline of any\ndemocracy\nto see our country’s democratic decline as\na Trump phenomenon would miss the\npicture\ndata\nsuggests\nthree\nproblems\nunequal treatment for p\no\nc\n, partisan polarization, and\nmoney in politics\nunequal treatment\nis one of the most enduring findings\ndue to\nslavery and\nsegregation\nDecades after\nfairness\nof elections is\nat issue\npartisan polarization\nsurpasses\nother\ndemocracies\nbifurcation\ndrives\ncivic discourse to the extremes\ngerrymandering\nis a key driver\nthe U\nS\nstands out for special-interest influence in politics", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Certainty is key – counterplan generates ambiguity over the application of antitrust immunity. That deters market entry.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "II.Why should we worry about uncertainty costs?\nWhen considering the potential costs of new regulation, decision-makers often emphasise the legal spend, i.e., the cost of in-house lawyers, external advisers, document preservation systems, etc. But what is often overlooked is the far more expensive costs related to uncertainty in the process of risk-weighting potential investments. A simple example:\nCompany A seeks to enter into a transaction with Company B to achieve carbon output reduction. Company A’s executive management team, in conjunction with financial advisors, calculates a value for the transaction, which is typically a range of acceptable prices to achieve the desired goal. Company A’s CEO then engages her legal department to assess the potential for regulatory risk flowing from the venture. Given the potential for fines, divestitures, restrictions, or outright prohibitions on the project from a myriad of governmental authorities, the application of competition regulation has the potential to result in billions of dollars in business losses. On receiving legal advice on the probability of such losses, Company A’s CEO applies risk weighting to the value of the transaction, adjusting the value downward to account for the regulatory risk.\nIn some ways, legal ‘weight’ on a transaction, collaboration, or other business initiative is (socially and economically) desirable—if for example, a company employee proposed to engage in a price-fixing cartel, the legal department’s assessment of extreme risk serves a valuable societal goal. But in far too many cases, it is the mere lack of transparency and certainty in global competition regimes that lead to a determinative ‘risk weighting’ outcome in a deal. Competition counsel must conservatively advise of the uncertainty surrounding deal execution, and responsible CEOs must protect shareholders against business losses flowing from possible regulatory intervention including the reputational risk following compliance breaches. As in our example, regulatory uncertainty alone may prevent a pro-competitive, socially desirable transaction that has been devalued by the risk of regulatory intervention.\nWhen designing business practices, engaging in collaboration with other companies, and in considering merger activities, legal certainty, transparency, and predictability routinely drive willingness to invest.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Why should we worry about uncertainty costs\nCompany A seeks to enter into a transaction with Company B\nCompany A\ncalculates a value for the transaction\nCompany A\nengages\nlegal department to assess\npotential for regulatory risk\nGiven the potential for fines\ndivestitures\nrestrictions\nor\nprohibitions\nthe application of competition regulation has the potential to result in billions of dollars in business losses. On receiving legal advice on the probability of such losses, Company A’s CEO applies risk weighting to the value of the transaction\nadjusting the value downward to account for\nregulatory risk\nin far too many cases, it is the\nlack of\ncertainty in\ncompetition regimes that lead to a determinative\nrisk weighting’\nCompetition counsel must conservatively advise of the uncertainty surrounding deal execution, and\nCEOs must protect shareholders against business losses flowing from\nregulatory intervention\nWhen designing business practices\nengaging in collaboration with other companies, and in considering\nlegal certainty\nand predictability routinely drive willingness to invest", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Certainty is key – counterplan generates ambiguity over the application of antitrust immunity. That deters market entry.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Why should we worry about uncertainty costs\nCompany A seeks to enter into a transaction with Company B\nCompany A\ncalculates a value for the transaction\nCompany A\nengages\nlegal department to assess\npotential for regulatory risk\nGiven the potential for fines\ndivestitures\nrestrictions\nor\nprohibitions\nthe application of competition regulation has the potential to result in billions of dollars in business losses. On receiving legal advice on the probability of such losses, Company A’s CEO applies risk weighting to the value of the transaction\nadjusting the value downward to account for\nregulatory risk\nin far too many cases, it is the\nlack of\ncertainty in\ncompetition regimes that lead to a determinative\nrisk weighting’\nCompetition counsel must conservatively advise of the uncertainty surrounding deal execution, and\nCEOs must protect shareholders against business losses flowing from\nregulatory intervention\nWhen designing business practices\nengaging in collaboration with other companies, and in considering\nlegal certainty\nand predictability routinely drive willingness to invest", "role": "user" }, { "content": "uncertainty costs\nlegal department\nregulatory risk\nfines\ndivestitures\nrestrictions\nprohibitions\nbillions of dollars\nlegal advice\nrisk weighting\ndownward\nregulatory risk\ncertainty\ncompetition regimes\nrisk weighting’\nconservatively advise\nuncertainty\nprotect shareholders\nbusiness losses\nregulatory intervention\nbusiness practices\nlegal certainty\npredictability", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Certainty is key – counterplan generates ambiguity over the application of antitrust immunity. That deters market entry.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Why should we worry about uncertainty costs\nCompany A seeks to enter into a transaction with Company B\nCompany A\ncalculates a value for the transaction\nCompany A\nengages\nlegal department to assess\npotential for regulatory risk\nGiven the potential for fines\ndivestitures\nrestrictions\nor\nprohibitions\nthe application of competition regulation has the potential to result in billions of dollars in business losses. On receiving legal advice on the probability of such losses, Company A’s CEO applies risk weighting to the value of the transaction\nadjusting the value downward to account for\nregulatory risk\nin far too many cases, it is the\nlack of\ncertainty in\ncompetition regimes that lead to a determinative\nrisk weighting’\nCompetition counsel must conservatively advise of the uncertainty surrounding deal execution, and\nCEOs must protect shareholders against business losses flowing from\nregulatory intervention\nWhen designing business practices\nengaging in collaboration with other companies, and in considering\nlegal certainty\nand predictability routinely drive willingness to invest", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Why\nworry about uncertainty\nCompany\nassess\nrisk\nGiven\npotential for\nrestrictions\napplication\nhas\npotential to result in billions\nin\nlosses\nlack of\ncertainty in\ncompetition regimes\nlead to\nrisk weighting’\ncounsel\nconservatively advise of\nuncertainty\nand\nprotect\nagainst\nlosses\ncertainty\nand predictability\ndrive willingness to invest", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: DOT key – using industry-specific agencies precision regulates the industry.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Though common ownership causes competitive harm within the airline industry, two aspects of the practice make it difficult to regulate within the conventional boundaries of the Sherman and Clayton Acts: courts’ emphasis on showing a “mechanism of harm” and an exception to the Clayton Act for investors. This Section covers those aspects in turn. First, the nebulous nature of the competitive harm caused by common ownership makes the Sherman and Clayton Acts difficult to apply. Since at least Twombly, 59 courts have required antitrust enforcers to show the specific method by which a business practice harms competition in order to bring suit under the Sherman Act.60 If regulators bring an enforcement action but cannot prove a specific method by which a common owner is reducing competition (like telling executives not to compete or structuring executive pay to dissuade competition), then courts are likely to dismiss the suit.61 Such overt acts are hard to identify.62 In fact, the most likely method is not any overt action but instead “selective omission,” whereby common owners simply decline to encourage corporations to compete as hard as independent owners would.63 Consequently, the DOJ and others suing under the Sherman Act may be prevented from addressing common ownership in many cases. \nSection 7 of the Clayton Act specifically prohibits stockholders from using stock acquisitions to reduce competition,64 so it could provide an avenue for regulators looking to address common ownership even if the Sherman Act would not apply. But section 7 provides a carve-out for stock that is acquired solely for investment, 65 which throws its applicability to common ownership into question. Professor Elhauge has argued that because institutional investors still exercise voting power and control through their stock, the Clayton Act should apply to common owners who are institutional investors.66 But since institutional investors are often more concerned about making a return on investment than about controlling the corporations themselves, other scholars have disagreed or noted lasting questions about the applicability of the Clayton Act.67 Resolving this disagreement is outside of the scope of this Note, but its presence suggests another issue the DOJ may face in suing common owners under the Clayton Act.\nBeyond these legal questions lie concerns about the method by which the Sherman and Clayton Acts must be enforced: through the courts. The DOJ may not use notice-and-comment rulemaking to regulate antitrust behavior; instead, it must bring action in court.68 But courts are often far from ideal adjudicators of antitrust issues given that economic analysis is required.69 This is especially true when courts are confronted with cutting-edge theories of antitrust harm. For example, in the early 2000s the FTC discovered that pharmaceutical companies were paying generic manufacturers to delay challenging their drug patents. 70 When the FTC sued to stop these “pay for delay” arrangements, courts of appeals held that “pay for delay” was not a traditionally recognized mechanism of harm and allowed the arrangements to continue. “Pay for delay” arrangements cost consumers $60 billion in higher drug prices.71 As this example shows, the DOJ and private parties may be prevented from enforcing the antitrust laws by courts unfriendly to new theories of antitrust harm. The DOJ may face an uphill battle countering the competitive harm common ownership causes: it is difficult to identify how common ownership harms competition, the Clayton Act exempts passive investors, and courts are hostile to new economic arguments. Because common ownership sits on the boundaries of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, agencies able to prosecute “unfair methods of competition”—like the FTC and the DOT—may have an easier path to regulation.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "competitive harm within the airline industry\nmake it difficult to regulate within the conventional boundaries of the Sherman and Clayton Acts\ncourts’ emphasis on showing a “mechanism of harm\nBut courts are often far from ideal adjudicators of antitrust issues given that economic analysis is required.6\nThis is especially true when courts are confronted with cutting-edge theories of antitrust harm\nmechanism\n, the DOJ and private parties may be prevented from enforcing the antitrust laws by courts unfriendly to new theories of antitrust harm. The DOJ may face an uphill battle countering the competitive harm\nit is difficult to identify how\nharms competition\ncourts are hostile to new economic arguments", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: DOT key – using industry-specific agencies precision regulates the industry.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "competitive harm within the airline industry\nmake it difficult to regulate within the conventional boundaries of the Sherman and Clayton Acts\ncourts’ emphasis on showing a “mechanism of harm\nBut courts are often far from ideal adjudicators of antitrust issues given that economic analysis is required.6\nThis is especially true when courts are confronted with cutting-edge theories of antitrust harm\nmechanism\n, the DOJ and private parties may be prevented from enforcing the antitrust laws by courts unfriendly to new theories of antitrust harm. The DOJ may face an uphill battle countering the competitive harm\nit is difficult to identify how\nharms competition\ncourts are hostile to new economic arguments", "role": "user" }, { "content": "competitive harm\nin\nairline industry\nconventional boundaries\nSherman\nClayton Acts\ncourts’\nmechanism of harm\nideal adjudicators\neconomic analysis\ncutting-edge theories\nantitrust harm\nprevented\nantitrust laws\nunfriendly\nantitrust harm\nDOJ\nuphill battle\ncompetitive harm\nhow\ncompetition\nhostile\neconomic arguments", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: DOT key – using industry-specific agencies precision regulates the industry.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.7", "role": "system" }, { "content": "competitive harm within the airline industry\nmake it difficult to regulate within the conventional boundaries of the Sherman and Clayton Acts\ncourts’ emphasis on showing a “mechanism of harm\nBut courts are often far from ideal adjudicators of antitrust issues given that economic analysis is required.6\nThis is especially true when courts are confronted with cutting-edge theories of antitrust harm\nmechanism\n, the DOJ and private parties may be prevented from enforcing the antitrust laws by courts unfriendly to new theories of antitrust harm. The DOJ may face an uphill battle countering the competitive harm\nit is difficult to identify how\nharms competition\ncourts are hostile to new economic arguments", "role": "user" }, { "content": "competitive harm\nin\nairline industry\nmake it difficult to regulate within\nboundaries of\ncourts’ emphasis on\nharm\ncourts are often far from ideal adjudicators\ngiven\neconomic analysis\nThis is\ntrue when\nconfronted with\ntheories of antitrust harm\nparties may be prevented from enforcing\nantitrust\nby courts unfriendly to\ntheories of antitrust harm\nDOJ\nface an uphill battle countering\ncompetitive harm\ndifficult to identify how\nharms competition\ncourts are hostile to\neconomic arguments", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No overdeterrence – standard of demonstrated consumer benefits retains business confidence.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "With regard to questions one and two, the common argument against imposing any time limits on ATI is that this likely would deter the airlines proposing a joint venture from integrating their operations for fear that they might have to incur substantial costs at a later date to dismantle the joint venture. The FTC states, “The premerger notification requirements of the Hart–Scott–Rodino Act allow the antitrust agencies to examine the likely effects of proposed mergers before they take place. This advance notice avoids the difficult and potentially ineffective tive ‘unscrambling of the eggs’ once an anticompetitive merger has been completed.”36 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has pointed out: “far-reaching joint ventures[ ] are deemed more likely to achieve mergerlike synergies and efficiencies. At the same time, they may require substantial investments by the allied airlines to implement the foreseen level of integration, and integration can be difficult to adjust or unwind if needed.”37\nSince integration in a joint venture generates benefits for consumers, the deterrent effect could have greatly limited the potential benefits and diminished the value of ATI. However, the FTC and Department of Justice established precedent in investigating completed mergers that later harmed customers.38 Furthermore, if the airlines proposing a joint venture truly believed that ATI and the subsequent investments in creating metal-neutral operations would generate net benefits for consumers, then why should they worry about time limits and future reviews? The only uncertainty emanates from the possibility that the joint venture would not produce net benefits. This would be discovered in a future review that measures rather than hypothesizes the efficiencies and anticompetitive effects. Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine the benefits, including broader public interest benefits, which joint ventures among airlines in an alliance should produce to counter criticism to imposing any limits on ATI.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the common argument against imposing\ntime limits on ATI is\nthis\nwould deter\nairlines proposing a joint venture from integrating their operations for fear\nthey might have to incur substantial costs at a later date to dismantle the joint venture\nSince integration in a joint venture generates benefits for consumers\nthe deterrent effect could have greatly limited the potential benefits and diminished the value of ATI\nHowever\nthe FTC and D\no\nJ\nestablished precedent in investigating\nmergers that later harmed customers\nFurthermore, if the airlines proposing a joint venture truly believed that ATI and the subsequent investments in creating metal-neutral operations would generate net benefits for consumers, then why should they worry about time limits and future reviews\nThe only uncertainty emanates from the possibility that the joint venture would not produce net benefits. This would be discovered in a future review that measures rather than hypothesizes\nefficiencies and anticompetitive effects\nit is necessary to examine the benefits\nwhich joint ventures among airlines in an alliance should produce to counter criticism to imposing any limits on ATI", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No overdeterrence – standard of demonstrated consumer benefits retains business confidence.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the common argument against imposing\ntime limits on ATI is\nthis\nwould deter\nairlines proposing a joint venture from integrating their operations for fear\nthey might have to incur substantial costs at a later date to dismantle the joint venture\nSince integration in a joint venture generates benefits for consumers\nthe deterrent effect could have greatly limited the potential benefits and diminished the value of ATI\nHowever\nthe FTC and D\no\nJ\nestablished precedent in investigating\nmergers that later harmed customers\nFurthermore, if the airlines proposing a joint venture truly believed that ATI and the subsequent investments in creating metal-neutral operations would generate net benefits for consumers, then why should they worry about time limits and future reviews\nThe only uncertainty emanates from the possibility that the joint venture would not produce net benefits. This would be discovered in a future review that measures rather than hypothesizes\nefficiencies and anticompetitive effects\nit is necessary to examine the benefits\nwhich joint ventures among airlines in an alliance should produce to counter criticism to imposing any limits on ATI", "role": "user" }, { "content": "imposing\ntime limits\nATI\ndeter\njoint venture\nsubstantial costs\nintegration\nconsumers\ndeterrent effect\nHowever\nFTC\nD\no\nJ\nprecedent\nlater harmed customers\ntruly believed\nATI\nsubsequent investments\ngenerate\ntime limits\nfuture reviews\nonly uncertainty\nnot produce\nfuture review\nhypothesizes\nefficiencies\nexamine\ncounter criticism", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No overdeterrence – standard of demonstrated consumer benefits retains business confidence.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the common argument against imposing\ntime limits on ATI is\nthis\nwould deter\nairlines proposing a joint venture from integrating their operations for fear\nthey might have to incur substantial costs at a later date to dismantle the joint venture\nSince integration in a joint venture generates benefits for consumers\nthe deterrent effect could have greatly limited the potential benefits and diminished the value of ATI\nHowever\nthe FTC and D\no\nJ\nestablished precedent in investigating\nmergers that later harmed customers\nFurthermore, if the airlines proposing a joint venture truly believed that ATI and the subsequent investments in creating metal-neutral operations would generate net benefits for consumers, then why should they worry about time limits and future reviews\nThe only uncertainty emanates from the possibility that the joint venture would not produce net benefits. This would be discovered in a future review that measures rather than hypothesizes\nefficiencies and anticompetitive effects\nit is necessary to examine the benefits\nwhich joint ventures among airlines in an alliance should produce to counter criticism to imposing any limits on ATI", "role": "user" }, { "content": "argument against\nlimits on ATI is\nthis\nwould deter\nairlines proposing\njoint venture\nintegration\nbenefits\nconsumers\ndeterrent effect could\nlimit\nbenefits\nHowever\nthe FTC and D\no\nJ\nestablished precedent\ninvestigating\nmergers that\nharmed customers\nif\nairlines\nbelieved\nATI\nwould generate\nbenefits\nwhy should they worry about\nreviews\nonly uncertainty emanates from\npossibility\nventure would not produce\nbenefits\nwould be discovered in a\nreview that measures rather than hypothesizes\nefficiencies", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The CP’s functional approach to algorithmic output strikes the right balance. The aff results in overprotection.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Computers are making an increasing number of important decisions in our lives. They fly airplanes, navigate traffic, and even recommend books. In the process, computers reason through automated algorithms and constantly send and receive information, sometimes in ways that mimic human expression. When can such communications, called here “algorithmic outputs,” claim First Amendment protection?\nThe question of “rights for robots,” if once limited to science fiction, has now entered the public debate. In recent years, firms like Verizon and Google have relied on First Amendment defenses against common-law and regulatory claims by arguing that some aspect of an automated process is speech protected by the Constitution.1 These questions will only grow in importance as computers become involved in more areas of human decisionmaking.\nA simple approach, favored by some commentators, says that the First Amendment presumptively covers algorithmic output so long as the program seeks to communicate some message or opinion to its audience.2 But while simplicity is attractive, so is being right. In practice, the approach yields results both absurd and disruptive;3 the example of the car alarm shows why. The modern car alarm is a sophisticated computer program that uses an algorithm to decide when to communicate its opinions, and when it does it seeks to send a particularized message well understood by its audience. It meets all the qualifications stated: yet clearly something is wrong with a standard that grants Constitutional protection to an electronic annoyance device. Something is missing.\nThe big missing piece is functionality. More specifically, what’s being overlooked is the differential treatment courts should accord communications closely tied to some functional task. A close reading of the relevant cases suggests that courts, in fact, limit coverage in a way that reserves the power of the state to regulate the functional aspects of the communication process, while protecting its expressive aspects.4 Here, I go further and suggest that the law contains a de facto functionality doctrine that must be central to any consideration of machine speech.\nThe doctrine operates in two distinct ways. First, courts tend to withhold protection from carrier/conduits—actors who handle, transform, or process information, but whose relationship with speech or information is ultimately functional. Definitive examples are Federal Express or the telephone company, common carriers to whom the law does not grant speech rights. Those who merely carry information from place to place (courier services) generally don’t enjoy First Amendment protection, while those who select a distinct repertoire, like a newspaper or cable operator, do. Similarly, those who provide the facilities for job interviews are not recognized as speakers, nor are the manufacturers of technologies that record or transform information from one form into another—like a typewriter, photocopier, or loudspeaker.5\nSecond, courts do not normally protect tools—works whose use of information is purely functional, such as navigational charts, court filings, or contracts. The reasons are complex, and related to a broader nonprotection of information that by its very communication performs some task. In the words of language philosophers these are “speech acts,” “illocutionary acts,” or “situation-altering utterances.” The broader category includes the communications embodied in criminal commands, commercial paper, nutritional information, and price-fixing conspiracies.6\nCombined, these two tendencies form a de facto functionality doctrine, which, as we shall see, is central to understanding the First Amendment in the context of algorithmic output (and, thankfully, excludes car alarms from the protections of the Constitution). For one thing, in many cases the fact that an algorithm makes the decisions in software cases is in tension with the requirement of knowing selection or intimate identification. Other times, algorithmic output falls into the category of communication that acts by its very appearance.7 Warnings, status indications, directions, and similar signals are common outputs for computer software in this category. These outputs act to warn or instruct and are therefore similar analytically to something like a criminal command or conspiracy. \nIn an area as complex as this, a rule of thumb might be useful. Generally, we can distinguish software that serves as a “speech product” from that which is a “communication tool.” Communication tools fall into the categories just described: they primarily facilitate the communications of another person, or perform some task for the user. In contrast, speech products are technologies like blog posts, tweets, video games, newspapers, and so on, that are viewed as vessels for the ideas of a speaker, or whose content has been consciously curated.\nThe boundary between one and the other may be imperfect, but it must be drawn somewhere if the First Amendment is to be confined to its primary goal of protecting the expression of ideas, and if we are to prevent its abuse. If a software designer is primarily interested in facilitating some task for the user, he will be unlikely to have the space to communicate his own ideas. At a minimum, his ideas must bend to operations. Thus, the intent is not to communicate ideas, or, as the Supreme Court puts it, “affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”8\nIn what follows, I introduce these ideas more thoroughly and, along the way, consider the speech status of blogging and microblogging software like Twitter, GPS navigation software, search engines, and automated concierges. The importance of these matters cannot be overstated. Too little protection would disserve speakers who have evolved beyond the printed pamphlet. Too much protection would threaten to constitutionalize many areas of commerce and private concern without promoting the values of the First Amendment. ", "role": "user" }, { "content": "When can\nalgorithmic outputs\nclaim First Amendment protection\nrights for robots\nhas now entered the public debate\nfirms like Verizon and Google\nrelied on First Amendment defenses against\nregulatory claims by arguing\nan automated process is speech protected by the Constitution\nA simple approach\nsays that the First Amendment presumptively covers algorithmic output so long as the program seeks to communicate some message\nthe approach yields results\nabsurd and disruptive\nThe big missing piece is functionality\nwhat’s being overlooked is the differential treatment courts should accord communications closely tied to some functional task\ncourts\nlimit coverage in a way that reserves the power of the state to regulate the functional aspects of the communication process, while protecting its expressive aspects\nthe law contains a de facto functionality doctrine that must be central to any consideration of machine speech\ncourts\nwithhold protection from\nactors who\nprocess information, but whose relationship with speech\nis\nfunctional\nwhile those who select a distinct repertoire\ndo\nthose who provide the facilities for job interviews are not recognized as speakers, nor are the manufacturers of technologies that record\ninformation\ncourts do not\nprotect tools\nsuch as navigational charts\nthese are “speech acts\nThe broader category includes\ncommunications embodied in criminal commands\nthese two tendencies form a de facto functionality doctrine\nwhich\nis central to understanding the First Amendment in the context of algorithmic output\nin many cases the fact that an algorithm makes the decisions in software cases is in tension with the requirement of knowing selection or intimate identification\nOther times, algorithmic output falls into the category of communication that acts by its very appearance\ndirections\nare common outputs for computer software in this category. These outputs act to warn or instruct and are therefore similar analytically to something like a criminal command or conspiracy\na rule of thumb might be useful\nwe can distinguish software that serves as a “speech product” from that which is a “communication tool\nCommunication tools\nfacilitate\ncommunications of another person\nspeech products are technologies like blog posts\nthat are\nvessels for\nideas of a speaker\nor whose content has been consciously curated\nThe boundary\nmust be drawn somewhere if the First Amendment is to be confined to its primary goal of protecting the expression of ideas, and if we are to prevent its abuse\nToo little protection would disserve speakers who have evolved beyond the printed pamphlet\nToo much protection would threaten to constitutionalize\ncommerce\nwithout promoting the values of the First Amendment", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The CP’s functional approach to algorithmic output strikes the right balance. The aff results in overprotection.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "When can\nalgorithmic outputs\nclaim First Amendment protection\nrights for robots\nhas now entered the public debate\nfirms like Verizon and Google\nrelied on First Amendment defenses against\nregulatory claims by arguing\nan automated process is speech protected by the Constitution\nA simple approach\nsays that the First Amendment presumptively covers algorithmic output so long as the program seeks to communicate some message\nthe approach yields results\nabsurd and disruptive\nThe big missing piece is functionality\nwhat’s being overlooked is the differential treatment courts should accord communications closely tied to some functional task\ncourts\nlimit coverage in a way that reserves the power of the state to regulate the functional aspects of the communication process, while protecting its expressive aspects\nthe law contains a de facto functionality doctrine that must be central to any consideration of machine speech\ncourts\nwithhold protection from\nactors who\nprocess information, but whose relationship with speech\nis\nfunctional\nwhile those who select a distinct repertoire\ndo\nthose who provide the facilities for job interviews are not recognized as speakers, nor are the manufacturers of technologies that record\ninformation\ncourts do not\nprotect tools\nsuch as navigational charts\nthese are “speech acts\nThe broader category includes\ncommunications embodied in criminal commands\nthese two tendencies form a de facto functionality doctrine\nwhich\nis central to understanding the First Amendment in the context of algorithmic output\nin many cases the fact that an algorithm makes the decisions in software cases is in tension with the requirement of knowing selection or intimate identification\nOther times, algorithmic output falls into the category of communication that acts by its very appearance\ndirections\nare common outputs for computer software in this category. These outputs act to warn or instruct and are therefore similar analytically to something like a criminal command or conspiracy\na rule of thumb might be useful\nwe can distinguish software that serves as a “speech product” from that which is a “communication tool\nCommunication tools\nfacilitate\ncommunications of another person\nspeech products are technologies like blog posts\nthat are\nvessels for\nideas of a speaker\nor whose content has been consciously curated\nThe boundary\nmust be drawn somewhere if the First Amendment is to be confined to its primary goal of protecting the expression of ideas, and if we are to prevent its abuse\nToo little protection would disserve speakers who have evolved beyond the printed pamphlet\nToo much protection would threaten to constitutionalize\ncommerce\nwithout promoting the values of the First Amendment", "role": "user" }, { "content": "algorithmic outputs\nFirst Amendment\nrights for robots\npublic debate\nVerizon\nGoogle\nregulatory claims\nspeech\npresumptively covers\nmessage\nabsurd\ndisruptive\nfunctionality\ndifferential treatment\nfunctional task\nlimit coverage\nregulate\nfunctional aspects\nprotecting\nfunctionality doctrine\nmachine speech\nwithhold protection\nprocess information\nfunctional\ndistinct repertoire\nfacilities\nmanufacturers\ntools\nspeech acts\ncriminal commands\nfunctionality doctrine\nFirst Amendment\nalgorithmic output\ndecisions\nrequirement\nalgorithmic output\ncommunication\ndirections\nwarn\ninstruct\ncriminal command\nconspiracy\nrule of thumb\ndistinguish\nspeech product\ncommunication tool\ncommunications\nspeech products\nblog posts\nspeaker\nconsciously curated\nmust be drawn\nFirst Amendment\nexpression\nabuse\nToo little protection\nToo much protection\nthreaten\ncommerce\nFirst Amendment", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The CP’s functional approach to algorithmic output strikes the right balance. The aff results in overprotection.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "When can\nalgorithmic outputs\nclaim First Amendment protection\nrights for robots\nhas now entered the public debate\nfirms like Verizon and Google\nrelied on First Amendment defenses against\nregulatory claims by arguing\nan automated process is speech protected by the Constitution\nA simple approach\nsays that the First Amendment presumptively covers algorithmic output so long as the program seeks to communicate some message\nthe approach yields results\nabsurd and disruptive\nThe big missing piece is functionality\nwhat’s being overlooked is the differential treatment courts should accord communications closely tied to some functional task\ncourts\nlimit coverage in a way that reserves the power of the state to regulate the functional aspects of the communication process, while protecting its expressive aspects\nthe law contains a de facto functionality doctrine that must be central to any consideration of machine speech\ncourts\nwithhold protection from\nactors who\nprocess information, but whose relationship with speech\nis\nfunctional\nwhile those who select a distinct repertoire\ndo\nthose who provide the facilities for job interviews are not recognized as speakers, nor are the manufacturers of technologies that record\ninformation\ncourts do not\nprotect tools\nsuch as navigational charts\nthese are “speech acts\nThe broader category includes\ncommunications embodied in criminal commands\nthese two tendencies form a de facto functionality doctrine\nwhich\nis central to understanding the First Amendment in the context of algorithmic output\nin many cases the fact that an algorithm makes the decisions in software cases is in tension with the requirement of knowing selection or intimate identification\nOther times, algorithmic output falls into the category of communication that acts by its very appearance\ndirections\nare common outputs for computer software in this category. These outputs act to warn or instruct and are therefore similar analytically to something like a criminal command or conspiracy\na rule of thumb might be useful\nwe can distinguish software that serves as a “speech product” from that which is a “communication tool\nCommunication tools\nfacilitate\ncommunications of another person\nspeech products are technologies like blog posts\nthat are\nvessels for\nideas of a speaker\nor whose content has been consciously curated\nThe boundary\nmust be drawn somewhere if the First Amendment is to be confined to its primary goal of protecting the expression of ideas, and if we are to prevent its abuse\nToo little protection would disserve speakers who have evolved beyond the printed pamphlet\nToo much protection would threaten to constitutionalize\ncommerce\nwithout promoting the values of the First Amendment", "role": "user" }, { "content": "When can\nalgorithmic outputs\nclaim\nprotection\nfirms\nrelied on\ndefenses against\nregulatory claims\nA\napproach\nsays\nthe First Amendment\ncovers\noutput so long as the program\ncommunicate some message\nThe\nmissing piece is functionality\ncourts\nlimit coverage\nthat reserves the power\nto regulate\nfunctional aspects\nwhile protecting\nexpressive aspects\ncourts\nwithhold protection from\nactors who\nprocess information\ncourts do not\nprotect tools\nwe can distinguish software that serves as a\nproduct” from\ncommunication\nboundary\nmust be drawn\nto\nprotec\nexpression\nand\nprevent\nabuse\nToo little protection\ndisserve speakers\nToo much\nthreaten to constitutionalize\ncommerce", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Falsehoods produce harm that outweighs the chilling effect.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "F. Harm in the Balance\nWhen falsehoods are banned, it is not only because they are falsehoods, but also because they threaten to produce real harm. Consider the canonical example of an unprotected falsehood: a false cry of \"fire!\" in a crowded theater. 4 Such a cry is not merely false. It also threatens, with a sufficiently high probability, to cause serious harm - and under plausible assumptions, little or nothing can be done, in time, to prevent that harm. Some falsehoods create a clear and present danger. 85 If someone sells a product with a false claim that it cures some illness, 8 6 there is an immediate risk that people will waste their money on it (and fail to take appropriate steps to address that illness). If someone commits perjury 7 - by saying, for example, that she saw a defendant at the scene of a crime, when she saw no such thing - the likelihood of an unjust conviction is immediately increased. If someone claims to be a government agent,\"\" and so induces some action or statement from someone, there is immediate harm. All of these acts are unlawful. In fact, many falsehoods that the law forbids create something like a clear and present danger. But it is difficult to say something like that about other false statements of fact, which are more innocuous. (Consider, for example, a claim from one neighbor to another, that her dog - who is actually a mixed breed - is a pure-bred Labrador Retriever, or an exaggerated report about an alleged achievement on the tennis court over the weekend.)\nTo be sure, many falsehoods can be harmful even if they do not fall in the traditional categories. Holocaust denials might fuel anti-Semitism.8 9 Claims about U.S. responsibility for the 9/11 attacks can discredit efforts to counteract terrorism. False claims about presidents and presidential candidates can be delegitimating or worse. One more time: If social welfare is the goal, we would want to measure the benefits against the costs of allowing the false statement in question, or perhaps the category of statements of which it is a part.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "When falsehoods are banned, it is not only because they are falsehoods, but also because they threaten to produce real harm\na false cry of \"fire\nin a crowded theater.\nSuch a cry is not merely false. It also threatens\nto cause serious\nnothing can be done, in time, to prevent that harm\nfalsehoods create a clear and present danger\nsells a product with a false claim\nperjury\nclaims to be a government agent\nAll of these acts are unlawful\nmany falsehoods can be harmful even if they do not fall in the traditional categories\nHolocaust denials might fuel anti-Semitism\nClaims about U.S. responsibility for the 9/11 attacks can discredit efforts to counteract terrorism\nFalse claims about presidents\ncan be delegitimating\n: If social welfare is the goal, we would want to measure the benefits against the costs of allowing the false statement in question\nor perhaps the category of statements of which it is a part", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Falsehoods produce harm that outweighs the chilling effect.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "When falsehoods are banned, it is not only because they are falsehoods, but also because they threaten to produce real harm\na false cry of \"fire\nin a crowded theater.\nSuch a cry is not merely false. It also threatens\nto cause serious\nnothing can be done, in time, to prevent that harm\nfalsehoods create a clear and present danger\nsells a product with a false claim\nperjury\nclaims to be a government agent\nAll of these acts are unlawful\nmany falsehoods can be harmful even if they do not fall in the traditional categories\nHolocaust denials might fuel anti-Semitism\nClaims about U.S. responsibility for the 9/11 attacks can discredit efforts to counteract terrorism\nFalse claims about presidents\ncan be delegitimating\n: If social welfare is the goal, we would want to measure the benefits against the costs of allowing the false statement in question\nor perhaps the category of statements of which it is a part", "role": "user" }, { "content": "produce real harm\nfire\nthreatens\nto cause serious\nprevent that harm\nclear\npresent danger\nfalse claim\nperjury\ngovernment agent\nunlawful\neven if\nHolocaust denials\nanti-Semitism\ndiscredit efforts\npresidents\ndelegitimating\nbenefits\ncosts\ncategory of statements", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Falsehoods produce harm that outweighs the chilling effect.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "When falsehoods are banned, it is not only because they are falsehoods, but also because they threaten to produce real harm\na false cry of \"fire\nin a crowded theater.\nSuch a cry is not merely false. It also threatens\nto cause serious\nnothing can be done, in time, to prevent that harm\nfalsehoods create a clear and present danger\nsells a product with a false claim\nperjury\nclaims to be a government agent\nAll of these acts are unlawful\nmany falsehoods can be harmful even if they do not fall in the traditional categories\nHolocaust denials might fuel anti-Semitism\nClaims about U.S. responsibility for the 9/11 attacks can discredit efforts to counteract terrorism\nFalse claims about presidents\ncan be delegitimating\n: If social welfare is the goal, we would want to measure the benefits against the costs of allowing the false statement in question\nor perhaps the category of statements of which it is a part", "role": "user" }, { "content": "falsehoods\nthreaten\nharm\nfire\nin a\ntheater\ncreate a clear and present danger\nfalsehoods\nharmful even if they do not fall in\ntraditional categories\nHolocaust denials\nfuel anti-Semitism\nIf soci\nwelfare is the goal\nmeasure the benefits against\ncosts\nor\ncategory of statements", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: ANZUS and the MDT are interconnected — identical treaty language and close links mean undermining one harms the credibility of the other.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The San Francisco alliance system\nThe Cold War in East Asia intensified in June 1950 when communist North Korea invaded the Republic of Korea. This ensured a greater commitment by Washington to the region. The Philippines was one of the first countries to declare its support for the defence of a neighbouring state against communist aggression, loyalty to Washington and commitment to UN collective security (Jose 2012, 36). Both Australia and the Philippines contributed a battalion to UN forces in Korea, while Canberra also deployed an air force squadron. The Korean War was the catalyst for a series of US security alliances with Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and the Philippines, that were signed in 1951 in conjunction with the Treaty of Peace with Japan, becoming known as the hub-and-spokes alliance system. As is well-known, the conclusion of these security treaties allowed for a ‘soft’ peace treaty with Japan to be politically acceptable in Australia and New Zealand.10\nWhat is not generally known, however, is that negotiations for the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty were undertaken in the context of Filipino attempts to create a Pacific Pact. The Philippines government was thus directly involved in the negotiations around ANZUS, especially in terms of the nature of the security guarantee provided for in Article IV. With the shock of the Korean invasion and perceived leverage of making a military contribution, Manila sought an ironclad security guarantee from Washington in 1951 in parallel with Australia’s efforts. Given its diplomatic initiatives to form a Pacific Pact, the Philippines also believed it should be part of any putative security treaty covering the Asia-Pacific that was negotiated with Australia and New Zealand. Manila was extremely disappointed to be ultimately left out of the ANZUS arrangement, leaving Washington little choice but to offer a similar treaty to the Philippines.11 It is interesting to note in this context that the Australian government was prepared to enter into a quadripartite pact including the Philippines if Washington had insisted on it.12 But in Asia, Washington preferred bilateral (or trilateral in Australia’s case) treaties with its smaller partners to maintain its freedom of action (Brands 1992, 257). There were also concerns that including only one Asian state in such a Pact would evoke resentment and suspicion from other regional countries, potentially creating more diplomatic problems than it would solve.13\nIn the negotiations leading to ANZUS and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the Republic of the Philippines (MDT), there was also controversy over whether the treaties should include an automatic provision of military assistance similar to Article V of NATO. The Philippines, in particular, was very concerned with the vague nature and perceived lack of commitment in the wording of the document, but Washington was unwilling to provide this assurance. Some Filipino politicians such as Romulo and Defense Minister at the time, Ramon Magsaysay, made the point that with American bases on its territory, any attack on the Philippines would prompt an automatic US response in any case (Buss 1977, 30).14 To avoid diplomatic conflict and also the taint of racism (by appearing to privilege Australia and New Zealand over the Philippines), both of the treaties contain the identical Article IV clause which reads:\nEach Party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.15", "role": "user" }, { "content": "North Korea invaded\nR\no\nK\nensured\ngreater commitment by Washington to the region\nPhilippines was one of the first countries to declare\nsupport for the defence of a neighbouring state against communist aggression\nloyalty to Washington and commitment to\ncollective security\nBoth Australia and the Philippines contributed a battalion to UN forces in Korea\nKorean War was the catalyst for\nUS security alliances with Japan\nAustralia\nNew Zealand\nand\nPhilippines\nbecoming\nthe hub-and-spokes\nWhat is not generally known\nis that\nANZUS\nwere undertaken in the context of Filipino attempts to create a Pacific Pact\nPhilippines\nwas\ndirectly involved in\nANZUS\nin terms of the\nsecurity guarantee provided for in Article IV\nManila sought an ironclad security guarantee\nin parallel with Australia’s efforts\nPhilippines\nbelieved it should be part of\nsecurity treaty covering\nAsia-Pacific\nManila was\ndisappointed to be\nleft out of\nANZUS\nleaving Washington\nto offer a similar treaty to the Philippines\nAustralian government was prepared to enter into a quadripartite pact including the Philippines\nIn\n ANZUS and\nM\nD\nT\nThe Philippines\nwas\nconcerned with the\nperceived lack of commitment\nwith American bases on its territory, any attack on the Philippines would prompt\nautomatic US response\nboth of the treaties contain the identical Article IV clause which reads\nEach Party recognises\nan armed attack\nwould act to meet the common dangers", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: ANZUS and the MDT are interconnected — identical treaty language and close links mean undermining one harms the credibility of the other.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "North Korea invaded\nR\no\nK\nensured\ngreater commitment by Washington to the region\nPhilippines was one of the first countries to declare\nsupport for the defence of a neighbouring state against communist aggression\nloyalty to Washington and commitment to\ncollective security\nBoth Australia and the Philippines contributed a battalion to UN forces in Korea\nKorean War was the catalyst for\nUS security alliances with Japan\nAustralia\nNew Zealand\nand\nPhilippines\nbecoming\nthe hub-and-spokes\nWhat is not generally known\nis that\nANZUS\nwere undertaken in the context of Filipino attempts to create a Pacific Pact\nPhilippines\nwas\ndirectly involved in\nANZUS\nin terms of the\nsecurity guarantee provided for in Article IV\nManila sought an ironclad security guarantee\nin parallel with Australia’s efforts\nPhilippines\nbelieved it should be part of\nsecurity treaty covering\nAsia-Pacific\nManila was\ndisappointed to be\nleft out of\nANZUS\nleaving Washington\nto offer a similar treaty to the Philippines\nAustralian government was prepared to enter into a quadripartite pact including the Philippines\nIn\n ANZUS and\nM\nD\nT\nThe Philippines\nwas\nconcerned with the\nperceived lack of commitment\nwith American bases on its territory, any attack on the Philippines would prompt\nautomatic US response\nboth of the treaties contain the identical Article IV clause which reads\nEach Party recognises\nan armed attack\nwould act to meet the common dangers", "role": "user" }, { "content": "R\no\nK\ngreater commitment\ndefence\ncommunist aggression\nWashington\ncollective security\nAustralia\nPhilippines\ncatalyst\nUS security alliances\nJapan\nAustralia\nNew Zealand\nPhilippines\nhub-and-spokes\nWhat is not generally known\nANZUS\nFilipino attempts\nPacific Pact\ndirectly involved\nANZUS\nsecurity guarantee\nArticle IV\nironclad security guarantee\nAustralia’s efforts\nsecurity treaty\nAsia-Pacific\nsimilar treaty\nAustralian government\nquadripartite pact\nPhilippines\nANZUS\nM\nD\nT\nconcerned\nlack of commitment\nautomatic US response\ntreaties\nidentical Article IV\narmed attack\ncommon dangers", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: ANZUS and the MDT are interconnected — identical treaty language and close links mean undermining one harms the credibility of the other.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "North Korea invaded\nR\no\nK\nensured\ngreater commitment by Washington to the region\nPhilippines was one of the first countries to declare\nsupport for the defence of a neighbouring state against communist aggression\nloyalty to Washington and commitment to\ncollective security\nBoth Australia and the Philippines contributed a battalion to UN forces in Korea\nKorean War was the catalyst for\nUS security alliances with Japan\nAustralia\nNew Zealand\nand\nPhilippines\nbecoming\nthe hub-and-spokes\nWhat is not generally known\nis that\nANZUS\nwere undertaken in the context of Filipino attempts to create a Pacific Pact\nPhilippines\nwas\ndirectly involved in\nANZUS\nin terms of the\nsecurity guarantee provided for in Article IV\nManila sought an ironclad security guarantee\nin parallel with Australia’s efforts\nPhilippines\nbelieved it should be part of\nsecurity treaty covering\nAsia-Pacific\nManila was\ndisappointed to be\nleft out of\nANZUS\nleaving Washington\nto offer a similar treaty to the Philippines\nAustralian government was prepared to enter into a quadripartite pact including the Philippines\nIn\n ANZUS and\nM\nD\nT\nThe Philippines\nwas\nconcerned with the\nperceived lack of commitment\nwith American bases on its territory, any attack on the Philippines would prompt\nautomatic US response\nboth of the treaties contain the identical Article IV clause which reads\nEach Party recognises\nan armed attack\nwould act to meet the common dangers", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Philippines\ndeclare\nsupport for\ndefence\nagainst communist aggression\nand commitment to\ncollective security\nBoth Australia and\nPhilippines contributed\nto\nKorea\nthe catalyst for\nalliances\nWhat is not\nknown\nis that\nANZUS\nin the context of Filipino attempts to create a\nPact\nPhilippines\nwas\ninvolved\nin\nthe\nsecurity guarantee\nin Article IV\nManila sought\nsecurity guarantee\nin parallel with Australia’s efforts\nAustralian government was prepared to enter\na quadripartite pact including\nPhilippines\nANZUS and\nM\nD\nT\nPhilippines\nwas\nconcerned with\nperceived lack of commitment\nwith American bases\nattack on the Philippines would prompt\nUS response\nboth\ntreaties contain\nidentical Article IV clause", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Confidence in extended nuclear deterrence checks prolif.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Extended nuclear deterrence\nThere were good strategic reasons for this. In the 1980s and 1990s there seemed almost no risk that Australia would ever be threatened militarily by a nuclear power, and if it was we could be confident of being shielded by America through the policy of extended nuclear deterrence (END). The US evolved END during the Cold War to deter Soviet attack on US allies and discourage those allies from acquiring their own nuclear forces. America promised to retaliate with nuclear weapons against any power that launched a nuclear attack on a US ally. This promise was made quite explicitly to US allies on the front line of the Cold War in Europe and Northeast Asia. It was not explicitly extended to Australia during the Cold War, presumably because we were so far from the front line and the chances of us facing a nuclear threat seemed so small. Canberra was nonetheless happy to assume that we were covered by US extended deterrence, and nothing was said in Washington to deny it.\nEND persisted beyond the Cold War because in the optimistic 1990s neither America nor its allies saw any reason to abandon it. It cost America little to continue guaranteeing its allies’ security in this way, and it suited its allies to keep on accepting that guarantee. Indeed, in the post–Cold War world order, END seemed more potent than ever because it appeared so unlikely that any country would challenge the ostensibly all-powerful US by threatening its allies, and Washington appeared so determined to maintain its alliances as the foundation of US global leadership.\nAs long as all that remained true we could rely on END, and there was no reason for Australia to contemplate nuclear forces of its own. The question now is whether we can continue to rely on END. If we can, we will not need nuclear weapons. If not, we will have a difficult choice to make. To see which it will be, we must consider a little further how and why END has worked until now, and how things might be different in Asia in the next few decades.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Australia\nwas\nconfident of being shielded by America through\nextended nuclear deterrence\nAmerica promised to retaliate\nagainst any power that launched a nuclear attack on a US ally\npromise was made\nexplicitly to US allies\nCanberra was\nhappy to assume\nwe were covered by US extended deterrence\nEND persisted\nbecause\nneither America nor its allies saw any reason to abandon it\nIt\nit suited\nallies to keep on accepting that guarantee\nWashington\ndetermined to maintain its alliances\nAs long as all that remained true we could rely on END\nthere was no reason for Australia to contemplate nuclear forces\nquestion\nis whether we can continue to rely on END. If we can, we will not need nuclear weapons. If not, we will have a difficult choice to make", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Confidence in extended nuclear deterrence checks prolif.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Australia\nwas\nconfident of being shielded by America through\nextended nuclear deterrence\nAmerica promised to retaliate\nagainst any power that launched a nuclear attack on a US ally\npromise was made\nexplicitly to US allies\nCanberra was\nhappy to assume\nwe were covered by US extended deterrence\nEND persisted\nbecause\nneither America nor its allies saw any reason to abandon it\nIt\nit suited\nallies to keep on accepting that guarantee\nWashington\ndetermined to maintain its alliances\nAs long as all that remained true we could rely on END\nthere was no reason for Australia to contemplate nuclear forces\nquestion\nis whether we can continue to rely on END. If we can, we will not need nuclear weapons. If not, we will have a difficult choice to make", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Australia\nconfident\nshielded\nextended nuclear deterrence\nretaliate\nnuclear attack\nUS ally\nexplicitly\nUS allies\nUS extended deterrence\npersisted\nany reason\nabandon it\nguarantee\ndetermined\nmaintain its alliances\nAs long as all that remained true\nno reason\nnuclear forces\ncontinue to rely\nEND\ndifficult choice", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Confidence in extended nuclear deterrence checks prolif.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Australia\nwas\nconfident of being shielded by America through\nextended nuclear deterrence\nAmerica promised to retaliate\nagainst any power that launched a nuclear attack on a US ally\npromise was made\nexplicitly to US allies\nCanberra was\nhappy to assume\nwe were covered by US extended deterrence\nEND persisted\nbecause\nneither America nor its allies saw any reason to abandon it\nIt\nit suited\nallies to keep on accepting that guarantee\nWashington\ndetermined to maintain its alliances\nAs long as all that remained true we could rely on END\nthere was no reason for Australia to contemplate nuclear forces\nquestion\nis whether we can continue to rely on END. If we can, we will not need nuclear weapons. If not, we will have a difficult choice to make", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Australia\nwas\nconfident of being shielded by America\npromise was made\nexplicitly to\nallies\nCanberra was\nhappy to assume\nextended deterrence\nEND persisted\nbecause\nAmerica nor\nallies saw\nreason to abandon\nWashington\ndetermined to maintain\nalliances\nAs long as\nthat remained true\nno reason for Australia to contemplate nuclear forces", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Reducing alliance commitments to South Korea necessitates nuclear reassurances.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Nuclear cooperation and the future of U.S. alliances\nVisible extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to allies through forward basing, deployment of nuclear capable delivery systems, official declarations, consultative fora or joint policy and planning thus remains an important element underpinning the robustness of U.S. alliances today. Nuclear warheads remain the crown jewels of military capability, and taking nonnuclear allies into confidence on nuclear matters is itself a political sign of the depth of U.S. commitment to these countries. But whereas it is a core purpose of U.S. alliances to extend deterrence—and deterrence is almost the sole-purpose of nuclear weapons—this article has shown that the concept of extended deterrence has limited utility in explaining the interests the United States and its allies pursue through institutional cooperation on nuclear weapons, and the forms this cooperation takes.\nCooperation on nuclear weapons in U.S. alliances is important because it provides an institutional means to create and maintain alliance cohesion at times when that cohesion has come under threat from perceptions of differing strategic priorities among allies. All the iconic steps by which NATO developed into a genuinely “nuclear alliance”—including the reliance on nuclear weapons after the failure of the 1952 Lisbon Summit goals, the development of nuclear sharing in the late 1950s, the creation of the NPG in the 1960s and the dual-track decision of 1979—were ultimately taken to promote broader alliance bargains about relative costs and benefits embedded in NATO strategy and posture. In most of these cases, the need for a new bargain arose because of allies’ concerns about U.S. policies, rather than a changed threat from the adversary. Similarly, the more recent creation of the U.S.–Japan and U.S.–Republic of Korea extended deterrence dialogue forums essentially resulted from concerns that Washington, DC may be backtracking from its alliance commitments in East Asia, in addition to more immediate concerns about extended conventional deterrence credibility in relation to China and North Korea.\nIn the end, the institutional cooperation on nuclear weapons that creates the impression of a “nuclear umbrella” is inseparable from the institutional basis that gives U.S. alliances credibility as a whole. Efforts by materially weaker allies to bargain with Washington, DC on the detail and extent of its security guarantees will become more intense, and more explicit, as perceived security threats increase, and as anxiety about abandonment and/or entrapment grows. Fears that the United States will become “decoupled” from its regional allies do not have to originate from, or be confined to, developments in the nuclear sphere. That said, as is evident in the case of Japan, any indication the United States may be diluting the strength of its nuclear commitment risks triggering concern about the broader credibility of alliance security assurances. The main benefit of nuclear consultation measures is therefore not to signal extended deterrence. Instead, they provide the means for allies to negotiate the management of alliance costs that relate to possible conflict, while ensuring that the United States remains committed strategically to the relevant theater in which the non-nuclear allies are located.\nHere, the multinational nature of NATO—compared to bilateral alliances in Asia—remains crucially important, as it raises the political importance of consensus with every member state, and has led to the institutionalized nature of that alliance. U.S. disagreements with Asian allies are bilateral disputes over specific questions, whereas in NATO, disagreements risk threatening America’s reputation as a leader of the Western Alliance if they are not addressed through intra-alliance compromise. In this sense, the difference in the consultative arrangements in Asia, compared to the policy and planning role of the NPG in Europe, also reflects institutional factors within these alliances unrelated to allies’ need for, or desire to create, extended nuclear deterrence.\nDespite these differences, perceived attenuation of U.S. commitment to nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear allies in Europe or in Asia would have serious consequences for perceptions of America’s alliance commitments more generally. In the NATO context, nuclear consultations have been a high-level staple of the alliance since the 1960s, and any diminution of this would raise questions about the depth of Washington, DC’s strategic commitment to defend its European and Asian allies. Discussion of the nuclear commitment in NATO has tended to focus on whether U.S. B-61 nuclear weapons should remain deployed on the continent, but the real centerpiece of America’s nuclear commitment to NATO remains the various nuclear consultation mechanisms that have been built over several decades. At the same time, however, the NPG itself gains much of its stature and importance from the existence of integrated nuclear forces. Similarly, any pull back by the United States from nuclear consultation in Asia would signal to highly sensitized Japanese and South Korean elites that not only are U.S. security assurances conditional, but also that Tokyo and Seoul will have significantly reduced scope to negotiate the terms of assurances in the future.\nIn Cold War Europe, and more recently in East Asia, consultation on nuclear strategy and posture has thus been an important means for the United States to influence strategic choices and perceptions of its nonnuclear allies. Nuclear capabilities do not exist in a separate strategic universe from the general balance of forces, and nuclear posture and strategy have defense resource implications. U.S. interests in this regard are far broader than the objective of avoiding further proliferation among its allies. In the past, Washington, DC was able to gain increased emphasis on conventional forces in NATO defense planning when negotiating the new role of nuclear weapons in Flexible Response, and has alleviated allied concerns about concessions to the Soviet Union by pushing for NATO nuclear force modernization. As the United States’ relative strategic weight continues to decline, and as Washington, DC continues to face significant fiscal pressures to curtail defense spending while tensions mount in Europe and Asia, critics are right to highlight the need for greater military burden sharing with allies. Reducing the role and prominence of U.S. nuclear weapons in its alliances, however, would remove a major avenue for United States influence, and therefore render it more difficult for current and future U.S. administrations to promote even conventional military burden sharing with non-nuclear allies.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Visible extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella\nthrough\ndeployment of nuclear capable delivery systems\nremains an important element underpinning the robustness of U.S. alliances\ntaking nonnuclear allies into confidence\nis\na political sign of the depth of U.S. commitment\nCooperation on nuclear weapons in U.S. alliances is important because it provides an institutional means to\nmaintain alliance cohesion\nwhen\ncohesion has come under threat from perceptions of differing strategic priorities among allies\niconic steps by which NATO developed into a\nnuclear alliance\nwere\ntaken to promote broader alliance bargains about\ncosts and benefits embedded in NATO strategy and posture\nneed for a new bargain arose because of allies’ concerns about U.S. policies\nrecent creation of the U.S.–Japan and U.S\nKorea extended deterrence dialogue\nresulted from concerns\nWashington\nmay be backtracking from its alliance commitments\nin addition to\nconcerns about\ndeterrence credibility\ninstitutional cooperation\nthat creates\nnuclear umbrella\nis inseparable from\ninstitutional basis that gives U.S. alliances credibility as a whole. Efforts by\nweaker allies to bargain with Washington\non the detail and extent of its security guarantees will become more intense\nand\nexplicit\nas anxiety about abandonment\ngrows\nFears\nthe U\nS\nwill become “decoupled\nfrom its\nallies do not have to originate from\ndevelopments in the nuclear sphere\nThat said, as is evident in the case of Japan\nindication the U\nS\nmay be diluting the strength of its nuclear commitment risks triggering concern about the broader credibility of alliance security assurances\nnuclear\nmeasures\nprovide the means for allies to negotiate the management of alliance costs\nwhile ensuring\nthe U\nS\nremains committed\nNATO\nraises the political importance of consensus with every member state\nand has led to the institutionalized nature of that alliance\ndisagreements risk threatening America’s reputation as a leader of the Western Alliance if they are not addressed through intra-alliance compromise\nperceived attenuation of U.S. commitment to nuclear cooperation with\nallies in Europe or\nAsia\nhave serious consequences for perceptions of America’s alliance commitments more generally. In\nNATO\nnuclear consultations have been a high-level staple\nand\ndiminution\nwould raise questions about the depth of Washington\n’s strategic commitment to defend\nEuropean and Asian allies\nDiscussion\nhas tended to focus on\nB-61 nuclear weapons\nthe real centerpiece\nremains\nvarious nuclear consultation mechanisms\nNPG\ngains\nimportance from the existence of integrated nuclear forces\nany pull back\nfrom\nAsia would signal to\nJapanese and South Korean\nthat not only are U.S. security assurances conditional\nconsultation on nuclear strategy and posture has\nbeen an important means for the U\nS\nto influence\nperceptions of its nonnuclear allies\nNuclear capabilities\nposture and strategy have\nimplications\nU.S. interests\nare far broader than\navoiding\nproliferation\nIn the past, Washington\nhas alleviated allied concerns about concessions to the Soviet Union by pushing for NATO nuclear force modernization", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Reducing alliance commitments to South Korea necessitates nuclear reassurances.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Visible extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella\nthrough\ndeployment of nuclear capable delivery systems\nremains an important element underpinning the robustness of U.S. alliances\ntaking nonnuclear allies into confidence\nis\na political sign of the depth of U.S. commitment\nCooperation on nuclear weapons in U.S. alliances is important because it provides an institutional means to\nmaintain alliance cohesion\nwhen\ncohesion has come under threat from perceptions of differing strategic priorities among allies\niconic steps by which NATO developed into a\nnuclear alliance\nwere\ntaken to promote broader alliance bargains about\ncosts and benefits embedded in NATO strategy and posture\nneed for a new bargain arose because of allies’ concerns about U.S. policies\nrecent creation of the U.S.–Japan and U.S\nKorea extended deterrence dialogue\nresulted from concerns\nWashington\nmay be backtracking from its alliance commitments\nin addition to\nconcerns about\ndeterrence credibility\ninstitutional cooperation\nthat creates\nnuclear umbrella\nis inseparable from\ninstitutional basis that gives U.S. alliances credibility as a whole. Efforts by\nweaker allies to bargain with Washington\non the detail and extent of its security guarantees will become more intense\nand\nexplicit\nas anxiety about abandonment\ngrows\nFears\nthe U\nS\nwill become “decoupled\nfrom its\nallies do not have to originate from\ndevelopments in the nuclear sphere\nThat said, as is evident in the case of Japan\nindication the U\nS\nmay be diluting the strength of its nuclear commitment risks triggering concern about the broader credibility of alliance security assurances\nnuclear\nmeasures\nprovide the means for allies to negotiate the management of alliance costs\nwhile ensuring\nthe U\nS\nremains committed\nNATO\nraises the political importance of consensus with every member state\nand has led to the institutionalized nature of that alliance\ndisagreements risk threatening America’s reputation as a leader of the Western Alliance if they are not addressed through intra-alliance compromise\nperceived attenuation of U.S. commitment to nuclear cooperation with\nallies in Europe or\nAsia\nhave serious consequences for perceptions of America’s alliance commitments more generally. In\nNATO\nnuclear consultations have been a high-level staple\nand\ndiminution\nwould raise questions about the depth of Washington\n’s strategic commitment to defend\nEuropean and Asian allies\nDiscussion\nhas tended to focus on\nB-61 nuclear weapons\nthe real centerpiece\nremains\nvarious nuclear consultation mechanisms\nNPG\ngains\nimportance from the existence of integrated nuclear forces\nany pull back\nfrom\nAsia would signal to\nJapanese and South Korean\nthat not only are U.S. security assurances conditional\nconsultation on nuclear strategy and posture has\nbeen an important means for the U\nS\nto influence\nperceptions of its nonnuclear allies\nNuclear capabilities\nposture and strategy have\nimplications\nU.S. interests\nare far broader than\navoiding\nproliferation\nIn the past, Washington\nhas alleviated allied concerns about concessions to the Soviet Union by pushing for NATO nuclear force modernization", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Visible extension\nnuclear umbrella\nnuclear capable delivery systems\nrobustness\nU.S. alliances\nnonnuclear allies\nconfidence\npolitical sign\ndepth\nU.S. commitment\nU.S. alliances\ninstitutional means\nalliance cohesion\nunder threat\nperceptions\ndiffering strategic priorities\nallies\nnuclear alliance\nbroader alliance bargains\ncosts\nbenefits\nNATO strategy\nposture\nallies’ concerns\nU.S. policies\nU.S.