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among others. It is a version of the cosmological argument, being an argument |
from the mere existence of the universe to the existence of God, as |
opposed to arguing from the concept of God, as the ontological argument |
does, or from particular features of the universe, such as evidence of design. |
William Craig β s formulation of the argument is particularly concise, and |
runs as follows: |
Whatever begins to exist has a cause. |
The universe began to exist. |
Therefore, the universe has a cause. (63) |
This argument is clearly a valid modus ponens ; but how certain is the |
truth of the premises? The major premise seems unproven. It is not self - |
contradictory to assert that something could, or did, begin to exist without |
any cause. There is, of course, a powerful empirical inductive argument |
Craig , William L. The Kalam Cosmological Argument . London : Macmillan , |
1979 . |
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy, |
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone. |
Β© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. |
The Kalam Argument for the Existence of God 23 |
from the fact that there are billions upon billions of examples of something |
beginning to exist and having a cause of its existence, and not a single |
observed or recorded example of something coming to exist without a |
cause. But this is insuffi cient for proof for two reasons. First, no inductive |
argument gives us more than very good evidence that something is always |
the case: however many confi rming instances we fi nd, an exception is |
always a possibility, even if an unlikely one. Second, even if every individual |
entity in the universe that began to exist has a cause of its existence, it does |
not follow that this is true of the universe as a whole, since what is true |
even of every part is not necessarily true of the totality and vice versa. |
A third argument for the claim that whatever begins to exist has a cause |
would be that though it is not self - contradictory that something might come |
into existence without a cause, it is unimaginable. To this two replies might |
be made. One is that this might be a feature of our minds rather than a |
feature of how the world really is, that is, simply a limit on what we can |
conceive and not a limit on what can happen. Secondly, the universe as a |
whole is something totally beyond our experience: hence it might be said |
that we simply have no idea what might or might not be possible. Hence, |
the major premise of the argument cannot be proven by either logic or |
experience. Nevertheless, the notion that something could come into being |
from nothing, without a cause, seems close to incredible, so that the premise, |
though unproven, seems very plausible. |
On the other hand, the minor premise, that the universe has a beginning, |
for a long time looked very vulnerable: there seemed to be no reason to |
assert that the universe came into being rather than having always existed, |
as most of the Greeks, including Aristotle, thought. The Kalam philosophers |
themselves, and those who followed them, tried to argue that the notion of |
an infi nite series of events back in time, with no fi rst event, is incoherent |
or in some way impossible, but no convincing argument on these lines has |
been produced. It is true that the idea that time has no beginning creates |
problems for the mind, but there are equal problems in supposing that it |
does have a beginning, since one can always ask, β What happened before |
that? β What has reestablished the argument in a contemporary version, by |
no means confi ned to Muslims, is the increasing scientifi c evidence that the |
universe did have a beginning. This does not yet amount to proof: indeed, |
it is not clear what astronomical or other observations could absolutely |
prove the β big bang β theory of the beginning of the universe. But it makes |
the proposition, that the universe had a beginning, plausible, something for |
which there is evidence and which is believed by many who have studied |
the evidence. So the Kalam argument for the existence of God is a valid |
argument from two premises of which neither is proven nor certain, but |
both are plausible. The jury is still out, and much depends on how science |
develops and whether the minor premise looks increasingly plausible. |
24 Harry Lesser |
We should note, though, that the argument is incomplete. Even if the |
universe has a cause outside itself, further argument is needed to establish |
that the cause is an eternal and good being; in other words, that it is God. |
Some who accept the argument think that one also has to show that the |
cause is a personal being and have offered arguments for this. Certainly it |
could be argued that only an eternal being could precede the universe and |
therefore only an eternal being could cause it. It can also be argued that |
the only kind of cause that could operate on the universe from outside, as |
opposed to being part of it, would be the act of a personal being and only |
a good personal being would wish to create a universe. But it is fair to say, |
I think, that we have not yet got a full and rigorous working - out of this |
part of the argument, though the above indicates the lines it might take. |
Once again, we might say that it is plausible, but not proven, that the cause |
of the universe is a good personal Creator, just as it is plausible, but not |
proved, that the universe has a cause. |
P1. If something begins to exist, then it has a cause. |
P2. The universe began to exist. |
C1. The universe has a cause ( modus ponens , P1, P2). |
4 |
The Ontological Argument |
Sara L. Uckelman |
In philosophy of religion, arguments that attempt to prove the existence of |
God on the basis of God β s essence are called ontological arguments because |
they appeal only to the nature or essence of God β s being. The fi rst such |
argument was given by Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033 β 1109) in Chapter |
II of his Proslogion (written c .1077 β 8). Saint Anselm defi nes God as β that |
than which nothing greater can be thought β and seeks to derive from this |
defi nition a contradiction with the assumption that God does not exist. |
Some modern commentators have also found another similar argument in |
Proslogion III, which purportedly shows not only that God exists but that |
God β s existence is necessary. However, it is the argument in Proslogion II |
that is usually referred to simply as β the ontological argument. β |
Anselm of Canterbury . Proslogion, in S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi |
Opera Omnia , vol. 1 , edited by F. S. Schmitt , 93 β 104 . Seccovii : Abbatia , |
1938 β 61 . |
Anselm of Canterbury . Proslogion, in Anselm of Canterbury: The Major |
Works , edited by B. Davies and G. R. Evans , translated by M. J. |