metadata

base_model: BAAI/bge-m3
datasets: []
language: []
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics:
  - cosine_accuracy
  - dot_accuracy
  - manhattan_accuracy
  - euclidean_accuracy
  - max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags:
  - sentence-transformers
  - sentence-similarity
  - feature-extraction
  - generated_from_trainer
  - dataset_size:5000
  - loss:TripletLoss
widget:
  - source_sentence: >-
      philosophical. It is a schematic, bare-bones biography devoting only
      minimal attention to the significance of Marx's thought. It makes no
      attempt at textual exegesis beyond citations of a few " classic" passages,
      let alone at critical evaluation or interpretation of Marx's ideas. Yet
      its extremely readable style, richness of detail and highly useful manner
      of viewing Marx's life against the political history of his era, makes
      this book a service to the general public if not to the philosopher or
      Marxologist. (It should hardly need saying that Rubel is himself one of
      the world's eminent practicioners of the latter art.) Each chapter is
      devoted to six or seven years of Marx's life. Preceding each, the authors
      have included very valuable chronological tables listing major political
      events in Europe, the Americas and Asia, scientific and technological
      advances, and important works published (including notation as to whether
      Marx is known to have read them). The short biographies of various persons
      important to the life story of Marx and bibliographies of Marx's works and
      of works on Marx are also helpful. Rubel and Manale's understanding of
      Marx's intellectual development, as a unity originating in the mid1840s
      carried through consistently for the remainder of his life, is well
      documented, with due emphasis given the manuscripts of 1857-58 (the
      "Grundrisse") documenting the link between the Paris manuscripts of 1844
      and Capital so often disputed by Marxist-Leninist apologists. Because of
      its greater interest to philosophers, I shall devote the rest of this
      review to Axelos'
    sentences:
      - >-
        equations" relative to ECF+, provable in H. Similarly, we obtain from
        MUC and the recursive density theorem for ECF the corresponding results
        for ECF+; the proof of QF-AC from the recursive density theorem also
        holds good for ECF+ [T1, 2.6.20]. So far, we have shown these basic
        facts about ECF+ to be provable in H, i.e. in EL + AC-NF; but we have to
        show that they can be established in EL + QF-AC. To complete the proof,
        we note that (10) EL + AC-NF is conservative over EL + QF-AC for
        formulae of Fo [T1, 3.6.18(i)] where Fo is defined as in [T1, 3.6.3].
        (20) Almost negative predicates are transformed by the elimination
        translation r into almost negative predicates (by an induction on
        logical complexity), and therefore W+, I' are almost negative
        predicates; using this fact one then verifies that all basic properties
        of ECF+ needed can be expressed by means of formulae of F0. 2.2. REMARK.
        The method for constructing ECF+ as described here can also be used to
        construct a model ECFK of HA' + AC-NF in which the tape-2 objects are
        exactly the elements of K, and such that all the relevant closure
        conditions can be established in IDB,. ?3. The models for E-HA' + MUC.
        3.1. Preliminaries. In discussing the term models for E-HA' + MUC, we
        find it actually more convenient to take as our starting point E-HA' +
        MUC*, where MUC* is the strengthening of MUC which states in addition to
        MUC
      - >-
        s work. As Bruzina points out in his Introduction (xxvi), Axelos' s work
        on Marx is part of a trilogy entitled Le deploiement de I'errance, which
        attempts to investigate the three alleged critical stages of Western
        thought: its beginnings, in Heraclite et la philosophie: La premiire
        saisie de Vetre en devenir de la totality; its culmination, in the
        present book, the original title of which is Marx, penseur de la
        technique: De I'alienation de Vhomme a la conquete du monde; and the
        transcending passage to a new way of thought, Vers la pensee planetaire:
        Le devenir-pensee du monde et le devenir-monde de la pensee. We are thus
        thrown into a study situating Marx as the culmination of Western, and
        particularly modern Western, thought. The interpretation of the
        tradition, and of Marx's place in it, is essentially Heideggerian; after
        Heraclitus's and Parmenides's attempts to think Being as logos and
        physis, Western thought began its fall into the confusion of Being with
        particular types of entities (Plato: idea; Aristotle: entelechyenergeia;
        Christianity: Being as God or ens increatum, ens perfectissimum;
        Descartes: man's mind as subject, all other entities as objects; and
        post-Cartesian thought, culminating in Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche: human
        subjectivity as will which subdues and desolates the earth). Thus it can
        be seen at a glance that Axelos' s Marx is going to be neither the Marx
        of Marxism-Leninism (Heaven forbid!) nor of contemporary Marxology,
        i.e., the Marx of the Int J Phil Rel 12:59-64 (1981)
        0020-7047/81/0121-0059 $00.90. ©1981 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The
      - >-
        is accordingly neither confined to, nor ought it to be judged merely by
        its relative success on, the historical plane. There is, further, a
        particular methodological angle which deserves our attention. In this
        post-Freudian age, psychobiography has come to the fore. Seigel is
        profoundly interested in Eric Erickson's psychohistorical approach, in
        terms of which he believes it possible to construct a dialectical
        analysis. It is well known that Marx's thought was deeply influenced by
        Hegel's. In this regard, following his psychohistorical inclination,
        Seigel makes the unusual suggestion that the little known Hegelian
        concept of inversion can function as a central thread with which to
        elucidate three specific incidents, so far unexplained in Marx's
        biography: Marx's passage to Hegelianism; as a guiding thread in his
        interpretation of Greek philosophy in his dissertation; and as a central
        element in Capital, whose unfinished status remained the great tragedy
        of Marx's life. On the abstract level, this strategy has considerable
        intrinsic interest. Transcending any mere assemblage of the documented
        or documentable facts about Marx's life, the interest here is clearly to
        tie together little understood events early and late in terms of a
        single explanatory principle which is intended to shed light on
        supposedly dark corners of Marx's life and thought. Rather than
        appealing to such frequently employed techniques as the patient
        collection of data, or the careful reassessment of the known events of
        Marx's life, or even the critical reinterpretation of his writings, a
  - source_sentence: >-
      really know what I have to face? Has she felt anything like this set of
