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C3. You logically should choose the Christian kind of life and believe in
God ( modus ponens , C2, P4).
6
James ’ Will to Believe Argument
A. T. Fyfe
William James (1842 – 1910), in his 1896 lecture, “ The Will to Believe, ”
gave an argument for holding onto religious belief even in the face of insuffi
cient evidence that is second in prominence only to Pascal ’ s Wager (#5).
James ’ stated target in his lecture is W. K. Clifford (1845 – 79), a philosopher
who had recently argued in his “ The Ethics of Belief ” that “ It is wrong
always, everywhere and for everyone to believe anything upon insuffi cient
evidence. ” James ’ strategy in “ The Will to Believe ” is fi rst to identify what
he thought would be a point of agreement with Clifford; specifi cally, that
our two fundamental duties as believers are to believe truth and avoid falsehood.
James then goes on to agree partially with Clifford that at least
ordinarily, when someone believes upon insuffi cient evidence, he is irrational.
This is because while believing upon insuffi cient evidence does con-
James , William. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy .
New York : Dover , 1956 .
Welchman , Jennifer. “ William James ’ s ‘ The Will to Believe ’ and the Ethics of
Self - Experimentation . ” Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society 42 ,
2 (Spring 2006 ): 229 – 41 .
Wernham , James C. S. James ’ Will - to - Believe Doctrine: A Heretical View .
Montreal : McGill - Queen ’ s University Press , 1987 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
James’ Will to Believe Argument 33
tribute to the pursuit of true belief (since the belief might be true), when
someone believes upon insuffi cient evidence, he is usually violating his duty
to avoid false belief (since he didn ’ t wait for suffi cient evidence before
believing).
Where James disagrees with Clifford is on whether believing upon insuffi
cient evidence always involves violating our duty to avoid false belief.
Specifi cally, James argues that there exist beliefs for which the evidence of
their truth (if they were true) would only become available after we believed
them and, therefore, waiting to believe until we had suffi cient evidence
would be a self - defeating wait. To illustrate with an example, suppose that
you have just fi nished medical school and that you are trying to decide
whether to join a research team working to discover a cure for cancer. Now,
to make such a substantial commitment to the search for a cure, James
would argue that you must believe that a cure exists to be found. That is,
you ’ d be fooling yourself if you thought you could make such a momentous
career choice while continuing to suspend belief about the existence of the
cure you ’ re looking for. At the very least, most people would need such a
belief to sustain them during the times in which their research was going
poorly. That being said, suffi cient evidence that such a cure exists won ’ t be
available until well into the search for one. Therefore, a belief in the existence
of a cure for cancer is a belief for which the evidence of its truth (if it
is true) only becomes available after we believe a cure exists.
Similar to a cancer researcher ’ s belief in the existence of a cure, James
holds that religious belief is required before evidence of its truth (if it is
true) can become available. While this would seem to justify religious belief
only for those who make a career of religious research, James argues that
religious belief is justifi ed even for ordinary believers in virtue of the peculiar
way its evidence depends upon their belief. In the preface to the published
version of his “ The Will to Believe ” lecture, James fi lls in this last step of
his argument:
If religious hypotheses about the universe be in order at all, then the active
faiths of individuals in them, freely expressing themselves in life, are the
experimental tests by which they are verifi ed, and the only means by which
their truth or falsehood can be wrought out. The truest scientifi c hypothesis
is that which, as we say, ‘ works ’ best; and it can be no otherwise with religious
hypotheses. Religious history proves that one hypothesis after another has
worked ill, has crumbled at contact with a widening knowledge of the world,
and has lapsed from the minds of men. Some articles of faith, however, have
maintained themselves through every vicissitude, and possess even more vitality
to - day than ever before [ … ]. [T]he freest competition of the various faiths
with one another, and their openest application to life by their several champions,
are the most favorable conditions under which the survival of the fi ttest
can proceed. (XII)
34 A. T. Fyfe
P1. It is not rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence if
and only if having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our
duty to avoid false belief.
P2. Having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our duty to
avoid false belief if and only if I could withhold religious belief for the
purpose of waiting until I had suffi cient evidence.
C1. If it is not rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence,
then having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our
duty to avoid false belief (equivalence, simplifi cation, P1).
C2. If having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our duty
to avoid false belief, then I could withhold religious belief for the
purpose of waiting until I had suffi cient evidence (equivalence, simplifi
cation, P2).
C3. If it is not rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence,
then I could withhold religious belief for the purpose of waiting until
I had suffi cient evidence (hypothetical syllogism, C1, C2).
P3. Access to the evidence for religious belief requires already having religious
belief.
P4. If access to the evidence for religious belief requires already having
religious belief, then I cannot withhold belief for the purpose of waiting
until I had suffi cient evidence.
C4. I cannot withhold religious belief for the purpose of waiting until I
had suffi cient evidence ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
C5. It is rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence
( modus tollens , C3, C4).
7
The Problem of Evil
Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone

C3. You logically should choose the Christian kind of life and believe in

God ( modus ponens , C2, P4).