–Japan\nU.S\nKorea extended deterrence dialogue\nbacktracking\nalliance commitments\ndeterrence credibility\nnuclear umbrella\ninstitutional basis\ncredibility\nbargain\ndetail\nextent\nsecurity guarantees\nmore intense\nexplicit\nanxiety\nabandonment\ngrows\ndecoupled\ndo not\nnuclear sphere\nJapan\ndiluting\nnuclear commitment\nbroader credibility\nalliance security assurances\nnegotiate\nmanagement\nalliance costs\ncommitted\nNATO\npolitical importance\nconsensus\nmember state\ninstitutionalized nature\nthreatening\nleader\nWestern Alliance\nintra-alliance compromise\nperceived attenuation\nU.S. commitment\nEurope\nAsia\nserious consequences\nperceptions\nalliance commitments\nNATO\ndiminution\nstrategic commitment\nEuropean\nAsian allies\nB-61 nuclear weapons\nnuclear consultation mechanisms\nimportance\nintegrated nuclear forces\nAsia\nU.S. security assurances conditional\nnuclear strategy\nposture\nperceptions\nimplications\nfar broader\nproliferation\nalleviated allied concerns\nNATO nuclear force modernization", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Reducing alliance commitments to South Korea necessitates nuclear reassurances.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Visible extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella\nthrough\ndeployment of nuclear capable delivery systems\nremains an important element underpinning the robustness of U.S. alliances\ntaking nonnuclear allies into confidence\nis\na political sign of the depth of U.S. commitment\nCooperation on nuclear weapons in U.S. alliances is important because it provides an institutional means to\nmaintain alliance cohesion\nwhen\ncohesion has come under threat from perceptions of differing strategic priorities among allies\niconic steps by which NATO developed into a\nnuclear alliance\nwere\ntaken to promote broader alliance bargains about\ncosts and benefits embedded in NATO strategy and posture\nneed for a new bargain arose because of allies’ concerns about U.S. policies\nrecent creation of the U.S.–Japan and U.S\nKorea extended deterrence dialogue\nresulted from concerns\nWashington\nmay be backtracking from its alliance commitments\nin addition to\nconcerns about\ndeterrence credibility\ninstitutional cooperation\nthat creates\nnuclear umbrella\nis inseparable from\ninstitutional basis that gives U.S. alliances credibility as a whole. Efforts by\nweaker allies to bargain with Washington\non the detail and extent of its security guarantees will become more intense\nand\nexplicit\nas anxiety about abandonment\ngrows\nFears\nthe U\nS\nwill become “decoupled\nfrom its\nallies do not have to originate from\ndevelopments in the nuclear sphere\nThat said, as is evident in the case of Japan\nindication the U\nS\nmay be diluting the strength of its nuclear commitment risks triggering concern about the broader credibility of alliance security assurances\nnuclear\nmeasures\nprovide the means for allies to negotiate the management of alliance costs\nwhile ensuring\nthe U\nS\nremains committed\nNATO\nraises the political importance of consensus with every member state\nand has led to the institutionalized nature of that alliance\ndisagreements risk threatening America’s reputation as a leader of the Western Alliance if they are not addressed through intra-alliance compromise\nperceived attenuation of U.S. commitment to nuclear cooperation with\nallies in Europe or\nAsia\nhave serious consequences for perceptions of America’s alliance commitments more generally. In\nNATO\nnuclear consultations have been a high-level staple\nand\ndiminution\nwould raise questions about the depth of Washington\n’s strategic commitment to defend\nEuropean and Asian allies\nDiscussion\nhas tended to focus on\nB-61 nuclear weapons\nthe real centerpiece\nremains\nvarious nuclear consultation mechanisms\nNPG\ngains\nimportance from the existence of integrated nuclear forces\nany pull back\nfrom\nAsia would signal to\nJapanese and South Korean\nthat not only are U.S. security assurances conditional\nconsultation on nuclear strategy and posture has\nbeen an important means for the U\nS\nto influence\nperceptions of its nonnuclear allies\nNuclear capabilities\nposture and strategy have\nimplications\nU.S. interests\nare far broader than\navoiding\nproliferation\nIn the past, Washington\nhas alleviated allied concerns about concessions to the Soviet Union by pushing for NATO nuclear force modernization", "role": "user" }, { "content": "extension of the\numbrella\nthrough\ndeployment of nuclear\nsystems\nunderpin\nrobustness of\nalliances\ntaking\nallies\nconfidence\nis\na\nsign of the depth of\ncommitment\nprovides\ninstitutional means to\nmaintain\ncohesion\nwhen\ncohesion\nunder threat from perceptions of differing\npriorities\nto promote\nalliance bargains about\nposture\nneed\narose because of\nconcerns about\npolicies\ncreation of\nJapan and\nKorea extended deterrence dialogue\nresulted from concerns\nWashington\nbacktracking\nalliance commitments\nEfforts\nto bargain\non\nextent of\nsecurity guarantees will become\nintense\nas anxiety about abandonment\ngrows\nFears\ndo not have to originate from\nnuclear sphere\nindication\nU\nS\ndiluting\ncommitment risks\nconcern about\ncredibility of\nassurances\nnuclear\nmeasures\nensur\nU\nS\nremains committed\ndisagreements\nthreaten\nreputation\nif\nnot addressed through intra-alliance\nattenuation of\ncommitment\nhave\nconsequences for perceptions of\nalliance commitments\nDiscussion\nfocus on\nB-61\npull back\nfrom\nAsia would signal to\nJapan\nand\nKorea\nthat\nsecurity assurances conditional\nNuclear\nposture\nalleviate\nallied concerns", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The counterplan enacts domestic legislation that contravenes treaty commitments. Durable fiat upholds the counterplan, resulting in treaty abrogation and constraining the Charming Betsy doctrine.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "For over two centuries, the Charming Betsy doctrine has guided United States courts when international obligations and domestic law collide. The Charming Betsy doctrine has signaled to courts that when international obligations and domestic law conflict with one another, statutes enacted by Congress “ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”1 Since it was first applied, numerous courts have implemented the Charming Betsy doctrine as a tool of statutory interpretation.\nUndoubtedly, Congress has the power and authority to disregard and abrogate international agreements by passing subsequent domestic legislation, so long as Congress demonstrates to the courts that it intended to abrogate the international agreement by doing so.2 Therefore, the Charming Betsy doctrine essentially “acts as a rebuttable presumption that Congress did not intend to place the United States in breach of international law.”3 In order for Congress to rebut this presumption, Congress must provide the courts with an “affirmative expression of congressional intent” to abrogate the international agreement.4 When such an affirmative expression of congressional intent is absent from the statute’s text, the statute is deemed ambiguous, and the interpreting court, in accordance with the Charming Betsy doctrine, interprets the statute in such a way that it remains consistent with international law.5\nBut what does it mean for Congress to provide an “affirmative expression of congressional intent” to abrogate an international agreement? Unfortunately, courts have not provided a definitive answer.6\nAlmost all cases that involve a conflict between a statute and an international obligation can be put into one of two categories. The first category consists of cases that involve a textually ambiguous statute that conflicts with an international agreement. In these cases, courts readily apply the Charming Betsy canon to interpret the statute in such a way as to avoid a conflict with the international agreement.7 A second category is comprised of cases that involve a textually unambiguous statute that expressly abrogates an international agreement.8 Courts are precluded from applying the Charming Betsy doctrine in these cases because congressional intent to abrogate the relevant international agreement is expressly stated in the statute and is therefore so clear and explicit that no “other possible construction [of the statute] remains . . . .”9\nAlthough courts’ willingness to apply the Charming Betsy doctrine to cases that fit into these two categories has received extensive attention,10 this Article presents the first analysis of the appropriateness of Charming Betsy’s application to a third category of cases. This “new” category consists of cases that involve a conflict between an international obligation and a textually unambiguous statute that does not expressly abrogate an international agreement. In other words, the statutes involved in this third category are unlike the statutes in the first category because they are textually unambiguous and unlike the statutes in the second category because they do not expressly abrogate the conflicting international agreement.\nThis Article proposes that courts should not apply Charming Betsy to this third category of cases because Charming Betsy’s application is predicated on textual ambiguity. Because of this, there is no room for courts to apply the Charming Betsy doctrine when a statute is textually unambiguous, regardless of whether the statute contains an express reference to the conflicting international agreement. A textually unambiguous statute serves as an “affirmative expression of congressional intent,” thereby rebutting the Charming Betsy presumption. In essence, this Article contends that cases that fall into this third category should be treated the same as the textually unambiguous statutes found in the second category.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "For\ntwo centuries\nCharming Betsy\nhas guided United States courts when international obligations and domestic law collide\nCharming Betsy\nhas signaled to courts that when international obligations and domestic law conflict with one another, statutes\nought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains\nnumerous courts have implemented\nCharming Betsy\nas a tool of statutory interpretation.\nCongress has the power\nto disregard and abrogate international agreements by passing subsequent domestic legislation, so long as Congress demonstrates\nthat it intended to abrogate the international agreement by doing so.\nthe Charming Betsy doctrine\nacts as a rebuttable presumption that Congress did not intend to place the United States in breach of international law\nCongress must provide the courts with an “affirmative expression of congressional intent” to abrogate the international agreement\nWhen such an affirmative expression\nis absent\nthe\ncourt, in accordance with\nCharming Betsy\ninterprets the statute in such a way that it remains consistent with international law\nwhat does it mean for Congress to provide an “affirmative expression of congressional intent” to abrogate an international agreement?\ncourts have not provided a definitive answer\nAlmost all cases that involve a conflict between a statute and\ninternational obligation can be put into\ntwo categories. The first\nconsists of cases that involve a textually ambiguous statute that conflicts with an international agreement\ncourts readily apply\nCharming Betsy\nto interpret the statute in such a way as to avoid\nconflict with the international agreement\nA second category is comprised of cases that involve a textually unambiguous statute that expressly abrogates an international agreement\nCourts are precluded from applying the Charming Betsy doctrine in these cases\nAlthough courts’ willingness to apply\nCharming Betsy\nto cases that fit into these two categories has received extensive attention\nthis Article presents the first analysis of the appropriateness of Charming Betsy’s application to a third category\nThis “new” category consists of cases that involve a conflict between an international obligation and a textually unambiguous statute\nunlike\nthe first category because they are textually unambiguous and\ndo not expressly abrogate the conflicting international agreement.\nThis Article proposes\ncourts should not apply Charming Betsy to this third category\nbecause Charming Betsy’s application is predicated on textual ambiguity\nthere is no room for courts to apply\nCharming Betsy\nwhen a statute is textually unambiguous\nA textually unambiguous statute serves as an “affirmative expression of congressional intent,”", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The counterplan enacts domestic legislation that contravenes treaty commitments. Durable fiat upholds the counterplan, resulting in treaty abrogation and constraining the Charming Betsy doctrine.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "For\ntwo centuries\nCharming Betsy\nhas guided United States courts when international obligations and domestic law collide\nCharming Betsy\nhas signaled to courts that when international obligations and domestic law conflict with one another, statutes\nought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains\nnumerous courts have implemented\nCharming Betsy\nas a tool of statutory interpretation.\nCongress has the power\nto disregard and abrogate international agreements by passing subsequent domestic legislation, so long as Congress demonstrates\nthat it intended to abrogate the international agreement by doing so.