DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
Charlesworth, 82 – 104 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1998 .
Davies , Brian. “ Anselm and the Ontological Argument , ” in The Cambridge
Companion to Anselm , edited by B. Davies and B. Leftow , 57 – 178 .
Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2004 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
26 Sara L. Uckelman
Many authors since Anselm have objected to the argument on the
strength of its conclusion and have attempted to show that it is either invalid
or unsound. During Anselm ’ s lifetime, Gaunilo, a monk from Marmoutier,
criticized the argument by showing that an argument of the same structure
could be used to demonstrate the existence of the best possible island, which
conclusion is taken to be absurd. While this criticism does not point to a
specifi c error in Anselm ’ s argument, it casts some doubt on its structure,
since the same structure can be used to derive absurd conclusions. One
famous counterargument is given by Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), who
argues that Anselm mistakenly uses “ existence ” as a predicate, which it is
not. However, there is no agreement as to the status of the validity of the
argument or the soundness of its premises; even among those who believe
the argument is problematic do not agree on what is the problem.
Well then, Lord, You who give understanding to faith, grant me that I may
understand, as much as You see fi t, that You exist as we believe You to exist,
and that You are what we believe You to be. Now we believe that You are
something than which nothing greater can be thought. Or can it be that a
thing of such a nature does not exist, since ‘ the Fool has said in his heart,
there is no God ’ [Ps. 13: 1; 52: 1]? But surely, when this same Fool hears
what I am speaking about, namely ‘ something - than - which - nothing - greater -
can - be - thought ’ , he understands what he hears, and what he understands is
in his mind, even if he does not understand that it actually exists. For it is
one thing for an object to exist in the mind, and another thing to understand
that an object actually exists. Thus, when a painter plans beforehand what
he is going to execute, he has [the picture] in his mind, but he does not yet
think that it actually exists because he has not yet executed it. However, when
he has actually painted it, then he both has it in his mind and understands
that it exists because he has now made it. Even the Fool, then, is forced to
agree that ‘ something - than - which - nothing - greater - can - be - thought exists in
the mind, since he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is understood
is in the mind. And surely that - than - which - a - greater - cannot - be - thought
cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists solely in the mind, it can be
thought to exist in reality also, which is greater. If then that - than - which -
a - greater - cannot - be - thought exists in the mind alone, this same that -
than - which - a - greater - cannot - be - thought is that - that - which - a - greater - can - be -
thought. But this is obviously impossible. Therefore there is absolutely no
doubt that something - than - which - a - greater - cannot - be - thought exists both in
the mind and in reality. (Anselm trans. Charlesworth, 87)
P1. God is something than which nothing greater can be thought
(defi nition).
P2. Existence in the understanding and existence in reality are two separate
things.
P3. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding.
The Ontological Argument 27
(P3a. Something existing in reality is greater than something that only exists
in the understanding.)
P4. Even the fool understands the concept of “ something than which none
greater can be imagined. ”
P5. If something is understood, then it exists in the understanding
(defi nition).
C1. “ Something than which none greater can be imagined ” exists in the
understanding ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
P6. “ Something than which none greater can be imagined ” can exist only
in the understanding (assumption for reductio ).
P7. It is greater for “ something than which none greater can be imagined ”
to exist in reality than for it to just exist in the understanding.
C2. There is something greater than “ something than which none greater
can be imagined ” (instantiation, P6).
C3. “ Something than which none greater can be imagined ” cannot exist
only in the understanding. It must also exist in reality ( reductio ,
P6 – C2).
C4. God exists (substitution of defi niendum for defi niens , C3, P1).
5
Pascal ’ s Wager
Leslie Burkholder
Unlike some other arguments about God ’ s existence, Pascal ’ s Wager doesn ’ t
try to prove that God exists. It is intended to show that you are better off
believing that God exists and leading the life of a believer than not doing
so. More particularly, it tries to show that it is worthwhile to believe in the
existence of a Christian God and lead the life of a Christian believer.
The following is a modern presentation of Pascal ’ s thinking. The Christian
God either exists or does not. It is diffi cult to prove the existence of God
by philosophical argument. Is it worthwhile for you to live a Christian life
– acting as though you are a believer – in the hope of attaining eternal life
and of becoming a believer in the process of living that life? If God exists
and if you live the Christian life, you will be saved. This has nearly infi nite
value to you. If God exists and if you do not lead the Christian life, you
will be damned, a result whose negative utility is also large. If God does
not exist and if you live the Christian life, you lose at most a little worldly
Pascal , Blaise. Pens é es , translated by John Warrington. London : Dent , 1960 .
Hacking, Ian . “ The Logic of Pascal ’ s Wager . ” American Philosophical
Quarterly 9 ( 1972 ): 186 – 92 .
McClennan , Edward F. “ Pascal ’ s Wager and Finite Decision Theory , ” in
Gambling on God , edited by Jeff Jordan , 115 – 33 . London : Rowman &
Littlefi eld , 1994 .
Whyte , Jamie. Crimes against Logic . New York : McGraw - Hill , 2004 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Pascal’s Wager 29
pleasure compared to what you would get if God did exist. Hence the
expected gain from living the Christian life is higher than that of living

Charlesworth, 82 – 104 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1998 .

