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7,500
AR6_WGIII
145
41
This leaves high uncertainty, both near term (2021–30) and longer term (2021– 50), on the feasibility of an alignment of financial flows with the Paris Agreement goals
high
2
train
7,501
AR6_WGIII
146
5
When the perceived risks are too high, the misallocation of abundant savings persists and investors refrain from investing in infrastructure and industry in search of safer financial assets, even earning low or negative real returns
high
2
train
7,502
AR6_WGIII
147
2
To meet the needs for rapid deployment of mitigation options, global mitigation investments are expected to need to increase by the factor of three to six
high
2
train
7,503
AR6_WGIII
147
3
The gaps represent a major challenge for developing countries, especially Least-Developed Countries (LDCs), where flows have to increase by the factor of four to seven for specific sectors such as AFOLU, and for specific groups with limited access to, and high costs of, climate finance
high
2
train
7,504
AR6_WGIII
147
6
Soft costs for regulatory environment and institutional capacity, upstream funding needs as well as R&D and venture capital for development of new technologies and business models are often overlooked despite their critical role to facilitate the deployment of scaled-up climate finance
high
2
train
7,505
AR6_WGIII
147
9
This will particularly impact urban infrastructure and the energy and transport sectors
high
2
train
7,506
AR6_WGIII
147
10
A common understanding of debt sustainability and debt transparency, including negative implications of deferred climate investments on future GDP, and how stranded assets and resources may be compensated, has not yet been developed
medium
1
train
7,507
AR6_WGIII
147
13
A significant push for international climate finance access for vulnerable and poor countries is particularly important given these countries’ high costs of financing, debt stress and the impacts of ongoing climate change
high
2
train
7,508
AR6_WGIII
147
15
Approaches include de-risking investments, robust ‘green’ labelling and disclosure schemes, in addition to a regulatory focus on transparency and reforming international monetary system financial sector regulations
medium
1
train
7,509
AR6_WGIII
147
18
These relatively new labelled financial products will help by allowing a smooth integration into existing asset allocation models
high
2
train
7,510
AR6_WGIII
147
19
Green bond markets and markets for sustainable finance products have also increased significantly since AR5, but challenges nevertheless remain, in particular, there are concerns about ‘greenwashing’ and the limited application of these markets to developing countries
high
2
train
7,511
AR6_WGIII
147
25
Greater public-private cooperation can also encourage the private sector to increase and broaden investments, within a context of safeguards and standards, and this can be integrated into national climate change policies and plans
high
2
train
7,512
AR6_WGIII
147
27
It can also help address macroeconomic uncertainty and alleviate developing countries’ debt burden post-COVID-19
high
2
train
7,513
AR6_WGIII
147
30
In addition to indirect and direct subsidies, the public sector’s role in addressing market failures, barriers, provision of information, and risk-sharing can encourage the efficient mobilisation of private sector finance
high
2
train
7,514
AR6_WGIII
147
34
Existing policy misalignments – for example, in fossil fuel subsidies – undermine the credibility of public commitments, reduce perceived transition risks and limit financial sector action
high
2
train
7,515
AR6_WGIII
148
3
This highlights the importance of trust in political leadership which, in turn, affects risk perception and ultimately financing costs
high
2
train
7,516
AR6_WGIII
148
7
A coordinated effort to green the post-pandemic recovery is also essential in countries facing much higher debt costs
high
2
train
7,517
AR6_WGIII
148
13
Technological innovation can also bring about new and improved ways of delivering services that are essential to human well-being
high
2
test
7,518
AR6_WGIII
148
15
Trade-offs include negative externalities’ – for instance, greater environmental pollution and social inequalities – rebound effects leading to lower net emission reductions or even increases in emissions, and increased dependency on foreign knowledge and providers
high
2
train
7,519
AR6_WGIII
148
18
This systemic view of innovation takes into account the role of actors, institutions, and their interactions, and can inform how innovation systems that vary across technologies, sectors and countries, can be strengthened