6

James ’ Will to Believe Argument

A. T. Fyfe

William James (1842 – 1910), in his 1896 lecture, “ The Will to Believe, ”

gave an argument for holding onto religious belief even in the face of insuffi

cient evidence that is second in prominence only to Pascal ’ s Wager (#5).

James ’ stated target in his lecture is W. K. Clifford (1845 – 79), a philosopher

who had recently argued in his “ The Ethics of Belief ” that “ It is wrong

always, everywhere and for everyone to believe anything upon insuffi cient

evidence. ” James ’ strategy in “ The Will to Believe ” is fi rst to identify what

he thought would be a point of agreement with Clifford; specifi cally, that

our two fundamental duties as believers are to believe truth and avoid falsehood.

James then goes on to agree partially with Clifford that at least

ordinarily, when someone believes upon insuffi cient evidence, he is irrational.

This is because while believing upon insuffi cient evidence does con-

James , William. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy .

New York : Dover , 1956 .

Welchman , Jennifer. “ William James ’ s ‘ The Will to Believe ’ and the Ethics of

Self - Experimentation . ” Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society 42 ,

2 (Spring 2006 ): 229 – 41 .

Wernham , James C. S. James ’ Will - to - Believe Doctrine: A Heretical View .

Montreal : McGill - Queen ’ s University Press , 1987 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

James’ Will to Believe Argument 33

tribute to the pursuit of true belief (since the belief might be true), when

someone believes upon insuffi cient evidence, he is usually violating his duty

to avoid false belief (since he didn ’ t wait for suffi cient evidence before

believing).

Where James disagrees with Clifford is on whether believing upon insuffi

cient evidence always involves violating our duty to avoid false belief.

Specifi cally, James argues that there exist beliefs for which the evidence of

their truth (if they were true) would only become available after we believed

them and, therefore, waiting to believe until we had suffi cient evidence

would be a self - defeating wait. To illustrate with an example, suppose that

you have just fi nished medical school and that you are trying to decide

whether to join a research team working to discover a cure for cancer. Now,

to make such a substantial commitment to the search for a cure, James

would argue that you must believe that a cure exists to be found. That is,

you ’ d be fooling yourself if you thought you could make such a momentous

career choice while continuing to suspend belief about the existence of the

cure you ’ re looking for. At the very least, most people would need such a

belief to sustain them during the times in which their research was going

poorly. That being said, suffi cient evidence that such a cure exists won ’ t be

available until well into the search for one. Therefore, a belief in the existence

of a cure for cancer is a belief for which the evidence of its truth (if it

is true) only becomes available after we believe a cure exists.

Similar to a cancer researcher ’ s belief in the existence of a cure, James

holds that religious belief is required before evidence of its truth (if it is

true) can become available. While this would seem to justify religious belief

only for those who make a career of religious research, James argues that

religious belief is justifi ed even for ordinary believers in virtue of the peculiar

way its evidence depends upon their belief. In the preface to the published

version of his “ The Will to Believe ” lecture, James fi lls in this last step of

his argument:

If religious hypotheses about the universe be in order at all, then the active

faiths of individuals in them, freely expressing themselves in life, are the

experimental tests by which they are verifi ed, and the only means by which

their truth or falsehood can be wrought out. The truest scientifi c hypothesis

is that which, as we say, ‘ works ’ best; and it can be no otherwise with religious

hypotheses. Religious history proves that one hypothesis after another has

worked ill, has crumbled at contact with a widening knowledge of the world,

and has lapsed from the minds of men. Some articles of faith, however, have

maintained themselves through every vicissitude, and possess even more vitality

to - day than ever before [ … ]. [T]he freest competition of the various faiths

with one another, and their openest application to life by their several champions,

are the most favorable conditions under which the survival of the fi ttest

can proceed. (XII)

34 A. T. Fyfe

P1. It is not rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence if

and only if having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our

duty to avoid false belief.

P2. Having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our duty to

avoid false belief if and only if I could withhold religious belief for the

purpose of waiting until I had suffi cient evidence.

C1. If it is not rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence,

then having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our

duty to avoid false belief (equivalence, simplifi cation, P1).

C2. If having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our duty

to avoid false belief, then I could withhold religious belief for the

purpose of waiting until I had suffi cient evidence (equivalence, simplifi

cation, P2).

C3. If it is not rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence,

then I could withhold religious belief for the purpose of waiting until

I had suffi cient evidence (hypothetical syllogism, C1, C2).

P3. Access to the evidence for religious belief requires already having religious

belief.

P4. If access to the evidence for religious belief requires already having

religious belief, then I cannot withhold belief for the purpose of waiting

until I had suffi cient evidence.

C4. I cannot withhold religious belief for the purpose of waiting until I

had suffi cient evidence ( modus ponens , P3, P4).

C5. It is rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence

( modus tollens , C3, C4).

7

The Problem of Evil

Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone