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DebateCards-SFT-phase2-v2

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[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: NATO should invoke the right of collective self-defense against cyberattacks with a modified scale-and-effects test.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "A second, more reasonable possibility is the \"scale and effects\" test employed by the ICJ.91 The ICJ finds a real, substantive distinction between an \"armed attack\" and mere \"use of force.\" 92 To distinguish between the two, the ICJ analyzes the scale and the effects of the attack.93 By design, not every action by a state in cyberspace triggers the right to collective or individual self-defense because not all presentations of force rise to the level of \"armed attack.\" \"To know whether a cyber attack meets the threshold of 'armed attack' requires knowing where the de minimis threshold lies. However, this is a vague and fact-specific rule., 94\nUnder the scale and effects test, a cyberattack which inflicts \"substantial destruction upon important elements of the target state\" through, for example, destruction of property or the loss of lives, would trigger the right to self-defense under article 51.95 This is also reflected in the Tallinn Manual rule 13: \"A State that is the target of a cyber operation that rises to the level of an armed attack may exercise its inherent right to self-defen[s]e. Whether a cyber operation constitutes an armed attack depends on its scale and effects.\" 96 Despite the division among the experts in the Tallinn Manual on many points, the experts agree that as of 2012, no international cyber incidents reached the threshold of an armed attack, and unanimously conclude that a cyberattack, if sufficiently grave, could reach the threshold of an armed attack to trigger a response from a state. 97 In reaching this conclusion, the experts note that biological, radiological, and chemical attacks could constitute armed attack despite the absence of \"arms\"; thus, cyberattacks could as well. 98\nC. A Modified Scale and Effects Test\nThe problem with a scale and effects approach lies in timing. By its definition, the scale and effects test requires a state to analyze the outcome of an attack to determine its severity. Thus, there can be no real prevention of cyberattacks before they occur if the right to exercise self-defense can only be triggered by the outcome of an unlawful action by another state under this test. It leaves no room for a state to analyze the intended purpose of an impending attack in cyberspace. Rather, it requires a state to sit still and watch. Therefore, the best approach would be a modified scale and effects test, where, if an attack was sufficiently grave and verified to occur, then self-defense would be triggered.\nThis, in turn, \"has led states to turn to customary international law for the determination of when it is appropriate to forestall an attack.\"99 The Caroline testwhose name is derived from the American Steamboat Caroline involved in international disputes between Canada, America, and Britain in the nineteenth century-determines whether a state may take action in anticipatory self-defense.' 00 To act in anticipatory self-defense, a state must show \"that the 'necessity of selfdefense was instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.\"\"10 1 However, even if these difficult thresholds are met, the response must not be \"unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and be kept clearly within it.\"'0 2\nConcluding that cyberattacks could constitute an armed attack or an act of war leaves open the question of where the de minimis threshold lies. Michael Gervais uses two examples to illustrate this point. First, under customary practice, he suggests \"that under conventional notions of force, even small-scale bombings, artillery, naval or aerial attacks qualify as 'armed attacks' activating Article 51, as long as they result in, or are capable of resulting in, destruction of property or loss of lives.\"' 0 3 On the other hand, an action similar to \"the firing of a single missile into some unpopulated wilderness as a mere display of force would likely not be sufficient to trigger Article 51, despite violating Article 2(4).' ' °4\nThrough these examples, the Tallinn Manual establishes a reasonable definition and answer to cyberattacks in rule 30, which defines cyberattack as \"a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.' 0 5 The experts argue that this rule should be interpreted broadly. 10 6 For example, even if the attack is intercepted and caused no damage or injury, it could still rise to the level of a cyberattack because, under this definition, the cyber operation must only be reasonably expected to cause damage to constitute a cyberattack. 107 Moreover, if the actor did not intend the results that followed, it could still constitute a cyberattack if it resulted in substantial destruction of property or loss of life. 1°8 On the other hand, \"[a] cyber attack that merely creates an inconvenience might be a prohibited use of force, but it would not rise to the level of an armed attack. In comparison, a cyber attack capable of substantially destroying property or causing the loss of lives should trigger the right to self-defense.\"' 0 9\nAnother issue with cyberspace and cyberattacks lies in degree. Is there a middle ground between inconvenience or annoyance and destruction of property or the loss of lives? What if the cyberattack merely disables a crucial military defense? Or releases private and personal information about governments or its officials? Should the right to self-defense be triggered then? Perhaps a more appropriate response in these situations would be a mere countermeasure to quell or deter the threat. Rule 9 in the Tallinn Manual presents a sotind response to such a situation. It states: \"A State injured by an internationally wrongful act may resort to proportionate countermeasures, including cyber countermeasures, against the responsible State.\"1 0 This suggests a countermeasure that would be both similar in degree and kind. Countermeasure, in this context, is a legal term of art and is distinguishable from the military's definition, where countermeasures are more aggressive and seek to destroy rather than merely quell or deter through proportionate response.\"'1 The experts in the Tallinn Manual elaborate on appropriate countermeasures in cyberspace:", "role": "user" }, { "content": "A\npossibility is the \"scale and effects\" test employed by the ICJ\nThe ICJ finds a real, substantive distinction between an \"armed attack\" and\n\"use of force.\"\nthe ICJ analyzes the scale and\neffects of the attack\na cyberattack which inflicts \"substantial destruction upon important elements of the target state\" through\ndestruction of property or the loss of lives, would trigger the right to self-defense under article 51.\nThis is also reflected in the Tallinn Manual\nA State that is the target of a cyber operation\nmay exercise its\nright to self-defen[s]e\nexperts\nunanimously conclude that a cyberattack, if sufficiently grave, could reach the threshold of an armed attack\nbiological, radiological, and chemical attacks\nconstitute armed attack\nscale and effects\nrequires a state to analyze the outcome of an attack to determine its severity\nthere can be no\nprevention of cyberattacks before they occur if the right to exercise self-defense can only be triggered by\nan unlawful action by another state\nthe best approach would be a modified scale and effects test, where, if an attack was sufficiently grave and verified\nself-defense would be triggered\nunder conventional notions of force, even small-scale bombings, artillery, naval or aerial attacks qualify as 'armed attacks'\nas long as they\nare capable of resulting in, destruction of property or loss of lives.\nfiring\na single missile into\nunpopulated wilderness\nwould\nnot be sufficient\nthe Tallinn Manual\ndefines cyberattack as \"a cyber operation\nthat is reasonably expected to cause injury or death\nthis rule should be interpreted broadly\neven if the attack is intercepted and caused no damage or injury, it could still rise to the level of a cyberattack\nthe cyber operation must only be reasonably expected to cause damage\n\"[a] cyber attack that merely creates an inconvenience\nwould not rise to the level of an armed attack\nAnother issue\nlies in degree. Is there a middle ground between inconvenience or annoyance and destruction of property\nShould the right to self-defense be triggered\nPerhaps a more appropriate response\nwould be a\ncountermeasure to quell or deter the threat.\nthe Tallinn Manual\nstates: \"A State\nmay resort to proportionate countermeasures, including cyber countermeasures, against the responsible State.\na countermeasure that would be both similar in degree and kind. Countermeasure\nis a legal term of art", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: NATO should invoke the right of collective self-defense against cyberattacks with a modified scale-and-effects test.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "A\npossibility is the \"scale and effects\" test employed by the ICJ\nThe ICJ finds a real, substantive distinction between an \"armed attack\" and\n\"use of force.\"\nthe ICJ analyzes the scale and\neffects of the attack\na cyberattack which inflicts \"substantial destruction upon important elements of the target state\" through\ndestruction of property or the loss of lives, would trigger the right to self-defense under article 51.\nThis is also reflected in the Tallinn Manual\nA State that is the target of a cyber operation\nmay exercise its\nright to self-defen[s]e\nexperts\nunanimously conclude that a cyberattack, if sufficiently grave, could reach the threshold of an armed attack\nbiological, radiological, and chemical attacks\nconstitute armed attack\nscale and effects\nrequires a state to analyze the outcome of an attack to determine its severity\nthere can be no\nprevention of cyberattacks before they occur if the right to exercise self-defense can only be triggered by\nan unlawful action by another state\nthe best approach would be a modified scale and effects test, where, if an attack was sufficiently grave and verified\nself-defense would be triggered\nunder conventional notions of force, even small-scale bombings, artillery, naval or aerial attacks qualify as 'armed attacks'\nas long as they\nare capable of resulting in, destruction of property or loss of lives.\nfiring\na single missile into\nunpopulated wilderness\nwould\nnot be sufficient\nthe Tallinn Manual\ndefines cyberattack as \"a cyber operation\nthat is reasonably expected to cause injury or death\nthis rule should be interpreted broadly\neven if the attack is intercepted and caused no damage or injury, it could still rise to the level of a cyberattack\nthe cyber operation must only be reasonably expected to cause damage\n\"[a] cyber attack that merely creates an inconvenience\nwould not rise to the level of an armed attack\nAnother issue\nlies in degree. Is there a middle ground between inconvenience or annoyance and destruction of property\nShould the right to self-defense be triggered\nPerhaps a more appropriate response\nwould be a\ncountermeasure to quell or deter the threat.\nthe Tallinn Manual\nstates: \"A State\nmay resort to proportionate countermeasures, including cyber countermeasures, against the responsible State.\na countermeasure that would be both similar in degree and kind. Countermeasure\nis a legal term of art", "role": "user" }, { "content": "scale and effects\n\"armed attack\nuse of force\nsubstantial destruction\ntrigger the right to self-defense\nreach the threshold\nno\nprevention\ntriggered by\nan unlawful action\nsufficiently grave\nverified\nsmall-scale bombings\nnaval\naerial attacks\ncapable of\ndestruction of property\nloss of lives\nreasonably expected\ninterpreted broadly\ninconvenience\nmiddle ground\nquell\ndeter the threat\nproportionate countermeasures\nlegal term of art", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: NATO should invoke the right of collective self-defense against cyberattacks with a modified scale-and-effects test.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "A\npossibility is the \"scale and effects\" test employed by the ICJ\nThe ICJ finds a real, substantive distinction between an \"armed attack\" and\n\"use of force.\"\nthe ICJ analyzes the scale and\neffects of the attack\na cyberattack which inflicts \"substantial destruction upon important elements of the target state\" through\ndestruction of property or the loss of lives, would trigger the right to self-defense under article 51.\nThis is also reflected in the Tallinn Manual\nA State that is the target of a cyber operation\nmay exercise its\nright to self-defen[s]e\nexperts\nunanimously conclude that a cyberattack, if sufficiently grave, could reach the threshold of an armed attack\nbiological, radiological, and chemical attacks\nconstitute armed attack\nscale and effects\nrequires a state to analyze the outcome of an attack to determine its severity\nthere can be no\nprevention of cyberattacks before they occur if the right to exercise self-defense can only be triggered by\nan unlawful action by another state\nthe best approach would be a modified scale and effects test, where, if an attack was sufficiently grave and verified\nself-defense would be triggered\nunder conventional notions of force, even small-scale bombings, artillery, naval or aerial attacks qualify as 'armed attacks'\nas long as they\nare capable of resulting in, destruction of property or loss of lives.\nfiring\na single missile into\nunpopulated wilderness\nwould\nnot be sufficient\nthe Tallinn Manual\ndefines cyberattack as \"a cyber operation\nthat is reasonably expected to cause injury or death\nthis rule should be interpreted broadly\neven if the attack is intercepted and caused no damage or injury, it could still rise to the level of a cyberattack\nthe cyber operation must only be reasonably expected to cause damage\n\"[a] cyber attack that merely creates an inconvenience\nwould not rise to the level of an armed attack\nAnother issue\nlies in degree. Is there a middle ground between inconvenience or annoyance and destruction of property\nShould the right to self-defense be triggered\nPerhaps a more appropriate response\nwould be a\ncountermeasure to quell or deter the threat.\nthe Tallinn Manual\nstates: \"A State\nmay resort to proportionate countermeasures, including cyber countermeasures, against the responsible State.\na countermeasure that would be both similar in degree and kind. Countermeasure\nis a legal term of art", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the \"scale and effects\"\nfinds a\ndistinction\na cyberattack which inflicts \"substantial destruction\nthrough\ndestruction of property or\nloss of lives, would trigger\nself-defense\na cyberattack\ncould reach the threshold of an armed attack\nthere can be no\nprevention\nbefore they occur\neven small-scale bombings,\nnaval or aerial attacks qualify as 'armed attacks'\nas long as they\nare capable of resulting in, destruction\nor loss of lives\nthis\nshould be interpreted broadly\n\"[a] cyber attack that merely creates\ninconvenience\nwould not rise to the level\nthe Tallinn Manual\nstates: \"A State\nmay resort to proportionate countermeasures\nagainst the responsible State", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: A joint hybrid warfare posture clarifies redlines while retaining Article V to compel forceful response.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Accordingly, the danger that hybrid threats may bypass Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU does not lie at the two extremes: the possibility that non-forcible instruments may render the use of armed force redundant at one end or that individual low-intensity incidents may fail to trigger the right to use force in selfdefense at the other. Rather, the danger lies in the indirect use of force and in its combination with non-military levers of influence in a way that avoids Article 5 and Article 42(7) being triggered in precisely those situations where a forcible response would be politically warranted, legally admissible, and militarily effective.\nCountering the challenges\nThe legal challenges that hybrid threats present for collective security guarantees have been recognized at the highest political level. At their Warsaw summit held in July 2016, NATO's member states confirmed their readiness to assist each other at any stage of a hybrid campaign and to counter hybrid warfare as part of collective defense. 294 They also underscored that the North Atlantic Council \"could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.\" 295 They repeated these points at their Brussels summit in July 2018.296 By drawing an express link between hybrid warfare and collective defense, NATO leaders signaled their resolve not to allow Article 5 to be hollowed out. 2 9 7 Still, their declarations of intent strike a rather conservative note. Whilst they accept that NATO may assist an Ally at any stage of a \"hybrid campaign,\" it is only in cases of \"hybrid warfare\" that they foresee a potential role for Article 5. This is not an unreasonable position to take. As we saw earlier, recourse to the use of force to counter hybrid threats falling below the threshold of an armed attack is neither permissible nor necessarily appropriate. A pledge to invoke the mutual defense commitment in response to every type of hybrid threat would be a promise to use the proverbial sledgehammer to crack a nut. It would be unrealistic and therefore lack credibility in the eyes of hybrid adversaries. 298 By accepting that the role of Article 5 is confined to situations of hybrid warfare, the Warsaw and Brussels Summit Declarations avoid such empty gestures. However, in the same breath they also concede that the application of Article 5 is contingent on the legal threshold between warfare and peace, and thus vulnerable to subversion along the lines discussed in the preceding sections.\nIt may be tempting to deal with the problem of legal thresholds by attempting to escape them altogether, but this is not a feasible strategy. Even if the contracting parties were to revise Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU to avoid references to \"armed attack\" and \"armed aggression,\" 299 they would remain bound by the rules governing the use of force under the UN Charter and customary international law. Although the member states of NATO and the EU make up an influential part of the international community, it is not within their ability to adjust these general rules of international law unilaterally. In any event, lowering the threshold for the use of force in order to facilitate the application of Article 5 and Article 42(7) would come with significant costs, since it would loosen the legal restrictions for all states, including hostile powers. The applicable thresholds therefore cannot be unilaterally modified at will and without the risk of unraveling key elements of the international legal order as it currently stands.\nA more promising approach is to strengthen legal interoperability among NATO and EU nations. One line of effort is to reduce legal gray zones, 300 for example by narrowing disagreements over the gap that lies between the definition of force and armed attack. This could prepare the ground for developing a shared understanding of what kind of hybrid threats may trigger the applicability of Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU. Given that the assessment of any security threat depends heavily on its context, it may prove somewhat sterile to build such a consensus in the abstract. Drawing on war-gaming and exercises may offer a more fruitful way forward. Bearing in mind how attractive the use of proxies is to a hybrid state adversary, 30 1 developing a common approach to attribute their activities to the sponsoring state also merits attention. Although many aspects of the rules governing the attribution of wrongful acts are settled, certain questions could benefit from a joint posture. 30 2 NATO and EU nations should also strengthen their collective mechanisms for unmasking attempts at plausible deniability in order to deny its use as a hybrid instrument, 30 3 as illustrated by their united response to the Skripal incident and to Russian cyber operations. 30 4\nRather than seek to harmonize divergent national positions, another option for increasing legal interoperability is to embrace and draw strength from their diversity. As is well known, the United States denies that a gap exists between the use of force and armed attack.30 5 On the U.S. view, any use of force against a state, regardless of its gravity, gives rise to the right to use necessary and proportionate force in self-defense. Stationing even small numbers of U.S. forces in the territory of the most vulnerable allied nations thus increases the chances that the United States could invoke its right of individual self-defense in circumstances where neither the host nation nor other Allies might be prepared to invoke Article 5. Similarly, the greater the number of nations that expose their forces to the risk of direct attack by an adversary, the more likely it is that they will muster the political will to invoke Article 5 should they suffer an attack.30 7 This calls for highly multinationalized force structures. It should be emphasized that the function of national assets in these circumstances is not operational, but legal. Their primary role is not to defeat or deter an aggressor through military strength, but to serve as legal tripwires that threaten to increase the costs of aggression. 30 8", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the danger that hybrid threats may bypass Article 5\ndoes not lie at the two extremes\nthe danger lies in the indirect use of force and in its combination with non-military levers\nin a way that avoids Article 5\nbeing triggered in precisely those situations where a forcible response would be\nwarranted, legally admissible, and militarily effective\nThe\nchallenges that hybrid threats present\nhave been recognized at the highest political level\nNATO's member states confirmed their readiness to assist each other at any stage of a hybrid campaign and\ncounter hybrid warfare as part of collective defense\nthe North Atlantic Council \"could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.\"\nThey repeated these points at their Brussels summit\nBy drawing an express link between hybrid warfare and collective defense, NATO leaders signaled\nresolve not to allow Article 5 to be hollowed out.\nit is only in cases of \"hybrid warfare\" that they foresee a potential role for Article 5\nBy accepting\nArticle 5 is confined to\nhybrid warfare, the Warsaw and Brussels Summit Declarations avoid\nempty gestures\nThe applicable thresholds therefore cannot be unilaterally modified at will\nwithout the risk of unraveling key elements of the international legal order\nOne\neffort is to reduce legal gray zones\nby narrowing disagreements over the gap that lies between the definition of force and armed attack. This could prepare\na shared understanding of what\nhybrid threats may trigger the applicability of Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU\nAlthough many aspects\nare settled, certain questions could benefit from a joint posture\nRather than\nharmonize divergent national positions, another option\nis to embrace and draw strength from their diversity\nthe United States denies that a gap exists between\nforce and armed attack\nOn the U.S. view, any use of force\ngives rise to the right to use necessary and proportionate force in self-defense\nthe United States could invoke its right of\nself-defense in circumstances where neither the host nation nor other Allies might\ninvoke Article 5.\nThis calls for\nmultinationalized force structures\nthe function of national assets\nnot to defeat or deter an aggressor\nbut\nserve as legal tripwires that threaten to increase the costs of aggression", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: A joint hybrid warfare posture clarifies redlines while retaining Article V to compel forceful response.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the danger that hybrid threats may bypass Article 5\ndoes not lie at the two extremes\nthe danger lies in the indirect use of force and in its combination with non-military levers\nin a way that avoids Article 5\nbeing triggered in precisely those situations where a forcible response would be\nwarranted, legally admissible, and militarily effective\nThe\nchallenges that hybrid threats present\nhave been recognized at the highest political level\nNATO's member states confirmed their readiness to assist each other at any stage of a hybrid campaign and\ncounter hybrid warfare as part of collective defense\nthe North Atlantic Council \"could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.\"\nThey repeated these points at their Brussels summit\nBy drawing an express link between hybrid warfare and collective defense, NATO leaders signaled\nresolve not to allow Article 5 to be hollowed out.\nit is only in cases of \"hybrid warfare\" that they foresee a potential role for Article 5\nBy accepting\nArticle 5 is confined to\nhybrid warfare, the Warsaw and Brussels Summit Declarations avoid\nempty gestures\nThe applicable thresholds therefore cannot be unilaterally modified at will\nwithout the risk of unraveling key elements of the international legal order\nOne\neffort is to reduce legal gray zones\nby narrowing disagreements over the gap that lies between the definition of force and armed attack. This could prepare\na shared understanding of what\nhybrid threats may trigger the applicability of Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU\nAlthough many aspects\nare settled, certain questions could benefit from a joint posture\nRather than\nharmonize divergent national positions, another option\nis to embrace and draw strength from their diversity\nthe United States denies that a gap exists between\nforce and armed attack\nOn the U.S. view, any use of force\ngives rise to the right to use necessary and proportionate force in self-defense\nthe United States could invoke its right of\nself-defense in circumstances where neither the host nation nor other Allies might\ninvoke Article 5.\nThis calls for\nmultinationalized force structures\nthe function of national assets\nnot to defeat or deter an aggressor\nbut\nserve as legal tripwires that threaten to increase the costs of aggression", "role": "user" }, { "content": "avoids Article 5\nwarranted\nadmissible, and militarily effective\nhighest political level\nconfirmed their readiness\ncounter hybrid warfare\ninvoke Article 5\nhollowed out\navoid\nempty gestures\nunilaterally modified at will\nreduce legal gray zones\nnarrowing disagreements\nshared understanding\njoint posture\nnecessary\nproportionate force\ninvoke its right of\nself-defense\nmultinationalized force structures\nlegal tripwires", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: A joint hybrid warfare posture clarifies redlines while retaining Article V to compel forceful response.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the danger that hybrid threats may bypass Article 5\ndoes not lie at the two extremes\nthe danger lies in the indirect use of force and in its combination with non-military levers\nin a way that avoids Article 5\nbeing triggered in precisely those situations where a forcible response would be\nwarranted, legally admissible, and militarily effective\nThe\nchallenges that hybrid threats present\nhave been recognized at the highest political level\nNATO's member states confirmed their readiness to assist each other at any stage of a hybrid campaign and\ncounter hybrid warfare as part of collective defense\nthe North Atlantic Council \"could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.\"\nThey repeated these points at their Brussels summit\nBy drawing an express link between hybrid warfare and collective defense, NATO leaders signaled\nresolve not to allow Article 5 to be hollowed out.\nit is only in cases of \"hybrid warfare\" that they foresee a potential role for Article 5\nBy accepting\nArticle 5 is confined to\nhybrid warfare, the Warsaw and Brussels Summit Declarations avoid\nempty gestures\nThe applicable thresholds therefore cannot be unilaterally modified at will\nwithout the risk of unraveling key elements of the international legal order\nOne\neffort is to reduce legal gray zones\nby narrowing disagreements over the gap that lies between the definition of force and armed attack. This could prepare\na shared understanding of what\nhybrid threats may trigger the applicability of Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU\nAlthough many aspects\nare settled, certain questions could benefit from a joint posture\nRather than\nharmonize divergent national positions, another option\nis to embrace and draw strength from their diversity\nthe United States denies that a gap exists between\nforce and armed attack\nOn the U.S. view, any use of force\ngives rise to the right to use necessary and proportionate force in self-defense\nthe United States could invoke its right of\nself-defense in circumstances where neither the host nation nor other Allies might\ninvoke Article 5.\nThis calls for\nmultinationalized force structures\nthe function of national assets\nnot to defeat or deter an aggressor\nbut\nserve as legal tripwires that threaten to increase the costs of aggression", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the danger lies in\nnon-military levers\nin a way that avoids Article\nprecisely\nwhere a forcible response would be\nwarranted, legally admissible, and militarily effective\nNATO's member states confirmed\nreadiness to assist each other\nand\ncounter hybrid warfare\nthe North Atlantic Council \"could\ninvoke Article 5\nNATO leaders signaled\nresolve not to allow Article 5 to be hollowed out\nBy accepting\nArticle 5 is confined to\nhybrid warfare,\nWarsaw and Brussels\navoid\nempty gestures\nOne\neffort is to reduce legal gray zones\nby narrowing disagreements\nThis could prepare\na shared understanding of what\nthreats\ntrigger\nArticle 5\nOn the U.S. view, any use of force\ngives rise to\nnecessary and proportionate\nself-defense\nmultinationalized force structures\nserve as legal tripwires that threaten\naggression", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: NATO should jointly clarify thresholds for attack under Article V.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Most importantly, NATO must ensure indestructible resilience across the Alliance and strengthen relationships with strategic partners such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). To reinforce this effort, NATO should “clearly articulate what counts as an attack under Article V.” 54 For example, Estonia was nearly crippled by the cyber attack on its infrastructure in 2007. Although cyber security was addressed at the 2014 Wales Summit, the Alliance concluded that determination on whether a cyber attack on one of its members invokes Article V action would be made on a case-by-case basis.55 Additionally, Russia’s “little green men” were successful in preparing Crimea for a Russian annexation long before the confirmed appearance of conventional forces on the eastern border. With Russia choosing not to cooperate with international cybersecurity initiatives and already skilled in the use of unmarked special purpose forces, revised Article V verbiage to address the use of hybrid tools is imperative. Without it, NATO could find itself ill-prepared to deal with Putin’s next ambiguous engagement that may very well be within NATO’s borders. The result could be, at best, a weakened Alliance, shaken by uncertainty of the collective defense of its trusting members. In the worst case scenario, Putin succeeds at permanently shattering the venerable North Atlantic security establishment.\nIt is not too late to lay down the ornamental rapier. By honing and clearly conveying the Article V language to include hybrid tools, NATO stands to bolster the alliance’s institutional trust and strategic relationships. A resolute strategic communication program that includes counter-information techniques and information defense will uncover Putin’s misinformation and hamper his attempts to delegitimize Western institutions, create confusion and foster dissent. This will better prepare member countries and partners for Russia’s hybrid approach as implemented in Ukraine - Putin is still exploiting these methodologies within NATO countries today. Finally, according to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, “Computer security studies assert that unspecified Russian cyber actors are developing means to access industrial control systems (ICS) remotely.”56 How will NATO respond to computer hackers controlling NATO Country X’s electric power grids, urban mass-transit systems, airtraffic control, and oil and gas distribution networks? It’s time to sharpen NATO’s illustrious sword.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "NATO must ensure indestructible resilience across the Alliance and strengthen relationships with strategic partners\nNATO should “clearly articulate what counts\nunder Article V.”\nAlthough cyber security was addressed at the 2014\nSummit, the Alliance concluded\ndetermination on whether a cyber attack\ninvokes Article V\nwould be made on a case-by-case basis\nAdditionally, Russia’s “little green men” were successful in preparing Crimea for\nRussian annexation\nWith Russia choosing not to cooperate with\ncybersecurity initiatives\nrevised Article V verbiage to address\nhybrid tools is imperative. Without it, NATO could find itself ill-prepared to deal with Putin’s next\nengagement\nThe result could be\na weakened Alliance, shaken by uncertainty of\ncollective defense\nIn the worst case\nPutin succeeds at permanently shattering the\nNorth Atlantic security establishment\nIt is not too late\nBy honing and clearly conveying\nArticle V language to include hybrid tools, NATO stands to bolster the alliance’s institutional trust and\nrelationships. A resolute\ncommunication program that includes counter-information\nand information defense will uncover Putin’s misinformation\nThis will\nprepare\ncountries and partners for Russia’s hybrid approach\nComputer security studies assert\nRussian cyber actors are developing means to access industrial control systems\nHow will NATO respond to computer hackers controlling NATO\npower grids, urban\nsystems, airtraffic control, and oil and gas distribution\nIt’s time to sharpen NATO’s\nsword", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: NATO should jointly clarify thresholds for attack under Article V.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "NATO must ensure indestructible resilience across the Alliance and strengthen relationships with strategic partners\nNATO should “clearly articulate what counts\nunder Article V.”\nAlthough cyber security was addressed at the 2014\nSummit, the Alliance concluded\ndetermination on whether a cyber attack\ninvokes Article V\nwould be made on a case-by-case basis\nAdditionally, Russia’s “little green men” were successful in preparing Crimea for\nRussian annexation\nWith Russia choosing not to cooperate with\ncybersecurity initiatives\nrevised Article V verbiage to address\nhybrid tools is imperative. Without it, NATO could find itself ill-prepared to deal with Putin’s next\nengagement\nThe result could be\na weakened Alliance, shaken by uncertainty of\ncollective defense\nIn the worst case\nPutin succeeds at permanently shattering the\nNorth Atlantic security establishment\nIt is not too late\nBy honing and clearly conveying\nArticle V language to include hybrid tools, NATO stands to bolster the alliance’s institutional trust and\nrelationships. A resolute\ncommunication program that includes counter-information\nand information defense will uncover Putin’s misinformation\nThis will\nprepare\ncountries and partners for Russia’s hybrid approach\nComputer security studies assert\nRussian cyber actors are developing means to access industrial control systems\nHow will NATO respond to computer hackers controlling NATO\npower grids, urban\nsystems, airtraffic control, and oil and gas distribution\nIt’s time to sharpen NATO’s\nsword", "role": "user" }, { "content": "ensure indestructible resilience\nstrengthen relationships\ncase-by-case basis\nlittle green men\nrevised Article V verbiage\nimperative\nweakened Alliance\npermanently shattering\nhoning\nclearly conveying\nArticle V language\nbolster the alliance’s institutional trust\ncounter-information\nhybrid approach\nsharpen NATO’s\nsword", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: NATO should jointly clarify thresholds for attack under Article V.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "NATO must ensure indestructible resilience across the Alliance and strengthen relationships with strategic partners\nNATO should “clearly articulate what counts\nunder Article V.”\nAlthough cyber security was addressed at the 2014\nSummit, the Alliance concluded\ndetermination on whether a cyber attack\ninvokes Article V\nwould be made on a case-by-case basis\nAdditionally, Russia’s “little green men” were successful in preparing Crimea for\nRussian annexation\nWith Russia choosing not to cooperate with\ncybersecurity initiatives\nrevised Article V verbiage to address\nhybrid tools is imperative. Without it, NATO could find itself ill-prepared to deal with Putin’s next\nengagement\nThe result could be\na weakened Alliance, shaken by uncertainty of\ncollective defense\nIn the worst case\nPutin succeeds at permanently shattering the\nNorth Atlantic security establishment\nIt is not too late\nBy honing and clearly conveying\nArticle V language to include hybrid tools, NATO stands to bolster the alliance’s institutional trust and\nrelationships. A resolute\ncommunication program that includes counter-information\nand information defense will uncover Putin’s misinformation\nThis will\nprepare\ncountries and partners for Russia’s hybrid approach\nComputer security studies assert\nRussian cyber actors are developing means to access industrial control systems\nHow will NATO respond to computer hackers controlling NATO\npower grids, urban\nsystems, airtraffic control, and oil and gas distribution\nIt’s time to sharpen NATO’s\nsword", "role": "user" }, { "content": "NATO must ensure indestructible resilience\nNATO should “clearly articulate what counts\nunder Article V.”\nthe Alliance concluded\ndetermination\nwould be made\ncase-by-case\nRussia’s “little green men” were successful\nrevised Article V verbiage\nis imperative. Without it, NATO could find itself ill-prepared\nThe result could be\na weakened Alliance\nBy\nclearly conveying\nArticle V language\nNATO stands to bolster\ninstitutional trust\nThis will\nprepare\npartners for Russia’s hybrid approach\nIt’s time to sharpen NATO’s\nsword", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: And, it successfully deters hybrid conflict escalation.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The following prediction of events in the case of Russian hybrid warfare against the Baltic States will help us understand how the adoption of this legal doctrine will create a political will of the NATO members to engage in a more deterring posture vis-à-vis Russia and will therefore deter Russian expansionism:\n1 Russia engages in hybrid warfare against the Baltic States: use of military and non-military tactics to destabilize the Baltic States and, in the worst case, invade parts of their territories by proxy forces.\n2 The Baltic States, as soon as any hybrid warfare tactics are used against their sovereignty, will engage in an armed conflict against Russia and will ask NATO members to abide by their Article 5 promise to stand by any member of NATO facing an armed attack.\n3 Three scenarios are possible at this level:\na. NATO members do not agree with the active and early use of armed self-defence of the Baltic States and do not militarily support them: the consequence of such an abandonment would be the loss of NATO’s credibility. In the long run, some eastern European NATO members would probably reconsider their NATO treaty obligations and would turn to a “European Union-only” security framework.\nb. NATO members do not agree with the active and early use of armed self-defence of the Baltic States but militarily support them: by doing so, NATO safeguards its fundamental purpose – collective selfdefence – but the NATO-Russia armed conflict would cause too much of a disturbance in terms of international relations and its military and financial consequences could be dramatic.\nc. NATO members agree with the active and early use of armed self-defence of the Baltic States and militarily support them: same consequences as in (b).\nAs for the Russian standpoint, scenarios (a), (b) and (c) would cost too much for too little gain. Indeed, in scenario (a), the dislocation of NATO in Eastern Europe would certainly strengthen European Union projects concerning defence unification and could lead to a coherent European block on the western border of Russia. As for scenario (b), the fight against NATO would probably cost too much for Russia on both the economic and military levels, partly because the modernization of the Russian army is still underway. Additionally, the European and Asian neighbours of Russia would distance themselves even more out of fear of more targeting in terms of hybrid warfare.\nSince the consequences in the three possible scenarios would be too grave to be acceptable, the psychological effect of the adoption of the pinpricks doctrine would lead to a stronger presence of NATO in the Baltic States and to Russia reconsidering the use of hybrid warfare against them. The pinpricks doctrine of the Baltic States would be similar to nuclear deterrence in that its fundamental objective is to, paradoxically, never be used. Its primary goal is to deter, not to destroy or justify any military action.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The following prediction\nin the case of Russian hybrid warfare\nwill help us understand how\nthis\ndoctrine will create a political will of\nNATO members to engage in a more deterring posture vis-à-vis Russia and\ndeter Russian expansionism\n1 Russia engages in hybrid warfare against the Baltic States: use of military and non-military tactics to destabilize the Baltic States\n2 The Baltic States,\nwill engage in an armed conflict against Russia and\nask NATO members to abide by their Article 5 promise\n3 Three scenarios are possible\na. NATO members do not agree with\nactive and early use of armed self-defence\nthe consequence of such\nabandonment would be the loss of NATO’s credibility\nsome\nEuropean NATO members\nwould turn to a “European Union-only” security framework\nNATO members do not agree\nbut militarily support them\nNATO safeguards its fundamental purpose – collective selfdefence – but the NATO-Russia armed conflict would cause too much\ndisturbance\nNATO members agree with\narmed self-defence\nand militarily support them\nAs for the Russian standpoint, scenarios (a), (b) and (c) would cost too much for too little gain\nin scenario (a), the dislocation of NATO\nwould\nstrengthen European Union projects concerning defence unification and\nlead to a coherent European block on the western border of Russia\nthe fight against NATO would\ncost too much for Russia on\nthe economic and military levels,\nSince the consequences\nwould be too grave to be acceptable, the psychological effect of\nthe pinpricks doctrine would lead to a stronger presence of NATO in the Baltic States and\nRussia reconsidering\nhybrid warfare\nThe pinpricks doctrine\nwould be similar to nuclear deterrence in that its fundamental objective is to,\n, never be used", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: And, it successfully deters hybrid conflict escalation.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The following prediction\nin the case of Russian hybrid warfare\nwill help us understand how\nthis\ndoctrine will create a political will of\nNATO members to engage in a more deterring posture vis-à-vis Russia and\ndeter Russian expansionism\n1 Russia engages in hybrid warfare against the Baltic States: use of military and non-military tactics to destabilize the Baltic States\n2 The Baltic States,\nwill engage in an armed conflict against Russia and\nask NATO members to abide by their Article 5 promise\n3 Three scenarios are possible\na. NATO members do not agree with\nactive and early use of armed self-defence\nthe consequence of such\nabandonment would be the loss of NATO’s credibility\nsome\nEuropean NATO members\nwould turn to a “European Union-only” security framework\nNATO members do not agree\nbut militarily support them\nNATO safeguards its fundamental purpose – collective selfdefence – but the NATO-Russia armed conflict would cause too much\ndisturbance\nNATO members agree with\narmed self-defence\nand militarily support them\nAs for the Russian standpoint, scenarios (a), (b) and (c) would cost too much for too little gain\nin scenario (a), the dislocation of NATO\nwould\nstrengthen European Union projects concerning defence unification and\nlead to a coherent European block on the western border of Russia\nthe fight against NATO would\ncost too much for Russia on\nthe economic and military levels,\nSince the consequences\nwould be too grave to be acceptable, the psychological effect of\nthe pinpricks doctrine would lead to a stronger presence of NATO in the Baltic States and\nRussia reconsidering\nhybrid warfare\nThe pinpricks doctrine\nwould be similar to nuclear deterrence in that its fundamental objective is to,\n, never be used", "role": "user" }, { "content": "political will\nmore deterring posture\ndeter Russian expansionism\nhybrid warfare\nmilitary\nnon-military tactics\narmed conflict\nArticle 5 promise\nloss of NATO’s credibility\nEuropean Union-only”\nmilitarily support them\nNATO-Russia armed conflict\narmed self-defence\ncost too much\ncoherent European block\ncost too much for Russia\ntoo grave to be acceptable\nstronger presence of NATO\nnuclear deterrence\nnever be used", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: And, it successfully deters hybrid conflict escalation.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The following prediction\nin the case of Russian hybrid warfare\nwill help us understand how\nthis\ndoctrine will create a political will of\nNATO members to engage in a more deterring posture vis-à-vis Russia and\ndeter Russian expansionism\n1 Russia engages in hybrid warfare against the Baltic States: use of military and non-military tactics to destabilize the Baltic States\n2 The Baltic States,\nwill engage in an armed conflict against Russia and\nask NATO members to abide by their Article 5 promise\n3 Three scenarios are possible\na. NATO members do not agree with\nactive and early use of armed self-defence\nthe consequence of such\nabandonment would be the loss of NATO’s credibility\nsome\nEuropean NATO members\nwould turn to a “European Union-only” security framework\nNATO members do not agree\nbut militarily support them\nNATO safeguards its fundamental purpose – collective selfdefence – but the NATO-Russia armed conflict would cause too much\ndisturbance\nNATO members agree with\narmed self-defence\nand militarily support them\nAs for the Russian standpoint, scenarios (a), (b) and (c) would cost too much for too little gain\nin scenario (a), the dislocation of NATO\nwould\nstrengthen European Union projects concerning defence unification and\nlead to a coherent European block on the western border of Russia\nthe fight against NATO would\ncost too much for Russia on\nthe economic and military levels,\nSince the consequences\nwould be too grave to be acceptable, the psychological effect of\nthe pinpricks doctrine would lead to a stronger presence of NATO in the Baltic States and\nRussia reconsidering\nhybrid warfare\nThe pinpricks doctrine\nwould be similar to nuclear deterrence in that its fundamental objective is to,\n, never be used", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The following prediction\nwill help us understand how\nthis\nwill create a political will\nto engage in a more deterring posture vis-à-vis Russia\nRussia engages in hybrid warfare\nThe Baltic States\nengage in an armed conflict\nand\nask NATO\nto abide by\nArticle 5\nNATO members do not agree\nthe consequence\nwould be the loss of NATO’s credibility\nNATO members\nmilitarily support them\nfor the Russian standpoint, scenarios\nwould cost too much\ndislocation of NATO\nwould\nlead to a coherent European block\nthe fight\nwould\ncost too much for Russia\nthe consequences\nwould be too grave to be acceptable\nThe pinpricks doctrine\nwould be similar to nuclear deterrence", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Lack of consensus turns the case – conflicting standards produce unclear thresholds that undercut deterrence.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Alliance has made progress in deterring and protecting against such threats. Protecting against a limited ballistic strike from the Middle East was the rationale for NATO’s ballistic missile defense program. It is today an operational capability. The cyber threat is now recognized as having the potential to be considered, under some circumstances, an “armed attack.”16 But faced with a limited attack, NATO should not expect that Article 5 will be automatically, swiftly and unanimously declared (and the history of the past 25 years highlights the relevance of these doubts). If coming from Russia, it should be expected that several member states will hesitate before taking steps that may commit them to war with Moscow. This includes not only a “Northern contingency” (in the Baltic region or in the High North), but also a scenario where Russia forcefully responds on Turkish territory to what it would, rightly or wrongly, see as provocation by Ankara.\nAttribution will be a problem in many instances; even assuming that this issue is solved, some member countries might hesitate in acknowledging the adversary’s responsibility, especially if the latter – as should be expected – embarks on massive propaganda aimed at influencing their public opinions.\nFinally, a 30 plus-country alliance (if two or more countries joined) would be less likely to reach consensus on the urgency to declare Article 5 faced with a limited attack than it would have been when NATO included only half that number (which was the case during most of the Cold War). As a result, “what might count locally as an intolerable assault on the Baltic States’ sovereignty may not be seen in Brussels as an ‘armed attack’ for Article 5 purposes. [...] All the strength of the world’s mightiest military alliance will not amount to much if its members cannot agree when an aggressor has actually stepped over the line.”17\nNATO should expect that its potential aggressors are smart. Having learned from the history of warfare and terrorism, an adversary could organize fake civilian accidents, launch false flag operations, embark on sabotage, commit acts of terrorism, abduct foreign citizens, claim a “right of hot pursuit” on Alliance territory under a false pretext, etc.18\nIncursions of security forces and militia (so-called “little green men”) – a subset of what Russia calls “hybrid warfare” – are the hardest to deter and defend against. Northern European security analysts are right to ask the following question: “to what extent is NATO’s legal framework ready to deal with modern warfare? [...] Supposing a Crimea-like situation occurs in Narva, Estonia, for example. Can Article 5 be called on if there is no armed attack, but instead, what Russia would call a ‘democratic right of self-determination of the same nature as Kosovo and Crimea’?”19 It would be impossible to declare that any form of externally-induced political destabilization is an “armed attack.” A positive answer to the question asked would be impossible to reach unanimously and would stretch the definition of an “armed attack” to the implausible.\nLegal history provides a useful guide to what an armed attack is in international law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its seminal Nicaragua decision (1986), stated that it includes “the sending of or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregular or mercenaries” provided that said State has “effective” control [over] them. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, for its part, judges that “overall” control is sufficient.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The cyber threat is\nrecognized as having the potential to be considered, under some circumstances, an “armed attack.”\nfaced with a limited attack, NATO should not expect that Article 5 will be automatically, swiftly and unanimously declared\nIf coming from Russia\nseveral member states will hesitate before taking steps that may commit them to war\nThis includes not only a “Northern contingency” (in the Baltic region\nbut also\nTurkish territory\na 30 plus-country alliance\nwould be less likely to reach consensus on\nArticle 5 faced with a limited attack than it would have been when NATO included only half that number\nwhat might count locally as an intolerable assault on the Baltic States’\nmay not be seen in Brussels as an ‘armed attack’ for Article 5 purposes.\nAll the strength of the world’s mightiest\nalliance will not amount to much if its members cannot agree\nNATO should expect that its\naggressors are smart.\nan adversary could organize fake civilian accidents, launch false flag operations, embark on sabotage, commit\nterrorism, abduct foreign citizens,\netc.\nIncursions of security forces\nwhat Russia calls “hybrid warfare” – are the hardest to deter and defend against\nto what extent is NATO’s legal framework ready to deal with modern warfare?\nCan Article 5 be called on if there is no armed attack, but instead\na ‘democratic right of self-determination\nLegal history provides a useful guide to what an armed attack is in international law. The\nICJ\nstated that it includes “the sending of or on behalf of a State of armed\ngroups\nprovided\nsaid State has “effective” control [over] them", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Lack of consensus turns the case – conflicting standards produce unclear thresholds that undercut deterrence.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The cyber threat is\nrecognized as having the potential to be considered, under some circumstances, an “armed attack.”\nfaced with a limited attack, NATO should not expect that Article 5 will be automatically, swiftly and unanimously declared\nIf coming from Russia\nseveral member states will hesitate before taking steps that may commit them to war\nThis includes not only a “Northern contingency” (in the Baltic region\nbut also\nTurkish territory\na 30 plus-country alliance\nwould be less likely to reach consensus on\nArticle 5 faced with a limited attack than it would have been when NATO included only half that number\nwhat might count locally as an intolerable assault on the Baltic States’\nmay not be seen in Brussels as an ‘armed attack’ for Article 5 purposes.\nAll the strength of the world’s mightiest\nalliance will not amount to much if its members cannot agree\nNATO should expect that its\naggressors are smart.\nan adversary could organize fake civilian accidents, launch false flag operations, embark on sabotage, commit\nterrorism, abduct foreign citizens,\netc.\nIncursions of security forces\nwhat Russia calls “hybrid warfare” – are the hardest to deter and defend against\nto what extent is NATO’s legal framework ready to deal with modern warfare?\nCan Article 5 be called on if there is no armed attack, but instead\na ‘democratic right of self-determination\nLegal history provides a useful guide to what an armed attack is in international law. The\nICJ\nstated that it includes “the sending of or on behalf of a State of armed\ngroups\nprovided\nsaid State has “effective” control [over] them", "role": "user" }, { "content": "automatically\nswiftly\nunanimously declared\nseveral member states will hesitate\n30 plus-country alliance\nreach consensus\nlimited attack\nlocally\nintolerable assault\narmed attack’\ncannot agree\nsmart\nhardest to deter\ndefend\nCan Article 5 be called on\narmed attack\ninternational law\neffective” control [over]", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Lack of consensus turns the case – conflicting standards produce unclear thresholds that undercut deterrence.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The cyber threat is\nrecognized as having the potential to be considered, under some circumstances, an “armed attack.”\nfaced with a limited attack, NATO should not expect that Article 5 will be automatically, swiftly and unanimously declared\nIf coming from Russia\nseveral member states will hesitate before taking steps that may commit them to war\nThis includes not only a “Northern contingency” (in the Baltic region\nbut also\nTurkish territory\na 30 plus-country alliance\nwould be less likely to reach consensus on\nArticle 5 faced with a limited attack than it would have been when NATO included only half that number\nwhat might count locally as an intolerable assault on the Baltic States’\nmay not be seen in Brussels as an ‘armed attack’ for Article 5 purposes.\nAll the strength of the world’s mightiest\nalliance will not amount to much if its members cannot agree\nNATO should expect that its\naggressors are smart.\nan adversary could organize fake civilian accidents, launch false flag operations, embark on sabotage, commit\nterrorism, abduct foreign citizens,\netc.\nIncursions of security forces\nwhat Russia calls “hybrid warfare” – are the hardest to deter and defend against\nto what extent is NATO’s legal framework ready to deal with modern warfare?\nCan Article 5 be called on if there is no armed attack, but instead\na ‘democratic right of self-determination\nLegal history provides a useful guide to what an armed attack is in international law. The\nICJ\nstated that it includes “the sending of or on behalf of a State of armed\ngroups\nprovided\nsaid State has “effective” control [over] them", "role": "user" }, { "content": "NATO should not expect\nArticle 5 will be\nswiftly and unanimously declared\nIf coming from Russia\nseveral\nstates will hesitate\na 30 plus-country alliance\nwould be less likely to reach consensus\nwhat might count locally a\nintolerable assault\nmay not be seen in Brussels as an ‘armed attack’\nAll the strength\nwill not amount to much if\nmembers cannot agree\nhybrid warfare\nare the hardest to deter and defend\nCan Article 5 be called on\nhistory provides a useful guide\nThe\nICJ\nstated that it includes\narmed\ngroups\nprovided\nsaid State has “effective” control [over] them", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: And, the aff produces reluctance to invoke Article V early in a crisis. That “wait-and-see” posture complicates crisis escalation management later.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The first exercise was conducted in fall of 2016, in support of U.S. SOCEUR, and involved 29 expert respondents. The scenario vignette explored a series of suspicious Russia-linked incidents against Latvia: a cyberattack against the energy grid, an explosion in a Russian-language middle school, and staged protests in Riga. As Baltic, American, and Western European experts addressed these crises, several important findings emerged. The first was that both Latvia and its neighbour Lithuania delayed asking for Western assistance as long as possible – U.S. and/or NATO assistance in handling Russian interference was likely seen as the ultimate trump card to be called upon only at the darkest hour (which any individual grey zone crisis hardly qualified as, though their cumulative impact was approaching the threshold). The problem was that it significantly complicated escalation management, depriving allied decision-makers of a series of tools that could help de-escalate the conflict early and giving rise to more possibilities for the adversary to sow discord and ambiguity among the allies. The second important insight was that the EU played a significantly more important role than NATO in managing the grey zone crises – turning to NATO resources was seen as too escalatory a step. The third significant insight was that although the experts agreed at the outset on the importance for NATO and the EU to maintain a united front, during any particular crisis there was a tendency to conduct bilateral talks with Russia, trying to resolve the situation without involving the target state (i.e. Latvia) directly – which inevitably backfired.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The first exercise was conducted in\n2016\nand involved 29 expert respondents. The scenario\nexplored a series of suspicious Russia-linked incidents against Latvia: a cyberattack\nan explosion in a\nmiddle school, and staged protests\nboth Latvia and its neighbour Lithuania delayed asking for Western assistance as long as possible – U.S. and/or NATO assistance\nwas\nseen as the ultimate trump card to be called upon only at the darkest hour (which any individual grey zone crisis hardly qualified as\nThe problem was that it significantly complicated escalation management, depriving allied decision-makers of\ntools that could\nde-escalate the conflict early and giving rise to more possibilities for the adversary to sow discord and ambiguity among the allies\nturning to NATO resources was seen as too escalatory\nbilateral talks with Russia\ninevitably backfired.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: And, the aff produces reluctance to invoke Article V early in a crisis. That “wait-and-see” posture complicates crisis escalation management later.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The first exercise was conducted in\n2016\nand involved 29 expert respondents. The scenario\nexplored a series of suspicious Russia-linked incidents against Latvia: a cyberattack\nan explosion in a\nmiddle school, and staged protests\nboth Latvia and its neighbour Lithuania delayed asking for Western assistance as long as possible – U.S. and/or NATO assistance\nwas\nseen as the ultimate trump card to be called upon only at the darkest hour (which any individual grey zone crisis hardly qualified as\nThe problem was that it significantly complicated escalation management, depriving allied decision-makers of\ntools that could\nde-escalate the conflict early and giving rise to more possibilities for the adversary to sow discord and ambiguity among the allies\nturning to NATO resources was seen as too escalatory\nbilateral talks with Russia\ninevitably backfired.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "delayed asking for Western assistance\nultimate trump card\ndarkest hour\nsignificantly complicated escalation management\nde-escalate the conflict\nsow discord\nambiguity\ninevitably backfired", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: And, the aff produces reluctance to invoke Article V early in a crisis. That “wait-and-see” posture complicates crisis escalation management later.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The first exercise was conducted in\n2016\nand involved 29 expert respondents. The scenario\nexplored a series of suspicious Russia-linked incidents against Latvia: a cyberattack\nan explosion in a\nmiddle school, and staged protests\nboth Latvia and its neighbour Lithuania delayed asking for Western assistance as long as possible – U.S. and/or NATO assistance\nwas\nseen as the ultimate trump card to be called upon only at the darkest hour (which any individual grey zone crisis hardly qualified as\nThe problem was that it significantly complicated escalation management, depriving allied decision-makers of\ntools that could\nde-escalate the conflict early and giving rise to more possibilities for the adversary to sow discord and ambiguity among the allies\nturning to NATO resources was seen as too escalatory\nbilateral talks with Russia\ninevitably backfired.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The first exercise was conducted in\nLatvia\nboth Latvia and\nLithuania delayed asking for Western assistance as long as possible\nNATO assistance\nwas\nseen as the ultimate trump card\nonly at the darkest hour\nit significantly complicated escalation management, depriving\ndecision-makers of\ntools that could\n-escalate the conflict early and giving rise to\npossibilities for the adversary to sow discord\namong\nallies\nbilateral talks\ninevitably backfired.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The fallback for attacks below Article 5 is Article 4 – that’s slow and impractical in a crisis.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Remarkably cyber-crime has served as the default mechanism in addressing cyber-attacks when there is a lack of clarity as to whether a particular event arises to the level of an attack that amounts to an act of war. As an example, the 2007 Estonia attacks were viewed by NATO and the international community as an instance of cybercrime or cyber terrorism as opposed to cyber war due in part to the lack of clear attribution of the conduct to a nation state. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) addressed this issue of non-state actors in its Nicaragua case, saying that the armed attack would be judged under the \"scale and effects\" test (ICJ, 1986). This means that if the armed attack, even if carried out by irregular forces, would amount to an armed attack if a state has \"effective control\" of the non-state actors who carried out the attack, that state will be held accountable for the attack (Gervais, 2012). Under the law of armed conflict, once a cyber-attack is determined to have risen to the level of an armed attack, the response of the state must be necessary, proportional, and attributive (Carr & Shepherd, 2009).\nThe North Atlantic Council is required to hold consultations under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, which states that \"the parties will consult whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the parties is threatened.\" Cyber warfare would activate NATO treaty Article 4, requiring NATO members to consult one another to determine response to a cyber-attack against NATO members (Raboin, 2011). The requirement of consultation has raised serious concerns in international law as consultation may not be possible in an attack that is immediate and direct and threatens severe harm to civilians. \nIII. THE TALLINN MANUAL The ability of nation states to define cyberspace, cyber-attack, cyberwarfare, and cybercrime under their own terms creates an unstable and uncertain environment for responding to cyber threats and cyber-attacks and distinguishing among cyber events. Moreover, most national cyber strategies do not include what they consider to be a serious threat that might amount to cyber warfare or a terrorist attack, or how existing strategies can cope with rapidly changing threat dynamics. Nor do national strategies discuss the policies or legislation that is needed to address and prevent these attacks. For instance, the UK 2011 cybersecurity strategy mentions as potential threats the possibility of states spreading disinformation and terrorists spreading propaganda, radicalizing potential supporters, raising funds, communicating and planning, but does not provide an overarching legal framework for controlling these attacks (UK Cabinet Office 2011). Estonia, in its 2014-2017 cyber security strategy refers to new threats and needs not covered in its previous documents, without defining these threats (Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication 2014).", "role": "user" }, { "content": "cyber-crime has served as the default mechanism in addressing cyber-attacks when there is a lack of clarity as to whether a\nevent arises to the level of an attack that amounts to\nwar\nthe 2007 Estonia attacks were viewed\nas an instance of cybercrime\nas opposed to cyber war due in part to the lack of clear attribution\nThe\nICJ\naddressed this issue\nsaying that the armed attack would be judged under the \"scale and effects\" test\nif the armed attack\nwould amount to an armed attack if a state has \"effective control\" of the non-state actors\nthat state will be held accountable for the attack\nonce a cyber-attack is determined to have risen to the level of an armed attack, the response\nmust be necessary, proportional, and attributive\nThe North Atlantic Council is required to hold consultations under Article 4\nwhich states that \"the parties will consult whenever\nthe territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any\nis threatened.\" Cyber warfare would activate NATO treaty Article 4, requiring NATO members to consult one another\nconsultation has raised serious concerns in international law as consultation may not be possible in an attack that is immediate and direct and threatens severe harm\nThe ability of nation states to define cyberspace, cyber-attack, cyberwarfare\nunder their own terms creates an unstable and uncertain environment for responding to cyber threats\nmost national\nstrategies do not include what they consider to be a serious threat", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The fallback for attacks below Article 5 is Article 4 – that’s slow and impractical in a crisis.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "cyber-crime has served as the default mechanism in addressing cyber-attacks when there is a lack of clarity as to whether a\nevent arises to the level of an attack that amounts to\nwar\nthe 2007 Estonia attacks were viewed\nas an instance of cybercrime\nas opposed to cyber war due in part to the lack of clear attribution\nThe\nICJ\naddressed this issue\nsaying that the armed attack would be judged under the \"scale and effects\" test\nif the armed attack\nwould amount to an armed attack if a state has \"effective control\" of the non-state actors\nthat state will be held accountable for the attack\nonce a cyber-attack is determined to have risen to the level of an armed attack, the response\nmust be necessary, proportional, and attributive\nThe North Atlantic Council is required to hold consultations under Article 4\nwhich states that \"the parties will consult whenever\nthe territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any\nis threatened.\" Cyber warfare would activate NATO treaty Article 4, requiring NATO members to consult one another\nconsultation has raised serious concerns in international law as consultation may not be possible in an attack that is immediate and direct and threatens severe harm\nThe ability of nation states to define cyberspace, cyber-attack, cyberwarfare\nunder their own terms creates an unstable and uncertain environment for responding to cyber threats\nmost national\nstrategies do not include what they consider to be a serious threat", "role": "user" }, { "content": "default mechanism\nlack of clear attribution\nscale and effects\" test\nheld accountable\nnecessary\nproportional\nattributive\nrequired to hold consultations\nactivate NATO treaty Article 4\nmay not be possible\nimmediate\ndirect\nthreatens severe harm\nunstable\nuncertain environment", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The fallback for attacks below Article 5 is Article 4 – that’s slow and impractical in a crisis.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "cyber-crime has served as the default mechanism in addressing cyber-attacks when there is a lack of clarity as to whether a\nevent arises to the level of an attack that amounts to\nwar\nthe 2007 Estonia attacks were viewed\nas an instance of cybercrime\nas opposed to cyber war due in part to the lack of clear attribution\nThe\nICJ\naddressed this issue\nsaying that the armed attack would be judged under the \"scale and effects\" test\nif the armed attack\nwould amount to an armed attack if a state has \"effective control\" of the non-state actors\nthat state will be held accountable for the attack\nonce a cyber-attack is determined to have risen to the level of an armed attack, the response\nmust be necessary, proportional, and attributive\nThe North Atlantic Council is required to hold consultations under Article 4\nwhich states that \"the parties will consult whenever\nthe territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any\nis threatened.\" Cyber warfare would activate NATO treaty Article 4, requiring NATO members to consult one another\nconsultation has raised serious concerns in international law as consultation may not be possible in an attack that is immediate and direct and threatens severe harm\nThe ability of nation states to define cyberspace, cyber-attack, cyberwarfare\nunder their own terms creates an unstable and uncertain environment for responding to cyber threats\nmost national\nstrategies do not include what they consider to be a serious threat", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the\nEstonia attacks were viewed\nas\ncybercrime\nas opposed to cyber war\nunder the \"scale and effects\" test\nresponse\nmust be necessary, proportional, and attributive\nThe North Atlantic Council is required to hold consultations under Article 4\nCyber warfare would activate\nArticle 4, requiring NATO members to consult\nconsultation\nraised serious concerns\nas consultation may not be possible in an attack that is immediate\ndirect and threatens severe harm\nThe ability of nation states to define\nunder their own terms creates an\nuncertain environment", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Article IV only mandates consultation – so responses are slow, fragmented, and insufficient.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The research on national security strategies, national cyber security strategies and military or national defense cyber strategies has shown that there is not a common understanding among nations of an armed cyber-attack. Cyber-attack, cyber warfare, cyber-crimes and cyber espionage have different and conflicting meanings under national policies and cyber security strategies. Cyberwarfare does not merely change the \"weaponry\" of modern wars, but it represents a radical shift in the nature of the \"wartime battlefield\" requiring a reframing of our understanding of conventional kinetic warfare and the new realm of cyber warfare. To develop a framework for cyber warfare, there must first be an agreement among nations as to what constitutes a cyber-attack. This requires agreement on when a cyber-attack has occurred and the breadth and severity of damage that must occur to be characterized as a cyber-attack. The Tallinn Manual (Klimburg, 2012) has not discussed the prohibition of intervention below the armed conflict threshold thus, leaving open the question of acceptable responses to cyber-attacks. \nAll NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries (NATO, 2016). Consultation between member states is therefore at the heart of NATO since Allies are able to exchange views and information, and discuss issues prior to reaching agreement and taking action. As discussed in this article, though consultation is mandated under NATO article 4, consultation is not always possible or practicable if a threat is imminent and direct, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation (Nichols, 2008). If the international community is to avert serious loss of property and potential loss of life, there should be a governing framework to hold law-breaking nations accountable and help govern cyber weapons use. It may well be time for the international community to address cyber warfare and the evolving technology used as a weapon so that technology is used for the advancement of mankind, and not as a tool of destruction and devastation.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "research on national security strategies\nhas shown that there is not a common understanding among nations of an armed cyber-attack. Cyber-attack, cyber warfare, cyber-crimes and cyber espionage have\nconflicting meanings\nTo develop a framework for cyber warfare, there must first be an agreement\nas to what constitutes a cyber-attack. This requires agreement on when a cyber-attack has occurred and the breadth and severity of damage\nto be characterized as a cyber-attack. The Tallinn Manual\nhas not discussed\nintervention below the armed conflict threshold\nAll NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries\nConsultation between member states is\nat the heart of NATO since Allies are able to exchange views and information, and discuss issues\nthough consultation is mandated under NATO article 4, consultation is not always possible\nif a threat is imminent and direct, leaving no choice\nand no moment of deliberation\nIf the international community is to avert serious loss of property and\nlife, there should be a governing framework to hold law-breaking nations accountable\nIt may\nbe time for the international community to address cyber warfare", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Article IV only mandates consultation – so responses are slow, fragmented, and insufficient.