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DebateCards-SFT-phase2-v2

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[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The counterplan rebalances authority over war-making.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Interbranch conflicts surrounding foreign policy have existed throughout\nhistory and continue to the present day. The Supreme Court has\nissued rulings affecting this balance of power\nSutherland’s opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright\ncreated the sole-organ doctrine, which designated the president as the sole organ of U.S. foreign policy. Additional rulings\ngenerally added to the increasing power of the foreign policy powers of the president\nThe elevated status of the United States as a global superpower\ncontributed to the dramatic expansion of presidential foreign policy powers\nthe legislative veto became a weapon of restraint in the effort to regain control over the executive branch’s\ncavalier use of authority\nGiven its popularity\nthe Chadha ruling posed a number of challenges to lawmakers in terms of the veto’s continued application\nthe ruling intensified interbranch conflict for strategic-salient issues such as arms sales to the Middle East, as well as intermestic issues that meld aspects of both domestic and foreign policy\nFor diplomatic, crisis, and strategic-nonsalient foreign policy\nthe effect of Chadha was less severe\ncommittee-based vetoes have become more common in the postChadha period and dual-House vetoes are more likely to be tied to joint, rather than concurrent, resolutions", "role": "user" }, { "content": "sole-organ doctrine\nincreasing power\nforeign policy powers\nelevated status\ndramatic expansion\npresidential foreign policy powers\nweapon of restraint\ncavalier use of authority\nveto’s continued application\narms sales to the Middle East\ncrisis\nless severe\njoint, rather than concurrent, resolutions", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The counterplan rebalances authority over war-making.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Interbranch conflicts surrounding foreign policy have existed throughout\nhistory and continue to the present day. The Supreme Court has\nissued rulings affecting this balance of power\nSutherland’s opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright\ncreated the sole-organ doctrine, which designated the president as the sole organ of U.S. foreign policy. Additional rulings\ngenerally added to the increasing power of the foreign policy powers of the president\nThe elevated status of the United States as a global superpower\ncontributed to the dramatic expansion of presidential foreign policy powers\nthe legislative veto became a weapon of restraint in the effort to regain control over the executive branch’s\ncavalier use of authority\nGiven its popularity\nthe Chadha ruling posed a number of challenges to lawmakers in terms of the veto’s continued application\nthe ruling intensified interbranch conflict for strategic-salient issues such as arms sales to the Middle East, as well as intermestic issues that meld aspects of both domestic and foreign policy\nFor diplomatic, crisis, and strategic-nonsalient foreign policy\nthe effect of Chadha was less severe\ncommittee-based vetoes have become more common in the postChadha period and dual-House vetoes are more likely to be tied to joint, rather than concurrent, resolutions", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Curtiss-Wright\ncreated the sole-organ doctrine\nAdditional rulings\nadded to the increasing\nforeign policy powers of the president\nthe legislative veto became a weapon of restraint\nover the executive branch’s\ncavalier use of authority\nChadha\nposed a number of challenges\nthe ruling intensified interbranch conflict for\narms sales to the Middle East, as well as\ndomestic and foreign policy\nFor\ncrisis\npolicy\nChadha was less severe\nvetoes are more likely to be tied to joint, rather than concurrent, resolutions", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Threshold for a deficit’s low – the counterplan’s another mixed signal that can’t solve industry confidence.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "III. UNCERTAINTY IN THE BANKING MARKET\nEven before the rescission of the Cole memo, financial institutions were leery of providing services to MRBs because of the uncertainty and the risk of violating anti-laundering laws.110 Of the 11,442 financial institutions in America, only 551 have provided services to MRBs.\" Some people in the market recognize the additional risk from the rescission of the Cole memo but believe financial institutions should still consider serving MRBs as long as they appropriately manage the risks.112 Others believe large institutions do not want to take on the risk of a Bank Secrecy Act violation and will not serve MRBs.113 In the end, smaller financial institutions and community banks are primarily the institutions taking on the risk of these customers.114 One possible reason for their willingness to assume this risk is that smaller financial institutions often personally know their customers, giving the institution confidence in their compliance with FinCEN MRB guidance.\nA. Mixed Signals within the Banking Industry\nThe federal government has shown signs of wanting financial institutions to provide services to MRBs.115 For example, former Department of Justice senior attorney John Vardaman believes that the Sessions memo has not really affected the industry and that it was symbolic rather than substantive.\" While with the Department, Vardaman helped financial institutions manage the risk of marijuana industry by assisting in the development of the FinCEN MRB guidance. 1 1 7\nOne of the mixed signals regarding MRBs and financial institutions is the Federal Reserve Bank's conditional approval to Fourth Corner Credit Union less than a month after the Sessions memo.\" As previously mentioned, Fourth Corner modified its business plan and instead of serving dispensaries, shifted its focus to ancillary marijuana businesses.119 Another mixed signal is the tenth renewal of the Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Amendment, on March 22, 2018, after the Sessions memo was issued.120 The amendment seems to contradict the Sessions memo because federal funds cannot be used to prosecute state legalized medical marijuana.12 1 This amendment only regulates medical marijuana and does not affect its designation as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act.122 These signals seem to be promising signs for the state legalized marijuana industry. 123\nHowever, on April 3, 2018, the U.S. Small Business Association issued a policy notice revising their lending guidance. 124 Ultimately, the policy notice prohibits businesses involved in the marijuana industry, as well as hemp-related businesses, from participating in their lending programs. 125 This new guidance will likely increase the financial burdens for marijuana businesses and ancillary businesses, which includes engineers, web developers, and garden supply stores, among others. 126\nB. FinCEN Has Not Updated MRB Guidance\nIn early 2018, FinCEN stated that financial institutions should continue to follow the 2014 MRB Guidance, even after the dissemination of the Sessions memo. 127 However, the Sessions memo created additional legal risk for banks who continue to follow the FinCEN MRB guidance.128 The safe harbor in the Cole memo was rescinded by the Sessions memo. 129 If banks continue to serve MRBs, they are committing a felony and admitting the criminal behavior through reports on suspicious activity and large currency transactions.13 0 Despite the criminal risks, many financial institutions with MRB customers have continued to follow FinCEN guidance.131\nC. Inconsistency in Federal Prosecution of Legalized Marijuana\nU.S. Attorneys have become vocal about their different responses to the Sessions memo.132 Some U.S. Attorneys have indicated that they will not change their policies developed from the Cole memo, and therefore will not actively prosecute those engaged in the legal marijuana trade.133 This list includes U.S. Attorneys Bob Troyer in the District of Colorado and David Freed in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.13 4 However, Andrew Lelling of the District of Massachusetts stated that he cannot promise that those engaged in state legalized marijuana would be exempt from federal prosecution.135 Other U.S. Attorneys have reiterated that while marijuana is illegal on a federal level, they will prioritize the federal prosecution of activity involving public safety and violent crimes. 13 6 Inconsistencies from U.S. Attorneys leaves legalized marijuana businesses, ancillary marijuana businesses, and financial institutions unsure of the future of federal prosecution.137\nD. Current Issues with Attorney-Client Privilege and Other Ancillary Businesses\nAs more financial institutions are slowly accepting MRB customers, additional issues arise including issues with attorneys with cannabis clients.138 For example, in California the Greenbridge Corporate Counsel's bank account with Umpqua Bank was closed.13 9 Greenbridge Corporate Counsel advises MRB clients.140 According to a staff attorney at Greenbridge Corporate Counsel, the bank demanded detailed information about his MRB clients, including client names, details about his clients' direct marijuana contacts, and how much of the firm's business is dedicated to counseling MRBs. 4 1 These questions, which are required under the FinCEN MRB Guidance, were to develop a better understanding of the firm's relationship to MRBs.1 2 However, because of the firm's duty to protect attorney-client privilege, the bank's questions put the law firm in a difficult situation. 143 Attorneys are traditionally considered higher-risk bank customers.1 44 Attorney-client privilege could be a reason for this classification that results in financial institutions' additional scrutiny. Attorneyclient privilege prevents attorneys from disclosing details about their clients, and as a result, it can prevent banks from fully complying with the Customer Information Program.\nE. Uncertainty Causes Significant Risks to MRBs\nReluctance from financial institutions to work with MRBs causes significant risks to the marijuana business, including safety, paying taxes, compensating employees, and handling other business matters. 145 Tracking transactions and paying taxes is challenging in a cash-heavy business.146 In addition, when employees are paid in cash, they are at a higher risk for robbery. 147 Furthermore, the limited financial institutions that actually provide services to MRBs charge higher fees on those banks to make up for the additional compliance costs associated with the added legal risk and procedures. 148\nThe limited access to financial institutions is problematic for MRBs, their clients, third party vendors, landlords, etc. Without proper access to financial institutions, MRBs and related business have increased costs, increased opportunity for human error because the large amount of cash, and are at a greater risk for robbery. This added risk could be solved by allowing MRBs access to the financial industry.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "UNCERTAINTY IN THE BANKING MARKET\nEven before\nrescission of the Cole memo, financial institutions were leery of providing services to MRBs because of the uncertainty and\nrisk of violating anti-laundering laws.\nOf the 11,442 financial institutions\nonly 551 have provided services to MRBs.\"\nlarge institutions do not want to take on the risk of a Bank Secrecy Act violation and will not serve MRBs\nMixed Signals within the Banking Industry\nThe federal government has shown signs of wanting financial institutions to provide services to MRBs.\nVardaman believes that the Sessions memo has not really affected the industry and that it was symbolic rather than substantive.\"\nOne of the mixed signals regarding MRBs and financial institutions is the Federal Reserve Bank's conditional approval to Fourth Corner Credit Union\nFourth Corner modified its business plan and\nshifted\nto ancillary marijuana businesses\nAnother mixed signal is the\nrenewal of the Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Amendment\nThis amendment only regulates medical marijuana and does not affect its designation as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act\nthe U.S. Small Business Association issued a policy notice\nthe policy notice prohibits businesses involved in the marijuana industry, as well as hemp-related businesses, from participating in their lending programs.\nThis new guidance will likely increase\nfinancial burdens for marijuana businesses and ancillary businesses\nthe Sessions memo created additional legal risk for banks who continue to follow the FinCEN MRB guidance.\nThe safe harbor in the Cole memo was rescinded by the Sessions memo\nIf banks\nserve MRBs, they are committing a felony and admitting the criminal behavior through reports on suspicious activity and large currency transactions\nInconsistency in Federal Prosecution\nSome U.S. Attorneys have indicated that they will not change their policies\nand\nwill not actively prosecute those engaged in the legal marijuana trade\nThis list includes\nColorado and\nPennsylvania\nHowever, Andrew Lelling of the District of Massachusetts stated that he cannot promise that those engaged in state legalized marijuana would be exempt from federal prosecution\nOther U.S. Attorneys have reiterated that while marijuana is illegal on a federal level, they will prioritize\npublic safety and violent crimes\nInconsistencies from U.S. Attorneys leaves legalized marijuana businesses\nand financial institutions unsure of the future of federal prosecution\nUncertainty Causes Significant Risks to MRBs\nReluctance from financial institutions to work with MRBs causes significant risks to the marijuana business, including safety\ntaxes, compensating employees, and handling\nbusiness\nTracking transactions and paying taxes is challenging in a cash-heavy business.\nthe limited financial institutions that actually provide services to MRBs charge higher fees\nlimited access to financial institutions is problematic for MRBs, their clients, third party vendors, landlords, etc.\nThis added risk could be solved by allowing MRBs access to the financial industry.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Threshold for a deficit’s low – the counterplan’s another mixed signal that can’t solve industry confidence.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "UNCERTAINTY IN THE BANKING MARKET\nEven before\nrescission of the Cole memo, financial institutions were leery of providing services to MRBs because of the uncertainty and\nrisk of violating anti-laundering laws.\nOf the 11,442 financial institutions\nonly 551 have provided services to MRBs.\"\nlarge institutions do not want to take on the risk of a Bank Secrecy Act violation and will not serve MRBs\nMixed Signals within the Banking Industry\nThe federal government has shown signs of wanting financial institutions to provide services to MRBs.\nVardaman believes that the Sessions memo has not really affected the industry and that it was symbolic rather than substantive.\"\nOne of the mixed signals regarding MRBs and financial institutions is the Federal Reserve Bank's conditional approval to Fourth Corner Credit Union\nFourth Corner modified its business plan and\nshifted\nto ancillary marijuana businesses\nAnother mixed signal is the\nrenewal of the Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Amendment\nThis amendment only regulates medical marijuana and does not affect its designation as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act\nthe U.S. Small Business Association issued a policy notice\nthe policy notice prohibits businesses involved in the marijuana industry, as well as hemp-related businesses, from participating in their lending programs.\nThis new guidance will likely increase\nfinancial burdens for marijuana businesses and ancillary businesses\nthe Sessions memo created additional legal risk for banks who continue to follow the FinCEN MRB guidance.\nThe safe harbor in the Cole memo was rescinded by the Sessions memo\nIf banks\nserve MRBs, they are committing a felony and admitting the criminal behavior through reports on suspicious activity and large currency transactions\nInconsistency in Federal Prosecution\nSome U.S. Attorneys have indicated that they will not change their policies\nand\nwill not actively prosecute those engaged in the legal marijuana trade\nThis list includes\nColorado and\nPennsylvania\nHowever, Andrew Lelling of the District of Massachusetts stated that he cannot promise that those engaged in state legalized marijuana would be exempt from federal prosecution\nOther U.S. Attorneys have reiterated that while marijuana is illegal on a federal level, they will prioritize\npublic safety and violent crimes\nInconsistencies from U.S. Attorneys leaves legalized marijuana businesses\nand financial institutions unsure of the future of federal prosecution\nUncertainty Causes Significant Risks to MRBs\nReluctance from financial institutions to work with MRBs causes significant risks to the marijuana business, including safety\ntaxes, compensating employees, and handling\nbusiness\nTracking transactions and paying taxes is challenging in a cash-heavy business.\nthe limited financial institutions that actually provide services to MRBs charge higher fees\nlimited access to financial institutions is problematic for MRBs, their clients, third party vendors, landlords, etc.\nThis added risk could be solved by allowing MRBs access to the financial industry.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "UNCERTAINTY\nBANKING MARKET\nfinancial institutions were leery\nuncertainty\nrisk of violating\nonly 551\ndo not want to take on the risk\nwill not serve MRBs\nMixed Signals\nBanking Industry\nshown signs\nwanting financial institutions\nmixed signals\nconditional approval\nancillary marijuana businesses\nmixed signal\nprohibits businesses\nmarijuana industry\nincrease\nfinancial burdens\nadditional legal risk\nsafe harbor\nrescinded by the Sessions memo\ncommitting a felony\nadmitting the criminal behavior\nInconsistency\nFederal Prosecution\nwill not change\nColorado\nPennsylvania\nMassachusetts\nInconsistencies from U.S. Attorneys\nfinancial institutions unsure\nUncertainty Causes Significant Risks\nReluctance\nfinancial institutions\ncharge higher fees\nlimited access\nfinancial institutions\nallowing MRBs access", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Threshold for a deficit’s low – the counterplan’s another mixed signal that can’t solve industry confidence.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "UNCERTAINTY IN THE BANKING MARKET\nEven before\nrescission of the Cole memo, financial institutions were leery of providing services to MRBs because of the uncertainty and\nrisk of violating anti-laundering laws.\nOf the 11,442 financial institutions\nonly 551 have provided services to MRBs.\"\nlarge institutions do not want to take on the risk of a Bank Secrecy Act violation and will not serve MRBs\nMixed Signals within the Banking Industry\nThe federal government has shown signs of wanting financial institutions to provide services to MRBs.\nVardaman believes that the Sessions memo has not really affected the industry and that it was symbolic rather than substantive.\"\nOne of the mixed signals regarding MRBs and financial institutions is the Federal Reserve Bank's conditional approval to Fourth Corner Credit Union\nFourth Corner modified its business plan and\nshifted\nto ancillary marijuana businesses\nAnother mixed signal is the\nrenewal of the Rohrabacher-Blumenauer Amendment\nThis amendment only regulates medical marijuana and does not affect its designation as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act\nthe U.S. Small Business Association issued a policy notice\nthe policy notice prohibits businesses involved in the marijuana industry, as well as hemp-related businesses, from participating in their lending programs.\nThis new guidance will likely increase\nfinancial burdens for marijuana businesses and ancillary businesses\nthe Sessions memo created additional legal risk for banks who continue to follow the FinCEN MRB guidance.\nThe safe harbor in the Cole memo was rescinded by the Sessions memo\nIf banks\nserve MRBs, they are committing a felony and admitting the criminal behavior through reports on suspicious activity and large currency transactions\nInconsistency in Federal Prosecution\nSome U.S. Attorneys have indicated that they will not change their policies\nand\nwill not actively prosecute those engaged in the legal marijuana trade\nThis list includes\nColorado and\nPennsylvania\nHowever, Andrew Lelling of the District of Massachusetts stated that he cannot promise that those engaged in state legalized marijuana would be exempt from federal prosecution\nOther U.S. Attorneys have reiterated that while marijuana is illegal on a federal level, they will prioritize\npublic safety and violent crimes\nInconsistencies from U.S. Attorneys leaves legalized marijuana businesses\nand financial institutions unsure of the future of federal prosecution\nUncertainty Causes Significant Risks to MRBs\nReluctance from financial institutions to work with MRBs causes significant risks to the marijuana business, including safety\ntaxes, compensating employees, and handling\nbusiness\nTracking transactions and paying taxes is challenging in a cash-heavy business.\nthe limited financial institutions that actually provide services to MRBs charge higher fees\nlimited access to financial institutions is problematic for MRBs, their clients, third party vendors, landlords, etc.\nThis added risk could be solved by allowing MRBs access to the financial industry.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "financial institutions were leery of\nMRBs because of\nuncertainty and\nrisk of violating\nlaws\nOf\n11,442\ninstitutions\nonly 551\nprovided services\nMixed Signals within\nBanking\nOne of the mixed signals\nis\nFederal Reserve\nconditional approval\nthe\nSmall Business Association\nprohibits businesses involved in\nmarijuana\nfrom\ntheir lending programs\nThe safe harbor\nwas rescinded by the Sessions memo\nIf banks\nserve MRBs, they are committing a felony\nAttorneys\nindicated\nthey will not change\npolicies\nInconsistencies from\nAttorneys leaves\nfinancial institutions unsure\nUncertainty Causes Significant Risks\nlimited access\nis problematic for MRBs\nclients, third party vendors, landlords\nrisk could be solved by allowing MRBs access", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Link’s empirically denied AND cannabis banking reform is deeply bipartisan – it’ll sail through the Senate.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Congress is considering a number of more substantive measures, including the Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2019 (commonly known as the MORE Act), for which Vice President-elect Kamala Harris (D-Calif) is the lead sponsor. The bill would legalize and tax marijuana. Other, more focused measures have received approval by the U.S. House of Representatives but remain stalled in the U.S. Senate. In September 2019, the House passed the Secure and Fair Enforcement (SAFE) Banking Act of 2019 (H.R. 1595) by a vote of 321-103. The SAFE Banking Act was also passed as part of the Health and Economic Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions (HEROES) Act, which the House passed in May 2020. While HEROES awaits Senate action, Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) reportedly included the SAFE Banking Act in the Senate Democrats' COVID relief proposal. This represents a milestone for marijuana reform, as it is the first time either caucus has made providing banking relief to the industry part of a major bill. The SAFE Banking Act would explicitly allow depository institutions to allow banks to provide services to attorneys and others serving the cannabis industry without fear of legal violations. This would allow banking regulators to provide the clearer rules and guidelines that Federal Reserve Chairman Powell has said are necessary.\nAt the state level, various measures have been considered and passed to ease banking restrictions. In September 2020, California Gov. Gavin Newsom signed AB 1525, removing state penalties that could have been levied on banks for working with state-legalized marijuana businesses. In 2019, the California Senate also passed SB 51, which would have allowed for a limited-purpose state bank charter in order to provide depository services to licensed cannabis businesses. However, the measure never made it to the governor's desk.\nAt the 2020 American Bar Association's Midyear Meeting in Austin, Texas, the ABA House of Delegates approved Resolution 103D, resolving that the ABA would urge Congress to enact legislation protecting proceeds earned by lawyers and other service providers working with the state-legalized cannabis trade. This measure allows the ABA to advocate on behalf of bills such as the SAFE Banking Act.\nConclusion\nThe incongruence between federal and state cannabis policy has created a multibillion-dollar market serviced by numerous actors even without legal protections afforded non-illicit industries. For this reason, the financial industry's penetration into this market remains tepid, with the vast majority of banks and credit unions staying on the sidelines. Others that have chosen to service the industry have done so only after consultation with regulatory and cannabis counsel, and after strengthening their compliance policies and procedures, all of which increases costs.\nCannabis measures outperformed both parties in the states where voters could decide to legalize. In deep-red Mississippi, medical marijuana legalization passed with nearly 66 percent of the vote, beating the portion of Mississippians who voted for President Trump by 7 percentage points. In South Dakota, full legalization passed with 54 percent of the vote; in Arizona, full legalization passed with 60 percent of the vote. And in deep-blue New Jersey, full legalization passed with 67 percent of the vote, beating President-elect Biden's 57.4 percent.\nAlthough during the campaign President-elect Biden did not come out for complete legalization, it is likely that his administration will push to liberalize the federal government's approach to cannabis. Vice President-elect Harris has vowed that a Biden administration would seek to decriminalize marijuana. As the lead sponsor of the MORE Act, she is likely to lead the administration's reform efforts. The most likely reforms and those that could be rolled out early in the administration would consist of further guidance from the DO], FinCEN, and other financial regulators. The guidance would likely provide increased security to industry actors and those who serve them.\nUltimately, congressional legislation providing clarity and regulatory certainty to financial institutions will likely be needed before the cannabis industry can access traditional banking products and services with the same level of comfort and normal scrutiny as mainstream customers. Any reforms will need the 60 votes required to succeed in the U.S. Senate to overcome a filibuster. Given the growing number of states legalizing cannabis, including deeply conservative states such as Oklahoma, Mississippi, and both Dakotas, it appears probable that, should a marijuana reform bill reach the Senate floor, it would have sufficient votes to pass.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Congress is considering\nmore substantive measures, including the Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2019\nthe MORE Act\nThe bill would legalize and tax marijuana. Other\nmeasures\nremain stalled in the U.S. Senate\nThe SAFE Banking Act was\npassed as part of the\nHEROES) Act, which the House passed\nSchumer\nreportedly included the SAFE Banking Act in the Senate Democrats' COVID relief proposal. This represents a milestone for marijuana reform, as it is the first time either caucus has made providing banking relief to the industry part of a major bill\nthe ABA would urge Congress to enact legislation protecting proceeds earned by lawyers and other service providers working with the state-legalized cannabis trade. This measure allows the ABA to advocate on behalf of\nthe SAFE Banking Act.\nincongruence between federal and state cannabis policy has created a multibillion-dollar market serviced by\nactors\nwithout legal protections\nthe financial industry's penetration into this market remains tepid, with\nbanks and credit unions staying on the sidelines\nCannabis measures outperformed both parties in the states where voters could decide to legalize. In deep-red Mississippi, medical marijuana legalization passed with\n66 percent of the vote, beating the portion\nwho voted for President Trump by 7 percentage points. In South Dakota\nlegalization passed with 54 percent of the vote; in Arizona\nlegalization\nwith 60 percent of the vote.\nin deep-blue New Jersey, full legalization passed with 67 percent of the vote, beating\nBiden's 57.4 percent.\nBiden\nwill push to liberalize the federal government's approach to cannabis.\nHarris has vowed that a Biden administration would seek to decriminalize marijuana.\nThe most likely reforms\nwould consist of further guidance from the DO], FinCEN, and other financial regulators.\ncongressional legislation providing clarity and regulatory certainty to financial institutions will\nbe needed before the cannabis industry can access traditional banking products and services with the same level of comfort and normal scrutiny as mainstream customers. Any reforms will need\n60 votes required to succeed in the U.S. Senate to overcome a filibuster. Given the growing number of states legalizing cannabis, including deeply conservative states such as Oklahoma, Mississippi, and both Dakotas, it appears probable that, should a marijuana reform bill reach the Senate\nit would have sufficient votes to pass.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Link’s empirically denied AND cannabis banking reform is deeply bipartisan – it’ll sail through the Senate.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Congress is considering\nmore substantive measures, including the Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2019\nthe MORE Act\nThe bill would legalize and tax marijuana. Other\nmeasures\nremain stalled in the U.S. Senate\nThe SAFE Banking Act was\npassed as part of the\nHEROES) Act, which the House passed\nSchumer\nreportedly included the SAFE Banking Act in the Senate Democrats' COVID relief proposal. This represents a milestone for marijuana reform, as it is the first time either caucus has made providing banking relief to the industry part of a major bill\nthe ABA would urge Congress to enact legislation protecting proceeds earned by lawyers and other service providers working with the state-legalized cannabis trade. This measure allows the ABA to advocate on behalf of\nthe SAFE Banking Act.\nincongruence between federal and state cannabis policy has created a multibillion-dollar market serviced by\nactors\nwithout legal protections\nthe financial industry's penetration into this market remains tepid, with\nbanks and credit unions staying on the sidelines\nCannabis measures outperformed both parties in the states where voters could decide to legalize. In deep-red Mississippi, medical marijuana legalization passed with\n66 percent of the vote, beating the portion\nwho voted for President Trump by 7 percentage points. In South Dakota\nlegalization passed with 54 percent of the vote; in Arizona\nlegalization\nwith 60 percent of the vote.\nin deep-blue New Jersey, full legalization passed with 67 percent of the vote, beating\nBiden's 57.4 percent.\nBiden\nwill push to liberalize the federal government's approach to cannabis.\nHarris has vowed that a Biden administration would seek to decriminalize marijuana.\nThe most likely reforms\nwould consist of further guidance from the DO], FinCEN, and other financial regulators.\ncongressional legislation providing clarity and regulatory certainty to financial institutions will\nbe needed before the cannabis industry can access traditional banking products and services with the same level of comfort and normal scrutiny as mainstream customers. Any reforms will need\n60 votes required to succeed in the U.S. Senate to overcome a filibuster. Given the growing number of states legalizing cannabis, including deeply conservative states such as Oklahoma, Mississippi, and both Dakotas, it appears probable that, should a marijuana reform bill reach the Senate\nit would have sufficient votes to pass.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "MORE Act\nSAFE Banking Act\nincluded the SAFE Banking Act\nmilestone for marijuana reform\nbanking relief\nurge Congress to enact\nadvocate on behalf of\nthe SAFE Banking Act.\ncannabis policy\nwithout legal protections\nbanks\ncredit unions\non the sidelines\noutperformed both parties\nMississippi\n66 percent of the vote\nSouth Dakota\nArizona\nNew Jersey,\npush to liberalize\nseek to decriminalize marijuana\ncongressional legislation\nwill\nbe needed\ncomfort\nnormal scrutiny\nneed\n60 votes\novercome a filibuster\ndeeply conservative states\nsufficient votes to pass.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Link’s empirically denied AND cannabis banking reform is deeply bipartisan – it’ll sail through the Senate.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Congress is considering\nmore substantive measures, including the Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2019\nthe MORE Act\nThe bill would legalize and tax marijuana. Other\nmeasures\nremain stalled in the U.S. Senate\nThe SAFE Banking Act was\npassed as part of the\nHEROES) Act, which the House passed\nSchumer\nreportedly included the SAFE Banking Act in the Senate Democrats' COVID relief proposal. This represents a milestone for marijuana reform, as it is the first time either caucus has made providing banking relief to the industry part of a major bill\nthe ABA would urge Congress to enact legislation protecting proceeds earned by lawyers and other service providers working with the state-legalized cannabis trade. This measure allows the ABA to advocate on behalf of\nthe SAFE Banking Act.\nincongruence between federal and state cannabis policy has created a multibillion-dollar market serviced by\nactors\nwithout legal protections\nthe financial industry's penetration into this market remains tepid, with\nbanks and credit unions staying on the sidelines\nCannabis measures outperformed both parties in the states where voters could decide to legalize. In deep-red Mississippi, medical marijuana legalization passed with\n66 percent of the vote, beating the portion\nwho voted for President Trump by 7 percentage points. In South Dakota\nlegalization passed with 54 percent of the vote; in Arizona\nlegalization\nwith 60 percent of the vote.\nin deep-blue New Jersey, full legalization passed with 67 percent of the vote, beating\nBiden's 57.4 percent.\nBiden\nwill push to liberalize the federal government's approach to cannabis.\nHarris has vowed that a Biden administration would seek to decriminalize marijuana.\nThe most likely reforms\nwould consist of further guidance from the DO], FinCEN, and other financial regulators.\ncongressional legislation providing clarity and regulatory certainty to financial institutions will\nbe needed before the cannabis industry can access traditional banking products and services with the same level of comfort and normal scrutiny as mainstream customers. Any reforms will need\n60 votes required to succeed in the U.S. Senate to overcome a filibuster. Given the growing number of states legalizing cannabis, including deeply conservative states such as Oklahoma, Mississippi, and both Dakotas, it appears probable that, should a marijuana reform bill reach the Senate\nit would have sufficient votes to pass.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the MORE Act\nwould legalize\nmarijuana\nSchumer\nincluded the SAFE Banking Act in\nCOVID relief\na milestone for marijuana reform\nCannabis\noutperformed both parties in\nstates\nIn\nMississippi\nlegalization passed with\n66 percent\nbeating\nTrump\nin\nNew Jersey\n67 percent\nBiden\nwill push to\ndecriminalize marijuana\ncongressional legislation\nwill\nbe needed before\ncannabis\ncan access\nbanking\nAny reforms will need\n60 votes\nGiven\nstates legalizing cannabis, including deeply conservative states\nit appears probable that,\na\nreform bill\nwould have sufficient votes to pass.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The plan cuts through gridlock, accrues interest group support, and permanently accelerates legislative efficiency.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "One of the key considerations undertheorized by statutory incorporation scholars is its ability to shift blame away from congressmembers onto state legislatures for flaws in federal law or policy.197 This theory recognizes Congress as a body of individual members whose principal goal is reelection. 198 As rational economic actors, congressmembers will enact legislation according to a loss-aversion principle, seeking to maximize benefits to increase their reelection chances while mitigating risks of adopting unpopular or ineffective policies. 199 This is especially true in criminal law, where public opinion is particularly unforgiving if a law proves to be underinclusive and allows a perceived criminal off the hook.200 Delegation and diffusion, from this standpoint, is a brilliant strategy of legislative design that ensures individual congressmembers only reap the benefits and only rarely being held accountable for the costs. 201 Many scholars have contributed to this scapegoating theory, 202 but it has yet to be expanded to statutory incorporation.\nUnder the scapegoating theory, congressmembers would find statutory incorporation attractive. By attaching federal criminal consequences to the states’ definition of “burglary,” for example, Congress gets the credit for passing tough on crime criminal and immigration laws. However, if a perceived dangerous person or noncitizen escapes just punishment due to the under inclusivity of state law or some other legal loophole, Congress can shift blame to the applicable state law or state official that let that person off the hook. The same can be true of bankruptcy laws or federal benefits statutes, giving congressmembers all of the benefits for positive outcomes, but allowing them to pass blame for negative or unpopular outcomes to state actors if their state law produces undesired outcomes by leaving debtors or beneficiaries with negative federal outcomes.\nConsidering the self-interested goals of maximizing benefit while minimizing risk under this scapegoating theory has important implications. First, the individualism of congressmembers should be highlighted.203 Thus, any broad presumptions that Congress as a whole might use statutory incorporation to signal values of federalism or delegation principles must be appropriately discounted.204 Instead, individual congressmembers are likely more interested in winning re-election than they are about imbuing statutes with the purported benefits of ivory tower theory. Second, this level of individual self-interest also challenges whether statutory incorporation or similar legislative schemes serve the public interest or if they are meant to serve congressmembers’ private interests.205 As Arrow’s Theorem predicts, when the individual self-interests of congressmembers is properly accounted for, it is nearly impossible to ensure that any given majority vote in Congress will capture the voters’ interests.206 Third, the self-interests at play in statutory incorporation muddles the loyalty of individual congressmembers between their duties to the federal government and their representation of the local constituents who voted them into power. Congressmembers “are as much officers of the entire Union as is the President,” 207 and must serve federal interests when passing laws irrespective of their loyalty to their homes. Thus, while a member representing a particular congressional district in Ohio or the state of California might prefer to incorporate the laws of those states into federal law, this goes against their ethical and professional duties to do what is best for the federal electorate. Of course, it is not uncommon for congressmembers to fight for pork and other federal benefits to shower their constituents with, but statutory incorporation goes further by federally incorporating state law. Instead of the lofty ideals of serving federalism and decentralization of empowering states, this rather serves to empower the individual congressmembers next campaign.\nB. Interest Group Realities\nThe self-interests highlighted in interest-based incorporation also serves to explain the unfettered access and important role that interest groups and lobbyists have in the statutory drafting process. Interest group theories of politics are the subject of extensive commentary,208 and interest groups’ influence on congressional processes is undeniable. Several studies documenting the legislative drafting process found that lobbyists are regularly involved in the drafting process and even offer initial first drafts of bills for congressional drafters and legislative counsel to consider.209 Indeed, many congressional drafters have become somewhat dependent on the research and expertise of lobbyists, finding it to be a helpful resource. 210 The influence of lobbyists in Congress has only increased in recent years, going from $1.45 billion in 1998 to $3.5 billion in 2020.211 In short, those that draft federal statutes are likely less occupied with federalism and delegation concerns as they are with interest group influences.212 \nThis interest group dynamic has notable quid pro quo benefits for all parties involved. Congressmembers benefit from the immense research, expertise, and resources of interest groups during the legislative process. This research and expertise can help pass laws more effectively, and lobbyists may be able to spread enough influence to build political coalitions that are necessary to pass bills into law. In addition, congressmembers also benefit from making important allies in the private sector during the legislative process that may be important campaign finance contributors. Interest groups in return get high levels of access to the legislative drafting process and enjoy tremendous influence over federal laws.\nAs applied to statutory incorporation, interest groups favor delegations of power to weaker institutions that are more susceptible to interest-group capture. 213 Others have argued that interest groups would prefer greater centralization of power because capture of this single power source would grant the interest group with more power than trying to capture multiple power sources. 214 But this consolidation of power in Congress or in federal agencies may indeed require more investment and resources than a delegation and diffusion to state legislatures through statutory incorporation.\nFirst, state legislators are paid much less than congressmembers and have less legislative resources in the form of time, research, and staff. 215 Thus, state legislators may be more susceptible to interest-group capture than members of Congress who have more resources, more eyes on them, and more responsibility. Second, state legislative bodies tend to be much smaller with fewer legislators than Congress, meaning it may less influence with fewer legislators to draft and sway votes in state legislatures.216 Third, interest groups are not always interested in instituting nation-wide policies, but may be more attuned to regional and intrastate goals according to the will of clients who may only operate in one or a number of states. Influencing congressmembers to use statutory incorporation empowers interest groups to efficiently target specific states and regions in accordance with regional clients. And finally, interest groups may favor statutory incorporation from a competition standpoint. Because Congress is the largest locust of consolidated legislative power in the nation, competition among lobbyists vying for congressional influence would be greater on the national level than if power were diffused to lesser legislatures. Criminologist Lisa Miller has documented how interest groups, large and small, can skew federalism goals at the local level by ensuring that less organized interests are drowned out by well-resourced and well-organized interest groups.217 This is often the case with national interest groups, such as the NRA or the ACLU, taking increased interest in state and local lawmaking, thus displacing local mores with nationalized agendas in the creation of state and local law.218\nInterest groups play an ever-important role in the legislative process, and their influence must be appreciated when considering statutory incorporation. The quid pro quo relationship that benefits the self-interests of congressmembers as well as the regional and national aims of interest groups explains why statutory incorporation is an attractive legislative tool for both parties.\nC. Negotiating Ambiguity\nStatutory incorporation also carries the benefits of intentional ambiguity. Scholars have long recognized that ambiguous statutes are often the result of intentional design, 219 and the study of such ambiguity has large implications for statutory interpretation. 220 Incorporating state law is not all that different from drafting an ambiguous term; whereas ambiguity describes how terms and statutes can be legitimately interpreted in different ways, statutory incorporation all but ensures that federal statutes will be interpreted and applied fifty different ways among the different states.\nThe first benefit to drafting ambiguous terms is the benefits to legislative efficiency. These terms allow negotiators to pass over difficult sticking points of disagreement that would otherwise derail or take too much time to reach consensus.221 This is congruent with statutory incorporation. Instead of using the precious little time available in most drafting and negotiation sessions to hash out difficult issues of what should “burglary,” “debt,” or “child” mean in federal statutes, drafters save tremendous time by incorporating the laws of all fifty states into the statute to resolve this problem.222 This allows congressional drafters to insert a term that can be read multiple different ways to prevent gridlock in the legislative process and allows each negotiator to leave the room believing they got what they wanted. And perhaps each of them did, since using statutory incorporation produces a federal statute that will apply differently in each state.\nBut legislative efficiency should be generally approached with suspicion, especially when congressmembers are so flagrantly ignoring their difficult duties of drafting meaningful legislation. The federal legislative process was never intended to be efficient; in fact, it was designed to be the opposite. The committee process, multiple tiers of draftsmanship, and the nine vetogates described by Professor William Eskridge, Jr. that a bill must hurdle before even getting to the President’s desk is a process that is meant to produce good law, not fast law. 223 In the face of such legislative Darwinism, only the fittest, best negotiated, and most compromised upon bills become law, explaining why as little as 3% of proposed bills become statutes.224 Statutory incorporation thus serves as a shortcut that diminishes the legitimacy and efficacy of the carefully designed legislative process.\nA second and closely related reason why Congress intentionally drafts ambiguous terms is that it allows congressmembers to side-step complex issues and instead defer to other institutions to solve these ambiguities. 225 By refusing to take on the difficult task of negotiating difficult topics, congressional drafters may instead pass this difficult task off to agencies or courts to solve themselves on their time. 226 This means that opposing negotiators can walk out of the room each with the hope that another institution will interpret the law in their favor sometime in the future. 227 Statutory incorporation accomplishes the same goal by allowing congressmembers to shirk their legislative duties and pass the difficult task of defining things like “burglary,” “husband,” and various torts to state legislatures who have already defined these terms according to the preferences of their polity. Congressmembers representing California would be just as satisfied with those representing Texas, since they would be able to avoid the taxing negotiating process of defining the complexities of bankruptcy or social security statutes by instead allowing the law of their home jurisdictions to govern how federal law will apply to their constituents. The unfortunate irony is that while the congressional dodge of statutory incorporation may improve legislative efficiency while becoming a tax on judicial economy as has happened in various contexts employing statutory incorporation.228\nWhere federalism and delegation theories fall short, interest-based incorporation offers a more complete explanation on why Congress so frequently relies on statutory incorporation across so many federal statutes that cover diverse areas of the law. Interest-based incorporation offers a realistic look into how self-interested politicians seek to continue their career in politics by passing laws that maximize political benefits while mitigating political risks. Statutory incorporation allows individual congressmembers to reap the benefits of scapegoating, interest-group politics, and drafting ambiguous terms all to increase their political outlook. Congress may indeed be the most political branch of the federal government, so it should come as no surprise that congressmembers are the most politically motivated members of the federal government.