Davies , Brian. “ Anselm and the Ontological Argument , ” in The Cambridge

Companion to Anselm , edited by B. Davies and B. Leftow , 57 – 178 .

Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2004 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

26 Sara L. Uckelman

Many authors since Anselm have objected to the argument on the

strength of its conclusion and have attempted to show that it is either invalid

or unsound. During Anselm ’ s lifetime, Gaunilo, a monk from Marmoutier,

criticized the argument by showing that an argument of the same structure

could be used to demonstrate the existence of the best possible island, which

conclusion is taken to be absurd. While this criticism does not point to a

specifi c error in Anselm ’ s argument, it casts some doubt on its structure,

since the same structure can be used to derive absurd conclusions. One

famous counterargument is given by Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), who

argues that Anselm mistakenly uses “ existence ” as a predicate, which it is

not. However, there is no agreement as to the status of the validity of the

argument or the soundness of its premises; even among those who believe

the argument is problematic do not agree on what is the problem.

Well then, Lord, You who give understanding to faith, grant me that I may

understand, as much as You see fi t, that You exist as we believe You to exist,

and that You are what we believe You to be. Now we believe that You are

something than which nothing greater can be thought. Or can it be that a

thing of such a nature does not exist, since ‘ the Fool has said in his heart,

there is no God ’ [Ps. 13: 1; 52: 1]? But surely, when this same Fool hears

what I am speaking about, namely ‘ something - than - which - nothing - greater -

can - be - thought ’ , he understands what he hears, and what he understands is

in his mind, even if he does not understand that it actually exists. For it is

one thing for an object to exist in the mind, and another thing to understand

that an object actually exists. Thus, when a painter plans beforehand what

he is going to execute, he has [the picture] in his mind, but he does not yet

think that it actually exists because he has not yet executed it. However, when

he has actually painted it, then he both has it in his mind and understands

that it exists because he has now made it. Even the Fool, then, is forced to

agree that ‘ something - than - which - nothing - greater - can - be - thought exists in

the mind, since he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is understood

is in the mind. And surely that - than - which - a - greater - cannot - be - thought

cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists solely in the mind, it can be

thought to exist in reality also, which is greater. If then that - than - which -

a - greater - cannot - be - thought exists in the mind alone, this same that -

than - which - a - greater - cannot - be - thought is that - that - which - a - greater - can - be -

thought. But this is obviously impossible. Therefore there is absolutely no

doubt that something - than - which - a - greater - cannot - be - thought exists both in

the mind and in reality. (Anselm trans. Charlesworth, 87)

P1. God is something than which nothing greater can be thought

(defi nition).

P2. Existence in the understanding and existence in reality are two separate

things.

P3. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding.

The Ontological Argument 27

(P3a. Something existing in reality is greater than something that only exists

in the understanding.)

P4. Even the fool understands the concept of “ something than which none

greater can be imagined. ”

P5. If something is understood, then it exists in the understanding

(defi nition).

C1. “ Something than which none greater can be imagined ” exists in the

understanding ( modus ponens , P4, P5).

P6. “ Something than which none greater can be imagined ” can exist only

in the understanding (assumption for reductio ).

P7. It is greater for “ something than which none greater can be imagined ”

to exist in reality than for it to just exist in the understanding.

C2. There is something greater than “ something than which none greater

can be imagined ” (instantiation, P6).

C3. “ Something than which none greater can be imagined ” cannot exist

only in the understanding. It must also exist in reality ( reductio ,

P6 – C2).

C4. God exists (substitution of defi niendum for defi niens , C3, P1).

5

Pascal ’ s Wager

Leslie Burkholder

Unlike some other arguments about God ’ s existence, Pascal ’ s Wager doesn ’ t

try to prove that God exists. It is intended to show that you are better off

believing that God exists and leading the life of a believer than not doing

so. More particularly, it tries to show that it is worthwhile to believe in the

existence of a Christian God and lead the life of a Christian believer.

The following is a modern presentation of Pascal ’ s thinking. The Christian

God either exists or does not. It is diffi cult to prove the existence of God

by philosophical argument. Is it worthwhile for you to live a Christian life

– acting as though you are a believer – in the hope of attaining eternal life

and of becoming a believer in the process of living that life? If God exists

and if you live the Christian life, you will be saved. This has nearly infi nite

value to you. If God exists and if you do not lead the Christian life, you

will be damned, a result whose negative utility is also large. If God does

not exist and if you live the Christian life, you lose at most a little worldly

Pascal , Blaise. Pens é es , translated by John Warrington. London : Dent , 1960 .

Hacking, Ian . “ The Logic of Pascal ’ s Wager . ” American Philosophical

Quarterly 9 ( 1972 ): 186 – 92 .

McClennan , Edward F. “ Pascal ’ s Wager and Finite Decision Theory , ” in

Gambling on God , edited by Jeff Jordan , 115 – 33 . London : Rowman &

Littlefi eld , 1994 .

Whyte , Jamie. Crimes against Logic . New York : McGraw - Hill , 2004 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Pascal’s Wager 29

pleasure compared to what you would get if God did exist. Hence the

expected gain from living the Christian life is higher than that of living