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AR6_WGIII
1,672
6
While previous IPCC assessments have noted important synergies between the outcomes of climate mitigation and achieving sustainable development objectives, there now appear to be synergies between the two processes themselves
medium
1
train
7,901
AR6_WGIII
1,672
10
International cooperation helps countries achieve long-term mitigation targets when it supports development and diffusion of low-carbon technologies, often at the level of individual sectors, which can simultaneously lead to significant benefits in the areas of sustainable development and equity
medium
1
train
7,902
AR6_WGIII
1,672
13
By contrast, the commitments under the Paris Agreement are primarily procedural, extend to all Parties, and are designed to trigger domestic policies and measures, enhance transparency, stimulate climate investments, particularly in developing countries, and to lead iteratively to rising levels of ambition across all countries
high
2
train
7,903
AR6_WGIII
1,672
14
Issues of equity remain of central importance in the UN climate regime, notwithstanding shifts in the operationalisation of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ from Kyoto to Paris
high
2
train
7,904
AR6_WGIII
1,672
17
The recent proliferation of national mid-century net zero GHG targets can be attributed in part to the Paris Agreement
medium
1
train
7,905
AR6_WGIII
1,672
18
Moreover, its processes and commitments will enhance countries’ abilities to achieve their stated level of ambition, particularly among developing countries
medium
1
train
7,906
AR6_WGIII
1,672
19
Arguments against the Paris Agreement are that it lacks a mechanism to review the adequacy of individual Parties’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), that collectively current NDCs are inconsistent in their level of ambition with achieving the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal, that its processes will not lead to sufficiently rising levels of ambition in the NDCs, and that NDCs will not be achieved because the targets, policies and measures they contain are not legally binding at the international level
medium
1
train
7,907
AR6_WGIII
1,672
20
To some extent, arguments on both sides are aligned with different analytic frameworks, including assumptions about the main barriers to mitigation that international cooperation can help overcome
medium
1
train
7,908
AR6_WGIII
1,672
21
The extent to which countries increase the ambition of their NDCs and ensure they are effectively implemented will depend in part on the successful implementation of the support mechanisms in the Paris Agreement, and in turn will determine whether the goals of the Paris Agreement are met
high
2
train
7,909
AR6_WGIII
1,672
23
Agreements addressing ozone depletion, transboundary air pollution, and release of mercury are all leading to reductions in the emissions of specific greenhouse gases
high
2
train
7,910
AR6_WGIII
1,672
25
Transnational partnerships and alliances involving non-state and sub-national actors are also playing a growing role in stimulating low-carbon technology diffusion and emissions reductions
medium
1
train
7,911
AR6_WGIII
1,672
27
Climate change is being addressed in a growing number of international agreements operating at sectoral levels, as well as within the practices of many multilateral organisations and institutions
high
2
train
7,912
AR6_WGIII
1,672
28
Sub-global and regional cooperation, often described as climate clubs, can play an important role in accelerating mitigation, including the potential for reducing mitigation costs through linking national carbon markets, although actual examples of these remain limited
high
2
train
7,913
AR6_WGIII
1,673
1
Many developing countries’ NDCs have components or additional actions that are conditional on receiving assistance with respect to finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building, greater than what has been provided to date
high
2
train
7,914
AR6_WGIII
1,673
3
In some cases, notably with respect to aviation and shipping, sectoral agreements have adopted climate mitigation goals that fall far short of what would be required to achieve the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement
high
2
test
7,915
AR6_WGIII
1,673
4
Moreover, there are cases where international cooperation may be hindering mitigation efforts, namely evidence that trade and investment agreements, as well as agreements within the energy sector, impede national mitigation efforts
medium
1
train
7,916
AR6_WGIII
1,673
5
International cooperation is emerging but so far fails to fully address transboundary issues associated with Solar Radiation Modification and CO 2 removal
high
2
train
7,917
AR6_WGIII
1,711
18
Cooling caused by SRM would increase the global land and ocean CO 2 sinks (medium confidence), but this would not stop CO 2 from increasing in the atmosphere or affect the resulting ocean acidification under continued anthropogenic emissions
high
2
train
7,918
AR6_WGIII
1,712
2
A gradual phase-out of SRM combined with emissions reduction and CDR could avoid these termination effects
medium
1
train
7,919
AR6_WGIII
1,768
1
Fundamental inequities in access to finance as well as its terms and conditions, and countries’ exposure to physical impacts of climate change overall result in a worsening outlook for a global just transition
high
2
train
7,920
AR6_WGIII
1,768
9
This increased awareness can support climate policy development and implementation
high
2
train
7,921
AR6_WGIII
1,768
17
This leaves high uncertainty, both near-term (2021–30) and longer- term (2021–50), on the feasibility of an alignment of financial flows with the Paris Agreement
high
2
train
7,922
AR6_WGIII
1,768
19
There is a climate financing gap which reflects a persistent misallocation of global capital
high
2
train
7,923
AR6_WGIII
1,768
25
This reflects policy misalignment, the current perceived risk-return profile of fossil fuel-related investments, and political economy constraints
high
2
train
7,924
AR6_WGIII
1,768
31
To meet the needs for rapid deployment of mitigation options, global mitigation investments are expected to need to increase by the factor of 3 to 6
medium
1
train
7,925
AR6_WGIII
1,768
32
The gaps are wide for all sectors and represent a major challenge for developing countries,3 especially Least-Developed Countries (LDCs), where flows have to increase by factor 4 to 7, for specific sectors like agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) in relative terms, and for specific groups with limited access to, and high costs of, climate finance
high
2
train
7,926
AR6_WGIII
1,768
34
Financing needs for the creation and strengthening of regulatory environment and institutional capacity, upstream financing needs as well as R&D and venture capital for development of new technologies and business models are often overlooked despite their critical role to facilitate the deployment of scaled-up climate finance
high
2
train
7,927
AR6_WGIII
1,769
1
This will particularly impact urban infrastructure and the energy and transport sectors
high
2
train
7,928
AR6_WGIII
1,769
2
A common understanding of debt sustainability and debt transparency, including negative implications of deferred climate investments on future GDP, and how stranded assets and resources may be compensated, has not yet been developed
medium
1
train
7,929
AR6_WGIII
1,769
6
This highlights the importance of trust in political leadership which, in turn, affects risk perception and ultimately financing costs
high
2
train
7,930
AR6_WGIII
1,769
9
A significant push for international climate finance access for vulnerable and poor countries is particularly important given these countries’ high costs of financing, debt stress and the impacts of ongoing climate change
high
2
train
7,931
AR6_WGIII
1,769
15
In addition to indirect and direct subsidies, the public sector’s role in addressing market failures, barriers, provision of information, and risk sharing (equity, various forms of public guarantees) can encourage the efficient mobilisation of private sector finance
high
2
test
7,932
AR6_WGIII
1,769
19
Existing policy misalignments – for example in fossil fuel subsidies – undermine the credibility of public commitments, reduce perceived transition risks and limit financial sector action
high
2
train
7,933
AR6_WGIII
1,769
21
Approaches include de-risking investments, robust ‘green’ labelling and disclosure schemes, in addition to a regulatory focus on transparency and reforming international monetary system financial sector regulations
medium
1
train
7,934
AR6_WGIII
1,769
24
These relatively new labelled financial products will help by allowing a smooth integration into existing asset allocation models
high
2
train
7,935
AR6_WGIII
1,769
33
The following policy options can have important long-term catalytic benefits
high
2
train
7,936
AR6_WGIII
1,773
11
The AR5 concluded that published assessments of financial flows whose expected effect was to reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and/or to enhance resilience to climate change aggregated USD343–385 billion4 yr–1 globally between 2010 and 2012
medium
1
train
7,937
AR6_WGIII
1,774
1
The resulting estimated gaps in annual mitigation financing during 2014 to 2017, using reporting of climate financing from published sources, was about 67% for 2015, and 76% for the energy sector alone in 2017
medium
1
train
7,938
AR6_WGIII
1,774
6
The gap is expected to be aggravated by COVID-19
high
2
train
7,939
AR6_WGIII
1,774
19
Four major events and macro trends mark the developments in climate finance in the previous five years and likely developments in the near term.• First, the 2015 Paris Agreement, with the engagement of the financial sector institutions in the climate agenda, has been followed by a series of related developments in financial regulation in relation to climate change and in particular to the disclosure of climate-related financial risk
high
2
train
7,940
AR6_WGIII
1,774
22
At the same time, while it is still too early to draw positive conclusions, this crisis highlights opportunities in terms of political and policy feasibility and behavioural change in respect of realigning climate finance
medium
1
train
7,941
AR6_WGIII
1,776
4
As each warmer year keeps producing more negative impacts – arising from greater and rising variability and intensity of rainfall, floods, droughts, forest fires and storms – the negative consequences have become more macro- economically significant, and worst for the most climate-vulnerable developing countries
high
2
train
7,942
AR6_WGIII
1,776
27
The third headwind is rising financial and insurance sector risks and stresses (distinct from real ‘physical’ climate risks above) arising from the impacts of climate change, and systematically affecting both national and international financial institutions and raising their credit risks
high
2
train
7,943
AR6_WGIII
1,783
9
Climate finance in developing countries remains heavily concentrated in a few large economies
high
2
train
7,944
AR6_WGIII
1,783
10
Least-developed countries (LDCs), on the other hand, continue to represent less than 5% year-on-year
medium
1
train
7,945
AR6_WGIII
1,783
20
Mitigation continues to represent the lion’s share of global climate finance (consistently above 90% between 2017 and 2020), and in particular renewable energy, followed by energy efficiency and transport
high
2
train
7,946
AR6_WGIII
1,785
7
More generally, significant gaps remain to track climate finance comprehensively at a global level: • Available estimates are based on a good coverage of investments in renewable energy and, where available, energy efficiency and transport, while other sectors remain more difficult to track, such as industry, agriculture and land use
high
2
train
7,947
AR6_WGIII
1,785
10
Data on private and commercial finance remain very patchy, particularly for corporate financing (including debt financing provided by commercial banks), for which it is difficult to establish a link with activities and projects on the ground
high
2
train
7,948
AR6_WGIII
1,785
28
To avoid locking GHG emissions incompatible with remaining carbon budgets, this implies a rapid scaling down of new fossil fuel- related investments, combined with a scaling up of financing to allow energy and infrastructure systems to transition
high
2
train
7,949
AR6_WGIII
1,796
13
Estimated mitigation financing needs as a percentage of mean 2017–2020 GDP in USD 2015 comes in at around 2–4% for developed countries, and around 4-9% for developing countries
high
2
train
7,950
AR6_WGIII
1,796
15
This disparity is further exacerbated when considering adaptation, infrastructure and SDG-related investment needs
high
2
train
7,951
AR6_WGIII
1,796
24
Notably, climate finance flows to African countries might have even decreased for mitigation technology deployment (stagnated for adaptation between 2017 and 2020), widening the finance gap in African countries in the recent years
high
2
train
7,952
AR6_WGIII
1,798
29
Taking into account the inertia of the financial system as well as the magnitude of the challenge to align financial flows with the long-term global goals, fast action is required to ensure the readiness of the financial sector as an enabler of the transition
high
2
train
7,953
AR6_WGIII
1,799
18
On the one hand, unmitigated climate change implies an increased potential for adverse socio-economic impacts especially in more exposed economic activities and areas
high
2
train
7,954
AR6_WGIII
1,800
7
On the other hand, the mitigation of climate change, by means of a transition to a low- carbon economy, requires a transformation of the energy and production system at a pace and scale that implies adverse impacts on a range of economic activities, but also opportunities for some other activities
high
2
train
7,955
AR6_WGIII
1,800
38
Significant cost increases have been observed related to increases in frequency and magnitude of extreme events
high
2
train
7,956
AR6_WGIII
1,801
10
Fossil fuel reserve and resource estimates exceed in equivalent quantity of CO 2 with virtual certainty the carbon budget available to reach the 1.5°C and 2°C targets
high
2
train
7,957
AR6_WGIII
1,801
33
One outstanding challenge for the analysis of investors’ exposure to climate risks is the difficulty of gathering granular and standardised information on the breakdown of non-financial firms’ revenues and CAPEX in terms of low-/high- carbon activities
high
2
train
7,958
AR6_WGIII
1,802
10
One fundamental challenge is that climate-related financial risk is endogenous
high
2
train
7,959
AR6_WGIII
1,802
24
The endogeneity of risk and its associated deep uncertainty implies that the standard approach to financial risk, consisting of computing expected values and risk based on historical values of market prices, is not adequate for climate risk
high
2
train
7,960
AR6_WGIII
1,802
36
This development is key to mainstreaming the assessment of transition risk among financial institutions, but the following challenges emerge
high
2
train
7,961
AR6_WGIII
1,803
3
Global macroeconomic changes that may affect asset prices are expected to take place as a result of a possible reduction in growth or contraction of fossil fuel demand, in scenarios in which climate targets are met according to carbon budgets, but also following ongoing energy efficiency changes
high
2
train
7,962
AR6_WGIII
1,803
16
Due to the predominantly international nature of fossil fuel markets, assets may be at risk from regulatory and technological changes both domestically and in foreign countries
medium
1
train
7,963
AR6_WGIII
1,803
24
Framing climate risk as a financial risk (not just as an ethical issue) is key for it to become an actionable criterion for investment decision among mainstream investors
high
2
train
7,964
AR6_WGIII
1,805
6
The role of government is crucial for creating an enabling environment for climate (Clark 2018), and governments are critical in the launching and maintenance of this circle of trust by lowering the political, regulatory, macroeconomic and business risks
high
2
train
7,965
AR6_WGIII
1,805
12
Transparency: Policy de-risking measures, such as robust policy design and better transparency, as well as financial de-risking measures, such as green bonds and guarantees, at both domestic and international levels, enhance the attractiveness of clean energy investments
high
2
train
7,966
AR6_WGIII
1,805
14
However, risk disclosures alone would likely be insufficient as long as market failures that inhibit the emergence of low-carbon investment initiatives with positive risk-weighted returns
high
2
train
7,967
AR6_WGIII
1,805
17
Central banks in all economies will likely have to play a critical role in supporting the financing of fiscal operations, particularly in a post-COVID-19 world
high
2
train
7,968
AR6_WGIII
1,805
26
A green QE programme ‘would have the benefit of providing large amounts of additional liquidity to companies interested’ in green projects
medium
1
train
7,969
AR6_WGIII
1,805
33
Additional monetary policies and macroprudential financial regulation may facilitate the expected role of carbon pricing on boosting low-carbon investments
medium
1
train
7,970
AR6_WGIII
1,805
40
Despite increasing challenges to the theory (Sewell 2011), especially by repeated episodes of global financial crashes and crises, and other widely noted anomalies, a weaker form of the efficient markets hypothesis may still apply
medium
1
train
7,971
AR6_WGIII
1,806
44
As a result, low-carbon investments do not take place to socially and economically optimal levels, and the correct market signals would involve setting carbon prices high enough or equivalent trading in reduced carbon emissions by regulatory action to induce sufficient and faster shift towards low-carbon investments
high
2
train
7,972
AR6_WGIII
1,807
1
Carbon tax can be a simpler and easier way to implement carbon pricing, especially in developing countries, because countries can utilise the existing fiscal tools and do not need concrete enabling conditions as market-based frameworks
high
2
train
7,973
AR6_WGIII
1,807
39
There is a growing awareness of the low leverage ratio of public to private capital in climate blended finance (Blended Finance Taskforce 2018b) and of a ‘glass ceiling’, caused by a mix of agencies’ inertia and perceived loss of control over the use of funds, on the use of public guarantees by MDBs to increase it
high
2
train
7,974
AR6_WGIII
1,809
1
Limited prioritisation and agreement on prioritisation of sectors and/or project categories being ready and/or preferred for direct private sector involvement might become a challenge in the coming years
high
2
train
7,975
AR6_WGIII
1,809
15
A missing alignment of public funding and investment activity with the Paris Agreement (and Sustainable Development Goals) would result in significant carbon lock-ins, stranded assets and thus increase transition risks and ultimately economic costs of the transition
high
2
train
7,976
AR6_WGIII
1,809
21
Lessons from the global financial crises show that although deep economic crises create a sharp short-term emission drop, and green stimulus is argued to be the ideal response to tackle both the economic and the climate crises at once, disparities between regional strategies hinder the low-carbon transition
high
2
train
7,977
AR6_WGIII
1,809
32
Boosting investment should propel job creation, increasing household income and therefore demand across economic sectors
high
2
train
7,978
AR6_WGIII
1,809
35
First, only those countries and regions with highest credit-ratings (AAA or AA) with access to deep financial markets and excess savings will be able to mount such counter-cyclical climate investment paths, typically high-income developed economies
high
2
train
7,979
AR6_WGIII
1,810
6
Box 15.6 | Macroeconomics and Finance of a Post-COVID-19 Green Stimulus Economic Recovery Path Financial history suggests that capital markets may be willing to accommodate extended public borrowing for transient spending spikes (Barro 1987) when macroeconomic conditions suggest excess savings relative to private investment opportunities (Summers 2015) and when public spending is seen as timely, effective and productive, with governments able to repay when conditions improve as economic crisis conditions abate
high
2
train
7,980
AR6_WGIII
1,811
2
However, in terms of increase of supply of, in particular, public finance, often the debate is still driven by the question on affordability, considerations around financial debt sustainability and budgetary constraints against the background of macroeconomic headwinds – even more in the (post-)COVID-19 world
high
2
train
7,981
AR6_WGIII
1,811
3
The level of climate alignment of debt is hardly considered in debt-related regulation and/ or debt sustainability agreements like the Maastricht Treaty ceilings (3% of GDP government deficit and 60% of GDP (gross) government debt) not considering economic costs of deferred climate action as well as economic benefits of the transformation.Robust studies on the economic costs and benefits in the short- to long-term of reaching the LTGG exist for only few countries and/or regions, primarily in the developed world
high
2
train
7,982
AR6_WGIII
1,811
6
For many developing countries, the focus of debt sustainability discussions is on the negative effect of climate change on the future GDP and the uncertainty with regard to short-term effects of climate change and their economic implications
high
2
train
7,983
AR6_WGIII
1,812
6
Debt levels globally but particularly in developing and vulnerable countries have significantly increased over the past years with current and expected climate change impacts further burdening debt sustainability
high
2
train
7,984
AR6_WGIII
1,812
19
Definition of triggers is likely the most complex challenge in this context.The use of debt-for-nature and debt-for-climate-swaps is still very limited and not mainstreamed but offers significant potential if used correctly
high
2
train
7,985
AR6_WGIII
1,812
31
The debate around stranded assets focuses strongly on the loss of value to financial assets for investors (Section 15.6.1), however, stranded assets and resources in the context of the transition towards a low-emission economy ‘are expected to become a major economic burden for states and hence the tax payers’
high
2
train
7,986
AR6_WGIII
1,813
2
Late government action can delay action and consequently strengthen the magnitude of action needed at a later point in time with implications for employment and economic development in impacted regions requiring higher level of fiscal burden
high
2
train
7,987
AR6_WGIII
1,813
17
While there are questions about the sufficiency of insurance products to address the losses and damages of climate- related disasters, insurance can help to cover immediate needs directly, provide rapid response and transfer financial risk in times of extreme crisis
high
2
train
7,988
AR6_WGIII
1,814
4
Risk pooling among countries and regions is relatively advantageous when compared to conventional insurance because of the effective subsidising of ‘affected regions’ using revenues from unaffected regions which involve pooling among a large subset of countries
high
2
train
7,989
AR6_WGIII
1,814
8
At the same time, this approach has substantial basis risk (actual losses do not equal financial compensation)
high
2
train
7,990
AR6_WGIII
1,814
17
Increasingly, climate risk insurance schemes are being blended into disaster risk management as part of a comprehensive risk management approach
high
2
train
7,991
AR6_WGIII
1,814
27
There are also challenges with risk diversification, replication, and scalability
high
2
train
7,992
AR6_WGIII
1,815
13
Other gaps and challenges flagged by Kreft and Schäfer (2017) include limited coverage of the full spectrum of contingency risks experienced by countries, inadequate role of risk management as a standard for all regional pools, though there are some emerging best practices in terms of data provision on weather-related risks, and incentivisation of risk reduction
high
2
train
7,993
AR6_WGIII
1,815
40
It has transformative potential as a key enabler of inclusive urban economic development through the building of resilient communities
high
2
train
7,994
AR6_WGIII
1,816
7
The effect of deficit in investment for global infrastructure towards the growing subnational-level debt also creates pressure on subnational finances and constrains future access to financing
high
2
train
7,995
AR6_WGIII
1,816
22
PPPs are particularly important in cities with mature financial systems as the effectiveness of PPPs depends on appropriate investment architecture at scale and government capacity
high
2
train
7,996
AR6_WGIII
1,816
25
National-level investment vehicles can provide leadership for subnational climate financing and crowd in private finance by providing early-stage market support to technologies or evidence related to asset performance and costs-benefits
high
2
train
7,997
AR6_WGIII
1,816
27
Debt financing via subnational bonds and borrowing, including municipal bonds, is another potential tool for raising upfront capital, especially for rich cities
high
2
train
7,998
AR6_WGIII
1,816
33
Across all types of cities, five key challenges constrain the flow of subnational climate finance
high
2
train
7,999
AR6_WGIII
1,816
37
Access to capital markets has been one of the major sources for subnational financing and is generally limited to rich cities, and much of this occurs through loans
high
2
train