\nthe Charming Betsy doctrine\nacts as a rebuttable presumption that Congress did not intend to place the United States in breach of international law\nCongress must provide the courts with an “affirmative expression of congressional intent” to abrogate the international agreement\nWhen such an affirmative expression\nis absent\nthe\ncourt, in accordance with\nCharming Betsy\ninterprets the statute in such a way that it remains consistent with international law\nwhat does it mean for Congress to provide an “affirmative expression of congressional intent” to abrogate an international agreement?\ncourts have not provided a definitive answer\nAlmost all cases that involve a conflict between a statute and\ninternational obligation can be put into\ntwo categories. The first\nconsists of cases that involve a textually ambiguous statute that conflicts with an international agreement\ncourts readily apply\nCharming Betsy\nto interpret the statute in such a way as to avoid\nconflict with the international agreement\nA second category is comprised of cases that involve a textually unambiguous statute that expressly abrogates an international agreement\nCourts are precluded from applying the Charming Betsy doctrine in these cases\nAlthough courts’ willingness to apply\nCharming Betsy\nto cases that fit into these two categories has received extensive attention\nthis Article presents the first analysis of the appropriateness of Charming Betsy’s application to a third category\nThis “new” category consists of cases that involve a conflict between an international obligation and a textually unambiguous statute\nunlike\nthe first category because they are textually unambiguous and\ndo not expressly abrogate the conflicting international agreement.\nThis Article proposes\ncourts should not apply Charming Betsy to this third category\nbecause Charming Betsy’s application is predicated on textual ambiguity\nthere is no room for courts to apply\nCharming Betsy\nwhen a statute is textually unambiguous\nA textually unambiguous statute serves as an “affirmative expression of congressional intent,”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Charming Betsy\ninternational obligations\ndomestic law collide\nany other possible construction\ndisregard\nabrogate international agreements\nintended to abrogate\nrebuttable presumption\nbreach of international law\naffirmative expression of congressional intent\nconsistent with international law\naffirmative expression\ncongressional intent\ntextually ambiguous statute\nconflicts\nreadily apply\nCharming Betsy\ntextually unambiguous statute\nexpressly abrogates\nthe Charming Betsy doctrine\nextensive attention\nthird category\ninternational obligation\ntextually unambiguous statute\ntextually unambiguous\ndo not expressly abrogate\nshould not apply Charming Betsy\ntextual ambiguity\ntextually unambiguous", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The counterplan enacts domestic legislation that contravenes treaty commitments. Durable fiat upholds the counterplan, resulting in treaty abrogation and constraining the Charming Betsy doctrine.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "For\ntwo centuries\nCharming Betsy\nhas guided United States courts when international obligations and domestic law collide\nCharming Betsy\nhas signaled to courts that when international obligations and domestic law conflict with one another, statutes\nought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains\nnumerous courts have implemented\nCharming Betsy\nas a tool of statutory interpretation.\nCongress has the power\nto disregard and abrogate international agreements by passing subsequent domestic legislation, so long as Congress demonstrates\nthat it intended to abrogate the international agreement by doing so.\nthe Charming Betsy doctrine\nacts as a rebuttable presumption that Congress did not intend to place the United States in breach of international law\nCongress must provide the courts with an “affirmative expression of congressional intent” to abrogate the international agreement\nWhen such an affirmative expression\nis absent\nthe\ncourt, in accordance with\nCharming Betsy\ninterprets the statute in such a way that it remains consistent with international law\nwhat does it mean for Congress to provide an “affirmative expression of congressional intent” to abrogate an international agreement?\ncourts have not provided a definitive answer\nAlmost all cases that involve a conflict between a statute and\ninternational obligation can be put into\ntwo categories. The first\nconsists of cases that involve a textually ambiguous statute that conflicts with an international agreement\ncourts readily apply\nCharming Betsy\nto interpret the statute in such a way as to avoid\nconflict with the international agreement\nA second category is comprised of cases that involve a textually unambiguous statute that expressly abrogates an international agreement\nCourts are precluded from applying the Charming Betsy doctrine in these cases\nAlthough courts’ willingness to apply\nCharming Betsy\nto cases that fit into these two categories has received extensive attention\nthis Article presents the first analysis of the appropriateness of Charming Betsy’s application to a third category\nThis “new” category consists of cases that involve a conflict between an international obligation and a textually unambiguous statute\nunlike\nthe first category because they are textually unambiguous and\ndo not expressly abrogate the conflicting international agreement.\nThis Article proposes\ncourts should not apply Charming Betsy to this third category\nbecause Charming Betsy’s application is predicated on textual ambiguity\nthere is no room for courts to apply\nCharming Betsy\nwhen a statute is textually unambiguous\nA textually unambiguous statute serves as an “affirmative expression of congressional intent,”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Charming Betsy\nhas guided\ncourts when international obligations and domestic law collide\nwhen international obligations and domestic law conflict\nstatutes\nought never to be construed to violate the law\nif any other possible construction remains\nCongress has the power\nto disregard\ninternational agreements\nso long as Congress demonstrates\nit intended to abrogate the international agreement\nCongress must provide\nan “affirmative expression of congressional intent”\nWhen such an affirmative expression\nis absent\nthe\ncourt\ninterprets the statute\nthat it remains consistent with international law\ncases that involve a textually ambiguous statute that conflicts\ncourts readily apply\nCharming Betsy\ncases that involve a conflict between an international obligation and a textually unambiguous statute\ndo not expressly abrogate the conflicting international agreement.\ncourts should not apply Charming Betsy to this\ncategory", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The counterplan’s explicit overrule of Chevron deference reinvigorates the Charming Betsy canon – that shores up rule of law globally via pacta sunt servanda and solves converging transnational threats.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The rule of law justification—or bundle of justifications—for the Charming Betsy canon says that distinct from whatever Congress intends and distinct from the Constitution’s separation of the different branches of government, judges have (and should have) a normative commitment to advancing what is commonly called “the rule of law” and that judicial decisions that align domestic American law with the international legal obligations of the United States are both expressions of and endorsements of the rule of law.\nFew would quibble with Justice Sotomayor when she said she “believe[s] in the rule of law as the foundation for all our basic rights,”101 but the notion of “rule of law” is “elusive,” 102 if not “contested.”103 Different people mean different things—of varying complexity and rigor—when they say “rule of law.”104 This is not the place to summarize the vast “rule of law” literature, but given how frequently lawyers and law professors use this concept,105 it may be helpful to specify how the phrase is used here and where this use falls in rule of law thinking.\nThe notion of “rule of law” can be traced back to Aristotle, and the phrase itself appeared in the 1610 English Petition of Grievances, arguing that English subjects enjoy the right “to be guided and governed by the certain rule of law.”106 There are scores of modern formulations of the “rule of law,”107 but this Article will focus on a “thin” version.108 One of the most minimal formulations would be Brian Tamanaha’s “[t]he rule of law means that government officials and citizens are bound by and abide by the law,”109 which is not too different from federal judge Jill Otake’s defining “rule of law” as “[e]veryone understands what the law is and that everyone will be held to that law.”110 Some additional commitments are typically considered part of the basic idea of “rule of law”:\n[a] that laws should be stable, public, consistent, and known in advance;\n[b] that these laws are applied nonarbitrarily111 and equally to all citizens, without regard to their individual circumstances;\n[c] that these laws are applied equally to government and its actions;112 and\n[d] that the application of law is done through adjudication by an independent judiciary.\nIn addition to these components (in one form or another), some add respect for human rights or that the domestic laws must be consistent with international human rights norms.113 But this additional component moves beyond the “thin” understanding of rule of law.\nUnderstood this way, promoting domestic rule of law in developing countries has been a centerpiece of international development programs for decades. It is an agenda that can attract support from both financial investors and human rights activists.\nSeparate from this concern for what happens in each jurisdiction, there has been much discussion and debate over “international rule of law” to govern the interaction of sovereign nations. This “international rule of law” is frequently conceptualized at the level of state-to-state, government-to-government interaction, i.e., how states resolve border or resource disputes between themselves, how states and international organizations abide by the laws of war and occupation, etc. At this level, much has been written about whether, when, and how “international rule of law” shapes the interaction of sovereign states114 as well as constrains international organizations.115 There is a rich debate on how much international rule of law is truly separate from international politics116 or whether there is a “distinctively international version of rule of law.”117\nBut there is also the “rule of law” concern that each nation implement domestically its international legal obligations—in other words, that nations fulfill their international legal obligations to each other through the substance of their own domestic laws. In a world thick with international legal norms created by multilateral, plurilateral, and bilateral agreements, pacta sunt servanda happens less with state-to-state interaction on the international plane and more with domestic implementation of international obligations (in immigration law, trade law, civil rights, criminal law, contract law, environmental regulations). Eliciting commitments from a nation in any of these areas is pointless unless there is “rule of law” consistency between the international legal obligation and the nation’s domestic law. Instead of “international rule of law” one can think of this as concern for the rule of law globally— or “global rule of law.”118\nSo, how does the Charming Betsy canon as used by American courts fit into these considerations? The canon is clearly “a tool for the judiciary to advance the normatively desirable goal of harmonizing domestic law with international law,”119 but we need to say more. In terms of domestic rule of law, to the degree that treaty commitments of the United States are part of the “supreme Law of the Land” and customary international legal norms are part of federal common law, Charming Betsy is a doctrine harmonizing different elements of our domestic legal regime—and thereby avoiding arbitrariness that corrodes rule of law.120 By shaping domestic law to meet international obligations, Charming Betsy makes the state itself accountable to laws it publicly accepted as binding;121 the canon applies “law” to the sovereign—one of the basic elements of rule of law.122 As Rachel Kleinfeld observes, “[r]eining in the state by forcing it to govern through a known set of laws has been accepted as a goal of rule of law since the ancient Greeks.”123 In its narrow realm of application, Charming Betsy forces the state to govern consistent with public commitments the state has undertaken vis-à-vis other states and known laws in the law of nations.\nIn short, Charming Betsy advances both our own “domestic rule of law” narrowly understood and “global rule of law” in terms of the United States honoring pacta sunt servanda.\nAt the level of “international law,” the Charming Betsy doctrine will not have significant impact on the “rule of law” understood as state-to-state interaction, but the canon engages American judges with international legal norms (versus, say, an interpretative canon that said international legal norms were irrelevant to interpretation of domestic statutes). And to the degree Charming Betsy compels American judges to recognize and interpret international legal norms, it has the salutary effect of bringing a cohort of relatively well-trained, disciplined jurists into the business of helping shape international law. Even if that is not “rule of law” per se, it is surely a salutary effect of the canon. Separate from the effect on domestic law, all or almost all American policymakers would choose more American influence over substantive interpretation of international legal norms versus less.\nTurning to domestic rule of law in other countries—and those countries implementing in their domestic laws the treaty obligations they have undertaken, pacta sunt servanda, it should be clear that the Charming Betsy doctrine provides an example for other countries. Each American court decision interpreting an ambiguous statute to fulfill our treaty obligations sends a signal to judges in other jurisdictions to do the same. One can debate how strong a signal and how much American courts can lead by example, but there is no question that the American legal system—judicial decisions,124 regulations,125 and statutes126—provides an important role model for other countries.\nStrengthening this global rule of law serves both the United States’ ideals and its pragmatic needs. Idealistically, in the post-1945 world the thicket of international legal norms has grown more vast and dense—and that thicket of norms has been largely shaped by the United States.127 The great international project of the United States—the Pax Americana—has not just been relative peace, but the spread of democratic institutions and human rights as well as the increasing economic prosperity of the world based on increasingly transparent, predictable market conditions. It may be diplomatically awkward to discuss, but it is simply hard to overstate how much the post-1945 international human rights, trade, and finance regimes have been built along American outlines.128 The rule of law’s strengthening in as many jurisdictions as possible undergirds these projects.\nOn the practical side, nothing is more important for the efficient, affordable maintenance of America’s far-flung geopolitical and commercial interests than rule of law in as many of those jurisdictions as possible. In 2007, Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein argued that Charming Betsy should give way to Chevron-style deference to executive interpretations of statutes that concern foreign affairs129— an argument that we will explore in Part V. While recognizing that Charming Betsy produces the benefit of “a general strengthening of the system of international law,”130 they reasoned that this should only trigger “an additional judgment about whether deference has systemic or rule of law benefits or disadvantages for the United States.”131 In the context of that calculus, Posner and Sunstein offered the stunning comment (then and now) that “[t]he United States generally has little interest in what occurs on foreign soil.”132 From that, they reasoned that calculated violations of international law will often enough accrue to the short-term benefit of the United States without long-term detriment that such decision should be left to the executive branch.133", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The rule of law justification\nfor\nCharming Betsy\nsays that\njudges have\na normative commitment to advancing what is commonly called “the rule of law” and\njudicial decisions that align domestic American law with\ninternational legal obligations\nare both expressions of and endorsements of the rule of law.\nSotomayor\nbelieve[s] in the rule of law as the foundation for all our basic rights\nThe notion of “rule of law” can be traced back to Aristotle\nThere are scores of modern formulations\nbut this Article will focus on a “thin” version\n“[t]he rule of law means that government officials and citizens are bound by\nthe law\n“[e]veryone understands what the law is and that everyone will be held to that law\nlaws should be stable, public, consistent, and known in advance\nlaws are applied nonarbitrarily\nand equally to all citizens, without regard to their individual circumstances\nlaws are applied equally to government and its actions\nthrough adjudication by an independent judiciary.\npromoting domestic rule of law in developing countries has been a centerpiece of international development\nIt is an agenda that can attract support from both financial investors and human rights activists.\nthere has been much\ndebate over “international rule of law” to govern the interaction of sovereign nations. This “international rule of law” is frequently conceptualized at the level of state-to-state,\ninteraction, i.e., how states resolve\ndisputes\nhow states\nabide by the laws of war\nmuch has been written about\nhow “international rule of law” shapes the interaction of sovereign states\nBut there is also the “rule of law” concern that each nation implement domestically its international legal obligations\nthat nations fulfill their international legal obligations to each other through the substance of their own domestic laws. In a world thick with international legal norms\npacta sunt servanda happens less with state-to-state interaction\nand more with domestic implementation of international obligations (in immigration\ntrade\ncivil rights, criminal law, contract law, environmental regulations\nEliciting commitments from a nation in any of these areas is pointless unless there is “rule of law” consistency between the international\nobligation and the nation’s domestic law.\none can think of this as concern for the rule of law globally— or “global rule of law.”\nhow does the Charming Betsy canon\nfit into these considerations? The canon is clearly “a tool for the judiciary to advance the\ndesirable goal of harmonizing domestic law with international law,\nto the degree that treaty commitments\nare part of the “supreme Law of the Land”\nCharming Betsy is a doctrine harmonizing different elements of our domestic legal regime\nand\navoiding arbitrariness that corrodes rule of law\nBy shaping domestic law to meet international obligations, Charming Betsy makes the state itself accountable to laws it publicly accepted as binding\nthe canon applies “law” to the sovereign\none of the basic elements of rule of law\n“[r]eining in the state by forcing it to govern through a known set of laws has been accepted as a goal of rule of law\nCharming Betsy forces the state to govern consistent with public commitments the state has undertaken vis-à-vis other states\nCharming Betsy advances both our own “domestic rule of law” narrowly understood and “global rule of law” in terms of the United States honoring pacta sunt servanda.\nthe Charming Betsy doctrine\nengages American judges with international legal norms\nAnd to the degree Charming Betsy compels American judges to\ninterpret international legal norms, it has the salutary effect of bringing a cohort of\nwell-trained, disciplined jurists into the business of\ninternational law. Even if that is not “rule of law”\nit is\na salutary effect of the canon\nTurning to domestic rule of law in other countries\nand those countries implementing\ntreaty obligations\npacta sunt servanda\nCharming Betsy doctrine provides an example for other countries\nthere is no question that the American legal system—judicial decisions\nregulations\nand statutes\nprovides an important role model for other countries.\nStrengthening this global rule of law serves\nthe United States’ ideals and its pragmatic needs.\nthe thicket of international legal norms has grown\nvast and dense\nthat thicket of norms has been\nshaped by the United States\nThe great international project of the United States\nPax Americana—has not just been relative peace, but the spread of democratic institutions and human rights as well as\neconomic prosperity\nit is\nhard to overstate how much the post-1945 international human rights, trade, and finance regimes have been built along American outlines\nThe rule of law’s strengthening\nundergirds these projects\nnothing is more important for\nefficient, affordable maintenance of America’s far-flung geopolitical\ninterests than rule of law\nPosner an\nSunstein argued that Charming Betsy should give way to Chevron-style deference to executive interpretations of statutes that concern foreign affairs\nPosner and Sunstein offered the stunning comment\nthat “[t]he United States generally has little interest in what occurs on foreign soil\nthey reasoned\ncalculated violations of international law will\naccrue to the short-term benefit of the United States", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The counterplan’s explicit overrule of Chevron deference reinvigorates the Charming Betsy canon – that shores up rule of law globally via pacta sunt servanda and solves converging transnational threats.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The rule of law justification\nfor\nCharming Betsy\nsays that\njudges have\na normative commitment to advancing what is commonly called “the rule of law” and\njudicial decisions that align domestic American law with\ninternational legal obligations\nare both expressions of and endorsements of the rule of law.\nSotomayor\nbelieve[s] in the rule of law as the foundation for all our basic rights\nThe notion of “rule of law” can be traced back to Aristotle\nThere are scores of modern formulations\nbut this Article will focus on a “thin” version\n“[t]he rule of law means that government officials and citizens are bound by\nthe law\n“[e]veryone understands what the law is and that everyone will be held to that law\nlaws should be stable, public, consistent, and known in advance\nlaws are applied nonarbitrarily\nand equally to all citizens, without regard to their individual circumstances\nlaws are applied equally to government and its actions\nthrough adjudication by an independent judiciary.\npromoting domestic rule of law in developing countries has been a centerpiece of international development\nIt is an agenda that can attract support from both financial investors and human rights activists.\nthere has been much\ndebate over “international rule of law” to govern the interaction of sovereign nations. This “international rule of law” is frequently conceptualized at the level of state-to-state,\ninteraction, i.e., how states resolve\ndisputes\nhow states\nabide by the laws of war\nmuch has been written about\nhow “international rule of law” shapes the interaction of sovereign states\nBut there is also the “rule of law” concern that each nation implement domestically its international legal obligations\nthat nations fulfill their international legal obligations to each other through the substance of their own domestic laws. In a world thick with international legal norms\npacta sunt servanda happens less with state-to-state interaction\nand more with domestic implementation of international obligations (in immigration\ntrade\ncivil rights, criminal law, contract law, environmental regulations\nEliciting commitments from a nation in any of these areas is pointless unless there is “rule of law” consistency between the international\nobligation and the nation’s domestic law.\none can think of this as concern for the rule of law globally— or “global rule of law.”\nhow does the Charming Betsy canon\nfit into these considerations? The canon is clearly “a tool for the judiciary to advance the\ndesirable goal of harmonizing domestic law with international law,\nto the degree that treaty commitments\nare part of the “supreme Law of the Land”\nCharming Betsy is a doctrine harmonizing different elements of our domestic legal regime\nand\navoiding arbitrariness that corrodes rule of law\nBy shaping domestic law to meet international obligations, Charming Betsy makes the state itself accountable to laws it publicly accepted as binding\nthe canon applies “law” to the sovereign\none of the basic elements of rule of law\n“[r]eining in the state by forcing it to govern through a known set of laws has been accepted as a goal of rule of law\nCharming Betsy forces the state to govern consistent with public commitments the state has undertaken vis-à-vis other states\nCharming Betsy advances both our own “domestic rule of law” narrowly understood and “global rule of law” in terms of the United States honoring pacta sunt servanda.\nthe Charming Betsy doctrine\nengages American judges with international legal norms\nAnd to the degree Charming Betsy compels American judges to\ninterpret international legal norms, it has the salutary effect of bringing a cohort of\nwell-trained, disciplined jurists into the business of\ninternational law. Even if that is not “rule of law”\nit is\na salutary effect of the canon\nTurning to domestic rule of law in other countries\nand those countries implementing\ntreaty obligations\npacta sunt servanda\nCharming Betsy doctrine provides an example for other countries\nthere is no question that the American legal system—judicial decisions\nregulations\nand statutes\nprovides an important role model for other countries.\nStrengthening this global rule of law serves\nthe United States’ ideals and its pragmatic needs.\nthe thicket of international legal norms has grown\nvast and dense\nthat thicket of norms has been\nshaped by the United States\nThe great international project of the United States\nPax Americana—has not just been relative peace, but the spread of democratic institutions and human rights as well as\neconomic prosperity\nit is\nhard to overstate how much the post-1945 international human rights, trade, and finance regimes have been built along American outlines\nThe rule of law’s strengthening\nundergirds these projects\nnothing is more important for\nefficient, affordable maintenance of America’s far-flung geopolitical\ninterests than rule of law\nPosner an\nSunstein argued that Charming Betsy should give way to Chevron-style deference to executive interpretations of statutes that concern foreign affairs\nPosner and Sunstein offered the stunning comment\nthat “[t]he United States generally has little interest in what occurs on foreign soil\nthey reasoned\ncalculated violations of international law will\naccrue to the short-term benefit of the United States", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Charming Betsy\nalign domestic American law\ninternational legal obligations\nexpressions of\nendorsements of the rule of law.\nfoundation for all\nbasic rights\nbound by\nthe law\nwhat the law is\neveryone will be held\nstable\npublic\nconsistent\nknown in advance\nnonarbitrarily\nadjudication\nindependent judiciary.\ncenterpiece of international development\nfinancial investors\nhuman rights activists.\ninternational rule of law\ndisputes\nlaws of war\ninteraction of sovereign states\nimplement domestically\ninternational legal obligations\nfulfill their international legal obligations\npacta sunt servanda\ndomestic implementation\ninternational obligations\nimmigration\ntrade\nenvironmental regulations\npointless\nrule of law” consistency\nglobal rule of law.”\nCharming Betsy canon\nharmonizing domestic law\nsupreme Law of the Land”\navoiding arbitrariness\ncorrodes rule of law\nmakes the state itself accountable\napplies “law” to the sovereign\ngovern\nknown set of laws\nconsistent with public commitments\ndomestic rule of law\nglobal rule of law”\npacta sunt servanda.\nCharming Betsy doctrine\ninterpret international legal norms\nwell-trained, disciplined jurists\ndomestic rule of law\nprovides an example for other countries\nAmerican legal system\nimportant role model\nglobal rule of law\ninternational legal norms\nPax Americana\nrelative peace\ndemocratic institutions\nhuman rights\neconomic prosperity\ninternational human rights, trade\nfinance\nundergirds these projects\nChevron-style deference\ninterpretations of statutes\nforeign affairs\ncalculated violations of international law", "role": "assistant" } ]