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "research on national security strategies\nhas shown that there is not a common understanding among nations of an armed cyber-attack. Cyber-attack, cyber warfare, cyber-crimes and cyber espionage have\nconflicting meanings\nTo develop a framework for cyber warfare, there must first be an agreement\nas to what constitutes a cyber-attack. This requires agreement on when a cyber-attack has occurred and the breadth and severity of damage\nto be characterized as a cyber-attack. The Tallinn Manual\nhas not discussed\nintervention below the armed conflict threshold\nAll NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries\nConsultation between member states is\nat the heart of NATO since Allies are able to exchange views and information, and discuss issues\nthough consultation is mandated under NATO article 4, consultation is not always possible\nif a threat is imminent and direct, leaving no choice\nand no moment of deliberation\nIf the international community is to avert serious loss of property and\nlife, there should be a governing framework to hold law-breaking nations accountable\nIt may\nbe time for the international community to address cyber warfare", "role": "user" }, { "content": "not a common understanding\nframework for cyber warfare\nmust first be an agreement\nrequires agreement\nmade by consensus\nconsultation\nheart of NATO\nmandated under NATO article 4\nnot always possible\nno choice\nno moment of deliberation\navert serious loss of property\nlife\ngoverning framework", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Article IV only mandates consultation – so responses are slow, fragmented, and insufficient.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "research on national security strategies\nhas shown that there is not a common understanding among nations of an armed cyber-attack. Cyber-attack, cyber warfare, cyber-crimes and cyber espionage have\nconflicting meanings\nTo develop a framework for cyber warfare, there must first be an agreement\nas to what constitutes a cyber-attack. This requires agreement on when a cyber-attack has occurred and the breadth and severity of damage\nto be characterized as a cyber-attack. The Tallinn Manual\nhas not discussed\nintervention below the armed conflict threshold\nAll NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries\nConsultation between member states is\nat the heart of NATO since Allies are able to exchange views and information, and discuss issues\nthough consultation is mandated under NATO article 4, consultation is not always possible\nif a threat is imminent and direct, leaving no choice\nand no moment of deliberation\nIf the international community is to avert serious loss of property and\nlife, there should be a governing framework to hold law-breaking nations accountable\nIt may\nbe time for the international community to address cyber warfare", "role": "user" }, { "content": "there is not a common understanding\nof\narmed cyber-attack\nTo develop a framework\nthere must first be\nagreement\nConsultation\nis\nat the heart of NATO\nthough consultation is mandated under\narticle 4, consultation is not always possible\nif a threat is imminent and direct, leaving no choice\nand no moment of deliberation\nIf the international community is to avert\nloss of\nlife, there should be a governing framework", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Growth ensures planetary defense tech development – otherwise, extinction.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The commonalities between planetary defense and asteroid mining are extensive for the wide range of proximity operations. For both endeavors, hovering, orbiting, landing, and anchoring on the space body are essential competencies. The same base technologies that can be used to mine metals could be employed in burying a nuclear device to fragment an asteroid, or as a mass driver apparatus used in deflection. The technologies that could be employed to secure thrusters or a solar sail to a tumbling asteroid to change its orbit could be adapted to anchor a full suite of mining equipment to the surface of a resource-rich body.\nFrom initial detection to detailed characterization to operations on and around a NEO, the twin disciplines of planetary defense and asteroid mining share a host of common attributes. Because of this, advances in one field also will lead to advances in the other. Building a robust space mining industry and developing the technologies and techniques to conduct extended operations in a microgravity environment would yield tremendous benefits for future planetary defense operations. Likewise, advances in planetary defense-related detection, orbit calculation, characterization, and mitigation capabilities would provide a similar boost to the fledgling mining industry.\nA constructive path forward would see increased cooperation and collaboration between the planetary defense and asteroid mining communities, the former overseen primarily by governments and academia, and the latter spearheaded by the private sector. While collaboration currently exists, it is piecemeal and poorly resourced, with very limited government funding being used to develop collision mitigation technologies or kick-start the space mining industry. Considering the consequences of a major asteroid or comet strike, as well as the immense promise of commercial mining in space, a greater focus on this connectivity could be extremely beneficial to the long-term health, wealth, and survival of our species.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "commonalities between planetary defense and asteroid mining are extensive for\nproximity operations. For both endeavors, hovering, orbiting, landing, and anchoring on the space body are essential\nThe same base technologies that can be used to mine metals could be employed in burying a nuclear device to fragment an asteroid, or as a mass driver apparatus\nin deflection. The technologies that could\nsecure thrusters or a solar sail\nto change its orbit could be adapted to anchor a full suite of mining equipment to the surface of a resource-rich body\nFrom initial detection to detailed characterization to operations\naround a NEO\ntwin disciplines of planetary defense and asteroid mining share a host of common attributes\nadvances in one field also will lead to advances in the other. Building a robust space mining industry and developing the technologies and techniques to conduct extended operations\nwould yield tremendous benefits for future planetary defense operations\nadvances in planetary defense-related detection, orbit calculation, characterization, and mitigation capabilities would provide a similar boost to the fledgling mining industry.\nA constructive path forward would see increased cooperation\nbetween the planetary defense and asteroid mining communities\nthe latter spearheaded by the private sector.\nConsidering the consequences of a major asteroid or comet strike, as well as the immense promise of commercial mining\na greater focus on this connectivity could be extremely beneficial to\nlong-term health, wealth, and survival of our species", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Growth ensures planetary defense tech development – otherwise, extinction.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "commonalities between planetary defense and asteroid mining are extensive for\nproximity operations. For both endeavors, hovering, orbiting, landing, and anchoring on the space body are essential\nThe same base technologies that can be used to mine metals could be employed in burying a nuclear device to fragment an asteroid, or as a mass driver apparatus\nin deflection. The technologies that could\nsecure thrusters or a solar sail\nto change its orbit could be adapted to anchor a full suite of mining equipment to the surface of a resource-rich body\nFrom initial detection to detailed characterization to operations\naround a NEO\ntwin disciplines of planetary defense and asteroid mining share a host of common attributes\nadvances in one field also will lead to advances in the other. Building a robust space mining industry and developing the technologies and techniques to conduct extended operations\nwould yield tremendous benefits for future planetary defense operations\nadvances in planetary defense-related detection, orbit calculation, characterization, and mitigation capabilities would provide a similar boost to the fledgling mining industry.\nA constructive path forward would see increased cooperation\nbetween the planetary defense and asteroid mining communities\nthe latter spearheaded by the private sector.\nConsidering the consequences of a major asteroid or comet strike, as well as the immense promise of commercial mining\na greater focus on this connectivity could be extremely beneficial to\nlong-term health, wealth, and survival of our species", "role": "user" }, { "content": "planetary defense\nasteroid mining\nhovering\norbiting\nlanding\nanchoring\nmine metals\nburying a nuclear device\ndeflection\nsecure thrusters\nsolar sail\nsuite of mining equipment\ninitial detection\ndetailed characterization\ntwin disciplines\nlead to advances\nrobust space mining industry\nyield tremendous benefits\nplanetary defense-related detection\nplanetary defense\nasteroid mining\nspearheaded by the private sector.\nmajor asteroid\ncomet strike\nsurvival of our species", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Growth ensures planetary defense tech development – otherwise, extinction.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "commonalities between planetary defense and asteroid mining are extensive for\nproximity operations. For both endeavors, hovering, orbiting, landing, and anchoring on the space body are essential\nThe same base technologies that can be used to mine metals could be employed in burying a nuclear device to fragment an asteroid, or as a mass driver apparatus\nin deflection. The technologies that could\nsecure thrusters or a solar sail\nto change its orbit could be adapted to anchor a full suite of mining equipment to the surface of a resource-rich body\nFrom initial detection to detailed characterization to operations\naround a NEO\ntwin disciplines of planetary defense and asteroid mining share a host of common attributes\nadvances in one field also will lead to advances in the other. Building a robust space mining industry and developing the technologies and techniques to conduct extended operations\nwould yield tremendous benefits for future planetary defense operations\nadvances in planetary defense-related detection, orbit calculation, characterization, and mitigation capabilities would provide a similar boost to the fledgling mining industry.\nA constructive path forward would see increased cooperation\nbetween the planetary defense and asteroid mining communities\nthe latter spearheaded by the private sector.\nConsidering the consequences of a major asteroid or comet strike, as well as the immense promise of commercial mining\na greater focus on this connectivity could be extremely beneficial to\nlong-term health, wealth, and survival of our species", "role": "user" }, { "content": "commonalities between planetary defense and\nmining are extensive\nhovering, orbiting, landing\nanchoring\nare essential\nThe same\ntechnologies\nused to mine metals could be\nburying a nuclear device\nin deflection\nsecure thrusters\nto change its orbit\nplanetary defense and asteroid mining share\ncommon attributes\nadvances in one\nlead to advances in the other.\nspace mining\nyield tremendous benefits for\nplanetary defense\nA\npath forward would see\nmining\nspearheaded by the private sector\nConsidering\na major asteroid\ngreater focus\ncould be\nbeneficial to\nsurvival of our species", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Courts agree – ‘enact’ and ‘promulgate’ are synonymous.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "33. It should be noted that even before Mead was enacted, courts examined the scope of the enabling legislation. For example, in Pinney v. NTSB, 993 F.2d 201, 203 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit noted that \"Congress has given the FAA general authority to enact regulations necessary to provide adequately for safety in air commerce\" and then determined that the challenged regulation \"was within the FAA's jurisdictional grant if there is a reasonable relationship between a conviction for violating a drug law and flight safety.\" See also Communities for a Better Env. v. Cal. Resources Agency, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 441, 448 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2002) (\"The question is whether the regulation alters or amends the governing statute or case law, or enlarges or impairs its scope. In short, the question is whether the regulation is within the scope of the authority conferred; if it is not, it is void.\"); Henning v. Div. of Occupational Safety & Health, 268 Cal. Rptr. 476, 482 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1990) (holding that courts \"must first look to the law governing the agency promulgating the regulation . . . to decide whether the [agency] reasonably interpreted [its] legislative mandate\") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Quincy v. Mass. Water Resources Auth., 658 N.E.2d 145, 148 (Mass. 1995) (\"[A] regulation that is irreconcilable with an agency's enabling legislation cannot stand.\").", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the Tenth Circuit noted that \"Congress has given the FAA general authority to enact regulations necessary to provide adequately for safety in air commerce\" and\ndetermined that the challenged regulation \"was within the FAA's jurisdictional grant\nthe question is whether the regulation is within the scope of the authority conferred\ncourts \"must\nlook to the law governing the agency promulgating the regulation\nto decide whether the [agency] reasonably interpreted [its] legislative mandate", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Courts agree – ‘enact’ and ‘promulgate’ are synonymous.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the Tenth Circuit noted that \"Congress has given the FAA general authority to enact regulations necessary to provide adequately for safety in air commerce\" and\ndetermined that the challenged regulation \"was within the FAA's jurisdictional grant\nthe question is whether the regulation is within the scope of the authority conferred\ncourts \"must\nlook to the law governing the agency promulgating the regulation\nto decide whether the [agency] reasonably interpreted [its] legislative mandate", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Congress has given the FAA general authority to enact regulations necessary to provide\nsafety in air commerce\ncourts \"must\nlook to the law governing the agency promulgating the regulation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Agencies can enact quasi-legislative regulations.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Administrative law often suffers from its nomenclature. Because agency action can be roughly analogized to adjudication, legislation, and enforcement, the tendency has been to force into agency procedures the features found by the \"real\" adjudicators, legislators, and prosecutors, namely, courts, legislatures, and prosecutors. But there has always been an aversion to equating agency action completely with the action of its constitutionally recognized cousin because of crucial differences between the two. Thus, for example, when agencies enact regulations, judges describe the result as \"quasi-legislative,\"1 in reaction to the fact that regulations in most respects look like legislation, but would flatly violate the Constitution if courts said so.2 Similarly, the Administrative Procedure Act labels as 'Judges\" many agency personnel who initially impose agency policy on individual parties' even though they lack the institutional independence and tenure and salary protections that have come to be seen as the defining characteristics of federal 'Judges.\"4", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Because agency action can be\nanalogized to adjudication, legislation, and enforcement, the tendency has been to force into agency procedures the features found by\nadjudicators\n when agencies enact regulations, judges describe the result as \"quasi-legislative,\"\nin reaction to the fact that regulations\nlook like legislation, but would\nviolate the Constitution if courts said so.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Agencies can enact quasi-legislative regulations.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Because agency action can be\nanalogized to adjudication, legislation, and enforcement, the tendency has been to force into agency procedures the features found by\nadjudicators\n when agencies enact regulations, judges describe the result as \"quasi-legislative,\"\nin reaction to the fact that regulations\nlook like legislation, but would\nviolate the Constitution if courts said so.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "adjudication\nlegislation\nenforcement\nwhen agencies enact regulations\nquasi-legislative\nlook like legislation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Agencies can enact quasi-legislative regulations.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Because agency action can be\nanalogized to adjudication, legislation, and enforcement, the tendency has been to force into agency procedures the features found by\nadjudicators\n when agencies enact regulations, judges describe the result as \"quasi-legislative,\"\nin reaction to the fact that regulations\nlook like legislation, but would\nviolate the Constitution if courts said so.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Because agency action can be\nanalogized to adjudication, legislation, and enforcement\nwhen agencies enact regulations, judges describe the result as \"quasi-legislative\nregulations\nlook like legislation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The APA authorizes agencies to enact rules.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In 1947, Congress adopted the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), which governs the process by which administrative agencies create and enact laws. The Act was implemented in order to ensure that the public has adequate notice of proposed laws, that there is an opportunity to comment on the proposed law, and that there are clear standards for agency rulemaking. The APA also specifies when courts may review and nullify administrative agency rules and provides standards for any administrative hearings that are conducted.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "In 1947, Congress adopted the\nAPA\nwhich governs the process by which administrative agencies create and enact laws. The Act was implemented\nto ensure that the public has adequate notice\nthat there is an opportunity to comment\nand that there are clear standards for agency rulemaking", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The APA authorizes agencies to enact rules.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In 1947, Congress adopted the\nAPA\nwhich governs the process by which administrative agencies create and enact laws. The Act was implemented\nto ensure that the public has adequate notice\nthat there is an opportunity to comment\nand that there are clear standards for agency rulemaking", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the\nAPA\ngoverns the process by which administrative agencies\nenact laws\nthere are clear standards for agency rulemaking", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Rules can be enacted through notice and comment.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "There are two versions of the rulemaking process: what textbooks describe (and what scholars typically study) and what happens in practice. In the former, regulations (or rules)16 are enacted through relatively simple notice-and-comment procedures. After internal agency planning and subsequent review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a unit of the Office of Management and Budget, an executive agency formally starts the public rulemaking process by publishing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register and by providing a public docket of supporting materials. The NPRM commences a public comment period, usually sixty days but sometimes shorter, during which time interested persons can submit their reactions in written form to the agency. The agency examines the comments and evaluates what changes to make to the proposed regulation. The final rule, which is also reviewed by OIRA and then published in the Federal Register, must be a “logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule.17 In most cases, the final rule does not take effect for thirty days—or for sixty days, if the rule is classified as major.18", "role": "user" }, { "content": "regulations (or rules)\nare enacted through\nsimple notice-and-comment procedures\nAfter internal agency planning and subsequent review\nan executive agency formally starts the public rulemaking process by publishing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register\nThe NPRM commences a public comment period\nduring which time interested persons can submit\nreactions", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Rules can be enacted through notice and comment.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "regulations (or rules)\nare enacted through\nsimple notice-and-comment procedures\nAfter internal agency planning and subsequent review\nan executive agency formally starts the public rulemaking process by publishing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register\nThe NPRM commences a public comment period\nduring which time interested persons can submit\nreactions", "role": "user" }, { "content": "regulations\nare enacted\nnotice-and-comment\nexecutive agency\npublic rulemaking process\npublic comment period", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Rules can be enacted through notice and comment.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "regulations (or rules)\nare enacted through\nsimple notice-and-comment procedures\nAfter internal agency planning and subsequent review\nan executive agency formally starts the public rulemaking process by publishing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register\nThe NPRM commences a public comment period\nduring which time interested persons can submit\nreactions", "role": "user" }, { "content": "regulations\nare enacted through\nnotice-and-comment procedures\nan executive agency formally starts\npublic rulemaking\nby publishing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking\nThe NPRM commences a public comment period", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: An ‘enacted’ rule is published in the Federal Register.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Unlike the amorphous commencement of the rulemaking process, at least in its nonpublic form, the enactment of a rule is easier to identify. Each agency publishes its final rules or actions in the Federal Register to take effect usually thirty or sixty days later and reports those dates in the Unified Agenda.110 Figure 6 charts final actions by cabinet departments, executive agencies, and independent agencies from 1983 to 2009. Figure 7 displays the number of such actions for the Department of Commerce, Department of the Interior, EPA, and FCC.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Unlike the amorphous commencement of the rulemaking process\nthe enactment of a rule is easier to identify. Each agency publishes its final rules\nin the Federal Register to take effect usually thirty or sixty days later", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: An ‘enacted’ rule is published in the Federal Register.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Unlike the amorphous commencement of the rulemaking process\nthe enactment of a rule is easier to identify. Each agency publishes its final rules\nin the Federal Register to take effect usually thirty or sixty days later", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Unlike\namorphous commencement\nthe enactment of a rule is easier to identify. Each agency publishes its final rules\nsixty days later", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Auer allows agencies to enact regulations.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "To see the wide range of cases to which Auer is relevant,11 consider the following:12\n1. The facts of Auer itself: An agency must decide whether police captains and sergeants are eligible for overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The statute contains an exemption from overtime for \"executive, administrative, or professional\" employees.' Binding regulations, enacted with notice and comment, say that such employees must be paid on a \"salary basis,\" the antonym of piecework. The regulations further say that if pay is \"subject to\" being adjusted for quality, it is an indicator of piecework. The problem then becomes this: police captains might have their pay docked if, after internal affairs proceedings, they are found to have committed disciplinary infractions, such as maltreating a suspect. 4 Does that possibility make them \"subject to\" adjustment for quality of work? What if the captains were never actually fined, but could be? How should the agency interpret the \"subject to\" language in the regulation?\n– Footnote 11 –\n11 Here and throughout, we assume that the agency's interpretation of its own legislative regulation either was enacted through notice-and-comment procedures in its own right, or else falls within a valid exception to notice-and-comment rulemaking under § 553(b)(3)(A) or (B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (the exceptions for interpretive rules, procedural rules, general statements of policy, or legislative rules as to which there is \"good cause\" for dispensing with notice and comment). 5 USC § 553(b)(3)(A)-(B). We thereby bracket and set aside any claim that the agency's interpretation was procedurally defective; our focus is strictly on the substantive validity of the interpretation. Although Chevron deference to agency interpretation of statutes is partly tied to the procedures agencies use to enact their interpretations, see United States v Mead Corp, 533 US 218, 229-30 (2001), in the Auer setting the law rejects that approach. Indeed, agencies may receive deference even for interpretations set forth in appellate briefs. See, for example, Talk America, Inc v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 564 US 50, 59 (2011).", "role": "user" }, { "content": "To see the\nrange of cases to which Auer is relevant,11 consider the following\nThe facts of Auer itself: An agency must decide whether\ncaptains and sergeants are eligible for overtime\nBinding regulations, enacted with notice and comment, say\nemployees must be paid on a \"salary basis,\" the antonym of piecework\n– Footnote 11 –\nwe assume that the agency's interpretation of its\nlegislative regulation\nwas enacted through notice-and-comment procedures\nAlthough Chevron deference to agency interpretation of statutes is partly tied to the procedures agencies use to enact\ninterpretations\nin\nAuer\nthe law rejects that approach", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Auer allows agencies to enact regulations.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "To see the\nrange of cases to which Auer is relevant,11 consider the following\nThe facts of Auer itself: An agency must decide whether\ncaptains and sergeants are eligible for overtime\nBinding regulations, enacted with notice and comment, say\nemployees must be paid on a \"salary basis,\" the antonym of piecework\n– Footnote 11 –\nwe assume that the agency's interpretation of its\nlegislative regulation\nwas enacted through notice-and-comment procedures\nAlthough Chevron deference to agency interpretation of statutes is partly tied to the procedures agencies use to enact\ninterpretations\nin\nAuer\nthe law rejects that approach", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Auer is relevant,11\nenacted\n– Footnote 11 –\nenacted through notice-and-comment procedures\nChevron deference\nenact\ninterpretations", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Auer allows agencies to enact regulations.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "To see the\nrange of cases to which Auer is relevant,11 consider the following\nThe facts of Auer itself: An agency must decide whether\ncaptains and sergeants are eligible for overtime\nBinding regulations, enacted with notice and comment, say\nemployees must be paid on a \"salary basis,\" the antonym of piecework\n– Footnote 11 –\nwe assume that the agency's interpretation of its\nlegislative regulation\nwas enacted through notice-and-comment procedures\nAlthough Chevron deference to agency interpretation of statutes is partly tied to the procedures agencies use to enact\ninterpretations\nin\nAuer\nthe law rejects that approach", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Binding regulations, enacted with notice and comment, say\nemployees must be paid on a \"salary basis,\"\nwe assume that the agency's interpretation\nwas enacted through notice-and-comment procedures\nChevron deference\nis\ntied to the procedures agencies use to enact\ninterpretations", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Scalia agrees.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Deferring to an agency’s interpretation of a statute does not encourage Congress, out of a desire to expand its power, to enact vague statutes; the vagueness effectively cedes power to the Executive. By contrast, deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases. This frustrates the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary government. The seeming inappropriateness of Auer deference is especially evident in cases such as these, involving an agency that has repeatedly been rebuked in its attempts to expand the statute beyond its text, and has repeatedly sought new means to the same ends.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Deferring to an agency’s interpretation\ndoes not encourage Congress\nto enact vague statutes\nvagueness\ncedes power to the Executive.\ndeferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Scalia agrees.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Deferring to an agency’s interpretation\ndoes not encourage Congress\nto enact vague statutes\nvagueness\ncedes power to the Executive.\ndeferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "deferring to an agency’s interpretation\nencourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it\npower", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Agencies can enact both legislative and interpretative regulations.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Once it is determined that an agency has the authority to enact regulations that have the force of law (or \"legislative regulations\"), courts may then begin a Chevron analysis. 55 Under Chevron, courts must determine whether the legislature has directly spoken to the specific issue in question or left a \"gap\" for the agency to fill. 56 This is accomplished by examining the plain language of the authorizing statute (the statute that arguably gives the agency the power to regulate on the specific issue in question) and the legislature's intent behind enacting the authorizing statute. 58\n– Footnote 55 –\n55. Again, if the agency has the authority to enact only interpretative regulations, only Skidmore deference is available. See Packard v. Pitt. Transp. Co., 418 F.3d 246, 253 (3d Cir. 2005).", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Once it is determined\nan agency has the authority to enact regulations that have the force of law (or \"legislative regulations\"), courts may\nbegin a Chevron analysis\nUnder Chevron, courts must determine whether the legislature has directly spoken to the\nissue in question\nThis is accomplished by examining the plain language of the authorizing statute\n– Footnote 55 –\nif the agency has the authority to enact only interpretative regulations, only Skidmore deference is available", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Agencies can enact both legislative and interpretative regulations.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Once it is determined\nan agency has the authority to enact regulations that have the force of law (or \"legislative regulations\"), courts may\nbegin a Chevron analysis\nUnder Chevron, courts must determine whether the legislature has directly spoken to the\nissue in question\nThis is accomplished by examining the plain language of the authorizing statute\n– Footnote 55 –\nif the agency has the authority to enact only interpretative regulations, only Skidmore deference is available", "role": "user" }, { "content": "enact regulations\nlegislative regulations\nChevron analysis\n– Footnote 55 –\nenact only interpretative regulations\nSkidmore deference", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Agencies can enact both legislative and interpretative regulations.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Once it is determined\nan agency has the authority to enact regulations that have the force of law (or \"legislative regulations\"), courts may\nbegin a Chevron analysis\nUnder Chevron, courts must determine whether the legislature has directly spoken to the\nissue in question\nThis is accomplished by examining the plain language of the authorizing statute\n– Footnote 55 –\nif the agency has the authority to enact only interpretative regulations, only Skidmore deference is available", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Once it is determined\nan agency has the authority to enact regulations that have\nforce of law (or \"legislative regulations\"), courts may\nbegin a Chevron analysis\nif the agency has the authority to enact only interpretative regulations, only Skidmore\nis available", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Agencies can enact administrative rules.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "While bureaucrats writing regulations may seem like a violation of the separation of powers fundamental to the American government, federal agencies may enact rules solely within the statutory authority granted to them by Congress. These administrative laws allow regular citizens to have a greater influence on regulations that could directly impact them. Citizens are given opportunities to propose rule language and comment on language agencies propose. Citizen involvement tends to produce better public policy outcomes than what Congress would produce.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "federal agencies may enact rules solely within the statutory authority granted to them by Congress. These administrative laws allow\ncitizens to have a greater influence on regulations that could\nimpact them. Citizens are given opportunities to propose rule language and comment on language agencies propose.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Agencies can enact administrative rules.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "federal agencies may enact rules solely within the statutory authority granted to them by Congress. These administrative laws allow\ncitizens to have a greater influence on regulations that could\nimpact them. Citizens are given opportunities to propose rule language and comment on language agencies propose.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "agencies may enact rules\nwithin the statutory authority granted to them by Congress. These administrative laws allow\ncitizens to have a\ninfluence", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Specifically, agencies can enact criminal provisions.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "69. An interesting delegation question is whether the legislature can grant an administrative agency the power to enact criminal provisions. Congress can clearly grant an agency rule-making power and then declare that any violation of the resulting rules constitutes a crime. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944); 49 U.S.C. ? 11914 (1982) (violations of Interstate Commerce Commission regulation). The remaining question is whether Congress could grant the agency the power to decide whether its regulation should be enforced by a criminal penalty and to set the level of the penalty. This may seem objectionable, but one must remember that all the Constitution's protections regarding criminal procedure and punishment would continue to apply; accused persons would still be entitled to a jury trial to determine whether they had violated the regulation, and the agency-imposed sanction would still be tested against eighth amendment standards. Even if one concludes that agency enactment of criminal rules is unconstitutional, however, that conclusion would presumably be based on the special features of the criminal sanction. The delegation doctrine, by itself, cannot generate the distinction between civil and criminal statutes. All it says is that the legislature's ability to delegate \"its\" power is limited, and civil jurisdiction is as much a part of that power as criminal jurisdiction. In fact, the assertion that all legislation represents a delegation of the legislative power only obscures the real question about criminal rules. That question is whether the legislature, despite its general power to legislate, may not grant certain kinds of power to administrative agencies.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "An interesting delegation question is whether the legislature can grant an administrative agency the power to enact criminal provisions.\nThe\nquestion is whether Congress could grant the agency the power to decide whether its regulation should be enforced by a criminal penalty and\nset the level of the penalty\nall the Constitution's protections regarding criminal procedure\nwould continue to apply\nEven if one concludes that agency enactment of criminal rules is unconstitutional\nthat conclusion would\nbe based on the special features of the criminal sanction. The delegation doctrine, by itself, cannot generate the distinction between civil and criminal statutes", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Specifically, agencies can enact criminal provisions.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "An interesting delegation question is whether the legislature can grant an administrative agency the power to enact criminal provisions.\nThe\nquestion is whether Congress could grant the agency the power to decide whether its regulation should be enforced by a criminal penalty and\nset the level of the penalty\nall the Constitution's protections regarding criminal procedure\nwould continue to apply\nEven if one concludes that agency enactment of criminal rules is unconstitutional\nthat conclusion would\nbe based on the special features of the criminal sanction. The delegation doctrine, by itself, cannot generate the distinction between civil and criminal statutes", "role": "user" }, { "content": "administrative agency\nenact criminal provisions\nenforced\ncriminal penalty\nagency enactment\nspecial features\ncannot generate the distinction", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Specifically, agencies can enact criminal provisions.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "An interesting delegation question is whether the legislature can grant an administrative agency the power to enact criminal provisions.\nThe\nquestion is whether Congress could grant the agency the power to decide whether its regulation should be enforced by a criminal penalty and\nset the level of the penalty\nall the Constitution's protections regarding criminal procedure\nwould continue to apply\nEven if one concludes that agency enactment of criminal rules is unconstitutional\nthat conclusion would\nbe based on the special features of the criminal sanction. The delegation doctrine, by itself, cannot generate the distinction between civil and criminal statutes", "role": "user" }, { "content": "An interesting\nquestion is whether the legislature can grant an\nagency the power to enact criminal provisions\nEven if one concludes\nagency enactment\nis unconstitutional\nthat\nwould\nbe based on the special features of the criminal sanction. The delegation doctrine\ncannot generate the distinction between civil and criminal statutes", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Chevron conferred upon agencies the power to ‘enact’ regulations.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Even before Chevron, courts have held that ambiguous statutes are proper subjects for interpretative regulations. 64 Since Chevron, courts have consistently held that general grants of power to regulate certain topics give agencies wide authority to enact regulations. This is especially true \"[w]hen the [1]egislature delegates to an administrative agency a broad grant of authority to implement a program of reform or social welfare . . . .\"66 However, even broad grants of authority are not limitless. Instead, such authority may \"be exercised only within fixed boundaries . . . [because] the agency's regulations must be consistent, not in conflict with the statute, and reasonably necessary to effectuate its purpose.\" 67", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Even before Chevron, courts have held\nambiguous statutes are\nsubjects for interpretative regulations\nSince Chevron, courts have consistently held that general grants of power\ngive agencies wide authority to enact regulations.\nthe agency's regulations must be consistent\nwith the statute, and\nnecessary to effectuate its purpose", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Chevron conferred upon agencies the power to ‘enact’ regulations.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Even before Chevron, courts have held\nambiguous statutes are\nsubjects for interpretative regulations\nSince Chevron, courts have consistently held that general grants of power\ngive agencies wide authority to enact regulations.\nthe agency's regulations must be consistent\nwith the statute, and\nnecessary to effectuate its purpose", "role": "user" }, { "content": "statutes are\nsubjects for interpretative regulations\nSince Chevron, courts have consistently held that general grants of power\ngive agencies wide authority to enact regulations.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: That solves Eastern Mediterranean instability.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Biden administration should leverage the flowering of US-Greece relations to promote stability and strengthen its influence in the region. It should aim to ensure Greece’s strategic role as a net security provider in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans as it works with its partners and allies to address regional instability. This should involve making greater use of reliably available and strategically important military facilities in Greece, continuing US investment in Souda Bay, and increasing military financing to Greece, including through the enhancement of international military education and training (IMET), to further strengthen bilateral military cooperation.\nAt the same time, the United States should continue its high-level engagement to encourage the creation of an inclusive regional security system in the Eastern Mediterranean. Further deepening and expanding the security and energy partnerships in the region would be a key step in that direction. The development of the Israel-Greece-Cyprus trilateral partnership in particular could be strengthened through continuous, high-level US engagement and the creation of the United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center as envisioned in the East Med Act. Similar initiatives to deepen existing defense cooperation should be developed.\nThe Biden administration should also expand Greece’s contribution to the energy security of Southeastern Europe through technology-sharing and investments that support Greece’s transition to green energy, while promoting infrastructure projects that bring new suppliers of energy to the region—including Eastern Mediterranean gas and American LNG. The United States should also support calls for Greece to join the Three Seas Initiative, which would link the Aegean to the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas, further integrating and strengthening energy and other supply networks in Eastern Europe. \nThe United States should continue to cultivate Greece as a key ally in its efforts to integrate Southeastern Europe with the EU and counter malign influence of foreign powers in the wider region. That should include financing support from the US International Development Finance Corporation to boost strategically important infrastructure projects, encouragement of US investment in the digital sector, and initiatives to promote transparency and awareness regarding disinformation in Greece’s open and diverse media and social-media landscape.\nThe United States should also work with Greece to address regional challenges by supporting peaceful, neighborly relations with Turkey. The Biden administration should back efforts to resolve the maritime dispute between Greece and Turkey on the basis of international law. It should continue to support dialogue with Turkey and urge the two sides to resort to international arbitration should they fail to settle their dispute through that process. Such an approach is crucial to resolving tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean while also improving the climate surrounding the Cyprus negotiations. By tackling one of the recurring points of tension in Turkey’s relations with the EU and within NATO, it would also help establish the conditions for the transatlantic community to find common ground with Ankara on addressing immigration and security issues and securing Western interests in the region.\nEven as Biden welcomes the latest United Nations-led effort to resume negotiations on Cyprus and the start of exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey, he should not push for a settlement to the Cyprus issue or a resolution of the Greek-Turkish maritime dispute that undermines international law or rewards Turkey’s revisionist policy. Rather than facilitate a grand bargain with Turkey, this approach would potentially undermine political stability in Greece by unleashing a nationalist backlash in the country. As was the case during the financial and migration crises, such a development would have wider regional repercussions as well, further igniting tensions within NATO. It would also strain US relations with Greece while further emboldening Turkey to satisfy its revisionist aspirations.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The Biden administration should leverage\nflowering of US-Greece relations to promote stability and strengthen its influence in the region. It should aim to ensure Greece’s strategic role as a net security provider in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans as it works with its partners and allies to address regional instability. This should involve making greater use of\nmilitary facilities in Greece\nand increasing military financing to Greece\nto further strengthen bilateral military cooperation\nthe United States should continue its high-level engagement to encourage the creation of an inclusive regional security system in the Eastern Mediterranean. Further deepening and expanding the security and energy partnerships in the region would be a key step\nThe development of the Israel-Greece-Cyprus trilateral partnership in particular could be strengthened through\nhigh-level US engagement\nBiden\nshould also expand Greece’s contribution to the energy security of Southeastern Europe through technology-sharing\nwhile promoting infrastructure\nThe United States should\ncultivate Greece as a key ally in its efforts to integrate Southeastern Europe with the EU and counter malign\nforeign powers\nThat should include financing support from the US International Development Finance Corporation\nencouragement of US investment\nand initiatives to promote transparency and awareness regarding disinformation in Greece’s\nmedia\nThe United States should\nwork with Greece to address regional challenges by supporting peaceful, neighborly relations with Turkey. The Biden administration should back efforts to resolve the maritime dispute between Greece and Turkey on the basis of international law. It should\nsupport dialogue with Turkey and urge the two sides to resort to international arbitration should they fail to settle their dispute through that process. Such an approach is crucial to resolving tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean while also improving the climate surrounding the Cyprus negotiations. By tackling\nrecurring points of tension in Turkey’s relations with the EU and within NATO, it would\nestablish the conditions for the transatlantic community to find common ground with Ankara on\nimmigration and security\nand securing Western interests in the region\nBiden\nshould not push for a settlement to the Cyprus issue or a resolution of the Greek-Turkish maritime dispute that undermines international law or rewards Turkey’s revisionist policy. Rather than facilitate a grand bargain with Turkey, this approach would\nundermine political stability in Greece by unleashing a nationalist backlash in the country\nsuch a development would have wider regional repercussions as well, further igniting tensions within NATO. It would\nstrain US relations with Greece while further emboldening Turkey", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: That solves Eastern Mediterranean instability.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Biden administration should leverage\nflowering of US-Greece relations to promote stability and strengthen its influence in the region. It should aim to ensure Greece’s strategic role as a net security provider in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans as it works with its partners and allies to address regional instability. This should involve making greater use of\nmilitary facilities in Greece\nand increasing military financing to Greece\nto further strengthen bilateral military cooperation\nthe United States should continue its high-level engagement to encourage the creation of an inclusive regional security system in the Eastern Mediterranean. Further deepening and expanding the security and energy partnerships in the region would be a key step\nThe development of the Israel-Greece-Cyprus trilateral partnership in particular could be strengthened through\nhigh-level US engagement\nBiden\nshould also expand Greece’s contribution to the energy security of Southeastern Europe through technology-sharing\nwhile promoting infrastructure\nThe United States should\ncultivate Greece as a key ally in its efforts to integrate Southeastern Europe with the EU and counter malign\nforeign powers\nThat should include financing support from the US International Development Finance Corporation\nencouragement of US investment\nand initiatives to promote transparency and awareness regarding disinformation in Greece’s\nmedia\nThe United States should\nwork with Greece to address regional challenges by supporting peaceful, neighborly relations with Turkey. The Biden administration should back efforts to resolve the maritime dispute between Greece and Turkey on the basis of international law. It should\nsupport dialogue with Turkey and urge the two sides to resort to international arbitration should they fail to settle their dispute through that process. Such an approach is crucial to resolving tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean while also improving the climate surrounding the Cyprus negotiations. By tackling\nrecurring points of tension in Turkey’s relations with the EU and within NATO, it would\nestablish the conditions for the transatlantic community to find common ground with Ankara on\nimmigration and security\nand securing Western interests in the region\nBiden\nshould not push for a settlement to the Cyprus issue or a resolution of the Greek-Turkish maritime dispute that undermines international law or rewards Turkey’s revisionist policy. Rather than facilitate a grand bargain with Turkey, this approach would\nundermine political stability in Greece by unleashing a nationalist backlash in the country\nsuch a development would have wider regional repercussions as well, further igniting tensions within NATO. It would\nstrain US relations with Greece while further emboldening Turkey", "role": "user" }, { "content": "flowering of US-Greece relations\npromote stability\nstrengthen its influence\nnet security provider\nstrengthen bilateral military cooperation\ncontinue its high-level engagement\ninclusive regional security system\nsecurity\nenergy partnerships\nenergy security\nkey ally\nintegrate Southeastern Europe\nmalign\nforeign powers\npeaceful, neighborly relations\nsupport dialogue\ninternational arbitration\nresolving tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean\nCyprus negotiations\ncommon ground\nsecuring Western interests\nundermines international law\nrevisionist policy\nundermine political stability\nunleashing a nationalist backlash\nigniting tensions within NATO\nfurther emboldening Turkey", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: That solves Eastern Mediterranean instability.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Biden administration should leverage\nflowering of US-Greece relations to promote stability and strengthen its influence in the region. It should aim to ensure Greece’s strategic role as a net security provider in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans as it works with its partners and allies to address regional instability. This should involve making greater use of\nmilitary facilities in Greece\nand increasing military financing to Greece\nto further strengthen bilateral military cooperation\nthe United States should continue its high-level engagement to encourage the creation of an inclusive regional security system in the Eastern Mediterranean. Further deepening and expanding the security and energy partnerships in the region would be a key step\nThe development of the Israel-Greece-Cyprus trilateral partnership in particular could be strengthened through\nhigh-level US engagement\nBiden\nshould also expand Greece’s contribution to the energy security of Southeastern Europe through technology-sharing\nwhile promoting infrastructure\nThe United States should\ncultivate Greece as a key ally in its efforts to integrate Southeastern Europe with the EU and counter malign\nforeign powers\nThat should include financing support from the US International Development Finance Corporation\nencouragement of US investment\nand initiatives to promote transparency and awareness regarding disinformation in Greece’s\nmedia\nThe United States should\nwork with Greece to address regional challenges by supporting peaceful, neighborly relations with Turkey. The Biden administration should back efforts to resolve the maritime dispute between Greece and Turkey on the basis of international law. It should\nsupport dialogue with Turkey and urge the two sides to resort to international arbitration should they fail to settle their dispute through that process. Such an approach is crucial to resolving tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean while also improving the climate surrounding the Cyprus negotiations. By tackling\nrecurring points of tension in Turkey’s relations with the EU and within NATO, it would\nestablish the conditions for the transatlantic community to find common ground with Ankara on\nimmigration and security\nand securing Western interests in the region\nBiden\nshould not push for a settlement to the Cyprus issue or a resolution of the Greek-Turkish maritime dispute that undermines international law or rewards Turkey’s revisionist policy. Rather than facilitate a grand bargain with Turkey, this approach would\nundermine political stability in Greece by unleashing a nationalist backlash in the country\nsuch a development would have wider regional repercussions as well, further igniting tensions within NATO. It would\nstrain US relations with Greece while further emboldening Turkey", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Biden\nshould leverage\nflowering\nUS-Greece relations to promote stability and strengthen\ninfluence\nThis should\nstrengthen bilateral military cooperation\nthe U\nS\nshould\nencourage\nan inclusive regional security system\nwork with Greece to\nsupport\npeaceful, neighborly relations with Turkey\nIt should\nsupport dialogue\nand\ninternational arbitration should\ncrucial to resolving tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean while\nsecuring Western interests\nshould not push for a settlement\nthat undermines international law or rewards Turkey’\nthis\nwould\nundermine\nstability", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Withdrawing security commitments undermines effective engagement – turns the case.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "After recovering from its debt crisis, Greece has emerged as a key US ally in that effort. The Biden administration will find in Greece a like-minded ally with strong democratic credentials. Greece’s unwavering commitment to NATO and its constructive engagement within the European Union (EU), multilateral organizations, and an increasing nexus of regional alliances makes it irreplaceable for achieving progress on transatlantic cooperation. Within the framework of its strategic commitment to the EU and NATO, Greece has promoted Euro-Atlantic institutions in the Western Balkans and strengthened regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.\nThe United States should deepen its strategic engagement with Greece in order to jointly address the challenges that competition among global and regional powers poses for the stability and future direction of Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. Among these profound challenges is Turkey’s authoritarian turn and revisionist foreign policy, which undermine both Greek sovereignty and the Western alliance.\nThe United States still remains the indispensable country. Its allies are waiting for it to take the lead.\nStabilizing the Eastern Mediterranean\nThe US withdrawal from the Middle East, accelerated under the Trump presidency, has left a power vacuum. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the conflicts in Syria and Libya have turned into proxy wars and have exported mass migration and instability to the wider region and the shores of the European Union. These geopolitical challenges warrant attention and require greater transatlantic coordination to ensure peace, promote prosperity, and fend off malign activities by state and non-state actors alike. In recent years, in the absence of such a common strategic approach by the United States and EU, Turkey and Russia have filled the regional vacuum.\nTurkey in particular has been emboldened to undermine NATO through actions such as its acquisition of the S-400 missile system from Russia and its military intervention and lack of coordination with NATO allies in northeastern Syria. This behavior has challenged the balance of power in the region, creating room for growing Russian influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. In response, the EU has indicated a renewed interest in working with the United States to engage Turkey, understanding that US engagement can be a catalyst for a more effective “carrot and stick” approach to the country. The understanding is mutual. In his first call with the European Commission president’s head of cabinet, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan agreed that the two sides would “work together on issues of mutual concern” with regard to Turkey.\nSetting clear boundaries on Turkey’s expansionist agenda in the Eastern Mediterranean, as part of a roadmap to improve Turkey’s relations with the EU, will have positive knock-on effects like calming tensions with EU members Greece and Cyprus. The United States has traditionally played the role of mediator between the parties and has important economic and military leverage on both Turkey and Greece.\nAmerican clout here, however, does not mean a return to the old Cold War dynamic. As Greece has assumed a more proactive role in stabilizing its neighborhood, its relations with the United States have become increasingly independent of US relations with Turkey. During the Cold War, NATO succeeded in preventing war between Greece and Turkey yet failed to address the disputes between its two “entangled allies.” Turkey was given strategic priority given its value in containing the Soviet Union. But Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s authoritarian backsliding toward the “post-liberal” world of Presidents Vladimir Putin in Russia and Xi Jinping in China, his challenge to the territorial status quo established by international treaties (most notably the Treaty of Lausanne), and his broader revisionist foreign policy mean that a new approach will have to predominate.\nEven though a grand bargain with Turkey may prove elusive given the multiple points of contention with the West, US engagement would still help stabilize the Eastern Mediterranean. Seeking to contain the crisis, Greece has shown restraint in its response to what it views as Turkey’s violation of its sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, demonstrating what US Ambassador to Greece Geoffrey Pyatt acknowledged as “forbearance” in the face of Turkish provocations. With the encouragement of the United States and its European partners, Greece has resumed exploratory talks with Turkey and continues to call for international arbitration to settle their maritime dispute. Greece needs more support to sustain these policies, and the Biden administration should provide it.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "After recovering from its debt crisis, Greece has emerged as a key US ally\nThe Biden administration will find in Greece a like-minded ally with strong democratic credentials. Greece’s unwavering commitment to NATO and its constructive engagement within the European Union (EU), multilateral organizations, and\nregional alliances makes it irreplaceable for achieving progress on transatlantic cooperation. Within\nits strategic commitment to the EU and NATO, Greece has promoted Euro-Atlantic institutions in the Western Balkans and strengthened regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.\nThe United States should deepen its strategic engagement with Greece\nto jointly address\nchallenges that competition among global and regional powers poses for\nstability\nAmong these\nchallenges is Turkey’s authoritarian turn and revisionist foreign policy\nThe United States\nremains\nindispensable\nIts allies are waiting for it to take the lead.\nUS withdrawal from the Middle East\nhas left a power vacuum. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the conflicts in Syria and Libya have turned into proxy wars and have exported mass migration and instability to the wider region and the shores of the European Union. These geopolitical challenges\nrequire\ntransatlantic coordination to ensure peace, promote prosperity, and fend off malign activities\nthe absence of such a common strategic approach by the United States and EU, Turkey and Russia have filled the regional vacuum\nTurkey\nhas been emboldened to undermine NATO through actions such as its acquisition of the S-400 missile system from Russia and its military intervention and lack of coordination with NATO allies in northeastern Syria. This behavior has challenged the balance of power in the region, creating room for growing Russian influence\nthe EU has indicated a renewed interest in working with the United States to engage Turkey\nUS engagement can be a catalyst for a more effective “carrot and stick” approach to the country.\nSullivan agreed that the two sides would “work together on issues of mutual concern” with regard to Turkey.\nSetting clear boundaries on Turkey’s expansionist agenda in the Eastern Mediterranean\nwill have positive knock-on effects like calming tensions with EU members Greece and Cyprus. The United States has traditionally played\nmediator between the parties and has important economic and military leverage on\nTurkey and Greece\nAmerican clout\ndoes not mean a return to the old Cold War dynamic. As Greece has assumed a more proactive role in stabilizing its neighborhood, its relations with the United States have become increasingly independent of US relations with Turkey. During the Cold War, NATO succeeded in preventing war between Greece and Turkey\nErdoğan’s authoritarian backsliding\nand his broader revisionist foreign policy mean that a new approach will have to predominate.\nUS engagement would still help stabilize the Eastern Mediterranean\nGreece has shown restraint in its response to what it views as Turkey’s violation of its sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, demonstrating\nforbearance” in the face of Turkish provocations. With the encouragement of the United States\nGreece has resumed exploratory talks with Turkey and continues to call for international arbitration to settle their maritime dispute. Greece needs more support to sustain these policies, and the Biden administration should provide it.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Withdrawing security commitments undermines effective engagement – turns the case.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "After recovering from its debt crisis, Greece has emerged as a key US ally\nThe Biden administration will find in Greece a like-minded ally with strong democratic credentials. Greece’s unwavering commitment to NATO and its constructive engagement within the European Union (EU), multilateral organizations, and\nregional alliances makes it irreplaceable for achieving progress on transatlantic cooperation. Within\nits strategic commitment to the EU and NATO, Greece has promoted Euro-Atlantic institutions in the Western Balkans and strengthened regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.\nThe United States should deepen its strategic engagement with Greece\nto jointly address\nchallenges that competition among global and regional powers poses for\nstability\nAmong these\nchallenges is Turkey’s authoritarian turn and revisionist foreign policy\nThe United States\nremains\nindispensable\nIts allies are waiting for it to take the lead.\nUS withdrawal from the Middle East\nhas left a power vacuum. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the conflicts in Syria and Libya have turned into proxy wars and have exported mass migration and instability to the wider region and the shores of the European Union. These geopolitical challenges\nrequire\ntransatlantic coordination to ensure peace, promote prosperity, and fend off malign activities\nthe absence of such a common strategic approach by the United States and EU, Turkey and Russia have filled the regional vacuum\nTurkey\nhas been emboldened to undermine NATO through actions such as its acquisition of the S-400 missile system from Russia and its military intervention and lack of coordination with NATO allies in northeastern Syria. This behavior has challenged the balance of power in the region, creating room for growing Russian influence\nthe EU has indicated a renewed interest in working with the United States to engage Turkey\nUS engagement can be a catalyst for a more effective “carrot and stick” approach to the country.\nSullivan agreed that the two sides would “work together on issues of mutual concern” with regard to Turkey.\nSetting clear boundaries on Turkey’s expansionist agenda in the Eastern Mediterranean\nwill have positive knock-on effects like calming tensions with EU members Greece and Cyprus. The United States has traditionally played\nmediator between the parties and has important economic and military leverage on\nTurkey and Greece\nAmerican clout\ndoes not mean a return to the old Cold War dynamic. As Greece has assumed a more proactive role in stabilizing its neighborhood, its relations with the United States have become increasingly independent of US relations with Turkey. During the Cold War, NATO succeeded in preventing war between Greece and Turkey\nErdoğan’s authoritarian backsliding\nand his broader revisionist foreign policy mean that a new approach will have to predominate.\nUS engagement would still help stabilize the Eastern Mediterranean\nGreece has shown restraint in its response to what it views as Turkey’s violation of its sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, demonstrating\nforbearance” in the face of Turkish provocations. With the encouragement of the United States\nGreece has resumed exploratory talks with Turkey and continues to call for international arbitration to settle their maritime dispute. Greece needs more support to sustain these policies, and the Biden administration should provide it.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "key US ally\nlike-minded ally\nunwavering commitment\nconstructive engagement\nirreplaceable\ntransatlantic cooperation\npromoted Euro-Atlantic institutions\nstrengthened regional cooperation\ncompetition\nglobal\nregional powers\nTurkey’s authoritarian turn\nrevisionist foreign policy\nindispensable\ntake the lead.\npower vacuum\nproxy wars\nmass migration\ninstability\ngeopolitical challenges\ntransatlantic coordination\ncommon strategic approach\ngrowing Russian influence\nrenewed interest\nworking with the United States\ncatalyst\neffective “carrot and stick\nissues of mutual concern\npositive knock-on effects\ncalming tensions\ntraditionally played\nmediator\neconomic\nmilitary leverage\nmore proactive role\nincreasingly independent\nsucceeded in preventing\nnew approach\nstabilize the Eastern Mediterranean\nencouragement of the United States\nresumed exploratory talks\ninternational arbitration\nneeds more support", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Withdrawing security commitments undermines effective engagement – turns the case.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "After recovering from its debt crisis, Greece has emerged as a key US ally\nThe Biden administration will find in Greece a like-minded ally with strong democratic credentials. Greece’s unwavering commitment to NATO and its constructive engagement within the European Union (EU), multilateral organizations, and\nregional alliances makes it irreplaceable for achieving progress on transatlantic cooperation. Within\nits strategic commitment to the EU and NATO, Greece has promoted Euro-Atlantic institutions in the Western Balkans and strengthened regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.\nThe United States should deepen its strategic engagement with Greece\nto jointly address\nchallenges that competition among global and regional powers poses for\nstability\nAmong these\nchallenges is Turkey’s authoritarian turn and revisionist foreign policy\nThe United States\nremains\nindispensable\nIts allies are waiting for it to take the lead.\nUS withdrawal from the Middle East\nhas left a power vacuum. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the conflicts in Syria and Libya have turned into proxy wars and have exported mass migration and instability to the wider region and the shores of the European Union. These geopolitical challenges\nrequire\ntransatlantic coordination to ensure peace, promote prosperity, and fend off malign activities\nthe absence of such a common strategic approach by the United States and EU, Turkey and Russia have filled the regional vacuum\nTurkey\nhas been emboldened to undermine NATO through actions such as its acquisition of the S-400 missile system from Russia and its military intervention and lack of coordination with NATO allies in northeastern Syria. This behavior has challenged the balance of power in the region, creating room for growing Russian influence\nthe EU has indicated a renewed interest in working with the United States to engage Turkey\nUS engagement can be a catalyst for a more effective “carrot and stick” approach to the country.\nSullivan agreed that the two sides would “work together on issues of mutual concern” with regard to Turkey.\nSetting clear boundaries on Turkey’s expansionist agenda in the Eastern Mediterranean\nwill have positive knock-on effects like calming tensions with EU members Greece and Cyprus. The United States has traditionally played\nmediator between the parties and has important economic and military leverage on\nTurkey and Greece\nAmerican clout\ndoes not mean a return to the old Cold War dynamic. As Greece has assumed a more proactive role in stabilizing its neighborhood, its relations with the United States have become increasingly independent of US relations with Turkey. During the Cold War, NATO succeeded in preventing war between Greece and Turkey\nErdoğan’s authoritarian backsliding\nand his broader revisionist foreign policy mean that a new approach will have to predominate.\nUS engagement would still help stabilize the Eastern Mediterranean\nGreece has shown restraint in its response to what it views as Turkey’s violation of its sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, demonstrating\nforbearance” in the face of Turkish provocations. With the encouragement of the United States\nGreece has resumed exploratory talks with Turkey and continues to call for international arbitration to settle their maritime dispute. Greece needs more support to sustain these policies, and the Biden administration should provide it.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Greece\nemerged as a key US ally\nGreece’s unwavering commitment to NATO and\nengagement\nmakes it irreplaceable for\ntransatlantic cooperation\nThe U\nS\nshould deepen\nengagement\nto jointly address\nTurkey\nThe U\nS\nremains\nindispensable\nIts allies are waiting for it to take the lead\nUS withdrawal\nleft a power vacuum\ninstability\nrequire\ntransatlantic coordination\nthe EU\nindicated\nrenewed interest in working with the U\nS\nto engage Turkey\nThe U\nS\nhas traditionally played\nmediator\nand has\neconomic and military leverage\nNATO succeeded in preventing war between Greece and Turkey\nUS engagement would\nstabilize the Eastern Mediterranean\nWith\nthe U\nS\nGreece\nresumed\ntalks\nand\ncall for international arbitration\nGreece needs more support", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Strong US-Greece bilateral ties ensure Biden can get Greece on board.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Biden is familiar with Greece and the broader region. His campaign stressed his role as vice president in helping Greece overcome its debt crisis and the fact that he is the highest-ranking US official to have visited Cyprus for over half a century. He has done much to strengthen America’s bilateral relations with Greece and strategic partnership with Cyprus.\nIn recent years, US-Greece relations have enjoyed consensus across the political spectrum in both countries and been a case study of foreign-policy continuity, even surviving the tumultuous Trump presidency. This consensus is all the more impressive given the traditional anti-American sentiment on the Greek left as a result of perceived US support for the Greek junta and its stance on the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. It also breaks with a pattern of US neglect of Greece amid differing foreign-policy priorities in the years following the fall of the Iron Curtain.\nFor the United States, the Greek debt crisis underscored the country’s geostrategic importance. In 2010, President Barack Obama supported a bailout for Greece after considering the catastrophic ramifications that a disorderly Greek default would have on the Eurozone. Even after a firewall was created to safeguard the euro, the Obama administration was concerned that a Greek exit from the Eurozone would destabilize Greece at a time when an axis of instability from Ukraine to Libya was threatening to engulf Southeastern Europe and bring migration-related tensions and terrorism threats to the European Union. The assistance the Obama administration provided to the leftist Greek government in 2015 was critical to Greece staying in the Eurozone. Just as critically, it also helped improve perceptions of the United States among the Greek population.\nHaving helped secure the country’s European future, the United States found ways to ensure Greece’s role as a stabilizing force in the region—a policy that continued into the Trump years. Since 2018, an annual Strategic Dialogue has given US-Greece ties direction and contributed to a high in relations not seen in a generation. Beyond regional collaboration, all aspects of the bilateral agenda—energy, military, security, trade and investment cooperation, people-to-people ties—have grown over the course of the Strategic Dialogue, thanks to the work of very engaged and forward-leaning diplomats. This is most evident in the expansion of the US-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA), cooperation on energy that has resulted in US natural gas reaching 50 percent of Greek LNG imports, and US-supported investments in Greek infrastructure projects that promote regional interconnectedness.\nGreece has also gained strategic importance for the United States in the context of major-power competition. In testimony to Congress in June 2018, then-Assistant Secretary of State Wess Mitchell noted that the United States was “cultivating Greece as an anchor of stability” as part of a long-term strategy to bolster the US presence in the region and counter the influence of China and Russia. US officials have spoken of a particularly favorable alignment of interests. The catalyst for the United States to see Greece as a stabilizing force in the region was the 2018 Prespa agreement between Greece and North Macedonia, which opened the door for North Macedonia to join NATO and reinvigorated the stalled process of integrating the Western Balkans into Euro-Atlantic institutions.\nWith the support of the United States, Greece has actively promoted regional partnerships of American allies that are willing to work together to foster cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Among these, the Israel-Cyprus-Greece partnership in particular has been endorsed in Congress, which passed the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act (East Med Act) to address Russian and Chinese influence in the region. The United States has participated in this trilateral partnership through its secretary of state, making it a “3+1,” and has also taken part in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, an intergovernmental organization that promotes energy cooperation in the region.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Biden is familiar with Greece\nHis campaign stressed his role as vice president in helping Greece overcome its debt crisis and the fact that he is the highest-ranking US official to have visited Cyprus for over half a century. He has done much to strengthen America’s bilateral relations with Greece\nUS-Greece relations have enjoyed consensus across the political spectrum\nand been a case study of foreign-policy continuity, even surviving the\nTrump presidency\nObama supported a bailout for Greece\nthe Obama administration was concerned that a Greek exit from the Eurozone would destabilize Greece\nwhen\ninstability from Ukraine to Libya was threatening to engulf Southeastern Europe\nan annual Strategic Dialogue has given US-Greece ties direction and contributed to a high in relations not seen in a generation.\nThis is most evident in the expansion of the US-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA)\nGreece has also gained strategic importance for the United States in the context of major-power competition\nthe United States was “cultivating Greece as an anchor of stability” as part of a long-term strategy to bolster\n US presence in the region and counter the influence of China and Russia\nWith\nthe United States, Greece has actively promoted regional partnerships of American allies that are willing to work together to foster cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Among these, the Israel-Cyprus-Greece partnership in particular has been endorsed in Congress\nThe United States has participated in this trilateral partnership through its secretary of state, making it a “3+1,” and has\ntaken part in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Strong US-Greece bilateral ties ensure Biden can get Greece on board.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Biden is familiar with Greece\nHis campaign stressed his role as vice president in helping Greece overcome its debt crisis and the fact that he is the highest-ranking US official to have visited Cyprus for over half a century. He has done much to strengthen America’s bilateral relations with Greece\nUS-Greece relations have enjoyed consensus across the political spectrum\nand been a case study of foreign-policy continuity, even surviving the\nTrump presidency\nObama supported a bailout for Greece\nthe Obama administration was concerned that a Greek exit from the Eurozone would destabilize Greece\nwhen\ninstability from Ukraine to Libya was threatening to engulf Southeastern Europe\nan annual Strategic Dialogue has given US-Greece ties direction and contributed to a high in relations not seen in a generation.\nThis is most evident in the expansion of the US-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA)\nGreece has also gained strategic importance for the United States in the context of major-power competition\nthe United States was “cultivating Greece as an anchor of stability” as part of a long-term strategy to bolster\n US presence in the region and counter the influence of China and Russia\nWith\nthe United States, Greece has actively promoted regional partnerships of American allies that are willing to work together to foster cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Among these, the Israel-Cyprus-Greece partnership in particular has been endorsed in Congress\nThe United States has participated in this trilateral partnership through its secretary of state, making it a “3+1,” and has\ntaken part in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum", "role": "user" }, { "content": "familiar with Greece\novercome its debt crisis\nstrengthen America’s bilateral relations\nacross the political spectrum\nforeign-policy continuity\nsupported a bailout\nStrategic Dialogue\nhigh in relations\nmajor-power competition\nbolster\nUS presence\nChina\nRussia\nactively promoted regional partnerships\nfoster cooperation\nEastern Mediterranean\nEastern Mediterranean Gas Forum", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Strong US-Greece bilateral ties ensure Biden can get Greece on board.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Biden is familiar with Greece\nHis campaign stressed his role as vice president in helping Greece overcome its debt crisis and the fact that he is the highest-ranking US official to have visited Cyprus for over half a century. He has done much to strengthen America’s bilateral relations with Greece\nUS-Greece relations have enjoyed consensus across the political spectrum\nand been a case study of foreign-policy continuity, even surviving the\nTrump presidency\nObama supported a bailout for Greece\nthe Obama administration was concerned that a Greek exit from the Eurozone would destabilize Greece\nwhen\ninstability from Ukraine to Libya was threatening to engulf Southeastern Europe\nan annual Strategic Dialogue has given US-Greece ties direction and contributed to a high in relations not seen in a generation.\nThis is most evident in the expansion of the US-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA)\nGreece has also gained strategic importance for the United States in the context of major-power competition\nthe United States was “cultivating Greece as an anchor of stability” as part of a long-term strategy to bolster\n US presence in the region and counter the influence of China and Russia\nWith\nthe United States, Greece has actively promoted regional partnerships of American allies that are willing to work together to foster cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Among these, the Israel-Cyprus-Greece partnership in particular has been endorsed in Congress\nThe United States has participated in this trilateral partnership through its secretary of state, making it a “3+1,” and has\ntaken part in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Biden is familiar with Greece\nHe has done much to strengthen\nbilateral relations\nUS-Greece relations\nenjoyed consensus across the\nspectrum\nan annual Strategic Dialogue\ncontributed to a high in relations\nGreece\ngained\nimportance\nin the context of major-power competition\nto\ncounter\nChina and Russia\nGreece\nactively promoted regional partnerships\nwilling to work together to foster cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Renewed diplomacy under Biden can get Turkey on board – a joint carrots-and-sticks strategy will prove successful.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "All this needs to change, and indeed can change, under Biden, Harris, Blinken, Austin, Haines, and Sullivan, as the new Administration settles down to sort out priorities and policies. Some of the appointments to the ranks below cabinet level indicate the prospect of a departure from past policies. Key players in the Administration, who have been involved in various ways in the fight against the Islamic State since 2014, have formed an unfavorable opinion of Erdogan’s role and the duplicity of the Turkish authorities. Even in the battle of Kobani, which played a crucial role in reversing the tide of IS expansion, Turkey did as little as possible – despite pressure from the US-led coalition – to enable the Kurds to survive and prevail. There are now people in positions of responsibility in Washington who have not forgotten this.\nThis does not mandate a swing to the other, extreme end of the spectrum. Clearly, Turkey is a major regional player and will remain so. (Nor will it leave NATO of its own free will, and there is no procedure for removing a member of the alliance). The US does not want to push Ankara all the way to a full reliance on Russia and a working alignment with Iran (or even in the direction, already hinted at by Erdogan, of seeking nuclear weapons). Even for Israel, let alone the US, diplomatic engagement with Ankara is important.\nBut the “rules of the road” for such an engagement need to be equally clear. Talk about “liberating al-Aqsa”, and the sheltering of active Hamas operatives, must cease. Following the Qatari-Saudi understanding, and the parallel Egyptian effort to reach out to the GNA and stabilize the status quo, Turkey will need to assure the Biden Administration that it will promptly renounce past patterns of propaganda against Egypt and support of the Muslim Brotherhood across the region.\nTwo-faced practices by the MIT (the “Turkish CIA”, under Hakan Fidan) in terms of facilitating the movement of Islamist radicals must come to an end. The same is true for the deployment of Syrian and other militias as Turkish proxies in Libya and elsewhere.\nAt the strategic level, and as a major demonstrable departure from Trump’s ambiguous policy, the US should make it clear that the Turkish-Libyan EEZ delineation map should be taken off the table, in favor of an open-ended negotiation with Greece and Egypt aimed at a practical compromise serving the interests of all (including Israel).\nWhat Israel should seek to do (in close cooperation with Greece and Cyprus and in consultation with Egypt’s leadership) is to draw the Administration’s attention to these perspectives and to suggest a practical, open minded way for Turkey to change course. It should be the purpose of such a policy to enable Ankara to change course, and thus take its proper place in a US-led regional alignment. US allies in the Gulf can be of help in offering positive incentives for this kind of transition. \nAt the same time, with their unique capacity to mobilize kin or “Diaspora” communities, Israel and Greece can play a crucial role in encouraging key members of Congress to clarify what Turkey would be required to do; and what the relevant rewards would be if it does so (in terms of economic opportunities, and perhaps international help in dealing with a large refugee population). A creative solution for the S-400 problem is also needed. Since Congress is unlikely to defray the costs of packing-up these missiles and sending them back to Russia, perhaps some regional player (such as the Saudis or the UAE) may wish to do so, if and when Ankara proves that it is no longer playing a subversive role in regional affairs.\nAt the same time, Erdogan should also be made aware of the consequences if he insists on pursuing his present policies. Biden does not need to utilize Trump’s crude threats. The Turkish economy is fragile, and Erdogan’s popularity rests upon his ability to deliver economic growth. Turkey is not Iran, which has long been impoverished and cut off from world trade. As a member of the G-20, Turkey’s economic future depends on its place in the global economy. Defying the US and the international community by pursuing its regional ambitions (let alone, as some suspect, embarking on a quest for military nuclear capabilities) could and should have an unambiguous price tag attached to it.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "All this needs to change\nunder Biden, Harris, Blinken, Austin, Haines, and Sullivan, as the new Administration settles down to sort out priorities\nKey players in the Administration\nformed an unfavorable opinion of Erdogan’s role and the duplicity of the Turkish authorities. Even in the battle of Kobani, which played a crucial role in reversing the tide of IS expansion, Turkey did as little as possible\nto enable the Kurds to survive and prevail\nThis does not mandate a swing to the\nextreme end of the spectrum. Clearly, Turkey is a major regional player and will remain\nNor will it leave NATO\nand there is no procedure for removing a member of the alliance\nThe US does not want to push Ankara\nto\nfull reliance on Russia and a working alignment with Iran\ndiplomatic engagement with Ankara is important\nTurkey will need to assure\nBiden\nthat it will promptly renounce past patterns of propaganda against Egypt and support of the Muslim Brotherhood across the region\nThe same is true for the deployment of Syrian and other militias as Turkish proxies in Libya and elsewhere\nIt should be the purpose of such a policy to enable Ankara to change course, and thus take its proper place in a US-led regional alignment. US allies in the Gulf can be of help in offering positive incentives for this kind of transition.\nIsrael and Greece can play a crucial role in encouraging key members of Congress to clarify what Turkey would be required to do; and what the relevant rewards would be if it does so (in terms of economic opportunities, and perhaps international help in dealing with a large refugee population). A creative solution for the S-400\nis also needed\nSince Congress is unlikely to defray the costs of packing-up these missiles and sending them back to Russia, perhaps some regional player (such as the Saudis or the UAE) may wish to do so, if and when Ankara proves that it is no longer playing a subversive role in regional affairs\nErdogan should also be made aware of the consequences if he insists on pursuing his present policies\nThe Turkish economy is fragile, and Erdogan’s popularity rests upon his ability to deliver economic growth. Turkey is not Iran, which has long been impoverished and cut off from world trade. As a member of the G-20, Turkey’s economic future depends on its place in the global economy. Defying the US\nshould have an unambiguous price tag attached to it.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Renewed diplomacy under Biden can get Turkey on board – a joint carrots-and-sticks strategy will prove successful.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "All this needs to change\nunder Biden, Harris, Blinken, Austin, Haines, and Sullivan, as the new Administration settles down to sort out priorities\nKey players in the Administration\nformed an unfavorable opinion of Erdogan’s role and the duplicity of the Turkish authorities. Even in the battle of Kobani, which played a crucial role in reversing the tide of IS expansion, Turkey did as little as possible\nto enable the Kurds to survive and prevail\nThis does not mandate a swing to the\nextreme end of the spectrum. Clearly, Turkey is a major regional player and will remain\nNor will it leave NATO\nand there is no procedure for removing a member of the alliance\nThe US does not want to push Ankara\nto\nfull reliance on Russia and a working alignment with Iran\ndiplomatic engagement with Ankara is important\nTurkey will need to assure\nBiden\nthat it will promptly renounce past patterns of propaganda against Egypt and support of the Muslim Brotherhood across the region\nThe same is true for the deployment of Syrian and other militias as Turkish proxies in Libya and elsewhere\nIt should be the purpose of such a policy to enable Ankara to change course, and thus take its proper place in a US-led regional alignment. US allies in the Gulf can be of help in offering positive incentives for this kind of transition.\nIsrael and Greece can play a crucial role in encouraging key members of Congress to clarify what Turkey would be required to do; and what the relevant rewards would be if it does so (in terms of economic opportunities, and perhaps international help in dealing with a large refugee population). A creative solution for the S-400\nis also needed\nSince Congress is unlikely to defray the costs of packing-up these missiles and sending them back to Russia, perhaps some regional player (such as the Saudis or the UAE) may wish to do so, if and when Ankara proves that it is no longer playing a subversive role in regional affairs\nErdogan should also be made aware of the consequences if he insists on pursuing his present policies\nThe Turkish economy is fragile, and Erdogan’s popularity rests upon his ability to deliver economic growth. Turkey is not Iran, which has long been impoverished and cut off from world trade. As a member of the G-20, Turkey’s economic future depends on its place in the global economy. Defying the US\nshould have an unambiguous price tag attached to it.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Biden\nnew Administration\nsort out priorities\nunfavorable opinion of Erdogan’s role\nextreme end of the spectrum\nmajor regional player\nfull reliance on Russia\nworking alignment with Iran\ndiplomatic engagement\nimportant\npromptly renounce\nTurkish proxies\nUS-led regional alignment.\noffering positive incentives\nencouraging key members of Congress\nrelevant rewards\neconomic opportunities\ninternational help\nsubversive role\nmade aware of the consequences\nTurkey’s economic future\nunambiguous price tag", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Renewed diplomacy under Biden can get Turkey on board – a joint carrots-and-sticks strategy will prove successful.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "All this needs to change\nunder Biden, Harris, Blinken, Austin, Haines, and Sullivan, as the new Administration settles down to sort out priorities\nKey players in the Administration\nformed an unfavorable opinion of Erdogan’s role and the duplicity of the Turkish authorities. Even in the battle of Kobani, which played a crucial role in reversing the tide of IS expansion, Turkey did as little as possible\nto enable the Kurds to survive and prevail\nThis does not mandate a swing to the\nextreme end of the spectrum. Clearly, Turkey is a major regional player and will remain\nNor will it leave NATO\nand there is no procedure for removing a member of the alliance\nThe US does not want to push Ankara\nto\nfull reliance on Russia and a working alignment with Iran\ndiplomatic engagement with Ankara is important\nTurkey will need to assure\nBiden\nthat it will promptly renounce past patterns of propaganda against Egypt and support of the Muslim Brotherhood across the region\nThe same is true for the deployment of Syrian and other militias as Turkish proxies in Libya and elsewhere\nIt should be the purpose of such a policy to enable Ankara to change course, and thus take its proper place in a US-led regional alignment. US allies in the Gulf can be of help in offering positive incentives for this kind of transition.\nIsrael and Greece can play a crucial role in encouraging key members of Congress to clarify what Turkey would be required to do; and what the relevant rewards would be if it does so (in terms of economic opportunities, and perhaps international help in dealing with a large refugee population). A creative solution for the S-400\nis also needed\nSince Congress is unlikely to defray the costs of packing-up these missiles and sending them back to Russia, perhaps some regional player (such as the Saudis or the UAE) may wish to do so, if and when Ankara proves that it is no longer playing a subversive role in regional affairs\nErdogan should also be made aware of the consequences if he insists on pursuing his present policies\nThe Turkish economy is fragile, and Erdogan’s popularity rests upon his ability to deliver economic growth. Turkey is not Iran, which has long been impoverished and cut off from world trade. As a member of the G-20, Turkey’s economic future depends on its place in the global economy. Defying the US\nshould have an unambiguous price tag attached to it.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "All this needs to change\nunder Biden\nThis does not mandate a swing to the\nextreme end\nTurkey is a major\nplayer and will remain\nThe US does not want to push Ankara\nto\nRussia and\nIran\ndiplomatic engagement\nis important\nIt should be the purpose\nto enable Ankara to\ntake its\nplace in a US-led regional alignment. US allies\ncan\noffer\npositive incentives\nthe\nrewards\nin terms of economic opportunities, and\ninternational help\nErdogan should also be made aware of the consequences if he insists on pursuing\npolicies\nTurkey’s economic future depends on\nthe US", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Negotiations are ongoing but fail because the US has stepped back from the dispute.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "This policy briefing argues that the crisis has been aggravated and complicated by two distinct geopolitical developments, namely energy exploration and the Libyan conflict. It also underscores that this crisis is more perilous than previous disputes in part due to two systemic changes: 1) the power vacuum created by the United States downsizing its regional role in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East; and 2) the loss of the European Union (EU) accession framework. The void left by the United States has set off a scramble for power and influence in the Mediterranean and Middle East that should serve as a wakeup call for the EU to play a larger role in de-escalating the crisis.\nBackground\nThe United States no longer views the European neighborhood, be it in the South or East, as holding high strategic value. Although President Donald Trump was responsible for many ill-conceived policy decisions, the partial U.S. withdrawal from the region actually started under President Barack Obama.[2] Joseph Biden’s administration is unlikely to reverse this trend in any significant way. At a time of U.S. absence, it falls squarely upon the Europeans to prevent the eastern Mediterranean crisis from getting out of hand—as of now, a conflict is unlikely, but not unthinkable. In the end, this is not only a crisis in Europe’s neighborhood, but also a crisis within Europe, given the deep involvement of three EU member states, namely Greece, Cyprus, and France.\nIn this respect, German and European mediation efforts to de-escalate the crisis are steps in the right direction. However, the future prospects of these efforts will be contingent upon sharp diagnosis of the crisis, patience, commitment, and imaginative policy responses. The core of the crisis is the multi-layered maritime disputes between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. But Turkey-Greece relations are unfolding against the larger backdrop of the European framework. The honeymoon period between Ankara and Athens during the late 1990s and 2000s was a natural outcome and requirement of Turkey’s EU accession vision and process at the time. This was the primary reason for the Turkish government’s strong support for the United Nations (U.N.) plan that was put to a referendum in Cyprus in 2004 on the unification of the island. However, Turkey’s EU accession process and aspirations have long since come to a standstill, which has in turn hurt Turkish relations with Greece and Cyprus.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the crisis has been aggravated and complicated by\nenergy exploration and the Libyan conflict.\nthis crisis is more perilous than previous disputes\ndue to t\nthe power vacuum created by the United States downsizing its regional role in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East\nThe void left by the United States has set off a scramble for power and influence in the Mediterranean and Middle East that should serve as a wakeup call for the EU to play a larger role in de-escalating the crisis.\nThe United States no longer views the European neighborhood\nas holding high strategic value.\nthe partial U.S. withdrawal from the region actually started under\nObama\nBiden’s administration is unlikely to reverse this trend\nAt a time of U.S. absence, it falls squarely upon the Europeans to prevent the eastern Mediterranean crisis from getting out of hand\nthis is not only a crisis in Europe’s neighborhood, but\na crisis within Europe, given the deep involvement of\nGreece, Cyprus, and France\nGerman and European mediation efforts to de-escalate the crisis are steps in the right direction\nfuture prospects\nwill be contingent upon sharp diagnosis of the crisis, patience, commitment, and imaginative policy responses. The core of the crisis is the multi-layered maritime disputes between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus.\nTurkey-Greece relations are unfolding against the larger backdrop of the European framework", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Negotiations are ongoing but fail because the US has stepped back from the dispute.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the crisis has been aggravated and complicated by\nenergy exploration and the Libyan conflict.\nthis crisis is more perilous than previous disputes\ndue to t\nthe power vacuum created by the United States downsizing its regional role in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East\nThe void left by the United States has set off a scramble for power and influence in the Mediterranean and Middle East that should serve as a wakeup call for the EU to play a larger role in de-escalating the crisis.\nThe United States no longer views the European neighborhood\nas holding high strategic value.\nthe partial U.S. withdrawal from the region actually started under\nObama\nBiden’s administration is unlikely to reverse this trend\nAt a time of U.S. absence, it falls squarely upon the Europeans to prevent the eastern Mediterranean crisis from getting out of hand\nthis is not only a crisis in Europe’s neighborhood, but\na crisis within Europe, given the deep involvement of\nGreece, Cyprus, and France\nGerman and European mediation efforts to de-escalate the crisis are steps in the right direction\nfuture prospects\nwill be contingent upon sharp diagnosis of the crisis, patience, commitment, and imaginative policy responses. The core of the crisis is the multi-layered maritime disputes between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus.\nTurkey-Greece relations are unfolding against the larger backdrop of the European framework", "role": "user" }, { "content": "aggravated\ncomplicated\npower vacuum created by the United States\nvoid\nscramble for power\nwakeup call\npartial U.S. withdrawal\nunlikely to reverse\nU.S. absence\neastern Mediterranean crisis\ncrisis within Europe\nsteps in the right direction\nmulti-layered maritime disputes\nlarger backdrop", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Negotiations are ongoing but fail because the US has stepped back from the dispute.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the crisis has been aggravated and complicated by\nenergy exploration and the Libyan conflict.\nthis crisis is more perilous than previous disputes\ndue to t\nthe power vacuum created by the United States downsizing its regional role in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East\nThe void left by the United States has set off a scramble for power and influence in the Mediterranean and Middle East that should serve as a wakeup call for the EU to play a larger role in de-escalating the crisis.\nThe United States no longer views the European neighborhood\nas holding high strategic value.\nthe partial U.S. withdrawal from the region actually started under\nObama\nBiden’s administration is unlikely to reverse this trend\nAt a time of U.S. absence, it falls squarely upon the Europeans to prevent the eastern Mediterranean crisis from getting out of hand\nthis is not only a crisis in Europe’s neighborhood, but\na crisis within Europe, given the deep involvement of\nGreece, Cyprus, and France\nGerman and European mediation efforts to de-escalate the crisis are steps in the right direction\nfuture prospects\nwill be contingent upon sharp diagnosis of the crisis, patience, commitment, and imaginative policy responses. The core of the crisis is the multi-layered maritime disputes between Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus.\nTurkey-Greece relations are unfolding against the larger backdrop of the European framework", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the crisis has been aggravated and complicated by\nenergy exploration\nthe power vacuum created by the U\nS\nThe void\nset off a scramble for power\nin the Mediterranean\nthat should serve as a wakeup call\npartial U.S. withdrawal\nstarted under\nObama\nBiden’s\nis unlikely to reverse\nGerman and European\nefforts\nare steps in the right direction", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: NATO can establish an effective deconfliction mechanism.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Hold a Mediterranean conference\nGiven the new maritime focus of both Turkey and the UAE, the Mediterranean will remain a key battleground for geopolitical competition between the two countries. In this environment, Europe needs to establish its own process for deconfliction in the region and to minimise the effects of the Turkish-Emirati rivalry there. It is in the EU’s long-term interests to create its own mechanisms for de-escalation.\nThe Berlin Process on Libya is a good example of an EU-owned process that came to involve multilateral organisations. While it is imperfect, the process provided Europeans with a mechanism to coordinate de-escalation, feeding into a ceasefire and a re-energised UN political process.\nThe EU should now organise a pan-Mediterranean conference that could develop into a multilateral framework akin to the Berlin Process. The conference would discuss maritime borders and hydrocarbon resources. By involving participants from coastal nations – including Cyprus – and representatives from the Turkish Cypriot community, the conference would create a new space to encourage settlement negotiations in Cyprus. This could also serve as a platform to bring competition for hydrocarbons in line with the standards of the European Green Deal – a consideration that is absent from the current geopolitical struggle. Such an effort would likely win the backing of the Biden administration and reduce Europe’s internal divisions.\nUse the NATO platform for deconfliction\nNATO is an important and underestimated instrument for its members to help contain the Turkey-UAE rivalry. The UAE, nicknamed “Little Sparta” for its interest in gaining military prowess, has long wanted to develop its relationship with NATO. The country has been a member of NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative since 2004, was among the first members of the initiative to sign up for an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (in 2016), and was active in NATO-led missions in Bosnia, Libya, and Afghanistan. The development of the UAE’s relationship with NATO has slowed since 2016, partly due to the Turkish veto in the consensus-driven organisation. As one NATO official recently said: “we have problems with the UAE because Turkey has problems with the UAE.”[9]\nGiven the prospect of US retrenchment in the Middle East and the Biden administration’s emphasis on multilateralism, NATO is likely to be reinvigorated in the coming years – as is the UAE’s interest in closer cooperation with the organisation. As NATO is increasingly attentive to security issues on Europe’s southern flank, Europeans have an opportunity to persuade the UAE and Turkey to establish a deconfliction hotline within the alliance, as well as a platform to define military deconfliction protocols.\nConclusion\nThe Turkish-Emirati rivalry is an intractable problem that now affects Europe’s internal dynamics. The conflict, which is more about geopolitics than ideology, helps both regimes extend their reach across the region and consolidate their domestic support. Turkey and the UAE have tried to promulgate their own narratives on the dispute in European capitals and Washington, highlighting their purported strengths and lobbying against the other side. In fact, both aim to extend their influence over Europe’s neighbourhood in a way that is deeply problematic for European interests.\nInstead of using one actor to push back against the other – thereby linking European politics to regional conflicts and a zero-sum rivalry – Europeans should develop their own agency and independent strategy, and should look to manage the destabilising effects of this rivalry in the Mediterranean. If the EU wants to develop its strategic autonomy in its southern neighbourhood, it will need to create a European-owned deconfliction mechanism in the Mediterranean, proceed with the Berlin Process in Libya, and design a constructive new framework for its relationship with Turkey.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Hold a Mediterranean conference\nthe Mediterranean will remain a key battleground for geopolitical competition between the two countries\nEurope needs to establish its own process for deconfliction in the region and to minimise the effects of the Turkish-Emirati rivalry there. It is in the EU’s long-term interests to create its own mechanisms for de-escalation.\nthe process provided Europeans with a mechanism to coordinate de-escalation, feeding into a ceasefire and a re-energised UN political process.\na pan-Mediterranean conference\ncould develop into a multilateral framework akin to the Berlin Process\nBy involving participants from coastal nations – including Cyprus – and representatives from the Turkish Cypriot community, the conference would create a new space to encourage settlement negotiations in Cyprus\nSuch an effort would likely win the backing of the Biden administration and reduce Europe’s internal divisions.\nUse\nNATO\nfor deconfliction\nNATO is an important and underestimated instrument\nto\ncontain the Turkey-UAE rivalry\nGiven\nUS retrenchment in the Middle East and the Biden administration’s emphasis on multilateralism, NATO is likely to be reinvigorated in the coming years – as is the UAE’s interest in closer cooperation with the organisation. As NATO is increasingly attentive to security issues on Europe’s southern flank, Europeans have an opportunity to persuade the UAE and Turkey to establish a deconfliction hotline\nas well as a platform to define military deconfliction protocols\nThe Turkish-Emirati rivalry is an intractable problem\nThe conflict\nhelps both regimes extend their reach across the region and consolidate their domestic support. Turkey and the UAE have tried to promulgate their own narratives\nboth aim to extend their influence over Europe’s neighbourhood\nEuropeans should develop their own agency and independent strategy, and should look to manage the destabilising effects of this rivalry in the Mediterranean\nthe EU\nwill need to create a European-owned deconfliction mechanism in the Mediterranean", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: NATO can establish an effective deconfliction mechanism.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Hold a Mediterranean conference\nthe Mediterranean will remain a key battleground for geopolitical competition between the two countries\nEurope needs to establish its own process for deconfliction in the region and to minimise the effects of the Turkish-Emirati rivalry there. It is in the EU’s long-term interests to create its own mechanisms for de-escalation.\nthe process provided Europeans with a mechanism to coordinate de-escalation, feeding into a ceasefire and a re-energised UN political process.\na pan-Mediterranean conference\ncould develop into a multilateral framework akin to the Berlin Process\nBy involving participants from coastal nations – including Cyprus – and representatives from the Turkish Cypriot community, the conference would create a new space to encourage settlement negotiations in Cyprus\nSuch an effort would likely win the backing of the Biden administration and reduce Europe’s internal divisions.\nUse\nNATO\nfor deconfliction\nNATO is an important and underestimated instrument\nto\ncontain the Turkey-UAE rivalry\nGiven\nUS retrenchment in the Middle East and the Biden administration’s emphasis on multilateralism, NATO is likely to be reinvigorated in the coming years – as is the UAE’s interest in closer cooperation with the organisation. As NATO is increasingly attentive to security issues on Europe’s southern flank, Europeans have an opportunity to persuade the UAE and Turkey to establish a deconfliction hotline\nas well as a platform to define military deconfliction protocols\nThe Turkish-Emirati rivalry is an intractable problem\nThe conflict\nhelps both regimes extend their reach across the region and consolidate their domestic support. Turkey and the UAE have tried to promulgate their own narratives\nboth aim to extend their influence over Europe’s neighbourhood\nEuropeans should develop their own agency and independent strategy, and should look to manage the destabilising effects of this rivalry in the Mediterranean\nthe EU\nwill need to create a European-owned deconfliction mechanism in the Mediterranean", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Mediterranean conference\nkey battleground\ngeopolitical competition\nmechanisms for de-escalation\ncoordinate de-escalation\nre-energised UN political process.\nmultilateral framework\nencourage settlement negotiations\nbacking of the Biden administration\nNATO\nimportant\nunderestimated\nemphasis on multilateralism\nreinvigorated\ndeconfliction hotline\nmilitary deconfliction protocols\nintractable problem\nextend their reach\nconsolidate their domestic support\nextend their influence\ndevelop their own agency\nindependent strategy\nmanage the destabilising effects\nEuropean-owned deconfliction mechanism", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: NATO can establish an effective deconfliction mechanism.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Hold a Mediterranean conference\nthe Mediterranean will remain a key battleground for geopolitical competition between the two countries\nEurope needs to establish its own process for deconfliction in the region and to minimise the effects of the Turkish-Emirati rivalry there. It is in the EU’s long-term interests to create its own mechanisms for de-escalation.\nthe process provided Europeans with a mechanism to coordinate de-escalation, feeding into a ceasefire and a re-energised UN political process.\na pan-Mediterranean conference\ncould develop into a multilateral framework akin to the Berlin Process\nBy involving participants from coastal nations – including Cyprus – and representatives from the Turkish Cypriot community, the conference would create a new space to encourage settlement negotiations in Cyprus\nSuch an effort would likely win the backing of the Biden administration and reduce Europe’s internal divisions.\nUse\nNATO\nfor deconfliction\nNATO is an important and underestimated instrument\nto\ncontain the Turkey-UAE rivalry\nGiven\nUS retrenchment in the Middle East and the Biden administration’s emphasis on multilateralism, NATO is likely to be reinvigorated in the coming years – as is the UAE’s interest in closer cooperation with the organisation. As NATO is increasingly attentive to security issues on Europe’s southern flank, Europeans have an opportunity to persuade the UAE and Turkey to establish a deconfliction hotline\nas well as a platform to define military deconfliction protocols\nThe Turkish-Emirati rivalry is an intractable problem\nThe conflict\nhelps both regimes extend their reach across the region and consolidate their domestic support. Turkey and the UAE have tried to promulgate their own narratives\nboth aim to extend their influence over Europe’s neighbourhood\nEuropeans should develop their own agency and independent strategy, and should look to manage the destabilising effects of this rivalry in the Mediterranean\nthe EU\nwill need to create a European-owned deconfliction mechanism in the Mediterranean", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the Mediterranean will remain a key battleground for geopolitical competition\nIt is in the EU’s\ninterests to create\nmechanisms for de-escalation.\nSuch an effort would\nwin\nBiden\nand reduce\ninternal divisions.\nUse\nNATO\nfor deconfliction\nGiven\nBiden\nemphasis on multilateralism, NATO is likely to be reinvigorated\nEuropeans have an opportunity to\nestablish a deconfliction hotline\nEuropeans should\nmanage the destabilising effects of this rivalry", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Including NATO enables successful crisis mediation over the Cyprus dispute.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Stemming this dangerous action-reaction cycle requires urgent international mediation. The European Union is reportedly preparing such an effort, which will include both positive incentives and tough new sanctions on Turkey should talks fail. NATO has also started talks between Turkey and Greece on military deconfliction in the Eastern Mediterranean. \nAn initial de-escalatory goal of EU-led talks could be for Turkey to extend indefinitely TPAO’s September 12 suspension of Oruc Reis’s exploration near Kastellorizo and perhaps recognize the special case of an EEZ for Crete in exchange for Athens accepting no EEZ for Kastellorizo. \nWere Ankara to agree to some sort of special economic rights for Crete, it would mark a major concession, breaking with Turkey’s longstanding position that islands are not entitled to EEZs. Eliciting such a concession will require Greece to agree to Turkey’s insistence on discussing the “full range of issues” dividing them in the Eastern Mediterranean. Chief among these is Cyprus, where Turkey has not legally recognized the Government of the Republic of Cyprus since 1974. UN-led mediation between the Government of the Republic of Cyprus (supported by Greece and a member of the EU) and the Turkish Cypriot community (supported by Turkey) has so far been unsuccessful in reuniting the island.\nThis political division of Cyprus results in competing EEZ claims as depicted in the map below. \nThe Greek Cypriot authorities in Nicosia, who are the internationally recognized government of an EU member state, claim an EEZ that surrounds the entire island, and which is defined by delimitation agreements with Egypt in 2003, Lebanon in 2007, and Israel in 2010. Nicosia subsequently licensed several hydrocarbon-exploration blocks to international oil companies in waters south of the island. These companies began seismic surveys and drilling in 2011. In response, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leaders signed a maritime-boundary delimitation agreement in 2011, resulting in their own EEZ claims and licensing hydrocarbon-exploration blocks in waters also claimed by Nicosia.\nThe Turkish government maintains that it showed restraint by refraining from any challenges at sea to the above actions by Nicosia from 2003 to 2011. Moreover, TPAO waited an additional seven years to begin drilling, helping provide space for the latest round of UN-brokered talks aimed at reunifying Cyprus in a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Those talks collapsed, however, in the summer of 2017­­ and TPAO started drilling a year later.\nThe political, economic, and legal disputes dividing Cyprus long predate current tensions between Turkey and Greece over Kastellorizo and Crete, and will require an intensive and sustained diplomatic effort by the EU and perhaps the United States to prevent crises from recurring in the Eastern Mediterranean.\nFrance, Greece, and the entire EU should embrace this de-escalatory approach, recognizing that the entire transatlantic community will be strategically better off with a strong Greece-Turkey relationship that ensures a fair system for sharing Eastern Mediterranean energy resources.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Stemming this dangerous action-reaction cycle requires urgent international mediation\nThe European Union is\npreparing such an effort, which will include both positive incentives and tough new sanctions on Turkey should talks fail. NATO has also started talks between Turkey and Greece on military deconfliction in the Eastern Mediterranean.\ninitial de-escalatory goal of EU-led talks could be for Turkey to extend indefinitely TPAO’s\nsuspension of\nexploration near Kastellorizo and perhaps recognize\nan EEZ for Crete in exchange for Athens accepting no EEZ for Kastellorizo.\nit would mark a major concession, breaking with Turkey’s longstanding position that islands are not entitled to EEZs\nThe political, economic, and legal disputes dividing Cyprus long predate current tensions between Turkey and Greece over Kastellorizo and Crete, and will require an intensive and sustained diplomatic effort by the EU and perhaps the United States to prevent crises from recurring in the Eastern Mediterranean\nFrance, Greece, and the entire EU should embrace this de-escalatory approach, recognizing that the entire transatlantic community will be strategically better off with a strong Greece-Turkey relationship that ensures a fair system for sharing Eastern Mediterranean energy resources.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Including NATO enables successful crisis mediation over the Cyprus dispute.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Stemming this dangerous action-reaction cycle requires urgent international mediation\nThe European Union is\npreparing such an effort, which will include both positive incentives and tough new sanctions on Turkey should talks fail. NATO has also started talks between Turkey and Greece on military deconfliction in the Eastern Mediterranean.\ninitial de-escalatory goal of EU-led talks could be for Turkey to extend indefinitely TPAO’s\nsuspension of\nexploration near Kastellorizo and perhaps recognize\nan EEZ for Crete in exchange for Athens accepting no EEZ for Kastellorizo.\nit would mark a major concession, breaking with Turkey’s longstanding position that islands are not entitled to EEZs\nThe political, economic, and legal disputes dividing Cyprus long predate current tensions between Turkey and Greece over Kastellorizo and Crete, and will require an intensive and sustained diplomatic effort by the EU and perhaps the United States to prevent crises from recurring in the Eastern Mediterranean\nFrance, Greece, and the entire EU should embrace this de-escalatory approach, recognizing that the entire transatlantic community will be strategically better off with a strong Greece-Turkey relationship that ensures a fair system for sharing Eastern Mediterranean energy resources.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "urgent international mediation\npositive incentives\ntough new sanctions on Turkey\ninitial de-escalatory goal\nmark a major concession\nlong predate current tensions\nintensive\nsustained diplomatic effort\nprevent crises from recurring\nembrace this de-escalatory approach\nstrategically better off\nfair system", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Including NATO enables successful crisis mediation over the Cyprus dispute.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Stemming this dangerous action-reaction cycle requires urgent international mediation\nThe European Union is\npreparing such an effort, which will include both positive incentives and tough new sanctions on Turkey should talks fail. NATO has also started talks between Turkey and Greece on military deconfliction in the Eastern Mediterranean.\ninitial de-escalatory goal of EU-led talks could be for Turkey to extend indefinitely TPAO’s\nsuspension of\nexploration near Kastellorizo and perhaps recognize\nan EEZ for Crete in exchange for Athens accepting no EEZ for Kastellorizo.\nit would mark a major concession, breaking with Turkey’s longstanding position that islands are not entitled to EEZs\nThe political, economic, and legal disputes dividing Cyprus long predate current tensions between Turkey and Greece over Kastellorizo and Crete, and will require an intensive and sustained diplomatic effort by the EU and perhaps the United States to prevent crises from recurring in the Eastern Mediterranean\nFrance, Greece, and the entire EU should embrace this de-escalatory approach, recognizing that the entire transatlantic community will be strategically better off with a strong Greece-Turkey relationship that ensures a fair system for sharing Eastern Mediterranean energy resources.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Stemming this\naction-reaction cycle requires urgent international mediation\nsuch an effort\nwill include both positive incentives and\nnew sanctions\ninitial de-escalatory\ncould be for Turkey to extend indefinitely TPAO’s\nsuspension\nThe\ndisputes dividing Cyprus\npredate current tensions\nand will require an intensive and sustained diplomatic effort by the EU and\nthe U\nS\nto prevent crises from recurring\nFrance, Greece, and the\nEU should embrace this de-escalatory approach\nthe entire\ncommunity will be\nbetter off with a strong Greece-Turkey relationship", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Diplomacy solves Turkey-Greece war – disengagement cedes leverage.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "At present, the United States’ ability to mediate and manage tensions is threatened by the changing dynamics of the US-Turkey-Greece relationship. The United States’ slow disengagement from the region, which began during the Obama administration and continued through the Trump administration, has coincided with a worsening of US-Turkey relations. This deterioration in the bilateral relationship has been caused by a number of issues, the most challenging of which has been Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile-defense system. In December 2020, then-US President Donald Trump’s administration imposed sanctions on Turkey under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in response to its purchase of the missile-defense system. Turkey’s decision to purchase S-400s has also drawn criticism from US policymakers, particularly those in the US defense establishment, which had been among Turkey’s staunchest defenders in Washington.\nTurkey, on the other hand, views US support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia as an existential threat and anathema to the spirit of its relationship with the United States. The YPG is acknowledged to be the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which both Turkey and the United States have designated a terrorist organization.\nUS-Greece ties flourish\nAt the same time, US-Greece bilateral relations have been flourishing with intense diplomatic efforts bolstered by traditionally strong lobbying by the diaspora community. This warming has led to reports and speculation that a new strategic alliance between Greece and the United States could serve as an alternative to Turkey and that the United States is considering Greek islands as an alternative to the Incirlik airbase in Turkey.\nThe way forward\nWhile a certain distancing between the United States and Turkey is understandable, abandoning Turkey for Greece (or, hypothetically, vice versa) would not contribute to stability and peace in the region, and it would gravely impact US interests.\nEncouraging Greece to make concessions regarding its maximalist claims in its disputes with Turkey could arguably embolden nationalistic political forces in Greece, weaken the chances for success of talks between Greece and Turkey, and put the US-Greece relationship in jeopardy. But it is the responsibility of political leaders to communicate to and persuade their constituents of the virtues of striking a monumental agreement as opposed to being intransigent. Indeed, the world already witnessed an unfavorable outcome in 2004 when Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan for the reunification of Cyprus, which the Turkish Cypriot community supported—the closest the two sides came to healing the divided island.\nHopefully, the United States can maintain its unique position as a neutral mediator while at the same time leveraging its relationship with Greece, currently at an all-time high, to encourage holistic dialogue with its other ally Turkey. Through such a proactive approach, the United States could help resolve one of NATO’s longstanding points of discord and reassert itself as a problem solver in the region.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the United States’ ability to mediate and manage tensions is threatened by the changing dynamics of the US-Turkey-Greece relationship. The United States’ slow disengagement from the region\ncoincided with a worsening of US-Turkey relations. This deterioration in the bilateral relationship has been caused by a number of issues, the most challenging of which has been Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400\nTurkey’s decision to purchase S-400s has also drawn criticism from US policymakers, particularly those in the US defense establishment, which had been among Turkey’s staunchest defenders in Washington.\nTurkey, on the other hand, views US support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia as an existential threat and anathema to the spirit of its relationship with the United States. The YPG is acknowledged to be the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which both Turkey and the United States have designated a terrorist organization.\nUS-Greece bilateral relations have been flourishing with intense diplomatic efforts bolstered by traditionally strong lobbying by the diaspora community. This warming has led to reports and speculation that a new strategic alliance between Greece and the United States could serve as an alternative to Turkey\nabandoning Turkey for Greece (or, hypothetically, vice versa) would not contribute to stability and peace in the region, and it would gravely impact US interests.\nit is the responsibility of political leaders to communicate to and persuade their constituents of the virtues of striking a monumental agreement as opposed to being intransigent\nHopefully, the United States can maintain its unique position as a neutral mediator while at the same time leveraging its relationship with Greece, currently at an all-time high, to encourage holistic dialogue with its other ally Turkey. Through such a proactive approach, the United States could help resolve one of NATO’s longstanding points of discord and reassert itself as a problem solver in the region.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Diplomacy solves Turkey-Greece war – disengagement cedes leverage.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the United States’ ability to mediate and manage tensions is threatened by the changing dynamics of the US-Turkey-Greece relationship. The United States’ slow disengagement from the region\ncoincided with a worsening of US-Turkey relations. This deterioration in the bilateral relationship has been caused by a number of issues, the most challenging of which has been Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400\nTurkey’s decision to purchase S-400s has also drawn criticism from US policymakers, particularly those in the US defense establishment, which had been among Turkey’s staunchest defenders in Washington.\nTurkey, on the other hand, views US support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia as an existential threat and anathema to the spirit of its relationship with the United States. The YPG is acknowledged to be the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which both Turkey and the United States have designated a terrorist organization.\nUS-Greece bilateral relations have been flourishing with intense diplomatic efforts bolstered by traditionally strong lobbying by the diaspora community. This warming has led to reports and speculation that a new strategic alliance between Greece and the United States could serve as an alternative to Turkey\nabandoning Turkey for Greece (or, hypothetically, vice versa) would not contribute to stability and peace in the region, and it would gravely impact US interests.\nit is the responsibility of political leaders to communicate to and persuade their constituents of the virtues of striking a monumental agreement as opposed to being intransigent\nHopefully, the United States can maintain its unique position as a neutral mediator while at the same time leveraging its relationship with Greece, currently at an all-time high, to encourage holistic dialogue with its other ally Turkey. Through such a proactive approach, the United States could help resolve one of NATO’s longstanding points of discord and reassert itself as a problem solver in the region.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "mediate\nmanage tensions\nUS-Turkey-Greece relationship\ndeterioration in the bilateral relationship\nTurkey’s staunchest defenders\nexistential threat\nintense diplomatic efforts\ntraditionally strong lobbying\nnew strategic alliance\nGreece and the United States\nnot contribute to stability\ngravely impact US interests\ncommunicate to\npersuade their constituents\nleveraging its relationship with Greece\nencourage holistic dialogue\nproactive approach\nresolve one of NATO’s longstanding points of discord\nreassert itself as a problem solver", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Diplomacy solves Turkey-Greece war – disengagement cedes leverage.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the United States’ ability to mediate and manage tensions is threatened by the changing dynamics of the US-Turkey-Greece relationship. The United States’ slow disengagement from the region\ncoincided with a worsening of US-Turkey relations. This deterioration in the bilateral relationship has been caused by a number of issues, the most challenging of which has been Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400\nTurkey’s decision to purchase S-400s has also drawn criticism from US policymakers, particularly those in the US defense establishment, which had been among Turkey’s staunchest defenders in Washington.\nTurkey, on the other hand, views US support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia as an existential threat and anathema to the spirit of its relationship with the United States. The YPG is acknowledged to be the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which both Turkey and the United States have designated a terrorist organization.\nUS-Greece bilateral relations have been flourishing with intense diplomatic efforts bolstered by traditionally strong lobbying by the diaspora community. This warming has led to reports and speculation that a new strategic alliance between Greece and the United States could serve as an alternative to Turkey\nabandoning Turkey for Greece (or, hypothetically, vice versa) would not contribute to stability and peace in the region, and it would gravely impact US interests.\nit is the responsibility of political leaders to communicate to and persuade their constituents of the virtues of striking a monumental agreement as opposed to being intransigent\nHopefully, the United States can maintain its unique position as a neutral mediator while at the same time leveraging its relationship with Greece, currently at an all-time high, to encourage holistic dialogue with its other ally Turkey. Through such a proactive approach, the United States could help resolve one of NATO’s longstanding points of discord and reassert itself as a problem solver in the region.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the U\nS\nability to mediate and manage tensions is threatened by\nthe US-Turkey-Greece relationship\nTurkey\nviews US support for\nYPG\nas an existential threat\nUS-Greece bilateral relations have been flourishing\nbolstered by\nstrong lobbying\nabandoning Turkey\nor\nvice versa\nwould gravely impact US interests.\nthe U\nS\ncan\nleverag\nits relationship with Greece\nto encourage holistic dialogue\nThrough such a proactive approach, the U\nS\ncould\nresolve\ndiscord and reassert itself as a problem solver", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The dialogue will restore stability to the region.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Although NATO’s involvement in those initiatives is evidently more in the interest of its European member states rather than the US, this does not mean that America neglects the Turkish issue. Despite the retreat of the US from the MENA region, Ankara remains a partner for the US, and Americans cannot afford to lose Turkey.[lxvi] However, the US remains vague about its engagement and, it is unlikely that Washington will take the lead over any de-escalation initiative. The 2020 US presidential election candidates, moreover, seem to have slightly different approaches towards the current conflict. While Trump’s administration has been showing a softer approach vis-á-vis Ankara,[lxvii] conversely, the rival Joe Biden has been more critical of Turkey’s stances, also condemning President Erdogan for undertaking provocative actions in the East Med.[lxviii] The fragile balance in the region has been recently marked by the persistency of the Ankara-Moscow axis[lxix]; nevertheless, Turkey hangs in the balance. Ankara and Moscow remain historical competitors and “distancing itself from the Euro-Atlantic alliance would also leave Turkey vulnerable to Russian designs and meddling”.[lxx] Accordingly, it is unlikely that Turkey would risk opting for a geopolitical realignment with Russia and Iran—not least due to the chaotic situation raised in Libya—yet fully re-anchoring Turkey to the West remains arduous, and Europeans hold the hot potato. While Europe is torn due to differing stances towards Turkey-related dossiers, Germany has been playing a mediator role between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, filling the role the US used to play in the past.[lxxi] Accordingly, Europeans should maintain a dialogue with Ankara backed by a concrete agenda. In other words, Europe should seize the opportunity to come out of its shell and start developing a set of policy options to face the problems in its own backyard.\nIn this sense, NATO plays a crucial role in preventing confrontation. As it does for the US, Turkey remains a crucial actor for the Alliance, able to stabilize the situation or act as a spoiler: “for NATO, Turkey is a window to Eurasia, while for the EU it is an important trade and energy hub”.[lxxii] NATO has already proved to be the most suitable forum to develop pre-emptive mechanisms and to avoid the spectre of a confrontation that can potentially spiral into open war. The success of the military deconfliction mechanisms should pave the path to restore cooperation within the Alliance, and joint naval exercises may also help the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations.[lxxiii] NATO’s maritime presence could be a valuable resource, and the Alliance’s presence at sea could be a starting point for NATO to expand its role in the Eastern Mediterranean. Operation Sea Guardian has contributed to achieving tangible results: to secure the area, coordinate allies, develop a modus operandi with the EU, and establish partnerships with third countries. However, it shall not become an end per se, since NATO has to develop a new strategy to cope with the appearance of Russia and the spread of instability in the region. NATO member states, to a greater or lesser extent, share interests in the area both to counter Russia and to project stability—e.g., Eastern and Southern allies, respectively. The Alliance should, therefore, renovate its strategy and act as a facilitator to escape from the current impasse, re-establish internal unity through dialogue, and restore its role in the region.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Although NATO’s involvement in those initiatives is evidently more in the interest of its European member states rather than the US\nthis does not mean that America neglects the Turkish issue. Despite the retreat of the US from the MENA\nAnkara remains a partner for the US,\nAmericans cannot afford to lose Turkey\nthe US remains vague about its engagement\nBiden has been more critical of Turkey’s stances\ncondemning\nErdogan for undertaking provocative actions in the East Med.[\nAnkara and Moscow remain historical competitors and “distancing itself from the Euro-Atlantic alliance would also leave Turkey vulnerable to Russian designs and meddling\nit is unlikely that Turkey would risk opting for a geopolitical realignment with Russia and Iran—not least due to the chaotic situation raised in Libya—yet fully re-anchoring Turkey to the West remains arduous, and Europeans hold the hot potato.\nGermany has been playing a mediator role between\nErdogan and Greek Prime Minister\nMitsotakis, filling the role the US used to play in the past\nEuropeans should maintain a dialogue with Ankara backed by a concrete agenda. In other words, Europe should seize the opportunity to come out of its shell and start developing a set of policy options to face the problems in its own backyard.\nNATO plays a crucial role in preventing confrontation\nTurkey remains a crucial actor for the Alliance, able to stabilize the situation or act as a spoiler: “for NATO, Turkey is a window to Eurasia, while for the EU it is an important trade and energy hub”.[\nNATO has already proved to be the most suitable forum to develop pre-emptive mechanisms and to avoid\nconfrontation that can\nspiral into open war. The success of the military deconfliction mechanisms should pave the path to restore cooperation within the Alliance,\njoint naval exercises may\nhelp the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations.[\nthe Alliance’s presence at sea could be a starting point for NATO to expand its role in the Eastern Mediterranean\nNATO member states,\nshare interests in the area both to counter Russia and to project stability\nThe Alliance should\nrenovate its strategy and act as a facilitator to escape from the current impasse, re-establish internal unity through dialogue, and restore its role in the region", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The dialogue will restore stability to the region.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Although NATO’s involvement in those initiatives is evidently more in the interest of its European member states rather than the US\nthis does not mean that America neglects the Turkish issue. Despite the retreat of the US from the MENA\nAnkara remains a partner for the US,\nAmericans cannot afford to lose Turkey\nthe US remains vague about its engagement\nBiden has been more critical of Turkey’s stances\ncondemning\nErdogan for undertaking provocative actions in the East Med.[\nAnkara and Moscow remain historical competitors and “distancing itself from the Euro-Atlantic alliance would also leave Turkey vulnerable to Russian designs and meddling\nit is unlikely that Turkey would risk opting for a geopolitical realignment with Russia and Iran—not least due to the chaotic situation raised in Libya—yet fully re-anchoring Turkey to the West remains arduous, and Europeans hold the hot potato.\nGermany has been playing a mediator role between\nErdogan and Greek Prime Minister\nMitsotakis, filling the role the US used to play in the past\nEuropeans should maintain a dialogue with Ankara backed by a concrete agenda. In other words, Europe should seize the opportunity to come out of its shell and start developing a set of policy options to face the problems in its own backyard.\nNATO plays a crucial role in preventing confrontation\nTurkey remains a crucial actor for the Alliance, able to stabilize the situation or act as a spoiler: “for NATO, Turkey is a window to Eurasia, while for the EU it is an important trade and energy hub”.[\nNATO has already proved to be the most suitable forum to develop pre-emptive mechanisms and to avoid\nconfrontation that can\nspiral into open war. The success of the military deconfliction mechanisms should pave the path to restore cooperation within the Alliance,\njoint naval exercises may\nhelp the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations.[\nthe Alliance’s presence at sea could be a starting point for NATO to expand its role in the Eastern Mediterranean\nNATO member states,\nshare interests in the area both to counter Russia and to project stability\nThe Alliance should\nrenovate its strategy and act as a facilitator to escape from the current impasse, re-establish internal unity through dialogue, and restore its role in the region", "role": "user" }, { "content": "neglects the Turkish issue\nretreat of the US\ncannot afford to lose Turkey\nremains vague\nhistorical competitors\nleave Turkey vulnerable\nfully re-anchoring Turkey to the West\nfilling the role the US used to play\nmaintain a dialogue\nset of policy options\ncrucial role\nstabilize the situation\ndevelop pre-emptive mechanisms\nspiral into open war\nrestore cooperation\njoint naval exercises\nexpand its role\nshare interests\ncounter Russia\nre-establish internal unity\nrestore its role", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The dialogue will restore stability to the region.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Although NATO’s involvement in those initiatives is evidently more in the interest of its European member states rather than the US\nthis does not mean that America neglects the Turkish issue. Despite the retreat of the US from the MENA\nAnkara remains a partner for the US,\nAmericans cannot afford to lose Turkey\nthe US remains vague about its engagement\nBiden has been more critical of Turkey’s stances\ncondemning\nErdogan for undertaking provocative actions in the East Med.[\nAnkara and Moscow remain historical competitors and “distancing itself from the Euro-Atlantic alliance would also leave Turkey vulnerable to Russian designs and meddling\nit is unlikely that Turkey would risk opting for a geopolitical realignment with Russia and Iran—not least due to the chaotic situation raised in Libya—yet fully re-anchoring Turkey to the West remains arduous, and Europeans hold the hot potato.\nGermany has been playing a mediator role between\nErdogan and Greek Prime Minister\nMitsotakis, filling the role the US used to play in the past\nEuropeans should maintain a dialogue with Ankara backed by a concrete agenda. In other words, Europe should seize the opportunity to come out of its shell and start developing a set of policy options to face the problems in its own backyard.\nNATO plays a crucial role in preventing confrontation\nTurkey remains a crucial actor for the Alliance, able to stabilize the situation or act as a spoiler: “for NATO, Turkey is a window to Eurasia, while for the EU it is an important trade and energy hub”.[\nNATO has already proved to be the most suitable forum to develop pre-emptive mechanisms and to avoid\nconfrontation that can\nspiral into open war. The success of the military deconfliction mechanisms should pave the path to restore cooperation within the Alliance,\njoint naval exercises may\nhelp the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations.[\nthe Alliance’s presence at sea could be a starting point for NATO to expand its role in the Eastern Mediterranean\nNATO member states,\nshare interests in the area both to counter Russia and to project stability\nThe Alliance should\nrenovate its strategy and act as a facilitator to escape from the current impasse, re-establish internal unity through dialogue, and restore its role in the region", "role": "user" }, { "content": "this does not mean\nAmerica neglects the Turkish issue. Despite\nretreat of the US from the MENA\nAmericans cannot afford to lose Turkey\nit is unlikely\nTurkey would risk\nRussia and Iran\nyet\nre-anchoring Turkey to the West remains arduous\nEuropeans hold the hot potato\nGermany has been playing\nmediator\nfilling the role the US used to\nEuropeans should maintain a dialogue\nand start developing\npolicy options\nNATO plays a crucial role\nto develop pre-emptive mechanisms and\navoid\nopen war. The\ndeconfliction mechanisms\njoint naval exercises may\nhelp\nNATO\nstates\nshare interests\nThe Alliance should\nact as a facilitator to\nre-establish internal unity through dialogue, and restore its role", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Turkey’s principal concern is energy security. That’s the underlying cause of its military adventurism.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The recent gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean, combined with several other factors, have increased Turkey’s appetite for hydrocarbon exploration. Energy trade is the main source of the country’s budget deficit. Turkey imported 72.4 percent of its energy needs as of 2018 (see Figure 1), while energy constituted 16.8 percent of its overall imports as of June 2020.[5] In the last five years, Turkey’s total budget deficit amounted to $220 billion, according to data from the Turkish Statistical Institute and the Central Bank.[6] In the same period, Turkey’s overall energy bill stood at $213 billion.[7] Through hydrocarbon exploration, Turkey hopes to address its chronic economic problems; to this end, the country has doubled down on its energy exploration activities both in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, which recently culminated in a major gas discovery.[8]\nLikewise, Turkey has long aspired to situate itself as an energy hub for, and corridor to, Europe and has signed several oil and gas pipeline deals with Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, and Russia (see Figure 2).[9] However, its aspirations have largely remained unfulfilled. Along the same lines, Turkey wanted any eastern Mediterranean pipeline project to Europe to go through it. Yet, Ankara’s difficult relations with almost all other countries bordering the eastern Mediterranean have made this option highly unrealistic.\nThrough energy exploration in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, Turkey also aims to reduce its strategic vulnerability and energy dependency (see Figure 3). For a long time, the top two exporters of natural gas to Turkey were Russia and Iran, two countries with which Turkey has competitive regional aspirations. In recent years, Turkey has pursued a policy of energy independence from these countries: during the first half of 2020, natural gas imports from Iran and Russia declined by 44.8 percent and 41.5 percent, respectively, compared to the same period of 2019 (though, in Iran’s case, this decline was partially caused by a damaged pipeline).[10] In contrast, Turkey’s imports from Azerbaijan increased by 23.4 percent during the same period, giving Azerbaijan the largest share in Turkey’s natural gas market.[11]\nDespite Turkey’s energy ambitions, the recent eastern Mediterranean gas discoveries have deepened its concerns of being sidelined from the region’s emerging energy and security order.[12] This is primarily due to two interlinked reasons: 1) the projected route for the eastern Mediterranean gas pipeline project and 2) the creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. The envisioned €6.2 billion pipeline to Europe is premised on closer cooperation between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, and excludes Turkey.[13] This tripartite cooperation gained an institutional form in January 2020 with the creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which also includes Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Italy.[14]\nVarious geopolitical struggles, uncertainty over the amount of gas in the eastern Mediterranean, and the EU’s green energy goals have made financing the project less attractive, and Italy has since withdrawn.[15] The pipeline project is not economically feasible at this point, and is therefore unlikely to be implemented.[16] However, the proposed pipeline and forum, as well as the regional realignment that underpinned them, have contributed to Turkish fears of being sidelined from the emerging energy and security framework in the eastern Mediterranean. In response, Turkey has deployed a hard power-driven approach and coercive diplomacy to prevent the emergence of such a framework.[17]", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The recent gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean\nincreased Turkey’s appetite for hydrocarbon exploration. Energy trade is the main source of the country’s budget deficit. Turkey imported 72.4 percent of its energy\nTurkey’s total budget deficit amounted\n$220 billion\nThrough hydrocarbon exploration, Turkey hopes to address its chronic economic problems; to this end, the country has doubled down on its energy exploration activities both in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, which recently culminated in a major gas discovery\nTurkey has long aspired to situate itself as an energy hub for, and corridor to, Europe\nits aspirations have largely remained unfulfilled\nTurkey wanted any eastern Mediterranean pipeline project\nto go through it. Yet, Ankara’s difficult relations\nmade this option highly unrealistic.\nThrough energy exploration in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, Turkey also aims to reduce its strategic vulnerability and energy dependency\nTurkey has pursued a policy of energy independence from these\nrecent eastern Mediterranean gas discoveries have deepened its concerns of being sidelined from the region’s emerging energy and security order\nThis is primarily due to\n1) the projected route for the eastern Mediterranean gas pipeline project and 2) the creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum\nthe proposed pipeline and forum, as well as the regional realignment that underpinned them, have contributed to Turkish fears of being sidelined from the emerging energy and security framework in the eastern Mediterranean. In response, Turkey\ndeployed a hard power-driven approach and coercive diplomacy to prevent the emergence of such a framework", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Turkey’s principal concern is energy security. That’s the underlying cause of its military adventurism.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The recent gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean\nincreased Turkey’s appetite for hydrocarbon exploration. Energy trade is the main source of the country’s budget deficit. Turkey imported 72.4 percent of its energy\nTurkey’s total budget deficit amounted\n$220 billion\nThrough hydrocarbon exploration, Turkey hopes to address its chronic economic problems; to this end, the country has doubled down on its energy exploration activities both in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, which recently culminated in a major gas discovery\nTurkey has long aspired to situate itself as an energy hub for, and corridor to, Europe\nits aspirations have largely remained unfulfilled\nTurkey wanted any eastern Mediterranean pipeline project\nto go through it. Yet, Ankara’s difficult relations\nmade this option highly unrealistic.\nThrough energy exploration in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, Turkey also aims to reduce its strategic vulnerability and energy dependency\nTurkey has pursued a policy of energy independence from these\nrecent eastern Mediterranean gas discoveries have deepened its concerns of being sidelined from the region’s emerging energy and security order\nThis is primarily due to\n1) the projected route for the eastern Mediterranean gas pipeline project and 2) the creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum\nthe proposed pipeline and forum, as well as the regional realignment that underpinned them, have contributed to Turkish fears of being sidelined from the emerging energy and security framework in the eastern Mediterranean. In response, Turkey\ndeployed a hard power-driven approach and coercive diplomacy to prevent the emergence of such a framework", "role": "user" }, { "content": "appetite for hydrocarbon exploration\nbudget deficit\nchronic economic problems\ndoubled down\nenergy hub\nunfulfilled\nhighly unrealistic\nstrategic vulnerability\nenergy dependency\nenergy independence\nbeing sidelined\nEastern Mediterranean Gas Forum\nfears of being sidelined\nhard power-driven approach\ncoercive diplomacy", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Turkey’s principal concern is energy security. That’s the underlying cause of its military adventurism.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The recent gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean\nincreased Turkey’s appetite for hydrocarbon exploration. Energy trade is the main source of the country’s budget deficit. Turkey imported 72.4 percent of its energy\nTurkey’s total budget deficit amounted\n$220 billion\nThrough hydrocarbon exploration, Turkey hopes to address its chronic economic problems; to this end, the country has doubled down on its energy exploration activities both in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, which recently culminated in a major gas discovery\nTurkey has long aspired to situate itself as an energy hub for, and corridor to, Europe\nits aspirations have largely remained unfulfilled\nTurkey wanted any eastern Mediterranean pipeline project\nto go through it. Yet, Ankara’s difficult relations\nmade this option highly unrealistic.\nThrough energy exploration in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, Turkey also aims to reduce its strategic vulnerability and energy dependency\nTurkey has pursued a policy of energy independence from these\nrecent eastern Mediterranean gas discoveries have deepened its concerns of being sidelined from the region’s emerging energy and security order\nThis is primarily due to\n1) the projected route for the eastern Mediterranean gas pipeline project and 2) the creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum\nthe proposed pipeline and forum, as well as the regional realignment that underpinned them, have contributed to Turkish fears of being sidelined from the emerging energy and security framework in the eastern Mediterranean. In response, Turkey\ndeployed a hard power-driven approach and coercive diplomacy to prevent the emergence of such a framework", "role": "user" }, { "content": "recent gas discoveries\nincreased Turkey’s appetite for hydrocarbon exploration. Energy\nis the main source of the\ndeficit\nTurkey hopes to address\nchronic economic problems\nTurkey\naspired to situate itself as an energy hub\nTurkey\naims to reduce\nstrategic vulnerability and energy dependency\nrecent\ngas discoveries\ndeepened its concerns of being sidelined from the region’s emerging energy\norder\nIn response, Turkey\ndeployed a hard power-driven approach and coercive diplomacy to prevent\nsuch a framework", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Inviting them to the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum solves.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "However, a frozen conflict always runs the risk of thawing and providing opportunities for other actors such as Russia to step in and gain further influence in the European neighborhood. As such, this briefing urges the EU to try to facilitate Turkey’s accession into the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. If this is not possible, efforts should be made to devise a trilateral framework involving the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum countries, the EU, and Turkey to deal with the crisis and explore the ways in which eastern Mediterranean gas reserves can be the source of cooperation, rather than conflict.\nThe eastern Mediterranean crisis, at its core, is not about energy. Thus far, no gas has been found in the disputed territories. Certainly, the eastern Mediterranean gas discoveries made by Israel in 2009 and 2010 (Tamar and Leviathan, respectively), Cyprus in 2011, and Egypt in 2015 (Zohr) have precipitated and aggravated the crisis.[3] Yet, the roots of the crisis lie elsewhere, in conflicting claims by Turkey and Greece regarding maritime boundaries and Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZs) on the one hand, and Cyprus on the other.\nWith respect to the first issue, Ankara and Athens disagree on the roles and extents of the islands in generating the EEZ, with the former taking a more restrictive view and the latter a more expansive one. With respect to the latter, Turkey objects to the Republic of Cyprus (or, more specifically, the Greek Cypriots) being the sole conductor of energy exploration activities in the eastern Mediterranean. By insisting on political equality between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Ankara contends that the Turkish administration in northern Cyprus (which is only recognized by Turkey) also has rights to undertake energy exploration activities and issue licenses.[4]\nIn this way, the interlocking set of maritime disputes between Turkey and Greece is strongly tied to their conflicting projections of national sovereignty. As the following sections will demonstrate, these maritime disputes have since morphed into geopolitical confrontations and power struggles between Turkey and a set of countries including Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, France, and the UAE as a result of tensions over energy exploration and the Libyan conflict.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "a frozen conflict always runs the risk of thawing and providing opportunities for other actors such as Russia to step in and gain further influence in the European neighborhood\nthis briefing urges the EU to\nfacilitate Turkey’s accession into the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum.\nefforts should be made to devise a trilateral framework involving the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum countries, the EU, and Turkey to deal with the crisis and explore the ways in which eastern Mediterranean gas reserves can be the source of cooperation, rather than conflict.\nThe eastern Mediterranean crisis, at its core, is not about energy\nthe roots of the crisis lie\nin conflicting claims by Turkey and Greece regarding maritime boundaries\nthe interlocking set of maritime disputes between Turkey and Greece is strongly tied to their conflicting projections of national sovereignty\nthese maritime disputes have\nmorphed into geopolitical confrontations and power struggles between Turkey and\nGreece, Cyprus, Egypt, France, and the UAE as a result of tensions over energy exploration", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Inviting them to the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum solves.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "a frozen conflict always runs the risk of thawing and providing opportunities for other actors such as Russia to step in and gain further influence in the European neighborhood\nthis briefing urges the EU to\nfacilitate Turkey’s accession into the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum.\nefforts should be made to devise a trilateral framework involving the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum countries, the EU, and Turkey to deal with the crisis and explore the ways in which eastern Mediterranean gas reserves can be the source of cooperation, rather than conflict.\nThe eastern Mediterranean crisis, at its core, is not about energy\nthe roots of the crisis lie\nin conflicting claims by Turkey and Greece regarding maritime boundaries\nthe interlocking set of maritime disputes between Turkey and Greece is strongly tied to their conflicting projections of national sovereignty\nthese maritime disputes have\nmorphed into geopolitical confrontations and power struggles between Turkey and\nGreece, Cyprus, Egypt, France, and the UAE as a result of tensions over energy exploration", "role": "user" }, { "content": "facilitate Turkey’s accession\ntrilateral framework\nEastern Mediterranean Gas Forum\nsource of cooperation\nconflict\neastern Mediterranean crisis\nconflicting claims\ninterlocking set of maritime disputes\nprojections of national sovereignty\nenergy exploration", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Inviting them to the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum solves.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "a frozen conflict always runs the risk of thawing and providing opportunities for other actors such as Russia to step in and gain further influence in the European neighborhood\nthis briefing urges the EU to\nfacilitate Turkey’s accession into the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum.\nefforts should be made to devise a trilateral framework involving the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum countries, the EU, and Turkey to deal with the crisis and explore the ways in which eastern Mediterranean gas reserves can be the source of cooperation, rather than conflict.\nThe eastern Mediterranean crisis, at its core, is not about energy\nthe roots of the crisis lie\nin conflicting claims by Turkey and Greece regarding maritime boundaries\nthe interlocking set of maritime disputes between Turkey and Greece is strongly tied to their conflicting projections of national sovereignty\nthese maritime disputes have\nmorphed into geopolitical confrontations and power struggles between Turkey and\nGreece, Cyprus, Egypt, France, and the UAE as a result of tensions over energy exploration", "role": "user" }, { "content": "this\nurges the EU to\nfacilitate Turkey’s accession into the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum.\nefforts should be made to devise a trilateral framework involving the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum\nto\nexplore the ways in which eastern Mediterranean\ncan be the source of cooperation, rather than conflict\ninterlocking\ndisputes between Turkey and Greece is strongly tied to\nprojections of national sovereignty\nthese\ndisputes have\nmorphed into geopolitical confrontations\nas a result of\nenergy exploration", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The counterplan PIC’s out of ‘in the US’ – that establishes a test case for the presumption against extraterritoriality by enacting a geospatially ambiguous statute. It spills over to challenges regarding the Alien Tort Statute.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The presumption against extraterritoriality tells courts to read a territorial limit into statutes that are ambiguous about their geographic reach. This canon of construction has deep roots in Anglo-American law, and the US. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle of statutory interpretation in Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Yet as explained in this Article, none of the purported justifications for the presumption against extraterritoriality hold water. Older decisions look to international law or conflict-of-laws principles, but these bodies of law have changed such that they no longer support a territorial rule. Modern courts suggest that the presumption avoids conflicts with foreign states and approximates legislative attention, yet these same decisions show the presumption is poorly attuned to either of these laudable goals. And while separation of powers and due process are superficially served by this rule, they too crumble in the face of serious scrutiny.\nAlthough courts continue to rely on this outmoded presumption, some scholars have noted the incongruity between its goals and its execution. These scholars have offered alternative rules such as a presumption against extrajurisdictionality or a dual-illegality rule. But these alternative proposals fall into the same trap as the presumption - they uncritically apply a single approach to all types of cases. Instead, different statute types call for different rules: the Charming Betsy doctrine for private civil litigation, a rule of lenity for criminal statutes, and Chevron deference for administrative cases. These rules, not a singular presumption, best support the public policy interests that are important in each of these classes of disputes, and they also suggest an approach to Alien Tort Statute litigation that could serve as an alternative to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kiobel.\nINTRODUCTION\nThe presumption against extraterritoriality has been applied in U.S. courts for more than a century, receiving perhaps its most prominent endorsement from no less than Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: \"[A]ll legislation is prima facie territorial.\"' In the 1990s, Chief Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed this principle in its modem formulation: \"[L]egislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.\" 2 And in 2013, Chief Justice Roberts quoted Justice Scalia for the proposition that: \"When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.\" 3\nAs these Justices explained, and as its name suggests, the presumption against extraterritoriality instructs courts to construe geoambiguous statutes to apply only to the territory of the United States.4 The presumption against extraterritoriality has been cited in hundreds of reported decisions,5 and the Supreme Court has continued to \"wholeheartedly embrace\" the presumption against extraterritoriality in transnational litigation in U.S. courts. 6\nJudicial and scholarly advocates point to a range of justifications for the presumption against extraterritoriality: it reflects international law and conflictof-laws principles, 7 it insulates U.S. foreign relations interests by minimizing conflicts with foreign laws,8 it approximates congressional intent,9 it maintains the separation of powers among the coordinate branches,10 and it protects due process rights of defendants.\" Each of these goals is laudable, but the presumption against extraterritoriality is a crude tool to achieve these ends and at times it is counterproductive for its stated purposes.' 2 For these reasons, the presumption against extraterritoriality merits reevaluation. Part I of this Article takes up that task.\nThe examination of the presumption and its purposes is important for a few reasons. The presumption against extraterritoriality is a widely cited judicial rule, and it affects topics from securities regulation 3 to employment discrimination 4 to piracy.' 5 These decisions have consequences for regulated individuals and entities, and for those protected by such laws. The question of extraterritoriality further connects with foreign relations issues that have consequences for the United States and for foreign states. Interpretative rules also have dynamic effects.16 The behavior of legislators, regulators, and prosecutors is colored by the background rules established by courts, so ideally those background rules will be grounded in a justified normative foundation. More generally, transnational litigation and policy are significant. Professor Harold Koh, for example, has noted a recent emphasis on issues of extraterritoriality, which he attributes to an increase in transnational economic activity, the transnational interests of nation states, and the rise of transnational regulation.\" The presumption against extraterritoriality is one significant piece of this transnational legal landscape.\nPart I of this Article marshals evidence that the presumption against extraterritoriality is ill-suited for its purported purposes. These specific criticisms also reveal a deeper concern with current approaches to extraterritoriality. Although courts may adopt truly transsubstantive rules without exceptions, courts must make judgments about both the content of the rule and the scope of its application for many areas of statutory interpretation and procedure. Decisions about a rule's application reflect choices about the nature of cases; like cases should be treated more alike than unlike ones. The presumption against extraterritoriality reflects a judgment of this kind: it assumes that cases meeting the definition of \"extraterritorial\"' 8 are enough alike to be treated similarly for purposes of determining prescriptive jurisdiction.' 9 Scholarly proposals to replace the presumption against extraterritoriality track this conclusion, suggesting alternative rules to apply in all extraterritorial cases. 20 And a wider literature about foreign relations law takes as a given that \"foreign relations cases\" - whatever that term means - should be treated as a unified category. 21 But this conclusion is not required. Instead, at least with respect to the presumption against extraterritoriality, the relevant values may be best served by first considering other aspects of the case.\nPart II of this Article applies this insight and the purposes identified in Part I to frame a new approach to extraterritoriality and related cases. Unlike the aforementioned alternatives, the approach in Part II treats statute type rather than territory as the first cut. Once statutes are divided into civil, criminal, and administrative, then social values are more easily pursued. Indeed, Part II shows that the relevant values are served by existing case-type-specific doctrines of statutory interpretation: the Charming Betsy doctrine for private civil litigation, 22 the rule of lenity in criminal statutes,23 and Chevron deference in administrative cases.24 Part II explains that these rules, rather than the presumption, should govern extraterritorial cases in those three areas.\nHaving laid out these replacements, Part III looks to a statute that is highly salient in international litigation though not covered by these three categories. The Alien Tort Statute provides for federal court jurisdiction for international law torts, 25 and in recent years courts and scholars have debated its operation in extraterritorial cases. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute,26 but not without criticism from dissenting Justices and the academy. 27 Part III asks whether the rules laid out for substantive statutes in Part II have something to say about this jurisdictional statute that raises similar structural and international concerns.28", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The presumption against extraterritoriality tells courts to read a territorial limit into statutes that are ambiguous about\ngeographic reach. This canon of construction has deep roots\nand the US. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle of statutory interpretation in Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum\nnone of the purported justifications for the presumption against extraterritoriality hold water\nModern courts suggest\nthe presumption avoids conflicts with foreign states and approximates legislative attention, yet\nthe presumption is poorly attuned to either of these\ngoals\nwhile separation of powers and due process are superficially served\nthey\ncrumble in the face of serious scrutiny.\nAlthough courts\nrely on this outmoded presumption\nscholars have noted the incongruity between its goals and its execution\nalternative rules\nfall into the same trap as the presumption\nthey uncritically apply a single approach to all types of cases\ndifferent statute types call for different rules:\nCharming Betsy\nfor private civil litigation\nrule of lenity for criminal statutes, and Chevron\nfor administrative cases\nthey also suggest an approach to Alien Tort Statute litigation that could serve as an alternative to the Supreme Court's\ndecision in Kiobel.\nThe presumption against extraterritoriality has been applied in U.S. courts for more than a century\nChief Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed this principle\n\"[L]egislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States\nChief Justice Roberts quoted\nScalia for the proposition that: \"When a statute gives no clear indication of\nextraterritorial application, it has none\nthe presumption against extraterritoriality instructs courts to construe geoambiguous statutes to apply only to the territory of the United States\nThe presumption against extraterritoriality has been cited in hundreds of\ndecisions\nthe Supreme Court has continued to\nembrace\" the presumption against extraterritoriality in transnational litigation\nthe presumption against extraterritoriality is a crude tool to achieve these ends and\nis counterproductive for its stated purposes.\nthe presumption against extraterritoriality merits reevaluation\nThe presumption against extraterritoriality is a widely cited judicial rule, and it affects topics from securities regulation\nto employment discrimination\nto piracy\nThese decisions have consequences for regulated individuals and entities,\nThe question of extraterritoriality\nconnects with foreign relations issues that have consequences for the United States and\nforeign states. Interpretative rules\nhave dynamic effects.\nThe behavior of legislators, regulators, and prosecutors is colored by the\nrules established by courts\nideally those\nrules will be grounded in a justified normative foundation.\ntransnational litigation and policy are significant\nKoh\nhas noted a recent emphasis on\nextraterritoriality, which he attributes to an increase in transnational economic activity,\ntransnational interests of\nstates, and the rise of transnational regulation\nPart I\nmarshals evidence that the presumption against extraterritoriality is ill-suited\nThese specific criticisms\nreveal a deeper concern with current approaches to extraterritoriality. Although courts may adopt\ntranssubstantive rules\ncourts must make judgments about\nthe content of the rule and the scope of\napplication for many areas of statutory interpretation\nThe presumption against extraterritoriality reflects a judgment of this kind: it assumes\ncases meeting the definition of \"extraterritorial\"'\nare enough alike to be treated similarly for purposes of determining prescriptive jurisdiction\nBut this conclusion is not required\nat least with\nthe presumption against extraterritoriality, the relevant values may be best served by\nconsidering other aspects of the case\nPart II\napplies this insight\nto frame a new approach to extraterritoriality\nthe approach in Part II treats statute type rather than territory as the first cut. Once statutes are divided into civil, criminal, and administrative\nrelevant values are served by existing case-type-specific doctrines\nCharming Betsy\nfor private civil litigation\nthe rule of lenity in criminal statutes\nand Chevron\nin administrative cases\nPart III looks to a statute that is highly salient in international litigation\nThe Alien Tort Statute provides for federal court jurisdiction for international law torts\nand\ncourts and scholars have debated its operation in extraterritorial cases. The Supreme Court's\ndecision in Kiobel\napplied the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute\nbut not without criticism from dissenting Justices", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The counterplan PIC’s out of ‘in the US’ – that establishes a test case for the presumption against extraterritoriality by enacting a geospatially ambiguous statute. It spills over to challenges regarding the Alien Tort Statute.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The presumption against extraterritoriality tells courts to read a territorial limit into statutes that are ambiguous about\ngeographic reach. This canon of construction has deep roots\nand the US. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle of statutory interpretation in Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum\nnone of the purported justifications for the presumption against extraterritoriality hold water\nModern courts suggest\nthe presumption avoids conflicts with foreign states and approximates legislative attention, yet\nthe presumption is poorly attuned to either of these\ngoals\nwhile separation of powers and due process are superficially served\nthey\ncrumble in the face of serious scrutiny.\nAlthough courts\nrely on this outmoded presumption\nscholars have noted the incongruity between its goals and its execution\nalternative rules\nfall into the same trap as the presumption\nthey uncritically apply a single approach to all types of cases\ndifferent statute types call for different rules:\nCharming Betsy\nfor private civil litigation\nrule of lenity for criminal statutes, and Chevron\nfor administrative cases\nthey also suggest an approach to Alien Tort Statute litigation that could serve as an alternative to the Supreme Court's\ndecision in Kiobel.\nThe presumption against extraterritoriality has been applied in U.S. courts for more than a century\nChief Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed this principle\n\"[L]egislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States\nChief Justice Roberts quoted\nScalia for the proposition that: \"When a statute gives no clear indication of\nextraterritorial application, it has none\nthe presumption against extraterritoriality instructs courts to construe geoambiguous statutes to apply only to the territory of the United States\nThe presumption against extraterritoriality has been cited in hundreds of\ndecisions\nthe Supreme Court has continued to\nembrace\" the presumption against extraterritoriality in transnational litigation\nthe presumption against extraterritoriality is a crude tool to achieve these ends and\nis counterproductive for its stated purposes.\nthe presumption against extraterritoriality merits reevaluation\nThe presumption against extraterritoriality is a widely cited judicial rule, and it affects topics from securities regulation\nto employment discrimination\nto piracy\nThese decisions have consequences for regulated individuals and entities,\nThe question of extraterritoriality\nconnects with foreign relations issues that have consequences for the United States and\nforeign states. Interpretative rules\nhave dynamic effects.\nThe behavior of legislators, regulators, and prosecutors is colored by the\nrules established by courts\nideally those\nrules will be grounded in a justified normative foundation.\ntransnational litigation and policy are significant\nKoh\nhas noted a recent emphasis on\nextraterritoriality, which he attributes to an increase in transnational economic activity,\ntransnational interests of\nstates, and the rise of transnational regulation\nPart I\nmarshals evidence that the presumption against extraterritoriality is ill-suited\nThese specific criticisms\nreveal a deeper concern with current approaches to extraterritoriality. Although courts may adopt\ntranssubstantive rules\ncourts must make judgments about\nthe content of the rule and the scope of\napplication for many areas of statutory interpretation\nThe presumption against extraterritoriality reflects a judgment of this kind: it assumes\ncases meeting the definition of \"extraterritorial\"'\nare enough alike to be treated similarly for purposes of determining prescriptive jurisdiction\nBut this conclusion is not required\nat least with\nthe presumption against extraterritoriality, the relevant values may be best served by\nconsidering other aspects of the case\nPart II\napplies this insight\nto frame a new approach to extraterritoriality\nthe approach in Part II treats statute type rather than territory as the first cut. Once statutes are divided into civil, criminal, and administrative\nrelevant values are served by existing case-type-specific doctrines\nCharming Betsy\nfor private civil litigation\nthe rule of lenity in criminal statutes\nand Chevron\nin administrative cases\nPart III looks to a statute that is highly salient in international litigation\nThe Alien Tort Statute provides for federal court jurisdiction for international law torts\nand\ncourts and scholars have debated its operation in extraterritorial cases. The Supreme Court's\ndecision in Kiobel\napplied the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute\nbut not without criticism from dissenting Justices", "role": "user" }, { "content": "presumption against extraterritoriality\nread a territorial limit\ncanon of construction\ndeep roots\nSupreme Court recently reaffirmed\npurported justifications\nhold water\npoorly attuned\ncrumble\noutmoded presumption\nuncritically apply a single approach\ncriminal statutes\nAlien Tort Statute litigation\nmore than a century\nreaffirmed this principle\ncontrary intent\nwithin the territorial jurisdiction\nno clear indication\nextraterritorial application\ngeoambiguous statutes\nterritory of the United States\nhundreds of\ndecisions\ncontinued to\nembrace\ncrude tool\ncounterproductive\nmerits reevaluation\nwidely cited judicial rule\nsecurities regulation\nemployment discrimination\npiracy\nforeign relations issues\nconsequences\nInterpretative rules\ndynamic effects\njustified normative foundation\ntransnational litigation\npolicy\ntransnational economic activity\ntransnational regulation\nill-suited\nspecific criticisms\ndeeper concern\ncontent of the rule\nscope of\napplication\nprescriptive jurisdiction\nconsidering other aspects\nnew approach\nstatute type\ncivil\ncriminal\nadministrative\nhighly salient\ninternational litigation\npresumption against extraterritoriality\nAlien Tort Statute\nnot without criticism", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The counterplan PIC’s out of ‘in the US’ – that establishes a test case for the presumption against extraterritoriality by enacting a geospatially ambiguous statute. It spills over to challenges regarding the Alien Tort Statute.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The presumption against extraterritoriality tells courts to read a territorial limit into statutes that are ambiguous about\ngeographic reach. This canon of construction has deep roots\nand the US. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle of statutory interpretation in Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum\nnone of the purported justifications for the presumption against extraterritoriality hold water\nModern courts suggest\nthe presumption avoids conflicts with foreign states and approximates legislative attention, yet\nthe presumption is poorly attuned to either of these\ngoals\nwhile separation of powers and due process are superficially served\nthey\ncrumble in the face of serious scrutiny.\nAlthough courts\nrely on this outmoded presumption\nscholars have noted the incongruity between its goals and its execution\nalternative rules\nfall into the same trap as the presumption\nthey uncritically apply a single approach to all types of cases\ndifferent statute types call for different rules:\nCharming Betsy\nfor private civil litigation\nrule of lenity for criminal statutes, and Chevron\nfor administrative cases\nthey also suggest an approach to Alien Tort Statute litigation that could serve as an alternative to the Supreme Court's\ndecision in Kiobel.\nThe presumption against extraterritoriality has been applied in U.S. courts for more than a century\nChief Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed this principle\n\"[L]egislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States\nChief Justice Roberts quoted\nScalia for the proposition that: \"When a statute gives no clear indication of\nextraterritorial application, it has none\nthe presumption against extraterritoriality instructs courts to construe geoambiguous statutes to apply only to the territory of the United States\nThe presumption against extraterritoriality has been cited in hundreds of\ndecisions\nthe Supreme Court has continued to\nembrace\" the presumption against extraterritoriality in transnational litigation\nthe presumption against extraterritoriality is a crude tool to achieve these ends and\nis counterproductive for its stated purposes.\nthe presumption against extraterritoriality merits reevaluation\nThe presumption against extraterritoriality is a widely cited judicial rule, and it affects topics from securities regulation\nto employment discrimination\nto piracy\nThese decisions have consequences for regulated individuals and entities,\nThe question of extraterritoriality\nconnects with foreign relations issues that have consequences for the United States and\nforeign states. Interpretative rules\nhave dynamic effects.\nThe behavior of legislators, regulators, and prosecutors is colored by the\nrules established by courts\nideally those\nrules will be grounded in a justified normative foundation.\ntransnational litigation and policy are significant\nKoh\nhas noted a recent emphasis on\nextraterritoriality, which he attributes to an increase in transnational economic activity,\ntransnational interests of\nstates, and the rise of transnational regulation\nPart I\nmarshals evidence that the presumption against extraterritoriality is ill-suited\nThese specific criticisms\nreveal a deeper concern with current approaches to extraterritoriality. Although courts may adopt\ntranssubstantive rules\ncourts must make judgments about\nthe content of the rule and the scope of\napplication for many areas of statutory interpretation\nThe presumption against extraterritoriality reflects a judgment of this kind: it assumes\ncases meeting the definition of \"extraterritorial\"'\nare enough alike to be treated similarly for purposes of determining prescriptive jurisdiction\nBut this conclusion is not required\nat least with\nthe presumption against extraterritoriality, the relevant values may be best served by\nconsidering other aspects of the case\nPart II\napplies this insight\nto frame a new approach to extraterritoriality\nthe approach in Part II treats statute type rather than territory as the first cut. Once statutes are divided into civil, criminal, and administrative\nrelevant values are served by existing case-type-specific doctrines\nCharming Betsy\nfor private civil litigation\nthe rule of lenity in criminal statutes\nand Chevron\nin administrative cases\nPart III looks to a statute that is highly salient in international litigation\nThe Alien Tort Statute provides for federal court jurisdiction for international law torts\nand\ncourts and scholars have debated its operation in extraterritorial cases. The Supreme Court's\ndecision in Kiobel\napplied the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute\nbut not without criticism from dissenting Justices", "role": "user" }, { "content": "presumption against extraterritoriality tells courts to read a territorial limit into statutes\nThis canon\nhas deep roots\nand the\nSupreme Court recently reaffirmed this\nnone of the\njustifications\nhold water\ncourts\nrely on this outmoded presumption\nthey uncritically apply a single approach\nfor criminal statutes\nthey\nsuggest an approach to Alien Tort\nlitigation\nthe presumption\ninstructs courts to construe geoambiguous statutes to apply only to the territory of the U\nS\nThe presumption\nis\nwidely cited\nand it affects\nsecurities regulation\nemployment discrimination\npiracy\nThe question\nconnects with foreign relations issues\nInterpretative rules\nhave dynamic effects.\nbehavior of legislators, regulators\nis colored by the\ncourts\nthe presumption against extraterritoriality is ill-suited\na new approach\ntreats statute type\nas the first cut\nThe Supreme Court's\ndecision\napplied the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: That precedent forces the Court to uphold corporate liability under the ATS in Nestlé v. Doe.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In 2019, Nestlé USA and Cargill petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to prevent the case proceeding further and in May 2020 they received the support of the former Solicitor General, Noel Francisco, on behalf of the Trump administration. The Solicitor General argued that “aiding and abetting” is not a type of conduct that breaches a norm of international character and hence cannot trigger application of the ATS. Mr Francisco also argued that ATS claims against U.S. corporations, as well as natural persons, should not be allowed. This represents a change in position for the Trump administration that, three years ago, in Jesner, argued that claims against U.S. corporations should be allowed.\nThe Supreme Court will have to decide whether to uphold the Ninth Court finding that corporate liability is justiciable under the ATS and, if so, whether conduct of the type referred to in this case (i.e. general oversight and financing) is sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality articulated in Kiobel and RJR Nabisco. To do that, the Court will need to decide whether the companies’ conduct in the U.S. is the true focus of the alleged violations of international law. It also may clarify whether “aiding and abetting” conduct amounts to a violation of a “norm of international character” that is “specific, universal, and obligatory”.