      forces on her road to holiness? More to our point here, what does this
      saint, Vincent de Paul, know of business of the push and pull and
      particular grind of this world? Granting the depth and richness of his
      spiritual experience, was it shaped, at least analogously, by the kinds of
      pressures which the business person has to withstand? Does his path to
      holiness go through anything like the terrain of the modern business
      climate? If not, this saint's story, too, lifts off from this world and
      flies into its own orbit, perhaps admired but from too remote a distance
      to have influence. In short, what are the possi bilities of getting the
      two worlds together? The second issue concerns the manner in which lives
      of exemplars have been brought to bear upon moral thinking. One method
      might be termed prescriptive. It asks what directives for living can be
      drawn from the actions and atti tudes this person showed? There are
      principles and behavior patterns embedded in this saint's life which can
      serve as guides for present action. Francis of Assisi, for instance, out
      of a profound desire live out his sense of total dependence on God, made
      his way by begging. Therefore, there should be some embracing of radical
      unpre dictability and a large dose of reliance on others in our affairs
      also. The example is awkward perhaps, but it points up the method of
      drawing relatively clear moral lessons from
    sentences:
      - >-
        the holy one's life. While this approach affords a kind of clarity, it
        stands on shaky ground because of the often times wide gap between the
        saint's era and the present. The historically consciousness reader is
        wary of clear and simple crossovers. Too many changed circumstances and
        new assumptions lie in the valley between the distant past and now. If
        the moral directives have not been carefully passed through the screen
        of shifting horizons, they appear stretched and even fanciful. Applica
        tions to current situations are suspected of being as much a projection
        of the interpreter's agenda as it is a transmission of the saint's
        morality. An alternate way of bringing saints to bear on moral thinking
        is through the imagination. Most readers are familiar with recent
        attention to the role affect plays in following the good. Logic may
        package norms clearly and distinctly, but of itself does not bring about
        adherence. The deeper emotions must come into play as the engines which
        drive toward the good. Ethical reckoning happens primordially in the
        imagination where the attraction or repulsion of a given value
        registers. On a foundation level, moral education aims for the affect.
        It works to shape the image field in which the good is pictured. The
        rightly-told story of a saint appeals directly to the imagination. The
        narrative of his or her life presents a drama which invites in the
        listener much more as participant than spectator. Such a biography lays
      - >-
        principle whence all else follows. It knows that that principle is the
        divine essence and that, in this life, we cannot properly know it. On
        the other hand, it does not renounce all thought of synthesis to settle
        down to teaching catechism ; for it knows that there is such a thing as
        imperfect understanding. Systematically, it proceeds to that limited
        goal.1 (4) Matters of faith are not fit objects for science. Some
        clarification is in order here. For Aquinas, Christian beliefs fall into
        two categories : those that can be known by science and those that
        cannot. The ones that can be known by science are yet often known by
        faith. Further, this is a good thing : some people are too stupid to
        know by science what they believe by faith. And even people able to know
        by science what they believe by faith, may take longer to arrive at the
        belief by science. Moreover, beliefs acquired by faith may be more
        stable, more 'free of doubt and uncertainty, ' than the more abstruse
        deliverances of science (ST 11,11,2.4). The belief that there is an
        unmoved mover falls within the province of science though that belief is
        often held through faith. The belief that there is a Trinity is strictly
        outside the province of science. (5) Our assent to Christian doctrines
        has no natural explanation. The natural light of reason, even if it
        enjoins us to assent that there is a God, does not afford us any further
        information
      - >-
        crushing to our smaller vanities, that there is no break in the seamless
        robe wherewith the universe is dressed. The facile distinction between
        moral education on the one hand and religious education on the other is
        drawn readily enough, and has its conveniences; but to conceive that at
        such and such a point the one ends and at such and such a point the
        other begins is to disrupt the universe. Moral education without vista
        is no education at all; it is truncated pedantry. Moral education only
        then begins to exercise its more potent ministry when it confronts and
        astounds and overwhelms us with categorical imperatives whose origins
        are wrapped in mystery but whose obligatoriness upon us for this very
        reason is immediate and certain and bows us in submission and awe. Some
        Essentials of Moral Education. 477 The moral education then of which we
        speak, and the "character" in which it culminates, must be conceived as
        embracing in their content an element, which, for want of more adequate
        words to express it, we call wonder, reverence, awe; an attitude of the
        soul which proves to be the Bridge of the Gods to the highest Realities.
        One more element we presuppose as inherent in the "character" in which
        moral education finds its culmination, namely, that passion for human
        service which spends itself and is spent for others without miserly
        calculation or circumstantial prudence; which with a pure
        disinterestedness repays the debt it owes to humanity and is ready at
        any
  - source_sentence: >-
      between stuffs and things is complex and highly controversial, but it can
      be roughly understood as the distinction prevailing between objects and
      their constituting matter. Statues, tables, and trees are paradigmatic
      examples of objects, whereas copper, water, and wood are paradigmatic
      examples of stuffs. Objects and stuffs differ in many respects. For
      example, unlike individual things, stuffs persist despite division and
      transformation. If a statue made of bronze is melted to obtain two bronze
      cups, the statue disappears whereas the bronze persists. I will argue that
      olfactory perception involves being acquainted with stuffs rather than
      particular objects and that the notion of stuff is essential for
      understanding the idiosyncratic characteristics of olfaction. The argument
      will proceed as follows. In the first part, I will give a short inventory
      of olfactory experiences. In the second part, I will show how most
      philosophical accounts fail to do justice to the phenomenology of
      olfactory experiences. In the last part, I will argue that olfactory
      experiences present compelling evidence that odors are properties of
      stuffs. 2 A world of odors Unlike colors, and to a lesser extent sounds,
      odors and olfaction have received little attention from philosophers. In
      philosophy, odors are sometimes mentioned to illustrate the distinction
      between primary and secondary qualities (Locke 1690) or to exemplify the
      category of "sense-data" (Russell 1912) or "qualia" (Campbell 2004;
      Jackson 1982), but they are rarely considered for their own
    sentences:
      - >-
        same olfactory level throughout an exhibition. Important as these
        practical issues are, the focus of the remainder of our article is on
        two theoretical questions: In what ways are smells suitable objects of
        aesthetic attention, and given that olfactory works are now an accepted
        part of the artworld, what are their special characteristics and
        limitations as serious art? This second question will lead to a final
        one concerning the art status of the most ancient of olfactory arts,
        perfume. II. THE PREJUDICE AGAINST SMELL As a first step in exploring
        these issues, we need to consider a longstanding philosophical prejudice
        against the so-called lower senses of smell, taste, and touch that has
        often led to the denial of their suitability for aesthetic reflection.
        From the ancient world into the twentieth century, majority opinion
        among philosophers has been that these senses are far beneath vision and
        hearing in dignity, intellectual power, and refinement.'1 The classic
        philosophical application of this view to the aesthetic realm is Plato's
        claim in Hippias Major that "beauty is the pleasant which comes through
        the senses of hearing and sight," whereas the pleasures of the other
        senses should not be called beautiful." Aristotle agreed on the
        superiority of sight and hearing, but also offered a more extensive and
        nuanced account of the senses.12 Although human taste, touch, and smell
        are sources of pleasure, not just of utility, the objects of the lower
        senses, for Aristotle, have no connection to moral qualities as do the
        pleasures of vision and hearing that are involved
      - >-
        interest. Thomas Reid's work is a notable exception; an entire chapter
        of his Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense
        ([1764] 2000) is dedicated to smell. It is remarkable that Reid's
        discussion of the external senses starts with a long chapter devoted to
        olfaction. Reid's justification for this choice is that an inquiry into
        human understanding must proceed from the simplest to the more complex
        and that the same principle should be applied to the philosophical
        examination of the senses. Therefore. Reid starts his discussion of the
        senses with olfaction not because it is "the noblest, or the most
        useful"4 sense, but because it is, according to him. the simplest.
        Reid's view regarding the simplicity of smell appears to have roots in
        antiquity. Aristotle, for example, considers smell to be both poor and
        inaccurate: Smell and its object are much less easy to determine than
        what we have hitherto discussed; the distinguishing characteristic of
        the object of smell is less obvious than those of sound or colour. The
        ground of this is that our power of smell is less discriminating and in
        general inferior to that of many species of animals; men have a poor
        sense of smell and our apprehension of its 3 See Casati and Dokic
        (2005). 4 chap. II, section II. <£) Springer 236 V. Mizrahi proper
        objects is inseparably bound up with and so confused by pleasure and
        pain, which shows that in us the organ is inaccurate.5 The goal of this
        section is to rehabilitate the sense of olfaction in view of such
        allegations by showing with a
      - >-
        question, how to think the fundamental unity of thought and Being before
        this unity is broken by the insertion of a subject doing the thinking.
        This article is only one instance in a long series of relections,
        ranging from the Phe'nome'nologie de l'experience esthe'tique to Le
        Poetique, on Nature and its relation to humanity and art. There is
        "nature," the ensemble of all phenomena, and there is "Nature," which is
        an "anonymous, blind force" (Phe'nome'nologie 1: 134) which is the
        source of nature, humanity, and art. Nature, on the other hand, needs
        art to be articulated and glorified. The following essay is "The A
        Priori of Imagination" (1965), and in it Dufreene argues against Kant
        that the a priori is not just a subjective condition of objectivity, but
        rather is in the object as well. The imagination's function is to reveal
        this objective meaning to us. The next essay, "The Imaginary" (1976),
        deals first with images, the imagination, the imaginary, and the real
        and the unreal, all played off against Jean-Paul Sartre's descriptions
        of the imagination. The second, and much shorter part of the article,
        considers, successively, desire and world, desire and language, language
        and world, language and desire, image and world, and finally image and
        language. Following "The Imaginary" is a very short piece, "Eye and
        Mind" (no entry in the Bibliography, thus no date available). This is a
        very clear and helpful, albeit too brief, commentary on Maurice
        Merleau-Ponty's Eye and Mind and through it, the latter's final
        philosophical project
  - source_sentence: >-
      construed as the personal/subjective degrees of belief of Bayesian agents
      is an old one. In recent years the idea has been vigorously pursued by a
      group of physicists who fly the banner of quantum
    sentences:
      - >-
        Bayesianism (QBism). The present paper aims to identify the prospects
        and problems of implementing QBism, and it critically assesses the claim
        that QBism provides a resolution (or dissolution)
      - >-
        divorcing moral responsibility from free will setting aside the threat
        of Frankfurt-style cases.6 There are two reasons for this restriction of
        focus. First, Wallace's strategy is offered as a logically independent
        strategy to Fischer's. Hence, it is important to evaluate it on its own
        merits. Second, I believe that the success of Frankfurt-style cases
        depends on the plausibility of the belief that moral responsibility
        requires free will. Defenders of Frankfurt-style cases have been
        hard-pressed to furnish a case in which an agent is clearly morally
        responsible and clearly lacks access to alternative possibilities. This
        has led many defenders of Frankfurt-style cases to contend that the true
        of aim of Frankfurt-style cases is to show that access to alternative
        possibilities is not explanatorily relevant, even if it is necessary
        (cf. Hunt 2005; Leon and Tognazzini 2010; Pereboom 200 1).7 An adequate
        response to the neo-Frankfurtian attack requires a direct defense of the
        thesis that moral responsibility requires free will. By offering a
        theory of pleas that is simple, unified, plausible, and has just this
        consequence, my theory serves as a partial response to proponents of
        Frankfurtstyle cases. Therefore, my defense of my proffered theory of
        pleas and the thesis that moral responsibility requires free will are
        conditional up on the failure of these cases.8 I begin by laying out R.
        Jay Wallace's (1994) theory of the normative force of excuses and
        exemptions. I believe that Wallace's theory of exemptions is sound, but
        that his account of
      - >-
        allows, on the one hand, for learning from experience and, on the other
        hand, avoids admitting observation reports into evidence (R. C. Jeffrey
        (5), ch. 11). I find Jeffrey's brave efforts inadequate to the job and
        have said so elsewhere (I. Levi (11) and (12)). Whatever the merits of
        Jeffrey's proposals, they constitute a rejection of conditionalization
        as the sole principle of rational probability revision. Other pressures
        have induced authors who tend to identify themselves as Bayesians to
        strip exclusive status away from the principle of conditionalization. P.
        Suppes acknowledges that conceptual innovation involves shifts in
        probability judgement which conditionalization cannot accommodate. If
        such shifts are to be brought under rational control, conditionalization
        will have to be supplemented by other principles (P. Suppes (18), p.
        64). Thus, even within the Bayesian camp, serious doubts have been
        raised concerning the exclusive rights of conditionalization as a
        principle of rational probability revision. As a consequence, the force
        of the argument purporting to show that evidential assumptions accorded
        probability 1 must be immune to correction has been substantially
        undermined. With the demise of this argument, much of the case against
        allowing fallible assumptions maximum probability withers away. Not only
        have Bayesians failed to muster decisive arguments against according
        probability 1 to fallible assumptions, a good case can be made in
        support of the view that a viable Bayesian (or quasi Bayesian) approach
        to inference requires granting evidential status to fallible
        assumptions. 302 NOOS According to Leonard Savage, Bayesians who endorse
        a subjectivist or personalist interpretation of
  - source_sentence: >-
      structural affinity between the case study as a genre of writing and the
      question of gendered subjectivity. With John Forrester's chapter
      'Inventing Gender Identity: The Case of Agnes' as my starting point, I ask
      how the case of
    sentences:
      - >-
        justified (D-justified) at t if it doesn't fit S's O-evidence at t, but
        S would have O-evidence of the appropriate kind (this derivative
        evidence amounting to D-evidence) were she to think of p (see Feldman
        1988, pp. 98-99). In the example above, I was too busy with the paper to
        entertain any evidence that could support the belief that the PIN code
        is ####. So my O-evidence didn't encompass anything supporting such
        belief. However, I had the disposition, upon considering my PIN code, to
        generate O-evidence of the appropriate kind: in the sense just
        presented, I had D-evidence. Since the quotation also seems to suggest
        that a true (stored) belief, if D-justified, may count as D-knowledge,
        it shows that the evidentialist is not banned from acknowledging that I
        did know my PIN code, even if this knowledge has a somehow derivative
        status, that of D-knowledge. This interpretation of Feldman's reply
        raises two important concerns, respec tively related to the notion of
        dispositional justification and the notion of dispositional knowledge.
        Let us begin by taking into account Goldman's worry, according to which
        no clear sense can be attached to the suggestion that a belief may be
        D-justified in the sense just adumbrated. The discussion of what must be
        added to D-justification in order to turn a true belief into D-knowledge
        shall not occupy us until the final part of the paper. A. Goldman has
        called into question Feldman's answer (Goldman 1999, pp. 278 279, 2002,
        p. 9). He has written: "if having a disposition to generate conscious
        evidential states
      - >-
        consideration, Oliver unravels the consequences of this strange
        chiasmus-the resymbolization of the body and the embodiment of the
        Symbolic-for psychoanalysis, feminism, linguistics, ethics, and
        political theory. Although it draws on a variety of discourses ranging
        from philosophy to religion, from aesthetics to politics, Reading
        Kristeva privileges in a certain way the psychoanalytic framework as it
        focuses on Kristeva's most psychoanalytic texts from the 1980s and early
        1990s. Accounting for Kristeva's interventions and revisions of
        psychoanalytic theory, Reading Kristeva points to the crucial
        differences not only between Kristeva and Jacques Lacan, but also
        between Kristeva and other French feminists, especially Luce Irigaray
        and Helene Cixous. The main challenge to the psychoanalytic theory,
        Oliver argues, lies in Kristeva's claim that the maternal function
        prefigures the oedipal structure and at the same time prevents its
        closure. The nodal points of these pre-oedipal relations are constituted
        by the narcissistic subject, the abject maternal body (constituting the
        pattern of rejection and negation), and the imaginary father (setting up
        the pattern of reduplication and identification). Reading Kristeva
        offers us many engaging and original readings of the difficult moments
        in Kristeva's work. One can mention, for instance, an excellent account
        of the structure of the primary narcissism, which, as the original
        displacement to the place of the Other, sets up the logic of
        reduplication and "the possibility of metaphorical shifting" (74). Yet
        probably the most original contribution of Oliver's book to feminist
        psychoanalytic theory lies in its re-interpretation of the imaginary
        father, one of
      - >-
        'Agnes' continues to inform our understanding of different disciplinary
        approaches (sociological and psychoanalytic) to theorizing gender. I
        establish a conversation between distinct, psychoanalytically informed
        feminisms (Simone
model-index:
  - name: SentenceTransformer based on BAAI/bge-m3
    results:
      - task:
          type: triplet
          name: Triplet
        dataset:
          name: all nli test
          type: all-nli-test
        metrics:
          - type: cosine_accuracy
            value: 0.8085
            name: Cosine Accuracy
          - type: dot_accuracy
            value: 0.1915
            name: Dot Accuracy
          - type: manhattan_accuracy
            value: 0.8085
            name: Manhattan Accuracy
          - type: euclidean_accuracy
            value: 0.8085
            name: Euclidean Accuracy
          - type: max_accuracy
            value: 0.8085
            name: Max Accuracy

SentenceTransformer based on BAAI/bge-m3

This is a sentence-transformers model finetuned from BAAI/bge-m3. It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 1024-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.

Model Details

Model Description

Model Type: Sentence Transformer
Base model: BAAI/bge-m3
Maximum Sequence Length: 8192 tokens
Output Dimensionality: 1024 tokens
Similarity Function: Cosine Similarity

Model Sources

Documentation: Sentence Transformers Documentation
Repository: Sentence Transformers on GitHub
Hugging Face: Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face

Full Model Architecture

SentenceTransformer(
  (0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: XLMRobertaModel 
  (1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 1024, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': True, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
  (2): Normalize()
)

Usage

Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

First install the Sentence Transformers library:

pip install -U sentence-transformers

Then you can load this model and run inference.

from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer

# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/bge-m3-philosophy-triplets_v1")
# Run inference
sentences = [
    "structural affinity between the case study as a genre of writing and the question of gendered subjectivity. With John Forrester's chapter 'Inventing Gender Identity: The Case of Agnes' as my starting point, I ask how the case of",
    "'Agnes' continues to inform our understanding of different disciplinary approaches (sociological and psychoanalytic) to theorizing gender. I establish a conversation between distinct, psychoanalytically informed feminisms (Simone",
    'consideration, Oliver unravels the consequences of this strange chiasmus-the resymbolization of the body and the embodiment of the Symbolic-for psychoanalysis, feminism, linguistics, ethics, and political theory. Although it draws on a variety of discourses ranging from philosophy to religion, from aesthetics to politics, Reading Kristeva privileges in a certain way the psychoanalytic framework as it focuses on Kristeva\'s most psychoanalytic texts from the 1980s and early 1990s. Accounting for Kristeva\'s interventions and revisions of psychoanalytic theory, Reading Kristeva points to the crucial differences not only between Kristeva and Jacques Lacan, but also between Kristeva and other French feminists, especially Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous. The main challenge to the psychoanalytic theory, Oliver argues, lies in Kristeva\'s claim that the maternal function prefigures the oedipal structure and at the same time prevents its closure. The nodal points of these pre-oedipal relations are constituted by the narcissistic subject, the abject maternal body (constituting the pattern of rejection and negation), and the imaginary father (setting up the pattern of reduplication and identification). Reading Kristeva offers us many engaging and original readings of the difficult moments in Kristeva\'s work. One can mention, for instance, an excellent account of the structure of the primary narcissism, which, as the original displacement to the place of the Other, sets up the logic of reduplication and "the possibility of metaphorical shifting" (74). Yet probably the most original contribution of Oliver\'s book to feminist psychoanalytic theory lies in its re-interpretation of the imaginary father, one of',
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 1024]

# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]

Evaluation

Metrics

Triplet

Dataset: all-nli-test
Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.8085
dot_accuracy	0.1915
manhattan_accuracy	0.8085
euclidean_accuracy	0.8085
max_accuracy	0.8085

Training Details

Training Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

Size: 5,000 training samples
Columns: anchor, positive, and negative

Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

	anchor	positive	negative
type	string	string	string
details	min: 16 tokens mean: 276.83 tokens max: 597 tokens	min: 12 tokens mean: 276.4 tokens max: 571 tokens	min: 25 tokens mean: 295.99 tokens max: 607 tokens

Samples:

anchor	positive	negative
`have argued from broadly conciliationist premises that we should not. If they are right, we philosophers face a dilemma: if we believe our views, we are irrational; if we do not, we are not sincere in`	`holding them. This paper offers a way out, proposing an attitude we can rationally take toward our views that can support sincerity of the appropriate sort. We should arrive at our views via a certain sort of`	the subtle weighing of various factors involved in being responsive to ail aspects of a complex issue. He is likely to attach too much or too little weight to a single principle or a single distinction. And in matters of public dispute, it is the sensibility of the average person rather than the trained philosopher that seems most relevant. In this paper I will explore the possibility that the relevant criterion of "rational" or "reasonable" belief can be derived not from social science, clinical psychology, or philosophical dialectics, but from the rhetorical tradition stemming from Aristotle. Actually, Clifford seems to point in this direction when he writes, No one man's belief is . . . a private matter which concerns himself alone. Our lives are guided by that generai conception of the course of things which has been created by society for social purposes.11 I will assume that actions that tend to harm the interests of others are prima fade immoral, and should prima fade be restricted by society, without trying to defìne "harm," "interest," or "immoral."12 (I will also leave aside the difficult issue of actions causing harm only to oneself.) I will assume that belief s about justice and social groups are sufficiently voluntary that we can rightly be held responsible for them. This seems reasonable, since such belief s rest on évidence toward which each person must take up an attitude of acceptance, rejection, or something in between. I will not be concerned with whether the belief s are true or false, but with whether the act of
nature, and its effort to search for the truth is obscured by the passions. The inherent capacity of the soul for self-realization is also obstructed by the veil of karma.4 It is subjected to the forces of karma, which express themselves, first, through the feelings and emotions and, secondly, in the chains of very subtle kinds of matter invisible to the eye and all ordinary instruments of knowledge. It is then embodied and is affected by the environment-physical, social, and spiritual. Thus, various typeg of soul existence come into being. Karma, according to the Jainas, is material in nature. It is matter in a subtle form and is a substantive force. It is constituted of finer particles of matter. The kind of matter fit to manifest karma is everywhere in the universe. It has the special property of developing the effects of merit and demerit. By its activity due to contact with the physical world, the soul becomes penetrated 2 Ibid., p. 15. 3 Dravya-sthagraha, II. 4 Umisaviti, Tattvarthadhigama-siftra, J. L. Jaini, trans. (Arrah: The Central Jaina Publishing House, 1920). KARMA IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 231 with particles of karmic body (karma-sartra), which are constantly attached to the soul until the soul succeeds in freeing itself from the body. "Nowhere has the physical nature of karma been asserted with more stress than in Jainism."5 A moral fact produces a psychophysical quality, a real and not merely a symbolic mark, affecting the soul in its physical nature. This point of view has been worked out in detail in the form of mathematical calculation in the	Karma-grantha. The Jaina tradition distinguishes two aspects: (1) the physical aspect (dravya-karma) and (2) the psychic aspect (bhavakarma). The physical aspect comprises the particles of karma accruing to the soul and polluting it. The psychic aspect is primarily the mental states and events arising out of the activity of mind, body, and speech--they are like the mental traces of the actions, since we experience the mnemic traces long after the experienced conscious states vanish. Physical karma and psychic karma are mutually related as cause and effect." The distinction between the physical and the psychic aspects of karma is psychologically significant, since it presents the interaction of the bodily and the mental due to the incessant activity of the soul. This bondage of the soul to karma is of four types, according to its nature (prakrti), duration (sthiti), intensity (anubhaga, rasa), and quantity (pradeda) . Karma can be distinguished into eight types: (1) finanavaran~iya, that which obscures right knowledge; (2) darianavaraniya, that which obscures right intuition; (3) vedaniya, that which arouses affective states such as feelings and emotions ; (4) mohaniya, that which deludes right faith; (5) dyu-karma, that which determines the age of the individual; (6) nama-karma, that which produces various circumstances collectively making up an individual existence, such as the body and other special qualities of individuality; (7) gotra-karma, that which determines the family, social standing, etc., of the individual; (8) antardya-karma, that which obstructs the	was that even the gods were subject to the inexorable law of Karma. Of the schools based on the Veda, the Nyaya-Vai§esika system, which is mainly concerned with logic and dialectics, may be described as realistic. It has an interesting atomic theory, and regards the physical universe as ultimately consisting of an indefinite number of atoms of four types, plus three infinite and pervasive entities-ether (dkAsa, regarded as the substratum of sound), time, and space. This system regards the whole and its parts as quite distinct and postulates a special relation (samavaya, "inherence") between them, which is described by Mr. Hiriyanna as "a metaphysical fiction." The same relationship is supposed to obtain between a universal and the particulars which it characterizes. Universals in this doctrine are regarded as eternal and independently real, not as transient configurations of particular objects (Jain view) or as purely conceptual (Buddhist view). 267 PHILOSOPHY The Sankhya and Yoga schools form another composite system, which regards both matter and spirit as ultimately real and admits a plurality of selves. It differs from the Nyaya-VaiSesika in tracing the whole of the physical universe to a single source called Prakrti. Purusa and Prakrti, or spirit and nature, are the two basic conceptions of the doctrine (p. 107). Spirit without nature (or "matter") is inoperative and nature without spirit is blind. The knowledge of the ultimate separateness of these two principles is stated to be the means to release. The philosophical
`the hundredth anniversary of the publication of Nishida Kitaro's An Inquiry into the Good. The following is an English version of a talk delivered on that occasion. In it I have`	`tried to argue against the widely held view that this maiden work contains the germ of Nishida's mature philosophy, and at the same time to suggest that an early strain of ambiguity`	`the origins of this important work, a text often seen as marking the beginning of Modern Japanese philosophy. I will show that while Buddhism is an important part of Nishida's early intellectual development, there is ample biographical and textual evidence to suggest that zen no kenkyu is at its core a text which attempts to solve key ethical problems via a modern interpretation of concepts`

Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

{
    "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.EUCLIDEAN",
    "triplet_margin": 5
}

Evaluation Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

Size: 1,000 evaluation samples
Columns: anchor, positive, and negative

Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

	anchor	positive	negative
type	string	string	string
details	min: 13 tokens mean: 279.94 tokens max: 554 tokens	min: 15 tokens mean: 279.37 tokens max: 527 tokens	min: 17 tokens mean: 298.26 tokens max: 506 tokens

Samples:

anchor	positive	negative
Y involves not only fitting particular curves from some given hypothesis space to the data but also making ‘higher’ level decisions about which general family or functional form (linear, quadratic, etc.) is most appropriate. There may be a still higher level allowing choice between expansions in polynomials and expansions in Fourier series. At the lowest level of the hierarchical model representing curve fitting, theories T 0 specify specific curves, such as } $y=2x+3$ or } $y=x^{2}-4$ , that we fit to the data. At the next level of the hierarchy, theories T 1 are distinguished by the maximum degree of the polynomial they assign to curves in the low‐level hypothesis space. For instance, T 1 could be the theory Poly1, with maximum polynomial degree 1. An alternative T 1 is Poly2, with maximum polynomial degree 2, and so on. At a higher level, there are two possible theories that specify that T 1 theories are either polynomials or Fourier series, respectively. The model also specifies the conditional probabilities } $p( T_{0} T_{1}) $ and } $p( T_{1} T_{2}) $ . At each level of the HBM, the alternative theories are mutually exclusive. In this example, Poly1 and Poly2 are taken to be mutually exclusive alternatives. We will see soon how this should be understood.	We now suggest that HBMs are particularly apt models in certain respects of scientific inference. They provide a natural way to represent a broadly Kuhnian picture of the structure and dynamics of scientific theories. Let us first highlight some of the key features of the structure and dynamics of scientific theories to which historians and philosophers with a historical orientation (Kuhn 1962; Lakatos 1978; Laudan 1978) have been particularly attentive and for which HBMs provide a natural model. It has been common in philosophy of science, particularly in this tradition, to distinguish at least two levels of hierarchical structure: a higher level consisting of a paradigm, research program, or research tradition and a lower level of more specific theories or hypotheses. Paradigms, research programs, and research traditions have been invested with a number of different roles. Kuhn’s paradigms, for instance, may carry with them a commitment to specific forms of instrumentation and to general theoretical goals and methodologies, such as an emphasis on quantitative prediction or a distaste for unobservable entities. However, one of the primary functions of paradigms and their like is to contain what we will call ‘framework theories’, which comprise abstract	what they focus primarily on what Prof. Kuhn had said PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS 119 about the products of scientific communities scientific theories and the empirical claims associated with them. Other aspects of his theory dealing with the scientific communities are however peripherally touched. In particular, both Prof. Stegm?ller and I, in somewhat different ways, try to explain what it is for a person 'zu verf?gen ?ber' or 'to have' a theory. I have explained my conception of logical reconstruction of physical theories and the extent of its normative aspect. ([4], p. 4). I still believe this account of the matter to be correct and I now believe the account applies as well to logical reconstructions of theories in the science of science. I think the principal consideration is faithfulness to the 'existing exposition' of the theory. Within this, normative considerations of logical consistency, clarity and systematic elegance operate. Only at doubtful points where the existing exposition is ambiguous or unclear should normative consideration dominate the existing exposition. This means that in reconstructing a theory of science we are primarily concerned with exhibiting what the theory tells us about the way scientific communities work in particular, but not exclusively, what it tells us about how their products change over time. Whether the theory's account is true, whether it agrees with some preconceived account of 'scientific rationality', and whether it suggests some 'better' alternatives for meeting society's infor? mation needs are all different and distinct questions. The first and last, at least, are obviously interesting. 2. THE PRODUCTS
obligation'O'-signify an all-things-considered obligation. This claim is harmless if it simply expresses our intention to call only all-things-considered moral requirements "duties" or "obligations" and to treat 'prima facie obligation' as a technical term. But I think that more than this is usually intended by those who deny that prima facie obligations are genuine obligations, and their denial rests on a misunderstanding of prima facie obligations that it is important to avoid. These writers sometimes say that prima facie obligations are merely apparent obligations such that they have no moral force if overridden.7 But this does not fit our understanding of prima facie obligations or Ross's. As Ross points out, we should not understand prima facie obligations as the epistemic claim that certain things appear to be obligatory that may not prove to be.8 This reading does not imply that there is any moral reason supporting x corresponding to the prima facie obligation to do x. Rather, prima facie obligations should be given a metaphysical reading that recognizes prima facie obligations as moral forces that are not canceled by the existence of other moral forces even if the latter override or defeat the former.9 Now Ross does say that prima facie duties are conditional duties 6Foot recognizes genuine obligations that may be overridden (type-i obligations) and distinguishes them from the obligation associated with what there is the most moral reason to do (type-2 obligations), and so recognizes something like the distinction that I intend between prima facie and all-things-considered obligations. But she	seems to treat prima facie obligations epistemically or statistically (see text below) and so does not want to equate the type-1/type-2 distinction with the prima facie/all-thingsconsidered distinction. See Philippa Foot, "Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma," reprinted in Moral Dilemmas, ed. C. Gowans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 256-57. Because I reject these readings of prima facie obligations, our distinctions are similar. 7See Bernard Williams, "Ethical Consistency," reprinted in Moral Dilemmas, ed. Gowans, 125, 126; Bas van Fraassen, "Values and the Heart's Command," ibid., 141, 142; Ruth Barcan Marcus, "Moral Dilemmas and Consistency," ibid., 191; Foot, "Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma," 257. 8The Right and the Good, 20. 90n the metaphysical reading, a prima facie obligation expresses a pro tanto moral obligation or moral reason. 218 MORAL CONFLICT AND ITS STRUCTURE and not duties proper.'0 This, I believe, reflects only his decision to reserve the terms 'duty' and 'obligation' for all-things-considered moral claims. If we concede this to him, then we can explain most of his claims about prima facie obligations on our model. Prima facie obligations are conditional (all-things-considered) duties in the sense that if all else is equal, then there is not only a prima facie obligation to do x but also a genuine or all-things-considered obligation. Sometimes Ross says that prima facie obligations refer to features of an act that tend to make acts of that type (all-things-considered) obligatory." This claim admits of a purely statistical reading: though there may be nothing about this token act	a situation, and it can still be right to break the promise. This is because two prima facie duties can come into conflict. We may, for example, have promised to meet a friend for lunch, but meet a stranger in dire need of help along the way. In such a case, there will be a conflict of prima facie duties: it would be prima facie right to keep the promise, but it is also prima facie right to help those in need when we are able. In such a case, the right thing to do may very well be to help the stranger, and thus break our promise to our friend. One prima facie duty, therefore, can be overridden by another. Even when a prima facie duty is overridden, however, it still retains its force. Our judgment that, overall, it is right to break our promise does not mean that promise-breaking, in this case, does give us some reason to think the action wrong. It simply doesn't give us enough of a reason. To borrow Robert Audi's phrase, Dancy interprets prima facie duties as "ineradicable but overridable." (Audi, 1997, p. 35) This, it turns out, is what makes Ross a generalist. As Dancy writes, It is clearly a generalist account, in that it maintains that what is a reason here must be the same reason everywhere. (Dancy, 1993, p. 96) 6 The most important source for Ross's theory is (Ross, 1930). For a later statement congruent with these central claims see: (Ross,
`over another's duties grounds rights. The Will Theory has commonly been objected to on the grounds that it undergenerates right-ascriptions along three fronts. This paper systematically examines a range of positions open`	`to the Will Theory in response to these counterexamples, while being faithful to the Will Theory's focus on normative control. It argues that of the seemingly plausible ways the defender of the Will Theory can proceed, one`	monstrous to admit as a subjective determinant of the will any element which has not intelligible roots in the character of the agent. An act of will which does not spring from the self's character, it is said, is obviously not the self's act at all. It is of no more use to the wise Libertarian than to the Determinist. This may fairly be said to have established itself as a philosophical cliche. It is also, as I believe, and as I have argued more than once elsewhere, a devastating error which has played havoc withl the whole free will controversy. My purpose at the moment, however, is merely to point out that here, in the climate of philosophical opinion, there has been an additional encouragement to the psychologist to give a preference to one of the two rival hypotheses concerning the experience of will-effort. It is, I hope, not unfair to suggest that psychologists have often approached the analysis of the experience of will-effort with a rather definite expectation of finding that, even from the standpoint of psychology, there is nothing which lends countenance to the notion of a form of mental energy which, while not intelligibly rooted in character, can yet influence the act of choice. One further word before commencing consideration of the more important of the psychological analyses which proceed along what, for the sake of a convenient label, we may call " Determinist " lines. We ought to be clear at the outset about the fundamental requirement which any such analysis

Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

{
    "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.EUCLIDEAN",
    "triplet_margin": 5
}

Training Hyperparameters

Non-Default Hyperparameters

eval_strategy: steps
per_device_train_batch_size: 4
per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
learning_rate: 1e-05
num_train_epochs: 5
warmup_ratio: 0.1
batch_sampler: no_duplicates

All Hyperparameters

Click to expand

overwrite_output_dir: False
do_predict: False
eval_strategy: steps
prediction_loss_only: True
per_device_train_batch_size: 4
per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
per_gpu_train_batch_size: None
per_gpu_eval_batch_size: None
gradient_accumulation_steps: 1
eval_accumulation_steps: None
learning_rate: 1e-05
weight_decay: 0.0
adam_beta1: 0.9
adam_beta2: 0.999
adam_epsilon: 1e-08
max_grad_norm: 1.0
num_train_epochs: 5
max_steps: -1
lr_scheduler_type: linear
lr_scheduler_kwargs: {}
warmup_ratio: 0.1
warmup_steps: 0
log_level: passive
log_level_replica: warning
log_on_each_node: True
logging_nan_inf_filter: True
save_safetensors: True
save_on_each_node: False
save_only_model: False
restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint: False
no_cuda: False
use_cpu: False
use_mps_device: False
seed: 42
data_seed: None
jit_mode_eval: False
use_ipex: False
bf16: False
fp16: False
fp16_opt_level: O1
half_precision_backend: auto
bf16_full_eval: False
fp16_full_eval: False
tf32: None
local_rank: 0
ddp_backend: None
tpu_num_cores: None
tpu_metrics_debug: False
debug: []
dataloader_drop_last: False
dataloader_num_workers: 0
dataloader_prefetch_factor: None
past_index: -1
disable_tqdm: False
remove_unused_columns: True
label_names: None
load_best_model_at_end: False
ignore_data_skip: False
fsdp: []
fsdp_min_num_params: 0
fsdp_config: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap: None
accelerator_config: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
deepspeed: None
label_smoothing_factor: 0.0
optim: adamw_torch
optim_args: None
adafactor: False
group_by_length: False
length_column_name: length
ddp_find_unused_parameters: None
ddp_bucket_cap_mb: None
ddp_broadcast_buffers: False
dataloader_pin_memory: True
dataloader_persistent_workers: False
skip_memory_metrics: True
use_legacy_prediction_loop: False
push_to_hub: False
resume_from_checkpoint: None
hub_model_id: None
hub_strategy: every_save
hub_private_repo: False
hub_always_push: False
gradient_checkpointing: False
gradient_checkpointing_kwargs: None
include_inputs_for_metrics: False
eval_do_concat_batches: True
fp16_backend: auto
push_to_hub_model_id: None
push_to_hub_organization: None
mp_parameters:
auto_find_batch_size: False
full_determinism: False
torchdynamo: None
ray_scope: last
ddp_timeout: 1800
torch_compile: False
torch_compile_backend: None
torch_compile_mode: None
dispatch_batches: None
split_batches: None
include_tokens_per_second: False
include_num_input_tokens_seen: False
neftune_noise_alpha: None
optim_target_modules: None
batch_eval_metrics: False
eval_on_start: False
batch_sampler: no_duplicates
multi_dataset_batch_sampler: proportional

Training Logs

Epoch	Step	Training Loss	loss	all-nli-test_max_accuracy
0.08	100	4.8908	4.8563	-
0.16	200	4.8672	4.8117	-
0.24	300	4.8049	4.7065	-
0.32	400	4.7156	4.5210	-
0.4	500	4.5615	4.4572	-
0.48	600	4.5355	4.4548	-
0.56	700	4.589	4.4488	-
0.64	800	4.5506	4.4304	-
0.72	900	4.4665	4.4323	-
0.8	1000	4.5033	4.4068	-
0.88	1100	4.5526	4.4300	-
0.96	1200	4.5195	4.4004	-
1.04	1300	4.4698	4.3785	-
1.12	1400	4.4466	4.4032	-
1.2	1500	4.4429	4.3731	-
1.28	1600	4.4364	4.3455	-
1.3600	1700	4.4631	4.3660	-
1.44	1800	4.3781	4.3577	-
1.52	1900	4.442	4.3767	-
1.6	2000	4.4354	4.3541	-
1.6800	2100	4.3309	4.3393	-
1.76	2200	4.3784	4.3350	-
1.8400	2300	4.403	4.3271	-
1.92	2400	4.3733	4.3328	-
2.0	2500	4.3256	4.3385	-
2.08	2600	4.3109	4.3845	-
2.16	2700	4.3712	4.3043	-
2.2232	2779	-	-	0.8085

Framework Versions

Python: 3.10.12
Sentence Transformers: 3.0.1
Transformers: 4.42.4
PyTorch: 2.3.1+cu121
Accelerate: 0.32.1
Datasets: 2.21.0
Tokenizers: 0.19.1

Citation

BibTeX

Sentence Transformers

@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
    title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
    author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
    month = "11",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}

TripletLoss

@misc{hermans2017defense,
    title={In Defense of the Triplet Loss for Person Re-Identification}, 
    author={Alexander Hermans and Lucas Beyer and Bastian Leibe},
    year={2017},
    eprint={1703.07737},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    primaryClass={cs.CV}
}