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "One of the key considerations undertheorized by statutory incorporation\nis its ability to shift blame away from congressmembers onto state legislatures for flaws in federal law\nThis\nrecognizes Congress as a body of individual members whose principal goal is reelection\ncongressmembers will enact legislation according to a loss-aversion principle, seeking to maximize benefits to increase\nreelection chances while mitigating risks of\nunpopular or ineffective policies\nThis is especially true in criminal law, where public opinion is particularly unforgiving if a law proves to be underinclusive and allows a\ncriminal off the hook\nDelegation and diffusion, from this standpoint, is\nbrilliant\nlegislative design that ensures individual congressmembers only reap the benefits\nrarely being held accountable for the costs.\ncongressmembers would find statutory incorporation attractive. By attaching federal criminal consequences to\nstates’ definition of “burglary,” for example, Congress gets the credit for passing tough on crime criminal and immigration laws.\n, if a perceived\nperson or noncitizen escapes just punishment due to the under inclusivity of state law or some other legal loophole, Congress can shift blame to the applicable state law\nThe same can be true of bankruptcy laws or federal benefits statutes, giving congressmembers all of the benefits for positive outcomes, but allowing them to pass blame for negative or unpopular outcomes to state actors\nindividualism of congressmembers should be highlighted.\nany broad presumptions that Congress as a whole might use statutory incorporation to signal\nfederalism or delegation\nmust be appropriately discounted\nindividual congressmembers are\nmore interested in winning re-election\nit is not uncommon for congressmembers to fight for pork and other federal benefits to shower their constituents with, but statutory incorporation goes further by federally incorporating state law. Instead of\nserving federalism and decentralization\nthis\nserves to empower the individual congressmembers next campaign.\ninterest groups’ influence on congressional processes is undeniable. Several studies documenting the legislative drafting process found that lobbyists are regularly involved in the drafting process and\noffer initial first drafts of bills for congressional drafters and legislative counsel to consider.\nThe influence of lobbyists in Congress has only increased in recent years, going from $1.45 billion in 1998 to $3.5 billion in 2020\nThis interest group dynamic has notable quid pro quo benefits for all parties involved. Congressmembers benefit from the immense research, expertise, and resources of interest groups during the legislative process\nlobbyists may\nspread enough influence to build political coalitions that are necessary to pass bills into law.\ncongressmembers\nbenefit from making important allies in the private sector during the legislative process that may be\ncampaign finance contributors\ninterest groups favor delegations of power to weaker institutions that are more susceptible to interest-group capture\nconsolidation of power in Congress\nrequire more investment and resources than\ndelegation and diffusion to state legislatures through statutory incorporation.\nstate legislators may be more susceptible to interest-group capture than members of Congress who have more resources, more eyes on them, and more responsibility\ninterest groups are not always interested in instituting nation-wide policies, but may be more attuned to regional and intrastate goals\nInfluencing congressmembers to use statutory incorporation empowers interest groups to efficiently target specific states and regions\ninterest groups may favor statutory incorporation from a competition standpoint.\ncompetition among lobbyists vying for congressional influence would be greater\nif power were diffused to lesser legislatures\nInterest groups play an ever-important role in the legislative process, and their influence must be appreciated when considering statutory incorporation. The quid pro quo relationship that benefits\nself-interests of congressmembers\nexplains why statutory incorporation is an attractive legislative tool for both parties.\nStatutory incorporation\ncarries the benefits of intentional ambiguity\nstatutory incorporation\nensures that federal statutes will be interpreted and applied fifty different ways among the different states\nThe\nbenefit to drafting ambiguous terms is the benefits to legislative efficiency\nThese terms allow negotiators to pass over difficult sticking points of disagreement that would\nderail or take too much time to reach consensus\nThis is congruent with statutory incorporation. Instead of using\nprecious little time\nto hash out difficult issues of what should “burglary,” “debt,” or “child” mean in federal statutes, drafters save tremendous time by incorporating the laws of all fifty states into the statute to resolve this problem\nThis allows congressional drafters to insert a term that can be read multiple different ways to prevent gridlock in the legislative process and allows each negotiator to leave the room believing they got what they wanted\nCongress intentionally drafts ambiguous terms is that it allows congressmembers to side-step complex issues and instead defer to other institutions to solve these ambiguities\nBy refusing to take on the difficult task of negotiating difficult topics, congressional drafters may instead pass this difficult task off to agencies or courts to solve themselves on their time\nopposing negotiators can walk out of the room each with the hope that another institution will interpret the law in their favor sometime in the future.\nStatutory incorporation accomplishes the same goal by allowing congressmembers to\nand pass the difficult task of defining things like “burglary,” “husband,” and various torts to state legislatures\nCongressmembers representing California would be just as satisfied with those representing Texas\nby\nallowing the law of their home jurisdictions to govern how federal law will apply to their constituents.\nInterest-based incorporation offers a realistic look into how self-interested politicians seek to continue their career in politics by passing laws that maximize political benefits while mitigating political risks. Statutory incorporation allows\ncongressmembers to reap the benefits of scapegoating, interest-group politics, and drafting ambiguous terms all to increase their political outlook.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The plan cuts through gridlock, accrues interest group support, and permanently accelerates legislative efficiency.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "One of the key considerations undertheorized by statutory incorporation\nis its ability to shift blame away from congressmembers onto state legislatures for flaws in federal law\nThis\nrecognizes Congress as a body of individual members whose principal goal is reelection\ncongressmembers will enact legislation according to a loss-aversion principle, seeking to maximize benefits to increase\nreelection chances while mitigating risks of\nunpopular or ineffective policies\nThis is especially true in criminal law, where public opinion is particularly unforgiving if a law proves to be underinclusive and allows a\ncriminal off the hook\nDelegation and diffusion, from this standpoint, is\nbrilliant\nlegislative design that ensures individual congressmembers only reap the benefits\nrarely being held accountable for the costs.\ncongressmembers would find statutory incorporation attractive. By attaching federal criminal consequences to\nstates’ definition of “burglary,” for example, Congress gets the credit for passing tough on crime criminal and immigration laws.\n, if a perceived\nperson or noncitizen escapes just punishment due to the under inclusivity of state law or some other legal loophole, Congress can shift blame to the applicable state law\nThe same can be true of bankruptcy laws or federal benefits statutes, giving congressmembers all of the benefits for positive outcomes, but allowing them to pass blame for negative or unpopular outcomes to state actors\nindividualism of congressmembers should be highlighted.\nany broad presumptions that Congress as a whole might use statutory incorporation to signal\nfederalism or delegation\nmust be appropriately discounted\nindividual congressmembers are\nmore interested in winning re-election\nit is not uncommon for congressmembers to fight for pork and other federal benefits to shower their constituents with, but statutory incorporation goes further by federally incorporating state law. Instead of\nserving federalism and decentralization\nthis\nserves to empower the individual congressmembers next campaign.\ninterest groups’ influence on congressional processes is undeniable. Several studies documenting the legislative drafting process found that lobbyists are regularly involved in the drafting process and\noffer initial first drafts of bills for congressional drafters and legislative counsel to consider.\nThe influence of lobbyists in Congress has only increased in recent years, going from $1.45 billion in 1998 to $3.5 billion in 2020\nThis interest group dynamic has notable quid pro quo benefits for all parties involved. Congressmembers benefit from the immense research, expertise, and resources of interest groups during the legislative process\nlobbyists may\nspread enough influence to build political coalitions that are necessary to pass bills into law.\ncongressmembers\nbenefit from making important allies in the private sector during the legislative process that may be\ncampaign finance contributors\ninterest groups favor delegations of power to weaker institutions that are more susceptible to interest-group capture\nconsolidation of power in Congress\nrequire more investment and resources than\ndelegation and diffusion to state legislatures through statutory incorporation.\nstate legislators may be more susceptible to interest-group capture than members of Congress who have more resources, more eyes on them, and more responsibility\ninterest groups are not always interested in instituting nation-wide policies, but may be more attuned to regional and intrastate goals\nInfluencing congressmembers to use statutory incorporation empowers interest groups to efficiently target specific states and regions\ninterest groups may favor statutory incorporation from a competition standpoint.\ncompetition among lobbyists vying for congressional influence would be greater\nif power were diffused to lesser legislatures\nInterest groups play an ever-important role in the legislative process, and their influence must be appreciated when considering statutory incorporation. The quid pro quo relationship that benefits\nself-interests of congressmembers\nexplains why statutory incorporation is an attractive legislative tool for both parties.\nStatutory incorporation\ncarries the benefits of intentional ambiguity\nstatutory incorporation\nensures that federal statutes will be interpreted and applied fifty different ways among the different states\nThe\nbenefit to drafting ambiguous terms is the benefits to legislative efficiency\nThese terms allow negotiators to pass over difficult sticking points of disagreement that would\nderail or take too much time to reach consensus\nThis is congruent with statutory incorporation. Instead of using\nprecious little time\nto hash out difficult issues of what should “burglary,” “debt,” or “child” mean in federal statutes, drafters save tremendous time by incorporating the laws of all fifty states into the statute to resolve this problem\nThis allows congressional drafters to insert a term that can be read multiple different ways to prevent gridlock in the legislative process and allows each negotiator to leave the room believing they got what they wanted\nCongress intentionally drafts ambiguous terms is that it allows congressmembers to side-step complex issues and instead defer to other institutions to solve these ambiguities\nBy refusing to take on the difficult task of negotiating difficult topics, congressional drafters may instead pass this difficult task off to agencies or courts to solve themselves on their time\nopposing negotiators can walk out of the room each with the hope that another institution will interpret the law in their favor sometime in the future.\nStatutory incorporation accomplishes the same goal by allowing congressmembers to\nand pass the difficult task of defining things like “burglary,” “husband,” and various torts to state legislatures\nCongressmembers representing California would be just as satisfied with those representing Texas\nby\nallowing the law of their home jurisdictions to govern how federal law will apply to their constituents.\nInterest-based incorporation offers a realistic look into how self-interested politicians seek to continue their career in politics by passing laws that maximize political benefits while mitigating political risks. Statutory incorporation allows\ncongressmembers to reap the benefits of scapegoating, interest-group politics, and drafting ambiguous terms all to increase their political outlook.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "shift blame away\nonto state legislatures\nprincipal goal is reelection\nloss-aversion principle\nincrease\nreelection chances\nespecially true in criminal law\nbrilliant\nlegislative design\nonly reap the benefits\nfind statutory incorporation attractive.\nfederal criminal consequences\ngets the credit\nblame to the applicable state law\npass blame\nto state actors\nindividualism\nappropriately discounted\ninterested in winning re-election\npork\nshower their constituents\nfederally incorporating state law.\nempower the individual congressmembers\ninterest groups’ influence\nundeniable\nregularly involved\nonly increased\n$3.5 billion\nnotable quid pro quo benefits\nimmense research\nexpertise\nresources\nbuild political coalitions\nnecessary to pass bills\nmaking important allies\ncampaign finance contributors\nfavor delegations of power\nstate legislatures\nstatutory incorporation\nmore susceptible\nattuned to regional\nintrastate goals\nstatutory incorporation\nefficiently target\nfavor statutory incorporation\ndiffused to lesser legislatures\never-important role\nbenefits\nself-interests of congressmembers\nattractive legislative tool\nboth parties\nintentional ambiguity\ninterpreted\napplied\nlegislative efficiency\ndifficult sticking points\nderail\ntake too much time\ncongruent with statutory incorporation\nhash out difficult issues\nsave tremendous time\nprevent gridlock\nbelieving they got what they wanted\nside-step complex issues\ndefer to other institutions\npass this difficult task off\nagencies\ncourts\ninterpret the law in their favor\npass the difficult task\nCalifornia\nTexas\nlaw of their home jurisdictions\nmaximize political benefits\nmitigating political risks\nincrease their political outlook", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The plan cuts through gridlock, accrues interest group support, and permanently accelerates legislative efficiency.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "One of the key considerations undertheorized by statutory incorporation\nis its ability to shift blame away from congressmembers onto state legislatures for flaws in federal law\nThis\nrecognizes Congress as a body of individual members whose principal goal is reelection\ncongressmembers will enact legislation according to a loss-aversion principle, seeking to maximize benefits to increase\nreelection chances while mitigating risks of\nunpopular or ineffective policies\nThis is especially true in criminal law, where public opinion is particularly unforgiving if a law proves to be underinclusive and allows a\ncriminal off the hook\nDelegation and diffusion, from this standpoint, is\nbrilliant\nlegislative design that ensures individual congressmembers only reap the benefits\nrarely being held accountable for the costs.\ncongressmembers would find statutory incorporation attractive. By attaching federal criminal consequences to\nstates’ definition of “burglary,” for example, Congress gets the credit for passing tough on crime criminal and immigration laws.\n, if a perceived\nperson or noncitizen escapes just punishment due to the under inclusivity of state law or some other legal loophole, Congress can shift blame to the applicable state law\nThe same can be true of bankruptcy laws or federal benefits statutes, giving congressmembers all of the benefits for positive outcomes, but allowing them to pass blame for negative or unpopular outcomes to state actors\nindividualism of congressmembers should be highlighted.\nany broad presumptions that Congress as a whole might use statutory incorporation to signal\nfederalism or delegation\nmust be appropriately discounted\nindividual congressmembers are\nmore interested in winning re-election\nit is not uncommon for congressmembers to fight for pork and other federal benefits to shower their constituents with, but statutory incorporation goes further by federally incorporating state law. Instead of\nserving federalism and decentralization\nthis\nserves to empower the individual congressmembers next campaign.\ninterest groups’ influence on congressional processes is undeniable. Several studies documenting the legislative drafting process found that lobbyists are regularly involved in the drafting process and\noffer initial first drafts of bills for congressional drafters and legislative counsel to consider.\nThe influence of lobbyists in Congress has only increased in recent years, going from $1.45 billion in 1998 to $3.5 billion in 2020\nThis interest group dynamic has notable quid pro quo benefits for all parties involved. Congressmembers benefit from the immense research, expertise, and resources of interest groups during the legislative process\nlobbyists may\nspread enough influence to build political coalitions that are necessary to pass bills into law.\ncongressmembers\nbenefit from making important allies in the private sector during the legislative process that may be\ncampaign finance contributors\ninterest groups favor delegations of power to weaker institutions that are more susceptible to interest-group capture\nconsolidation of power in Congress\nrequire more investment and resources than\ndelegation and diffusion to state legislatures through statutory incorporation.\nstate legislators may be more susceptible to interest-group capture than members of Congress who have more resources, more eyes on them, and more responsibility\ninterest groups are not always interested in instituting nation-wide policies, but may be more attuned to regional and intrastate goals\nInfluencing congressmembers to use statutory incorporation empowers interest groups to efficiently target specific states and regions\ninterest groups may favor statutory incorporation from a competition standpoint.\ncompetition among lobbyists vying for congressional influence would be greater\nif power were diffused to lesser legislatures\nInterest groups play an ever-important role in the legislative process, and their influence must be appreciated when considering statutory incorporation. The quid pro quo relationship that benefits\nself-interests of congressmembers\nexplains why statutory incorporation is an attractive legislative tool for both parties.\nStatutory incorporation\ncarries the benefits of intentional ambiguity\nstatutory incorporation\nensures that federal statutes will be interpreted and applied fifty different ways among the different states\nThe\nbenefit to drafting ambiguous terms is the benefits to legislative efficiency\nThese terms allow negotiators to pass over difficult sticking points of disagreement that would\nderail or take too much time to reach consensus\nThis is congruent with statutory incorporation. Instead of using\nprecious little time\nto hash out difficult issues of what should “burglary,” “debt,” or “child” mean in federal statutes, drafters save tremendous time by incorporating the laws of all fifty states into the statute to resolve this problem\nThis allows congressional drafters to insert a term that can be read multiple different ways to prevent gridlock in the legislative process and allows each negotiator to leave the room believing they got what they wanted\nCongress intentionally drafts ambiguous terms is that it allows congressmembers to side-step complex issues and instead defer to other institutions to solve these ambiguities\nBy refusing to take on the difficult task of negotiating difficult topics, congressional drafters may instead pass this difficult task off to agencies or courts to solve themselves on their time\nopposing negotiators can walk out of the room each with the hope that another institution will interpret the law in their favor sometime in the future.\nStatutory incorporation accomplishes the same goal by allowing congressmembers to\nand pass the difficult task of defining things like “burglary,” “husband,” and various torts to state legislatures\nCongressmembers representing California would be just as satisfied with those representing Texas\nby\nallowing the law of their home jurisdictions to govern how federal law will apply to their constituents.\nInterest-based incorporation offers a realistic look into how self-interested politicians seek to continue their career in politics by passing laws that maximize political benefits while mitigating political risks. Statutory incorporation allows\ncongressmembers to reap the benefits of scapegoating, interest-group politics, and drafting ambiguous terms all to increase their political outlook.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "congressmembers\nenact legislation according to\nloss-aversion\nseeking to\nincrease\nreelection chances while mitigating\nunpopular\npolicies\nespecially\nin criminal law, where public opinion is particularly unforgiving\ncongressmembers\nfind statutory incorporation attractive. By attaching federal criminal consequences\nCongress gets the credit\nif a\nperson\nescapes\nCongress can shift blame to\nstate law\nfederally incorporating state law\nempower\nindividual congressmembers next campaign\ninterest groups’ influence\nis undeniable\nThis\ndynamic has\nquid pro quo benefits\ncongressmembers\nbenefit from\ncampaign finance contributors\ninterest groups favor delegations of power\nquid pro quo\nself-interests\nexplains why statutory incorporation is an attractive\nfor both parties.\nThe\nbenefit\nis\nlegislative efficiency\nnegotiators\npass over difficult sticking points\nincorporating\nlaws of\nstates\nprevent gridlock\nand allows each negotiator to leave\nbelieving they got what they wanted\nallowing\nhome jurisdictions to govern how federal law will apply to\nconstituents\nStatutory incorporation allows\ncongressmembers to\nincrease\npolitical outlook.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Crimes apply to entities capable of meeting both actus reus and mens rea requirements – we meet, and it solves limits.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "For some years, there has been significant controversy about the very essence of an AI entity.16 Futurologists have proclaimed the birth of a new species, machina sapiens, which will share the human place as intelligent creatures on earth.17 Critics have argued that a “thinking machine” is an oxymoron.18 Machines, including computers, with their foundations of cold logic, can never be as insightful or creative as humans.19 This controversy raises the basic questions of the essence of humanity (do human beings function as thinking machines?) and of AI (can there be thinking machines?).20\nThere are five attributes that one would expect an intelligent entity to possess.21 The first is communication.22 One can communicate with an intelligent entity. The easier it is to communicate with an entity, the more intelligent the entity seems. One can communicate with a dog, but not about Einstein’s theory of relativity. One can communicate with a little child about Einstein’s theory, but it requires a discussion in terms that a child can comprehend. The second is internal knowledge;23 an intelligent entity is expected to have some knowledge about itself. The third is external knowledge;24 an intelligent entity is expected to know about the outside world, to learn about it, and to utilise that information. The fourth is goal-driven behaviour;25 an intelligent entity is expected to take action in order to achieve its goals. The fifth is creativity;26 an intelligent entity is expected to have some ability to take alternate action when the initial action fails. For example, a fly that tries to exit a room and bumps into a windowpane will do that repeatedly and incessantly. When an AI robot bumps into a window, it tries to exit using the door. Most AI entities possess these five attributes by definition.27 Some twenty-first century types of AI entities possess even more attributes that enable them to act in far more sophisticated ways.28\nAI entities have a wide variety of applications. AI entities can be designed to imitate the physical capabilities of a human being, and these capabilities can be improved. AI entity is capable of being physically faster and stronger than a human being. The AI software installed in it also enables the AI entity to calculate many complicated calculations faster and simultaneously, or to “think” faster. An AI entity is capable of learning and of gaining experience, and experience is a useful way of learning. AI entities and AI software are used in a wide range of applications in industry, military services, medical services, science and even in games.29 All these attributes create the essence of an AI entity.30\nAn AI system is required to complete the preparation of a given software for public use. The system may be designed as a debugger which fills in necessary ingredients if required or missing. At some places in the software, the AI system fills the relevant ingredient by copying a protected part of another software. Although the AI system has made some changes in the copied software, it still is considered to be an IP violation, which is protected by a criminal offence besides some civil protections. If the state wishes to deter the society from such conduct, the administrative directive is to indict the violator in criminal proceedings.31\nIn order to impose criminal liability upon a person, two main elements must exist for non-strict liability offences. The first is the factual element (actus reus), while the other is the mental element (mens rea). The actus reus requirement is expressed mainly by acts or omissions.32 Sometimes, other external elements are required in addition to conduct, such as the specific results of that conduct and the specific circumstances underlying the conduct.33 In most IP offences, the actual conduct which infringes the IP right is the actus reus requirement (e.g., the actual copying of the information).\nThe mens rea requirement has various levels of mental elements. The highest level is expressed by direct intention, but often subjective recklessness is sufficient. Obviously, subjective recklessness comes in many degrees. A person’s knowledge of the essential facts can be used to infer either direct intention or subjective recklessness. That a person knows something might result does not mean she intended it to result.34 Substitutes for the mental element requirement are expressed by negligence35 (a reasonable person should have known), or by strict liability offences.36 These are substitutes for the mental state requirement; they do not require the human agent to have formed any mental knowledge or foresight about the criminal nature of the proscribed conduct. In most legal systems, the mental element requirement of IP offences is expressed through knowledge, i.e., the offender is required to know or to be aware of the offending nature of the illegal conduct, i.e., while violating protected IP rights.\nThese two requirements are the only criteria or capabilities which are required in order to impose criminal liability, not only from humans, but from any other kind of entity, including corporations and AI entities. Any entity might possess further capabilities, such as creativity, for example. However, in order to impose criminal liability, the existence of actus reus and mens rea of the specific offence is adequate. No further capabilities are required for the imposition of criminal liability. Thus, on one hand, an uncreative thief is still a thief, if actus reus and mens rea of theft are proven. On the other hand, an ant is capable of biting creatively, but it is incapable of formulating the mens rea requirement; therefore, a creatively biting ant bears no criminal liability. A parrot is capable of repeating words it hears, but it is incapable of formulating the mens rea requirement for libel.37\nThe imposition of criminal liability on any kind of entity is dependent on proving these two elements beyond a reasonable doubt. When it has been proven that a person committed the criminal act knowingly or with criminal intent, that person is held criminally liable for that offence.38 The relevant question concerning the criminal liability of AI entities is: how can these entities fulfil the two requirements of criminal liability? This chapter proposes the imposition of criminal liability on AI entities using three possible models of liability: the Perpetration-by-Another liability model, the Natural-Probable-Consequence liability model and the Direct liability model. The following subsections explain these three possible models.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "For some years, there has been\ncontroversy about the very essence of an AI entity\nFuturologists have proclaimed\na new species, machina sapiens, which will share the human place as intelligent creatures on earth\nThere are five attributes\none would expect an intelligent entity to possess\nThe first is communication\nOne can communicate with an intelligent entity\nThe second is internal knowledge\nan intelligent entity is expected to have some knowledge about itself. The third is external knowledge\nan intelligent entity is expected to know about the outside world\nand\nutilise that information\nThe fourth is goal-driven behaviour;\nan intelligent entity is expected to take action\nto achieve its goals. The fifth is creativity\nan intelligent entity is expected to have some ability to take alternate action when the initial action fails\nMost AI entities possess these five attributes by definition\nSome twenty-first century types of AI entities possess even more\nAI entity is capable of being physically faster and stronger than a human being\nAll these attributes create the essence of an AI entity\nAn AI system is required to complete\npreparation of a given software for public use.\nAt some places in the software, the AI system fills the relevant ingredient by copying a protected part\nAlthough the AI system has made some changes\nit\nis considered to be an IP violation\nthe administrative directive is to indict the violator in criminal proceedings\nIn order to impose criminal liability\ntwo main elements must exist\nThe first is the factual element (actus reus), while the other is the mental element (mens rea). The actus reus requirement is expressed\nby acts or omissions\nthe actual conduct which infringes the\nright is the actus reus requirement\nThe mens rea requirement has various levels of mental elements. The highest level is expressed by direct intention, but often subjective recklessness is sufficient.\nA person’s knowledge of the essential facts can be used to infer either direct intention or subjective recklessness.\nSubstitutes for the mental element requirement are expressed by negligence\nor by strict liability offences\nIn most legal systems, the mental element requirement of IP offences is expressed through knowledge, i.e., the offender is required to know or to be aware of the offending nature of the illegal conduct\nwhile violating protected IP rights\nThese two requirements are the only criteria or capabilities which are required in order to impose criminal liability, not only from humans, but from any other kind of entity, including corporations and AI entities\nin order to impose criminal liability, the existence of actus reus and mens rea of the specific offence is adequate. No further capabilities are required\nan uncreative thief is still a thief, if actus reus and mens rea of theft are proven.\nan ant is capable of biting creatively, but it is incapable of formulating the mens rea requirement\nA parrot is capable of repeating words it hears, but it is incapable of formulating the mens rea requirement for libe\nThe imposition of criminal liability on any kind of entity is dependent on proving these two elements beyond a reasonable doubt. When it has been proven that a person committed the criminal act\nthat person is held criminally liable for that offence\nThe relevant question concerning\nAI entities is: how can these entities fulfil the two requirements", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Crimes apply to entities capable of meeting both actus reus and mens rea requirements – we meet, and it solves limits.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "For some years, there has been\ncontroversy about the very essence of an AI entity\nFuturologists have proclaimed\na new species, machina sapiens, which will share the human place as intelligent creatures on earth\nThere are five attributes\none would expect an intelligent entity to possess\nThe first is communication\nOne can communicate with an intelligent entity\nThe second is internal knowledge\nan intelligent entity is expected to have some knowledge about itself. The third is external knowledge\nan intelligent entity is expected to know about the outside world\nand\nutilise that information\nThe fourth is goal-driven behaviour;\nan intelligent entity is expected to take action\nto achieve its goals. The fifth is creativity\nan intelligent entity is expected to have some ability to take alternate action when the initial action fails\nMost AI entities possess these five attributes by definition\nSome twenty-first century types of AI entities possess even more\nAI entity is capable of being physically faster and stronger than a human being\nAll these attributes create the essence of an AI entity\nAn AI system is required to complete\npreparation of a given software for public use.\nAt some places in the software, the AI system fills the relevant ingredient by copying a protected part\nAlthough the AI system has made some changes\nit\nis considered to be an IP violation\nthe administrative directive is to indict the violator in criminal proceedings\nIn order to impose criminal liability\ntwo main elements must exist\nThe first is the factual element (actus reus), while the other is the mental element (mens rea). The actus reus requirement is expressed\nby acts or omissions\nthe actual conduct which infringes the\nright is the actus reus requirement\nThe mens rea requirement has various levels of mental elements. The highest level is expressed by direct intention, but often subjective recklessness is sufficient.\nA person’s knowledge of the essential facts can be used to infer either direct intention or subjective recklessness.\nSubstitutes for the mental element requirement are expressed by negligence\nor by strict liability offences\nIn most legal systems, the mental element requirement of IP offences is expressed through knowledge, i.e., the offender is required to know or to be aware of the offending nature of the illegal conduct\nwhile violating protected IP rights\nThese two requirements are the only criteria or capabilities which are required in order to impose criminal liability, not only from humans, but from any other kind of entity, including corporations and AI entities\nin order to impose criminal liability, the existence of actus reus and mens rea of the specific offence is adequate. No further capabilities are required\nan uncreative thief is still a thief, if actus reus and mens rea of theft are proven.\nan ant is capable of biting creatively, but it is incapable of formulating the mens rea requirement\nA parrot is capable of repeating words it hears, but it is incapable of formulating the mens rea requirement for libe\nThe imposition of criminal liability on any kind of entity is dependent on proving these two elements beyond a reasonable doubt. When it has been proven that a person committed the criminal act\nthat person is held criminally liable for that offence\nThe relevant question concerning\nAI entities is: how can these entities fulfil the two requirements", "role": "user" }, { "content": "AI entity\nmachina sapiens\nshare the human place\ncommunication\ninternal knowledge\nexternal knowledge\ngoal-driven behaviour;\ncreativity\nAI entities\nby definition\nessence of an AI entity\ncopying a protected part\nIP violation\nindict the violator\ncriminal proceedings\nimpose criminal liability\nactus reus\nmens rea\nactual conduct\nactus reus requirement\nmens rea requirement\ndirect intention\nsubjective recklessness\nexpressed through knowledge\ntwo requirements\nonly criteria\ncapabilities\nimpose criminal liability\nany other kind of entity\ncorporations\nAI entities\nactus reus\nmens rea\nadequate\nNo further capabilities\nactus reus\nmens rea\nmens rea requirement\nparrot\nmens rea requirement\nbeyond a reasonable doubt.\ncommitted the criminal act\nheld criminally liable\nfulfil the two requirements", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Crimes apply to entities capable of meeting both actus reus and mens rea requirements – we meet, and it solves limits.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "For some years, there has been\ncontroversy about the very essence of an AI entity\nFuturologists have proclaimed\na new species, machina sapiens, which will share the human place as intelligent creatures on earth\nThere are five attributes\none would expect an intelligent entity to possess\nThe first is communication\nOne can communicate with an intelligent entity\nThe second is internal knowledge\nan intelligent entity is expected to have some knowledge about itself. The third is external knowledge\nan intelligent entity is expected to know about the outside world\nand\nutilise that information\nThe fourth is goal-driven behaviour;\nan intelligent entity is expected to take action\nto achieve its goals. The fifth is creativity\nan intelligent entity is expected to have some ability to take alternate action when the initial action fails\nMost AI entities possess these five attributes by definition\nSome twenty-first century types of AI entities possess even more\nAI entity is capable of being physically faster and stronger than a human being\nAll these attributes create the essence of an AI entity\nAn AI system is required to complete\npreparation of a given software for public use.\nAt some places in the software, the AI system fills the relevant ingredient by copying a protected part\nAlthough the AI system has made some changes\nit\nis considered to be an IP violation\nthe administrative directive is to indict the violator in criminal proceedings\nIn order to impose criminal liability\ntwo main elements must exist\nThe first is the factual element (actus reus), while the other is the mental element (mens rea). The actus reus requirement is expressed\nby acts or omissions\nthe actual conduct which infringes the\nright is the actus reus requirement\nThe mens rea requirement has various levels of mental elements. The highest level is expressed by direct intention, but often subjective recklessness is sufficient.\nA person’s knowledge of the essential facts can be used to infer either direct intention or subjective recklessness.\nSubstitutes for the mental element requirement are expressed by negligence\nor by strict liability offences\nIn most legal systems, the mental element requirement of IP offences is expressed through knowledge, i.e., the offender is required to know or to be aware of the offending nature of the illegal conduct\nwhile violating protected IP rights\nThese two requirements are the only criteria or capabilities which are required in order to impose criminal liability, not only from humans, but from any other kind of entity, including corporations and AI entities\nin order to impose criminal liability, the existence of actus reus and mens rea of the specific offence is adequate. No further capabilities are required\nan uncreative thief is still a thief, if actus reus and mens rea of theft are proven.\nan ant is capable of biting creatively, but it is incapable of formulating the mens rea requirement\nA parrot is capable of repeating words it hears, but it is incapable of formulating the mens rea requirement for libe\nThe imposition of criminal liability on any kind of entity is dependent on proving these two elements beyond a reasonable doubt. When it has been proven that a person committed the criminal act\nthat person is held criminally liable for that offence\nThe relevant question concerning\nAI entities is: how can these entities fulfil the two requirements", "role": "user" }, { "content": "machina sapiens\nwill share the human place as intelligent creatures\nThere are five attributes\ncommunication\ninternal knowledge\nexternal knowledge\ngoal-driven behaviour\ncreativity\nAI entities possess these\nby definition\nto impose criminal liability\ntwo\nelements must exist\nthe factual element (actus reus\nthe mental element (mens rea).\nthe mental\nrequirement\nis expressed through knowledge\nThese two\nare the only criteria\nrequired in order to impose criminal liability\nfrom any other kind of entity, including corporations and AI entities\nNo further capabilities are required\nan ant is capable of biting\nit is incapable of\nmens rea\nAI entities\nfulfil the two requirements", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Their interp reflects outdated legal jurisprudence.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "If all of its specific requirements are met, criminal liability may be imposed upon any entity – human, corporate or AI entity. Modern times warrant modern legal measures in order to resolve today’s legal problems. The rapid development of AI technology requires current legal solutions in order to protect society from possible dangers inherent in technologies not subject to the law, especially criminal law. Criminal law has a very important social function – that of preserving social order for the benefit and welfare of society. The threats upon that social order may be posed by humans, corporations or AI entities. Humans have been subject to criminal law, except when otherwise decided by international consensus. Thus, minors and mentally ill persons are not subject to criminal law in most legal systems around the world. Although corporations in their modern form have existed since the fourteenth century,90 it took hundreds of years to subordinate corporations to the law, and especially, to criminal law.\nFor hundreds of years, the law stated that corporations are not subject to criminal law, as inspired by Roman law (societas delinquere non potest – corporations cannot perform delinquency).91 It was only in the seventeenth century that an English court dared to impose criminal liability on a corporation.92 It was inevitable. Corporations participate fully in human life, and it was outrageous not to subject them to human laws, since offences are committed by corporations or through them. But corporations have neither body nor soul. Legal solutions were developed so that in relation to criminal liability, corporations would be deemed capable of fulfilling all the requirements of criminal liability, including factual elements and mental elements.93 These solutions were embodied in models of criminal liability and general punishment adjustment considerations. It worked. In fact, it is still working, and very successfully. Why should AI entities be different from corporations?\nAlthough corporations are not human entities, the effects and imposition of punishments on a corporation are still felt by human beings, which lead to deterrence. So is the situation with AI entities when they are treated as criminally liable, since no legal difference is to be between humans and AI entities as to the imposition of criminal liability and the imposition of punishments. When AI entities are accepted as legal entities, all effects of criminal law shall be identical to those of humans. Of course, since AI entities are able to learn by themselves, they are also able to be deterred by learning what happened in similar cases, exactly as do humans.94", "role": "user" }, { "content": "If all of its specific requirements are met, criminal liability may be imposed upon any entity – human, corporate or AI entity. Modern times warrant modern legal measures in order to resolve today’s legal problems. The rapid development of AI technology requires current legal solutions\nto protect society from possible dangers\nespecially criminal law. Criminal law has a very important social function – that of preserving social order for the benefit and welfare of society. The threats\nmay be posed by humans, corporations or AI entities. Humans have been subject to criminal law, except when otherwise decided by international consensus. Thus, minors and mentally ill persons are not subject to criminal law in most legal systems around the world. Although corporations\nhave existed since the fourteenth century\nit took hundreds of years to subordinate corporations to\ncriminal law.\nIt was only in the seventeenth century that an English court dared to impose criminal liability on a corporation\nIt was inevitable. Corporations participate fully in human life, and it was outrageous not to subject them to human laws, since offences are committed by corporations or through them. But corporations have neither body nor soul. Legal solutions were developed so that in relation to criminal liability, corporations would be deemed capable of fulfilling all the requirements of criminal liability, including factual elements and mental elements\nIt worked. In fact, it is still working, and very successfully. Why should AI entities be different from corporations?\nAlthough corporations are not human entities, the effects and imposition of punishments on a corporation are still felt by human beings\nSo is the situation with AI entities when they are treated as criminally liable, since no legal difference is to be between humans and AI entities as to the imposition of criminal liability and the imposition of punishments. When AI entities are accepted as legal entities, all effects of criminal law shall be identical to those of humans", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Their interp reflects outdated legal jurisprudence.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "If all of its specific requirements are met, criminal liability may be imposed upon any entity – human, corporate or AI entity. Modern times warrant modern legal measures in order to resolve today’s legal problems. The rapid development of AI technology requires current legal solutions\nto protect society from possible dangers\nespecially criminal law. Criminal law has a very important social function – that of preserving social order for the benefit and welfare of society. The threats\nmay be posed by humans, corporations or AI entities. Humans have been subject to criminal law, except when otherwise decided by international consensus. Thus, minors and mentally ill persons are not subject to criminal law in most legal systems around the world. Although corporations\nhave existed since the fourteenth century\nit took hundreds of years to subordinate corporations to\ncriminal law.\nIt was only in the seventeenth century that an English court dared to impose criminal liability on a corporation\nIt was inevitable. Corporations participate fully in human life, and it was outrageous not to subject them to human laws, since offences are committed by corporations or through them. But corporations have neither body nor soul. Legal solutions were developed so that in relation to criminal liability, corporations would be deemed capable of fulfilling all the requirements of criminal liability, including factual elements and mental elements\nIt worked. In fact, it is still working, and very successfully. Why should AI entities be different from corporations?