\nThe U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Nestle USA, Cargill is likely to have significant consequences for human rights litigation both in the U.S. and globally. If the Supreme Court finds that corporate liability is justiciable under the ATS and that domestic corporate activity in the U.S. to “aid and abet” human rights violations is sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, litigants will be sure to attempt more such claims in the future.\nIf the Supreme Court in Nestlé USA, Cargill finds in favour of the corporations, this may shift plaintiffs’ attempts to assert customary international law claims against global corporations to jurisdictions that are more favourable to such claims. As we reported here, earlier this year, the Canadian Supreme Court became the first supreme court to hold that violations of customary international law may give rise to a private cause of action against a corporation. If corporate conduct or “aiding and abetting conduct” cannot amount to a violation of the law of nations under the ATS, plaintiffs also are more likely to seek redress regarding such conduct under domestic tort law as an alternative. As we reported here, in 2019, the UK Supreme Court held that parent companies may be held liable in connection with their subsidiaries’ involvement in adverse human rights and environmental impacts overseas under common law tort principles.\nRegardless of the outcome of the appeal, corporations will continue to face significant legal risks whenever they are involved in human rights impacts through their own or their suppliers’ operations. Litigation under the common law is not the only risk. Governments around the world are starting to adopt mandatory human rights reporting and due diligence legislation with respect to overseas operations and supply chains. Some of this legislation provides for a private cause of action against a non-compliant company where that non-compliance has caused foreseeable harm.\nBipartisan support for legislation imposing legal obligations with respect to human rights issues arising in supply chains also appears to be growing in the U.S. In July of this year, Republican Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri introduced the Slave-Free Business Certification Act (“the Act”). If passed, the Act would require covered companies to audit and report on instances of forced labour in their supply chains. Companies that deliberately violate the Act could be liable for civil damages of up to USD100 million, and punitive damages of up to USD500m. Congressional committees have also discussed a proposed Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2020 (H.R. 6279), and a Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (S. 3471).\nThe direction of travel globally is towards requiring companies to engage in ongoing due diligence on their supply chains, report findings to regulators and the public, and – significantly – certify the absence of or even prevent human rights impacts in their supply chains. Given the prevalence of human rights abuses around the world, these requirements mean that responsible sourcing compliance programmes and processes are becoming business-critical issues and boards and general counsels should be taking notice. Now is the time to assess the efficacy of current responsible sourcing compliance programmes (onboarding, auditing, and responses to issues that arise) and build out a risk-based supply chain compliance programme to address and mitigate the liability risk of these developing legal obligations.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "In 2019, Nestlé\nand Cargill petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to prevent the case proceeding further and\nreceived the support of the former Solicitor General, Noel Francisco\nFrancisco\nargued that ATS claims against U.S. corporations\nshould not be allowed\nThe Supreme Court will have to decide whether to uphold the Ninth Court finding that corporate liability is justiciable under the ATS\nthe Court will need to decide whether the companies’ conduct in the U.S. is the\nfocus of the alleged violations of international law. It\nmay clarify whether “aiding and abetting” conduct amounts to a violation of a “norm of international character” that is “specific, universal, and obligatory”.\nThe U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Nestle USA, Cargill is likely to have significant consequences for human rights litigation\nin the U.S. and globally. If the Supreme Court finds that corporate liability is justiciable under the ATS and\nis sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, litigants will\nattempt more such claims in the future.\nIf the Supreme Court\nfinds in favour of the corporations, this may shift plaintiffs’ attempts to assert customary international law claims against\ncorporations to jurisdictions that are more favourable to such claims\nthe Canadian Supreme Court became the first\nto hold that violations of customary international law may give rise to a private cause of action\nIf corporate conduct\ncannot amount to a violation of the law\nunder the ATS, plaintiffs\nare more likely to seek redress\nunder domestic tort law as an alternative\ncorporations will continue to face significant legal risks whenever they are involved in human rights impacts\nLitigation\nis not the only risk. Governments around the world are starting to adopt mandatory human rights reporting and due diligence\nSome of this\nprovides for a private cause of action against a non-compliant company\nBipartisan support for\nimposing legal obligations with respect to human rights\nappears to be growing in the U.S\nCompanies that deliberately violate the Act could be liable for civil damages\nThe direction of travel globally is towards requiring companies to engage in\ndue diligence on their supply chains\nGiven the prevalence of human rights abuses\nthese requirements mean\nresponsible sourcing compliance\nand processes are becoming business-critical", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: That precedent forces the Court to uphold corporate liability under the ATS in Nestlé v. Doe.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In 2019, Nestlé\nand Cargill petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to prevent the case proceeding further and\nreceived the support of the former Solicitor General, Noel Francisco\nFrancisco\nargued that ATS claims against U.S. corporations\nshould not be allowed\nThe Supreme Court will have to decide whether to uphold the Ninth Court finding that corporate liability is justiciable under the ATS\nthe Court will need to decide whether the companies’ conduct in the U.S. is the\nfocus of the alleged violations of international law. It\nmay clarify whether “aiding and abetting” conduct amounts to a violation of a “norm of international character” that is “specific, universal, and obligatory”.\nThe U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Nestle USA, Cargill is likely to have significant consequences for human rights litigation\nin the U.S. and globally. If the Supreme Court finds that corporate liability is justiciable under the ATS and\nis sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, litigants will\nattempt more such claims in the future.\nIf the Supreme Court\nfinds in favour of the corporations, this may shift plaintiffs’ attempts to assert customary international law claims against\ncorporations to jurisdictions that are more favourable to such claims\nthe Canadian Supreme Court became the first\nto hold that violations of customary international law may give rise to a private cause of action\nIf corporate conduct\ncannot amount to a violation of the law\nunder the ATS, plaintiffs\nare more likely to seek redress\nunder domestic tort law as an alternative\ncorporations will continue to face significant legal risks whenever they are involved in human rights impacts\nLitigation\nis not the only risk. Governments around the world are starting to adopt mandatory human rights reporting and due diligence\nSome of this\nprovides for a private cause of action against a non-compliant company\nBipartisan support for\nimposing legal obligations with respect to human rights\nappears to be growing in the U.S\nCompanies that deliberately violate the Act could be liable for civil damages\nThe direction of travel globally is towards requiring companies to engage in\ndue diligence on their supply chains\nGiven the prevalence of human rights abuses\nthese requirements mean\nresponsible sourcing compliance\nand processes are becoming business-critical", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Nestlé\nCargill\nprevent the case\nATS claims against U.S. corporations\nNinth Court finding\ncorporate liability is justiciable\nviolations of international law\naiding and abetting\nsignificant consequences\nhuman rights litigation\npresumption against extraterritoriality\nmore such claims\nshift plaintiffs’ attempts\ncustomary international law claims\nmore favourable\nCanadian Supreme Court\ndomestic tort law\nsignificant legal risks\nmandatory human rights reporting\nBipartisan support\ndirection of travel globally\ndue diligence\nresponsible sourcing compliance\nbusiness-critical", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: That precedent forces the Court to uphold corporate liability under the ATS in Nestlé v. Doe.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In 2019, Nestlé\nand Cargill petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to prevent the case proceeding further and\nreceived the support of the former Solicitor General, Noel Francisco\nFrancisco\nargued that ATS claims against U.S. corporations\nshould not be allowed\nThe Supreme Court will have to decide whether to uphold the Ninth Court finding that corporate liability is justiciable under the ATS\nthe Court will need to decide whether the companies’ conduct in the U.S. is the\nfocus of the alleged violations of international law. It\nmay clarify whether “aiding and abetting” conduct amounts to a violation of a “norm of international character” that is “specific, universal, and obligatory”.\nThe U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Nestle USA, Cargill is likely to have significant consequences for human rights litigation\nin the U.S. and globally. If the Supreme Court finds that corporate liability is justiciable under the ATS and\nis sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, litigants will\nattempt more such claims in the future.\nIf the Supreme Court\nfinds in favour of the corporations, this may shift plaintiffs’ attempts to assert customary international law claims against\ncorporations to jurisdictions that are more favourable to such claims\nthe Canadian Supreme Court became the first\nto hold that violations of customary international law may give rise to a private cause of action\nIf corporate conduct\ncannot amount to a violation of the law\nunder the ATS, plaintiffs\nare more likely to seek redress\nunder domestic tort law as an alternative\ncorporations will continue to face significant legal risks whenever they are involved in human rights impacts\nLitigation\nis not the only risk. Governments around the world are starting to adopt mandatory human rights reporting and due diligence\nSome of this\nprovides for a private cause of action against a non-compliant company\nBipartisan support for\nimposing legal obligations with respect to human rights\nappears to be growing in the U.S\nCompanies that deliberately violate the Act could be liable for civil damages\nThe direction of travel globally is towards requiring companies to engage in\ndue diligence on their supply chains\nGiven the prevalence of human rights abuses\nthese requirements mean\nresponsible sourcing compliance\nand processes are becoming business-critical", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Nestlé\nand Cargill petitioned the\nCourt to prevent the case proceeding further\nThe\nCourt will have to decide whether to uphold the Ninth Court finding that corporate liability is justiciable under the ATS\nThe\nruling\nis likely to have significant consequences for human rights litigation\nIf the\nCourt finds\ncorporate liability is justiciable\nand\nis sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, litigants will\nattempt more such claims\ncorporations will\nface significant legal risks whenever they are involved in human rights\nGovernments\nare starting to adopt mandatory human rights reporting\nBipartisan support\nappears to be growing\nresponsible sourcing compliance\nare becoming business-critical", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: That reverses current doctrine shielding PMCs from liability.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Like the political question doctrine, the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS presents a difficult hurdle in suits against PMCs. The appropriate application of the touch and concern test has recently given rise to a circuit split between the Fourth Circuit in Al Shimari and the Fifth Circuit in Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., another case involving ATS claims brought against a U.S. PMC for torts committed in Iraq. 163 As noted above, before the Fourth Circuit for the third time, the Al Shimari court held that the plaintiffs’ claims for abuse and torture at the Abu Ghraib detention center in Iraq touched and concerned the territory of the U.S. with sufficient force to receive jurisdiction under the ATS. 164 While the Fourth Circuit employed a broad, factbased inquiry taking into account all pertinent facts underlying the plaintiffs’ claims, the Fifth Circuit in Adhikari took a restrictive approach looking only at the conduct that was in violation of international law and the location of that conduct. 165 This restrictive approach has the potential to immunize PMCs that confine their illegal conduct to foreign countries. 166\nIn addition to the presumption against extraterritoriality and the political question doctrine, ATS plaintiffs may have to overcome challenges based on forum non conveniens (“FNC”),167 comity, and exhaustion.168 Under a challenge based on FNC, for example, ATS claimants must show that the alternative forum, such as Iraq or Afghanistan, provides a remedy so clearly unsatisfactory or inadequate that it essentially provides no remedy at all. 169\nFinally, ATS plaintiffs may have to overcome claims of immunity by PMCs based on FTCA preemption or the government contractor defense. The government contractor defense presents an untested170 obstacle to holding PMCs accountable. The defense originated in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., where the Supreme Court found that state tort law “had to give way to ‘uniquely federal interests’ in procuring equipment for the military.”171 One commentator argued that the “uniquely federal interests” in insulating federal contractors from state tort law do not weigh in favor of insulating federal contractors from federal law under the ATS. 172 Since violations of IHRL will presumably violate official U.S. policies, ATS claimants can often establish state action without implication of the discretionary judgements or official policies of the U.S. Government.173 Al Shimari supports this approach. 174\nIn Jesner, the Court declined to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations without express authorization from Congress. 175 Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion found this holding necessary because of the possibility that permitting such liability would allow other nations to hale U.S. corporations into foreign courts for violations of the law of nations. 176 The final part of Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion described Congress’s possible responses to Jesner.177 Justice Kennedy characterized the decision to preclude foreign corporate liability under the ATS as a matter of first impression—the First Congress provided a federal remedy only for a narrow category of international-law violations committed by individuals. 178 Accordingly, “[t]he political branches can determine, referring to international law to the extent they deem proper,” (1) whether to impose liability upon foreign corporations and, conversely, allow other countries to hold U.S. corporations liable; (2) whether to subject such liability to “limitations or preconditions” based on the unavailability of “neutral judicial safeguards” in other countries; and (3) whether corporate liability should be “limited to cases where a corporation’s management was actively complicit in the crime.”179\nJustice Kennedy’s suggestions to Congress involved questions of comity and direct (as opposed to indirect) liability. Comprehensive legislation could do much more, especially with regard to PMCs. Legislation could clarify a host of frequently litigated issues like the “touch and concern test,” immunity for defense contractors, FTCA preemption, comity, exhaustion, and the statute of limitations. A recent article discussing the need for clarity in defending lawsuits against PMCs emphasized the need for a comprehensive legislative solution to the “current patchwork of laws” governing PMC liability.180 In a democracy, “the state should have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in the interest of public order.”181 However, PMCs act as an extension of the state, and reliance on PMCs is increasing. 182 There are many advantages to comprehensive PMC legislation including greater legal predictability in the contractor industry, increased business efficiency, and greater comfort on the part of the public. 183 Further, given that PMCs are often populated by alumni of the U.S. military and are headquartered in the U.S., legislation would improve international confidence in U.S. policy. 184 A plan for oversight would indicate that the U.S. government is aware and responsible. 185\nCalls for legislative action affecting PMCs target many different institutions including U.S. military law, U.S. criminal law, International Human Rights Law, International Criminal Law, and the ATS. 186 Amending the ATS is the most logical way to ensure the viability of claims against PMCs, especially considering that the plurality opinion in Jesner turned on the lack of corporate liability under the TVPA. An express cause of action for violations of international law, brought by aliens against PMCs, would satisfy the Jesner’s concerns over separation-of-powers while leaving the ATS intact. 187\nJesner’s fractured reasoning behind granting ATS immunity to foreign (but not domestic) corporations suggests the conservative justices were motivated, above all else, by a desire to end the Jesner litigation. Justice Sotomayor concluded her dissent by taking aim at the Court’s leniency towards corporations. She warned that corporate immunity under the ATS “undermines the system of accountability for law-of-nations violations that the First Congress endeavored to impose.”188 As in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, Jesner allows corporations “to take advantage of the significant benefits of the corporate form and enjoy fundamental rights . . . without having to shoulder attendant fundamental responsibilities.”189 The Court’s fractured opinion resulted from the conflict between a corporation friendly Court and a statute that does not tolerate corporations who abuse their power. 190\nWhile the Al Shimari litigation supports the viability of ATS claims against PMCs in the near term, the two-century old statute stands on shaky ground.191 The conservative justices demonstrated a willingness not only to construe the Court’s ATS precedent narrowly, but to overturn its precedent altogether. As the federal judiciary increasingly reflects the ideology of the Court’s most conservative justice, 192 ATS plaintiffs can no longer rely on U.S. courts to carry the torch of enforcing international human rights law. The Court may have exercised restraint in limiting Jesner’s formal holding to foreign corporations, but ATS plaintiffs should not expect mercy in the next ATS decision. Congress must protect the ATS and ensure that no corporation is exempt from the law of nations.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS presents a difficult hurdle in suits against PMCs.\nbefore the Fourth Circuit\nthe Al Shimari court held that the plaintiffs’ claims for abuse and torture at the Abu Ghraib detention center in Iraq touched and concerned the territory of the U.S. with sufficient force to receive jurisdiction under the ATS\nthe Fifth Circuit\ntook a restrictive approach\nThis restrictive approach has the potential to immunize PMCs that confine their illegal conduct to foreign countries\nIn Jesner, the Court declined to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations without express authorization from Congress\nKennedy’s\nopinion found this holding necessary because of the possibility that permitting such liability would allow other nations to hale U.S. corporations into foreign courts\nKennedy characterized the decision to preclude foreign corporate liability under the ATS as a matter of first impression\nthe First Congress provided a federal remedy only for a narrow category of international-law violations\nt]he political branches can determine\nwhether to impose liability upon foreign corporations and\nwhether to subject such liability to “limitations or preconditions\nthe conservative justices were motivated, above all else, by a desire to end the Jesner litigation\nSotomayor\nwarned that corporate immunity under the ATS “undermines the system of accountability for law-of-nations violations\nJesner allows corporations “to take advantage of the\nbenefits of the corporate form and enjoy fundamental rights\nwithout having to shoulder\nfundamental responsibilities\nThe Court’s fractured opinion resulted from the conflict between a corporation friendly Court and a statute that does not tolerate corporations who abuse their power\nthe two-century old statute stands on shaky ground\nThe conservative justices demonstrated a willingness not only to construe the Court’s ATS precedent narrowly, but to overturn its precedent altogether.\nATS plaintiffs can no longer rely on U.S. courts to carry the torch of enforcing\nhuman rights law. The Court may have exercised restraint in limiting Jesner’s formal holding to foreign corporations, but ATS plaintiffs should not expect mercy in the next ATS decision", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: That reverses current doctrine shielding PMCs from liability.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS presents a difficult hurdle in suits against PMCs.\nbefore the Fourth Circuit\nthe Al Shimari court held that the plaintiffs’ claims for abuse and torture at the Abu Ghraib detention center in Iraq touched and concerned the territory of the U.S. with sufficient force to receive jurisdiction under the ATS\nthe Fifth Circuit\ntook a restrictive approach\nThis restrictive approach has the potential to immunize PMCs that confine their illegal conduct to foreign countries\nIn Jesner, the Court declined to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations without express authorization from Congress\nKennedy’s\nopinion found this holding necessary because of the possibility that permitting such liability would allow other nations to hale U.S. corporations into foreign courts\nKennedy characterized the decision to preclude foreign corporate liability under the ATS as a matter of first impression\nthe First Congress provided a federal remedy only for a narrow category of international-law violations\nt]he political branches can determine\nwhether to impose liability upon foreign corporations and\nwhether to subject such liability to “limitations or preconditions\nthe conservative justices were motivated, above all else, by a desire to end the Jesner litigation\nSotomayor\nwarned that corporate immunity under the ATS “undermines the system of accountability for law-of-nations violations\nJesner allows corporations “to take advantage of the\nbenefits of the corporate form and enjoy fundamental rights\nwithout having to shoulder\nfundamental responsibilities\nThe Court’s fractured opinion resulted from the conflict between a corporation friendly Court and a statute that does not tolerate corporations who abuse their power\nthe two-century old statute stands on shaky ground\nThe conservative justices demonstrated a willingness not only to construe the Court’s ATS precedent narrowly, but to overturn its precedent altogether.\nATS plaintiffs can no longer rely on U.S. courts to carry the torch of enforcing\nhuman rights law. The Court may have exercised restraint in limiting Jesner’s formal holding to foreign corporations, but ATS plaintiffs should not expect mercy in the next ATS decision", "role": "user" }, { "content": "presumption against extraterritorial application\nabuse\ntorture\nsufficient force\nreceive jurisdiction\nimmunize PMCs\nconfine their illegal conduct\ndeclined to extend ATS liability\nwithout express authorization\npreclude foreign corporate liability\nnarrow category\ninternational-law violations\npolitical branches\nend the Jesner litigation\ncorporate immunity under the ATS\nsystem of accountability\nfundamental rights\ndoes not tolerate corporations\nabuse their power\nshaky ground\nconservative justices\nconstrue the Court’s ATS precedent narrowly\noverturn its precedent altogether\nshould not expect mercy", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: That reverses current doctrine shielding PMCs from liability.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS presents a difficult hurdle in suits against PMCs.\nbefore the Fourth Circuit\nthe Al Shimari court held that the plaintiffs’ claims for abuse and torture at the Abu Ghraib detention center in Iraq touched and concerned the territory of the U.S. with sufficient force to receive jurisdiction under the ATS\nthe Fifth Circuit\ntook a restrictive approach\nThis restrictive approach has the potential to immunize PMCs that confine their illegal conduct to foreign countries\nIn Jesner, the Court declined to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations without express authorization from Congress\nKennedy’s\nopinion found this holding necessary because of the possibility that permitting such liability would allow other nations to hale U.S. corporations into foreign courts\nKennedy characterized the decision to preclude foreign corporate liability under the ATS as a matter of first impression\nthe First Congress provided a federal remedy only for a narrow category of international-law violations\nt]he political branches can determine\nwhether to impose liability upon foreign corporations and\nwhether to subject such liability to “limitations or preconditions\nthe conservative justices were motivated, above all else, by a desire to end the Jesner litigation\nSotomayor\nwarned that corporate immunity under the ATS “undermines the system of accountability for law-of-nations violations\nJesner allows corporations “to take advantage of the\nbenefits of the corporate form and enjoy fundamental rights\nwithout having to shoulder\nfundamental responsibilities\nThe Court’s fractured opinion resulted from the conflict between a corporation friendly Court and a statute that does not tolerate corporations who abuse their power\nthe two-century old statute stands on shaky ground\nThe conservative justices demonstrated a willingness not only to construe the Court’s ATS precedent narrowly, but to overturn its precedent altogether.\nATS plaintiffs can no longer rely on U.S. courts to carry the torch of enforcing\nhuman rights law. The Court may have exercised restraint in limiting Jesner’s formal holding to foreign corporations, but ATS plaintiffs should not expect mercy in the next ATS decision", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the presumption against extraterritorial application\npresents a difficult hurdle in suits against PMCs\nthe Fourth Circuit\nheld\nclaims for abuse and torture\nconcerned\nthe U.S. with sufficient force to receive jurisdiction under the ATS\nthe Fifth Circuit\ntook a restrictive approach\nThis\napproach has the potential to immunize PMCs\nIn Jesner, the Court declined to extend ATS liability\nwithout\nauthorization from Congress\nt]he political branches can determine\nwhether to impose liability\nconservative justices were motivated\nby a desire to end\nJesner\ncorporate immunity under the ATS “undermines\naccountability\na statute\ndoes not tolerate corporations who abuse\npower\nThe conservative justices demonstrated\nwillingness not only to construe\nATS precedent narrowly, but\noverturn its precedent altogether", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Doesn’t undermine war powers.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "We urge the Biden Administration to support amending the National Emergencies Act to establish better checks and balances between the Executive and Legislative Branches in the declaration of a national emergency and the invocation of the powers that flow from such a declaration.[24] \nOver the last century, Congress has increased the President’s authority with respect to national emergencies not involving war or other military conflict. Congress has done little to police these grants of authority, which have no or few explicit limitations. Moreover, emergencies and the granting of emergency powers are rarely reconsidered, leaving in place a significant potential for abuse of authority by a future President. For this reason, this Association generally supports the ARTICLE ONE Act (S.764), which changes the framework for terminating emergencies. Instead of an emergency continuing until it is terminated by a resolution enacted into law, the ARTICLE ONE Act provides that any authority the President invokes during an emergency terminates after 30 days unless a joint resolution of approval is enacted. There would also be a general prohibition on amending the resolution, and a timeline would be set forth to ensure the resolution’s timely consideration.[25]\nThe ARTICLE ONE Act leaves unchanged the President’s war-making authority, which is governed by a different regime, and does not impact other authorities residing in the Executive Branch. The Act simply rebalances the nation’s emergency powers system to more properly reflect the necessary involvement of both policy-making branches of government in these important decisions, and we recommend that the Administration support it.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "We urge\nBiden\nto support amending the National Emergencies Act to establish better checks and balances between the Executive and Legislative Branches in the declaration of a national emergency and the invocation of the powers that flow from such a declaration\nCongress has increased the President’s authority with respect to national emergencies\nCongress has done little to police these grants of authority, which have no\nlimitations\nemergencies and the granting of emergency powers are rarely reconsidered, leaving in place\nsignificant potential for abuse of authority\nthis Association generally supports the ARTICLE ONE Act\nwhich changes the framework for terminating emergencies. Instead of an emergency continuing until it is terminated\nany authority the President invokes during an emergency terminates after 30 days unless a joint resolution of approval is enacted.\nThe ARTICLE ONE Act leaves unchanged the President’s war-making authority, which is governed by a different regime, and does not impact other authorities residing in the Executive Branch\nThe Act simply rebalances the nation’s emergency powers\nto\nreflect the necessary involvement of both policy-making branches", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Doesn’t undermine war powers.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "We urge\nBiden\nto support amending the National Emergencies Act to establish better checks and balances between the Executive and Legislative Branches in the declaration of a national emergency and the invocation of the powers that flow from such a declaration\nCongress has increased the President’s authority with respect to national emergencies\nCongress has done little to police these grants of authority, which have no\nlimitations\nemergencies and the granting of emergency powers are rarely reconsidered, leaving in place\nsignificant potential for abuse of authority\nthis Association generally supports the ARTICLE ONE Act\nwhich changes the framework for terminating emergencies. Instead of an emergency continuing until it is terminated\nany authority the President invokes during an emergency terminates after 30 days unless a joint resolution of approval is enacted.\nThe ARTICLE ONE Act leaves unchanged the President’s war-making authority, which is governed by a different regime, and does not impact other authorities residing in the Executive Branch\nThe Act simply rebalances the nation’s emergency powers\nto\nreflect the necessary involvement of both policy-making branches", "role": "user" }, { "content": "amending the National Emergencies Act\nchecks and balances\ninvocation of the powers\nincreased the President’s authority\ndone little\nrarely reconsidered\nsignificant potential\nabuse of authority\nchanges the framework\nunless a joint resolution of approval is enacted\nunchanged\nwar-making authority\ndifferent regime\nrebalances the nation’s emergency powers\nnecessary involvement", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Doesn’t undermine war powers.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "We urge\nBiden\nto support amending the National Emergencies Act to establish better checks and balances between the Executive and Legislative Branches in the declaration of a national emergency and the invocation of the powers that flow from such a declaration\nCongress has increased the President’s authority with respect to national emergencies\nCongress has done little to police these grants of authority, which have no\nlimitations\nemergencies and the granting of emergency powers are rarely reconsidered, leaving in place\nsignificant potential for abuse of authority\nthis Association generally supports the ARTICLE ONE Act\nwhich changes the framework for terminating emergencies. Instead of an emergency continuing until it is terminated\nany authority the President invokes during an emergency terminates after 30 days unless a joint resolution of approval is enacted.\nThe ARTICLE ONE Act leaves unchanged the President’s war-making authority, which is governed by a different regime, and does not impact other authorities residing in the Executive Branch\nThe Act simply rebalances the nation’s emergency powers\nto\nreflect the necessary involvement of both policy-making branches", "role": "user" }, { "content": "We urge\nBiden\nto support amending the National Emergencies Act\nCongress\nincreased the President’s authority with\nnational emergencies\nthe\nAct\nchanges the framework\nany authority\nterminates\nunless a joint resolution of approval is enacted\nThe\nAct leaves unchanged the President’s war-making authority, which is governed by a different regime\nThe Act simply rebalances the nation’s emergency powers\nto\nreflect\nboth\nbranches", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The counterplan rebalances authority over war-making.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Interbranch conflicts surrounding foreign policy have existed throughout American history and continue to the present day. The Supreme Court has at times issued rulings affecting this balance of power. In one of the most important cases to date regarding presidential foreign policy authority, Justice George Sutherland’s opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936), created the sole-organ doctrine, which designated the president as the sole organ of U.S. foreign policy. Additional rulings in this area have generally added to the increasing power of the foreign policy powers of the president (Adler 1996). The elevated status of the United States as a global superpower over the course of the twentieth century also contributed to the dramatic expansion of presidential foreign policy powers. Particularly during the 1970s, the legislative veto became a weapon of restraint in the effort to regain control over the executive branch’s increasingly cavalier use of authority (Gibson 1994, 443).\nGiven its popularity as a means of providing foreign policy oversight, the Chadha ruling posed a number of challenges to lawmakers in terms of the veto’s continued application (Franck and Bob 1985; Gibson 1992, 1994). Gibson’s (1994) studies of Congress’s use of the veto to affect foreign policy find that the ruling intensified interbranch conflict for strategic-salient issues such as arms sales to the Middle East, as well as intermestic issues that meld aspects of both domestic and foreign policy such as most-favored nation status. For diplomatic, crisis, and strategic-nonsalient foreign policy matters, the effect of Chadha was less severe. Following a pattern similar to other issue areas, committee-based vetoes have become more common in the postChadha period and dual-House vetoes are more likely to be tied to joint, rather than concurrent, resolutions as the veto mechanism.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Interbranch conflicts surrounding foreign policy have existed throughout\nhistory and continue to the present day. The Supreme Court has\nissued rulings affecting this balance of power\nSutherland’s opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright\ncreated the sole-organ doctrine, which designated the president as the sole organ of U.S. foreign policy. Additional rulings\ngenerally added to the increasing power of the foreign policy powers of the president\nThe elevated status of the United States as a global superpower\ncontributed to the dramatic expansion of presidential foreign policy powers\nthe legislative veto became a weapon of restraint in the effort to regain control over the executive branch’s\ncavalier use of authority\nGiven its popularity\nthe Chadha ruling posed a number of challenges to lawmakers in terms of the veto’s continued application\nthe ruling intensified interbranch conflict for strategic-salient issues such as arms sales to the Middle East, as well as intermestic issues that meld aspects of both domestic and foreign policy\nFor diplomatic, crisis, and strategic-nonsalient foreign policy\nthe effect of Chadha was less severe\ncommittee-based vetoes have become more common in the postChadha period and dual-House vetoes are more likely to be tied to joint, rather than concurrent, resolutions", "role": "assistant" } ]