high
2
train
7,520
AR6_WGIII
150
1
The effectiveness of such international cooperation arrangements, however, depends on the way they are developed and implemented
high
2
train
7,521
AR6_WGIII
150
4
International diffusion of low-emission technologies is also facilitated by knowledge spillovers from regions engaged in clean R&D
medium
1
train
7,522
AR6_WGIII
150
6
The evidence on the role of intellectual property rights (IPR) in innovation is mixed. Some literature suggests that it is a barrier while other sources suggests that it is an enabler to the diffusion of climate-related technologies
medium
1
test
7,523
AR6_WGIII
150
11
These gaps could be filled by enhancing financial support for international technology cooperation, by strengthening cooperative approaches, and by helping build suitable capacity in developing countries across all technological innovation system functions
high
2
train
7,524
AR6_WGIII
150
13
For example, despite building a large market for mitigation technologies in developing countries, the lack of a systemic perspective in the implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), operational since the mid-2000s, has only led to some technology transfer, especially to larger developing countries, but limited capacity building and minimal technology development
medium
1
train
7,525
AR6_WGIII
150
16
Addressing both sets of challenges simultaneously presents multiple and recurrent obstacles that systemic approaches to technological change could help resolve, provided they are well managed
high
2
train
7,526
AR6_WGIII
150
17
Obstacles include both entrenched power relations dominated by vested interests that control and benefit from existing technologies, and governance structures that continue to reproduce unsustainable patterns of production and consumption
medium
1
train
7,527
AR6_WGIII
150
23
Inspiration can be drawn from the global unit-cost reductions of solar PV, which were accelerated by a combination of factors interacting in a mutually reinforcing way across a limited group of countries
high
2
train
7,528
AR6_WGIII
152
5
At present, the understanding of both the direct and indirect impacts of digitalisation on energy use, carbon emissions and potential mitigation is limited
medium
1
train
7,529
AR6_WGIII
153
2
Looking at climate change from a justice perspective also means placing the emphasis on: (i) the protection of vulnerable populations from the impacts of climate change, (ii) mitigating the effects of low-carbon transformations, and (iii) ensuring an equitable decarbonised world
high
2
train
7,530
AR6_WGIII
153
4
Understanding the co-benefits and trade-offs associated with mitigation is key to understanding how societies prioritise among the various sectoral policy options
medium
1
train
7,531
AR6_WGIII
153
10
There are synergies and trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation as well as synergies and trade-offs with sustainable development
high
2
train
7,532
AR6_WGIII
153
27
There can be many synergies in urban areas between mitigation policies and the SDGs but capturing these depends on the overall planning of urban structures and on local integrated policies such as combining affordable housing and spatial planning with walkable urban areas, green electrification and clean renewable energy
medium
1
test
7,533
AR6_WGIII
158
1
The feasibility challenges associated with mitigation pathways are predominantly institutional and economic rather than technological and geophysical
medium
1
train
7,534
AR6_WGIII
159
8
A wide range of factors have been found to enable sustainability transitions, ranging from technological innovations to shifts in markets, and from policies and governance arrangements to shifts in belief systems and market forces
high
2
train
7,535
AR6_WGIII
159
10
Those same conditions that may serve to impede the transition (i.e., organisational structure, behaviour, technological lock-in) can also ‘flip’ to enable both the transition and the framing of sustainable development policies to create a stronger basis for policy support
high
2
test
7,536
AR6_WGIII
159
12
For example, rebuilding more sustainably after an extreme event, or renewed public debate about the drivers of social and economic vulnerability to multiple stressors
medium
1
train
7,537
AR6_WGIII
159
14
Climate change is the result of decades of unsustainable production and consumption patterns, as well as governance arrangements and political economic institutions that lock-in resource-intensive development patterns
high
2
train
7,538
AR6_WGIII
159
20
Strengthening different stakeholders’ ‘response capacities’ to mitigate and adapt to a changing climate will be critical for a sustainable transition
high
2
train
7,539
AR6_WGIII
168
9
It found this would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems
high
2
train
7,540
AR6_WGIII
168
13
Modelled direct mitigation costs of pathways to 1.5°C, with no/limited overshoot, span a wide range, but were typically three to four times higher than in pathways to 2°C
high
2
test
7,541
AR6_WGIII
229
1
Since 2010, GHG emissions have continued to grow, reaching 59 ± 6.6 GtCO 2-eq in 2019,1 but the average annual growth in the last decade (1.3%, 2010–2019) was lower than in the previous decade (2.1%, 2000–2009)
high
2
test
7,542
AR6_WGIII
229
2
Average annual GHG emissions were 56 ± 6.0 GtCO 2-eq yr –1 for the decade 2010–2019 growing by about 9.1 GtCO 2-eq yr –1 from the previous decade (2000–2009) – the highest decadal average on record
high
2
train
7,543
AR6_WGIII
229
4
The average annual emission levels of the last decade (2010–2019) were higher than in any previous decade for each group of GHGs
high
2
train
7,544
AR6_WGIII
229
8
F-gases excluded from GHG emissions inventories such as chlorofluorocarbons and hydrochlorofluorocarbons are about the same size as those included
high
2
train
7,545
AR6_WGIII
229
11
This growth outpaced the reduction in the use of energy per unit of GDP (–2% yr –1, globally) as well as improvements in the carbon intensity of energy (–0.3% yr –1)
high
2
train
7,546
AR6_WGIII
229
14
Emissions, however, have rebounded globally by the end of December 2020
medium
1
train
7,547
AR6_WGIII
229
22
For comparison, the remaining carbon budget for keeping warming to 1.5°C with a 67% (50%) probability is about 400 (500) ± 220 GtCO 2
medium
1
train
7,548
AR6_WGIII
230
10
Average annual GHG emissions growth during 2010 to 2019 slowed compared to the previous decade in energy supply (from 2.3% to 1.0%) and industry (from 3.4% to 1.4%, direct emissions only), but remained roughly constant at about 2% per year in the transport sector
high
2
train
7,549
AR6_WGIII
230
11
Emission growth in AFOLU is more uncertain due to the high share of CO 2-LULUCF emissions
medium
1
train
7,550
AR6_WGIII
230
14
Reductions in global carbon intensity by –0.2% yr –1 contributed further – reversing the trend during 2000 to 2009 (+0.2% yr –1)
medium
1
train
7,551
AR6_WGIII
231
9
Increasing inequality within a country can exacerbate dilemmas of redistribution and social cohesion, and affect the willingness of rich and poor to accept lifestyle changes for mitigation and policies to protect the environment (medium evidence, medium agreement) {2.6.1, 2.6.2, Figure 2.25} Estimates of future CO 2 emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructures already exceed remaining cumulative net CO 2 emissions in pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot
high
2
train
7,552
AR6_WGIII
231
11
This compares to overall cumulative net CO 2 emissions until reaching net zero CO 2 of 510 (330–710) Gt in pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, and 890 (640–1160) Gt in pathways that limit warming to 2°C (<67%)
high
2
train
7,553
AR6_WGIII
231
12
While most future CO 2 emissions from existing and currently planned fossil fuel infrastructure are situated in the power sector, most remaining fossil fuel CO 2 emissions in pathways that limit warming to 2°C (<67%) and below are from non-electric energy – most importantly from the industry and transportation sectors
high
2
train
7,554
AR6_WGIII
231
13
Decommissioning and reduced utilisation of existing fossil fuel installations in the power sector as well as cancellation of new installations are required to align future CO 2 emissions from the power sector with projections in these pathways
high
2
train
7,555
AR6_WGIII
231
16
Countries with a lower carbon pricing gap (higher carbon price) tend to be less carbon intensive
medium
1
train
7,556
AR6_WGIII
238
32
For methane, GWP100 implies a social discount rate of about 3–5% depending on the assumed damage function, whereas GWP20 implies a much higher discount rate, greater than 10%
medium
1
train
7,557
AR6_WGIII
239
5
These studies indicate that, for mitigation pathways that limit warming to 2°C (<67%) above pre-industrial levels or lower, using GWP100 to inform cost-effective abatement choices between gases would achieve such long-term temperature goals at close to least global cost within a few percent
high
2
train
7,558
AR6_WGIII
239
6
Using the dynamic GTP instead of GWP100 could reduce global mitigation costs by a few percent in theory (high confidence), but the ability to realise those cost savings depends on the temperature limit, policy foresight and flexibility in abatement choices as the weighting of SLCF emissions increases over time
medium
1
train
7,559
AR6_WGIII
239
35
The ability of these metrics to relate changes in emission rates of short-lived gases to cumulative CO 2 emissions makes them well-suited, in principle, to estimating the effect on the remaining carbon budget from more, or less, ambitious SLCF mitigation over multiple decades compared to a given reference scenario
high
2
train
7,560
AR6_WGIII
240
6
A fundamental change in GHG emission metrics used to monitor achievement of existing emission targets could therefore inadvertently change their intended climate outcomes or ambition, unless existing emission targets are re-evaluated at the same time
very high
3
train
7,561
AR6_WGIII
240
20
GHG emissions levels in 2019 were higher compared to 10 and 30 years earlier
high
2
train
7,562
AR6_WGIII
240
21
GHG emissions growth slowed compared to the previous decade
high
2
train
7,563
AR6_WGIII
242
6
The CO 2-FFI share in total CO 2-eq emissions has plateaued at about 65% in recent years and its growth has slowed considerably since AR5
high
2
train
7,564
AR6_WGIII
242
18
Starting in the spring of 2020 a major break in global emissions trends was observed due to lockdown policies implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic
high
2
train
7,565
AR6_WGIII
242
28
Daily emissions, estimated based on activity and power-generation data, declined substantially compared to 2019 during periods of economic lockdown, particularly in April 2020 – as shown in Figure 2.6 – but rebounded by the end of 2020
medium
1
train
7,566
AR6_WGIII
243
10
Cumulative CO 2 emissions since 1850 reached 2400 ± 240 GtCO 2 in 2019
high
2
train
7,567
AR6_WGIII
243
14
Emissions in the last decade are about the same size as the remaining carbon budget of 400 ± 220 (500, 650) GtCO 2 for limiting global warming to 1.5°C and between one-third and half the 1150 ± 220 (1350, 1700) GtCO 2 for limiting global warming below 2°C with a 67% (50%, 33%) probability, respectively
medium
1
train
7,568
AR6_WGIII
245
38
GHG and CO 2-FFI levels diverge starkly between countries and regions
high
2
train
7,569
AR6_WGIII
262
11
Residential buildings accounted for the majority of this sector’s emissions (64%, 6.3 GtCO 2-eq, including both direct and indirect emissions), followed by non-residential buildings (35%, 3.5 GtCO 2-eq)
high
2
train
7,570
AR6_WGIII
263
31
Road transport passenger and freight emissions represented by far the largest component and source of this growth (6.1 GtCO 2-eq, 69% of all transport emissions in 2019)
high
2
train
7,571
AR6_WGIII
263
36
North America’s absolute and per capita transport emissions are the highest amongst world regions, but those of South, South-East and East Asia are growing the fastest
high
2
train
7,572
AR6_WGIII
267
48
Technological change has had a mitigating effect on emissions over the long term and is central to efforts to achieving climate goals
high
2
train
7,573
AR6_WGIII
267
49
Progress since AR5 shows that multiple low-carbon technologies are improving and falling in cost (high confidence); technology adoption is reaching substantial shares, and small-scale technologies are particularly promising on both
medium
1
train
7,574
AR6_WGIII
267
51
However, the historical pace of technological change is still insufficient to catalyse a complete and timely transition to a low-carbon energy system: technological change needs to accelerate
high
2
train
7,575
AR6_WGIII
268
31
Reasons that these exemplars could be applied more broadly in the future include: growing urgency on climate change, shifting motivation from price response to proactive resource scarcity, and an increase in the likelihood of technological breakthroughs
medium
1
train
7,576
AR6_WGIII
269
9
Technological change has been at the core of transitions, but is best understood as part of a system in which social aspects are crucial
medium
1
train
7,577
AR6_WGIII
269
19
The observed pace of these changes and the likelihood of their continuation support the arguments in the previous section that future energy transitions are likely to occur more quickly than in the past
medium
1
train
7,578
AR6_WGIII
269
20
Among the most notable are solar PV, wind power, and batteries
high
2
train
7,579
AR6_WGIII
269
23
The future potential for PV and batteries seems especially promising given that neither industry has yet begun to adopt alternative materials with attractive properties as the cost reductions and performance improvements associated with the current generation of each technology continue
medium
1
train
7,580
AR6_WGIII
269
29
Solar PV is by far the most dynamic technology, and its cost since AR5 has continued on its steep decline at about the same rate of change as before AR5, but now costs are well within the range of fossil fuels
high
2
train
7,581
AR6_WGIII
269
41
Smaller unit sizes, sometimes referred to as ‘granularity’, tend to be associated with faster learning rates
medium
1
train
7,582
AR6_WGIII
270
9
The large residual has motivated studies, which find that small-scale technologies provide opportunities for rapid change, but they do not make rapid change inevitable; a supportive context, including supportive policy and complementary technologies, can stimulate more favourable technology outcomes
high
2
train
7,583
AR6_WGIII
270
10
There is also evidence that small technologies not only learn but become adopted faster than large technologies
medium
1
train
7,584
AR6_WGIII
271
2
Cost reductions facilitate adoption, which generates opportunities for further cost reductions through a process of learning by doing
medium
1
train
7,585
AR6_WGIII
271
11
In contrast, IAMs indicate that they expect much lower rates of growth in future years for the technologies that have been growing fastest in recent years (wind and solar), without strong evidence for why this should occur.The overall pattern shows that IAMs expect growth in small-scale renewables to fall to less than half of their recent pace, and large- scale CCS to more than double from the limited deployment assessed
high
2
train
7,586
AR6_WGIII
279
26
Hence, cumulative net CO 2 emissions to limit warming to 2°C (<67%) or lower could already be exhausted by current and planned fossil fuel infrastructure
high
2
train
7,587
AR6_WGIII
281
2
Therefore, our overall assessment of these available lines of evidence strongly emphasises the importance of decommissioning, reduced utilisation of existing power sector infrastructure, as well as continued cancellation of new power sector infrastructures in order to limit warming to well below 2°C
high
2
train
7,588
AR6_WGIII
282
44
Despite such evidence, studies of carbon pricing find that additional policies are often needed to stimulate sufficient emissions reductions in transportation
medium
1
train
7,589
AR6_WGIII
283
18
Public transit can reduce vehicle travel and lower GHG emissions by reducing the number of trips taken by private vehicles and the length of those trips
medium
1
train
7,590
AR6_WGIII
283
27
Bike- and car-sharing programmes can reduce GHG emissions
medium
1
train
7,591
AR6_WGIII
351
7
Final energy demand in the absence of any new climate policies is projected to grow to around 480–750 EJ yr–1 in 2050 (compared to around 390 EJ in 2015)
medium
1
train
7,592
AR6_WGIII
351
8
The highest emissions scenarios in the literature result in global warming of >5°C by 2100, based on assumptions of rapid economic growth and pervasive climate policy failures
high
2
train
7,593
AR6_WGIII
351
10
The likelihood of limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot has dropped in AR6 compared to the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (SR1.5) because global GHG emissions have risen since the time SR1.5 was published, leading to higher near-term emissions (2030) and higher cumulative CO 2 emissions until the time of net zero
medium
1
train
7,594
AR6_WGIII
352
1
Pathways limiting warming to 2°C (>67%) reach 50% reductions in the 2040s and net zero CO 2 by 2070s
medium
1
train
7,595
AR6_WGIII
352
15
Only 30% of the pathways limiting warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower reach net zero GHG emissions in the 21st century
high
2
train
7,596
AR6_WGIII
352
16
In those pathways reaching net zero GHGs, it is achieved around 10 to 40 years later than for net zero CO 2
medium
1
train
7,597
AR6_WGIII
352
18
Reaching and sustaining global net zero GHG emissions, measured in terms of GWP-100, results in a gradual decline of temperature
high
2
train
7,598
AR6_WGIII
352
21
In pathways limiting warming to 2°C (>67%), projected CO 2 emissions are reduced between 2019 and 2050 by around 49% for energy demand, 97% for energy supply, and 136% for AFOLU
medium
1
train
7,599
AR6_WGIII
352
25
In cost-effective mitigation pathways, the energy-supply sector typically reaches net zero CO 2 before the economy as a whole, while the demand sectors reach net zero CO 2 later, if ever
high
2
train