\nAlthough corporations are not human entities, the effects and imposition of punishments on a corporation are still felt by human beings\nSo is the situation with AI entities when they are treated as criminally liable, since no legal difference is to be between humans and AI entities as to the imposition of criminal liability and the imposition of punishments. When AI entities are accepted as legal entities, all effects of criminal law shall be identical to those of humans", "role": "user" }, { "content": "upon any entity\nAI entity\nmodern legal measures\ntoday’s legal problems\ncurrent legal solutions\nCriminal law\npreserving social order\nAI entities\nHumans\ncorporations\nsubordinate corporations\ncriminal law.\nimpose criminal liability\nparticipate fully in human life,\noutrageous\nneither body nor soul\ncriminal liability\nfactual elements\nmental element\nWhy should AI entities be different from corporations?\nnot human entities\neffects\nimposition of punishments\nimposition of criminal liability\nimposition of punishments\naccepted as legal entities\nidentical to those of humans", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Their interp reflects outdated legal jurisprudence.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "If all of its specific requirements are met, criminal liability may be imposed upon any entity – human, corporate or AI entity. Modern times warrant modern legal measures in order to resolve today’s legal problems. The rapid development of AI technology requires current legal solutions\nto protect society from possible dangers\nespecially criminal law. Criminal law has a very important social function – that of preserving social order for the benefit and welfare of society. The threats\nmay be posed by humans, corporations or AI entities. Humans have been subject to criminal law, except when otherwise decided by international consensus. Thus, minors and mentally ill persons are not subject to criminal law in most legal systems around the world. Although corporations\nhave existed since the fourteenth century\nit took hundreds of years to subordinate corporations to\ncriminal law.\nIt was only in the seventeenth century that an English court dared to impose criminal liability on a corporation\nIt was inevitable. Corporations participate fully in human life, and it was outrageous not to subject them to human laws, since offences are committed by corporations or through them. But corporations have neither body nor soul. Legal solutions were developed so that in relation to criminal liability, corporations would be deemed capable of fulfilling all the requirements of criminal liability, including factual elements and mental elements\nIt worked. In fact, it is still working, and very successfully. Why should AI entities be different from corporations?\nAlthough corporations are not human entities, the effects and imposition of punishments on a corporation are still felt by human beings\nSo is the situation with AI entities when they are treated as criminally liable, since no legal difference is to be between humans and AI entities as to the imposition of criminal liability and the imposition of punishments. When AI entities are accepted as legal entities, all effects of criminal law shall be identical to those of humans", "role": "user" }, { "content": "criminal liability may be imposed upon any entity\nhuman, corporate or AI entity. Modern times warrant modern legal measures\nto resolve today’s legal problems\nCriminal la\npreserv\nsocial order\nthreats\nmay be posed by humans, corporations or AI\nCorporations participate fully in human life\ncorporations have neither body nor soul.\nsolutions were developed so that in\ncriminal liability, corporations would be\ncapable of fulfilling all\nrequirements\nWhy should AI\nbe different from corporations\nno legal difference is to be between humans and AI\nas to\nimposition of criminal liability and\npunishments. When AI entities are accepted as legal entities, all\ncriminal law shall be identical to those of humans", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Sufficiently intelligent AI entities are legally humans because they meet mens rea, which is the only relevant standard for criminal law.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "If a person fulfils the requirements of both the factual element and the mental element of a specific offence, then the person is held criminally liable. Why should an AI entity that fulfils all elements of an offence be exempt from criminal liability? One might argue that some segments of human society are exempt from criminal liability even if both the external and internal elements have been established. Such segments of society include infants and the mentally ill.\nSpecific provisions in criminal law exempt infants from criminal liability.64 The social rationale behind the infancy defence is to protect infants from the harmful consequences of the criminal process and to handle them in other social frameworks.65 Do such frameworks exist for AI entities? The original legal rationale behind the infancy defence was the fact that infants are as yet incapable of comprehending what was wrong in their conduct (doli incapax).66 However, children can be held criminally liable if the presumption of mental incapacity was refuted by proof that the child was able to distinguish between right and wrong, i.e., between permitted and forbidden actions in terms of criminal offences.67 Could that be similarly applied to AI entities? Most AI algorithms are capable of distinguishing between permitted and forbidden actions, and therefore they may distinguish between a conduct which is a commission of an offence (forbidden) or which is not (permitted).68\nSimilarly, the mentally ill are presumed to lack the fault element of the specific offence, due to their mental illness.69 The mentally ill are unable to distinguish between right and wrong (i.e., lack the cognitive capabilities possessed by normal persons)70 or to control impulsive behaviour.71 When an AI algorithm functions properly, there is no reason for it not to use all of its capabilities to analyse the factual data received through its receptors. However, an interesting legal question would be whether a defence of insanity might be raised in relation to a malfunctioning AI algorithm, when its analytical capabilities become corrupted as a result of that malfunction.\nWhen an AI entity establishes all elements of a specific offence, both factual and mental, there is no reason to prevent imposition of criminal liability upon it for that offence. The criminal liability of an AI entity does not replace the criminal liability of the programmers or the users, if criminal liability is imposed on the programmers and/or users by any other legal path. Criminal liability is not to be divided, but rather added. The criminal liability of the AI entity is imposed in addition to the criminal liability of the human programmer or user.\nHowever, the criminal liability of an AI entity is not dependent upon the criminal liability of the programmer or user of that AI entity. As a result, if the specific AI entity was programmed or used by another AI entity, the criminal liability of the programmed or used AI entity is not influenced by that fact. The programmed or used AI entity shall be held criminally accountable for the specific offence pursuant to the direct liability model, unless it was an innocent agent. In addition, the programmer or user of the AI entity shall be held criminally accountable for that very offence pursuant to one of the three liability models, according to its specific role in the offence. The chain of criminal liability might continue, if more parties are involved, whether they are human or AI entities.\nThere is no reason to eliminate the criminal liability of an AI entity or of a human, which is based on complicity between them. An AI entity and a human might cooperate as joint perpetrators, as accessories and abettors, etc., and the relevant criminal liability might be imposed on them accordingly. Since the factual and mental capabilities of an AI entity are sufficient to impose criminal liability on it, if these capabilities satisfy the legal requirements of joint perpetrators, accessories and abettors, etc., then the relevant criminal liability as joint perpetrators, accessories and abettors, etc., should be imposed, regardless of whether the offender is an AI entity or a human.\nNot only may positive factual and mental elements be attributed to AI entities, but also all relevant negative fault elements are attributable to AI entities. Most of these elements are expressed by the general defences in criminal law; e.g., self-defence, necessity, duress, intoxication, etc. For some of these defences (justifications),72 there is no material difference between humans and AI entities, since they relate to a specific situation (in rem), regardless of the identity of the offender. For example, an AI entity serving under the local police force is given an order to arrest a person, and unbeknownst to the AI entity, this order is illegal. If the executer is unaware, or could not reasonably become aware, that an otherwise legal action is illegal in this specific instance, the executer of the order is not criminally liable.73 In that case, there is no difference whether the executer is human or an AI entity.\nFor other defences (excuses and exempts),74 some applications should be adjusted. For example, the intoxication defence is applied when the offender is under the physical influence of an intoxicating substance, e.g., alcohol, drugs, etc. The influence of alcohol on an AI entity is minor, at most, but the influence of an electronic virus that is infecting the operating system of the AI entity might be considered parallel to the influence of intoxicating substances on humans. Some other factors might be considered as being parallel to insanity or loss of control.\nIt might be summed up that the criminal liability of an AI entity according to the direct liability model is not different from the relevant criminal liability of a human. In some cases, some adjustments are necessary, but substantively, it is the very same criminal liability, which is based upon the same elements and examined in the same ways.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "If a person fulfils\nboth the factual element and the mental element of a specific offence\nthe person is held criminally liable. Why should an AI entity that fulfils all elements of an offence be exempt from criminal liability? One might argue\nsome segments of human society are exempt from criminal liability\nSuch segments\ninclude infants and the mentally ill.\nSpecific provisions\nexempt infants from criminal liability\nThe\nrationale behind the infancy defence is to protect infants from the harmful consequences of the criminal process\ninfants are\nincapable of comprehending what was wrong in their conduct\nMost AI algorithms are capable of distinguishing between permitted and forbidden actions, and\nmay distinguish between a conduct which is a commission of an offence (forbidden) or which is not (permitted).\nthe mentally ill are presumed to lack\nfault\nof the specific offence, due to their mental illness\nThe mentally ill are unable to distinguish between right and wrong\ni.e., lack the cognitive capabilities possessed by normal persons\nWhen an AI algorithm functions properly, there is no reason for it not to use all of its capabilities to analyse\nfactual data\nWhen an AI entity establishes all elements of a specific offence\nthere is no reason to prevent imposition of criminal liability upon it\nThe criminal liability of an AI entity does not replace the criminal liability of the programmers\nCriminal liability is not\ndivided, but rather added. The criminal liability of the AI entity is imposed in addition to the criminal liability of the human programmer\nthe criminal liability of an AI entity is not dependent upon the criminal liability of the programmer\nif the specific AI entity was programmed\nby another AI entity, the criminal liability of the programmed\nis not influenced by that fact. The programmed\nAI entity shall be held criminally accountable for the specific offence pursuant to the direct liability model\nThere is no reason to eliminate the criminal liability of an AI entity or\na human\nAn AI entity and a human might cooperate as joint perpetrators, as accessories and abettors\nSince the factual and mental capabilities of an AI entity are sufficient\nif these capabilities satisfy the legal requirements of joint perpetrators\nthe relevant criminal liability\nshould be imposed, regardless of whether the offender is an AI entity or a human\nNot only may positive factual and mental elements be attributed to AI entities, but\nall relevant negative fault elements are attributable to AI entities\nFor\nthese defences\nthere is no material difference between humans and AI entities, since they relate to a specific situation\nregardless of the identity of the offender\nthere is no difference whether the executer is human or an AI entity.\nthe influence of an electronic virus that is infecting the operating system of the AI entity might be considered parallel to the influence of intoxicating substances on humans\nthe criminal liability of an AI entity according to the direct liability model is not different from the relevant criminal liability of a human.\nsubstantively, it is the very same criminal liability, which is based upon the same elements and examined in the same ways.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Sufficiently intelligent AI entities are legally humans because they meet mens rea, which is the only relevant standard for criminal law.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "If a person fulfils\nboth the factual element and the mental element of a specific offence\nthe person is held criminally liable. Why should an AI entity that fulfils all elements of an offence be exempt from criminal liability? One might argue\nsome segments of human society are exempt from criminal liability\nSuch segments\ninclude infants and the mentally ill.\nSpecific provisions\nexempt infants from criminal liability\nThe\nrationale behind the infancy defence is to protect infants from the harmful consequences of the criminal process\ninfants are\nincapable of comprehending what was wrong in their conduct\nMost AI algorithms are capable of distinguishing between permitted and forbidden actions, and\nmay distinguish between a conduct which is a commission of an offence (forbidden) or which is not (permitted).\nthe mentally ill are presumed to lack\nfault\nof the specific offence, due to their mental illness\nThe mentally ill are unable to distinguish between right and wrong\ni.e., lack the cognitive capabilities possessed by normal persons\nWhen an AI algorithm functions properly, there is no reason for it not to use all of its capabilities to analyse\nfactual data\nWhen an AI entity establishes all elements of a specific offence\nthere is no reason to prevent imposition of criminal liability upon it\nThe criminal liability of an AI entity does not replace the criminal liability of the programmers\nCriminal liability is not\ndivided, but rather added. The criminal liability of the AI entity is imposed in addition to the criminal liability of the human programmer\nthe criminal liability of an AI entity is not dependent upon the criminal liability of the programmer\nif the specific AI entity was programmed\nby another AI entity, the criminal liability of the programmed\nis not influenced by that fact. The programmed\nAI entity shall be held criminally accountable for the specific offence pursuant to the direct liability model\nThere is no reason to eliminate the criminal liability of an AI entity or\na human\nAn AI entity and a human might cooperate as joint perpetrators, as accessories and abettors\nSince the factual and mental capabilities of an AI entity are sufficient\nif these capabilities satisfy the legal requirements of joint perpetrators\nthe relevant criminal liability\nshould be imposed, regardless of whether the offender is an AI entity or a human\nNot only may positive factual and mental elements be attributed to AI entities, but\nall relevant negative fault elements are attributable to AI entities\nFor\nthese defences\nthere is no material difference between humans and AI entities, since they relate to a specific situation\nregardless of the identity of the offender\nthere is no difference whether the executer is human or an AI entity.\nthe influence of an electronic virus that is infecting the operating system of the AI entity might be considered parallel to the influence of intoxicating substances on humans\nthe criminal liability of an AI entity according to the direct liability model is not different from the relevant criminal liability of a human.\nsubstantively, it is the very same criminal liability, which is based upon the same elements and examined in the same ways.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "criminally liable\nexempt from criminal liability\nexempt from criminal liability\ninfants\nmentally ill.\nprotect infants\nharmful consequences\nincapable of comprehending\ncapable of distinguishing\npermitted\nforbidden actions\nlack\nfault\nunable to distinguish\nright\nwrong\nlack the cognitive capabilities\nAI algorithm functions properly\nno reason\nprevent imposition of criminal liability\ndoes not replace\nprogrammers\ndivided\nadded\nin addition to\nnot dependent\nheld criminally accountable\nno reason to eliminate the criminal liability\nAI entity\nmight cooperate\nfactual\nmental capabilities\nsatisfy the legal requirements\nregardless\nAI entity\nhuman\nnegative fault elements\nno material difference\nrelate to a specific situation\nregardless of the identity\nno difference\nintoxicating substances\nnot different\nrelevant criminal liability of a human\nvery same criminal liability\nbased upon the same elements\nexamined in the same ways", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Sufficiently intelligent AI entities are legally humans because they meet mens rea, which is the only relevant standard for criminal law.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "If a person fulfils\nboth the factual element and the mental element of a specific offence\nthe person is held criminally liable. Why should an AI entity that fulfils all elements of an offence be exempt from criminal liability? One might argue\nsome segments of human society are exempt from criminal liability\nSuch segments\ninclude infants and the mentally ill.\nSpecific provisions\nexempt infants from criminal liability\nThe\nrationale behind the infancy defence is to protect infants from the harmful consequences of the criminal process\ninfants are\nincapable of comprehending what was wrong in their conduct\nMost AI algorithms are capable of distinguishing between permitted and forbidden actions, and\nmay distinguish between a conduct which is a commission of an offence (forbidden) or which is not (permitted).\nthe mentally ill are presumed to lack\nfault\nof the specific offence, due to their mental illness\nThe mentally ill are unable to distinguish between right and wrong\ni.e., lack the cognitive capabilities possessed by normal persons\nWhen an AI algorithm functions properly, there is no reason for it not to use all of its capabilities to analyse\nfactual data\nWhen an AI entity establishes all elements of a specific offence\nthere is no reason to prevent imposition of criminal liability upon it\nThe criminal liability of an AI entity does not replace the criminal liability of the programmers\nCriminal liability is not\ndivided, but rather added. The criminal liability of the AI entity is imposed in addition to the criminal liability of the human programmer\nthe criminal liability of an AI entity is not dependent upon the criminal liability of the programmer\nif the specific AI entity was programmed\nby another AI entity, the criminal liability of the programmed\nis not influenced by that fact. The programmed\nAI entity shall be held criminally accountable for the specific offence pursuant to the direct liability model\nThere is no reason to eliminate the criminal liability of an AI entity or\na human\nAn AI entity and a human might cooperate as joint perpetrators, as accessories and abettors\nSince the factual and mental capabilities of an AI entity are sufficient\nif these capabilities satisfy the legal requirements of joint perpetrators\nthe relevant criminal liability\nshould be imposed, regardless of whether the offender is an AI entity or a human\nNot only may positive factual and mental elements be attributed to AI entities, but\nall relevant negative fault elements are attributable to AI entities\nFor\nthese defences\nthere is no material difference between humans and AI entities, since they relate to a specific situation\nregardless of the identity of the offender\nthere is no difference whether the executer is human or an AI entity.\nthe influence of an electronic virus that is infecting the operating system of the AI entity might be considered parallel to the influence of intoxicating substances on humans\nthe criminal liability of an AI entity according to the direct liability model is not different from the relevant criminal liability of a human.\nsubstantively, it is the very same criminal liability, which is based upon the same elements and examined in the same ways.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Why should an AI entity\nbe exempt from criminal liability\nprovisions\nexempt infants from criminal liability\ninfants are\nincapable of comprehending what was wrong\nAI algorithms are capable of distinguishing\npermitted and forbidden actions\nWhen an AI entity establishes\na specific offence\nthere is no reason to prevent imposition of criminal liability\nThe\nliability of an AI\ndoes not replace the\nprogrammers\nThere is no reason to eliminate\ncriminal liability of an AI entity\nSince the factual and mental capabilities\nare sufficient\nif these capabilities satisfy\nlegal requirements\nthe\nliability\nshould be imposed, regardless of\nAI entity or\nhuman\nthere is no material difference between humans and AI entities\nthey relate to a\nsituation\nregardless of the identity of the offender\nan AI entity\nis not different from\na human\nsubstantively, it is the very same criminal liability,\nbased upon the same elements and examined in the same ways.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Stimulus passes easily next week through reconciliation.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Democrats have started to lay the groundwork to pass the next coronavirus relief package without Republican votes as GOP lawmakers criticize the cost of President Joe Biden’s rescue plan.\nHouse Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, D-Md., added votes to the chamber’s schedule next week “that will give us the option of using budget reconciliation to advance a COVID-19 relief package,” he told lawmakers Tuesday night. The thorny process would allow Democrats to pass a pandemic aid bill by a simple majority vote in the Senate with no Republican support.\nIn a letter to Democrats later Wednesday, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., said committee chairs “are working on coronavirus relief legislation as a basis for reconciliation, should that step be needed.” She added that “we hope and expect” Republicans will back an aid bill, but “Democrats will not take any tools off the table.”\nNeither Democratic leader explicitly said they will opt to use reconciliation, as the Biden administration holds talks with centrist GOP lawmakers it hopes will vote for a relief measure. Still, the moves to set up the process suggest the party has doubts about Republicans providing the votes to approve a rescue package.\nThe House majority leader told lawmakers he could change the schedule again before March 14 to allow time to renew programs to boost unemployed workers during the pandemic. Both the $300 per week federal jobless benefit supplement and the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program formally expire that day.\nBiden and Democrats have pushed to inject more money into the health-care system and economy as the virus kills more than 3,000 Americans per day on average and the country takes on the biggest vaccination effort in history. Biden’s $1.9 trillion rescue plan aims to speed up vaccinations and send more money to individuals, small businesses, and state and local governments.\nRepublicans and a few Democrats in Congress have questioned the need to spend so much money about a month after a $900 billion relief plan became law. GOP skeptics have called for a smaller bill based around vaccine distribution funds.\nBut after a stalled congressional response in the second half of last year that allowed millions to fall into poverty and exacerbated the worst U.S. hunger crisis in decades, Democrats say Congress cannot spend too much money. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen told lawmakers earlier this month that “with interest rates at historic lows, the smartest thing we can do is act big.”\nDemocratic leaders have said they will push ahead even without Republican support.\n“If our Republican colleagues decide to oppose the necessary, robust, Covid relief that is needed, we will have to move forward without them. It is not our preference,” Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., said Wednesday.\nHe added that Congress should not “repeat the mistakes of 2008 and 2009,” when he said lawmakers were “too timid” in responding to the global financial crisis.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Democrats\nstarted to lay the groundwork to pass the next coronavirus relief package without Republican votes as GOP lawmakers\nBiden’s rescue plan.\nHouse Majority Leader\nHoyer\nadded votes to the chamber’s schedule next week “that will give us the option of using budget reconciliation to advance a COVID\nrelief package\nThe\nprocess would allow Democrats to pass a pandemic aid bill by a simple majority vote in the Senate with no Republican support.\nPelosi\nsaid committee chairs “are working on coronavirus relief legislation as a basis for reconciliation\nwe hope and expect” Republicans will back an aid bill, but “Democrats will not take any tools off the table.”\nthe party has doubts about Republicans providing the votes to approve a rescue package.\nBiden and Democrats\npushed to inject more money into the health-care system and economy as the virus kills more than 3,000 Americans per day\nBiden’s $1.9 trillion rescue plan aims to speed up vaccinations and send\nmoney to individuals, small businesses, and state and local governments.\nRepublicans\nquestioned the need to spend so much money about a month after a $900 billion relief plan became law.\nBut after a stalled congressional response\nDemocrats say Congress cannot spend too much money\nYellen told lawmakers earlier this month that “with interest rates at historic lows, the smartest thing we can do is act big.”\nDemocratic leaders\nsaid they will push ahead even without Republican support.\nIf our Republican colleagues decide to oppose the necessary\nCovid relief\nwe will have to move forward without them. It is not our preference\nCongress should not “repeat the mistakes of 2008 and 2009,”\nlawmakers were “too timid” in responding to the global financial crisis", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Stimulus passes easily next week through reconciliation.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Democrats\nstarted to lay the groundwork to pass the next coronavirus relief package without Republican votes as GOP lawmakers\nBiden’s rescue plan.\nHouse Majority Leader\nHoyer\nadded votes to the chamber’s schedule next week “that will give us the option of using budget reconciliation to advance a COVID\nrelief package\nThe\nprocess would allow Democrats to pass a pandemic aid bill by a simple majority vote in the Senate with no Republican support.\nPelosi\nsaid committee chairs “are working on coronavirus relief legislation as a basis for reconciliation\nwe hope and expect” Republicans will back an aid bill, but “Democrats will not take any tools off the table.”\nthe party has doubts about Republicans providing the votes to approve a rescue package.\nBiden and Democrats\npushed to inject more money into the health-care system and economy as the virus kills more than 3,000 Americans per day\nBiden’s $1.9 trillion rescue plan aims to speed up vaccinations and send\nmoney to individuals, small businesses, and state and local governments.\nRepublicans\nquestioned the need to spend so much money about a month after a $900 billion relief plan became law.\nBut after a stalled congressional response\nDemocrats say Congress cannot spend too much money\nYellen told lawmakers earlier this month that “with interest rates at historic lows, the smartest thing we can do is act big.”\nDemocratic leaders\nsaid they will push ahead even without Republican support.\nIf our Republican colleagues decide to oppose the necessary\nCovid relief\nwe will have to move forward without them. It is not our preference\nCongress should not “repeat the mistakes of 2008 and 2009,”\nlawmakers were “too timid” in responding to the global financial crisis", "role": "user" }, { "content": "lay the groundwork\nnext coronavirus relief package\nschedule next week\nusing budget reconciliation\nsimple majority vote\nno Republican support.\ncoronavirus relief legislation\nbasis for reconciliation\nwill not take any tools off the table\nhas doubts\nRepublicans\npushed to inject more money\n$1.9 trillion rescue plan\nspeed up vaccinations\nquestioned the need\nstalled congressional response\nsmartest thing\nact big.”\neven without Republican support.\nnecessary\nCovid relief\nmove forward without them\nshould not “repeat\ntoo timid", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Stimulus passes easily next week through reconciliation.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Democrats\nstarted to lay the groundwork to pass the next coronavirus relief package without Republican votes as GOP lawmakers\nBiden’s rescue plan.\nHouse Majority Leader\nHoyer\nadded votes to the chamber’s schedule next week “that will give us the option of using budget reconciliation to advance a COVID\nrelief package\nThe\nprocess would allow Democrats to pass a pandemic aid bill by a simple majority vote in the Senate with no Republican support.\nPelosi\nsaid committee chairs “are working on coronavirus relief legislation as a basis for reconciliation\nwe hope and expect” Republicans will back an aid bill, but “Democrats will not take any tools off the table.”\nthe party has doubts about Republicans providing the votes to approve a rescue package.\nBiden and Democrats\npushed to inject more money into the health-care system and economy as the virus kills more than 3,000 Americans per day\nBiden’s $1.9 trillion rescue plan aims to speed up vaccinations and send\nmoney to individuals, small businesses, and state and local governments.\nRepublicans\nquestioned the need to spend so much money about a month after a $900 billion relief plan became law.\nBut after a stalled congressional response\nDemocrats say Congress cannot spend too much money\nYellen told lawmakers earlier this month that “with interest rates at historic lows, the smartest thing we can do is act big.”\nDemocratic leaders\nsaid they will push ahead even without Republican support.\nIf our Republican colleagues decide to oppose the necessary\nCovid relief\nwe will have to move forward without them. It is not our preference\nCongress should not “repeat the mistakes of 2008 and 2009,”\nlawmakers were “too timid” in responding to the global financial crisis", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Democrats\nstarted to lay the groundwork to pass\ncoronavirus relief\nwithout Republican votes\nnext week\nthat will give us the option of using\nreconciliation\nThe\nprocess would allow Democrats to pass a\nbill\nwith no Republican support\ncommittee chairs “are working on coronavirus relief\nDemocrats will not take\ntools off the table\nBiden and Democrats\npushed\nmore money\nafter a stalled congressional response\nthe smartest thing we can do is act big\neven without Republican support\nwe will have to move forward without them.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Links to the net benefit – even limited constitutional conventions require Congress.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Under Article V, Congress shall call a convention on the application of two-thirds of state legislatures. Convention of states has never been called, despite a number of attempts. An Article V convention has become a specific form of constitutional initiative at the federal level. It serves primarily as a convenient way to pressure Congress to propose an amendment and not to actually make federal legislature call a convention. Such a use of an Article V convention has not been very effective and only rarely proved to be successful.\nArticle V of the U.S. Constitution sets the amendment procedure. It reads as follows: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress (…)1 .\nThis short provision establishes two methods to amend the Constitution. The procedure is – at least in general terms – rather straightforward. Basically, it is a two-step process2 . First, an amendment must be proposed. This can be done either by Congress, where the majority of two-thirds in both houses is required, or by a convention called by Congress when applied to by the similar majority of state legislatures. Second, an amendment passed by Congress or proposed by a convention must be subsequently approved by the qualified majority of states representative bodies. Amendment may be ratified either by legislatures or by conventions. Approval of these bodies in at least three-fourths of the states is required, which means that as the current number of states is fifty, thirty-eight of them must approve. The federal legislature makes decision concerning the mode of ratification. It makes no difference whether an amendment is proposed by Congress or by a convention. In other words, Congress may decide that an amendment proposed by Congress itself should be ratified by state conventions and one proposed by a convention called under Article V should be ratified by state legislatures, or – of course – the other way around.\nLanguage of Article V suggests that the first method to amend the Constitution, that is one where Congress proposes amendments, should be the ordinary way to make occasional alterations in the text, should they be requested or required. There is also little doubt that this was exactly what the Framers intended. In practice, the congressional method has become not only the usual but literally the only way to propose amendments to the Constitution. All thirty-three amendments sent to the states for ratification had been passed by Congress. Convention for proposing amendments – known simply as an Article V convention or convention of states – has never been called.\nIt is easy to dismiss the convention of states as one of the – allegedly numerous – relics of the Constitution. To do so would be, however, to overlook its significant role in the American constitutional system. In the absence of constitutional initiative provision at the federal level, convention clause of Article V has showed itself to be a convenient alternative. Even though no attempt to call a convention has yet been successful, on more than one occasion the process itself proved to be effective in pressuring federal legislators to act on particular propositions of constitutional amendments, despite their initial opposition. Continuing relevance of the convention method to amend the Constitution lies therefore not in its ability to bypass Congress altogether but rather in its potential to successfully push for constitutional amendments that enjoy popular support, against the opposition from the federal political elites [Rogers 2007].", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Under Article V, Congress shall call a convention on the application of two-thirds of state legislatures. Convention of states has never been called\nAn Article V convention has become a specific\nconstitutional initiative at the federal level. It serves\nas a convenient way to pressure Congress to propose an amendment and not\nmake federal legislature call a convention. Such\nan Article V convention has\nrarely proved to be successful.\nArticle V of the U.S. Constitution sets the amendment procedure\nThe Congress, whenever two thirds\nshall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or\nshall call a Convention for proposing Amendments\nThis\nprovision establishes two methods to amend the Constitution\nit is a two-step process2\nan amendment must be proposed.\neither by Congress,\nor by a convention called by Congress when applied\nby the similar majority of state legislatures. Second, an amendment passed by Congress or proposed by a convention must be\napproved by the qualified majority of states\nIt makes no difference whether an amendment is proposed by Congress or by a convention.\nLanguage of Article V suggests\nthe first method to amend the Constitution\nwhere Congress proposes amendments, should be the ordinary way\nthe congressional method has become not only the usual but\nthe only way to propose amendments\nAll thirty-three amendments sent to the states for ratification had been passed by Congress\nConvention for proposing amendments\nknown\nas an Article V convention\nhas never been called.\nrelevance of the convention method to amend the Constitution lies\nnot in its ability to bypass Congress altogether but\nin its potential to successfully push for constitutional amendments that enjoy popular support, against\nopposition from the federal political elites", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Links to the net benefit – even limited constitutional conventions require Congress.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Under Article V, Congress shall call a convention on the application of two-thirds of state legislatures. Convention of states has never been called\nAn Article V convention has become a specific\nconstitutional initiative at the federal level. It serves\nas a convenient way to pressure Congress to propose an amendment and not\nmake federal legislature call a convention. Such\nan Article V convention has\nrarely proved to be successful.\nArticle V of the U.S. Constitution sets the amendment procedure\nThe Congress, whenever two thirds\nshall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or\nshall call a Convention for proposing Amendments\nThis\nprovision establishes two methods to amend the Constitution\nit is a two-step process2\nan amendment must be proposed.\neither by Congress,\nor by a convention called by Congress when applied\nby the similar majority of state legislatures. Second, an amendment passed by Congress or proposed by a convention must be\napproved by the qualified majority of states\nIt makes no difference whether an amendment is proposed by Congress or by a convention.\nLanguage of Article V suggests\nthe first method to amend the Constitution\nwhere Congress proposes amendments, should be the ordinary way\nthe congressional method has become not only the usual but\nthe only way to propose amendments\nAll thirty-three amendments sent to the states for ratification had been passed by Congress\nConvention for proposing amendments\nknown\nas an Article V convention\nhas never been called.\nrelevance of the convention method to amend the Constitution lies\nnot in its ability to bypass Congress altogether but\nin its potential to successfully push for constitutional amendments that enjoy popular support, against\nopposition from the federal political elites", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Congress shall call a convention\ninitiative at the federal level\npressure Congress\nrarely proved to be successful.\nArticle V of the U.S. Constitution\ncall a Convention\ntwo methods\ncalled by Congress\npassed by Congress\nordinary way\nonly way\npropose amendments\nAll thirty-three amendments\npassed by Congress\nnever been called.\nnot\nbypass Congress altogether\nagainst\nopposition\nfederal political elites", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Links to the net benefit – even limited constitutional conventions require Congress.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Under Article V, Congress shall call a convention on the application of two-thirds of state legislatures. Convention of states has never been called\nAn Article V convention has become a specific\nconstitutional initiative at the federal level. It serves\nas a convenient way to pressure Congress to propose an amendment and not\nmake federal legislature call a convention. Such\nan Article V convention has\nrarely proved to be successful.\nArticle V of the U.S. Constitution sets the amendment procedure\nThe Congress, whenever two thirds\nshall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or\nshall call a Convention for proposing Amendments\nThis\nprovision establishes two methods to amend the Constitution\nit is a two-step process2\nan amendment must be proposed.\neither by Congress,\nor by a convention called by Congress when applied\nby the similar majority of state legislatures. Second, an amendment passed by Congress or proposed by a convention must be\napproved by the qualified majority of states\nIt makes no difference whether an amendment is proposed by Congress or by a convention.\nLanguage of Article V suggests\nthe first method to amend the Constitution\nwhere Congress proposes amendments, should be the ordinary way\nthe congressional method has become not only the usual but\nthe only way to propose amendments\nAll thirty-three amendments sent to the states for ratification had been passed by Congress\nConvention for proposing amendments\nknown\nas an Article V convention\nhas never been called.\nrelevance of the convention method to amend the Constitution lies\nnot in its ability to bypass Congress altogether but\nin its potential to successfully push for constitutional amendments that enjoy popular support, against\nopposition from the federal political elites", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Under Article V, Congress shall call a convention on\napplication of two-thirds of\nlegislatures\nAn Article V convention has become a specific\ninitiative at the federal level\nto pressure Congress to propose an amendment\nan Article V convention has\nrarely proved\nsuccessful\nArticle V\nsets\nCongress\nshall call a Convention for proposing Amendments\nrelevance of the convention method\nlies\nnot in its ability to bypass Congress\nbut\npush for\namendments that enjoy\nsupport, against\nopposition from\nfederal political elites", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The states can’t call a constitutional convention without Congress.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Aug. 10 front-page article “Trump decried for gun remark” was in error when it stated, “There are two ways to alter the Constitution.”\nThere are actually four ways. (1) Both houses propose an amendment with a two-thirds vote, and three-fourths of the state legislatures approve. Twenty-six of the 27 amendments were approved in this manner. (2) Both houses propose an amendment with a two-thirds vote, and three-fourths of the states approve the amendment via ratifying conventions. Only the 21st Amendment, which repealed Prohibition, was passed in this manner. (3) Two-thirds of the state legislatures call on Congress to hold a constitutional convention, and three-fourths of the state legislatures approve the amendment. (4) Two-thirds of the state legislatures call on Congress to hold a constitutional convention, and three-fourths of the states approve the amendment via ratifying conventions.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The\narticle\nwas in error when it stated, “There are two ways to alter the Constitution.”\nThere are actually four ways. (1) Both houses propose an amendment\nand three-fourths of the state legislatures approve.\n(2) Both houses propose an amendment\nand three-fourths of the states approve the amendment via ratifying conventions\n(3) Two-thirds of the state legislatures call on Congress to hold a constitutional convention, and three-fourths of the state legislatures approve\n(4) Two-thirds of the state legislatures call on Congress to hold a constitutional convention\nand three-fourths of the states approve the amendment", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The states can’t call a constitutional convention without Congress.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The\narticle\nwas in error when it stated, “There are two ways to alter the Constitution.”\nThere are actually four ways. (1) Both houses propose an amendment\nand three-fourths of the state legislatures approve.\n(2) Both houses propose an amendment\nand three-fourths of the states approve the amendment via ratifying conventions\n(3) Two-thirds of the state legislatures call on Congress to hold a constitutional convention, and three-fourths of the state legislatures approve\n(4) Two-thirds of the state legislatures call on Congress to hold a constitutional convention\nand three-fourths of the states approve the amendment", "role": "user" }, { "content": "was in error\ntwo ways\nactually four ways\nthree-fourths of the states\ncall on Congress\ncall on Congress", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The states can’t call a constitutional convention without Congress.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The\narticle\nwas in error when it stated, “There are two ways to alter the Constitution.”\nThere are actually four ways. (1) Both houses propose an amendment\nand three-fourths of the state legislatures approve.\n(2) Both houses propose an amendment\nand three-fourths of the states approve the amendment via ratifying conventions\n(3) Two-thirds of the state legislatures call on Congress to hold a constitutional convention, and three-fourths of the state legislatures approve\n(4) Two-thirds of the state legislatures call on Congress to hold a constitutional convention\nand three-fourths of the states approve the amendment", "role": "user" }, { "content": "to alter the Constitution\nThere are\nfour ways\n(3) Two-thirds of the state legislatures call on Congress to hold a constitutional convention, and\nstate legislatures approve\n(4) Two-thirds of the state legislatures call on Congress\nand three-fourths of the states approve", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No preemption or dormant Commerce Clause challenges.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Federal law is of little assistance in this debate, as national antitrust laws do not preempt the antitrust efforts of states in any substantive way.2 ' Modem dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is equally unavailing. It will only invalidate nondiscriminatory state statutes if their burden on interstate commerce is \"clearly excessive\" in relation to their intrastate benefits. 2 2 Consequently, court holdings that curtail state antitrust enforcement via the dormant Commerce Clause are extremely rare.23 When this highly deferential standard is compared to the diverse interstate constraints contemplated by state courts, the potentially massive effect of the current debate over these statutes' original scope is clear: a court's interpretation of the issue can effectively determine if a statute has no application in modem commerce or a very robust operation.24 Indeed, this debate is decisive as to where a state statute will fall between these two points.\nThe lack of uniformity among modern courts is not surprising. Legislative histories for these statutes are largely nonexistent; 25 the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence around the turn of the twentieth century was convoluted; 26 and litigants rarely challenged these statutes on dormant Commerce Clause grounds before the 1980s, limiting the early judicial record.27 While general analyses of the historical boundaries of state antitrust statutes exist,28 scholars typically do not employ historical examination as a lens for understanding the modern scope of these laws. Instead, most scholarship is content to note that turn-of-the-twentieth-century dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence was so different from the constitutional constraints of today that an examination of original scope is unhelpful for determining modern jurisdiction.29 While such conclusions may be useful in pressing the case for broader state enforcement, they are irrelevant for states that must divine original scope.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Federal law is of little assistance\nnational antitrust laws do not preempt\nantitrust efforts of states in any substantive way\nModem dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is equally unavailing\nIt will only invalidate nondiscriminatory state statutes if their burden on interstate commerce is \"clearly excessive\nin relation to their intrastate benefits\nConsequently\ncourt holdings that curtail state antitrust enforcement via the dormant Commerce Clause are extremely rare\nlack of uniformity among modern courts is not surprising\nLegislative histories for these statutes are\nnonexistent\nCourt's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence\nwas convoluted\nand litigants rarely challenged\nstatutes on\nCommerce Clause grounds\nlimiting the early judicial record\nscholars\ndo not employ historical examination as a lens for understanding\nmodern scope of these laws\nmost scholarship is content to note\ndormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence was so different from the constitutional constraints of today that an examination of original scope is unhelpful for determining modern jurisdiction", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No preemption or dormant Commerce Clause challenges.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Federal law is of little assistance\nnational antitrust laws do not preempt\nantitrust efforts of states in any substantive way\nModem dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is equally unavailing\nIt will only invalidate nondiscriminatory state statutes if their burden on interstate commerce is \"clearly excessive\nin relation to their intrastate benefits\nConsequently\ncourt holdings that curtail state antitrust enforcement via the dormant Commerce Clause are extremely rare\nlack of uniformity among modern courts is not surprising\nLegislative histories for these statutes are\nnonexistent\nCourt's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence\nwas convoluted\nand litigants rarely challenged\nstatutes on\nCommerce Clause grounds\nlimiting the early judicial record\nscholars\ndo not employ historical examination as a lens for understanding\nmodern scope of these laws\nmost scholarship is content to note\ndormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence was so different from the constitutional constraints of today that an examination of original scope is unhelpful for determining modern jurisdiction", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Federal law\nlittle assistance\ndo not preempt\nany substantive way\ndormant Commerce Clause\nequally unavailing\nclearly excessive\ncurtail state antitrust enforcement\nare extremely rare\nuniformity\nLegislative histories\nnonexistent\nconvoluted\nrarely challenged\nlimiting\ndo not employ\nso different from the constitutional constraints\nunhelpful", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No preemption or dormant Commerce Clause challenges.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Federal law is of little assistance\nnational antitrust laws do not preempt\nantitrust efforts of states in any substantive way\nModem dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is equally unavailing\nIt will only invalidate nondiscriminatory state statutes if their burden on interstate commerce is \"clearly excessive\nin relation to their intrastate benefits\nConsequently\ncourt holdings that curtail state antitrust enforcement via the dormant Commerce Clause are extremely rare\nlack of uniformity among modern courts is not surprising\nLegislative histories for these statutes are\nnonexistent\nCourt's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence\nwas convoluted\nand litigants rarely challenged\nstatutes on\nCommerce Clause grounds\nlimiting the early judicial record\nscholars\ndo not employ historical examination as a lens for understanding\nmodern scope of these laws\nmost scholarship is content to note\ndormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence was so different from the constitutional constraints of today that an examination of original scope is unhelpful for determining modern jurisdiction", "role": "user" }, { "content": "national antitrust laws do not preempt\nantitrust efforts of states in any\nway\ndormant Commerce Clause\nis\nunavailing\nIt will only invalidate\nstate statutes if\nburden\nis\nexcessive\ncourt holdings that curtail state\nvia\nCommerce\nare extremely rare\nlack of uniformity\nnot surprising\nLegislative histories for\nstatutes are\nnonexistent\ndormant Commerce Clause\nwas convoluted\nlitigants rarely challenged\nstatutes on\nCommerce Clause\nlimiting\nearly judicial record\nscholars\ndo not employ historical examination\nfor understanding\nscope of these laws\ndormant Commerce Clause\nwas so different from\nconstitutional constraints\nthat\nexamination of original scope is unhelpful for\nmodern jurisdiction", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No preemption/commerce clause violation", "role": "system" }, { "content": "However, the empirical basis for this claim is questionable, to say the least. Congress has often refused to exercise the full extent of its commerce power, leaving regulation of interstate commercial subjects to the states. Indeed, Congress has declined three different times to exercise its entire commerce power when enacting post-1890 antitrust legislation. It thus seems altogether possible that the 1890 Congress would not have exercised more expansive authority than conferred by the Court’s pre-1890 Commerce Clause jurisprudence if given the opportunity to do so. Nothing in the Act’s text speaks to how the 1890 Congress would have (re)drafted the Act in response to the sort of fundamental constitutional change that Wickard wrought. The federal-state balance canon resolves this dilemma. Since the early 1940s, the Supreme Court has refused to read ambiguous federal statutes to reach conduct traditionally subject to exclusive state regulation. More recently, the Court has recognized that trade restraints are topics “traditionally regulated by the States.”7 Replacing the direct/indirect standard with the substantial effects test contravened this canon by expanding an ambiguous Sherman Act to supplant traditional state prerogatives.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the empirical basis for this claim is questionable\nCongress has often refused to exercise the full extent of its commerce power, leaving regulation of interstate commercial subjects to the states\nCongress has declined three different times to exercise its entire commerce power when enacting\nantitrust legislation\nfederal-state balance canon resolves this dilemma\nthe\nCourt has refused to read ambiguous federal statutes to reach conduct traditionally subject to exclusive state regulation\nCourt has recognized that trade restraints are topics\ntraditionally regulated by the States", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No preemption/commerce clause violation", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the empirical basis for this claim is questionable\nCongress has often refused to exercise the full extent of its commerce power, leaving regulation of interstate commercial subjects to the states\nCongress has declined three different times to exercise its entire commerce power when enacting\nantitrust legislation\nfederal-state balance canon resolves this dilemma\nthe\nCourt has refused to read ambiguous federal statutes to reach conduct traditionally subject to exclusive state regulation\nCourt has recognized that trade restraints are topics\ntraditionally regulated by the States", "role": "user" }, { "content": "questionable\nrefused\nstates\nthree different times\nantitrust legislation\nfederal-state balance\nresolves this dilemma\nrefused\nexclusive state regulation\ntraditionally regulated by the States", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No preemption/commerce clause violation\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.7", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the empirical basis for this claim is questionable\nCongress has often refused to exercise the full extent of its commerce power, leaving regulation of interstate commercial subjects to the states\nCongress has declined three different times to exercise its entire commerce power when enacting\nantitrust legislation\nfederal-state balance canon resolves this dilemma\nthe\nCourt has refused to read ambiguous federal statutes to reach conduct traditionally subject to exclusive state regulation\nCourt has recognized that trade restraints are topics\ntraditionally regulated by the States", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Congress\nrefused to exercise\ncommerce power, leaving regulation of interstate commercial subjects to\nstates\nCongress has declined three different times to exercise\ncommerce power when enacting\nantitrust legislation\nfederal-state balance\nresolves this dilemma\nthe\nCourt\nrefused to read ambiguous federal statutes to reach conduct\nsubject to exclusive state regulation\nCourt\nrecognized\ntrade restraints are\ntraditionally regulated by the States", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Solves cost concerns and Japan says yes.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Suga could mark his first policy success as Japan’s new leader by implementing a robust and comprehensive missile defense plan.\nWith Yoshihide Suga confirmed as Japan’s new prime minister, one of the first pressing policy choices that he faces concerns the future of Japan’s ballistic and cruise missile defense (BMD) architecture. Since Japan faces a multitude of missile threats from North Korea and China, Prime Minister Suga should propose a comprehensive solution that ensures improved persistence and distribution of BMD capabilities to reduce the burden on the U.S. and Japanese maritime units as well as other shared alliance interests.\nA new BMD plan would help address the gap created by the Japanese defense ministry’s decision not to acquire two land-based Aegis Ashore (AA) systems for use at separate sites. Until June, Japan was intent on installing these systems to enhance its existing BMD assets, which include a maritime component of Aegis BMD-equipped naval vessels and land-based components consisting of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and AN/TPY-2 Radar. Deploying Aegis Ashore would have decreased the current burden on the maritime units by assuming the majority of responsibilities for protecting Japan against North Korean ballistic missiles.\nThe Japanese Defense Ministry, however, scrapped this plan due to growing perceptions among Tokyo’s leadership that there would be added costs to enhance the system’s safety measures. These enhancements would ease a backlash from civilians living near the planned AA sites, who cited concerns of the potential damage to residential areas due to falling rocket boosters from the system’s interceptors.\nAn alternative solution under consideration in Tokyo is placing the AA’s radars and missile interceptors on specially constructed naval vessels rather than on land. Moving these capabilities off land would resolve the local communities’ concerns and potentially avoid the added costs for boosting safety measures. However, this option still leaves Japan’s BMD architecture with vulnerabilities in its coverage. Admiral Hiroshi Yamamura of Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force argued that Japan’s additional BMD capability must not be influenced by the weather or climate. This is because naval vessels provide less persistent coverage than land-based systems, such as AA, since vessels cannot perform their BMD functions in rough weather or sea conditions.\nJapan is also considering the acquisition of a limited strike capability that can range enemy ships and land-based assets to deter and if necessary defeat any aggressive actions. These capabilities would be deployed to supplement Tokyo’s missile defense architecture by creating deterrence capabilities. This, however, is a controversial option due to Japan’s pacifist constitution, which forbids Tokyo from acquiring offensive and power projection capabilities. Additionally, Komeito, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s junior coalition partner, opposes the plan for this very reason.\nStill, Japan needs an alternative to the missile interception capabilities provided by land-based AA. Specifically, the replacement to this system should still prioritize improved persistence and distribution of BMD capabilities to increase flexibility and relieve pressure on maritime assets. This is specifically important because AA would have enabled Japan to more effectively support Washington’s regional military posture and its efforts to deter China’s aggressive actions throughout the Indo-Pacific. Deploying AA to Japan aimed not only to boost Japan’s own ballistic missile defense capabilities, but also to lessen the burden on Japanese Self Defense Force Aegis-equipped destroyers and allow them to conduct other missions. The deployment also sought to increase the U.S. military’s flexibility to deploy its BMD-equipped naval vessels stationed in Japan to other areas under threat of Chinese incursion and power projection, such as the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean.\nIt is imperative to address Admiral Yamaura’s concerns regarding coverage in intercepting capabilities. However, the United States and Japan could alleviate these issues by strengthening other elements of a more comprehensive BMD solution to better anticipate enemy missile strikes. For instance, one area for further U.S.-Japan collaboration is the development and fielding of a distributed network of mobile and fixed sensors and radars as well as satellites to augment the alliance’s early warning and detection capabilities. Aerial drones, such as the MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle, should be considered as a possibility for mobile options. The U.S. has been equipping these drones with the necessary capabilities to support BMD missions. Washington already tested this drone in the Indo-Pacific in June 2016 during the Pacific Dragon joint BMD exercise with Japan and South Korea.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Suga could mark his first policy success\nby implementing\nrobust and comprehensive missile defense\none of the first pressing policy choices\nconcerns the future of Japan’s ballistic and cruise missile defense (BMD)\nSuga should propose a comprehensive solution that ensures\npersistence and distribution of BMD capabilities to reduce the burden on the U.S.\nas well as other shared alliance interests.\nnew BMD\nwould help address the gap created by the Japanese defense ministry’s decision not to acquire\nland-based Aegis Ashore (AA) systems\nUntil June, Japan was intent on installing these systems to enhance its existing BMD\nDeploying Aegis Ashore would have decreased the current burden on the maritime units by assuming\nresponsibilities for protecting Japan against North Korean\nmissiles\nThe Japanese Defense Ministry\nscrapped this plan due to growing perceptions\nthat there would be added costs to enhance the system’s safety measures. These enhancements would ease a backlash from civilians\nAn alternative solution\nis placing the AA’s radars and missile interceptors on specially constructed naval vessels\nthis option still leaves Japan’s BMD architecture with vulnerabilities\nJapan is also considering\na limited strike capability that can range enemy ships and land-based assets\nThese capabilities would be deployed to supplement Tokyo’s missile defense\nby creating deterrence\nJapan needs an alternative to\nmissile interception\nthe replacement to this system should\nprioritize\npersistence and distribution of BMD capabilities\nAA would have enabled Japan to more effectively support Washington’s regional military posture and its efforts to deter China’s aggressive actions throughout the Indo-Pacific. Deploying AA to Japan aimed not only to boost Japan’s\nballistic missile defense\nbut\nlessen the burden on Japanese Self Defense Force Aegis-equipped destroyers\nThe deployment also sought to increase the U.S. military’s flexibility to deploy its BMD-equipped\nvessels stationed in Japan to other areas under threat of Chinese incursion\nsuch as the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean.\nthe United States and Japan could alleviate these issues by strengthening\nof a more comprehensive BMD solution\none area for further U.S.-Japan collaboration is\ndevelopment and fielding\ndistributed\nmobile and fixed sensors and radars\nThe U.S. has been equipping these drones with the necessary capabilities to support BMD missions.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Solves cost concerns and Japan says yes.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Suga could mark his first policy success\nby implementing\nrobust and comprehensive missile defense\none of the first pressing policy choices\nconcerns the future of Japan’s ballistic and cruise missile defense (BMD)\nSuga should propose a comprehensive solution that ensures\npersistence and distribution of BMD capabilities to reduce the burden on the U.S.\nas well as other shared alliance interests.\nnew BMD\nwould help address the gap created by the Japanese defense ministry’s decision not to acquire\nland-based Aegis Ashore (AA) systems\nUntil June, Japan was intent on installing these systems to enhance its existing BMD\nDeploying Aegis Ashore would have decreased the current burden on the maritime units by assuming\nresponsibilities for protecting Japan against North Korean\nmissiles\nThe Japanese Defense Ministry\nscrapped this plan due to growing perceptions\nthat there would be added costs to enhance the system’s safety measures. These enhancements would ease a backlash from civilians\nAn alternative solution\nis placing the AA’s radars and missile interceptors on specially constructed naval vessels\nthis option still leaves Japan’s BMD architecture with vulnerabilities\nJapan is also considering\na limited strike capability that can range enemy ships and land-based assets\nThese capabilities would be deployed to supplement Tokyo’s missile defense\nby creating deterrence\nJapan needs an alternative to\nmissile interception\nthe replacement to this system should\nprioritize\npersistence and distribution of BMD capabilities\nAA would have enabled Japan to more effectively support Washington’s regional military posture and its efforts to deter China’s aggressive actions throughout the Indo-Pacific. Deploying AA to Japan aimed not only to boost Japan’s\nballistic missile defense\nbut\nlessen the burden on Japanese Self Defense Force Aegis-equipped destroyers\nThe deployment also sought to increase the U.S. military’s flexibility to deploy its BMD-equipped\nvessels stationed in Japan to other areas under threat of Chinese incursion\nsuch as the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean.\nthe United States and Japan could alleviate these issues by strengthening\nof a more comprehensive BMD solution\none area for further U.S.-Japan collaboration is\ndevelopment and fielding\ndistributed\nmobile and fixed sensors and radars\nThe U.S. has been equipping these drones with the necessary capabilities to support BMD missions.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "robust\ncomprehensive\ncomprehensive solution\nBMD capabilities\nshared alliance interests\naddress the gap\nnot to acquire\nAegis Ashore\ndecreased the current burden\nprotecting Japan\nadded costs\nsystem’s safety\nspecially constructed naval vessels\nlimited strike capability\ndeterrence\npersistence\ndistribution of BMD capabilities\nsupport Washington’s regional military posture\ndeter China’s aggressive actions\nlessen the burden\nU.S. military’s flexibility\nstrengthening\ncomprehensive BMD solution\nfurther U.S.-Japan collaboration", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Solves cost concerns and Japan says yes.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Suga could mark his first policy success\nby implementing\nrobust and comprehensive missile defense\none of the first pressing policy choices\nconcerns the future of Japan’s ballistic and cruise missile defense (BMD)\nSuga should propose a comprehensive solution that ensures\npersistence and distribution of BMD capabilities to reduce the burden on the U.S.\nas well as other shared alliance interests.\nnew BMD\nwould help address the gap created by the Japanese defense ministry’s decision not to acquire\nland-based Aegis Ashore (AA) systems\nUntil June, Japan was intent on installing these systems to enhance its existing BMD\nDeploying Aegis Ashore would have decreased the current burden on the maritime units by assuming\nresponsibilities for protecting Japan against North Korean\nmissiles\nThe Japanese Defense Ministry\nscrapped this plan due to growing perceptions\nthat there would be added costs to enhance the system’s safety measures. These enhancements would ease a backlash from civilians\nAn alternative solution\nis placing the AA’s radars and missile interceptors on specially constructed naval vessels\nthis option still leaves Japan’s BMD architecture with vulnerabilities\nJapan is also considering\na limited strike capability that can range enemy ships and land-based assets\nThese capabilities would be deployed to supplement Tokyo’s missile defense\nby creating deterrence\nJapan needs an alternative to\nmissile interception\nthe replacement to this system should\nprioritize\npersistence and distribution of BMD capabilities\nAA would have enabled Japan to more effectively support Washington’s regional military posture and its efforts to deter China’s aggressive actions throughout the Indo-Pacific. Deploying AA to Japan aimed not only to boost Japan’s\nballistic missile defense\nbut\nlessen the burden on Japanese Self Defense Force Aegis-equipped destroyers\nThe deployment also sought to increase the U.S. military’s flexibility to deploy its BMD-equipped\nvessels stationed in Japan to other areas under threat of Chinese incursion\nsuch as the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean.\nthe United States and Japan could alleviate these issues by strengthening\nof a more comprehensive BMD solution\none area for further U.S.-Japan collaboration is\ndevelopment and fielding\ndistributed\nmobile and fixed sensors and radars\nThe U.S. has been equipping these drones with the necessary capabilities to support BMD missions.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Suga could\nimplement\nrobust and comprehensive missile defense\nSuga should propose\ncomprehensive\nBMD capabilities to reduce the burden on the U.S.\nnew BMD\nwould\naddress the gap created by the\ndecision not to acquire\nAegis Ashore\ndue to\nperceptions\nthere would be added costs to enhance\nsafety\nAA would have enabled Japan to\nsupport Washington’s\nmilitary posture and\ndeter China’s\nactions\nThe deployment\nsought to increase the\nmilitary’s flexibility\nthe U\nS\nand Japan could alleviate these issues by strengthening\nBMD\nfor further\ncollaboration", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No. Military exercises empirically have no impact on denuclearization negotiations.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The former top commander in South Korea said he thinks continuing to halt large-scale military exercises “is no longer relevant” as a negotiating tool with North Korea over denuclearizing the peninsula.\nRetired Army Gen. Vincent Brooks, speaking at an Atlantic Council virtual conference, said Friday the more than two-year pause in the major training exercises between South Korean and American forces “didn’t seem to yield the diplomatic traction” to advance negotiations on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missile programs.\nDuring his remaining tenure as commander of U.S. Forces Korea “we did exercises in different ways,” he said. President Donald Trump ordered a halt to the exercises after his summit talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. “That’s a tradeoff where we could take some risk” at the time, Brooks said. He added that his successor, Army Gen. Robert Abrams, and Seoul’s top military commanders have continued to find workarounds to keep readiness high while also not conducting large exercises.\nBut over time “there is some degradation” by not having major exercises to iron out challenges, Brooks said. Abrams, in a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies forum, gave an example of this. He acknowledged his concern that combined air-ground maneuvering exercises could not be done on the peninsula and that not conducting those drills had an impact on readiness.\n“Right now, I think we’re at an impasse” in meaningful talks with North Korea,” Brooks said. He cited a number of reasons why: waiting for the outcome of the American election, the combined impact of economic sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic on its already weak economy and slow recovery from three typhoons earlier this year.\n“They had their hands full,” dealing with those events.\nUnchanged is North Korea’s insistence on remaining a nuclear power to guarantee its survival.\nWhen asked about the restraint Kim has shown since the Singapore summit, Brooks said one way of looking at last year’s short-range missile tests is as reminders to Seoul, Tokyo and Washington to not “count us out” because “we’re still very, very dangerous.”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The former top commander in South Korea said\ncontinuing to halt large-scale military exercises “is no longer relevant” as a negotiating tool with North Korea\nRetired Army Gen\nBrooks\nsaid\nthe more than two-year pause in\nmajor training exercises\ndidn’t seem to yield\ndiplomatic traction” to advance negotiations on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missile programs\nTrump ordered a halt to the exercises after his s\ntalks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. “That’s a tradeoff where we could take some risk”\nhis successor\nand Seoul’s top\ncommanders have continued to find workarounds to keep readiness high\nover time “there is\ndegradation” by not having major exercises\ncombined air-ground maneuvering exercises could not be done on the peninsula\nnot conducting those\nhad an impact on readiness.\nwe’re at an impasse” in meaningful talks with North Korea\nwaiting for the\nelection, the combined impact of\nsanctions and\nCOVID-19\nand slow recovery from three typhoons\nUnchanged is North Korea’s insistence on remaining a nuclear power\none way of looking at last year’s short-range missile tests is\nreminders to Seoul, Tokyo and Washington to not “count us out” because “we’re still very,\ndangerous", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No. Military exercises empirically have no impact on denuclearization negotiations.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The former top commander in South Korea said\ncontinuing to halt large-scale military exercises “is no longer relevant” as a negotiating tool with North Korea\nRetired Army Gen\nBrooks\nsaid\nthe more than two-year pause in\nmajor training exercises\ndidn’t seem to yield\ndiplomatic traction” to advance negotiations on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missile programs\nTrump ordered a halt to the exercises after his s\ntalks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. “That’s a tradeoff where we could take some risk”\nhis successor\nand Seoul’s top\ncommanders have continued to find workarounds to keep readiness high\nover time “there is\ndegradation” by not having major exercises\ncombined air-ground maneuvering exercises could not be done on the peninsula\nnot conducting those\nhad an impact on readiness.\nwe’re at an impasse” in meaningful talks with North Korea\nwaiting for the\nelection, the combined impact of\nsanctions and\nCOVID-19\nand slow recovery from three typhoons\nUnchanged is North Korea’s insistence on remaining a nuclear power\none way of looking at last year’s short-range missile tests is\nreminders to Seoul, Tokyo and Washington to not “count us out” because “we’re still very,\ndangerous", "role": "user" }, { "content": "no longer relevant\nnegotiating tool\nmore than two-year pause\ndidn’t\nyield\ndiplomatic traction\nhalt to the exercises\ntradeoff\nkeep readiness high\ndegradation\ncould not be done\nimpact on readiness.\nat an impasse\ninsistence on remaining a nuclear power\nnot “count us out\nvery\ndangerous", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No. Military exercises empirically have no impact on denuclearization negotiations.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The former top commander in South Korea said\ncontinuing to halt large-scale military exercises “is no longer relevant” as a negotiating tool with North Korea\nRetired Army Gen\nBrooks\nsaid\nthe more than two-year pause in\nmajor training exercises\ndidn’t seem to yield\ndiplomatic traction” to advance negotiations on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missile programs\nTrump ordered a halt to the exercises after his s\ntalks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. “That’s a tradeoff where we could take some risk”\nhis successor\nand Seoul’s top\ncommanders have continued to find workarounds to keep readiness high\nover time “there is\ndegradation” by not having major exercises\ncombined air-ground maneuvering exercises could not be done on the peninsula\nnot conducting those\nhad an impact on readiness.\nwe’re at an impasse” in meaningful talks with North Korea\nwaiting for the\nelection, the combined impact of\nsanctions and\nCOVID-19\nand slow recovery from three typhoons\nUnchanged is North Korea’s insistence on remaining a nuclear power\none way of looking at last year’s short-range missile tests is\nreminders to Seoul, Tokyo and Washington to not “count us out” because “we’re still very,\ndangerous", "role": "user" }, { "content": "continuing to halt\nexercises “is no longer relevant” as a negotiating tool with North Korea\nthe\npause\ndidn’t\nyield\ndiplomatic traction\nthere is\ndegradation” by not having\nexercises\nwe’re at an impasse” in\ntalks with North Korea\nwaiting for the\nelection, the\nimpact of\nsanctions and\nCOVID\nUnchanged is North Korea’s insistence on remaining a nuclear power\none way of looking at last year’s\ntests is\nreminders\nwe’re still very\ndangerous", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No great power war in Afghanistan.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Following President Joe Biden’s announcement last week that US forces will withdraw from Afghanistan by Sept. 11, 2021, multiple outlets are reporting that both China and Russia may increase their involvement in the country once the last US boot is off Afghan soil.\n“The security forces of the Afghan government are not capable of ensuring Afghan security,” Sun Qi, an international relations specialist at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, told the South China Morning Post.\nAdditionally, Katharyn Stoner, deputy director of the Institute of International Studies at Stanford University, told Deutsche Welle that Moscow was concerned about instability on its southern border as well as the potential for Islamist terrorism to spread across Central Asia.\nWhile Beijing and Moscow both have concerns about the stability of the regime in Kabul, as well as the prospect of civil war following a US exit from Afghanistan, experts contend that neither nation has an interest in stationing troops in the country. Rather, those experts say, China and Russia will seek to work with other regional players in order to both promote stability and secure their borders.\n“Their interest would be stability. So, if that means working with Pakistan or with India, Russia will do it,” Stoner told Deutsche Welle.\nJohnny Walsh, a senior expert on Afghanistan at the United States Institute of Peace, told Deutsche Welle that another major concern for Moscow was the prevention of a civil war in Afghanistan, which could spark a refugee crisis in Central Asia.\nFor centuries, landlocked Afghanistan has been a battlefield for proxy wars between “great powers” as part of what historically has been known as “The Great Game.”\nIn a late 20th-century version of “The Great Game,” Washington supported an anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan during the 1980s — a move many historians cite as a major reason the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.\nAccording to a June 26, 2020, article published in The New York Times, Moscow appeared to have returned to playing “the game” by secretly offering bounties to “Taliban-linked militants for killing coalition forces in Afghanistan — including targeting American troops.”\nOn Thursday, Washington all but abandoned that narrative. According to The Daily Beast, the Biden administration announced that intelligence agencies have only “low to moderate” confidence in the story. A senior Biden official told the publication that the “difficult operating environment in Afghanistan” complicated US intelligence gathering.\nWalsh painted a different picture to Deutsche Welle of the relationship between Washington and Moscow regarding Afghanistan. While not “thrilled” about Moscow’s relationship with the Taliban, Washington was encouraging Russia to use its ties to push the Taliban toward political reconciliation with Kabul, Walsh said.\nWalsh also said that the two countries shared common interests in Afghanistan’s future and are already cooperating with each other. More specifically, both countries agree that Afghanistan needs to be stable and peaceful, and that both have a vested interest in interrupting the export of narcotics from Afghanistan.\nStoner told Deutsche Welle that she felt Moscow would take a “business approach” to Afghanistan, thereby limiting the threats to Russian interests. This includes turning a blind eye, if need be, to potential human rights violations by the Taliban — so long as it means stability for Moscow.\n“Russia is cautious. It did not want to put troops in Afghanistan when the US invaded the country 20 years ago. It was partly because of the situation Russia was in back then, but also because of the past Russian experience in Afghanistan,” Stoner said.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Biden\nannouncement\nUS forces will withdraw\nChina and Russia may increase their involvement in\nonce\nlast US boot is off Afghan soil\nneither nation has an interest in stationing troops in the country\nexperts say\nChina and Russia will\nwork with\nregional players\nto\npromote stability and secure their borders\nthat means working with Pakistan or\nIndia\nRussia will do it\nconcern for Moscow was\nprevention of a civil war in Afghanistan\nwhich could spark a refugee crisis in Central Asia\nWashington was encouraging Russia to use its ties to push the Taliban toward political reconciliation with Kabul\ntwo countries shared common interests in Afghanistan’s future and are already cooperating with each other\nboth countries agree\nAfghanistan needs to be stable and peaceful\nboth have\nvested interest in interrupting the export of narcotics from Afghanistan\nMoscow would take a “business approach\nto Afghanistan, thereby limiting the threats to Russian interests\nRussia is cautious\nIt did not want to put troops in Afghanistan when the US invaded the country 20 years ago\nbecause of the past Russian experience in Afghanistan", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No great power war in Afghanistan.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Biden\nannouncement\nUS forces will withdraw\nChina and Russia may increase their involvement in\nonce\nlast US boot is off Afghan soil\nneither nation has an interest in stationing troops in the country\nexperts say\nChina and Russia will\nwork with\nregional players\nto\npromote stability and secure their borders\nthat means working with Pakistan or\nIndia\nRussia will do it\nconcern for Moscow was\nprevention of a civil war in Afghanistan\nwhich could spark a refugee crisis in Central Asia\nWashington was encouraging Russia to use its ties to push the Taliban toward political reconciliation with Kabul\ntwo countries shared common interests in Afghanistan’s future and are already cooperating with each other\nboth countries agree\nAfghanistan needs to be stable and peaceful\nboth have\nvested interest in interrupting the export of narcotics from Afghanistan\nMoscow would take a “business approach\nto Afghanistan, thereby limiting the threats to Russian interests\nRussia is cautious\nIt did not want to put troops in Afghanistan when the US invaded the country 20 years ago\nbecause of the past Russian experience in Afghanistan", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Biden\nUS forces\nwithdraw\nChina\nRussia\nAfghan soil\nneither nation\nstationing troops\nexperts\nregional players\nstability\nsecure their borders\nPakistan\nIndia\nMoscow\ncivil war\nAfghanistan\nrefugee crisis\nCentral Asia\nWashington\nencouraging Russia\nTaliban\npolitical reconciliation\ncommon interests\nalready cooperating\nstable\npeaceful\nvested interest\nnarcotics\nbusiness approach\ncautious\ntroops in Afghanistan\npast Russian experience in Afghanistan", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No great power war in Afghanistan.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Biden\nannouncement\nUS forces will withdraw\nChina and Russia may increase their involvement in\nonce\nlast US boot is off Afghan soil\nneither nation has an interest in stationing troops in the country\nexperts say\nChina and Russia will\nwork with\nregional players\nto\npromote stability and secure their borders\nthat means working with Pakistan or\nIndia\nRussia will do it\nconcern for Moscow was\nprevention of a civil war in Afghanistan\nwhich could spark a refugee crisis in Central Asia\nWashington was encouraging Russia to use its ties to push the Taliban toward political reconciliation with Kabul\ntwo countries shared common interests in Afghanistan’s future and are already cooperating with each other\nboth countries agree\nAfghanistan needs to be stable and peaceful\nboth have\nvested interest in interrupting the export of narcotics from Afghanistan\nMoscow would take a “business approach\nto Afghanistan, thereby limiting the threats to Russian interests\nRussia is cautious\nIt did not want to put troops in Afghanistan when the US invaded the country 20 years ago\nbecause of the past Russian experience in Afghanistan", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Biden\nannouncement\nUS forces will withdraw\nChina\nRussia\nneither\nhas\ninterest in stationing troops\nwill\nwork with\nplayers\nto\npromote stability and secure\nborders\nworking with Pakistan\nIndia\nconcern\nwas\nprevention of\ncivil war\nwhich could spark\nrefugee crisis\nWashington\nencouraging Russia to use\nties to push\nTaliban toward\nreconciliation\ncountries shared common interests\nand are\ncooperating\nhave\ninterest in interrupting\nnarcotics\nRussia is cautious\nbecause o\npast\nexperience", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No Indo-Pak – blurred religious lines, economics, and balanced presence.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Moreover, today Pakistan doesn’t need to panic about India’s presence in Afghanistan. First, Pakistan has a larger presence and more assets in Afghanistan than India. Second, proximity to Afghanistan gives Pakistan the upper hand to move troops around (to or from the Afghan border) and take vigorous actions against anti-Pakistan elements. Third, the relationship between ordinary Afghans and Pakistanis is strong and has always withstood tense state-level relations.  \nNo Afghan would want to take a stand that would hurt Pakistan; history proved this twice in 1965 and 1971, when Pakistan was fighting for its survival against a much larger enemy. In 2011, President Hamid Karzai  that even if America attacked Pakistan, Afghanistan would support Pakistan. Afghans have a vested interest in Pakistan’s survival and prosperity.\nFurthermore, with regards to Baloch separatists and Pakistani Taliban (TTP) using Afghan territory, it must be noted that after the fall of the Taliban, the Afghan government was  to shelter Baloch separatists. Only later after the Taliban re-emerged from Pakistan did the Afghans start turning a blind eye to Baloch separatists and TTP using Afghan territory. Improved Pak-Afghan relations will lead to a decline in cross-border acts of violence in both countries.\nBesides, the Pakistani establishment and policymakers shouldn’t link Afghanistan to the Kashmir issue. Linking the two won’t help either and will further complicate matters for Pakistan. It will make the Afghans more suspicious of Pakistan, and likely provoke India to try using Afghanistan as a base to destabilize Pakistan. It would please the Afghans if both India and Pakistan resolve their bilateral issues, and not drag Afghanistan into them.\nAdditionally, it is in Afghanistan’s interest to receive economic assistance from India, a rising economic power in its neighborhood. India is projected to become  global economy by 2030. Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq P. Kayani  India could have an economic role in Afghanistan. Pakistan itself  60-70 percent of active ingredients contained in medicines sold in Pakistan from India.\nBeing an Indian and a Hindu cannot be synonymous (Pakistanis were also Indian until 1947). There are nearly as many Muslims in India as in Pakistan. When tensions run high between India and Pakistan, life becomes harder for Indian Muslims. Casting the Indo-Pakistan rivalry as a struggle between Islam and Hinduism is detrimental to Indian Muslims, who, like Pakistanis, have religious, historical, and ancestral ties with Afghans. It is impractical to expect Afghans to distance themselves from Indian Muslims.\nLikewise, the perception that when the Afghan Taliban come to power, Pakistan will have the upper hand in Afghanistan is unrealistic. When the Taliban do come to power (through a power-sharing agreement), they will want to have friendly relations with both India and Pakistan. The Taliban believe Kashmir is an  and have  on both India and Pakistan to not drag Afghanistan into it. It’s a feeling shared by most Afghans.\nSimilarly, India should also realize that any attempts to use Afghan soil to undermine Pakistan would backfire with serious consequences for India. As Muslims, it’s inconceivable for Afghans to hurt Pakistan, a fellow Muslim-majority country. Moreover, Pakistan’s survival and prosperity are vital for, and linked to, Afghanistan’s own survival and prosperity. India should never expect that its cordial relations with Afghanistan can be used as a steppingstone against Pakistan.   \nAn example from cricket should suffice to bring this writing to a close. Afghan players’ recent  in the Pakistan Super League (PSL) is a welcome development. Afghan players shouldn’t have to choose between playing in the Indian Premier League (IPL) and PSL; they should play in both. Whereas IPL is a bigger league with more money, PSL is played in an immediate neighboring country that has inspired Afghans to love and play cricket.\nLike Afghan cricketers, Afghanistan should not have to choose between India and Pakistan; instead, it should have cordial and constructive relations with both. Given Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan, Pak-Afghan relations can be expected to be more cordial than Indo-Afghan relations. But neither India nor Pakistan should entertain hopes to use Afghanistan against each other. Instead, Afghanistan should be a platform for constructive cooperation between India and Pakistan. The sooner India and Pakistan realize this the better for everyone in the region.  ", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Pakistan doesn’t need to panic about India’s presence in Afghanistan\nPakistan has a larger presence and more assets in Afghanistan than India\nproximity to Afghanistan gives Pakistan the upper hand to move troops around\ntake vigorous actions against anti-Pakistan elements\nthe relationship between ordinary Afghans and Pakistanis is strong\nit is in Afghanistan’s interest to receive economic assistance from India,\nIndia is projected to become\nglobal economy by 2030. Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Staff\nIndia could have an economic role in Afghanistan. Pakistan itself\n60-70 percent of active ingredients\nin medicines\nfrom India\nBeing\nIndian and\nHindu cannot be synonymous\nPakistanis were also Indian until 1947\nThere are nearly as many Muslims in India as in Pakistan\nWhen tensions run high\nlife becomes harder for Indian Muslims. Casting the Indo-Pakistan rivalry as\nstruggle between Islam and Hinduism is detrimental to Indian Muslims, who\nhave religious\nties with Afghans\nthe perception that when the Afghan Taliban come to power, Pakistan will have the upper hand in Afghanistan is unrealistic\nWhen the Taliban do come to power\nthey will want\nhave friendly relations with both India and Pakistan\nIndia\nrealize that any attempts to use Afghan soil to undermine Pakistan would backfire with serious consequences for India. As Muslims, it’s inconceivable for Afghans to hurt Pakistan, a fellow Muslim-majority country\nPakistan’s survival and prosperity are vital for\nAfghanistan’s own survival\nIndia should never expect\ncordial relations with Afghanistan can be used as a steppingstone against Pakistan\nneither India nor Pakistan should entertain hopes to use Afghanistan against each other\nAfghanistan\na platform for constructive cooperation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No Indo-Pak – blurred religious lines, economics, and balanced presence.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Pakistan doesn’t need to panic about India’s presence in Afghanistan\nPakistan has a larger presence and more assets in Afghanistan than India\nproximity to Afghanistan gives Pakistan the upper hand to move troops around\ntake vigorous actions against anti-Pakistan elements\nthe relationship between ordinary Afghans and Pakistanis is strong\nit is in Afghanistan’s interest to receive economic assistance from India,\nIndia is projected to become\nglobal economy by 2030. Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Staff\nIndia could have an economic role in Afghanistan. Pakistan itself\n60-70 percent of active ingredients\nin medicines\nfrom India\nBeing\nIndian and\nHindu cannot be synonymous\nPakistanis were also Indian until 1947\nThere are nearly as many Muslims in India as in Pakistan\nWhen tensions run high\nlife becomes harder for Indian Muslims. Casting the Indo-Pakistan rivalry as\nstruggle between Islam and Hinduism is detrimental to Indian Muslims, who\nhave religious\nties with Afghans\nthe perception that when the Afghan Taliban come to power, Pakistan will have the upper hand in Afghanistan is unrealistic\nWhen the Taliban do come to power\nthey will want\nhave friendly relations with both India and Pakistan\nIndia\nrealize that any attempts to use Afghan soil to undermine Pakistan would backfire with serious consequences for India. As Muslims, it’s inconceivable for Afghans to hurt Pakistan, a fellow Muslim-majority country\nPakistan’s survival and prosperity are vital for\nAfghanistan’s own survival\nIndia should never expect\ncordial relations with Afghanistan can be used as a steppingstone against Pakistan\nneither India nor Pakistan should entertain hopes to use Afghanistan against each other\nAfghanistan\na platform for constructive cooperation", "role": "user" }, { "content": "doesn’t need\nIndia’s presence\nPakistan\nproximity\nupper hand\nanti-Pakistan elements\nstrong\neconomic assistance\nglobal economy\nPakistan’s\neconomic role\nPakistan itself\n60-70 percent\nIndia\ncannot be synonymous\nstruggle\ndetrimental\nreligious\nAfghans\nAfghan Taliban\nunrealistic\nfriendly relations\nIndia\nundermine Pakistan\nbackfire\ninconceivable\nMuslim-majority country\nown survival\ncordial relations\nsteppingstone\nuse Afghanistan against each other\nconstructive cooperation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No Indo-Pak – blurred religious lines, economics, and balanced presence.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Pakistan doesn’t need to panic about India’s presence in Afghanistan\nPakistan has a larger presence and more assets in Afghanistan than India\nproximity to Afghanistan gives Pakistan the upper hand to move troops around\ntake vigorous actions against anti-Pakistan elements\nthe relationship between ordinary Afghans and Pakistanis is strong\nit is in Afghanistan’s interest to receive economic assistance from India,\nIndia is projected to become\nglobal economy by 2030. Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Staff\nIndia could have an economic role in Afghanistan. Pakistan itself\n60-70 percent of active ingredients\nin medicines\nfrom India\nBeing\nIndian and\nHindu cannot be synonymous\nPakistanis were also Indian until 1947\nThere are nearly as many Muslims in India as in Pakistan\nWhen tensions run high\nlife becomes harder for Indian Muslims. Casting the Indo-Pakistan rivalry as\nstruggle between Islam and Hinduism is detrimental to Indian Muslims, who\nhave religious\nties with Afghans\nthe perception that when the Afghan Taliban come to power, Pakistan will have the upper hand in Afghanistan is unrealistic\nWhen the Taliban do come to power\nthey will want\nhave friendly relations with both India and Pakistan\nIndia\nrealize that any attempts to use Afghan soil to undermine Pakistan would backfire with serious consequences for India. As Muslims, it’s inconceivable for Afghans to hurt Pakistan, a fellow Muslim-majority country\nPakistan’s survival and prosperity are vital for\nAfghanistan’s own survival\nIndia should never expect\ncordial relations with Afghanistan can be used as a steppingstone against Pakistan\nneither India nor Pakistan should entertain hopes to use Afghanistan against each other\nAfghanistan\na platform for constructive cooperation", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Pakistan doesn’t need\npanic about India\nin Afghanistan\nPakistan has\nand more assets\nproximity\ngives\nupper hand\nin Afghanistan’s interest to receive\nassistance from India\nPakistan’s\nChief of Army Staff\nIndia could have\neconomic\nPakistan itself\nfrom India\nIndian and\nHindu\nnot\nsynonymous\nas many Muslims in India as\nPakistan\nCasting\nrivalry\nis detrimental to Indian Muslims, who\nhave religious\nties with Afghans\nperception\nwhen\nTaliban come to power, Pakistan will have\nupper hand\nis unrealistic\nTaliban\nwill want\nfriendly relations with both\nIndia\nrealize\nAfghan\nto undermine Pakistan would backfire\nAs Muslims, it’s inconceivable for Afghans to hurt Pakistan\nIndia should never expect\ncordial relations with Afghanistan\na steppingstone against Pakistan\nAfghanistan\na platform for\ncooperation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Instability’s inevitable.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The central thesis of this analysis is that 40 years of war have fundamentally changed Afghans and made the country more prone to war in the future.1 A coup in 1978 ushered in a civil war followed immediately by the Soviet invasion. By the time the Soviet Union left in 1989, 7 percent to 9 percent of the Afghan population had been killed, with the death count rising to a staggering one in five for working-age males.2 Civil war resumed. Before the U.S. invasion in 2001, war in Afghanistan had already killed, wounded, or displaced half of the population.3 Then in late 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan to destroy al Qaeda and dislodge the Taliban and later continued fighting to stabilize the country and establish a democratic government. As of 2018, Afghans remain mired in war, and the Taliban contest, influence, or control more territory than at any point since America initiated combat operations.4\nU.S. efforts have been significant, yet American objectives remain largely unmet. Since October 2001, more than 2,000 Americans have been killed in Afghanistan at an estimated financial cost of $840 billion. Forty-one other countries have also contributed to the war in varying degrees.5\nSeventeen years in, the United States remains torn between maintaining the status quo, surging military forces, or leaving the country altogether. The Trump administration has chosen to surge forces, but regardless of the path pursued, Americans can expect continued civil war involving the Taliban and other insurgent groups, as well as a corrupt, illiberal, and largely incompetent Afghan government. An end to the violence will happen only after one group finally monopolizes the use of force in Kabul and a sufficient number of provinces outside the capital, but even then there is a much higher than average probability that civil war will resume.\nUnfortunately, neither the United States nor the international community can substantially improve Afghanistan’s situation. Instead, the future of the country rests primarily in the hands of Afghans who, to date, have largely been incapable of or uninterested in fundamentally changing conditions on the ground. A large number of policy analyses suggest otherwise: that a substantial and enduring U.S. presence will sufficiently improve the situation. However, those analyses typically ignore two critical questions: Why have Afghans been at war for so long? And why haven’t the United States and the international community ended the war after 16 years of trying?\nThe reasons for Afghanistan’s bleak future can be found in the answers to those two questions. Some of the more obvious explanations include the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ failure to stop the insurgency, the low opportunity cost of rebel recruitment, and insurgent sanctuary in the mountains and in Pakistan. Other likely causes include rebels motivated by grievances against their extremely corrupt government, as well as ethnolinguistic fractionalization between Pashtuns and others (e.g., Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras). Financial incentives likely motivate a number of insurgent groups too, as perpetual war perversely provides them an enduring income stream from the illicit opium trade that would otherwise be confined to traditional criminal elements if the conflict ended.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "40 years of war have fundamentally changed Afghans\nA coup in 1978 ushered in a civil war followed immediately by the Soviet invasion. By the time the Soviet Union left in 1989, 7 percent to 9 percent of the Afghan population had been killed, with the death count rising to a staggering one in five for working-age males.\nCivil war resumed. Before the U.S. invasion in 2001, war in Afghanistan had already killed, wounded, or displaced half of the population.\nThen in late 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan to destroy al Qaeda and dislodge the Taliban and later continued fighting to stabilize the country and establish a democratic government. As of 2018, Afghans remain mired in war, and the Taliban contest, influence, or control more territory than at any point since America initiated combat operations.\nSince October 2001, more than 2,000 Americans have been killed in Afghanistan at an estimated financial cost of $840 billion. Forty-one other countries have also contributed to the war in varying degrees.\nSeventeen years in, the United States remains torn\nThe Trump administration has chosen to surge forces, but regardless of the path pursued, Americans can expect continued civil war involving the Taliban and other insurgent groups, as well as a corrupt, illiberal, and largely incompetent Afghan government. An end to the violence will happen only after one group finally monopolizes the use of force in Kabul and a sufficient number of provinces outside the capital, but even then there is a much higher than average probability that civil war will resume.\nUnfortunately, neither the United States nor the international community can substantially improve Afghanistan’s situation.\nthe future of the country rests primarily in the hands of Afghans who,\nhave largely been incapable of or uninterested in fundamentally changing conditions on the ground. A large number of policy analyses suggest\nenduring U.S. presence will sufficiently improve the situation. However, those analyses typically ignore two critical questions: Why have Afghans been at war for so long? And why haven’t the United States and the international community ended the war after 16 years of trying?\nThe reasons for Afghanistan’s bleak future can be found in the answers to those two questions. Some of the more obvious explanations include the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ failure to stop the insurgency, the low opportunity cost of rebel recruitment, and insurgent sanctuary in the mountains and in Pakistan. Other likely causes include rebels motivated by grievances against their extremely corrupt government, as well as ethnolinguistic fractionalization between Pashtuns and others (e.g., Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras). Financial incentives likely motivate a number of insurgent groups too, as perpetual war perversely provides them an enduring income stream from the illicit opium trade that would otherwise be confined to traditional criminal elements if the conflict ended.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Instability’s inevitable.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "40 years of war have fundamentally changed Afghans\nA coup in 1978 ushered in a civil war followed immediately by the Soviet invasion. By the time the Soviet Union left in 1989, 7 percent to 9 percent of the Afghan population had been killed, with the death count rising to a staggering one in five for working-age males.\nCivil war resumed. Before the U.S. invasion in 2001, war in Afghanistan had already killed, wounded, or displaced half of the population.\nThen in late 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan to destroy al Qaeda and dislodge the Taliban and later continued fighting to stabilize the country and establish a democratic government. As of 2018, Afghans remain mired in war, and the Taliban contest, influence, or control more territory than at any point since America initiated combat operations.\nSince October 2001, more than 2,000 Americans have been killed in Afghanistan at an estimated financial cost of $840 billion. Forty-one other countries have also contributed to the war in varying degrees.\nSeventeen years in, the United States remains torn\nThe Trump administration has chosen to surge forces, but regardless of the path pursued, Americans can expect continued civil war involving the Taliban and other insurgent groups, as well as a corrupt, illiberal, and largely incompetent Afghan government. An end to the violence will happen only after one group finally monopolizes the use of force in Kabul and a sufficient number of provinces outside the capital, but even then there is a much higher than average probability that civil war will resume.\nUnfortunately, neither the United States nor the international community can substantially improve Afghanistan’s situation.\nthe future of the country rests primarily in the hands of Afghans who,\nhave largely been incapable of or uninterested in fundamentally changing conditions on the ground. A large number of policy analyses suggest\nenduring U.S. presence will sufficiently improve the situation. However, those analyses typically ignore two critical questions: Why have Afghans been at war for so long? And why haven’t the United States and the international community ended the war after 16 years of trying?\nThe reasons for Afghanistan’s bleak future can be found in the answers to those two questions. Some of the more obvious explanations include the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ failure to stop the insurgency, the low opportunity cost of rebel recruitment, and insurgent sanctuary in the mountains and in Pakistan. Other likely causes include rebels motivated by grievances against their extremely corrupt government, as well as ethnolinguistic fractionalization between Pashtuns and others (e.g., Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras). Financial incentives likely motivate a number of insurgent groups too, as perpetual war perversely provides them an enduring income stream from the illicit opium trade that would otherwise be confined to traditional criminal elements if the conflict ended.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "40 years of war\ncoup in 1978\nSoviet invasion\n7 percent to 9 percent\nkilled\ndeath count\none in five\n2018\nAfghans remain mired in war\nexpect continued civil war\ncorrupt\nilliberal\nlargely incompetent\neven then\nmuch higher\nprobability\ncivil war will resume\nneither\nUnited States nor\ninternational community\nimprove\nincapable\nuninterested\nchanging conditions\n16 years of trying\nfailure to stop the insurgency\nlow opportunity cost\nrebel recruitment\ninsurgent sanctuary\nmountains\nPakistan\ngrievances\nFinancial incentives\nincome stream\nillicit opium trade", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Instability’s inevitable.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "40 years of war have fundamentally changed Afghans\nA coup in 1978 ushered in a civil war followed immediately by the Soviet invasion. By the time the Soviet Union left in 1989, 7 percent to 9 percent of the Afghan population had been killed, with the death count rising to a staggering one in five for working-age males.\nCivil war resumed. Before the U.S. invasion in 2001, war in Afghanistan had already killed, wounded, or displaced half of the population.\nThen in late 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan to destroy al Qaeda and dislodge the Taliban and later continued fighting to stabilize the country and establish a democratic government. As of 2018, Afghans remain mired in war, and the Taliban contest, influence, or control more territory than at any point since America initiated combat operations.\nSince October 2001, more than 2,000 Americans have been killed in Afghanistan at an estimated financial cost of $840 billion. Forty-one other countries have also contributed to the war in varying degrees.\nSeventeen years in, the United States remains torn\nThe Trump administration has chosen to surge forces, but regardless of the path pursued, Americans can expect continued civil war involving the Taliban and other insurgent groups, as well as a corrupt, illiberal, and largely incompetent Afghan government. An end to the violence will happen only after one group finally monopolizes the use of force in Kabul and a sufficient number of provinces outside the capital, but even then there is a much higher than average probability that civil war will resume.\nUnfortunately, neither the United States nor the international community can substantially improve Afghanistan’s situation.\nthe future of the country rests primarily in the hands of Afghans who,\nhave largely been incapable of or uninterested in fundamentally changing conditions on the ground. A large number of policy analyses suggest\nenduring U.S. presence will sufficiently improve the situation. However, those analyses typically ignore two critical questions: Why have Afghans been at war for so long? And why haven’t the United States and the international community ended the war after 16 years of trying?\nThe reasons for Afghanistan’s bleak future can be found in the answers to those two questions. Some of the more obvious explanations include the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ failure to stop the insurgency, the low opportunity cost of rebel recruitment, and insurgent sanctuary in the mountains and in Pakistan. Other likely causes include rebels motivated by grievances against their extremely corrupt government, as well as ethnolinguistic fractionalization between Pashtuns and others (e.g., Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras). Financial incentives likely motivate a number of insurgent groups too, as perpetual war perversely provides them an enduring income stream from the illicit opium trade that would otherwise be confined to traditional criminal elements if the conflict ended.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "40 years of war\nfundamentally changed Afghans\ncoup\nfollowed\nby\ninvasion\n9 percent\nkilled, with\ndeath count\none in five for\nmales\nCivil war resumed\nwar\nkilled, wounded, or displaced half\nthe population\nAfghans remain\nin war\nand\nTaliban\ncontrol more territory than at any point since\ncombat operations\nmore than 2,000 Americans have been killed\nat\ncost of $840 billion\nForty-one\ncountries\ncontributed to\nin\nAmericans can expect continued\nwar involving\nTaliban and\ncorrupt, illiberal, and\nincompetent Afghan government\neven then\nwar will resume\nneither\nU\nS\nnor\ninternational community\nimprove\nsituation\nAfghans\nhave\nbeen\nuninterested\nanswers\ninclude\nA\nN\nD\nS\nF\nfailure to stop\ninsurgency, the low\ncost of\nrecruitment, and\nsanctuary in\nmountains\nOther\ncauses include\ngrievances\nFinancial incentives\nmotivate\ngroups\nas\nwar\nprovides them a\nstream from\nillicit opium trade", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No Africa war – countries are stable, and conflict is declining.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Africa is often presented as a war-ridden continent, but this depiction is becoming outdated. In the 21st century, the amount of warfare in Africa has declined dramatically, and today most Africans are more secure than ever.\n“Africa” and “conflict” are words all too often linked in Western minds. From Cold War proxy wars, to what Robert Kaplan saw as “the coming anarchy”  in the 1990s, to Boko Haram massacres today, news from Africa may seem dominated by never-ending conflict. That image is out of date. In 2002 Tony Blair was justified in describing the state of Africa as a “scar on the conscience of humanity”, but in the years since there has been an underappreciated success story in Africa. The amount of warfare in Africa has declined dramatically, and today most Africans are more secure than ever. Troubled areas remain, unfortunately, but the larger picture of receding conflict has implications for how we think about African security needs. Outside actors can help reinforce positive external and internal trends that mitigate conflict, can avoid creating new conflict zones like Libya or South Sudan, and should recognize emerging human security needs that are becoming relatively more important as armed conflict declines.\nAfrica’s waning wars\nQuietly over the last 15 years, many African wars did end, to paraphrase Scott Strauss. Lingering Cold War struggles like the Angolan civil war burned out. West African nations including Liberia and Sierra Leone ceased being playgrounds for warlords and regained their status as functional, if weak, states. Eastern Congo is still violent, but far less so than during the 1990s “African World War”. Overall, 21st century Africa has seen more wars end or abate than ignite.\nThe trend towards peace in Africa can be seen by using various datasets on armed conflict (for more on data sources, tabulation, and trend analysis, see Burbach and Fettweis 2014). The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP), for example, tracks conflicts from 1946 to the present, scoring each for the intensity of its societal impact. Figure 1 shows the yearly sum of conflict intensity assessed by CSP, for both Africa and the rest of the world. The end of the Cold War brought peace to much of the world, but African conflicts increased in the 1990s. States like Somalia and Sierra Leone collapsed into warlordism, for example. Central Africa was hit by the Rwanda genocide and bloody chaos in Eastern Congo, killing one to five million people.  At least three-fourths of the world’s total war deaths in the late 1990s took place in Africa (Burbach and Fettweis 2014, Figure 4).\nAfter the year 2000, the tide of war receded. Africa’s total conflict intensity as measured by CSP fell by approximately half. A similar pattern is shown by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project. Using somewhat different definitions, the Uppsala data shows that the number of conflicts in Africa resulting in 1,000 or more “battle deaths” per year declined from an average of 12 in the late 1990s to an average of 3.5 from 2010-2013. Some decades-long wars ended with formal peace accords, as with Angola in 2002; elsewhere, states gradually gained the upper hand on armed disorder. Given the unfortunate rise of warfare in the Middle East, Africa is no longer the most violent region of the world.\nThe decline of warfare in Africa is even more dramatic in terms of individual risks. Africa’s population is growing rapidly, up 150% since 1980. Declining conflict despite a much larger population means the mortality risk from war has fallen substantially. An average of 32 people per 100,000 population were killed per year in the 1980s and 45 per 100,000 in the 1990s. In 2013, though the rate was only 8 per 100,000 (Burbach & Fettweis 2014, Figure 5). World Health Organization data shows an astonishing 95% decline in African conflict deaths from 2000 to 2012. In the 1980s, warfare killed more Africans than vehicle accidents. Today, perhaps three to six times as many Africans die in road crashes than from conflict. Many more Africans are harmed by crime or domestic violence than by warfare. Africa is still afflicted by more conflict than most of the world and the suffering of those involved is very real. Nevertheless, a greater proportion of Africans live free of war today than ever in the post-independence period.\nCelebrating African peace may seem premature given the civil war in South Sudan or the ravages of Boko Haram. Conflict has increased since 2011, but the level of armed conflict still remains lower than any time from 1970 – 2000. The most tragic development is the civil war in South Sudan, which the U.N. estimated had killed 50,000 as of spring 2016.Fortunately, South Sudan’s case is nearly unique: a newly created nation, devoid of physical or administrative infrastructure, with ethnically divided, soon-to-be-unemployed armed factions eyeing the lucrative oil revenues awaiting whomever could seize power. As academic panelists noted in 2011 – two years before the civil war –  predictors of conflict were flashing red in South Sudan. Few African countries contain such a combustible mix of problems anymore.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Africa is often presented as a war-ridden continent\nthis depiction is\noutdated. In the 21st century\nwarfare in Africa has declined dramatically\nmost Africans are more secure than ever\nthere has been an underappreciated success story in Africa\nover the last 15 years, many African wars did end\nLingering Cold War struggles like the Angolan civil war burned out. West African nations\nceased being playgrounds for warlords and regained\nas functional\nstates\nCongo is\nviolent, but far less so\n21st century Africa has seen more wars end\nthan ignite\ntrend towards peace\ncan be seen by using various datasets on armed conflict\nCenter for Systemic Peace (CSP\ntracks conflicts from 1946 to the present\nAfter\n2000, the tide of war receded. Africa’s total conflict intensity\nfell by\nhalf. A similar pattern is shown by\nUppsala Conflict Data Project\nthe number of conflicts in Africa\ndeclined from an average of 12\nto\n3.5\ndecades-long wars ended with formal peace accords, as with Angola\nelsewhere, states gradually gained\nupper hand on armed disorder\ndecline of warfare in Africa is\ndramatic in terms of individual risks. Africa’s population is growing rapidly\nDeclining conflict despite\nlarger population means the mortality risk from war has fallen substantially\nW\nH\nO\ndata shows\nan astonishing 95% decline in African conflict deaths\nIn the 1980s, warfare killed more Africans than vehicle accidents. Today\nthree to six times as many Africans die in road crashes\nmore Africans are harmed by crime\nthan\nwarfare\na greater proportion of Africans live free of war today than ever\nthe level of armed conflict\nremains lower than any time from 1970 – 2000\nSouth Sudan’s case is\nunique\nFew African countries contain\na combustible mix of problems anymore", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No Africa war – countries are stable, and conflict is declining.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Africa is often presented as a war-ridden continent\nthis depiction is\noutdated. In the 21st century\nwarfare in Africa has declined dramatically\nmost Africans are more secure than ever\nthere has been an underappreciated success story in Africa\nover the last 15 years, many African wars did end\nLingering Cold War struggles like the Angolan civil war burned out. West African nations\nceased being playgrounds for warlords and regained\nas functional\nstates\nCongo is\nviolent, but far less so\n21st century Africa has seen more wars end\nthan ignite\ntrend towards peace\ncan be seen by using various datasets on armed conflict\nCenter for Systemic Peace (CSP\ntracks conflicts from 1946 to the present\nAfter\n2000, the tide of war receded. Africa’s total conflict intensity\nfell by\nhalf. A similar pattern is shown by\nUppsala Conflict Data Project\nthe number of conflicts in Africa\ndeclined from an average of 12\nto\n3.5\ndecades-long wars ended with formal peace accords, as with Angola\nelsewhere, states gradually gained\nupper hand on armed disorder\ndecline of warfare in Africa is\ndramatic in terms of individual risks. Africa’s population is growing rapidly\nDeclining conflict despite\nlarger population means the mortality risk from war has fallen substantially\nW\nH\nO\ndata shows\nan astonishing 95% decline in African conflict deaths\nIn the 1980s, warfare killed more Africans than vehicle accidents. Today\nthree to six times as many Africans die in road crashes\nmore Africans are harmed by crime\nthan\nwarfare\na greater proportion of Africans live free of war today than ever\nthe level of armed conflict\nremains lower than any time from 1970 – 2000\nSouth Sudan’s case is\nunique\nFew African countries contain\na combustible mix of problems anymore", "role": "user" }, { "content": "war-ridden\nwarfare\ndeclined dramatically\nmore secure than ever\nunderappreciated success story\nCold War struggles\nburned out\nceased being playgrounds\nfar less so\nend\nignite\npeace\nvarious datasets\nCSP\nhalf\nUppsala Conflict Data Project\n12\n3.5\npeace accords\nupper hand\nmortality risk\nfallen substantially\nW\nH\nO\n95% decline\nconflict deaths\nsix times\ngreater proportion\nfree of war\narmed conflict\nremains lower\nFew African countries", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No Africa war – countries are stable, and conflict is declining.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Africa is often presented as a war-ridden continent\nthis depiction is\noutdated. In the 21st century\nwarfare in Africa has declined dramatically\nmost Africans are more secure than ever\nthere has been an underappreciated success story in Africa\nover the last 15 years, many African wars did end\nLingering Cold War struggles like the Angolan civil war burned out. West African nations\nceased being playgrounds for warlords and regained\nas functional\nstates\nCongo is\nviolent, but far less so\n21st century Africa has seen more wars end\nthan ignite\ntrend towards peace\ncan be seen by using various datasets on armed conflict\nCenter for Systemic Peace (CSP\ntracks conflicts from 1946 to the present\nAfter\n2000, the tide of war receded. Africa’s total conflict intensity\nfell by\nhalf. A similar pattern is shown by\nUppsala Conflict Data Project\nthe number of conflicts in Africa\ndeclined from an average of 12\nto\n3.5\ndecades-long wars ended with formal peace accords, as with Angola\nelsewhere, states gradually gained\nupper hand on armed disorder\ndecline of warfare in Africa is\ndramatic in terms of individual risks. Africa’s population is growing rapidly\nDeclining conflict despite\nlarger population means the mortality risk from war has fallen substantially\nW\nH\nO\ndata shows\nan astonishing 95% decline in African conflict deaths\nIn the 1980s, warfare killed more Africans than vehicle accidents. Today\nthree to six times as many Africans die in road crashes\nmore Africans are harmed by crime\nthan\nwarfare\na greater proportion of Africans live free of war today than ever\nthe level of armed conflict\nremains lower than any time from 1970 – 2000\nSouth Sudan’s case is\nunique\nFew African countries contain\na combustible mix of problems anymore", "role": "user" }, { "content": "warfare in Africa has declined dramatically\nCold War struggles\nburned out. West African nations\nceased being playgrounds for warlords\nAfrica has seen more wars end\nthan ignite\npeace\ncan be seen\nusing various datasets\nCSP\nAfrica’s\nconflict intensity\nfell by\nhalf\nsimilar pattern\nshown by\nUppsala\nconflicts\ndeclined from\n12\nto\n3.5\nwars ended with\npeace accords\nstates gradually gained\nupper hand\nmortality risk\nhas fallen substantially\nW\nH\nO\nshows\n95% decline in\nconflict deaths\ngreater proportion of Africans live free of war\nlevel of armed conflict\nremains lower than any time\nFew African countries contain\nmix of problems", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Great powers are discouraging conflict and African nations are cooperating.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Accounting for the decline\nThere are several factors behind the ebbing of conflict in Africa. One important change is the geopolitical environment. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviets armed and funded rival factions in civil wars, allowing bloody wars to fester for decades in countries like Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Then, 1990s Africa fell into turmoil as superpower-sponsored regimes collapsed. A disinterested world mostly left Africa to its fate, but continued trade in weapons and resources with warlords. In the last decade, however, the U.S., Europe, and China have all become more active in diplomacy, security assistance, and peacekeeping. The US and China are together pressing the South Sudanese factions to stop fighting, rather than choosing sides. The world has become somewhat less willing to sell arms or purchase minerals that directly fuel conflicts, admittedly with a long way to go.\nAfricans themselves deserve great credit for ending the wars that plagued their continent.  Economic growth, improvements in governance, and greater space for peaceful political participation have all made state failure and internal conflict less likely. As Paul Collier among others has noted, civil wars tend to create vicious cycles that spread insecurity to whole regions. Many regions of Africa have climbed out of the conflict trap; political, security, and economic improvements are reinforcing each other. The nations of Africa increasingly work together through the institutions of the African Union to head off or resolve conflict, and to deploy peacekeepers to conflict zones. Needs still outpace available resources, but that cooperation is a marked change from 20th century Africa.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "There are several factors behind\nebbing of conflict in Africa. One important change is the geopolitical environment. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviets armed\nrival factions\nThen, 1990s Africa fell into turmoil as superpower-sponsored regimes collapsed\nIn the last decade\nthe\nU.S.,\nEurope, and\nChina\nhave all become\nactive in diplomacy, security assistance, and peacekeeping. The US and China are together pressing\nthe South Sudanese factions to stop fighting, rather than choosing sides. The world has become\nless willing to\nsell arms\nthat\nfuel conflicts\nEconomic growth, improvements in governance, and greater space for peaceful political participation\nhave\nmade state failure and internal conflict less likely\nMany regions of Africa\nclimbed out of the conflict trap; political, security, and economic improvements are reinforcing each other\nnations of Africa\nwork together through\ninstitutions of the A\nU\nto\nresolve conflict, and to deploy peacekeepers to conflict zones\ncooperation is a marked change from 20th century Africa", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Great powers are discouraging conflict and African nations are cooperating.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "There are several factors behind\nebbing of conflict in Africa. One important change is the geopolitical environment. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviets armed\nrival factions\nThen, 1990s Africa fell into turmoil as superpower-sponsored regimes collapsed\nIn the last decade\nthe\nU.S.,\nEurope, and\nChina\nhave all become\nactive in diplomacy, security assistance, and peacekeeping. The US and China are together pressing\nthe South Sudanese factions to stop fighting, rather than choosing sides. The world has become\nless willing to\nsell arms\nthat\nfuel conflicts\nEconomic growth, improvements in governance, and greater space for peaceful political participation\nhave\nmade state failure and internal conflict less likely\nMany regions of Africa\nclimbed out of the conflict trap; political, security, and economic improvements are reinforcing each other\nnations of Africa\nwork together through\ninstitutions of the A\nU\nto\nresolve conflict, and to deploy peacekeepers to conflict zones\ncooperation is a marked change from 20th century Africa", "role": "user" }, { "content": "several factors\nebbing of conflict\ngeopolitical environment\nCold War\nrival factions\nlast decade\nU.S\nEurope\nChina\ndiplomacy\nsecurity assistance\npeacekeeping\nstop fighting\nchoosing sides\nless willing\nsell arms\nEconomic growth\ngovernance\npeaceful political participation\nstate failure\ninternal conflict\nclimbed out\nconflict trap\nreinforcing\nA\nU\nmarked change", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Great powers are discouraging conflict and African nations are cooperating.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "There are several factors behind\nebbing of conflict in Africa. One important change is the geopolitical environment. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviets armed\nrival factions\nThen, 1990s Africa fell into turmoil as superpower-sponsored regimes collapsed\nIn the last decade\nthe\nU.S.,\nEurope, and\nChina\nhave all become\nactive in diplomacy, security assistance, and peacekeeping. The US and China are together pressing\nthe South Sudanese factions to stop fighting, rather than choosing sides. The world has become\nless willing to\nsell arms\nthat\nfuel conflicts\nEconomic growth, improvements in governance, and greater space for peaceful political participation\nhave\nmade state failure and internal conflict less likely\nMany regions of Africa\nclimbed out of the conflict trap; political, security, and economic improvements are reinforcing each other\nnations of Africa\nwork together through\ninstitutions of the A\nU\nto\nresolve conflict, and to deploy peacekeepers to conflict zones\ncooperation is a marked change from 20th century Africa", "role": "user" }, { "content": "change is the geopolitical environment\nCold War\nU.S. and\nSoviets armed\nrival factions\nIn the last decade\nU.S.,\nEurope, and\nChina\nhave\nbecome\nactive in diplomacy\npeacekeeping\npressing\nfactions to stop fighting, rather than choosing sides\nworld has become\nless willing to\nsell arms\nEconomic growth\ngovernance, and\npeaceful political participation\nmade\nconflict less likely\nMany regions\nclimbed out of the conflict trap\nimprovements are reinforcing\nnations\ntogether through\nA\nU\ncooperation is a marked change", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No Arctic war.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Most of America’s historic foreign policy blunders were driven by threat inflation. From fake attacks on ships in Havana Harbor or the Gulf of Tonkin, to falling dominos in Southeast Asia and WMD in Iraq — the response to these “dire threats” is often a costly quagmire. In the Cold War it was phony bomber and missile “gaps” that sparked a precarious and ultimately pointless nuclear confrontation. Today a new “icebreaker gap” could fuel an Arctic arms race.\nFor over a decade, defense hawks have been sounding the alarm about Russia’s supposed “militarization” and “dominance” of the Arctic. More recently, China has joined the list of “aggressors” allegedly threatening vital Western economic and strategic interests in the High North. The Obama administration resisted calls for a major Arctic buildup coming from a mix of armchair analysts, defense contractors, and special political interests. Notably, the U.S. Navy has never joined this chorus. Nobody denies the need for some new heavy icebreakers to buttress an aging fleet, but these are for Coast Guard missions — not the remote warfighting scenarios hyped by Arctic hawks. Theirs is classic threat inflation, built on equal parts exaggeration and ignorance, that makes it irresistible to a Trump administration happy to overturn yet another Obama legacy. And so, with a recent series of provocative words and deeds, America’s Arctic policy has taken an abruptly belligerent turn.\nThis is another historic mistake, not only because it could lead to costly and dangerous confrontation in an extremely fragile region, but because its entire premise is false. Once a superpower rival in the High North, Russia’s Arctic presence imploded after the Cold War leaving America and its NATO allies militarily dominant. Retreating from rivalry, Russia joined other regional states in a new Arctic Council that has proved a model of shared global governance, fostering cooperation in areas from environmental protection and search and rescue to commercial shipping and fisheries. Importantly, Arctic Council members agreed over a decade ago to settle any territorial disputes through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea framework — and have scrupulously kept to that agreement. It is simply false that Russia threatens to seize the North Pole seabed or other Arctic territory, or that China, a nonvoting observer at the Arctic Council, threatens to undermine the independence of regional states through its so-called “Polar Silk Road.”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "blunders were driven by threat inflation\nthe response to\n“dire threats” is often a costly quagmire\nToday a new “icebreaker gap” could fuel an Arctic arms race.\nFor over a decade, defense hawks have been sounding the alarm about Russia’s supposed “militarization” and “dominance” of the Arctic. More recently, China\njoined the list of “aggressors”\nNotably, the\nNavy has never joined this chorus\nicebreakers\nare for Coast Guard missions — not\nremote warfighting scenarios hyped by Arctic hawks. Theirs is classic threat inflation, built on equal parts exaggeration and ignorance\nThis is another historic mistake\nits entire premise is false. Once a superpower rival in the High North, Russia’s Arctic presence imploded after the Cold War leaving America and its NATO allies militarily dominant. Retreating from rivalry, Russia joined other regional states in a new Arctic Council that has proved a model of shared global governance, fostering cooperation in areas from environmental protection and search and rescue to commercial shipping and fisheries. Importantly, Arctic Council members agreed over a decade ago to settle any territorial disputes through the U\nN\nLaw of the Sea framework — and have scrupulously kept to that agreement. It is simply false that Russia threatens to seize the North Pole\nor that China\nthreatens\nregional states through its\n“Polar Silk Road.”", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No Arctic war.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "blunders were driven by threat inflation\nthe response to\n“dire threats” is often a costly quagmire\nToday a new “icebreaker gap” could fuel an Arctic arms race.\nFor over a decade, defense hawks have been sounding the alarm about Russia’s supposed “militarization” and “dominance” of the Arctic. More recently, China\njoined the list of “aggressors”\nNotably, the\nNavy has never joined this chorus\nicebreakers\nare for Coast Guard missions — not\nremote warfighting scenarios hyped by Arctic hawks. Theirs is classic threat inflation, built on equal parts exaggeration and ignorance\nThis is another historic mistake\nits entire premise is false. Once a superpower rival in the High North, Russia’s Arctic presence imploded after the Cold War leaving America and its NATO allies militarily dominant. Retreating from rivalry, Russia joined other regional states in a new Arctic Council that has proved a model of shared global governance, fostering cooperation in areas from environmental protection and search and rescue to commercial shipping and fisheries. Importantly, Arctic Council members agreed over a decade ago to settle any territorial disputes through the U\nN\nLaw of the Sea framework — and have scrupulously kept to that agreement. It is simply false that Russia threatens to seize the North Pole\nor that China\nthreatens\nregional states through its\n“Polar Silk Road.”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "threat inflation\n“dire threats”\nArctic arms race\nsound\nChina\nnever\nhyped\nArctic hawks\nclassic threat inflation\nexaggeration\nignorance\nhistoric mistake\nentire premise\nfalse\nRussia’s Arctic presence imploded after the Cold War\nmilitarily dominant\nArctic Council\nmodel\nshared global governance\ncoop\nU\nN\nscrupulously kept\nsimply false", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No Arctic war.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "blunders were driven by threat inflation\nthe response to\n“dire threats” is often a costly quagmire\nToday a new “icebreaker gap” could fuel an Arctic arms race.\nFor over a decade, defense hawks have been sounding the alarm about Russia’s supposed “militarization” and “dominance” of the Arctic. More recently, China\njoined the list of “aggressors”\nNotably, the\nNavy has never joined this chorus\nicebreakers\nare for Coast Guard missions — not\nremote warfighting scenarios hyped by Arctic hawks. Theirs is classic threat inflation, built on equal parts exaggeration and ignorance\nThis is another historic mistake\nits entire premise is false. Once a superpower rival in the High North, Russia’s Arctic presence imploded after the Cold War leaving America and its NATO allies militarily dominant. Retreating from rivalry, Russia joined other regional states in a new Arctic Council that has proved a model of shared global governance, fostering cooperation in areas from environmental protection and search and rescue to commercial shipping and fisheries. Importantly, Arctic Council members agreed over a decade ago to settle any territorial disputes through the U\nN\nLaw of the Sea framework — and have scrupulously kept to that agreement. It is simply false that Russia threatens to seize the North Pole\nor that China\nthreatens\nregional states through its\n“Polar Silk Road.”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Today\nan Arctic arms race\nhawks\nsound\nthe alarm about\nChina\nthe\nNavy\nnever joined\nscenarios hyped by Arctic hawks\nis classic threat inflation, built on\nexaggeration\nits entire premise is false\nRussia’s Arctic presence imploded\nleaving America\ndominant\nRussia joined\na\nArctic Council\na model of shared\ngovernance, fostering coop\nmembers agreed\nto settle\ndisputes through the U\nN\nand\nscrupulously kept to that\nIt is simply false that\nChina\nthreatens\nthrough its\n“Polar Silk Road.”", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No blackouts impact and no attacks that can take down the grid.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "A catastrophic cyberattack was first predicted in the mid-1990s. Since then, predictions of a catastrophe have appeared regularly and have entered the popular consciousness. As a trope, a cyber catastrophe captures our imagination, but as analysis, it remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking. There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack.\nTo qualify as a catastrophe, an event must produce damaging mass effect, including casualties and destruction. The fires that swept across California last summer were a catastrophe. Covid-19 has been a catastrophe, especially in countries with inadequate responses. With man-made actions, however, a catastrophe is harder to produce than it may seem, and for cyberattacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills most actors still do not possess. It requires planning, reconnaissance to find vulnerabilities, and then acquiring or building attack tools—things that require resources and experience. To achieve mass effect, either a few central targets (like an electrical grid) need to be hit or multiple targets would have to be hit simultaneously (as is the case with urban water systems), something that is itself an operational challenge.\nIt is easier to imagine a catastrophe than to produce it. The 2003 East Coast blackout is the archetype for an attack on the U.S. electrical grid. No one died in this blackout, and services were restored in a few days. As electric production is digitized, vulnerability increases, but many electrical companies have made cybersecurity a priority. Similarly, at water treatment plants, the chemicals used to purify water are controlled in ways that make mass releases difficult. In any case, it would take a massive amount of chemicals to poison large rivers or lakes, more than most companies keep on hand, and any release would quickly be diluted.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "predictions of a catastrophe have appeared regularly\nAs a trope, a cyber catastrophe captures our imagination, but\nit remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking. There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack\nTo qualify as a catastrophe, an event must produce damaging mass effect,\na catastrophe is harder to produce than it may seem, and for cyberattacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills most actors still do not possess. It requires planning, reconnaissance to find vulnerabilities, and then acquiring or building attack tools\nTo achieve mass effect, either a few central targets\nneed to be hit or multiple targets\nhit simultaneously\nsomething that is itself an operational challenge\nIt is easier to imagine a catastrophe than to produce it. The 2003 East Coast blackout is the archetype for an attack\nNo one died in this blackout, and services were restored in a few days\nmany electrical companies have made cybersecurity a priority\nat water treatment plants, the chemicals used to purify water are controlled in ways that make mass releases difficult\nit would take a massive amount of chemicals to poison large rivers or lakes, more than most companies keep on hand, and any release would quickly be diluted", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No blackouts impact and no attacks that can take down the grid.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "predictions of a catastrophe have appeared regularly\nAs a trope, a cyber catastrophe captures our imagination, but\nit remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking. There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack\nTo qualify as a catastrophe, an event must produce damaging mass effect,\na catastrophe is harder to produce than it may seem, and for cyberattacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills most actors still do not possess. It requires planning, reconnaissance to find vulnerabilities, and then acquiring or building attack tools\nTo achieve mass effect, either a few central targets\nneed to be hit or multiple targets\nhit simultaneously\nsomething that is itself an operational challenge\nIt is easier to imagine a catastrophe than to produce it. The 2003 East Coast blackout is the archetype for an attack\nNo one died in this blackout, and services were restored in a few days\nmany electrical companies have made cybersecurity a priority\nat water treatment plants, the chemicals used to purify water are controlled in ways that make mass releases difficult\nit would take a massive amount of chemicals to poison large rivers or lakes, more than most companies keep on hand, and any release would quickly be diluted", "role": "user" }, { "content": "trope\nimagination\nentirely imaginary\ndubious value\nThere has never been a catastrophic cyberattack\nharder to produce\norganizational\ntechnical\nplanning\nreconnaissance\nvulnerabilities\nacquiring\nattack tools\nmass effect\noperational challenge\nimagine\nservices were restored\nelectrical companies\ncybersecurity\nwater treatment\npurify water\nmassive amount\npoison\nrivers\nlakes\nquickly\ndiluted", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No blackouts impact and no attacks that can take down the grid.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "predictions of a catastrophe have appeared regularly\nAs a trope, a cyber catastrophe captures our imagination, but\nit remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking. There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack\nTo qualify as a catastrophe, an event must produce damaging mass effect,\na catastrophe is harder to produce than it may seem, and for cyberattacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills most actors still do not possess. It requires planning, reconnaissance to find vulnerabilities, and then acquiring or building attack tools\nTo achieve mass effect, either a few central targets\nneed to be hit or multiple targets\nhit simultaneously\nsomething that is itself an operational challenge\nIt is easier to imagine a catastrophe than to produce it. The 2003 East Coast blackout is the archetype for an attack\nNo one died in this blackout, and services were restored in a few days\nmany electrical companies have made cybersecurity a priority\nat water treatment plants, the chemicals used to purify water are controlled in ways that make mass releases difficult\nit would take a massive amount of chemicals to poison large rivers or lakes, more than most companies keep on hand, and any release would quickly be diluted", "role": "user" }, { "content": "There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack\ncatastrophe is hard\nto produce\ncyberattacks\nrequires\nskills most\ndo not possess. It requires planning\nand\nacquiring\ntools\ncentral targets\nneed to be hit or multiple\nhit simultaneously\nan operational challenge\nThe 2003\nblackout is the archetype\nNo one died\nservices were restored\nelectrical companies have made cyber\na priority\nat water\nplants\nchemicals\nare controlled\nit would take\nmassive amount\nto poison\nrivers or lakes\nand\nwould quickly be diluted", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No disease impact.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Are we safe now from events like this? Or are we more vulnerable? Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?10 \nThe Black Death was not the only biological disaster to scar human history. It was not even the only great bubonic plague. In 541 CE the Plague of Justinian struck the Byzantine Empire. Over three years it took the lives of roughly 3 percent of the world’s people.11 \nWhen Europeans reached the Americas in 1492, the two populations exposed each other to completely novel diseases. Over thousands of years each population had built up resistance to their own set of diseases, but were extremely susceptible to the others. The American peoples got by far the worse end of exchange, through diseases such as measles, influenza and especially smallpox. \nDuring the next hundred years a combination of invasion and disease took an immense toll—one whose scale may never be known, due to great uncertainty about the size of the pre-existing population. We can’t rule out the loss of more than 90 percent of the population of the Americas during that century, though the number could also be much lower.12 And it is very difficult to tease out how much of this should be attributed to war and occupation, rather than disease. As a rough upper bound, the Columbian exchange may have killed as many as 10 percent of the world’s people.13 \nCenturies later, the world had become so interconnected that a truly global pandemic was possible. Near the end of the First World War, a devastating strain of influenza (known as the 1918 flu or Spanish Flu) spread to six continents, and even remote Pacific islands. At least a third of the world’s population were infected and 3 to 6 percent were killed.14 This death toll outstripped that of the First World War, and possibly both World Wars combined. \nYet even events like these fall short of being a threat to humanity’s longterm potential.15 \n[FOONOTE]\nIn addition to this historical evidence, there are some deeper biological observations and theories suggesting that pathogens are unlikely to lead to the extinction of their hosts. These include the empirical anti-correlation between infectiousness and lethality, the extreme rarity of diseases that kill more than 75% of those infected, the observed tendency of pandemics to become less virulent as they progress and the theory of optimal virulence. However, there is no watertight case against pathogens leading to the extinction of their hosts.\n[END FOOTNOTE]\nIn the great bubonic plagues we saw civilization in the affected areas falter, but recover. The regional 25 to 50 percent death rate was not enough to precipitate a continent-wide collapse of civilization. It changed the relative fortunes of empires, and may have altered the course of history substantially, but if anything, it gives us reason to believe that human civilization is likely to make it through future events with similar death rates, even if they were global in scale. \nThe 1918 flu pandemic was remarkable in having very little apparent effect on the world’s development despite its global reach. It looks like it was lost in the wake of the First World War, which despite a smaller death toll, seems to have had a much larger effect on the course of history.16 \nIt is less clear what lesson to draw from the Columbian exchange due to our lack of good records and its mix of causes. Pandemics were clearly a part of what led to a regional collapse of civilization, but we don’t know whether this would have occurred had it not been for the accompanying violence and imperial rule. The strongest case against existential risk from natural pandemics is the fossil record argument from Chapter 3. Extinction risk from natural causes above 0.1 percent per century is incompatible with the evidence of how long humanity and similar species have lasted. But this argument only works where the risk to humanity now is similar or lower than the longterm levels. For most risks this is clearly true, but not for pandemics. We have done many things to exacerbate the risk: some that could make pandemics more likely to occur, and some that could increase their damage. Thus even “natural” pandemics should be seen as a partly anthropogenic risk.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?\nthe world had become so interconnected that a truly global pandemic was possible\nYet even events like these fall short of being a threat to humanity’s longterm potential\nIn addition to\nhistorical evidence, there are some deeper biological observations and theories suggesting that pathogens are unlikely to lead to the extinction of their hosts. These include the empirical anti-correlation between infectiousness and lethality, the extreme rarity of diseases that kill more than 75% of those infected, the observed tendency of pandemics to become less virulent as they progress and the theory of optimal virulence\nIn the great bubonic plagues we saw civilization in the affected areas falter, but recover. The regional\n50 percent death rate was not enough to precipitate a continent-wide collapse of civilization\nif anything, it gives us reason to believe that human civilization is likely to make it through future events with similar death rates, even if\nglobal\nThe strongest case against existential risk from natural pandemics is the fossil record\nExtinction risk from natural causes above 0.1 percent per century is incompatible with the evidence of how long humanity and similar species have lasted", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No disease impact.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?\nthe world had become so interconnected that a truly global pandemic was possible\nYet even events like these fall short of being a threat to humanity’s longterm potential\nIn addition to\nhistorical evidence, there are some deeper biological observations and theories suggesting that pathogens are unlikely to lead to the extinction of their hosts. These include the empirical anti-correlation between infectiousness and lethality, the extreme rarity of diseases that kill more than 75% of those infected, the observed tendency of pandemics to become less virulent as they progress and the theory of optimal virulence\nIn the great bubonic plagues we saw civilization in the affected areas falter, but recover. The regional\n50 percent death rate was not enough to precipitate a continent-wide collapse of civilization\nif anything, it gives us reason to believe that human civilization is likely to make it through future events with similar death rates, even if\nglobal\nThe strongest case against existential risk from natural pandemics is the fossil record\nExtinction risk from natural causes above 0.1 percent per century is incompatible with the evidence of how long humanity and similar species have lasted", "role": "user" }, { "content": "humanity\nfall short\nhumanity\nhistorical\ndeep\nbiological\nsuggest\npathogens are unlikely to lead to the extinction\nempirical anti-correlation\ninfectiousness\nlethality\nextreme rarity\ntendency\nbecome less virulent\noptimal virulence\nrecover\n50 percent\nnot enough\nprecipitate a continent-wide collapse\nlikely to make it through\neven if\nglobal\nfossil record\n0.1 percent per century\nincompatible\nevidence\nhow long", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No disease impact.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?\nthe world had become so interconnected that a truly global pandemic was possible\nYet even events like these fall short of being a threat to humanity’s longterm potential\nIn addition to\nhistorical evidence, there are some deeper biological observations and theories suggesting that pathogens are unlikely to lead to the extinction of their hosts. These include the empirical anti-correlation between infectiousness and lethality, the extreme rarity of diseases that kill more than 75% of those infected, the observed tendency of pandemics to become less virulent as they progress and the theory of optimal virulence\nIn the great bubonic plagues we saw civilization in the affected areas falter, but recover. The regional\n50 percent death rate was not enough to precipitate a continent-wide collapse of civilization\nif anything, it gives us reason to believe that human civilization is likely to make it through future events with similar death rates, even if\nglobal\nThe strongest case against existential risk from natural pandemics is the fossil record\nExtinction risk from natural causes above 0.1 percent per century is incompatible with the evidence of how long humanity and similar species have lasted", "role": "user" }, { "content": "global pandemic\nfall short of\na threat to humanity\ndeep\nbiological\ntheories suggest\npathogens are unlikely to lead to\nextinction\nThese include\nanti-correlation between infectiousness and lethality\nextreme rarity\nthat kill more than 75%\ntendency\nto become less virulent\nand\noptimal virulence\ncivilization\nrecover\n50 percent death rate was not enough to precipitate\ncollapse\nit gives\nreason to believe\ncivilization is likely to make it through future events\neven if\nglobal\nstrongest\nagainst existential risk\nis\nfossil record\nrisk\nabove 0.1 percent\nis incompatible with\nhow long humanity\nlasted", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The risk is comparatively tiny.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Let me make one other comment. You could say, well, even if the odds are small, the damage would be so catastrophic that it is worth our concern. But there are downsides to worrying about existential risk. One of them is the possible stigmatization and abandonment of helpful technologies. Stuart mentioned the example of nuclear power. What’s catastrophic is that we don’t roll out nuclear power the way that France did, which would go a long way toward solving the genuinely dangerous problem of climate change. Fear of nuclear power has been irrationally stoked by vivid examples: the fairly trivial accident at Three Mile Island in the United States, which killed no one, the tsunami at Fukushima, where people died in the botched evacuation, not the nuclear accident, and the Soviet bungling at Chernobyl. Even that accident killed a fraction of the people that die every day from the burning of fossil fuels, to say nothing of the likely future harm from climate change. The reaction to Chernobyl is exactly how we should not deal with the dangers facing humanity. \nGenetically modified organisms are another example: a technology overregulated or outlawed out of worst-case fears, depriving us of the spectacular benefits of greater ecological sustainability, human nutrition, and less use of water and pesticides. \nThere are other downsides of fretting about exotic hypothetical existential risks. There is a line of reasoning in the existential risk community and the so called Rationality community that goes something like this: since the harm of extinguishing the species is basically infinite, probabilities no longer matter, because by expected utility calculations, if you multiply the tiny risk by the very large number of the potential descendants of humans before the sun expands and kills us off (or in wilder scenarios,  the astronomically larger number of immortal consciousnesses that will exist when we can upload our connectomes to the cloud, or when we colonize and multiply in other solar systems)—well, then even an eensy, eensy, infinitesimal probability of extinction would be catastrophic, and we should worry about it now.\nThe problem is that that argument could apply to any scenario with a nonzero probability, which means any scenario that is not logically impossible. Should we take steps to prevent the evolution of toxic killer gerbils that will nibble everyone to death? If I say, “That’s preposterous,” you can say, “Well, even if the probability is very, very small, since the harm of extinction is so great, we must devote some brain power to that scenario.”\nI do fear the moral hazard of human intellect being absorbed in this free-for-all: that any risk, if you imagine it’s potentially existential, could justify any amount of expenditure, according to this expected utility calculation. The hazard is that smart people, clever enough to grasp a danger that common sense would never conceive of, will be absorbed into what might be a fruitless pursuit, compared to areas where we urgently do need application of human brain power–in climate, in the prevention of nuclear war, in the prevention of pandemics. Those are real risks, which no one denies, and we haven’t solved any of them, together with other massive sources of human misery like Alzheimer’s disease. Given these needs, I wonder whether the infinitesimal-probability-times-infinite-harm is the right way of allocating our intellectual capital.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "You could say\neven if the odds are small, the damage would be so catastrophic\nit is worth our concern\nthere are downsides to worrying about existential risk\nOne of them is the\nstigmatization and abandonment of helpful technologies\nStuart mentioned\nnuclear power\nwe don’t roll out nuclear power the way\nFrance did\nwhich would\nsolving the\nclimate change\nFear of nuclear power has been\nstoked by\nthe\naccident at Three Mile Island in the United States\nthe tsunami at Fukushima\nand\nChernobyl\nthat accident killed a fraction of the people that die\nevery day\nfrom\nburning\nfossil fuels\nThe reaction to Chernobyl is\nhow we should not deal with the dangers facing humanity\nGenetically modified organisms are another\na technology overregulated or outlawed\ndepriving us of\ngreater ecological sustainability\nnutrition, and less\nwater and pesticides\nThere are other downsides of fretting about exotic hypothetical existential risks\nthe so called Rationality community that\nsince the harm of extinguishing the species is\ninfinite\nprobabilities no longer matter\nbecause by\nutility calculations\nif you multiply the tiny risk by the very large number of\ndescendants of humans before the sun\nkills us off\nor in wilder scenarios\nwe\nupload our connectomes to the cloud, or when we colonize\nother solar systems\nthen even an eensy, eensy, infinitesimal probability of extinction would be catastrophic, and we should worry about it\nThe problem is\nthat argument could apply to any scenario with a nonzero probability\nany scenario that is not logically impossible\nShould we take steps to prevent the evolution of toxic killer gerbils\nIf I say, “That’s preposterous,” you can say, “Well, even if the probability is\nvery small, since the harm of extinction is so great, we must devote some brain power\nI\nfear the moral hazard of human intellect being absorbed in this free-for-all\nany risk, if you imagine it’s potentially existential\ncould justify any amount of expenditure\nsmart people, clever enough to grasp a danger\nwill be absorbed into\na fruitless pursuit\ncompared to areas where we urgently do need application of human brain power\nin climate\nprevention of nuclear war\nprevention of pandemics\nThose are real risks\nand we haven’t solved any of them\nI wonder whether the infinitesimal-probability-times-infinite-harm is the right way of allocating our intellectual capital", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The risk is comparatively tiny.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "You could say\neven if the odds are small, the damage would be so catastrophic\nit is worth our concern\nthere are downsides to worrying about existential risk\nOne of them is the\nstigmatization and abandonment of helpful technologies\nStuart mentioned\nnuclear power\nwe don’t roll out nuclear power the way\nFrance did\nwhich would\nsolving the\nclimate change\nFear of nuclear power has been\nstoked by\nthe\naccident at Three Mile Island in the United States\nthe tsunami at Fukushima\nand\nChernobyl\nthat accident killed a fraction of the people that die\nevery day\nfrom\nburning\nfossil fuels\nThe reaction to Chernobyl is\nhow we should not deal with the dangers facing humanity\nGenetically modified organisms are another\na technology overregulated or outlawed\ndepriving us of\ngreater ecological sustainability\nnutrition, and less\nwater and pesticides\nThere are other downsides of fretting about exotic hypothetical existential risks\nthe so called Rationality community that\nsince the harm of extinguishing the species is\ninfinite\nprobabilities no longer matter\nbecause by\nutility calculations\nif you multiply the tiny risk by the very large number of\ndescendants of humans before the sun\nkills us off\nor in wilder scenarios\nwe\nupload our connectomes to the cloud, or when we colonize\nother solar systems\nthen even an eensy, eensy, infinitesimal probability of extinction would be catastrophic, and we should worry about it\nThe problem is\nthat argument could apply to any scenario with a nonzero probability\nany scenario that is not logically impossible\nShould we take steps to prevent the evolution of toxic killer gerbils\nIf I say, “That’s preposterous,” you can say, “Well, even if the probability is\nvery small, since the harm of extinction is so great, we must devote some brain power\nI\nfear the moral hazard of human intellect being absorbed in this free-for-all\nany risk, if you imagine it’s potentially existential\ncould justify any amount of expenditure\nsmart people, clever enough to grasp a danger\nwill be absorbed into\na fruitless pursuit\ncompared to areas where we urgently do need application of human brain power\nin climate\nprevention of nuclear war\nprevention of pandemics\nThose are real risks\nand we haven’t solved any of them\nI wonder whether the infinitesimal-probability-times-infinite-harm is the right way of allocating our intellectual capital", "role": "user" }, { "content": "You could say\neven if the odds are small, the damage would be so catastrophic\nthere are downsides\nstigmatization\nof helpful tech\nnuclear power\nsolv\nclimate\nFear\nstoked by\nThree Mile Island\nFukushima\nChernobyl\naccident killed a fraction of\npeople that die\nfrom\nfossil fuels\nG\nm\no\ns\nanother\ntech\noverregulated\noutlawed\necological sustainability\nless\nwater\npesticides\ndownsides\nfretting about\nexistential risks\nharm\nis\ninfinite\nmultiply the tiny risk by the\nlarge number of\ndescendants\nthen\nan eensy, eensy,\nprobability of extinction would be catastrophic\nthat argument could apply to any scenario with a nonzero probability\nevolution of toxic killer gerbils\nhuman intellect being absorbed\nsmart people\nwill be absorbed\nclimate\nprevention of nuclear war\npandemics\nwe haven’t solved any", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The risk is comparatively tiny.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "You could say\neven if the odds are small, the damage would be so catastrophic\nit is worth our concern\nthere are downsides to worrying about existential risk\nOne of them is the\nstigmatization and abandonment of helpful technologies\nStuart mentioned\nnuclear power\nwe don’t roll out nuclear power the way\nFrance did\nwhich would\nsolving the\nclimate change\nFear of nuclear power has been\nstoked by\nthe\naccident at Three Mile Island in the United States\nthe tsunami at Fukushima\nand\nChernobyl\nthat accident killed a fraction of the people that die\nevery day\nfrom\nburning\nfossil fuels\nThe reaction to Chernobyl is\nhow we should not deal with the dangers facing humanity\nGenetically modified organisms are another\na technology overregulated or outlawed\ndepriving us of\ngreater ecological sustainability\nnutrition, and less\nwater and pesticides\nThere are other downsides of fretting about exotic hypothetical existential risks\nthe so called Rationality community that\nsince the harm of extinguishing the species is\ninfinite\nprobabilities no longer matter\nbecause by\nutility calculations\nif you multiply the tiny risk by the very large number of\ndescendants of humans before the sun\nkills us off\nor in wilder scenarios\nwe\nupload our connectomes to the cloud, or when we colonize\nother solar systems\nthen even an eensy, eensy, infinitesimal probability of extinction would be catastrophic, and we should worry about it\nThe problem is\nthat argument could apply to any scenario with a nonzero probability\nany scenario that is not logically impossible\nShould we take steps to prevent the evolution of toxic killer gerbils\nIf I say, “That’s preposterous,” you can say, “Well, even if the probability is\nvery small, since the harm of extinction is so great, we must devote some brain power\nI\nfear the moral hazard of human intellect being absorbed in this free-for-all\nany risk, if you imagine it’s potentially existential\ncould justify any amount of expenditure\nsmart people, clever enough to grasp a danger\nwill be absorbed into\na fruitless pursuit\ncompared to areas where we urgently do need application of human brain power\nin climate\nprevention of nuclear war\nprevention of pandemics\nThose are real risks\nand we haven’t solved any of them\nI wonder whether the infinitesimal-probability-times-infinite-harm is the right way of allocating our intellectual capital", "role": "user" }, { "content": "You could say\neven if the odds are small\nthe damage would be\ncatastrophic\nit is worth\nconcern\nthere are downsides to worrying\nstigmatization\nof helpful tech\nnuclear power\nsolv\nthe\nclimate\nG\nm\no\ns are another\ntech\noverregulated or outlawed\ndepriving\necological sustainability\nand less\nwater and pesticides\nif you multiply the tiny risk by the\nlarge number of\ndescendants\nthen even an\ninfinitesimal probability\nwould be catastrophic\nand we should worry\nShould we take steps to prevent\ntoxic killer gerbils\nIf I say\nThat’s preposterous\nyou\nsay\nWell, even if the probability is\nsmall\nwe must devote\nbrain power\nI\nfear the\nhazard of human intellect being absorbed in this\nsmart people\nabsorbed into\na fruitless pursuit\nwe\nneed\nbrain power\nin climate\nprevention of nuclear war\npandemics", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Trade doesn’t stop wars – causes populism and their studies lack causation.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Yet, decades of neoliberal integration have not brought Fukuyama’s prophecy closer to its realization. Across the world, liberal market integration has facilitated convivial relations among key countries and paid important dividends to elites, yet it has also resulted in the concentration of wealth in ever fewer hands, rising inequalities within countries (although not between them) and higher concentration of wealth at the top, and increased risks and vulnerability as the logic of market competitiveness takes hold of many aspects of our lives (Anand & Segal, 2015; Lynch, 2006). The relation between the United States and China or the processes of economic integration in the European Union are clear examples of these trends. In these places as well as others, inequalities, precarization and economic insecurity have given way to a populist and nationalist momentum that can be interpreted both as a popular response to the extreme and diverse forms of violence engendered by processes of market integration, or as a manoeuvre to channel discontent towards the ‘other’ in order to protect elite interests (Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017). By prescribing ever more market globalization to counter populist politics and avoid conflict, liberal elites add fuel to the fire as they sever the very conditions that led to the disfranchisement of significant segments of the population in the first place. Thereby, it is crucial to understand how the argument for capitalist peace fails to factor in the crisis-prone and socially destructive tendencies of capitalism, particularly in a context of unfenced global competitiveness along market lines.2\nTwo of the underlying problems in the liberal peace argument stand out. The first has to do with the statistical selection of fixed points in time that suggest correlations between growth in trade and diminished conflict – while failing to discern mechanisms of causation (Hayes, 2012). A wider temporal lens is needed to situate the contemporary rise of mercantilist and illiberal politics in the context of neoliberal globalization, representing the same sort of ‘counter movement’ that Polanyi had warned of in his reading of the 19th-century downward spiral towards war – aided in our contemporary case by the demise of the traditional left (Blyth & Matthijs, 2017; Carroll & Gonzalez-Vicente, 2017). The second problem relates to liberal international political economy and IRT’s scalar fixation on inter-state matters and hence their inability to factor in violence in the absence of war. I turn now to these two points.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "decades of neoliberal integration have not brought Fukuyama’s prophecy closer to its realization\nliberal market integration\nhas\nresulted in\nconcentration of wealth in\nfewer hands, rising inequalities within countries\nand higher concentration of wealth at the top, and increased risks and vulnerability as\nmarket competitiveness takes hold of many aspects of our lives\nrelation between the U\nS\nand China or\nprocesses of economic integration in the E\nU\nare clear examples\nIn these places\ninequalities, precarization and economic insecurity have given way to\npopulist\nmomentum that can be interpreted\nas a popular response to the extreme and diverse forms of violence engendered by processes of market integration, or as a manoeuvre to channel discontent towards the ‘other’ in order to protect elite interests\nBy prescribing\nmarket globalization to counter populist politics and avoid conflict, liberal elites add fuel to the fire as they sever the very conditions that led to the disfranchisement of significant segments of the population\nthe argument for capitalist peace fails to factor in the crisis-prone and socially destructive tendencies of capitalism, particularly in a context of unfenced global competitiveness along market lines\nTwo\nunderlying problems in the liberal peace argument stand out. The first\nwith the statistical selection of fixed points in time that suggest correlations between growth in trade and diminished conflict\nwhile failing to discern mechanisms of causation\nA wider temporal lens is needed to situate the contemporary rise of mercantilist and illiberal politics in the context of neoliberal globalization, representing the same sort of ‘counter movement’ that Polanyi had warned of in his reading of the 19th-century downward spiral towards war – aided in our contemporary case by the demise of the traditional left\nThe second problem relates to liberal international political economy and IRT’s scalar fixation on inter-state matters and hence their inability to factor in violence in the absence of war", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Trade doesn’t stop wars – causes populism and their studies lack causation.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "decades of neoliberal integration have not brought Fukuyama’s prophecy closer to its realization\nliberal market integration\nhas\nresulted in\nconcentration of wealth in\nfewer hands, rising inequalities within countries\nand higher concentration of wealth at the top, and increased risks and vulnerability as\nmarket competitiveness takes hold of many aspects of our lives\nrelation between the U\nS\nand China or\nprocesses of economic integration in the E\nU\nare clear examples\nIn these places\ninequalities, precarization and economic insecurity have given way to\npopulist\nmomentum that can be interpreted\nas a popular response to the extreme and diverse forms of violence engendered by processes of market integration, or as a manoeuvre to channel discontent towards the ‘other’ in order to protect elite interests\nBy prescribing\nmarket globalization to counter populist politics and avoid conflict, liberal elites add fuel to the fire as they sever the very conditions that led to the disfranchisement of significant segments of the population\nthe argument for capitalist peace fails to factor in the crisis-prone and socially destructive tendencies of capitalism, particularly in a context of unfenced global competitiveness along market lines\nTwo\nunderlying problems in the liberal peace argument stand out. The first\nwith the statistical selection of fixed points in time that suggest correlations between growth in trade and diminished conflict\nwhile failing to discern mechanisms of causation\nA wider temporal lens is needed to situate the contemporary rise of mercantilist and illiberal politics in the context of neoliberal globalization, representing the same sort of ‘counter movement’ that Polanyi had warned of in his reading of the 19th-century downward spiral towards war – aided in our contemporary case by the demise of the traditional left\nThe second problem relates to liberal international political economy and IRT’s scalar fixation on inter-state matters and hence their inability to factor in violence in the absence of war", "role": "user" }, { "content": "neoliberal integration\nnot\nFukuyama’s prophecy\nwealth\nfewer hands\nrising inequalities\nrisks\nvulnerability\ncompetitiveness\nU\nS\nChina\nE\nU\nclear examples\ninequalities\nprecarization\neconomic insecurity\npopulist\ndiscontent\nother’\nelite interests\nglobalization\npopulist politics\navoid conflict\nliberal elites\nfuel to the fire\ncapitalist peace\ncrisis-prone\nsocially destructive\ncapitalism\nunderlying problems\nstatistical selection\nfixed points\ngrowth in trade\ndiminished conflict\nfailing\ncausation\nwider temporal lens\nmercantilist\nilliberal politics\ncounter movement’\ndemise\npolitical economy\ninter-state matters\nviolence\nabsence of war", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Trade doesn’t stop wars – causes populism and their studies lack causation.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "decades of neoliberal integration have not brought Fukuyama’s prophecy closer to its realization\nliberal market integration\nhas\nresulted in\nconcentration of wealth in\nfewer hands, rising inequalities within countries\nand higher concentration of wealth at the top, and increased risks and vulnerability as\nmarket competitiveness takes hold of many aspects of our lives\nrelation between the U\nS\nand China or\nprocesses of economic integration in the E\nU\nare clear examples\nIn these places\ninequalities, precarization and economic insecurity have given way to\npopulist\nmomentum that can be interpreted\nas a popular response to the extreme and diverse forms of violence engendered by processes of market integration, or as a manoeuvre to channel discontent towards the ‘other’ in order to protect elite interests\nBy prescribing\nmarket globalization to counter populist politics and avoid conflict, liberal elites add fuel to the fire as they sever the very conditions that led to the disfranchisement of significant segments of the population\nthe argument for capitalist peace fails to factor in the crisis-prone and socially destructive tendencies of capitalism, particularly in a context of unfenced global competitiveness along market lines\nTwo\nunderlying problems in the liberal peace argument stand out. The first\nwith the statistical selection of fixed points in time that suggest correlations between growth in trade and diminished conflict\nwhile failing to discern mechanisms of causation\nA wider temporal lens is needed to situate the contemporary rise of mercantilist and illiberal politics in the context of neoliberal globalization, representing the same sort of ‘counter movement’ that Polanyi had warned of in his reading of the 19th-century downward spiral towards war – aided in our contemporary case by the demise of the traditional left\nThe second problem relates to liberal international political economy and IRT’s scalar fixation on inter-state matters and hence their inability to factor in violence in the absence of war", "role": "user" }, { "content": "integration\nnot brought Fukuyama’s prophecy\nresulted in\ninequalities\nincreased risks\nas\ncompetitiveness takes hold\nrelation between\nU\nS\nand China\nE\nU\nare\nexamples\ninsecurity\ngiven way to\npopulist\nprescribing\nglobalization\nelites add fuel to\nfire\ncapitalist peace fails to factor\ncrisis-prone\ntendencies\nproblems\nwith\nstatistical selection of fixed points\nsuggest correlations between\ntrade and\nconflict\nfailing to discern\ncausation\nwider\nlens\nneeded to situate\nilliberal politics\nsecond\nrelates to\npolitical economy and\nfixation on inter-state matters and hence\ninability to factor in violence", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Trade makes interventions more likely.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Here, one vital issue often left out of the liberal peace equations is the fact that most military interventions in the post-Second World War period were aimed at disciplining countries that opted out of the United States’ global liberalizing project and sought to pursue a variety of indigenous pathways to modernity, often including many that did so under the rubric of socialism, democratically achieved or otherwise. The reverse is also true, as countries that chose to ally with the United States during the Cold War were shielded from attacks, and in some cases given preferential trade access, technology transfer and allowed to engage in market protection. In this context, associating conflict with the lack of strong trade links, rather than to the meticulous unfolding of a market-based imperial agenda, would be tantamount to concluding that low opium consumption was responsible for British military expeditions in 19th-century China. While there is certainly a correlation between China’s ban on opium and British intervention, nobody could seriously suggest that opium consumption reduces interstate conflict. Similarly, in many of these cases, it is not that the absence of trade results in conflict, but on the contrary, that military intervention has often been aimed at expanding markets and protecting investment.\nThis situation is aptly explained by Richmond (2006), who discusses ‘virtual’ peace and emphasizes how war and peace can be synonymous in countries subjected to military intervention in the name of liberal peace. Old examples of this practice would include the above-mentioned Opium Wars or indeed most colonial wars to open new market frontiers. Cold War examples abound, from the CIA-supported assassination of Salvador Allende following his policies of nationalization and collectivization in Chile, to the training of Contras to oust the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua, or the perennial yoke on Cuba to seed the ground for a market-friendly regime.3 While these interventions were justified on the basis of dubious arguments regarding the national security of the attacking country, today these rationales cohabit with moral claims for ‘human security’ and humanitarian intervention in the target countries, although many authors have suggested that these moral arguments often conceal Realpolitik motivations (Chandler, 2004). The Iraq War is a case in point, having achieved a boom in trading links between Iraq and United States following the 2003 invasion, with a six-fold increase of trade between 2002 and 2008 that only started to decline following the discovery of shale oil reserves in the United States (United States Census Bureau, 2017), but having achieved very little in terms of curbing internal violence.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "one vital issue often left out of the liberal peace equations is the fact that\nmilitary interventions in the post\nWar period were aimed at disciplining countries that opted out of the United States’ global liberalizing project and sought to pursue\nindigenous pathways to modernity\nincluding many that did so under\nsocialism\nThe reverse is also true\ncountries that chose to ally with the U\nS\nwere shielded from attacks, and in some cases given preferential trade access, technology transfer and allowed to engage in market protection\nassociating conflict with the lack of strong trade links, rather than to the meticulous unfolding of a market-based imperial agenda, would be tantamount to concluding that low opium consumption was responsible for British military expeditions in 19th-century China\nnobody could seriously suggest that opium consumption reduces interstate conflict\nit is not that the absence of trade results in conflict, but\nthat military intervention has often been aimed at expanding markets and protecting investment\nThis\nis\nvirtual’ peace\nwar and peace can be synonymous in countries subjected to military intervention in the name of liberal peace\nexamples\nwould include\nOpium Wars\ncolonial wars to open new market frontiers. Cold War examples abound, from\nCIA-supported assassination of Salvador Allende\nin Chile\ntraining of Contras\nin Nicaragua, or\nCuba to seed the ground for a market-friendly regime\nthese interventions were justified on the basis of dubious arguments regarding\nnational security\nthese rationales cohabit with moral claims for ‘human security’ and humanitarian intervention in the target countries\nthese moral arguments\nconceal Realpolitik motivations\nIraq\nis a case in point, having achieved a boom in trading links between Iraq and U\nS\nfollowing\n2003 invasion\nbut having achieved very little in terms of curbing internal violence", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Trade makes interventions more likely.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "one vital issue often left out of the liberal peace equations is the fact that\nmilitary interventions in the post\nWar period were aimed at disciplining countries that opted out of the United States’ global liberalizing project and sought to pursue\nindigenous pathways to modernity\nincluding many that did so under\nsocialism\nThe reverse is also true\ncountries that chose to ally with the U\nS\nwere shielded from attacks, and in some cases given preferential trade access, technology transfer and allowed to engage in market protection\nassociating conflict with the lack of strong trade links, rather than to the meticulous unfolding of a market-based imperial agenda, would be tantamount to concluding that low opium consumption was responsible for British military expeditions in 19th-century China\nnobody could seriously suggest that opium consumption reduces interstate conflict\nit is not that the absence of trade results in conflict, but\nthat military intervention has often been aimed at expanding markets and protecting investment\nThis\nis\nvirtual’ peace\nwar and peace can be synonymous in countries subjected to military intervention in the name of liberal peace\nexamples\nwould include\nOpium Wars\ncolonial wars to open new market frontiers. Cold War examples abound, from\nCIA-supported assassination of Salvador Allende\nin Chile\ntraining of Contras\nin Nicaragua, or\nCuba to seed the ground for a market-friendly regime\nthese interventions were justified on the basis of dubious arguments regarding\nnational security\nthese rationales cohabit with moral claims for ‘human security’ and humanitarian intervention in the target countries\nthese moral arguments\nconceal Realpolitik motivations\nIraq\nis a case in point, having achieved a boom in trading links between Iraq and U\nS\nfollowing\n2003 invasion\nbut having achieved very little in terms of curbing internal violence", "role": "user" }, { "content": "vital issue\nleft out\nmilitary interventions\ndisciplining countries\nopted out\nU\nS\nglobal liberalizing project\nindigenous pathways\nsocialism\nreverse\nalso true\nally\nshielded\nattacks\nassociating conflict\nmarket-based imperial agenda\nlow opium consumption\nBritish military expeditions\nChina\nseriously suggest\ninterstate conflict\nnot\nabsence of trade\nconflict\nmilitary intervention\nexpanding markets\nprotecting investment\nvirtual’ peace\nmilitary intervention\nliberal peace\nOpium Wars\ncolonial wars\nCold War\nCIA-supported assassination\nChile\nNicaragua\nCuba\ndubious arguments\nRealpolitik motivations\nIraq\nboom\ntrading links\n2003\nvery little\ninternal violence", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Trade makes interventions more likely.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "one vital issue often left out of the liberal peace equations is the fact that\nmilitary interventions in the post\nWar period were aimed at disciplining countries that opted out of the United States’ global liberalizing project and sought to pursue\nindigenous pathways to modernity\nincluding many that did so under\nsocialism\nThe reverse is also true\ncountries that chose to ally with the U\nS\nwere shielded from attacks, and in some cases given preferential trade access, technology transfer and allowed to engage in market protection\nassociating conflict with the lack of strong trade links, rather than to the meticulous unfolding of a market-based imperial agenda, would be tantamount to concluding that low opium consumption was responsible for British military expeditions in 19th-century China\nnobody could seriously suggest that opium consumption reduces interstate conflict\nit is not that the absence of trade results in conflict, but\nthat military intervention has often been aimed at expanding markets and protecting investment\nThis\nis\nvirtual’ peace\nwar and peace can be synonymous in countries subjected to military intervention in the name of liberal peace\nexamples\nwould include\nOpium Wars\ncolonial wars to open new market frontiers. Cold War examples abound, from\nCIA-supported assassination of Salvador Allende\nin Chile\ntraining of Contras\nin Nicaragua, or\nCuba to seed the ground for a market-friendly regime\nthese interventions were justified on the basis of dubious arguments regarding\nnational security\nthese rationales cohabit with moral claims for ‘human security’ and humanitarian intervention in the target countries\nthese moral arguments\nconceal Realpolitik motivations\nIraq\nis a case in point, having achieved a boom in trading links between Iraq and U\nS\nfollowing\n2003 invasion\nbut having achieved very little in terms of curbing internal violence", "role": "user" }, { "content": "issue\nleft out of\nis\ninterventions\npost\nWar\naimed at disciplining countries that opted out of\nU\nS\nliberalizing\nreverse\nalso true\ncountries that\nally\nwere shielded\nassociating conflict with\ntrade\nrather than\nmarket-\nimperial agenda, would be tantamount to concluding\nlow opium consumption was responsible for British\nexpeditions in\nChina\nmilitary intervention has\nbeen aimed at expanding markets\nexamples\nOpium Wars\ncolonial wars\nCold War\nChile\nNicaragua\nCuba\nIraq\nachieved\ntrading links\nfollowing\n2003\nbut\nachieved\nlittle in\ncurbing\nviolence", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It causes populism.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The liberal peace fixation with short-term correlations between trade openness and the absence of grand inter-national conflict is particularly perplexing if one considers how the liberal argument for economic development dismisses the immediate social dislocations underpinned by market integration as tangential to longer term improvements for all segments of society (Garret, 1998, p. 796). Here, it would seem that liberal arguments for peace and development operate under different temporal logics. If liberalism’s positive impacts on peace are attested with a focus on yearly correlations between commerce and an absence of conflict, its alleged positive developmental impacts can often be supported only by eschewing the immediate social conflict and diminished living standards fomented by interdependence and marketization – see, for example, the arguments for structural adjustment throughout the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s or more recent austerity policies in Europe, which, incidentally, many authors have demonstrated to be also counterproductive for long-term development (Blyth, 2013; Chang, 2007).\nThis last example brings one back to the contemporary juncture. Across the world, we are observing an emergence of illiberal politics in countries that have represented the backbone of neoliberal globalization, and indeed at its very Anglo-American core. In many places, reactionary politicians have been first to galvanize social discontent successfully by publicly condemning the negative social impacts of economic globalization, such as increased inequalities and growing insecurity. In the United States, the UK or France, for example, it has been the populist right that has more prominently hoisted the anti-globalization flag, even if its discourses place targets on ethnic minorities or national trade imbalances, rather than on class inequality or the increased leverage of businesses in processes of transnational integration. We can see, for example, how rising job insecurity and deteriorating living standards in the UK were mobilized by the Brexit campaign. While much of the ‘Leave’ discourse was problematic, and focused its anger towards European Union regulations and immigrants, Brexit advocates successfully tapped into a widespread sense of vulnerability and precarization throughout the isles that is intimately linked to neoliberal transformations at home and to the consolidation of the world market and its competitive pressures more broadly (Pettifor, 2017; The Guardian, 2016). Similarly, Donald Trump’s antiChina and anti-migrant rhetoric resonated with the experiences of many in the middle class who have been on the losing side of growing inequality and declining social mobility for decades, but also remarkably in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, with the top 1% capturing 85.1% of the country’s income growth between 2009 and 2013 (Economic Policy Institute, 2016). Indeed, there are striking similarities in the protestations of politicians at opposite ends of the spectrum, such as Trump and Bernie Sanders, despite proposing diametrically opposed treatments to the perceived problems, with Trump doing little to upset the business-centric order and only adding bigotry and defensive nationalism into the mix.4\nIn this way, this rise of illiberal positions and movements must not be seen as a diversion from the road to neoliberal globalization, but rather a direct consequence of the consolidation of the world market facilitated by neoliberal policy sets and the techno-logistical developments underpinning globalized forms of accumulation. The current illiberal rise is hence aptly interpreted both as a counter movement in the Polanyian sense, and as a dialectical relationship. Although the detrimental social impacts of liberal integration are often felt rather swiftly by many, their reverberations into politics take the shape of more prolonged reactions. Yet, there is a strong association between liberal integration, its social impacts and the rearticulations of politics that follow and that we currently experience in many parts of the world (Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017). The current rise of various kinds of populism – in places as diverse as the United States, the UK, Indonesia, Russia, Turkey or the Philippines, to name a few– represents from this perspective a ‘counter movement’ following a ‘global organic crisis’(Gill, 2015), as people look beyond the mainstream for alternatives that explain and respond to the social dislocations brought about by the pursuit of transnational liberal integration. In this way, neoliberalism’s illiberal moment is in a dialectical relationship with the pursuit of a liberal utopia, mirroring the Polanyian counter movement that would put an end to the ‘Hundred Years Peace’ (1815–1914). Most importantly, the traditional centre left’s failure in many contexts to formulate viable responses to the current social dislocation has left it up to the reactionary right to devise a way out of the crisis.5 More often than not, the leaders of the new populist moment combine an enduring business- and market-centric approach to development with nationalist and reactionary discourse, resulting in a dangerous blend that is likely to perpetuate social discontent, but redirecting it not towards the policy and economic elites responsible of the current developmental impasse but towards countries that are increasingly perceived as rivals.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "liberal peace fixation with short-term correlations between trade openness and the absence of\nconflict is\nperplexing if one considers how the liberal argument\ndismisses the immediate social dislocations underpinned by market integration as tangential to longer term improvements\nliberal arguments for peace\noperate under different temporal logics. If liberalism’s positive impacts on peace are attested with a focus on yearly correlations between commerce and an absence of conflict, its alleged positive developmental impacts can often be supported only by eschewing the immediate social conflict and diminished living standards fomented by interdependence and marketization\nfor example\nstructural adjustment throughout the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s or more recent austerity policies in Europe, which\nmany authors have demonstrated to be also counterproductive for long-term development\nAcross the world, we are observing\nemergence of illiberal politics in countries that have represented the backbone of neoliberal globalization\nreactionary politicians have been first to galvanize social discontent\nby\ncondemning\nglobalization\nIn the U\nS\nUK or France\nit has been the populist right that has more prominently hoisted the anti-globalization flag, even if its discourses place targets on ethnic minorities\nrather than\ninequality\njob insecurity\nin the UK were mobilized by\nBrexit\nBrexit\ntapped into\nvulnerability\nlinked to neoliberal transformations\nTrump’s antiChina and anti-migrant rhetoric resonated wi\nmany in the middle class who have been on the losing side of\ninequality\nthis rise of illiberal\nmovements must not be seen as a diversion from\nneoliberal globalization, but\na direct consequence of the consolidation of the world market facilitated by neoliberal policy sets and the techno-logistical developments underpinning globalized forms of accumulation\nthere is a strong association between liberal integration, its social impacts and the rearticulations of politics that follow and that we currently experience in many parts of the world\npopulism\nrepresents from this perspective a ‘counter movement’ following a\nglobal organic crisis’\nas people look beyond the mainstream for alternatives\nto\nliberal integration\nneoliberalism’s illiberal moment is in a dialectical relationship with the pursuit of a liberal utopia\nthe\ncentre left’s failure\nto formulate\nresponses to\nsocial dislocation has left\nthe\nright to devise a way out of the crisis\nthe leaders of the new populist moment combine an enduring\nmarket-centric approach\nwith\nreactionary discourse, resulting in a dangerous blend that is likely to perpetuate social discontent\ntowards countries that are increasingly perceived as rivals", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It causes populism.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "liberal peace fixation with short-term correlations between trade openness and the absence of\nconflict is\nperplexing if one considers how the liberal argument\ndismisses the immediate social dislocations underpinned by market integration as tangential to longer term improvements\nliberal arguments for peace\noperate under different temporal logics. If liberalism’s positive impacts on peace are attested with a focus on yearly correlations between commerce and an absence of conflict, its alleged positive developmental impacts can often be supported only by eschewing the immediate social conflict and diminished living standards fomented by interdependence and marketization\nfor example\nstructural adjustment throughout the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s or more recent austerity policies in Europe, which\nmany authors have demonstrated to be also counterproductive for long-term development\nAcross the world, we are observing\nemergence of illiberal politics in countries that have represented the backbone of neoliberal globalization\nreactionary politicians have been first to galvanize social discontent\nby\ncondemning\nglobalization\nIn the U\nS\nUK or France\nit has been the populist right that has more prominently hoisted the anti-globalization flag, even if its discourses place targets on ethnic minorities\nrather than\ninequality\njob insecurity\nin the UK were mobilized by\nBrexit\nBrexit\ntapped into\nvulnerability\nlinked to neoliberal transformations\nTrump’s antiChina and anti-migrant rhetoric resonated wi\nmany in the middle class who have been on the losing side of\ninequality\nthis rise of illiberal\nmovements must not be seen as a diversion from\nneoliberal globalization, but\na direct consequence of the consolidation of the world market facilitated by neoliberal policy sets and the techno-logistical developments underpinning globalized forms of accumulation\nthere is a strong association between liberal integration, its social impacts and the rearticulations of politics that follow and that we currently experience in many parts of the world\npopulism\nrepresents from this perspective a ‘counter movement’ following a\nglobal organic crisis’\nas people look beyond the mainstream for alternatives\nto\nliberal integration\nneoliberalism’s illiberal moment is in a dialectical relationship with the pursuit of a liberal utopia\nthe\ncentre left’s failure\nto formulate\nresponses to\nsocial dislocation has left\nthe\nright to devise a way out of the crisis\nthe leaders of the new populist moment combine an enduring\nmarket-centric approach\nwith\nreactionary discourse, resulting in a dangerous blend that is likely to perpetuate social discontent\ntowards countries that are increasingly perceived as rivals", "role": "user" }, { "content": "liberal peace\nshort-term correlations\nliberal argument\nimmediate social dislocations\nmarket integration\ntemporal logics\nyearly correlations\ndevelopmental impacts\neschewing\nsocial conflict\ndiminished living standards\ninterdependence\nmarketization\nstructural adjustment\ndeveloping world\nausterity policies\nEurope\ncounterproductive\nlong-term development\nilliberal politics\nbackbone\nneoliberal globalization\nreactionary politicians\nU\nS\nUK\nFrance\npopulist right\nhoisted\nethnic minorities\ninequality\nBrexit\nBrexit\nvulnerability\nantiChina\nanti-migrant\ndirect consequence\nneoliberal policy\ntechno-logistical developments\naccumulation\nsocial impacts\npopulism\ncounter movement’\ndialectical relationship\nliberal utopia\nreactionary discourse\nsocial discontent\nrivals", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: It causes populism.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "liberal peace fixation with short-term correlations between trade openness and the absence of\nconflict is\nperplexing if one considers how the liberal argument\ndismisses the immediate social dislocations underpinned by market integration as tangential to longer term improvements\nliberal arguments for peace\noperate under different temporal logics. If liberalism’s positive impacts on peace are attested with a focus on yearly correlations between commerce and an absence of conflict, its alleged positive developmental impacts can often be supported only by eschewing the immediate social conflict and diminished living standards fomented by interdependence and marketization\nfor example\nstructural adjustment throughout the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s or more recent austerity policies in Europe, which\nmany authors have demonstrated to be also counterproductive for long-term development\nAcross the world, we are observing\nemergence of illiberal politics in countries that have represented the backbone of neoliberal globalization\nreactionary politicians have been first to galvanize social discontent\nby\ncondemning\nglobalization\nIn the U\nS\nUK or France\nit has been the populist right that has more prominently hoisted the anti-globalization flag, even if its discourses place targets on ethnic minorities\nrather than\ninequality\njob insecurity\nin the UK were mobilized by\nBrexit\nBrexit\ntapped into\nvulnerability\nlinked to neoliberal transformations\nTrump’s antiChina and anti-migrant rhetoric resonated wi\nmany in the middle class who have been on the losing side of\ninequality\nthis rise of illiberal\nmovements must not be seen as a diversion from\nneoliberal globalization, but\na direct consequence of the consolidation of the world market facilitated by neoliberal policy sets and the techno-logistical developments underpinning globalized forms of accumulation\nthere is a strong association between liberal integration, its social impacts and the rearticulations of politics that follow and that we currently experience in many parts of the world\npopulism\nrepresents from this perspective a ‘counter movement’ following a\nglobal organic crisis’\nas people look beyond the mainstream for alternatives\nto\nliberal integration\nneoliberalism’s illiberal moment is in a dialectical relationship with the pursuit of a liberal utopia\nthe\ncentre left’s failure\nto formulate\nresponses to\nsocial dislocation has left\nthe\nright to devise a way out of the crisis\nthe leaders of the new populist moment combine an enduring\nmarket-centric approach\nwith\nreactionary discourse, resulting in a dangerous blend that is likely to perpetuate social discontent\ntowards countries that are increasingly perceived as rivals", "role": "user" }, { "content": "liberal argument\ndismisses\nsocial dislocations\nby\nintegration\neschewing\nsocial conflict\nfomented by interdependence\nexample\nausterity policies\nemergence of illiberal politics in countries that\nrepresented\nbackbone of\nglobalization\nU\nS\nUK\nFrance\nthe populist right\nhoisted the\nflag\nBrexit\ntapped into\nvulnerability\nTrump’s antiChina and anti-migrant rhetoric\nilliberal\nmovements\na\nconsequence of\nneoliberal policy\npopulism\nrepresents\na ‘counter movement’\nilliberal moment is in a dialectical relationship with\nliberal utopia\npopulist moment\nwith\nreactionary discourse, resulting in\nsocial discontent\ntowards countries\nperceived as rivals", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No water wars.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "This hypothesis says that increased water shortages around the world will lead to war between states. It goes something like this: as water is central to all human activities, including food production, no state can allow its water resources to be compromised. Therefore, in a world of squeezed water supply, states should be willing to go to war to protect their access to water. At its core, the \"water wars\" hypothesis expresses our deepest anxieties about a drought-laden future, wherein desperately thirsty societies take up arms against one another.\nAs evocative as this hypothesis is, the track record also shows that water wars are overblown – thankfully. Exhaustive research by Aaron Wolf, a geographer at Oregon State University, has documented the surprising fact that there have been no interstate wars fought directly over water for thousands of years. In fact, his team’s research indicates that states have cooperated over shared water resources far more often than they have fought over them.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the \"water wars\" hypothesis expresses our deepest anxieties about a drought-laden future\nAs evocative as this hypothesis is, the track record\nshows that water wars are overblown\nExhaustive research by Aaron Wolf, a geographer at Oregon State University, has documented the\nfact that there have been no interstate wars fought directly over water for thousands of years.\nhis team’s research indicates that states have cooperated over shared water resources far more often than they have fought over them.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No water wars.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the \"water wars\" hypothesis expresses our deepest anxieties about a drought-laden future\nAs evocative as this hypothesis is, the track record\nshows that water wars are overblown\nExhaustive research by Aaron Wolf, a geographer at Oregon State University, has documented the\nfact that there have been no interstate wars fought directly over water for thousands of years.\nhis team’s research indicates that states have cooperated over shared water resources far more often than they have fought over them.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "water wars\ndeepest anxieties\noverblown\nExhaustive research\nno interstate wars fought directly over water for thousands of years\ncooperated", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No water wars.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the \"water wars\" hypothesis expresses our deepest anxieties about a drought-laden future\nAs evocative as this hypothesis is, the track record\nshows that water wars are overblown\nExhaustive research by Aaron Wolf, a geographer at Oregon State University, has documented the\nfact that there have been no interstate wars fought directly over water for thousands of years.\nhis team’s research indicates that states have cooperated over shared water resources far more often than they have fought over them.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "\"water wars\"\nAs evocative as this\nis, the track record\nshows that water wars are overblown\nExhaustive research\nhas documented the\nfact that there have been no\nwars fought\nover water for thousands of years.\nresearch indicates that states have cooperated\nmore often than\nfought", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No cyber impact.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are:\nNonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals.\nThere is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.)\nNo one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare.\nState use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war.\nThis has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation.\nThe United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have\nability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more\ndecades of experience with the use of cyber techniques\nand have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions\nNonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level\nThere have been regular predictions every year\nthat nonstate actors will acquire these\nin two or three years\nThe monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals\nwho might have the necessary skills\nThere is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response\nNo one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful\nproduced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them\nThe shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare\nState use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold\nnot start a war\nThis has implications\ninadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred\nthere are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation\nThe United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks.\nbut neither Russia nor China would be well served by a\nattack on the United States. Iran\nmay reach the point where it could use cyberattacks\nbut it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States\nNorth Korea has not\ndeveloped this kind of capability", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No cyber impact.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have\nability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more\ndecades of experience with the use of cyber techniques\nand have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions\nNonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level\nThere have been regular predictions every year\nthat nonstate actors will acquire these\nin two or three years\nThe monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals\nwho might have the necessary skills\nThere is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response\nNo one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful\nproduced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them\nThe shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare\nState use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold\nnot start a war\nThis has implications\ninadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred\nthere are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation\nThe United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks.\nbut neither Russia nor China would be well served by a\nattack on the United States. Iran\nmay reach the point where it could use cyberattacks\nbut it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States\nNorth Korea has not\ndeveloped this kind of capability", "role": "user" }, { "content": "strategic constraints\ncatastrophe attacks\ncyber techniques\nclear understanding\nmotives\ncapabilities\nintentions\nNonstate\nmost states\nreturn is negligible\ndissuades\nuncertainty\nU\nS\nattribute\nunwilling to risk massive retaliation\nnuclear war distorts discussion\nprimary emphasis\nespionage\ncoercion\nU\nS\nopponents\nconflict\nno interest\ncertainly\ncatastrophic retaliation\ninadvertent escalation\nnever occurred\ntechnological\nstrategic constraints\nlimit risk\nabsence\ncontrol\nadvanced states\nU\nS\nopponents\navoid actions\ntrigger escalation\nU\nS\nChina\nRussia\nRussia\nChina\nU\nS\nIran\nonly\ndecided\nengage\nmajor armed conflict\nU\nS\nNorth Korea\nnot", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No cyber impact.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have\nability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more\ndecades of experience with the use of cyber techniques\nand have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions\nNonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level\nThere have been regular predictions every year\nthat nonstate actors will acquire these\nin two or three years\nThe monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals\nwho might have the necessary skills\nThere is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response\nNo one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful\nproduced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them\nThe shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare\nState use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold\nnot start a war\nThis has implications\ninadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred\nthere are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation\nThe United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks.\nbut neither Russia nor China would be well served by a\nattack on the United States. Iran\nmay reach the point where it could use cyberattacks\nbut it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States\nNorth Korea has not\ndeveloped this kind of capability", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Nonstate actors and most states lack\ncapability to\ncause\ndamage\nThere is enough uncertainty among\nattackers about\nU\nS\nability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk\nretaliation\nNo one has\ndied from\ncyber\nState\nemphasis is\nespionage and\ncoercion\nU\nS\nopponents\nhave no interest in\ncatastrophic\nattack\nit would\nproduce\nequal\nretaliation\ninadvertent escalation\nhas\nnever occurred\nthere are\nconstraints that\nlimit risk\nabsence\nsuggests\nhigh degree of control\nby advanced states\nneither Russia nor China would be well served by\nattack on the U\nS\nIran\ncould\nbut\nonly\nwhen it\ndecided to engage in\nmajor\nconflict", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No US-China war.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Many observers are pessimistic about deteriorating US-China relations and believe the two countries are heading towards a cold war. Even worse, some argue that the situation might be more dangerous than the US-Soviet Union Cold War, and that a hot war might break out between the two. This argument is unconvincing. First of all, deterrents to a flare-up are much stronger in US-China relations than in US-Soviet relations. Although economic and people-to-people ties between China and the US are declining, they are still close compared to US-Soviet ties. It is hard to decouple two closely intertwined economies and societies. Take two examples. China is expected to become the world's largest consumer market, a temptation hard to resist for exporters, including those from the US. And in education, more than 300,000 Chinese students study in the US, bringing in huge revenues for the US education industry. Many universities go to great lengths to woo international students. Recently Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology even sued the government over its new visa restrictions, now aborted, on international students. Second, even if there is decoupling, the pain would not be too great and can be kept out of the national security sphere if properly handled. In fact, for national security reasons, a modest degree of isolation will make both sides more secure and comfortable. For instance, if China’s information technology equipment cannot capture Western markets, the US will be more relaxed. If China cannot get advanced technologies from the US and its technological progress slows down, the US will be less anxious. In the same vein, China feels assured knowing that if the Trump administration does impose a travel ban on Communist Party members, it would be abandoning one of the tools available to the US to promote “peaceful evolution” in China. Economic decoupling is undeniably more painful for China than for the US. But unlike Japan during WWII, which was hit hard by the US oil embargo because of its lack of natural resources, China has no such problems. Given its large domestic market, losing the US as a major customer is not a disaster for China, and can be compensated through more dynamic economic activities at home. China can also make up for being freezed out of technological exchanges by turning to indigenous innovation. As for the US, it can import goods from other developing countries, albeit less cheaply. The relative loss is acceptable when weighed against the heightened perception of economic independence and security. Third, the ideological confrontation between China and the US is less intense than that during the Cold War. Unlike the obsession with ideology in those days, the line between capitalism and socialism is blurred today. The market economy has become universally recognised as the best way to promote economic growth and, politically, many countries have embraced democracy. Even North Korea calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although ideological hawks in the US still long for the day when the beacon of freedom will light up the world, after many years of fighting bloody wars overseas, most American people are not interested in promoting democracy abroad. Meanwhile, China just wants to preserve its political system and has no interest in exporting it to other countries, as the Soviet Union did. Thus, ideological antagonism in China-US relations can easily be eased by calculations of realistic interests, which create conditions for compromise and cooperation. Fourth, both China and the US have many options other than war to achieve their policy goals. While they have no allies to serve as a buffer, given the nature of the potential conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, both countries are adept at operating in grey zones and fighting psychological, public opinion or diplomatic warfare below the threshold of war. The forced closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston by the US government is just the latest act of brinkmanship. In addition, given China’s huge economic and financial interests in the US, the latter can wield the stick of sanctions when use of force is highly risky or not worth it. When both sides have many tools and options, why would they rush to war to achieve their goals? Last but not least, the imbalance of power will act as a deterrent. Some say the US and Soviet Union did not fight a hot war because they were evenly matched. It was not the case, actually. At the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was at a relative military disadvantage. Moreover, a country needs the will to fight before going to war, even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is weary of war. China, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges, China would not wish to recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is very small. The greatest danger for China is not a cold or hot confrontation with the US, but policymakers’ interpretation of the momentary hostility towards Beijing of a portion of the American population and the larger world. An erroneous interpretation could end China’s march to further opening up, and see it turn instead towards self-isolation.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Many\nare pessimistic about deteriorating US-China relations and believe the two countries are heading towards\nwar\nsome argue that the situation might be more dangerous than the US-Soviet Union Cold War, and that a hot war might break out between the two. This argument is unconvincing\nFirst\ndeterrents to a flare-up are\nstrong\nin US-China relations than in US-Soviet relations\nIt is hard to decouple two closely intertwined economies and societies.\nChina is expected to become the world's largest consumer market, a temptation hard to resist for exporters, including those from the US. And in education, more than 300,000 Chinese students study in the US, bringing in huge revenues for the US education industry\nSecond, even if there is decoupling, the pain would not be too great and can be kept out of the national security sphere\nisolation will make both\nsecure\nChina’s\ntechnology\ncannot capture\nUS\nUS will be less anxious\nThird, the ideological confrontation between China and the US is less intense\nthe line between capitalism and socialism is blurred today. The market economy has become universally recognised as the best way to promote economic growth\nafter many years of fighting bloody wars overseas, most American people are not interested in promoting democracy abroad\nChina just wants to preserve its political system and has no interest in exporting it to other countries, as the Soviet Union did. Thus, ideological antagonism in China-US relations can easily be eased by calculations of realistic interests, which create conditions for compromise and cooperation. Fourth, both China and the US have many options other than war to achieve their policy goals\nboth countries are adept at operating in grey zones and fighting psychological, public opinion or diplomatic warfare below the threshold of war\ngiven China’s huge economic and financial interests in the US, the latter can wield the stick of sanctions when use of force is highly risky or not worth it. When both sides have many tools and options, why would they rush to war to achieve their goals? Last\nthe imbalance of power will act as a deterrent\na country needs the will to fight before going to war, even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is weary of war\nChina, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges\nChina would not wish to recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is very small", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No US-China war.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Many\nare pessimistic about deteriorating US-China relations and believe the two countries are heading towards\nwar\nsome argue that the situation might be more dangerous than the US-Soviet Union Cold War, and that a hot war might break out between the two. This argument is unconvincing\nFirst\ndeterrents to a flare-up are\nstrong\nin US-China relations than in US-Soviet relations\nIt is hard to decouple two closely intertwined economies and societies.\nChina is expected to become the world's largest consumer market, a temptation hard to resist for exporters, including those from the US. And in education, more than 300,000 Chinese students study in the US, bringing in huge revenues for the US education industry\nSecond, even if there is decoupling, the pain would not be too great and can be kept out of the national security sphere\nisolation will make both\nsecure\nChina’s\ntechnology\ncannot capture\nUS\nUS will be less anxious\nThird, the ideological confrontation between China and the US is less intense\nthe line between capitalism and socialism is blurred today. The market economy has become universally recognised as the best way to promote economic growth\nafter many years of fighting bloody wars overseas, most American people are not interested in promoting democracy abroad\nChina just wants to preserve its political system and has no interest in exporting it to other countries, as the Soviet Union did. Thus, ideological antagonism in China-US relations can easily be eased by calculations of realistic interests, which create conditions for compromise and cooperation. Fourth, both China and the US have many options other than war to achieve their policy goals\nboth countries are adept at operating in grey zones and fighting psychological, public opinion or diplomatic warfare below the threshold of war\ngiven China’s huge economic and financial interests in the US, the latter can wield the stick of sanctions when use of force is highly risky or not worth it. When both sides have many tools and options, why would they rush to war to achieve their goals? Last\nthe imbalance of power will act as a deterrent\na country needs the will to fight before going to war, even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is weary of war\nChina, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges\nChina would not wish to recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is very small", "role": "user" }, { "content": "heading towards\nwar\nmore dangerous\nhot war might break out\nunconvincing\nFirst\ndeterrents\nstrong\nin US-China relations\nhard to decouple\nclosely intertwined economies\nsocieties\nlargest consumer market\nhard to resist\nincluding\neducation\n300,000 Chinese students\nhuge revenues\neven if\nnot be too great\nkept out\nnational security sphere\nisolation\nsecure\ntechnology\nUS\nless anxious\nideological confrontation\nless intense\nblurred\nmarket economy\nuniversally recognised\nmany years\nbloody wars overseas\nnot interested\npreserve its political system\nno interest in exporting it\nantagonism\neased\ninterests\ncompromise and cooperation\nFourth\nmany options other than war\nadept at operating in grey zones\nbelow the threshold of war\nwield the stick of sanctions\nhighly risky\nmany tools and options,\nrush to war\nLast\nimbalance of power\nwill to fight\ngoing to war,\nyears of meaningless wars\nweary of war\nabhors war\nclear understanding\nespecially\nslowing down\nvarious domestic challenges\nnot wish\nrecklessly start a war with the US\nhot war\nvery small", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No US-China war.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Many\nare pessimistic about deteriorating US-China relations and believe the two countries are heading towards\nwar\nsome argue that the situation might be more dangerous than the US-Soviet Union Cold War, and that a hot war might break out between the two. This argument is unconvincing\nFirst\ndeterrents to a flare-up are\nstrong\nin US-China relations than in US-Soviet relations\nIt is hard to decouple two closely intertwined economies and societies.\nChina is expected to become the world's largest consumer market, a temptation hard to resist for exporters, including those from the US. And in education, more than 300,000 Chinese students study in the US, bringing in huge revenues for the US education industry\nSecond, even if there is decoupling, the pain would not be too great and can be kept out of the national security sphere\nisolation will make both\nsecure\nChina’s\ntechnology\ncannot capture\nUS\nUS will be less anxious\nThird, the ideological confrontation between China and the US is less intense\nthe line between capitalism and socialism is blurred today. The market economy has become universally recognised as the best way to promote economic growth\nafter many years of fighting bloody wars overseas, most American people are not interested in promoting democracy abroad\nChina just wants to preserve its political system and has no interest in exporting it to other countries, as the Soviet Union did. Thus, ideological antagonism in China-US relations can easily be eased by calculations of realistic interests, which create conditions for compromise and cooperation. Fourth, both China and the US have many options other than war to achieve their policy goals\nboth countries are adept at operating in grey zones and fighting psychological, public opinion or diplomatic warfare below the threshold of war\ngiven China’s huge economic and financial interests in the US, the latter can wield the stick of sanctions when use of force is highly risky or not worth it. When both sides have many tools and options, why would they rush to war to achieve their goals? Last\nthe imbalance of power will act as a deterrent\na country needs the will to fight before going to war, even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is weary of war\nChina, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges\nChina would not wish to recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is very small", "role": "user" }, { "content": "war\nis unconvincing\ndeterrents\nare\nstrong\nhard to decouple\neconomies\nChina is\nworld's largest\nmarket\nChinese students study in\nUS\neven if there is\npain\ncan be kept out of\nsecurity\nisolation\nmake both\nsecure\nChina’s\ntechnology\ncannot capture\nUS\nUS will be less anxious\nideological confrontation\nless intense\nline between capitalism\nsocialism is blurred\nAmerica\nnot interested\npromoting democracy\nChina\nwants to preserve\npolitical system\nboth\nhave\noptions other than war\nin grey zones\nHaving fought\nmeaningless wars\nUS is weary\nChina\nabhors war\nespecially when\neconomy is slowing\nand\ndomestic challenges", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No chance of Sino-Indian war.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "However, contrary to widespread fears, another Sino-Indian war is unlikely to be in the offing. In the shadow of nuclear weapons, a limited conventional war on the Sino-Indian border — somewhat akin to the month-long clash in 1962 – can be avoided for several reasons.\nFirst, this is because of the nature of the dispute and the lack of ideological fundamentalism and issue indivisibility. Unlike the United States, which has increasingly begun to view the geopolitical competition with China as a battle for values such as freedom of navigation or democracy or the preservation of the liberal international order, India and China do not see each other through such an ideological lens. The authoritarian regime of the Chinese Community Party is not perceived to be antithetical to India’s democratic character, and vice versa. India’s long-term strategy, as former Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale puts it, is to retain its strategic autonomy, and pursue alignments based “on issues, not ideology.”\nHence, while both parties have been cautious of each other’s maneuvers on the border, they have refrained from linking these to existential attributes of national identity, which are notorious for inflating the significance of disputed territories — for example in the case of Kashmir, Tibet, or Taiwan. In fact, Beijing has long held that the border dispute is a remnant of British colonialism and its reckless cartographic practices, rather than being driven by India’s territorial expansionism. On the Indian side, Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane, in a break from traditional bouts of recrimination between adversaries, accepted that due to differing notions of the LAC, “both sides” were guilty of aggressive behavior in Eastern Ladakh and North Sikkim. This choice of words effectively yielded the use of any victimhood narratives that could be mobilized to create moral justification for retaliatory action.\nSecond, the risks of inadvertent pre-emption are also not nearly as high as they were in 1962, when Nehru’s ill-fated “forward policy” was met by overwhelming Chinese military force. This is because of a series of five agreements signed between India and China to address disputes arising over the LAC: 1) the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC; 2) the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the LAC, 3) the 2005 Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the LAC; 4) the 2012 Agreement on the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs; and 5) the 2013 Border Defense Cooperation Agreement.\nThese agreements provide a modus operandi for diplomatic engagement at the military and political levels, as well as a set of “status quo” commitments both sides can return to in case of escalation. They proved effective during the 16-day stand-off between Indian and Chinese forces in eastern Ladakh near the village of Chumar, the military confrontation at Burtse in the Depsang plains in northern Ladakh in 2015, and the Doklam crisis in 2017.\nIndian Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Anurag Srivastava has also affirmed New Delhi’s intention to de-escalate the current stand-off based on these agreements. He stated that “the two sides [already] have established mechanisms to resolve such situations peacefully through dialogue.” Similarly, the Chinese official statement also reiterated Beijing’s commitment “to uphold peace and tranquility in border areas.” Summit diplomacy is likely to return if the crisis escalates further.\nThird is the element of ambiguity and the “fog” surrounding the details of the military stand-off. Typically, analysts have viewed “nationalist strongmen” as promoters of aggressive state behavior. But, in this case, the ability of both governments to control national media, and the inscrutability of the facts related to the dispute, aided efforts to manage domestic audience costs. For instance, media reports of 15-20 personnel of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police force being detained by the Chinese were categorically refuted by the Indian side. This meant that no domestic pressure for retaliation arose and no great reputational damage was suffered. In the aftermath of the Doklam crisis, similar ambiguity allowed both sides to claim tactical victories for themselves and diffuse the situation successfully. In India, criticism has been incrementally rising with respect to the Modi government’s lack of transparency on the matter, but it is unlikely to reach electorally harmful proportions.\nLastly, the material costs of limited war for both parties far outweigh potential gains. For China, conflict on the border with India would diminish its ability to meet key security challenges in the South China Sea, thus making it vulnerable to the United States, which Beijing considers its primary security competitor. It seems unlikely that Beijing would want to risk a two-front war. Additionally, reputational damages suffered due to COVID-19, pre-existing fears surrounding China’s rise, and India’s conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities will all temper Beijing’s pre-emptive use of military force. Similarly, for India, the primary security challenge remains Pakistan-based terrorist infiltration on the Kashmir border. More importantly, beyond the protection of vital strategic points on either side that allow military forces to effectively defend and patrol their territories in challenging high-altitude mountainous regions, the vast tracts of disputed land along the LAC do not hold any important material resources such as oil, precious mineral reserves, or ethnic-kin populations. The benefits of territorial aggrandizement are therefore, limited to deterrence value and the natural terrain offers few advantages to offensive forces.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "contrary to widespread fears, another Sino-Indian war is unlikely to be in the offing. In the shadow of nuclear weapons, a limited conventional war on the Sino-Indian border\ncan be avoided for several reasons\nFirst, this is because of the nature of the dispute and the lack of ideological fundamentalism and issue indivisibility\nIndia and China do not see each other through such an ideological lens. The\nC\nC\nP\nis not perceived to be antithetical to India’s democratic character, and vice versa. India’s long-term strategy\nis to retain its strategic autonomy\nwhile both\ncautious of\nmaneuvers on the border, they have refrained from linking these to existential attributes of national identity\nSecond, the risks of inadvertent pre-emption are\nnot nearly as high as they were in 1962\nbecause of a series of five agreements signed between India and China to address disputes arising over the LAC\nThese agreements provide a modus operandi for diplomatic engagement at the military and political levels, as well as a set of “status quo” commitments both sides can return to in case of escalation. They proved effective during the 16-day stand-off\nthe military confrontation at Burtse\nin 2015\nand the Doklam crisis in 2017\nIndia\naffirmed\nintent\nto de-escalate the current stand-off based on these agreements\nSummit diplomacy is likely to return if the crisis escalates further\nThird is the element of ambiguity and the “fog” surrounding the details of the military stand-off\nthe ability of both governments to control national media, and the inscrutability of the facts related to the dispute, aided efforts to manage domestic audience costs\nambiguity allowed both sides to claim tactical victories\nand diffuse the situation successfully\nLastly, the material costs of limited war for both parties far outweigh potential gains. For China, conflict\nwith India would diminish its ability to meet key security challenges in the S\nC\nS\nthus making it vulnerable to the U\nS\nwhich Beijing considers its primary security competitor. It seems unlikely that Beijing would want to risk a two-front war\nreputational damages suffered due to COVID-19, pre-existing fears surrounding China’s rise, and India’s conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities will all temper Beijing’s pre-emptive use of military force. Similarly, for India, the primary security challenge remains Pakistan-based terrorist infiltration on the Kashmir border\nthe\ndisputed land\ndo not hold any important material resources\nThe benefits of\naggrandizement are therefore, limited", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No chance of Sino-Indian war.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "contrary to widespread fears, another Sino-Indian war is unlikely to be in the offing. In the shadow of nuclear weapons, a limited conventional war on the Sino-Indian border\ncan be avoided for several reasons\nFirst, this is because of the nature of the dispute and the lack of ideological fundamentalism and issue indivisibility\nIndia and China do not see each other through such an ideological lens. The\nC\nC\nP\nis not perceived to be antithetical to India’s democratic character, and vice versa. India’s long-term strategy\nis to retain its strategic autonomy\nwhile both\ncautious of\nmaneuvers on the border, they have refrained from linking these to existential attributes of national identity\nSecond, the risks of inadvertent pre-emption are\nnot nearly as high as they were in 1962\nbecause of a series of five agreements signed between India and China to address disputes arising over the LAC\nThese agreements provide a modus operandi for diplomatic engagement at the military and political levels, as well as a set of “status quo” commitments both sides can return to in case of escalation. They proved effective during the 16-day stand-off\nthe military confrontation at Burtse\nin 2015\nand the Doklam crisis in 2017\nIndia\naffirmed\nintent\nto de-escalate the current stand-off based on these agreements\nSummit diplomacy is likely to return if the crisis escalates further\nThird is the element of ambiguity and the “fog” surrounding the details of the military stand-off\nthe ability of both governments to control national media, and the inscrutability of the facts related to the dispute, aided efforts to manage domestic audience costs\nambiguity allowed both sides to claim tactical victories\nand diffuse the situation successfully\nLastly, the material costs of limited war for both parties far outweigh potential gains. For China, conflict\nwith India would diminish its ability to meet key security challenges in the S\nC\nS\nthus making it vulnerable to the U\nS\nwhich Beijing considers its primary security competitor. It seems unlikely that Beijing would want to risk a two-front war\nreputational damages suffered due to COVID-19, pre-existing fears surrounding China’s rise, and India’s conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities will all temper Beijing’s pre-emptive use of military force. Similarly, for India, the primary security challenge remains Pakistan-based terrorist infiltration on the Kashmir border\nthe\ndisputed land\ndo not hold any important material resources\nThe benefits of\naggrandizement are therefore, limited", "role": "user" }, { "content": "contrary to widespread fears\nunlikely\nlimited conventional war\navoided\nseveral reasons\nnature\nlack\nideological fundamentalism\nissue indivisibility\nnot\nideological\nC\nC\nP\nIndia’s\nstrat\nstrategic autonomy\ninadvertent pre-emption\nnot nearly as high\nseries of five agreements\nmodus operandi\ndiplomatic engagement\nmilitary\npolitical\n“status quo” commitments\nreturn to\n16-day stand-off\nBurtse\n2015\nDoklam\n2017\nIndia\nintent\nde-escalate\nSummit diplomacy\nlikely to return\nambiguity\n“fog”\ncontrol national media\ninscrutability\naided\ndomestic audience costs\nclaim tactical victories\ndiffuse\nsuccessfully\nmaterial costs\nfar outweigh\ngains\nS\nC\nS\nU\nS\nprimary\nunlikely\ntwo-front war\nreputational damages suffered due to COVID-19\npre-existing fears\nIndia’s conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities\ntemper\nprimary\nPakistan\nlimited", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No chance of Sino-Indian war.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "contrary to widespread fears, another Sino-Indian war is unlikely to be in the offing. In the shadow of nuclear weapons, a limited conventional war on the Sino-Indian border\ncan be avoided for several reasons\nFirst, this is because of the nature of the dispute and the lack of ideological fundamentalism and issue indivisibility\nIndia and China do not see each other through such an ideological lens. The\nC\nC\nP\nis not perceived to be antithetical to India’s democratic character, and vice versa. India’s long-term strategy\nis to retain its strategic autonomy\nwhile both\ncautious of\nmaneuvers on the border, they have refrained from linking these to existential attributes of national identity\nSecond, the risks of inadvertent pre-emption are\nnot nearly as high as they were in 1962\nbecause of a series of five agreements signed between India and China to address disputes arising over the LAC\nThese agreements provide a modus operandi for diplomatic engagement at the military and political levels, as well as a set of “status quo” commitments both sides can return to in case of escalation. They proved effective during the 16-day stand-off\nthe military confrontation at Burtse\nin 2015\nand the Doklam crisis in 2017\nIndia\naffirmed\nintent\nto de-escalate the current stand-off based on these agreements\nSummit diplomacy is likely to return if the crisis escalates further\nThird is the element of ambiguity and the “fog” surrounding the details of the military stand-off\nthe ability of both governments to control national media, and the inscrutability of the facts related to the dispute, aided efforts to manage domestic audience costs\nambiguity allowed both sides to claim tactical victories\nand diffuse the situation successfully\nLastly, the material costs of limited war for both parties far outweigh potential gains. For China, conflict\nwith India would diminish its ability to meet key security challenges in the S\nC\nS\nthus making it vulnerable to the U\nS\nwhich Beijing considers its primary security competitor. It seems unlikely that Beijing would want to risk a two-front war\nreputational damages suffered due to COVID-19, pre-existing fears surrounding China’s rise, and India’s conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities will all temper Beijing’s pre-emptive use of military force. Similarly, for India, the primary security challenge remains Pakistan-based terrorist infiltration on the Kashmir border\nthe\ndisputed land\ndo not hold any important material resources\nThe benefits of\naggrandizement are therefore, limited", "role": "user" }, { "content": "contrary to\nfears\nSino-Indian war is unlikely\nbecause of\nnature\nand\nlack of ideological fundamentalism\nIndia’s\nstrat\nis\nautonomy\nrisks of\npre-emption are\nnot\nhigh\nbecause of\nagreements\nfor diplomatic engagement\neffective during the 16-day stand-off\nBurtse\nand\nDoklam\nSummit diplomacy is likely\nif\ncrisis escalates\nability of both\nto control\nmedia, and\ninscrutability\naided efforts to manage\naudience costs\nboth\nclaim tactical victories\nand diffuse\nsuccessfully\nmaterial costs\nfar outweigh\ngains. For China, conflict\ndiminish\nability to meet\nchallenges in\nS\nC\nS\nmaking it vulnerable to\nits primary\ncompetitor\nrep\ndamage\ndue to COVID\nfears\nand India’s\ncapabilities\ntemper\nforce\nfor India\nprimary\nremains Pakistan\nland\ndo not hold\nresources\nbenefits\nare therefore, limited", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: NATO collapse enables strategic autonomy. Europe can defend itself.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "These views are wrong, and the U.S. military reaction is unnecessary. In fact, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reveals surprising weakness, and Europe’s response shows its ability to handle Russia’s threat without U.S. help. The war in Ukraine is a crime, a tragedy, and an opportunity for the United States to transition responsibility for European security to Europeans.\nSince the early Cold War, the main rationale for garrisoning U.S. forces in Europe has been to balance Soviet, and then Russian, power to keep the peace. The decline of Soviet power and Europe’s growing wealth allowed for most U.S. troops in Europe to come home — from over 300,000 during the late Cold War to around 65,000 by 2021. But opposition in Washington to letting Europe mature into a power independent of U.S. strings, plus the belief that Europe remained too divided to match Russia’s military strength, prevented further reductions.\nThe classic formula about threats says they are a product of intention and capability. By this measure, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine does not make it a bigger threat to the rest of Europe — indeed its threat is reduced.\nThe invasion shows more malign intent — or at least more risk tolerance — than most analysts imagined. But there is little evidence to support the view that Russia’s attack in Ukraine is part of a plan to reconstitute the Soviet empire. Russian President Vladimir Putin may wax nostalgic for the glory days, but his ranting complaints about Ukraine are unique; he makes no analogous claims about the Baltics, or even Georgia.\nAs for capability, the shambolic Russian effort thus far in Ukraine is good news for Europe. If Russia were capable of conquering a chunk of Europe, it should have been able to quickly defeat Ukraine, with its 215,000 military personnel, more antiquated vehicles, and small air force.\nBut despite much‐​heralded reforms since its underwhelming performance against Georgia in 2008, Russia has struggled with logistics and support for infantry, left its armor vulnerable to anti‐​tank fire, and failed for three weeks to establish air superiority. Morale is perhaps the largest issue, with conscript troops abandoning vehicles and vanishing into forests. More than 7,000 Russian troops have been killed in Ukraine, according to U.S. officials, a pace that may not be politically sustainable.\nRussia could overcome these problems and win militarily. But then they would be left trying to pacify more than 40 million mostly hostile Ukrainians, which would require most of the active‐​duty military, leaving little for further invasions. And while Russia’s next war likely won’t suffer from such poor planning, its morale issues — and the length of its supply lines — would only get worse against a NATO foe. And any further wars will be funded by an economy shrunken by sanctions.\nMeanwhile, Russia’s aggression caused a sharp increase in European military exertions. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has announced a $110 billion special fund to increase defense spending and committed to take the country to the 2 percent of GDP defense spending standard set forth by NATO. Seventy‐​eight percent of Germans supported the move. Poland announced an increase in defense spending from 2.5 to 3 percent of GDP. Other European countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, will likely follow suit, as occurred to a limited extent after Russia seized Crimea in 2014.\nThis shift adds to Europe’s collective power advantage over Russia. NATO Europe has more than 10 times Russia’s $1.6 trillion GDP. It has twice as many active troops as Russia does — 1.8 million to 900,000. Its military spending outpaces Russia’s, $302 billion to $62 billion (or $178 billion adjusted for purchasing power). In sum, the war has revealed that Russia is weaker than we thought, making Europe stronger by comparison.\nNow the trick is to use Europe’s energy in responding to Russia to overcome coordination problems among states — to achieve what is called strategic autonomy: military capability independent of the U.S.\nRussia’s aggression also helps solve that problem. The European response to the war has been impressively unified in sanctioning and condemning Russia, including Germany’s costly decision to stop the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. That decision risks Russian retaliation that could increase already‐​high energy prices. This unity of political effort could be transformed into more military cohesion — if Washington permits it.\nThe U.S. has long been hostile to the idea of Europe’s independence from U.S. leadership, and sought to use NATO as a means to prevent that. The main reason to change this is that we spend a great deal defending Europe, and could use some of that windfall for better purposes — at home or in Asia — without harming European security. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can help produce a more capable European partner, even if it’s one that does not follow American orders. That starts by gradually bringing troops home from Europe, not sending more there.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "U.S. military reaction is unnecessary\nRussia’s invasion of Ukraine reveals surprising weakness\nand Europe’s response shows its ability to handle Russia’s threat without U.S. help\nThe war in Ukraine is\nan opportunity for the U\nS\nto transition responsibility for European security to Europeans\nThe classic formula about threats says they are a product of intention and capability\nRussia’s invasion of Ukraine does not make it a bigger threat to the rest of Europe\nits threat is reduced\nthere is little evidence to support the view that Russia’s attack in Ukraine is part of a plan to reconstitute the Soviet empire\nPutin\nranting complaints about Ukraine are unique\nhe makes no analogous claims about the Baltics\nor\nGeorgia\nthe shambolic Russian effort\nin Ukraine is good news\nIf Russia were capable of conquering\nEurope, it should have been able to quickly defeat Ukraine\nBut\nRussia has\nstruggled\nwith logistics and support for infantry, left its armor vulnerable to anti‐​tank fire\nand failed for three weeks to establish air superiority\nMorale is\nthe largest issue\nwith conscript troops abandoning\n7,000 Russian troops have been killed\na pace that may not be\npolitically sustainable\nRussia\nwould be left trying to pacify\nhostile Ukrainians\nwhich would require\nactive‐​duty military, leaving little for further invasions\nRussia’s\nmorale issues\nand\nsupply lines\nwould only get worse against a\nNATO foe\nany further wars will be funded by an economy shrunken by sanctions\nRussia’s aggression caused a\nsharp increase in European military exertions\nGerman Chancellor\nannounced\n$110 billion special fund to increase defense spending\ntake the country to the 2 percent of GDP\nPoland announced\nincrease\nfrom 2.5 to 3 percent\nOther European countries\nwill\nfollow suit\nThis shift adds to Europe’s collective power advantage over Russia\nNATO Europe has more than 10 times Russia’s $1.6 trillion GDP. It has twice as many active troops as Russia does\nIts military spending outpaces Russia’s, $302 billion to $62 billion\nEurope’s energy\novercome\ncoordination problems\nachieve\nstrategic autonomy\nRussia’s aggression\nsolve that problem\nEuropean response\nhas been impressively unified in sanctioning and condemning Russia, including Germany’s costly decision to stop the Nord Stream 2\nThis unity of political effort could be transformed into\nmilitary cohesion\nif Washington permits it.\nwe spend a great deal defending Europe, and could use some of that windfall\nwithout harming European security\nRussia’s invasion of Ukraine can help produce a\nmore capable European\nThat starts by gradually bringing troops\nhome", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: NATO collapse enables strategic autonomy. Europe can defend itself.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "U.S. military reaction is unnecessary\nRussia’s invasion of Ukraine reveals surprising weakness\nand Europe’s response shows its ability to handle Russia’s threat without U.S. help\nThe war in Ukraine is\nan opportunity for the U\nS\nto transition responsibility for European security to Europeans\nThe classic formula about threats says they are a product of intention and capability\nRussia’s invasion of Ukraine does not make it a bigger threat to the rest of Europe\nits threat is reduced\nthere is little evidence to support the view that Russia’s attack in Ukraine is part of a plan to reconstitute the Soviet empire\nPutin\nranting complaints about Ukraine are unique\nhe makes no analogous claims about the Baltics\nor\nGeorgia\nthe shambolic Russian effort\nin Ukraine is good news\nIf Russia were capable of conquering\nEurope, it should have been able to quickly defeat Ukraine\nBut\nRussia has\nstruggled\nwith logistics and support for infantry, left its armor vulnerable to anti‐​tank fire\nand failed for three weeks to establish air superiority\nMorale is\nthe largest issue\nwith conscript troops abandoning\n7,000 Russian troops have been killed\na pace that may not be\npolitically sustainable\nRussia\nwould be left trying to pacify\nhostile Ukrainians\nwhich would require\nactive‐​duty military, leaving little for further invasions\nRussia’s\nmorale issues\nand\nsupply lines\nwould only get worse against a\nNATO foe\nany further wars will be funded by an economy shrunken by sanctions\nRussia’s aggression caused a\nsharp increase in European military exertions\nGerman Chancellor\nannounced\n$110 billion special fund to increase defense spending\ntake the country to the 2 percent of GDP\nPoland announced\nincrease\nfrom 2.5 to 3 percent\nOther European countries\nwill\nfollow suit\nThis shift adds to Europe’s collective power advantage over Russia\nNATO Europe has more than 10 times Russia’s $1.6 trillion GDP. It has twice as many active troops as Russia does\nIts military spending outpaces Russia’s, $302 billion to $62 billion\nEurope’s energy\novercome\ncoordination problems\nachieve\nstrategic autonomy\nRussia’s aggression\nsolve that problem\nEuropean response\nhas been impressively unified in sanctioning and condemning Russia, including Germany’s costly decision to stop the Nord Stream 2\nThis unity of political effort could be transformed into\nmilitary cohesion\nif Washington permits it.\nwe spend a great deal defending Europe, and could use some of that windfall\nwithout harming European security\nRussia’s invasion of Ukraine can help produce a\nmore capable European\nThat starts by gradually bringing troops\nhome", "role": "user" }, { "content": "unnecessary\nsurprising weakness\nwithout U.S. help\nU\nS\nintention\ncapability\ndoes not\nreduced\nlittle evidence\nreconstitute\nSoviet empire\nunique\nno analogous claims\nBaltics\nGeorgia\nshambolic\nconquering\nquickly defeat\nBut\nstruggled\nanti‐​tank fire\nair superiority\nlargest issue\n7,000\npolitically sustainable\nhostile Ukrainians\nlittle\nsupply lines\nNATO foe\nsanctions\nsharp increase\nEuropean military exertions\n$110 billion\ndefense spending\n2 percent\nfollow suit\ncollective power\nNATO Europe\n10 times\nGDP\ntwice\n$302 billion\n$62 billion\ncoordination problems\nstrategic autonomy\nEuropean response\nimpressively unified\nNord Stream 2\nmilitary cohesion\npermits it.\nwithout harming European security\nmore capable\nhome", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: NATO collapse enables strategic autonomy. Europe can defend itself.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "U.S. military reaction is unnecessary\nRussia’s invasion of Ukraine reveals surprising weakness\nand Europe’s response shows its ability to handle Russia’s threat without U.S. help\nThe war in Ukraine is\nan opportunity for the U\nS\nto transition responsibility for European security to Europeans\nThe classic formula about threats says they are a product of intention and capability\nRussia’s invasion of Ukraine does not make it a bigger threat to the rest of Europe\nits threat is reduced\nthere is little evidence to support the view that Russia’s attack in Ukraine is part of a plan to reconstitute the Soviet empire\nPutin\nranting complaints about Ukraine are unique\nhe makes no analogous claims about the Baltics\nor\nGeorgia\nthe shambolic Russian effort\nin Ukraine is good news\nIf Russia were capable of conquering\nEurope, it should have been able to quickly defeat Ukraine\nBut\nRussia has\nstruggled\nwith logistics and support for infantry, left its armor vulnerable to anti‐​tank fire\nand failed for three weeks to establish air superiority\nMorale is\nthe largest issue\nwith conscript troops abandoning\n7,000 Russian troops have been killed\na pace that may not be\npolitically sustainable\nRussia\nwould be left trying to pacify\nhostile Ukrainians\nwhich would require\nactive‐​duty military, leaving little for further invasions\nRussia’s\nmorale issues\nand\nsupply lines\nwould only get worse against a\nNATO foe\nany further wars will be funded by an economy shrunken by sanctions\nRussia’s aggression caused a\nsharp increase in European military exertions\nGerman Chancellor\nannounced\n$110 billion special fund to increase defense spending\ntake the country to the 2 percent of GDP\nPoland announced\nincrease\nfrom 2.5 to 3 percent\nOther European countries\nwill\nfollow suit\nThis shift adds to Europe’s collective power advantage over Russia\nNATO Europe has more than 10 times Russia’s $1.6 trillion GDP. It has twice as many active troops as Russia does\nIts military spending outpaces Russia’s, $302 billion to $62 billion\nEurope’s energy\novercome\ncoordination problems\nachieve\nstrategic autonomy\nRussia’s aggression\nsolve that problem\nEuropean response\nhas been impressively unified in sanctioning and condemning Russia, including Germany’s costly decision to stop the Nord Stream 2\nThis unity of political effort could be transformed into\nmilitary cohesion\nif Washington permits it.\nwe spend a great deal defending Europe, and could use some of that windfall\nwithout harming European security\nRussia’s invasion of Ukraine can help produce a\nmore capable European\nThat starts by gradually bringing troops\nhome", "role": "user" }, { "content": "invasion\nreveals\nweakness\nPutin\nmakes n\nclaims about the Baltics\nIf Russia were capable\nit should\nquickly defeat Ukraine\nBut\nstruggled\nwith logistics\nair superiority\nMorale\nRussia\nwould be\npacify\nUkrainians\nsupply lines\nwould\nget worse\neconomy shrunken by sanctions\naggression caused\nincrease in\nexertions\nGerman\nannounced\n$110 billion\nOther\ns\nwill\nfollow\nEurope has\n10 times Russia’s\nGDP\ntwice\ntroops\nspending outpaces\nstrategic autonomy\naggression\nsolve\nproblem\nEuropean response\nhas been\nunified\nstop\nNord Stream 2\nThis\ncould be transformed into\ncohesion\nstarts by\nbringing troops\nhome", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Commitment trap collapses the alliance. Deterrence failure is inevitable.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "However, the risk of this (for political reasons intentionally moderate) current NATO posture is the possibility that Russia could—counter to expectations—attack on a large scale with large conventional formations from day one, rather than in a hybrid manner with non-attributable “little green men” only. In this case, Russian troops, reportedly according to Putin, “could take Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw or Bucharest in two days.” 19 This is what NATO’s in-place forces and reinforcements such as the VJTF and NRF could not deny, due to a lack of rapidly available and combat capable heavy larger formations for initial defensive operations. In case of a large-scale military invasion and occupation of Baltic states’ territory and parts of Poland, NATO would need to prepare over some weeks or even months for a largescale, high intensity counterattack in order to reconquer lost territory and restore the status quo ante, i.e. territorial integrity of all its member states. This is NATO’s most vulnerable “Achilles heel.” The operational and political problem with NATO’s current responsiveness and reinforcement concept is that it can be undermined by Russia at this stage, both politically and operationally. Politically, consensus in NATO decision-making may be difficult to achieve once the territories of some allies have already been occupied and NATO’s initial operations to defend them have failed. In such a situation, some member states might prefer appeasement and could argue that “the problem can never be solved by military means” and that “only diplomacy, sanctions and dialogue could end the war.” In case of nuclear coercion by Russia, the argument will be made that “although the aggression and landgrab was terrible, illegal and will never be acceptable, an escalation toward nuclear war must be avoided under any circumstances.” Fertile ground for “opting out” must be taken into account particularly in member states whose political leaders are driven by a pacifist mainstream thinking within their societies and that do not want to suffer similar physical destruction as the media will report from the frontline states during wartime. Given the fact that political control by the North Atlantic Council over NATO military authorities also continues in wartime and does not end with the outbreak of hostilities, the possibility cannot be excluded that the North Atlantic Council might fail to agree when SACEUR requests authorization for preparing and launching a large-scale counter-attack operation. Once exposed allied countries were occupied, the risk of NATO losing its unity and resolve is higher, the longer it takes to assemble and deploy the bulk of its (i.e. in essence America’s) air, land and naval forces for a large-scale counterattack. At the operational level, a group of NATO nations led by the USA could still conduct a large counterattack operation to liberate e.g. the Baltic states or Poland from a Russian occupation. However, e.g., in case of an “opting out” by Germany and/or other allies in central Europe, it would be difficult for such a remaining “coalition of the willing” to successfully operate without freedom of movement in their rear area. It is to be hoped that the turnaround in Germany’s defense policy announced by Chancellor Scholz in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will reduce the risk of such a scenario.\nIn the geopolitical situation since 2014, where NATO’s possible adversary in wartime was assumed to be an isolated Russia, this political and operational risk of NATO’s responsiveness concept has been assessed as manageable due to a rather low probability of the above-described worst case. However, in case Russia enjoys military and political backing by China and perhaps also substantial support through common hybrid activities against NATO across Europe, the risk of NATO being defeated in its initial defensive operations and consequently losing its political unity and resolve is significantly higher. The consequence of this political and operational vulnerability is that an emerging military alliance between Russia and China would call for a different approach for the defense of Northeastern Europe. With such a revised or alternative approach, NATO would need to avoid a situation in which NATO’s initial defense operations on the ground would come to a preliminary end, followed over weeks or even months by a pause for building-up the forces for a large counterattack operation. Losing its “center of gravity,” i.e. political unity and resolve among the 30 NATO allies and operational partners would then mean final victory for Russia in such a war, and probably also the end of NATO as an alliance.20", "role": "user" }, { "content": "risk of\ncurrent NATO posture\nRussia could\nattack on a large scale\nfrom day one\nrather than\nlittle green men\nRussian troops\ncould take Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn\nWarsaw or Bucharest in two days\nNATO’s\nreinforcements\ncould not deny\ndue to a lack of rapidly available and combat capable\nlarger formations\nIn case of a\ninvasion and occupation of Baltic states’\nand\nPoland\nNATO would need to prepare over\nmonths for\ncounterattack\nThis is NATO’s most vulnerable “Achilles heel\nThe\nproblem with NATO’s current responsiveness\nconcept is that it can be undermined by Russia at this stage\nPolitically\nconsensus in NATO decision-making may be difficult to achieve once\nterritories of some allies have already been occupied and NATO’s initial operations to defend\nfailed\nsome member states might prefer appeasement and could argue\nescalation\nmust be avoided\nthe North Atlantic Council might fail to agree when\nauthoriz\ncounter-attack\nOnce exposed allied countries were occupied\nrisk of NATO losing\nunity and resolve is higher\na group of NATO nations led by the USA could still conduct a large counterattack\nto liberate\nthe Baltic\ns or Poland\nHowever\nin case of an “opting out\nby\nallies in central Europe\nit would be difficult for\na\ncoalition of the willing\nto\noperate without freedom of movement\nLosing\npolitical unity\namong the 30 NATO allies\nwould\nmean final victory for Russia in\nwar\nand\nthe end of NATO as an alliance", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Commitment trap collapses the alliance. Deterrence failure is inevitable.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "risk of\ncurrent NATO posture\nRussia could\nattack on a large scale\nfrom day one\nrather than\nlittle green men\nRussian troops\ncould take Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn\nWarsaw or Bucharest in two days\nNATO’s\nreinforcements\ncould not deny\ndue to a lack of rapidly available and combat capable\nlarger formations\nIn case of a\ninvasion and occupation of Baltic states’\nand\nPoland\nNATO would need to prepare over\nmonths for\ncounterattack\nThis is NATO’s most vulnerable “Achilles heel\nThe\nproblem with NATO’s current responsiveness\nconcept is that it can be undermined by Russia at this stage\nPolitically\nconsensus in NATO decision-making may be difficult to achieve once\nterritories of some allies have already been occupied and NATO’s initial operations to defend\nfailed\nsome member states might prefer appeasement and could argue\nescalation\nmust be avoided\nthe North Atlantic Council might fail to agree when\nauthoriz\ncounter-attack\nOnce exposed allied countries were occupied\nrisk of NATO losing\nunity and resolve is higher\na group of NATO nations led by the USA could still conduct a large counterattack\nto liberate\nthe Baltic\ns or Poland\nHowever\nin case of an “opting out\nby\nallies in central Europe\nit would be difficult for\na\ncoalition of the willing\nto\noperate without freedom of movement\nLosing\npolitical unity\namong the 30 NATO allies\nwould\nmean final victory for Russia in\nwar\nand\nthe end of NATO as an alliance", "role": "user" }, { "content": "NATO posture\nlarge scale\nlittle green men\nRiga\nVilnius\nTallinn\nWarsaw\nBucharest\ntwo days\nreinforcements\nrapidly available\ncombat capable\ninvasion\noccupation\nprepare over\nmonths\nAchilles heel\nundermined\nPolitically\ndifficult to achieve\nalready been occupied\nNATO’s initial operations\nappeasement\nescalation\nNorth Atlantic Council\nfail to agree\ncounter-attack\noccupied\nNATO\nunity\nresolve\ngroup of NATO nations\nUSA\nlarge counterattack\nliberate\nBaltic\ns\nPoland\nopting out\ncentral Europe\ncoalition of the willing\nfreedom of movement\npolitical unity\n30 NATO allies\nfinal victory\nwar\nend of NATO as an alliance", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Commitment trap collapses the alliance. Deterrence failure is inevitable.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "risk of\ncurrent NATO posture\nRussia could\nattack on a large scale\nfrom day one\nrather than\nlittle green men\nRussian troops\ncould take Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn\nWarsaw or Bucharest in two days\nNATO’s\nreinforcements\ncould not deny\ndue to a lack of rapidly available and combat capable\nlarger formations\nIn case of a\ninvasion and occupation of Baltic states’\nand\nPoland\nNATO would need to prepare over\nmonths for\ncounterattack\nThis is NATO’s most vulnerable “Achilles heel\nThe\nproblem with NATO’s current responsiveness\nconcept is that it can be undermined by Russia at this stage\nPolitically\nconsensus in NATO decision-making may be difficult to achieve once\nterritories of some allies have already been occupied and NATO’s initial operations to defend\nfailed\nsome member states might prefer appeasement and could argue\nescalation\nmust be avoided\nthe North Atlantic Council might fail to agree when\nauthoriz\ncounter-attack\nOnce exposed allied countries were occupied\nrisk of NATO losing\nunity and resolve is higher\na group of NATO nations led by the USA could still conduct a large counterattack\nto liberate\nthe Baltic\ns or Poland\nHowever\nin case of an “opting out\nby\nallies in central Europe\nit would be difficult for\na\ncoalition of the willing\nto\noperate without freedom of movement\nLosing\npolitical unity\namong the 30 NATO allies\nwould\nmean final victory for Russia in\nwar\nand\nthe end of NATO as an alliance", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Russia could\nattack on\nlarge scale\ntake\nTallinn\nin\ndays\nreinforcements\nlack\nrapid\nformations\nNATO would need\nmonths\nconsensus\ndifficult to achieve once\nterritories\noccupied\nsome\nprefer appeasement\nrisk of NATO losing\nunity\nhigher\ngroup\nled by\nUS\ncould\nliberate\nBaltic\ns\ndifficult\nto\noperate without\nmovement\nwould\nmean\nvictory for Russia\nand\nend of NATO", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Ukraine, the rise of China, and failed interventions. Restraint avoids further crises.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The United States’ primary security interest in Ukraine is a stable relationship with Russia, but you would not know it based on U.S. foreign policy. As John Mearsheimer has argued, the United States has pursued a revisionist policy “to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border.” This strategy, which included vague promises of eventual NATO membership, was pursued with naïve disregard for Russia’s security concerns and the likely effect on the U.S.-Russia relationship.\nAs early as 2000, power transition theorists argued that “Russia matters because of the potential power of a Russian-Chinese alliance.” Just as Russia ought to have been viewed in light of the anticipated security competition with China, Ukraine ought to have been viewed in terms of the realpolitik need to keep Russia onside. Instead, motivated by liberal ideology and mistaken assumptions tracing back to the end of the Cold War, the United States viewed Ukraine (and Georgia) as the logical next target for inclusion in its democratic alliance system. If history was over, then such a policy was logical. Ukraine’s inclusion in key Western institutions was simply part of a process whereby China, the Middle East, and Russia itself would eventually join the United States in a universal democratic peace.\nThis faulty vision, derived from learning the wrong lessons of U.S. victory in the Cold War, is responsible for errant U.S. policy in Ukraine. It is responsible for the idea that because democracy was on the march and because democracies tend not to fight one another, “support for democracy [was] to be our guide in the … world,” as David Lake summarized the widely held view in 1994. The successful expansion of NATO in 1999 and 2004, as well as waves of EU enlargement, reinforced this view. But Russia’s invasion of Georgia following NATO promises of future Georgian and Ukrainian membership at the alliance’s 2008 summit in Bucharest should have been a blinking red light that spheres of interest still mattered. Instead, the United States chose to ignore this warning. Its ideological blinders would not allow it to consider that great power politics remained alive and well.\nThis ideological misunderstanding of the U.S. national interest has influenced the U.S. pursuit of a revisionist and interventionist approach across the globe for three decades, with catastrophic consequences in Iraq and now Ukraine. At Stephen Walt points out, “the liberal ideologues who dismissed Russia’s repeated protests and warnings and continued to press a revisionist program in Europe with scant regard for the consequences” deserve a healthy share of blame. Had the United States understood its interests in Ukraine from the perspective of U.S-Russia (and, ultimately, U.S.-China) relations (a perspective Joe Biden himself shared regarding NATO expansion in 1997) rather than democracy expansion, this crisis and humanitarian tragedy could have been avoided.\nRather than bring about a more stable, secure, and prosperous world, U.S. revisionist policy inspired by liberal ideology has had the opposite effect. The Middle East is engulfed in perennial chaos, the Taliban once again rule Afghanistan, and a hostile Iran continues to wield great influence in Iraq. More significantly, every year China’s economy grows faster than the American economy is a year in which U.S. relative power further declines. As Graham Allison illustrates, on many key measures of power China has already surpassed the United States. This is why the 2021 U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment listed China as the United States’ number one threat, the second consecutive administration to hold such a view. This view of China as the biggest threat to U.S. interests is uniquely bipartisan.\nBecause economics and demographics are the primary sources of power, prescient analysts foresaw the threat from China as early as the 1990s, even as scholars like John Ikenberry were focused on “strengthen[ing], deepen[ing], and codify[ing] the liberal political order.” In 2000, power transition scholars argued that “plans for limited NATO expansion ignore the biggest future security problem for the West,” namely China. They accurately understood that the “need to prevent any … [Sino-Russian] alignment should be central to all thinking about the future of NATO.” It was “naive,” these scholars argued, to assume NATO expansion would not ultimately push Russia into China’s arms. Yet NATO did expand, and Sino-Russian alignment is precisely what has occurred.\nThis is a strategic error of massive consequence. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov is not wrong when he suggests the war in Ukraine poses a question to “the legal world order.” Indeed, Fareed Zakaria has officially declared that we are now living in a “post-American” global order. Given the so-called economic law of uneven growth articulated by scholars like Robert Gilpin, such a new reality may have been inevitable. But the United States has accelerated this shift by expanding rather than contracting its global commitments even as its relative power basis has declined. The United States has been talking loudly while carrying a shrinking stick.\nThe war in Ukraine gives the lie to liberal internationalists such as Robert Kagan who argue that “maintaining the liberal world order” is simply a matter of resolve. Quite the opposite. What Kagan calls “constant [order] tending” is actually clinging to a strategic lifestyle the United States can no longer afford. If American foreign commitments continue to exceed American power, the inevitable result will be additional crises and accelerated decline. Rather than expanding our commitments in places like Ukraine (and Taiwan, for that matter), the United States should begin strategically unwinding commitments it no longer has the capacity to uphold. As Paul MacDonald and Joseph Parent point out, “sagging capabilities and a sprawling defensive perimeter will court disaster.”\nUnfortunately, the disaster has already arrived. The United States should, therefore, work to limit the scale of the catastrophe by supporting peace talks between Ukraine and Russia. The U.S. interest is in a sovereign, neutral Ukraine with clear red lines mutually understood and agreed to by Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. Such an agreement might involve an open door to eventual EU membership even as NATO is definitively taken off the table. If such a deal can be reached and the United States finally abandons its ideologically driven foreign policy and instead pursues a foreign policy of restraint, perhaps this tragedy will not have been completely in vain.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the U\nS\nhas pursued a revisionist policy\nNATO\nwas pursued with naïve disregard for Russia’s security concerns\nRussia ought to have been viewed in light of\nsecurity competition with China\nmotivated by liberal ideology\nthe U\nS\nviewed Ukraine\nand Georgia\nas the logical next target for inclusion in its democratic alliance system\nThis faulty vision\nis responsible for errant U.S. policy in Ukraine\nRussia’s invasion of Georgia following NATO promises of future Georgian and Ukrainian membership\nshould have been a blinking red light that spheres of interest\ntill mattered\nmisunderstanding of the U.S. national interest has\ncatastrophic consequences in Iraq and\nUkraine\nThe Middle East is engulfed in perennial chaos\nthe Taliban on\nrule Afghanistan\nand a hostile Iran continues to wield great influence\nevery year China’s economy grows faster than the American economy\nU.S. relative power further declines\non many key measures of power\nhas already surpassed\nplans for\nNATO\nignore\nChina\nthe “need to prevent any\nSino-Russian\nalignment should be central to all thinking about the future of NATO.” It was “naive\nto assume NATO\nwould not ultimately push Russia into China’s arms\nYet\nSino-Russian alignment is\nprecisely what has occurred\nThis is a strategic error of massive consequence\nwe are now living in a “post-American” global order\nsuch a new reality may have been inevitable\nBut the U\nS\nhas accelerated this shift by expanding rather than contracting its global commitments even as its relative power basis has declined\nThe U\nS\nloudly while carrying a shrinking\nUkraine gives the lie to liberal internationalists\nwho argue\nmaintaining the liberal world order\nis simply a matter of resolve\nQuite the opposite\norder] tending” is\nclinging to a strategic lifestyle the U\nS\ncan no longer afford\nIf American foreign commitments continue to exceed American power\nthe inevitable result will be additional crises and accelerated decline\nthe U\nS\nshould begin strategically unwinding commitments it no longer has the capacity to uphold\nsagging capabilities and a sprawling defensive perimeter will court disaster\nthe disaster has already arrived\nThe U\nS\nshould\nwork to limit the scale of the catastrophe\nIf\nthe U\nS\npursues\nrestraint\ntragedy will not have been completely in vain", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Ukraine, the rise of China, and failed interventions. Restraint avoids further crises.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the U\nS\nhas pursued a revisionist policy\nNATO\nwas pursued with naïve disregard for Russia’s security concerns\nRussia ought to have been viewed in light of\nsecurity competition with China\nmotivated by liberal ideology\nthe U\nS\nviewed Ukraine\nand Georgia\nas the logical next target for inclusion in its democratic alliance system\nThis faulty vision\nis responsible for errant U.S. policy in Ukraine\nRussia’s invasion of Georgia following NATO promises of future Georgian and Ukrainian membership\nshould have been a blinking red light that spheres of interest\ntill mattered\nmisunderstanding of the U.S. national interest has\ncatastrophic consequences in Iraq and\nUkraine\nThe Middle East is engulfed in perennial chaos\nthe Taliban on\nrule Afghanistan\nand a hostile Iran continues to wield great influence\nevery year China’s economy grows faster than the American economy\nU.S. relative power further declines\non many key measures of power\nhas already surpassed\nplans for\nNATO\nignore\nChina\nthe “need to prevent any\nSino-Russian\nalignment should be central to all thinking about the future of NATO.” It was “naive\nto assume NATO\nwould not ultimately push Russia into China’s arms\nYet\nSino-Russian alignment is\nprecisely what has occurred\nThis is a strategic error of massive consequence\nwe are now living in a “post-American” global order\nsuch a new reality may have been inevitable\nBut the U\nS\nhas accelerated this shift by expanding rather than contracting its global commitments even as its relative power basis has declined\nThe U\nS\nloudly while carrying a shrinking\nUkraine gives the lie to liberal internationalists\nwho argue\nmaintaining the liberal world order\nis simply a matter of resolve\nQuite the opposite\norder] tending” is\nclinging to a strategic lifestyle the U\nS\ncan no longer afford\nIf American foreign commitments continue to exceed American power\nthe inevitable result will be additional crises and accelerated decline\nthe U\nS\nshould begin strategically unwinding commitments it no longer has the capacity to uphold\nsagging capabilities and a sprawling defensive perimeter will court disaster\nthe disaster has already arrived\nThe U\nS\nshould\nwork to limit the scale of the catastrophe\nIf\nthe U\nS\npursues\nrestraint\ntragedy will not have been completely in vain", "role": "user" }, { "content": "U\nS\nrevisionist policy\nNATO\nnaïve disregard\nsecurity concerns\nsecurity competition\nChina\nliberal ideology\nUkraine\nGeorgia\ndemocratic alliance system\nfaulty vision\nerrant U.S. policy\nUkraine\nNATO promises\nblinking red light\nspheres of interest\nU.S. national interest\ncatastrophic consequences\nIraq\nUkraine\nMiddle East\nperennial chaos\nTaliban\nAfghanistan\nIran\nChina’s economy\nAmerican economy\nfurther declines\nalready surpassed\nNATO\nChina\nSino-Russian\nNATO\nChina’s arms\nprecisely\nstrategic error\npost-American\ninevitable\naccelerated this shift\nexpanding\nglobal commitments\nU\nS\nshrinking\nUkraine\nliberal internationalists\nliberal world order\nQuite the opposite\nclinging\nU\nS\nno longer afford\nforeign commitments\ninevitable result\nadditional crises\naccelerated decline\nU\nS\nstrategically unwinding commitments\ncourt disaster\nalready arrived\nlimit the scale\ncatastrophe\nU\nS\nrestraint", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Ukraine, the rise of China, and failed interventions. Restraint avoids further crises.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the U\nS\nhas pursued a revisionist policy\nNATO\nwas pursued with naïve disregard for Russia’s security concerns\nRussia ought to have been viewed in light of\nsecurity competition with China\nmotivated by liberal ideology\nthe U\nS\nviewed Ukraine\nand Georgia\nas the logical next target for inclusion in its democratic alliance system\nThis faulty vision\nis responsible for errant U.S. policy in Ukraine\nRussia’s invasion of Georgia following NATO promises of future Georgian and Ukrainian membership\nshould have been a blinking red light that spheres of interest\ntill mattered\nmisunderstanding of the U.S. national interest has\ncatastrophic consequences in Iraq and\nUkraine\nThe Middle East is engulfed in perennial chaos\nthe Taliban on\nrule Afghanistan\nand a hostile Iran continues to wield great influence\nevery year China’s economy grows faster than the American economy\nU.S. relative power further declines\non many key measures of power\nhas already surpassed\nplans for\nNATO\nignore\nChina\nthe “need to prevent any\nSino-Russian\nalignment should be central to all thinking about the future of NATO.” It was “naive\nto assume NATO\nwould not ultimately push Russia into China’s arms\nYet\nSino-Russian alignment is\nprecisely what has occurred\nThis is a strategic error of massive consequence\nwe are now living in a “post-American” global order\nsuch a new reality may have been inevitable\nBut the U\nS\nhas accelerated this shift by expanding rather than contracting its global commitments even as its relative power basis has declined\nThe U\nS\nloudly while carrying a shrinking\nUkraine gives the lie to liberal internationalists\nwho argue\nmaintaining the liberal world order\nis simply a matter of resolve\nQuite the opposite\norder] tending” is\nclinging to a strategic lifestyle the U\nS\ncan no longer afford\nIf American foreign commitments continue to exceed American power\nthe inevitable result will be additional crises and accelerated decline\nthe U\nS\nshould begin strategically unwinding commitments it no longer has the capacity to uphold\nsagging capabilities and a sprawling defensive perimeter will court disaster\nthe disaster has already arrived\nThe U\nS\nshould\nwork to limit the scale of the catastrophe\nIf\nthe U\nS\npursues\nrestraint\ntragedy will not have been completely in vain", "role": "user" }, { "content": "NATO\npursued with\ndisregard for Russia\nfaulty vision\nresponsible for\nUkraine\ninvasion of Georgia\nshould have been\nred light\nspheres of interest\nmatter\nmisunderstanding\nhas\nconsequences in Iraq\nUkraine\nMiddle East is\nin\nchaos\nTaliban\nrule Afghanistan\nhostile Iran\nChina’s economy grows faster\nU.S\npower\ndeclines\nNATO\nignore\nChina\nSino-Russian alignment\noccurred\nwe are\nin a “post-American\norder\nIf\ncommitments\nexceed\npower\nresult will be\ncrises\nU\nS\nshould\nunwind\nlimit the scale of\ncatastrophe", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Democratic backsliding destroys the alliance.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Over the past decade, several NATO allies have taken a turn away from democracy. Hungary and Poland are sliding into illiberalism, while the rule of law has long since unraveled in Turkey. In Greece and Slovenia, press freedom is rapidly deteriorating. NATO’s newest members made substantial progress since the end of the Cold War, but democracy remains fragile in Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia. As a result, internal corruption or malign influence could readily unleash new instability.\nFrom the beginning, NATO has faced tensions over how much emphasis to put on democratic values. On one hand, NATO has always been more than just a military alliance. Its strength and resilience have long derived from the shared commitment of allies to the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. The preamble to this document stresses democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law while its second article explicitly commits to “peaceful and friendly international relations.”\nBut the alliance has not always lived up to these ideals. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, NATO debated how to deal with authoritarianism in Portugal and Greece as well as multiple coups in Turkey. Ultimately, members decided not to address the problem, instead prioritizing cohesion and geopolitical interests during a tense Cold War period. As explained by then-National Security Adviser Walt Rostow, “[T]he time has come to separate our NATO relationship from our disapproval of domestic Greek politics.”\nThis was the wrong choice then and an even worse one today. The risks of ignoring NATO’s internal strains far outweigh the benefits of addressing them. Some of the reasons are longstanding: A country’s treatment of its own citizens reflects, positively or negatively, on NATO’s brand, and an unstable domestic environment inhibits that country’s ability to meet its international obligations.\nToday, though, ignoring democratic decline carries new risks. NATO’s adversaries have become increasingly skilled at taking advantage of and, in some cases, actively exacerbating countries’ societal vulnerabilities. A compromised media environment allows disinformation campaigns to flourish, while corruption opens space for Russian networks to operate and gain influence. Moscow is also preying on the grievances of racial and ethnic minorities in NATO member countries in order to weaken national-level governance and cohesion.\nIn this context, democratic decline has empowered the leaders of some NATO states to take self-serving decisions at the expense of the alliance’s collective interests. In both Turkey and Hungary, for example, hypernationalism and corrupt ties with Russia have led to decisions that have compromised NATO decision-making and weakened the alliance’s military readiness. Turkey recently acquired a Russian S-400 missile system, for example, which can undermine NATO’s integrated air defense, and then launched an invasion of northeast Syria that endangered NATO countries’ forces on the ground. More recently, Turkey also blocked a defense plan for the Baltic states and Poland on the grounds that NATO did not sufficiently support its war against Kurdish separatist forces. Hungary has helped hamstring NATO, as well. In 2019, Budapest blocked Ukraine’s NATO Membership Action Plan and canceled meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission over a bilateral dispute regarding Kiev’s treatment of the country’s ethnically Hungarian minority.\nWhen Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg appointed experts to examine NATO’s future, they noted that a “drift toward NATO disunity … must be seen as a strategic rather than merely tactical or optical problem.” To date, allies have lacked the political will or legal instruments to effectively address in-house tensions and divergences. The European Union can theoretically address democratic backsliding through its rule of law mechanism and conditionality on its funding. NATO, by contrast, has no legal provisions for suspending or expelling an ally that violates the alliance’s founding principles and no financial carrots that might incentivize good behavior.\nGood Intentions Won’t Be Enough\nIn his first months in office, President Biden has already demonstrated a desire to defend trans-Atlantic values. Recognizing the Armenian genocide and adopting sanctions against Russia and China in coordination with Europe are only the most recent examples. But how Biden plans to translate this democratic agenda into concrete action in NATO remains unclear. A mere declaration of good intentions won’t be enough. As NATO adapts for the next decade through the “NATO 2030” process, leaders should seize the opportunity to adopt concrete solutions to defend democratic values and ultimately uphold NATO’s political cohesion.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "several NATO allies have taken a turn away from democracy\nHungary and Poland are sliding into illiberalism\nrule of law has\nunraveled in Turkey\nIn\nGreece\nand\nSlovenia\npress freedom is\ndeteriorating\ndemocracy remains fragile in\nMontenegro\nAlbania\nand\nMacedonia\ncorruption\ncould\nunleash\ninstability\ncountry’s treatment of its\ncitizens reflects\non\nNATO’s brand\nan unstable domestic environment\ninhibits\nability to meet\ninternational obligations\ndemocratic decline carries\nrisks\nNATO’s adversaries have become\nskilled at\nexacerbating countries’ societal vulnerabilities\ncompromised media\nallows\ndisinformation\nto weaken\ncohesion\ndemocratic decline\nempowered\nsome NATO states to take self-serving decisions at the expense of the alliance’s collective interests\nIn\nTurkey and Hungary\nhypernationalism and corrupt ties with Russia\nled to decisions that have compromised NATO decision-making and weakened the alliance’s military readiness\nTurkey\nacquired a Russian S-400\nand\nlaunched\ninvasion of northeast Syria\nTurkey\nblocked a defense plan for the Baltic states\nHungary\nblocked\nUkraine’s NATO Membership Action Plan\nallies\nlacked\nthe political will\nto\naddress\ndivergences\nThe E\nU\ncan\naddress democratic backsliding\nNATO\nhas no legal provisions\nhow Biden plans to translate\ndemocratic agenda into concrete action in NATO remains unclear\ndeclaration of good intentions won’t be enough", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Democratic backsliding destroys the alliance.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "several NATO allies have taken a turn away from democracy\nHungary and Poland are sliding into illiberalism\nrule of law has\nunraveled in Turkey\nIn\nGreece\nand\nSlovenia\npress freedom is\ndeteriorating\ndemocracy remains fragile in\nMontenegro\nAlbania\nand\nMacedonia\ncorruption\ncould\nunleash\ninstability\ncountry’s treatment of its\ncitizens reflects\non\nNATO’s brand\nan unstable domestic environment\ninhibits\nability to meet\ninternational obligations\ndemocratic decline carries\nrisks\nNATO’s adversaries have become\nskilled at\nexacerbating countries’ societal vulnerabilities\ncompromised media\nallows\ndisinformation\nto weaken\ncohesion\ndemocratic decline\nempowered\nsome NATO states to take self-serving decisions at the expense of the alliance’s collective interests\nIn\nTurkey and Hungary\nhypernationalism and corrupt ties with Russia\nled to decisions that have compromised NATO decision-making and weakened the alliance’s military readiness\nTurkey\nacquired a Russian S-400\nand\nlaunched\ninvasion of northeast Syria\nTurkey\nblocked a defense plan for the Baltic states\nHungary\nblocked\nUkraine’s NATO Membership Action Plan\nallies\nlacked\nthe political will\nto\naddress\ndivergences\nThe E\nU\ncan\naddress democratic backsliding\nNATO\nhas no legal provisions\nhow Biden plans to translate\ndemocratic agenda into concrete action in NATO remains unclear\ndeclaration of good intentions won’t be enough", "role": "user" }, { "content": "several\nturn away\nHungary\nPoland\nilliberalism\nrule of law\nTurkey\nGreece\nSlovenia\nfragile\nMontenegro\nAlbania\nMacedonia\ninstability\nNATO’s brand\ninhibits\ninternational obligations\ndemocratic decline\nNATO’s\nskilled\nexacerbating\nsocietal vulnerabilities\ndisinformation\ncohesion\ndemocratic decline\nNATO\nself-serving decisions\ncollective interests\nTurkey\nHungary\nRussia\ncompromised NATO decision-making\nmilitary readiness\nRussian S-400\nnortheast Syria\nBaltic states\nblocked\nlacked\ndivergences\nE\nU\ndemocratic backsliding\nNATO\nno legal provisions\nBiden\nconcrete action\nunclear\nwon’t be enough", "role": "assistant" } ]